The Law of Delict in Scotland 9781474477758

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The Law of Delict in Scotland

For Alexander and William

The Law of Delict in Scotland

Elspeth Christie Reid

Professor Emerita of Scottish Private Law in the University of Edinburgh

Edinburgh University Press is one of the leading university presses in the UK. We publish academic books and journals in our selected subject areas across the humanities and social sciences, combining cutting-edge scholarship with high editorial and production values to produce academic works of lasting importance. For more information visit our website: edinburghuniversitypress.com © Elspeth Christie Reid, 2022 Edinburgh University Press Ltd The Tun – Holyrood Road 12(2f) Jackson’s Entry Edinburgh EH8 8PJ Typeset in 11/13 Plantin by IDSUK (DataConnection) Ltd, and printed and bound in Great Britain A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 1 4744 1678 8 (hardback) ISBN 978 1 4744 7775 8 (webready PDF) ISBN 978 1 4744 7776 5 (epub)

The right of Elspeth Christie Reid to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, and the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498).

Contents

Table of Casesvii Table of Statuteslxxx Table of Statutory Instrumentsxcii Table of European Legislationxciv Table of Conventionsxcv Prefacexcvi Abbreviationsxcvii PART I: INTRODUCTION   1 Historical Introduction   2 Fundamental Concepts   3 Liability for the Acts of Others

3 31 56

PART II: NEGLIGENCE   4 Duty of Care   5 Economic Loss   6 Psychiatric Injury   7 Public Authorities   8 Roads Authorities   9 The Emergency Services 10 Standard of Care 11 Professional Negligence 12 Liability of Employers to Employees

113 161 221 249 275 291 321 358 391

PART III: CAUSATION AND REMOTENESS 13 Factual Causation 14 Legal Causation and Remoteness of Damage

415 471

PART IV: INJURIES TO SPECIFIC INTERESTS 15 Intention and Malice 16 Interference with Bodily and Mental Integrity

505 515 v

vi  Contents

17 Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty 18 Defamation and Malicious Publication 19 Breach of Confidence 20 Invasion of Privacy 21 The Economic Delicts 22 Nuisance 23 Interference with Property Rights

571 605 682 728 780 840 893

PART V: STATUTORY LIABILITY 24 Breach of Statutory Duty 25 Occupiers’ Liability 26 Product Liability 27 Statutory Liability for Harm caused by Animals 28 Protection from Harassment

917 935 968 1012 1022

PART VI: DEFENCES AND REMEDIES 29 Defences and Contributory Negligence 30 Prescription and Limitation 31 Remedies

1037 1078 1091

Index1130

Table of Cases

A v B [2007] EWHC 1246 (QB), [2007] 2 FLR 1051��������������������������������������������21.74 A v B plc [2002] EWCA Civ 337, [2003] QB 195����������������������������� 20.10, 20.40, 20.41 A v B’s Trs (1906) 13 SLT 830������������������������������������������������������������������������������16.60 A v C [2018] CSOH 65, 2018 SLT 1194���������������������������������������������������������������31.23 A v Essex CC [2003] EWCA Civ 1848, [2004] 1 WLR 1881������������������������������������6.12 A v Glasgow City Council [2019] CSIH 6, 2019 SC 295����������������������������������������30.24 A v Glasgow City Council [2021] CSOH 102����������������������������������������������������������3.25 A v Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust [2004] EWHC 644 (QB), [2005] QB 506������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������11.12 A v N [2013] CSOH 161, 2014 SCLR 225������������������������������������������������������������16.22 A v N 2015 SLT 289, 2015 SCLR 701������������������������������������������������������������������16.22 A v National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289��������� 26.25, 26.34, 26.36, 26.56, 26.58, 26.59, 26.62, 26.82, 26.84, 26.86 A v UK (2003) 36 EHRR 51�������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.101 A (A Child) v Ministry of Defence [2004] EWCA Civ 641, [2005] QB 183���������������3.90 A (A Protected Party) v Persons Unknown [2016] EWHC 3295 (Ch), [2017] EMLR 11���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������20.50 A G Spalding Bros v A W Gamage Ltd [1915] 32 RPC 273������������������������� 21.82, 21.97 A J Allan (Blairnyle) Ltd v Strathclyde Fire Board [2016] CSIH 3, 2016 SC 304������4.48, 9.28, 9.30, 9.46, 9.47, 9.48, 9.49, 9.50, 9.53 AB v A Chief Constable [2014] EWHC 1965 (QB)��������������������������������������������������5.56 AB v CD (1851) 14 D 177������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.04, 19.59 AB v CD (1904) 7 F 72, revd sub nom McEwan v Watson (1905) 7 F (HL) 109��������18.25, 19.04 AB v CD 2018 Rep LR 15�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������16.04 AB v Sunday Newspapers [2014] NICA 58������������������������������������������������������������19.29 AB v Tameside and Glossop HA [1997] 8 Med LR 91, (1997) 35 BMLR 79������������6.47 AB v XY 1917 SC 15��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.18 Abbott v Will Gannon & Smith Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 198, [2005] PNLR 30��������11.28 ABC v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust [2017] EWCA Civ 336, [2017] PIQR P15�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4.40, 4.68, 4.69 ABC v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust [2020] EWHC 455 (QB), [2020] PIQR P13������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 4.66, 4.69, 4.70, 19.66 ABC v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2329, [2019] 2 All ER 684�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������19.68 Abercorn (Duke of) v Merry & Cuninghame Ltd 1909 SC 750�������������������������������23.27 Abernethy v Hutchinson (1825) 1 H & Tw 28, 47 ER 1313������������������������� 19.08, 19.15

vii

viii   Table of Cases Abouzaid v Mothercare (UK) Ltd [2000] All ER (D) 2436���������������� 26.48, 26.50, 26.62 AC v Devon CC [2013] EWCA Civ 418, [2014] RTR 1���������������������������������� 8.09, 8.11 AD v East Kent Community NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Civ 1872, [2003] 3 All ER 1167�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������16.84 Adam v Allan (1841) 3 D 1058����������������������������������������������������������������������������18.111 Adam v Alloa Police Commrs (1874) 2 R 143�������������������������22.03, 22.10, 22.14, 22.53 Adam v Braco (1743) Mor 16745��������������������������������������������������������������������������19.02 Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.108 Adams v Guardian Newspapers Ltd 2003 SC 425��������������������������������������� 18.75, 18.83 Adams v Rhymney Valley DC [2001] PNLR 4��������������������������������������������������������10.48 Advocate General for Scotland v Murray Group Holdings Ltd [2017] UKSC 45, 2018 SC (UKSC) 15����������������������������������������������������������������������������������11.20 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co v Jeppesen & Co 642 F 2d 339 (9th Cir 1981)������������26.38 Agnew v British Legal Life Assurance Co Ltd (1906) 8 F 422���������������������������������18.33 Agnew v Laughlan 1948 SC 656����������������������������������������������������������������������������18.67 Agnew v Scott Lithgow Ltd (No 2) 2003 SC 448, 2002 GWD 13-437��������������������30.16 AH v Greater Glasgow HB [2018] CSOH 57, 2018 SLT 535����������� 26.47, 26.52, 26.55, 26.63, 26.66, 26.91 Ahmed v City of Glasgow Council 2000 SLT (Sh Ct) 153����������������������������� 4.54, 11.33 Aikens v State of Wisconsin 25 S Ct 3 (1904)�������������������������������������������������������21.107 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789������������������������������������������������������������6.06 Aitchison v Thorburn (1870) 7 SLR 347������������������������������������������ 16.24, 16.29, 23.10 Aitken v Laidlay 1938 SC 303�������������������������������������������������������������������������������31.22 Aitken v Scottish Ambulance Service [2011] CSOH 49, 2011 SLT 822������������ 4.56, 9.57 Aitken’s Trs v Rawyards Colliery (1894) 22 R 201��������������������������������������� 23.25, 23.29 Akenzua v Home Office [2002] EWCA Civ 1470, [2003] 1 WLR 741�����������������������7.42 Al Najar v Cumberland Hotel [2019] EWHC 1593 (QB), [2019] 1 WLR 5953���������4.53 Al Sadik v Sadik [2019] EWHC 2717 (QB), [2020] EMLR 7���������������������� 18.46, 18.47 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310������� 4.37, 6.05, 6.06, 6.07, 6.08, 6.09, 6.10, 6.17, 6.18, 6.19, 6.23, 6.26, 6.27, 6.32, 6.38, 6.39, 6.44, 9.17, 9.19, 12.16, 26.42 Alexander v Butchart (1875) 3 R 156��������������������������������������������������������������������23.11 Alexander-Theodotou v Kounis [2019] EWHC 956 (QB)��������������������������������������18.46 Alexandra v Murphy 2000 SLT (Sh Ct) 44������������������������������������������������������������28.15 Al-Fagih v HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1634, [2002] EMLR 13����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.86 Ali v Channel 5 Broadcasting Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 677��������������������������������������20.21 Ali v Furness Withy (Shipping) Ltd [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 379���������������������������������11.02 Ali v Playgirl, Inc 447 F Supp 723 (DCNY 1978)��������������������������������������������������20.59 Alison v Watt (1829) 7 S 786���������������������������������������������������������������������������������22.03 Al-Kandari v J R Brown & Co [1988] QB 665����������������������������������������������������������5.65 Allan v Amlin UK Ltd [2013] CSOH 156, 2014 SLT 75����������������������������������������31.67 Allan v Barclay (1864) 2 M 873�������������������������������������������������������������������� 6.14, 14.28 Allan v Greater Glasgow HB 1998 SLT 580�����������������������������������������������������������16.77 Allan v M’Leish (1819) 2 Mur 158������������������������������������������������������������������������29.54 Allen v British Rail Engineering Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 242, [2001] ICR 942��������13.12, 13.48, 13.49, 13.58 Allen v Chief Constable of Hampshire [2013] EWCA Civ 967������������������������� 3.55, 3.61 Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1��������������������������������������������������������������� 15.09, 21.22, 21.52 Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd [1981] AC 1001�������������������������������������������� 22.25, 22.64 Allen v Hargreaves [2019] SC STO 67, 2019 GWD 26-415�����������������������������������23.09

Table of Cases   ix Allen v London Borough of Southwark [2008] EWCA Civ 1478�����������������������������28.04 Allen v Ravenhill Farm Services Ltd [2009] CSOH 42, 2009 SLT 1084��������������������6.01 Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 1 WLR 1602�������� 13.97, 13.98 Allin v City and Hackney HA [1996] 7 Med LR 167��������������������������������������� 6.46, 6.47 Alsaifi v Amunwa [2017] EWHC 1443 (QB), [2017] 4 WLR 172�������������������������18.104 Alstoun v Riddel (1680) Mor 13957������������������������������������������������������������������������1.09 Alvis v Harrison 1989 SLT 746, revd 1991 SLT 64������������������������������������������������23.13 AM v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWHC 308 (QB)��������������������������������20.21 AMC v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWHC 2361 (QB)���������������� 20.44, 20.49 Ancell v McDermott [1993] 4 All ER 355����������������������������������������������������������������9.27 Anchor Line v Dundee Harbour Trs 1922 SC (HL) 79�������������������������������������������25.18 Anderson v Blackwood (1629) Mor 8033�������������������������������������������������� 21.108, 22.80 Anderson v Brady & Ross Ltd 1964 SLT (Notes) 11������������������������������������������������3.84 Anderson v Brattisanni’s 1978 SLT (Notes) 42��������������������������������� 23.11, 23.12, 23.13 Anderson v Burnet (1849) 12 D 131����������������������������������������������������������������������22.03 Anderson v Christian Salvesen plc [2006] CSOH 101, 2006 SLT 815�����������������������6.40 Anderson v Gerrard 1994 SLT 1326����������������������������������������������������������������������31.26 Anderson v Imrie [2016] CSOH 171, 2017 Rep LR 21, affd [2018] CSIH 14, 2018 SC 328���������������������������������������������������������������� 25.21, 25.54, 29.63 Anderson v Marshall (1835) 13 S 1130�����������������������������������16.01, 16.16, 16.29, 16.30 Anderson v Newham College of Further Education [2002] EWCA Civ 505, [2003] ICR 212������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������29.65 Anderson v Robertson 1958 SC 367����������������������������������������������������������������������23.36 Anderson v St Andrew’s Ambulance Association 1943 SC 248��������������������������������13.17 Anderson v Scottish Ministers [2009] CSOH 92, 2009 Rep LR 122��������������� 25.06, 25.18, 25.21 Anderson v Smith 26 November 1814 FC��������������������������������������������������������������17.02 Anderson v Torrie (1857) 19 D 356�������������������������������������������������������������� 1.24, 11.18 Anderson and Craig v Mags of Renfrew (1764) Mor 11753��������������������������������������1.24 Andreae v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1938] Ch 1������������������������������������������������������������22.14 Andrepont v Naquin 345 So 2d 1216 (La App 1 Cir 1977)�������������������������������������16.43 Andrew v Penny 1964 SLT (Notes) 24�������������������������������������������������������������������18.70 Andrew Oliver & Son Ltd v Douglas 1981 SC 192������������������������������������������ 5.29, 5.48 Andrews v Greater Glasgow HB [2019] CSOH 31, 2019 SLT 727���� 10.50, 13.07, 13.73 Andrews v Hopkinson [1957] 1 QB 229�����������������������������������������������������������������26.06 Andrews v Reading BC [2005] EWHC 256 (QB), [2006] RVR 56��������������������������22.77 Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd v Johnson & Higgs Ltd [2001] UKHL 51, [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 929���������������������������������������������������������������������������14.49 Angiolini v Green [2013] CSOH 196, 2014 GWD 5-104���������������������������� 18.24, 18.90 Angus v Clifford [1891] 2 Ch 449�������������������������������������������������������������������������21.70 Angus v Glasgow Corp 1977 SLT 206���������������������������������������������������������������������3.69 Angus v National Coal Board 1955 SC 175������������������������������������������������� 23.25, 23.27 Annabel’s (Berkeley Square) Ltd v G Schock [1972] FSR 261��������������������������������21.98 Anns v London Borough of Merton [1978] AC 728����� 4.13, 4.14, 4.15, 4.16, 4.45, 5.16, 5.17, 5.81, 5.83, 7.06, 7.08, 9.13 Antec International Ltd v South Western Chicks (Warren) Ltd [1997] FSR 278������21.91 Antermony Coal Co v Wingate (1866) 4 M 1017�����������������������������������������������������2.29 Anthony v Brabbs 1998 SC 894�����������������������������������������������������������������������������31.27 Appleton v Garrett [1996] PIQR P1����������������������������������������������������������������������16.52 AR v Coxen [2018] SC EDIN 53, 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 335�������16.04, 16.22, 16.44, 16.46 Arbuckle v Taylor (1815) 3 Dow 160���������������������������������������������������������� 17.20, 17.52

x   Table of Cases Archer v Brown [1985] QB 401�����������������������������������������������������������������������������21.75 Archer v Ritchie (1891) 18 R 719��������������������������������������������������������������������������18.88 Archer v Williams [2003] EWHC 1670 (QB), [2003] EMLR 38�������� 19.73, 20.21, 20.46 Argyll and Clyde HB v Strathclyde RC 1988 SLT 381��������������������������������������������22.35 Argyll (Duchess of) v Duke of Argyll [1967] Ch 302�������������������������� 19.27, 19.42, 19.59 Argyll (Duke of) v Duchess of Argyll 1962 SC (HL) 88������������������������������������������19.42 Argyll Group plc v The Distillers Company plc 1987 SLT 514���������������������������������7.45 Argyllshire Weavers Ltd v A Macaulay (Tweeds) Ltd 1965 SLT 21������18.130, 18.142, 21.87 Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA (The Ocean Frost) [1986] AC 717�������������������� 3.65, 3.73 Armes v Nottinghamshire CC [2017] UKSC 60, [2018] AC 355��� 3.11, 3.16, 3.19, 3.25, 3.28, 3.79, 3.80, 3.81, 3.87, 3.89 Armistead v Bowerman (1888) 15 R 814������������������������������������������ 22.10, 22.26, 22.36 Armstrong v Moore 1996 SLT 690��������������������������������������������������������������������������5.18 Arneil v Paterson 1931 SC (HL) 117��������������������������������������� 2.40, 13.15, 13.24, 13.25 Arnot v Brown (1852) 1 Macq 229������������������������������������������������������������������������22.17 Arnott v Brown and Common (1847) 10 D 95�������������������������������������������� 22.03, 22.16 Arrott v Whyte and Hamilton (1826) 4 Murr 149��������������������������������������������������22.03 Arscott v The Coal Authority [2004] EWCA Civ 892, [2005] Env LR 6�����������������22.74 Arthur J S Hall & Co v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615������������������������ 7.16, 9.06, 11.56, 17.33 AS v Poor Sisters of Nazareth [2008] UKHL 32, 2008 SC (HL) 146����������������������30.22 Ashbridge v Christian Salvesen plc [2006] CSOH 79, 2006 SLT 697����������������������12.06 Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 AC 962������15.18, 16.04, 16.06, 16.26, 16.27, 16.38, 31.04 Ashmore v Rock Steady Security Ltd [2006] CSOH 30, 2006 SLT 207������ 16.25, 16.29, 16.30, 29.37, 29.41 Askey v Golden Wine Co Ltd [1948] 2 All ER 35���������������������������������������������������29.43 Aspro Travel Ltd v Owners Abroad Group plc [1996] 1 WLR 132���������������������������18.55 Assirati v W M A Graham & Sibbald, unreported, CSOH, Lord Mayfield, 27 May 1983����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������31.13 Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 AC 546��������������������������������������������������������������������7.01 Aswan (M/s) Engineering Establishment Co v Lupdine Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 1����������26.08 AT v Dulghieru [2009] EWHC 225 (QB), [2009] All ER (D) 194 (Feb)�����������������17.16 Athey v Leonati [1996] 3 SCR 458������������������������������������������������������������������������14.38 Atkinson v Newcastle and Gateshead Waterworks Co (1877) 2 Ex D 441����� 24.02, 24.06 Attia v British Gas plc [1988] QB 304����������������������������������������������������������� 6.01, 16.98 Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268������������������������������������������������������������19.74 Attorney General v Greater Manchester Newspapers Ltd [2001] All ER (D) 32 (Dec)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������19.29 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109���������������������������19.20, 19.22, 19.23, 19.27, 19.28, 19.31, 19.33, 19.35, 19.49, 19.51, 19.52, 19.54, 19.59, 19.60, 19.61, 19.63, 19.65, 19.67, 19.74 Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169�����������������������������������������22.87 Attorney General of the British Virgin Islands v Hartwell [2004] UKPC 12, [2004] 1 WLR 1273�������������������������������������������������������������������3.48, 3.55, 4.49, 9.18, 14.35 Attorney General’s Reference No 3 of 1999 [2009] UKHL 34, [2010] 1 AC 145�����20.10 Atwal Enterprises Ltd v Toner t/a Donal Toner Associates [2006] CSOH 76, 2006 SLT 537��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������11.29 Aubry v Éditions Vice-Versa Inc [1998] 1 SCR 59, 157 DLR (4th) 577�������������������20.62 Auchincloss v Black (1793) Hume 595������������������������������������������������������������������21.51 Auld v Shairp (1874) 2 R 191��������������������������������������������������������������������� 18.64, 31.02

Table of Cases   xi Austin v Commr of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKHL 5, [2009] 1 AC 564�����17.03, 17.06 Austin v UK (2012) 55 EHRR 14��������������������������������������������������������������������������17.06 Author of a Blog v Times Newspapers Ltd [2009] EWHC 1358 (QB), [2009] EMLR 22���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������20.29 Axel Springer AG v Germany (2012) 55 EHRR 6����������������������������� 20.21, 20.31, 20.39, 20.40, 20.42 Axon v Ministry of Defence [2016] EWHC 787 (QB), [2016] EMLR 20����������������20.21 B v A 1993 SC 232���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.103 B v Burns 1993 SC 232�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������17.57 B v H Bauer Publishing Ltd [2002] EMLR 8���������������������������������������������������������19.31 B v IVF Hammersmith [2018] EWCA Civ 2803, [2020] QB 93�����������������������������16.79 B v McDonald’s Restaurants Ltd [2002] EWHC 490���������������������������������������������26.50 B v Ministry of Defence [2010] EWCA Civ 1317, (2011) 117 BMLR 101��������������13.43 B v Royal Devon and Exeter NHS Foundation Trust [2016] EWHC 1024 (QB)������29.52 B (adult: refusal of medical treatment), Re [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam), [2002] 2 All ER 449�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������16.51 Badenach v Calvert [2016] HCA 18��������������������������������������������������������������� 5.72, 5.74 Bahner v Marwest Hotel Co [1970] 6 DLR (3d) 322, affd [1970] 12 DLR (3d) 646����� 17.10 Baigent v McCulloch 1998 SLT 780��������������������������������������������������������� 18.111, 19.69 Bailey v Ministry of Defence [2008] EWCA Civ 883, [2009] 1 WLR 1052���������13.70, 13.71, 13.72 Bain v Kings & Co Ltd 1973 SLT (Notes) 8������������������������������������������������������������6.25 Baird v Addie (1854) 16 D 490���������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.24, 3.82 Baird v Graham (1852) 14 D 615����������������������������������������������������������������������������3.35 Baird v Hamilton (1826) 4 S 790�����������������������������������������������������������������������������3.06 Baird v Thomson (1825) 3 S 448���������������������������������������������������������������� 23.06, 23.07 Baker v KTM Sportmotorcycle UK Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 378�����������������������������26.78 Baker v Quantum Clothing Group Ltd [2011] UKSC 17, [2011] 1 WLR 1003������10.27, 12.10, 12.11, 12.34, 24.21 Baker v T E Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 966����������������������������6.30, 14.17, 29.10 Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC 467������������������������������������������������������������ 13.78, 13.79 Bald v Alloa Colliery Co (1854) 16 D 870�������������������������������������������������������������23.23 Balfour v Barty-King [1957] 1 QB 496��������������������������������������������������������������������3.83 Balfour v William Beardmore and Co Ltd 1956 SLT 205���������������������������� 13.61, 13.62 Ballantyne v City of Glasgow District Licensing Board 1986 SC 266���������������� 7.36, 7.37 Ballard v North British Railway Co 1923 SC (HL) 43��������������������������������������������10.60 Bamford v Turnley 122 ER 27, (1862) 3 B & S 66�������������������������������������������������22.27 Banaghan v Smith (1857) 19 D 317�����������������������������������������������������������������������20.77 Band v Clerk & Scott 31 May 1797 FC����������������������������������������������������������������18.103 Bank of New Zealand v Greenwood [1984] 1 NZLR 525���������������������������������������22.10 Bank of Scotland v Fuller Peiser 2002 SLT 574�������������������������������������5.42, 5.71, 11.25 Bank of Scotland v Stewart (1891) 18 R 957���������������������������19.70, 22.29, 23.15, 31.75 Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd v Baskan Gida Sanayi Ve Pazarlama AS [2009] EWHC 1276 (Ch), [2010] Bus LR D1���������������������������������������������������21.57 Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart NV v Slatford [1953] 1 QB 248���������������������������3.20 Banks v Cox [2002] EWHC 2166 (Ch)�����������������������������������������������������������������21.74 Banner Universal Motion Pictures Ltd v Endemol Shine Group Ltd [2017] EWHC 2600 (Ch)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21.100 Banner’s Tutor v Kennedy’s Trs 1978 SLT (Notes) 83��������������������������������������������29.61

xii   Table of Cases Bannister v Freemans plc [2020] EWHC 1256 (QB)����������������������������������������������13.40 Barber v Somerset CC [2004] UKHL 13, [2004] 1 WLR 1089��������� 10.18, 12.16, 12.17, 12.19, 12.23, 12.25 Barbier and others (1867) 5 Irvine 482������������������������������������������������������� 13.22, 13.39 Barbulescu v Romania (61496/08) [2017] IRLR 1032��������������������������������������������20.34 Barclay v Chief Constable of the Northern Constabulary 1986 SLT 562�����������������17.07 Barclays Bank plc v Guardian News and Media Ltd [2009] EWHC 591 (QB)���������19.29 Barclays Bank plc v Taylor [1989] 1 WLR 1066������������������������������������������������������19.40 Barings plc v Coopers & Lybrand [2002] EWHC 461, [2002] PNLR 39�����������������21.70 Barker v Baxendale-Walker [2017] EWCA Civ 2056, [2018] 1 WLR 1905��������������11.20 Barker v Corus UK Ltd [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572���������������������� 13.11, 13.43, 13.45, 13.50, 13.51, 13.52, 13.54, 13.60, 13.63 Barnes v Hampshire CC [1969] 1 WLR 1563��������������������������������������������������������11.33 Barnes v Irwell Valley Water Board [1939] 1 KB 21�������������������������������������������������26.07 Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.06, 13.74 Barnett v H & J Packer & Co Ltd [1940] 3 All ER 575�������������������������������������������26.09 Barr v Baird & Co (1904) 6 F 524�������������������������������������������������������������������������23.23 Barr v Biffa Waste Services Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 312, [2013] QB 455������� 22.10, 22.25 Barr v Neilsons (1868) 6 M 651����������������������������������������������������������������������������13.26 Barratt International Resorts Ltd v Barratt Owners’ Group 2003 GWD 1-19��������18.137 Barrett v Enfield LBC [2001] 2 AC 550������������������������ 4.41, 7.09, 7.10, 7.15, 7.20, 7.23 Barrett v Ministry of Defence [1995] 1 WLR 1217���������������������������������������������������4.60 Barretts & Baird Ltd v Institution of Professional Civil Servants [1987] IRLR 3������21.37 Barry v Sutherland 2002 SLT 413�������������������������������������������������������������������������21.75 Bartholomew v Hackney LBC [1999] IRLR 246������������������������������������������������������5.53 Barton v County Natwest Ltd [2002] 4 All ER 494 (Note), [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 408���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21.72 Bartonshill Coal Co v Reid (1858) 3 Macq 266�������������������������������������1.29, 3.09, 12.01 Bates v Batey & Co Ltd [1913] 3 KB 351������������������������������������������������������� 1.30, 4.06 Bates v George [2012] CSOH 102, 2012 GWD 23-464������������������������������������������30.24 Baxall Securities Ltd v Sheard Walshaw Partnership [2002] EWCA Civ 9, [2002] PNLR 24���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������11.28 Baxter v St Helena Group Hospital Management Committee, The Times, 14 February 1972���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������12.07 Bazley v Curry (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 45�������������������������������������� 3.12, 3.14, 3.36, 3.41 Bazley v Wesley Monash IVF Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 118������������������������������������������16.98 BC v Chief Constable Police Service of Scotland [2020] CSIH 61, 2020 SLT 1021�����������������������������������������������������19.61, 20.02, 20.19, 20.21, 20.25, 20.86 Beals v Hayward [1960] NZLR 131�����������������������������������������������������������������������16.10 Beaton v Drysdale (1819) 2 Mur 151���������������������������������������������������������������������16.12 Beaton v Ivory (1887) 14 R 1057������������������������������������������������������ 16.39, 17.20, 17.26 Beaumont and O’Neill v Ferrer [2014] EWHC 2398 (QB), [2015] PIQR P2����������29.37 Beckham v MGN Ltd [2001] All ER (D) 307 (Jun)������������������������������������������������20.26 Bee v T & N Shelf Twenty Six Ltd 2002 SLT 1129������������������������������������������������13.58 Begg v Jack (1875) 3 R 35�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23.12, 23.13 Beggs v Motherwell Bridge Fabricators Ltd 1998 SLT 1215�����������������������������������31.48 Beggs v Scottish Ministers [2007] UKHL 3, 2007 SLT 235��������������������������������������2.39 Bell v Alliance Medical Ltd [2015] CSOH 34, 2015 SCLR 676�������������3.03, 3.91, 11.14 Bell v Black and Morrison (1865) 3 M 1026����������������������������������������������������������17.59 Bell v Haldane (1894) 2 SLT 320��������������������������������������������������������������������������18.30

Table of Cases   xiii Bell v North Ayrshire Council 2007 Rep LR 108����������������������������������������� 25.15, 25.34 Bell v Shand (1870) 7 SLR 267������������������������������������������������������������������ 16.33, 23.10 Bellefield Computer Services v E Turner & Sons Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1823��������11.28 Bellman v Northampton Recruitment Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2214, [2019] ICR 459����3.59 Belmont Laundry Co Ltd v Aberdeen Steam Laundry Co Ltd (1898) 1 F 45����������21.04 Beloff v Pressdram Ltd [1973] 1 All ER 241�����������������������������������������������������������19.61 Belvedere Motors v King [1981] 2 EGLR 131��������������������������������������������������������11.27 Ben Nevis Distillery (Fort William) Ltd v North British Aluminium Co Ltd 1948 SC 592������������������������������������������������������������������� 22.11, 22.16, 22.27 Benham v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 293���������������������������������������������������������������������17.45 Benjamin v Storr (1874) LR 9 CP 400�������������������������������������������������������������������24.11 Bennett v J Lamont & Sons 2000 SLT 17����������������������������������������������������������������8.14 Berezovsky v Abramovich [2011] EWCA Civ 153, [2011] 1 WLR 2290������������������21.48 Berkoff v Burchill [1996] 4 All ER 1008�������������������������������������������� 18.25, 18.28, 18.29 Bermingham v Sher Bros 1980 SC (HL) 67������������������������������������������������ 10.08, 25.45 Bernard v Attorney General of Jamaica [2004] UKPC 47, [2005] IRLR 398�������������3.55 Bernstein v Skyviews and General Ltd [1978] QB 479��������������������������������������������23.02 Berry v Forgan School Board (1898) 6 SLT 330����������������������������������������������������22.10 Berwick (Mayor of) v Laird of Hayning (1661) Mor 12772�������������������������������������22.01 Berwick (Town of) v Scot of Haining (1661) 2 Bro Sup 292�����������������������������������22.80 Beta Computers (Europe) Ltd v Adobe Systems (Europe) Ltd 1996 SLT 604���������26.39 Bett v Dalmeny Oil Co Ltd (1905) 7 F 787��������������������������������������������������������������3.82 Beyts v Trump International Golf Club Scotland Ltd [2017] SC EDIN 21, 2017 SLT (Sh Ct) 93����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������20.85 Bici v Ministry of Defence [2004] EWHC 786 (QB)����������������������������������� 16.08, 16.10 Bidwell v Briant, The Times, 9 May 1956����������������������������������������������������������������14.38 Biffa Waste Services Ltd v Maschinenfabrik Ernst Hese GmbH [2008] EWCA Civ 1257, [2009] QB 725������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.83 Bilta (UK) Ltd v Nazir [2015] UKSC 23, [2016] AC 1������������������������������� 29.49, 29.51 Birch v George McPhie & Son Ltd 2020 SLT (Sh Ct) 93���������������������������������������10.65 Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QB 742��������������������������������������������������������������������������������17.04 Bird v Pearce [1979] RTR 369��������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.15 Bishop v Arts & Letters Club of Toronto (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 107��������������������������14.38 Black v Caddell (1804) Mor 13905, affd (1812) 5 Paton 567�����������������1.17, 4.71, 25.02 Black v CB Richard Ellis Management Services Ltd 2006 Rep LR 36���������������������25.21 Black v Christchurch Finance Co Ltd [1894] AC 48������������������������������������������������3.83 Black v Fife Coal Co Ltd 1912 SC (HL) 33������������������������������������������������ 12.02, 24.07 Black v Kent CC (1983) 82 LGR 39������������������������������������������������������������������������4.54 Black v North British Railway Co 1908 SC 444�����������������������������������1.15, 31.07, 31.20 Black Loch Angling Club v Tarmac Ltd 2012 SCLR 501���������� 5.06, 22.10, 22.14, 23.34 Blacker v Lake and Elliot Ltd (1912) 106 LT 533����������������������������������������������������4.06 Blackmore v Department for Communities and Local Government [2017] EWCA Civ 1136, [2018] QB 471������������������������������������������������� 13.66, 26.19, 29.64 Blackwood v Robertson 1984 SLT (Sh Ct) 68����������������������������������������������������������2.31 Blair v Springfield Stores Ltd (1911) 27 Sh Ct Rep 178������������������������������������������22.10 Blake v Galloway [2004] EWCA Civ 814, [2004] 1 WLR 2844���������� 10.33, 16.48, 29.12 Blake v J Perry Nominees Pty Ltd [2012] VSCA 122������������������������������������������������3.58 Blake v Lothian HB 1993 SLT 1248����������������������������������������������������������������������30.11 Blamire v South Cumbria HA 1993 PIQR Q1��������������������������������������������������������31.35 Blennerhassett v Novelty Sales, The Times, 19 May 1933�����������������������������������������18.28 Bloxom v Bloxom 512 So 2d 839 (La 1987)�����������������������������������������������������������13.09

xiv   Table of Cases Blue Circle Industries plc v Ministry of Defence [1999] Ch 289�����������������������������22.14 Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks (1856) 11 Ex 781���������������������������������������������������4.44 Bogle v Cameron (1844) 6 D 682��������������������������������������������������������������������������19.39 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582�������� 11.07, 11.08, 11.12, 11.13, 11.18, 11.35 Bolitho v City and Hackney HA [1998] AC 232���������������������10.27, 11.08, 11.09, 11.10, 11.11, 11.12, 11.13, 11.17, 11.30, 11.45 Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850������������������������������������������������10.02, 10.15, 10.21, 10.25 Bonar v Trafalgar House Offshore Fabrication Ltd 1996 SLT 548����� 31.58, 31.59, 31.61 Bone v Seale [1975] 1 WLR 797����������������������������������������������������������������������������22.21 Bonomi v Backhouse (1861) 9 HL Cas 503������������������������������������������������ 23.24, 23.27 Borders RC v Roxburgh DC 1989 SLT 837����������������������������������������3.85, 22.59, 23.31 Boryk v National Coal Board 1959 SC 1����������������������������������������������������������������24.19 Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH v AOK Sachsen-Anhalt – Die Gesundheitskasse���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������26.60 Boswell v Minister of Police 1978 3 SA 268 (E)������������������������������������������� 16.14, 16.60 Bosworth Water Trust v SSR [2018] EWHC 444 (QB)���������������������������������� 4.65, 10.37 Bothwell v D M Hall [2009] CSOH 24, 2009 GWD 10-165�������������� 11.24, 11.26, 11.27 Bottomley v Brougham [1908] 1 KB 584���������������������������������������������������������������17.34 Boumedien v Delta Services [2008] EWCA Civ 368�������������������������������������������������6.01 Bourhill v Young 1942 SC (HL) 78���������� 4.28, 4.31, 4.32, 5.29, 6.03, 6.05, 6.16, 10.04, 14.21, 14.28, 14.30, 14.44, 16.15, 16.60 Bowater v Rowley Regis Corp [1944] KB 476��������������������������������������������������������29.16 Bower v Peate (1876) 1 QBD 321������������������������������������ 3.83, 3.85, 22.57, 22.58, 22.59 Bowes v Highland Council [2017] CSOH 53, 2017 SLT 749������������������������������������8.05 Bowes v Highland Council [2018] CSIH 38, 2018 SC 499����������������������������������������������������������8.01, 8.05, 8.06, 8.10, 8.14, 8.15, 29.58 Boy Andrew (Owners of the) v Owners of the St Rognvald 1947 SC (HL) 70������������2.38 Boyce v Paddington BC [1903] 1 Ch 109���������������������������������������������������������������24.11 Boyd v BBC 1969 SLT (Sh Ct) 17������������������������������������������������������������������������18.07 Boyle v Kodak Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 661���������������������������������������������� 24.03, 24.23, 24.24 Braddock v Bevins [1948] 1 KB 580����������������������������������������������������������������������18.09 Bradford v Robinson Rentals Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 337���������������������������������������������14.36 Bradford (Mayor of) v Pickles [1895] AC 587��������������������������������������������������������22.80 Bradford-Smart v West Sussex CC [2002] EWCA Civ 07, [2002] ELR 139�������������4.54, 6.45, 11.32 Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v Borders [1941] 2 All ER 205����� 21.71 Bradley v Menley & James Ltd 1913 SC 923����������������������������������������������� 18.06, 20.72 Brahan v Caledonian Railway Co (1895) 3 SLT 105������������������������������������ 16.03, 16.40 Brand v Transocean North Sea Ltd [2011] CSOH 57, 2011 GWD 14-336������31.32, 31.35 Brandon v Osborne Garrett & Co Ltd [1924] 1 KB 548�����������������������������������������14.16 Branson v Bower [2001] EWCA Civ 791, [2001] EMLR 32������������������������ 18.90, 18.91 Brayshaw v Partners of Apsley Surgery [2018] EWHC 3286 (QB), [2019] 2 All ER 997�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������16.67 Breadalbane (Earl of) v Jamieson (1877) 4 R 667���������������������������������������������������31.72 Brevan Howard Asset Management LLP v Reuters Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 950, [2017] EMLR 28����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������19.67 Brian Lackey Trust (Trs of) v Annandale 2004 3 SA 281 (C)����������������������������������23.11 Brice v Brown [1984] 1 All ER 997������������������������������������������������������������������������14.44 Bridge v South Portland Street Synagogue 1907 SC 1351�����������������������������������������2.33 Brierley v CC of Midlothian 1921 1 SLT 192�����������������������������������������������������������8.07 Briess v Woolley [1954] AC 333����������������������������������������������������������������������������21.68

Table of Cases   xv Brimelow v Casson [1924] 1 Ch 302���������������������������������������������������������������������21.28 Brink’s Global Services Inc v Igrox Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 1207, [2011] IRLR 343�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.62, 3.63 Briody v St Helens and Knowsley AHA [2001] EWCA Civ 1010, [2002] QB 856������16.101 Brisco v Secretary of State for Scotland 1997 SC 14������������������������������������ 10.23, 12.14 Bristol & West Building Society v Aitken Nairn, WS 1999 SC 678���������������� 11.21, 11.22 Bristol & West Building Society v Davidson & Robertson 1990 SLT 456�����������������11.25 Bristol & West Building Society v Rollo, Steven & Bond 1998 SLT 9�� 11.22, 11.23, 14.53 British Bank of Commerce Ltd v Graham 1961 SLT (Notes) 27�����������������������������19.40 British Diabetic Association v Diabetic Society [1996] FSR 1���������������������������������21.99 British Gas Trading Ltd v McPherson [2020] CSOH 61, 2020 GWD 20-271��������18.129 British Industrial Plastics Ltd v Ferguson [1940] 1 All ER 479��������������������������������21.12 British Motor Trade Association v Gray 1951 SC 586��������������21.05, 21.07, 21.14, 21.15 British Railways Board v South of Scotland Electricity Board 1973 SLT (Notes) 9�������31.66 British Road Services Ltd v Slater [1964] 1 WLR 498���������������������������������������������22.48 British Telecommunications plc v James Thomson & Sons (Engineers) Ltd 1999 SC (HL) 9���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4.42, 5.80 British Telecommunications plc v One in a Million Ltd [1999] 1 WLR 903������� 21.82, 21.93 British Transport Commission v Gourley [1956] AC 185����������������������������������������31.26 British Vacuum Cleaner Co Ltd v New Vacuum Cleaner Co Ltd [1907] 2 Ch 312���21.91 Britten v Tayside HB [2016] SC DUN 75, 2016 GWD 37-668�������������������� 11.48, 11.53 Brocket Estates Ltd v M’Phee 1949 SLT (Notes) 35����������������������������������������������23.02 Brocklesby v US 767 F 2d 1288 (1985)�����������������������������������������������������������������26.38 Bromage v Prosser (1825) 4 B & C 247������������������������������������������������������ 15.09, 15.18 Brooke v Bool [1928] 2 KB 578�������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.42 Brooks v Commr of Police of the Metropolis [2005] UKHL 24, [2005] 1 WLR 1495���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7.16, 9.06 Brooks v Lind 2000 GWD 8-307���������������������������������������������������������������� 18.80, 18.95 Broom v Ritchie (1904) 6 F 942����������������������������������������������������������������� 18.66, 18.67 Broomfield v Greig (1868) 6 M 563���������������������������������������������������������18.145, 18.146 Broster v Galliard Docklands Ltd [2011] EWHC 1722 (TCC), [2011] PNLR 34������5.21 Brown v Baty 1957 SC 351�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������23.11 Brown v Bower [2017] EWHC 2637 (QB), [2017] 4 WLR 197�������������������������������18.18 Brown v East Lothian Council [2013] CSOH 62, 2013 SLT 721����������������������������25.05 Brown v Fulton (1881) 9 R 36���������������������������������������������2.25, 3.02, 4.65, 7.25, 10.36 Brown v Glasgow Corp 1922 SC 527�����������������������������������������������������������������������6.05 Brown v Lakeland Ltd [2012] CSOH 105, 2012 Rep LR 140���������������������������������25.21 Brown v Lee Constructions Ltd 1977 SLT (Notes) 61��������������������������������������������23.02 Brown v Macgregor 26 Feb 1813 FC������������������������������������������������������1.17, 3.06, 4.71 Brown v North Lanarkshire Council [2010] CSOH 156, 2011 SLT 150�����������������11.33 Brown v Robins (1859) 4 H & N 186���������������������������������������������������������������������23.16 Brown v Robinson [2004] UKPC 56�����������������������������������������������������������������������3.52 Brown v Rolls Royce Ltd 1960 SC (HL) 22������������������������������������������������ 10.28, 12.10 Brown v Russell 1981 SLT (Sh Ct) 22�������������������������������������������������������������������31.12 Brown v Sugar Association of Greenock 1913 1 SLT 117�����������������������������������������1.28 Brown v Wintours (1821) 2 Mur 451�������������������������������������������������������������������18.112 Brown’s Trs v Hay (1898) 25 R 1112�������������������������� 19.09, 19.16, 19.17, 19.23, 19.58, 19.72, 20.17 Brown Jenkinson & Co Ltd v Percy Dalton (London) Ltd [1957] 2 QB 621������������21.71 Browne v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] EWHC 202 (QB), [2007] EMLR 19, revd in part [2007] EWCA Civ 295, [2008] QB 103������������� 19.27, 19.43, 19.64, 20.14, 20.21, 20.44

xvi   Table of Cases Browne v D C Thomson & Co 1912 SC 359������������������������������������������������� 2.41, 18.09 Brownlie v Miller (1880) 7 R (HL) 66���������������������������������������������� 21.67, 21.68, 21.81 Brownlie v Thomson (1859) 21 D 480�������������������������������������������������������������������18.31 Brownlie & Son v Mags of Barrhead 1923 SC 915, affd 1925 SC (HL) 41��������������13.13 Bruce v J M Smith Ltd (1898) 1 F 327����������������������������������������������������18.142, 18.146 Brumder v Motornet Service and Repairs Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 195, [2013] 1 WLR 2783�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������24.24 Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609����������������������������������������������������������� 5.22, 5.24 Bryce v Normand 1997 SLT 1351�������������������������������������������������������������������������20.85 Bryson v Somervill (1565) Mor 1703���������������������������������������������������������������������10.31 Bryson & Co Ltd v Bryson 1916 1 SLT 361�����������������������������������������������������������21.65 Buccleuch (Duke of) v Cowan (1866) 5 M 214, affd (1876) 4 R (HL) 14������13.13, 13.14, 13.29, 13.56, 22.03, 22.27, 22.28, 23.34 Buccleuch (Duke of) v Mags of Edinburgh (1865) 3 M 528������������������������������������23.11 Buchan v Ortho Pharmaceutical (Can) Ltd (1986) 25 DLR (4th) 658��������������������26.07 Buchanan v Alexandra Golf Club 1916 1 SLT 353���������������������������������������� 4.44, 23.08 Buchanan v Andrew (1873) 11 M (HL) 13������������������������������������������������������������23.23 Buchanan v Glasgow Corp (1905) 7 F 1001�����������������������������������������������������������17.40 Buchanan v Glasgow Corp 1919 SC 515�������������������������������������������������������� 4.29, 4.44 Buchanan v Jennings [2004] UKPC 36, [2005] 1 AC 115�������������������������������������18.101 Buckley v UK (1997) 23 EHRR 101����������������������������������������������������������������������22.74 Buckley and The Toronto Transportation Commission v Smith Transport Ltd [1946] 4 DLR 721��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.47 Bukovsky v Crown Prosecution Service [2017] EWCA Civ 1529, [2018] 4 WLR 1������18.11 Bull v Desporte [2019] EWHC 1650 (QB)������������������������������������������������������������20.21 Bull v London CC, The Times, 29 Jan 1953���������������������������������������������������������������9.51 Bullock v Tamiami Trail Tours Inc 266 F 2d 326 (5th Cir 1959)�������������������������������4.57 Bunker v Charles Brand & Son Ltd [1969] 2 QB 480���������������������������������� 25.50, 25.60 Bunt v Tilley [2006] EWHC 407 (QB), [2007] 1 WLR 1243��������������������������������18.127 Burgess v Lejonvarn [2017] EWCA Civ 254, [2017] PNLR 25���������������������� 5.44, 11.01 Burgess v Lejonvarn [2018] EWHC 3166 (TCC), (2018) 181 Con LR 204��������������5.44 Burke v Burke 1983 SLT 331��������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.23, 16.57 Burnet v Gow (1896) 24 R 156�����������������������������������������������������������������������������18.72 Burnett v Grampian Fire and Rescue Services [2007] CSOH 3, 2007 SLT 61� 4.17, 9.45, 9.46, 9.47, 9.48 Burnett v Marcius [2018] CSOH 34, 2018 SLT 472���������������������� 2.48, 3.03, 3.04, 3.52 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520����������������������22.05 Burns v Boots UK Ltd [2011] CSOH 182, 2011 Rep LR 124�����������������������������������6.10 Burton v Davies and General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp Ltd [1953] State Reports Queensland 26����������������������������������������������������������������������������17.04 Burton v Moorhead (1881) 8 R 892�����������������������������������������������������������������������27.02 Business Computers International Ltd v Registrar of Companies [1988] Ch 229�������5.65 Butchart v Home Office [2006] EWCA Civ 239, [2006] 1 WLR 1155�����������������������6.44 Butcher v Cornwall CC [2002] EWCA Civ 1640���������������������������������������������������29.66 Butt v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 933, [2019] EMLR 23����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.91 Buyukardicli v Hammerson UK Properties plc [2002] EWCA Civ 683�������������������29.65 Bye v Fife Council 2007 Rep LR 40�������������������������������������������������� 13.44, 25.18, 25.39 Bygate v Edinburgh Corp 1967 SLT (Notes) 65�����������������������������������������������������25.21 Byrne v Boadle (1863) 2 H & C 722����������������������������������������������������������� 10.60, 10.65 Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818����������������������������������������������������������������������������18.20 Byrne v Ross 1992 SC 498������������������������������������������������������������������������� 28.22, 31.74

Table of Cases   xvii C v Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland [2019] CSOH 48, 2019 SLT 875, affd [2020] CSIH 61, 2020 SLT 1021������������������ 19.55, 20.02, 20.86 C v City of Edinburgh Council [2017] SC EDIN 84, 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 34��� 6.01, 25.35 C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155���������������������������������������������������������������������������20.74 C v MGN Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1382, [2013] 1 WLR 1015�������������������������������18.122 C v North Cumbria University Hospitals NHS Trust [2014] EWHC 61 (QB), [2014] Med LR 189�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������11.14 C v WH [2015] EWHC 2687 (QB), [2016] PIQR Q2�������������16.63, 16.65, 16.67, 16.68 Cadell and Davies v Robertson (1804) Mor App Literary Property No 5, 5 Pat 493������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������19.11 C v Stewart (1804) Mor App Literary Property No 4, 1 June 1804 FC�������� 19.11, 19.16, 19.41, 19.48 Caird v Sime (1885) 13 R 23���������������������������������������������������������������������������������19.08 Caird v Sime (1887) 14 R (HL) 37��������������������������������������������������� 19.08, 19.09, 19.16 Cairns v Clyde Navigation Trs (1898) 25 R 1021�����������������������������������������������������3.33 Cairns v Dundee City Council [2017] CSOH 86, 2017 GWD 21-352��������������������25.21 Cairns v Harry Walker Ltd 1914 SC 51��������������������������������������������������������������������2.42 Cairns v Northern Lighthouse Board [2013] CSOH 22, 2013 SLT 645��������� 2.20, 24.21 CAL No 14 Pty Ltd v Scott [2009] HCA 47, (2009) 239 CLR 390��������������������������4.58 Calder v M’Kenzie (1700) 5 Bro Sup 535��������������������������������������������������������������31.20 Caldwell v Maguire [2001] EWCA Civ 1054, [2002] PIQR P6�������������������������������10.52 Caldwell v Monro (1872) 10 M 717����������������������������������������������������������������������18.09 Caledonia North Sea Ltd v British Telecommunications plc [2002] UKHL 4, 2002 SC (HL) 117������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 2.50, 2.51 Caledonian Railway Co v Baird (1876) 3 R 839�����������������������������������������������������22.03 Caledonian Railway Co v Greenock Corp 1917 SC (HL) 56�������� 22.03, 22.06, 22.12, 22.52 Caledonian Railway Co v Sprot (1856) 2 M 449����������������������������������������������������23.29 Caledonian Railway Co v Warwick (1897) 25 R (HL) 1��������������������������������������������1.28 Callaghan v Independent News and Media Ltd [2009] NIQB 1������������������������������20.51 Callendar v Eddington (1826) 4 Mur 108��������������������������������������������������������������23.17 Calor Gas Ltd v Express Fuels (Scotland) Ltd [2008] CSOH 13, 2008 SLT 123������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 21.09, 21.22 Calveley v Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police [1989] AC 1228���������������������24.15 Calvert v William Hill Credit Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 1427, [2009] Ch 330�������4.59, 13.06 Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264������� 14.55, 22.05 Cameron v Carlaw (1918) 34 Sh Ct Rep 286���������������������������������������������������������23.04 Cameron v Fraser (1881) 9 R 26��������������������������������������������22.03, 22.12, 22.14, 22.56 Cameron v Hamilton’s Auction Marts Ltd 1955 SLT (Sh Ct) 74������� 14.30, 23.09, 27.09 Cameron v Inverness-shire CC 1935 SC 493�����������������������������������������������������������8.24 Cameron v Swan [2021] CSIH 30�������������������������������������������������������������������������10.03 Cameronia (The) v The Hauk 1928 SLT 71����������������������������������������������������������14.12 Campbell v Borders HB [2011] CSOH 73, 2011 GWD 22-505, affd [2012] CSIH 49, 2012 GWD 23-468���������������������������������������������������������������������������11.14 Campbell v Bryson (1864) 3 M 254�����������������������������������������������������������������������23.36 Campbell v Cochrane (1905) 8 F 205������������������������������������������������������������������18.112 Campbell v Dugdale [2020] CSIH 27, 2020 SC 481��������������18.12, 18.18, 18.24, 18.88, 18.90, 18.91, 18.92, 18.93 Campbell v Frisbee [2002] EWCA Civ 1374, [2003] EMLR 3�������������������������������19.67 Campbell v Hewcon Ltd [2005] CSOH 173����������������������������������������������������������30.24 Campbell v James Henderson Ltd 1915 1 SLT 419��������������������������������������������������6.05 Campbell v Lothian HB 1987 SLT 665�����������������������������������������������������������������12.06 Campbell v Mackay 1959 SLT (Sh Ct) 34�������������������������������������������������������������23.04

xviii   Table of Cases Campbell v MGN Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1373, [2003] QB 633, revd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457��������������� 7.32, 19.33, 19.36, 19.50, 19.54, 19.64, 20.10, 20.11, 20.14, 20.15, 20.16, 20.18, 20.19, 20.21, 20.22, 20.24, 20.25, 20.27, 20.31, 20.32, 20.41, 20.42, 20.44, 20.48, 20.51, 20.62, 20.74, 20.83, 20.86, 20.87 Campbell v Muir 1908 SC 387������������������������������������������������������������������������������22.80 Campbell v North Lanarkshire Council 2000 SCLR 373��������������������������������� 6.08, 6.14 Campbell v Ord and Maddison (1873) 1 R 149������������������������������������������� 10.31, 29.61 Campbell v Peter Gordon Joiners Ltd [2016] UKSC 38, 2017 SC (UKSC) 13�������24.05, 24.11, 24.25, 24.26 Campbell v Ritchie & Co 1907 SC 1097����������������������������������������������������������������18.22 Campbell v Wilson 1934 SLT 249�������������������������������������������������������������� 18.09, 18.61 Campbell’s Trs v Henderson (1884) 11 R 520��������������������������������������������������������23.17 Campbell-James v Guardian Media Group plc [2005] EWHC 893 (QB), [2005] EMLR 24�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.122 Canadian National Railway v Norsk Pacific Steamship Co [1992] 1 SCR 1021���������4.33 Canadian Pacific Railway Co v Lockhart [1942] AC 591������������������������������������������3.36 Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co [1951] 2 KB 164���������������������������������������� 4.13, 5.27 Candlewood Navigation Corp Ltd v Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd [1986] AC 1�������� 2.13, 5.01, 5.05, 5.82 Canmore Housing Association Ltd v Bairnsfather 2004 SLT 673������ 22.12, 22.21, 22.53, 22.80 Canterbury v Spence 464 F 2d 772, 150 US App DC 263 (1972)���������������������������13.85 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605������ 1.30, 4.10, 4.15, 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, 4.19, 4.23, 4.24, 4.25, 4.32, 4.37, 5.26, 5.30, 5.31, 5.33, 5.34, 5.36, 5.37, 5.38, 5.41, 5.42, 5.44, 5.51, 5.81, 5.83, 5.86, 5.90, 7.06, 7.12, 7.20, 8.02, 9.01, 11.30, 14.46, 16.78 Capita Alternative Fund Services v Drivers Jonas [2012] EWCA Civ 1417, [2013] 1 EGLR 119�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������11.26 Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire CC [1997] QB 1004 ������������ 4.53, 9.30, 9.44, 9.45, 9.47, 9.53, 9.55 Capps v Miller [1989] 1 WLR 839�������������������������������������������������������������� 29.56, 29.65 Carberry v Davies [1968] 1 WLR 1103��������������������������������������������������������������������3.74 Carder v University of Exeter [2016] EWCA Civ 790, [2017] ICR 392, [2016] Med LR 562������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 13.48, 13.49 Cardle v Murray 1993 SLT 525�����������������������������������������������������������������������������16.34 Carey v Vauxhall Motors Ltd [2019] EWHC 238 (QB)������������������������������������������13.37 Cargill v Dundee and Perth Railway Co (1848) 11 D 216�����������������������������������������1.21 Carisbrooke Shipping CV5 v Bird Port Ltd [2005] EWHC 1974 (Admlty), [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 626����������������������������������������������������������������������������������25.19 Carlsberg Bryggeriene og Tuborgs Bryggerier de Forene de Bryggerier Aktieselskabet v Tennent Caledonian Breweries [1972] RPC 847�����������������������21.82 Carmarthenshire CC v Lewis [1955] AC 549��������������������� 2.25, 3.02, 4.65, 10.36, 11.33 Carmichael v Bearsden and District Rifle & Pistol Club 2000 SLT (Sh Ct) 49����������2.35 Carney v Smith 1953 SC 19����������������������������������������������������������������������������������25.04 Carr-Glynn v Frearsons [1999] Ch 326���������������������������������������������������������� 5.72, 5.76 Carrick Jewellery v Ortak, unreported, CSOH, 27 September 1989�������������������������21.94 Carroll v Andrew Barclay & Sons Ltd 1948 SC (HL) 100���������������������������������������24.19 Carroll v Fearon, Bent and Dunlop Ltd [1998] PIQR P416����10.63, 26.07, 26.09, 26.10, 26.13, 26.15 Carruthers v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2019] EWHC 33 (QB)��������������������������18.95 Carslogie Steamship Co Ltd v Royal Norwegian Government [1952] AC 292, [1952] 1 All ER 20�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������14.12

Table of Cases   xix Carson v Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc 698 F 2d 831 (6th Cir 1983)��������������20.61 Carson v Howard Doris Ltd 1981 SC 278�������������������������������������������������������������30.22 Carson v McDonald 1987 SCLR 415��������������������������������������������������������������������31.67 Carty v Croydon LBC [2005] EWCA Civ 19, [2005] 1 WLR 2312������������������ 4.41, 7.09 Cases C-503/13 & C-504/13, [2015] 3 CMLR 6����������������������������������������������������26.60 Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027������������������������������������������������������������2.17 Cassidy v Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1929] 2 KB 331��������������������������������������18.51 Cassidy v Ministry of Health [1951] 2 KB 343������������������������������������3.22, 10.64, 10.70 Castellain v Preston (1883) 11 QBD 380�����������������������������������������������������������������2.50 Castle Rock Edinvar Housing Association Ltd v Coal Authority 2013 SLT (Lands Tr) 2�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������23.30 Caughie v John Robertson & Co (1897) 25 R 1������������������������������������������������������13.21 Cavanagh v Ulster Weaving Co Ltd [1960] AC 145������������������������������������� 10.27, 12.10 Cayzer v Times Newspapers Ltd [2015] CSIH 55, 2015 SLT 501��������������������������18.22 CC v AB [2006] EWHC 3083 (QB), [2007] EMLR 11������������������������������� 19.64, 20.22 Celanese International Corp v BP Chemicals Ltd [1999] RPC 203�������������������������19.74 Central Motors (Glasgow) Ltd v Cessnock Garage and Motor Co 1925 SC 796�������3.46, 3.62 Central Motors (St Andrews) Ltd v Mags of St Andrews 1961 SLT 290������ 22.10, 22.19, 22.25 Central Railway Co of Venezuela v Kisch (1867) LR 2 HL 99���������������������������������21.73 CF Partners (UK) LLP v Barclays Bank plc [2014] EWHC 3049 (Ch)�������������������19.58 CGL Group Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2017] EWCA Civ 1073, [2018] 1 WLR 2137��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4.40 Chadwick v British Railways Board [1967] 1 WLR 912����������������������������6.31, 6.32, 6.35 Chalfont St Peter Parish Council v Holy Cross Sisters Trs [2019] EWHC 1128 (QB)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.44, 21.46 Chalmers v Barclay, Perkins & Co Ltd 1912 SC 521�����������������������������������������������17.55 Chalmers v Diageo Scotland Ltd [2017] CSOH 36, 2017 GWD 9-126�������������������22.11 Chalmers v Payne (1835) 2 C M and R 156�����������������������������������������������������������18.12 Chalmers v William Dixon Ltd (1876) 3 R 461������������� 3.85, 22.03, 22.06, 22.10, 22.36, 22.43, 22.44, 22.53 Chapman v Barber 1989 SLT 830�����������������������������������������������������������������������18.113 Chapman v Lord Advocate [2005] CSOH 148, 2006 SLT 186�������������������������������12.19 Chappel v Hart (1998) 156 ALR 517,��������������������������������������������������������������������13.86 Chapronière v Mason (1905) 21 TLR 633�������������������������������������������������������������10.65 Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1995] 2 AC 65������������������������ 18.06, 18.11 Charlton v Forrest Printing Ink Co Ltd [1980] IRLR 331���������������������������������������10.27 Charmian v Orion Publishing Group Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 972, [2008] EMLR 16���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.87 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432����������������������������������������������������������������������16.47 Chaudhry v Prabhakar [1989] 1 WLR 29�����������������������������������������������������������������5.44 Chell v Tarmac Cement and Lime Ltd [2020] EWHC 2613 (QB), [2021] PIQR P5��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.58 Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134�������������11.48, 11.50, 13.02, 13.82, 13.83, 13.84, 13.85, 13.86, 16.73, 31.05 Chicago (City of) v Tribune Co 139 NE 86 (1923)������������������������������������������������18.57 Childs v Desormeaux 2006 SCC 18, [2006] 1 SCR 643�������������������������������������������4.58 Chipchase v British Titan Products Co [1956] 1 QB 545����������������������������������������24.20 Chisholm v Grant 1914 SC 239�����������������������������������������������������������������������������18.24 Chittock v Woodbridge School [2002] EWCA Civ 915, [2002] ELR 735����������������11.35 Christie v Davey [1893] 1 Ch 316��������������������������������������������������������������������������22.36

xx   Table of Cases Christie v Robertson (1899) 1 F 1155��������������������������������������������������������� 18.32, 18.33 Clark v Armstrong (1862) 24 D 1315��������������������������������������������������������������������27.20 Clark v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 1558����������������������������������������21.99 Clark v City of Edinburgh Council [2010] CSOH 144, 2011 Rep LR 11�����������������31.67 Clark v Greater Glasgow HB [2016] CSOH 126, 2016 Rep LR 126�����������������������31.39 Clark v Haddon (1895) 3 SLT 85������������������������������������������������������������������������18.103 Clark v McLean 1994 SC 410�������������������������������������������������������������������� 30.21, 30.24 Clark v Maersk Co Ltd 2000 SLT (Sh Ct) 9����������������������������������������������������������25.18 Clark v Scottish Power 1994 SLT 924����������������������������������������������������������������������6.01 Clark Boyce v Mouat [1994] 1 AC 428������������������������������������������������������������������11.23 Clark Fixing Ltd v Dudley MBC [2001] EWCA Civ 1898����������������������������������������4.74 Clarke v Norton [1910] VLR 494��������������������������������������������������������������������������18.90 Clason v Black (1842) 4 D 743��������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.24 Clay v A J Crump and Sons Ltd [1964] 1 QB 533��������������������������������������������������11.28 Cleese v Clark [2003] EWHC 137 (QB), [2004] EMLR 3������������������������������������18.122 Cleghorn v Taylor (1856) 18 D 664�����������������������������������������������������������������������22.03 Clelland v Robb 1911 SC 253���������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.28 Clippens Oil Co Ltd v Edinburgh and District Water Trs (1897) 25 R 370�������31.75, 31.76 Clough v Bussan [1990] 1 All ER 431����������������������������������������������������������������������9.27 Clunis v Camden and Islington HA [1998] QB 978������������������������������������ 29.41, 29.44 Clyde Navigation Trs v Bowring Steamship Co 1929 SC 715����������������������������������31.11 CMI-Centres v Phytopharm Ltd [1999] FSR 235��������������������������������������������������19.46 Cochran’s Trs v Caledonian Railway Co (1898) 25 R 572���������������������������������������23.18 Cock v Neville (1797) Hume 602��������������������������������������������������������������������������23.06 Cockburn v Reekie (1890) 17 R 568����������������������������������������������������������������������18.31 Cocking v Eacott [2016] EWCA Civ 140, [2016] QB 1080������������������������������������22.50 Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41������ 19.20, 19.25, 19.33, 19.35, 19.58 Cole v State Department of Public Safety and Corrections 825 So 2d 1134 (La 2002)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������16.42 Cole v Weir Pumps Ltd 1995 SLT 12��������������������������������������������������������������������25.21 Coleridge v Miller Construction Ltd 1997 SLT 485�������������������������������������������������5.11 Coleridge (Lord) v Sotheby’s [2012] EWHC 370 (Ch)�������������������������������������������11.15 Coles v Hetherton [2013] EWCA Civ 1704, [2015] 1 WLR 160�����������������������������31.12 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172�������������������������������������������������������� 16.12, 16.45 Collins Stewart v The Financial Times Ltd [2004] EWHC 2337, [2005] EMLR 5�������18.50 Coltman v Bibby Tankers Ltd [1988] AC 276���������������������������������������������������������12.37 Commrs of Inland Revenue v Muller & Co Ltd [1901] AC 217������������������������������21.84 Commodities Research Unit International (Holdings) Ltd v King & Wood Mallesons LLP [2016] EWHC 727 (QB), [2016] PNLR 29���������������������11.19 Commodity Solution Services Ltd v First Scottish Searching Services Ltd [2019] SAC (Civ) 4, 2019 SC (SAC) 41���������������������������������������������������������������� 4.25, 5.58 Commodity Solution Services Ltd v First Scottish Searching Services Ltd [2020] SC DUN 29, 2020 GWD 22-293�����������������������������������������������������������������������������5.58 Company’s Application (A), Re [1989] Ch 477������������������������������������������� 19.17, 19.61 Compugraphics International Ltd v Nikolic [2011] CSIH 34, 2011 SC 744������������23.13 Condon v Basi [1985] 1 WLR 866���������������������������������������������������� 10.51, 10.52, 10.53 Connolly-Martin v Davis [1999] PNLR 826������������������������������������������������������������5.65 Connor v Jessop 1988 SCCR 624��������������������������������������������������������������������������16.10 Conoco (UK) Ltd v The Commercial Law Practice 1997 SLT 372���� 19.38, 19.63, 19.65 Continental Tyre Group Ltd v Robertson 2011 GWD 14-321�������������������������������18.142 Conway v Dalziel (1901) 3 F 918��������������������������������������������������������������������������13.26 Conway v George Wimpey and Co [1951] 2 KB 266������������������������������������������������3.36

Table of Cases   xxi Cook v Bell (1857) 20 D 137���������������������������������������������������������������������������������12.01 Cook v Gibson [2013] CSOH 64, [2013] RVR 188������������������������������������������������18.22 Cook v J L Kier & Co [1970] 1 WLR 774��������������������������������������������������������������31.23 Cook v Lewis [1952] 1 DLR 1�������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.22, 13.39 Cook v Square D Ltd [1992] ICR 262, [1992] IRLR 34�������������������������������������������3.82 Cooke v Falconer’s Representatives (1850) 13 D 157���������������������������������������������11.05 Cookson v Knowles [1979] AC 556�����������������������������������������������������������������������31.32 Cooper v Caledonian Railway Co (1902) 4 F 880�����������������������������������������������������6.05 Cooper v North British Railway Co (1863) 1 M 499����������������������������������������������22.03 Cooper v Smith Llewellyn Partnership [1999] PNLR 576���������������������������������������11.20 Cooper v Strathclyde RC 1993 GWD 31-2013������������������������������������������������������25.14 Cooper v Turrell [2011] EWHC 3269 (QB)�������������������������������������� 20.21, 20.38, 20.54 Co-operative Group (CWS) Ltd v Pritchard [2011] EWCA Civ 329, [2012] QB 320�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������15.08 Copartnership Farms v Harvey-Smith [1918] 2 KB 405���������������������������������������18.102 Copeland v Burnet (1896) 3 SLT 293��������������������������������������������������������������������25.02 Copland v UK (2007) 45 EHRR 37�����������������������������������������������������������������������20.34 Cork v Kirby Maclean Ltd [1952] 2 All ER 402�����������������������������������������������������14.02 Cormack v Dundee Harbour Trs 1930 SC 112�������������������������������������������������������25.18 Cornelius v de Taranto [2001] EWCA Civ 1511, [2002] EMLR 6��������������� 19.36, 20.53 Cornwell v Myskow [1987] 1 WLR 630�����������������������������������������������������������������18.25 Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd [2008] UKHL 13, [2008] 1 AC 884������������ 13.80, 14.15, 14.19, 29.13, 29.20, 29.60 Costello v Chief Constable of Northumbria [1999] ICR 752������������������������������������9.33 Costello-Roberts v UK (1995) 19 EHRR 112��������������������������������������������������������16.35 Couch v Attorney General [2008] 3 NZLR 725���������������������������������������������� 4.64, 7.25 Couderc v France [2016] EMLR 19����������������������������������������������������������� 20.27, 20.45 Coultas v Victorian Railway Commrs (1888) 13 App Cas 222������������������������� 6.03, 6.05 Coulters Property Ltd v Coulter [2021] SC EDIN 22����������������������������������������������4.21 Coutts v Blake (1775) Mor 7375���������������������������������������������������������������������������23.01 Coutts v MacBrayne Ltd 1910 SC 386������������������������������������������������������������������17.40 Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] AC 822���������22.10, 22.25, 22.29, 22.67, 22.70, 22.71, 23.13 Coventry v Lawrence (No 2) [2014] UKSC 46, [2015] AC 106������������������������������22.63 Cowan v Bennett 2012 GWD 37-738��������������������������������������������������������� 18.18, 18.41 Cowan v Duke of Buccleuch (1876) 4 R (HL) 14�����������������������������������������������������2.41 Cowan v Hopetoun House Preservation Trust [2013] CSOH 9, 2013 Rep LR 62������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 25.06, 25.18, 25.21, 25.54 Cowell v Corrective Services Commission (1988) 13 NSWLR 714�������������������������16.07 Cowie v London, Midland and Scottish Railway Co 1934 SC 433����������������������������6.03 Cox v MGN Ltd [2006] EWHC 1235 (QB), [2006] 5 Costs LR 764����������������������19.50 Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] AC 660������������������������������������������3.10, 3.11, 3.13, 3.16, 3.19, 3.20, 3.23, 3.24, 3.28 Coyle v Lanarkshire HB [2013] CSOH 167, 2013 GWD 37-722, affd [2014] CSIH 7, 2015 SC 172���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.06, 11.14 Craggy v Chief Constable of Cleveland Police [2009] EWCA Civ 1128���������������������9.15 Craig v Collie (1828) 6 S 1147������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.03, 19.18 Craig v Glasgow Victoria and Leverndale Hospitals Board of Management, unreported, 1976����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.51, 16.54 Craig v Inveresk Paper Merchants Ltd 1970 SLT (Notes) 50��������������������18.131, 18.137 Craig v Millar (1888) 15 R 1005��������������������������������������������������������������������������21.108

xxii   Table of Cases Cramaso LLP v Viscount Reidhaven’s Trs [2014] UKSC 9, 2014 SC (UKSC) 121�������������������������������������������������������������������2.32, 4.13, 4.16, 5.35, 5.48, 5.49, 21.68 Craven v Riches [2002] PIQR P23�������������������������������������������������������������������������25.18 Crawford Adjusters (Cayman) Ltd v Sagicor General Insurance (Cayman) Ltd [2013] UKPC 17, [2014] AC 366�����������������������������������������������17.53 Crawley v Barnsley MBC [2017] EWCA Civ 36, [2017] 1 WLR 2329����������������������8.12 Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee [2004] UKHL 44, [2005] 1 AC 253����������� 19.71, 20.56 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Export Credits Guarantee Department [2000] 1 AC 486������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.64 Cremin v Thomson 1956 SLT 357������������������������������������������������������������������������25.52 Crocker v Sundance Northwest Resorts Ltd [1988] 1 SCR 1186, 51 DLR (4th) 321������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4.57, 4.61 Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch 1942 SC (HL) 1�������������������������������������������������������������� 15.11, 21.52, 21.53, 21.54, 21.55 Croke v Wiseman [1982] 1 WLR 71����������������������������������������������������������������������31.32 Crolla v Hussain 2008 SLT (Sh Ct) 145������������������������������������������������������� 3.84, 22.59 Crookall v Vickers-Armstrong Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 659��������������������������������������������13.61 Cross v Highlands and Islands Enterprise 2001 SLT 1060����������������� 10.18, 12.19, 12.24 Cross v Kirby, The Times, 5 April 2000�������������������������������������������������������������������16.25 Crossley v Faithful & Gould Holdings Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 293, [2004] 4 All ER 447�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������12.27 Crouch v British Rail Engineering Ltd [1988] IRLR 404����������������������������������������12.06 Croucher v Cachia [2016] NSWCA 132, (2016) 95 NSWLR 117���������������������������16.07 Cruden Building & Renewals Ltd v Scottish Water [2017] CSOH 98, 2017 GWD 22-363���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.07 Cruickshank v Fairfield Rowan Ltd [2005] CSOH 1, 2005 SLT 462�����������������������31.55 Cruickshanks v Forsyth (1747) Mor 4034����������������������������������������� 16.01, 16.12, 31.20 CTB v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1326 (QB)����������������������������20.52 Cullen v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] UKHL 39, [2003] 1 WLR 1763������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������24.15 Cullen’s Tr v Thomson’s Trs (1865) 3 M 935���������������������������������������������������������21.67 Cullin v London Fire and Civil Defence Authority [1999] PIQR P314����������������������6.33 Cumpănă v Romania (2005) 41 EHRR 14�������������������������������������������������������������18.01 Cunningham v Cameron [2013] CSOH 193, 2014 GWD 3-69�������������������� 22.12, 22.19 Cunningham v Reading Football Club Ltd [1992] PIQR P141�������������������������������25.25 Cunningham v The Scotsman Publications Ltd 1987 SC 107�������������������������������18.104 Curran v Docherty 1995 SLT 716�������������������������������������������������������������������������11.55 Curran v Scottish Daily Record [2011] CSIH 86, 2012 SLT 359��������������� 18.26, 18.113 Currie v Clamp’s Exr 2002 SLT 196������������������������������������������������� 29.19, 29.37, 29.56 Currie v Colquhoun (1823) 2 S 407����������������������������������������������������������� 11.19, 11.21 Currie v Esure Services Ltd [2014] CSOH 34, 2014 SLT 631, affd [2014] CSIH 112, 2015 SC 351������������������������������������������������������������������������ 31.54, 31.70 Currie v Wardrop 1927 SC 538�������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.05 Cusick v Campbell 2002 SCLR 581����������������������������������������������������������������������31.27 Customs and Excise Commrs v Barclays Bank plc [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181���������������������������4.25, 4.26, 4.39, 4.40, 5.30, 5.31, 5.32, 5.84, 5.85, 5.86, 5.90 Cuthbert v Linklater 1935 SLT 94�������������������������������������������������������������������������18.07 Cuthbertson v Merchiston Castle School 2001 SLT (Sh Ct) 13�����������4.54, 10.36, 11.34 Cutler v Vauxhall Motors Ltd [1971] 1 QB 418�����������������������������������������������������14.41 Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] AC 398���������������������������� 24.05, 24.08, 24.09

Table of Cases   xxiii D v Commr of Police of the Metropolis [2015] EWCA Civ 646, [2016] QB 161�������7.33 D v D [1979] Fam 70���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.24 D v East Berkshire Community Healthcare Trust [2005] 2 AC 373������������������ 4.41, 7.30 D v Victim Support Scotland [2017] SC EDIN 85, 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 91���� 11.42, 11.43 D’s Curator Bonis v Lothian HB [2010] CSOH 61, 2010 SLT 725�������������������������30.09 D & F Estates Ltd v Church Commrs for England [1989] AC 177�����������3.79, 5.17, 5.82 D C Thomson & Co Ltd v Deakin [1952] Ch 646��������������������������������������� 21.06, 21.21 D Geddes (Contractors) Ltd v Neil Johnson Health & Safety Services Ltd [2017] CSOH 42, [2017] PNLR 21�����������������������������������29.37, 29.43, 29.47, 29.49 D Pride & Partners v Institute for Animal Health [2009] EWHC 685 (QB)�������������26.07 Daborn v Bath Tramways [1946] 2 All ER 333�������������������������������������������� 10.24, 10.25 Dadourian Group International Inc v Simms [2009] EWCA Civ 169, [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 601���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21.72 Daiichi Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd v Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty [2003] EWHC 2337 (QB), [2004] 1 WLR 1503�����������������������������������������������������������28.02 Dalgleish v Glasgow Corp 1976 SC 32������������������������������������������������������� 31.21, 31.24 Dalton v Henry Angus & Co (1881) 6 App Cas 740�������������������������������������� 3.83, 23.28 Dalton v Nottinghamshire CC [2011] EWCA Civ 776���������������������������������������������8.11 Daniel v Griffiths [1998] EMLR 489�������������������������������������������������������������������18.102 Daniels v Thompson [2004] EWCA Civ 307, [2004] PNLR 33��������������������������������5.76 Daniels and Daniels v R White & Sons Ltd [1938] 4 All ER 258�����������������������������26.14 Dann v Hamilton [1939] 1 KB 509�����������������������������������������������������������������������29.19 Darbishire v Warran [1963] 1 WLR 1067���������������������������������������������������������������31.67 Dargie v Mags of Forfar (1855) 17 D 730������������������������������������������������������� 1.24, 8.07 Darker v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2001] 1 AC 435�����������������17.57 Darley Main Colliery Co v Mitchell (1886) 11 App Cas 127�����������������������������������23.27 Darnley v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust [2018] UKSC 50, [2019] AC 831�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4.19, 4.22, 11.16, 14.14 David T Morrison & Co Ltd v ICL Plastics [2014] UKSC 48, 2014 SC (UKSC) 222����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30.02, 30.05 Davidson v Kerr 1997 Hous LR 11�����������������������������������������22.10, 22.19, 22.21, 22.36 Davidson v Lothian and Borders Fire Board 2003 SLT 363, revd 2003 SLT 939����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.51, 31.21, 31.68 Davidson v McIrvine 2007 GWD 23-389��������������������������������������������������������������27.17 Davie v Edinburgh Corp 1977 SLT (Notes) 5�������������������������� 4.58, 25.21, 25.32, 25.40 Davie v New Merton Board Mills Ltd [1959] AC 604��������������������������������������������12.36 Davies v Global Strategies Group (Hong Kong) Ltd [2009] EWHC 2342 (QB), affd [2010] EWCA Civ 648�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������29.16 Davis v Commr of Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWHC 38 (QB)�����������������������16.26 Davis v Stena Line Ltd [2005] EWHC 420 (QB), [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 13���������������4.57 Dawkins v Carnival plc [2011] EWCA Civ 1237, [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1����������������10.65 Dawson v Allardyce 18 Feb 1809 FC�����������������������������������������������������������������������7.36 Dawson v Page [2013] CSIH 24, 2013 SC 432������������ 25.05, 25.10, 25.21, 25.55, 25.62 Dawson v Scottish Power plc 1999 SLT 672���������������������������25.06, 25.44, 25.54, 29.63 Day v Brownrigg (1878) 10 Ch D 294�������������������������������������������������������������������21.99 Day v High Performance Sports Ltd [2003] EWHC 197 (QB)���������������������������������4.57 DC v DG and DR [2017] CSOH 5, 2018 SC 47, affd [2017] CSIH 72, 2018 SC 171���������������������������������������������������������������������16.04, 16.22, 16.44, 16.46 De Charmoy v Day Star Hatchery (Pty) Ltd 1967 4 SA 188 (D)������������������ 22.13, 22.26 De Freville v Dill [1927] All ER Rep 205���������������������������������������������������������������17.39 De Maudsley v Palumbo [1996] EMLR 460����������������������������������������������������������19.26 De Reus v Gray [2003] 9 VR 432, [2003] VSCA 84������������������������������������������������20.82

xxiv   Table of Cases Dean v Allin and Watts [2001] PNLR 39������������������������������������������������������������������5.65 Delaney v McGregor Construction (Highlands) Ltd 2003 Rep LR 56���������������������29.65 Delaney v Pickett [2011] EWCA Civ 1532, [2012] 1 WLR 2149�����������������������������29.39 Dellwo v Pearson 107 NW 2d 859 (1961)��������������������������������������������������������������10.35 Dennis v Ministry of Defence [2003] EWHC 793 (QB), [2003] Env LR 34������ 22.10, 22.77 Dennistoun v Bell and Brown (1824) 2 S 649��������������������������������������������������������23.20 Dental Manufacturing Co Ltd v C de Trey & Co [1912] 3 KB 76���������������������������21.85 Department of Health & Community Services v JWB and SMB (1992) 175 CLR 218����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.45, 16.47 Department of Transport v North West Water Authority [1984] AC 336������������������22.65 DePerno v Hans 18 Misc 3d 1119(A), 856 NYS 2d 497 (Sup Ct 2007)������� 10.35, 10.36 Depp v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2020] EWHC 2911 (QB)���������������������������18.31 Derbyshire CC v Times Newspapers [1993] AC 534, [1992] QB 770��������������������18.57, 18.60, 18.62, 18.63, 18.147 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337������������������������������������������������ 21.63, 21.69, 21.70 Derwent Valley Foods v Forth Valley Foods, unreported, CSOH, Lord Cowie, 18������� 31.76 Devine v Colvilles Ltd 1968 SLT 294, affd 1969 SC (HL) 67���������������������� 10.61, 10.67 Devlin v Jeffray’s Trs (1902) 5 F 130����������������������������������������������������������������������25.16 Devlin v Strathclyde RC 1993 SLT 699�������������������������������������������� 25.39, 25.57, 29.12 Devon Angling Association v Scottish Water [2018] SAC (Civ) 7, 2018 SC (SAC) 35�����5.05 Dewar v Fraser (1767) Mor 12803������������������������������������������������������������������������22.80 Dewar v Scottish Borders Council [2017] CSOH 68, 2017 GWD 15-250�����������������8.09 Dews v National Coal Board [1988] AC 1��������������������������������������������������������������31.26 Di Ciacca v Archibald Sharp & Sons 1995 SLT 380�����������������������������������������������11.21 Diageo North America Inc v Intercontinental Brands (ICB) Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 920, [2011] 1 All ER 242����������������������������������������������������������������������������21.86 Dickie v Flexcon Glenrothes Ltd 2009 GWD 35-602������������������������� 3.61, 13.55, 28.06, 28.09, 28.10, 28.17 Dickson v Hygienic Institute 1910 SC 352�������������������������������������������������������������11.03 Dickson v Taylor (1816) 1 Mur 141������������������������������������������������������������ 21.05, 21.10 Dickson Minto, WS v Bonnier Media Ltd 2002 SLT 776������������������� 18.49, 18.56, 19.71 Dillon v Inverclyde Leisure [2007] CSOH 82���������������������������������������������������������25.21 Dillon v Twin State Gas & Electric Co 85 NH 449 (1932)��������������������������������������13.77 DPP v Ray [1974] AC 370������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21.66 Divya v Toyo Tire and Rubber Co Ltd [2011] EWHC 1993 (QB)���������������������������26.13 Dobbie v Henderson 1970 SLT (Sh Ct) 27������������������������������������������������� 27.02, 27.12 Dobson v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2011] EWHC 3253 (TCC), 140 Con LR 135������������������������������������������������������������������������� 22.10, 22.55, 22.78 Docherty v City of Glasgow DC 1982 SLT 273�����������������������������������������������������31.22 Docherty v Scottish Ministers [2011] CSIH 58, 2012 SC 150��������������������� 17.46, 31.06 Dodd v Holme (1834) 1 Ad & El 493��������������������������������������������������������������������23.16 Dodsley v M’Farquhar (1775) Mor 8308, 27 July 1775 FC (Appendix to vol 7, 485)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������19.06 Dodwell v Burford (1669) 1 Modern 24�����������������������������������������������������������������16.11 Doe v Johnson 817 F Supp 1382 W D Mich (1993)������������������������������������������������16.13 Donachie v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2004] EWCA Civ 405, [2004] Po LR 204�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.12 Donaghy v National Coal Board 1957 SLT (Notes) 23, affd 1957 SLT (Notes) 35��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������14.13 Donald v Rutherford 1984 SC 70��������������������������������������������������������������������������30.22 Donaldson v Haldane (1840) 1 Rob 226������������������������������������������������������������������1.25

Table of Cases   xxv Donnelly v Safeway Stores plc 2003 SC 236�����������������������������������������������������������17.12 Donoghue v Concrete Products (Kirkcaldy) Ltd 1976 SLT 58��������������������������������26.14 Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31�����������������������������1.28, 1.30, 1.31, 1.36, 4.01, 4.03, 4.04, 4.05, 4.06, 4.07, 4.08, 4.09, 4.10, 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, 4.24, 4.25, 4.26, 4.27, 4.33, 4.44, 4.45, 4.49, 5.13, 5.28, 5.64, 6.05, 10.01, 11.01, 14.24, 14.28, 26.04, 26.05, 26.07, 26.08, 26.10, 26.11, 26.13, 26.20 Donovan v Idant Laboratories 625 F Supp 2d 256 (2009)��������������������������������������26.36 Dooley v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd [1951] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 271������������������6.19, 6.37, 6.38 Doran v Smith 1971 SLT (Sh Ct) 46���������������������������������������������������������������������23.18 Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office [1970] AC 1004�����������������������������������������������7.25 Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Ltd [1964] 1 QB 518�����������������������������������������14.35 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967���������������������������������������������������������� 20.67, 20.69 Douglas v Hello! (No 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125 (CA), revd [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1���������������������������� 19.28, 19.31, 19.33, 19.50, 20.14, 20.39, 20.52, 20.65, 20.66, 20.67, 20.69, 20.70, 20.71, 20.88, 21.35, 21.42, 21.43 Douglas v Monteith (1826) 4 Mur 130������������������������������������������������������������������23.17 Dow v Amec Group Ltd [2017] CSIH 75, 2018 SC 247�����������������������6.01, 6.08, 24.21 Dow v Brown (1844) 6 D 534���������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.17 Dowie v Douglas (1822) 1 Shaw App 125��������������������������������������������������� 16.25, 16.28 Downie v Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police 1998 SLT 8�������������������������������������16.38 Doyle v Advocate General for Scotland [2013] CSOH 164, 2013 GWD 35-698������31.22 Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 QB 158�������������������������������������������������21.75 Doyle v Smith [2018] EWHC 2935 (QB), [2019] EMLR 15����������������������� 18.82, 18.85 Draper v Hodder [1972] 2 QB 556������������������������������������������������������������� 14.37, 27.01 Drew v Western SMT Co 1947 SC 222�����������������������������������������������������������������13.18 Driver v Dover Roman Painted House [2014] EWHC 1929 (QB)���������������������������25.40 Drummond v Alexander (1700) Mor 16703������������������������������������������������ 19.02, 19.41 Drummond-Jackson v British Medical Association [1970] 1 WLR 688��������� 18.21, 18.24 Drury v HM Advocate 2001 SLT 1013������������������������������������������������������������������16.32 Dryburgh v Fife Coal Co (1905) 7 F 1083�������������������������������������������������������������23.25 Dryden v Johnson Matthey plc [2018] UKSC 18, [2019] AC 403������� 2.06, 31.16, 31.17, 31.18, 31.19 Drysdale v Earl of Rosebery 1909 SC 1121������������������������������������������������������������18.08 DSG Retail Ltd v Comet Group plc [2002] EWHC 116, [2002] FSR 58��������������18.143 Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48, [2003] 2 AC 3662.30, 3.14, 3.43, 3.45, 3.48, 3.50, 3.66, 3.77 Dublin (South) City Market Co v McCabes Ltd [1953] IR 283������������������������������22.10 Duce v Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust [2018] EWCA Civ 1307, [2018] PIQR P18���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������13.86 Ducharme v Davies [1984] 1 WWR 699, 29 Sask R 54�������������������������������������������29.61 Dudgeon v Forbes (1833) 11 S 1014�������������������������������������������������������������������18.111 Duff v Chief Constable of Dumfries and Galloway 2014 SC DUM 33, 2014 GWD 26-513, affd [2012] CSIH 45, 2012 SLT 975����������������������������������28.20 Duff v East Dunbartonshire Council 2002 Rep LR 98��������������������������������� 25.21, 25.28 Duff v Highland and Islands Fire Board 1995 SLT 1362��������������������������������� 9.43, 9.45 Duff v National Telephone Co (1889) 16 R 675�������������������������������������������������������4.50 Duff v Strang [2008] HCJAC 4, 2008 JC 251��������������������������������������������������������28.20 Dulieu v White & Sons [1901] 2 KB 669������������������������������������������������������ 6.05, 14.38

xxvi   Table of Cases Dumbreck v Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries) Ltd 1928 SC 547����������������������������25.03 Dumbreck v Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries) Ltd 1929 SC (HL) 51���������� 25.03, 25.04 Duncan v Associated Scottish Newspapers Ltd 1929 SC 14����������������������� 18.15, 18.104 Duncan v Findlater (1839) Macl & R 911����������������������������������������������������������������8.11 Duncan’s Hotel (Glasgow) Ltd v J & A Ferguson Ltd 1974 SC 191��������������� 3.84, 22.12 Dunfermline Building Society v CBRE Ltd [2017] EWHC 2745 (Ch), [2018] PNLR 13����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������11.26 Dunlop v Corbet 20 June 1809 FC������������������������������������������������������������������������23.28 Dunlop v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1920] 1 Ir Rep 280, affd [1921] 1 AC 367����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 18.28, 18.29 Dunlop v McGowans 1980 SC (HL) 73����������������������������������������������������� 30.02, 30.03 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Dunlop Motor Co Ltd 1907 SC (HL) 15������������21.92 Dunn v Carlin 2003 SLT 342����������������������������������������������������������������������� 6.01, 25.21 Dunn v Hamilton (1837) 15 S 853, (1838) 3 S & McL 356������������������������� 22.03, 22.63 Dunnage v Randall [2015] EWCA Civ 673, [2016] QB 639�������������� 10.39, 10.40, 10.41 Dunvale Investments Ltd v Burness Paull & Williamsons LLP [2015] CSOH 32, 2015 SCLR 567������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.15, 11.18 Durham v BAI (Run Off) Ltd [2012] UKSC 14, [2012] 1 WLR 867������������ 13.51, 13.53 Durkin v DSG Retail Ltd [2014] UKSC 21, 2014 SC (UKSC) 139��������������������������5.55 Dutton v Bognor Regis UDC [1972] 1 QB 373��������������������������������������������������������5.81 Dwek v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2000] EMLR 284������������������������������� 18.06, 18.09 Dyer v Munday [1895] 1 QBD 742�������������������������������������������������������������������������3.36 Dynamco Ltd v Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd 1971 SC 257����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.01, 5.10, 5.11 E v English Province of Our Lady of Charity [2012] EWCA Civ 938, [2013] QB 722������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.11, 3.18, 3.21, 3.23 E v UK (2003) 36 EHRR 31�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.33 E Hobbs (Farms) Ltd v Baxenden (Chemical Co) Ltd [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 54������26.12 E Hulton & Co v Jones [1910] AC 20��������������������������������������������������������������������18.51 Easson v LNER [1944] KB 421�����������������������������������������������������������������������������10.63 East v Maurer [1991] 1 WLR 461��������������������������������������������������������������������������21.75 East Lothian Angling Association v Haddington Town Council 1980 SLT 213��������5.05, 5.06 Easton v Louvain Preparations Ltd 1928 SLT (Sh Ct) 33�����������������������������������������1.30 Eccles v Cross 1938 SC 697����������������������������������������������������������������������������������26.08 Economou v de Freitas [2016] EWHC 1853 (QB), [2017] EMLR 4, affd [2018] EWCA Civ 2591, [2019] EMLR 7��������������������������������������������������������� 18.78, 18.84 Edge & Sons Ltd v William Niccolls & Sons Ltd [1911] AC 693�����������������������������21.94 Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459�������������������������������������������������������21.72 Edinburgh Railway Access & Property Co Ltd v John Ritchie & Co (1903) 5 F 299������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 22.03, 22.12 Edward Wong Finance Co Ltd v Johnson Stokes & Master [1984] AC 296������11.12, 11.21 Edwards, Re [2011] NSWSC 478��������������������������������������������������������������������������16.98 Edwards v Lee, The Times, 5 Nov 1991, [1991] NLJ 1517���������������������������������������21.79 Edwin Hill and Partners v First National Finance Corp [1989] 1 WLR 225�������������21.26 EETPU case see Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbing Union v Times Newspapers Eisten v North British Railway Co (1870) 8 M 980��������������������������������������������������1.25 Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbing Union v Times Newspapers [1980] QB 585 (EETPU case)���������������������������������������������18.63 Elguzouli-Daf v Commr of Police of the Metropolis [1995] QB 335��������������������������7.19 Elite Model Management Corp v BBC [2001] All ER (D) 334 (May)���������������������18.54

Table of Cases   xxvii Ellerman Lines Ltd v Clyde Navigation Trs 1911 SC 122���������������������������������������13.18 Elliot v J & C Finney 1989 SLT 208, affd 1989 SLT 605������������������� 30.14, 30.16, 30.24 Elliott v Hall (1885) 15 QBD 315����������������������������������������������������������������������������4.06 Elliott v Saunders, unreported, QBD, 10 June 1994������������������������������������������������10.53 Ellis v Home Office [1953] 2 QB 135����������������������������������������������������������������������4.63 Emeh v Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster AHA [1985] QB 1012����� 14.13, 16.77 Emerald Construction Co Ltd v Lowthian [1966] 1 WLR 691������ 21.13, 21.14, 21.16, 21.18 English v Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co Ltd 1937 SC (HL) 46������������������3.09, 3.82, 3.87, 12.04, 12.07 Environment Agency v Empress Car Co [1999] 2 AC 22����������������������������������������14.06 Erskine v Smith (1700) Mor 16703������������������������������������������������������������ 19.02, 19.41 Erven Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd [1979] AC 731��� 21.82, 21.83, 21.86, 21.87, 21.96, 21.99 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801����������������������������������������������������5.49 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Scottish Ministers [2016] CSOH 15, 2016 SCLR 539, [2015] CSOH 21, 2015 GWD 7-134�������������������������������2.39, 3.83, 3.84, 3.85, 3.86, 22.14, 22.56, 22.59, 22.61 Esterhuizen v Allied Dunbar Assurance [1998] 2 FLR 668, [1998] Fam Law 527�������� 5.77 Etheridge v K [1999] Ed CR 550��������������������������������������������������������������������������10.34 Euclid (Village of) v Ambler Realty Co 272 US 365 (1926)������������������������������������22.23 European Commission v UK (Case C–300/95) [1997] 3 CMLR 923����26.25, 26.82, 26.83, 26.84 Evans v Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd [1936] 1 All ER 283���������������������������������������26.10 Ewart v Brown (1882) 10 R 163����������������������������������������������������������������� 16.03, 16.35 Ewing v Colquhoun’s Trs (1877) 4 R (HL) 116������������������������������������������������������23.12 Ewing v Earl of Mar (1851) 14 D 314, (1852) 14 D 330���������16.03, 16.15, 16.20, 27.01 Exchange Telegraph Co v Giulianotti 1959 SC 19��������������������������������������������������19.09 Eyre v Earl of Moray (1827) 5 S 912����������������������������������������������������������������������22.03 F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation), Re [1990] 2 AC 1�����������������16.09, 16.12, 16.51, 16.54 Fage UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5, [2014] ETMR 26, [2014] FSR 29������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21.87 Fairbairn v Scottish National Party 1979 SC 393������������������������������ 18.10, 18.24, 31.73 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32�����13.11, 13.22, 13.28, 13.36, 13.37, 13.38, 13.39, 13.40, 13.41, 13.42, 13.43, 13.44, 13.45, 13.46, 13.50, 13.52, 13.66, 13.93, 25.24 Fairley v Edinburgh Trams Ltd [2019] CSOH 50, 2019 SLT 819�����������������������������8.04 Fairlie v Carruthers 1996 SLT (Sh Ct) 56��������������������������������������������������� 27.03, 27.14 Fairlie v Perth and Kinross Healthcare NHS Trust 2004 SLT 1200���������������������������7.30 Fairly v Earl of Eglinton (1744) Mor 12780�����������������������������������������������������������22.80 Falconer v Cochran (1837) 15 S 891���������������������������������������������������������������������16.29 Falconer v Edinburgh City Transport Longstone Social Club 2003 Rep LR 39�������25.23, 25.33 Falconer v Glenbervie (1642) Mor 4146��������������������������������������������������� 22.80, 21.108 Farley v G Adam of Hillington 1977 SLT (Sh Ct) 81����������������������������������������������22.10 Farquhar v Murray (1901) 3 F 859������������������������������������������������������������������������11.05 Farquharson v Earl of Aboyn (1679) Mor 4147����������������������������������������� 21.108, 22.80 Farraj v King’s Healthcare NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 1203, [2010] 1 WLR 2139����3.91 Farrell v Avon HA [2001] Lloyd’s Rep Med 458��������������������������������������������� 6.46, 6.47 Farstad Supply AS v Enviroco Ltd [2011] CSOH 153, 2012 SLT 348, affd [2013] CSIH 9, 2013 SC 302���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������31.64 Faulds v British Steel Corp 1977 SLT (Notes) 18����������������������������������������������������6.01

xxviii   Table of Cases FB v Rana [2017] EWCA Civ 334, [2017] PIQR P17��������������������������������������������10.50 Fearn v Board of Trs of the Tate Gallery [2019] EWHC 246 (Ch), [2019] Ch 369, affd [2020] EWCA Civ 104, [2020] Ch 621������������������������������ 22.10, 28.06 Feely v Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd 1990 SLT 547������25.07, 25.10, 25.13, 25.21 Fegan v Highland Council [2007] CSIH 44, 2007 SC 723�������25.21, 25.28, 25.29, 25.30 Fennelly v Connex South Eastern Ltd [2001] IRLR 390���������������������3.36, 16.41, 17.42 Fentiman v Marsh [2019] EWHC 2099 (QB)��������������������������������������������������������18.46 Fenty v Arcadia Group Brands Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 3, [2015] 1 WLR 3291�������20.62, 21.104, 21.105 Ferdinand v MGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB)���������������������������� 20.23, 20.44, 20.49 Ferguson v British Gas Trading Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 46, [2010] 1 WLR 785��������2.28, 28.02, 28.04 Ferguson v Dawson [1976] 1 WLR 1213������������������������������������������������������������������3.18 Ferguson v Ferguson [2015] CSIH 63, 2015 SLT 561����������������������� 27.03, 27.23, 31.71 Ferguson v J & A Lawson [2014] CSIH 82, 2015 SC 243���������������������������������������30.23 Ferguson v Kinnoull (1842) 1 Bell 662��������������������������������������������������������� 7.44, 24.02 Ferguson v Tennant 1978 SC (HL) 19�������������������������������������������������������������������31.75 Fernquest v City & County of Swansea [2011] EWCA Civ 1712������������������������������4.57 Findlay v Blaylock 1937 SC 21������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.28, 21.30 Finlay v Corrins [2020] SAC (Crim) 1, 2020 SC (SAC) 7��������������������������������������28.14 Finlay v Ruddiman and Niell (1763) 5 Bro Sup 575�����������������������������������������������18.52 Firth Shipping Co Ltd v Morton’s Trs (No 2) 1938 SC 177������������������������������������25.18 Fish & Fish Ltd v Sea Shepherd UK [2015] UKSC 10, [2015] AC 1229����� 2.42, 2.43, 2.44 Fitzgerald v Lane [1989] AC 328���������������������������������������������������������������� 13.17, 29.67 Flack v Hudson [2001] QB 698������������������������������������������������������������������ 27.07, 27.08 Flannigan v British Dyewood Co Ltd 1970 SLT 285����������������������������������������������25.45 Flannigan’s Application for Judicial Review, In re [2016] NIQB 27��������������������������20.34 Fleeming v Orr (1855) 2 Macq 14�������������������������������������������������������������������������27.02 Fleming v Gemmill 1908 SC 340������������������������5.05, 13.14, 13.56, 22.28, 22.53, 22.63 Fleming v Hislop (1886) 13 R (HL) 43�����������������������������������22.04, 22.10, 22.21, 22.70 Fleming v Strathclyde RC 1992 SLT 161���������������������������������������������������������������11.55 Fleming v Ure (1750) Mor 13159��������������������������������������������������������������� 22.01, 22.53 Fletcher v Argyll and Bute Council [2007] CSOH 174, 2007 SLT 1047�����������������12.19 Fletcher v Chancery Lane Supplies Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1112������������������������������3.67 Fletcher v Lunan [2008] CSOH 55, 2008 Rep LR 72���������������������������������������������31.57 Flint v Tittensor [2015] EWHC 466 (QB), [2015] 1 WLR 4370�������� 16.25, 16.31, 16.57 Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] UKSC 11, [2012] 2 AC 273������18.01, 18.76, 18.86 Flood v University Court of the University of Glasgow [2010] CSIH 3, 2010 SLT 167��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 12.19, 12.25 Flynn v Lothian and Borders Police 2010 GWD 30-626�����������������������������������������27.13 Flynn v Robin Thompson & Partners [2000] All ER (D) 329������������������������������������2.31 Forbes v City of Dundee DC 1997 SLT 1330����������������������������������������������������������5.24 Forbes v Fife Council 2009 SLT (Sh Ct) 71�����������������������������������������������������������23.10 Forbes v HM Advocate 1994 JC 71������������������������������������������������������������������������20.76 Ford Motor Co Ltd v HLM Design Ltd 1997 SLT 837������������������������������������������11.28 Foreman v Advocate General for Scotland [2016] CSOH 94, 2016 SLT 962���� 31.50, 31.53 Forgie v Henderson (1818) 1 Mur 410��������������������������������������������������������������������2.49 Forrest v Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd 2001 SLT (Sh Ct) 59������������������������30.11 Forsyth v Hare (1834) 13 S 42��������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.29 Forsyth’s Curator Bonis v Govan Shipbuilders Ltd 1988 SC 421����������������������������31.40 Forteith v Earl of Fife (1821) 2 Mur 463��������������������������������������������������������������18.112 Foskett v McClymont 1998 SC 96���������������������������������������������������� 27.09, 27.12, 27.15

Table of Cases   xxix Foster v Biosil (2000) 59 BMLR 178���������������������������������������������������������������������26.66 Foster v British Gas plc (Case C–188/89) [1991] 1 QB 405��������������������������������������7.45 Fothringham v Passmore 1984 SC (HL) 96�����������������������������������������������������������22.80 Fowler v North British Railway Co 1914 SC 866������������������������������������������������������6.05 Fowler v Tierney 1974 SLT (Notes) 23������������������������������������������������������ 29.03, 29.04 Frame v Campbell (1836) 14 S 914�������������������������������������������������������������������������1.23 Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 892������������������������������19.69 Francovich v Italy (C-6/90) [1991] ECR I-5357, [1993] 2 CMLR 66�����������������������7.45 Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP [2013] CSOH 80, 2013 SLT 993��������������������������������������������� 2.42, 2.43, 2.44, 21.80, 21.81 Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP [2014] CSIH 79, 2015 SC 187���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 2.30, 2.44, 5.03, 5.78 Franklin v Chief Constable, Grampian Police 2001 Rep LR 79���������������������������������9.33 Frans Maas (UK) Ltd v Samsung Electronics (UK) Ltd [2004] EWHC 1502 (Comm), [2005] 1 CLC 647����������������������������������������������������������3.62 Fraser v Caledonian Railway Co (1902) 5 F 41����������������������������������������������� 4.29, 4.44 Fraser v Fraser 2010 SLT (Sh Ct) 147������������������������������������������� 18.24, 18.51, 18.110, Fraser v J Morton Wilson Ltd 1965 SLT (Notes) 81�����������������������������������������������31.11 Fraser v Kitsons Insulation Contractors Ltd [2015] CSOH 135, 2015 SLT 753����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 31.58, 31.59, 31.61 Fraser v McArthur Stewart [2008] CSOH 159, 2009 SLT 31�����������������������������������5.75 Fraser v Mirza 1993 SC (HL) 27�������������������������������������� 18.24, 18.106, 18.108, 18.110 Fraser v Rothesay (Mags of) (1892) 19 R 817����������������������������������������������������������8.14 Fraser v State Hospitals Board for Scotland 2001 SLT 1051�����������������������������������12.19 Fraser v Thames Television Ltd [1984] QB 44��������������������������������������������� 19.26, 19.54 Fraser’s Trs v Cran (1877) 4 R 794������������������������������������������������������������� 22.13, 22.21 Fraser’s Trs v Cran (1879) 6 R 451������������������������������������������������������������� 22.03, 22.10 Freeman v Home Office [1984] QB 524���������������������������������11.46, 16.45, 16.47, 16.55 Freeman v Marshall & Co (1966) 200 EG 777�������������������������������������������������������10.50 French v Strathclyde Fire Board [2013] CSOH 3, 2013 SLT 247��������9.51, 11.37, 12.15 Froom v Butcher [1976] QB 286���������������������������������������������������������������� 29.56, 29.58 Fryer v North British Railway Co (1908) 15 SLT 886��������������������������������������������29.61 Fryers v Belfast Health & Social Care Trust [2009] NICA 57����������������������������������12.21 Fullemann v McInnes’s Exrs 1993 SLT 259������������������������������������������������ 31.23, 31.27 Fulton v Stubbs Ltd (1903) 5 F 814����������������������������������������������������������������������19.18 Fulton v Sunday Newspapers Ltd [2017] NICA 45������������������������������������������������28.04 Furmedge v Chester-Le-Street DC [2011] EWHC 1226 (QB)�������������������������������25.18 Furnell v Flaherty [2013] EWHC 377 (QB), [2013] PTSR D20�������������������������������4.41 Fytche v Wincanton Logistics [2004] UKHL 31, [2004] 4 All ER 221��������������������24.20 G v S [2006] CSOH 88, 2006 SLT 795������������������������������������������������������ 16.72, 28.07 G B & A M Anderson v White 2000 SLT 37������������������������������������� 22.12, 22.38, 22.51 GA Estates Ltd v Caviapen Trs Ltd 1993 SLT 1037����������������������������3.85, 22.31, 22.59 Gadois v Baird (1856) 28 SJ 682���������������������������������������������������������������������������28.20 Galbraith’s Curator ad Litem v Stewart (No 2) 1998 SLT 1305��������� 10.31, 29.61, 29.63 Gallagher v Balfour Beatty and Co 1951 SC 712����������������������������������������������������12.10 Gallagher v Kleinwort Benson (Trs) Ltd 2003 SCLR 384���������������������������������������25.09 Gallagher v SC Cheadle Hume Ltd [2014] CSOH 103, 2015 Rep LR 33����� 31.41, 31.55 Galli-Atkinson v Seghal [2003] EWCA Civ 697, [2003] Lloyd’s Rep Med 285������ 6.23, 6.25 Galt v British Railways Board (1983) 133 NLJ 870���������������������������������������������������6.37 Garcia v St Mary’s NHS Trust [2006] EWHC 2314 (QB), [2011] Med LR 348�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������11.12

xxx   Table of Cases Gardiner v Miller 1967 SLT 29������������������������������������������������������������������ 27.01, 27.17 Gardner v Ferguson, unreported, 1795��������������������������������������������������������������������1.16 Garratt v Dailey 279 P 2d 109 (1955)��������������������������������������������������������������������16.11 Garrod v North Devon NHS Primary Care Trust [2006] EWHC 850, [2007] PIQR Q1�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������12.25 Gartside v Outram (1856) 26 LJ Ch 113����������������������������������������������������������������19.63 Gavin v Ayrshire CC 1950 SC 197������������������������������������������������������������� 22.15, 22.17 GB v Home Office [2015] EWHC 819 (QB)������������������������������������������������������������3.90 GE v Commr of An Garda Siochana [2021] IECA 113�������������������������������������������17.29 Geddes v Haldane (1905) 13 SLT 707�������������������������������������������������������������������23.27 Geddes v Lothian HB 1992 SLT 986���������������������������������������������������������������������31.32 Geddes’ Trs v Haldane (1906) 14 SLT 328������������������������������������������������������������23.15 Geddis v Proprietors of the Bann Reservoir (1877–78) LR 3 App Cas 430����������������7.03 Gee v DePuy International Ltd [2018] EWHC 1208 (QB), [2018] Med LR 347����26.52, 26.55, 26.59, 26.62, 26.63, 26.64, 26.66 Gee v Pritchard (1818) 2 Swans 402����������������������������������������������������������������������19.12 Geest plc v Lansiquot [2002] UKPC 48, [2002] 1 WLR 3111���������������������������������31.66 General Cleaning Contractors v Christmas [1953] AC 180���������������� 12.05, 12.10, 12.11 General Motors v Sanchez 997 S W 2d 584 (Tex 1999) �����������������������������������������26.95 George v Eagle Air Services Ltd [2009] UKPC 21, [2009] 1 WLR 2133������ 10.65, 10.67 George v Skivington (1869–70) LR 5 Ex 1������������������������������������������������������ 1.30, 4.06 George Porteous Arts Ltd v Regal Motors 1970 SLT (Notes) 75����������������������������31.12 Gerrard v Eurasian Natural Resources Corp Ltd [2020] EWHC 3241 (QB), [2021] EMLR 8�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������20.81 Gerrard v Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh NHS Trust [2005] CSIH 10, 2005 1 SC 192������������������������������������������������������������������11.06, 11.08, 11.10, 11.12 Giblin v Middle Ward District Committee of the Lanarkshire CC 1927 SLT 563�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������22.13 Gibney v Eric Johnson Stubbs (Scotland) Ltd 1987 SLT 132���������������������������������31.26 Gibson v Babcock International Ltd [2018] CSOH 78, 2018 SLT 886��������������������13.37 Gibson v British Insulated Callenders Construction Co 1973 SC (HL) 15��������������24.21 Gibson v National Cash Register Co Ltd 1925 SC 500�������������������������������������������21.67 Gibson v Orr 1999 SC 420����������������������4.17, 7.08, 7.15, 8.01, 9.02, 9.15, 9.27, 9.28, 9.45, 9.46, 9.47, 9.50, 25.19 Gibson v Strathclyde RC 1993 SLT 1243����������������������������������������������������������������8.08 Gibson v West Lothian Council [2011] CSOH 110, 2011 Rep LR 84, affd [2012] CSIH 62, 2012 GWD 28-583�����������������������������������������������������������8.26 Giffen v McGill’s Exrs 1983 SLT 498��������������������������������������������������������������������10.42 Gilfillan v Barbour 2003 SLT 1127��������������������������������������������������������������� 9.15, 11.38 Gillick v BBC [1996] EMLR 267��������������������������������������������������������������������������18.12 Gillies v Ralph 2009 JC 25������������������������������������������������������������������������������������20.77 Gilligan v Robb 1910 SC 856����������������������������������������������������������������������� 6.05, 27.01 Gillingham BC v Medway (Chatham Docks) Co Ltd [1993] QB 343����������������������22.25 Gillon v Chief Constable of Strathclyde Police 1997 SLT 1218���������������������� 9.33, 10.14 Gillon v HM Advocate [2006] HCJAC 61, 2007 JC 24�������������������������������������������16.31 Ginty v Belmont Building Supplies Ltd [1959] 1 All ER 414����������������������������������24.24 Girvan v Inverness Farmers Dairy 1998 SC (HL) 1������������������������������������� 31.23, 31.71 Glancy v Southern General Hospital NHS Trust [2013] CSOH 35, 2013 GWD 10-221�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������11.47 Glasgow City Council v First Glasgow (No 1) Ltd [2019] CSOH 101, 2020 SLT 75���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4.25, 4.35, 4.40, 5.56 Glasgow (City of) DC v Carroll 1991 SLT (Sh Ct) 46��������������������������������������������22.10

Table of Cases   xxxi Glasgow Corp v Barclay, Curle & Co Ltd 1923 SC (HL) 78�������������������������������������1.29 Glaxo Wellcome UK Ltd v Sandoz Ltd [2019] EWHC 2545 (Ch)��������������������������21.94 Glen v Korean Airlines Co Ltd [2003] EWHC 643 (QB), [2003] QB 1386�������������26.42 Glen v Lagwell Insulation Co Ltd [2017] CSOH 153, 2018 Rep LR 25������� 31.30, 31.33 Gleneagles Hotels Ltd v Quillco 100 Ltd 2003 SLT 812������������������������������ 21.83, 21.87 Glennie v University Court of the University of Aberdeen [2013] CSOH 71, 2013 GWD 17-362�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������25.21 Global Resources Group v Mackay [2008] CSOH 148, 2009 SLT 104������� 21.04, 21.05, 21.07, 21.10, 21.17, 21.18, 21.20, 21.24, 21.25, 21.33, 21.35, 21.38, 21.43, 21.45 Globe (Aberdeen) Ltd v North of Scotland Water Authority 2000 SC 392������ 8.07, 22.14 GN v Poole BC [2019] UKSC 25, [2020] AC 780, [2019] 2 WLR 1478�����������������������������������4.19, 7.06, 7.13, 7.17, 7.18, 7.19, 7.22, 7.26, 8.24 Godefroy v Dalton (1830) 6 Bingham 460�������������������������������������������������������������11.20 Godwin v Uzoigwe [1993] Fam Law 65������������������������������������������������������ 21.48, 21.49 Gold v Essex CC [1942] 2 KB 293��������������������������������������������������������������������������3.22 Goldie v Goldie’s and Threshie’s Representatives (1842) 4 D 1489���������������������������1.26 Goldie v Macdonald (1757) Mor 352����������������������������������������������������������������������5.68 Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645������������������������������������������������4.73, 22.41, 22.49 Goldsmith v Bhoyrul [1998] QB 459���������������������������������������������������������������������18.62 Good v Lanarkshire HB [2015] CSOH 75, 2015 Rep LR 99����������������������������������31.39 Goodes v East Sussex CC [2000] 1 WLR 1356����������������������������������������������� 8.12, 8.28 Goodwill v British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1996] 1 WLR 1397������������ 16.88, 16.90 Goodwin v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1437 (QB), [2011] EMLR 27����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.23, 20.44 Goorkani v Tayside HB 1991 SLT 94��������������������������������������������� 11.54, 11.55, 16.101 Gordon v John Leng & Co 1919 SC 415����������������������������������������������������������������18.24 Gordon v Stewart (1842) 5 D 8�����������������������������������������������������������������������������16.03 Gordon v Wilson 1992 SLT 849����������������������������������������������������������������������������31.40 Gordon’s Trs v Campbell Riddell Breeze Paterson LLP [2017] UKSC 75, 2017 SLT 1287�������������������������������������������������������������������������������30.05 Gore v Stannard (t/a Wyvern Tyres) [2012] EWCA Civ 1248, [2014] QB 1�������������22.05 Gorham v British Telecommunications plc [2000] 1 WLR 2129��������������������������������5.77 Gorringe v Calderdale MBC [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057������2.15, 7.10, 7.11, 7.19, 8.02, 8.16, 8.18, 8.19, 8.20, 8.21, 8.22, 9.44, 24.02, 24.03, 24.05 Gorris v Scott (1873–74) LR 9 Ex 125�������������������������������������������������������� 14.46, 24.18 Gough v Thorne [1966] 1 WLR 1387��������������������������������������������������������������������29.62 Gourock Ropework Co Ltd v Greenock Corp 1966 SLT 125����������������������� 22.12, 22.59 Govan v Lang (1794) Mor 10499��������������������������������������������������������������������������23.01 Gow v Glasgow Education Authority 1922 SC 260�������������������������������������� 10.36, 11.33 Gracie v City of Edinburgh Council [2018] CSOH 37, 2018 GWD 13-187�������������30.23 Gracie v Clyde Spinning Co Ltd 1915 SC 906�������������������������������������������������������31.68 Graham v Commercial Bodyworks Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 47, [2015] PIQR P15�����3.58, 3.59, 12.05 Graham v East of Scotland Water Authority 2002 Rep LR 58����������������������� 25.21, 25.28 Graham v Roy (1851) 13 D 634����������������������������������������������������������������������������18.20 Graham v Strathern 1924 SC 699��������������������������������������������������������������������������17.59 Grahame v M’Kenzie (1810) Hume 641����������������������������������������������������������������23.07 Grahame v Mags of Kirkcaldy (1882) 9 R (HL) 91������������������������������������� 23.12, 23.13 Gran Gelato Ltd v Richcliff Ltd [1992] Ch 560������������������������������������������������������21.79 Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd [1936] AC 85������������������������������������ 26.07, 26.13 Grant v Chief Constable, Grampian Police 2001 Rep LR 74�������������������������������������9.33

xxxii   Table of Cases Grant v Fife Council [2013] CSOH 11, 2013 Rep LR 73���������������������������������������12.03 Grant v Forbes and Henderson (1758) Mor 2081��������������������������������������������������31.20 Grant v International Insurance Co of Hanover Ltd [2021] UKSC 12, 2021 SC (UKSC) 1 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������15.21 Grant v Lothian RC 1988 SLT 533�������������������������������������������������������������������������8.24 Grant v National Coal Board 1956 SC (HL) 48������������������������������������������ 14.46, 24.18 Grant v Sun Shipping Co Ltd 1948 SC (HL) 73������������������������������� 13.18, 13.19, 13.25 Grant Estates Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2012] CSOH 133, 2012 GWD 29-588����������������������������������������������������������������������������5.33, 5.63, 5.89 Gravil v Carroll [2008] EWCA Civ 689, [2008] IRLR 829, [2008] ICR 1222�������3.52, 10.52 Gray v Avadis [2003] EWHC 1830 (QB)�������������������������������������������������������������18.102 Gray v Brassey (1852) 15 D 135������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.23 Gray v Dunlop 1954 SLT (Sh Ct) 75���������������������������������������������������������� 22.50, 22.83 Gray v Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (1890) 17 R 1185������ 18.80, 18.113 Gray v Thames Trains Ltd [2009] UKHL 33, [2009] 1 AC 1339������ 13.81, 29.27, 29.39, 29.40, 29.43, 29.45 Great North of Scotland Railway Co v Mann (1892) 19 R 1035�����������������������������19.53 Greater Glasgow HB v W 2006 SCLR 159������������������������������������������������������������17.39 Greatorex v Greatorex [2000] 1 WLR 1970����������������������������������������������������� 6.28, 6.35 Green v Chalmers [2017] SAC (Civ) 8, 2017 SLT (Sh Ct) 69, 2016 SCLR 413�����28.04, 28.06, 28.10, 28.12, 28.13, 31.72, 31.73 Green v Lord Somerleyton [2003] EWCA Civ 198, [2004] 1 P & CR 33����������������22.49 Green v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2013] EWCA Civ 1197, [2014] Bus LR 168��24.03 Greene v Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co 257 NY 190, 177 NE 416 (1931)�������������������10.05 Greenfield v Irwin [2001] 1 WLR 1279, [2001] PIQR Q7���������������������������������������16.79 Greengairs Rovers Football Club v Blades (1910) 26 Sh Ct Rep 280�������������������������2.34 Greenhorn v South Glasgow University Hospitals NHS Trust [2008] CSOH 128, (2008) 104 BMLR 50��������������������������������������������������������� 10.48, 10.50 Greenman v Yuba Power Products Inc 59 Cal 2d 57 (1963)������������������������������������26.21 Greenstein v Campaign Against Antisemitism [2021] EWCA Civ 1006, [2021] EMLR 24����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.74 Gregg v Scott [2002] EWCA Civ 1471, (2003) 71 BMLR 16���������������������������������13.95 Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2, [2005] 2 AC 176��������������������13.92, 13.93, 13.94, 13.95 Gribben v Gribben 1976 SLT 266�������������������������������������������������������������������������31.74 Grier v Chief Constable, Police Scotland [2020] CSOH 33, 2020 SCLR 619���� 17.55, 17.56 Grier v Lord Advocate [2021] CSOH 18, 2021 SLT 371����������������������������������������17.58 Griffin v Mersey Regional Ambulance [1998] PIQR P34������������������������������� 9.54, 11.38 Griffiths v Arch Engineering Co (Newport) Ltd [1968] 3 All ER 217������26.06, 26.09, 26.11 Griffiths v Liverpool Corp [1967] 1 QB 374������������������������������������������������������������8.12 Grondona v Stoffel & Co [2020] UKSC 42, [2020] 3 WLR 1156������ 29.29, 29.30, 29.32, 29.34, 29.35 Groom v Selby [2001] EWCA Civ 1522, [2002] PIQR P18, (2002) 64 BMLR 47���16.91 Group B Plaintiffs v Medical Research Council (1998) 41 BMLR 157������������� 6.48, 6.49 Groves v Lord Wimborne [1898] 2 QB 402��������������������������������������� 24.06, 24.07, 24.13 Grubb v Shannon 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 193����������������������������������������������������������������3.29 Gubarev v Orbis Business Intelligence Ltd [2020] EWHC 2912 (QB)���������������������18.50 Gujra v Roath & Roath [2018] EWHC 854 (QB), [2018] 1 WLR 3208�������� 29.40, 29.42 Gulati v MGN Ltd [2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch), [2016] FSR 12, affd [2015] EWCA Civ 1291, [2017] QB 149��������������������������� 19.45, 20.11, 20.21, 20.33, 20.34, 20.38, 20.57, 20.78, 20.81 Gumpo v Church of Scientology Religious Education College Inc [2000] CP Rep 38�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21.48

Table of Cases   xxxiii Gunn v Gunn 1955 SLT (Notes) 69����������������������������������������������������������������������28.22 GUS Property Management Ltd v Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd 1982 SC (HL) 157����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������31.12 Guy v Strathkelvin DC 1997 Hous LR 14��������������������������������������������������������������25.21 GWK Ltd v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd (1926) 42 TLR 376���������������������������������������21.34 H v The Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children [1990] 1 Med LR 297�������������������26.68 H & J M Bennett (Potatoes) Ltd v Secretary of State for Scotland 1990 SC (HL) 27�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21.72 Haberstich v McCormick and Nicholson 1975 SC 1����������������������������������������������11.21 Haggart v Duncan (1857) 20 D 180������������������������������������������������������������������������1.22 Haggart’s Trs v Lord President Hope (1824) 2 Shaw’s App 125����������������� 17.34, 18.103 Haggarty v Glasgow Corp 1964 SLT (Notes) 54����������������������������������������� 25.15, 25.34 Haig & Co v Forth Blending Co 1954 SC 35���������������������������������������������� 21.88, 21.94 Hale v Hants & Dorset Motor Services Ltd [1947] 2 All ER 628�����������������������������13.18 Haley v London Electricity Board [1965] AC 778���������������������������������4.30, 4.31, 10.17 Halkerston v Wedderburn (1781) Mor 10495���������������������������������������������������������23.11 Halkett v McSkeane 1962 SLT (Sh Ct) 59�������������������������������������������������������������16.23 Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club [1933] 1 KB 205�������������������������������� 10.56, 25.57 Hall v Corbet (1698) Mor 12775���������������������������������������������������������������������������22.01 Hall v Holker Estate Co Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 1422��������������������������������������������25.18 Hallowell v Niven (1843) 5 D 759�������������������������������������������������������������� 16.25, 16.28 Halpin v Oxford Brookes University [1996] CLY 5658�����������������������������������������18.110 Hamble Fisheries Ltd v L Gardner & Sons Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1�������������������26.08 Hambrook v Stokes Bros [1925] 1 KB 141��������������������������������������������������������������6.05 Hamcor Pty Ltd v State of Queensland [2014] QSC 224������������������������������������������9.48 Hamilton v Al Fayed [2001] 1 AC 395�����������������������������������������������������������������18.101 Hamilton v Allied Domecq plc [2007] UKHL 33, 2007 SC (HL) 142����������������������5.33 Hamilton v Anderson (1856) 18 D 1003����������������������������������������������������������������17.34 Hamilton v Arbuthnott (1750) Mor 7682������������������������������������������������18.142, 18.145 Hamilton v Clifford [2004] EWHC 1542 (QB)������������������������������������������������������18.97 Hamilton v Ferguson Transport (Spean Bridge) Ltd [2012] CSIH 52, 2012 SC 486����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 31.56, 31.71 Hamilton v Fife HB 1993 SC 369����������������������������������������������������������������������������2.22 Hamilton v Hope (1827) 5 S 569�������������������������������������������������������������� 15.20, 18.103 Hamilton v Turner (1867) 5 M 1086������������������������������������������������ 23.23, 23.25, 23.28 Hamilton v Wahla 1999 Rep LR 118���������������������������������������������������������� 22.56, 23.31 Hammersley-Gonsalves v Redcar and Cleveland BC [2012] EWCA Civ 1135, [2012] ELR 431�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������11.34 Hand v North of Scotland Water Authority 2002 SLT 798��������������������������� 22.14, 22.53 Hanke v Resurfice Corp 2007 SCC 7, [2007] 1 SCR 333���������������������������������������26.19 Hanley v Mags of Edinburgh 1913 SC (HL) 27������������������������������������������ 22.03, 22.12 Hanlon v British Railways Board 1991 SLT 228�����������������������������������������������������25.32 Hanlon v Glasgow and South Western Railway Co (1899) 1 F 559��������������������������16.41 Hannigan v Lanarkshire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust [2012] CSOH 152, 2013 SCLR 179����������������������������������������������������������������������������11.10 Hannon v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2015] EMLR 1��������������������������������������20.53 Hardey v Russel & Aitken 2003 GWD 2-50����������������������������19.24, 19.25, 19.36, 19.59 Hardman v Amin [2001] PNLR 11������������������������������������������������������������������������16.94 Harkes v Mowat (1862) 24 D 701�������������������������������������������������������������������������18.31 Harkness v Daily Record Ltd 1924 SLT 759����������������������������������������������������������18.52 Harper v Stuart (1907) 15 SLT 550�����������������������������������������������������������������������23.36

xxxiv   Table of Cases Harpers v Greenwood & Batley (1896) 4 SLT 116�����������������������������������������������18.141 Harris v Advocate General for Scotland [2016] CSOH 49, 2016 SLT 572������ 2.39, 31.36 Harris v Brights Asphalt Contractors Ltd [1953] 1 QB 617������������������������������������31.38 Harris v Evans [1998] 1 WLR 1285�������������������������������������������������������������������������7.29 Harris v North British Railway Co (1891) 18 R 1009���������������������������������������������16.40 Harris v Perry [2008] EWCA Civ 907, [2009] 1 WLR 19������������������������������ 4.65, 10.37 Harrison v Michelin Tyre Co Ltd [1985] ICR 696����������������������������������������������������3.58 Harrison v Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co [1891] 2 Ch 409�������������������������������22.22 Harrison v Technical Sign Co Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1569, [2014] PNLR 15���������11.24 Harrison v Vincent [1982] RTR 8��������������������������������������������������������������������������10.54 Harrison v West of Scotland Kart Club 2001 SC 367, revd 2004 SC 615�������� 2.33, 2.35, 25.61 Harriton v Stephens [2006] HCA 15���������������������������������������������������������������������16.96 Harrods Ltd v Harrodian School Ltd [1996] RPC 697�������������������������������������������21.98 Harrods Ltd v Times Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 294�������������������������������19.63 Hart v Dominion Stores (1968) 67 DLR (2d) 675��������������������������������������� 26.07, 26.15 Hartman v South Essex Mental Health and Community Care NHS Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 6, [2005] ICR 782���������������������������������������������������������������12.21 Hartt v Newspaper Publishing TLR 9 Nov 1989�����������������������������������������������������18.11 Harvey v Cairns 1989 SLT 107�����������������������������������������������������������������������������29.61 Harvey v Dyce (1876) 4 R 265����������������������������������������������������������������� 17.34, 18.103 Harvey v Sturgeon 1912 SC 974����������������������������������������������������������������������������17.20 Harvie v Robertson (1903) 5 F 338�������������������������������������������������� 22.53, 22.67, 22.68 Harvie v Turner (1916) 32 Sh Ct Rep 267�������������������������������������������������������������23.09 Haseldine v C A Daw and Son Ltd [1941] 2 KB 343����������������������������������������������26.06 Haskett v Trans Union of Canada Inc (2003) 224 DLR (4th) 419����������������������������5.55 Hastie v Mags of Edinburgh 1907 SC 1102������������������������������������������������������������25.37 Hastings v Finsbury Orthopaedics Ltd [2019] CSOH 96, 2019 SLT 1411, affd [2021] CSIH 6, 2021 SLT 187���������������������������������26.19, 26.48, 26.55, 26.59, 26.62, 26.63 Hatton v Sutherland [2002] EWCA Civ 76, [2002] 2 All ER 1���������� 12.16, 12.17, 12.19 Hatton v UK (2003) 37 EHRR 28�������������������������������������������������������������������������22.76 Hawkins v Coulsdon and Purley UDC [1954] 1 QB 319������������������� 10.05, 10.06, 26.06 Hawkins v Smith (1896) 12 TLR 532����������������������������������������������������������������������4.06 Hawley v Luminar Leisure Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 18, [2006] PIQR P17�������� 3.31, 3.32, 3.34, 3.52 Hay v Bailie (1868) 7 M 32�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������11.05 Hay v Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland 2003 SLT 612��������������������18.102 Hay v Littlejohn (1666) Stair’s Decisions I, 358, (1666) Mor 13974��������������� 1.09, 22.01 Hay’s Trs v Young (1877) 4 R 398�������������������������������������������������������������������������23.04 Haydon v Kent CC [1978] QB 343�������������������������������������������������������������������������8.28 Hayford v Forrester-Paton 1927 SC 740��������������������������������������� 18.31, 18.105, 18.110 Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146�������������������������������������������������������������� 4.50, 6.30 Hayward v Zurich Insurance Co plc [2016] UKSC 48, [2017] AC 142������� 21.71, 21.72, 21.73 Heary v Phinn 2013 SLT (Sh Ct) 145��������������������������������������������������������� 25.06, 25.59 Heasmans v Clarity Cleaning Co [1987] ICR 949, [1987] IRLR 286������������������������3.63 Heaton v AXA Equity and Law Life Assurance Society plc [2002] UKHL 15, [2002] 2 AC 329����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������13.61 Heaven v Pender (1883) 11 QBD 503��������������������������� 1.26, 1.27, 1.28, 1.30, 4.06, 4.07 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465������������������������������4.13, 5.27, 5.28, 5.29, 5.30, 5.33, 5.44, 5.48, 5.51, 5.52, 5.57, 5.59, 5.62, 5.63, 5.66, 5.67, 5.70, 5.71, 5.79, 5.81, 5.82, 5.83, 7.19, 9.24, 21.64

Table of Cases   xxxv Hegarty v Shine (1878) LR 4 Ir 288����������������������������������������������������������������������29.26 Heil v Rankin [2001] QB 272, [2001] PIQR Q3������������������������������������������ 13.78, 31.22 Hemmens v Wilson Browne [1995] Ch 223�������������������������������������������������������������5.74 Henderson v Chief Constable, Fife Police 1988 SLT 361��������16.20, 17.21, 17.32, 20.84, 20.85 Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124������������������������������ 29.29, 29.30, 29.31, 29.32, 29.34, 29.35, 29.38, 29.41, 29.42, 29.43, 29.44, 29.46 Henderson v John Stuart (Farms) Ltd 1963 SC 245������������������������������������ 27.03, 27.20 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145������������������ 4.18, 5.30, 5.60, 5.61, 5.62, 5.63, 5.64, 5.66, 5.79, 5.80, 5.83, 5.89, 11.01 Henderson v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2008] CSOH 146, 2008 SCLR 823��������14.53 Henderson v Wotherspoon [2013] CSOH 113, [2013] PNLR 28����������������������������11.21 Henderson and Thomson v Stewart (1818) Hume 522�������������������������������������������22.63 Heneghan v Manchester Dry Docks Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 86, [2016] 1 WLR 2036����������������������������������������������������������� 13.28, 13.43, 13.52, 13.67, 13.68 Henry v Chief Constable Thames Valley [2010] RTR 14�����������������������������������������11.39 Henry v Rentokil Initial plc [2008] CSIH 24, 2008 SC 447������������������������������������31.70 Henry Squire Cash Chemist Ltd v Ball, Baker and Co (1911) 27 TLR 269, affd (1911) 28 TLR 81��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������11.30 Henwood v Municipal Tramways Trust (The) (1938) 60 CLR 438����� 29.24, 29.27, 29.37 Hepburn v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2002] EWCA Civ 1841����������16.16 HM Advocate v Kelly (Stephen), unreported, HCJ, 23 February 2001��������������������16.13 HM Advocate v Mola (Giovanni), unreported, HCJ, 7 February 2007���������������������16.13 HM Advocate v R 2002 SLT 834, revd [2002] UKPC D 3, 2003 SC (PC) 21���������17.01 Herd v Weardale Steel, Coal and Coke Co [1915] AC 67����������������������������������������17.14 Herron v A, B, C, and D 1977 SLT (Sh Ct) 24������������������������������������������������������17.01 Herschtal v Stewart & Ardern Ltd [1940] 1 KB 155�����������������������������������������������26.07 Hester v MacDonald 1961 SC 370������������������������������������������������������������������������17.58 Hewison v Meridian Shipping Pte Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1821, [2003] PIQR P17��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������29.52 Hewitt v Bonvin [1940] 1 KB 188���������������������������������������������������������������������������3.74 HFC Bank plc v Midland Bank plc [2000] FSR 176�����������������������������������������������21.88 Hicks v Young [2015] EWHC 1144 (QB)��������������������������������������������������������������17.10 Higgins v Burton 1967 SLT (Notes) 61�������������������������������������������������������������������6.18 Highland Dancing Board v Alloa Printing Co Ltd 1971 SLT (Sh Ct) 50�����������������18.61 Highland Railway Co v Menzies (1878) 5 R 887����������������������������������������� 16.03, 16.40 Hilder v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 1434��������10.21 Hill v Caledonian Railway Co (1855) 17 D 569��������������������������������������������������������1.24 Hill v Campbell (1905) 8 F 220�����������������������������������������������������������������������������17.21 Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53�������� 4.30, 4.41, 7.14, 9.04, 9.05, 9.06, 9.07, 9.09, 9.12, 9.13, 9.24 Hill v Chivers 1987 SLT 323���������������������������������������������������������������������������������29.56 Hill v Council of the Law Society of Scotland 2000 SC 582������������������������������������31.72 Hill v James Crowe (Cases) Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 812���������������26.07, 26.09, 26.14, 26.15 Hill v Lovett 1992 SLT 994�������������������������������������������������������������� 25.18, 25.21, 27.01 Hill v McAlpine 2004 SLT 736�����������������������������������������������������������������������������30.24 Hill v Merricks and Hay (1813) Hume 397������������������������������������������������������������23.08 Hill v Norside Ltd [2013] CSIH 44, 2013 GWD 19-387����������������������������������������24.27 Hill’s Trs v Mags of Edinburgh 1912 2 SLT 284�����������������������������������������������������23.27 Hincks v Sense Network Ltd [2018] EWHC 533 (QB), [2019] ICR 385�������������������5.53 Hines v King Sturge LLP [2010] CSIH 86, 2011 SLT 2���������������������������������� 4.13, 4.34 Hiram v Mullen [2020] SC EDIN 23, 2020 SLT (Sh Ct) 135��������������������������������18.24

xxxvi   Table of Cases Hirsch v S C Johnson & Son, Inc 280 NW 2d 129 (Wis 1979)��������������������������������20.61 Hislop v Durham (1842) 4 D 1168�������������������������������������������� 1.17, 4.71, 25.02, 29.54 HIT Finance Ltd v Cohen Arnold & Co [1999] All ER (D) 1107���������������������������11.30 HL v UK (2005) 40 EHRR 32������������������������������������������������������������������� 17.06, 17.47 Hoare v Silverlock (1848) 12 QB 624��������������������������������������������������������� 18.13, 18.16 Hobbin v Vertical Descents Ltd [2011] CSOH 207, 2012 GWD 3-53���������������������31.07 Hockley Mint Ltd v Ramsden [2018] EWCA Civ 2480, [2019] 1 WLR 1617������3.65, 3.66 Hodder v Tower Hamlets LBC [1993] CLY 1371��������������������������������������������������22.10 Hodges v Webb [1920] 2 Ch 70�����������������������������������������������������������������������������21.49 Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd v Wards Mobility Services Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 1564���������21.88 Hoffman v Sofaer [1982] 1 WLR 1350�������������������������������������������������������������������31.23 Hogan v Bentinck West Hartley Collieries [1949] 1 All ER 588�������������������������������14.10 Hogg v Campbell 1993 GWD 27-1712������������������������������������������������������������������23.04 Holbeck Hall Hotel Ltd v Scarborough BC [2000] QB 836������������������������� 22.41, 23.21 Holdich v Lothian HB [2013] CSOH 197, 2014 SLT 495��������2.06, 16.86, 16.98, 16.99, 16.100, 16.101, 16.102, 31.10 Hollingworth v Southern Ferries Ltd (The Eagle) [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 70�������������25.18 Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468�����������������������������������������22.36 Holmes v Ashford [1950] 2 All ER 76��������������������������������������������������������������������26.52 Holmes v Bank of Scotland 2002 SLT 544���������������������������������������������������������������5.71 Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd [2000] ICR 1086��������13.12, 13.49, 13.58, 13.59 Holyoake v Candy [2017] EWHC 3397 (Ch)���������������������������������������������������������21.73 Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004��������������������������4.14, 4.47, 4.62, 7.25, 9.29, 14.07 Homsi v Homsi [2016] VSC 354�����������������������������������������������������������������������������6.28 Hondon Development Ltd v Powerise Investments Ltd [2005] HKCA 29, [2006] PNLR 1������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������11.21 Honeybourne v Burgess [2005] CSOH 151, 2006 SLT 585������������������������������������25.23 Honeywill and Stein Ltd v Larkin Bros (London’s Commercial Photographers), Ltd [1934] 1 KB 191������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.83 Honisz v Lothian HB [2006] CSOH 24, 2008 SC 235���������������������� 11.08, 11.10, 11.11 Hook v McCallum (1905) 7 F 528������������������������������������������������������������������������13.26 Hopper v Reeve (1817) 7 Taunton 698�������������������������������������������������������������������16.11 Hopps v Mott MacDonald Ltd [2009] EWHC 1881 (QB), [2009] All ER (D) 259 (Jul)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������12.13 Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135�������������������������������������������������������������18.106, 18.110 Horsley v Cascade Insulation Services Ltd [2009] EWHC 2945�����������������������������13.49 Horsley v MacLaren (The Ogopogo) [1971] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 410 (SCC)���������� 4.57, 13.05 Horton v Taplin [2002] EWCA Civ 1604, [2003] ICR 179�������������������������������������24.25 Hosie v Arbroath Football Club 1978 SLT 122������������������������������������������������������25.25 Hotson v East Berkshire AHA [1987] AC 750������������������������13.44, 13.74, 13.89, 13.90, 13.91, 13.92, 13.93 Houchin v Lincolnshire Probation Trust [2014] EWCA Civ 823�������������������������������7.40 Hounga v Allen [2014] UKSC 47, [2014] 1 WLR 2889��������������������� 29.33, 29.37, 29.42 Hourani v Thomson [2017] EWHC 432 (QB)�������������������������������������������������������18.85 Houston v M’Laren (1894) 21 R 923���������������������������������������������������������������������23.12 Howie v Upper Clyde Shipbuilders Ltd 1991 SLT 2�����������������������������������������������31.40 Howmet Ltd v Economy Devices Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 847, [2016] BLR 555�����26.12, 26.97 Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84������������������������������������������������������������������������19.61 Hubbuck & Sons Ltd v Wilkinson Heywood & Clark Ltd [1899] 1 QB 86�������������18.143 Hucks v Cole [1993] 4 Med LR 393����������������������������������������������������������������������11.12 Huda v Wells [2017] EWHC 2553, [2018] EMLR 7��������������������������������������������18.102

Table of Cases   xxxvii Hudson v Ridge Manufacturing Co Ltd [1957] 2 QB 348��������������������������������������12.05 Hufford v Samsung Electronics (UK) Ltd [2014] EWHC 2956 (TCC), [2014] All ER (D) 60 (Sep)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������26.65 Hugh v National Coal Board 1972 SC 252��������������������������������������� 24.28, 27.20, 29.18 Hughes v Lord Advocate 1963 SC (HL) 31��������������������������������������� 14.31, 14.35, 14.37 Hughes v National Union of Mineworkers [1991] 4 All ER 278��������������������������������9.33 Hughes v Percival (1883) 8 App Cas 443�����������������������������������������������������������������3.80 Hughes v Turning Point Scotland [2019] CSOH 42, 2019 SLT 651�������4.21, 4.25, 4.40, 4.52, 9.48, 11.03, 11.42, 11.44 Hughes’ Tutrix v Glasgow DC 1982 SLT (Sh Ct) 70����������������������������������������������25.59 Hughes-Holland v BPE Solicitors [2017] UKSC 21, [2018] AC 599����������������������14.46, 14.49, 14.50, 14.52 Humberside Police (Chief Constable of) v Mulloy [2002] EWCA Civ 1851������������16.38 Humphrey v Aegis Defence Services Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 11, [2017] 1 WLR 2937������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 10.26, 12.14 Humphries v Brogden (1850) 12 QB 739���������������������������������������������������������������23.24 Hunt v Optima (Cambridge) Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 714, [2015] 1 WLR 1346�������11.28 Hunt v Severs [1994] 2 AC 350�������������������������������������������������������������������� 2.51, 31.40 Hunter v British Coal Corp [1999] QB 140�������������������������������������������������������������6.41 Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655��������������22.10, 22.13, 22.14, 22.25, 22.53, 22.54 Hunter v Hanley 1955 SC 200�������������������������������������������������������������������� 7.33, 11.03, 11.05, 11.07, 11.08, 11.12, 11.13, 11.14, 11.15, 11.16, 11.17, 11.18, 11.20, 11.29, 11.30, 11.31, 11.32, 11.37, 11.43, 11.44, 11.45 Hunter v National Specialist Steeplejacks 2004 Rep LR 26�������������������������������������31.12 Hunter v Perth and Kinross Council 2001 SCLR 856��������������������������������������������11.33 Hunter v Sommerville (1903) 11 SLT 70���������������������������������������������������������������18.32 Hunter’s Exrx v Advocate General for Scotland [2016] CSOH 166, 2016 SLT 1287����� 31.50 Huntley v Ward (1859) 6 CB (NS) 514����������������������������������������������������������������18.110 Hurley v Dyke [1979] RTR 265�����������������������������������������������������������������������������26.12 Hussain v Houston 1995 SLT 1060�����������������������������������������������������������������������16.52 Hussain v Lancaster City Council [2000] QB 1������������������������������������������������������22.63 Hutcheson v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 808, [2012] EMLR 2�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������20.23 Hutchison v City of Dundee DC 1996 Rep LR 181������������������������������������������������31.23 Hutchison v Davidson 1945 SC 395����������������������������������������������������������������������31.11 Hutchison v North Lanarkshire Council [2007] CSOH 23���������������������������������������8.08 Huth v Huth [1915] 3 KB 32��������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.38 Huttley v Simmons [1898] 1 QB 181���������������������������������������������������������������������21.51 Hyam v DPP [1975] AC 55�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������15.09 Hyslop v Staig (1816) 1 Mur 15����������������������������������������������������������������������������16.15 ICI Ltd v Shatwell [1965] AC 656������������������������������� 24.28, 27.20, 29.05, 29.08, 29.18 ICL Tech Ltd v Johnston Oils Ltd [2012] CSOH 62, 2012 SLT 667����� 4.36, 4.37, 11.08, 11.16, 11.17 ICL Tech Ltd v Johnston Oils Ltd [2013] CSOH 159, 2013 SLT 1090������������ 4.36, 4.37 Ide v ATB Sales Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 424, [2009] RTR 8������������������������ 26.66, 26.67 Ilkiw v Samuels [1963] 1 WLR 991��������������������������������������������������������������������������3.36 Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908, [2011] Fam 116������������������ 19.45, 20.33 Informer (An) v A Chief Constable [2012] EWCA Civ 197, [2013] QB 579���� 9.20, 9.26 Inglis v Shotts Iron Co (1881) 8 R 1006, affd (1882) 9 R (HL) 78���� 22.10, 22.15, 22.16, 22.27 Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396��������������������������������� 19.63, 19.65, 19.69

xxxviii   Table of Cases Inman v Reck (1867–69) LR 2 PC 25����������������������������������������������������������������������4.44 Innes v Mags of Edinburgh (1798) Mor 13189 and 13967������1.16, 1.17, 1.24, 8.01, 8.02 Innes v Wylie (1844) 1 C & K 257�������������������������������������������������������������������������16.16 International Energy Group Ltd v Zurich Insurance plc [2015] UKSC 33, [2016] AC 509������������������������������������������������������� 13.02, 13.43, 13.51, 13.53, 13.54 Inventors Friend Ltd v Leathes Prior [2011] EWHC 711 (QB), [2011] PNLR 20���11.19 Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1994] 3 NZLR 513, [1996] AC 624���������� 5.23, 5.24 Inverurie Mags v Sorrie 1956 SC 175��������������������������������������������������������� 23.04, 31.72 Iqbal v Dean Manson Solicitors [2011] EWCA Civ 123, [2011] IRLR 428���� 2.30, 28.06 Iqbal v London Transport Executive (1974) 16 KIR 329������������������������������������������3.36 Iqbal v Prison Officers Association [2009] EWCA Civ 1312, [2010] QB 732�����������17.31 Ireland v Smith (1895) 3 SLT 180, (1895) 33 SLR 156�����������22.10, 22.22, 22.23, 27.01 Irvine v Orr 2003 SLT 1193����������������������������������������������������������������������������������16.24 Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch), [2002] 1 WLR 2355��������� 20.67, 21.89, 21.102, 21.103, 21.104, 21.105, 21.106 Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 423, [2003] 2 All ER 881���������������������21.105 Irving v Hiddleston 1998 SC 759��������������������������������������������������������������������������31.15 Isaacs v Commr of Police of the Metropolis [2013] EWHC 4157 (QB)�������������������16.12 Island Records Ltd, Ex p [1978] Ch 122����������������������������������������������������������������24.11 J B Williams Co v Bronnley and Co Ltd (1909) 26 RPC 765����������������������������������21.94 J Bollinger SA v Costa Brava Wine Co Ltd [1960] Ch 262��������������������������� 21.86, 21.87 J J Coughlan Ltd v Ruparelia [2003] EWHC Civ 1057, [2004] PNLR 4�������������������3.77 J Lyons & Co Ltd v Lipton Ltd (1914) 49 LJ 542���������������������������������������������������18.54 J T Stratford & Son Ltd v Lindley [1965] AC 269���������������������������������������� 21.34, 21.48 Jack v Begg (1875) 3 R 35�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������23.11 Jackson v Liverpool City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 1068, [2011] IRLR 1009���������5.53 Jackson v McCuiston 247 Ark 862, 448 SW 2d 33 (1969)��������������������������������������10.35 Jackson v Murray [2012] CSOH 100, 2012 SCLR 605�������������������������������������������29.66 Jackson v Murray [2012] CSIH 100, 2013 SLT 153�����������������������������������������������29.66 Jackson v Murray [2015] UKSC 5, 2015 SC (UKSC) 105������29.56, 29.62, 29.64, 29.66 Jacobi v Griffith (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 71���������������������������������������������������������������3.41 Jacques v Oxfordshire CC (1967) 66 LGR 440��������������������������������������������������������4.54 Jagger v Darling [2005] EWHC 683 (Ch)��������������������������������������������������� 19.50, 20.26 Jain v Trent Strategic HA [2009] UKHL 4, [2009] 1 AC 853�����������������4.41, 7.29, 7.32, 18.145 Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359��������18.01, 18.50, 18.76, 18.80, 18.81, 18.83, 19.33 James v Baird 1916 SC 510, revd 1916 SC (HL) 158�������������������������������� 18.15, 18.109 James v Campbell (1832) 5 Carrington and Payne 372�������������������������������������������16.10 James v Wellington City [1972] NZLR 70��������������������������������������������������������������27.20 James-Bowen v Commr of Police of the Metropolis [2018] UKSC 40, [2018] 1 WLR 4021������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.33, 9.37, 12.26 James Couper & Sons v Macfarlane (1879) 6 R 683������������������������������������ 21.05, 21.51 James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co [1991] 2 QB 113������5.35, 5.45 Jameson v Corrie (1833) 11 S 1027�����������������������������������������������������������������������16.03 Jamieson v Napier (1747) Mor 17070��������������������������������������������������������������������17.52 Jan de Nul (UK) Ltd v AXA Royale Belge SA [2002] EWCA Civ 209, [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 583����������������������������������������������������������������������������������22.14 J’Anson v Stuart (1787) 1 Term Rep 748���������������������������������������������������������������18.09 Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 KB 316������������������������������������������������������������ 16.60, 16.64

Table of Cases   xxxix Jarrett v Kirkcaldy Ice Rink 2009 GWD 27-444�����������������������������������������������������25.35 Jayes v IMI (Kynoch) Ltd [1985] ICR 155�������������������������������������������������������������29.65 JD v East Berkshire Community NHS Trust [2003] EWCA Civ 1151, [2004] QB 558, affd [2005] UKHL 23, [2005] 2 AC 373���������������������������� 7.09, 7.30 Jebson v Ministry of Defence [2000] 1 WLR 2055��������������������������������������������������12.05 Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd [1982] AC 794�������������������������������� 13.79, 13.80, 14.42 Joel v Morison (1834) 6 C & P 501����������������������������������������������������������������� 3.48, 3.69 John v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWHC 1611 (QB), [2006] EMLR 27����20.22 John v Central Manchester and Manchester Children’s University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2016] EWHC 407 (QB), [2016] 4 WLR 54������������������13.72 John Haig and Co Ltd v Forth Blending Co Ltd 1954 SC 35����������������������� 21.82, 21.94 John Henderson & Son v Alexander Munro & Co (1905) 7 F 636���������������������������31.73 John Kenway Ltd v Orcantic Ltd 1979 SC 422��������������������������������������������������������5.48 John Lewis & Co v Tims [1952] AC 676����������������������������������������������������������������17.12 John Walker & Sons Ltd v Henry Ost & Co Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 917�����������������������21.100 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1��������������������������������������������������������������2.26 Johnston v Constable (1841) 3 D 1263������������������������������������������������������������������22.03 Johnston v National Coal Board 1960 SLT (Notes) 84�������������������������������������������10.41 Johnston v Scottish Ministers [2005] CSOH 68, 2006 SCLR 5�������������������������������30.04 Johnston v White (1877) 4 R 721���������������������������������������������������������������������������23.18 Johnstone v Bloomsbury HA [1992] QB 333����������������������������������������������������������29.17 Johnstone v Mags of Lochgelly 1913 SC 1078����������������������������������������������������������1.29 Johnstone v NHS Grampian [2019] CSOH 90, 2019 GWD 38-62��������������������������11.48 Jolley v Sutton LBC [2000] 1 WLR 1082���������������������������������������������������� 14.34, 14.35 Jolly v Brown (1828) 6 S 872���������������������������������������������������������������������������������23.03 Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 13, [2011] 2 AC 398���������������������������������������� 7.16, 11.56 Jones v Livox Quarries Ltd [1952] 2 QB 608����������������������������������������������������������29.59 Jones v Ruth [2011] EWCA Civ 804, [2012] 1 WLR 1495��������������������������������������14.54 Jones v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2012] EWHC 2936 (QB)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������13.66 Jones v Tsige 108 OR (3d) 24, 2012 ONCA 32 (Ontario)���������������������������������������20.74 Jones v Warwick University [2003] EWCA Civ 151, [2003] 1 WLR 954������������������20.79 Joseph v Spiller [2010] UKSC 53, [2011] 1 AC 852������������������������������������ 18.93, 18.97 Joyce v O’Brien [2013] EWCA Civ 546, [2014] 1 WLR 70�������������������������� 29.19, 29.37 JR38, In re [2015] UKSC 42, [2016] AC 1131�������������������������������������������� 20.21, 20.32 JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov [2018] UKSC 19, [2020] AC 727����� 21.51, 21.52, 21.53, 21.57, 21.60, 21.61, 21.62 Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd 1982 SC (HL) 244�������4.13, 5.03, 5.60, 5.80, 5.81, 5.82, 5.83, 5.84 JXJ v Province of Great Britain of the Institute of Brothers of the Christian Schools [2020] EWHC 1914 (QB), [2020] ELR 579��������������������������������������������������������3.23 K v Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland [2020] CSIH 18, 2020 SC 399������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.82 K2 Restaurants Ltd v Glasgow City Council [2013] CSIH 49, 2013 GWD 21-420��7.27, 24.03 Kafagi v JBW Group Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 1157������������������������������������������ 3.13, 3.30 Kaizer v Scottish Ministers [2017] CSOH 110, 2017 Rep LR 124, affd [2018] CSIH 36, 2018 SC 491���������������������������������������������������2.39, 4.63, 7.25, 9.29, 17.32 Kane v New Forest DC [2001] EWCA Civ 878, [2002] 1 WLR 312�������������������������8.02 Kapfunde v Abbey National plc [1998] IRLR 583, [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Med 48���������5.54 Kay v ITW [1968] 1 QB 140�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.36

xl   Table of Cases Kay’s Tutor v Ayrshire and Arran HB 1987 SC (HL) 145���������������������������������������13.05 Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62������������������������������������������������� 18.131, 18.137, 20.08 KD v Chief Constable of Hampshire [2005] EWHC 2550 (QB)���������������������� 3.54, 3.60 Kearney v Lloyd (1890) 26 LR Ir 268��������������������������������������������������������������������21.51 Kearn-Price v Kent CC [2002] EWCA Civ 1539, [2003] ELR 17��������������������������11.35 Keegan v Chief Constable of Merseyside (2007) 44 EHRR 33��������������������������������20.79 Keen v Tayside Contracts 2003 SLT 500�����������������������������������������������������������������6.19 Keenan v The City Line Ltd 1953 SLT 128�����������������������������������������������������������29.16 Keith v Davidson Chalmers 2004 SC 287��������������������������������������������������� 11.18, 31.08 Keith v Keir 10 June 1812 FC���������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.05 Kelly v Riverside Inverclyde (Property Holdings) Ltd [2014] CSOH 86, 2014 GWD 18-355�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������25.21 Kelly v Sir Frank Mears & Partners 1983 SC 97����������������������������������������� 10.28, 11.06, 11.28, 11.29 Kelly v Stoddart Sekers International plc 2005 Rep LR 12�������������������������������������30.24 Kelly v Vannet 1999 JC 109�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������19.65 Kelso v Boyds (1768) Mor 12807��������������������������������������������������������������������������22.80 Kelso School Board v Hunter (1874) 2 R 228����������������������������������� 31.73, 31.75, 31.76 Kemp v Glasgow City Council 2000 SLT 471����������������������������������������������������������8.02 Kemp & Dougall v Darngavil Coal Co Ltd 1909 SC 1314������������������������������� 1.28, 4.27 Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 345�����������������������������������������������������������������������������18.91 Kenlin v Gardiner [1967] 2 QB 510�����������������������������������������������������������������������16.34 Kennedy v Aldington [2005] CSOH 58���������������������������������������������������������������18.141 Kennedy v Allan (1848) 10 D 1293������������������������������������������������������������ 18.08, 18.20 Kennedy v Bonnici, Madden and Alexander [2021] CSOH 106��������������������������������3.23 Kennedy v Cordia (Services) LLP [2016] UKSC 6, 2016 SC (UKSC) 59���������������12.35 Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd 1996 SC 95��������������������������� 3.85, 22.12, 22.19, 22.32, 22.35, 22.38, 22.39, 22.42, 22.43, 22.45, 22.46, 22.51, 22.59, 22.60, 22.61, 23.31, 23.35 Kennedy v Shotts Iron Co 1913 SC 1143��������������������������������������������������� 25.07, 25.16 Kent v Griffiths [2001] QB 36�������������������������������������� 4.56, 9.24, 9.25, 9.55, 9.56, 9.57 Kenway v Orcantic 1979 SC 422�����������������������������������������������������������������������������5.29 Kenyon v Bell 1953 SC 125�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������13.88 Keppel Bus Co v Sa’ad bin Ahmad [1974] 1 WLR 1082�������������������������������� 3.36, 17.42 Kerr v Duke of Roxburgh (1822) 3 Mur 126����������������������������������������������� 19.04, 19.14 Kerr v Earl of Orkney (1857) 20 D 298�����������������������������������������������������������������22.03 Kerr v Kennedy [1942] 1 KB 409��������������������������������������������������������������������������18.18 Kerr v McGreevy 1970 SLT (Sh Ct) 7�������������������������������������������������������������������23.18 Kershaw v Connel Community Council [2018] CSOH 111, 2019 SLT 121��������������2.36 Keystone Properties Ltd v Sun Alliance and London Insurance plc 1993 SC 494����31.11 KGM v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2010] EWHC 3145 (QB)��������������������������19.30 Khalil v Barakat [2013] EWHC 85 (QB)���������������������������������������������������� 18.18, 18.21 Khan v Hussain [2019] CSOH 11, 2019 SC 322����������������������������������������� 29.34, 29.48 Khan v UK (2001) 31 EHRR 45���������������������������������������������������������������������������20.09 Khatun v UK (1998) 26 EHRR CD212�����������������������������������������������������������������22.54 Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727��������������������������������������������������������������������22.53 Kiam v Neil [1996] EMLR 493�����������������������������������������������������������������������������18.25 Kidd v Lime Rock Management LLP [2020] CSOH 96, 2021 SLT 35������� 21.57, 21.60, 21.66 Kidd v Paull and Williamsons LLP [2017] CSOH 16, 2018 SC 193�������������� 2.32, 16.57, 21.71, 21.75 Kilboy v South Eastern Fire Area Joint Committee 1952 SC 280�������������3.16, 3.22, 9.42

Table of Cases   xli Kim v Lee [2021] EWHC 231 (QB)����������������������������������������������������������� 18.45, 18.46 Kimathi v Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2018] EWHC 1305 (QB)���������������17.50 Kimber v Press Association [1893] 1 QB 65���������������������������������������������������������18.104 Kincaid Smith v Cameron (1900) 2 F 1179�����������������������������������������������������������22.28 Kinch v Rosling [2009] EWHC 286 (QB)��������������������������������������������������������������21.74 King v Advocate General for Scotland [2009] CSOH 169, 2010 GWD 1-15���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 2.39, 22.10 King v Bristow Helicopters Ltd [2002] UKHL 7, 2002 SC (HL) 59�������������������������2.15 King v Common Thread Ltd [2019] SC EDIN 76, 2019 GWD 28-452������������������25.23 King v Fife Council 2004 Rep LR 33�������������������������������������������������������������� 3.31, 3.32 King v John Brown & Co Ltd 1952 SLT (Notes) 62�����������������������������������������������12.11 King v Lord Advocate [2005] CSOH 169��������������������������������������������������������������22.77 King v Sussex Ambulance Service NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Civ 953, [2002] ICR 1413, (2002) 68 BMLR 177����������������������������������������9.58, 12.12, 12.15 Kingsway (The) [1918] P 344��������������������������������������������������������������������������������31.12 Kinley v Devine [2014] CSOH 67, 2014 GWD 14-255������������������������������������������18.22 Kinloch v Robertson (1756) Mor 13163����������������������������������������������������������������22.01 Kinnoull (Earl of) v Ferguson (1842) 1 Bell 662�������������������������������������������������������7.44 Kirby v National Coal Board 1958 SC 514����������������������������������������������������� 3.07, 3.41 Kirkham v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police [1990] 2 QB 283�������4.55, 9.31, 9.32, 29.12, 29.20, 29.25, 29.26 Kirkham v Link Housing Group [2012] CSIH 58, 2012 Hous LR 87������ 25.15, 25.21, 25.34 Kirkpatrick v Dumfries and Galloway Council 2001 SCLR 261������������������������������25.19 Kirkton Investments Ltd v VMH LLP [2011] CSOH 200, [2012] PNLR 11�����������13.98 Kirkwood’s Trs v Leith (1888) 16 R 255����������������������������������������������������������������22.17 Kitchen v Royal Air Force Association [1958] 1 WLR 563������������������������������������13.100 Kivuwatt Ltd v Dane Associates Ltd [2011] CSOH 118, 2011 GWD 24-530����������21.33 KM (FE) Iran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] CSOH 8, 2010 GWD 6-107��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������31.06 Knight v Inverness District Board of Control 1920 2 SLT 157����������������������������������3.36 Knightley v Johns [1982] 1 WLR 349��������������������������������������������������9.33, 14.05, 14.06 Knowles v Liverpool City Council [1993] 1 WLR 1428������������������������������������������12.37 Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116�����������������������������������18.09 Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd [2005] HCA 15, (2005) 214 ALR 355���������������12.25 Kolmar Group AG v Traxpo Enterprises Pvt Ltd [2010] EWHC 113 (Comm), [2010] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 653����������������������������������������������������������������������������������21.49 Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB), [2020] 4 WLR 25���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 18.12, 18.91 Kozikowska v Kozikowski 1996 SLT 386���������������������������������������������������������������31.40 KR v Lanarkshire HB [2016] CSOH 133, 2016 GWD 31-556�������������������� 11.06, 11.48 Kubach v Hollands [1937] 3 All ER 907����������������������������������������������������������������26.06 Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire [2001] UKHL 29, [2002] 2 AC 122����31.07 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co [2002] UKHL 19, [2002] 2 AC 883��������13.04, 13.10, 13.21 Kuwait Oil Tanker Co SAK v Al Bader [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 271���������������������21.56 Kwik-Fit-Euro Ltd v Scottish Daily Record and Sunday Mail Ltd 1987 SLT 226����18.54 Kyle v P & J Stormonth Darling WS 1993 SC 57��������������������������������������13.100, 13.101 L Lucas Ltd v Export Credits Guarantee Department [1974] 1 WLR 909�����������������2.50 Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2019] UKSC 27, [2020] AC 612����������� 18.17, 18.31, 18.39, 18.40, 18.42, 18.44, 18.45, 18.73 Lagden v O’Connor [2003] UKHL 64, [2004] 1 AC 1067�������������������������������������31.67

xlii   Table of Cases Laing v Darling (1850) 12 D 1279���������������������������������������������������������������������������1.22 Laing v Muirhead (1822) 2 S 73����������������������������������������������������������������������������22.03 Laing v Paull & Williamsons 1912 SC 196����������������������������������������������������������������8.04 Lamb v Camden LBC [1981] QB 625���������������������������������������������������������������������4.75 Lamb v Wray 2014 SLT (Sh Ct) 2�������������������������������������������������������������������������11.14 Lambert v Barratt Homes Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 681, [2011] HLR 1����22.41, 22.48, 22.49 Lambie v Toffolo Jackson Ltd 2003 SLT 1415�������������������������������������������������������30.16 Lamond v The Daily Record (Glasgow) Ltd 1923 SLT 512��������� 18.131, 18.135, 18.137 Lamont v Monklands DC 1992 SLT 428���������������������������������������������������������������25.19 Landcatch Ltd v International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 552, affd 1999 SLT 1208���������������������������������������������4.33, 5.06, 5.24 Landell v Landell (1841) 3 D 819��������������������������������������������������������������������������31.71 Landry v Bellanger 851 So 2d 943 (La 2003)���������������������������������������������������������16.30 Lane v Holloway [1968] 1 QB 379�������������������������������������������������������������������������16.43 Lang v Lillie (1826) 4 Mur 82�������������������������������������������������������������������������������16.16 Lang Bros Ltd v Goldwell Ltd 1980 SC 237������������������������������������� 21.83, 21.86, 21.87 Langlands v John Leng & Co Ltd 1916 SC (HL) 102���������������������������������������������18.10 Langridge v Levy (1837) 2 M & W 519, 150 ER 863����������������������������������������������21.74 Lappin v Britannia Airways Ltd 1989 SLT 181������������������������������������������������������25.18 Large v Hart [2021] EWCA Civ 24, [2021] PNLR 13��������������������������������������������31.13 Larner v Solihull MBC [2001] RTR 32��������������������������������������������������������������������8.19 Latimer v AEC Ltd [1953] AC 643������������������������������������������������������������������������10.22 Laugher v Pointer (1826) 108 ER 204, 5 B & C 547�������������������������������������������������3.33 Laughton v Bishop of Sodor and Man (1871–73) LR 4 PC 495����������������������������18.113 Laurent v Lord Advocate (1869) 7 M 607����������������������������������������� 22.06, 22.14, 22.53 Lavelle v Glasgow Royal Infirmary 1931 SC (HL) 34���������������������������������������������11.14 Law Hospital NHS Trust v Lord Advocate 1996 SC 301����������������������������������������16.51 Lawrence v Pembrokeshire CC [2007] EWCA Civ 446, [2007] 1 WLR 2991������������7.30 Laws v Florinplace Ltd [1981] 1 All ER 65������������������������������������������������� 22.10, 22.23 Le Lievre v Gould [1893] 1 QB 491��������������������������������������������������������������� 1.27, 4.07 Leakey v National Trust [1980] QB 485����������������������� 22.09, 22.40, 22.41, 22.49, 22.72 Ledger v MacGregor Energy Services Ltd 2000 GWD 39-1464������������������������������12.03 Lee v Chung [1990] 2 AC 374������������������������������������������������������������������������ 3.20, 3.21 Lee v Minister of Correctional Services 2013 2 SA 144 (CC)���������������������������������13.39 Leeds and Holbeck Building Society v Alex Morison [2001] PNLR 13�������������������11.23 Lees v Tod (1882) 9 R 807������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21.71 Legal & General Assurance Ltd v Kirk [2001] EWCA Civ 1803, [2002] IRLR 124������ 5.54 Leichtman v WLW Jacor Communications, Inc 92 Ohio App 3d 232, 634 NE 2d 697 (1994)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������16.12 Leigh and Sillavan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd [1986] AC 785�������4.15, 5.05, 5.07, 5.08, 5.82 Leitch v Fairy (1711) Mor 13946��������������������������������������������������������������������������17.36 Leitch v Howie 1927 SLT 186���������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.28 Lenderink-Woods v Zurich Assurance Ltd [2016] EWHC 3287 (Ch), [2017] PNLR 15����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������11.30 Lennon v Commr of Police of the Metropolis [2004] EWCA Civ 130, [2004] 1 WLR 2594�����������������������������������������������������������������������9.36, 12.27, 12.28 Lennon v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1978] FSR 573���������������������������������������19.27 Lennon v Scottish Daily Record and Sunday Mail Ltd [2004] EWHC 359 (QB), [2004] EMLR 18����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.13 Lennox v Bishop [2005] CSOH 87, 2005 Rep LR 109�������������������������������������������31.57

Table of Cases   xliii Leon v Edinburgh Evening News 1909 SC 1014����������������������������������������� 18.11, 18.22 Leonard v Lindsay & Benzie (1886) 13 R 958��������������������������������������������������������23.11 Leonard v Loch Lomond and the Trossachs National Park Authority [2014] CSOH 38, 2014 Rep LR 46, affd [2015] CSIH 44, 2016 SCLR 102�������� 25.06, 25.21, 25.28, 25.29 Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc [2014] UKSC 55, [2015] AC 430����������������29.25 Leslie v Secretary of State for Scotland 1999 Rep LR 39�������������������������������������������4.63 Lesly v Guthry (1670) Stair’s Decisions I, 672, (1670) Mor 3148�����������������������������1.09 Letford v Glasgow City Council 2002 Rep LR 107������������������������������������������ 8.02, 8.09 Lever Bros Ltd v The “Daily Record” Glasgow Ltd 1909 SC 1004�������������������������18.54 Levi v Bates [2015] EWCA Civ 206, [2016] QB 91������������������������������������������������28.11 Levin v Caledonian Produce (Holdings) Ltd 1975 SLT (Notes) 69��������19.21, 19.25, 19.55, 19.58, 19.74 Levin v Farmers’ Supply Association of Scotland 1973 SLT (Notes) 43������������������19.47 Levine v Morris [1970] 1 WLR 71���������������������������������������������������������������������������8.02 Lewis v Australian Capital Territory [2020] HCA 26, (2020) 381 ALR 375�����17.29, 31.06 Lewis v Buckpool Golf Club 1993 SLT (Sh Ct) 43�������������������������������������� 10.54, 16.48 Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234�������18.11, 18.16, 18.22, 18.51, 18.72, 18.73 Lewis v University of Bristol [1999] EWCA Civ 1569��������������������������������������������26.52 Lexus Financial Services v Russell see Ide v ATB Sales Ltd Liberace v Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd, The Times, 18 June 1959�������������������������18.18 Lin v HM Advocate [2012] HCJAC 151, 2014 SLT 173����������������������������������������17.01 Lindley v Rutter [1981] QB 128����������������������������������������������������������������� 16.20, 20.84 Lindsay v Berkeley Homes (Capital) plc [2018] EWHC 2042 (TCC)�����������������������3.83 Lindsay v Poole 1984 SLT 269������������������������������������������������������������������������������29.24 Lindsays v Ramsay (1743) Mor 16746�������������������������������������������������������������������19.02 Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407������������������������������������������������������������������20.41 Linklaters Business Services v Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd [2010] EWHC 1145 (TCC), [2010] BLR 537, 130 Con LR 11���������������������������������������������������5.21 Linwood v Hathorn 14 May 1817 FC, affd (1821) 1 Sh App 20���������������3.05, 3.06, 3.70 Lion Laboratories v Evans [1985] QB 526�������������������������������������������������� 19.61, 19.63 Lippiatt v South Gloucestershire Council [2000] QB 51�����������������������������������������22.50 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215�������� 3.28, 3.35, 3.38, 3.39, 3.40, 3.41, 3.42, 3.43, 3.44, 3.46, 3.51, 3.52, 3.62, 17.42, 28.16, 28.17 Lister v Perryman (1869–70) LR 4 HL 521������������������������������������������������������������17.53 Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555����������������2.51, 3.03, 3.15 Liverpool Victoria Legal Friendly Society v Houston (1900) 3 F 42�������������������������19.03 Liverpool Women’s Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Ronayne [2015] EWCA Civ 588, [2015] PIQR P20����������������������������������������������������������������������6.16 Livingstone v Ministry of Defence [1984] NI 356���������������������������������������������������16.10 Lloyd v Borg [2013] NSWCA 245���������������������������������������������������������������������������3.74 Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co [1912] AC 716����������������������������������������������������� 3.62, 3.65 Lloyd v Hickley 1967 SLT 225������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.21 Lloyds TSB Foundation for Scotland v Lloyds Banking Group plc [2013] UKSC 3, 2013 SC (UKSC) 169�����������������������������������������������������������������������22.19 Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co Ltd v McMullan 1933 SC (HL) 64���������������3.82, 4.01, 12.04 Lockhart v Barr 1941 SC 578, affd 1943 SC (HL) 1����������������������������������� 26.07, 26.14 Logan v Wang (UK) Ltd 1991 SLT 580������������������������������������������������������ 23.36, 31.73 Logan (Daniel) and Son v Rodger 1952 SLT (Sh Ct) 99����������������������������������������23.09 London Artists Ltd v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375��������������������������������������������������������18.94 London Association for Protection of Trade v Greenlands Ltd [1916] 2 AC 15������18.109

xliv   Table of Cases London Regional Transport v Mayor of London [2001] EWCA Civ 1491, [2003] EMLR 4������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 19.63, 20.43 Long Beach Ltd v Global Witness Ltd [2007] EWHC 1980 (QB)���������������������������19.30 Longmeid v Holliday (1851) 6 Exch 761������������������������������������������������������������������4.06 Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) [1982] AC 173������������ 21.53, 24.11, 24.12 Lonrho plc v Fayed [1993] 1 WLR 1489����������������������������������������������������������������21.84 Lonsdale (Earl of) v Littledale (1793) 2 H Bl 267���������������������������������������������������23.24 Lord Advocate v Glengarnock Iron and Steel Co Ltd 1909 1 SLT 15����������������������23.06 Lord Advocate v Reo Stakis Organisation Ltd 1981 SC 104��������������� 22.12, 23.17, 23.31 Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd 1989 SC (HL) 122������� 19.19, 19.20, 19.23, 19.24, 19.28, 19.42, 19.48, 19.49, 19.52, 19.53, 19.54, 19.60, 19.63, 19.70, 20.68 Lothian (Marquis of) v British Coal Authority [1996] RVR 252������������������������������23.30 Louden v Chief Constable of Police Scotland [2014] SC DUND 18, 2014 SLT (Sh Ct) 97����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������17.22 Loureiro v iMvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd [2014] ZACC 4, 2014 3 SA 394 (CC)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4.53 Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1805, [2002] QB 783�������18.151 Love v Halfords Ltd [2014] EWHC 1057 (QB), [2014] RTR 32����������������� 26.67, 26.77 Love v Port of London Authority [1959] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 541������������������������������������14.38 Loveday v Renton [1990] 1 Med LR 117���������������������������������������������������������������26.19 Lovell v Blundells and Crompton & Co Ltd [1944] KB 502�����������������������������������12.06 Lowe v Cairnstar Ltd [2020] SC EDIN 16, 2020 SLT (Sh Ct) 151������������������������25.35 LT v Lothian NHS HB [2019] CSIH 20, 2019 GWD 17-272��������������������������������11.47 Lukowiak v Unidad Editorial SA [2001] EMLR 46������������������������������������������������18.13 Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 E & B 216, 118 ER 749����������������������21.06, 21.11, 21.21, 21.34 Lundie v MacBrayne (1894) 21 R 1085�����������������������������������������������������������������17.40 Luxmoore-May v Messenger May Baverstock [1990] 1 WLR 1009�������������������������11.15 Lyons v Chief Constable of Strathclyde Police [2013] CSIH 46, 2014 SCLR 281������18.108 Lyons Sons & Co v Gulliver [1914] 1 Ch 63����������������������������������������������������������22.10 M v DG’s Exr [2021] SAC (Civ) 3, 2021 SLT (Sh Ct) 87��������������������������������������30.19 M v O’Neill [2006] CSOH 93, 2006 SLT 823�������������������������������������������������������30.23 M (A Child) v Leeds HA [2002] PIQR Q4������������������������������������������������������������31.32 McAleenan v National Coal Board 1987 SLT 106����������������������������������������������������6.01 McAlpine of West Green (Lord) v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB)���������������������18.38 McAnulty v McCulloch [2018] CSOH 121, 2019 SLT 449������������������������������������18.24 MacAskill v Macleod 1926 SLT (Sh Ct) 34�����������������������������������������������������������16.04 Macatee v Montgomery 1949 SLT (Sh Ct) 5���������������������������������������������� 23.09, 27.09 Macaulay v Buist & Co (1846) 9 D 245�����������������������������������������������������������������12.01 Macaulay v School Board of North Uist (1887) 15 R 99�����������������������������������������17.52 McAuley v London Transport Executive [1957] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 500�������������������������31.68 McAvennie v Scottish Daily Record & Sunday Mail, unreported, Glasgow Sheriff Court, 20 Aug 2002, affd 2003 Rep LR 93����������� 18.10, 18.11, 18.22 McC, Re [1985] 1 AC 528��������������������������������������������������������������� 17.33, 17.36, 17.38 McCabe v British Domestic Appliances Ltd 1978 SLT (Notes) 31��������������������������31.68 McCallum v Paterson 1968 SC 280�����������������������������������������������������������������������31.20 McCallum v Procurator Fiscal, Edinburgh [2019] HCJAC 26, 2019 JC 125������������16.34 McCallum v S & D Properties (Commercial) Ltd 2000 Rep LR 24�������������������������25.16 McCann v J R McKellar (Alloys) Ltd 1969 SC (HL) 1�������������������������������������������10.41 McCann v McGurran 2002 SLT 592���������������������������������������������������������������������28.14

Table of Cases   xlv McCann v Miller Insulation and Engineering Ltd 1986 SLT 147����������������������������13.62 McCann v Scottish Media Newspapers Ltd 2000 SLT 256�������������������������������������18.10 McCann v State Hospitals Board for Scotland [2017] UKSC 31, 2017 SC (UKSC) 121��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7.33, 7.34 McCarn v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills [2014] CSOH 121, 2014 Rep LR 138��������������������������������������������������������������������������31.55 McCarthy v Highland Council [2011] CSIH 51, 2012 SLT 95�������������������� 12.19, 12.23 MacColl v Hoo 1983 SLT (Sh Ct) 23��������������������������������������������������������������������22.84 McComiskey v McDermott [1974] IR 75��������������������������������������������������������������10.51 McCord v Swansea Football Club, The Times, 11 February 1997�����������������������������10.52 McCormack v Glasgow Corp 1910 SC 562������������������������������������������������������������17.40 M’Cormick v Fife Coal Co 1931 SC 19�����������������������������������������������������������������23.27 M’Cosh v Crow & Co (1903) 5 F 670������������������������������������19.04, 19.19, 19.23, 20.63 M’Cosh v M’Cosh (1832) 10 S 579�����������������������������������������������������������������������21.51 McCracken v Smith [2015] EWCA Civ 380, [2015] PIQR P19������������������� 29.19, 29.37 M’Creadie v M’Broom (1860) 22 D 405����������������������������������������������������������������22.03 McCreadie v Thomson 1907 SC 1176������������������������������������17.34, 17.35, 17.36, 17.38 McCrindle Group Ltd v Maclay Murray & Spens [2013] CSOH 72, 2013 GWD 19-389�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������13.102 M’Crone v Sawers (1835) 13 S 443�����������������������������������������������������������������������17.59 McCulloch v Forth Valley HB [2021] CSIH 21������������������������������������������������������11.12 McCulloch v Lewis A May (1948) 65 RPC 58������������������������������������������ 21.89, 21.103 M’Culloch v Wallace (1846) 9 D 32����������������������������������������������������������������������22.03 McCusker v Saveheat Cavity Wall Insulation Ltd 1987 SLT 24�������������������������������29.66 McDermid v Nash Dredging & Reclamation Co Ltd [1987] AC 906�������������� 3.82, 12.03 McDiarmid v Barrie (1902) 18 Sh Ct Rep 47���������������������������������������������� 16.25, 16.33 Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council [2013] CSIH 83, 2014 SC 114������5.84, 8.01, 8.04, 8.05, 8.06, 8.13, 8.14, 8.15, 8.22, 8.23, 9.46, 25.19 MacDonald v Comhairle Nan Eilean Siar [2015] CSOH 132, 2016 Rep LR 10������8.15, 8.19 McDonald v Frossway [2012] IEHC 440���������������������������������������������������������������11.28 Macdonald v Glasgow Western Hospitals Board of Management 1954 SC 453��������3.19, 3.22 McDonald v National Grid Electricity Transmission plc [2014] UKSC 53, [2015] AC 1128�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������24.06 MacDonald v Reid’s Trs 1947 SC 726�������������������������������������������������������������������25.52 MacDonald v Robertson (1911) 27 Sh Ct Rep 103��������������������������� 16.07, 16.15, 16.33 Macdonald v Scottish Ministers 2004 Rep LR 16������������������������������������8.24, 8.26, 8.28 Macdonald v Watson (1883) 10 R. 1079����������������������������������������������������������������23.10 MacDonald’s Tutor v CC of Inverness 1937 SC 69������� 10.05, 10.27, 10.29, 10.36, 11.33 MacDougall v Dochree 1992 JC 154���������������������������������������������������������������������20.85 MacDougall v MacDougall’s Exrs 1994 SLT 1178���������������������������������������������������5.68 McDougall v Strathclyde RC 1996 SLT 1124 �������������������������������������������������������11.34 McDowall v G4S Care and Justice Services (UK) Ltd [2016] SC EDIN 67, 2016 SLT (Sh Ct) 371��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������17.32 McDyer v The Celtic Football and Athletic Co Ltd 2000 SC 379����� 10.62, 10.65, 10.69, 22.82, 22.85, 22.86, 25.11, 25.48 McErlean v Sarel (1987) 42 DLR (4th) 577�����������������������������������������������������������10.35 McEwan v Ayrshire & Arran Acute Hospitals NHS Trust [2009] CSOH 22, 2009 GWD 13-208�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������16.101 McEwan v Watson (1905) 7 F (HL) 109����������������������������������������������������� 18.25, 19.04

xlvi   Table of Cases M’Ewen v Lowden (1881) 19 SLR 22��������������������������������������������������������������������25.02 M’Ewen v Steedman & M’Alister 1912 SC 156������������ 22.10, 22.13, 22.21, 22.23, 22.53 McFadzean v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union [2007] VSCA 289������17.03 Macfarlane v Black and Co (1887) 14 R 870����������������������������������������������� 18.16, 18.21 McFarlane v EE Caledonia [1994] 2 All ER 1������������������������������������������������� 6.13, 6.19 McFarlane v Tayside HB 1998 SC 389����������������������������������16.75, 16.77, 16.85, 16.87, 16.91, 31.02, 31.09 McFarlane v Tayside HB 2000 SC (HL) 1��� 2.15, 4.39, 4.40, 16.75, 16.77, 16.78, 16.79, 16.80, 16.81, 16.82, 16.84, 16.85, 16.86, 16.87, 16.91, 16.92, 16.93, 26.43 M’Feat v Rankin (1879) 6 R 1043�������������������������������������������������������������������������25.02 M’Fee v Police Commrs of Broughty-Ferry (1890) 17 R 764������������������������������������8.07 McGarvey v Eve NCI Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 374, [2002] All ER (D) 345 (Feb)����12.03 M’Gavin v M’Intyre (1890) 17 R 818, affd (1893) 20 R (HL) 49����������������������������22.03 M’Geever v M’Farlane 1951 SLT (Sh Ct) 27���������������������������������������������������������16.32 McGeouch v Strathclyde RC 1985 SLT 321������������������������������������������������������������8.25 McGhee v Diageo plc [2008] CSOH 74�����������������������������������������������������������������31.35 McGhee v National Coal Board 1973 SC (HL) 37�����������������13.32, 13.33, 13.34, 13.35, 13.36, 13.37, 13.40, 13.41, 13.57 MacGibbon v Robinson [1952] 4 DLR 142�����������������������������������������������������������22.36 M’Glashan v Dundee and Perth Railway Co (1848) 10 D 1397��������������������������������1.21 McGlennan v McKinnon 1998 SLT 494����������������������������������������������������������������28.05 McGlinchey v General Motors UK Ltd [2011] CSOH 206, 2012 Rep LR 20, affd [2012] CSIH 91, 2013 GWD 1-47�������������������������������������������������� 26.65, 26.78 McGlone v British Railways Board 1966 SC (HL) 1�������������������������� 25.21, 25.42, 25.43 McGlone v Greater Glasgow HB [2011] CSOH 63, 2011 GWD 19-45�������������������13.44 McGlone v Greater Glasgow HB [2012] CSOH 190, 2013 SCLR 459��������� 31.22, 31.35 McGovern v Glasgow City Council [2009] CSOH 148, 2010 Rep LR 2��������������������8.09 McGowan v Mein 1975 SLT (Sh Ct) 10������������������������������������������������������������������3.67 McGowan v Scottish Water [2005] IRLR 167���������������������������������������������������������20.79 McGregor v AAH Pharmaceuticals Ltd 1996 SLT 1161������������������������������ 12.06, 12.11 McGregor v J S Duthie & Sons 1966 SLT 133���������������������������������������������������������3.31 MacGregor v Shepherd 1946 SLT (Sh Ct) 42��������������������������������������������� 16.14, 16.29 McGuire v Kidston 2002 SLT (Sh Ct) 66��������������������������������������������������������������28.14 McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384, affd (1966) 115 CLR 199�����2.23, 10.31, 10.32 McHardy v Bawden International Ltd 1993 SCLR 893������������������������������������������30.13 McHardy v Dundee General Hospitals’ Board of Management 1960 SLT (Notes) 19������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4.55, 9.32 Machargs v Campbell (1767) Mor 12541���������������������������������������������������������������16.05 McInnes v Norwich Union Insurance Ltd [2012] CSOH 6A, 2012 GWD 7-131�����13.18 M’Intosh v Scott and Co (1859) 21 D 363�������������������������������������������������������������23.17 McIrvine v McIrvine [2012] CSOH 23, 2012 GWD 9-171�����������������������������������18.140 MacIver v J & A Gardner Ltd 2001 SLT 585������������������������������������������������� 3.82, 12.11 McIver v McNeill (1873) 11 M 777�����������������������������������������������������������������������18.70 Mackay v Borthwick 1982 SLT 265�����������������������������������������������������������������������29.57 McKay v Essex AHA [1982] QB 1166�������������������������������������������������������������������16.96 Mackay v Greenhill (1858) 20 D 1251�������������������������������������������������������������������22.03 Mackay v McCankie (1883) 10 R 537��������������������������������������������������������������������18.37 M’Kay v M’Lean 1920 1 SLT 34�����������������������������������������������������������������������������3.02 Mackay v Scottish Fire and Rescue Service [2015] CSOH 55, 2015 SLT 342������4.40, 9.50 Mackay v Scottish Hydro Electric plc 2000 SC 87������������������������������������������������18.110

Table of Cases   xlvii McKeith v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2005] EWHC 1162 (QB), [2005] EMLR 32����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.24 McKendrick v Sinclair 1972 SC (HL) 25���������������������������������������������������������������16.05 McKenna v British Aluminium [2002] Env LR 30��������������������������������������������������22.54 McKenna v O’Hare [2017] SAC (Civ) 16, 2017 SC (SAC) 33�������������������������������22.35 McKennitt v Ash [2005] EWHC 3003 (QB), [2006] EMLR 10�������� 19.31, 19.65, 20.22, 20.26, 20.41, 20.53 McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73��������7.32, 19.44, 19.49, 19.50, 20.10, 20.14, 20.15, 20.21, 20.22, 20.40, 20.44, 20.48, 20.53 Mackenzie v Cluny Hill Hydropathic Co Ltd 1908 SC 200���������������� 17.05, 17.11, 31.04 Mackenzie v Iron Trades Employers Insurance Association Ltd 1910 SC 79���� 21.52, 21.108 Mackenzie v Maclennan 1916 SC 617�������������������������������������������������������������������28.20 Mackenzie v Young (1902) 10 SLT 231������������������������������������������������������ 17.40, 17.42 M’Kerchar v Cameron (1892) 19 R 383����������������������������������������������������������������18.24 McKernan v Fraser (1931) 46 CLR 343����������������������������������������������������������������21.55 McKevitt v National Trust for Scotland [2018] SC EDIN 20, 2018 Rep LR 76�������25.35 McKew v Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd 1969 SC 14, affd 1970 SC (HL) 20������������������������������������������������������������������������ 14.01, 14.13, 14.31 M’Kibbin v Glasgow Corp 1920 SC 590����������������������������������������������������������������10.17 McKie v Chief Constable of Strathclyde 2002 Rep LR 137, affd 2003 SC 317�������17.21, 20.85 Mackie v Currie 1991 SLT 407�����������������������������������������������������������������������������30.11 Mackie v Dumbartonshire CC 1927 SC (HL) 99�����������������������������������������������������8.07 McKie v Orr 2003 SC 317������������������������������������������������������������������������������������16.39 McKie v Strathclyde Joint Police Board 2004 SLT 982�������������������������������� 17.55, 17.57 McKie v Swindon College [2011] EWHC 469 (QB), [2011] IRLR 575��������������������5.54 McKillen v Barclay Curle & Co Ltd 1967 SLT 41��������������������������������������������������14.31 McKinnell v White 1971 SLT (Notes) 61��������������������������������������������������� 10.31, 29.61 McKinney v Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police 1998 SLT (Sh Ct) 80������� 15.09, 17.20, 17.22, 17.26 Mackinnon v Hadfield [2014] CSOH 15, 2014 SCLR 510�������������������������������������31.41 Mackintosh v Fraser (1859) 21 D 783�������������������������������������������������������������������17.39 Mackintosh v Fraser (1860) 22 D 421���������������������������������������������������������������������1.21 Mackintosh v Mackintosh (1864) 2 M 1357������������������� 1.23, 10.02, 10.13, 22.34, 22.41 Mackintosh v Squair (1868) 40 Scot Jur 561, 5 SLR 635����������������������������������������16.20 McKnight v Clydeside Buses Ltd 1999 SLT 1167����������������������������������������������������8.07 M’Kone v Wood (1831) 5 C & P 1������������������������������������������������������������������������27.07 McLachlan v Early Learning Centre Ltd [2011] CSOH 25, 2011 Rep LR 30����������24.27 Maclachlan v Road Trs (1827) 4 Mur 216��������������������������������������������������� 16.57, 29.54 M’Laren v British Railways Board 1971 SC 182�����������������������������������������������������22.51 MacLaren v Ritchie, The Scotsman, 9 July 1856������������������������������������������� 18.16, 18.29 McLaren v Robertson (1859) 21 D 183�����������������������������������������������������������������18.25 M’Lauchlan v Monach (1823) 2 S 590������������������������������������������������������������������13.16 McLaughlan v Craig 1946 SC 599�������������������������������������������������������������� 22.06, 22.42 M’Laughlan v Orr, Pollock & Co (1894) 22 R 38���������������������������������������������������18.27 McLaughlin v Malcolm 1965 SLT (Sh Ct) 70��������������������������������������������������������31.12 McLaughlin v Morrison [2013] CSOH 163, 2014 SLT 111������������������������� 16.11, 29.40 McLaughlin v Morrison [2014] CSOH 123, 2014 SLT 862������������������������� 16.31, 16.56 M’Laurin v NB Railway Co (1892) 19 R 346���������������������������������������������������������31.23 M’Lean v Adam (1888) 16 R 175������������������������������������������������������������������������18.145

xlviii   Table of Cases McLean v Grant (1805) Mor App Reparation No 2��������������������������������������� 1.21, 11.05 M’Lean v Russell (1850) 12 D 887��������������������������������������������������������������������������3.84 Maclean v Russell, Macnee, & Co (1849) 11 D 1035����������������������������������������������16.05 McLean v University of St Andrews 2004 Rep LR 54�����������������������������������������������4.54 McLeish v Lothian NHS Board [2017] CSOH 71, 2017 Rep LR 90�������������������������6.01 McLellan v J & D Pierce (Contracts) Ltd [2015] CSIH 80, 2015 GWD 37-594������23.12 McLellan v Mitie Group plc [2015] CSOH 151, 2015 SLT 861�����������������������������12.07 McLelland v Greater Glasgow HB 1999 SC 305����������������������������������������������������14.41 McLelland v Greater Glasgow HB 2001 SLT 446���������� 2.15, 11.55, 16.92, 16.94, 16.95 MacLeod v Commr of Police of the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 977 (QB)�����������������9.15 McLeod v Crawford [2010] CSOH 101, 2010 SLT 1035�����������������������������������������5.75 MacLeod v MacAskill 1920 SC 72������������������������������������������������������������������������16.23 Macleod v Newsquest (Sunday Herald) Ltd 2007 CSOH 04, 2007 SCLR 555�������18.12, 18.29, 18.39, 18.41 McLeod v Rooney [2009] CSOH 158, 2010 SLT 499�������������21.33, 21.35, 21.43, 21.45 McLeod v Shaw 1981 SLT (Notes) 93�������������������������������������������������������������������17.18 MacLeod’s Legal Representatives v Highland HB [2016] CSIH 25, 2016 SC 647������ 11.08 McLinden v Richardson 1962 SLT (Notes) 104�������������������������������������������������������6.25 McLoone v British Railways Board 1981 SLT (Notes) 65���������������������������������������31.32 McLoughlin v Jones [2001] EWCA Civ 1743, [2002] QB 1312�������������2.08, 6.01, 17.50 McLoughlin v Jones [2006] EWCA Civ 1167���������������������������������������������������������17.50 McLoughlin v O’Brian [1981] QB 599��������������������������������������������������������������������6.32 McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410���� 4.27, 6.17, 6.18, 6.19, 6.20, 6.21, 6.25, 11.55 McMahon v Dear [2014] CSOH 100, 2014 SLT 823������������������������ 10.14, 10.51, 10.56 McMahon v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2020] CSOH 50, 2020 SLT 908����������������11.30 McManus v British Railways Board 1993 SC 553���������������������������������������������������31.21 M’Martin v Hannay (1872) 10 M 411�������������������������������������������������������������������25.02 McMillan v McDowall 1993 SLT 312�������������������������������������������������������� 31.07, 31.40 M’Mullan v Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co Ltd 1933 SC 235���������������������������������������24.02 M’Mullan v Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co Ltd 1933 SC (HL) 64��������������������������������12.34 M’Murchy v Campbell (1887) 14 R 725��������������������������������������������������������������18.103 Macnab v McDevitt 1971 SLT (Sh Ct) 41���������������������������������������� 22.10, 22.12, 23.31 Macnair v Cathcart (1802) Mor 12832������������������������������������������������������������������23.13 McNamara v Duncan (1971) 26 ALR 584�������������������������������������������������������������16.49 McNaughton v Caledonian Rly Co (1858) 21 D 160����������������������������������������������29.54 M’Neil v Bailie of Falkirk (1678) Mor 11725�����������������������������������������������������������1.09 McPake v SRCL Ltd [2013] CSOH 157, 2014 SCLR 199, 2014 Rep LR 41������ 6.01, 31.23 McPhail v Lanarkshire CC 1951 SC 301���������������������������������������������������������������25.04 Macphail v Macleod (1895) 3 SLT 91�������������������������������������������������������������������18.09 M’Phee v Macfarlane’s Exr 1933 SC 163���������������������������������������������������������������17.38 MacPherson v Buick Motor Co 217 NY 382, 111 NE 1050 (1916)������ 1.30, 4.06, 26.04, 26.07 M’Pherson v Cattanach (1850) 13 D 287��������������������������������������������������������������17.52 McQueen v Ballater Golf Club 1975 SLT 160�������������������������������������������� 10.62, 25.49 McQueen v Glasgow Garden Festival (1988) Ltd (The) 1995 SLT 211�������������������10.68 Macrae v Reed and Mallik Ltd 1961 SC 68������������������������������������������������������������31.20 McShane v Burnwynd Racing Stables Ltd [2015] CSOH 70, 2015 Rep LR 107�����29.15, 29.16 McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2005] CSOH 69, 2005 2 SC 1������� 13.22, 26.19, 26.52, 29.15 McVean and Co v Blair (1801) Hume 609�������������������������������������������������� 18.49, 18.56 McWilliams v Russell [2017] SC GLA 64, 2017 GWD 32-510, affd [2018] SAC (Civ) 9, 2018 GWD 14-193����������������������������������������������������������������������28.06

Table of Cases   xlix McWilliams v Sir William Arrol & Co Ltd 1962 SC (HL) 70����������������������� 13.08, 24.23 Maguire v Charles McNeil Ltd 1922 SC 174���������������������������������������������� 22.10, 22.23 Mahmood v Galloway [2006] EWHC 1286 (QB), [2006] EMLR 26����������������������20.32 Mahon v Osborne [1939] 2 KB 14������������������������������������������������������������������������10.70 Mainstream Properties Ltd v Young [2005] IRLR 964��������������������������������� 21.11, 21.35 Mair v Rhind (1897) 4 SLT 351����������������������������������������������������������������������������12.01 Mair v Wood 1948 SC 83�������������������������������������������������������������� 2.31, 3.72, 3.77, 3.78 Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224����������������������������������������������������������3.60, 3.61, 12.05, 28.03, 28.16, 28.17 Malcolm v Broadhurst [1970] 3 All ER 508�����������������������������������������������������������14.43 Malcolm v Dickson 1951 SC 542����������������������������������������������������������������������������6.14 Malfroot v Noxal Ltd (1935) 79 Sol Jo 610, 51 TLR 551����������������������������������������26.06 Malley v London, Midland and Scottish Rly Co 1944 SC 129����������������������������������3.32 Mallon v Spook Erections Ltd 1993 SCLR 845������������������������������������������������������25.12 Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd 1987 SC (HL) 37�����4.45, 4.46, 4.50, 4.52, 4.53, 4.74, 4.75, 7.05, 10.14, 22.40, 22.41, 22.51 Malone v Lord Advocate [2018] CSOH 86, 2018 SLT 1129�����������������������������������12.19 Malone v Metropolitan Police Commr [1979] Ch 344��������������������������������������������19.22 Manchester Building Society v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2021] UKSC 20����� 14.48, 14.49, 14.51 Manchester Corp v Farmworth [1930] AC 171������������������������������������������������������22.64 Manchester Ship Canal Co Ltd v United Utilities Water plc [2014] UKSC 40, [2014] 1 WLR 2576��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.03 Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd [2001] UKHL 1, [2003] 1 AC 469����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21.70 Manners v Whitehead (1898) 1 F 171������������������������������������������������������������� 5.27, 5.48 Manning v King’s College Hospital NHS Trust [2008] EWHC 1838 (QB), affd [2009] EWCA Civ 832, (2009) 110 BMLR 175������������������������������������������11.12 Manorgate Ltd v First Scottish Property Services Ltd [2013] CSOH 108, [2014] PNLR 1������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������31.66 Mansfield v Weetabix Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 1263�������������������������������������������� 10.45, 10.46 Manson v Forrest (1887) 14 R 802������������������������������������������������������������� 22.16, 22.17 Manson v Henry Robb Ltd [2017] CSOH 126, 2017 SLT 1173�����������������������������31.55 Manson v Midlothian Council [2018] SC EDIN 50, 2019 SCLR 723���������������������23.10 Marathon Mutual Ltd v Waters [2009] EWHC 1931 (QB), [2010] EMLR 3��������18.132 Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd [1996] AC 211���������2.51, 4.17, 4.42 Marcel v Commr of Police [1992] Ch 225��������������������������������������������������������������19.55 Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2003] UKHL 66, [2004] 2 AC 42����� 22.49, 22.73, 22.75, 22.76, 24.10 Marco v Merrens 1964 SLT (Sh Ct) 74����������������������������������15.05, 16.07, 16.25, 16.43 Margrie Holdings Ltd v City of Edinburgh DC 1994 SC 1�������������������������������������14.31 Marine & Offshore (Scotland) Ltd v Hill [2018] CSIH 9, 2018 SLT 239����������������21.66 Marinello v Edinburgh City Council [2011] CSIH 33, 2011 SC 736���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 28.06, 28.17, 28.19 Market Investigations Ltd v Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173������������������3.21 Mars UK Ltd v Teknowledge Ltd [1999] EWHC 226 (Pat), [2000] FSR 138���������19.32 Marshall v Caledonian Railway Co (1899) 1 F 1060�������������������������������������������������4.44 Marshall v Osmond [1983] QB 1034����������������������������������������� 9.15, 9.16, 11.37, 11.39 Marshall v Scottish Milk Marketing Board 1956 SC (HL) 37�����������������������������������7.01 Martin v Bell-Ingram 1986 SC 208������������������������������������������� 5.36, 6.01, 11.25, 31.13 Martin v McGuiness 2003 SLT 1424�������������������������������������20.02, 20.75, 20.79, 20.80 Martin v M’lean (1844) 6 D 981���������������������������������������������������������������������������18.24 Martin v Thomson 16 June 1818 FC���������������������������������������������������������������������22.80

l   Table of Cases Martin v Ward (1887) 14 R 814������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.02 Martin v Watson [1996] AC 74������������������������������������������������������������������������������17.54 Mason v Orr (1901) 4 F 220, (1901) 9 SLT 132���������������������16.36, 16.37, 16.38, 16.39 Mason v Williams & Williams Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 549, [1955] 1 All ER 808�����26.09, 26.13 Massie v McCaig [2013] CSIH 14, 2013 SC 343���������������������������� 18.95, 18.129, 31.76 Matania v The National Provincial Bank Ltd and The Elevenist Syndicate Ltd [1936] 2 All ER 633�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.83, 22.58 Matthews v Hunter & Robertson Ltd [2008] CSOH 88, 2008 SLT 634����������� 5.72, 5.76 Mattis v Pollock (t/a Flamingos Nightclub) [2004] EWCA Civ 887, [2004] 4 All ER 85����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.52, 3.53 Maxwell v Caledonian Railway Co (1898) 25 R 550�����������������������������������������������17.40 Mayer v Hoar [2012] EWHC 1805 (QB)�������������������������������������������������������������18.102 Maylin v Dacorum Sports Trust [2017] EWHC 378 (QB)��������������������������������������10.57 Maynard v West Midlands Regional HA [1984] 1 WLR 634������������������������ 11.07, 11.10 MCE v de La Salle Bros [2007] CSIH 27, 2007 SC 556�������������������������������������������3.87 Meadows v Khan [2021] UKSC 21����������������������������������������14.46, 14.47, 14.52, 16.80 Medcalf v Mardell [2002] UKHL 27, [2003] 1 AC 120����������������������������������������18.103 Mediana (The) [1900] AC 113������������������������������������������������������������������������������31.12 Medicina v Midlothian Council [2013] CSOH 106, 2014 Rep LR 36���������������������31.67 Meek v Burton’s Gold Medal Biscuits Ltd 1989 SLT 338���������������������������������������31.61 Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co (1920) 122 LT 44�������������������������������������17.09 Mellon v Henderson 1913 SC 1207�����������������������������������������������������������������������25.02 Mellor v William Beardmore & Co 1927 SC 597����������������������������������������������������19.74 Melrose v Davidson and Robertson 1993 SC 288�����������������������������������������������������5.42 Melville v Walls 1976 SLT (Notes) 71���������������������������������������������������������������������6.01 Menzies v Menzies (1893) 20 R (HL) 108�������������������������������������������������������������21.66 Mercedes-Benz Finance Ltd v Clydesdale Bank plc 1997 SLT 905�������������������������21.27 Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1303, [2008] Ch 244���������21.21, 21.56, 21.57 Merivale v Carson (1888) LR 20 QBD 275������������������������������������������������������������18.95 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc v Havner 953 S W 2d 706 (1993)�����������������������13.64 Merrett v Babb [2001] EWCA Civ 214, [2001] QB 1174�������������������������������� 5.31, 5.50 Merrington v Ironbridge Metal Works Ltd [1952] 2 All ER 1101����������������������������25.45 Merry & Cuninghame v Aitken (1895) 22 R 247����������������������������������������������������23.03 Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v Coggins and Griffiths (Liverpool) Ltd [1947] AC 1���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.31, 3.32 Merson v Cartwright [2005] UKPC 38, [2005] All ER (D) 144 (Oct)���������������������17.46 Merthyr Tydfil CBC v C [2010] EWHC 62 (QB), [2010] 1 FLR 1640����������������������7.30 Metropolitan Asylum District Managers v Hill (1881) 6 App Cas 193���������� 22.10, 22.65 Metropolitan International Schools Ltd v Designtechnica Corp [2009] EWHC 1765 (QB), [2011] 1 WLR 1743���������������������������������������������������������18.127 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732������� 2.17, 2.46, 7.03, 7.09, 7.17, 7.19, 7.25, 7.32, 9.01, 9.02, 9.07, 9.08, 9.09, 9.10, 9.11, 9.12, 9.23, 9.24, 9.25, 9.29, 9.38, 9.41, 9.47, 9.53 Micosta SA v Shetland Islands Council 1983 SLT 483�������������������������������� 19.37, 19.38 Micosta SA v Shetland Islands Council 1986 SLT 193��������������� 7.36, 7.37, 20.88, 21.49 Mid and East Calder Gas-Light Co v The Oakbank Oil Co Ltd (1891) 18 R 788����23.29 Middlebrook Mushrooms Ltd v TGWU [1993] ICR 612���������������������������������������21.21 Midland Bank Trust Co v Green (No 3) [1979] Ch 496, affd [1982] Ch 529�����������21.51 Midler v Ford Motor Co 849 F 2d 460 (9th Cir 1988)�������������������������������������������20.60 Miles v Finlayson (1829) 5 Mur 84������������������������������������������������������������� 16.28, 16.29

Table of Cases   li Millar v Bassey [1994] EMLR 44��������������������������������������������������������������������������21.20 Millar v Edinburgh Road Trs (1828) 4 Mur 563�����������������������������������������������������29.54 Millar v Galashiels Gas Co 1949 SC (HL) 31��������������������������������������������������������24.21 Millar v Rooney [2006] NIQB 7����������������������������������������������������������������������������25.60 Miller v Harvie (1827) 4 Mur 385���������������������������������������������������������������������������3.07 Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966������������������������������������������������������������������ 22.26, 31.75 Miller v Robert Addie & Sons’ Collieries 1934 SC 150�������������������������������������������22.06 Miller v Stein (1791) Mor 12823���������������������������������������������������������������������������22.70 Milligan’s Exrs v Hewats [2013] CSOH 60, 2013 SLT 758�������������������5.74, 5.76, 31.47 Milliken v Glasgow Corp 1918 SC 857������������������������������������������������������������������10.65 Mills v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EMLR 41������������������������������ 19.29, 20.21 Miln v Mudie (1828) 6 S 967��������������������������������������������������������������������������������23.12 Milne v Express Newspapers [2002] EWHC 2564 (QB), [2003] EMLR 22, affd [2004] EWCA Civ 664, [2004] EMLR 24������������������������������������������������18.123 Milne v Smith (1814) 2 Dow 390��������������������������������������������������������������������������31.20 Milne v Stuartfield Windpower Ltd [2019] SC ABE 25������������������������������������������22.10 Milne v Walker (1893) 21 R 155��������������������������������������������������������������������������18.113 Milner v Humphreys and Glasgow Ltd, unreported, QBD, 24 November 1998�������13.12 Ministry of Defence v Griffin [2008] EWHC 1542 (QB)����������������������������������������20.43 Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223����������� 5.57, 5.58, 5.85, 24.05 Mink v University of Chicago 460 F Supp 713 DC Ill (1978)���������������������������������16.11 Mionis v Democratic Press SA [2017] EWCA Civ 1194, [2018] QB 662����������������19.67 Mirage Studies v Counter-Feat Clothing Co Ltd [1991] FSR 145���������������������������21.95 Mitchell v Department for Transport [2006] EWCA Civ 1089, [2006] 1 WLR 3356��8.11 Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2008] CSIH 19, 2008 SC 351, rev'd [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21��������������������������������������������������� 2.17, 2.44, 4.02, 4.16, 4.17, 4.39, 4.41, 4.43, 4.45, 4.46, 4.47, 4.49, 4.50, 4.52, 4.57, 4.75, 7.05, 7.17, 7.18, 7.19, 7.23, 7.32, 9.47 Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254����������������4.72 Moffat v West Highland Publishing Co Ltd 2000 SLT 335�������������������������� 18.26, 18.29 Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co (1889) 23 QBD 598, affd [1892] AC 25���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.51, 21.53 Mohammed v Home Office [2011] EWCA Civ 351, [2011] 1 WLR 2862�����������������4.40 Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2014] EWCA Civ 116, [2014] 2 All ER 990�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.52 Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677������3.46, 3.47, 3.48, 3.49, 3.50, 3.51, 3.52, 3.53, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.63, 17.42, 28.16, 28.17 Mohidin v Commr of Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWHC 105 (QB), [2016] 1 Costs LR 71�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.03 Moir v Wide Arc Services Ltd 1987 SLT 495�������������������������������������������������� 3.31, 3.32 Monarch Airlines Ltd v London Luton Airport Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 403���������25.18 Moncrieff v Cooper [2013] CSOH 180, 2013 GWD 40-766����������������������������������12.19 Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42, 2008 SC (HL) 1��������������������������������������22.67 Monk v PC Harrington Ltd [2008] EWHC 1879 (QB), [2009] PIQR P3������������������6.41 Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB), [2017] 4 WLR 68�������� 18.13, 18.14, 18.38 Monson v Tussauds Ltd [1894] 1 QB 671�������������������������������������������������������������18.06 Montgomerie v Buchanan’s Trs (1853) 15 D 853���������������������������������������������������22.03 Montgomery v Johnson Underwood Ltd [2001] ICR 819�����������������������������������������3.19

lii   Table of Cases Montgomery v Lanarkshire HB [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63����� 11.08, 11.14, 11.45, 11.47, 11.48, 11.49, 11.50, 11.51, 11.52, 11.53, 16.47 Moore v MacDougall 1989 SCCR 659������������������������������������������������������������������16.25 Moore v Scottish Daily Record and Sunday Mail Ltd 2007 SLT 217��������������������18.121 More v Boyle 1967 SLT (Sh Ct) 38������������������������������������������������������������ 22.80, 22.81 Morgan v Bryson Recycling Ltd [2018] NIQB 12��������������������������������������������������29.53 Morgan v Fry [1968] 2 QB 710������������������������������������������������������������������ 21.48, 21.49 Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1239��������������������������������������������������18.11 Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel & Co Ltd [1991] Ch 295������������������� 5.37, 11.30 Morgans v Launchbury [1973] AC 127���������������������������������������������������3.74, 3.75, 3.76 Morrice v Martin Retail Group Ltd 2003 SCLR 289����������������������������������������������30.24 Morris v Beardmore [1981] AC 446����������������������������������������������������������������������20.78 Morris v Bicket (1864) 2 M 1082��������������������������������������������������������������������������23.34 Morris v C W Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716����������������������������������������� 3.62, 3.63 Morris v Curran [2019] SC KIR 77, 2019 GWD 31-496����������������������������������������22.10 Morris v Ford Motor Co Ltd [1973] QB 792�������������������������������������������������� 2.51, 3.03 Morris v Murray [1991] 2 QB 6������������������������������������������������������ 29.05, 29.06, 29.11, 29.14, 29.19 Morris v Richards [2003] EWCA Civ 232, [2004] PIQR Q3����������������������� 31.66, 31.68 Morris v West Hartlepool Steam Navigation Co Ltd [1956] AC 552������������ 10.14, 12.10 Morris Amusements Ltd v Glasgow City Council [2009] CSOH 84, 2009 SLT 697������ 3.84, 22.38, 22.59 Morrison v Forsyth 1995 SLT 539������������������������������������������������������������������������31.08 Morrison v Morrison 1956 SLT (Sh Ct) 42�������������������������������������������������������������2.24 Morrison v Ritchie (1902) 4 F 645������������������������������������������������������������� 18.51, 18.53 Morrison v Ure (1826) 4 S 662�������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.21 Morrison Sports Ltd v Scottish Power UK plc [2010] UKSC 37, 2011 SC (UKSC) 1�����������������������������������������������������������24.05, 24.06, 24.07, 24.13 Morrisons Associated Companies Ltd v James Rome & Sons Ltd 1962 SLT (Notes) 75, revd 1964 SC 160�������������������������������������������������������������������11.16 Morrow v Neil 1975 SLT (Sh Ct) 65���������������������������������������������������������������������28.20 Mortgage Corporation (The) v Mitchells Roberton 1997 SLT 1305�������������� 5.78, 11.03 Mortgage Express Ltd v Bowerman & Partners [1996] 2 All ER 836�����������������������11.23 Morton v British Aluminium Co Ltd 1982 SLT 292�����������������������������������������������31.23 Morton v Glasgow and Edinburgh Railway Co (1845) 8 D 288������������������������������31.07 Morton v Glasgow City Council 2007 SLT (Sh Ct) 81���������������������� 25.18, 25.54, 25.58 Morton v Liddle 1996 JC 194�������������������������������������������������������������������� 28.20, 28.21 Morton v West Lothian Council 2006 Rep LR 7, affd [2008] CSIH 18������������ 8.23, 8.26 Morton v William Dixon Ltd 1909 SC 807������������������������������������������������� 10.27, 12.10 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20�������������������������������������������������������������� 19.64, 20.10, 20.14, 20.21, 20.22, 20.38, 20.42, 20.44, 20.57, 31.04 Motschenbacher v R J Reynolds Tobacco Co 498 F 2d 821 (9th Cir 1974) �������������20.61 Moulds v Reid [2012] CSOH 13, 2012 GWD 8-159������������������������� 28.04, 28.07, 28.19 Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383�������������������������������������������������6.47 Mount Murray Country Club Ltd v Macleod [2003] UKPC 53, [2003] STC 1525������ 19.55 Moyes v Lothian HB 1990 SLT 444����������������������������������������������������������������������11.47 MTM Construction Ltd v William Reid Engineering Ltd 1998 SLT 211����������������22.56 Muckarsie v Dickson (1848) 11 D 4����������������������������������������������������������������������16.35 Muir v Glasgow Corp 1942 SC 126�����������������������������������������������������������������������10.09

Table of Cases   liii Muir v Glasgow Corp 1943 SC (HL) 3������������� 10.06, 10.09, 10.10, 10.11, 10.30, 10.32, 10.49, 14.21, 14.30, 25.01, 25.11 Muir v North Ayrshire Council [2005] CSOH 127, 2005 SLT 963���� 25.15, 25.21, 25.34 Muirhead v Industrial Tank Specialities Ltd [1986] QB 507����������������������������� 5.15, 5.82 Mukheiber v Raath 1999 3 SA 1065 (SCA)������������������������������������������������������������16.78 Mull Shellfish Ltd v Golden Sea Produce Ltd 1992 SLT 703������������������������������������5.05 Mullan v Anderson No 2 1997 SLT 93������������������������������������������������������������������16.04 Mullaney v Chief Constable of the West Midlands [2001] EWCA Civ 700, [2001] Po LR 150�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.33 Mullen v A G Barr & Co 1929 SC 461����������������������������������������� 1.30, 4.05, 4.06, 4.09, 26.04, 26.05 Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 WLR 1304������������������������������������������������������� 10.32, 10.33 Munro v Brown [2011] CSOH 117, 2011 SLT 947������������������������������������������������18.24 Munro v Finlayson 2015 SLT (Sh Ct) 123�������������������������������������������������������������23.12 Munro v Fraser (1858) 21 D 103���������������������������������������������������������������� 19.37, 19.38 Munro v Sturrock [2010] CSOH 116, 2010 GWD 29-608, affd [2012] CSIH 35, 2012 GWD 15-312���������������������������������������������������������������������������26.38 Munster v Lamb (1882–83) LR 11 QBD 588������������������������������������������������������18.103 Murdoch v A & R Scott 1956 SC 309��������������������������������������������������������������������25.50 Murdoch v Dunbar (1783) Mor 13184������������������������������������������������������������������23.12 Murdoch v Glacier Metal Co Ltd [1998] Env LR 732��������������������������������������������22.23 Murdoch v Murdoch 1973 SLT (Notes) 13�������������������������������������� 31.72, 31.73, 28.22 Murislaw v Halyburton (1623) Mor 13984��������������������������������������������������������������3.05 Murphy v Brentwood DC [1991] 1 AC 398��������������������������2.06, 4.15, 5.01, 5.11, 5.16, 5.17, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.22, 5.23, 5.24, 5.82, 5.83 Murphy v Culhane [1977] QB 94��������������������������������������������������������������� 16.30, 16.56 Murphy v D Y Stewart & Co Ltd (1906) 14 SLT 336���������������������������������������������25.02 Murphy v East Ayrshire Council [2011] CSOH 136, 2011 Rep LR 92, aff'd [2012] CSIH 47, 2012 SLT 1125����������������������������������������������������������������������10.16 Murray v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 488, [2015] EMLR 21��18.119 Murray v Bonn (1913) 29 Sh Ct Rep 62����������������������������������������������������������������18.25 Murray v Brown (1881) 19 SLR 253���������������������������������������������������������������������27.07 Murray v Donaldson [2019] SC AIR 28, 2019 GWD 17-260���������������������������������21.66 Murray v Edinburgh DC 1981 SLT 253���������������������������������10.62, 25.15, 25.34, 25.49 Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481���������������������������������������������� 20.21, 20.25, 20.27, 20.28, 20.36, 20.41, 20.46 Murray v Fraser 1916 SC 623�������������������������������������������������������������������������������16.23 Murray v Harringay Arena Ltd [1951] 2 KB 529����������������������������������������������������29.15 Murray v Lothian HB 2011 GWD 35-732�������������������������������������������������������������11.14 Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692��������������������������������������������������17.09 Murray v Nicholls 1983 SLT 194������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.14, 8.21 Murray (Doe dem) v Bridges (1831) 1 B & Ad 847������������������������������������������������24.12 Mushets Ltd v Mackenzie Bros (1899) 1 F 756������������������������������������������������������19.18 Mutch v Robertson 1981 SLT 217����������������������������������������������������������� 18.26, 18.110 Mutter v Fyfe (1848) 11 D 303�����������������������������������������������������������������������������22.10 Muuse v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 453������ 7.36, 7.43 Myton v Woods (1980) 79 LGR 28�������������������������������������������������������������������������3.80 N v Chief Constable Merseyside Police [2006] EWHC 3041 (QB)���������������������������3.56 N v Poole BC [2019] UKSC 25, [2019] 2 WLR 1478�����������������������������������������������4.52 Nacap Ltd v Moffat Plant Ltd 1987 SLT 221�������������������������������������������������� 5.07, 5.08 Nail v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1708, [2005] EMLR 12���� 18.122

liv   Table of Cases Napier v Scottish Ministers 2005 1 SC 229, affd [2005] CSIH 16, 2005 1 SC 307����� 17.46 Nash v Eli Lilly & Co [1993] 1 WLR 782���������������������������������������������������������������30.12 Natal (Administrator of) v Edouard 1990 3 SA 581 (A)������������������������������������������16.83 National Phonographic Co Ltd v Edison-Bell Consolidated Phonographic Co Ltd [1908] 1 Ch 335�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������21.40 National Union of Bank Employees v Murray 1949 SLT (Notes) 25�����������������������18.63 National Union of General and Municipal Workers v Gillian [1946] KB 81�������������18.63 Nayyar v Denton Wilde Sapte [2009] EWHC 3218 (QB), [2010] PNLR 15������������29.25 NB v EL [2017] SC DUN 62, 2017 GWD 32-511�������������������������������������������������28.22 Neil Martin Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commrs [2007] EWCA Civ 1041, [2008] Bus LR 663���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 5.87, 24.03 Neill v Doherty and Akram [1997] CLY 3772��������������������������������������������������������29.58 Neill’s Tr v William Dixon (1880) 7 R 741�������������������������������������������������������������23.28 Neilson v Waterstone (1823) 2 S 259���������������������������������������������������������������������22.53 Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691���������������������������� 2.51, 10.49, 10.53, 29.04, 29.14 Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Conarken Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1852 (TCC), [2010] BLR 601, affd [2011] EWCA Civ 644, [2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 692���� 5.02, 15.02 Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Williams [2018] EWCA Civ 1514, [2019] QB 601������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������22.10 Neuman & Co Ltd v A & W Kennedy (1905) 12 SLT 763��������������������������������������19.03 Neville v C&A Modes 1945 SC 175����������������������������������������������������3.36, 17.12, 18.08 New South Wales v Bujdoso [2005] HCA 76, (2005) 227 CLR 1������������������������������4.63 New South Wales v Godfrey [2004] NSWCA 113������������������������������������������� 4.64, 7.25 New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638�����������������������������������������������������23.06 Newcastle Building Society v Paterson Robertson and Graham 2001 SC 734����������11.23 News Group Newspapers Ltd v Society of Graphical and Allied Trades ’82 [1987] ICR 181������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21.49 Newstead v London Express Newspaper [1940] 1 KB 377�������������������������������������18.52 Newton v Edgerley [1959] 1 WLR 1031������������������������������������������������2.25, 3.02, 10.36 Ng Chun Pui v Lee Chuen Tat [1988] RTR 298�����������������������������������������������������10.69 Nicholson v Atlas Steel Foundry and Engineering Co 1957 SC (HL) 44������ 13.30, 13.33 Nicolson v Clyde Marine Training Ltd 2017 GWD 19-312�������������������������������������30.23 Niemietz v Germany (1993) 16 EHRR 97��������������������������������������������������������������20.26 Nimmo v Alexander Cowan & Sons Ltd 1967 SC (HL) 79�������������������������������������24.21 NM v Smith [2007] 5 SA 250 (CC)�����������������������������������������������������������������������20.35 Noble’s Trs v Economic Forestry (Scotland) Ltd 1988 SLT 662������������������� 3.85, 22.46, 22.59, 23.36 Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932����������������������������������������������������������������5.28 Nolan v Advance Construction (Scotland) Ltd [2014] CSOH 4, 2014 SCLR 351������23.13, 31.69 Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s of London v Scalera [2000] 1 SCR 551�����������16.45, 16.46, 16.47 Norberg v Wynrib [1992] 2 SCR 226���������������������������������������������������������� 16.42, 16.45 Norman v Future Publishing Ltd [1999] EMLR 325����������������������������������� 18.11, 18.28 North British Railway Co v Leadburn Railway Co and Waddell (1865) 3 M 340��������1.24 North British Railway Co v Turners Ltd (1904) 6 F 900�����������������������������������������23.29 North Glamorgan Trust v Walters [2002] EWCA Civ 1792, [2003] PIQR P16����� 6.24, 6.27 North Scottish Helicopters Ltd v United Technologies Corp Inc 1988 SLT 77����������5.08 Northesk (Earl of) v Cheyn (1680) Mor 353����������������������������������������������������������19.02 Norwich City Council v Harvey [1989] 1 WLR 828��������������������������������������������������4.42 Norwood v Navan [1981] RTR 457�������������������������������������������������������������������������3.74 Novartis Grimsby Ltd v Cookson [2007] EWCA Civ 1261���������������� 13.43, 13.45, 13.66

Table of Cases   lv NRAM plc v Steel [2018] UKSC 13, 2018 SC (UKSC) 141������������������������������������������������������� 5.43, 5.46, 5.47, 5.65, 21.79, 21.81 Nugent v Glasgow City Council [2009] CSOH 88, 2009 GWD 24-392����������� 8.08, 8.09 Numatic International Ltd v Qualtex Ltd [2010] EWHC 1237 (Ch), [2010] RPC 25�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21.94 Nwabudike v London Borough of Southwark [1997] ELR 35���������������������������������11.33 Nykredit Mortgage Bank plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 1627�����14.48 O v Rhodes [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] AC 219�����������������������15.04, 15.09, 16.60, 16.61, 16.62, 16.63, 16.64, 16.65, 16.66, 16.67, 16.68, 16.70, 16.71, 16.72, 18.67 O Mustad & Son v Dosen [1964] 1 WLR 109��������������������������������������������������������19.30 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1�����������������2.13, 19.28, 20.65, 21.02, 21.03, 21.04, 21.06, 21.11, 21.12, 21.13, 21.17, 21.18, 21.19, 21.20, 21.21, 21.22, 21.23, 21.33, 21.35, 21.36, 21.37, 21.38, 21.40, 21.41, 21.42, 21.45, 21.47, 21.48, 21.53, 21.57, 21.61, 21.62, 21.107 O’Brien’s Curator Bonis v British Steel plc 1991 SC 315��������31.29, 31.33, 31.37, 31.38, 31.39 O’Briens v Watts 1987 SLT 101����������������������������������������������������������������������������21.92 O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur SA [2010] UKSC 23, [2010] 1 WLR 1412���������������������26.28 O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur SA (Case C–358/08) [2010] 2 CMLR 16�����������������������26.32 O’Byrne v Sanofi Pasteur MSD Ltd (Case C–127/04) [2006] 1 WLR 1606������� 26.28, 26.89 O’Connor v Matthews 1996 SLT 408��������������������������������������������������������� 31.34, 31.39 Office Cleaning Services Ltd v Westminster Office Cleaning Association [1944] 2 All ER 269, affd [1946] 1 All ER 320��������������������������������������������������������������21.91 Ogilvie v Riddel (1680) Mor 13956�������������������������������������������������������������������������1.09 Ogston v Aberdeen District Tramways Co (1896) 24 R (HL) 8, [1897] AC 111��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.07, 22.10 Ogwo v Taylor [1988] AC 431���������������������������������������������������������������������� 6.32, 25.46 O’Hara v Central SMT Co 1941 SC 363���������������������������������������������������������������10.68 O’Hara v Glasgow Corp 1966 SLT (Notes) 24�������������������������������������������� 25.18, 25.39 Oil Technics v Ltd v Thistle Chemicals Ltd 1997 SLT 416�������������������������������������19.58 Oliphant v McNeil (1776) 5 Brown’s Supp 573����������������������������������������������������18.103 Oliver v Chief Constable of Northumbria [2003] EWHC 2417 (QB), [2004] EMLR 32����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.24 Oliver v Saddler & Co 1929 SC (HL) 94��������������������������������������������������������� 1.28, 4.06 OLL Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport [1997] 3 All ER 897�������������������������������9.53 Olotu v Home Office [1997] 1 WLR 328����������������������������������������������������������������24.09 Oman v McIntyre 1962 SLT 168���������������������������������������������������������������������������14.38 Omega Trust Co Ltd v Wright Son & Pepper [1997] PNLR 424, (1998) 75 P & CR 57������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 5.42, 11.25 O’Neil v DHL Services Ltd [2011] CSOH 183, 2011 GWD 39-806�����������������������12.11 Orchard v Lee [2009] EWCA Civ 295, [2009] PIQR P16���������������������������������������10.34 Oren v Red Box Toy Factory Ltd [1999] FSR 785��������������������������������������������������21.42 Ormrod v Crosville Motor Services Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 1120���������������������������� 3.74, 3.76 Ormsby v Chief Constable of Strathclyde Police [2008] CSOH 143, 2009 Rep LR 2�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.35 Oropesa (The) [1943] P 32�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������14.07 O’Rourke v Camden LBC [1998] AC 188�������������������������������������������������������������24.07 Orr Ewing v Colquhoun’s Trs (1877) 4 R (HL) 116�����������������������������������������������23.11

lvi   Table of Cases Osborne v BBC 2000 SC 29����������������������������������������������������������������������������������31.76 Osman v Ferguson [1993] 4 All ER 344�������������������������������������������������������������������7.14 Osman v J Ralph Moss Ltd [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 313��������������������������������������������29.47 Osman v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 245��������������������������������� 7.14, 7.15, 7.16, 7.33, 9.38, 9.40 Outram v Academy Plastics Ltd [2001] ICR 367����������������������������������������������������12.28 Outram v Reid (1852) 14 D 577������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.23 Overall v Kadella 138 Mich App 351, 361 NW 2d 352 (1984)��������������������������������16.49 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty (The) (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617��������������������10.14, 10.21, 14.25, 14.55 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co (The Wagon Mound (No 1)) [1961] AC 388��������������������������������� 6.14, 14.25, 14.26, 14.27, 14.30, 14.31, 14.33, 14.34, 14.45, 14.46 Owers v Medway NHS Foundation Trust [2015] EWHC 2363 (QB), [2015] Med LR 561�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.27 P v Advocate General for Scotland [2009] CSOH 121, 2009 GWD 29-461�������������31.06 P v Quigley [2008] EWHC 1051 (QB)������������������������������������������������������������������20.53 P v Taunton and Somerset NHS Trust [2009] EWHC 1965 (QB), (2009) 110 BMLR 164������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������16.91 P’s Curator Bonis v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board 1997 SLT 1180�����������16.96 P & P Property Ltd v Owen White & Catlin LLP [2018] EWCA Civ 1082, [2019] Ch 273��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21.79 P Perl (Exporters) Ltd v Camden LBC [1984] QB 342��������������������������������������������4.75 Pace v Cully 1992 SLT 1073���������������������������������������������������������������������������������29.57 Padbury v Holliday and Greenwood Ltd (1912) 28 TLR 494����������������������������������22.62 Page v Read (1984) 134 NLJ 723��������������������������������������������������������������������������25.50 Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155������������������������������������ 6.04, 6.10, 6.11, 6.12, 6.14, 6.32, 6.40, 6.43, 6.46, 6.48, 6.49, 9.35, 14.44, 16.14 Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 1) [1976] VR 331������������������������������������������������16.48 Palmer v Tees HA [2000] PIQR P1, [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Med 351����������������������������4.68 Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co 248 NY 339, 162 NE 99 (1928)��������4.29, 4.31, 4.32 Parabola Investments Ltd v Browallia Cal Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 486, [2011] QB 477������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21.75 Paris v Stepney BC [1951] AC 367��������������������������������������������������������������� 1.23, 10.20 Parker-Knoll Ltd v Knoll International Ltd (1962) RPC 265����������������������������������21.92 Parkhead Housing Association Ltd v Phoenix Preservation Ltd 1990 SLT 812����������5.84 Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 530, [2002] QB 266������������������������������� 2.06, 14.52, 16.75, 16.79, 16.80, 16.81, 16.82, 16.83, 16.84, 16.87, 16.88, 16.91 Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105������������������������������������������������������������18.28 Parry v Cleaver [1970] AC 1������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.49 Parry v Day [1996] 7 Med LR 396������������������������������������������������������������������������11.14 Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467���������������������29.25, 29.26, 29.28, 29.29, 29.30, 29.31, 29.32, 29.33, 29.35, 29.38, 29.43, 29.50, 29.51 Paterson v Corp of the City of Glasgow (1908) 16 SLT 224���������������������������������18.145 Paterson v Hindle [2017] BCSC 1104�������������������������������������������������������������������14.42 Paterson v Kidd’s Trs (1896) 24 R 99��������������������������������������������������������������������25.52 Paterson v M’Pherson (1917) 33 Sh Ct Rep 237����������������������������������������������������23.04 Paterson v Paterson [2012] CSOH 183, 2013 Rep LR 13���������������������������������������31.30 Paterson v Sturrock & Armstrong 1993 GWD 27-1706������������������������������������������11.21 Paterson v Welch (1893) 20 R 744�����������������������������������������������������������18.130, 18.131

Table of Cases   lvii Paton v Scottish Ministers [2019] SAC (Civ) 31, 2019 GWD 27-436���������������������24.04 Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2019] EWHC 2893 (QB), [2020] PIQR P5�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.24 Pavesich v New England Life Insurance Co 122 Ga 190, 50 SE 68 (Ga 1905)���������20.03 Pawlak v Doucette and Reinks [1985] 2 WWR 588���������������������������������������������������3.74 Paymaster (Jamaica) Ltd v Grace Kennedy Remittance Services Ltd [2017] UKPC 40, [2018] Bus LR 492��������������������������������������������������������������������������19.47 Peacock v Allan (1704) Mor 17065������������������������������������������������������������������������17.01 Pearce v Round Oak Steel Works [1969] 1 WLR 595����������������������������������������������12.07 Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare Trust (1998) 48 BMLR 118������������������������������11.47 Pearson v Educational Institute for Scotland 1997 SC 245������������������������������������18.110 Pearson Education Ltd v Charter Partnership Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 130, [2007] BLR 324�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������11.28 Peat’s Exrs v Assembly Theatre Ltd [2014] CSOH 144, 2014 SLT 1017�����������������30.24 Peck v UK (2003) 36 EHRR 41����������������������������������������������������������������� 20.14, 20.21 Pegasus Management Holdings SCA v Ernst & Young [2010] EWCA Civ 181, [2010] PNLR 23����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������11.30 Peggie v Clark (1868) 7 M 89��������������������������������������������������������������������������������20.77 Pelling v Times Newspapers, unreported, QBD, 29 June 2000������������������������������18.104 Pemberton v Southwark LBC [2000] 1 WLR 1672�������������������������������������������������22.10 Penney v East Kent HA [2000] Lloyd’s Rep Med 41, (2000) 55 BMLR 63�������������11.12 Penny v Wimbledon UDC [1899] 2 QB 72��������������������������������������������������������������3.83 Pentland v Henderson (1855) 17 D 542������������������������������������������������������ 22.03, 22.25 Percy v Glasgow Corp 1922 SC (HL) 144������������������������������������������3.36, 17.40, 17.42 Performance Cars v Abraham [1962] 1 QB 33�������������������������������������������������������13.77 Perrett v Collins [1999] PNLR 77������������������������������������������������������������������ 2.06, 4.19 Peter Pan Manufacturing Corp v Corsets Silhouette Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 96�������������19.74 Petershill Football Club v St Bernard’s Football Club Ltd 1926 SLT (Sh Ct) 42����21.04, 21.05 PG v UK (2008) 46 EHRR 51������������������������������������������������������������������������������20.26 Phee v Gordon [2013] CSIH 18, 2013 SC 379����������������������10.14, 10.48, 10.52, 10.54, 10.56, 25.18, 25.21 Phelps v Hillingdon LBC [2001] 2 AC 619������������������ 5.32, 6.45, 7.03, 7.09, 7.15, 7.21, 11.31, 24.14 Philco Radio and Television Corp v J Spurling Ltd [1949] 2 All ER 882������������������14.06 Philipps v Humber (1904) 6 F 814��������������������������������������������������������������������������1.28 Philips v Wm Whiteley Ltd [1938] 1 All ER 566�����������������������������������������������������11.02 Phillips v Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co Ltd [1923] 2 KB 832�����������������������������24.06 Philp v Highland Council [2018] CSIH 53, 2018 GWD 28-351�������������������������������7.36 Philp v Morton (1816) Hume 865�����������������������������������������������������������������������18.139 Phimister v D M Hall LLP [2012] CSOH 169, 2013 SLT 261�������������������������������11.24 Phipps v Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh [2010] CSOH 58, 2010 GWD 27-544������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.36, 7.38, 7.43 Phones 4U Ltd v Phone4U.co.uk Internet Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 244, [2007] RPC 83���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.82, 21.91, 21.93 Pickard v Smith (1861) 10 CBNS 470���������������������������������������������������������������������3.83 Piepenbrock v London School of Economics and Political Science [2018] EWHC 2572 (QB), [2018] ELR 596������������������������������������������������������ 12.19, 12.20 PIK Facilities Ltd v Watson’s Ayr Park Ltd 2005 SLT 1041������������������������������������23.04 Pine Energy Consultants Ltd v Talisman Energy (UK) Ltd [2008] CSOH 10, 2008 GWD 4-60������������������������������������������������������������������ 19.25, 19.74 Pirie and Sons v Mags of Aberdeen (1871) 9 M 412������������������������������������ 22.03, 22.51 Pitts v Hunt [1991] 1 QB 24���������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.37, 29.65

lviii   Table of Cases PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26, [2016] AC 1081��������19.31, 20.11, 20.15, 20.21, 20.40, 20.44, 20.52, 20.55 Plank v Mags of Stirling 1956 SC 92������������������������������������������������� 25.04, 25.18, 25.38 Plantza v Glasgow Corp 1910 SC 786�������������������������������������������������������������������10.31 Platform Home Loans Ltd v Oyston Shipways Ltd [2000] 2 AC 190�����������������������14.47 Playboy Club London Ltd v Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA [2018] UKSC 43, [2018] 1 WLR 4041������������������������������������������������������������������ 5.33, 5.39 Plean Precast Ltd v National Coal Board 1985 SC 77��������������������������������������������22.12 Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635���������������������������������������������������������������������23.06 Plumb v Cobden Flour Mills [1914] AC 62�������������������������������������������������������������3.36 Poland v John Parr and Sons [1927] 1 KB 236���������������������������������������������������������3.36 Polemis and Furness, Withy and Co Ltd, Re [1921] 3 KB 560���������� 14.24, 14.25, 14.26, 14.30, 14.33 Poliskie v Lane 1981 SLT 282�������������������������������������������������������������������������������25.18 Pomphrey v James A Cuthbertson Ltd 1951 SC 147�������������������������� 31.10, 31.11, 31.12 Pope v Curl (1741) 2 Atk 342��������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.05, 19.11 Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association v Donoghue [2001] EWCA Civ 595, [2002] QB 48����������������������������������������������������������������7.01 Port Glasgow and Newark Sailcloth Co v Caledonian Railway Co (1892) 19 R 608, affd (1893) 20 R (HL) 35��������������������������������������������������������������������2.50 Porteous v Grieve (1839) 1 D 561�������������������������������������������������������������������������22.03 Porter v Barking and Dagenham LBC, The Times, 9 April 1990�������������������������������10.36 Porter v George Robb & Sons Ltd 1961 SLT (Sh Ct) 14����������������������������������������31.12 Porter v Scottish Borders Council [2008] CSOH 163, 2009 Rep LR 46�����������������25.06, 25.21, 25.35 Porter v Strathclyde RC 1991 SLT 446��������������������������������������������� 25.21, 25.32, 25.54 Potter v Scottish Ministers [2007] CSIH 67, 2007 SLT 1019���������������������������������20.19 Powell v Boladz (1998) 39 BMLR 35���������������������������������������������������������������������21.59 Power v Central SMT Co 1949 SC 376�������������������������������������������������������� 3.36, 17.42 Powrie Castle Properties Ltd v Dundee City Council 2001 SCLR 146���������� 3.84, 22.10, 22.38, 22.56, 22.59, 22.62 Pratt v Scottish Ministers [2013] CSIH 17, 2013 SLT 590�������������������������� 12.21, 12.24 Preferred Mortgages Ltd v Shanks [2008] CSOH 23, [2008] PNLR 20������ 11.22, 13.25, 14.53 Prentice v Sandeman [2011] CSOH 169, 2012 SCLR 451�������������������������������������11.18 Prentice v William Thyne Ltd 1989 SLT 336���������������������������������������������� 31.59, 31.61 Prescott v University of St Andrews [2016] CSOH 3, 2016 GWD 4-99�������������������13.40 Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1����������������������������������������������������������������������������11.48 Pridie v Dick (1857) 19 D 287��������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.04 Primary Group (UK) Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2014] EWHC 1082 (Ch), [2014] RPC 26����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������19.53 Primrose v Waterston (1902) 4 F 783������������������������������������������������������������������18.103 Prince v St Francis–St George Hosp, Inc 20 Ohio App 3d 4, 484 NE 2d 265 (1985)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������20.35 Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 Mac & G 25, 41 ER 1171 and (1849) 1 H & Tw 1, 47 ER 1302, affd (1849) 2 De G & Sm 652, 64 ER 293������� 19.07, 19.09 Prince Alfred College Inc v ADC [2016] HCA 37, (2016) 258 CLR 134������������������3.47 Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (A Firm) [1999] 2 AC 222����������������������������������������19.39 Prince of Wales (HRH) v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1776, [2008] Ch 57������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.28, 19.67, 20.14 Pringle v Bremner and Stirling (1867) 5 M (HL) 55�����������������������������������������������20.77

Table of Cases   lix Pritchard v Co-operative Group Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 329, [2012] QB 320���������16.56, 29.55 Proform Sports Management Ltd v Proactive Sports Management Ltd [2006] EWHC 2903 (Ch), [2007] 1 All ER 542������������������������������������������������������������21.08 Property Selection & Investment Trust Ltd v United Friendly Insurance plc 1999 SLT 975��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������23.14 Prophit v BBC 1997 SLT 745�������������������������������������������������������������������� 18.18, 18.28 Proude v Visic [2013] SASC 154�����������������������������������������������������������������������������9.48 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204���������2.26 Pullar v Window Clean Ltd 1956 SC 13����������������������������������������������������� 24.02, 24.08 Pullman v Walter Hill & Co Ltd [1891] 1 QB 524��������������������������������������������������18.38 Purdue v Devon Fire & Rescue Service [2002] EWCA Civ 1538������������������������������9.42 Purves v Landell (1845) 4 Bell’s App 46�����������������������������������������������������������������11.05 Pusey v Somerset DC [2012] EWCA Civ 988��������������������������������������������������������22.10 Pwllbach Colliery Co Ltd v Woodman [1915] AC 634��������������������������������������������22.10 Queen Insurance Co v Hammond 374 Mich 655, 132 NW 2d 792 (1965)����������������2.23 Quilty v Windsor 1999 SLT 346����������������������������������������������������������������� 18.18, 19.52 Quinland v Governor of Swaleside Prison [2002] EWCA Civ 174, [2003] QB 306���� 17.28 Quinn v CC Automotive Group Ltd t/a Carcraft [2010] EWCA Civ 1412�����������������3.65 Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495����������������������������������������������������� 14.54, 21.51, 21.52 Quinn v McGinty 1999 SLT (Sh Ct) 27����������������������������������������������������������������24.26 Quinn v Wright’s Insulations Ltd [2020] CSOH 21, 2020 SCLR 731���������������������30.23 R v B [2006] EWCA Crim 2945, [2007] 1 WLR 1567��������������������������������������������16.13 R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust [1999] 1 AC 458�������17.47 R v Broadcasting Complaints Commission, ex p Granada TV [1995] EMLR 163����19.31 R v Chargot Ltd [2008] UKHL 73, [2009] 1 WLR 1����������������������������������������������24.21 R v Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall, ex p CEGB [1982] QB 458���������������16.09 R v Cox and Railton (1884–85) LR 14 QBD 153���������������������������������������������������19.65 R v Crozier (1990–91) 12 Cr App R (S) 206������������������������������������������������� 4.68, 19.66 R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, ex p Hague [1992] 1 AC 58�������� 17.31, 24.09 R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103, [2004] QB 1257��������������������������������������������16.13 R v Dyment (1988) 55 DLR (4th) 503, [1988] 2 SCR 417�������������������������������������20.74 R v Dytham [1979] QB 722������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.44 R v East Riding of Yorkshire [1968] 1 QB 32��������������������������������������������������������18.102 R v Gnango [2011] UKSC 59, [2012] 1 AC 827����������������������������������������������������16.10 R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex p Evans [2001] 2 AC 19���������������������������������17.28 R v Hendy-Freegard [2007] EWCA Crim 1236, [2008] QB 57�������������������������������17.04 R v Ireland [1998] AC 147������������������������������������������������������������������������������������16.16 R v Khan (Sultan) [1997] AC 558�������������������������������������������������������������������������20.09 R v Latimer (1886) 17 QBD 359���������������������������������������������������������������������������16.10 R v Monney (1999) 6 BHRC 336��������������������������������������������������������������������������20.82 R v Pohoretsky [1987] 1 SCR 945�������������������������������������������������������������������������20.82 R v Rimmington [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 AC 459���������������������������������������������22.87 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Brind [1991] 1 AC 696��������20.09 R v Secretary of State for Social Services, ex p Hincks (1980) 1 BMLR 93��������������24.07 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd (No 6) [2001] 1 WLR 942, [2001] 1 CMLR 47�������������������������������������������������������������������������7.45 R v Shayler [2002] UKHL 11, [2003] 1 AC 247����������������������������������������������������20.43 R v Tessling (1988) 244 DLR (4th) 541, 2004 SCC 67������������������������������������������20.26 R v Wise [1992] 1 SCR 527 (SCC)�����������������������������������������������������������������������20.26

lx   Table of Cases R (on the application of Gomes) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 373�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������17.30 R (on the application of Gourlay) v Parole Board [2020] UKSC 50, [2020] 1 WLR 5344���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.102 R (on the application of Greenfield) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 14, [2005] 1 WLR 673����������������������������������������������7.33 R (on the application of Ingenious Media Holdings plc) v Revenue and Customs Commrs [2016] UKSC 54, [2016] 1 WLR 4164������������������������������������������������19.55 R (on the application of Jalloh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 4, [2021] AC 262������������������������������������������������������������ 17.03, 17.06 R (on the application of Kambadzi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 23, [2011] 1 WLR 1299�������������������������������� 17.07, 17.30 R (on the application of L) v Commr of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKSC 3, [2010] 1 AC 410��������������������������������������������������������������������������������19.30 R (on the application of Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12, [2012] 1 AC 245������������������������ 17.07, 17.09, 17.29, 17.30, 20.57, 31.06, 31.09 R (on the application of Nakash) v Metropolitan Police Service [2014] EWHC 3810 (Admin)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������19.55 R (on the application of Prudential plc) v Special Commr of Income Tax [2013] UKSC 1, [2013] 2 AC 185��������������������������������������������������������������������������������19.37 R (on the application of Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] UKHL 15, [2005] 2 AC 246����������������������������������������������16.35 R H Thomson & Co v Pattison, Elder, & Co (1895) 22 R 432���������������������������������21.51 R J McLeod (Contractors) Ltd v South of Scotland Electricity Board 1982 SLT 274����� 3.67, 3.69 Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust [2012] UKSC 2, [2012] 2 AC 72������4.55, 7.32, 7.33 Racing Partnership Ltd v Sports Information Services Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 1300, [2021] 2 WLR 469����������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.57, 21.58, 21.61 Radio France v France (2005) 40 EHRR 29�����������������������������������������������������������18.01 Rae v Linton (1875) 2 R 669���������������������������������������������������������������������������������17.52 Rae v Musselburgh Town Council 1973 SC 291�������������������������������� 22.12, 22.64, 22.65 Rae v Royal Scottish Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children 1924 SC 102����17.52, 18.15 Rae v Strathern 1924 SC 147��������������������������������������������������������������������������������17.59 RAH v MH [2013] CSIH 82, 2013 GWD 34-675��������������������������������������������������18.24 Rahman v Arearose Ltd [2001] QB 351������������������������������������������������������ 14.02, 14.10 Rainford v Aberdeenshire Council 2007 Rep LR 126�����������������������������������������������8.23 Ralston v Greater Glasgow HB 1987 SLT 386�������������������������������������������������������12.37 Ralston v Pettigrew (1768) Mor 12808������������������������������������������������������������������22.80 Ramsay v Coulter and Sprott (1799) Mor App “Wrongous Imprisonment” No 1�����17.36 Ramsay v Maclay and Co (1890) 18 R 130������������������������������������������������������������18.37 Rand v East Dorset HA (2000) 56 BMLR 39���������������������������������������������������������16.93 Rands v McNeil [1955] 1 QB 253�������������������������������������������������������������������������27.20 Rankin v M’Lachlan (1864) 3 M 128���������������������������������������������������������������������23.04 Rantzen v Mirror Group Newspapers [1994] QB 670���������������������������������������������20.09 Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524�����������������������������������������������������������18.131, 18.135 Ratcliffe v Plymouth & Torbay HA [1998] PIQR P170�������������������������������������������10.70 Rathband v Chief Constable of Northumbria [2016] EWHC 181 (QB)��������������������9.33 Raymond v Honey [1983] 1 AC 1��������������������������������������������������������������������������17.31 Razumas v Ministry of Justice [2018] EWHC 215 (QB), [2018] PIQR P10���������������3.90 RCA v Pollard [1983] Ch 135�������������������������������������������������������������������������������21.42

Table of Cases   lxi Read v Croydon Corp [1938] 4 All ER 631������������������������������������������������������������26.15 Read v Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons [1902] 2 KB 88, rev’d [1902] 2 KB 732��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.26, 21.30 Read v Lyons [1947] AC 156��������������������������������������������������������������������������������22.05 Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497�������������������������������������������������������������������3.20 Realstone Ltd v J & E Shepherd [2008] CSOH 31, [2008] PNLR 21������� 5.31, 5.84, 11.24, 11.25, 11.28 Reavis v Clan Line Steamers 1925 SC 725��������������������������������� 5.12, 5.40, 14.28, 31.27 Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc (No 3) [1990] 1 WLR 491���� 21.82, 21.83, 21.88, 21.94, 21.99, 21.103 Reddaway v Banham [1896] AC 199���������������������������������������������������������� 21.82, 21.91 Reeman v Department of Transport [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 648, [1997] PNLR 618������ 5.34, 7.29 Rees v Commr of Police of the Metropolis [2018] EWCA Civ 1587������������� 17.55, 17.56 Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309����������������������������������������� 13.84, 16.78, 16.79, 16.84, 16.85, 16.86, 16.87, 16.88, 16.95, 16.101, 31.09, 31.10 Reeves v Commr of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360����������������4.55, 9.31, 9.32, 14.20, 16.57, 16.58, 29.12, 29.20, 29.26, 29.60, 29.65 Reffell v Surrey CC [1964] 1 WLR 358������������������������������������������������������������������24.13 Reibl v Hughes [1980] 2 SCR 880 (SCC), (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1�������11.48, 16.45, 16.47, 16.51 Reid v Mitchell (1885) 12 R 1129�������������������������������������������10.34, 15.06, 15.08, 16.08 Reid v Rush & Tompkins Group plc [1990] 1 WLR 212������������������������������������������12.27 Reilly v Merseyside Regional HA [1995] 6 Med LR 246, 23 BMLR 26�������������������17.50 Reinhardt v Mentasti (1889) 42 Ch D 685�������������������������������������������������������������22.10 Reitze v Strathclyde RC 1999 SC 614��������������������������������������������������������������������10.57 Reklos v Greece [2009] EMLR 16�������������������������������������������������������������������������20.46 Renfrew Golf Club v Motocaddy Ltd [2015] CSOH 173, 2016 SLT 345, affd [2016] CSIH 57, 2016 SC 860���������������������������������������������� 26.10, 26.26, 26.44 Renton Football Club v McDowall (1891) 18 R 670������������������������������������������������2.33 Response Handling Ltd v BBC [2007] CSOH 102, 2008 SLT 51����� 19.61, 19.63, 19.71, 20.19, 20.26, 20.39, 20.43 Revenue and Customs Commrs v Total Network SL [2008] UKHL 19, [2008] 1 AC 1174�����������������������������������������������������2.38, 21.03, 21.45, 21.48, 21.52, 21.53, 21.57, 21.59, 21.61, 21.62 Revill v Newbery [1996] QB 567��������������������������������� 16.33, 25.24, 29.27, 29.29, 29.39 Rex Procter & Partners Retirement Benefits Scheme’s Trs v Edwards [2015] CSOH 83, 2015 GWD 22-403��������������������������������������������������������������������������11.30 Reynolds v Shipping Federation Ltd [1924] 1 Ch 28����������������������������������������������21.51 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127������������������������ 15.20, 18.75, 18.76, 18.77, 18.78, 18.79, 18.82, 18.83, 18.85, 18.86 RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde RC 1985 SC (HL) 17����� 1.35, 22.06, 22.08, 22.09, 22.13, 22.19, 22.35, 22.52, 22.59, 22.65, 22.86, 23.15, 23.17, 23.35 Richard v BBC [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch), [2019] Ch 169���������������� 20.21, 20.39, 20.40 Richards v Pharmacia Ltd [2018] CSIH 31, 2018 SLT 492������������������������� 26.17, 26.51 Richardson v Howie [2004] EWCA Civ 1127, [2005] PIQR Q3�����������������������������16.03 Richardson v LRC Products Ltd (2001) 59 BMLR 185������������������������������� 26.43, 26.62

lxii   Table of Cases Richardson v Pitt-Stanley [1995] QB 123��������������������������������������������������� 24.05, 24.26 Richardson v Stephenson Clarke Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1695����������������������������� 3.82, 12.06 Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263������������������������������������������������������������������������22.05 Rickless v United Artists Corp [1988] QB 40���������������������������������������������������������24.07 Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [1985] 1 WLR 1242��������������� 9.18, 11.40 Rigby and Beardmore v Downie (1872) 10 M 568��������������������������������������������������22.03 Roberson v Rochester Folding Box Co 9 Bedell 538, 64 NE 442 (NY 1902)�����������20.03 Robert and Scotlands v Thomson (1776) 2 Hailes 716, 8 Aug 1776 FC����������������18.111 Roberts v Bank of Scotland plc [2013] EWCA Civ 882��������������������� 28.04, 28.07, 28.08 Roberts v Gable [2007] EWCA Civ 721, [2008] QB 502����������������������������������������18.86 Roberts v Hamilton 1989 JC 91�����������������������������������������������������������������������������16.10 Roberts v Johnstone [1989] QB 878����������������������������������������������������������������������31.39 Roberts v Ramsbottom [1980] 1 WLR 823��������������������������������������� 10.44, 10.45, 10.46 Roberts, Fereday and Smith v Haines (1856) 6 E & B 643��������������������������������������23.24 Robertson v Bell 1969 SLT 119�������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.33 Robertson v British Bakeries Ltd 1991 SLT 434�����������������������������������������������������31.60 Robertson v Fleming (1861) 4 Macq 167��������������������������������������� 1.25, 1.29, 5.68, 5.71 Robertson v Forth Road Bridge Joint Board 1995 SC 364�����������������������6.19, 6.38, 6.40 Robertson v Hill (1824) 3 S 383����������������������������������������������������������������� 16.28, 16.31 Robertson v Horses in Scotland Ltd [2007] CSOH 68�������������������������������������������27.03 Robertson v Keith 1936 SC 29��������������������������16.37, 16.39, 17.26, 18.08, 18.22, 20.77 Robertson v Newsquest (Sunday Herald) Ltd 2006 SCLR 792�������������������� 18.11, 18.73 Robertson v Pedison (1705) Mor 17067����������������������������������������������������������������17.01 Robertson v Scottish Ministers [2007] CSOH 186��������� 3.61, 16.60, 28.07, 28.16, 28.17 Robertson v Stewarts and Livingston (1872) 11 M 189������������������������������������������22.03 Robertson v Strang (1825) 4 S 6����������������������������������������������������������������������������23.17 Robertson v Thomas (1887) 14 R 822�������������������������������������������������������������������22.12 Robertson v Watt, unreported, CSIH, 4 July 1995����������������������������������������������������5.71 Robertson v Wright (1885) 13 R 174���������������������������������������������������������� 23.02, 23.04 Robinson v Balmain New Ferry Co [1910] AC 295������������������������������������� 17.13, 17.14 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2014] EWCA Civ 15, [2014] PIQR P14������������������������������������������������������������������������������4.18, 4.50, 9.12 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 2.15, 4.19, 4.23, 4.25, 4.26, 4.38, 4.39, 4.43, 4.49, 4.50, 4.69, 5.11, 5.31, 5.91, 7.02, 7.03, 7.12, 9.01, 9.02, 9.04, 9.12, 9.13, 9.14, 9.15, 9.16, 9.20, 9.21, 9.23, 11.36, 11.37 Robinson v Hamilton (Motors) Ltd 1923 SC 838��������������������������������������������������16.57 Robinson v Lindsay 92 Wash 2d 410598 P 2d 392 (1979)���������������������������������������10.35 Robinson v National Bank of Scotland 1916 SC (HL) 154��������������������4.13, 5.27, 21.70 Robinson v P E Jones (Contractors) Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 9, [2012] QB 44������ 5.13, 5.25, 5.63, 5.84 Robinson v Post Office [1974] 1 WLR 1176������������������������������������������������ 14.40, 31.23 Robinson v Scottish Borders Council [2016] CSOH 47, 2016 SLT 435��������������������8.04 Robson v School Board of Hawick (1900) 2 F 411�������������������������������������������������16.21 Roddie v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2015] CSOH 30, 2015 SCLR 589���������������18.10 Rodger (Builders) Ltd v Fawdry 1950 SC 483�������������������������������������������������������21.32 Rodgers v Dunsmuir Confectionery Co 1952 SLT (Notes) 9����������������������������������12.07 Roe v Minister of Health [1954] 2 QB 66��������������������������������������������������� 10.05, 10.29 Roe v Sheffield City Council [2003] EWCA Civ 1, [2004] QB 653���������������������������8.11 Rogano v British Railways Board 1979 SC 297�������������������������������������������������������23.15 Rogers v Night Riders [1983] RTR 324�������������������������������������������������������������������3.71

Table of Cases   lxiii Rogers v Orr 1939 SC 121����������������������������������������������������������������������� 18.22, 18.105 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479����������������������������������������������������������������11.48 Rolls-Royce (1971) v Hutchison 1976 SLT (Notes) 15�������������������������������������������31.67 Rome v Watson (1898) 25 R 733�������������������������������������������������������������������������18.103 Ronaldson v Ballantine (1804) Mor 15270�������������������������������������������������������������23.01 Roncarelli v Duplessis [1959] SCR 121�������������������������������������������������������������������7.39 Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191��������������������������������������������������������������� 9.05, 11.56 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129������������������������������������������������������������� 21.41, 21.48 Rootes v Shelton (1967) 116 CLR 383������������������������������������������������������� 10.52, 16.48 Rorrison v West Lothian College 2000 SCLR 245, 1999 Rep LR 102�������6.04, 12.19, 16.72 Rose v Plenty [1976] 1 WLR 141�����������������������������������������������������������������������������3.36 Rose Street Foundry and Engineering Co v Lewis & Sons 1917 SC 341������������������21.05 Ross v Bryce 1972 SLT (Sh Ct) 76������������������������������������������������������������� 16.29, 16.30 Ross v Caunters [1980] Ch 297�������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.68 Ross v Glasgow Corp 1919 SC 174������������������������������������������������������6.03, 6.05, 14.29 Ross v Harper 2004 SLT 353��������������������������������������������������������������������������������31.23 Ross v McCallum’s Trs 1922 SC 322���������������������������������������������������������������������25.21 Ross v Secretary of State for Scotland 1990 SLT 13�������������������������������������������������7.36 Ross Harper & Murphy v Banks 2000 SC 500������������������������������ 2.31, 3.03, 3.15, 11.18 Rossleigh Motors v Leader Cars Ltd 1987 SLT 355����������������21.14, 21.16, 21.17, 21.18 Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd [2007] UKHL 39, [2008] 1 AC 281���� 1.38, 6.49, 6.50, 31.16, 31.19 Rouse v Squires [1973] QB 889������������������������������������������������������������������ 13.18, 14.05 Rowallan Creamery Ltd v Henry Dawes 1988 SLT 95��������������������������������������������11.29 Roxburgh v McArthur (1841) 3 D 556������������������������������������������������������� 19.03, 19.15 Roxburgh v Seven Seas Engineering 1980 SLT (Notes) 49�������������������������������������19.18 Roy v Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Family Practitioner Committee [1992] 1 AC 624����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������24.15 Royal Aquarium & Summer & Winter Garden Society Ltd v Parkinson [1892] 1 QB 431�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.102, 18.112 Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Bannerman Johnstone Maclay [2005] CSIH 39, 2005 1 SC 437���������������������������������������������������������� 3.31, 5.32, 5.33, 5.41 RSP Architects, Planners & Engineers v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 1075 [1999] 2 SLR 449�������������������������������������������������������5.84 RSP Architects, Planners & Engineers v Ocean Front Pte Ltd [1996] 1 SLR 113�������5.84 Rubens v Walker 1946 SC 215������������������������������������������������������������������������������31.38 Ruddy v Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police [2012] UKSC 57, 2013 SC (UKSC) 126����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 24.15, 24.17 Ruddy v Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police [2013] CSIH 73, 2014 SC 58�������������24.17 Ruegger v Shell Oil Co of Canada (1963) 41 DLR (2d) 183�����������������������������������26.07 Rufus v Elliott [2015] EWCA Civ 121, [2015] EMLR 17���������������������������������������18.20 Rugby Joinery UK Ltd v Whitfield [2005] EWCA Civ 561, [2006] PIQR Q2�����13.48, 13.49 Rule v Hazelhaw Properties [2017] SC GLA 1, 2017 GWD 2-16���������������� 25.14, 25.21 Runciman v Borders RC 1987 SC 241�������������������������������������������������������������������14.31 Rush v Glasgow Corp 1947 SC 580�������������������������������������������������������������������������8.04 Rushmer v Polsue [1907] AC 121��������������������������������������������������������������������������22.23 Russell v Dickson 1997 SC 269�������������������������������������������������������� 17.34, 17.35, 17.36 Russell v Stubbs Ltd 1913 SC (HL) 14������������������������������������������������������ 18.10, 18.11, 18.15, 18.25 Russell v West Sussex CC [2010] EWCA Civ 71, [2010] RTR 19�����������������������������8.11 Russell’s Exrx v British Railways Board 1965 SC 422���������������������������������������������31.47 Rutherfoord v Boak (1836) 14 S 732���������������������������������������������������������������������19.15

lxiv   Table of Cases Rutherford v Chief Constable for Strathclyde Police 1981 SLT (Notes) 119�����������16.03, 16.14, 16.30 Ryder v Highland Council [2013] CSOH 95, 2013 SLT 847������ 7.28, 8.09, 8.23, 8.24, 8.27 Rylands v Fletcher (1865–66) LR 1 Ex 265, affd (1868) LR 3 HL 330������������ 1.35, 2.20, 14.55, 22.05, 22.06, 22.13, 22.42, 22.52, 22.54, 22.57 S v Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 114�����������������������������������������26.17 S v Lothian HB [2009] CSOH 97, 2009 SLT 689������������������������������������������� 3.91, 3.92 S v Sweden (2014) 58 EHRR 36���������������������������������������������������������������������������20.34 S, In Re [2004] UKHL 47, [2005] 1 AC 593���������������������������������������������������������20.40 S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication), In Re [2005] 1 AC 593�����20.21 S & D Property Investments Ltd v Nisbet [2009] EWHC 1726 (Ch)������������������������3.61 SAAMCO case see South Australia Asset Management Corp v York Montague Ltd Sabet v Fife Council [2019] CSOH 26, 2019 SLT 514�������������������������������������������22.09 Sabri-Tabrizi v Lothian HB 1998 SC 373��������������������������������������������������������������29.07 Sadaati v Moorhead 2017 SCC 28, 409 DLR (4th) 395�������������������������������������������6.04 Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd v Condek Holdings Ltd [2014] EWHC 2016 (TCC), [2014] BLR 574�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.50 St Albans City and District Council v International Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 481�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������26.39 St Helens Smelting Co v Tipping (1865) 11 HL Cas 642���������������������������������������22.11 St John Poulton’s Tr in Bankruptcy v Ministry of Justice [2010] EWCA Civ 392, [2011] Ch 1�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������24.05 Sally v Dunbar (1899) 6 SLT 322����������������������������������������������������������������������������3.84 Salmon v Seafarer Restaurants Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 1264�����������������������������������������25.46 Saloomey v Jeppesen & Co 707 F 2d 671 (2d Cir 1983)�����������������������������������������26.38 Salter v UB Frozen and Chilled Foods Ltd 2004 SC 233������������������������������������������6.40 Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203�����19.20, 19.27, 19.32 Samuel v Edinburgh & Glasgow Railway Co (1850) 13 D 312��������������������������������22.03 Sanderson v Geddes (1874) 1 R 1198��������������������������������������������������������������������23.13 Sanderson v Hull [2008] EWCA Civ 1211, [2009] PIQR P7����������������������������������13.43 Sandhar v Department of Transport, Environment and the Regions [2004] EWCA Civ 1440, [2005] 1 WLR 1632����������������������������������������������������������������8.28 Sandhu Menswear Co Ltd v Woolworths plc [2006] EWHC 1299 (TCC), [2006] 24 EG 176 (CS)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4.74 Sandison v Coope [2016] SC PER 33, 2016 Rep LR 70������������������������������ 27.13, 27.17 Santander UK plc v Keeper of the Registers of Scotland [2013] CSOH 24, 2013 SLT 362������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4.42, 5.57 Sargent v Secretary of State for Scotland 2000 Rep LR 118����8.05, 8.06, 8.07, 8.13, 8.14 Sarjantson v Chief Constable of Humberside Police [2013] EWCA Civ 125, [2014] QB 411���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.40 Sarwar v News Group Newspapers Ltd 1999 SLT 327�������������������������������������������18.70 Saunders v Edwards [1987] 1 WLR 1116���������������������������������������������������������������29.24 Savage v South Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust [2008] UKHL 74, [2009] 1 AC 681�������������������������������������������������������������������������������4.55, 7.33, 9.32 Savage v Wallis [1966] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 357��������������������������������������������������������������31.68 Sayers v Harlow UDC [1958] 1 WLR 623����������������������������������������� 14.15, 17.49, 29.56 Scala Ballroom (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Ratcliffe [1958] 1 WLR 1057���������������������21.55 Scandecor Development AB v Scandecor Marketing AB [1999] FSR 26�����������������21.85

Table of Cases   lxv Schembri v Marshall [2020] EWCA Civ 358, [2020] PIQR P16, [2020] Med LR 240�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������13.07 Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital 211 NY 125, 105 NE 92 (1914)���������16.51 Schofield v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [1999] ICR 193����������������������6.12 Schubert Murphy (A Firm) v The Law Society [2017] EWCA Civ 1295, [2017] 4 WLR 200����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.46 Schuh Ltd v SHHH . . . Ltd [2011] CSOH 123, 2011 GWD 26-593����������� 21.88, 21.96 Schweizer v Central Hospital (1974) 53 DLR (3d) 494������������������������������������������16.52 SCM (United Kingdom) Ltd v W J Whittall and Son Ltd [1971] 1 QB 337���������������5.10 Scorgie v Lawrie (1883) 10 R 610��������������������������������������������������������������� 16.03, 16.35 Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 33������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.74, 3.76 Scott v Gavigan [2016] EWCA Civ 544�����������������������������������������������������������������14.15 Scott v Leith Police Commrs (1830) 2 R 143���������������������������������������������������������22.53 Scott v Leith Police Commrs (1835) 13 S 646��������������������������������������������������������22.03 Scott v London & St Katherine Docks Co (1865) 3 H & C 596������������������ 10.60, 10.61, 10.65, 22.86 Scott v Lothian RC 1999 Rep LR 15���������������������������������������������������������������������11.32 Scott v Scott (1881) 8 R 851���������������������������������������������������������������������������������22.10 Scott v Shepherd (1773) 2 Blackstone W 892���������������������������������������������� 14.08, 16.11 Scott’s Trs v H E Moss (1889) 17 R 32��������������������������������������������� 14.04, 14.29, 23.08 Scott Lithgow Ltd v GEC Electrical Projects Ltd 1989 SC 412��������������������������������5.84 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Glasgow Fleshers Trade Defence Association (1897) 5 SLT 263���������������������������������������������������������������� 21.09, 21.52 Scottish Eastern Omnibuses v Leslie 1996 SLT (Sh Ct) 53�������������������������������������31.12 Scottish Milk Marketing Board v Paris 1935 SC 287����������������������������������������������31.76 Scout Association v Barnes [2010] EWCA Civ 1476����������������������������������������������10.57 Scullion v Bank of Scotland plc [2011] EWCA Civ 693, [2011] 1 WLR 3212����� 5.42, 11.25 Seafield (Countess of) v Kemp (1899) 1 F 402���������������������������������� 13.13, 22.10, 31.72 Seaga v Harper [2008] UKPC 9, [2009] 1 AC 1�����������������������������������������������������18.76 Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 923����������������������������������������� 19.21, 19.24, 19.47 Seaspray Steamship Co Ltd v Tenant (1908) 15 SLT 874���������������������������������������18.54 Sebry v Companies House [2015] EWHC 115 (QB), [2016] 1 WLR 2499������� 5.55, 7.03 Secretary of State for Health v Servier Laboratories Ltd [2021] UKSC 24������� 21.42, 21.43, 21.62 Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ and others [2007] UKHL 45, [2008] 1 AC 385����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������17.03 Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880������������������������������ 22.09, 22.40, 22.47, 22.48, 22.49, 22.50, 22.51 Semayne’s Case (1604) 5 Co Rep 91, 77 ER 194����������������������������������������������������20.76 Sexton v John Ritchie & Co (1890) 17 R 680, affd (1891) 18 R (HL) 20�����������������18.15 Seymour v M’Laren (1828) 6 S 969�����������������������������������������������������������������������16.29 Shahid v Scottish Ministers [2015] UKSC 58, 2016 SC (UKSC) 1�������������������������17.46 Shakoor v Situ [2001] 1 WLR 410�������������������������������������������������������������������������11.14 Shand v Henderson (1814) 2 Dow 519������������������������������������������������������������������23.06 Shanks v BBC 1993 SLT 326��������������������������������������������������������������������� 18.24, 18.95 Shanlin v Collins 1973 SLT (Sh Ct) 21��������������22.10, 22.13, 22.19, 22.21, 22.53, 27.01 Sharp v Highland and Islands Fire Board 2005 SLT 855, affd 2008 SCLR 526��������3.38, 10.03, 10.51, 10.52, 10.56 Shaw v M’Donell (1786) Mor 9185�����������������������������������������������������������������������11.05 Shaw v Morgan (1888) 15 R 865�������������������������������������������������������������������������18.105

lxvi   Table of Cases Shehadeh v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] CSOH 139, 2014 SLT 199, affd [2014] CSIH 91, 2015 SC 295�������������������������������� 17.07, 17.29 Shelbourne v Cancer Research UK [2019] EWHC 842 (QB), [2019] PIQR P16������3.51, 3.58 Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287������������������������������22.29 Shell UK Ltd v Total UK Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 180, [2011] QB 86�����������������������5.09 Shepherd v Elliot (1895) 3 SLT 115����������������������������������������������������������� 18.10, 18.31 Shepherd v Elliot (No 2) (1895) 3 SLT 192������������������������������������������������ 18.10, 18.31 Shepherd v Menzies (1900) 2 F 443����������������������������������������������������������������������23.03 Shepherd v Travelodge Hotels Ltd [2014] CSOH 162, 2015 Rep LR 2������� 25.06, 25.18, 25.19, 25.21 Sheridan v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2018] CSIH 76, 2019 SC 203���������������31.64 Sherratt v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2018] EWHC 1746 (QB), [2019] PIQR P1���������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.25, 9.32 Shields v Crossroads (Orkney) [2013] CSOH 144, 2014 SLT 190�������3.52, 16.22, 16.63 Shields v Shearer 1914 SC (HL) 33�����������������������������������������������������������������������15.09 Shillinglaw v J G & R Turner 1925 SC 807�������������������������������������������������������������25.02 Shinwell v National Sailors’ and Firemen’s Union 1913 2 SLT 83���������������������������31.73 Short v J & W Henderson Ltd 1946 SC (HL) 24������������������������������������������������������3.21 Shortell v Bical, unreported, QBD District Registry (Liverpool), 16 May 2008��������13.66 Sibbald v Lady Rosyth (1685) Mor 13976����������������������������������� 1.09, 1.23, 3.05, 22.01 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871������������������������������������������ 11.07, 11.47, 11.50 Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd [2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 2 AC 229���� 13.11, 13.40, 13.43, 13.44, 13.45, 13.46, 13.49, 13.63, 13.66 Sim v Howat [2012] CSOH 171, 2012 GWD 36-731�����������������������������������������������2.31 Sim v Strathclyde Fire Board [2010] CSOH 63, 2010 GWD 17-345�������������������������9.02 Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237����������������������������������������18.02, 18.17, 18.18, 18.19 Simaan General Contracting Co v Pilkington Glass Ltd [1988] QB 758��������� 5.82, 26.08 Simmons v British Steel plc [2004] UKHL 20, 2004 SC (HL) 94��������� 6.01, 6.14, 14.22, 14.29, 14.31, 14.43 Simpson v Dundee Corp 1928 SN 30����������������������������������������������������������������������9.31 Simpson v Edinburgh Corp 1960 SC 313��������������������������������������������������������������24.08 Simpson v ICI Ltd 1983 SLT 601���������������������������������������������������������������������������6.04 Simpson & Co v Thomson (1877) 5 R (HL) 40�������������������������������������������������������5.05 Singer & Friedlander Ltd v John D Wood & Co [1955–95] PNLR 70����������������������11.26 Singularis Holdings Ltd v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Ltd [2017] EWHC 257 (Ch)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������29.51 Singularis Holdings Ltd v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Ltd [2019] UKSC 50, [2020] AC 1189�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.49, 29.50, 29.51 Sion v Hampstead HA [1994] 5 Med LR 170����������������������������������������������������������6.27 Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd v Alfred McAlpine plc [2004] RPC 36����������������������������21.96 Skerries Salmon Ltd v The Braer Corp 1999 SLT 1196�������������������������������������������5.06 Skinner v Glasgow Corp 1961 SLT 130�������������������������������������������������������������������4.54 Sky plc v Stewart [2017] CSOH 141, 2017 GWD 36-55����������������������������������������31.74 Slack v Glenie [2000] All ER (D) 592��������������������������������������������������������������������25.57 Smith v Baker [1891] AC 325��������������������������������������������������������������������� 12.02, 29.04 Smith v Barking, Havering and Brentwood HA [1994] 5 Med LR 285��������� 11.54, 11.55 Smith v Bluebird Buses Ltd [2014] CSOH 75, 2014 Rep LR 91�����������������������������10.03 Smith v Chadwick (1884) 9 App Cas 187��������������������������������������������������������������21.71 Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police see Van Colle v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police

Table of Cases   lxvii Smith v Crombie [2012] CSOH 52, 2012 GWD 16-331����������������������������������������23.12 Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831������������������������������������������� 5.29, 5.36, 5.38, 5.39, 5.42, 11.25 Smith v Fordyce [2013] EWCA Civ 320������������������������������������������� 10.60, 10.65, 10.68 Smith v Leech Brain & Co Ltd [1962] 2 QB 405����������������������������������������� 14.38, 14.39 Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256, [1945] ALR 392������������������������������������������������3.02 Smith v Manchester Corp (1974) 17 KIR 1�����������������������������������������������������������31.30 Smith v Middleton 1972 SC 30�����������������������������������������������������������������������������31.65 Smith v Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41, [2014] AC 52����������������4.17, 7.16, 7.32, 12.12, 12.13 Smith v Muir Construction Ltd [2014] CSOH 171, 2015 Rep LR 8�����������������������31.30 Smith v O’Reilly (1800) Hume’s Decisions 605������������������������������������������������������13.25 Smith v Prendergast, The Times, 18 October 1984���������������������������������������������������27.07 Smith v Sabre Insurance Co Ltd [2013] CSIH 28, 2013 SC 569�������������������������������2.06 Smith v Scot Bowyers Ltd [1986] IRLR 315����������������������������������������������������������12.07 Smith v Stages [1989] AC 928������������������������������������������������������������������������ 3.67, 3.68 Smith v Stewart & Co 1961 SC 91������������������������������������������������������������������������31.47 Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Secretary to the Department of Community Services and Health [1990] FSR 617������������ 19.58, 20.42 Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA [1997] AC 254������� 14.54, 21.75, 21.76, 31.66 Smithies v National Association of Operative Plasterers [1909] 1 KB 310����������������21.26 Smoldon v Whitworth [1996] EWCA Civ 1225, [1997] PIQR P133�����������������������10.55 Sneddon v Addie (1849) 11 D 1159����������������������������������������������������������������������12.01 Snowie v Stirling Council 2008 SLT (Sh Ct) 61�����������������������������������������������������20.78 So v HSBC Bank plc [2009] EWCA Civ 296, [2009] 1 CLC 503�����������������������������5.47 Soblusky v Egan (1960) 103 CLR 215���������������������������������������������������������������������3.74 Society of Solicitors v Robertson (1781) Mor 13935�����������������������������������������������18.54 Software Incubator Ltd (The) v Computer Associates UK Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 518, [2019] Bus LR 522�����������������������������������������������������������������26.39 Sokhulu v New Africa Publications (2001) 4 SA 1357 (W)�������������������������������������18.18 Somerville v Hamilton (1541) Mor 8905���������������������������������������������������������������10.31 Somerville v Harsco Infrastructure Ltd [2015] SC EDIN 71, 2015 GWD 38-607����3.58, 12.05, 16.10 Somerville v Rowbotham (1862) 24 D 1187������������������������������������������������������������2.33 Somerville v Scottish Ministers [2006] CSIH 52, 2007 SC 140�������������������������������17.31 Somerville v Scottish Ministers [2007] UKHL 44, 2008 SC (HL) 45������������� 7.31, 17.46 Soofi v Dykes [2019] CSOH 59, 2019 GWD 27-442, affd [2020] CSIH 10, 2020 GWD 10-152�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������11.18 Sorrell v Smith [1925] AC 700������������������������������������������������������������������������������21.35 Soutar v Mulhern 1907 SC 723�������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.04 South Australia Asset Management Corp v York Montague Ltd (SAAMCO case) [1997] AC 191������������������������ 13.20, 14.47, 14.48, 14.49, 14.52, 14.53, 16.93, 31.14 South Hetton Coal Co Ltd v North-Eastern News Association Ltd [1894] 1 QB 133���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.50 South Wales Miners’ Federation v Glamorgan Coal Co Ltd [1903] 2 KB 545, affd [1905] AC 239����������������������������������������������������� 21.19, 21.26, 21.29 Southesk (Earl of) v Inch Bleaching Co (1881) 8 R 573������������������������������������������22.10 Southesk Trust Co Ltd v Angus Council [2006] CSOH 6�����������������������������������������3.84 Spandeck Engineering Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 1 SLR 720����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.84 Spargo v North Essex District HA [1997] PIQR P235, [1997] PIQR P235������� 30.12, 30.16

lxviii   Table of Cases Spark v Appraisal Security Services [1994] CLY 1470��������������������������������������������17.12 Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27���� 5.03, 5.10, 5.11, 14.47 Spelman v Express Newspapers [2012] EWHC 355 (QB)��������������������������������������20.55 Spencer v Cruddas [2018] CSOH 95, 2018 Rep LR 124����������������������������������������30.24 Spencer v Wincanton Holdings Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1404, [2010] PIQR P8�������14.15 Spiers v Newton-on-Ayr Gas Co Ltd 1942 SLT (Sh Ct) 2��������������������������������������22.13 Sporrong & Lonnroth v Sweden (A/52) (1983) 5 EHRR 35������������������������������������22.74 Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1993] 2 All ER 273, revd [1995] 2 AC 296��������5.30, 5.44, 5.51, 5.52, 5.53, 5.56, 5.59, 5.60, 12.29, 13.99, 18.110, 18.137 Square Grip Reinforcement Co Ltd v Macdonald 1968 SLT 65������������������������������21.22 Squires v Perth and Kinross DC 1985 SC 297���������������������������������������������� 4.75, 14.07 Stafford v Conti Commodity Services Ltd [1981] 1 All ER 691������������������������������10.66 Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp [2002] UKHL 43, [2003] 1 AC 959������������������������������������������������������ 3.01, 16.56, 16.57, 21.73, 29.55 Stansbie v Troman [1948] 2 KB 48�������������������������������������������������������������������������4.53 Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd [1953] AC 663���������������������������������������������� 13.02, 29.64 Starbucks (HK) Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Group plc [2015] UKSC 31, [2015] 1 WLR 2628����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21.100 Stark v Lothian and Borders Fire Board 1993 SLT 652��������������������������������� 6.01, 31.21 Stedman v Henderson (1923) 40 Sh Ct Rep 8��������������������������������������������� 16.03, 16.15 Steel v Commrs of Police of Gourock (1872) 10 M 954������������������������������������������22.17 Steel v Joy [2004] EWCA Civ 576, [2004] 1 WLR 3002�����������������������������������������13.76 Steel v McGill’s Bus Service [2015] CSOH 5, 2015 SCLR 617��������������������������������4.57 Steel and Morris v UK (68416/01) (2005) 41 EHRR 22������������������������������ 18.54, 18.70 Steele v Scottish Daily Record and Sunday Mail Ltd 1970 SLT 53�����18.02, 18.130, 18.137 Steer v Durable Rubber Manufacturing Co Ltd, The Times, 20 November 1958�������26.14 Stennett v Hancock and Peters [1939] 2 All ER 578�������������������������� 26.06, 26.07, 26.09 Stephen v North of Scotland Water Authority 1999 SLT 342, 2000 GWD 1-28�������30.13 Stephen v Thurso Police Comrs (1876) 3 R 535��������������������������������������������� 3.29, 3.79 Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449������������������������������������������������������ 19.33, 19.44, 19.64 Stephenson, Jordan & Harrison Ltd v Macdonald & Evans (1952) 69 RPC 10����������3.20 Stermer v Lawson (1977) 79 DLR (3d) 366�����������������������������������������������������������29.09 Steven v Hewats [2013] CSOH 61, 2013 SLT 763���������������5.73, 5.74, 5.75, 5.76, 31.47 Stevens v Yorkhill NHS Trust [2006] CSOH 143, 2006 SLT 889����������������������������11.12 Stevenson v A & J Stephen (Builders) Ltd 1996 SLT 140�����������������������������������������5.17 Stevenson v Chief Constable of Police Scotland [2015] CSOH 16, 2015 GWD 6-129�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.33 Stevenson v Drummond 1942 SLT (Sh Ct) 38�������������������������������������������������������18.99 Stevenson v East Dunbartonshire 2003 SLT 97������������������������������������������������������12.19 Stevenson v Glasgow Corp 1908 SC 1034�������������������������������������������������������������25.37 Stevenson v Mags of Edinburgh 1934 SC 226��������������������������������������������� 13.19, 13.25 Stevenson v Pontifex & Wood (1887) 15 R 125�������������������������������������������� 22.68, 31.58 Stevenson v Sweeney 1995 SLT 29������������������������������������������������������������������������31.34 Stevenson v Wilson (1903) 5 F 309���������������������������������������������������������������������18.112 Stewart v H A Brechin & Co 1959 SC 306�������������������������������������������������� 11.24, 31.13 Stewart v London, Midland and Scottish Railway Co 1943 SC (HL) 19������������������31.48 Stewart v Malik [2009] CSIH 5, 2009 SC 265���������������� 3.84, 3.86, 22.56, 22.58, 23.15, 23.20 Stewart v Payne [2016] HCJAC 122, 2017 JC 155�������������������������������������������������17.55 Stewart’s Exrx v Clyde Navigation Trs 1946 SC 317������������������������������������ 27.20, 29.04

Table of Cases   lxix Stewart’s Hospital (Governors of) v Waddell (1890) 17 R 1077������������������������������23.15 Stocker v Stocker [2019] UKSC 17, [2020] AC 593������������������������������������ 18.13, 18.38 Stokes v Guest, Keen and Nettlefold (Bolts and Nuts) Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 1776�����12.04, 12.19 Stoll v Switzerland (2007) 44 EHRR 53�����������������������������������������������������������������20.41 Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens [2009] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 AC 1391������ 29.46, 29.49 Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923��������������������� 2.17, 4.18, 4.45, 4.47, 4.49, 7.10, 7.11, 8.02, 8.17, 8.18, 8.20, 9.43, 9.45 Strachan v Aberdeen District Committee of the CC of Aberdeenshire (1894) 21 R 915������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.14 Strachan v Highland Council 1999 GWD 38-1863�������������������������������������������������25.28 Strang v Strang (1849) 11 D 378���������������������������������������������������������������������������17.39 Strange v Wincanton Logistics Ltd [2011] CSIH 65A, 2011 GWD 39-807�������������10.27 Strathclyde RC v Persimmon Homes (Scotland) Ltd 1996 SLT 176������������ 23.11, 23.13 Strathford East Kilbride Ltd v HLM Design Ltd 1999 SLT 121�������������5.24, 5.30, 5.77, 5.84, 11.28 Street v Union Bank of Spain and England (1885) 30 Ch D 156�����������������������������21.99 Stringfellow v McCain Foods [1984] RPC 501������������������������������������������������������21.98 Struthers v Lang (1826) 4 S 418������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.25 Struthers v Lang (1827) 2 W&S 563������������������������������������������������������������������������5.68 Stuart v Bell [1891] 2 QB 341�����������������������������������������������������������������������������18.109 Stuart v Reid [2014] CSOH 117A, 2014 Rep LR 107��������������������������������������������31.55 Stubbs v Mazure 1919 SC (HL) 112���������������������������������������������������������������������18.25 Sturgeon v Gallagher 2003 SLT 67������������������������������������������������������������������������31.40 Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852���������������������������������������������������������������22.23 STV Central Ltd v Semple Fraser LLP [2015] CSIH 35, 2015 SLT 313������ 11.24, 11.27 Sube v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2018] EWHC 1961 (QB), [2018] 1 WLR 5767�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.48 Sunbolf v Alford (1838) 3 M & W 248�������������������������������������������������������������������17.10 Surrey CC v P [2014] UKSC 19, [2014] AC 896���������������������������������������������������17.48 Sutherland v McConechy’s Tyre Service Ltd [2012] CSOH 28, 2012 Rep LR 46�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������12.11 Sutherland v Monkland Railways Co (1857) 19 D 1004�����������������������������������������12.01 Sutherland v National Coal Board, unreported, CSOH, Lord Ross, 13 February 1981���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������14.41 Sutherland v North British Steel Group Ltd 1986 SLT (Sh Ct) 29��������������������������14.41 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 167 CLR 424���������������������������������������9.49 Sutradhar v National Environment Research Council [2006] UKHL 33, [2007] Env LR 10�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4.33 Suzor v Buckingham 1914 SC 299�����������������������������������������������������������18.106, 18.110 Swan v Andrew Minto & Son 1998 Rep LR 42������������������������������������������������������27.17 Swan v Salisbury Construction Co Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 204�������������������������������������10.65 Swinney v Chief Constable of Northumbria [1997] QB 464�������������������������� 9.26, 19.56 Swinson v Scottish National Party [2019] CSOH 98, 2019 GWD 38-609���������������18.24 Swinton v Pedie (1837) 15 S 775, affd (1839) Macl & R 1018��������������������� 22.03, 22.14 Sword v Cameron (1839) 1 D 493���������������������������������������������������� 12.01, 12.11, 13.64 Sylvester v G B Chapman Ltd (1935) 79 Sol Jo 777�����������������������������������������������27.19 Syme v East Lothian Council 2012 Rep LR 66�������������������������������������������� 25.06, 25.19 Syme v Scottish Borders Council 2003 SLT 601��������������������������������������������� 8.23, 8.28 T v English Province of the Congregation of Christian Brothers (The) [2020] SC EDIN 13, 2020 SLT (Sh Ct) 108�������������������������������� 31.26, 31.30

lxx   Table of Cases T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), In Re [1993] Fam 95�������������������������������������������16.51 Tafa v Matsim Properties Ltd [2011] EWHC 1302 (QB)����������������������������������������29.65 Tait v Payne and Kennedy (1856) 18 D 1038���������������������������������������������������������17.40 Taplin v Fife Council 2003 SLT 653����������������������������������������������������������������������12.19 Tapp v McColl [2016] CSOH 129, 2016 GWD 30-534�����������������������������������������13.44 Tarasoff v Regents of University of California 17 Cal 3d 425 (Cal 1976)������ 4.67, 4.68, 4.69 Tarleton v M’Gawley (1794) Peake 270�����������������������������������������������������������������21.39 Tartan American Machinery Corp v Swan & Co 2004 SC 276����������������������������������4.17 Tartan Army Ltd v SETT GmbH [2017] CSOH 22, 2017 SLT 532�����������������������21.88 Taylor v A Novo (UK) Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 194, [2014] QB 150��������������������������6.24 Taylor v City of Glasgow DC 1997 SC 183��������������������������������������������������� 3.65, 21.77 Taylor v Dailly Health Centre [2018] CSOH 91, 2018 SLT 1324���������������������������11.45 Taylor v Dick (1897) 4 SLT 297����������������������������������������������������������������� 13.22, 13.39 Taylor v Dunlop (1872) 11 M 25���������������������������������������������������������������������������23.20 Taylor v Glasgow Corp 1922 SC (HL) 1���������������������������������10.17, 25.18, 25.21, 25.38 Taylor v Leslie 1998 SLT 1248������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.27, 29.37 Taylor v Malcolm Macalister & Son 1951 SLT (Notes) 65��������������������������������������29.16 Taylor v Quigley [2016] CSOH 178, 2017 Rep LR 37����������������������������������������������2.35 Taylor v Rover Co Ltd [1966] 2 All ER 181�����������������������������������������������������������26.07 Taylor & Co v Smellie (1869) 6 SLR 677���������������������������������������������������� 23.12, 23.14 Taylorson v Shieldness Produce Ltd [1994] PIQR P329�������������������������������������������6.27 Teece v Ayrshire & Arran HB 1990 SLT 512����������������������������������������������������������19.37 Telfer v Glasgow Corp 1974 SLT (Notes) 51�����25.10, 25.21, 25.39, 25.41, 25.54, 29.63 Temperton v Russell [1893] 1 QB 715�������������������������������������������������������� 21.51, 21.52 Terrapin v Builders’ Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd [1967] RPC 375���������������������������������19.47 Tesco Stores Ltd v Guardian News & Media Ltd [2008] EWHC B14 (QB), [2009] EMLR 5���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.121 Tesco Stores Ltd v Pollard [2006] EWCA Civ 393, [2006] All ER (D) 186 (Apr)����26.64 Tetley v Chitty [1986] 1 All ER 663�����������������������������������������������������������������������22.63 Thacker v North British Steel Group plc [2018] CSOH 73, 2018 SLT 799�������������13.37 Thaine v London School of Economics [2010] ICR 1422���������������������������������������13.49 Thake v Maurice [1985] 2 WLR 215���������������������������������������������������������������������16.77 Thankakharm v Akai Holdings [2011] 1 HKC 357, [2010] HKEC 1692������������������3.65 Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EWHC 137 (QB), [2002] EMLR 22����������� 19.50, 20.32 Thelma v Owners of the Endymion [1953] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 613����������������������������������3.74 Thin & Sinclair v Archibald Arrol & Sons (1896) 24 R 198�������������������������������������21.65 Thom v Graham (1835) 13 S 1129������������������������������������������������������������������������16.29 Thom v Hetherington 1988 SC 185�����������������������������������������������������������������������23.18 Thomas v General Motors–Holden’s Ltd (1988) 49 SASR 11���������������������������������12.09 Thomas v National Union of Mineworkers (South Wales Area) [1986] Ch 20����������16.15 Thomas v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1233, [2002] EMLR 4������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 28.04, 28.10 Thomas v Warwickshire CC [2011] EWHC 772 (QB)����������������������������������������������8.11 Thomas v Winchester 6 NY 397 (1852)�������������������������������������������������������������������1.30 Thompson v Smiths Shiprepairers (North Shields) Ltd [1984] QB 405������� 12.11, 13.12, 13.48 Thompson v Toorenburgh (1973) 50 DLR (3d) 717����������������������������������������������14.09 Thompson-Schwab v Costaki [1956] 1 WLR 335���������������������������������������� 22.10, 22.23 Thomson, Petitioner 1989 SLT 343�����������������������������������������������������������������������17.31 Thomson v British Steel Corp 1977 SLT 26������������������������������������������������������������3.67 Thomson v Christie, Manson and Woods [2005] EWCA Civ 555, [2005] PNLR 38����11.15

Table of Cases   lxxi Thomson v Devon (1899) 15 Sh Ct Rep 209���������������������������������������������������������16.51 Thomson v Kindell 1910 2 SLT 442����������������������������������������������������������������������18.37 Thomson v Ross 2000 GWD 26-986�������������������������������������������������������������������18.102 Thomson v Ross 2001 SLT 807������������������������������������������������������� 17.36, 17.37, 18.24 Thomson v St Cuthbert’s Co-operative Association Ltd 1958 SC 380���������� 23.18, 23.35 Thomson v Scottish Ministers [2013] CSIH 63, 2013 SC 628������4.30, 4.35, 4.64, 7.25, 9.29 Thomson v Thomson 2002 SLT (Sh Ct) 97�����������������������������������������������������������28.22 Thorne v Northern Group Hospital Management Committee (1964) 108 SJ 484�����4.55, 9.32 Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB), [2011] 1 WLR 1985�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.39 Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2011] EWHC 1884 (QB), [2012] EMLR 8���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.123 Thorpe v Aberdeen City Council 2007 Rep LR 105�������������������������������������������������8.09 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England [2001] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 AC 1��������������������7.35, 7.37, 7.38, 7.39, 7.40, 7.41, 7.43, 7.44, 15.11 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England [2004] UKHL 48, [2005] 1 AC 610���������������19.37 Thwaytes v Sotheby’s [2015] EWHC 36 (Ch), [2016] 1 WLR 2143������������������������11.15 Timeplan Education Group Ltd v National Union of Teachers [1997] IRLR 457����21.28 Tindall v Bisset (1918) 34 Sh Ct Rep 292��������������������������������������������������������������23.04 Tindall v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2020] EWHC 837 (QB), [2021] RTR 6�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.30 Tiscali UK Ltd v British Telecommunications plc [2008] EWHC 3129 (QB)����������21.38 Titan Europe 2006-3 plc v Colliers International UK plc [2015] EWCA Civ 1083, [2016] PNLR 7������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������11.26 Titchener v British Railways Board 1981 SLT 208, aff'd 1984 SC (HL) 34�������������25.18, 25.19, 25.39, 25.43, 25.56, 25.58, 29.22 Todd v Adams (The Margaretha Maria) [2002] EWCA Civ 509, [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 97����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 24.05, 24.06 Tods Murray WS v Arakin Ltd [2010] CSOH 90, 2011 SCLR 37���������������� 11.18, 11.30 Tolley v J S Fry and Sons Ltd [1931] AC 333���������������������������������������������� 18.06, 20.72 Tomlinson v Congleton BC [2003] UKHL 47, [2004] 1 AC 46�������� 10.25, 25.20, 25.27, 25.28, 25.29 Toner v Glasgow Airport Ltd [2019] SC EDIN 78, 2019 GWD 33-527������������������25.18 Tontine Hotel (Greenock) Ltd v Greenock Corp 1967 SLT 180������������������ 22.12, 22.65 Toogood v Spyring (1834) 1 Cr M & R 181���������������������������������������������������������18.108 Toole v Bolton MBC [2002] EWCA Civ 588���������������������������������������������������������29.65 Topp v London Country Bus (South West) Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 976���������������������������4.50 Torquay Hotel Co Ltd v Cousins [1969] 2 Ch 106�������������������������������������������������21.21 Tot Toys Ltd v Mitchell [1993] 1 NZLR 325����������������������������������������������������������21.94 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461���������19.40 Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2003] UKHL 61, [2004] 2 AC 1����������������� 22.05, 22.13 Transport Arendonk BVBA v Chief Constable of Essex Police [2020] EWHC 212 (QB), [2020] RTR 22������������������������������������������������������������� 4.50, 9.22 Trapp v Mackie 1979 SC (HL) 38�����������������������������������������������������������������������18.102 Traynor’s Exrx v Bairds & Scottish Steel 1957 SC 311����������������������������������� 6.01, 31.20 Treadwell’s Drifters Inc v RCL Ltd 1996 SLT 1048�����������������������������������������������21.83 Tremain v Pike [1969] 1 WLR 1556����������������������������������������������������������������������14.36 Trimingham v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWHC 1296 (QB), [2012] 4 All ER 717�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.28

lxxii   Table of Cases Trotman v North Yorkshire CC [1999] IRLR 98�������������������������������������3.36, 3.40, 3.44 Trotter v Farnie (1832) 10 S 423���������������������������������������������������������������������������22.03 Trotter v Hume (1757) Mor 12798������������������������������������������������������������������������22.80 Tse Wai Chun v Cheng [2001] EMLR 31��������������������������������������� 18.95, 18.99, 18.106 Tuberville v Savage [1669] 1 Mod Rep 3, 86 ER 684����������������������������������������������16.15 Tullis v Glenday (1834) 13 S 698��������������������������������������������������������������������������16.12 Turcu v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2005] EWHC 799 (QB), [2005] All ER (D) 34 (May) 18.70 Turnbull v Frame 1966 SLT 24�����������������������������������������������������������������������������13.26 Turner v Royal Bank of Scotland [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 664������������������������������19.40 Tuttle v Buck 107 Minn 145, 119 NW 946 (1909)�����������������������������������������������21.107 Tweedale (Marquis of) v Dalrymple (1778) Mor 4992��������������������������������� 23.01, 23.06 Twomax Ltd v Dickson M’Farlane & Robinson 1982 SC 113�����������������������������������5.48 Twycross v Farrell 1973 SLT (Notes) 85����������������������������������������������������������������16.34 Uber BV v Aslam [2021] UKSC 5������������������������������������������������������������������ 3.18, 3.27 Ultramares Corp v Touche 255 NY 170, 174 NE 441 (NY 1931)�����������������������������5.03 United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1�������������������������������������������20.87 United Project Consultants Pte Ltd v Leong Kwok Onn [2005] SGCA 38���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������29.47, 29.48 United States v Carroll Towing Co Ltd 159 F 2d 169 (1947)����������������������������������10.14 United Wholesale Grocers Ltd v Sher 1993 SLT 284��������������������������������������� 3.19, 3.21 Unruh v Webber (1992) 98 DLR (4th) 294������������������������������������������������������������16.49 Upstone v G D W Carnegie and Co 1978 SLT (Sh Ct) 4����������������������������������������31.13 Upton Park Homes Ltd v MacDonalds Solicitors [2009] CSOH 159, [2010] PNLR 12����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������14.53 Vacwell Engineering Co Ltd v BDH Chemicals Ltd [1971] 1 QB 88����������� 14.37, 14.45, 26.07, 26.09 Vaickuviene v J Sainsbury plc [2013] CSIH 67, 2014 SC 147�����������������3.38, 3.57, 3.58, 3.61, 12.05, 28.17 Vakante v Governing Body of Addey and Stanhope School (No 2) [2004] EWCA Civ 1065, [2004] 4 All ER 1056������������������������������������������������������������29.42 Valentine v Transport for London [2010] EWCA Civ 1358, [2011] RTR 24�������������8.03 Van Colle v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police; Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225���������4.38, 7.32, 7.33, 9.06, 9.07, 9.10, 9.12, 9.13, 9.28, 9.38, 9.39, 9.41, 9.53 Van Oppen v Bedford Charity Trs [1990] 1 WLR 235�����������������������������������������������4.38 Vance v Bough [2008] CSOH 70, 2008 Rep LR 90����������������������������������������� 3.43, 3.63 Various Claimants v Barclays Bank plc [2020] UKSC 13, [2020] AC 973������� 3.16, 3.27, 3.28, 3.29, 3.79 Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1��������������������������������������� 3.01, 3.16, 3.19, 3.20, 3.23, 3.24, 3.25, 3.33, 3.44, 3.46, 3.50, 3.52 Various Claimants v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2020] UKSC 12, [2020] AC 989������������������������������������������������3.43, 3.48, 3.49, 3.50, 3.53 Vaughan v Menlove (1837) 3 Bing NC 468, 132 ER 490������������������������������� 1.23, 10.07 Veedfald v Arhus Amtskommune (Case C–203/99) [2003] 1 CMLR 41������ 26.34, 26.72, 26.75

Table of Cases   lxxiii Vellino v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police [2001] EWCA Civ 1249, [2002] 1 WLR 218���������������������������������������������9.16, 29.37, 29.39 Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] Fam 430��������������������������������������20.50 Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2019] EWHC 494 (Fam), [2019] EMLR 17����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������20.50 Venter v Nel 1997 4 SA 1014 (D)��������������������������������������������������������������������������16.13 Vernon Knights Associates v Cornwall Council [2013] EWCA Civ 950, [2014] Env L 6���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.11, 22.41 Vertical Leisure Ltd v Poleplus Ltd [2014] EWHC 2077 (IPEC)����������������������������21.93 Vestergaard Frandsen A/S and others v Bestnet Europe Ltd [2013] UKSC 31, [2013] 1 WLR 1556������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������19.53 Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1151, [2006] QB 510��������������������������������������������������������������� 3.20, 3.33 Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2015] EWCA Civ 311, [2016] QB 1003��������������������������20.15 Videan v British Transport Commission [1963] 2 QB 650����������������������������� 6.30, 14.17 Viewpoint Housing Association Ltd v City of Edinburgh Council [2007] CSOH 114, 2007 SLT 772���������������������������������������������������������� 22.12, 22.38, 22.52 Vignoli v Sydney Harbour Casino [1999] NSWSC 1113����������������������������������������17.10 Vinton v Fladgate Fielder [2010] EWHC 904 (Ch), [2010] STC 1868������������ 5.72, 5.74 Vodafone Group plc v Orange Personal Communications Services Ltd [1997] EMLR 84�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.143 Volkswagen AG v Garcia [2013] EWHC 1832 (Ch), [2014] FSR 12�����������������������19.32 von Hannover v Germany (No 1) (2005) 40 EHRR 1������ 20.21, 20.26, 20.28, 20.32, 20.45 von Hannover v Germany (No 2) (2012) 55 EHRR 15������������20.21, 20.28, 20.32, 20.45 Vowles v Evans [2003] EWCA Civ 318, [2003] 1 WLR 1607������������������������� 2.51, 10.55 W v Advocate General for Scotland [2015] CSOH 111, 2015 SLT 537�������������������31.58 W v Egdell [1990] Ch 359��������������������������������������������� 4.68, 19.36, 19.63, 19.66, 19.69 W v Essex CC [2001] 2 AC 592������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.39 Waddell v BBC 1973 SLT 246�������������������������������������������������������������������� 18.22, 31.76 Wade v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1214��������������������������������19.46 Wagner v International Railway Co 232 NY 176 (1921)�������������������������������� 6.30, 14.17 Wagner Associates v Joseph Dunn (Bottlers) Ltd 1986 SLT 267������������������ 11.15, 11.28 Wagon Mound (The) (No 1) see Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Wagon Mound (The) (No 2) see Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty (The) Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406������� 1.37, 6.04, 16.09, 16.60, 16.69, 20.02, 20.11, 20.26, 20.35, 20.83, 20.85 Wainwright v UK (2007) 44 EHRR 40������������������������������������������������������� 20.82, 20.83 Waits v Frito-Lay, Inc 978 F 2d 1093 CA9 (Cal 1992)�������������������������������������������20.61 Walker v Commr of Police of the Metropolis [2014] EWCA Civ 897, [2015] 1 WLR 312��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 17.05, 17.06 Walker v Cumming (1868) 6 M 318����������������������������������������������������������������������20.77 Walker v Eastern Scottish Omnibuses Ltd, CSOH, 28 December 1989�������� 25.21, 25.32 Walker v Hall (1876) 40 JP 456�����������������������������������������������������������������������������27.07 Walker v Northumberland CC [1995] 1 All ER 737, [1995] ICR 702���������� 12.18, 12.25 Walker v Pitlochry Motor Co 1930 SC 565��������������������������������������������������������������6.03 Walker v Robertson (1821) 2 Mur 508�������������������������������������������������������� 18.65, 18.66 Wallace v City of Glasgow DC 1985 SLT 23����������������������������������������������� 25.06, 25.31 Wallace v Culter Paper Mills Co Ltd (1892) 19 R 915��������������������������������������������29.04

lxxiv   Table of Cases Wallace v Kennedy (1908) 16 SLT 485��������������������������������������������������������������������6.05 Wallace v Morrison & Co Ltd 1929 SLT 73�������������������������������������������������������������3.69 Wallace v Paterson 2002 SLT 563��������������������������������������������������������������������������31.22 Wallbank v Wallbank Fox Designs Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 25, [2012] IRLR 307�������3.59 Walsh v Holst & Co Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 800�����������������������������������������������������������10.65 Wamphray (Creditors of) v Lady Wamphray (1675) Mor 347����������������������������������19.02 Wands v Fife Council 2009 GWD 30-477������������������������������������ 4.41, 4.54, 6.45, 11.32 Ward v Abraham 1910 SC 299������������������������������������������������������������������������������13.39 Ward v Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police 1991 SLT 292�������������������������� 16.37, 16.39 Ward v Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust [2004] EWHC 2106 (QB)�������������������6.16 Ward v Scotrail Railways Ltd 1999 SC 255�������������������� 6.04, 16.17, 16.60, 28.17, 28.22 Ward v Tesco Stores Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 810����������������������������������������������� 10.65, 25.21 Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings Ltd 1956 SC (HL) 26����������13.28, 13.30, 13.31, 13.32, 13.33, 13.35, 13.37, 13.57, 13.60, 13.61, 13.69, 13.70, 13.71, 13.72, 13.73 Wardlaw v Drysdale (1898) 25 R 879��������������������������������������������������������������������18.09 Wardle v Scottish Borders Council 2011 SLT (Sh Ct) 199��������������������������� 11.33, 25.39 Warner v Riddiford (1858) 4 CB (NS) 180������������������������������������������������������������17.05 Warner v Scapa Flow Charters [2018] UKSC 52, 2019 SC (UKSC) 1��������������������30.20 Warren v Henlys Ltd [1948] 2 All ER 935����������������������������������������������������������������3.53 Waters v Commr of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 WLR 1607����������3.82, 9.34, 12.05 Watkins v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 17, [2006] 2 AC 395������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7.38, 31.07 Watson v Buckley, Osborne, Garrett & Co Ltd [1940] 1 All ER 174������������� 26.06, 26.07 Watson v Burnet (1864) 24 D 494�����������������������������������������������������������������������18.105 Watson v Duncan (1890) 17 R 404������������������������������������������������������������������������18.33 Watson v Earl of Errol (1763) Mor 4991����������������������������������������������������������������23.06 Watson v McEwan (1905) 7 F (HL) 109��������������������������������������������������������������18.103 Watson v M’Leish & M’Taggart (1898) 25 R 1028���������������������������������������������������1.28 Watson, Laidlaw, & Co Ltd v Pott, Cassels, & Williamson 1914 SC (HL) 18�����������19.74, 21.106, 31.03, 31.70 Watt v Hertfordshire CC [1954] 1 WLR 835����������������������������������������������������������12.15 Watt v Jamieson 1954 SC 56�����������������������������22.09, 22.11, 22.19, 22.20, 22.21, 22.34 Watt v Longsdon [1930] 1 KB 130����������������������������������������������������������������������18.111 Watts v Times Newspapers Ltd [1997] QB 650����������������������������������������������������18.113 Waugh v James K Allan Ltd 1963 SC 175��������������������������������������������������������������10.42 Waugh v James K Allan Ltd 1964 SC (HL) 102����������� 10.42, 10.43, 10.44, 10.45, 10.46 Webb v Barclays Bank plc [2001] EWCA Civ 1141, [2002] PIQR P8����������������������14.11 Webster v Lord Advocate 1985 SC 173����������������������������������22.10, 22.16, 22.18, 22.23, 22.26, 22.27, 22.68, 22.70, 31.73, 31.75 Webster v Lord Chancellor [2015] EWCA Civ 742, [2016] QB 676����� 17.43, 17.44, 17.45 Webster v Young (1851) 13 D 752���������������������������������������������������������������������������5.68 Weddall v Barchester Healthcare Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 25, [2012] IRLR 307��������3.57, 3.59, 12.05 Weddle v Glasgow City Council [2021] SAC (Civ) 17, 2021 SLT (Sh Ct) 277����������6.13 Weems v Mathieson (1861) 4 Macq 215������������������������������������������������������������������1.17 Weir v Aiton (1858) 20 D 968�������������������������������������������������������������������������������22.80 Weir v Andrew Barclay & Co Ltd 1955 SLT (Notes) 54�����������������������������������������29.16 Weir v Chief Constable Merseyside Police [2003] EWCA Civ 111, [2003] ICR 708�������3.55 Weir v East of Scotland Water Authority 2001 SLT 1205����������������������������� 24.06, 24.07

Table of Cases   lxxv Weir v J M Hodge & Son 1990 SLT 266������������������������������������������������������������������5.68 Weir v National Westminster Bank plc 1993 SC 515�������������������������������������������������4.16 Weir v Wyper 1992 SLT 579��������������������������������������������������29.27, 29.33, 29.37, 29.42 Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1920] AC 956��������������������������������������������������� 14.06, 19.56 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 1163 (QB), [2014] EMLR 24�����20.36 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1176, [2016] 1 WLR 1541�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.21, 20.25, 20.27 Wells v Hay 1999 Rep LR 44���������������������������������������������������������������������������������31.48 Wells v University Hospital Southampton NHS Foundation Trust [2015] EWHC 2376 (QB), [2015] Med LR 477�������������������������������������������������������������6.42 Wells v Wells [1999] 1 AC 345���������������������������������������������������������� 31.31, 31.33, 31.37 Welsh v Brady [2008] CSOH 45, 2008 SLT 363, affd [2009] CSIH 60, 2009 SLT 747��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 27.03, 27.14 Wembridge Claimants v East Sussex Fire and Rescue Service [2013] EWHC 2331 (QB)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.51 Wentworth v Wiltshire CC [1993] QB 654�������������������������������������������������������������24.19 Wessex Regional HA v HLM Design Ltd (1994) 40 ConLR 1��������������������������������11.28 West Bromwich Albion Football Club Ltd v El Safty [2006] EWCA Civ 1299, [2007] PIQR P7������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.12, 5.40, 14.28 West London Commercial Bank Ltd v Kitson (1884) 13 QBD 360�������������������������21.66 Western Bank v Bairds (1862) 24 D 859������������������������������������������������������������������4.45 Western Silver Fox Ranch v Ross and Cromarty CC 1940 SC 601��������������� 22.06, 22.22 Weston v Incorporation of Tailors of Potterrow (1839) 1 D 1218������������������ 22.03, 22.83 Whannel v Secretary of State for Scotland 1989 SLT 671�����������������������������������������4.63 Wheat v Lacon & Co Ltd [1966] AC 552���������������������������������������������������������������25.11 Wheatley v Anderson and Miller 1927 SC 133�������������������������������������������������������18.93 Wheatley v Patrick (1837) 2 M and W 650, 150 ER 917�������������������������������������������3.74 Wheeler v J J Saunders Ltd [1996] Ch 19����������������������������������������� 22.10, 22.25, 27.15 Wheeler v New Merton Board Mills Ltd [1933] 2 KB 669�������������������������������������24.28 White v Advocate General for Scotland [2018] CSOH 113, 2019 SLT 91�����������������2.39 White v Blackmore [1972] 2 QB 651���������������������������������������������������������������������25.57 White v Brown [1983] CLY 972����������������������������������������������������������������������������17.12 White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1998] QB 254��������������������������������������6.32 White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 2 AC 455�������� 6.01, 6.12, 6.14, 6.16, 6.29, 6.32, 6.34, 6.35, 6.38, 6.40, 6.44, 9.35, 12.04, 12.16 White v Dickson (1881) 8 R 896��������������������������������������������19.13, 19.23, 19.41, 20.55 White v Inveresk Paper Co Ltd 1987 SC 143������������������������������������ 31.59, 31.60, 31.61 White v Johnston [2015] NSWCA 18��������������������������������������������������������������������16.47 White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207������������������ 5.30, 5.58, 5.66, 5.67, 5.68, 5.69, 5.70, 5.71, 5.73, 5.74, 5.75, 5.76, 5.77 White v Mellin [1895] AC 154����������������������������������������������������������������������������18.143 White v Samsung Electronics America, Inc 971 F 2d 1395 (9th Cir 1992)���������������20.61 White v Southampton University Hospitals NHS Trust [2011] EWHC 825 (QB), (2011) 120 BMLR 81���������������������������������������������������������������������������18.102 White’s Trs v Duke of Hamilton (1887) 14 R 597���������������������������������������������������23.15 Whitehouse v Gormley [2018] CSOH 93, 2020 SCLR 27�������15.09, 17.23, 17.24, 17.26 Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246����������������������������������������������������������������11.05 Whitehouse v Lord Advocate [2019] CSIH 52, 2020 SC 133������������������������ 2.17, 11.56, 17.58, 18.103 Whitelaw v Moffat (1849) 12 D 434������������������������������������������������������������� 1.22, 12.01

lxxvi   Table of Cases Whittington Hospital NHS Trust v XX [2020] UKSC 14, [2021] AC 275, [2020] 2 WLR 972������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.101, 31.38 Wieland v Cyril Lord Carpets Ltd [1969] 3 All ER 1006����������������������������������������14.13 Wieser v Austria (2007) 45 EHRR 44��������������������������������������������������������������������20.82 Wigg v British Railways Board (1986) 136 NLJ 446, The Times, 4 Feb 1986��������������6.37 Wight v Burns (1883) 11 R 217�����������������������������������������������������������������������������16.03 Wightman v Lees 2000 SLT 111���������������������������������������������������������������������������17.12 Wigley v British Vinegars Ltd [1964] AC 307���������������������������������������������������������24.07 Wild v Southend University Hospital NHS Trust [2014] EWHC 4053 (QB)��� 6.18, 6.27, 6.42 Wildcat Haven Enterprises CIC v Wightman [2020] CSOH 30, 2020 SLT 473������18.12, 18.13, 18.14, 18.85, 18.91 Wilkes v DePuy International Ltd [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB), [2018] QB 627��������26.48, 26.49, 26.52, 26.54, 26.59, 26.62, 26.63, 26.64 Wilkie v M’Culloch (1823) 2 S 413���������������������������������������������������������������������21.101 Wilkie v Wallace (1765) Mor 7360�������������������������������������������������������������������������31.20 Wilkinson v City of York Council [2011] EWCA Civ 207, [2011] PTSR D39������ 8.09, 8.12 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57������������������������� 16.60, 16.61, 16.64, 16.71, 18.67 Wilkinson v Hjaltland Housing Association Ltd [2015] SC LER 22, 2015 Rep LR 62�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 25.17, 25.21 Wilks v Cheltenham Homeguard Motor Cycle and Light Car Club [1971] 1 WLR 668�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.56 Willers v Joyce [2016] UKSC 43, [2018] AC 779���������������������������������������������������17.56 William Grant & Sons Ltd v Glen Catrine Bonded Warehouse Ltd 1995 SLT 936��������������������������������������������������������������� 21.83, 21.84, 21.85, 21.92, 21.103 William Grant & Sons Ltd v Glen Catrine Bonded Warehouse Ltd 2001 SC 901������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 19.70, 21.100 William Hay’s Trs v Young (1877) 4 R 398�������������������������������������������������������������31.72 William Morton & Co v Muir Bros & Co 1907 SC 1211����������������������������� 19.19, 19.20 William Tracey Ltd v SP Transmission plc [2016] CSOH 14, 2016 SLT 678�����������23.11 Williams v A and W Hemphill Ltd 1966 SLT 33, affd 1966 SC (HL) 31����� 3.41, 3.48, 3.70 Williams v Bermuda Hospitals Board [2016] UKPC 4, [2016] AC 888�������������������������13.48, 13.66, 13.71, 13.72, 13.73, 13.74, 13.75, 13.89, 13.91 Williams v Humphrey, The Times, 20 February 1975�������������������������� 10.33, 15.05, 16.07 Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 830��������� 5.33, 5.50, 5.63, 5.88 Williams v University of Birmingham [2011] EWCA Civ 1242, [2012] ELR 47������13.41 Williamson v East London and City HA [1998] Lloyd’s Rep Med 6, (1998) 41 BMLR 85����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������16.54 Williamson v Umphray and Robertson (1890) 17 R 905���������������������������18.103, 18.112 Wilsher v Essex AHA [1987] QB 730, revd [1988] AC 1074���10.50, 13.23, 13.35, 13.36, 13.41, 13.70, 13.93 Wilson v Beko plc [2019] EWHC 3362 (QB), [2021] 1 WLR 1711�������������������������26.97 Wilson v Bennet (1904) 6 F 269����������������������������������������������������������������������������16.04 Wilson v Chief Constable, Lothian and Borders Constabulary 1989 SLT 97��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4.61 Wilson v Exel UK Ltd [2010] CSIH 35, 2010 SLT 671�����������������������3.58, 12.05, 16.08 Wilson v Fleming 1970 SLT (Sh Ct) 49������������������������������������������������������ 23.02, 23.04 Wilson v Gibb and Brattesani (1903) 10 SLT 293��������������������������������������� 22.10, 22.26 Wilson v Lothian and Borders Police 1989 SLT 97������������������������������������������ 4.61, 9.31 Wilson v North Star Shipping (Aberdeen) Ltd [2014] CSOH 156, 2014 GWD 36-675���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������31.30

Table of Cases   lxxvii Wilson v Pottinger 1908 SC 580������������������������������������������������������� 23.11, 23.12, 23.13 Wilson v Pringle [1987] QB 237����������������������������������������������������������������� 16.09, 16.12 Wilson v Telling (Northern) Ltd 1996 SLT 380�����������������������������������������������������30.24 Wilson v Westney [2001] EWCA Civ 839������������������������������������������������������������18.102 Wilsons v Brydone (1877) 14 SLR 667������������������������������������������������������������������22.10 Wimpey Construction (UK) Ltd v Martin Black & Co (Wire Ropes) Ltd 1982 SLT 239�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.05 Winans v Macrae (1885) 12 R 1051����������������������������������������������������������������������23.04 Winn v Quillan (1899) 2 F 322������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.20 Winnik v Dick 1981 SLT (Sh Ct) 101, affd 1984 SC 48������������������������������ 29.15, 29.24 Winnipeg Condominium Corp v Bird Construction Co Ltd (1995) 121 DLR (4th) 193������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.22 Winslet v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2009] EWHC 2735 (QB), [2010] EMLR 11�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18.119 Winter v GP Putnam’s 938 F 2d 1033 (1991)��������������������������������������������������������26.38 Winter v News Scotland Ltd 1991 SLT 828�������������������������������������� 18.23, 18.24, 31.07 Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 10 M & W 109����������������������������������������1.25, 1.26, 1.28 Wise Property Care Ltd v White Thomson Preservation Ltd [2008] CSIH 44, 2008 GWD 28-440���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21.83 Wisely v John Fulton (Plumbers) Ltd 2000 SC (HL) 95�����������������������������������������31.64 Wisniewski v Central Manchester HA [1998] PIQR P324��������������������������������������11.12 Wolff v John Moulds (Kilmarnock) Ltd [2011] CSOH 159, 2012 SLT 231�������������31.48 Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721, [2003] 3 All ER 932�����16.60 Wong Yoke Kong v Azmi M Anshar [2003] 4 Malayan Law Journal Reports 96�������18.28 Wood v Commr of Police of the Metropolis [2009] EWCA Civ 414, [2010] 1 WLR 123���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.61, 20.11, 20.30 Wood v Miller 1958 SLT (Notes) 49������������������������������������������������������������������������6.26 Wood v North British Railway Co (1899) 1 F 562��������������������������������������� 16.41, 17.18 Wood v North British Railway Co (1899) 2 F 1��������������������������������� 16.33, 16.40, 23.10 Wood v Wood 1935 SLT 431�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.24 Woodhouse v Lochs and Glens (Transport) Ltd [2020] CSIH 67, 2020 SLT 1203��10.67 Woodhouse v Wright, Johnston & Mackenzie 2004 SLT 911�����������������������������������11.20 Woodland v Advocate General 2005 SCLR 163�������������������������������� 13.14, 13.58, 13.62 Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association [2012] EWCA Civ 239, [2013] 3 WLR 853���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.91 Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association [2013] UKSC 66, [2014] AC 537�������3.29, 3.79, 3.83, 3.87, 3.88, 3.89, 3.90, 3.91, 3.92 Woods v Caledonian Railway Co (1886) 13 R 1118������������������������������������������������14.17 Woods and Pirie v Cumming Gordon, unreported, 1812 (IH), 1819 (HL)��������������18.18 Woodward v Chief Constable, Fife Constabulary 1998 SLT 1342��������������� 15.09, 17.18, 17.23, 17.25, 17.26 Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 WLR 760��������������������������������������������������� 19.28, 20.42 Wooldridge v Summer [1963] 2 QB 43������������������������������������������������������������������10.56 Woolgar v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2000] 1 WLR 25��������������������� 19.55, 19.63 Woolley v Ultimate Products Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1038�������������������������� 21.82, 21.96 Worsley v Tambrands [2000] PIQR P95����������������������������������������������������� 13.09, 26.51 Worthington v Metropolitan Housing Trust Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 1125, [2018] HLR 32������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 28.04, 28.06 Wray v Associated Newspapers 2000 SLT 869�������������������������������������������� 18.25, 18.26 Wright v Cambridge Medical Group [2011] EWCA Civ 669, [2013] QB 312������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.95, 14.10

lxxviii   Table of Cases Wright v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd (1972) 13 KIR 255���������������������������������������������26.12 Wright v Lodge [1993] 4 All ER 299���������������������������������������������������������������������14.05 Wright v National Galleries of Scotland [2020] SAC (Civ) 6, 2020 SLT (Sh Ct) 175������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������25.07 Wright v Paton Farrell [2006] CSIH 7, 2006 SC 404������������������������������������ 7.16, 11.56 Wright v Stoddard International plc [2007] CSOH 173, 2008 Rep LR 2������� 6.50, 13.12, 13.55, 13.57, 13.59, 13.61, 13.62 WTL International Ltd Retirement Benefits Scheme Trs v Edwards [2010] CSOH 34, 2010 GWD 16-319��������������������������������������������������������������������������11.30 Wyatt v Harrison (1832) 3 B & Adol 871���������������������������������������������������������������23.16 Wyngrove’s Exrx v Scottish Omnibuses 1966 SC (HL) 47����������������������������� 1.23, 26.16 X v BBC [2005] CSOH 80, 2005 SLT 796��������������������������18.129, 19.30, 19.71, 20.19, 20.25, 20.27, 20.43, 20.47, 20.56, 31.76 X v Hounslow LBC [2009] EWCA Civ 286, [2009] 2 FLR 262���������������������� 4.54, 7.19 X v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648������������������������������������������������������������������������������������19.66 X (A Woman formerly known as Mary Bell) v O’Brien [2003] EWHC 1101 (QB), [2003] EMLR 37����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������20.51 X HA v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648������������������������������������������������������������������������������19.24 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire CC [1995] 2 AC 633�������������������2.15, 4.41, 7.04, 7.05, 7.06, 7.07, 7.08, 7.09, 7.10, 7.15, 24.03, 24.04, 24.06, 24.09, 24.10, 24.14, 24.16 X NHS Trust v T (Refusal of medical treatment) [2004] EWHC 1279 (Fam), [2005] 1 All ER 387�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������16.51 XJO v XIM [2011] EWHC 1768 (QB)������������������������������������������������������������������18.74 XYZ v Schering Health Care Ltd [2002] EWHC 1420 (QB), (2003) 70 BMLR 88������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 13.65, 26.19, 26.65 Yachuk v Oliver Blais Co Ltd [1949] AC 386���������������������������������������������� 10.36, 29.63 YAH v Medway NHS Foundation Trust [2018] EWHC 2964 (QB), [2019] 1 WLR 1413���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.42 Yapp v Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2014] EWCA Civ 1512, [2015] IRLR 112���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 12.16, 12.20 Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, [2010] QB 1���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.98, 16.100, 16.102 Yeo v Wallace (1867) 5 SLR 253��������������������������������������������������������������18.139, 18.140 Yeoman v Ferries 1967 SC 255����������������������������������������������������������������������������13.100 Yetkin v Mahmood [2010] EWCA Civ 776, [2011] QB 827������������������������������� , [2011] EWHC 772 (QB)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.02, 8.11 YF v Turkey (2004) 39 EHRR 34��������������������������������������������������������������� 16.51, 20.82 Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co Ltd v Minister of War Transport [1942] AC 691������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.02, 14.02 Young v Allison (1820) 2 Mur 228�������������������������������������������������������������������������16.28 Young v Borders HB [2016] CSOH 13, 2016 GWD 8-162���������������� 30.12, 30.16, 30.23 Young v Bowie and Dobie (1824) 3 S 307��������������������������������������������������������������22.03 Young v Hay (1679) 3 Bro Sup 276������������������������������������������������������������ 17.34, 17.36 Young v MacVean [2015] CSIH 70, 2016 SC 135���������������������� 6.18, 6.22, 31.55, 31.70 Young v Rankin 1934 SC 499����������������������������������������������������������������������� 2.24, 16.35 Young v Scottish Coal (Deep Mining) Co Ltd 2002 SLT 1215�������������������������������31.61

Table of Cases   lxxix Young and Co v Bankier Distillery Co (1892) 19 R 1083, aff'd (1893) 20 R (HL) 76���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������23.35 Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 581������ 18.07, 18.34, 18.35 Yuen Kun Yeu v Attorney General of Hong Kong [1988] AC 175��������������������� 4.15, 4.41 Z v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 3�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7.15, 24.16 Zarb v Odetoyinbo [2006] EWHC 2880 (QB), (2007) 93 BMLR 166���������������������11.06 Zumeris v Testa [1972] VR 839�����������������������������������������������������������������������������14.41 Zurich CSG Ltd v Gray & Kellas [2007] CSOH 91, 2007 SLT 917������������� 21.70, 21.78 ZXC v Bloomberg LP [2020] EWCA Civ 611, [2021] QB 28���������������������������������19.65

Table of Statutes

Act of 1425, RPS 1425/3/26, APS ii, 8 c 25������������������������������������������ 1.03 Act of 1426, RPS 1426/10, APS ii, 9 c 7�������������������������������������������� 1.03 Act of 1427, APS ii, 14 c 14�������������� 1.04 Act of 1427, RPS 1427/3/7-16, APS ii, 12 c 23������������������� 1.04, 22.01 Act of 1429, RPS 1430/24, APS ii, 19 c 20�������������������������������������� 28.21 Act of 1438, RPS A1438/12/1, APS ii, 32 c 2������������������������������ 1.04 Act of 1458, RPS 1458/3/3, APS ii, 47 c 2������������������������������������������ 1.03 Act of 1555, RPS A1555/6/26, APS ii, 497 c 25������������������������� 23.01 Act of 1579, RPS 1579/10/31, APS iii, 144 c 16������������������������ 17.52 Act of 1581, RPS 1581/10/41, APS iii, 222 c 22������������������������ 28.21 Act of 1617, RPS 1617/5/22, APS iv, 535 c 8���������������������������� 9.03 Act of 1701, RPS 1700/10/234, APS x, 272 c 6��������������������������� 17.01 Administration of Justice Act 1982 (c 53) s 4(3)(b)������������������������������������ 31.54 s 8��������������������������������������������� 31.40 (1)���������������������������������������� 31.40 (2)���������������������������������������� 31.40 (3)���������������������������������������� 31.40 (4)���������������������������������������� 31.40 s 9��������������������������������������������� 31.52 (4)���������������������������������������� 31.41 s 10�����������������������31.28, 31.43, 31.44 (b)���������������������������������������� 31.44 s 11������������������������������������������� 31.43 s 12������������������������������������������� 31.58 (1)(a)������������������������������������ 31.60

lxxx

 (b)������������������������������������ 31.58 (2)(b)����������������������������������� 31.58 (4)���������������������������������������� 31.58 s 13(1)���������������������������� 31.40, 31.41 s 68������������������������������������������� 16.23 sch 6����������������������������������������� 16.23 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 (asp 4)�������������� 16.53, 17.48 s 47(1)�������������������������������������� 16.53 (2)���������������������������������������� 16.53 Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 (c 50)����������������� 2.23, 10.31 s 1(1)(a)�������������������������������������� 2.22 (3)(c)���������������������������� 2.23, 10.31  (f)(ii)����������������������������������� 2.22 s 2(4A)���������������������������������������� 2.22 (5A)��������������������������������������� 2.22 Animal Health (Scotland) Act 1981 (c 22) s 79(2)�������������������������������������� 27.16 Animals Act 1971 (c 22)����������������� 27.03 s 6(3)���������������������������������������� 27.07 (5)���������������������������������������� 27.20 Animals (Scotland) Act 1987 (c 9)�����23.09, 24.01, 27.03, 27.04, 27.12, 27.20, 27.22, 27.23 s 1������������������������������������� 2.20, 23.09 (1)(a)������������������������������������ 27.06  (b)����������������27.09, 27.14, 27.15  (c)������������������������������������� 27.12 (2)(a)������������������������������������ 27.09 (3)���������������������������������������� 27.10  (a)��������������������������� 27.10, 27.14  (b)�������������������������� 27.11, 27.15 (4)������������������������������ 27.05, 27.16 (5)���������������������������������������� 27.17 (6)���������������������������������������� 27.22

Table of Statutes   lxxxi (7)���������������������������������������� 27.08 (8)���������������������������������������� 27.04  (b)������������������������������������ 27.11 s 2(1)(a)������������������������������������ 27.18  (b)�������������������������� 24.28, 27.19  (c)������������������������������������� 27.21 (2)���������������������������������������� 27.21 s 3(1)���������������������������������������� 27.24 s 4��������������������������������������������� 27.24 s 5(1)���������������������������������������� 27.06 (2)���������������������������������������� 27.06  (b)������������������������������������ 27.06 s 7����������������������������������� 27.05, 27.09 Apologies (Scotland) Act 2016 (asp 5) s 1����������������������������������������������� 1.38 Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 (c 18) s 2��������������������������������������������� 26.39 Bankruptcy Act 1621, RPS 1621/6/30, APS iv, 615 c 18������� 21.63 Bankruptcy Act 1696, RPS 1696/9/57, APS x, 33 c 5������������ 21.63 Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Act 2007 (asp 3) s 159������������������������������������������� 5.58 Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 (asp 21) s 98������������������������������������������� 21.63 s 99������������������������������������������� 21.63 Betting and Lotteries Act 1934 (24 & 25 Geo c 58)�������������������� 24.08 Bill of Rights 1688 (1 Will & Mar c 2)�����������������������������������18.101   Art 9�����������������������������������������18.101 Building (Scotland) Act 1959 (7 & 8 Eliz 2 c 24) s 13(1)���������������������������������������� 7.27 (2)������������������������������������������ 7.27 (4)������������������������������������������ 7.27 Carriage by Air Act 1961 (9 & 10 Eliz 2 c 27)���������������������������������� 2.20 Chancery Amendment Act 1858 (21 & 22 Vict c 27) s 2��������������������������������������������� 22.29 Child Care Act 1980 (c 5)���������������� 7.04 Children Act 1989 (c 41)������������������ 7.04 s 17��������������������������������������������� 7.22 s 47��������������������������������������������� 7.22 Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (c 54)��������������������������������� 7.04

Children (Equal Protection from Assault) (Scotland) Act 2019 (asp 16) s 1��������������������������������������������� 16.35 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 (c 36) s 1(1)(d)�������������������������������������� 2.22 Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 (c 45) s 5��������������������������������������������� 23.03 s 60������������������������������������������� 23.03 s 74������������������������������������������� 27.06 s 99������������������������������������������� 23.03 Civil Aviation Act 1982 (c 16)��������� 26.42 s 76��������������������������������������������� 2.20 (1)���������������������������������������� 23.02 (2)������������������������������ 23.02, 26.42 Civil Evidence Act 1995 (c 38) s 10������������������������������������������� 31.33 Civil Imprisonment (Scotland) Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict c 42) s 6��������������������������������������������� 28.21 Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (c 47)��������������� 13.51, 13.53 Claim of Right 1689, RPS 1689/3/108, APS ix, 38 c 28�������������� 17.01, 18.101 Coal Industry Act 1975 (c 56) s 2��������������������������������������������� 23.30 Coal Industry Act 1994 (c 21)�������� 23.30 s 43������������������������������������������� 23.30 Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946 (9 & 10 Geo 6 c 59) s 48������������������������������������������� 23.30 Coal Mines Act 1911 (1 & 2 Geo 5 c 50) s 55������������������������������������������� 24.19 Coal-Mining (Subsidence) Act 1957 (5 & 6 Eliz 2 c 59)��������������������� 23.30 Coal Mining Subsidence Act 1991 (c 45)���������������������������������������� 23.30 s 2��������������������������������������������� 23.30 s 3(3)���������������������������������������� 23.30 ss 7–12�������������������������������������� 23.30 s 33(2)�������������������������������������� 23.30 (3)���������������������������������������� 23.30 s 40(2)�������������������������������������� 23.30 Compensation Act 2006 (c 29)�������13.54, 13.56 s 3������������������������13.51, 13.52, 13.53, 13.56, 13.65 (1)���������������������������������������� 13.51 (2)(a)������������������������������������ 13.51  (b)������������������������������������ 13.51 (3)(b)����������������������������������� 13.51 (4)���������������������������������������� 13.51

lxxxii   Table of Statutes Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 (c 28) s 1����������������������������������������������� 6.43 Consumer Protection Act 1987 (c 43)�������������������������2.20, 5.14, 21.74, 24.01, 26.06, 26.25, 26.26, 26.27, 26.40, 26.41, 26.44, 26.46, 26.52, 26.55, 26.56, 26.57, 26.64, 26.65, 26.91, 26.96, 30.01, 30.07   Pt I�������������� 26.23, 26.25, 26.26, 26.82 s 1(1)������������������������������ 26.25, 26.82 (2)��������������������26.27, 26.33, 26.36 (3)���������������������������������������� 26.33 s 2���������������������������5.13, 26.06, 26.88 (1)�������� 26.19, 26.26, 26.46, 26.65, 26.66, 26.76, 26.97 (2)���������������������������������������� 26.76  (a)������������������������������������� 26.27  (b)������������������������������������ 26.30  (c)������������������������������������� 26.31 (3)������������������������������ 26.32, 26.35 (5)��������� 26.29, 26.33, 26.87, 26.88 s 3��������������������������5.13, 13.09, 26.43, 26.51, 26.62, 26.64 (1)��������������������26.47, 26.59, 26.64 (2)�������������������26.38, 26.48, 26.49, 26.56, 26.94  (a)��������������������������� 26.50, 26.96  (b)������������������������������������ 26.53  (c)������������������������������������� 26.54 s 4  26.97 (1)���������������������������������������� 26.69  (a)������������������������������������� 26.70  (b)������������������������������������ 26.71  (c)��������������������������� 26.34, 26.73  (d)������������������������������������ 26.76  (e)������ 26.25, 26.79, 26.81, 26.82  (f)������������������������������������� 26.87 (2)������������������������������ 26.76, 26.88 s 5(1)�������������������26.26, 26.41, 26.42, 26.43, 26.45 (2)�������������������������������� 5.14, 26.45 (3)����������� 5.13, 26.07, 26.26, 26.44 (4)���������������������������������������� 26.41 s 6(1)(c)������������������������������������ 26.26 (4)���������������������������������������� 26.93 s 7��������������������������������������������� 26.96 s 11������������������������������������������� 26.97 s 12������������������������������������������� 26.97

s 41(1)�������������������������������������� 26.97 s 45(1)������������������26.36, 26.42, 26.73 s 46(1)�������������������������������������� 26.71 (3)���������������������������������������� 26.35 (4)������������������������������ 26.35, 26.37 s 49������������������������������������������� 26.25 Consumer Rights Act 2015 (c 15)�����26.26 s 2(2)���������������������������������������� 26.39 (3)��������������������25.61, 26.26, 29.23 (9)���������������������������������������� 26.39 s 9��������������������������������������������� 26.02 (2)���������������������������������������� 26.02 (3)���������������������������������������� 26.02 s 46������������������������������������������� 26.39 s 62����������������������������������� 5.89, 29.23 (4)���������������������������������������� 29.23 s 65��������������������������������� 25.61, 29.23 (4)������������������������������ 25.61, 29.23 s 66(4)�������������������������������������� 25.61 Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict c 70) s 75������������������������������������������� 24.18 Copyright Act 1710 (8 Anne c 19)���������������������19.05, 19.11, 19.12 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (c 48)����������������� 2.11, 20.62 Court of Session Act 1825 (6 Geo 4 c 28) s 28�������������������������1.32, 16.02, 22.02 Court of Session Act 1988 (c 36) s 29(1)�������������������������������������� 31.71 Courts Act 2003 (c 39) ss 31–32������������������������������������ 17.37 Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 (asp 18)������������������������������������� 17.36 s 5��������������������������������������������� 17.36 s 38(2)(f)����������������������������������� 22.02 s 69(2)�������������������������������������� 31.71 ss 128–129�������������������������������� 17.36 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c 33) s 61������������������������������������������� 23.10 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980 (c 62) s 2(1)���������������������������������������� 17.25 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 (asp 7) s 51(1)�������������������������������������� 16.35 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016 (asp 1) s 1��������������������������������������������� 17.18 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 (c 21) sch 10 Pt I��������������������������������� 17.01

Table of Statutes   lxxxiii Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (c 46)������������������������� 17.37 s 13������������������������������������������� 17.18 s 170����������������������������������������� 17.38 (1)������������������������������ 17.37, 17.59  (c)������������������������������������� 17.37 (2)���������������������������������������� 17.37 (3)���������������������������������������� 17.37 (4)���������������������������������������� 17.37 s 234AZA���������������������������������� 28.14 Crown Proceedings Act 1947 (10 & 11 Geo 6 c 44)������������������� 2.38 s 2����������������������������������������������� 7.02 (1)(a)�������������������������������������� 2.38  (b)�������������������������������������� 2.38  (c)��������������������������������������� 2.38 (2)������������������������������������������ 2.38 (5)���������������������������������������� 17.28 s 40��������������������������������������������� 2.38 Crown Suits (Scotland) Act 1857 (20 & 21 Vict c 44) ss 1–4A����������������������������������������2.39 Cruelty to Animals (Scotland) Act 1850 (13 & 14 Vict c 59) s 6��������������������������������������������� 23.03 Damages Act 1996 (c 48)��������������� 31.63 s B1������������������������������������������ 31.37 (4)���������������������������������������� 31.37 s 2��������������������������������������������� 31.63 s 6��������������������������������������������� 31.63 Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 (c 28) s 1��������������������������������������������� 31.19 Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009 (asp 4)��������� 1.38 s 1����������������������������������� 31.19, 31.58 Damages (Investment Returns and Periodical Payments) (Scotland) Act 2019 (asp 4) s 1��������������������������������������������� 31.37 s 3��������������������������������������������� 31.63 Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 (c 13) s 1����������������������������������������������� 5.75 s 8��������������������������������������������� 16.05 Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 (asp 7) s 1(2)���������������������������������������� 31.23 (3)���������������������������������������� 31.23 (4)���������������������������������������� 31.23 (5)������������������������������ 31.33, 31.36 (6)���������������������������������������� 31.36

(7)���������������������������������������� 31.36 s 2�������������������������18.64, 31.21, 31.48 (1)���������������������������������������� 31.48 (2)���������������������������������������� 31.47 (3)���������������������������������������� 18.64 s 4����������������������������������� 31.49, 31.62 (1)���������������������������������������� 31.53 (2)���������������������������������������� 31.49 (3)������������������������������������������ 6.02  (a)��������������������������� 31.41, 31.50  (b)������������������������������������ 31.53 s 5����������������������������������������������� 5.75 s 6���������������������������5.12, 31.52, 31.62 s 7������������������������������������� 5.12, 31.51 (1)(a)������������������������������������ 31.51  (b)������������������������������������ 31.51  (c)(i)��������������������������������� 31.51  (ii)�������������������������������� 31.51  (d)������������������������������������ 31.51 (2)���������������������������������������� 31.51 (3)���������������������������������������� 31.51 s 8(1)������������������������������������������ 2.49 (3)���������������������������������������� 31.62 s 10(1)�������������������������������������� 31.46 (2)���������������������������������������� 31.46 s 14(1)���������������������������� 31.50, 31.53 (2)������������������������������ 31.50, 31.53 Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976 (c 38) s 7(4)���������������������������������������� 27.10 sch 1����������������������������������������� 27.10 Data Protection Act 1998 (c 29)�����20.08, 20.85 s 4(4)������������������������������������������ 3.48 Data Protection Act 2018 (c 12)�����20.08, 20.75, 20.86 s 168����������������������������������������� 20.35 Day Trespass Act 1832 see Game (Scotland) Act 1832 Debtors (Scotland) Act 1880 (43 & 44 Vict c 34) s 4��������������������������������������������� 17.10 Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987 (c 18) s 108����������������������������������������� 17.10 sch 6 para 8������������������������������� 17.10 Defamation Act 1952 (15 & 16 Geo 6 and 1 Eliz 2 c 66) s 5(2)���������������������������������������� 18.71 s 14(d)�������������������������������������� 18.71 Defamation Act 1996 (c 31)���������18.119, 18.121, 18.123, 18.127 s 1������������������� 18.124, 18.125, 18.127

lxxxiv   Table of Statutes ss 2–4���������������������������� 18.03, 18.119 s 3��������������������������������������������18.121 s 4��������������������������������������������18.121 s 14������������������������������������������18.104 ss 14–15������������������������������������ 18.03 s 15������������������������������������������18.116 sch 1����������������������������������������18.116 Defamation Act 2013 (c 26)������������ 1.38, 18.03, 18.17, 18.35, 18.39, 18.42, 18.73, 18.94, 18.151, 18.152 s 1(1)������������������������������ 18.40, 18.42 (2)���������������������������������������� 18.50 s 2(1)���������������������������������������� 18.69 (3)���������������������������������������� 18.71 s 3��������������������������������������������� 18.89 (5)���������������������������������������� 18.95 s 4�������������������������18.77, 18.79, 18.94 (2)���������������������������������������� 18.84 (3)���������������������������������������� 18.87 (6)���������������������������������������� 15.20 s 6��������������������������������� 18.03, 18.115 s 7(9)���������������������������������������� 18.03 s 14(2) 18.35 s 15������������������������������������������� 18.05 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 (asp 10)������ 1.38, 2.27, 15.16, 18.02, 18.03, 18.04, 18.05, 18.19, 18.21, 18.35, 18.37, 18.39, 18.57, 18.61, 18.63, 18.68, 18.69, 18.71, 18.73, 18.78, 18.83, 18.87, 18.89, 18.91, 18.94, 18.107, 18.114, 18.119, 18.125, 18.128, 18.130, 18.135, 18.155, 29.01   Pt 2�������������������������������������������18.148   Pt 3�������������������������������������������� 18.02 s 1(1)������������������18.04, 18.05, 18.127 (2)��������� 18.39, 18.40, 18.42, 18.43  (a)��������������������������� 18.04, 18.37  (b)������� 2.27, 18.04, 18.15, 18.29 (3)����������� 2.27, 18.49, 18.50, 18.54 (4)������������������������������ 18.21, 18.35  (a)������������������������������������� 18.17  (b)������������������������ 18.38, 18.150  (c)������������������������� 18.38, 18.150 s 2��������������������������������������������18.147

(1)���������������������������������������� 18.57 (2)���������������������������������������� 18.58 (3)���������������������������������������� 18.58 (5)���������������������������������������� 18.60 s 3������������������������������� 18.126, 18.127 (1)���������������������������������������18.126 (2)���������������������������������������18.126 (3)���������������������������������������18.126 (4)���������������������������������������18.127 s 5��������������������������������������������18.148 (1)���������������������������������������� 18.69 (2)���������������������������������������� 18.71 s 6������������ 15.20, 18.78, 18.98, 18.148 (1)��������������������18.78, 18.81, 18.84  (a)������������������������������������18.148  (b)������������������������������������ 18.82 (2)���������������������������������������� 18.84 (3)��������������������18.51, 18.73, 18.87 (4)���������������������������������������� 18.81 s 7��������������������������������� 18.89, 18.148 (2)������������������������������ 18.89, 18.90 (3)������������������������������ 18.89, 18.93 (4)������������������������������ 18.89, 18.94 (5)������������������������������ 18.89, 18.95 (6)���������������������������������������� 18.96 (8)������������������������������ 18.93, 18.94  (b)������������������������������������ 18.98 s 8��������������������������������������������� 18.89 (1)���������������������������������������18.152  (a)������������������������������������18.125  (b)������������������������������������ 18.69  (c)������������������������������������� 18.78 s 9��������������������������������� 18.98, 18.104 (2)���������������������������������������18.104 s 10������������������� 18.98, 18.104, 18.115 (2)�������������������������� 18.115, 18.117 (3)���������������������������������������18.115 (4)�������������������������� 18.115, 18.118 (5)�������������������������� 18.115, 18.118 (6)�������������������������� 18.115, 18.116 s 11������������������������������������������18.116 s 13������������������������������������������18.120 (1)���������������������������������������18.120  (a)(ii)�������������������������������18.120 (2)���������������������������������������18.120  (d)�����������������������������������18.120 (3)(c)�����������������������������������18.121 ss 13–17�����������������������������������18.119 s 14(2)�������������������������������������18.119 (2)(a)�����������������������������������18.120 (4)���������������������������������������18.122

Table of Statutes   lxxxv (5)���������������������������������������18.122 (6)���������������������������������������18.122 (7)���������������������������������������18.122 s 16(2)�������������������������������������18.122 (3)�������������������������� 18.119, 18.122 (4)���������������������������������������18.124 s 21���������������������������� 18.130, 18.132, 18.140, 18.144, 18.149 (1)(a)(i)�������������������������������18.132    (ii)������������������������������18.132  (b)�����������������������������������18.132 (2)�������������� 18.133, 18.140, 18.144  (b)�����������������������������������18.138 ss 21–23������������������������������������ 15.19 s 22����������������� 18.130, 18.139, 18.149 (1)(a)(i)�������������������������������18.139   (ii)������������������������������18.139  (b)�����������������������������������18.139 (2)(b)(ii)������������������������������18.140 s 23����������������� 18.130, 18.143, 18.149 (1)(a)(i)�������������������������������18.143   (ii)������������������������������18.143  (b)�����������������������������������18.143 (2)(b)(ii)������������������������������18.144 s 26������������������������������������������18.130 s 27������������������������������� 18.130, 19.02 (1)�������������������������� 18.139, 18.143 s 28������������������������������������������18.128 s 29������������������������������������������18.128 s 30������������������������������������������18.128 s 32������������������������������������������18.149 (3)���������������������������������������18.152 s 33������������������������������������������18.154 s 34������������������������������������������18.154 s 35(2)�������������������������������������� 18.74 (3)(a)�����������������������������������18.125 s 36������������������������������������������� 18.05 sch�������������������������������������������18.116   Pt 1����������������������������������18.117   Pt 2����������������������������������18.118   para 3��������������������������18.104   para 4��������������������������18.104 Defective Premises Act 1972 (c 35)������5.24 Directors’ Liability Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict c 64) s 3��������������������������������������������� 21.69 Dogs Act 1906 (6 Edw 7 c 32)��������27.02, 27.10 s 1��������������������������������������������� 27.02 (1)–(3)���������������������������������� 27.10 Dramatic and Musical Performers’ Protection Act 1958 (c 44)��������� 24.07

Education Act 1944 (7 & 8 Geo 6 c 31)������������������������������� 24.10, 24.14 Education Act 1981 (c 60)��������������24.10, 24.14 Education Act 1993 (c 35) s 294����������������������������������������� 16.35 Education Act 1996 (c 56) s 548����������������������������������������� 16.35 Education (Scotland) Act 1980 (c 44) s 48A���������������������������������������� 16.35 Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 (c 57)��������� 2.48, 3.03, 3.11, 24.26 s 5��������������������������������������������� 24.26 Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 (c 37)������12.08, 12.36, 12.37 s 1����������������������������������������������� 3.82 (1)���������������������������������������� 12.36 (3)���������������������������������������� 12.37 Employment Act 1982 (c 46)���������� 21.02 Employment Rights Act 1996 (c 18)���������������������������������������� 31.28 s 135����������������������������������������� 31.28 s 230(3)(b)���������������������������������� 3.27 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (c 24)�������������������� 12.31, 24.07, 24.11, 24.22 s 47(2)�������������������������������������� 12.32 s 69(2)�������������������������������������� 12.31 (3)������������������������������ 12.22, 12.32 Equality Act 2010 (c 15)����������������� 18.18 s 4��������������������������������������������� 18.18 s 109(1)�������������������������������������� 3.60 European Communities Act 1972 (c 68) s 2(2)���������������������������������������� 26.97 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (c 16)������������������������������������������ 7.45 sch 1 para 4��������������������������������� 7.45 Factories Act 1937 (1 Edw 8 & 1 Geo 6 c 67)���������������������������������� 24.07, 24.21 s 26(2)���������������������������� 24.23, 24.24 Factories Act 1961 (9 & 10 Eliz 2 c 34) s 29(1)�������������������������������������� 25.45 Factory and Workshop Act 1878 (41 & 42 Vict c 16) s 5��������������������������������������������� 24.13 s 82������������������������������������������� 24.13 Family Law Act 1996 (c 27) s 30������������������������������������������� 22.53

lxxxvi   Table of Statutes Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 (asp 2) sch 3 para 1��������������������������������� 2.24 Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (c 30)������ 31.49 s 1(1)���������������������������������������� 13.80 s 7��������������������������������������������� 31.49 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (c 8) s 90������������������������������������������� 21.69 Fire (Scotland) Act 2005 (asp 5) s 9(1)������������������������������������������ 9.42 s 10(1)���������������������������������������� 9.42 s 13��������������������������������������������� 9.50 s 53��������������������������������������������� 6.08 Fishing Vessels (Safety Provisions) Act 1970 (c 27)��������������������������� 5.34 Game (Scotland) Act 1832 (2 and 3 Will 4 c 68) (Day Trespass Act 1832) s 2��������������������������������������������� 23.10 General Police and Improvement (Scotland) Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict c 101)�������������������������������� 22.03 Glasgow Police Act 1866 (29 & 30 Vict c cclxxiii) s 88������������������������������������������� 17.20 Guard Dogs Act 1975 (c 50)����������� 27.21 Gulf Oil Refining Act 1965 (c xxiv)����22.64 Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (c 37)���������������������� 7.29, 12.22, 12.31, 12.32, 24.01 s 2��������������������������������������������� 12.31 ss 2–8���������������������������������������� 24.01 s 15������������������������������������������� 12.32 s 20������������������������������������������� 23.03 s 47��������������������������������� 12.22, 12.37 (1)������������������������������ 12.31, 24.01 (2)���������������������������������������� 12.32 sch 1����������������������������������������� 12.37 Highways Act 1959 (7 & 8 Eliz 2 c 25)�������������������������������������� 24.19 Highways Act 1980 (c 66)��������������� 8.11, 8.12, 8.28 s 41�������������������������������������8.12, 8.28 (1)�����������������8.11, 8.16, 8.17, 8.18 (1A)��������������������������������������� 8.28 s 58��������������������������������������������� 8.12 (2)������������������������������������������ 8.12 s 79��������������������������������������������� 8.17 s 329(1)�������������������������������������� 8.11 Highways (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1961 (9 & 10 Eliz 2 c 63) s 1����������������������������������������������� 8.11

Housing (Scotland) Act 1974 (c 45)����25.13 Housing (Scotland) Act 2006 (asp 1) ss 98–99���������������������������� 5.36, 11.25 Human Rights Act 1998 (c 42)�������� 2.45, 2.46, 2.47, 7.09, 7.31, 7.32, 7.33, 7.34, 9.11, 9.38, 9.41, 12.12, 17.28, 17.32, 17.43, 17.46, 17.47, 18.59, 18.75, 19.29, 19.62, 20.09, 20.10, 20.13, 20.75, 20.83, 20.85, 22.66, 22.73, 22.74, 22.77, 22.78, 24.16, 24.17 s 1����������������������������������������������� 2.46 s 3������������������������������������� 2.46, 20.10 s 4������������������������������������� 2.46, 20.10 s 6���������������� 2.46, 20.10, 20.85, 22.73 (1)�������������������������������� 7.31, 20.19 (3)������������� 2.47, 7.01, 18.59, 22.54 (5)�������������������������������� 7.01, 20.10 s 7���2.46, 7.09, 9.06, 9.38, 22.55, 22.73 (1)����������� 7.31, 17.35, 17.43, 17.44 s 8��������������������������2.46, 20.86, 22.55, 22.73, 22.78 (3)�������������������������������� 7.33, 17.46 s 9��������������������������������������������� 17.43 (3)������������������������������ 17.43, 17.44 (5)���������������������������������������� 17.43 s 12��������������������� 18.75, 18.129, 20.19 (3)������������������18.129, 19.71, 20.56 (4)��������������������������� 18.129, 19.29, 19.62, 19.71, 20.56 Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015 (asp 12) s 1��������������������������������������������� 17.16 Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (c 1)����������������������������� 5.87 Interest on Damages (Scotland) Act 1958 (6 & 7 Eliz 2 c 61) s 1��������������������������������������������� 31.64 s 1A������������������������������������������ 31.64 Interest on Damages (Scotland) Act 1971 (c 31) s 1��������������������������������������������� 31.64 Interpretation Act 1978 (c 30) s 16(1)(a)������������������������������������ 2.24 s 23A������������������������������������������ 2.24 Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 2010 (asp 10) sch 1����������������������������������������� 18.49

Table of Statutes   lxxxvii Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (c 25)���������������������������������������������20.75 Jobseekers Act 1995 (c 18)������������� 31.28 Jury Trials (Scotland) Act 1815 (55 Geo 3 c 42)��������������������������� 1.32 Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 (asp 2)�������������������23.02, 23.10, 25.29   Pt 1�������������������������������������������� 20.78 s 5(1)���������������������������������������� 23.02 (2)���������������������������������������� 25.29 s 6(1)(b)(iv)������������������������������ 20.78 s 14������������������������������������������� 23.10 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (8 & 9 Geo 6 c 28)������16.56, 16.57, 16.58, 21.73, 26.93, 27.22, 29.02, 29.55, 29.64, 29.65 s 1��������� 12.02, 25.54, 29.64, 31.66 (1)����������������������������� 16.57, 24.27, 27.22, 29.56, 29.58, 29.60, 29.64 (4)���������������������������������������� 31.49 s 5(a)����������������������������� 16.57, 29.55, 29.56 (c)���������������������������������������� 31.49 Law Reform (Husband and Wife) Act 1962 (10 & 11 Eliz 2 c 48)����������� 2.24 s 1����������������������������������������������� 2.24 s 2����������������������������������������������� 2.24 (1)������������������������������������������ 2.24 (2)������������������������������������������ 2.24 s 3����������������������������������������������� 2.24 Law Reform (Husband and Wife) (Scotland) Act 1984 (c 15) s 1��������������������������������������������� 21.28 Law Reform (Limitation of Actions, &c) Act 1954 (2 & 3 Eliz 2 c 36) s 1����������������������������������������������� 7.02 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970 (c 33) s 5��������������������������������������������� 16.23 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 (3 & 4 Geo 6 c 42)����������������������������������������� 13.25 s 3���������������������������������� 13.16, 13.18, 13.51, 13.53, 27.08 (1)�������������������������������� 3.03, 13.17 (2)�����������������������2.40, 3.03, 13.24, 13.55, 30.01

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1968 (c 70) s 10(2)�������������������������������������� 16.04 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985 (c 73)����������� 5.48 s 10(1)������������������������������ 5.48, 21.64 Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948 (11 & 12 Geo 6 c 41) s 1���������������������������� 3.09, 3.82, 12.02 s 2(1)������������������������������ 31.28, 31.44 (4)���������������������������������������� 31.38 Leases Act 1449, RPS 1450/1/16-17, APS ii, 35 c 6������������������������������ 5.05 Limitation Act 1980 (c 58)��������������� 5.60 s 4A�����������������������������������������18.149 s 11(4)�������������������������������������� 30.16 s 14(1)(b)���������������������������������� 30.12 s 38(1)�������������������������������������� 16.98 Limitation (Childhood Abuse) (Scotland) Act 2017 (asp 3)������������������������ 30.17 Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 (c 12)������������������������������������������ 2.32 s 1����������������������������������������������� 2.32 s 6(4)������������������������������������������ 2.32 Local Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994 (c 39) s 2����������������������������������������������� 8.01 Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981 (c 59)��������� 22.53 Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 (asp 13)����� 17.39   Pt 5�������������������������������������������� 17.39   Pt 6�������������������������������������������� 17.39   Pt 7�������������������������������������������� 17.39 Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1960 (8 & 9 Eliz 2 c 61) s 107����������������������������������������� 17.39 Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 (c 36)���������������������������������������� 17.39 Mental Health (Scotland) Act 2015 (asp 9)��������������������������������������� 17.39 Mercantile Law Amendment Act Scotland 1856 (19 & 20 Vict c 60)������������ 26.02 s 5��������������������������������������������� 26.02 Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (c 21) s 101(3)������������������������������������ 17.41 Merchant Shipping Amendment Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict c 63) s 37������������������������������������������� 17.40 Modern Slavery Act 2015 (c 30) s 8��������������������������������������������� 17.16

lxxxviii   Table of Statutes National Health Service Act 1977 (c 49)������������������������������������������ 7.11 National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978 (c 29)��������������������������� 7.11 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1987 (c 30) s 15������������������������������������������� 24.15 (9)(a)������������������������������������ 24.15 Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (c 57) s 7(1A)���������������������������������������� 2.20 Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 (5 & 6 Eliz 2 c 31)��������������������������� 25.04, 25.11, 25.18, 25.24, 25.25, 25.51 s 1(1)���������������������������������������� 25.20 s 2(1)������������������������������ 25.04, 25.61 (2)���������������������������������������� 10.25 (3)(a)������������������������������������ 25.39 (4)(b)������������������������� 25.51, 25.53 (5)���������������������������������������� 25.57 Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 (c 3)����������������������25.24, 25.27, 29.39 s 1��������������������������������������������� 25.27 (1)(a)������������������������������������ 25.20 (7)���������������������������������������� 25.19 Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 (8 & 9 Eliz 2 c 30)�������������� 2.38, 4.71, 4.72, 7.04, 10.62, 12.30, 22.86, 24.01, 25.01, 25.05, 25.07, 25.09, 25.12, 25.14, 25.15, 25.19, 25.20, 25.23, 25.26, 25.28, 25.30, 25.32, 25.36, 25.38, 25.39, 25.43, 25.53, 25.54, 25.61, 27. 01, 29.21, 29.23 s 1��������������������������������������������� 25.05 (1)��������� 25.05, 25.07, 25.18, 25.19 (2)������������������������������ 25.05, 25.08 (3)���������������������������������������� 25.18 s 2����������������������������������� 25.05, 25.15 (1)�����������������������4.71, 4.72, 10.62, 11.33, 12.30, 22.85, 25.04, 25.06, 25.19, 25.20, 25.23, 25.25, 25.30, 25.31, 25.35, 25.36, 25.39, 25.41, 25.47, 25.53, 25.61, 29.21, 29.22

(3)����������������������������� 24.28, 25.55, 25.59, 29.21, 29.22 s 3��������������������������������������������� 25.34 (1)������������������������������ 25.15, 25.59 (2)���������������������������������������� 25.15 Ordinance of 1438, RPS A1438/12/1, APS ii, 32 c 2������������������������������ 1.03 Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 (3 & 4 Vict c 9) s 1��������������������������������������������18.101 Partnership Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict c 39)�������������������� 21.78 s 4(2)����������������������2.29, 18.49, 18.56 s 10�������������������������� 2.30, 3.77, 21.78 s 12��������������������������������������������� 2.30 Patents Act 1977 (c 37)�������������������� 2.11 Pawnbrokers Act 1872 (35 & 36 Vict c 93) s 34������������������������������������������� 17.40 s 35������������������������������������������� 17.40 Police Act 1996 (c 16) s 88(1)���������������������������������������� 3.54 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c 60) s 9��������������������������������������������� 19.40 Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (asp 8)�������������������������������� 9.42 s 20(1)���������������������������������������� 9.03 s 24������������������������������������������� 17.27 (1)����������������������������������3.22, 3.54 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 (c 52)���������17.07, 18.150, 22.67, 26.88, 30.01, 30.07, 30.17 s 3��������������������������������������������� 22.67 s 6�������������� 17.07, 22.68, 22.69, 30.01 s 7��������������������������������������������� 22.68 (2)������������������������������ 26.90, 30.01 s 8��������������������������������������������� 22.68 s 8A������������������������������������������ 30.01 s 11(1)������� 22.69, 23.27, 30.02, 30.03 (2)������������������������������ 22.69, 30.04 (3)���������������������������������������� 30.05 (3A)������������������������������������� 30.05 (3B)������������������������������������� 30.05 s 15(2)���������������������������� 22.69, 30.01 s 17����������������������17.07, 26.90, 30.07, 30.16, 30.18, 30.22 (2)���������������������������������������� 30.21  (a)������������������������������������� 30.08  (b)�������������������������� 28.19, 30.10  (i)��������������������������������� 30.13

Table of Statutes   lxxxix  (ii)�������������������������������� 30.20  (iii)�����������30.13, 30.14, 30.20 (3)������������������������������ 30.09, 30.21 s 17A������������������������������ 30.17, 30.18 (1)������������������������������ 30.17, 30.19 (2)���������������������������������������� 30.17 ss 17A–17D������������������������������� 30.17 s 17B���������������������������������������� 30.17 s 17C ��������������������������������������� 30.18 (4)(b)����������������������������������� 30.18 s 17D���������������������������������������� 30.19 (2)���������������������������������������� 30.19 (3)���������������������������������������� 30.19 s 18������������ 26.90, 30.07, 30.21, 30.22 (2)���������������������������������������� 30.20  (b)������������������������������������ 30.20  (i)��������������������������������� 30.20  (ii)�������������������������������� 30.20 (3)���������������������������������������� 30.20 (4)���������������������������������������� 30.21 s 18A������������������18.149, 30.07, 30.22 (1)���������������������������������������18.150 (1A)������������������������������������18.151 (1A)–(1C)���������������������������18.152 (1B)������������������������������������18.152 (1C)������������������������������������18.152 (2)���������������������������������������18.150 (4)(b)����������������������������������18.150 s 18B���������������������3.60, 28.19, 30.07, 30.22 (2)���������������������������������������� 28.18  (a)������������������������������������� 28.19  (b)������������������������������������ 28.19 (3)���������������������������������������� 28.18 s 19A��������������������������� 18.153, 26.91, 30.14, 30.22, 30.24 s 19CB��������������������������������18.154 s 19CC��������������������������������18.154 s 22A������������������������������ 26.88, 30.01 s 22B������������������������������ 26.91, 30.07 (3)���������������������������������������� 26.91 (4)���������������������������������������� 26.91 (6)���������������������������������������� 26.91 s 22C���������������������������������������� 26.92 (2)���������������������������������������� 26.92 (3)���������������������������������������� 26.92 (5)���������������������������������������� 26.92 sch 1 para 1(d)�������������������������� 30.01   para 2(e)��������������������������� 22.69     (g)��������������������������� 30.01     (gg)�������������� 18.155, 30.01     (ggg)������������������������ 30.01

Prescription (Scotland) Act 2018 (asp 15)������������������������������������� 30.05 s 5��������������������������������������������� 30.05 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 (c 4) s 14(1)(b)���������������������������������� 24.15 Prison Act 1952 (15 & 16 Geo 2 and 1 Eliz 2 c 52)���������������������� 24.09 Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (c 42) s 9(1)���������������������������������������� 20.70 Prosecution of Offences Act 1879 (42 & 42 Vict c 22) s 2��������������������������������������������� 17.53 Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (c 23) s 1��������������������������������������������� 17.54 Protection from Abuse (Scotland) Act 2001 (asp 14) s 1��������������������������������������������� 28.22 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (c 40)������������������������������� 3.54, 14.54, 16.17, 16.18, 16.20, 16.60, 16.70, 20.08, 21.50, 24.01, 28.01, 28.02, 28.03, 28.04, 28.11, 28.14, 28.16, 28.17, 28.20, 28.22, 30.07, 31.72 s 1(1)���������������������������������������� 28.11 (2)������������������������������������������ 2.28 ss 1–5���������������������������������������� 28.03 ss 1–7���������������������������������������� 28.01 s 3��������������������������������������������� 20.81 (1)���������������������������������������� 28.11 s 7����������������������������������� 28.01, 28.04 s 8���������������������������3.60, 16.72, 28.01 (1)�������������������28.01, 28.02, 28.05, 28.09, 28.10, 28.12  (a)������������������������������������� 28.09  (b)������������������������������������ 28.09 (2)������������������������������ 28.01, 28.11 (3)��������� 28.03, 28.04, 28.05, 28.07 (5)(a)������������������������������������ 28.01  (b)�������������������������� 28.01, 28.14  (i)��������������������������������� 28.12  (ii)�������������������������������� 28.14 (6)��������������������16.18, 21.50, 28.08 ss 8–11�������������������������������������� 28.01 s 8A������������������������������������������ 16.18 (1)���������������������������������������� 28.05 (2)���������������������������������������� 28.05 (3)���������������������������������������� 28.05 s 9(1)���������������������������������������� 28.15 (3)���������������������������������������� 28.15

xc   Table of Statutes s 10������������������������������������������� 28.16 (1)������������������������������������������ 3.60 Public Authorities Protection Act 1893 (56 & 57 Vict c 61)�������������� 7.02 s 1����������������������������������������������� 7.01 s 3����������������������������������������������� 7.02 Public Health etc (Scotland) Act 2008 (asp 5) ss 41–45������������������������������������ 17.39 Public Health (Scotland) Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict c 101)������������������ 22.03 Public Health (Scotland) Act 1897 (60 & 61 Vict c 38) s 103����������������������������������������� 22.65 Public Services Reform (Scotland) Act 2010 (asp 8) sch 12 para 2����������������������������� 31.43 Publication of Lectures Act 1835 (5 & 6 Will 4 c 65)��������������������� 19.08 Railway Regulation Act 1840 (3 & 4 Vict c 97) s 16������������������������������������������� 23.10 Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 (c 20) s 111������������������������������������������� 8.28 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (c 23)������������������������������� 20.75 Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000 (asp 11)����� 20.75 Regulation of Railways Act 1889 (52 & 53 Vict c 57) s 5(2)������������������������������ 17.40, 17.41 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974������� (c 53) s 4��������������������������������������������� 18.74 s 8(3)���������������������������������������� 18.74 (5)���������������������������������������� 18.74 (8)���������������������������������������� 18.74 Rights of Relatives to Damages (Mesothelioma) (Scotland) Act 2007 (asp 18)��������������������������������������� 5.75 Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876 (39 & 40 Vict c 75)�������������������� 22.03 Road Traffic Act 1930 (20 & 21 Geo 5 c 43) s 35�������������������������������������2.48, 2.51 Road Traffic Act 1972 (c 20) s 6��������������������������������������������� 29.24 s 143������������������������������������������� 3.76 Road Traffic Act 1988 (c 52)����������� 29.19

s 39��������������������������������������������� 8.18 s 143���������������� 2.48, 2.51, 3.76, 29.19 s 149������������������������������� 29.19, 29.23 Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (c 27) s 87����������������������������������� 9.15, 11.38 Roads (Scotland) Act 1984 (c 54)���� 7.28, 8.01, 8.04, 8.24, 25.19 s 1(1)������������������������������������������ 8.01 s 2����������������������������������������������� 8.01 s 5����������������������������������������������� 8.01 s 25��������������������������������������������� 8.01 s 26��������������������������������������������� 8.01 s 27��������������������������������������������� 8.01 s 29��������������������������������������������� 8.01 ss 30–31�������������������������������������� 8.01 ss 32–34�������������������������������������� 8.01 s 34�������������������������������������7.28, 8.23 s 35��������������������������������������������� 8.01 ss 36–40�������������������������������������� 8.01 ss 59–60�������������������������������������� 8.01 s 83��������������������������������������������� 8.17 s 151(1)������������������������������8.01, 8.04 Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994 (c 35)���������������������������������������� 26.02 Sale of Goods Act 1893 (56 & 57 Vict c 71)���������������������������������� 26.02 Sale of Goods Act 1979 (c 54)���� 5.14, 26.02 s 14������������������������������������������� 26.02 (2A)������������������������������������� 26.02 (2B)(d)��������������������������������� 26.02 s 18������������������������������������������� 26.39 Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 2003 (asp 15) s 66(1)���������������������������������������� 5.05 Scotland Act 1998 (c 46)������������������ 1.38 s 29��������������������������������������������� 1.38 (1)(d)��������������������������� 2.46, 20.10 s 41(1)(a)���������������������������������18.101  (b)�����������������������������������18.101 s 44��������������������������������������������� 2.39 s 53��������������������������������������������� 2.39 s 57����������������������������������� 2.46, 20.10 (2)�������������������������������� 7.31, 31.06 Senior Courts Act 1981 (c 54) s 50��������������������������������� 22.29, 22.30 Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009  (asp 9)����������� 16.22, 16.44 ss 12–17�������������������������� 16.22, 16.44 s 13(2)�������������������������������������� 16.44

Table of Statutes   xci Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1838 (1 & 2 Vict c 99) s 15������������������������������������������� 22.02 Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1907 (7 Edw 7 c 51) s 3(e)������������������������������������������ 2.34 (n)������������������������������������������ 2.34 (o)������������������������������������������ 2.34 Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Extracts Act 1892 (55 & 56 Vict c 17) s 9��������������������������������������������� 31.64 Smoke Nuisance (Scotland) Act 1857 (20 & 21 Vict c 73)������ 22.03 Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997 (c 27) s 3��������������������������������������������� 31.42 s 4��������������������������������������������� 31.42 s 6��������������������������������������������� 31.42 s 8��������������������������������������������� 31.42 s 33(1)�������������������������������������� 31.44 (2)���������������������������������������� 31.44 sch 2����������������������������������������� 31.42 sch 3 para 1������������������������������� 31.44 sch 4����������������������������������������� 31.44 Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (c 76)���������������������������������������� 24.12 Standards in Scotland’s Schools etc Act 2000 (asp 6) s 16������������������������������������������� 16.35 Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1906 (6 Edw 7 c 38) sch 1����������������������������������������� 17.01 Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1964 (c 80) s 1��������������������������������������������� 17.52 sch 1����������������������������������������� 17.01 Suicide Act 1961 (9 & 10 Eliz 2 c 60) s 1��������������������������������������������� 29.26 Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act 1908 (8 Edw 7 c 65) s 59������������������������������������������� 17.38 Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 (c 29)������������������������������� 26.02 Tenements (Scotland) Act 2004 (asp 11)��������������������������� 23.20, 23.32 s 4��������������������������������������������� 23.32 s 8��������������������������������������������� 23.20 (2)���������������������������������������� 23.20 (3)���������������������������������������� 23.20

s 9��������������������������������������������� 23.20 s 24������������������������������������������� 23.32 (2)���������������������������������������� 23.32 sch 1����������������������������������������� 23.32 Theft Act 1968 (c 60) s 16������������������������������������������� 29.52 Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 (c 10)���������� 2.48, 3.04, 3.11 s 1���������������������������������������2.48, 3.04 s 3���������������������������������������2.48, 3.04 Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 (asp 9) s 76������������������������������������������� 22.67 Trade Marks Act 1994 (c 26)����������� 2.11, 20.62 Trade Disputes Act 1906 (6 Edw 7 c 47)��������������������������� 21.02 Trade Disputes Act 1965 (c 48)������ 21.02 Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 (c 52)������������������������� 21.02 s 2(1)���������������������������������������� 18.63 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (c 52) s 10(1)�������������������������������������� 18.63  (b)�������������������������������������� 2.37 s 219����������������������������������������� 21.02 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (c 50)��������������������������������� 5.42, 5.63, 5.89 s 2(1)���������������������������������������� 29.17 (2)������������������������������������������ 5.42 s 11(3)���������������������������������������� 5.42 s 15(2)(c)������������������������������������ 5.42 s 16����������������������������������� 5.94, 25.61 (1)����������������������5.42, 25.61, 29.17  (a)������������������������������������� 29.23  (b)������������������������������������ 29.23 (3)������������������������������ 29.17, 29.23 s 25(1)(c)���������������������������������� 29.23 Water Industry Act 1991 (c 56)������� 24.10 Wildlife and Natural Environment (Scotland) Act 2011 (asp 6) sch 1 Pt 2���������������������������������� 23.10 Winter Herding Act 1686 RPS 1686/4/37, APS viii, 595 c 21�����27.02, 27.11

Table of Statutory Instruments

Act of Sederunt (Rules of the Court of Session 1994) 1994, SI 1994/1443����������������������������� 31.16 r 7.7������������������������������������������ 31.64 r 43.1���������������������������������������� 31.16 r 43.11(3)���������������������������������� 31.57 (5)���������������������������������������� 31.57 rr 43.11–43.12��������������������������� 31.57 r 43.12�������������������������������������� 31.57 Act of Sederunt (Sheriff Court Ordinary Cause Rules) 1993, SI 1993/1956�������������������������������� 2.34 r 5.7(1)�������������������������������2.29, 2.34 rr 36.8–36.10���������������������������� 31.57 r 36.9(3)����������������������������������� 31.57 (5)���������������������������������������� 31.57 r 36.10�������������������������������������� 31.57 Building (Safety, Health and Welfare) Regulations 1948, SI 1948/1145������������������������������������24.24 reg 29(4)����������������������������������� 24.23 reg 31(3)����������������������������������� 24.24 Business Protection from Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008, SI 2008/1276����������������������������� 21.38 Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2007, SI 2007/320 reg 40������������������������������������������ 6.08 Consumer Protection Act 1987 (Commencement No 1) Order 1987, SI 1987/1680��������� 26.25 Consumer Protection Act 1987 (Product Liability) (Modification) Order 2000, SI 2000/2771��������� 26.40

xcii

Consumer Protection Act 1987 (Product Liability) (Modification) (Scotland) Order 2001, SSI 2001/265��������� 26.40 Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, SI 2008/1277����21.38 Detention Centre Rules 2001, SI 2001/238 r 33��������������������������������������������� 3.90 Electricity Supply Regulations 1988, SI 1988/1057�����������������������������24.07, 24.13 reg 17���������������������������������������� 24.13 reg 24���������������������������������������� 24.13 reg 25���������������������������������������� 24.13 Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/2013��������������� 18.124, 18.125 reg 17���������������������������������������18.124 reg 18���������������������������������������18.124 reg 19���������������������������������������18.124 General Product Safety Regulations 2005, SI 2005/1803������������������� 26.97 reg 2����������������������������������������� 26.97 reg 5����������������������������������������� 26.97 reg 8����������������������������������������� 26.97 reg 20���������������������������������������� 26.97 Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (Civil Liability) (Exceptions) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/1667 reg 3����������������������������������������� 12.33 Housing (Scotland) Act 2006 (Consequential Provisions) Order 2008, SI 2008/1889   art 3������������������������������ 5.36, 11.25

Table of Statutory Instruments   xciii Human Rights Act 1998 (Jurisdiction) (Scotland) Rules 2000, SSI 2000/301 r 4��������������������������������������������� 17.43 Limitation (Childhood Abuse) (Scotland) Act 2017 (Commencement) Regulations 2017, SSI 2017/279����������������������30.18 Management of Health and Safety at Work and Fire Precautions (Workplace) (Amendment) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/2457 reg 6����������������������������������������� 12.32 Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, SI 1999/3242���������������������� 12.22, 12.32, 12.33, 12.35 reg 3������������������������������� 12.22, 12.32 (1)���������������������������������������� 12.35 reg 22���������������������������������������� 12.32 Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992, SI 1992/2793 reg 4(1)(b)���������������������������������� 9.51 Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992, SI 1992/2966 reg 4������������������������������������������� 9.51 (1)���������������������������������������� 12.35 reg 7(1)������������������������������������� 24.20 Prison Rules 1964, SI 1964/388����24.09 Product Safety and Metrology etc (Amendment etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, SI 2019/696   sch 3�������������������������������������� 26.25

Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1992, SI 1992/2932����������������������������� 12.37 reg 4������������������������������������������� 9.51 Quarries (Explosives) Regulations 1959, SI 1959/2259 reg 27(4)����������������������������������� 24.28 Southern Rhodesia (Petroleum) Order 1965, SI 1965/2140��������� 24.12 Southern Rhodesia (United Nations Sanctions) Order 1968, SI 1968/885������������������������������ 24.12 Trade Secrets (Enforcement, etc) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/597�����������������������������������19.01, 19.75 reg 2����������������������������������������� 19.75 reg 3����������������������������������������� 19.01 reg 11���������������������������������������� 19.75 reg 14���������������������������������������� 19.75 reg 16���������������������������������������� 19.75 Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2016, SI 2016/362������������������������������� 9.15, 11.38 Wild Birds Protection (County of Midlothian) Order 1905������������� 18.22

Table of European Legislation

Regulations 2016  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1���� 20.86 Art 4(1)��������������������������� 20.35, 20.75   (2)�������������������������������� 20.35, 20.75 Directives 1985  Directive 85/374/EEC on liability for defective products [1985] OJ L201/29�������������������� 26.22, 26.23, 26.25, 26.52, 26.55, 26.56 preamble������������������������� 26.22, 26.23 Art 1����������������������������������������� 26.28 Art 6����������������������������������������� 26.60   (1)����������������������26.47, 26.49, 26.55   (2)������������������������������������������ 26.54 Art 7  26.69    (a)����������������������������� 26.71, 26.72    (c)��������������������������������������� 26.75    (e)�������� 26.22, 26.25, 26.80, 26.82 Art 9(a)������������������������������������� 26.42    (b)����������������������������� 26.23, 26.41

xciv

Art 11����������������������������� 26.28, 26.88 Art 12��������������������������������������� 26.96 Art 13��������������������������������������� 26.23 Art 15(1)(b)�������������������� 26.22, 26.80 Art 16(1)����������������������������������� 26.22 1989  Directive 89/391/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work [1989] OJ L183/1���������� 12.32 1999  Directive 1999/34/EC on liability for defective products [1999] OJ L141/20�������������������� 26.22 2000  Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic commerce [2000] OJ L178/1��������������������������������18.124   Recital 42����������������������������������18.124 2001  Directive 2001/95/EC on general product safety [2001] OJ L11/4����������������������������������� 26.97 2016  Directive 2016/943 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure [2016] OJ L157/1������ 19.75

Table of Conventions

1929  Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International Carriage by Air (Warsaw Convention)������������������ 2.20 1950  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights)������������������� 2.45, 2.46, 2.47, 7.09, 7.32, 7.33, 17.06, 17.43, 18.59, 20.09, 20.10, 22.73, 24.16, 31.06 Art 1��������������������������������������� 2.46 Art 2��������������������� 2.46, 7.32, 7.33, 7.34, 9.06, 9.08, 9.11, 9.38, 9.39, 9.40, 9.41, 12.12, 19.29, 20.50, 20.51, 24.17 Arts 2–12�������������������������������� 2.46 Art 3������������������7.15, 17.32, 17.46, 19.29, 20.50, 20.82, 24.16, 24.17 Art 4������������������������������������������������ 17.17 Art 5�����������������17.06, 17.47, 17.48 (1)������������������������ 17.06, 17.17, 17.35, 17.43, 17.44 (4)����������������������������������� 17.47 (5)������������������������� 17.43, 17.45 Art 6��������������������������������������� 7.32 (1)�����������������������������7.14, 7.15 Art 8��������������������2.47, 7.34, 16.79, 17.32, 17.46, 18.01, 18.42, 18.68, 18.75,

18.129, 19.01, 19.67, 20.04, 20.09, 20.10, 20.14, 20.15, 20.18, 20.19, 20.20, 20.21, 20.28, 20.40, 20.41, 20.46, 20.79, 20.82, 20.83, 20.88, 22.54, 22.55, 22.66, 22.73, 22.74, 22.75, 22.76, 22.77, 22.78 (1)���������������19.30, 20.79, 22.54 (2)������������������������� 19.66, 20.41 Art 9������������������������������������� 16.35 Art 10�������������������������� 2.47, 18.42, 20.40, 21.21 (2)����������������������������������� 20.50 Art 12������������������������������������� 2.46 Art 13�����������������������������2.46, 7.15 Art 14������������������������������������� 2.46 First Protocol Art 1������������������7.32, 20.19, 20.26, 22.54, 22.73, 22.75, 22.78 Arts 1–3���������������������������������� 2.46 Art 2������������������������������������� 16.35 Fourth Protocol Art 2������������������������������������� 17.06 Thirteenth Protocol Art 1��������������������������������������� 2.46 1976  Strasbourg Convention on Products Liability in regard to Personal Injury and Death��������� 26.22

xcv

Preface

The law of delict, famously, “is about messes” (J L Coleman “Second Thoughts and other First Impressions”, in B Bix (ed), Analyzing Law: New Essays in Legal Theory (1998) 257 at 302). In accounting for those “messes” and the ways in which they came about, this book seeks to provide as clear and principled a statement of the law of delict as the subjectmatter allows. The focus throughout is upon Scottish authorities, but case law and commentary from other jurisdictions, and especially England and Wales, are given full consideration in those areas of the law where it is appropriate to do so. The law is stated as at 1 March 2021, although it has sometimes been possible to note later developments. The Defamation and Malicious Publications (Scotland) Act 2021 received Royal Assent on 21 April 2021, and the text assumes that the Act will have been brought fully into force by the time of publication. References to websites have been checked as the book went to press but, obviously, are subject to change. The book does not deal with matters of international private law, for which readers are referred to specialist texts. My own understanding of the law of delict owes much to conversations, exchanges, and sometimes disagreements with colleagues in the Scottish Law Schools and elsewhere, and with my former students at the University of Edinburgh. To all I am greatly indebted. Thanks are also due to the Faculty of Law at the University of Stellenbosch and the Max-PlanckInstitut für ausländisches and internationales Privatrecht in Hamburg for providing a warm welcome and exemplary research facilities at various stages of the writing of this book. Elspeth Christie Reid Edinburgh April 2021

xcvi

Abbreviations

Atiyah’s Accidents Compensation and the Law P Cane and J Goudkamp, Atiyah’s Accidents Compensation and the Law, 9th edn (2018) Balfour, Practicks P G B McNeill (ed), The Practicks of Sir James Balfour of Pittendreich, 2 vols (Stair Society vols 21 and 22, 1962 and 1963) Bankton, Inst  A McDouall, Lord Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland in Civil Rights (1751–53; reprinted as Stair Society vols 41–43, 1993–95) von Bar, Common European Law of Torts C von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts (1998) Bell, Comm  G J Bell, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland and on the Principles of Mercantile Jurisprudence, 7th edn by J McLaren (1870; reprinted 1990) Bell, Principles  G J Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland, 4th edn (1839; reprinted by the Edinburgh Legal Education Trust as Old Studies in Scots Law vol 1, 2010) BGB  Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code) Blackie, “Defamation” J Blackie, “Defamation”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 633 Blackie, “Unity in Diversity” J Blackie, “Unity in Diversity: the History of Personality Rights in Scots Law”, in N R Whitty and R Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective (2009) 31

xcvii

xcviii  Abbreviations Broun, Nuisance  J Broun, The Law of Nuisance in Scotland (1891) Burn-Murdoch, Interdict  H Burn-Murdoch, Interdict in the Law of Scotland (1933) Carty, Economic Torts H Carty, An Analysis of the Economic Torts, 2nd edn (2010) Charlesworth and Percy on Negligence C Walton et al (eds), Charlesworth and Percy on Negligence, 14th edn (2018) Clerk and Lindsell on Torts M Jones et al (eds), Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 23rd edn (2020) CLJ

Cambridge Law Journal

CLP

Current Legal Problems

DCFR C von Bar and E Clive (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference, 6 vols (2010) Delict (SULI) J Thomson (ed), Delict (Scottish Universities Law Institute, looseleaf) Dobbs, Law of Torts D Dobbs et al, The Law of Torts (2020 update) Earle and Whitty, “Medical Law” M Earle and N R Whitty, “Medical Law”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2006) EdinLR

Edinburgh Law Review

Erskine, Inst  J Erskine, An Institute of the Law of Scotland, 1st edn (1773; reprinted by the Edinburgh Legal Education Trust as Old Studies in Scots Law vol 5, 2014) Fleming, Torts  C Sappideen and P Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts, 10th edn (2011) Forbes, Inst  W Forbes, The Institutes of the Law of Scotland (1722; reprinted by the Edinburgh Legal Education Trust as Old Studies in Scots Law vol 3, 2012) Gatley on Libel and Slander R Parkes et al (eds), Gatley on Libel and Slander, 12th edn (2013)

Abbreviations  xcix Glegg, Reparation  A T Glegg, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Reparation, 1st edn (1892) Gloag and Henderson, Law of Scotland H L MacQueen and Rt Hon Lord Eassie (eds), Gloag and Henderson: The Law of Scotland, 14th edn (2017) Gordon, Criminal Law G H Gordon et al, The Criminal Law of Scotland, vol 1, 3rd edn (2000); vol 2, 4th edn (2016) Gordon and Wortley, Scottish Land Law W M Gordon and S Wortley, Scottish Land Law, 3rd edn, vol I (2009), vol II (2020) Goudkamp, Defences  J Goudkamp, Tort Law Defences (2013) Gurry on Breach of Confidence T Aplin et al, Gurry on Breach of Confidence, 2nd edn (2012) Guthrie Smith, Reparation  J Guthrie Smith, A Treatise on the Law of Reparation (1864) Guthrie Smith, Law of Damages J Guthrie Smith, The Law of Damages: A Treatise on the Reparation of Injuries, as Administered in Scotland, 2nd edn (1889) Hume, Comm  D Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland respecting Crimes, 3rd edn by B R Bell (1844; reprinted 1986) Hume, Lectures  G C H Paton (ed), Baron David Hume’s Lectures 1786–1822 (Stair Society vols 5, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 1939-58) Ibbetson, Historical Introduction D Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (1999) Johnston, Prescription and Limitation D Johnston, Prescription and Limitation, 2nd edn (2012) JLSS

Journal of the Law Society of Scotland

JR

Juridical Review

Kames, Principles of Equity

Lord Kames, Principles of Equity, 3rd edn (1778, reprinted as Old Studies in Scots Law vol 4, 2013)

LQR

Law Quarterly Review

c  Abbreviations McBryde, Contract W W McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 3rd edn (2007) McEwan and Paton on Damages A Paton, McEwan and Paton on Damages for Personal Injuries in Scotland, 2nd edn (looseleaf) McGregor on Damages J Edelman et al (eds), McGregor on Damages, 20th edn (2020) McKechnie, “Delict and Quasi Delict” H McKechnie, “Delict and Quasi-Delict”, in G C H Paton (ed), Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Stair Society vol 20, 1958) 265 Mackenzie, Inst  G Mackenzie, Institutions of the Law of Scotland, 2nd edn (1688) MacQueen and Sellar, “Negligence” H MacQueen and W D H Sellar, “Negligence”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 517 MacQueen and Thomson, Contract  H L MacQueen, MacQueen and Thomson on Contract Law in Scotland, 5th edn (2020)  MLR Modern Law Review Murphy, Nuisance

J Murphy, The Law of Nuisance (2010)

Neethling’s Law of Personality J Neethling et al, Neethling’s Law of Personality, 3rd edn (2019) OCR Act of Sederunt (Sheriff Court Ordinary Cause Rules) 1993, SI 1993/1956 (as amended) OJLS

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies

Prosser and Keaton on Torts W Page Keeton (ed), Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th edn (1984) Rankine, Landownership  J Rankine, The Law of Land-Ownership in Scotland, 4th edn (1909) RCS Act of Sederunt (Rules of the Court of Session 1994) 1994, SI 1994/1443 (as amended) Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy E C Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law (2010)

Abbreviations  ci Reid, Property  K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) Reid and Blackie, Personal Bar E C Reid and J W G Blackie, Personal Bar (2006) Reid and Zimmermann, History  K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland, 2 vols (2000) Renton and Brown, Criminal Procedure C Stoddart (ed), Renton and Brown Criminal Procedure, 6th edn (2 vols, looseleaf) Ripstein, Private Wrongs

A Ripstein, Private Wrongs (2016)

Robbie, Private Water Rights J Robbie, Private Water Rights (Studies in Scots Law vol 4, 2015) Salmond and Heuston on Torts R F V Heuston and R A Buckley, Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts, 21st edn (1996) Scott Robinson, Interdict  S Scott Robinson, The Law of Interdict, 2nd edn (1994) SLG

Scottish Law Gazette

SLPQ

Scottish Law and Practice Quarterly

SME Sir Thomas Smith et al (eds), The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia (1987–1996) with Cumulative Supplements, Service and Reissues Stair, Inst  J Dalrymple, 1st Viscount Stair, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, 6th edn by D M Walker (1981) Thomson, Delictual Liability J M Thomson, Delictual Liability, 5th edn (2014) Toulson & Phipps on Confidentiality C Phipps et al, Toulson & Phipps on Confidentiality, 4th edn (2020) Trayner’s Latin Maxims A G M Duncan (ed), Trayner’s Latin Maxims, 4th edn (1993) Van der Walt, Neighbours  A J van der Walt, The Law of Neighbours (2010) Walker, Civil Remedies D M Walker, The Law of Civil Remedies in Scotland (1974)

cii  Abbreviations Walker, Delict D M Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland, 2nd edn (1981) Weir, Introduction to Tort Law T Weir, An Introduction to Tort Law, 2nd edn (2006) White and Fletcher, Delictual Damages R M White and M L Fletcher, Delictual Damages (1999) Whitty, “Nuisance” N R Whitty, “Nuisance”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort J Goudkamp et al (eds), Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 20th edn (2020) Zimmermann, Obligations  R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990)

PART I

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1

Historical Introduction1

Para A. EARLY HISTORY�������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.02 B. THE INSTITUTIONAL WRITERS (1) Stair����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.07 (2) Bankton������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1.10 (3) Erskine������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.13 C. INJURY TO THE PERSON THROUGH NEGLIGENCE������� 1.15 D. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN LAW������������������� 1.18 E. THE RISE OF THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (1) Degrees of culpa�������������������������������������������������������������� 1.23 (2) A duty of care��������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.24 (3) Scottish responses��������������������������������������������������������������� 1.28 (4) Donoghue v Stevenson������������������������������������������������������� 1.30 F. LATER DEVELOPMENTS����������������������������������������������������� 1.31 (1) Intentional wrongs�������������������������������������������������������������� 1.32 (2) Neighbourhood relations����������������������������������������������������� 1.34 (3) After Donoghue: convergence and divergence������������������������ 1.36 The term “delict” (delictum) has long been understood as meaning a civil wrong – a “private crime”, as distinct from a “public crime” – obliging those responsible “to repair the Damage and Interest of the private Party”2 irrespective of whether they are also made answerable in criminal proceedings.3 “Delict” did not gain currency in Scotland as a general term for this field of law until the nineteenth century,4 and even then, the titles of the

 1 In addition to the general account which follows, the history of certain individual doctrines appears, where appropriate, in later chapters.   2 This definition is to be found in Mackenzie, Inst 4.4.1–2, which also explains that public crimes are “committed immediately against the Commonwealth”. See also Sir Robert Spotiswoode, Practicks of the Laws of Scotland (1706, but compiled more than 60 years earlier) 5: “Some Actions are ex delicto (improperly so called, as having some resemblance to Criminal Actions, in respect of the mixture of some violent Deed in them) as Contraventions of Acts of Law borrows, of Acts of Cautionry, or Removing, Spulzies, Ejections, wrongous Intromission, Intrusion.”   3 For further discussion of the meaning of “delict” as a single act of wrongdoing, see para 2.01 below. On the meaning of the Latin “delictum” as “an offence, a lapse, or a mistake”, see C von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts (1998) vol 1, para 6.   4 See paras 1.18–1.19 below.

3

1.01

4   The Law of Delict in Scotland

first textbooks continued to favour the term “Reparation”.5 Indeed the first Scottish textbook to be called The Law of Delict was that published by D M Walker in 1966.6 But if the usage is modern, the legal ideas which it encompasses go back to the earliest period of Scottish legal history.

A. EARLY HISTORY 1.02

Although much of the early history of the law of reparation remains “obscure”,7 there is ample if fragmentary evidence, dating back at least to the late medieval period, of civil remedies for wrongs against property and against the person. A statute of 1230 refers to the brieve of novel dissasine as pleadable by those wrongfully dispossessed of heritage,8 and the brieve de proteccione regis infricta dealt with claims which, slightly later, would be called wrongful occupation and spuilzie (the wrongful dispossession of moveables).9 In addition, reflecting perhaps an aspiration to displace customs of blood feud and retaliatory violence,10 the Leges inter Brettos et Scotos (Laws of the Britons and the Scots)11 set out a framework by which reparation was to be made to victims or their families in respect of death and the spilling of blood, adjusted for social status and for gender, and including a graduated tariff for “compensating injuries and blows”. The

  5 See e.g. J Guthrie Smith Treatise on the Law of Reparation (1864), and the 2nd edition of 1889, retitled The Law of Damages: A Treatise on the Reparation of Injuries; A T Glegg, Practical Treatise on the Law of Reparation, 1st edn (1892), and subsequent editions of 1905, 1939, and 1955. In Morison’s Dictionary of Decisions the principal grouping of cases was listed under “Reparation”. The main entry on the topic in Lord Dunedin et al (eds), Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland was similarly entitled “Reparation” (vol 12, 1931, paras 1058–1172), although accompanied by an entry on “Negligence” (vol 10, 1930, paras 524–611). See also D M Walker’s historical survey, “The Development of Reparation” (1952) 64 JR 101.   6 A 2nd edition was published in 1981. However, the historical survey by H McKechnie in G C H Paton (ed), Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Stair Society vol 20, 1958) 265 was entitled “Delict and Quasi-Delict”. See also D McKerron, The Law of Delict (on South African law), the 1st edition of which was published in 1933.   7 H MacQueen and W D H Sellar, “Negligence”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann, A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 517 at 520.   8 For a detailed account, see H L MacQueen, Common Law and Feudal Society in Medieval Scotland (1993) 136–166. A brieve was the writ issued in the name of the king addressed to the court ordering a trial to be made, and was in this period the means by which most actions were initiated. For an overview see J Cairns, “Historical Introduction”, in Reid and Zimmermann, History, vol 1, 14 at 26–27.  9 MacQueen, Common Law and Feudal Society 129. 10 See Balfour, Practicks, vol 2, 529, referring, in the context of remedies for injury, to the “great strife, discord, and lurking envy [that] was among the Lords and nobility of this realm, in the days of King Alexander”. 11 For analysis and edited versions of the relevant manuscripts, see A Taylor, The Laws of Mediaeval Scotland (Stair Society vol 66, 2019). The Leges inter Brettos et Scotos, dating from the 12th or 13th century, constituted a source for the 14th-century Regiam Majestatem, the most commonly used version of which is that edited and translated by Lord Cooper (Stair Society vol 11, 1947).

Historical Introduction   5

Statutes of Alexander II12 made more general provision for pleas of wrang and unreason (querelae de iniuria et non racione), and the Statutes of Robert I of 1318 set out a procedure for defending such claims (De defensione torte et unreson quod dicitur wrang et unlau) in relation to “all manner of actions for injury, great or small” (“in omnimoda actione injuriarum”), suggesting that actions for injury were by now well-established.13 In MacQueen’s assessment, actions14 of wrang and unlaw, brought without brieve, constituted “a residual general category as the law developed”, in addition to the three specific forms of action mentioned above. Encompassing wrongs “of almost any kind, including broken agreements, unpaid debts, seizure of one’s goods by another, and the infliction of other injuries of various kinds”,15 they enabled the common law to extend itself beyond protection of specific interests to civil injuries more generally.16 Further legislative developments in the first half of the fifteenth century “brought delict fully into the Scottish legal system”,17 consolidating procedure in cases of spuilzie.18 The term “assythment” appeared in legislation of this period,19 modernising the procedure for reparation claims as an adjunct of criminal process in relation to death or injury. As well as seeking to compensate harm and assuage grievances, this suggested wider social objectives of “pacifying rancour”.20 The remedy of assythment was contingent upon the criminal liability of the aggressor, but both were relevant to injuries occurring through negligence as well as to those inflicted by design.21 12 For an edition of the text with detailed commentary, see Taylor, Laws of Mediaeval Scotland 571–623. 13 Statute 18. 14 As distinct from defences pleading lack of wrang and unlaw. 15 H L MacQueen, “Some Notes on Wrang and Unlaw”, in H L MacQueen (ed), Miscellany V (Stair Society vol 52, 2006) 13 at 18 and 23. At 20–22 this study analyses a sample of such actions, as recorded in W C Dickinson (ed), Early Records of the Burgh of Aberdeen 1317; 1398–1407 (Scottish History Society, 3rd series, vol 49, 1957), including defamation and assault as well as seizure of goods and unpaid debts. 16 A Harding, “Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies in Late Mediaeval English and Scots Law”, in H L MacQueen (ed), Miscellany II (Stair Society vol 49, 2002) 1 at 3. See also Stair, Inst 4.43.9, describing the “King’s unlaw” as relevant to “the ordinary mulct for misdemeanors”. 17 Harding, “Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies” 8. 18 Ordinance of 1438, RPS A1438/12/1, APS ii, 32 c 2; Act of 1458, RPS 1458/3/3, APS ii, 47 c 2. 19 Act of 1425, RPS 1425/3/26, APS ii, 8 c 25; see also Act of 1426, RPS 1426/10, APS ii, 9 c 7 on forthocht felony. For an account of assythment, see R Black, “A Historical Survey of Delictual Liability in Scotland for Personal Injuries and Death: Part One” (1975) 8 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 46 at 52–70; D M Walker, “The Development of Reparation” (1952) 64 JR 101 at 103–106. 20 See Black, “Historical Survey of Delictual Liability in Scotland” 55. 21 Assythment remained available for non-intentional injury until the 18th century: see H McKechnie, “Reparation”, in Lord Dunedin et al (eds), Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, vol 12 (1931) paras 1114–1115; Black, “Historical Survey of Delictual Liability in Scotland” 54. For an exception, see Regiam Majestatem 4.24 (text as in the Ayr Miscellany is at A Taylor, The Laws of Mediaeval Scotland (Stair Society vol 66, 2019) 468–471), providing that a horseman who knocked down a pedestrian

1.03

6   The Law of Delict in Scotland

1.04

1.05

Even in this early period there were further specific contexts in which negligence provided the basis for liability. A series of provisions from the fifteenth century required public officials to compensate those adversely affected by negligence or partiality in the officials’ exercise of their duties.22 The concept of culpable negligence is also encountered in a statute of 1427 making provision for liability in relation to fires in towns. Public officials might be held liable for lack of diligence in executing their duties as regards fire prevention, as well as householders for their own or their servants’ recklessness in setting fires, with the proviso that liability would not arise where the fire was triggered by a “sudden occurrence that may not be foreseen”.23 By the time of Balfour’s Practicks (1579), the range of subject matter, cataloguing fifteenth- and sixteenth-century case law, included numerous instances of actions relating to ejection following wrongful dispossession of land, of spuilzie, and assythment, as well as more limited mention of liability of judicial officials,24 the obligation to make reparation for property damage caused by obstructing mill lades or dams,25 the spread of fire,26 or interference with coal workings.27 From the start of the following century, Hope’s Major Practicks indicated a similar spread of case law, dealing extensively with ejection and spuilzie, as well as with assythment, but with less to say on other possible areas of liability.28 A further significant seam of case law during this period can be found in the decisions of the Commissary courts, established after 1564, dealing not only with consistorial and executry matters but also with defamation and verbal injury.29

in front of the horse on the road was obliged to pay reparation to the victim’s family as if he had killed him with his own hands, whereas if the victim was killed by the horse riding backwards, reparation was reduced to the fourth foot of the horse or a fourth of its value. For general discussion of whether the keeper’s culpa had a role in liability for injury caused by animals, see B S Jackson, “Liability for Animals in Scottish Legal Literature: From the Auld Lawes to the Sixteenth Century” (1975) 10 Irish Jurist 334. 22 E.g. Act of 1427 (judges in ecclesiastical courts), APS ii, 14 c 14; Act of 1438 (sheriffs in relation to return of despoiled goods), RPS A1438/12/1, APS ii, 32 c 2. For discussion and further instances, see H McKechnie, “Delict and Quasi-Delict”, in G C H Paton (ed), Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Stair Society vol 20, 1958) 265 at 266–267. For contemporary developments in England in regard to the negligence of public officers, see P H Winfield, “Duty in Tortious Negligence” (1934) 34 Columbia LR 41 at 44–47. 23 RPS 1427/3/7–16, APS ii, 12 c 23. For contemporary developments in England in regard to the spread of fire, see Winfield, “Duty in Tortious Negligence” 47–48. 24 Balfour, Practicks, vol 1, 284. 25 Balfour, Practicks, vol 2, 494. 26 Balfour, Practicks, vol 2, 509. 27 Balfour, Practicks, vol 2, 497. 28 Lord Clyde (ed), Hope’s Major Practicks, 1608–1633 (Stair Society vols 3 and 4, 1937 and 1938). 29 For a detailed account see J Blackie, “Defamation”, in Reid and Zimmermann, History, vol 2, 633 at 638–641.

Historical Introduction   7

By the start of the seventeenth century, therefore, civil liability for wrongdoing was firmly established in various contexts. As yet, however, there was no coherent body of law on the field that we now call “delict”. Moreover, the close link with criminal law reflected broader aims not only of reparation to victims and vindication of wrongs but of deterrence of unlawful activity and preservation of public order, and redress often focussed as much upon restoration of property or suspension of a wrongful act as upon reparation as such.

1.06

B. THE INSTITUTIONAL WRITERS (1) Stair The first writer to present a systematic structure for the law of reparation was Stair, in his Institutions of the Law of Scotland, first published in 1681 but with a second and more extensive edition in 1693. The Institutions was broadly modelled on Justinian’s Institutes and influenced by the work of Natural Law writers,30 including Grotius31 and possibly Pufendorf.32 Although much of the detail of his account is no longer discernible in the modern law, Stair’s enduring contribution was the “notion of system”33 – the idea that the assorted rules and remedies in this area could be understood as part of a principled general framework of the law of obligations. In Stair’s scheme the “formal and proper object of law” was the rights of individuals, which were first and foremost liberty, dominion (a real right), and obligation (that which corresponds to a personal right).34 The obligation to make reparation was classified as one of 30 Stair, Inst 1.1.17. 31 See D Visser and N Whitty, “The Structure of the Law of Delict”, in Reid and Zimmermann, History, vol 2, 422 at 428–432. On Stair’s use of Grotius’ De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), see W M Gordon, Roman Law, Scots Law and Legal History: Selected Essays (Edinburgh Studies in Law vol 4, 2007) 261. See also A L M Wilson, “Stair and the Inleydinge of Grotius” (2010) 14 EdinLR 259 on whether the Inleydinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleertheyt (1631) was a source for the Institutions. 32 G M Hutton, “Purposes and Pattern of the Institutions”, in D M Walker (ed), Stair Tercentenary Studies (Stair Society vol 33, 1981) 79 at 105; T Richter, “Did Stair know Pufendorf?” (2003) 7 EdinLR 367 at 376, drawing a parallel with Pufendorf’s categories of congenital and adventitious obligations. A parallel can also be observed with the listing of reparable interests set out in Pufendorf’s De Jure Naturae et Gentium (transl of edn of 1688 by C H Oldfather and W A Oldfather, 1934) 3.1.1: “Now not only those things which nature herself has immediately granted us, such as our life, our body, our limbs, our virtue, our plain reputation, our liberty, are guarded by this precept and ordered to be held, as it were, sacred, but also the strength of this precept is understood to extend to cover all institutions and conventions, whereby anything is secured for men, as though without it they would be useless. And so, this precept forbids that any possession of ours, no matter on what ground it is held, be taken from us, destroyed, damaged, or removed from our use, either entirely or in part.” A similar listing is found in Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis 2.17.2. 33 D Visser and N Whitty, “The Structure of the Law of Delict”, in Reid and Zimmermann, History, vol 2, 422 at 446. 34 Stair, Inst 1.1.22. “Obligation” is not, of course, a right but the counterpart of a right; but Stair justifies the usage by explaining that it “hath no proper name as it is in the creditor, but hath the name of obligation as it is in the debtor”.

1.07

8   The Law of Delict in Scotland

1.08

the “obediential” obligations, that is, an obligation arising by force of law, as distinct from “conventional” obligations arising from agreement.35 Thus the title on “Reparation”36 took as its subject “the private rights of men, arising to them by delinquence, of exacting reparation of their damages inferred thereby”.37 “Damages and delinquencies” were to be judged “according to several rights and enjoyments”, comprising “life, members, and health”, “liberty”, “fame, reputation and honour”, “content, delight, or satisfaction” in that which we own, and “goods and possession”.38 In analysing the civil remedies to which infringement of these rights gave rise, and by which these obediential obligations could be made effectual, Stair acknowledged the Roman law delicts of furtum, rapina, damnum and iniuria.39 He preferred, however, the nomenclature already familiar in Scotland, referring to the “private delinquencies, and obligations and actions thence arising, as they are known by the terms in our law, in so far as they use to be civilly prosecute”.40 These “obligations by delinquence” were catalogued by Stair as follows:41 “These are either general, having no particular name or designation: and as such are pursued under the general names of damage and interest. Which hath as many branches and specialities, as there can be valuable and reparable damages: besides those of a special name and nature, which are chiefly these, assythment, extortion, circumvention, spuilzie, intrusion, ejection, molestation, breach of arrestment, deforcement, contravention, forgery.”

1.09

The full implications of this passage are unclear. It reaffirmed the existence of the specific nominate “native delicts”42 deriving from criminal acts, including now extortion, circumvention, molestation, breach of arrestment, deforcement, contravention, and forgery, as well as ejection, spuilzie, and assythment.43 Such delinquences were not only to be “punished”, but also gave rise to a “civil action for damage and interest”.44 Each had its own “specific matrix”45 containing the conditions of liability in that Inst 1.1.19. Inst 1.9. Inst 1.9.2. Inst 1.9.4. It may be noted that while furtum and rapina played no further part in the development of the law, the categories of damnum and iniuria were not discarded entirely, as discussed further below. 40 Inst 1.9.4. 41 Stair, Inst 1.9.6. A similar statement from the same period can be found in Mackenzie, Inst 4.1.12: “Some actions, are called rei persecutoriae, by which we pursue that quod patrimonio nostro abest; which is commonly called, damage and interest.” Mackenzie did not elaborate with an example. 42 K McK Norrie, “The Intentional Delicts”, in Reid and Zimmermann, History, vol 2, 477 at 481, 513. 43 For detailed analysis of these individual wrongs, see Norrie, “The Intentional Delicts” 483–506. 44 As e.g. in the case of unjust imprisonment: Stair, Inst 1.2.16. 45 D Visser and N Whitty, “The Structure of the Law of Delict”, in Reid and Zimmermann, History, vol 2, 422 at 441. 35 36 37 38 39

Historical Introduction   9

particular context. But the first sentence in the passage above also envisaged a residual general category of “damage and interest” dealing with “many branches” of “valuable damages”. Modern commentators have seen in this wording the basis for the later development of a general principle of delictual liability, extending in particular to physical injury as well as property damage or loss.46 Stair’s definition of damage – a consequence that “diminisheth or taketh away something from another, which of right he had”47 – was arguably capable of being construed in this way.48 On the other hand, when, in his Decisions, Stair reported under the general heading of “damage” cases not falling within the nominate categories, the cases were exclusively concerned with property loss.49 As Whitty and Visser have observed, “the intellectual assimilation of the idea and its realization in practice are two different things”,50 and there is little evidence from this period of the concept of “damage” being applied other than to property interests.

(2) Bankton Bankton’s discussion of “Delinquencies” in his Institute of the Laws of Scotland, published in three volumes between 1751 and 1753, similarly concentrated upon the “redress” due to the victims of criminal activity.51 His list of the “known names and titles” by which delinquencies were civilly cognoscible included “Assythment, Injury, Damage, Extortion, Circumvention, Spuilie, Intrusion, Ejection, Molestation, Contravention of Lawborrows, Battery pendente lite, Breach of Arrestment, Deforcement,

46 See D W McKenzie and R Evans-Jones, “The Development of Remedies for Personal Injury and Death”, in R Evans-Jones (ed), The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland (Stair Society suppl vol 2, 1995) 277 at 285–289. For discussion, see Visser and Whitty, “The Structure of the Law of Delict” 437–439; H MacQueen and W D H Sellar, “Negligence”, in Reid and Zimmermann, History, vol 2, 517 at 523–524. 47 Stair, Inst 1.9.3. 48 Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis 2.17.2 defined “damage” as “that which conflicts with one’s right” including body, limbs, reputation, honour, acts of will and property. Pufendorf’s definition in De Jure Naturae et Gentium 3.1.3 specifically extended to “every injury which concerns a man’s body, reputation, and virtue”. 49 Hay v Litlejohn (1666) Stair’s Decisions I, 358, (1666) Mor 13974 (damage from collapse of adjacent building); Lesly v Guthry (1670) Stair’s Decisions I, 672, (1670) Mor 3148 (spoiling of cargo). Other instances of successful claims for negligently inflicted damage at this time included fire damage (Sibbald v Lady Rosyth (1685) Mor 13976) and economic loss caused by the negligence of those in judicial or public office (M’Neil v Bailie of Falkirk (1678) Mor 11725; Ogilvie v Riddel (1680) Mor 13956; Alstoun v Riddel (1680) Mor 13957). See also A D M Forte, “Reparation for Pure Economic Loss: An Historical Perspective of Scots Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries” (1987) 8 Journal of Legal History 3. 49 Stair, Inst 1.9.7. 50 Visser and Whitty, “The Structure of the Law of Delict” 437. 51 Bankton, Inst 1.10 (preamble). Title 10 of Book 1 is headed “Reparation arising from Crime or Delinquencies”.

1.10

10   The Law of Delict in Scotland

1.11

1.12

Escape of a Prisoner, Excessive and Deceitful Gaming, Forgery of Writings, and Perjuries”.52 But while Bankton’s classification was thus similar to Stair’s, in his arrangement the context-specific delinquencies were preceded by three general categories. The first of these, assythment, dealt with redress for criminal wrongs done to “life, members and health”.53 The second and third, injury and damage, returned to the Roman law categories noted by Stair. Injury addressed deliberate harm to “fame and reputation” including “atrocious usage of one’s person”,54 and divided into “real” and “verbal” injuries (depending upon whether the wrongdoing had been perpetrated by a physical act or by the spoken word).55 Damage meant a wrong done to the pursuer’s “goods”.56 Although damage was a “general term”, and arose in different ways,57 it was “particularly understood of that damage which arises from diminishing, spoiling or destroying one’s goods, without any advantage to the offender”,58 but possibly also encompassed economic loss.59 In similar vein, Wallace, in his System of the Principles of the Law of Scotland, published in 1760, distinguished between “injuries”, “assythment”, and “damage”.60 Wallace acknowledged that the last of these was used in several senses but most frequently in the limited meaning of “a diminution of one’s estate”;61 his examples all related to property damage.62 A feature of the distinction between the categories of “injury” and “damage” was a difference in the fault requirements. Whereas injury was “maliciously committed”,63 liability for damage did not arise only in this way. In regard to the latter, Bankton drew an analogy with the “civil law” concept of damnum iniuria datum as repaired by the lex Aquilia, which meant that damage could be redressed where it had been caused by “fraud

Inst 1.10.13. Inst 1.10.14. Inst 1.10.21. Inst 1.10.22 and 1.10.24. A distinction between iniuria realis and iniuria verbalis can be traced back to Labeo: see R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 1064–1065. 56 Inst 1.10.40. 57 With “as many branches as there are ways whereby our valuable and repairable interests may be damnified”: Inst 1.10.41. 58 Inst 1.10.40. Like the cases reported by Stair, the practical examples suggested by Bankton focussed upon property damage. 59 A D M Forte, “Reparation for Pure Economic Loss: An Historical Perspective of Scots Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries” (1987) 8 Journal of Legal History 3. On understanding of the distinction between damage and iniuria, see D J Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (1999) 6–7. 60 G Wallace, System of the Principles of the Law of Scotland (1760) § 728. 61 Wallace, Principles § 728. 62 Wallace, Principles §§ 734–744. 63 Bankton, Inst 1.10.21 52 53 54 55

Historical Introduction   11

or fault”, including not only intentional conduct but also “neglect”.64 Broadly speaking therefore, this division between injury and damage might be seen as reflecting the Roman law distinction between liability for iniuria, addressed by the actio iniuriarium and requiring animus iniuriandi (the intention to injure),65 and liability under the lex Aquilia in which liability required culpa66 and which appeared to have been understood at the time of Bankton to be limited to damage to things.67

(3) Erskine Erskine’s Institute of the Law of Scotland, first published in 1773,68 contained a similar acknowledgement of general principle. Although detailed attention was directed towards civil redress for specific crimes or “delinquencies”,69 Erskine discussed the precept of alterum non laedere (injure no one), the consequence of which was broadly stated:70 “[E]very one who has the exercise of reason, and so can distinguish between right and wrong, is naturally obliged to make up the damage befalling his neighbour from a wrong committed by himself. Wherefore every fraudulent contrivance, or unwarrantable act, by which another suffers damage, or runs the hazard of it, subjects the delinquent to reparation.”

As so formulated, this principle embraced both intentional and negligent conduct. The obligation to make up “damage” arose, Erskine continued, “not only from positive acts of trespass or injury, but from blameable omission or neglect of duty”,71 and where the party injured could not be “restored precisely to his former state”, “the value of damage in money must be ascertained by the judge . . . agreeably to the rule of the lex Aquilia”.72

64 Inst 1.10.40–41: “where damage occurs, through any fault of the person who occasions it, the same must be repaired to the person aggrieved . . . but if it was accidental, and could not be prevented by the utmost care of the other, he who suffers the damage has no remedy”. See also Wallace, Principles § 733. 65 For discussion of the legacy of the actio iniuriarum, see K McK Norrie, “The Actio Iniuriarum in Scots Law: Romantic Romanism or Tool for Today?”, in E Descheemaeker and H Scott (eds), Iniuria and the Common Law (2013) 49. 66 Cf G MacCormack, “Culpa in the Scots Law of Reparation” 1974 JR 13 at 14–15 on the place of culpa in Institutional writings. 67 For a contemporary textbook held in the Advocates’ Library, see e.g. J Ayliffe, A New Pandect of Roman Civil Law (1734) 599–600. 68 Published posthumously after Erskine’s death in 1768. 69 Erskine, Inst 3.1.12. The substance of individual crimes was discussed separately in Book 4, Title 4. 70 Inst 3.1.13. 71 Inst 3.1.13. 72 Inst 3.1.14.

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1.14

Again though, the intended scope of “damage” in the passage above is not beyond doubt.73 As in the case of Stair’s treatment of reparation, the influence of Natural Law can be discerned in Erskine’s account, and in that respect a parallel has been drawn with contemporary English discussion, in which “ideas plucked from Natural Law . . . provided all the materials out of which the Common Law was to fashion its tort of negligence”.74 Yet while English law by this stage expressly included physical injury,75 the instances of negligently inflicted damage suggested by Erskine all related either to economic loss or property damage.76 Although the passage may be read as laying doing a general principle of liability, therefore, the practical extent of that principle appeared as yet to be limited.

C. INJURY TO THE PERSON THROUGH NEGLIGENCE 1.15

While earlier writers had left the point unresolved, the entitlement to reparation for physical injury culpably inflicted – whether intentionally or negligently – was addressed directly by Kames in his Principles of Equity.77 In explaining “the powers of a court of equity to remedy what is imperfect in common law”, Kames argued that: “The social state, however desirable, could never have taken place among men, were they not restrained from injuring those of their own species. To abstain from injuring others, is accordingly the primary law of society, enforced by the most vigorous sanctions: every culpable transgression of that law, subjects the wrong-doer to reparation; and every intentional transgression, subjects him also to punishment.”

By this time, theoretical justifications for a “power” to compensate negligently inflicted injury, alongside remedies for intentional harm, were reinforced by important practical considerations. Up until this point assythment had provided an entitlement to damages where bodily harm was inflicted upon the victim by way of a criminal act; and since, as noted earlier, the criminal law applied to both intentionally and negligently inflicted injury, assythment had broad application. Reparation for “slaughter, mutilation, 73 On the “risk of placing an anachronistic interpretation” on this passage, see A Rodger, “Lord Macmillan’s speech in Donoghue v Stevenson” (1992) 108 LQR 236 at 241. 74 D Ibbetson, “Natural Law and Common Law” (2001) 5 EdinLR 4 at 18–19, highlighting in particular the influence of Pufendorf; see also Ibbetson, Historical Introduction 166–168. 75 See F Buller, An Introduction to the Law Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius, 1st edn (1768) 35–37: “Every man ought to take reasonable care that he does not injure his neighbour; therefore when a man receives hurt through default of another, though the same were not wilful, yet if it be occasioned by negligence or folly the law gives him an action to recover damages for the injury so sustained.” Examples included accidents caused by runaway horses or obstructions on the highway, as well as professional negligence by surgeons. 76 At Inst 3.1.13–14. 77 Henry Home, Lord Kames, Principles of Equity, 3rd edn (1778) vol 1, 43–44.

Historical Introduction   13

or other injuries in the members of health of the body”,78 both intentional and negligent, could be dealt with under this heading. For earlier writers, therefore, it was not of pressing importance to specify whether, in addition, a general category of liability for “damage” might apply in cases of physical injury.79 By the eighteenth century, however, it had come to be accepted that mens rea was required for criminal liability80 and hence also for liability to make reparation by way of assythment; the infliction of injury through want of care no longer sufficed. The distinction between intentional and non-intentional harm thus acquired a new significance and an alternative route to redress became necessary if this potential gap in civil liability was to be bridged. Referring to general principle and to Roman law – and, importantly, without mention of assythment – a sequence of three cases at the end of the eighteenth century and beginning of the nineteenth affirmed that liability arose for physical injury caused by negligence. In Gardner v Ferguson81 the pursuer had suffered injury by falling into an unfenced drain which was being dug as part of construction works in Edinburgh. There was no issue of criminal liability on the part of those responsible for the state of drain, and so an action of assythment would not have been relevant. However, the Court of Session accepted the pursuer’s argument, on the basis of general principle fortified by a reference to the lex Aquilia, that the circumstances demonstrated culpable negligence for which reparation was due. In a case with similar facts decided a short time later, Innes v Magistrates of Edinburgh,82 the pursuer fell into an unfenced pit left in a public lane during building works (for the University of Edinburgh’s Old College). He brought a successful claim against the Magistrates, again on the basis of Aquilian liability, and by reference to Digest texts by Ulpian, including one on the liability of magistrates for the safety of roads.83 The court held that the Magistrates were liable even for the “smallest neglect” of their public duty to ensure that the city streets were free of danger.84 Moreover, liability was evidently thought to extend to private parties who had acted negligently, since the court reserved to the Magistrates a claim for relief against the building contractors.85 78 Stair, Inst 1.9.7. 79 Although see Black v North British Railway Co 1908 SC 444 per Lord President Dunedin at 453: “Originally I take it the two actions stood side by side”. 80 See J Irvine Smith and I Macdonald, “Criminal Law”, in G C H Paton (ed), Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Stair Society vol 20, 1958) 280 at 292–293. 81 Unreported, 1795, but the relevant Session Papers are available in the collection of Sir Ilay Campbell held by the Advocates Library. 82 (1798) Mor 13189. 83 D 9.2.29.7; D 43.8.2.24. 84 Significantly, the case was reported by Morison both under “Public Police”, (1798) Mor 13189, and under “Negligence in Office”, a sub-heading of “Reparation”, (1798) Mor 13967. 85 The Trustees of Mr Adam, and “others who may have acted in carrying on the building”.

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1.17

The potential liability of private parties for physical injury inflicted negligently was confirmed in a third case, Black v Cadell,86 in which the father of the pursuers had been killed by falling into an unfenced coal-pit close to the road while he was riding home after dark. His children successfully claimed damages from the owner of the land on which the pit was situated. Their case was based upon the “universal law of humanity, as exemplified in the Jewish law”, Aquilian liability, and the precedent of Innes. The court rejected the defender’s argument that, while the delict of assythment87 allowed the relatives of a deceased person to claim reparation from his killer, such a claim was not competent in the absence of criminal responsibility; liability arose quasi ex delicto. Subsequent cases established that claims might be made not only for patrimonial loss caused by the death of a relative but also for solatium in respect of the wounded feelings and suffering due to the bereavement.88

D. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN LAW 1.18

Against this background of an expanding law of negligence, the framework of obediential obligations presented by Hume89 at the start of the nineteenth century distinguished between obligations that arose ex delicto and those that arose quasi ex delicto. While for Stair and Bankton the category of actions quasi ex delicto had corresponded with certain specific instances of strict liability in classical Roman law,90 Hume’s usage was consistent with a contemporary civil law understanding of the terms, as set

86 (1804) Mor 13905, affd (1812) 5 Paton 567. 87 By reference to Stair, Inst 1.9.7. 88 See Brown v Macgregor 26 Feb 1813 FC (damages awarded to wife and children in assythment included reparation for patrimonial loss and solatium for suffering); Hislop v Durham (1842) 4 D 1168 (negligence causing death of daughter); Weems v Mathieson (1861) 4 Macq 215 (negligence causing death of son); Dow v Brown (1844) 6 D 534 (death of wife, damages successfully claimed for solatium only). 89 Hume, Lectures III, 120. The lectures in question were given by David Hume as Professor of Scots Law at the University of Edinburgh between 1786 and 1822. The lectures as published by the Stair Society are based upon the manuscript used in the final year. 90 Modern scholarship shows that the quasi-delicts of classical Roman law encompassed four specific instances of strict liability: actions against a judge qui litem suam fecit, and the actions de deiectis vel effusis, de posito vel suspenso, and de damno aut furto in navi aut caupone aut stabulo (the judge acting in his own suit, on substances pouring from buildings, on objects falling from buildings, and on liability of masters of ships, innkeepers and stable-keepers for damage or theft of items in their charge). On “the fate of the Roman quasi-delicts”, see Zimmermann, Obligations 1126–1130; E Descheemaeker, The Division of Wrongs (2009) 57–67. On their application in Scots law, see P Stein, “The Actio de effusis vel dejectis and the Concept of Quasi-Delict in Scots Law” (1955) 4 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 356; W J Stewart, “Smith’s Question-mark, Walker’s Exhortation and Quasi-Delict” 1990 JR 71; R Zimmermann and P Simpson, “Strict Liability”, in Reid and Zimmermann, History, vol 2, 548 at 567–583; W M Gordon, Roman Law, Scots Law and Legal History: Selected Essays (Edinburgh Studies in Law vol 4, 2007) 148.

Historical Introduction   15

out for example by Pothier91 and reflected in the Code Napoléon of 1804.92 Obligations ex delicto required reparation “for every wrong or criminal act which injures a neighbour in his property, or person, or other material concerns”.93 This category comprised, in essence, a catalogue of wrongs arising from intentional conduct, including those which entailed criminal liability, such as assythment, and those in which the civil claim no longer presupposed a criminal offence, such as verbal injury.94 Obligations arising quasi ex delicto, on the other hand, were sub-divided into two types, the first of which arose from the consequences of the defender’s “negligence or inadvertency”,95 exemplified by injuries caused by neglect of buildings or hazards on land, and the second of which dealt with liability arising from the fault of another – primarily what came to be known as vicarious liability. In his Principles of the Law of Scotland96 Bell applied a similar distinction between delicts and quasi-delicts as an organising principle in discussing remedies for infringement of rights “to property, or to personal liberty, safety, or reputation”. In Part I of the Principles delicts were said to be “offences committed with an injurious, fraudulent or criminal purpose”;97 quasi-delicts, on the other hand, arose from “gross negligence or imprudence” such as injury to the property of another, maritime collisions, carelessness in keeping dogs or managing fire-arms, or carelessness on the part of public officials, and also included vicarious liability.98 Erskine was given as Bell’s principal authority in the first edition of the Principles, along with examples drawn from recent case law. References to Toullier’s Le droit civil français suivant l’ordre du Code Napoléon99 and Justinian’s Institutes were 91 Traité des obligations (1761) § 116: “On appelle délit le fait par lequel une personne, par dol ou malignité, cause du dommage ou quelque tort à un autre. Le quasi-délit est le fait par lequel une personne, sans malignité, mais par un imprudence qui n’est pas excusable, cause quelque tort à un autre.” 92 The terminology of “délits” and “quasi-délits” appeared in the Code civil des Français, as the title of the section containing Articles 1382–1386. On this distinction, see e.g. Zimmermann, Obligations 19–20. The corresponding section in the modern Code civil, Articles 1240–1252, is entitled “La responsabilité extracontractuelle”. On the modern usage of “quasi-delicts” as a “synonym for liability for negligence”, see also C von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts (1998) vol 1, paras 7–8. 93 Hume, Lectures III, 120. 94 Most of Hume’s lectures on obligations “ex delicto” were taken up with verbal injury and defamation. On the expanding jurisdiction of the civil courts in these matters, see J Borthwick, A Treatise on the Law of Libel and Slander (1826) chs 2 and 4. 95 Hume, Lectures III, 186. 96 First published in 1829, and running to 10 editions, the last in 1899. A reprint of the final edition prepared by Bell himself, the 4th of 1839, was published by the Edinburgh Legal Education Trust in 2010. Paragraph references are to the numbering in the 4th edition. 97 Bell, Principles §§ 543–552. 98 §§ 553–554. 99 It is not clear which edition Bell used. The 1st dates from 1811, but the earliest held by the Advocates’ Library is the 5th of 1830–1836.

1.19

16   The Law of Delict in Scotland

1.20

1.21

added to the third edition of 1833, although they made little impact on the wording of the text,100 and Scottish case law was augmented with citation to English cases by the fourth (and, for Bell himself, final) edition of 1839. Following on from this distinction, wrongs against the person were analysed in much greater detail in Part IV of the Principles, dealing with the “absolute rights of individuals”.101 The main focus was the intentional wrongs – assault, wrongous imprisonment, and “protection of character”, as discussed further below.102 The four editions of the Principles for which Bell was personally responsible had little to say in this Part on “injuries by negligence”, dealing with them in a single paragraph,103 but by the time of the tenth and last edition in 1899, the editor104 had considerably “revised and enlarged” the treatment of negligence, adding new examples and compendious case law citation, without equivalent expansion of the sections concerning intentional injury. The term “quasi-delict” eventually fell out of use,105 but the distinction between intentional and negligent wrongs remained, and the reach of the latter expanded markedly over the course of the nineteenth century, in particular due to the cases arising from the effects of urban and industrial development, as well as due to the role of negligence in regulating relationships which, in other countries, might be brought within the law of contract.106 Defective services rendered by professional advisers, for example,107 might be addressed by the law of negligence. Carriers, and in particular the railway companies, might be found liable in delict for injuries suffered by travellers.108 But while in mid-century such cases were still relatively few,109 by the end of the nineteenth century a different picture had 100 On Bell’s use of comparative law, see K G C Reid, “From Text-book to Book of Authority: the Principles of George Joseph Bell” (2011) 15 EdinLR 6. 101 Bell, Principles §§ 2028–2057. This is consistent with the categories used by Blackstone in the first volume of his Commentaries on the Law of England, in which Section IV, Ch 1 spoke in comparable terms “Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals”. 102 See para 1.33 below. 103 Bell, Principles § 2031 (referring back to § 543, and dealing mainly with injuries arising from “rapid travelling by land or water” and with problems of vicarious liability). 104 Sheriff William Guthrie. 105 See A T Glegg, Practical Treatise on the Law of Reparation, 1st edn (1892) 13 n 1, to the effect that “the useless distinction between delict and quasi delict has . . . been given up”. But see also H McKechnie, “Delict and Quasi-Delict”, in G C H Paton (ed), Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Stair Society vol 20, 1958) 265. 106 See e.g. McLean v Grant (1805) Mor App Reparation No 2, on “the general doctrine of the responsibility of a man of business arising from gross ignorance or wilful negligence”, and on “the option of suing the delinquent in contract or delict”. See also J Guthrie Smith, The Law of Damages: A Treatise on the Reparation of Injuries as administered in Scotland, 2nd edn (1889) 55. 107 E.g. Morrison v Ure (1826) 4 S 662 (lawyer); Mackintosh v Fraser (1860) 22 D 421 (doctor). 108 E.g. M’Glashan v Dundee and Perth Railway Co (1848) 10 D 1397; Cargill v Dundee and Perth Railway Co (1848) 11 D 216. 109 For example the 13th volume of Dunlop’s reports, containing cases for the session 1850–1851, included, under the heading of “Reparation”, 11 cases on injury to reputation, 2 on wrongful arrest, and 7 on injuries to property.

Historical Introduction   17

emerged. Intentional wrongs appeared in the law reports less frequently,110 whereas negligence had become the dominant topic in the law of delict. These developments can be illustrated from the legal literature of the period.111 In the very first textbook on delictual liability, John Guthrie Smith’s Treatise on the Law of Reparation, published in 1864,112 “examples of negligence” already included “injuries occurring from the insufficiency of machinery”,113 “use of dangerous implements”,114 as well as “reckless driving”,115 and accidents on the railways,116 but one short chapter only was dedicated to negligence generally, with further chapters on professional negligence and on the negligence of agents. By contrast, the intentional delicts were given separate sections and chapters, so that the chapter on defamation, for example, was the longest in the book and twice the length of the chapter on negligence.117 When, however, the second edition of the work appeared thirty-five years later, in 1889,118 the text had been transformed. The treatment of negligence now extended over several chapters, while the treatment of the intentional delicts (with the exception of defamation, and in particular the law of privilege) had shown little development. Meanwhile the first edition of a book wholly devoted to the law of negligence had been published in 1871. Written by a Scottish advocate who practised as a barrister in England, Robert Campbell’s The Law of Negligence purported to cover the law in both jurisdictions.119 Finally, A T 110 See McKechnie, “Delict and Quasi-Delict” 279: “intentional injuries bulk very small in our courts today as opposed to faults of omission, fraud alone being a usual ground of action, breach of promise rare and defamation infrequent” (as contrasted with the 19th century). 111 It seems worth remarking that three of the early authors had studied law for a period at a university in Germany. These were John Guthrie Smith (Heidelberg, 1854), Robert Campbell (Heidelberg, 1855), and Frank T Cooper (Bonn, 1885). On this topic, see A Rodger, “Scottish Advocates in the Nineteenth Century: the German Connection” (1994) 110 LQR 563; K G C Reid, “Scottish Law Students in Germany in the Nineteenth Century and their Influence on Legal Culture in Scotland”, forthcoming, 2022. 112 J Borthwick’s textbook on defamation had, however, been published several decades earlier: A Treatise on the Law of Libel and Slander (1826). See also A Macallan, The Pocket Lawyer: A Practical Digest of the Law of Scotland. The 3rd edition of Macallan’s text (1834) did not deal with delict, but the 4th edition (1840, updated after the author had brought out an edition of Erskine’s Institute in 1838) prefaced a section on “Injuries”, and treatment of the individual delicts, with the general statement that: “An injury to person or property is the result of either design, negligence, or accident. The general rule is that reparation is due in the two first cases, but not in the last.” Erskine, Inst 3.1.3 was cited as authority. 113 J Guthrie Smith’s Treatise on the Law of Reparation, 1st edn (1864) 71: e.g. Whitelaw v Moffat (1849) 12 D 434; Haggart v Duncan (1857) 20 D 180. 114 Guthrie Smith 69: e.g. Laing v Darling (1850) 12 D 1279. 115 Guthrie Smith 67. 116 Guthrie Smith 70. 117 The former is at 187–249, while the latter is at 58–88. 118 Re-titled The Law of Damages. 119 R Campbell, The Law of Negligence; being the first of a series of Practical Law Tracts (1871) 1: “The point of view taken in the following pages is that of an English lawyer. But I intend to treat of those subjects the principles of which are substantially common to all parts of the United Kingdom, and are, indeed, more or less adopted by all countries whose legal system incorporates the results of Latin civilization.”

1.22

18   The Law of Delict in Scotland

Glegg’s Practical Treatise on the Law of Reparation, the first edition of which was published in 1892, marked a further stage in what Tony Weir was later to brand “The Staggering March of Negligence”.120 Glegg’s treatment of “Negligence” (subtitled “breaches of duty from absence of attention”) took up more than half of the book.

E. THE RISE OF THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (1) Degrees of culpa 1.23

As the law of negligence extended its reach so too its rules of liability underwent significant development. In the early years of the nineteenth century the boundaries of actionable negligence were not clearly marked out. As in English law,121 a distinction was attempted between culpa lata (gross negligence), culpa levis (ordinary negligence), and culpa levissima (slight negligence), as a means of distinguishing the standard of care required as between different types of wrongdoer.122 By the time Guthrie Smith published the first edition of his Treatise on the Law of Reparation in 1864, opinion had shifted to the view that definitions of degrees of culpa were “neither possible nor desirable”, but rather productive of “endless confusion” and “irrational caprice”.123 In the same year, in the case of Mackintosh v Mackintosh,124 Lord Neaves suggested that the example of the “civilians” should be followed in erasing the distinction between culpa levis and culpa levissima, and leaving a simple distinction between culpa lata and culpa levis.125 This allowed him to state a “general rule” for assessing culpability in cases of alleged negligence by reference to context-specific standards of conduct:126 “[I]n all cases the amount of care which a prudent man will take must vary infinitely according to circumstances. No prudent man in carrying a lighted candle through a powder magazine would fail to take more care than if he was going through a damp cellar. The amount of care will be proportionate to the degree of risk run, and to the magnitude of the mischief that may be occasioned.”

120 In P Cane and J Stapleton (eds), The Law of Obligations: Essays in Celebration of John Fleming (1998) 97. 121 See Vaughan v Menlove (1837) 3 Bing NC 468. 122 See e.g. Frame v Campbell (1836) 14 S 914; Outram v Reid (1852) 14 D 577; Gray v Brassey (1852) 15 D 135; and see also Sibbald v Lady Rosyth (1685) Mor 13976. 123 Guthrie Smith, Reparation 62. See also A T Glegg, Practical Treatise on the Law of Reparation, 1st edn (1892) 13, stating that the tripartite division of negligence was a thing of the past, and in the modern law “negligence varies with each set of circumstances”. 124 (1864) 2 M 1357. 125 (1864) 2 M 1357 at 1362. 126 (1864) 2 M 1357 at 1362–1363.

Historical Introduction   19

This formulation continued to be cited in modern times127 in determining the necessary standard of care in individual cases. A further, and logically anterior, question, however, now came to the fore – whether the defender had been under a duty to exercise care in the first place.

(2) A duty of care The notion that liability arose from neglect of duty was hardly new in the nineteenth century. A moral duty to take care in interactions with others was fundamental to the Natural Lawyers’ account of the obligation to make reparation for injury,128 and in the Scottish legal tradition duty might be thought of as integral to the concept of “obediential” obligations.129 More specifically, Erskine’s exposition of general principle had distinguished between “positive acts of trespass or injury” and “blameable omission or neglect of duty”,130 and it was a long-established form of pleading that the basis of liability for non-intentional harm should be presented as “neglect of duty”.131 In this usage, the concept of duty made specific the standard of behaviour expected of the defender in the circumstances of the case. Its content was more likely to be contentious where what was at issue was a failure to act (culpa in non faciendo),132 or it concerned a breach of obligations incidental to the performance of an undertaking, calling or office.133 Generally speaking, however, if D’s failure to exercise the necessary level of care had caused harm to P, it appeared to have been taken as read that D had been under a duty to take care in the first place. Indeed in directing practitioners as to the form of issue in cases of “delinquence and quasidelinquence”, Lord Chief Commissioner Adam’s manual for the conduct

127 E.g. in Paris v Stepney Borough Council [1951] AC 367; Wyngrove’s Executrix v Scottish Omnibuses 1966 SC (HL) 47. 128 See Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium 1.5.3–1.5.5; 3.1.1; on this point see Ibbetson, Historical Introduction 166–167. 129 On this point see H MacQueen and W D H Sellar, “Negligence”, in Reid and Zimmermann, History, vol 2, 517 at 536–539. 130 Erskine, Inst 3.1.13. 131 See e.g. Anderson and Craig v Mags of Renfrew (1764) Mor 11753; Innes v Mags of Edinburgh (1798) Mor 13189; Hill v Caledonian Railway Co (1855) 17 D 569; Dargie v Mags of Forfar (1855) 17 D 730; and see North British Railway Co v Leadburn Railway Co and Waddell (1865) 3 M 340. 132 Innes v Magistrates of Edinburgh (1798) Mor 13189 and 13967 (duty of magistrates to “take care that the streets of the city are kept in such a state as to prevent the slightest danger to passengers. They are liable for the smallest neglect of this duty”); Baird v Addie (1854) 16 D 490 (failure by employer to ensure safe working environment). 133 E.g. Clason v Black (1842) 4 D 743 per Lord Medwyn at 745 (successful action against a messenger-at-arms who failed to execute a summons properly, since it was “specially the messenger’s duty to take care” that the execution was good); see also Anderson v Torrie (1857) 19 D 356. On parallel English developments, see M J Prichard, Scott v Shepherd (1773) and the Emergence of the Tort of Negligence, Seldon Society Lecture 1973 (1976); Ibbetson, Historical Introduction 170–174.

1.24

20   The Law of Delict in Scotland

1.25

of jury trials made no explicit mention of duty as a distinct and essential element.134 As the law of negligence expanded its scope, however, the argument was advanced in English case law that the absence of pre-existing duty between the parties might negate liability, whatever the defendant’s standard of conduct. More particularly this was seen in cases where the plaintiff had suffered harm due to the defendant’s incidental negligence in fulfilling contractual obligations towards someone else. An early example was Winterbottom v Wright,135 in which the defendant had entered into a contract with a coach operator by which the defendant provided him with coaches. The plaintiff, a coach driver, was injured in an accident allegedly caused by the defective condition of one of the coaches. He was unsuccessful in claiming damages because his claim relied upon the terms of a contract to which he was not party. The court reasoned that, whether or not there had been a breach of duty by the defendant, such duty arose “solely from contract” and so existed vis-à-vis the coach operator, with whom there were contractual relations, but not the driver.136 An indication that similar reasoning was applicable in Scottish cases can be seen in Robertson v Fleming,137 in which the pursuer argued that he had suffered loss as a result of the negligence of the defender, a solicitor, in acting for a third party. The case turned primarily on whether a jus quaesitum tertio might be asserted, but in the House of Lords the Lord Chancellor, Lord Campbell, took the opportunity to comment upon the “unsoundness” of the proposition “that A employing B, a professional lawyer, to do any act for the benefit of C, A having to pay B, and there being no intercourse of any sort between B and C, – if through the gross negligence or ignorance of B in transacting the business, C loses the benefit intended for him by A, C may maintain an action against B, and recover damages for the loss sustained”. This was said not to be the law of Scotland, nor of “any country where jurisprudence has been cultivated as a science”.138

134 W Adam, A Practical Treatise and Observations on Trial by Jury in Civil Causes (1836) 134–153. Cf, in England, H Greening (ed), Chitty’s Treatise on Pleading and Parties to Actions, 7th edn (1844), more explicitly specifying duty of care between, e.g., carriage drivers and passengers (486) or attorneys and clients (500). 135 (1842) 10 M & W 109. 136 (1842) 10 M & W 109 per Rolfe B at 116. 137 (1861) 4 Macq 167. 138 (1861) 4 Macq 167 at 177, distinguishing Struthers v Lang (1826) 4 S 418 and Donaldson v Haldane (1840) 1 Rob 226. For critical discussion, see A Dewar Gibb, Law from over the Border (1950) 88. See also Eisten v North British Railway Co (1870) 8 M 980 per the Lord Ordinary, Lord Ormidale, at 982: “to recognise as a sound principle of liability the circumstance of any one being able to shew that he is indirectly affected by an injury, whether arising ex contractu or ex delicto, done to another, would impose an indefinite extent of liability, and lead to the most absurd and anomalous consequences, besides being opposed by authorities.”

Historical Introduction   21

Cases such as Winterbottom were patently “hard cases”.139 The counterargument, that privity of contract did not always negate a duty to others, and that such a duty might be established by invoking specific considerations, found support in the English case of Heaven v Pender.140 The defendant, a dock owner, had erected staging alongside a ship to allow work to be carried out. This was pursuant to a contract with the ship owner. The staging was defective, however, so that the plaintiff, a painter working on the ship, fell off and was injured. Liability for his injuries was established, even though the contract to provide the staging was between the defendant and a third party, and there was no contractual relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff. In delivering his judgment the Master of the Rolls, Sir William Brett, observed that:141

1.26

“[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at once recognise that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.”

“This proposition”, he continued, includes “all the recognised cases of liability”. The other judges, however, were less convinced of the universality of such a rule. Lord Justice Cotton’s142 judgment acknowledged a more limited form of duty, reasoning that, since the dock owner had specifically “invited” the painter and other workers to use his premises in this way, he was obliged to exercise reasonable care that those premises were safe. In the years following Heaven v Pender the boundaries of duty remained fluid in cases where there had been a contract between the defendant and a third party, and its existence continued to be more readily established where the plaintiff had been in some way “invited” on to the defendant’s premises or to use the defendant’s property. The scope of duty was further qualified in Le Lievre v Gould,143 to the effect that the defendant should have been “near to another” or “near to the property of another”.144 Nonetheless,

139 (1842) 10 M & W 109 per Rolfe B at 116; see also Goldie v Goldie’s and Threshie’s Representatives (1842) 4 D 1489 per Lord Fullerton at 1494, commenting on the difficulty of a blanket exclusion of liability in cases where the pursuer had not directly employed the defender. 140 (1883) 11 QBD 503. For more detailed discussion, see P H Winfield, “Duty in Tortious Negligence” (1934) 34 Columbia LR 41 at 54 ff. 141 (1883) 11 QBD 503 per Brett MR at 509. 142 With whom Bowen LJ concurred. 143 [1893] 1 QB 491. 144 [1893] 1 QB 491 per Lord Esher at 497; see also A L Smith LJ at 504, explaining that “The decision of Heaven v Pender was founded upon the principle, that a duty to take due care did arise when the person or property of one was in such proximity to the person or property of another.”

1.27

22   The Law of Delict in Scotland

Heaven v Pender marked the point at which the duty concept took up the centre ground in the law of negligence.145

(3) Scottish responses 1.28

In Scotland the decision in Heaven v Pender drew criticism on the grounds that the rule was too broadly stated to be of “practical service”, and that fears of an “infinity of actions” would have been adequately addressed by imposing the “natural, reasonable and recognised limit” already provided by the concept of remoteness.146 The case came to be extensively cited,147 however, and duty began to take hold as a prior and distinct requirement of liability. Whereas the traditional Scottish style of pleading had referred to the “duties” owed by the defender as a “particularization or concretization of the general duty of reasonable conduct”, by the late nineteenth century there had been a shift to a “directional” duty of care.148 Guthrie Smith’s second edition of 1889 featured a separate section on “duty of care”,149 presented as an essential feature of negligence liability;150 and A T Glegg’s Practical Treatise on the Law of Reparation of 1892 stated, quite simply, that “Negligence is a breach, by omission, of a positive duty”.151 As Lord President Dunedin went on to say in Clelland v Robb: “Negligence per se will not make liability unless there is first of all a duty which there has been failure to perform through that neglect.”152 The entry on “Negligence” in

145 Winfield, “Duty in Tortious Negligence” 58; see also the formulation introduced in the 8th edition of Underhill’s Summary of the Law of Torts (1905) 176: “there are three points to be established to found an action for negligence: 1) A duty to take care; 2) A breach of that duty – negligence; and 3) Damage as the natural and probable consequence.” 146 Anon, “Observations on Negligence” (1884) 28 Journal of Jurisprudence 113 at 119. The fear of an “infinity of actions” was expressed in Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 10 M & W 109 per Lord Abinger at 113. 147 Duty was more readily recognised in the limited contexts favoured by the English courts: e.g. Leitch v Howie 1927 SLT 186; Oliver v Saddler & Co 1929 SC (HL) 94; Brown v The Sugar Association of Greenock 1913 1 SLT 117 (duty recognised but no fault established). In other cases the courts contrived to distinguish Heaven v Pender on the facts: see e.g. Caledonian Railway Co v Warwick (1897) 25 R (HL) 1; Watson v M’Leish & M’Taggart (1898) 25 R 1028; Philipps v Humber (1904) 6 F 814; Kemp & Dougall v Darngavil Coal Co Ltd 1909 SC 1314. 148 R Black, “A Historical Survey of Delictual Liability in Scotland for Personal Injuries and Death: Part Three” (1975) 8 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 318 at 321–322. 149 Guthrie Smith, Damages 22. 150 Guthrie Smith, Damages 26, presenting the essential question in cases of negligence (distinguished from intentional wrongdoing) as being “whether in the situation in which the party stood the danger was so likely to occur, as to suggest the duty of taking steps to provide against it, which were omitted”. 151 At 12, citing as authority not case law but J Austen, Lectures on Jurisprudence, 5th edn by R Campbell (1885) lecture 20, and F Pollock’s Indian Civil Wrongs Bill cl 9 (included as an appendix in later editions of Pollock’s Law of Torts). Intriguingly, the editor of Austin’s Lectures was also the author of the book on the law of negligence mentioned in para 1.22 above. 152 1911 SC 253 at 256; see also Lord Kinnear at 256 to the same effect, citing Pollock on Torts, 6th edn (1901).

Historical Introduction   23

the Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland published in 1930 (shortly before Donoghue v Stevenson153) stated unequivocally that:154 “Before there can be negligence there must be a duty which is (1) accepted by law, and (2) conceived in favour of the claimant, and there must be (3) failure to fulfil it.”

The question of fact – whether the defender had acted with due care in the circumstances – had ceded priority to the question of law – whether the defender had owed the pursuer a duty of care in the first place. One consequence was that the question of the foreseeability of harm, traditionally a factor in assessing remoteness, now found an anterior role as one of the indicators of duty. 155 In the developing field of negligence the relative scarcity of native authority, at least initially, meant that Scots lawyers were likely to look to England for relevant precedent, particularly given the increased accessibility of law reports after the foundation of the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales in 1865. Mention was made earlier of Robert Campbell’s treatise on the law of negligence of 1871, which advertised itself as being based upon “principles substantially common to all parts of the United Kingdom”.156 Although cross-border differences were usually respected,157 inappropriate transposition of English authority occurred in certain House of Lords decisions in which English members of the Judicial Committee too readily assumed the uniformity of Scots and English law.158 At the same time, Scottish judges themselves, both in the Court of Session and on elevation to the House of Lords, played their part in the assimilation of English authority and in assuming that the “cases in our own books . . . are entirely in accordance with the English cases”.159

153 1932 SC (HL) 31. See para 1.30 below. 154 H McKechnie, “Negligence”, in Lord Dunedin et al (eds), Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, vol 10 (1930) para 242. 155 On this point in English law, see Ibbetson, Historical Introduction 176–177. 156 R Campbell, The Law of Negligence (1871) 1; see para 1.22 above. 157 See e.g. Glasgow Corporation v Barclay, Curle & Company Ltd 1923 SC (HL) 78 per Earl of Birkenhead at 81. 158 See generally A Dewar Gibb, Law from over the Border (1950). Robertson v Fleming (1861) 4 Macq 167 was arguably an example, as was the extension of the doctrine of common employment to Scotland (by which employers were held not to be liable to employees for negligent harm caused by a fellow employee acting in the course of his or her common employment): see Bartonshill Coal Co v Reid (1858) 3 Macq 266, reversing the decision of the Inner House. In Bartonshill Coal Co Lord Cranworth famously asked, at 285: “if such be the law of England, on what ground can it be argued not to be the law of Scotland?”. On the fate of the doctrine, and its ultimate abolition, see para 3.09 below. 159 Johnstone v Mags of Lochgelly 1913 SC 1078 per Lord Kinnear at 1088. As T B Smith, British Justice: The Scottish Contribution (1961) 227, characteristically reflected: “The main subverters of Scots law in modern times have been the Scots”.

1.29

24   The Law of Delict in Scotland

This search for common ground was understandable, of course, not least because the scope of duty of care continued to be the subject of uncertainty in both jurisdictions.

(4) Donoghue v Stevenson 1.30

A persistent “loose strand”160 was whether duty was to be recognised in cases where a defect in a product produced by the defender was alleged to have caused harm to someone other than the immediate purchaser. Across the Atlantic, the landmark judgment of Judge Cardozo in the New York case of MacPherson v Buick Motor Co161 established in 1916 that a manufacturer’s duty to take care for the safety of its products extended to the ultimate consumers irrespective of contractual status. By contrast, in Scotland and in England, even after Heaven v Pender, the case law was conflicting, drawing complex distinctions to block the extension of duty to manufacturers of defective products.162 The opportunity to settle these difficulties presented itself in what was to become the most celebrated case in the whole law of delict, Donoghue v Stevenson.163 In this Scottish appeal to the House of Lords, the pursuer had allegedly164 consumed ginger beer contaminated with the remains of a snail after the drink was bought for her by a friend in a café in Paisley. The foundation of her case, that the manufacturer of the drink owed her a duty of care in regard to the safety of his product even though she had no contractual relationship with him, was held by the House of Lords to be relevant. As well as resolving the issue of manufacturers’ duty to consumers, Donoghue set out principles which had far-reaching implications for the development of duty of care more generally. The decision marked the beginning of the “more modern approach of seeking a single general principle which may be applied in all circumstances to determine the existence of a duty of care”.165 Moreover, the case has been credited with sealing the “convergence” between the 160 P H Winfield, “The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts” (1926) 42 LQR 184 at 197. See also a case note on Mullen v A G Barr & Co Ltd by A Mackenzie Stuart in (1929) 41 JR 260, noting that it was “not quite clear” how far duty in this regard extended in Scotland. 161 217 NY 382, 111 NE 1050 (1916). See also Thomas v Winchester 6 NY 397 (1852). 162 For exposition of those “thorny and difficult” distinctions, see Mullen v A G Barr & Co Ltd 1929 SC 461 per Lord Justice-Clerk Alness at 471, Lord Ormidale at 471–472, and Lord Hunter (dissenting) at 474–477; Easton v Louvain Preparations Ltd 1928 SLT (Sh Ct) 33. In England, contrast Bates v Batey & Co Ltd [1913] 3 KB 351 with George v Skivington (1869–70) LR 5 Ex 1. See also A Rodger, “Lord Macmillan’s Speech in Donoghue v Stevenson” (1992) 108 LQR 236 at 246; R Evans-Jones and H Scott, “Lord Atkin, Donoghue v Stevenson and the Lex Aquilia: Civilian Roots of the ‘Neighbour’ Principle”, in P J du Plessis (ed), Wrongful Damage to Property in Roman Law (2018) 255. 163 1932 SC (HL) 31. For more detailed discussion, see paras 4.03–4.12 below. 164 The claim was settled before the case went to proof, so that the facts were never established. 165 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 per Lord Bridge at 616. For discussion of the evolution of duty of care, see D Brodie, “In defence of Donoghue” 1997 JR 65.

Historical Introduction   25

Scots and English law of negligence,166 and the principles stated there have been accepted as authoritative not only in the Scottish and English courts167 but in other jurisdictions where the legal system has its roots in English law – in the Commonwealth as well as Ireland.168 Chapter 4 contains a more detailed discussion of Donoghue and of subsequent developments in regard to duty of care.

F. LATER DEVELOPMENTS A process of convergence between the English and Scottish law of negligence thus culminated with the decision in Donoghue v Stevenson, and indeed the rise and rise of negligence has continued into the twenty-first century in both jurisdictions. Yet the “intellectual superstructure” has remained separate and distinct as between the law of delict and the law of torts,169 and, leaving negligence aside, English authority has tended to play a much less influential role in other areas of liability.

1.31

(1) Intentional wrongs Prior to the late eighteenth century little had been made of the distinction between negligent and non-negligent wrongdoing, but this was to acquire greater significance as different rule-systems developed. Over the course of the nineteenth century, as seen above, the law of negligence transformed itself in regard both to scope and to conceptual apparatus, and this was matched by important changes in the treatment of intentional wrongs also, particularly in regard to wrongs against the person. Perhaps most important of all was a jurisdictional shift. Traditionally, although criminal and civil liability had been clearly distinguished,170 injuries to the person, including even verbal injuries, were regarded primarily as offences against the criminal or consistorial law, and civil remedies were sought in the Justiciary or Commissary courts171 depending upon whether real or verbal

166 H MacQueen and W D H Sellar, “Negligence”, in Reid and Zimmermann, History, vol 2, 517 at 546–547. 167 See R F V Heuston, “Donoghue v Stevenson in Retrospect” (1957) 20 MLR 1 at 5–6. 168 For an overview of the impact of Donoghue v Stevenson “Into the Common Law World”, see M Chapman, The Snail and the Ginger Beer: The Singular Case of Donoghue v Stevenson (2009) ch 7. 169 MacQueen and Sellar, “Negligence” 547. 170 See e.g. G Wallace, System of the Principles of the Law of Scotland (1760) § 698: “Every delinquency implies an obligation on the delinquent 1) to repair the damage done by him, 2) to undergo punishment.” 171 J Blackie, “Unity in Diversity: the History of Personality Rights in Scots Law”, in N R Whitty and R Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective (2009) 31 at para 2.1.2; J Blackie, “The Interaction of Crime and Delict in Scotland”, in M Dyson (ed), Unravelling Tort and Crime (2014) 356 at 360.

1.32

26   The Law of Delict in Scotland

1.33

injuries were at issue.172 By the early nineteenth century, however, in particular after the institution of the Jury Court in 1816173 with jurisdiction to hear “all actions on account of injury to the person, whether real or verbal, as assault and battery, libel or defamation”,174 civil claims began to be heard in the ordinary civil courts in significant numbers.175 Hume taught that every wrong or criminal act gave rise to two sorts of action, the one criminal ad vindictam publicam, and the other civil at the instance of the party injured to repair patrimonial damage and compensate for “trouble and distress”.176 But if in the past the criminal law and the civil law had moved in parallel, they were now decoupled,177 and an increasingly sophisticated taxonomy of injury provided the basis for development of the discrete delicts still familiar in the modern law.178 The Court of Session Act of 1825 identified as within the Court’s jurisdiction actions for damages on account of injuries to the person including “assault and battery”, “breach of promise of marriage”, “seduction” and verbal injury, as well as actions “founded on delinquency or quasi delinquency of any kind”.179 In other countries, too, the early nineteenth century marked the beginning of an era of systematisation, and often codification as well. As previously mentioned, Bell, like Hume before him, adopted the contemporary civil law usage of delict and quasi-delict to distinguish intentional from non-intentional injury;180 and as with the earlier Institutional writers181 it was axiomatic for Bell that the law of reparation was given substance

172 Blackie, “Unity in Diversity” para 2.2.6; Erskine, Inst 4.4.81. 173 Jury Trials (Scotland) Act 1815. 174 Court of Session Act 1825 s 28. 175 For a detailed account, see Blackie, “Unity in Diversity” paras 2.3.1–2.3.8. 176 Hume, Lectures III, 120. Hume’s treatment of such wrongs (120–164) included assault and seduction, but gave the most detailed attention to verbal injuries. 177 See J Blackie, “The Protection of Corpus in Modern and Early Scots Law”, in E Descheemaeker and H Scott (eds), Iniuria and the Common Law (2013) 155 at 158 ff. 178 Blackie, “Unity in Diversity” paras 2.3.1–2.3.6. 179 Court of Session Act 1825 s 28. 180 Bell, Principles § 543; see para 1.19 above. 181 And indeed the “Rights of Persons” was the title of the first book of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England published more than sixty years earlier. In discussing “Wrongs and Their Remedies, Respecting the Rights of Persons”, Blackstone defined the “absolute” rights of each individual as the right of personal security (as affected by “injuries against their lives, their limbs, their bodies, their health, or their reputations”), the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property: Commentaries, Book 3, ch 8. A similar classification was adopted in vol 2 of James Kent’s Commentaries on American Law, which first appeared in 1827. Part 4 was entitled “The law concerning the rights of persons”, and lecture 24 discussed, under the head of “absolute rights of persons”, the right of personal security, the laws concerning slander and libels, and the right of personal liberty. It is plausible that Bell was influenced by Blackstone, as the Commentaries is cited in the first edition of the Principles, although not, admittedly, in the treatment of the rights of persons. On the other hand, Kent’s work almost certainly came too late and does not seem to have been known to Bell until the fourth edition of the Principles in 1839, where it is cited quite extensively.

Historical Introduction   27

by the “absolute” (as distinct from the “relative”) rights of the person,182 encompassing rights to personal safety,183 personal freedom,184 and protection of character.185 The step forward taken by Bell in his Principles of the Law of Scotland was that, although the account of negligence remained as yet rudimentary,186 intentional injury was given a detailed, coherent, and recognisably modern framework.187 Assault, wrongous imprisonment, and “protection of character” were set out as discrete areas of liability, each with its own features, in particular in regard to the required quality of intention or malice. Naturally, the listing of rights would eventually require development. To twenty-first-century eyes an obvious gap is the absence of reference to a right to private life,188 although certain issues of confidentiality were already touched upon in areas of law other than delict.189 Many of the privacy concerns which began to preoccupy commentators in the late nineteenth century, such as intrusive use of photography and invasive press coverage, could not reasonably have been imagined by Bell. Nonetheless, his treatment of intentional delicts against the person set the foundation for subsequent jurists.190

(2) Neighbourhood relations A further and related development of the nineteenth century was the growing importance of the law of delict in regulating neighbourhood relations, as charted in chapters 22 and 23 below. In particular the law of nuisance, at least in some of its aspects, was seen as crossing the boundary between property law and delict.191 Hume’s Lectures and Bell’s Principles contained extensive discussion of nuisance and of the expanding case law, but located it within the treatment of property law.192 As the century progressed, however, detailed accounts of the law of nuisance found their way into delict

182 Bell, Principles § 2027. 183 §§ 2032–2033. 184 §§ 2034–2042. 185 §§ 2043–2057. 186 §§ 553–554, 2031 187 §§ 2032–2057. 188 See, however, W Watt, Outline of Legal Philosophy (1893) 69–70, expressly acknowledging the debt to Bell in its analysis of rights associated with “personality”. 189 In Bell’s time, interests of confidentiality were protected sometimes by reference to the law of contract, sometimes the law of property, and only rarely the law of delict (see ch 12 below) although discussion of “breach of epistolary confidence” was added by Bell with his treatment of “Literary Property” to the 5th edition of his Commentaries (1826). 190 See e.g. Walker Delict 488–489 (treatment of assault); Thomson, Delictual Liability para 1.2. 191 See paras 22.01–22.08 below; for a detailed doctrinal history of the law of nuisance, see N R Whitty, “Nuisance”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) paras 7–17. 192 Hume, Lectures III, 213–216 (lectures on rights of property); Bell, Principles §§ 973–978 (entitled “limitation by the law of nuisance”).

1.34

28   The Law of Delict in Scotland

1.35

textbooks, notably Guthrie Smith’s Treatise on the Law of Reparation193 and Glegg’s Practical Treatise on the Law of Reparation.194 The modern law of nuisance is the subject of chapter 22 below. For present purposes it can be observed that its dual doctrinal affiliation has prevented it from sitting readily, in all cases, within the division between intentional and nonintentional wrongs proposed by Hume and Bell. As Whitty pointed out, nuisance is best understood as having distinct roles.195 It functions as a doctrine in the law of reparation, entitling the aggrieved neighbour to compensation for damage, where harm has been inflicted intentionally (in the sense that the defender has actual or constructive knowledge that harm was likely to result from the disputed land use), or where such harm occurs as the result of culpable negligence.196 However, nuisance also operates as a doctrine of property law, protecting the enjoyment of land from unlawful interference, in which the main remedy is interdict to prevent disturbance, and which is not therefore contingent upon considerations of fault.197 Chapter 22 also discusses the related issue of the strict liability rule for dangerous activities associated with the English case of Rylands v Fletcher,198 the use of that case in the Scottish authorities, and its ultimate repudiation in RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council in 1985.199

(3) After Donoghue: convergence and divergence 1.36

As previously mentioned, the process of convergence between the Scottish and English law of negligence has not been replicated in other areas of liability. Delicts such as nuisance, assault, infringement of liberty, and defamation have not had their Donoghue, in that there has been no statement of general principle accepted as equally applicable in the two jurisdictions. Instead, a distinctive Scottish framework of liability survives, supplemented but not subsumed by reference to English law. As Walker pointed out, while English terminology has been appropriated in some cases as “convenient titles for sets of circumstances”, the terms do not necessarily carry the same connotations or ambit as their English counterparts.200 Admittedly, in terms of style, lawyers in both jurisdictions may now think very much along the same lines, sorting different categories of liability into separate delicts (or torts), and reasoning largely by analogy 193 At 379 in the 1st edition (1864), and 216 in the 2nd edition (1889). 194 At 281–297 in the 1st edition (1892) and at comparable length in subsequent editions. 195 Whitty, “Nuisance” para 17. 196 See para 22.08 below. 197 See para 22.08 below. 198 (1868) LR 3 HL 330. 199 1985 SC (HL) 17; see paras 22.05–22.06 below 200 Walker, Delict 31.

Historical Introduction   29

with established precedent. Nevertheless, Scotland retains a strong conceptualist tradition, so that, if there is no obvious answer to a problem in the case law or in statute, its courts may look to the Institutional writers or elsewhere in a search for principle. Bell, for example, continues to be consulted in determining the scope of the intentional delicts. England, moreover, remains affected to an extent by the legacy of the forms of action – the procedures by which claims were brought during much of the history of the common law until the mid-nineteenth century201 – which seems to hinder or prevent the judicial development of new torts in areas such as privacy.202 In Scotland, on the other hand, there are no procedural reasons for fettering judicial discretion with regard to the rights for which delict provides a remedy,203 so that, in principle at least, the existing list may yet be capable of further development. As Lord Hope remarked: “The creation of a new tort is a bold, some would say an irresponsible, exercise – not to be undertaken lightly. To embrace something new within the concept of delict is so much easier.”204 That said, however, judicial caution, coupled with a much smaller volume of case law, means that such innovation is rare in Scotland, and in developing the law the courts have tended to confine themselves to use of authority from Scottish, English or Commonwealth sources.205 The creation in 1999 of a devolved Scottish legislature206 with competence to legislate in matters of private law207 has not brought a wave of legislation in the law of delict and there have been few changes of significance. In 2004 the Scottish Law Commission proposed legislation on reparation for psychiatric injury, adopting an approach based on general principle rather than the category-based framework suggested for this area by the Law Commission in England,208 but after consultation its proposals were not taken

201 For an overview, see Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort paras 2.01–2.04. 202 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406 per Lord Hoffmann at para 31: “There seems to me a great difference between identifying privacy as a value which underlies the existence of a rule of law. . . That is not the way the common law works.” 203 Bankton, Inst 4.23.18: “For every right there must be a remedy, and want of right and want of remedy are the same thing.” 204 Lord Hope of Craighead, “The Strange Habits of the English”, in H L MacQueen (ed), Miscellany VI (Stair Society vol 54, 2009) 309 at 317. 205 See H L MacQueen, “Mixing it? Comparative law in the Scottish courts” (2003) 11 European Review of Private Law 735 at 741. 206 Following enactment of the Scotland Act 1998, the devolved Scottish Parliament opened on 1 July 1999. 207 Scotland Act 1998 s 29. 208 Report on Damages for Psychiatric Injury (Scot Law Com No 196, 2004); cf Law Commission, Liability for Psychiatric Illness (Law Com No 249, 1998). The proposed Scottish legislation opened by stating the general principle that “A person who causes mental harm to another person is liable to make reparation in accordance with the provisions of this Act” while the proposed English legislation began by setting out a list of conditions attached to duty of care in relation to “recognisable psychiatric illness”.

1.37

1.38

30   The Law of Delict in Scotland

forward.209 In another development, the Scottish Parliament enacted legislation providing that asymptomatic pleural plaques caused by exposure to asbestos constituted actionable injury,210 even although this contradicted the ruling of the House of Lords in an English case on this point.211 The Apologies (Scotland) Act 2016 had the worthy aim of disinhibiting apologies, thereby promoting a more conciliatory attitude between parties prior to litigation. Section 1 provides that apologies made outside of civil proceedings are not thereafter admissible as evidence of liability and cannot otherwise be used in those proceedings to the prejudice of the person making the apology. The Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 sets much of the law of defamation, previously rooted primarily in the common law, on a statutory footing. As chapter 18 further explores, its provisions mirror very closely the detail of those applied to England and Wales by the Defamation Act 2013. In none of this is there much sign that, in this area of private law at least, a Scottish Government and a Scottish Parliament will seek to build significantly on the Scottish intellectual tradition.

209 See Civil Law of Damages: Issues in Personal Injury: Scottish Government Response to the Consultation (2013). 210 Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009. 211 Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd [2007] UKHL 39, [2008] 1 AC 281.

Chapter 2

Fundamental Concepts

Para A. THE ROLE OF THE LAW OF DELICT��������������������������������� 2.01 (1) Absolute rights and personal rights�������������������������������������� 2.02 (a) The right to bodily and mental integrity������������������������� 2.06 (b) The right to liberty�������������������������������������������������������� 2.08 (c) The right to reputation�������������������������������������������������� 2.09 (d) The right to the integrity of property������������������������������ 2.10 (e) The right to economic well-being����������������������������������� 2.12 (2) The function of damages����������������������������������������������������� 2.14 B. WRONGFUL CONDUCT������������������������������������������������������� 2.18 (1) Intentional wrongs and negligent wrongs������������������������������ 2.19 (2) Strict liability���������������������������������������������������������������������� 2.20 C. WRONGDOERS AND THE WRONGED������������������������������� 2.21 (1) Children����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 2.22 (2) Litigation between family members�������������������������������������� 2.24 (3) Corporations����������������������������������������������������������������������� 2.26 (4) Partnerships������������������������������������������������������������������������ 2.29 (5) Limited liability partnerships����������������������������������������������� 2.32 (6) Unincorporated associations������������������������������������������������ 2.33 (7) The Crown������������������������������������������������������������������������� 2.38 (8) Multiple parties (a) Defenders��������������������������������������������������������������������� 2.40 (b) Pursuers����������������������������������������������������������������������� 2.41 (c) Accessories to intentional wrongdoing���������������������������� 2.42 D. THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998����������������������������������������� 2.45 E. THE ROLE OF INSURANCE�������������������������������������������������� 2.48

A. THE ROLE OF THE LAW OF DELICT The law of delict provides redress or “reparation” for wrongdoing; but it does so in a manner that is distinct from contract law and criminal law, both of which are or may also be concerned with wrongdoing. Delict law operates without regard to whether the parties at issue were in contractual relations with each other or with a third party. And in modern, although

31

2.01

32   The Law of Delict in Scotland

not in earlier, times,1 it operates separately from the criminal law, paying no attention to whether a person’s alleged wrongdoing constitutes a crime. The law of delict regulates the conditions under which one person may be held accountable for causing legally relevant damage to another, a “delict” being the term given to the conduct that renders the wrongdoer accountable. The paradigm delict is a road traffic accident. P and D are strangers. P alleges that, due to negligent driving, D has crashed D’s car into P’s car. The alleged delict in such a case is D’s negligent driving. The law of delict tells us whether D can be held liable for causing damage to P’s car and injury to P’s person.

(1) Absolute rights and personal rights 2.02

2.03

For the Institutional writers, as mentioned in chapter 1, the “formal and proper object of law” was “the rights of men”,2 with the infringement of such rights being a wrong giving rise to the obediential obligation to make “reparation”3 (obediential obligations being those arising by force of law).4 But while the rights and their infringement resulted in legal remedies, it was the right not the remedy that was paramount. In this respect, Scotland and England have different histories and intellectual traditions. Lord Dunedin, a Scottish judge who sat for many years in the House of Lords, put it this way at the end of his long career: “different actions have different names, but the question in Scotland was never as to the remedy – it was always as to the right. You ask for what you want in your summons . . . You may not get what you want, but that will be because you failed to show that you had the right to get it.”5 Notions of rights and their infringement, then, have traditionally lain at the heart of law of delict. Following the terminology favoured by Bell,6 the rights to be protected – rights such as the right to liberty or reputation or bodily integrity – might be characterised as “absolute” rights. By this is not meant that the rights are unqualified, for, as will be seen throughout this book, the highly general rights protected by the law of delict are qualified in all kinds of ways. Rather, such rights are absolute in two distinct senses. They are absolute in respect that, subject to some qualifications, they are held by all people, and by all people equally. But they are also absolute in the sense of being enforceable against all challengers. In the   1 For the position in the earlier law, see ch 1 above and especially paras 1.03, 1.06, and 1.15.  2 Stair, Inst 1.1.22.  3 Stair, Inst 1.1.19.   4 See paras 1.07 ff above.   5 Lord Dunedin, The Divergencies and Convergencies of English and Scottish law (Fifth lecture on the David Murray Foundation in the University of Glasgow, 21 May 1935). For detailed discussion of the relevance of a “rights model” to English law, see R Stevens, Torts and Rights (2007).  6 Bell, Principles §§ 2027–2057.

Fundamental Concepts   33

latter respect, but not the former, they resemble real rights in the law of property.7 Equally, in this very universality lies an important point of distinction from the individuated rights typically found in the law of contract. The counterpart of absolute right is universal duty or obligation. So if everyone has a right to bodily integrity, then, in order for such a right to be meaningful, everyone else must have the corresponding duty to respect the right. The precise scope of such duties is a much debated topic in the law of delict. And in this mutual interdependence of right and duty (or obligation) lies the explanation for the classification of delict law as part of the law of obligations. An obligation is a right seen, as it were, from the other end.8 Where an absolute right is infringed, it gives rise to a specific or – to use more traditional terminology – to a “personal” right against the wrongdoer. The universal or first-order right is thus buttressed by personal or second-order rights.9 In the particular circumstances that happen to have arisen, the personal right is the means of giving effect to the absolute right. And the counterpart of that personal right is, typically, the duty of the particular wrongdoer to make reparation to the person who has been wronged. To a degree which is unusual in private law, the second-order personal rights have served to shape the first-order absolute rights. For the very scope of the law of delict – its intricate patterns, its rivulets of liability and non-liability, its logical strength and, in places, its apparent lack of all logic – have been largely determined by its case law. The law of delict can only be understood by reference to a voluminous body of court decisions, often highly fact-specific and sometimes involving situations which the most fertile of imaginations could scarcely have invented. And it is thus in the working out of the personal rights that the content of the absolute rights has been, and continues to be, established. What, then, are the absolute rights which the law of delict seeks to protect? For Stair, the “several rights and enjoyments” protected by the obligation to make reparation were: (i) “life, members, and health”; (ii) “liberty”, “fame, reputation and honour”; (iii) “content, delight, or satisfaction” in that which we own; and (iv) “goods and possession”.10 In essence, that list continues to apply in the modern law. It had changed

  7 Rights which Bell also classifies as “absolute”: see Principles §§ 939 and 962–972.   8 This point is too obvious, and too ancient, to require to be fleshed out by reference to Hohfeld’s well-known analysis of rights and their jural opposites and correlatives, as to which see W N Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (1913–1914) 23 Yale Law Journal 16 and (1916–1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710, esp at 718 ff. It might be added that parts of Hohfeld’s analysis, and in particular his account of “multital” rights, do not sit well in a system of private law such as Scotland’s where the influence of Roman law has been strong.   9 Or, in different terminology, “universal” rights are buttressed by “relative” rights. See e.g. Bell, Principles § 2027, but this usage is widespread. 10 Stair, Inst 1.9.4. See also paras 1.07–1.09 above.

2.04

2.05

34   The Law of Delict in Scotland

little by the time of Bell,11 and indeed was and is in substantially the same terms as the list in – to take a present-day example from another jurisdiction – the German Civil Code, which spells out as protected interests the life, body, health, freedom, property or another right of another person.12 The main elements of the list in modern Scots law are enumerated and discussed below.

(a) The right to bodily and mental integrity 2.06

2.07

The right to bodily integrity remains as important today as in the time of Stair.13 Indeed, with the greatly enhanced diagnostic skills of modern times, it is possible to identify a wider range of injuries with deleterious impact upon health, capability or physical capacity to enjoy life.14 The extent of the corresponding duty not to inflict physical injury upon another is, as a rule, more extensive than the duty not to damage corporeal property15 or economic interests.16 It includes refraining not only from deliberate infliction of blows but also from deliberate unconsented touching that goes beyond the trivial. It also entails a duty to exercise due care in the conduct of any activity that risks accidental physical harm to another, such as by road traffic accidents, or by exposure to harmful substances in the industrial setting.17 In some cases it extends to a positive duty to safeguard health or physical safety, as in the case of doctors diagnosing and treating patients’ illness. Indeed duties relating to bodily integrity have taken on new dimensions in the medical context, as seen in an increased regard for issues of personal autonomy during medical treatment18 and in matters of reproductive medicine.19 We will return to this important topic in chapter 4. Issues of mental well-being, by contrast, are treated with greater circumspection. Where psychiatric harm has been inflicted independent of injury to the person or to any other interest of the affected person, the difficulties of an earlier age in diagnosing and calibrating psychiatric injury20

11 Bell, Principles § 543: rights to property, personal liberty, safety and reputation. Bell indicated that his list was relevant with regard to both intentional and negligent wrongdoing. 12 BGB § 823. 13 See e.g. Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 530, [2002] QB 266 per Hale LJ at para 56; Smith v Sabre Insurance Co Ltd [2013] CSIH 28, 2013 SC 569 per Lord Brodie at para 39. 14 Dryden v Johnson Matthey plc [2018] UKSC 18, [2019] AC 403. 15 Perrett v Collins [1999] PNLR 77 per Buxton LJ at 111. 16 Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398 per Lord Oliver at 487. 17 See C Witting, “Physical Damage in Negligence” (2002) 61 CLJ 189. 18 See paras 11.45–11.55 below. 19 See paras 16.73–16.101 below; see also discussion in Holdich v Lothian Health Board [2013] CSOH 197, 2014 SLT 495 per Lord Stewart at para 102. 20 See e.g. Guthrie Smith, Reparation 131: “The best of men may be mistaken on such an occult subject as the diseases of the mind.”

Fundamental Concepts   35

have left their legacy in the form of restrictive criteria for liability. As chapter 16 will show, such criteria continue to operate even in relation to the duty to refrain from intentional infliction of mental distress.21 The extent of duty to exercise care in conduct affecting a person’s state of mind is still more narrowly circumscribed, as discussed in chapter 6.

(b) The right to liberty The right to personal liberty was similarly a “precious right” in Stair’s account, and it remains the case that “loss of liberty is just as much an interference in bodily integrity as is loss of a limb”.22 The corresponding duty to refrain from interfering with the liberty of another is far-reaching, and its breach entitles the detained person to claim reparation regardless of whether the wrongful conduct caused identifiable physical or psychiatric injury or economic loss. There are a range of circumstances, however, in which liberty may be “lawfully abridged”,23 and the meaning of “lawful” in this context continues to be contested, as chapter 17 explains.

2.08

(c) The right to reputation Although the right to reputation is of major significance, the assertion of claims in particular cases, and the imposition of correlative duties not to impugn the reputation of others, are far from straightforward. Up until the early nineteenth century, the duty entailed in the law of verbal injury extended beyond matters of falsehood to the non-disclosure of certain types of truthful information.24 In the modern law, however, delictual liability is directed mainly at the propagation of lies. The law of defamation, which provides the principal channel for defending reputation, imposes no duty where imputations are shown to be true, no matter how hurtful.25 To the extent that it is recognised as a category of wrong in Scotland,26 misuse of private information does extend to truthful disclosures, but it is not actionable in all cases where harm has been caused, because it requires the reasonableness of P’s expectation of privacy to be balanced against the interests of freedom of expression asserted by D. Moreover, both defamation and misuse of private information allow for defences where the allegation or disclosure in question was on a matter of public interest.

21 See paras 16.59–16.72 below. 22 McLoughlin v Jones [2001] EWCA Civ 1743, [2002] QB 1312 per Hale LJ at para 57. 23 Bell, Principles § 2034. 24 See E C Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law (2010) paras 8.01–8.15. 25 On the defence of truth, see paras 18.69–18.74 below. 26 See paras 20.16–20.19 below.

2.09

36   The Law of Delict in Scotland

(d) The right to the integrity of property 2.10

2.11

The right to the integrity of property is at its most straightforward in instances of physical damage, although P is usually required to prove fault on the part of D. In the early sources, interference with the possession of property was dealt with by actions for ejection or spuilzie, and these, and the delicts of encroachment and trespass, continue to apply today.27 The law of delict encounters greater difficulties where the conduct of D on D’s own land is claimed to interfere with the enjoyment of a neighbouring owner, P. The law of nuisance must then attempt to mediate between two competing rights of use, each held in respect of a different property.28 Those problems are discussed at greater length in chapter 22. The framework of intellectual property rights, and remedies for infringement thereof, are now governed primarily by statute, including the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, the Trade Marks Act 1994, and the Patents Act 1977. However, the common law has a role to play too, notably by means of actions for breach of confidence (classified as a delict in Scotland), as discussed in chapter 19, and passing off, as discussed in chapter 21.29

(e) The right to economic well-being 2.12

2.13

The right to enjoyment of economic well-being is long-established, as reflected in some of the earliest examples of delictual liability noted in chapter 1. But whereas the entitlement to compensation for financial loss suffered as a direct consequence of actionable damage to property or the person is uncontroversial, the scope of delictual liability is limited where the conduct complained of has caused damage to economic interests alone. Such “pure economic loss” may come about in the form of damage to profits, loss of an anticipated gain, additional expenditure which would not have been incurred but for the wrongful conduct, or acquisition of an asset worth less than anticipated due to discovery of a latent defect. In cases of such loss the assertion of a right to reparation, and the extent of correlative duty, are often problematic. There is no general duty to refrain from conduct that bolsters one’s own business interests at the expense of a rival’s. But the law of delict gives limited support to enforcing the “basic standards of civilised behaviour in economic competition”.30 In the context of the so-called “economic delicts”,

27 See ch 24 below. 28 J Rankine, The Law of Land-Ownership in Scotland, 4th edn (1909) 368 describes neighbourhood as the scene of “conflict between liberty and order, between the rights and duties incident to the enjoyment of real property” as expressed by the maxims “qui utitur jure suo neminem laedit and sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas, meaning by alienum not the property but the rights of another”. 29 See paras 21.82–21.106 below. 30 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 56.

Fundamental Concepts   37

such as inducing breach of contract or conspiracy, the boundaries of acceptable conduct may be breached by conduct imputed as being with “malice”, as discussed in chapter 21. By contrast, where economic loss has occurred due to a person’s negligence, even more restrictive conditions are placed on the scope of duty.31 Broadly speaking a duty of care in negligence requires a special relationship to be made out between the parties, an issue explored further in chapter 5. This means that duty is sometimes recognised in cases involving negligent provision of advice or information or of services, but almost never in cases involving loss deriving from damage to the property or person of another, or merely from acquisition of defective goods or property.

(2) The function of damages In the Institutional writings, the obligation to make reparation was presented as one of the main categories of “obediential” obligations (arising by force of law). And although there were pockets of delictual liability arising from noncriminal conduct, for the Institutional writers the law of delict was primarily a corollary of the criminal law, providing the means by which the rights infringed by the conduct might be vindicated,32 and the injury suffered by the victim redressed. Today, delictual liability arises independently of criminal wrongdoing, and the relationship between delictual and criminal liability has long since been loosened, as charted in chapter 1. Nonetheless, the view remains that delicts may be vindicated by the award of damages – a view acquiring particular significance in the light of the decriminalisation of certain types of intentional wrong, such as defamation,33 but more recently finding a limited role in the law of negligence, as chapter 31 explores further.34 The principal function of damages is “the provision of just compensation for injuries to person or property”.35 Even as the subject-matter of the law of delict has shifted, the “judge’s instinct” has continued to be to achieve “full corrective justice”36 (the notion that the perpetrator of 31 Candlewood Navigation Corporation Ltd v Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd [1986] AC 1 per Lord Fraser at 25. 32 See para 31.04 below. 33 See Guthrie Smith, Damages 40: “The man who has without leave walked across another’s field is liable in damages, although the field is not a farthing the worse; and the like holds in an assault on the person, an attack on the reputation, and the wrongful detention of movables – these are all acts injurious in themselves, and no further proof is necessary.” 34 See para 31.05 below. 35 N MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) 166: “the underlying policy of the law of tort or delict is the provision of just compensation for injuries to person or property”. See also Guthrie Smith, Damages 1: “An act wrongful and injurious may be stopped by interdict, and punished if criminal; but the remedy would be inadequate were not the wrong-doer liable also in civil reparation, and therefore the law out of the wrongful act creates an obligation to make good the loss for which he is to blame.” 36 King v Bristow Helicopters Ltd [2002] UKHL 7, 2002 SC (HL) 59 per Lord Nicholls at para 28. See X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 749, acknowledging that “the public policy consideration which has first claim on the loyalty of the law is that wrongs should be remedied”.

2.14

2.15

38   The Law of Delict in Scotland

2.16

wrongful conduct has a duty to repair the damage caused by that conduct). Yet no system of delictual liability can allow the goal of corrective justice to prevail every time over distributive justice (the notion that the benefits and burdens of economic and social activity should be fairly distributed).37 In particular, the expansion of negligence law into diverse areas of liability,38 and the generality of rules determining the scope of duty of care, have entailed greater emphasis on broader policy goals. Most notably, the requirement in novel cases that the imposition of duty should be fair, just and reasonable39 contributes to a framework of liability that dispels the “illusion that for every misfortune there is a remedy”.40 The courts may readily acknowledge that they cannot function as a Law Commission, but in determining the scope of duty there is no escaping policy choices.41 The cost implications of awarding or refusing damages are plainly relevant in determining the rules of liability. Aside from the broader policy considerations that may support or deny recognition of duty of care, the cost of precautions and the utility of the defender’s activities influence the judgment whether that duty has been breached.42 Moreover, theories of enterprise liability – the idea that businesses that profit from an activity should internalise the cost of the accidents that it generates – are offered as providing a rationale for regimes based upon liability without fault, such

37 See e.g. J Gardner, Torts and Other Wrongs (2020) chs 2 and 3. See also Lord Steyn, “Perspectives of Corrective and Distributive Justice in Tort Law” (2002) 37 Irish Jurist 1; Lord Scott, “Damages” [2007] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 465. For general discussion, see Atiyah’s Accidents Compensation and the Law ch 17. For an overt example in a Scottish case, see McFarlane v Tayside Health Board 2000 SC (HL) 1, discussed at paras 16.77–16.79 below, per Lord Steyn at 16, acknowledging that from the perspective of corrective justice the pursuers’ claim should succeed, but that distributive justice required a “a focus on the just distribution of burdens and losses among members of a society”. (This was apparently to be achieved by the judge imagining the response had “commuters on the Underground” been asked whether the pursuers should be allowed to recover damages.) 38 As sketched in paras 1.23–1.30 above. 39 See e.g. McFarlane v Tayside Health Board 2000 SC (HL) 1, discussed at paras 16.77–16.79 below, per Lord Steyn at 17, expressly citing distributive justice to deny the pursuers’ claim for compensation, and adding that “If it were necessary to do so, I would say that the claim does not satisfy the requirement of being fair, just and reasonable”. See also McLelland v Greater Glasgow Health Board 2001 SLT 446 per Lord Prosser at para 25 on “the multiplicity, and indeed richness, of the considerations which underpin the law when broad concepts such as fairness and reasonableness, and justice itself, have to be assessed, and are used to provide answers”. 40 See Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 per Lord Steyn at para 2:“On the one hand the courts must not contribute to the creation of a society bent on litigation, which is premised on the illusion that for every misfortune there is a remedy. On the other hand, there are cases where the courts must recognise on principled grounds the compelling demands of corrective justice.” 41 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Mance at para 84. 42 See ch 10 below.

Fundamental Concepts   39

as strict liability for products,43 and vicarious liability.44 Nonetheless, the North American enthusiasm for the economic analysis of tort law45 has not been replicated in Scotland, and the goal of incentivising economically efficient behaviour has not figured large in judicial reasoning. Some theorists argue for a “mixed” theory of delictual liability, in which objectives of corrective justice “collaborate” with those of deterrence46 – the idea that the prospect of being required to pay damages might encourage good practice and deter future wrongdoing. There is also support in English case law for the view that “very large compensatory damages” may serve in some cases as a deterrent,47 although such authorities must be read against the background that English law, unlike Scots law,48 recognises a specific category of punitive damages. Aside from in limited areas such as defamation and misuse of private information, there is little direct evidence to show that, as a general rule, the fear of a civil claim influences potential wrongdoers in their behaviour, or, assuming that it does, that this is the optimum means of promoting efficiency.49 The converse argument – that this prospect would encourage defensive practices which would be damaging to the wider community50 – similarly lacks a convincing empirical basis.51

2.17

B. WRONGFUL CONDUCT Wrongful conduct may take different forms and come about in different ways. It might be an intentional infringement of the rights of another, or a failure to act with due care in regard to those rights. Much more unusually, it might fall within one of the categories to which the law attaches strict liability without proof of fault.

43 On the difficulties of applying efficiency theory to product liability see, however, J Stapleton, Product Liability (1994) ch 6. 44 See para 3.14 below. 45 See e.g. R A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 9th edn (2014) chs 1, 2, and 6. Such an analysis requires the economic and social costs of wrongdoing to be considered alongside the cost of intervention to prevent it, so that liability can be determined in a way that represents the most efficient use of wealth and social resources. 46 See e.g. G T Schwarz, “Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice” (1997) 75 Texas LR 1801 at 1834. 47 Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027 per Lord Kilbrandon at 1134. 48 See para 31.07 below. 49 See e.g. Whitehouse v Lord Advocate [2019] CSIH 52, 2020 SC 133 per Lord President Carloway at para 103; Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923 per Lord Hoffmann at 955; Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 per Lord Toulson at para 121. 50 See e.g. Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21 per Lord Hope at para 28. 51 See paras 9.05 and 9.09 above. See also Whitehouse v Lord Advocate [2019] CSIH 52, 2020 SC 133 per Lord President Carloway at para 100; Lord Bingham, “The Uses of Tort Law (2010) 1 Journal of European Tort Law 3 at 9–10.

2.18

40   The Law of Delict in Scotland

(1) Intentional wrongs and negligent wrongs 2.19

For the Institutional writers, as already mentioned, the primary function of the law of delict was to provide reparation for criminal conduct, and therefore the rules of criminal law did much of the early work in determining whether conduct was wrongful for the purposes of delictual liability.52 Over time, however, the notion of wrongful conduct extended its scope to cover a greater range of non-criminal acts, and in particular the causing of harm negligently but without intending to do so. The civil law terminology of “delicts” and “quasi-delicts” was used by Hume and Bell to distinguish intentional from unintentional infliction of damage.53 The former followed, and continues to follow, discrete patterns of development in regard not only to the specific conduct entailed but also the state of mind required on the part of the defender. Even today it is difficult to identify a single framework of analysis to which all the intentional delicts conform.54 By contrast, from early on a unitary framework was used to analyse wrongful conduct constituted by negligence.55 For all its highly diverse applications, the law of negligence purports to apply a uniform set of general principles by which the conduct of defender is judged, drawing on the key concepts of duty56 and standard of care.57

(2) Strict liability 2.20

Where, instead of seeking reparation in the form of damages, a pursuer seeks only to interdict the defender from an activity that infringes the pursuer’s right, it is readily accepted that there is no need to prove fault (whether deriving from intention or negligence) on the part of the defender. A common example is seen in the law of nuisance in which the grant of interdict requires the pursuer to show only that the defender’s activities are wrongful in the sense that they exceed the level that is reasonably tolerable to neighbours.58 By contrast, it is rare for damages to be awarded without requiring proof of fault, and where such “strict liability” does arise it is almost always a creation of statute, and underpinned by the rationale that the risk created by certain types of activity should be borne by the party

52 See generally ch 1 above. 53 See paras 1.18–1.21 above. 54 For further discussion, see E Reid, “‘That Unhappy Expression’: Malice at the Margins”, in S G A Pitel et al (eds), Tort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy (2013) 441. 55 See Bell, Principles in which the section on “Absolute Rights of Persons” (§§ 2028–2057) contains one paragraph only (2031) on the general outline of negligence, with the rest being given over to the intentional wrongs. 56 See ch 4 below. 57 See ch 10 below. 58 See para 22.15 below.

Fundamental Concepts   41

creating risk and deriving economic benefit therefrom.59 Examples are the Nuclear Installations Act 1965, section 7,60 the Carriage by Air Act 1961,61 the Civil Aviation Act 1982, section 76,62 and the Animals (Scotland) Act 1987, section 1.63 Another example is liability for injuries and damage caused by defective products although, as chapter 26 discusses in greater detail, the form of liability created by the Consumer Protection Act 1987 combines elements of strict and fault-based liability. In addition, English law recognises a common law form of strict liability, the so-called Rylands v Fletcher rule,64 in relation to damage caused by the escape of dangerous substances from the defendant’s land. That rule has no direct counterpart in Scots law, as chapter 22 explains.65

C. WRONGDOERS AND THE WRONGED In principle, all persons against whom a delict has been perpetrated are entitled to an appropriate remedy, and all those who commit a delict are liable to submit to that remedy.66 For certain categories, however, that principle requires further explanation.

2.21

(1) Children Children below the age of sixteen lack legal capacity to enter into transactions.67 Nonetheless, they have capacity to instruct a solicitor in connection with any civil matter where they have “a general understanding of what it means to do so”.68 Children over twelve are presumed to be of sufficient age and maturity to have such understanding,69 and it might be possible for even younger children to have capacity if they are shown to have the necessary understanding, so that they could, for example, pursue

59 See also discussion in Cairns v Northern Lighthouse Board [2013] CSOH 22, 2013 SLT 645 per Lord Drummond Young at para 37. 60 Imposing strict liability on the operators in regard to injury or damage emanating from nuclear installations. 61 Giving effect to the Warsaw Convention to the extent of imposing strict liability for injuries suffered by passengers on board aircraft. 62 Providing for strict liability in relation to damage or injury suffered on the ground as a result of aircraft accidents. 63 See ch 27 below. 64 As derived from Rylands v Fletcher (1865–66) LR 1 Ex 265, affd (1868) LR 3 HL 330. 65 See paras 22.05–22.06 below. 66 See Bankton, Inst 4.23.18: “all persons may pursue, for the law ought to be open to all people, to make their claims effectual; since for every right there must be a remedy, and want of right and want of remedy are the same thing; and therefore none are excluded from bringing their actions, except persons attainted.” 67 Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 s 1(1)(a). 68 s 2(4A). 69 s 2(4A).

2.22

42   The Law of Delict in Scotland

2.23

or defend actions in delict.70 Where children lack capacity, actions may be brought by their legal representatives. Normally the legal representative is the child’s parent,71 but in exceptional cases the court can appoint a curator ad litem,72 for example where the child is suing a parent as responsible for road accident injuries. A child has a right to reparation for injuries inflicted prior to the child’s birth.73 There is no minimum age of responsibility below which a child lacks capacity to commit a delict,74 and no formal equivalent to the “rule of sevens” applicable in some American states, whereby children under the age of seven are deemed incapable of negligence.75 The Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 specifically states that its provisions do not “affect the delictual or criminal responsibility of any person”.76 At the same time, the tender years of the defender are likely to be a relevant consideration in determining whether the child intended harm or failed to exercise due care. As discussed in chapter 10,77 the key question is whether the child’s age and understanding were such that a standard of care could appropriately be applied to him or her – whether, in the words of an Australian judge, the child was “old enough to know that his conduct was wrongful”.78 A number of cases involving the defence of contributory negligence have indicated that, from an extremely early age, children may be assessed as negligent in their regard for their own safety.79

(2) Litigation between family members 2.24

In the modern law there is no impediment to one spouse suing the other in delict. But, relatively speaking, this is a recent development because it was only in 1962 that this became permissible.80 The former rule was abolished by the Law Reform (Husband and Wife) Act 1962, section 2 and, although the 1962 Act has itself since been repealed,81 it is thought

70 s 2(5A). 71 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 s 1(1)(d). 72 See Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 s 1(3)(f)(ii). 73 See Scottish Law Commission, Report on Liability for Antenatal Injury (Scot Law Com No 30, 1973) paras 8–13; see also Hamilton v Fife Health Board 1993 SC 369. 74 Scottish Law Commission, Report on the Legal Capacity and Responsibility of Minors and Pupils (Scot Law Com No 110, 1987) para 5.1. 75 See e.g. Queen Insurance Co v Hammond 374 Mich 655, 132 NW 2d 792 (1965). 76 Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 s 1(3)(c). 77 See paras 10.32–10.35 below. 78 McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384 per Windeyer J at 386. 79 See paras 29.61–29.63 below. 80 For the former law, see e.g. Morrison v Morrison 1956 SLT (Sh Ct) 42. 81 By the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 Sch 3 para 1.

Fundamental Concepts   43

that the common law rule has not revived.82 Similarly, there is no rule that a child cannot sue a parent in delict,83 or indeed that a parent cannot sue a child.84 Spouses are not regarded as vicariously liable for each other’s wrongdoing, except where one is the employer of the other. By the same token, parents are not vicariously liable for their children’s wrongdoing, although in some cases it may be possible to show that a parent has failed in a direct duty to the victim to exercise due care in supervising the child’s conduct.85

2.25

(3) Corporations As juristic persons, corporations may bring actions in delict, and do so in their own names. Shareholders as individuals have no title to sue in respect of wrongdoing against a company, even if the value of their shareholdings has been reduced as a consequence, and even if the company itself has chosen not to bring an action.86 But shareholders have a right of action for losses which are separate and distinct from those suffered by the company, and caused by a breach of duty owed independently to the shareholder.87 Clearly, certain delicts, such as those involving infringement of bodily integrity or deprivation of liberty, can have no relevance to corporations. Equally, corporations cannot suffer injury to feelings or, therefore, seek solatium. Corporations may, however, sue for defamation or, more unusually, malicious publication even if, under the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021, they will not be regarded as having suffered the serious harm required by section 1(2)(b) unless serious financial loss can be shown.88

82 The wording of Sch 3 para 1 to the 2006 Act is anomalous. The Scottish Law Commission had earlier recommended the repeal only of s 2(2) of the 1962 Act (a subsection allowing the court discretion to dismiss proceedings between spouses): see Report on Family Law (Scot Law Com 135, 1992). Despite this, Sch 3 para 1 purported to repeal “the whole Act”. Since only s 2 of the 1962 Act applied to Scotland, that repeal had no effect in regard to the continuing application of ss 1 and 3 to England and Wales. However, the effect of repealing s 2(1), which had allowed the parties to a marriage to bring proceedings against the other “as if they were not married”, is more troublesome, but it seems likely that the common law prohibition on proceedings against spouses did not revive. On this point, see Interpretation Act 1978 ss 16(1)(a) and 23A, to the effect that common law rules abrogated by an Act which is itself later repealed do not revive at the point of that repeal (as e.g. in D v D [1979] Fam 70). 83 Young v Rankin 1934 SC 499. 84 Wood v Wood 1935 SLT 431. 85 Brown v Fulton (1881) 9 R 36; Newton v Edgerley [1959] 1 WLR 1031. See also Carmarthenshire County Council v Lewis [1955] AC 549 (occupiers of school premises adjoining a highway under duty to prevent children from escaping thereby creating a hazard). See paras 10.36–10.37 below. 86 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204; see also Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 for detailed discussion by Lord Bingham at 35–36. 87 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 per Lord Bingham at 35. 88 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 1(3).

2.26

2.27

44   The Law of Delict in Scotland

2.28

Although corporations cannot be injured in their feelings they are deemed capable of perpetrating intentional delicts such as harassment.89 The requisite state of mind is attributed to the corporation where it knew or ought to have known that a course of conduct carried on within its business was wrongful for the purposes of the delict in question.90 Corporations may also of course incur vicarious liability for delicts committed by employees.

(4) Partnerships 2.29

2.30

A partnership has separate legal personality91 and may thus sue or be sued in the name of the firm, whatever form that name takes. If the name is “social”, in the sense that it is made up of specific names, whether or not this includes the names of the current partners, it can sue or be sued in that name alone, without conjoining the names of the individual partners,92 although it is advised that the names of the individual partners should be added so as to identify those who were in the partnership at the relevant time.93 Where the partnership name does not use the names of individuals and is therefore “descriptive”, it may sue and be sued in that name alone in the sheriff court.94 In the Court of Session, however, the names of at least three partners must be included alongside the “descriptive” name.95 Partnerships are vicariously liable for loss or injury suffered by third parties due to the wrongful conduct of the partners acting in the ordinary course of the business of the firm, or with the authority of the copartners.96 But ultimate liability lies with the partners themselves, because each partner (or former partner) is jointly and severally liable to make reparation in respect of wrongs for which the firm became liable at a time when that partner was within the firm.97 Examples of conduct for which partnerships have been held liable as occurring in the ordinary course of business include not only negligence, such as the provision of negligent

89 Ferguson v British Gas Trading Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 46, [2010] 1 WLR 785. 90 Ferguson v British Gas Trading Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 46, [2010] 1 WLR 785 at paras 41–42. Cf Trimingham v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWHC 1296 (QB), [2012] 4 All ER 717, in which it could not be shown that the defendant ought to have known that its conduct was sufficiently distressing to be considered oppressive or amount to harassment for the purposes of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 1(2); no decision was made on whether a company could be held liable for harassment without identification of specific company officers as responsible. 91 Partnership Act 1890 s 4(2). 92 Forsyth v Hare (1834) 13 S 42. 93 I D Macphail, Sheriff Court Practice, 3rd edn by T Walsh (2006) para 4.94. 94 Ordinary Cause Rules 1993 r 5.7(1). 95 Or the names of both partners, if there are only two: Antermony Coal Co v Wingate (1866) 4 M 1017. 96 Partnership Act 1890 s 10. 97 Partnership Act 1890 s 12.

Fundamental Concepts   45

advice by a partner in a solicitors’ firm,98 but also intentional delicts such as fraud,99 harassment,100 and even assault.101 The general rule, given in Mair v Wood,102 is that a partnership cannot be held vicariously liable to one of its own partners for damage suffered as a consequence of another partner’s wrongful conduct towards him or her. On the other hand, Lord Keith also observed in Mair v Wood that partners may be found liable to the partnership for breach of the duty owed to the partnership in the proper conduct of the partnership affairs.103 The standard of care required of partners in this regard is not entirely settled. Institutional authority indicated that partners should observe, in regard to the partnership, that diligence which they would “ordinary use . . . in their own affairs”.104 However, in Ross Harper & Murphy v Banks,105 an action brought by a partnership to recover loss sustained due to a partner’s negligence in conducting business for a client of the firm, the Lord Ordinary, Lord Hamilton, indicated that the relevant standard of care should not be “based exclusively on that referable to the individual alleged to have been at fault”; rather, it should “reflect the nature of the partnership relationship and must also be affected by the incidents and practices within the particular partnership where the issue arises”.106 In the absence of express contractual agreement, therefore, uncertainty persists as to the standard of skill and care imposed on partners vis-à-vis the partnership in regard to the conduct of partnership business.107

  98 R I’Anson Banks, Lindley & Banks on Partnership, 20th edn (2017) paras 12.92–12.93.  99 Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48, [2003] 2 AC 366; Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP [2014] CSIH 79, 2015 SC 187. 100 Iqbal v Dean Manson Solicitors [2011] EWCA Civ 123, [2011] IRLR 428. 101 Flynn v Robin Thompson & Partners [2000] All ER (D) 329. 102 Mair v Wood 1948 SC 83; see also R I’Anson Banks, Lindley & Banks on Partnership, 20th edn (2017) para 20–12 n 47, suggesting that “the position would be no different in English law, save that the firm does not exist as a separate entity”. 103 1948 SC 83 at 90. 104 Stair, Inst 1.16.7; see also Erskine, Inst 3.3.21. 105 2000 SC 500. 106 2000 SC 500 at para 26. On application of that criterion Lord Hamilton declined to dismiss the action as irrelevant. He thought that the standard might allow for “some mutual tolerance of error” (para 30) and that a breach of a duty of reasonable care to a third party did not necessarily mean that there had been a breach of duty to the firm. It would therefore be rare for such an action to succeed, but not impossible (para 31). It is understood that the pursuers did not insist in their claim when it came before the Inner House on a reclaiming motion: see Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Report on Partnership Law (Scot Law Com No 192, 2003) para 11.8. See also Blackwood v Robertson 1984 SLT (Sh Ct) 68 per Sheriff N MacVicar at 71: “a partner may in serious cases be made liable to his fellow partners for loss occasioned in the partnership business by his lack of care or skill, but . . . a minor blunder will not give rise to a right of action.” 107 Report on Partnership Law (Scot Law Com No 192, 2003) para 11.10; Sim v Howat [2012] CSOH 171, 2012 GWD 36–731 per Lord Hodge at para 41.

2.31

46   The Law of Delict in Scotland

(5) Limited liability partnerships 2.32

Limited liability partnerships (LLPs), as established by the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, are bodies corporate with legal personality separate from that of their members.108 They may therefore sue and be sued in the name of the LLP.109 Section 6(4) of the 2000 Act provides that, where a member of an LLP is liable to any person as a result of a wrongful act or omission in the course of the LLP’s business or with its authority, the LLP is vicariously liable to the same extent as the member.110

(6) Unincorporated associations 2.33

2.34

An association such as a club or a charity that has not constituted itself as a company or other form of incorporated body has no separate legal personality.111 As a general rule, therefore, it cannot sue in its own name, and in Court of Session proceedings it must sue in the name of its office-bearers, or in the name of members authorised for this purpose at a meeting of the association or by the association’s rules.112 In the Court of Session an unincorporated association may be sued by calling the club or association in its own name, together with its office-bearers as representing it; it is not necessary to call all the members if they are numerous.113 The effect of following this procedure is to convene the club or association as a whole, although any decree obtained can only be enforced directly against the named representatives.114 The liability of members in these circumstances is personal, with a claim for relief against whatever funds are held at the time in the name of the club or association. In sheriff court proceedings, the Ordinary Cause Rules provide that where the association is carrying on a business under a trading or descriptive name, it may sue and be sued in that name, without the addition of the names of office-bearers or others.115 Moreover, as Macphail indicates, even if the association is not carrying on a business under a trading or descriptive name, it falls within the statutory definition of persons who

108 Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 s 1. 109 See e.g. Cramaso LLP v Viscount Reidhaven’s Trs [2014] UKSC 9, 2014 SC (UKSC) 121. 110 Cf Kidd v Paull and Williamsons LLP [2017] CSOH 16, 2018 SC 193, in which Lord Tyre held no relevant case to have been pled where the pursuer alleged that an LLP had made a fraudulent misrepresentation. While the LLP might be held vicariously liable for the fraud of an employee, or of a member of the LLP in terms of s 6(4), this was not fraud on the part of the LLP itself. 111 Somerville v Rowbotham (1862) 24 D 1187. 112 Renton Football Club v McDowall (1891) 18 R 670. 113 Bridge v South Portland Street Synagogue 1907 SC 1351. For commentary and suggested styles, see R N M Anderson, “Raising Actions against Unincorporated Associations” 2006 SLT (News) 55. 114 Harrison v West of Scotland Kart Club 2004 SC 615 per Lord Marnoch at para 23. 115 Ordinary Cause Rules 1993 r 5.7(1).

Fundamental Concepts   47

may be pursuers or defenders, and on that basis also it may sue or be sued in its own name alone.116 Association members cannot sue the association or its office-bearers, in their capacity as such, in delict in respect of damage suffered while the members were engaged in the activities of the society, as this is regarded as the members in effect suing themselves.117 However, this does not preclude personal liability arising between members:118 for example, the fact that P and D happen to be members of the same golf club does not prevent P from suing D for negligence where P has been hit by a golf ball carelessly played by D, or where P has suffered loss due to D’s failure to observe due care in acting as P’s solicitor. A Scottish Law Commission report published in 2009119 made a series of recommendations to clarify the legal status of unincorporated associations, and in particular recommended the creation of a new entity to be called the “Scottish Association with Legal Personality”. The legislative proposals contained in the report have not, however, been taken forward.120 Although trade unions are not to be regarded as bodies corporate, statutory provision has been made to allow them to sue and be sued in proceedings founded on delict.121

2.35

2.36

2.37

(7) The Crown There is nothing to prevent the Crown, as well as government departments and agencies, from suing in delict.122 Up until 1947, however, although the legal tradition had earlier been otherwise,123 the Scottish courts fell in with the rule of English common law that the king could do no wrong 116 Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1907 s 3(e), (n), (o); Greengairs Rovers Football Club v Blades (1910) 26 Sh Ct Rep 280; I D Macphail, Sheriff Court Practice, 3rd edn by T Walsh (2006) para 4.101; see also Anderson, “Raising Actions against Unincorporated Associations”. 117 Carmichael v Bearsden & District Rifle & Pistol Club 2000 SLT (Sh Ct) 49; Harrison v West of Scotland Kart Club 2004 SC 615 per Lord Marnoch at para 25; Taylor v Quigley [2016] CSOH 178, 2017 Rep LR 37. 118 Taylor v Quigley [2016] CSOH 178, 2017 Rep LR 37 per Lord Uist at para 4. 119 Report on Unincorporated Associations (Scot Law Com No 217, 2009). For discussion see R G Anderson, “Unincorporated Associations Reform” (2009) 13 EdinLR 507. See also Kershaw v Connel Community Council [2018] CSOH 111, 2019 SLT 121 per Lord Woolman at paras 15–18. 120 See Reforming the Law on Scottish Unincorporated Associations and Criminal Liability of Scottish Partnerships: the Government’s Response to Consultation (2012). 121 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 s 10(1)(b). For their status in defamation actions, see para 18.63 below. 122 See e.g. Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] UKHL 19, [2008] 1 AC 1174; Owners of the “Boy Andrew” v Owners of the “St Rognvald” 1947 SC (HL) 70. 123 J R Philip, “The Crown as Litigant in Scotland” (1928) 40 JR 238; H McKechnie, “Delict and Quasi-Delict”, in G C H Paton (ed), Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Stair Society vol 20, 1958) 265 at 268 and 271; N J Adamson, “The Crown and Government”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 7 (1995), para 745.

2.38

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and could not be held vicariously liable for the torts of his servants. The Crown Proceedings Act 1947 ended the immunity of the Crown. While it remains the case that proceedings cannot be maintained against the Sovereign in her private capacity,124 the Crown may otherwise be held liable, on the same basis as private persons, for delicts committed by its servants or agents,125 for breach of its duties as an employer,126 and for breach of common law duties arising out of ownership, occupation, possession or control of property.127 The Crown is also liable for breach of statutory duties, including, for example, those arising out of the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960.128 As a matter of practice, actions in England are generally brought against the relevant government minister. Section 53 of the Scotland Act 1998 provided for functions within devolved competence to be transferred from Ministers of the Crown to the Scottish Ministers.129 Accordingly, claims arising from matters within the competence of the Scottish Parliament are generally brought against the Scottish Ministers.130 Actions in relation to non-devolved matters are normally brought against the Advocate General.131

(8) Multiple parties (a) Defenders 2.40

As discussed in greater detail in chapter 13, where the “whole of the damage” suffered by the pursuer is the common result of a number of defenders acting together, they may be sued in a single action.132 Those defenders may then be found liable jointly and severally, so that the pursuer may claim the full amount from any one of the defenders, who is in turn entitled to recover proportionate contributions from the others, in terms of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940, section 3(2). By contrast, liability is several, and the defenders must be sued in separate actions, if the wrongs committed by the defenders are disconnected, and

124 125 126 127 128 129

Crown Proceedings Act 1947 s 40. s 2(1)(a). s 2(1)(b). s 2(1)(c). s 2(2). For explanation, see Beggs v Scottish Ministers [2007] UKHL 3, 2007 SLT 235 per Lord Rodger at paras 32–33 (the “Scottish Ministers” being the collective title for members of the Scottish Government: Scotland Act 1998 s 44). 130 E.g. Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Scottish Ministers [2016] CSOH 15, 2016 SCLR 539; Kaizer v Scottish Ministers [2018] CSIH 36, 2018 SC 491. 131 Crown Suits (Scotland) Act 1857 ss 1–4A. See e.g. King v Advocate General for Scotland [2009] CSOH 169, 2010 GWD 1–15; Harris v Advocate General for Scotland [2016] CSOH 49, 2016 SLT 572; White v Advocate General for Scotland [2018] CSOH 113, 2019 SLT 91. 132 Arneil v Paterson 1931 SC (HL) 117 per Viscount Hailsham at 122.

Fundamental Concepts   49

have separate consequences, even if the conduct complained of occurred at a similar time and place.133

(b) Pursuers Where more than one person suffers damage arising out of a single wrong, and each makes a claim on the same basis, they may join together in a single action, each claiming a separate sum of damages.134 Groups of relatives suing for damages following the death of a common relation are obliged to sue together in a single action so that their claims may be considered together.135

2.41

(c) Accessories to intentional wrongdoing Delictual liability may derive from the conduct not only of the principal wrongdoers but also of those who “are but accessory” to the wrongdoing.136 Almost invariably the issue of accessory liability arises in relation to intentional wrongdoing by the primary wrongdoer,137 and recent case law has accepted that it is appropriate to draw an analogy with the criminal law in this area.138 In the English case of Fish & Fish Ltd v Sea Shepherd UK,139 the Supreme Court put forward a two-step test for accessory liability. First, the accessory must have had a substantial role in assisting the principal wrongdoer to commit the tort. Merely assisting is not enough. Secondly, there must be some kind of “common design to do or secure the doing of the acts which constituted the tort”.140 That this second element is more troublesome than the first141 is demonstrated in a case decided in Scotland shortly before Fish (although not cited there). In Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP142 133 See further paras 13.24–13.27 below. 134 Cowan v Duke of Buccleuch (1876) 4 R (HL) 14; Browne v D C Thomson & Co 1912 SC 359. 135 I D Macphail, Sheriff Court Practice, 3rd edn by T Walsh (2006) para 4.40. 136 Stair, Inst 1.9.5; see also Bankton, Inst 1.10.46; Erskine, Inst 3.1.15. 137 A small number of cases have arisen from alleged negligence (e.g. Brooke v Bool [1928] 2 KB 578), but the better view is that such cases do not properly present examples of primary and accessory wrongdoing and that instead both wrongdoers should be fixed with liability as primary wrongdoers. On accessory liability and negligence, see J Dietrich and P Ridge, Accessories in Private Law (2016) para 5.5.5. 138 Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP [2013] CSOH 80, 2013 SLT 993 per Lord Hodge at paras 40 and 43. Lord Hodge referred to Cairns v Harry Walker Ltd 1914 SC 51 per Lord Skerrington at 54, who discussed “the summary of the criminal law as to accession” as contained in J H A Macdonald, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scotland, 3rd edn (1894) 6, and saw “no reason why a different rule should apply in the case of a civil delict”. The decision of Lord Hodge was affirmed on appeal: [2014] CSIH 79, 2015 SC 187. 139 [2015] UKSC 10, [2015] AC 1229. 140 [2015] UKSC 10, [2015] AC 1229 per Lord Toulson at para 21. 141 For discussion, see Dietrich and Ridge, Accessories in Private Law para 5.4.3. 142 In the Inner House: [2014] CSIH 79, 2015 SC 187. For discussion of the Outer House decision, see E Reid, “‘Accession to Delinquence’: Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd (FHI) v Biggart Baillie LLP” (2013) 17 EdinLR 388.

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the alleged accessory was a solicitor whose client had granted the pursuer a standard security over land which he did not own, on the strength of which substantial sums were advanced by the pursuer. The solicitor was initially unaware of his client’s fraud, but when he did become aware he failed to alert the pursuer. Meanwhile the pursuer made an additional £100,000 available to the client, which, like the rest of the loan monies, was never repaid. By this conduct the solicitor was regarded as having become an accessory to the continuing fraud, and he was therefore held jointly and severally liable for the additional £100,000 advanced after he had uncovered his client’s deception. Much of the solicitor’s involvement in facilitating the fraud – preparing the initial loan documentation and so forth – had been innocent, but it was accepted that, once he became aware of the fraud, his continuing silence was instrumental in allowing the pursuer to be defrauded out of the additional loan monies. The first element in Fish was therefore present. However, as regards the second element – common design – the solicitor had not shared the client’s fraudulent intent at the outset and, at least in normal circumstances, it would be difficult to infer culpable intent from the solicitor’s subsequent silence once the fraud was discovered. Nonetheless, a majority of the court143 concluded that the accessory to a delict need not have the mental element required of the primary wrongdoer, and indeed the idea that intent might vary as between accessory and principal has been endorsed in other jurisdictions.144 In Frank Houlgate the solicitor had been acting in a position of trust in a transaction where it was highly likely that the victim of past fraud would suffer further loss without the solicitor’s intervention. This was enough to create a duty to act once the truth was uncovered, and to clothe his subsequent silence with intention to deceive. A limited “common design” was established to the extent of keeping the pursuer in ignorance, even although it did not encompass a shared intention to profit from the illegally gotten gains. Consequently, the solicitor was an accessory to the fraud insofar as it related to the client’s obtaining of the further advance. In summary, the decision in Frank Houlgate shows that the accessory to an intentional delict may be held jointly and severally liable with the

143 I.e. Lord Menzies and Lord McEwan. Lord Malcolm dissented on this point on the basis (para 69) that “a person cannot make himself liable as an accessory to a crime without having, to some degree, the mental element necessary for commission of the wrong itself”. 144 See e.g. G L Williams, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence (1951) para 4 at 15, suggesting that in some instances “each defendant should as a matter of justice be considered separately”. Fraud was not one of the intentional torts discussed by Williams, but he noted the problems of joint libel where, in relation to qualified privilege, it might be appropriate to look for differing levels of “malice” as between the wrongdoers. See also the “two-tier” approach to assessing the mental element in the US Restatement Third of Torts (Apportionment of Liability) § 14, providing for liability on the part of a person who, negligently or otherwise, has failed to protect the plaintiff “from the specific risk of an intentional tort” at the hand of another.

Fundamental Concepts   51

principal for wrongdoing where the accessory has deliberately engaged in conduct that foreseeably facilitated the primary wrong, even if that conduct was not unlawful in itself and the accessory had no wish that the primary wrong should occur.145 There is no requirement that the circumstances should be such that a duty of care in negligence arose between the accessory and the victim.146 Frank Houlgate thus leaves open the possibility of accessory liability being invoked as a means of circumventing the restrictions of duty of care in negligence. In other words, it provides a means of avoiding the difficulties posed by negligence law: that there is generally no primary duty to protect others, and that foreseeability alone does not give rise to a duty to prevent a person from being harmed by the criminal act of a third party.147 Whether this is a desirable development seems open to question.

D. THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 As already mentioned, the central focus of the law of delict in Scotland has traditionally been “the rights of men”.148 But although there are parallels between what Bell termed the “absolute rights of persons”149 and the content of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the mechanisms put in place by the Human Rights Act 1998 to “bring rights home”150 remain conceptually and procedurally distinct from the common law of delict. In ratifying the Convention on 8 March 1951, the United Kingdom was one of the first signatories to the ECHR. Yet, perhaps because the values it expressed were regarded as having “deep roots in our national history and culture”,151 ratification was not accompanied by a significant reform agenda. Indeed it was half a century before UK citizens were supplied with

145 And see also Fish & Fish Ltd v Sea Shepherd UK [2015] UKSC 10, [2015] AC 1229, in which it was observed that if the accessory and principal co-operate in a common design to commit a tort in a certain eventuality, and that eventuality occurs and the tort is committed, it is irrelevant that they both hoped that it would not occur. 146 Although in the circumstances of Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP [2014] CSIH 79, 2015 SC 187, Lord Malcolm, who dissented on the issue of accessory liability, thought (at para 81) that liability might be established on the basis that the solicitor had owed a duty of care to the pursuer to protect him against the further consequences of a fraud which he had unwittingly facilitated. 147 Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21. 148 Stair, Inst 1.1.22; see para 2.02 above. 149 Bell, Principles §§ 2028–2057. 150 According to Lord Irvine of Lairg, the then Lord Chancellor, Hansard, HL Deb 3 November 1997, col 1228, echoing the Labour Party’s 1997 manifesto pledge. See also Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, Cm 3782, 1997. 151 Lord Hoffmann, “The Universality of Human Rights” (2009) 125 LQR 416 at 422.

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a route to enforce Convention rights152 in the domestic courts, rather than by application to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The Human Rights Act 1998 requires all legislation, whether primary or subordinate, to be interpreted in a way that is compatible with Convention rights,153 and makes provision for challenging legislation that is not ECHRcompliant.154 Moreover, the Act makes it unlawful for public authorities to act in a way that is incompatible with Convention rights,155 and provides a framework for bringing proceedings against errant authorities,156 as well as a range of judicial remedies including the award of damages.157 Further detail on the right of action against public authorities is given in chapter 7, but, as explained there, liability under the 1998 Act and delictual liability at common law have not been elided but continue to follow separate paths of development.158 A breach of a public authority’s duty to act compatibly with Convention rights does not necessarily entail breach of common law duty,159 and vice versa. This is not to downplay the impact of the 1998 Act upon the law of delict. It is certainly true that the Act stops short of a mechanism for invoking the ECHR directly in disputes between private parties. But since the statutory definition of public authorities includes the courts,160 they too come under the obligation to act compatibly with Convention rights, not only in deciding cases brought against other public authorities but also in developing the existing common law principles governing disputes between private parties.161 And while the 1998 Act cannot be said to have inaugurated an era of judicial creativity, the imperative to give expression to Convention rights has made its mark upon the law in areas where the protection of Convention rights was previously fragile. A notable example can be seen in England in the process by which the courts have built a new tort of misuse of private information from the shell of the equitable wrong of breach of confidence, thus giving due recognition to the values 152 For an explanation of the term “Convention rights” and its definition in the Human Rights Act 1998 s 1, see J Murdoch, Reed and Murdoch: Human Rights Law in Scotland, 4th edn (2017) para 1.31. These are the rights and fundamental freedoms set out in (a) Arts 2–12 and 14 of the Convention; (b) Arts 1–3 of the First Protocol; and (c) Art 1 of the Thirteenth Protocol. The content of ECHR Arts 1 and 13 is dealt with by the Human Rights Act itself. 153 Human Rights Act 1998 s 3. 154 By means of a “declaration of incompatibility” (s 4). The Scotland Act 1998 s 29(1)(d) goes further, by determining the competence of the Scottish Parliament in such a way as to exclude legislation incompatible with the Convention. 155 Human Rights Act 1998 s 6. From the time of its formation in May 1999 the Scottish Government had been required to act compatibly with the Convention: Scotland Act 1998 s 57. 156 s 7. 157 s 8. 158 See paras 7.31–7.34 below. 159 See Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732. 160 At s 6(3). 161 See Reed and Murdoch: Human Rights Law in Scotland para 1.81.

Fundamental Concepts   53

enshrined in ECHR Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence) as balanced against the liberties enshrined in Article 10 (freedom of expression).162

E. THE ROLE OF INSURANCE In the great majority of the delict cases that find their way into the courtroom, one or both parties is likely to be insured. Third-party insurance, funding the defender’s liability for damage to others, has become standard in many areas, and indeed compulsory in some.163 Where a wrongdoer who was insured against third-party liability has become insolvent, the wrongdoer’s rights against the insurer to be indemnified in the event of a successful claim are transferred to the third party (thereby avoiding the possibility that payment from the insurer is simply divided among the creditors). In such cases the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 allows third parties to bring proceedings to enforce claims directly against the insurer, subject to the liability of the insolvent person being established.164 First-party insurance is also common, whereby the pursuer has in place a policy providing for a certain amount to be paid out in the event of the insured suffering a specified form of damage. The fact that a person has first-party insurance covering all or part of the damage suffered does not alter the way the person’s claim is quantified. If, for example, the damage suffered is personal injury, the injured person is able to claim compensation from the wrongdoer, and in addition retain the amount payable under the insurance policy for that injury. As Lord Reid observed in Parry v Cleaver, “it would be unjust and unreasonable to hold that the money which [the plaintiff] prudently spent on premiums and the benefit from it should enure to the benefit of the tortfeasor”.165 Where the claim relates to the death of a relative, no deduction is made from the sum awarded to offset insurance monies received by the relative of the deceased.166 In principle, the same is true in respect of property damage or economic loss.167 But where payment is made under the policy, and the pursuer also 162 See paras 20.14–20.15 below. On the question of whether the equivalent delict is accepted in Scotland, see paras 20.16–20.19. 163 E.g. in regard to motor vehicle users and injury caused to third parties, as now provided in the Road Traffic Act 1988 s 143 but deriving originally from the Road Traffic Act 1930 s 35. Employers similarly are bound to insure against their liability for personal injury to their employees: Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969. 164 Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 ss 1 and 3; see e.g. Burnett v Marcius [2018] CSOH 34, 2018 SLT 472. 165 Parry v Cleaver [1970] AC 1 at 14, citing Forgie v Henderson (1818) 1 Mur 410 per Lord Chief Commissioner Adam at 418: insurance pay-out was “a return for money paid”. 166 Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 8(1). 167 Port Glasgow and Newark Sailcloth Co v Caledonian Railway Co (1892) 19 R 608, affd (1893) 20 R (HL) 35.

2.48

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2.51

recovers compensation in a court action in relation to the same damage or loss, the pursuer must account to the insurer for the amount thereby received.168 In the event, however, that the pursuer is awarded more in the court action than was payable from the insurance policy, the excess is not handed to the insurers.169 An insurer which has indemnified an insured against a particular loss is ordinarily entitled to be subrogated in any claim relative to that loss and thus to enforce any right of recourse which would have been available to the insured.170 Although one or both parties to a litigation are often insured, the traditional view is that it is irrelevant to the adjudication of individual cases to consider whether the defender was insured against liability, or indeed whether the pursuer had first-party insurance cover.171 Nonetheless, at a more general level, insurance practices exert a significant influence upon the development of the law.172 Almost all personal injury claims are made against defenders who are insured,173 and indeed the scale of damages awards now regularly made in respect of personal injuries can only be accounted for by judicial awareness that this is so, and that the imposition of liability need not therefore entail the defender’s financial ruin.174 Moreover, insurance practices appear to have been a factor in the extension of the reach of negligence in recent years, and, in some areas at least,175 in the imposition of a more exacting standard of care. The statutory requirement that users of motor vehicles carry third-party insurance,176 for example, forms part of the background to a standard of care that the vast majority of ordinary drivers would struggle to meet.177 Equally, it has been argued 168 Castellain v Preston (1883) 11 QBD 380. 169 L Lucas Ltd v Export Credits Guarantee Department [1974] 1 WLR 909. 170 Caledonia North Sea Ltd v British Telecommunications plc [2002] UKHL 4, 2002 SC (HL) 117 per Lord Bingham at para 11. 171 Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555 per Viscount Simonds at 576–577; Hunt v Severs [1994] 2 AC 350 per Lord Bridge at 363; Caledonia North Sea Ltd v British Telecommunications plc [2002] UKHL 4, 2002 SC (HL) 117. 172 For a detailed study arguing that the operation of insurance lies at the core of obligations law in both conceptual and practical terms, see R Merkin and J Steele, Insurance and the Law of Obligations (2013). For an overview of “Insurance and the common law tradition”, see J Morgan, “Tort, Insurance and Incoherence” (2004) 67 MLR 384 at 389–391. But for a robust attack on the relevance of insurance and insurability to tort liability, see J Stapleton, “Tort, Insurance and Ideology” (1995) 58 MLR 820. 173 Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (Pearson Commission), Cmnd 7054-II (1978) vol 2, para 509. 174 Morris v Ford Motor Co Ltd [1973] QB 792 per Lord Denning at 798. For discussion, see Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law 249. 175 See e.g. Vowles v Evans [2003] EWCA Civ 318, [2003] 1 WLR 1607 per Lord Phillips at para 12 (on duty of care by sports referees). 176 Now contained in the Road Traffic Act 1988 s 143, but deriving originally from the Road Traffic Act 1930 s 35. 177 As pointed out by Atiyah’s Accidents Compensation and the Law 29–30; see also para 10.03 below. For acknowledgement that in this context judges regard insurance companies as being the answer to the test: “On whom should the risk fall?”, see Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691 per Lord Denning at 699–700.

Fundamental Concepts   55

that the reality of employers’ liability insurance was an important consideration in the relaxation of the “but-for” test for causation in favour of a “material increase in risk” test in cases of industrial disease, in particular mesothelioma.178 On the other hand, the disruption to existing insurance conventions has been cited as a reason for judicial reluctance to extend duty of care in respect of certain categories of economic loss.179

178 R Merkin, “Tort, Insurance and Ideology: Further Thoughts” (2012) 75 MLR 301 at 319; see also paras 13.32–13.44 below. 179 Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd [1996] 1 AC 211 per Lord Steyn at 239–241.

Chapter 3

Liability for the Acts of Others

Para A. VICARIOUS LIABILITY: INTRODUCTION (1) Overview���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.01 (2) History (a) Injuries “from the manner of doing the master’s work”��� 3.05 (b) Doctrine of common employment��������������������������������� 3.09 (3) Policy rationale������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.10 B. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS FOR EMPLOYEES������������������ 3.17 (1) The employment relationship (a) Identifying employment relationships����������������������������� 3.18 (b) Relationships “akin to employment”������������������������������ 3.23 (c) Loan of employees�������������������������������������������������������� 3.31 (d) Sharing of the employer’s responsibilities����������������������� 3.33 (2) The course of employment (a) The Salmond test and its limitations������������������������������ 3.35 (b) Lister and the close-connection test�������������������������������� 3.39 (c) The employee’s “field of activities”�������������������������������� 3.46 (d) “Frolics” of the employee’s own������������������������������������ 3.48 (3) The close-connection test: the important of context�������������� 3.50 (a) Employees in customer-facing roles������������������������������� 3.51 (b) Police officers��������������������������������������������������������������� 3.54 (c) Intentional injury to fellow employees���������������������������� 3.57 (d) Harassment������������������������������������������������������������������ 3.60 (e) Dishonesty�������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.62 (f) Fraud��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.64 (4) Travel in the course of employment������������������������������������� 3.67 C. LIABILITY OF PRINCIPALS FOR AGENTS (1) Direct liability��������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.71 (2) Vicarious liability���������������������������������������������������������������� 3.72 (a) Liability of principals for fraud by agents������������������������ 3.73 (b) Liability of car-owners for drivers����������������������������������� 3.74 D. LIABILITY OF PARTNERSHIPS FOR PARTNERS��������������� 3.77 E. NON-DELEGABLE DUTIES OF CARE��������������������������������� 3.79 (1) Safety of employees in the workplace����������������������������������� 3.82 (2) Inherently hazardous operations������������������������������������������ 3.83 (3) Care of the vulnerable��������������������������������������������������������� 3.87 56

Liability for the Acts of Others   57

A. VICARIOUS LIABILITY: INTRODUCTION (1) Overview A fundamental principle of delictual liability is encapsulated in the Latin maxim culpa tenet suos auctores,1 explained by Hume as follows: “each man is liable for his own fault, and no one for that of another”.2 Yet there are situations where the obligation to make reparation is imposed on a person other than the author of the wrongdoing. The doctrine of vicarious liability provides the main, though not the only, example. Where the defender’s (D’s) relationship with the wrongdoer (W) is one to which vicarious liability applies, D is held strictly liable for delicts perpetrated by W upon the pursuer (P) in the course of the D–W relationship, even although D has not committed a wrongful act and has not contributed to the wrong in any immediate causal sense. By far the most common instance of such a relationship is employment, so that employers are generally held liable for the wrongs committed by employees in the course of their employment. Vicarious liability may also be imposed, exceptionally, in relationships that are “akin to employment”.3 In addition, vicarious liability arises as between a partnership and its partners.4 By contrast, independent contractors who commit delicts do not generally render their clients vicariously liable, although the relationship between the client and the injured party may be sufficiently close to give rise to a direct, non-delegable, duty of care to prevent harm.5 Unless an employment relationship exists between them,6 parties to a marriage or civil partnership are not vicariously liable for wrongs committed by each other. Nor are parents vicariously liable for wrongs committed by their children,7 although parents may be held directly liable in negligence where they have failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent their children harming others.8

  1 “Fault binds its authors”. See G MacCormack, “Culpa Tenet Suos Auctores: The Application of a Principle in Scots Law” 1973 JR 159.  2 Hume, Lectures III, 187; or, as stated by Lord Rodger in Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corporation [2002] UKHL 43, [2003] 1 AC 959 at para 40, “Where someone commits a tortious act, he at least will be liable for the consequences; whether others are liable also depends on the circumstances.”   3 As in e.g. Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1; see paras 3.23–3.26 below.   4 See paras 3.77–3.78 below.   5 See paras 3.79 ff below.   6 See discussion in Martin v Ward (1887) 14 R 814.  7 M’Kay v M’Lean 1920 1 SLT 34; Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256, [1945] ALR 392.  8 Brown v Fulton (1881) 9 R 36; Newton v Edgerley [1959] 1 WLR 1031. See also Carmarthenshire County Council v Lewis [1955] AC 549 (occupiers of school premises adjoining a highway under duty to prevent children from escaping thereby creating a hazard). For further discussion, see paras 10.36–10.37 below.

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Vicarious liability renders D strictly liable for the wrongdoing of W in regard to P. It does not, however, remove the personal responsibility of W to P, with the result that D and W are jointly and severally liable.9 In the event that D is found vicariously liable to P for the wrongdoing of W, D may seek indemnity from W.10 In the employment context, the victim normally pursues the employer, which in most cases has deeper pockets than the wrongdoer and is in any event likely to be insured.11 And although, as a matter of law, the employer has a right to be indemnified by the employee,12 as a matter of convention, an agreement was struck by members of the British Insurance Association in the 1950s to the effect that:13 “Employers’ Liability Insurers agree that they will not institute a claim against the employee of an insured employer in respect of the death of or injury to a fellow-employee unless the weight of evidence clearly indicates (i) collusion or (ii) wilful misconduct on the part of the employee against whom a claim is made.”

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The continuing effect of this agreement is that employers and their insurers do not generally seek recovery from an employee who has injured, unintentionally, a fellow-employee in the workplace.14 The agreement is, however, inapplicable in cases of “wilful misconduct”,15 or where the wrongdoer and the victim were not fellow-employees.16 Where an employer who was insured against third-party liability becomes insolvent, the employer’s rights against the insurer to be indemnified in   9 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 s 3(1). 10 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 s 3(2). See also G L Junor, “The Employer Solicitor’s Right of Relief?” 1998 SLT (News) 275. 11 See e.g. Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 in relation to injuries sustained by employees. 12 Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555; Ross Harper & Murphy v Banks 2000 SC 500; Bell v Alliance Medical Ltd [2015] CSOH 34, 2015 SCLR 676. 13 As reproduced in Morris v Ford Motor Co Ltd [1973] QB 792 at 799. This was said to be in response to fears that industrial relations would be unsettled by employers and their insurers regularly pursuing employees for indemnity in respect of industrial injuries caused by the employee’s negligence. 14 See J Birds et al (eds), Macgillivray on Insurance Law, 14th edn (2018) paras 24–080 to 24–082. 15 See e.g. Mohidin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWHC 105 (QB), [2016] 1 Costs LR 71; but see also Burnett v Marcius [2018] CSOH 34, 2018 SLT 472, rejecting the insurer’s argument that its liability to indemnify the employer was excluded because the policy had excluded “wilful” conduct. Although the employee had intended to assault the pursuer’s husband, he had not intended to kill him. The cover provided by the policy therefore extended to the employee’s negligence in causing his death.  16 See e.g. Morris v Ford Motor Co Ltd [1973] QB 792 (accident occurred at a factory due to the negligence of a factory employee, but the victim was an employee of a firm of cleaners which had been bound by the contract to indemnify the factory for accidents occurring to employees there); Bell v Alliance Medical Ltd [2015] CSOH 34, 2015 SCLR 676. For discussion, see T Weir, “Subrogation and Indemnity” (2012) 71 CLJ 1 (article originally published privately in 1973).

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the event of a successful claim are transferred to the third-party claimant. The Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 allows third parties to bring proceedings against the insurer, subject to the negligence of the employee and the vicarious liability of the employer being established.17

(2) History (a) Injuries “from the manner of doing the master’s work” The principle that employers should be liable for the wrongdoing of employees has a long history in Scots,18 as in English,19 law. Although early case law is sparse,20 the topic was already well-known by the time of the Institutional writers. Stair wrote of the direct liability of masters as “anterior” accessories to wrongdoing by “pernicious servants”, where fault lay in “knowing and not restraining the common and known inclination of the actors towards delinquences”.21 The master would also be liable where wrongdoing had been committed by the servant “by command” of the master, on the basis that “he doeth that causeth do”.22 Bankton similarly suggested that masters were liable for wrongdoing carried out when servants were acting in the “business in which they are employed” and at the master’s command.23 The role of personal fault, and the scope of what lay within the master’s “command”, remained unsettled, however, as shown by a series of cases in the early nineteenth century. In Keith v Kerr 24 in 1812, a landowner was held liable for the consequences of a fire started by his employees while clearing his farm land, even though he was not in the area at the time and had apparently ordered that fire should not be used for this purpose. Yet, by contrast, in Linwood v Hathorn25 in 1817, a landowner was absolved of liability for a fatal accident caused by a servant, on 17 Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 ss 1 and 3; see e.g. Burnett v Marcius [2018] CSOH 34, 2018 SLT 472. 18 P Simpson, “Vicarious Liability”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann, A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 584–588. 19 D J Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (1999) 69–70. 20 See e.g. Murislaw v Halyburton (1623) Mor 13984; Sibbald v Lady Rosyth (1685) Mor 13976. 21 Stair, Inst 1.9.5. 22 Stair, Inst 1.9.5. 23 Bankton, Inst 1.10.47: “If damage is done by children in family, or servants, in the offices or business in which they are employed, their father or master is liable to repair it; but otherwise, the children or servants are only answerable themselves for damage done, without the parent’s or master’s authority; and if with it, the parent or master only, and not the children or servants who were bound to obey.” See further 1.2.54; 1.2.Observation 30 (commenting that “our practice in the like cases is agreeable to the law of England”); 4.45.175. See also Erskine, Inst 3.1.15, to the effect that “whoever gives a mandate or order for doing [a wrong], is held as the doer”. 24 Keith v Keir 10 June 1812 FC. 25 14 May 1817 FC affd (1821) 1 Sh App 20. The defender, who was a Writer to the Signet, was held not to be liable to the family of a passerby killed when employees on his estate felled a tree in such a way that it fell on a public road.

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the basis that the master had been absent from the scene and had given no specific orders about the operation in hand. A thread running through the early cases was that employers who had failed adequately to supervise inexperienced or unreliable26 employees should be held answerable for damage. Any notion, however, that liability was contingent on the employer having observed the employee’s “malpractice”27 in person did not survive long into the nineteenth century. The proliferation of litigation arising from the incidents of industrialisation and urbanisation, and the changing nature of employment relationships, meant that it was difficult to sustain a requirement for the employer to have been present at the scene and to have given specific directions to the errant employee.28 In Baird v Hamilton, the court rejected the proposition that liability turned upon negligence or blame on the part of the employer itself. Employers were liable where damage had arisen from “the way and manner of doing the master’s work”,29 and in stating this principle the court was said to be aligning itself with “the general law of Europe”.30 Thus the fourth edition of Bell’s Principles, published in 1839, set out, in § 547, an extended statement of the liability of masters for intentional “injuries”31 inflicted by servants: “1. If a master give express directions, in obeying which damage is done, he is liable for it. 2. Where something is directed to be done, or is in the common line of the servant’s duty, but no special directions are given, the servant’s act, and even his exercise of discretion, is the act and discretion of the master, and he is liable.

26 See Brown v Macgregor 26 Feb 1813 FC (holding coach operators liable to the family of a passenger killed when a coach overturned, on the basis that employers were liable for damage caused by the “unskilfullness, malversation or culpable negligence of servants, in matters entrusted to their care”). Later, in Linwood v Hathorn 14 May 1817 FC, Lord Justice-Clerk Boyle was to comment that the coach operator in Brown had been warned that the driver was drunk, “and yet he allowed him to drive”. 27 See Hume, Lectures III, 190: “This obligation of a master, for the faults of his servants, reaches those wrongs only which are done, properly speaking, with relation to or by occasion of his service, and where the malpractice is of such a kind, as ought to fall under the master’s own observation, and might be effectually prevented, if he maintained due discipline among his people.” 28 On the equivalent problem in England, see discussion in M Lobban, “Tort”, in W Cornish et al, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol XII, 1820–1914: Private Law (2010) 877 at 894–899. 29 (1826) 4 S 790 per Lord Glenlee at 791. 30 (1826) 4 S 790 per Lord Alloway at 792. The authorities cited by both parties included Pothier and case law from England. 31 I.e. offences “committed with an injurious fraudulent or criminal purpose” (§ 544). Although § 547 dealt specifically with intentional “injuries”, the framework set out there was copied over into general statements of vicarious liability that survived into the twentieth century: see e.g. the four different types of situation “envisaged as guides to the solution of this problem” as posited by Lord President Clyde in Kirby v National Coal Board 1958 SC 514 at 532–533.

Liability for the Acts of Others   61 3. Where the master has not ordered, or authorized, the thing to be done; and especially where he has forbidden it, he is not liable. And, 4. If the servant willfully or maliciously do an injurious act, his master will not be liable.”

In relation to “injuries by negligence”, Bell added, the master was liable “provided the injury arises from the manner of doing the master’s work, and not from some cause unconnected; or some license used by the servant”.32 A textbook on master and servant, published in 1841, further explained that liability attached to “misconduct within the scope of the [servant’s] engagement”, and that “The damage must arise from the way and manner of doing the master’s work, and not from some cause unconnected with the work itself”.33 Another textbook of the same period explained, for the avoidance of doubt, that if the servant’s wrongdoing “lay within the line of his duties it will form no relevant defence to the master that he was not aware, that the servant was engaged in such employment at the time, and had given no express order that he should perform it”.34 On the other hand, the master would not be liable for wrongdoing perpetrated without the master’s knowledge and outwith the servant’s “line of duties”.35 In that connection “wilful” or “malicious” acts were generally outwith the line of duties;36 but, as Guthrie Smith was later to explain, “malice and wantonness will not defeat responsibility if the thing done was merely a mode of doing what the servant was employed to do”.37 It was settled by the mid-nineteenth century, therefore, that employers might be found vicariously without personal fault on their part. Problems remained, however, and indeed still endure, in pinpointing relevant contracts of service, and in deciding when wrongdoing took employees outwith the scope of their duties, particularly when the wrongdoing was intentional.38

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(b) Doctrine of common employment An important part of the background to late nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury case law was the doctrine of common employment. This English law doctrine was confirmed as extending to Scotland by the House of

32 Bell, Principles § 2031. 33 T Baird, Treatise on the Law of Scotland Relative to Master and Servant and Master and Apprentice (1840) 153. 34 P Fraser, A Treatise on the Law of Scotland: As Applicable to the Personal and Domestic Relations (1846) vol 2, 455–456. (Subsequent editions, in which the section on Master and Servant was published under separate cover, appeared in 1872 and 1882.) 35 Fraser, A Treatise on the Law of Scotland: As Applicable to the Personal and Domestic Relations, vol 2, 458. 36 Miller v Harvie (1827) 4 Mur 385 37 Guthrie Smith, Damages 330. 38 For discussion see P Simpson, “Vicarious Liability”, in Reid and Zimmermann, History, vol 2, 584 at 601–611.

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Lords decision in Bartonshill Coal Co v Reid in 1858,39 and remained part of the law until its abolition by statute in 1948.40 Latterly acknowledged as “illogical”,41 the effect of the doctrine was that employees could not be held liable for negligent conduct which caused the injury of a fellow employee. Hence employers, in turn, could not be held vicariously liable to employees for workplace accidents where a fellow employee had been at fault, which of course accounted for a large proportion of industrial injuries. Accordingly, case law involving vicarious liability for workplace accidents became commonplace only in the latter part of the twentieth century. That is not to say, however, that earlier generations of employers escaped liability entirely. The principle that an employer, of itself, owed a primary, and non-delegable, duty of care to its employees to provide safe working conditions was perhaps a by-product of the negation of vicarious liability,42 but, if so, it has survived the abolition of the common employment doctrine. Similarly, the enhancement of statutory duties can be seen as providing a route to redress for injured workers during this period.43

(3) Policy rationale 3.10

3.11

Various policy explanations have been put forward as justifying the imposition of vicarious liability.44 All of the following have been accorded some measure of judicial recognition, with the emphasis changing depending upon the context.45 A traditional argument is that employers have deep pockets, and in situations where an employee who has caused injury has few assets or is uninsured, the doctrine allows accident victims to identify a betterresourced46 defender from whom compensation can be obtained.47 This 39 (1858) 3 Macq 266, in which Lord Cranworth famously ventured, at 285: “if such be the law of England, on what ground can it be argued not to be the law of Scotland?”. For commentary, see Simpson, “Vicarious liability” 591 ff; A D Gibb, Law from Over the Border (1950) 58–59, 99–101. 40 Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948 s 1. 41 English v Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co Ltd 1937 SC (HL) 46 per Lord Wright at 61. 42 For discussion, see English v Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co 1937 SC (HL) 46. 43 See Clerk and Lindsell on Torts para 12–47. 44 See discussion in T Baty, Vicarious liability: A Short History of the Liability of Employers, Principals, Partners, Associations and Trade-Union Members with a Chapter on the laws of Scotland and Foreign States (1916) 146–154; P Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (1967) 15–28; P Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort (2010) 227–254. A comprehensive modern evaluation is provided by J Neyers, “A Theory of Vicarious Liability” (2005) 43 Alberta Law Review 287. 45 For recent detailed discussion, see Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] AC 660 per Lord Reed at para 20. 46 Employers are required to carry insurance against accidents occurring in the operation of their businesses: Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969; and see also Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010. 47 E v English Province of Our Lady of Charity [2012] EWCA Civ 938, [2013] QB 722 per Ward LJ at para 52.

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is hardly a satisfactory justification in itself, since, as Lord Reed observed in Cox v Ministry of Justice, “The mere possession of wealth is not in itself any ground for imposing liability”.48 Moreover, it begs the question why employers should not then also be liable for delicts committed by independent contractors. However, modern case law continues to emphasise the importance of achieving a route to compensation where an award of damages against the actual wrongdoer may often be worthless.49 Another rationalisation, seen already in nineteenth-century sources, is that employers can reduce the risk of accidents by efficient management and training of their workforce, and therefore vicarious liability incentivises good practice and deters bad.50 However, the effectiveness of vicarious liability as an impetus for effective accident-prevention seems doubtful. This argument is perhaps more persuasive in jurisdictions where employers can avoid liability by demonstrating that reasonable care was shown in selecting employees,51 but less so where vicarious liability is applied even when the employer has taken every care in this regard. A related argument is that the employer has been in “control” of the activities of the wrongdoer, and should therefore be held accountable where the level of that control has proved insufficient. However, the control theory fails to explain why parents are not held liable in respect of their children’s wrongdoing – nor teachers in respect of their pupils – and it is apparently contradicted by the liability of employers for professional employees such as surgeons over whose activities no close control can be exercised.52 Thus, vicarious liability cannot be accounted for one way or another by reference only to “control”, although the absence of even a “vestigial degree of control” is an indicator that vicarious liability should not apply.53 Modern commentary has focussed increasingly upon “enterprise liability”, looking upon vicarious liability as a device for apportioning appropriately the true costs created by a given enterprise, according to the principle that the person who derives the profit should internalise the risk that its

48 [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] AC 660 at para 20. See also P Cane, “Vicarious Liability for Sexual Abuse” (2000) 116 LQR 21 at 26: “the fairness of vicarious liability depends on who [the employers] are and what they have done, not on what they can afford”. 49 See Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council [2017] UKSC 60, [2018] AC 355 per Lord Reed at para 63. 50 See discussion in Bazley v Curry (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 45 per McLachlin J at paras 32–33. See also T Baird, Treatise on the Law of Scotland Relative to Master and Servant and Master and Apprentice (1840) 153, to the effect that vicarious liability, while “apparently severe”, was imposed “in order to induce masters to be careful in the choice of their servants, upon whom both their own security, and that of others, so greatly depends”. 51 As e.g. in German law: BGB § 831(1). 52 See P Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (1967) 15–16. 53 [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] AC 660 per Lord Reed at paras 20–21. For an example where the absence of control was decisive, see Kafagi v JBW Group Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 1157.

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employees may inflict injury.54 This is reflected in “the underlying legal policy” articulated by the House of Lords:55 “[C]arrying on a business enterprise necessarily involves risks to others. It involves the risk that others will be harmed by wrongful acts committed by the agents through whom the business is carried on. When those risks ripen into loss, it is just that the business should be responsible for compensating the person who has been wronged.”

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A difficulty with this argument is that the benefit of some forms of enterprise, and charitable enterprises in particular, is often widely spread through the community.56 And again it does not wholly explain why vicarious liability should attach to the acts of employees and not, as a general rule, to those of independent contractors. Some commentators have accounted for vicarious liability by reference to the contract between employer and employee into which is implied an undertaking to indemnify the employee for liabilities incurred in the conduct of the employer’s business. The victim of the wrongdoing is in turn subrogated to the employee’s right of indemnity.57 A rejoinder to this explanation is that the notion of implied indemnification sits awkwardly with egregious instances of intentional wrongdoing by the employee, such as child abuse. It is also at odds with the English and Scots authority noted above to the effect that the employer is entitled to indemnification by the employee.58 In short, no one rationale provides a definitive explanation for vicarious liability.59 Instead, the Supreme Court has sought to identify a basic list of five “policy reasons”, including “deep pockets” and control arguments as well as a reference to enterprise liability:60 “(i) the employer is more likely to have the means to compensate the victim than the employee and can be expected to have insured against that liability;

54 See Bazley v Curry (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 45 per McLachlin J at para 22; G C Keating, “The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability” (2001) 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 1285; D Brodie, Enterprise Liability and the Common Law (2010). 55 Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48, [2003] 2 AC 366 per Lord Nicholls at para 21. 56 See P Morgan, “Recasting Vicarious Liability” (2012) 71 CLJ 615 at 618–620. 57 J Neyers, “A Theory of Vicarious Liability” (2005) 43 Alberta Law Review 287 at 301–304. 58 Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555; Ross Harper & Murphy v Banks 2000 SC 500; and see para 3.03 above. For a rebuttal of possible objections to the contract theory, see Neyers, “A Theory of Vicarious Liability” 304–325. 59 See discussion in Neyers, “A Theory of Vicarious Liability”; Morgan, “Recasting Vicarious Liability”. See also remarks by Lord President Cooper in Kilboy v South Eastern Fife Area Joint Committee 1952 SC 280 at 285. 60 See Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1 per Lord Phillips at para 35.

Liability for the Acts of Others   65 (ii) the tort will have been committed as a result of activity being taken by the employee on behalf of the employer; (iii) the employee’s activity is likely to be part of the business activity of the employer; (iv) the employer, by employing the employee to carry on the activity will have created the risk of the tort committed by the employee; (v) the employee will, to a greater or lesser degree, have been under the control of the employer.”

All of these factors involve questions of degree and none is conclusive. The first and the fifth in particular are likely to hold little independent significance.61 However, this list has established itself as the necessary background for any discussion of the boundaries of vicarious liability, and in particular the circumstances in which the doctrine should be extended to analogous contexts that are seen as “akin to employment”.62

B. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS FOR EMPLOYEES In the employment context vicarious liability rests upon two essential requirements, both of which have been the subject of considerable judicial development in recent years. The first is that a relationship exists between the defender and the wrongdoer which can be characterised either as employment63 or as “akin to employment”.64 The second is that the alleged wrongful acts by the employee should have been committed in the course of that employment or quasi-employment.65

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(1) The employment relationship (a) Identifying employment relationships Employers are vicariously liable for wrongdoings committed by a person engaged in an employment relationship with them at the time of the wrongdoing. In the great majority of cases a contract of service between the parties can readily be identified, but where it cannot, attention may be given not just to the detail of any contract between the parties but to the “realities” of the arrangements between them.66

61 Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] AC 660 per Lord Reed at paras 20–21. 62 See e.g. Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] AC 660 per Lord Reed at paras 17–24; Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council [2017] UKSC 60, [2018] AC 355 per Lord Reed at paras 59–73; Various Claimants v Barclays Bank plc [2020] UKSC 13, [2020] AC 973 per Lady Hale at para 15. 63 See paras 3.18–3.22 below. 64 See paras 3.23–3.30 below. 65 See paras 3.35 ff below. 66 Ferguson v Dawson [1976] 1 WLR 1213 per Megaw LJ at 1222, cited in E v English Province of Our Lady of Charity [2012] EWCA Civ 938, [2013] QB 722 per Ward LJ at para 29; see also Uber BV v Aslam [2021] UKSC 5.

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The key criterion in determining whether a relevant employment relationship existed has traditionally been the degree to which the alleged employer exerted detailed control or authority over the other person’s conduct at work.67 Control remains significant, particularly in relation to unskilled workers, but is less decisive in categorising the status of the more highly skilled, such as surgeons, IT specialists, or ships’ captains. Skilled workers are perfectly capable of entering into employment relationships, but they are often expected to exercise a high level of autonomy and to apply expertise that is not susceptible to detailed management by others.68 Indeed employers would usually lack the expertise to impose direct control, and increasingly are large corporate bodies rather than individuals. With changing employment patterns and increasing numbers of skilled workers, there has been recognition that in many employment relationships “the employer can direct what the employee does, not how he does it”.69 It is accepted therefore that degree of control is a more decisive factor in some contexts than in others, and sometimes needs to be looked at alongside a range of other considerations. As summarised by Lord Reed in Cox v Ministry of Justice, control “is a factor which is unlikely to be of independent significance in most cases. On the other hand, the absence of even that vestigial degree of control would be liable to negative the imposition of vicarious liability.”70 A further test that emerged from decisions by Lord Denning in the 1950s focussed less on control and more upon whether the work of the person in question was “an integral part” of the employer’s business”,71 as “part and parcel of the organisation”.72 Was the work “integrated” into the business or “only accessory to it”?73 Subsequent case law has criticised this “integration” test as too vague, and has questioned its reliability in identifying contracts of employment, particularly in regard to workplaces where key functions are fulfilled by self-employed contractors working under contracts for services, casual workers or those working concurrently for more than one person.74 Nonetheless, the question whether a worker is “so

67 For an account of the control test, see P Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (1967) 15–28; P Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort (2010) 40–49. 68 Macdonald v Glasgow Western Hospitals Board of Management 1954 SC 453; United Wholesale Grocers Ltd v Sher 1993 SLT 284; see also discussion in Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council [2017] UKSC 60, [2018] AC 355 per Lord Reed at para 65; cf Montgomery v Johnson Underwood Ltd [2001] ICR 819 (unfair dismissal). 69 Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1 per Lord Phillips at para 36. 70 [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] AC 660 at para 21. 71 Stephenson, Jordan & Harrison Ltd v Macdonald & Evans (1952) 69 RPC 10 per Denning LJ at 22. 72 Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart NV v Slatford [1953] 1 QB 248 per Denning LJ at 295. 73 Stephenson, Jordan & Harrison Ltd v Macdonald & Evans (1952) 69 RPC 10 per Denning LJ at 22. 74 Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497 per McKenna J at 524; Lee v Chung [1990] 2 AC 374 per Lord Griffiths at 388.

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much a part of the work, business or organisation” continues to be asked, albeit in parallel with other considerations,75 and it has taken on further importance in assessing whether a relationship “akin to employment” was in existence, as discussed further below.76 In the modern law no single test is regarded as conclusive in pinpointing the contract of service, but instead a mix of criteria are applicable, with the emphasis changing according to context.77 Aside from control, other indicia of the employment relationship include the alleged employer’s power of selection of the person; the payment of wages or other remuneration; and the employer’s right of suspension or dismissal.78 On the other hand, in identifying a contract for services, to which vicarious liability does not apply, it is relevant to consider:79

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“whether the man performing the services provides his own equipment, whether he hires his own helpers, what degree of financial risk he takes, what degree of responsibility for investment and management he has, and whether and how far he has an opportunity of profiting from sound management in the performance of his task. The application of the general test may be easier in a case where the person who engages himself to perform the services does so in the course of an already established business of his own; but this factor is not decisive, and a person who engages himself to perform services for another may well be an independent contractor even though he has not entered into the contract in the course of an existing business carried on by him.”

Staff working within the National Health Service are normally regarded as employees and the relevant Health Board is held vicariously liable for wrongdoing committed in the course of that employment.80 The Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland is liable in respect of any unlawful conduct perpetrated by police officers in carrying out their functions, “in the same manner as an employer is liable in respect of any unlawful conduct on the part of an employee in the course of employment”.81 The

75 Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1151, [2006] QB 510 per Rix LJ at para 79. 76 Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1 per Lord Phillips at para 49; Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] AC 660 per Lord Reed at para 24. 77 See e.g. United Wholesale Grocers Ltd v Sher 1993 SLT 284. For a useful set of “tick boxes”, see N J McBride and R Bagshaw Tort Law, 6th edn (2018) 834–837. 78 Short v J & W Henderson Ltd 1946 SC (HL) 24 per Lord Thankerton at 33. 79 Market Investigations Ltd v Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173 per Cooke J at 184–185, endorsed in Lee v Chung [1990] 2 AC 374 per Lord Griffiths at 382 and in E v English Province of Our Lady of Charity [2012] EWCA Civ 938, [2013] QB 722 per Ward LJ at para 67. 80 Gold v Essex County Council [1942] 2 KB 293; Cassidy v Ministry of Health [1951] 2 KB 343 at 363; Macdonald v Glasgow Western Hospitals Board of Management 1954 SC 453. 81 Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 s 24(1).

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Scottish Fire and Rescue Service is liable in respect of unlawful conduct by its firefighters acting in the course of their duties.82

(b) Relationships “akin to employment” 3.23

There is now acceptance that vicarious liability should apply in certain situations where a relationship between the alleged wrongdoer and another party is closely analogous to employment, even although there is no formal contract of employment between them. The status of such relationships “akin to employment” first came to the fore in cases involving allegations of child abuse, where the alleged abuser was a clergyman or monk or nun in holy orders. In the leading case of Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society,83 the claimants claimed to have been sexually abused as pupils at a boarding school managed by a Roman Catholic diocese. The alleged perpetrators of the abuse were members of a Christian order who performed teaching duties at the school under the close instructions of their order. The teachers were bound by their vows to their order, but their contract of employment was with the diocesan authorities. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ruled that the relationship between the order and the teachers was sufficiently “akin to employment” that the order should be held vicariously liable for the teachers’ acts of abuse. As noted above, the court’s analysis of the characteristics of such relationships was informed by discussion of the five policy factors by which vicarious liability is commonly justified.84 The “modern theory”85 of relationships akin to employment, however, was said to rest on the presence of the “essential elements”86 of a relationship between an employer and its employees. In this particular case they were demonstrated by the following: (i) the religious order was subject to a hierarchical structure and conducted its activities as if it were a corporate body; (ii) the teaching activity of the members was undertaken because the order directed them to undertake it; (iii) the teaching activity undertaken by the members was in furtherance of the mission of the order; and (iv) the manner in which the members were obliged to conduct themselves as teachers was dictated by the rules of the order.87 The fact that the members of the order were bound to it by their vows, rather than 82 Kilboy v South Eastern Fife Area Joint Committee 1952 SC 280. 83 Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1. See also E v English Province of Our Lady of Charity [2012] EWCA Civ 938, [2013] QB 722; Kennedy v Bonnici, Madden and Alexander [2021] CSOH 106. 84 See para 3.16 above. 85 As it was later called by Lord Reed in Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] AC 660 at para 24. 86 [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1 per Lord Phillips at para 56. 87 [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1 per Lord Phillips at para 56. For commentary, see C McIvor, “Vicarious Liability and Child Abuse” (2013) 29 Journal of Professional Negligence 62; Lord Hope of Craighead, “Tailoring the Law on Vicarious Liability” (2013) 129 LQR 514.

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by a contract of employment, and that they gifted all their earnings to the order rather than being paid by it, strengthened rather than weakened the connection between the order and its members.88 Taking these elements together, the Supreme Court concluded that the relationship between the order and its members shared the “incidents” of a contract of employment, with the result that vicarious liability should be imposed.89 Not long after the decision in Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society, the concept of relationships akin to employment was extended by the Supreme Court to a very different context. In Cox v Ministry of Justice90 the claimant was a prison catering-manager who had sustained an injury due to the negligence of a prisoner working in the prison kitchen under her supervision. The prisoner had received nominal remuneration from the prison authorities for the kitchen work, but there was certainly no contract of employment between them. Nonetheless, the relationship between the prisoner and the prison authorities was deemed sufficiently akin to employment that vicarious liability was held to apply. Lord Reed referred to the discussion of policy factors in Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society and the “modern theory” of vicarious liability to which they provided the backdrop. This meant that key questions were (a) whether the work of the wrongdoer had been sufficiently “integral” to the business activities of the alleged employer, and (b) whether the wrongdoing was a “risk” created by the employer by that process of integration:91 “[A] relationship other than one of employment is in principle capable of giving rise to vicarious liability where harm is wrongfully done by an individual who carries on activities as an integral part of the business activities carried on by a defendant and for its benefit (rather than his activities being entirely attributable to the conduct of a recognisably independent business of his own or of a third party), and where the commission of the wrongful act is a risk created by the defendant by assigning those activities to the individual in question.”

88 [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1 per Lord Phillips at paras 57–58. Cf JXJ v Province of Great Britain of the Institute of Brothers of the Christian Schools [2020] EWHC 1914 (QB), [2020] ELR 579, holding that a gardener/night watchman employed by the managers of a residential school where members of a religious order formed the teaching staff and controlled its day-to-day business was not in a relationship akin to employment with the religious order. 89 [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1 per Lord Phillips at para 60. Lord Phillips went on to conclude, at para 94, that the imposition of vicarious liability was “fair, just and reasonable”. However, in Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] AC 660 Lord Reed commented, at para 41, that the question of fairness, justice, and reasonableness did not need to be asked where the other relevant criteria had already been met, and that such an exercise “would be liable to lead to uncertainty and inconsistency”. 90 [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] AC 660. 91 [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] AC 660 per Lord Reed at para 24.

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3.25

In this case the prison authorities had integrated the work of prisoners into the operation of the prison by setting them to regular paid work in the kitchens, and in running such a system the prison managers created the risk that prisoners might commit negligent acts within the field of activities assigned to them. The element of compulsion in requiring the prisoner to be incarcerated in the prison and to undertake useful work there meant that there was no contract of employment, but it bound the prisoner “into a closer relationship with the prison service than would be the case for an employee”. As in Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society, the distinctive bonds between them strengthened, rather than weakened, the case for imposing vicarious liability.92 Vicarious liability, moreover, did not require the defendant to have been seeking to make a financial profit from the wrongdoer’s labour, nor that the objectives of the defendant and the wrongdoer, commercial or otherwise, should have been “in alignment”.93 The relevance of relationships akin to employment to the non-commercial sector was confirmed in a further Supreme Court decision, arising once again in the context of child abuse, Armes v Nottinghamshire CC.94 In Armes a local authority was held vicariously liable for the abuse inflicted upon the claimant by foster parents into whose care it had placed her as a child (although the court also held that the local authority had not owed her a non-delegable duty of care),95 The “modern theory” identified in Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society and endorsed in Cox was applied so that the concepts of integration and risk were looked at closely. The provision of foster care was not an independent business venture by the foster parents but “an integral part of the local authority’s organisation of its child care services”; the foster parents were participants in “an activity carried on for the benefit of the local authority”.96 Moreover, the local authority’s placing of children in foster care carried the “inherent risk” that abuse might occur.97 As background to the modern theory, the court in Armes referred back to the policy factors supporting vicarious liability. In exercising “powers of approval, inspection, supervision and removal without any parallel in ordinary family life”, the local authority exerted “a significant degree of control over both what the foster parents did and how they did it, in order to ensure that the children’s needs were met”,

92 [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] AC 660 per Lord Reed at paras 32 and 35. 93 [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] AC 660 per Lord Reed at para 35. 94 [2017] UKSC 60, [2018] AC 355; for commentary, see P Giliker, “Analysing Institutional Liability for Child Sexual Abuse in England and Wales and Australia: Vicarious Liability, Non-Delegable Duties and Statutory Intervention” (2018) 77 CLJ 506. See also A v Glasgow City Council [2021] CSOH 102, in which the vicarious liability of the local authority for abuse committed by a foster carer was a matter of admission. 95 See further discussion at para 3.89 below. 96 [2017] UKSC 60, [2018] AC 355 at paras 59–60. 97 [2017] UKSC 60, [2018] AC 355 at para 61.

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and although the foster parents had “day-to-day” control over the children’s family life, “micro-management” by the defendant was said not to be essential.98 While in Cox Lord Reed had queried the appropriateness of considering the respective resources of employer and employee, in Armes he conceded the importance of the defendant’s “deeper pockets”, in particular in a case such as this involving non-commercial activities:99 “[V]icarious liability is only of practical relevance in situations where (1) the principal tortfeasor cannot be found or is not worth suing, and (2) the person sought to be made vicariously liable is able to compensate the victim of the tort. Those conditions are satisfied in the present context. Most foster parents have insufficient means to be able to meet a substantial award of damages, and are unlikely to have (or to be able to obtain) insurance against their own propensity to criminal behaviour. The local authorities which engage them can more easily compensate the victims of injuries which are often serious and long-lasting.”

With its focus on integration and risk, the “modern theory” thus allows for the possibility that relationships akin to employment may be identified in a variety of not-for-profit settings, such as where the work of a charitable organisation is carried out by unpaid volunteers. Finally, in Various Claimants v Barclays Bank plc100 the Supreme Court registered two caveats on further expansion of the category of relationships akin to employment. First, the court noted the changing labour patterns associated with the “gig” economy and increased outsourcing of contracts for the provision of services integral to the operation of businesses. In particular, the statutory definition of “worker” for the purposes of employment law now included not only persons with contracts of employment in the traditional sense, but also workers with contracts “whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual”.101 However, misplaced notions of “tidiness” should not mean that the concept of vicarious liability, developed for one set of reasons, was to be aligned with the statutory concept of “worker”, developed for a different set of reasons.102

  98   99 100 101

[2017] UKSC 60, [2018] AC 355 at paras 62 and 65. [2017] UKSC 60, [2018] AC 355 at para 63. [2020] UKSC 13, [2020] AC 973. Employment Rights Act 1996 s 230(3)(b). See e.g. Uber BV v Aslam [2021] UKSC 5, in which the “reality” of the situation, given the level of control exercised by the employers over Uber drivers, was that the latter were to be treated as employees. 102 [2020] UKSC 13, [2020] AC 973 per Lady Hale at para 29.

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3.28

3.29

Secondly, the Supreme Court warned against a tendency to elide the policy reasons underlying the imposition of vicarious liability with the criteria determining its extension into relationships akin to employment.103 If those general policy reasons were to be read as the primary criteria of liability, the “akin to employment” category would become over-inclusive. In the case itself, the defendant bank had engaged a doctor to perform medical examinations of its new recruits. The doctor had his own list of other patients, was paid a fee by the bank only on a case-by-case basis, and was free to refuse referrals if he so chose. In concluding that there was a relationship akin to employment, and hence vicarious liability for sexual assaults perpetrated by the doctor upon the new recruits sent to him by the bank, the Court of Appeal had treated all five policy reasons as “criteria” justifying the imposition of vicarious liability,104 but did not give due weight to the essential character of the relationship between the bank and the doctor, which was one of a business engaging an independent contractor. The key criteria in determining the nature of the relationship, as seen above, are integration and risk. No doubt in marginal cases, such as Cox or Armes, whether in the commercial or the non-commercial sphere, the five policy reasons can provide helpful background in determining whether workers are “part and parcel” of the alleged employer’s business. However, they have no place where, as in Various Claimants v Barclays Bank plc, it is clear that the key criteria are not met and that the wrongdoer was carrying on his or her own independent business.105 The doctor in that case was evidently on business on his own account and was not “anything close to an employee”.106 Reversing the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court held that the bank was not vicariously liable. The decision in Various Claimants v Barclays Bank plc raises a question mark over the slightly earlier Scottish case of Grubb v Shannon.107 In Grubb the defender was the proprietor of a beauty salon who rented out spare chairs in her premises to other self-employed beauticians for use with their own clients. The beauticians advertised their services on the salon’s Facebook page and had common branding and pricing structures. They also paid the defender a daily fee of £20 for use of the salon, but otherwise the cash receipts of the parties were kept separate and 103 [2020] UKSC 13, [2020] AC 973 per Lady Hale at para 16, citing Lord Hobhouse in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215 at para 60: “[A]n exposition of the policy reasons for a rule . . . is not the same as defining the criteria for its application. Legal rules have to have a greater degree of clarity and definition than is provided by simply explaining the reasons for the existence of the rule and the social need for it, instructive though that may be. In English law that clarity is provided by the application of the criterion to which I have referred derived from the English authorities.” 104 [2018] EWCA Civ 1670, [2018] IRLR 947 at para 22. 105 [2020] UKSC 13, [2020] AC 973 per Lady Hale at para 27. 106 [2020] UKSC 13, [2020] AC 973 per Lady Hale at para 28. 107 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 193.

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the beauticians did not give a percentage to the defender. The defender likewise did not pay any fee to the beauticians, had no involvement in their tax affairs, and did not provide their equipment. The client of one of the beauticians claimed to have suffered injury as a result of the beautician’s negligence in applying an eyebrow treatment, and she argued that the defender should be held vicariously liable. Sheriff Reid’s reading of the “modern theory” of vicarious liability involved alignment of the policy reasons for vicarious liability with the criteria that identified relationships akin to employment.108 Since he considered four of the five policy reasons to be applicable,109 he held that the relationship between the beauticians and the defender was a contract akin to employment, even although all of the beauticians regarded themselves as independent contractors.110 In reaching this conclusion the sheriff downplayed the long-established distinction between those employed under a contract of service and independent contractors engaged under contracts for services.111 Give the reaffirmation of that distinction by the Supreme Court in Various Claimants v Barclays Bank plc, and the caveats expressed there regarding over-expansion of the category of relationships akin to employment, it is doubtful whether vicarious liability would now be recognised in circumstances comparable to those in Grubb. The distinct status of independent contractors is similarly seen in Kafagi v JBW Group Ltd112 in which various torts were allegedly committed by a bailiff sent to enforce payment of council tax arrears from the claimant. The claimant attempted to hold the debt-collection agency which had instructed the bailiff vicariously liable. However, the bailiff ran his own business, taking or leaving jobs offered by the defendants, working for other clients as he chose, and recruiting personnel to help him as the need arose. He was free to go about debt collection in any lawful manner that he saw fit, he maintained his own indemnity insurance, and provided his own personal bond to the court as security against proper conduct. His work could not therefore be considered an integrated part of the agency’s business activity. As an independent contractor he was not in a relationship akin to employment with his clients. In short, therefore, the presence of some of the indicia of the employment relationship does not mean that more cogent indicia of the wrongdoer’s self-employed status are to be ignored. 108 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 193 at paras 70–72. 109 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 193 at paras 89–111 (although the element of control that the defender exercised over the beauticians’ work was “vestigial” (para 106). 110 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 193 at para 37. The sheriff also appeared to regard their relationship in these terms (para 101). 111 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 193 at paras 49–50. For that distinction, see Stephen v Thurso Police Comrs (1876) 3 R 535 per Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff at 539. See also Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association [2013] UKSC 66, [2014] AC 537 per Lord Sumption at para 3: vicarious liability “has never extended to the negligence of those who are truly independent contractors”. 112 [2018] EWCA Civ 1157.

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(c) Loan of employees 3.31

3.32

Subject to instances of relationships akin to employment, as discussed above, the general rule is that the person held liable for the wrongdoing of an employee is the employer with whom that employee has entered into a contract of service. This rule usually continues to apply even when the employee’s services are loaned by the employer to another party pro hac vice (on this occasion). Thus in Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v Coggins and Griffiths (Liverpool) Ltd113 a harbour authority hired out a mobile crane to a firm of stevedores in order to unload a ship. With the crane the authority loaned one of its employee crane drivers. The plaintiff was injured in an accident which occurred due to the negligence of the crane driver. At the time of the accident the stevedores had power to tell the driver which loads to move, but the harbour authority, as well as paying his wages, retained control over how he operated the crane machinery. Since it retained effective control over his work, the harbour authority, rather than the stevedores, was held vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence. As Mersey Docks illustrates, the issue of control, although not conclusive,114 is in this context significant, and there is a presumption that control, and with it vicarious liability, remains with the original employer. Very occasionally that presumption may be displaced, but the burden of showing that the employee’s services have been transferred from the regular employer to the temporary employer falls upon the regular employer and is not readily discharged.115 An example can be seen in Hawley v Luminar Leisure Ltd,116 in which a serious assault was carried out on a member of the public by a doorman at a nightclub. The services of the doorman had been temporarily hired out to the club by a security services company, an arrangement that had subsisted for two years. In this case it was the nightclub management, not the security services company, that controlled in detail not only what the doormen did but how they did it. On that basis the nightclub was held to be vicariously liable for the doorman’s wrongdoing. While the notion of control is key in this context, as discussed above117 this can be difficult to assess in relation to skilled or professional employees.118 There is recognition that, in many employment contexts, other factors 113 [1947] AC 1. 114 See discussion in King v Fife Council 2004 Rep LR 33 per Lord Brodie at para 11; McGregor v J S Duthie & Sons 1966 SLT 133. 115 Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v Coggins and Griffiths (Liverpool) Ltd [1947] AC 1 per Lord Macmillan at 13; Moir v Wide Arc Services Ltd 1987 SLT 495; Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Bannerman Johnstone Maclay [2005] CSIH 39, 2005 1 SC 437 per Lord Justice-Clerk Gill at para 67. 116 [2006] EWCA Civ 18, [2006] PIQR P17. 117 See para 3.19 above. 118 Moir v Wide Arc Services Ltd 1987 SLT 495; King v Fife Council 2004 Rep LR 33 per Lord Brodie at para 11.

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may require to be considered, such as: the defendant’s power of selection of the employee; the defendant’s right of suspension or dismissal; the payment of wages, as distinct from a fee to the original employer; the length of the “loaned” service; trade customs; and the nature of the machinery operated by the employee.119 An employee loaned out to provide unskilled labour is more likely to be regarded as having been transferred to the temporary employer. But where complex machinery is in use, requiring a high level of skill, it is likely that the employee’s services will be deemed to have remained with the original employer. The nature of the contract between the parties may also be relevant, to the extent that it demonstrated the employee’s consent to the transfer.120

(d) Sharing of the employer’s responsibilities Exceptionally, it is possible for both the original and also the temporary employer to be regarded as sharing the employer’s responsibilities and therefore for both to be vicariously liable. In Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd, May LJ indicated that the “core question” in determining whether such dual liability applied was “who was entitled, and in theory obliged, to control the employee’s relevant negligent act so as to prevent it”.121 Accordingly, dual liability was unlikely commonly to arise. However, in the same case Rix LJ applied a broader test of whether the employee in question was “so much a part of the work, business or organisation of both employers that it is just to make both employers answer for his negligence”.122 This latter approach, focussing upon business integration, was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society123 in finding that vicarious liability for acts of abuse carried out by members of a religious order at a school where they were teachers should be shared by both the religious order and the diocesan authorities which managed the school. The possibility of establishing shared responsibility between employers thus offers an additional option to injured parties, and will be of particular value where one of the employers has become insolvent. Dual vicarious liability is not, however, recognised in every case where each of two 119 Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v Coggins and Griffiths (Liverpool) Ltd [1947] AC 1 per Lord Porter at 17; Malley v London, Midland and Scottish Rly Co 1944 SC 129; Moir v Wide Arc Services Ltd 1987 SLT 495; Hawley v Luminar Leisure Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 18, [2006] PIQR P17. 120 Malley v London, Midland and Scottish Rly Co 1944 SC 129 per Lord Justice-Clerk Cooper at 137. 121 Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1151, [2006] QB 510 per May LJ at para 49. Prior to Viasystems it had been thought that an employee could not have two employers and that dual vicarious liability could not therefore exist: see Laugher v Pointer (1826) 108 ER 204, 5 B & C 547; Cairns v Clyde Navigation Trustees (1898) 25 R 1021. 122 Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1151, [2006] QB 510 per Rix LJ at para 79. 123 [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1 per Lord Phillips at para 45.

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employers has a significant level of involvement. In a case discussed above, Hawley v Luminar Leisure Ltd,124 the Court of Appeal acknowledged that dual liability might sometimes be appropriate but took the view that, on the facts, control had been so clearly transferred to the nightclub management and so “embedded”125 within its organisation that responsibility should rest exclusively with it.

(2) The course of employment (a) The Salmond test and its limitations 3.35

3.36

Even where a contract of employment, or a relationship akin to employment, exists, the employer is vicariously liable only if it can be shown that, in committing the wrong, the employee was acting in the course of that employment.126 For more than a century the basic definition of what lay within the scope of employment was as stated by Sir John Salmond in his textbook, The Law of Torts, the first edition of which was published in 1907. According to Salmond, wrongdoing occurred in the course of employment if it was “either (a) a wrongful act authorised by the master, or (b) a wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing some act authorised by the master”.127 Salmond’s category (a) was uncontentious: employers are plainly liable for acts which they have specifically authorised or ratified; indeed this engages direct, rather than vicarious, liability.128 Category (b), on the other hand, presented a number of difficulties. The wording of (b) meant that, while in some cases employees might remain within the scope of their employment even when doing something that they had been told not to do, in other cases breaching an employer’s prohibition would take the employee outside the “sphere of employment”.129 One way of distinguishing these two cases was to ask of an employee: “what was the job on which he was engaged for his employer?”130 That approach was endorsed in Rose v Plenty,131 in which it was held that a milkman had not exceeded the scope of his employment by enlisting the 124 [2006] EWCA Civ 18, [2006] PIQR P17; see para 3.31 above. 125 [2006] EWCA Civ 18, [2006] PIQR P17 per Hallett LJ at para 85. 126 See Bell, Principles § 547 setting out liability for acts “directed to be done” by the master, or “in the common line of the servant’s duty”; see also Baird v Graham (1852) 14 D 615 per Lord Cuninghame at 619. 127 J W Salmond, The Law of Torts: A Treatise on the English Law of Liability for Civil Injuries, 1st edn (1907) 83. 128 See Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215 per Lord Millett at para 67. 129 Plumb v Cobden Flour Mills [1914] AC 62 per Lord Dunedin at 67, cited with approval by Lord Thankerton in Canadian Pacific Railway Co v Lockhart [1942] AC 591 at 599, and by Scarman J in Rose v Plenty [1976] 1 WLR 141 at 149. 130 Ilkiw v Samuels [1963] 1 WLR 991 per Diplock LJ at 1004. 131 [1976] 1 WLR 141; cf Conway v George Wimpey and Co [1951] 2 KB 266 (carriage of prohibited passengers).

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assistance of a teenaged helper, even though this had been expressly prohibited by his employer. The milkman’s job had been to deliver milk. He had hired the teenager to help with the performance of that function, not to further the employee’s own purposes, so that this was “a mode, albeit a prohibited mode, of doing the job with which he was entrusted”.132 His employer was therefore held vicariously liable to the boy for injuries sustained due to the milkman’s negligent driving of the milk float. However, cases in which employees carried out work that they were appointed to do but by unauthorised means could not always be cleanly divided from those in which, regardless of how it was carried out, the conduct was not part of an authorised act.133 The awkward distinction between “a very stupid mode of doing an authorised act and acts which involve doing something which the employee has no business at all to be doing”134 seemed in practice to collapse into a “question of degree”, and attempts to analyse the underlying principle typically achieved little more than restating the problem.135 The focus on what was or was not “authorised” meant that injuries caused in an excess of zeal to further the employer’s interests might be judged to have remained within the scope of employment,136 but independent acts of “self indulgence or self gratification”137 venting the employee’s “private malice or spite”, were not, “even if the source of that malice or spite [was] to be found in a transaction intrinsic to his employment”.138 The consequence was that application of the Salmond test tended to exclude from vicarious liability many situations where employees had deliberately caused injury, which in practical terms meant that the victim was left uncompensated. An increase in numbers of the latter type of case precipitated a review of the Salmond test by the House of Lords in 2001 in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd,139 a case which has been acknowledged as representing a leading modern authority in Scotland as well as in England.140

132 Rose v Plenty [1976] 1 WLR 141 per Scarman LJ at 148. 133 Compare e.g. Iqbal v London Transport Executive (1974) 16 KIR 329 with Kay v ITW [1968] 1 QB 140. 134 Kay v ITW [1968] 1 QB 140 per Sachs LJ at 156. 135 See discussion in Bazley v Curry (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 45 per McLachlin J at paras 10–15. 136 Dyer v Munday [1895] 1 QBD 742; Knight v Inverness District Board of Control 1920 2 SLT 157; Percy v Glasgow Corp 1922 SC (HL) 144; Poland v John Parr and Sons [1927] 1 KB 236; Neville v C&A Modes 1945 SC 175; Fennelly v Connex South Eastern Ltd [2001] IRLR 390. 137 Trotman v North Yorkshire County Council [1999] IRLR 98 per Chadwick LJ at para 26. 138 Power v Central SMT Co 1949 SC 376 per Lord President Cooper at 380; see also Keppel Bus Co v Sa’ad bin Ahmad [1974] 1 WLR 1082. 139 [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215. 140 Sharp v Highland and Islands Fire Board 2005 SLT 855 per Lord Macphail at para 33, affd 2008 SCLR 526; see also Vaickuviene v J Sainsbury plc [2013] CSIH 67, 2014 SC 147.

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(b) Lister and the close-connection test 3.39

3.40

3.41

In Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd141 the House of Lords considered carefully how the traditional Salmond test should be applied so as to identify “a wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing some act authorised by the master”. It concluded that, in problem cases of intentional wrongdoing in particular, attention was required to the ancillary question of whether the employee’s wrongdoing was “so closely connected with his employment that it would be fair and just to hold the employers vicariously liable”.142 The circumstances of Lister were particularly sensitive. The defendants were operators of a boarding house for schoolchildren, and the question for the court to consider was whether they were to be held vicariously liable for acts of sexual abuse committed by a warden employed to look after the child residents. Previously the Court of Appeal had ruled, in Trotman v North Yorkshire CC, that a local education authority could not be held vicariously liable for acts of abuse perpetrated by a deputy headmaster on one of his pupils during a school trip.143 Its reasoning was that an indecent assault upon a child was such a negation of the teacher’s duty that it could not be regarded as a mode – even an improper and unauthorised mode – of doing what the teacher was employed to do. That authority was, however, overruled by the House of Lords in Lister, after its reexamination of the traditional Salmond test. The quest for “principled but practical justice” steered the House of Lords away from “mechanical” application of the Salmond test.144 Lord Steyn pointed out that Salmond’s own commentary on the content of his category (b) had often been overlooked.145 After setting out his test in its basic form, Salmond had gone on to explain that acts which the employer had not authorised remained within the scope of employment “provided they are so connected with acts which he has authorised that they may rightly be regarded as modes–although improper modes–of doing them”; on the other hand vicarious liability would not attach to conduct that was “not so connected with the authorised act as to be a mode of doing it, but is an independent act”.146 In Salmond’s own words, therefore, a key to deciding whether conduct remained within the scope of the employee’s conduct was not simply the work that the employee had been taken on to do, but also the connection between the wrongdoing and that work. As Lord Clyde pointed out in Lister, this reading of the Salmond test could already 141 [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215. 142 [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215 per Lord Steyn at para 28. 143 Trotman v North Yorkshire County Council [1999] IRLR 98, overruled by Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215. 144 [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215 per Lord Steyn at para 16. 145 [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215 per Lord Steyn at para 15; see also Lord Clyde at paras 36–38 and Lord Millett at paras 69–70. 146 J W Salmond, The Law of Torts: A Treatise on the English Law of Liability for Civil Injuries, 1st edn (1907) 84 (emphasis added).

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be seen in the reasoning of the Scottish courts.147 The House of Lords also drew support from decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bazley v Curry148 and Jacobi v Griffith,149 in the former of which McLachlin J similarly identified the essential question as being “whether the wrongful act is sufficiently related to conduct authorised by the employer to justify the imposition of vicarious liability”.150 Proper application of the traditional Salmond test to the facts of Lister therefore required the court to ask whether the warden’s torts were so “closely connected” with his employment that it would be “fair and just” to hold the boarding house operators vicariously liable.151 Here the warden’s acts of abuse were “inextricably interwoven” with the duties entrusted to him.152 The personal contact with the children entailed in this work created a “sufficient connection between the acts of abuse which he committed and the work which he had been employed to do”.153 The closeness of that connection, said the House of Lords, provided the basis for imposition of vicarious liability upon the employer. By way of further guidance in Lister, Lord Clyde suggested that: (i) it was necessary to look at the context and the circumstances in which the employee’s wrongdoing occurred; (ii) the time and the place at which the actings occurred were always relevant, although not conclusive; but (iii) the mere fact that the employment had furnished the employee with the opportunity to commit the wrong was not sufficient to bring it within the scope of the employment.154 With regard to the last of these points, Lord Millett further explained that “The fact that his employment gave the employee the opportunity to commit the wrong is not enough to make the employer liable. He is liable only if the risk is one which experience shows is inherent in the nature of the business.”155 A school groundsman’s employment, for example, might have presented the groundsman with the opportunity to abuse the residents, but that would have been insufficient to establish liability.156 The warden on the other hand had been employed 147 Kirby v National Coal Board 1958 SC 514 per Lord Russell at 539–540; Williams v A and W Hemphill Ltd 1966 SLT 33 per Lord Strachan at 36, affd 1966 SC (HL) 31. This was noted in Lister [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215 at para 39. 148 (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 45. 149 (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 71. 150 Bazley v Curry (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 45 at para 41. 151 [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215 per Lord Steyn at para 28. 152 [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215 per Lord Steyn at para 28. 153 [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215 per Lord Clyde at para 50. 154 [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215 at paras 43–45. 155 [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215 per Lord Millett at para 65. On discussion of the requirement that the risk should be inherent in the employer’s business, see Vance v Bough [2008] CSOH 70, 2008 Rep LR 90. 156 For a further example where his work presented the employee with the opportunity to commit the wrongdoing but was insufficiently connected with the field of activities assigned to him to warrant the imposition of vicarious liability, see Various Claimants v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2020] UKSC 12, [2020] AC 989 per Lord Reed at para 35.

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specifically to have close personal contact with the children.157 At the same time, Lord Millett added, it is “no answer to a claim against the employer to say that the employee was guilty of intentional wrongdoing, or that his act was not merely tortious but criminal, or that he was acting exclusively for his own benefit, or that he was acting contrary to express instructions, or that his conduct was the very negation of his employer’s duty . . . vicarious liability is not necessarily defeated if the employee acted for his own benefit.”158 Even the most egregious acts of “self-indulgence or self-gratification”159 were to be reappraised in the light of this renewed emphasis upon the closeness of the connection between the wrongdoing and the employment, rather than upon the duties that the employment ought to have entailed. Thus the Court of Appeal decision in Trotman v North Yorkshire County Council was overruled because, while an indecent assault upon a pupil was diametrically opposed to a teacher’s duty, there had been a very close connection between the teacher’s work in looking after the child and the act of abuse.160 It was thus possible for the Salmond test to be met even where an employee’s intentional wrongdoing was a subversion of what that employee was authorised to do. A distinction was to be drawn between the employer’s purpose in placing the employee in a particular role and the level of risk created by so doing. That distinction was emphasised in Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society, in which Lord Phillips noted the extreme vulnerability of the school pupils placed in the care of the members of the religious order, but explained that:161 “The brother teachers were placed in the school to care for the educational and religious needs of these pupils. Abusing the boys in their care was diametrically opposed to those objectives but, paradoxically, that very fact was one of the factors that provided the necessary close connection between the abuse and the relationship between the brothers and the institute that gives rise to vicarious liability on the part of the latter . . . The placement of brother teachers in St William’s, a residential school in the precincts of which they also resided, greatly enhanced the risk of abuse by them if they had a propensity for such misconduct”.

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Subsequent cases have continued to emphasise the importance of the appropriate allocation of the risk created by the employment. According to Lord Nicholls in Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam, it is inescapable 157 [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215 per Lord Millett at para 82. 158 Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48, [2003] 2 AC 366 per Lord Millett at para 121. 159 As in Trotman v North Yorkshire County Council [1999] IRLR 98 per Chadwick LJ at para 26. 160 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215 per Lord Steyn at paras 21–25. 161 [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1 at paras 93–93.

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that employees on occasion “exceed the bounds of their authority or even defy express instructions”. In such cases:162 “It is fair to allocate risk of losses thus arising to the businesses rather than leave those wronged with the sole remedy, of doubtful value, against the individual employee who committed the wrong. To this end, the law has given the concept of ‘ordinary course of employment’ an extended scope.”

(c) The employee’s “field of activities” The close-connection test, as an extension163 of the traditional Salmond test, remains unchallenged as the definitive criterion to assess whether conduct lies within the scope of employment.164 While vicarious liability has been “on the move”165 as regards the types of relationship giving rise to liability, the Supreme Court has seen “no need for the law governing the circumstances in which an employer should be held vicariously liable for a tort committed by his employee to be on the move”.166 Further guidance has nonetheless been provided on how the “close connection” between the employment and the wrongdoing is to be made out. The point of reference in evaluating the connection between the employment and the wrongdoing is the “field of activities” allotted to the employee. That formulation in fact derived from an early twentieth-century Scottish case, Central Motors (Glasgow) Ltd v Cessnock Garage and Motor Co,167 where the Inner House held that garage proprietors were vicariously liable for the actions of an employee who crashed a client’s car having taken it on a drunken joyride. Although the employee’s actions had been “deliberately wrongful”168 they did not sever the connection with his employer. As Lord Cullen stated:169 “It remains necessary to the master’s responsibility that the servant’s act be one done within the sphere of his service or the scope of his employment, but it may have this character although it consists in doing something which 162 [2002] UKHL 48, [2003] 2 AC 366 at para 22. 163 See Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677 at para 56, in which Lord Dyson described the close-connection test as an “improvement” of the Salmond test. 164 See Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677, in which the court stated that the law would not be improved “by a change of vocabulary” (Lord Toulson at para 46), and rejected counsel’s argument that the test should “be refined by asking whether an authorised representative of the principal has committed a wrong in circumstances where the reasonable observer would consider the wrongdoer . . . to be acting in a representative capacity”. 165 Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1 per Lord Phillips at para 19. 166 Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677 per Lord Toulson at para 56. 167 1925 SC 796, cited in both Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215, and Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677 per Lord Toulson at para 36. 168 1925 SC 796 per Lord Cullen at 803. 169 1925 SC 796 at 802 (emphasis added).

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82   The Law of Delict in Scotland is the very opposite of what the servant has been intended or ordered to do, and which he does for his own private ends. An honest master does not employ or authorise his servant to commit crimes of dishonesty towards third parties; but nevertheless he may incur liability for a crime of dishonesty committed by the servant if it was committed by him within the field of activities which the employment assigned to him, and that although the crime was committed by the servant solely in pursuance of his own private advantage.”

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This wording informed the test for the scope of employment, as stated in “the simplest terms” by the Supreme Court in Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc:170 “The first question is what functions or ‘field of activities’ have been entrusted by the employer to the employee, or, in everyday language, what was the nature of his job . . . Secondly, the court must decide whether there was sufficient connection between the position in which he was employed and his wrongful conduct to make it right for the employer to be held liable under the principle of social justice.”

For a sufficiently close connection to be made out, the wrongdoing must occur as part of an “unbroken sequence of events” within the “field of activities” entrusted by the employer to the employee”.171 In Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc itself, the offending employee was a customer assistant at a supermarket petrol station. The claimant, who was of Somali origin, had entered the kiosk on the forecourt and asked if it would be possible to print material from a USB stick. The employee refused and launched into a torrent of angry and racist abuse, following the claimant out of the kiosk, despite the intervention of a supervisor, and subjecting the claimant to a serious physical assault as he returned to his car. The courts below held that the employee had acted outwith the scope of his employment, since his conduct was not directed to advancing the employer’s interest, and took place “purely for reasons of his own”.172 The Supreme Court, however, allowed the claimant’s appeal. The relevant question was not the reasons for the employee’s conduct,173 but whether

170 [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677 per Lord Toulson at para 44. 171 Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677. Cf Prince Alfred College Incorporated v ADC [2016] HCA 37, (2016) 258 CLR 134, in which the High Court of Australia rejected the “field of activities” concept as “likely to result in the imposition of vicarious liability for wrongful acts for which employment provides no more than an opportunity” (at para 83). Instead it preferred to look at whether the role allotted to the employee provided the “occasion” for the wrongful act, taking into account factors of authority, power, trust, control and the potential for achieving intimacy with the victim. 172 [2014] EWCA Civ 116, [2014] 2 All ER 990. 173 [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677 per Lord Toulson at para 48.

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he was going about his employer’s business at the time of the assault. The “field of activities” assigned to him was to interact with customers and respond to their queries. He may have set about that task in a way that was abhorrent but he was still acting within that role throughout. He did not “metaphorically take off his uniform” when he followed the claimant on to the forecourt; there was an “unbroken sequence of events” between his response to the initial query and the assault outside. That meant that there was a sufficient connection between the employment and the wrongful conduct to hold the employer vicariously liable.

(d) “Frolics” of the employee’s own A long-standing rule of thumb in regard to vicarious liability was that employers should not be held liable for wrongdoing of employees where the employees had simply been going about a “frolic” of their own at the time of the wrongdoing.174 That basic principle continues to apply and is seen as consistent with the close-connection test. Vicarious liability applies in situations where the employees were engaged, even if misguidedly, in furthering the employer’s business, and therefore remained within the field of activities allocated to them. Vicarious liability does not apply where employees were engaged solely in pursing their own interests – “frolics” of their own – even if they used apparatus provided by their employer to do so.175 This is demonstrated in Various Claimants v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc176 in which a disaffected employee, as an internal auditor, had been given access to his employer’s payroll data in order to send it on to the employer’s external auditors. As well as doing this, he surreptitiously copied the information to a personal USB stick. He then uploaded the information to a publicly accessible website and circulated it round national newspapers on the day when the employer’s financial results were due to be announced. This was all done with the intention of causing harm to the employer. A group of employees whose payroll data had been disclosed brought actions against the employer as vicariously liable for misuse of private information, breach of confidence, and breach of section 4(4) of the Data Protection Act 1998. The court distinguished cases such as Mohamud where, even if the behaviour in question was hateful, the employee was nonetheless carrying out the employer’s business in dealing with customers. In the present case, unlawful disclosure of the data was

174 Joel v Morison (1834) 6 C & P 501 per Parke B at 503; see also Williams v A and W Hemphill Ltd 1966 SC (HL) 31. 175 Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48, [2003] 2 AC 366 per Lord Nicholls at para 32. 176 [2020] UKSC 12, [2020] AC 989.

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not part of the employee’s functions or field of activities allocated to him, but instead it was in pursuance of a “personal vendetta”.177 The assessment whether, in committing the wrongdoing, employees have remained with the field of activities allocated to them purports to be an objective one. The essential enquiry relates to the tasks asked of employees by employers, and the extent to which the wrongdoing was distanced from them. To that extent the employee’s motivation may be helpful in understanding the course of events, but a spiteful motive does not of itself remove an employee from the course of employment. In Mohamud, the employee’s aggressive behaviour was explicable by reference to racism, but that behaviour was nonetheless deemed to have occurred while the employee was carrying out his employer’s business.178 However, an interesting feature of Various Claimants v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc is that the employee’s primary purpose in the wrongdoing was to harm the employer; the harm to the pursuers was merely an incidental consequence. In this case there were other reasons why that conduct could not in any event be seen as sufficiently closely connected to his employment, but the court left open the question whether wrongdoing designed specifically to harm an employer might be capable of attracting vicarious liability.179

(3) The close-connection test: the importance of context 3.50

The lack of precision in the close-connection test has been readily acknowledged but is seen as inevitable given the “infinite range of circumstances” in which the issue of vicarious liability may arise.180 However, as Lord Reed warned in Various Claimants v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc, the inherent flexibility of the test is not to be taken as “an invitation to judges to decide cases according to their personal sense of justice”.181 Nor is it appropriate to seek to define the scope of employment by reference to the five policy factors listed by Lord Phillips in Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society;182 177 [2020] UKSC 12, [2020] AC 989 per Lord Reed at para 47. See also Attorney General of the British Virgin Islands v Hartwell [2004] UKPC 12, [2004] 1 WLR 1273, in which a policeman left his post to confront his girlfriend whom he found with another man. A bystander was injured in the ensuing fracas in which the policeman fired shots with his police revolver. The police authorities were not vicariously liable, as the policeman had been engaged upon a “vendetta” of his own, but they had themselves been negligent in failing to take greater care in the issuing of firearms. 178 [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677 per Lord Toulson at para 48; see also commentary in Various Claimants v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2020] UKSC 12, [2020] AC 989 per Lord Reed at paras 29–30. 179 Various Claimants v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2020] UKSC 12, [2020] AC 989 per Lord Reed at para 36. 180 Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48, [2003] 2 AC 366 per Lord Nicholls at para 26; Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677 per Lord Dyson at para 54. 181 [2020] UKSC 12, [2020] AC 989 at para 24. 182 [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1 at para 35; see para 3.16 above.

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such factors have no bearing on the closeness of the connection between the wrongdoing and the employment.183 The scope of employment must be determined by reference to the decided cases relevant to the particular form of wrongdoing. Attention must focus on the factors considered significant in like cases, so that decisions can be reached “on a basis which is principled and consistent”.184 Context is thus a key consideration. A consideration of some typical contexts for wrongdoing follows.

(a) Employees in customer-facing roles Where an employee has been employed in a customer-facing role, Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc185 suggests that a close connection is readily made out between the employment and interaction with customers, as long as the wrongdoing is part of an uninterrupted sequence of events within that interaction. This remains the case even where harm has been deliberately inflicted, and even where, to recall Lord Millett in Lister, the risk “inherent in the nature of the business” was marginal. However, the requirement to look broadly at the employee’s field of activities is “not an acknowledgement that the concept has no boundaries”.186 Prior to Mohamud it had already been accepted that a sufficiently close connection might more easily be established in regard to customer-facing employment contexts where “friction, confrontation or intimacy” was inherent.187 Employees who were routinely expected to employ a degree of force in going about their duties remained within the scope of their employment when physical force directed towards customers spilled over directly therefrom into negligent injury or even intentional assault. Mattis v Pollock (t/a Flamingos Nightclub),188 noted below, is one of a number of cases involving the vicarious liability of employers for excessive violence perpetrated upon customers by security guards or doormen. In such cases the potential for violence is a risk reasonably incidental to the nature of the employee’s role in the employer’s business. Similarly, as Lister189 and Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society190 demonstrate, employees engaged in positions of trust 183 184 185 186 187

[2020] UKSC 12, [2020] AC 989 per Lord Reed at para 31. [2020] UKSC 12, [2020] AC 989 at paras 23–26. [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677. Shelbourne v Cancer Research UK [2019] EWHC 842 (QB), [2019] PIQR P16 per Lane J at para 126. Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2014] EWCA Civ 116, [2014] 2 All ER 990 per Treacy LJ at para 42. 188 [2004] EWCA Civ 887, [2004] 4 All ER 85; see also Brown v Robinson [2004] UKPC 56; Hawley v Luminar Leisure Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 18, [2006] PIQR P17; Burnett v Marcius [2018] CSOH 34, 2018 SLT 472. See also Gravil v Carroll [2008] EWCA Civ 689, [2008] IRLR 829, in which a rugby club was held vicariously liable for an assault committed when one of its players threw a punch at an opponent during a game. In this case, as in Mattis, the potential for violence was held to be a risk that was reasonably incidental to the nature of the employer’s business. 189 [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215. 190 [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1.

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requiring them to have close physical or emotional contact with their clients or charges remain within the scope of their employment even when that trust is betrayed by acts of abuse.191 It now follows from Mohamud, however, that the scope of employment may include incidents arising during working hours even where that role, as in Mohamud itself, normally involves little potential for “friction, confrontation or intimacy”. No matter how egregious the wrongdoing or selfish the motivation, where it follows directly from the interaction between customer and employee, it is possible to make out a sufficiently close connection with the field of activities assigned to the employee. In Mohamud the court set store by the sequence of events having been “unbroken”, in the sense of having been a “seamless episode” in the interaction between the aggressive employee and the customer victim.192 In the messy interactions that typically precede wrongdoing of this nature, it can be sometimes be difficult to pinpoint if or when an employee’s business with the employer ends, but the employee’s temporary absence from the scene does not necessarily have that effect. In Mattis v Pollock (t/a Flamingos Nightclub)193 a nightclub proprietor was held vicariously liable for one of his doormen who attacked a customer on the street outside with a knife, even though the doorman was apparently motivated by personal revenge and briefly left the scene to collect the weapon from his home nearby. The incident followed from an earlier fracas in the nightclub, in which the proprietor had encouraged the doorman’s bellicose approach to crowd control. It was seen as the “culmination” of unpleasantness that started within the club “and could not fairly and justly be treated in isolation from earlier events, or as a separate and distinct incident”.194 The sequence of events, and with it the course of employment, was therefore unbroken. By contrast, in Warren v Henlys Ltd,195 which, like Mohamud, involved a petrol station attendant assaulting a customer, vicarious liability was not applied. After an altercation between the attendant and a customer whom he suspected of attempting to make off without paying, the customer left the petrol station and returned a short while later with a policeman. The policeman proposed to take no further action, but when the customer threatened to report the attendant to his employer the attendant punched the customer. Lord Toulson observed that this conduct would have

191 For an outlier, see Shields v Crossroads (Orkney) [2013] CSOH 144, 2014 SLT 190. In the event, no wrong was held to have been committed, but Lord Pentland observed that the conduct of a social worker in embarking on a sexual liaison with an adult client with mental health issues fell outwith the scope of his employment. It is doubtful, especially after Mohamud, that this reasoning would be followed if such a case were to arise again. 192 For commentary on this point, see Various Claimants v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2020] UKSC 12, [2020] AC 989 per Lord Reed at paras 27–28. 193 [2004] EWCA Civ 887, [2004] 4 All ER 85. 194 [2004] EWCA Civ 887, [2004] 4 All ER 85 per Judge LJ at para 32. 195 [1948] 2 All ER 935, discussed by Lord Toulson in Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677 at para 45.

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remained within the course of employment “if the attendant had punched the customer because he believed, rightly or wrongly, that the customer was leaving without payment”,196 but by the time the blow was struck, the argument was not about the employer’s business but “because the plaintiff proposed to take a step which might affect [the attendant] in his own personal affairs”. In the language of Mohamud, the attendant had ceased to operate in the field of activities assigned to him by his employer.

(b) Police officers It is uncontroversial that wrongdoing by police officers on duty, such as excessive violence in the making of an arrest, or wrongful deprivation of liberty, is closely connected with the work that they are employed to do.197 Furthermore, the link with the field of activities assigned to the employee can be seen as persisting even after working hours if, in inflicting injury, the wrongdoer purports to be carrying out his or her functions as a police officer. The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012, section 24(1) provides that the Chief Constable is vicariously liable for “unlawful conduct” by police officers “in the carrying out (or purported carrying out) of that person’s functions in the same manner as an employer is liable in respect of any unlawful conduct on the part of an employee in the course of employment.” 198 It follows that the Chief Constable may be rendered vicariously liable even where a police officer only purported to be acting as such, perhaps when off-duty. An illustration can be found in Weir v Chief Constable Merseyside Police,199 in which an off-duty policeman borrowed a police van, without permission, to help his girlfriend move house. Suspecting the claimant of pilfering from the girlfriend’s belongings, the police officer identified himself as such, and on that authority took the claimant into the van and assaulted him. The Chief Constable was held to be vicariously liable because, in mistreating the claimant, the officer was “apparently acting as a constable, albeit one who was behaving very badly”.200 By contrast, 196 Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677 at paras 32 and 45. 197 Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 s 24(1). See also KD v Chief Constable of Hampshire [2005] EWHC 2550 (QB), in which a chief constable was found vicariously liable in terms of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 for harassment perpetrated by a detective constable while investigating a crime against a member of the claimant’s family. 198 Emphasis added. The equivalent English provisions (Police Act 1996 s 88(1)) are in similar terms. 199 [2003] EWCA Civ 111, [2003] ICR 708. 200 [2003] EWCA Civ 111 per Sir Denis Henry at para 12. See also Bernard v Attorney General of Jamaica [2004] UKPC 47, [2005] IRLR 398, in which the claimant had been using a public telephone when he was approached by an off-duty police officer shouting “police” and demanding use of the phone. When the claimant refused, the officer shot him, using an official-issue revolver which he was permitted to carry when off-duty. Vicarious liability was imposed and the close connection made out since the officer had asserted his authority as a policeman, and shot the claimant because he did not give way to that authority. Moreover, the employer routinely permitted constables to carry service revolvers off-duty since it was their duty at all times to keep a watch on public order, and in so doing it created the risk that weapons might be abused.

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in Allen v Chief Constable of Hampshire201 a police officer was motivated by romantic rivalry to embark upon a campaign of harassment against the claimant, but there was no suggestion that in doing so she was asserting, or purporting to assert, her authority as a police officer, and the claim against the Chief Constable was accordingly struck out. The statutory wording requires that police officers should have been acting “in the course of employment”. This means that vicarious liability does not arise, even if the police officer has purported to assert authority as such, where the court is not persuaded that the wrongdoing meets the test of being closely connected with the officer’s employment. In N v Chief Constable Merseyside Police202 the Chief Constable was held not to be vicariously liable for an off-duty police officer who, still wearing his uniform but driving his own car, showed his warrant card and offered to help a heavily intoxicated woman by taking her to a police station. Instead he took her to his home and raped her. The court took the view that he had been “on the prowl” for sexual conquests, and could not be regarded as performing any police function when he came upon the woman. The police uniform and warrant card gave him the “opportunity” to abuse for his own purposes the trust which they instilled, but did not of themselves return him to the course of his employment.203

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Mohamud204 indicates that where the field of activities assigned to an employee involves interaction with customers or clients, intentional wrongdoing that can be seen as part of an uninterrupted sequence of events within that interaction may readily be regarded as closely connected with the employment. Application of the close-connection test is more problematic,205 however, where intentional wrongdoing has arisen out of an interaction between fellow employees. Although interaction with colleagues is to a greater or lesser extent part of the field of activities allocated to most employees, Lord Carloway emphasised in Vaickuviene v J Sainsbury plc that “the mere bringing together of persons as employees is . . . not sufficient to impose vicarious liability for all the actings of each employee towards the other”.206 201 [2013] EWCA Civ 967. The court also noted that there was no question of the “creation of risk” arising out of the relationship between the police officer and the claimant, a feature to which importance had been attached in e.g. the child abuse cases. Cf Attorney General of the British Virgin Islands v Hartwell [2004] UKPC 12, [2004] 1 WLR 1273, in which police authorities were not vicariously liable for the actions of a police officer who fired a police-issue gun in pursuance of a personal vendetta, but had themselves failed to exercise due care in the issuing of weapons. 202 [2006] EWHC 3041 (QB). 203 [2006] EWHC 3041 (QB) per Nelson J at para 28. 204 Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677. 205 See Weddall v Barchester Healthcare Limited [2012] EWCA Civ 25, [2012] IRLR 307 per MooreBick LJ at para 60 and Aikens LJ at para 68. 206 [2013] CSIH 67, 2014 SC 147 at para 31.

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On that basis, incidents arising from random “horseplay” or private pranks between employees are not normally regarded as engaging vicarious liability if they have no connection with the work that the offending employee was engaged to do.207 The same reasoning applies even when horseplay escalates into serious assault, unless the risk of violence can be regarded as closely connected with the field of activities allocated to the offending employee.208 In Vaickuviene, a decision which pre-dated Mohamud, a person employed to stack supermarket shelves had racially harassed and then murdered a fellow shelf-stacker. The court took the view that a connection between the wrongdoing and the employee’s work was not adequately made out by the simple fact that the harassment and subsequent violence had been conducted by one employee against another in the workplace; the relevant question was whether there was “a connection between what the employee was engaged to do by the employer (i.e. the employment) and the wrongdoing”. 209 In the terminology of Mohamud, racial harassment and extreme violence were not related in any meaningful way to the field of activities assigned to the homicidal employee. Nor were they the eventuation of a specific risk inherent in engaging employees to stack supermarket shelves. Vicarious liability did not therefore arise. An issue of direct liability might possibly have arisen from the employer’s negligent failure adequately to address the employee’s misconduct at an earlier stage, but this point was not argued before the court. The position is different where the risk of confrontation or friction is inherent in the role allocated to the employee.210 The connection with the employment may be more readily made out where violence erupts as a result of an interaction in which those in managerial roles seek to impose authority upon their subordinates. In Bellman v Northampton Recruitment Ltd211 the defendant company was held vicariously liable for an assault committed by its managing director upon an employee sales manager at a drinking session hosted by the managing director at a nearby hotel after the office Christmas party. In the early hours of the morning, by which time the managing

207 Wilson v Exel UK Ltd [2010] CSIH 35, 2010 SLT 671 (no close connection between the work of a health and safety supervisor and the act of tugging a colleague’s hair); Somerville v Harsco Infrastructure Ltd [2015] SC EDIN 71, 2015 GWD 38–607; Shelbourne v Cancer Research UK [2019] EWHC 842 (QB), [2019] PIQR P16; Blake v J Perry Nominees Pty Ltd [2012] VSCA 122; Chell v Tarmac Cement and Lime Ltd [2020] EWHC 2613 (QB), [2021] PIQR P5; but cf Harrison v Michelin Tyre Co Ltd [1985] ICR 696, where the practical joke on a fellow employee was regarded as so closely connected to the course of the prankster’s employment as to be incidental, rather than extraneous, to it. 208 Graham v Commercial Bodyworks Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 47, [2015] PIQR P15 per Longmore LJ at para 14. 209 [2013] CSIH 67, 2014 SC 147 at para 34. 210 Graham v Commercial Bodyworks Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 47, [2015] PIQR P15 per Longmore LJ at para 14. 211 [2018] EWCA Civ 2214, [2019] ICR 459.

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director was heavily intoxicated, conversation turned to matters of company management. The managing director flew into a rage at perceived criticism by the sales manager and threw him two punches, fracturing his skull and causing permanent brain damage. While the after-party drinks had not followed in an unbroken sequence from the office party, the Court of Appeal took the view that at the time of the assault the assailant had put back on his “metaphorical managing director’s hat”.212 He was purporting to exercise managerial authority over his subordinates, and indeed to back this up with violence. There was therefore a sufficient connection between the field of activities allocated to him and the assault.213

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An employer may be vicariously liable where an employee has subjected a fellow employee or other individual to a course of conduct amounting to harassment in terms of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, section 8.214 In Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust215 Lord Nicholls noted the policy considerations supporting the imposition of vicarious liability for common law wrongs, and suggested that the same “rationale” should hold good for a breach of a statutory duty.216 More specifically, Lord Hope pointed out that, in the sections of the Act relevant to Scotland, the defender in proceedings brought under the Act was referred to as “a person responsible for the alleged harassment or the employer or principal of such a person”.217 This indicated the legislator’s intention that employers might be held vicariously liable to victims of harassment. At the same time, vicarious liability will be imposed only if the harassment is closely connected with the field of activities allotted to the employee. Where the victim is a fellow employee, it is insufficient that parties have a 212 [2018] EWCA Civ 2214 per Asplin LJ at para 25 (an allusion to Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677 at para 47, in which Lord Toulson referred to the employee not having “metaphorically taken off his uniform” when he stepped out from behind the counter). 213 See also Wallbank v Wallbank Fox Designs Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 25, [2012] IRLR 307, in which an employer was held vicariously liable for a factory worker who attacked a supervisor on being directed to load a conveyor belt more swiftly. The assault was regarded as a reaction to the friction particularly inherent in a factory environment, “where instant instructions and quick reactions are required”. This contrasts with the decision in the conjoined case of Weddall v Barchester Healthcare Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 25, [2012] IRLR 307, in which an intoxicated healthcare worker attacked a manager after being summoned from home 20 minutes previously with a request to work an extra shift, an assault that was deemed to be an “independent venture”. 214 For further discussion, see paras 28.16–28.17 below. 215 [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224; see also KD v Chief Constable of Hampshire [2005] EWHC 2550 (QB). 216 [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224 at paras 9–10. See also Equality Act 2010 s 109(1). 217 [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224 at paras 44–45, referring specifically to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 10(1), inserting a new s 18B into the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973.

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common employer,218 but the close-connection test is more likely to be met where a person in a dominant or supervisory role metes out inappropriate treatment as a means of imposing authority upon a junior colleague.219 Employers will not be held vicariously liable for a “personal vendetta” against a third party,220 unless a close connection is made out, for example where the harassment has been used as a tactic by the employee to pursue the employer’s interests.221

(e) Dishonesty The decision in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd222 endorsed the principle already stated in early twentieth-century authority,223 that an employer’s “vicarious liability is not necessarily defeated if the employee acted for his own benefit”, although such cases require “an intense focus on the connection between the nature of the employment and the tort of the employee”.224 On that basis, there is no reason why theft by an employee during the course of employment should not result in liability being attributed to the employer if there is sufficient connection with the field of activities allocated to the employee. One of the leading authorities cited in Lister was Morris v C W Martin & Sons Ltd,225 in which the Court of Appeal held the defendants, a firm of dry cleaners, liable to the plaintiff for the loss of her fur coat after it was stolen by one of their employees. Although Lord Denning’s judgment in Morris focussed primarily upon the defendants’ failure in their direct duty as bailees of the goods,226 Lords Diplock and Salmon reasoned that the employers had deputed the employee to take charge of the coat and clean it. Vicarious liability should be applied

218 As in Vaickuviene v J Sainsbury plc [2013] CSIH 67, 2014 SC 147. 219 As in Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224; see also Robertson v Scottish Ministers [2007] CSOH 186; Dickie v Flexcon Glenrothes Ltd 2009 GWD 35–602 (in which it was not established that the supervisor’s conduct constituted harassment, but it was accepted that vicarious liability would have applied had it done so). 220 Allen v Chief Constable of Hampshire [2013] EWCA Civ 967. 221 See e.g. S & D Property Investments Ltd v Nisbet [2009] EWHC 1726 (Ch) (harassment in seeking to recover a debt for the employer). 222 [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215. 223 Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co [1912] AC 716, in which a firm of solicitors was held liable when its clerk persuaded a client to hand over title deeds and to sign conveyances. The clerk then disposed of the relevant properties for his own gain, and without any of the proceeds returning to the employer. 224 [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215 per Lord Steyn at para 17. 225 [1966] 1 QB 716; see also Central Motors (Glasgow) Ltd v Cessnock Garage and Motor Co 1925 SC 796. 226 [1966] 1 QB 716 at 725: “If the master is under a duty to use due care to keep goods safely and protect them from theft and depredation, he cannot get rid of his responsibility by delegating his duty to another. If he entrusts that duty to his servant, he is answerable for the way in which the servant conducts himself therein. No matter whether the servant be negligent, fraudulent, or dishonest, the master is liable.”

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because “The manner in which he conducted himself in doing that work was to convert it. What he was doing, albeit dishonestly, he was doing in the scope or course of his employment.”227 In Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd the latter analysis was taken up, with the facts of Morris being seen as representing “the classic example of vicarious liability for intentional wrong doing”.228 This reading of Morris was followed in Brink’s Global Services Inc v Igrox Ltd 229 in which the defendant, a firm providing fumigation services, was held vicariously liable for the conduct of an employee who, on being instructed to fumigate a container filled with silver bars, helped himself to some of the contents. As in Morris, the facts of the case might plausibly have lent themselves to application of direct liability, in that the defendant had failed in its duty to take care of the goods entrusted to it during the fumigation process. Taking the lead from Lister, however, the court concluded that, because care of the goods had been entrusted to the employee, the theft was a “risk reasonably incidental to the purpose for which he is employed”, and there was a sufficiently close connection between the employee’s theft of the silver and the purpose of his employment.230 The employer was therefore to be held vicariously liable. However, the distinction between cases such as Morris and cases in which the employment is seen as merely presenting the opportunity for the theft,231 such as the Outer House decision in Vance v Bough,232 appears to be a marginal one. In Vance v Bough it was held that employers were not vicariously liable for a storeman’s pilfering and inappropriate storage of herbicide, which led to the fatal poisoning of the pursuer’s father. The Lord Ordinary, Lord Brailsford, noted that the storeman’s “employment was to be responsible for the herbicide” and to issue it when required for gardening purposes, but he reasoned that the theft of this substance was not an “incident” of that employment.233 It remains to be seen whether vicarious liability would now be denied in a case such as Vance, in the light of the reasoning in Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc234 which 227 [1966] 1 QB 716 per Lord Diplock at 737. 228 [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215 per Lord Steyn at para 19. 229 [2010] EWCA Civ 1207, [2011] IRLR 343; see also Frans Maas (UK) Ltd v Samsung Electronics (UK) Ltd [2004] EWHC 1502 (Comm), [2005] 1 CLC 647, in which employers were held to be both vicariously liable for the theft of the claimant’s goods by their employee and directly liable in respect of their negligent failure to maintain adequate security precautions at their warehouse. 230 [2010] EWCA Civ 1207, [2011] IRLR 343 per Moore-Bick LJ at para 30. 231 Heasmans v Clarity Cleaning Co [1987] ICR 949, [1987] IRLR 286 was distinguished in Brink’s Global Services Inc v Igrox Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 1207, [2011] IRLR 343 as a case where a cleaner’s employment had merely provided the opportunity to use the telephone in the premises being cleaned to make expensive telephone calls. 232 [2008] CSOH 70, 2008 Rep LR 90. 233 [2008] CSOH 70, 2008 Rep LR 90 at para 22. It may be argued, however, that the existence of a special relationship between the employer and the pursuer or the pursuer’s goods is a marker of a direct duty, rather than one of the features of vicarious liability. 234 [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677, discussed at paras 3.46–3.47 above.

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applies the close-connection test by focussing upon the employee’s “field of activities”. It is arguable that the field of activities allotted to a storeman involves intromission with the stored goods, and that therefore, postMohamud, the closeness of the connection to the employment in such circumstances requires to be reappraised.

(f) Fraud The elements of delictual liability for fraud, as a “machination or contrivance to deceive”,235 are discussed elsewhere in this volume.236 As noted in the paragraph above, an employer may be held liable for an employee’s dishonest conduct occurring within the course of employment, even where the act was done for the personal benefit of the employee and there was no benefit to the employer. In regard to vicarious liability for fraud, the pursuer must establish that all the elements that are normally looked for to constitute the delict of fraud have occurred in the course of the employee’s employment. In Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Export Credits Guarantee Department,237 a third party had successfully devised a scheme to obtain substantial amounts of money by selling forged bills of exchange to the claimant bank. The bills purported to relate to export transactions that were fictitious, but the transactions were vouched for by guarantees issued by a corrupt employee of the defendant. The bank claimed damages from the defendant, arguing that it was vicariously liable for the corrupt employee as an accessory to the tort of deceit. The House of Lords held, however, that the essential elements of the tort of deceit had been committed by the third party and not by the employee. The actions of the employee committed during the course of his employment did not, looked at in isolation, constitute a tort rendering his employers vicariously liable. An employer’s liability for fraud is not in dispute if the employer has expressly authorised the employee to issue false information or to engage in the deceptive conduct in question; indeed such a case would conform to the first category identified by Salmond as occurring within the course of employment, and is more properly regarded as an instance of direct liability.238 The position is less straightforward when such activities were not so authorised by the employer. Fraud entails not only a particular mental element on the part of the defender, or the defender’s employee, but also a specific response, in that the pursuer must believe in the deception and act in reliance upon it, “for he who knoweth the snare, cannot be said to be ensnared”.239 There is accordingly a further dimension to the 235 Bell, Principles § 13. 236 See paras 21.63–21.81 below. 237 [2000] 1 AC 486. 238 See para 3.35 above. 239 Stair, Inst 1.9.9.

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establishment of vicarious liability for this reliance-based delict, in that the pursuer is required to show that he or she relied on the employee’s actual or ostensible authority to perpetrate the deceptive conduct in question.240 By its words or conduct the employer must in some way have given the injured party to believe that the employee was acting in the course of the employer’s business.241 It is not enough that such belief rested on the conduct of the employee alone, “when the servant is not authorised to do what he is purporting to do, when what he is purporting to do is not within the class of acts that an employee in his position is usually authorised to do, and when the employer has done nothing to represent that he is authorised to do it.” 242 On the other hand, the reasonableness of such reliance may be accepted “if the transaction is within the class of acts that an employee in the position of the rogue is usually authorised to do”.243 Importantly, the close-connection test and the test for reliance in the context of fraud are not interchangeable, and the former has not supplanted the latter.244 The tests are conceptually distinct, the latter focussed upon the external appearance of the employer’s behaviour, the former, as discussed above, concerned with a range of policy considerations that have little to do with such appearances. In the leading case of Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam, Lord Nicholls discussed the application of the close-connection test to dishonest conduct in general, but made clear that he was leaving “aside cases where the wronged party is defrauded by an employee acting within the scope of his apparent authority . . . The critical feature in this type of case is that the wronged person acted in reliance on the ostensible authority of the employee.”245

240 See e.g. Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co [1912] AC 716 per Lord Shaw at 740. This requirement is not met where the pursuer did not honestly believe in the employee’s authority, or turned a blind eye to suspicions: Quinn v CC Automotive Group Limited t/a Carcraft [2010] EWCA Civ 1412 per Gross LJ at para 23. 241 Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA (The Ocean Frost) [1986] AC 717 per Lord Keith at 783; see also Taylor v City of Glasgow District Council 1997 SC 183, in which the employer was not party to the fraud, but proof before answer was allowed to determine whether the actions by which the fraud was perpetrated came within the scope of the actual authority granted to the fraudulent employee. 242 Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA (The Ocean Frost) [1986] AC 717 per Lord Keith at 783; see also Quinn v CC Automotive Group Limited t/a Carcraft [2010] EWCA Civ 1412 per Gross LJ at para 20. 243 Quinn v CC Automotive Group Limited t/a Carcraft [2010] EWCA Civ 1412 per Gross LJ at para 23; see also Thankakharm v Akai Holdings [2011] 1 HKC 357, [2010] HKEC 1692; Hockley Mint Ltd v Ramsden [2018] EWCA Civ 2480, [2019] 1 WLR 1617. 244 Hockley Mint Ltd v Ramsden [2018] EWCA Civ 2480, [2019] 1 WLR 1617; see also M Roberts, “Vicarious Liability for Fraudulent Misrepresentations” [2011] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 457 at 461. 245 Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48, [2003] 2 AC 366 at para 28. See also discussion in P Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort (2010) 180–181.

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(4) Travel in the course of employment Employees travelling to and from their place of employment at the beginning and the end of the working day are not generally considered to be acting within the scope of their employment,246 unless the means of travel is one which the employee was obliged to use by reason of the contract of employment.247 Employees remain within the scope of their employment while travelling, however, if it can be shown that the employee was in fact employed to make the particular journey, as for example where the employee was required to travel between two places of work.248 The following six rules have been suggested as a guide to ascertaining when employees are going about their employer’s business:249

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1. Employees travelling from their ordinary residence to their regular place of work are not acting in the course of their employment unless they are obliged by their contract of service to use the employer’s transport. 2. Travelling in the employer’s time between workplaces will be in the course of the employment. 3. Receipt of wages for travelling time indicates that employees are acting in the course of their employment, even if the employees have discretion as to the mode and time of travelling. 4. Employees travelling in the employer’s time from home to a workplace other than their regular workplace or in the course of a peripatetic occupation or to the scene of an emergency are acting in the course of their employment. 5. A deviation from or interruption of a journey undertaken in the course of employment (unless merely incidental to the journey) will, for the time being, take employees out of the course of their employment. 6. Return journeys are to be treated on the same footing as outward journeys. In relation to the fifth of the propositions above, it can often be difficult to determine whether a deviation from the normal or authorised route is “merely incidental” or significant enough to remove a driver or other

246 See e.g. Fletcher v Chancery Lane Supplies Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1112 (insufficient to establish vicarious liability that at the time of the wrongdoing after working hours the employee was still in close vicinity to the place of work). 247 Smith v Stages [1989] AC 928 per Lord Goff of Chieveley at 936; see also McGowan v Mein 1975 SLT (Sh Ct) 10; R J McLeod (Contractors) Ltd v South of Scotland Electricity Board 1982 SLT 274 (employee took employer’s van home so as to allow him to attend out-of-hours emergencies). 248 Smith v Stages [1989] AC 928; Thomson v British Steel Corp 1977 SLT 26. 249 Smith v Stages [1989] AC 928, paraphrasing Lord Lowry at 955–956.

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person from the course of employment. The length of the detour is relevant, but must be considered in the context of its purpose. Employers are not liable for extra journeys on which an employee is engaged upon “a frolic of his own”,250 but the addition of significant length to a journey need not always take a driver out of the scope of employment, particularly where the vehicle is carrying cargo or passengers en route to a destination specified by the employer. A deviation does not remove the employee from the scope of the employment unless it is “established that the purpose of the journey on which the employee has embarked in the course of his employment has been wholly abandoned and superseded by a purpose entirely unconnected with the employer’s business”.251 Thus in Angus v Glasgow Corporation252 an employer was held vicariously liable for the negligent driving of an employee who crashed the employer’s lorry into the pursuer’s car while the employee was on a detour that added five miles to a journey of three-and-a-half miles. The employee had diverted via his home to collect spectacles that he needed for driving and all the while he had his employer’s load and work colleagues on board. The detour was not therefore so extravagant as to mean that the employee had abandoned his employer’s business.253 Where an employee’s negligent driving has injured a passenger of his employer’s, there is particular reluctance to find that the employee has exceeded the scope of employment. In older case law, owners of stage coaches and the like were regarded as undertaking a direct duty to convey passengers safely.254 In the leading case of Williams v A and W Hemphill Ltd,255 it was further accepted that an employer was vicariously liable for the conduct of its drivers in transporting passengers.256 In Williams a lorry

250 Joel v Morison (1834) 6 C & P 501 per Parke B at 503; and see generally paras 3.48–3.49 above. 251 R J McLeod (Contractors) Ltd v South of Scotland Electricity Board 1982 SLT 274 per Lord Wylie at 276. 252 1977 SLT 206. 253 See also Wallace v Morrison & Co Ltd 1929 SLT 73, in which a detour of three miles to allow a chauffeur on a long shift to collect his tea from his brother’s house was not a deviation on the chauffeur’s own account but remained within the scope of employment. 254 See Linwood v Hathorn 14 May 1817 FC affd (1821) 1 Sh App 20 per Lord Robertson: “No doubt there are cases . . . in which a person is liable for the damage occasioned by the carelessness of those employed by him. This is the case of artificers, of owners of a ship, who are liable for the acts of the master and seamen, and a proprietor of a stage-coach, who is answerable for the skilfulness of the drivers. But I apprehend that in all these cases the liability arises ex contractu, incurred in consequence of his having failed to fulfil the object which he contracted for. The owner of a stage-coach undertakes to convey the passengers safely; and if he employs unskilful persons, through whose fault an accident happens, he must be liable in damages.” 255 1966 SC (HL) 31. 256 Although counsel had also attempted to argue that a direct duty was owed to the passengers by the defenders as carriers, that argument was not considered since it was unsupported by the pleadings: see 1966 SC (HL) 31 per Lord Strachan at 40.

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driver employed to transport a party of teenaged boys from a summer camp in Benderloch back to their homes in Glasgow was persuaded by some of his passengers to make a detour via Stirling, so that they could assist friends to change trains there. The driver crashed the lorry on this additional leg of the journey, injuring the pursuer and several other of the boys. Although the detour would have added 51 miles to a journey of 97 miles, the driver was regarded as engaged on his employer’s business, albeit by an improper mode. Had the driver been driving an empty lorry the court might have been inclined to regard a substantial deviation of this nature as outwith the scope of his employment, but it attached particular significance to the fact that the pursuer was one of the passengers whom the driver had on board and whom he was transporting on his employer’s behalf. Their safe transport did not cease to be part of his employer’s business simply because the driver had chosen a route that was contrary to his instructions, and vicarious liability was applied.257

C. LIABILITY OF PRINCIPALS FOR AGENTS (1) Direct liability There are several contexts in which a principal may incur direct liability for the consequences of wrongdoing by its agent.258 One is where a wrong perpetrated by an agent breaches a non-delegable duty of care owed by the principal to the pursuer; such a duty cannot be avoided merely by delegating it to an agent.259 Another is where the wrongdoing is specifically authorised or ratified by the principal, since in this situation the principal has in effect committed the wrongdoing itself.260 The doctrine of apparent authority may bar a principal from asserting that an agent acted independently in dealings with a third party if the principal has in some way represented that the agent was acting with its authority. Such a representation may take a variety of forms, but is commonly extrapolated from conduct, where the principal has permitted the agent to interact in a particular way with third parties, thus creating the appearance that the agent has the authority customarily invested in an agent so acting in the conduct of the principal’s business.261

257 Williams v A and W Hemphill Ltd 1966 SC (HL) 31 per Lord Pearce at 46. 258 See generally discussion in L Macgregor, The Law of Agency in Scotland (2013) paras 13.10–13.25. 259 See Rogers v Night Riders [1983] RTR 324. For further discussion of non-delegable duties, see paras 3.79 ff below. 260 P Watts and F M B Reynolds, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, 22nd edn (2021) para 8.181; R Munday, Agency Law and Principles, 3rd edn (2016) para 11.19; P Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort (2010) 132. 261 L Macgregor, The Law of Agency in Scotland (2013) para 13.10; E C Reid and J W G Blackie, Personal Bar (2006) paras 13.01–13.17.

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(2) Vicarious liability 3.72

There is no general rule that principals are vicariously liable for the wrongdoing of their agents.262 Clearly if an agent is in an employment relationship with the principal, it can be expected that the principal/employer will be held vicariously liable for wrongs committed during the course of that employment, as discussed above. Otherwise it is doubtful whether vicarious liability can arise. There are two specific contexts in which this is sometimes said to occur, although neither is straightforward, as explained further below.

(a) Liability of principals for fraud by agents 3.73

As discussed above,263 the liability of an employer for an employee’s fraud requires there to have been reliance by the injured party on the employee’s actual or ostensible authority to perpetrate the deceptive conduct in question. Although the reference to authority brings to mind the law of agency, the liability of an employer appears to be vicarious, and not direct.264 This leaves open the question of whether, in cases of fraud by agents who are not employees, liability on the part of the principal should be regarded as an application of the law of agency, engaging direct liability, or as a special category of vicarious liability.265 The distinction is not always sharply drawn in this context, but the better view would appear to be that principals are directly liable for deception perpetrated by their agents in the course of representing them, provided that the acts in question fall within a category of conduct which the agent had actual or apparent authority to undertake.266

(b) Liability of car-owners for drivers 3.74

Employers are of course vicariously liable for the negligence of employees who, in the course of their employment, injure others in driving the employer’s car, or indeed in using any other mode of transport. In addition, there is authority to suggest that the owner of a vehicle may, in very limited circumstances, be held liable when the vehicle is given into the keeping of a third party who is not an employee and who culpably causes injury in using it. The case law has mostly involved cars but other types

262 Mair v Wood 1948 SC 83 per Lord President Cooper at 87; P Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (1967) ch 9; L Macgregor, The Law of Agency in Scotland (2013) para 13.01. 263 See paras 3.64–3.66 above. 264 As in Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA (The Ocean Frost) [1986] AC 717. 265 See P Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort (2010) 176. 266 P Watts and F M B Reynolds, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, 22nd edn (2021) para 8.182; see also P Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (1967) chs 9 and 10.

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of transport may also bring this rule into play.267 It is not enough that a vehicle has been loaned to another.268 The vehicle owner must also have retained a specific interest in the use being made of it. The key consideration is therefore the purpose for which the vehicle was being used by the third party.269 In Ormrod v Crosville Motor Services Ltd,270 for example, the owner of a car had asked a friend to drive it to Monte Carlo so that they could meet there and holiday together using the car. The owner was held liable for the consequences of a collision caused by the driver en route. The court reasoned that, at the time of the accident, the driver was fulfilling a joint purpose in which the owner had an interest.271 The circumstances of this case contrast with those in Morgans v Launchbury272 in which a husband had driven to an evening out in his wife’s car. Later in the evening, after consuming alcohol, he asked a friend to drive the car to a restaurant and, during this journey, a fatal accident occurred due to the friend’s negligent driving. The wife was held not to be vicariously liable, since at the relevant time the driver “was not doing anything for her or at her request”,273 and the car was not being driven for a purpose of hers. No clear explanation is offered for the imposition of liability upon carowners in such circumstances. In Morgans v Launchbury, Lord Wilberforce borrowed from the terminology of agency:274 “The owner ought to pay .  .  . because he has authorised the act, or requested it, or because the actor is carrying out a task or duty delegated, or because he is in control of the actor’s conduct. He ought not to pay (on accepted rules) if he has no control over the actor, has not authorised or requested the act, or if the actor is acting wholly for his own purposes.”

At the same time, Lord Wilberforce stated that this did not entail agency in the contractual sense; the term “agency” was apparently used here in a

267 Early case law involved horse-drawn carriages: see e.g Wheatley v Patrick (1837) 2 M and W 650, 150 ER 917; but see also Thelma v Owners of the Endymion [1953] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 613 (rowing boat); Pawlak v Doucette and Reinks [1985] 2 WWR 588 (motorboat); Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 333 (light aeroplane, although liability was rejected because the owner had not retained the direction and control of the plane). 268 Morgans v Launchbury [1973] AC 127 per Lord Dilhorne at 138. 269 Ormrod v Crosville Motor Services Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 1120 per Lord Denning at 1123; see also Hewitt v Bonvin [1940] 1 KB 188; Carberry v Davies [1968] 1 WLR 1103; Soblusky v Egan (1960) 103 CLR 215 (in which the bailee in possession of a car was held vicariously liable for the negligence of a driver whom he had asked to drive his party to a function). 270 [1953] 1 WLR 1120. Although the headnote makes reference to “vicarious” liability, this term is not used in the judgments. 271 [1953] 1 WLR 1120 per Lord Denning at 1123. 272 [1973] AC 127. 273 [1973] AC 127 per Lord Dilhorne at 140; see also Norwood v Navan [1981] RTR 457; Lloyd v Borg [2013] NSWCA 245. 274 [1973] AC 127 per Lord Wilberforce at 135.

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loose sense merely as “a concept, the meaning and purpose of which is to say ‘is vicariously liable,’ and . . . either expression reflects a judgment of value – respondeat superior is the law saying that the owner ought to pay”.275 In similar vein, the leading English textbook on agency concludes that the cases involving car-owners “do not link to agency, at least in the central sense of that word”; rather their explanation is to be found “in works on tort”, Clerk and Lindsell on Torts being referred to in this context.276 The latter work, however, merely perpetuates the mystery, noting that such cases can be characterised in different ways, and submitting “that it is best to view this category as sui generis”.277 In any event, claims are now rarely brought on this basis, and there have been few instances of car-owners being found liable since Ormrod v Crosville. Almost all the litigants invoking this principle have done so in order to seek out a defender who was insured where the negligent driver was not.278 However, the Road Traffic Act 1988, section 143,279 now provides that motor vehicles must not be used on the roads unless the user has a valid policy of insurance in respect of third-party risks, and that owners must not permit their vehicles to be used without such cover in place. These provisions thus remove much of the practical impetus for proceedings to be brought on the basis of the vicarious liability of the car-owner.280

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Partnerships are vicariously liable to third parties for the wrongful acts or omissions of a partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the firm, or with the authority of his or her co-partners.281 The fact that the

275 [1973] AC 127 per Lord Wilberforce at 135. 276 P Watts and F M B Reynolds, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, 22nd edn (2021) para 8.187. For comparative discussion, see P Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort (2010) 112. 277 Clerk and Lindsell on Torts para 6–84. 278 P Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort (2010) 112–116; C Sappideen and P Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts, 10th edn (2011) para 19.150. See also Morgans v Launchbury [1973] AC 127 per Viscount Dilhorne at 138, conjecturing that the car-owner had been sued “in the hope that claims against her by passengers were covered by a policy of insurance”, whereas any claim against the actual driver would not have been. 279 Previously the Road Traffic Act 1972 s 143 applied to similar effect. 280 See also Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 33 per Gummow J at para 253, rejecting further expansion of the liability of vehicle-owners on the basis that: “The doctrine of vicarious liability in modern times derives support from the notion that a party who engages others to advance that party’s economic interests should be placed under a liability for losses incurred by third parties in the course of the enterprise. Further, the employer is seen as a suitable means for the passing on of those losses through such means as liability insurance and higher prices for the goods and services supplied by the enterprise. Such notions of economic efficiency have little part to play in supporting any broad principle . . . supporting the imposition of liability upon [the vehicle-owner].” 281 Partnership Act 1890 s 10; see also Mair v Wood 1948 SC 83; Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48, [2003] 2 AC 366.

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partner has behaved unlawfully does not remove his or her conduct from the ordinary course of the business of the firm; the relevant test is whether the partner’s conduct in perpetrating the wrongdoing was so closely connected with the acts which the partner was authorised to do that the partner could fairly and properly be regarded as having acted in the ordinary course of the partnership business.282 If, for example, a partnership is to be held vicariously liable for the fraud on one of its partners, the defrauded third party must establish that all the elements normally looked for to constitute the delict of fraud have occurred in the course of the partnership business.283 Vicarious liability may be rejected if the transaction within which the wrongdoing occurred was so “abnormal and incredible” that the third party could not reasonably and sincerely have believed that it came within the partnership’s normal course of business.284 A firm bears no liability where one partner negligently injures another. The victim may have a claim against the offending partner as an individual, but not against the partnership itself.285

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E. NON-DELEGABLE DUTIES OF CARE As a general rule, a person incurs no vicarious liability for wrongs committed by an independent contractor – that is, a person engaged under a contract for services, as distinct from a contract of service.286 Exceptionally, however, there may be direct liability for an independent contractor, where the duty of care is personal and is not avoided by delegation to another. Vicarious liability and liability based upon failure of a non-delegable duty are “two distinct legal doctrines with different incidents and different rationales”.287 The distinction was explained by Baroness Hale in Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association as follows:288 “In the one case, the defendant is not liable because he has breached a duty which he owes personally to the claimant; he is liable because he has employed someone to go about his business for him and in the course of doing so that person has breached a duty owed to the claimant. In the other 282 Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48, [2003] 2 AC 366. 283 Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48, [2003] 2 AC 366. 284 See e.g. J J Coughlan Ltd v Ruparelia [2003] EWHC Civ 1057, [2004] PNLR 4 per Dyson LJ at paras 34–36. The partner, a solicitor, had accompanied his client to a meeting where the client perpetrated a fraud upon the claimant so “preposterous” and “abnormal and incredible” that it did not credibly fall within the ordinary course of business of his firm of solicitors. 285 Mair v Wood 1948 SC 83, and see para 2.31 above. 286 Stephen v Thurso Police Comrs (1876) 3 R 535; D & F Estates Ltd v Church Comrs for England [1989] AC 177 per Lord Bridge at 208; Various Claimants v Barclays Bank plc [2020] UKSC 13, [2020] AC 973. 287 Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council [2017] UKSC 60, [2018] AC 355 per Lord Reed at para 50. 288 Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association [2013] UKSC 66, [2014] AC 537 at para 33.

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A non-delegable duty is not conceptualised as an absolute duty to make certain that the pursuer does not suffer harm. It does, however, entail that in carrying out certain types of activity D is under a personal duty to provide for P’s personal safety or the safety of P’s property. A third party may be enlisted to carry out the function in question, but D does not discharge D’s non-delegable duty by the exercise of reasonable care in the selection of that third party; D has a duty to ensure that care is taken by that third party. If the third party fails adequately to fulfil the task delegated to him or her, D remains liable for the consequences.289 However, D is liable in this way only in regard to “the very duty which he himself has to fulfil”, not in respect of collateral negligence by the third party.290 Duties of this nature, based on a duty to ensure that another party exercises due care,291 are exceptional.292 The contexts in which non-delegable duties may arise can be broadly identified as follows.

(1) Safety of employees in the workplace 3.82

An employer has a non-delegable duty to provide a safe system for its employees in the workplace.293 The employer is thus personally liable for performance of this duty and does not escape liability where it has been delegated to someone else and then inadequately performed.294 Alongside the statutory duties imposed upon employers,295 this common law duty 289 Hughes v Percival (1883) 8 App Cas 443; Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council [2017] UKSC 60, [2018] AC 355 per Lord Reed at para 31. 290 Myton v Woods (1980) 79 LGR 28 per Lord Denning at 33. 291 See also Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council [2017] UKSC 60, [2018] AC 355 per Lord Reed at para 51, acknowledging that a non-delegable duty might be breached by a deliberate wrong. 292 Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council [2017] UKSC 60, [2018] AC 355 per Lord Reed at para 32. 293 English v Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co Ltd 1937 SC (HL) 46; Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co Ltd v McMullan 1933 SC (HL) 64. 294 Baird v Addie (1854) 16 D 490; McDermid v Nash Dredging & Reclamation Co Ltd [1987] AC 906. See also E McKendrick, “Vicarious Liability and Independent Contractors – A Re-examination” (1990) 53 MLR 770. Cf Cook v Square D Ltd [1992] ICR 262, [1992] IRLR 34 (duty did not extend to management of “daily events” while employee was working for a client on an oversees assignment); Richardson v Stephenson Clarke Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1695 (employer had fulfilled its duty by providing adequate equipment, and was not negligent in leaving the selection of the equipment to the plaintiff). 295 See ch 12 below. Note in particular the Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 s 1, providing that where an employee suffers personal injury in consequence of a defect in equipment provided by his employer, and the defect is attributable wholly or partly to the fault of a third party, the injury is deemed to be also attributable to negligence on the part of the employer.

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comprises “the devising, maintaining and enforcing of a safe system for the work”296 including “provision of a competent staff of men, adequate material, a proper system, and effective supervision”.297 The concept of a safe system of work extends to addressing not only physical hazards but also aspects of the working regime that threaten the employees’ mental well-being.298 As noted above, the rise of the importance of the employer’s non-delegable duty of care may be attributed historically, at least in part, to the doctrine of common employment whereby employers could not be held vicariously liable to employees for workplace accidents where another employee had been at fault.299 Although the common employment doctrine has long been abolished,300 the principle that the employer retains a personal, non-delegable duty to see to the safety of employees retains a modern relevance.301

(2) Inherently hazardous operations English law recognises non-delegable duties as arising in that “large, varied and anomalous class of cases in which the defendant employs an independent contractor to perform some function which is either inherently hazardous or liable to become so in the course of his work”.302 Where a contractor has been employed to carry out a task within this category, the employer cannot escape liability merely by employing a competent contractor, but must personally ensure that proper precautions are taken to prevent injury to others as a consequence of the hazard. A non-delegable duty of care has been identified by the English courts in relation to hazards such as exposure to fire or risk of explosion,303 open ditches,304 dust and disturbance generated by adjacent construction works,305 as well as withdrawal of support

296 MacIver v J & A Gardner Ltd 2001 SLT 585 per Lord Carloway at 587. 297 Bett v Dalmeny Oil Co Ltd (1905) 7 F 787 per Lord McLaren at 790; see also Waters v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 WLR 1607 on the “personal duty” of the employer to provide an environment free of harassment and personal violence. 298 K v Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland [2020] CSIH 18, 2020 SC 399 per Lord President Carloway at para 66; and see ch 6 below. 299 See para 3.09 above. 300 By the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948 s 1. 301 For further discussion of the content of that duty, see e.g. A Emir, Selwyn’s Law of Employment, 20th edn (2018) ch 10. 302 Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association [2013] UKSC 66, [2014] AC 537 per Lord Sumption at para 6. For general discussion, see J Murphy, “Juridical Foundations of Common Law NonDelegable Duties”, in J W Neyers, E Chamberlain, and S G A Pitel (eds), Emerging Issues in Tort Law (2007) 369. 303 Black v Christchurch Finance Co Ltd [1894] AC 48; Honeywill and Stein Ltd v Larkin Bros (London’s Commercial Photographers), Ltd [1934] 1 KB 191; Balfour v Barty-King [1957] 1 QB 496. 304 Pickard v Smith (1861) 10 CBNS 470; see also Penny v The Wimbledon Urban District Council [1899] 2 QB 72. 305 Matania v National Provincial Bank Ltd and Elevenist Syndicate Ltd [1936] 2 All ER 633.

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from adjacent property in the course of building or other operations.306 In the modern law, however, the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary hazards has come to be seen as highly problematic.307 Some recent cases have interpreted the doctrine narrowly as relevant only to “exceptionally dangerous” operations,308 while other sources have suggested that, in the law of nuisance at least, liability can be construed more broadly as applicable to “work undertaken by independent contractors either where the work undertaken poses an especial risk or in cases where damage to a neighbour will foreseeably result in the natural course of things”.309 The question arises whether an equivalent doctrine is applicable according to the law of Scotland. References to English case law in this context did not become commonplace until the late nineteenth century, but there is a “long tradition”310 of Scottish authority to the effect that proprietors instructing contractors to undertake hazardous works on their property might themselves be regarded as culpable when a third party suffers harm due to the contractor’s failure to exercise due care. Hume lectured his students to the effect that:311 “If one employ a tradesman, to build him a house in a town, and the tradesman neglect properly to fence the ground, while the foundation is digging, and thus someone falls into the pit and is hurt, the employer, as well as the tradesman, is here liable for the damage, though the one may be entitled to ultimate relief against the other. In a matter which so nearly concerns the safety of the lieges, either he ought himself to see that the necessary precautions are taken, or he ought to employ such a tradesman, on whom he can rely in that respect.”

Although Hume’s example involved personal injury,312 subsequent case law has for the most part concerned property damage arising from operations such as building or demolition works.313 That case law was charted in detail 306 Bower v Peate (1876) 1 QBD 321; Dalton v Henry Angus & Co (1881) 6 App Cas 740. 307 Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association [2013] UKSC 66, [2014] AC 537 per Lord Sumption at para 6; see also Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Scottish Ministers [2016] CSOH 15, 2016 SCLR 539 per Lord Tyre at paras 16–17. 308 Biffa Waste Services Ltd v Maschinenfabrik Ernst Hese GmbH [2008] EWCA Civ 1257, [2009] QB 725 per Stanley Burnton LJ at para 78; see also Lindsay v Berkeley Homes (Capital) plc [2018] EWHC 2042 (TCC). 309 J Murphy, The Law of Nuisance (2010) para 4.42. 310 Stewart v Malik [2009] CSIH 5, 2009 SC 265 per Lord President Hamilton at para 22. 311 Hume, Lectures III, 188. See also M’Lean v Russell (1850) 12 D 887 per Lord Mackenzie at 892, acknowledging liability might be established for damage done to a neighbouring tenement, “because that generally arises from dangerous operations which are culpable, unless precautions are taken to secure the neighbourhood from damage”. 312 See also Sally v Dunbar (1899) 6 SLT 322; Anderson v Brady & Ross Ltd 1964 SLT (Notes) 11. 313 Such authorities include e.g. Duncan’s Hotel (Glasgow) Ltd v J & A Ferguson Ltd 1974 SC 191; Crolla v Hussain 2008 SLT (Sh Ct) 145; Morris Amusements Ltd v Glasgow City Council [2009] CSOH 84, 2009 SLT 697 per Lord Emslie at paras 43–45; Powrie Castle Properties Ltd v Dundee City Council 2001 SCLR 146 (demolition works exposing neighbouring property to risk of damp penetration). See also Walker, Delict 159.

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by Lord President Hamilton in Stewart v Malik,314 who nonetheless concluded by reserving his opinion on “whether the treatment in the Scottish textbooks, the majority of the Outer House cases and the sheriff courts, suggesting as it does, a general acceptance as applicable to Scots law of English decisions in this field, is well founded.”315 The court in Stewart v Malik recognised a positive duty of support as between proprietors in a tenement building, which could not be avoided when building works were undertaken by a contractor, but it committed itself no further.316 The decision in Stewart v Malik may thus leave a legacy of uncertainty as to the applicability of English authority on the general doctrine of non-delegable duties in regard to hazardous operations.317 There is of course a significant overlap between cases in which the liability of a proprietor is argued on the basis of negligent execution of works by contractors and those argued under the law of nuisance, in which the modern analysis of culpa makes special provision for activities creating risk of abnormal damage. Indeed in the same month in 1876 when the leading English case on non-delegable duties, Bower v Peate,318 was decided, the Second Division issued its decision in Chalmers v William Dixon Ltd, to the effect that:319 “If a man puts upon his land a new combination of materials, which he knows, or ought to know, are of a dangerous nature, then either due care will prevent injury, in which case he is liable if injury occurs for not taking that due care, or else no precautions will prevent injury, in which case he is liable for his original act in placing the materials upon the ground.”

Although Chalmers did not discuss the role of contractors, this point was dealt with at length in the Outer House case of Noble’s Trs v Economic Forestry (Scotland) Ltd,320 in which Lord Jauncey dismissed the action against the proprietors of land from which nuisance had emanated, stating that liability did not arise “ex dominio” and that a proprietor was not liable for “casual negligence” on the part of an independent contractor. But, following discussion of Bower v Peate, and under reference to Chalmers, Lord Jauncey

314 [2009] CSIH 5, 2009 SC 265 at paras 10–22. 315 [2009] CSIH 5, 2009 SC 265 at para 22. Lord Hamilton also noted, at para 17, the doubts expressed on this issue in Southesk Trust Co Ltd v Angus Council [2006] CSOH 6 per Lord Macphail at para 15; see also D Brodie, “Rights of Support and Non-delegable Duties” 2011 SLT (News) 253. 316 [2009] CSIH 5, 2009 SC 265 per Lord President Hamilton at para 26. 317 See e.g. Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Scottish Ministers [2016] CSOH 15, 2016 SCLR 539 at para 23, in which Lord Tyre stated that, in the light of the reasoning in Stewart v Malik, it would be “presumptuous” of him to express an opinion of general application to non-delegable duties in this context. 318 (1876) 1 QBD 321. 319 (1876) 3 R 461 per Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff at 464. 320 1988 SLT 662.

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observed that culpa on the part of the proprietor could in some circumstances be made out in this context:321 “A landowner will be liable to his neighbour if he carries out operations on his land which will or are likely to cause damage to his neighbour’s land however much care is exercised. Similarly will a landowner be liable in respect of carrying out operations, either at his own hand or at the hand of the contractor, if it is necessary to take steps in the carrying out of those operations to prevent damage to a neighbour, and he, the landlord, does not take or instruct those steps. In the former case the landowner’s culpa lies in the actual carrying out of his operations in the knowledge actual or implied of their likely consequences. In the latter case culpa lies in not taking steps to avoid consequences which he should have foreseen would be likely to flow from one method of carrying out the operation.”

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As discussed in greater detail in chapter 22, Chalmers and Noble’s Trs provided the primary references for the category of culpable nuisance, described by Lord President Hope in Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd as “conduct which gives rise to a special risk of abnormal damage, from which fault is implied if damage results from that conduct”.322 According to the leading account of the law of nuisance, proprietors may be found culpable where they have instructed contractors to perform operations in the knowledge that they are necessarily attended with risk of this nature.323 And indeed in policy terms it would seem undesirable that proprietors should be permitted to evade the onerous regime specified in Kennedy as attaching to such activities simply by instructing a contractor to undertake the work on their behalf.324 In summary, therefore, there is acceptance that proprietors are under a duty to refrain from works that breach their positive duty to support neighbouring property, a duty that is breached even when independent contractors have been instructed to execute the works.325 There appears also to be a solid basis for the imposition of liability upon proprietors who instruct contractors in operations that carry a special risk of abnormal damage to

321 1988 SLT 662 at 664. See also GA Estates Ltd v Caviapen Trs Ltd 1993 SLT 1037. 322 1996 SC 95 at 100, discussed at paras 22.59–22.60 below. In Kennedy itself, an appeal contesting the relevancy of the action had been brought by the contractors, but it had been agreed that the case in nuisance directed against the proprietors should go to proof before answer. 323 N R Whitty, “Nuisance”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) para 138, citing, inter alia, Noble’s Trs on this point (although the terminology of this section is confusing in that it appears to refer to a non-delegable duty as a “type” of vicarious liability). On the importance of knowledge, see Borders Regional Council v Roxburgh District Council 1989 SLT 837. 324 Or that the affected proprietor, who has had no control over the hazardous operations, should bear the risk of a negligent contractor’s insolvency. See discussion in Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Scottish Ministers [2016] CSOH 15, 2016 SCLR 539 per Lord Tyre at para 22. 325 Stewart v Malik [2009] CSIH 5, 2009 SC 265 per Lord President Hamilton at para 26.

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neighbouring property. The general position was summarised by Lord Tyre in Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Scottish Ministers as follows:326 “Liability of an employer for negligence of or nuisance caused by an independent contractor exists in Scots law beyond the specific situation of interference with rights of support. It is capable of applying more generally to operations carried out on a person’s land which cause or are likely to cause damage or injury to or on a neighbouring property.”

Whether or not English authority is recognised in this area, therefore, there is plainly a significant functional overlap between the Scots rules and the English doctrine of non-delegable duties.

(3) Care of the vulnerable English authority supports a further category of cases as giving rise to a nondelegable duty in circumstances where the defendant has assumed responsibility for the well-being of a vulnerable person in its care. In this context, at least, the existence of comparable duties appears to have been accepted by the Scottish courts.327 The cases within this category were characterised by Lord Sumption in Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association as follows:328 “(1) the claimant is a patient or a child, or for some other reason is especially vulnerable or dependent on the protection of the defendant against the risk of injury. Other examples are likely to be prisoners and residents in care homes. (2) There is an antecedent relationship between the claimant and the defendant, independent of the negligent act or omission itself, (i) which places the claimant in the actual custody, charge or care of the defendant, and (ii) from which it is possible to impute to the defendant the assumption of a positive duty to protect the claimant from harm, and not just a duty to refrain from conduct which will foreseeably damage the claimant. It is characteristic of such relationships that they involve an element of control over the claimant, which varies in intensity from one situation to another, but is clearly very substantial in the case of schoolchildren. (3) The claimant has no control over how the defendant chooses to perform those obligations, ie whether personally or through employees or through third parties. (4) The defendant has delegated to a third party some function which is an integral part of the positive duty which he has assumed towards the claimant; and the third party is exercising, for the purpose of the function thus delegated

326 [2016] CSOH 15, 2016 SCLR 539 at para 23. 327 See e.g. MCE v de La Salle Brothers [2007] CSIH 27, 2007 SC 556 per Lord Osborne at para 146, acknowledging such duties as “a feature of Scots law for many years”. The context was care of pupils at a residential school, although reference was also made to English v Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co Ltd 1937 SC (HL) 46 (employer’s duties). 328 [2013] UKSC 66, [2014] AC 537 at para 23.

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In setting out these five “criteria”, Lord Sumption added the caveat that the courts should be wary of imposing unreasonable financial burdens on those providing public services, on whom a non-delegable duty of care should be imposed “only so far as it would be fair, just and reasonable to do so”.329 As pointed out by Lord Reed in Armes v Nottinghamshire CC, however, it is not “routinely necessary” in such cases for the court to assess what was fair and just as a second stage of analysis;330 in cases where the first-stage criteria are clearly satisfied, such an exercise is “unnecessarily duplicative” and it should come into play only where the results of the first-stage inquiry are more marginal. In Woodland the court found that the five criteria were met in circumstances where the defendant local education authority ran a school which had outsourced to a private contractor swimming lessons for its pupils during school hours. The child claimant had got into difficulties in the swimming pool but, due to the alleged negligence of the contractor’s employees, was not rescued quickly enough to prevent severe brain injury. The key factors in allowing the case against the education authority to go to trial were, firstly, that there was a very clear antecedent relationship between the defendant and a vulnerable claimant. This gave the defendant substantial control over her well-being during school hours, and in that context the defendant had assumed a positive duty to protect her from harm. The defendant had delegated instruction and care of the child to a contractor, and that contractor had been negligent in the very function delegated to it. Lord Sumption added a further qualification in Woodland, to the effect that employers should not be held liable on the basis of a non-delegable duty of care for the negligence of independent contractors where the extent of the employers’ own duty was not to perform the function in question, but only to arrange for its performance. This meant that schools were not liable for failure of due care on the part of independent contractors providing extra-curricular activities outside school hours, such as school trips in the holidays. By the same token they were not liable for the collateral negligence of those to whom no control over the child had been delegated, such as bus drivers or the staff at theatres, zoos or museums to which children might be taken on trips during school hours.331 On application of this reasoning, the

329 [2013] UKSC 66, [2014] AC 537 at para 23 330 [2017] UKSC 60, [2018] AC 355 at para 36. 331 Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association [2013] UKSC 66, [2014] AC 537 per Lord Sumption at para 25(3).

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Supreme Court held in Armes v Nottinghamshire CC332 that, although the defendant local authority should be held vicariously liable for the abusive conduct of foster parents towards a child in their care, the authority did not owe the child a non-delegable duty of care by virtue of having placed her in foster care. The key question was whether the function of providing the child with day-to-day care, in the course of which she had been abused, was one which the authority was itself under a duty to perform, or one which it was “merely bound to arrange to have performed, subject to a duty to take care in making and supervising those arrangements”.333 The court’s conclusion was that the latter alternative was applicable in this case and therefore a non-delegable duty did not arise. For similar reasons a non-delegable duty was rejected in Razumas v Ministry of Justice.334 The claimant, a former prisoner, brought a claim against the prison authorities on the basis that his health had been severely compromised by inadequate medical care during periods of imprisonment. The court recognised that the defendant owed a direct duty of care to prisoners in regard to matters arising out of their custody, including the provision of a safe environment, but that duty extended no further than arranging access to National Health Service care. This was not, therefore, a case where one of the defendant’s functions in regard to the prisoners had been delegated to a contractor, since it was no part of the role of the prison authorities actually to provide healthcare.335 In other words, the defendant’s own duty was not to perform the function in question, but only to arrange for its performance, a circumstance in which, according to Woodland, non-delegable duties are not recognised. Aside from schools, hospitals are also singled out as owing a non-delegable duty to see that care is taken for the safety of a patient “who (a) is generally in its care, and (b) is receiving a service which is part of the institution’s mainstream function of . . . tending to the sick”.336 That principle

332 [2017] UKSC 60, [2018] AC 355, discussed above at para 3.25. 333 [2017] UKSC 60, [2018] AC 355 per Lord Reed at para 37. On this point see also Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association [2013] UKSC 66, [2014] AC 537 per Lord Sumption at para 25(3). 334 [2018] EWHC 215 (QB), [2018] PIQR P10. See also A (A Child) v Ministry of Defence [2004] EWCA Civ 641, [2005] QB 183, in which the defendant employer had contracted with a foreign hospital to provide healthcare for the families of staff stationed abroad, but in which the employer itself had not assumed responsibility for healthcare and therefore no duty had been delegated. 335 Cf GB v Home Office [2015] EWHC 819 (QB), in which a non-delegable duty was recognised on the part of the Home Office in regard to the provision of health care to detainees in an immigration removal centre, but in this case the Detention Centre Rules 2001, SI 2001/238, provided in r 33 that centres were obliged to employ their own general practitioner and healthcare team. 336 Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association [2012] EWCA Civ 239, [2013] 3 WLR 853 per Laws LJ at para 30; see also the discussion of the status of hospitals by Lord Sumption in [2013] UKSC 66, [2014] AC 537 at para 24.

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was accepted in S v Lothian Health Board,337 a case pre-dating Woodland, in which the pursuer had undergone cystic fibrosis carrier testing in pregnancy and, after a false negative test result, had gone on to give birth to a son affected by the condition. The pursuer had received her ante-natal care in an NHS hospital, and although the test in question had been performed by an independent contractor, she argued that the hospital remained liable for the consequences of the contractor’s negligence. Proof before answer was permitted in order to determine the scope of the duty owed by the hospital to the patient. This case contrasts with the English case of Farraj v King’s Healthcare NHS Trust338 in which the Court of Appeal dismissed a claim against a hospital which had engaged an independent laboratory to process a tissue sample sent to it for analysis by a doctor in another jurisdiction. Although that process was performed inadequately, the hospital was found not to have been under a non-delegable duty of care towards the claimant since she was not a patient undergoing treatment in the hospital and had not therefore been taken under its care. The court in S v Lothian Health Board attached considerable significance to the outward appearance of the arrangements, and the absence of notification that the test in question was to be performed by a contractor. But in the light of the analysis in Woodland in particular, it is doubtful whether those instructing contractors would be regarded as avoiding imposition of a non-delegable duty simply by advertising that a contractor was to be used for a particular service.

337 [2009] CSOH 97, 2009 SLT 689 per Lady Stacey at para 37; see also Bell v Alliance Medical Ltd [2015] CSOH 34, 2015 SCLR 676, accepting in principle that a health board owed a nondelegable duty to a patient where the function of performing MRI scans at one of its hospitals had been contracted out to a commercial provider. 338 [2009] EWCA Civ 1203, [2010] 1 WLR 2139.

PART II

NEGLIGENCE

Chapter 4

Duty of Care

Para A. THE TEST FOR DUTY: FROM DONOGHUE TO ROBINSON������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4.02 (1) Donoghue v Stevenson and the neighbour principle����������������� 4.03 (2) Anns v London Borough of Merton and the two-stage test�������� 4.13 (3) The retreat from Anns: Caparo Industries plc v Dickman��������� 4.15 (4) Reassessment of Caparo: Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police��������������������������������������������������������� 4.18 B. THE FEATURES OF DUTY��������������������������������������������������� 4.26 (1) The foreseeability of damage to the pursuer������������������������� 4.27 (2) Proximity���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4.32 (3) Novel cases: fairness, justice and reasonableness������������������� 4.38 C. DUTY AND OMISSIONS�������������������������������������������������������� 4.43 (1) “Pure” omissions���������������������������������������������������������������� 4.44 (2) The distinction between omissions and active conduct���������� 4.49 (3) “Blameable” omissions�������������������������������������������������������� 4.51 (4) Prior relationship between the defender and the pursuer (a) Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������� 4.52 (b) Professionals in a supervisory role���������������������������������� 4.54 (c) Commercial carriers������������������������������������������������������ 4.57 (d) Responses to intoxication and other forms of over-indulgence ����������������������������������������������������������� 4.58 (5) Relationship of control between defender and wrongdoer����� 4.62 (6) Duty of medical professionals to warn non-patients�������������� 4.66 (7) Duty of occupiers to mitigate hazards on land (a) Harm occurring within the defender’s property�������������� 4.71 (b) Harm occurring outwith the defender’s property������������ 4.73 The opening chapter tracked the increasing prominence of the law of negligence over the course of the nineteenth century, and finished by noting the crucial part played by the decision of the House of Lords in Donoghue v Stevenson (1932)1 in establishing the foundations for the later development of the law. The present chapter carries that discussion forward to the modern law. Today, the victims of unintended harm greatly outnumber those   1 1932 SC (HL) 31.

113

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of intentional wrongdoing, and negligence figures far more frequently in the reported cases than the intentional delicts. At the core of negligence is the notion that the pursuer (P) has suffered harm because the defender (D) has not exercised the appropriate level of care in an interaction with P. Yet, failure to exercise due care is not enough in itself to engage delictual liability. As explained by Lord Wright in Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co Ltd v McMullan, shortly after Donoghue, “negligence means more than heedless or careless conduct, whether in omission or commission; it properly connotes the complex concept of duty, breach, and damage thereby suffered by the person to whom the duty was owing”.2 In other words, delictual liability is based on three distinct requirements: (1) the interaction between P and D was such that D owed P a duty to take care to avoid conduct that risked injury to P; (2) D failed to meet the standard of conduct appropriate to that interaction; and (3) injury was caused to P as a result of that failure. The first requirement is the subject of this chapter. Later chapters will consider the other requirements.3

A. THE TEST FOR DUTY: FROM DONOGHUE TO ROBINSON 4.02

That those who are careless should be liable in reparation to those whom they harm is hardly a controversial principle. Yet, if individual freedom of action is not to be compromised unduly, some means must be found to control, and therefore to limit, liability for careless conduct; and of these “control devices”, duty of care is perhaps the most important.4 Negligence does not exist in a vacuum, therefore. The first step in pursuing a negligence claim is to show that the defender owed the pursuer a duty of care. In the absence of such a duty, there is no liability for injury. Questions about the existence or scope of a duty of care are questions of law, for the

  2 1933 SC (HL) 64 at 78. See also Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31 per Lord Macmillan at 70: “The cardinal principle of liability is that the party complained of should owe to the party complaining a duty to take care, and that the party complaining should be able to prove that he has suffered damage in consequence of a breach of that duty.”   3 Standard of care is considered in chs 10, 11 and 12, and causation and remoteness in chs 13 and 14.  4 Fleming, Torts para 8.10. For a comparison with control devices used in Civil Law systems, see F H Lawson, “Duty of care in negligence: a comparative study” (1947) 22 Tulane Law Review 111. For the argument that, in the interests of conceptual clarity, the concept of duty of care might usefully be deconstructed, and the issues with which it deals reallocated to other parts of the law of negligence enquiry, see D Nolan, “Deconstructing the Duty of Care” (2013) 129 LQR 559.

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court to decide, not matters of fact.5 The task is made a great deal harder by the innumerable and unpredictable contexts in which such a duty can potentially arise, for, unlike other more specific categories of delictual liability, negligence is not restricted to a particular type of harm, or to harms inflicted in the course of a specific sphere of activity. By no means everything, of course, is uncertain. Well-established case law acknowledges a duty of care in many common situations, such as between road users or between doctor and patient. In novel situations, however, where precedent provides no precise analogy with the case in hand, the duty enquiry becomes more complex, and more contested.

(1) Donoghue v Stevenson and the neighbour principle As chapter 1 showed, it was the landmark Scottish case of Donoghue v Stevenson6 which provided the classic analysis of duty, and in so doing set the seal on a process of convergence between Scots and English law in the law of negligence7 (a process which is not necessarily replicated in other areas of the law of delict). Indeed, although Donoghue was a Scottish case, it has acquired a reputation as “probably the most famous case in the whole Commonwealth world of the Common Law”.8 In the light of Donoghue’s towering status, its facts seem almost trivial.9 At the invitation of a friend, the pursuer, Mrs May Donoghue, visited the Wellmeadow Café in Paisley (now long since demolished, although a plaque marks the spot) where the friend bought for her a ginger beer float.10 The café proprietor served the pair himself, placing the ice cream into a glass and pouring over it some of the contents of a bottle of ginger beer. The drink was labelled as having been produced by D Stevenson, the defender, and the bottle was made of opaque dark glass, allowing little opportunity to inspect the contents. After Mrs Donoghue had drunk some of this brew her friend poured the rest of the liquid from the bottle. To  5 Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21 per Lord Hope at para 11.   6 1932 SC (HL) 31. Proceedings in the lower courts are noted in 1930 SN 117 (OH) and 1930 SN 138 (IH), and reproduced at the website devoted to the case by the Scottish Council for Law Reporting at http://www.scottishlawreports.org.uk/resources/dvs/donoghue-v-stevenson.html.   7 H MacQueen and W D H Sellar, “Negligence”, in Reid and Zimmermann, History, vol 2, 517 at 544–547.   8 A Rodger, “Mrs Donoghue and Alfenus Varus” (1988) 41 Current Legal Problems 1 at 2. Donoghue came to be appropriated by lawyers in Common Law jurisdictions as providing the “apodictic” account of duty of care: Fleming, Torts para 8.20.  9 On the factual background, see Rodger, “Mrs Donoghue and Alfenus Varus”; W W McBryde, “Donoghue v Stevenson: The Story of the ‘Snail in the Bottle’ Case”, in A J Gamble (ed), Obligations in Context: Essays in Honour of D M Walker (1990) 13; P T Burns and S J Lyons (eds), Donoghue v Stevenson and the Modern Law of Negligence (1991); M Chapman, The Snail and the Ginger Beer: The Singular Case of Donoghue v Stevenson (2009). 10 The facts as described are as averred by Mrs Donoghue. As mentioned below, the case did not in the end proceed to proof.

4.03

4.04

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4.05

4.06

their horror, the decomposing remains of a snail tipped into the glass. Mrs Donoghue claimed not only to have been shocked by the realisation that her drink had been thus contaminated, but also to have been made so ill by gastro-enteritis that she later required treatment at Glasgow Royal Infirmary and lost wages as a result of absence from work. Clearly Mrs Donoghue, who had not paid for the drink herself, had no contract with the café-owner, nor with Mr Stevenson, the manufacturer of the drink, but she nonetheless brought an action in negligence against Mr Stevenson.11 She maintained that the common law imposed a duty of care on manufacturers to the ultimate consumers of their goods in regard to safety defects that might cause harm. In response Mr Stevenson argued that he owed no such duty; manufacturers owed contractual duties to the retailers to whom they sold their goods, and retailers in turn owed contractual duties to their customers, but manufacturers could not reasonably be required to answer for the safety of their products to the ultimate consumer in all cases – the imposition of a general duty vis-à-vis such a wide circle of potential litigants would be far too onerous. In his support, he invoked a recent Scottish case, Mullen v A G Barr & Co,12 which involved a mouse in a bottle of ginger beer, and in which the majority in the Inner House had rejected the existence of duty on the part of manufacturers to any persons other than those with whom they had contracted. Although the Lord Ordinary allowed the action to proceed to proof, the Inner House was persuaded by the authority of Mullen and dismissed the action.13 The House of Lords, however, reversed that decision by a three– two majority and remitted the case back to the Court of Session for proof.14 In the House of Lords “two rival principles” were at issue: on the one hand, “the well-established principle that no one other than a party to a contract can complain of a breach of that contract”, and on the other, “the equally well-established doctrine that negligence apart from contract gives a right of action to the party injured by that negligence” (i.e. “a duty owed and neglected”).15 In resolving this conflict in favour of the latter, Lord Atkin, whose speech is the most often quoted of all those in the case, relied on a number of largely English authorities supporting the existence of a duty of care on the part of manufacturers.16 To the extent that certain case law from

11 Originally the café-owner had also been sued, but the action against him was abandoned at an earlier stage: see 1932 SLT 520. 12 1929 SC 461. 13 The composition of the Second Division bench in Donoghue v Stevenson was the same as that which had heard the appeal in Mullen v A G Barr & Co only a short time before. 14 In the event Stevenson died before the proof, and his executors settled the action on payment of a sum which was probably £100: see Chapman, The Snail and the Ginger Beer 173. 15 1932 SC (HL) 31 per Lord Macmillan at 64. 16 These included Heaven v Pender (1883) 11 QBD 503; George v Skivington (1869–70) LR 5 Ex 1; Hawkins v Smith (1896) 12 TLR 532; Elliott v Hall (1885) 15 QBD 315; also Oliver v Saddler & Co 1929 SC (HL) 94.

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the lower courts indicated that there was no such duty, this was a “grave defect in the law, and so contrary to principle” that Lord Atkin was not disposed to follow it.17 Reference was made also to a prominent decision by Judge Cardozo in the New York Court of Appeals some fifteen years earlier. In MacPherson v Buick Motor Co,18 a manufacturer was found liable to a customer who was injured when the wooden wheel on one of its cars disintegrated. It was held to be no defence that the car had been bought not directly from the manufacturer but from a dealer, nor that the wheel itself had been made by another supplier. Where danger could be foreseen as a result of the manufacturer’s negligence, Judge Cardozo held that duty was established, irrespective of the absence of a contract between the parties. By the same token, Lord Atkin held it to be “sound common sense” that:19 “by Scots and English law alike a manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him, with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the products will result in an injury to the consumer’s life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care.”

In the circumstances of this case, Lord Atkin thought, the “ordinary needs of civilised society and the ordinary claims it makes upon its members” required a remedy to be found for consumers where they were injured as a result of manufacturers’ negligence.20 For Lord Atkin, as MacCormick points out, imposing duty on the manufacturer was not only justified in terms of existing authority but also justifiable in terms of “sound common sense”, and the “needs of civilised society”.21 But if previously the courts had tended to concern themselves with the “elaborate classification” of duties rather than with fundamental principles, Lord Atkin reached for statements of general application. His search for authority took him beyond the law reports to the New Testament book of Luke, chapter 10, and to the discussion between Jesus and a lawyer on the meaning of the legal imperative to love “thy neighbour as thyself”.22 In the Gospel the lawyer’s question 17 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 46. Other cases were distinguished, including Longmeid v Holliday (1851) 6 Exch 761; Blacker v Lake and Elliot Ltd (1912) 106 LT 533; and Bates v Batey & Co Ltd [1913] 3 KB 351. Unlike his brother judges, Lord Atkin did not discuss the recent Scottish case of Mullen v A G Barr & Co 1929 SC 461. 18 217 NY 382, 111 NE 1050 (1916). 19 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 57. 20 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 46. 21 N MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, 2nd edn (1994) 119–128. 22 Frederick Pollock had stated in one of the leading English texts, The Law of Torts, 1st edn (1889) 12: “‘Thou shalt do no hurt to thy neighbour.’ Our law of torts, with all its irregularities, has for its main purpose nothing else than the development of this precept.”

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“Who then is my neighbour?”23 received as its answer the parable of the Good Samaritan, demonstrating the “positive spiritual imperative to show mercy”.24 In contrast, Lord Atkin’s lawyerly reply to the same question was more restricted:25 “You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.”

4.08

In a passage which looks beyond the analysis of manufacturers’ duties to the context of negligence more generally, therefore, proximity between the parties and foreseeability of harm, the indicators of duty already discernible in the English case law,26 were confirmed as the essential criteria in determining when one person was legally obliged to take care for the safety of another. Although Lord Atkin’s speech is the more often quoted, the House of Lords speech of one of the Scottish judges,27 Lord Macmillan, is of special interest. Lord Macmillan also found in favour of the pursuer. His speech as published in the law reports proceeded on the basis that there was “no distinction between the law of Scotland and the law of England in the legal principles applicable to the case”28 and presented a detailed review of English and American authorities as confirming his decision. At the heart of his speech, as in Lord Atkin’s, there was an appeal to first principle. Citing one of the leading English textbooks of the day,29 Lord Macmillan reasoned that the existence of a contract did not prevent another type of obligation arising between the same parties out of the relationship brought about by the contract. Moreover, there was no reason in principle why the same circumstances might not give one person a right of action in contract and another person a right of action in delict. In the case of a consumer, therefore, the contract for the sale of goods between manufacturer and retailer did not preclude a delictual claim by the consumer against the manufacturer. Like Lord Atkin, Lord Macmillan set out to establish a general rule for establishing duty of care; unlike Lord Atkin, he took his 23 Luke 10:29. 24 K Spiers, “Who is my neighbour?”, in P T Burns and S J Lyons (eds), Donoghue v Stevenson and the Modern Law of Negligence (1991) 279 at 282. 25 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 44. 26 As in Heaven v Pender (1883) 11 QBD 503 and Le Lievre v Gould [1893] 1 QB 491. 27 The other Scottish judge in the House of Lords, Lord Thankerton, also found in favour of the pursuer, but (at 60) gave his express agreement to Lord Atkin’s reasoning, not Lord Macmillan’s. 28 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 63. 29 F Pollock, The Law of Torts (then in its 13th edn of 1929) 570.

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lead not from the Gospel but from common sense and the traditional test of the judgment of the “reasonable man”:30 “What then are the circumstances which give rise to this duty to take care? In the daily contacts of social and business life, human beings are thrown into, or place themselves in, an infinite variety of relations with their fellows; and the law can refer only to the standards of the reasonable man in order to determine whether any particular relation gives rise to a duty to take care as between those who stand in that relation to each other. The grounds of action may be as various and manifold as human errancy; and the conception of legal responsibility may develop in adaptation to altering social conditions and standards. The criterion of judgment must adjust and adapt itself to the changing circumstances of life. The categories of negligence are never closed.”

In the reasonable man’s judgment a manufacturer of foodstuffs owed a duty to consumers to take care that the goods were not dangerous to life and health. Proximity was an element here too, in assessing the “daily contacts” that the parties had been “thrown into”. Foreseeability mattered also, in that the reasonable man would foresee that carelessness in food safety matters might harm his consumers. Given that the ginger beer bottles were sealed in the factory, the presence of a snail would indicate that the manufacturer had indeed been careless. Moreover, the opaque glass of the bottles had deprived the consumer, and others in the retail chain, of the opportunity to inspect the contents. The case should therefore go to proof to determine whether the facts as alleged could be proved. Lord Macmillan’s published speech professed him to be “happy to think that in their relation to the practical problem of everyday life which this appeal presents, the legal systems of [Scotland and England] are no way at variance, and that the principles of both alike are sufficiently consonant with justice and common sense to admit of the claim which the appellant seeks to establish.”31 Yet it seems that the journey to this apparently felicitous common destination had not been entirely straightforward. A detailed study by Lord Rodger of Earlsferry of an earlier draft of Lord Macmillan’s speech found significant differences between it and the final version, although the ultimate decision was the same.32 The draft was notably longer than the final version of the speech, and contained 30 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 70. 31 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 71–72. 32 A Rodger, “Lord Macmillan’s Speech in Donoghue v Stevenson” (1992) 108 LQR 236. It may be significant that the appeal was heard in December 1931 but the House of Lords did not publish its decision until late May 1932, postponed from 14 April – i.e. five months later, when at that time three months would have been more typical. Lord Rodger deduced that the draft had been written in March 1932. The text was found in the papers Lord Macmillan bequeathed to the Advocates Library on his death in 1952.

4.09

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4.10

extensive discussion of Institutional authority and Scots case law which was excised from the published version. Affirming that the case was to be determined by the law of Scotland, and that recognition of duty was consistent with the Scottish authorities,33 it presented its conclusions on the English authorities tentatively, noting a close “approximation” between the Scots law of delict and the English law of tort, but also distinctions “both in origin and in principle” between the two systems.34 The final version, on the other hand, relied mainly on English cases and, as mentioned above, presented its conclusions as equally applicable to both England and Scotland. In other words, the general principles which the draft identified as forming the foundations for the Scots law were repackaged in the final version as presenting the law of both systems. Lord Macmillan was to reflect in his memoirs that he never doubted the relevance of the pursuer’s claim,35 but the reasons for altering the draft of his speech in this way remain obscure.36 What is certain is that the opportunity was seized to settle the rules on manufacturers’ liability that had been unsettled on both sides of the border. But more than that, Donoghue came to be regarded as providing the foundation for the modern law of negligence in England37 as well as in Scotland. In fact, the broader legacy of Donoghue was not immediately apparent. The case could be read as providing authority for various propositions, ranging from the particular to the general. It settled beyond doubt that manufacturers owe a duty of care to the ultimate consumers to make their products safe. It also put paid to the idea that “privity of contract” restricted the right of the injured party to claim compensation in this type of situation; where injury to A is caused by negligence in the performance of a contract between B and C, A is not necessarily precluded from bringing a claim in delict. Beyond this, it set out “general principles applicable in all circumstances to determine the existence of duty of care”,38 offering 33 Indeed Lord Macmillan considered that the Second Division’s reasoning in Mullen v A G Barr & Co (that the manufacturer had owed no duty to the consumer where a mouse was found in a ginger beer bottle) was based on a misreading of English authority, rather than proper application of the Scottish sources: reproduced in Rodger, “Lord Macmillan’s Speech in Donoghue v Stevenson” 252. 34 Rodger, “Lord Macmillan’s Speech in Donoghue v Stevenson” 248–249. 35 A Man of Law’s Tale (1952) 151. 36 Lord Rodger advanced several theories, but suggested that the most likely explanation was that Lord Macmillan was persuaded to do so by Lord Atkin: Rodger, “Lord Macmillan’s Speech in Donoghue v Stevenson” 246–247. The English authorities on this subject were equivocal. The case was decided by a three–two majority, so that in effect Lord Macmillan had the casting vote. If his speech had found in Mrs Donoghue’s favour on the basis of Scots law but come to no definite conclusion on the English law, the English law would have remained uncertain. As it was, his speech in the final version, coupled with those of the other two judges in the majority, set on a firm basis the law of both jurisdictions. 37 For an English perspective, see J Plunkett, The Duty of Care in Negligence (2018) ch 2. 38 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 per Lord Bridge at 616. For discussion of the evolution of duty of care, see D Brodie, “In defence of Donoghue” 1997 JR 65.

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jurists, in Scotland and in England, the wherewithal to rationalise negligence as a coherent normative system, rather than a miscellany of disparate instances of duty.39 At the same time, there were obvious differences between the accounts of duty found in the various speeches. A narrow interpretation of the neighbour principle as expressed by Lord Atkin (to which Lord Macmillan did not refer in his own speech) was that a finding of duty rested specifically upon proximity and foreseeability.40 But where recourse to precedent produced no clear result, Lord Macmillan’s traditional “reasonable man” test suggested that account might be taken of “altering social conditions and standards” since “the categories of negligence are never closed”.41 Both approaches were directed at the recognition of duty in a novel context, and neither approach excluded normative considerations – what the law ought to be, as well as the principles gleaned from existing authority. But uncertainty as to the proper role of policy considerations in working through the different contexts for duty was to persist. In the decades immediately after Donoghue it is perhaps not surprising that the courts did not immediately seize upon its more open-ended formulations as a basis for extending the scope of duty of care.42 Even as late as the publication of the fourth edition of Glegg’s Law of Reparation in Scotland in 1955, Donoghue was cited not to vouch for general principle on duty but as an authority in the more restricted context of manufacturers’ liability for dangerous products.43 In practice, the scope of duty often continued to be plotted by reference to familiar categories, although over time there was a shift away from the restrictions of individual duties of care and towards a more general approach.44

4.11

4.12

(2) Anns v London Borough of Merton and the two-stage test It was thirty years before the speeches in Donoghue were invoked to develop the scope of duty in any significant way. For much of the twentieth century the courts in Scotland and England had declined to recognise liability for financial loss resulting from negligent misrepresentations in the absence of a special relationship of trust between the parties.45 In Candler v Crane,

39 See overview in E Weinrib, Corrective Justice (2012) 38–43. 40 For discussion on whether the neighbour principle is properly considered to be part of the ratio of the case, since it appears only in Lord Atkin’s speech, see R F V Heuston, “Donoghue v Stevenson in retrospect” (1957) 20 MLR 1 at 8. 41 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 70. 42 See J Plunkett, The Duty of Care in Negligence (2018) 39. 43 A T Glegg, The Law of Reparation in Scotland, 4th edn by J L Duncan (1955) 4–6 and 35–37. 44 See D Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (1999) 191–192; A Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (2007) 2. 45 Robinson v National Bank of Scotland 1916 SC (HL) 154.

4.13

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4.14

Christmas & Co46 the English Court of Appeal had declined to extend the reasoning of Donoghue beyond physical injury to person or property to a case in which the plaintiff had suffered economic loss due to allegedly negligent financial advice. That case was expressly overruled by the House of Lords in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd47 in 1963, holding that duty of care should not be restricted to loss caused through physical injury and that economic loss caused directly should not be excluded.48 Reference was made not only to Lord Atkin’s neighbour dictum,49 but also to Lord Macmillan’s reasonable man for whom in his “adaptation to altering social conditions and standards” the categories of negligence were “never closed”.50 A few years later, in Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd, the reasoning in Donoghue, and in particular the neighbour dictum, was confirmed as supporting a general principle:51 “the well-known passage in Lord Atkin’s speech should I think be regarded as a statement of principle. It is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances. But I think that the time has come when we can and should say that it ought to apply unless there is some justification or valid explanation for its exclusion.”

That general principle was further glossed in Anns v London Borough of Merton, a case holding the local authority liable for the economic loss suffered by the occupants after the statutory local authority inspections had failed to detect that a block of flats had been built on inadequate foundations. In formulating a test for duty Lord Wilberforce elided the criteria of foreseeability and proximity into a single test, and then asked simply whether there were any policy reasons that should constrain liability:52 “in order to establish that a duty of care arises in a particular situation, it is not necessary to bring the facts of that situation within those of previous situations in which a duty of care has been held to exist. Rather the question has to be approached in two stages. First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, 46 [1951] 2 KB 164. 47 [1964] AC 465. 48 The reasoning of Hedley Byrne was accepted in the Scottish courts: see e.g. Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd 1982 SC (HL) 244; Hines v King Sturge LLP [2010] CSIH 86, 2011 SLT 2; Cramaso LLP v Viscount Reidhaven’s Trustees [2014] UKSC 9, 2014 SC (UKSC) 121. In the circumstances of Hedley Byrne itself, however, the presence of a competently worded disclaimer was sufficient to exclude liability. 49 [1964] AC 465 per Lord Devlin at 524. 50 [1964] AC 465 per Lord Hodson at 505. 51 [1970] AC 1004 per Lord Reid at 1027. 52 [1978] AC 728 at 751–752.

Duty of Care   123 in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latter – in which case a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise.”

The tension between principle and policy inherent in the assessment of duty from the beginning was thus resolved by casting policy considerations as factors which could count against duty, but which were not essential in arguing for its recognition.

(3) The retreat from Anns: Caparo Industries plc v Dickman The difficulty posed by the approach set out in Anns was its open-endedness, particularly in widening liability for economic loss without also offering clear guidance on how this might be kept within reasonable bounds. It was not long before the courts went into retreat, emphasising that the extended principle presented in Anns was directed only at “novel” types of factual situation which had not arisen before, and not to circumstances in which the existence of such a duty had already been held not to exist.53 Furthermore, the two-stage test in Anns was “not to be regarded as in all circumstances a suitable guide to the existence of a duty of care”.54 Finally the decision in Anns was formally overruled in Murphy v Brentwood District Council,55 and a more conservative account of the scope of duty was provided by the House of Lords in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman.56 In Caparo a firm of auditors who had negligently certified misleading company accounts as accurate were held not to have owed a duty of care to potential investors. This meant that they could not be held liable to those who had acquired shares in the company and found themselves with an investment worth significantly less than anticipated. On the question of duty Lord Bridge stated that: 57 “in addition to the foreseeability of damage, necessary ingredients in any situation giving rise to a duty of care are that there should exist between the party owing the duty and the party to whom it is owed a relationship characterised by the law as one of ‘proximity’ or ‘neighbourhood’ and that the situation should be one in which the court considers it fair, just and reasonable that the law should impose a duty of a given scope upon the one party for the benefit of the other. But it is implicit in the passages referred to that the concepts of proximity and fairness embodied in these additional ingredients are not susceptible of any such precise definition as would be 53 54 55 56 57

Leigh and Sillavan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd [1986] AC 785 per Lord Brandon at 815. Yuen Kun Yeu v Attorney General of Hong Kong [1988] AC 175 per Lord Keith at 194. [1991] 1 AC 398. [1990] 2 AC 605. [1990] 2 AC 605 at 617–618.

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124   The Law of Delict in Scotland necessary to give them utility as practical tests, but amount in effect to little more than convenient labels to attach to the features of different specific situations which, on a detailed examination of all the circumstances, the law recognises pragmatically as giving rise to a duty of care of a given scope. Whilst recognising, of course, the importance of the underlying general principles common to the whole field of negligence, I think the law has now moved in the direction of attaching greater significance to the more traditional categorisation of distinct and recognisable situations as guides to the existence, the scope and the limits of the varied duties of care which the law imposes. We must now, I think, recognise the wisdom of the words of Brennan J in the High Court of Australia in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 60 ALR 1, 43–44, where he said: ‘It is preferable, in my view, that the law should develop novel categories of negligence incrementally and by analogy with established categories, rather than by a massive extension of a prima facie duty of care restrained only by indefinable “considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed”’.”

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Caparo marked a major departure from the expansive methodology of Anns, therefore. It was not sufficient for the pursuer to show a prima facie case for duty by reference to foreseeability and proximity and then leave it to the defender to point to compelling policy considerations against recognition of duty. Lord Bridge acknowledged that there was no “single general principle to provide a practical test which can be applied to every situation to determine whether a duty of care is owed”.58 “Previous situations” could not therefore be disregarded as “unnecessary”, as they had been in Anns, and indeed they were the essential starting point for assessing whether duty existed in the case in hand. If there was no precedent in point, new categories of negligence were not to be developed on a blank sheet, but instead “by analogy with established categories”. That process had as its points of reference foreseeability and proximity, and it was also subject to judicial determination of whether the imposition of duty was fair, just and reasonable. The authority of Caparo in setting out this framework was accepted without demur in Scotland.59 Caparo itself dealt with pure economic loss, and indeed it is in such cases that the existence of duty may often be controversial, but the analysis in Caparo was not to be confined to cases of this type. In Marc Rich & Co

58 [1990] 2 AC 605 at 617. Lord Oliver similarly pondered whether a single formula could be devised, and wondered whether the three ingredients of duty were in most cases “merely facets of the same thing” (at 633). 59 See e.g. Weir v National Westminster Bank plc 1993 SC 515; Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21 per Lord Hope at para 25; Cramaso LLP v Viscount Reidhaven’s Trustees [2014] UKSC 9, 2014 SC (UKSC) 121.

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AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd60 the House of Lords applied Caparo to a case involving property damage. Moreover, the leading Scottish case of Mitchell v Glasgow City Council, discussed at greater length below,61 similarly accepted the methodology of Caparo where duty of care was at issue in regard to physical injury.

(4) Reassessment of Caparo: Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police As noted above, Lord Bridge rejected the idea in Caparo that there was a single test for duty that could be usefully applied in every situation. Nonetheless, although the House of Lords in Caparo did not itself use the expression, the notion gained currency that Caparo had introduced a “tripartite” test for duty, in which the criteria were foreseeability, proximity and whether duty was fair, just and reasonable, and which had universal application.62 In Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police similarly, the Court of Appeal had taken the “three stage Caparo test” as its starting point, in holding that duty could not be recognised. The claimant was an elderly passer-by who sued the police after she was knocked over and injured in the scuffle that resulted from two officers attempting to arrest a suspected drug dealer on a busy street. The Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge’s decision that the police had acted negligently and held that it would not be fair, just and reasonable to impose duty on police officers “doing their best” to remove suspects from the streets.63 The Court of Appeal’s decision was in turn overturned by the Supreme Court, stating unequivocally that “the idea that Caparo established a tripartite test is mistaken”.64 As underlined by the Supreme Court in Robinson, it is only “in a novel type of case, where established principles do not provide an answer”, that the courts require to look further in order to decide whether a duty of care should be recognised. Caparo did not introduce a “universal tripartite

60 [1996] 1 AC 21. The case involved the loss of a valuable cargo at sea. The cargo-owners sued the classification society that had certified the ship as seaworthy shortly before the ship sank with their cargo on board. In order to determine whether a duty of care existed between the parties, the House of Lords applied Caparo, holding in this marginal case that the imposition of duty would not be fair, just and reasonable, given the existing international contractual structure that already dealt with distribution of loss. The Scottish courts have also accepted Caparo reasoning as relevant to property damage: see e.g. Tartan American Machinery Corporation v Swan & Co 2004 SC 276; Burnett v Grampian Fire and Rescue Services [2007] CSOH 3, 2007 SLT 61. 61 Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21; see also Gibson v Orr 1999 SC 420. In England, see Smith v Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41, [2014] AC 52. 62 For references to the “tripartite” or “three-stage” test, see e.g. Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923; Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145. 63 [2014] EWCA Civ 15, [2014] PIQR P14 per Hallett LJ at para 51. 64 [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 28.

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test for the existence of a duty of care, but recommended an incremental approach to novel situations, based on the use of established categories of liability as guides, by analogy, to the existence and scope of a duty of care in cases which fall outside them.”65 By contrast, in cases presenting established categories of duty, issues of fairness, justice and reasonableness have already been factored into the relevant principles and need not be considered further.66 Lord Reed explained the process as follows:67 “In the ordinary run of cases, courts consider what has been decided previously and follow the precedents (unless it is necessary to consider whether the precedents should be departed from). In cases where the question whether a duty of care arises has not previously been decided, the courts will consider the closest analogies in the existing law, with a view to maintaining the coherence of the law and the avoidance of inappropriate distinctions. They will also weigh up the reasons for and against imposing liability, in order to decide whether the existence of a duty of care would be just and reasonable.”

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In Robinson the existing authorities indicated that police officers were under a duty to exercise due care in taking positive action that might have as its consequence physical injury to others. As Hobhouse LJ had stated in Perrett v Collins,68 where the case in hand fell within a recognised category of duty, as a general rule “a defendant should not be allowed to seek to escape from liability by appealing to some vaguer concept of justice or fairness”. The Court of Appeal had therefore been mistaken in introducing the “three stage test” in such a way as to pre-empt principles already established in the case law. The essential first step in the duty enquiry is of course is to sort the “novel” from the “ordinary run” of cases. In practice, it may prove difficult to sustain a clear-cut distinction between: (i) novel cases, in which it is appropriate to consider whether duty is fair, just and reasonable; and (ii) cases which present an established category of duty but a new set of facts, to which this consideration is unnecessary. The making of this crucial distinction may itself present the opportunity for future litigation. The Outer House case of Hughes v Turning Point Scotland69 presents an example of the first category – a novel case. In Hughes a thirty-four-yearold man attended a facility operated by a homelessness charity that offered 65 GN v Poole Borough Council [2019] UKSC 25, [2019] 2 WLR 1478 per Lord Reed at para 64. 66 See also Darnley v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust [2018] UKSC 50, [2019] AC 831 per Lord Lloyd-Jones at para 15. 67 [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 29. 68 [1999] PNLR 77 at 91, cited by Lord Reed in [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 at para 26. 69 [2019] CSOH 42, 2019 SLT 651. See also Coulters Property Ltd v Coulter [2021] SC EDIN 22, in which the parties were in agreement that a novel set of facts was presented, thus opening up discussion, by analogy with case law, of whether duty would be fair, just and reasonable.

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support to alcoholics in giving up their addiction. Withdrawal from alcohol can be dangerous, carrying serious health risks. The project worker on duty admitted Hughes to a bedroom in the unit, and called a doctor with a view to providing him with medication for alcohol withdrawal. Three hours later, before the medication had been obtained, Hughes was found dead in his room, having suffered a fatal seizure. His family claimed that the charity had been negligent, either in admitting a client in a critical condition when it did not have on-site medical care, or in failing to implement a system whereby medical care could be urgently obtained. On the question of duty, the Lord Ordinary, Lord Clark, considered that there were no directly comparable cases dealing with the scope of duty on the part of organisations such as the defender. Analogies drawn by the pursuers between the charity and hospitals were not persuasive.70 This was therefore a novel type of case, which invited discussion of whether recognition of duty would be fair, just and reasonable. On that point the court considered that it would be contrary to the public interest to impose duties of this nature on charities like the defender, which performed “crucially important” services, but had only limited resources and staffing to deal with medical care.71 On that basis duty was not extended to ensuring a medically secure environment for the deceased’s detoxification. Darnley v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust,72 on the other hand, presents an example of the second category – an established category of duty but with a new set of facts. In Darnley the claimant had suffered a blow to the head and presented himself at the hospital casualty department managed by the defendant. The receptionist advised him that he might have to wait four to five hours to see a doctor, but failed to tell him that he would be seen by a triage nurse within thirty minutes. After a short wait he felt increasingly unwell and left the hospital to go home for paracetamol. He collapsed there not long after and, despite emergency surgery to treat a haematoma, he was left with permanent brain damage which would probably have been avoided by earlier treatment. His claim in negligence against the hospital authority was successful, on the basis that the longterm injury had been caused by a breach of the hospital authority’s duty of care to advise him accurately about waiting times. The Supreme Court held that the circumstances fell squarely within an established category of duty, since it had long been recognised that hospital personnel owed a duty to take reasonable care for the well-being of patients accepted into the hospital. Admittedly the precise factual situation of a receptionist misinforming a patient had not been the subject of any previous authorities. However, the absence of this exact fact pattern from the law reports did 70 [2019] CSOH 42, 2019 SLT 651 at para 93. 71 [2019] CSOH 42, 2019 SLT 651 at para 94. 72 [2018] UKSC 50, [2019] AC 831.

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not automatically mean that it was necessary to consider whether duty was fair, just and reasonable. It was sufficient that the case fell within an established category where the law imposed a duty of care. In summary, the court in Robinson did not set out to innovate but simply to reassert the essentials of the reasoning in Caparo. The following questions are reaffirmed as the foundations of the duty of care enquiry: (1) Is the relationship between the parties one in which established principles already indicate one way or another whether a duty of care arises? There are many types of relationship where duty is uncontroversial, such as between motorists and other road users, manufacturers and consumers, employers and employees, or doctors and patients. If the relationship falls within an established category of duty, it may be open to consider whether in the circumstances the levels of foreseeability and proximity are sufficient to support duty in this particular case, but it is generally “unnecessary and inappropriate to reconsider whether the existence of the duty is fair, just and reasonable”.73 (2) Alternatively is this a “novel type of case” where the established principles do not provide an answer on the existence or non-existence of duty? If so, the law must be developed “incrementally and by analogy with established authority”. The process of analogising takes as its reference points “the legally significant features of the situations with which the earlier authorities were concerned”. In this novel type of case it is also appropriate, “if injustice is to be avoided”, to consider not only proximity and foreseeability but also whether recognition or denial of duty is fair, just and reasonable.74 (3) A further, exceptional, possibility is acknowledged in Robinson.75 Is this a situation in which the existence or non-existence of duty of care has already been recognised, but one of the parties is inviting the court76 to depart from that established line of authority? If so, it is relevant to consider whether it would be fair, just and reasonable to realign the boundaries of duty. It is likely, however, that arguments in favour of a departure from an established line of authority would require also to address analogies with established 73 74 75 76

[2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 26. [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 27. [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 26. [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 26, acknowledging the “possibility that this court may be invited to depart from an established line of authority”. For discussion whether this indicates such questions in England to be within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court alone, see J Morgan, “Nonfeasance and the End of Policy? Reflections on the Revolution in Public Authority Liability” (2019) 35 Professional Negligence 32 at 41. In any event it is unlikely that the Inner House would regard itself as so constrained.

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authorities, including on matters of foreseeability and proximity, in order to persuade the court why those authorities had become unpersuasive in present circumstances. For the most part, then, the boundaries of duty are settled and uncontroversial. But in the spirit of Donoghue, where past experience is inadequate they may be opened up as appropriate to accommodate novel cases, or, exceptionally, to depart from existing authorities. Where such developments are at issue, normative considerations must be reconciled alongside the factual, as they were in Donoghue. In the modern law Caparo has articulated the method for this by referring to considerations of fairness, justice and reasonableness. As with Caparo itself, the authority of Robinson and its restatement of the reasoning in Caparo has been accepted by the Scottish courts.77 Yet, although the leading judgment in Robinson was delivered by a Scottish judge, Lord Reed,78 lingering disquiet has been expressed that the emphasis on analogy with established authorities represents a triumph of pragmatism over principle which sits unhappily within the Scottish legal tradition.79 It is certainly attractive to think of the Scots law of delict as capable of being found “as easily and pleasantly as a flower in a formal garden set out along the path of principle”, in contrast to the law of England “where one has to hack a way through a jungle of torts to find the relevant rule”.80 But in most legal systems, including those in the civilian tradition, the law of negligence is “an area of law dominated by the facts”,81 and, as chapter 1 has discussed, the emphasis upon precedent predates Donoghue in Scottish and English cases alike. The main thrust of Robinson is to rein back the range of cases in which policy issues of fairness, justice and reasonableness – at best a “set of blunt tools”82 – should be factored into the duty of care enquiry. 77 E.g. Hughes v Turning Point Scotland [2019] CSOH 42, 2019 SLT 651; Commodity Solution Services Ltd v First Scottish Searching Services Ltd [2019] SAC (Civ) 4, 2019 SC (SAC) 41; Glasgow City Council v First Glasgow (No 1) Ltd [2019] CSOH 101, 2020 SLT 75. 78 One of the Scottish judges on the Supreme Court. The other, Lord Hodge, concurred in his judgment. 79 See Commodity Solution Services Ltd v First Scottish Searching Services Ltd [2019] SAC (Civ) 4, 2019 SC (SAC) 41 per Sheriff Principal D C W Pyle at para 6; also “Principles of Delict in Scotland following Robinson” (2019) 146 Civil Practice Bulletin 1. 80 P Catala and J A Weir, “Delict and Torts” (Part 4) (1965) 39 Tulane Law Review 701 at 781 (discussing the fundamental differences between the civil law and common law traditions). 81 Catala and Weir, “Delict and Torts” 782, commenting on French law. See e.g. G Viney and P Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité, 4th edn (2013) para 449: “En dépit de la place grandissante des normes écrites réglementant les comportements ou protégeant les droits d’autrui, c’est la jurisprudence qui, aujourd’hui encore, conserve le rôle essentiel dans la définition de l’illicite à défaut d’une réglementation complète et détaillée de toutes les conduites humaines qui serait d’ailleurs aussi rigide qu’étouffante et probablement inefficace.” 82 Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181 per Lord Walker at 209.

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It is not clear that expanding their application to all cases would represent recourse to “principle”. In any event, it is not in the spirit of Lord Macmillan’s speech in Donoghue, which even in its original, Scotland-focussed, version was a model of incremental reasoning – recognising that the categories of negligence were never closed but fastidious in examining whether the Institutional writings and the “Law Reports of Scotland” already accommodated claims like those of Mrs Donoghue.83

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According to Robinson, attention to prior case law is key in deciding whether the case in hand falls within established principles or is of a “novel type”, and reasoning by analogy provides the “visible landmarks”84 in determining whether duty of care should be extended in regard to the latter. As Lord Reed indicated in Robinson, the points of reference in this exercise are the “legally significant features” of the situations with which the earlier authorities were concerned.85 Foreseeability and proximity, which figured large in Donoghue, remain fundamental to the duty analysis in all cases of alleged negligence, but, as discussed above, the interests of fairness, justice and reasonableness should also be considered where a novel case presents itself.86 An overview of each of these concepts is provided below, with the caveat that the common denominators in the wide variety of possible incidences of duty are “notoriously elusive”.87 A more detailed account of how these features interact in problem contexts is to be found in the chapters which follow.

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At the heart of duty of care is the idea that defenders should carry responsibility only for damage which they might reasonably have been expected to foresee.88 The principal determinant of the range of duty in Lord Atkin’s neighbour test in Donoghue v Stevenson was whether the pursuer was one of 83 Reproduced in A Rodger, “Lord Macmillan’s Speech in Donoghue v Stevenson” (1992) 108 LQR 236 at 251. 84 J Morgan, “The Rise and Fall of the General Duty of Care” (2006) 22 Professional Negligence 206 at 218, citing Lord Mance in Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181 at para 93 to the effect that “Incrementalism operates as an important crosscheck on any other approach”. 85 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 27. 86 [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Mance at para 84. 87 Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181 per Lord Bingham at para 15 (speaking particularly of economic loss). 88 A Ripstein, “Philosophy of Tort Law”, in J Coleman and S Shapiro (eds), Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (2004) 657 at 664–670.

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those persons who were “so closely and directly affected” by the defender’s act that the defender “ought reasonably” to have had the pursuer “in contemplation as being so affected” when directing his or her mind to the acts or omissions called in question.89 In assessing foreseeability it is of course important to consider any evidence that the defender actually foresaw the risk of damage to the pursuer, but it is also relevant to look with hindsight at what the hypothetical reasonable person in the position of the defender “ought” to have foreseen.90 Moreover, even if the defender did not have the particular pursuer in mind, damage may be foreseeable if persons generally in the position of the pursuer were likely to be affected.91 The issue of foreseeability is more likely to be contentious in novel cases than in cases involving the established categories of duty. An obvious feature of the duty that doctors owe to their patients, for example, is that unprofessional standards of care will foreseeably bring those patients harm. However, even where the case in hand relates to an established category, the particular relationship between the pursuer and the defender may be such that it is not foreseeable that want of care by the defender would be likely to injure the pursuer. The leading Scottish case demonstrating the limits of foreseeability in this context92 is Bourhill v Young.93 The pursuer was a heavily pregnant fishwife who had travelled through Edinburgh by tram to sell her stock in a city suburb. Just as she was unloading her basket of fish from the tram at the tram stop in the middle of the road, Mr Young passed the stationary tram on the near side, travelling at speed on his motorcycle. In this position he would have been hidden from the view of traffic coming in the opposite direction, and as he crossed the junction just ahead of the tram he was hit by a car coming from the other direction and turning right. The collision threw him from his motorcycle and caused him fatal head injuries. The accident took place around 50 feet from Mrs Bourhill and, although the tram blocked her view, she heard the noise and saw the blood on the road after Mr Young’s body had been removed. She claimed that in consequence she suffered nervous shock to which she attributed the still-birth of her child a month later. Her claim in negligence against Mr Young’s executors for the injury she had suffered 89 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 44. 90 See McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 per Lord Wilberforce at 420. 91 See Kemp & Dougall v Darngavil Coal Co Ltd 1909 SC 1314 per Lord Johnston at 1327: the pursuer must establish that he or she was “a person or of a class definitely ascertained, and so related by the circumstances to the [defender] that the [defender] is bound, in the exercise of ordinary sense, to regard his interest and his safety”. 92 Issues of foreseeability are also relevant to assessing breach of standard of care and to remoteness, where the question of what exactly was reasonably foreseeable to the defender may take on a different focus. These issues are considered in subsequent chapters. 93 1942 SC (HL) 78. For the background to this case, see W W McBryde, “Bourhill v Young: The Case of the Pregnant Fishwife”, in D L Carey Miller and D W Meyers (eds), Comparative and Historical Essays in Scots Law: A Tribute to Emeritus Professor Sir Thomas Smith, QC (1992) 66.

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was unsuccessful, on the basis that no duty had been owed to her in the circumstances. The duty between drivers or motorcyclists and other road users was already an established category of duty, and the court observed that Mr Young owed a duty to the occupants of the car with which he collided. However, the indicators of duty were not sufficiently present in his relationship with Mrs Bourhill, since he could not have foreseen that a person in her position would be at risk from his excessive speed. In speeding towards the junction he ought to have been able to foresee the risk of damage to other vehicles at the junction, but the pursuer, by contrast, had not been in his line of vision, or within the possible range of any debris from the accident, so that she was outwith the foreseeable range of duty.94 A leading American case, Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co,95 provides another illustration of the outer limits of foreseeability. In Palsgraf railway employees helped up a passenger jumping on to a train as it pulled away from the station platform. An unmarked parcel knocked from the passenger’s grasp in this manoeuvre contained fireworks that exploded as they dropped to the ground. Due to the vibration of the explosion, heavy metal scales some thirty feet away at the opposite end of platform toppled over and injured the plaintiff. Her claim for damages against the railroad company was rejected. The relationship between railroad staff and the passengers whom they were directing on and off trains would no doubt have been regarded as an accepted category of duty,96 but even assuming a duty had been owed to passengers in the immediate locus of the accident, it was not foreseeable that the defendant’s employees’ actions were likely to cause harm to the plaintiff or persons in her position. As Judge Cardozo stated, “negligence . . . is a . . . term of relation”,97 and so the plaintiff had to “sue in her own right for a wrong personal to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another”.98 Duty does not require that the particular pursuer should have been within the defender’s sights if the pursuer was a member of a class of persons foreseeably at risk from the defender’s conduct.99 In road traffic accidents, for example, careless drivers may not necessarily be able to predict injury to any one individual, but they ought to be able to foresee that their negligent driving may endanger any road-users in their vicinity.

94 1942 SC (HL) 78 per Lord Macmillan at 88. 95 248 NY 339, 162 NE 99 (1928). 96 For Scottish examples, see Fraser v Caledonian Railway Company (1902) 5 F 41; Buchanan v Glasgow Corporation 1919 SC 515. 97 248 NY 339, 162 NE 99 (1928) at per Judge Cardozo at 345, 101. 98 248 NY 339, 162 NE 99 (1928) at per Judge Cardozo at 342, 100. 99 Cf Thomson v Scottish Ministers [2013] CSIH 63, 2013 SC 628 per Lord Justice-Clerk Carloway at para 57: it could not be shown that the defenders’ conduct had placed the pursuer’s daughter, or a class of persons of which she was a member, at any “distinct or special risk”.

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This notion of a “class” of persons to whom duty is owed is demonstrated in Haley v London Electricity Board.100 The defendant’s employees excavated a hole in a pavement in Woolwich, south London, and, in order to prevent passers-by from falling into it, they propped up a long-handled hammer across the pavement, some two feet off the ground. The plaintiff was blind and, as he approached the scene, his white stick missed the hammer, so that he tripped and fell, sustaining an injury which rendered him deaf. The makeshift barrier used by the defendant’s employees would have been adequate to warn off sighted persons, but it was insufficient to protect blind pedestrians. The defendant could not have known that Mr Haley, in particular, would be passing by the locus, but evidence was led regarding the number of blind people in Britain as a whole, in London, and specifically in Woolwich (258).101 This was a class of persons of sufficient statistical significance that the likelihood of one of them coming across the hole could reasonably have been foreseen by the defendant. Duty of care was therefore established in relation to blind persons passing through Woolwich, a group of which the plaintiff was a member.102 Where, as in cases such as Bourhill and Palsgraf, damage was not foreseeable, there is no duty of care, and a claim based upon negligence cannot proceed. But even where foreseeability is established, as in Haley, this is not conclusive of the existence of duty. Other factors, too, require to be considered that may substantiate or undermine the arguments for duty, namely proximity, and, in novel cases, fairness, justice and reasonableness.

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(2) Proximity Proximity between the parties is a further key feature of duty, often considered in tandem with notions of foreseeability.103 In Bourhill, for example, the lack of physical proximity between parties some 50 feet apart was also an important consideration in judging that the injury to Mrs Bourhill could not have been foreseen by Mr Young. In Palsgraf, similarly, the plaintiff’s physical distance from the actions of the defendant’s employees underlined the unforeseeability of the damage that she suffered. Proximity in this sense is broadly understood. The starting point for enquiry is the nature of the interaction between the pursuer and the

100 [1965] AC 778. 101 [1965] AC 778 per Lord Evershed at 798. 102 But cf Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53, in which it was reasonably foreseeable that a serial killer, if not found and arrested by the defendant, would be likely to harm young female members of the public, like the plaintiff’s daughter, who subsequently became one of his victims. However, this was a wide and indeterminate class and there had been nothing to place the plaintiff’s daughter at special risk. Duty was not therefore made out. 103 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 per Lord Oliver at 633.

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defender.104 In some cases sufficient proximity may be found between parties not previously known to each other where there is close physical propinquity, such as in the relationship between road users. But as Lord Atkin remarked in Donoghue v Stevenson, proximity need not necessarily be looked for in a physical or geographical sense. Duty can extend to parties whom the defender knew to be “directly affected by his act”.105 In some circumstances, therefore, proximity may be identified by reference to an antecedent relationship, or sequence of relationships, between the parties – just as Donoghue was linked to Stevenson by being the ultimate consumer of one of his bottles of ginger beer. But whatever the relationship between the parties, duty is unlikely to be recognised unless the defender was sufficiently close to have “a measure of control over and responsibility for” the source of harm to the pursuer.106 The intertwining of the threads of foreseeability and proximity is demonstrated in Hines v King Sturge LLP.107 The pursuers were tenants of an office building that was damaged by fire more severely than would otherwise have occurred, because the fire-alarm system did not work. The defenders were the managing agents who looked after the building, and as part of their duties maintained the fire-alarm system, but had failed to keep open the telephone line on which the system depended. The tenants sought damages for their loss, which they alleged had been caused by the agents’ negligence. The Inner House held that a relevant case was made out and proof before answer was allowed. On the question of duty, the court considered it arguable that there was sufficient proximity between the tenants and the agents who managed the tenanted building on behalf of the landlords. It might also be shown that the agents should have foreseen risk to the tenants’ property as a consequence of their failure to restore the telephone line. In addition, given that no specific precedent existed for the imposition of a duty upon a landlord’s property agent to take reasonable

104 E.g. Landcatch Ltd v International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 552 per Lord Gill at para 115 (affd 1999 SLT 1208), finding on scrutiny of the “primary facts” that the pursuers’ business activities were not sufficiently “bound up” with the area affected by the harm. 105 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 45. See also Canadian National Railway v Norsk Pacific Steamship Co [1992] 1 SCR 1021 per McLachlin J at para 49, instancing “the relationship between the parties, physical propinquity, assumed or imposed obligations”. 106 Sutradhar v National Environment Research Council [2006] UKHL 33, [2007] Env LR 10 per Lord Hoffmann at para 3. On being commissioned to carry out research into groundwater resources in Bangladesh the defendant had published a report noting the presence of various toxins in water samples, but making no mention of arsenic, for which it had not tested. In consequence, the presence of arsenic in groundwater supplies in Bangladesh went undetected. When a claim was brought by those poisoned by arsenic-contaminated water it was accepted as foreseeable that reliance upon the defendant’s report might lead to harm of this type. However, it was held that the defendants had no form of control over drinking-water supplies in Bangladesh, nor responsibility for its wholesomeness, and thus the necessary element of proximity was absent. 107 [2010] CSIH 86, 2011 SLT 2.

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care for the property of the landlord’s tenant,108 the fairness, justice and reasonableness of duty could be taken into account. Although foreseeability and proximity are often considered side-byside, they are nonetheless discrete features of duty. Indeed it is perfectly possible, although perhaps less usual, for one to be present but not the other.109 In Glasgow City Council v First Glasgow (No 1) Ltd,110 for example, the driver of a local authority bin lorry knocked down and fatally injured several pedestrians after losing consciousness at the wheel. His former employer had allegedly given the local authority an employment reference that did not mention a previous incident of losing consciousness while driving a bus. The issue for the court to consider was whether the previous employer owed a duty of care to the injured persons to disclose such information in providing the employment reference. Lord Ericht held that if a reference failed to mention the risk of a person causing harm, it was reasonably foreseeable that the harm might occur in the course of the person’s work with a new employer. Nonetheless he also held that the provider of the reference was not in a relationship of proximity with the injured person such as would give rise to a duty of care.111 ICL Tech Ltd v Johnston Oils Ltd112 provides a further example of a situation in which the risk of injury was foreseeable, but there was insufficient proximity between the parties. The case arose out of a fatal gas explosion caused by the leaking of propane gas from a cracked underground pipe inside industrial premises. One of the injured workers obtained damages from the owner of the premises who, in turn, sought relief from its gas supplier. The central issue was whether the supplier was under a duty of care to inquire about the adequacy of the customer’s pipework and to advise on its inspection and maintenance. It was accepted without argument that the supplier might readily foresee the possibility of an explosion if its customer allowed pipes to become corroded and leak. Nonetheless, Lord Hodge found that there was no duty of care because there had been insufficient proximity between the parties, taking into account factors such as the defender’s lack of knowledge of the disposition of the pursuer’s pipework after the point of supply, and the failure of the pursuer to seek out safety advice from the defenders.113 108 [2010] CSIH 86, 2011 SLT 2 as noted by Lord Carloway at para 77. 109 See Thomson v Scottish Ministers [2013] CSIH 63, 2013 SC 628. 110 [2019] CSOH 101, 2020 SLT 75. 111 [2019] CSOH 101, 2020 SLT 75 at para 41: “The injured person is not injured by the giver of the reference. The injured person is not the recipient of the reference. The injured person is not injured by the recipient of the reference. The injured person is not aware that the reference has been given. The injured person is not aware of what the reference says. The injured person has not relied on the reference in any way. The injured person has not taken the reference into account in deciding to be in central Glasgow that day.” 112 [2013] CSOH 159, 2013 SLT 1090. 113 [2013] CSOH 159, 2013 SLT 1090 per Lord Hodge at paras 59–67.

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Where a novel case is at issue, the factual assessment of the indicators of proximity cannot always be disentangled from policy considerations. As Lord Oliver reflected a short time after Caparo:114 “[N]o doubt ‘policy’, if that is the right word, or perhaps more properly, the impracticability or unreasonableness of entertaining claims to the ultimate limits of the consequences of human activity, necessarily plays a part in the court’s perception of what is sufficiently proximate . . . [I]n the end, it has to be accepted that the concept of ‘proximity’ is an artificial one which depends more upon the court’s perception of what is the reasonable area for the imposition of liability than upon any logical process of analogical deduction.”

Thus in ICL Tech Ltd v Johnston Oils Ltd there was little in the way of proximity between the defender and the source of danger, since there was no evidence that the pursuer had sought out or relied upon the defender’s advice on the condition of their pipework, and the defender had next to no involvement in maintaining the pipework’s safety.115 At the same time, however, account was also taken of other factors in denying duty, notably the practice in the industry of leaving safety issues to the owners, the need for certainty in such matters, and the conclusion of a report into the incident that “the primary responsibility for the safety of the LPG pipework should rest with the user of the installation”.116 In other words, the court’s perception of what was “reasonable” confirmed its finding of insufficient proximity. In the assessment of proximity, therefore, the courts are often concerned not only with whether the defender was proximate to the danger in factual terms but also with whether it was reasonable to regard the defender as so positioned. The interplay of factual and policy considerations in determining proximity is particularly noticeable in cases where the harm is not physical but psychological or economic, as later chapters will discuss.

(3) Novel cases: fairness, justice and reasonableness 4.38

Foreseeability and proximity, then, are the main foundations for duty of care, and the assessment of whether they are present is primarily, although not exclusively, factual in nature. Where they are absent, or insufficiently present, there is no duty. However, in novel cases, where established principles do not provide an answer, the question of duty turns not only upon foreseeability and proximity but also whether it is fair, just and reasonable to extend duty to

114 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 at 410–411. 115 [2013] CSOH 159, 2013 SLT 1090 per Lord Hodge at para 67. 116 [2013] CSOH 159, 2013 SLT 1090 at paras 61–63 (emphasis added).

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the circumstances in hand.117 Given policy considerations cannot always be unscrambled from other factors in the duty enquiry, in particular from proximity (as seen above), it is unusual for duty not to be regarded as fair, just and reasonable where foreseeability and proximity are demonstrated. However, this remains a possible outcome.118 All three elements may also be considered in marginal cases where the question of duty has already been determined in analogous circumstances but where it is argued that its scope has been too narrowly, or perhaps too generously, drawn.119 The question whether duty is fair, just and reasonable should not therefore be regarded as a “routine aspect” of negligence case law,120 although, given that cases where duty is straightforward are unlikely to be litigated on that point, it is precisely the novel and the marginal on which the courts are likely to be asked to adjudicate. Even in a restricted role, however, this aspect of the duty enquiry is not free from difficulty. Robinson warns that, while the courts must exercise their “judgment about the potential consequences of a decision”, they are not “policy-making bodies” in the sense, for example, of the Law Commissions.121 Yet reference to fairness, justice and reasonableness clearly does involve the court in making policy choices to limit the wide range of circumstances to which negligence might otherwise apply.122 There are no exhaustive lists of which extra-doctrinal factors are relevant or how they should be weighted.123 The policy considerations that may be persuasive in particular contexts are considered in more detail 117 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 27. 118 See discussion in Van Oppen v Bedford Charity Trustees [1990] 1 WLR 235. See also Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225, in which the police did not act quickly enough to prevent the claimant being seriously assaulted by his former partner, despite his having reported earlier threats to the police and given the police full information about the partner’s whereabouts. It was held that the police did not owe him a duty of care because, although the elements of foreseeability and proximity may have been present, the imposition of duty of care upon the police might induce a “detrimentally defensive frame of mind”. 119 [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 26, acknowledging the “possibility that this court may be invited to depart from an established line of authority”. 120 [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 69.1. 121 [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 69.2. 122 [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Mance at para 84, noting that the consideration of issues of proximity and fairness, justice and reasonableness necessarily entailed the making of policy choices. As Lord Hope conceded in Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21 at para 25, “It is really no more than an expression of the idea that lies at the heart of every judgment about legal policy”. See also Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence para 2–43; E Weinrib, Corrective Justice (2012) 69–79 on “two notions of policy” in this context. 123 Judicial definitions of legal policy in this context often simply lead back to notions of fairness, justice and reasonableness. See e.g. McFarlane v Tayside Health Board 2000 SC (HL) 1 per Lord Millett at 39: legal policy entailed “a search for justice, and this demands that the dispute be resolved in a way which is fair and reasonable and accords with ordinary notions of what is fit and proper. It is also concerned to maintain the coherence of the law and the avoidance of inappropriate distinctions if injustice is to be avoided in other cases.” See also J Morgan, “The Rise and Fall of the General Duty of Care” (2006) 22 Professional Negligence 206.

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in the chapters which follow. However, the following broad themes recur in the case law.124 In some novel cases the imposition of duty may raise issues so fundamental that the judiciary steps back from resolving them, regarding them instead as a matter for the legislature.125 In other contexts the existence of a statutory framework may be seen as providing a more appropriate avenue than the common law of delict for resolution of disputes.126 The so-called “floodgates” argument is also encountered – that imposition of duty in one case will lead to its recognition in an indeterminate number of others, resulting in a burden to a particular class of defender that may be both morally and economically disproportionate, as well as an inefficient allocation of risk.127 In Glasgow City Council v First Glasgow (No 1) Ltd128 discussed above, for example, the court decided that there was insufficient proximity between the former employer of the bin-lorry driver and the pedestrians whom he knocked down and killed. However, since this was a novel case, the court also addressed the parties’ arguments on whether the imposition of duty would be fair, just and reasonable. Lord Ericht was persuaded that such an extension of the scope of duty might mean that employers would decline to provide references, fearful of exposing themselves to the risk of extensive and unpredictable liability to unknown persons at an unknown future date. This would mean the loss to employees and employers alike of the benefits of references. Moreover, if duty were not to be recognised on the part of the former employer, the injured and their families would still have a remedy against the employer at the time of the incident.129 In short, fairness, justice and reasonableness not only related to perceived justice between the parties in the particular case, but were also based upon conjecture as to the longterm impact on social behaviour were duty to be recognised.130 124 For extensive discussion, and a detailed listing of “unconvincing” and “convincing” factors, see J Stapleton, “Duty of Care Factors: A Selection from the Judicial Menus”, in P Cane and J Stapleton (eds), The Law of Obligations: Essays in Celebration of John Fleming (1998) 59. For more recent division of policy considerations into “justice” and “welfare” factors, see A Robertson, “Policybased reasoning in duty of care cases” (2013) 33 Legal Studies 119. As Lord Rodger counselled in discussing duty in Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181 at para 51, “seek simplicity, and distrust it”. 125 See e.g. McFarlane v Tayside Health Board 2000 SC (HL) 1 per Lord Hope at 27. 126 See e.g. Mohammed v Home Office [2011] EWCA Civ 351, [2011] 1 WLR 2862; CGL Group Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2017] EWCA Civ 1073, [2018] 1 WLR 2137. 127 See e.g. Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181 per Lord Mance at para 100. See also Mackay v Scottish Fire and Rescue Service [2015] CSOH 55, 2015 SLT 342 per Lord McEwan at para 40; ABC v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust [2017] EWCA Civ 336, [2017] PIQR P15 per Irwin LJ at para 45. 128 [2019] CSOH 101, 2020 SLT 75. 129 [2019] CSOH 101, 2020 SLT 75 per Lord Ericht at para 42. 130 See also Hughes v Turning Point Scotland [2019] CSOH 42, 2019 SLT 651, noted at para 4.21 above, where discussion of what was fair, just and reasonable included weighing up the detriment to the public interest from imposing duty upon charities such as the defender, as against the loss to the persons such as the pursuers if they were not to have a cause of action in the type of circumstances at issue.

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Policy considerations are often invoked in cases involving public authority defenders, in which the question of social cost is likely to be of particular importance.131 The implications of imposing duty may be assessed in regard not only to the loss to public funds in defending future claims, but also to the impact upon the service provided by the defender. Another recurrent theme is the fear that imposing duty would have damaging wider consequences insofar as it would encourage defensive practices on the part of parties with a similar role to that of the defender. Such arguments, although seldom empirically based, are encountered in cases involving the police,132 social services,133 healthcare,134 schooling135 and regulatory activities.136 An example of how such considerations worked against duty can be seen in Mitchell v Glasgow City Council.137 The issue for the court to decide was whether a local authority landlord owed a duty of care to one of its tenants to warn him of the risk of aggression from another tenant. After the aggressive tenant went on to murder his neighbour the dead man’s family brought a claim in negligence against the landlord. In denying duty, the House of Lords thought it important that social landlords should not be deterred from intervening to curb anti-social behaviour, an outcome that it thought possible if duty was imposed in this instance (although no evidence was led to that effect).138 Concern for the fair allocation of risk is the dominant factor.139 In the commercial context this may invite scrutiny of any contractual agreement 131 Discussed further in chs 7, 8 and 9 below. 132 Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53. 133 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633; cf Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 550. 134 D v East Berkshire Community Healthcare Trust [2005] 2 AC 373. 135 Carty v Croydon LBC [2005] 1 WLR 2312 per Dyson LJ at para 43. Cf Wands v Fife Council 2009 GWD 30–477 per Sheriff Way at para 30: “the ‘fair, just and reasonable’ requirement may be difficult but not impossible to satisfy where (as here) the complaint is that, following trauma at school the defenders or their employees failed to properly implement highly detailed and elaborate policies of discipline, counselling and support system which they claim were already in place”. 136 Yuen Kun Yeu v Attorney General of Hong Kong [1988] AC 175; Jain v Trent Strategic Health Authority [2009] UKHL 4, [2009] 1 AC 853; Furnell v Flaherty [2013] EWHC 377 (QB), [2013] PTSR D20 per Turner J at para 89. 137 [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21. 138 See [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21 per Lord Hope at para 28: “[I]t is desirable . . . that social landlords, social workers and others who seek to address the many behavioural problems that arise in local authority housing estates and elsewhere, often in very difficult circumstances, should be safeguarded from legal proceedings arising from an alleged failure to warn those who might be at risk of a criminal attack in response to their activities. Such proceedings, whether meritorious or otherwise, would involve them in a great deal of time, trouble and expense which would be more usefully devoted to their primary functions in their respective capacities . . . There are other considerations too. Defensive measures against the risk of legal proceedings would be likely to create a practice of giving warnings as a matter of routine. Many of them would be for no good purpose, while others would risk causing undue alarm or reveal the taking of steps that would be best kept confidential.” 139 See e.g. Santander UK plc v Keeper of the Registers of Scotland [2013] CSOH 24, 2013 SLT 362, holding that it was not fair, just and reasonable to impose duty upon the Keeper towards a bank where a borrower had fraudulently persuaded the Keeper to register a discharge of a standard security, with resultant loss to the bank. Lord Boyd considered (at para 107) that a commercial lender was more properly regarded as having assumed the risk of fraud in these circumstances, and that loss should not in effect be passed on to the public purse.

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between the parties on that point.140 The considerations that affect the assessment of whether duty is fair, just and reasonable are various, however, and their range and relative weight can only properly be understood by looking at their interaction in regard to the particular relationships where they are in contention. The succeeding five chapters will look at the effect of the various duty factors in specific problem contexts.

C. DUTY OF CARE AND OMISSIONS 4.43

There is a difference between injuring others and failing to prevent their injury. The distinction between positive conduct and omissions is important not only in moral but also in legal terms, and the law of negligence uses the concept of duty of care to filter liability for the latter. It readily recognises a duty to refrain from active conduct that will foreseeably cause harm to others. It is far more sparing in imposing a duty of intervention to prevent harm occurring, such as where injury is foreseeable at the hand of a third party or by operation of natural forces.141 Although a failure to act does not always escape liability, a duty to prevent harm to others is limited to the contexts discussed below.

(1) “Pure” omissions 4.44

The literature of negligence has traditionally distinguished between omissions which do not attract liability, and “blameable” omissions, which do, but that distinction has not always been clearly drawn. Already in the mid-eighteenth century Erskine had written that “wrong may arise not only from positive acts of trespass or injury, but from blameable omission or neglect of duty”.142 In similar vein, Guthrie Smith’s Treatise on the Law 140 As seen above in Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd [1996] 1 AC 21, noted at para 4.17 above. See also Norwich City Council v Harvey [1989] 1 WLR 828, in which the contractual arrangements in regard to a building project, as agreed between the owner, main contractor and subcontractor, were that the owner assumed and would insure against fire risk, and in which no duty was therefore imposed upon the subcontractor in regard to such risk. Cf British Telecommunications plc v James Thomson & Sons (Engineers) Ltd 1999 SC (HL) 9, in which the owner, main contractor and subcontractors had agreed that the owner’s insurance would cover damage caused by the main contractors and certain subcontractors but not including the defenders, who would have to make their own arrangements. This contractual arrangement therefore reinforced rather than negatived the existence of a duty of care between the owner and the excluded subcontractors. 141 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 69.4: “[The law of negligence] does not generally impose duties to provide [other people] with benefits (including the prevention of harm caused by other agencies). Duties to provide benefits are, in general, voluntarily undertaken rather than being imposed by the common law, and are typically within the domain of contract, promises and trusts rather than tort.” See also Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21 per Lord Hope at para 15; Fleming, Torts para 8.80; A Ripstein, Private Wrongs (2016) 65. 142 Erskine, Inst 3.1.13.

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of Reparation, first published in 1864, allowed that negligence could be “active” or “passive” – “either in doing these things which we ought not to have done (culpa in faciendo), or in leaving undone these things which we ought to have done (culpa in non faciendo)”.143 An equivalent formulation is found in Glegg’s Treatise on Reparation, drawing on the well-known dictum of Alderson B in Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks to the effect that negligence was “the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.”144 In the nineteenth century, as now, the law of negligence could not be used to enforce “duties of humanity” to rescue strangers in distress, such as saving a person from drowning or extinguishing a fire in a neighbour’s house. But “a duty may be imposed in many ways besides private contract”, and an affirmative duty to take action might arise to prevent harm where there was a pre-existing nexus between the pursuer and the defender, or between the defender and the source of harm.145 In other words, the concept of duty was already applied as a tool to separate the blameable from the non-actionable. The distinction between different types of omission was fundamental to Lord Atkin’s neighbour dictum in Donoghue v Stevenson, discussed above. Lord Atkin evidently placed some types of omission beyond the reach of negligence law, referring to the parable of the Good Samaritan to demonstrate that, while there might be a moral duty to assist strangers imperilled by the actions of others, there was no legal duty to do so.146 But not all omissions escaped liability, since the same passage expressly extended duty to “acts and omissions” that might foreseeably injure those in proximity to the

143 Guthrie Smith, Reparation 63–64 (with echoes perhaps of the Book of Common Prayer). This formulation was altered in the 2nd edition, published in 1889, in which it is stated, at 27, that liability for omissions turned upon whether the thing omitted to be done: was clearly within the defender’s power; would in all probability have prevented the accident; and would have occurred to any person of competent skill and experience in the position of the defender. The authority cited was an English shipping case, Inman v Reck (1867–69) LR 2 PC 25. 144 (1856) 11 Ex 781 at 784, cited in Glegg, Reparation 13. 145 See Guthrie Smith, Reparation 65: culpa in non faciendo arose only where there was “breach of a pre-existing obligation to act otherwise” (although the scope of duty was broadly drawn, being imposed “either by express contract, the regulations of public authority, or arising simply by the force of law”). Guthrie Smith’s suggested examples included cases of landowners failing to take precautionary measures against hazards on their land but not of their creation. Other examples in the period prior to Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31 included cases where there was: (a) a relationship of responsibility between the defender and a third party who had caused the damage, as in e.g. Marshall v Caledonian Railway Co (1899) 1 F 1060, and Buchanan v Alexandra Golf Club 1916 1 SLT 353 (in which the defenders were found liable after leaving a small gap in a wall when rebuilding a tunnel, allowing an employee to steal from the adjacent shop); or (b) a relationship of responsibility between the defender and the pursuer, as in e.g. Fraser v Caledonian Railway Company (1902) 5 F 41, and Buchanan v Glasgow Corporation 1919 SC 515. 146 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 44.

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defender.147 The expansive approach to duty of care adopted by decisions in the 1970s and 1980s, including most notably Anns v London Borough of Merton,148 was regarded by some commentators as having “blurred” the lines between omissions and positive conduct in an unhelpful way.149 This problematic distinction was revisited by the House of Lords in the leading Scottish case of Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd,150 in which the term “pure” omissions was coined to denote conduct beyond the reach of duty, with failure to rescue again cited as an example.151 The type of “pure” omission exemplified in Maloco was a failure to prevent third parties from causing damage to others.152 The defenders had acquired disused cinema premises and left them unoccupied pending their conversion into a supermarket. In the meantime, apparently without the owners’ knowledge, local youngsters had taken to breaking into the empty building and running amok. On one such occasion unidentified individuals set fire to a bundle of discarded film reels, sparking a conflagration that caused substantial damage to adjacent property belonging to the pursuers. Holding that the cinema owners were not liable, Lord Goff stated it to be “well recognised that there is no general duty of care to prevent third parties from causing such damage” and that the defenders could not be held responsible “for having failed to prevent a third party from causing damage to the pursuer or his property by the third party’s own deliberate wrongdoing”.153 Lord Goff’s terminology of “pure” omissions was applied in Mitchell v Glasgow City Council,154 a case in which a local authority landlord failed to warn one of its tenants of the risk of aggression by another tenant, with fatal consequences. As discussed earlier,155 the House of Lords held that the imposition of a duty of care would not be fair, just and reasonable,

147 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 44; see also Lord Macmillan at 71. 148 [1978] AC 728; see paras 4.13ff above 149 See e.g. T Weir, “The Answer to Anns” (1985) 44 CLJ 26 at 30; see also J C Smith and P Burns, “Donoghue v Stevenson – the not so Golden Anniversary” (1983) 46 MLR 147. 150 1987 SC (HL) 37 per Lord Goff at 76; see also Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21 per Lord Hope at para 15, taking up this usage. In this connection Lord Goff cited J G Fleming, The Law of Torts, 6th edn (1983) 138 (see now 10th edn, para 8.80) as to the “invidious comparison with affirmative duties of good-neighbourliness in most countries outside the common law orbit”. On that point see e.g. the French Code pénal Art 223–6 and German Strafgesetzbuch § 323c, imposing criminal liability for failing to effect an easy rescue. 151 Although the term “pure” omission is found from time to time in earlier Scottish cases: see e.g. Western Bank v Bairds (1862) 24 D 859. In Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923 at 931, Lord Nicholls similarly gave as examples of “pure” omissions an adult standing by while a young child drowned in a shallow pool, or a person watching a nearby pedestrian stroll into the path of an oncoming vehicle. 152 For the factual background, see E Reid, “Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd”, in C Mitchell and P Mitchell (eds), Landmark Cases in the Law of Tort (2010) 251. 153 1987 SC (HL) 37 at 76. 154 [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21. 155 At para 4.41.

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but it also expressed the broader view that “the law does not impose a duty to prevent a person from being harmed by the criminal act of a third party based simply upon foreseeability”.156 There are a variety of reasons why duties are imposed only sparingly in respect of omissions, the foremost of which relates to individual liberty. A passage from Lord Hoffmann’s speech in Stovin v Wise, much quoted since, including by the Scottish courts,157 summarises some of the justifications commonly encountered for treating omissions differently from active conduct:158

4.47

“It is one thing for the law to say that a person who undertakes some activity shall take reasonable care not to cause damage to others. It is another thing for the law to require that a person who is doing nothing in particular shall take steps to prevent another from suffering harm from the acts of third parties . . . or natural causes. One can put the matter in political, moral or economic terms. In political terms it is less of an invasion of an individual’s freedom for the law to require him to consider the safety of others in his actions than to impose upon him a duty to rescue or protect. A moral version of this point may be called the ‘why pick on me?’ argument. A duty to prevent harm to others or to render assistance to a person in danger or distress may apply to a large and indeterminate class of people who happen to be able to do something. Why should one be held liable rather than another? In economic terms, the efficient allocation of resources usually requires an activity should bear its own costs. If it benefits from being able to impose some of its costs on other people (what economists call ‘externalities’), the market is distorted because the activity appears cheaper than it really is. So liability to pay compensation for loss caused by negligent conduct acts as a deterrent against increasing the cost of the activity to the community and reduces externalities. But there is no similar justification for requiring a person who is not doing anything to spend money on behalf of someone else.”

In summary, there is no general expectation that individuals will intervene so as to address hazards not of their creation, or to change a course of events set in motion by the forces of nature or the actions of third parties. This means that there is normally no duty of care in negligence to take care for the interests of those who may be foreseeably affected by such

156 [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21 per Lord Hope at para 15, under reference to Lord Goff’s speech in Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd 1987 SC (HL) 37. 157 Notably by Lord Reed in his dissenting judgment in the Inner House in Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2008] CSIH 19, 2008 SC 351 at para 89 (dissenting from the majority decision that the claim based on negligence should proceed to proof, a decision overturned by the House of Lords). 158 [1996] AC 923 at 943–944; see also Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004 per Lord Reid at 1060.

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phenomena, even if harm or loss could readily have been averted.159 In limited circumstances, however, duty attaches to “blameable” omissions, as discussed further below.

(2) The distinction between omissions and active conduct 4.49

Although the distinction between omissions and active conduct is highly significant in its implications for imposition of a duty of care, it is often imprecisely drawn.160 Where an alleged failure to act, or to intercept a third party, occurred in the course of an activity initiated by the defender and in which risk to the pursuer was foreseeable if due care was not taken, the scope of duty is likely to be judged in the light of that broader sequence of positive conduct rather than an isolated instance of failing to act.161 Thus an alleged omission to apply car brakes occurs as part of the general enterprise of taking to the roads in a motor vehicle, which creates the risk of accidents to other road users if due care is not observed. A duty to other road users is therefore imposed for acts and omissions while a driver is behind the wheel. In Donoghue v Stevenson itself, the alleged omission to check that empty ginger beer bottles were snail-free was seen as part of the business of selling ginger beer to the public, which created risk to health if appropriate hygiene was not applied in the factory processes. A duty of care as between manufacturer and consumer was thus recognised. This distinction was highlighted in the Privy Council case of AttorneyGeneral of the British Virgin Islands v Hartwell,162 in which a policeman left his post to confront his girlfriend whom he found with another man. A bystander was injured in the ensuing fracas in which the policeman fired shots with his police revolver. The police authorities were held directly liable for the consequences because their conduct was looked at not as an isolated omission to intervene, but as part of the general enterprise of

159 A J Allan (Blairnyle) Ltd v Strathclyde Fire Board [2016] CSIH 3, 2016 SC 304; see in particular Lord Drummond Young at para 87. 160 Attorney-General of the British Virgin Islands v Hartwell [2004] UKPC 12, [2004] 1 WLR 1273 per Lord Nicholls at para 31. See T Honoré, “Are Omissions Less Culpable?”, in P Cane and J Stapleton (eds), Essays for Patrick Atiyah (1991) 31 at 41: the basis for distinguishing “doing” from “not doing” is by reference to “the notion of intervening in the world so as to bring about change; and . . . at a secondary level this notion extends to the interruption of human routines. If the human routine is required by a norm, the violation of it is an omission which will entail responsibility.” 161 See Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923 per Lord Nicholls at 930; J C Smith and P Burns, “Donoghue v Stevenson – the not so Golden Anniversary” (1983) 46 MLR 147 at 155–156; Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law para 3.2.2; J Kortmann, Altruism in Private Law: Liability for Nonfeasance and Negotiorum Gestio (2005) 5–8. 162 [2004] UKPC 12, [2004] 1 WLR 1273. The police authorities were not, however, vicariously liable for the rogue policeman’s conduct as this private “vendetta” was not sufficiently closely connected with his employment.

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giving a policeman unsupervised access to guns and ammunition. This was a positive act to which duty attached, and “where an article as dangerous as a loaded gun is handed over the class of persons to whom the duty of care is owed is wide and the standard of care required is high”.163 As Lord Rodger said in Mitchell v Glasgow City Council, “in some circumstances a defender who provides an opportunity for a third party to harm the pursuer in a foreseeable way must take reasonable care to prevent the harm”.164 It follows that a duty of care arises towards those who might foreseeably be harmed if the defender has actively created a source of danger in circumstances where third parties may “spark off” that danger.165 In other words, there is a duty not to bring into being foreseeable risk to others.166 The case often used to illustrate this point is Haynes v Harwood,167 in which the plaintiff was injured in restraining horses that had bolted after being left unattended in a busy street. Although the immediate cause of the horses taking fright had been a child throwing a stone at them, the carter was under a duty to other highway users not to create this source of danger by leaving the horses in a location where it was foreseeable that they might be interfered with. This distinction between “pure” omissions and active conduct creating danger may often appear contentious,168 but it is crucial for determining the scope of duty.

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(3) “Blameable” omissions There are, however, a number of contexts in which a duty to act has been held to arise even from an interaction in which the risk to the pursuer was not of the defender’s own creation. The main examples of such contexts are: 163 [2004] UKPC 12, [2004] 1 WLR 1273 per Lord Nicholls at para 36. 164 [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21 at para 57 (distinguishing the case in hand); see also Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 70. 165 Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd 1987 SC (HL) 37 per Lord Goff at 77. 166 Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2008] CSIH 19, 2008 SC 351 per Lord Reed at paras 90–99, approved by Lord Hope [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21 at para 20. 167 [1935] 1 KB 146, cited by Lord Goff in Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd 1987 SC (HL) 37 at 77; see also Transport Arendonk BVBA v Chief Constable of Essex Police [2020] EWHC 212 (QB), [2020] RTR 22; cf Duff v National Telephone Co (1889) 16 R 675 (in which a wheelbarrow left unattended in a public place was held not to be intrinsically dangerous); Topp v London Country Bus (South West) Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 976 (in which it was held not to be foreseeable that a third party would make off with a bus left unattended by the defendants in a layby, thereby causing a fatal accident). 168 E.g. in Robinson, the Supreme Court regarded the accident to the claimant as having resulted from police officers’ positive conduct, but the Court of Appeal had attributed it to the officers’ failure to prevent harm to her ([2014] EWCA Civ 15 at para 53). Similar difficulties in categorising the conduct of firefighters who fail fully to extinguish fires that they attend are noted at para 9.48 below.

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(a) where there is a contract or other prior relationship by which the defender assumed responsibility for the pursuer or the pursuer’s interests;169 (b) where there is a relationship of control between the defender and the wrongdoer;170 (c) where the defender, a medical professional, has information in respect of a patient that indicates specific risk to a third party;171 and (d) where harm to the pursuer is caused by a hazard present on land occupied by the defender.172 Each may now be considered in turn.

(4) Prior relationship between the defender and the pursuer (a) Introduction 4.52

A duty to act may arise on the basis of a prior relationship in which the defender assumed responsibility for the pursuer or for the pursuer’s interests. The mere fact of a pre-existing relationship is not in itself a sufficient basis for duty, however. After all, in Mitchell v Glasgow City Council,173 the defenders and the victim had been landlord and tenant respectively, and yet a duty to warn was not recognised. No doubt the landlord-tenant relationship gives rise to certain duties with regard to protecting the tenant’s enjoyment of the subjects of let, but the House of Lords in Mitchell considered that there was there was nothing intrinsic to that relationship which obliged the landlord to anticipate and protect its tenant against the criminal acts of other tenants.174 It is therefore always necessary to examine the nature of the relationship in question in order to construe the specific duties it creates. In particular was there an interaction by which the defender “assumed responsibility”175 to protect the pursuer or the pursuer’s interests, and did that assumption of responsibility extend to the specific type of harm suffered?176 In Hughes v Turning Point Scotland, for example,177 the interaction between the defender and the deceased was considered

169 170 171 172 173 174

See paras 4.52–4.61 below. See paras 4.62–4.65 below. See paras 4.66–4.70 below. See paras 4.71–4.75 below. [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21. [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21 per Lord Scott at para 41; see also N v Poole BC [2019] UKSC 25, [2019] 2 WLR 1478. 175 For discussion, see D Nolan, “Assumption of Responsibility: Four Questions” (2019) 72 Current Legal Problems 123. 176 Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd 1987 SC (HL) 37 per Lord Goff at 77. 177 [2019] CSOH 42, 2019 SLT 651; for discussion, see para 4.21 above.

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in detail, as a result of which the court concluded that the defender had assumed responsibility to provide certain services to the deceased, including the provision of a bed, and requesting medication on his behalf from a doctor. However, it had not assumed a general responsibility to protect him from medical mishap of the type to which he succumbed, and while it aspired to provide a safe environment for his detoxification, no duty was undertaken to guarantee this. Sometimes, however, a duty of care in negligence does arise out of a prior contractual relationship. The example discussed by Lord Goff in Maloco was that of Stansbie v Troman,178 in which a decorator employed by the plaintiff left the house with the door unlocked, enabling a thief to enter and steal property. In those circumstances the prior contractual relationship between the decorator and the plaintiff imposed a duty on the painter to take reasonable care with regard to the state of the premises if he left them unattended during the work contracted for. He was therefore held liable for the loss to which breach of that duty gave rise. On a similar basis, it has been held that, in receiving guests into a hotel, a hotel proprietor assumes responsibility for their safety to the extent of taking reasonable steps to protect them against the foreseeable risks of criminal acts by third parties.179 A prior relationship giving rise to a duty of care can readily be identified also between professional advisers and their clients, as discussed in greater detail in chapter 11. A doctor who happens to witness a road accident would hopefully go to the assistance of those injured, but is not under any legal obligation to do so.180 By contrast, a doctor who accepts patients for treatment assumes responsibility for their well-being.181 The doctor may not have caused the patient’s illness but undertakes a duty to apply due care in diagnosing the condition and offering appropriate treatment.

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(b) Professionals in a supervisory role Professional persons whose role involves a close level of care or supervision of children or of vulnerable individuals may have a duty to intervene 178 [1948] 2 KB 48, discussed in 1987 SC (HL) 37 at 77. 179 Al Najar v Cumberland Hotel [2019] EWHC 1593 (QB), [2019] 1 WLR 5953 per Dingemans J at para 187. The claimants were robbed and assaulted by an intruder who walked into their unlocked hotel room in the middle of the night. The court accepted that the hotel’s duty to its guests extended to implementation of security measures against intruders, and that, in the light of other incidents, such incidents were foreseeable. However, there had been no breach of duty in this case because the precautions taken by the hotel had been reasonable. Cf Loureiro v iMvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd [2014] ZACC 4, 2014 3 SA 394 (CC) holding the defendant, a private security firm, liable where the employee whom it had sent to guard the plaintiffs’ house mistakenly opened a gate to armed robbers, thereby enabling them to ransack the house and assault the occupants. 180 Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council [1997] QB 1004 per Stuart-Smith LJ at 1035. 181 On the distinction between doctors accepting patients within the National Health Service and doctors in private practice, see Earle and Whitty, “Medical Law” paras 143–144.

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4.56

to prevent harm to their charges. Teachers, for example, are under a duty to take reasonable care to protect their pupils against the foreseeable risk of negligent182 or intentional183 wrongdoing by others during the school day.184 That duty does not normally extend beyond the school gates, unless the wrongdoing takes place on some form of school-organised activity or excursion,185 or on transport provided by the education authority.186 Such a duty may also extend to older students placed by educational institutions in locations where the institution has control over their security and welfare.187 The duty of professional persons may even extend to protecting children or vulnerable persons from self-harm. Where a patient has a history of mental illness, for example, hospital authorities accepting such patients for treatment are under a duty to take precautions to avoid the possibility of injury, whether self-inflicted or otherwise.188 Similarly, police officers who detain individuals in the knowledge that they are suicide risks are under a duty to see that appropriate measures are taken while they are in custody to protect those individuals from self-inflicted injury.189 The concept of a professional duty extends to cases involving the ambulance service. Responsibility towards a patient is said to be assumed

182 Black v Kent County Council (1983) 82 LGR 39; cf Skinner v Glasgow Corporation 1961 SLT 130; Cuthbertson v Merchiston Castle School 2001 SLT (Sh Ct) 13 (involving “altogether exceptional”, and therefore unforeseeable, mishaps). 183 E.g. bullying: see Wands v Fife Council 2009 GWD 30–477; Bradford-Smart v West Sussex County Council [2002] EWCA Civ 07, [2002] ELR 139. Cf Ahmed v City of Glasgow Council 2000 SLT (Sh Ct) 153 (in which there was no “special knowledge of a risk” of horseplay); X v Hounslow London Borough Council [2009] EWCA Civ 286, [2009] 2 FLR 262 (in which a local authority was held to have had no duty to protect vulnerable adults under their supervision against harassment in the adults’ home). 184 For further discussion on the “non-delegable” duty owed by schools to pupils, see paras 3.87–3.88 above. 185 Bradford-Smart v West Sussex County Council [2002] EWCA Civ 07, [2002] ELR 139. 186 Jacques v Oxfordshire County Council (1967) 66 LGR 440. 187 See McLean v University of St Andrews 2004 Rep LR 54, in which the pursuer had been placed by her university on a student exchange in Odessa, at a time when the Ukraine was troubled by significant levels of crime. She suffered a violent sexual assault when returning to her hostel from the beach at 2 am. The university acknowledged that it owed its students a duty to take care in the exchange arrangements that it made for them and to ensure that they were adequately and safely accommodated. Indeed the court conjectured that, if the attack had happened inside hostel accommodation which the university arranged or if it had happened within a “battle zone” to which it had dispatched its students, a duty might be recognised in regard to foreseeable acts of violence by third parties. However, it held that no duty arose in relation to random acts of violence in a public place to which the pursuer had gone voluntarily and over which the university had no possibility of control. 188 Thorne v Northern Group Hospital Management Committee (1964) 108 SJ 484 per Edmund Davies J, cited by Lord Rodger in Savage v South Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust [2008] UKHL 74, [2009] 1 AC 681 at para 47; Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust [2012] UKSC 2, [2012] 2 AC 72. See also McHardy v Dundee General Hospitals’ Board of Management 1960 SLT (Notes) 19. 189 Kirkham v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police [1990] 2 QB 283; Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360, in which Lord Hope at 379 described the duty of police officers as one “to take reasonable care to prevent the deceased, while in police custody, from taking his own life deliberately”.

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at the point when an undertaking is given to send an ambulance. In Kent v Griffiths,190 an ambulance summoned when the claimant suffered an asthma attack took forty minutes to arrive, during which time she suffered respiratory arrest and brain damage. Had the ambulance arrived sooner there was a high probability that these consequences would have been avoided. It was held that acceptance of the emergency call provided the prior relationship between the claimant and the ambulance service upon which duty might be based.191 Other than the ambulance service, however, the emergency services are not normally regarded as under a duty to intercept the wrongdoing of third parties or avert an emergency which is not of their own creation, as explained further in chapter 8.

(c) Commercial carriers Commercial carriers must take reasonable steps to maintain the safety of passengers during their journey,192 and to rescue passengers who become imperilled, such as by falling overboard.193 By extension, Canadian authority suggests that those in charge of vessels being used for social or recreational purposes are under a duty to use their best endeavours to effect the rescue of passengers who fall overboard.194 However, there is generally no duty to warn of potential hazards confronting passengers at their destinations once they have disembarked.195 Those who host facilities for “extreme” or dangerous sports are likewise under a duty to rescue clients who find themselves in difficulties, even if those difficulties are attributable to their clients’ own incompetence.196

4.57

(d) Responses to intoxication and other forms of over-indulgence Intoxication, as a form of self-inflicted impairment, does not generally impose responsibilities of affirmative action upon those interacting with the inebriated.197 Generous hosts who ply their guests with alcohol at 190 [2001] QB 36. 191 [2001] QB 36 per Lord Woolf at para 49; followed in Aitken v Scottish Ambulance Service [2011] CSOH 49, 2011 SLT 822. 192 See discussion of Bullock v Tamiami Trail Tours Inc 266 F 2d 326 (5th Cir 1959) by Lord Rodger in Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21 at paras 59–61; Steel v McGill’s Bus Service [2015] CSOH 5, 2015 SCLR 617 (bus driver failing, before driving off, to ensure that elderly passenger was seated). 193 Davis v Stena Line Ltd [2005] EWHC 420 (QB), [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 13. 194 As accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Horsley v MacLaren [1971] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 410 (SCC). This is not an absolute duty; the operator is not required to have used the best possible method of rescue – merely to have done the best he or she could in the circumstances. 195 Fernquest v City & County of Swansea [2011] EWCA Civ 1712 (no duty on operator of park-andride service to warn of ice on the ground near a bus stop). 196 Day v High Performance Sports Ltd [2003] EWHC 197 (QB) per Hunt J at para 18; see also Crocker v Sundance Northwest Resorts Ltd [1988] 1 SCR 1186, 51 DLR (4th) 321. 197 See Davie v Edinburgh Corporation 1977 SLT (Notes) 5.

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social occasions are under no duty to intervene to prevent the guests from injuring themselves or others on their way home.198 Even commercial providers of alcohol are normally under no delictual duty to monitor the consumption of their customers or to intervene to protect them from the consequences of that consumption. In CAL No 14 Pty Ltd v Scott, a publican who had previously agreed to store a customer’s motorcycle returned the keys to the customer despite having served him copious amounts of alcohol.199 The customer subsequently crashed the motorcycle on his way home and was killed. The High Court of Australia absolved the publican from liability, taking the view that alcohol consumption was “a matter of personal decision and individual responsibility” and that to impose a duty on landlords would be inconsistent with customer autonomy as well as with public law regulation of alcohol consumption.200 Even where a person has provided the wherewithal for over-indulgence, therefore, there is generally no duty towards those who succumb to protect them from the consequences. An exception is made, and duty may arise, where responsibility to protect customers or clients is expressly assumed. In Calvert v William Hill Credit Ltd,201 the claimant, a compulsive gambler, had entered into an exclusion agreement with the defendants, his bookmakers, by which they bound themselves to close his account and refuse further bets. Their employees failed to honour this and as a result the claimant placed large bets, sustaining significant losses which he sought to recover from the defendants. The Court of Appeal accepted that by entering into this agreement the defendants had assumed responsibility towards the claimant, and accordingly owed a duty towards him which was breached by allowing him to continue gambling. Crucially, however, in this case that duty was held not to have extended to preventing him from gambling with other bookmakers, and therefore the claim in this case failed on causation grounds; even if the defendants had refused further bets, the claimant would in all probability have sustained the equivalent loss by betting with other bookmakers. Similarly, although there may have been no duty to intervene in the first place, a defender who has intervened in a dangerous situation is deemed to assume responsibility towards the person at risk from that point onwards. There is thus a duty to take care, even though the initial risk to the pursuer was self-inflicted. In Barrett v Ministry of Defence202 the plaintiff’s husband, a naval airman, had become extremely intoxicated off-duty and later, after having been stretchered to his bunk by colleagues, asphyxiated on his own 198 199 200 201 202

Childs v Desormeaux 2006 SCC 18, [2006] 1 SCR 643. [2009] HCA 47, (2009) 239 CLR 390. [2009] HCA 47 per Gummow, Heydon and Crennan JJ at para 54. [2008] EWCA Civ 1427, [2009] Ch 330. [1995] 1 WLR 1217.

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vomit. It was held that there was no duty to prevent an individual from drinking to excess, even as between employer and employee; but once the deceased’s colleagues took him in hand and placed him in his cabin, they had assumed responsibility for his welfare. This gave rise to a duty of care which had been breached by their failure to supervise him adequately or to seek medical help.203 While there is normally no positive duty to intervene to protect an individual from the consequences of intoxication, there is of course a duty to desist from action which will endanger an inebriated person further. In Wilson v Chief Constable, Lothian and Borders Constabulary,204 police officers called to a domestic disturbance in the depths of winter removed a drunken man from his home and, so as to prevent him causing further trouble, deposited him in open country several miles away. He died shortly afterwards of hypothermia, his judgment and resistance to extreme cold having been weakened by the effects of alcohol. The police were found liable to his widow, on the basis that they owed “a duty to exercise reasonable care to ensure that the deceased was not released from police custody in circumstances and into an environment in which it was reasonably foreseeable that he would be exposed to the risk of harm”.205

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(5) Relationship of control between defender and wrongdoer A second situation in which a duty to act may be recognised is where the defender was in a position of control over the actions of a third party who caused foreseeable damage to the pursuer. One of the most common instances is where a detained person causes harm after escaping the effective control of the prison authorities. The leading case is Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd206 in which a group of youths imprisoned in a borstal (a type of youth detention centre at that time) were sent to an island on a training exercise supervised by borstal officers. They escaped and attempted to get off the island by appropriating a yacht, causing damage to a second yacht in the process. The owners of the damaged yacht successfully argued that the officers supervising the detainees had owed a duty of care to those who might foreseeably be affected by the detainees’ escape, and since the place of confinement was an island, owners of boats 203 The principle of such cases is expressed in C O Gregory, “The Good Samaritan and the Bad: The Anglo American Law”, in J M Ratcliffe (ed), The Good Samaritan and the Law (1966) 23 at 28, as follows: “If you are not under a duty to ‘fease’, then nonfeasance can never be held actionable. But if you do engage in feasance toward anybody, then in most circumstances you must ‘fease’ carefully. Moral: don’t ever ‘fease’ unless you have to.” 204 1989 SLT 97. 205 1989 SLT 97 per Lord McCluskey at 105. See also Crocker v Sundance Northwest Resorts Ltd [1988] 1 SCR 1186, 51 DLR (4th) 321 (duty not to provide visibly inebriated customer with equipment to take part in dangerous “tubing” competition on a ski slope). 206 [1970] AC 1004.

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in the vicinity came within that category. The basis for duty was set out by Lord Diplock as follows:207 “A is responsible for damage caused to the person or property of B by the tortious act of C (a person responsible in law for his own acts) where the relationship between A and C has the characteristics (1) that A has the legal right to detain C in penal custody and to control his acts while in custody; (2) that A is actually exercising his legal right of custody of C at the time of C’s tortious act and (3) that A if he had taken reasonable care in the exercise of his right of custody could have prevented C from doing the tortious act which caused damage to the person or property of B; and where also the relationship between A and B has the characteristics (4) that at the time of C’s tortious act A has the legal right to control the situation of B or his property as respects physical proximity to C and (5) that A can reasonably foresee that B is likely to sustain damage to his person or property if A does not take reasonable care to prevent C from doing tortious acts of the kind which he did.”

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While the background risk of violence may be higher in prisons than in the general community,208 the Scottish courts regard it to be “well established” that a duty arises on the part of prison officers vis-à-vis prisoners to exercise due care in supervising prison activities. That duty includes averting foreseeable injury, including between prisoners, in particular where a specific risk is known.209 In Kaizer v Scottish Ministers the pursuer was seriously injured in a racially aggravated assault by a fellow prisoner while they were both inmates at Aberdeen Prison.210 A week prior to the assault the attacker had threatened the pursuer, but a complaint made by the pursuer to the prison staff was not appropriately acted upon. The court was satisfied that prison staff had owed a duty to the pursuer, that the risk to the pursuer’s safety was foreseeable, and that the failure to take due care in preventing implementation of the earlier threat had caused the injury. By contrast, duty on the part of prison officers has been denied in comparable cases where the risk of violence by the assailant was not foreseeable.211

207 [1970] AC 1004 at 1063–1064. 208 New South Wales v Bujdoso [2005] HCA 76, (2005) 227 CLR 1 at para 44: “violence is, to a lesser or a greater degree, often on the cards”. 209 Kaizer v Scottish Ministers [2017] CSOH 110, 2017 Rep LR 124 per Lord Ericht at para 49 (affd [2018] CSIH 36, 2018 SC 491). See also Whannel v Secretary of State for Scotland 1989 SLT 671; New South Wales v Bujdoso [2005] HCA 76, (2005) 227 CLR 1. 210 Kaizer v Scottish Ministers [2017] CSOH 110, 2017 Rep LR 124, affd [2018] CSIH 36, 2018 SC 491. 211 See Leslie v Secretary of State for Scotland 1999 Rep LR 39 (in which Lord Nimmo Smith observed that “different considerations would arise” had the case concerned “a prisoner with a known history of violence”); Ellis v Home Office [1953] 2 QB 135 (in which evidence was not available that the assailant’s violent propensities were known).

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Duty in this context arises only in relation to the foreseeable victims of the third-party wrongdoer. The scope of duty therefore requires scrutiny not only of the relationship between the defender and the third party, and also of the foreseeability of the specific risk to the pursuer. In Couch v Attorney General,212 for example, the Supreme Court of New Zealand refused to strike out a claim in negligence brought against the Probation Service where it had permitted an ex-offender with convictions for aggravated burglary to work in employment with ready access to alcohol and cash. He had used his knowledge of the workplace to stage a robbery with accomplices during which three other employees were murdered and a fourth, the plaintiff, was injured. The court held that duty would be established if the plaintiff could demonstrate that:213

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“either as an individual or as a member of an identifiable and sufficiently delineated class, she was or should have been known by the defendants to be the subject of a distinct and special risk of suffering harm of the kind she sustained at the hands of [the ex-offender]. The necessary risk must be distinct in the sense of being clearly apparent, and special in the sense that the plaintiff’s individual circumstances or her membership of the necessary class rendered her particularly vulnerable to suffering harm of the relevant kind from [the ex-offender].”

In Thomson v Scottish Ministers,214 by contrast, duty was not recognised because there was no distinct risk in this sense. Prison officials had authorised short leave for a prisoner, despite his history of significant violence and substance abuse. While on leave in his home town he obtained class A drugs and, after consuming them, murdered a childhood acquaintance. Whatever the risk to the general population, the victim’s family was unable to establish that the authorisation of the prisoner’s short leave had placed the victim, or a class of persons of which she was a member, at a “distinct or special risk”.215 A further, everyday, context in which a duty of care arises is in relation to parents, or those acting in loco parentis. Although parents and teachers are not vicariously liable for the wrongdoing of children in their charge,216 they are under a direct duty of care when looking after children to supervise them appropriately so as to avoid foreseeable risk to others. The leading case is Carmarthenshire County Council v Lewis217 in which a four-year-old

212 213 214 215

[2008] 3 NZLR 725. [2008] 3 NZLR 725 per Tipping J at para 112. [2013] CSIH 63, 2013 SC 628. [2013] CSIH 63, 2013 SC 628 per Lord Justice-Clerk Carloway at para 57. See also New South Wales v Godfrey [2004] NSWCA 113. 216 See para 3.02 above. 217 [1955] AC 549; see also Brown v Fulton (1881) 9 R 36.

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pupil at a nursery school succeeded in escaping the school premises and strayed across the adjacent road into the path of an oncoming lorry. The plaintiff’s husband was driving the lorry and swerved sharply to avoid the child, but in doing so crashed into a telegraph post and was killed. It was not disputed that the child’s actions were the direct cause of the accident. The operators of the nursery school were held liable because, by running a school in that location, they came under a duty to care to road users to prevent children getting out on to the road and creating a hazard for traffic. As for parents, the context in which the duty typically comes to the fore is where their children are playing or engaged in sporting activities with other children. Adults allowing children to play together are under a duty to supervise them in such a way as to restrict the risk of injury to themselves and to their playmates to an acceptable level.218 The question of the standard of care required of those supervising children is considered further in chapter 10.219

(6) Duty of medical professionals to warn non-patients 4.66

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As discussed further in chapter 19,220 medical professionals and others are subject to an obligation of confidentiality in regard to personal and health information obtained in the course of their interaction with their patients. They may, however, be released from that obligation of confidentiality where there are compelling public interest considerations in favour of disclosure. Medical professionals may exceptionally owe duties to more than one person,221 and, more specifically, an affirmative duty to warn may arise in relation to disclosures by or about patients that indicates specific risk to third parties. In the well-known American case of Tarasoff v Regents of University of California222 a patient told his psychotherapist on a university campus that he intended to kill the plaintiff’s daughter. The psychotherapist notified the campus police, who took the patient to a mental hospital for observation but later released him. Shortly afterwards the patient killed the daughter, and her parents sued the psychotherapist for failing to warn them or their daughter about the threat. The California Supreme Court noted the general rule that no duty is owed “to control the conduct of another nor to warn those endangered by such conduct”, but it also recognised that “the courts have carved out an exception to this rule in cases in which the 218 Harris v Perry [2008] EWCA Civ 907, [2009] 1 WLR 19 per Lord Phillips at para 34; see also Bosworth Water Trust v SSR [2018] EWHC 444 (QB). 219 See paras 10.36–10.37 below. 220 See para 19.36 below. 221 ABC v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust [2020] EWHC 455 (QB), [2020] PIQR P13 per Yip J at para 167. 222 17 Cal 3d 425 (Cal 1976).

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defendant stands in some special relationship to either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or in a relationship to the foreseeable victim of that conduct”.223 The relationship between medical personnel and their patients could be seen as supporting affirmative duties to avert danger to third parties arising from a patient’s behaviour. Accordingly, the court rejected the psychotherapist’s defence that he owed no duty to third parties and ruled that:224 “When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger. The discharge of this duty may require the therapist to take one or more of various steps, depending upon the nature of the case. Thus it may call for him to warn the intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances.”

The so-called “Tarasoff doctrine” has been noted in the English courts,225 and the existence of an affirmative duty to warn, overriding the duty of confidentiality to the patient, has been accepted in principle. The General Medical Council’s guidance to practitioners likewise concedes that, while the decision on whether to disclose may be “complex”, in exceptional cases public interest may support disclosure of otherwise confidential information to protect individuals or society from risks of serious harm, such as from serious communicable diseases or serious crime.226 A duty of care in negligence is, however, only established where the threat to the specific victim, or a narrow class of specific victims, was foreseeable.227 The difficulties of meeting this test are illustrated in Palmer v Tees Health Authority,228 in which the claimant sued the authority responsible for psychiatric care in her area after a psychiatric patient abducted and murdered her four-year-old daughter. The murderer had recently been treated in hospital for serious psychiatric problems and had remained an out-patient. While in hospital he had confessed that he had sexual feelings towards children and that a child would be murdered if he were to be discharged, but he had not named a specific individual. Since the patient 223 17 Cal 3d 425 (Cal 1976) per Torbriner J at 434. 224 17 Cal 3d 425 (Cal 1976) per Torbriner J at 431. 225 W v Egdell [1990] Ch 359; R v Crozier (1990–91) 12 Cr App R (S) 206; Palmer v Tees Health Authority [2000] PIQR P1, [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Med 351; ABC v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust [2017] EWCA Civ 336, [2017] PIQR P15. 226 General Medical Council, Disclosures for the Protection of Patients and Others (https://www.gmc-uk. org/ethical-guidance/ethical-guidance-for-doctors/confidentiality/disclosures-for-the-protectionof-patients-and-others) paras 63–70. 227 Palmer v Tees Health Authority [2000] PIQR P1 per Pill LJ at P19. 228 [2000] PIQR 1.

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had not identified the plaintiff’s daughter as his target there was held to be insufficient proximity between the parties to found a duty of care. The conflict for medical professionals between patient confidentiality and duty to third parties has become more complex with increased sophistication in identifying genetic risk. Unlike the risk of unpredictable behaviour by patients with mental health problems, the risk as identified by a clinical geneticist is a specific one, and the geneticist is professionally trained to quantify its probability. But the obligation of confidentiality can present a particular dilemma in cases where the patient does not wish a genetic condition to be made known to other family members whom it may also affect. The required balancing exercise, and its implications for duty of care in negligence, are illustrated in the English case of ABC v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust.229 A patient with Huntington’s disease and a history of psychiatric illness had refused permission for his psychiatrist, or other healthcare professionals, to inform his pregnant daughter of his diagnosis, even though Huntington’s is progressive, ultimately fatal, and carries a 50 per cent probability of being passed on to the next generation. After her child was born, the daughter found out about her father’s condition and thereafter herself tested positive for the Huntington’s gene. She raised an action alleging that the various healthcare professionals who had treated her father and dealt with the family had owed a duty to her to inform her of this risk. Their failure to do so had, she said, deprived her of the option of terminating her pregnancy. It was held that the geneticists who had identified the problem owed her no duty since they had no direct dealings with her and there was insufficient proximity between them. However, a duty had been owed to her by the psychiatrist who had treated her father. This was a “novel” case (in the terminology of Robinson)230 for which there was no direct analogy,231 but recognition of duty was a “modest incremental step”.232 There was sufficient foreseeability, since the claimant’s challenging domestic circumstances were known and the father’s psychiatrist admitted that he had thought it could be harmful to the claimant to withhold information from her.233 There was proximity in the “unusual” circumstances of this case where the psychiatrist and other professionals treating the father also had significant contact with the daughter.234 It was, moreover, fair,

229 [2020] EWHC 455 (QB), [2020] PIQR P13. 230 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736; see paras 4.18–4.25 above. 231 The Court of Appeal, in refusing to strike out the claim, had noted the “parallels” with the American case of Tarasoff ([2017] EWCA Civ 336, [2017] PIQR P15 at para 56), but whereas the risk in that case, of acts of violence by a patient, was difficult to predict, the risk in the case of clinical genetics arose from a specific quantifiable risk. 232 [2020] EWHC 455 (QB), [2020] PIQR P13 at para 186. 233 [2020] EWHC 455 (QB), [2020] PIQR P13 at para 174. 234 [2020] EWHC 455 (QB), [2020] PIQR P13 at para 182.

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just and reasonable to impose a duty of this nature since it ran parallel to the duty already acknowledged by the professional bodies to undertake a proper balancing exercise between confidentiality and risk.235 At the same time, the court found that the psychiatrist had exercised due care in evaluating these conflicting, and to an extent incommensurable, considerations, so that there was no breach of duty and the claim was accordingly dismissed. In recognising a duty to warn in ABC, Yip J emphasised that her judgment did not support a “free-standing” duty to disclose genetic information.236 The duty imposed upon medical professionals requires foreseeability of harm to the third party and close proximity between the parties – a significant feature of this particular case. Moreover, disclosure is appropriate only once a proper balancing exercise has indicated that risk outweighs confidentiality. The reasoning applied to support duty in ABC, Yip J thought, would also be relevant to cases where genetic information was not at issue but other types of disclosure between a patient and a medical professional revealed a serious risk to a third party.237 However, the limits of this duty to warn, now no longer novel, have yet to be tested. It was an important factor in ABC that recognition of a legal duty in the circumstances at issue went no further than the professional guidelines already recommended,238 and in determining the scope of duty in future cases such guidelines may continue to perform a significant role.

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(7) Duty of occupiers to mitigate hazards on land (a) Harm occurring within the defender’s property Occupation of land has traditionally been thought of as entailing a range of affirmative duties towards others entering the property, or occupying neighbouring property, and indeed some of the earliest cases in the Scots law of negligence involved omissions in this context. The fact of having occupied land brings with it a (common law) duty not only to desist from conduct that might endanger those entering it, but also to remedy hazards even if they were not of the occupier’s own making. In the early nineteenth-century case of Black v Caddell239 an action was brought successfully by the relatives of a man who was killed riding at night along a road that passed through the defender’s land. The rider and his horse had fallen into a water-logged coal pit a short distance from the road and protected

235 [2020] EWHC 455 (QB), [2020] PIQR P13 at para 195. The professional guidelines are discussed at paras 36–44. 236 [2020] EWHC 455 (QB), [2020] PIQR P13 at paras 164. 237 [2020] EWHC 455 (QB), [2020] PIQR P13 at para 184. 238 [2020] EWHC 455 (QB), [2020] PIQR P13 at para 261. 239 (1804) Mor 13905; see also Brown v Macgregor 26 Feb 1813 FC; Hislop v Durham (1842) 4 D 1168.

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only by a low fence. The landowner was found liable, even though the pit had not been dug by him but by a predecessor, the court having accepted the pursuers’ argument that “every day it remained insufficiently fenced in fact made [the landowner] responsible for the damage that might be sustained from it”. As discussed at greater length in chapter 24, the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 now transposes into statute an occupier’s duty of care towards those entering their property. Occupiers must exercise “such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable”240 to see that such persons do not suffer injury or damage, even in relation to dangers that have been created by the forces of nature, or by the actions of third parties. There is therefore a duty to address hazards arising from the state of the premises which occupiers might reasonably have been expected to make safe, even if those hazards were originally created by a third party. However, a duty is not normally imposed upon occupiers to intercept the intentional wrongdoing of third parties who simply happen to have been on their property at the point of inflicting injury, especially where that wrongdoing is unrelated to any pre-existing hazard. Such a duty is outwith the scope both of the 1960 Act241 and also of common law duty of care. As stated in the High Court of Australia by Gleeson CJ in Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (a case involving an assault on the plaintiff in a shopping centre car park occupied by the defendants):242 “The control and knowledge which form the basis of an occupier’s liability in relation to the physical state or condition of land are absent when one considers the possibility of criminal behaviour on the land by a stranger . . .The unpredictability of criminal behaviour is one of the reasons why, as a general rule, and in the absence of some special relationship, the law does not impose a duty to prevent harm to another from the criminal conduct of a third party, even if the risk of such harm is foreseeable.”

Of course, a duty might still arise to prevent wrongdoing by a third party on a person’s land or premises, where the circumstances of the case bring it within one of the other special categories of duty discussed in the sections above.

(b) Harm occurring outwith the defender’s property 4.73

Occupation of land similarly carries with it duties in regard to hazards that may lead to damage beyond the defender’s boundaries, such as flooding. If the occupier was responsible for creating the source of danger, then duty 240 Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 s 2(1). 241 See s 2(1): the occupier’s duty relates to “dangers which are due to the state of the premises”. 242 (2000) 205 CLR 254 at para 29.

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is likely to be uncontentious. But even if the threat to the safety of others stems from the negligence of third parties or from the forces of nature, an affirmative duty to prevent harm may nonetheless arise. As discussed in chapter 22, the law of negligence overlaps with the law of nuisance243 in imposing a duty upon landowners and others to address dangers on their land created by third parties of which they have actual or constructive knowledge. In such circumstances they are regarded as having “adopted” the nuisance.244 The positive duty thereby imposed is a “measured” one which takes into account the resources of occupiers in their individual circumstances.245 In this connection, fire has traditionally been regarded as a hazard that presents neighbours with particular mutual responsibilities.246 Admittedly, in Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd,247 the owners of a disused cinema where a conflagration started were held to owe no duty to the adjoining proprietors, since they apparently had no knowledge of the regular visits by vandals or of the resultant fire hazard to neighbouring property. However, it was recognised that a duty to prevent damage would arise where the occupiers had actual or constructive knowledge that intruders were “in the habit of trespassing” on their property and starting fires that might spread to neighbouring property.248 Fire is obviously particularly dangerous because of its potential to spread rapidly, but a duty to neighbours might similarly be recognised where occupiers knew that trespassers were frequenting their property and were letting loose some other hazard with the potential to cause damage to adjacent property, such as by flooding. Lord Mackay suggested in Maloco that where an occupier “knows of the physical facts giving rise to the hazard, [he or she] has a duty to take reasonable care to prevent the hazard causing damage to neighbouring properties”.249 Cases of the type just discussed (involving a hazard created by trespassers which spreads to neighbouring property) were expressly distinguished in Maloco from those cases where trespassers use an occupier’s premises simply as a route to access neighbouring property for the purposes of theft or vandalism. As Lord Mackay reflected, “neighbouring proprietors can, independently, take action to protect themselves against theft in a way that is not possible with fire”.250 In such cases, although the

Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645 per Lord Wilberforce at 657. See paras 22.47–21.49 below. See para 22.41 below. See para 1.04 above. 1987 SC (HL) 37; for discussion, see para 4.46 above. 1987 SC (HL) 37 per Lord Goff at 79. See also Clark Fixing Ltd v Dudley MBC [2001] EWCA Civ 1898; Sandhu Menswear Co Ltd v Woolworths plc [2006] EWHC 1299 (TCC), [2006] 24 EG 176 (CS). 249 1987 SC (HL) 37 at 73. 250 1987 SC (HL) 37 at 73. 243 244 245 246 247 248

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occupier’s lack of care might have provided the opportunity, the general rule remains that there is no duty to intercept wrongdoing by third parties that threatens the interests of neighbours, unless the circumstances of the case bring it within one of the special categories previously discussed in this section. In P Perl (Exporters) Ltd v Camden LBC,251 for example, the defendants had done nothing to keep their unoccupied premises secure, even although they had already been burgled. In the course of a further break-in, intruders knocked a hole through the wall to give them access to the plaintiffs’ premises next door and stole the plaintiffs’ stock. The Court of Appeal ruled that no duty should be imposed upon the occupiers of the empty premises where there was no “special relationship” between them and the third-party intruders.252

251 [1984] QB 342. See also Lamb v Camden London Borough Council [1981] QB 625. 252 [1984] QB 342 per Goff LJ at 360. Cf Squires v Perth and Kinross District Council 1985 SC 297, a similar Scottish case, in which a thief had taken advantage of the defenders’ premises lying empty and unsecured to knock a hole in the floor through to the pursuers’ jewellery shop below. The Second Division’s decision in that case, that duty was established where there had been a “fairly high degree of probability” of the eventual outcome, was doubted in Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd 1987 SC (HL) 37 per Lord Mackay at 72 and Lord Goff at 81–82, and seems inconsistent with the law as stated in Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21.

Chapter 5

Economic Loss

Para A. INTRODUCTION������������������������������������������������������������������� 5.01 B. ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE NO-DUTY RULE (1) Economic loss consequent on damage to another’s property������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 5.05 (2) Economic loss consequent on injury to another�������������������� 5.12 (3) Economic loss consequent on quality defects in goods���������� 5.13 (4) Economic loss consequent on defects in buildings (a) The decision in Murphy v Brentwood District Council������� 5.16 (b) The complex structure theory���������������������������������������� 5.19 (c) Murphy v Brentwood District Council questioned�������������� 5.22 (d) Postscript: the NHBC��������������������������������������������������� 5.25 C. CIRCUMSTANCES TO WHICH DUTY MAY EXTEND������ 5.26 (1) Hedley Byrne and “assumption of responsibility”������������������� 5.27 (2) After Hedley Byrne����������������������������������������������������������� 5.29 D. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION��������������������������������� 5.33 (1) Indicators of duty (a) The purpose of the advice��������������������������������������������� 5.34 (b) Knowledge that advice will be communicated to pursuer������������������������������������������������������������������������� 5.38 (c) Knowledge that the advice will be acted upon���������������� 5.41 (d) Without independent inquiry����������������������������������������� 5.42 (e) Reasonable reliance������������������������������������������������������� 5.44 (2) Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985, section 10(1)������������������������������������������������������������� 5.48 (3) Continuing representations�������������������������������������������������� 5.49 (4) Juristic persons as advisers��������������������������������������������������� 5.50 (5) Representations as to the pursuer (a) Employment references: duty to employee��������������������� 5.51 (b) Other contexts�������������������������������������������������������������� 5.55 (c) Employment references: duty to other parties����������������� 5.56 (6) Representations as to the pursuer’s interests������������������������� 5.57 E. NEGLIGENT PROVISION OF SERVICES����������������������������� 5.59 (1) The significance of contractual relations������������������������������� 5.60 (2) Liability to third parties������������������������������������������������������� 5.64

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(a) Services by law agents: a general rule of no liability to third parties ������������������������������������������������������������� 5.65 (b) Services by law agents: the special position of wills and estate planning������������������������������������������������������� 5.66 (c) Services by law agents: items held as undelivered������������ 5.78 F. ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTRACTUAL CHAINS����������������������������������������������������� 5.79 (1) Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd���������������������������������������� 5.80 (2) The retreat from Junior Books�������������������������������������������� 5.82 G. THE LIMITS OF ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY (1) The need for the voluntary acceptance of a relationship�������� 5.85 (2) Contractual agreement on allocation of risk�������������������������� 5.89 H. ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILTY AND THE CAPARO FEATURES OF DUTY�������������������������������������������� 5.90 I. ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR PURE ECONOMIC LOSS: A SUMMARY������������������������������������������ 5.92

A. INTRODUCTION 5.01

It is customary for comparative law textbooks to single out liability for pure economic loss1 as a particularly troublesome category, with some jurisdictions permitting recovery for such loss only in restricted circumstances.2 In Scotland economic loss barely featured as a separate category until the mid-nineteenth century, and the early sources gave little indication that the law of negligence might deny recovery.3 Yet in 1971 Lord Migdale was to assert, in Dynamco Ltd v Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd, that “The law of Scotland has for over a hundred years refused to accept that a claim for financial loss which does not arise directly from damage to the claimant’s property can give rise to a legal claim for damages founded on negligence.”4 In the last half century there has been little challenge to that general principle, although the law of Scotland, like the law of England, has come to accept some limited exceptions. So while reasonable care must be taken not to imperil the physical integrity of other persons or of their property, the protection given to their economic interests is less generously

  1 For a definition see para 2.12 above.   2 For a helpful overview, see C von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts (1998) vol 2, paras 23–30. See also M Bussani and V Palmer (eds), Pure Economic Loss in Europe (2003); W H van Boom et al (eds), Pure Economic Loss (2003); M Bussani and V Palmer (eds), Pure Economic Loss – New Horizons in Comparative Law (2009); J Bell, A Janssen, and B Markesinis, Markesinis’s German Law of Torts, 5th edn (2019) 87–106.   3 For further discussion, see A B Wilkinson and A D M Forte, “Pure Economic Loss – A Scottish Perspective” 1985 JR 1.   4 1971 SC 257 at 265.

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drawn.5 Economic loss is not generally recoverable unless it derives from injury to another of a person’s interests, or, where it is the only harm suffered, unless there is a special relationship between the parties. The main filter used in regard to the latter is duty of care. Of course, many delictual claims include an economic element that derives from damage done to a non-pecuniary interest. A person who is physically injured by another’s negligence may seek compensation for subsequent loss of earnings; the proprietor of damaged commercial property may claim for loss of profits pending repairs;6 and a person who has been defamed may seek recovery for the patrimonial loss suffered due to reputational damage. The term “pure” economic loss, however, denotes financial loss which does not flow from damage to non-pecuniary interests. There are innumerable ways in which financial loss may occur independently. In the paradigm case of a road traffic accident, for example, various persons may have suffered financial loss without having suffered property damage or physical injury in the crash itself: those who find the road temporarily impassable might miss crucial business meetings or fail to buy a winning lottery ticket, or the employers of those injured might be unable to fulfil contractual obligations because of the resulting absence from work. Or again pure economic loss might include the negative impact on expected future earnings or profits resulting from taking up negligent financial advice, or being persuaded to enter into a bad bargain. Various overlapping explanations have been offered as to why pure economic loss should be compensated only sparingly.7 (i) Traditional notions of individual responsibility emphasise the value of self-reliance, so that the burden of their own misfortunes should rest with the individuals concerned rather than being passed on to others.8 (ii) There is a widespread fear that admitting claims for pure economic loss would open  5 See para 2.13 above. See also Candlewood Navigation Corporation Ltd v Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd [1986] AC 1 per Lord Fraser at 25; Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398 per Lord Oliver at 487: “The infliction of physical injury to the person or property of another universally requires to be justified. The causing of economic loss does not. If it is to be categorised as wrongful it is necessary to find some factor beyond the mere occurrence of the loss and the fact that its occurrence could be foreseen.”   6 See e.g. Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Conarken Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1852 (TCC), [2010] BLR 601, in which the railway operator was permitted to recover not only the cost of repairs to bridges and track damaged by the defendant’s negligence but also loss of use and lost profits as reasonably foreseeable and demonstrably consequential upon the physical damage.  7 See J Stapleton, “Duty of care and economic loss: a wider agenda” (1991) 107 LQR 249 at 253–259; C Witting, “Distinguishing between Property Damage and Pure Economic Loss in Negligence: a Personality Thesis” (2001) 21 LS 481.  8 See Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27 per Lord Denning at 38: economic loss deriving from an interruption of electricity supply was “regarded by most people as a thing they must put up with – without seeking compensation from anyone . . . They try to make up the economic loss by doing more work next day. This is a healthy attitude which the law should encourage.”

5.02

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the floodgates to an unmanageable volume of claims, risking “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class”.9 In the road accident example given above, for example, it is not disputed that a person who is physically injured, or whose property is damaged, should be compensated by the road-user whose negligence caused the crash. But if all those caught up in the wave of economic after-effects were entitled to compensation, such open-ended liability would be a disproportionate consequence of the defender’s moment of inattention. (iii) Third-party insurance for everyday activities, such as taking a car on the road, might become problematic if pure economic loss was recoverable, and it is thought to be more efficient that negligently inflicted economic losses should be distributed by first-party insurance provision.10 (iv) In practice, many cases involving economic loss arise from situations where parties find themselves denied contractual remedies against the party who has caused them loss, and there is a concern that the law of negligence should not be used by the undeserving to “get round” the boundaries of the law of contract.11 Such arguments have combined to justify a default rule that there is no duty to refrain from conduct likely to have as its consequence pure economic loss to others. That rule is subject to important qualification, as discussed later in this chapter, but the next section illustrates the contexts in which duty is denied.

B. ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE NO-DUTY RULE (1) Economic loss consequent on damage to another’s property 5.05

That there should be a duty of care to refrain from conduct that damages property is uncontentious. Moreover, that duty is owed not just to the owner of the damaged property but to anyone holding a real right12

 9 Ultramares Corporation v Touche 255 NY 170 per Cardozo CJ at 179, 174 NE 441 at 444 (NY 1931); see also discussion by Lord Fraser in Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd 1982 SC (HL) 244 at 264; Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP [2014] CSIH 79, 2015 SC 187 per Lord Malcolm at para 73. 10 For a critique of “realties of insurance” argument, see J Stapleton, “Tort, Insurance and Ideology” (1995) 58 MLR 820 at 829–832. 11 J O’Sullivan, “Suing in Tort where no Contractual Claim will Lie – a Bird’s Eye View” (2007) 23 PN 165. 12 See Leigh & Sillavan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd [1986] AC 785 per Lord Brandon at 809, holding that, for the purposes of English law, duty required the plaintiff to have enjoyed “legal ownership of or a possessory title to” the damaged property. Cf Candlewood Navigation Corp v Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd [1986] AC 1, in which the time charterer of a damaged ship was found to have no title to sue as its right in relation to the vessel was merely contractual, not proprietary or possessory.

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in it such as a right in security,13 lease,14 servitude,15 or proper liferent.16 Yet sometimes those suffering economic loss from property damage have no relevant interest in the property itself. They may, for example, lose future benefits (such as advantages secured by contract), or find themselves burdened with increased liabilities.17 Nonetheless, the general rule is that, even if they have suffered significant derivative economic loss, duty of care does not extend to such persons, whatever the scope of duty might be between the person causing the damage and the owner of the damaged property.18 The leading English case is Leigh & Sillavan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd,19 in which the plaintiff had bought a quantity of steel coils which required to be shipped from Korea. It was agreed that ownership of the goods was to remain with the seller until the goods arrived at the warehouse, but risk passed to the buyer while the goods were in transit. When the coils were damaged due to the negligence of the shippers, the House of Lords held that there was no duty of care between the shippers and the buyer because, at the time that damage was sustained, the goods still belonged to the seller. This was seen as pure economic loss to which duty did not extend. Furthermore, allowing recovery would have undermined the contractual provisions already agreed between the various parties to allocate risk. As Lord Brandon reflected, “Where a party exposes himself to risk as a result of voluntarily entering into a contract with another party, he should do that by the terms of the contract”.20 Similar reasoning can be seen in relation to heritable property in the Scottish case of East Lothian Angling Association v Haddington Town Council.21 The pursuer had long-standing written permission, falling short of a lease, to fish in the River Tyne. The substantial revenue that the pursuer 13 See Simpson & Co v Thomson (1877) 5 R (HL) 40 per Lord Penzance at 46, referring to “lien or hypothecation”; Thomson, Delictual Liability para 4.29 on the right of a pledgee. 14 Fleming v Gemmill 1908 SC 340; Mull Shellfish Ltd v Golden Sea Produce Ltd 1992 SLT 703. See also Devon Angling Association v Scottish Water [2018] SAC (Civ) 7, 2018 SC (SAC) 35, referring to the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 2003 s 66(1). The Act provides that a contract in writing for more than a year conferring a right of fishing for freshwater fish is deemed to be a lease to which the Leases Act 1449, RPS 1450/1/16–17, APS ii, 35 c 6, applies. Since the pursuer had entered into a contract of this nature, the pursuer was deemed to be a lessee and therefore had sufficient interest for a duty of care to be owed to it by the defender, which had allegedly caused the fishing waters to become polluted. East Lothian Angling Association v Haddington Town Council 1980 SLT 213, discussed below at para 5.06, was distinguished since in that case the pursuer’s right was not deemed to be a lease in terms of the criteria in the legislation then applicable. 15 D J Cusine and R Paisley, Servitudes and Public Rights of Way (1998) para 16.22. 16 W J Dobie, Manual of the Law of Liferent and Fee in Scotland (1941) 75; Maclennan v Scottish Gas Board 1985 SLT 2. 17 See discussion in Simpson & Co v Thomson (1877) 5 R (HL) 40 per Lord Penzance at 46. 18 Wimpey Construction (UK) Ltd v Martin Black & Co (Wire Ropes) Ltd 1982 SLT 239. 19 [1986] AC 785. 20 [1986] AC 785 at 800. 21 1980 SLT 213; cf Black Loch Angling Club v Tarmac Ltd 2012 SCLR 501, in which liability for pollution arose in nuisance because the pursuers owned the loch, having previously leased it.

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5.07

5.08

derived from the sale of fishing permits was markedly reduced when the river became polluted by sewage discharged by the defender. It was held that, in the absence of a real right in the pursuer over the river or its fishings, there was no duty of care on the part of the defender to keep the river water clean. It was not a sufficient basis for duty that the pursuer’s contractual rights in regard to the damaged property had been rendered less profitable, or, for that matter, that its contractual obligations had become more onerous.22 Mere contractual rights, therefore, do not create a sufficient nexus on which to found a duty of care, even where those contractual rights entail a right to possession. In Nacap Ltd v Moffat Plant Ltd23 the pursuer had entered into a contract to construct a pipeline for a third party. At all times the pipeline remained in the third party’s ownership, but the pursuer was in physical possession of the pipes during the course of construction and was contractually bound to bear the cost of repairing any damage occasioned over that period. When the pipeline was damaged by an employee of the defender, the pursuer was held to have no title to sue in relation to the damaged pipes, and the principle articulated in Leigh & Sillavan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd was applied. The right of possession under the contract, and the contractual obligation to maintain the pipeline, did not provide a basis for a duty of care, even though the defender might reasonably have foreseen the pursuer’s economic loss. The facts of Nacap were distinguished, perhaps not very convincingly, in North Scottish Helicopters Ltd v United Technologies Corp Inc.24 The pursuer “leased” a helicopter from a finance company for seven years, with an option to renew for a further six. This gave the pursuer exclusive physical control over the helicopter as well as responsibility for maintenance and repairs, but no real right because the hire (“lease”) of moveables, unlike the equivalent arrangement for land, is contractual only. Lord Davidson referred to Leigh & Sillavan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd, in which Lord Brandon had said that duty was contingent upon the plaintiff enjoying “legal ownership of or a possessory title to” the damaged property,25 and in which the anticipation of ownership was not enough. In North Scottish Helicopters Ltd Lord Davidson considered that the contract set up the pursuer as owner of the helicopter “in substance if not in legal title”. This

22 Such claims have even less prospect of success where they are based on the loss of an opportunity for the pursuer to enter into contractual relations in regard to the damaged property: Landcatch Ltd v International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 552; Skerries Salmon Ltd v The Braer Corporation 1999 SLT 1196. 23 1987 SLT 221; see also Cruden Building & Renewals Ltd v Scottish Water [2017] CSOH 98, 2017 GWD 22–363. 24 1988 SLT 77. 25 [1986] AC 785 at 809.

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conferred the required level of “possessory title”,26 allowing the pursuer to sue the manufacturer and designer when the helicopter caught fire, allegedly due to its negligent manufacture. The implication is that those acquiring ships, motor vehicles or other similar assets, by means of financial arrangements which fix ownership with the lender but allow the borrower exclusive possession and repairing responsibilities, have title to sue for these purposes.27 It has been held in England that the beneficial owner of damaged property may be entitled to recover economic loss where the legal owner is a bare trustee, on the basis that beneficial ownership implies a special relationship between the defendant and the person suffering loss.28 However, given the different property law framework applicable to trusts in Scotland, it is unlikely that such a special relationship would be identified in relation to a beneficiary where trust property was damaged. Even in a bare trust, a beneficiary has no proprietary right in the trust property but merely a personal right as against the trustees. The practical significance of the distinction between (i) physical damage to the pursuer’s own property, (ii) economic loss derived from such damage, and (iii) economic loss derived from damage to the property of another, is illustrated by the well-known case of Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd.29 In that case the defendant’s employees, who were digging up a roadway some distance from the plaintiff’s steel works, negligently damaged the power cable that served the works, thereby interrupting the electricity supply for several hours. The plaintiff’s losses were: (i) £368, representing the actual value of the metal being processed at the time of the power cut and which had to be discarded; (ii) £400, as the anticipated profit from the sale of that metal; and (iii) £1,767 as the anticipated profit from further batches of metal which would have been processed during the time when the electricity supply was cut off. The defendant admitted liability for £368 as payable for foreseeable physical damage to the plaintiff’s property, and the Court of Appeal held that a duty also arose in relation to the £400 in lost profits from this metal, as foreseeable financial damage immediately consequential on the foreseeable physical damage to the plaintiff’s property. However, no duty arose in relation to the £1,767 of lost profits that would have been gained from the sale of further batches of steel that had not yet been in process. The raw materials had not been affected by the power cut, 26 1988 SLT 77 at 81. 27 On the question of whether this case might be read as an example of spuilzie, namely the wrong constituted by unjustified denial of title to possess (Walker, Delict 1002), see the sequence of articles: C Anderson, “Spuilzie Today” 2008 SLT (News) 257; W J Stewart, “The Alleged Case of the Spuilzied Helicopter” 2009 SLT (News) 13; C Anderson, “The Alleged Case of the Spuilzied Helicopter: A Reply” 2009 SLT (News) 31. 28 Shell UK Ltd v Total UK Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 180, [2011] QB 86. 29 [1973] QB 27; see also SCM (United Kingdom) Ltd v W J Whittall and Son Ltd [1971] 1 QB 337.

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so the loss to the plaintiff on this count was purely financial, consequent on damage to a power cable which did not belong to them. An earlier Scottish case, Dynamco Ltd v Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd,30 involved the defender’s employees cutting through the power cable serving the pursuer’s factory. None of the pursuer’s goods or fixtures was damaged, but power was lost for a time, meaning that production and the profits therefrom were lost. As the loss derived wholly from property owned by another it could not be recovered. The rule as stated by Lord Migdale was that “The pursuers cannot recover for loss of profits unless that loss arises from damage to their plant or materials.”31 The distinctions in this area of law32 have not always been applied in a straightforward manner, in particular those that separate economic loss deriving from property of a third party, and economic loss deriving from secondary damage to the pursuer’s own property (of the type seen in Spartan Steel, category (b)). In the Outer House case of Coleridge v Miller Construction Ltd,33 the power supply serving the pursuers’ glass factory was interrupted by building contractors working on a site some distance away. The pursuers made a claim against the contractors for the costs of repairs to their furnace and the value of the glass damaged in production. Lord MacLean found nothing in the pleadings to the effect that the defenders knew that the pursuers were glass manufacturers, and therefore that it was essential that they received a constant and uninterrupted supply of electricity. As there were no averments that it was reasonably foreseeable that interruption of supply would cause the pursuers loss, there could be no duty of care.34 But matters were not left there. Although according to the analysis in Spartan Steel the case did not involve “pure” economic loss, Lord MacLean observed that it seemed to him “artificial and without justification to make recovery of loss by those supplied in these circumstances turn upon whether the damage sustained was physical or purely economic”.35 Citing concerns as to whether this distinction remained valid, and commenting that “loss of electricity is a hazard that all consumers have to face”,36 he concluded that it was not fair, just and 30 1971 SC 257. 31 1971 SC 257 at 267. 32 See Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398 per Lord Oliver at 486: “Where, for instance, the defendant’s careless conduct results in the interruption of the electricity supply to business premises adjoining the highway, it is not easy to discern the logic in holding that a sufficient relationship of proximity exists between him and a factory owner who has suffered loss because material in the course of manufacture is rendered useless but that none exists between him and the owner of, for instance, an adjoining restaurant who suffers the loss of profit on the meals which he is unable to prepare and sell. In both cases the real loss is pecuniary.” 33 1997 SLT 485. 34 1997 SLT 485 at 491. 35 1997 SLT 485 at 491. 36 1997 SLT 485 at 492.

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reasonable that duty should be imposed in relation to the loss of profits or indeed even in respect of physical damage. One problem with Lord MacLean’s approach is that the fair, just and reasonable test is appropriate only in novel cases where no directly relevant precedent already exists, as Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police now re-emphasises.37 For all that the distinctions drawn in Dynamco and Spartan Steel may have seemed “Jesuitical”,38 there was previous case law in point, supporting duty in relation to secondary economic loss – economic loss, flowing from harm done to the pursuer’s property by the original act of alleged negligence. It seems, therefore, that Lord Maclean’s observations on this point in Coleridge should not be followed.39

(2) Economic loss consequent on injury to another The scope of duty of care does not normally extend to economic loss suffered following injury to a third party.40 There is no liability in negligence if, for example, the defender injures the pursuer’s employer, leading to loss of work for the pursuer, or the defender injures the pursuer’s employee with the consequence that the pursuer is unable to fulfil contractual obligations. In Reavis v Clan Line Steamers41 a passenger steamer sank following a collision caused by the negligence of the defender. The passengers included a successful American jazz orchestra from which eight players were killed and five injured. The pursuer was a member of the orchestra and also its impresario, in the sense that she recruited its members and arranged its engagements. Following the disaster, the orchestra was unable to fulfil its advance bookings so that the pursuer lost considerable anticipated earnings. This, however, was held to be irrecoverable economic loss, as deriving from death and incapacity of others (i.e. the players).

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(3) Economic loss consequent on quality defects in goods It goes without saying that, whatever the contractual undertakings entered into, manufacturers and suppliers are under both a common law duty of

37 [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736. See paras 4.18–4.25 above. 38 1997 SLT 485 at 489. 39 For detailed criticism of the reasoning in Coleridge v Miller Construction Ltd, see D Brodie, “Jesuitical Distinctions” 1997 SLT (News) 84. 40 There is of course an important statutory exception to this general rule, in terms of the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 ss 6 and 7, allowing claims for loss of personal services and/or loss of support due to the death of an immediate family member. See paras 31.49–31.52 below. 41 1925 SC 725. See also West Bromwich Albion Football Club Ltd v El Safty [2006] EWCA Civ 1299, [2007] PIQR P7. 42 Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31. 43 Consumer Protection Act 1987 ss 2 and 3 (in regard to products in non-commercial use, s 5(3)).

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care42 and also a statutory obligation43 to the ultimate consumers of goods not to supply goods that will threaten the safety of their person or their property. If they do so, they become liable to compensate not only the personal injury or property damage caused thereby but also any economic loss that flows directly from such injury or damage. So if, for example, a safety defect causes a product to malfunction and injure the person operating it, that person may recover damages to compensate both for those injuries and for any consequent loss of earnings. By contrast, where a defect merely compromises the working of the product itself or the profits to be derived from the product, but does not cause injury or damage to other property belonging to the pursuer, the loss suffered is regarded as pure economic loss and cannot be recovered. There is thus a “crucial distinction” in terms of duty between supplying something which is defective, and supplying something “which, because of its defects, causes loss or damage to something else”.44 In parallel with duty of care in negligence, the Consumer Protection Act 1987 sets out statutory remedies when a consumer product malfunctions in such a way as to cause injury to bystanders or damage to other property, but section 5(2) excludes claims for the loss of or damage to the product itself. In other words, if, say, a kitchen appliance explodes due to a defect in its electrical wiring, claims may be brought under the 1987 Act for any injury suffered to bystanders or damage to other property in the vicinity, but the purchaser would need to look to contractual remedies under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and Consumer Rights Act 2015 in respect of the damage to the appliance itself.45 By extension, any loss attributable to repairing or replacing the product, and not derived from personal injury or property damage caused by its malfunction, is considered to be purely economic and so non-recoverable under the law of negligence. In Muirhead v Industrial Tank Specialities Ltd,46 for example, the plaintiff, a fish merchant, catered for his customers’ needs at peak periods of demand by keeping a supply of live lobsters in tanks. When the motors powering the oxygen pumps in the tanks failed, the lobsters perished and the scheme had to be abandoned. In a subsequent claim the manufacturer of the pump motors was held liable for the physical damage caused to the stock of lobsters, and the financial loss suffered by the plaintiff in consequence of that physical damage (loss of sales of the lobsters). On the other hand the cost of the pumps themselves, as well as the future profits anticipated from the scheme, were deemed to be pure economic loss which the fish merchant could not recover in tort.

44 Robinson v P E Jones (Contractors) Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 9, [2012] QB 44 per Burnton LJ at para 93. 45 See further para 26.45 below. 46 [1986] QB 507.

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(4) Economic loss consequent on defects in buildings (a) The decision in Murphy v Brentwood District Council The principle outlined in the section above is also applicable in relation to defects in buildings. The House of Lords decision in Murphy v Brentwood District Council47 is the leading authority on this point, overruling the earlier decision of the House of Lords in Anns v London Borough of Merton.48 In Murphy the defendant was a local authority which had statutory powers of inspection to verify that new houses were built in conformity with building regulations. The defendant Council approved the design of the plaintiff’s house despite the foundations being unsuitable for the site. After the plaintiff had occupied the house for several years, a crack in the foundations was discovered. As he could not afford to repair the defect, he sold the house at a loss. Alleging that the loss had been caused by the Council’s negligent failure to identify the problem, he attempted to claim from the Council the difference between the likely sale price without the defect and the actual sale price. That claim was, however, rejected as based upon pure economic loss. The House of Lords reasoned that the Council could not owe a duty of care in regard to such a loss if the original builder would not similarly have done so. Besides, the physical damage that had occurred had been confined almost entirely to the object that the plaintiff had bought, namely the house:49

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“If a builder erects a structure containing a latent defect which renders it dangerous to persons or property, he will be liable in tort for injury to persons or damage to property resulting from that dangerous defect. But if the defect becomes apparent before any injury or damage has been caused, the loss sustained by the building owner is purely economic. If the defect can be repaired at economic cost, that is the measure of the loss. If the building cannot be repaired, it may have to be abandoned as unfit for occupation and therefore valueless. These economic losses are recoverable if they flow from breach of a relevant contractual duty, but, here again, in the absence of a special relationship of proximity they are not recoverable in tort.”

In other words, if the foundations had cracked in such a way that the plaintiff’s collection of antique porcelain had smashed and the plaintiff himself had broken a leg, duty might well have extended to that property damage and physical injury.50 However, in Murphy the plaintiff had moved 47 48 49 50

[1991] 1 AC 398. [1978] AC 728. [1991] 1 AC 398 per Lord Bridge at 475. See Lord Keith, [1991] 1 AC 398 at 463, reserving his opinion on whether the Council would have owed a duty to Murphy in relation to any property damage or personal injury. See also the Outer House case of Stevenson v A & J Stephen (Builders) Ltd 1996 SLT 140, where the defect for which the builder was allegedly liable was failure to construct a fire stop as required by building regulations, and the entire house had burned down. It was held that a relevant case of duty was made against the builder and the averments of loss were sufficiently specific to go to proof.

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on, having discovered the defect, before any damage or injury could occur. The builder owed no duty of care in regard to the economic loss deriving from the alleged defect in the house itself, for otherwise there would be an “indefinitely transmissible warranty of quality”.51 Accordingly, the imposition of liability in negligence on the Council, in place of the builder, would be an unacceptable extension of liability for economic loss. The scope of the Council’s liability for a negligent failure to ensure compliance with building regulations should not exceed that of the liability of the builder for his negligent failure to comply in the first place,52 and it was not obvious why the existence of statutory powers to regulate construction of new buildings should create for local authorities a general private law duty to prevent one party causing economic loss to another. In Murphy Lord Bridge observed that the cost of pre-emptive repairs to defective property might be recoverable from the builder where, without repairs, there was a risk of damage to neighbours,53 although there was no discussion of potential local authority liability in such circumstances. In fact, Scottish authority suggests that there is no direct duty of care between a local authority and the proprietors of an adjacent building damaged by defects in a different building which the authority’s inspection failed to identify.54

(b) The complex structure theory 5.19

Additional consideration was given in Murphy to the so-called “complex structure” theory. This argues that when, in complex structures such as buildings, one part of the structure causes damage to another part of the same structure, this should be regarded as damaging “other pro­ perty”. That would allow the loss suffered to be classified as deriving 51 [1991] 1 AC 398 per Lord Bridge at 480. Reference was made to D & F Estates Ltd v Church Commissioners for England [1989] AC 177, in which the plaintiffs sought unsuccessfully to recover from the relevant subcontractors the cost of making good defective plasterwork in their flat. A builder might owe a duty of care to the ultimate owners or occupiers to carry out construction work with reasonable skill, since a latent defect might foreseeably cause damage to their person or other property, but the expenditure claimed was not seen as consequential upon such damage and was more properly regarded as pure economic loss derived from a complaint over quality. It was therefore to be recovered by means of contractual remedies. Although the “underlying logical basis” of Anns v London Borough of Merton [1978] AC 728 was not clear to their Lordships (Lord Oliver at 216), Anns was distinguished since the claim in that case was based not on common law negligence but on breach of a statutory duty, and its logic could be confined to that context. 52 [1991] 1 AC 398 per Lord Bridge at 481. 53 [1991] 1 AC 398 per Lord Bridge at 475: “if a building stands so close to the boundary of the building owner’s land that after discovery of the dangerous defect it remains a potential source of injury to persons or property on neighbouring land or on the highway, the building owner ought, in principle, to be entitled to recover in tort from the negligent builder the cost of obviating the danger, whether by repair or by demolition, so far as that cost is necessarily incurred in order to protect himself from potential liability to third parties.” 54 Armstrong v Moore 1996 SLT 690.

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from property damage to which duty extended rather than economic loss to which it did not. Application of this theory was, however, dismissed as “unrealistic” in Murphy.55 The structural elements in a building were seen as forming “a single indivisible unit of which the different parts are essentially interdependent”,56 so that a defect in one part was a defect in the whole; so for example a defect in the foundations was a defect in the whole building and damage caused by the defective foundations to, say, its system of pipes could not be regarded as damage to “other property”. The cost suffered by the plaintiff in terms of the diminution in value of the building as a whole was therefore to be classed as economic loss in circumstances such as those that affected Mr Murphy. At the same time, it was accepted in Murphy that a limited version of the “complex structure” theory might apply where the malfunction concerned a clearly separable and “distinct item” which was fitted to the structure but was clearly separable from it. If, for example, a central heating boiler exploded and damaged the house, the owners of the house should be entitled to recover if the explosion was caused by the negligence of the boiler manufacturer.57 Lord Jauncey went so far as to observe that recovery should be possible from the component manufacturer if “one integral component of the structure was built by a separate contractor and . . . a defect in such a component had caused damage to other parts of the structure, e.g. a steel frame erected by a specialist contractor which failed to give adequate support to floors or walls”.58 But even where one element in the construction of a building has been built by a separate contractor, the dividing line between consequential damage (that is, physical damage to other construction elements caused by the carelessness in providing that single element) and damage to the thing itself is not always apparent. A possible example of damage to a single element can be found in Linklaters Business Services v Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd, where the defendant subcontractor had provided defective thermal insulation that corroded the surrounding pipework and fittings in an airconditioning system. Acknowledging the practical difficulties in distinguishing between damage to a separable element of the whole and damage to the thing itself, Akenhead J refused to strike out the claim in negligence brought by the tenants of the building against the subcontractor.59 By contrast, in Broster v Galliard Docklands Ltd60 the inadequately secured roof on a row of six terraced houses blew off in high winds, causing damage to 55 [1991] 1 AC 398 per Lord Keith at 470, Lord Bridge at 478, Lord Jauncey at 497. 56 [1991] 1 AC 398 per Lord Bridge at 478. 57 [1991] 1 AC 398 per Lord Bridge at 478. 58 [1991] 1 AC 398 per Lord Jauncey at 497. 59 [2010] EWHC 1145 (TCC), [2010] BLR 537, 130 Con LR 111 at para 30. 60 [2011] EWHC 1722 (TCC), [2011] PNLR 34; for comment, see D Brodie, “Negligence and Defective Buildings” (2012) 108 Greens Reparation Bulletin 4.

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the property beneath. Since the defendant builders had built the houses as a unit, the damage was regarded as occurring to the thing itself, and the builders were not therefore under a duty of care to subsequent owners of the property to protect them against the economic loss involved in making good the roof.

(c) Murphy v Brentwood District Council questioned 5.22

5.23

One apparently odd result of Murphy is that, whereas owners who make prompt repairs to defective property are unable to claim (except in contract) from a negligent builder or local authority, less attentive proprietors who wait for personal injury or damage to other property to occur are owed a duty of care and may recover the cost of repairs. On this account the authority of Murphy has not been accepted in other Commonwealth jurisdictions.61 In Bryan v Maloney the High Court of Australia held that there was sufficient proximity between the builder and a subsequent owner of a house to allow recovery of economic loss in the form of “diminution in value of a house when the inadequacy of its footings first becomes manifest by reason of consequent damage to the fabric of the house”.62 Murphy was regarded as resting “upon a narrower view of the scope of the modern law of negligence and a more rigid compartmentalization of contract and tort than is acceptable under the law of this country”.63 Canadian case law has similarly endorsed the principle that recovery against the builder should be permitted, pointing out the anomaly inherent in Murphy’s reasoning that “the plaintiff who moves quickly and responsibly to fix a defect before it causes injury to persons or damage to property must do so at his or her own expense. By contrast, the plaintiff who, either intentionally or through neglect, allows a defect to develop into an accident may benefit at law from the costly and potentially tragic consequences”.64 In New Zealand, planning authorities are liable in tort for negligent failure properly to inspect a building during construction, at least in circumstances where the original builder has become insolvent. So in Invercargill City Council v Hamlin65 the New Zealand Court of Appeal rejected the authority of Murphy and held that there was sufficient proximity between house owners and local authorities due to the legislative framework by which the latter enforced building byelaws, and the reliance of the former upon the local authority fulfilling this role effectively. Its decision was 61 For discussion, see A Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (2007) 252–256. 62 Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609 at 630. 63 Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609 at 629. 64 Winnipeg Condominium Corp v Bird Construction Co Ltd (1995) 121 DLR (4th) 193 at para 37. 65 [1994] 3 NZLR 513. For an account of subsequent developments in New Zealand, see M French “Donoghue v Stevenson and Local Authorities: a New Zealand Perspective – Can the Tort of Negligence be Built on Shaky Foundations?” 2013 JR 287.

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upheld on appeal to the Privy Council,66 which noted the different statutory background in this area as between England and New Zealand and recognised the importance of permitting the common law to develop in a way which was appropriate to local conditions. The authority of Murphy v Brentwood District Council has not been seriously questioned by the Scottish courts, nor has detailed consideration been given to the criticism levelled against the decision in other Commonwealth jurisdictions.67 It should be noted, however, that in denying duty in Murphy the House of Lords set store by the availability of remedies under the Defective Premises Act 1972, an Act that does not apply in Scotland. The absence of equivalent provisions in New Zealand was a reason for the Privy Council in Invercargill City Council v Hamlin leaving the reasoning of the New Zealand Court of Appeal undisturbed.

5.24

(d) Postscript: the NHBC As a postscript to this section it should be mentioned that most reputable builders in the UK are members of the National House Building Council, which provides a guarantee against defects in new buildings for the first ten years after construction, and this can be assigned to subsequent purchasers within that period.68 For house buyers who have the benefit of such a guarantee, the incentive to seek recourse for defects in construction from the local authority is much reduced in regard to defects arising during this initial period.69

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C. CIRCUMSTANCES TO WHICH DUTY MAY EXTEND While the general rule, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, is that duty of care does not extend to negligently inflicted pure economic loss, that rule is departed from in certain restricted circumstances. In recent decades there has been much discussion of new contexts where this might

66 [1996] AC 624. 67 Forbes v City of Dundee District Council 1997 SLT 1330; Landcatch Ltd v International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 1999 SLT 1208. Bryan v Maloney was cited in the Outer House in Landcatch Ltd v International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund [1998] ECC 314 per Lord Gill at para 138, but dismissed as contrary to Murphy and therefore not a source of “reliable guidance”. See also Strathford East Kilbride Ltd v HLM Design Ltd 1999 SLT 121 per Lord MacLean at 123, rejecting contrary Commonwealth authorities with the statement that “Scots law . . . in my opinion has not developed differently from English law in this field”. 68 For details, see the National House Building Council website at http://www.nhbc.co.uk/. 69 But see also Robinson v P E Jones (Contractors) Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 9, [2012] QB 44 per Jackson LJ at paras 87–88, denying duty where the contract between the builder and the customer had provided for allocation of risk, and the latent defect in the claimant’s house emerged 12½ years after completion so that it was outside the scope of the NHBC agreement.

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be permitted. Although no single “touchstone”70 has revealed itself, the concept of assumption of responsibility in particular has played an important role in developing the scope of duty.71

(1) Hedley Byrne and “assumption of responsibility” 5.27

5.28

The decision of the House of Lords in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd72 in 1964 marked an important turning point in developing the concept of assumption of responsibility. In Hedley Byrne the plaintiff requested the defendant, a bank, to supply a reference with regard to a company for which it had been asked to act as agent in placing advertising orders. The reference, which was supplied without charge, advised that the company was “considered good for its ordinary business engagements”, and advertising orders were duly submitted by the plaintiff. Not long afterwards, the company went into liquidation, leaving the plaintiff to bear the substantial costs of the orders placed on the company’s behalf – a pure economic loss. The plaintiff thereafter sued the bank, arguing that the bank had owed it a duty to take care in providing the reference, and this had been breached by the misleading assurance that the company was creditworthy. The particular obstacle for the plaintiff in this case was that the reference was specifically given as “without responsibility”, and the House of Lords took the view that no duty could be imposed in the face of this express disclaimer. However, the House of Lords also took the opportunity to consider whether, in the absence of an effective disclaimer, duty might have been recognised. This point was controversial because, while it was well established that there should be liability for loss suffered due to reliance upon a misrepresentation that was fraudulent,73 up until Hedley Byrne no duty of care had been recognised in relation to economic loss following upon a negligent, but not dishonest, misstatement.74 Although there was no clear consensus on whether, without the disclaimer, duty would have arisen in the circumstances of this particular

70 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 per Lord Roskill at 628. 71 See A Robertson and J Wang, “The Assumption of Responsibility”, in K Barker, R Grantham and W Swain (eds), The Law of Misstatements: 50 Years on from Hedley Byrne v Heller (2015) 49. 72 [1964] AC 465. For a detailed account of the background, see P Mitchell, “Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd”, in C Mitchell and P Mitchell (eds), Landmark Cases in the Law of Tort (2010) 251. 73 See paras 21.66–21.68 below. 74 Manners v Whitehead (1898) 1 F 171; Robinson v National Bank of Scotland 1916 SC (HL) 154; see also the English case of Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co [1951] 2 KB 164 to similar effect, but in which Lord Denning, in a dissenting judgment (at 180), argued that those engaged in a calling which required special knowledge and skill were under a duty to those with whom they had no contract but who were “closely and directly affected by their work” and who relied upon their representations in the ordinary course of business.

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case,75 all the judges were in agreement that, in principle, a person making a negligent but non-fraudulent misrepresentation of this type might owe a duty of care to the person receiving it, even if the only loss suffered by the recipient was financial. This was seen as an application of the “neighbour principle” set out by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson,76 and as an exception to the general “principle of proximity” that duty did not attach to words as it did to actions.77 Their Lordships reached this conclusion by slightly different routes, however. Lord Reid thought that a person providing information “knowing that he was being trusted or that his skill and judgment were being relied on” must “be held to have accepted some responsibility for his answer being given carefully”.78 Lord Morris was more specific. Duty might arise “if A assumes a responsibility to B to tender him deliberate advice” and examples would be the advice given by accountants, solicitors or doctors.79 Lord Devlin similarly attached importance to the notion of assumption of responsibility. Duty might arise in relationships which were “‘equivalent to contract,’ that is, where there is an assumption of responsibility in circumstances in which, but for the absence of consideration, there would be a contract”.80 Lord Hodson thought that a duty arose where there was a special relationship of proximity or where advisers “hold themselves out as possessing a special skill”.81 Lord Pearce’s speech also referred to the notion of a “special relationship” arising in circumstances which “give rise to an assumption that care as well as honesty is demanded”, normally only where the representation concerned a “business or professional transaction whose nature makes clear the gravity of the inquiry and the importance and influence attached to the answer”.82

(2) After Hedley Byrne The decision in Hedley Byrne was thus an important milestone in establishing that duty of care attached to certain types of representation causing

75 Lords Morris and Hodson appeared to think there would have been no duty even without the disclaimer ([1964] AC 465 at 504 and 512–513), but Lord Devlin thought that there would (at 532). 76 1932 SC (HL) 31. 77 [1964] AC 465 per Lord Devlin at 524–525. 78 [1964] AC 465 at 486. Lord Reid prefaced this comment as follows (at 486): “I say ‘ought to have known’ because in questions of negligence we now apply the objective standard of what the reasonable man would have done.” 79 [1964] AC 465 at 494. 80 [1964] AC 465 at 528–529 (under reference to Lord Shaw in Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932 at 972). 81 [1964] AC 465 at 510. 82 [1964] AC 465 at 539.

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economic loss, and it was accepted as such in the Scottish courts.83 However, Hedley Byrne did not itself provide a straightforward illustration of the circumstances in which duty might arise. Moreover, while the notions of a “special relationship” and an “assumption of responsibility” figured to varying degrees in the various speeches, no clear framework of analysis was provided.84 Some years later, the basis of duty for economic loss was again considered by the House of Lords, in Smith v Eric S Bush, another case involving an allegedly negligent misrepresentation.85 In the facts of that case, discussed below,86 the defendant patently had not actively accepted responsibility for the plaintiff’s interests, but the House of Lords stated that assumption of responsibility was to be “understood as referring to the circumstances in which the law will deem the maker of the statement to have assumed responsibility to the person who acts upon the advice”.87 This could occur where it is “foreseeable that if the advice is negligent the recipient is likely to suffer damage, that there is a sufficiently proximate relationship between the parties and that it is just and reasonable to impose the liability”.88 In short, the idea that the defendant assumed responsibility as a deliberate “voluntary undertaking”, as suggested by the speeches in Hedley Byrne,89 was expanded into a more general construct in which duty was deemed to arise by operation of law. A short while after Smith, in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman,90 the House of Lords still had no single “ready answer” as to when duty arose.91 It noted that “assumption of responsibility” had served in Hedley Byrne to denote a voluntary undertaking by the person making the allegedly negligent statement,92 but that in many instances the expression now served

83 See Kenway v Orcantic 1979 SC 422 (duty on the part of ship designers not to misrepresent the capacity of a ship with consequent loss of revenue to future owners) per Lord Dunpark at 426: “The fact that [the principle in Hedley Byrne] has not yet been judicially acknowledged in Scotland is, in my opinion, attributable to the lack of opportunity. I am now able to give formal recognition to a proposition which is no more than a particular application of the definition stated by Lord Macmillan as long ago as 1942 in Bourhill v Young 1942 SC (HL) 78, at p 88.” See also Andrew Oliver & Son Ltd v Douglas 1981 SC 192. 84 From an early stage the coherence of the “assumption of responsibility” criterion was questioned: see e.g. J A Weir, “Liability for Syntax” (1963) 21 CLJ 216; R Stevens, “Hedley Byrne v Heller: Judicial Creativity and Doctrinal Possibility” (1964) 27 MLR 121; K Barker, “Unreliable Assumptions in the Law of Negligence” (1993) 109 LQR 461. 85 [1990] 1 AC 831. 86 See para 5.36 below. 87 [1990] 1 AC 831 per Lord Griffiths at 862. 88 [1990] 1 AC 831 per Lord Griffiths at 865. Lord Jauncey (at 871) said that the salient question was whether the defendants could be deemed to have assumed responsibility towards the plaintiff “by reason of the proximate relationship between them”. 89 [1964] AC 465, in particular per Lord Devlin at 529. 90 [1990] 2 AC 605. 91 [1990] 2 AC 605 per Lord Roskill at 628; see also Lord Oliver at 637. 92 [1990] 2 AC 605 per Lord Bridge at 623.

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simply as one of numerous “labels” for the factual situations in which a “special relationship” existed between the parties.93 And, as discussed further in the sections which follow, a sequence of leading cases in the 1990s94 affirmed new variants for such relationships. In particular in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd,95 arising out of the negligent provision of management services, Lord Goff noted that the “governing principle” as derived from all of the speeches in Hedley Byrne was that there should have been a relationship between the parties “which may be general or specific to the particular transaction, and which may or may not be contractual in nature” and in which one party had “assumed or undertaken a responsibility towards the other”.96 Although accepting that the concept had been criticised as too open-ended, Lord Goff argued that in cases like that before him, where there was no difficulty in keeping liability within “reasonable bounds”,97 assumption of responsibility was to be regarded as the definitive test for duty:98 “[T]he concept provides its own explanation why there is no problem in cases of this kind about liability for pure economic loss; for if a person assumes responsibility to another in respect of certain services, there is no reason why he should not be liable in damages for that other in respect of economic loss which flows from the negligent performance of those services. It follows that, once the case is identified as falling within the Hedley Byrne principle, there should be no need to embark upon any further enquiry whether it is ‘fair, just and reasonable’ to impose liability for economic loss.”

Further guidance on how assumption of responsibility related to the Caparo features of duty of care99 was provided by the House of Lords in

93 [1990] 2 AC 605 per Lord Roskill at 628, who found “considerable difficulty in phrases such as ‘voluntary assumption of responsibility’ unless they are to be explained as meaning no more than the existence of circumstances in which the law will impose a liability upon a person making the allegedly negligent statement to the person to whom that statement is made; in which case the phrase does not help to determine in what circumstances the law will impose that liability or indeed, its scope”. See also Lord Oliver at 637. 94 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145; White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207; Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1995] 2 AC 296; and on these developments see Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181 per Lord Rodger at paras 50–51. 95 [1995] 2 AC 145, discussed further below at paras 5.60–5.62. 96 [1995] 2 AC 145 at 179–180. 97 [1995] 2 AC 145 at 180. Lord Goff added at 195 that he suspected “that the situation which arises in the present case is most unusual; and that in many cases in which a contractual chain comparable to that in the present case is constructed it may well prove to be inconsistent with an assumption of responsibility which has the effect of, so to speak, short circuiting the contractual structure so put in place by the parties”. 98 [1995] 2 AC 145 at 181. See also Strathford East Kilbride Ltd v HLM Design Ltd 1999 SLT 121. 99 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; see paras 4.15 and 4.16 above.

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Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc.100 The key question in cases of economic loss was whether “the defendant assumed responsibility for what he said and did vis-à-vis the claimant, or is to be treated by the law as having done so”.101 But unlike the Caparo features, each of which is necessary but not sufficient in establishing duty,102 assumption of responsibility was “a sufficient but not a necessary condition of liability, a first test which, if answered positively, may obviate the need for further inquiry”.103 Even without it,104 duty might be established in “novel” cases where the claimant could establish foreseeability of harm, proximity between the parties, and that such an outcome would be fair, just and reasonable.105 Assumption of responsibility may be most readily recognised in the “paradigm situation” where there is a relationship with “all the indicia of contract save consideration”,106 but it is not confined to those circumstances. Indeed Lord Slynn went so far as to observe, in Phelps v Hillingdon LBC, that it often signifies “simply that the law recognises that there is a duty of care. It is not so much that responsibility is assumed as that it is recognised or imposed by the law”.107 Even without direct evidence of a deliberate undertaking by the defender, the position may be assessed objectively, on the basis of inference from the defender’s conduct.108 However, the further that attention moves from what the defender thought or intended and towards responsibilities imposed by operation of law, the more the concept sheds its distinctive meaning and merges with the

100 [2007] 1 AC 181. Again in this case the House of Lords rejected the idea of a “common denominator” for duty (Lord Mance at para 93). Lord Rodger referred to the adage “Seek simplicity, and distrust it” (at para 51). As previously observed by May LJ in Merrett v Babb [2001] QB 1174 at para 41, the search for a single formulation was tantamount to “reaching for the moon”. 101 [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181 per Lord Bingham at para 4 (emphasis added). 102 In other words, they require to be present in all cases, although fairness, justice and reasonableness need positively to be established only in “novel” contexts where the existence of duty has not already been settled: see Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736, and para 4.23 above. 103 [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181 per Lord Bingham at para 4. 104 [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181 per Lord Rodger at para 52. 105 Subject to the caveat that the features identified in Caparo do “not provide an easy answer to all our problems, but only a set of fairly blunt tools”: [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181 per Lord Walker at para 71. See also Realstone Ltd v J & E Shepherd [2008] CSOH 31, [2008] PNLR 21, in which Lord Hodge allowed proof before answer to determine whether there had been assumption of responsibility and reliance, but also noted that it might be necessary at proof to consider whether the imposition of duty was fair, just and reasonable. 106 Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181 per Lord Bingham at para 4. 107 [2001] 2 AC 619 at 654. 108 Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181 per Lord Bingham at para 5, Lord Hoffmann at para 35.

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other features of duty, in particular proximity.109 The particular contexts in which assumption of responsibility may be recognised are the subject of the rest of the chapter.

D. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION Liability for the financial consequences of words carelessly spoken or written poses particular problems. Whereas the consequences of physical acts are generally finite and relatively easy to anticipate, verbal communications may be disseminated and acted upon in ways and with outcomes which their author neither controls nor expects.110 The “foundation of this area of law” is the idea of an assumption of responsibility on the part of the person issuing the words.111 An “advisory relationship” is not sufficient in itself.112 Duty of care rests upon a special relationship in which the defender has assumed responsibility “to an identifiable (although not necessarily identified) person or group of persons, and not to the world at large or to a wholly indeterminate group”.113 In order to determine whether the relationship has this quality the interaction between the parties is looked at objectively from both sides; the pursuer’s own perception that the defender would look after the pursuer’s interests does not of itself suffice.114 The importance of taking an external view of the relationship between the parties can be seen in the leading case of Caparo Industries plc v Dickman.115 The defendants were auditors who certified accounts overstating a company’s profitability. The plaintiffs relied upon the accuracy of these accounts, as signed off by the defendants, in purchasing shares in the company and, as a result, found themselves with an investment worth

109 Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181 per Lord Walker: “voluntary assumption of responsibility towards others, judged objectively, may provide the necessary proximity”; Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Bannerman Johnstone Maclay [2005] CSIH 39, 2005 1 SC 437 per Lord Justice-Clerk Gill at para 45 on the necessary relationship of proximity. See also A Robertson and J Wang, “The Assumption of Responsibility”, in K Barker, R Grantham and W Swain (eds), The Law of Misstatements: 50 Years on from Hedley Byrne v Heller (2015) 49 at 82, arguing that assumption of responsibility is better understood as a “loosely defined subset of proximity”, and as such a “particular manifestation” of Lord Atkin’s neighbour principle. See also paras 4.52–4.53 above. 110 See discussion by Lord Reid in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 at 483. 111 Playboy Club London Ltd v Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA [2018] UKSC 43, [2018] 1 WLR 4041 per Lord Sumption at para 7. 112 Grant Estates Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2012] CSOH 133, 2012 GWD 29–588 per Lord Hodge at para 73. 113 Playboy Club London Ltd v Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA [2018] UKSC 43, [2018] 1 WLR 4041 per Lord Sumption at para 7. 114 Hamilton v Allied Domecq plc [2007] UKHL 33, 2007 SC (HL) 142; see also Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 830 per Lord Steyn at 835. 115 [1990] 2 AC 605.

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considerably less than anticipated. In determining that the auditors had owed no duty to potential investors, the court gave specific consideration to interactions whereby one party gives advice to another. According to Lord Oliver, duty of care in relation to the provision of information “typically” arises where:116 “(1) the advice is required for a purpose, whether particularly specified or generally described, which is made known, either actually or inferentially, to the adviser at the time when the advice is given; (2) the adviser knows, either actually or inferentially, that his advice will be communicated to the advisee, either specifically or as a member of an ascertainable class, in order that it should be used by the advisee for that purpose; (3) it is known either actually or inferentially, that the advice so communicated is likely to be acted upon by the advisee for that purpose without independent inquiry; and (4) it is so acted upon by the advisee to his detriment.”

Lord Oliver’s indicators of duty in relation to misrepresentations may now be considered in more detail.

(1) Indicators of duty (a) The purpose of the advice 5.34

The “purpose” of the allegedly negligent advice is crucial to characterising the interaction between the parties. Duty of care is unlikely to be found if the advisee uses the information for a purpose other than that for which the adviser originally intended it to be used, as illustrated in the facts of Caparo.117 The auditors’ purpose in signing off the accounts was to certify the state of the company’s finances in order for it to meet its statutory obligations under the Companies Acts, not to assist parties contemplating dealing in the company’s shares. This was a decisive factor in undermining arguments for duty. Of course the auditors may well have realised that potential investors might rely on the accounts as certified in deciding whether to acquire shares in the company, but the House of Lords stated firmly that foreseeability alone could not give rise to the necessary “relationship of ‘proximity’” between the parties.118 Similarly in Reeman v Department of Transport,119 the plaintiffs had bought a fishing 116 [1990] 2 AC 605 at 638. Similar conditions figured in the speech of Lord Bridge at 620–621. See also Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Bannerman Johnstone Maclay [2005] CSIH 39, 2005 1 SC 437 per Lord Justice-Clerk Gill at para 45, declaring proximity to be established where “the defender knows (1) the identity of the person to whom his advice or information is to be communicated; (2) the purpose for which that person is to be provided with the advice or information; and (3) the fact that that person is likely to rely upon the advice or information for the known purpose”. 117 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. 118 [1990] 2 AC 605 per Lord Oliver at 643. 119 [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 648, [1997] PNLR 618.

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boat in reliance upon a certificate issued by the Department of Transport stating it to be seaworthy. Such a certificate is a mandatory requirement for all such vessels before they can take to the water. In fact the Department of Transport surveyor who inspected the vessel had failed to pick up that it was unstable. Shortly after the Reemans’ purchase the certificate was withdrawn, and, since it was beyond their means to undertake the necessary corrective repairs, they were left with a worthless asset. Their claim to recover their economic loss from the Department of Transport was unsuccessful. The survey had been undertaken in terms of legislation directed at providing for the safety of fishing vessels, not at protecting the financial interests of those who might be affected by the vessels’ unseaworthiness.120 By contrast, in the Scottish case of Cramaso LLP v Viscount Reidhaven’s Trs121 the offending misrepresentation took the form of an overstated tally of the game population on the defenders’ grouse moor. The defenders had prepared this information specifically for a prospective tenant in order to allay fears as to dwindling shooting potential. The purpose was therefore specified and known to both parties, and so a duty of care arose between them. As Cramaso further illustrates, it is especially significant if the statement was made with the stated aim of inducing the advisee to take the action that ultimately resulted in loss – in this case, entering into a lease – rather than being offered “for information only”.122 Statements may of course have more than one purpose, and it is not impossible for duty to arise on the basis of a known secondary purpose. In Smith v Eric S Bush,123 decided by the House of Lords a few months before Caparo, the defendant surveyors had produced a survey report for a building society, confirming that the house which the plaintiff was about to buy was adequate security for the loan that the society had offered her. The primary purpose of their representation, therefore, was to provide reassurance to the lender. However, the surveyors knew that it was customary practice for borrowers to purchase houses in reliance upon the building society valuation. Moreover, although the survey had been commissioned by the lender, it was paid for by the borrower and it was known

120 121 122 123

Fishing Vessels (Safety Provisions) Act 1970. [2014] UKSC 9, 2014 SC (UKSC) 121. James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co [1991] 2 QB 113 per Neill LJ at 126. [1990] 1 AC 831. See also the earlier case of Martin v Bell-Ingram 1986 SC 208, holding a similar duty to exist between a surveyor and borrowers where the surveyor was “well aware” that prospective purchasers would rely on the survey report. Note that this scenario does not now arise in Scotland in quite the same way. In terms of the Housing (Scotland) Act 2006 ss 98–99, there is a statutory obligation upon the sellers of residential property to provide a home report prior to sale. A purchaser who suffers material loss due to reliance upon a home report prepared without “reasonable skill and care” may recover that loss from the surveyor: see Housing (Scotland) Act 2006 (Consequential Provisions) Order 2008, SI 2008/1889, art 3.

5.35

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that a copy would immediately be passed on to her. Provision of advice to the borrower was therefore an acknowledged secondary purpose of the survey report.124 On that basis a duty arose between the surveyors and the borrower, and they were held liable for her loss in correcting a major structural problem that the survey had failed to detect. A more complex example of a representation with multiple purposes can be seen in Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel & Co Ltd .125 As in Caparo, the misrepresentations took the form of statements by a company’s directors, and certified by its financial advisers and auditors, that overstated the company’s profitability. The context was a take-over bid. Unlike in Caparo, the disputed documentation also included an exaggerated profits forecast that was circulated after the plaintiff had made an initial, unsuccessful, bid for the company. This profits forecast was not only circulated to shareholders, advising them to reject the bid as too low, but was also issued in the form of a press release and delivered to the plaintiff’s financial advisers. Following receipt of this information the plaintiff increased the amount offered for the company and its second bid was accepted. It later transpired that the company’s worth had been greatly overstated so that the plaintiff was left with an investment worth significantly less than the price paid. The Court of Appeal refused to strike out the plaintiff’s claim against the directors and the auditors to recover its loss. Distinguishing Caparo, the court held that the purpose of issuing the offending documentation had been not only to inform the shareholders but also to encourage the plaintiff to increase their bid, and so a relationship of proximity had been created between the parties sufficient to give rise to duty. In the context of a company take-over, therefore, the officers and advisers of the target company come under a duty to take care when issuing any financial information designed to influence the bidding process, and this duty is owed not only to shareholders but also to any specific known bidder.

(b) Knowledge that advice will be communicated to pursuer 5.38

The imposition of duty of care requires the adviser to have known that the offending statement would be communicated to the pursuer, or to an “ascertainable class” of which the pursuer was a member, in order for it to be used for the purpose as discussed above. The difficulty in Caparo126 was that the offending statement was directed at a specific class of persons of which the plaintiff did not at that time form part, namely the company’s shareholders. The defenders might perhaps have anticipated that persons

124 Although Lord Griffiths thought that duty would not extend to subsequent purchasers: see [1990] 1 AC 831 at 865. 125 [1991] Ch 295. 126 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, discussed at para 5.33 above.

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such as the plaintiff would also see it, but the class of persons to which the plaintiff belonged – that of potential investors – was open-ended, and the purpose to which the plaintiff put the information was not that for which the defendants had intended it. In Smith v Eric S Bush,127 on the other hand, the surveyors clearly knew that although their report was made to the lender it would also be communicated forthwith to the borrower, and that she would rely upon it in proceeding with the house purchase. As Smith demonstrates, duty is capable of being extended to the situation where a statement was prepared in response to an enquiry by a party other than the pursuer, but in that case the adviser needs to have known that it would be communicated to, and relied upon by, the pursuer.128 In Playboy Club London Ltd v Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA129 the claimant was a casino operator who wished to obtain a financial reference before allowing a new customer to place large bets. In order to do so discreetly, it asked an associated company to obtain the reference on its behalf from the defendant, a bank named by the customer. The defendant bank duly provided a favourable reference to the associated company, which relayed it to the claimant. In the event, there appeared to have been no reasonable basis for confirming the customer’s creditworthiness, and substantial cheques made out to the claimant by the customer and drawn on the bank were returned unpaid. Although the court had little sympathy for the bank, it nonetheless held that the bank had owed no duty to the casino operator, since it knew nothing about the casino’s role in the enquiry and had no reason to suppose that the associated company was acting for someone else.130 Where the primary interaction is between the adviser and a party other than the pursuer, it may be relevant to consider whether there is any possible conflict between the interests of the pursuer and those of the other party which might affect the provision of the advice. In West Bromwich Albion Football Club Ltd v El Safty,131 for example, the defendant, an orthopaedic surgeon, had negligently advised a professional footballer with regard to future treatment, which meant that his career was brought to an end and his employer suffered financial loss. Although the surgeon’s fee had been paid by the employer, the primary interaction was with the player. The potential conflict between the financial interests of the employer, which might wish to have the player on the field again as soon as possible, and the overall long term well-being of the player, pointed against the surgeon having assumed responsibility to the employer in addition to the player.

127 [1990] 1 AC 831. 128 See Playboy Club London Ltd v Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA [2018] UKSC 43, [2018] 1 WLR 4041 per Lord Sumption at para 11. 129 [2018] UKSC 43, [2018] 1 WLR 4041. 130 [2018] UKSC 43, [2018] 1 WLR 4041 per Lord Sumption at para 16. 131 [2007] PIQR P7.

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(c) Knowledge that the advice will be acted upon 5.41

Lord Oliver’s account of duty also requires the adviser to have known, “either actually or inferentially, that the advice so communicated is likely to be acted upon by the advisee” for the purpose as discussed above.132 Duty is not therefore contingent upon the adviser intending that the recipient of the offending information should act upon it. It is enough that the adviser knew, or ought to have known, that the recipient of the information was likely to act upon it in the way that the recipient did.133 Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Bannerman Johnstone Maclay134 provides an illustration. The case arose out of the insolvency of a company for which the defenders were the auditors and the pursuers were the bankers. The pursuers had advanced significant sums of money to the company on the strength of its business plan, monthly management accounts, and audited accounts, all as prepared by the defenders. However, this documentation materially overstated the company’s assets and profitability, as the pursuers later discovered when they were appointed as its receivers. A claim based upon breach of duty of care (as well as one based upon vicarious liability for the fraud of one of the defender’s employees) was held to be relevant by the Second Division. Whatever their intention in providing the financial documentation, the defenders knew that it was a condition of the pursuers’ lending and that they would be likely to proceed with the loan once the documentation was received. This provided a sufficient basis for duty.

(d) Without independent inquiry 5.42

Lord Oliver stipulated that the adviser must have known “actually or inferentially” that the advice was likely to be acted upon by the advisee “without independent inquiry”.135 The question is therefore whether the adviser knew, or is deemed to have known, that the advisee was the sort of person who would be likely to accept the advice without seeking further guidance. What an adviser is deemed to have known may differ as between commercial and consumer transactions. In the former there is an expectation that the parties will take responsibility for safeguarding their own financial affairs by informing themselves appropriately, if necessary engaging an adviser of their own, before undertaking a significant investment, particularly where information was provided in the first instance to a third party, as in Caparo. This distinction between commercial and consumer transactions is demonstrated in cases involving negligent property 132 [1990] 2 AC 605 at 638. 133 Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Bannerman Johnstone Maclay [2005] CSIH 39, 2005 1 SC 437 per Lord Justice-Clerk Gill at paras 49–53. 134 [2005] CSIH 39, 2005 1 SC 437. 135 [1990] 2 AC 605 at 638.

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surveys. In Smith v Eric S Bush,136 discussed above, the misleading survey report contained a disclaimer137 of liability for its accuracy. Moreover, the borrower was advised that the report was not a structural survey and that she should obtain independent professional advice. Yet the defendant surveyors knew that in a residential transaction the borrower was likely to rely on their report alone in buying the house, and so duty was established. By contrast, in Bank of Scotland v Fuller Peiser138 the offending survey report was provided in connection with the purchase of a hotel and was later found to have overvalued the property substantially. The valuation had been instructed by the purchaser and was also relied upon by the bank lending her funds for the purchase. A disclaimer in the report, stating “no responsibility whatsoever to any party other than the client”, was held to be effective in this commercial context. However, the court found that in any event there had been no duty where the pursuer was a commercial lender that was well-positioned to obtain its own independent advice. The expectation that in a commercial transaction each side will seek, and pay for, its own advice is seen clearly in the Scottish case of NRAM plc v Steel.139 The defender was a solicitor acting on behalf of a company which had bought four parcels of land for development. The purchase was financed by a loan from the pursuer bank, in exchange for which the company had granted a standard security over the total area. One parcel of land was duly sold and released from the standard security. When the second parcel came to be sold, the solicitor remitted to the bank the amount of the outstanding loan relative to that parcel. The proper course would then have been to request the bank to release that area from the standard security by means of a deed of restriction. In error, however, the solicitor sent to the bank a short email asking them to execute a discharge of the security covering all of the remaining land owned by the company. The bank duly complied, without taking further advice, and even though the company’s indebtedness relevant to the other land had not been repaid. When the company became insolvent the bank attempted to recover the amount it had lost, arguing that the solicitor had owed it a duty of care which was 136 [1990] 1 AC 831. 137 As a notice which purported to exclude liability for negligence within the meaning of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 s 2(2), the disclaimer failed to meet the requirement of reasonableness as provided by s 11(3) of the Act, and was consequently found to be ineffective. The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 makes different provision for England and Wales and for Scotland. However, it has been held in the Scottish courts, in equivalent circumstances, that in a residential transaction the contract to provide a borrower with a copy of a survey report was a contract to provide services of the kind to which s 16(1) of the 1977 Act applied by virtue of s 15(2)(c): see Melrose v Davidson and Robertson 1993 SC 288. 138 2002 SLT 574; see also Omega Trust Co Ltd v Wright Son & Pepper [1997] PNLR 424, (1998) 75 P & CR 57; Scullion v Bank of Scotland plc [2011] EWCA Civ 693, [2011] 1 WLR 3212 (purchaser acquiring buy-to-let property). 139 [2018] UKSC 13, 2018 SC (UKSC) 141.

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breached by her misrepresentation. However, the Supreme Court held that the errant solicitor had not assumed responsibility for the bank’s interests in addition to those of her client (the borrower). It was “presumptively inappropriate” that solicitors should assume responsibility for third parties with whom their clients were transacting, and this would be inferred only if it was “reasonable” for those third parties to have relied on what the solicitor said, and if the solicitor could “reasonably have foreseen” that they would do so.140 In the circumstances of this case the court was of the firm view that a commercial lender did not act reasonably if it executed deeds in relation to its security solely on the say-so of the borrower’s solicitor.141

(e) Reasonable reliance 5.44

Duty does not always require the adviser’s assumption of responsibility to be matched by the advisee’s reliance, as is discussed further below.142 At the same time, the fact that the adviser has induced the advisee to rely and act upon the adviser’s representation is a significant indicator of duty, although only to the extent that such reliance was reasonable. It is important to ask whether the advisee “reasonably suppose[d] that he was entitled to rely on the advice or information communicated to him for the very purpose for which he required it”.143 In Caparo it might have been foreseeable that strangers would see and trust the audited accounts, but potential investors could not reasonably have regarded themselves as entitled to appropriate the auditors’ expertise in deciding whether to go ahead with transactions for their own individual profit.144 It is not necessary that money should change hands for duty to arise where professional or commercial services have been rendered to the advisee.145 However, it is probably not reasonable to rely upon information which has been communicated by the adviser in a “casual social” context.146 140 [2018] UKSC 13, 2018 SC (UKSC) 141 at para 32. 141 [2018] UKSC 13, 2018 SC (UKSC) 141 at para 38. 142 See e.g. discussion of Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1995] 2 AC 296 at para 5.52 below. 143 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 per Lord Bridge at 621. 144 [1990] 2 AC 605 per Lord Bridge at 621, Lord Oliver at 654. 145 See Burgess v Lejonvarn [2017] EWCA Civ 254, [2017] PNLR 25, in which an architect was held to have owed a duty of care to friends whom she had agreed to help in a landscape gardening project, without taking payment but in the expectation that the project would lead to remunerated work. At the subsequent trial, however, the claimants were unable to prove breach of that duty ([2018] EWHC 3166 (TCC), (2018) 181 Con LR 204). 146 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 at 539. See also Lord Reid at 482–483, noting that: “Quite careful people often express definite opinions on social or informal occasions even when they see that others are likely to be influenced by them; and they often do that without taking that care which they would take if asked for their opinion professionally or in a business connection.” Cf Chaudhry v Prabhakar [1989] 1 WLR 29, in which the defendant misadvised the plaintiff that a second car which she was considering buying was in good condition. The defendant conceded that a duty of care arose, even though the advice had been given for free and the parties were close friends, but May LJ doubted whether the concession was rightly made.

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As Neill LJ commented in James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co, the adviser must therefore reflect upon “who is my neighbour?”, but the advisee is also expected to “consider first those who would consider you to be their neighbour”.147 He elaborated as follows:148

5.45

“One should therefore consider whether and to what extent the advisee was entitled to rely on the statement to take the action that he did take. It is also necessary to consider whether he did in fact rely on the statement, whether he did use or should have used his own judgment and whether he did seek or should have sought independent advice. In business transactions conducted at arms’ length it may sometimes be difficult for an advisee to prove that he was entitled to act on a statement without taking any independent advice or to prove that the adviser knew, actually or inferentially, that he would act without taking such advice.”

The unreasonableness of the pursuer’s reliance was thus a key consideration in the court denying duty in NRAM.149 It had not been reasonable for the lender to rely on the solicitor’s representation that the whole area should be released from the security without carrying out checks of its own. By the same measure, it was reasonable for the solicitor not to foresee that the lender would do so.150 In Schubert Murphy (A Firm) v The Law Society,151 by contrast, the claimants’ client had bought a house in reliance on an undertaking of the seller’s solicitors, as underwritten by the Solicitors Compensation Fund, to discharge the outstanding loan over the property. Before proceeding the claimants had verified that the selling solicitors were listed on the Law Society’s website at its “Find a solicitor” page, but in reality this entry had been made in error, and the seller’s “agents”, who were not in fact solicitors, made off with the purchase price without repaying the loan. The court held that a claim of negligent misrepresentation against the Law Society should not be struck out. Not only had it been reasonable for members of the public to rely upon information on its website; the Law Society had positively “encouraged” them to do so.152 A further factor of significance in NRAM was that, although the borrower’s solicitor had misrepresented the state of affairs between the lender and her client (the borrower), the lender had at its disposal all the relevant information relating to the company’s outstanding indebtedness and the securities by which it was secured. The nub of the misrepresentation was therefore factual information which the lender could very readily have 147 148 149 150 151 152

[1991] 2 QB 113 at 126. [1991] 2 QB 113 at 126–127. NRAM plc v Steel [2018] UKSC 13, 2018 SC (UKSC) 141, discussed at para 5.43 above. [2018] UKSC 13, 2018 SC (UKSC) 141 at para 38. [2017] EWCA Civ 1295, [2017] 4 WLR 200. [2017] EWCA Civ 1295, [2017] 4 WLR 200 at para 52.

5.46

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checked for itself. As Lord Wilson reflected, there was no authority to the effect “that there was an assumption of responsibility for a careless misrepresentation about a fact wholly within the knowledge of the representee”.153 In other words, it is not reasonable for an advisee to rely on a representation where the advisee can easily check the information independently. On the other hand, in So v HSBC Bank plc154 the defendant bank had provided documentation to two specific individuals making enquiries regarding an investment scheme with one of the bank’s clients. Letters from the bank had conveyed the impression that the clients were trustworthy and that funds received from the individuals (now claimants against the bank) would be placed in a joint account. In fact the clients were fraudsters who channelled the investment funds into a separate account and the claimants’ investment was lost. Although the claim failed for other reasons, the court found that duty had arisen because there was no reason why the claimants should have sought further independent advice on the truthfulness and reliability of HSBC’s own representations, which were “uniquely within the knowledge of, and could only be verified by, HSBC itself”.155

(2) Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985, section 10(1) 5.48

The authority of Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd156 was accepted in the Scottish courts to the effect that pure economic loss was recoverable where caused by reliance upon a negligent misrepresentation.157 Initially, however, this was subject to qualification. The Hedley Byrne principle was recognised where the adviser’s negligent misrepresentation had induced the advisee to enter into a disadvantageous contract with a third party; but where the adviser had induced the advisee to enter into a contract with the adviser, the courts felt bound by existing Scottish authority to the effect that liability should be imposed only in cases of fraud.158 In due course this cross-border difference in treatment was addressed by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985, section 10(1). This provides that a person induced to enter into a contract by the negligent misrepresentation of another party to the contract is not disentitled from recovering 153 [2018] UKSC 13, 2018 SC (UKSC) 141 at para 38. 154 So v HSBC Bank plc [2009] EWCA Civ 296, [2009] 1 CLC 503. 155 [2009] EWCA Civ 296, [2009] 1 CLC 503 per Etherton LJ at para 51. In the event, liability was not established because of failure to prove causation; the investors had been put on their guard and had placed the funds nonetheless because of reassurances by the fraudster, not the bank’s representations. 156 [1964] AC 465.  157 See John Kenway Ltd v Orcantic Ltd 1979 SC 422, and see discussion in Andrew Oliver & Son Ltd v Douglas 1981 SC 192 per Lord Stewart at 201–202. 158 See discussion in Twomax Ltd v Dickson M’Farlane & Robinson 1982 SC 113 per Lord Stewart at 121–122, applying Manners v Whitehead (1898) 1 F 171.

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damages by reason that the misrepresentation is not fraudulent. Thus, while the 1985 Act does not of itself provide a basis for liability, it removes any barrier in the common law previously thought to preclude recovery in these circumstances.159

(3) Continuing representations According to the Scottish case of Cramaso LLP v Viscount Reidhaven’s Trs160 a representation once made may be deemed to have continuing effect so as to give rise to duty on an on-going basis. Thus a representation made during pre-contractual negotiations, in relation to which duty of care arose, can survive the making of the written contract. Or a party making a negligently misleading representation will continue to be responsible for its content, and may be held liable if the other party relies upon it to the party’s detriment in concluding the contract, even where there is a protracted interval of time between representation and contract.161 Moreover, the continuing effect of the representation is not necessarily excluded even if the contract is ultimately made with a person other than the original representee. In Cramaso the defenders had provided misleading figures on the game population of their grouse moor in negotiations for its lease to a private individual. By the time the lease was entered into, that private individual had formed a limited partnership with his wife, as a vehicle for the investment. It was therefore the limited partnership that suffered loss when the shooting potential of the moor transpired to be significantly less than represented by the defenders. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court considered it legitimate to enquire whether the parties “proceeded with the negotiation and conclusion of the contract on the basis that the accuracy of the representation continued to be asserted by the representor, implicitly if not expressly, after the identity of the prospective contracting party had changed”.162 In these circumstances “the representor may be taken to have assumed responsibility for the accuracy of the representation towards the contracting party who relied upon it, even though that person was not the original representee”.163

5.49

(4) Juristic persons as advisers The focus in determining whether responsibility has been assumed is on the exchange between adviser and advisee. Where the adviser is a juristic 159 See discussion in Cramaso LLP v Viscount Reidhaven’s Trs [2014] UKSC 9, 2014 SC (UKSC) 121 per Lord Reed at paras 32–43. 160 [2014] UKSC 9, 2014 SC (UKSC) 121. 161 See Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801; Cramaso LLP v Viscount Reidhaven’s Trs [2014] UKSC 9, 2014 SC (UKSC) 121 per Lord Reed at paras 22–23. 162 [2014] UKSC 9, 2014 SC (UKSC) 121 per Lord Reed at para 25. 163 [2014] UKSC 9, 2014 SC (UKSC) 121 per Lord Reed at para 26.

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person, its employee or company officer will not be regarded as having assumed personal responsibility towards the advisee unless the employee or officer has in some specific way indicated that he or she was doing so, and the advisee has reasonably relied upon the representations made by the employee or officer in a personal capacity. In Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd,164 the plaintiffs obtained a franchise from the defendant company to run a health-food store on the basis of unfounded predictions of profitability made in the company’s promotional literature. The plaintiffs’ shop closed after only eighteen months and they claimed damages from the company in respect of the loss suffered as a result of the company’s negligent advice. They argued that the company had assumed responsibility towards them, but when the company became insolvent they continued their action against the company’s managing director on the same basis. The company certainly had held itself out as offering expertise that would help the plaintiffs to succeed in the health-food business, and various encouraging representations were made in the company’s literature as to the managing director’s personal track record in running a health-food shop. However, the plaintiffs had no direct personal dealings with the managing director and had dealt throughout with an employee of the company. The court found that representations made for the business in the company’s literature were made on behalf of the company rather than of the managing director personally. There was nothing in the interaction between the plaintiffs and the company which indicated that the managing director was assuming personal responsibility for the representations made by the company, or that they were reasonably entitled to rely upon such an assumption of responsibility.

(5) Representations as to the pursuer (a) Employment references: duty to employee 5.51

In the cases discussed above, the allegedly negligent misrepresentation concerned a topic extraneous to the pursuer, and caused the pursuer to act to the pursuer’s detriment. In a further subgroup of cases, the representation is made to a third party about the pursuer, causing the third party to take action to the pursuer’s detriment. The leading case is Spring v Guardian Assurance plc165 in which the plaintiff was an insurance salesman who lost his job after the company for which he was working was taken over by the defendant. When he then attempted to go into business selling the 164 [1998] 1 WLR 830; see also Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd v Condek Holdings Ltd [2014] EWHC 2016 (TCC), [2014] BLR 574. Cf Merrett v Babb [2001] EWCA Civ 214, [2001] QB 1174, in which the parties similarly had not met but the defendant had signed the offending mortgage valuation report in his personal capacity. 165 [1995] 2 AC 296.

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products of another insurance company, he was required to produce an employment reference. The reference provided by the defendant falsely stated the plaintiff to have been dishonest, and as a result the plaintiff was unsuccessful in finding work as a salesman for other companies. Unable to bring proceedings in defamation due to the qualified privilege that attached to employment references,166 he argued that the reference had been compiled negligently and claimed compensation on that basis for his failure to find work. At trial it was established that the allegation of dishonesty was unfounded and that the reference had been compiled without due care. That left the question as to whether the defendant owed its former employee a duty of care with regard to the accuracy of a reference provided to a third party. The interaction here did not fit the paradigmatic “special relationship” of the type identified in Caparo, since the statement had been made to a third party, for a purpose pertinent to that third party, and it had been the third party, rather than the plaintiff, who had acted in reliance on the information it contained. Nonetheless, for the majority in the House of Lords167 the basic features of duty were present. Harm to the plaintiff’s employment prospects was a foreseeable consequence of the careless reference, the necessary proximity was found in the special relationship between employer and employee, and imposition of duty was “fair, just and reasonable” given the employer’s “moral obligation” to provide references.168 Although counsel had not argued the point, Lord Goff thought that the “source” of duty could be narrowed down to assumption of responsibility by the defendant to the plaintiff in its provision of the reference to third parties.169 This was therefore seen as an extension of the principles recognised in Hedley Byrne.170 The employer had not deliberately assumed responsibility for the plaintiff, but duty arose by operation of law from circumstances where the plaintiff had entrusted his affairs to the defendant and the defendant could be “held to have assumed responsibility” for them. Moreover, 166 The reference could have been regarded as defamatory, but the employer was under a duty to give the reference, and an action in defamation would have been defeated by the defence of qualified privilege unless the plaintiff proved malice, which he was unable to do. (He had sought to prove malice for the purposes of a claim on grounds of malicious falsehood, but the trial judge found that he had failed in this.) The position is explained by Lord Keith, [1995] 2 AC 296 at 308. 167 Lords Lowry, Slynn and Woolf. Lord Goff saw duty as resting upon assumption of responsibility as discussed further below. Lord Keith dissented, taking the view that the plaintiff had not relied upon the statement, and also that there were policy reasons for protecting employment references from the threat of litigation, predicting that, in the event of liability being recognised (at 309): “Those asked to give a reference would be inhibited from speaking frankly lest it should be found that they were liable in damages through not taking sufficient care in its preparation. They might well prefer, if under no legal duty to give a reference, to refrain from doing so at all. Any reference given might be bland and unhelpful and information which it would be in the interest of those seeking the reference to receive might be withheld.” 168 [1995] 2 AC 296 per Lord Slynn at 335, Lord Woolf at 342. 169 [1995] 2 AC 296 at 316. 170 [1995] 2 AC 296 at 318.

194   The Law of Delict in Scotland

5.52

5.53

although the plaintiff had not relied upon the statement as such, he had “relied” upon the defendant, when providing such statements to others, to compile them with due care and skill. Importantly, reliance as seen in Spring was not the same as reliance of the type discussed in Hedley Byrne. In Hedley Byrne it was recognised that duty might exist between a person making a statement and the recipient of the statement if the statement misrepresented its subject – typically, although not necessarily, in an exaggeratedly positive light – and was relied upon by the recipient for a specific purpose at a specific point in time. In Spring, by contrast, duty was acknowledged between a person making a statement and the person who was the subject of the statement if the statement misrepresented the subject in a negative light. In the latter context “reliance” was against the background of a continuing relationship of mutual trust in which the subject had relied generally upon the statementmaker not to act contrary to the subject’s interests. As in the Hedley Byrne scenario, there is little risk of indeterminate liability in these circumstances since duty is rooted in a known, specific relationship between the person making the representation and the person who was its subject. Spring remains the leading authority on the existence of duty between an employer and past and present employees with regard to the provision of employment references to third parties. This requires the employer to take appropriate care in investigating the factual information upon which the reference is based and to provide a fair and accurate reference.171 In Hincks v Sense Network Ltd, Lambert J summarised the duty of employers in this context as follows:172 “(a) to conduct an objective and rigorous appraisal of facts and opinion, particularly negative opinion, whether those facts and opinions emerge from earlier investigations or otherwise; (b) to take reasonable care to be satisfied that the facts set out in the reference are accurate and true and that, where an opinion is expressed, there is a proper and legitimate basis for the opinion; (c) where an opinion is derived from an earlier investigation, to take reasonable care in considering and reviewing the underlying material so that the reference writer is able to understand the basis for the opinion and be satisfied that there is a proper and legitimate basis for the opinion; (d) to take reasonable care to ensure that the reference is fair, in the . . . sense, of not being misleading either by reason of what is not included or by implication, nuance or innuendo.”

5.54

A similar duty arises in relation to other potentially damaging communications by current or former employers about their employees, even where 171 Bartholomew v Hackney London Borough Council [1999] IRLR 246; Jackson v Liverpool City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 1068, [2011] IRLR 1009 at para 89. 172 [2018] EWHC 533 (QB), [2019] ICR 385.

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these do not take the form of a reference. In McKie v Swindon College,173 the claimant’s former employer had sent an email to his current employer informing it, wrongly, that there had been safeguarding concerns for their students in contact with the claimant when he was in his former employment as a college administrator and tutor. This triggered the claimant’s summary dismissal. He claimed compensation from his former employer for loss of earnings. Reasoning by analogy with Spring the court found duty in this context also, since the harm had been foreseeable, there was a sufficiently proximate relationship between the parties, and the imposition of duty was fair, just and reasonable. By contrast, doctors engaged to assess potential employees’ health in connection with employment applications do not enter into a sufficiently proximate relationship with those individuals for duty to arise if the report submitted contains a misrepresentation.174

(b) Other contexts Other contexts in which duty has been identified on the part of those making representations about the pursuer to third parties include bank references and the like. Financial institutions giving out representations concerning their customers’ creditworthiness which are likely to be acted upon by third parties come under a duty to the customers to take due care in investigating and presenting the information accurately and fairly.175 It has also been held in England that, when recording a winding-up order in the Register of Companies, the Registrar “assumes responsibility” to the relevant company to take reasonable care that the order is not mistakenly registered against the wrong company. In the case in question, Sebry v Companies House,176 a special relationship was said to have arisen with a company whose entry had been altered in error. The Registrar was accordingly held liable for the losses suffered when the company’s business associates were wrongly led to believe that the company was being wound up.

173 [2011] EWHC 469 (QB), [2011] IRLR 575. Cf Legal & General Assurance Ltd v Kirk [2001] EWCA Civ 1803, [2002] IRLR 124, in which no liability arose where an allegedly negligent misstatement would have prevented the claimant from obtaining his desired future employment but had not been relied upon by any specific future employer. For a review of some of the case law, see S Middlemiss, “The Truth and Nothing but the Truth? The Legal Liability of Employers for Employee References” (2004) 33 Industrial Law Journal 59. 174 Kapfunde v Abbey National plc [1998] IRLR 583, [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Med 48, although no breach of duty would have arisen in that case in any event as the advice contained in the doctor’s report was essentially correct. 175 Durkin v DSG Retail Ltd [2014] UKSC 21, 2014 SC (UKSC) 139 per Lord Hodge at paras 32–35; see also Haskett v Trans Union of Canada Inc (2003) 224 DLR (4th) 419. 176 [2015] EWHC 115 (QB), [2016] 1 WLR 2499.

5.55

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(c) Employment references: duty to other parties 5.56

In Spring v Guardian Assurance plc177 the duty of care was owed to a former employee as the subject of a misrepresentation in an employment reference. But what of the position where the recipient of an unmerited positive reference has been misled into acting to its detriment, for example by employing a person whom the reference has falsely stated to be reliable? In Spring Lord Goff observed that it did not necessarily follow “that, because the employer owes such a duty of care to his employee, he also owes a duty of care to the recipient of the reference”.178 He declined to express an opinion on the scope of duty in such a case, although he commented that the relationship between employer and employee could not readily be compared with that between successive employers. This question was given more attention in AB v A Chief Constable,179 a case in which the primary concern was the extent of duty to an employee but in which the court acknowledged a common law duty vis-à-vis the recipient to take care that any reference was not unfair or misleading. Considerably more tenuous is the relationship between the maker of a reference and a third party who was not its intended recipient. In Glasgow City Council v First Glasgow (No 1) Ltd,180 discussed in chapter 4, it was held that a former employer had not been under a duty vis-à-vis third parties physically injured by the employee to disclose that the employee’s health record cast doubt on whether he could safely drive a heavy goods vehicle. It is unlikely therefore that a duty to third parties would be recognised in regard to economic loss alleged to have been caused by less than full disclosure in an employment reference.

(6) Representations as to the pursuer’s interests 5.57

In a final subgroup of cases, the representation is made to a third party about the pursuer’s interests, causing the third party to take action to the pursuer’s detriment. An example is the English case of Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp,181 decided a few years after Hedley Byrne,182 in which a clerk employed by the operators of a local land charges register negligently omitted to include a duly recorded notice of compensation in a search obtained by intending purchasers of land. Having obtained a certificate to the effect that the land was free of encumbrances, the purchasers were not bound to pay the compensation due to the previous landowner, 177 [1995] 2 AC 296, discussed at paras 5.51 and 5.52 above. 178 [1995] 2 AC 296 at 320. 179 [2014] EWHC 1965 (QB). In this case, however, an effective disclaimer in the reference had stated that the employer did not accept “any responsibility or liability for any loss of damage caused . . . as a result of any reliance being placed on it”. 180 [2019] CSOH 101, 2020 SLT 75, discussed at paras 4.35 and 4.40 above. 181 [1970] 2 QB 223. 182 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465.

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who instead sued the defendants. In holding that the clerk had been under a duty of care to the landowner the Court of Appeal acknowledged that there had been no voluntary assumption of responsibility in the sense seen in Hedley Byrne, since the defendant was obliged by statute to provide searches; but it did not regard this as a necessary feature of every case.183 There was a close level of proximity between the defendant and the landowner.184 Duty arose “from the fact that the person making it knows, or ought to know, that others . . . would act on the faith of the statement being accurate”. That duty was owed not just to the recipient of the certificate but “to any person whom he knows, or ought to know, will be injuriously affected by a mistake”, such as the landowner in this case.185 And although the parties that relied directly upon the accuracy of the search were the purchasers, it would have been “absurd” 186 for duty to be owed to the purchasers but not to the landowner, since it was precisely the interests of persons such as the landowner that the register was designed to protect.187 The reasoning in Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp returned to the fore in the Scottish case of Commodity Solution Services Ltd v First Scottish Searching Services Ltd,188 in which the facts were considered as closely analogous. In this case the pursuers had previously obtained decree against G for payment of the sum of £50,000. As the sum remained unpaid, they registered an inhibition against G which was effective against G’s house. Later, in anticipation of selling the house, G instructed the defenders, professional searchers, to produce a search in the Register of Inhibitions. The search, which was exhibited to the eventual purchasers, failed to disclose the inhibition with the result that the purchasers’ title was registered in the Land Register without qualification. The meant that the inhibition ceased to have effect.189 The pursuers argued that the searchers had owed them a duty of care which they had breached by failing to disclose the inhibition on the search. The Sheriff Appeal Court recognised this as a novel context for duty, but found in Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp a persuasive analogy from which duty in a case like the present was an incremental development.190 Unlike in Sharp, the defenders 183 [1970] 2 QB 223 per Denning MR at 268, Salmon LJ at 279, Cross LJ at 291. 184 [1970] 2 QB 223 per Salmon LJ at 278–280. 185 [1970] 2 QB 223 per Denning MR at 268–269. 186 [1970] 2 QB 223 per Salmon LJ at 279. 187 Cf Santander UK plc v Keeper of the Registers of Scotland [2013] CSOH 24, 2013 SLT 362, in which a borrower had fraudulently persuaded the Keeper to register a discharge of a standard security, with resultant loss to the lender. It was held that it would not be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty between the Keeper and the lender, that a commercial lender might be regarded as having assumed the risk of fraud, and that loss should not in effect be passed on to the public purse. 188 [2019] SAC (Civ) 4, 2019 SC (SAC) 41. 189 Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Act 2007 s 159. 190 [2019] SAC (Civ) 4, 2019 SC (SAC) 41 per Sheriff Braid at para 39.

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were not public servants, and the fact that they had searched the register on a commercial basis reinforced the proximity of their relationship to the pursuers. They were regarded as having assumed responsibility not just to the immediate recipients of the search report but to “the class of persons affected by that task, namely, inhibiting creditors whose inhibition was on the register”.191 Admittedly, the very fact of the omission from the search demonstrated that the defenders had no actual knowledge of the pursuers; but as the whole purpose of a search was to uncover inhibitions that had not been disclosed by the seller, the defenders knew that inhibiting creditors as a class were dependent upon them carrying out that task with due care.192 In undertaking the commercial task of providing a search of the register they had therefore assumed responsibility to the class of persons that the publicity of the registers was designed to protect.

E. NEGLIGENT PROVISION OF SERVICES 5.59

Assumption of responsibility has also played a central role in extending the duty of care of those who provide services, rather than information. Whether or not the parties are or have been in a contractual relationship, a service provider may be regarded as entering into a special relationship with those who are served whereby a duty of care in negligence is imposed. In Spring v Guardian Assurance plc, discussed above,193 Lord Goff reflected upon the scope of the principles to be derived from Hedley Byrne194 and observed:195 “[A]lthough Hedley Byrne itself was concerned with the provision of information and advice, it is clear that the principle in the case is not so limited and extends to include the performance of other services, as for example the professional services rendered by a solicitor to his client . . . Accordingly where the plaintiff entrusts the defendant with the conduct of his affairs, in general or in particular, the defendant may be held to have assumed responsibility to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff to have relied on the defendant to exercise due skill and care, in respect of such conduct.”

191 [2019] SAC (Civ) 4, 2019 SC (SAC) 41 per Sheriff Braid at para 45. 192 [2019] SAC (Civ) 4, 2019 SC (SAC) 41 per Sheriff Braid at para 45 (drawing an analogy with the relationship between the solicitor and the beneficiaries in White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207, discussed at paras 5.66 ff below). For the subsequent proof, in which the defenders were held liable to the extent of the debtor’s share in the sale proceeds of the house, see [2020] SC DUN 29, 2020 GWD 22–293. 193 At paras 5.51 and 5.52. 194 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; see paras 5.27 and 5.28 above. 195 [1995] 2 AC 296 at 318.

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(1) The significance of contractual relations196 That line of reasoning was taken up again in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd197 decided only a short time after Spring. In Henderson the plaintiffs were investors in the Lloyd’s insurance market – Lloyd’s “Names” – who shared the income from premiums but also supplied funds for the underwriting of insurance policies. For this purpose the Names were arranged into syndicates, managed by agents. While profits and losses were ultimately a matter for the Names, the agents had “absolute discretion” in managing the underwriting business, deciding which risks to insure, which risks to re-insure, and how claims should be settled. After a series of exceptionally large insurance claims, resulting in heavy losses for the Names, they brought claims against their agents alleging negligent mismanagement of their syndicates. The contractual arrangements governing the syndicates were complex. Some (“direct Names”) dealt directly with their managing agents. Others (“indirect Names”) had only an indirect contractual relationship, using “members’ agents” as intermediaries. Notwithstanding the network of direct and indirect contractual relationships, the Names sought to establish duty of care in negligence. This allowed the Names take advantage of the later time threshold allowed under the (English) Limitation Act 1980 to claims in tort, as compared with contractual claims.198 For the indirect Names, it also provided an avenue to impose direct liability on those they regarded as responsible for their losses. The House of Lords in Henderson determined that the agents had owed a duty of care to both the direct and the indirect Names, so that the direct names could bring claims in negligence despite their contracts with the defendants, and the indirect names similarly notwithstanding the existence of a chain of contracts linking them to the defendants. In terms of “the governing principles”199 for duty in relation to pure economic loss, a prima facie case for duty was said to have been established. The agents had “plainly” assumed responsibility for the financial affairs of the Names by holding out their expertise in management matters, knowing that this would be relied upon by the Names:200 “The managing agents have accepted the Names as members of a syndicate under their management. They obviously hold themselves out as possessing a special expertise to advise the Names on the suitability of risks 196 See also the discussion of Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd 1982 SC (HL) 244 at paras 5.79–5.84 below. 197 [1995] 2 AC 145 (in which the decision was issued on 25 July 1994; the decision in Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1995] 2 AC 296 was issued on 7 July 1994). 198 For the indirect Names, this provided an avenue to impose direct liability on those regarded as responsible for their losses and with whom their contractual relationship was indirect. 199 [1995] 2 AC 145 at 178–179. 200 [1995] 2 AC 145 per Lord Goff at 182.

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5.61

200   The Law of Delict in Scotland to be underwritten; and on the circumstances in which, and the extent to which, reinsurance should be taken out and claims should be settled. The Names, as the managing agents well knew, placed implicit reliance on that expertise, in that they gave authority to the managing agents to bind them to contracts of insurance and reinsurance and to the settlement of claims.”

5.62

5.63

Lord Goff rejected the defendants’ argument that, even where assumption of responsibility could be identified, liability in tort should be recognised only where there was no contract. The proper approach in his view was to consider whether the relationship between the parties demonstrated “assumption of responsibility, together with its concomitant reliance”, and then to enquire whether or not that tortious liability was excluded by the contract because the latter was inconsistent with it.201 There was nothing to prevent the plaintiffs choosing the remedy that was more advantageous to them, “subject only to ascertaining whether the tortious duty is so inconsistent with the applicable contract that, in accordance with ordinary principle, the parties must be taken to have agreed that the tortious remedy is to be limited or excluded”. In this case the time bar on the contractual remedies previously available to the Names as against the managing agents was not seen as a “sound” reason to reject duty of care in negligence.202 Moreover, the fact that the managing agents had structured their contractual relationships with the indirect Names through the members’ agents as intermediaries was not a convincing reason to exclude liability in tort. Given that the managing agents had assumed equivalent responsibility towards the indirect Names as towards the direct Names, they also owed them a duty of care. The existence of a contract, or a chain of contracts, between a party providing a service and its client does not therefore preclude duty of care in negligence. By extension of the reasoning in Hedley Byrne, duty will be recognised between A and B where: A has held itself out as having a particular skill or expertise in providing a particular service; B has engaged A to perform such a service; and A knew, or ought to have known, that B was relying upon A to perform that service with due care. However, the nature of the agreement between the parties as evidenced by the contract “modifies and shapes” duty in negligence.203 Certain types of service lend themselves more readily than others to assumption of responsibility for the purposes of delictual liability. “Professional persons” are more readily be deemed to 201 [1995] 2 AC 145 per Lord Goff at 193, adding that even if his reading of Hedley Byrne and subsequent authority was wrong in that regard, “this House should now, if necessary, develop the principle of assumption of responsibility as stated in Hedley Byrne to its logical conclusion so as to make it clear that a tortious duty of care may arise not only in cases where the relevant services are rendered gratuitously, but also where they are rendered under a contract”. 202 [1995] 2 AC 145 per Lord Goff at 193–194. 203 [1995] 2 AC 145 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 206.

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have assumed responsibility for their clients, to the extent that “they give advice, prepare reports, draw up accounts, produce plans” and are aware that clients and sometimes others rely on their work to make economic choices.204 At the same time, the contract or chain of contracts between the parties must be considered carefully, so that by moving into the “gaps”205 left by the law of contract, the law of negligence does not “short circuit” freely agreed contractual structures.206 Clear and straightforward contractual provision for allocation of risk should not be circumvented by the law of delict.207 In particular, where a contract contains an express provision limiting liability in delict, and that provision is not unreasonable in terms of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, it is unlikely that a court would allow a delictual claim to succeed.208

(2) Liability to third parties As discussed above, Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd209 demonstrates that duty may arise between A and B where A has held itself out as having a particular skill in providing a service to B, B has relied upon A to perform that service with due care, and B has suffered loss as a result of A’s failure to do so. A further issue is whether, in performing a service for B, A may also undertake a duty of care towards C, a third party affected by negligent provision of that service. It is not usually accepted that C can exploit contractual arrangements between A and B so as to impose duty upon A, but Donoghue v Stevenson210 long ago made clear that the existence of a contract between A and B did not in all cases preclude a duty of care arising between A and C in A’s performance of that contract. The scope of duty, it is true, is narrowly construed and must not be inconsistent with obligations undertaken towards B, but duty may nonetheless be recognised if there is sufficient proximity between A and C. The paradigm context in which contractual arrangements have been judged to give rise to duty towards third parties is in regard to services provided by law agents.

5.64

(a) Services by law agents: a general rule of no liability to third parties Law agents do not usually owe a duty of care towards parties other than their clients. The normal expectation is that the parties to a transaction 204 Robinson v P E Jones (Contractors) Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 9, [2012] QB 44 per Jackson LJ at para 75. 205 Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 830 per Lord Steyn at 837. 206 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145 per Lord Goff at 195. 207 See Robinson v P E Jones (Contractors) Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 9, [2012] QB 44 per Jackson LJ at paras 87–88. 208 See Grant Estates Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2012] CSOH 133, 2012 GWD 29–588, discussed at para 5.89 below. 209 [1995] 2 AC 145, discussed at paras 5.60–5.62 above. 210 1932 SC (HL) 31.

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will obtain separate legal advice, particularly where there may be a conflict of interests between parties transacting at arm’s length, and particularly in a commercial context.211 Thus neither a party nor the party’s law agent owes a duty of care to the other party in the conduct of litigation,212 and it is “presumptively inappropriate”213 that a law agent should do so in the conduct of transactions apart from in the most exceptional of circumstances.214

(b) Services by law agents: the special position of wills and estate planning 5.66

An important exception to the general rule that law agents owe a duty only to their clients is in the provision of professional services in matters of wills and estate planning. In Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd215 the notion that the defendants should have assumed responsibility for the plaintiffs’ financial interests was coupled with the requirement that the plaintiffs should have relied upon the defendants doing so.216 However, in a case decided shortly after Henderson, the House of Lords took forward the Hedley Byrne principle217 as the basis for duty towards third parties who had little prior interaction with the defendant, and could not be said to have relied, in the same sense, upon his skill in the provision of services. In White v Jones218 the plaintiffs were two sisters who had briefly fallen out with their father, then aged seventy-eight, and their father had in response made a will cutting them out of any entitlement to his estate. The family having quickly made up the quarrel, the father destroyed his copy of the will and instructed the defendant, a legal executive, to draw up a new will

211 NRAM plc v Steel [2018] UKSC 13, 2018 SC (UKSC) 141. 212 Business Computers International Ltd v Registrar of Companies [1988] Ch 229; Connolly-Martin v Davis [1999] PNLR 826. For an exceptional case in which the defendant solicitors were held to have undertaken a wider responsibility to parties other than their client, see Al-Kandari v J R Brown & Co [1988] QB 665. 213 NRAM plc v Steel [2018] UKSC 13, 2018 SC (UKSC) 141 per Lord Wilson at para 32. 214 For an example, see Dean v Allin and Watts [2001] PNLR 39, in which the defendant solicitors’ clients had asked the solicitors to make arrangements to secure a loan provided to them by the claimant. The claimant was not a commercial lender but a car mechanic “not widely experienced in business” and relied upon the defendants to do the necessary. The defendants negligently failed to make the security effective, so that the claimant was unable to recover the loan monies on the clients’ bankruptcy, but he successfully claimed the amount due from the solicitors. The provision of an effective security was a benefit which the defendants knew their clients wished to confer on the claimant, so there was no conflict of interest between the clients and the claimant, and the defendants were in these circumstances regarded as having assumed responsibility for the claimant. 215 [1995] 2 AC 145, discussed at paras 5.60–5.62 above. 216 See [1995] 2 AC 145 per Lord Goff at 182. 217 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465, discussed at paras 5.27 and 5.28 above. 218 [1995] 2 AC 207.

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leaving the bulk of his estate to his daughters. The defendant did not give this task priority, and when the father died two months after sending his letter of instruction the defendant had still not produced the new will. This meant that the old will was admitted to probate and the daughters received no legacy. The plaintiffs (the daughters) argued that the defendant’s negligent delay had deprived them of the share in his estate that their father had intended for them and they sought to recover that loss. The obvious difficulty for their claim was that it was their father, not the plaintiffs, who had instructed the defendant in providing this service. The defendant had no doubt assumed responsibility towards the plaintiffs’ father, and the plaintiffs’ father had relied upon the defendant to act with due despatch.219 Potential beneficiaries such as the plaintiffs, however, are in a different position. Often beneficiaries are not even aware that a legacy is in prospect when instructions are given to draw up a will in their favour, far less do they “rely” upon that will being executed. Thus if solicitors were to be regarded as assuming responsibility to beneficiaries in addition to the testator by whom they were instructed, this would extend the Hedley Byrne principle to a situation that was “quite different”.220 In Scotland there was specific authority denying liability in these very circumstances. Reference was made in White v Jones to the Scottish case of Robertson v Fleming,221 in which the House of Lords held that law agents could not be held responsible by anyone other than their clients for neglect of their professional duties. That case, admittedly, had arisen from a different type of transaction,222 but in justifying the decision of the House of Lords Lord Campbell had commented that the imposition of liability in the circumstances in hand would have the undesirable consequence that “a disappointed legatee might sue the solicitor employed by a testator to make a will in favour of a stranger, whom the solicitor never saw or before heard of, if the will were void for not being properly signed and attested”.223 As it happens, Lord Campbell’s observation was not entirely consistent with prior Scots authorities.224 Nonetheless, up until White v Jones the authority of Robertson v Fleming had been accepted 219 As Lord Mustill pointed out in his dissenting speech, the defendant undertook the task of drawing up a will that would enrich the beneficiaries “but he did not draw it for the beneficiaries, he drew it for the testator”: [1995] 2 AC 207 at 290. 220 [1995] 2 AC 207 per Lord Mustill at 290. 221 (1861) 4 Macq 167. 222 The allegedly negligent law agent had acted for his client in arranging for a loan, but in doing so had omitted to arrange for a bond and assignation in security to protect the position of the pursuers, who were the guarantors of the loan. 223 (1861) 4 Macq 167 at 177. 224 See J H Begg, A Treatise on the Law of Scotland relating to Law Agents, 2nd edn (1883) 260–263, accepting the relevance of Robertson v Fleming in denying the liability of solicitors to disappointed beneficiaries, but noting the case of Webster v Young (1851) 13 D 752 in which the Second Division accepted the pleadings of a disappointed beneficiary as presenting a relevant case. See also Goldie v Macdonald (1757) Mor 352; Struthers v Lang (1827) 2 W&S 563.

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without demur in the Scottish courts as the basis for denying the liability of the testators’ solicitors to disappointed beneficiaries, even in cases of obvious neglect.225 In the event, the House of Lords in White v Jones was to dismiss Lord Campbell’s “sweeping statement” in Robertson v Fleming as not forming part of the ratio of the case. In White v Jones Lord Goff maintained that the law had “moved on”, particularly in England, in relation to the role of privity of contract in restricting liability in tort.226 Failure to recognise duty between solicitor and beneficiary would mean that “the only person who may have a valid claim has suffered no loss, and the only person who has suffered a loss has no claim”.227 This created a “lacuna” in the law which “practical justice” required to be filled.228 With the support of the majority,229 Lord Goff proposed that:230 “the assumption of responsibility by the solicitor towards his client should be held in law to extend to the intended beneficiary who (as the solicitor can reasonably foresee) may, as a result of the solicitor’s negligence, be deprived of his intended legacy in circumstances in which neither the testator nor his estate will have a remedy against the solicitor.”

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In support, Lord Browne-Wilkinson spoke of the “special relationship” between a solicitor and the intended beneficiaries. This rested upon the solicitor’s awareness that the beneficiaries’ economic well-being depended on the proper discharge of the solicitor’s duty, which in these circumstances made the imposition of duty fair, just and reasonable.231 The House of Lords in White v Jones stressed the exceptional nature of its decision, fending off the spectre of indeterminate liability with the stipulation that “liability is not to an indeterminate class, but to the particular beneficiary or beneficiaries whom the client intended to benefit through the particular will”.232 In these specific circumstances no contractual arrangements were being subverted since the client himself was not in a position to pursue a claim. The door to further expansion of the 225 In Ross v Caunters [1980] Ch 297 the Court of Appeal had ruled that a solicitor owed a duty of care to the wife of a deceased client where they had failed to warn the client that if the wife witnessed the signing of the will any bequest in her favour would be void. However, when this case was cited in Weir v J M Hodge & Son 1990 SLT 266 (involving alleged negligence by the testator’s solicitors which disadvantaged the pursuers as beneficiaries), the Lord Ordinary, Lord Weir, felt that he was bound to follow House of Lords authority in Robertson v Fleming as a Scottish case. See also MacDougall v MacDougall’s Exrs 1994 SLT 1178. 226 [1995] 2 AC 207 at 259. 227 [1995] 2 AC 207 at 262. 228 [1995] 2 AC 207 at 265. 229 Lords Goff, Browne-Wilkinson and Nolan. Lords Mustill and Keith dissented. 230 [1995] 2 AC 207 at 268. 231 [1995] 2 AC 207 at 275–276. 232 [1995] 2 AC 207 per Lord Goff at 268.

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Hedley Byrne principle was not closed, however, since Lord Goff added: “If by any chance a more complicated case should arise to test the precise boundaries of the principle in cases of this kind, that problem can await solution when such a case comes forward for decision.”233 The authority of White v Jones was accepted by the Scottish courts with little hesitation in cases on all fours with its facts. So in Robertson v Watt,234 an unreported decision by the Inner House only a few months later, the court declared itself no longer bound by Robertson v Fleming. Instead it invoked the reasoning in White v Jones to find that a relevant case had been made by a widow who claimed that she had received a much-diminished share in her late husband’s estate due to negligent advice provided to her late husband by his solicitor.235 Later, in Holmes v Bank of Scotland, the Lord Ordinary (Lord Kingarth) referred to Robertson v Watt as “an authoritative indication that the ‘principle enunciated by the majority in White v Jones’ would be followed in Scotland”.236 Thus a niece and nephew who sought damages from a bank for losses allegedly caused by the defenders’ failure to make timeous arrangements for the execution of their aged aunt’s will had stated a relevant case by reference to the extended Hedley Byrne principle. The cases mentioned so far indicate that duty of care may be extended to a prospective beneficiary where the scope of duty claimed as owing to the beneficiary is co-extensive with that which the solicitor owed to the testator.237 More precisely, the solicitor owes a duty to the beneficiaries named by the testator to take reasonable care to secure for them the benefit specified in the testator’s instructions. But as pointed out in the Australian case of Badenach v Calvert the solicitor’s duty238 “plainly cannot extend to requiring the solicitor to take reasonable care for future and contingent interests of every prospective beneficiary when undertaking every action that might be expected of a solicitor in the performance of the solicitor’s duty to the testator. If the tortious duty of care were to extend that far, it would have the potential to get in the way of performance of the solicitor’s contractual duty to the testator. Extended to multiple prospective beneficiaries, it would be crippling.”

233 [1995] 2 AC 207 at 268. 234 Unreported, CSIH, 4 July 1995. 235 His solicitors had failed to advise the pursuer’s late husband that he should execute a new will when his existing will could not be found. Since the will was never found, this meant that his estate was distributed on his death according to the laws of intestacy rather than passing in its entirety to the pursuer, which had been his testamentary intention. 236 2002 SLT 544 at para 11. 237 See also Carr-Glynn v Frearsons [1999] Ch 326 (distinguished in Matthews v Hunter & Robertson Ltd [2008] CSOH 88, 2008 SLT 634); Vinton v Fladgate Fielder [2010] EWHC 904 (Ch), [2010] STC 1868. 238 [2016] HCA 18 at para 58.

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In Badenach v Calvert itself the defendant solicitor had followed the testator’s instructions in preparing a will that bequeathed the estate to the plaintiff, but the solicitor had failed to anticipate a maintenance claim made under the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1912 by the testator’s estranged daughter, which had the effect of substantially depleting the estate. The plaintiff argued that the solicitor’s failure to advise the testator of the possibility of such a claim, and of tactics for minimising its impact by reducing or extinguishing the estate, constituted a breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff. The claim, however, was rejected. It was not certain what the testator would have done if the solicitor had enquired about other family members and drawn to his attention the possibility of a claim under the 1912 Act. It may have been in the plaintiff’s interest for the testator to take steps to reduce the estate at that point, but it was not beyond doubt that the testator himself would have wished to do so. The testator’s instructions regarding his will “would not have been sufficient to convey to the solicitor that the client would wish to take any lawful step to defeat any claim which was made by the daughter”.239 In short, the solicitor’s duty to the client is framed by reference to the instructions that the solicitor has received. Duty cannot be extended to intended beneficiaries if the interests of such beneficiaries do not precisely coincide with the interests of the client as disclosed in those instructions. On the whole, therefore, a conservative view has been taken in regard to expanding the scope of duty to third parties in this context. A helpful reminder of the rationale of White v Jones can be found in Steven v Hewats, which concerned alleged negligence in giving effect to a lifetime gift, and in which Lord Tyre explained that:240 “[T]he key concept underlying the decision in White v Jones is assumption of responsibility. More specifically, responsibility to an intended beneficiary may be held to have been assumed where the solicitor can reasonably foresee that negligence on his part would deprive the beneficiary of a benefit which the solicitor’s client intended that beneficiary to receive, in circumstances where no right of action is available to the client or his or her estate. The purpose of the principle, in my opinion, is to ensure, on the one hand, that there is no lacuna in which a loss sustained as a result of the solicitor’s negligence cannot be recovered by anyone and, on the other hand, that the same loss cannot be recovered twice.”

5.74

It has been recognised that duty may be further extended, but only where the “lacuna” thereby filled is closely analogous to that seen in White v Jones, and where there is harmony between the interests of the deceased client

239 [2016] HCA 18 at para 33. 240 [2013] CSOH 61, 2013 SLT 763 at para 11.

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and those of the third party asserting duty. In Steven v Hewats,241 the pursuer’s aunt sought advice from her solicitors on reducing inheritance tax liability on her death, and in accordance with this she conveyed her house to the pursuer in 1997. Due to conveyancing errors by the solicitors, however, a corrective disposition had to be granted in 2006. The aunt died in 2008. Since lifetime transfers within seven years before death are liable to inheritance tax, this meant that a large tax bill became payable on the value of the house re-gifted in 2006. This would not have been payable had the conveyancing been properly completed in 1997. The niece therefore argued that, but for the negligence of the aunt’s solicitors, the tax bill would not have been levied. On that basis she claimed from them the amount of tax for which she had become liable. Lord Tyre did not regard a lifetime gift as necessarily beyond the scope of the White v Jones decision. Instead he focussed upon “whether the consequences of the negligent act are capable of being rectified by the solicitor’s client”, which plainly they were not in this case.242 As in White v Jones, there was a “lacuna” in that there was no obvious alternative means of the pursuer recovering this loss. He allowed that the status of a recipient of a lifetime gift differed from that of a testamentary beneficiary in respect that the latter was inevitably be “an entirely passive recipient of benefit”, whereas the recipient of a lifetime gift may or may not be a passive recipient. This meant that it was necessary to consider any “transactional element”243 in the lifetime gift, and whether there was potentially a conflict of interest between donor and donee that would make assumption of responsibility towards both parties problematic.244 Following this analysis, it could not be said, without hearing the evidence, that there was a “transactional” element in the gift, or a conflict of interest between donor and recipient such as would preclude the solicitors’ assumption of responsibility for the recipient. Using the terminology of the High Court of Australia in the later case of Badenach v Calvert, discussed above, it could not be said that the interests of the aunt and niece did not coincide, and the action was allowed to proceed to proof.245 By contrast, in Fraser v McArthur Stewart,246 the defenders, a firm of solicitors, wrongly advised the deceased as to restrictions on the disposal of crofting land, with the result that his will bequeathed his croft subject to a 241 242 243 244 245

[2013] CSOH 61, 2013 SLT 763. [2013] CSOH 61, 2013 SLT 763 at para 12. [2013] CSOH 61, 2013 SLT 763 at para 13. See e.g. Hemmens v Wilson Browne [1995] Ch 223. See, however, Milligan’s Exrs v Hewats [2013] CSOH 60, 2013 SLT 758, discussed below at para 5.76, dismissing the claim of the executors. See also Vinton v Fladgate Fielder [2010] EWHC 904 (Ch), [2010] STC 1868, in which the deceased had similarly been negligently advised on IHT liability by the defendant solicitors. The court declined to strike out claims brought by the claimants as executors, as trustees on the residuary estate, and as residuary beneficiaries, observing that prior English authority in this matter was not settled. 246 [2008] CSOH 159, 2009 SLT 31.

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tenancy, a bequest that did not reflect his original testamentary intentions. On discovering the error in the defenders’ advice after the testator’s death, his beneficiaries argued that defenders’ negligence had deprived them of the benefit of the legacy of the croft with vacant possession, and accordingly brought an action to recover their loss. However, Lord Brailsford dismissed the action, finding that the circumstances were not “factually identical” to those in White v Jones. Unlike in Stevens v Hewats, “The negligent act by the solicitor in the present case was . . . perpetrated at a time when there was scope both for the mistake to have been recognised and, importantly, when there was in any event time for the testator to change his intentions”.247 In McLeod v Crawford, 248 similarly, the court did not recognise the existence of a duty towards the family of a deceased client to whom the defenders had provided disadvantageous advice in respect of a claim for personal injury. There had been no assumption of responsibility for the interests of the client’s family in circumstances where the client and his family could conceivably have taken different views on how his claim should proceed. Moreover, there was no lacuna in the law since the widow’s claim could in any event proceed in her capacity as the deceased’s executor-nominate.249 Assumption of responsibility is less likely to be recognised where it is the executors, as distinct from the beneficiaries, who claim that the deceased’s solicitor owed them a duty in advising the deceased on the making of his or her will or in estate planning matters. In the Outer House case of Matthews v Hunter & Robertson Ltd250 the defenders were solicitors who, in attending to the conveyancing of the former matrimonial home during a divorce, had neglected to ensure that their client’s house was cleared of a survivorship destination in favour of her former husband. This meant that a half-share in the house passed automatically to the former husband on her death, and the value of the estate transmitted to the executry was reduced accordingly. A claim in contract by the deceased’s executor was dismissed on the basis that the deceased had not herself suffered any loss in her lifetime. Moreover, the court was not persuaded that there had been additional assumption of responsibility towards the executor beyond that owed to the deceased.251 A similar claim by executors occurred in Milligan’s Trs

247 [2008] CSOH 159, 2009 SLT 31 at para 10. 248 [2010] CSOH 101, 2010 SLT 1035. 249 And although too late for this family, the law had now changed to allow relatives to claim damages where a discharge had been granted by the deceased (as in this case): see Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 s 1, as amended by the Rights of Relatives to Damages (Mesothelioma) (Scotland) Act 2007 (now contained in the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 5). 250 [2008] CSOH 88, 2008 SLT 634. 251 [2008] CSOH 88, 2008 SLT 634 per Lord Brodie at paras 31 and 40. See also Daniels v Thompson [2004] EWCA Civ 307, [2004] PNLR 33, where the defendant solicitor had given the deceased negligent IHT advice and in which an action brought by the executor was dismissed, on the

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v Hewats,252 arising out of the same facts as Steven v Hewats, discussed above.253 Although in Steven v Hewats Lord Tyre declined to dismiss the beneficiaries’ claim as irrelevant, he took a different view of the claim by the executors. The executors argued that the defenders’ breach of duty to the deceased had resulted in loss, the right to seek reparation for which transmitted to her executors. But in this case, also, it was held that no loss had been sustained during the lifetime of the deceased, so that there was nothing that could transmit to the executor and form the basis of a claim. Lord Tyre further observed that:254 “It may, indeed, be easier to reach a conclusion as to whether a solicitor may be said to have assumed responsibility to an identifiable beneficiary, or to an identifiable class of beneficiaries, than to an ‘estate’ or to an executor with administrative duties. The availability of a remedy based on the White v Jones principle would always, of course, depend upon the circumstances of the particular case: in some, such as Matthews v Hunter & Robertson Ltd and also Fraser v McArthur Stewart, the facts will simply not support a finding of such assumption of responsibility.”

The principle that a duty may have been assumed to beneficiaries in a deceased client’s estate has been extended beyond law agents to other advisers holding themselves out as advising on the making of wills or the arrangement of their client’s affairs on death.255 In Gorham v British Telecommunications plc256 the deceased had opted out of the occupational pension scheme provided by his employer, British Telecommunications plc, and sought advice from an insurance company on the most advantageous pension provision for his family. The insurance company negligently failed to advise him that the best option was his employer’s scheme and sold him its own personal pension plan. Although it subsequently corrected this

252 253 254 255

256

basis that the loss suffered by the deceased was disappointment of her wish to benefit the beneficiary with reduced tax liability – a loss that could not properly be quantified: for discussion, see J O’Sullivan, “Loss, Limitation and Lawyers – Digging a Black Hole” (2005) 64 CLJ 29. In Matthews, Lord Brodie distinguished the English case of Carr-Glynn v Frearsons [1999] Ch 326, in which the defendant solicitors had failed to arrange that property subject to a joint tenancy remained in their client’s estate at death, meaning that it could not be bequeathed, as intended, to the plaintiff. A successful claim was brought by the beneficiary, on the basis that there had been a breach of duty to the deceased, and by extension of White v Jones, the beneficiary was a person to whom responsibility had been assumed. [2013] CSOH 60, 2013 SLT 758. See para 5.74. [2013] CSOH 60, 2013 SLT 758 at para 17. Esterhuizen v Allied Dunbar Assurance [1998] 2 FLR 668, [1998] Fam Law 527. Cf Strathford East Kilbride Ltd v HLM Design Ltd 1999 SLT 121, in which the court declined to extend the reasoning of White v Jones to impose duty as between the tenants of a building and the providers of architectural services to the building’s owner. [2000] 1 WLR 2129.

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information, and the deceased discontinued contributions to the insurance company’s scheme, he had not got round to rejoining his employer’s scheme by the time of his early death not long afterwards. His wife and children sued the insurance company, arguing breach of duty of care in regard to their loss of benefit. The court held that this situation was “identical” to that in White v Jones, in that the deceased had intended to create a benefit for his wife and children in the event of his predeceasing them and had relied upon the defendant’s professional services in doing so. The interests of the deceased and the plaintiffs coincided in that he had made clear that his family’s interests were fundamental to the advice solicited on pension provision, and hence “practical justice”257 dictated that responsibility had been assumed towards them.

(c) Services by law agents: items held as undelivered 5.78

Outer House authority suggests that a duty of care may arise between solicitors and third parties where, in settling conveyancing transactions, solicitors for client A have fulfilled their client’s contractual obligations by sending certain items to the solicitors for client B, but on the basis that such items are held as undelivered until such time as client B in turn fulfils his or her obligations under the contract. In such circumstances the solicitors for client B have been held to assume a duty of care in regard to client A not to release that item prematurely. In The Mortgage Corporation v Mitchells Roberton,258 solicitors for a lender had sent a cheque to solicitors for the borrower in a standard security, but on condition that it should be held as undelivered until such time as the security documentation confirming the lender’s position as first-ranking creditor was delivered. Although this documentation was not delivered the funds were released and the lender suffered significant loss when the borrower eventually defaulted on the loan. While acknowledging that “the law does not in general terms admit to the duty of care between a solicitor on one side of a transaction and the client on the other”, Lord Johnston regarded this scenario as escaping the generality of that rule. A duty of care was capable of arising from the “conscious intromission with the money”259 by the solicitors for the borrower, knowing of the lender’s interest in obtaining appropriate security documentation. It goes without saying that if the solicitor acting for a borrower becomes aware of dishonest intentions on the part of his or her client, that solicitor is required to take reasonable care to prevent foreseeable losses to the other parties to the transaction.260

257 258 259 260

[2000] 1 WLR 2129 per Pill LJ at 2141. 1997 SLT 1305. 1997 SLT 1305 at 1309. Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP [2014] CSIH 79, 2015 SC 187.

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F. ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTRACTUAL CHAINS While the existence of a chain of contracts that link the defender, indirectly, to the pursuer does not necessarily preclude duty arising between them, the general rule is that there is no duty of care to prevent economic loss where the parties are connected only in this way. The point was explicitly addressed by Lord Goff in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd,261 in which he pointed out that, although the defendants in that case had assumed responsibility to the indirect Names to whom they were linked by a contractual chain, that situation was “most unusual”. An indirect link of this nature is normally inconsistent with an assumption of responsibility, since this would be likely to have the effect of “short circuiting” the contractual arrangements agreed by the parties.262 Lord Goff took the common example of a network of building contracts, under which main contractor contracts with the owner to construct the building and then subcontracts with others to supply materials and services. In the event that the subcontracted work or materials fall short of the agreed standard, it is not normally open to the owner to sue the subcontractor directly, under the Hedley Byrne principle,263 since “there is generally no assumption of responsibility by the subcontractor or supplier direct to the building owner, the parties having so structured their relationship that it is inconsistent with any such assumption of responsibility”.264 It is therefore only in the type of exceptional circumstances illustrated by Henderson, where duty does not conflict with the agreed contractual arrangements, that assumption of responsibility may reach across a contractual chain.

5.79

(1) Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd The “high point”265 of concurrent liability in contract and delict for economic loss is the Scottish case of Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd,266 decided some time before Henderson, and concerning just such a chain of construction contracts. In that case the pursuer had engaged main contractors to construct a factory, but the work of laying the flooring was subcontracted by the main contractors to the defender. The defender had been specifically nominated by the pursuer’s architect as suppliers of the 261 [1995] 2 AC 145 at 195. For discussion of this case, see paras 5.60–5.62 above. 262 [1995] 2 AC 145 at 195. 263 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465, discussed at paras 5.27 and 5.28 above. 264 [1995] 2 AC 145 per Lord Goff at 196. 265 D Howarth, “Negligence after Murphy: Time to Re-think” (1991) 50 CLJ 58 at 87. 266 1982 SC (HL) 244. Lord Goff conceded in Henderson that “some difficulty” had been created by Junior Books, but said that it was unnecessary to reconsider that decision for the purposes of the case in hand: [1995] 2 AC 145 at 196.

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flooring, but there was no direct contract between the defender and the pursuer. The flooring turned out to be defective, to the extent that within two years it began to crack and it became apparent that much of it would have to be replaced. There was apparently no issue of the floor having endangered health and safety or causing damage to other fittings in the factory, so that the loss suffered – the cost of replacement – was purely economic.267 It is unclear why the factory owner did not sue the main contractors in contract, leaving it to the main contractors to recover from the subcontractor. In the event the factory owner elected to sue the subcontractor in delict, claiming from it the cost of replacing the flooring and the attendant loss of profits entailed in that process. The Lord Ordinary held the pursuer’s claim to be relevant and that decision was affirmed in the Inner House and in the House of Lords. There was no authority directly in point and, since the case was heard some years before the House of Lords’ decision in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman,268 the anchor for the analysis of duty of care was the earlier decision in Anns v London Borough of Merton.269 The two-stage test in Anns entailed consideration first of foreseeability and proximity, and secondly of any factors negativing or limiting the scope of duty.270 With regard to the first stage of the test, the necessary elements of foreseeability and proximity were said to be made out within the chain of contracts. Lord Fraser saw the proximity between the parties as “extremely close, falling only just short of a direct contractual relationship”.271 Lord Roskill referred to Lord Devlin’s analysis in Hedley Byrne, and thought that the features of duty identified there were present in this case also. Although proximity in the present context required “some degree of reliance”, here the factory owners had relied upon the flooring subcontractors to a significant degree:272 “(1) The appellants were nominated sub-contractors. (2) The appellants were specialists in flooring. (3) The appellants knew what products were required by the respondents and their main contractors and specialised in the production of those products. (4) The appellants alone were responsible for the composition and construction of the flooring. (5) The respondents relied upon the appellants’ skill and experience. (6) The appellants as nominated subcontractors must have known that the respondents relied upon their skill and experience. (7) The relationship between the parties was as close as it could be, short of actual privity of contract. (8) The appellants 267 Cf British Telecommunications plc v James Thomson & Sons (Engineers) Ltd 1999 SC (HL) 9, in which a duty of care was established where the defenders were subcontractors alleged to have caused physical damage (by fire) during works at the pursuer’s building. 268 [1990] 2 AC 605; see paras 4.15 and 4.16 above. 269 [1978] AC 728; see paras 4.13 and 4.14 above. 270 1982 SC (HL) 244 per Lord Roskill at 273. 271 1982 SC (HL) 244 at 265. 272 1982 SC (HL) 244 per Lord Roskill at 277.

Economic Loss   213 must be taken to have known that if they did the work negligently . . . the resulting defects would at some time require remedying by the respondents expending money upon the remedial measures as a consequence of which the respondents would suffer financial or economic loss.”

With regard to the second part of the Anns test, the court saw in the “artificial distinctions”273 between physical and financial damage – or between delictual and contractual liability – no valid policy reasons to preclude duty for “economic damage which the plaintiff suffers through buying a worthless thing, as is shown by the Hedley Byrne case”.274

(2) The retreat from Junior Books This dismantling of “artificial distinctions” was almost immediately regarded as controversial.275 Judicially, Junior Books was accepted as an application of Hedley Byrne,276 but an obvious difficulty was the House of Lords’ emphasis upon reliance, with little discussion of the sense in which the defenders could be taken to have assumed responsibility towards the pursuers in the sense envisaged in Hedley Byrne. The reasoning was therefore taken as applicable only in cases where there was a “special relationship of proximity” between the parties that was sufficiently “akin to contract” so that reliance was present to a high degree.277 The judicial consensus was that the decision was “so far dependent upon the unique, albeit non-contractual, relationship between the pursuer and the defender in that case and the unique scope of the duty of care owed by the defender to the pursuer arising from that relationship that the decision cannot be regarded as laying down any principle of general application in the law of tort or delict”.278 This has meant that most subsequent decisions have distinguished Junior Books, on the basis that its authority is confined to its own specific fact pattern.279 Soon of course the expansive Anns two-stage test for duty upon which Junior Books liability was predicated was replaced by the more restrictive

273 1982 SC (HL) 244 per Lord Roskill at 276. 274 1982 SC (HL) 244 per Lord Roskill at 274, citing Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban District Council [1972] 1 QB 373 per Stamp LJ at 414. 275 See e.g. A J E Jaffey, “Sub-contractors – Privity and Negligence” (1983) 42 CLJ 37. 276 Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398 per Lord Keith at 466. 277 Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398 per Lord Bridge at 481. 278 See D & F Estates Ltd v Church Commissioners for England [1989] AC 177 per Lord Bridge at 202. 279 See Leigh & Sillavan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd [1986] AC 785; Muirhead v Industrial Tank Specialities Ltd [1986] QB 507; Candlewood Navigation Corp v Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd [1986] AC 1; Simaan General Contracting Co v Pilkington Glass Ltd [1988] QB 758 (involving a similar chain of building contracts but distinguishing Junior Books on the basis that the plaintiffs were the main contractors, not the owner of the building, the defective wall was unacceptable visually but not unfit for use, and the defendants were simply suppliers, not subcontractors nominated specifically by the plaintiffs).

5.82

5.83

214   The Law of Delict in Scotland

5.84

Caparo approach.280 But while Anns itself was eventually formally overruled, in Murphy v Brentwood District Council,281 Junior Books remained.282 Although the opportunity arose in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd to reconsider the implications of Junior Books, Lord Goff’s only specific reference to the case was with the cryptic observation that it had created “some difficulty”.283 His speech restated the basic position that a chain of contracts linking the parties did not preclude duty in tort, but he indicated that the imposition of duty would be “unusual”.284 Assumption of responsibility might be more readily identified in the case of professional relationships of an advisory nature, but, as noted above, Lord Goff commented that, in the ordinary case of a building contract, duty would not normally arise between the owner of the building and a subcontractor brought in by the main contractor.285 In short, there has been a “retreat from Junior Books”.286 Although some commentators in Scotland initially hailed its reasoning as stating the “general lines of liability for all cases of primary [economic] loss”,287 the Scottish courts have not on the whole read the decision in this way, regarding it as decisive only in relation to cases which closely resemble it on their facts.288 Two hurdles in particular must be surmounted in establishing duty for economic loss as between parties related indirectly by a chain of

280 See para 4.15 above. 281 [1991] 1 AC 398; see para 5.16 above. 282 The House of Lords in Murphy [1991] 1 AC 398 per Lord Bridge at 481 confined the scope of the reasoning in Junior Books by stating that it could “only be understood” by reference to Hedley Byrne, and on the basis that it illustrated “a special relationship of proximity between builder and building owner which is sufficiently akin to contract to introduce the element of reliance”. 283 [1995] 2 AC 145 at 196. 284 [1995] 2 AC 145 at 195. 285 [1995] 2 AC 145 per Lord Goff at 181–182: see para 5.79 above. 286 Realstone Ltd v J & E Shepherd [2008] CSOH 31, [2008] PNLR 21 per Lord Hodge at para 22. 287 A B Wilkinson and A D M Forte, “Pure Economic Loss – A Scottish Perspective” 1985 JR 1 at 25. 288 See Scott Lithgow Ltd v GEC Electrical Projects Ltd 1989 SC 412; Realstone Ltd v J & E Shepherd [2008] CSOH 31, [2008] PNLR 21; Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council [2013] CSIH 83, 2014 SC 114 at para 74, in which Lord Drummond Young observed that Junior Books represented a “high water mark” in the expansion of duty of care. In England the Court of Appeal went so far as to brand Junior Books “as aberrant, indeed as heretical”: Robinson v P E Jones (Contractors) Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 9, [2012] QB 44 per Burnton LJ at para 92. It has been noted (Thomson, Delictual Liability para 4.22 n 4) that the Singapore courts previously signalled continuing approval of Junior Books in RSP Architects, Planners & Engineers v Ocean Front Pte Ltd [1996] 1 SLR 113 and RSP Architects, Planners & Engineers v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 1075 [1999] 2 SLR 449. However, a retreat is in evidence in Singapore also. The Singapore Court of Appeal indicated in Spandeck Engineering Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 1 SLR 720 that, while a single test for duty of care continues to apply regardless of whether the plaintiff has suffered economic loss or physical damage, within those confines a more restricted approach may be preferable for cases of pure economic loss. In particular (at para 83), policy considerations must be applied to the case in hand to determine whether duty is negated. “Among the relevant policy considerations would be, for example, the presence of a contractual matrix which has clearly defined the rights and liabilities of the parties and the relative bargaining positions of the parties.”

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contracts. First, a high level of proximity must be demonstrated, normally by reference to assumption of responsibility by the pursuer and reliance by the defender.289 Secondly, the Scottish cases, like the English, have emphasised the importance of considering the detail of the contractual chain by which the parties are related in order to determine whether the content of the various contractual agreements is consistent with a duty of care in negligence.290 In Realstone Ltd v J & E Shepherd,291 for example, the pursuer was a property developer who, through its solicitors, instructed architects to prepare plans for plots on a housing estate. The architects in turn instructed the defenders, a firm of chartered surveyors, to carry out the work. The defenders misdesignated one of the plots, so that it included land needed for building a road, with the result that the pursuer was obliged to buy it back. The pursuer raised an action in negligence to recover the loss. Lord Hodge allowed a proof before answer in order to determine whether assumption of responsibility and reliance could be established, but, making reference to Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc,292 he warned that the more general question might arise at proof of whether it was fair, just and reasonable in the circumstances to impose a duty of care. In addition, he discussed the modern English authorities as noted above and underlined the “concern that the general law should not impose duties which would cut across the detailed contractual provisions which parties in a contractual chain have put in place to govern their liability inter se” and with it “the risk of introducing uncertainty into complex commercial transactions”.293

289 Scott Lithgow Ltd v GEC Electrical Projects Ltd 1989 SC 412 per Lord Clyde at 423–424, stating that, while assumption of responsibility and reliance were not essential indicators of proximity in all cases, it would be considerably more difficult to establish duty where they were lacking. See also Strathford East Kilbride Ltd v HLM Design Ltd 1999 SLT 121, finding no duty, in the absence of assumption of responsibility and reliance, as between the tenants of a building and the providers of architectural services to the building owner. 290 See Scott Lithgow Ltd v GEC Electrical Projects Ltd 1989 SC 412 per Lord Clyde at 426: “the existence of such relationships and of any restraints on liability are relevant considerations bearing on the decision whether such a duty can exist in any given case”. See also Parkhead Housing Association Ltd v Phoenix Preservation Ltd 1990 SLT 812, in which Lord Prosser observed at 817 that, where the damage was purely economic, “and where the various contractual connections are such that the person doing the work knows that the owner has contractual remedies against others, something quite unusual will be required to create a delictual ‘bridge’ between the pursuer and the subcontractor”. 291 Realstone Ltd v J & E Shepherd [2008] CSOH 31, [2008] PNLR 21. 292 [2007] 1 AC 181. 293 Realstone Ltd v J & E Shepherd [2008] CSOH 31, [2008] PNLR 21 at para 22. On the broader question of the desirability of overriding the contractual matrix linking the parties, see: J Stapleton, “Duty of Care and Economic Loss: a Wider Agenda” (1991) 107 LQR 249; J G Fleming, “Tort Law in a Contractual Matrix” (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 661; J Stapleton, “Duty of Care: Peripheral Parties and Alternative Opportunities for Deterrence” (1995) 111 LQR 301.

216   The Law of Delict in Scotland

G. THE LIMITS OF ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY (1) The need for the voluntary acceptance of a relationship 5.85

5.86

It is not a prerequisite of duty of care that the defender expressly accepted responsibility to procure a specific outcome for the pursuer. Yet, although assumption of responsibility has expanded some way beyond the specific sense of a deliberate undertaking of responsibility, even this elastic concept has its limits. Assumption of responsibility in the broad sense still requires the defender voluntarily to have accepted a relationship the nature of which is that the pursuer’s economic interests are dependent upon the defender acting with due care.294 As Lord Hoffmann explained in Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc,295 it arises from a task or role which the defender has “decided to do” – whether giving a reference, supplying a report, or indeed making ginger beer. It may be that the defender has undertaken that role for profit, or perhaps in order to perform a statutory function. It does not arise from random interactions in which, rather than having been chosen, a particular role has been foisted upon the defender. The facts of Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc296 illustrate. In Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc the Customs and Excise Commissioners had sought to recover large amounts of unpaid value added tax from two companies by placing freezing injunctions on their assets, including their bank accounts. Although the injunctions were duly notified to the bank, the bank negligently allowed payments to be made out of the accounts. The Commissioners therefore claimed compensation from the bank for the amounts denied them by this error. The claim was rejected by the House of Lords. On any view, there was no deliberate assumption of responsibility by the bank to assist the claimants’ recovery of unpaid tax, since it was bound by law, not by any dealings with the claimants, to comply with the freezing injunctions. But the House of Lords also took the view that assumption of responsibility in the wider sense could not be derived from an order of court. A court order carries its own remedies and its reach does not extend further to create obligations in the general law.297 Since this was a novel set of circumstances, it was appropriate to consider whether the Caparo ingredients of duty were nonetheless present.298 However, there was, it was said, insufficient proximity

294 On the “relational” quality of assumption of responsibility, see D Nolan, “Assumption of Responsibility: Four Questions” (2019) 72 CLP 123. 295 [2007] 1 AC 181 at para 38 (suggesting, as an example of the defendant performing a statutory function, Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp, discussed above at para 5.57). 296 [2007] 1 AC 181. 297 [2007] 1 AC 181 per Lord Hoffmann at para 39. 298 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; see paras 4.15 and 4.16 above.

Economic Loss   217

between a creditor on the one hand and a third party notified of a freezing injunction over a debtor’s assets on the other.299 Moreover, it would not be fair, just and reasonable to hold that such a third party owed a duty of care in negligence, given that compliance with the order brought the third party no gain, and failure to comply was already dealt with by sanctions for contempt of court.300 By contrast, in Neil Martin Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners301 the defendants had a statutory duty in terms of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 to issue Construction Industry Scheme certificates to applicants who met with the appropriate conditions. When one of the defendants’ employees mistakenly took it upon himself to apply for a registration card rather than a certificate on behalf of the claimant, this delayed the issue of the correct documentation and resulted in loss of revenue to the claimant. In these circumstances, where the employee had taken positive action with regard to the claimant’s interests without authority from the claimant, responsibility had been assumed and the defendants were found liable for loss of revenue attributable to delay caused thereby. By confining duty to particular types of relationship, intentionally entered into by the defender, assumption of responsibility screens out cases where there may be a fear of indeterminate liability, while still allowing negligence law an “essential gap-filling role”302 in situations where a contractual relationship or network of contractual relationships has left an interested party without a remedy.

5.87

5.88

(2) Contractual agreement on allocation of risk While the existence of a contract between adviser and advisee does not preclude delictual liability as such,303 the content of that contract “modifies and shapes” the scope of duty of care.304 In particular, duty is unlikely to be recognised where it is inconsistent with an unequivocal contractual provision that was not unreasonable in terms of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.305 In Grant Estates Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc,306 for example,

299 Note, however, that Lord Rodger distinguished the situation in Scotland when an arrestment on the dependence is served: [2007] 1 AC 181 at para 59. The freezing orders were directed specifically at the debtor, whereas an arrestment on the dependence is served on the third party holding assets due to the debtor. 300 [2007] 1 AC 181 per Lord Rodger at para 62. 301 [2007] EWCA Civ 1041, [2008] Bus LR 663. 302 Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 830 per Lord Steyn at 837. For detailed analysis, see J O’Sullivan, “Suing in Tort where no Contractual Claim will Lie – a Bird’s Eye View” (2007) 23 PN 165. 303 See paras 5.60–5.63 above. 304 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 206. 305 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 s 16 (for consumer contracts, see Consumer Rights Act 2015 s 62). 306 [2012] CSOH 133, 2012 GWD 29–588.

5.89

218   The Law of Delict in Scotland

the pursuer, a limited company, argued that the Bank had mis-sold to it an interest rate swap agreement, supposedly as a means of protecting it from a rise in interest rates. A sharp fall in interest rates thereafter meant that the agreement locked the pursuer into much higher rates than would otherwise have been available to it. The pursuer sought compensation for the loss caused by this allegedly negligent advice by the Bank. However, the Bank’s terms of business, which the pursuer had accepted, specified that it would not provide investment advice or advice on the merits of a particular transaction and that the customer should obtain independent advice. In the face of the express contractual arrangements into which the parties had entered, Lord Hodge held that no duty of care had arisen and that it had not been reasonable for the pursuer to rely upon the Bank’s representations alone in entering into the interest agreement. In reaching that decision Lord Hodge set out “five propositions” pertinent to assumption of responsibility in regard to financial advice in the commercial context, in which contractual undertakings between the parties were of central significance:307 “(1) It is not sufficient to set up a duty of care to assert the existence of an ‘advisory relationship’. There is a clear distinction between giving advice and assuming legal responsibility for that advice. A salesperson of a financial product may give investment advice or express opinions without becoming an investment adviser and undertaking duties of care as such. Whether the giving of advice gives rise to legal obligations in tort or delict to exercise reasonable care or to advise on certain matters depends on the terms of the legal relationship between the parties . . . (2) The absence of any written advisory agreement is a significant pointer against the existence of an advisory obligation . . . (3) Parties can enter into a contract which defines the basis of their trading or banking relationship and allocates risk in a way which negates any possibility of a general or specific advisory duty coming into existence . . . The outcome can be expressed in different ways but with the same meaning. The contractual terms can define the parties’ relationship in a way that no assumption of responsibility can be inferred. The relationship so defined is not equivalent to that of professional adviser and advisee which would make it just and reasonable to impose a duty of care . . . (4) The contractual delineation of responsibility and allocation of risk may preclude a party from founding on the actual reality which eventuates if he has contracted to accept a particular state of affairs as true. Thus if A and B agree that B will not advise A and A will not rely on any statement by B as advice, the contract will bar A from asserting the giving of that advice and his reliance on it . . . (5) The approach in (4) above extends to a retrospective agreement in relation to past events. A and B may agree that their relationship will be on

307 [2012] CSOH 133, 2012 GWD 29–588 per Lord Hodge at para 73.

Economic Loss   219 the basis of a certain state of affairs in the past which they know not to be the case, such as that B had not made any representations, and A will thereafter be obliged to act on the basis of that acknowledgement . . .”

H. ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CAPARO FEATURES OF DUTY Where responsibility is judged to have been assumed, the criteria of duty often do not need extended consideration. This is not because assumption of responsibility replaces the normal features of duty – foreseeability, proximity, and fairness, justice and reasonableness – as set out in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman308 and other authorities; it is because assumption of responsibility itself encapsulates all these features as contextualised for particular types of relationship. Conversely, where assumption of responsibility is judged not to have occurred, the enquiry does not end there. The circumstances must be considered to determine whether foreseeability, proximity, and fairness, justice and reasonableness are manifested in other ways.309 While assumption of responsibility has received most attention in cases involving economic loss, it is also applied in other contexts to similar purpose, namely as an indicator of duty where the default rule is otherwise. Thus assumption of responsibility may, for example, displace the default rule that there is normally no duty to intervene to prevent wrongdoing by third parties.310

5.90

5.91

I. ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILTY FOR PURE ECONOMIC LOSS: A SUMMARY Assumption of responsibility requires D voluntarily to have accepted a relationship the nature of which is that P’s economic interests, or the economic interests of a specific ascertainable class of persons of which P is a member, are dependent upon D acting with due care. The relationship typically will have entailed D providing information or a service to P. In some cases it may have entailed D providing information or a service to a third party (T) in circumstances where D knew or ought to have known that P’s economic interests were dependent upon D providing that information or service to T with due care. 308 [1990] 2 AC 605; see paras 4.15 and 4.16 above. 309 See e.g. discussion of Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2007] 1 AC 181, at para 5.86 above. 310 See para 4.52 above. See also the discussion of assumption of responsibility in Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 (a case involving physical injury not economic loss), in which assumption of responsibility was cast as a “special circumstance” capable overturning the default rule that there was no duty to prevent injury by third parties.

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220   The Law of Delict in Scotland

5.93

The following are key indicators of relationships whereby D may be deemed to have assumed responsibility for P. The list is not exhaustive, and the indicators need not all be present in each case. • D professes to have a particular skill, or otherwise to possess particular information or expertise needed by P. • In providing a certain type of information or service D is uniquely placed to protect P’s interests and P had limited opportunity to obtain the equivalent information or service from another source. • D knows that P, or persons of an ascertainable class of which P is a member, will tailor P’s conduct, or their conduct, on the basis of the information or service provided by D. • In circumstances where D has provided information or a service to T, and P argues that responsibility has been assumed to P thereby, D knows of P’s existence and knows that the interests of P will be adversely affected if the information or service is rendered to T without due care on D’s part.

5.94

Conversely, the following indicate that there has been no assumption of responsibility: • The use that P has sought to make of the information or service does not coincide with the purpose for which D has provided the information or service. • In circumstances where D has provided information or a service to T, and P argues that responsibility has been assumed to P thereby, D does not know, or could not reasonably have known, that P’s interests, or the interests of a particular ascertainable class of which P was a member, would be dependent upon D rendering that information or service to T with due care. • In circumstances where D has provided information or a service to T, and P argues that responsibility has been assumed to P thereby, P’s interests in receiving the information or service do not coincide with T’s interests therein. • To the extent that P has relied on a service or information provided by D, such reliance was unreasonable. It is normally unreasonable for one commercial entity transacting with another to rely on the advice provided to the other, rather than seeking independent advice. It is normally unreasonable for P to rely on advice provided by D in a social setting. • The imposition of duty of care in negligence upon D is inconsistent with, or “short-circuits”, an unequivocal contractual provision that was not unreasonable in terms of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, section 16. • Assumption of responsibility would be contrary to public policy.

Chapter 6

Psychiatric Injury

Para A. INTRODUCTION (1) Classification of psychiatric injury���������������������������������������� 6.01 (2) Pure psychiatric injury: the threshold of severity������������������� 6.04 B. SUDDEN SHOCKING EVENTS: PRIMARY AND SECONDARY VICTIMS (1) Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������� 6.05 (2) Primary victims������������������������������������������������������������������� 6.09 (3) Secondary victims��������������������������������������������������������������� 6.15 (a) A close relationship of love and affection������������������������ 6.18 (b) Presence at the accident or its immediate aftermath�������� 6.20 (c) Direct perception of the accident or its immediate aftermath���������������������������������������������������������������������� 6.25 (3) Liability to secondary victims where harm to injured person was self-inflicted������������������������������������������������������� 6.28 (4) Problem categories�������������������������������������������������������������� 6.29 (a) Rescuers����������������������������������������������������������������������� 6.30 (b) Involuntary agents of injury������������������������������������������� 6.36 (c) Mothers of children injured before birth������������������������� 6.42 C. RELATIONAL DUTIES OF CARE (1) In general��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 6.44 (2) Communication of medical information������������������������������� 6.46 D. ANXIETY REGARDING FUTURE PHYSICAL RISK������������� 6.48

A. INTRODUCTION (1) Classification of psychiatric injury This chapter considers the circumstances in which a duty of care is established between those who have suffered “pure” psychiatric injury1 and those whose want of due care was the cause of that injury.2 The law distinguishes between “pure” psychiatric injury and psychiatric injury where the   1 This term is used in various cases including e.g. White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 2 AC 455; Dow v Amec Group Ltd [2017] CSIH 75, 2018 SC 247.   2 Liability for the intentional perpetration of psychiatric or emotional harm is considered at paras 16.59–16.72 below.

221

6.01

222   The Law of Delict in Scotland

injury is suffered in conjunction with, or as a result of, a recognised injury of a different type. For psychiatric injury of the second kind it is uncontroversial that there is entitlement to damages. Most commonly, the conjunction of psychiatric injury is with physical injury,3 where the amount awarded as solatium may reflect not only physical pain and suffering, the discomfort of treatment and consequential patrimonial loss,4 but also elements such as the impact on mental health,5 post-traumatic stress,6 anxiety7 and diminished enjoyment of life.8 Other types of injury may also have psychiatric or emotional impact. Loss of liberty, for example, is regarded as an interference with bodily integrity in the same way as physical injury, so that a person displaying negligence in proceedings leading to wrongful imprisonment may be liable for the consequential psychiatric injury suffered by the detained person.9 It also appears to be accepted that a claim may be made for mental distress consequent upon a person discovering damage to the person’s property or in other cases of patrimonial loss. In Attia v British Gas,10 the plaintiff’s house burned down due to the negligence of central-heating engineers. The Court of Appeal refused to strike out her claim in respect of psychiatric injury, holding that so long as causation and foreseeability could be proved, the plaintiff might recover damages for the nervous shock experienced in witnessing the fire.11 In the Scottish case of Martin v Bell-Ingram12 the defender had negligently misadvised the pursuers’ building society that the house which the pursuers were about to buy was free from major defect. In addition to their patrimonial loss (the difference in the value of the house with and without the defect), the pursuers were held entitled to recover solatium for their worry and inconvenience. Similarly, in Clark v Scottish Power,13 the pursuer was   3 See para 31.15 below.  4 Traynor’s Exrx v Bairds & Scottish Steel 1957 SC 311.  5 Simmons v British Steel plc 2004 SC (HL) 94; see also Allen v Ravenhill Farm Services Ltd [2009] CSOH 42, 2009 SLT 1084; McLeish v Lothian NHS Board [2017] CSOH 71, 2017 Rep LR 90.  6 Stark v Lothian and Borders Fire Board 1993 SLT 652.  7 Faulds v British Steel Corporation 1977 SLT (Notes) 18; McAleenan v National Coal Board 1987 SLT 106; C v City of Edinburgh Council 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 34.  8 Dunn v Carlin 2003 SLT 342; McPake v SRCL Ltd [2013] CSOH 157, 2014 Rep LR 41.   9 See discussion in McLoughlin v Jones [2001] EWCA Civ 1743, [2002] QB 1312 per Hale LJ at para 57; para 17.50 below. 10 [1988] QB 304. 11 See also Boumedien v Delta Services [2008] EWCA Civ 368, holding that liability might be established for psychiatric injury, suffered when the claimant discovered that the defendant had crashed his car through the claimant’s garden wall, where the defendant could reasonably have foreseen that his conduct would “expose the plaintiff to risk of personal injury, whether physical or psychiatric”. Cf Melville v Walls 1976 SLT (Notes) 71 in which the “nervous exhaustion” suffered by the pursuer after a house fire caused by the negligence of an electrician was held not to be reasonably foreseeable since the pursuer had not been present when the fire broke out and was never in any physical danger. 12 1986 SC 208. 13 1994 SLT 924.

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awarded compensation for the “psychiatric symptoms” and “considerable distress” experienced after returning home to find that the defender had, due to an administrative error, forced entry to her home and cut off her power supply. An entitlement to damages for emotional injury is also conferred by certain statutes, most notably by section 4(3) of the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011, regarding claims by close family members for distress and sorrow where a relative has died due to the defender’s wrongdoing. This is discussed further in chapter 31. The position is different in respect of “pure” psychiatric injury. As a matter of history, the reluctance to recognise such psychiatric injury as the “natural and probable consequence” of an act of negligence14 was aggravated by difficulties of diagnosis and aetiology.15 By the early twentieth century, however, it had come to be regarded as “quite clearly and definitely settled that shock may be a good ground of action, even where the pursuer is unable to aver any outward physical or visible hurt”.16 Yet where the pursuer has suffered no other form of injury or loss aside from psychiatric or emotional harm, any entitlement to damages remains subject to significant restrictions.

6.02

6.03

(2) Pure psychiatric injury: the threshold of severity For pure psychiatric injury, liability in negligence arises only where the victim has experienced injury that exceeds a certain threshold of severity.17 In modern terms this is expressed as a requirement that the victim should have suffered a form of medically verifiable psychiatric disorder; reactions which fall short of this, such as “shock” or “fright” with no lasting effect, do not entitle the affected individual to damages.18 Modern cases have tended to take as their starting point internationally recognised classifications of mental disorder such as those contained in the American Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,19 or the International

14 Ross v Glasgow Corporation 1919 SC 174; see also Coultas v Victorian Railway Commissioners (1888) 13 App Cas 222. 15 In the 1860s Guthrie Smith was to remark that: “The best of men may be mistaken on such an occult subject as the diseases of the mind”: J Guthrie Smith, A Treatise on the Law of Reparation (1864) 131. See also the discussion in Walker v Pitlochry Motor Co 1930 SC 565; Bourhill v Young 1942 SC (HL) 78 per Lord Macmillan at 87. 16 Cowie v London, Midland and Scottish Railway Co 1934 SC 433 per Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison at 437; see also Bourhill v Young 1942 SC (HL) 78 per Lord Macmillan at 87. 17 See e.g. Pridie v Dick (1857) 19 D 287. 18 Simpson v ICI Ltd 1983 SLT 601; Rorrison v West Lothian College 2000 SCLR 245, 1999 Rep LR 102; Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155 per Lord Lloyd at 189; but cf Sadaati v Moorhead 2017 SCC 28, 409 DLR (4th) 395, accepting that a “a serious and prolonged disruption that transcended ordinary emotional upset or distress” was reparable. 19 Now in its 5th edition, DSM-5 (for details see http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm).

6.04

224   The Law of Delict in Scotland

Statistical Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders, ICD-11.20 As discussed elsewhere in this volume,21 there is some limited authority to support the imposition of liability where emotional distress or injury to feelings, falling short of recognised psychiatric illness, has been inflicted intentionally. If, however, such injury is caused negligently and this is the only injury suffered, the courts in Scotland and England22 are unlikely to recognise liability. In Rorrison v West Lothian College, for example, Lord Reed ruled that “psychological distress”23 which did not constitute psychiatric injury was not actionable if negligently inflicted.24

B. SUDDEN SHOCKING EVENTS: PRIMARY AND SECONDARY VICTIMS (1) Introduction 6.05

Where a person, though not physically harmed, suffers psychiatric injury in the aftermath of a sudden shocking event, the law of negligence distinguishes two categories of victim, which have come to be known as “primary” and “secondary”. In the first category are persons affected directly to the extent of being imperilled by sudden danger to themselves. In the second are persons who have experienced shock or distress by witnessing or learning of danger being visited on someone else. In the Scottish courts the first category was traditionally treated more sympathetically than the second. Early cases generally turned on questions of remoteness.25 Where victims were closely bound up in a distressing course of events, such as a road or railway accident, and perceived themselves as only just escaping injury, extreme fright or shock was generally not regarded as too remote.26 And while cases in the second category were not incompetent,27 “horror” at the consequences for others of the defender’s negligence, as distinct from “terror” for the pursuer’s own personal safety, was more likely to be

20 Now in its 11th edition (available at https://icd.who.int/browse11/l-m/en). 21 See para 16.72 below. 22 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406 per Lord Hoffmann at paras 44–45. 23 2000 SCLR 245 at 250. 24 See also Soutar v Mulhern 1907 SC 723, holding that annoyance, discomfort and anxiety, of themselves, were not reparable; see also discussion by Lord Reed in Ward v Scotrail Railways Ltd 1999 SC 255. 25 Ross v Glasgow Corporation 1919 SC 174; Coultas v Victorian Railway Commissioners (1888) 13 App Cas 222. 26 Brown v Glasgow Corporation 1922 SC 527; see also Cooper v Caledonian Railway Co (1902) 4 F 880; Wallace v Kennedy (1908) 16 SLT 485; Gilligan v Robb 1910 SC 856; Fowler v North British Railway Co 1914 SC 866; Dulieu v White & Sons [1901] 2 KB 669. 27 Hambrook v Stokes Brothers [1925] 1 KB 141; see also Currie v Wardrop 1927 SC 538, allowing that the pursuer might recover for nervous shock due to apprehension for her own safety, but as aggravated by anxiety for the safety of the person walking with her and injured in the accident.

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regarded as too remote.28 The foundation for the modern law is Bourhill v Young, discussed in chapter 4,29 in which the pursuer claimed to have been afflicted by nervous shock after witnessing the aftermath of a fatal accident. In that case, following the analysis of Donoghue v Stevenson,30 the question was seen as being whether the defender had owed the pursuer a duty of care not to inflict injury of this type,31 and in that regard attention was directed to foreseeability and proximity. In the light of Bourhill, the duty enquiry has become the means by which the distinction between “primary” and “secondary” victims is maintained. The actual terms “primary” and “secondary” can be seen already in Lord Wright’s speech in Bourhill as “defining and distinguishing the type of the negligence”,32 but the starting point for discussing these categories today is usually taken to be Lord Oliver’s analysis in the House of Lords in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police.33 Alcock arose out of the aftermath of the Hillsborough football stadium disaster in 1989. Ninety-seven34 of the spectators who had gathered in the stadium to watch a semi-final of the FA cup died from crush injuries as a result of sudden overcrowding in the stands. Claims were brought against the police by relatives of the victims, alleging that the tragedy had been caused by police mismanagement of crowd control, and in particular by the decision of officers to allow access to an area of the ground which was already overfull. Certain of the relatives alleged that they had suffered psychiatric injury in response to what they had seen whether at the scene itself, in the immediate aftermath, or on live television. The fundamental question raised was whether the police owed the relatives of the deceased a duty of care in regard to this form of injury. The House of Lords used the terminology of primary and secondary victims to differentiate, respectively, between “those cases in which the injured plaintiff was involved, either mediately or immediately, as a participant, and those in which the plaintiff was no more than the passive and unwilling witness of injury caused to others”.35 In cases of the first type, the scope of duty was more widely drawn while, in cases of the second type, duty was dependent upon the victim meeting with further restrictive conditions. The claims in Alcock fell within the second group and, since

Campbell v James Henderson Ltd 1915 1 SLT 419. 1942 SC (HL) 78; see para 4.28 above. 1932 SC (HL) 31. See in particular 1942 SC (HL) 78 per Lord Macmillan at 87–88. 1942 SC (HL) 78 per Lord Wright at 91. [1992] 1 AC 310. As the report notes, 95 died immediately. A further victim (Tony Bland) succumbed to his injuries after four years in a coma: see Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. Another, Andrew Devine, died of his injuries 32 years later, in 2021. 35 [1992] 1 AC 310 per Lord Oliver at 407. 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

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none of the cases met those further conditions, duty of care was not established. In Alcock, as in many other cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the incident which triggered their psychiatric injuries was caused by the defendant’s breach of a common law duty of care. There can, however, also be breaches of duties as to health and safety imposed by statute, and, in principle, there is no reason why the relevant statutory provisions should not be interpreted as encompassing duty in regard to psychiatric as well as to physical injury.36 Moreover, the distinction between primary and secondary victims continues to be relevant in such cases.37

(2) Primary victims 6.09

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In the words of Lord Oliver in Alcock, already quoted, primary victims are those involved “either mediately or immediately, as a participant” in a shocking event caused by the defendant’s negligence.38 Where the plaintiff has “participated” in the shocking event in this way, the duty enquiry also asks “whether, in the circumstances, injury of that type to that plaintiff was or was not reasonably foreseeable”.39 A few years after Alcock, in Page v Smith,40 the House of Lords restated the primary/secondary distinction along similar lines, but with a new slant on the issue of foreseeability. The facts of Page v Smith were that the defendant had negligently driven across the path of the plaintiff’s car. Although both cars were badly damaged, the plaintiff escaped physical injury. He had, however, previously experienced episodes of chronic fatigue syndrome, and the nervous shock caused by the accident triggered a recurrence of the complaint, making it impossible for him to work. Was he a primary victim to whom the defendant driver had owed a duty of care? Lord Lloyd, with whom the majority agreed,41 said that primary victims were to be considered as such if they were “directly involved in the accident, and well within the range of foreseeable physical injury”, rather

36 See Dow v Amec Group Ltd [2017] CSIH 75, 2018 SC 247, in which the Inner House held that the pursuer had failed to prove that his employer’s breach of the Fire (Scotland) Act 2005 s 53, or of the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2007, SI 2007/320, reg 40, was the cause of his post-traumatic stress disorder. Lord Brodie observed, at para 84, that “harm” in the relevant provisions might include “assaults on mental integrity as well as assaults on physical integrity”. See also Campbell v North Lanarkshire Council 2000 SCLR 373. 37 Dow v Amec Group Ltd [2017] CSIH 75, 2018 SC 247. Lord Brodie observed (at para 80) that, in regard to primary victims, the foreseeability of the victims believing themselves to be in danger of serious physical harm was the key criterion of duty. 38 [1992] 1 AC 310 per Lord Oliver at 407. 39 [1992] 1 AC 310 per Lord Oliver at 407 (emphasis added). 40 [1996] 1 AC 155. 41 With whom Lord Ackner and Lord Browne-Wilkinson agreed. The two Scottish judges, Lord Keith and Lord Jauncey, dissented.

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than being mere “spectators” or “bystanders”.42 Indisputably, the plaintiff in Page had been directly involved in the car accident, and was within range of foreseeable physical danger. The difficulty was that the particular harm that he suffered was not of a type that was foreseeable to the other driver. In this regard Lord Lloyd elaborated upon an important distinction between primary and secondary victims. Foreseeability of psychiatric injury remained a requirement in relation to secondary victims, since secondary victims were generally outwith the range of physical impact. But as long as primary victims had been within the range of physical danger, even if they emerged physically unscathed, there was no separate requirement to consider whether psychiatric injury was also foreseeable. Lord Lloyd reasoned: “Since the defendant was admittedly under a duty of care not to cause the plaintiff foreseeable physical injury, it was unnecessary to ask whether he was under a separate duty of care not to cause foreseeable psychiatric injury.”43 Given that physical risk could readily have been anticipated as a result of the defendant’s negligent driving, it made no difference, in the view of the House of Lords, whether the plaintiff’s illness had occurred due to eventuation of the physical risk, or “through the medium of the mind, or of the nervous system”.44 The plaintiff was not, therefore, required to establish the foreseeability of the injury that actually occurred. In effect this was an extension of the “eggshell skull” rule, discussed more fully in chapter 14,45 whereby defendants must take the victims of their negligence as they find them in terms of particular physical vulnerabilities. As Lord Lloyd argued, once duty is established by reference to foreseeability of physical injury, no difference should be made “between an eggshell skull and an eggshell personality. Since the number of potential claimants is limited by the nature of the case, there is no need to impose any further limit by reference to a person of ordinary phlegm.”46 In other words, if the defender’s negligence has exposed the pursuer to a foreseeable risk of physical danger, a duty is owed in respect of all personal injury that eventuates, even if the pursuer is physically unharmed and the harm is triggered by abnormal, and unforeseeable, susceptibility to psychiatric injury.47 This reasoning from Page v Smith has been taken

42 [1996] 1 AC 155 per Lord Lloyd at 184. E.g. in Burns v Boots UK Ltd [2011] CSOH 182, 2011 Rep LR 124, a grandmother who was standing by her granddaughter’s pushchair when a rolling pin fell out of a shop window, fracturing the child’s skull, was said (by Lord Stewart at para 13) to be “potentially” a primary victim. 43 [1996] 1 AC 155 at 187. 44 [1996] 1 AC 155 at 187. 45 See paras 14.43–14.44 below. 46 [1996] 1 AC 155 at 189. 47 For case commentary, see F Trindade, “Nervous Shock and Negligent Conduct” (1996) 112 LQR 22.

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forward in several English cases. It was endorsed by the majority of the House of Lords in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire,48 a case brought by police officers claiming psychiatric injury as a result of their experiences on duty at the Hillsborough disaster and in which the court refused to recognise the police officers as primary victims where they were “not within the range of foreseeable physical injury and their psychiatric injury was caused by witnessing or participating in the aftermath of accidents which caused death or injury to others”.49 And it was applied in, for example, Donachie v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester,50 where the claimant was a police officer tasked with attaching a tracking device to the underside of a car thought to belong to a criminal gang. The batteries in the device persisted in failing, which meant the claimant visiting the car nine times, each time more fearful that the suspects would return. The claimant was abnormally sensitive to stress due to a medical condition and suffered an extreme psychiatric reaction, which in turn triggered a stroke. His employer’s negligence had thus exposed the claimant to a foreseeable risk of physical injury, and in accordance with the reasoning in Page v Smith it was irrelevant that the psychiatric harm that eventuated was not foreseeable. The fact that his employer was not aware of the claimant’s particular vulnerability was not an impediment to his claim. At the same time, victims who claim that fear for their physical safety triggered psychiatric illness must have had rational grounds for that fear. In McFarlane v EE Caledonia51 the plaintiff witnessed a catastrophic explosion and fire on an oil rig and claimed to have suffered psychiatric injury as a result. However, he did so from a support vessel some 550 metres from the scene and, although the vessel later moved closer in to assist, the plaintiff was never less than 50 metres from the rig. He could not therefore recover as a primary victim, since there were no reasonable grounds for him to believe that he was in immediate physical danger, and he did not come within the category of secondary victims to whom duty extended. This recasting of the rules on foreseeability in relation to primary victims has been subject to trenchant criticism on various grounds.52 Of these perhaps the most fundamental is that the analysis in Page v Smith conflicts 48 [1999] 2 AC 455. 49 [1999] 2 AC 455 at 509. 50 [2004] EWCA Civ 405, [2004] Po LR 204; see also Schofield v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [1999] ICR 193; A v Essex County Council [2003] EWCA Civ 1848, [2004] 1 WLR 1881 (in which physical injury and property damage were foreseeable and duty arose if psychiatric injury was sustained as well or instead). 51 [1994] 2 All ER 1; see also Weddle v Glasgow City Council [2021] SAC (Civ) 17, 2021 SLT (Sh Ct) 277, in which it was accepted that the witness to a serious road traffic accident had suffered significant psychiatric injury in consequence of what she had seen, but this could not be regarded as referable to a fear of physical injury reasonably held by her at the time of the accident. 52 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Damages for Psychiatric Injury (Scot Law Com No 196, 2004) para 2.16; S Bailey and D Nolan, “The Page v Smith Saga: A Tale of Inauspicious Origins and Unintended Consequences” (2010) 69 CLJ 495.

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with the basic rule of remoteness as expressed in Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 1)) to the effect that “the essential factor in determining liability is whether the damage is of such a kind as the reasonable man should have foreseen”.53 While the “eggshell skull” rule is well-established, it has traditionally been applied to deal with the situation where the extent of the harm was greater than anticipated, rather than with where a different, unforeseeable type of injury had ensued. As Lord Goff pointed out in his dissenting speech in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, it “only applies where liability has been established. . . . Lord Lloyd [in Page v Smith] appears to have taken an exceptional rule relating to compensation and treated it as being of general application, thereby creating a wider principle of liability.”54 Teff has condemned the reasoning in Page v Smith as marking “a retreat to the early twentieth century fixation on the ‘zone of danger’” and “a refusal to engage with modern science at odds with the protestations that the legal rules need to reflect advances in psychiatry”.55 Nonetheless, the criteria which the primary victim must satisfy as stated in Page v Smith have not been overruled, and have been acknowledged in Simmons v British Steel plc56 as relevant to Scots law.

(2) Secondary victims As discussed above, the distinction between primary and secondary victims is of considerable practical importance, since primary victims face significantly fewer barriers to recovery. However, those persons who do not meet the criteria for primary victims may nonetheless establish duty of care if they can satisfy the more restrictive criteria required of secondary victims. Secondary victims must establish that they have suffered a recognised psychiatric illness,57 and that the injury that has occurred to them was foreseeable. There is no room for an extended version of the “eggshell skull” rule where neither physical injury nor psychiatric injury was foreseeable.58

53 [1961] AC 388 per Viscount Simonds at 426. Similarly, it is inconsistent with the so-called “grand rule” in Scots law that damages may not be claimed “except such as naturally and directly arise out of the wrong done; and such, therefore, as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the view of the wrongdoer”: Allan v Barclay (1864) 2 M 873 per the Lord Ordinary, Lord Kinloch, at 874; and see paras 14.28–14.32 below. 54 [1999] 2 AC 455 at 476–480. As Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson remarked in Malcolm v Dickson 1951 SC 542 at 548, application of the “thin skull” rule “may be perfectly right when the victim is within the ambit of the negligent act but it is a begging of the question to pray in aid the victim’s weakness in order to get him within the ambit of the negligent act”. 55 H Teff, Causing Psychiatric and Emotional Harm (2009) 82. 56 [2004] UKHL 20, 2004 SC (HL) 94 per Lord Rodger at para 53; see also discussion in Campbell v North Lanarkshire Council 2000 SCLR 373 per Lord Reed at 379–380. 57 See para 6.04 above. 58 See White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 2 AC 455 per Lord Goff at 476.

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It remains the case that secondary victims are expected to demonstrate reasonable fortitude in dealing with trying and upsetting circumstances. As stated by Lord Porter in Bourhill v Young:59 “The driver of a car or vehicle, even though careless, is entitled to assume that the ordinary frequenter of the streets has sufficient fortitude to endure such incidents as may from time to time be expected to occur in them, including the noise of a collision and the sight of injury to others, and is not to be considered negligent towards one who does not possess the customary phlegm.”

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Similarly, witnessing the death or serious illness of a loved one in hospital is not regarded as being outwith the expected tolerance of the ordinary individual unless the circumstances are wholly exceptional in some way so as to shock or horrify.60 In addition, secondary victims may recover for their psychiatric injury only if they establish that they stood in a sufficiently proximate relationship both to the person physically injured and to the events of the accident. The enquiry into proximity requires three elements to be considered: the relationship between the person physically injured and the pursuer; the proximity of the pursuer to the accident; and the means by which the injury was caused.61 These three elements were given extended consideration in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police62 (the case brought by relatives of those who died in the Hillsborough stadium disaster). The plaintiffs argued that a duty was owed to them as secondary victims of police negligence since they had either been present at the stadium, attended shortly afterwards, or viewed events on live television. However, as the House of Lords emphasised, duty in regard to secondary victims required an affirmative answer to each of three questions: (a) Was a close relationship of love and affection established between the secondary victim and the person injured by the defender’s wrongdoing? (b) Was the secondary victim present at the accident or at its immediate aftermath? (c) Was the secondary victim’s psychiatric injury caused by direct perception (i.e. through his or her own unaided senses) of the accident or its immediate aftermath?

59 Bourhill v Young 1942 SC (HL) 78 per Lord Porter at 98. 60 Ward v Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust [2004] EWHC 2106 (QB); Liverpool Women’s Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Ronayne [2015] EWCA Civ 588, [2015] PIQR P20. 61 McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 per Lord Wilberforce at 422. 62 [1992] 1 AC 310.

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(a) A close relationship of love and affection None of the plaintiffs in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police was a mere bystander since all stood in some kind of family relationship with those who had died. The question was therefore how narrowly duty should be construed in looking at such relationships. Reference was made to McLoughlin v O’Brian,63 in which it was held that a negligent driver owed a duty of care to the plaintiff as the wife and mother of the victims of a horrific road accident. Lord Wilberforce in that case had identified the relationship between parent and child or between husband and wife as “the closest of family ties”.64 Similarly in Alcock itself, it was thought that proximity might be presumed from the fact of such a relationship, in the absence of “anything which might tend to rebut that presumption”, such as a period of estrangement.65 Thus a close tie was identified in the cases of a father and mother66 who lost their son at Hillsborough, and Lord Keith at least thought that a litigant67 who had lost her fiancé should be regarded in the same way.68 Applying this reasoning, there was little dispute in the later Scottish case of Young v MacVean69 that a mother who came upon the scene of a traffic accident in which her son had been killed had a close tie of love and affection with him, although she failed, for other reasons, to establish duty. Equally, it was accepted in Wild v Southend University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust70 that a father who claimed psychiatric injury on witnessing the discovery of the death of his child in the womb stood in a close enough family relationship to be regarded as a secondary victim, although his claim also failed for other reasons. As to other degrees of kinship, the House of Lords in Alcock drew back from laying down rigid rules. At the same time, it took note of Lord Wilberforce’s observation in McLoughlin that “cases involving less close relationships must be very carefully scrutinised”,71 and, as Lord Jauncey remarked, no remoter relative had successfully claimed hitherto.72 Accordingly, the relationships of those litigants in Alcock who had lost, respectively, their grandson, siblings, brother-in-law and nephew were examined by the court and deemed insufficiently close without evidence of exceptional bonds 63 [1983] 1 AC 410. 64 [1983] 1 AC 410 at 422; see also Higgins v Burton 1967 SLT (Notes) 61. 65 [1992] 1 AC 310 per Lord Keith at 398. 66 The Copocs. 67 Ms Penck. 68 [1992] 1 AC 310 per Lord Keith at 398 (although neither the Copocs’ nor Ms Penk’s claims ultimately succeeded since they could not show that their psychiatric injury was caused by direct perception of the accident or its immediate aftermath: see para 6.26 below). 69 [2015] CSIH 70, 2016 SC 135 (and evidence was also led of the exceptionally close relationship between them following the early death of the pursuer’s husband). 70 [2014] EWHC 4053 (QB). 71 [1983] 1 AC 410 at 422. 72 [1992] 1 AC 310 per Lord Jauncey at 420.

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between the family members concerned.73 Where no family relationship exists, formal or informal, it is improbable that sufficient proximity could be established, even in relation to close friendships. In Robertson v Forth Road Bridge Joint Board, 74 the pursuers were maintenance workers on the Forth Road Bridge who witnessed the death of a colleague blown from his lorry and over the bridge parapet by a gust of wind. Neither pursuer was regarded as having a relevant tie of love and affection with the deceased although one of them had been his close friend for many years. The absence of a close familial connection between the pursuer and the injured victim thus precludes duty.75

(b) Presence at the accident or its immediate aftermath 6.20

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In addition to proximity of relationship to the injured person, duty of care requires that the alleged secondary victim was close “in both time and space” to the original incident caused by the negligence of the defender.76 The primary point of reference is the locus of the accident itself, not the scene of a subsequent deterioration in the accident victim’s medical condition. It is, however, recognised that to insist in all cases upon direct and immediate perception of the accident would be “impractical and unjust”.77 Those who come upon the scene very soon afterwards may be regarded as having met the proximity requirement if they were within “sight or hearing of the event or of its immediate aftermath”.78 In the leading case of McLoughlin v O’Brian the plaintiff was not actually present at the road accident in which her husband and two children were badly injured and another child was killed, but she was called to the hospital some two hours later. There she saw the injured before they had been cleaned up and while they were still visibly suffering from their immediate injuries. This brought her sufficiently within the “aftermath” of the accident for proximity to be established.

73 As Lord Ackner remarked ([1992] 1 AC 310 at 406), “The quality of brotherly love is well known to differ widely – from Cain and Abel to David and Jonathan.” 74 1995 SC 364; see also McFarlane v EE Caledonia [1994] 2 All ER 1. English cases such as Dooley v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd [1951] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 271 had earlier been thought to indicate that duty might be imposed upon employers in regard to employees who merely witnessed accidents in the workplace, but Lord Allanbridge pointed out in Robertson, at 376, that these authorities were now more narrowly construed as limiting duty to employees who had thought themselves to be the “involuntary cause” of injury (Alcock [1992] 1 AC 310 per Lord Oliver at 408). See also para 6.38 below. 75 See e.g. Keen v Tayside Contracts 2003 SLT 500, in which a road worker called to the scene of an accident in order to help set up a traffic diversion could not recover for the psychiatric injury he suffered as a result of witnessing dead bodies in the crashed vehicle, since he had no relationship whatsoever with the deceased. 76 McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 per Lord Wilberforce at 422. 77 McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 per Lord Wilberforce at 422. 78 McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 per Lord Wilberforce at 423.

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It is not enough, however, for the pursuer simply to have seen the aftermath of the accident; the pursuer must also be aware of its significance – that the pursuer’s close relative was its victim. In Young v MacVean79 the pursuer did not actually see the road accident in which her son was killed, but by chance she came upon the scene shortly afterwards. The court appeared to concede that if she had come upon the scene immediately after the collision in the knowledge that her son was involved, then that would have been sufficient.80 However, at the point when she saw the wreckage of the accident, she did not know that her son had been its victim, and therefore the undoubted trauma that she later suffered could not be associated with her witnessing the aftermath of events. The time frame of the “immediate aftermath” is limited. In Galli-Atkinson v Seghal81 the claimant had gone out looking for her daughter and, on seeing that the police had cordoned off an accident scene, discovered that her daughter had been the victim. She did not witness the actual wreckage, but she did see her daughter’s badly injured body in the mortuary an hour or so later. In the view of the Court of Appeal, “the immediate aftermath . . . extended from the moment of the accident until the moment that the appellant left the mortuary”; it was “artificial” to separate out the mortuary visit from what was an “uninterrupted sequence of events”.82 On that basis the requirement of proximity was met. In Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police,83 by contrast, those relatives who identified their relatives’ bodies in the mortuary eight hours or more after the Hillsborough disaster were deemed not to have been “part of the immediate aftermath” of the disaster. As the notion of the aftermath relates to the time period directly following the accident, it does not include medical misadventure experienced as a result of the accident but some time later. In Taylor v A Novo (UK) Ltd,84 the claimant’s mother had been injured in an accident at work. Three weeks later, while recovering at home, she suddenly collapsed and died as a consequence of the injuries she had suffered. Her daughter had not been present at the original accident but was at the scene at the time of her mother’s death, and she claimed to have suffered post-traumatic stress syndrome as a result. It was held, however, that in order for duty to be established the relevant event at which the claimant’s presence was required was the accident itself or events following immediately thereafter in a seamless sequence.85 The time lapse of three weeks between the 79 80 81 82 83 84

[2015] CSIH 70, 2016 SC 135. [2015] CSIH 70, 2016 SC 135 at para 26. [2003] EWCA Civ 697, [2003] Lloyd’s Rep Med 285. [2003] EWCA Civ 697, [2003] Lloyd’s Rep Med 285 per Latham LJ at para 26. [1992] 1 AC 310 per Lord Ackner at 405; see also Lord Jauncey at 424. [2013] EWCA Civ 194, [2014] QB 150; see also Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2019] EWHC 2893 (QB), [2020] PIQR P5. 85 As e.g. in North Glamorgan Trust v Walters [2002] EWCA Civ 1792, [2003] PIQR P16.

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initial accident and the shocking event stretched the concept of aftermath too far.

(c) Direct perception of the accident or its immediate aftermath 6.25

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The third requirement is closely related to the second. The injury must be caused by the secondary victim directly perceiving – whether by seeing or by hearing – the accident or its immediate aftermath. This requirement is met, for example, in the case of a mother who at a distance of 150 yards hears an explosion and shouting, and immediately afterwards sees her injured child being carried to her house.86 There was also strong evidence of psychiatric injury having been triggered by the secondary victim’s direct perception of the immediate aftermath of the accidents in McLoughlin v O’Brian and Galli-Atkinson v Seghal, as discussed above. It is not sufficient that the secondary victims were shocked by learning, shortly after the event, that the accident had taken place. In Wood v Miller,87 for example, a woman was rendered immediately unconscious in a road accident in which her husband was severely injured. After recovering consciousness, she suffered shock on being informed about her husband’s condition. This was held to be too “remote” from the original incident. Similarly in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police,88 some of the plaintiffs had seen events unfold at the Hillsborough stadium by watching the events on television. The live coverage revealed that serious problems had occurred but, very properly, it had not shown the suffering of identifiable victims. Relatives would have been made anxious by seeing the television pictures, but their shock came several hours later when the bodies were identified. On this basis a father and mother89 who lost their son at Hillsborough fulfilled requirement (a) above (a close relationship of love and affection) but failed on (c). They had seen the television pictures but had not been present at the stadium, and although the father had gone to the mortuary to identify the body, he had not done so until the next day, after they had already received the news of their son’s death. The anguish that they experienced was not therefore caused by the direct perception of the event as it affected their son or of its immediate aftermath.90 The claim of another person91 who lost her fiancé was precluded for similar reasons.

86 Bain v Kings & Co Ltd 1973 SLT (Notes) 8; see also McLinden v Richardson 1962 SLT (Notes) 104. 87 1958 SLT (Notes) 49. 88 [1992] 1 AC 310. 89 The Copocs. 90 By contrast, there might be sufficient proximity where a live broadcast provided coverage of a disaster in which the identity of individual victims was clear: see [1992] 1 AC 310 per Lord Ackner at 405. 91 Ms Penck.

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The House of Lords in Alcock further stipulated that the psychiatric injury should have been caused by the “sudden appreciation by sight or sound of a horrifying event, which violently agitates the mind”.92 For all that this “sudden shock” requirement may be derived from an “outdated view of how mental harm is sustained”,93 duty does not arise in respect of a psychiatric illness engendered by protracted exposure to upsetting circumstances, or the gradual realisation of the gravity of injury to others, no matter how traumatic. In Sion v Hampstead Health Authority,94 for example, the plaintiff’s son had been injured in a motorcycle accident, and the plaintiff alleged that the son’s death in hospital fourteen days later was attributable to negligent medical treatment. The plaintiff had remained at his son’s bedside throughout and underwent a severe, prolonged and persistent grief reaction to his death, suffering frequent flashbacks of his son’s life and in particular of the period in hospital. Liability was refused, however, on the basis that there was no nervous shock in the sense described in Alcock. The process by which the plaintiff was affected had continued over some time, from his son’s first arrival in hospital until the appreciation at the inquest that medical negligence was implicated, and indeed the son’s death when it occurred was not unexpected. By contrast, the sudden shock requirement was considered to have been met in North Glamorgan Trust v Walters,95 in which a mother suffered psychiatric illness following the death of her young son. The child had been admitted to hospital suffering from acute hepatitis but his condition was not properly diagnosed. Not long afterwards he suffered a major epileptic seizure, as witnessed by his mother. The mother was then informed that the seizure had caused no brain damage and that preparations could be made for a liver transplant, only to be told a few hours subsequently that there had in fact been severe brain damage and a transplant was inappropriate. The child died a short while later, thirty-six hours after the epileptic seizure, when his life-support machine was switched off. In this case, unlike in Sion, the court took the view that the thirty-six-hour period, beginning with the epileptic fit and ending with the child’s death, was to be viewed as a single horrifying event, rather than a series of gradual assaults on the mind as in Sion. Since the court was satisfied that the mother’s pathological grief reaction was triggered by the sudden appreciation of that event, the “sudden shock” requirement was met. 92 [1992] 1 AC 310 per Lord Ackner at 401. 93 See Scottish Law Commission, Report on Damages for Psychiatric Injury (Scot Law Com No 196, 2004) para 2.5, pointing out that this requirement produces harsh and inconsistent results rendering “some forms of mental harm, such as post-traumatic stress syndrome, more reparable than others, for example depression”. 94 [1994] 5 Med LR 170. See also Taylorson v Shieldness Produce Ltd [1994] PIQR P329; Wild v Southend University Hospital NHS Trust [2014] EWHC 4053 (QB); Owers v Medway NHS Foundation Trust [2015] EWHC 2363 (QB), [2015] Med LR 561. 95 [2002] EWCA Civ 1792, [2003] PIQR P16.

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(3) Liability to secondary victims where harm to injured person was self-inflicted 6.28

In some instances, witnesses of accidents of which the injured persons themselves are the cause may be psychiatrically damaged by what they have seen. In Greatorex v Greatorex,96 for example, the defendant was badly injured in a car accident caused by his own careless driving.97 By chance, one of the fire officers who attended the accident was the defendant’s father. He later claimed compensation from his son98 when the shock of seeing his son’s injuries at close quarters induced long-term, severe, post-traumatic stress disorder. Unusually for a member of the professional rescue services, the father met the standard criteria for duty in relation to secondary victims, since he had a close tie of love and affection with the primary victim, was present at the immediate aftermath of the accident, and suffered injury in consequence of his direct perception of his son’s injuries. Nonetheless, the court ruled that there was no duty between the parties. Liability might arise where, in the course of harming himself or herself, the defendant caused foreseeable physical injury to another, but to impose liability for psychiatric harm caused in such a way would be “to create a significant further limitation upon an individual’s freedom of action”.99 Reference was made to a German decision in which the Bundesgerichtshof observed:100 “A person is under no legal duty, whatever the moral position may be, to look after his own life and limb simply in order to save his dependants from the likely psychical effects on them if he is killed or maimed: to impose such a legal duty, except in very peculiar cases, for instance, wherever a person commits suicide in a deliberately shocking manner, would be to restrict a person’s self-determination in a manner inconsistent with our legal system.”

(4) Problem categories 6.29

As discussed earlier, whether or not a person was within the range of foreseeable physical injury marks out primary from secondary victims. Yet that criterion creates a number of anomalies,101 particularly in regard to the categories explored below.   96 [2000] 1 WLR 1970.   97 Indeed he was subsequently convicted of driving a motor vehicle without due care and attention, driving without insurance, and failing to provide a specimen.   98 Since the son was uninsured, the Motor Insurers’ Bureau was brought into the action as the second defendant.  99 Greatorex v Greatorex [2000] 1 WLR 1970 per Cazalet J at 1984. 100 BGHZ 56, 163 VI. Civil Senate (VI ZR 78/70) (translation by T Weir, available at http://www. utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=672). See also Homsi v Homsi [2016] VSC 354. 101 See White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 2 AC 455 per Lord Goff at 479; see also H Teff, Causing Psychiatric and Emotional Harm (2009) 75–77.

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(a) Rescuers As discussed in chapter 4,102 there is generally no duty to come to the rescue of others except in restricted circumstances, such as where the defender has specifically assumed responsibility for the pursuer’s safety. Nonetheless, an individual who does attempt a rescue and is physically injured in the process may be entitled to compensation from the person by whose negligence the danger arose. In the leading English case of Haynes v Harwood,103 the plaintiff was a policeman on duty in a crowded street. Seeing a van careering down the street pulled by runaway horses, he rushed to seize their reins, sustaining injury in the process. He was successful in his claim against the owner of the horses since physical injury to a person attempting to halt the horses was to be anticipated as one of the reasonable and probable results of the defendants’ wrongful act in leaving the horses unattended and the cart unsecured. Reference was made to the judgment of Cardozo J in the New York case of Wagner v International Railway Company, in which he remarked:104

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“Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them as normal. It places their effects within the range of the natural and probable. The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperilled victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer. The state that leaves an opening in a bridge is liable to the child that falls into the stream, but liable also to the parent who plunges to its aid. . . . The railroad company whose train approaches without signal is a wrongdoer toward the traveler surprised between the rails, but a wrongdoer also to the bystander who drags him from the path.”

The status of rescuers, and the circumstances in which ambitious or illconsidered rescue attempts might be considered to have broken the chain of causation, are discussed further in the section on causation.105 The question examined here is whether rescuers may be entitled to compensation when they have suffered not physical but psychiatric injury as a result of attempting to assist others. One of the key authorities in relation to psychiatric injury suffered by rescuers is the 1967 case of Chadwick v British Railways Board.106 Mr Chadwick, a member of the public, went to assist at a serious railway accident that occurred close to his home and in which 90 people were 102 See paras 4.44–4.48 above. 103 [1935] 1 KB 146; see also Baker v T E Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 966; Videan v BTC [1963] 2 QB 650. 104 232 NY 176 (1921) at 180. 105 See para 14.17 below. 106 [1967] 1 WLR 912.

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killed and a further 179 seriously injured. When Mr Chadwick arrived on the scene the mangled wreckage was in a precarious position, but because he was small and wiry he was able to manoeuvre himself through the carriages. Over a period of around twelve hours he comforted the injured and helped those trapped to extricate themselves. As a reaction to the horror of those experiences, he developed a psychoneurotic illness and spent several months in a mental hospital. By the time the action was raised Mr Chadwick had died of an unrelated illness, but his widow, as the administratrix of his estate, was held to be entitled to recover from the railway operator whose negligence had caused the crash. It owed a duty to Mr Chadwick since it was foreseeable that an individual might try to rescue passengers and suffer injury in the process. It was no bar to recovery that Mr Chadwick had not run precisely the same risk as the passengers since, once the possibility of rescue was foreseeable, the exact manner of achieving it was immaterial: it was “sufficient to say that shock was foreseeable and that rescue was foreseeable”.107 The precise focus of the foreseeability test in relation to rescuers was subjected to detailed scrutiny thirty years later in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire,108 the case brought by those police officers who suffered psychiatric injury as a result of their experiences on duty at the Hillsborough Football Stadium disaster. Police officers played various roles at the scene and in dealing with its aftermath. Negligence was conceded by the Chief Constable, but while liability was admitted in relation to the shock suffered by those officers who actually entered the crowd enclosure or were stationed at the fence, it was disputed in relation to those whose involvement in the disaster was less immediate, for example in dealing with bodies and staffing the mortuary. The claims of this group were recognised by the majority in the Court of Appeal (although each judge adopted different reasoning)109 but the decision was overturned, again by a majority,110 in the House of Lords.111 The court noted, but declined to adopt, the so-called “Firefighters’ Rule” adopted in some United States jurisdictions, to the effect that firefighters or police officers normally have no claim when injured by risks that they are employed to confront.112 Eschewing a special category for rescuers suffering from psychiatric injury, the House of Lords held that rescuers were entitled to recover as primary victims only if they had been within range of foreseeable physical injury, or as secondary victims only in the unlikely event that they 107 108 109 110 111 112

[1967] 1 WLR 912 per Waller J at 922. [1999] 2 AC 455. [1998] QB 254. With Lord Goff dissenting. [1999] 2 AC 455. For general discussion, see Dobbs, Law of Torts § 363. The rule was noted by Lord Goff at 471 and Lord Hoffmann at 511. Its application had been similarly rejected in Ogwo v Taylor [1988] AC 431.

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met the various criteria confirmed in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police113 and discussed above. Lord Hoffmann reflected upon Chadwick and adopted the “ex post facto rationalisation” that duty was owed to Mr Chadwick because he “might have been injured by a wrecked carriage collapsing on him as he worked among the injured” and he was thus in range of physical injury.114 Chadwick was therefore explained as an illustration of the principle later applied in Page v Smith,115 namely that duty is owed to a person placed foreseeably within range of physical danger, even if the injury actually suffered is not physical but psychiatric. The core requirement, however, was that a rescuer could be regarded as a primary victim only if “he objectively exposed himself to danger or reasonably believed that he was doing so”.116 That requirement was not met by the plaintiffs in this case. Similar reasoning has been applied in relation to firefighters claiming to have suffered psychiatric injury as a result of witnessing distressing events at the scene of a fire. Duty is established if such individuals meet the threshold requirements for classification as primary victims; in other situations they are treated as secondary victims and within the range of duty only in the narrow circumstances discussed above.117 The disinclination in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire to apply a special regime to rescuers was informed by two clearly articulated policy considerations.118 The first was the difficulty, without the control device of proximity to physical danger, of limiting the category of rescuers, and the prospect that those who had provided some trifling service at the scene of an accident might be brought within its definition. The second was the broader concern that the “floodgates” might be opened thereby to an “unacceptable” increase in claims, which would offend notions of distributive justice. In the particular context of the Hillsborough disaster, it might have been thought objectionable “that policemen, even as part of a general class of persons who rendered . . . assistance, should have the right to compensation for psychiatric injury out of public funds while the bereaved relatives are sent away with nothing”.119 In his dissenting speech in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, Lord Goff argued that the use of proximity to physical danger as a control mechanism created arbitrary divisions between those affected by psychiatric injury,120 and he pointed out that the trial judge in Chadwick had treated the 113 [1992] 1 AC 310. 114 [1999] 2 AC 455 at 509, citing Lord Griffiths in the Court of Appeal in McLoughlin v O’Brian [1981] QB 599 at 622. 115 [1996] 1 AC 155. 116 [1999] 2 AC 455 per Lord Steyn at 499. 117 Cullin v London Fire and Civil Defence Authority [1999] PIQR P314. 118 [1999] 2 AC 455 per Lord Hoffmann at 510. 119 [1999] 2 AC 455 per Lord Hoffmann at 510. 120 [1999] 2 AC 455 per Lord Goff at 487.

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existence of physical danger to Mr Chadwick as irrelevant.121 The Scottish Law Commission similarly, in its Report on Damages for Psychiatric Injury, argued that the requirement imposed upon rescuers in White was hard to justify,122 and it suggested that rescuers should not be barred from recovery merely because they were not at risk of physical harm. Instead, the rescuer’s status should be regarded as “a gateway which will allow him to claim reparation provided he can show that the mental harm sustained was a medically recognised mental disorder and that it was reasonably foreseeable that a person in the position of the victim would suffer such mental harm in the particular circumstances of the case”.123 The recommendations made by the Scottish Law Commission have not, however, been implemented,124 and there has been no subsequent indication in the Scottish or English courts of more generous treatment of rescuers.125

(b) Involuntary agents of injury 6.36

6.37

A further possibility is that, where A’s negligence has caused physical injury to B, a duty of care may also extend to C if C was bound up in events to the extent that C reasonably believed that C was the involuntary agent of that injury. The authorities on this point are not, however, entirely settled. One of the first cases to consider this issue was the English case of Dooley v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd.126 The plaintiff was a crane driver working in a shipyard when the sling on the crane broke, dropping its load into the hold of a ship where men were at work. No one was hurt, but the court held that it was a “consequence reasonably to have been foreseen” of the negligent equipping of the crane that the driver would suffer nervous shock when the load fell, and the employer was held to be liable. At one time it was thought, on the basis of Dooley, that employers might owe a general duty of care to employees who suffered nervous shock due to witnessing accidents in the workplace, even where the employees had not themselves

121 [1967] 1 WLR 912, noted in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 2 AC 455 per Lord Goff at 486. 122 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Damages for Psychiatric Injury (Scot Law Com No 196, 2004) para 2.18. 123 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Damages for Psychiatric Injury para 3.52. 124 Following a consultation on Civil Law of Damages: Issues in Personal Injury (2013), the Scottish Government announced that it had no immediate plans to legislate on recovery for psychiatric injury: see http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0042/00429742.pdf. 125 See e.g. Greatorex v Greatorex [2000] 1 WLR 1970, in which it was reaffirmed that the plaintiff, a fireman, could claim no special status as a rescuer (notwithstanding that he was the father of the injured person). 126 [1951] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 271.

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been physically injured.127 This generous view of the employer’s duty of care has not survived, however.128 Although this specific point was not at issue in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police,129 Lord Oliver favoured a narrow interpretation of cases such as Dooley, as meaning that duty might be recognised “where the negligent act of the defendant has put the plaintiff in the position of being, or of thinking that he is about to be or has been, the involuntary cause of another’s death or injury and the illness complained of stems from the shock to the plaintiff of the consciousness of this supposed fact”.130 In Robertson v Forth Road Bridge Joint Board131 the First Division likewise acknowledged a category of primary victim where the pursuer’s “own hand, or his own act” was the cause or supposed cause of injury to another. In White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire132 the House of Lords also rejected a more generous construction of Dooley although it did not express a clear view on the circumstances in which employees who had been the “involuntary cause” of injury to another could claim the status of primary victims. Lord Hoffmann ventured only that “there may be grounds for treating such a rare category of case as exceptional and exempt from the Alcock control mechanisms”.133 Notwithstanding the uncertainty over the scope of duty, the House of Lords gave further credence to this category in a case arising out of a very different context. In W v Essex County Council,134 the plaintiffs, a couple, had agreed to foster a teenage boy after having been falsely assured by the defendants that the boy was not known to have sexually abused other children. The foster child went on to abuse the plaintiffs’ four children while living in their house, and the parents brought a claim in respect of the psychiatric injury they had suffered on discovering this. The court referred back to Alcock, and the proposition that duty might be imposed where “the defendant’s negligent conduct has foreseeably put the plaintiff in the position of being an unwilling participant in the event”.135 The claim 127 See also Galt v British Railways Board (1983) 133 NLJ 870; Wigg v British Railways Board (1986) 136 NLJ 446, The Times, 4 Feb 1986. 128 Note that the point at issue in this context is the employer’s duty of care to those employees witnessing sudden shocking events in the workplace. The extent of the employer’s duty to protect employees against ongoing occupational stress is noted at para 6.45 below and discussed in greater detail in chapter 12. 129 [1992] 1 AC 310. 130 [1992] 1 AC 310 per Lord Oliver at 408. 131 1995 SC 364 per Lord President Hope at 372. 132 [1999] 2 AC 455 per Lord Goff at 479, Lord Hoffmann at 507–508. For discussion see F Leverick, “Counting the Ways of Becoming a Primary Victim: Anderson v Christian Salvesen Plc” (2007) 11 EdinLR 258. 133 [1999] 2 AC 455 per Lord Hoffmann at 508. 134 [2001] 2 AC 592. 135 [1992] 1 AC 310 per Lord Oliver at 408, cited in W v Essex County Council [2001] 2 AC 592 per Lord Slynn at 601.

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was permitted to proceed to trial, on the basis that there was nothing in the prior authorities to prevent the parents being recognised as primary victims if their injury derived from “a feeling that they brought the abuser and the abused together” or “a feeling of responsibility that they did not detect earlier what was happening”.136 Lord Slynn’s analysis was prefaced with the observation that “the categorisation of those claiming to be included as primary or secondary victims is not as I read the cases finally closed. It is a concept still to be developed in different factual situations.”137 Against that background it was subsequently held in two Outer House cases that duty had been relevantly averred where the pursuer had unwittingly played a part in another’s injury, but neither provides satisfactory guidance on the precise scope of duty. In the first case, Salter v UB Frozen and Chilled Foods Ltd,138 the pursuer was the driver of a forklift truck transporting a “cage” in which two colleagues were travelling. The truck jerked forward, causing one of the men to sustain fatal head injuries. The driver had not been at physical risk but suffered psychiatric injury. Although the court might perhaps have found a relevant case to have been made against the employer on the grounds that the driver believed himself to have been the cause of harm, Temporary Judge J G Reid QC stated that “active participation was sufficient” to establish duty and allowed the claim to proceed to proof on that basis.139 Such a statement is difficult to reconcile with the analysis of duty in cases such as Page v Smith140 and White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, as well as Robertson v Forth Road Bridge Joint Board, and the case must therefore be regarded as being of doubtful authority in that respect.141 In the second case, Anderson v Christian Salvesen plc,142 the pursuer was the driver of a lorry which, in being manoeuvred out of a loading bay, crushed and fatally injured a colleague working in the trailer behind. Lord Drummond Young regarded this as a “classic instrumentality case”, and on that basis held it to be relevant. However, he left the key questions of “whether it is possible for a person who is instrumental in a death to recover for psychiatric loss, and the possible limitations on that right” to be resolved only once the facts had been explored at proof.143 In summary, therefore, there is broad acceptance in Scotland as well as in England that duty of care may be relevantly averred in “instrumentality cases”. However, important questions remain in regard to the scope of 136 137 138 139 140 141 142

[2001] 2 AC 592 per Lord Slynn at 601. [2001] 2 AC 592 at 601. 2004 SC 233. 2004 SC 233 at paras 21 and 27. [1996] 1 AC 155. See D Kinloch, “Salter v UB Frozen and Chilled Foods Ltd” 2003 SLT (News) 261. [2006] CSOH 101, 2006 SLT 815. See F Leverick, “Counting the Ways of Becoming a Primary Victim: Anderson v Christian Salvesen Plc” (2007) 11 EdinLR 258. 143 [2006] CSOH 101, 2006 SLT 815 at para 9.

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duty. None of the cases so far has given clear guidance on foreseeability. Does the “eggshell skull” rule that is allowed to victims who have been within range of physical danger144 also extend to victims in this category, even though they may not have been at physical risk, so that duty may extend to them even where they are abnormally sensitive to psychiatric injury? And if it is enough that victims “think” themselves to have been the involuntary cause of injury, how is that thought process to be gauged, and to what extent is it required to be rational? The Court of Appeal has rejected the claim of an employee whose belief in his own culpability was deemed “irrational”, but it left unresolved the “conundrum” of identifying which categories of victim should be entitled to recover damages for “guilt-induced depression”.145

(c) Mothers of children injured before birth Where due to the negligence of medical staff prior to its delivery a baby has been still-born, died shortly after birth, or suffered disability, it seems that the mother may claim as a primary victim for any psychiatric injury that she has suffered in consequence. Although medical negligence was not in the end established in Wells v University Hospital Southampton NHS Foundation Trust,146 it was said that the mother of a still-born baby would have been categorised as a primary victim because the medical errors alleged to have caused the baby’s death occurred prior to the delivery, and therefore at a time when the mother and the baby were still considered as one person. The father, on the other hand, who was also present at the birth, would have been categorised as a secondary victim and would not have met the criteria required of such victims.147 Similar reasoning was applied in YAH v Medway NHS Foundation Trust148 in which the claimant claimed damages for psychiatric injury suffered following the trauma of her daughter’s birth, the daughter being placed immediately in a special care unit with a subsequent diagnosis of cerebral palsy. As it was medical negligence before the birth that caused damage to the child, and as this had therefore occurred at a time when mother and baby were one single physical entity, the mother was regarded as a primary victim. This meant that she did not

144 See para 6.11 above. 145 Hunter v British Coal Corporation [1999] QB 140 per Brooke LJ at para 153; see also Monk v PC Harrington Ltd [2008] EWHC 1879 (QB), [2009] PIQR P3, denying duty where the claimant’s belief that he might have somehow caused the accident was considered “unreasonable”. 146 [2015] EWHC 2376 (QB), [2015] Med LR 477. 147 See paras 6.17–6.27 above. The court held that, in any event, any injury that the father suffered was not due to witnessing a sudden “shocking event”: see [2015] EWHC 2376 (QB), [2015] Med LR 477 at para 86. 148 [2018] EWHC 2964 (QB), [2019] 1 WLR 1413. See also Wild v Southend University Hospital NHS Trust [2014] EWHC 4053 (QB), applying similar reasoning.

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require to meet the restrictive criteria imposed upon secondary victims to make a claim for her psychiatric injury. To the extent that they conceptualise the distress to the mother as “purely” psychiatric, such cases seem anomalous. After all, if mother and baby are to be considered as a single physical entity prior to the baby’s birth, then the antenatal physical damage to the baby was, in legal terms, inflicted upon the mother. The psychiatric injury which she suffered as a consequence must be regarded as derivative from that injury to her physical person, notwithstanding that the child when born may enjoy an independent right of action in regard to that damage.149 This is not therefore “pure psychiatric injury” in the sense seen for example in Page v Smith.150

C. RELATIONAL DUTIES OF CARE (1) In general 6.44

As conceded in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police,151 the control mechanisms discussed in that case as applicable to primary and secondary victims of single shocking incidents were “plainly never intended to apply to all cases of psychiatric injury”.152 In particular, they are usually inappropriate where a pre-existing relationship between the parties entails an ongoing duty of protection against psychiatric harm. Such relational duties of care can be seen where the parties were already known to each other and where the nature of their relationship entails an assumption of responsibility by one of the parties in regard to the well-being of the other. In cases of this nature the restrictive Alcock criteria are displaced, and, as Latham LJ stated in Butchart v Home Office,153 “what has to be determined is the nature and potential scope of the duty of care in the light of the relationship between the claimant and defendant”. In Butchart itself the claimant, who was suffering from depression, had been imprisoned in a cell with another individual known to be a suicide risk. The claimant found the body when the cell-mate hanged himself, and he claimed to have suffered psychiatric harm as a “result of the cumulative effect of being incarcerated with an increasingly disturbed man”.154 The court held that where the defendants had responsibility for custody of a vulnerable individual it was “inevitable that the duty of care which the defendant owed to the claimant 149 Such a right of action is conferred in England by the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 s 1. In Scotland it is generally accepted that the common law confers a comparable right on a child in regard to ante-natal injury: see para 2.22 above. 150 [1996] 1 AC 155; see paras 6.10 and 6.11 above. 151 [1992] 1 AC 310. 152 White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 2 AC 455 per Lord Hoffmann at 504. 153 [2006] EWCA Civ 239, [2006] 1 WLR 1155 at para 20. See also C McIvor, “Liability for Psychiatric Harm” (2007) 23 Professional Negligence 249. 154 [2006] EWCA Civ 239, [2006] 1 WLR 1155 per Latham LJ at para 15.

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included a duty to take reasonable steps to minimise the risk of psychiatric harm”.155 A relevant claim was therefore made out in relation to his alleged injury. The employment relationship is a further, very common, setting for such a relational duty of care; the employer’s duty in regard to protection of employees against occupational stress is considered further in chapter 12. The duty of educational authorities to take care for the well-being of children at school, for example by dealing appropriately with incidents of bullying, is arguably another manifestation of a relational duty of care.156

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(2) Communication of medical information A further context in which relational duties of care may arise is where healthcare providers find themselves in the position of having to communicate shocking information to patients or relatives.157 The English case of Allin v City and Hackney Health Authority158 illustrates. In Allin the plaintiff was misinformed after a difficult caesarean section that her baby had died at birth, and it was six hours before she found out that the baby had in fact survived. The court found it established that the plaintiff had suffered posttraumatic stress syndrome as a result, and allowed her claim. The question of whether medical staff had a duty not to misinform patients was not seriously challenged.159 However, the awkwardness of locating informationproviders within the sudden accident paradigm is demonstrated by Farrell v Avon Health Authority.160 In Farrell a father was misinformed on arriving at the hospital that his newborn son had died, and was given the corpse of a baby to hold, only to be told some twenty minutes later that there had been a mistake, and that his own child was alive. Thereafter he developed post-traumatic stress syndrome which the court found to have been caused largely by this negligent communication of erroneous information. Applying the Alcock rules, Bursell J made the obvious point that the father could not be a “secondary” victim since he had not witnessed negligent injury to another. His rather strained interpretation of events was instead that the 155 [2006] EWCA Civ 239, [2006] 1 WLR 1155 per Latham LJ at para 20. 156 See e.g. Bradford-Smart v West Sussex County Council [2002] EWCA Civ 7, [2002] 1 FCR 425. There is also authority from the sheriff court to suggest that a relevant case may be made in relation to distress suffered due to the “scourge of bullying” at school, although this conclusion appears to be based upon authority concerning impairment of educational opportunity: see Wands v Fife Council 2009 GWD 30–477 per Sheriff Way at para 30, citing Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619. 157 See discussion in H Teff, Causing Psychiatric and Emotional Harm (2009) 103–109. 158 [1996] 7 Med LR 167. 159 For discussion, see N Mullany, “Liability for Careless Communication of Traumatic Information” (1998) 114 LQR 380; R Mulheron, Medical Negligence: Non-Patient and Third Party Claims (2010) ch 8. 160 [2001] Lloyd’s Rep Med 458.

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father was “clearly a primary victim as he was physically involved in the incident itself”. In fact it was equally clear that the father did not fit within the definition in Page v Smith161 of having been “well within the range of foreseeable physical injury”.162 Arguably the more appropriate approach would have been to apply the general criteria for duty of care, considering in particular whether the hospital authorities had assumed responsibility towards the father in these circumstances, and whether it was foreseeable that this manner of misinformation would cause psychiatric illness to a person of reasonable fortitude.163 Both Allin and Farrell concerned negligent communication of misinformation. There is further English authority to suggest, that even where the distressing medical information is true (as it usually will be), there is a duty to convey it sensitively with regard to its potential for psychiatric injury. In AB v Tameside and Glossop Health Authority164 the plaintiffs were obstetric patients who had at one time been treated by a health worker later found to be HIV positive. The patients were informed of this in a letter from the health authority which also counselled them of a “remote” risk that they would have been infected. Although it was recognised that there was no precedent for imposing liability for the careless notification of accurate, but upsetting, news, the defendants conceded that the general duty to take reasonable care as between health authorities and their patients encompassed the communication of information. In the light of the concession, the nature and extent of that duty was not further explored, and the court concentrated instead on whether the duty had been breached. In the event, the claim was dismissed because, although the sending of the letters in question might not have been the optimum method of reducing distress to the claimants, it was nevertheless a reasonable way of transmitting this news to those potentially affected. While there may be no general duty “to break bad news gently”165 to individuals with whom the bearer of the news has no previous connection, a pre-existing relationship between the parties (such as between health authority and patient) is highly relevant to determining whether a duty can be made out.166

D. ANXIETY REGARDING FUTURE PHYSICAL RISK 6.48

Finally, there is a further group of cases in which, exceptionally, a claim for psychiatric injury may succeed even though the pursuer has not been in the 161 [1996] 1 AC 155; see paras 6.10 and 6.11 above. 162 [2001] Lloyd’s Rep Med 458. 163 H Teff, Causing Psychiatric and Emotional Harm (2009) 98–99. See also S Deakin and Z Adams, Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law, 8th edn (2019) 119–120. 164 [1997] 8 Med LR 91, (1997) 35 BMLR 79. 165 Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383 per Windeyer J at 407. 166 For discussion, see N Mullany, “Liability for Careless Communication of Traumatic Information” (1998) 114 LQR 380.

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immediate range of physical danger. This is where the defender’s alleged negligence has exposed the pursuer to the future risk of physical harm, and where it was reasonably foreseeable not only that the pursuer would fear such harm, but also that psychiatric illness would be triggered as a result of that anxiety. The main English case in point is Group B Plaintiffs v Medical Research Council,167 in which a group of child sufferers of dwarfism were treated under a government-sponsored programme by being injected with a human-growth hormone harvested from cadavers. The programme was suspended after several years when it became known that a small number of those treated had gone on to develop Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, an incurable and fatal condition. The plaintiffs had not themselves developed the disease, but since the disease had a long incubation period, they alleged that the fear of its future occurrence had caused them to suffer psychiatric illness. Page v Smith168 was distinguished since the defendants’ actions in administering the treatment had not put those treated in the way of immediate physical danger. Nonetheless, taking a small “incremental step forward”, Morland J found duty of care to be established on the basis of the close relationship “akin to that of doctor and patient” between the defendants and the recipients of the hormone therapy.169 That duty was breached by injecting the patients with the growth hormone at a time when the defendants might reasonably have foreseen – and indeed there was evidence that they did actually foresee – that news would get out of deaths from CJD and that their patients might suffer psychiatric injury on learning of the risk. Compensation was therefore payable to those that proved that their psychiatric illness was “genuine” and was caused by awareness of this risk. 170 Morland J did not classify the plaintiffs as primary victims as such, and warned of the “incalculable” ramifications of doing so, opening the way for countless litigants who had at one time been exposed to substances such as asbestos or radiation. That warning was noted when, a few years later, a group of such claimants brought a claim before the English courts. As decided in Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd, discussed in chapter 31,171 the English courts have set themselves against classifying pleural plaques on the lungs as a form of personal injury, because the plaques are generally asymptomatic and do not in themselves increase susceptibility to illness. It was further argued in Rothwell that, since the presence of pleural plaques signals past exposure to asbestos, those diagnosed with the condition had been made anxious as to the future possibility of

167 168 169 170 171

(1998) 41 BMLR 157. [1996] 1 AC 155; see paras 6.10 and 6.11 above. (1998) 41 BMLR 157 at 165. (1998) 41 BMLR 157 at 169. [2008] 1 AC 281; see para 31.19 below.

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6.50

serious lung disease, and indeed one of the plaintiffs had suffered depressive illness. However, the House of Lords refused to recognise the fear of future disease as actionable in this context. Although reference was made to Group B Plaintiffs v Medical Research Council, the Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease litigation was distinguished, primarily in terms of the foreseeability of illness. In the earlier case the court had found that the patients’ susceptibility to psychiatric harm was not only foreseeable but had actually been foreseen, whereas the court regarded employers as unlikely to have been able to predict how employees would react to the risk of asbestosrelated disease decades after they had been exposed to it. In the absence of the special circumstances of Page v Smith (exposure to physical risk), Lord Hoffmann stated that the general rule required the court to decide “whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the event which actually happened (in this case, the creation of a risk of an asbestos-related disease) would cause psychiatric illness to a person of reasonable fortitude”.172 In this case there was found to be no basis for such a finding. In an Outer House case heard shortly before the House of Lords decision in Rothwell, Wright v Stoddard International plc, it was observed that Rothwell would “definitively state the law on the recoverability of damages for pleural plaques”.173 As discussed below, however, legislation was enacted by the Scottish Parliament a short time later to provide that pleural plaques in themselves constitute personal injury.174 The practical implications of the Rothwell decision are therefore much diminished in relation to those affected by pleural plaques in Scotland.

172 [2008] 1 AC 281 at para 30. 173 [2007] CSOH 173, 2008 Rep LR 2 per Lord Uist at para 157. 174 See para 31.19 below.

Chapter 7

Public Authorities

Para A. INTRODUCTION������������������������������������������������������������������� 7.01 B. NEGLIGENCE IN PERFORMANCE OF STATUTORY FUNCTIONS (1) The changing role of policy considerations��������������������������� 7.06 (2) The legacy of Osman v United Kingdom and public authority “immunity”���������������������������������������������������������� 7.14 (3) The duty to intervene���������������������������������������������������������� 7.17 (a) Assumption of responsibility������������������������������������������ 7.19 (b) Relationship of control�������������������������������������������������� 7.25 (4) “The scheme of the legislation”������������������������������������������� 7.26 C. HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998�������������������������������������������������� 7.31 D. DELIBERATE MISUSE OF STATUTORY POWERS������������� 7.35 (1) Deliberate misuse���������������������������������������������������������������� 7.37 (2) Malice�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7.38 (a) Targeted malice������������������������������������������������������������ 7.39 (b) Untargeted malice��������������������������������������������������������� 7.40 (3) Omissions��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7.44 E. POSTSCRIPT: BREACH OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW������� 7.45

A. INTRODUCTION The term “public authority” has no settled definition for the purposes of the law of negligence,1 but for present purposes it is taken to mean a body which exercises its functions in the public interest, including ministries of state, local authorities, the police and rescue services, prison authorities, and regulatory bodies. The Human Rights Act 1998, section 6(3), is similarly non-specific, but identifies as a public body “a court or tribunal, and any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature”. The question whether a body’s functions are “functions of a public nature” has generally been interpreted broadly and turns on how   1 But see e.g. Marshall v Scottish Milk Marketing Board 1956 SC (HL) 37, discussing the definition of “public authority” in the now repealed Public Authorities Protection Act 1893 s 1, as being applicable to “any person for any act done in pursuance, or execution, or intended execution of any Act of Parliament, or of any public duty or authority”.

249

7.01

250   The Law of Delict in Scotland

7.02

“closely assimilated”2 the function at issue is to those of bodies such as local authorities. The Human Rights Act 1998, section 6(5) also allows for the possibility that a body may be a hybrid, so that for the purposes of the Act it may be classified as a public body in regard to some of its functions and a private entity in regard to others. In Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association v Donoghue,3 for example, the Court of Appeal classified a housing association as a functional public authority in its role as a landlord of social housing, but allowed that the raising of private finance by the same organisation might be regarded as a private function. It is arguable that a similar form of split identity might also be recognised for the purposes of the law of negligence. The primary means of holding public authorities to account for maladministration are by judicial review, complaints to the relevant ombudsman, or the statutory grievance or review procedures as set out in the statute under which the public authority was operating in exercising the function in question. In addition, however, wrongful conduct by a public authority may give rise to a private law claim by the party wronged. Until the mid-twentieth century the Crown enjoyed immunity against liability in reparation (an immunity that was removed by the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, section 2)4, but public authorities and their officers have not traditionally been protected from suit. As explained in chapter 2,5 there is no general rule against public authorities suing or being sued in delict. Indeed, one of the earliest uses of the term “negligence” in Scotland was in relation to breach of public duty by officials.6 During the first half of the twentieth century the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893 placed narrow time limits on claims against public bodies for breach of statutory duties or powers,7 but that legislation was repealed in 1954.8 Today public authorities are subject to delictual liability in the same way as private individuals or private entities: “if conduct would be tortious if committed by a private person or body, it is generally equally tortious if committed by a public authority”.9

 2 Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association v Donoghue [2001] EWCA Civ 595, [2002] QB 48 per Lord Woolf CJ at para 66; cf Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 AC 546.   3 [2001] EWCA Civ 595, [2002] QB 48.   4 See para 2.38 above.   5 See paras 2.38–2.39 above; see also P Craig, Administrative Law, 8th edn (2016) ch 30.   6 See para 1.04 above; see also H McKechnie, “Delict and Quasi-Delict”, in G C H Paton (ed), Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Stair Society vol 20, 1958) 265 at 266–267.   7 For discussion, see J A Weir, “Governmental Liability” [1989] Public Law 40 at 48. Note that the 1893 Act did not, however, extend to legislation that applied to Scotland only (s 3).   8 Law Reform (Limitation of Actions, &c) Act 1954 s 1.  9 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at paras 32–33.

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The law of negligence may thus be invoked against public authorities in much the same way as against private entities. Public authorities are under a duty of care to avoid positive actions that would injure others, subject only to limited exceptions where the conduct in question is authorised by statute.10 This includes a duty to avoid the infliction of economic loss, within the limits already discussed in chapter 5.11 Public authorities are, moreover, vicariously liable for the negligence of their employees acting within the scope of their employment where the employee’s conduct causes actionable harm to another.12 If, for example, employees driving vehicles within the scope of their employment cause road traffic accidents, the employer authority is vicariously liable to third parties injured thereby. Hospital authorities owe the same duty to their patients whether they are operating within the National Health Service or the private sector, and schools similarly owe the same duty to their pupils whether they are publicly funded or privately operated.13 Furthermore, as stated in Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police,14 public authorities, like private entities, are not generally liable for their omissions, as discussed further below. Where harm is caused to P by D’s breach of a statutory duty, a private law right of action is recognised, regardless of whether D is a public authority or a private entity, provided only that the statutory provisions are sufficiently precise as to indicate a clear parliamentary intention to protect the interests of A or of a specific group of persons which includes P. Many actions brought under the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960, for example, have involved public authority defenders, as the cases cited in chapter 25 demonstrate. On the other hand, in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council,15 claims that a public authority had acted in breach of statutes relating to child welfare16 did not succeed, because the duties contained in that legislation were regarded as being for the benefit of the community as a whole, rather than offering a private law right of action to specific individuals who might have benefited from the proper exercise of those duties. In addition, claims may be brought in negligence where a public authority has failed to exercise due care in performing its statutory functions. This is the subject of the present chapter. A claim in negligence will 10 Geddis v Proprietors of the Bann Reservoir (1877–78) LR 3 App Cas 430; see also Manchester Ship Canal Co Ltd v United Utilities Water plc [2014] UKSC 40, [2014] 1 WLR 2576 per Lord Sumption at para 2. While statutory authority may in principle be relevant to any form of delictual liability, in practice it is most likely to apply in relation to actions in nuisance: see paras 22.64–22.66 below. 11 See e.g. Sebry v Companies House [2015] EWHC 115 (QB), [2016] 1 WLR 2499. 12 See e.g. Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619 per Lord Slynn at 654. 13 See Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 per Lord Toulson at para 112. 14 [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736. 15 [1995] 2 AC 633. 16 Children and Young Persons Act 1969; Child Care Act 1980; Children Act 1989.

7.03

7.04

7.05

252   The Law of Delict in Scotland

succeed only if the circumstances are such as to give rise to a common law duty of care between the public authority and the pursuer.17 In other words, there is no “action for negligent breach of a statutory duty, distinct from the claim in the tort of negligence and from the action at private law for breach of statutory duty”.18 It is in this category, however, that difficulties typically arise in relation to public authority defenders. A particular problem is that very often what is alleged is not active conduct on the part of the authority but an omission. The general rule, applicable to private entities as well as to public authorities, is that there is no duty to prevent the occurrence of harm to others.19 There are thus only limited circumstances in which public authorities may come under such protective duties of care. Similarly, public authorities only rarely owe a duty to protect others from the wrongdoing of third parties, and on this point the principles explained in Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd,20 in which the defender was a private entity, were taken in Mitchell v Glasgow City Council21 to apply to public authorities.

B. NEGLIGENCE IN PERFORMANCE OF STATUTORY FUNCTIONS (1) The changing role of policy considerations 7.06

For several decades in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries the incidence of duty of care upon public authorities in the performance of their statutory functions was seen as “remarkably resistant to the development of a coherent and stable set of legal principles”.22 The expansive approach to duty of care in the 1970s and 1980s, following the decision of the House of Lords in Anns v London Borough of Merton,23 had important consequences for public authority defenders. Lord Wilberforce’s speech in Anns set out a two-stage test for duty, eliding foreseeability and proximity in the first stage, and, if these criteria were satisfied, asking only if there were public policy considerations to “negative” or limit the scope of duty.24 The open-endedness of that formulation presented particular problems for public authorities. Many public authority functions involve interactions with the public that are of a protective nature only, or have

17 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, as explained by Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 732–735. See also P Craig, Administrative Law, 8th edn (2016) para 30–001. 18 J Steele, Tort Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, 4th edn (2017) 407. 19 See paras 4.44 ff above. 20 1987 SC (HL) 37. 21 [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21; see para 4.46 above. 22 D Fairgrieve and D Squires, The Negligence Liability of Public Authorities, 2nd edn (2018) para 1.02. 23 [1978] AC 728, as discussed in paras 4.13–4.14 above. 24 [1978] AC 728 at 751–752.

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consequences that are purely economic, yet they could readily be seen as creating proximity between the parties and involving foreseeable harms. In such cases, Anns in effect allowed duty to be established unless the public authority defenders identified persuasive public policy reasons with which to rebut its imposition. The decision in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman,25 while not directly relevant to public authorities, reined in these developments to an extent, but was “widely misunderstood”26 as allowing a creative approach to duty wherever the court could be persuaded that its imposition was “fair, just and reasonable”. Caparo did little therefore to halt the flow of decisions in which public policy considerations were cited in determining the scope of public authority duty, leading to evaluations of public policy that the courts were not always adequately equipped to conduct.27 The best known of such decisions was X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council.28 In X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council a number of claims were conjoined in proceedings before the House of Lords. One group of cases was brought by abused or neglected children who alleged that the local authorities’ failure to remove them into care was negligent. In another case a child wrongfully removed into care, and her mother, argued that the local authority had been negligent in so doing. In a further group of cases it was claimed that local authorities had negligently failed to make appropriate educational provision for children with special needs. In respect of the educational cases29 the court considered that the defendant authorities might be held vicariously liable for the professional negligence of their employee teachers and psychologists, but in none of the cases was it held to be fair, just and reasonable to impose direct liability upon the authorities for their failure to exercise due care in the performance of their statutory duties. A combination of factors lay behind this decision. In the child welfare cases it was feared that the imposition of duty “would cut across the whole statutory system”, and involve passing judgment on a complex and sensitive decision-making process in which different agencies had overlapping roles.30 It was thought to be not only unfair but disruptive of working relationships to pin liability on one such agency in particular, and indeed the threat of litigation might lead to defensive practices in future.31 Recognition of duty was said to bring the risk of hopeless cases taking up 25 [1990] 2 AC 605; see paras 4.15–4.17 above. 26 GN v Poole Borough Council [2019] UKSC 25, [2020] AC 780 per Lord Reed at para 30; see also paras 4.18–4.23 above. 27 See GN v Poole Borough Council [2019] UKSC 25, [2020] AC 780 per Lord Reed at para 30. 28 [1995] 2 AC 633. 29 The “Dorset”, “Hampshire”, and “Bromley” cases. In the Dorset case, it was further held that the authority might be liable for the negligent operation of its psychology service. 30 [1995] 2 AC 633 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 749–750. 31 [1995] 2 AC 633 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 750.

7.07

254   The Law of Delict in Scotland

7.08

7.09

the time and resources of public authorities, which was particularly undesirable given that administrative complaints procedures already existed.32 A recurring concern was that the coherence of public law redress should not be compromised by the intervention of private law remedies. This had been addressed in Anns itself by distinguishing policy and operational matters. It was acknowledged that statutes conferred a discretion on public authorities in areas of policy in which it was not normally appropriate for the courts to intervene. By contrast, a common law duty of care might more readily be “superimposed” in operational areas involving the practical execution of policy decisions.33 In X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council, similarly, decision-making cases involving the exercise of a statutory discretion were said in principle to be non-justiciable, unless the decision in question was so plainly “unreasonable” that it fell altogether outside the ambit of the authority’s statutory discretion.34 These were differentiated from cases concerning the manner in which a statutory function had been implemented. The latter were justiciable by reference to the “ordinary principles of negligence” and therefore open to imposition of duty of care.35 Although the “delicate and difficult” nature of responsibilities shouldered by public authorities in child-welfare cases continued to attract sympathy,36 it was not long before the policy considerations that had played an important role in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council were reappraised. In Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council, a case involving the negligent mismanagement of the arrangements made for a child taken into care, the court commented that the fear of encouraging defensive practices by public authorities should normally carry little weight,37 and also that administrative remedies might not be as “efficacious” as the imposition of duty of care in encouraging good practice, so that their availability should not necessarily preclude duty.38 Shortly afterwards, in Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council,39 a case involving alleged negligence by teachers 32 33 34 35

[1995] 2 AC 633 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 761–762. [1978] AC 728 per Lord Wilberforce at 754. X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 736–737. X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 735–738; see discussion e.g. in Gibson v Orr 1999 SC 420. 36 Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 550 per Lord Slynn at 572, observing that in these circumstances the courts should not be “too ready” to find negligence. 37 [2001] 2 AC 550 per Lord Slynn at 568. See also Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 per Lord Toulson at para 121, Lord Kerr at paras 184–185, doubting the force of arguments on “defensive” practices in cases involving the police, and commenting upon the absence of empirical evidence to demonstrate that the fear of litigation does indeed induce such a reaction. 38 [2001] 2 AC 550 per Lord Slynn at 568; see also Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619 per Lord Clyde at 672; Carty v Croydon London Borough Council [2005] EWCA Civ 19, [2005] 1 WLR 2312 per Dyson LJ at paras 52–53. 39 [2001] 2 AC 619.

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and educational psychologists in making educational arrangements for children with special needs, the House of Lords did not accept that the complexity of the disputed decision-making processes, or the risk of potentially vexatious litigation, counted against the imposition of duty upon public authorities. A subsequent decision by the Court of Appeal, in JD v East Berkshire Community NHS Trust,40 involved alleged negligence by public authorities in making unfounded accusations of child abuse. The court took notice of the reasoning in Barrett and Phelps, and in addition considered the implications of the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998. This further undermined the argument that recognition of duty in child welfare cases would not be fair, just and reasonable. Where alleged neglect by public authorities also infringed the claimants’ rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, a remedy would now be available to them under section 7 of the Act. It could not therefore be said that imposition of duty of care in negligence of itself encouraged unnecessary litigation since in many contexts, even if common law duty was denied, the prospect of direct action under the Human Rights Act 1998 remained.41 Duty was not in the end recognised in regard to most of the claimants in JD, and the Court of Appeal’s decision was upheld by the House of Lords, but Lord Nicholls stated that the law had “moved on” since the decision in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council: “Local authorities may owe common law duties to children in the exercise of their child protection duties.”42 The distinction drawn in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council between policy and operational matters was also called into question. The precise dividing line had often appeared “elusive”,43 and it was argued by commentators, almost immediately after X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council, that the distinction generated “unnecessary confusion” and should be abandoned in favour of the ordinary private law principles of negligence, which were sufficiently flexible and sophisticated to determine the scope of duty on the part of public authorities.44 Signs of a return to those principles were soon seen, in particular in two cases involving the liability of roads authorities, Stovin v Wise45 and Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council.46 As explained by Lord Steyn in Gorringe:47 40 41 42 43

[2003] EWCA Civ 1151, [2004] QB 558, affd [2005] UKHL 23, [2005] 2 AC 373. [2003] EWCA Civ 1151, [2004] QB 558 at paras 82–84. [2005] UKHL 23, [2005] 2 AC 373 at para 82. Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923 per Lord Hoffmann at 951. See also Barrrett v Enfield London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 550 per Lord Slynn at 571, pointing out that even knocking a nail into a piece of wood involves some choice or discretion about the use of resources, yet would normally be regarded as an operational matter. 44 S H Bailey and M J Bowman, “The Policy/Operational Dichotomy – A Cuckoo in the Nest” (1986) 45 CLJ 430 at 430. 45 [1996] AC 923 per Lord Hoffmann at 951. 46 [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057. 47 [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 at para 3.

7.10

256   The Law of Delict in Scotland “in a case founded on breach of statutory duty the central question is whether from the provisions and structure of the statute an intention can be gathered to create a private law remedy? In contradistinction in a case framed in negligence, against the background of a statutory duty or power, a basic question is whether the statute excludes a private law remedy?”

7.11

In cases where public authorities had “actually done acts or entered into relationships or undertaken responsibilities which give rise to a common law duty of care”, duty rested upon a “solid, orthodox common law foundation”, so that the peculiarity of such cases was simply whether the terms of the statute under which the authority was acting were such that duty was excluded.48 The example cited in Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council was that of a hospital trust in England providing healthcare pursuant to its public law duty in the National Health Service Act 1977,49 where the duty of care owed to patients was essentially the same as that owed by doctors to private patients.50 On the other hand, where what was at issue was an omission to perform a statutory duty, Lord Hoffmann stated:51 “If such a duty does not give rise to a private right to sue for breach, it would be unusual if it nevertheless gave rise to a duty of care at common law which made the public authority liable to pay compensation for foreseeable loss caused by the duty not being performed. It will often be foreseeable that loss will result if, for example, a benefit or service is not provided. If the policy of the Act is not to create a statutory liability to pay compensation, the same policy should ordinarily exclude the existence of a common law duty of care.”

7.12

A further important development was the decision of the Supreme Court in Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police,52 pointing out that since Caparo the role of fairness, justice and reasonableness in determining the scope of duty had often been misconstrued.53 There was no general rule that Caparo criteria could be applied in any case to impose or deny duty. In many contexts the existence or non-existence of duty had already been established, and it was therefore unnecessary and inappropriate to reconsider whether the imposition of duty was fair, just and reasonable. Where the existing authorities did not already provide an answer for the facts in hand, duty might be extended “incrementally and by analogy with

48 49 50 51 52 53

Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 at para 38. For Scotland, see the National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978. [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 per Lord Hoffmann at para 38. [1996] AC 923 at 952–953. [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736. [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 21. See paras 4.18–4.25 above.

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established authority”, but it was only in “novel types of case” that it was appropriate to consider not only the degree of proximity between the parties and the foreseeability of harm but also whether recognition or denial of duty was fair, just and reasonable.54 A further possibility acknowledged in Robinson55 was that, in a context where the existence or non-existence of duty had previously been established, the court might, very exceptionally, be invited to depart from that established line of authority, and in those circumstances it might be relevant to consider whether it was fair, just and reasonable to realign the boundaries of duty. This sequence of recent decisions was reviewed in GN v Poole Borough Council,56 in which Lord Reed’s judgment reaffirmed the following: (a) As a general rule it is only in novel circumstances, where the issue of duty has not previously been decided, that it is necessary or appropriate to consider whether the imposition of duty is fair, just and reasonable. Caparo did not introduce a “universal tripartite test” for the existence of a duty of care.57 (b) However, it is no longer good law that public policy considerations should preclude the imposition of a duty of care between public authorities and children with whom they have dealings in performance of their statutory functions under child welfare legislation. A more useful starting point for such cases is to consider “whether the case is one in which the defendant is alleged to have harmed the claimant, or one in which the defendant is alleged to have failed to provide a benefit to the claimant, for example by protecting him from harm”.58 (c) The basic premise is that:59 “[P]ublic authorities are prima facie subject to the same general principles of the common law of negligence as private individuals and organisations, and may therefore be liable for negligently causing individuals to suffer actionable harm but not, in the absence of some particular reason justifying such liability, for negligently failing to protect individuals from harm caused by others.”

(d) In cases where duty would normally be imposed upon a public authority on application of the common law of negligence, duty may nonetheless be excluded if this would be inconsistent with 54 55 56 57 58 59

[2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 27. [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 26. [2019] UKSC 25, [2020] AC 780. [2019] UKSC 25, [2020] AC 780 at para 64. [2019] UKSC 25, [2020] AC 780 at para 74. [2019] UKSC 25, [2020] AC 780 at para 75.

7.13

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the scheme of the legislation under which the public authority was operating. That approach is preferable to denying duty on broad grounds of public policy, yet still allows the courts to give due consideration to the “difficult choices . . . involved in the exercise of discretionary powers”.60

(2) The legacy of Osman v United Kingdom and public authority “immunity” 7.14

7.15

An important twenty-first-century development in the shaping of public authority liability was the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Osman v United Kingdom.61 The Osmans had brought a claim in negligence against the police in the English courts. Its substance was that, despite the threat of violence from a known assailant, the police had failed to intervene to prevent the father from being murdered and the son injured. After their claim was struck out on the basis that the police had owed the family no duty of care62 they then made application to the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that in striking out the claim, the domestic courts had denied the family’s right to a “fair and public hearing” in determination of their rights, as guaranteed by Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Their application was upheld on the basis that denial of duty had functioned as an absolute defence, which had prevented the courts from properly considering the competing public interests in a case of this nature. The immediate consequence of the decision in Osman was that the courts in England appeared less disposed to strike out negligence claims against public authorities,63 and in Scotland too Osman was cited in support of greater readiness to recognise duty.64 At the same time, the House of Lords described the reasoning in the case as “extremely difficult to understand”, and based on a misinterpretation of the criteria for duty.65 Not long afterwards, the European Court of Human Rights reformulated its position. In Z v United Kingdom,66 a case brought by various of the unsuccessful litigants in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council,67 the European Court 60 [2019] UKSC 25, [2020] AC 780 at para 75. 61 (2000) 29 EHRR 245. 62 Osman v Ferguson [1993] 4 All ER 344. Although the facts of the cases were not on all fours, the Court of Appeal regarded the decision of the House of Lords in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53 as presenting cogent policy reasons for refusing to recognise duty on the part of the police. 63 See e.g. Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 550; Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619. 64 See Gibson v Orr 1999 SC 420. 65 Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 550 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 558–559. 66 (2002) 34 EHRR 3. 67 [1995] 2 AC 633, discussed in paras 7.07 and 7.08 above.

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of Human Rights ruled that, although there had been a breach of Article 3 (prohibition of degrading treatment) and Article 13 (right to effective remedy), the decision of the House of Lords in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council that there was no duty of care had not breached Article 6(1). The Court effectively conceded that it had misconstrued failure to recognise duty of care in the circumstances of individual cases as the granting of an immunity to public authorities.68 The decision in Osman v United Kingdom lingered, however, in judicial memory. In particular, it led to a reappraisal of anything resembling an “immunity” – or concessions made to particular classes of defender that might be regarded as such.69 A rare survival of an immunity persists for actions taken by the armed forces in the course of “actual or imminent armed conflict”, although this “combat immunity” is construed narrowly and does not extend to negligence at an earlier stage before the commencement of hostilities.70

7.16

(3) The duty to intervene Allegations of negligence against public authorities are most problematic when they relate not to the authority’s positive conduct but to its failure to intervene in circumstances where statute conferred a power or discretion to do so. As reaffirmed in GN v Poole Borough Council,71 there is not usually a positive duty to act to protect others, or to prevent others from being harmed by actions of a third party.72 If in equivalent circumstances a private entity would have owed no duty, the fact that a public body has statutory powers to do something, or even a public law duty, does not of itself create a duty of care towards those persons affected by its failure to do so. As Lord Toulson pointed out in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police,73 while the principles regarding liability for omissions have evolved for the most part in cases involving private litigants, they are “equally applicable” where the defendant is a public body. This means that a positive duty to act is likely to be recognised only in exceptional circumstances.

68 (2002) 34 EHRR 3 at para 100; for commentary, see C Gearty, “Osman Unravels” (2002) 65 MLR 87. 69 In regard e.g. to the police: Brooks v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2005] UKHL 24, [2005] 1 WLR 1495; or to barristers: Arthur J S Hall & Co v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615, but for a different approach, continuing to recognise immunities for Scottish advocates and solicitors in criminal proceedings, see Wright v Paton Farrell [2006] CSIH 7, 2006 SC 404; or to expert witnesses: Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 13, [2011] 2 AC 398. See para 11.56. 70 Smith v Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41, [2014] AC 52. 71 [2019] UKSC 25, [2020] AC 780. 72 Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21 per Lord Hope at para 15. 73 [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 per Lord Toulson at para 101.

7.17

260   The Law of Delict in Scotland

7.18

As discussed in chapter 4,74 various non-exhaustive lists have been suggested of such exceptional circumstances.75 The main instances relevant to public authorities are situations (a) where there was a prior relationship by which the public authority assumed responsibility for the interests of another or others, or (b) where there was a relationship of control between the authority and the wrongdoer. Questions of duty may also arise from a public authority’s occupation of land, and these are discussed elsewhere in this volume.76

(a) Assumption of responsibility 7.19

7.20

The fact that a public authority has been charged with providing services in terms of a statutory scheme does not of itself create a sufficient nexus between the authority and those affected by the services in question.77 However, a duty of care may arise, by extension of the Hedley Byrne principle,78 where the authority’s conduct in pursuance of the statutory scheme involves an assumption of responsibility to protect from harm a particular person or class of persons.79 Aside from the context of employment and fiduciary relationships,80 duty arises in this way most notably in the provision of healthcare, welfare and educational services, or the custody of prisoners.81 In Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council,82 for example, the plaintiff had been taken into care as a young baby by the defendant authority and remained there throughout his childhood. He alleged that he had suffered long-term psychiatric problems because of a variety of negligent failings on the part of the authority. These included its failure to arrange for his

74 Paras 4.51–4.65 above. It is sometimes suggested that failure to avert danger where the defender was responsible for creating the source of that danger is to be regarded as a culpable omission, but, as argued at para 4.50, the more logical view is that duty is triggered in those circumstances by creation of the hazard, which is itself a form of active conduct. 75 Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21 per Lord Hope at para 23; a similar list was suggested by Lord Reed in GN v Poole Borough Council [2019] UKSC 25, [2020] AC 780 at para 76. 76 See paras 4.71–4.75 above; ch 22 (Nuisance); ch 25 (Occupiers’ Liability). 77 See X v Hounslow London Borough Council [2009] EWCA Civ 286 per Sir Anthony Clarke MR at para 60. 78 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; see paras 5.26 ff above. 79 GN v Poole Borough Council [2019] UKSC 25, [2020] AC 780 per Lord Reed at paras 66–73. See also Elguzouli-Daf v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1995] QB 335 per Steyn LJ at 350; Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 per Lord Hoffmann at paras 39–40; Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21 per Lord Hope at para 23; Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 per Lord Toulson at paras 100–101. 80 For employment relationships, see ch 12 below. 81 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 per Lord Toulson at para 101; GN v Poole Borough Council [2019] UKSC 25, [2020] AC 780 per Lord Reed at para 73. 82 [2001] 2 AC 550.

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adoption, for suitable placements in foster care, or for appropriate psychiatric treatment. The House of Lords accepted the argument that, in taking the plaintiff into care, the authority had assumed responsibility for his well-being and he had relied upon it so to do. The authority therefore owed him a duty to make reasonable provision in that regard, and this was not a “novel category” of negligence subject to public policy counterarguments under cover of the Caparo tripartite test.83 Similarly, in Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council 84 the plaintiffs had all been affected as children by disabilities or learning difficulties. They argued that the local authority, and teachers and educational psychologists employed by it, had failed to offer appropriate advice or make adequate provision for their education, causing them long-term educational disadvantage. Although the educational psychologists’ interaction with the children arose in their performance of their contractual duties to provide advisory services to the local authority, this did not mean that duty was not owed, in addition, to the children. As Lord Slynn explained in that case: 85

7.21

“[W]here an educational psychologist is specifically called in to advise in relation to the assessment and future provision for a specific child, and it is clear that the parents acting for the child and the teachers will follow that advice, prima facie a duty of care arises. It is sometimes said that there has to be an assumption of responsibility by the person concerned. That phrase can be misleading in that it can suggest that the professional person must knowingly and deliberately accept responsibility. It is, however, clear that the test is an objective one . . . The phrase means simply that the law recognises that there is a duty of care. It is not so much that responsibility is assumed as that it is recognised or imposed by the law. The question is thus whether in the particular circumstances the necessary nexus has been shown.”

By contrast, the “necessary nexus” was missing in GN v Poole Borough Council.86 The claimants in this case were two children, one with special needs, who with their mother had been placed in accommodation specially adapted for the family. The family became subject to a persistent campaign of harassment and physical and verbal abuse by a neighbouring family. Despite measures being taken by the authority against the persons responsible, this mistreatment continued until finally, five years after moving into the house, the claimants and their mother were provided with 83 [2001] 2 AC 550 per Lord Hutton at 589. As noted at para 7.09 above, the validity of some of those counterarguments was questioned. 84 [2001] 2 AC 619. 85 [2001] 2 AC 619 at 654. 86 [2019] UKSC 25, [2020] AC 780.

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alternative accommodation. The children argued that the authority had been negligent in its failure adequately to deal with the wrongdoing of the third parties. In particular they pointed to section 17 of the Children Act 1989, imposing a general duty on local authorities to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in need within their area, and section 47, imposing a duty to investigate where they have reasonable cause to suspect that a child is suffering significant harm. In effect, this was an allegedly negligent omission in the performance of the authority’s statutory duties, and accordingly the claim was based upon assumption of responsibility. However, the court distinguished the facts from cases such as Barrett, in which the defendant authority had taken the child into care, thereby actively taking over responsibility for his welfare. In the present case the council’s statutory duties to monitor and investigate the children’s welfare did not involve the provision of a service upon which the children or their mother could be expected to rely. Unlike in Barrett, the safety of the children had not been entrusted to the authority, and an assumption of responsibility could not be inferred from the way in which the authority had behaved towards the claimants.87 In a different context, the argument that a local authority had assumed responsibility for the personal safety of one of its tenants formed a central part of the pursuer’s pleadings in Mitchell v Glasgow City Council,88 in which the issue before the court was whether the authority had owed a tenant a duty of care to warn him of the risk of aggression from a neighbour. The tenant was murdered by the neighbour after a meeting with council employees who had told the neighbour that he risked eviction unless he desisted from antisocial behaviour. It was accepted in Mitchell that a duty of care might arise where responsibility had been assumed, but this occurred only exceptionally, where the authority had done so expressly or where the circumstances were such that it was to be regarded as having done so. In this instance, however, the House of Lords rejected the proposition that a duty to warn was within the scope of the relationship between the local authority and its tenant, noting that “The situation would have been different if there had been a basis for saying that the defenders had assumed a responsibility to advise the deceased of the steps that they were taking, or in some other way had induced the deceased to rely on them to do so”.89

87 [2019] UKSC 25, [2020] AC 780 per Lord Reed at paras 81–82. 88 [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21. 89 [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21 per Lord Hope at para 29. In the Inner House ([2008] CSIH 19, 2008 SC 351 at para 124), Lord Reed had discussed the concept of assumption of responsibility at length, concluding that here there had been “no suggestion that [the victim] requested the defenders to keep him informed of any action taken, or that the defenders agreed to do so, or that he relied on the defenders doing so. Nor is it suggested that he requested the defenders to keep the police informed, or that the defenders agreed to do so, or that he relied on the defenders’ doing so.”

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The concept of assumption of responsibility takes on particular significance in the context of alleged negligence by members of the emergency services, and these cases are discussed separately in chapter 9.

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(b) Relationship of control Alternatively, a duty of care may arise where the wrongdoer was a third party whom the public authority had a specific statutory responsibility to supervise or control.90 This requires examination of the relationship between the authority and the wrongdoer, and also of the foreseeability of injury not to the public in general but to the specific individual, or group of individuals, harmed.91 Such circumstances are typically found in contexts where the authority has a specific statutory duty to confine or control the movements of the wrongdoer. Chapter 492 has already discussed the circumstances in which a relevant relationship of control on the part of a public authority was recognised in Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office,93 and Kaizer v Scottish Ministers,94 but denied in Thomson v Scottish Ministers where it could not be shown that there was “a particular risk of damage as a result of negligence by the defenders”.95 As also discussed in chapter 4, education authorities looking after children during the school day may be regarded as undertaking a duty of care to supervise the children appropriately so as to avoid foreseeable risk to others.96

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(4) “The scheme of the legislation” In GN v Poole Borough Council97 Lord Reed stated that public authorities were subject to the same general principles of the common law of negligence as private entities, but with the qualification that “even if a duty of care would ordinarily arise on the application of common law principles, it may nevertheless be excluded or restricted by statute where it would be inconsistent with the scheme of the legislation under which the public authority is operating”. Although, as discussed in GN v Poole Borough Council, doubt has been cast on some of the reasoning previously applied in denying duty on public policy grounds, Lord Reed noted that this attention to the statutory 90 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 per Lord Toulson at para 99. 91 See Couch v Attorney General [2008] 3 NZLR 725 per Elias CJ at para 5. 92 See paras 4.62–4.64 above. 93 [1970] AC 1004. 94 [2017] CSOH 110, 2017 Rep LR 124, affd [2018] CSIH 36, 2018 SC 491. 95 [2013] CSIH 63, 2013 SC 628 at para 56 (emphasis added). See also New South Wales v Godfrey [2004] NSWCA 113. 96 See para 4.65 above, citing Carmarthenshire County Council v Lewis [1955] AC 549; Brown v Fulton (1881) 9 R 36. 97 [2019] UKSC 25, [2020] AC 780 at para 75.

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background allowed the courts to make allowance, for example, for “the difficult choices . . . involved in the exercise of discretionary powers”.98 It may also potentially identify concerns that overlap to a degree with those thought of as raising public policy considerations. This suggested aligning of the incidence of duty with the scheme of the legislation can already be seen in the Scottish case law. In K2 Restaurants Ltd v Glasgow City Council,99 for example, the defender Council had served a demolition notice on the upper floors of a tenement building in which the pursuer’s premises were situated on the ground floor, pursuant to a discretion conferred by the Building (Scotland) Act 1959, section 13(1) (now repealed and replaced). The Act also conferred power on the Council, under section 13(2) and (4), to take over and execute the necessary works itself if the relevant owners failed to do so, and the defender had exercised the power in this case. After the demolition work was carried out, brickwork from an exposed gable wall collapsed into the pursuer’s premises, causing major damage. The decision by the Council’s Director of Building Control to issue the demolition notice in the first place was within the ambit of the discretion conferred upon the Council by the statute, and it was, said the court, inconsistent with the statutory scheme that a common law duty of care should be imposed in regard to the manner in which that discretion was exercised. However, there was nothing “inconsistent with the statutory duty” in imposing a common law duty of care in regard to the practical operation of how the demolition was planned and executed.100 The Council was therefore held to have been under a duty to neighbouring proprietors to take care that their properties were not endangered in consequence of those works. As discussed further in chapter 8, recognition of “the difficult choices” entailed in the exercise of a statutory discretion is also apparent in some cases involving roads authorities. In Ryder v Highland Council,101 for example, the pursuer’s mother had been fatally injured when her car skidded on black ice on an untreated road. In an action against the roads authority, the pursuer argued that the accident would have been avoided had the authority employed a round-the-clock system for gritting its roads in winter. The Roads (Scotland) Act 1984, section 34, imposed a statutory duty upon roads authorities to “take such steps as they consider reasonable” to prevent snow and ice from endangering road safety, but, as Lord Tyre acknowledged, this required complex decision-making on the basis of expert advice and the implications for allocations of resources. He concluded that it was

  98   99 100 101

[2019] UKSC 25, [2020] AC 780 at para 75. [2013] CSIH 49, 2013 GWD 21–420. [2013] CSIH 49, 2013 GWD 21–420 per Lord Menzies at para 42. [2013] CSOH 95, 2013 SLT 847; see also para 8.24 below.

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not the intention when the 1984 Act was enacted that the body making such decisions in pursuance of its statutory duty should be held to a common law duty of care.102 Duty was not therefore recognised. Concern for consistency with the statutory scheme means that common law duty will not be recognised where this conflicts with the purpose of the duties or powers conferred by the statute. Such a conflict may be evident in cases involving regulatory bodies, for example. In Jain v Trent Strategic Health Authority,103 the defendant Health Authority was the regulator for the operators of nursing homes in its area. On the basis of a flawed and careless investigation it had abruptly withdrawn the registration of the care home operated by the claimants, resulting in considerable financial loss to them. Nonetheless, a duty of care was not imposed. As Lord Scott explained:104 “[W]here action is taken by a state authority under statutory powers designed for the benefit or protection of a particular class of persons, a tortious duty of care will not be held to be owed by the state authority to others whose interests may be adversely affected by an exercise of the statutory power. The reason is that the imposition of such a duty would or might inhibit the exercise of the statutory powers and be potentially adverse to the interests of the class of persons the powers were designed to benefit or protect, thereby putting at risk the achievement of their statutory purpose.”

Similarly, in Harris v Evans105 the Health and Safety Executive was held not to owe a common law duty of care to the operator of bungee-jumping facilities after a Health and Safety inspector wrongly reported the facilities as unsafe, causing local authorities to close the business down. The function of providing safety advice to businesses was allotted to the Health and Safety Executive in terms of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974. Whether a duty of care was owed, said the Court of Appeal, depended on “whether the imposition of the requisite duty was consistent” with the statutory scheme within which the defendant was operating.106 It was implicit in the 1974 Act that economic loss might be caused where adverse decisions were made. In the court’s view, it would interfere with the proper discharge by enforcing authorities of their responsibilities in respect of

102 103 104 105

[2013] CSOH 95, 2013 SLT 847 at para 52. [2009] UKHL 4, [2009] 1 AC 853. [2009] UKHL 4, [2009] 1 AC 853 at para 28. Harris v Evans [1998] 1 WLR 1285. See also Reeman v Department of Transport [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 648, [1997] PNLR 618 (no duty by defendants who had erroneously deemed plaintiff’s ship to be unseaworthy, as their primary responsibility was marine safety, not the economic interests of shipowners). 106 [1998] 1 WLR 1285 per Sir Richard Scott V-C at 1301.

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public safety if they were subject to a common law duty to the owners of the businesses affected by those decisions. Finally, conflict between common law duty and the statutory scheme is also seen in certain of the child welfare cases. In JD v East Berkshire Community NHS Trust,107 noted above, the claimants were parents against whom healthcare authorities and a local authority had made unfounded accusations of child abuse. In each of the three conjoined cases duty was denied, and at the centre of the reasoning of the majority of the court was a perceived conflict of interest. The imposition of a common law duty of care in regard to the wrongly maligned parents would inhibit the public authority in its statutory duties in regard to child welfare and effective investigation of suspected abuse.108

D. HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 7.31

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In terms of the Human Rights Act 1998, section 6(1), it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way that is incompatible with the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights, and a victim of such an unlawful act may bring proceedings directly against the authority.109 Detailed consideration of the remedies available under the 1998 Act is beyond the scope of this volume,110 but any account of the common law duty of care imposed upon public authorities is incomplete without also noting their parallel duty under this legislation. Many of the rights guaranteed by the Convention already derive protection from the common law of negligence, and indeed there is a degree of overlap between those factors regarded as underpinning the duty of public authorities to adhere to Convention rights and those relevant to duty of

107 [2005] 2 AC 373, discussed above at para 7.09; see also Fairlie v Perth and Kinross Healthcare NHS Trust 2004 SLT 1200; Lawrence v Pembrokeshire County Council [2007] EWCA Civ 446, [2007] 1 WLR 2991; but cf Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council v C [2010] EWHC 62 (QB), [2010] 1 FLR 1640, distinguishing those cases in which the alleged abuse was perpetrated by a third party and where the same considerations would not constrain the recognition of duty towards parents of abused children. 108 [2005] UKHL 23, [2005] 2 AC 373 per Lord Nicholls at para 85. In a dissenting judgment, Lord Bingham argued, at para 49, that any perceived conflict of responsibilities was more appropriately taken into consideration not by denying duty but in assessing whether the relevant standard of care had been breached. His views attracted academic support but have not been followed in the courts. 109 Human Rights Act 1998 s 7(1). In addition the Scotland Act 1998 s 57(2) provides that members of the Scottish Government have no power to act in a way that is incompatible with the Convention rights, and damages may be claimed for just satisfaction in proceedings for judicial review in respect of such conduct (see discussion in Somerville v Scottish Ministers [2007] UKHL 44, 2008 SC (HL) 45, and commentary in D Mac Síthigh, “Pensioners over Prisoners: Amending the Scotland Act in Response to Somerville and Napier” 2010 JR 1). 110 See paras 2.45–2.47 above. For the standard textbook in Scotland, see J Murdoch, Reed and Murdoch: Human Rights Law in Scotland, 4th edn (2017).

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care.111 It is therefore conceivable that claims against a public authority might be brought in parallel under both the law of negligence and the 1998 Act.112 Yet these two regimes of liability remain analytically distinct.113 While the United Kingdom courts have bowed to the need to develop the common law in order to give expression to Convention rights where no remedy was otherwise available for their breach,114 they have hitherto rejected suggestions that the law of negligence should be expanded so as to “gold plate” Convention rights where other forms of redress are already available.115 In principle, therefore, it is possible that a right of action against a public authority may arise under the Human Rights Act where no remedy is available in the common law of negligence,116 and vice versa. The framework for claims brought against public authorities under the Human Rights Act 1998 thus continues to differ significantly from that applied by the common law of negligence. Whereas negligence has as its principal goal compensation of the victim’s losses, the purpose of claims under the 1998 Act is to vindicate Convention rights and thereby uphold minimum human rights standards.117 In other words, “the focus is on the state’s compliance, not the claimant’s loss”.118 This can be seen in the fact that the 1998 111 See e.g. Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust [2012] UKSC 2, [2012] 2 AC 72 in which the issue of whether the defendant had assumed responsibility for the claimants’ daughter was key in determining whether Art 2 was engaged. See also Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21 in which the question of assumption of responsibility was considered both in relation to an “operational” obligation under Art 2 (Lord Rodger at para 66) and to duty of care in negligence (Lord Hope at para 23). Also see Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225 per Lord Bingham at para 58. 112 See e.g. Smith v Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41, [2014] AC 52 in which claims based upon Art 2 and upon duty of care in negligence were both permitted to go forward to trial; cf Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21 in which neither a breach of Art 2 nor a duty of care in negligence was made out. 113 See Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225 per Lord Brown at paras 136–139. See also discussion in D Nolan, “Negligence and Human Rights Law: The Case for Separate Development” (2013) 76 MLR 286; F du Bois, “Human Rights and the Tort Liability of Public Authorities” (2011) 127 LQR 589. 114 Notably in developing the tort of misuse of private information: see Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457; McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73 per Buxton LJ at para 11. 115 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 per Lord Toulson at para 125. 116 See e.g. Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732, in which the negligence claim was struck out but the claim based upon Art 2 was permitted to proceed to trial. See also Jain v Trent Strategic Health Authority [2009] UKHL 4, [2009] 1 AC 853, in which the disputed conduct took place before the 1998 Act came into force. However, Lord Scott noted (at paras 11 and 39) that, had it occurred after 2 October 2000, it would have been directly actionable under the 1998 Act as breaching Art 6 as well as Art 1 of the First Protocol. This rendered it unnecessary to develop the common law to provide a parallel cause of action. 117 Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225 per Lord Brown at para 138. 118 D v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2015] EWCA Civ 646, [2016] QB 161 per Laws LJ at para 66; see also discussion in F du Bois, “Human Rights and the Tort Liability of Public Authorities” (2011) 127 LQR 589.

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Act provides for a range of remedies but stipulates that damages are to be awarded only where necessary for “just satisfaction” of the claim.119 Substantive differences are also entailed. It has been suggested that “a looser approach to causation” is appropriate in actions brought under the 1998 Act as compared with those brought under the law of negligence: the latter requires the pursuer to prove on the balance of probabilities that the defender’s negligence caused the pursuer’s loss, whereas the former may succeed on the basis that the pursuer was “deprived of a real chance of a better outcome”.120 Their distinct focus also creates differences as to the content of the respective duties. A police authority acting compatibly with Article 2 of the ECHR, for example, must have structures in place to ensure that the right to life is given appropriate protection. Aside from the general duty to provide an efficient police force, the authority comes under a specific obligation to prevent harm where it knows, or ought to know, of “the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party” and where there are measures within the scope of its powers which, “judged reasonably”, could avoid that risk”.121 Although a duty of care in negligence may also arise in circumstances where the public authority knew of a “real and immediate risk” to life, the existence of duty does not turn on that question in particular.122 Similarly, in the healthcare context, a public health authority’s obligations in terms of Article 2 of the ECHR include provision of appropriate premises, working systems and competent staff, but “casual acts of negligence” by medical staff do not constitute a breach of Article 2.123 Differences are even more apparent in cases where it is alleged that damages are due in respect of a public authority’s positive interference with a Convention right.124 The law of negligence has no exact equivalent for the complex considerations of proportionality applied, for example, in

119 Human Rights Act 1998 s 8(3); see also R (on the application of Greenfield) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 14, [2005] 1 WLR 673. 120 R (on the application of Greenfield) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 14, [2005] 1 WLR 673 per Lord Bingham at para 14; see also E v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 31 at para 99. 121 Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245 at para 116. 122 See Van Colle v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police; Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225, for discussion of two conjoined appeals, the first of which rested upon Art 2 and the second upon negligence. 123 Savage v South Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust [2008] UKHL 74, [2009] 1 AC 681 (duty may be readily established between patients and medical personnel, but the more contentious issue is likely to be whether the defender met the appropriate standard of professional care in terms of Hunter v Hanley 1955 SC 200). The one exceptional circumstance in which medical negligence is held to breach Art 2 is where a patient at “real and immediate risk” of suicide has been released by medical staff from their care and that patient has then committed suicide: Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust [2012] UKSC 2, [2012] 2 AC 72. 124 See D Nolan, “Negligence and Human Rights Law: The Case for Separate Development” (2013) 76 MLR 286 at 303–308.

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McCann v State Hospitals Board for Scotland125 in determining whether a smoking ban by a hospital authority interfered unduly with the Article 8 rights of an inmate compulsorily detained under its care.

E. DELIBERATE MISUSE OF STATUTORY POWERS The English tort of misfeasance in public office arises where a public officer knowingly abuses his or her powers with the intention of injuring the claimant, or acts beyond those powers knowing that harm to the claimant is likely to result.126 Although difficult to establish, this tort thus has the potential to provide a remedy against public officials in circumstances where the claimant might be unable to establish the specific levels of foreseeability and proximity required in order for a duty of care to arise in negligence. Consideration of this intentional wrong might be seen as out of place in a section devoted to negligence, but it is nonetheless helpful to consider it in parallel with liability in negligence. While the English tort is not directly recognised in Scots law, there is early authority vouching for the availability of damages as a remedy for a deliberate misuse of power by public officers.127 There is also a clear statement by Lord Ross in the Outer House case of Micosta SA v Shetland Islands Council128 to indicate that “deliberate misuse of statutory powers by a public body would be actionable . . . at the instance of a third party who has suffered loss and damage in consequence”. Although reference was made to English case law, Lord Ross understood this delict to be rooted in first principles:129 “The validity of a claim such as that made by the present pursuers does not depend upon there being any precise Scottish authority. There is no such thing as an exhaustive list of named delicts in the law of Scotland. If the conduct complained of appears to be wrongful, the law of Scotland will afford a remedy even if there has not been any previous instance of a remedy being given in similar circumstances.”

In the years since the decision in Micosta the delict of deliberate misuse of statutory powers has been invoked only infrequently, but its relevance has 125 [2017] UKSC 31, 2017 SC (UKSC) 121 per Lord Hodge at para 60. 126 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3) [2001] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 AC 1. For a comprehensive account of Commonwealth authority, see E Chamberlain, Misfeasance in a Public Office (2016). See also J Murphy, “Misfeasance in a Public Office: A Tort Law Misfit?” (2012) 32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 51; M Aronson, “Misfeasance in Public Office: Some Unfinished Business” (2016) 132 LQR 427. 127 Dawson v Allardyce 18 Feb 1809 FC; see also Scottish Law Commission, Remedies in Administrative Law (Scot Law Com Memo No 14, 1971) 42–43. 128 Micosta SA v Shetland Islands Council 1986 SLT 193 per Lord Ross at 198. For case commentary, see C Reid, “Deliberate Misuse of Powers” [1986] PL 380. 129 Micosta SA v Shetland Islands Council 1986 SLT 193 per Lord Ross at 198, citing Walker, Delict 9.

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continued to be accepted.130 As stated in Micosta, it requires the pursuer to demonstrate: (i) that the misuse was “deliberate”, in the sense that the officers concerned knew or ought to have known that their conduct was illegal; and (ii) that it was perpetrated by malice, in the sense discussed below.131 In other words, it requires to address the state of mind of the relevant public officers as regards both the legality of their conduct and its consequences to the pursuer.132

(1) Deliberate misuse 7.37

The misuse of power requires to be “deliberate”. This requirement is met where it can be shown that the action was taken by the public officers concerned “in the full knowledge that [the authority] did not possess the power which it purported to exercise”.133 Given the difficulties of proving subjective knowledge it may also be sufficient that the public officers were “recklessly indifferent” to the boundaries of their power or authority.134 On the other hand, liability does not arise from a “mere error of judgment” while public officers were acting in the ordinary course of duty, or where those officers can be shown “genuinely” to have believed that their actions were within their powers.135

(2) Malice136 7.38

The requirement to prove malice on the part of public officers is onerous. In light of the relative scarcity of Scottish authority in this context it has been accepted as appropriate to look to the development of the concept of malice in English case law,137 in particular the decision of the House of

130 See Ballantyne v City of Glasgow District Licensing Board 1986 SC 266; Ross v Secretary of State for Scotland 1990 SLT 13; Phipps v Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh [2010] CSOH 58, 2010 GWD 27–544; Philp v Highland Council [2018] CSIH 53, 2018 GWD 28–351. 131 Micosta SA v Shetland Islands Council 1986 SLT 193 per Lord Ross at 198. The malice requirement was similarly noted in Philp v Highland Council [2018] CSIH 53, 2018 GWD 28–351 per Lord President Carloway at para 33; see also Ross v Secretary of State for Scotland 1990 SLT 13, stipulating that bad faith must be shown. 132 See e.g. Muuse v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 453. 133 Micosta SA v Shetland Islands Council 1986 SLT 193 per Lord Ross at 198. 134 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3) [2001] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 AC 1. 135 Ballantyne v City of Glasgow District Licensing Board 1986 SC 266 per Lord Jauncey at 271. 136 For general discussion, see ch 15 below. 137 Phipps v Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh [2010] CSOH 58, 2010 GWD 27–544 per Lord Bonomy at paras 8–9; see also Watkins v Home Office [2006] UKHL 17, [2006] 2 AC 395 per Lord Hope at para 29: “It is the normal practice for rules regulating the conduct of public officers in Scotland to be the same, or at least substantially the same, as those by which the conduct of comparable public officers in England and Wales are regulated. . . . It would be a matter for regret if the remedies for a breach of these and other rules regulating the conduct of public officers were not the same on either side of the border.”

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Lords in Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3).138 That case envisaged that malice on the part of public officers might take two forms – “targeted” and “untargeted”.139

(a) Targeted malice “Targeted” malice is where the defendant authority acted “intentionally with the purpose of causing loss to the plaintiff”.140 In other words malice in this sense correlates with bad motive, turning on an element of spite or ill-will. A rare example of such targeted malice can be seen in the Quebec case of Roncarelli v Duplessis,141 in which the plaintiff had been deprived of the liquor licence for his restaurant as an act of political revenge instigated by the Prime Minister himself.

7.39

(b) Untargeted malice In Three Rivers it was acknowledged that liability might also arise where malice was “untargeted”. According to Lord Hobhouse’s analysis in that case, untargeted malice does not turn upon the defendant’s motivation142 but upon whether it was known to the defendant that the claimant would suffer harm. As such it has two variants. In its first variant, untargeted malice does not require that harm to the claimant was the target of the official’s actions. Malice may instead be inferred where the official knew, or ought to have known, that the likely outcome of the misuse of power would be detriment to the claimant:143 “Here the official does the act intentionally being aware that it will in the ordinary course directly cause loss to the plaintiff or an identifiable class to which the plaintiff belongs. The element of knowledge is an actual awareness but is not the knowledge of an existing fact or an inevitable certainty. It relates to a result which has yet to occur. It is the awareness that a certain consequence will follow as a result of the act unless something out of the ordinary intervenes. The act is not done with the intention or purpose of causing such a loss but is an unlawful act which is intentionally done for a different purpose notwithstanding that the official is aware that such injury will, in the ordinary course, be one of the consequences.”

138 [2001] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 AC 1. 139 Note that the meaning of “targeted” and “untargeted” malice as explained here is specific to misfeasance in public office. 140 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3) [2001] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 AC 1 per Lord Hobhouse at 230 (emphasis in original). 141 [1959] SCR 121. 142 See Houchin v Lincolnshire Probation Trust [2014] EWCA Civ 823. 143 [2001] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 AC 1 per Lord Hobhouse at 230–231.

7.40

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272   The Law of Delict in Scotland

7.42

An example of this first type of untargeted malice can be seen in Akenzua v Home Office144 in which the claimants alleged that the defendants had procured the release into the community of a violent offender who then murdered their relative. The court directed that:145 “[I]t will be a sufficient pleading, in a case where the consequence of misfeasance in public office is alleged to have been personal injury or death, that the harm in contemplation was either to a known victim or victims . . . or to one or more victims who would be unknown unless and until the expected harm eventuated. . . . If in his period of arranged liberty [the murderer] had killed someone by careless driving, no action of the present kind would lie because the harm would not have been of the kind indicated by his known proclivities. If, by parity of reasoning, he committed a murder in circumstances in which the defendants knew or should have known he was likely to do so . . . the action lies.”

7.43

Untargeted malice in this form thus requires an “awareness” of the likely consequence of the misfeasance. However, according to the reasoning in Akenzua it does not also require that the precise identity of the victim should have been foreseeable. Given that this was a tort involving deliberate misfeasance, the court in Akenzua rejected the argument that it should be subject to “a further limiting requirement akin to proximity” in the law of negligence.146 The second variant of untargeted malice suggested by Lord Hobhouse in Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3) was “reckless untargeted malice”, in which the public officer acted in “wilful disregard” 147 of, or simply “not caring”148 about, a risk to the victim. Such culpable recklessness takes the form of indifference to the harmful consequences of the officer’s conduct, as well as to its illegality.149 In Muuse v Secretary of State for the Home Department,150 for example, Home Office officials detained the Somali-born claimant for more than four months pending deportation, despite the ready availability of his Dutch passport and repeated protestations by the claimant that he was a citizen of the European Union. The Court of Appeal observed that the evidence in that

144 [2002] EWCA Civ 1470, [2003] 1 WLR 741. 145 [2002] EWCA Civ 1470, [2003] 1 WLR 741 per Sedley LJ at para 20. 146 Akenzua v Home Office [2002] EWCA Civ 1470, [2003] 1 WLR 741 per Simon Brown LJ at para 35. 147 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3) [2001] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 AC 1 per Lord Hobhouse at 231. 148 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3) [2001] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 AC 1 per Lord Steyn at 196. 149 Phipps v Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh [2010] CSOH 58, 2010 GWD 27–544 per Lord Bonomy at para 9. 150 [2010] EWCA Civ 453.

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case might well have supported a conclusion that public officials had acted with reckless indifference to the illegality of their actions. Nonetheless, a finding of misfeasance in public office could not stand because the reasoning at first instance had addressed only the officials’ indifference to the probability of causing the claimant injury, without also considering their indifference to the illegality of continued detention (the first element of this tort, as noted above).151

(3) Omissions In principle, there can also be misuse of power by omission, where a public officer has failed to take action in pursuance of an available power. Although liability for omissions of this type is likely to arise only rarely, Lord Millett accepted in Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3) that failure to exercise a discretion might be regarded as actionable misfeasance:152

7.44

“where (i) the circumstances are such that the discretion whether to act can only be exercised in one way so that there is effectively a duty to act; (ii) the official appreciates this but nevertheless makes a conscious decision not to act; and (iii) he does so with intent to injure the plaintiff or in the knowledge that such injury will be the natural and probable consequence of his failure to act.”

It is said that “mere inadvertence or oversight” is not enough and an “actual decision is required.153 As an illustration, Lord Millett cited the circumstances of R v Dytham,154 in which a criminal prosecution was brought against a police officer who stood by and did nothing to intervene when a man was beaten and kicked to death a short distance away. A nineteenthcentury Scottish example is Earl of Kinnoull v Ferguson,155 in which the Presbytery of Auchterarder was held liable for its failure to adhere to its statutory duty to give a “trial” to a candidate minister.

F. POSTSCRIPT: BREACH OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW For as long as the United Kingdom remained a member of the European Union, it was competent to bring a claim for damages in the Scottish

151 An award of exemplary damages in respect of the claimant’s false imprisonment was nonetheless upheld. 152 [2001] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 AC 1 at 237. 153 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3) [2001] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 AC 1 per Lord Hutton at 228. 154 [1979] QB 722, cited in [2001] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 AC 1 at 237. 155 (1842) 1 Bell 662.

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courts156 where the pursuer had suffered loss on account of a breach of European law by the state. The “state” was interpreted broadly as including “organisations or bodies which were subject to the authority or control of the state or had special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable to relations between individuals”, such as tax authorities, local or regional authorities, authorities responsible for public order, and authorities providing public health services.157 However, the “Eurotort”, otherwise known as “Francovich liability”,158 does not figure in retained European Union Law. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018159 provides succinctly that: “There is no right in domestic law on or after exit day to damages in accordance with the rule in Francovich.”

156 See e.g. Argyll Group plc v The Distillers Company plc 1987 SLT 514. 157 Foster v British Gas plc (Case C–188/89) [1991] 1 QB 405 at paras 18–19. 158 The term “Eurotort” was given respectability in R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd (No 6) [2001] 1 WLR 942, [2001] 1 CMLR 47. (The term “Eurodelict” was never coined.) For detailed treatment, see P Giliker, The Europeanisation of English Tort Law (2014) ch 4. In Francovich v Italy (C–6/90) [1991] ECR I-5357, [1993] 2 CMLR 66, the European Court of Justice had held that states might be liable to individuals who had suffered loss as a result of that state’s failure to transpose a Directive, where that Directive had been framed so as to confer rights upon individuals such as the claimant. 159 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 Sch 1 para 4.

Chapter 8

Roads Authorities

Para A. THE BASIS FOR DUTY���������������������������������������������������������� 8.01 B. FAILURES OF MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR (1) Scope of duty���������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.04 (2) Dangerous obstructions������������������������������������������������������� 8.07 (3) Standard of care������������������������������������������������������������������ 8.08 (4) Cross-border difference������������������������������������������������������� 8.11 C. FAILURE TO IMPROVE SAFETY (1) In general��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.13 (2) Cross-border difference������������������������������������������������������� 8.16 D. SNOW AND ICE (1) In general��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.23 (2) Cross-border difference������������������������������������������������������� 8.28

A. THE BASIS FOR DUTY The functions of roads authorities in managing and maintaining public roads are set out in the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984. Section 1(1) provides that local authorities1 “shall manage and maintain” all public roads within their area, with “power to reconstruct, alter, widen, improve or renew any such road” as necessary to that end; maintenance is defined as including “repair”.2 Section 2 allocates the same role to the Scottish Ministers in regard to trunk roads.3 The 1984 Act also empowers authorities to implement a variety of safety enhancements including provision of footways,4 pedestrian bridges and subways,5 traffic islands,6 fencing,7 flood8 and snow

  1 Defined in s 151(1) as “a council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994”.   2 Roads (Scotland) Act 1984 s 151(1).   3 As defined in Roads (Scotland) Act 1984 s 5. Trunk roads are managed for the Scottish Ministers by Transport Scotland (https://www.transport.gov.scot/transport-network/roads/).   4 s 25.   5 s 26.   6 s 27.   7 s 29.   8 ss 30–31.

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8.02

defences,9 lighting,10 traffic calming,11 and control or removal of obstructions.12 But although the powers and responsibilities of roads authorities are now specified by statute, their duty of care to road users to keep public roads and pavements reasonably safe was established at common law “well before the modern statutory system of roads legislation came into being” and does not require to be “spelled out of any statutory power”.13 On any view, the duty of care placed upon roads authorities is not “novel”, in the sense of requiring consideration in the light of the features of duty as discussed in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman.14 And it is uncontroversial that, at least as respects their active conduct, roads authorities owe a duty to take reasonable care for the safety of road users, whether in the design or construction of new roads and pavements,15 or in the introduction of new features to an existing road system.16 In Yetkin v Mahmood,17 for example, an authority which planted shrubbery at a pedestrian crossing in such a way as to obscure the view of oncoming traffic was found liable to a pedestrian unsighted thereby who had stepped out into the path of a car. By the same token, a roads authority which installed a misleading set of warning signs would in all likelihood be held liable to road users who were thus “enticed” into danger.18 There is also a duty to make the roadway safe again when construction or demolition works have been carried out.19

  9 10 11 12 13

ss 32–34. s 35. ss 36–40. ss 59–60. Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council [2013] CSIH 83, 2014 SC 114 per Lord Drummond Young at para 78; Bowes v Highland Council [2018] CSIH 38, 2018 SC 499 at para 45. See also Gibson v Orr 1999 SC 420 per Lord Hamilton at 435, explaining that this is “a duty not directly under the statute but a duty arising out of the relationship between those authorities and road users created by the control vested by statute in the former over the public roads in their charge”. For an example of an early case, see Innes v Magistrates of Edinburgh (1798) Mor 13189. 14 [1990] 2 AC 605; see discussion at paras 4.15–4.25 above. 15 E.g. Kemp v Glasgow City Council 2000 SLT 471 (new design of kerb with hazardous raised edge). 16 E.g. Levine v Morris [1970] 1 WLR 71 (siting of a large road sign in such a way to present a danger to passing traffic). 17 [2010] EWCA Civ 776, [2011] QB 827. See also Kane v New Forest District Council [2001] EWCA Civ 878, [2002] 1 WLR 312, in which the defendant local authority granted planning permission for a new housing development including pedestrian access by a footpath, but it did not first ensure that sightlines were improved at a blind spot where the path opened on to a main road. The court distinguished Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923, in which the authority had not itself created the source of danger, and held that, as the hazard arose as a result of the defendant’s positive action, a pedestrian injured in a collision with a car as he emerged from the footpath had a good claim against the defendant. 18 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 per Lord Brown at para 102. 19 E.g. Letford v Glasgow City Council 2002 Rep LR 107 (pothole left after removal of a lighting column), as well as Innes v Magistrates of Edinburgh (1798) Mor 13189.

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In most instances, however, the allegedly negligent conduct of a roads authority takes the form, not of action but of omission – of failure to deal with a hazard. As in other contexts, inaction is regarded differently from action.20 The special circumstances in which duty is extended to such omissions are discussed below.

8.03

B. FAILURES OF MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR (1) Scope of duty Roads authorities have responsibility to maintain and repair such roads and pavements as the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984 Act places within their remit.21 But while their assumption of responsibility for this task provides the basis for a common law duty of care towards road users, the duty is not unlimited in scope. In Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council, Lord Drummond Young explained that the question whether duty arose in relation to specific hazards was assessed by reference to whether the nature and extent of the alleged hazard would “present a significant risk of an accident to a person proceeding along the road in question with due skill and care”.22 On that basis, duty of care may readily extend to shortcomings of maintenance and repair, in particular to those which are unlikely to be immediately apparent to road users, whether in all circumstances or to those travelling at speed or at night. This includes problems such as uneven or unstable surfaces on pavements23 or roads,24 or craters or potholes25 in the road surface. The importance of risk to the “careful road user”26 as the appropriate standard was highlighted in Bowes v Highland Council.27. The driver of a pickup truck was drowned when his vehicle swerved in icy conditions and crashed through the parapet of a bridge over the Kyle of Tongue, plunging into the sea below. The reason for the deceased losing control of the vehicle could not be ascertained, but was probably his own negligence.28 Nonetheless, the bridge should normally have contained the impact of his 20 On the difficulties of distinguishing errors of omission and of commission in this context, see Valentine v Transport for London [2010] EWCA Civ 1358, [2011] RTR 24 at paras 30–34. For general discussion, see paras 4.43 ff above, and for discussion of omissions by public authorities, see paras 7.17 ff. 21 For the meaning of “roads authority”, see Roads (Scotland) Act 1984 s 151(1). 22 [2013] CSIH 83, 2014 SC 114 at para 63. 23 Laing v Paull & Williamsons 1912 SC 196; Rush v Glasgow Corporation 1947 SC 580. 24 E.g. Robinson v Scottish Borders Council [2016] CSOH 47, 2016 SLT 435 (metal strips designed into roadway on bridge after widening operations); Fairley v Edinburgh Trams Ltd [2019] CSOH 50, 2019 SLT 819 (layout of tram tracks forcing cyclists to cross the tracks at a dangerously narrow angle). 25 Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council [2013] CSIH 83, 2014 SC 114 per Lady Paton at para 36. 26 Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council [2013] CSIH 83, 2014 SC 114 per Lord Drummond Young at para 64. 27 [2018] CSIH 38, 2018 SC 499. 28 See judgment of the Lord Ordinary, Lord Mulholland, [2017] CSOH 53, 2017 SLT 749, at para 11. The Inner House held, however, that a finding of 30 per cent contributory negligence was appropriate.

8.04

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8.06

vehicle, but the structure of the parapet was defective, and the Council had known it to be such. The hazard which claimed the deceased’s life was not therefore his negligent driving, but “the fact that the parapet of a bridge over the sea, built for containment, was in such a weakened state that its containment factor, if any, was unknown”.29 There were any number of reasons why vehicles might collide with the bridge without any fault on the driver’s part.30 Its weakened state thus presented the sort of danger that carried significant risk to a “careful road user”, even if the deceased himself could not be categorised as such.31 The Council was therefore held liable to the driver’s family, because it had been under a duty of care to address such known risks, and its failure to do so had caused the driver to drown. A further point to emerge from Bowes v Highland Council is that the concept of a hazard may be understood in a more extended sense that that articulated in Macdonald. The defective parapet did not increase the risk of accident as such; but as part of a bridge over a sea inlet, it increased the risk of a detrimental outcome should an accident occur. In the view of the court this was sufficient to constitute a hazard over which duty had been assumed.32 This decision has important implications for Scottish authorities whose roads cross many miles of challenging natural terrain. Over the years miscellaneous barriers and road furniture have been installed to provide protection against vehicles tipping down steep hillsides or into water.33 On the authority of Bowes a deterioration in the integrity of such items is a hazard in respect of which duty of care may arise.

(2) Dangerous obstructions 8.07

Alongside the statutory regime, there is a long-established common law duty on relevant public authorities “to see that there shall be no dangerous obstruction” on roads or pathways under the authority’s control,34 including

29 [2018] CSIH 38, 2018 SC 499 per Lady Dorrian at para 48. 30 E.g. the driver might suffer a heart attack, or the vehicle might be shunted by another vehicle: see [2018] CSIH 38, 2018 SC 499 per Lady Dorrian at para 51. See e.g. Sargent v Secretary of State for Scotland 2000 Rep LR 118, in which the driver swerved to avoid an oncoming bus in the centre of the road, crashing through the boundary wall in the process, and in which there was held to have been no contributory negligence. 31 [2018] CSIH 38, 2018 SC 499 per Lady Dorrian at para 49. 32 A similar view was taken in Sargent v Secretary of State for Scotland 2000 Rep LR 118, in which the boundary wall on a lochside road had degraded, so that a car that swerved to the side toppled off the road into the loch below. 33 On the duty to install such protective barriers etc, see para 8.14 below. 34 M’Fee v Police Commissioners of Broughty-Ferry (1890) 17 R 764 per Lord Justice-Clerk Macdonald at 767; see also Dargie v Magistrates of Forfar (1855) 17 D 730. In principle, proprietors whose premises front on to a street affected by an obstruction on the carriageway may also have title and interest to sue in nuisance: e.g. Ogston v Aberdeen District Tramways Co (1896) 24 R (HL) 8; Globe (Aberdeen) Ltd v North of Scotland Water Authority 2000 SC 392; but in practice, the common law liability of roads authorities has traditionally been regarded as governed by the ordinary principles of negligence: see N R Whitty, “Nuisance”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) § 166.

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obstructions attributable to the fault or omission of third parties.35 Compliance with the duty entails removal of obstructions36 or, where removal is impracticable, mitigating the risk with appropriate lighting or signage,37 as well as the exercise of reasonable care to anticipate potential hazards such as trees collapsing upon the highway.38 In McKnight v Clydeside Buses Ltd,39 for example, the pursuer’s young daughter was killed when the double-decker bus in which she was travelling smashed into a low railway bridge across a city street. The height of the bridge was alleged to be a “manifest danger to road users”, as indicated by previous collisions at the locus. Lady Cosgrove noted that “the Scottish authorities . . . amply vouch the proposition that that duty encompasses an obligation on the roads authority arising out of their ownership of and responsibility for the road to remedy a dangerous situation”.40 The roads authority was therefore under a duty to act in the interests of public safety, and proof before answer was allowed to determine whether it had breached this duty by failing to “remedy the obvious hazard which [was] known to exist”.41

(3) Standard of care Even where a hazard is accepted as having been within the ambit of a roads authority’s duty of care, the pursuer has still to show that the duty has been breached. This means specifying why it was reasonable and practicable for the authority to have been alerted to the danger and to have taken action before the accident occurred.42 This might be done by showing that:43 “inspection in accordance with a practice common to roads authorities would have revealed the defect or that some special and exceptional circumstances, such as numerous previous complaints about the defect, made it reasonable and practicable to inspect the locus before the accident occurred”.

35 Brierley v County Council of Midlothian 1921 1 SLT 192; McKnight v Clydeside Buses Ltd 1999 SLT 1167. 36 M’Fee v Police Commissioners of Broughty-Ferry (1890) 17 R 764. 37 McKnight v Clydeside Buses Ltd 1999 SLT 1167; see also M’Fee v Police Commissioners of BroughtyFerry (1890) 17 R 764; Sargent v Secretary of State for Scotland 2000 Rep LR 118. 38 Brierley v County Council of Midlothian 1921 1 SLT 192; Mackie v Dumbartonshire County Council 1927 SC (HL) 99. 39 1999 SLT 1167. 40 1999 SLT 1167 at 1172, under reference to M’Fee v Police Commissioners of Broughty-Ferry (1890) 17 R 764. 41 1999 SLT 1167 per Lady Cosgrove at 1172. 42 Gibson v Strathclyde Regional Council 1993 SLT 1243. 43 Hutchison v North Lanarkshire Council [2007] CSOH 23 per Lord Brodie at para 16, agreeing with the submissions of counsel for the defender; see also Nugent v Glasgow City Council [2009] CSOH 88, 2009 GWD 24–392.

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8.09

8.10

The pursuer is thus expected to specify such matters as the intervals at which inspection ought reasonably to have taken place,44 or the respects in which any inspection carried out by the defender was deficient.45 The failure by a roads authority properly to implement its own repairs and maintenance policy is likely to be considered significant in this regard.46 In McGovern v Glasgow City Council,47 the defender was taken to have failed in its duty where it was established that its own practice had been to identify potholes deeper than 40 mm and that an inspection of the locus shortly before the accident had failed to detect the 70-mm gap into which the pursuer subsequently fell. In this connection a non-statutory code of practice is used across the UK, Well-managed Highway Infrastructure – A Code of Practice.48 It (or its predecessors) has been recognised as providing a suitable benchmark in both Scottish and English cases.49 Evidence of compliance with the Code suggests that the authority has met the appropriate standard, although it does not do so conclusively; by the same token, the Code’s recommendations are not regarded as mandatory.50 In cases where the defect had been discovered but the time lapse between discovery and accident meant that the roads authority could not reasonably have been expected to have remedied it, the authority will nonetheless have failed in its duty where it has failed to put in place feasible interim measures such as secondary barriers, lane restrictions, or speed restrictions.51

(4) Cross-border difference 8.11

There are significant differences in the statutory background as between Scotland and England in regard to the repairing obligations of roads authorities. Although the practical consequences of this can perhaps be overstated, they must be borne in mind when citing English authority. As mentioned above, it has long been recognised in Scotland that roads authorities are under a common law duty of care to maintain road safety.52 By contrast, until the 44 Letford v Glasgow City Council 2002 Rep LR 107 per Sheriff Principal Bowen at para 3. 45 See Dewar v Scottish Borders Council [2017] CSOH 68, 2017 GWD 15–250. 46 [2009] CSOH 148, 2010 Rep LR 2; see also Thorpe v Aberdeen City Council 2007 Rep LR 105. 47 [2009] CSOH 148, 2010 Rep LR 2. 48 Compiled by the UK Roads Liaison Group. The current edition dates from 2016 (https://www.ciht.org. uk/ukrlg-home/code-of-practice/) and replaces earlier Codes of Practice (Well-maintained Highways, Well-lit Highways, and Management of Highway Structures). 49 See e.g. Ryder v Highland Council [2013] CSOH 95, 2013 SLT 847; Wilkinson v York City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 207, [2011] PTSR D39. 50 See AC v Devon County Council [2013] EWCA Civ 418, [2014] RTR 1; also discussion in Nugent v Glasgow City Council [2009] CSOH 88, 2009 GWD 24–392. 51 Bowes v Highland Council [2018] CSIH 38, 2018 SC 499 per Lady Dorrian at para 49. 52 With the exception of a short period in the mid-nineteenth century when, under the influence of Duncan v Findlater (1839) Macl & R 911, it was thought that the immunity principle applied to the trustees of turnpike (toll) roads: see E Reid, “Different and yet the Same? Delictual Liability of Roads Authorities in Scotland and in England” 2016 JR 1.

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mid-twentieth century English highways authorities were immune from suit in such matters, so that English authority from that period must be treated with caution. The position changed in 1961 with the abrogation of immunity in relation to non-repair, thus permitting civil actions to be brought against highways authorities.53 The current law in England is as stated in the Highways Act 1980, which provides in section 41(1) that highways authorities are “are under a duty . . . to maintain the highway”, maintenance being defined as including repair.54 This statutory duty readily encompasses the types of hazard typically encountered in the Scottish cases, such as such as potholes,55 irregularities in the road surface,56 loose or uneven paving,57 and faulty drainage.58 The understanding of what constitutes a “repair” for the purposes of the duty arising under section 41(1) is fairly generous. In Thomas v Warwickshire County Council,59 for example, a mound of concrete that had spilled on to a road and hardened was regarded as part of the fabric of the highway, so that failure to remove it constituted a failure to repair. Similarly, a precipitous verge at the side of a carriageway was held in Russell v West Sussex County Council60 to generate a repairing duty under section 41(1). The overlap with the scope of Scottish common law duty is therefore extensive. As with common law duty in Scotland, the statutory duty to repair under section 41 is not absolute and does not require roads to be kept in “perfect” condition.61 Section 58 of the 1980 Act provides English authorities with a “special defence”, which has no direct Scottish equivalent. This is available where the authority can show that it has taken “such care as in all the circumstances was reasonably required to secure” the highway.62 The considerations relevant to establishing the section 58 defence63 53 Highways (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1961, which in s 1 abrogated “the rule of law exempting the inhabitants at large and any other persons as their successors from liability for non-repair of highways”. 54 Highways Act 1980 s 329(1). 55 E.g. AC v Devon County Council [2013] EWCA Civ 418, [2014] RTR 1. 56 E.g. Roe v Sheffield City Council [2003] EWCA Civ 1, [2004] QB 653. 57 E.g. Dalton v Nottinghamshire County Council [2011] EWCA Civ 776. 58 E.g. Mitchell v Department for Transport [2006] EWCA Civ 1089, [2006] 1 WLR 3356; Vernon Knights Associates v Cornwall Council [2013] EWCA Civ 950, [2014] Env LR 6. 59 [2011] EWHC 772 (QB). 60 [2010] EWCA Civ 71, [2010] RTR 19. 61 Goodes v East Sussex County Council [2000] 1 WLR 1356 per Lord Hoffmann at 1361. 62 E.g. Griffiths v Liverpool Corporation [1967] 1 QB 374; Wilkinson v York City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 207, [2011] PTSR D39. 63 Section 58(2) of the Highways Act 1980 directs the courts to consider: “(a) the character of the highway, and the traffic which was reasonably to be expected to use it; (b) the standard of maintenance appropriate for a highway of that character and used by such traffic; (c) the state of repair in which a reasonable person would have expected to find the highway; (d) whether the highway authority knew, or could reasonably have been expected to know, that the condition of the part of the highway to which the action relates was likely to cause danger to users of the highway; (e) where the highway authority could not reasonably have been expected to repair that part of the highway before the cause of action arose, what warning notices of its condition had been displayed”.

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are broadly similar to those relevant to establishing whether duty has been met in Scots law. Although lack of resources is not in itself a defence,64 the authority escapes liability where it can show that it had done “all that was reasonably necessary to make the road safe for users”.65 An important practical difference between the jurisdictions is that the burden of proof is more favourable to claimants under the framework of the 1980 Act, giving the English claimant a tactical advantage over the Scottish litigant relying on common law duty. Where a claim is brought for breach of section 41, the claimant need only show that the highway was dangerous, and the onus then passes to the roads authority to prove that it has acted reasonably.66 In Scotland, by contrast, the onus remains with the injured party to prove that the authority has acted unreasonably.

C. FAILURE TO IMPROVE SAFETY (1) In general 8.13

8.14

In addition to the duty to attend to matters of maintenance and repair, roads authorities may in some circumstances be held to a duty to improve road safety features. However, duty arises only in relation to those hazards which create a foreseeable “significant” risk of accidents, and which the careful road user could not be expected to detect.67 As with alleged defects of repair and maintenance, the “critical question” in determining the scope of duty is whether the alleged hazard presented a risk to a road user exercising “due skill and care”.68 However, this criterion is less readily satisfied in relation to alleged failure to implement improvements, as compared with specific defects of maintenance such as potholes. The duty to instigate improvements where the road layout is itself unsafe is a limited one. The authorities indicate that there is, for example, a duty to fence roads in “very dangerous places”69 where the route of the road and the nature of the immediately surrounding landscape means that there is a high risk of accident if a vehicle, or a pedestrian, veers off the carriageway,

64 Crawley v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council [2017] EWCA Civ 36, [2017] 1 WLR 2329. 65 Wilkinson v City of York Council [2011] EWCA Civ 207, [2011] PTSR D39 per Toulson LJ at para 35. 66 See D Fairgrieve and D Squires, The Negligence Liability of Public Authorities, 2nd edn (2018) para 15.31. See also Goodes v East Sussex County Council [2000] 1 WLR 1356 per Lord Clyde at 1368, explaining with regard to s 58 that “Such a reversal of the onus . . . is justifiable by the consideration that the plaintiff is not likely to know or be able readily to ascertain in what respects the authority has failed in its duty”. 67 Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council [2013] CSIH 83, 2014 SC 114 per Lord Drummond Young at paras 64 and 80; see also Sargent v Secretary of State for Scotland 2000 Rep LR 118. 68 Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council [2013] CSIH 83, 2014 SC 114 per Lord Drummond Young at para 85. 69 Fraser v Magistrates of Rothesay (1892) 19 R 817 per Lord McLaren at 819.

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particularly at night when light is poor.70 But while roads authorities have extensive statutory powers to alter road layout, install markings and lighting, remove features impeding sightlines, and so on,71 there is no common law duty of care to enhance safety by such measures where the careful road user might have been expected to negotiate a road layout without incident.72 In Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council,73 for example, the pursuer was injured, and her passengers killed, when she drove out of a minor road on to a trunk road without stopping, thereby colliding with an oncoming van. The pursuer claimed that the roads authority had a duty to provide better signage at the junction and in particular that the customary double white lines warning traffic on the minor road to stop, which had been eroded, should have been reinstated. The court took the view, however, that the pursuer’s own description of the road configuration was suggestive of an obvious danger, so that a careful driver would have approached the junction slowly, keeping a careful look out. There was therefore no hazard in the sense indicated above, and a duty of care to reinstate markings and signage was not made out. In exceptional circumstances there may be a duty to reinstate safety measures recently removed, but only if it can be shown that road users had been induced to place reasonable reliance upon their continued presence.74 In MacDonald v Comhairle Nan Eilean Siar,75 a pedestrian tripped and was injured walking home from work late at night along a road where the lighting had been switched off at midnight. It could not be proved that the street had previously been lit at the time in question. However, Lord Matthews observed that:76 “a case could be made for common law liability on the part of local authorities who had switched off lights where it was averred and proved that a pursuer had come to rely on the lighting and that it was switched off negligently. By negligently I mean without taking reasonable care to see to it that those whom the authority knew or ought to have known relied on the light were made aware that it was about to be switched off.” 70 Strachan v Aberdeen District Committee of the County Council of Aberdeenshire (1894) 21 R 915; Bennett v J Lamont & Sons 2000 SLT 17 (in which Temporary Judge T G Coutts observed that if a public road ran close to some natural feature, such as a ravine, the roads authority might be bound to provide adequate fencing, although there could be no general duty to fence roads against incursion by animals); Sargent v Secretary of State for Scotland 2000 Rep LR 118; see also Bowes v Highland Council [2018] CSIH 38, 2018 SC 499, discussed at paras 8.05–8.06 above, on the duty to keep barriers in good repair. 71 See para 8.01 above. 72 E.g. Murray v Nicholls 1983 SLT 194 (road markings and signage at a junction). 73 [2013] CSIH 83, 2014 SC 114. 74 On this point see the English case of Bird v Pearce [1979] RTR 369, in which the roads authority had itself obliterated the white lines during road works in such a way as to create a kind of “trap” for drivers (cited e.g. in Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council [2013] CSIH 83, 2014 SC 114; Bowes v Highland Council [2018] CSIH 38, 2018 SC 499). 75 [2015] CSOH 132, 2016 Rep LR 10. 76 [2015] CSOH 132, 2016 Rep LR 10 at para 148.

8.15

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(2) Cross-border difference 8.16

8.17

8.18

As discussed above,77 section 41(1) of the Highways Act 1980 imposes a positive duty upon highways authorities in England and Wales to repair and maintain roads. Section 41(1) does not, however, extend the duty to the implementation of safety improvements, such as painted signage or street furniture.78 This means that the only option for claimants in such cases is to argue for a common law duty of care. But whereas in Scotland the common law is regarded as capable, at least in principle, of encompassing a positive duty to address such hazards, in England the legacy of the immunity principle means that there is no equivalent tradition of imposing liability upon omissions of this nature. Two leading cases have in recent years reaffirmed judicial reluctance to recognise an affirmative duty in this context. In Stovin v Wise,79 the plaintiff motorcyclist was injured in a collision with a car as it exited a junction where visibility was obscured by a high bank on adjoining land. Section 79 of the Highways Act 198080 empowers highway authorities to require landowners to remove features that obstruct the view of road users, and the local highway authority had been in negotiation with the landowner although no action had been taken. The House of Lords held that the failure to remove the hazard was not within the scope of the section 41(1) duty. The fact that a statutory power existed did not mean that a common law duty was imposed to take action on the source of danger. As Lord Nicholls reminded the court, there must be special justification for compelling a person (including a public authority) “to act, and to act for the benefit of another”.81 The “minimum preconditions” for common law duty were that it would “in the circumstances have been irrational not to have exercised the power, so that there was in effect a public law duty to act”, and that there were “exceptional grounds for holding that the policy of the statute requires compensation to be paid to persons who suffer loss because the power was not exercised”.82 The scope of common law duty was reviewed once again in Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council.83 The claimant driver was injured in a collision with another vehicle as she attempted to negotiate a bend in the road at the crest of a hill. A sign previously painted on the road warning

77 See paras 8.11 and 8.12 above. 78 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 per Lord Hoffmann at para 15. 79 [1996] AC 923. 80 For an equivalent power to require removal of obstructions of view at corners, bends and junctions, see Roads (Scotland) Act 1984 s 83. 81 [1996] AC 923 at 930. 82 [1996] AC 923 per Lord Hoffmann at 953. 83 [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057.

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drivers to slow down had disappeared, and the claimant approached this hazard without reducing speed. The House of Lords held that the roads authority’s neglect of signage was not a culpable failure to maintain in terms of section 41(1). Nor did it consider that a duty to the claimant flowed from the authority’s responsibilities under section 39 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, requiring roads authorities to undertake measures “designed to promote road safety”. The Act made no express provision for an action for breach of statutory duty, and, under reference to the reasoning in Stovin v Wise, a common law duty could not be founded “simply upon the failure (however irrational) to provide some benefit which a public authority has power (or a public law duty) to provide.”84 Whether the defender was a public authority or a private entity, reasonable foreseeability of injury was “insufficient to justify the imposition of liability upon someone who simply does nothing: who neither creates the risk nor undertakes to do anything to avert it”.85 In other words, the “irrationality” of the authority’s inaction was not enough.86 A common law duty of care might arise only when the authority had “done acts or entered into relationships or undertaken responsibilities” which gave rise to such a duty.87 Duty might similarly arise where the authority had in some way encouraged an expectation that particular safety measures would be put in place.88 However, there was no prior relationship or assumption of responsibility in regard to the claimant in Gorringe, and while authorities normally warn of potential hazards such as the road configuration encountered in Gorringe there could be no expectation that they would always do so. As Lord Hoffmann had remarked in Stovin v Wise: “Drivers of vehicles must take the highway network as they find it. Everyone knows that there are hazardous bends, intersections and junctions. It is primarily the duty of drivers of vehicles to take due care.”89 An important factor in Gorringe was that the claimant herself accepted that she had approached the crest driving negligently fast.90 The road configuration was such that the need

84 [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 per Lord Hoffmann at para 32. 85 [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 per Lord Hoffmann at para 17. 86 And to the extent the reasoning in Larner v Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council [2001] RTR 32 suggested that an unreasonable failure to provide signage might provide the basis for duty, the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in that case was disapproved in Gorringe. 87 [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 per Lord Hoffmann at paras 38–40. Such an assumption of responsibility by public authorities was seen in other contexts where, e.g., the authority had taken over the care and welfare of a child in its area: see discussion at paras 7.19–7.24 above. 88 [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 per Lord Hoffmann at para 43. For a Scottish example discussing reliance in this sense, see MacDonald v Comhairle Nan Eilean Siar [2015] CSOH 132, 2016 Rep LR 10. 89 [1996] AC 923 per Lord Hoffmann at 958. 90 [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 as noted by Lord Scott at para 45, Lord Rodger at para 96.

8.19

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8.21

8.22

for care at this point was “obvious” to drivers.91 The court was reluctant to impose a duty upon highways authorities to protect drivers from the consequences of their own negligent driving. As Lord Rodger remarked: “Drivers must take care for themselves and drive at an appropriate speed, irrespective of whether or not there is a warning sign.”92 In tracing the history of public authority immunity in England and Wales, Lord Rodger acknowledged that “the common law of Scotland is somewhat more generous to those injured due to the failure to maintain the roads than was English common law”.93 He nonetheless thought it worth identifying a Scottish comparator, Murray v Nicholls,94 to assist in determining whether duty in modern English law was capable of extension to safety features such as road markings. The pursuers in Murray v Nicholls were injured in a collision when the car in which they were passengers was driven without stopping out of a minor road on to a major road. There were no warning signs or white road-markings at the junction, and the pursuers argued that the roads authority had owed road users a duty to restore these protective features. Lord Stott, however, held that duty did not arise on the basis of foreseeability alone, although the roads authority conceded that duty might have arisen if there had been evidence of a dangerous situation existing at a particular locus over a period of time.95 The fact that roads authorities had the power to paint white lines on the road did not mean that they came under a common law duty to do so at every junction where it might be foreseeable that an accident might otherwise occur.96 In summary, where the alleged neglect by a roads authority takes the form of a failure proactively to improve safety, the default position in England is that no common law duty arises, except in the restricted circumstances where responsibility to the road user has been assumed for the particular defect, or the authority in some way induced the road user to rely on the authority providing greater safety. In Scotland, by contrast, there has long been acceptance that roads authorities may owe a duty to do more than attend to repairs and maintenance, and that there may be a positive duty to implement safety features. However, as in relation to other allegedly culpable omissions, a positive duty of this nature is only sparingly recognised, and only where the road conditions represent a foreseeable and significant risk of accidents occurring to road users approaching the locus with due care.97 Conversely, there is no such duty where risk is apparent and capable 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

[2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 per Lord Scott at para 59. [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 at para 93. [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 at para 84 (emphasis added). 1983 SLT 194. 1983 SLT 194 at 195. 1983 SLT 194 at 195. Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council [2013] CSIH 83, 2014 SC 114 per Lord Drummond Young at para 64.

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of being avoided by exercise of due care. The premise in both jurisdictions is that the statutory functions of roads authorities do not relieve road users of the obligation to take care for their own safety, and common law duty of care is unlikely to be imposed in relation to features which should have been negotiated safely. As Lord Drummond Young remarked in Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council,98 “much of what is said in Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council supports the general approach of the Scottish common law”. In practical terms, therefore, the differences in scope may often be marginal between the affirmative duty in English law, which looks for exceptional circumstances such as assumption of responsibility or induced reliance, and that imposed by Scots law, which looks at significant and foreseeable risk to the non-negligent road user.

D. SNOW AND ICE (1) In general Numerous Scottish cases involve the hazards presented by snow and ice. Section 34 of the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984, requiring roads authorities to “take such steps as they consider reasonable to prevent snow and ice endangering the safe passage of pedestrians and vehicles over public roads”, does not in itself create an additional remedy where snow or ice has not been cleared, but the common law duty owed by roads authorities to road users may in principle extend to this task.99 Black ice in particular may constitute a hazard in the sense discussed above since it can take even the most careful driver by surprise.100 Nonetheless, it has proved extremely difficult for accident victims to establish that the roads authority has failed in a duty of care to treat a particular locus.101 The fulfilment of their statutory duties to clear snow and ice presents extensive logistical problems for the Scottish roads authorities, since it is “simply impossible” for them “particularly in a large geographical region like the Highlands, to ensure that every patch of black ice which appears

  98 [2013] CSIH 83, 2014 SC 114 at para 83.  99 Syme v Scottish Borders Council 2003 SLT 601; Rainford v Aberdeenshire Council 2007 Rep LR 126. This was also a matter of concession in Ryder v Highland Council [2013] CSOH 95, 2013 SLT 847. 100 Although Lord Drummond Young observed in Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council 2014 SC 114 at para 70 that careful drivers will “drive in such a way as to minimise the risk of skidding on black ice”, the evidence in cases such as Morton v West Lothian Council 2006 Rep LR 7, affd [2008] CSIH 18 indicates that careful driving cannot eliminate that risk; in that case there was no suggestion that the pursuer was driving carelessly when her car skidded on black ice, and witnesses spoke to a series of vehicles skidding at the scene thereafter, even although they had been alerted to the need to drive with care. 101 See discussion by Lord Drummond Young in Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council [2013] CSIH 83, 2014 SC 114 at para 70.

8.23

8.24

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on roads within their area, is treated simultaneously and indeed continuously so as to avoid any vehicle skidding”.102 The authorities’ choice of systems to accomplish this task is an instance where the imposition of duty is normally denied as “inconsistent with the scheme of the legislation under which the public authority is operating”;103 the courts step back from intervening in the “difficult choices . . . involved in the exercise of discretionary powers”.104 This line of reasoning is clearly apparent in Ryder v Highland Council.105 After a motorist was killed when her car skidded off an untreated road in the early morning, her son sought damages from the roads authority in respect of the loss and damage sustained as a consequence of his mother’s death. He argued that the authority had been negligent in failing to maintain a round-the-clock system for gritting roads. Lord Tyre declined to recognise a duty of care since this would be inconsistent with the framework of the 1984 Act:106 “[T]he decision whether or not to allocate sufficient resources to permit the operation of a 24 hour winter maintenance service for some or all of the roads classified as priority 1 routes within the Highland local government area falls within the category of decisions which this court is not fitted to determine. It is . . . a decision ultimately taken by elected representatives, on the basis of information and advice from officials, with very significant financial consequences for the budgetary process of allocation of limited resources. It requires the balancing of competing public interests as the expense of a 24 hour service which . . . would increase winter maintenance costs by almost 50 per cent, could not be met out of the existing roads budget and would presumably require to be funded by cutting spending on some other council service. In my opinion this goes beyond the setting of operational priorities and is dictated by considerations in respect of which Parliament could not have intended, when enacting the 1984 Act that the court would substitute its view for that of the body elected to make such decisions.”

8.25

Once a roads authority has put a system of clearing snow and ice into action, a duty arises properly to implement that system in the light of the information available. The pursuer in McGeouch v Strathclyde Regional Council,107 for example, was injured after slipping on an icy pavement

Macdonald v Scottish Ministers 2004 Rep LR 16 per Lord Clarke at para 8. GN v Poole BC [2019] UKSC 25, [2020] AC 780 per Lord Reed at para 75. GN v Poole BC [2019] UKSC 25, [2020] AC 780 per Lord Reed at para 75. [2013] CSOH 95, 2013 SLT 847. [2013] CSOH 95, 2013 SLT 847 at para 52. See also Cameron v Inverness-shire County Council 1935 SC 493 at 497 (in which the court thought it impossible that “the idea which inspired the draftsman” was that the roads authority should be regarded as the “true authors” of the loss caused by a snow-blocked road); Grant v Lothian Regional Council 1988 SLT 533. 107 1985 SLT 321.

102 103 104 105 106

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which had been the subject of several complaints to the roads authority. The pursuer did not challenge the Council’s system by which priority was given to gritting main roads and accident black spots, but she argued that, in executing this system, the Council should have turned its attention promptly to streets where there was a reported risk. This was seen by the court not as an attempt to pre-empt a policy decision but as a complaint in relation to the proper operation of the system already in place. Proof before answer was therefore allowed on whether failure in a duty owed to the pursuer had caused her accident. Where breach of duty is alleged, there is a need for precision in specifying the steps which might reasonably have taken to have prevented the occurrence of the accident.108 Moreover, the transient nature of the road conditions means that establishing breach may be challenging. In Morton v West Lothian Council,109 for example, the pursuer allowed that gritting lorries had passed by the locus of the accident, but invited the court to infer from the presence of black ice shortly afterwards that they had negligently failed to spread salt over that particular stretch of roadway. Given competing explanations for this phenomenon, including the possibility that rainfall had washed the salt from the road surface, this was not accepted. Similarly, it is not always straightforward to prove that breach of duty caused the accident. Even if the defenders in Ryder v Highland Council110 had been found to have failed in their duty by not operating a twenty-fourhour system for gritting, it was by no means evident that such treatment would have prevented the occurrence of the accident, given other variables in the weather conditions, including, in this case also, the likelihood of rain washing salt from the road.111

8.26

8.27

(2) Cross-border difference The duty to treat snow and ice is another point on which Scots and English law have differed in the past. Until recently the duty of public authorities in England to maintain the highway under the Highways Act 1980, section 41, was held not to include a duty to prevent the formation of ice or to remove snow from the road and, unlike in Scotland, there was no common law duty so to do.112 However, by amendment to the 1980 Act in 2003, section 41(1A) now encompasses “a duty to ensure, so far as is 108 Macdonald v Scottish Ministers 2004 Rep LR 16. 109 2006 Rep LR 7, affd [2008] CSIH 18; see also Gibson v West Lothian Council [2011] CSOH 110. 2011 Rep LR 84, affd [2012] CSIH 62, 2012 GWD 28–583. 110 [2013] CSOH 95, 2013 SLT 847, discussed at para 8.24 above. 111 [2013] CSOH 95, 2013 SLT 847 at paras 56–57. 112 Goodes v East Sussex County Council [2000] 1 WLR 1356, overruling Haydon v Kent County Council [1978] QB 343 on this point. See also Sandhar v Department of Transport, Environment and the Regions [2004] EWCA Civ 1440, [2005] 1 WLR 1632 (accident in 1996).

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reasonably practicable, that safe passage along a highway is not endangered by snow or ice”.113 Comparison with English law on this point is difficult since few reported cases have followed from the 2003 reform. Plainly, however, earlier dicta in Scottish cases to the effect that there is no right to sue English roads authorities in these circumstances no longer hold good.114 Furthermore, since the obligation imposed upon English authorities is expressed as ensuring safe passage “so far as is reasonably practicable”, the factors relevant to establishing negligence are likely to replicate the considerations discussed above as elaborated in the Scots common law.

113 Highways Act 1980 s 41(1A), inserted by Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 s 111. 114 See e.g. Syme v Scottish Borders Council 2003 SLT 601 at para 5; Macdonald v Scottish Ministers 2004 Rep LR 16.

Chapter 9

The Emergency Services

Para A. INTRODUCTION������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.01 B. THE POLICE �������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.03 (1) The “core principle” in Hill and its reformulations (a) Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire ��������������������������� 9.05 (b) Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police�������������������������� 9.06 (c) Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police���������������� 9.08 (d) Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police����������� 9.12 (2) Positive conduct in the course of police functions����������������� 9.15 (3) Creation of danger�������������������������������������������������������������� 9.21 (4) Failure to prevent wrongdoing or avert danger��������������������� 9.23 (a) Assumption of responsibility������������������������������������������ 9.24 (b) “Taking charge” of a hazard������������������������������������������ 9.27 (c) Position of control over a third party������������������������������ 9.29 (5) Making an existing situation worse��������������������������������������� 9.30 (6) The physical safety of persons in custody����������������������������� 9.31 (7) Duty to police officers as employees������������������������������������� 9.33 (8) Liability under the Human Rights Act 1998������������������������� 9.38 C. THE FIRE SERVICE���������������������������������������������������������������� 9.42 (1) The duty to extinguish fires (a) The position in English law������������������������������������������� 9.43 (b) Cross-border difference? Burnett v Grampian Fire and Rescue Services��������������������������������������������������������������� 9.45 (c) Rejection of Burnett���������������������������������������������������� 9.46 (2) Failure to respond to eventualities other than fire����������������� 9.50 (3) Duty to firefighters as employees����������������������������������������� 9.51 D. THE MARITIME AND COASTGUARD AGENCY���������������� 9.53 E. THE AMBULANCE SERVICE������������������������������������������������ 9.54

A. INTRODUCTION The decision of the Supreme Court in Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police1 and its implications for the liability of public authorities   1 [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 68; see also Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 per Lord Toulson at para 101.

291

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9.02

were reviewed in chapters 4 and 7. In giving the majority judgment in Robinson, Lord Reed stated that the “ordinary principles of the law of negligence”2 applied to public authorities in much the same way as to private entities. But while there is no “universal formula or yardstick”3 to assess the scope of duty of care, in many areas of public authority activity the existence of duty is not contentious, and therefore, as also stated in Robinson, the pursuer does not require in every case to address whether all of the significant features of duty as identified in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman4 are present. It is only in “novel” circumstances where the question of duty has not yet been resolved, or is under challenge, that the Caparo criteria must be considered. Application of the ordinary principles of the law of negligence fixes public authorities with a duty of care to avoid positive actions that would foreseeably cause injury or property damage to others. Duty is readily applied, therefore, in regard to the manner in which public authority employees go about straightforward operational tasks, such as driving public-service vehicles on public roads.5 On the other hand, public authorities, like private entities, are held liable for their omissions only in exceptional circumstances.6 As earlier chapters have discussed, one of the key circumstances in which affirmative duties are recognised is where the defender is deemed to have assumed responsibility for the pursuer’s interests. That concept is particularly contentious where the context is provision of one of the emergency services.

B. THE POLICE 9.03

The public duty entrusted to police constables of “keeping and preserving of the king’s majesty’s peace” is long-established.7 In the modern law the  2 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 33.  3 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 per Lord Toulson at para 103.   4 [1990] 2 AC 605. On Caparo, and discussion in Robinson, see paras 4.15–4.25 above.  5 E.g. Sim v Strathclyde Fire Board [2010] CSOH 63, 2010 GWD 17–345; see also Gibson v Orr 1999 SC 420 per Lord Hamilton at 436. For discussion of the relevant standard of care, see paras 11.36–11.41 below.   6 [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 4; see also Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 per Lord Toulson at para 101.   7 Act regarding the Justices for keeping of the King’s Majesty’s Peace and their Constables, RPS 1617/5/22, APS iv, 535 c 8 (conferring upon Justice of the Peace the power to appoint two constables to assist in apprehending suspects). For a historical account of the powers and duties of police officers, see J Irvine Smith, “Criminal Procedures”, in G C H Paton (ed), Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Stair Society vol 20, 1958) 426 at 427–428; C A Macpherson, “Police”, in Lord Dunedin et al (eds), Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, vol 11 (1931) 376–416; J Murdoch and D McFadzean, “Police”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Second Reissue (2013) paras 4–13.

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duties of police constables, as set out in section 20(1) of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012, include preventing and detecting crime, maintaining order, protecting life and property, and bringing offenders to justice. Liability for police conduct amounting to intentional assault or wrongful detention is considered elsewhere in this volume.8 The present chapter is concerned with negligence. Where police officers are alleged to have acted negligently, the Supreme Court has stated that “the ordinary principles” 9 of negligence apply, as they do in other cases involving public authorities. Nonetheless, a recurring preoccupation in the case law has been whether police officers should be favoured by a “protective” approach when duty is assessed.10 A useful starting point in tracking judicial receptiveness to policy arguments against the imposition of duty is the decision of the House of Lords in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire.11

9.04

(1) The “core principle” in Hill and its reformulations (a) Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire In Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire,12 the plaintiff’s daughter had been murdered as the thirteenth and final victim of a notorious serial killer. The plaintiff argued that the police had been under a duty to conduct their investigations into the earlier offences more efficiently and that, had they done so, they would have arrested the killer before this last murder. The House of Lords determined, however, that the police had owed no duty in this regard. Lord Keith, giving the leading speech, conceded that “a police officer, like anyone else, may be liable in tort to a person who is injured as a direct result of his acts or omissions”,13 but duty was not owed to the world at large to apprehend an unknown criminal. The plaintiff’s daughter, who had been killed at random, could not be said to be part of a special class of persons to whom a duty had been assumed. She had been one of a “vast number” of women in the community at general risk from the killer but she had been at “no special distinctive risk”.14 The conduct of police investigations necessarily involved a variety of decisions on matters of policy, including the exercise of discretion as to lines of inquiry and the deployment of available resources. If such decisions were susceptible to challenge,   8 See chs 15 and 17 respectively.  9 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 68. 10 C McIvor, “Getting Defensive about Police Negligence: The Hill Principle, the Human Rights Act 1998 and the House of Lords” (2010) 69 CLJ 133 at 133. 11 [1989] AC 53. 12 [1989] AC 53. 13 [1989] AC 53 at 59. 14 [1989] AC 53 at 62.

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two problems might arise, in the court’s view: first, police officers might believe it necessary to approach their investigations in “a detrimentally defensive frame of mind”; secondly, the need to defend claims would waste police time, trouble and expense, thus diverting resources from the suppression crime. Police officers’ sense of duty would not be “appreciably reinforced” by the imposition of liability, since they already applied their “best endeavours” in the investigation and suppression of crime.15 Lord Keith concluded his analysis by maintaining that the Court of Appeal had been “right to take the view that the police were immune from an action of this kind on grounds similar to those which in Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191 were held to render a barrister immune from actions for negligence in his conduct of proceedings in court”.16

(b) Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police 9.06

9.07

A few years later the comparison with the regime applied to barristers ceased to be relevant, with the removal of their immunity from suit,17 and the House of Lords indicated, in Brooks v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,18 that it would be helpful to “reformulate” the “core principle” in Hill in terms of absence of duty of care rather than absolute immunity. Lord Keith’s confidence in the police applying their “best endeavours” in exercising their functions could no longer be accepted as a justification for releasing them from a duty of care, and indeed the courts had moved to “a more sceptical approach to the carrying out of all public functions”.19 Even as reformulated, however, that “core principle” from Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire continued to have considerable force, as seen in the reasoning in Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police.20 In Smith, unlike in Hill, the police knew that a threat had been made to a specific person by a known individual. The claimant had suffered violence at the hands of his former partner and, after breaking off their relationship, received a series of abusive and threatening messages from him. The claimant reported these to the police, giving full details of the phone numbers used, the partner’s address, and the unmistakable substance of his threats. The police did not intercept the violent partner, and his subsequent attack on the claimant inflicted grievous injuries. The resulting 15 16 17 18 19

[1989] AC 53 at 63. [1989] AC 53 at 63–64. Arthur J S Hall & Co v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615. [2005] UKHL 24, [2005] 1 WLR 1495 per Lord Steyn at para 27. Brooks v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2005] UKHL 24, [2005] 1 WLR 1495 per Lord Steyn at para 28. See also Van Colle v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225 per Lord Bingham at para 48. See also para 7.16 above. 20 [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225 (one of two conjoined appeals, the other of which was Van Colle v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police, a claim under the Human Rights Act 1998 s 7, and Art 2 ECHR, as discussed further below).

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claim against the Chief Constable in negligence was nevertheless struck out. Lord Bingham had argued in a dissenting speech that it was fair, just and reasonable to impose duty upon the police: “if a member of the public (A) furnishes a police office (B) with apparently credible evidence that a third party whose identity and whereabouts are known presents a specific and imminent threat to his life or physical safety, B owes A a duty to take reasonable steps to assess such threat and, if appropriate, take reasonable steps to prevent it being executed”.21 The majority in the House of Lords, however, considered this proposition too uncertain in its terms, and apt to induce the detrimental effects originally identified by Lord Keith in Hill.22 While accepting that duty might be imposed in “exceptional cases”,23 such as where police officers had assumed responsibility for the safety of an individual,24 the court was not disposed to allow the shortcomings of the police in individual cases to undermine the basic reasoning of Hill.25 The “core principle” remained that in their general duty of combating and investigating crime the police owed no duty to specific individuals affected by their failure to do so with due care.

(c) Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police A further reformulation followed in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police,26 by which time reference to the “immunity” of the police had come to be acknowledged as “not only unnecessary but unfortunate”.27 In Michael, Ms Michael called 999 in the early hours of the morning to report that her former partner had found her in her home with another man. The former partner had left to escort the other man away, but Ms Michael told the operator that he had already assaulted her and had said he was returning to kill her. The 999 call was routed in the first instance to Gwent Police, although Ms Michael’s house was within the area served by South Wales Police. The Gwent operator told Ms Michael that she would pass the call on to South Wales Police and that Ms Michael should lock her doors and keep the phone free for police calls. The Gwent operator logged the call as of “grade 1” priority, indicating that it required an immediate response, but in passing it to South Wales Police the operator failed to mention the death threat. The South Wales operator then graded the call as of “grade 2” 21 [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225 at para 44. 22 [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225 per Lord Hope at para 77, a view endorsed in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 per Lord Toulson at para 129. 23 [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225 per Lord Hope at para 78. 24 [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225 per Lord Brown at para 120. 25 [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225 per Lord Hope at para 75. 26 [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732. For commentary, see S Tofaris and S Steel, “Negligence Liability for Omissions and the Police” (2016) 75 CLJ 128; N McBride, “Michael and the Future of Tort Law” (2016) 32 PN 14. 27 [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 per Lord Toulson at para 44.

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priority, indicating that a response was required within 60 minutes. Fourteen minutes after the first call, Ms Michael called 999 once again and screaming was heard. Her case was then upgraded to “grade 1”, but by the time South Wales Police officers reached the house, 22 minutes after the first call, Ms Michael had already been murdered by her former partner. The Michael family brought proceedings against the Chief Constables of both police forces, alleging negligence, on the basis that a duty of care to attend swiftly was owed to Ms Michael once her 999 call was received. By a majority decision the Supreme Court held that this claim should be struck out, although there was a strong dissent,28 and a claim based upon breach of Article 2 of the ECHR was permitted to proceed to trial.29 Lord Toulson, giving the judgment for the majority, shared the scepticism of some commentators as to certain of the policy justifications used previously to deny duty in cases such as Hill. There was no empirical basis for believing that the imposition of duty would foster a “defensive” attitude on the part of the police, but neither was he persuaded that the imposition of duty upon the police would increase efficiency in dealing with cases of domestic violence. The only consequence that was reasonably certain was financial, in that the payment of compensation and the costs of dealing with claims would diminish the police budget at the expense of other services.30 However, the reasoning of the majority31 was based not upon any notion of “immunity” for the police32 but upon the general rule that there was no positive duty of care to act to protect others, or to prevent them from being harmed by actions of a third party. In other words, there was no question of special treatment for the police; the majority was simply applying a general principle of equal relevance to private parties as well as to other types of public authority:33 28 [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 (the leading judgment was given by Lord Toulson, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Reed and Lord Hodge agreed. Lady Hale and Lord Kerr dissented). 29 See paras 9.40–9.43 below. 30 [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 at paras 121–122. 31 In his dissenting judgment, Lord Kerr argued ([2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 at para 144, under reference to Lord Bingham’s dissent in Smith) that there was sufficient proximity for duty to be found where the following factors were present: “(i) a closeness of association between the claimant and the defendant, which can be created by information communicated to the defendant but need not necessarily come into existence in that way; (ii) the information should convey to the defendant that serious harm is likely to befall the intended victim if urgent action is not taken; (iii) the defendant is a person or agency who might reasonably be expected to provide protection in those circumstances; and (iv) he should be able to provide for the intended victim’s protection without unnecessary danger to himself.” Lady Hale similarly, at para 197, thought that there was sufficient proximity “if the police know or ought to know of an imminent threat of death or personal injury to a particular individual which they have the means to prevent. Once that proximity is established, it is fair, just and reasonable to expect them to take reasonable care to prevent the harm”. 32 [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 at para 44. 33 [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 at paras 113–114; see also para 101.

The Emergency Services   297 “It does not follow from the setting up of a protective system from public resources that if it fails to achieve its purpose, through organisational defects or fault on the part of an individual, the public at large should bear the additional burden of compensating a victim for harm caused by the actions of a third party for whose behaviour the state is not responsible. To impose such a burden would be contrary to the ordinary principles of the common law.

The refusal of the courts to impose a private law duty on the police to exercise reasonable care to safeguard victims or potential victims of crime, except in cases where there has been a representation and reliance, does not involve giving special treatment to the police. It is consistent with the way in which the common law has been applied to other authorities vested with powers or duties as a matter of public law for the protection of the public.” For the police, as for private entities, therefore, application of the “ordinary principles of the common law” meant that there was no duty to avert harm to members of the public at the hand of third parties or emanating from sources outwith police control. As with private entities, that principle was subject to exceptions, such as where police officers had assumed responsibility for the safety of the claimant and the claimant had relied upon them so to do. However, the court did not consider that the interaction between the emergency services call-handler and Ms Michael constituted an assumption of responsibility by the police sufficient to found duty.34 Moreover, recognition of duty was not necessary in order to vindicate the rights arising under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to life), since this could be achieved by a separate claim under the Human Rights Act 1998,35 and the court upheld the decision of the lower courts that the Article 2 claim should be allowed to proceed to trial in this case.36

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(d) Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police The reasoning of the majority in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police was endorsed in Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police,37 but while Hill, Smith and Michael had all concerned claims arising out of police officers’ failure to intercept danger, the facts of Robinson involved an alleged failure of due care in carrying out positive action. In Robinson the claimant was injured on a busy street in Huddersfield when, as a passer-by, 34 [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 per Lord Toulson at para 138. 35 [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 at paras 126–128. For discussion of this point, see N McBride, “Michael and the Future of Tort Law” (2016) 32 PN 14 at 25 ff. 36 See paras 9.38–9.41 below. 37 [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736.

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she became caught up the fracas preceding the arrest of a suspected drug dealer. A struggle ensued as two police officers attempted to detain the suspect, resulting in Mrs Robinson, a frail seventy-six-year-old, being knocked to the ground and injured. Her claim against the police was dismissed in the lower courts, with the Court of Appeal holding that the officers owed her no duty of care. In reaching this decision it took into account “an obvious public interest in not imposing a duty which might deter the police from removing a drugs dealer from the streets” and held that “the risk to passers-by like [the claimant] is trumped by the risk to society as a whole”.38 That decision was, however, overturned in the Supreme Court. Lord Reed’s judgment in Robinson contained an extensive review of English authorities relating to alleged police negligence, including the cases noted above, and its conclusions provide an important statement of the modern law. In summary, they are as follows:39 • In considering the conduct of police officers, as of other public officers or of private actors, a distinction is to be drawn between “careless acts causing personal injury”, for which the law generally imposes liability, and “careless omissions” to prevent harm, for which the common law generally imposes no liability.40 Such a distinction is “not a mere alternative to policy-based reasoning, but is inherent in the nature of the tort of negligence”. The “central point” is that “the law of negligence generally imposes duties not to cause harm to other people or their property: it does not generally impose duties to provide them with benefits (including the prevention of harm caused by other agencies)”. • The general rule that police officers owe no duty to potential victims, when engaged in work to investigate and prevent crime, is thus based upon “the application of a general and long-established principle that the common law imposes no liability to protect persons against harm caused by third parties, in the absence of a recognised exception such as a voluntary assumption of responsibility”. • The discussion in earlier case law of policy considerations concerning the police is not to be “consigned to history”. The exercise of judgment about the potential consequences of a decision, and about the need for the law to develop “coherently and incrementally”, remain relevant when the court is asked to consider whether duty

38 [2014] EWCA Civ 15, [2014] PIQR P14 per Hallett LJ at para 47. 39 [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 at paras 69–70. For a critique, see J Morgan, “Nonfeasance and the End of Policy? Reflections on the Revolution in Public Authority Liability” (2019) 35 PN 32. 40 And insofar as Lord Keith had appeared in Hill to endorse some form of “immunity”, his remarks were to be read as addressed at absence of duty in relation to police functions in investigating crime, rather than a general immunity in litigation of any kind: [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 at para 55.

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arises in a novel context. However, in this context as in others, it is not to be thought of as a “routine aspect” of deciding cases in the law of negligence.41 • In the circumstances of Robinson, there was no general rule that the police were not under any duty of care in their positive conduct, even allowing for the fact that they were discharging their function of preventing and investigating crime. They generally owed such duties as arose under the ordinary principles of the law of negligence, unless statute or the common law provided otherwise. On this approach, there was therefore no barrier in principle to recognising a duty of care in Robinson where police officers’ careless acts had caused the claimant to suffer physical injury. Furthermore, as the context was not novel, there was no requirement to consider whether the imposition of duty was fair, just and reasonable, or whether policy considerations militated against it. There had been a reasonably foreseeable risk of physical injury in attempting to arrest a suspect on a busy street, particularly at a time when vulnerable passers-by such as the claimant might be knocked over. The officers had thus owed a duty to pedestrians in the immediate vicinity of the arrest, and even on a “realistic”42 view of the standard of care incumbent upon them, the claimant’s injury had been caused by their negligence.

9.14

(2) Positive conduct in the course of police functions In their positive actions, as Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police43 demonstrates, police officers must take care not to inflict physical injury or property damage on others. A straightforward example is the duty owed by police officers to other road users when driving on the roads.44 Concessions may be made by the criminal law to police officers infringing speed limits45 or other road traffic regulations,46 and the law of negligence 41 As pointed out by Lord Reed, at paras 51 and 69, the extended discussion of policy considerations in Hill dated from the era when Anns v London Borough of Merton [1978] AC 728 was understood as giving greater prominence to the role of such arguments (see also paras 4.13–4.14 above). In Smith, on the other hand, policy discussion figured large because existing principles pointed towards the rejection of duty in regard to omissions and those principles were under challenge. Note, however, Lord Hughes’ dissenting judgment in Robinson ([2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 at para 113), to which Lord Reed was responding, in which he said that statements of the policy considerations in earlier case law were “simply too considered, too powerful and too authoritative in law to be consigned to history”. Lord Mance, while concurring with the decision of the majority, similarly maintained, at para 84, that “It would be unrealistic to suggest that, when recognising and developing an established category, the courts are not influenced by policy considerations.” 42 [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 75. 43 [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736. 44 Gibson v Orr 1999 SC 420 per Lord Hamilton at 436. See e.g. MacLeod v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 977 (QB). 45 Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 s 87. 46 Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2016, SI 2016/362.

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allows for the possibility that even a careful driver may be required to run a risk when an emergency is being attended to.47 Nonetheless, police drivers are required to apply such care as is “reasonable in the circumstances”, including in regard to individuals suspected of having been engaged in criminal activity for which there was a power of arrest.48 Robinson indicates, moreover, that even during key operational activities, such as pursuing and arresting suspects, police officers must take care for the safety of others in the vicinity, such as the elderly passer-by in that case. There is also a duty to the fleeing suspect to take reasonable care in avoiding infliction of physical injury,49 but it seems that police officers normally owe no duty to protect suspects against injuring themselves in attempting to escape.50 In Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police51 it was similarly accepted that police officers engaged in crowd control at large sporting events owed a duty to exercise due care in their actions so that members of the public were not exposed to physical danger. A duty to avoid physical injury or property damage also extends to functions involving the use of dangerous weapons or devices. In Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire,52 for example, police officers attempted to end a siege at the plaintiff’s gun shop by firing a canister of highly flammable CS gas into the premises, but they did so in the knowledge that a fire engine previously in attendance had left the scene. This breached the duty of care that was owed to the shop proprietor and in consequence the Chief Constable was held liable for the damage to the premises and contents caused by the ensuing fire. Similarly, in Attorney General of the British Virgin Islands v Hartwell53 a policeman left his post to confront his girlfriend whom he found with another man. A bystander was injured in the ensuing fracas in which the policeman fired shots with his police-issue revolver. The Attorney General, as representing the Virgin Islands Police Force, was held liable to the injured victim since the police authorities owed a duty to the public when giving out dangerous weapons to take due care that the recipients were individuals suitable to be entrusted with them.

47 E.g. Marshall v Osmond [1983] QB 1034; see also Craggy v Chief Constable of Cleveland Police [2009] EWCA Civ 1128 (duty to driver of another emergency vehicle); Gilfillan v Barbour 2003 SLT 1127 (assessing standard of driving required to avoid finding of contributory negligence). 48 Marshall v Osmond [1983] QB 1034 per Sir John Donaldson MR at 1038; Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 47. For further discussion of the relevant standard of care, see paras 11.36–11.41 below. 49 Marshall v Osmond [1983] QB 1034. 50 Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2001] EWCA Civ 1249, [2002] 1 WLR 218. 51 [1992] 1 AC 310. 52 [1985] 1 WLR 1242. 53 [2004] UKPC 12, [2004] 1 WLR 1273. In the event, the police authorities were held not to be vicariously liable because the policeman had been engaged upon a “vendetta” of his own.

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As Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police54 further demonstrates, however, duty is recognised in relation to infliction of psychiatric harm, unrelated to exposure to physical danger, only where the pursuer meets the additional criteria set out in that case as applicable to primary and secondary victims.55 Similarly, a duty of care not to inflict purely financial harm may arise in circumstances where police officers can be shown to have assumed responsibility for the pursuer’s economic interests, although such cases are likely to be rare.56

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(3) Creation of danger Police officers may be under a duty of care to protect against dangers which they themselves have created, including risks “resulting from human agency”.57 As explained in chapter 4,58 the creation of danger can also be regarded as a form of positive conduct. An illustration is Transport Arendonk BVBA v Chief Constable of Essex Police.59 Police officers arrested a lorry driver who had stopped his lorry in an unlit layby in open countryside. After a breath test proved positive, the officers required the driver to leave the vehicle and accompany them to the police station, although the driver protested that he was not permitted to leave the lorry unattended. The lorry was curtain-sided, and therefore relatively easy to break into, and there were known to have been thefts from vehicles in the area. Before the lorry could be recovered, its cargo of sportswear was stolen. The court refused to strike out a claim against the police by the owner of the lorry and its cargo. Although the theft was perpetrated by a third party, arguably the police had created the danger that it might occur. In a location where the lorry’s contents were vulnerable to theft they had removed the driver and taken steps which prevented others from keeping the lorry safe. In those circumstances, the possibility that a court might find the existence of a duty of care could not, therefore, be excluded, and the claim was allowed to proceed to trial.

54 [1992] 1 AC 310. 55 See para 6.32 above. 56 This possibility was acknowledged by the Court of Appeal in An Informer v A Chief Constable [2012] EWCA Civ 197, [2013] QB 579, although in the circumstances of that case duty did not extend to the claimant’s financial loss. See also Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Mance at para 83. 57 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 70. 58 See para 4.50 above. 59 [2020] EWHC 212 (QB), [2020] RTR 22.

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(4) Failure to prevent wrongdoing or avert danger 9.23

As stated in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police60 and repeated in Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police,61 the application of the ordinary principles of the law of negligence means that the police are not generally under a duty to avert harm to members of the public by the hand of third parties or emanating from sources outwith the control of the police. As also stated in Michael, that principle is subject to important exceptions.62 The “exceptional” circumstances in which the police may come under a positive duty to avert harm include the following.

(a) Assumption of responsibility 9.24

It remains the case that in circumstances such as those in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire,63 where police inefficiency delays the identification of an offender, there is no assumption of responsibility in favour of members of the public generally, and therefore no duty of care between police and the as yet unknown victims of the offender’s criminal conduct. Admittedly, a duty may be imposed where, under the Hedley Byrne principle,64 the defender assumed a positive responsibility to safeguard the claimant in regard to a specific risk, and the pursuer relied upon the defender to do so,65 but often, as in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police,66 such assumption of responsibility is not found to have occurred. Looking for elements of “representation and reliance”67 to displace the usual common law rule, the court in Michael considered the content of the exchange between Ms Michael and the 999 call handler, in which the only assurance given was that the call would be passed on to South Wales Police, and no undertaking was offered as to the speed of the police response.68 The majority took the view that there was insufficient evidence from this interaction of an assumption of responsibility by the handler on behalf of the police.69

60 61 62 63 64 65

[2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732. [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736. [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 per Lord Toulson at paras 99–101. [1989] AC 53; see para 9.05 above. Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; see paras 5.27 and 5.28 above. Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 per Lord Toulson at paras 97–100. 66 [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732; see paras 9.08–9.11 above. 67 [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 at para 114. 68 Cf Kent v Griffiths [2001] QB 36 in which the ambulance service falsely represented that the ambulance would reach the patient shortly. 69 [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 at para 138. For discussion, see N McBride, “Michael and the Future of Tort Law” (2016) 32 PN 14 at 22–23.

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By contrast, an illustration of circumstances in which the police may be regarded as having assumed responsibility can be seen in Sherratt v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police,70 although in that case the harm was self-inflicted rather than at the hand of a third party. In Sherratt the content of a 999 call was similarly “pivotal” to the question of duty.71 The mother of a woman who later committed suicide had called the emergency services at 6.44 pm, expressing her fear that her daughter might take an overdose of her anti-depressant medication. As in Michael, the call was first logged as “grade 1” priority but then somehow downgraded to “grade 2”. Police officers eventually attended the daughter’s house at 10.19 pm, but left the scene having found the house in darkness. When they revisited at 8.17 am the next day they found that the daughter had died from an overdose. It was held that, in accepting the emergency call, the police had assumed responsibility. The call handler had told the mother that police officers would attend the daughter’s house promptly and that they would call an ambulance if one was needed. The court also found that that had the mother not been reassured in this way, and relied upon police officers to attend to her daughter, she would herself have taken other steps, such as calling for an ambulance, seeking assistance from others, or making her own way to the house. Although the undertakings had been given to the mother rather than to the daughter, and reliance was by the mother rather than the daughter, this was sufficient where it was obvious that the mother was seeking assistance on the daughter’s behalf.72 A further context for assumption of responsibility can be seen in Swinney v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police Force.73 The plaintiffs had provided the police with information about a driver who had knocked down and killed a police officer. Subsequently, the plaintiffs’ contact details, contained in a document left in the back of an unattended police car, were stolen and passed on to the suspect, whereupon the plaintiffs received threats of violence and fire-raising. The Court of Appeal ruled that the claim against the police, on grounds of negligence and breach of confidence, should not be struck out.74 It was arguable that in their interaction with their informants the police had assumed responsibility for protecting their identity, disclosure of which would expose them to a specific known risk.75

70 [2018] EWHC 1746 (QB), [2019] PIQR P1. 71 [2018] EWHC 1746 (QB), [2019] PIQR P1 at para 11. 72 In this respect reference was made to Kent v Griffiths [2001] QB 36, discussed at para 9.55 below. 73 [1997] QB 464. 74 The claim failed on both counts at trial, however: see (1999) 11 Admin LR 811. 75 Cf An Informer v A Chief Constable [2012] EWCA Civ 197, [2013] QB 579, holding that police officers might be in principle regarded as having assumed responsibility for the physical risks to which the claimant was subjected by his enlistment as a covert human intelligence source, although no breach of duty was established.

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(b) “Taking charge” of a hazard 9.27

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Exceptionally, duty might be established where, in the course of their functions to promote public safety, the police take control of a hazard that was not of their making but presents an ongoing danger. In the Outer House case of Gibson v Orr76 a bridge partially collapsed due to exceptionally heavy rainfall. Aware of the collapse, the police visited the scene and placed traffic cones and warning lights on one side of the bridge. They then departed without having checked whether similar provision had been made on the other side, which it had not. The car in which the pursuer was travelling approached the bridge from the other side and fell into the river below, killing two of its occupants and injuring the pursuer. Lord Hamilton reasoned that one of the “civil functions” of police officers was to take “control” of traffic and road-safety situations in order to safeguard life and property. Such functions brought with them an “attendant responsibility”.77 This meant that, once police officers had taken charge of “a particular road traffic situation which, without control by [the officers], presents a grave and immediate risk of death or serious injury to road users likely to be affected by the particular hazard”, such officers were brought into “such a relationship with such road users as to satisfy the requisite element of proximity”.78 The police officers had therefore owed a duty of care not to abandon the scene without taking reasonable care to make the hazard safe. Lord Hamilton’s reasoning in Gibson v Orr was reviewed by the Inner House in A J Allan (Blairnyle) Ltd v Strathclyde Fire Board.79 Observing that duty flowed from the police taking control of the hazard, the majority of the court added that this “analysis is one that may frequently apply to work performed by the police in controlling traffic or dealing with hazards on the roads. It would not, however, normally apply to work performed in the prevention of crime and the detection of the perpetrators of crime.”80

(c) Position of control over a third party 9.29

As discussed elsewhere in this volume,81 duty of care may be found where the defender was in a position of control over a third party who harms the pursuer. However, it will be necessary for the pursuer to show that the 76 1999 SC 420. 77 1999 SC 420 at 433. 78 1999 SC 420 at 433. Cf Clough v Bussan [1990] 1 All ER 431; Ancell v McDermott [1993] 4 All ER 355 (in which the police, although notified of a hazard, had not taken control of its management). 79 [2016] CSIH 3, 2016 SC 304. 80 [2016] CSIH 3, 2016 SC 304 per Lord Drummond Young at para 91. Gibson was also cited with approval in Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225 per Lord Hope at para 79, in discussion of “cases where operational decisions taken by the police can give rise to civil liability without compromising the public interest in the investigation and suppression of crime”. 81 See paras 4.62–4.64 above.

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specific likelihood of the third party causing harm was foreseeable in the event that the defender failed to take reasonable care in exercising control.82 The difficulties of establishing foreseeability in this sense are illustrated by Thomson v Scottish Ministers,83 a case involving prison authorities.

(5) Making an existing situation worse A service, such as the police, attending an emergency is under a duty, at the very least, not to make an existing situation worse or to create new dangers.84

9.30

(6) The physical safety of persons in custody Once an individual has been taken into police custody85 the police are under a duty to take reasonable care for the individual’s physical safety.86 In cases where a detainee has suffered physical harm, therefore, the focus of litigation is normally on determining whether that duty has been breached, rather than whether it existed in the first place. It was accepted, for example, in Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis87 that the police owed a duty of care to protect the welfare of a detainee whom they knew to have suicidal tendencies. Similarly, in Wilson v Lothian and Borders Police88 police officers removed the pursuer’s husband from his home, in a state of intoxication, because he had been causing a disturbance there. They were held to have assumed a duty of care after they had effectively detained him by requiring him to get into their car and driving him several miles away. That duty was breached by putting him out of the car in a remote country location on a freezing January night, in consequence of which he died of hypothermia. As demonstrated by Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,89 the duty of professional persons may extend to protecting their charges 82 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 at para 99. The classic example is Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004. See also Kaizer v Scottish Ministers [2017] CSOH 110, 2017 Rep LR 124, affd [2018] CSIH 36, 2018 SC 491 (duty of prison officers). 83 [2013] CSIH 63, 2013 SC 628, discussed at para 4.64 above. 84 Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council [1997] QB 1004; and see A J Allan (Blairnyle) Ltd v Strathclyde Fire Board [2016] CSIH 3, 2016 SC 304 per Lord Drummond Young at para 62. See also Tindall v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2020] EWHC 837 (QB), [2021] RTR 6. 85 For liability in cases where the imprisonment was unlawful, see ch 17 below. 86 Simpson v Dundee Corporation 1928 SN 30. After collapsing in the street, the pursuer’s husband was bundled by officers into a police van and placed in a cell, suspected of being drunk. When a member of his family collected him the next day and transported him to hospital he was found to have been suffering from a cerebral haemorrhage from which he died shortly afterwards. The court held that if the delay in treatment were found to have hastened his death then damages would be due. 87 [2000] 1 AC 360; see also Kirkham v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police [1990] 2 QB 283. 88 1989 SLT 97. 89 [2000] 1 AC 360. See also Sherratt v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2018] EWHC 1746 (QB), [2019] PIQR P1.

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from harm at their own hand. In the same way that hospital authorities are under a duty to guard against the possibility of injury, self-inflicted or otherwise, to patients with a history of mental illness”,90 so police officers who detain vulnerable individuals known to be at risk are under a duty to take care that appropriate measures are taken to protect them against selfinflicted injury.91

(7) Duty to police officers as employees 9.33

Just as they owe a duty to members of the public, police officers owe a duty to their colleagues of whatever rank in regard to positive actions which might foreseeably create the risk of injury to those colleagues. 92 In addition, the relevant chief constable – in Scotland, the Chief Constable of Police Scotland – owes to police officers a duty of care “closely analogous”93 to that owed by an employer to employees.94 There is thus a non-delegable duty to implement a safe system of work and to have due regard to risk where injury “in the event of failure to exercise reasonable care for [the officer’s] safety could reasonably and probably be anticipated”.95 The duty of care of Chief Constables as quasi-employers extends also to police training courses, during which precautions should be implemented to reduce any foreseeable risk of injury to participants.96 It also entails providing appropriate assistance to officers confronting danger in the course of police operations.97 As, however, the risk of harm is an inescapable feature of police 90 Thorne v Northern Group Hospital Management Committee (1964) 108 SJ 484 per Edmund Davies J, cited by Lord Rodger in Savage v South Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust [2008] UKHL 74, [2009] 1 AC 681 at para 47; see also McHardy v Dundee General Hospitals’ Board of Management 1960 SLT (Notes) 19. 91 Kirkham v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police [1990] 2 QB 283; Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360, in which Lord Hope at 379 described the duty of police officers as one “to take reasonable care to prevent the deceased, while in police custody, from taking his own life deliberately”. 92 See e.g. Knightley v Johns [1982] 1 WLR 349, in which a police inspector fell short in that duty where at the scene of an accident he ordered a police constable to ride his motorcycle against the flow of traffic and round a blind bend, in the course of which the constable was injured in a collision with a car. 93 See James-Bowen v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2018] UKSC 40, [2018] 1 WLR 4021 at para 15. 94 On the content of which see ch 12 below. 95 Robertson v Bell 1969 SLT 119 per Lord Fraser at 121; cf Gillon v Chief Constable of Strathclyde Police 1997 SLT 1218, in which the risk of harm (a footballer careering off a football pitch during a match and colliding with one of the officers policing the crowd) was not foreseeable. 96 Franklin v Chief Constable, Grampian Police 2001 Rep LR 79; cf Grant v Chief Constable, Grampian Police 2001 Rep LR 74 (in which the pursuer failed to establish that there was a precaution not undertaken which would have prevented bruising); Stevenson v Chief Constable of Police Scotland [2015] CSOH 16, 2015 GWD 6–129 (in which the pursuer failed to establish that the instructors had not provided adequate training on avoiding injury). 97 Costello v Chief Constable of Northumbria [1999] ICR 752; Mullaney v Chief Constable of the West Midlands [2001] EWCA Civ 700, [2001] Po LR 150.

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work, the nature and scope of the duty can give rise to difficulty, and duty is apt to be excluded in relation to “operational decisions taken in the heat of the moment and when resources may be inadequate to cover all possibilities”.98 As with other types of employment, the duty to provide a safe system of work may also extend to protecting police officers against occupational stress, and against bullying and harassment by fellow officers.99 Where police officers are negligently placed in a one-off dangerous situation in which physical harm was foreseeable, the duty of care owed by their employers extends to protection against psychiatric injury, whether or not physical harm has eventuated.100 But where officers claim to have suffered psychiatric injury as a result of witnessing injury to others or other distressing events, and have not themselves been exposed to physical danger, duty is established only where the officers meet the criteria for secondary victims as explained in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police.101 The extent of duty of commanding officers in relation to psychiatric injury suffered by members of the rescue services is discussed more fully in chapter 6.102 Police authorities may also be under a duty to protect the financial interests of police officers, in circumstances where they assume responsibility for those interests and are relied upon so to do by the officers in question. Thus liability might arise if a representative of the police force offers negligent advice on the terms and conditions of officers’ engagement with the police force, thereby inducing them to make career choices to their financial disadvantage.103 The case of James-Bowen v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis104 raised the novel question of whether, in defending (other) litigation in which the Commissioner had been sued as vicariously liable for the alleged misconduct of police officers, the Commissioner had been under a duty to officers in her force to exercise due care in protecting their reputations and financial interests. The four claimants had taken part in the arrest of a suspected terrorist, who later alleged that they had seriously assaulted him. Although complaints made against the officers were not upheld, and  98 Costello v Chief Constable of Northumbria [1999] ICR 752 per May LJ at 766. See also Hughes v National Union of Mineworkers [1991] 4 All ER 278; Rathband v Chief Constable of Northumbria [2016] EWHC 181 (QB).  99 Waters v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 WLR 1607. 100 Ormsby v Chief Constable of Strathclyde Police [2008] CSOH 143, 2009 Rep LR 2, under reference, per Lord Malcolm at para 20, to Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155. 101 [1999] 2 AC 455. 102 See para 6.32 above. 103 Lennon v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2004] EWCA Civ 130, [2004] 1 WLR 2594 (negligent advice on entitlement to allowances on transfer between different police forces). 104 [2018] UKSC 40, [2018] 1 WLR 4021; for commentary, see D Cabrelli, “Receding Confidence in Trust and Confidence?” (2019) 23 EdinLR 411.

9.34 9.35

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they were acquitted of criminal charges, the Commissioner settled a civil claim brought by the suspect, paying an agreed sum of damages, admitting liability, and apologising for “gratuitous violence”. As the recognition of a claim by the officers against the Commissioner would extend duty of care to a new situation, the Supreme Court considered it proper to test the proposed duty against considerations of legal policy. There were clearly conflicting interests at stake in this situation, and while the fact that the recognition of duty might potentially subject an individual to conflicting duties was not necessarily conclusive, it was “a weighty consideration against its imposition”.105 The interests of an employer who was sued as vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of its employees differed fundamentally from the interests of those employees. For the employees the overwhelming interest was in vindicating their reputation. The employer, on the other hand, had to be able to assess the conduct of the litigation from its own point of view, taking into account various factors including the nature of the alleged wrongs, the prospects for the defence, and also the likely costs.106Those important but conflicting interests “strongly suggested” that in this case it would not be fair, just or reasonable to impose on an employer a duty of care to defend legal proceedings so as to protect the economic or reputational interests of employees.107

(8) Liability under the Human Rights Act 1998 9.38

While the claim in negligence was struck out in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales, as noted above,108 the Michael family also made a claim against the police under the Human Rights Act 1998, section 7, invoking breach of ECHR Article 2 (right to life), and that claim was permitted to proceed to trial. In principle, it is possible for a claim based upon Article 2 to succeed where danger to life was apparent, but where a claim in negligence is bound to fail due to differences in the criteria used to assess duty. The test for duty to be imposed upon a public authority in terms of Article 2 is explained in Van Colle v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police:109 “[I]t must be established to [the court’s] satisfaction that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the

105 106 107 108 109

[2018] UKSC 40, [2018] 1 WLR 4021 per Lord Lloyd-Jones at paras 28–29. [2018] UKSC 40, [2018] 1 WLR 4021 per Lord Lloyd-Jones at para 30. [2018] UKSC 40, [2018] 1 WLR 4021 per Lord Lloyd-Jones at para 32. [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732; see paras 9.08–911 above. [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225 per Lord Bingham at para 29, under reference to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245 at para 116.

The Emergency Services   309 criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.”

In Van Colle the claimants’ son had received menacing phone calls from a former employee seeking to intimidate him against giving evidence at the employee’s forthcoming trial on charges of theft. The calls were reported to the police but no action was taken to restrain the accused, who had previous convictions only for trivial offences. Shortly before the trial was due to take place the accused shot the claimants’ son dead. The court acknowledged that the state had a positive duty under Article 2 not only to apply the criminal law in order to deter the commission of offences against the person, but also, “in certain well-defined circumstances”, to take preventative measures to protect specific individuals whose lives were at risk from the criminal acts of others.110 In this case, however, it could not be said that the police should have appreciated that the risk to the life of the claimants’ son was “real and immediate”. The available information pointed to the accused’s unpleasant character, but not to the likelihood that he would kill. The test was not therefore satisfied. By contrast, the test for liability under Article 2 was found to be met in Sarjantson v Chief Constable of Humberside Police,111 a case in which duty in regard to the actions of third parties almost certainly would not have been established under the common law of negligence. In Sarjantson an emergency call had been made to the police regarding a violent affray in which a gang was threatening a third party. Eight minutes later, the police having not yet attended, a second call reported that the claimant was also being assaulted. By the time the police arrived at the scene, several minutes later, the claimant had suffered grievous head injuries. An internal police enquiry concluded that there had been an unnecessary delay in police units reaching the incident. No claim was brought in negligence, but the claimant invoked a breach of Article 2. At first instance the court struck out the claim, holding that the Article 2 duty could not have arisen until eight minutes after the first call, when the claimant was identified for the first time, and by then it was too late to prevent the injury. The Court of Appeal, however, considered that knowledge of the specific identity of the potential victim was not required in order to give rise to duty under Article 2, stating under reference to Strasbourg jurisprudence that:112 “The essential question in a case such as this is whether the police knew or ought to have known that there was a real and immediate risk to the life of

110 [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225 per Lord Bingham at para 28. 111 [2013] EWCA Civ 125, [2014] QB 411. 112 [2013] EWCA Civ 125, [2014] QB 411 per Lord Dyson MR at para 25.

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310   The Law of Delict in Scotland the victim of the violence and whether they did all that could reasonably be expected of them to prevent it from materialising. Where the police are informed about an incident of violent disorder, the Osman duty113 may arise regardless of whether they know or ought to know the names or identities of actual or potential victims of the criminal activity. It is sufficient that they know or ought to know that there are such victims.”

9.41

In Michael, similarly, the Article 2 claim was permitted to proceed to trial on the basis that it would be necessary to hear more of the facts, and in particular to examine the content of the initial emergency call, in order to determine whether the test as set out in Van Colle was satisfied. Thus, while Michael signals that liability in negligence will continue to be precluded in many cases by the limited scope of duty in relation to the actions of third parties, a possible response in cases involving incidents of extreme violence may be that victims and their families will look instead to a remedy under the Human Rights Act 1998.

C. THE FIRE SERVICE 9.42

The Scottish Fire and Rescue Service114 is under a statutory duty to “make provision for the purpose of (a) extinguishing fires in its area; and (b) protecting life and property in the event of fires”.115 It is also charged with the rescue of victims of road accidents.116 The Service is vicariously responsible for the wrongdoing of firefighters acting in the performance of those duties.117 Claims founded on the alleged negligence of the Service in its failure to attend to or fully extinguish fires are contentious, as discussed in the next section. But whatever the position may be in respect of omissions, there is little doubt that firefighters, like police officers, are under a duty of care to desist from positive conduct that may foreseeably cause injury to bystanders in the course of fighting fires or while travelling to emergencies.118 So in Kilboy v South Eastern Fire Area Joint Committee,119 a

113 Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245, as to which see paras 7.28–7.30 above. 114 For an account of the historical background and of the modern structure of the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, see P N McDonald, “Fire and Rescue Services”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Second Reissue (2017). 115 Fire (Scotland) Act 2005 s 9(1). 116 Fire (Scotland) Act 2005 s 10(1). 117 Unlike in the case of the Chief Constable of Scotland, the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 does not provide expressly for the vicarious liability of the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service for members of the service. However, the principle of vicarious liability on the part of fire brigades for the wrongdoing of firefighters was confirmed in Kilboy v South Eastern Fire Area Joint Committee 1952 SC 280. 118 See e.g. Purdue v Devon Fire & Rescue Service [2002] EWCA Civ 1538 (negligent driving of fire engine). 119 1952 SC 280.

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case which turned upon whether a fire authority was vicariously liable for the conduct of the firefighters in its service, it appeared to be accepted that a duty of care would arise between firefighters and a child who lived close to the scene of a tenement fire and who was injured when firefighters carelessly dislodged masonry without clearing the street below.

(1) The duty to extinguish fires (a) The position in English law Like the police, therefore, the fire service does not enjoy general “immunity” from suit in negligence.120 But the English courts, at least, have adopted a narrow approach to duty of care. As Lord Hoffmann observed in Stovin v Wise:121

9.43

“[I]t is true that the fire brigade is there to protect people in situations in which they could not be expected to be able to protect themselves. On the other hand, they can and do protect themselves by insurance against the risk of fire. It is not obvious that there should be a right to compensation from a negligent fire authority which will ordinarily enure by right of subrogation to an insurance company. The only reason would be to provide a general deterrent against inefficiency. But there must be better ways of doing this than by compensating insurance companies out of public funds. And while premiums no doubt take into account the existence of the fire brigade and the likelihood that it will arrive swiftly upon the scene, it is not clear that they would be very different merely because no compensation was paid in the rare cases in which the fire authority negligently failed to perform its public duty.”

In England the fire service is not regarded as under a positive duty to attend fires when summoned, and if it does attend at the scene, it is under no positive duty to extinguish the flames. However, it is fixed with a negative duty, in the sense that it is obliged to exercise reasonable care not to make the situation worse that it would have been but for its actions. This is demonstrated in the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council,122 in which four cases were conjoined. In the first two, the fire service was said to have been negligent in switching off the sprinkler system in a burning building without first locating the seat of the fire. This meant that the fire rapidly spread out of control and the resultant damage was allegedly more extensive than it would have been had the sprinkler system been left on. In the third case the fire service 120 Duff v Highland and Islands Fire Board 1995 SLT 1362. 121 [1996] AC 923 at 955. 122 [1997] QB 1004. For a critique, see R Bagshaw, “Proximity’s Siren Song: Negligence Liability of Fire Brigades in England” (1998) 6 Tort Law Review 109.

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had attended a fire on land adjacent to the plaintiff’s, and left the scene after verifying that the fire had been extinguished there, but without checking the plaintiff’s premises for smouldering debris. In fact sparks had spread next door and the fire took hold some hours later, substantially destroying the plaintiff’s property. In the fourth case several fire engines attended a fire at the plaintiff’s premises promptly, but firefighters took so long to locate the nearby hydrants that the fire, which should readily have been contained, consumed the entire building. Taking into account the statutory framework governing the operation of the fire services in England, the court concluded that they were “not under a common law duty to answer the call for help, and [were] not under a duty to take care to do so. If, therefore, they fail to turn up, or fail to turn up in time, because they have carelessly misunderstood the message, got lost on the way or run into a tree, they are not liable.”123 The court further held that even once firefighters have arrived at the scene of a fire, the mere fact of their presence is not sufficient to bring them into proximity with the owner of the burning building, since there is no reason “why a rescuer who is not under an obligation to attempt a rescue should assume a duty to be careful in effecting the rescue merely by undertaking the attempt”.124 The most that can be said is that a duty arises not to make matters worse than they would have been had the firefighters done nothing. On that basis there was no duty to extinguish the fire in the third and fourth cases, and no liability for failing to prevent the spread of the fire. On the other hand, duty was established in the first and second cases where the defendants’ ill-judged disabling of the sprinkler system had led to damage that would not have happened otherwise.

(b) Cross-border difference? Burnett v Grampian Fire and Rescue Services 9.45

The Scottish courts have not always taken the same approach. Although, as in England, the fire service does not submit to a delictual duty to attend a fire simply by virtue of having been summoned,125 until recently certain authorities indicated that, once the fire service arrived at the scene, it undertook a positive duty of care to see that the fire was extinguished. This was the ratio in the Outer House case of Burnett v Grampian Fire and Rescue Services,126 in which Lord Macphail stated that the reasoning 123 [1997] QB 1004 per Stuart-Smith LJ at 1030. This passage was cited and approved by Lord Hoffmann in Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 at para 32. 124 [1997] QB 1004 per Stuart-Smith LJ at 1037. 125 See Burnett v Grampian Fire and Rescue Services [2007] CSOH 3, 2007 SLT 61 per Lord Macphail at para 58. 126 [2007] CSOH 3, 2007 SLT 61. For commentary, see D Brodie, “Public Authority Liability: The Scottish Approach” (2007) 11 EdinLR 254.

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in Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council127 was inconsistent with the law of Scotland. In Burnett, firefighters had attended a fire in the tenement flat below the pursuer’s, and checked the pursuer’s flat before leaving the scene. Unfortunately, they failed to detect that the fire was continuing to smoulder in the void between the two properties, thus allowing the flames to re-ignite and cause substantial damage. The householder’s action for damages against the fire service was held to be relevant, on the basis that the firefighters had been under a duty to take reasonable care for the safety of premises that might foreseeably be damaged by the spread of fire. Lord Macphail hesitated over the problematic distinction between positive conduct and omissions, observing that “the law of Scotland does not draw a distinction between acts and omissions comparable to that which appears to exist in the English law of tort between misfeasance and non-feasance”.128 But to the extent that the firefighters’ conduct was to be regarded as an “omission”, it was an “omission which occurred after [the firefighters] had gone into action and in the course of their fire fighting activities” and it was therefore “the kind of omission” in respect of which duty might arise.129 As in Gibson v Orr,130 a common law duty of care in the carrying out of this routine operation was not inconsistent with the defenders’ statutory duties.131 The householder had been “dependent” upon the defenders in regard to the management of a hazard over which, like the police officers in Gibson v Orr, they had taken “control” and which affected the householder specifically.132

(c) Rejection of Burnett This cross-border difference in determining the duty of fire services persisted for several years, but was brought to an end by the decision of the Inner House in A J Allan (Blairnyle) Ltd v Strathclyde Fire Board,133 expressly disapproving of Burnett. The facts of A J Allan were similar to those of Burnett, in that firefighters, having attended a fire at the pursuers’ property, later left the scene without noticing that the roof timbers were 127 128 129 130 131

[1997] QB 1004, discussed in para 9.44 above. [2007] CSOH 3, 2007 SLT 61 at para 34. [2007] CSOH 3, 2007 SLT 61 at para 36. 1999 SC 420; see para 9.27 above. [2007] CSOH 3, 2007 SLT 61 at para 41. The firefighters’ attendance at the fire created a sufficiently proximate relationship so as to give rise to duty in regard to the owners of endangered property (although Lord Macphail did not find assumption of responsibility and reliance in these circumstances, noting the comments by Lord Hoffmann on that concept in Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923 at 953–955). 132 [2007] CSOH 3, 2007 SLT 61 at paras 57 and 69. Lord Macphail also cited Duff v Highland and Islands Fire Board 1995 SLT 1362, in which Lord Macfadyen observed at 1363 that he would have rejected a submission that firefighters owed no common law duty to take reasonable care in comparable circumstances. 133 [2016] CSIH 3, 2016 SC 304.

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still smouldering. The property burned down shortly afterwards. In the Outer House the Lord Ordinary, Lord Brailsford, followed Burnett and ruled that the fire service owed a duty of care to the property owners. The Inner House, however, held the case to be irrelevant; while the fire service might have owed a duty of care not to make the situation worse, there was no duty to ensure that the flames were extinguished. Lord Macphail’s reasoning on this issue in Burnett was explicitly rejected.134 Two main threads ran through the Inner House’s analysis in A J Allan. In the first place, unlike Lord Macphail in Burnett, the court regarded the firefighters’ failure to extinguish the fire as a pure omission;135 and in Scots law, as in English, duty arose with regard to “pure omissions” only in exceptional situations, none of which applied in this situation.136 The notion that Scots and English law differed significantly in their mode of distinguishing acts and omissions had been undermined in Mitchell v Glasgow City Council,137 decided after Burnett but before A J Allan. Contrary to Lord Macphail’s view, firefighting was not one of the instances where duty arose by virtue of the defenders being in control of a hazard. As firefighters have to deal with intrinsically unpredictable emergencies that are not of their own creation, and on which they have incomplete information, they cannot be said to take control of the fire in the same way as the policemen in Gibson took control of directing traffic in a situation which was “known and understood”.138 In the second place, given that the court in A J Allan was being invited to overturn an existing line of Scottish authority, it was appropriate to take account of policy considerations, and these pointed against the imposition of duty.139 The factors adduced were familiar. The court conjectured as to the implications for “indeterminate liability” if duty were to be recognised, the undesirability of interfering in

134 It may, however, be noted that two members of the Extra Division in A J Allan had sat two years previously in Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council [2013] CSIH 83, 2014 SC 114, in which they had apparently approved of Lord Macphail’s reasoning in Burnett. Lady Paton had cited Lord Macphail’s observation that Scots and English law differed on the distinction between acts and omissions and added “I agree” (paras 38–39). Lord Drummond Young (at para 62) had discussed the reasoning in Burnett as drawing on the judgment in Gibson and gave no indication that he regarded this as misconceived. 135 [2016] CSIH 3, 2016 SC 304 per Lord Drummond Young at paras 59 and 83. 136 [2016] CSIH 3, 2016 SC 304 per Lord Drummond Young at paras 62–75. 137 In the Inner House in Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2008] CSIH 19, 2008 SC 351, Lord Reed had, at para 87, under reference to Burnett, “respectfully questioned” whether the Scottish approach to liability for “pure” omissions did indeed differ from the English, and Lord Reed’s comments were expressly endorsed by Lord Hope in the House of Lords: [2009] UKHL 11, 2009 SC (HL) 21 at paras 19–22. In A J Allan at para 73 Lord Drummond Young further noted the comments of Lord Toulson in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 at paras 76–78 as a “clear criticism” of the reasoning in Burnett. 138 [2016] CSIH 3, 2016 SC 304 per Lord Drummond Young at para 84. 139 [2016] CSIH 3, 2016 SC 304 per Lord Drummond Young at paras 78–82.

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complex decision-making and resource allocation by the emergency services, and the costs of compensation to the public purse – costs which would be more efficiently met by the property owners’ own insurance policies. In short, the decision of the Inner House indicated an assimilation of Scots law to the position adopted by the Court of Appeal in Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council, namely that duty on the part of the fire service should be limited to those situations where its intervention had created a new danger or made the existing situation worse. The decision in A J Allan (Blairnyle) Ltd v Strathclyde Fire Board must now be accepted as representing the modern Scots law on the scope of duty owed by firefighters attending a fire.140 Nonetheless, the reasoning of the Inner House is not without its difficulties. Although the difference between positive acts and omissions is seen as fundamental, the divergence in characterising the same fact pattern as between Burnett and A J Allan shows that there is often no bright line to separate the categories, or to identify the point at which a pure omission becomes “blameable”.141 The court in A J Allan may have seen Burnett as involving a “misunderstanding of the notion of pure omission”. However, courts in other jurisdictions have been more receptive to the proposition that, in assuming control of efforts to contain a fire, firefighters may come into a sufficiently close and direct relationship with vulnerable property owners as to give rise to duty.142 The decision in A J Allan leaves one further question still open. In concluding his judgment, Lord Drummond Young observed that there was a distinction to be drawn between damage to property, as in the case in hand, and physical injury to the person.143 Pointing out the “greater moral significance” of the health and safety of the person as compared with the security and integrity of property, he expressed a “hope” that a limited form of positive duty to rescue might be recognised in the future. He believed this to be appropriate at least in cases where firefighters or police officers could, without danger to themselves, have undertaken the rescue of a person in imminent danger, and he noted the criminal law provisions in France and Germany imposing such a duty, from which a civil law obligation also derived.144 As yet there has been no judicial response to this suggestion.

140 See e.g. Hughes v Turning Point Scotland [2019] CSOH 42, 2019 SLT 651 per Lord Clark at para 62. 141 See discussion at para 4.51 above. 142 See discussion of Burnett in e.g. Proude v Visic [2013] SASC 154; Hamcor Pty Ltd v State of Queensland [2014] QSC 224. 143 See also remarks by Mason J in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 167 CLR 424 at 464 on “reliance or dependence” as the basis for a duty by a public authority to “prevent or minimise a risk of personal injury or disability”, but not of property damage. 144 [2016] CSIH 3, 2016 SC 304 per Lord Drummond Young at paras 95–96.

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(2) Failure to respond to eventualities other than fire 9.50

Section 13 of the Fire (Scotland) Act 2005 empowers the fire service to respond as it thinks appropriate to “eventualities”, other than fire, threatening injury to members of the public or to property. In the light of the reasoning in A J Allan (Blairnyle) Ltd v Strathclyde Fire Board145 it is unlikely that this entails a positive duty of care in negligence to eliminate the threat from such hazards. In Mackay v Scottish Fire and Rescue Service,146 for example, the pursuer was injured by snow and ice falling from guttering on to a city street adjacent to his home. He argued that, in neglecting to exercise its statutory power to inspect and clear roofs, the fire service had failed in a duty of care towards him. Lord McEwan, however, concluded that there was nothing in these circumstances to displace the general rule that no duty attached to omissions. The fire service had neither caused the situation to develop nor made it worse, and there was no question of it having taken control of the hazard, as seen in cases such as Gibson v Orr.147 Moreover, proximity could not be established where a finding of duty would “open the floodgates to almost unlimited liability to an indeterminate class of people”.148

(3) Duty to firefighters as employees 9.51

It is uncontentious that senior officers, and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service as vicariously liable for them, are not only obliged to adhere to statutory provisions governing safety in the workplace but also owe a common law duty to take reasonable care to protect firefighters under their command from injury. Public servants are deemed to have accepted the risks inherent in their work but not the risks which the exercise of reasonable care could have avoided. No “battle immunity” attaches to decisions taken in the heat of the moment by commanding officers, although the court must take account of the difficulty of exercising command and making swift decisions at the scene of a fire.149 In French v Strathclyde Fire Board,150 two firefighters were injured when the watch commander gave the order to force the door of a burning building, precipitating the sudden collapse of the lintel. Even allowing for the challenging context in which the watch commander was operating, and for the level of risk involved either way in forcing the door, the court held that his conduct had fallen short of the relevant standard, namely “that of a skilled firefighter exercising reasonable 145 146 147 148 149

[2016] CSIH 3, 2016 SC 304. [2015] CSOH 55, 2015 SLT 342. 1999 SC 420; see para 9.27 above. [2015] CSOH 55, 2015 SLT 342 at para 40. Wembridge Claimants v East Sussex Fire and Rescue Service [2013] EWHC 2331 (QB) per Irwin J at para 225. See also Bull v London County Council, The Times 29 Jan 1953. 150 [2013] CSOH 3, 2013 SLT 247.

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care”.151 The duty of commanding officers to take care for the well-being of firefighters extends also to their safety while undergoing training courses152 The extent of duty of commanding officers in relation to psychiatric injury suffered by members of the rescue services is discussed in chapter 6.153

9.52

D. THE MARITIME AND COASTGUARD AGENCY It has been held in an English case that the duty owned by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency to mariners in distress is comparable to that owed by the fire service to the proprietors or occupants of burning buildings. In OLL Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport,154 the reasoning in Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council155 was said to be directly applicable in a case where the Coastguard was alleged to have seriously misdirected the rescue of a group of child canoeists. It appeared that the Coastguard had given out incorrect information to other rescuers on the likely whereabouts of the group and had itself delayed in putting to sea, so that although all of the group were eventually rescued, four children later died and the others suffered severe hypothermia and shock. By analogy with Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council, however, the extent of the Coastguard’s duty was regarded as merely not to make things worse, and, perhaps rather surprisingly, the court took the view that its failures could not be “equated” with the turning off of the sprinkler system by the defendants in Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council.156 Assuming the comparison with the fire service also holds good in relation to the activities of the Coastguard in Scotland, then, following the reasoning of the Inner House in A J Allan (Blairnyle) Ltd v Strathclyde Fire Board,157 duty would appear to be cast in similarly restricted terms.158 The decision in OLL Ltd has been criticised,159 but those criticisms were 151 French v Strathclyde Fire Board [2013] CSOH 3, 2013 SLT 247 per Lord Drummond Young at para 41. There had also been breaches in that case of the Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992, SI 1992/2966, reg 4, and the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998, SI 1998/2306, reg 4. 152 Davidson v Lothian and Borders Fire Board 2003 SLT 939, although in that case negligence was not in fact established and liability turned upon a breach of the Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992, 1992/2793, reg 4(1)(b). 153 See para 6.32 above. 154 [1997] 3 All ER 897. 155 [1997] QB 1004; see para 9.44 above. 156 [1997] 3 All ER 897 per May J at 907. It was not lost upon the court that the Coastguard was staffed by volunteers, and this was perhaps an additional factor in constraining duty. 157 [2016] CSIH 3, 2016 SC 304; see para 9.46 above. 158 OLL Ltd was cited without comment by Lord Drummond Young in A J Allan (Blairnyle) Ltd v Strathclyde Fire Board [2016] CSIH 3, 2016 SC 304 at para 73. 159 See Van Colle v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225 per Lord Bingham at para 57: “a law of delict which denies a remedy on facts such as these, in the absence of any statutory inhibition, fails to perform the basic function for which such a law exists.”

9.53

318   The Law of Delict in Scotland

expressly discounted by the Supreme Court in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police.160

E. THE AMBULANCE SERVICE 9.54

9.55

As previously stated, duty of care is readily applied in relation to the positive conduct of those working in the emergency services as they go about straightforward operational tasks, such as driving ambulances.161 However, the scope of the duty of the ambulance service to attend the victims of emergencies is judged differently from that of the other emergency services. As a general rule, the police and the fire service are not under a positive duty to respond to an emergency call by immediately going to the scene. By contrast, it is acknowledged both in Scotland and in England that, once the ambulance service has accepted a call, and the patient, or those caring for the patient, have been informed that an ambulance will attend, the service assumes a duty of care to attend the patient promptly. In Kent v Griffiths162 the claimant, who was pregnant, had a serious asthma attack in her home, and the doctor attending her called the emergency services to request that an ambulance take her immediately to hospital. When no ambulance appeared, two further calls were made and the operator reassured first the claimant’s husband and then her doctor that an ambulance would be there within minutes. In the event, and inexplicably, the ambulance did not finally arrive until forty minutes after the first call. By the time the claimant was brought to the hospital a respiratory arrest had caused her to suffer brain damage and a miscarriage, both of which might have been averted had the ambulance arrived promptly. Moreover, had the doctor and her husband been informed that the ambulance would be delayed, they would have used other means to get the claimant to hospital more speedily. The case of Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council, discussed above,163 was drawn expressly to the court’s attention, but the court reasoned that, in determining the scope of duty, the appropriate analogy was not with the fire service but with the health service:164 “The police and fire services’ primary obligation is to the public at large. In protecting a particular victim of crime, the police are performing their more general role of maintaining public order and reducing crime. In the case of fire the fire service will normally be concerned not only to protect a particular property where a fire breaks out but also to prevent fire spreading. In the 160 [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 per Lord Toulson at paras 79–80. 161 See e.g. Griffin v Mersey Regional Ambulance [1998] PIQR P34. 162 [2001] QB 36. For discussion, see K Williams, “Litigation against English NHS ambulance services and the rule in Kent v Griffiths” (2007) 15 Medical Law Review 153. 163 [1997] QB 1004; see para 9.44 above. 164 [2001] QB 36 per Lord Woolf MR at para 45.

The Emergency Services   319 case of both services, there is therefore a concern to protect the public generally. The emergency services that can be summoned by a 999 call do, in the majority of situations, broadly carry out a similar function. But in reality they can be very different. The ambulance service is part of the health service. It is therefore appropriate to regard the [London Ambulance Service] as providing services of the category provided by hospitals and not as providing services equivalent to those rendered by the police or the fire service.”

The court in Kent v Griffiths accepted that there would be cases in which it would not be appropriate to re-open difficult decisions about the allocation of limited resources in the light of competing demands upon the service.165 However, such questions did not arise in the present case, where there was no issue of an ambulance being unavailable, or of a conflict in priorities. In these circumstances, the court found the ambulance service to be in no less proximate a relationship to individual patients than were medical professionals. Although it might well have been said that there was reliance, in that those attending the patient relied upon reassurance of the ambulance’s imminent arrival rather than resorting to alternative transport,166 it was the more general notion of proximity upon which duty was held to rest. In accepting the emergency call the ambulance service had brought itself into a relationship of proximity with this particular patient and had thereby come under a duty to attend her promptly. The decision in Kent v Griffiths raises a number of questions – for example, as to why sufficient proximity links the ambulance service and an individual patient but not the fire service and the individual proprietor to whose premises a fire engine has been sent. By the same token, if the ambulance service is to be held to professional standards of conduct in the same way as the medical profession, it is not clear why, in operational matters at least, a test analogous to the professional negligence test is not more generally applicable to professional rescuers. Nonetheless, the reasoning in Kent v Griffiths was followed, after discussion, in the Scottish case of Aitken v Scottish Ambulance Service.167 It was held that duty might have been owed by the ambulance service to a patient who had suffered a severe epileptic seizure and who died after the ambulance summoned to take her to hospital took thirty-three minutes to arrive, and on that basis a proof before answer was allowed. In principle, the ambulance service owes its own employees a duty of care in negligence comparable to that owed by employers generally, so that

165 [2001] QB 36 per Lord Woolf MR at para 46. 166 A difficulty of basing duty upon reliance in these circumstances would be that duty might then be owed to those who could prove that they had alternative transport available but not to those who could not. 167 [2011] CSOH 49, 2011 SLT 822.

9.56

9.57

9.58

320   The Law of Delict in Scotland

ambulance workers should not be exposed to risks that can be avoided by the exercise of reasonable care. At the same time, they are deemed to accept a certain level of risk as “inherent in their work”,168 as discussed more fully in chapter 12.169

168 King v Sussex Ambulance Service NHS Trust [2002] ICR 1413, (2002) 68 BMLR 177 per Hale LJ at para 21. 169 See para 12.15 below.

Chapter 10

Standard of Care

Para A. DUTY OF CARE AND STANDARD OF CARE�������������������� 10.01 B. THE STANDARD OF THE “PRUDENT AND CONSCIENTIOUS” PERSON (1) Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������� 10.02 (2) Foreseeability of risk��������������������������������������������������������� 10.04 (a) The limitations of hindsight����������������������������������������� 10.05 (b) The foresight of the “reasonable” person���������������������� 10.06 (3) Calculating the standard of care: the variables�������������������� 10.13 (a) The probability of harm���������������������������������������������� 10.15 (b) The gravity of harm����������������������������������������������������� 10.19 (c) The burden of precautions������������������������������������������ 10.21 (d) The utility of the defender’s activities��������������������������� 10.24 (e) Custom and practice��������������������������������������������������� 10.27 C. PARTICULAR CONTEXTS�������������������������������������������������� 10.30 (1) Children (a) Age of delictual liability����������������������������������������������� 10.31 (b) Standard of care���������������������������������������������������������� 10.32 (c) Supervision of children������������������������������������������������ 10.36 (2) The incapacitated and the disabled (a) Old age����������������������������������������������������������������������� 10.38 (b) Infirmity or disability��������������������������������������������������� 10.39 (c) Unforeseeable loss of control��������������������������������������� 10.41 (3) Varying levels of skill��������������������������������������������������������� 10.48 (4) Sport (a) Liability of participants to other participants���������������� 10.51 (b) Liability of referees to participants������������������������������� 10.55 (c) Liability to spectators�������������������������������������������������� 10.56 (d) Liability of operators of sports facilities to participants����� 10.57 D. PROVING BREACH OF DUTY: RES IPSA LOQUITUR������� 10.59 (1) Exclusive management by the defender������������������������������ 10.62 (2) Harm of a type which does not ordinarily occur if proper care is taken���������������������������������������������������������������������� 10.65 (3) No explanation is offered consistent with absence of fault by the defender��������������������������������������������������������� 10.67 (4) Postscript�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10.70 321

322   The Law of Delict in Scotland

A. DUTY OF CARE AND STANDARD OF CARE 10.01

“The law”, said Lord Macmillan in Donoghue v Stevenson,1 “takes no cognizance of carelessness in the abstract. It concerns itself with carelessness only where there is a duty to take care and where failure in that duty has caused damage.” Both of Lord Macmillan’s requirements – a duty of care and a failure in that duty – must be met. Thus, even if it can be established that the defender owed a duty of care to the pursuer, a successful claim in negligence also requires the pursuer to show that the defender fell short in that duty. This second requirement, that the standard of care set by the duty has been breached, is the subject of the present chapter. The requirement has two aspects: first, the court must be satisfied as to the particular standard of care incumbent upon the defender in the circumstances that have arisen (a question of law), and secondly it must be proved that the defender failed to meet that standard (a question of fact).

B. THE STANDARD OF THE “PRUDENT AND CONSCIENTIOUS” PERSON (1) Introduction 10.02

10.03

The law of negligence does not make a person the guarantor of another’s safety; to do so would be to impose absolute liability. Rather, a person is required only to take reasonable care for the safety of others, so that the measure of the required standard of conduct is relative – neither too exacting nor too lenient. The starting point in fixing that standard is to hypothesise as to the level of “care and diligence which a prudent man would observe in his own affairs, and which a prudent and conscientious man will observe as to the interests of his neighbours”.2 This is not the same as assessing how the average person would actually have behaved; the standard is normative, based upon the court’s judgment as to how the “prudent and conscientious” ought to have behaved in the circumstances.3 That assessment also factors in a degree of reciprocity of risk in the community. As Lord Reid noted, “In the crowded conditions of modern life even the most careful person cannot avoid creating some risks and accepting others.”4 In some contexts at least, the standard of care ascribed to the prudent and conscientious person may differ markedly from that of the average person. An “average” British motorist, for example, is estimated to commit   1 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 70.  2 Mackintosh v Mackintosh (1864) 2 M 1357 per Lord Neaves at 1362.   3 For critical discussion of the concept of the objectively reasonable man, see M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person: An Egalitarian Reconstruction of the Objective Standard (2003).  4 Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850 at 867. See also Ripstein, Private Wrongs 102–116.

Standard of Care   323

around fifty serious driving errors per week, and to be careless at least once on 98 per cent of journeys.5 Happily, most errors do not result in an accident; but when they do, errant drivers will almost certainly be regarded as having failed in the necessary standard of care, even though they have demonstrated only an average propensity to fault. This exacting standard of care imposed on drivers6 compares awkwardly with, for instance, the standard expected of sportsmen, according to which “a reasonable football player is not a paragon who never makes a mistake” and is “liable only for damages caused by errors of judgment or lapse of skill going beyond such as, in the stress of circumstances, may reasonably be regarded as excusable”.7 The variables used in positing the standard of the prudent and conscientious person in the circumstances of a given case are considered later in the chapter.

(2) Foreseeability of risk As explained by Lord Macmillan in Bourhill v Young, “the duty to take care is the duty to avoid doing or omitting to do anything the doing or omitting to do which may have as its reasonable and probable consequence injury to others”.8 The threshold question for the court to consider in assessing standard of care is whether the harm that eventuated was foreseeable. Of course, when conduct is viewed with the benefit of hindsight, it is almost always possible to imagine an alternative course of action that would have avoided the harm. For that reason the perspective adopted by the court is qualified in important ways.

10.04

(a) The limitations of hindsight The first qualification of foreseeability is temporal: to avoid being “wise after the event”,9 the foreseeability of the harm must be gauged in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time of the alleged negligence, not at the time of litigation. As Cardozo CJ explained in the New York case of Greene v Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co, in which the plaintiff had been injured after tripping over the defendant’s foot:10   5 J Prynn, “50 Blunders a Week by Motorists”, The Times, 2 December 1996, citing a survey commissioned by Autoglass.   6 See also Smith v Bluebird Buses Ltd [2014] CSOH 75, 2014 Rep LR 91; Cameron v Swan [2021] CSIH 30, to the effect that there is a heavy onus on drivers to look out for pedestrians on the road even when they are behaving with a disregard for their own safety.  7 Sharp v Highland and Islands Fire Board 2005 SLT 855 per Lord Macphail at para 26 (affd 2008 SCLR 526).   8 1942 SC (HL) 78 at 88.  9 Hawkins v Coulsdon and Purley Urban District Council [1954] 1 QB 319 per Romer LJ at 341; MacDonald’s Tutor v County Council of Inverness 1937 SC 69 per Lord Pitman at 79. 10 257 NY 190 at 192, 177 NE 416 (1931) at 417.

10.05

324   The Law of Delict in Scotland “The measure of the defendant’s duty was reasonable care. . . . Looking back at the mishap with the wisdom born of the event, we can see that the [defendant] would have done better if he had given warning of the change of pose. Extraordinary prevision might have whispered to him at the moment that the warning would be helpful. What the law exacted of him, however, was only the ordinary prevision to be looked for in a busy world.”

The court should not assume knowledge which a person in the defender’s position could not reasonably have had at the time. In Roe v Minister of Health11 the plaintiffs suffered paralysis after minor operations because the spinal anaesthetic administered was contaminated. Microscopic cracks in the ampoules of anaesthetic were undetectable to the naked eye but had permitted seepage of the carbolic acid disinfectant in which they had been stored. The injuries were suffered in 1947 and the Court of Appeal decision is from 1954. The court noted that the leading medical textbook, published in 1951, had cautioned against storing anaesthetic in this type of solution, so that a doctor who did so subsequently would be negligent. But in 1947 the medical profession was not generally aware of the possibility of contamination by this means, and, as Lord Denning declared, “We must not look at the 1947 accident with 1954 spectacles.”12 The anaesthetist had not therefore breached the requisite standard of care.

(b) The foresight of the “reasonable” person 10.06

The second qualification is that the defender is not expected to have foreseen all possible eventualities. The foreseeability of risk is judged by reference not to what the defender could have foreseen, but to what the defender should have foreseen. A hypothesis is constructed as to the powers of perception and general awareness demonstrated by the hypothetical reasonable person in the circumstances of the defender,13 without possessing “the prophetic vision of a clairvoyant”.14 The leading Scottish case, providing the classic formulation of this methodology, is Muir v Glasgow Corporation, in which Lord Macmillan directed that:15 “The standard of foresight of the reasonable man is, in one sense, an impersonal test. It eliminates the personal equation and is independent of the 11 [1954] 2 QB 66. 12 [1954] 2 QB 66 at 84. 13 See e.g. US Restatement Second of Torts § 290: “For the purpose of determining whether the actor should recognize that his conduct involves a risk, he is required to know (a) the qualities and habits of human beings and animals and the qualities, characteristics, and capacities of things and forces in so far as they are matters of common knowledge at the time and in the community; and (b) the common law, legislative enactments, and general customs in so far as they are likely to affect the conduct of the other or third persons.” 14 Hawkins v Coulsdon and Purley Urban District Council [1954] 1 QB 319 per Romer LJ at 341. 15 1943 SC (HL) 3 at 10.

Standard of Care   325 idiosyncrasies of the particular person whose conduct is in question. Some persons are by nature unduly timorous and imagine every path beset with lions. Others, of more robust temperament, fail to foresee or nonchalantly disregard even the most obvious dangers. The reasonable man is presumed to be free both from over-apprehension and from over-confidence, but there is a sense in which the standard of care of the reasonable man involves in its application a subjective element. It is still left to the judge to decide what, in the circumstances of the particular case, the reasonable man would have had in contemplation, and what, accordingly, the party sought to be made liable ought to have foreseen.”

Objectivity of a sort is thus attempted in this disregard for distinctive “personal” features influencing the defender’s viewpoint. At the same time, however, it is relevant to consider what the reasonable person would have had in contemplation in the circumstances of the particular case. This balance between the objective and the subjective is an awkward one. With the elimination of personal “idiosyncrasies”, no concession is made to claims of inferior powers of understanding. In the nineteenthcentury English case of Vaughan v Menlove,16 for instance, the defendant had built a hayrick close to the plaintiff’s house, despite the fire risk. He was held liable for his negligence when the hayrick caught fire and caused the house to burn down. The court rejected the argument that he had acted “to the best of his judgment”, and that he should not be blamed for “not possessing the highest order of intelligence”. As Chief Justice Tindal remarked:17

10.07

“Instead . . . of saying that the liability for negligence should be co-extensive with the judgment of each individual, which would be as variable as the length of the foot of each individual, we ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe.”

However, that requirement for “ordinary prudence”, and an average level of understanding, means that a standard is set which may be harder to achieve by some individuals than by others. Indeed it may be seen as imposing a form of strict liability on those individuals who genuinely had limited capacity accurately to assess hazards. The reasonable person is deemed to know, for example, that fire may spread rapidly, but may not be expected to be aware that specific elements of the structure of a building have made it especially hazardous for firefighters summoned to put out a fire.18 On the other hand, 16 (1837) 3 Bing NC 468, 132 ER 490. 17 (1837) 3 Bing NC 468 at 475, 132 ER 490 at 493. 18 See e.g. Bermingham v Sher Bros 1980 SC (HL) 67.

10.08

326   The Law of Delict in Scotland

although actual ignorance is apparently to be discounted, the particular defender’s more highly developed understanding of risk is unlikely to be ignored. Professional expertise in fire safety engineering, for example, would almost certainly be one of the “circumstances of the particular case” relevant to whether a more complex fire risk was foreseeable. This approach to defenders with above-average skills or knowledge is clearly articulated in the American Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm):19 “If an actor has skills or knowledge that exceed those possessed by most others, these skills or knowledge are circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether the actor has behaved as a reasonably careful person.”

10.09

The importance of context in judicial perceptions of reasonableness is demonstrated by the decision in Muir v Glasgow Corporation,20 a decision which to modern eyes may seem surprising. The locus was King’s Park, a newlyopened public park belonging to Glasgow Corporation, which also operated a tearoom and sweetshop from a large mansion house in the grounds. One Saturday afternoon in June 1940 various parties converged on the park to hold their annual summer picnics, including a large community group from Rutherglen, and a smaller church party from the Milton Free Church in the city centre. Since this was wartime, weather forecasts were no longer given on the radio and in the newspapers (in case the information was of advantage to the enemy). The picnickers were therefore unprepared for a downpour of rain. The manageress of the tearoom granted the church group special permission to bring their picnic into the tearoom in the mansion house. In order to reach the tearoom, however, the group had to pass through the sweetshop, where various children from the Rutherglen party were crowded round the counter. The church group brought with them a 16-inch tea urn recently filled with boiling water. When one of the church officers carrying the urn lost his grip on the handle,21 the urn tipped to the side, seriously scalding several of the children, including four-year-old Eleanor Muir. For reasons unexplained,22 Eleanor did not sue the church officer, but instead Glasgow Corporation as the employer 19 § 12. 20 1943 SC (HL) 3. For valuable background on the facts of the case, and an account of the author’s meeting with Eleanor Muir, by then in her seventies but still bearing significant physical and mental scars of the scalding, see W W McBryde, “Muir v Glasgow Corporation: The Case of the Dropped Urn”, in R G Anderson et al (eds), Glasgow Tercentenary Essays (2014) 121. For Eleanor Muir, the outcome of the litigation was ultimately nothing but a significant liability for expenses (McBryde, 135). 21 For reasons unknown, this individual, a Mr MacDonald, was not called to give evidence. See the judgment of the Lord Ordinary, Lord Robertson: 1942 SC 126 at 130. 22 On this point see McBryde, “Muir v Glasgow Corporation: The Case of the Dropped Urn” 137.

Standard of Care   327

of the tearoom manageress. It was argued for Eleanor that, in allowing the urn of scalding liquid to be carried through the sweetshop, the manageress had made a safe place dangerous and that she should have taken the precaution of clearing the passageway. Unquestionably, the manageress owed a duty of care to provide for the safety of members of the public in the tearoom and shop, and the issue was whether she had failed in the standard of care that this entailed. In determining the relevant standard the court directed itself not to what the manageress had actually been thinking at that moment, but to what “the hypothetical reasonable person” would have foreseen: “Was the operation of carrying the tea-urn something which a reasonable person in [the manageress’s] position should have realised would render the place in which it was performed dangerous to the children in the circumstances?”23 That question was answered by the House of Lords in the negative. Reversing the decision of the Inner House, the House of Lords held that the reasonable tearoom manageress, neither over-apprehensive nor over-confident, would not have foreseen that a scalding accident would occur as a consequence of permitting the church party to pass through the building, and accordingly she had been under no duty to implement special precautions against it. She was entitled to assume that the urn would be in the charge of responsible persons, and that they would exercise due care in carrying it.24 It could not be said, therefore, that she had been negligent, and no liability was found. It is debatable whether, on applying the same test for standard of care to facts equivalent to those in Muir, a modern court would reach the same decision. It might be argued that the reasonable tearoom supervisor in the twenty-first century would not allow members of the public to manhandle urns of scalding water through crowded premises, particularly where large numbers of children were in the vicinity. Evidence might be led of a greater awareness of health and safety risks in public places, and of standard practices more geared to eliminating hazards. If so, this case provides an object lesson in how the standpoint of the reasonable person may change through time. Nonetheless, we should not look at the facts of this case only through “2022 spectacles”, and the basic test for standard of care as formulated in Muir remains as relevant today as it was when it was formulated in 1943. As noted above, there is an awkwardness about a test which requires the court to hypothesise as to the foresight exercised by the reasonable person, while at the same time taking into consideration the specific circumstances 23 1943 SC (HL) 3 at 10 per Lord Wright at 15. 24 See further Lord Macmillan’s explanation at 1943 SC (HL) 3 at 9. A problem for the pursuer was that her pleadings left unexplained the actual cause of the urn overturning. Since the offending church officer was not called as a witness, the court had no evidence before it on what had caused him to lose his grip.

10.10

10.11

10.12

328   The Law of Delict in Scotland

of the case. While the defender’s “idiosyncrasies” should not influence that hypothesis, the extent to which the defender’s status is of relevance is not always clear. The difficulties of fixing an objective standard of care in relation to particular categories of defender is considered further below.

(3) Calculating the standard of care: the variables 10.13

Even where some degree of danger is foreseeable, a person cannot be expected to eliminate every hazard. The standard of care in negligence is that of the prudent and conscientious person, but even the prudent and conscientious person does not take precautions against all eventualities. Some level of risk is unavoidable in most activities, and precautions against all foreseeable threats to safety are impracticable. The task for the court in assessing standard of care is therefore to determine whether the magnitude of the risk to which the pursuer was exposed exceeded acceptable levels. As stated by Lord Neaves in the nineteenth-century case of Mackintosh v Mackintosh:25 “the amount of care which a prudent man will take must vary infinitely according to circumstances. No prudent man in carrying a lighted candle through a powder magazine would fail to take more care than if he was going through a damp cellar. The amount of care will be proportionate to the degree of risk run, and to the magnitude of the mischief that may be occasioned.”

10.14

This exercise therefore requires a number of variables to be taken into consideration. The courts in the United States have sometimes referred to this assessment as a quasi-mathematical exercise. The “calculus of risk” postulated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v Carroll Towing Co Ltd26 required three variables to be entered into its calculation: (i) the probability that harm will occur; (ii) the gravity of the resulting injury if it does; and (iii) the burden of adequate precautions. Judge Hand explained that “if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B is less than PL”. 27 The terminology of the “calculus of risk” has similarly been taken up by the Scottish courts,28 but in a less mechanistic fashion than Judge 25 (1864) 2 M 1357 per Lord Neaves at 1362–1363. 26 159 F 2d 169 (1947) at 173. 27 159 F 2d 169 (1947) at 173. Lord Reid was to suggest a similar calculation, weighing up “the magnitude of the risk, the likelihood of an accident happening and the possible seriousness of the consequences if an accident does happen, and, on the other hand, the difficulty and expense and any other disadvantage of taking the precaution”: Morris v West Hartlepool Steam Navigation Co Ltd [1956] AC 552 at 574. 28 See e.g. Phee v Gordon [2013] CSIH 18, 2013 SC 379; McMahon v Dear [2014] CSOH 100, 2014 SLT 823. The expression also figures in W A Wilson, Introductory Essays on Scots Law, 2nd edn (1984) 132.

Standard of Care   329

Hand’s formulation would suggest, and subject to the overarching question whether “it is justifiable not to take steps to eliminate a real risk if it is small and if the circumstances are such that a reasonable man, careful of the safety of his neighbour, would think it right to neglect it”.29 This is, moreover, an exercise that admits criteria other than those identified by Judge Hand, including the relative social utility of the activity, and the standard practices in the activity. These variables are now considered in turn.

(a) The probability of harm The importance of probability is demonstrated in the leading English case of Bolton v Stone.30 The plaintiff was stepping out of her garden gate in a residential street when she was hit on the head by a stray cricket ball hit from a nearby cricket ground. Balls had been hit into the street only very rarely – possibly on six occasions within the last twenty eight years, none involving personal injury. The possibility of this occurrence was therefore foreseeable, but its likelihood was marginal, and it was even less probable that a stray ball would injure a passer-by. Moreover, the cricket club had built a fence, and the wicket from which the ball had been hit was some 78 yards from the fence and 100 yards from where the plaintiff was injured. In the assessment of the court, the precautions already implemented were adequate, as balanced against the very small chances of injury occurring. The “reasonable” person would not have contemplated this level of risk as necessitating additional safety measures, and the standard of care had not been breached. Similarly, in Murphy v East Ayrshire Council31 the pursuer, who was physically disabled, was injured when he fell from his wheelchair due to sharp braking by the minibus in which he was travelling to the defender’s day centre. The accident occurred because the pursuer had himself unfastened his seat belt. Although he had done this on previous journeys as he approached his home, there was no clear evidence of the pursuer doing so before in mid-journey.32 The risk of misadventure by this means was therefore regarded to have been marginal. Moreover, the only reliable additional precaution that would have protected against such an occurrence would have been for carers to travel alongside the pursuer in the back of

29 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd Appellant v The Miller Steamship Co Pty (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617 per Lord Reid at 642–643 This passage is cited e.g. in Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd 1987 SC (HL) 37 per Lord Mackay at 74; Gillon v Chief Constable of Strathclyde Police 1997 SLT 1218 per Lord Johnston at 1220; Phee v Gordon [2013] CSIH 18, 2013 SC 379 per Lord Hodge at para 27. 30 [1951] AC 850. 31 [2012] CSIH 47, 2012 SLT 1125. 32 See judgment of the Lord Ordinary, Lord Tyre, at [2011] CSOH 136, 2011 Rep LR 92.

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the vehicle, which would have entailed risk to their own safety. Consequently there was held to be no failure in the appropriate standard of care in the arrangements that the defender had made. In gauging the probability of injury, defenders must reckon with the known vulnerabilities of persons affected by their actions, if those vulnerabilities make misadventure more likely. In Haley v London Electricity Board33 the defendant, the London Electricity Board, had dug a large hole in the pavement. To prevent pedestrians walking into it, the Board’s employees propped up a large hammer across the pavement as well as putting up signs. This would have been adequate to warn off sighted pedestrians, but the plaintiff was blind, and his white stick missed the hammer, so that he tripped and fell to his severe injury. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that duty was owed only to non-disabled road users and did not require consideration of those more susceptible to hazards. It considered evidence as to the numbers of blind people in the area, and found that the defendant had failed in the requisite standard of care by disregarding precautions appropriate to a statistically significant sector of the local population. Reference was made to Taylor v Glasgow Corporation,34 in which Lord Sumner had warned that “a measure of care appropriate to the inability or disability of those who are immature or feeble in mind or body is due from others who know of, or ought to anticipate, the presence of such persons within the scope and hazard of their own operations”. As Lord Sumner’s dictum indicates, this reasoning extends to psychological as well as to physical vulnerabilities. In Barber v Somerset County Council,35 for example, the claimant suffered stress as a result of difficulties in coping with a heavy workload as a teacher. It was held that a prudent employer would have taken positive steps to alleviate risks to its employee’s health. Since the plaintiff’s employer knew about his problems, its failure to relieve him of some of his responsibilities constituted a breach of duty towards him. This case contrasts, however, with Cross v Highlands and Islands Enterprise36 in which it was found that the risk to the mental health of a particular employee could not reasonably have been known to the employer, and in which there had therefore been no requirement upon it to implement special protective measures for his benefit.

(b) The gravity of harm 10.19

The seriousness of the consequences if the harm comes to pass is a further factor which must be weighed in the balance in assessing standard of care.

33 34 35 36

[1965] AC 778; see also M’Kibbin v Glasgow Corporation 1920 SC 590. 1922 SC (HL) 1 at 15. [2004] UKHL 13, [2004] 1 WLR 1089. 2001 SLT 1060.

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A potential danger to life, for example, would indicate a much more exacting standard than trifling damage to property. Relevant to this inquiry are the known vulnerabilities of those to whom duty is owed, if those vulnerabilities would increase the gravity of the injury should it occur (whether or not they increase the likelihood that injury would occur). In Paris v Stepney Borough Council37 the plaintiff had lost the sight of one of his eyes in the Second World War. In his employment as a garage hand he was dismantling the chassis of a heavy vehicle when a metal fragment hit him in his other eye, causing him to lose his sight completely. The probability of a worker being hit in the eye in this way was very small – so marginal that it would not have justified the use of goggles by workers with sight in both eyes. Indeed it appeared that workers employed in this type of work did not generally wear goggles. It was no more likely that the plaintiff would be hit in the eye than one of his fully-sighted colleagues. Nonetheless, it was held that the ordinary prudent employer would have provided this particular worker with goggles, knowing that he would suffer particularly serious consequences if this risk to his sighted eye came to pass. As Lord Morton remarked:38

10.20

“[I]f A and B, who are engaged on the same work run precisely the same risk of an accident happening, but if the results of an accident will be more serious to A than to B, precautions which are adequate in the case of B may not be adequate in the case of A, and it is a duty of the employer to take such additional precautions for the safety of A as may be reasonable. The duty to take reasonable precautions against injury is one which is owed by the employer to every individual workman.”

(c) The burden of precautions It is also relevant to weigh up the feasibility and expense of precautions which would have prevented eventuation of the risk. Failure to adopt measures proportionate to the level of risk inherent in the defender’s activities indicates breach of duty.39 Conversely, even the prudent and cautious person may neglect a risk of “small magnitude” where it would involve considerable expense to eliminate it.40 In Bolton v Stone,41 for example, the chance of stray cricket balls injuring passers-by could have been eliminated only by the construction of an even higher fence or by abandoning 37 [1951] AC 367. 38 [1951] AC 367 at 385–386. 39 See e.g. Hilder v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 1434, in which it would have been a simple matter to affix netting above a boundary wall to prevent footballs from landing on the public highway. 40 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd Appellant v The Miller Steamship Co Pty (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617 per Lord Reid at 642. 41 [1951] AC 850.

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cricket games altogether, a burden that was regarded as disproportionate to the marginal level of risk. Latimer v AEC Ltd42 is a further case in point. The defendant’s factory flooded after an exceptionally heavy rainstorm, leaving the floor coated in an oily film. The factory owners set large numbers of employers to cleaning the floor and depositing sawdust on the affected areas, but despite these efforts some areas were left untreated. The plaintiff slipped while working in an untreated area and injured his ankle. The only further precaution that would have eliminated the risk of an employee slipping would have been to close the factory altogether, with resultant loss of revenue. The court found insufficient evidence to indicate that the reasonably prudent employer would have closed down the factory, with consequent loss of wages to the workforce, rather than allowing its employees to run the minimal risks involved in continuing work there. Duty had not therefore been breached. As well as issues of cost, the burden of implementing precautions is also to be considered in terms of whether such precautions would undermine the purpose of the defender’s activities. In Brisco v Secretary of State for Scotland43 the pursuer was a prison officer who was injured during a training session involving a simulated riot. A heavy fencepost had been dropped on him from a stairwell, which resulted in injury to his foot. He argued that the dropping of heavy objects had been unnecessary for training purposes. The court, however, accepted that the probability of injury had been slight and also that “the whole purpose of the exercise was to give to the trainees realistic experience of the conditions with which they might be faced in a genuine riot, and there was ample evidence to indicate that the use of heavy missiles was required for that purpose”.44 Accordingly there was no breach of duty.

(d) The utility of the defender’s activities 10.24

Although not expressly factored into Judge Learned Hand’s calculation noted above,45 the utility of an activity may serve to counterbalance the risk that it entails. This was brought to the fore in, for example, Daborn v Bath Tramways,46 in which the plaintiff was involved in a collision while driving a left-hand drive ambulance. Such vehicles had limited rear vision, but ambulances of any type were in short supply at the time (during the Second World War). The ambulance collided with a bus as the plaintiff attempted to move lanes to her right, and she brought an action for 42 43 44 45 46

[1953] AC 643. 1997 SC 14. 1997 SC 14 per Lord Morison at 18. At para 10.14. [1946] 2 All ER 333.

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damages against the bus company. The defendant pled contributory negligence. In rejecting that defence, the court held that the plaintiff had not fallen short of the required standard of care in driving her vehicle. As Lord Justice Asquith reasoned:47 “[D]uring the war . . . it was necessary for many highly important operations to be carried out by means of motor vehicles with left-hand drives, no others being available. So far as this was the case, it was impossible for the drivers of such cars to give the warning signals which could otherwise be properly demanded of them. Meanwhile, it was essential that the ambulance service should be maintained. It seems to me, in those circumstances, it would be demanding too high and an unreasonable standard of care from the drivers of such cars to say to them: ‘Either you must give signals which the structure of your vehicle renders impossible or you must not drive at all.’”

In Daborn v Bath Tramways the scarcity of ambulances presented a cogent case of social utility for driving vehicles with compromised safety features. Even recreational activities, however, are regarded as having a measurable value. The significance of cricket as a national pastime was perhaps an undercurrent in Bolton v Stone, discussed above,48 but the relevance of social value was more explicitly addressed in Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council.49 The claimant suffered catastrophic injury when he dived into shallow waters in an artificial lake at a public park. In doing so he had ignored warning signs advising that swimming was dangerous. In the litigation he argued that, even with these precautions, the defendant, by creating a lake with attractive sandy beaches, had failed to exercise reasonable care in regard to visitors to the park who would be tempted nonetheless to swim there. The case was argued under the (English) Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957, section 2(2), but in the court’s view this provision made the same assessment as common law negligence, in that it weighed up “not only the likelihood that someone may be injured and the seriousness of the injury which may occur, but also the social value of the activity which gives rise to the risk and the cost of preventative measures”.50 The recreational value of the beaches for members of the public who used them for permitted purposes was therefore a factor taken into account in deciding that it was not reasonable to expect the council to remove the beaches.51 In the above cases the social utility factor was considered in contexts where the measures necessary to eliminate the risk would have made it impossible for the defender to continue with the activity in question. The 47 48 49 50 51

[1946] 2 All ER 333 at 336. [1951] AC 850; see para 10.15 above. [2003] UKHL 47, [2004] 1 AC 46; see also paras 25.27–25.29 below. [2003] UKHL 47, [2004] 1 AC 46 per Lord Hoffmann at para 34. [2003] UKHL 47, [2004] 1 AC 46 per Lord Hoffmann at para 42.

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factor may, however, also be relevant in circumstances where the consequences for the defender, while less decisive, would have disadvantaged the activity to an unacceptable degree. In Humphrey v Aegis Defence Services Ltd52 an employee of a private security contractor operating in Iraq was injured when an Iraqi interpreter dropped a stretcher due to fatigue during a simulation exercise in which both were participating. He argued that, in requiring employees of varying levels of fitness to participate in such exercises, his employer had failed to take reasonably practicable precautions to avoid injury to him. In response the employer argued that it was important for training purposes to require interpreters to participate in such exercises, but, given the crucial nature of the interpreters’ role and the difficulties of recruiting Iraqis willing to act in this capacity, it was not practical to require of them the same exacting levels of fitness as security personnel. Excluding unfit interpreters from such exercises would not have made it impossible for the defender to continue with its services, but it would have impeded their efficient delivery. The impact upon the efficiency of important services was therefore deemed to be a relevant consideration to be weighed alongside the risk of the harm in question and the measures required to avoid that risk.

(e) Custom and practice 10.27

Custom and practice are also relevant to fixing standard of care. Evidence of a recognised and established practice provides a starting point for ascertaining the appropriate standard for the activity in question,53 unless the practice is “clearly bad” or, in the light of developing knowledge about the risks involved in some location or operation, the particular defender has acquired a “greater than average knowledge of the risks”.54 Conversely, if the pursuer argues that a particular practice ought to have been followed and there is no evidence that such a practice was standard, this may point against the defender having been negligent.55 Of course, the existence of such a practice is only one of the factors to be weighed in the balance, and it is more or less persuasive depending upon other considerations such as the probability and gravity of the harm.56 Furthermore, it is always open to the pursuer to prove that a “standard” practice followed by the defender

52 [2016] EWCA Civ 11, [2017] 1 WLR 2937. 53 Morton v William Dixon Ltd 1909 SC 807; see also Charlton v Forrest Printing Ink Co Ltd [1980] IRLR 331. 54 Baker v Quantum Clothing Group Ltd [2011] UKSC 17, [2011] 1 WLR 1003 per Lord Mance at para 21. 55 MacDonald’s Tutor v County Council of Inverness 1937 SC 69. 56 Baker v Quantum Clothing Group Ltd [2011] UKSC 17, [2011] 1 WLR 1003 per Lord Mance at para 82; Strange v Wincanton Logistics Ltd [2011] CSIH 65A, 2011 GWD 39–807.

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was not in fact a reasonable one;57 equally, the defender who did not follow a “standard” practice may instead show that duty towards the pursuer was fulfilled by other means. In Brown v Rolls-Royce,58 for example, the pursuer contracted dermatitis on his hands which he attributed to contact with oily machinery during his work at the defenders’ factory. He argued that his employers had fallen short of the requisite standard of care by failing to supply him with the type of barrier cream for his hands that was commonly provided by other employers in the same line of business. It was indeed established that one particular cream was in widespread use, but there was conflicting evidence on its efficacy, and the defenders had instead implemented alternative preventative measures which their medical adviser considered more effective. Since the pursuer did not lead convincing evidence to show that the cream identified as standard was effective in general, or would have prevented the pursuer’s dermatitis in particular, his claim did not succeed. While acknowledging the evidential force of an established common practice, the court rejected the argument that the defenders’ failure to adhere to such a practice reversed the burden of proof. As Lord Denning concluded:59

10.28

“If the defenders do not follow the usual precautions, it raises a prima facie case against them in this sense, that it is evidence from which negligence may be inferred, but not in the sense that it must be inferred, unless the contrary is proved. At the end of the day, the Court has to ask itself whether the defenders were negligent or not. It is sufficient if there is a greater probability on one side or the other: but, if, at the end of the case, the evidence is so evenly balanced that the Court cannot come to a determinate conclusion, the legal burden comes into play and requires the Court to reject the case of negligence alleged against them.”

It remains for the pursuer to prove negligence, and it is not sufficient to argue that, of its own, proof of a departure from standard practice establishes negligence.60 Custom and practice are not of course static, so that, as noted above, earlier authorities must be read through the “spectacles”61 available to the defender at the time of the accident. In MacDonald’s Tutor v County Council of Inverness,62 for example, ten-year-old pupils were released into the school playground after a knitting lesson, carrying with them their steel

57 Cavanagh v Ulster Weaving Co Ltd [1960] AC 145; see also Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232. 58 1960 SC (HL) 22. 59 1960 SC (HL) 22 at 28–29. 60 Kelly v Sir Frank Mears & Partners 1983 SC 97 per Lord Justice-Clerk Wheatley at 104. 61 See discussion of Roe v Minister of Health [1954] 2 QB 66 at para 10.05 above. 62 1937 SC 69.

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knitting needles which had exposed sharp points. One child suffered a serious injury to the eye as the children clustered round a drinking well. The court was persuaded that there was no “custom” of providing knitting needles with protected tips, and there was nothing unusual in teachers allowing children to take the needles away with them. That decision dates from 1935. In the twenty-first century, while knitting lessons are perhaps less prominent in primary school timetables than once they were, indifference to the potential dangers of young children carrying sharpened steel objects around playgrounds is much less likely to be regarded as common practice.

C. PARTICULAR CONTEXTS 10.30

As indicated in Muir v Glasgow Corporation,63 standard of care is assessed objectively, disregarding personal idiosyncrasies. Nonetheless, as the court must determine what “in the circumstances of the particular case” the reasonable person would have considered proper, context remains important. A body of case law has developed providing guidance on the standards of conduct that can reasonably be expected in certain commonly encountered situations. The assessment of standard of care in regard to professional activities is dealt with separately in chapter 11.

(1) Children (a) Age of delictual liability 10.31

There is no minimum age of delictual liability,64 a position which was left undisturbed by the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991.65 The key question in determining whether a child is capable of negligence is whether the child’s age and understanding are such that a standard of care can appropriately be applied to him or her – whether, in the words, of an Australian judge, the child was “old enough to know that his conduct was wrongful”.66 There is very little Scots authority directly in point. Although two early cases on spuilzie67 suggest that a child of tender years is “incapable of wrongdoing or engaging in violence”,68 a number of cases involving the defence of contributory negligence have indicated that from

63 1943 SC (HL) 3 per Lord Macmillan at 10. 64 See para 2.23 above. 65 Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 s 1(3)(c). 66 McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384 per Windeyer J at 386. 67 Somerville v Hamilton (1541) Mor 8905; Bryson v Somervill (1565) Mor 1703. 68 In Somerville v Hamilton (1541) Mor 8905, the court accepted the representations made on behalf of the six-year-old defender that he could not “peccare, nec vim committere, nor yet be obliged ex delicto causante defectu intellectus in illa causa”.

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an extremely early age children may be assessed as negligent in regard for their own safety.69 Children as young as five have been deemed contributorily negligent if they have not “taken that care of [themselves] which is expected of a child of that age”.70 For contributory negligence the line seems to have drawn in the nineteenth century at the age of four, with the court accepting in Campbell v Ord and Maddison71 that a child of three years and eleven months was “unable from his tender years to appreciate the danger”. More recently, expectations of awareness seem to have been adjusted upwards, with greater diffidence in imputing appreciation of risk to children as young as eight.72 Naturally, it is one thing to judge children to have taken insufficient care for their own safety in regard to everyday hazards such as busy roads; it is another to judge them sufficiently mature in their reasoning powers to be capable of judging whether the risk to others entailed in their conduct is unreasonable. As discussed further below, authority from other jurisdictions would suggest that the awareness of foreseeable risk that underpins liability in negligence, as distinct from contributory negligence, is unlikely to be imputed before the early teenage years.

(b) Standard of care While there is little doubt that older children may owe a duty of care in a variety of contexts, questions arise as to how the relevant standard of care should be determined, and, more specifically, what allowance should be made for the age of the defender. In setting out an objective framework for standard of care, the court in Muir v Glasgow Corporation73 was careful to discount the “idiosyncrasies” of the individual defender. Childhood, however, “is not an idiosyncrasy”.74 It has generally been regarded as acceptable to judge child defenders by reference to the behaviour expected of an “ordinarily prudent and reasonable” child of the same age and in the same situation as the defender.75 In the leading Australian case of McHale v Watson,76 for example, the twelve-year-old defendant threw a piece of sharpened metal, apparently aiming at a tree, but instead injuring his nine-year-old friend. An adult might well have appreciated that

69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76

McKinnell v White 1971 SLT (Notes) 61 (five-year-old child running on road). Plantza v Glasgow Corporation 1910 SC 786 per Lord Justice-Clerk Macdonald at 789. (1873) 1 R 149 per Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff at 153. See e.g. Galbraith’s Curator ad Litem v Stewart (No 2) 1998 SLT 1305. See discussion at paras 29.61–29.63 below. 1943 SC (HL) 3. McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384 per Windeyer J at 397 (affd (1966) 115 CLR 199). Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 WLR 1304 per Hutchison LJ at 1308 (citing McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199). (1964) 111 CLR 384 per Windeyer J at 397.

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this conduct was dangerous, but the trial judge focussed upon the level of “foresight and appreciation of risk” that might reasonably have been expected of a child in these circumstances and on that basis ruled that he had not been negligent. Upholding that decision, Kitto J in the High Court of Australia explained that:77 “The standard of care being objective, it is no answer for [a child], any more than it is for an adult, to say that the harm he caused was due to his being abnormally slow-witted, quick-tempered, absent-minded or inexperienced. But it does not follow that he cannot rely in his defence upon a limitation upon the capacity for foresight or prudence, not as being personal to himself, but as being characteristic of humanity at his stage of development and in that sense normal. By doing so he appeals to a standard of ordinariness, to an objective and not a subjective standard. In regard to the things which pertain to foresight and prudence – experience, understanding of causes and effects, balance of judgment, thoughtfulness – it is absurd, indeed it is a misuse of language, to speak of normality in relation to persons of all ages taken together.”

10.33

That approach was expressly endorsed by the English courts in Mullin v Richards,78 in which the fifteen-year-old plaintiff had sustained an injury to her eye during a play fight in the school classroom. She and the fifteenyear-old defendant had been “duelling” with plastic rulers, one of which snapped, injuring the plaintiff’s eye. No warnings had been issued by teachers about the dangers of this commonplace game, and there was no evidence to suggest that a significant risk of injury should have been foreseeable to an ordinarily prudent and reasonable fifteen-year-old schoolgirl. The defendant was therefore held not to have been negligent.79 Similarly, in another case in which fifteen-year-old youths were engaged in “horseplay” that involved throwing pieces of bark at each other, resulting in a serious eye injury to one of them,80 the court ruled that the participants in the game had owed each other a duty of care not to cause injury. Nonetheless, that duty was breached only where the individual’s conduct amounted to “recklessness or a very high degree of carelessness”, and in this case the

77 (1966) 115 CLR 199 at 213. 78 [1998] 1 WLR 1304. 79 Contrast the earlier English case of Williams v Humphrey, The Times, 20 February 1975, in which the plaintiff tripped and was injured after the defendant, a family friend aged fifteen years and eleven months, playfully pushed him into a swimming pool. Talbot J took the view that: “Though not a man, [the defendant] was not a child, and it would not be appropriate to judge his conduct by a lower standard of care than would be expected of an adult person”. See also Blake v Galloway [2004] EWCA Civ 814, [2004] 1 WLR 2844, in which no express consideration was given to judging the fifteen-year-old defendant as a child. 80 Blake v Galloway [2004] EWCA Civ 814, [2004] 1 WLR 2844.

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youth’s conduct constituted at worst “an error of judgment or lapse of skill”. Breach of duty was not therefore established.81 In cases arising out of accidents at play, therefore, it is difficult to establish breach of duty unless the child has been culpable to a high degree.82 Participants in children’s games that involve rough and tumble might well predict “the odd scratch or bruise”,83 but they are not generally imputed with sufficient foresight to anticipate more complex risk. In Orchard v Lee84 the claimant, a school employee, suffered injury when she clashed heads with a thirteen-year-old boy who was running backwards in a game of tag. The incident happened as the claimant made her way along a walkway that crossed an outdoor “social space” on school premises. In ruling that the boy should not be held negligent, Waller LJ summarised the position as follows: 85

10.34

“[I]f there is to be found a breach of that duty of care it would have to be established that [the defendant], a 13-year-old, was running about and playing tag in a way which was to a significant degree outside the norm for 13-year-olds. The answer to that question can be assisted by considering whether [the defendant] was conducting himself in the way he played tag in a manner in which a 13-year-old boy would reasonably foresee there was likely to be injury beyond that normally occurring while a game of tag was in progress.”

For children engaged in children’s pursuits, therefore, the relevant standard of care is that expected of an ordinarily careful and reasonable child of the same age. However, this standard may be adjusted when the child engages in more adult pursuits. Children who engage in an adult activity, particularly one which normally carries with it insurance cover, may be required to measure up to objective adult standards. Thus for instance a seventeen-year-old car driver who has caused an accident would be judged by the same standard as an adult driver. North American authority suggests the same principle would apply in relation to motorised vehicles generally,86 so that, unless they are very young,87 children operating quadbikes,88 motorboats,89 or farm 81 Blake v Galloway [2004] EWCA Civ 814, [2004] 1 WLR 2844 per Dyson LJ at para 17. 82 Contrast the relatively higher level of culpability imputed to adults engaged in horseplay in cases such as Reid v Mitchell (1885) 12 R 1129. 83 Orchard v Lee [2009] EWCA Civ 295, [2009] PIQR P16 per Waller LJ at para 7. 84 [2009] EWCA Civ 295, [2009] PIQR P16; see also Etheridge v K [1999] Ed CR 550. 85 [2009] EWCA Civ 295, [2009] PIQR P16 at para 12. 86 Dobbs, Law of Torts para 137. 87 See DePerno v Hans 18 Misc 3d 1119(A), 856 NYS 2d 497 (Sup Ct 2007), holding that the factual inquiry as to whether the eight-year-old driver of a golf buggy was capable of understanding the danger required to be resolved before a finding of negligence on his part could be made. 88 McErlean v Sarel (1987) 42 DLR (4th) 577. 89 Dellwo v Pearson 107 NW 2d 859 (1961); see also Robinson v Lindsay 92 Wash 2d 410598 P 2d 392 (1979) (snowmobile).

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machinery,90 for example, cannot expect to be judged by a more lenient standard than that required of older drivers of such vehicles. A justification for reversion to the objective adult standard is found in the American case of Dellwo v Pearson:91 “While minors are entitled to be judged by standards commensurate with age, experience, and wisdom when engaged in activities appropriate to their age, experience, and wisdom, it would be unfair to the public to permit a minor in the operation of a motor vehicle to observe any other standards of care and conduct than those expected of all others. A person observing children at play with toys, throwing balls, operating tricycles or velocipedes, or engaged in other childhood activities may anticipate conduct that does not reach an adult standard of care or prudence. However, one cannot know whether the operator of an approaching automobile, airplane, or powerboat is a minor or an adult, and usually cannot protect himself against youthful imprudence even if warned. Accordingly, we hold that in the operation of an automobile, airplane, or powerboat, a minor is to be held to the same standard of care as an adult.”

(c) Supervision of children 10.36

Parents, teachers or other responsible adults looking after children are not vicariously liable for wrongdoing committed by their charges.92 They do, however, come under a duty of care towards persons who may foreseeably suffer injury as a result of their failure adequately to supervise the children, or as a result of their placing instruments of harm in children’s hands.93 The relevant standard of care is that of the ordinary “prudent” teacher or parent.94 In Carmarthenshire County Council v Lewis95 a four-year-old left unsupervised wandered out of his nursery school and strayed on to the neighbouring main road, causing the death of a lorry driver who swerved and crashed his vehicle in order to avoid hitting the child. The operators of the school were found liable as occupiers because the lay-out of their premises meant that children were not securely contained inside, and the installation of a child-proof gate would have been a reasonable precaution. The teacher, by contrast, was held not to have been negligent. She had left the child unattended for a short time in order to look after another pupil Jackson v McCuiston 247 Ark 862, 448 SW 2d 33 (1969). 107 NW 2d 859 (1961) per Loevinger J at 863. See para 3.02 above. Brown v Fulton (1881) 9 R 36 (unruly horse); Newton v Edgerley [1959] 1 WLR 1031 (firearm); DePerno v Hans 18 Misc 3d 1119(A), 856 NYS 2d 497 (Sup Ct 2007) (motorised golf buggy); cf MacDonald’s Tutor v County Council of Inverness1937 SC 69 (steel knitting needles regarded as obvious danger that did not require warning to ten-year-olds). See also Yachuk v Oliver Blais Co Ltd [1949] AC 386 (duty to child to whom defendant had sold a bucket of gasoline). 94 Carmarthenshire County Council v Lewis [1955] AC 549. 95 [1955] AC 549. 90 91 92 93

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who had been hurt, and she was held not to have breached the standard of care expected of a “careful parent”.96 Where the children concerned are not infants it is recognised that the reasonable parent attempts to strike a balance that does not “stifle initiative and independence”, and that duty does not require constant surveillance.97 Those supervising groups of children at play or engaged in sporting activities must do so in a way that minimises risk that children suffer injury. The standard of supervision required is, similarly, that of a “reasonably careful parent”, taking into consideration the age and size of the children involved, their known propensities to “boisterousness”, and the level of risk attached to the activity in question.98 It is acknowledged that some risk of injury may be inevitable where children play together, but those supervising are required to ensure that their charges are “subject to such supervision or surveillance as they know, or ought to know, is necessary to restrict the risk to an acceptable level”.99 The standard of care required of teachers in supervising children in sporting activities is discussed further in chapter 11.100

10.37

(2) The incapacitated and the disabled (a) Old age While concessions to age are made in fixing the standard of care appropriate for children, equivalent adjustments are not generally made in relation to those advanced in years. This attitude towards the elderly is consistent with the practice noted above that imposes adult standards upon children when they are engaged in adult activities.

10.38

(b) Infirmity or disability Similarly, the objective standard of the reasonable person does not make allowance for ongoing infirmity or disability. While some jurisdictions incline towards assessing the conduct of the disabled by reference to the standard of a reasonably careful person affected by the same disability,101 little support can be found for such an approach in the Scottish or English courts. There has been scant opportunity to consider such cases in Scotland, but in England the Court of Appeal has stated categorically that “everyone should owe the same duty of care”, and that those affected by physical or   96 To similar effect see Gow v Glasgow Education Authority 1922 SC 260.  97 Porter v Barking and Dagenham London Borough Council, The Times, 9 April 1990; see also Cuthbertson v Merchiston Castle School 2001 SLT (Sh Ct) 13.  98 Harris v Perry [2008] EWCA Civ 907, [2009] 1 WLR 19; Bosworth Water Trust v SSR [2018] EWHC 444 (QB).  99 Harris v Perry [2008] EWCA Civ 907, [2009] 1 WLR 19 per Lord Phillips at para 34. 100 See paras 11.34–11.35 below. 101 See US Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 11(a).

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mental impairment must meet the same standard of care as those unaffected by such impairment,102 so that a disabled driver, say, must meet the same standard of driving as expected of non-disabled drivers on the roads. In the same way, it appears that those suffering from verifiable psychiatric illness are normally to be judged by the standard of care applicable to those who are not so afflicted.103 The decision of the Court of Appeal in Dunnage v Randall104 confirms that medical impairment, whether physical or mental, does not absolve from liability except in the extreme circumstance that there has been complete “elimination” of control. In Dunnage, an individual suffering from paranoid schizophrenia arrived unannounced at his nephew’s house and had an agitated exchange with him in which various paranoid delusions were vented. After a while the uncle went out to his car and returned with a can of petrol which he poured over himself and set alight. The uncle died of his injuries, and the nephew, whom the uncle had not intended to injure, suffered severe burns in trying to come to his assistance. The nephew brought a claim in negligence against the uncle’s estate and the insurance company which had provided cover for accidental injuries caused by the deceased. The court was careful to distinguish irrational from involuntary conduct and held that, unless it could be established that the uncle’s condition “entirely eliminated responsibility”, he remained subject to the objective standard of care.105 In this case the uncle’s circumstances brought him close to that point but, although his motivation was highly irrational, he had remained in physical control of his movements and knew what he was doing in retrieving and igniting the petrol: “his mind, albeit deluded, directed his actions”.106 That meant that he was held to the standard of the reasonable person, without concession to paranoid schizophrenic delusion, a standard which he clearly had not met, thus rendering the insurer liable.

(c) Unforeseeable loss of control 10.41

The decision in Dunnage concerned an individual who, it appears, had been unwell for some time.107 In reaching its decision the court distinguished 102 Dunnage v Randall [2015] EWCA Civ 673, [2016] QB 639 per Arden LJ at para 153. 103 Dunnage v Randall [2015] EWCA Civ 673, [2016] QB 639. See also Guthrie Smith, Damages 69, citing English authority to the effect that “a lunatic, although not punishable for his criminal act, is not exempt from the duty of indemnifying a person who has suffered at his hands when he has the means of compensation”. 104 [2015] EWCA Civ 673, [2016] QB 639. For a critique, see J Goudkamp and M Ihuoma, “A Tour of the Action in Negligence” (2016) 32 Professional Negligence 137. The court emphasised that it did not distinguish between physical and mental infirmity in this regard: Rafferty LJ at para 104, Vos LJ at para 134, and Arden LJ at para 159. 105 [2015] EWCA Civ 673, [2016] QB 639 per Rafferty LJ at para 114. 106 [2015] EWCA Civ 673, [2016] QB 639 per Arden LJ at para 145. 107 Dunnage v Randall [2015] EWCA Civ 673, [2016] QB 639 per Rafferty LJ at para 9, narrating that there had been suicide attempts in the preceding months.

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ongoing illness or disability from cases in which a person, in apparent good health, experiences an unexpected onset of illness resulting in loss of capacity.108 Different considerations apply where significant109 disability overwhelmed the defender in a manner that was unforeseeable, depriving the defender of proper control over his or her actions and resulting in injury to the pursuer. The paradigm situation is that of a driver starting a car journey in good health but succumbing to a heart attack while at the wheel, thereby causing an accident. In the leading Scottish case of Waugh v James K Allan Ltd,110 for example, the pursuer suffered serious injuries when a lorry mounted the pavement and knocked him over. The reason for the accident was that the lorry driver, an employee of the defender, had been overcome by a coronary thrombosis from which he died minutes later. The issue for the court was whether the driver could be considered to have acted negligently, in which case the defender would be held vicariously liable. In those circumstances there were two points at which the driver’s conduct might potentially have been judged to have been negligent: at the time of the accident, and at the start of the journey. In regard to the former, the evidence pointed to the sudden onset of the coronary thrombosis, causing the driver to experience a total loss of consciousness, so that his actions were involuntary and wholly beyond his control. As the Lord Ordinary, Lord Migdale, had remarked, “a man who is not conscious cannot be guilty of negligence”.111 The primary question considered by the House of Lords in Waugh was therefore whether, at the start of the journey, the driver was at fault in taking to the wheel or whether he had acted reasonably. Shortly before his fatal collapse the driver had been collecting a load of bone-meal at a glue factory. He complained of the smell at the factory and according to witnesses he felt so nauseous that he had to rest for a while before getting back in the lorry. The driver had suffered from gastritis, but had no history of more serious health problems. The question was therefore whether reasonable persons in such circumstances would have realised that they were unfit to drive and likely to cause an accident: “were his symptoms such that an ordinary layman would have taken them as a warning that it

108 [2015] EWCA Civ 673, [2016] QB 639 per Arden LJ at para 147. 109 Cf e.g. Johnston v National Coal Board 1960 SLT (Notes) 84 (fly in the eye did not excuse lapse in driving skill); McCann v J R McKellar (Alloys) Ltd 1969 SC (HL) 1 (in which the pursuer had been carrying a load of steel ingots with the defender. On feeling a sharp pain in his finger from a ragged edge on the metal the defender let his end of the load fall, resulting in the pursuer’s finger being crushed. The defender admitted that he had not required medical attention and that the pain was “only a wee pinprick”. His dropping of the load was not therefore an involuntary action for which he escaped responsibility.) 110 1964 SC (HL) 102; see also Giffen v McGill’s Executors 1983 SLT 498 (driver suffering fatal subarachnoid haemorrhage). 111 1963 SC 175 at 183.

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was hazardous to drive off immediately?”112 One of the circumstances of the case which the court regarded it as proper to consider was the specific condition by which the driver was affected. In other words: would the reasonable person with a history of gastritis attribute feelings of nausea to an impending thrombosis, rather than a non-sinister bout of gastritis, and therefore realise that it was dangerous to drive? The court was satisfied that this question should be answered in the negative. The driver had not been at fault, therefore, and had not failed in his duty of care to other road users by getting behind the wheel. By the same token, the driver would have been considered negligent if it had been judged that he had good reason to anticipate the imminent onset of debilitating illness.113 The facts of Waugh contrast with those in Roberts v Ramsbottom,114 a decision of the High Court in England. In Roberts the defendant suffered a cerebral haemorrhage without warning, and without himself appreciating what was happening. He somehow managed to get in his car and drive for a short distance, but so erratically that he crashed into the plaintiff’s car. The court regarded him as having been at fault in getting into the car, because at that point he was aware that he was significantly unwell, even although he had not realised that his symptoms were those of a cerebral haemorrhage. The court, moreover, made no concession to the driver’s stroke-induced impairment of judgment in assessing the standard of care applicable to his driving. In the absence of evidence of “automatism” involving a complete loss of consciousness, such as that experienced by the lorry driver in Waugh, the defendant was deemed capable of negligence where he retained some degree of control over his physical actions. He was therefore deemed also to have been negligent at the time of the accident because “his driving, judged objectively, was below the required standard”.115 Although it did not consider the case to be wrongly decided, the reasoning in Roberts was criticised by the Court of Appeal in Mansfield v Weetabix Ltd116 in which a lorry driver, an employee of the defendant, had gradually lapsed into a hypoglycaemic state brought on by a rare malignant condition of which he had no reason to be aware. He had continued driving but, as his consciousness became increasingly clouded, crashed his lorry into the plaintiff’s shop premises. The Court of Appeal commented that Roberts had been correctly decided to the extent that the defendant in that case embarked on the car journey when he should have been aware that he was unfit to do so.117 It judged that the driver in Mansfield, on the other hand, 112 113 114 115 116 117

1964 SC (HL) 102 per Lord Reid at 105. On this point see the speech of Viscount Radcliffe, 1964 SC (HL) 102 at 106–107. [1980] 1 WLR 823. [1980] 1 WLR 823 per Neill J at 832. [1998] 1 WLR 1263. [1998] 1 WLR 1263 per Leggatt LJ at 1266–1267.

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could not reasonably have known of his increasing infirmity. He was not therefore at fault in continuing on his journey. However, it regarded the court in Roberts as having “erred” in suggesting that a defendant escaped liability in such circumstances only where he or she had lost control to the extent of automatism, and that a driver escaped liability only when a sudden event had occurred, such as the coronary thrombosis in Waugh. A progressive condition causing gradual loss of control, such as that experienced in Mansfield, might also be taken into account. The standard of care by which the court judged the driver in Mansfield, as he continued his journey and became increasingly unwell, was accordingly that expected of a “reasonably competent driver” in these circumstances, unaware that he might be suffering from a condition that would progressively undermine his ability to control his driving.118 Assessed in this way his conduct had not been negligent, and so his employer escaped liability. In summary, where the conduct causing an accident is claimed to be attributable to the unforeseeable onset of a condition that compromised the defender’s capacity to exercise due care towards the pursuer, the primary issue is the foreseeability of that condition and its effects. Was the defender aware, or able to foresee, that the capacity to control his or her conduct was about to be overwhelmed by illness, whether sudden as in Waugh, or more gradual as in Mansfield. Alternatively, would a reasonable person in the position of the defender, with the equivalent medical history, have been aware of or able to foresee the onset of that condition? If so, then it was negligent for the defender not to desist immediately, as in Roberts. If, on the other hand, there was no negligence on that score, the defender’s ongoing conduct is judged by reference to a “reasonably competent”119 person in equivalent circumstances, unaware that he or she might be suffering from a disability reducing the power to control his or her actions. It is possible for an unforeseen, complete loss of control to be produced by a mental, rather than a physical, condition. In the Canadian case of Buckley and The Toronto Transportation Commission v Smith Transport Ltd120 the defendant’s employee crashed an articulated lorry into a street-car. It transpired that the employee was suffering from advanced syphilis of the brain, which had caused him suddenly to become delusional. There was evidence to the effect that, at the time of the crash, he had become convinced that his lorry was being driven by remote control, and that he was powerless to steer it in another direction. The court was therefore persuaded that his conduct was involuntary. His mind was so ravaged by disease that not only did he lack capacity to understand the duty to take 118 [1998] 1 WLR 1263 per Leggatt LJ at 1268. 119 [1998] 1 WLR 1263 per Leggatt LJ at 1268. 120 [1946] 4 DLR 721.

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care; he was also prevented by his delusion from discharging it in driving the lorry. No liability attached to him, or to his employer who had no prior warning that he would be incapacitated in this way.

(3) Varying levels of skill 10.48

10.49

Since personal attributes are in principle disregarded in fixing standard of care, no concession is made to the lower level of skill that may have been attained by the defender in embarking upon the course of conduct in question. Persons who engage in interactions with others should not expose them to unreasonable risk. Those of below-average skill are expected to recognise their limitations and desist from activities which, due to their level of skill, carry unreasonable risk.121 If they proceed, their conduct is measured against the level of skill normally possessed by the reasonable person engaging in the activity in question. If that activity is capable of being carried out safely only by a person with the necessary skill to do it, then the standard of care to be shown is that appropriate to one possessing that skill.122 Thus learner drivers, for example, are judged by the same standards as the reasonable qualified driver. In Nettleship v Weston123 the defendant crashed a car into a lamppost during her third driving lesson, while travelling at only four miles per hour, and under the close supervision of her driving instructor. She was nonetheless held to the standard of care of the reasonable driver and therefore held liable for the injuries suffered by the instructor. As Lord Denning explained: “The learner driver may be doing his best, but his incompetent best is not good enough. He must drive in as good a manner as a driver of skill, experience and care, who is sound in wind and limb, who makes no errors of judgment, has good eyesight and hearing, and is free from any infirmity.”124 The reasoning underlying this decision not only derived from the objective standard formulated in Muir v Glasgow Corporation,125 but was also reinforced by practical policy concerns. The court was influenced by the prospect of uncertainty if the standard of care varied according to different levels of driving skill. Another relevant factor was the existence of compulsory insurance cover for third-party risk:126

121 See e.g. Phee v Gordon [2013] CSIH 18, 2013 SC 379: a golfer of “moderate skill” should have appreciated the likelihood of playing a bad shot and therefore desisted from playing until others were well out of range. 122 Adams v Rhymney Valley District Council [2001] PNLR 4; Greenhorn v South Glasgow University Hospitals NHS Trust [2008] CSOH 128, (2008) 104 BMLR 50 per Lord Uist at para 109. 123 [1971] 2 QB 691. 124 [1971] 2 QB 691 at 699. 125 1943 SC (HL) 3; see para 10.06 above. 126 [1971] 2 QB 691 per Lord Denning at 700.

Standard of Care   347 “[W]e are, in this branch of the law, moving away from the concept: ‘No liability without fault.’ We are beginning to apply the test: ‘On whom should the risk fall?’ Morally the learner driver is not at fault; but legally she is liable to be because she is insured and the risk should fall on her.”

In practical terms this means that the standard of care demanded of novices such as Mrs Weston is well-nigh unattainable,127 and in effect produces a form of strict liability without fault. The equivalent rule applies to those exercising a trade or profession. Newly qualified hospital doctors, for example, are not entitled to argue for a lesser standard of care in treating patients; they must attain the ordinary levels of skill required of experienced doctors.128 Similarly, surveyors who hold themselves out as providing professional services must be deemed to have the skills of a surveyor and be adjudged upon them, even if they lack formal qualifications.129 However, that principle is qualified to the extent that the standard of care demanded of any particular individual may reflect the defender’s specific post and responsibilities. So the standard required of a junior hospital doctor, for example, is that of the average hospital doctor in an equivalent post in an equivalent workplace, rather than that of a specialist consultant; concession is not made, however, to the particular individual’s lack of experience in the job.130

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(4) Sport (a) Liability of participants to other participants Those who participate in sport owe a duty of care to their fellow sportsmen and to spectators, the relevant standard being ascertained by reference to the reasonable player playing the particular sport under comparable conditions.131 The standard takes account of the fact that in some contact and field sports the participants can be placed in situations where they are obliged to react quickly, without opportunity for mature consideration of the possible risks to others, for “the careful player is a bore – and rarely wins”.132 As explained by Lord Macphail in Sharp v Highland and Islands 127 In Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691 it was apparently of no avail for the defendant to plead that “I was doing my best and could not help it”. 128 See e.g. Andrews v Greater Glasgow Health Board [2019] CSOH 31, 2019 SLT 727; FB v Rana [2017] EWCA Civ 334, [2017] PIQR P17. 129 Freeman v Marshall & Co (1966) 200 EG 777. 130 Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1987] QB 730 per Mustill LJ at 750–751 (revd on a different issue [1988] AC 1074); see also Greenhorn v South Glasgow University Hospitals NHS Trust [2008] CSOH 128, (2008) 104 BMLR 50 per Lord Uist at para 109. 131 Condon v Basi [1985] 1 WLR 866. See also McMahon v Dear [2014] CSOH 100, 2014 SLT 823 per Lord Jones at para 208: decisions (on golf) are “very fact specific”. 132 C Gearty, “Tort: Liability for Injuries received during Sports and Pastimes” (1985) 44 CLJ 371 at 373.

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Fire Board, 133 a case arising out of an injury sustained during an amateur football match, concessions are made for context: “In the circumstances of a football match . . . any player when tackling an opponent may be guilty of an error of judgment. Where by such an error of judgment he has caused injury to his opponent, the test of liability is whether the error of judgment was one that a reasonable football player would not have made. A reasonable football player is not a paragon who never makes a mistake. A player is therefore liable only for damages caused by errors of judgment or lapse of skill going beyond such as, in the stress of circumstances, may reasonably be regarded as excusable.”

10.52

On the facts of Sharp the pursuer failed to discharge the burden of establishing that a tackle by a fellow player went beyond an “excusable” error of judgment. “Serious and dangerous foul play” plainly falls below the relevant standard,134 and in more outrageous cases may constitute an intentional assault,135 but less egregious conduct may be “excused” even although it breached the rules of the game. Such rules are an important part of the background for the court’s assessment of the standard of care, but they are not conclusive.136 In Caldwell v Maguire,137 for example, a jockey was injured at a horse race as a result of a collision with other riders. A stewards’ inquiry determined that the other riders had been guilty of “careless riding” that contravened Jockey Club rules. The Court of Appeal thought, however, that this was not determinative of negligence, and that “there is a difference between response by the regulatory authority and response by the courts in the shape of a finding of legal liability”.138 In this case the conduct of the other riders was no more than “an error of judgment, an oversight or a lapse which any participant might be guilty of in the context of a race of this kind. It was the sort of incident which happens quite often.” 139 It was not therefore inconsistent with the standard expected of the reasonable jockey, and so negligence was not established.

133 2005 SLT 855 at para 26 (affd 2008 SCLR 526); see also McComiskey v McDermott [1974] IR 75 (duty of rally driver to navigator) per Henchy J at 89: “the duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff was to drive as carefully as a reasonably careful, competitive rally driver would be expected to drive in the prevailing circumstances”. 134 Condon v Basi [1985] 1 WLR 866; for an example of a football tackle “unmistakeably inconsistent” with the defendant taking reasonable care towards his opponent, see McCord v Swansea Football Club, The Times, 11 February 1997. 135 See e.g. Gravil v Carroll [2008] EWCA Civ 689, [2008] ICR 1222. 136 Phee v Gordon [2013] CSIH 18, 2013 SC 379 at para 31; see also Rootes v Shelton (1967) 116 CLR 383 per Kitto J at 389; S Yeo, “Accepted Inherent Risks among Sporting Participants” 2001 Tort Law Review 114. 137 [2001] EWCA Civ 1054, [2002] PIQR P6. 138 [2001] EWCA Civ 1054, [2002] PIQR P6 per Tuckey LJ at para 28. 139 [2001] EWCA Civ 1054, [2002] PIQR P6 per Tuckey LJ at para 28.

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It has been further observed that the standard of the “reasonable player” is sensitive to the level at which the sport is being played, so that a higher standard of care may be required of a player in a Premier League football match than of a player in a local league match, for example.140 While errors of judgment may be excusable where they occur in the heat of the contest, they are considerably less so if they occur in preparing for a match or competition.141 Furthermore, it goes without saying that concessions to time pressure are unlikely to affect the standard of care in relation to sports such as golf, where speed is not of the essence.142

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(b) Liability of referees to participants Referees, in turn, owe a duty of care to supervise enforcement of the rules of the game so that the safety of players is not compromised.143 As with duty between players, the relevant standard of care is determined by all the circumstances, including above all the nature of the game. It is not therefore breached by “errors of judgment, oversights or lapses of which any referee might be guilty in the context of a fast-moving and vigorous contest”.144 Nonetheless, in Smoldon v Whitworth,145 a rugby referee who failed to insist upon correct scrummaging procedures was held to have fallen below the standards of the reasonable referee and so was liable when a player suffered a broken neck in a collapsed scrum. In Vowles v Evans,146 another rugby case, the referee was similarly held liable to a player whose neck was broken in the scrum. In that case the accident was found to have been caused by the referee permitting a player who lacked suitable training and experience to play in the front row, which was in breach of the laws of the game. In holding that there had been breach of duty, the court was, however, careful to point out that the referee’s decision to proceed in this way “was taken while play was stopped and there was time to give considered thought to it. Very different considerations would be likely to apply in a case in which it was alleged that the referee was negligent because of a decision made during play.”147

140 Condon v Basi [1985] 1 WLR 866 per Sir John Donaldson MR at 868; but cf Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691. The basis for distinguishing between different levels of player was questioned by Drake J in Elliott v Saunders, unreported, QBD, 10 June 1994; see also case comment by C Gearty, (1985) 44 CLJ 371 at 373. 141 Harrison v Vincent [1982] RTR 8 (accident occurring during motorcycle race due to faulty maintenance before the competition). 142 See e.g. Lewis v Buckpool Golf Club 1993 SLT (Sh Ct) 43; Phee v Gordon [2013] CSIH 18, 2013 SC 379. 143 Vowles v Evans [2003] EWCA Civ 318, [2003] 1 WLR 1607. 144 Smoldon v Whitworth [1996] EWCA Civ 1225, [1997] PIQR P133 per Lord Bingham at P139. 145 [1996] EWCA Civ 1225, [1997] PIQR P133. 146 Vowles v Evans [2003] EWCA Civ 318, [2003] 1 WLR 1607. 147 Vowles v Evans [2003] EWCA Civ 318, [2003] 1 WLR 1607 per Lord Phillips at para 38.

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(c) Liability to spectators 10.56

The standard of care owed to spectators by participants in sporting events is similarly tailored to the circumstances of the sport and the fixture in question. An English case of the 1960s suggested that the threshold of duty set thereby was unexacting and that breach of duty was likely to be found only in conduct that evinced “a reckless disregard of the spectator’s safety”.148 Subsequent decisions modified that standard, so that the breach did not need to go as far as recklessness but might be constituted “by an error of judgment that a reasonable competitor, being the reasonable man of the sporting world, would not have made”.149 This standard was endorsed by the Lord Ordinary, Lord Jones, in the Scottish case of McMahon v Dear,150 in which a spectator, who was also a match official, was injured by a stray ball at an amateur golf tournament. The defender, one of the competitors, had hit his shot towards the hole where the pursuer was stationed as a “ball spotter” and injured the pursuer in the eye. Lord Jones summarised his conclusions as to the relevant standard of care, and the applicable authorities, as follows:151 “(i) in cases involving injury to spectators caused by competitors acting in the ordinary course of play, the test to be applied in determining the issue of negligence is ‘whether or not the competitor in question has committed an error of judgment that a reasonable competitor being a reasonable man of the sporting world would not have made’;[152]  (ii) in determining that question, the court should have regard to the whole relevant surrounding facts and circumstances;[153]   (iii) in deciding whether the competitor has committed an error of judgment that a reasonable competitor would not have made, it is relevant to have regard to the perils which might reasonably be expected to occur and the extent to which the ordinary spectator might be expected to appreciate and take the risk of such perils;[154] in the case of a golf competition: ‘Spectators who pay for admission to golf courses to witness important matches, though they keep beyond the boundaries required by the stewards, run the risk of the players slicing or pulling balls which may hit them with considerable velocity and damage.’”155 148 Wooldridge v Sumner [1963] 2 QB 43 per Diplock LJ at 68. See also Murray v Harringay Arena [1951] 2 KB 529 (duty of sports promoters). 149 Wilks v Cheltenham Homeguard Motor Cycle and Light Car Club [1971] 1 WLR 668 per Edmund Davies LJ at 674, citing case note by A L Goodhart, (1962) 78 LQR 490 at 496. See also on this point Sharp v Highland and Islands Fire Board 2008 SCLR 526 per Lord Johnston at paras 8–10; McMahon v Dear [2014] CSOH 100, 2014 SLT 823 per Lord Jones at paras 194–195 and 209. 150 [2014] CSOH 100, 2014 SLT 823. 151 [2014] CSOH 100, 2014 SLT 823 at para 209. 152 Citing Sharp v Highland and Islands Fire Board 2008 SCLR 526 per Lord Johnston at para 10. 153 Citing Wilks v Cheltenham Homeguard Motor Cycle and Light Car Club [1971] 1 WLR 668 per Phillimore LJ at 676; Phee v Gordon [2013] CSIH 18, 2013 SC 379 at para 24. 154 Citing Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club [1933] 1 KB 205, as noted by Diplock LJ in Wooldridge v Summer [1963] 2 QB 43 at 67. 155 Citing Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club [1933] 1 KB 205 per Scrutton LJ at 209.

Standard of Care   351

In effect, therefore, although arguments based on volenti non fit injuria were not advanced in McMahon, the relevant standard of care took into account the conduct which the defender might reasonably “expect” of others on the golf course in avoiding risk incidental to the course of play. Where, as in this case, the pursuer was an official, there was a reasonable expectation that he would make himself aware of play and position himself accordingly.156

(d) Liability of operators of sports facilities to participants Operators of sports facilities owe a duty to exercise reasonable care in making provision against risks to which participants might be exposed, as well as in offering appropriate instruction in that connection. However, it is accepted that some risk is inherent in many forms of sport, and when assessing the reasonableness of exposure to risk it is legitimate to factor in the social value that derives from participation in sport.157 It is further recognised that in some activities the hazards are so obvious as to be accepted by those who take part, so that any duty to warn may be limited.158 On the other hand, where a sports operator has led participants to believe that it will supervise activities with suitably qualified staff, or implement particular safety measures, then it must make good these assurances and it will be liable for injuries resulting from its failure to do so. In Reitze v Strathclyde Regional Council,159 for example, the pursuers had hired equipment to go white-water rafting on the River Orchy and engaged the services of Council employees to lead the expedition. The raft capsized as the party attempted to navigate the river in full spate, resulting in the death of two of the party and the injury of others. A relevant case in negligence against the Council was made where the pursuers offered to prove that the accident was attributable to the inexperience of the Council employees leading the party, and that in making the arrangements for the expedition they had been led to believe that those employees were adequately qualified. By contrast, in Maylin v Dacorum Sports Trust160 the claimant, who was injured in a fall from the defendants’ climbing wall, maintained that she would not have climbed to any height had she not thought that the defendants’ employees would oversee her climb and had she not relied on flooring mats being sufficiently deep to cushion any fall. Her claim was, however, dismissed as she could not reasonably have relied upon the defendants to provide this level of protection where no assurance was given that an employee would supervise her and notices had been posted warning that “the soft mats do not make it any safer”. 156 157 158 159 160

[2014] CSOH 100, 2014 SLT 823 at para 211. Scout Association v Barnes [2010] EWCA Civ 1476. E.g. a climbing wall, as in Maylin v Dacorum Sports Trust [2017] EWHC 378 (QB). 1999 SC 614. [2017] EWHC 378 (QB).

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10.58

The liability of players for intentional injury inflicted upon the sports field is discussed in chapter 16,161 and the liability of operators of sports facilities and stadia as occupiers is considered further in chapter 25.

D. PROVING BREACH OF DUTY: RES IPSA LOQUITUR 10.59

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As noted above, the questions whether a duty was owed by the defender to the pursuer, and what standard of care was required of the defender, are both questions of law. The questions whether that standard has been breached and, if so, whether the breach caused the harm to the pursuer are questions of fact in relation to which the pursuer bears the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities. Where evidence is evenly balanced, the claim must fail because that burden has not been discharged. Exceptionally, an accident may come about in such a way that no definite explanation can be ascertained, but the circumstances clearly suggest a breach of duty by the defender. This allows the pursuer to argue res ipsa loquitur, meaning “the thing itself speaks”.162 The court is thereby asked to accept that mere occurrence of the accident in the circumstances of the case creates an inference that, as a matter of fact, the defender acted without due care.163 The classic instance in which the doctrine was held to apply is in the English case of Scott v London & St Katherine Docks Co.164 The plaintiff was passing by the defendant’s warehouse when six bags of sugar suddenly fell on top of him from an upper storey, causing him injury. There was no direct evidence of how this had occurred, but it was known that the defendant’s employees had been using a hoist to unload sugar from the warehouse at the time in question. The mere fact of bags of sugar falling from a building was regarded as more consistent with negligence rather than due care, and the case was remitted to the lower court, which had earlier found there to have been insufficient evidence of negligence. As Erle CJ explained:165 “There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But where the thing is shewn to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.”

The doctrine is therefore a rule of evidence by which a pursuer is not always required to show precisely how an event occurred if it is possible to 161 162 163 164 165

See paras 16.48–16.49 below. J Trayner, Trayner’s Latin Maxims, 4th edn (1894, reprinted 1993) 553. Ballard v North British Railway Co 1923 SC (HL) 43. (1865) 3 H & C 596. See also Byrne v Boadle (1863) 2 H & C 722. (1865) 3 H & C 596 at 601.

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point to “a combination of facts which are sufficient, without more, to give rise to a proper inference that the defendant was negligent”.166 For res ipsa loquitur to apply, the pursuer is required to show that: (i) the thing which caused the damage was under the defender’s management; and (ii) the accident was of a type that does not ordinarily occur if proper care is taken. The inference of negligence is then accepted only if the defender can offer no explanation consistent with absence of fault on the defender’s part. These three elements are discussed in turn.167

10.61

(1) Exclusive management by the defender In order for the doctrine to be applicable, the defender, or those for whom the defender was responsible, must have had sole control of the thing that caused the damage. If, therefore, the chain of events leading to the accident could have been subject to intervention by others, then the inference cannot be drawn. In McDyer v The Celtic Football and Athletic Co Ltd168 a piece of timber fell from the canopy over the seating in the Celtic Park football stadium and injured a spectator at a sporting event. The pursuer’s averments that the defender was the occupier of the stadium and had exclusive management and control over it at the relevant time, and that the canopy had been inaccessible to the public, were regarded as sufficient to support the inference of res ipsa loquitur. By contrast, in Easson v LNER169 a child fell from the door of the Edinburgh-to-London express train seven miles from the previous station and in an era when doors were opened and closed manually. It was accepted that the defendant’s staff were under a duty to take care that doors were closed when the train left stations, but it was not clear that the doors were under the sole control of railway employees in between stations, since passengers could conceivably interfere with them. While it was therefore plausible that the accident had occurred due to fault on the part of railway staff, the existence of other possible explanations meant it could not be said that res ipsa loquitur. Similarly, in Carroll v Fearon, Bent and Dunlop Ltd170 the mere fact of a tyre blowing out seven years after its manufacture by the defendant did not bring the res ipsa loquitur doctrine into operation as the 166 Smith v Fordyce [2013] EWCA Civ 320 per Toulson LJ at para 61. 167 See also Devine v Colvilles Ltd 1968 SLT 294, affd 1969 SC (HL) 67, adopting and explaining the reasoning in Scott v London & St Katherine Docks Co (1865) 3 H & C 596. 168 2000 SC 379. The case was argued as a failure of the reasonable care incumbent upon the defender as occupier of the stadium, in terms of the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 s 2(1). By contrast, simple averments to the effect that the premises were in a hazardous condition are not generally sufficient to support the operation of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in relation to the 1960 Act: see McQueen v Ballater Golf Club 1975 SLT 160; Murray v Edinburgh District Council 1981 SLT 253. 169 [1944] KB 421. 170 [1998] PIQR P416.

10.62

10.63

354   The Law of Delict in Scotland

10.64

tyre had long since ceased to be under the defendant’s control and could readily have been affected by misuse or damage by others in that period. Where the instrument of harm has been under the control of more than one employee of the same employer, and it is not clear which of them in particular was negligent, the doctrine is nonetheless permitted to operate. Responsibility is taken as falling upon the employer without the pursuer being required to single out a particular employee.171

(2) Harm of a type which does not ordinarily occur if proper care is taken 10.65

Objects generally do not fall from buildings, as occurred in Scott v London & St Katherine Docks Co,172 if proper care has been exercised by the occupiers.173 Other misadventures that do not normally arise without negligence include, for example, foreign objects finding their way into foodstuffs,174 scalding water spouting from workplace washbasins,175 cranes toppling over on construction sites,176 aircraft crashing,177 or vehicles careering off course.178 Similarly, accidents involving customers slipping on spillages in shops and restaurants do not normally occur if the operator has an efficient system for inspecting and cleaning floors. In Ward v Tesco Stores Ltd,179 for example, the plaintiff was injured when she slipped on a patch of spilt yoghurt on a supermarket floor. Holding that a prima facie case of negligence was made out, the court reasoned that:180 “The accident was such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if floors are kept clean and spillages are dealt with as soon as they occur. If an accident does happen because the floors are covered with spillage, then . . . some explanation should be forthcoming from the defendants to show that the accident did not arise from any want of care on their part.”

10.66

By contrast, it cannot be said, for example, that investors do not generally suffer losses in the commodities futures market if their brokers exercise due care, since this market is recognised as “notoriously wayward and erratic”, 171 Cassidy v Ministry of Health [1951] 2 KB 343 per Singleton LJ at 358–359. 172 (1865) 3 H & C 596; see para 10.60 above. 173 See e.g. Byrne v Boadle (1863) 2 H & C 722; Walsh v Holst & Co Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 800; McDyer v The Celtic Football and Athletic Co Ltd 2000 SC 379. 174 Chapronière v Mason (1905) 21 TLR 633. 175 Birch v George McPhie & Son Ltd 2020 SLT (Sh Ct) 93. 176 Swan v Salisbury Construction Co Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 204. 177 George v Eagle Air Services Ltd [2009] UKPC 21, [2009] 1 WLR 2133. 178 Milliken v Glasgow Corporation 1918 SC 857; Smith v Fordyce [2013] EWCA Civ 320 per Toulson LJ at para 61. 179 [1976] 1 WLR 810; see also Dawkins v Carnival plc [2011] EWCA Civ 1237, [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1. 180 [1976] 1 WLR 810 per Lawton LJ at 814.

Standard of Care   355

and the fortunes of investors may therefore be affected by a variety of factors which even the most astute of brokers could not fully mitigate.181

(3) No explanation is offered consistent with absence of fault by the defender Where both of the above elements are present, the pursuer may establish a prima facie case of negligence by relying simply upon the fact of the accident. And where no “reasonable”182 explanation is then offered by the defender that is consistent with absence of fault on the defender’s part, the defender will be taken to have been negligent. In Devine v Colvilles Ltd,183 for example, the pursuer was injured in a fall precipitated by an explosion in the defender’s steel works where he was an employee. The most probable cause of the explosion was a fire in a pressurised oxygen hose which had become contaminated with rust or scale. The pipe had a filter attached in order to prevent such contamination, but since no evidence was put forward as to the condition of the filter at the time of the explosion, no explanation of the explosion had been provided that was consistent with absence of fault by the defender. Negligence was therefore established. Similarly, in Woodhouse v Lochs and Glens (Transport) Ltd184 a tour bus driven by the defender’s employee swerved off a country road in high winds, injuring some of its passengers. The first two elements of the res ipsa doctrine were present, in that the bus was under the exclusive control of its driver, and properly driven buses do not usually crash off the road, even in windy conditions, which are in any case common in Scotland.185 The defender was unable to satisfy the court that there was adequate evidence of an alternative explanation for the accident, consistent with the absence of driver negligence.186 The inference of negligence created by the first two elements was not therefore rebutted, and liability was established without the pursuer being further required to prove fault. If, on the other hand, the defender offers an explanation that is consistent with defender having exercised due care, that explanation, and the 181 Stafford v Conti Commodity Services Ltd [1981] 1 All ER 691 per Mocatta J at 696. 182 Devine v Colvilles Ltd 1969 SC (HL) 67 per Lord Guest at 100. 183 1969 SC (HL) 67. See also George v Eagle Air Services Ltd [2009] UKPC 21, [2009] 1 WLR 2133, in which the claimant’s husband was killed in a light-aircraft crash. The court considered that, given the very good safety record of the aviation industry, it was no longer credible to assert that air crashes might ordinarily occur in the absence of fault by someone connected with the design, manufacture or operation of the aircraft. In the absence of an explanation from the aircraft operators consistent with absence of fault on their part, the inference of fault had not been displaced. 184 [2020] CSIH 67, 2020 SLT 1203. 185 [2020] CSIH 67, 2020 SLT 1203 per Lord President Carloway at para 36. 186 Indeed, Lord President Carloway remarked that the evidence was “eloquent only of negligence”: [2020] CSIH 67, 2020 SLT 1203 at para 46.

10.67

10.68

356   The Law of Delict in Scotland

10.69

evidence to support it, must be evaluated in order to determine if the inference of negligence may still reasonably be drawn from the mere fact of the accident. In McQueen v The Glasgow Garden Festival (1988) Ltd 187 the pursuer was injured by flying shrapnel when a firework exploded prematurely at a fireworks display organised by the defender. The probable cause of the explosion was a defect within the shell in which the firework was encased, but rather than pointing to negligence on the part of the defender, this was “eloquent of negligence” on the part of the manufacturer.188 The res ipsa inference could not therefore stand, and since the pursuer was unable to prove any respect in which the defender was at fault, her claim against it failed. Similarly, in O’Hara v Central SMT Co189 the pursuer was injured when a bus from which she was just about to alight swerved suddenly ahead of the bus stop, throwing her on to the road. Without further explanation such an occurrence might indicate negligence on the part of the driver, but in this case the court found support for the driver’s account of events (that a passer-by had run suddenly into the path of the vehicle) to displace the prima facie inference of negligence, and indeed the strength of the evidence to this effect was regarded as sufficient to absolve the driver of fault.190 The operation of the doctrine in this respect was explained by Lord Griffiths in Ng Chun Pui v Lee Chuen Tat as follows:191 “[I]n an appropriate case the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by relying upon the fact of the accident. If the defendant adduces no evidence there is nothing to rebut the inference of negligence and the plaintiff will have proved his case. But if the defendant does adduce evidence that evidence must be evaluated to see if it is still reasonable to draw the inference of negligence from the mere fact of the accident. Loosely speaking this may be referred to as a burden on the defendant to show he was not negligent, but that only means that faced with a prima facie case of negligence the defendant will be found negligent unless he produces evidence that is capable of rebutting the prima facie case. Resort to the burden of proof is a poor way to decide a case; it is the duty of the judge to examine all the evidence at the end of the case and decide whether on the facts he finds to have been proved and on the inferences he is prepared to draw he is satisfied that negligence has been established. In so far as resort is had to the burden of proof the burden remains at the end of the case as it was at the beginning upon the plaintiff to prove that his injury was caused by the negligence of the defendants.” 187 188 189 190

1995 SLT 211. 1995 SLT 211 per Lord Cullen at 214. 1941 SC 363. See also Smith v Fordyce [2013] EWCA Civ 320 (loss of control of car consistent with skid on black ice). 191 [1988] RTR 298 at 301.

Standard of Care   357

Thus in McDyer v The Celtic Football and Athletic Co Ltd192 a relevant case had been made by averments that the defender had exclusive management and control over the premises and that timber does not fall from premises operated, inspected and maintained with reasonable care. The case was therefore permitted to proceed to proof on that basis. However, it remained open for Celtic to rebut the inference of negligence at proof by showing that the happening of the accident was consistent with no lack of care on its part.193

(4) Postscript In practice, given scientific advances and greater technical capabilities in evidence-gathering, it now unusual for the facts of a case to be taken as speaking for themselves in this way. This is particularly apparent in the context of alleged medical negligence, where there is often little room left for the doctrine except in the most straightforward of cases.194 In Cassidy v Ministry of Health, decided in 1951, Lord Denning put himself in the shoes of the plaintiff and asked of the defendant: “I went into hospital to be cured of two stiff fingers. I have come out with four stiff fingers, and my hand is useless. That should not have happened if due care had been used. Explain it, if you can.”195 In modern practice, however, medical expert witnesses for both parties are likely to have produced complex and competing explanations for particular outcomes, with the result that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine falls away. As Hobhouse LJ remarked in Ratcliffe v Plymouth & Torbay Health Authority,196 the doctrine “is merely a guide to help to identify when a prima facie case is being made out. Where expert and factual evidence has been called on both sides at a trial its usefulness will normally have long since been exhausted.”

192 2000 SC 379. 193 See analysis by Lord President Rodger: 2000 SC 379 at 385–386. The defender failed to do so at the subsequent proof: see 2001 SLT 1387. 194 E.g. Mahon v Osborne [1939] 2 KB 14: where a surgical swab was left inside a patient after an operation, an inference of negligence was created without an explanation from the surgeon as to how this might be compatible with absence of fault. 195 [1951] 2 KB 343 at 365. 196 [1998] PIQR P170 at P189–P190.

10.70

Chapter 11

Professional Negligence

Para A. INTRODUCTION����������������������������������������������������������������� 11.01 B. HUNTER v HANLEY AND THE PROFESSIONAL OF “ORDINARY SKILL” (1) Hunter v Hanley������������������������������������������������������������� 11.05 (2) Cross-border difference?���������������������������������������������������� 11.07 (3) The Bolitho “gloss”������������������������������������������������������������ 11.09 (4) Application of Hunter to other professions�������������������������� 11.14 (5) The standard applicable to tradespersons��������������������������� 11.16 C. SOME SPECIFIC CATEGORIES (1) Solicitors�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.18 (2) Surveyors�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.24 (3) Architects������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.28 (4) Accountants and auditors�������������������������������������������������� 11.30 (5) Teachers��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.31 (6) The emergency services����������������������������������������������������� 11.36 (7) Charitable organisations���������������������������������������������������� 11.42 D. MEDICAL CASES: THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE RISK��������� 11.45 (1) The duty to inform 11.46 (2) Issues of causation 11.53 (3) Compensation for shock and distress 11.54 E. IMMUNITY OF SOLICITORS, ADVOCATES AND EXPERT WITNESSES?��������������������������������������������������������� 11.56

A. INTRODUCTION 11.01

Typically, those who suffer loss or damages from dealings with a professional or tradesperson have a contract with the person in question and hence the possibility of contractual remedies. However, as Lord Macmillan remarked in Donoghue v Stevenson:1 “The fact that there is a contractual relationship between the parties, which may give rise to an action for breach of contract, does not exclude the coexistence of a right of action founded on negligence as between the same   1 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 64.

358

Professional Negligence   359 parties, independently of the contract, although arising out of the relationship in fact brought about by the contract. Of this the best illustration is the right of the injured railway passenger to sue the railway company either for breach of the contract of safe carriage or for negligence in carrying him, and there is no reason why the same set of facts should not give one person a right of action in contract and another person a right of action in tort.”

The claim in Donoghue v Stevenson related to personal injury. The leading modern case confirming this principle in relation to economic loss is Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd,2 discussed in chapter 5,3 in which a group of underwriting members of the Lloyd’s of London insurance market (“Lloyds Names”) claimed that their agents had failed to exercise reasonable care and skill in managing their underwriting affairs. The House of Lords held that, alongside any contractual remedies available to them, the Names were also entitled to sue the agents for breach of their duty of care. Common instances where such concurrent liability might arise include claims by clients against professional advisers, by employees against employers, and by passengers against carriers. In allowing for concurrent liability the law of Scotland and of England differs from that of jurisdictions such as France where the principle of “non cumul des responsabilités” means that contractual and delictual remedies may not be pursued concurrently. Parties, of course, are not always in contractual relations, but even in the absence of a contract a professional adviser may owe a duty of care in relation to services provided, where there has been an assumption of responsibility analogous to a contractual relationship.4 The issues surrounding recognition of duty of care were discussed in earlier chapters. Building on chapter 10 (which covers standard of care in general), the present chapter is concerned with the appropriate standard of care expected of professionals and tradespeople. As a general rule, the elimination of personal “idiosyncrasies” levels out the standard of care required of the reasonable person, so that little concession is made to the inexperienced or inept.5 By the same token, laypersons who make no claim to professional expertise are not normally judged by professional standards, so that, for example, a passer-by who goes to the assistance of a stranger taken unwell is not judged by the standards of a qualified medical practitioner.6 In Philips v Wm Whiteley Ltd7 the plaintiff developed a serious infection after having had her ears pierced by a jeweller and attributed this to a failure to sterilise the equipment properly. In holding   2 [1995] 2 AC 145.   3 See paras 5.60–5.62.  4 Burgess v Lejonvarn [2017] EWCA Civ 254.   5 See paras 10.06–10.08 above.   6 See e.g. Ali v Furness Withy (Shipping) Ltd [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 379.   7 [1938] 1 All ER 566.

11.02

360   The Law of Delict in Scotland

that no negligence had been proved on the part of the jeweller, Goddard J reasoned that:8 “If a person wants to ensure that the operation of piercing her ears is going to be carried out with that proportion of skill and so forth that a Fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons would use, she must go to a surgeon. If she goes to a jeweller, she must expect that he will carry it out in the way that one would expect a jeweller to carry it out.”

11.03

11.04

On the other hand, those providing a service in the course of a profession or trade are not assessed by the standard applicable to the general public. Whether or not a contract is at the root of the relationship between the parties,9 a defender who has held himself or herself out as a member of a particular profession is expected to demonstrate the ordinary level of skill or competence associated with the discharge of that profession.10 The benchmark for standard of care is therefore set by reference to the level of “ordinary skill”11 observed in the profession in question, a standard that must normally be fixed by reference to suitably qualified expert evidence.12 Furthermore, a professional person may be bound to perform to a higher standard where there is an express undertaking to that effect.13 As explained in chapter 10,14 a rule that allowances should not be made for novices extends to also professional persons, so that newly qualified hospital doctors, for example, are not entitled to argue for a lesser standard of care in treating patients; they must attain the ordinary levels of skill required of experienced doctors occupying an equivalent position.

B. HUNTER v HANLEY AND THE PROFESSIONAL OF “ORDINARY SKILL” (1) Hunter v Hanley 11.05

In setting the boundaries of professional liability much of the nineteenthcentury case law referred to the concept of “gross negligence”,15 so that a   8 [1938] 1 All ER 566 at 569.   9 See Bell, Principles §§ 153–154; see also Dickson v Hygienic Institute 1910 SC 352. 10 For detailed analysis of the authorities, see K Norrie, “Professional Negligence”, in Delict (SULI) paras 19.20–19.49. 11 Hunter v Hanley 1955 SC 200. 12 See e.g. Hughes v Turning Point Scotland [2019] CSOH 42, 2019 SLT 651 per Lord Clark at para 102: “where the court is not dealing with something commonly experienced in ordinary life (such as driving), appropriate skilled evidence is necessary to allow the court to decide on questions of standard of care”. 13 See e.g. The Mortgage Corporation v Mitchells Roberton 1997 SLT 1305; see also R Rennie, “Solicitors’ Negligence: the Specialist and Best Practice” 2006 SLT (News) 225. 14 Paragraphs 10.48–10.50. 15 Purves v Landell (1845) 4 Bell’s App 46; see also Cooke v Falconer’s Representatives (1850) 13 D 157 (looking for “crassa ignorantia” on the part of a law agent); McLean v Grant (1805) Mor App

Professional Negligence   361

pursuer required to aver and prove “a case of gross ignorance, gross want of professional knowledge, or gross carelessness”,16 typically evidenced by failure to follow a “well-defined course of practice”.17 Hunter v Hanley,18 however, the leading Scottish case of the twentieth century, signalled a departure from gross negligence as the main organising concept. The pursuer argued that her doctor had been negligent in injecting her using a hypodermic needle of insufficient strength, so that the needle broke, causing her injury. The Lord Ordinary, Lord Patrick, directed the jury to the effect that liability required “gross negligence”, meaning a “serious departure from a normal practice” that involved “a substantial and serious fault”.19 On appeal, the First Division held that this was not the correct test for breach of duty and remitted the case for a new trial. The Lord President, Lord Clyde, acknowledged the relevance of the notion of “gross negligence”, but defined this in more qualified terms: it was breached by “so marked a departure from the normal standard of conduct of a professional man as to infer a lack of that ordinary care which a man of ordinary skill would display”.20 The other members of the court were less convinced that the term “gross negligence” continued to have useful significance, doubting that there might be differing shades of negligence. Nonetheless they described the threshold in comparable terms as “the absence of reasonable care in the circumstances or ordinary culpa”.21 In ascertaining whether that “ordinary” standard had been breached, a court might be addressed on standard practice in the profession, but deviation from ordinary professional practice was not a conclusive indicator of negligence. As Lord Clyde explained:22 “Even a substantial deviation from normal practice may be warranted by the particular circumstances. To establish liability by a doctor where deviation from normal practice is alleged, three facts require to be established. First of all it must be proved that there is a usual and normal practice; secondly it must be proved that the defender has not adopted that practice; and thirdly (and this is of crucial importance) it must be established that the course the doctor adopted is one which no professional man of ordinary skill would have taken if he had been acting with ordinary care. There is clearly a heavy onus on a pursuer to establish these three facts, and without

16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Reparation No 2 (on “the general doctrine of the responsibility of a man of business arising from gross ignorance or wilful negligence”); Shaw v M’Donell (1786) Mor 9185 (on alleged gross negligence in the compilation of a Gaelic dictionary). Farquhar v Murray (1901) 3 F 859 per Lord Young at 862. Hay v Bailie (1868) 7 M 32. 1955 SC 200. 1954 SLT 303 at 305. Hunter v Hanley 1955 SC 200 per Lord President Clyde at 206. For a critique of Hunter, see K Norrie, “Professional Negligence”, in Delict (SULI) paras 19.28–19.35. Hunter v Hanley 1955 SC 200 per Lord Russell at 207; see also Lord Sorn at 208. Hunter v Hanley 1955 SC 200 at 206.

362   The Law of Delict in Scotland all three his case will fail. If this is the test, then it matters nothing how far or how little he deviates from the ordinary practice. For the extent of deviation is not the test. The deviation must be of a kind which satisfies the third of the requirements just stated.”

11.06

Accordingly, while “gross” ignorance or carelessness no longer needs to be shown, the requirement to prove Lord Clyde’s third “fact” ensures that the test for breach of duty remains difficult to meet because, even if standard practice has not been followed, the pursuer must also establish that no “ordinary” professional would have done the same as the defender. This goes further than merely seeking out “errors of clinical judgment”.23 Whether or not such an error constitutes a breach of duty can be determined only by reference to whether it was incompatible with the actions of a professional of ordinary skill acting with ordinary care. From the point of view of professionals, this is not an especially rigorous standard as it is tied only to “ordinary”, not to “best” practice. It follows that evidence of the defender’s adherence to professional guidelines generally constitutes a “major obstacle” to a finding that the relevant standard of care has not been met, although it is not always an insuperable one.24 Failure to follow professional guidelines, on the other hand, is likely to indicate that the necessary standard has not been met, although it need not do so invariably, in particular where the defender can offer an explanation why an alternative course of action was preferable.25 However, such guidelines require explication by expert witnesses,26 as does reference to standard professional textbooks.27

(2) Cross-border difference? 11.07

A short time after Hunter v Hanley,28 a similar case came before the Court of Appeal in England. In Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee29 the plaintiff argued that his doctor had been negligent in failing to put in place protective measures to guard against the risk of bone fracture during electro-convulsive therapy. Hunter was cited to the court, and there was

23 Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246. 24 Zarb v Odetoyinbo [2006] EWHC 2880 (QB), (2007) 93 BMLR 166 per Tugendhat J at para 110; see also Coyle v Lanarkshire Health Board [2013] CSOH 167, 2013 GWD 37–722. Such guidelines are not conclusive in the rare case that the court deems them incapable of withstanding logical analysis (see paras 11.09–11.13 below). See also discussion in R Heywood, “Litigating Labour: Condoning Unreasonable Risk-taking in Childbirth?” (2015) 44 Common Law World Review 28 at 41–43. 25 KR v Lanarkshire Health Board [2016] CSOH 133, 2016 GWD 31–556. 26 Kelly v Sir Frank Mears & Partners 1983 SC 97. 27 Gerrard v Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh NHS Trust [2005] CSIH 10, 2005 1 SC 192. 28 1955 SC 200. 29 [1957] 1 WLR 582.

Professional Negligence   363

no suggestion that its reasoning did not accord with English law also, but McNair J “preferred” to express the test for standard of care differently: a doctor was not guilty of negligence “if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art. I do not think there is much difference in sense. It is just a different way of expressing the same thought”.30 Over the years there has been debate in the academic press as to the significance of this difference between the Scottish and English wordings: Hunter refers to the course of conduct followed by a “professional man of ordinary skill”, whereas Bolam focuses upon a practice accepted by “a responsible body of medical opinion”. Some have questioned the use of “ordinary” in Hunter, pointing out that “‘ordinary’ may well be less than ‘reasonable’, though one hopes it is not”.31 On a literal reading, the Scottish test may be seen as setting a less exacting standard for doctors, who are likely to be exculpated if a medical expert witness can be found to testify that some “ordinary” doctors would do the same. By contrast the English reference to “a responsible body of medical opinion” underpins an enquiry that is essentially normative (ascertaining the level of skill that the responsible professional ought to have applied to reduce the risk of injury).32 Other commentators, however, have pointed out that the Scottish case law prior to Hunter had often used “ordinary” and “reasonable” “interchangeably”,33 and the equiparation of “ordinary” with “reasonable” has traditionally left scope for procedures to be found negligent even if shown to be in current practice.34 While in the Scottish courts Hunter has remained the primary source of the test for professional negligence, there has been little judicial enthusiasm for distinguishing Bolam, and in practical terms this difference in wording does not appear to have resulted in a difference of outcomes in the case law.35 Moreover, the possibility that the Hunter wording might allow an ordinary but unreasonable doctor to be exculpated has in effect been

30 [1957] 1 WLR 582 at 587. For other cases citing Hunter but without setting store by cross-border difference, see Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1984] 1 WLR 634; Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871. 31 D M Walker, Case note, (1955) 67 JR 220 at 221. 32 See e.g. R B M Howie, “The Standard of Care in Medical Negligence” 1983 JR 193 at 201, citing J L Montrose, “Is Negligence an Ethical or a Sociological Concept?”(1958) 21 MLR 259 at 259: “The question of negligence is one of what ought to be done in the circumstances, not what is done in similar circumstances by most people or even by all people.” 33 K Norrie, “Professional Negligence”, in Delict (SULI) para 19.33. 34 M Earle and N R Whitty, “Medical Law”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2006) para 172. 35 See e.g. Honisz v Lothian Health Board [2006] CSOH 24, 2008 SC 235; ICL Tech Ltd v Johnston Oils Ltd [2012] CSOH 62, 2012 SLT 667; Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63 per Lord Kerr and Lord Reed at para 26, referring to “the test in Hunter v Hanley . . . or the equivalent Bolam test”. See also J W G Blackie, “Medical Negligence in Scotland” (1996) 3 European Journal of Health Law 127 at 137; Earle and Whitty, “Medical Law” para 172.

11.08

364   The Law of Delict in Scotland

closed off by the acceptance in Scotland of the reasoning in the English case of Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority.36

(3) The Bolitho “gloss” 11.09

11.10

The decision in Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority37 provided a further “gloss”38 on how medical evidence should be evaluated, in particular where no clear consensus emerges from the expert opinions put before the court. The facts of Bolitho were that a two-year-old child had been admitted to hospital suffering from respiratory problems. In the course of a short space of time the child suffered three separate episodes of breathing difficulties, the third of such severity that it triggered a cardiac arrest, causing the child to sustain severe brain damage. The doctor in charge was summoned on each occasion but did not attend until the third episode. If she had attended earlier and arranged for prophylactic intubation, the child would probably have been saved from disability. The defendants conceded that the failure to attend was negligent, but the court accepted the doctor’s evidence that, even if she had done so, she would not have arranged for the child to be intubated, and therefore her negligent nonattendance had not caused the injury. A key question therefore, ultimately answered in the negative, was whether a decision not to intubate would have been a breach of duty.39 The difficulty was that opinion on this matter was divided as between the large number of medical witnesses called to give evidence, and the court required to consider how this diversity of views should be factored into its determination. The reasoning in Bolitho accepts that it is not for the court to arbitrate between medical witnesses so as to endorse one opinion over another.40 As general rule, where evidence is led that a responsible body of professional opinion would have supported the practice followed by the defendant, then it is open to the court to find that duty has not been breached, even if other suitably-qualified professionals would have taken a different view.41

36 [1998] AC 232, cited e.g. in Gerrard v Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh NHS Trust [2005] CSIH 10, 2005 1 SC 192; MacLeod’s Legal Representatives v Highland Health Board [2016] CSIH 25, 2016 SC 647; Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63. 37 [1998] AC 232. 38 R Mulheron, “Trumping Bolam: A Critical Legal Analysis of Bolitho’s Gloss” (2010) 69 CLJ 609. 39 If failure to attend and failure to intubate both constituted a breach of duty, then the injury was likely to be caused by the doctor’s negligence, and liability could be established. If, on the other hand, the only breach of duty was the doctor’s failure to attend, but the doctor would not in any event have intubated (and that failure to intubate was justified), the child’s injury could not be said to have been caused by the doctor’s negligence. 40 Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1984] 1 WLR 634 per Lord Scarman at 639; Gerrard v Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh NHS Trust [2005] CSIH 10, 2005 1 SC 192; Honisz v Lothian Health Board [2006] CSOH 24, 2008 SC 235 per Lord Hodge at para 39. 41 See e.g. Hannigan v Lanarkshire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust [2012] CSOH 152, 2013 SCLR 179.

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In Bolitho itself, three out of eight “responsible” expert witnesses stated that the doctor’s failure to intubate was defensible, taking into consideration the problems of performing such a procedure on a very young child. That, thought the court, was sufficient to indicate that the doctor had met the Bolam test for standard of care, even though the other five witnesses would have intubated. However, Lord Browne-Wilkinson also stated in Bolitho that the court is not bound to find that a doctor was not negligent “just because he leads evidence from a number of medical experts who are genuinely of opinion that the defendant’s treatment or diagnosis accorded with sound medical practice.”42 Rather, the court may, exceptionally, conclude that a practice sanctioned by a responsible body of professional expert opinion does not stand up to rational analysis and therefore, notwithstanding that opinion, that it did indeed constitute a breach of duty.43 The significance of Bolitho was summarised by Lord Hodge in the Scottish case of Honisz v Lothian Health Board as follows:44 “First, as a general rule, where there are two opposing schools of thought among the relevant group of responsible medical practitioners as to the appropriateness of a particular practice, it is not the function of the court to prefer one school over the other. . . . Secondly, however, the court does not defer to the opinion of the relevant professionals to the extent that, if a defender leads evidence that other responsible professionals among the relevant group of medical practitioners would have done what the impugned medical practitioner did, the judge must in all cases conclude that there has been no negligence. This is because, thirdly, in exceptional cases the court may conclude that a practice which responsible medical practitioners have perpetuated does not stand up to rational analysis. . . . Where the judge is satisfied that the body of professional opinion, on which a defender relies, is not reasonable or responsible he may find the medical practitioner guilty of negligence, despite that body of opinion sanctioning his conduct. This will rarely occur as the assessment and balancing of risks and benefits are matters of clinical judgment. Thus it will normally require compelling expert evidence to demonstrate that an opinion by another medical expert is one which that other expert could not have held if he had taken care to analyse the basis of the practice. Where experts have applied their minds to the comparative risks and benefits of a course of action and have reached a defensible conclusion, the court will have no basis for rejecting their view and concluding that the pursuer has proved negligence in terms of the Hunter v Hanley test. . . . As Lord Browne-Wilkinson said in Bolitho (p 243D–E), ‘it is only where the judge can be satisfied that the body of expert opinion cannot logically be supported at all that such opinion will not provide the benchmark by which the defendant’s conduct falls to be assessed’.” 42 [1998] AC 232 at 241. 43 [1998] AC 232 at 243. 44 [2006] CSOH 24, 2008 SC 235 at para 39.

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In short, the effect of Bolitho is that, while the medical profession retains the “trump card”45 placed in its hand by Hunter and Bolam, it can on occasion be outplayed by the court in determining whether a professional standard of care has been met.46 Unsurprisingly, however, it is highly unusual,47 for the court to be satisfied that a body of professional opinion, typically provided by eminent experts, can be discounted as not “logically supported at all”.48 Rare examples might include where the difference of opinion related to the facts rather than professional standards,49 where expert opinion had overlooked a “simple precaution” that would have prevented injury,50 where a difficult decision required to be made about relative risks and benefits or about allocation of resources and conflicting duties to other patients,51 or possibly even where medical opinion has lagged behind established public opinion as to best practice.52 A practical example, cited in Bolitho, can be seen in the non-medical sphere. In Edward Wong Finance Co Ltd v Johnson Stokes & Master,53 a Privy Council decision, the plaintiffs had granted a loan to a company, secured by a mortgage, to acquire property in Hong Kong and instructed the defendants, a firm of solicitors, to attend to the conveyancing. The completion of the transaction was conducted “Hong Kong style”, meaning that the loan monies were paid over to the borrowers against an undertaking from the borrowers’ solicitors that the duly executed security documentation would be delivered at a later date. Unhappily on this occasion the borrowers’ solicitor made use of this opportunity to abscond with the loan money without providing the

45 G T Laurie et al (eds), Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, 11th edn (2019) para 5.42. 46 For a detailed survey, see R Mulheron, “Trumping Bolam: A Critical Legal Analysis of Bolitho’s Gloss” (2010) 69 CLJ 609 at 620–637; R Heywood, “Litigating Labour: Condoning Unreasonable Risk-taking in Childbirth?” (2015) 44 Common Law World Review 28; G T Laurie et al (eds), Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, 11th edn (2019) paras 5.42–5.51; A MacLean, “Beyond Bolam and Bolitho” (2002) 5 Medical Law International 205. 47 The earlier examples cited in Bolitho were Hucks v Cole [1993] 4 Med LR 393, and Edward Wong Finance Co Ltd v Johnson Stokes & Master [1984] AC 296. 48 Wisniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR P324 per Brooke LJ at P336; see discussion in Gerrard v Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh NHS Trust [2005] CSIH 10, 2005 1 SC 192 at paras 86–87; see also McCulloch v Forth Valley Health Board [2021] CSIH 21, in which the Second Division overturned the Lord Ordinary’s decision that the actions of the doctor, although supported by expert evidence, had not met the Bolitho test (causation was not in any event established). 49 E.g. Penney v East Kent Health Authority [2000] Lloyd’s Rep Med 41, (2000) 55 BMLR 63; see also Manning v King’s College Hospital NHS Trust [2008] EWHC 1838 (QB), affd [2009] EWCA Civ 832, (2009) 110 BMLR 175. 50 As in Hucks v Cole [1993] 4 Med LR 393. 51 See e.g. Garcia v St Mary’s NHS Trust [2006] EWHC 2314 (QB), [2011] Med LR 348, ultimately decided in favour of the defendant, but in which one of the considerations was whether it was legitimate in view of budgetary and staffing constraints not to maintain a specialist doctor on-site at a particular hospital. 52 A v Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust [2004] EWHC 644 (QB), [2005] QB 506; Stevens v Yorkhill NHS Trust [2006] CSOH 143, 2006 SLT 889. 53 [1984] AC 296.

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mortgage documents. Although the practice followed by the defendants was in universal use and in accordance with professional opinion in Hong Kong at the time, the Privy Council held it to have been negligent, in that it created an obvious risk which was “foreseeable, and readily avoidable”.54 In summary, therefore, Bolitho did not displace Hunter in Scotland (or Bolam in England) as providing the base line for determining professional standard of care. As before, this looks to the practices followed by a professional “of ordinary skill”. Evidence as to those practices is provided primarily by expert professional opinion, which in most cases is accorded the highest respect. The court has the final say, however, and will not allow professional opinion to determine whether or not the appropriate standard of care has been breached if the “ordinary” practice which it endorses cannot be shown to be “responsible, reasonable and respectable”.55

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(4) Application of Hunter to other professions In looking to the practices followed by a professional “of ordinary skill”, Hunter v Hanley56 set out the fundamental principles by which standard of care is judged, not only on the part of doctors, as in Hunter itself,57 but also of medical professionals generally. The conduct of nurses,58 midwives,59 radiographers,60 dentists,61 and practitioners of alternative medicine,62 is to be assessed by reference to members of their particular profession of ordinary skill, acting with ordinary care. The authorities cited in Hunter were, however, wide-ranging, and Hunter has become established as the primary point of reference for determining the standard of care required of other professionals, such as surveyors, accountants, teachers, solicitors, and so on.63 Where it is alleged, 54 [1984] AC 296 per Lord Brightman at 308. 55 Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 241–242. 56 1955 SC 200. 57 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63. 58 Murray v Lothian Health Board 2011 GWD 35–732; see also Lavelle v Glasgow Royal Infirmary 1931 SC (HL) 34. 59 Campbell v Borders Health Board [2011] CSOH 73, 2011 GWD 22–505, affd [2012] CSIH 49, 2012 GWD 23–468; Coyle v Lanarkshire Health Board [2013] CSOH 167, 2013 GWD 37–722, affd [2014] CSIH 7, 2015 SC 172. See also C v North Cumbria University Hospitals NHS Trust [2014] EWHC 61 (QB), [2014] Med LR 189. 60 E.g. Bell v Alliance Medical Ltd [2015] CSOH 34, 2015 SCLR 676. 61 E.g. Lamb v Wray 2014 SLT (Sh Ct) 2; see also Parry v Day [1996] 7 Med LR 396. 62 See Shakoor v Situ [2001] 1 WLR 410: the conduct of a qualified practitioner of Chinese herbal medicine was to be judged by the standard of the ordinary practitioner skilled in that particular art, although if he provided a substance for human consumption he required also to check the literature of orthodox medicine for any notices or warnings that might have appeared regarding that substance. 63 See e.g. Dunvale Investments Ltd v Burness Paull & Williamsons LLP [2015] CSOH 32, 2015 SCLR 567 (solicitors); Wagner Associates v Joseph Dunn (Bottlers) Ltd 1986 SLT 267 (recognition of Hunter v Hanley in relation to architects, although case decided on other grounds).

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for example, that auctioneers and valuers have breached their professional duty to their clients by failing properly to advise on the identity and value of artworks put up for sale, the starting point is Lord President Clyde’s judgment in Hunter v Hanley,64 and the relevant standard of care is that of the auctioneers or valuers of ordinary skill, taking into account the particular expertise claimed by them and the particular market in which they operate.65

(5) The standard applicable to tradespersons 11.16

The Scottish courts have, however, rejected the notion that the Hunter v Hanley test for professional standard of care can be copied across to fit all trades and specialisms. In Morrisons Associated Companies Ltd v James Rome & Sons Ltd,66 the Lord Ordinary, Lord Cameron, discounted as “startling” the proposition that the work of a firm of builders was to be judged in the same as that of a doctor. Instead of applying the Hunter v Hanley test, he started from the standpoint that: “A builder or any other skilled tradesman is only required to possess a reasonable degree of competence and to display it in his work. As in every trade or profession, not every member of it possesses or is expected to possess the same level of skill or competence. There must be a certain standard of competence, however, and a certain standard of care displayed in its exercise. What is the measure of the standard in each case must be judged against the practice ruling in the particular trade at the particular time.

The distinction between professions and trades in this respect was upheld more recently by Lord Hodge, in commenting upon the standard of care required of a supplier of propane gas in ICL Tech Ltd v Johnston Oils Ltd.67 Lord Hodge took the view that “The possession of specialist knowledge by a defender is not of itself sufficient to require a pursuer to plead that the defender had acted in a way that no person of reasonable skill in his profession or industry exercising ordinary care would have acted in the circumstances”.68 Instead, the defender’s conduct was to be judged by the standard of the “reasonably competent supplier” of such gas, under the caveat that it was “ultimately for the court to determine what the duty

64 Luxmoore-May v Messenger May Baverstock [1990] 1 WLR 1009; Thwaytes v Sotheby’s [2015] EWHC 36 (Ch), [2016] 1 WLR 2143. 65 Thomson v Christie, Manson and Woods [2005] EWCA Civ 555, [2005] PNLR 38. See also Lord Coleridge v Sotheby’s [2012] EWHC 370 (Ch). 66 1962 SLT (Notes) 75 (revd 1964 SC 160, but not on this point). 67 [2012] CSOH 62, 2012 SLT 667. 68 [2012] CSOH 62, 2012 SLT 667 at para 16.

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of reasonable care required of such a supplier”.69 Similarly, while others attending to patients are held to professional standards, the standard applicable to a hospital receptionist working in an Accident and Emergency Department is as follows:70 “A receptionist in an A & E department cannot, of course, be expected to give medical advice or information but he or she can be expected to take reasonable care not to provide misleading advice as to the availability of medical assistance. The standard required is that of an averagely competent and well-informed person performing the function of a receptionist at a department providing emergency medical care.”

The scope of the descriptor “professional” is of course imprecise,71 particularly as traditional trades become more specialised and closely regulated. In practical terms, however, there may not be a great deal to separate the standard imputed to: (i) the professional of ordinary skill acting with ordinary care (Hunter), subject to the court’s view as to whether a professional appraisal of disputed conduct withstands logical analysis (Bolitho); and (ii) the reasonably competent tradesperson, subject to the court having the final say in determining what the duty of reasonable care required of such a tradesperson amounts to (ICL Tech).

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C. SOME SPECIFIC CATEGORIES (1) Solicitors Chapter 5 explained some of the circumstances in which solicitors might owe a duty of care not only to their clients, but also to third parties who suffer loss as a result of solicitors’ negligent handling of their clients’ affairs.72 As a general rule, the standard of care expected of solicitors is determined, by analogy with Hunter v Hanley,73 under reference to the conduct expected of the ordinary solicitor acting with ordinary skill.74 Negligence on the part 69 [2012] CSOH 62, 2012 SLT 667 at para 12. 70 Darnley v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust [2018] UKSC 50, [2019] AC 831 per Lord LloydJones at para 25. 71 See J L Powell et al (eds), Jackson and Powell on Professional Liability, 8th edn (2016) para 1003, suggesting that the indicators of a profession are: (1) skilled and specialised work; (2) a “moral” commitment on the part of practitioners; (3) regulation by a collective organisation; and (4) “high status”. 72 See paras 5.65–5.78 above. See also, on the liability of a solicitor to his former partners, Ross Harper & Murphy v Banks 2000 SC 500. 73 1955 SC 200; see paras 11.05 and 11.06 above. 74 See e.g. Keith v Davidson Chalmers 2004 SC 287; Dunvale Investments Ltd v Burness Paull & Williamsons LLP [2015] CSOH 32, 2015 SCLR 567; Soofi v Dykes [2019] CSOH 59, 2019 GWD 27–442, affd [2020] CSIH 10, 2020 GWD 10–152. See also R Rennie, Opinions on Professional Negligence in Conveyancing (2004) referring to Hunter v Hanley 1955 SC 200 as the starting point for discussion of standard of care in numerous opinions; W Flenley and T Leech, The Law of Solicitors’ Liabilities, 4th edn (2020) ch 2, taking Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 as its starting point.

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of solicitors can, of course, take many forms, and the Hunter v Hanley test is in some contexts more challenging for the pursuer than others. Expert evidence is almost invariably called for to provide a foundation for allegations of professional negligence, even in circumstances where the pursuer alleges the misconduct to have been “blatant”.75 As an exception, however, it has been accepted that if the pursuer’s complaint is failure to meet procedural deadlines, then the Hunter v Hanley test need not be applied, since no question of nuanced professional judgment arises. In Prentice v Sandeman,76 Lord Stewart was prepared to treat a “bald averment of professional negligence” as satisfying the requirement of relevancy in such circumstances, stating that “a lawyer who professes competence to act in [the proceedings in question] should be capable of meeting procedural deadlines”. In order to establish that the defender’s conduct falls short of that of an ordinarily competent solicitor, the pursuer must first make clear the exact nature and scope of the task that the solicitor was instructed to carry out. The standard of care does not vary according to the fee charged or whether that fee was in the event remunerative,77 but, in an increasingly specialised profession, it may be tailored to the rank and specialism claimed by the defender. In Commodities Research Unit International (Holdings) Ltd v King & Wood Mallesons LLP,78 for example, the claimants argued that the defendant had given negligent advice in connection with the termination of the employment of a chief executive officer. Although breach of duty was only partly made out, it was common ground between the parties that the relevant standard of skill and care was “that of the specialist employment lawyer willing to undertake work in relation to the matters which may arise when a corporate client is considering bringing . . . to an end the employment of a chief executive”.79 Negligence may involve misinforming the client on a point of law, and in this regard solicitors are required to keep up to date with developments in the law, including case law, statute, and standard practice in the profession. They are expected to keep abreast of the changing scope of expertise regarded as within “ordinary” competence.80 But it seems that “ordinary” solicitors are not infallible in this regard, so that the Hunter v Hanley standard may still be met even where they have got the law wrong.81 Where the 75 Tods Murray WS v Arakin Ltd [2010] CSOH 90, 2011 SCLR 37 per Lord Woolman at paras 90–93. 76 [2011] CSOH 169, 2012 SCLR 451 at para 34. See also Anderson v Torrie (1857) 19 D 356. 77 Inventors Friend Ltd v Leathes Prior [2011] EWHC 711 (QB), [2011] PNLR 20; and see also Currie v Colquhoun (1823) 2 S 407. 78 [2016] EWHC 727 (QB), [2016] PNLR 29. 79 [2016] EWHC 727 (QB), [2016] PNLR 29 per Dingemans J at para 14. 80 G L Gretton and K G C Reid, Conveyancing, 5th edn (2018) para 1–21. 81 See also Godefroy v Dalton (1830) 6 Bingham 460 per Tindal CJ at 468, indicating tolerance of “error in judgment upon points of new occurrence, or of nice or doubtful construction”.

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point is a straightforward or routine one, for example on the start point of the period for prescription or limitation, then a solicitor is plainly negligent in giving incorrect advice.82 Proving negligence may be more challenging, however, where the point is more contentious.83 In Barker v BaxendaleWalker,84 for example, the defendants advised the claimants to enter into a complex tax-avoidance scheme that was successfully challenged by HMRC. It was accepted that a reasonably competent solicitor with the defendants’ expertise might well have advised as the defendants did, and there was no negligence simply because other reasonably competent lawyers of equivalent expertise would have taken a different view. However, even although the defendants had not been negligent in recommending the scheme, the statutory interpretation on which it was based was sufficiently ambiguous that a reasonably competent solicitor would have warned of the “significant risk” that it might not be tax-effective, and the defendants were therefore found to have been negligent on that ground. In the conveyancing context,85 there is a heavy onus on the solicitor to ensure that the missives are drafted according to the clients’ instructions, the disposition duly conveys the precise subjects that the clients believed themselves to be buying,86 a good and marketable title is obtained,87 relevant ancillary documentation such as local authority consents is inspected,88 the requisite deeds are competently executed and recorded,89 and prior encumbrances have been discharged.90 Failure in respect of any of these matters is likely to constitute negligence, since the solicitor of ordinary competence91 is expected to manage such standard tasks without mishap.92 In the case of solicitors acting for lenders in standard securities, the basic standard of care to be met is that all necessary steps should be taken to ensure, from a legal point of view, that the security subjects present adequate security, and that a valid right in security is created. Their assurance on practical issues relevant to valuation, such as adequate rights of 82 See e.g. Cooper v Smith Llewellyn Partnership [1999] PNLR 576. 83 See e.g. Woodhouse v Wright, Johnston & Mackenzie 2004 SLT 911. 84 [2017] EWCA Civ 2056, [2018] 1 WLR 1905. A Scottish tax-avoidance scheme advised on by the defendants and structured on similar principles was likewise the subject of a successful challenge by HMRC: see Advocate General for Scotland v Murray Group Holdings Ltd [2017] UKSC 45, 2018 SC (UKSC) 15. 85 See R Rennie, Opinions on Professional Negligence in Conveyancing (2004). On breach of contractual obligations, see e.g. Haberstich v McCormick and Nicholson 1975 SC 1 (breach of contract constituted by failure to ensure that a good and marketable title was obtained). 86 Henderson v Wotherspoon [2013] CSOH 113, [2013] PNLR 28; and see Hondon Development Ltd v Powerise Investments Ltd [2005] HKCA 29, [2006] PNLR 1. 87 See e.g. Di Ciacca v Archibald Sharp & Sons 1995 SLT 380. 88 See e.g. Paterson v Sturrock & Armstrong 1993 GWD 27–1706. 89 Currie v Colquhoun (1823) 2 S 407. 90 Edward Wong Finance Co Ltd v Johnson Stokes & Master [1984] AC 296. 91 As invoked e.g. in Bristol & West Building Society v Aitken Nairn, WS 1999 SC 678. 92 For detailed analysis, see R Rennie, Solicitors’ Negligence (1997) ch 6.

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access and the provision of a relevant architect’s certificate, may be “critical” to the transaction proceeding, and an ordinarily competent solicitor would not normally provide incomplete or misleading advice on such matters.93 This standard is breached not only by failure to comply with the specific terms of the lender’s letter of instruction, but also in failing to take instruction on further matters that the solicitor “ought to have” identified as being of importance to the lender.94 Where the same solicitor acts for both borrower and lender, typically in regard to a standard security over domestic property, solicitors are said to take on the role of “policing the transaction”. This extends to checking the integrity of the borrowers as well as the value of the security subjects,95 although discretion may be needed in disclosure of information about the borrower, so that the lender’s interests are protected without infringement of the borrower’s confidentiality. This type of case turns largely upon its facts, and upon expert evidence as to “proper practice”, rather than upon levels of skill and knowledge.96 In the event that a solicitor acts for clients within the same family in regard to a single transaction, the concept of “informed consent” underpins the solicitor’s responsibilities, so that the solicitor must explain fully to both sides their respective positions and the risks that they may run in not seeking separate advice.97 In Clark Boyce v Mouat,98 in which the same solicitor acted for both a mother remortgaging her home and her son whose debts she was guaranteeing, this concept was explained by Lord Jauncey as follows:99 “Informed consent means consent given in the knowledge that there is a conflict between the parties and that as a result the solicitor may be disabled from disclosing to each party the full knowledge which he possesses as to the transaction or may be disabled from giving advice to one party which conflicts with the interests of the other. If the parties are content to proceed upon this basis the solicitor may properly act.”

93 Preferred Mortgages Ltd v Shanks [2008] CSOH 23, [2008] PNLR 20; see also Bristol & West Building Society v Rollo, Steven & Bond 1998 SLT 9, in which the defenders omitted to disclose to the lender that there was a sitting tenant in the security subjects. 94 Bristol & West Building Society v Aitken Nairn, WS 1999 SC 678. A relevant case was made out where solicitors acting for both borrower and lender were instructed simply to take security over a “feudal castle” and accordingly drafted a standard security over the dominium utile of the castle. It was arguable that the solicitors had been negligent in failing to advise the lender that the barony title had become separated from the dominium utile, which was therefore less valuable than it would have been while still held with the barony title. 95 Bristol & West Building Society v Rollo, Steven & Bond 1998 SLT 9 per Lord Maclean at 12; see also Newcastle Building Society v Paterson Robertson and Graham 2001 SC 734 per Lord Reed at para 12; Mortgage Express Ltd v Bowerman & Partners [1996] 2 All ER 836. 96 See e.g. Leeds and Holbeck Building Society v Alex Morison [2001] PNLR 13. 97 See R Rennie, Opinions on Professional Negligence in Conveyancing (2004), Opinions 6 and 8. 98 [1994] 1 AC 428. 99 Clark Boyce v Mouat [1994] 1 AC 428 per Lord Jauncey at 435.

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(2) Surveyors As well as a duty of care to their clients in the provision of professional services such as inspection and valuation of property, preparation of plans, project management, and advice and representation in negotiations and arbitrations,100 surveyors may also have a duty to third parties.101 Often the harm occasioned by the negligent provision of services is economic, in the form of liability for repairs or other expenditure, or loss of profits.102 As discussed in Realstone Ltd v J & E Shepherd,103 duty towards third parties is likely to rest upon demonstrating a relationship of sufficient proximity, often, but not exclusively, as evidenced by assumption of responsibility and reliance.104 The content of duty is framed by reference to surveyors’ contractual obligations, in relation to in doing “the work they were employed to do” and “within the proper scope of their professional activities”.105 Where, for instance, the alleged negligence has been constituted by failure to identify a defect in inspecting a property, the pursuer must first address the question whether that defect was one which fell within the scope of the type of survey which the defender was instructed to carry out.106 As discussed in chapter 5,107 a common instance of surveyors’ duty in relation to third parties arises in the context of the purchase of domestic property. The practice in Scotland used to be that, where the purchaser of a house was also granting a standard security, a valuation survey was commissioned by the lender, but the surveyor was “well aware” that the purchaser also relied upon this document, and a duty of care therefore arose to both the lender108 and the borrower/purchaser.109 This scenario is unlikely now to arise in Scotland, with the introduction of a statutory obligation upon the seller of residential property to commission and provide a “home report” prior to sale.110 Nonetheless, the surveyor remains liable, now on the basis of statute, if the purchaser suffers material loss as a result of relying upon a home report that has been prepared without “reasonable skill

100 See e.g. Bothwell v D M Hall [2009] CSOH 24, 2009 GWD 10–165. 101 Realstone Ltd v J & E Shepherd [2008] CSOH 31, [2008] PNLR 21. 102 Although for an example of personal injury see Harrison v Technical Sign Co Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1569, [2014] PNLR 15. 103 Realstone Ltd v J & E Shepherd [2008] CSOH 31, [2008] PNLR 21; see also para 5.84 above. 104 [2008] CSOH 31, [2008] PNLR 21 per Lord Hodge at paras 23–24; see also STV Central Ltd v Semple Fraser LLP [2015] CSIH 35, 2015 SLT 313. 105 Stewart v H A Brechin & Co 1959 SC 306 per Lord Cameron at 307; see e.g. STV Central Ltd v Semple Fraser LLP [2015] CSIH 35, 2015 SLT 313. 106 Stewart v H A Brechin & Co 1959 SC 306; see also Phimister v D M Hall LLP [2012] CSOH 169, 2013 SLT 261. 107 See para 5.36 above. 108 See e.g. Bristol & West Building Society v Davidson & Robertson 1990 SLT 456. 109 Martin v Bell-Ingram 1986 SC 208; see also Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831. 110 Housing (Scotland) Act 2006 ss 98–99.

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and care”.111 The position is different where the loan is secured over commercial subjects, in which case it is expected that both lender and borrower should be independently advised.112 Moreover, as noted in chapter 5,113 in a situation where the pursuer and the surveyor are connected indirectly by a chain of contracts, but there is no direct contractual relationship between them, the Scottish courts have expressed a “concern that the general law should not impose duties which would cut across the detailed contractual provisions which parties in a contractual chain have put in place to govern their liability inter se” and with it “the risk of introducing uncertainty into complex commercial transactions”.114 The test for breach of duty requires the pursuer to demonstrate that, in providing a professional service, the surveyor was “guilty of such failure as no chartered surveyor of ordinary skill would have been guilty of if acting with ordinary care”.115 If the complaint against the surveyor was an allegedly inaccurate valuation, there may be particular problems in identifying breach of duty. Valuation is acknowledged to be an “art, not a science”,116 so that it must be shown not only that the valuer failed to exercise ordinary skill and care but also that the result was wrong in the sense of falling outside the permissible margin of error. The extent of that margin is itself variable, and requires to be addressed by expert evidence, but it is generally considered that the margin of error may be as little as plus or minus 5 per cent for a standard residential property, 10 per cent for a “one-off” property, but 15 per cent where the property is in some way exceptional.117 Surveyors instructed to advise on sale118 or in negotiations or arbitrations in connection with leases or rent reviews119 are similarly required to demonstrate the ordinary skill expected of a surveyor acting with ordinary care in that role. In providing an independent valuation of market rent, surveyors fail to exercise the care and skill required of them if they: omit to consider some matter which they ought to have considered; take into account some matter which they ought not to have taken into account; or

111 Housing (Scotland) Act 2006 (Consequential Provisions) Order 2008, SI 2008/1889, art 3. 112 Bank of Scotland v Fuller Peiser 2002 SLT 574 (valuation instructed by purchaser but also relied upon by lender); see also Omega Trust Co Ltd v Wright Son & Pepper [1997] PNLR 424 (1998) 75 P & CR 57; Scullion v Bank of Scotland plc [2011] EWCA Civ 693, [2011] 1 WLR 3212 (purchaser acquiring buy-to-let property). 113 See para 5.84 above. 114 Realstone Ltd v J & E Shepherd [2008] CSOH 31, [2008] PNLR 21 per Lord Hodge at para 22. 115 Bothwell v D M Hall [2009] CSOH 24, 2009 GWD 10–165 per Lord Hodge at para 36. 116 Singer & Friedlander Ltd v John D Wood & Co [1955–95] PNLR 70 per Watkins J at 75; Capita Alternative Fund Services v Drivers Jonas [2012] EWCA Civ 1417, [2013] 1 EGLR 119. 117 Titan Europe 2006–3 plc v Colliers International UK plc [2015] EWCA Civ 1083, [2016] PNLR 7; Dunfermline Building Society v CBRE Ltd [2017] EWHC 2745 (Ch), [2018] PNLR 13. 118 E.g. Bothwell v D M Hall [2009] CSOH 24, 2009 GWD 10–165. 119 E.g. STV Central Ltd v Semple Fraser LLP [2015] CSIH 35, 2015 SLT 313.

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otherwise fail to adopt the procedure and practices accepted as standard in their profession.120

(3) Architects Architects, like surveyors, are required to apply reasonable skill in fulfilling their contractual obligations to their clients, whether in matters of design and construction, or in related tasks including supervision of building contracts and inspection of works.121 Their duty is defined primarily by the terms of the contract and the instructions given.122 In the event that clients, or in some cases third parties, suffer physical injury123 or property damage124 attributable to deficiencies in the provision of those professional services, liability in negligence may arise. In addition, there may be a duty of care in relation to economic loss,125 typically in the form of expenditure on remedial works although, for the reasons discussed in general terms in chapter 5, that duty is more narrowly drawn, particularly in regard to third parties, and the necessary degree of proximity between the parties is likely to rest upon assumption of responsibility by the architect and reliance on the part of the pursuer.126 Under reference to Hunter v Hanley,127 duty of care is breached where “no ordinarily competent and careful member of the relevant profession could have been guilty of the particular failure alleged against the defender”.128 Thus in Rowallan Creamery Ltd v Henry Dawes,129 for example, a relevant case was made against architects who, it was alleged, had designed a refrigerated store with a roof that could not withstand thermal

120 Belvedere Motors v King [1981] 2 EGLR 131 per Jones J at 132. 121 For discussion, see S Whitham, “Architect’s Role not just Design” (2014) 25(9) Construction Law 17. 122 See e.g. Bellefield Computer Services v E Turner & Sons Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1823. 123 Clay v A J Crump and Sons Ltd [1964] 1 QB 533; Kelly v Sir Frank Mears & Partners 1983 SC 97; McDonald v Frossway [2012] IEHC 440. 124 Pearson Education Ltd v Charter Partnership Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 130, [2007] BLR 324, distinguishing Baxall Securities Ltd v Sheard Walshaw Partnership [2002] EWCA Civ 9, [2002] PNLR 24 (damage to the property of third parties not recoverable where they had earlier passed over a reasonable opportunity for inspection that would have uncovered the building’s defect); Abbott v Will Gannon & Smith Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 198, [2005] PNLR 30; see also Bellefield Computer Services v E Turner & Sons Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1823. 125 Wessex Regional Health Authority v HLM Design Ltd (1994) 40 ConLR 1; Ford Motor Co Ltd v HLM Design Ltd 1997 SLT 837. See also Wagner Associates v Joseph Dunn (Bottlers) Ltd 1986 SLT 267 (counterclaim by clients against architects, who were suing for their fees, on the basis of economic loss). 126 See Strathford East Kilbride Ltd v HLM Design Ltd 1999 SLT 121; Hunt v Optima (Cambridge) Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 714, [2015] 1 WLR 1346. See also discussion of Realstone Ltd v J & E Shepherd [2008] CSOH 31, [2008] PNLR 21 at para 5.84 above. 127 1955 SC 200; see paras 11.05 and 11.06 above. 128 Atwal Enterprises Ltd v Toner t/a Donal Toner Associates [2006] CSOH 76, 2006 SLT 537 per Lord Emslie at para 39; see also Kelly v Sir Frank Mears & Partners 1983 SC 97. 129 1988 SLT 95.

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expansion. In that case it was sufficient for the pursuer to aver that the architects should have designed the roof in such a way that differential thermal expansion “did not occur to an unacceptable extent, or at least in such a way that the roof would not be weakened by such expansion”; it was not necessary for them in addition to specify what an architect of ordinary skill would have done to avoid this problem. Similarly, in Atwal Enterprises Ltd v Toner t/a Donal Toner Associates,130 negligence was established on the part of an architect who had failed adequately to supervise contractors to ensure that a football complex was built to specification, with the result that its pitches frequently became waterlogged. The defender’s dealings with the contractors were found to have fallen “below the standard to be expected of an architect of ordinary competence exercising reasonable care and skill”.131 In this connection, the appropriate professional codes of practice may be of evidential value in establishing ordinarily competent practice, but they are not of themselves definitive and their relevance in the particular circumstances of the case requires to be spoken to by expert evidence.132

(4) Accountants and auditors 11.30

The scope of the duty of care owed by accountants, as by other professional advisers, is determined within the limits of the specific tasks that the clients have engaged them to undertake,133 although there may also be an implied duty to provide clients with further advice which is reasonably incidental to the work instructed.134 As recognised by Caparo,135 a duty of care may extend also to third parties, including shareholders, creditors,136 or, exceptionally, potential investors.137 The standard of conduct required is ascertained by reference to the Hunter v Hanley138 test for professional negligence.139 Naturally, the steps required to meet that standard depend on the specific task for which the accountant has been engaged.140 The 130 [2006] CSOH 76, 2006 SLT 537. 131 [2006] CSOH 76, 2006 SLT 537 per Lord Emslie at para 52. 132 Kelly v Sir Frank Mears & Partners 1983 SC 97. 133 Pegasus Management Holdings SCA v Ernst & Young [2010] EWCA Civ 181, [2010] PNLR 23. 134 See McMahon v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2020] CSOH 50, 2020 SLT 908 (accountant engaged to advise on tax compliance not liable for failure to provide detailed advice on tax planning). 135 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; see paras 4.15 and 4.16 above. 136 HIT Finance Ltd v Cohen Arnold & Co [1999] All ER (D) 1107. 137 Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel & Co Ltd [1991] Ch 295. 138 1955 SC 200; see paras 11.05 and 11.06 above. 139 See e.g. McMahon v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2020] CSOH 50, 2020 SLT 908 per Lord Doherty at para 107. 140 The function of auditing, for example, is said to require a “reasonable and proper investigation of accounts and stock sheets”, calling attention to anything that a “reasonably prudent” person would have concluded was amiss: Henry Squire Cash Chemist Ltd v Ball, Baker and Co (1911) 27 TLR 269 per Alverstone CJ at 271 (affd (1911) 28 TLR 81).

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standards set by the relevant professional bodies141 are also of key importance in determining whether duty has been breached, and experts would normally be called to speak to those standards and their application to the defender’s conduct.142 However, the principle discussed in Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority143 is relevant in this context also. This means that, even when expert opinion is to the effect that the defender’s conduct was compatible with the exercise of ordinary skill and care within the profession, it remains open to the court to find that there has been breach of duty, if the body of professional opinion is not regarded as reasonable or responsible, or if its application to the defender’s conduct was based on a mistaken or incomplete understanding of the facts.144

(5) Teachers Where the alleged negligence is constituted by failure to meet a teacher’s educational responsibilities towards a child, it seems clear that the Hunter v Hanley145 test may properly be applied. In Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council,146 the negligence on the part of education professionals was constituted by failure to provide properly for the schooling of children with special needs, but the court observed that teachers were under a similar duty to “exercise due skill and care” in regard to all children. While this was not intended to open the door to claims based simply on “poor quality of teaching”, duty is breached by “manifest incompetence or negligence comprising specific, identifiable mistakes”.147 As Lord Clyde remarked in that case:148 “Any fear of a flood of claims may be countered by the consideration that in order to get off the ground the claimant must be able to demonstrate that the standard of care fell short of that set by the Bolam test. . . . That is deliberately and properly a high standard in recognition of the difficult nature of some decisions which those to whom the test applies require to make and of the room for genuine differences of view on the propriety of one course 141 See e.g. standards obtainable from the Financial Reporting Council (https://www.frc.org.uk/); Professional Conduct in Relation to Taxation (https://www.tax.org.uk/professional-standards/professionalrules/professional-conduct-relation-taxation). 142 Except perhaps in those circumstances where a lapse is glaring or obvious: see Lenderink-Woods v Zurich Assurance Ltd [2016] EWHC 3287 (Ch), [2017] PNLR 15. But cf Tods Murray WS v Arakin Ltd [2010] CSOH 90, 2011 SCLR 37 (alleged solicitor’s negligence). 143 [1998] AC 232; see paras 11.09–11.13 above. 144 See WTL International Ltd Retirement Benefits Scheme Trs v Edwards [2010] CSOH 34, 2010 GWD 16–319 per Lord Hodge at para 74; see also Rex Procter & Partners Retirement Benefits Scheme’s Trs v Edwards [2015] CSOH 83, 2015 GWD 22–403. 145 1955 SC 200; see paras 11.05 and 11.06 above. 146 [2001] 2 AC 619. 147 [2001] 2 AC 619 per Lord Nicholls at 666–667. 148 [2001] 2 AC 619 at 672.

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378   The Law of Delict in Scotland of action as against another. In the field of educational matters there may well exist distinct but respectable opinions upon matters of method and practice, and it may be difficult to substantiate a case of fault against the background of a variety of professional practices.”

11.32

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Similarly, in relation to problems of bullying between pupils, the courts have referred back to Hunter v Hanley149 in determining standard of care.150 This means that the pursuer must prove that, in failing to prevent the bullying, the teacher failed to meet the standard of a teacher of ordinary skill, acting with ordinary care.151 However, the range of duties that teachers undertake in regard to the welfare of their pupils is complex, and where children’s physical safety is concerned, what is required of teachers varies according to the circumstances.152 Within the school premises, the operator of a school is under a duty as occupier to exercise “such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable” to eliminate hazards and to keep the buildings in proper repair.153 Over and above the need for safe premises, the standard of care expected of teachers in looking after the physical well-being of their charges is generally regarded to be that observed by a “reasonable parent”.154 This entails a duty to “exercise care and forethought, having regard to their age, inexperience, carelessness and high spirits and the nature and degree of danger, not to subject them to avoidable risks of harm”.155 There is similarly a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that young children do not leave school premises unsupervised,156 although there is no obligation to turn the school into a “fortress” so as to prevent the escape of a particularly determined pupil.157 However, the standard of the reasonable parent does not readily translate to supervision of large groups of children at play. In that context there is a duty to provide reasonable levels of supervision, but no absolute duty to protect children from injury during play, or horseplay,

149 1955 SC 200; see paras 11.05 and 11.06 above. 150 Scott v Lothian Regional Council 1999 Rep LR 15; also Wands v Fife Council 2009 GWD 30–477. See also Bradford-Smart v West Sussex County Council [2002] EWCA Civ 07, [2002] ELR 139, referring to the “Bolam principle” and holding that a responsible body of professional opinion would have agreed that enough had been done for the pupil. 151 Scott v Lothian Regional Council 1999 Rep LR 15. 152 See discussion in Ahmed v City of Glasgow Council 2000 SLT (Sh Ct) 153. 153 Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 s 2(1); see e.g. Wardle v Scottish Borders Council 2011 SLT (Sh Ct) 199. 154 Gow v Glasgow Education Authority 1922 SC 260. 155 Brown v North Lanarkshire Council [2010] CSOH 156, 2011 SLT 150 per Lady Dorrian at para 36, citing Walker, Delict 1062. 156 Barnes v Hampshire County Council [1969] 1 WLR 1563. 157 Nwabudike v London Borough of Southwark [1997] ELR 35 per Zucker J at 38. See also Carmarthenshire County Council v Lewis [1955] AC 549 on the liability of schools to third parties suffering injury caused by child escapees.

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whether in the playground,158 or indeed when the teacher’s back is turned in the classroom.159 Sporting activities present particular safety challenges, and in this context there appears to be considerable flexibility in the tests applied. In McDougall v Strathclyde Regional Council160 the Inner House observed that the judgment in this type of case must be “essentially factual”, but it made reference to the position of a “careful parent” and the need to balance appropriate levels of supervision against allowing children a degree of “independence” as part of the learning process. On the facts of the case a gymnastics teacher was held not to have been negligent in failing to prevent the pursuer from attempting a perilous manoeuvre while the teacher was attending to another pupil. Similarly, in Cuthbertson v Merchiston Castle School,161 a teacher taking a golfing lesson was not required constantly to supervise each pupil, and was held not to have been negligent when one pupil accidentally injured another with his golf club at a time when the teacher was attending to another player. English authority similarly tends to apply the standard of the reasonably careful parent in this context. In Chittock v Woodbridge School,162 there was held to be no breach of duty where a seventeen-year-old pupil was injured while skiing unsupervised on a school trip, since the standard of care exercised by the teachers had not fallen below that of “a reasonably careful parent credited with experience of skiing and its hazards and of running school ski trips”. At the same time, the reasoning in Chittock veers between the parental and the professional comparator, since the court also added that “Where there are a number of options for the teacher as to the manner in which he might discharge that duty, he is not negligent if he chooses one which, exercising the Bolam test163 . . . would be within a reasonable range of options for a reasonable teacher exercising that duty of care in the circumstances.”164 The Court of Appeal has added the further proviso that evidence of what is standard procedure at schools is highly material to a determination of standard of care, but it is not conclusive, so that it remains open to a court to decide that a standard generally applied is not sufficient to discharge the duty of care in the particular circumstances.165 158 Hunter v Perth and Kinross Council 2001 SCLR 856; MacDonald’s Tutor v County Council of Inverness 1937 SC 69. 159 Ahmed v City of Glasgow Council 2000 SLT (Sh Ct) 153. 160 1996 SLT 1124 per Lord McCluskey at 1126. 161 2001 SLT (Sh Ct) 13; see also Hammersley-Gonsalves v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council [2012] EWCA Civ 1135, [2012] ELR 431. 162 [2002] EWCA Civ 915, [2002] ELR 735 per Auld LJ at para 18. 163 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582; see paras 11.07 and 11.08 above. 164 [2002] EWCA Civ 915, [2002] ELR 735 per Auld LJ at para 18. 165 Kearn-Price v Kent County Council [2002] EWCA Civ 1539, [2003] ELR 17 per Dyson LJ at para 30.

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(6) The emergency services 11.36

11.37

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The leading case of Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police166 confirmed that police officers owe a general duty of care, in accordance with the “ordinary principles of the law of negligence”, to members of the public put at risk by their conduct in the course of operational duties, and the scope of the duty to which the emergency services generally are subject was discussed in chapter 9 above. However, Robinson also acknowledged the importance of not imposing unrealistically demanding standards of care on members of the emergency services, since their work often requires difficult decisions to be taken with limited time for considered thought.167 The relevant standard of care for members of the emergency services was discussed in French v Strathclyde Fire Board, in which Lord Drummond Young indicated that the Hunter v Hanley test168 did not apply “in its ordinary form” to a Watch Commander in the fire service, but invoked instead the standard of “a skilled firefighter exercising reasonable care”.169 While allowance is to be made for the “stressful”170 circumstances in which decisions require to be made, a skilled member of the emergency services exercising reasonable care is expected to bring a level of specialist knowledge to the customary variables in the calculus of risk.171 The severity and the urgency of the emergency with which the defender was dealing are also to be assessed in order to judge whether the taking of risk was justified. In Robinson itself, the claimant was injured as a bystander when police officers arrested a suspect on a busy street. However, the suspect did not require to be arrested at that precise moment, regardless of risk, and the police officers admitted that, had they not failed to notice the claimant’s approach, they would not have attempted the arrest. This was therefore a clear breach of their duty towards the claimant. A similar calculation is applied to the conduct of drivers of emergency vehicles. The criminal law makes concession for such drivers infringing speed limits172 or other road traffic regulations,173 and the law of negligence similarly allows that some risk-taking is permissible, again depending upon the nature of the emergency. In Gilfillan v Barbour,174 Lord Reed took the view that the risk of driving at speed required to be weighed against the urgency of the call which a police driver was attending:

166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174

[2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736. [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 per Lord Reed at para 75. 1955 SC 200; see paras 11.05 and 11.06 above. [2013] CSOH 3, 2013 SLT 247 at para 41. Marshall v Osmond [1983] QB 1034 per Sir John Donaldson MR at 1038. [2013] CSOH 3, 2013 SLT 247 at para 42. Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 s 87. Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2016, SI 2016/362. 2003 SLT 1127 at para 31.

Professional Negligence   381 “The only question, as it seems to me, is whether it is reasonable for [the driver] in the particular circumstances to drive at a given speed, notwithstanding the risk of possibly injuring another road user. The answer to that question must depend on the circumstances, in particular those circumstances relevant to the urgency of the police business on which he is engaged, and those circumstances relevant to the degree of risk which he is taking. For example, in deciding whether it was reasonable for a police driver to drive at a given speed, and to take the concomitant risks as regards other road users, it might be relevant to know whether he was in pursuit of an escaping murderer or in pursuit of a motorist with defective lights; whether he was trying to get an injured man to hospital in time to save his life, or trying to catch a car thief. There will of course be circumstances where the risk to other road users is so high that it would not be reasonable to take that risk, however urgent the police business might be.”

The standard of care expected of a driver in such circumstances is therefore that of the reasonable police officer or other member of the emergency services in a comparable situation attending an emergency of the same level of urgency. This means that, although drivers are not absolved of duty towards other road users, driving through a red light, for example, is not necessarily a breach of that duty of care.175 As discussed in chapter 9,176 the duty owed by police drivers to other road users extends also to individuals giving the appearance of having been engaged in a criminal activity for which there was a power of arrest. That circumstance, however, is relevant to the standard of care required of police drivers. In Marshall v Osmond,177 for example, a police driver pursuing a suspected car thief was required to show such care in regard to the safety of the suspect as was “reasonable in all the circumstances”, but his “error of judgment”, which resulted in the suspect being knocked over, did not constitute negligence in those “stressful” circumstances. In Henry v Chief Constable Thames Valley,178 on the other hand, a police driver injured a speeding motorcyclist by attempting to use his car to block his escape. This tricky manoeuvre required a series of fine judgments to avoid injury to the suspect, but the miscalculations made by the defendant fell below the standards expected of the reasonably careful police driver. Reasonable care is demanded in relation to property as well as the person. In Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire179 the police attempted to end a siege at the plaintiff’s gun shop by firing a canister of highly flammable CS gas into the premises, but in the knowledge that a fire engine

175 176 177 178 179

Griffin v Mersey Regional Ambulance [1998] PIQR P34. See paras 9.15 and 9.16 above. [1983] QB 1034. [2010] RTR 14. [1985] 1 WLR 1242.

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previously in attendance had left the scene. The behaviour of the intruder in the premises had given rise to an urgent need to arrest him but, in the court’s view, it was not reasonable to release the gas without taking further precautions – in particular by seeking back-up from the fire service. The police were therefore held liable when the shop and its contents were badly damaged by the ensuing fire. It is inevitable that, in some circumstances, the work of the emergency services exposes their personnel to personal risk. Such exposure is not inconsistent with superior officers taking reasonable care for the safety of their workforce where the risk has been properly evaluated and is proportionate to the emergency in hand, as discussed further in chapter 12.180

(7) Charitable organisations 11.42

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Charitable organisations which provide services to members of the public owe a duty to do so with due care, even although no payment is made. Duty is said to rest upon an assumption of responsibility towards the client and therefore its exact scope is determined by the undertakings made in the interaction between the parties. In D v Victim Support Scotland,181 for example, a duty of care was established where the defender had held itself out as having particular expertise in advising on applications to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, and its website stated that it could assist with assessing applicants’ eligibility for the scheme and with completing the formalities of the application process. The pursuer sought out and relied upon the defender’s services in making an application for compensation in respect of abuse in his childhood years. By contrast, in Hughes v Turning Point Scotland, discussed in chapter 4,182 the court held that a provider of services to homeless persons in crisis had not assumed responsibility to protect the pursuer against medical mishap in his detoxification. The most that could be said was that it had undertaken to provide accommodation and to assist with procuring and administering his medication. Even where duty is recognised, proving breach may be challenging for the client, although the more specific the duty, the more readily the question of breach may be addressed. In D v Victim Support Scotland,183 the defender had assumed responsibility to provide skilled advice on the state compensation scheme, and its failure to take account of all relevant factors in the pursuer’s case, including his potential entitlement to loss of earnings, meant that he received less than the amount to which he was entitled. 180 181 182 183

See para 12.15 below. [2017] SC EDIN 85, 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 91. [2019] CSOH 42, 2019 SLT 651; see para 4.52 above. [2017] SC EDIN 85, 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 91.

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The advice provided was thus clearly deficient. The court did not attempt to modify the Hunter v Hanley test184 of “ordinary” professional skill for this context, but instead referred in general terms to expectations of the “reasonable advisor”.185 Since reasonable advisers would have been familiar with the basic terms of the scheme on which they were advising and with the potential for individual advisees to claim elements such as wage loss, the defender had failed to meet that standard, and duty was established. In Hughes v Turning Point Scotland, 186 however, even if it had been accepted that the defender had assumed a general responsibility to provide a medically safe and comfortable environment for the deceased’s detoxification, the court would not have been satisfied that it had failed to exercise a proper level of care in that regard. The Hunter v Hanley standard as applied to a hospital or specialist medical unit was plainly not relevant to an organisation such as the defender, but the court would have wished to have been referred to appropriate skilled evidence. The pursuer was unable to provide acceptable comparators within the same area of practice as the defender’s, and no evidence was produced of an actual protocol or detailed system operated by an entity which provided similar services. The pursuer had not therefore done enough to indicate the required standard of care and to identify the specific failings in the defender’s conduct relative thereto.187

11.44

D. MEDICAL CASES: THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE RISK In the Scottish case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board,188 decided in 2015, the Supreme Court endorsed the test for professional negligence set out in Hunter v Hanley189 and glossed in Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority190 as of continuing relevance in the medical context. Montgomery itself, however, concerned a particular aspect of medical negligence which requires separate consideration here. This is the level of information that doctors or other medical professionals should provide to patients before those patients consent to undergoing a medical procedure.191

184 185 186 187

1955 SC 200; see paras 11.05 and 11.06 above. [2017] SC EDIN 85, 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 91 at para 63. [2019] CSOH 42, 2019 SLT 651. [2019] CSOH 42, 2019 SLT 651 at para 102. Lord Clark nonetheless went on to evaluate the views expressed by expert witnesses as to the practice in facilities assisting with detoxification, but took the view that the defender and its staff had acted reasonably in the circumstances (paras 105–107). 188 [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63. 189 1955 SC 200; see paras 11.05 and 11.06 above. 190 [1998] AC 232; see paras 11.09–11.13 above. 191 In looking at the doctor’s duty to inform patients regarding recommended medical treatment and its possible alternatives, the court expressly distinguished the situation in which the doctor was considering possible investigatory options with a view to diagnosis: [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63 per Lord Kerr and Lord Reed at para 82; see also Taylor v Dailly Health Centre [2018] CSOH 91, 2018 SLT 1324.

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(1) The duty to inform 11.46

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Patients’ right to self-determination entails that, before deciding to undergo medical procedures, they should be appropriately informed about the risks and benefits involved as well as of the risks and benefits of possible alternatives, including the option of no intervention. However, consent obtained on the basis of erroneous or insufficient information is not vitiated to the extent of converting the treatment subsequently accepted into an assault. As long as the patient “knew in broad terms what he was consenting to”192 and has not been induced by fraud or misdescription to submit to it,193 the patient’s agreement is not invalidated by the medical practitioner’s defective advice. Instead, the potential liability is addressed within the framework of negligence, as a failure in the practitioner’s duty of care towards the patient. In this context negligence lies not in creating the risk of harm but in omitting to warn the patient properly of that risk. The practitioner owes a duty of care to the patient to provide an appropriate level of information about the procedure the patient is about to undergo. Failure to do so constitutes a breach of duty towards the patient for which the practitioner is liable in negligence. A duty to inform arises only where there is a risk of which the medical practitioner is aware, or of which a practitioner of ordinary skill should have been aware.194 It is not, however, to be expected that practitioners will tell patients about every conceivable eventuality; rather they should filter the information that they communicate to patients. The essential question, therefore, is the precise level of information required if the practitioner is to meet the necessary standard of care. In this regard Scottish courts for many years regarded themselves as “effectively” bound195 by the House of Lords’ decision in the English case of Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital.196 The majority in Sidaway held that doctors would not generally be found negligent if in advising patients they followed the practice of a responsible body of medical opinion, and the medical consensus was that risks of less than around 1 per cent need not normally be communicated to the patient.197 Later English case law, however, began to edge away from this “reasonable doctor” test in cases involving non-disclosure of risk. In an influential dissenting speech in Sidaway, Lord Scarman had argued that doctors should be bound to communicate those risks to which “a reasonable person in the patient’s position would

Freeman v Home Office [1984] QB 524 per McCowan J at 537. See paras 16.51–16.55 below. LT v Lothian NHS Health Board [2019] CSIH 20, 2019 GWD 17–272 per Lord Brodie at para 61. Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2013] CSIH 3, 2013 SC 245 at 254 per Lord Eassie. [1985] AC 871, as followed in Moyes v Lothian Health Board 1990 SLT 444; Glancy v Southern General Hospital NHS Trust [2013] CSOH 35, 2013 GWD 10–221. 197 [1985] AC 871 at 900 per Lord Bridge. 192 193 194 195 196

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be likely to attach significance”.198 This approach had gathered increasing support in the closing years of the twentieth century, and in particular in Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare Trust Lord Woolf drew attention to the importance of the patient’s perspective, stating that:199 “[I]f there is a significant risk which would affect the judgment of a reasonable patient, then in the normal course it is the responsibility of a doctor to inform the patient of that significant risk, if the information is needed so that the patient can determine for him or herself as to what course he or he should adopt.”

Lord Woolf’s dictum became the “standard formulation” of the duty to disclose.200 At the same time there was increasing recognition of the importance of patient autonomy in this sphere not only in the common law201 but also in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights,202 as well as in the guidelines produced by the medical profession itself.203 Against that background the Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board concluded that in Scotland, as in England, it was time for “medical paternalism” to give way to patients’ rights to make their “own decision”.204 Doctors were understood to be under a duty to communicate “material” risks,205 identified by asking:206 “whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it.”

In determining whether a given risk is sufficiently material to require disclosure, the touchstone is thus no longer the views of the doctor “of ordinary skill”, but those of a reasonable person in the patient’s position. In gauging whether such a person would have perceived the risk as significant, the court may, however, take into account:207 198 [1985] AC 871 at 889. 199 (1998) 48 BMLR 118 at 124 200 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63 per Lord Kerr and Lord Reed at para 69. Lord Woolf’s formulation was also cited by Lord Steyn in Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134 at para 15 as the standard account of “how a surgeon’s duty to warn a patient of a serious risk of injury fits into the tort of negligence”. 201 Including in other Common Law jurisdictions, noting in particular Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 and Reibl v Hughes [1980] 2 SCR 880. 202 See e.g. Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1 at para 61. 203 See e.g. General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (2013, available at http://www.gmc-uk. org/guidance/good_medical_practice.asp) para 49. 204 [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63 per Lord Kerr and Lord Reed at para 81. 205 [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63 per Lord Kerr and Lord Reed at para 82. 206 [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63 per Lord Kerr and Lord Reed at para 87. 207 [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63 per Lord Kerr and Lord Reed at para 89.

11.48

386   The Law of Delict in Scotland “a variety of factors besides its magnitude: for example, the nature of the risk, the effect which its occurrence would have on the life of the patient, the importance to the patient of the benefits sought to be achieved by the treatment, the alternatives available, and the risks involved in those alternatives. The assessment is therefore fact-sensitive, and sensitive also to the characteristics of the patient.”

11.49

11.50

The duty to disclose this level of information thus relates not only to the treatment proposed but also to alternative treatment options that a person in the patient’s position might reasonably regard as viable, including the option of no treatment at all.208 The patient’s case is not undermined by failure to ask the doctor the right questions. Doctors are obliged to use “dialogue”, so that, without “bombarding” patients with “technical information”, they nonetheless “ensure” that the patient understands the gravity of the condition and the risks and benefits of the alternative treatments available.209 As the defender in Montgomery pointed out, many patients now research suspected ailments online, arriving at their consultation with a range of queries on possible treatments, and it is the doctor’s duty to respond to such detailed questioning as far as possible. However, the court regarded it as “unreal” to place the “onus of asking on a patient who may not know that there is anything to ask about”.210 Even where the anxieties expressed are general in nature, doctors are duty-bound to draw the patient’s attention to associated specific risks of which the patient may hitherto have had no knowledge. That said, doctors do not need to discuss risk in detail with patients who make it plain that they do not want further information.211 Moreover, a “therapeutic exception” is made for circumstances of necessity, such as where a patient is unconscious, and also where disclosure would be detrimental to a patient’s health – where, for example, it might aggravate an anxiety-related condition.212 However, the scope of such exceptions is to be narrowly construed and must not be abused.213 In summary, therefore, the reasoning in Montgomery indicates that both objective and subjective considerations determine the content of the doctor’s duty to inform, and also that duty may be attributed to other medical professionals.214 At an objective level, the medical practitioner must take

208 See KR v Lanarkshire Health Board [2016] CSOH 133, 2016 GWD 31–556; see also Johnstone v NHS Grampian [2019] CSOH 90, 2019 GWD 38–62; Britten v Tayside Health Board [2016] SC DUN 75, 2016 GWD 37–668 per Sheriff S G Collins QC at para 23. 209 [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63 per Lord Kerr and Lord Reed at para 90. 210 [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63 per Lord Kerr and Lord Reed at para 58. 211 [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63 per Lord Kerr and Lord Reed at para 85. 212 [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63 per Lord Kerr and Lord Reed at para 88. 213 [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63 per Lord Kerr and Lord Reed at para 91. 214 See detailed analysis by R Mulheron, Principles of Tort Law (2016) 139–146.

Professional Negligence   387

account of the degree of risk that the reasonable patient would wish to have disclosed. This is likely to be gauged by reference to considerations such as: • the probability of an adverse outcome: as in previous cases such as Sidaway,215 the medical profession’s assessment of the mathematical probability that a particular risk might eventuate remains of importance, but this is not the conclusive factor, and the court in Montgomery was careful to emphasise that “the assessment of whether a risk is material cannot be reduced to percentages”;216 • the gravity of harm should the risk eventuate; • the comparative risks of alternative treatments; and • whether the procedure in question is essential, as in Montgomery, or merely elective.217 In addition, further (subjective) considerations that the medical practitioner must not ignore include: • “the needs, concerns and circumstances of the individual patient”;218 • “expressions of concern by the patient”, and in this connection doctors are not only expected to answer “specific questions” but are also expected to make allowance for the fact that patient may not know precisely which questions to ask to address those concerns.219 On application of this standard to the circumstances of Montgomery, the Supreme Court held that the doctor had indeed breached her duty to provide her patient with a sufficient level of information. Mrs Montgomery was suing on behalf of her son who had been born with significant disabilities. Mrs Montgomery was diabetic and had been identified as having various problems in her pregnancy, and yet the consultant obstetrician did not tell her about the specific 9–10 per cent risk, attached to a natural birth for a woman with her medical profile, that the baby’s shoulders could become stuck during delivery (shoulder dystocia). In the vast majority of cases, although a highly unpleasant experience, this can be managed 215 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871; see para 11.47 above. 216 [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63 per Lord Kerr and Lord Reed at para 89. 217 As in Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134. 218 Montgomery [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63 per Lord Kerr and Lord Reed at para 73. 219 See Montgomery [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63 per Lord Kerr and Lord Reed at para 73: “courts should not be too quick to discard [the subjective part of the test] (ie the possibility that the medical practitioner was or ought reasonably to have been aware that the particular patient, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it) merely because it emerges that the patient did not ask certain kinds of questions.”

11.51

388   The Law of Delict in Scotland

11.52

safely. The obstetrician did not mention it because she thought it was better that her patients should try for a normal delivery if they could. In a very small number of cases, however, the more complicated mechanics of delivery can result in damage to the child. In Mrs Montgomery’s case, not only did shoulder dystocia occur, but also this lesser risk eventuated and her child was damaged. Mrs Montgomery contended that, had she been better informed of risk, she would have opted for a caesarean delivery and the damage to her son would have been avoided. Adopting the perspective of the reasonable patient, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the reasonable expectant mother would have wished to know that she was subject to a 9–10 per cent risk of her baby’s shoulder becoming stuck. Even although this eventuality could almost always be managed safely, no woman would contemplate it “with equanimity”, the court said. Moreover, Mrs Montgomery herself had specifically asked the doctor about the difficulties of delivering a large baby given that Mrs Montgomery herself was small in stature. There was therefore a duty to disclose to her the risk of shoulder dystocia.

(2) Issues of causation 11.53

Patients who allege that information about risk was negligently withheld must also persuade the court that, had they been more adequately informed, they would have opted for a different plan of treatment, so that the risk would not have come to pass. In effect they must prove a counterfactual, and this enquiry is subjective, rather than objective – assessing what the pursuer, and not the reasonable patient, would have done. In Montgomery, the court was satisfied, and indeed her doctor conceded, that had she been told of this risk Mrs Montgomery would have opted for a caesarean section, and her son would have been born undamaged.220 The obstetrician’s failure to inform her patient of this 9–10 per cent risk was a breach of duty and that breach meant the much lesser (0.1–0.2 per cent) risk came to pass; in other words the negligent failure to provide the correct level of information caused the damage to the baby. Issues of causation in this context are discussed further in chapter 13.221

(3) Compensation for shock and distress 11.54

As well as compensation for physical injury there is also the possibility of an award of solatium to compensate for the “shock” and distress of discovering, without prior warning, that a particular medical risk has eventuated. 220 Cf, e.g., Britten v Tayside Health Board [2016] SC DUN 75, 2016 GWD 37–668, in which the patient failed to persuade the court (with the benefit of hindsight) that he would have opted not to accept the treatment offered. 221 See paras 13.82–13.86 below.

Professional Negligence   389

Such an award may be made to a patient who consented to a procedure on the basis of less than adequate information, even where the patient, if properly advised, would have accepted the risk in any event. In the Outer House case of Goorkani v Tayside Health Board,222 a doctor recommended drug therapy to his patient to save him from blindness but neglected to warn him of the risk of infertility which it carried. Lord Cameron found that the doctor had failed in his duty of care but that, had the patient been able to make an informed choice, he would in any case have been prepared to accept the risk of infertility in order to keep his sight. No award could therefore be made to compensate him for becoming infertile, since the necessary causal connection was absent, but solatium of £2,500 was granted as a “reasonable award for the loss of self esteem, the shock and anger at the discovery of his infertility together with the frustration and disruption which ignorance and the sudden shock of discovery brought to the marital relationship”.223 Similarly, in the English decision of Smith v Barking, Havering and Brentwood Health Authority,224 Hutchison J found, on the balance of probabilities, that the plaintiff would have consented to an operation to relieve a serious spinal condition even if she had been properly advised about the risk of tetraplegia which attached to it. Nevertheless, he awarded damages of £3,000 to compensate for the “shock and depression” caused by the immediate onset of tetraplegia about which the surgeon had negligently failed to warn her. In neither Goorkani nor Smith did the court address the rules set out by Lord Bridge in the leading case McLoughlin v O’Brian,225 limiting recovery for negligently inflicted shock or distress to cases of “positive psychiatric illness”.226 However, the framework set out by Lord Bridge was directed towards limiting the scope of duty of care between those who negligently cause accidents on the one hand and bystanders or those who receive news of the event on the other. By contrast, the existence of a duty of care between doctor and patient to provide adequate information about treatment is not in doubt, and, as observed in McLelland v Greater Glasgow Health Board,227 the distress experienced by those who discover a medical condition about which they have been given inadequate warning is hardly to be regarded as analogous to the nervous shock sustained by those witnessing or hearing about accidents. As Lord Prosser commented in McLelland, in awarding damages to a father as solatium for the “shock and distress” of discovering that his newborn son was affected by Down’s syndrome (for which the defenders’ employees had negligently failed to test the foetus):228 222 223 224 225 226 227 228

1991 SLT 94. 1991 SLT 94 per Lord Cameron at 96. [1994] 5 Med LR 285. [1983] 1 AC 410 at 431; see ch 6 above. Earle and Whitty, “Medical Law” para 262. 2001 SLT 446. 2001 SLT 446 per Lord Prosser at para 11.

11.55

390   The Law of Delict in Scotland “The language which has been used where the scope of duty is in question, or where one has an essentially secondary victim, is in my opinion quite misleading when one is dealing with a victim of direct wrong . . . There is no need to come within the expression ‘personal injuries’; but Fleming v Strathclyde Regional Council 229 seems to me to illustrate the need for the law to accept that personal damage is not limited to medical conditions, just as Curran v Docherty230 shows that anxiety, worry and distress over a significant period are matters which cannot be excluded from the category of consequences which sound in damages, when caused by negligence . . . I see no basis, in principle or upon the facts of this case, for denying a pursuer such as Mr McLelland damages in the form of solatium for what the defenders’ staff did to him.”

E. IMMUNITY OF SOLICITORS, ADVOCATES AND EXPERT WITNESSES? 11.56

Today advocates and solicitors no longer enjoy immunity from negligence claims in relation to their conduct of civil litigation.231 It is thought, however, that they retain immunity in criminal proceedings.232 Expert witnesses were also previously immune, but it has been held by the House of Lords in an English appeal that they owe a duty of care in the law of negligence towards those whom their evidence concerns, and this decision is likely to be followed in Scotland also.233 The extent of privilege that the law of defamation allows to legal representatives and witnesses in court proceedings is discussed below in chapter 18.234

229 1992 SLT 161. 230 1995 SLT 716. 231 Arthur J S Hall & Co v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615. For a Scottish perspective on this English decision see Wright v Paton Farrell [2006] CSIH 7, 2006 SC 404 per Lord President Hamilton at para 13: “ I find it difficult to suppose that the unanimous views of their Lordships on that aspect, albeit expressed in the context of English procedural arrangements, would not be highly influential on a Scottish court.” For the previous law, see Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191. 232 Wright v Paton Farrell [2006] CSIH 7, 2006 SC 404, although the pursuer failed relevantly to aver his loss, and therefore discussion of immunity was obiter; for commentary, see G W Gordon, “Not Yet Dead: Wright v Paton Farrell and Advocates’ Immunity in Scotland” (2007) 70 MLR 471. For the position in English law, see Arthur J S Hall & Co v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615 in which civil proceedings were at issue, but the majority (with Lord Hope dissenting) took the view that solicitors and barristers do not enjoy immunity in criminal proceedings. Note also that the Lord Advocate and those acting for him in the conduct of solemn criminal proceedings no longer enjoy immunity from claims for malicious prosecution: see Whitehouse v Lord Advocate [2019] CSIH 52, 2020 SC 133, discussed at para 17.58 below. 233 Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 13, [2011] 2 AC 398, referred to with apparent approval in Whitehouse v Lord Advocate [2019] CSIH 52, 2020 SC 133. 234 See para 18.103.

Chapter 12

Liability of Employers to Employees

Para A. INTRODUCTION����������������������������������������������������������������� 12.01 B. NON-DELEGABLE DUTY TO PROVIDE FOR PHYSICAL SAFETY�������������������������������������������������������������� 12.04 (1) Competent staff���������������������������������������������������������������� 12.05 (2) Adequate material������������������������������������������������������������� 12.06 (3) Safe system of working������������������������������������������������������ 12.09 (4) Unusually hazardous workplaces���������������������������������������� 12.12 C. OCCUPATIONAL STRESS��������������������������������������������������� 12.16 D. DUTY IN REGARD TO FINANCIAL LOSS������������������������� 12.26 (1) Provision of financial advice���������������������������������������������� 12.27 (2) Misinformation about the employee����������������������������������� 12.29 E. BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY (1) The statutory duties���������������������������������������������������������� 12.30 (2) Breach of statutory duty as evidence of liability at common law��������������������������������������������������������������������� 12.34 (3) Defective equipment��������������������������������������������������������� 12.36

A. INTRODUCTION The common law has long held employers answerable for the physical safety of their employees in the workplace. Liability to make reparation stems primarily from one or both of: (i) vicarious responsibility for other employees whose wrongdoing causes injury to a colleague1 (as considered further in chapter 3 above); and (ii) a direct personal duty to the employee to exercise due care in the management of the working environment. During the nineteenth century and beyond, however, the potential for recovery of damages was frequently thwarted by application of one, or a combination, of three delictual doctrines. First of all, consent to risk was readily imputed to those who had agreed to work in dangerous employment and were seen to have placed themselves voluntarily in jeopardy, so that the

 1 Sword v Cameron (1839) 1 D 493; Macaulay v Buist & Co (1846) 9 D 245; Sneddon v Addie (1849) 11 D 1159; Whitelaw v Moffat (1849) 12 D 434.

391

12.01

392   The Law of Delict in Scotland

12.02

12.03

defence of volenti non fit injuria blocked their claims.2 Moreover, a “correlative duty incumbent on the master and on the servant”3 to adopt precautions against accidents meant that any lapse in due care on the employee’s part might bring the defence of contributory negligence into play; until 1945 this was a complete defence. Finally, and even more controversially, in a notable example of “Law from over the Border”4 the doctrine of “common employment” was assimilated into Scots law in 1858 by the decision of the House of Lords in Bartonshill Coal Co v Reid.5 This doctrine held the employer not to be vicariously liable for injuries caused to employees by others in “common employment” with them.6 By the mid-twentieth century, however, the prospects for the injured employee had improved markedly. The defence of volenti had come to be applied only sparingly in relation to workplace injuries;7 contributory negligence was reconfigured by the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, section 1, so as to allow for apportionment of liability between pursuer and defender; and the doctrine of common employment was abolished by the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948, section 1, so that the employer became vicariously liable for the negligence of other employees, just as it was liable for breach of its own direct duty. That said, various strategies had in the meantime evolved to mitigate the impact of these doctrines and to facilitate recovery by employees. These included the imposition of an expanding range of statutory duties upon the employer.8 Moreover, in order to circumvent the problem of the common employment doctrine, duties to provide for the safety of the workforce had increasingly been categorised as personal to the employer, so that although it might be possible to delegate their performance to other employees, the employer remained liable where these had been imperfectly performed. With the abolition of common employment in 1948, it became much less important to distinguish an employer’s vicarious liability for other employees from liability based upon the employer’s direct duties, but the concept of the employer’s non-delegable duty to its employees remains. And while injuries may often be attributed to the fault of a fellow employee for which the employer is then vicariously liable, the employer’s direct, non-delegable, duty is of particular relevance in situations where either vicarious liability does not apply (because a colleague’s wrongdoing is not  2 Sutherland v Monkland Railways Co (1857) 19 D 1004; Cook v Bell (1857) 20 D 137; Mair v Rhind (1897) 4 SLT 351.  3 Cook v Bell (1857) 20 D 137 per Lord Ivory at 143.   4 A D Gibb, Law from Over the Border (1950) 99–101.  5 (1858) 3 Macq 266. For commentary, see P Simpson, “Vicarious Liability”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 584 at 591ff.   6 See para 3.09 above.   7 See e.g. Smith v Baker [1891] AC 325. For a modern overview, see D Brodie, “Volenti strikes back?” (2012) 109 Employment Law Bulletin 4.   8 See e.g. Black v Fife Coal Co Ltd 1912 SC (HL) 33.

Liability of Employers to Employees   393

within the scope of the colleague’s employment),9 or where an employee has been injured in the workplace due to fault of a person who is not employed by the same employer. In McDermid v Nash Dredging & Reclamation Co Ltd,10 for example, the injured employee was a deckhand employed by the defender. At the time of his accident he had been sent to work on a tugboat owned by his employer’s parent company and his injury was allegedly caused by the negligence of the captain – an employee of the parent company, not of the defendant. The defendant could not therefore be held vicariously liable for the captain’s negligence, but in sending the employee to this other vessel, the defendant remained under a direct, nondelegable, duty to provide for his safety. Accordingly it could not escape liability when that duty was breached, even although the defendant had no direct control over the conditions in which the employee was working at the time of the accident.11 As Lord Stewart has observed on the “familiar” usage of the term “non-delegable duties” in that context, “in practical terms it is not duties that are non-delegable but the immediate liabilities to employees that arise from failure and breach”.12

B. NON-DELEGABLE DUTY TO PROVIDE FOR PHYSICAL SAFETY The essential nature of the employer’s non-delegable duty to provide a safe working environment was set out in the Scottish case of English v Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co Ltd,13 in which a miner, injured by haulage machinery, alleged that the system of working adopted at the colliery was unsafe. The mine owners had apparently appointed a competent manager to implement the requisite safety measures, but this did not absolve them of liability. The House of Lords held that the duty to perform the “fundamental obligations of a contract of employment” was personal to the employer, and that the employer remained “absolutely responsible” notwithstanding the appointment of another employee to take care of those obligations. Lord Wright explained:14   9 See para 12.05 below. 10 [1987] AC 906. For discussion, see E McKendrick, “Vicarious Liability and Independent Contractors – A Re-examination” (1990) 53 MLR 770 at 773–774. See also Ledger v MacGregor Energy Services Ltd 2000 GWD 39–1464. 11 See also McGarvey v Eve NCI Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 374, [2002] All ER (D) 345 (Feb), in which the employee of a subcontractor was injured after having been instructed that he should follow the orders of the main contractor’s foreman. The subcontractor was held liable as his employer for his injuries, but the court held that the main contractor had also “assumed some responsibility for the claimant’s safety”, and liability was therefore apportioned between them in the ratio of two-thirds to one-third. 12 Grant v Fife Council [2013] CSOH 11, 2013 Rep LR 73 at para 16. 13 1937 SC (HL) 46. 14 1937 SC (HL) 46 per Lord Wright at 60 (citing McMullan v Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co Ltd 1933 SC (HL) 64), as cited e.g. in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 2 AC 455 per Lord Goff at 481.

12.04

394   The Law of Delict in Scotland “When I use the word absolutely, I do not mean that employers warrant the adequacy of plant, or the competence of fellow-employees, or the propriety of the system of work. The obligation is fulfilled by the exercise of due care and skill. But it is not fulfilled by entrusting its fulfilment to employees, even though selected with due care and skill. The obligation is threefold – ‘the provision of a competent staff of men, adequate material, and a proper system and effective supervision’.”

The standard of care required to fulfil this “threefold”, non-delegable, obligation was set out by Swanwick J in Stokes v Guest, Keen and Nettlefold (Bolts and Nuts) Ltd:15 “[T]he overall test is still the conduct of the reasonable and prudent employer, taking positive thought for the safety of his workers in the light of what he knows or ought to know . . . He must weigh up the risk in terms of the likelihood of injury occurring and the potential consequences if it does; and he must balance against this the probable effectiveness of the precautions that can be taken to meet it and the expense and inconvenience they involve.”

Each part of the threefold obligation may be considered in turn.

(1) Competent staff 12.05

The employer’s duty to its workforce to engage “competent staff” was of crucial importance at the time when the doctrine of common employment was current since, as already mentioned,16 vicarious liability did not arise in relation to fault by a fellow employee, competent or not. Although this remains an overarching obligation, its modern importance lies mainly in those relatively unusual situations where the “close connection” test is not made out between the wrongdoing perpetrated by the employee’s colleague and the colleague’s employment, so that the employer is not vicariously liable. Instances where the courts have declined to recognise wrongdoing as having occurred within the scope of employment include incidents of “horseplay”,17 random acts of violence,18 and harassment between employees that is unconnected with the work allotted to them.19

15 [1968] 1 WLR 1776 at 1783. 16 See para 12.01 above. 17 Wilson v Exel UK Ltd [2010] CSIH 35, 2010 SLT 671; Somerville v Harsco Infrastructure Ltd 2015 GWD 38–607. 18 Vaickuviene v J Sainsbury plc [2013] CSIH 67, 2014 SC 147; Graham v Commercial Bodyworks Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 47, [2015] PIQR P15; but cf Weddall v Barchester Healthcare Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 25, [2012] IRLR 307. 19 Vaickuviene v J Sainsbury plc [2013] CSIH 67, 2014 SC 147; but cf Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224 (vicarious liability did apply to harassment by employee in managing role).

Liability of Employers to Employees   395

In such situations an employer may be found to have been in breach of its direct duty to take care for its employees’ safety if it has erred in making an unsuitable appointment, or if it has failed to address a pattern of potentially dangerous misbehaviour within the workforce.20 Reasonable care also requires to be exercised in supervising employees who may be exposed to potentially hazardous situations,21 and in providing appropriate instruction on safety measures.22

(2) Adequate material Employers must exercise reasonable care in making available plant and equipment that are appropriate for the work that employees are asked to perform.23 These should be accessible in sufficient quantities,24 although it is acceptable to leave employees who are reasonably believed to be competent to exercise their discretion in selecting and using the necessary tools and gear.25 There is also a duty to provide protective clothing or equipment adequate to protect employees’ safety in their particular working conditions.26 Reasonable care is required to ensure that the gear is put into the employees’ hands,27 and that they are aware of the risks of failing to use it.28 Plant and equipment must be maintained in a proper condition, a continuing duty29 which is likely to entail due care in carrying out regular inspections, including at the point when the goods are acquired.30 Since the employer’s duty is non-delegable, the duty to inspect is not discharged by delegating it to an independent contractor, no matter how competent, and the employer remains liable if the contractor negligently fails to identify a potentially dangerous defect.31 That duty extends to maintaining adequate replacement supplies of protective clothing, although there is an expectation that the employee will inform the employer where clothing becomes worn out and no longer fit for purpose.32 20 Hudson v Ridge Manufacturing Co Ltd [1957] 2 QB 348; Waters v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 WLR 1607. 21 Jebson v Ministry of Defence [2000] 1 WLR 2055. 22 General Cleaning Contractors v Christmas [1953] AC 180. 23 Lovell v Blundells and Crompton & Co Ltd [1944] KB 502; Ashbridge v Christian Salvesen plc [2006] CSOH 79, 2006 SLT 697. 24 McGregor v AAH Pharmaceuticals Ltd 1996 SLT 1161. 25 Richardson v Stephenson Clarke Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1695. 26 Ashbridge v Christian Salvesen plc [2006] CSOH 79, 2006 SLT 697. 27 Crouch v British Rail Engineering Ltd [1988] IRLR 404. 28 Campbell v Lothian Health Board 1987 SLT 665. 29 English v Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co Ltd 1937 SC (HL) 46 per Lord Wright at 65. 30 Pearce v Round Oak Steel Works [1969] 1 WLR 595; see also Baxter v St Helena Group Hospital Management Committee, The Times, 14 February 1972; McLellan v Mitie Group plc [2015] CSOH 151, 2015 SLT 861. 31 Rodgers v Dunsmuir Confectionery Co 1952 SLT (Notes) 9. 32 Smith v Scot Bowyers Ltd [1986] IRLR 315.

12.06

12.07

396   The Law of Delict in Scotland

12.08

Alongside the common law duty to provide adequate material, the employer has statutory obligations to employees in terms of the Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969, discussed further below in section E.33

(3) Safe system of working 12.09

12.10

12.11

The employer must maintain a safe system of working, although it need not be absolutely safe: “the taking of reasonable steps, not perfection, is what is required”.34 Moreover, the reasonable employer does not necessarily remove all risk where that risk is balanced against cogent reasons for exposing employees to a dangerous environment.35 Evidence that the practice followed by the employer was an established one, common in workplaces of a similar type, goes some way towards establishing that duty has been met, but does not of itself present a prima facie case.36 Such evidence will not persuade where it was “obvious” that some further precaution was needed and “inexcusable or folly to omit it”,37 where the practice in question is shown to be “clearly bad”, or alternatively where the employer has greater than average knowledge about risks to which the practice gives rise.38 Similarly, failure to comply with the common practice is not conclusive in establishing negligence where the employer can show that it has adopted reasonable alternative measures.39 The system of working requires to be kept under review, even if it is of long standing.40 The employer has a duty to keep itself informed about safety developments, in regard to both the discovery of hazards hitherto unrecognised and the practicability of safer working methods.41 It may also be appropriate to go to greater lengths to institute safety measures when the workforce is composed of inexperienced employees.42 Reasonable measures

33 34 35 36

See paras 12.36–12.37 below. Thomas v General Motors-Holden’s Ltd (1988) 49 SASR 11 per Bollen LJ at 26. See paras 12.12–12.15 below. Morton v William Dixon Ltd 1909 SC 807. See also Cavanagh v Ulster Weaving Co Ltd [1960] AC 145 per Lord Somervell at 167, commenting that evidence of a common practice will vary in its persuasiveness according to how closely the circumstances covered by the practice resemble those in which the accident happened. See paras 10.27–10.29 above. 37 Gallagher v Balfour Beatty and Co 1951 SC 712 per Lord President Cooper at 718. 38 Baker v Quantum Clothing Group Ltd [2011] UKSC 17, [2011] 1 WLR 1003 per Lord Mance at para 21; see also General Cleaning Contractors v Christmas [1953] AC 180; Morris v West Hartlepool Steam Navigation Co Ltd [1956] AC 552; Cavanagh v Ulster Weaving Co Ltd [1960] AC 145. 39 Brown v Rolls-Royce Ltd 1960 SC (HL) 22, as discussed at para 10.28 above. 40 See Sword v Cameron (1839) 1 D 493 per Lord Gillies at 498: “The fact of [the system of working] being the inveterate practice there, affords just the stronger reason for effectually checking it.” See also MacIver v J & A Gardner Ltd 2001 SLT 585. 41 Thompson v Smiths Shiprepairers (North Shields) Ltd [1984] QB 405; Baker v Quantum Clothing Group Ltd [2011] UKSC 17, [2011] 1 WLR 1003. 42 King v John Brown & Co Ltd 1952 SLT (Notes) 62.

Liability of Employers to Employees   397

are required to ensure that the system of work continues to be safe in practice, and a duty of supervision may require the employer to intervene, rather than turn a blind eye, if employees have fallen into potentially dangerous practices.43 On the other hand, an employer may avoid liability where an employee is injured due to contravening safety instructions in a manner that the employer could not reasonably have detected.44

(4) Unusually hazardous workplaces In fundamentally dangerous workplaces, employees may recognise that the nature of their work necessarily involves exposure to some level of risk; but they “accept the risks which are inherent in their work”, not those which the employer could have avoided by the exercise of reasonable care.45 In Smith v Ministry of Defence46 – admittedly an extreme example – claims were brought by the families of soldiers killed while on active service in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. The Supreme Court held that “combat immunity”, narrowly construed, might operate so as to remove the conduct of armed conflict from the court’s jurisdiction, but it distinguished “actual operations against the enemy” from “other activities of the combatant services in time of war”. In regard to the latter there was no reason to regard the employer as not being subject to a duty of care, “remembering always that the standard of care is that which is reasonable in the circumstances”.47 That duty extended to the provision of safe systems of work and appropriate equipment, although, in assessing what was reasonable in this context, allowances were to be made for “decisions that have already been taken for reasons of policy at a high level of command beforehand or by the effects of contact with the enemy”, so that those duties were not pitched at a level that was “unrealistic or excessively burdensome”.48 The cogency of policy issues in determining what is reasonable is to be seen in Hopps v Mott MacDonald Ltd,49 cited in Smith. This was another case involving employees sent to Iraq, although in this instance the claimant was a civilian. Mr Hopps was a consultant electrical engineer who in 2003 volunteered to go to Iraq where his employer was providing energy 43 General Cleaning Contractors v Christmas [1953] AC 180 per Lord Reid at 194; McGregor v AAH Pharmaceuticals Ltd 1996 SLT 1161. 44 O’Neil v DHL Services Ltd [2011] CSOH 183, 2011 GWD 39–806; Sutherland v McConechy’s Tyre Service Ltd [2012] CSOH 28, 2012 Rep LR 46. 45 King v Sussex Ambulance Service NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Civ 953, [2002] ICR 1413 per Hale LJ at para 21. 46 [2013] UKSC 4, [2014] AC 52. Claims were brought in negligence and also under the Human Rights Act 1998, citing ECHR Art 2 (right to life). 47 [2013] UKSC 4, [2014] AC 52 per Lord Hope at para 94. 48 [2013] UKSC 4, [2014] AC 52 per Lord Hope at para 99. 49 [2009] EWHC 1881 (QB), [2009] All ER (D) 259 (Jul).

12.12

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12.14

12.15

and civil engineering expertise as part of an international effort to rebuild the country’s infrastructure. He was injured when the standard-production Land Rover in which he was travelling was hit by an improvised explosive device. He argued that his employer should have ensured either that he travelled in an armoured vehicle or that he remained at the base. The court recognised that in this extreme situation the claimant was entitled to “such protection as was, in all the circumstances, reasonable, having regard to what was or ought to have been known by the military about prevailing conditions”.50 This meant that the risk of explosion had to be properly considered. Nonetheless, the claimant was unable to show that an alternative vehicle available at that time would have prevented his injuries. Moreover, the court took the view that, if the claimant had been confined to base waiting for such a vehicle, he would have been hindered in the important job of reconstructing a shattered infrastructure, which in turn had the broader objective of improving the safety of the general environment. Breach of duty was not therefore established and the claim was dismissed. The necessity for some employers to factor a degree of risk into training exercises is recognised in Brisco v Secretary of State for Scotland,51 in which the pursuer was a prison officer who was injured during a training session that simulated a prison riot. A heavy fencepost had been dropped on him from a stairwell, and he argued that training exercises that involved the dropping of heavy objects did not constitute a safe system of work. The court, however, found no breach of duty. Since this was a risk to which, unavoidably, employees might be exposed when faced with a genuine riot, it was not a failure of due care to simulate those conditions in a training exercise. Despite the exceptional hazards of their working conditions, the emergency services, as already noted in chapter 9,52 are subject to a duty of care to their employees to avoid risks that could reasonably have been mitigated. In assessing whether an employer has measured up to the required standard of care, it is necessary to balance the level of risk against the nature of the emergency, and “the saving of life or limb justifies taking considerable risk”.53 In Watt v Hertfordshire County Council,54 for example, fire officers were called out to a road accident in which the victim was trapped under a heavy vehicle. Special lifting gear was required, but the vehicle normally used to transport this from the fire station was unavailable. The officer in charge therefore ordered that it should be brought in another vehicle,

50 [2009] EWHC 1881 (QB), [2009] All ER (D) 259 (Jul) per Clarke J at para 87. 51 1997 SC 14, discussed at para 10.23 above; see also Humphrey v Aegis Defence Services Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 11, discussed at para 10.26 above. 52 See paras 9.33–9.37, 9.51–9.52 and 9.58 above. 53 Watt v Hertfordshire County Council [1954] 1 WLR 835 per Denning LJ at 838. 54 [1954] 1 WLR 835.

Liability of Employers to Employees   399

which was not specially adapted for this purpose. When that vehicle braked suddenly, the lifting gear shifted, injuring one of the firefighters travelling with it. The officer was held not to have been negligent, however, since the emergency confronting him required to be factored into the calculus of risk. The risk involved in ordering the unsuitable vehicle to be used was not overwhelming when set against the attempt to save life and limb: “It is always a question of balancing the risk against the end.”55 Similarly in King v Sussex Ambulance Service NHS Trust,56 the Trust was held not to have failed in its duty to an ambulance technician injured while attempting to move a patient down a staircase in the patient’s house by means of a carry chair. The Ambulance Service had a duty to members of the public to attend promptly to their needs, and no evidence had been presented to the court of a reasonable alternative method available of transporting the patient. By contrast in French v Strathclyde Fire Board57 the commanding officer at a fire scene ordered firefighters to force entry to a building in which it should have been evident that the structure was unstable. Set against this, the advantages of forcing the door were limited, given that the fire was not in danger of spreading and there was no danger to life from the fire itself. The commanding officer’s misjudgment in ordering firefighters into the building therefore fell below the standard of a skilled officer exercising reasonable care, and his employers were vicariously liable for his negligence when the firefighters were injured in the ensuing collapse of the structure.

C. OCCUPATIONAL STRESS Whereas early cases almost invariably concerned the liability of employers for physical injury, the common law obligations of employers are now recognised as relevant also to employees’ mental well-being. As discussed in chapter 6,58 the “control mechanisms” set out in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police59 in regard to primary and secondary victims of single shocking incidents were “plainly never intended to apply to all cases of psychiatric injury.”60 In particular, they do not apply where a preexisting relationship between the parties has created an ongoing duty on the defender’s part to exercise due care in protecting the pursuer against psychiatric harm. The most obvious example of such a relational duty of care is found in the employment relationship. An employer’s duty of care

55 56 57 58 59 60

[1954] 1 WLR 835 per Denning LJ at 838. [2002] EWCA Civ 953, [2002] ICR 1413. [2013] CSOH 3, 2013 SLT 247. See paras 6.05ff above. [1992] 1 AC 310. White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 2 AC 455 per Lord Hoffmann at 504.

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12.17

12.18

to take reasonable steps to provide a safe system of work is co-extensive with an implied term in the contract of employment regarding the employee’s safety.61 Just as employers must have regard to the physical safety of employees, so systems of work should not subject employees to a level of stress that might result in psychiatric injury. As confirmed in Hatton v Sutherland,62 there are “no special control mechanisms applying to claims for psychiatric (or physical) illness or injury arising from the stress of doing the work the employee is required to do”, and “the ordinary principles of employer’s liability apply.” On the other hand, those control mechanisms are relevant where psychiatric injury is alleged to have been caused in consequence of witnessing death or injury suffered by someone else, even if this occurred during the employee’s working day.63 The key factors to be considered in determining whether a duty of care arises were set out by Hale LJ in the Court of Appeal in Hatton v Sutherland.64 In general terms the court must of course consider questions such as the nature and extent of the work, whether the employer put the employee under unreasonable pressure, and whether other workers doing the same job had suffered injury to their health. However, the essential control device is that injury should have been foreseeable, in the sense that the employer knew, or should reasonably have known, of the employee’s exposure to stress, and that this involved a risk of psychiatric injury higher than that to which employees in a similar role were normally subject. Was a harmful reaction to the pressures of the workplace “reasonably foreseeable in the individual employee concerned”, given “the particular characteristics of the employee concerned and the particular demands which the employer casts upon him”?65 The case of Walker v Northumberland County Council illustrates.66 The plaintiff was a senior social worker with management responsibilities for four teams of social workers. Due to the changing demographic profile of the area, the responsibilities of these teams were growing appreciably without any corresponding increase in staffing. Eventually the plaintiff suffered a mental breakdown followed by a lengthy absence from work. On his return to his post, promises of additional resources were not made

61 See Yapp v Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2014] EWCA Civ 1512, [2015] IRLR 112 per Underhill LJ at para 119. 62 [2002] EWCA Civ 76, [2002] 2 All ER 1 per Hale LJ at paras 20, 22 and 43. Although the decision in a conjoined case was overturned on appeal – sub nom Barber v Somerset Council [2004] UKHL 13, [2004] 1 WLR 1089 – Hale LJ’s reasoning on this point was left in place. 63 [2002] EWCA Civ 76, [2002] 2 All ER 1 per Hale LJ at paras 20–21. 64 [2002] EWCA Civ 76, [2002] 2 All ER 1 at para 43. Although the decision in a conjoined case was overturned on appeal – sub nom Barber v Somerset Council [2004] UKHL 13, [2004] 1 WLR 1089 – Hale LJ’s essential reasoning on this point was not disputed. 65 [2002] EWCA Civ 76, [2002] 2 All ER 1 per Hale LJ at para 25. 66 [1995] 1 All ER 737, [1995] ICR 702.

Liability of Employers to Employees   401

good and, despite renewed representations to his employers, no further assistance was provided. The plaintiff suffered a second mental breakdown a year later and was dismissed on grounds of permanent ill-health shortly afterwards. After lengthy deliberation the court held that the plaintiff’s first breakdown was not reasonably foreseeable to his employer, in the sense that the risk to which he was exposed was not higher than that to which social services managers in his position were ordinarily subject. However, after his first breakdown it was reasonably foreseeable that his health would break down once again if he was exposed to the same working conditions without additional support. Given the risk of recurrence of illness and its likely gravity, there had been a duty to alleviate the plaintiff’s workload through additional assistance or restructuring of the social services. The importance of foreseeability was similarly endorsed by the House of Lords in Barber v Somerset County Council,67 again by reference to the standard test for the foreseeability of physical injury in the workplace: “the overall test is still the conduct of the reasonable and prudent employer, taking positive thought for the safety of his workers in the light of what he knows or ought to know”.68 The perspective adopted is that of a “responsible employer acting as a lay person without the benefit of informed psychiatric experience”.69 As Hale LJ warned in Hatton v Sutherland, however, “because of the very nature of psychiatric disorder . . . it is bound to be harder to foresee than is physical injury”.70 Foreseeability must relate to a material risk of sustaining a psychiatric disorder. It is not sufficient that the employer is aware that an employee is unhappy or frustrated or anxious, since such emotions are regarded as “a normal part of human experience”, even if caused by problems at work.71 Moreover, even where an employer is aware of events that might foreseeably cause stress and anxiety to an employee, it does not necessary follow that the risk of psychiatric injury is foreseeable.72 Ordinarily, employers are entitled to assume that employees can withstand the normal pressures of the job in the absence of evidence that it is “objectively likely to be harmful” to

67 [2004] UKHL 13, [2004] 1 WLR 1089. 68 Stokes v Guest, Keen and Nettlefold (Bolts and Nuts) Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 1776 per Swanwick J at 1783, cited in Barber v Somerset County Council [2004] UKHL 13, [2004] 1 WLR 1089 by Lord Walker at para 65. 69 Moncrieff v Cooper [2013] CSOH 180, 2013 GWD 40–766 per Lord Armstrong at para 75; Rorrison v West Lothian College 2000 SCLR 245, 1999 Rep LR 102 per Lord Reed at para 16–22. 70 [2002] EWCA Civ 76, [2002] 2 All ER 1 per Hale LJ at para 23. 71 Rorrison v West Lothian College 2000 SCLR 245, 1999 Rep LR 102; see also Fraser v State Hospitals Board for Scotland 2001 SLT 1051; Chapman v Lord Advocate [2005] CSOH 148, 2006 SLT 186. Cf Fletcher v Argyll and Bute Council [2007] CSOH 174, 2007 SLT 1047, holding the claim to be relevant where the employer was made aware not only that the pursuer was suffering from stress but that she was being made ill thereby. 72 Piepenbrock v London School of Economics and Political Science [2018] EWHC 2572 (QB), [2018] ELR 596.

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12.20

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the employee’s mental health.73 That assumption cannot, however, be made where events in the workplace have patently created abnormal pressure,74 in particular where the employee has put the employer on notice of conditions damaging to the employee’s mental health.75 Moreover, it is relevant to examine not only whether the employer had actual knowledge of any special vulnerability to harm on the employee’s part but also whether there was “any such susceptibility of which the employer (if not actually aware) ought reasonably to have been aware”.76 An employer’s duty of care towards an employee is assessed in the same way whether the claim relates to exposure to ongoing stressful circumstances or to an isolated stressful episode, such as groundless disciplinary proceedings.77 However, it would not normally be foreseeable that the experience of a single episode would cause the employee to suffer psychiatric injury, as opposed simply to distress and annoyance, unless there were indications of which the employer should have been aware of the employee’s pre-existing vulnerability to psychiatric harm.78 In workplaces which are known to present extraordinary stresses, employers are under a duty not merely to react to complaints but to anticipate threats to their employees’ mental health by developing and providing support mechanisms. In Hartman v South Essex Mental Health and Community Care NHS Trust79 one of the claimants was a prison health care officer whose job included the retrieval of bodies of prisoners who had committed suicide. The court held these traumatic experiences were “something specific about the job” which obliged the employer to devise and implement a system for dealing with foreseeable risk of psychiatric injury to its employees.80 The employer’s duty is not necessarily to ensure that the employee’s needs are

73 Cross v Highlands and Islands Enterprise 2001 SLT 1060 per Lord Macfadyen at para 77; see also Taplin v Fife Council 2003 SLT 653; Chapman v Lord Advocate [2005] CSOH 148, 2006 SLT 186. 74 See e.g. McCarthy v Highland Council [2011] CSIH 51, 2012 SLT 95 where the pursuer, a teacher, was known to have been subjected to a series of violent assaults by an autistic pupil. 75 See e.g. Flood v University Court of the University of Glasgow [2010] CSIH 3, 2010 SLT 167 (where the pursuer, a university lecturer, had repeatedly intimated to her employers that her increased workload was excessive to the point of being damaging to her health); Stevenson v East Dunbartonshire 2003 SLT 97; Malone v Lord Advocate [2018] CSOH 86, 2018 SLT 1129. It is not enough, however, that the employee attributes illness to aspects of his or her work if there is “no clear evidence before [the employer] that the job was objectively likely to be harmful to his mental health”: Cross v Highlands and Islands Enterprise 2001 SLT 1060 per Lord Macfadyen at para 77. 76 Cross v Highlands and Islands Enterprise 2001 SLT 1060 per Lord Macfadyen at para 68. 77 Yapp v Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2014] EWCA Civ 1512, [2015] IRLR 112. 78 Yapp v Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2014] EWCA Civ 1512, [2015] IRLR 112 per Underhill LJ at para 125, considering it “exceptional that an apparently robust employee, with no history of any psychiatric ill-health, will develop a depressive illness as a result even of a very serious setback at work”. See also Piepenbrock v London School of Economics and Political Science [2018] EWHC 2572 (QB), [2018] ELR 596. 79 [2005] EWCA Civ 6, [2005] ICR 782. 80 [2005] EWCA Civ 6, [2005] ICR 782 per Scott Baker LJ at para 136.

Liability of Employers to Employees   403

met by support in-house, however. In Pratt v Scottish Ministers81 the pursuer, a prison officer, claimed to have suffered psychiatric injury after breaking up a fight in which he ingested blood from a prisoner known to be an intravenous drug user. He was not referred to the prison’s in-house care team, which in any event had no specialism in dealing with issues of this type, but the employer was aware that the pursuer had presented himself immediately after the incident to his GP and to a clinic at the nearest infectious diseases unit and that he was receiving advice from it. In these circumstances the court held that there was no reason for the employer to believe that “it would do any good”82 to refer the pursuer for “low level emotional support” from its own in-house counselling service in addition.83 It was not therefore at fault for failing to do so. Employers’ duties under the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 197484 include responsibility for employees’ mental health and, in terms of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999,85 they are required to undertake a “suitable and sufficient” risk assessment of threats to health and safety including mental health. Compliance with these provisions does not necessarily entail failure of an employee’s common law claim. Similarly, non-compliance does not of itself guarantee its success, but may provide evidence indicating breach of the common law duty of care, in particular if no assessment has been performed when an employee returns to work after an absence due to mental health problems. Even if foreseeability of psychiatric injury is established, an employee must show in addition that the employer breached its duty of care by unreasonable failure to adopt a course of action that would have prevented the employee succumbing to that injury. The court must “consider what steps the employer could be reasonably be expected to take once he was aware of that risk and whether they would have been effective”.86 In McCarthy v Highland Council,87 the pursuer suffered psychiatric injury after being exposed to physical violence on several occasions in the school where she taught. Her assailant was an autistic thirteen-year-old boy. The court was

81 [2013] CSIH 17, 2013 SLT 590. 82 [2013] CSIH 17, 2013 SLT 590 per Lord Glennie at para 72. 83 Contrast Pratt with Fryers v Belfast Health & Social Care Trust [2009] NICA 57, in which the fear of infection followed from the claimant pricking his finger on a used injection needle. Although the injury was trivial in itself, the court held that the psychiatric harm which ensued was compensatable as deriving from physical injury. 84 Note that in terms of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 s 47, as amended by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 s 69(3), regulations governing safety in the workplace do not of themselves confer a right of action in civil proceedings unless specific provision is made to this effect. See para 12.31 below. 85 SI 1999/3242 reg 3. 86 Barber v Somerset County Council [2004] UKHL 13, [2004] 1 WLR 1089 per Lord Rodger at para 18. 87 [2011] CSIH 51, 2012 SLT 95.

12.22

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12.24

satisfied that the school’s head teacher had been put on notice of the dangerous situation and that the school might reasonably have been expected to appoint a male support worker to work with the child on a one-on-one basis. If it had done so, this would, on a balance of probabilities, have protected the pursuer either wholly or to a significant extent from the distress and injury suffered following the subsequent attacks. In other words, it was established not only that there had been a breach of duty but also that this had caused the injury. Proving causation may be challenging where psychiatric injury has allegedly developed over a protracted period, during which time the victim may have been affected by any number of other environmental factors. The difficulties of proof which this presents were manifest in Cross v Highlands and Islands Enterprise,88 in which Mr Cross committed suicide after a prolonged period of depression and having complained that he could not cope with work pressures. It was clear that he suffered from a major depressive disorder, but his own perception that he could not cope with the professional demands made of him did not necessarily mean that his working conditions were the root cause of his depression. As Lord Macfadyen explained:89 “[T]he relationship between work conditions and depressive illness is potentially complex. It was not, I think, disputed that stressful working conditions can cause a person to develop a depressive illness. Conversely, I do not consider that it was seriously questioned that depressive illness can affect adversely a person’s ability to cope with his work . . . If it had been established that before he became depressed James Cross was struggling to cope with a job which placed on him responsibilities the nature and scope of which were beyond his capacity and experience and for which he was inadequately trained; that the staff resources available to him, including secretarial and administrative support, were inadequate; and that the resulting difficulties were compounded by the humiliating experience of having his work regularly and repeatedly rejected by the chief executive, and then, when finalised, rejected or subjected to unreasonable criticism by members of the board of WIE, it might have been reasonable to conclude that it was probably those stressful circumstances that precipitated the depression, rather than depression that led him to feel that he was not coping with his job . . . [H]owever, I am of opinion that it has not been established that in those ways the conditions in which James Cross worked were such as to be objectively likely to precipitate depression.”

Proof of causation was also a hurdle for the pursuer in Pratt v Scottish Ministers, discussed above,90 in which, even if the pursuer had established 88 2001 SLT 1060. 89 2001 SLT 1060 per Lord Macfadyen at para 48. 90 [2013] CSIH 17, 2013 SLT 590; see para 12.21.

Liability of Employers to Employees   405

that his employers were under a duty to provide him with emotional support, he was unable to show that this would have prevented or alleviated the illness to which he fell prey. A feature of Walker v Northumberland County Council, discussed above,91 was that the plaintiff’s duties appeared to have become more onerous over the years, with a significantly growing case load that went well beyond what was originally in the contemplation of the parties when they entered into the contract of employment.92 In Barber v Somerset County Council,93 Lord Rodger expressed disquiet regarding a possible tension between the delictual duty imposed upon the employer and the terms of the contract of employment, namely that, on the intimation of stress an employer’s duty of care requires that employees should be relieved of, or assisted with, their normal contractual duties. In other words recognition of a delictual duty of care might in practice entail that contractual terms should be varied at the expense of the employer. These concerns were cited by the High Court of Australia in Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd in which it was stated that:94 “[I]t is only when the contractual position between the parties (including the implied duty of trust and confidence between them) is explored fully along with the relevant statutory framework that it would be possible to give appropriate content to the duty of reasonable care upon which an employee claiming damages for negligent infliction of psychiatric injury at work would seek to rely.”

The UK courts have yet to explore properly the interrelationship between delictual and contractual obligations in the manner Lord Rodger recommended,95 but commentary north of the border has doubted whether the scope of duty should be narrowed by excluding claims that stress has been caused by performance of agreed contractual duties. Brodie has argued that this is tantamount to the employer “benefiting from a defence along the lines of volenti non fit injuria”, a defence that now plays “an almost invisible role in the workplace” in relation to physical injury except in “truly exceptional circumstances”.96

91 [1995] 1 All ER 737, [1995] ICR 702; see para 12.18 above. 92 See also Flood v University Court of the University of Glasgow [2010] CSIH 3, 2010 SLT 167, a claim brought by a lecturer who alleged that, after merger of her college with a university, her workload steadily increased until it equalled that normally carried out by 3.5 employees; i.e. it greatly exceeded the contractual commitments originally agreed. 93 [2004] UKHL 13, [2004] 1 WLR 1089 at paras 32–35. 94 [2005] HCA 15, (2005) 214 ALR 355 at para 24. For discussion, see H Teff, Causing Psychiatric and Emotional Harm (2009) 163–164. 95 Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd was distinguished in Garrod v North Devon NHS Primary Care Trust [2006] EWHC 850, [2007] PIQR Q1. 96 D Brodie, “Volenti strikes back?” (2012) 109 Employment Law Bulletin 4 at 6. On volenti in relation to physical injuries in the workplace, see paras 29.16–29.18 below.

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D. DUTY IN REGARD TO FINANCIAL LOSS 12.26

There is nothing sufficiently distinctive about the employment relationship or the contract of employment to give rise to a general positive duty on the part of employers to protect employees against pure economic loss. This was demonstrated in James-Bowen v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, discussed in chapter 9,97 in which it was held that, in the Commissioner’s conduct of litigation holding her vicariously liable for the alleged misconduct of police officers, there was no duty to the officers to exercise due care in protecting their reputations and financial interests. Notwithstanding this general rule, however, there are certain specific types of interaction with or about employees in which a duty is imposed upon employers to take care that employees’ financial interests are not adversely affected.

(1) Provision of financial advice 12.27

12.28

An employer may, in limited circumstances, undertake a duty to exercise care in providing employees with financial advice. Duty has been recognised where employers have explicitly assumed responsibility to supply advice relating to employees’ financial interests and that advice is relied upon by those employees in managing their affairs. In Lennon v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,98 an employer led an employee to believe that he could rely upon its advice regarding his entitlement to allowances on transfer between different police forces, and it was deemed thereby to have undertaken a duty to advise him with due care. That duty was breached by the employer’s failure to take into account obviously relevant factors in advising the employee, and the employer was therefore liable when the employee followed that advice to his financial disadvantage. However, as the judgment in Lennon makes clear,99 there is no positive duty to offer financial advice absent an assumption of responsibility, express or implied, on the part of the employer. Nor is there a general obligation to warn of the risk of financial loss where advice has not been asked for and there has been no encouragement from the employer that the employee should look to it for such advice. In Lennon the court distinguished the case of Outram v Academy Plastics Ltd100 in which an employer had not warned an employee of the disadvantages of failing to rejoin the   97   98   99 100

[2018] UKSC 40, [2018] 1 WLR 4021; see para 9.37 above. [2004] EWCA Civ 130, [2004] 1 WLR 2594. [2004] EWCA Civ 130, [2004] 1 WLR 2594 per Mummery LJ at paras 33–34. [2001] ICR 367. See also Crossley v Faithful & Gould Holdings Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 293, [2004] 4 All ER 447; Reid v Rush & Tompkins Group plc [1990] 1 WLR 212 (holding that the employer owed no duty to warn an employee posted overseas that he required extended personal accident insurance. The employee could not therefore recover his losses when he was left uninsured after being involved in a road-traffic accident caused by an unknown driver in a jurisdiction where there was no system of compulsory third-party motor insurance or institutions such as the Motor Insurers’ Bureau).

Liability of Employers to Employees   407

employer’s pension scheme after a gap in service, causing the employee’s widow a significant loss in pension benefits. There was no indication that the employee was unaware of the terms of the scheme or had asked the employer for advice about his pension. Hence no duty on the employer was held to exist.

(2) Misinformation about the employee As recognised in Spring v Guardian Assurance plc,101 and discussed at greater length in chapter 5,102 employers are under a duty not to convey misleading information about employees, or former employees, in the form of employment references or similar communications with new employers or potential new employers. Employers are required to exercise “reasonable care and skill” in regard to the accuracy of any facts which “either (1) are communicated to the recipient of the reference from which he may form an adverse opinion of the employee, or (2) are the basis of an adverse opinion expressed by the employer himself about the employee”.103 Employers may therefore be found liable where their failure to exercise this level of care causes employees to suffer financial loss, or loss of financial opportunity.

12.29

E. BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY (1) The statutory duties In addition to their common law obligations to protect the safety of their workforce, employers are also subject to a number of statutory obligations, some of which are enforceable by way of a private law right of action. Among the most prominent is the obligation incumbent upon employers in terms of the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960. As discussed further in chapter 25, this requires employers to take “such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable” to see that persons entering the employment premises, including employees, are not exposed to dangers “due to the state of the premises”.104 A range of further statutory provisions deal with hazards in the workplace. The Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, still in force, was an important legislative landmark, setting out the modern framework of employers’ duties, including, first and foremost, a duty “to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work of all . . . employees”.105 Today,

101 102 103 104 105

[1995] 2 AC 296. See paras 5.51–5.54 above. [1995] 2 AC 296 per Lord Goff at 320. Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 s 2(1). Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 s 2.

12.30

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12.32

12.33

following amendment of the 1974 Act by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, those duties are enforced primarily by public law sanctions, and section 47(1)106 expressly provides that an employer’s failure to comply does not confer upon the employee a right of action in civil proceedings. The result is that the employees will in most cases have to fall back on the law of negligence to establish a claim. The change applies to breaches of statutory duty occurring after the commencement of the Act, which was on 1 October 2013, and it remains possible that industrial diseases caused by the employer’s conduct prior to that date, and which have been slow to emerge, may continue to be the subject of a direct claim for breach of statutory duty. The 1974 Act also empowers the Secretary of State to establish a system of regulations and codes of practice in order to provide in more detail for health and safety in specific contexts.107 Prior to 2013, breach of a duty imposed by health and safety regulations was actionable except in so far as the regulations provided otherwise, but again, following the 2013 amendments to the 1974 Act, breach is no longer civilly actionable except to the extent that regulations themselves so provide (which they rarely do).108 The possibilities for establishing a civil claim on the basis of breach of statutory duty have thus been substantially reduced. The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999109 remain an important source of employer’s duties in regard to key matters such as the obligation to undertake appropriate risk assessments.110 Although in their original wording they expressly precluded a right of civil action,111 that position was reversed by amendment in 2003.112 The effect was short-lived. While the impact of the 2013 reforms is not spelled out, it would appear that the right of civil action has been removed; that right is expressly preserved only in relation to new or expectant mothers, implying that for other claimants the Regulations are no longer a source of civil liability.113

106 As amended by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 s 69(2). 107 Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 s 15. 108 Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 s 47(2), as amended by Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 s 69(3). Previously s 47(2) had provided that breach of regulations made under the Act was actionable unless the regulations provided otherwise. 109 SI 1999/3242 (the main instrument implementing European Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work). 110 SI 1999/3242, reg 3. 111 SI 1999/3242, reg 22. 112 Management of Health and Safety at Work and Fire Precautions (Workplace) (Amendment) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/2457, reg 6. 113 Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (Civil Liability) (Exceptions) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/1667, reg 3.

Liability of Employers to Employees   409

(2) Breach of statutory duty as evidence of liability at common law This shift in 2013 from a presumption of actionability to one of nonactionability has meant that breach of the employer’s statutory duties is now less likely to serve as a direct basis for delictual liability. However, the fact that a statutory duty has not been performed remains relevant evidence in considering whether an employer’s common law duty has been breached.114 It is open to employees to argue that employers who failed to comply with statutory safety standards failed to take reasonable care for their employees’ safety in terms of the law of negligence. A practical difference, however, is that whereas statutory regulations will often place the onus on the employer to show that it was not reasonably practicable to take effective safety precautions, the law of negligence leaves the onus upon the employee to establish that the employer failed to meet the requisite standard of care. The role of statutory duties in informing the content of common law duty was considered by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v Cordia (Services) LLP.115 The pursuer slipped on an icy path on her way to a place of work. The accident occurred in 2010, before the 2013 reform, and so she was successful in claiming compensation for breach of regulation 3(1) of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999116 (failure to conduct an adequate risk assessment) and regulation 4(1) of the Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992117 (failure to provide suitable footwear). In addition, the pursuer claimed that her employers had breached their common law duty of care in failing to provide her with footwear suitable for the weather conditions. In addressing this issue, the Supreme Court made it clear that: “The expansion of the statutory duties imposed on employers in the field of health and safety has given rise to a body of knowledge and experience in this field, which . . . creates the context in which the court has to assess an employer’s performance of its common law duty of care.”118 Thus the “context” against which the employer’s conduct was to be judged in this case included the statutory requirement to carry out a risk assessment for the purpose of identifying threats to the employee’s safety and informing itself as to the reasonable precautions available to minimise that risk – in this case the provision of readily obtainable footwear attachments. In those circumstances, the Lord

114 McMullan v Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co Ltd 1933 SC (HL) 64; see also discussion by Lord Dyson in Baker v Quantum Clothing Group Ltd [2011] UKSC 17, [2011] 1 WLR 1003 at para 125. 115 [2016] UKSC 6, 2016 SC (UKSC) 59. 116 SI 1999/3242. 117 SI 1992/2966. 118 [2016] UKSC 6, 2016 SC (UKSC) 59 per Lord Reed and Lord Hodge at para 64.

12.34

12.35

410   The Law of Delict in Scotland

Ordinary had been entitled to conclude that the employer was negligent in failing to provide the pursuer with such attachments.119 Kennedy seems to suggest therefore that, although as a general rule statutory obligations on the employer may no longer be directly actionable in relation to incidents occurring after 2013, their content will continue to be a factor in determining the extent of the employer’s common law duty to take care for the safety of its employees.

(3) Defective equipment 12.36

12.37

While the common law obligation to provide “adequate material” requires the employer to apply no more than reasonable care, not to guarantee safety, the Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 extends liability in a significant way. Section 1(1) deems the employer to have been at fault where an employee suffers injury in the workplace due to a defect in equipment provided by his or her employer, even although the defect is attributable wholly or partly to the fault of a “third party”. After the enactment of this legislation it thus became impossible for employers to argue, as was done successfully in Davie v New Merton Board Mills Ltd,120 that they had discharged their duty by procuring equipment from a reputable source and that a latent defect had not been discoverable. As in the common law, this statutory duty is non-delegable. “Equipment” is defined non-exhaustively in the 1969 Act as including “any plant and machinery, vehicle, aircraft and clothing”,121 and the definition has been held to extend to cleaning materials,122 material on which employees have been working,123 and also to vehicles and aircraft, and unseaworthy ships.124 The Act requires the pursuer to demonstrate that personal injury was caused by a “defect”, meaning that there was something intrinsically wrong with the equipment, rather than the equipment simply being unsuitable for the task in question. There is no requirement that the third party responsible for the defect be identified, and indeed no limitation on the status of such third parties, but nonetheless it must be shown that the defect was attributable to fault, meaning in this context “negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission which gives rise to liability in tort in England and Wales or which is wrongful and

119 Although the common law case ultimately failed on causation. See discussion at [2016] UKSC 6, 2016 SC (UKSC) 59 per Lord Reed and Lord Hodge at paras 110–113 and 121. 120 [1959] AC 604. 121 Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 s 1(3). 122 Ralston v Greater Glasgow Health Board 1987 SLT 386 (carbolic soap). 123 Knowles v Liverpool City Council [1993] 1 WLR 1428 (flagstones). 124 Coltman v Bibby Tankers Ltd [1988] AC 276.

Liability of Employers to Employees   411

gives rise to liability in damages in Scotland”.125 The rules of contributory negligence are also left in place.126 The scope of the 1969 Act was left unaffected by the 2013 reform.127

125 Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 s 1(3). 126 Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 s 1(3). 127 The 1969 Act is not included in the list of relevant statutory provisions in Sch 1 to the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 to which the revised wording of s 47 now applies. It is worth adding that the practical importance of the 1969 Act was reduced for a time by the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1992, SI 1992/2932, later replaced by the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998, SI 1998/2306, which impose an absolute duty on the employer to provide safe equipment, irrespective of the fault of the employer or third parties. Until 2013 the 1998 Regulations were directly actionable at the instance of the employee but, as discussed above, it is no longer possible to assert a civil right of action based upon breach of statutory regulations unless the regulations so provide, which the 1998 Regulations do not.

PART III

CAUSATION AND REMOTENESS

Chapter 13

Factual Causation

Para A. INTRODUCTION����������������������������������������������������������������� 13.01 B. THE BUT-FOR TEST����������������������������������������������������������� 13.04 (1) Some examples����������������������������������������������������������������� 13.05 (2) The pursuer’s hypothetical response to non-negligence������� 13.08 (3) Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������ 13.10 C. MULTIPLE CAUSES: GENERAL PRINCIPLES (1) “Indivisible” and “divisible” harm������������������������������������� 13.11 (2) Causes operating in combination (a) Divisible harm: “material” contribution by multiple wrongdoers����������������������������������������������������������������� 13.13 (b) Indivisible harm: wrongdoers acting in concert������������� 13.15 (c) Indivisible harm: independent wrongful acts����������������� 13.16 (3) Competing sources of the same causal agent���������������������� 13.22 (4) Apportionment of liability������������������������������������������������� 13.24 D. MULTIPLE CAUSES: INDUSTRIAL DISEASES (1) Two additional routes for establishing causation����������������� 13.28 (2) The first route: material contribution to harm�������������������� 13.29 (3) The second route: material increase in risk (a) Prolongation of exposure to a single harmful agent: McGhee v National Coal Board������������������������������������� 13.32 (b) Multiple wrongdoers exposing pursuer to a single harmful agent: The Fairchild principle�������������������������� 13.37 (c) Delictual and non-delictual exposure to a single noxious agent ������������������������������������������������������������� 13.45 (4) Industrial diseases: apportionment of liability��������������������� 13.47 (a) The English approach������������������������������������������������� 13.48 (b) The Scottish approach������������������������������������������������ 13.55 (c) Aggravation of existing condition��������������������������������� 13.61 (5) Disparate causal agents: the but-for test and doubling of risk������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.63 (a) The “doubles the risk” test������������������������������������������ 13.64 (b) Multiple defenders������������������������������������������������������ 13.67 E. THE MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION TEST AND MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE���������������������������������������������������� 13.69

415

416   The Law of Delict in Scotland

F. INDEPENDENT SUPERVENING CAUSES (1) Consecutive causes with equivalent potential impact����������� 13.76 (2) Supervening events diminishing impact of initial harm�������� 13.78 (3) Impact of wrongdoing diminished by normal “vicissitudes of life”����������������������������������������������������������� 13.79 G. CHESTER v AFSHAR������������������������������������������������������������ 13.82 H. LOSS OF A CHANCE������������������������������������������������������������ 13.87 (1) Loss of a medical chance��������������������������������������������������� 13.88 (2) Loss of a commercial chance��������������������������������������������� 13.96 (3) Loss of a chance in litigation���������������������������������������������13.100

A. INTRODUCTION 13.01

13.02

Fundamental to delictual liability is a causal link between the defender’s alleged wrongdoing and the loss or injury suffered by the pursuer. Often that causal link is readily made out, so that cases in which it is contentious are in a minority. As a general rule, proof of causation is likely to cause few problems where the defender’s conduct was intentional. Typically where complex issues of causation arise, the defender’s wrongdoing has taken the form of negligence or contravention of statutory duties. In older case law, the causal enquiry was often seen as a matter of simple “common sense”,1 to be “understood as the man in the street, and not as either the scientist or the metaphysician, would understand it”.2 Even in the twenty-first century, Lord Hoffmann has written, extra-judicially, that the courts are wary of overarching theories of causation or “attempts at generalisation”, and that “the intuitions upon which judges rely to make choices within the space allowed them by precedent and statute usually have impure origins, not easily capable of being subsumed in any consistent formula”.3 Yet, with increasingly complex scientific evidence in play, particularly in personal injury actions and in relation to the aetiology of disease, work remains to be done on the implications of new circumstances and challenges.4 Indeed there has been much debate in the academic press in recent years as to the competing merits of different approaches to these problems. This book cannot take up that discussion in detail, and readers are referred to specialist texts.5  1 See Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd [1953] AC 663 per Lord Reid at 681.  2 Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co Ltd v Minister of War Transport [1942] AC 691 per Lord Wright at 706.   3 (2017) 133 LQR 516 at 516, reviewing S Steel, Proof of Causation in Tort Law (2015).  4 International Energy Group Ltd v Zurich Insurance plc [2015] UKSC 33, [2016] AC 509 per Lord Mance at para 1. See also Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134 per Lord Hope at para 83, doubting the value of common sense “on its own” and without “more guidance”.   5 See e.g. R Goldberg (ed), Perspectives on Causation (2011); S Steel, Proof of Causation in Tort Law (2015); S Green, Causation in Negligence (2015); G Turton, Evidential Uncertainty in Causation in Negligence (2016); M Hogg, “The Role of Causation in Delict” 2005 JR 89; J Stapleton, “Unnecessary Causes” (2013) 129 LQR 39.

Factual Causation   417

The traditional analysis6 presents the causation enquiry as having two facets. The first considers whether the defender’s conduct was a factual cause of the harm or injury: was it part of a sequence of events linking the conduct to the harm, without which the harm would not have occurred? The second acknowledges a causal nexus between the defender’s conduct and the harm to the pursuer but goes on to assess whether, as a matter of legal policy, the defender should be held responsible. This first aspect of the causation enquiry is the subject of the present chapter; the second will be explored in the next.

13.03

B. THE BUT-FOR TEST The usual starting point in determining factual causation is the so-called “but-for” test. This is satisfied if, on the balance of probabilities, the harm to the pursuer would not have occurred “but for” the defender’s wrongdoing.7 The test can also be framed negatively; it is not met where the pursuer would have suffered the same harm even if the defender had not committed the wrongdoing. The Latin tag given to a relevant cause is a causa sine qua non, meaning a cause without which the thing would not have happened. The test is thus counterfactual. In effect it requires the court to form a view, on the balance of probabilities, as to a set of events that did not occur, since a comparison must be attempted between what actually happened and a hypothetical alternative – what is likely to have happened had the defender not committed the alleged wrong.

13.04

(1) Some examples A straightforward example in which, after hearing the facts, the court applied this test and held causation not to have been established is Kay’s Tutor v Ayrshire and Arran Health Board.8 The defenders in that case had unarguably been negligent in administering an overdose of penicillin to a small child suffering from pneumococcal meningitis. The child subsequently became deaf, but the weight of the evidence pointed to the illness itself as the cause of deafness rather than the overdose; in other words, it could not be shown that, but for the negligence, the deafness would not have occurred anyway. In a different context, in Horsley v MacLaren (The Ogopogo)9 the defendant   6 It may be noted, however, that early textbooks gave no detailed consideration to the topic of causation. Guthrie Smith did not include a chapter on causation in his Treatise on the Law of Reparation (1864) or The Law of Damages (1889), nor was detailed treatment included in successive editions of Glegg’s Practical Treatise on the Law of Reparation (1892, 1905, 1938, and 1955).  7 See Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co [2002] UKHL 19, [2002] 2 AC 883 per Lord Nicholls at para 73.   8 1987 SC (HL) 145.   9 [1971] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 410 (Supreme Court of Canada).

13.05

418   The Law of Delict in Scotland

13.06

13.07

boat captain’s mismanagement of the rescue of a man overboard did not render him liable for the man’s death, since the court accepted the evidence to the effect that the victim had in all likelihood died instantly on his immersion in the water; it could not be said that, but for the negligent delay in rescuing him, the victim would not have died anyway. The causal link is more likely to be contentious where the defender’s conduct has taken the form of a wrongful omission rather than active conduct. Here too the but-for test operates, by asking: “Would the harm have been suffered just the same if the defendant had behaved properly?”10 The most frequently cited example is Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee.11 The plaintiff’s husband was a night watchman who had been on duty over New Year’s Eve. He had become rapidly unwell after drinking tea which, unknown to him, was contaminated with arsenic, and he had presented himself at the casualty department of the defendant’s hospital. The duty medical officer was called, but he did not attend, suspecting that overindulgence was the cause of the patient’s nausea, and directed that the patient should to go home to bed and call his own doctor. The patient died a few hours later. The court had little hesitation in holding that the doctor’s failure to attend the patient was negligent but also held that, on the balance of probabilities, even if the doctor had treated him promptly, the patient could not by that stage have been saved from the effects of the arsenic poisoning. The action was therefore dismissed. By contrast, in Andrews v Greater Glasgow Health Board12 a person died of acute mesenteric ischaemia, having previously been misdiagnosed with gastroenteritis and sent home from a hospital Accident and Emergency Department. This caused a 24-hour delay in her admission as an in-patient, during which time her condition rapidly deteriorated. The court accepted evidence that, but for the negligent delay in proper diagnosis, it was more likely than not that she would have been in hospital at the point when she became seriously unwell, and that her condition would have been identified and successfully treated. The but-for test was therefore satisfied.

10 Weir, Introduction to Tort Law 71. 11 [1969] 1 QB 428. For a further example, see Calvert v William Hill Credit Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 1427, [2009] Ch 330, in which the claimant, a compulsive gambler, entered into an exclusion agreement with the defendants, his bookmakers, by which they bound themselves to refuse further bets. Their employees failed to honour this and as a result the claimant placed large bets, sustaining significant losses which he sought to recover from the defendants. It was accepted that the defendants had owed the claimant a duty to prevent him gambling with them, but there was no duty to preventing him gambling with other bookmakers, and therefore the claim failed on causation grounds. Even if the defendants had not breached their duty to prevent him gambling with them, the claimant would in all probability have sustained the equivalent loss by betting with the defendants’ competitors. 12 [2019] CSOH 31, 2019 SLT 727; see also Schembri v Marshall [2020] EWCA Civ 358, [2020] PIQR P16, [2020] Med LR 240, in which the deceased’s prospects of survival had she been appropriately diagnosed and admitted to hospital would have been “very good indeed”.

Factual Causation   419

(2) The pursuer’s hypothetical response to non-negligence Where appropriate evidence is available, the counterfactual implicit in the but-for test is capable of factoring in the pursuer’s hypothetical response had the defender not acted negligently. Where the defender’s alleged negligence takes the form of a culpable omission to provide the wherewithal to avert danger, the but-for test is not met if it can be shown that the pursuer would not have used the safety device in question even if it had been provided. In McWilliams v Sir William Arrol & Co Ltd13 the defender had breached its common law and statutory duty to provide a safety harness for the pursuer’s husband, a shipyard worker who fell to his death while employed in building a tall structure. The defender was not, however, held liable because evidence was led that the deceased and his colleagues had preferred to work without such harnesses even when they were provided, and there was no indication that the deceased would have altered this practice if a harness been available on the day of the accident. On the balance of probabilities, therefore, the deceased would have fallen anyway, and it could not be said that, but for the employer’s negligence, he would not have been killed. The result of this case would have been different if the employer’s duty had extended not only to providing a harness but to ensuring that employees wore it, but the House of Lords did not recognise duty as extending this far. Similarly, where the defender’s wrongdoing takes the form of a failure to provide a warning, liability is not established if the court is satisfied that the pursuer would not in any event have heeded the warning. In Worsley v Tambrands,14 the claimant alleged that the defendants’ brand of tampon had been defective within the meaning of section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987, because a leaflet provided with the product had not featured a sufficiently conspicuous warning that users might suffer toxic-shock syndrome, a condition by which she had been seriously affected. The court did not in the end regard the leaflet as inadequate, but even if it had done so, it formed the view that a different design or content would not have caused the claimant to act differently, and she would not have sought and received effective medical care sooner. Thus, even if the product had been categorised as defective due to the format of the warning, it could not be said to have caused the injury to the claimant; the harm would have been suffered just the same.

13.08

13.09

(3) Evaluation The but-for test therefore assists in filtering out factors that have had no causal impact in bringing about an alleged harm. It functions, however, in a rudimentary way and it is not expected to provide “infallible threshold guidance

13 1962 SC (HL) 70. 14 [2000] PIQR P95; see also Bloxom v Bloxom 512 So 2d 839 (La 1987).

13.10

420   The Law of Delict in Scotland

on causal connection for every tort in every circumstance”.15 It gives no guidance on relative importance where a sequence of factors has culminated in a detrimental outcome, a problem discussed in the next chapter. Moreover, the results of the but-for test may be over-exclusionary, denying the causal link where two or more factors have combined to cause harm, or where there was more than one episode of culpable conduct which could, of itself, have produced harm (so-called “overdetermined” causation). In these more complex fact patterns a more nuanced approach to causation is therefore required, as discussed in the next sections.

C. MULTIPLE CAUSES: GENERAL PRINCIPLES (1) “Indivisible” and “divisible” harm 13.11

13.12

For the purposes of this and the next section it is helpful to note a distinction, applied in English case law, between “indivisible” and “divisible” harms.16 A harm or injury is “indivisible” if it cannot be divided into gradations of severity attributable to the relative impact of different causal factors. Broken bones suffered in a road traffic accident caused by the negligence of more than one driver provide an obvious example of an indivisible injury; for it is not normally possible to prove that a fracture was exacerbated by the negligence of one driver over the other. The death of the victim is the ultimate indivisible injury.17 Illnesses and disease may likewise develop in such a way that they can be categorised as indivisible harm. Mesothelioma, the malignant disease that afflicted the employees in the leading case of Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd,18 is an example. The risk of developing mesothelioma may vary according to the duration and intensity of the victim’s various exposures to asbestos, but once the disease has been triggered it is equally dangerous in its effects whatever the level of the patient’s previous contact with asbestos. By contrast, in the case of some other forms of injury or disease, increased exposure not only increases the risk that the subject will suffer harm but also affects the intensity with which the harm is experienced. Such dose-related harms can be regarded as “divisible”, in the sense that the extent to which respective defendants exposed the claimant to the harmful substance has

15 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co [2002] UKHL 19, [2002] 2 AC 883. 16 See e.g. Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd [2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 2 AC 229 per Lord Phillips at paras 12–14. 17 See Barker v Corus UK Ltd [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572 per Lady Hale at para 122. 18 [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32. See also Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd [2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 2 AC 229 per Lord Phillips at para 12, instancing malaria as an indivisible harm. The trigger for malaria may be a single mosquito bite. The risk of contracting the disease may increase in relation to the patient’s periods of exposure to mosquitoes, but once the disease has taken hold the intensity or frequency of such exposure has no effect on the gravity of the symptoms.

Factual Causation   421

a proportionate bearing on the intensity with which the harm is suffered. Certain asbestos-related illnesses such as asbestosis and pneumoconiosis fall within this category, in that the degree to which sufferers were exposed to asbestos affects not only the likelihood that the diseases will occur but also the severity of the symptoms.19 The same is true of industrial injuries such as noise-related hearing loss20 or vibration white finger.21 The injury represented by such diseases may therefore be regarded as divisible, in the sense that it is possible to apportion responsibility between different defendants by reference to the extent to which the respective defendants exposed the claimant to the harmful activity or substance.22

(2) Causes operating in combination (a) Divisible harm: “material” contribution by multiple wrongdoers The nineteenth-century case of Duke of Buccleuch v Cowan23 offers a straightforward example of a divisible harm, where the wrongdoing of several defenders had a cumulative effect. The defenders were the operators of six separate paper mills which were all concurrently discharging effluent into a stream. The resultant pollution would therefore have been made more or less severe according to the quantity of pollutant emitted by each individual defender. The downstream proprietors sought interdict against the various mill operators to prevent them from disposing of their waste in this way. The but-for test would plainly not have been satisfied by any of the individual defenders in respect of the total damage suffered, since some pollution of the pursuers’ water supply would likely have occurred in any event, even without the input of one of the six. All that could therefore be said was that the input of any given defender was a but-for cause of a material part of the total pollution damage: but for the defender’s activities, the relevant proportion of the damage would not have occurred. In these circumstances the court held that the relevant question for the court to consider was whether the individual

19 As in e.g. Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd [2000] ICR 1086. See G W Gibbs, “Epidemiology and Risk Assessment”, in J E Craighead and A R Gibbs (eds), Asbestos and Its Diseases (2008) 94. 20 As in e.g. Thompson v Smiths Shiprepairers (North Shields) Ltd [1984] QB 405. 21 As in e.g. Allen v British Rail Engineering Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 242, [2001] ICR 942. 22 It has been suggested that: “Where there are causes concurrent in time, the likelihood is that a resulting injury will be indivisible; but where causes are sequential in time, it is not likely that an injury will be truly indivisible especially if . . . the injury is a disease which can get worse with cumulative exposure”: see Milner v Humphreys and Glasgow Ltd, unreported, QBD, 24 November 1998, per Longmore J, as cited in Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd [2000] ICR 1086 per Stuart-Smith LJ at para 17, and noted in Wright v Stoddard International plc [2007] CSOH 173, 2008 Rep LR 2 per Lord Uist at para 125. However, this distinction based upon sequential and concurrent causes is far from infallible and therefore potentially misleading in this connection. 23 (1866) 5 M 214, affd (1876) 4 R (HL) 14.

13.13

422   The Law of Delict in Scotland

13.14

proprietors had “materially contributed”24 to the pollution of the stream, and an action for interdict could competently be brought against all who had done so. Duke of Buccleuch v Cowan was an action for interdict only. Subsequent case law indicated, however, that a defender who had made a comparable “material contribution” to the occurrence of harm, such as pollution of a water source, was “versans in illicito” and therefore to be held jointly and severally liable, along with those responsible for other contributions, for the total damage that ensued.25 Public law controls now mean that cases involving water pollution from multiple sources are unlikely to arise, but the reasoning employed continues to hold good. Hence, similarly, where a person succumbs to a “divisible” industrial disease as a result of exposure to harmful substances in a number of different workplaces, each of the various employers is regarded as having made a “material contribution” to the onset of harm.26 In Scotland, if not in England, liability has traditionally been regarded as arising jointly and severally between all those who have made such a contribution, as discussed in greater detail below.27

(b) Indivisible harm: wrongdoers acting in concert 13.15

The but-for test is similarly inadequate to deal with the complexity of multiple wrongdoing where indivisible harm is suffered as a result of the wrongdoing of two or more persons acting in concert. It may be impossible to prove whether, but for the wrongdoing of any particular defender, the pursuer would have suffered injury. Nonetheless, as each is acting in concert with the others, each is regarded as having caused the injury and is held jointly and severally liable for the whole. So where, for example, two assailants cause injuries that cannot be attributed to one assailant rather than the other, a strict application of the but-for test would deny that either caused the injury. The law, however, is that both wrongdoers are deemed to have caused the injury. An illustration is found in Arneil v Paterson,28 in which two separately-owned dogs had together worried a flock of sheep, injuring some and killing ten. It was, apparently, impossible to determine the level of injuries inflicted by the individual dogs, but this was judged to be a concerted attack in which both dogs were instrumental, rendering the owners of each of the dogs jointly and severally liable for the whole amount of damage. 24 On the language of “material contribution”, see also Countess of Seafield v Kemp (1899) 1 F 402 per Lord President Robertson at 409–410; Brownlie & Son v Magistrates of Barrhead 1923 SC 915, affd 1925 SC (HL) 41 (material contribution to flood damage by failure to maintain sewers). 25 Fleming v Gemmill 1908 SC 340 per Lord President Dunedin at 350. 26 See e.g. Woodland v Advocate General 2005 SCLR 163. 27 See paras 13.24–13.27 below. 28 1931 SC (HL) 117.

Factual Causation   423

(c) Indivisible harm: independent wrongful acts In other cases, a combination of independent and distinct wrongful acts operate contemporaneously or near-contemporaneously to cause a single indivisible harm. The wrongdoers may be held jointly and severally liable29 where their separate acts of wrongdoing were individually necessary causes, even although those separate acts may not have been individually sufficient to bring about the harm. A Scottish case from 1823, M’Lauchlan v Monach,30 involved injury to a pedestrian who attempted to avoid a horseman riding furiously and in doing so fell into the path of another horseman riding in the same way. The actions of both horsemen could be considered as necessary causes: but for the actions of the first horseman the injury would probably not have occurred, and the same could be said of the second. On the other hand it could not be said for sure that the actions of each were independently sufficient to cause the injury. Nonetheless, if the facts were proved, the causal impact of the conduct of both was such that they would be judged to be concurrent wrongdoers – “versantes in illicito” – and therefore equally liable for the consequences. The modern equivalent of such a scenario can be seen in shipping or road traffic accidents, where indivisible injuries are suffered as a result of the separate wrongdoing of two or more drivers. So where two drivers cause an accident by their separate acts of negligence, and the pursuer suffers a broken nose and a broken toe in the collision, it is not usually possible to prove that the broken nose was the result of driver A’s negligence while the broken toe was the result of driver B’s negligence. Instead it is normally accepted that the negligence of both drivers caused the totality of the pursuer’s injuries, rendering them jointly and severally liable.31 In Anderson v St Andrew’s Ambulance Association,32 for example, the pursuer was injured in an accident caused both by the negligence of the driver of the ambulance in which she was travelling and by the negligence of the driver of a bus with which the ambulance collided. It was held that the employers of both drivers were jointly and severally liable and bound to contribute towards the award of damages in equal measure in terms of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 section 3(1).33 Liability would of course be apportioned differently if a sequence of separate collisions caused separate and distinct injuries. In 29 And therefore bound to make contribution to any compensation awarded, in terms of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 s 3. 30 (1823) 2 S 590. 31 Example taken from Dobbs, Law of Torts § 192. 32 1943 SC 248. 33 For an example of how such joint fault interacts with contributory negligence, see Fitzgerald v Lane [1989] AC 328. The plaintiff was a pedestrian struck first by one car driven negligently and then within a few seconds by another. Both drivers were equally at fault, but since the plaintiff was judged to have been 50 per cent contributorily negligent, this meant that the two drivers were each held liable to the extent of 25 per cent of the total damage.

13.16

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13.18

such cases of identifiably separate wrongs, each driver would be liable only to the extent of the specific injury caused by that driver. Such combinations of independent wrongful acts giving rise to joint and several liability often take the form of defender A negligently creating a specific foreseeable risk to persons such as the pursuer, which risk is triggered only as the result of further negligence on the part of defender B.34 McInnes v Norwich Union Insurance Ltd35 illustrates. Driver A recklessly pulled out to overtake a series of vehicles travelling north along a trunk road, the rearmost of which was driven by driver B. As the car in which the pursuer was a passenger approached heading south, the northbound vehicles were all forced to break sharply to allow driver A’s van back into the line of traffic. Driver A managed to do this just in time to avoid impact with the pursuer’s car, and driver A drove on unscathed. Driver B, on the other hand, had left inadequate braking distance from the vehicle in front and was not paying due care to the road ahead. A glancing impact with the vehicle in front knocked driver B’s vehicle across the centre of the road, colliding with the pursuer’s car and injuring its occupants. In that scenario driver A created a foreseeable risk to other road users by his reckless overtaking, but that risk was activated by driver B’s negligent failure to pay due care to the road ahead. The actions of both were necessary factors in causing the accident, but neither would have been sufficient to cause it without the other.36 Both drivers were regarded as having caused the accident, and they were held jointly and severally liable for the pursuer’s injuries.37 34 See Grant v Sun Shipping Co Ltd 1948 SC (HL) 73 per Lord du Parcq at 94: “If the negligence or breach of duty of one person is the cause of injury to another, the wrong-doer cannot in all circumstances escape liability by proving that, though he was to blame, yet but for the negligence of a third person the injured man would not have suffered the damage of which he complains. There is abundant authority for the proposition that the mere fact that a subsequent act of negligence has been the immediate cause of disaster does not exonerate the original offender.” 35 [2012] CSOH 6A, 2012 GWD 7–131. See also Drew v Western SMT Co 1947 SC 222; Hale v Hants & Dorset Motor Services Ltd [1947] 2 All ER 628; Rouse v Squires [1973] QB 889 per Cairns LJ at 898: “If a driver so negligently manages his vehicle as to cause it to obstruct the highway and constitute a danger to other road users, including those who are driving too fast or not keeping a proper lookout, but not those who deliberately or recklessly drive into the obstruction, then the first driver’s negligence may be held to have contributed to the causation of an accident of which the immediate cause was the negligent driving of the vehicle which because of the presence of the obstruction collides with it or with some other vehicle or some other person.” 36 See also Ellerman Lines Ltd v Clyde Navigation Trs 1911 SC 122, in which shipbuilders had positioned a large warship under construction in such a way that it jutted out into the navigable channel of the River Clyde. A tugboat towing several barges attempted to circumnavigate this obstruction by steering out across the river. In consequence, two steamships required to take rapid evasive action, and they in turn collided. In setting up the initial hazard the shipbuilder created the risk that other shipping would attempt unconventional manoeuvres to avoid it, and this risk was realised by the negligent navigation of the tug. The actions of both the shipbuilder and the tugboat operator were each necessary, although not sufficient, causes of the damage to the steamships, for which they were held joint and severally liable. 37 In terms of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 s 3, both defenders were deemed 50 per cent liable.

Factual Causation   425

A further variant is where defender A negligently creates a specific foreseeable risk to persons such as P, which defender B then omits to eliminate. If that risk then eventuates, and positive action by B would have prevented it doing so, defender B’s omission is deemed to be a cause of the ensuing harm, provided that the risk was within the scope of the eventualities which defender B had a positive duty to address, and B breached the requisite standard of care in failing to do so. A sequence of this nature can be seen in Grant v Sun Shipping Co Ltd.38 The pursuer was a dock worker employed in shifting cargo on a ship belonging to defender B, as repairs were being carried out on the ship by employees of defender A. While the pursuer was absent on a break, defender A’s employees finished work and departed, leaving a hatch open on an unlit area of the deck. When the pursuer returned, he did not see that the hatch was open and fell through it, sustaining serious injury. The employees of defender A had created a foreseeable risk by abandoning the site in this hazardous state. However, defender B’s omission to check the site of the repairs, in breach of its common law and statutory duty to ensure the safety of the ship for those working there, was also deemed to be a cause of the accident. Defenders A and B were therefore held to be jointly and severally liable for their independent acts of negligence.39 A precondition of liability on the part of defender A, as the party who has negligently created risk, is that the injury suffered by P is within the scope of the foreseeable risk thereby created.40 If defender A has created risk in defender A’s interaction with P, but P then suffers injury unrelated to that risk and as a result of wrongdoing by B, defender B alone is liable, even if the but-for test is satisfied and defender A’s wrongdoing is a necessary cause of harm. Suppose, for example, that a mountaineer about to undertake a difficult climb is concerned about the fitness of his knee. Defender A, a doctor, makes a superficial examination only and negligently misinforms him that the knee is sound. Reassured, the climber undertakes the climb, but is injured in an accident caused by the malfunction of a skilift and which has nothing to do with the weakness in his knee.41 The doctor’s negligent advice meets the but-for test as a necessary cause without which the mountaineer would not have gone climbing in the first place. Nonetheless, the risk thereby created was that he might perhaps have damaged the knee further by exercise or lost his footing due to its infirmity, not that he should have sustained an unrelated injury on a malfunctioning 38 1948 SC (HL) 73; see also Stevenson v Magistrates of Edinburgh 1934 SC 226. 39 To the extent of 75 per cent and 25 per cent respectively. The decision by the Inner House, overturning that of the Lord Ordinary, that the pursuer had been contributorily negligent, was itself overturned in the House of Lords. 40 See further discussion at paras 14.46–14.47 below. 41 This scenario is loosely based upon that instanced by Lord Hoffmann in South Australia Asset Management Corp v York Montague Ltd [1997] AC 191 at 214.

13.19

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ski-lift. The ski-lift operator may be held liable therefore, but the doctor is not. As Lord Hoffmann explained of a similar scenario postulated in South Australia Asset Management Corp v York Montague Ltd:42 “The doctor was asked for information on only one of the considerations which might affect the safety of the mountaineer on the expedition. There seems no reason of policy which requires that the negligence of the doctor should require the transfer to him of all the foreseeable risks of the expedition.”

13.21

A further possible set of circumstances indicating joint and several liability is that harm to the pursuer follows from a series of independent wrongful acts, each of which would in itself have been sufficient to have produced that result, but was not a necessary cause. In Caughie v John Robertson & Co,43 for example, the pursuer’s young son was injured when he fell into a pile of hot ashes which had been deposited on a public footpath. It appeared that both defenders had been in the habit of depositing ashes in this location, but had done so entirely independently. In such circumstances the ashes deposited by either of the defenders alone might well have been sufficient to injure the child, but, as the child might equally have been injured by the ashes deposited by the other, the actions of neither were a necessary cause, and the but-for test was not met. Nonetheless, the case against both was found to be relevant and allowed to go to trial, on the basis that “both the defenders were concerned in doing the act of which the pursuer complains and which he says caused the injury”.44 It is said that in this type of case the court may “make a value judgment on responsibility”45 in treating the wrongful conduct of each as having sufficient causal connection with the damage.

(3) Competing sources of the same causal agent 13.22

As seen above, the general rule is that the but-for test is satisfied only where the pursuer can prove on the balance of probabilities that, but for the actions of one specific defender, the harm would not have occurred. But in some cases it may be asking the impossible for the pursuer to attain 42 43 44 45

[1997] AC 191 at 214. See further discussion at para 14.50 below. (1897) 25 R 1. (1897) 25 R 1 per Lord Moncreiff at 3. Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co [2002] UKHL 19, [2002] 2 AC 883 per Lord Nicholls at para 74: “The classic example is where two persons independently search for the source of a gas leak with the aid of lighted candles. According to the simple ‘but for’ test, neither would be liable for damage caused by the resultant explosion. In this type of case, involving multiple wrongdoers, the court may treat wrongful conduct as having sufficient causal connection with the loss for the purpose of attracting responsibility even though the simple ‘but for’ test is not satisfied. In so deciding the court is primarily making a value judgment on responsibility.”

Factual Causation   427

such a standard of proof if there are various competing and alternative explanations as to which wrongdoer caused harm. Nonetheless, it is considered unsatisfactory to leave the victim without a remedy where causation cannot be determined. An example often discussed is that of a group of hunters who all fire shots in a reckless manner. A bystander is injured by a single gunshot wound, but forensic techniques are inadequate to determine from which rifle the bullet came. The but-for test is not satisfied in relation to any one of the hunters, yet clearly one of them caused the harm. The approach adopted in a nineteenth-century criminal case to deal with such circumstances was that “if two or more persons went together to shoot, and shot in a reckless manner in the direction of a public place . . . and a death resulted, all would be guilty of culpable homicide, although it could not be proved who fired the fatal shot”.46 Similar facts were seen in the twentieth-century Canadian case of Cook v Lewis,47 in which the plaintiff was shot in the face while hunting. It was established that two other hunters had fired in his direction, but it could not be ascertained which of them had been responsible for the shot that wounded him. The Supreme Court of Canada directed that, rather than leaving the plaintiff without a remedy, “if . . . the jury, having decided that the plaintiff was shot by either [Hunter C] or [Hunter A], found themselves unable to decide which of the two shot him because in their opinion both shot negligently in his direction, both defendants should have been found liable”.48 The English courts have similarly observed that in such cases:49 “the evidential difficulty arising from the impossibility of identifying the gun which fired the crucial pellet should redound upon the negligent hunters, not the blameless plaintiff. The unattractive consequence, that one of the hunters will be held liable for an injury he did not in fact inflict, is outweighed by the even less attractive alternative, that the innocent plaintiff should receive no recompense even though one of the negligent hunters injured him.”

A “relaxation” in the causation requirement is therefore permitted to avoid such injustice. In practical terms, however, the context in which the existence 46 Barbier and others (1867) 5 Irvine 482 per Lord Neaves at 487. But cf Taylor v Dick (1897) 4 SLT 297, in which the pursuer’s young son was shot while out playing on the street. Evidence was led that the defender and two other men were firing with rifles at a nearby quarry, and that the defender had fired two shots while his companions had fired one each. In an action for damages, the Lord Ordinary, Lord Kincairney, directed the jury that it was necessary for the pursuer to prove that the defender specifically was the individual who fired the shot which wounded the boy. 47 [1952] 1 DLR 1. 48 [1952] 1 DLR 1 per Cartwright J at para 44. 49 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 per Lord Nicholls at para 39, as cited also in McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2005] CSOH 69, 2005 2 SC 1 per Lord Nimmo Smith at para 6.16.

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13.23

of competing causes has created particular difficulty is not shooting accidents but the onset of disease, more specifically industrial disease, as discussed in section D below. Such “relaxation” in establishing causation is accepted in cases where the causal agent is in little doubt, but its precise source cannot be proved on the balance of probabilities. It has not, however, been extended to contexts where multiple and varied causal agents are potentially but uncertainly implicated. In Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority50 the plaintiff had become blind shortly after his premature birth. The medical evidence was complex and, although five factors were identified as possible causes of his blindness, only one of them was attributable to the defendants’ negligence (in administering an excess of oxygen to the child). In these circumstances, the plaintiff argued that the reasoning applied in cases of industrial injury51 could be applied to allow a departure from the usual but-for rule. The House of Lords gave a firm steer, however, that in a case where there were five, disparate, possible agents of harm, the burden remained upon the claimant to establish on the balance of probabilities which specifically had been the cause of the harm.

(4) Apportionment of liability 13.24

13.25

Where the “whole of the damage” suffered by the pursuer is the common result of the actions of a number of defenders, they may be sued in a single action.52 Those defenders may then be found liable jointly and severally, so that the pursuer may claim the full amount from any of the defenders, who are in turn entitled to recover relative contributions from the others, in terms of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940, s 3(2). A leading authority demonstrating this principle (although predating the 1940 Act) is Arneil v Paterson,53 the case discussed above in which two separately-owned dogs had together run wild, injuring and killing sheep. When the owner of the sheep attempted to recover all of his loss from one dog owner, on the basis that liability was joint and several, the defender argued that he should be liable for half of the damage only. However, Viscount Dunedin exposed the “fallacy” of this argument by asking: “supposing only one sheep had been worried. Should we then have to hold that each dog had half killed the sheep, and that, therefore, each owner should

50 [1988] AC 1074. 51 As discussed in section D below. 52 Arneil v Paterson 1931 SC (HL) 117 per Lord Hailsham at 122. 53 1931 SC (HL) 117. See para 13.15 above. See also Smith v O’Reilly (1800) Hume’s Decisions 605. For a modern example involving economic loss, see Preferred Mortgages Ltd v Shanks [2008] CSOH 23, [2008] PNLR 20.

Factual Causation   429

pay for half the value of the sheep?”54 It is not, however, a necessary condition of joint and several liability that the defenders should have acted in concert if their independent wrongful acts have combined to cause harm. A straightforward example, discussed above,55 is a road-traffic accident caused by the negligence of two drivers and in which the pursuer has been injured. Both drivers are then jointly and severally liable for those injuries. As also seen above, joint and several liability may arise where the conduct of two or more parties has contributed to the presence of a hazard by which the pursuer has been injured, even if in so doing those parties have not collaborated in any way.56 Scottish authority has hitherto applied joint and several liability both to divisible and to indivisible harms. On the other hand, the defenders must be sued in separate actions if the wrongs committed by each are disconnected, and have separate consequences, even if the conduct occurred at a similar time and place.57 If, say, the pursuer suffers a blow to the head from defender A and shortly afterwards a blow to the shins from defender B, this produces two separate injuries for which the defenders are separately liable.58 Similarly, defamatory statements made about the same person but by different persons are regarded as separate delicts, even if the statements are made at the same time and in the same forum.59 The application of joint and several liability in cases involving the onset of industrial disease is considered further below.60

13.26

13.27

D. MULTIPLE CAUSES: INDUSTRIAL DISEASES (1) Two additional routes for establishing causation Where the alleged injury takes the form of an industrial disease, the pursuer is often in a position to meet the basic test for causation by showing that, but for occupational exposure to a known harmful substance, he or she would not have contracted the disease. However, the aetiology of some forms of disease is such that the traditional but-for test poses significant difficulty for the pursuer. As a result, two further routes for establishing causation have been opened up in the modern case law, alongside application of the but-for test, by further development of the general principles

54 1931 SC (HL) 117 at 122. 55 At para 13.11. 56 As in Grant v Sun Shipping Co Ltd 1948 SC (HL) 73, discussed in para 13.19 above; see also Stevenson v Magistrates of Edinburgh 1934 SC 226. 57 Conway v Dalziel (1901) 3 F 918. 58 Example drawn from Hook v McCallum (1905) 7 F 528 per Lord Justice-Clerk Macdonald at 532. 59 Turnbull v Frame 1966 SLT 24; see also Barr v Neilsons (1868) 6 M 651. 60 See paras 13.55–13.60 below.

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outlined in section C above.61 The first, available where the disease has been caused by the combined effect of an agency, part of which is attributable to the defender’s wrongdoing and part of which did not involve wrongdoing by the defender, is to show that the defender’s wrongdoing made a “material contribution” to the disease.62 The second, available only in highly restricted circumstances where due to the aetiology of the disease in question neither the but-for nor the material contribution test can be met, is to establish that the defender materially increased the risk of the victim contracting the disease.63

(2) The first route: material contribution to harm 13.29

13.30

As cases such as Duke of Buccleuch v Cowan64 established, where the wrongdoing of several defenders has a cumulative effect in causing harm, such as water pollution, each defender is held to have caused the harm in the sense that each defender has made a “material contribution” to its occurrence. The terminology of material contribution to harm, initially found in pollution cases, came to be used during the twentieth century in cases on industrial diseases in circumstances where there was little question as to which type of substance had caused the disease in question, but the victim’s exposure to that substance was attributable partly to a breach of duty by the defender and partly to a different source. The leading Scottish case is Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings Ltd65 in which a steel-foundry worker contracted pneumoconiosis as a result of inhaling air permeated by silica dust. There were two possible sources for the dust in the foundry – pneumatic hammers and swing grinders. It was accepted that the pursuer’s employers were not at fault in failing to prevent the pursuer’s exposure to dust escaping from the hammers, because there was no accepted way of doing this effectively. However, the employers had been negligent in allowing the escape of dust from the grinders, because the extraction plant available to do this had been rendered ineffective by poor maintenance. In other words, although the single agent of harm was brick dust, only one source of that dust was attributable to the defender’s negligence, and the other was not. It was unlikely that that the pursuer’s condition was caused uniquely by the “negligent” dust, but the precise proportions in which the pursuer had inhaled the “negligent” and “non-negligent” dust were not ascertainable. It 61 For a summary, see Heneghan v Manchester Dry Docks Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 86, [2016] 1 WLR 2036 per Dyson LJ at para 23. 62 The leading case is Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings Ltd 1956 SC (HL) 26, discussed at para 13.30 below. 63 The leading case is Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32, discussed at paras 13.37–13.44 below. 64 (1866) 5 M 214, affd (1876) 4 R (HL) 14; see para 13.13 above. 65 1956 SC (HL) 26; see also Nicholson v Atlas Steel Foundry and Engineering Co 1957 SC (HL) 44.

Factual Causation   431

could not therefore be proved on the balance of probabilities that, but for the “negligent” dust, the pursuer would not have contracted the disease, because there might have been sufficient quantities of the “non-negligent” dust to cause the disease on its own. Nonetheless, Lord Reid indicated that in these circumstances the “real question” was whether the “negligent” dust from the swing grinders “materially contributed to the disease”, adding that: “What is a material contribution must be a question of degree.”66 Since the court was satisfied that the “negligent” dust had made a contribution to the disease that was “material” in the sense that it was “not negligible”,67 the causation requirement was satisfied and the employers were held liable to the full extent. An issue not raised by the defenders in Wardlaw was whether the pursuer’s pneumoconiosis was a divisible disease,68 and so whether, if causation was established, liability was restricted to part of the amount claimed in respect of that illness. Their case was that the claim fell in its entirety on the causation issue, and no esto argument was made that, even if liability were to be established, it should extend only to a proportion of the damages, corresponding with the extent of the “material contribution” attributable to their negligence. The implications of Wardlaw in terms of the apportionment of liability are considered further below.69

13.31

(3) The second route: material increase in risk (a) Prolongation of exposure to a single harmful agent: McGhee v National Coal Board Some years after Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings Ltd70 the concept of material contribution to the causation of industrial disease was reviewed in another Scottish case, but in the light of a significantly different set of circumstances. In McGhee v National Coal Board71 an employee at a brickworks had been sent to work on a temporary basis in the brick kilns. Conditions there were hot and dusty and he subsequently developed dermatitis, for which he claimed damages from his employers. He argued that the employers were at fault on two grounds: first, that employees should not have been sent in to remove bricks before the kilns had cooled; and secondly, that showers should have been provided to allow employees to wash off the dust before leaving the workplace. The first basis for fault was rejected because it would not have been practicable to allow the kilns 66 67 68 69 70 71

1956 SC (HL) 26 at 32. 1956 SC (HL) 26 per Lord Reid at 33. For the distinction between “divisible” and “indivisible” harm, see paras 13.11 and 13.12 above. See paras 13.37–13.44 below. 1956 SC (HL) 26. 1973 SC (HL) 37.

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13.33

to cool further before the bricks were collected. However, the employers were found to have been at fault in regard to the second (not providing washing facilities). In other words, while the defenders were not at fault in exposing Mr McGhee to hot and dusty conditions, their negligence meant that the combination of dust and sweat remained on his skin for the extra ten to fifteen minutes each day that it took him to cycle home and wash. Their negligence had not increased the quantity of the harmful substance to which he was exposed, but it had increased the period of his exposure to it. The abrasions on Mr McGhee’s skin that triggered the dermatitis could well have occurred while he was working in the kilns, in which case the disease was not caused by the employers’ negligence, or they might have occurred while he was cycling home, in which case it was caused by their negligence, or there could even have been a combination of the two. In the event, the second alternative could not be established on the balance of probabilities, and it could not therefore be said that, but for the employers’ negligence, the dermatitis would have been avoided. Medical evidence was, however, led to the effect that the provision of showers would materially have reduced the risk of dermatitis occurring. Neither the Lord Ordinary nor the Inner House in McGhee was prepared to regard this material increase in risk as satisfying the requirement, stated in cases such as Wardlaw, that the employers’ negligence should have made a material contribution to causing the disease itself.72 The House of Lords, however, took a different view. It would have been practicable and reasonable for the defenders to provide showers, thereby reducing the risk to employees. “Material reduction of the risk” and “substantial contribution to the injury” were “mirror concepts”.73 Proof that the defenders’ conduct materially increased the risk of disease was therefore accepted as discharging the burden of proving that the defenders had materially contributed to the onset of the condition. It was conceded that this involved a logical leap,74 but the House of Lords was at pains to emphasise the policy justifications for alleviating the evidential difficulties posed for the employee by these circumstances:75 “[T]he question remains whether a pursuer must necessarily fail if, after he has shown a breach of duty, involving an increase of risk of disease, he cannot positively prove that this increase of risk caused or materially 72 See 1972 SLT (Notes) 61. 73 1973 SC (HL) 37 per Lord Simon at 57, referring to Nicholson v Atlas Steel Foundry and Engineering Co 1957 SC (HL) 44. 74 See e.g. Lord Hoffmann commenting extra-judicially that McGhee had been “based on a crude equiparation between materially contributing to the cumulative causes of the injury (as in Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw) and increasing the risk of occurrence of the injury”: see “Fairchild and after”, in A Burrows et al (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (2013) 63 at 67. 75 1973 SC (HL) 37 per Lord Wilberforce at 55; see also Lord Simon at 57.

Factual Causation   433 contributed to the disease while his employers cannot positively prove the contrary. In this intermediate case there is an appearance of logic in the view that the pursuer, on whom the onus lies, should fail – a logic which dictated the judgments below. The question is whether we should be satisfied in factual situations like the present, with this logical approach. In my opinion, there are further considerations of importance. First, it is a sound principle that where a person has, by breach of a duty of care, created a risk, and injury occurs within the area of that risk, the loss should be borne by him unless he shows that it had some other cause. Secondly, from the evidential point of view, one may ask, why should a man who is able to show that his employer should have taken certain precautions, because without them there is a risk, or an added risk, of injury or disease, and who in fact sustains exactly that injury or disease, have to assume the burden of proving more: namely, that it was the addition to the risk, caused by the breach of duty, which caused or materially contributed to the injury? In many cases, of which the present is typical, this is impossible to prove, just because honest medical opinion cannot segregate the causes of an illness between compound causes. And if one asks which of the parties, the workman or the employers should suffer from this inherent evidential difficulty, the answer as a matter in policy or justice should be that it is the creator of the risk who, ex hypothesi must be taken to have foreseen the possibility of damage, who should bear its consequences.”

Although scientific progress has made it less likely for the courts to be confronted with the kind of aetiological uncertainty for which allowance was made in the passage above, McGhee remains good authority for the principle that causation may be established where there is sufficient evidence that the wrongful prolongation of exposure to a noxious substance has materially increased the risk of disease triggered by that substance. For many years after the decision in McGhee in 1973, the courts showed little enthusiasm for extending the “material increase in risk” test to other contexts. Indeed in Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority, noted above,76 the House of Lords indicated that the reasoning of McGhee should be confined to its specific facts, and declined to extend it to a situation where the disability that the plaintiff suffered as a premature baby had five possible causes, only one of which (the administering of an excess of oxygen) was attributable to the medical negligence of the defendants. In these circumstances, the plaintiff invoked the reasoning in McGhee to argue that the “material increase in risk” test might be taken as satisfied in regard to the excess oxygen. That test was, however, rejected by the House of Lords as inapplicable. A situation in which there were five, very different, possible agents of harm was regarded as too far removed from the factual matrix of McGhee (or indeed Wardlaw), where there was only one possible agent that 76 [1988] AC 1074, noted at para 13.23 above.

13.34

13.35

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13.36

could have caused the disease and the negligence of the pursuer had the effect of prolonging or intensifying the pursuer’s exposure to it. McGhee was described as demonstrating a “robust and pragmatic approach to the primary facts”, which permitted the court to draw a “legitimate inference” that “the defenders’ negligence had materially contributed to the pursuer’s injury”. Nonetheless, the court in Wilsher took the view that McGhee had “laid down no new principle of law whatever”.77 That gloss on McGhee did not survive the decision of the House of Lords in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd.78 The court in Fairchild did not dissent from the position that the “material increase in risk” test should not be applied to resolve causal uncertainty where a multiplicity of different causal agents were implicated. At the same time, McGhee was reevaluated as “undoubtedly” involving “a development of the law relating to causation”,79 and a further application of the “material increase in risk” test was approved.

(b) Multiple wrongdoers exposing pursuer to a single harmful agent: the Fairchild principle 13.37

In Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd,80 just as in Wardlaw and McGhee,81 there was no doubt as to the identity of the substance that caused the claimants’ disease; the difficulty was that it was impossible to determine which one of a number of possible defendants had exposed the claimants to the specific dose that had triggered the disease in their particular cases. The three conjoined cases of which Fairchild was the first-named related to employees who had developed mesothelioma, a malignant condition of the lung or abdomen. The causal link between asbestos and mesothelioma has been known since the 1960s, and victims typically have had direct contact with asbestos in the workplace, although environmental exposure has also been implicated.82 Whereas with certain other pulmonary diseases, such as asbestosis and pneumoconiosis, the disease may be made more or less severe depending upon the total amount of dust inhaled, the cell changes entailed in mesothelioma may be triggered by a very small quantity of asbestos, and inhalation or ingestion of further asbestos thereafter does not aggravate or intensify the disease when it later develops. At the same time, 77 [1988] AC 1074 per Lord Bridge at 1090. 78 [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32. The Wilsher overview of McGhee was expressly rejected by Lord Bingham at para 22, Lord Hoffmann at para 70, and Lord Rodger at para 150, but cf Lord Hutton at paras 106–109. 79 [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 per Lord Rodger at para 154. 80 [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32. 81 Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings Ltd 1956 SC (HL) 26; McGhee v National Coal Board 1973 SC (HL) 37. 82 See J E Craighead, “Epidemiology of Mesothelioma and Historical Background”, in A Tannapfel (ed), Malignant Mesothelioma (2011) 13.

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the risk of developing mesothelioma increases in proportion to the quantity of asbestos dust inhaled over the years. Where the victim has been exposed to asbestos from various sources, medical science does not yet extend to identifying the specific provenance of the fibres that initiate the malignant cell changes. The gestation period between exposure to the offending asbestos and the onset of mesothelioma is normally very long, typically at least twenty years, but sometimes up to fifty or even sixty years.83 Proof of causation is uncontentious where the pursuer’s sole exposure to asbestos was while working for one particular employer,84 or where the pursuer had otherwise been exposed to asbestos from a single source.85 However, the features of this disease mean that where the pursuer has been exposed to asbestos in a number of different workplaces it is almost impossible to prove that any one specific employer caused the pursuer’s mesothelioma. The employees in Fairchild had all been exposed to asbestos over long careers working for a succession of different employers. Much of that exposure had taken place many years previously and the employees had found it difficult to identify all those employers for whom they had worked. They had therefore sued those employers whom they could identify and who were still in existence. But given that the trigger for the disease might well have been a small amount of fibres, it was entirely possible in each case that the relevant asbestos exposure had occurred during employment with a single one of those employers, or indeed with one of those employers who had not been sued. There was no way of pinpointing the exact source of the injurious fibre or fibres and thereby identifying which particular employer was actually responsible for it. Since the employees could not therefore establish, on a balance of probabilities, which of their various employers had actually caused the disease, the lower courts rejected their claims. The House of Lords, however, took a different view. The House of Lords prefaced its analysis in Fairchild with a tour d’horizon of approaches in various other jurisdictions to the problem of attributing legal responsibility where a person has suffered injury but cannot show which of several possible wrongdoers has caused it.86 Particular emphasis 83 See Craighead, “Epidemiology of Mesothelioma and Historical Background” 13. 84 E.g. Thacker v North British Steel Group plc [2018] CSOH 73, 2018 SLT 799. 85 See e.g. Gibson v Babcock International Ltd [2018] CSOH 78, 2018 SLT 886, concerning a claim in respect of the now-deceased wife of an employee who had worked with asbestos. Her own only source of exposure to asbestos was when, many years previously, she had washed out her husband’s working clothes after he came from his work. It was held that the defender ought reasonably to have foreseen the risk of domestic exposure to asbestos to persons such as the deceased by reason of employees transporting asbestos dust home on their clothing. See also Carey v Vauxhall Motors Ltd [2019] EWHC 238 (QB). 86 Reference was made to US Restatement Second of Torts § 433(3): “Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.” That provision was revised in Restatement Third of Torts

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436   The Law of Delict in Scotland

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was given to the Canadian case of Cook v Lewis,87 mentioned above,88 in which two hunters who had recklessly fired their guns were both held to have caused the injury to the plaintiff, even though he was hit by only one of their bullets. This comparative overview was seen as a “cross-check” which confirmed “that it is not necessarily the hallmark of a civilised and sophisticated legal system that it treats cases where strict proof of causation is impossible in exactly the same way as cases where such proof is possible”.89 In the circumstances of Fairchild it would be impossible to establish on the balance of probabilities which particular employer’s asbestos had caused the claimants’ disease, so that the effect of requiring such proof would be to empty the employer’s duty of content.90 Equally, it was clear that increased exposure to asbestos increased the likelihood that an employee would contract mesothelioma: the greater the quantity of dust inhaled, the greater the risk of the disease occurring.91 By analogy with the reasoning in McGhee v National Coal Board,92 the House of Lords said that all of the employers who had by their breach of duty exposed the employee to this risk were to be “treated . . . as making a material contribution” to the onset of mesothelioma, and causation was thereby established.93 It could therefore be said that each employer who had employed the claimants in conditions where asbestos was present had materially increased the risk that they would develop mesothelioma. Use of the qualifier “material” was intended to exclude those risks that are “so insignificant that the court will properly disregard it on the de minimis principle”.94 Admittedly, the

87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94

(Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 28 (b), to the effect that: “When the plaintiff sues all of the multiple actors and proves that each engaged in tortious conduct that exposed the plaintiff to a risk of harm and that the tortious conduct of one or more of them caused the plaintiff’s harm but the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to prove which actor or actors caused the harm, the burden of proof, including both production and persuasion, on factual causation is shifted to the defendants.” Also cited were the BGB § 830(1) and relevant German case law, as well as the Netherlands Civil Code, the Greek Civil Code, and French, Norwegian and Australian cases. It was further noted that Italian, South African and Swiss law would be unlikely to recognise causation as established in these circumstances, although, in relation to South Africa, see now Lee v Minister of Correctional Services 2013 2 SA 144 (CC). [1952] 1 DLR 1. See also the Scottish case of Taylor v Dick (1897) 4 SLT 297, citing Barbier and others (1867) 5 Irvine 482, but cf Ward v Abraham 1910 SC 299. See para 13.22 above. [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 per Lord Rodger at para 168. [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 per Lord Hoffmann at para 62. As noted by Lord Hoffmann, [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 at para 61. 1973 SC (HL) 37, discussed at paras 13.32 and 13.33 above. [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 per Lord Bingham at para 34. Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd [2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 2 AC 229 per Lord Phillips at paras 107– 108. For discussion of the limits of de minimis exposure, see Prescott v University of St Andrews [2016] CSOH 3, 2016 GWD 4–99; see also Bannister v Freemans plc [2020] EWHC 1256 (QB) in which, at para 168, Tattersall J accepted the view that “a dose of asbestos which was properly capable of being neglected could be defined as a dose which a medical practitioner who is aware of the medical risks would define as something that the average patient should not worry about”.

Factual Causation   437

“unattractive consequence” of extending the “material increase in risk” test in this way was that some of those who exposed the victim to asbestos would be held liable for a disease to which their exposure had made no contribution; yet without it the victims’ claims would have foundered on a “rock of uncertainty”,95 even though the injury had ultimately been inflicted by one of the parties who had exposed them to asbestos.96 In short, therefore, the causal requirement would be treated as satisfied in relation to each employer whom the claimant proved had materially increased the risk that the claimant would contract the disease. The McGhee “material increase in risk” test was thus adapted to the circumstances of Fairchild. It was applied to resolve causal uncertainty in circumstances where:

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• the claimant was exposed to asbestos from more than one source but including from a source for which the defendant was responsible; • the defendant breached a common law or statutory duty of care not to expose the claimant to asbestos dust;97 • that breach of duty materially increased the risk of the claimant developing mesothelioma or a like condition; and • the claimant contracted mesothelioma, and it was impossible to determine which exposure –whether originating with the defendant or with a different source – had triggered the disease. Where all of the above features were present, each defendant who had exposed the victim to asbestos was to be regarded as having materially increased the risk of the victim contracting the disease, and the requirement to prove causation was deemed to have been met in relation to each of them. For the avoidance of doubt, however, Lord Rodger pointed out that the Fairchild principle would be inapplicable “where the claimant has merely proved that his injury could have been caused by a number of different events, only one of which is the eventuation of the risk created by the defendant’s wrongful act or omission”.98 Wilsher, noted above,99 is an example of such a case. The various speeches in Fairchild did not present identical perspectives on the future boundaries of the Fairchild principle.100 Lords Bingham and   95 [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 per Lord Bingham at para 7.   96 [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 per Lord Nicholls at para 39.   97 The principle does not apply where the employer’s actions did not constitute breach of duty, such as where it was not reasonably foreseeable that exposure to asbestos might carry a risk of asbestos– related injury: Williams v University of Birmingham [2011] EWCA Civ 1242, [2012] ELR 47.   98 [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 at para 170.  99 Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074; see para 13.23 above. 100 Lord Hoffmann later observed, extra-judicially, that the Fairchild exception should have been stated as “part of a coherent principle”, and that the House of Lords “failed this test quite badly”: see “Fairchild and after”, in A Burrows et al (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (2013) 63 at 65.

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Hoffmann appeared to confine its application specifically to cases involving mesothelioma101 or at least malignant conditions related to asbestos.102 Lord Rodger’s reasoning suggested that it might be relevant to other diseases affected by similar aetiological uncertainty, although, where there were multiple potential sources of the substance alleged to have caused injury, the claimant required to prove that the disease was caused “if not by exactly the same agency as was involved in the defendant’s wrongdoing, at least by an agency that operated in substantially the same way”.103 In subsequent case law the Fairchild principle has on the whole been steered so as to avoid confronting other “rocks of uncertainty”.104 The majority of cases have involved employees contracting mesothelioma as a result of workplace exposure to asbestos, but the principle has been held relevant to diseases other than mesothelioma, such as lung cancer,105 “provided that the damage was inflicted by the same destructive agent.”106 Thus the principle has been largely confined to circumstances in which there was exposure from multiple sources to substantially the same noxious substance or agency, and where it is scientifically impossible to show which specific exposure caused the injury.107 The requirements outlined above mean that the Fairchild principle does not assist where there were a number of qualitatively different causal events. Nor does it serve, more generally, to close gaps in relation to causation: it is not enough that the claimants cannot prove how they have become affected by disease.108 Similarly, the principle is not brought into play simply because no examination was made at the time when injury was

101 [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 per Lord Bingham at para 2. 102 [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 per Lord Hoffmann at para 61. 103 [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 per Lord Rodger at para 170. 104 See Sienkiewicz v Greif(UK) Ltd [2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 2 AC 229 per Lord Brown at para 186. 105 See Heneghan v Manchester Dry Docks Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 86, [2016] 1 WLR 2036, although see also para 13.52 below on apportionment of liability. 106 See International Energy Group Ltd v Zurich Insurance plc [2015] UKSC 33, [2016] AC 509 per Lord Sumption at para 127. 107 Sanderson v Hull [2008] EWCA Civ 1211, [2009] PIQR P7 per Smith LJ at para 52; B v Ministry of Defence [2010] EWCA Civ 1317, (2011) 117 BMLR 101. In Barker v Corus UK Ltd [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572 at para 24, Lord Hoffmann observed that it might also apply where two different agents had acted upon the body “in the same way”. Indeed it was suggested in Novartis Grimsby Ltd v Cookson [2007] EWCA Civ 1261, where smoking of cigarettes and workplace exposure to dye were both implicated as causes of bladder cancer, that the Fairchild principle should apply because “amines in cigarette smoke act on the body in the same way as the amines in the occupational exposure”; Lord Hoffmann, however, has commented upon the “absurdity” of periling the test upon “this interesting biochemical fact”: see “Fairchild and after”, in A Burrows et al (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (2013) 63 at 66. See also Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd [2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 2 AC 229 per Lord Phillips at para 104 and Lord Brown at para 187, questioning the exact nature of the distinction between single-agent and multiple-agent cases. 108 Bye v Fife Council 2007 Rep LR 40; McGlone v Greater Glasgow Health Board [2011] CSOH 63, 2011 GWD 19–45; Tapp v McColl [2016] CSOH 129, 2016 GWD 30–534.

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first sustained and definitive proof was thus made impossible.109 Furthermore, this exception to the normal rules for proving causation was created in response to the evidential difficulties posed by the current state of medical knowledge; if, therefore, the time comes when it becomes scientifically possible to resolve that causal uncertainty – in the case of mesothelioma, to identify the fibre or fibres that triggered the malignant mutation – those difficulties will disappear and the Fairchild exception will become unnecessary, at least in relation to mesothelioma.110

(c) Delictual and non-delictual exposure to a single noxious agent A few years after Fairchild111 the application of the “material increase in risk” test came under scrutiny in relation to a different pattern of asbestos exposure. In Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd112 the claimant’s late mother contracted mesothelioma after having been exposed to asbestos in the factory where she had worked for eighteen years. In addition, however, she had been exposed to background levels of asbestos in the general environment, for which neither her employers nor anyone else identified by the claimant was responsible. The workplace exposure was assessed as having increased her risk of contracting mesothelioma by only 18 per cent. Against that background the employers denied liability, on the basis that the claimant could not establish on the balance of probabilities that the workplace exposure had more than doubled the risk of the disease, the test previously cited where a combination of tortious and non-tortious causes had been present.113 The applicability of the “doubles the risk” test of causation was, however, rejected by the Supreme Court, which viewed the victims in this case as being in a position equivalent to that of the victims of mesothelioma in Fairchild. Just as in Fairchild, the claimant in Sienkiewicz was unable, in the present state of medical knowledge, to identify on the balance of probabilities precisely which source of exposure to asbestos had triggered the malignant cell changes. To that extent she had encountered the same “rock of uncertainty” as the Fairchild litigants, and the court saw no reason to treat single-exposure cases differently from multiple-defendant cases. Indeed this very pattern of causation had been anticipated by Lord Hoffmann, who in Barker v Corus UK Ltd explained that:114 “The purpose of the Fairchild exception is to provide a cause of action against a defendant who has materially increased the risk that the claimant 109 As in Hotson v East Berkshire AHA [1987] AC 750. 110 Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd [2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 2 AC 229 per Lord Rodger at para 142. 111 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32. 112 [2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 2 AC 229. 113 As in Novartis Grimsby Ltd v Cookson [2007] EWCA Civ 1261. The “doubles the risk” test is discussed in further detail in the next section. 114 [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572 at para 17.

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440   The Law of Delict in Scotland will suffer damage and may have caused that damage, but cannot be proved to have done so because it is impossible to show, on a balance of probability, that some other exposure to the same risk may not have caused it instead. For this purpose, it should be irrelevant whether the other exposure was tortious or non-tortious, by natural causes or human agency or by the claimant himself. These distinctions may be relevant to whether and to whom responsibility can also be attributed, but from the point of view of satisfying the requirement of a sufficient causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the claimant’s injury, they should not matter.”

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The Fairchild principle was therefore to be applied in determining causation for all cases of mesothelioma, whether or not there were multiple culpable sources of exposure to asbestos. This meant that in cases where there had been negligent exposure to asbestos alongside non-tortious exposure, causation was established if the claimant could prove that the defendant’s negligence materially increased the risk of disease. A risk was material if it was “more than minimal”,115 so that the increase in risk of 18 per cent, as encountered by Ms Sienkiewicz’s mother, was of a sufficient order to cross this threshold.

(4) Industrial diseases: apportionment of liability 13.47

Where multiple wrongdoers are held to have caused injury in this way, the question arises as to how liability should be apportioned among them. In particular, in cases of industrial diseases, is liability among successive employers joint and several or are employers to be found liable only to the extent that they have exposed workers to harmful substances? On this issue the Scottish and English courts have not adopted a uniform approach.

(a) The English approach 13.48

It is now generally accepted in the English courts that, where disease affecting a claimant is characterised as a “divisible” harm, in the sense explained above,116 then the defendants are held liable for that specific part of the claimant’s ultimate damage to which they are causally linked.117 In Thompson v Smiths Shiprepairers (North Shields) Ltd,118 for instance, the plaintiffs had been exposed to excessive noise during their working lives in various shipyards and had suffered significant hearing loss as a result. Part of that exposure had been at a time when the employers could not be considered

115 [2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 2 AC 229 per Lord Brown at para 175. 116 See paras 13.11–13.12 above. 117 Williams v Bermuda Hospitals Board [2016] UKPC 4, [2016] AC 888 per Lord Toulson at para 31; Carder v University of Exeter [2016] EWCA Civ 790, [2017] ICR 392 per Lord Dyson at para 41. 118 [1984] QB 405.

Factual Causation   441

negligent in exposing them to noise, and part during a period when such exposure was negligent. The court took the view that the plaintiffs’ hearing loss was a divisible injury, as the “culmination of a progression, the individual stages of which were each brought about by the separate acts of the persons sued, or (as the case may be) the separate non-faulty and faulty acts” of the defendants.119 The liability of each employer was therefore to be measured by the length of the respective employee’s employment with them during the “negligent” years. Similar reasoning has been applied in relation to other cumulative conditions such as vibration white finger, which worsens commensurately with the victim’s use of heavy power tools. In such cases employers have been held liable only for a proportion of the total amount of damages, reflecting the relative contribution made by the employer’s negligence in causing the employee’s injury.120 The English courts have similarly held that lung diseases such as asbestosis and silicosis are “divisible”, in the sense that the severity of the disease may vary according to how much dust has been inhaled.121 This is taken to mean that liability is proportionate and limited by reference to the relative degree of exposure to the offending substance for which the defendant in question was responsible. In Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd¸122 for example, the claimant contracted asbestosis as a result of cumulative exposure to asbestos dust during a working career in various shipyards. He had been employed by the defendant for around half of his working life, and the rest had been with other employers. The court held that the defendant’s negligence had materially contributed to causing the claimant’s condition, but that its liability should be limited to a proportion of the total damages, matching the relative proportion of the claimant’s working life spent in its employ. In short, therefore, the reasoning in Holtby indicates that where causal agents have operated in such a way as to make a distinct and quantifiable impact upon a divisible harm, then liability is imposed upon individual defendants in accordance with their relative contribution to causation.123 South of the border this reasoning is regarded as in keeping with the “march of science”, since a more precise understanding of the aetiology of disease now provides an acceptable medical basis for apportionment in relation to the cumulative effects of substances such as asbestos.124 119 [1984] QB 405 per Mustill J at 440. 120 See e.g. Allen v British Rail Engineering Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 242, [2001] ICR 942; see also Rugby Joinery UK Ltd v Whitford [2005] EWCA Civ 561, [2006] PIQR Q2. 121 See Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd [2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 2 AC 229 per Lord Phillips at para 90. 122 [2000] ICR 1086. 123 See also Allen v British Rail Engineering Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 242, [2001] ICR 942; Rugby Joinery UK Ltd v Whitfield [2005] EWCA Civ 561, [2006] PIQR Q6; Horsley v Cascade Insulation Services Ltd [2009] EWHC 2945; Thaine v London School of Economics [2010] ICR 1422; Carder v University of Exeter [2016] EWCA Civ 790, [2016] Med LR 562. 124 J Stapleton and S Steel, “Causes and Contributions” (2016) 132 LQR 363 at 368.

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By contrast, for diseases constituting “indivisible” harm, Fairchild125 confirmed that liability should be imposed upon all those employers who had exposed mesothelioma sufferers to asbestos, thereby materially increasing the risk of disease, but it did not make a specific direction on the apportionment of liability. This question, however, came to the fore not long afterwards in Barker v Corus UK Ltd.126 In Barker the victim contracted mesothelioma after having been exposed to asbestos during three periods in his working life: first while working for a company which had since become insolvent; secondly while working for the defendant; and thirdly as self-employed. In two other cases conjoined with the appeal in Barker, mesothelioma victims had been exposed to asbestos by a number of employers, some of whom had since become insolvent. In each case causation was established by reference to the Fairchild principle but the House of Lords did not consider that the indivisibility of injury necessarily entailed that each of the persons who had materially increased risk should be liable to pay for all of its consequences. Instead, each employer was to be held liable only in proportion to the level of exposure to asbestos for which it was responsible. This aspect of the decision in Barker v Corus UK Ltd proved to be politically controversial, and immediately afterwards legislation was introduced to reverse its effect in regard to mesothelioma. The Compensation Act 2006, section 3, which also extends to Scotland, provides for the situation where: (i) a defender has materially increased the risk of mesothelioma by exposing the victim to asbestos; (ii) the victim has contracted mesothelioma; and (iii) it is not possible to determine whether it was the defender’s exposure or that of another that caused the disease.127 In these circumstances the defender is liable for the “whole of the damage caused to the victim by the disease”,128 liability being joint and several, so that defenders who have been required to pay out damages in full have a right of relief against others who also exposed the victim to asbestos.129 Provision is also made for contributory negligence – for example, dealing with the situation where the employee was exposed to asbestos during a period of self-employment.130 In addition, the statute sets out the presumptive basis for apportionment between parties by reference to “the relative lengths of the periods of exposure for which each was responsible”, although it is open to the parties, or to the court, to

125 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32; see paras 13.37–13.44 above. 126 [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572. 127 Compensation Act 2006 s 3(1). 128 s 3(2)(a). 129 s 3(2)(b). 130 s 3(3)(b).

Factual Causation   443

agree a different apportionment.131 As discussed further below,132 where the Compensation Act 2006, section 3 applies, so that an employer is jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of compensation due to the employee, an insurer who provided cover during the period of asbestos exposure must similarly must bear liability for the whole amount. This is subject to a right to obtain the appropriate contribution133 from other employers, or their insurers, who also exposed the employee to asbestos.134 However, the Compensation Act 2006, section 3, applies to mesothelioma only, and not to other conditions, asbestos-related or otherwise. In England this has been taken to mean that the reasoning of Barker v Corus UK Ltd otherwise remains binding, so that liability is separately apportioned as between employers, even where those other conditions follow the same pattern as mesothelioma in that successive exposure to the offending substance increased the risk of disease but did not make the disease cumulatively worse once it took hold – in other words where the disease can be classified as an “indivisible” harm. In Heneghan v Manchester Dry Docks Ltd,135 a decision of the Court of Appeal, the deceased was afflicted by a lung cancer with a similar pathology to that of mesothelioma: exposure to asbestos in various workplaces had increased the risk that cancer would occur, but it could not be determined which exposure had triggered the disease, and once it had been triggered further exposure did not make it any more severe. The cancer was therefore an indivisible injury. Not all of the victim’s employers had been cited in the action, but liability was established in regard to those who were by reference to the Fairchild principle. However, the court also regarded itself as bound by the decision in Barker v Corus UK Ltd in regard to the incidence of liability. It followed therefore that the defendants were not each liable (with a right of relief against the others) for the full damages of £175,000, but only in proportion to the increase in risk of contracting lung cancer for which each was responsible, which totalled £61,600. The implications of apportionment also require to be considered in regard to the liability of insurers, in particular, where an insured employer has materially increased the risk of disease by exposing an employee to a

131 s 3(4). It is not obvious why one employer might agree with another to shoulder a greater share of liability than provided in the statute, but a court might perhaps be persuaded to depart from the statutory apportionment if, say, an employee had worked with two employers for equivalent periods, but evidence could be brought to show that the asbestos exposure in one workplace was significantly more intense than that experienced in the other. 132 See para 13.53 below. 133 In England, under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978; for Scotland, see the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 s 3. 134 Durham v BAI (Run Off) Ltd [2012] UKSC 14, [2012] 1 WLR 867; International Energy Group Ltd v Zurich Insurance plc [2015] UKSC 33, [2016] AC 509. 135 [2016] EWCA Civ 86, [2016] 1 WLR 2036.

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444   The Law of Delict in Scotland

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harmful substance, but the insurer has provided cover for part only of the period of such exposure. In circumstances where the Compensation Act 2006, section 3, applies, so that the employer is jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of compensation due to the employee, the insurer who provided cover during the period of asbestos exposure must similarly bear liability for the whole amount. This is subject to a right to obtain the appropriate contribution136 from other employers, or their insurers, who also exposed the employee to asbestos.137 However, in circumstances where the 2006 Act does not apply, and the English common law as stated in Barker v Corus UK Ltd continues to allow for apportionment of liability, the employer is liable proportionately only, to the extent of the period during which it exposed the employee to the harmful substance.138 Moreover, in this latter situation, an insurer’s liability similarly is restricted to the extent of the period of cover. In International Energy Group Ltd v Zurich Insurance plc139 an employee developed mesothelioma after occupational exposure to asbestos over a 27-year period working for one employer. Proceedings were raised against that employer who, having settled the claim in full, sought to recover from its insurer. The employer was based in Guernsey, to which the Compensation Act 2006 did not extend, and where the common law was taken to be the same as English common law – in other words, as previously provided by Barker in regard to apportionment. The insurer had provided employers’ liability insurance to the claimant employer for six years out of the 27-year period – or 22.08 per cent of the total. Accordingly, the insurer was held liable to reimburse the employer for only 22.08 per cent of the total amount paid out to the employee.

(b) The Scottish approach 13.55

The Scottish courts have not entirely fallen into line with the approach of the English courts as regards the apportionment of liability. The traditional approach in Scotland was to apply joint and several liability wherever multiple wrongdoers had made a material contribution towards the causation of a single harm, whether the resulting harm was “divisible” or “indivisible”.140 This meant that it was open to a pursuer to claim the full amount from any one of the defenders, who might then attempt to recover relative

136 In England, under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978; for Scotland, see the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 s 3. 137 Durham v BAI (Run Off) Ltd [2012] UKSC 14, [2012] 1 WLR 867; International Energy Group Ltd v Zurich Insurance plc [2015] UKSC 33, [2016] AC 509. 138 See para 13.52 above. 139 [2015] UKSC 33, [2016] AC 509. 140 For the distinction between “divisible” and “indivisible” harm, see paras 13.11 and 13.12 above.

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contributions from the others, as now set out in the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940, section 3(2).141 As already noted,142 early application of the “material contribution” test can be seen in cases on water pollution. Although such terminology was not applied at that time, the relevant harm might be regarded as “divisible”, in that the level of pollution would have been directly affected by the quantities of pollutant emitted by the different defenders. Nonetheless, the polluters were regarded as each “versans in illicito”, and so potentially liable jointly and severally for the damage that ensued.143 As far as industrial diseases are concerned, the Compensation Act 2006, section 3 also extends to Scotland (although it is the only section of the 2006 Act to do so), so that all those whose breach of duty has exposed a mesothelioma victim to asbestos are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount of damages caused to the victim by that disease. In relation to other diseases the position continues to be determined by reference to the common law, and in this regard the Scottish authorities point, as a general rule, to application of joint and several liability. In the leading case of Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings Ltd,144 there was no discussion of whether the pneumoconiosis suffered by the pursuer was a divisible or an indivisible disease in the sense discussed above, and it was not disputed that, if causation was established by reference to the “material contribution to harm” test, the defenders should then be liable for the whole amount claimed in respect of the pursuer’s illness. The defenders sought to defeat the claim in its entirety and did not make an esto argument that, if causation was made out, the defenders should be held liable only for a proportion of the damages, corresponding with the extent of the material contribution attributable to their negligence.145 Similarly in McGhee v National Coal Board,146 the defenders did not attempt to argue that, if causation were established, the amount of compensation should be proportionately reduced to reflect the degree to which the defenders’ negligence had increased the risk of dermatitis. Admittedly at the time when those cases were decided – 1956 and 1973 respectively – issues of apportionment of damages had not been fully aired in the English courts.

141 Wright v Stoddard International plc [2007] CSOH 173, 2008 Rep LR 2 (asbestosis, although in this case it was not proved that the deceased had in fact suffered from the disease); see also Dickie v Flexcon Glenrothes Ltd 2009 GWD 35–602 (psychiatric injury). 142 See paras 13.13 and 13.14 above. 143 Fleming v Gemmill 1908 SC 340 per Lord President Dunedin at 350. The leading case, Duke of Buccleuch v Cowan (1866) 5 M 214, affd (1876) 4 R (HL) 14, was an action for interdict only. 144 1956 SC (HL) 26; see paras 13.29–13.31 above. 145 See Wright v Stoddard International plc [2007] CSOH 173, 2008 Rep LR 2 per Lord Uist at para 141, dismissing any suggestion that counsel in Wardlaw, or indeed McGhee, failed to raise this issue because they were remiss in overlooking a valid point. 146 1973 SC (HL) 37; see paras 13.32–13.34 above.

13.56

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446   The Law of Delict in Scotland

13.58

13.59

Nonetheless, more recent Scottish authorities have not taken up the reasoning found in English cases on specific apportionment of damages. In Woodland v Advocate General,147 for example, the pursuer claimed compensation for vibration white finger sustained as a result of working with pneumatic and vibrating tools, and he sought to hold three of his former employers jointly and severally liable. The defenders argued that, because vibration white finger was a cumulative disease, producing a divisible injury, the action was incompetent, since the defenders had been responsible for three separate, unconnected breaches of duty, rendering them liable only to the extent of their respective contributions to causing the illness. This argument was rejected, because the defenders’ alleged negligence had cumulatively produced a single result, although that result was in English terms “divisible”. The decisions in Holtby148 and Allen149 were noted, but the Lord Ordinary, Temporary Judge J G Reid QC, preferred the analysis of Lord Clarke, who had dissented in part in Holtby.150 Temporary Judge Reid concluded that, where the pursuer’s case was that each defender materially contributed to the causation of his illness, the pursuer was entitled to proceed against the defenders jointly and severally. He added the rider, however, that it was for the defenders to plead and prove that others, or another factor for which they are not responsible, caused a definable part of the pursuer’s condition, and thus to restrict the extent of any liability on their part. He continued: “It may be that, if the defenders made appropriate averments, the pursuer would add alternative conclusions seeking specific sums from each defender which in total amounted to the sum presently sought against all defenders jointly and severally.”151 This issue was taken up again in Wright v Stoddard International plc,152 in which the pursuer’s husband had died as a result of chronic lung disease. He had been exposed to significant quantities of asbestos dust during his working life, which included periods of employment with the first and second defenders in turn. The Lord Ordinary, Lord Uist, found that the pulmonary fibrosis which caused his death was not in fact asbestosis 147 2005 SCLR 163. See also Bee v T & N Shelf Twenty Six Ltd 2002 SLT 1129, for example, in which the pursuer was diagnosed with asbestosis, a “divisible” illness, after having been exposed to asbestos many years previously in the employment of three different employers, and in which there was no dispute that liability as among the three employers was joint and several. 148 Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd [2000] ICR 1086; see para 13.49 above. 149 Allen v British Rail Engineering Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 242, [2001] ICR 942. 150 [2000] ICR 1086 at paras 31–32, to the effect that proof that the defendant’s negligence made a material contribution to his condition discharged the onus upon the claimant of proving causation and entitled him to judgment in full against each, unless they showed the extent to which some other factor also contributed (cited in Woodland v Advocate General 2005 SCLR 163 at para 14). 151 2005 SCLR 163 at para 15. 152 [2007] CSOH 173, 2008 Rep LR 2.

Factual Causation   447

but cryptogenic fibrosing alveolitis, a progressive fibrosing inflammatory disease of the lung of unknown aetiology, and on that basis causation was not established. However, it may be noted that, although the defender had cited the authority of Holtby, Lord Uist distanced himself from the stance of the Court of Appeal in that case.153 He explained the general position as follows:154 “It seems to me that that [joint and several liability applies] whether the injury or illness is divisible or not and whether the wrongs are concurrent or consecutive. The principle which applies is the same throughout. It is, of course, necessary to ask first of all what injury or illness was caused by the defender. If there were entirely distinct and separate injuries or illnesses, then, of course, the defender is liable only for the injury or illness which he caused. If the defender made a material contribution to causing the injury or illness in question, he is liable in full for causing the injury or illness, but if he made only a material contribution to aggravating or exacerbating the injury or illness in question, then he is liable in full to the extent of the aggravation or exacerbation.”

Such an approach had also been endorsed in the strong dissenting speech of Lord Rodger in Barker v Corus UK Ltd, in which he stated that the Scottish case of Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings Ltd155 was “the classic authority for the proposition that, to succeed and recover damages in full against any defendant, a plaintiff need prove no more than that the defendant’s wrongful act materially contributed to his injury.”156 A cogent case was therefore to be made for holding the defendants “liable in solidum like any other concurrent tortfeasors whose separate wrongful acts combine to produce indivisible harm”.157 Lord Rodger conceded that “rough justice” necessarily prevailed in cases where some employers could not be traced or had become insolvent, but the authorities had hitherto dealt with this “as a matter of policy” by placing “the risk of the insolvency of a wrongdoer or his insurer on the other wrongdoers and their insurers”.158 The unfortunate consequence for English law of the majority’s reasoning in Barker would be that:159 “the risk of the insolvency of a wrongdoer or his insurer is to bypass the other wrongdoers and their insurers and to be shouldered entirely by the innocent claimant. As a result, claimants will often end up with only a small 153 154 155 156 157 158 159

At paras 147 and 149. At para 142. 1956 SC (HL) 26; see paras 13.29–13.31 above. [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572 at para 72. [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572 at para 87. [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572 at para 90. [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572 at para 90.

13.60

448   The Law of Delict in Scotland proportion of the damages which would normally be payable for their loss. The desirability of the courts, rather than Parliament, throwing this lifeline to wrongdoers and their insurers at the expense of claimants is not obvious to me.”

(c) Aggravation of existing condition 13.61

13.62

Where a series of defenders materially contribute to causation of harm, or materially increase the risk of its incidence, the position adopted by the Scottish courts is that liability is joint and several, regardless of whether that harm can be regarded as divisible or indivisible. However, an important distinction, highly relevant to divisible illnesses, is drawn between: (i) those cases where the defender materially contributed to, or materially increased the risk of, the onset of disease; and (ii) those cases where the pursuer was already affected by the disease and the defender materially contributed to, or materially increased the risk of, its aggravation. In relation to the latter, the issue of apportionment of liability was considered by an Outer House case decided shortly after Wardlaw. The claims in Balfour v William Beardmore and Co Ltd160 were brought by a number of steelworkers who had developed pneumoconiosis (a divisible illness) due to inhalation of dust. In regard to most of the pursuers it was held, on the authority of Wardlaw, that the defenders’ negligence in exposing them to dust in their steelworks had materially contributed to the onset of that condition, and the defenders were therefore to be held liable to pay the full amount of compensation. However, there was evidence that one of the pursuers, who had worked for many years in other foundries, had already developed pneumoconiosis by the time he entered the defenders’ employment. In his case the Lord Ordinary, Lord Strachan, held that additional exposure to dust in the defenders’ employ materially contributed to the “aggravation” of this employee’s condition, but not to his developing the condition in the first place. In such cases the appropriate method of proceeding was to “to assess the full amount of the damage caused by the pursuer’s disease and to find the defenders liable for such proportion thereof as corresponds to the proportion of aggravation which their negligence has caused”.161 This distinction between causation of the disease itself, and causation of aggravation of the disease after it has already been contracted, continues to be observed in the reasoning of the Scottish courts. As noted above, it figured in Lord Uist’s reasoning in Wright v Stoddard International plc: “if 160 1956 SLT 205. 161 1956 SLT 205 at 216. The approach was informed by reference to the English case of Crookall v Vickers-Armstrong Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 659, but it has been endorsed, e.g., by Lord Rodger in Heaton v AXA Equity and Law Life Assurance Society plc [2002] UKHL 15, [2002] 2 AC 329 at para 77, and Lord Uist in Wright v Stoddard International plc [2007] CSOH 173, 2008 Rep LR 2 at para 142.

Factual Causation   449

[the defender] made only a material contribution to aggravating or exacerbating the injury or illness in question, then he is liable in full to the extent of the aggravation or exacerbation.”162

(5) Disparate causal agents: the but-for test and the doubling of risk As discussed above, the “material increase in risk” test requires that the victim should have been exposed, if not to multiple sources of the same harmful substance, then at the least to multiple agencies “that operated in substantially the same way”. Whatever the uncertainties as to the particular source of the operative asbestos, there is no question that mesothelioma, for example, is caused by asbestos. Different considerations apply, however, where, for instance, “the claimant suffers lung cancer which may have been caused by exposure to asbestos or some other carcinogenic matter but may also have been caused by smoking and it cannot be proved which is more likely to have been the causative agent”.163 Where the suspected causes of disease are varied in their mode of operation, it remains for the pursuer to address the but-for test, and, as the court remarked in Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd,164 there is “little flexibility” in regard to the causal requirement. The question then arises as to how the pursuer proves, on the balance of probabilities, that one factor rather than another caused the harm in question.

13.63

(a) The “doubles the risk” test In this connection a “doubles the risk” test has in recent years been imported into English case law from the United States.165 The test, at its most basic, is explained by the American courts as follows:166 “Assume that a condition naturally occurs in six out of 1,000 people even when they are not exposed to a certain drug. If studies of people who did take the drug show that nine out of 1,000 contracted the disease, it is still more likely than not that causes other than the drug were responsible for any given occurrence of the disease since it occurs in six out of 1,000 individuals anyway. Six of the nine incidences would be statistically attributable

162 [2007] CSOH 173, 2008 Rep LR 2 at para 142; see para 13.59 above. See also McCann v Miller Insulation and Engineering Ltd 1986 SLT 147. The implications of Balfour were also noted in Woodland v Advocate General 2005 SCLR 163 at paras 19–20. 163 Barker v Corus UK Ltd [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572 per Lord Hoffmann at para 24. 164 [2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 2 AC 229 per Lord Brown at para 87. 165 Although for an early Scottish application of an equivalent text in a very different context, see Sword v Cameron (1839) 1 D 493 per Lord President Hope at 499: the negligent method of firing a charge in a quarry “doubled the risk” of accident. 166 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc v Havner 953 S W 2d 706 (1993) per Owen J at 717.

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450   The Law of Delict in Scotland to causes other than the drug, and therefore, it is not more probable that the drug caused any one incidence of disease. This would only amount to evidence that the drug could have caused the disease. However, if more than twelve out of 1,000 who take the drug contract the disease, then it may be statistically more likely than not that a given individual’s disease was caused by the drug.”

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This methodology was taken up in the English case of XYZ v Schering Health Care Ltd,167 in which a group of claimants alleged that a contraceptive pill manufactured by the defendant was “defective” within the meaning of section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987. Its safety, they argued, was “not such as persons generally [were] entitled to expect”, in that it created an increased risk of cardio-vascular injury. Although exhaustive examination of the epidemiological evidence ultimately indicated that the risk did not reach the requisite level, the defendant accepted that, if the risk of such injury was more than doubled, even if it was very low in absolute terms, then the drug fell within the statutory definition.168 This decision should be approached with caution. In the first place, the validity of the test for these purposes was conceded by the defendant; in the second, its main application was not to the causation question pure and simple but in relation to whether the product met the statutory definition of “defective”. Nonetheless, the “doubles the risk” test was not long afterwards copied across to resolve questions of causation in relation to industrial disease. A leading example is Novartis Grimsby Ltd v Cookson.169 The plaintiff suffered from bladder cancer. He had been exposed to various carcinogenic substances in his employment at a dyeworks but had also previously been a smoker, which increased the risk of developing cancer. Expert evidence assessed the contribution of smoking to the risk of cancer at between 25 and 30 per cent, and that of the occupational exposure at between 70 and 75 per cent. Although there was some discussion of the potential applicability of the Fairchild principle170 to bladder cancer, Smith LJ held that, in any event, the but-for test was met by the claimant having established that the occupational exposure had more than doubled the risk due to smoking. That being the case, the “natural inference” was that “if it had not been for the occupational exposure, the respondent would not have developed bladder cancer”.171 The “doubles the risk” test as applied in Novartis and

167 168 169 170 171

[2002] EWHC 1420 (QB). Per Mackay J at para 20. [2007] EWCA Civ 1261. As to which see paras 13.37–13.44 above. [2007] EWCA Civ 1261 at para 74. See also Shortell v Bical, unreported, QBD District Registry (Liverpool), 16 May 2008, holding in relation to asbestosis that the “doubles the risk” test was satisfied by occupational exposure to asbestos, but also holding that the victim’s smoking habit constituted contributory negligence justifying a 1 per cent reduction in damages.

Factual Causation   451

subsequent case law has been subjected to detailed and searching criticism for its “wholly unscientific and internally inconsistent” approach to epidemiological principle and relative risk.172 The Supreme Court in Sienkiewicz expressed concern regarding over-reliance upon epidemiological evidence of association, although it did not say that the “doubles the risk” test was invalid – merely that it was inappropriate in mesothelioma cases where there was a single carcinogen. Similarly, in Williams v Bermuda Hospitals Board173 Lord Toulson urged that caution should be exercised in using the test, warning that “inferring causation from proof of heightened risk is never an exercise to apply mechanistically. A doubled tiny risk will still be very small.” The test has nonetheless continued to be applied to establish causation in cases where victims have developed cancers or chronic respiratory diseases in which a history of smoking and workplace exposure to noxious substances are implicated.174

(b) Multiple defenders The “doubles the risk” test was used in Heneghan v Manchester Dry Docks Ltd,175 a case in which the victim of lung cancer had both been a smoker and also worked for a series of employers who had exposed him to asbestos, six of whom were sued on behalf of his estate. The risk from smoking of developing this form of cancer was increased five-fold by the occupational exposure to asbestos. Since asbestos exposure had plainly more than doubled the risk of disease, it was common ground that it was the cause of the cancer. But while the but-for test was thus established in relation to overall asbestos exposure, it was not satisfied in relation to each of the six defendants, none of whom individually had exposed the victim to levels of asbestos that doubled the risk, and but for whose exposure the cancer might nonetheless have occurred. As Lord Dyson observed, the “doubles the risk” test solved the question of “what” had caused the disease, but it was not helpful in determining “who” had done so.176 In order to answer this second question, the “material increase in risk” principle was invoked,177 to the effect that, by exposing the victim to asbestos, each of the employers sued had materially contributed to the risk of his contracting the disease. 172 C McIvor, “The ‘Doubles the Risk’ Test for Causation”, in S G A Pitel et al (eds), Tort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy (2013) 215 at 233; see also J Stapleton, “Factual Causation, Mesothelioma and Statistical Validity” (2012) 128 LQR 221. 173 [2016] UKPC 4, [2016] AC 888 at para 48. 174 See Jones v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2012] EWHC 2936 (QB) (workers contracting cancers and respiratory diseases after workplace exposure to phurnacite but also with a history of smoking); Blackmore v Department for Communities and Local Government [2017] EWCA Civ 1136, [2018] QB 471 (smoker contracting lung cancer after exposure to asbestos). 175 [2016] EWCA Civ 86, [2016] 1 WLR 2036. 176 [2016] EWCA Civ 86, [2016] 1 WLR 2036 at paras 8–9. 177 As to which see paras 13.32ff above.

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In summary, therefore, once the application of the “doubles the risk” test establishes which substance has caused the pursuer’s disease, the claim does not fail by reason that multiple persons were responsible for exposing the pursuer to that substance. The “material increase in risk” test may then be applied in relation to each exposure. Adapting Lord Dyson’s terminology from Heneghan, the “doubles the risk” test determines the “what” question; the “material increase in risk” test determines the “who” question.

E. THE MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION TEST AND MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE 13.69

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As outlined above, the material contribution test, as applied in Wardlaw178 to the onset of industrial disease, applies in cases where allegedly negligent causes operate concurrently with non-negligent causes in bringing about injury. In recent years, furthermore, the test has been carried across to the medical context, in situations where a patient has in the first place suffered injury or disease due to natural or environmental causes and where subsequent negligent treatment or misdiagnosis is then alleged to have played a causal role in bringing about an adverse outcome. The Court of Appeal purported to apply the material contribution test in Bailey v Ministry of Defence,179 a case in which the claimant, suffering complications after surgery to remove a gall stone, developed pancreatitis. Poor aftercare by hospital staff then combined with the effects of the pancreatitis to leave the claimant in a seriously debilitated condition. While in this weak state she attempted to drink, was unable to swallow, and aspirated her vomit, leading to cardiac arrest and hypoxic brain damage. Thus she had been rendered susceptible to this misadventure by a combination of: (i) a naturally occurring event (the pancreatitis); and (ii) the defenders’ negligence (the substandard medical care). These could therefore be regarded as cumulative causes within a single process. The element of causal uncertainty was the degree to which the second cause had contributed to the ultimate harmful result. Under reference to Wardlaw, the court held that the claimant was entitled to succeed if she could show that the medical negligence made a material contribution to the weakening of her condition which in turn caused her cardiac arrest. “Material” meant that the contribution had to be “more than negligible”.180 In this regard the court distinguished Wilsher,181 which had held the material contribution test to be inapplicable in circumstances where the element of causal uncertainty derived from the impossibility of establishing which of several disparate causal agents had caused the harm. 178 179 180 181

Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings Ltd 1956 SC (HL) 26; see paras 13.29–13.31 above. [2008] EWCA Civ 883, [2009] 1 WLR 1052. [2008] EWCA Civ 883, [2009] 1 WLR 1052 per Waller LJ at para 46. Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074; see para 13.23 above.

Factual Causation   453

Bailey v Ministry of Defence was the subject of comment in Williams v Bermuda Hospitals Board.182 While the Privy Council considered the outcome of Bailey to be correct, it doubted whether the case in reality involved a departure from the but-for test. Lord Toulson reasoned that: “The fact that [the claimant’s] vulnerability was heightened by her pancreatitis no more assisted the hospital’s case than if she had an eggshell skull.”183 However, the Privy Council deliberated at length upon the material contribution test, identifying an obvious “parallel”184 between Wardlaw185 and the facts of the case in hand. In Williams the claimant attended the defendant’s hospital suffering from appendicitis, and indeed his appendix had already ruptured by this point. Although an appendectomy was performed, there was a negligent delay, so that the operation took place 140 minutes later than it should have done. The claimant ultimately suffered lasting damage to his heart and lung due to sepsis from the ruptured appendix that had developed incrementally over a period of approximately six hours, during which the supply of oxygen to the heart steadily reduced. The harm-inducing sepsis was therefore brought about by “a single continuous process”,186 as in Bailey, beginning with the naturally occurring event – the ruptured appendix – but prolonged by the negligent delay in treating it. The trial judge held causation not to be established, because the claimant had not proved that long-term damage would have been avoided by prompt treatment, a test which the Bermuda Court of Appeal had regarded as “raising the bar unattainably high”.187 The Privy Council viewed matters differently. The proper approach was to determine whether the negligent delay contributed materially to the occurrence of sepsis, and, in assessing this cumulative process, it was immaterial whether the causal factors operated concurrently (as in Wardlaw) or successively (as in this case).188 The circumstances provided sufficient grounds for the inference “on the balance of probabilities that the hospital board’s negligence materially contributed to the process, and therefore materially contributed to the injury to the heart and lungs”.189

182 [2016] UKPC 4, [2016] AC 888. 183 [2016] UKPC 4, [2016] AC 888 at para 47. For criticism of this view, see S H Bailey, “Material contribution after Williams v The Bermuda Hospitals Board” (2018) 38 Legal Studies 411 at 423. 184 [2016] UKPC 4, [2016] AC 888 per Lord Toulson at para 35. 185 Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings Ltd 1956 SC (HL) 26; see paras 13.29–13.31 above. 186 [2016] UKPC 4, [2016] AC 888 per Lord Toulson at para 41. 187 [2016] UKPC 4, [2016] AC 888 per Lord Toulson at para 19. 188 [2016] UKPC 4, [2016] AC 888 per Lord Toulson at para 38. 189 [2016] UKPC 4, [2016] AC 888 per Lord Toulson at para 42. An application of the material contribution test in a similar context is seen in John v Central Manchester and Manchester Children’s University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2016] EWHC 407 (QB), [2016] 4 WLR 54, in which delay in treating the claimant appropriately for a head injury resulted in an extended period of raised intra-cranial pressure which was deemed materially to have contributed to the significant cognitive and neuropsychological impairment suffered by the claimant.

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The judgment in Williams does not spell out in detail the basis on which the decision rests.190 It is possible to cast the decision as using material contribution as “simply one route to establishing ‘but-for’ causation”.191 Yet, in allowing causation to be established where, on the balance of probabilities, the defendant’s negligence materially contributed to a process that in turn materially contributed to the claimant’s injury, it represents a significant extension of the Wardlaw material contribution test. That view is illustrated by a subsequent Scottish case, Andrews v Greater Glasgow Health Board.192 The case concerns a death from acute mesenteric ischaemia. At first, the doctor in a hospital Accident and Emergency Department failed to diagnose the patient’s condition, resulting in a 24-hour delay in her being admitted as an in-patient. The court regarded the traditional but-for test as satisfied on the facts; but for the negligent delay in proper diagnosis, the patient would have been admitted to hospital earlier, and on the balance of probabilities she would not have succumbed to the medical misadventure which later befell her. However, the Lord Ordinary, Lord Pentland, went on to state that, even if he had not regarded the but-for test as satisfied, the circumstances of this case were capable of being “equiparated” with those of Williams. That meant that, where the combined effect of negligent and non-negligent causes was not capable of being separated out, the but-for test could be “modified” by going one step back and looking at material contributions to the process by which the patient was ultimately harmed. It was therefore relevant to ask whether, on the balance of probabilities, the negligent delay in diagnosis and treatment was “‘material’ in the sense that it made a real (or meaningful or significant) contribution towards the death”.193 Williams thus extends the but-for test, allowing two questions to be asked in such cases of alleged medical negligence. (i) On the balance of probabilities, but for the defender’s negligence would the harm to the pursuer have occurred in any event? If the answer to that question is “no”, then causation is established. But even if the answer is “yes”, a second question may be asked. (ii) On the balance of probabilities, did the defender’s negligence (typically delay in treatment) make a material contribution, cumulatively with other factors, to a process which caused harm to the pursuer? If the answer is “yes”, then causation is established.

190 See commentary in J Stapleton and S Steel, “Causes and Contributions” (2016) 132 LQR 363 at 365. 191 C Foster, “A Material Contribution to Forensic Clarity” (2016) 166 NLJ 7689 at 9. 192 [2019] CSOH 31, 2019 SLT 727, discussed at para 13.07 above. 193 [2019] CSOH 31, 2019 SLT 727 at para 168.

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Although question (i) could not be answered in the negative in Williams, a positive answer to question (ii) meant that causation was established. By contrast, in cases such as Barnett194 and Hotson,195 the weight of evidence indicated that the defendants’ negligence made no contribution, material or otherwise, to the occurrence of harm, since this was entirely attributable to another factor (the arsenic in Barnett, and irreparable injury at the time of the fall in Hotson). Williams has continued to generate discussion. Some commentators have argued that doctors risk being made the “effective insurers” of their patients by the availability of this extended, and as yet loosely-defined, “material contribution” test in all cases where already unwell or injured patients have put themselves in the care of the medical profession.196 Those fears do not appear to have been realised, so far at least, but it is hard to disagree with the perception that the “exact parameters” of this extended material contribution test are “crying out for review afresh by the Supreme Court”.197

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F. INDEPENDENT SUPERVENING CAUSES (1) Consecutive causes with equivalent potential impact A further situation in which the traditional but-for test is not insisted upon is where there is a sequence of wrongdoing with causal impact, but wrongdoing A and wrongdoing B are independent and unrelated to one another. A’s wrongdoing was sufficient to cause harm to the pursuer, but B’s wrongdoing means that the pursuer would have suffered substantially the same harm in any event. In those circumstances A’s initial wrongdoing is nonetheless deemed to have caused the harm. In effect A’s wrongdoing pre-empts B’s. The English case of Steel v Joy198 illustrates. The claimant was injured in an accident in 1996 due to the fault of the first defendant, and then in a second accident in 1999 due to the fault of the second defendant. The first accident accelerated the onset of a serious medical condition. If the first accident had not already occurred, the second accident in turn would have had substantially the same effect upon the claimant but, since the first accident had already taken place, the second accident did not

194 Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428; see para 13.06 above. 195 Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750; see paras 13.89–13.91 below. 196 S Green, “Q: When is a material contribution not a material contribution? A: When it has not been proven to have made any difference to the claimant’s damage” (2016) 32 Professional Negligence 169 at 172. 197 S H Bailey, “Material Contribution after Williams v The Bermuda Hospitals Board” (2018) 38 Legal Studies 411 at 425. 198 [2004] EWCA Civ 576, [2004] 1 WLR 3002.

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significantly affect his condition. The court held it to be irrelevant that, but for the first accident, the second accident would in any event have caused the same damage.199 Since the claimant had already suffered that damage, the second defendant did not cause it. On that basis the claimant was held to be entitled to recover damages from the first defendant for the losses inflicted by him, and from the second defendant only to the extent of any additional losses suffered as a result of the second accident (which in the event were negligible). By the same token, in the earlier case of Performance Cars v Abraham200 the plaintiff’s Rolls-Royce was involved in a collision for which the defendant was to blame. However, the car had not long previously been involved in another collision, for which a different driver was responsible. That earlier collision had called for the same type of respray, which had yet to be carried out. The defendant had therefore collided with a motor-car which already needed to be resprayed, and could be held liable only to the extent of any additional costs incurred due to the second collision. Accordingly, the driver in the first collision remained liable for the full costs of respraying.201

(2) Supervening events diminishing impact of initial harm 13.78

Similar reasoning applies where the pursuer has been injured by successive acts of wrongdoing in which the impact of the first wrongdoing is diminished by the second. The classic case illustrating this point is Baker v Willoughby,202 in which the plaintiff’s leg was injured in a road accident caused by the negligence of the defendant. Three years later, during a robbery at his place of work, the plaintiff was shot in the same leg and the leg had to be amputated. At the time of the amputation he had begun proceedings against the defendant to recover for the pain, discomfort, loss of amenities, and loss of earning power resulting from the injuries to the leg. In those proceedings the defendant argued that the sum claimed should be reduced because the second injury had removed the limb affected by disability, and the continuing losses suffered thereafter could not therefore 199 [2004] EWCA Civ 576, [2004] 1 WLR 3002 per Dyson LJ at para 70. 200 [1962] 1 QB 33. See also the New Hampshire case of Dillon v Twin State Gas & Electric Co 85 NH 449 (1932), in which a child fell from a road bridge and was fatally electrocuted by grasping an unprotected power cable as he fell. The case was allowed to proceed to trial on the basis that: “If it were found that [the child] would have thus fallen with death probably resulting, the [electricity company] would not be liable, unless for conscious suffering found to have been sustained from the shock. In that situation his life or earning capacity had no value. To constitute actionable negligence there must be damage, and damage is limited to those elements the statute prescribes. If it should be found that but for the current he would have fallen with serious injury, then the loss of life or earning capacity resulting from the electrocution would be measured by its value in such injured condition. Evidence that he would be crippled would be taken into account in the same manner as though he had already been crippled.” 201 In fact a judgment had already been obtained against the first driver, but he had not so far paid up. 202 [1970] AC 467; see also Heil v Rankin [2001] PIQR Q3.

Factual Causation   457

be attributed to the respondent’s negligence. The House of Lords held, however, that there should be no reduction to take account of the second injury, with Lord Pearson explaining its reasoning as follows:203 “The original accident caused what may be called a ‘devaluation’ of the plaintiff, in the sense that it produced a general reduction of his capacity to do things, to earn money and to enjoy life. For that devaluation the original tortfeasor should be and remain responsible to the full extent, unless before the assessment of the damages something has happened which either diminishes the devaluation (e.g. if there is an unexpected recovery from some of the adverse effects of the accident) or by shortening the expectation of life diminishes the period over which the plaintiff will suffer from the devaluation. If the supervening event is a tort, the second tortfeasor should be responsible for the additional devaluation caused by him.”

(3) Impact of wrongdoing diminished by normal “vicissitudes of life” As just seen, a defender’s liability is not to be reduced just because the defender’s wrongdoing is followed by a second wrong that diminishes the impact of the first. The position is different, however, if the defender’s wrongdoing is followed not by further wrongdoing but by a non-delictual event regarded as one of the normal “vicissitudes of life”. In those circumstances that second event may be taken into account in assessing the compensation payable by the defender. The analysis in Baker v Willoughby204 can be contrasted with that seen in Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd,205 in which the plaintiff suffered an injury to his back due to an accident at work. Three years later he suffered the onset of myelopathy which was unconnected with the accident and which would have caused total disability in any event, so that he would eventually have been rendered unfit for work even if the accident had not happened. Expressing its doubts in regard to the reasoning in Baker, the House of Lords held it to be inapplicable where, after the wrongfully inflicted injury, the plaintiff had suffered not further wrongdoing but a wholly unconnected and disabling illness.206 The employers were therefore found liable to compensate the plaintiff for 203 [1970] AC 467 at 496. 204 [1970] AC 467. 205 [1982] AC 794. 206 This was an application of “the long-established and eminently reasonable principle that the onset or emergence of illness is one of the vicissitudes of life relevant to the assessment of damages”: [1982] AC 794 per Lord Edmund-Davies at 809. If, however, in Baker the second tort had the effect of reducing liability in respect of the first, this would on the one hand place the victim in a worse position due to having suffered two torts rather than only one (since the robbers were unlikely to be in a position to pay damages), and on the other benefit the first wrongdoer due to unrelated tortious actions of another. For detailed analysis of the reasoning in Baker and in Jobling, see S Green, Causation in Negligence (2015) 39–43.

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his loss of earnings only until the time at which his illness took hold. In fixing the appropriate level of compensation for loss of earnings, courts were entitled to hypothesise as to the normal contingencies of life that would befall the plaintiff in future, including possible illnesses. It followed that where such a contingency was in fact realised before the date of trial, as in this case, this should be taken into account. It goes without saying, however, that where a supervening disability does not arise independently but is a direct consequence of the initial wrongdoing by the defender, then the defender’s liability is not to be reduced. In Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd207 the claimant’s husband had suffered severe head injuries in an accident at work caused by his employer’s negligence. Thereafter he experienced post-traumatic stress disorder causing him to lapse into severe depression, and six years after the original accident he committed suicide. Unlike in Jobling, therefore, his depression and suicidal tendencies were not regarded as supervening events independent of the employer’s negligence but as part of a sequence that flowed directly from the initial injury, caused by the employer. The damages payable by the employer therefore encompassed all the consequences of the initial breach of duty, including compensation under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, section 1(1), for the deceased’s suicide. In the event that supervening disability prompts the pursuer to commit a criminal offence, a period of imprisonment which results constitutes a vicissitude of life that may be taken into account in assessing compensation, meaning that the pursuer cannot claim for loss of earnings during that period. Such loss is attributed to the pursuer’s illegal act rather than to any earlier breach of duty by the defender. In Gray v Thames Trains Ltd208 the claimant was involved in a train crash caused by the negligence of the defendant. While suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder he committed manslaughter and was compulsorily detained in a psychiatric institution. He would not have committed this offence but for the initial injury, sustained due to the defendant’s negligence, but the period of detention was nonetheless to be regarded as a “vicissitude of life”209 and the loss of earnings relative to that period was not be included in calculating the compensation to which he was entitled. As Lord Brown observed:210 “Whilst recognising that in the result the tortfeasor benefits from criminality which in one sense he himself has contributed to bringing about, the opposite conclusion would result in the claimant being able to ignore a vicissitude for which he for his part has been held responsible . . . And this surely would be a strange conclusion when one bears in mind that vicissitudes for which a claimant may be wholly blameless (as in Jobling itself) 207 208 209 210

[2008] UKHL 13, [2008] 1 AC 884. [2009] UKHL 33, [2009] 1 AC 1339. [2009] UKHL 33, [2009] 1 AC 1339 per Lord Brown at para 101. [2009] UKHL 33, [2009] 1 AC 1339 at para 102.

Factual Causation   459 can and do take effect to terminate what earlier had appeared recoverable long-term continuing losses.”

G. CHESTER v AFSHAR The decision in the English appeal in Chester v Afshar211 is in a category of its own as a case in which the House of Lords considered it appropriate to permit a “narrow and modest departure from traditional causation principles”.212 In Chester a patient with a history of back pain consented to undergo a particular surgical procedure on being advised that it would relieve her condition. Her surgeon did not, however, warn her that this procedure carried a random 1 to 2 per cent risk of triggering the debilitating condition known as cauda equina syndrome, a risk which unfortunately materialised. It was accepted that, although the operation itself had been performed with due care, the surgeon had been negligent in failing to disclose the risk beforehand, and on that basis the patient claimed from him full compensation for her injury. Causation would have been readily established in these circumstances if the patient had been able to show that she would not have had the operation had she been informed of the risk; conversely, the necessary causal link would have been absent if it had been established that she would have had the operation in any event. The problem in this case was that the patient admitted that she would have been likely to agree to the surgery even if she had been more fully informed, but she also said that she would have taken longer to consider the options and would not have gone ahead on that particular day. The majority reasoned that if the risk attached to the procedure was only 1 to 2 per cent, the likelihood that the operation on a different day would have proceeded without incident was 98 to 99 per cent.213 On these statistics the majority of the court in Chester regarded the butfor test as having been met: “but for the surgeon’s negligent failure to warn the claimant of the small risk of serious injury the actual injury would not have occurred when it did and the chance of it occurring on a subsequent occasion was very small.”214 However, even the majority qualified their 211 [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134. 212 [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134 per Lord Steyn at para 24. For commentary from a Scottish perspective, see J K Mason and D Brodie, “Bolam, Bolam – Wherefore are thou Bolam?” (2005) 9 EdinLR 298. 213 [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134 per Lord Steyn at para 19, Lord Hope at para 62. 214 [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134 per Lord Steyn at para 19. Lords Hope (para 61) and Walker (para 94) agreed on this point. Lords Bingham (para 8) and Hoffmann (para 32) dissented. The latter has commented extra-judicially (“Causation”, in R Goldberg (ed), Perspectives on Causation (2011) 3 at 7 n 11): “That is like arguing that if the taxi to take you to Oxford arrives half an hour late and you are injured when it is struck by a meteorite on the M40, its late arrival caused your injury because if it had arrived on time, the chances of being struck by a meteorite during the hypothetical alternative journey would have been very small. In fact it is simply a coincidence that the car struck by the meteorite happened to have set out late. The lateness of the car did not cause the meteorite to strike. Similarly, it was a coincidence that the complication happened to a patient who had not been warned.”

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analysis of causation to the extent that it could not “neatly be accommodated within conventional causation principles”, and that it represented a “modest departure” from them.215 At the close of his speech Lord Steyn reflected that he was:216 “glad to have arrived at the conclusion that the claimant is entitled in law to succeed. This result is in accord with one of the most basic aspirations of the law, namely to right wrongs. Moreover, the decision announced by the House today reflects the reasonable expectations of the public in contemporary society.”

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It may be questioned, however, whether “modification”217 of the rules of causation in relation to physical injury was a satisfactory means of giving “content”218 to the right to adequate information. An alternative view of the facts of Chester is that the wrong caused by the surgeon’s negligence was not the paralysis, but the infringement of Ms Chester’s right to make a free choice on the basis of proper information. The physical harm suffered was coincidental to the failure to warn.219 Yet there was little discussion by the majority in Chester on whether the patient’s right to adequate information might be ascribed independent importance, or whether infringement of that right was to be recognised as a separate wrong. Rather it seemed to be accepted that liability arose only if an adequate causal link was made out between the doctor’s negligence and the physical harm. In other words, the specific wrong for which the House of Lords was prepared to find a remedy was the physical paralysis, not the information deficit per se. Lord Hoffmann alone, in a dissenting speech,220 commented upon failure to inform as a distinct wrong. Lord Hoffmann did not support interference with the established rules of causation so as to render the surgeon’s negligent failure to inform Ms Chester a cause of the physical paralysis.221 On the other hand, he recognised that denial of the opportunity to make an informed choice “was an affront to her personality and leaves her feeling aggrieved”, even if it did not cause the injury.222 Lord Hoffmann conceded that a “modest solatium” might be

215 Per Lord Steyn at paras 22–24. Lord Hope similarly thought that the failure to warn was not the “effective cause” of the injury, and that a finding in the patient’s favour could not rest on “conventional causation principles” (para 61). Lord Walker too thought a finding in the patient’s favour might require “some extension of existing principle” (para 101). 216 [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134 at para 25. 217 [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134 per Lord Steyn at para 23. 218 [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134 per Lord Hope at para 87. 219 See R Stevens, Torts and Rights (2007) 163–167. 220 Lord Bingham also dissented on the question of causation. 221 [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134 at paras 32–35. See also Lord Bingham at para 9. 222 [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134 at para 33.

Factual Causation   461

appropriate in recognition of such an affront, although he dismissed this possibility as impracticable.223 Academic commentary has been divided on the reasoning in Chester.224 Some has accepted the decision as capable of being accommodated within conventional principles of causation and remoteness.225 Other commentary disagrees, on the basis that even if Ms Chester had been properly advised, the patient would have run exactly the same risk if she had chosen to have the procedure later, and that “the fact that the injury fell within the scope of the surgeon’s duty of care is not a substitute for causal involvement”.226 This point is taken up by Clark and Nolan:227

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“[A]lthough the failure to warn . . . robbed [the patient] of the opportunity to avoid risk x, we know that she would not have taken that opportunity, as she would have been willing to run risk x even if properly informed. The patient in such a case cannot therefore legitimately complain about the consequences of risk x materializing (albeit that it may be that she can legitimately complain about something else, such as her autonomy having been violated).”

There has so far been no indication of Chester being reclassified as a “loss of autonomy case”,228 but it has been commented in the Court of Appeal that the reasoning of Chester on the issue of causation may be “ripe for further consideration by the Supreme Court when the opportunity arises”.229 In 223 [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134 at para 34. Lord Hoffmann reasoned that “the risks which may eventuate will vary greatly in severity and . . . there would be great difficulty in fixing a suitable figure. In any case, the cost of litigation over such cases would make the law of torts an unsuitable vehicle for distributing the modest compensation which might be payable.” No reference was made to the “conventional award” for loss of autonomy that had recently been recognised by the same court in Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309. 224 For a comprehensive review of the academic literature, see T Clark and D Nolan, “A Critique of Chester v Afshar” (2014) 34 OJLS 659. 225 J Stapleton, “Occam’s Razor Reveals an Orthodox Basis for Chester v Afshar” (2006) 122 LQR 426 at 429: “Since, but for the breach, she probably would not have suffered the syndrome, historical involvement of the breach in the syndrome was established by satisfaction of the but-for test.” For a Scottish perspective, see M Hogg, “Duties of Care, Causation, and the Implications of Chester v Afshar” (2005) 9 EdinLR 156, accepting that the but-for test was not met but arguing that this is “notoriously adequate” so that it is acceptable to fashion exceptions in deserving cases. 226 S Green, Causation in Negligence (2015) 166. 227 T Clark and D Nolan, “A Critique of Chester v Afshar” (2014) 34 OJLS 659 at 667, citing Canterbury v Spence 464 F 2d 772, 150 US App DC 263 (1972). 228 On this point see S Green, Causation in Negligence (2015) 166–170. See also D Pearce and R Halson, “Damages for Breach of Contract: Compensation, Restitution and Vindication” (2008) 28 OJLS 73 at 98; S Waddams, “Causation, Physicians and Disclosure of Risks” (1999) 7 Tort Law Review 5 (on the earlier Australian case of Chappel v Hart (1998) 156 ALR 517, arguing, at 7, for recognition of an award for the “intangible losses of autonomy and dignity” even where no physical harm was suffered). 229 Duce v Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust [2018] EWCA Civ 1307, [2018] PIQR P18 per Leggatt LJ at para 92.

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Duce v Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust,230 a further case in which a surgeon negligently failed to disclose one of the risks of a particular procedure, the Court of Appeal was careful to take the narrowest possible view of Chester, rejecting the claimant’s argument that reasoning on causation set up a “free-standing test”. Instead the Court of Appeal regarded Chester as having “modified” the normal approach to causation by treating “a ‘but for’ cause that was not an effective cause as a sufficient cause in law in the ‘unusual’ circumstances of the case”.231 And whereas in Chester the court accepted the claimant’s account that, although she would have proceeded with the operation, she would not have done so on that particular day, in Duce the evidence indicated that the claimant would have gone ahead with the operation as scheduled. This allowed the court to reject the Chester “modification” in the circumstances of Duce and the claim failed accordingly.

H. LOSS OF A CHANCE 13.87

A further category of case in which proving causation may present significant challenges is where the harm complained of is the “loss of a chance”. The pursuer argues that the defender’s wrongdoing has deprived the pursuer of the “chance” of a better outcome from a potentially harmful situation which was not itself of the defender’s creation. Typically that hypothetical better outcome would have taken the form of recovery from a physical injury or illness, avoidance of economic detriment, or a favourable outcome in litigation.

(1) Loss of a medical chance 13.88

A standard example of medical chance is the patient who argues that the defender’s negligent failure to diagnose and treat a particular injury or medical condition has deprived the patient of a chance of recovery or at least a better outcome. As a general rule such cases are subject to the normal butfor test in determining causation. So if, on the balance of probabilities, the harmful outcome would have occurred in any event due to the patient’s underlying condition, the defender’s negligence is not judged to have been its cause. In other words, if medical failings deprived the pursuer of a chance of recovery which was at any rate less than 50 per cent, it cannot be said that, but for the defender’s negligence, the harm would not have occurred. 232 230 [2018] EWCA Civ 1307, [2018] PIQR P18. 231 [2018] EWCA Civ 1307, [2018] PIQR P18 per Hamblen LJ at para 66. 232 See Kenyon v Bell 1953 SC 125, in which a child with an eye injury received inadequate treatment on attending hospital and shortly afterwards required to have the eye removed. Proof before answer was allowed in an action against the doctor, but on the basis that the pursuer would succeed only if it could be established on the balance of probabilities that the eye would have been saved by prompt and appropriate treatment.

Factual Causation   463

The leading case demonstrating this principle is Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority.233 When a teenager fell from a tree and was brought to hospital, it took five days for his injury to be diagnosed and treated properly, and he was left with permanent disability in his hip joint. There were two distinct causal factors at issue: the trauma of the initial fall, and the delay in appropriate treatment. The evidence led at trial indicated with 75 per cent certainty that the rupture of the blood vessels at the moment of the fall had caused the lasting disability, which would not have been reversed by prompter treatment, but that there was also a 25 per cent possibility that disability might have been avoided had internal bruising and bleeding been treated promptly. This was not, therefore a case of causes combining to make a material contribution to the adverse outcome.234 Either the injury was rendered irreparable at the time of the fall, or it was caused by the subsequent bruising or bleeding. The trial judge, nonetheless, considered it appropriate to award the plaintiff 25 per cent of the total damages claimed, to reflect denial of that 25 per cent possibility of full recovery. This approach was approved by the Court of Appeal, but rejected by the House of Lords. The evidence established on the balance of probabilities that the fall had caused the lasting injury, so that, even without the defendants’ negligence, the harm would still have occurred. In these circumstances there was no basis for awarding a proportionate fraction of the full damages for the injury commensurate with that lost chance. As Lord Ackner explained: “Once liability is established, on the balance of probabilities, the loss which the plaintiff has sustained is payable in full. It is not discounted by reducing his claim by the extent to which he has failed to prove his case with 100 per cent. certainty.”235 The outcome of Hotson was therefore determined by the traditional test of but-for causation.236 The claim failed because on the balance of probabilities the cause of disability was the original traumatic injury. Where causation can be determined, on the balance of probabilities, in the defender’s favour, the pursuer is not to be compensated to reflect causal uncertainty introduced by the defender’s negligence and assessed at less than 50 per cent. This case can therefore be distinguished from those discussed above in which two or more causes combine in making a “material contribution” 233 [1987] AC 750. 234 On this point see Williams v Bermuda Hospitals Board [2016] UKPC 4, [2016] AC 888 per Lord Toulson at para 36, distinguishing Hotson. 235 [1987] AC 750 at 793. 236 As Lord Mackay summarised, [1987] AC 750 at 789–790: “the judge’s findings in fact mean that the sole cause of the plaintiff’s avascular necrosis was the injury he sustained in the original fall, and that implies . . . that when he arrived at the authority’s hospital for the first time he had no chance of avoiding it. Accordingly, the subsequent negligence of the authority did not cause him the loss of such a chance.”

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to the process by which the pursuer is injured but in which no one cause can been established as the sole cause on the balance of probabilities.237 The question whether loss of a chance should be reparable was revisited by the House of Lords some years later in a case in which the medical circumstances were significantly different from those in Hotson. The analysis of the plaintiff’s situation in Hotson was that on the balance of probabilities the harm had already been done to his hip before his interaction with the defendants, so that there was by then no chance to be lost and more appropriate treatment would have made no difference. Gregg v Scott238 presented a different scenario in that the chances of a better outcome were still capable of improvement at the point of the alleged negligence, and it was accepted that those chances had been reduced by the defendants’ negligence. The claimant suffered from malignant lymphoma, and delay by doctors in diagnosis and referral for appropriate treatment had diminished his chances of survival over ten years. Those chances were rated at 25 per cent, but they would have been assessed at 42 per cent had he been treated promptly following his first consultation with his GP. Mr Gregg’s claim did indeed relate to the loss of a chance, therefore – more specifically the proportionate reduction of his prospects of survival by 18 per cent. By a three-to-two majority, however, the House of Lords held that, on these figures, causation was not established on the balance of probabilities, and that a lost opportunity of less than 50 per cent should not be compensated. Lord Hoffmann accepted that 42 out of 100 patients with the same condition might well have survived on being treated immediately, but that figure masked the variations in the factors determining outcomes for individual cancer patients. For some the delay in treatment might well have been crucial in causing the condition to be terminal, whereas for others the cancer might have been incurable from the start due to the patient’s genetic make-up or to environmental factors. In Lord Hoffmann’s view, such cases did not fall within the narrow circumstances mapped out for the Fairchild exception, in which the cause of the cancer was certain but uncertainty attached to the provenance of the specific carcinogen.239 The inability to establish definitively the causal role of delay in diagnosis could not be remedied by application of the “material increase in risk” test.240 A closer analogy was Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority,241 in which causation was not established where there was uncertainty as to which of various 237 See Williams v Bermuda Hospitals Board [2016] UKPC 4, [2016] AC 888 per Lord Toulson at para 36, distinguishing Hotson. For analysis of the reasoning in Hotson, see H Reece, “Losses of Chances in the Law” (1996) 59 MLR 189. 238 [2005] UKHL 2, [2005] 2 AC 176. For a Scottish perspective on this case, see M Hogg, “Re-establishing Orthodoxy in the Realm of Causation” (2007) 11 EdinLR 8. 239 For the Fairchild exception, see paras 13.37–13.44 above. 240 For the “material increase in risk” test, see paras 13.32ff above. 241 [1988] AC 1074; see para 13.23 above.

Factual Causation   465

factors had caused the plaintiff’s blindness.242 Given that the claimant was unable to prove on the balance of probabilities that, but for the defendant’s negligence, he would have been cured, his claim necessarily failed. Thus Gregg, like Hotson, was not resolved on the basis of a loss of a chance, but on traditional principles of causation. Gregg was unable to prove on the balance of probabilities that, but for the defendants’ negligence, he would have been cured, just as Hotson was unable to prove that, but for the delay in treatment, he would have escaped disability. For the majority of the court in Gregg, there were also persuasive policy reasons for endorsing this “all or nothing” approach and for rejecting the uncertainties entailed in compensating marginal loss of a chance. As Baroness Hale commented, the corollary of compensating a claimant for lost chances of less than 50 per cent was that the defendant might expect compensation to be reduced proportionately in circumstances where the “chance” was more than 50 per cent but less than 100 per cent.243 Put another way, had the figures been reversed, and Mr Gregg’s chances of survival been assessed at 58 per cent, might the defendant then have argued that the sum awarded to compensate negligent delay in treatment should be restricted to 58 per cent of the total? The potential complexity and unpredictability entailed in adjudicating claims for proportionate damages were considered sufficiently unattractive to outweigh any policy benefits that it might bring. In addition, there was also the practical consideration that Mr Gregg was in fact still alive ten years after the negligent first consultation when his GP failed to refer him for treatment. This meant that arguments regarding the loss of the chance of survival were appearing increasingly artificial.244 The decision in Gregg v Scott was not unanimous and the dissenting judgments from the minority were strongly expressed. Lord Nicholls spoke to the manifest unfairness of treating a patient’s prospects of recovery as non-existent and worthless where they were recognised to have existed but fell short of 50 per cent:245

242 [2005] UKHL 2, [2005] 2 AC 176 per Lord Hoffmann at paras 80–85. 243 [2005] UKHL 2, [2005] 2 AC 176 per Lady Hale at paras 222–225. 244 [2005] UKHL 2, [2005] 2 AC 176 per Lord Phillips at para 169, Lady Hale at para 226. 245 [2005] UKHL 2, [2005] 2 AC 176 at para 3. He concluded, at para 43: “Where a patient’s condition is attended with such uncertainty that medical opinion assesses the patient’s recovery prospects in percentage terms, the law should do likewise. The law should not, by adopting the all-or-nothing balance of probability approach, assume certainty where none in truth exists . . . The difference between good and poor prospects is a matter going to the amount of compensation fairly payable, not to liability to make payment at all.” Lord Hope, also in the minority, used a different argument. The Court of Appeal had agreed that the enlargement of the tumour was caused by the delay in diagnosis ([2002] EWCA Civ 1471, (2003) 71 BMLR 16 per Lathan LJ at para 21). This, said Lord Hope, should in itself be regarded as a form of injury which merited compensation (para 121).

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466   The Law of Delict in Scotland “The loss of a 45% prospect of recovery is just as much a real loss for a patient as the loss of a 55% prospect of recovery. In both cases the doctor was in breach of his duty to his patient. In both cases the patient was worse off. He lost something of importance and value.”

And even one of the majority, Lord Phillips, decided against the plaintiff only because he did not regard this case as a “suitable vehicle” for recognition of “the right to recover damages for the loss of a chance of a cure”.246 It is accepted, therefore, that Gregg v Scott does not definitively close the door on claims for loss of a chance in medical matters. Given the difficulty of this area and the need for certainty and consistency, the lower courts, in England at least, have acknowledged the loss of a chance doctrine as “appropriate for reconsideration by the Supreme Court”, although they have declined themselves to develop it further.247

(2) Loss of a commercial chance 13.96

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By contrast with the cases involving missed opportunities of a better medical outcome, just discussed, the loss of a chance is more likely to be compensated where professional negligence has removed a commercial opportunity. In such cases the defender’s negligence has typically deprived the pursuer of a chance that was contingent upon predictable further action by a third party, and there is likely to be less evidential uncertainty surrounding the defender’s negligence as the cause of losing that chance (as compared with cases where complex medical and environmental factors may also be implicated). The leading English case is Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons,248 in which the plaintiff, a retailing company, instructed the defenders, a firm of solicitors, to act on its behalf in acquiring a chain of shops. The draft contract originally contained a clause that protected the plaintiff’s position against outstanding liabilities under the leases over the shop premises that it was taking over. However, at some point while the final version of the contract was being agreed with the vendors, the defendants allowed the relevant clause to be deleted. As a result, the plaintiff found itself liable for substantial sums arising from those leases. Plainly the solicitors were in breach of their duty of care towards their client in allowing the clause to be deleted without explaining to their client the consequences, and the court accepted that, had 246 [2005] UKHL 2, [2005] 2 AC 176 at para 190. A more appropriate case for proportionate damages might arise where negligence had increased the chance of an adverse outcome to medical treatment and, unlike in Gregg, that outcome had eventuated. 247 Wright v Cambridge Medical Group [2011] EWCA Civ 669, [2013] QB 312 per Lord Neuberger at para 84. 248 [1995] 1 WLR 1602.

Factual Causation   467

the plaintiff been properly informed, the plaintiff would have instructed the defenders to negotiate for retention of the clause. It was less certain whether the vendors would have consented to this, but a sufficient causal link between the defendants’ negligence and the plaintiff’s loss would be made out if the plaintiff could establish that there was a significant chance that the vendors would have done so. The proper course of action would then be to evaluate and compensate that lost chance. As Stuart Smith LJ directed:249 “[T]he plaintiff must prove as a matter of causation that he has a real or substantial chance as opposed to a speculative one. If he succeeds in doing so, the evaluation of the chance is part of the assessment of the quantum of damage, the range lying somewhere between something that just qualifies as real or substantial on the one hand and near certainty on the other.”

The case was therefore remitted to the lower courts to determine: (i) whether there was a substantial or realistic chance that the plaintiff would have been successful in reinstating the clause; and (ii) to assess the value of the lost chance in percentage terms. The approach adopted in Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons is followed also by the Scottish courts. In Kirkton Investments Ltd v VMH LLP,250 for example, the pursuer had instructed the defenders to act as its solicitors in the purchase of a site for a housing development, with the intention that the properties would come on the market from April 2007. The property market was strong for most of 2007 but, due to the defenders’ delay in ensuring that the necessary permissions were obtained for the development, the properties on the site did not become available for sale until nearly a year later, by which time the financial downturn had made the market considerably more challenging. As a result the pursuer experienced considerable delay in disposing of the properties, and most achieved prices significantly below those originally projected for them in 2007. The pursuer sought damages for professional negligence from the defenders to recover their loss. The Lord Ordinary, Lord Doherty, was persuaded that the defenders had breached their duty of care towards the pursuer, and, under reference to Allied Maples, Lord Doherty took the view that the defenders’ negligence had deprived the pursuer of a “real and substantial” chance of achieving higher sales revenue from the site.251 It is of significance that, in fixing an overall value upon that lost chance, Lord Doherty accepted that the pursuer might recover for certain lost opportunities which had been rated at less than 50 per cent. But for the 249 [1995] 1 WLR 1602 at 1614. 250 [2011] CSOH 200, [2012] PNLR 11. 251 [2011] CSOH 200, [2012] PNLR 11 at para 65.

13.98

468   The Law of Delict in Scotland

13.99

defenders’ negligence, the pursuer would have had a 60 per cent chance of selling the apartments in the development before the financial downturn, but only a 40 per cent chance of selling the townhouses by then. On that basis it would have had a 55 per cent chance of clearing its bank indebtedness for the development by that date. The damages to which the pursuer was found entitled reflected the corresponding reduction in sale proceeds of both the apartments and the town houses attributable to the market downturn, as well as the increased bank borrowing costs due to the delay in sales. As these examples indicate, this type of case is most often seen in the context of professional negligence. However, an example of an actionable lost chance in a different context leading to economic loss can be seen in the well-known case of Spring v Guardian Assurance plc, discussed in an earlier chapter in relation to negligent misstatements.252 In that case it was held that an employer owed a duty to a former employee to exercise due care in preparing an employment reference. It could not be determined for sure that the plaintiff would have obtained employment had the reference not been compiled negligently. However, the inclusion of misleading and damaging information in the reference breached the relevant standard of care, and the case was remitted by the House of Lords to the court below to determine whether a reasonable chance of employment had indeed been lost, and, if so, to quantify the damage suffered thereby.

(3) Loss of a chance in litigation 13.100

13.101

Claims have similarly been recognised to compensate disappointed litigants for opportunities missed due to negligence by legal advisers in taking their cases forward – typically where a solicitor has failed to take appropriate action within required time limits.253 In such circumstances the pursuer’s success, had the solicitor not been negligent and had the action proceeded, could not of course have been guaranteed, but it is recognised that a “prospect” or “opportunity” to press a claim has been lost, to which a value can be ascribed.254 In Kyle v P & J Stormonth Darling WS,255 decree was pronounced against Mr Kyle in an action brought against him in the sheriff court. An appeal to the sheriff principal was unsuccessful but, on being advised that this might have reasonable prospects of success, he had instructed the defenders, his solicitors, to appeal to the Inner House. However, the defenders failed to lodge the necessary papers timeously, and the appeal 252 253 254 255

[1995] 2 AC 296; see paras 5.51–5.53 above. See e.g. Yeoman v Ferries 1967 SC 255; Kitchen v Royal Air Force Association [1958] 1 WLR 563. Kyle v P & J Stormonth Darling WS 1993 SC 57 per Lord McCluskey at 68. 1993 SC 57.

Factual Causation   469

was held to have been abandoned. As a consequence final decree against Mr Kyle was obtained. Mr Kyle could not have been confident of success in his appeal (after all, he had been unsuccessful twice already), and he was not required for the purposes of the litigation against his solicitors to show that he would have succeeded on the balance of probabilities. He was held to be entitled to recover for the lost “opportunity” of that appeal, and to place a value on it, if it could be shown to be “non-negligible”. As Lord McCluskey explained:256 “[I]t is rather unlikely that the true measure of the loss resulting from the negligence of the solicitor will be exactly equal to the value of the original loss sustained by the litigant, being the loss giving rise to the original claim in the litigation. There may be cases in which the litigant, suing his negligent solicitor, can demonstrate that the claim against the original defender would have been bound to succeed; in that event the measure of his claim against the solicitor may be close to or identical to the measure of his lost claim against the original wrongdoer. Equally, there may be cases in which the prospects of success in the original claim were so remote that the court could confidently conclude that the claim in the litigation was worthless and that the loss of the right to pursue it was a nugatory loss. In between there may be a whole spectrum of possibilities. It may be that in a case such as the present the court could be readily persuaded to have regard to the everyday fact that legal disputes are compromised at some stage (often at the last minute) between their initiation and their determination by the court. There are elaborate and frequently used procedures for compromising claims in whole or in part. It follows, therefore, that the pursuer in the present case is right to claim damages for what he offers to prove he has lost, namely the value of the lost right to proceed with his appeal in the original litigation. The pursuer will fail unless it is established that the lost right had an ascertainable, measurable, non-negligible value; but he is under no obligation, as a precondition of obtaining an award against the present defenders, to show that he would probably have succeeded in the original litigation.”

On this basis proof before answer was allowed, so that a value could be ascertained for the lost opportunity to continue with the appeal. A similar approach was adopted in McCrindle Group Ltd v Maclay Murray & Spens,257 in which detailed consideration was given as to how such a lost opportunity should be valued. The defenders had acted as the pursuer’s solicitors in the conduct of complex arbitration proceedings. They failed, however, to advise it on appropriate measures to ensure that pre-award interest was obtained on the ultimate award achieved and,

256 1993 SC 57 per Lord McCluskey at 69. 257 [2013] CSOH 72, 2013 GWD 19–389.

13.102

470   The Law of Delict in Scotland

since the case had been protracted, this represented a significant sum. The pursuer argued that the defenders’ negligence in this respect had not only deprived it of the relevant interest but also created uncertainty, causing settlement negotiations to be more difficult and protracted. The pursuer had thereby lost out on the opportunity of obtaining a more advantageous settlement figure at an earlier date. Accepting that causation was established, the Lord Ordinary, Lord Hodge, proceeded to value that lost opportunity by reference to the degree of likelihood that it would have eventuated. This entailed evaluation of evidence regarding the circumstances of the settlement discussions and negotiations. On that basis, Lord Hodge was satisfied that the pursuer would have accepted a settlement figure of £450,000, and he assessed the chance of the other side offering this amount at 40 per cent. This meant that the lost opportunity was to be valued at £180,000, from which the sum actually paid, £90,000, was to be deducted, leaving the sum of £90,000 to be awarded against the defenders.258

258 [2013] CSOH 72, 2013 GWD 19–389 at para 156.

Chapter 14

Legal Causation and Remoteness of Damage

Para A. INTRODUCTION����������������������������������������������������������������� 14.01 B. LEGAL CAUSATION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERVENING EVENTS����������������������������������������������������� 14.02 (1) Subsequent conduct by a third party�������������������������������� 14.04 (2) Subsequent medical treatment������������������������������������������� 14.10 (3) Subsequent natural event�������������������������������������������������� 14.12 (4) Subsequent conduct by the pursuer (a) In general������������������������������������������������������������������� 14.13 (b) Reaction to an emergency�������������������������������������������� 14.16 (c) Acts of rescuers����������������������������������������������������������� 14.17 (d) Deliberate self-harm���������������������������������������������������� 14.18 C. REMOTENESS OF DAMAGE���������������������������������������������� 14.21 (1) The “starting point”: foreseeability (a) The English position��������������������������������������������������� 14.23 (b) The Scottish position�������������������������������������������������� 14.28 (2) The genus of the harm and the nature of the risk���������������� 14.33 (3) The “eggshell skull” principle (a) Defenders taking victims as they find them������������������� 14.38 (b) Some qualifications����������������������������������������������������� 14.41 (c) Psychiatric harm��������������������������������������������������������� 14.43 (d) Property damage��������������������������������������������������������� 14.45 D. RISK OUTWITH THE SCOPE OF DUTY (THE SAAMCO PRINCIPLE)������������������������������������������������ 14.46 E. REMOTENESS AND THE INTENTIONAL DELICTS (1) A direct consequence rule?������������������������������������������������ 14.54 (2) Nuisance�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 14.55

A. INTRODUCTION Even where wrongdoing by D is established as a factual cause of harm suffered by P, it may nonetheless be determined, as a matter of legal policy, that D should not be found liable for P’s harm. There are two main cases. One is where the harm to P arose from a sequence of events, and a 471

14.01

472   The Law of Delict in Scotland

different and later event is considered to have superseded D’s wrongdoing in causative potency. The other is where the consequences of D’s wrong are so far removed from the original wrongdoing that it would be unfair to impose liability on D. The first category of case involves a judgment on legal (as opposed to factual) causation, the second on the question of remoteness of damage.1

B. LEGAL CAUSATION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERVENING EVENTS 14.02

14.03

The harm suffered by P is not always the product of D’s wrongdoing alone but in many instances can be seen as flowing from a sequence of events. Thus the initial wrongdoing by D may have been followed by a further action by a third party, a natural event, an act of carelessness by P, or a combination of these. All may be classified as factual causes but for which the harm would not have occurred, but the causal potency of a later event may be such as to supersede D’s wrongdoing for the purposes of fixing liability. This exercise in weighing causes is referred to as the attribution of “legal” causation, by determining the causa causans – the immediate,2 effective or proximate cause of the harm. The essential question is whether an event subsequent to D’s wrongdoing was of such significance as to interrupt the chain of causation as a novus actus interveniens (a new intervening act). If so, the factual causation brought about by D’s wrongdoing will not translate into causation as a matter of law. The assessment as to whether a novus actus has occurred is said to rest not upon any scientific formula but upon “common sense”.3 Key factors are likely to include: (i) whether the second event was foreseeably within the risk created by the first; and (ii) the relative culpability of the various actors who have contributed to the sequence of events. Where the chain of factual causation between D’s wrongdoing and the harm to P is broken in this way, D is relieved of liability. Conversely, if the chain of factual causation is found not to be broken, D remains liable. A further possible outcome is that the chain of factual causation between initial  1 See McKew v Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd 1969 SC 14 (affd 1970 SC (HL) 20) per Lord Justice-Clerk Grant at 24: “For practical reasons . . . there must come some stage in the sequence of events where damages cease to be exigible from the wrongdoer. There may be some intervening act which interrupts the chain of causation or the stage may come when the ultimate result is too remote or too indirect to found a claim for damages.”  2 Trayner’s Latin Maxims 71. See, however, e.g. Rahman v Arearose Ltd [2001] QB 351 per Laws LJ at paras 32–33, querying the usefulness of the distinction between factual and legal causation.  3 See Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co Ltd v Minister of War Transport [1942] AC 691 per Lord Wright at 706; Rahman v Arearose Ltd [2001] QB 351 per Laws LJ at para 33. See also Cork v Kirby Maclean Ltd [1952] 2 All ER 402 per Denning LJ at 407: “It is always a matter of seeing whether the particular event was sufficiently powerful a factor in bringing about the result as to be properly regarded by the law as a cause of it.”

Legal Causation and Remoteness of Damage   473

wrongdoing and ultimate harm is unbroken but the causal impact of intervening wrongdoing cannot be discounted. In that case, more than one party may be liable for the harm, and an apportionment of liability is required.4

(1) Subsequent conduct by a third party In determining whether subsequent conduct by a third party supersedes D’s initial breach of duty as the cause of harm to P, both foreseeability and culpability are important factors. Thus the chain of causation is more readily broken by a third-party intervention which does not flow foreseeably from D’s actions, as opposed to actions which lie squarely within the scope of foreseeable risk created by those actions.5 Equally, conduct demonstrating a greater degree of fault on the part of the third party is more likely to have this effect. The English case of Knightley v Johns6 illustrates. Defendant A negligently overturned his car in a road tunnel. Arriving at the scene of the accident, defendant B, a police inspector, having initially omitted to close the tunnel to traffic, ordered the plaintiff, one of his police constables, to ride back through the tunnel on his motorcycle in order to do this. This involved the plaintiff riding the wrong way into the flow of traffic and round a blind bend, where he was knocked down and injured by a car driven negligently by defendant C. Although A conceded negligence, he disputed his role in causing the plaintiff’s injuries. The court held that A’s negligent driving had been the initial factual cause of this “chapter of accidents”, but it had been overtaken as the legal cause by the police inspector’s negligence in managing the incident, as well as by the bad driving of defendant C. While A might reasonably have anticipated that the emergency services would become involved in dealing with his overturned car, it was not foreseeable that there would be “so many departures from the common sense procedure”7 prescribed for such emergencies, and in this regard it was significant that the intervening action itself constituted a breach of duty. In holding B and C liable for the plaintiff’s injury, but not A, Stephenson LJ summarised as follows:8 “The question to be asked is accordingly whether that whole sequence of events is a natural and probable consequence of the first defendant’s negligence and a reasonably foreseeable result of it. In answering the question it   4   5   6   7

See discussion at paras 13.16–13.21 above. See e.g. Scott’s Trs v H E Moss (1889) 17 R 32. [1982] 1 WLR 349. [1982] 1 WLR 349 per Stephenson LJ at 368. See also Wright v Lodge [1993] 4 All ER 299. By contrast, for an example of a road-traffic accident in which the sequence of events was not regarded as too distanced from the defendant’s initial negligence in crashing his vehicle, see Rouse v Squires [1973] QB 889.   8 [1982] 1 WLR 349 per Stephenson LJ at 366.

14.04

14.05

474   The Law of Delict in Scotland is helpful but not decisive to consider which of these events were deliberate choices to do positive acts and which were mere omissions or failures to act; which acts and omissions were innocent mistakes or miscalculations and which were negligent having regard to the pressures and the gravity of the emergency and the need to act quickly. Negligent conduct is more likely to break the chain of causation than conduct which is not; positive acts will more easily constitute new causes than inaction.”

14.06

Wilful and egregious wrongdoing by a third party is more likely to be deemed a novus actus interveniens as compared with conduct which is merely negligent.9 The example given by Lord Nolan in Environment Agency v Empress Car Co is as follows:10 “A factory owner carelessly leaves a drum containing highly inflammable vapour in a place where it could easily be accidentally ignited. If a workman, thinking it is only an empty drum, throws in a cigarette butt and causes an explosion, one would have no difficulty in saying that the negligence of the owner caused the explosion. On the other hand, if the workman, knowing exactly what the drum contains, lights a match and ignites it, one would have equally little difficulty in saying that he had caused the explosion and that the carelessness of the owner had merely provided him with an occasion for what he did. One would probably say the same if the drum was struck by lightning. In both cases one would say that although the vapour-filled drum was a necessary condition for the explosion to happen, it was not caused by the owner’s negligence.”

14.07

On the other hand, even deliberate wrongdoing by a third party does not break the chain of causation if such wrongdoing was a “manifest and obvious” risk of D’s initial breach of duty,11 so that the third party’s response to a hazard created by D’s negligence was foreseeable. In The Oropesa,12 a ship named the Manchester Regiment was seriously damaged after colliding with another, the Oropesa. Since both ships had been at fault in causing the collision, the owners of both were held liable to make compensation for the property damage caused. Following the collision, however, the Manchester Regiment was so badly damaged that its master decided, in heavy seas, to set out in a lifeboat for the Oropesa to discuss how his ship might be salvaged. He took with him a number of crewmen, including the plaintiffs’ son, who

 9 Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1920] AC 956 per Lord Sumner at 986: Knightley v Johns [1982] 1 WLR 349 per Stephenson LJ at 365. 10 [1999] 2 AC 22 at 30–31. See also Philco Radio and Television Corp v J Spurling Ltd [1949] 2 All ER 882. 11 Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004 per Lord Morris at 1035; see also Squires v Perth and Kinross District Council 1985 SC 297 per Lord Justice-Clerk Wheatley at 303–304. 12 [1943] P 32.

Legal Causation and Remoteness of Damage   475

perished when the lifeboat sank. The question for the court to consider was whether the cause of the son’s death was attributable to both vessels, since each had been part responsible for the original collision, or whether the chain of causation had been broken by the ill-judged decision of the master of the Manchester Regiment to make the journey in the lifeboat. The court held that the master’s action had not had this effect since his actions were within the “exigencies of the emergency” and, even if mistaken, could not be regarded as unreasonable. The chain of causation would be broken only by an event that was “ultroneous . . . unwarrantable, a new cause which disturbs the sequence of events, something which can be described as either unreasonable or extraneous or extrinsic”.13 The chain of causation is not generally broken merely by the unthinking or instinctive reactions of third parties to save themselves from an emergency created by the defender’s wrongdoing. This point is illustrated by the well-known eighteenth-century English case of Scott v Shepherd,14 in which the defendant threw a lighted squib into a crowded market place, prompting successive traders to toss it away until it finally exploded in the plaintiff’s eye. The court considered that:15

14.08

“all that was done subsequent to the original throwing [is] a continuation of the first force and first act, which will continue till the squib was spent by bursting . . . [A]ny innocent person removing the danger from himself to another is justifiable; the blame lights upon the first thrower. The new direction and new force flow out of the first force, and are not a new trespass.”

An intervening event that takes the form of a negligent omission is less readily regarded as having causal impact as compared with positive action. So for example the failure to intervene in such a way as would have saved an accident victim’s life is not judged in the same way as committing an intervening act that caused the victim’s death.16

14.09

(2) Subsequent medical treatment When an initial injury is followed by defective medical treatment, such medical negligence does not automatically constitute a novus actus interveniens breaking the chain of causation, since it is an inherent risk of the original injury that medical intervention may be less than optimal. The causative potency of the initial wrongdoing is likely to be extinguished only

13 14 15 16

[1943] P 32 per Lord Wright at 39. (1773) 2 Blackstone W 892. (1773) 2 Blackstone W 892 per De Grey CJ at 899. Thompson v Toorenburgh (1973) 50 DLR (3d) 717.

14.10

476   The Law of Delict in Scotland

14.11

where the medical negligence is of an order that is “gross or egregious”.17 A more common outcome is that the initial wrongdoing is judged still to have been a cause, but liability is split with the medical authorities regarded as having a shared responsibility for lasting injury. In Rahman v Arearose Ltd18 the claimant was assaulted while employed at a fast-food restaurant. Negligent medical treatment of his eye injury led to the claimant losing the sight of the affected eye. In addition to the physical injuries, he suffered post-traumatic stress disorder and personality change due to both the loss of the eye and the trauma of the attack. The medical authorities accepted liability for the loss of the eye, since the eye surgery had been “bungled”.19 The question arose, however, as to causation of the claimant’s long-term psychological damage. It was a “sensible finding” that the negligence of both the employers and the surgeon had its part to play in causing this.20 On that basis, liability was apportioned 25 per cent to the employers and 75 per cent to the medical authorities. A similar result can be seen in Webb v Barclays Bank plc21 in which the claimant injured her knee at her workplace in an accident attributable to her employer’s negligence. Thereafter a surgeon negligently advised amputation of the leg. The court held that the employer’s negligence remained a causative force which had not been “eclipsed” by the medical negligence. The chain of causation would have been broken only by negligence of such a degree as to be a completely inappropriate response to the injury. Liability for the damage deriving from the amputation was therefore apportioned 75 per cent to the medical authorities and 25 per cent to the employers.

(3) Subsequent natural event 14.12

It sometimes happens that, although the immediate cause of harm was a naturally occurring event, the circumstances are such that this event would not have affected P but for D’s prior breach of duty. As a general rule, a

17 Wright v Cambridge Medical Group [2011] EWCA Civ 669, [2013] QB 312 per Elias LJ at para 111. For an example, see Hogan v Bentinck West Hartley Collieries [1949] 1 All ER 588, in which the plaintiff injured his thumb working as a miner. The affected thumb had been abnormal in that it had an additional joint. When the pain after the accident did not recede, the doctor advised amputation to part of the thumb including the extra joint, reducing the plaintiff’s capacity for work. The evidence indicated that, while amputation might have been appropriate to deal with the abnormality, it was inappropriate in treating this form of injury. By a narrow majority (Lord Reid, dissenting, argued at 607 that the chain of causation should be broken only by a “grave lack of skill or care”), the House of Lords held that the amputation was a novus actus interveniens, so that the employers were not liable to make compensation for the miner’s incapacity. 18 [2001] QB 351. 19 As narrated by Laws LJ at [2001] QB 351 para 5. 20 [2001] QB 351 per Laws LJ at para 34. 21 [2001] EWCA Civ 1141, [2002] PIQR P8.

Legal Causation and Remoteness of Damage   477

natural event is to be treated as a novus actus interveniens, eclipsing D’s original wrongdoing, only if it is of a significant order, has occurred independently of D’s negligence, and is not within the range of reasonably foreseeable risk created by D’s negligence. An example is Carslogie Steamship Co Ltd v Royal Norwegian Government.22 The plaintiff’s vessel was damaged in a collision caused by the negligence of the defenders. Temporary repairs having been carried out at Port Glasgow, the vessel was despatched across the Atlantic to receive permanent repairs in the United States. On that journey it met with stormy weather and was further damaged, rendering her unseaworthy and requiring further, more extensive, repairs. As a result the ship was laid up for a lengthy period, thirty days of which was taken up with work on both sets of repairs. On their own, the repairs on the damage caused by the initial collision would have required only ten days to complete. The House of Lords held that the defendants were not to be held liable for the further losses attributable to the storm damage. Admittedly, the defendants’ negligence was a factual cause of the damage, since the ship would not have been sent on the ill-fated Atlantic voyage but for the repairs necessitated by the initial collision. Yet the defendants’ negligence could not be said to have created the risk of storm damage in the mid-Atlantic. The court therefore determined that the storm damage “was not in any sense a consequence of the collision, and must be treated as a supervening event occurring in the course of a normal voyage”.23

(4) Subsequent conduct by the pursuer (a) In general In theory, even the pursuer’s own conduct might be sufficient to break the chain of causation, but only where that conduct is unreasonable or “unwarrantable”24 to a high degree.25 McKew v Holland & Hannen and Cubitts26 is such a case. Having injured his left leg at work, the pursuer, some three weeks later, went to look at a flat which was situated up a steep staircase with no handrail. As he set off back down the stairs he felt a sudden weakness in his injured leg, to which his reaction was to throw himself down the remaining ten stairs to the next landing. As a result he injured his right leg. His employers were liable for the injury caused in the first accident, and that first accident was, without doubt, a necessary condition for the second. 22 [1952] AC 292; a fuller report appears in [1952] 1 All ER 20. See also The “Cameronia” v The “Hauk” 1928 SLT 71. 23 [1952] 1 All ER 20 per Viscount Jowitt at 22. Furthermore, the defendants were not to be held liable for loss of the use of the ship during the 10 days attributable to the collision repairs because the storm damage repairs were in any case being carried out on the ship during this time. 24 Donaghy v National Coal Board 1957 SLT (Notes) 23, affd 1957 SLT (Notes) 35. 25 Emeh v Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster AHA [1985] QB 1012 per Waller LJ at 1019. 26 1970 SC (HL) 20; cf Wieland v Cyril Lord Carpets Ltd [1969] 3 All ER 1006.

14.13

478   The Law of Delict in Scotland

14.14

14.15

Nonetheless, the House of Lords held that the chain of legal causation had been broken. Given his weakness due to injury, and the absence of a handrail, the pursuer’s incautious descent of the staircase was unreasonable to the extent of constituting a new intervening act. The employers were not therefore to be regarded as having caused the second injury. The incaution of Mr McKew contrasts with the impatience of Mr Darnley in Darnley v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust,27 a case already discussed in chapter 4.28 In Darnley the claimant had suffered a blow to the head and presented himself at a hospital casualty department managed by the defendant. The receptionist there advised him that he might have to wait four to five hours to see a doctor, but negligently failed to tell him that he would be seen by a triage nurse within thirty minutes. Feeling increasingly unwell, the claimant left the hospital after approximately nineteen minutes to go home for paracetamol. A short time later he collapsed, suffering permanent brain damage which would probably have been avoided by earlier treatment. His claim in negligence against the hospital authority was successful, on the basis that his brain damage had been caused by the hospital employee’s negligently misleading advice. The claimant’s fateful decision to leave the hospital was not considered to have interrupted the chain of causation, because this was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of misinforming a patient in this manner. The precise boundary between unreasonable conduct constituting a novus actus interveniens and conduct that merely triggers a finding of contributory negligence has eluded judicial definition.29 However, the guiding principle is said to be fairness to the parties,30 and “pretty exceptional circumstances” are required if liability is to be denied to a pursuer who has established foreseeability, negligence, and causation on the part of the defender.31 Thus, for example, pedestrians who run out thoughtlessly into the road and are struck by cars driven negligently are unlikely to find that their conduct constitutes a novus actus, although damages may well be reduced to reflect contributory negligence.32

(b) Reaction to an emergency 14.16

The chain of causation is unlikely to be broken by the conduct of pursuers who, confronted with an emergency of the defenders’ own making, fail to

27 28 29 30

[2018] UKSC 50, [2019] AC 831. See para 4.22 above. Spencer v Wincanton Holdings Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1404, [2010] PIQR P8 per Aikens LJ at para 43. Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd [2008] UKHL 13, [2008] 1 AC 884 per Lord Bingham at para 15; Spencer v Wincanton Holdings Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1404, [2010] PIQR P8 per Sedley LJ at para 15. 31 Scott v Gavigan [2016] EWCA Civ 544 per Christopher Clarke LJ at para 34. 32 As discussed in Scott v Gavigan [2016] EWCA Civ 544 (although in that case the driver was held not to have been negligent in the first place). See also Sayers v Harlow UDC [1958] 1 WLR 623.

Legal Causation and Remoteness of Damage   479

react in the most sensible or reasonable way. In Brandon v Osborne Garrett & Co Ltd,33 the plaintiff was standing in a shop where the defendant company was carrying out roof repairs. Due to the defendant’s negligence, part of the glass roof gave way, hitting the plaintiff’s husband. The plaintiff’s instinctive reaction was to try to pull her husband away, but the effort of doing so strained her leg, thereby reactivating a thrombosis that she had suffered years earlier. The court noted that “if a person is placed by the negligence of the defendant in a position in which he acts under a reasonable apprehension of danger and in consequence of so acting is injured, he is entitled to recover damages”; moreover, that same principle applied to any “instinctive act for the preservation of his wife or child or even of a friend or stranger”.34

(c) Acts of rescuers Similarly, an act of heroism to rescue another from the consequences of a person’s wrongdoing is generally not to be considered as a novus actus interveniens, even if it entails considerable risk to the rescuer.35 On the contrary, the original wrongdoer is likely to be liable for any harm that comes to the rescuer. As explained by Cardozo J in the New York case of Wagner v International Railway Co:36 “Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them as normal. It places their effects within the range of the natural and probable. The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer. The state that leaves an opening in a bridge is liable to the child that falls into the stream, but liable also to the parent who plunges to its aid . . . The railroad company whose train approaches without signal is a wrongdoer toward the traveler surprised between the rails, but a wrongdoer also to the bystander who drags him from the path . . . The rule is the same in other jurisdictions . . . The risk of rescue, if only it be not wanton, is born of the occasion. The emergency begets the man. The wrongdoer may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is accountable as if he had.”

Although rescuers deliberately put themselves in danger, this is treated as a natural and foreseeable reaction to the plight of another. The person who creates the danger in the first place must therefore take responsibility

33 34 35 36

[1924] 1 KB 548. [1924] 1 KB 548 per Swift J at 552. Baker v T E Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 966. 232 NY 176 at 180 (1921). See also Woods v Caledonian Railway Co (1886) 13 R 1118; Videan v British Transport Commission [1963] 2 QB 650.

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480   The Law of Delict in Scotland

for those who attempt to rescue the endangered. Causation is established whether the rescuer acts deliberately or instinctively, “so long as it is not wanton interference”.37 Thus in Baker v T E Hopkins & Son Ltd,38 for example, a doctor descended into a well in order to attempt a rescue of two of the defendant’s employees who had been overcome by carbon monoxide fumes while seeing to machinery there. Although he had been warned to wait for the fire brigade, the doctor decided to proceed alone, and both the workers and the doctor succumbed to the effects of the fumes. In holding the employer of the workers liable in negligence for the death of the doctor as well as that of the workers, the court considered it foreseeable that “some brave and stalwart man would attempt to save their lives”,39 and the doctor’s actions could not therefore be regarded as constituting a novus actus interveniens.

(d) Deliberate self-harm 14.18 14.19

A deliberate act of self-harm may be sufficient to break the chain of causation initiated by D’s negligence, but there are two specific contexts in which it has been held that even suicide does not have this effect. The first is where P self-harms while in the grip of a psychiatric illness suffered as a direct consequence of an injury for which D was liable. In Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd,40 the claimant’s husband had experienced posttraumatic stress disorder and severe depression after suffering severe head injuries in an accident at work caused by his employers’ negligence. Six years after the original accident he committed suicide, and the claimant sought to hold the employers liable. Lord Bingham reflected that a voluntary, informed decision taken by an adult of sound mind, making a personal decision about his own future, “forms no part of a chain of causation beginning with the tortfeasor’s breach of duty”.41 But the principle of “fairness” was key. A suicide was to be regarded as part of an unbroken chain of events flowing from the employers’ breach of duty where it was:42 “the response of a man suffering from a severely depressive illness which impaired his capacity to make reasoned and informed judgments about his future, such illness being, as is accepted, a consequence of the employer’s tort. It is in no way unfair to hold the employer responsible for this dire consequence of its breach of duty, although it could well be thought unfair to the victim not to do so.”

37 38 39 40 41 42

Videan v British Transport Commission [1963] 2 QB 650 per Lord Denning at 669. [1959] 1 WLR 966. [1959] 1 WLR 966 per Morris LJ at 972. [2008] UKHL 13, [2008] 1 AC 884. [2008] UKHL 13, [2008] 1 AC 884 at para 15. [2008] UKHL 13, [2008] 1 AC 884 at para 16.

Legal Causation and Remoteness of Damage   481

The second context in which self-harm does not break causation is where D was under a specific duty to protect P from self-harm by the means in question. In Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,43 the plaintiff’s partner, who was a known suicide risk, hanged himself in a police cell by forming a noose with his shirt and suspending it from a flap in the door that had been left open. Although the defendant accepted a duty of care was owed to the deceased while he was in custody, he argued that the suicide was a novus actus interveniens which broke the link between the breach of duty and the death.44 But although “free, deliberate” actions exploiting the situation created by a defendant might have this effect, the court recognised a limited exception to this rule where the defendant had been under a duty to guard against the particular loss in question: “It would make nonsense of the existence of such a duty if the law were to hold that the occurrence of the very act which ought to have been prevented negatived causal connection between the breach of duty and the loss.”45 However, the damages awarded were reduced by 50 per cent in this case to reflect contributory negligence.46

14.20

C. REMOTENESS OF DAMAGE Even when duty of care, breach of duty, and causation are all fully established, consideration must still be given to “the measure of the consequences which go with the liability”.47 After all, the possible consequences of a single act of wrongdoing are many and varied; and where consequences suffered by P are distant or far-removed from D’s initial wrongdoing, the damage may be deemed to be too remote and the imposition of liability for those consequences unfair. Remoteness of damage concerns compensation not culpability.48 As David Walker explained: “This question is not one of liability at all, but of remedy, of segregating inadmissible from admissible elements in the pursuer’s claim of damages.”49 Questions of remoteness arise more often in the context of negligent than of intentional wrongdoing.50 Of course, in determining whether, in cases of negligence, the required standard of care has been breached, it will already have been necessary to consider whether D failed to take account of such consequences of his or her acts that a reasonable person “of ordinary intelligence and experience

43 [2000] 1 AC 360. 44 It was also argued that the illegality defence should apply or alternatively contributory negligence. 45 [2000] 1 AC 360 per Lord Hoffmann at 367–368. 46 See para 29.60 below. 47 Bourhill v Young 1942 SC (HL) 78 per Lord Wright at 92. 48 As remarked by Lord Russell in Bourhill v Young 1942 SC (HL) 78 at 85. 49 Walker, Delict 242. 50 As discussed further below at para 14.54.

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14.22

so acting would have in contemplation”.51 Nonetheless, remoteness still remains to be considered as a further limitation on liability where, although harm or injury was foreseeable, the specific type of damage that occurred was in some way extraordinary and difficult to anticipate. A statement of what the remoteness inquiry entails in the modern law was provided by Lord Rodger in the Scottish case of Simmons v British Steel plc:52 “Once liability is established, any question of the remoteness of damage is to be approached along the following lines which may, of course, be open to refinement and development. (1) The starting point is that a defender is not liable for a consequence of a kind which is not reasonably foreseeable . . . (2) While a defender is not liable for damage that was not reasonably foreseeable, it does not follow that he is liable for all damage that was reasonably foreseeable: depending on the circumstances, the defender may not be liable for damage caused by a novus actus interveniens or unreasonable conduct on the part of the pursuer, even if it was reasonably foreseeable . . . (3) Subject to the qualification in (2), if the pursuer’s injury is of a kind that was foreseeable, the defender is liable, even if the damage is greater in extent than was foreseeable or it was caused in a way that could not have been foreseen . . . (4) The defender must take his victim as he finds him . . . (5) Subject again to the qualification in (2), where personal injury to the pursuer was reasonably foreseeable, the defender is liable for any personal injury, whether physical or psychiatric, which the pursuer suffers as a result of his wrongdoing.”

The various elements in this statement are considered further below.

(1) The “starting point”: foreseeability (a) The English position 14.23

14.24

The prevailing view in English law is that liability is limited to damage which is a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s wrongdoing. But until the latter part of the twentieth century, there was considerable confusion as to how the remoteness enquiry should be framed – in particular whether it should focus primarily upon the foreseeable consequences of the defendant’s wrongdoing or upon its “direct” consequences. The leading English case in the early part of the twentieth century, In Re Polemis and Furness, Withy and Co Ltd,53 arose out of an apparently freak accident. Stevedores employed by the defendant were engaged in shifting leaking cans of petrol in the hold of the plaintiff’s ship, and to do so they had stacked a series of planks on the deck. Due to their negligence 51 Muir v Glasgow Corporation 1943 SC (HL) 3 per Lord Macmillan at 10. 52 [2004] UKHL 20, 2004 SC (HL) 94. 53 [1921] 3 KB 560.

Legal Causation and Remoteness of Damage   483

one of the planks fell into the hold and caused a spark which ignited the petrol vapours, leading to the ship being completely destroyed by fire. In holding the defendants liable, the Court of Appeal ruled that they should be answerable for all of the “direct consequences” of their negligence, and that such consequences were not required in all circumstances to be foreseeable. This decision was almost immediately perceived as controversial by English commentators,54 and was subject to differing interpretations over the ensuing decades.55 The opportunity eventually arose for In Re Polemis to be reconsidered in Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co (The Wagon Mound (No 1)),56 a case from Australia heard by the Privy Council. The defendants were ship owners who had carelessly allowed a large quantity of furnace oil to spill into the water in Sydney Harbour. According to the evidence presented to the court it was foreseeable that the oil spillage might spoil adjoining property, but fire was not anticipated as a hazard, since informed opinion at the time was to the effect that oil floating on water would not ignite. The plaintiffs owned an adjacent wharf where they were carrying out repairs to a ship in the course of which their employees were using welding equipment. They assumed that it was safe for the welding operations to continue, and this was confirmed by the defendants’ manager. Nonetheless, molten metal from the welding operations fell upon cotton waste in the water and set the film of oil alight, causing a conflagration which seriously damaged the wharf and the equipment on it.

54 See F Pollock, “Liability for Consequences” (1922) 38 LQR 165, pointing out, at 167, that: “What the previous authorities really did establish . . . was that when it is found that a man ought to have foreseen in a general way consequences of a certain kind, it will not avail him to say that he could not foresee the precise course or the full extent of the consequences, being of that kind, which in fact have happened. The Court of Appeal has gone a long way beyond this.” In Re Polemis requires to be read in its historical context, however. Several years before Donoghue v Stevenson set out the “neighbour principle” as a general basis for duty of care, duty remained narrowly construed, often on the basis of specific relationships. Thus, as Martin Davies explained (“The Road from Morocco: Polemis through Donoghue to No-fault” (1982) 45 MLR 534 at 541), the defendants’ duty in In Re Polemis “was, like all pre-Donoghue duties of care, a particularised relational one. It was owed by the defendants to the plaintiffs alone, and it arose from the nature of the special relationship between the parties. To forget this is to misunderstand why the Re Polemis rule took the form it did. The true original intention behind the Re Polemis remoteness rule can only be recognised by seeing it in the context of a pre-1932 duty of care. A wide remoteness test was unexceptionable when duty was narrowly conceived. Extensive liability of defendants is not a problem when those defendants can only be liable to a limited class of plaintiffs, or even a single plaintiff only.” 55 For discussion, see R Dias, “Remoteness of Liability and Legal Policy” (1962) 20 CLJ 178 at 179. On a wider view, the imposition of liability for all the direct consequences of the defendant’s negligence required only that damage of some kind should be foreseeable, whereas, on a narrower view, damage of some kind to the plaintiff had to be foreseeable even if its extent or manner of occurrence was not. 56 [1961] AC 388. This case should not be confused with Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v The Miller Steamship Co Pty (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617, arising out of the same facts but in which the plaintiffs were the owners of the damaged ships.

14.25

484   The Law of Delict in Scotland

14.26

14.27

In the ensuing litigation, In Re Polemis was read by the Privy Council as imposing liability for direct consequences “whatever that may mean”, whether those consequences were reasonably foreseeable or not.57 But this, in its view, was not “good law”; it was contrary to “justice” and “morality” that “for an act of negligence, however slight or venial, which results in some trivial foreseeable damage the actor should be liable for all consequences however unforeseeable and however grave, so long as they can be said to be ‘direct’”.58 Liability should follow not the conduct but its consequences, and the relevant test for remoteness should thus consider the foreseeability of the consequences that actually occurred.59 In short, the essential factor in determining whether a defendant should be held liable for the particular consequences of the defendant’s wrongdoing was “whether the damage is of such a kind as the reasonable man should have foreseen”. 60 In this particular case, while some pollution damage to the wharf could have been predicted, it was accepted that fire damage was not reasonably foreseeable when the oil was carelessly spilled into the harbour waters. The fire damage was therefore deemed to be too remote. Although the decision of the Privy Council in The Wagon Mound (No 1) was not binding upon the English courts it was quickly taken up by them as establishing that the test for remoteness was that the defendant should be held liable for damage of a kind which a reasonable person should have foreseen, and this remains the position in the modern law.

(b) The Scottish position 14.28

Scottish discussion of remoteness often begins by referring back to the mid-nineteenth-century statement of the “grand rule” by Lord Kinloch in Allan v Barclay:61 “The grand rule on the subject of damages is, that none can be claimed except such as naturally and directly arise out of the wrong done; and such, therefore, as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the view of the wrongdoer. Tried by this test, the present claim appears to fail. The 57 [1961] AC 388 per Viscount Simonds at 415–416. 58 [1961] AC 388 per Viscount Simonds at 422. 59 [1961] AC 388 per Viscount Simonds at 425: “Suppose an action brought by A for damage caused by the carelessness . . . of B, for example, a fire caused by the careless spillage of oil. It may, of course, become relevant to know what duty B owed to A, but the only liability that is in question is the liability for damage by fire. It is vain to isolate the liability from its context and to say that B is or is not liable, and then to ask for what damage he is liable. For his liability is in respect of that damage and no other. If, as admittedly it is, B’s liability (culpability) depends on the reasonable foreseeability of the consequent damage, how is that to be determined except by the foreseeability of the damage which in fact happened – the damage in suit? And, if that damage is unforeseeable so as to displace liability at large, how can the liability be restored so as to make compensation payable?” 60 [1961] AC 388 per Viscount Simonds at 426. 61 (1864) 2 M 873 at 876.

Legal Causation and Remoteness of Damage   485 personal injuries of the individual himself will be properly held to have been in the contemplation of the wrongdoer. But he cannot be held bound to have surmised the secondary injuries done to all holding relations with the individual, whether that of a master, or any other.”

It is important, however, to note the context in which this statement was made. In Allan v Barclay the defender had negligently created an obstruction on the highway, which caused a cart driven by the pursuer’s employee to crash, resulting in significant injury to the employee. The pursuer raised an action to recover compensation for both the property damage and the loss of the employee’s services, but the latter formed the more significant part of the claim. As is obvious from the extended quotation, the statement above was made in the context of determining whether an employer might recover for economic loss occasioned by being deprived of an employee’s services, a claim which was rejected.62 In other words, in an era several decades before Donoghue v Stevenson,63 remoteness of damage was being used to resolve a question which in the modern law is answered by reference to the scope of duty of care (and answered in the negative in the absence of other factors to support the imposition of duty).64 Indeed when the “grand rule” was first taken up again in the twentieth century, after sixty years of neglect, it was similarly in the context of whether duty might be imposed in regard to the consequences of injury to a person other than the pursuer.65 The “grand rule”, taken by itself, is therefore not directly relevant to analysis of the doctrine of remoteness of damage in its modern applications to other types of loss.66 Setting this reservation aside, however, a close reading points to foreseeability as the nub of the “grand rule”. As has been pointed out,67 the word “therefore” connects directness with foreseeability: a consequence that is “natural and direct” is therefore supposed to be “in the view of the wrongdoer”. Thus the main focus is on what was in the “contemplation of 62 The court offered no view on whether the property damage was too remote, because the part of the claim relating to loss of the employee’s services was ultimately denied, and without this the overall value of the claim fell below the level that was within the jurisdiction of the court. 63 1932 SC (HL) 31. 64 Reavis v Clan Line Steamers 1925 SC 725; West Bromwich Albion Football Club Ltd v El-Safty [2006] EWCA Civ 1299, [2007] PIQR P7. 65 As in Reavis v Clan Line Steamers 1925 SC 725; Bourhill v Young 1941 SC 395 per Lord Jamieson at 427. 66 See W A Wilson, Introductory Essays on Scots Law, 2nd edn (1984) 145–146 on the “regrettable tendency” of Scottish judges to found on the words of Lord Kinloch. 67 By K Norrie, “Obligations”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 15 (1995) para 384, and approved in Simmons v British Steel plc [2004] UKHL 20, 2004 SC (HL) 94 per Lord Hope at para 19. See also Ross v Glasgow Corporation 1919 SC 174 per Lord Mackenzie at 179: “it can only be said that the injury is a natural and probable consequence of his act if it can be said that it was so likely to result from what he did that a reasonable man, with his means of knowledge, ought to have foreseen that the injury would result from what he did.”

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14.30

the wrongdoer”, and attention is directed to whether consequences were “natural and direct” only to the extent that they fall within that category. Other case law of this period appears similarly to interweave considerations of what is “probable and natural” with what “ought to have been foreseen” to the defender.68 This approach is confirmed by the weight of subsequent Scottish authority, which views foreseeability as the dominant criterion in determining remoteness of damage. Just as in England, the reasoning of In Re Polemis was in the past regarded as problematic, and there was doubt as to whether the decision was consistent with the law of Scotland.69 Indeed, in reframing the test for remoteness in The Wagon Mound (No 1), the Privy Council drew expressly upon Scottish authority, in particular Muir v Glasgow Corporation70 and Bourhill v Young, in the latter of which Lord Russell had stated:71 “In considering whether a person owes to another a duty a breach of which will render him liable to that other in damages for negligence, it is material to consider what the defendant ought to have contemplated as a reasonable man. This consideration may play a double role. It is relevant in cases of admitted negligence (where the duty and breach are admitted) to the question of remoteness of damage, i.e., to the question of compensation not to culpability, but it is also relevant in testing the existence of a duty as the foundation of the alleged negligence, i.e., to the question of culpability not to compensation.”

14.31

The discussion of The Wagon Mound (No 1) in the Scottish case law has not been without its controversies.72 However, the weight of authority in the latter part of the twentieth century accepted foreseeability as the essential criterion of remoteness.73 The most authoritative Scottish statement in the 68 Scott’s Trs v H E Moss (1889) 17 R 32 per Lord Shand at 37. 69 See discussion by Sheriff Hector McKechnie in Cameron v Hamilton’s Auction Marts Ltd 1955 SLT (Sh Ct) 74 at 78; Wilson, Introductory Essays on Scots Law 145–146. For an extensive review of the Scottish sources and of the differing views as to whether In Re Polemis was consonant with Scots law, see Walker, Delict 247–263 (at the same time stating, at 263–269, that the pre-1961 law had been “materially altered” by the decision in The Wagon Mound (No 1)). 70 1943 SC (HL) 3. 71 1942 SC (HL) 78 at 85, cited [1961] AC 388 per Viscount Simonds at 421. 72 One of the first Inner House cases to note the Privy Council decision, McKillen v Barclay Curle & Co Ltd 1967 SLT 41, was uncontentious in its main conclusion, that the wrongdoer had to take his victim as he found him where injury reactivated a pre-existing medical condition; but Lord President Clyde (at 42) also referred back to the “grand rule” and observed that foreseeability was inappropriate as the test for remoteness in cases of personal injury. 73 See e.g. Hughes v Lord Advocate 1963 SC (HL) 31; McKew v Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd 1969 SC 14, affd 1970 SC (HL) 20; Margrie Holdings Ltd v City of Edinburgh District Council 1994 SC 1. See also Runciman v Borders Regional Council 1987 SC 241 per Lord Clyde at 244, applying the “grand rule” but interpreted as encompassing those losses that “might reasonably be supposed to have been within the defenders’ view”.

Legal Causation and Remoteness of Damage   487

modern law is that cited above by Lord Rodger in Simmons v British Steel plc, which states unequivocally that “the ultimate test is whether the damage was reasonably foreseeable”,74 as indicated in The Wagon Mound (No 1). Where the basis of liability is negligence, therefore, the issue of foreseeability may thus arise at three separate stages, with a different, albeit overlapping, focus of enquiry in each. (i) In determining at the outset whether D owed a duty of care to P, one of the questions asked is whether D ought to have foreseen that P would be affected by D’s conduct.75 (ii) If duty is established, it is then necessary to determine whether D breached the requisite standard of care. This involves a consideration of which risks D ought to have foreseen and taken steps to mitigate.76 (iii) Finally, assuming D owed a duty to P, and this duty was breached, the third stage involves asking whether some or all of the consequences of that breach of duty were unforeseeable, and hence were too remote to be compensated.

14.32

(2) The genus of the harm and the nature of the risk In disapproving the reasoning in In Re Polemis77 and asserting foreseeability as the main criterion of remoteness, the Privy Council in The Wagon Mound (No 1)78 predicted that this change of approach would not, in most cases, change the end result, although it was hoped that the law would “be thereby simplified”.79 That latter aspiration has not been wholly realised. Despite the apparently straightforward formulation by the Privy Council, it is not always obvious what is meant by the “kind” of damage that must be foreseeable. Moreover, this does not appear to entail that the “precise manner” in which damage occurs or its “extent” are in themselves foreseeable.80 Much, therefore, remains to judicial discretion in determining what exactly foreseeability entails in any given set of circumstances. In The Wagon Mound (No 1) itself, the defendants could have anticipated that their carelessness in spilling the oil might result in pollution damage, but the court accepted the evidence that ignition of oil on water was not foreseeable. And since they could not have foreseen the fire damage which ultimately occurred, such damage was held to be too remote. On these facts, therefore, the distinction between foreseeable and unforeseeable harm appeared relatively clear. However, such categorisation is not

Simmons v British Steel plc [2004] UKHL 20, 2004 SC (HL) 94 per Lord Rodger at para 66. See paras 4.27ff above. See paras 10.04ff above. In Re Polemis and Furness, Withy and Co Ltd [1921] 3 KB 560; see para 14.24 above. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co (The Wagon Mound (No 1)) [1961] AC 388; see paras 14.25 and 14.26 above. 79 [1961] AC 388 per Viscount Simonds at 422. 80 See Jolley v Sutton LBC [2000] 1 WLR 1082 per Lord Steyn at 1090. 74 75 76 77 78

14.33

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488   The Law of Delict in Scotland

always so obvious, and at least where personal injury, rather than property damage, is at issue, the approach of the courts tends to be more expansive. Further guidance is found in Jolley v Sutton LBC, in which Lord Hoffmann suggested that:81 “what must have been foreseen is not the precise injury which occurred but injury of a given description. The foreseeability is not as to the particulars but the genus. And the description is formulated by reference to the nature of the risk which ought to have been foreseen.”

14.35

Much therefore depends upon the specificity – or latitude – with which a court chooses to define the “genus”, and thereby to characterise the risk. The leading Scottish case, Hughes v Lord Advocate,82 demonstrates that this test is commonly applied in terms generous to the pursuer in cases of personal injury. In Hughes employees of the Post Office were working on underground cables in an Edinburgh street, and had left the site unattended to go for a tea break. During this time a manhole was left open but was covered over by a temporary canvas shelter. By way of warning four paraffin lamps were placed round the site. Meanwhile the eight-year-old pursuer and a ten-year-old relation happened upon the scene and went inside to explore the shelter, taking a paraffin lamp with them. The pursuer then tripped and knocked the lamp into the manhole. The escape of paraffin from the lamp triggered an explosion, which knocked the pursuer off balance so that he fell into the hole, sustaining severe burning injuries. When he brought an action in negligence against the Lord Advocate (as representing the Postmaster-General), the critical question was whether the injuries he had suffered were too remote. The specific sequence of events by which the explosion was triggered and caused injury to the pursuer could not readily have been anticipated. Taking a broad view, however, it was foreseeable that leaving paraffin lamps unattended created the danger of fire, with which the danger of explosions could be bracketed,

81 Jolley v Sutton LBC [2000] 1 WLR 1082 at 1091. 82 1963 SC (HL) 31. Jolley v Sutton LBC [2000] 1 WLR 1082 similarly points to a generous reading of the type of harm in the realm of personal injury. The defendants had allowed a dilapidated boat to remain on their land. Two local teenagers, one of whom was the plaintiff, decided that they would try to repair it, and to that end they jacked it up. While the plaintiff was working underneath, the boat collapsed on top of him, causing him serious injury. The Court of Appeal considered it foreseeable that children would play on the boat and might be injured, for example by falling through the rotten planking, but unforeseeable that they would prop up the boat and be injured by its collapse. Thus the accident was of a different kind from what might reasonably have been anticipated. The House of Lords, however, recast the relevant risk more widely as being that of injuries attributable to the dangerous condition of the boat, and held accordingly that the plaintiff’s injuries were not too remote.

Legal Causation and Remoteness of Damage   489

and the consequent risk of burning injuries.83 Read in this expansive way, the type of danger created by the defendant’s employees’ actions was foreseeable as well as the type of damage that eventuated from it, and the child’s injuries were not therefore too remote. This broad construction of the genus of personal injury and the nature of risk leaves considerable room for judicial discretion, as is demonstrated by the contrast between the following two cases, with broadly comparable facts but very different outcomes. In Bradford v Robinson Rentals Ltd,84 the defendant required one of its employees to undertake a 450-mile round-trip in the depths of winter in a company van which had a defective radiator, no anti-freeze liquid, and no heating system. This arduous journey in extreme cold caused the employee to suffer frostbite, a condition which the court recognised as unusual in this country. In a claim against his employer it was held that exposure to extreme low temperatures and fatigue could be anticipated as risking some sort of cold-related condition, such as chilblains or pneumonia, and that frostbite, although more severe in nature, was “of the type and kind of injury which was reasonably foreseeable” and not therefore too remote.85 Bradford may be contrasted with Tremain v Pike,86 in which the plaintiff, a herdsman, contracted Weil’s disease, a disease very rare in humans, which is caused by exposure to rat urine. He argued that this had occurred because his employers had failed to keep the rat population under proper control on the farm where he worked. However, the court did not accept “that all illness or infection arising from an infestation of rats should be regarded as of the same kind”.87 Given that this disease was “entirely different in kind” from other consequences of human proximity to rats, such as a rat bite and its effects, or food poisoning from contaminated food, it was held to be unforeseeable and too remote to be recoverable. In other words, while the genus of coldrelated injury was accepted in Bradford, the court declined to recognise a genus of rat-exposure-related injury in Tremain.

83 Cf Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Ltd [1964] 1 QB 518, in which employees of the defendant negligently allowed an asbestos cover to drop into a vat of very hot molten liquid. The submersion of the cover caused the mixture to explode, injuring the plaintiff. While dropping the cover into the vat might foreseeably have entailed a risk of injury due to splashing of hot liquid, it could not have been anticipated that it would cause an explosion, and the plaintiff’s injury was therefore deemed too remote. See also, however, Attorney General of the British Virgin Islands v Hartwell [2004] UKPC 12, [2004] 1 WLR 1273, in which Lord Nicholls observed at paras 28–29 that such a distinction may not now be sustainable in the light of Hughes v Lord Advocate 1963 SC (HL) 31 and of Jolley v Sutton LBC [2000] 1 WLR 1082. 84 [1967] 1 WLR 337. 85 [1967] 1 WLR 337 per Rees J at 344. 86 [1969] 1 WLR 1556. 87 [1969] 1 WLR 1556 per Payne J at 1561.

14.36

490   The Law of Delict in Scotland

14.37

As stated in Hughes v Lord Advocate, once the genus of the injury and the nature of the risk are accepted as foreseeable, liability is established, even if the precise mechanism by which the injury occurred, or its extent,88 could not have been foreseen. In Hughes, the turn of events was extremely unlucky, and the extent of the pursuer’s injuries greater than might have been expected as a result of a child larking around with Post Office gear, but as Lord Morris remarked:89 “The circumstance that an explosion as such could not have been contemplated does not alter the fact that it could reasonably have been foreseen that a boy who played in and about the canvas shelter and played with the things that were thereabouts might get hurt and might in some way burn himself. That is just what happened. The pursuer did burn himself, though his burns were more grave than would have been expected. The fact that the features or developments of an accident may not reasonably have been foreseen does not mean that the accident itself was not foreseeable. The pursuer was, in my view, injured as a result of the type or kind of accident or occurrence that could reasonably have been foreseen . . . [T]he defenders do not avoid liability because they could not have foretold the exact way in which the pursuer would play with the alluring objects that had been left to attract him or the exact way in which in so doing he might get hurt.”

(3) The “eggshell-skull” principle (a) Defenders taking victims as they find them 14.38

There can, of course, be no liability unless damage was a foreseeable result of D’s conduct. But so long as P’s injury was of a genus which was generally foreseeable, and the risk was of a nature that ought to have been foreseen, D must “take his victim as he finds him” even if the consequences of the injury were more serious than D could have anticipated.90 D does not escape liability simply because it transpires that P suffered from a particular weakness rendering P abnormally vulnerable to the consequences of injury. As Kennedy J stated in Dulieu v White & Sons:91 “If a man is negligently run over or otherwise negligently injured in his body, it is no answer to the sufferer’s claim for damages that he would have suffered less injury, or no injury at all, if he had not had an unusually thin skull or an unusually weak heart.” Thus D remains responsible even though the injury was

88 See e.g. Draper v Hodder [1972] 2 QB 556; Vacwell Engineering Co Ltd v BDH Chemicals Ltd [1971] 1 QB 88. 89 1963 SC (HL) 31 at 43–44. 90 Smith v Leech Brain & Co Ltd [1962] 2 QB 405, followed in Oman v McIntyre 1962 SLT 168. 91 [1901] 2 KB 669 at 679.

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exacerbated by P’s haemophilia,92 or weak back,93 or heart problems and associated neurosis,94 none of which D could specifically have foreseen. The classic illustration of the “eggshell” or “thin” skull principle is Smith v Leech Brain & Co Ltd.95 The plaintiff’s husband was involved in an accident at work, which was attributable to his employer’s negligence. On being hit by a flying fragment of molten metal he suffered a burn to his lip, and a burn injury was a foreseeable consequence of such an incident. However, the trauma of the burn was the “promoting agency” of cancer in his lip tissue which, it transpired, had already been affected by premalignant changes, and he subsequently died of this disease. In holding that the compensation payable to his widow should take account of the cancer as well as the original burn injury, the court reasoned that this was plainly a case which came within the “thin-skull” rule. As stated by Lord Parker CJ:96

14.39

“The test is not whether these employers could reasonably have foreseen that a burn would cause cancer and that he would die. The question is whether these employers could reasonably foresee the type of injury he suffered, namely, the burn. What, in the particular case, is the amount of damage which he suffers as a result of that burn, depends upon the characteristics and constitution of the victim.”

The “eggshell-skull” principle extends to cases where a foreseeable medical intervention after an accident has given rise to complications to which the pursuer was abnormally sensitive. In Robinson v Post Office,97 the plaintiff sustained a minor injury to his leg in an accident that was attributable to his employers’ negligence. In treating this injury his doctor administered an anti-tetanus injection, which was found to be a reasonable procedure to follow after a wound of this type. However, due to an unusual and very severe reaction to the anti-tetanus serum the plaintiff developed encephalitis, which had serious long-term consequences. It was not foreseeable that administration of an anti-tetanus injection would itself give rise to a rare serious illness, but it was foreseeable that an injury of this type might occur and that it might require medical treatment. In the absence of evidence that this treatment had been so untoward as to constitute a novus actus interveniens, the employers had to take the victim as they found him, in this case with an allergy to the serum used. They could not therefore escape 92 Bishop v Arts & Letters Club of Toronto (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 107; but cf Bidwell v Briant, The Times, 9 May 1956. 93 Athey v Leonati [1996] 3 SCR 458. 94 Love v Port of London Authority [1959] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 541. 95 [1962] 2 QB 405. 96 [1962] 2 QB 405 at 415. 97 [1974] 1 WLR 1176.

14.40

492   The Law of Delict in Scotland

liability for the consequences of the encephalitis, in addition to those of the initial injury.

(b) Some qualifications 14.41

14.42

There are some qualifications. Where D’s wrongdoing merely accelerates an underlying medical condition by which P was likely to be affected in any event, even without the wrongdoing, English authority suggests that there is no liability.98 There is, however, Scottish authority to support the award of compensation to P to reflect the fact that the condition has been brought forward. In Sutherland v North British Steel Group Ltd,99 an accident at work accelerated the development of a hernia which would probably have affected the pursuer within two years in any case. Although Sheriff Principal Macphail QC held negligence not to be established in the particular circumstances, he observed that, had he held otherwise, the pursuer would not in any event have been permitted to recover for solatium in respect of the pain and suffering of his operation, nor for the pain and inconvenience consequent on the development of the hernia, since he would have suffered these even without the defender’s wrongdoing. However, a modest sum of solatium would have been awarded to compensate the pursuer for the pain of the accident itself. Moreover, a further sum, representing two years’ interest on the pursuer’s net wage loss, would have been payable in recognition of his being required to take time off work for treatment two years earlier than anticipated. Furthermore, although defenders must take victims as they find them, they are not answerable for the consequences of pre-existing conditions on which their wrongdoing had no causal impact.100 In Paterson v Hindle,101 for example, the plaintiff suffered various injuries in a car crash caused by the defendant’s negligence. These included pelvic trauma which appeared to trigger post-menopausal bleeding. A hysterectomy was performed, revealing the underlying cause of the bleeding to be endometrial cancer, which could not be said to have been caused by the accident.

 98 See Cutler v Vauxhall Motors Ltd [1971] 1 QB 418, in which an accident at work caused ulceration of the wound area, which in turn revealed varicosity in the veins of both of the plaintiff’s legs. This meant that an operation became necessary in 1966 to treat the veins, but even without the accident the plaintiff’s condition would probably have required the same procedure in 1970 or 1971. The court held that, since the accident had merely advanced the date of the operation and had not itself caused it, the plaintiff’s employers were not liable for the loss of wages that the operation entailed. Cutler was cited with approval by Lord Macfadyen in McLelland v Greater Glasgow Health Board 1999 SC 305.   99 1986 SLT (Sh Ct) 29, citing discussion in Zumeris v Testa [1972] VR 839, and Sutherland v National Coal Board, unreported, CSOH, Lord Ross, 13 February 1981. 100 As in Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd [1982] AC 794. 101 [2017] BCSC 1104.

Legal Causation and Remoteness of Damage   493

In fixing compensation, therefore, the court made no award in respect of the hysterectomy or the expenses connected with it, since it was plain that these had arisen as a result of the plaintiff having cancer, not as a result of the accident. Thus the “eggshell skull” principle is not brought into play by underlying conditions which are brought to light by medical intervention after an accident but on which the wrongdoing has had no effect.

(c) Psychiatric harm The principle that wrongdoers must take their victims as they are found extends also to psychiatric vulnerabilities, so that an “eggshell personality” is treated in a similar way to an “eggshell skull”. Thus exacerbation of a depressive condition, for example, would not be regarded as too remote a consequence of a physical injury.102 In Simmons v British Steel plc103 the pursuer sustained a head injury at work, which was attributable to his employer’s negligence. After the accident he experienced feelings of anger, followed by deterioration in a pre-existing skin condition, followed in turn by a personality change which resulted in a severe depressive illness. The House of Lords held that a sufficient causal connection had been made between the pursuer’s anger, the worsening of the skin condition and the depressive illness, and that he was entitled to damages. In causing the pursuer physical injury the defender had to take its victim as it found him, and it did not matter that a “psychologically more robust individual” would have recovered from the accident without succumbing to such a condition.104 The scope of duty in relation to those who have suffered psychiatric injury independent of physical harm is discussed in chapter 6. The decision in Page v Smith105 indicates that if physical injury was foreseeable in general terms, then, even if no physical injury actually occurred, P may recover as a primary victim for psychiatric injury caused by the wrongdoing, even if this followed from a particular predisposition to such injury. On the other hand, where P was not within the range of physical harm, but meets the criteria to be considered a secondary victim of an accident, psychiatric injury is recoverable only if such injury would be foreseeable in a person of “ordinary fortitude”.106 However, where psychiatric injury is foreseeable in this sense, P may recover for the injury actually sustained, even if this was aggravated by P’s particular sensitivity.107

102 103 104 105 106 107

Malcolm v Broadhurst [1970] 3 All ER 508. [2004] UKHL 20, 2004 SC (HL) 94. [2004] UKHL 20, 2004 SC (HL) 94 per Lord Rodger at para 56. [1996] 1 AC 155, discussed at paras 6.10–6.11. Bourhill v Young 1941 SC 395. Brice v Brown [1984] 1 All ER 997.

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(d) Property damage 14.45

D must take P’s property as D finds it in terms of value, so that the full amount of damage will be compensated whether the vehicle negligently collided with by P’s car is a luxury sports car or an ageing hatchback.108 There is no definitive authority on how liability is affected by abnormal sensitivity in the damaged property, but application of the principle in The Wagon Mound (No 1)109 would indicate that, if property damage of the relevant type is foreseeable, liability will follow even if the extent of the damage is greater than could have been anticipated. Much will depend therefore on how the property damage is classified. Take the example of a driver crashing a vehicle into a building which then unexpectedly collapses due to a pre-existing structural weakness caused by subsidence. If the type of foreseeable damage is categorised, in general terms, as structural harm, then liability for the total cost should arguably follow, since the complete collapse of the building is merely an extreme form of structural harm.110

D. RISK OUTWITH THE SCOPE OF DUTY (THE SAAMCO PRINCIPLE) 14.46

There being “no such thing as liability in the air”,111 D bears responsibility only for those losses that were within the scope of D’s duty of care and were caused by breach of that duty. P may establish duty of care, breach of duty by D, and factual causation, but even where there has been no intervening cause, and the loss suffered is not too remote, there is no liability in the absence of a “sufficient nexus between a particular element of the harm for which the claimant seeks damages and the subject matter of the defendant’s duty of care”.112 As will be discussed in chapter 24,113 no liability arises in regard to breach of statute by D unless the harm suffered was of a type against which the legislation was designed to protect P.114 In the law of negligence, similarly, the question is: “what, if any, risks of harm

108 See also Vacwell Engineering Co Ltd v BDH Chemicals Ltd [1971] 1 QB 88. 109 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co (The Wagon Mound (No 1)) [1961] AC 388; see paras 14.25 and 14.26 above. 110 See McGregor on Damages para 8.072, stating that the “thin skull” rule applies “equally to damage to a chattel with an abnormal physical susceptibility, such as a fragile vase”. 111 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co (The Wagon Mound (No 1)) [1961] AC 388 per Viscount Simonds at 425. 112 Meadows v Khan [2021] UKSC 21 per Lord Hodge and Lord Sales at para 28; see also HughesHolland v BPE Solicitors [2017] UKSC 21, [2018] AC 599 per Lord Sumption at para 27. 113 See paras 24.18–24.19. 114 Grant v National Coal Board 1956 SC (HL) 48 per Viscount Simonds at 52. The classic illustration is found in the English case of Gorris v Scott (1873–74) LR 9 Ex 125, the facts of which are narrated at para 24.18 below.

Legal Causation and Remoteness of Damage   495

did the defendant owe a duty of care to protect the claimant against?”115 In many instances an affirmative answer to that question is self-evident. A driver has a duty to other road users, which is breached if the driver, proceeding without due care, knocks down and injures a pedestrian. Plainly, the scope of the driver’s duty extends to avoiding not only physical injury to pedestrians but also economic loss deriving from the physical injury in terms of loss of earnings.116 The victim of the accident may claim both. Other cases, however, may be less straightforward. The rule that D should be held liable only for losses that fall within the scope of D’s duty to P is commonly dubbed the SAAMCO principle, named after the leading case of South Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd.117 In that case Lord Hoffmann demonstrated the principle with a modern parable:118 “A mountaineer about to undertake a difficult climb is concerned about the fitness of his knee. He goes to a doctor who negligently makes a superficial examination and pronounces the knee fit. The climber goes on the expedition, which he would not have undertaken if the doctor had told him the true state of his knee. He suffers an injury which is an entirely foreseeable consequence of mountaineering but has nothing to do with his knee . . . [T]he doctor is not liable. The injury has not been caused by the doctor’s bad advice because it would have occurred even if the advice had been correct.”

The principle, of course, pre-dates the SAAMCO case itself, in that the idea of certain categories of loss – pure economic loss, for example – being outwith the scope of duty was already well recognised.119 However, a significant feature of SAAMCO is application of this reasoning to the quantification of damage, where the question arises in cases of professional negligence whether all or perhaps only part of the loss claimed was the consequence of the risk against which the defendant had to take care.120 115 Meadows v Khan [2021] UKSC 21 per Lord Hodge and Lord Sales at para 38; see also Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 per Lord Bridge at 627: is the harm alleged “the kind of damage from which [D] must take care to save [P] harmless”. 116 See Meadows v Khan [2021] UKSC 21 per Lord Hodge and Lord Sales at para 47. 117 [1997] AC 191. For critical comment, see J Stapleton, “Negligent Valuers and Falls in the Property Market” (1997) 113 LQR 1; and for more recent discussion of “The Character of the SAAMCO Principle”, see J Stapleton, Three Essays on Torts (2021) at 95–98. 118 [1997] AC 191 at 213. 119 See discussion in Meadows v Khan [2021] UKSC 21 per Lord Hodge and Lord Sales at paras 33–34; and see e.g. Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27, discussed at para 5.10 above. The plaintiff suffered various losses as a result of the defendant’s negligently cutting the power supply to the plaintiff’s steel factory. Although duty of care was established, that duty encompassed only the steel goods in production and damaged at the time of the power cut, and not the loss of profits on batches that would have been processed later in the day. The latter was not the “kind of damage” from which the defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff. 120 See Platform Home Loans Ltd v Oyston Shipways Ltd [2000] 2 AC 190 per Lord Hobhouse at 209; Meadows v Khan [2021] UKSC 21 per Lord Hodge and Lord Sales at para 38.

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496   The Law of Delict in Scotland

14.48

The decision in SAAMCO conjoined a group of cases in which there was no glimpse of Alpine landscapes. Their common thread was that the plaintiffs were commercial lenders which had provided customers with substantial mortgages on the security of properties that had been valued by the respective defendants. When the customers defaulted on the loans and the plaintiffs came to realise the security subjects, it transpired that not only had the defendants negligently overvalued the properties at the time of the loans but the property market had also fallen substantially in the meantime. The defendants had clearly assumed responsibility to the plaintiffs to provide valuations that were accurate at the time they were made and, but for the defendants’ valuations, the plaintiffs would not have provided the loans.121 But, hardly less clearly, the defendants had not assumed responsibility for the properties retaining those values against the subsequent vagaries of the market. On that basis, the defendants were held liable for amounts that reflected the difference between the negligent valuation and the correct valuation at that time, but not for the subsequent drop in the value of the properties due to market conditions.122 As Lord Hoffmann explained:123 “[A] person under a duty to take reasonable care to provide information on which someone else will decide upon a course of action is, if negligent, not generally regarded as responsible for all the consequences of that course of action. He is responsible only for the consequences of the information being wrong. A duty of care which imposes upon the informant responsibility for losses which would have occurred even if the information which he gave had been correct is not in my view fair and reasonable as between the parties.”

As a “cross-check”,124 the SAAMCO principle allows a counterfactual scenario to be posited: if the service provided by D to P had not been negligent, would P still have suffered the loss? An affirmative answer to this question indicates that the loss was outwith the scope of duty. In SAAMCO, if the defendant’s valuations had been correct, the plaintiffs would still have suffered loss on their investments due to the fall in the market. The losses attributable to the fall in the market were therefore outwith the scope of duty.125

121 As narrated by Lord Hoffmann: [1997] AC 191 at 210. 122 As Lord Hoffmann stated in Nykredit Mortgage Bank plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 1627 at 1638: “it is therefore insufficient, for the purpose of establishing liability on the part of the valuer, to prove that the lender is worse off than he would have been if he had not lent the money at all. What he must show is that he is worse off as a lender than he would have been if the security had been worth what the valuer said”. 123 [1997] AC 191 at 214. 124 Manchester Building Society v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2021] UKSC 20 per Lord Hodge and Lord Sales at paras 23–27. 125 But see also, on the awkwardness of applying the counterfactual test to cases of overvaluation, Manchester Building Society v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2021] UKSC 20 per Lord Leggatt at paras 100–106.

Legal Causation and Remoteness of Damage   497

In determining the scope of duty in SAAMCO, Lord Hoffmann placed importance upon the distinction between “advice” cases and “information” cases:126 “If the duty is to advise whether or not a course of action should be taken, the adviser must take reasonable care to consider all the potential consequences of that course of action. If he is negligent, he will therefore be responsible for all the foreseeable loss which is a consequence of that course of action having been taken. If his duty is only to supply information, he must take reasonable care to ensure that the information is correct and, if he is negligent, will be responsible for all the foreseeable consequences of the information being wrong.”

The Supreme Court has subsequently warned, however, of the “descriptive inadequacy” of the terms “advice” and “information”.127 Distinguishing between them is not now regarded as a reliable method of delineating the scope of duty. This is more properly assessed by reference to the “purpose of duty, judged on an objective basis by reference to the purpose for which the advice is being given”.128 At one end of the spectrum, advice may have been sought for the purpose of obtaining comprehensive guidance on all aspects of a proposed transaction; if any element of the advice offered turns out to have been negligently miscalculated, the whole loss ensuing from the transaction will be within the scope of the adviser’s duty.129 At the other, the adviser may have been asked to supply specific material for the client to consider as part of the client’s broader assessment of the risk of a course of action.130 In such cases, as in SAAMCO, the scope of duty is ascertained by reference to the limited purpose of that advice, and the adviser’s liability is confined to the consequences of its being incorrect; liability does not extend to loss attributable to other factors.131 However, 126 [1997] AC 191 at 214. 127 See Hughes-Holland v BPE Solicitors [2017] UKSC 21, [2018] AC 599 per Lord Sumption at para 39, noting that the terms are not distinct or mutually exclusive categories; see also Manchester Building Society v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2021] UKSC 20 per Lord Hodge and Lord Sales at paras 18–22. 128 Manchester Building Society v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2021] UKSC 20 per Lord Hodge and Lord Sales at para 4; see also Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd v Johnson & Higgs Ltd [2001] UKHL 51, [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 929 per Lord Lloyd at para 17. 129 Hughes-Holland v BPE Solicitors [2017] UKSC 21, [2018] AC 599 per Lord Sumption at para 40; Manchester Building Society v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2021] UKSC 20 per Lord Hodge and Lord Sales at para 18. 130 See Hughes-Holland v BPE Solicitors [2017] UKSC 21, [2018] AC 599 per Lord Sumption at para 35: “where the contribution of the defendant is to supply material which the client will take into account in making his own decision on the basis of a broader assessment of the risks, the defendant has no legal responsibility for his decision”. 131 Hughes-Holland v BPE Solicitors [2017] UKSC 21, [2018] AC 599 per Lord Sumption at para 41; Manchester Building Society v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2021] UKSC 20 per Lord Hodge and Lord Sales at para 18.

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498   The Law of Delict in Scotland

14.50

14.51

“between these extremes, every case is likely to depend on the range of matters for which the defendant assumed responsibility and no more exact rule can be stated”.132 An example of duty restricted in scope is seen in Hughes-Holland v BPE Solicitors.133 The claimant agreed to lend £200,000 to a developer on the understanding that the sum would be used to convert a disused property. In reality, the developer planned to use most of the money to discharge an existing charge over the building, and he was himself bringing no funds to the project. The defendants were the solicitors engaged by the claimant to draw up a facility letter and charge over the building. Although the solicitors knew of the developer’s true intentions, they did not alert the claimant to these, and, due to an oversight, the wording of the loan documentation prepared by the defendants negligently confirmed the claimant’s misunderstanding. The project failed and the claimant lost all of the money invested. The Supreme Court held that the claimant could not recover his loss from the defendants. Admittedly the transaction would not have gone ahead and the claimant would not have suffered his loss but for the defendants’ preparation of the loan documentation and confirmation of the claimant’s mistaken assumption about the developer’s use of the funds. On the other hand, the service supplied by the defendants was only one of the factors relevant to the claimant’s decision to proceed with the transaction; the defendants had not undertaken general responsibility for advising the claimant on whether or not to make the loan, and even if the loan monies been applied to development works, the project was unpromising and would in all likelihood have remained incomplete and substantially worthless. The defendants had not assumed the risk of the claimant’s investment failing in this way. Hence the failure was not within the scope of their duty, but instead attributable to the claimant’s own commercial misjudgments. Applying the counterfactual as a cross-check, even if the assumption about the developer’s use of funds had been correct, and the £200,000 had been applied to developing the site, the evidence indicated that the project would still have failed, and the loss would have occurred in any event. A different decision, however, was reached in Manchester Building Society v Grant Thornton UK LLP.134 The defendant acted as auditor to the claimant, a small building society whose main activity was the provision of mortgages. On the basis of its own assessment of the market the claimant’s management had decided upon a business model that used long-term interest

132 Hughes-Holland v BPE Solicitors [2017] UKSC 21, [2018] AC 599 per Lord Sumption at para 44. 133 [2017] UKSC 21, [2018] AC 599; for comment, see J O’Sullivan, “The Contract/Tort Borderline”, in W Day and S Worthington (eds), Challenging Private Law: Lord Sumption on the Supreme Court (2020) 115. 134 [2021] UKSC 20.

Legal Causation and Remoteness of Damage   499

rate swaps as a hedge against the cost of borrowing to fund its mortgage lending. The defendant had not advised on this general strategy. However, the claimant was also subject to a regulatory regime that required it to maintain a substantial level of capital in order to guarantee its continuing viability. The defendant negligently advised the claimant that it was possible to apply a form of accounting practice known as “hedge accounting” to reduce the effect in its accounts of the volatility of the market-to-market value of interest rate swaps, and this would allow the claimant to comply with regulatory constraints. On the strength of this advice the claimant kept open prior swap transactions and entered into further transactions of this nature. It subsequently transpired, however, that the claimant was not entitled to apply hedge accounting and in consequence it required to close out the swaps, the value of which had become negative due to a fall in interest rates. In consequence the claimant suffered losses on the swaps and associated transaction fees, which it sought to recover by bringing a claim in negligence against the defendant. In judging whether those losses were within the scope of the defendant’s duty the Supreme Court noted that the purpose of enlisting the defendant’s services was to advise the claimant specifically on the impact of hedge accounting on its regulatory capital position.135 The defendant’s negligent advice that this form of accounting was competent in the claimant’s case meant that the claimant believed that it had capacity to follow this business model and remain within the regulations, when in fact it did not.136 The defendant had no duty to advise the claimant on its business model generally, but advice on that particular point was within the scope of its duty. The consequence of the erroneous advice in regard to the availability of hedge accounting was the loss sustained by the claimant on closing down the swaps. Given the purpose for which the advice had been given, there was a sufficient nexus between the harm for which the claimant sought damages and the subject-matter of the defendant’s duty of care. Applying a counterfactual analysis as a cross-check, if the defendant’s advice had been correct and the claimant had been entitled to apply hedge accounting, the claimant would have continued with the swaps and would not have suffered the loss now claimed.137 The claim for this loss therefore succeeded. However, the court also took the view that the claimant had been overly ambitious in its application of its business model, and that it had contributed to its own loss by the mismatching of lifetime mortgages and interest rate swaps. To

135 [2021] UKSC 20 per Lord Hodge and Lord Sales at para 38. 136 As Lord Hodge and Lord Sales commented, [2021] UKSC 20 at para 38, this was “analogous to a dividend payment case, where an auditor negligently advises a company that it has capital resources at a level which would permit payment of a dividend when in fact it does not”. 137 [2021] UKSC 20 per Lord Leggatt at para 149.

500   The Law of Delict in Scotland

14.52

14.53

that extent the claimant was found to have been 50 per cent contributorily negligent, and the defendant’s liability was reduced accordingly. Although the reported cases have mostly involved economic loss flowing from the advice or information provided by professional advisers in a business context, the SAAMCO principle is a general one, capable of application in other settings,138 and indeed Lord Hoffmann’s parable of the mountaineer involved medical, not commercial, advice. In Meadows v Khan,139 for example, the claimant had consulted the defendant, a doctor, with a view to establishing whether she was a carrier for the haemophilia gene, so that she could assess the risks of pregnancy. The doctor negligently omitted to administer the necessary genetic tests, and so failed to detect that the claimant was indeed a carrier. The claimant went on to have a child who suffered from both haemophilia and autism, but the two conditions were not related. The claimant argued that, but for the defendant’s negligent testing, she would have terminated the pregnancy, and she therefore claimed the additional costs of childcare deriving from both the haemophilia and the autism. However, the Supreme Court held that the scope of the defendant’s duty was to be determined by reference to the purpose for which the advice was sought, which was to ascertain whether she was a carrier of the haemophilia gene, not to obtain the defendant’s counsel on all the risks associated with pregnancy.140 Applying the counterfactual analysis as a cross-check, if the defendant’s advice had been correct and the claimant had not been a carrier of haemophilia, the child would nonetheless have been born with autism. The development of autism was therefore a coincidental injury that was not within the scope of the defendant’s duty. The defendant was liable for the costs of care only insofar as they were caused by the child’s haemophilia, not for those attributable to his autism. The principle that there should be no liability for risk outwith the scope of duty, and the reasoning applied in SAAMCO, have been accepted in the Scottish courts.141 In Bristol & West Building Society v Rollo, Steven & Bond,142 for example, the defenders were a firm of solicitors that acted for the pursuer, a building society, in a loan transaction. They advised that a 138 Hughes-Holland v BPE Solicitors [2017] UKSC 21, [2018] AC 599 per Lord Sumption at para 47; see also Meadows v Khan [2021] UKSC 21 per Lord Hodge and Lord Sales at para 62. 139 [2021] UKSC 21. 140 In this regard the court distinguished Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 530, [2002] QB 266 (discussed at paras 16.80–16.83 above), in which the service undertaken by medical staff was to prevent the birth of any child, not only a child afflicted by a specific disorder (see Lord Hodge and Lord Sales [2021] UKSC 21 at para 63). 141 Lord Hoffmann’s reasoning in SAAMCO was cited as providing a general principle relevant to Scots law e.g. by Lord Woolman in Henderson v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2008] CSOH 146, 2008 SCLR 823 at para 14; see also Preferred Mortgages Ltd v Shanks [2008] CSOH 23, [2008] PNLR 20; Upton Park Homes Ltd v MacDonalds Solicitors [2009] CSOH 159, [2010] PNLR 12. 142 1998 SLT 9.

Legal Causation and Remoteness of Damage   501

property offered as security could be repossessed with vacant possession in the event of default by the borrower. In fact, there was a sitting tenant, and on that basis the sale price after the property was repossessed was significantly less than the sum advanced. The Lord Ordinary, Lord MacLean, referred back to Lord Hoffmann’s reasoning and held that the solicitors had not simply provided information on a specific aspect of the proposed transaction, but were in effect advising the building society to take a certain course of action, namely to provide a secured loan. Accordingly, their duty was to take reasonable care to consider all the potential consequences of their advice to the building society and, since they had failed to do so, they were to be held responsible for the full loss following from the loan transaction.

E. REMOTENESS AND THE INTENTIONAL DELICTS (1) A direct consequence rule? The focus thus far has been on negligence. So far as intentional delicts are concerned, there is little authority to indicate the circumstances in which damage may be considered as too remote, but it is thought that foreseeability gives way to a direct consequence rule. Assuming that to be correct, a person who sets out with the intention of harming another is held liable for the consequences that flow directly from the wrongdoing, even where those consequences were neither intended nor foreseen. As explained by Lord Steyn in Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA:143 “[I]t is a rational and defensible strategy to impose wider liability on an intentional wrongdoer . . . [A]n innocent plaintiff may, not without reason, call on a morally reprehensible defendant to pay the whole of the loss he caused. The exclusion of heads of loss in the law of negligence, which reflects considerations of legal policy, does not necessarily avail the intentional wrongdoer.”

For Scotland, Walker takes a similar view, citing criminal authority to support the proposition that a defender should be held “responsible for direct consequences of his conduct, even though unforeseen, such as for the death of a person assaulted”.144 An English court has likewise indicated that the 143 [1997] AC 254 at 279, under reference to H L A Hart and T Honoré, Causation in the Law, 2nd edn (1985) 303–304: “The relative culpability of the defendant’s conduct is certainly an important consideration when non-causal limitations on liability are in issue . . . But the exclusion of such loss in the law of negligence, which reflects considerations of legal policy, will not necessarily be adhered to when the wrongful conduct complained of consists of something gravely reprehensible, such as deceit . . . An innocent plaintiff may, not without reason, call on a morally reprehensible defendant to pay the whole of the loss he has caused.” For further discussion of English law, see J Cartwright, “Remoteness of Damage in Contract and Tort” (1996) 55 CLJ 488 at 508–510. 144 Walker, Delict 167.

14.54

502   The Law of Delict in Scotland

Protection from Harassment Act 1997, although silent on the question of remoteness, is directed at “deliberate conduct of a kind which the defendant knows or ought to know will amount to harassment of the claimant. Once that is proved the defendant is responsible in damages for the injury and loss which flow from that conduct.”145 English authority supports an equivalent principle in relation to the tort of deceit,146 and it has been stated in relation to conspiracy that “the intention to injure the plaintiff negatives all excuses and disposes of any question of remoteness of damage”.147

(2) Nuisance 14.55

As explained in chapter 22, the basis of liability in the law of nuisance may be either intention or negligence, with the latter being more typical in cases of physical damage. The question of remoteness in regard to nuisance was considered by the Privy Council in a second Wagon Mound case brought by the owners of the ships damaged by fire (as opposed to the wharf-owners, as in the first case).148 This second case, heard six years later, appears to endorse the reasoning of the first, to the extent that foreseeability is said to be the essential element in the remoteness enquiry when a nuisance case is one of public nuisance.149 According to Whitty, this statement of principle in The Wagon Mound (No 2), although made in relation to accidental public nuisance, is “wide enough to cover intentional ‘private nuisance’”.150 But at least insofar as intentional nuisance relates to physical damage to property, Whitty’s view seems inconsistent with case law concerning other intentional delicts, which has tended to abandon foreseeability in favour of liability for direct consequences.151 The position may be different where the damage complained of is impairment of amenity, as is more common for intentional nuisances,152 for it seems less persuasive that an entitlement to compensation should extend to unforeseeable consequences flowing from disturbances such as noise or fumes. Jones v Ruth [2011] EWCA Civ 804, [2012] 1 WLR 1495 per Patten LJ at para 32. Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA [1997] AC 254. Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495 per Lord Lindley at 537. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v The Miller Steamship Co Pty (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617. 149 [1967] 1 AC 617 per Lord Reid at 639–640 (although in the light of evidence that the risk of fire to the ships was foreseeable, liability was established in this second case). See also Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264, to the effect that, although the Rylands v Fletcher rule imposes strict liability in respect of the escape of dangerous substances from land, in the sense of the absence of a fault requirement, it requires that the consequences of the dangerous escape should be foreseeable. See also D Nolan, “The Distinctiveness of Rylands v Fletcher” (2005) 121 LQR 421 at 444. 150 N R Whitty, “Nuisance”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) para 156. 151 See para 14.54 above. 152 See discussion at para 22.38 below. 145 146 147 148

PART IV

INJURIES TO SPECIFIC INTERESTS

Chapter 15

Intention and Malice

Para A. INTRODUCTION����������������������������������������������������������������� 15.01 B. INTENTION�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 15.03 (1) Intention and purpose������������������������������������������������������� 15.04 (2) Intention and recklessness������������������������������������������������� 15.07 C. MALICE (1) “Malice in law” and “malice in fact”���������������������������������� 15.09 (2) Generic and specific meanings (a) Malice as a synonym for wrongful intention����������������� 15.10 (b) Motive malice������������������������������������������������������������� 15.11 D. EVIDENTIAL PROBLEMS��������������������������������������������������� 15.13 E. THE ROLES OF INTENTION AND MALICE: AN OVERVIEW��������������������������������������������������������������������� 15.17 (1) Conduct in the knowledge that injurious consequences were substantially certain to result�������������������������������������� 15.18 (2) Motive malice������������������������������������������������������������������� 15.19 (3) Rebuttal of privilege���������������������������������������������������������� 15.20 F. INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE POLICIES��������������� 15.21

A. INTRODUCTION Of course, the law of negligence, covered in detail in the previous part of this book, does not exhaust the law of delict. There is also the important category of delicts which, traditionally, are characterised by reference to injury to specific interests, that is to say, injury to a person’s right to bodily and mental integrity, liberty, reputation, integrity of property, and economic well-being.1 These are the subject of this part of the book. By and large, these delicts involve harm that is intentionally inflicted, but this is not exclusively the case: chapter 20, for example, will argue that proof of intention is not an essential element of breach of privacy, and chapter 22 will show that nuisance may be perpetrated negligently as well as intentionally. As noted in the introductory chapters, early authorities made little of the distinction between negligent and non-negligent wrongdoing,2 a distinction which acquired significance   1 See paras 2.05–2.13 above.   2 See paras 1.32–1.33 above.

505

15.01

506   The Law of Delict in Scotland

15.02

only from the nineteenth century onwards. Even then, clearer differentiation between these categories, and eventually greater systemisation of the law of negligence, did not bring with it a single framework of analysis to which all non-negligent wrongdoing conformed.3 Each of the categories discussed in this part of the book is therefore distinctive in the conduct pattern by which it is defined. Nonetheless, some general observations can be made on intention and malice, troublesome terms that are pivotal to this group of delicts. Liability for intentional wrongdoing can, of course, occur only where that wrongdoing was perpetrated by a voluntary act. As already discussed,4 the general rule applicable to wrongdoing, whether negligent or non-negligent, is that no liability attaches to involuntary conduct.5 So liability does not arise in respect of those who were overcome by a complete loss of control of their movements at the time of the wrongdoing. Similarly, as the English courts have remarked, “if X bodily throws Y onto someone else’s land, Y will not be committing a trespass”.6

B. INTENTION 15.03

In ordinary language, to “intend” something means “to have [it] in the mind as a fixed purpose”.7 In the context of delictual liability, however, construing intention in this way is not straightforward. An obvious evidential problem, discussed below,8 is that the content of a person’s mind is seldom knowable by direct means. Furthermore, there is also the substantive difficulty of deciding in what circumstances a person should take responsibility for the consequences of conduct, in itself deliberate, where those consequences were not part of the person’s “fixed purpose”?

(1) Intention and purpose 15.04

In considering that second issue, analogies may be drawn with the requirement for mens rea in criminal law, and the debate on whether, for the crime of assault for example, it is necessary to show that the accused had

  3 See para 2.16 above. See also P Cane, “Mens Rea in Tort Law” (2000) 20 OJLS 533 at 552, observing in relation to the English torts that the search for general principle is “at worst a potential source of serous confusion”.   4 See paras 10.41–10.47 above.   5 Although liability in negligence may nonetheless be established if such loss of control should have been foreseeable to the defender: see para 10.46 above.  6 Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Conarken Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1852 (TCC), [2010] BLR 601 per Akenhead J at para 65 (affd [2011] EWCA Civ 644, [2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 692); see also A J Sebok, “Purpose, Belief, and Recklessness: Pruning the Restatement (Third)’s Definition of Intent” (2001) 54 Vanderbilt L Rev 1165 at 1165: “a man thrown into another’s close is not a trespasser”.  7 Oxford English Dictionary Online, definition 18 of “intend” (described as “the chief current sense”).   8 At paras 15.13–15.16.

Intention and Malice   507

“evil intent”.9 Chapter 110 noted the overlap between crimes and delicts in the early development of the intentional wrongs. However, the assessment of fault necessarily takes on a different character as between the criminal law and the law of delict.11 For the criminal law a “hierarchy of relative moral blameworthiness”12 is fundamental to ascertaining the penalty to be imposed upon the wrongdoer – hence the concern to ensure that the accused had the mens rea appropriate to that penalty. The main objective of the law of delict, on the other hand, is to provide redress for those who have suffered the consequences of the wrongdoer’s conduct, not to punish that conduct.13 The balancing exercise which this entails14 has less concern for any subjective measure of fault, as compared with the criminal law, and places greater emphasis on whether the wrongdoer’s conduct departed from community standards. D does not therefore displace liability for invasion of P’s right simply by asserting that this was not the D’s fixed purpose.15 Of course it is relevant to consider subjective evidence of purpose, if this is available. But the law holds that D should accept responsibility for injurious consequences which D knew, or ought to have known with substantial certainty, would result from D’s actions. Taking the basic example of an assault, it may not have been D’s fixed purpose in punching P in the face to break P’s nose. Nonetheless, D knew, or ought to have known with substantial certainty, that a forceful blow to the head would cause serious harm; thus D is regarded as having inflicted an intentional injury if a broken nose is the consequence. It is no answer for D to maintain that this was not the objective in striking the blow.16 A more specific reading of intention in relation to different categories of liability is explored in subsequent chapters. In summary, however, a person is regarded as having acted intentionally to produce a particular consequence where either: (i) producing this consequence was the person’s purpose in embarking upon the conduct in question; or (ii) the person knew, or ought   9 See discussion in Gordon, Criminal Law, vol 2, para 33.29. 10 See paras 1.06ff above. 11 As Hume wrote of crimes against reputation (Commentaries on the Law of Scotland, Respecting Crimes ch 10 § 3): “the criminal is . . . distinguished from the civil process, that, to warrant the inflicting of any punishment, the animus injuriandi, or special malice of the act must be shown; whereas mere petulance or indiscretion may be the just ground of an award for the reparation of damage, though the parties are not even known to each other, if the things said are naturally and in themselves of an injurious tendency.” 12 See J Blackie, “The Interaction of Crime and Delict in Scotland”, in M Dyson (ed), Unravelling Tort and Crime (2014) 356 at 367–368. 13 As pointed out by P Cane, “Mens Rea in Tort Law” (2000) 20 OJLS 533 at 553, it is possible to be convicted of an attempted or indeed a victimless crime, but there is no liability for an attempted or victimless delict. 14 On which see e.g. O v Rhodes [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] AC 219 per Lady Hale at para 42. 15 See e.g. Marco v Merrens 1964 SLT (Sh Ct) 74; see also Williams v Humphrey, The Times, 20 Feb 1975. 16 For further discussion, see para 16.07 below.

15.05

15.06

508   The Law of Delict in Scotland

to have known, that this consequence was substantially certain to result from the particular conduct.17

(2) Intention and recklessness 15.07

15.08

This extended view of intention encompasses “conscious recklessness”,18 where D is indifferent to a risk of harm that could be foreseen with substantial certainty, and proceeds without concern for the possible consequences of D’s conduct.19 While the criminal law may treat offences perpetrated recklessly more leniently than those perpetrated intentionally,20 the intentional delicts generally do not. Reid v Mitchell is an example.21 The pursuer, the defender and two other farm workers were engaged in building a haystack. The defender and the two others were “carrying on”, playfully knocking each other over. The pursuer continued with his work. In an attempt to draw the pursuer into the game, the defender pushed him, causing him to fall from the haystack on to his head and to sustain serious injury. The defender was held liable for assault, despite the absence of evidence of “bad intention”, because the game was “manifestly a dangerous proceeding”22 carrying risk which the pursuer had not accepted and which the defender had ignored.

C. MALICE (1) “Malice in law” and “malice in fact” 15.09

Notoriously an “unhappy expression”,23 “malice” has generated considerable confusion over the years.24 Legal usage in England traditionally differentiated between “malice in law”, meaning “a wrongful act, done 17 The term “substantial certainty” is copied from the US Restatement. See now American Law Institute, Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 1: “A person acts with the intent to produce a consequence if: (a) the person acts with the purpose of producing that consequence; or (b) the person acts knowing that the consequence is substantially certain to result.” But see also discussion in A J Sebok, “Purpose, Belief, and Recklessness: Pruning the Restatement (Third)’s Definition of Intent” (2001) 54 Vanderbilt L Rev 165. 18 See P Cane, “Mens Rea in Tort Law” (2000) 20 OJLS 533 at 535–538. 19 See J Guthrie Smith, A Treatise on the Law of Reparation (1864) 202. 20 See Gordon, Criminal Law, vol 2, para 33.29, stating that assault, for example, is “a crime of intent and cannot be committed recklessly”. 21 (1885) 12 R 1129. See also Co-operative Group (CWS) Ltd v Pritchard [2011] EWCA Civ 329, [2012] QB 320 per Aikens LJ at para 33: “acts done or words said reckless as to whether they cause damage also give rise to an ‘intentional tort’”; and N Cox, “Civil Liability for Foul Play in Sport” (2003) 54 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 351 at 373. 22 (1885) 12 R 1129 per Lord Justice-Clerk Macdonald at 1131. 23 Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1 per Lord Macnaghten at 144. 24 See H T Terry, “Malicious Torts” (1904) 20 LQR 10 at 12: “not all intention, even to do something that one ought not to do, amounts to malice”. See also G Fridman, “Malice in the Law of Torts” (1958) 21 MLR 484; E Reid, “‘That Unhappy Expression’: Malice at the Margins”, in S Pitel et al (eds), Tort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy (2013) 441.

Intention and Malice   509

intentionally, without just cause or excuse”,25 and “malice in fact”, signifying positive “ill will against a person” 26 or simply “bad motive”.27 These terms eventually found a route into Scots law in the House of Lords’ discussion of liability for wrongful arrest in Shields v Shearer.28 The Lord Chancellor, Lord Haldane, explained the distinction as follows:29 “A person who inflicts an injury upon another person in contravention of the law is not allowed to say that he did so with an innocent mind; he is taken to know the law, and he must act within the law. He may, therefore, be guilty of malice in law, although, so far as the state of his mind is concerned, he acts ignorantly, and in that sense innocently. Malice in fact is quite a different thing; it means an actual malicious intention on the part of the person who has done the wrongful act, and it may be, in proceedings based on wrongs independent of contract, a very material ingredient in the question of whether a valid cause of action can be stated.

This terminology, opaque and misleading as it is, has now all but disappeared from English law.30 Yet, although Lord Dunedin pointed out in Shields that these were “not perfectly familiar terms in Scotland”, their adoption in that case has given them an occasional, and often unhappy, afterlife in Scottish cases involving alleged wrongful arrest.31 An understanding of their usage is important for a proper reading of older case law, but these terms are unhelpful in the modern law and hence best avoided. Just as the Scots followed the English into the tangled terminology of “malice in law” and “malice in fact”, so it would now seem sensible to discard those out-moded terms, as the English have done, in favour of more specific articulation of the intentional requirement in different areas of liability.

25 Bromage v Prosser (1825) 4 B & C 247 per Bayley J at 255. 26 Bromage v Prosser (1825) 4 B & C 247 per Bayley J at 255. For early reference to the distinction in criminal law, see also Sir Matthew Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae: The History of the Pleas of the Crown (1736) 451 at 455. “Malice in fact” was “a deliberate intention of doing any bodily harm to another”, whereas “malice in law” was found “When the homicide is voluntarily committed without provocation”. 27 See P Cane, “Mens Rea in Tort Law” (2000) 20 OJLS 533 at 539. 28 1914 SC (HL) 33 at 34 per Lord Haldane. 29 1914 SC (HL) 33 at 34. 30 As acknowledged e.g. in O v Rhodes [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] AC 219. For discussion of the historical development of the treatment of malice in English criminal law, and the fall into desuetude of this terminology, see Hyam v DPP [1975] AC 55 per Lord Diplock at 87–93. 31 E.g. Woodward v Chief Constable, Fife Constabulary 1998 SLT 1342; McKinney v Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police 1998 SLT (Sh Ct) 80; Whitehouse v Gormley [2018] CSOH 93, 2020 SCLR 27.

510   The Law of Delict in Scotland

(2) Generic and specific meanings (a) Malice as a synonym for wrongful intention 15.10

Yet even if the labels of “malice in law” and “malice in fact” are abandoned, as they ought to be, it can certainly be accepted that “malice” has both a generic and a specific meaning.32 As to the former, Glegg wrote that “For the purposes of classification, all wrongful intention must be included under the head of malice.”33 Similarly, the editors of the Dunedin Encyclopaedia did not include an entry on “Intention”, while the entry on “Malice” began with the assurance that “the term malice may be taken as co-extensive with wrongful intention.”34 In other words “malice” in a broad sense has been understood to encompass the various meanings of “intention” discussed in the previous section,35 and some of the references to “malice” in the case law must be so understood, as will be noted in analysis in later chapters.

(b) Motive malice 15.11

15.12

But “malice” also has a narrower meaning in the sense of hostile motivation, and in some contexts a malice requirement involves addressing the defender’s actual desires or motives – not only whether the outcome of the defender’s conduct was intended but why it was intended. In this narrower sense, “malice” can be seen as a form of “intention plus”, the “plus” being a requirement of bad motive. While the level of hostility looked for in different contexts may vary,36 the core concept is bad or improper motive.37 Although “malice” is certainly encountered in older sources in the broader generic sense, analytical clarity is promoted by confining the term to what may be described as “motive malice”, leaving the terminology of “intention” to deal with the generic meaning. This is the usage generally adopted in the present work. 32 For an exposition in relation to defamation, and by reference to the English terms, see J Guthrie Smith, A Treatise on the Law of Reparation (1864) 201–202. 33 A T Glegg, Practical Treatise on the Law of Reparation, 1st edn (1892) 10, and carried forward to subsequent editions including the 4th of 1955, ed by J L Duncan, at 7. Guthrie Smith, Damages 5 similarly wrote of “malice in law” meaning “whatever is done consciously without just cause or excuse”. 34 R H Maconochie, “Malice”, in Dunedin Encyclopaedia, vol 9 (1930) 361. 35 See paras 15.03–15.06 above. As Walker, Delict 50 puts it, malice in this broad sense was “an element in all cases of intentional wrongs, and is adequately proved by showing that the conduct was deliberate and not accidental”. 36 See e.g. the distinction between “targeted” and “untargeted” malice in the English tort of misfeasance in public office discussed in Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3) [2001] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 AC 1, contrasted with “targeted” harm, in the sense of “predominant purpose” to harm, in lawful-means conspiracy, as in Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch 1942 SC (HL) 1. 37 See J Murphy, “Malice as an Ingredient of Tort Liability” (2019) 78 CLJ 355 at 370.

Intention and Malice   511

D. EVIDENTIAL PROBLEMS There are manifest problems of proof where liability hinges on the defender’s intention or motive, since neither can be definitively ascertained by objective means. The defender’s own evidence, even where it is available, may not report the defender’s mindset at a given point in time wholly accurately, particularly when that evidence takes the form of an ex post facto rationalisation. More typically the defender’s purpose, and the defender’s knowledge of the substantial certainty of the harmful consequence, must be inferred from the defender’s conduct and from the surrounding circumstances. In drawing those inferences the court is likely to be influenced by its assessment whether others in the community, acting in comparable circumstances, would normally have had hostile purpose or, as the case may be, ought to have been substantially certain of a harmful outcome. For example, where a person punches another in the face this is typically because that person had the purpose of causing serious injury, but such persons ought in any event to have known that a punch would be likely to cause serious injury. On the same basis, a court would be entitled to infer that a defender who pushed the pursuer into a room and locked the door intended to deprive the pursuer of liberty, since persons do not generally behave in this way without intending such a result.38 Recklessness is judged in a similar fashion, in circumstances where the defender is alleged to have been indifferent to the risk to the pursuer and to have proceeded without concern for the possible consequences of particular conduct. Was the defender indifferent to a risk that persons generally could have foreseen with substantial certainty,39 and would such persons have adjusted their behaviour to take account of that risk? In short, because more often than not intention and purpose are judged on the basis of inference, there is a tendency for community standards to become their touchstone. This is not the same as the standard of care enquiry in the law of negligence, which uses the standard of foresight of the reasonable person (and not the defender’s subjective mental state) to measure the defender’s actions. The use made of community standards by the intentional delicts is more troublesome, in that it uses these not to rate the defender’s actions as such, but to form conclusions about the defender’s mental state. A practical disadvantage of imputing states of mind on the basis of community patterns of conduct has been to add further layers of interpretation to intention and malice, as assumptions about patterns of conduct

38 See Dobbs, Law of Torts § 29. 39 See para 15.07 above.

15.13

15.14

15.15

15.16

512   The Law of Delict in Scotland

elide with the key requirements for the delict in question.40 This is particularly apparent in regard to malice, where different interpretations have developed for different contexts, and modern definitions have tended to increase rather than reduce the complexity of the taxonomy.

E. THE ROLES OF INTENTION AND MALICE: AN OVERVIEW 15.17

The chapters which follow provide a detailed treatment of the interpretation of intention and malice in the particular categories of liability to which they are relevant. On the basis of the discussion above, aspects of a more general framework may also be discerned.

(1) Conduct in the knowledge that injurious consequences were substantially certain to result 15.18

D may be taken to have intended harm to P where D knew, or ought to have known, that the harm was substantially certain to result from D’s conduct. This first level of intention is generally sufficient to establish liability in relation to intentional infringement of the absolute rights relating to the person, that is to say, the rights to bodily and mental integrity, liberty and reputation.41 The necessary element of intention is inferred from deliberate conduct in circumstances where D could have foreseen with substantial certainty that D’s conduct would infringe P’s right.42 There is not normally any need to establish D’s purpose in acting as D did.43 So the delict of assault, for example, is constituted by infringement of “the right in principle not to be subjected to physical harm by the intentional actions of another person”.44 If a blow is struck, it is not generally necessary to show the assailant’s purpose in so doing. Justifications such as provocation, self-defence, or privilege may be accepted, as detailed in later chapters in relation to specific delicts, but the inference that D intended

40 E.g. see discussion at paras 18.137–18.138 below on the process by which indifference to truth, traditionally regarded as an indicator of malice in the common law, has moved over to become a necessary requirement for proving malice in the statutory formulation of the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021. 41 See paras 2.06–2.09 above. 42 Bell, Principles § 2044. See e.g. Guthrie Smith, Reparation 201; R H Maconochie, “Malice”, in Lord Dunedin et al (eds), Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, vol 9 (1930) 361 at 363; M Lobban, “Intentional and Economic Torts”, in W Cornish et al (eds), The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol XII, 1820–1914: Private Law (2010) 1033 at 1034; see also Bromage v Prosser (1825) 4 B & C 247 per Bayley J at 255: “If I give a perfect stranger a blow likely to produce death, I do it of malice, because I do it intentionally and without just cause or excuse.” 43 Although such evidence may serve to corroborate intention in the primary sense. 44 See Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 AC 962 per Lord Scott at para 18.

Intention and Malice   513

to harm is difficult to rebut, and on that basis some have argued that these delicts function in effect as a form of strict liability.45

(2) Motive malice In the modern law, as already noted,46 “malice” is best understood as meaning that D acted with the hostile motive of harming P. Such “motive malice” is not normally a requirement of liability. But certain types of conduct which are otherwise perfectly lawful may be rendered unlawful by proof of motive malice.47 This is the case with malicious abuse of procedure,48 or misuse of power by public officers,49 aemulatio vicini,50 and certain of the economic delicts, such as lawful-means conspiracy.51 This category also includes the new statutory delicts of malicious publication.52 The question of the defender’s underlying motivation must therefore be addressed in each of these particular contexts.

15.19

(3) Rebuttal of privilege Motive malice53 is also encountered as a ground for rebutting privilege. P alleges that D’s unlawful conduct has infringed one of P’s rights. D in turn asserts privilege, potentially rendering that unlawful conduct lawful. But privilege is defeated by proof of malice. P must show D’s conduct to have been motivated by ill-will rather than by the objectives for which the privilege was granted. The law of defamation54 is the most common context in which privilege and issues of its rebuttal arise, but it is also seen in cases of

45 See A Beever, “The Form of Liability in the Torts of Trespass” (2011) 40 Common Law World Review 378, but compare D Priel, “A Public Role for the Intentional Torts” (2011) 22 King’s Law Journal 183 at 190–193. 46 See paras 15.10–15.12 above. 47 For discussion of the equivalent requirement in the English torts, see J Murphy, “Malice as an Ingredient of Tort Liability” (2019) 78 CLJ 355. 48 See paras 17.52–17.57 below. 49 See paras 7.35–7.44 above. 50 See paras 22.79–22.81 below. 51 See paras 21.53–21.55 below. 52 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 ss 21–23; see also paras 18.133– 18.138 below. 53 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 at 229 per Lord Hope: “The foundation of an action of defamation is malice. If words are used which are defamatory and untrue the law implies malice. That presumption is rebutted if the occasion when the words were used is privileged. The privilege destroys the presumption. But it remains open to the claimant to prove that there was malice in fact.” See also Hamilton v Hope (1827) 5 S 569. “Reynolds privilege” for “responsible journalism” was abolished in England by the Defamation Act 2013 s 4(6), which replaces it with a construct that does not refer to malice. The Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 6 is in identical terms, but privilege continues to arise in other contexts. 54 See paras 18.105–18.118 below.

15.20

514   The Law of Delict in Scotland

alleged wrongful arrest55 or use of force by police officers.56 As a concession to the difficulties of obtaining direct evidence of malicious motivation, such motivation is in many contexts inferred where it can be shown that defenders did not honestly believe themselves to be acting in accordance with the purposes for which privilege was accorded.57

F. INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE POLICIES 15.21

Finally, and for the sake of completeness, something should be said about policies of insurance. Some of the modern cases on the meaning of “intention” have been directed at the question of whether liability for intentional or deliberate wrongdoing is covered by the wrongdoer’s insurance policy, or that of the wrongdoer’s employer. The meaning given by the law of delict to “intention” may be relevant to that enquiry, but the extent of exclusions from the insurance policy is a separate matter, for construction of the contract and not for the law of delict. In Grant v International Insurance Company of Hanover Ltd,58 for example, the pursuer’s husband had been put into a choke-hold by a nightclub door steward and had died of asphyxiation. The question for the court to decide was whether the pursuer’s personal injuries claim against the doorman’s employer, as vicariously liable for his actions, was covered by the employer’s public liability insurance, or whether it was excluded by a provision in the insurance contract that exempted “deliberate acts” or “wilful default or neglect”. As the doorman had already been convicted on a criminal charge of assault in relation to the incident (though acquitted of homicide), there was little doubt that his action had constituted the delict of assault, demonstrating “intention” in the sense discussed above for the purposes of delictual liability. However, after a close reading of the insurance contract, the court took the view that his conduct in causing death could not be classified as a “deliberate act” within the meaning of that contract, and therefore the pursuer’s claim was not excluded.59

55 56 57 58 59

See para 17.20 below. See para 16.37 below. See paras 18.105–18.106 below. [2021] UKSC 12. [2021] UKSC 12 per Lord Hamblen at para 26, referring to the reasoning of the First Division ([2019] CSIH 9, 2019 SC 379 per Lord Carloway at para 23) that the phrase “deliberate acts” as construed within the contract meant “doing something with the deliberate intention of bringing about a particular objective”. The court held that, for the exclusion to operate, the employee must have deliberately intended to cause the death, which, it was thought, he did not. On the other hand, the application of some level of force was part and parcel of the work of door stewards, and therefore it could not have been within the contemplation of the parties that this should be excluded from the insurance policy.

Chapter 16

Interference with Bodily and Mental Integrity

Para A. INTRODUCTION����������������������������������������������������������������� 16.01 (1) Assault and battery������������������������������������������������������������ 16.02 (2) Relevance of criminal proceedings������������������������������������� 16.04 (3) Claims by relatives������������������������������������������������������������ 16.05 B. INTENTION (1) In general������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.06 (2) Conscious recklessness������������������������������������������������������ 16.08 (3) Intention and affront��������������������������������������������������������� 16.09 (4) Transferred intention�������������������������������������������������������� 16.10 C. ASSAULT: INFLICTION OF PHYSICAL INJURY��������������� 16.11 D. ASSAULT: THREAT OF PHYSICAL INJURY���������������������� 16.15 E. “INDIRECT ASSAULT” CAUSING AFFRONT?������������������ 16.19 F. SEXUAL ASSAULTS������������������������������������������������������������� 16.22 G. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE USE OF FORCE (1) Self-defence���������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.24 (2) Provocation���������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.28 (3) Protection of property������������������������������������������������������� 16.33 (4) Reasonable resistance to unlawful arrest����������������������������� 16.34 (5) Chastisement of children?�������������������������������������������������� 16.35 H. EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE BY PUBLIC SERVANTS (1) The police������������������������������������������������������������������������ 16.36 (2) Other officials������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.40 I. CONSENT (1) The nature of consent������������������������������������������������������� 16.42 (2) Burden of proof���������������������������������������������������������������� 16.45 (3) Consent and sport������������������������������������������������������������� 16.48 (4) Consent and medical procedures��������������������������������������� 16.51 (5) Contributory negligence?��������������������������������������������������� 16.56 J. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF MENTAL HARM���������� 16.59 (1) The conduct element�������������������������������������������������������� 16.62 (2) The mental element���������������������������������������������������������� 16.66 (3) The consequence element������������������������������������������������� 16.68 (4) The Scottish position�������������������������������������������������������� 16.71 515

516   The Law of Delict in Scotland

K. INFRINGEMENT OF REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY������ 16.73 (1) Wrongful pregnancy���������������������������������������������������������� 16.74 (a) The non-disabled child������������������������������������������������ 16.77 (b) The disabled child������������������������������������������������������� 16.80 (c) Non-disabled child born to a disabled mother�������������� 16.84 (d) The position of the non-birthing parent����������������������� 16.87 (e) The position of subsequent partners���������������������������� 16.90 (2) Wrongful birth������������������������������������������������������������������ 16.91 (3) Wrongful life��������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.96 (4) Damaged sperm���������������������������������������������������������������� 16.97

A. INTRODUCTION 16.01

The right to bodily and mental integrity is fundamental to the framework of personality rights.1 In addition to its criminal law implications,2 an assault may give rise to a delictual claim against the assailant to compensate for loss or harm suffered and for solatium. The first topic to be mentioned in Stair’s discussion of “delinquence” was injury to “life, members, and health”. This was “inestimable and can have no price”, yet compensation was to be made for the injury itself, as well as in recognition of “the loss any man hath by the expenses of his cure or the loss of his labour, and industry in his affairs”.3 Bankton distinguished verbal injury from “real injury” which might be perpetrated both by “battery, by striking one” and also by assault, “holding up the fist, or any weapon, against one in a threatening manner, because it tends much to the person’s disgrace who is so used”.4 He added that “in all cases of injury, full reparation ought to be made to the party aggrieved, and even a consideration given him in solatium.” Similarly, in Hume’s lectures to his students on “Obligations ex delicto”, assault was one of the first illustrations:5 “It is the general rule of our practice and is plainly founded in reason, and justice, that every wrong or criminal act which injures a neighbour in his  1 See paras 2.06 and 2.07 above. On the role of iniuria in the development of civil liability for assault, see J Blackie, “The Protection of Corpus in Scots Law”, in E Descheemaeker and H Scott (eds), Iniuria and the Common Law (2013) 155.   2 On the treatment in the Institutional authorities of the crime of assault, see M G A Christie and J Fordyce, “Criminal Law”, The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, 2nd Reissue (2020) para 160. On the historical development of the relationship between the rules applicable to criminal prosecution and those applicable to delictual liability, see J Blackie, “Unity in Diversity: the History of Personality Rights in Scots Law”, in N R Whitty and R Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective (2009) 31; J Blackie and J Chalmers, “Mixing and Matching in Scottish Delict and Crime”, in M Dyson (ed), Comparing Tort and Crime (2015) 271 at 289–292.  3 Stair, Inst 1.9.4.  4 Bankton, Inst 1.10.22, citing D. 47.10.15.1.  5 Hume, Lectures III, 120.

Interference with Bodily and Mental Integrity   517 property, or person, or other material concerns, gives rise to two sorts of action, the one criminal, ad vindicatam publicam, for the sake of example to others – and (if the conclusion is not capital) for the reformation of the offender –; the other civil, and at instance of the party injured, for reparation of his patrimonial damage, as also, in many instances, for an award of the trouble and distress he has suffered on the occasion . . . [T]ake the case of a tradesman who has been assaulted, and disabled form working at his trade. He has a claim to be indemnified of this patrimonial damage, and the expense of his cure, and even a claim for a sum of money in solatium of his pain and distress, though not capable of a precise estimation.”

Early editions of Bell’s Principles discussed “personal violence” under the heading of “Assault and Battery”, as an invasion of the right to personal safety, and Bell added in his fourth edition of 1839 that the “civil claim of damage is not merely for damage sustained, but in solatium for affront and insult”.6 In other words, assault was regarded as injuring not only corpus but also dignitas, reflecting the Roman law legacy of the actio iniuriarum.7 This element of affront remains in the modern case law, although in a less prominent role than was seen in the nineteenth-century cases.

(1) Assault and battery The distinction between “assault” and “battery”, while still operative in English law,8 has receded from the modern Scots terminology.9 Adam Smith lectured his students to the effect that: “When a person is put to bodily fear it is assault, and when he is actualy [sic] beat it is battery”.10 These terms were retained in the Court of Session Act 1825, section 28, regarding actions appropriate for jury trial. Bell similarly headed § 2032 in his Principles “Assault and Battery”, but this was changed to “Reparation for Assault” by Shaw, the editor of the fifth edition of 1860. In modern Scots usage, “assault” has come to encompass direct physical injury as well as the threat of attack.11  6 Bell, Principles § 2032. An addendum to the 4th edition was made under reference to Cruickshanks v Forsyth (1747) Mor 4034 (blow to the head with a measuring stick (an ellwand) that caused affront but no significant injury). See also Anderson v Marshall (1835) 13 S 1130, in which solatium was awarded when a blow to the breast caused no lasting injury but was accompanied by verbal abuse.   7 See para 1.12 above; Blackie, “Unity in Diversity”.  8 In English law, battery involves the intentional application of physical force, whereas assault involves only the threat of such force: Clerk and Lindsell on Torts paras 14.09 and 14.12.   9 Blackie notes that by the early 18th century, in the formulation of issues for the civil jury, the terms “assault” and “assault and battery” came to be “ones of style”: Blackie, “Unity in Diversity” para 2.3.2.(b) at 105. 10 Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence 479–480. 11 E.g. Walker Delict 490–491 used the terminology of “actual assaults (batteries)” and “affronts, i.e., notional assaults” to distinguish between actual and threatened application of force, as discussed below.

16.02

518   The Law of Delict in Scotland

16.03

Nineteenth-century authority suggests that civil cases were brought for affront even where the physical injury was insufficient to attract criminal proceedings.12 But while it remains competent to claim solatium13 for the element of indignity, humiliation or distress suffered in an assault,14 the contexts in which such cases are like to arise have moved with the times. Citizens of the twenty-first century are less likely now to initiate civil proceedings in response to having their nose tapped15 or hat tilted,16 being spat at,17 or being the target of threatening imprecations.18 Nowadays actions are more commonly raised in order to call to account individuals alleged to have overstepped the power which their status gives to apply limited physical coercion against others. Today that is most likely to be the police, although at one time it included other public servants such as railway officials19 or school teachers.20 Other assault cases in the modern law arise out of consensual physical interaction, such as between doctor and patient, or between sportsmen, where it is alleged that consent to contact has been improperly obtained or that the level of physical contact has exceeded agreed levels.

(2) Relevance of criminal proceedings 16.04

Liability to make reparation for assault is unaffected by whether criminal charges are brought against the defender:21 the focus of a civil claim is reparation for the injury suffered by the pursuer, not (or at least not directly) punishment of the defender.22 Moreover, a verdict of acquittal or not 12 E.g. Gordon v Stewart (1842) 5 D 8 (touching or attempting to touch the pursuer’s nose in an insulting manner). According to Gordon, Criminal Law, para 33.01, although in theory an “extremely trivial attack” is sufficient for the criminal offence, in practice prosecutions are seldom brought where the assault did not involve significant violence or injury. 13 On the elements available in a claim for solatium, see White and Fletcher, Delictual Damages 38: “physical pain and discomfort; physical injury and disfigurement; physical illness and disease; psychological suffering; wounded feelings and affront; loss of faculties; loss of amenities; loss of expectation of life”. 14 Cf Rutherford v Chief Constable for Strathclyde Police 1981 SLT (Notes) 119, in which an award was made for the physical injury, but solatium for affront was deemed inappropriate. For the modern English position, see Richardson v Howie [2004] EWCA Civ 1127, [2005] PIQR Q3 per Thomas LJ at para 23: “in cases of assault and similar torts, it is appropriate to compensate for injury to feelings including the indignity, mental suffering, humiliation or distress that might be caused by such an attack, as well as anger or indignation arising from the circumstances of the attack”. 15 Gordon v Stewart (1842) 5 D 8. 16 Jameson v Corrie (1833) 11 S 1027. 17 Ewing v Earl of Mar (1851) 14 D 314; note, however, that damages were assessed at one farthing only and the pursuer was not awarded expenses: (1852) 14 D 330. 18 Stedman v Henderson (1923) 40 Sh Ct Rep 8. 19 Highland Railway Company v Menzies (1878) 5 R 887; Brahan v Caledonian Railway Co (1895) 3 SLT 105. 20 Ewart v Brown (1882) 10 R 163; Scorgie v Lawrie (1883) 10 R 610; see also Wight v Burns (1883) 11 R 217 (master and ship’s apprentice). 21 See e.g. DC v DG and DR [2017] CSOH 5, 2018 SC 47, affd [2017] CSIH 72, 2018 SC 171 (no criminal prosecution brought but civil claim successful). 22 Bell, Principles § 2032; see also Erskine, Inst 4.1.64.

Interference with Bodily and Mental Integrity   519

proven in criminal proceedings does not preclude a civil action arising out of the same facts,23 for the standard and burden of proof in criminal proceedings differ from those relevant to a civil claim.24 At the same time, if a guilty verdict has been reached, the accused is presumed for the purposes of subsequent civil proceedings to have committed that offence, unless the contrary can be proved,25 which is likely to be an “uphill struggle”.26

(3) Claims by relatives From the earliest times, the law of assythement permitted the spouse and close family of a person unlawfully killed to claim damages from the killer. No claim lay if the culprit was convicted of murder and executed, but if he or she escaped capital punishment the next of kin could make a pecuniary claim.27 Although not abolished until 1976,28 assythement had fallen into desuetude by the nineteenth century.29 Today, if the victim of an assault has died, close relatives may of course claim damages from the assailant; the modern provisions governing the entitlement of relatives are discussed further in chapter 31.

16.05

B. INTENTION (1) In general The delict of assault is distinguished from negligent infliction of physical or mental harm. It recognises “the right in principle not to be subjected to physical harm by the intentional actions of another person”.30 The preceding chapter discussed the meanings of “intentional” in this context, 23 MacAskill v Macleod 1926 SLT (Sh Ct) 34 (acquittal); AR v Coxen [2018] SC EDIN 53, 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 335 (not proven verdict); see also Wilson v Bennet (1904) 6 F 269, holding that the pursuer, who had been convicted of assault on a police officer, was not barred by that conviction from bringing a civil action against the officer in respect of an alleged earlier assault by the officer on the pursuer. 24 See Hume, Comm, vol 2, 71: “it may be, that the civil judge will be satisfied with weaker evidence than a jury would require towards conviction on a criminal charge”; see also vol 2, 468 and 465 n 1. For differences in the standard of proof as between criminal and civil cases in England, see Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 AC 962 per Lord Carswell at para 79. See also Mullan v Anderson No 2 1997 SLT 93, in which the family of a man killed with a knife sued the person against whom the murder charge was found not proven. The court found there to be a prima facie presumption of negligence, supporting a claim in damages. 25 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1968 s 10(2). 26 AB v CD 2018 Rep LR 15 per Sheriff Mackie at para 25. 27 See e.g. Machargs v Campbell (1767) Mor 12541; J Irvine Smith and I Macdonald, “Criminal Law”, in G Campbell Paton (ed), Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Stair Society vol 20, 1958) 280 at 299. 28 Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 s 8. 29 See discussion by Lord Reid in McKendrick v Sinclair 1972 SC (HL) 25 at 49–55. One of the last examples was Maclean v Russell, Macnee, & Co (1849) 11 D 1035. 30 See Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 AC 962 per Lord Scott at para 18.

16.06

520   The Law of Delict in Scotland

16.07

and the distinction between the different usages of the terms “intention” and “malice”. To the extent that older sources refer to assault as entailing the “malicious use” of violence,31 they must be read as meaning “malicious” in the broad sense of “intentional”. There is no authority to suggest that malice in the strict sense of hostile motivation is required to establish liability.32 In determining whether an assailant acted intentionally, it is relevant to consider subjective evidence of the assailant’s purpose in embarking upon the conduct in question, although reliable evidence of this nature is often not available. However, one may intend to do something without the consequences of that action necessarily being one’s ultimate purpose. D may intend to hit P without the ultimate purpose of breaking P’s nose, but D is nonetheless liable for the delict of assault if P’s nose is in fact broken.33 The requisite level of intention is inferred from commission of an act of force, such as striking a blow or discharging a weapon, in circumstances where D could have foreseen with substantial certainty that injury to P would result. A person who fires a gun in the direction of a group of people may not be seeking to shoot any particular individual, but the normal person in such a position would appreciate the likelihood that one of the group would be shot, and cannot therefore protest that there was no intention for this to happen.34 It is, moreover, no answer to liability that the severity of the consequences of D’s conduct was unintended. In Marco v Merrens,35 for example, reparation was due where the defender hit the pursuer with a bottle, even although it was accepted that the defender had not intended that the pursuer should suffer a significant head wound.

(2) Conscious recklessness 16.08

This construction of intention is thus capable of including “conscious recklessness”,36 where a person is indifferent to a risk of injury that could

31 See e.g. A T Glegg, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Reparation, 1st edn (1892) 91. 32 See discussion at paras 15.10–15.12 above. 33 J Guthrie Smith, A Treatise on the Law of Reparation (1864) 202; J Varuhas, “The Concept of ‘Vindication’ in the Law of Torts: Rights, Interests and Damages” (2014) 34 OJLS 253 at 264. See also Williams v Humphrey, The Times, 20 Feb 1975; Cowell v Corrective Services Commission (1988) 13 NSWLR 714 per Clarke JA at 743 (emphasis added): “it is not a necessary element of assault (and battery) that the defendant intended to injure the plaintiff. It is sufficient if he intended to strike him.” 34 See MacDonald v Robertson (1911) 27 Sh Ct Rep 103, in which the necessary element of intent was present where a landowner fired his gun aiming at the ground behind an escaping poacher, since the landowner “hit the man, and might well have expected to do so” (per Sheriff Sym at 105); see also Croucher v Cachia [2016] NSWCA 132, (2016) 95 NSWLR 117. 35 1964 SLT (Sh Ct) 74. 36 See para 15.07 above. See also Bici v Ministry of Defence [2004] EWHC 786 (QB) per Elias LJ at para 67.

Interference with Bodily and Mental Integrity   521

have been foreseen with substantial certainty, proceeding without concern for the possible consequences of his or her conduct. Thus while the criminal law may not readily recognise reckless conduct as an assault,37 delictual liability may nonetheless arise. The example cited in chapter 15 was Reid v Mitchell,38 in which the pursuer, the defender and two other farm workers were engaged in building a haystack. The defender and the two others were “carrying on”, playfully knocking each other over. The defender pushed the pursuer in an attempt to draw him into the game, causing him to fall and to sustain serious head injury. He was held liable for assault. The game was “manifestly a dangerous proceeding”39 carrying risk which the pursuer had not accepted and which the defender had ignored, and the actions therefore constituted assault “although he did it playfully and without any bad intention”.40

(3) Intention and affront As mentioned above, the delict of assault entails that reparation should be payable not only for the physical injury suffered but also for affront and insult.41 However, the question of intention to harm is more problematic in relation to conduct by which the pursuer has not sustained significant physical injury but claims to have suffered affront. Some English cases have suggested that assaults of this type require “a hostile touching”.42 However, the notion of hostile intent as a requirement was rejected by Lord Goff in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation), who commented that:43 “A prank that gets out of hand; an over-friendly slap on the back; surgical treatment by a surgeon who mistakenly thinks that the patient has consented to it – all these things may transcend the bounds of lawfulness, without being characterised as hostile. Indeed the suggested qualification is difficult to reconcile with the principle that any touching of another’s body is, in the absence of lawful excuse, capable of amounting to a battery.”

37 See Gordon, Criminal Law, vol 2, para 33.29 stating that assault is “a crime of intent and cannot be committed recklessly”. 38 (1885) 12 R 1129, discussed at para 15.08 above. 39 (1885) 12 R 1129 per Lord Justice-Clerk Macdonald at 1131. 40 (1885) 12 R 1129 per Lord Young at 1132. See also Wilson v Exel UK Ltd [2010] CSIH 35, 2010 SLT 671, in which a colleague who tugged on the pursuer’s ponytail, causing her to fall to her injury, perpetrated an assault, even though this had been “a form of horseplay”. As, however, the assault took the assailant outwith the scope of his employment, his employers were not vicariously liable. 41 See para 16.01 above. 42 Wilson v Pringle [1987] QB 237 per Croom-Johnson LJ at 252–253, adding, however, that hostility was not to be “equated with ill-will or malevolence”. 43 [1990] 2 AC 1 at 73. See also R v Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall, ex p CEGB [1982] QB 458, in which Lord Denning pointed out, at 471, that an unwanted kiss, although hardly “hostile” as such, is capable of constituting a battery. Lord Goff’s reasoning on this point was endorsed e.g. in Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406.

16.09

522   The Law of Delict in Scotland

If this reasoning is accepted, the presence of hostile motive at a subjective level is not an essential element in claims in respect of affront. An assault may occur where D intended to touch P in a way that can be characterised, in objective terms, as offensive and as representing an affront.44 It is not an additional requirement that physical injury was intended or inflicted.

(4) Transferred intention 16.10

Where D deliberately aims a blow at T, but T ducks and P is struck instead, can D be regarded as having intended to assault P? In these circumstances D’s action in striking a blow is intentional but the harmful consequence to P is unintended. “Transferred” intent to injure has been recognised as providing sufficient mens rea for the criminal charge of assault in cases like this,45 but Scottish authority in regard to delictual liability is scarce.46 Walker maintained that in the example above D should be liable on the basis of “transferred intention”,47 rather than negligence, although the authority cited by Walker was from the United States.48 Provision was made for this doctrine in the US Restatement Second of Torts § 16(2), which has now been extended into the Restatement Third of Torts (Intentional Torts to Persons), Tentative Draft No 1, § 110: “(a) For purposes of liability for battery, purposeful infliction of bodily harm, assault, or false imprisonment, the intent requirement for the tort is satisfied if the actor intends to cause the relevant tortious consequence to a third party, rather than to the plaintiff, but the actor’s conduct causes that consequence to the plaintiff.

44 See e.g. Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406, in which the defendant conceded that the touching of the plaintiff’s penis was a battery, although no physical injury was caused and there was no finding that the prison officers intended to cause distress. 45 Gordon, Criminal Law para 33.29; Roberts v Hamilton 1989 JC 91 (see also commentary on that case in Gordon, Criminal Law para 9.10); Connor v Jessop 1988 SCCR 624. On English law, see R v Latimer (1886) 17 QBD 359; R v Gnango [2011] UKSC 59, [2012] 1 AC 827. 46 A rare case is Somerville v Harsco Infrastructure Ltd [2015] SC EDIN 71, 2015 GWD 38–607, in which it was apparently accepted that the pursuer had been assaulted when a hammer thrown in jest at a third party hit the pursuer by mistake. However, the subject of the appeal to the sheriff principal was whether the hammer-thrower’s employer should be held vicariously liable (decided in the negative), and the question of “transferred intention” was not specifically considered. 47 Walker, Delict 489–490. See also A T Glegg, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Reparation, 1st edn (1892) 92, under reference to English authority: “If there is the intention to injure one person, and by accident the violence takes effect on another, an assault is committed.” 48 Walker, Delict 490 n 21, citing Prosser and Keeton on Torts in the 3rd edn of 1964 at 33. The corresponding text is in the current (5th) edn of 1984 at 37–38, in which the doctrine of “transferred intent” is referred to as a “curious surviving fiction”. On this point see now Dobbs, Law of Torts §§ 45–46, commenting on the above scenario: “If [D’s] fault lies in his intent and his act rather than in identification of a particular victim, then liability for the intent and the act seems perfectly appropriate even if the particular victim was not the intended one.”

Interference with Bodily and Mental Integrity   523 (b) For purposes of liability for battery, the intent requirement for the tort is satisfied if the actor either intends to cause a contact with the person of another or intends to cause the other to anticipate an imminent, and harmful or offensive, contact with his or her person.”

English case law similarly appears to accept that, in examples like the one given above, intention is transferred and such transferred intention suffices for the tort of battery.49 Nonetheless, some commentators have argued that the idea that intention can be “transferred” in this way is a “myth”.50 An alternative, and more straightforward, view is that D’s voluntary conduct in aiming a blow in the direction of T, and D’s recklessness as to where the blow landed, are sufficient to satisfy the intentional element of assault without the fiction that the intention is somehow transferred midair from T to P.51

C. ASSAULT: INFLICTION OF PHYSICAL INJURY In most assault cases, the harm is due either to a direct physical blow or to causing an object, such as a bullet or weapon, to make physical contact.52 Actionable physical injury is not restricted to fists or weapons, however. It would be an assault, for example, to injure a person by administering poison.53 More unusually, it may be assault deliberately to set off a train of events whereby a person suffers harmful contact. An assault may be committed, for example, where D has pulled out a chair underneath P, knowing that P was about to sit down, thereby causing P to fall and suffer injury.54

49 Bici v Ministry of Defence [2004] EWHC 786 (QB) (although not for the tort of assault); see also James v Campbell (1832) 5 Carrington and Payne 372; Livingstone v Ministry of Defence [1984] NI 356. 50 P Kutner, “The Prosser Myth of Transferred Intent” (2016) 91 Indiana LJ 1105; A Beever, “Transferred Malice in Tort Law?” (2009) 29 Legal Studies 400. 51 See Beals v Hayward [1960] NZLR 131 per McGregor J at 142: “deliberately firing a gun in the direction of another person is presumably done intentionally or recklessly, not caring whether the person was hurt or not, and if an act of this nature is done recklessly, that would itself amount to sufficient intention to commit an assault.” See also K Barker et al, The Law of Torts in Australia, 5th edn (2012) para 2.3.2; M Campbell, “Somerville v Harsco Infrastructure Ltd: Transferred Intent and the Scope of Vicarious Liability” (2016) 20 EdinLR 211. For similar reasoning in relation to criminal liability, see Gordon, Criminal Law para 9.10, reflecting that the need for a doctrine of transferred intention has been diminished by development of the concept of reckless injury. 52 See e.g. McLaughlin v Morrison [2013] CSOH 163, 2014 SLT 111 (driving car at pursuer); see also Hopper v Reeve (1817) 7 Taunton 698 (driving a carriage against the carriage in which the plaintiff was sitting); Dodwell v Burford (1669) 1 Modern 24 (striking a horse so as to cause it to throw the plaintiff). 53 On the criminal law, see Gordon, Criminal Law para 33.01; see also the US case of Mink v University of Chicago 460 F Supp 713 DC Ill (1978), holding that a battery action should not be dismissed where it was brought by women who had been prescribed the drug diethylstilbestrol while pregnant, without notice of the risk that it would lead to defects in their children in later life. 54 Garratt v Dailey 279 P 2d 109 (1955); Hopper v Reeve (1817) 7 Taunton 698; see also Scott v Shepherd (1773) 2 W Bl 892.

16.11

524   The Law of Delict in Scotland

16.12

As mentioned above,55 the concept of injury takes into account the affront or insult inflicted as well as the element of bodily hurt. Injury, said Bell, is constituted not only by physical damage but by the “affront and insult” that attacks a person’s dignity.56 An individual’s right to self-determination being fundamental, the delict of assault may extend to “intentional or reckless contacts with [the] person which would generally be regarded as objectionable”.57 In one early case, damages were awarded where the defender had spat upon the pursuer’s face;58 in another, the pursuer endured the indignity, as well as the physical fright, of being thrown into the waters of a harbour.59 A US court has held that the blowing of cigarette smoke directly into a person’s face might be actionable as a battery, since “tobacco smoke, as ‘particulate matter,’ has the physical properties capable of making contact”; moreover, in the case in question the gesture was designed to insult an anti-smoking campaigner and was therefore offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity.60 Thus intentional physical contact, in circumstances rendering it objectionable and offensive to dignity, constitutes an assault if the “affront” thereby inflicted is significant, even though the potential for bodily injury is slight.61 In Collins v Wilcock,62 for example, the action of a police officer in taking a restraining hold of a suspect’s arm without legitimate reason was regarded as a battery for the purposes of English law. On the other hand, the kind of trivial, if irksome, contacts to which

55 See para 16.01 above. 56 Bell, Principles § 2032. 57 F A Trindade, “Intentional Torts: Some Thoughts on Assault and Battery” (1982) 2 OJLS 211 at 237. 58 Tullis v Glenday (1834) 13 S 698. See also Cruickshanks v Forsyth (1747) Mor 4034 (blow to the head with a measuring stick (an ellwand) that caused affront but no significant injury; “though, strictly speaking, there was no damage other than the expense [of litigation], yet when a man is affronted and beat, something was thought to be due in solatium, and for encouraging persons to seek redress in this way, rather than to take it at their own hand.”) 59 Beaton v Drysdale (1819) 2 Mur 151. 60 Leichtman v WLW Jacor Communications, Inc 92 Ohio App 3d 232 at 235, 634 NE 2d 697 at 698 (1994). The plaintiff was a prominent anti-smoking campaigner and alleged that the gesture, while the parties were appearing on a television show, was “for the purpose of causing physical discomfort, humiliation and distress”. 61 See P R Glazebrook, “Assaults and their Consequences” (1986) 45 CLJ 379 at 381; F A Trindade, “Intentional Torts: Some Thoughts on Assault and Battery” (1982) 2 OJLS 211 at 237 (“intentional or reckless contacts with [the] person which would generally be regarded as objectionable”). See also American Law Institute, Restatement Second of Torts § 16(1): “If an act is done with the intention of inflicting upon another an offensive but not a harmful bodily contact, or of putting another in apprehension of either a harmful or offensive bodily contact, and such act causes a bodily contact to the other, the actor is liable to the other for a battery although the act was not done with the intention of bringing about the resulting bodily harm.” 62 [1984] 1 WLR 1172. The report in Collins in fact concerned a successful criminal appeal by the suspect, who had in turn been charged with assaulting a police officer, but the definitional issues discussed by Goff LJ, at 1177–1178, were also applicable to civil liability; cf Isaacs v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2013] EWHC 4157 (QB), in which there were reasonable grounds to suspect the claimant and the touching of his arm was therefore justified.

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people are accustomed in urban life – on crowded streets or public transport– are excluded since they neither inflict physical harm nor are likely to undermine individual dignity.63 It is a criminal offence for a person who knows himself or herself to be infected with HIV to have unprotected sexual relations with a partner without informing the partner of that infection.64 And as such conduct attracts criminal liability, it follows that it should also give rise to civil liability. Indeed, the South African courts have already recognised a civil claim on this basis.65 If a person fails to reveal to his or her partner an infection such as HIV, this does not negate consent to intercourse as such, but in terms of the criminal law there is no informed consent to the risk of transmission of the infection.66 A civil claim should similarly be available to the victim in regard to the consequences of that risk coming to pass. There is no reason in principle why such reasoning should not be extended to other similarly serious communicable diseases. The rule that one must take victims as one finds them67 applies as much to intentional assaults as to negligent injury.68 An assailant, therefore, is “not entitled to assume that the other party is in normal health”69 and must accept responsibility for the consequences of an assault which would not have affected the more robust. The “thin-skull” rule applies to psychiatric as well as physical injury resulting from the assault.70

63 See Re F [1990] 2 AC 1 per Lord Goff at 73, characterising battery as intentional physical contact going beyond that which is “generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of everyday life”; see also Wilson v Pringle [1987] QB 237 per Croom-Johnson LJ at 247–248. 64 HMA v Stephen Kelly, unreported, HCJ, 23 Feb 2001; HMA v Giovanni Mola, unreported, HCJ, 7 Feb 2007. See J Chalmers, Legal Responses to HIV and AIDS (2008) ch 6; for commentary on English law, see S Ryan, “‘Active Deception’ v Non-Disclosure: HIV Transmission, Non-Fatal Offences and Criminal Responsibility” [2019] Criminal Law Review 4. 65 Venter v Nel 1997 4 SA 1014 (D), an undefended action in which the defendant had infected the plaintiff with HIV, and the assessment of damages included medical expenses and further amounts in recognition of stress and fear, including the “fear of the unknown” (per Broome DJP at 1017). See also Doe v Johnson 817 F Supp 1382 W D Mich (1993); J A Sliker, “Misrepresentation of HIV Transmission Risk in Intimate Relationships” (2015) 9 Journal of Law and Social Deviance 242. 66 Gordon, Criminal Law para 33.49; and see also R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103, [2004] QB 1257 per Judge LJ at para 39; R v B [2006] EWCA Crim 2945, [2007] 1 WLR 1567. 67 See paras 14.38–14.40 above. 68 MacGregor v Shepherd 1946 SLT (Sh Ct) 42. Cf Rutherford v Chief Constable for Strathclyde Police 1981 SLT (Notes) 119, in which Lord Maxwell (at 120) dismissed as “altogether too speculative” the defender’s argument that damages should be reduced because treatment for the injury had uncovered an underlying illness which would have required treatment at a later date. 69 MacGregor v Shepherd 1946 SLT (Sh Ct) 42 per Sheriff-Substitute Chalmers at 43. 70 Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155; see also Boswell v Minister of Police 1978 (3) SA 268 (E) per Kannemeyer J at 274H: “Shock to [the plaintiff] is not only foreseeable, it is intended and the wrongdoer cannot be assisted by the fact that his victim is more prone or susceptible to the effect of shock than other more robust people may be.”

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D. ASSAULT: THREAT OF PHYSICAL INJURY 16.15

Even without physical injury or bodily contact, a claim may be brought by P if D’s behaviour has put P in immediate fear of hostile or objectionable physical contact, whether by D or by someone acting under D’s control.71 Although the injury in such cases is not to the physical person, the injury to the mind is also treated as constituting bodily harm.72 Adam Smith explained:73 “Not only maiming, mutilation, and such like are punishable injuries, but even the bringing a person into fear of them by any threat or menace, as the clenching a fist, the drawing of a sword or pistol. This is called an assault.”

16.16

Nineteenth-century case law included examples such as riding a horse at someone,74 or discharging a gun in a person’s direction.75 The gesture must have been such as to induce real fear, so that a threat with a realistic imitation pistol, for example, would be sufficient. It would not, however, constitute an assault if a weapon was brandished but the victim knew that it would not be used. The principle is illustrated in a well-known English case from 1669, Tuberville v Savage.76 Tuberville put his hand upon his sword, saying to Savage: “If it were not Assize time I would not take such language.” This could not be classified as an assault because it was Assize time and so this remark told Savage that the sword would not be used. In the same way, if the victim was certain of complete protection against the violence threatened, no liability would follow in respect of a threat which the victim knew could not be carried out.77 Early cases emphasised the physical dimension to threatening behaviour, so that a “physical bodily act” was required, and mere “words, or coming forward, or furious looks” did not amount to an assault.78 English 71 It is sufficient if the pursuer was “put in dread or apparent danger of bodily harm”: Hyslop v Staig (1816) 1 Mur 15 per Lord Commissioner Adam at 22; see also Stedman v Henderson (1924) 40 Sh Ct Rep 8. 72 See e.g. Bourhill v Young 1942 SC (HL) 78 per Lord Macmillan at 87. 73 Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence 119. 74 E.g. Ewing v Earl of Mar (1851) 14 D 314. 75 Ewing v Earl of Mar (1851) 14 D 314, as asserted by Lord President Boyle at 315. Note that Walker, Delict 490 cited the case of MacDonald v Robertson (1911) 27 Sh Ct Rep 103 as an instance of a “notional” assault of this nature. However, in that case, the gun was not only presented but also fired at the pursuer to his physical injury, and indeed Sheriff Sym ruled that in such circumstances the defender would be liable “if injury be so caused” (104, emphasis added). 76 [1669] 1 Mod Rep 3, 86 ER 684. 77 See e.g. Thomas v National Union of Mineworkers (South Wales Area) [1986] Ch 20, in which the plaintiffs knew that they would have adequate police protection from those threatening them. 78 Lang v Lillie (1826) 4 Mur 82 per Lord Chief Commissioner Adam at 86; see Anderson v Marshall (1835) 13 S 1130 in which Lord President Hope remarked, at 1131, that the use of insulting epithets alone would not have given grounds for an action but for the infliction of a physical blow. See also J S More, Lectures on the Law of Scotland (ed by J McLaren, 1864) vol 1, 347.

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case law suggested that a positive physical gesture was required, so that a passive act, such as blocking someone’s entrance into a room, could not constitute an assault,79 although a threat that passage would be forcibly obstructed might well be so regarded.80 More recently, however, the criminal law has recognised that the threat of aggression may be communicated by means other than physical gestures. In the English case of R v Ireland,81 for example, the House of Lords not only doubted the distinction between words and physical gestures, in terms of their potential to engender fear, but further held that a campaign of malicious silent telephone calls provided a sufficient basis for the English crime of assault where the victims had suffered psychiatric injury. It is possible that the same analysis might be applied to establish delictual liability where words or possibly silence, even if transmitted virtually, are such as to convey a sufficiently serious and plausible threat to physical safety. It was left open in Ward v Scotrail Railways Ltd82 whether a campaign of stalking, at a time shortly before the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 came into force, might give rise to delictual liability for assault. In Ward a railway ticket inspector alleged that a colleague was stalking her at work, following her, watching her and sending suggestive letters. There was no question of physical blows, but it was accepted that the pursuer’s fear of her colleague had led to nervous illness. The concept of injury, it was argued, was wide enough to encompass mental harm inflicted in this way.83 The claim was unsuccessful, however, because the court regarded the infliction of emotional distress as actionable only if it was deliberate, and the pursuer had based her case upon negligence. Nonetheless, the court also appeared to acknowledge that behaviour of this nature might well have been actionable had the case been relevantly pled, subject to the caveat that “conduct which causes a pursuer to feel fear, alarm or distress” was not to be regarded as unlawful in every instance.84 Today the surer remedy in circumstances where there has been a campaign of intimidating or distressing behaviour lies in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, discussed in chapter 28. The 1997 Act allows a victim to bring an action of harassment, offering the possibility of compensation for “anxiety”, without need to demonstrate more severe psychiatric injury.85 79 Innes v Wylie (1844) 1 C & K 257 (blocking entrance to a meeting of the Caledonian Society of London). 80 Hepburn v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2002] EWCA Civ 1841 per Sedley LJ at para 17. 81 [1998] AC 147. See in particular Lord Steyn at 162. The reasoning applied in R v Ireland was endorsed by the Scottish judge sitting in that case, Lord Hope, at 166. 82 1999 SC 255. 83 Reference was made to Walker, Delict, although the Session Cases report gives no page number, as well as to D M Walker, The Law of Damages in Scotland (1955) 555. 84 1999 SC 255 per Lord Reed at 259. 85 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 8(6). A course of conduct is required. It is only in the context of domestic abuse that a single isolated incident is sufficient to constitute harassment (s 8A).

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E. “INDIRECT ASSAULT” CAUSING AFFRONT? 16.19

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In addition to those categories of assault involving bodily injury or the threat of such injury, Walker put forward a further category of “indirect assault”, explaining: “It is doubtless equally an assault deliberately to do any act such as to take away a person’s clothes, which results in the person’s being affronted, or put in a state of alarm, or physically hurt.”86 On this view, affront is actionable not only when concomitant with the causing of alarm, physical aggression, or the threat of aggression, but also independently.87 There is little doubt that in some cases, especially where the physical attack is threatened rather than actual, the element of affront may be more significant than any element of physical injury. However, the question raised by Walker’s account is whether delictual liability for assault arises in the absence of alarm or fear of aggression, and where insult alone is the wrong that has been suffered.88 Walker offered hypothetical examples of assaults perpetrated by taking away a person’s clothes, or soiling a towel which another is expected to use.89 The authority given was the American Restatement Second of Torts.90 Scottish authority, on the other hand, is slender and not recent.91 It is true 86 Walker, Delict 492 (emphasis added). 87 Walker, Delict 490–492. 88 Neither of the earlier treatises on the Scots law of delict included a category of assault constituted by affront alone, independent of physical injury or threat: see J Guthrie Smith, The Law of Damages: A Treatise on the Reparation of Injuries (two editions, 1864 and 1889) ch 2; A T Glegg, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Reparation (four editions, 1892, 1905, 1939 and 1955) ch 5. 89 Walker, Delict 492. 90 Walker’s footnote (Delict 492 n 79) reads simply “§ 18” (on offensive contact, part of the Restatement chapter entitled “Intentional Invasions of Interests in Personality”). This example is offered in the Reporter’s notes at c) as an illustration of causing the plaintiff “to come in contact with a foreign substance in a manner which the other will reasonably regard as offensive”, a category repeated in the Reporter’s notes to the Restatement Third of Torts (Intentional Torts to Persons), Tentative Draft No 1, § 101. This is also one of the examples of different forms of iniuria which Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas 47.10.7 compiled from examples in the Digest, along with loading someone with too much wine so as to hold him up to mockery, laying hands on a free human being as though he was one’s own runaway slave, following the steps of a decent matron with lustful intent, or debauching another’s handmaiden. 91 There are no reported examples of damages being awarded in a civil case without some kind of actual or threatened physical injury, or defamatory representation: J Blackie, “Defamation”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 633 at 666. However, Sir George Mackenzie in The Laws and Customs of Scotland in Matters Criminal (1678, Stair Society vol 59 ed O F Robinson, 2012) Part I, Title 30 para 3 [223] listed an assortment of “real injuries” which might attract criminal penalty: “by hindering a man to use what is his own by removing his seat out of its place in the church, by giving a man medicaments which may affront him, by arresting his stooks [seizing his stacked sheaves] unjustly, by wearing in contempt what belongs to another man as a mark of honour, by razing shamefully a man’s hair or beard, by offering to strike him in public, or by striking him, or riving [ripping] or abusing his clothes, or his house, and many otherways related by Berlich, conclus.69” [i.e. Matthias Berlichius (1586–1638), Pars conclusionum practicabilium (Leizpig/Jena, 1651) Part 5, conc 59, ss 84–125]. In his listing of crimes, Erskine Inst 4.4.81 likewise included real injuries where a person’s honour or dignity was impugned, such as by aiming a blow or “assuming a coat of arms or any mark of distinction proper to another”.

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that in a case decided in 1851, and cited by Walker, spitting at a person was held to be an assault, even if this did not “actually take effect on his person”, but the defender had also made physical threats.92 Setting aside early instances of verbal injury,93 there are no findings of assault as such on the basis of soiled towels or other affronts to dignity without the presence of some element of physical contact or threatened danger.94 A modern example which might be regarded loosely as an “affront”, and in which one garment at least was taken away, is Henderson v Chief Constable, Fife Police.95 In that case the pursuer had not been physically threatened but was required to remove her bra while in lawful police custody. However, the terminology of indirect assault is absent from the case. Basing his analysis largely on the authority of the English case of Lindley v Rutter,96 concerning an inappropriate strip search, Lord Jauncey held this to be an “invasion of privacy and liberty”.97 As argued elsewhere in this work,98 such conduct is more logically characterised as infringing privacy alone. Overall, it is doubtful whether the modern authorities on assault would support a claim for affront where the victim has not also been hurt (in terms of physical or psychiatric injury) or subjected to intimidation,99 although a claim may of course be made on alternative grounds if another protected interest has been invaded, such as liberty or private life. On the other hand, as mentioned above, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 now provides remedies where a course of conduct consisting purely of insults has caused distress, even although no physical threat was involved.100 As well as “indirect assault”, there was in Walker’s analysis a further heading of “notional assault”.101 This included a miscellany of cases, some arising from specific physical threat such as use of a weapon, as discussed above, and others involving hostile behaviour without immediate physical danger, such as snatching papers or making a “sign or gesture of an

 92 In Ewing v Earl of Mar (1851) 14 D 314, cited Walker, Delict 490. As well as spitting, the defender rode his horse at the pursuer in such a way as to cause alarm and endanger his safety.   93 On the early history and the possibility of liability for insult as verbal injury, even where the substance of the words used was true, see E C Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law (2010) ch 6.   94 See e.g. Mackintosh v Squair (1868) 40 Scot Jur 561, 5 SLR 635, in which gesticulation and insults (such as “low scoundrel”) did not constitute assault.   95 1988 SLT 361.   96 [1981] QB 128.   97 1988 SLT 361 at 367.   98 See ch 20 below.   99 See also the definitive study by C F Amerasinghe, “The Protection of Corpus in Roman-Dutch Law” (1967) 84 South African Law Journal 56, 194, and 331, in which the factum of assault as “unlawful interference with another’s bodily integrity” (57) was subdivided into “application of force” (57) and “threat of force” (58) only. 100 See ch 28 below. 101 Walker, Delict 490–491.

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immodest nature” to a woman.102 It is difficult to make a case for regarding such “notional assaults” as a distinct category, since the heading appears to mix two other types: (i) assault in the form of physical threat, as discussed above; and (ii) “indirect assault”, meaning assault in the form of a non-physical “affront” to sensibilities, as discussed in this section. The first has no need of being qualified as “indirect”, and the second is in any event of doubtful relevance.

F. SEXUAL ASSAULTS 16.22

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Sexual assaults, including sexual exploitation of children,103 are actionable civil wrongs, and no material distinction arises between the conduct elements of the relevant criminal offences and those of the civil wrongs.104 This means, for example, that issues concerning the validity of consent, for the purposes of determining whether civil liability arises, should be approached against the background of the definitions contained in the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009.105 The question of consent in this context is discussed in detail later in the chapter.106 The non-violent enticement of a consenting adult into a sexual relationship, even where this entails breach of trust or of a professional code of conduct, is not regarded as constituting an actionable assault.107 Older textbooks mention the delict of seduction, said to be constituted by “obtaining sexual relations with a virgin by fraud, circumvention, guile, misrepresentations, or other persuasive practices and deflowering her”.108 It was said that seduction could be perpetrated only upon women, and that a man who was tricked into intercourse would have a claim only for “enticement or adultery”.109 In England the actions for seduction and enticement were abolished in 1970.110 There has been no formal abolition 102 Walker, Delict 490. The authority cited for snatching papers is Robson v School Board of Hawick (1900) 2 F 411, in which a teacher, disputing the mode of her dismissal, alleged that keys were snatched from her but did not substantiate this assertion in her pleadings. No authority is provided for immodest signs or gestures as constituting an assault. 103 A v N [2013] CSOH 161, 2014 SCLR 225, affd 2015 SLT 289, 2015 SCLR 701. 104 DC v DG and DR [2017] CSOH 5, 2018 SC 47 at para 267 (affd [2017] CSIH 72, 2018 SC 171); AR v Coxen [2018] SC EDIN 53, 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 335 at para 152. 105 Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 ss 12–17. 106 At paras 16.42ff. 107 Shields v Crossroads (Orkney) [2013] CSOH 144, 2014 SLT 190. 108 Walker, Delict 698. On the role of the historical treatment of cases with a sexual element, see J Blackie, “The Protection of Corpus in Scots Law”, in E Descheemaeker and H Scott (eds), Iniuria and the Common Law (2013) 155 at 162–167. 109 Walker, Delict 702. In addition, the spouse of a person whose affections had been diverted elsewhere was entitled to bring an action for “enticement” against the person responsible: Walker, Delict 711–713. 110 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970 s 5; for Northern Ireland, see Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 68, Sch 6.

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of the equivalent delict in Scotland. However, the most recent reported case in which damages for seduction were awarded was over a century ago,111 and it is doubtful whether such a claim would now be recognised as relevant.112 It remains the case, however, that a person entrapped into marriage with a person who is already married is entitled to damages for the injury sustained.113

G. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE USE OF FORCE (1) Self-defence Even where an assault is established to have occurred, liability may be avoided if the assailant acted in self-defence. The onus is on the assailant to prove that the force used was justified to that end.114 This contrasts with criminal proceedings, where the onus remains on the prosecution to prove that the accused intended to assault the victim, which in relevant circumstances includes proving that the accused did not do so in self-defence or by accident.115 In a civil case the defender must be able to demonstrate that the force used was reasonably proportionate to the violence shown or threatened by the pursuer.116 Use of a weapon, for example, would not normally be considered proportionate if the only threat presented was with fists,117 although the assessment of an individual’s response to attack may make allowance for “the heat of the moment”.118 In the English case of Cross v Kirby,119 for example, C attacked K with a baseball bat, inflicting trivial injuries, but K then grabbed the bat and hit C with sufficient force to

111 MacLeod v MacAskill 1920 SC 72; see also Murray v Fraser 1916 SC 623; but see Halkett v McSkeane 1962 SLT (Sh Ct) 59 per Sheriff-Substitute H S Wilson at 60, observing that if the pursuer felt “herself entitled to damages for seduction, she should have raised an action to that end”. 112 J Blackie and J Chalmers, “Mixing and Matching in Scottish Delict and Crime”, in M Dyson (ed), Comparing Tort and Crime (2015) 271 at 293. 113 Burke v Burke 1983 SLT 331 114 Bell, Principles § 2032; Walker, Delict 495. E.g. in Aitchison v Thorburn (1870) 7 SLR 347 the incident took place upon the defender’s land and the defender did no more than was necessary to disarm the pursuer of a gun. 115 Irvine v Orr 2003 SLT 1193. 116 Hallowell v Niven (1843) 5 D 759; cf McDiarmid v Barrie (1902) 18 Sh Ct Rep 47; Ashmore v Rock Steady Security Ltd [2006] CSOH 30, 2006 SLT 207; Flint v Tittensor [2015] EWHC 466 (QB), [2015] 1 WLR 4370. 117 See Dowie v Douglas (1822) 1 Shaw App 125 (responding to a push with a blow from a 20lb iron bar); Marco v Merrens 1964 SLT (Sh Ct) 74 (use of a broken bottle as a weapon was unjustified where there was other opportunity for the assailant to disengage from an “adolescent scuffle of fisticuffs”); see also Moore v MacDougall 1989 SCCR 659 (use of scissors to stab assailant was excessive in response to being punched, and self-defence not established in relation to criminal charge of assault). 118 Ashmore v Rock Steady Security Ltd [2006] CSOH 30, 2006 SLT 207 per Lord Emslie at para 23. 119 The Times, 5 April 2000.

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fracture his skull. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal held that K had acted reasonably in self-defence, as he honestly thought was necessary in the anguish of the moment. The use of force may be regarded as justified even where the defender was mistaken in believing that the pursuer presented a threat to safety, but only where it is shown that such belief was honestly and reasonably held. In another English case, Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police,120 a police officer shot and killed a man whom he mistakenly believed to have been armed. The reasonableness of that belief was questionable, since the incident took place during a dawn raid on the deceased’s home and the deceased was naked, having been woken out of his bed. Notwithstanding the officer’s acquittal on a criminal charge of murder, a civil claim for assault and battery by the victim’s family was allowed to proceed to trial, on the basis that it might be possible to defeat the plea of self-defence. In criminal proceedings a defendant was entitled to be acquitted where he or she honestly believed that it was necessary to use force in self-defence, even although that belief was mistaken. By contrast, the weight of English authority indicated that in civil proceedings the defendant had to show not only that that he or she honestly believed force to be necessary in self-defence, but also that it was reasonable so to believe. Lord Scott had “no hesitation whatever in holding that for civil law purposes an excuse of self-defence based on non existent facts that are honestly but unreasonably believed to exist must fail”.121 The position in Scots law is not settled, but it seems probable that the reasoning in Ashley would be followed, so that a plea of this nature would not succeed where the defender honestly believed that the pursuer presented a significant threat to the defender’s safety but did not have reasonable grounds for doing so.

(2) Provocation 16.28

Even if the defender exceeded the level of force acceptable as self-defence, it is possible that, in fixing the amount of damages to be awarded, consideration may be given to provocation on the part of the pursuer. Early cases required that, in civil claims for assault, the pursuer had to come to the court “pure”, and provocation was therefore treated as a “justification” for the assault.122 If there had been a prior physical attack by the pursuer, the 120 [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 AC 962. 121 [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 AC 962 at para 18. For an example where such a mistaken belief was considered to have been honestly and reasonably held, see Davis v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWHC 38 (QB). 122 Young v Allison (1820) 2 Mur 228 per Lord Chief Commissioner Adam at 231. Little discussion is to be found in 19th-century Scottish cases of ius commune writings on provocation (for which see generally C F Amerasinghe, “The Protection of Corpus in Roman-Dutch Law” (1967) 84 South African Law Journal 56 at 69).

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defender’s immediate and reasonable retaliation might be justified, with the result that there was no right of action.123 Provocation was accepted as a justification if the defender’s retaliation followed directly upon the original blow struck by the pursuer124 and was proportionate in relation to force used. Such justification was upheld in a case in the 1840s,125 for example, in which the pursuer alleged that she had been assaulted by the father of her illegitimate child, but the defender was considered to have applied no “excess of violence”, given that the pursuer had thrown handfuls of dirt and shouted abuse after seeing him in the company of another woman. By contrast, in another case the defender unsuccessfully pled provocation after assaulting the pursuer with a twenty-pound iron bar. Although the pursuer had begun the “affray” by striking the defender’s shoulder with his fist, this gesture could not justify the violent assault launched in response.126 These early cases indicated that provocation in the form of physical acts might absolve the defender altogether, since a prior physical attack removed the element of wrongfulness from the defender’s response, assuming the response was proportionate.127 Provocation that was purely verbal, on the other hand, could not justify physical blows entirely but might, if sufficiently offensive, constitute a good ground for mitigating damages,128 even to the extent that only a nominal amount was awarded.129 Since the nineteenth century there have been very few civil claims in which the defender pled provocation by words alone. No doubt this reflects a social context in which curses, once unacceptable, have lost their pungency; imprecations, such as “one of the greatest blackguards of the neighbourhood”, would hardly now be considered provocation “of the most offensive kind”.130 Nevertheless, provocation in the form of verbal insults131 or a mix of verbal aggression and physical gestures can serve to reduce the damages awarded for an assault.132 123 Miles v Finlayson (1829) 5 Mur 84. 124 Robertson v Hill (1824) 3 S 383. 125 Hallowell v Niven (1843) 5 D 759. 126 Dowie v Douglas (1822) 1 Shaw App 125. 127 See e.g. Aitchison v Thorburn (1870) 7 SLR 347, in which Sheriff Pattison declined to award damages since the pursuer had already “taken satisfaction out of the defender” (348); Miles v Finlayson (1829) 5 Mur 84 per Lord Chief Commissioner Adam at 90. 128 Seymour v M’Laren (1828) 6 S 969; Anderson v Marshall (1835) 13 S 1130; Falconer v Cochran (1837) 15 S 891; Bell, Principles § 2032; see also J Neethling et al, Neethling’s Law of Personality, 3rd edn (2019) 155–157. On the debate in ius commune writing on whether words were capable of justifying assault, see C F Amerasinghe, “The protection of Corpus in Roman-Dutch Law” (1967) 84 South African Law Journal 56 at 69, and authorities cited therein. 129 E.g. Thom v Graham (1835) 13 S 1129. 130 Thom v Graham (1835) 13 S 1129 per Lord President Hope at 1130. 131 MacGregor v Shepherd 1946 SLT (Sh Ct) 42. 132 E.g. Ross v Bryce 1972 SLT (Sh Ct) 76; Ashmore v Rock Steady Security Ltd [2006] CSOH 30, 2006 SLT 207.

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16.30

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While a number of cases raising the issue of provocation were reported in the first part of the nineteenth century, the case law has been sparse in more recent times. Perhaps under the influence of modern English authority, in which provocation serves only to reduce damages rather than to exculpate altogether,133 there is an understandable tendency to plead self-defence rather than provocation if significant physical violence was used by the pursuer. Such case law as there is affirms the survival of the defence in the modern law, and its potential to reduce the sum of damages, but casts doubt upon the usefulness of any continuing formal distinction between physical and verbal provocation. In one of the few modern cases, Ross v Bryce,134 there had been provocation in the form of verbal abuse and physical violence to the defender’s dog, Sheriff-Principal Kidd referred to earlier authorities requiring the pursuer to come to the court with “clean hands”,135 but, noting the analogy with provocation in the criminal law,136 concluded that the relative fault of both parties should be considered.137 On that basis, she upheld the sheriff’s award of damages which had been reduced by 50 per cent to reflect the degree of provocation. In another case, Ashmore v Rock Steady Security Ltd,138 damages were reduced by 20 per cent to take into account that the pursuer had subjected his assailant, a nightclub security guard, to a torrent of verbal abuse and had knocked him with his head. It is for the defender to prove the act of provocation, and that there was a direct causal connection with the response. In McLaughlin v Morrison,139 the defender drove a vehicle at the pursuer, knocking him down to his severe injury. She did so because she suspected that the pursuer had recently been involved in an attack on a public house operated by her uncle. However, she had no specific knowledge of that involvement, and her reaction could not

133 See Rutherford v Chief Constable for Strathclyde Police 1981 SLT (Notes) 119, and remarks by Lord Maxwell at 120. With regard to English law, see Murphy v Culhane [1977] QB 94. Cf, for the position in South Africa, Neethling’s Law of Personality 155–157 (provocation serves as a justification that excludes unlawfulness). See also Landry v Bellanger 851 So 2d 943 (La 2003) for discussion of Louisiana’s “aggressor doctrine”, which in the past precluded tort recovery where the plaintiff had provoked the defendant, and the elimination of the “all or nothing” recovery rules by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. 134 1972 SLT (Sh Ct) 76. 135 1972 SLT (Sh Ct) 76 at 77, citing Anderson v Marshall (1835) 13 S 1130. 136 1972 SLT (Sh Ct) 76 at 77. On provocation in the criminal law, see J Chalmers and F Leverick, Criminal Defences and Pleas in Bar of Trial (2005) paras 10.03–10.04. On connections between the defence of provocation in the criminal law and in the law of defamation (especially in the earlier conduct-oriented model of the law), see J Blackie, “Defamation”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 633 at 671. 137 See also P Q R Boberg, The Law of Delict: Aquilian Liability (1984) 837, commenting that the doctrine has a “twofold” function, reducing solatium “because the plaintiff has already in some degree compensated himself and the defendant has already in some degree been punished”. 138 [2006] CSOH 30, 2006 SLT 207. 139 [2014] CSOH 123, 2014 SLT 862

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therefore be said to have been occasioned by anything which she knew the pursuer had done. In the absence of averments as to what specific behaviour by the pursuer had operated on her mind and to what effect, provocation could not be taken into consideration.140 In any event, the defender’s response could not be said to have been reasonably proportionate141 or to have followed directly from any allegedly provocative behaviour by the pursuer.142 If a defender leaves the scene of a dispute but later returns to strike a blow at the pursuer, it is unlikely that any provocation from the earlier dispute would be deemed sufficiently proximate.143 Older authority suggesting that provocation might be constituted by the discovery of a partner’s infidelity144 cannot survive the decision in the criminal case of Drury v HM Advocate, holding that the victim’s sexual activity and the assailant’s attack were “incommensurable” elements.145

16.32

(3) Protection of property A degree of force may also be justified in defence of property.146 Physical resistance may be used against an intruder entering a house, particularly where the incident occurs in hours of darkness and theft is the apparent purpose.147 The same level of force cannot be justified in protecting open land against trespass.148 Nineteenth-century authority suggests that proportionate measures may be used to eject trespassers who refuse a request to leave land, but excessive force constitutes an assault.149 In Bell v Shand,150 it was regarded as justifiable for a lessee of shootings to grab the collar of a teenager (wrongly) suspected of poaching, drag him off, and pin

140 [2014] CSOH 123, 2014 SLT 862 per Lord Jones at para 17. 141 On the concept of proportionality in relation to the criminal defence of provocation, see Gillon v HM Advocate [2006] HCJAC 61, 2007 JC 24; see also Flint v Tittensor [2015] EWHC 466 (QB), [2015] 1 WLR 4370. 142 See Gordon, Criminal Law para 33.45 for discussion of time limits considered appropriate for provocation in relation to a criminal charge. 143 Robertson v Hill (1824) 3 S 383. 144 See M’Geever v M’Farlane 1951 SLT (Sh Ct) 27, in which the defender’s counterclaim for damages in respect of the pursuer’s seduction of her husband was lacking in specification, but the sheriff-substitute noted (at 28) that “undoubtedly” she could “plead that the circumstances reduce the assault to one for merely a nominal judgment”. 145 2001 SLT 1013 per Lord Justice-General Rodger at para 28. These could not therefore reasonably be “measured” against each other to assess whether the response was proportionate. For comment, see J Chalmers and F Leverick, Criminal Defences and Pleas in Bar of Trial (2005) para 10.05. 146 Bell, Principles § 2032. 147 Bell, Principles § 961, suggesting that the use of a “watch dog, spring gun or man trap” may even be justified. 148 See Hume, Lectures IV, 266 (suggesting that an intruder may be stopped and ordered off ground, “but should not be struck or laid hold of – or confined”); Bell, Principles § 961. 149 Wood v North British Railway Co (1899) 2 F 1. 150 Bell v Shand (1870) 7 SLR 267.

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536   The Law of Delict in Scotland

him to the ground, but in circumstances where the court doubted that the boy had been much harmed by the incident. By contrast, extreme physical force, such as shooting at suspected intruders, is clearly unacceptable in defending land151 or buildings.152

(4) Reasonable resistance to unlawful arrest 16.34

If a police officer has no lawful grounds for arrest, the officer has no reason to take hold of an individual, and the individual is entitled to resist, provided that the force used is proportionate.153 Wrongful arrest is discussed further in chapter 17.

(5) Chastisement of children? 16.35

Nineteenth-century case reports feature a number of cases brought by schoolchildren against teachers following chastisement which was barbaric by modern standards. Beatings with a cane, tawse, fist, and assorted blunt objects were not actionable unless they transgressed the boundary of “deserved” punishment.154 Even blows alleged to have resulted in paralysis155 or concussion156 were often not regarded as excessive, for it would be “injurious to the cause of education and to the discipline of schools that we should find a teacher guilty of assault”.157 Corporal punishment is now banned by statute from all schools and nursery schools so that reasonable chastisement may no longer justify a teacher hitting a child or serve as a defence in civil or criminal proceedings.158 In R (on the application of Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment159 a challenge to the ban was mounted in England by a group of parents and teachers of children at independent Christian schools, who argued that

151 MacDonald v Robertson (1911) 27 Sh Ct Rep 103 (landowner shooting at suspected poacher); McDiarmid v Barrie (1902) 18 Sh Ct Rep 47, where it was deemed unacceptable for a landowner to kick in the groin one of a group of runners who had strayed on to his land, especially as they had given details of their sports club and had agreed to pass on their way (the farmer had earlier set his dogs on the group with the instruction to “tear their guts out”). 152 Revill v Newbery [1996] QB 567 (use of force was excessive where an allotment owner fired shots at close range to ward off intruders breaking into his shed). 153 Twycross v Farrell 1973 SLT (Notes) 85; Cardle v Murray 1993 SLT 525; Kenlin v Gardiner [1967] 2 QB 510. See also McCallum v Procurator Fiscal, Edinburgh [2019] HCJAC 26, 2019 JC 125 (criminal charge of assault). 154 Muckarsie v Dickson (1848) 11 D 4. 155 Scorgie v Lawrie (1883) 10 R 610. 156 Ewart v Brown (1882) 10 R 163. 157 Scorgie v Lawrie (1883) 10 R 610 per Lord Young at 613. 158 Standards in Scotland’s Schools etc Act 2000 s 16. Corporal punishment was first banned in Scotland by virtue of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 s 48A, amended to include independent schools by the Education Act 1993 s 294. For the earlier position in independent schools, see Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom (1995) 19 EHRR 112. 159 [2005] UKHL 15, [2005] 2 AC 246.

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corporal punishment was integral to the method of teaching and education required by their faith. The prohibition was said to interfere with their right to manifest religious beliefs protected by ECHR Article 9, and to educate their children according to their right protected by Article 2 of the First Protocol. However, the House of Lords decisively rejected their application for judicial review,160 on the basis that such interference was necessary in order to protect the rights and freedoms of children. A ban on hitting children was not disproportionate in its adverse impact upon parents and teachers. Until recently a defence was similarly available in the domestic setting to the criminal offence of assault where parents or those acting in loco parentis had used physical punishment in “reasonable chastisement” of a child.161 It is now provided by statute that physical punishment of a child in the exercise of a parental right, or a right derived from having charge or care of the child, is not justifiable on such a basis and therefore constitutes a criminal assault.162 Thus violence against a child, even at the hand of a parent, opens the way not only to criminal proceedings but also, by extension, to a civil claim.163

H. EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE BY PUBLIC SERVANTS (1) The police By the very nature of their duties, some public officials must be permitted to use a degree of physical force. The police are the most obvious example. As Lord McLaren commented in Mason v Orr, “he would be a very inefficient police officer who should confine himself to speaking to people and leaving them alone if they refused to obey orders”.164 Plainly, this licence is not unlimited. In Mason v Orr Lord McLaren went on to state that a relevant case of assault could be made against a police officer by averring:165 “either (1) that the order which the officer was seeking to enforce was unlawful, that is, not within the scope of his duty; or (2) that the pursuer was willing to comply with the order, in which case the use of force would be unnecessary; or (3) that the force used was manifestly in excess of the requirements of the case.” 160 By way of a declaration that the English legislation (Education Act 1996 s 548) did not prevent a parent from delegating to a teacher in an independent school the right to administer corporal punishment. 161 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 s 51(1) (now repealed). 162 Children (Equal Protection from Assault) (Scotland) Act 2019 s 1. 163 Although claims by children against their parents are rare, there is no procedural rule which bars such actions: see Young v Rankin 1934 SC 499 (personal injuries action brought against pursuer’s father alleging negligence in a road traffic accident). 164 (1901) 4 F 220 at 223. 165 (1901) 4 F 220 at 223.

16.36

538   The Law of Delict in Scotland

16.37

16.38

In other words, the primary question in determining liability is whether the deliberate application of force was: (i) unlawful, in the sense of being outwith the scope of the officer’s duty; (ii) unnecessary; or (iii) “manifestly” excessive. A further question sometimes posed166 is whether, in addition to intentional application of force that is unlawful in the sense indicated above, malicious motive must also be established in order for an action of assault against the police to succeed.167 In this connection it is helpful to consider the distinction drawn by Lord President Normand in Robertson v Keith.168 While emphasising the importance to the public interest of protecting police officers “acting in the exercise of their duty”,169 Lord Normand left no doubt “that any unwarranted and unlawful proceeding by a public officer resulting in injury to anyone will subject him to liability, and that in such a case proof of malice and want of probable cause is not required of the pursuer”.170 The essential question is therefore whether the force used was unlawful. So in Mason v Orr171 the case brought against the police was held to be irrelevant because there was no evidence that the police officers were acting unlawfully in excess of the force required. If the use of force was warranted in itself, then it is difficult to identify circumstances in which liability might be established, although it is theoretically possible that force administered within the lawful limits but with demonstrably malicious motivation might be actionable.172 If on the other hand use of force was unlawful in the sense indicated by Lord McLaren, there is probably no requirement to prove malicious motivation. Although in Mason v Orr the Lord Ordinary’s decision on the relevancy was overturned, the First Division did not dissent from his view that an averment of malice and want of probable cause was not a necessary ingredient of liability.173 In Downie v Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police,174 police officers were shown to have used excessive force in the course of a wrongful arrest, and were found liable for assault without the question of malice being considered. For comparison purposes it may be noted that in

166 See e.g. Ward v Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police 1991 SLT 292. 167 See discussion at paras 15.10–15.12 above, setting out the two distinct meanings of malice – the generic sense, coextensive with wrongful intention, and the specific sense signifying malicious motivation. The question of the role of malice in the context of wrongful deprivation of liberty by the police is considered in chapter 17. 168 1936 SC 29. 169 1936 SC 29 at 41. 170 1936 SC 29 at 41. 171 (1901) 4 F 220. 172 See para 15.19 above. 173 (1901) 9 SLT 132 per Lord Kincairney at 132: “if assault be well averred there is no need for an averment or an issue of malice or want of probable cause; and the circumstance that the defender is a superintendent of police and was acting in that capacity at the time of the alleged assault seems to make no difference . . . [I]f it appear at the trial that in what he did he was acting in the performance of his duty and did not overstep its bounds, he will of course be entitled to a verdict.” 174 1998 SLT 8.

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English cases of alleged battery, the key issue is whether force was necessary and its use reasonable, but if it was not, there is no further requirement to establish malicious motivation.175 Nonetheless, two Scottish cases can be read as offering limited support for malice as a requirement in assault cases against the police. Both, however, arose in the context of police conduct that was ultimately judged to be lawful, so that the need for a malice requirement was uncontentious. In Ward v Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police176 the pursuers were injured when mounted police advanced into a football crowd. The court was satisfied that the actions of the police were necessary in order to disperse the disorder, and the use of force was therefore lawful, but it was apparently accepted177 without discussion that the pursuers would have required to show malice in order to succeed.178 In McKie v Orr,179 similarly, the pursuer alleged that police officers had acted oppressively in effecting her arrest on a charge of which she was later acquitted and in relation to which the evidence was discredited. Her claim that this behaviour180 constituted a series of assaults was rejected because the officers were judged to have acted lawfully within the scope of their normal duties, but again the necessity to prove malice was accepted by the parties. Importantly, neither of these cases supports a malice requirement where the disputed police conduct is deemed unlawful in terms of the criteria set out in Mason v Orr.

16.39

(2) Other officials There is no assault where transport officials use the minimum force needed to remove passengers who refuse to pay the correct fare.181 By contrast, the 175 See e.g. Chief Constable of Humberside Police v Mulloy [2002] EWCA Civ 1851, holding, per Kay LJ at para 79, “The only real question was whether, viewed overall, and in the particular context, the police exercised excessive force.” See also Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 AC 962. 176 1991 SLT 292. 177 1991 SLT 292 per Lord President Hope at 294. 178 The background to this requirement was not discussed, but the authorities cited were Robertson v Keith 1936 SC 29 and Beaton v Ivory (1887) 14 R 1057. Neither concerns assault or supports a malice requirement where the actions of the police are otherwise found to have been unlawful. In Beaton, the defender was acting within his powers as sheriff to order an arrest warrant in expansive terms, and in Robertson, the defender was acting within his powers as a police inspector in mounting a surveillance operation on the pursuer’s home. For discussion, see E Reid, “Liability for Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty” (2020) 24 EdinLR 175. 179 2003 SC 317. 180 The pursuer was arrested at her home early in the morning and taken from there to the police station. The alleged “assaults” were the actions of police officers in: insisting on watching her urinate, shower and dress; using unnecessary force to hold her arms at the charge bar; and performing an intimate body search in circumstances of inadequate privacy. 181 Highland Railway Company v Menzies (1878) 5 R 887 (a baronet was removed by the ticket inspector and two porters from a first-class carriage when he refused to replace his invalid ticket, but they did so “with propriety and becoming moderation”, per Lord Ormidale at 896); Brahan v Caledonian Railway Co (1895) 3 SLT 105.

16.40

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16.41

use of force against a passenger behaving lawfully and in possession of a valid ticket would be actionable.182 At one time, passenger litigants faced the difficulty that use of excessive force might take the official out of the scope of the official’s employment, with the result that the employer would not be vicariously liable.183 However, the modern approach to vicarious liability is that an encounter between a transport official and a passenger would almost always be regarded as having a sufficiently close connection with the official’s employment for the employer to be found vicariously liable. In Fennelly v Connex South Eastern Ltd,184 for example, a ticket inspector assaulted a passenger as he walked away, following an ill-tempered discussion about the ticket (which was acknowledged to have been in order). Although in the High Court it was held that the assault had taken place after the inspector’s duties had been concluded, the Court of Appeal found his employers liable on the basis that it was “artificial” to say that the assault was divorced from what the inspector was employed to do.185

I. CONSENT (1) The nature of consent 16.42

16.43

As a general rule physical contact is actionable only where it occurs against a person’s will; liability does not arise where the person has consented, whether expressly or by implication, to the level of contact experienced. Consent may be demonstrated by action or inaction and need not be explicitly communicated to the actor,186 but it must be genuine, knowingly given, and freely obtained. The relative status of the parties and their prior interaction is relevant to the question of consent since a position of relative weakness between the parties may undermine the exercise of free will. Where there has been a “power dependency”187 relationship between the parties, or one in which the weaker party has placed a high degree of trust in the stronger, it may be necessary to consider whether the former has freely chosen to interact with the latter. Consent is valid only to the extent given, and becomes ineffective if the level of contact exceeds that to which the person is taken to have agreed.

182 Harris v North British Railway Co (1891) 18 R 1009. See also Wood v North British Railway Co (1899) 2 F 1, where the jury was directed that if a cabdriver was not entitled to pick up passengers in a railway station, the railway employees might lawfully use force to evict him. 183 See Hanlon v Glasgow and South Western Railway Co (1899) 1 F 559 per Lord Justice-Clerk Macdonald at 561; see also Wood v North British Railway Co (1899) 1 F 562. 184 [2001] IRLR 390. 185 [2001] IRLR 390 per Buxton LJ at para 18. 186 See e.g. Cole v State Department of Public Safety and Corrections 825 So 2d 1134 (La 2002). 187 See discussion in Norberg v Wynrib [1992] 2 SCR 226 per La Forest J at paras 39–40.

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It is arguable, for example, that where parties have agreed to a one-to-one fist fight, they have impliedly consented to hostile contact, and with it the risk of minor injury, but not to excessive violence. In the English case of Lane v Holloway, Lord Denning stated that:188 “[I]n an ordinary fight with fists there is no cause of action to either of [the participants] for any injury suffered. The reason is that each of the participants in a fight voluntarily takes upon himself the risk of incidental injuries to himself . . . But he does not take on himself the risk of a savage blow out of all proportion to the occasion. The man who strikes a blow of such severity is liable in damages unless he can prove accident or self-defence.”

Thus in Marco v Merrens,189 the sheriff took the view that “a mere adolescent scuffle of fisticuffs” might initially have been consensual between the parties, but a blow struck with a broken bottle overstepped the limits of the pursuer’s consent and converted the defender’s actions into an actionable assault. In regard to sexual assault, since the elements of the civil wrong are said to correspond with the elements of criminal liability,190 issues concerning the validity of consent should be considered in the light of the definitions contained in the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009.191 These provide that free agreement to the defender’s conduct is absent in certain circumstances including intoxication, threats of violence, unlawful detention, and deception.192

16.44

(2) Burden of proof The precise role of consent within the framework of liability is open to question. In the common law tradition it has been argued that absence of consent is one of the definitional elements of trespass.193 Walker similarly stated that in Scots law “Consent . . . negatives any claim for assault”.194 On the other hand, there is conflicting English authority to the effect that

188 [1968] 1 QB 379 at 386–387. 189 1964 SLT (Sh Ct) 74 per Sheriff-Substitute Johnston at 75; see also Andrepont v Naquin 345 So 2d 1216 (La App 1 Cir 1977). 190 DC v DG and DR [2017] CSOH 5, 2018 SC 47 at para 267 (affd [2017] CSIH 72, 2018 SC 171); AR v Coxen [2018] SC EDIN 53, 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 335 at para 152. 191 The relevant provisions are ss 12–17. 192 Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 s 13(2). 193 J Goudkamp, Tort Law Defences (2013) 67, although this view is expressed “tentatively”. See also Freeman v Home Office [1984] QB 524 per McCowan J at 539, stating that in regard to medical liability there was “no tort” where the plaintiff was unable to show lack of consent. 194 Walker, Delict 496, although no authority was cited; see also American Law Institute, Restatement Third of Torts (Intentional Torts to Persons), Tentative Draft No 1, § 101, comment f: “Actual consent eliminates the wrongfulness of the actor’s otherwise tortious intentional conduct.”

16.45

542   The Law of Delict in Scotland

16.46

consent in relation to battery functions merely as a defence,195 and this approach is supported by case law from Canada196 and Australia.197 While this question remains open, it poses a practical problem as to where the onus of proof should lie: is it for the pursuer to establish absence of consent as a fundamental element of the delict of assault, or for the defender to prove the existence of consent as a defence? Recent commentary points to persuasive policy considerations in support of the latter alternative, arguing that the importance of the right to physical integrity means that the burden of proof should rest upon the defence.198 In the context of a violent physical assault the question of onus of proof may of course be academic, since absence of consent would typically be difficult to deny and straightforward to prove in equal measure. The issue is more problematic in other contexts, including sexual assaults and consent to medical treatment. The stance adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in relation to sexual assault is that the onus is placed upon the defendant, since:199 “To require a plaintiff in an action for sexual battery to prove that she did not consent or that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would not have thought she consented, would be to deny the protection the law has traditionally afforded to the inviolability of the body in the situation where it is perhaps most needed and appropriate.”

16.47

However, this approach has not been matched in the Scottish courts. In two recent cases, one in the Outer House200 and another in the sheriff court,201 it was accepted that the onus of proof rested with the pursuer to prove all the constituent elements of sexual assault, including the defender’s absence of reasonable belief in consent. However, in both cases the question of onus of proof appeared to have been a matter of agreement between the parties, and the matter was not discussed in any depth. Similarly, where a patient claims that medical treatment constituted an assault or battery, the Canadian202 and Australian203 courts generally look 195 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172 per Goff LJ at 1177. 196 Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1 per Laskin CJC at para 10; Norberg v Wynrib [1992] 2 SCR 226; Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s of London v Scalera [2000] 1 SCR 551. 197 Department of Health & Community Services v JWB and SMB (1992) 175 CLR 218 per McHugh J at 310–311. 198 Clerk and Lindsell on Torts para 14.93; Fleming, Law of Torts para 5.30. See also Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s of London v Scalera [2000] 1 SCR 551, discussing the “settled rule” in Canadian law that a plaintiff in a battery action need not prove the absence of consent. 199 Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s of London v Scalera [2000] 1 SCR 551 per McLachlin J at para 22. 200 DC v DG and DR [2017] CSOH 5, 2018 SC 47, affd [2017] CSIH 72, 2018 SC 171. 201 AR v Coxen [2018] SC EDIN 53, 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 335. 202 Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1; Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s of London v Scalera [2000] 1 SCR 551 per McLachlin J at para 6. 203 Department of Health & Community Services v JWB and SMB (1992) 175 CLR 218; but see discussion in White v Johnston [2015] NSWCA 18 where the plaintiff alleged consent to have been vitiated by fraud.

Interference with Bodily and Mental Integrity   543

to the medical professional to establish that relevant consent was given. The English courts, on the other hand, have required absence of consent to be proved by the claimant.204 Given the intensified focus upon patient autonomy in assessing standard of care in negligence law,205 some have argued that this position might usefully be reconsidered,206 but this particular issue has not so far been revisited in the courts.

(3) Consent and sport In certain sports, players necessarily expect to come into physical contact with others on the field, and that from time to time this will cause injury. This applies particularly to team sports such as rugby or football, where force is inevitable and broken limbs not unusual. It can be taken that participants consent to a certain level of physical contact,207 but since such consent is almost always implicit and non-reflective, the boundaries can be difficult to determine. Plainly, there is no blanket consent to all risks that may arise, but rather an acceptance of those risks inherent in the sport in question.208 Contact is consensual where it is “incidental” to the game209 or “within the spirit and intendment of the rules of that game or sporting contest”.210 Players are not taken to accept that their opponents may “act in flagrant disregard of the rules and practice of the sport”.211 For example, in Lewis v Buckpool Golf Club,212 one of the few Scottish cases, the court rejected the idea that the golf-playing victim had, by stepping on to the golf course, impliedly consented to the risk of injury from “flying golfballs”. However, it was accepted that this “kind of argument might be appropriate in relation to rough games such as boxing, football or motor racing”.213 204 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432; Freeman v Home Office [1984] QB 524. There is no Scottish authority directly in point in relation to civil liability for intentional injury by a doctor. 205 As seen in particular in assessing standard of care as regards disclosure of risk, as in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63. 206 At least in circumstances where the patient alleges that consent had been withdrawn: see R Heywood and J Miola, “The Changing Face of Pre-Operative Medical Disclosure: Placing the Patient at the Heart of the Matter” (2017) 133 LQR 296 at 317. 207 Walker, Delict 497. 208 A Duff, “Civil Actions and Sporting Injuries Sustained by Professional Footballers” 1994 SLT (News) 175 at 176; also S Yeo, “Accepted Inherent Risks among Sporting Participants” (2001) 9 Tort Law Review 114. The concept of “inherent risks” can be traced to the Australian case of Rootes v Shelton (1967) 116 CLR 383. They are described by Barwick CJ at 385 as risks “accepted by those who engage in the sport”. 209 Walker, Delict 497. 210 Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 1) [1976] VR 331 per McInerney J at 339; see also Blake v Galloway [2004] EWCA Civ 814, [2004] 1 WLR 2844 per Dyson LJ at para 24 (no liability for battery where “the offending missile was thrown more or less in accordance with the tacit understandings or conventions of the game”). 211 See A Duff, “Civil Actions and Sporting Injuries Sustained by Professional Footballers” 1994 SLT (News) 175 at 177. 212 1993 SLT (Sh Ct) 43, although given that the conduct reflected lack of skill rather than intention to harm, liability was established in negligence, not for the intentional delict of assault. 213 1993 SLT (Sh Ct) 43 at 46.

16.48

544   The Law of Delict in Scotland

16.49

16.50

In the heat of competition the rulebook is not always fastidiously observed, so that some degree of wayward or foul play is not uncommon.214 Yet it would be impractical to attach civil liability to every infringement of the rules. A distinction may be drawn between rules that are targeted at protecting the safety of participants, and those which are designed to secure the better playing of the game as a test of skill.215 Participants may be more readily regarded as having accepted the risk of infringement of the latter as compared with the former, but even then, von Bar suggests, only “gross fouls”216 should lie beyond the scope of consent. Another commentator has suggested that consent to risk should not be taken to encompass play which is “intentionally outside the safety rules of the game”, “involves the intentional or reckless infliction of physical harm”, and is “underpinned by a motivation unrelated to the playing of the game”.217 This would include illegal moves designed to “soften up” an opponent, take revenge, or prevent the opponent from scoring.218 Examples of players being held liable for intentional fouls are certainly rare, but would include striking a blow in an off-the-ball incident219 or violence towards an opponent not actively involved in play.220 Chapter 10 considers the relevant standard of care when participants in sport are alleged to have been negligent in their conduct towards fellow players or spectators.221

(4) Consent and medical procedures 16.51

Any deliberate invasion of bodily integrity is actionable where it goes beyond the minimal, and where there is no lawful justification or consent.222 In this connection, the right of adults of sound mind to determine whether or not to submit to medical treatment has been described as “absolute”.223

214 As pointed out by the defendant in McNamara v Duncan (1971) 26 ALR 584. 215 See Restatement Second of Torts § 50, Comment b. 216 C von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts (2000) vol 2, para 513 [539]. 217 N Cox, “Civil Liability for Foul Play in Sport” (2003) 54 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 351 at 373. 218 Cox, “Civil Liability for Foul Play in Sport” 372. 219 E.g. McNamara v Duncan (1971) 26 ALR 584 (deliberate blow to the plaintiff’s head, apparently to get him out the way). 220 E.g. Overall v Kadella 138 Mich App 351, 361 NW 2d 352 (1984) (liability for intentional battery when the defendant went over to benches after ice hockey game and struck a member of opposing team); cf Unruh v Webber (1992) 98 DLR (4th) 294 (an ice-hockey player “checked” the plaintiff from behind, recklessly knowing the move to be dangerous (the plaintiff’s neck was broken), but without intention to harm – liability found in negligence rather than for battery). 221 See paras 10.51–10.56 above. 222 Reibl v Hughes [1980] 2 SCR 880 (SCC) per Laskin CJC at 890. 223 In Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 per Lord Donaldson MR at 102. See also YF v Turkey (2004) 39 EHRR 34. For discussion of those circumstances in which treatment may be justified to prevent harm to others, see A M Maclean, Autonomy, Informed Consent and Medical Law: A Relational Challenge (2009) 153–154.

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A patient’s consent “renders lawful that which would otherwise be unlawful”;224 conversely, a procedure imposed upon a patient without consent may amount to assault.225 Where a patient withdraws consent to ongoing treatment, for example the maintenance of life-support systems, its continuation similarly constitutes an assault upon the patient.226 If liability is to be avoided, the patient must freely consent to the general nature of the procedure proposed and the doctor’s conduct must remain within the scope of that consent.227 A medical professional who uses deception to obtain consent for an invasive procedure commits an assault on the patient,228 as does the professional who performs a procedure different from and unrelated to that to which the patient has agreed.229 Where a patient lacks permanently the capacity to make decisions regarding medical treatment, the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 confers on the medical practitioner primarily responsible for that person’s care, and on other medical professionals such as dentists and opticians, “authority to do what is reasonable in the circumstances . . . to safeguard or promote the physical or mental health of the adult”.230 If a patient is unconscious, intoxicated or otherwise temporarily incapable of giving consent, necessity justifies the administering of treatment which cannot reasonably be delayed until the patient recovers capacity.231 Lifesaving treatment may thus be administered without consent to a patient

224 Law Hospital NHS Trust v Lord Advocate 1996 SC 301 per Lord President Hope at 306. 225 Re F [1990] 2 AC 1 per Lord Goff at 73; see also Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital 211 NY 125, 105 NE 92 (1914) per Justice Cardozo at 129–130 (injury suffered, as a consequence of a surgical operation, by patient who had stated that she did not wish to be operated upon). See also M Earle and N R Whitty, “Medical Law”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2006) para 248; Thomson v Devon (1899) 15 Sh Ct Rep 209 per Sheriff Berry at 218; Craig v Glasgow Victoria and Leverndale Hospitals Board of Management, unreported, 1976, discussed in J Blackie, Scotland report, in E Deutsch and H L Schreiber (eds), Medical Responsibility in Western Europe (1985) 555 at 578–579. 226 Re B (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam), [2002] 2 All ER 449; In Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95; cf X NHS Trust v T (Refusal of medical treatment) [2004] EWHC 1279 (Fam), [2005] 1 All ER 387, in which the patient was judged to have lacked capacity properly to make decisions regarding essential blood transfusions. See discussion in G T Laurie et al, Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, 11th edn (2019) paras 4.29–4.40. 227 See Hussain v Houston 1995 SLT 1060 concerning a doctor’s unsuccessful appeal against a criminal charge of assault. In three instances he had examined the private parts of female patients who had consulted him with complaints unrelated to their genitalia. Such contact clearly went beyond the limits of the consent given by the patients. 228 Appleton v Garrett [1996] PIQR P1 (dentist needlessly performing complex treatment on healthy teeth). 229 Schweizer v Central Hospital (1974) 53 DLR (3d) 494 (surgeon operated on spine of patient who had consented to minor surgery to toe). See also M Earle and N R Whitty, “Medical Law”, in SME Reissue (2006) para 252. 230 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 s 47(1), (2). 231 See discussion by Lord Goff in In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 73–78; see also G T Laurie et al, Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, 11th edn (2019) paras 4.08–4.13.

16.52

16.53

16.54

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16.55

who has lost consciousness in an accident or other sudden emergency. More difficult issues arise if the patient has been rendered unconscious in order to undergo a particular type of surgical procedure, in the course of which the surgeon discovers a different complaint. There is no clear dividing line between those circumstances in which the surgeon may act immediately and those in which the procedure should be postponed until the patient’s further consent can be obtained. In one of the few Scottish cases on this subject, Craig v Glasgow Victoria and Leverndale Hospitals Board of Management,232 a patient had agreed to an operation to remove a cyst, but the doctor discovered that the growth was a tumour and removed it, a procedure which carried significantly greater risk. Afterwards the patient argued his consent was to be limited within the scope of the diagnosis received before the operation, but the court held that his permission for “any operation the surgeon considers necessary” was wide enough to encompass any procedure related to removal of the growth. This case, however, is several decades old. It has been suggested that the approach adopted there does not go far enough to protect modern notions of patient autonomy, and that a more restrictive approach to the boundaries of consent is now likely to be adopted.233 Medical professionals owe a duty of care to inform patients appropriately before obtaining their consent to medical procedures. That consent may be vitiated by fraud or misdescription, but if the patient “knew in broad terms what he was consenting to”,234 the negligent provision of erroneous or insufficient information does not invalidate consent to the extent that the subsequent treatment is to be regarded as an assault. However, in omitting to warn the patient properly of risk the medical practitioner may be regarded as having failed in his or her duty of care towards the patient, and liability may therefore arise in negligence. The criteria by which the medical practitioner’s conduct is judged for such purposes are discussed further in chapter 11.235

(5) Contributory negligence? 16.56

Even if consent is not established, the question arises whether the defence of contributory negligence might be upheld in relation to an assault, in terms of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. That question was raised in a recent Scottish assault case, but left open since it was apparent

232 Unreported, 1976, discussed in J Blackie, Scotland report, in E Deutsch and H L Schreiber (eds), Medical Responsibility in Western Europe (1985) 555 at 578–579. 233 M Earle and N R Whitty, “Medical Law”, in SME Reissue (2006) para 252; see also G T Laurie et al, Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, 11th edn (2019) paras 10.12–10.13, contrasting Craig with Williamson v East London and City Health Authority [1998] Lloyd’s Rep Med 6, (1998) 41 BMLR 85. 234 Freeman v Home Office [1984] QB 524 per McCowan J at 537. 235 See paras 11.45–11.53 above.

Interference with Bodily and Mental Integrity   547

that the pursuer’s conduct had not contributed to his injury.236 However, in England the Court of Appeal has stated plainly that, contrary to some earlier authorities,237 the defence of contributory negligence is not available in cases of assault or battery.238 It is strongly arguable that in Scotland also the wording of the 1945 Act does not allow contributory negligence to be taken into consideration in cases of intentional wrongs.239 Indeed this was the view taken in a recent Scottish case involving fraudulent misrepresentation.240 The 1945 Act provides that contributory negligence reduces the amount of compensation payable where a person has suffered damage partly as a result of the person’s own “fault” and partly as a result of the “fault” of others.241 “Fault” is defined broadly as meaning “wrongful act, breach of statutory duty or negligent act or omission which [1] gives rise to liability in damages, or [2] would apart from this Act, give rise to the defence of contributory negligence” (numerals added).242 In other words, the definition of fault comprises two alternatives,243 only the second of which can apply to pursuers (since the question is of the defender’s liability in damages, not the pursuer’s). This means that fault on the pursuer’s part is limited to conduct which would, but for the Act, have given rise to the defence of contributory negligence. Before the 1945 Act came into force, the general rule in England was that contributory negligence did not operate as a defence for intentional torts, even where the plaintiff had not behaved blamelessly in the interaction with the defendant, and the doctrine was understood and applied in the same way in Scotland.244 The wording of 236 McLaughlin v Morrison [2014] CSOH 123, 2014 SLT 862; see also J Blackie and J Chalmers, “Mixing and Matching in Scottish Delict and Crime”, in M Dyson (ed), Comparing Tort and Crime (2015) 271 at 313. 237 In particular Murphy v Culhane [1977] QB 94. 238 Pritchard v Co-operative Group Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 329, [2012] QB 320; see also Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp [2002] UKHL 43, [2003] 1 AC 959 per Lord Rodger at para 45. 239 See G L Williams, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence (1951) § 55, and the detailed explanation of the meaning of fault in § 76 with implications for torts of wrongful intention spelled out at n 3. 240 Kidd v Paull and Williamsons LLP [2017] CSOH 16, 2018 SC 193. See also Burke v Burke 1983 SLT 331, rejecting the suggestion that the pursuer might have been contributorily negligent in regard to her entrapment into marriage. 241 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 s 1(1). 242 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 s 5(a). 243 See Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360 per Lord Hope at 382; Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp [2002] UKHL 43, [2003] 1 AC 959 per Lord Hoffmann at para 11. 244 Although some early cases referred in general terms to “culpa” on the part of the defender, the reported cases seem all to have involved negligence. As Guthrie Smith commented (Damages 35): “Contributory negligence always assumes that the defender has been guilty of negligence.” See also H McKechnie, “Negligence”, in Dunedin Encyclopaedia, vol 10 (1930) paras 594–602. McKechnie traces the origin of the common law defence to cases involving the alleged negligence of road trustees (Maclachlan v Road Trs (1827) 4 Mur 216), and explains it, under reference to Robinson v Hamilton (Motors) Ltd 1923 SC 838 per Lord President Clyde at 841, as “negligence on the part of a pursuer which is itself jointly causative of the accident along with the negligence of the defender”.

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16.58

the 1945 Act therefore indicates that, under the statutory regime likewise, contributory negligence is not to be considered a defence to intentional delicts, in England or in Scotland. Prior dealings between the parties may be considered to the extent of assessing whether the pursuer provoked the defender or consented to physical contact,245 but considerations of contributory negligence are inapplicable to liability for assault.246 On the other hand, there is nothing in the wording of the 1945 Act that is inconsistent with the operation of contributory negligence where it is alleged that the defender acted negligently, but the pursuer’s intentional conduct has contributed to the occurrence of harm.247

J. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF MENTAL HARM 16.59

16.60

The concept of injury encompasses invasion of mental integrity as well as physical integrity. If an assault is inflicted by physical contact or the threat of physical contact, damages may be recovered for resultant psychiatric harm as well as for physical injury and associated affront. But even in the absence of physical contact, or threat of contact, liability may arise in certain circumstances where D has intentionally inflicted mental harm upon P. As Walker observed, “it is as much actionable deliberately to shock a person as to affront or insult or assault him physically”.248 There is little Scottish authority to indicate the precise circumstances in which common law249 liability arises when the injury suffered takes the form of mental harm alone.250 There have been no cases directly in point,251 although courts have in the past252 cited with approval the leading English 245 See also Flint v Tittensor [2015] EWHC 466 (QB), [2015] 1 WLR 4370 per Edis J at para 29, to the effect that, in regard to battery, issues of the claimant’s interaction with the defendant should be dealt with by reference to the concept of consent, rather than by applying the doctrine of volenti non fit iniuria, which is more properly applied to breach of duty. 246 See also G L Williams, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence (1951) § 55 on “the ordinary human feeling that the defendant’s wrongful intention so outweighs the plaintiff’s negligence as to efface it altogether”. 247 Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360. 248 Walker, Delict 670. 249 Statutory liability for causing anxiety and distress may occur where this arises from a course of conduct within the meaning of “harassment” as per the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, discussed in ch 29 below. 250 See Robertson v Scottish Ministers [2007] CSOH 186 per Lord Emslie at paras 14–19. 251 In Ward v Scotrail Railways Ltd 1999 SC 255, discussed at para 16.17 above, dicta by Lord Reed at 259 suggest that the intentional infliction of emotional distress alone might be actionable, but in the case itself the defender’s employee’s behaviour was perceived by the pursuer as “harassment” threatening physical safety. 252 See A v B’s Trs (1906) 13 SLT 830 per Lord Johnston at 832 (describing the judgment in Wilkinson as “sound”, although in the Scottish case the actionable wrong which had induced the shock was breach of contract); Bourhill v Young 1942 SC (HL) 78 per Lord Porter at 100 (acknowledging, by reference to Wilkinson, that “shock occasioned by deliberate action affords a valid ground of claim”).

Interference with Bodily and Mental Integrity   549

case of Wilkinson v Downton,253 in which an ill-judged practical joke (the defendant told the plaintiff that her husband had broken both legs in a serious accident) provoked a nervous shock of such severity as to induce significant physical illness. Perhaps understandably, in an era when psychiatric illness was understood only imperfectly, the emphasis in Wilkinson was upon the physical consequences produced by shock rather than on the shock itself.254 However, more recent English cases have continued to reject the existence of a tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm, in the absence of physical injury, unless recognised psychiatric illness has resulted.255 In O v Rhodes the Supreme Court took the opportunity to review the case law flowing from Wilkinson v Downton and concluded that liability in tort required a combination of the following:256 “(a) the conduct element requiring words or conduct directed at the claimant for which there is no justification or excuse, (b) the mental element requiring an intention to cause at least severe mental or emotional distress, and (c) the consequence element requiring physical harm or recognised psychiatric illness.”

The circumstances of O v Rhodes could hardly have been more different from those of Wilkinson v Downton. In the first place, an injunction, rather than damages, was sought. The claimant was a “psychologically vulnerable” eleven-year-old child whose parents were divorced. The child’s mother brought the action on his behalf in order to prevent the defendant, his father, from publishing memoirs graphically detailing the experiences of abuse that the father had experienced during his schooldays. It was argued that the child would suffer psychiatric harm were he to learn of the disturbing content of the book. Holding that the three elements above were not satisfied, the Supreme Court lifted an interim injunction granted

253 [1897] 2 QB 57. See also Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 KB 316; and the South African case of Boswell v Minister of Police 1978 3 SA 268 (E) per Kannemeyer J at 273E–F: “Had a person suffered actual physical injury resulting in the sequelae experienced by the plaintiff his injury would have been a substantial one of appreciable duration. The position cannot be different merely because the impairment of health resulted from nervous shock and not from actual physical injury.” 254 Mrs Wilkinson suffered a “violent shock to her nervous system, producing vomiting and other more serious and permanent physical consequences at one time threatening her reason”: [1897] 2 QB 57 per Wright J at 58. In a later case involving intentional infliction of shock, Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 KB 316, the emphasis was similarly on the physical consequences – “neurasthenia, shingles, and other ailments”. 255 Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721, [2003] 3 All ER 932 per Hale LJ at paras 11–12 (no tort without “recognised psychiatric illness”); cf Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406, in which Lord Hoffmann stated, at paras 44–47, that Wilkinson itself did not provide a remedy for distress falling short of recognised psychiatric injury, but appeared to leave open the possibility that intentional causation of distress might be actionable. 256 [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] AC 219 per Lady Hale at para 88. For detailed commentary, see P-Y Chang, Intentional Infliction of Mental Harm, PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh (2019).

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by the Court of Appeal, thereby allowing publication to go ahead.257 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to consider each of the elements of the tort in general terms.

(1) The conduct element 16.62

16.63

16.64

The court in O v Rhodes did not elaborate on the type of “words or conduct” that trigger liability. It was accepted that the defendant might be answerable for conduct that was “deceptive”, “threatening”, or “abusive”, although this did not exhaust all the possibilities.258 There was “something to be said” for requiring the disputed conduct to have been “outrageous”, “flagrant” or “extreme”, in order to discourage undue interference with “the give and take of ordinary human discourse (including unpleasant, heated arguments, whether in domestic, social, business or other contexts, sometimes involving the trading of insults or threats)” or “normal, including trenchant, journalism and other writing”.259 However, whether or not the conduct was to be viewed as sufficiently egregious ultimately depended upon context.260 In the case in hand, Rhodes’ actions in releasing his memoirs to a general readership could not be regarded as offensive to that degree. They provide an obvious contrast with the conduct seen in C v WH,261 decided shortly after O v Rhodes, in which liability arose on the part of a male teacher who emotionally manipulated an underage female pupil, encouraging her to send indecent images of herself to him and engage in sexual banter – conduct that was clearly abusive of the teacher-pupil relationship. Little detail was provided in O v Rhodes as to the considerations that might justify otherwise reprehensible conduct. Certainly it is difficult, although not impossible, to conceive of sufficiently persuasive justifications in relation to threats of violence and abuse.262 And it was self-evident

257 Instrumental: A Memoir of Madness, Medication and Music by James Rhodes was published by Canongate Books in October 2015. 258 [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] AC 219 per Lady Hale at para 77. 259 [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] AC 219 per Lord Neuberger at paras 110–111. 260 [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] AC 219 per Lord Neuberger at para 111. 261 [2015] EWHC 2687 (QB), [2016] PIQR Q2. But cf Shields v Crossroads (Orkney) [2013] CSOH 144, 2014 SLT 190, decided not long before O v Rhodes, in which the actions of a social worker in enticing a vulnerable adult client into a sexual relationship, thereby injuring her mental health, were not judged to be sufficiently egregious to constitute an actionable wrong. 262 E.g. in Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 KB 316 the defendants were private detectives who attempted to coerce the plaintiff into obtaining for them letters belonging to a friend of her employer. They did so by telling her that they were police officers and that they would expose her correspondence with a German spy (her fiancé was German but he was not a spy). Wilkinson v Downton was followed and defendants held liable for the severe “shock” which the plaintiff suffered. However, following the framework in O v Rhodes, if the defendants had been police officers, it is arguable that the interests of detection of crime and national security might be put forward as a justification for this threat. For comment, see P-Y Chang, Intentional Infliction of Mental Harm, PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh (2019) para 2.3222.

Interference with Bodily and Mental Integrity   551

that the purposes of amusement served by the defendant’s lie in Wilkinson v Downton263 were not appropriate justification. By contrast, the interests of freedom of expression served by publication of Rhodes’ memoirs were undoubtedly more deserving. In O v Rhodes the court placed the burden of proof on the claimant to prove all the elements of this tort, including the absence of “justification or reasonable excuse” for the disputed conduct.264 That burden was not discharged where Rhodes’ interest in telling his story to the world was supported by broader considerations of freedom of expression.265 By contrast, in cases such as C v WH,266 where it was hard to imagine any plausible justification being put forward for the abusive and exploitative conduct on the claimant’s part, the proposition that it was unjustifiable can be readily accepted as self-evident.

16.65

(2) The mental element In O v Rhodes this tort was said to require a particular “mental element” on the part of the defendant. Intention was not simply to be “imputed” to the defendant from the occurrence of injury.267 Moreover, it was not sufficient that the defendant had been reckless to the risk of harm,268 and in this a distinction may be drawn from some of the cases of physical assault discussed above.269 Intention had to be established as a matter of fact, although in the absence of direct evidence, this state of fact might be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.270 However, in order to achieve a “just balance”, the Supreme Court allowed that where the claimant had indeed suffered physical harm or recognised psychiatric illness, the claimant needed to show only that the defendant intended to cause “at least severe mental or emotional distress” – not that the psychiatric illness itself was intended.271 This means that in many cases the mental element is apt to be readily established. Even if intention cannot be imputed, the circumstances surrounding most behaviour satisfying the conduct element of this tort272 are highly likely to yield the inference that the defender at least intended severe distress. In O v Rhodes there was little basis in the evidence for inferring that in publishing his memoirs to the general public the defendant specifically intended to cause distress to his son. The 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272

[1897] 2 QB 57; see para 16.60 above. [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] AC 219 per Lady Hale at para 74. [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] AC 219 per Lady Hale at paras 76–77. [2015] EWHC 2687 (QB), [2016] PIQR Q2. [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] AC 219 per Lady Hale at para 81. [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] AC 219 per Lady Hale at para 87. See para 16.08 above. [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] AC 219 per Lady Hale at paras 81 and 85. [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] AC 219 per Lady Hale at para 87. See para 16.62 above.

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requisite mental element was not therefore made out. In this respect also a contrast may be drawn with C v WH, in which the necessary mental element could be readily inferred where the defendant’s conduct was targeted specifically at the claimant and it would have been “entirely obvious” to him that grooming her in this way would ultimately cause harm to a vulnerable young girl.273 On the other hand, such an inference may not be drawn if the surrounding circumstances provide adequate evidence of benign intent at a subjective level. In Brayshaw v Partners of Apsley Surgery,274 for example, the claimant suffered an adverse psychological reaction after her general practitioner responded to her evident need for medical help with numerous psychiatric and medical problems by a sustained campaign of proselytisation, attempting to inculcate her into the practices of his evangelical church. The doctor’s conduct was found to be unprofessional, rendering him liable in negligence, but it was accepted that his subjective intention was to promote the claimant’s well-being by addressing her spiritual health.275 The mental element required to establish liability was not therefore made out.

(3) The consequence element 16.68

16.69

According to O v Rhodes, liability arises only if the consequence of the defendant’s conduct is physical harm or recognised psychiatric illness.276 As in the law of negligence, “stand-alone” mental harm is not actionable unless a diagnosis is provided in these terms; distress or anxiety which falls short of such a diagnosis does not form the basis for a claim unless it derives from injury to another primary interest. It should be said, however, that in O v Rhodes the court reached the conclusion that the conduct element and the mental element were not in any event satisfied, and accordingly there was little by way of detailed discussion of the consequence element, which was simply said to be “common ground”.277 It was left for Lord Neuberger, who differed from the majority on this point, to pick up on Lord Hoffmann’s observation in Wainwright v Home Office278 that “the policy considerations which limit the heads of recoverable damage in negligence do not apply equally to torts of intention”. Lord Neuberger argued that, in an intentional tort such as this, where intent to cause distress is one of the essential elements, it should be enough for the claimant to establish that he or she suffered “significant distress as a result 273 274 275 276

[2015] EWHC 2687 (QB), [2016] PIQR Q2 per Sir Robert Nelson at para 89. [2018] EWHC 3286 (QB), [2019] 2 All ER 997. [2018] EWHC 3286 (QB), [2019] 2 All ER 997 per Spencer J at para 58. [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] AC 219 per Lady Hale at para 73. See e.g. C v WH [2015] EWHC 2687 (QB), [2016] PIQR Q2, in which the claimant’s psychiatric condition received a formal diagnosis in terms of ICD10-F43.2. (On classification of mental disorders, see para 6.04 above.) 277 [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] AC 219 per Lady Hale at para 73. 278 [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406 at para 44.

Interference with Bodily and Mental Integrity   553

of the defendant’s conduct”. He was not persuaded that it was necessary to restrict the ambit of liability to the extent endorsed by the majority, since in any event the narrow restrictions entailed in the other two elements would mean that the tort was rarely invoked.279 However, in no subsequent case has liability been established for the intentional infliction of distress falling short of a recognised psychiatric condition. While O v Rhodes suggests that common law liability for intentional infliction of mental harm arises only where recognised psychiatric illness is suffered, in circumstances where a victim suffers distress falling short of recognised psychiatric injury a remedy may be found under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, subject to the requirement that this follows from a course of conduct rather than a single incident.280

16.70

(4) The Scottish position There has been no statement from the Scottish courts as to the applicability of English authority since the decision of the Supreme Court in O v Rhodes.281 However, there was no dispute that Wilkinson v Downton282 was relevant authority in Scottish cases,283 and the 2017 Scottish Law Commission Report on Defamation assumed that the Scottish courts would be prepared to accept the reformulation in O v Rhodes, with its three essential elements.284 It is possible that there might be sympathy north of the border for Lord Neuberger’s observations in O v Rhodes that evidence of severe distress, short of psychiatric injury as such, should be sufficient to trigger liability.285 In Rorrison v West Lothian College, for example, Lord Reed held that “psychological distress” short of psychiatric injury was not actionable if negligently inflicted, apparently leaving open the possibility that less serious injury might suffice if harm was intentional.286 Moreover, the Scottish Law Commission, in its 2004 Report on Damages for Psychiatric Injury,287 defined “mental harm” broadly as meaning “any harm to a person’s mental state,

279 For further discussion of this point, see P-Y Chang, Intentional Infliction of Mental Harm, PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh (2019) ch 4. 280 See ch 28 below. 281 [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] AC 219. 282 [1897] 2 QB 57; see para 16.60 above. 283 See e.g. Walker, Delict 670. 284 Scot Law Com No 248 (2017) para 2.7. 285 See para 16.69 above. 286 2000 SCLR 245 at 250: “The action being based on negligence, the pursuer can recover only if she has sustained psychiatric injury in the form of a recognised psychiatric illness.” But cf G v S [2006] CSOH 88, 2006 SLT 795 per Lord Turnbull at para 18 to the effect that, outwith the specific context of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 8, “a claim for damages arising out of anxiety would not normally sound in damages”. 287 Scot Law Com No 196 (2004).

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mental functioning or mental well-being whether or not it amounts to a medically recognised mental disorder”.288 Moreover, the Bill proposed by the Report restricted recovery in negligence to foreseeable or “recognised mental disorder”,289 but placed no such limitation upon recovery for intentionally inflicted mental harm.290 However, the recommendations contained in the 2004 Report are unlikely now to be implemented,291 and, as discussion above has shown, there is little direct authority in the common law to support an entitlement to solatium in cases where bodily injury in some form has not been either inflicted or threatened.292

K. INFRINGEMENT OF REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY 16.73

In addition to the traditional rights of the person, there is growing acknowledgment that individuals have an entitlement to “reproductive” rights – the rights to choose when, or when not, to have a child. Debated initially in the context of abortion,293 this category of rights has expanded to take account of the opportunities for individual self-determination and independence offered by rapid developments in medical science.294 Reproductive autonomy is regarded as encompassing access to contraception and appropriate pre-natal testing for foetal abnormality, and, as new technologies evolve, it is also relevant to assisted reproduction.295 But if respect for autonomy, including reproductive autonomy, has become established as the “cornerstone of modern medical jurisprudence”,296 the delictual framework by which it is supported is not yet entirely secure. Furthermore, and unlike in the other categories of liability considered above in this chapter, threats to reproductive rights are typically the result of negligent rather than intentional conduct. 288 Draft Bill s 7(c) [54]. 289 Draft Bill s 4(1) [50]. 290 Indeed the Report para 3.7 recommended that the defender should be liable for all harm intentionally caused, including “distress, anxiety, grief, anger etc, whether or not this amounts to a medically recognised mental disorder”. 291 The Report’s recommendations were reviewed as part of a Scottish Government consultation in 2013 (see http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2013/08/6983). 292 See paras 16.19–16.21 above. 293 J Robertson, “Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth” (1983) 69 Virginia Law Review 405. 294 O O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (2002) 50. For detailed discussion of the modern reading of “procreative right”, see C J Dillard, “Rethinking the Procreative Right” (2007) 10 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 1; E Adjin-Tettey, “Claims of Involuntary Parenthood: Why the Resistance?”, in J Neyers, E Chamberlain and S Pitel (eds), Emerging Issues in Tort Law (2007) 85. 295 See N Priaulx, “Managing Novel Reproductive Injuries in the Law of Tort: The Curious Case of Destroyed Sperm” (2010) 17 European Journal of Health Law 82; E Nelson, Law, Policy and Reproductive Autonomy (2013) 5. 296 G T Laurie et al, Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, 11th edn (2019) para 9.02. See also Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134 per Lord Walker at para 92: “the importance of personal autonomy has been more and more widely recognised”.

Interference with Bodily and Mental Integrity   555

(1) Wrongful pregnancy An action for “wrongful pregnancy”, or “wrongful conception”, is brought where the defenders have failed to provide effective assistance to the pursuers in preventing pregnancy – typically when the pursuers conceive a child after a sterilisation procedure has been negligently performed, and after relying on negligent advice as to the efficacy of the procedure.297 When a patient undergoes sterilisation, medical staff are under a duty not only to apply an ordinary level of skill in the procedure itself but also to advise the patient correctly and appropriately as to its implications and limitations, in particular in regard to any residual risk of conception.298 Where the objective of preventing conception has not been achieved, the natural processes entailed in pregnancy and childbirth, unlike those triggered by illness or injury such as a broken leg, are not universally regarded as harmful.299 Nonetheless, it is accepted that there an invasion of the mother’s right to “physical integrity” where she has become pregnant contrary to her wishes. This was the view taken by the Inner House in the leading case of McFarlane v Tayside Health Board,300 discussed below, and although the Inner House decision was overturned in the House of Lords, there was no dispute on that particular point. A similar analysis was adopted by Hale LJ in the Court of Appeal in Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust,301 also discussed below. Hale LJ opened her judgment with the reflection that “the right to bodily integrity is the first and most important of the interests protected by the law of tort”. She then presented that right as having two aspects. In addition to “the right not to be subjected to bodily injury or harm”, there was also “the right to physical autonomy: to make one’s own choices about what will happen to one’s own body”.302 It is the latter which is compromised where the mother becomes pregnant having made a definite choice not to do so and having relied upon medical professionals to give effect to that choice. There seems to be broad consensus, therefore, that where this right to bodily integrity is infringed, there should be an entitlement to reparation in respect of the pain and discomfort of pregnancy and childbirth. There is

297 See M Earle and N R Whitty, “Medical Law”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2006) para 128; J K Mason, “Wrongful Pregnancy, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Terminology” (2002) 6 EdinLR 46. 298 J K Mason, The Troubled Pregnancy: Legal Wrongs and Rights in Reproduction (2006) 104. 299 See e.g. C Witting, “Physical Damage in Negligence” (2002) 61 CLJ 189 at 193, arguing that physical integrity is not compromised by pregnancy. For a different view, see Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 530, [2002] QB 266 per Hale LJ at paras 63–73; N Priaulx, The Harm Paradox: Tort Law and the Unwanted Child in an Era of Choice (2007) ch 2. 300 1998 SC 389 per Lord McCluskey at 401 (revd 2000 SC (HL) 1). 301 [2001] EWCA Civ 530, [2002] QB 266. 302 [2001] EWCA Civ 530, [2002] QB 266 at para 56.

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less consensus, however, on entitlement to the other losses deriving from the unwanted pregnancy, including the social and financial costs of the forced change in lifestyle – perhaps the more enduring harm for the reluctant parent.

(a) The non-disabled child 16.77

The leading Scottish case on wrongful pregnancy is McFarlane v Tayside Health Board,303 brought by the parents of a healthy child born after the husband had undergone a vasectomy. The vasectomy itself had been carried out with due skill, but the procedure had spontaneously reversed itself, and the couple had been negligently misadvised that they could dispense with contraceptive measures. They welcomed the child into their already large family, but Mrs McFarlane claimed damages from the Health Board for the pain and discomfort of pregnancy and childbirth, and both parents claimed damages for the financial costs of bringing up the child. Although their claims were unsuccessful at first instance,304 the Inner House unanimously allowed the reclaiming motion, by application of the “well established principles of the law relating to reparation”.305 There had been an iniuria – the wrongful invasion of a right, in the form of the allegedly negligent advice. The right invaded was the mother’s physical integrity, given that she and her husband had deliberately chosen to avoid a pregnancy.306 The iniuria had in turn caused the pursuers to suffer a “damnum” – a harm, in the form of the pregnancy, which had resulted from the pursuers acting to their disadvantage in reliance on that advice.307 Once it is recognised that a right has been infringed (an iniuria) by wrongful conduct (in this case negligence), reparation is due for the loss that flows from the harmful result (the damnum) in both its non-patrimonial and patrimonial consequences. The entitlement to reparation, the Inner House held, thus extended to the prejudicial effects deriving from the iniuria done to Mrs McFarlane, including the expenses of bringing up the child. 303 2000 SC (HL) 1. For a detailed account of the legal and factual background to the case, see K McK Norrie, “Bringing up Catherine: McFarlane v Tayside Health Board”, in J P Grant and E E Sutherland (eds), Scots Law Tales (2010) 65. 304 1997 SLT 211. There was Scottish and English authority to support both claims: Thake v Maurice [1985] 2 WLR 215; Emeh v Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Area Health Authority [1985] QB 1012; Allan v Greater Glasgow Health Board 1998 SLT 580. However, the Lord Ordinary, Lord Gill, took the view that pregnancy, as a natural process, was not an injury, and that the privilege of parenthood transcended any patrimonial loss. 305 1998 SC 389 per Lord Justice-Clerk Cullen at 393. 306 1998 SC 389 per Lord McCluskey at 401. 307 As Lord McCluskey pointed out, 1998 SC 389 at 402, the concept of damnum “does not require injury in the ordinary sense of physical or personal injury; all that it requires is a material prejudice to an interest (whether it is of a patrimonial character or not) which the law allows a person to vindicate.” He summarised, at 398: “When there is concurrence of iniuria and damnum the person whose legal right has been invaded with resultant loss to him has a right to seek to recover money reparation for that loss from the wrongdoer.”

Interference with Bodily and Mental Integrity   557

On the Health Board’s appeal, however, the House of Lords308 upheld the relevancy only of Mrs McFarlane’s claim for the pain and suffering of pregnancy and childbirth. The couple’s claims for the costs of bringing up the child were deemed irrelevant. Its reasons for overturning the judgment of the Inner House on this point were miscellaneous.309 Whereas in the courts below, the second element of the claim had been treated as stemming from the first, in the House of Lords the claims were disaggregated.310 Separate consideration of the child maintenance costs allowed them to be classed as pure economic loss, rather than as loss flowing directly from personal injury, and the court found no special features in the relationship between the McFarlanes and the medical staff to render such loss recoverable.311 Reference was made to the Caparo “fair, just and reasonable” test for duty of care,312 and the view was taken that the defenders had not “assumed responsibility” for the pursuers’ economic interests in this regard.313 It was regarded as disproportionate to the duties undertaken by the defenders and to the “extent of the negligence”314 that the defenders should meet the costs of maintaining the child.315 Moreover, while the costs of bringing up the child could be measured, the innumerable benefits of having a child could not, and therefore it could not be said with certainty that the former would exceed the latter.316 Perhaps the oddest argument was that advanced by Lord Steyn, 308 2000 SC (HL) 1. 309 See e.g. commentary in J K Mason, The Troubled Pregnancy: Legal Wrongs and Rights in Reproduction (2006) 114; Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309 per Lord Bingham at para 6, noting the “different approaches” and “different reasons” of the judges in McFarlane. 310 For a critique of this “slicing-up” of duties of care, see L Hoyano, “Misconceptions about Wrongful Conception” (2002) 65 MLR 883 at 885–887. Lord Millett, who dissented, did not accept that the two parts of the claim could be separated, since the only difference between them was “temporal”, although he agreed with the Lord Ordinary that the birth of a baby was a “blessing”, not a “detriment”, and therefore that neither part of the claim should be compensated: 2000 SC (HL) 1 at 44. 311 See 2000 SC (HL) 1 per Lord Steyn at 14 and Lord Hope at 29, following the analysis in A Stewart, “Damages for the Birth of a Child” (1995) 40 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 298. 312 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; for discussion, see paras 4.15–4.17 above. 313 2000 SC (HL) 1 per Lord Slynn at 11, Lord Steyn at 17, and Lord Hope at 29. It was not clear, however, why the Health Board was not regarded as assuming responsibility for the economic consequences in this case, whereas there is normally little question that it does so in relation to economic loss deriving from negligent surgical procedures of other types. Cf Mukheiber v Raath 1999 3 SA 1065 (SCA), a wrongful pregnancy case in which the parents’ loss was categorised as “economic”, but in which recovery was permitted because the surgeon who had misadvised them was regarded as having undertaken a “special duty” towards them. 314 2000 SC (HL) 1 per Lord Hope at 24 and Lord Clyde at 37. 315 Although, as Lord Millet pointed out, 2000 SC (HL) 1 at 40, it is not usual to excuse negligence in other medical contexts on the basis that its consequences are costly. 316 Although Lord Clyde queried, 2000 SC (HL) 1 at 35, whether it was appropriate to ask the parents to prove that the child was more trouble than she was worth. He also pointed out, at 34, that “there is no principle under which the law recognises such a set off. A parent’s claim for the death of a child is not offset by the saving in maintenance costs which the parent will enjoy. Nor . . . is the loss sustained by a mineworker who is rendered no longer fit for work underground offset by the pleasure and benefit which he may enjoy in the open air of a public park.”

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who avoided the “quicksands” of public policy by instead directing himself to the requirements of distributive justice. He did so by asking how “commuters on the Underground” would respond if asked: “Should the parents of an unwanted but healthy child be able to sue the doctor or hospital for compensation equivalent to the cost of bringing up the child for the years of his or her minority?”317 In the absence of solid evidence as to the likely outcome of this rather curious opinion poll,318 Lord Steyn’s own “firm” view that the majority would say “no” was conclusive. The reasoning of the House of Lords did not therefore indicate a clear and principled basis for departing from the traditional framework of reparation, which had informed the judgment of the Inner House.319 As later observed by Hale LJ, the arguments applied by the House of Lords to displace the Inner House’s analysis were not “easy to assign to the traditional categories of duty, breach and damage, given that all agreed that there was some duty in the case and that, if that duty had been broken, some recoverable damage had resulted”.320 Nonetheless, the boundaries of reparable damage as drawn in McFarlane have not been reset, in Scotland or in England. It remains the case that where a medical practitioner performs a sterilisation or vasectomy procedure negligently, or provides negligent advice thereafter, resulting in an unwanted pregnancy, the pain and suffering of childbirth is regarded as a form of personal injury for which solatium is available to the mother, as is compensation for loss of earnings during pregnancy.321 However, the parents may not recover the costs of maintaining a child born subsequently without disability.322 The same restrictions apply where medical services have been provided privately, rather than within the National Health Service.323 317 2000 SC (HL) 1 at 16. 318 In the absence of an underground on Tayside, an alternative “straw poll” conducted by one commentator in a Glasgow pub revealed that 40 per cent of drinkers thought that the McFarlanes should have recovered and 80 per cent thought they should have recovered if the baby was disabled: J M Thomson, “Abandoning the Law of Delict?” 2000 SLT (News) 43 at 45. 319 2000 SC (HL) 1 per Lord Hope at 19. To this effect see also Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309 per Lord Bingham at para 4 (commenting that “orthodox application of familiar and conventional principles of the law of tort” would ordinarily have permitted recovery of the costs of maintaining the McFarlane child); Thomson, “Abandoning the Law of Delict?”. 320 Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 530, [2002] QB 266 at para 79. 321 See discussion in D Nolan, “New Forms of Damages in Negligence” (2007) 70 MLR 59 at 71–77. 322 See also Greenfield v Irwin [2001] 1 WLR 1279, [2001] PIQR Q7, holding that invocation of the right to family life as set out ECHR Art 8 did not require the court to provide a remedy in circumstances comparable to those in McFarlane. 323 See B v IVF Hammersmith [2018] EWCA Civ 2803, [2020] QB 93, in which a private clinic failed to obtain valid consent before implanting embryos formed with the claimant’s gametes into his former girlfriend, resulting in the birth of a daughter. The father claimed damages not in tort but for breach of contract, to cover the costs of his daughter’s upbringing. Although breach of contract was established, the Court of Appeal held that the legal policy considerations precluding recovery of child maintenance costs in tort were equally applicable in contract.

Interference with Bodily and Mental Integrity   559

(b) The disabled child While in McFarlane the House of Lords set itself against compensation for the maintenance of an uncovenanted, non-disabled child, some of the speeches alluded to the possibility of a different approach for children born with a disability.324 This was put to the test not long afterwards in the English case of Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust.325 Mrs Parkinson had undergone sterilisation in the defendants’ hospital, but the procedure had been negligently performed and she had become pregnant some months later. On discovering her pregnancy she had been warned of a risk that the child might be born disabled, but did not choose termination at that stage. The child was indeed born with severe disabilities, and the question before the court was whether the mother326 might be entitled to compensation for child maintenance costs. The Court of Appeal held that Mrs Parkinson was entitled to compensation for the extra costs of providing for the child’s special needs deriving from the disabilities, but, under reference to McFarlane, not for the basic costs of maintenance that would have applied in any event to a non-disabled child. In reaching this decision Brooke LJ reasoned: (i) that the birth of a child with congenital abnormalities was a foreseeable result of the surgeon’s negligence; (ii) that there was sufficient proximity between the surgeon and Mrs Parkinson; and (iii) that even if Mrs Parkinson’s loss were classified as economic, it was possible to regard the surgeon as having assumed responsibility for the foreseeable and far-reaching consequences of performing his services negligently. It is not clear why this reasoning was found persuasive in Parkinson but not in McFarlane, where the birth was a foreseeable result of medical negligence, parents were in a proximate relationship with medical staff, and the cost of maintenance was a foreseeable consequence of that negligence. Additionally, however, Brooke LJ reasoned that, unlike in McFarlane, it was fair, just and reasonable to compensate the additional costs of bringing up a disabled child, and, alluding as Lord Steyn had done to distributive justice, concluded that “ordinary people would consider that it would be fair for the law to make an award in such a case, provided that it is limited to the extra expenses associated with the child’s disability”.327 The distinction between McFarlane and Parkinson

324 2000 SC (HL) 1 per Lord Steyn at 18 and Lord Clyde at 31. 325 [2001] EWCA Civ 530, [2002] QB 266. For commentary, see J K Mason, “Wrongful Pregnancy, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Terminology” (2002) 6 EdinLR 46; J K Mason, The Troubled Pregnancy: Legal Wrongs and Rights in Reproduction (2006) 153–163. See also discussion in Meadows v Khan [2021] UKSC 21 per Lord Hodge and Lord Sales at para 63. 326 Mr Parkinson had left his wife and family before the child was born. 327 [2001] EWCA Civ 530, [2002] QB 266 at para 50.

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seems therefore to hinge upon the extent, rather than the nature, of the economic loss suffered by the mother,328 backed up by Brooke LJ’s perception that the “ordinary” person would regard it as “fair” to compensate Mrs Parkinson but not the McFarlanes. Interestingly, however, the concurring judgment by Hale LJ in Parkinson was in different terms, to an extent endorsing the reasoning of the Inner House in McFarlane and challenging that of the House of Lords. She opened her remarks with a realistic appraisal of the physical and practical impact of pregnancy, childbirth and motherhood.329 She then challenged the notion, at the heart of the House of Lords’ reasoning in McFarlane, that the costs of maintaining the child were separable from the pain and suffering of childbirth, pointing out that this element of the claim was directed at “the consequences of the fundamental invasion of [the mother’s] rights, which was the conception itself”.330 She also questioned the proposition that the defenders had not assumed responsibility for this loss; given that responsibility had been assumed for preventing conception, it was “difficult to understand” why they assumed responsibility for some but not all of the “clearly foreseeable” and “highly probable” losses resulting.331 Moreover, the putative opinion of the traveller on the Underground as the arbiter of distributive justice was an unreliable guide to the legitimacy of the mother’s claim.332 Finally, Hale LJ noted that in McFarlane only Lord Slynn had unmistakably placed the costs of maintaining disabled and non-disabled children alike outside the scope of duty.333 This provided an opening to distinguish cases involving a disabled child and made a maintenance award possible for the extra costs associated with the child’s disability. If the two judgments in Parkinson arrived at a common conclusion by very different routes, the central ratio was at least clear. In wrongful pregnancy cases the parents may recover the extra334 costs of maintaining a disabled child, but not the basic costs that would also have applied in relation to a non-disabled child.

328 See commentary in L Hoyano, “Misconceptions about Wrongful Conception” (2002) 65 MLR 883 at 897. 329 [2001] EWCA Civ 530, [2002] QB 266 at paras 63–73. 330 [2001] EWCA Civ 530, [2002] QB 266 at para 73. 331 [2001] EWCA Civ 530, [2002] QB 266 at para 80. 332 [2001] EWCA Civ 530, [2002] QB 266 at para 82. 333 [2001] EWCA Civ 530, [2002] QB 266 at para 86. 334 As a matter of legal principle, or indeed of “ordinary” perceptions of “fairness”, it is not clear why the “disabled” element of the claim should be regarded as stemming from the infringement of a legally recognised right, but not the “non-disabled”. After all, as Van Heerden JA remarked in the South African case of Administrator of Natal v Edouard 1990 3 SA 581 (A) at para 24, “The doctor who negligently or in breach of contract performed an unsuccessful sterilization operation may be blamed for causing the birth of an unwanted child, but hardly for the fact that the child was born with some abnormality.”

Interference with Bodily and Mental Integrity   561

(c) Non-disabled child born to a disabled mother The issue of disability and its effect upon the core reasoning of McFarlane came under scrutiny once again in Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust.335 In this case, however, it was the mother and not the child who was disabled, a possibility which had not been considered in McFarlane. A severe visual impairment caused Ms Rees to doubt her capacity to care for a child and she had undergone sterilisation at a hospital managed by the defendants. The procedure was negligently performed and she subsequently gave birth to a non-disabled child. In the House of Lords the agreed issue before the seven judges was which costs might be recovered by the mother, given that she had incurred both (i) the expenses of bringing up a non-disabled child experienced by all parents, and also (ii) the additional costs of bringing up the non-disabled child due to the mother’s physical disability. To allow expenses under the first head would, in effect, require McFarlane to be set aside, for which there was little judicial enthusiasm.336 The House of Lords was more divided on the second head. For the majority, the crucial consideration was that the child had been born without disability, unlike in Parkinson, and they were not inclined to depart from McFarlane to the extent of compensating the maintenance costs of a non-disabled child. While Ms Rees might face greater expense due to her own disability (although it would seem that a compelling account of this had not been presented),337 it was regarded as invidious to distinguish between disabled mothers and other parents whose circumstances presented practical or economic challenges in bringing up their children.338 Moreover, since the defendants bore no responsibility for the mother’s disability, this was not a factor which affected whether an award of the extra outlays attributable to her condition was fair, just and reasonable.339 A significant concession was, however, made to Ms Rees. It was uncontroversial, on the basis of McFarlane, that she should receive an award for the pain and suffering of pregnancy and childbirth,340 but the non-patrimonial 335 [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309. 336 See [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309 per Lord Bingham at para 7, Lord Nicholls at paras 15–16, and Lord Millett at para 103; see also discussion in J K Mason, The Troubled Pregnancy: Legal Wrongs and Rights in Reproduction (2006) 167–168. 337 As noted by Lord Bingham, [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309 at para 9, although on this point see also Lord Hope at para 76. 338 [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309 per Lord Millett at para 115. 339 See [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309 per Lord Bingham at para 9. One might also argue that, although the existence of the Parkinson child was due to medical negligence, his disability was not. For a further application of the McFarlane core principle, see AD v East Kent Community NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Civ 1872, [2003] 3 All ER 1167, in which it was alleged that the defendants had negligently failed to prevent the pregnancy of a patient compulsorily detained in psychiatric care, but in which it was held, under reference to McFarlane, that the costs of maintaining a healthy child were not recoverable. 340 See also J K Mason, The Troubled Pregnancy: Legal Wrongs and Rights in Reproduction (2006) 175, arguing that the element might legitimately be increased in the case of a disabled mother.

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element of her claim was expressly acknowledged as having a moral, as well as a purely physical, aspect. In this regard Lord Bingham referred back to a suggestion advanced by Lord Millett in his dissenting speech in McFarlane:341 “The rejection of [the McFarlanes’] claim to measure their loss by the consequences of Catherine’s conception and birth does not lead to the conclusion that they have suffered none. They have suffered both injury and loss. They have lost the freedom to limit the size of their family. They have been denied an important aspect of their personal autonomy. Their decision to have no more children is one the law should respect and protect. They are entitled to general damages to reflect the true nature of the wrong done to them. This should be a conventional sum which should be left to the trial judge to assess, but which I would not expect to exceed £5,000 in a straightforward case like the present.”

Endorsing this reasoning, Lord Bingham, supported by the majority in Rees, favoured awarding Ms Rees an amount “to mark the injury and loss” over and above the award that compensated her for pregnancy and childbirth. The court accepted that “the parent of a child born following a negligently performed vasectomy or sterilisation, or negligent advice on the effect of such a procedure, is the victim of a legal wrong”.342 More specifically, the “real loss suffered” was that “a parent, particularly (even today) the mother, has been denied, through the negligence of another, the opportunity to live her life in the way that she wished and planned,” and compensation only for the pregnancy and birth did not give “adequate recognition of or [do] justice to that loss”.343 An additional amount was therefore awarded to Ms Rees, which was intended not as “compensatory”, but as a “measure of recognition of the wrong done”.344 Payment of a “modest”345 conventional sum acknowledged the denial of her “personal autonomy” and vindicated “an important aspect of human dignity”.346 £15,000 was the figure lighted upon for this purpose. Although the father was not a party to the action in Rees, it would appear that this award for loss of autonomy should be available to both parents where the child is parented by a couple.347

341 2000 SC (HL) 1 at 44–45. 342 [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309 per Lord Bingham at para 8. 343 [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309 per Lord Bingham at para 8 (echoing the thinking of the Inner House of the Court of Session in McFarlane to the effect that the right invaded was the parents’ right “not to have a child at a time and in circumstances when they had made a deliberate choice not to have a child” (1998 SC 389 per Lord McCluskey at 399)). 344 [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309 per Lord Bingham at para 8 and Lord Nicholls at para 17. 345 £15,000 was the figure apparently plucked from the air for this purpose. 346 [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309 per Lord Bingham at para 123. 347 In Rees Lord Bingham spoke of the loss of freedom as affecting the “parent”, although he added that the mother was “particularly” affected: [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309 at para 8.

Interference with Bodily and Mental Integrity   563

This lifting of Lord Millett’s suggestion from McFarlane to Rees is not without difficulty.348 First of all, the suggestion was made by Lord Millett as the dissenting judge in McFarlane, and on the basis that he disagreed with compensating the mother for the pain and discomfort of childbirth; in other words this was not additional to, but instead of, an award made under this head. Moreover, the only Scottish judge sitting in the House of Lords in Rees, Lord Hope, registered his dissent, finding a “lack of any consistent or coherent ratio” in support of such an award and an absence of clear analysis as to the wrong which the award was supposed to redress.349 Although the status of such an award has yet to be discussed in a comparable Scottish case, it has been observed in the Outer House that it would be unsafe to apply the ratio of Rees beyond identical fact situations.350 Scots law has not previously recognised the category of “conventional award” as such, although, as Lord Hope explained in Rees, this may translate into an entitlement to solatium as compensation for pain, suffering and distress.351

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(d) The position of the non-birthing parent The Inner House in McFarlane had held that, where the father had sought medical assistance to limit his fertility, it was his right to receive advice that was not negligently misleading.352 That right was the counterpart of the defenders’ duty to exercise reasonable care to provide accurate advice, a duty that had been breached. Although the House of Lords rejected, on policy grounds, the father’s claim for the costs of the child’s upbringing (as it did the mother’s), it made no comment on this aspect of the Inner House’s reasoning. It is arguable therefore that where there is a relationship of sufficient proximity between the parties, such as that between Mr McFarlane and the Health Board, the non-birthing parent may have an entitlement to those elements of claims that are allowable, namely the additional costs of bringing up a disabled child, as recognised in Parkinson,353 and the equivalent of the “conventional award” for loss of autonomy, as recognised in Rees.354 That argument finds support in the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Parkinson. The claim in Parkinson was brought by the mother only, but it was observed that, although the primary invasion of bodily integrity and

348 For discussion, see J K Mason, The Troubled Pregnancy: Legal Wrongs and Rights in Reproduction (2006) 177. 349 [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309 at paras 70–77. 350 Holdich v Lothian Health Board [2013] CSOH 197, 2014 SLT 495 per Lord Stewart at para 101. 351 [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309 at para 72. 352 1998 SC 389 per Lord McCluskey at 399. 353 Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 530, [2002] QB 266. 354 Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309.

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autonomy was suffered by the mother, there were many cases in which the obligation to bring up a child was shared with, or sometimes undertaken solely by, the non-birthing parent. The “tentative” view expressed in Parkinson was that a claim for the extra costs of bringing up a disabled child should be available to a non-birthing parent who was undertaking some or all of the childcare burden, as long as there was a “sufficient relationship of proximity” between the medical practitioner and that individual.355 Since the issue did not arise in Parkinson there was no further comment on what made a relationship sufficiently proximate. It is likely, however, that such a connection may exist where there was a direct professional relationship between the non-birthing parent and the medical staff, or the latter knew at the point of providing negligent advice or services that their patient, the mother, was in a lasting sexual relationship with the non-birthing parent.356 On a similar basis, an award made as indicated in Rees in respect of loss of autonomy may competently be made to both parents where the child is parented by a couple. The position of non-birthing parents in wrongful birth cases, and the potential availability to them of an award to compensate for shock and distress on discovering a child’s disability, are discussed further below.357

(e) The position of subsequent partners 16.90

So far the right to compensation has not been extended beyond the woman who was either the patient or the partner of the patient at the time of the alleged negligence. In Goodwill v British Pregnancy Advisory Service358 the defendants had arranged a vasectomy for M, and advised M of its success without warning him that sterility is not always permanent. Three years later M embarked on a relationship with G, who became pregnant, the vasectomy having in the meantime reversed itself. The court struck out G’s claim for the expenses of raising the child, taking the view that the defendants owed G no duty of care, because when they were advising M they did not know of G’s future relationship with M and had assumed no responsibility to the indeterminate class of women with whom M might potentially become involved in the future.

(2) Wrongful birth 16.91

In an action for “wrongful birth” the issue is not the failure to prevent conception, and indeed the pregnancy may have been a desired event.359

355 [2001] EWCA Civ 530, [2002] QB 266 per Hale LJ at para 93. 356 Cf Goodwill v British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1996] 1 WLR 1397, noted at para 16.90 below, in which no duty was owed to a subsequent partner. 357 See para 16.95 below. 358 [1996] 1 WLR 1397. 359 See M Earle and N R Whitty, “Medical Law”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2006) para 128; J K Mason, “Wrongful Pregnancy, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Terminology” (2002) 6 EdinLR 46.

Interference with Bodily and Mental Integrity   565

Instead the alleged negligence takes the form of a failure to provide timeous advice with regard to its possible termination. Typically such an action is brought after the defender has negligently misinformed the pursuer that the foetus was free from any impairment, which meant that the pursuer proceeded with a pregnancy that she would otherwise have decided to terminate. Referring back to the framework of McFarlane,360 the iniuria in wrongful birth cases is “the failure to advise that the foetus is unhealthy and, by extension, to imply that termination is not indicated; the damnum lies in being deprived of a legal right – that is, a statutory opportunity for termination of a pregnancy”.361 In such cases the principle has been accepted, on the authority of McFarlane362 and Parkinson,363 that there is no right to reparation insofar as the maintenance costs of the disabled child correspond also to those of a non-disabled child, but an award may be made to compensate for the extra costs of maintaining the child that are attributable to the child’s disability.364 The leading Scots case is McLelland v Greater Glasgow Health Board,365 in which the parents of a disabled child raised an action of damages in respect of the defenders’ negligence in failing to perform an amniocentesis test during the pregnancy. This would have shown the presence of the child’s disability, and it was accepted by the court that the mother would have terminated the pregnancy had that information been available. The question of duty did not arise since the defenders admitted liability, but the issue for the court to determine was the extent of that liability. At first instance,366 the Lord Ordinary awarded the parents the expenses of maintaining the child until adulthood, including both ordinary outlays and those extra costs attributable to his disability, as well as solatium to compensate for the shock and distress of discovering the child’s disability and bringing up a disabled child. He also awarded solatium to the mother in respect of the physical consequences of continuing with the pregnancy and childbirth. However, by the time McLelland reached the Inner House the House of Lords had issued its decision in McFarlane, and the majority referred extensively to McFarlane in holding that it was not fair, just and reasonable that the parents should receive the ordinary costs of maintaining the child. The other elements of the award were allowed to stand. While it was accepted that there were differences between wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth,

360 361 362 363

In the Inner House: see 1998 SC 389, discussed at para 16.77 above. J K Mason, The Troubled Pregnancy: Legal Wrongs and Rights in Reproduction (2006) 86. McFarlane v Tayside Health Board 2000 SC (HL) 1. Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 530, [2002] QB 266; see paras 16.80–16.83 above. 364 Groom v Selby [2001] EWCA Civ 1522, [2002] PIQR P18, (2002) 64 BMLR 47 (in which the onset of the disability was some weeks after the birth, but the infection which caused it was present at birth); P v Taunton and Somerset NHS Trust [2009] EWHC 1965 (QB), (2009) 110 BMLR 164. 365 2001 SLT 446. 366 1999 SC 305.

16.92

566   The Law of Delict in Scotland

16.93

16.94

these underscored the decision to award only the extra costs. Whereas in cases such as McFarlane, the defender’s duties were directed at preventing pregnancy in any circumstances, in the present case they were directed only at preventing the birth of a disabled child – the pursuers had wished for a child but relied upon the defenders to detect abnormality and provide appropriate advice. The view of the majority was therefore that the defenders should not shoulder liability for all of the costs of bringing up a child, but only those extra expenses which flowed specifically from their breach of duty.367 Similar reasoning was followed in an English case discussed more extensively in chapter 14, Khan v Meadows,368 in which a failure of testing prior to her pregnancy meant that a mother was not informed that she was a carrier of haemophilia, and she subsequently had a son who suffered from both haemophilia and autism. The Supreme Court held that the doctor who had provided her with negligent advice prior to her pregnancy should be liable for the extra costs involved in bringing up a child with haemophilia, although, under reference to the SAAMCO principle,369 not for those associated with the child’s autism. The doctor had undertaken a duty to the patient to advise her on haemophilia, but undertook no duty in regard to other unrelated potential risks of pregnancy. A further question arising from wrongful birth cases is the extent to which the mother may claim for the pain and suffering of pregnancy and childbirth. In wrongful pregnancy cases the mother has enlisted medical advice to avoid all processes of physical change, whereas in wrongful birth cases the mother has willingly submitted herself to this prospect at a time when the child was not known to be disabled. In McLelland an award was made under this head on the basis of the pain and suffering which the mother experienced as a result of the continuation of the pregnancy beyond the date at which it would have been terminated, and as a result

367 2001 SLT 446 at paras 31–35. However, the distinction between wrongful pregnancy and wrongful life cases led Lord Morison to a different conclusion in his dissenting judgment. In his view the doctor/patient relationship in the McLellands’ case created an even more proximate relationship between the parties, in which the defenders had been relied upon to provide a very specific service. Had they performed that service with due care, the pregnancy would have been terminated. Given the defenders’ admission of liability he could see no “logical ground” for holding that “an award of damages to the pursuers includes part of the cost of maintaining the child but excludes another part” (para 2). 368 [2021] UKSC 21, discussed at para 14.52 above. See also Rand v East Dorset Health Authority (2000) 56 BMLR 39, in which doctors neglected to inform the parents of the results of an antenatal scan disclosing that the child was likely to be disabled. Had that information been communicated, the parents would have terminated the pregnancy. Under reference to McFarlane, the court held that the parents’ claim for the full cost of the maintenance of the child could not be allowed, but awarded damages to cover the consequences flowing specifically from her disability. 369 See para 14.48 above.

Interference with Bodily and Mental Integrity   567

of the birth itself. In Hardman v Amin,370 similarly, the continuation of the pregnancy was categorised as “personal injury”, and the mother received a “modest sum” accordingly for the pain and inconvenience of that part of the pregnancy and of childbirth, as well as for loss of earnings during that period.371 A feature of McLelland was the award of solatium to the father as well as to the mother to compensate for the shock and distress of discovering the child’s disability and the stress of bringing up a child with disability. In McLelland both parents were regarded as the victims of a “direct wrong” in this regard, which meant that neither had to meet the criteria required of secondary victims experiencing psychiatric injury as a result of witnessing injury to another.372 The Inner House endorsed the Lord Ordinary’s reasoning that the defenders had admitted breach of duty to provide both parents with advice on the risk of Down’s Syndrome, and that there had been a foreseeable risk that both parents might suffer severe shock and distress on discovering that their child was so affected. The award to the father of solatium under this head was thus additional to, and fulfilled a different function from, the “conventional award” made in Rees373 for loss of personal autonomy derived from wrongful pregnancy.

16.95

(3) Wrongful life The English courts have hitherto refused to entertain actions for “wrongful life”. Such an action is typically brought by a child born with a congenital disability, alleging that medical staff negligently failed to advise the parents of circumstances which would have led them to terminate the pregnancy.374 Essentially, the child argues that, but for the defender’s negligence, he or she would not have been born. The leading case is McKay v Essex Area Health Authority375 in which a pregnant woman had been in contact with rubella, a condition that is highly likely to damage the foetus. The defendants negligently failed to diagnose that the foetus had been infected by the contagion, and consequently deprived the mother of the

370 [2001] PNLR 11. 371 Subject to “set off” against the loss and expense of a future pregnancy and childbirth if relevant evidence can be brought: [2001] PNLR 11 at paras 16–17. 372 2001 SLT 446 per Lord Prosser at para 11. 373 Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309; see paras 16.84–16.86 above. 374 See the extended discussion in J K Mason, The Troubled Pregnancy: Legal Wrongs and Rights in Reproduction (2006) 188–240; R Scott, “Reconsidering ‘Wrongful Life’ in England after Thirty Years: Legislative Mistakes and Unjustifiable Anomalies” (2013) 72 CLJ 115. 375 [1982] QB 1166, discussed with approval in P’s Curator Bonis v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board 1997 SLT 1180; and see commentary in K McK Norrie, “Wrongful Life in Scots Law: No Right, No Remedy” 1990 JR 205; see also Harriton v Stephens [2006] HCA 15. For discussion of developments in France and Germany, see T Weir, “The Unwanted Child” (2002) 6 EdinLR 244.

16.96

568   The Law of Delict in Scotland

opportunity of termination. An action brought by the child, born with serious disabilities, was struck out. It was conceded that a duty might be owed to an unborn child not to cause it injury, but the injury in this case had been caused by the rubella, for which the defendants did not bear responsibility. The right on which the child sought to base her claim was different, namely a right not to be born at all if she were to be born afflicted by a congenital disability. However, the argument that a disabled child’s life was so valueless that it was “not worth preserving” was viewed as morally repugnant, and the court denied the existence of any duty to abort a disabled child’s existence, as making an “inroad on the sanctity of human life which would be contrary to public policy”.376

(4) Damaged sperm 16.97

16.98

Finally, there is the question as to what remedies are available to men who lose the opportunity of procreation where, typically in anticipation of cancer treatment, they arrange to have sperm samples preserved, but negligent storage renders those samples unusable. Or, to put the question more broadly: where harm occurs to body parts or products that have been separated from the pursuer’s person, what kind of injury has the pursuer suffered? In two cases, one English, Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust,377 and one Scottish, Holdich v Lothian Health Board,378 the defenders had accepted sperm samples from the pursuers prior to the pursuers receiving chemotherapy but, due to a malfunction in the storage facilities, the samples became degraded. In Yearworth the Court of Appeal ultimately determined that the claimants were the owners of the samples,379 and on that basis their destruction in the defendants’ storage facility was not only a breach of bailment but could also give rise to a claim for the psychiatric injury suffered when the men were informed of the loss.380 Recourse to 376 [1982] QB 1166 per Stephenson LJ at 1180. The court also found itself perplexed by the method of assessing damages, which would have required it to measure the difference between the child’s condition as a result of being permitted to be born alive, as against its condition if its life had been ended in the womb. 377 Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, [2010] QB 1. For discussion, see N Priaulx, “Managing Novel Reproductive Injuries in the Law of Tort: The Curious Case of Destroyed Sperm” (2010) 17 European Journal of Health Law 82; S H E Harmon and G T Laurie, “Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust: Property, Principles, Precedents and Paradigms” (2010) 69 CLJ 476. 378 Holdich v Lothian Health Board [2013] CSOH 197, 2014 SLT 495. For discussion, see K G C Reid, “Body Parts and Property”, and E Reid, “Delictual Liability in Holdich v Lothian Health Board”, in D Bain et al (eds), Northern Lights: Essays in Private Law in Memory of Professor David Carey Miller (2018) 235 and 261 respectively. 379 [2009] EWCA Civ 37, [2010] QB 1 per Lord Judge CJ at para 45. The concept of ownership over sperm samples was recognised in two subsequent Australian cases: Bazley v Wesley Monash IVF Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 118; Re Edwards [2011] NSWSC 478. 380 [2009] EWCA Civ 37, [2010] QB 1 per Lord Judge CJ at para 55, by reference to Attia v British Gas plc [1988] QB 304.

Interference with Bodily and Mental Integrity   569

this controversial381 property law analysis was necessitated by rejection of the proposition that damage to a substance generated by a person’s body could constitute a personal injury to the person. The court’s understanding382 was that the term “personal injury” connoted a specific impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition, and that to hold destruction of the sperm sample as a personal injury was a fiction that would “generate paradoxes, and yield ramifications, productive of substantial uncertainty, expensive debate and nice distinctions”.383 Holdich, the Scottish case, followed broadly similar reasoning. After a hearing to determine the relevancy of the pursuer’s arguments, a claim for mental injury due to property damage and breach of the contract of deposit was allowed to go forward to proof. Aside from the property and contractual issues, however, two further aspects of Lord Stewart’s decision are noteworthy from a delictual standpoint. First, the parties in Holdich were agreed that in Scots law, as in Yearworth, a wrong of this type did not constitute personal injury. Lord Stewart, however, expressed his own reservations:384

16.99

16.100

“Would it be unreasonable to extend the concept of injury to damage to viable biomatter produced or removed for the purpose of the living subject’s own reproduction or medical treatment? Clearly there is such a thing as out of body treatment, for example high dose radiation of cancerous organs removed to protect surrounding tissue. Thinking of autologous grafts, transplants and transfusions, would it be far fetched to deal with viable biomatter outside the body as part of the subject’s person? Would it do violence to the law? Would it run counter to current norms of medical practice? Would it be inconsistent with the regulatory regimes? Would it offend morality?”

Secondly, Lord Stewart was persuaded that Holdich’s claim for “loss of autonomy” should be heard, although he was not convinced that it would succeed. Autonomy in this context “seemed” to be a “personality right”, although Lord Stewart was troubled by the lack of authority to support its loss as an independent head of damages.385 The only case in which loss of reproductive autonomy had appeared to be recognised as a wrong in itself was Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust,386 discussed above, 381 On the “instrumentalist” approach adopted to property law, see J Lee, “Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust: Instrumentalism and Fictions in Property Law”, in S Douglas et al (eds), Landmark Cases in Property Law (2015) 25; T Krebs, “Unintended Side Effects of the NHS”, in I Goold et al (eds), Persons, Parts and Property (2014) 39. 382 Looking in particular at its definition in the English Limitation Act 1980 s 38(1) (per Lord Judge CJ at para 18). 383 [2009] EWCA Civ 37, [2010] QB 1 per Lord Judge CJ at para 23 (although it is arguable that the equivalent observation might be made of the property law analysis that was applied). 384 [2013] CSOH 197, 2014 SLT 495 at para 6. 385 [2013] CSOH 197, 2014 SLT 495 at para 102. 386 [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309; see paras 16.84–16.86 above.

16.101

570   The Law of Delict in Scotland

but the facts were clearly not on all fours, and as an English case its reasoning was not in any event binding.387 In answer to Lord Stewart’s question above, whether or not it is “far 16.102 fetched” to think of viable biomatter outside the body as susceptible of personal injury, the more direct approach is to consider the right infringed. This is characterised more accurately not as bodily integrity but as patient autonomy. In this connection both Yearworth and Holdich gave brief consideration to a German case from the 1990s,388 in which the Bundesgerichtshof ruled that the negligent storage of sperm samples caused a personal injury to the patient in terms of BGB § 823(1). The German court ultimately determined that the samples formed a “functional unity” with the patient’s body and therefore that their destruction was a personal injury to him.389 However, the court also gave broader recognition to the right to one’s body as part of the general right of personality, so that the proper focus of § 823(1) was not on physical matter as such, but on the patient’s “field of being and self-determination”.390 Indeed this very scenario was used as an illustration by the draftsmen of the European Draft Common Frame of Reference in their discussion of the operation of DCFR Article VI.–2:201.391 According to that provision, loss, whether economic or non-economic, is “legally relevant damage” if it: (i) comes within a traditional category (such as personal injury etc), (ii) “results from a violation of a right otherwise conferred by the law”, or (iii) “results from a violation of an interest worthy of legal protection”. The commentary concedes that destruction of a sperm sample does not constitute personal injury in the normal sense, nor an infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy, but argues that it comes within the third residual category. On that basis the facts of Holdich would trigger delictual liability – infringement of this protected interest is in itself “legally relevant damage”. In other words, the aspiration to preserve the possibility of procreation is an “interest worthy of legal protection” as an aspect of patient autonomy.

387 There is, however, authority supporting compensation for distress, irrespective of the gender of the patient, where infertility is a secondary consequence of negligent surgery: McEwan v Ayrshire & Arran Acute Hospitals NHS Trust [2009] CSOH 22, 2009 GWD 13–208; see also Briody v St Helens and Knowsley Area Health Authority [2001] EWCA Civ 1010, [2002] QB 856; Whittington Hospital NHS Trust v XX [2020] UKSC 14, [2021] AC 275. Or where medical staff negligently failed to warn that sterility was the likely outcome of a surgical procedure: Goorkani v Tayside Health Board 1991 SLT 94. 388 BGHZ 124, 52, 9 Nov 1993 (English translation available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/ centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=830). 389 However, its analysis might possibly have differed following revisions to the BGB in 2002, and acknowledgement in § 253 of a reparable category of “intangible damage”. The German court’s reasoning was perhaps influenced by the fact that at that time non-patrimonial loss was conceptualised only in terms of injury to the person or deprivation of liberty. 390 “Schutzgut des § 823 I BGB ist nicht die Materie, sondern das Seins- und Bestimmungsfeld der Persönlichkeit, das in der körperlichen Befindlichkeit materialisiert ist.” 391 C von Bar and E Clive (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (2010) vol 4, 3144.

Chapter 17

Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty

Para A. GENERAL����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 17.01 (1) The meaning of confinement��������������������������������������������� 17.03 (2) Article 5 ECHR and deprivation of liberty�������������������������� 17.06 (3) The harm suffered������������������������������������������������������������� 17.07 (4) Awareness by the detained person�������������������������������������� 17.09 B. DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY BY PRIVATE PERSONS������� 17.10 (1) Inferring intention������������������������������������������������������������� 17.11 (2) Citizen’s arrest������������������������������������������������������������������ 17.12 (3) Consent by the detainee���������������������������������������������������� 17.13 (4) Human trafficking������������������������������������������������������������� 17.16 C. DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS (1) Deprivation of liberty by police officers (a) Lawfulness of detention and arrest������������������������������� 17.17 (b) Lawful deprivation of liberty: the burden of proving malice������������������������������������������������������������ 17.20 (c) Unlawful deprivation of liberty������������������������������������ 17.22 (d) Privilege: unlawful conduct within the police officer’s “competence”?����������������������������������������������� 17.23 (e) Vicarious liability�������������������������������������������������������� 17.27 (2) Infringement of the rights of those already imprisoned (a) Wrongful prolongation of imprisonment���������������������� 17.28 (b) Detention of persons subject to deportation orders������� 17.29 (c) Lawful detention and the “residual” right to liberty��������������� (3) Deprivation of liberty and judicial immunity���������������������� 17.33 (a) Judges in the superior courts���������������������������������������� 17.34 (b) Judges in the inferior courts����������������������������������������� 17.36 (4) Detention in psychiatric institutions����������������������������������� 17.39 (5) Detention by public transport officials�������������������������������� 17.40 (6) Remedies under the Human Rights Act 1998 (a) Judicial acts���������������������������������������������������������������� 17.43 (b) Inhuman or degrading treatment in detention�������������� 17.46 (c) Wrongful detention in a psychiatric institution������������� 17.47 D. DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY RESULTING FROM NEGLIGENCE���������������������������������������������������������������������� 17.49

571

572   The Law of Delict in Scotland

E. MALICIOUS INSTIGATION OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS�������������������������������������������������������������������� 17.52 (1) Requirements of malice and want of probable cause����������� 17.53 (2) Immunity of prosecutors��������������������������������������������������� 17.58

A. GENERAL 17.01

In the accounts of the Institutional writers, personal liberty figured prominently on the list of rights which, if infringed, entitled the victim to reparation. Stair indeed ranked liberty “next to life” in this regard;1 as in other nations, so in Scotland “unlawful restraint or unjust imprisonment” were to be punished as “delinquences, according to the circumstances and atrocity thereof, and according to equity” as well as giving rise to a “civil action for damage and interest”.2 The protection afforded to liberty by the common law was enhanced by the Act of 1701 “For preventing wrongous Imprisonments and against undue delayes in tryals”.3 This “rough equivalent of the English Habeas Corpus procedure”4 addressed some of the grievances set out in the Claim of Right of 16895 by providing for the award of compensation, at a level dependent upon social status and the length of imprisonment, where appropriate time limits had not been observed in bringing to trial and sentencing those suspected of “capital or bailable” offences.6 The financial tariff specified in the 1701 Act indicated the high value placed on liberty, and comparable sums were also seen where actions were brought under the common law.7  1 Stair, Inst 1.9.4; Bankton, Inst 1.2.69; Erskine, Inst 4.4.31; Bell Principles §§ 2034–2042.  2 Stair, Inst 1.2.16.  3 RPS 1700/10/234, APS x, 272 c 6 (repealed in part by the Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1906 Sch 1, Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 Sch 10 Pt I, and Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1964 Sch 1). On the background to this legislation, and procedural reform in the late 17th century aimed at protection of the accused, see J Cairns, “Historical Introduction”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann, A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 1, 14 at 122; Lin v HM Advocate [2012] HCJAC 151, 2014 SLT 173 per Lord Justice-Clerk Carloway at para 16. For 20th-century application of the statute and discussion by Sheriff I D Macphail QC, see Herron v A, B, C, and D 1977 SLT (Sh Ct) 24. 4 See J Irvine Smith, “The Rise of Modern Scots Law, 1660–1707”, in G C H Paton (ed), Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Stair Society vol 20, 1958) 44 at 46. Hume devotes a chapter to the 1701 Act, equating it with the Habeas Corpus Act of Charles II: Hume, Comm, vol 2, ch 4 at 98ff. See also remarks by Lord Cameron in HMA v R 2002 SLT 834 at para 3 (revd [2002] UKPC D 3, 2003 SC (PC) 21). 5 RPS 1689/3/108, APS ix, 38 c 28. 6 For circumstances not included within the ambit of the 1701 Act, see Bell, Principles § 2036. The common law remained the source of remedy in relation to lesser offences, or if the pursuer’s complaint related not to time limits and due process but to the absence of justification for the detention. 7 See e.g. Peacock v Allan (1704) Mor 17065 (in which £2,000 Scots was claimed (unsuccessfully, as confinement was ultimately held to be justified) as the “penalty for a gentleman” and “£33 half a merk per diem so long as he was detained”); Robertson v Pedison (1705) Mor 17067 (in which a tailor claimed £2,000 Scots in a common law action against his neighbour, a shoemaker). Even valuing the Scottish pound at one-twelfth of the pound sterling (see W A Wilson, The Scottish Law of Debt, 2nd edn (1991) para 1.2), these were substantial sums.

Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty   573

In Scotland, therefore, liberty has traditionally been seen as “the most precious right”8 – one which is “inestimable”9 yet reparable. In Lord Balgray’s more worldly turn of phrase, from the early nineteenth century, “liberty is as much the pursuer’s property as the sixpence in his pocket”.10 But then, as now, liberty was not absolute but might sometimes be “lawfully abridged” in conformity with the rules of criminal procedure.11 This chapter considers the circumstances in which deprivation of liberty is to be considered wrongful, and therefore reparable, as well as those in which no remedy arises.

17.02

(1) The meaning of confinement As stated by the Supreme Court in R (on the application of Jalloh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, “the essence of imprisonment is being made to stay in a particular place by another person”,12 typically but not invariably by confinement within four walls. Egress from that space may be barred by various means, typically physical barriers such as locked doors but also by physical constraint, physical intimidation by individuals such as policemen or guards,13 or even by the threat of a legal or administrative process. Thus the imposition of a curfew between certain hours of day, enforced by threat of criminal sanction or electronic tagging, is to be regarded as confinement for these purposes.14 A person may also be deprived of liberty where escape from a particular location has been rendered physically impossible, for example where the person had been left on an island in dangerous waters with no safe means of reaching the mainland.15 A person is not deprived of liberty merely by being enticed under false pretences to travel to a location to which he or she would not otherwise have gone.16 Similarly, partial obstruction of freedom of movement is not regarded as depriving a person of liberty. In the leading English case of Bird v Jones,17 the defendants had blocked Hammersmith Bridge with a  8 Stair, Inst 1.2.5. While some editions feature the wording “a most precious right”, a persuasive case is made that Stair’s authorial holograph read “the most precious right”: see A Wilson, “The Textual Tradition of Stair’s Institutions”, in H L MacQueen (ed), Miscellany Seven (Stair Society vol 62, 2015) 1 at 84–91.  9 Stair, Inst 1.9.4. 10 Anderson v Smith 26 November 1814 FC. 11 Bell, Principles § 2034. 12 [2020] UKSC 4, [2021] AC 262 per Lady Hale at para 24. 13 See e.g. Austin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKHL 5, [2009] 1 AC 564 (demonstrators confined within Oxford Circus in London). 14 R (on the application of Jalloh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 4, [2021] AC 262; Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ and others [2007] UKHL 45, [2008] 1 AC 385. 15 Or perhaps, like Brünnhilde in Wagner’s Die Walküre, placed comatose on a rock and surrounded by a ring of fire. The example in the text is suggested by McFadzean v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union [2007] VSCA 289. 16 See R v Hendy-Freegard [2007] EWCA Crim 1236, [2008] QB 57. 17 Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QB 742.

17.03

17.04

574   The Law of Delict in Scotland

17.05

seating enclosure for spectators watching a regatta. The plaintiff was forcibly prevented from pushing past to cross the bridge. A claim for false imprisonment failed because the court held that, although the plaintiff’s passage was blocked in one direction, he was free to go as he pleased in all others; partial restraint of will could not be regarded as actionable imprisonment. A means of egress, even if inconvenient, prevents confinement from being complete, although that means of egress must be reasonable and free from danger.18 Where confinement is total, a wrong is committed even if the period is brief. In Mackenzie v Cluny Hill Hydropathic Co Ltd,19 a relevant case was pled where the pursuer claimed to have been forcibly detained in a room for fifteen minutes. However, the relative brevity of the period of detention has a direct bearing on the harm suffered and therefore on the sum awarded by way of compensation.20

(2) Article 5 ECHR and deprivation of liberty 17.06

Article 5(1) ECHR provides that: “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.”

The “following cases” include, for example, detention following conviction by a competent court. Importantly, the concept of deprivation of liberty for the purposes of Article 5 does not in all circumstances coincide with that entailed in common law delictual liability; indeed it has been held by the Supreme Court that it would be undesirable for these two concepts to be fully aligned.21 In judging whether individuals have been deprived of their liberty in contravention of Article 5, Strasbourg jurisprudence adopts a multi-factorial approach, weighing up the con-

18 See Burton v Davies and General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp Ltd [1953] State Reports Queensland 26, holding that the plaintiff had been falsely imprisoned by being driven fast in a truck so as to prevent her getting out. As Townley J explained, at 30: “If I lock a person in a room with a window from which he may jump to the ground at the risk of life or limb, I cannot be heard to say that he was not imprisoned because he was free to jump from the window.” 19 Mackenzie v Cluny Hill Hydropathic Co Ltd 1908 SC 200; see also Walker v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2014] EWCA Civ 897, [2015] 1 WLR 312; Warner v Riddiford (1858) 4 CB (NS) 180. 20 See e.g. the English case of Walker v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2014] EWCA Civ 897, [2015] 1 WLR 312, in which damages of £5 were awarded after the claimant had been illegally detained in a doorway by the police for just a few seconds. 21 R (on the application of Jalloh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 4, [2021] AC 262 per Lady Hale at para 33 (an English case, but the considerations supporting non-alignment are equally applicable in Scotland).

Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty   575

text and circumstances of confinement against assertions that confinement was in the interests of the common good,22 and making allowance for the separate treatment in the ECHR of “restriction of movement”.23 Accordingly, deprivation of liberty can be wrongful at common law without being wrongful under Article 5 for the purposes of a claim under the Human Rights Act 1998, or indeed the other way around.24 The distinction is illustrated by the English case of Austin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.25 The claimants there had been “kettled” by police officers, who compelled them to remain within Oxford Circus for several hours until a violent demonstration in the surrounding streets had been dispersed. In principle, this constituted the tort of false imprisonment, although in the particular circumstances it was found justified by the common law principle of necessity, in that confinement was necessary to prevent breach of the peace. In the light of the threat to public safety, it was further held that there had been no deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5.26

(3) The harm suffered Where P is deprived of liberty as a result of a deliberate act by D, the affront27 thereby inflicted is in itself sufficient to give rise to an entitlement to compensation. In this a parallel may be drawn with the English tort of false arrest, which is actionable per se, even without proof of financial loss or physical or mental injury.28 In quantifying damages a sum may attributed to the initial

22 R (on the application of Jalloh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 4, [2021] AC 262 per Lady Hale at paras 29 and 33. For discussion of this approach, see J Murdoch, Reed and Murdoch: Human Rights Law in Scotland, 4th edn (2017) para 4.154. 23 As dealt with in ECHR Fourth Protocol Art 2. (On the distinction between deprivation of liberty and restrictions on the freedom of movement, see Reed and Murdoch: Human Rights Law in Scotland para 4.154.) This provision has not been ratified by the UK, but the ECtHR has held that “Article 5 should not, in principle, be interpreted in such a way as to incorporate the requirements of Protocol No.4 in respect of states which have not ratified it, including the United Kingdom”: Austin v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 14 at para 55. 24 R (on the application of Jalloh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 4, [2021] AC 262 per Lady Hale at para 34. See e.g. HL v United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 32, to the effect that Art 5(1) was infringed in such circumstances, although the domestic court had ruled that there was no false imprisonment (of an “informal patient” in a psychiatric institution) for the purposes of English law. 25 [2009] UKHL 5, [2009] 1 AC 564; see also Walker v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2014] EWCA Civ 897, [2015] 1 WLR 312. 26 The reasoning of the ECtHR followed that of the domestic courts in holding that there had been no deprivation of liberty in terms of Art 5: Austin v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 14. 27 The injury to feelings caused thereby constitutes personal injury for the purposes of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, so that actions are subject to a three-year limitation period (s 17): see Barclay v Chief Constable of the Northern Constabulary 1986 SLT 562. 28 R (on the application of Kambadzi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 23, [2011] 1 WLR 1299 per Lady Hale at para 74.

17.07

576   The Law of Delict in Scotland

17.08

shock of being detained,29 with a further amount to compensate loss of liberty, calculated according to the period of detention.30 In one English case,31 where detention was unlawful but there was in any event a basis for lawful detention, nominal damages only were considered appropriate. There was held to be no loss since the claimants would have remained in detention even without the tortious conduct of the defendant.32 The entitlement to compensation in cases where deprivation of liberty is the consequence of the defender’s negligence is discussed separately below.33

(4) Awareness by the detained person 17.09

What if a person is unaware of the fact of detention? According to the US Restatement Second of Torts, there is no liability for false imprisonment unless the person knows of the confinement “or is harmed by it”.34 The Restatement commentators argue that, if a person has not suffered the mental disturbance of being made aware of the confinement, his or her “mere dignitary interest in being free from an interference with his personal liberty which he has only discovered later is not of sufficient importance to justify the recovery of the nominal damages involved”. In English law, by contrast, House of Lords authority35 provides a remedy for the tort of false imprisonment even if the claimant was unaware of the fact of detention at the relevant time, for example because the claimant was unconscious, heavily intoxicated, or otherwise mentally incapacitated, or simply because the claimant did not appreciate at that moment that egress from a particular location was barred.36 On this approach, the “supreme importance” 37 29 But cf Shehadeh v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] CSOH 139, 2014 SLT 199, affd [2014] CSIH 91, 2015 SC 295, in which no award was made for initial shock where the petitioner had previously been in lawful detention and had not yet been released at the point when detention became unlawful. 30 Where that period is protracted, a tapering scale is to be applied (in order to maintain proportionality with personal injury awards): Shehadeh v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] CSOH 139, 2014 SLT 199 per Lord Tyre at paras 30–33 (affd [2014] CSIH 91, 2015 SC 295). 31 R (on the application of Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 1 AC 245, [2012] 1 AC 245. 32 For further discussion of Lumba, see para 31.06 below. 33 See paras 17.49–17.51 below. 34 American Law Institute, Restatement Second of Torts §§ 35 and 42. It is notable that the Reporters found little authority in support of this provision, and indeed noted New York and Massachusetts case law in which compensation had been awarded without the victim having been aware of the confinement. The Restatement was considered by Lord Griffiths in Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692 at 703, but its formulation was rejected in light of the “supreme importance” of personal liberty. 35 Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692, endorsed in R (on the application of Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12, [2012] 1 AC 245 per Lord Dyson at para 64. 36 See Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co (1920) 122 LT 44 per Atkin LJ at 53–54. 37 Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692 per Lord Griffiths at 703.

Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty   577

attached to the liberty of the individual means that a remedy is provided for its loss even if no physical or psychological injury has resulted. While there is no Scottish authority directly in point, it is suggested that the English approach should be followed. In view of the high value placed upon liberty, from the Institutional writers onwards, an affront to dignity of this nature deserves to be compensated, even where it derives from the later discovery of the fact of imprisonment. In practical terms, however, an initial lack of awareness is likely to affect the amount awarded by way of compensation.38

B. DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY BY PRIVATE PERSONS In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, claims were frequently brought alleging wrongful imprisonment for debt, or wrongful application of a warrant de meditatione fugae (where a debtor was thought to be contemplating flight), but imprisonment for debt has now all but disappeared in practice39 and abuse of such procedures is not considered further here. The general principle is, as stated by Stair, that mere “matters of utility and profit” do not provide a pretext for deprivation of liberty.40 In similar vein English41 and Commonwealth42 authority suggests that the courts will not excuse detention by a creditor, however briefly, for the purpose of forcing payment of a debt, and that there is no justification for interference with liberty unless a crime has been committed. A person who attempts to detain a non-paying customer may therefore be found liable for the direct consequences of the detention, including the cost of “reasonable steps taken by the claimant to bring the detention to an end”.43

17.10

(1) Inferring intention As discussed in chapter 15, deprivation of liberty, as an infringement of a key personality right, is a category of liability in which intention is readily 38 Walker, Delict 682 asserts that “a person may be ‘detained’ without his knowing it, while asleep or drunk or unconscious or a lunatic, though damages would be affected by the complainer’s knowledge or not of his detention”. The references offered are the mutually contradictory authority of the English case law noted above as well as the Restatement. 39 Debtors (Scotland) Act 1880 s 4, as amended by the Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987 s 108, Sch 6 para 8. 40 Stair, Inst 1.2.5. 41 Sunbolf v Alford (1838) 3 M and W 248 (innkeeper liable to guest whom he detained in order to coerce him into paying bill for “tea and victuals”; one individual could not detain another for debt without process of law). 42 Bahner v Marwest Hotel Co [1970] 6 DLR (3d) 322, affd [1970] 12 DLR (3d) 646; also Vignoli v Sydney Harbour Casino [1999] NSWSC 1113. 43 Hicks v Young [2015] EWHC 1144 (QB) per Edis J at para 38. In Hicks, the claimant’s escape attempt involved jumping from a moving car, which was considered unreasonable, and therefore the driver was not liable under that head.

17.11

578   The Law of Delict in Scotland

inferred.44 A court would be entitled to infer that someone who pushed a person into a room and locked the door intended to deprive that person of liberty, since people do not generally behave in this way without intending such a result. No form of privilege is available to a private person detaining another, and thus there is no requirement to prove malice in the sense of hostile motive: ordinary intention is sufficient. Thus in Mackenzie v Cluny Hill Hydropathic Co Ltd,45 for example, the pursuer’s claim that she had been subject to “illegal and improper”46 detention by a hotel manager was held to be relevant where her pleadings referred to this as “wrongous” but made no additional reference to malicious motive on the manager’s part.

(2) Citizen’s arrest 17.12

A private individual may lawfully effect a “citizen’s arrest” in the narrow circumstances where the arrester has witnessed the arrestee commit a serious crime, or where there are circumstances that are strongly indicative of the arrestee having committed a crime,47 or possibly where a crime has recently been perpetrated upon the arrester and the person responsible has been pointed out by another witness.48 In the case of shopkeepers, if there is well-founded reason for enquiry, a person suspected of shoplifting may be detained for a short period to investigate whether that person is in possession of stolen goods.49 However, the period of detention and the force used must be restricted to what is absolutely necessary for the purposes of the specific investigation, and even if suspicions turn out to be wellfounded, there should be no unreasonable delay in transferring the suspect to police custody.50 A purported arrest that does not meet these criteria is wrongful, and therefore actionable; there is no additional requirement to demonstrate malice on the part of the arrester.51

(3) Consent by the detainee 17.13

There is no liability where those detained have consented to their detention, and it is possible for such consent to be given implicitly. Two decisions from 44 See para 15.13 above. 45 1908 SC 200. The issue with which the report is primarily concerned is the vicarious liability of the hotel for its manager. 46 1908 SC 200 at 202. 47 Wightman v Lees 2000 SLT 111. 48 Renton and Brown, Criminal Procedure para 6.20. 49 John Lewis & Co v Tims [1952] AC 676. 50 John Lewis & Co v Tims [1952] AC 676. 51 E.g. White v Brown [1983] CLY 972 (in which the elderly plaintiff was detained for 15 minutes in a shop changing-cubicle); Spark v Appraisal Security Services [1994] CLY 1470. See also Donnelly v Safeway Stores plc 2003 SC 236, and cf Neville v C&A Modes 1945 SC 175 (in which the pursuer raised an (unsuccessful) action in defamation against shop owners whose employees detained her on wrongful suspicion of shoplifting).

Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty   579

the beginning of the last century, one Australian, one English, explore the circumstances from which consent might be inferred. In Robinson v Balmain New Ferry Co,52 a river ferry company operated a turnstile arrangement for foot passengers. The turnstiles were situated on one bank of the river only, so that passengers entering or leaving the wharf area on that side required to pass through and pay a penny. The plaintiff paid to enter but decided to leave without taking the ferry. When he refused the turnstile operator’s demand that he should pay a further penny to leave, his way was barred and he was, in effect, detained on the wharf. His subsequent claim for wrongful imprisonment was unsuccessful on the basis that he had been “merely called upon to leave the wharf in the way in which he contracted to leave it”.53 Similar reasoning was applied in Herd v Weardale Steel, Coal and Coke Co54 in which the plaintiff was one of a group of miners who stopped work mid-shift due to a dispute with their employers over safety conditions. They asked to be brought to the surface by lift, the only means available, but the employers refused to operate the lift immediately and the miners were obliged to wait underground for twenty minutes. A claim for false imprisonment failed, and the defence of volenti non fit injuria was upheld, since the plaintiff was deemed to have consented to the risk of being detained below ground.55 Reference was made to Robinson v Balmain New Ferry Co and an interpretation based upon volenti explicitly applied to that case.56 It is unclear whether these cases remain good law. They date from an era when the balance between sanctity of contract and the “convenience of business enterprise” on the one hand and the interests of individual liberty on the other was differently regarded. A century later it seems less likely that consent to confinement would be so readily implied. In both cases the restoration of liberty to the plaintiffs would have involved the defendants in some degree of procedural or practical inconvenience, but it has been argued that: “Immense and imminent inconvenience must probably be shown to justify overriding a claim to personal liberty. Consent to submission of liberty is always revocable unless substantial inconvenience . . . is involved in the meeting of consent”.57 It is doubtful whether a court today would readily preference business convenience over personal liberty.

52 53 54 55

[1910] AC 295. [1910] AC 295 per Lord Loreburn LC at 299. [1915] AC 67. [1915] AC 67 per Viscount Haldane LC at 71: “when a man goes down a mine, from which access to the surface does not exist in the absence of special facilities given on the part of the owner of the mine, he is only entitled to the use of these facilities . . . on the terms on which he has entered”; also Lord Shaw at 75. 56 [1915] AC 67 per Viscount Haldane LC at 72. 57 See K F Tan, “A Misconceived Issue in the Tort of False Imprisonment” (1981) 44 MLR 166 at 176.

17.14

17.15

580   The Law of Delict in Scotland

(4) Human trafficking 17.16

The “stealing” of people58 – abduction, or “plagium”, of adults and children, often lamented in Scottish folklore – had ceased to be a widespread problem by the eighteenth century.59 However, in more recent times the issue of wrongful detention has arisen again in the context of trafficking of foreign nationals and forced labour.60 There seems little question that the Scottish courts would follow modern English authority in recognising that deprivation of liberty in such circumstances gives rise to delictual liability.61

C. DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS (1) Deprivation of liberty by police officers (a) Lawfulness of detention and arrest 17.17

17.18

Liberty, as Bell observed, may sometimes be “lawfully abridged”.62 The context in which individuals are most commonly deprived of their liberty is within the criminal justice process. The vast majority of such cases do not present grounds for delictual liability, since the circumstances are privileged, in the sense that arrest or detention has been carried out by public officials with lawful powers so to do. In addition to those circumstances where they are acting under the authority of a warrant, the police have traditionally been allowed widely

58 Stair, Inst 1.2.16. 59 See J Blackie, “Unity in Diversity: the History of Personality Rights in Scots Law”, in N R Whitty and R Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective (2009) 31 at para 2.3.3. 60 See Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015 s 1, creating the offence of human trafficking. 61 AT v Dulghieru [2009] EWHC 225 (QB), [2009] All ER (D) 194 (Feb), in which exemplary damages were awarded. In England and Wales a statutory remedy is now available under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 s 8, which provides for the making of slavery and trafficking reparation orders. This provision does not extend to Scotland. 62 Bell, Principles § 2034. See further ECHR Art 5(1) listing the following as not inconsistent with the Art 4 right to liberty: “(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.”

Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty   581

drawn powers of detention and arrest.63 Such powers are set out in the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016, section 1: “(1) A constable may arrest a person without a warrant if the constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person has committed or is committing an offence.   (2) In relation to an offence not punishable by imprisonment, a constable may arrest a person under subsection (1) only if the constable is satisfied that it would not be in the interests of justice to delay the arrest in order to seek a warrant for the person’s arrest.   (3) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (2), it would not be in the interests of justice to delay an arrest in order to seek a warrant if the constable reasonably believes that unless the person is arrested without delay the person will– (a)  continue committing the offence, or (b)  obstruct the course of justice in any way, including by–      (i)  seeking to avoid arrest, or      (ii)  interfering with witnesses or evidence.”

There is thus considerable flexibility in determining whether arrest without warrant is lawful, factoring in: whether there are “reasonable grounds” for suspicion; the constable’s perception of what is in the “interests of justice”; and the constable’s “reasonable belief” as to the consequences of not carrying out the arrest. There is further power under section 13 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 to detain persons for the purposes of requiring them to identify themselves or explaining suspicious circumstances. In the event of challenge to lawfulness, events are not looked at with the benefit of hindsight,64 and some concession is made for “errors of judgment . . . in dangerous or difficult, fast moving circumstances”.65 Moreover, the issue of lawfulness is not to be regarded as settled one way or another by the subsequent release, or as the case may be conviction, of the person arrested.66 It can be seen therefore that a broad-based approach to lawfulness is adopted, reflecting the varied and often pressurised contexts in which the decision whether to detain or arrest must be taken. Further discussion of police powers must be left to specialist texts.67 The focus of the present

63 See e.g. R W Renton and H H Brown, Criminal Procedure According to the Law of Scotland, 1st edn (1909) 32, indicating that the onus passed to the police officer, if challenged, to provide an “explanation” where an arrest was made without a warrant, but there was considerable latitude in the range of circumstances on which that explanation might rely. 64 McLeod v Shaw 1981 SLT (Notes) 93 at 94. 65 Woodward v Chief Constable, Fife Constabulary 1998 SLT 1342 per Lord Kingarth at 1350. 66 Wood v North British Railway Co (1899) 1 F 562 per Lord Justice-Clerk Macdonald at 568. 67 See in particular Renton and Brown, Criminal Procedure ch 6.

17.19

582   The Law of Delict in Scotland

section is the question of liability once the lawfulness or otherwise of deprivation of liberty has been determined.

(b) Lawful deprivation of liberty: the burden of proving malice 17.20

17.21

In circumstances where detention or arrest was lawful in terms of a warrant duly issued, or statutory or common law powers, an action lies in delict only if due process was abused in the sense that the person carrying out the arrest acted with malice.68 As discussed in chapter 15, this means that the official in question must be shown to have acted from a bad or improper motive.69 Unsurprisingly, it is rare for a successful claim to be brought in such circumstances. The lawful powers of the police to detain and arrest are extensive. If officers have acted within them, it is likely to be extremely challenging to establish malevolent motivation sufficient to convert an otherwise lawful process into an unlawful one, even in cases where there was evidence of personal ill-will towards the person detained.70 While cases in which malice renders otherwise lawful deprivation of liberty actionable are unusual, the conduct of officers in detaining a person may sometimes constitute a different delict. The use of unnecessary force, for example, may constitute the separate delict of assault, irrespective of the lawfulness or otherwise of the arrest.71 In McKie v Chief Constable of Strathclyde,72 the pursuer claimed damages (in the event, unsuccessfully) not because of her arrest, which was in implement of a warrant, but because the manner in which the arrest and detention were carried out allegedly constituted “an invasion of her privacy and liberty and an assault” upon her person.73

68 See e.g. Harvey v Sturgeon 1912 SC 974 per Lord Salvesen at 976–977, commenting that if the defenders were able to establish that they were justified in arresting the pursuer in terms of the Glasgow Police Act 1866 s 88, then, in principle, liability might still arise if it could be shown that they had acted maliciously. On the modern law, see e.g. McKinney v Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police 1998 SLT (Sh Ct) 80 per Sheriff Principal G L Cox QC at 82–83. 69 See paras 15.10–15.12 and 15.20 above, and see e.g. Beaton v Ivory (1887) 14 R 1057. 70 See Arbuckle v Taylor (1815) 3 Dow 160, where evidence that one of the defenders “did not like” the pursuer (per Lord Eldon at 181) was insufficient for the purposes of establishing malicious prosecution where there had been “probable cause” for suspecting criminal activity. See also Beaton v Ivory (1887) 14 R 1057, in which Lord President Inglis allowed that there was “a kind of recklessness” about a sheriff’s order to detain an entire township, but there was a strong presumption that a public officer exercising lawful powers was doing his duty “honestly and bona fide”. 71 See e.g. Hill v Campbell (1905) 8 F 220 (in which the arrest was held to have been lawful, but in which Lord President Dunedin observed at 224–225 that separate consideration might be due in such cases to whether undue force had been used); Henderson v Chief Constable, Fife Police 1988 SLT 361 (in which the arrest and detention were in themselves lawful, but compelling a female detainee to remove her underwear constituted an actionable breach of “liberty and privacy”). 72 McKie v Chief Constable of Strathclyde 2003 SC 317, noted at para 16.39 above. Despite use of the term “wrongful arrest” in the headnote to McKie, that issue was not raised in McKie’s pleadings. A warrant had been issued for her arrest, but she had apparently accepted its legality, as reported in the Outer House proceedings: 2002 Rep LR 137. 73 As detailed in the judgment of the Lord Ordinary, Lord Emslie: 2002 Rep LR 137 at para 8.

Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty   583

(c) Unlawful deprivation of liberty Police privilege is, however, contingent upon the lawfulness of their conduct. A flexible approach may be adopted in determining lawfulness, but where it can be established that a person was deliberately deprived of liberty in circumstances that were unlawful, such wrongful conduct is prima facie actionable and, as discussed in chapter 15,74 there is no further requirement for “motive” malice to be addressed.75 As summarised in the sheriff court case of McKinney v Chief Constable Strathclyde Police, for example:76

17.22

“[T]he decided cases can be divided between those in which the pursuer avers that he or she has been deprived of liberty unlawfully – in which case averments of malice are unnecessary – and those in which the pursuer concedes that the constable had the power to arrest or detain but that the exercise of that power on the particular occasion was unwarranted – in which case malice must be averred and proved.”

Two recent Outer House cases have, however, cast doubt on this straightforward binary classification, and argued that a third category of police conduct must be considered.

(d) Privilege: unlawful conduct within the police officer’s “competence”? In the Outer House case of Whitehouse v Gormley77 it was held that where police officers have acted unlawfully but nevertheless within their “competence” they enjoy a form of privilege which means that a relevant case can be made against them only if the detainee offers to prove in addition that they acted with malice. In this regard the court drew upon the reasoning in the earlier Outer House case of Woodward v Chief Constable, Fife Constabulary78 In effect, this approach begins with the traditional binary division into: (1) cases in which an arrest was lawful; and (2) cases in which the arrest was unlawful, but it then divides category (2) in turn into (a) cases within and (b) cases outwith the officer’s “competence”. In a category (1) case, as indicated above, liability arises only if malice can be established. On the analysis in Whitehouse v Gormley, however, that is also true in a category (2)(a) case. Only with category (2)(b), therefore – encompassing situations which, as we will see, only rarely arise in practice – is there liability without malice. 74 75 76 77 78

See para 15.19 above. See e.g. Louden v Chief Constable of Police Scotland [2014] SC DUND 18, 2014 SLT (Sh Ct) 97. 1998 SLT (Sh Ct) 80 per Sheriff Principal G L Cox QC at 82. [2018] CSOH 93, 2020 SCLR 27, revd on a different issue [2019] CSIH 52, 2020 SC 133. 1998 SLT 1342. Lord Kingarth summarised at 1350: “the actings of a police office in the course of or in discharge of his ordinary duty would attract . . . privilege . . . and . . . if he was doing that which he as an officer generally had power to do, it would not be enough for a pursuer who sought damages to prove that his or her actings in a particular case were wrongful (that is that they exceeded such constraints as might be imposed by common law or by statute on those powers)”.

17.23

584   The Law of Delict in Scotland

17.24

On the basis of Whitehouse, conduct is outwith competence (and so, if unlawful, falls within category (2)(b)) only if it is:79 “‘manifestly outwith the ambit of the defender’s official powers and duties.’ This connotes an objective test based on a comparison of the conduct involved with the ordinary duties of the official. Thus, by way of example, if a police constable detains someone, it will not cease to be within the general ambit of his powers if he did so for no good reason because of spite and ill will, though if those factors can be established the privilege flies off.”

According to this reasoning it is said that:80 “[T]he law accepts that an official can act without proper justification and thus unlawfully, and cause harm to another, for example loss of liberty, but escape civil liability in the absence of proof of deliberate wrongful motivation. Thus the touchstone is whether or not the official is genuinely and honestly trying to do something which falls within the four corners of his authorisation.”

17.25

An example of actings that were unlawful but regarded as within the officer’s “competence” (i.e. category (2)(a) above) can be seen in Woodward v Chief Constable, Fife Constabulary.81 A police officer purported to detain the pursuer under statutory powers which allow detention where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting an offence had been committed.82 But although there were indeed grounds for suspicion, the arresting officer herself had not been involved in the prior investigations and had detained the pursuer only on being requested to do so by colleagues. She personally had no reasonable grounds for suspecting the pursuer and was not therefore acting within her statutory powers. At proof Lord Kingarth stated that the essential question in determining the scope of privilege available to police officers was whether the impugned actions lay within the “competence” of the police officer, broadly construed so as to mean anything done “in the course of or in discharge of his ordinary duty”.83 In his view an arrest that was “wrongful”84 but within the competence of a police officer in this general sense would found an action of damages only if shown to have been made without probable cause and with malice.85 Accordingly, in the 79 80 81 82 83 84

[2018] CSOH 93, 2020 SCLR 27 at para 163. [2018] CSOH 93, 2020 SCLR 27 at para 157. 1998 SLT 1342. Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980 s 2(1). 1998 SLT 1342 at 1350. I.e. the officer had “exceeded such constraints as might be imposed by common law or by statute on [her] powers”: 1998 SLT 1342 at 1350. 85 1998 SLT 1342 at 1350. Lord Kingarth reached “this view not without a degree of satisfaction in this case, where it seemed to me that the pursuer’s ultimate claim in this respect was on any view, whatever the legal basis, somewhat artificial, given the accepted circumstances that the investigating officers had every entitlement to detain her and where it was, it seemed to me, a claim to a degree opportunistic”.

Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty   585

absence of malice the claim for wrongful detention could not succeed. This expansive reading of what lies within a police officer’s “ordinary duty” means that, excepting the most egregious circumstances, it can almost always encompass detention or arrest, even if unlawful. The consequence is that malice, and with it the problems of identifying “motivation”, must be addressed in practically all cases where arrest is challenged, even where the arrest itself was outwith officers’ lawful powers. It remains to be seen whether the decisions in Woodward and Whitehouse will be followed in future. It has been argued in greater detail elsewhere86 that the attribution of privilege to unlawful arrest is problematic on a number of grounds, even if it was within officers’ competence in this broad sense. First, leading authorities cited in support of this extended form of privilege relate to circumstances where the disputed police conduct, though controversial, was ultimately determined to be lawful.87 Secondly, the requirement to establish lack of probable cause and malice can be traced back to cases of malicious prosecution and abuse of procedure. But it is one thing to insist on proof of malice where the pursuer’s argument is that lawful procedure has been subverted; it is quite another to insist upon this where the pursuer offers to prove that he or she has been deprived of liberty by an unlawful process.88 Thirdly, insistence upon malice in cases of unlawful arrest is inconsistent with English and other comparative authority, which clearly distinguishes malicious prosecution, where malice is required, from false imprisonment, where it is not.89 On those grounds, it is argued here that the binary distinction recognised in McKinney v Chief Constable Strathclyde Police90 is correct. In other words a distinction should be drawn between cases in which the pursuer avers that he or she has been deprived of liberty unlawfully – in which case averments of malice are unnecessary – and those in which the pursuer concedes that the police officer had lawful power to arrest or detain but that the exercise of that power on the particular occasion was unwarranted – in which case malice must be averred and proved.

86 E Reid, “Liability for Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty” (2020) 24 EdinLR 175; see also P W Ferguson, “Malice and Negligence” 2007 SLT (News) 127 at 129, commenting that the decision in Woodward was “erroneous”. 87 Leading cases cited in this context include Beaton v Ivory (1887) 14 R 1057 and Robertson v Keith 1936 SC 29. 88 For further discussion, see Reid, “Liability for Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty”. 89 See on this point M I Schwartzman, “Tortious Liability for False Imprisonment in Louisiana” (1942) 17 Tulane Law Review 81 at 84; see also American Law Institute, Restatement Second of Torts § 35. § 44 states that “If an act which causes another’s confinement is done with the intention of causing the confinement, the actor is subject to liability although his act is not inspired by personal hostility or desire to offend.” 90 1998 SLT (Sh Ct) 80 per Sheriff Principal G L Cox QC at 82.

17.26

586   The Law of Delict in Scotland

(e) Vicarious liability 17.27

The Chief Constable of Scotland is liable for “any unlawful conduct” on the part of police constables “in the carrying out (or purported carrying out)” of their functions.91 There is little doubt that the carrying out of an unlawful arrest would be considered to be conduct in the performance or purported performance of police functions, and that vicarious liability would therefore arise.92

(2) Infringement of the rights of those already imprisoned (a) Wrongful prolongation of imprisonment 17.28

An official who detains a person in custody beyond the date at which detention is lawful commits a wrong for which reparation is due, on the same basis as that outlined above in relation to wrongful arrest. In other words, intentional deprivation of liberty is prima facie wrongful, but public officials may claim privilege in circumstances where they have lawful justification for their actions, subject to rebuttal by proof of malice. That privilege is, however, contingent upon the lawfulness of the justification. If, therefore, the conduct was unlawful, privilege falls away, leaving the detained person with a right of action without any further requirement for “motive” malice to be addressed.93 In practical terms there may be little to separate this approach from that adopted in England, where the House of Lords has indicated that wrongful prolongation of imprisonment constitutes the tort of false imprisonment, to which strict liability attaches. In R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex p Evans94 a prison governor had been misinformed as to the method of calculating the length of the claimant’s period of custody with the result that the claimant spent fifty-nine days too long in custody. Although the governor was himself blameless in following Home Office instructions, his good faith was held to be irrelevant and damages were found due.95 As Lord Steyn stated:96

91 Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 s 24. 92 On vicarious liability for the conduct of police officers, see paras 3.54–3.56 above. 93 On “motive” malice, see paras 15.10–15.12 and 15.19 above. 94 [2001] 2 AC 19. 95 Cf Quinland v Governor of Swaleside Prison [2002] EWCA Civ 174, [2003] QB 306, in which an arithmetical error made in composing the judicial warrant for commitment meant that the length of the plaintiff’s sentence was over-stated by three months. The warrant represented lawful authority and therefore the governor had no option but to obey it. He was therefore held not liable for false imprisonment during the extra period of detention. The Crown Proceedings Act 1947 s 2(5) provided for immunity on the part of the Lord Chancellor’s Department in regard to issuing of the erroneous warrant, although doubt was expressed in Quinland, per Clarke LJ at para 39 and Hale LJ at para 42, whether such immunity would survive in relation to events occurring after the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force. 96 [2001] 2 AC 19 at 28.

Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty   587 “It is common ground that the tort of false imprisonment involves the infliction of bodily restraint which is not expressly or impliedly authorised by the law. The plaintiff does not have to prove fault on the part of the defendant. It is a tort of strict liability.”

As Lord Hope further commented: “The defence of justification must be based upon a rigorous application of the principle that the liberty of the subject can be interfered with only upon grounds which a court will uphold as lawful.”97

(b) Detention of persons subject to deportation orders Where persons subject to deportation orders have been detained in a manner that is found to have been unlawful, damages are due on the same basis as for wrongful deprivation of liberty.98 No question of malice arises. According to Supreme Court authority in an English case, detention is rendered unlawful by a breach of a public law duty which had a “material” bearing on the decision to detain.99 Thus in the English case of R (on the application of Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department100 the claimants had been detained in accordance with an unpublished policy which was at odds with the defendant’s published policy. The exercise of the defendant’s power to detain was held to be tainted by this irregularity to the extent that it was deemed unlawful. It was no defence that the decision to detain could and would have been made lawfully had the published policy been applied.101 A claim for false imprisonment was therefore upheld, although the entitlement was to nominal damages only.102

  97 [2001] 2 AC 19 at 35.  98 Shehadeh v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] CSOH 139, 2014 SLT 199 affd [2014] CSIH 91, 2015 SC 295.  99 R (on the application of Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12, [2012] 1 AC 245 per Lord Dyson at para 68 and Lady Hale at para 207. For commentary, see S Steel, “False Imprisonment and the Fetch of Hypothetical Warrant” (2011) 127 LQR 527. 100 [2011] UKSC 12, [2012] 1 AC 245. 101 As Lady Hale commented at para 205: “The law requires that decisions to detain should be made on rational grounds and in an open and transparent way and not in accordance with arbitrary rules laid down by Government and operated in secret.” 102 The decision was not unanimous. Lord Brown, with whom Lord Rodger agreed, argued (at para 359) that it was “absurd” to hold the tort of false imprisonment to have been established where the detainee would have been detained in any event as per the lawful published policy and detention was thus inevitable. On the other hand, not all those who agreed that the detention had been wrongful were persuaded that false imprisonment was adequately compensated by nominal damages: Lord Hope at para 176 and Lady Hale at para 217 argued for the award of a “conventional sum” in recognition that the claimant’s fundamental constitutional rights had been breached. See also Lewis v Australian Capital Territory [2020] HCA 26, (2020) 381 ALR 375, awarding nominal damages only for wrongful imprisonment where the decision to detain the claimant was made on invalid grounds, but he could in any event have been lawfully imprisoned. For a different approach, emphasising the vindicatory function of damages, in a claim arising out of similar circumstances, see the decision of the Irish Court of Appeal in GE v Commissioner of An Garda Siochana [2021] IECA 113.

17.29

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17.30

Similarly in R (on the application of Kambadzi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,103 decided shortly after Lumba, the Supreme Court held that the failure to review regularly the claimant’s continuing period of detention in the manner stipulated by the defendant’s published guidelines rendered his continuing detention unlawful. Where there was an executive discretion to detain a person without limit of time, the right to liberty required that an action in tort should be available if the discretion was not lawfully exercised.104 In a dissenting judgment, Lord Brown, with whom Lord Rodger agreed, baulked at the suggestion that “any failure to give effect to a self-imposed requirement for periodic review of the continuing detention of those awaiting deportation similarly renders that detention unlawful”.105 Nonetheless, regular reviews in accordance with published policy would appear now to be a procedural obligation that is essential to ensure the continuing lawfulness of detention.106

(c) Lawful detention and the “residual” right to liberty 17.31

In principle an individual who is already in lawful detention “retains all civil rights which are not taken away expressly or by necessary implication”,107 and so the question arises whether an alteration in the mode of imprisonment may sometimes be actionable.108 In R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, ex p Hague,109 two long-term prisoners sought damages for wrongful imprisonment after, respectively, being held in segregation for twenty-eight days and being held in a “strip” cell. However, the content of the prisoners’ “civil rights” was found not to extend to challenging a stricter form of confinement. In dismissing their claims Lord Jauncey reasoned:110 “That a prisoner has a right to sue in respect of torts committed against him in prison is beyond doubt . . . If he is assaulted by a prison officer he may sue for damages, and if he is negligently cared for whereby he sustains 103 [2011] UKSC 23, [2011] 1 WLR 1299. 104 [2011] UKSC 23, [2011] 1 WLR 1299 per Lord Hope at para 40. 105 [2011] UKSC 23, [2011] 1 WLR 1299 at para 108 (and that “assuming such detention to be unlawful, it is to be compensated by no more than a nominal sum in damages”). 106 See R (on the application of Gomes) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 373. 107 Raymond v Honey [1983] 1 AC 1 per Lord Wilberforce at 10, subsequently cited in Scottish cases including Somerville v Scottish Ministers [2006] CSIH 52, 2007 SC 140 and Thomson, Petitioner 1989 SLT 343. 108 For a comparative discussion of English and German case law, distinguishing between restrictions upon personal and residual liberty, see L Lazarus, “Concepts of Liberty Deprivation” (2006) 69 MLR 738. 109 R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, ex p Hague [1992] 1 AC 58. For a comparative perspective, see C Okpaluba, “The Right to the Residual Liberty of a Person in Incarceration: Constitutional and Common Law Perspectives” (2012) 28 South African Journal on Human Rights 458. 110 R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, ex p Hague [1992] 1 AC 58 at 176.

Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty   589 injury to his health he may likewise sue. But does he have such residual liberty, vis-à-vis the governor, as amounts to a right protectable in law? I do not consider that he does. He is lawfully committed to a prison and while there is subject to the Prison Act 1952 and the Prison Rules 1964. His whole life is regulated by the regime. He has no freedom to do what he wants, when he wants. His liberty to do anything is governed by the prison regime. Placing [the first prisoner] in a strip cell and segregating [the second prisoner] altered the conditions under which they were detained but did not deprive them of any liberty which they had not already lost when initially confined.”

Similarly, in Iqbal v Prison Officers Association111 the Prison Officers Association had staged a one-day strike in a particular prison, in response to which the prison governor ordered that prisoners should be kept in their cells rather than being allowed out, as per normal practice. This was held not to constitute false imprisonment because the claimant did not have an actionable right to be released from his cell at any particular time, nor to be permitted to follow the normal regime at all times. But while prisoners may have no “residual” right to personal liberty, this does not mean that they are left without a remedy where other rights are violated, such as when they suffer assault.112 Moreover, Lord Jauncey’s own analysis as Lord Ordinary in the earlier case of Henderson v Chief Constable, Fife Police113 suggested that some form of residual right to liberty remains to detainees, which is infringed where conditions of detention are disproportionate to security needs.114 In Henderson the handcuffing of a male detainee lawfully arrested and held at a police station during an industrial dispute was deemed excessive and constituted a form of “wrongful detention” as perpetrated by the “wrongous use of handcuffs”.115 Moreover, the requirement that a female colleague detained at the same police station should remove her bra while in custody was deemed by his Lordship to be “an interference with her liberty which was not justified in law”.116 Of course this over-zealous measure did not compromise liberty in the sense of freedom of action or movement, and it may be that Henderson is better understood as an affront to dignity, or more specifically, privacy, a term also used in Lord Jauncey’s judgment in Henderson.117 111 [2009] EWCA Civ 1312, [2010] QB 732. 112 E.g. Kaizer v Scottish Ministers [2018] CSIH 36, 2018 SC 491. 113 Henderson v Chief Constable, Fife Police 1988 SLT 361. 114 Cf McDowall v G4S Care and Justice Services (UK) Ltd [2016] SC EDIN 67, 2016 SLT (Sh Ct) 371, in which the prisoner unsuccessfully challenged the use of double, rather than single, handcuffs on hospital outpatient visits as contrary to ECHR Arts 3 and 8, and therefore actionable under the Human Rights Act 1998. 115 1988 SLT 361 at 368. 116 1988 SLT 361 at 367. 117 1988 SLT 361 at 367 and 368, discussed at paras 20.84–20.85 below.

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(3) Deprivation of liberty and judicial immunity 17.33

Judges and magistrates have long been afforded extensive immunity against civil claims. Stair urged against the “punishment” of judges who erred without fraud or guile, for “otherwise no man but a beggar, or a fool, would be a judge”.118 Modern authority similarly suggests that it is not in the interests of the administration of justice to encourage enquiry into judicial motivation:119 “If one judge in a thousand acts dishonestly within his jurisdiction to the detriment of a party before him, it is less harmful to the health of society to leave that party without a remedy than that nine hundred and ninety nine honest judges should be harassed by vexatious litigation alleging malice in the exercise of their proper jurisdiction.”

At an international level, Article 16 of the United Nations’ Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary recommends that:120 “Without prejudice to any disciplinary procedure or to any right of appeal or to compensation from the State, in accordance with national law, judges should enjoy personal immunity from civil suits for monetary damages for improper acts or omissions in the exercise of their judicial functions.”

The extent of immunity accorded to the judiciary at all levels is accordingly far-reaching.

(a) Judges in the superior courts 17.34

A distinction is drawn between judges in the superior courts, including the sheriff court,121 as opposed to those in the lower courts such as the justice of the peace courts.122 Just as in England, judges in the superior courts in Scotland have been held to enjoy broad immunity.123 The relevant principles are to be found in the common law rather than statute,

118 Stair, Inst 4.1.5. 119 Re McC [1985] 1 AC 528 per Lord Bridge at 541; Arthur J S Hall & Co v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615 per Lord Hope at 731. 120 Available at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/IndependenceJudiciary.aspx, endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985. 121 E.g. Russell v Dickson 1997 SC 269; see also Harvey v Dyce (1876) 4 R 265 (slander). 122 McCreadie v Thomson 1907 SC 1176. On the position of “inferior judges”, see also Young v Hay (1679) 3 Bro Sup 276. 123 Hamilton v Anderson (1856) 18 D 1003.

Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty   591

and indicate a high degree of protection.124 The precise boundaries of immunity are not, however, entirely clear. In one of the leading early authorities, Haggart’s Trs v Lord President Hope125 (concerning a claim for defamation), an advocate claimed damages from the then Lord President who, when previously Lord Justice-Clerk, had roundly criticised his pleadings. The House of Lords upheld the decision of the Court of Session to the effect that immunity extended to “language used by a Judge upon the Bench, and any other judicial act”.126 However, when the same case was in the Court of Session, Lord Glenlee had distinguished between “a judicial act in an improper way”, which would attract immunity, and actions that were ultra vires though still in the “character of a judicial act”, which would not.127 Lord Boyle similarly had emphasised that the decision in this case did not mean “that any Judge, acting palpably ultra vires, may not be liable in reparation in the proper way”.128 It has been apparent over the years, however, that only extraordinary conduct is to be classified as “palpably ultra vires”. In an early twentieth-century case involving a magistrate in the Burgh Police Court, Lord Justice-Clerk Macdonald contrasted the position of “judges of the Supreme Court”, suggesting that the immunity of the latter was total.129 This view of things was applied in the Outer House case of Russell v Dickson,130 one of the few modern authorities, where Temporary Judge Coutts QC held that a sheriff could not be personally liable, despite “manifestly wrong” and “unreasonable” behaviour in imprisoning an accused person while enquiries were made into his counsel’s conduct of his case. The sheriff’s order to imprison represented “an unwarranted excess of jurisdiction”, but it was “an act done in [the sheriff’s] judicial capacity”. 131 Immunity was therefore preserved. If the “unwarrantable” and “incompetent” behaviour in Russell did not take the judge outwith 124 See McCreadie v Thomson 1907 SC 1176 per Lord Justice-Clerk Macdonald at 1182: “Upon the question of immunity of the Judges of the Supreme Court there can be no doubt. The principle is clear, and the decisions are emphatic. The principle is that such Judges are the King’s judges directly, bound to administer the law between his subjects, and even between his subjects and himself. To make them amenable to actions of damages for things done in their judicial capacity, to be dealt with by Judges only their equals in authority and by juries, would be to make them not responsible to the King, but subject to other considerations than their duty to him in giving their decisions, and to expose them to be dealt with as servants, not of him, but of the public.” See also Bottomley v Brougham [1908] 1 KB 584 per Chanell J at 587 to similar effect. 125 (1824) 2 Shaw’s App 125. 126 (1824) 2 Shaw’s App 125 per Lord Gifford at 143. 127 (1824) 2 Shaw’s App 125 at 135. 128 (1824) 2 Shaw’s App 125 at 139. 129 McCreadie v Thomson 1907 SC 1176 at 1182. 130 1997 SC 269. 131 1997 SC 269 at 277. Temporary Judge T G Coutts QC doubted whether it could be said to be ultra vires “in the fuller sense” since the pursuer had been on trial for a bailable offence, and there was therefore statutory authority for his detention.

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his judicial capacity, it is not clear what level of egregiousness is required in order for judicial conduct to be so regarded. It was conceded that the outcome of Russell v Dickson was unsatisfactory,132 but it was for the Inner House to decide “whether the time is ripe for reconsideration of Victorian expressions of absolute immunity for a judge, however unreasonably he may be acting while on the bench”.133 However, while immunities in regard to other responsible professions have been in “steady decline”,134 arguments advanced in favour of recasting the boundaries of judicial immunity have not generally found support.135 The entitlement to claim damages under section 7(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 in respect of judicial acts that breach ECHR Article 5(1) is discussed further below.136

(b) Judges in the inferior courts 17.36

The extent of immunity recognised by the common law is more limited in respect of judges in the inferior courts137 including justice of the peace courts138 and other tribunals.139 Justices are protected insofar as they act within “the exercise of their magisterial functions”, but if they act outwith their jurisdiction, there is liability without the need to prove malice.140 In this connection a custodial sentence which is “glaringly illegal” is said to represent a “gross error” in respect of which immunity cannot be

132 1997 SC 269 at 278: “It does, however, seem to be inequitable by today’s standards that a man can spend five days in prison unreasonably and improperly without compensation from some quarter being awarded to him.” 133 1997 SC 268 at 278. 134 J Murphy, “Rethinking Tortious Immunity for Judicial Acts” (2013) 33 Legal Studies 455 at 456; see also case note by A Grahame (1998) 66 SLG 38–39, reflecting that the “historical immunity” of judges was now “less acceptable” to the public. See also para 11.56 above. 135 M Brazier, “Judicial Immunity and the Independence of the Judiciary” [1976] Public Law 397; D Pannick, Judges (1997) 99; A Nicol, “Judicial Immunity and Human Rights” [2006] European Human Rights Law Review 558. For extensive discussion of comparable issues in New Zealand, see NZ Law Commission, Report on Crown Liability and Judicial Immunity: a Response to Baigent’s Case and Harvey v Derrick (NZLC R37, 1997) 45–62. 136 See paras 17.43–17.44 below. 137 McCreadie v Thomson 1907 SC 1176; Young v Hay (1679) 3 Bro Sup 276. 138 The position of summary sheriffs is open to question; stipendiary magistrates previously came within the category of judges in the inferior courts. The Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 abolished the office of stipendiary magistrate and provided that summary sheriffs (an office created by the 2014 Act) might henceforth sit in justice of the peace courts: ss 128–129. However, since summary sheriffs are appointed by the Queen (s 5 of the 2014 Act), it is arguable by reference to the dictum cited from McCreadie v Thomson at n 124 above that they should enjoy the same immunity as judges in the superior courts. On the other hand, it would seem invidious that differing levels of privilege should be extended to justices of the peace and to summary sheriffs sitting in the equivalent courts. 139 See e.g. Thomson v Ross 2001 SLT 807. 140 McCreadie v Thomson 1907 SC 1176. For the role and meaning of malice, see paras 15.09–15.12 above.

Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty   593

claimed.141 On the other hand immunity is not necessarily142 lost if such judges act within their jurisdiction but with malice.143 Ordinarily, however, judges sitting in summary proceedings in justice of the peace courts144 are likely to be able to invoke the qualified immunity provided by the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, section 170(1).145 In principle, they may be found liable in damages in respect of proceedings taken, acts done, or judgments, decrees or sentences passed if a person was imprisoned and the disputed proceedings, act, judgment, decree or sentence was subsequently quashed.146 However, the 1995 Act stipulates that liability is contingent upon proof that the judge acted “maliciously and without probable cause”.147 Moreover, no action lies if the judge establishes that the person was guilty of the offence of which he or she was convicted – or on account of which he or she was apprehended – and that the person suffered no greater punishment than was assigned by law to that offence.148. Section 170 of the 1995 Act confers immunity only in relation to “any summary proceedings under this Act”. The difficult question is to determine the point at which a judge ceases to act “under this Act”, so that the requirement to prove malice falls away.149 In M’Phee v Macfarlane’s Executor,150 Lord President Clyde remarked that if a magistrate “acts in a way in which it is outwith

141 McCreadie v Thomson 1907 SC 1176 per Lord Justice-Clerk Macdonald at 1184, citing Erskine, Inst 1.2.32. See also Ramsay v Coulter and Sprott (1799) Mor App “Wrongous Imprisonment” No 1 (in which no immunity attached where imprisonment followed from proceedings that were “harsh and rapid beyond what the circumstances of the case warranted”); Leitch v Fairy (1711) Mor 13946 (in which the Provost sitting as a judge had committed “manifest palpable injustice, in favour of himself”). 142 See Russell v Dickson 1997 SC 269 per Temporary Judge T G Coutts QC, observing, at 276, that it might be relevant to whether the judge was acting non-judicially that “the judge acted not to advance the proceedings at all but for motives of personal spite or malice”. 143 Thomson v Ross 2001 SLT 807 per Lord Cameron at para 9, referring to Re McC [1985] 1 AC 528, in which “certain of their Lordships reserved their opinion as to whether the common law liability of justices for acts done within their jurisdiction but with malice and without reasonable cause was obsolete in England. That being so, we consider that there may be some merit in this area of the law being reconsidered by a higher court.” 144 Sheriffs are specifically excluded from these provisions: Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s 170(4). On the status of summary sheriffs, see n 138 above. 145 For the equivalent English provisions, see Courts Act 2003 ss 31–32: “No action lies against a justice of the peace in respect of what he does or omits to do – (a) in the execution of his duty as a justice of the peace, and (b) in relation to a matter within his jurisdiction”, but where an action does lie, it must be proved that the justice “acted in bad faith”. 146 Actions must be commenced within two months of the proceeding, act, judgment, decree or sentence founded upon: Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s 170(3). 147 s 170(1)(c), i.e. a claim for wrongful imprisonment does not necessarily arise simply by virtue of the disputed proceeding being quashed. 148 s 170(2). 149 McCreadie v Thomson 1907 SC 1176. 150 M’Phee v Macfarlane’s Exr 1933 SC 163 (concerning the extent of immunity as then provided by the Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act 1908 s 59).

17.37

17.38

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his duty as a magistrate to act, his robe falls from his shoulders”, and the statutory immunity ceases to apply. However, he added, “a magistrate does not necessarily act outside his powers as a magistrate because he makes an honest mistake in applying the law”.151 Thus, on the authority of M’Phee, justices who simply misunderstand their powers are not treated as exceeding their jurisdiction and do not thereby step outwith the protection of section 170.152

(4) Detention in psychiatric institutions 17.39

According to Bell, the “groundless” detention of a person in an asylum founds an action in damages,153 and nineteenth-century case law indicated that a claim might be made where D caused P’s detention “without due enquiry and examination”.154 That general principle remains, but the necessary procedures in regard to compulsory detention of a patient in psychiatric institutions are now prescribed in detail by statute.155 A claim may be made for wrongful deprivation of liberty if these procedures are not observed at the time of admission or at the time stipulated for renewal of the detention. At one time legislation in the form of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 section 122(1)156 provided that no person was liable to civil or criminal proceedings in respect of any act purporting to be done in pursuance of the legislation unless the act was done in bad faith or without reasonable care. There is no equivalent provision, however, in the legislation which replaced the 1984 Act, the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003,157 and with the disappearance of statutory privilege, the good faith of a person detaining a patient in a psychiatric institution does not preclude liability.

151 M’Phee v Macfarlane’s Exr 1933 SC 163 at 169. 152 See also Re McC [1985] AC 528, a case from Northern Ireland, in which Lord Bridge, at 540, confirmed earlier authority to the effect that, in the lower courts, immunity is lost only where malice was present in combination with actions beyond the jurisdiction of the judge concerned. He further observed that “the holder of any judicial office who acts in bad faith, doing what he knows he has no power to do, is liable in damages”, suggesting that, in Northern Ireland and England and Wales at least, while innocent errors can be excused, deliberate acting in excess of jurisdiction cannot. For further analysis of bad faith in this context, see J Murphy, “Rethinking Tortious Immunity for Judicial Acts” (2013) 33 Legal Studies 455 at 459–462. 153 Bell, Principles § 2042. 154 Mackintosh v Fraser (1859) 21 D 783 per Lord President McNeill at 788; Strang v Strang (1849) 11 D 378; and see also De Freville v Dill [1927] All ER Rep 205. 155 See Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 Pts 5 (emergency detention) 6 (short-term detention), and 7 (compulsory treatment). For commentary, see H Patrick, Mental Health, Incapacity and the Law in Scotland, 2nd edn by J Stavert (2016) chs 12–14; L Thomson et al, Mental Health and Scots Law in Practice, 2nd edn (2014) ch 4. On detention on public health grounds in cases of contagious disease, see Public Health etc (Scotland) Act 2008 ss 41–45; Greater Glasgow Health Board v W 2006 SCLR 159. 156 Replicating the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1960 s 107. 157 As amended by the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 2015.

Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty   595

(5) Detention by public transport officials Older case law suggested that a variety of officials with jurisdiction over roads and transport enjoyed a “low degree of privilege”158 in terms of their authority to detain individuals in specified circumstances. This applied, for instance, to railway officials exercising power under statute159 and tramcar officials exercising power under local byelaws160 to detain faredodgers.161 Liability in delict for wrongful detention required two tests to be satisfied: (i) that the official “had no reasonable ground for the action which he took”; and (ii) that he “acted maliciously in this sense that he was not acting in the honest discharge of his duty but was acting from some illegitimate motive”.162 So in Coutts v MacBrayne Ltd,163 in which passengers were placed in irons for allegedly travelling with the wrong ticket on a Clyde steamer, the Captain’s privileged position meant that there could be liability for wrongful arrest only if it were “shewn that he has exercised his powers in abuse of his privilege, that is to say . . . maliciously and without probable cause”.164 Such privilege did not apply, however, if it was shown that the defender acted outwith the statutory framework from which the power to detain fare-dodgers derived.165 There are few modern cases, and detention in irons would certainly today be regarded as a disproportionate use of force, but statutory power remains to railway officials to detain those who cannot produce a valid ticket,166 and to the masters of passenger ships to detain passengers who do not pay the correct fare or who behave in a disorderly fashion.167 In the 158 Tait v Payne and Kennedy (1856) 18 D 1038; Buchanan v Glasgow Corporation (1905) 7 F 1001. 159 E.g. Maxwell v Caledonian Railway Company (1898) 25 R 550. The Regulation of Railways Act 1889 s 5(2), which remains in force, provides that if a passenger fails to produce a valid ticket, an “officer of the company or any constable may detain him until he can be conveniently brought before some justice or otherwise discharged by due course of law”. 160 E.g. Glasgow Corporation Tramways Acts 1870 to 1893. 161 McCormack v Glasgow Corporation 1910 SC 562; Percy v Glasgow Corporation 1922 SC (HL) 144 (although in that instance the officials concerned had exceeded their authority). See also Mackenzie v Young (1902) 10 SLT 231, involving the statutory power allotted to pawnbrokers under the Pawnbrokers Act 1872 ss 34 and 35 to detain those suspected of acquiring goods by dishonest means. It was held (Lord Kyllachy at 232) that, while malice as such did not require to be pled, following the wording of the statute, the pursuer needed to show that the pawnbroker’s employee had acted “without reasonable suspicion that the article tendered in pawn had been stolen, or otherwise illegally or clandestinely obtained”. 162 McCormack v Glasgow Corporation 1910 SC 562 per Lord Kinnear at 567. 163 Coutts v MacBrayne Ltd 1910 SC 386. 164 Coutts v MacBrayne Ltd 1910 SC 386 per Lord President Dunedin at 390. 165 Lundie v MacBrayne (1894) 21 R 1085 (involving the Merchant Shipping Amendment Act 1862 s 37) per Lord Kinnear at 1089–1090: “I do not think it necessary that the pursuer should take an issue of malice and want of probable cause. The defender and his servants have no privilege to give persons into custody except that conferred by the statute, and he cannot plead the statute unless he has observed its conditions.” 166 Regulation of Railways Act 1889 s 5(2). 167 Merchant Shipping Act 1995 s 101(3).

17.40

17.41

596   The Law of Delict in Scotland

17.42

event of a transport official detaining a passenger in circumstances that exceed the statutory powers it is doubtful that proof of malice continues to be a prerequisite of a claim for wrongful detention.168 Much of the case law in this category dates from an era when vicarious liability for intentional wrongdoing was cast more restrictively than it is today. If, therefore, the detention was categorised as without justification, this might remove it from the scope of the perpetrator’s employment, leaving the detained person without a remedy against the employer. This, for example, was the employer’s argument in Percy v Glasgow Corporation,169 where a passenger had been detained after tendering a penny which the tram conductor wrongly claimed to be defaced. The First Division took the view that the claim was based upon conduct outwith the scope of the employee’s authority, and the pursuer had thus “averred himself out of court”.170 This decision was, however, overturned in the House of Lords. In affirming the importance of having regard for “the comfort and security of the travelling public”,171 the House of Lords found that the wrongful detention was “within the scope of what [the officials] were employed to do, although they acted mistakenly”.172 In the modern analysis, it is highly likely that vicarious liability would attach to wrongful conduct arising out of the sale or inspection of tickets, even if motivated by error or by malice, since it would almost certainly be regarded as having a sufficiently close connection with the “field of activities” entrusted to the employee.173

(6) Remedies under the Human Rights Act 1998 (a) Judicial acts 17.43

Section 7(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides for a right of action against public authorities to be available to those who have been “victims” of treatment incompatible with a right under the ECHR. Section 9 of the same Act provides specifically that proceedings may be brought in respect

168 For the role and meaning of malice, see paras 15–09–15.12 above. 169 Percy v Glasgow Corporation 1922 SC (HL) 144. In this connection see also Keppel Bus Co v Sa’ad bin Ahmad [1974] 1 WLR 1082. 170 Percy v Glasgow Corporation 1922 SC (HL) 144 per Lord Mackenzie at 148. 171 1922 SC (HL) 144 per Viscount Finlay at 154. 172 1922 SC (HL) 144 per Viscount Haldane at 151; see also Mackenzie v Young (1902) 10 SLT 231. But cf Power v Central SMT Co 1949 SC 376, in which the Lord Ordinary had directed the jury that if the employee conductress had acted deliberately out of spite to harm the pursuer, her employers were nevertheless liable. A new trial was allowed on the basis that it was for the jury to decide whether “a criminal act performed by a servant [was] no more than a manifestation of over-zeal or impropriety of conduct within the scope of his employment” (per Lord President Cooper at 380) or whether private malice took the actions outwith the scope of the employment. 173 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215; Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677; see also Fennelly v Connex South Eastern Ltd [2001] IRLR 390 and discussion at paras 3.46–3.47 above.

Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty   597

of a judicial act174 by exercising a right of appeal, by petition for judicial review, or by action in the Court of Session.175 However, section 9(3) states that where a judicial act is “done in good faith, damages may not be awarded otherwise than to compensate a person to the extent required by Article 5(5) of the Convention”.176 Article 5(1) stipulates that no one should be deprived of liberty save in accordance with lawful process, including, for example, detention following conviction by a competent court. Article 5(5) in turn provides that: “Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.” It therefore follows from section 9(3) that:177

17.44

• as a general rule a claim for damages may arise under section 7(1) of the 1998 Act in respect of judicial acts which are not done in good faith where there is breach of any Convention right; but • a claim may also arise where detention or arrest is achieved by judicial acts that constitute a breach of Article 5(1), even if these acts are done in good faith. Article 5(5) of the Convention is not to be read as providing the basis for a right to compensation on the part of those whose convictions were originally reached by a lawfully constituted court but have been quashed on appeal.178

17.45

(b) Inhuman or degrading treatment in detention Where a person is already in lawful detention, alongside the common law remedies discussed in the previous section, claims may also be brought under the Human Rights Act 1998 in respect of conduct in breach of Article 3 (prohibiting inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) or Article 8 (providing for the right to private life, home and correspondence).179 If a 174 By Human Rights Act 1998 s 9(5), “judicial act” means a judicial act of a court, and includes an act done on the instructions, or on behalf, of a judge, which includes a justice of the peace and a clerk or other officer entitled to exercise the jurisdiction of the court. 175 Human Rights Act 1998 (Jurisdiction) (Scotland) Rules 2000, SSI 2000/301, r 4. 176 On the question of when judicial acts are not “done in good faith”, see Webster v Lord Chancellor [2015] EWCA Civ 742, [2016] QB 676 per Sir Brian Leveson at para 25–35. Errors of approach were insufficient to indicate want of good faith without further evidence of ulterior motive or “deliberate and knowing breach of the judicial oath to do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of the realm without fear or favour, affection or ill will”. 177 See Webster v Lord Chancellor [2015] EWCA Civ 742, [2016] QB 676 per Sir Brian Leveson at para 21. 178 Webster v Lord Chancellor [2015] EWCA Civ 742, [2016] QB 676 per Sir Brian Leveson at para 42; see also Benham v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 293. 179 For discussion, see J Murdoch, Reed and Murdoch: Human Rights Law in Scotland, 4th edn (2017) paras 4.79–4.84 and 6.146–6.150; Napier v Scottish Ministers 2005 1 SC 229, affd [2005] CSIH 16, 2005 1 SC 307; Somerville v Scottish Ministers [2007] UKHL 44, 2008 SC (HL) 45; Shahid v Scottish Ministers [2015] UKSC 58, 2016 SC (UKSC) 1.

17.46

598   The Law of Delict in Scotland

breach of this nature is established damages may be awarded, but only to the extent necessary to afford “just satisfaction”180 for infringement of Convention rights.

(c) Wrongful detention in a psychiatric institution 17.47

17.48

As in other contexts, it is possible for a remedy to be available under the Human Rights Act 1998 for wrongful detention in a psychiatric institution, even where common law liability cannot be established against the authority responsible. In the English case of R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust,181 there was no false imprisonment at common law where a patient was admitted to a hospital behavioural unit, the court being satisfied that the doctrine of necessity justified his continuing confinement there. The patient, who was himself was incapable of consent, had shown no inclination to leave the hospital, although the consultant would have applied for a compulsory order to detain him had he attempted to do so. However, when an application was made on the patient’s behalf to the European Court of Human Rights, the court took the view that he had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty for the purposes of Article 5, in the sense that the hospital staff exercised complete control over his movements. 182 The court was not persuaded that the common law concept of necessity made adequate allowance for the procedural safeguards envisaged by Article 5. In particular, no provision had been made for review of the lawfulness of the patient’s detention by a court, in accordance not only with domestic law requirements but also with those of Article 5(4).183 The importance of such procedural safeguards was later underlined by the Supreme Court in Surrey County Council v P,184 which involved the status of three patients in residential care. These patients similarly were incapable of consent, but had shown no inclination to leave the residential care into which they had been placed. Lady Hale said that the “acid test” of whether there had been deprivation of liberty was “whether a person is under the complete supervision and control of those caring for her and is not free to leave the place where she lives”.185 That test was met in all three 180 Human Rights Act 1998 s 8(3); Reed and Murdoch: Human Rights Law in Scotland para 2.84. For discussion of differences between “just satisfaction” awards in this context and payments made in reparation following from private law proceedings, see Docherty v Scottish Ministers [2011] CSIH 58, 2012 SC 150; see also Merson v Cartwright [2005] UKPC 38, [2005] All ER (D) 144 (Oct). 181 [1999] 1 AC 458. 182 HL v United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 32. 183 “Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.” 184 [2014] UKSC 19, [2014] AC 896. 185 [2014] UKSC 19, [2014] AC 896 at para 54.

Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty   599

cases, since the control exercised by the relevant carers, while entirely benevolent, was total. Accordingly, those care arrangements would be lawful under Article 5 only if they were regularly reviewed to ensure that they continued to be justified in the patients’ best interests.186 In response to concerns whether the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 provides adequate procedural safeguards for vulnerable patients deprived of their liberty,187 a Scottish Government Consultation elicited responses broadly in support of reform,188 but legislation has not yet been enacted.

D. DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY RESULTING FROM NEGLIGENCE Thus far the concern has been with intentional deprivation of liberty. But what if, rather than being intentional, the deprivation is attributable to a failure to take due care? English case law suggests that, unlike intentional false imprisonment, which is actionable per se, negligent deprivation of liberty is actionable only where specific consequential damage has resulted. In Sayers v Harlow Urban District Council,189 for example, the plaintiff found herself locked in a public lavatory due to the negligence of the local authority in maintaining the door mechanism. The physical injury that she sustained in attempting unsuccessfully to escape over the top of the door was considered to be directly caused by that negligence, and her claim for damages was upheld. It is accepted too that negligent deprivation of liberty resulting in recognised psychiatric injury should be compensated, on the basis that the detainee is the primary victim of such negligence.190 By contrast, distress, or even fear,191 is unlikely to be compensated, in keeping with the limitations discussed in chapter 6192 on recovery in the law of negligence 186 [2014] UKSC 19, [2014] AC 896 per Lady Hale at para 56. 187 See J Stavert, “Deprivation of Liberty and Persons with Incapacity: the Cheshire West Ruling” (2015) 19 EdinLR 129. 188 Consultation available at https://consult.gov.scot/health-and-social-care/adults-with-incapacity-reform/. 189 [1958] 1 WLR 623, but see para 29.56 on the issue of contributory negligence in the attempt to escape. See also the example given in American Law Institute, Restatement Second of Torts § 42, comment b, of a boy whose health suffers after he spends two days locked in a bank vault without food or water. 190 See McLoughlin v Jones [2001] EWCA Civ 1743, [2002] QB 1312 per Hale LJ at para 56. The claimant suffered depression, which he alleged was a foreseeable consequence of his former solicitor’s negligence in conducting his criminal defence. He argued that this had resulted in three months’ imprisonment following conviction for an offence that he did not commit, a verdict that was subsequently overturned. Negligence was ultimately held not to have been made out: see [2006] EWCA Civ 1167. See also Reilly v Merseyside Regional Health Authority [1995] 6 Med LR 246, 23 BMLR 26, acknowledging the requirement for either physical harm or a recognisable psychiatric condition such as post-traumatic stress disorder. 191 Kimathi v Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2018] EWHC 1305 (QB). 192 See para 6.04 above.

17.49

17.50

600   The Law of Delict in Scotland

17.51

for mental states falling short of recognised psychiatric injury. In Reilly v Merseyside Regional Health Authority193 the plaintiffs found themselves stuck in a lift for an hour and twenty minutes when visiting a hospital. Their claim for compensation was denied because, although the plaintiffs had been seriously distressed by the incident, that distress fell short of a chronic anxiety state or post-traumatic stress disorder, although the court indicated that the outcome would have been different had there been evidence of a “recognisable psychiatric injury”. There is little Scottish authority on this point. Walker appeared to endorse the English position, to the effect that “detention caused inadvertently, as by locking an employee in the strong-room” would occasion liability for negligence only if “actual harm” was sustained, although the authority cited for this proposition was the first US Restatement of Torts § 35.194 However, given that Stair ranked liberty “next to life”195 in terms of the interests that the law of delict protects, it is strongly arguable that damage to liberty, like damage to “life, members, and health”, should be actionable even if perpetrated negligently, without the need to prove consequential loss.196 Indeed, England aside, other European legal systems recognise infringement of liberty as actionable damage in itself, irrespective of whether infringement is intentional or negligent.197

E. MALICIOUS INSTIGATION OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 17.52

Those who know of, or suspect, criminal activity should be able to inform the appropriate investigating authorities without fear of civil liability. To that extent informers have traditionally been said to be “privileged”, even where charges were not brought against the persons identified by them or where proceedings resulted in acquittal.198 No liability, therefore, arises where intelligence is offered in good faith, with plausible grounds of suspicion, but the privilege is withdrawn if it can be shown that the informer was motivated by malice to give false information.199 This principle is long193 [1995] 6 Med LR 246, 23 BMLR 26. 194 Walker, Delict 682. 195 Stair, Inst 1.9.4. 196 On this point see D Nolan, “New Forms of Damage in Negligence” (2007) 70 MLR 59; P G Heffey, “Negligent Infliction of Imprisonment: Actionable Per Se or Cum Damno” (1983) 14 Melbourne University L Rev 53. 197 See C von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts (2000) vol 2, para 76, and see e.g. BGB § 826(1). See also DCFR VI.–2:203, providing that (emphasis added): “Loss caused to a natural person as a result of infringement of his or her right to respect for his or her dignity, such as the rights to liberty and privacy, and the injury as such are legally relevant damage.” 198 E.g. Jamieson v Napier (1747) Mor 17070; Arbuckle v Taylor (1815) 3 Dow 160; Macaulay v School Board of North Uist (1887) 15 R 99; Rae v Royal Scottish Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children 1924 SC 102. 199 For the meaning of malice in this context, see para 15.20 above.

Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty   601

established. Indeed an Act of 1579200 provided sanctions “forasmuch as sundry persons of mere malice and envy slander innocent persons and daily pursue them before the justice upon pains criminal”. Those who provided false information to the “King’s Advocate” were subject to financial penalties, to be paid over equally to the victim and to the Crown. The common law also allowed that a claim for damages might be brought by a person wrongly accused, notwithstanding that the proper procedures had otherwise been followed, where malice was shown.201

(1) Requirements of malice and want of probable cause Differences in criminal procedure as between Scotland and England202 form part of the background to the law of malicious prosecution. Until the creation of the office of Director of Public Prosecutions in the late nineteenth century,203 the initiation of criminal proceedings in England was typically at the instigation of the victim.204 As a consequence, claims for malicious prosecution were much more frequent than in Scotland.205 A remedy was required to prevent abuse of the state’s coercive powers by private individuals who could control both the initiation and the conduct of the proceedings.206 However, the bar set for the plaintiffs in such cases – proof of malice and want of probable cause – was regarded as an exacting one, so as “to protect parties from being oppressed or harassed in consequence of having caused arrests or prosecutions in the fair pursuit of their legitimate interests, or as a matter of duty, in a country where parties injured have not the aid of a public prosecutor to do these things for them”.207 By far the majority of criminal prosecutions in England are now instituted by the Crown Prosecution Service,208 and private prosecutions are infrequent, but the tort of malicious prosecution survives nevertheless. Its relevance has been restated by the House of Lords in modern times for 200 RPS 1579/10/31, APS iii, 144 c 16, “Aganis sic as troublis thair nychtboris be criminale persute saikles”, providing sanctions “forsamekle as sindry personis of mere malice and invy calumpniatis innocent personis and daylie persewis thame befoir the justice upoun panes criminall”. The 1579 Act was substantially repealed by the Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1964 s 1. 201 M’Pherson v Cattanach (1850) 13 D 287; Rae v Linton (1875) 2 R 669. 202 For a 19th-century comparative survey of criminal procedure in Scotland, England and France, see A F Irvine, “Report of the Trial of Madeleine Smith, before the High Court of Justiciary at Edinburgh” (1858) 108 Edinburgh Review 343. 203 Prosecution of Offences Act 1879 s 2. 204 See D Hay and F Snyder, “Using the Criminal Law”, in D Hay and F Snyder (eds), Policing and Prosecution in Britain 1750–1850 (1989) 3; and for explanation of what constituted a “prosecution” at that point, see H Stephen, Malicious Prosecution (1888) ch 2. 205 D Hay, “Prosecution and Power”, in Hay and Snyder (eds), Policing and Prosecution in Britain 343 at 378. See also W G Normand, “The Public Prosecutor in Scotland” (1938) 54 LQR 345. 206 Crawford Adjusters (Cayman) Ltd v Sagicor General Insurance (Cayman) Ltd [2013] UKPC 17, [2014] AC 366 per Lord Sumption at para 136. 207 Lister v Perryman (1869–70) LR 4 HL 521 per Lord Colonsay at 539. 208 Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 s 1.

17.53

17.54

602   The Law of Delict in Scotland

17.55

the situation where a person maliciously provides an investigating authority with false information indicating that another person is guilty of an offence, and that conduct is crucial in bringing about a prosecution. In Martin v Watson209 the alleged facts on which the false information was based were solely within the defendant’s knowledge, so that the authority could not have exercised any “independent discretion”. The defendant was de facto responsible for the prosecution having been brought, since she had been “actively instrumental” in setting proceedings in motion. She was therefore held liable in damages for malicious prosecution. In Scotland, private prosecutions have long since become a highly unusual occurrence, and claims for malicious prosecution rare.210 It is competent for such a claim to be brought against a person who has provided the police or other investigating authority with information that ultimately led to a prosecution. However, while malice and want of probable cause are essential elements, the Scottish courts have not insisted upon the notion that the information provided by the defender should have deprived the investigating officer of “independent discretion”, as seen in the English cases. In McKie v Strathclyde Joint Police Board,211 the defenders were employees of the Scottish Criminal Records Office who, on a doubtful basis, certified a fingerprint to be that of the pursuer, although she denied having been at the scene. Her denial resulted in her prosecution for perjury. After her acquittal she brought proceedings for malicious prosecution. Following a procedure roll debate, Lord Wheatley reaffirmed a requirement for malice and want of probable cause, but doubted whether the facts in question required to be exclusively in the defenders’ possession or that the defenders required to be the sole instigators of the prosecution. Instead a relevant case might be made where there was a “direct connection between the malice complained of and the course of action subsequently undertaken”.212 In the modern law, proceedings are perhaps most typically brought against police officers, but the direct causal link between the malicious conduct and the prosecution nonetheless requires to be made out.213 In Grier v Chief Constable, Police Scotland,214 for example, 209 [1996] AC 74. 210 See W G Normand, “The Public Prosecutor in Scotland” (1938) 54 LQR 345; for recent discussion, see Stewart v Payne [2016] HCJAC 122, 2017 JC 155. For an example of an (unsuccessful) claim for malicious prosecution brought following a private prosecution in Scotland, see Chalmers v Barclay, Perkins & Co Ltd 1912 SC 521. 211 2004 SLT 982. 212 2004 SLT 982 at para 28. 213 For an English example see Rees v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2018] EWCA Civ 1587, in which a claim was recognised where a police officer had a crucial role in presenting evidence to the Crown Prosecution Service and it was “inconceivable” that a prosecution would have been brought against the claimants without it. That evidence was tainted in respect that evidence of the sole eyewitness had been improperly procured by the officer, knowingly perverting the course of justice. 214 [2020] CSOH 33, 2020 SCLR 619.

Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty   603

the court declined to grant summary decree in an action for malicious prosecution, requiring further proof to show that erroneous evidence produced by police officers was key in causing the Crown to proceed with the charge against the pursuer. It does not disprove the presence of malice that the defender honestly believed the pursuer to have committed the offence in question, if there is evidence that the defender “deliberately misused the processes of the court”.215 In Rees v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,216 for example, the malice requirement was satisfied where, although it was accepted that the defendant police officer believed the claimants to have committed a murder, he had put forward evidence which he knew to be tainted. On the other hand, the making of errors in the presentation of evidence can be explained on grounds other than by malice, so that even where such errors are admitted it is open to the defender to prove that they were made in good faith.217 As noted above,218 there is an important distinction between malicious prosecution and wrongful deprivation of liberty, in which there is no malice requirement if the deprivation of liberty had no lawful basis. Malicious prosecution may follow from proceedings that were in themselves perfectly lawful; the wrong is perpetrated by instigating lawful proceedings on spurious grounds, and so the requirement to prove malice is central. As Lord Wheatley noted in McKie v Strathclyde Joint Police Board,219 a distinction is drawn between those situations where a claim for malicious prosecution may be relevant and those in which the defender enjoys immunity as a witness. Immunity from suit for malicious prosecution is conferred upon witnesses in relation to the content of what they say in court, their precognitions, and other statements or reports made in the course of an investigation by way of preparation for giving evidence. It does not, however, extend to police fabrication of evidence.220 In B v Burns, for example, the defender had allegedly provided false and malicious information about the pursuer, but she claimed that she had done so in response to a police inquiry, rather than having been the informer who had brought forward information to instigate that inquiry. The Inner House held the claim of malicious prosecution made against her to be irrelevant, on the basis that “the fact that a statement by a witness is made or evidence given in pursuance of an underlying conspiracy to injure does not affect that witness’s immunity”.221 By contrast in Darker v Chief Constable

215 216 217 218 219 220 221

Willers v Joyce [2016] UKSC 43, [2018] AC 779 per Lord Toulson at para 55. [2018] EWCA Civ 1587. Grier v Chief Constable, Police Scotland [2020] CSOH 33, 2020 SCLR 619. See para 17.26. 2004 SLT 982 at paras 14–15. Darker v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2001] 1 AC 435 per Lord Hope at 449. 1993 SC 232 per Lord Caplan at 239.

17.56

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604   The Law of Delict in Scotland

of the West Midlands Police222 the House of Lords ruled that a claim for malicious prosecution should not be struck out, where it was alleged that police officers had fabricated statements and incited an informer to plant evidence against the plaintiffs.

(2) Immunity of prosecutors 17.58

17.59

While earlier case law had been construed as conferring absolute immunity upon the Lord Advocate and those acting for him in the conduct of solemn criminal proceedings,223 the Inner House in Whitehouse v Lord Advocate224 held that such persons enjoy a qualified immunity only, so that the Lord Advocate, and those for whom he is responsible, are “generally subject to the same rights and duties as other public officials in the conduct of their public duties”.225 Absolute privilege applies solely in the context of defamation claims in regard to statements made in court, but not otherwise in relation to the conduct of prosecution matters. It was held therefore in Whitehouse that a claim for malicious prosecution might be brought against the Lord Advocate if malice and lack of probable cause could be proved.226 Similarly, “prosecutors in the public interest” acting in summary proceedings enjoy the qualified form of immunity from personal liability set out in the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 section 170(1),227 that is to say that liability might arise for their conduct of such proceedings only where there is proof of malice and lack of probable cause. As in the case of justices, the privilege provided by section 170 extends only to actings in proceedings “under this Act”.228 It would not therefore extend to actions which were manifestly illegal, such as where the procurator fiscal had acted outwith his or her jurisdiction.229

222 223 224 225 226

[2001] 1 AC 435. See in particular Hester v MacDonald 1961 SC 370 per Lord President Clyde at 377. [2019] CSIH 52, 2020 SC 133. [2019] CSIH 52, 2020 SC 133 per Lord President Carloway at para 87. See also Grier v Lord Advocate [2021] CSOH 18, 2021 SLT 371, to the same effect and noting, understandably, the absence of authority on what constituted lack of probable cause in this context. 227 See Graham v Strathern 1924 SC 699 on the difficulties of proving malice on the part of a prosecutor, as opposed to “negligence or defect of legal acumen”; Rae v Strathern 1924 SC 147 per Lord Cullen at 154. 228 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s 170(1). 229 E.g. M’Crone v Sawers (1835) 13 S 443; see also Bell v Black and Morrison (1865) 3 M 1026, in which malice did not require to be pled in an action for damages against fiscals who had obtained and acted upon an illegal warrant to search premises.

Chapter 18

Defamation and Malicious Publication

Para A. DEFAMATION, VERBAL INJURY, MALICIOUS PUBLICATION��������������������������������������������������������������������� 18.01 B. A STATEMENT ABOUT THE PURSUER��������������������������� 18.05 C. DEFAMATORY MEANING�������������������������������������������������� 18.10 (1) Principles of construction�������������������������������������������������� 18.11 (2) Innuendo�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 18.15 (3) Assessing damage to reputation����������������������������������������� 18.17 (4) Types of defamatory imputation���������������������������������������� 18.22 (5) Ridicule and irony������������������������������������������������������������� 18.27 (6) “Unmeaning” abuse and remarks made in rixa������������������ 18.31 (7) Imputations causing an individual to be “shunned”?����������� 18.34 D. PUBLICATION TO A THIRD PARTY��������������������������������� 18.37 E. SERIOUS HARM (1) The significance of the serious harm requirement��������������� 18.39 (2) Indicators of serious harm: English case law����������������������� 18.44 (3) Bodies trading for profit���������������������������������������������������� 18.49 F. THE DEFENDER’S INTENTIONS�������������������������������������� 18.51 G. WHO MAY SUE?������������������������������������������������������������������� 18.54 H. DEFAMATION OF THE DEAD������������������������������������������� 18.64 I. DEFENCES��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 18.68 (1) Truth������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 18.69 (2) Publication on a matter of public interest (a) From Reynolds privilege to public interest defence��������� 18.75 (b) A matter of public interest������������������������������������������� 18.79 (c) D’s reasonable belief that publication was in the public interest������������������������������������������������������������� 18.82 (d) All the circumstances of the case���������������������������������� 18.84 (e) Reportage������������������������������������������������������������������� 18.86 (3) Honest opinion����������������������������������������������������������������� 18.88 (a) A statement of opinion������������������������������������������������ 18.90 (b) Indication of the evidence on which the statement was based������������������������������������������������������������������� 18.93 (c) An honest person could have held the opinion�������������� 18.94 (d) Opinion genuinely held����������������������������������������������� 18.95 (e) Inferences of fact��������������������������������������������������������� 18.97 605

606   The Law of Delict in Scotland

(f) Facts stated in a privileged statement��������������������������� 18.98 (g) Honest opinion distinguished from qualified privilege��� 18.99 J. ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE������������������������������������������������������18.100 (1) Parliamentary proceedings������������������������������������������������18.101 (2) Judicial proceedings���������������������������������������������������������18.102 K. QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE�����������������������������������������������������18.105 (1) Qualified privilege in the common law (a) Duty and interest�������������������������������������������������������18.108 (b) Parties to court proceedings����������������������������������������18.112 (c) Statements made in response to an attack by another����� 18.113 (2) Statutory qualified privilege����������������������������������������������18.114 (a) Peer-reviewed statement in scientific or academic journals�������������������������������������������������������18.115 (b) Reports����������������������������������������������������������������������18.116 L. OFFERS TO MAKE AMENDS���������������������������������������������18.119 M. RESTRICTION ON PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SECONDARY PUBLISHERS�����������������������������������������������18.124 N. REMEDIES (1) Discursive remedies���������������������������������������������������������18.128 (2) Interim interdict: Human Rights Act 1998, section 12�������18.129 O. MALICIOUS PUBLICATION����������������������������������������������18.130 (1) Statements causing harm to business interests�������������������18.131 (a) Malice: a “credible” statement of fact�������������������������18.133 (b) Malice: indifference to truth and malicious motivation���� 18.137 (2) Statements causing doubt as to title to property�����������������18.139 (3) Statements criticising assets����������������������������������������������18.142 (4) Public authorities and malicious publication����������������������18.147 (5) Defences��������������������������������������������������������������������������18.148 P. LIMITATION (1) One-year limitation period������������������������������������������������18.149 (2) Multiple publication and single limitation period���������������18.151

A. DEFAMATION, VERBAL INJURY, MALICIOUS PUBLICATION 18.01

A good name is of incalculable value. It sustains both the respect of others and a sense of self-worth.1 The right to safeguard reputation is an important   1 As observed by Lord Hoffmann in Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359 at para 91, reputation is “the immortal part” of the individual, echoing Cassio’s words to Iago in Shakespeare’s Othello, Act 2 scene 3: “Reputation, reputation, reputation! O, I have lost my reputation! I have lost the immortal part of myself, and what remains is bestial.” For general discussion, see R C Post, “The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution” (1986) 74 California Law Review 691; T Gibbons, “Defamation Reconsidered” (1996) 16 OJLS 587; E Barendt, “What is the Point Of Libel Law?” (1999) 52 CLP 110.

Defamation and Malicious Publication   607

element of the right to respect for private life, as enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.2 Yet reputation is a complex social construct and attacks upon it cannot always be sensibly managed by formal regulation. At most, reputation may be protected by control of the information by which it is shaped. The legal protection of reputation has potentially two aspects: control over the expression of that which is objectionable and false, and control over the dissemination of information which may be true but which the person concerned wishes to screen from the attention of others. The modern law of defamation addresses the first of these categories but not the second. In the past, however, reputation was protected in both aspects by the law of verbal injury and defamation. In Institutional writings, “verbal injury” was a generic term for injury inflicted by words upon reputation and honour, as distinct from “real injury” perpetrated by physical acts.3 “Defamation” described the most common consequence of such injury, namely the loss of “fame”, but was not yet a term of art denoting a separate legal category. Even by the start of the nineteenth century there was no clear division between different forms of verbal injury,4 and the terms “verbal injury” and “defamation” had not yet narrowed to the distinct usage by which they later came to be understood.5 By the end of the twentieth century, however, “verbal injury” had come to mean a restricted category related to, but distinguishable from, defamation. It denoted an injury inflicted by words that could not be classified as defamatory, in the sense of “lowering” a person “in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally”.6 The precise scope of this residual category of non-defamatory verbal injury was shrouded in uncertainty7 and the modern case law was sparse. Partly for that reason, verbal injury was abolished by the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021, and replaced by a new set of delicts under the label of “malicious publication”.8 By the time of abolition, its ambit had narrowed to: intentional injury to business interests caused by false statements; intentional injury to feelings caused by false statements;9 and injury

 2 Radio France v France (2005) 40 EHRR 29 at para 31; Cumpănă v Romania (2005) 41 EHRR 14 at para 91; Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] UKSC 11, [2012] 2 AC 273 per Lord Phillips at para 44.   3 See E C Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law (2010) para 1.04.   4 See discussion of terminology in J Borthwick, A Treatise on the Law of Libel and Slander (1826) ch 1.   5 For a detailed account, see Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy paras 6.01–6.06.  6 Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 per Lord Atkin at 1240.   7 See e.g. Steele v Scottish Daily Record and Sunday Mail Ltd 1970 SLT 53 per Lord Wheatley at 60, declining to follow counsel into the “labyrinth” presented by “the developing history of defamation, convicium and verbal injury and the different elements which are said to be required to support each of these different types of action”. For a historical treatment, see J Blackie, “Defamation”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 633.   8 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 Pt 3; see paras 18.130–18.148 below.   9 This had become a marginal category, however: see Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy para 8.26.

18.02

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18.03

18.04

to patrimonial interests suffered as a consequence of a slander upon a third party.10 Conversely, verbal injury had ceased to be recognised in relation to loss or injury suffered as a result of the making of true statements (although liability might arise under other heads), or to injury to feelings suffered as a consequence of a slander upon a third party.11 This chapter is written on the basis that the 2021 Act has been brought into force. Until then, the law of defamation had been unenacted common law, subject to a scattering of legislation dealing with specific, largely ancillary, issues.12 Moreover, the common law had seen substantial convergence with the law in England, where defamation actions were much more common. As Stair reflected in his treatment of reparation for “delinquencies”, “Actions upon injurious words, as they may relate to damage in means, are frequent and curious among the English; but with us there is little of it accustomed to be pursued, though we own the same grounds, and would proceed to the same effects with them, if questioned.”13 More than three centuries later, that observation remained valid. While the pace of business in the English courts was intensified by “libel tourism”, neither tourist nor native showed equivalent inclination to litigate north of the border. In consequence the Scottish courts often drew upon the much more plentiful English case law to assist in areas where Scots authority was scarce. When therefore England put much of the law on to a statutory footing, with the Defamation Act 2013, the Scottish Law Commission took it upon itself to consider similar reform for Scotland. The resulting report proposed legislation which in its essential aspects closely paralleled the 2013 Act, but provision was also made for areas of Scottish distinctiveness.14 The Bill put forward by the Scottish Law Commission provided the foundation for the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act enacted by the Scottish Parliament in 2021. While the 2021 Act leaves the essential framework of defamation and many of its fundamental concepts to be determined by reference to the common law, the statutory provisions introduce changes in a number of key areas including, but not limited to, those addressed for England and Wales by the Defamation Act 2013. The next sections discuss the essential elements of defamation as incorporating the changes introduced by the 2021 Act, while a later section explains the new delicts of malicious publication.15 In bringing an action for defamation, in terms of the 2021 Act, it is for the pursuer (P) to prove that:

10 This had similarly become marginal: see Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy para 9.04. 11 See Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy para 6.06. 12 E.g. on the scope of privilege (Defamation Act 1996 ss 14–15 and Defamation Act 2013 ss 6 and 7(9)), and on the mechanism for offers of amends (Defamation Act 1996 ss 2–4). 13 Stair, Inst 1.9.4. 14 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Defamation (Scot Law Com No 248, 2017). 15 At paras 18.130–18.148.

Defamation and Malicious Publication   609

• • • •

the defender (D) made a statement “about” P;16 the statement was “defamatory” of P;17 D published the statement to a third party;18 and the statement caused, or was likely to cause, serious harm to P’s reputation.19

B. A STATEMENT ABOUT THE PURSUER Defamation is perpetrated by injurious and false “statements”.20 The terms “libel” and “slander” are freely used in the Scottish literature, distinguishing spoken defamation from that which has taken written or otherwise permanent form, but no formal distinction is drawn between the remedies offered.21 In the typical case words are used to defame. But just as the common law did not require defamatory imputations always to be in verbal form, so the 2021 Act uses the term “statement” under explanation that it means “words, pictures, visual images, gestures or any other method of signifying meaning”.22 More unusually, therefore, defamatory imputations can be conveyed through the use of images, by means either of the unfavourable content of the image itself, or of the context in which the image is placed.23 Unauthorised use of P’s image in a commercial advertisement may also be defamatory if P’s status or character would be harmed by the inference that P endorsed the product concerned.24 P may similarly be defamed if it can be demonstrated that a disreputable character on stage or screen, or in fiction, is sufficiently similar as to suggest that it is based on P. In Cuthbert v Linklater, for example, the court was persuaded that, given various shared characteristics and biographical detail, a risqué character in the defender’s novel was likely to be identified with the pursuer, and that the pursuer’s reputation would suffer because

16 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 1(1); see paras 18.05–18.09 below. 17 s 1(1); see paras 18.10–18.36 below. 18 s 1(2)(a); see paras 18.37 and 18.38 below. 19 s 1(2)(b); see paras 18.39–18.50 below. 20 s 1(1). 21 Erskine, Inst 4.4.81 distinguished between slander as verbal injury and libel as real injury, but, in the words of F T Cooper, A Handbook of the Law of Defamation and Verbal Injury, 2nd edn by D O Dykes (1906) 3, “no results follow from this distinction”. 22 s 36 (following the wording of the Defamation Act 2013 s 15). 23 E.g. Monson v Tussauds Ltd [1894] 1 QB 671 (in which the plaintiff, against whom a Scottish court had found a murder charge “not proven”, sued successfully for libel on finding his gun-wielding image in the Tussauds waxworks gallery alongside effigies of others associated with the crime of murder); Dwek v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2000] EMLR 284 (photograph of plaintiff sitting beside woman identified as sex worker); Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1995] 2 AC 65. 24 E.g. Tolley v J S Fry and Sons Ltd [1931] AC 333; see also Bradley v Menley & James Ltd 1913 SC 923 on the use of bogus endorsements.

18.05

18.06

18.07

610   The Law of Delict in Scotland

18.08

18.09

of this association.25 Similarly, in Boyd v BBC26 the pursuer successfully obtained interdict to prevent the broadcast of a play in which the central character was recognisably based on herself. Even more exceptionally, physical actions may also defame. In one midnineteenth-century case, Lord Cockburn observed that an imputation on character might be made when a man “holds up his finger to you”.27 But while disrespectful gestures of this nature might at one time have had the tendency to damage reputation, it is difficult now to imagine gestures sufficiently scurrilous as to have such an impact. More recently it has been argued that overzealous use of powers of search or surveillance may damage reputation by creating the inference that the individual concerned has been involved in crime.28 While a claim of this nature is apparently recognised as competent, it is unlikely to succeed if D was otherwise acting lawfully.29 A more direct means of calling such conduct to account may therefore be found by reference to the statutory frameworks which now regulate such activities.30 The allegedly defamatory statement must be capable of being understood by the reasonable person as referring to P.31 There is no difficulty in this regard if a statement identifies P by name or by reference to P’s designation or office. It may also be sufficient where D has used P’s nickname or initials, photograph,32 or a figurative or historical allusion33 allowing the sensible recipient of the information to infer P’s identity. Where the defamatory statement is targeted at a broad class of persons, such as “publicans” in general, no individual member of that group may raise an

25 1935 SLT 94. On the same facts, however, it is unlikely that a modern court would deem the representation defamatory, since the fictional character’s conduct was at worst “indelicate” (as a Nationalist activist she visited a men’s lavatory to deposit a stolen Union Jack flag). 26 1969 SLT (Sh Ct) 17. See also Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 581, in which the plaintiff successfully claimed to have been libelled by a film portrayal of a character that she alleged was based upon herself. 27 Kennedy v Allan (1848) 10 D 1293 at 1296. 28 E.g. Robertson v Keith 1936 SC 29, in which the pursuer initially argued that she had been defamed by a Chief Constable who had ordered very visible police surveillance on her house, but then abandoned defamation as a separate ground of action at an early stage of the proceedings (see Lord Murray at 60). See also Neville v C&A Modes 1945 SC 175. 29 See Robertson v Keith 1936 SC 29; Drysdale v Earl of Rosebery 1909 SC 1121. 30 See Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy ch 19. 31 Caldwell v Monro (1872) 10 M 717. 32 See Dwek v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2000] EMLR 284, in which the claimant could be identified from a photograph (sitting beside a person identified as a sex worker), although the majority of the court held that he required to show that the publication was seen by persons who were able to identify him. 33 E.g. J’Anson v Stuart (1787) 1 Term Rep 748, in which a newspaper article stated that “This diabolical character, like Polyphemus the man-eater, has but one eye, and is well known to all persons acquainted with the name of a certain noble circumnavigator”. This was taken as referring to the plaintiff, who had only one eye, and whose name resembled that of the then renowned Admiral Anson, who had sailed round the world.

Defamation and Malicious Publication   611

action.34 However, defamatory remarks made of a small group of persons may be actionable by individual members of that group if the court is satisfied that the words were reasonably capable of being understood as referring to them as particular identifiable persons.35

C. DEFAMATORY MEANING To be actionable, a statement must convey a defamatory meaning. The issue whether the statement is reasonably capable of bearing the defamatory meaning ascribed to it by P is a matter of law.36 If it is so capable, the issue whether the statement actually conveyed that defamatory meaning, thereby damaging P’s reputation in the circumstances of the case, is a matter of fact.37

18.10

(1) Principles of construction The meaning of D’s imputation must be construed objectively, by reference to the “reasonable, natural, or necessary interpretation of its terms”.38 P’s own interpretation is not the appropriate standard, nor is D’s actual intended meaning,39 but “[w]hat the ordinary man, not avid for scandal, would read into the words complained of”.40 The hypothetical reader or listener does not always think the worst, so that, for example, the reader of a newspaper story narrating that P was charged with assault does not necessarily construe this as indicating that P is guilty of that offence, even although “some readers might jump to the conclusion that the events did

34 Wardlaw v Drysdale (1898) 25 R 879; Campbell v Wilson 1934 SLT 249; Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116; Braddock v Bevins [1948] 1 KB 580. 35 Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116. See e.g. Browne v D C Thomson & Co 1912 SC 359 (in which remarks made of the “Roman Catholic religious authorities” in a small town could refer only to seven clergymen and so were sufficiently determinate to be actionable by them as individuals); Macphail v Macleod (1895) 3 SLT 91 (in which issue was allowed as to whether the “Presbytery of Lewis” could be taken as identifying individual clergymen). 36 See Russell v Stubbs Ltd 1913 SC (HL) 14 per Lord Kinnear at 20; Langlands v John Leng & Co Ltd 1916 SC (HL) 102 per Viscount Haldane at 106; McAvennie v Scottish Daily Record and Sunday Mail Ltd, unreported, Glasgow Sheriff Court, 20 Aug 2002 per Sheriff W Holligan (affd 2003 Rep LR 93); Roddie v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2015] CSOH 30, 2015 SCLR 589. 37 Fairbairn v Scottish National Party 1979 SC 393 per Lord Ross at 397; McCann v Scottish Media Newspapers Ltd 2000 SLT 256. See e.g. Shepherd v Elliot (1895) 3 SLT 115 (in which Lord Kyllachy held that the expression “dirty, low scum” was in principle actionable), and Shepherd v Elliot (No 2) (1895) 3 SLT 192 (in which the jury determined that the pursuer’s reputation had not in fact been harmed in the way alleged). 38 Russell v Stubbs Ltd 1913 SC (HL) 14 per Lord Shaw at 23: “To permit . . . a strained and sinister interpretation, which is thus essentially unjust, to form a ground for reparation, would be, in truth, to grant reparation for a wrong which had never been committed.” 39 Although the question of malice is relevant in cases where D claims qualified privilege: see para 18.105 below. 40 Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 per Lord Reid at 260.

18.11

612   The Law of Delict in Scotland

18.12

take place”.41 Ordinary readers are also credited with sufficient attention span to read beyond the headlines and bylines of an article to the narrative that follows. They form their judgment on the basis of the article as a whole42 although they are likely to have read the material “casually . . . not expecting a high degree of accuracy”.43 Thus the context in which the allegedly defamatory statement was made must be taken in the round. P is not permitted, for example, to select one part of an article as indicating a particular meaning when the reasonable reader reading the whole article would interpret it differently.44 The key principles of construction have been helpfully summarised in an English case as follows:45 “(i) The governing principle is reasonableness.   (ii) The intention of the publisher is irrelevant.   (iii) The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available. A reader who always adopts a bad meaning where a less serious or non-defamatory meaning is available is not reasonable: s/he is avid for scandal. But always to adopt the less derogatory meaning would also be unreasonable: it would be naïve.   (iv) Over-elaborate analysis should be avoided and the court should certainly not take a too literal approach to the task.   (v) Consequently, a judge providing written reasons for conclusions on meaning should not fall into the trap of conducting too detailed an analysis of the various passages relied on by the respective parties.

41 McAvennie v Scottish Daily Record and Sunday Mail Ltd, unreported, Glasgow Sheriff Court, 20 Aug 2002 per Sheriff W Holligan (affd 2003 Rep LR 93); Bukovsky v Crown Prosecution Service [2017] EWCA Civ 1529, [2018] 4 WLR 1. See also Hartt v Newspaper Publishing TLR 9 Nov 1989: the reasonable reader might read an unsympathetic account of a professor wrongly attributing a work of art to Michelangelo and take from this that the professor has poor judgement, but not the more sensational implication that the professor has been deliberately dishonest. 42 Leon v Edinburgh Evening News 1909 SC 1014; Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1995] 2 AC 65; Robertson v Newsquest (Sunday Herald) Ltd 2006 SCLR 792. 43 Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1239 per Lord Pearson at 1270. 44 Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1995] 2 AC 65 per Lord Bridge at 70: “the bane and the antidote” of the article must be read together; Norman v Future Publishing Ltd [1999] EMLR 325. 45 Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB), [2020] 4 WLR 25 per Nicklin J at para 12, cited in Wildcat Haven Enterprises CIC v Wightman [2020] CSOH 30, 2020 SLT 473; Campbell v Dugdale [2020] CSIH 27, 2020 SC 481. These guidelines develop those set out by Lord Neill in Gillick v British Broadcasting Corporation [1996] EMLR 267 at 272–273 (and noted by Lord Macphail in Macleod v Newsquest (Sunday Herald) Ltd 2007 CSOH 04, 2007 SCLR 555 at para 14).

Defamation and Malicious Publication   613 (vi) Any meaning that emerges as the produce of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation should be rejected. (vii) It follows that it is not enough to say that by some person or another the words might be understood in a defamatory sense. (viii) The publication must be read as a whole, and any ‘bane and antidote’46 taken together. Sometimes, the context will clothe the words in a more serious defamatory meaning (for example the classic ‘rogues’ gallery’ case). In other cases, the context will weaken (even extinguish altogether) the defamatory meaning that the words would bear if they were read in isolation (e.g. bane and antidote cases). (ix) In order to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the statement of which the claimant complains, it is necessary to take into account the context in which it appeared and the mode of publication. (x) No evidence, beyond publication complained of, is admissible in determining the natural and ordinary meaning. (xi) The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. The court can take judicial notice of facts which are common knowledge, but should beware of reliance on impressionistic assessments of the characteristics of a publication’s readership. (xii) Judges should have regard to the impression the article has made upon them themselves in considering what impact it would have made on the hypothetical reasonable reader. (xiii) In determining the single meaning, the court is free to choose the correct meaning; it is not bound by the meanings advanced by the parties (save that it cannot find a meaning that is more injurious than the claimant’s pleaded meaning).”

When reference is made to older authorities, allowance must be made for changes in reporting style and in the relationship between the media and their audience or readership. Today, ordinary readers are seen “as having stronger stomachs and more discriminating judgment than was traditionally recognised”.47 Moreover, content may be interpreted differently according to the medium in which it appears, so that allegedly defamatory material placed on the internet or on Twitter or Facebook requires a different approach from that applied to newspaper articles

46 “Bane and antidote” are explained by Alderson B in Chalmers v Payne (1835) 2 C M and R 156 at 159: “In one part of this publication, something disreputable to the plaintiff is stated, but that is removed by the conclusion; the bane and antidote must be taken together.” 47 Lukowiak v Unidad Editorial SA [2001] EMLR 46 per Eady J at para 47; see also Lennon v Scottish Daily Record and Sunday Mail Ltd [2004] EWHC 359 (QB), [2004] EMLR 18, in which Tugendhat J at para 40 accepted the proposition that “a modern readership can be treated as more discriminating and better able to understand what they read. The ordinary reader must presumably now be credited with having achieved a level of education which was not widely accessible to earlier generations.” Yet how many modern readers would be familiar, e.g. with Aesop’s Fable of the Frozen Snake, regarded by the court as within general knowledge in Hoare v Silverlock (1848) 12 QB 624?

18.13

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18.14

for example.48 In deliberating the import of a post on Facebook, the Supreme Court held in Stocker v Stocker that the fact of the statement having been published on social media was “critical”. Social media users were a “new class of reader”, so that in deciding how a Facebook post or a tweet on Twitter would be interpreted it was important to “keep in mind the way in which such postings and tweets are made and read”.49 Thus the first-instance judge in Stocker had been wrong to rely upon the dictionary definition of “strangle” in construing how the ordinary reader would have understood the defendant’s Facebook post, “He tried to strangle me”. Facebook readers are thought not to have the Oxford English Dictionary to hand in order to subject online content to close analysis. Given this context, the Supreme Court was satisfied the ordinary reasonable reader would have interpreted the wording as meaning, not that the claimant had tried deliberately to kill the defendant, but that the claimant had grasped the defendant by the throat and applied force to her neck.50 Twitter is similarly regarded as a “conversational medium”, so that the words used should not be subjected to “over-elaborate analysis”, and a more “impressionistic” approach is required to determine how they would have been understood in the context of the whole 140-character tweet.51 In cases where the alleged defamatory imputation is drawn from more than one publication, the court must be satisfied that the hypothetical reasonable reader of the material complained of will also have read, or have in mind, any additional material which P relies upon as context. This requires a “sufficient nexus, connection or association between the publications” by way of references or hyperlinks. The material being part of the same Twitter conversation or blog would be an example.52

(2) Innuendo 18.15

A statement that is not defamatory when looked at in isolation and in its literal sense may nonetheless be actionable if it takes on an offensive meaning in the light of extrinsic facts known by the persons to whom it is made. In order to establish that a defamatory meaning has thus arisen by “innuendo”, P must specify: (i) the particular meaning contended for; (ii) the

48 Wildcat Haven Enterprises CIC v Wightman [2020] CSOH 30, 2020 SLT 473 per Lord Clark at para 34. 49 [2019] UKSC 17, [2020] AC 593 per Lord Kerr at para 41. 50 [2019] UKSC 17, [2020] AC 593 per Lord Kerr at para 47. Since this latter meaning could be shown to be substantially true, and there was sufficient evidence that the claimant was dangerous, the defence of truth applied. 51 Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB), [2017] 4 WLR 68 per Warby J at para 35. 52 Wildcat Haven Enterprises CIC v Wightman [2020] CSOH 30, 2020 SLT 473 per Lord Clark at para 26; Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB), [2017] 4 WLR 68 per Warby J at paras 38–39.

Defamation and Malicious Publication   615

extrinsic facts necessary to support this meaning; and (iii) that these were known to at least one of the persons to whom the imputation was made.53 Evidence may be led as to the sense in which the words or actions were understood in the actual context. However, the method of construction remains objective, focussing upon the sense in which a reasonable person with knowledge of the same extrinsic facts would have understood the words: would the imputation tend to lower P in the estimation of a reasonable person in possession of this information?54 In addition, a statement is actionable only if it meets the serious harm test contained in section 1(2) (b) of the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021.55 The innuendoed meaning requires therefore to be significant in its actual or likely impact upon P’s reputation. A statement that is innocent in its literal meaning but defamatory in the light of knowledge known to all does not require the help of innuendo. For example, an assertion that P was a “real Hitler” in the workplace carries with it not just an association with an Austrian surname but the connotations known to all that P had the dictatorial qualities attributed to Adolf. Those connotations are widely understood as being within the ordinary meaning of this particular soubriquet.56 Generally speaking, use of metaphor or simile comparing P to a well-known historical or fictional villain, or perhaps to an animal considered to be odious,57 does not require the properties of that figure, or that animal, to be spelled out.58

53 Sexton v John Ritchie & Co (1890) 17 R 680 per Lord President Inglis at 685 (affd (1891) 18 R (HL) 20); James v Baird 1916 SC (HL) 158 per Lord Kinnear at 165. 54 Russell v Stubbs Ltd 1913 SC (HL) 14 per Lord Shaw at 24: “the innuendo must represent what is a reasonable, natural, or necessary inference from the words used, regard being had to the occasion and the circumstances of their publication.” See also Duncan v Associated Scottish Newspapers Ltd 1929 SC 14 per Lord Anderson at 21; but cf Rae v Royal Scottish Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children 1924 SC 102 per Lord Skerrington at 112: “the Court ought . . . to resist the attempts of litigants in slander actions to seize possession of ordinary and innocent words of the English language in order to impose upon them a sinister meaning, in the absence of an averment of special circumstances which might entitle a jury to adopt such a construction.” 55 See paras 18.39–18.50 below. This is a new requirement. 56 See discussion in Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 per Lord Devlin at 279–280; see also Hoare v Silverlock (1848) 12 QB 624 per Coleridge J at 633: “Suppose the libel had said the plaintiff acted like a Judas: must the history of Judas have been given, and referred to by innuendo? We ought to attribute to a Court and jury an acquaintance with ordinary terms and allusions, whether historical, or figurative or parabolical. If an expression, originally allegorical, has passed into such common use that it ceases to be figurative, and has obtained a signification almost literal, we must understand it as it is used.” 57 See e.g. MacLaren v Ritchie, in which comparison with a snake was deemed actionable in principle as verbal injury, and the issue was put to the jury whether, on that basis, the pursuer had been “held up to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule”. MacLaren is unreported, although the coverage in The Scotsman newspaper in 1856 is reproduced by Glegg in the Appendix to Reparation, 2nd edn (1905) at 611ff. The issues are also quoted in Macfarlane v Black and Co (1887) 14 R 870 by the Lord Ordinary, Lord McLaren, at 873–874. 58 See Hoare v Silverlock (1848) 12 QB 624 per Coleridge J at 633 (comparison with snake).

18.16

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(3) Assessing damage to reputation 18.17

18.18

For a statement to be defamatory, it must cause damage to P’s reputation.59 But in view of the highly subjective nature of the processes by which social judgments are formed,60 it is hard to formulate an objective test for determining whether reputation is likely to be or has been harmed. The starting point adopted in the Scottish cases was previously a dictum by Lord Atkin in the English case of Sim v Stretch. Giving thought to “the person or class of persons whose reaction to the publication is the test of the wrongful character of the words used”, Lord Atkin proposed that the appropriate criterion was: “would the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally?”61 The Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021, section 1(4) (a), has now adjusted this formulation so that: “a statement about a person is defamatory if it causes harm to the person’s reputation (that is, if it tends to lower the person’s reputation in the estimation of ordinary persons)”. Attention has thus shifted from the problematic category of “rightthinking members of society generally”,62 leaving the courts to pitch their assessment by gauging the “estimation of ordinary persons”. On this point the Scottish legislation goes beyond the Defamation Act 2013, which is silent on this matter and thus leaves the common-law test of the “rightthinking” person in place in England and Wales.63 A fundamental difficulty of the “right-thinking members of society” test64 was that it took for granted a level of community consensus as to how reputations were judged. Yet the shared community values that may have appeared readily identifiable when Sim v Stretch was decided in 1936 are more contentious today. Virtues such as honesty and professional competence no doubt remain important to reputation in the estimation of most, but social and moral judgments are likely to be more diverse on issues such as sexual mores or religious observance. In applying the “right-thinking” test before 2021,65 the courts tended therefore toward a normative assessment – the values that the court considered a socially responsible person

59 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 1(4)(a). 60 As remarked in R Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation (1990) 58, “One reason that theorizing about reputation has not made much progress is that we think we know the answers without having to conduct an investigation.” For an analysis of the nature of reputation in English law, see T Gibbons, “Defamation Reconsidered” (1996) 16 OJLS 587. 61 [1936] 2 All ER 1237 at 1240. 62 For a lengthy analysis of the common law test, see L McNamara, Reputation and Defamation (2007). 63 See commentary in Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2019] UKSC 27, [2020] AC 612 per Lord Sumption at para 6 (although the claimant must also now show that serious harm has occurred as a consequence). 64 As with the Irish “reasonable members of society” test: see para 18.19 below. 65 For further discussion as to the “right-thinking” criterion and to the value choices which it entails, see L B Lidsky, “Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community” (1996) 71 Washington LR 1.

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ought to have. The fluid nature of this test meant that it was capable of updating itself in keeping with other developments within the legal system, attributing the “right-thinking” person with support for the values that these reflect. Arguably, the attitudes of such a person could be taken, for example, as being informed by the principles embodied in the Equality Act 2010, regarding the unlawfulness of discrimination on the grounds of personal characteristics such as disability, gender, race or religion.66 On that basis, imputations attributing such characteristics to P were not to be regarded as defamatory, even if false. Attitudes towards same-sex relationships were a further case in point.67 At one time it was accepted that allegations of a relationship with a member of the same sex connoted immoral behaviour and were therefore defamatory.68 But sexual orientation is a protected characteristic in terms of the Equality Act 2010, and it would have been unacceptable for the courts to endorse the view that the right-thinking person perceived such a relationship as having a negative impact on reputation.69 Similarly, it would have been difficult to argue that right-thinking persons thought, or ought to think, less of those involved in sexual relationships outwith marriage,70 unless D’s statement further alleged reprehensible conduct such as deception, hypocrisy or abuse. It is unclear, however, how the estimation of “ordinary persons” – the test under the 2021 Act – will be construed. The Explanatory Notes to the Act say that this “follows closely the common law test adopted in Sim v Stretch as regards the nature of a defamatory statement”.71 However, “right-thinking” and “ordinary” are self-evidently not synonymous. The Explanatory Notes also claim that a “similar approach” has been adopted to that of the Irish Defamation Act 2009, section 2, but the Irish Act 66 For the full list of protected characteristics, see Equality Act 2010 s 4. 67 See L McNamara, Reputation and Defamation (2007) 197–227. 68 See Woods and Pirie v Cumming Gordon, unreported, a decision of the Inner House in 1812, upheld by the House of Lords in 1819, discussed in K McK Norrie, “Jane’s Story: A Tragedy in Three Acts”, in J P Grant and E Sutherland (eds), Pronounced for Doom (2013) 90. See also AB v XY 1917 SC 15; Prophit v BBC 1997 SLT 745; Kerr v Kennedy [1942] 1 KB 409; Liberace v Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd, The Times, 18 June 1959. 69 See Quilty v Windsor 1999 SLT 346 per Lord Kingarth at 355 (“merely to refer to a person as being homosexual would not now generally at least be regarded – if it ever was – as defamatory per se”); Cowan v Bennett 2012 GWD 37–738 per Sheriff McGowan at para 107; Brown v Bower [2017] EWHC 2637 (QB), [2017] 4 WLR 197 per Nicklin J at para 50. See also Campbell v Dugdale [2020] CSIH 27, 2020 SC 481, accepting that an allegation that the pursuer was “homophobic” was in principle defamatory. 70 See e.g. Khalil v Barakat [2013] EWHC 85 (QB) per Eady J at para 8. See also a case from South Africa, Sokhulu v New Africa Publications (2001) 4 SA 1357 (W) per Goldstein J at 1359: “the right-thinking person . . . is someone who subscribes to the norms and values of the Constitution”. The case involved allegations concerning the plaintiff’s extra-marital relationship. Since the South African Bill of Rights, s 9(3), outlaws discrimination on the grounds of marital status, no stigma attached to such a relationship in the eyes of the right-thinking and the allegations could not be considered defamatory. 71 Explanatory Notes, para 14.

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construes a “defamatory statement” as meaning “a statement that tends to injure a person’s reputation in the eyes of reasonable members of society”. Again, “reasonable members of society” and “ordinary persons” may be overlapping categories but they are not necessarily the same. In the absence of broad-based empirical research on popular reactions to potentially defamatory subject-matter, the estimation of “ordinary persons” is a matter for speculation. Are litigants to negotiate this new standard by conducting opinion polls? One assumes not. Alternatively, the courts may take the view that, change of wording notwithstanding, “ordinary persons” are to be attributed with the “right-thinking” or “reasonable” attitudes of their common law predecessors or their Irish counterparts. This would allow damage to reputation to be measured in a similar way as before, subject to the “serious harm” requirement discussed below. In any event it is apparent that the test thus formulated is intended as an objective one, and that “the estimation of ordinary persons” generally is not always to be taken as matching that of the actual readership or audience. In Byrne v Deane,72 for example, it was held not to be defamatory, by reference to the “right-thinking” test, to suggest that a club member had informed the police about the presence of illegal gambling machines on club premises, since a “good and worthy subject of the King” would not esteem any less a “person of whom it had been said that he had put the law into motion against wrongdoers”.73 It seems arguable that “ordinary persons” should be imputed with similar views, even if some of P’s actual acquaintances are likely to take a dim view of police informers. In general, the “estimation of ordinary persons” test appears to exclude imputations lowering P only in the estimation of some minority group, on the basis that such a group’s members are not “ordinary persons”.74 But there can be exceptions. For example, the common law permitted the community of the “right-thinking” to be narrowed in appropriate cases to take account of the specific context and circumstances, or if there was a particular

72 [1937] 1 KB 818; and see discussion in Rufus v Elliott [2015] EWCA Civ 121, [2015] EMLR 17 per Sharp LJ at paras 23–25. 73 [1937] 1 KB 818 per Slesser LJ at 833. Cf Graham v Roy (1851) 13 D 634, in which it was held to be defamatory to allege that the pursuer had given information to the officers of Excise against a distiller, in order that he could obtain a financial reward – in other words that the motive was base. However, Lord Fullerton also observed in that case, at 636: “If you publish on the streets of a town that a man is a common informer, is that not slander? It may be perfectly legitimate to give information, but an informer is by no means a popular character.” See also Kennedy v Allan (1848) 10 D 1293; Winn v Quillan (1899) 2 F 322 (in which accusations of informing also carried the suggestion of disreputable motives). 74 In contrast, Comment e. on § 559 of the US Restatement Second of Torts provides expressly that: “A communication to be defamatory need not tend to prejudice the other in the eyes of everyone in the community or of all of his associates, nor even in the eyes of a majority of them. It is enough that the communication would tend to prejudice him in the eyes of a substantial and respectable minority of them.”

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impact in the community within which P lived or worked. This possibility appears to have been left open by the 2021 Act, which applies the “ordinary persons” test “unless the context otherwise requires”.75 An example of such a departure from the general rule can be seen in an earlier Scottish case76 involving allegations of unsporting conduct against a member of the hunting and shooting fraternity in a rural area. Although such allegations might have meant little to the majority of “right-thinking” – or indeed “ordinary”– persons living in urban areas, the court held that it was defamatory “to accuse such a man in such company” in this way.77 In the English courts it has also been held relevant to consider the likely readership or audience for statements made on a specialised platform. So in assessing remarks made in an article on dental anaesthesia published in the British Medical Journal, for example, it was appropriate to consider how the words would be understood by the community of dental surgeons who were likely to read it.78

(4) Types of defamatory imputation There is no finite list of imputations deemed capable of being defamatory. An imputation that P has committed a criminal offence79 is normally capable of injuring reputation, in that it is highly likely to affect the good opinion imputed to the ordinary person, unless perhaps the offence is one that attracts no moral opprobrium, such as a minor traffic offence.80 A defamatory meaning may also be attached to words or actions which create a strong suspicion of criminal activity.81 However, it is not necessary 75 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 1(4). 76 Lloyd v Hickley 1967 SLT 225 per Lord Thomson at 227. 77 1967 SLT 225 per Lord Thomson at 227. See also Macfarlane v Black and Co (1887) 14 R 870 per the Lord Ordinary, Lord McLaren, at 873 (as to the relevance of “the class of persons to which the individual aggrieved belongs”); Khalil v Barakat [2013] EWHC 85 (QB) per Eady J at paras 8–9 (acknowledging that while allegations of unchastity were no longer in themselves defamatory, they might in specific circumstances be construed as such, e.g. if the claimant was an unmarried woman in a traditional Muslim community). 78 Drummond-Jackson v British Medical Association [1970] 1 WLR 688 per Lord Denning at 694. 79 E.g. Rogers v Orr 1939 SC 121 (theft); Waddell v BBC 1973 SLT 246 (involvement in a murder); McAvennie v Scottish Daily Record and Sunday Mail Ltd 2003 Rep LR 93 (assault); Cook v Gibson [2013] CSOH 64, [2013] RVR 188 (interest in children that was “at best undesirable and at worst criminal in nature”); Kinley v Devine [2014] CSOH 67, 2014 GWD 14–255 (theft and embezzlement). 80 See K McK Norrie, Defamation and Related Actions in Scots Law (1995) 19. See also Campbell v Ritchie & Co 1907 SC 1097, in which a newspaper article stated that the pursuers had been convicted of “bird-liming”, contrary to the Wild Birds Protection (County of Midlothian) Order 1905. This was not held to be defamatory, in the absence of innuendo that the pursuers were guilty of the more serious charge of theft. 81 Robertson v Keith 1936 SC 29 (police surveillance of pursuer’s house, although privilege applied); but cf Leon v Edinburgh Evening News 1909 SC 1014 (reference in a newspaper article to the pursuer as a “prisoner” insufficient to impute criminal character to him); Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 (revelations of a police investigation did not entail that the plaintiffs had committed the offence in question).

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that the conduct attributed to P should have been illegal; imputations that P has acted in breach of a moral duty may also be defamatory. In Cayzer v Times Newspapers Ltd,82 for example, an executor was accused of disregarding the wishes of the deceased in administering his estate, thereby obtaining personal advantage. The court took the view that the “majority of people” would find such behaviour “repugnant” as in breach of the executor’s moral duty, and that he would thereby be lowered “in the esteem of right thinking members of society”.83 At one time allegations regarding sexual relationships outwith marriage formed the basis for a significant proportion of claims brought for defamation.84 As noted above,85 such imputations are no longer regarded as injuring reputation of themselves but the potential to defame is recognised if there is a further dimension to D’s allegations, involving impropriety86 such as deception, abuse, adultery, or denial of parenthood. Imputations affecting P’s reputation in a trade, business, or professional activity are capable of defaming87 if they suggest some form of misconduct,88 prejudice,89 hypocrisy,90 or lack of appropriate qualifications,91 knowledge,92 skill,93 judgment or competence.94 Individuals may be defamed in regard to the conduct of their professional or business lives 82 [2015] CSIH 55, 2015 SLT 501. 83 [2015] CSIH 55, 2015 SLT 501 per Lady Dorrian at paras 15–16. 84 See e.g. the catalogue compiled by F T Cooper, A Handbook of the Law of Defamation and Verbal Injury, 2nd edn by D O Dykes (1906) 44–45. 85 At para 18.18. 86 E.g. Winter v News Scotland Ltd 1991 SLT 828 (prison officer accused of sexual relationship with prisoner). 87 See e.g. the catalogue compiled by F T Cooper, A Handbook of the Law of Defamation and Verbal Injury, 2nd edn by D O Dykes (1906) 61–75; K McK Norrie, Defamation and Related Actions in Scots Law (1995) 22–24. 88 E.g. Martin v M’lean (1844) 6 D 981 (minister accused of being a drunkard); Gordon v John Leng & Co 1919 SC 415 (army officer accused of surrender); Winter v News Scotland Ltd 1991 SLT 828 (prison officer accused of sexual relationship with prisoner); Shanks v BBC 1993 SLT 326 (accountant accused of fraud and gross ineptitude); Thomson v Ross 2001 SLT 807 (solicitors accused of professional misconduct); Fraser v Fraser 2010 SLT (Sh Ct) 147 (care worker alleged to have hit a patient); Angiolini v Green [2013] CSOH 196, 2014 GWD 5–104 (Lord Advocate, who was formerly a regional procurator fiscal, alleged to have suppressed investigations into sexual abuse and murder); RAH v MH [2013] CSIH 82, 2013 GWD 34–675 (solicitor acting as court reporter alleged knowingly to have recorded false information). 89 Fraser v Mirza 1993 SC (HL) 27 (police officer alleged to be racist); McAnulty v McCulloch [2018] CSOH 121, 2019 SLT 449 (MP alleged to have made racist comments); Campbell v Dugdale [2020] CSIH 27, 2020 SC 481 (political commentator alleged to be homophobic). 90 E.g. Swinson v Scottish National Party [2019] CSOH 98, 2019 GWD 38–609 (MP campaigning on environmental issues falsely accused of accepting a political donation from a fracking company). 91 E.g. McKeith v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2005] EWHC 1162 (QB), [2005] EMLR 32. 92 Chisholm v Grant 1914 SC 239. 93 E.g. Oliver v Chief Constable of Northumbria [2003] EWHC 2417 (QB), [2004] EMLR 32. 94 E.g. Hiram v Mullen [2020] SC EDIN 23, 2020 SLT (Sh Ct) 135 (professional dog-walker falsely accused of mistreating her clients’ dogs); Drummond-Jackson v British Medical Association [1970] 1 WLR 688; M’Kerchar v Cameron (1892) 19 R 383.

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without any suggestion that their personal character is impugned.95 However, aspersions cast upon the business itself, as distinct from the way in which it is carried on, are not in themselves considered defamatory of its officeholders or employees, unless they carry the innuendo that problems in the business result from incompetence or dishonesty on the part of such persons.96 Those engaged in sport at a high level, whether professional or amateur, may be defamed by allegations that they have behaved in an unsporting manner.97 The import of remarks affecting P’s reputation in a trade, business, professional, or sporting activity are assessed in the light of the potential damage to the reputation of those in such positions generally. The slightest imputation of dishonesty might damage a police officer’s professional standing, for example, and any suggestion of domestic violence, serious when made against any individual, might have a particularly devastating effect upon the reputation of a person holding public office, such as a member of Parliament.98 Remarks about personal appearance or attributes might be hurtful, but would not normally be regarded as damaging to reputation, when made of private individuals; on the other hand, they might well be capable of damaging the professional reputation of actors or others working in the entertainment industry.99 Similarly, it is not, as a rule, defamatory to call a person “poor”,100 and financial status should not reflect upon P’s moral standing. Nonetheless, the assertion that P is in financial difficulties may defame in certain circumstances.101 A false allegation that P is insolvent,102 or unable to meet debts,103 or likely to “refuse or delay”104 payment may diminish P’s reputation if P’s occupation is such that a reputation for creditworthiness is important. If, for example, P’s trade or business entails handling client funds, allegations that P is under financial pressure may be particularly damaging.105 In addition to damages

 95 Fairbairn v Scottish National Party 1979 SC 393.  96 Although they may constitute malicious publication, as considered at paras 18.131–18.138 below.  97 See Munro v Brown [2011] CSOH 117, 2011 SLT 947 (former captain of the Scottish ladies curling team alleged to have refused to play in a world championship match).  98 Wray v Associated Newspapers 2000 SLT 869.  99 See Berkoff v Burchill [1996] 4 All ER 1008, in which the defendant had described the plaintiff (an actor) as “notoriously hideous-looking”; Cornwell v Myskow [1987] 1 WLR 630, in which the comment that the plaintiff (an actress) “can’t sing, her bum is too big and she has the sort of stage presence that jams lavatories” was regarded by the jury as defamatory. 100 McLaren v Robertson (1859) 21 D 183 per Lord Deas at 186. 101 F T Cooper, A Handbook of the Law of Defamation and Verbal Injury, 2nd edn by D O Dyke (1906) 64–67. 102 AB v CD (1904) 7 F 22; Kiam v Neil [1996] EMLR 493. 103 Russell v Stubbs Ltd 1913 SC (HL) 14. 104 Stubbs v Mazure 1919 SC (HL) 112. 105 AB v CD (1904) 7 F 22, in which it was held to be damaging of a country solicitor to assert that he had “lost his all”.

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for patrimonial loss, P may also claim solatium where the false allegations have caused “annoyance” and embarrassment.106 By the same token, the reputation of those in certain lines of work may be deemed less vulnerable to adverse comment than that of other people. In Moffat v West Highland Publishing Co Ltd,107 a newspaper’s allegation that a television-company executive was an “in-house bully” was held not to be defamatory, and it was commented that a person “occupying a position of professional responsibility in the media world” must expect to suffer “rough language or unmannerly jests so long as such statements do not attack his private character or reputation or indeed disparage his business reputation or fitness for his office”.108 Generally speaking, a degree of latitude is permitted to discussion of the activities of those operating in the political and public sphere.109

(5) Ridicule and irony 18.27

In the late Victorian era Lord McLaren commented that the courts should respect:110 “the utmost freedom in the discussion of the conduct and motives of those who take part in [this country’s] public business, whether in the higher plane of statesmanship or in the conduct of local affairs. In such criticism ridicule is just as legitimate as any other rhetorical artifice.”

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Although public figures frequently find themselves lampooned and ridiculed, for the most part those who are targeted in this way either elect not to give satire further publicity through litigation, or they judge that the risk of bringing proceedings is too great, particularly given the availability of the defence of honest opinion (previously fair comment). Nonetheless, the use of humour and ridicule may be defamatory if its effect has been to diminish P in the esteem of ordinary individuals.111 In 106 See Murray v Bonn (1913) 29 Sh Ct Rep 62, in which a warrant sale had mistakenly been announced at the pursuer’s address, causing “considerable annoyance to a man of good standing”. The pursuer did not demand “heavy pecuniary damages” and indeed would have been satisfied with a public apology. 107 2000 SLT 335. 108 2000 SLT 335 per Lord Cameron at 337. See also remarks by Lord Johnston in Wray v Associated Newspapers 2000 SLT 869 at 869 that “persons in public life . . . require to have thick skins, although not necessarily in relation to untruthful allegations about their domestic life”. 109 Mutch v Robertson 1981 SLT 217 per Lord Kissen at 222; Curran v Scottish Daily Record [2011] CSIH 86, 2012 SLT 359 per Lady Paton at paras 45–51. 110 M’Laughlan v Orr, Pollock & Co (1894) 22 R 38 at 42. 111 See Prophit v BBC 1997 SLT 745 per Temporary Judge T G Coutts QC at 747. The notion that defamation encompassed exposure not just to “public hatred” or “contempt” but also to “ridicule” can be traced to the judgment of Parke B (later Lord Wensleydale) in the English case of Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105 at 108.

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the English case of Berkoff v Burchill,112 for example, the court allowed that making a serious actor a “figure of fun”113 might be defamatory where this adversely affected the attitude of others.114 Furthermore, an imputation may be actionable, despite being made in jocular vein, if it undermines reputation by providing a cover for serious allegations, such as fraud or sexual impropriety or professional ineptitude, thereby provoking disapprobation or contempt as well as ridicule.115 At the same time, where it was unlikely that this would be taken in earnest, the courts are unlikely to read “chaff and banter”116 as capable of damaging reputation. The obviousness of the element of jest may well mean that disparaging content does not have the potential to inflict any significant damage upon reputation. In Macleod v Newsquest (Sunday Herald) Ltd,117 Lord Macphail held that the pursuer was not defamed merely by “being chaffed or teased” in a “good-humoured or bantering manner”, where a newspaper “Diary” column conferred upon him “the prestigious Tartan Bollocks Award” for making a political prediction that turned out to be very wide of the mark.118 Individuals in public life may be expected to tolerate a “certain amount of ridicule and censure”,119 and indeed, even if such satirical comment were judged to have affected their reputations, it seems unlikely that they would be able to satisfy the court that “serious harm”120 had been caused, now a requirement in all cases. On the other hand, private

112 [1996] 4 All ER 1008. For discussion, see J Cottrell, “What Does ‘Defamatory’ Mean? Reflections on Berkoff v Burchill” (1998) 6 Tort Law Review 149. See also Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd v Dunlop [1921] 1 AC 367; but cf Blennerhassett v Novelty Sales, The Times, 19 May 1933. 113 [1996] 4 All ER 1008 per Neill LJ at 1018. The main complaint in regard to the defendant’s hostile review article was that it described the plaintiff, a well-known actor, as “notoriously hideouslooking”, which was held to be capable of damaging his professional standing. 114 Cf Norman v Future Publishing Ltd [1999] EMLR 325, distinguishing Berkoff, in which the offending remark was made in an otherwise complimentary article. A magazine article falsely reported that the plaintiff, a plus-sized African-American opera singer, had become trapped in revolving doors and on being advised to manoeuvre sideways had quipped: “Honey, I ain’t got no sideways.” The plaintiff did not dispute her size, but argued that the article held her up to mockery and contempt by reporting that she used a mode of speech which was: (a) vulgar and undignified; and/or (b) conformed to a degrading racist stereotype of the African-American. Twenty years later the second argument in particular might have prompted more searching consideration. However, the court read the offending words in the context of an article which gave full credit to the plaintiff’s professionalism and achievements, so that the inclusion of this anecdote was regarded as unlikely to affect her in public esteem. 115 Prophit v BBC 1997 SLT 745; see also Wong Yoke Kong v Azmi M Anshar [2003] 4 Malayan Law Journal Reports 96, in which satirical comment was held to be defamatory since it could be read as imputing to a firm of solicitors a lack of professionalism and also criminal connections. 116 See Berkoff v Burchill [1996] 4 All ER 1008 per Millett LJ (dissenting) at 1018. 117 [2007] CSOH 04, 2007 SCLR 555. For commentary, see C Munro, “A Jester’s Licence? Comedy and Defamation Law” 2007 SLT (News) 135. 118 [2007] CSOH 04, 2007 SCLR 555 at para 24. See also Moffat v West Highland Publishing Co Ltd 2000 SLT 335. 119 MacLaren v Ritchie per Lord Justice-Clerk Hope, as reported in The Scotsman, 9 July 1856. 120 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 1(2)(b).

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individuals might more reasonably object to public exposure which brings mockery and notoriety, even if it makes others laugh.121 The tone or linguistic register in which words are used is of course important in determining whether they will be understood in a way which damages reputation. Thus allowance may be made for irony, even if heavyhanded. In one instance a man who had fallen out with his son-in-law over money matters wrote a heavily sarcastic letter to him, alluding sardonically to the younger man’s “lunacy”, drunkenness and mendacity, and referring to the possibility that he might be committed to an asylum. An action for defamation was dismissed on the basis that the defender intended “sarcasm, heavy indeed and laboured, but only sarcasm”, and not that the allegations should be taken literally.122

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Insults or invective uttered as “mere unmeaning abuse, mere vituperation”123 are not actionable unless they are likely to have significant impact on the reputation of their target. In this respect the currency of abuse has been significantly devalued over the years, and the catalogue of potentially defamatory epithets painstakingly compiled by Cooper in the late nineteenth century now appears extraordinarily dated.124 Calling a person a “blackguard”, for example, was at one time potentially defamatory,125 and “rascal”126 or “scum”127 were similarly injurious. It is highly unlikely that general terms of this nature would now be classed as defamatory, unless they carried specific connotations of depravity or turpitude (such as “wife-beater”128), or were accompanied by more detailed accusations of disreputable behaviour.129 Although not forming the basis for a defence as such, the fact that words are uttered in the heat of the moment (in rixa)130 is “a very relevant

121 Dunlop v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1920] 1 Ir Rep 280 per Powell J at 291–292 (affd [1921] 1 AC 367). 122 Bell v Haldane (1894) 2 SLT 320 per Lord Kyllachy at 322. 123 Cockburn v Reekie (1890) 17 R 568 per Lord McLaren at 571. 124 F T Cooper, A Handbook of the Law of Defamation and Verbal Injury, 2nd edn by D O Dyke (1906) 45–57. 125 E.g. Brownlie v Thomson (1859) 21 D 480. 126 Harkes v Mowat (1862) 24 D 701 (“damned robbing swindling rascals”). 127 Shepherd v Elliot (1895) 3 SLT 115 (“scum” held capable of being defamatory, but the jury found for the defender in the circumstances of the case: Shepherd v Elliot (No 2) (1895) 3 SLT 192). 128 Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2019] UKSC 27, [2020] AC 612; see also Depp v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2020] EWHC 2911 (QB). 129 As e.g. in Hayford v Forrester-Paton 1927 SC 740. 130 Defined in Hunter v Sommerville (1903) 11 SLT 70 per Sheriff-Substitute Strachan at 71 as “a quarrel, strife, or dispute between two parties, in the course of which their feelings become excited and their self-control weakened”.

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consideration” in determining the “true sense” of the words in context.131 Institutional authority suggested that where D had spoken “injuriously” in the “heat of passion, or drunk to excess”, no action should be sustained, as long as the abusive comments had been withdrawn as soon as sobriety was regained.132 An example often cited is that of Christie v Robertson,133 in which the pursuer and defender became embroiled in a heated dispute at an auction after each thought that he had bought the same horse. On seeing the defender lead the horse away, the pursuer made various angry comments, including that he was sending for the police. The defender then retorted that the pursuer “should have been in the hands of the police twenty times during the past five years”. Against this background, these words, although false, were held not to be actionable. They did not injure the pursuer’s reputation in the same way as they might have done if they had been uttered in a more measured way in a neutral context. Bystanders in these circumstances would have understood the words as being nothing more than abuse “by way of retaliation”, not as indicating that the pursuer had had repeated contact with the police.134 Such leniency does not extend to all remarks made in anger, however. The heat of the moment may exculpate general invective, such as “you are a liar”135 – even a “damned liar”136 – or a vague accusation of criminality, as in Christie v Robertson. However, it does not extend to specific accusations, such as when D “makes a definite charge of crime or a charge of dishonest conduct against another, giving such point in regard to time and circumstances as to lead those who were present to believe that the charge was seriously made”.137

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(7) Imputations causing an individual to be shunned? In the first edition of his work on reparation, published in 1864, Guthrie Smith defined defamation as including imputations which resulted in P’s society being “shunned by those with whom he is accustomed to associate”.138 There has been no reported Scottish case since, supporting a category of defamatory imputation which does not necessarily lower P in the estimation of the “right-thinking”, yet causes P’s society to be “shunned” by them. Such an allegation did, however, form the basis for a successful

131 Christie v Robertson (1899) 1 F 1155 per Lord McLaren at 1157. 132 Bankton, Inst 1.10.25. Erskine, Inst 4.4.80 similarly wrote that intemperate expressions spoken “in a passion” should not give rise to a presumption of malicious intention. 133 (1899) 1 F 1155. 134 (1899) 1 F 1155 at 1157–1158. 135 Agnew v British Legal Life Assurance Co Ltd (1906) 8 F 422. 136 Watson v Duncan (1890) 17 R 404. 137 Christie v Robertson (1899) 1 F 1155 per Lord McLaren at 1157. 138 J Guthrie Smith, A Treatise on the Law of Reparation (1864) 188.

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claim in the English case of Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd.139 The plaintiff sued a film company, arguing that a character portrayed as a rape victim in one of its films was based on herself. This was held to be defamatory, not because the court thought that any “moral discredit” attached to a rape victim, but because such a person would apparently suffer “in social reputation and in opportunities of receiving respectful consideration from the world”.140 This kind of allegation was thus to be regarded as having a similar social effect as an allegation that the plaintiff was insane, or suffering from a serious contagious disease.141 Plainly this category is problematic. Prior to the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 it was open to question whether the common law test, drawing upon the opinion of “right-thinking” citizens, allowed such imputations to be considered defamatory, since that epithet could hardly be attributed to an individual who ostracised another merely because he or she was alleged to be the victim of misfortune such as sexual assault or disease.142 Of course there might be circumstances where such imputations caused patrimonial loss, and where a right of action might otherwise arise; an example might be a false allegation that an ophthalmic surgeon had impaired vision, thus casting doubt upon her professional competence.143 Following the introduction of the 2021 Act much will depend upon how the Scottish courts construe the “estimation of ordinary persons”, as discussed above.144 Arguably the test in section 1(4) of the 2021 Act is met where evidence can be produced that significant numbers of individuals “shunning” P were “ordinary persons”, but the opposite conclusion may be reached if the courts take the view that defamatory effect is to be measured by the standards of “right-thinking” or “reasonable” persons. Such disclosures may in any event be actionable as misuse of private information, even if they are substantially false, as discussed in chapter 20.145

139 (1934) 50 TLR 581. 140 (1934) 50 TLR 581 per Slesser LJ at 587. 141 (1934) 50 TLR 581 per Slesser LJ at 587. 142 See Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy para 10.47. See also, in England, the Faulks Committee on Defamation (Cmnd 5909, 1975) App 5, 256–257, to the effect that Youssoupoff went “too far” and recommending that causing the plaintiff to be “shunned or avoided” should not be recognised in itself as defamatory. The Defamation Act 2013 dealt only tangentially with this point, in relation to illness, providing in s 14(2) that “the publication of a statement that conveys the imputation that a person has a contagious or infectious disease does not give rise to a cause of action for slander unless the publication causes the person special damage”. Impliedly this leaves open the possibility that a cause of action for libel is available without such damage. 143 See n 142 above for provision made by the Defamation Act 2013 s 14(2) in England and Wales for imputations regarding “contagious or infectious disease”. There is no equivalent provision in the 2021 Act. 144 See para 18.19. 145 See paras 20.53–20.54

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D. PUBLICATION TO A THIRD PARTY A right to bring defamation proceedings arises only where the statement has been published to a third party.146 By contrast with the law before the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021,147 defamation may no longer be perpetrated by words or actions communicated by D to P alone, although it is possible that a remedy may be found in such circumstances by reference to another delict, such as harassment.148 “Publication” is broadly understood as “communicating the statement by any means to a person in a manner that the person can access and understand”,149 and the statement is published “when the recipient has seen or heard it”.150 There is no requirement that the statement should be published in the mass media or spoken out loud in a public place. Any mode of communication is sufficient, including digital, such as tweets,151 or the posting of messages to Facebook.152 The only requirements are that the content should have been accessed and understood by a third party. Case law in England illustrates that publication in this wide sense can be achieved, for example, by the dictating of a letter to a typist,153 or the sending of a communication to P in the knowledge that it will be opened and seen by an employee of P.154

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E. SERIOUS HARM (1) The significance of the serious harm requirement While English common law distinguishes libel from slander, the former being actionable per se, and the latter demanding proof of special damage,155 the common law in Scotland made no such distinction, requiring “no special averment or proof” of the specific injurious effect of a defamatory imputation,

146 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 1(2)(a). 147 See e.g. Mackay v McCankie (1883) 10 R 537; Ramsay v Maclay and Co (1890) 18 R 130; Thomson v Kindell 1910 2 SLT 442. 148 See ch 28 below. 149 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 1(4)(b). 150 s 1(4)(c). 151 E.g. Lord McAlpine of West Green v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB); Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB), [2017] 4 WLR 68. 152 E.g. Stocker v Stocker [2019] UKSC 17, [2020] AC 593. 153 Pullman v Walter Hill & Co Ltd [1891] 1 QB 524. 154 Pullman v Walter Hill & Co Ltd [1891] 1 QB 524, although Lopes LJ observed that the defendant might have escaped liability by writing “Private” on the envelope. See also Huth v Huth [1915] 3 KB 32, in which it was held that there was no publication where the plaintiff’s butler had opened the defendant’s letter out of curiosity. 155 Meaning specific financial loss. See discussion of the impact of the Defamation Act 2013, which did not abolish this distinction, in Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2019] UKSC 27, [2020] AC 612 per Lord Sumption at paras 17–19.

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whatever its form;156 in effect every defamatory imputation was “actionable per se”.157 Of course the de minimis principle applied, so that in evaluating whether a statement was defamatory, the common law excluded trifling knocks to reputation.158 In a significant, and arguably unwise, change of direction, the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 has now introduced a formal threshold, providing in section 1(2) that a right to bring defamation proceedings arises only if “the publication of the statement has caused (or is likely to cause) serious harm to the reputation of [P]”. The wording of section 1(2) on this point is an exact copy of the Defamation Act 2013, section 1(1), applicable to England and Wales. It is unclear why the Scottish Parliament considered it necessary to import the English legislation in this way.159 The mischief that the English “serious harm” test was intended to address was eloquently explained by Lord Pannick, quoting Iago in Shakespeare’s Othello:160 “[H]e that filches from me my good name Robs me of that which not enriches him, And makes me poor indeed.”

“The problem”, Lord Pannick continued, “is that the Iagos of the 21st century bring libel proceedings and they deter newspapers, publishers and others from commenting on their behaviour. The current state of the law of libel damages the good name of the English legal system.” As Lord Sumption further observed, in Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd,161 there was also a concern that persons resident outside England, with only limited reputation in England, were bringing proceedings in the English courts in order to exploit a defamation regime that appeared more claimant-friendly than in other jurisdictions.

156 F T Cooper, A Handbook of the Law of Defamation and Verbal Injury, 2nd edn by D O Dyke (1906) 6. 157 Walker, Delict 785. 158 E.g. in Macleod v Newsquest (Sunday Herald) Ltd [2007] CSOH 04, 2007 SCLR 555, discussed above. English law had latterly recognised a minimum threshold of seriousness in determining what was defamatory: see Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB), [2011] 1 WLR 1985. 159 See Scottish Parliament Justice Committee, Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Bill: Stage 1 Report, 17th Report, 2020 (Session 5) paras 104–106. The Committee considered the views of those who believed the serious harm test to be necessary in order to discourage “frivolous or vexatious cases”. The Committee also heard evidence that this threshold tilted the balance too far away from the rights of individuals to protect their reputation. However, it favoured retention of the serious harm test as part of “a package which creates an appropriate overall balance between freedom of expression and protection of reputation”. 160 Othello, Act 3, scene 3, cited in the House of Lords debate on the Second Reading of the English Defamation Bill, HL Deb 9 Jul 2010, col 447. 161 [2019] UKSC 27, [2020] AC 612 at para 1.

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In Scotland, by contrast, claims by twenty-first-century Iagos against the newspapers did not figure large in the rolls of the Scottish courts. It could not be said that a profusion of unmeritorious claims was damaging “the good name” of the Scottish legal system, nor that Edinburgh was in any danger of becoming a libel capital to rival London. There were of course cases where allegedly defamatory imputations were ultimately dismissed as “banter”,162 but there was little sign that those bringing such cases were seeking, not to vindicate reputation, but to bring undue pressure on the media, thereby chilling public discussion. In proposing the wording that was later used in section 1(2), the Scottish Law Commission cited the Court of Appeal decision in Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd163 as the basis for an assurance that “the issues of costs and complexity thought in the early days of the 2013 Act to be associated with the section 1(1) test are not as significant as was initially feared”.164 However, that assessment might usefully have been reconsidered in the light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lachaux which, though upholding the decision of the Court of Appeal, strongly criticised its interpretation of section 1(1). The Supreme Court held that the statutory wording:165 “not only raises the threshold of seriousness above that envisaged in [previous case law], but requires its application to be determined by reference to the actual facts about its impact and not just to the meaning of the words.”

If follows therefore that:166 “a statement which would previously have been regarded as defamatory, because of its inherent tendency to cause some harm to reputation, is not to be so regarded unless it ‘has caused or is likely to cause’ harm which is ‘serious’.”

A fundamental concern of defamation law reform in Scotland, as in England, was to maintain an appropriate balance between freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 10 of the ECHR, and the right to protect reputation in terms of Article 8.167 Arguably, the serious harm requirement tips the balance too far against the latter.168 162 Cowan v Bennett 2012 GWD 37–738; Macleod v Newsquest (Sunday Herald) Ltd [2007] CSOH 04, 2007 SCLR 555. 163 [2017] EWCA Civ 1334, [2018] QB 594, holding that a claimant could prove serious reputational harm without calling any evidence, by relying on a process of inference from the seriousness of the imputation conveyed by the statement. 164 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Defamation (Scot Law Com No 248, 2017) para 2.10. 165 [2019] UKSC 27, [2020] AC 612 per Lord Sumption at para 12 (emphasis added). 166 [2019] UKSC 27, [2020] AC 612 per Lord Sumption at para 14. 167 See para 18.01 above. 168 See e.g. D Erdos, “Serious Harm to Reputation Rights? Defamation in the Supreme Court” (2020) 78 CLJ 510 at 512.

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It is assumed that in interpreting the exact same wording in section 1(2) of the 2021 Act the Scottish courts will follow the Supreme Court’s reading of the English legislation. If so, Scottish litigants now confront a significant additional hurdle. Not only has the bar been raised on actionability, but there is also a requirement for factual evidence to be led regarding consequential harm, or potential harm. Henceforth, it is not just the Iagos, but the wrongly-maligned Cassios and Desdemonas who, unless they are well-resourced, may hesitate to take the risk of bringing a claim.

(2) Indicators of serious harm: English case law 18.44

18.45

At the time of writing there has as yet been no Scottish case law, but English cases since 2013 give an idea of the likely direction that this may follow. In Lachaux itself Lord Sumption maintained that the serious harm test had not brought a “revolution in the law of defamation”, but his judgment left no doubt that the defamatory status of a statement “no longer depends only upon the words and their inherent tendency to damage the claimant’s reputation”.169 In order to determine whether the serious harm threshold has been crossed, it is of course still relevant to consider that “inherent tendency”, but in conjunction with factual evidence regarding the actual or predicted impact of the publication. In Lachaux the offending publications represented the claimant as a wife-beater, and alleged that he had falsely accused his ex-wife of kidnapping their son, causing her to risk being jailed. The serious harm threshold was held to have been met as a preliminary issue. The testimony of several witnesses, as well as circulation figures for the relevant publications, vouched for the impact on the claimant’s reputation, in terms of: the scale of the publications; the probability that they would have come to the attention of persons who knew him or would come to know him in future, including in England; and the gravity of the statements themselves. Similar indicators have been looked for in subsequent case law. The claimant is expected to gather evidence in regard to the impact that the statement has made or is likely to make upon the opinions of those reading or hearing the statements.170 In Kim v Lee,171 for example, allegations made regarding a church pastor were demonstrated to have caused serious harm where evidence was produced of: (i) numerous complaints about the claimant that his church had received following the defendant’s allegations; (ii) a “loss of trust” on the part of his congregation; and (iii) his dismissal from part-time work as a columnist. 169 [2019] UKSC 27, [2020] AC 612 at para 17 (emphasis added). 170 See Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2019] UKSC 27, [2020] AC 612 per Lord Sumption at para 21. 171 [2021] EWHC 231 (QB).

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Although the assessment is not a simple “numbers game”,172 importance is attached to the extent of publication, or number of people accessing the defamatory imputation. In Al Sadik v Sadik,173 the court refused to strike out the claim where the WhatsApp group to whom the material in question was sent had thirty-four family members – a “comparatively small” number that was nonetheless “not trivial”.174 On the other hand, in Alexander-Theodotou v Kounis175 the court was persuaded that the constituency who could reasonably have identified the claimants was a small one, the members of which would already have taken an adverse view of the claimants’ professional conduct, so that no serious harm was likely to have resulted. Where statements have been made through internet channels, usage data is clearly relevant, so that in Fentiman v Marsh,176 for example, the large number of viewings that the defendant’s postings had received confirmed the seriousness of their impact. In this connection it is relevant to consider whether “grapevine dissemination” has occurred, or is likely to occur, whereby a statement published on social media has been passed on to even greater numbers of readers.177 The harm or potential harm may be judged more serious where the publication has been specifically targeted at a particular constituency. In Al Sadik v Sadik,178 where the claimant was accused of dishonest business dealings and of lying upon the Quran, the material was circulated by means of a family WhatsApp group, the members of which were all Muslim. It was recognised that publication specifically directed at a group of people who were important to the claimant had the potential to cause more harm to the claimant’s reputation than indiscriminate publication to much larger numbers.179 Where a series of defamatory statements are made, none of which is individually capable of causing serious harm to the claimant, English authority suggests that the court will not aggregate the statements to consider their cumulative effect. As a result, the necessary threshold will not be reached.180

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18.48

(3) Bodies trading for profit Section 1(3) of the 2021 Act stipulates that, where P is a “non-natural person which has as its primary purpose trading for profit”, harm to P’s 172 173 174 175 176

177 178 179 180

Al Sadik v Sadik [2019] EWHC 2717 (QB), [2020] EMLR 7 at para 95. [2019] EWHC 2717 (QB), [2020] EMLR 7. [2019] EWHC 2717 (QB), [2020] EMLR 7 at para 95. [2019] EWHC 956 (QB). [2019] EWHC 2099 (QB). See also Al Sadik v Sadik [2019] EWHC 2717 (QB), [2020] EMLR 7 at para 99; Kim v Lee [2021] EWHC 231 (QB) at para 146 (where there was evidence that the offending publications on two social media sites had “spread very quickly”). Fentiman v Marsh [2019] EWHC 2099 (QB) at para 55. [2019] EWHC 2717 (QB), [2020] EMLR 7. [2019] EWHC 2717 (QB), [2020] EMLR 7 at paras 95–98. Sube v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2018] EWHC 1961 (QB), [2018] 1 WLR 5767.

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reputation is not “serious harm” unless it has caused (or is likely to cause) P “serious financial loss”. It had long been recognised that legal persons might be defamed, just as natural persons,181 but while they could recover for patrimonial loss caused by injury to reputation, plainly they could not claim solatium for injury to feelings. In this respect (though not in others), section 1(3) follows the common law. The category of “non-natural persons which have as their primary purpose trading for profit” includes companies, and “persons” may also include partnerships,182 which the common law also accepted as having title to sue in relation to defamation.183 The wording of this subsection was designed to exclude charities from the requirement to demonstrate serious financial loss, although doubt may arise in cases where, as is now common, the charity has a trading arm with the primary purpose of raising profit, albeit that those profits are ultimately destined for charitable uses.184 In requiring “serious financial loss”, section 1(3) copies the wording of section 1(2) of the Defamation Act 2013 in England and Wales. This has been interpreted as meaning that, while there is “room for inference rather than strict proof”, there must be a “sound evidential basis” for the alleged past or future loss. As Warby J warned in Gubarev v Orbis Business Intelligence Ltd:185 “Proof that a statement with a seriously defamatory tendency was widely published in the relevant jurisdiction(s) is not likely to be enough. More evidence, and a more detailed examination of the context, will normally be required. The claimant also bears the burden of showing that any loss it proves is more likely than not to be a result of the publication complained of, rather than some other cause or causes.”

This means that evidence of adverse customer reaction, for example, must be tied to evidence of loss, showing that business was withheld in consequence.186 The mere fact of a downturn in sales does not suffice without proof that this is linked to the defamatory event.187 This “serious financial loss” requirement marks a departure from the common law position, which recognised the possibility that a company might have a “trading 181 See para 18.54 below. 182 Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 2010 Sch 1. 183 See e.g. McVean and Co v Blair (1801) Hume 609; Dickson Minto, WS v Bonnier Media Ltd 2002 SLT 776. See also Partnership Act 1890 s 4(2); para 18.56 below. 184 See Scottish Law Commission, Report on Defamation (Scot Law Com No 248, 2017) paras 2.23– 2.24, concluding that such issues could “safely be left” for the courts to resolve “on a case-bycase basis”. 185 [2020] EWHC 2912 (QB) at para 45. 186 [2020] EWHC 2912 (QB) at para 56–57. 187 See also Collins Stewart v The Financial Times Ltd [2004] EWHC 2337, [2005] EMLR 5 on the difficulties of assessing loss by reference to the value of company shares.

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character” capable of being defamed, even if no specific losses were demonstrated, but where the offending publication had a “tendency to damage [the company] in the way of its business”.188

F. THE DEFENDER’S INTENTIONS Although early case law on verbal injury placed emphasis upon the element of intention, the law of defamation had “slipped into strict liability” by the late nineteenth century.189 It remains there today. Guthrie Smith, in the first edition of his Treatise on the Law of Reparation in 1864, wrote that the defender “may be reasonably supposed to be actuated by improper motives in aspersing his neighbour’s character”,190 adding in his second edition of 1889 that, in non-privileged circumstances, “no man can found on the purity of his motives and the excellence of his intentions”.191 Thus in Morrison v Ritchie192 in 1902, a relevant case was made against newspaper publishers who published a false announcement accepted from a third party that the pursuers had become the parents of twins. Since the pursuers had only recently married, the clear, and at that time scurrilous, inference was that they had enjoyed a sexual relationship before marriage. The publishers’ ignorance of the falsity of the notice made no difference to the question of liability. The English courts adopt a similar stance in cases where personal animosity was patently absent,193 so that the relevant

188 Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359 per Lord Bingham at para 17; see also South Hetton Coal Co Ltd v North-Eastern News Association Ltd [1894] 1 QB 133. 189 J Blackie, “Defamation”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 633 at 662–665; Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy paras 10–49 to 10–50. See also R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 1067 on the tendency within the European legal tradition to alleviate otherwise formidable problems of proof by applying the presumption that defamatory acts had been committed with the requisite intention to impair reputation or dignity. 190 A Treatise on the Law of Reparation (1864) 204. 191 J Guthrie Smith, The Law of Damages: A Treatise on the Reparation of Injuries, as Administered in Scotland, 2nd edn (1889) 232. See also F T Cooper, A Handbook of the Law of Defamation and Verbal Injury (1894) 2: “In unprivileged cases, though there be absolutely no malice, damages are due.” In the second edition of 1906, Cooper’s editor, Oswald Dykes (at 9), distinguished defamation from verbal injury in that, in relation to the former, “the culpa, technically called malice, is presumed”, whereas the latter required the pursuer to aver and prove malice. 192 (1902) 4 F 645. 193 See E Hulton & Co v Jones [1910] AC 20. A newspaper had published a disparaging article concerning a character “Artemus Jones”, whom it claimed to have invented. A barrister of that name sued for libel, and his acquaintances testified that they had understood the story to refer to him. The court accepted that neither the author nor the newspaper editor knew of the real Artemus Jones (which was odd, given that Jones had previously written articles for the same newspaper). The trial judge directed the jury that the article was not actionable if the sensible reader would have understood the character to be imaginary, but if the reader would have believed the character to be real, so that the plaintiff’s acquaintances would think it was him, then damages would be due.

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18.53

enquiry is not what was “meant in the mind of the writer” but what was “meant by the words employed”.194 In the modern law in both jurisdictions, liability is determined not by subjective assessment of D’s intention to injure, but by an objective evaluation of whether the imputation was injurious.195 It is, moreover, no answer to liability that D has merely passed on a falsehood heard or read elsewhere, even if it is preceded by a prefix such as “I have been told that . . .” or “It is rumoured that . . .”.196 D’s actual intentions are similarly disregarded where an imputation is true of its intended subject, but coincidentally might also be taken to refer to P, of whom it is false.197 Liability turns on whether the ordinary reader would believe that there was a “personal connection” between P and the defamatory material.198 The onus is therefore upon a person publishing potentially defamatory material to ensure that the subject is identified with precision or in such a way as to reduce the possibility of confusion with other persons. It is only in cases of privilege, and in the absence of malice, that D may escape liability for unintentional harm.199 However, the harshness of the outcome in cases such as Morrison is tempered by the availability of the statutory procedure for making an offer of amends.200

G. WHO MAY SUE? 18.54

As already noted, it is possible for legal as well as natural persons to be defamed.201 A company may be defamed, for example, by allegations that its mode of business is inefficient, dishonest, or exploitative202 or that the

194 E Hulton & Co v Jones [1910] AC 20 per Lord Shaw at 26. 195 See Cassidy v Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1929] 2 KB 331 per Russell LJ at 354: “Liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer; but on the fact of defamation.” 196 Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 per Lord Devlin at 283; see e.g. Fraser v Fraser 2010 SLT (Sh Ct) 147. Note, however, s 6(3) of the 2021 Act, extending the public interest defence to reportage, discussed below at paras 18.86–18.87, and see also the restrictions on proceedings against secondary publishers, discussed below at paras 18.124–18.127. 197 See Newstead v London Express Newspaper [1940] 1 KB 377, in which the defendant published a story concerning “Harold Newstead, thirty-year-old Camberwell man”, convicted for bigamy. The story was true of the bigamist, but not of another Harold Newstead, resident in Camberwell, who successfully raised an action for damages, although only one farthing was awarded. Since the story was capable of a meaning defamatory of the plaintiff, it was no defence that it was true of another person of that name and that there had been no intention to harm the blameless Harold Newstead. See also Finlay v Ruddiman and Niell (1763) 5 Bro Sup 575 (this misspells the name of the second defender, the printer Patrick Neill); Harkness v Daily Record Ltd 1924 SLT 759. 198 Harkness v Daily Record Ltd 1924 SLT 759 per Lord President Clyde at 762. 199 See para 18.105 below. 200 See paras 18.119–18.123 below. 201 Para 18.49 above and also The Preses, and Society of Solicitors v Robertson (1781) Mor 13935; Lever Brothers Ltd v The “Daily Record” Glasgow Ltd 1909 SC 1004; Kwik-Fit-Euro Ltd v Scottish Daily Record and Sunday Mail Ltd 1987 SLT 226; F Patfield, “Freedom of Speech and Companies” 1993 JR 294. 202 E.g. Elite Model Management Corp v BBC [2001] All ER (D) 334 (May). See also Steel and Morris v UK (2005) 41 EHRR 22.

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company is trading while insolvent.203 A company may recover for patrimonial loss caused by injury to its reputation, subject to the further requirement, discussed above, that entities “trading for profit” must demonstrate “serious financial loss”.204 An action raised by a corporate body does not preclude a separate action on the part of individual members of that body, so that if, for example, a company and its directors are defamed, the individual directors as well as the company may sue. An allegation that company directors had permitted a company to continue trading while insolvent, for example, may be defamatory of the directors insofar as it imputes misconduct against them personally.205 Partnerships have legal personality separate from the individual partners206 and are capable of being defamed,207 but where they are trading for profit, they must similarly meet the threshold of proving “serious financial loss”.208 Public bodies, on the other hand, are prohibited from suing in defamation. The Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 clarifies the common law position209 by providing in section 2(1) that public authorities may not bring defamation proceedings. The underlying principle was explained by Lord Keith in the English case of Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers, referring to:210

18.55

18.56 18.57

“[T]he highest public importance that a democratically elected governmental body, or indeed any governmental body, should be open to uninhibited public criticism. The threat of a civil action for defamation must inevitably have an inhibiting effect on freedom of speech.”

A public authority is defined in section 2(2) of the 2021 Act as: “(a) any institution of central government, including in particular the Scottish Ministers and any non-natural person owned or controlled by them,   (b) any institution of local government, including in particular each local authority and any non-natural person that such an authority owns or controls, 203 E.g. Seaspray Steamship Co Ltd v Tenant (1908) 15 SLT 874. See also J Lyons & Co Ltd v Lipton Ltd (1914) 49 LJ 542, holding that it was defamatory of a company to allege that its directorate was composed of Germans – i.e. enemy aliens at that time. 204 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 1(3); and see paras 18.49–18.50 above. 205 Aspro Travel Ltd v Owners Abroad Group plc [1996] 1 WLR 132. 206 Partnership Act 1890 s 4(2). 207 E.g. McVean and Co v Blair (1801) Hume 609; Dickson Minto, WS v Bonnier Media Ltd 2002 SLT 776. 208 See para 18.49 above. 209 See Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers [1993] AC 534. 210 [1993] AC 534 at 547, citing City of Chicago v Tribune Co 139 NE 86 (1923).

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636   The Law of Delict in Scotland (c) a court or tribunal, (d) any person or office not falling within paragraphs (a) to (c) whose functions include functions of a public nature”.

18.59

18.60 18.61

Non-natural persons, however, are not brought within this definition by virtue of carrying out public functions “from time to time”, if such persons are not owned or controlled by a public authority and either: (i) have as their primary purpose trading for profit; or (ii) are a charity or have “purposes consisting only of one or more charitable purposes”.211 In other words commercial organisations and charities that may be contracted in by public bodies from time to time to assist in discharging public functions, and who do not otherwise come within the definition of a public authority, do not thereby lose the right to bring defamation proceedings. On the other hand, corporate entities set up by central or local government and remaining under public ownership or control are subject to the prohibition, even though they may be competing with entities under private ownership who are not thus restricted. The definition of public authority is narrower than the category of public authority for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, which includes, without qualification, “any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature”.212 Commercial organisations and charities are commonly contracted to carry out public functions, such as, for example, private care homes caring for residents on behalf of a local authority, or housing associations acting as social landlords. Such organisations would be bound by the Human Rights Act 1998 to act in a manner that is compatible with Convention rights in carrying out these public functions,213 but would not be barred from bringing defamation proceedings where potentially damaging allegations were made regarding their performance in this regard. Individual members or officers of public authorities of course retain the right to sue in respect of attacks on their own personal reputation.214 There are other types of non-trading entity with which the 2021 Act does not deal explicitly. Voluntary associations were recognised by the common law as having the right to sue for defamation, and the Act does not say that they are prohibited from doing so. Such entities, however, cannot (plainly) claim solatium, so that, while the “serious financial loss” requirement is inapplicable unless they are trading for profit, they must be able to aver and prove some form of patrimonial loss.215 211 212 213 214

Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 2(3). Human Rights Act 1998 s 6(3); see para 7.01 above. See paras 7.31–7.34 above. Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 2(5). This was already the position in the common law: see Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers [1993] AC 534 per Lord Keith at 550. 215 Highland Dancing Board v Alloa Printing Co Ltd 1971 SLT (Sh Ct) 50; on the status of individual members, see also Campbell v Wilson 1934 SLT 249.

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There is similarly no mention of whether political parties have the right to sue for defamation, but the common law position was that they did not, and the Act does not depart from this position. The rationale for the prohibition is the same as that articulated in Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers216 in relation to public authorities generally: granting such a right would create an unnecessary “fetter on free speech”.217 Individual candidates or party officials who are sufficiently identified by a defamatory imputation do, however, have the right to bring proceedings on their own account. It is not settled whether trade unions may sue for defamation, and again the 2021 Act makes no specific mention of this point. In the English case of Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbing Union v Times Newspapers,218 it was held that, although a trade union could sue in tort, the wording of section 2(1) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 prevented it from suing in defamation.219 That decision is now regarded as “doubtful”,220 however, and it is not clear what policy considerations would justify such a prohibition.

18.62

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H. DEFAMATION OF THE DEAD As with other types of delictual claim, executors may continue with any action for defamation which the deceased had commenced before death, pursuing a claim for both solatium and patrimonial loss.221 If a defamatory statement was made before death, but the deceased had not initiated proceedings, the executor may nonetheless raise an action, but only for patrimonial loss, not for solatium.222 A further question is whether injurious statements made about persons after their death are actionable. Most European jurisdictions, with the exception of England, offer some protection for the reputation of the 216 [1993] AC 534. 217 Goldsmith v Bhoyrul [1998] QB 459 per Buckley J at 463. 218 [1980] QB 585. 219 The reasoning was that, since s 2(1) provided that a trade union was not a body corporate, a trade union had no personality which was capable of being injured by defamatory remarks. (This provision has been replaced, but using substantially the same wording, by s 10(1) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.) Earlier authority to the opposite effect was therefore regarded as superseded: National Union of Bank Employees v Murray 1949 SLT (Notes) 25; and see also National Union of General and Municipal Workers v Gillian [1946] KB 81. 220 R Parkes et al (eds), Gatley on Libel and Slander, 12th edn (2013) para 8.24; see also K McK Norrie, Defamation and Related Actions in Scots Law (1995) 68. The EETPU case was not specifically mentioned in the House of Lords speeches in Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers, but Lord Keith referred to the earlier cases upholding the right of trade unions to sue and observed that they were “understandable upon the view that defamatory matter may adversely affect the union’s ability to keep its members or attract new ones or to maintain a convincing attitude towards employers”: [1993] AC 534 at 547. 221 Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 2. 222 Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 2(3); see also Auld v Shairp (1874) 2 R 191.

18.64

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dead.223 The older authorities suggested that such an action was at one time available in Scotland also, but they were divided as to its basis. In his treatment of “Injury”, Bankton said that a right of action lay with the family or “heirs”, although without making clear whether only patrimonial loss to the estate might be recovered or whether a claim might be made for solatium in respect of injury to the feelings of the living:224 “Injury may not only be done to the Living, but also in a manner to the Dead, by reproaching their memory, detaining their bodies from burial, lifting their bodies out of their graves, or defacing their monuments. The children or next of kin may prosecute the injuries done to the remains of their parent or relation, tho’ they are not heirs to the deceased; but, if there is an heir, the action is competent to him, the rule being, that semper hæredis interest defuncti existimationem purgare, It is always the interest and concern of the heir that the character of the deceased be vindicated.”

18.66

Some decades later, the remarks of Lord Chief Commissioner Adam in Walker v Robertson225 were more direct. This was the second of two conjoined cases. In the first226 a son continued an action for defamation raised initially by his father. The second, raised by the son as an individual, was a “substantive and distinct case from the other” and the Lord Chief Commissioner directed the jury that they were to consider whether statements about the father “were not such as ought to affect and were likely to affect the feelings of a son”.227 Borthwick subsequently cited Walker v Robertson as authority for the general proposition that “the heir may prosecute for the disparagement of his father’s memory if it is injurious to the heir himself or to his other descendants”.228 In the leading modern case, Broom v Ritchie,229 however, the report makes no reference to Bankton, and Walker v Robertson was dismissed out of hand.230 In Broom the wife and children of the deceased raised an action for defamation against the publishers of a newspaper which had reported his death under the headline “determined suicide”. The Lord Ordinary, Lord Kincairney, held that family members could not claim damages in respect of a defamatory statement, made after their relative’s death, which had caused

223 See C von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts (2000) vol 2, para 116. 224 Bankton, Inst 1.10.29. 225 (1821) 2 Mur 516. 226 Walker v Robertson (1821) 2 Mur 508. 227 (1821) 2 Mur 516 at 518–519. 228 J Borthwick, A Treatise on the Law of Libel and Slander (1826) 169. 229 (1904) 6 F 942. 230 The Lord Ordinary, Lord Kincairney, said of Walker v Robertson: “I cannot think that the course there followed would be followed now, and I suppose that now the second action would have been wholly disallowed”: (1904) 6 F 942 at 946.

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mental suffering but not pecuniary loss.231 That decision was upheld in the Inner House,232 although Lord Justice-Clerk Macdonald observed that an action might be competent where the defamatory remarks directly affected the patrimonial interests or status of the surviving relatives.233 The accepted view appears to be, therefore, that in modern Scots law,234 as in English law,235 defamatory statements made about persons after their death are not actionable at the instance of executors or relatives. In preparing its Report on Defamation,236 which provided the impetus for the 2021 Act, the Scottish Law Commission consulted upon whether provision should be made for defamation of the dead. It concluded that there was neither widespread support nor policy justification to extend the law in this way,237 and no form of actionable malicious publication was suggested to cover such circumstances. It remains possible in an extreme case, however, that injury to feelings of relatives might be actionable according to the principles identified in the English cases of Wilkinson v Downton238 and O v Rhodes.239 This would require the relatives to prove that the defender knew the statement about the deceased to be false, had the intention to cause acute distress, and thereby caused the relatives psychiatric injury.240

18.67

I. DEFENCES In protecting P and controlling the flow of false information the law of defamation “civilizes the standards of public discourse”,241 but it must also have regard for D’s “interest . . . in saying what he thinks, or thinks he knows”.242 Modern accounts often present this tension in terms of finding 231 (1904) 6 F 942 at 943. 232 The decision was not unanimous. Lord Young, at 948, considered the case irrelevant in any event given the factual background, but he dissented on the question of title to sue: “the widow and children of a dead man whose character has been defamed are not only interested to clear the character of the deceased, but it is their duty to take such measures as are necessary to clear his character and to seek solatium for the injury done to their own feelings.” 233 (1904) 6 F 942 at 946, e.g. where children were thereby alleged to be bastards (accusations of illegitimacy carried a defamatory quality in 1904 which clearly they no longer have). 234 Broom v Ritchie was the subject of detailed analysis in S Woolman, “Defaming the Dead” 1981 SLT (News) 29, commenting, at 31, that Broom appeared to “scotch the idea of a full remedy for defamation of the dead in Scotland”. See also K McK Norrie, Defamation and Related Actions in Scots Law (1995) 73; Agnew v Laughlan 1948 SC 656 at 661, in which Lord Mackintosh cited Broom as settled authority that “The right to sue for a defamation is in the party defamed alone, and no claim for solatium in respect of the defamation arises to the relatives after the death of the defamed.” 235 R Parkes et al (eds), Gatley on Libel and Slander, 12th edn (2013) para 8.11. 236 Scot Law Com No 248, 2017. 237 Scot Law Com No 248, 2017, paras 10.4–10.7. 238 [1897] 2 QB 57 per Wright J at 58–59. 239 [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] AC 219. 240 See paras 16.59–16.72 above. 241 E Barendt, “What is the Point of Libel Law?” (1999) 52 CLP 110 at 112. 242 T Weir, An Introduction to Tort Law, 2nd edn (2006) 175.

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the appropriate balance between the protection for private and family life provided by Article 8 of the ECHR and the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10, but concern for the proper limits of freedom of expression has of course a much longer history. Writing in 1826, Borthwick made frequent reference to the importance of “freedom of expression” and the “liberty of the press”, explaining that: “By the law of Scotland every man may speak, may write, may print, and may publish what lie pleases.”243 Yet his account of the doctrines from which the modern defences are derived also reflected the need to fix appropriate limits upon the “privilege of discourse”244 in redressing the injuries of libel and slander. This section outlines the defences available in an action for defamation as now provided by the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021.

(1) Truth 18.69

18.70

The law of defamation favours P to the extent that the falsity of D’s statement is presumed. But the presumption can of course be rebutted, and the common law came to recognise a complete defence where D was able to do so.245 The 2021 Act formally abolishes that common law defence, of veritas (truth),246 but provides a replacement defence where D can “show that the imputation conveyed by the statement complained of is true or is substantially true”.247 This wording replicates that of the corresponding legislation in England and Wales.248 In requiring D to establish that the imputation is “substantially true”, the statute follows the common law defence, which required that D’s words should have a solid basis in fact but not that every detail should be substantiated. In this connection it has been accepted that journalists “need to be permitted a degree of exaggeration even in the context of factual assertions (not only when making comments or voicing their opinions)”.249 In Sarwar v News Group Newspapers Ltd,250 for example, the defender published an article alleging that during a parliamentary election the pursuer, the duly elected candidate, had paid a bribe of £5,000 to a rival candidate to ease off his own campaign. Proof before answer was allowed, on the basis that a defence of veritas would be established in the 243 J Borthwick, A Treatise on the Law of Libel and Slander (1826) 145 (published not long after the notorious sedition trials in Scotland). 244 Borthwick, A Treatise on the Law of Libel and Slander 197. 245 See para 18.02 above. 246 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 8(1)(b). 247 s 5(1). 248 Defamation Act 2013 s 2(1). 249 Turcu v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2005] EWHC 799 (QB), [2005] All ER (D) 34 (May) per Eady J at para 108; Steel and Morris v UK (68416/01) (2005) 41 EHRR 22 at para 90: in a campaigning leaflet by a pressure group “a certain degree of hyperbole and exaggeration is to be tolerated, and even expected”. 250 1999 SLT 327. See also McIver v McNeill (1873) 11 M 777; Andrew v Penny 1964 SLT (Notes) 24.

Defamation and Malicious Publication   641

event that the defender established the substantial truth of the allegations. If it was able to prove the “sting” of the article – that the pursuer had committed bribery during the election – it would not be obliged to prove every detail, such as when the corrupt payment was made or whether the rival candidate’s actions influenced the eventual result of the poll. The 2021 Act further provides that if the statement complained of contained two or more distinct imputations, the defence does not fail where not all of the imputations are shown to be substantially true, as long as the remainder (i.e. those not shown to be substantially true) have not caused “serious harm” to P’s reputation.251 The defence of truth must be directed at the meaning which the ordinary, reasonable person would draw from D’s remarks,252 and the experience of the common law indicates that the elements necessary to prove the defence are determined primarily by the nature of the imputation. If the allegedly defamatory remark concerned one specific incident, D may be absolved by proof that the incident occurred as alleged. However, if the allegation related to a pattern of behaviour, or a general character trait, truth is more difficult to establish. An allegation that P was a “cheat”, for example, would not be excused by evidence that coursework for a longpast school examination was not all by P’s own hand; instead there would require to be evidence of a series of dishonest acts.253 A difficulty arises where D has merely repeated defamatory statements originating with others, prefacing them with a formulation such as “X said that. . .”. The common law “repetition rule” was that, while it might have been true in the literal sense that X, not D, had made defamatory statement about P, D’s repetition of that statement was treated as equivalent to a direct statement by D to the same effect. The defence of truth applied only if it were established that the statement was itself true.254 Neither the English nor the Scottish legislation abolished or limited that common law rule,255 and in England the Supreme Court has acknowledged its continuing application.256 On the other hand, where potentially defamatory allegations were repeated

251 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 5(2). This follows s 2(3) of the Defamation Act 2013 in England and Wales, which in turn follows the Defamation Act 1952 s 5(2) (applied to Scotland by s 14), with the added qualification that no “serious harm” should have been caused. 252 Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234. 253 See e.g. Burnet v Gow (1896) 24 R 156, in which evidence of two acts of adultery were insufficient to establish the truth of the allegation that the pursuer kept a mistress, although Lord President Robertson observed that evidence of a further two incidents “would probably do”. 254 Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 per Lord Devlin at 283–284. The “repetition rule”, or its equivalent, was also applied in the Scottish courts: see discussion in Robertson v Newsquest (Sunday Herald) Ltd 2006 SCLR 792 per Lord Reed at para 28. 255 The Explanatory Notes to the Defamation Act 2013 confirmed as much at para 15, and the Explanatory Notes to the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 are (as it happens) in identical terms, at para 41. 256 Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2019] UKSC 27, [2020] AC 612 per Lord Sumption at para 23.

18.71

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18.74

by D in a context the “whole tenor” of which was that the allegations were untrue, making clear that D was not itself adopting them, then a defamatory meaning is not read into their repetition.257 In addition, section 6(3) of the 2021 Act specifically extends the public interest defence to reportage, as discussed further below.258 Where the substance of an allegedly defamatory statement is that P has been charged with, prosecuted for, or convicted of a criminal offence, the defence of truth is available in the event that this is true, even if the offence is “spent” in terms of section 4 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974.259 The defence does not, however, apply if P can establish that the remarks were made maliciously.260

(2) Publication on a matter of public interest (a) From Reynolds privilege to public interest defence 18.75

In a series of cases beginning in the late 1990s, courts in England and elsewhere had occasion to reconsider the defence of qualified privilege as applied to media reports on matters of public interest. The leading English case of this period was Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd.261 At the time when Reynolds was decided, the Human Rights Act 1998 had not yet come into force, but it was already noted that section 12 of that Act262 would oblige the UK courts to have due regard to the importance of the right to freedom of expression and to develop and apply the common law in a manner consistent with Article 10 of the ECHR. In a passage rich in metaphor, Lord Steyn described the 1998 Act as the “new landscape” which provided the “taxonomy” of privilege, and in which the “starting point” was the right of freedom of expression.263 The outcome of that case was “Reynolds privilege”. This recognised publications as privileged264 where it had been in the public interest to publish the material in question, and a

257 Robertson v Newsquest (Sunday Herald) Ltd 2006 SCLR 792 per Lord Reed at para 28. 258 See paras 18.86–18.87 below. 259 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 s 8(3), (8), as amended by the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 35(2). 260 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 s 8(5). See also XJO v XIM [2011] EWHC 1768 (QB) per Eady J at para 15, commenting that malice might be found where “while knowing the words to be true”, the defendant had “published them with the dominant motive of injuring the Claimant’s reputation”. The English courts have also indicated that a claimant who seeks to draw an inference of malice must plead specific facts more consistent with the existence of malice than with its non-existence: Greenstein v Campaign Against Antisemitism [2021] EWCA Civ 1006, [2021] EMLR 24 per Dingemans LJ at para 16. 261 [2001] 2 AC 127. 262 Inserted into the 1998 legislation by House of Lords amendment to allay concerns that the Act might “undermine press freedom and result in the introduction of a privacy law by the back door”: Lord Williams of Mostyn, Hansard, HL, 29 Oct 1998, col 2113. 263 [2001] 2 AC 127 at 208. 264 And therefore actionable only in the unlikely event that malice might be proved.

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set of ten “illustrative” factors was offered by Lord Nicholls as assisting in determining public interest:265 “1. The seriousness of the allegation. The more serious the charge, the more the public is misinformed and the individual harmed, if the allegation is not true. 2. The nature of the information, and the extent to which the subjectmatter is a matter of public concern. 3. The source of the information. Some informants have no direct knowledge of the events. Some have their own axes to grind, or are being paid for their stories. 4. The steps taken to verify the information. 5. The status of the information. The allegation may have already been the subject of an investigation which commands respect. 6. The urgency of the matter. News is often a perishable commodity. 7. Whether comment was sought from the plaintiff. He may have information others do not possess or have not disclosed. An approach to the plaintiff will not always be necessary. 8. Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff’s side of the story. 9. The tone of the article. A newspaper can raise queries or call for an investigation. It need not adopt allegations as statements of fact. 10. The circumstances of the publication, including the timing.”

Two years later, in Adams v Guardian Newspapers Ltd, Reynolds was acknowledged as providing “authoritative guidance” in the Scottish courts as to the defence of qualified privilege in this context.266 Meanwhile numerous cases in England continued to gloss the “Nicholls factors”. In Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl267 the House of Lords indicated that in practice these centred upon three essential issues, namely: (a) whether the subject matter of the article was a matter of public interest; (b) whether the inclusion of the defamatory statement was justifiable; and (c) whether the steps taken to gather and publish the information were responsible and fair. Subsequently the Supreme Court acknowledged in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd268 that Reynolds privilege had evolved as a “different jurisprudential creature” from traditional qualified privilege, turning upon a test of responsible journalism and therefore leaving little room for separate consideration of malice. There was also recognition that, although it dated from an era when the print media dominated, Reynolds privilege should be capable of extension beyond the press and broadcasting media to publications of public interest appearing in any medium.269 At the same time, the consultation which preceded the 2013 reform in England and Wales noted that the operation of Reynolds privilege had proved 265 266 267 268 269

[2001] 2 AC 127 at 205. 2003 SC 425 per Lord Reed at para 52. [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359 per Lord Hoffmann at paras 48–58. [2012] UKSC 11, [2012] 2 AC 273 per Lord Phillips at para 38. See e.g. Seaga v Harper [2008] UKPC 9, [2009] 1 AC 1, holding that Reynolds privilege might in principle be claimed in relation to a political speech delivered at a public meeting (although in that case the Nicholls factors were not met). See also Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359 per Lord Hoffmann at para 54.

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“unpredictable, inflexible, complex and costly”.270 It advocated reform to make a public interest defence more accessible both to publishers and to the ordinary citizen, including “the growing number of citizen publishers” operating outside the mainstream media.271 The result was a statutory reformulation of the Reynolds doctrine for England and Wales, in section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013, which shed the guise of privilege and transformed itself into the defence of “publication on a matter of public interest”. This required the defendant to show that “the statement complained of was, or formed part of, a statement on a matter of public interest” and that the defendant “reasonably believed that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest”. Although the common law doctrine was abolished, and the statutory defence had an altered focus, the official Explanatory Notes directed that “current case law would constitute a helpful (albeit not binding) guide to interpreting how the new statutory defence should be applied. It is expected the courts would take the existing case law into consideration where appropriate.”272 Since this was a defence, not a form of privilege, the issue of rebuttal by proof of malice did not arise. Eight years later, exactly the same wording was adopted for Scotland in the 2021 Act, which also abolished Reynolds privilege.273 Section 6(1) provides that: “It is a defence to defamation proceedings for the defender to show that– (a) the statement complained of was, or formed part of, a statement on a matter of public interest, and (b) the defender reasonably believed that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest.”

Moreover, the Explanatory Notes to the Scottish legislation indicate that, like its English counterpart, section 6 is “intended to reflect the principles developed in [Reynolds] and subsequent case law” and can “therefore be regarded simply as a statutory incarnation of the common law position, albeit with a change of focus”.274 270 Report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill (HL Paper 203, HC 930–I, 2011) para 33. 271 Report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill para 37. 272 Para 35. 273 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 8(1)(c). 274 Para 44. See also Economou v de Freitas [2018] EWCA Civ 2591, [2019] EMLR 7 per Sharp LJ at para 86, speaking of the English s 4 public interest defence: “it could not sensibly be suggested that the rationale for the Reynolds defence and for the public interest defence are materially different, or that the principles that underpinned the Reynolds defence, which sought to hold a fair balance between freedom of expression on matters of public interest and the reputation of individuals, are not also relevant when interpreting the public interest defence.”

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(b) A matter of public interest At the centre of the statutory defence is the concept of public interest, yet section 6 does not attempt a definition.275 The underlying principle is that public debate on certain subjects is of such importance that participants in that debate must be given liberty to make assertions without always taking full responsibility for their accuracy. However, there are few guidelines on what subject matter falls within this category. In the absence of a “comprehensive definition”, Walker suggested a catalogue of topics which might be regarded as being of public interest.276 Guidance along similar lines can now be seen in the Editors’ Code of Practice, published by the Independent Press Standards Association,277 providing that: “The public interest includes, but is not confined to: • Detecting or exposing crime, or the threat of crime, or serious impropriety. • Protecting public health or safety. • Protecting the public from being misled by an action or statement of an individual or organisation. • Disclosing a person or organisation’s failure or likely failure to comply with any obligation to which they are subject. • Disclosing a miscarriage of justice. • Raising or contributing to a matter of public debate, including serious cases of impropriety, unethical conduct or incompetence concerning the public. • Disclosing concealment, or likely concealment, of any of the above.”

In marginal cases that do not fall precisely within one of the above categories, reference may be made to Lord Nicholls’ remarks in Reynolds, urging that the bar should not be set too high, and that:278 “The court should be slow to conclude that a publication was not in the public interest and, therefore, the public had no right to know, especially when the information is in the field of political discussion. Any lingering doubts should be resolved in favour of publication.”

275 The Explanatory Notes, para 46, state confidently that “this is a concept which is well-established in the common law”. The Scottish Law Commission in its Report on Defamation (Scot Law Com No 248, 2017) para 3.73 had doubted “whether it would be of any value to attempt to define ‘public interest’”. 276 Walker, Delict 842–847 (comprising matters of state and government, administration of justice, the affairs of the Church, the conduct of persons in offices of public responsibility or trust, management of public institutions, local government administration, and matters affecting the performance or management of arts and culture). 277 Editors’ Code of Practice (available at https://www.ipso.co.uk/editors-code-of-practice/). 278 [2001] 2 AC 127 at 205.

18.79

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18.80

18.81

At the same time, all that is newsworthy is not necessarily of public interest. In Jameel the House of Lords rejected a newsworthiness test as “too subjective”, since this was likely to be “based on the target audience, inclinations and interests of the particular publication”.279 It warned that “what engages the interest of the public may not be material which engages the public interest”,280 so that “the most vapid tittle-tattle about the activities of footballers’ wives and girlfriends interests large sections of the public but no-one could claim any real public interest in our being told all about it”.281 While private conduct may sometimes be an appropriate subject of comment, a distinction requires to be drawn between discussion capable of contributing to a debate relating to public figures in the exercise of their functions, in which the press has an important role, and coverage of the private life of an individual who has no official functions, in which it does not.282 Even if publication of the article as a whole is deemed to be in the public interest, there may be dispute as to which details were necessary to support it. Section 6(1) allows for the possibility that the material of which P complains, although not in itself of public interest, “formed part of” a statement that was so, and in this connection it may be noted that section 6(4) directs the court to “make such allowance for editorial judgement as it considers appropriate”. In other words, where the general subject matter of a publication is recognised as being of public interest, concession may be made for details included which were themselves of questionable public significance but were important for the story as a whole from an editorial point of view.283

(c) D’s reasonable belief that publication was in the public interest 18.82

That the statement complained of concerned a matter of public interest is not of itself sufficient to engage the public interest defence. In addition, it is necessary that D reasonably believed that its publication was in the public interest.284 Here the legislative intention bears to have been to inject

279 [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359 per Lady Hale at para 147 (although the offending material self-evidently passed the test of public interest anyway in the case itself: Lord Hoffmann at para 49). 280 [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359 per Lord Bingham at para 31. 281 [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359 per Lady Hale at para 147. 282 This reflects a concern articulated in the Scottish courts more than a century ago that a newspaper is not “entitled to invade private life in order to discuss questions of character with which the public is not concerned”: see Gray v Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (1890) 17 R 1185 per Lord McLaren at 1200; see also Brooks v Lind 2000 GWD 8–307 on the need to protect discussion of “private character”. 283 See e.g. Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359 per Lord Hoffmann at para 52, in which it was accepted that bland assertions regarding the involvement of “prominent Saudi companies” would not adequately have conveyed the point that these investigations were directed at “the heartland of the Saudi business world”, and therefore publication of further detail on individual account-holders was necessary. 284 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 6(1)(b).

Defamation and Malicious Publication   647

an objective element.285 D must satisfy the court not only that D believed publication to be in the public interest, but also that it was reasonable so to believe. In this regard, it is likely that the factors used to substantiate Reynolds privilege will provide important points of reference, although, as was the case for the common law defence, these do not operate as a checklist, nor is the listing exclusive. The reasonableness of D’s belief may therefore be assessed in the light of considerations such as:286 “(a) the reliability or credibility of the defendant’s source(s); (b) what steps were taken by the defendant to verify the truth of the allegations before he made them; (c) whether the defendant sought any comment from the claimant; (d) whether the defendant included the claimant’s side of the story. Where the target of a publication has given an explanation, but the publisher fails to report it, it will be difficult if not impossible to claim the protection of the privilege.”

As with the Reynolds factors previously, the 2021 Act in effect requires the publisher to have taken the care that a “responsible publisher” would take to verify its sources. This would normally entail that the publisher had “good reason” to think these reliable, and that it had done what it could to check them.287 To demand more would be to tip the balance too far against freedom of expression,288 but the requisite standard would not be met in a case such as Adams v Guardian Newspapers Ltd,289 for example, in which the source appeared unreliable, the article was poorly researched, and the defender’s averments contained little about the steps that it had taken to check facts prior to publication.

18.83

(d) All the circumstances of the case As well as the specific considerations mentioned in section 6(1), the court is directed to have regard to “all the circumstances of the case”.290 The reasonableness of D’s belief in the public-interest value of the material is therefore to be judged in the light of circumstances including: the nature of the subject matter; the particular words used; the range of meanings that D ought reasonably to have considered they would convey; and “the particular role” played by D in bringing about the publication.291 In regard 285 See Explanatory Notes, para 45. 286 Doyle v Smith [2018] EWHC 2935 (QB), [2019] EMLR 15 per Warby J at para 82. 287 Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359 per Lady Hale at para 149. 288 Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359 per Lord Hope at para 109. 289 2003 SC 425. 290 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 6(2). 291 Economou v de Freitas [2016] EWHC 1853 (QB), [2017] EMLR 4 per Warby J at para 241 (affd [2018] EWCA Civ 2591, [2019] EMLR 7), commenting on the Defamation Act 2013 s 4(2), which has the same wording.

18.84

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18.85

to this last point, a claim against a person who was merely a source for, or a contributor to, the offending publication or broadcast may be judged differently from one against a journalist or broadcaster who had overall responsibility for putting together the content, and of whom there may be greater expectations of responsible journalism.292 At the same time, the circumstance of D being a “citizen publisher” or blogger, rather than a professional journalist, does not excuse a failure to verify information properly. In Doyle v Smith293 the defendant ran a community newspaper which published articles defaming a property developer responsible for a proposed development in the local area. In judging whether the public interest defence applied, the court accepted that the publication in question was “in the nature of a community operation” but considered it wrong in principle to give the defendant “leeway to reflect his lack of professional skill, training, or expertise”.294 Moreover, it did not require extensive training or experience to realise that the allegations contained in the newspaper had not been appropriately checked out, or that it was unfair to publish them without giving the claimant an opportunity to comment. In any event, the defendant knew that a major component of the story was false, and therefore any belief in the public interest of publication would not have been reasonable. Similarly in Hourani v Thomson the promoters of a campaign against three individuals suspected of crime could not succeed with the public interest defence where the research for their allegations was seriously inadequate and their thinking “beyond sloppy”.295

(e) Reportage 18.86

The common law had previously recognised that a form of Reynolds privilege could be extended to “reportage”, that is to say where a media outlet has simply reported allegations made by others on a matter of public interest, without itself adopting them as true.296 As stated by the Supreme 292 Economou v de Freitas [2016] EWHC 1853 (QB), [2017] EMLR 4 per Warby J at paras 242–246 (affd [2018] EWCA Civ 2591, [2019] EMLR 7). 293 [2018] EWHC 2935 (QB), [2019] EMLR 15. 294 [2018] EWHC 2935 (QB), [2019] EMLR 15 per Warby J at para 96. 295 [2017] EWHC 432 (QB) per Warby J at para 222. See also Wildcat Haven Enterprises CIC v Wightman [2020] CSOH 30, 2020 SLT 473, in which the defence of fair comment was upheld, but the court would otherwise have refused to recognise Reynolds privilege, since material errors had been made in researching the content of the defender’s blogs, and inadequate attention had been given to the pursuer’s response to the allegations. 296 Al-Fagih v HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1634, [2002] EMLR 13. See also Roberts v Gable [2007] EWCA Civ 721, [2008] QB 502 per Ward LJ at para 61: “If upon a proper construction of the thrust of the article the defamatory material is attributed to another and is not being put forward as true, then a responsible journalist would not need to take steps to verify its accuracy. He is absolved from that responsibility because he is simply reporting in a neutral fashion the fact that it has been said without adopting the truth.”

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Court in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd,297 privilege attached to such reportage where it was not the content of a reported allegation that was of public interest, but the fact that the allegation had been made in the first place. As long as the publisher did not adopt the allegation as true, it was protected by privilege where it had taken “proper steps to verify the making of the allegation”.298 Reynolds privilege was thus capable of extension to circumstances where the defendant had published “the fact that the police are investigating the conduct of an individual, or that he has been arrested, or that he has been charged with an offence”.299 This principle has now been incorporated into the 2021 Act, which in turn copies the wording of the equivalent legislation in England and Wales.300 Section 6(3) provides that:

18.87

“If the statement complained of was, or formed part of, an accurate and impartial account of a dispute to which the pursuer was a party, the court must, in determining whether it was reasonable for the defender to believe that publishing the statement was in the public interest, disregard any omission of the defender to take steps to verify the truth of the imputation conveyed by it.”

As in the common law form of privilege, therefore, the key to the availability of the defence is whether it was in the public interest to publish the fact of the allegation having been made, and the publisher’s duty to verify its sources extends to that fact, not the actual content of the imputation conveyed by it. The experience of the common law suggests that this provision is unlikely to be much used, since it is seldom straightforward to prove that material has been published simply to report the fact that it was said, rather than to report the content of what was said as a fact.301

(3) Honest opinion The right to express one’s opinions freely has long been supported by the defence of “fair comment” in the common law,302 even when that opinion was “couched in vituperative or contumelious language”.303 The essential features of the fair comment defence were: (a) that words alleged to be defamatory were “epithets” expressing the writer’s “opinion” and not a statement of fact; and (b) that this was “as to a state of facts truly set 297 [2012] UKSC 11, [2012] 2 AC 273. 298 [2012] UKSC 11, [2012] 2 AC 273 per Lord Phillips at para 77. 299 [2012] UKSC 11, [2012] 2 AC 273 per Lord Phillips at para 35. 300 Defamation Act 2013 s 4(3). 301 See Charmian v Orion Publishing Group Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 972, [2008] EMLR 16 per Ward LJ at para 50. 302 See Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy paras 11–44 to 11–47. 303 Archer v Ritchie (1891) 18 R 719 per Lord McLaren at 727.

18.88

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18.89

forth”. The defence also required: (c) that the comment was made on a matter of public interest; and (d) that the comment was “fair”. It was for D to establish these first three elements, but even if they were established P might overturn the defence by attacking the fourth – by showing that, notwithstanding the comment’s factual basis and public interest value, it was nonetheless unfair.304 The Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 replaced the defence of fair comment with a new defence of “honest opinion”.305 Its essential elements are broadly similar to those of its common law predecessor as regards points (a) and (b) above, but there is no longer an express condition that the material in question should be of public interest,306 and the fourth element has shifted towards the “genuineness” of D’s opinion. In this the statutory wording closely mirrors the corresponding provisions for England and Wales.307 The rules are set out in section 7, and require that: • The statement complained of was a statement of opinion.308 • The statement indicated, either in general or in specific terms, the evidence on which it was based.309 • An honest person could have held the opinion conveyed by the statement on the basis of any part of that evidence.310 In addition, the defence fails “if the pursuer shows that the defender did not genuinely hold the opinion conveyed by the statement”.311 These elements are now considered in turn.

(a) A statement of opinion 18.90

The defence is available only for statements of opinion, not imputations of fact.312 Previous case law suggests that this may be taken as “something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, 304 F T Cooper, A Handbook of the Law of Defamation and Verbal Injury, 2nd edn by D O Dykes (1906) 46. See also K McK Norrie, Defamation and Related Actions in Scots Law (1995) 137; Campbell v Dugdale [2020] CSIH 27, 2020 SC 481 per Lord President Carloway at para 44. 305 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 ss 7 and 8. 306 The public interest requirement has similarly been omitted from the wording of the “honest opinion” defence as set out in s 3 of the Defamation Act 2013 (applicable to England and Wales). The policy justifications for removing the public interest requirement in the Scottish legislation are explained by the Scottish Law Commission in Report on Defamation (Scot Law Com No 248, 2017) para 3.26. 307 Defamation Act 2013 s 3. 308 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 7(2). 309 s 7(3). 310 s 7(4). 311 s 7(5). 312 s 7(2). See e.g. Angiolini v Green [2013] CSOH 196, 2014 GWD 5–104, rejecting the “fair comment” defence where it was alleged as a matter of fact that the pursuer had suppressed a criminal investigation.

Defamation and Malicious Publication   651

conclusion, criticism, judgment, remark, observation, etc”.313 However, opinion is not always flagged as such and assertions of fact and opinion can often be intermixed in such a way that they are difficult to separate. The key determining factor is how the statement would appear to the ordinary reasonable reader or listener, and whether such a person would perceive it as comment rather than a presentation of fact.314 In this respect it is important to consider not only the subject matter, and the disputed wording, but also the context. So, for example, an allegation that P “behaved badly” may be classified as comment if it is accompanied by a factual account of the behaviour upon which it is based. However, a simple assertion of this kind, without further information as to the offending conduct, would more readily be read as a statement of fact.315 Guidance on this issue was offered in an English case, drawing upon the jurisprudence accumulated since the 2013 Act came into force, as follows:316 “[W]when determining whether the words complained of contain allegations of fact or opinion, the court will be guided by the following points: (i) The statement must be recognisable as comment, as distinct from an imputation of fact. (ii) Opinion is something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation, etc. (iii) The ultimate question is how the word would strike the ordinary reasonable reader. The subject matter and context of the words may be an important indicator of whether they are fact or opinion. (iv) Some statements which are, by their nature and appearance opinion, are nevertheless treated as statements of fact where, for instance, the opinion implies that a claimant has done something but does not indicate what that something is, i.e. the statement is a bare comment.

313 Clarke v Norton [1910] VLR 494 per Cussen J at 499; Branson v Bower [2001] EWCA Civ 791, [2001] EMLR 32 per Latham LJ at para 12; Campbell v Dugdale [2020] CSIH 27, 2020 SC 481 per Lord President Carloway at paras 36–41. 314 Wildcat Haven Enterprises CIC v Wightman [2020] CSOH 30, 2020 SLT 473 per Lord Clark at para 28 (citing Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB), [2020] 4 WLR 25); Campbell v Dugdale [2020] CSIH 27, 2020 SC 481 per Lord President Carloway at para 36; Butt v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 933, [2019] EMLR 23 per Sharp LJ at para 39. 315 Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 345 per Lord Porter at 356. See e.g. Branson v Bower [2001] EWCA Civ 791, [2001] EMLR 32, in which the defendants alleged that the claimant was motivated by revenge and commercial greed, not altruism as claimed, when he announced that his group of companies would bid to operate the National Lottery. The statement that “Revenge rather than self righteousness has motivated Richard Branson’s latest bid to run Britain’s Lottery” might, without supporting detail, have been regarded as a factual assertion, but the court accepted that, in the context as a whole, it was read as an inference drawn from the factual background indicated in the article and therefore susceptible to a defence of fair comment. The case was, however, permitted to go to trial on the issue of whether the comment had been made honestly. 316 Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB), [2020] 4 WLR 25 per Nicklin J at para 16.

18.91

652   The Law of Delict in Scotland (v) Whether an allegation that someone has acted ‘dishonestly’ or ‘criminally’ is an allegation of fact or expression of opinion will very much depend upon context. There is no fixed rule that a statement that someone has been dishonest must be treated as an allegation of fact.”

18.92

The way in which the statement is presented is relevant in distinguishing opinion from fact. In Campbell v Dugdale317 the court noted the importance of looking at both “the visual and textual context” in which the article in question appeared. It was significant in this particular case that the offending newspaper article had appeared on a page given over to the defender’s views on political and other topics, rather than as part of a news-reporting section, and was accompanied by other subject matter that clearly took the form of opinion pieces. The ordinary reasonable reader would therefore have been likely to read the article about the pursuer in a similar way.

(b) Indication of the evidence on which the statement was based 18.93

An honest opinion should be grounded upon plausible “evidence”.318 The statutory condition, that P’s statement should indicate the evidence on which it was based, reflects the common law requirement as expressed in Joseph v Spiller:319 “The comment must . . . identify at least in general terms what it is that has led the commentator to make the comment, so that the reader can understand what the comment is about and the commentator can, if challenged, explain by giving particulars of the subject matter of his comment why he expressed the views that he did. A fair balance must be struck between allowing a critic the freedom to express himself as he will and requiring him to identify to his readers why it is that he is making the criticism.”

The relevant supporting facts should therefore accompany the opinion “at least in general terms” either explicitly or implicitly.320 It would be completely impractical for commentators to set out every fact which had informed their views – for a political columnist, for example, to set out the full supporting facts upon which an appraisal of policy is based. Some facts may be so obviously common knowledge that they do not require repetition. Other information may be readily obtained from other sources, and D is required only to have ensured that these were adequately indicated in the article. In Campbell v Dugdale,321 for example, the defender stated that the 317 [2020] CSIH 27, 2020 SC 481 per Lord President Carloway at para 39. 318 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 7(3), and see s 7(8) for the definition of “evidence”. 319 [2010] UKSC 53, [2011] 1 AC 852 per Lord Phillips at para 104; see also Wheatley v Anderson and Miller 1927 SC 133. 320 Joseph v Spiller [2010] UKSC 53, [2011] 1 AC 852 per Lord Phillips at para 105. 321 [2020] CSIH 27, 2020 SC 481 per Lord President Carloway at para 40.

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pursuer had sent “homophobic tweets” and engaged in an abusive “Twitter tirade” against two politicians. Although the defender had not set out the precise content of the pursuer’s tweet, the court judged her remarks to constitute opinion. It was legitimate for the article to presuppose that the ordinary reader was aware, from other media outlets, of the general nature of the pursuer’s activity on Twitter and his attempt at humour through the reference to the homosexuality of one of the politicians named.

(c) An honest person could have held the opinion The opinion conveyed by the statement must be one that an “honest” person could have held.322 In terms of the Act, the types of evidence which are looked for to support the honest person’s opinion are:323

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“(a) any fact which existed at the time the statement was published,   (b) anything asserted to be a fact in a privileged statement made available before, or on the same occasion as, the statement complained of, or   (c) anything that the defender reasonably believed to be a fact at the time the statement was published.”

The honest opinion defence, like its “fair comment” predecessor, thus expects commentators to “get [their] basic facts right”.324 An opinion based upon untruth is not usually appropriate evidence. Nonetheless, the defence may succeed if D can persuade the court that D reasonably believed that untruth to be true at the time of making the statement.325 Where not all of the facts relied upon by D were true, the facts which were true, or believed at the time to be true, must be shown to provide a sufficient basis for the opinion.

(d) Opinion genuinely held The fair comment defence of the common law required the disputed comments to relate to a matter of public interest and be based upon facts that were essentially true. The defence was not necessarily lost where D had not in reality held the opinion read into the comments.326 By contrast, the statutory defence is rejected where P can show that “the opinion conveyed by

322 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 7(4). 323 s 7(8). 324 London Artists Ltd v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375 per Denning MR at 391. 325 On this point the 2021 Act differs from the Defamation Act 2013 in England and Wales, in which s 3(4) does not make express provision for facts reasonably believed in to be taken into consideration. 326 See Massie v McCaig [2013] CSIH 14, 2013 SC 343, in which the Inner House held the defence of fair comment to be available where the defenders had published an article based upon facts that were essentially true, even although the defenders themselves admitted that they had not believed the defamatory comment taken from the article.

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the statement” was not genuinely held.327 “Genuine belief” has no objective measure, however, and, in the absence of an express admission by D, it is difficult to envisage what evidence might allow P to prove its absence. The opinion might possibly be shown to be insincere where, for example, significant details have been withheld which were known to D and would have shown P in a more positive light.328 Similarly, where the subject of comment is a literary or artistic work, the subject should not be inaccurately represented.329 At the same time, it is accepted that an honest person might be prejudiced or hold “exaggerated or obstinate” views: “a critic need not be mealy-mouthed in denouncing what he disagrees with. He is entitled to dip his pen in gall for the purposes of legitimate criticism.”330 A publisher who has published an opinion stated by a third party cannot use the defence of honest opinion if the publisher knew, or ought to have known, that the third party did not genuinely hold the opinion stated.331

(e) Inferences of fact 18.97

In order to clarify earlier uncertainty,332 section 7(7) of the 2021 Act provides that the honest opinion defence is available in relation to statements which draw inferences of fact. An example is a report that P has been the subject of police investigations, which draws the inference that there were reasonable grounds to suspect P of criminal activity.333 It had previously been unclear whether such inferences were to be regarded as comment.334 Some English cases have distinguished between “verifiable” and “unverifiable” inferences, allowing that only the latter were capable of being classified as comment.335 An example would be an allegation regarding P’s 327 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 7(5). For the common law background to this shift in emphasis from “fair” to “honest”, see Tse Wai Chun v Cheng [2001] EMLR 31 per Lord Nicholls at para 79: “Honesty of belief is the touchstone. Actuation by spite, animosity, intent to injure, intent to arouse controversy or other motivation, whatever it may be, even if it is the dominant or sole motive, does not of itself defeat the defence. However, proof of such motivation may be evidence, sometimes compelling evidence, from which lack of genuine belief in the view expressed may be inferred.” 328 See Carruthers v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2019] EWHC 33 (QB) per Nicklin J at para 30, allowing that “if the commentator did know of a series of exculpatory facts then, depending upon the assessment of their weight and cogency, this might provide a basis on which the Court could conclude that he did not hold the expressed opinion” (in terms of s 3(5) of the 2013 Act). See also Shanks v BBC 1993 SLT 326 (in which it was accepted that suppression by the defender of exculpatory circumstances regarding the dealings commented upon would have been relevant to the fairness of the comment made by them); Brooks v Lind 2000 GWD 8–307 (in which the comment was based on an inaccurate account of local government proceedings). 329 Merivale v Carson (1888) LR 20 QBD 275. 330 Tse Wai Chun v Cheng [2001] EMLR 31 per Lord Nicholls at para 20. 331 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 7(6). 332 See Scottish Law Commission, Report on Defamation (Scot Law Com No 248, 2017) para 3.56. 333 See e.g. Hamilton v Clifford [2004] EWHC 1542 (QB). 334 See R Parkes et al (eds), Gatley on Libel and Slander, 12th edn (2013) para 12.10. 335 See discussion in Joseph v Spiller [2010] UKSC 53, [2011] 1 AC 852 per Lord Phillips at para 114.

Defamation and Malicious Publication   655

motives. The wording of the Scottish legislation makes no such distinction, however, with the result that inferences of both types may in principle qualify for the section 7 defence.

(f) Facts stated in a privileged statement Generally, the honest opinion defence requires the facts upon which the opinion was based to have been “in existence”. But where the supporting facts were stated on a privileged occasion the defence remains available whether or not the facts were true, as long as the statement was made before or contemporaneously with the opinion.336 In this context privilege has a broad meaning as including not only absolute privilege in terms of section 9 of the 2021 Act, and qualified privilege in terms of sections 10 and 11, but also publications on a matter of public interest eligible for the defence set out in section 6.

18.98

(g) Honest opinion distinguished from qualified privilege There was at one time uncertainty in the common law as to whether fair comment, like qualified privilege, was defeated by malice (explicable perhaps by reference to the common beginnings of the doctrines in the late nineteenth century).337 Honest opinion is, however, clearly distinguishable from qualified privilege.338 The rationale of qualified privilege is to shield a particular person, who has a duty to perform or an interest to protect, in providing information in particular contexts. It protects those who have got the facts wrong, but not those who have exploited the privileged occasion to vent personal spite through untruth. The rationale of the honest opinion defence, on the other hand, is to promote free expression of opinion for all, irrespective of context. Unlike qualified privilege, its premise is that the commentator should have got the basic facts right. While there are good grounds for suppressing the malicious circulation of false facts, suppression of opinion is a different matter. Thus, while malice is capable of displacing privilege, the basic test in honest opinion, as explained above, is whether D, even if ill-disposed towards P, could honestly have held the views expressed.

18.99

J. ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE In certain contexts, where it is deemed essential that proceedings should take place free from the threat of litigation, freedom of speech is privileged 336 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 7(9)(a). 337 Tse Wai Chun v Cheng [2001] EMLR 31 per Lord Nicholls at paras 52 and 59. For a Scottish example of this terminological confusion, see Stevenson v Drummond 1942 SLT (Sh Ct) 38. 338 On this point, see Tse Wai Chun v Cheng [2001] EMLR 31 per Lord Nicholls at paras 55ff.

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over the threat to reputation. Regardless of the motivation of the person making the statement, absolute privilege applies, rendering any claim for defamation irrelevant. Whether or not absolute privilege applies in particular circumstances is a matter of law, although more often than not this is uncontentious. Absolute privilege is well-established in relation to the following types of statement.

(1) Parliamentary proceedings 18.101

Statements made in the United Kingdom339 or Scottish340 Parliaments, as well those published in reports, papers, and records of proceedings ordered to be published by either Parliament,341 are absolutely privileged. Parliamentary privilege, unless waived, prevents the courts from considering evidence or submissions which challenge the veracity or propriety of words exchanged in the course of Parliamentary proceedings.342 Absolute privilege does not, however, extend to statements made outside Parliament, even if such statements merely repeat what was said there.343

(2) Judicial proceedings 18.102

Absolute privilege extends to most statements made during judicial proceedings before a court of justice, and also those made before a tribunal performing a function similar to that of a court of justice.344 There is no definitive listing of such quasi-judicial tribunals, nor a definitive guide as to their qualifying characteristics:345 “[O]ne must consider first, under what authority the tribunal acts; secondly the nature of the question into which it is its duty to inquire; thirdly the procedure adopted by it in carrying out the inquiry; and fourthly the legal consequences of the conclusion reached by the tribunal as a result of the inquiry.”

Significant, but not decisive, features in determining whether absolute privilege is available would include:346 whether the tribunal was constituted by statute; whether witnesses might be compelled to give evidence; 339 Bill of Rights 1688 Art 9, as applied by 1 Will & Mar c 2. In turn, the Claim of Right of 1689, RPS 1689/3/108, APS ix, 38 c 28, had demanded that “freedom of speech and debate” be secured to members of the then Parliament of Scotland. See also A v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 51. 340 Scotland Act 1998 s 41(1)(a). 341 Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 s 1; Scotland Act 1998 s 41(1)(b). 342 See Hamilton v Al Fayed [2001] 1 AC 395. 343 Buchanan v Jennings [2004] UKPC 36, [2005] 1 AC 115. 344 See J Borthwick, A Treatise on the Law of Libel and Slander (1826) 200–201. 345 Trapp v Mackie 1979 SC (HL) 38 per Lord Diplock at 45. 346 Trapp v Mackie 1979 SC (HL) 38 per Lord Diplock at 49–50.

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the adversarial nature of proceedings and examination of witnesses; representation of the parties by solicitors or advocates; and the extent to which the tribunal’s decision leads “directly toward determination of an issue by the authority who appointed it”.347 Accordingly, absolute privilege is thought to extend to statements made in fora such as public inquiries, disciplinary tribunals convened by professional bodies,348 employment tribunals,349 and military tribunals.350 By contrast, only qualified privilege applies to the proceedings of tribunals of an administrative rather than a judicial nature, such as a licensing board.351 All those holding judicial office in such courts or tribunals352 are absolutely privileged in respect of statements made in the course of their judicial role; this contrasts with immunity from suit in relation to wrongful imprisonment, which extends only to judges in superior courts.353 Significant latitude is exercised in determining when judges are acting in a judicial role, so that judges overstep that limit only when it can be “shown so clearly that no man of ordinary intelligence and judgment could honestly dispute it – that the words used had no connection with the case in hand”.354 Legal representatives appearing before the court – solicitors and counsel – are similarly absolutely privileged in respect of both oral and written pleadings.355 Absolute privilege in relation to defamation proceedings protects statements made in connection with criminal trials by the Lord Advocate,

347 Trapp v Mackie 1979 SC (HL) 38 per Lord Fraser at 54. 348 Thomson v Ross 2000 GWD 26–986; Hay v Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland 2003 SLT 612; Gray v Avadis [2003] EWHC 1830 (QB); White v Southampton University Hospitals NHS Trust [2011] EWHC 825 (QB), (2011) 120 BMLR 81; Mayer v Hoar [2012] EWHC 1805 (QB); Huda v Wells [2017] EWHC 2553, [2018] EMLR 7. 349 Wilson v Westney [2001] EWCA Civ 839. 350 Copartnership Farms v Harvey-Smith [1918] 2 KB 405. 351 See R v East Riding of Yorkshire [1968] 1 QB 32 per Lord Denning at 53; Royal Aquarium & Summer & Winter Garden Society Ltd v Parkinson [1892] 1 QB 431. As regards the Parole Board, see Daniel v Griffiths [1998] EMLR 489, holding that a statement made to the Board did not have absolute privilege; but see also R (on the application of Gourlay) v Parole Board [2020] UKSC 50, [2020] 1 WLR 5344, affirming the decision of the lower court that the Parole Board been acting in at least a quasi-judicial capacity. 352 Haggart’s Trs v Lord President Hope (1824) 2 Shaw App 125; Hamilton v Hope (1827) 5 S 569; Harvey v Dyce (1876) 4 R 265; Williamson v Umphray and Robertson (1890) 17 R 905 per Lord President Inglis at 910–911. Older authorities indicate that at one time privilege was qualified, to the extent that it was displaced by proof of malice or “oppressive intention”: Band v Clerk & Scott 31 May 1797 FC; Oliphant v McNeil (1776) 5 Brown’s Supp 573. 353 See paras 17.34–17.38 above. 354 Primrose v Waterston (1902) 4 F 783 per Lord Moncreiff at 793 (a case in which privilege attached to the words of a police magistrate who, while trying a nine-year-old boy for theft of a bottle of lemonade, accused his father, the manager of a working men’s club, of ruining his customers and sending families “straight to the devil”). 355 Clark v Haddon (1895) 3 SLT 85; Rome v Watson (1898) 25 R 733. See also Munster v Lamb (1882–83) LR 11 QBD 588; Medcalf v Mardell [2002] UKHL 27, [2003] 1 AC 120 per Lord Hobhouse at para 53.

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procurators fiscal, deputy procurators fiscal, and advocates depute.356 Witnesses similarly enjoy absolute privilege in relation to what is said in the courtroom and to precognitions given beforehand.357 The principle that witnesses should testify free from fear of accusation of malice is seen as “one of the necessities of the administration of justice”, subject of course to the possibility of prosecution for perjury if witnesses are untruthful.358 As discussed further below,359 however, statements made by the parties themselves in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings attract only qualified privilege (unlike in England and Wales, where absolute privilege applies). In addition to these common law rules, section 9 of the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 confers absolute privilege upon “fair and accurate” reports, published “contemporaneously”, of the proceedings of any court in the United Kingdom, courts established under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom, and international courts or tribunals established by the Security Council of the United Nations or by international agreement. The statute does not define “fair and accurate”, but in earlier case law relating to common law privilege these terms were understood as meaning that the result of the litigation should be correctly reported, although not necessarily with an account of all the stages in that litigation,360 and concession was made for “immaterial” omissions or inaccuracies.361 “Contemporaneous” similarly is not defined, but the same wording in section 14 of the Defamation Act 1996, which section 9 replaces, was read as meaning that publication should have been “as nearly at the same time as the proceedings as is reasonably possible having regard to the opportunities for preparation of the report and the time of going to press or making the broadcast”.362 Section 9(2) allows a report of proceedings to be treated as contemporaneously published if it is required to be postponed (either by an order of the court or as a consequence of a statutory provision) and is published as soon as practicable after that is permitted. Reports of court proceedings that are non-contemporaneous may nonetheless be subject to qualified privilege.363

356 J Borthwick, A Treatise on the Law of Libel and Slander (1826) 202–203; M’Murchy v Campbell (1887) 14 R 725. No such privilege applies in proceedings for malicious prosecution: Whitehouse v Lord Advocate [2019] CSIH 52, 2020 SC 133. 357 Watson v McEwan (1905) 7 F (HL) 109; B v A 1993 SC 232. 358 Watson v McEwan (1905) 7 F (HL) 109 per Lord Halsbury at 110. 359 See para 18.112 below. 360 Duncan v Associated Scottish Newspapers Ltd 1929 SC 14; see also Cunningham v The Scotsman Publications Ltd 1987 SC 107. 361 Kimber v Press Association [1893] 1 QB 65. 362 See Alsaifi v Amunwa [2017] EWHC 1443 (QB), [2017] 4 WLR 172 per Warby J at para 73; Pelling v Times Newspapers, unreported, QBD, 29 June 2000. 363 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 11 and Sch paras 3 and 4.

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K. QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE In actions for defamation, intention on the part of D is generally presumed from the nature of the words or actions shown to have had a defamatory effect, and does not require to be separately proved.364 It is not normally open to D to dispute liability by establishing that there was no subjective intention to injure P.365 Where, however, the statement was made on an occasion of qualified privilege, P must aver facts and circumstances from which malice can be inferred, even if this causes P “hardship”.366 P’s claim will succeed only if it is established that the imputation was made maliciously.367 There is a presumption that D was acting in good faith.368 Whether or not qualified privilege attaches to a particular context is a matter of law. The rationale of qualified privilege is that in certain contexts there is a need for recipients “to receive frank and uninhibited communication of particular information from a particular source . . . Traditionally, these occasions have been described in terms of persons having a duty to perform or an interest to protect in providing the information.”369 The defence therefore has no place if it is shown that the primary motive in making the imputation was not to perform that duty or to protect such an interest. As stated by Lord Keith in the leading Scottish case of Fraser v Mirza:370 “The question is whether the respondent . . . ‘misused’ the occasion. It was for the appellant to prove that he did so. Such proof involved that it should be established that the respondent was actuated by some improper motive which was dominant in his mind. That is what is meant by express malice. The motive with which a person made a defamatory communication can only be ascertained from an examination of his state of mind at the time he made it, which . . . can only be inferred from what he did or said or knew.”

Direct evidence of malicious motivation or “express malice” is rare, and so this is generally inferred from circumstances indicating that D lacked “honest belief” in the veracity of the statement.371 In such cases the

364 Walker, Delict 780–781; Shaw v Morgan (1888) 15 R 865 per Lord Young at 870. 365 See paras 18.51–18.53 above. 366 Rogers v Orr 1939 SC 121. 367 Hayford v Forrester-Paton 1927 SC 740. 368 Watson v Burnet (1864) 24 D 494 per Lord Deas at 497. 369 Tse Wai Chun v Cheng [2001] EMLR 31 per Lord Nicholls at para 56. See also F T Cooper, A Handbook of the Law of Defamation and Verbal Injury, 2nd edn by D O Dykes (1906) 151. 370 1993 SC (HL) 27 at 33 (under reference to analysis by Lord Diplock in Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135 at 149–150). 371 Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135 per Lord Diplock at 150.

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occasion is regarded as having been exploited for other purposes, and D loses the protection of the privilege which has been thus abused.372 The doctrine of qualified privilege is long-established in the common law,373 but there are also various contexts in which provision is made by statute. This second category was updated and rationalised by the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021.

(1) Qualified privilege in the common law (a) Duty and interest 18.108

18.109

Qualified privilege attaches to communications made where, had the information contained therein been true, D would have been under a legal, moral or social duty to pass it on, and the recipient would have been subject to an interest or duty to receive it.374 In such contexts, a presumption that duty was D’s motivation for the communication is displaced only if P proves that D “misused” the occasion. In Fraser v Mirza,375 for example, it was recognised that, while a citizen with grounds for complaint regarding the conduct of a police officer had a public duty to make those grounds known to the Chief Constable, this particular occasion had been misused by the defender since the court was satisfied that his dominant motive in writing his letter of complaint was to injure the pursuer. The key question is not what D believed to be D’s duty, but what the court recognises to have been D’s duty.376 While the list of privileged occasions can “never be catalogued and rendered exact”,377 in practice, an argument for qualified privilege is usually made out by analogy with established case law. Qualified privilege is extended only sparingly to new situations where the court determines that “the general welfare of society and changing conditions so require”.378

372 Fraser v Mirza 1993 SC (HL) 27 per Lord Keith at 33. See e.g. Suzor v Buckingham 1914 SC 299, in which the court accepted that the pursuer’s averments if proved would show that the defender was “actuated not by the honest motive which the law imputes to a man who uses defamatory expressions on a privileged occasion, but by personal jealousy of the pursuer and a malicious desire to secure his dismissal from [their mutual employer’s] service” (Lord President Strathclyde at 305). 373 See J Borthwick, A Treatise on the Law of Libel and Slander (1826) 213–243. 374 Toogood v Spyring (1834) 1 Cr M & R 181 per Parke B at 193; Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 per Lord Atkinson at 334; Lyons v Chief Constable of Strathclyde Police [2013] CSIH 46, 2014 SCLR 281 per Lord Brodie at para 30. 375 1993 SC (HL) 27. 376 Stuart v Bell [1891] 2 QB 341 per Lindley LJ at 349; James v Baird 1916 SC 510 per Lord President Strathclyde at 517 (revd on a different point 1916 SC (HL) 158). 377 London Association for Protection of Trade v Greenlands Ltd [1916] 2 AC 15 per Lord Buckmaster at 22. 378 F Trindade, “Defamatory Statements and Political Discussion” (2000) 116 LQR 185 at 185.

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Matters of concern regarding the conduct of those discharging a public function are normally regarded as privileged to this extent. So qualified privilege attaches to complaints made in the appropriate forum regarding the behaviour of those entrusted with the management of public resources,379 of those administering a charity,380 or of police officers, as in Fraser v Mirza, the example above. The workplace also appears to generate a range of duties for these purposes, so that qualified privilege may attach to comments by a line manager to individual employees as to their competence,381 concerns expressed to a manager by one employee regarding the honesty of another,382 or an expression of no confidence in the management of a college sent by members of the work force to their professional body, which in turn sent it to the government body with responsibility for education.383 The content of a reference solicited from a former employer for the benefit of prospective employers is similarly privileged.384 In such situations, “no matter how harsh, hasty, untrue, or libellous the publication would be, but for the circumstances . . . the amount of public inconvenience from the restriction of freedom of speech or writing would far outbalance that arising from the infliction of private injury”.385 Qualified privilege requires not only that D should have been dutybound, in a broad sense, to pass on the information but also that the recipient should have been subject to a corresponding duty or interest to receive the information. In the English case of Watt v Longsdon,386 for example, it was accepted that a manager had a duty to pass on a worrying report regarding the conduct of one of the company’s overseas managing directors. It was also accepted that members of the board had a corresponding interest to receive that information, but the wife of the managing director in question did not, and therefore communication to her was not privileged. It follows that, if an expression of concern regarding the conduct of a public servant is to be privileged, it must be communicated to the public body entrusted with the supervision of such individuals, and not,

379 E.g. Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135; Mutch v Robertson 1981 SLT 217. 380 E.g. Hayford v Forrester-Paton 1927 SC 740. 381 E.g. Mackay v Scottish Hydro Electric plc 2000 SC 87; see also Halpin v Oxford Brookes University [1996] CLY 5658. 382 Suzor v Buckingham 1914 SC 299; but cf Fraser v Fraser 2010 SLT (Sh Ct) 147 per Sheriff Neilson at para 50, holding that in the particular circumstances the defender had no legal, moral or social duty to speak to their mutual employer about the pursuer’s alleged mistreatment of a patient several years earlier. An alternative analysis might have been that the passage of time was as an additional indication that the defender had an ulterior motive for disclosure at that point, and was therefore motivated by malice. 383 Pearson v Educational Institute for Scotland 1997 SC 245. 384 As in Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1995] 2 AC 296 (for the purposes of the law of defamation, but not of the law of negligence: see para 5.51 above). 385 Huntley v Ward (1859) 6 CB (NS) 514 per Willes J at 517. 386 [1930] 1 KB 130.

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for example, to the press or other media representatives.387 A clergyman is doubtless under a duty to promote the spiritual and physical well-being of his or her congregation, but no privilege attaches if he or she uses the pulpit to denounce specific individuals; there is no duty to publicise the shortcomings of individual parishioners, nor on the other parishioners to hear them.388

(b) Parties to court proceedings 18.112

As already mentioned, the parties to civil court proceedings are protected by qualified, not absolute privilege389 (in contrast with the absolute privilege extended to their legal representatives390 and to the parties while conducting their case in English court proceedings391). The rationale for no more than qualified privilege is that, unlike the other actors in court proceedings who come to court to fulfil a “public function”, the parties themselves do so to defend their own private interests.392 It is said that there is therefore no reason to shield them from suit if they use that forum to make malicious statements or as a “cloak for calumny”.393 The parties to civil proceedings are thought not to acquire the benefits of absolute privilege given to pleaders even if they conduct their own cases, although a party called as a witness by the other side enjoys absolute privilege while acting in that role.394 Norrie argues, however, that absolute privilege should be attributed to accused persons in criminal proceedings, since they have plainly not had any control over the instigation of proceedings and there is an even greater imperative to protect freedom of speech in that context.395

(c) Statements made in response to an attack by another 18.113

Persons whose reputation has been attacked by others are entitled to respond to criticisms of their own conduct, even if the rebuttal, in turn, disparages those making the allegations.396 Such statements made in self-defence, or “fair retort”,397 are protected by qualified privilege, as long as they address 387 Baigent v McCulloch 1998 SLT 780. 388 Robert and Scotlands v Thomson (1776) 2 Hailes 716, 8 Aug 1776 FC (the defender’s diatribe was “contrary to the decency, dignity and purity of the pulpit”); Dudgeon v Forbes (1833) 11 S 1014; Adam v Allan (1841) 3 D 1058. 389 E.g. Forteith v Earl of Fife (1821) 2 Mur 463; Williamson v Umphray and Robertson (1890) 17 R 905; Stevenson v Wilson (1903) 5 F 309; Campbell v Cochrane (1905) 8 F 205. 390 See para 18.103 above. 391 Royal Aquarium & Summer & Winter Garden Society Ltd v Parkinson [1892] 1 QB 431 per Lopes LJ at 451. 392 Williamson v Umphray and Robertson (1890) 17 R 905 per Lord President Inglis at 911. 393 Brown v Wintours (1821) 2 Mur 451 per Lord Chief Commissioner Adam at 456. 394 K McK Norrie, Defamation and Related Actions in Scots Law (1995) 108–109. 395 Norrie, Defamation 109. 396 Chapman v Barber 1989 SLT 830. 397 Milne v Walker (1893) 21 R 155.

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the substance of the original personal attack and vindicate the character of the person who was its target.398 A response of this nature may be framed in “robust” terms, although if it oversteps the limits of what is required by way of rebuttal, D risks manifesting malice with the result that privilege is overturned.399 Privilege does not extend to retaliatory remarks unconnected with the original accusation or with the vindication of the victim’s character; if, for example, they accuse P not merely of having misrepresented D on the particular occasion that gave offence but of mendacity generally.400 A statement made by a law agent to rebut criticism of a client is similarly regarded as privileged.401

(2) Statutory qualified privilege Qualified privilege is conferred by statute in various contexts, now drawn together in the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021.

18.114

(a) Peer-reviewed statement in scientific or academic journals Section 10 re-enacts section 6 of the Defamation Act 2013 (which had been one of the few provisions applicable to Scotland in that Act). As in section 6 of the 2013 Act, section 10 sets out a form of qualified privilege for statements in scientific or academic journals, on condition that the statement relates to a scientific or academic matter402 and that before publication an independent review of its merit was carried out by the editor and one or more persons with expertise in the scientific or academic matter at issue.403 The same privilege is extended to publication in the same journal of the content of that independent review.404 Fair and accurate copies, extracts and summaries of such statements or assessments are similarly protected.405 As is the case with other forms of qualified privilege, privilege in this setting is lost if it can be shown that the publication was made with malice.406

18.115

(b) Reports Section 11 of the 2021 Act and the Schedule re-enact section 15 of and Schedule 1 to the Defamation Act 1996. This provides qualified privilege 398 Gray v Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (1890) 17 R 1185; Laughton v Bishop of Sodor and Man (1871–73) LR 4 PC 495. 399 Curran v Scottish Daily Record [2011] CSIH 86, 2012 SLT 359 per Lady Paton at paras 34–35. 400 Milne v Walker (1893) 21 R 155. 401 Watts v Times Newspapers Ltd [1997] QB 650. 402 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 10(2). 403 s 10(3). 404 s 10(4). 405 s 10(5). 406 s 10(6).

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18.117

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to numerous types of publication of an official nature, subject to the overriding requirement that the material should have been of “public interest” and for “public benefit”.407 As was the case with section 15, there are two separate categories. The statements specified in Part 1 of the Schedule are protected by qualified privilege “without explanation or contradiction”, and are actionable only if “shown to be made with malice”.408 This category comprises a range of reports, including: fair and accurate accounts of proceedings of legislatures anywhere in the world; copies or extracts of matter published on the authority of legislatures or governments anywhere in the world; reports of proceedings in public before courts anywhere in the world (subject to absolute privilege being available to contemporaneous reports under section 9); reports of public inquiries anywhere in the world; court notices and advertisements; copies or extracts of documents published in public registers; reports of the public proceedings of international organisations or international conferences; and copies or extracts from matter published anywhere in the world by international organisations or international conferences. The statements specified in Part 2 of the Schedule are protected by qualified privilege “subject to explanation or contradiction”. This means that privilege is lost if, after being requested to do so, D fails to publish “in a suitable manner” a reasonable letter or statement either explaining or contradicting the allegedly defamatory remarks.409 “In a suitable manner” means that the explanation or contradiction should be published in the “same manner” as the statement originally complained of, or otherwise in a manner that is “adequate and reasonable”.410 This category is extensive, including: fair and accurate accounts of information notices issued by legislatures, governmental bodies, and international organisations anywhere in the world; documents released by courts and court officers anywhere in the world; reports of proceedings of local government, public meetings, commissions, inquiries and tribunals within the United Kingdom; reports of press conferences anywhere in the world on matters of public interest; reports of public meetings anywhere in the world on matters of public interest; reports of the meetings of listed companies; findings or decisions of governing bodies of associations anywhere in the world concerned with matters such as culture, professional regulation, sport, and charitable activities; reports of scientific and academic conferences; and reports and summaries of adjudications, and notices etc. issued by designees of the Scottish Ministers. 407 408 409 410

s 11(6). s 11(2). s 11(4). s 11(5).

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L. OFFERS TO MAKE AMENDS Liability for defamation is strict.411 Unless the occasion was privileged, D remains liable even where D offers to show that there was no intention to refer to P, no knowledge of falsity, or no awareness of the potential for serious harm. The consequences of strict liability are, however, tempered by the availability of a mechanism for making an offer of amends. In essence, where an offer of amends is made, accepted and duly performed, the aggrieved person may not bring or continue412 defamation proceedings in respect of the publication concerned or against the person who has made the offer.413 Furthermore, in cases where the defamatory statement was published innocently, in the sense discussed below,414 the fact that an offer was duly tendered but rejected may be relied upon as a defence in subsequent proceedings.415 The provisions set out in the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 in this regard416 replace the statutory framework previously available in terms of the Defamation Act 1996, sections 2–4. D’s offer to make amends must propose: to make a “suitable correction” of the offending statement; to give a “sufficient apology”; to publish the correction and apology in a “reasonable and practicable” manner; and to pay such compensation and expenses as may be agreed, or determined to be payable.417 In terms of form, the offer must: be made before defences are lodged in defamation proceedings; be in writing; and refer to section 13 of the 2021 Act.418 The offer may be a qualified one, in the sense that it identifies a specific defamatory meaning which D accepts was conveyed by the statement and to which the offer relates,419 and offers a “suitable correction” of that meaning.420 If P then continues with proceedings, the qualified offer serves as a defence only in respect of the meaning to which the offer related.421 Although there is normally no time limit for offers of amends, the requirement that they must be made before defences are lodged in defamation proceedings means in practice that they will need to be made promptly. There is similarly no exact time limit within which P must 411 See para 18.51 above. 412 But see Winslet v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2009] EWHC 2735 (QB), [2010] EMLR 11, holding that a claimant who accepted an offer of amends (under the 1996 Act procedure), but at the same time reserved the right to apply for a statement to be read in open court, was entitled to make that statement; she was not thereby regarded as “continuing defamation proceedings”. See also Murray v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 488, [2015] EMLR 21. 413 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 14(2). 414 See para 18.123 below. 415 ss 16–17. 416 ss 13–17. 417 s 13(1). 418 s 13(2). 419 s 13(1)(a)(ii). 420 s 13(2)(d). 421 s 14(2)(a).

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respond to an offer, but an offer is deemed to have been rejected where it has not been accepted “within a reasonable period”.422 The question of what might constitute a reasonable period was considered, for the purposes of the 1996 Act, in Moore v Scottish Daily Record and Sunday Mail Ltd,423 in which the pursuer delayed eighteen months, until the eve of a procedure roll debate on the parties’ preliminary pleas, before intimating acceptance of the offer. Although the court acknowledged that the aim of the provisions was to encourage speedy disposal, it held that the statutory wording left it open for the pursuer to take up an offer of amends until such time as the defender actually withdrew the offer, notwithstanding that court proceedings had been initiated after the offer was made. However, in the English case of Tesco Stores Ltd v Guardian News & Media Ltd,424 Eady J ruled that after the much shorter period of two months the claimants were to be compelled either to accept or to reject the defendants’ offer. Commenting that he did not find the reasoning applied in Moore persuasive, he stated: “There comes at some point a fork in the road. A claimant has to go to the right or the left and, depending on that choice, either . . . s 3 [on consequences of acceptance of offer of amends] or s 4 [on consequences of failure to accept] will come into operation.”425 If the parties cannot agree on the mode of correction, apology and publication, D may “take such steps as [D] considers appropriate”, including making the correction and apology by a statement in open court in terms approved by the court, and at the same time giving an undertaking to the court as to the manner of its publication.426 Thus the court becomes the ultimate arbiter as to what steps require to be taken. Similarly, where the parties have not been able to agree on the amount of compensation payable, the court is empowered to determine the figure, by reference to the principles relevant to defamation proceedings,427 but also taking into account the steps taken to fulfil the offer, as well as the suitability of the correction, the sufficiency of the apology, and whether the manner of their publication was reasonable in the circumstances.428 This might mean, for example, that where D has acted promptly to make an offer of amends, the court could regard this as a mitigating factor reducing the award of damages.429 On the other hand, where the offer is made only after a delay

422 s 13(3)(c). 423 2007 SLT 217. For commentary see G M Henderson, “Defamation: the Offer of Amends Defence – A Lamb in Lion’s Clothing?” (2009) 14 Communications Law 46. 424 [2008] EWHC B14 (QB), [2009] EMLR 5. 425 [2008] EWHC B14 (QB), [2009] EMLR 5 at para 47. 426 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 14(4). 427 s 14(5). 428 s 14(6). 429 See Nail v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1708, [2005] EMLR 12; C v MGN Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1382, [2013] 1 WLR 1015.

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and the apology is in “ungenerous” or “offhand” terms, the “credit” given to D for having made amends may be significantly reduced.430 While freedom of expression should not be unduly restricted, damages should not be reduced in such cases “to a level which publishers might with equanimity be tempted to risk having to pay”.431 In case of disagreement the court also has power to fix the amount to be paid as expenses.432 It is open to P to reject the offer of amends if its terms appear inadequate, but this is not a decision to be lightly taken. Even though the offer has been rejected, the fact that it has been made may be used as a defence in subsequent defamation proceedings.433 That defence only ceases to be available where D knew, or had reason to believe, that the statement complained of referred to P and was likely to be understood as referring to P, and that it was both false and defamatory of P. However, the difficulty for P is that it is presumed that D did not believe, or have reason to believe, these matters, and the burden therefore falls upon P to show that D did so believe.434 English authority in regard to the equivalent provisions in the 1996 Act suggests that the presumption is not easily rebutted. In Milne v Express Newspapers, it was said that the defendant must be shown to have acted in “bad faith” in the sense of having “chosen to ignore or shut his mind to information which should have led him to believe (not merely suspect) that the allegation is false”.435 In effect, the presumption is overturned only where the P can show at least “reckless indifference to the truth” by D.436 D on the other hand is not obliged to use this defence, but doing so precludes reliance upon any other defence (such as truth etc.).437

430 Campbell-James v Guardian Media Group plc [2005] EWHC 893 (QB), [2005] EMLR 24; see also Cleese v Clark [2003] EWHC 137 (QB), [2004] EMLR 3. 431 Nail v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1708, [2005] EMLR 12 per May LJ at para 39. 432 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 14(7). 433 s 16(2). 434 s 16(3). 435 Milne v Express Newspapers [2002] EWHC 2564 (QB), [2003] EMLR 22 per Eady J at para 41 (affd [2004] EWCA Civ 664, [2004] EMLR 24). Eady J further commented: “The main purpose of the statutory regime is to provide an exit route for journalists who have made a mistake and are willing to put their hands up and make amends. In the absence of agreement, the offer of amends also signifies a willingness to place oneself in the hands of the court for assessing the appropriate steps to be taken by way of vindication and compensation. It would thus make no sense at all to interpret the wording to mean that journalists would be deprived of the defence if they had been negligent – or behaved in such a way that a jury might perceive them to have been negligent. It would be self-defeating.” 436 Milne v Express Newspapers [2004] EWCA Civ 664, [2004] EMLR 24 per May LJ at para 59. For an example where the fact that the offer had been made did not constitute a defence, and where extensive extrinsic evidence was adduced to show that that defendant acted in bad faith, see Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2011] EWHC 1884 (QB), [2012] EMLR 8. 437 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 16(4).

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M. RESTRICTION ON PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SECONDARY PUBLISHERS 18.124

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18.126

One of the problems addressed by modern statutory reform of defamation law was the potential liability of those who participated in the dissemination of defamatory material without themselves being responsible for its content. Thus section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996 provided a defence for a range of persons involved only in the processing or distribution of printed material, films or recordings, or electronic media. The position of internet service providers was further assisted by the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002,438 which restrict the circumstances in which ISPs may be found liable for financial and penal sanctions in regard to defamation.439 Service providers of this intermediary nature may escape liability: under regulation 17, if they can establish that they acted merely as a conduit for transmission of defamatory material; under regulation 18, if they merely provided a cache for defamatory material and acted expeditiously to remove it on discovering that it has been removed from the network or had access disabled; and under regulation 19, if they hosted the defamatory material on their server but removed it expeditiously on discovering its nature. In its Report on Defamation the Scottish Law Commission considered the feasibility of making more detailed provision in regard to publication by internet intermediaries. It concluded that a review of liability and the availability of defences in this context would be timely, but that it was more appropriate that it should be undertaken at UK-level rather than for Scotland alone.440 The treatment of secondary publishers that ultimately found its way into the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 was therefore seen as an “interim measure”. The 2021 Act left the 2002 Regulations in place, but repealed section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996.441 Section 3 of the 2021 Act lays down a broad-based restriction on proceedings against “secondary publishers”. Such persons are negatively defined; there is no right to bring defamation proceedings against persons other than “authors, “editors” or “publishers”, or employees or agents of such persons 438 SI 2002/2013, implementing Directive 2000/31/EC. Recital 42 in the Directive explained that the exemptions from liability were to extend to circumstances where the activity of the service provider was “limited to the technical process of operating and giving access to a communication network over which information made available by third parties is transmitted or temporarily stored, for the sole purpose of making the transmission more efficient; this activity is of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature, which implies that the information society service provider has neither knowledge of nor control over information which is transmitted or stored.” 439 The Regulations do not, however, provide a defence against the grant of interdict. 440 Scot Law Com No 248, 2017, paras 4.1–4.7. 441 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 35(3)(a). The defence of innocent dissemination was abolished by s 8(1)(a).

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who were “responsible for the statement’s content or the decision to publish it”.442 Moreover, those three specified roles are in themselves restrictively construed. The definition of “author” excludes persons “who did not intend the statement to be published”.443 Unless their involvement “materially increased” the harm caused by publication, “editor” excludes those who published the statement or provided a “means of access” to it without altering its content (for example by retweeting or providing a hyperlink to it), or simply marked their interest in the statement (such as by a symbol, or by “liking” or “disliking” it).444 The definition of “publisher” includes only commercial publishers issuing the allegedly defamatory statement in the course of their business.445 In addition, section 3(4) lists a variety of functions the fulfilment of which does not mean that the person responsible is an “author”, “editor”, or “publisher. This substantially reproduces the list found in section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996, but with adjustment to extend the protection available to those involved in the dissemination of information in electronic form. The functions expressly stated as not rendering a person so liable include: printing, producing, distributing or selling printed material; processing, copying, distributing, exhibiting or selling a film or sound recording; processing, copying, distributing or selling any electronic medium in or on which the allegedly defamatory statement is recorded; operating or providing equipment, systems or services by means of which the statement is retrieved, copied, distributed or made available in electronic form; broadcasting a live programme containing the statement in circumstances in which the person had no effective control over the maker of the statement; operating or providing access to a communications system by means of which another person, over whom the person has no effective control, transmits the statement or makes it available; and moderating the statement (for example, by removing obscene language or correcting typographical errors without altering the substance of the statement). An important difference from the Defamation Act 1996446 is that section 3 omits the further requirement on defenders of having to show that they had taken “reasonable care” in relation to the publication of the statement, and had not known or had reason to believe that their actions “caused or contributed to the publication of a defamatory statement”. Thus section 3 excludes those who have been instrumental in regard to the dissemination of the material but whose role in regard to its content has been essentially

442 443 444 445 446

s 3(1). s 3(2). s 3(3). s 3(2). s 1(1).

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passive.447 Similarly, those who moderate potentially defamatory material, for example, and who by definition must know of its content, do not automatically lose protection on that basis.

N. REMEDIES (1) Discursive remedies 18.128

In addition to the usual remedies of damages and interdict, the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 makes provision for certain “discursive” remedies, requiring D to make a corrective or mitigating statement about the offending publication. The court is empowered to order D to publish a summary of its judgment, and the court has the final say in cases where the parties cannot agree on the wording of the summary, or the mode of its publication.448 A further possibility is that the court may allow a settlement statement to be read out in open court, with the court retaining the power to approve its wording.449 The court also has power to order the operator of a website to remove defamatory statements, or to order an author, editor or publisher to stop distributing, selling or exhibiting the offending material.450

(2) Interim interdict: Human Rights Act 1998, section 12 18.129

As also discussed in later chapters,451 the relevance of section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 must be considered in proceedings where the court is being asked to grant “relief which, if granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression” (as provided by ECHR Article 10). Section 12(4) directs the court to pay “particular regard” to the importance of the Convention right to freedom of expression where the proceedings relate to material purported to be journalistic, literary or artistic in character. In particular, section 12(3) directs that publication should not be restrained before trial “unless the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed”. Thus in proceedings for interim interdict P must establish the likelihood that an application for permanent interdict will succeed. According to the 447 See e.g. Bunt v Tilley [2006] EWHC 407 (QB), [2007] 1 WLR 1243 (holding that ISPs that had served only as “conduits” for the material could not be regarded as publishers in the common law understanding of that term); Metropolitan International Schools Ltd v Designtechnica Corp [2009] EWHC 1765 (QB), [2011] 1 WLR 1743 (holding that the operator of a search engine was not the publisher, in the common law understanding, of the “snippets” generated by the search engine from websites). 448 s 28. 449 s 29. 450 s 30. 451 See paras 19.62, 19.71 and 20.56 below.

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Inner House, section 12(3) poses a higher hurdle for P than that of demonstrating a “prima facie case”, and in that respect it must be taken to have “superseded” the common law test.452 Nonetheless, in evaluating the relative importance of freedom of expression in this context, it may still be possible to distinguish between cases relating to defamation and those relating to breach of confidentiality or misuse of private information, for in cases relating to defamation P has the option of restoring reputation by correcting a falsehood after publication has been permitted, whereas confidentiality or privacy once lost cannot be recovered.453

O. MALICIOUS PUBLICATION The verbal injuries of the common law were abolished by the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021.454 Case law had become sparse over the course of the twentieth century, and the Scottish Law Commission in its review in the Report on Defamation advised that “little would be lost” by dispensing with the more marginal categories of verbal injury.455 However, the Commission took the view that there was advantage in retaining and redrawing the business-related categories of verbal injury, namely: falsehoods causing business loss; slander of title; and slander of property.456 These are now reconfigured in the statutory delicts of malicious publication as set out in sections 21, 22 and 23 of the 2021 Act. As in the common law, liability for malicious publication requires P to establish the essential elements of liability, namely, that the statement made by D was false, that it was made with malice, and that it resulted, or was likely to result, in financial loss.457 Unlike in the law of defamation, no presumptions operate in P’s favour, and each element must be averred and proved. While all three types of malicious publication require financial loss to be shown, the amount of damages awarded may also take into account any distress and anxiety caused to P by the statement.458

452 Massie v McCaig [2013] CSIH 14, 2013 SC 343 per Lord President Carloway at para 34; see also British Gas Trading Ltd v McPherson [2020] CSOH 61, 2020 GWD 20–271 per Lady Poole at para 4. 453 See X v BBC 2005 SLT 796. 454 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 27. 455 Such as verbal injury to feelings by exposure to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, convicium, and slander on a third party. See Report on Defamation (Scot Law Com No 248, 2017) paras 9.9 and 9.28–9.29. 456 For more detail, see Reid, Personality, Confidentiality, and Privacy ch 7. 457 The basis for the common law framework was set out in Paterson v Welch (1893) 20 R 744; see also Argyllshire Weavers Ltd v A Macaulay (Tweeds) Ltd 1965 SLT 21 per Lord Hunter at 35; Steele v Scottish Daily Record and Sunday Mail Ltd 1970 SLT 53. 458 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 26.

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(1) Statements causing harm to business interests 18.131

18.132

A statement can amount to malicious publication even where it is not defamatory; indeed the very reason for having a delict of malicious publication is to provide a remedy where defamation would not assist. So while a statement which disparages P’s business competence or probity is likely to be defamatory of P personally, a malicious statement about P’s business activities might be seriously damaging even although not defamatory in the sense of lowering P’s personal reputation. In those circumstances the pre2021 common law imposed liability for falsehood causing loss.459 A leading authority illustrating the equivalent English tort is Ratcliffe v Evans,460 in which the defendants published a false statement in a newspaper to the effect that the plaintiff had ceased trading. Although the statement did not defame the plaintiff’s character as such, damages were awarded for this malicious falsehood because it was “intended or reasonably likely to produce . . . a general loss of business”.461 Section 21 of the 2021 Act now provides for delictual liability to arise in this context if P can show that: • D has made a “false and malicious statement” about P’s “business or business activities”;462 • D published that statement to a third party;463 and • the statement has caused or is likely to cause financial loss to P.464 P need not necessarily be personally identifiable in the offending statement (unlike in the law of defamation), but there must be a damaging reference which can be identified as relating to P’s business interests.465

(a) Malice: a “credible” statement of fact 18.133

Proving the first of the elements above – the making of a false and malicious statement – is likely to prove a substantial hurdle, since malice in 459 See e.g. Paterson v Welch (1893) 20 R 744, in which allegations that a town provost had voiced unpopular sentiments at a school board meeting led to the defeat of his party in subsequent municipal elections. See also Lamond v The Daily Record (Glasgow) Ltd 1923 SLT 512. 460 [1892] 2 QB 524. For a Scottish case brought in similar circumstances (but in which there was no liability because the defender was not held vicariously liable for the employee who made the statement), see Craig v Inveresk Paper Merchants Ltd 1970 SLT (Notes) 50. See also Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62, in which malicious falsehood was made out where the defendants had published a fictitious interview with the plaintiff, which deprived him of the lucrative opportunity of selling his real story to the press. 461 [1892] 2 QB 524 per Bowen LJ at 533. 462 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 21(1)(a)(i). 463 s 21(1)(a)(ii). 464 s 21(1)(b). 465 The same is true of malicious falsehood in English law: see Marathon Mutual Ltd v Waters [2009] EWHC 1931 (QB), [2010] EMLR 3 per Moloney J at para 9(c).

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this statutory delict is freighted with an extended definition that relates to much more than D’s motivation. A statement is deemed “malicious” only if P shows: 466 “(a) that the imputation conveyed by the statement complained of was presented as being a statement of fact (rather than a statement of opinion) and was sufficiently credible so as to mislead a reasonable person, and (b) both– (i)  that [D] knew that the imputation was false or was recklessly indifferent as to the truth of the imputation, and (ii) that [D]’s publication of the statement was motivated by a malicious intention to cause harm to [P]’s business or business activities.”

The requirement that the imputation should have been a statement of fact rather than opinion may be judged by principles similar to those that determine whether a statement is fact or opinion for the purposes of the honest opinion defence,467 although the onus here is upon P to prove that the content was fact (rather than being upon D to prove that it was opinion). In addition, P must demonstrate that the statement was both false and reasonably credible. This formulation no doubt covers the type of non-factual imputations by use of figurative or satirical language that the common law had generally rejected as the basis of actionable verbal injury,468 but it is nonetheless odd that the statute is worded in this particular way. The common law of verbal injury had required P to prove the falsity of the statement and that it was maliciously motivated or made with reckless disregard for the truth, but not that the injurious statement was credible. So in a case like Ratcliffe,469 for example, the statutory delict would now oblige P to show not only that P had continued trading, but also that it was “credible” that he had not – that the business was in difficulties. To take another, Scottish, example, in Lamond v The Daily Record (Glasgow) Ltd470 the defender had published a newspaper article falsely purporting to be based upon an interview with the pursuer, a musical hall performer. The views spuriously depicted her American audiences (during the Prohibition era) as “bored” and “miserable”. This account did not bring her character into disrepute, but was likely to affect prospects for her next tour to the United States. Damages were therefore awarded for verbal injury, on the basis that the article was false, likely to injure her in her profession, and published “in reckless disregard of the injury which it was calculated

466 467 468 469 470

s 21(2). See paras 18.90–18.92 above. See Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy paras 8.28–8.32. Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524, discussed in para 18.131 above. 1923 SLT 512.

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18.136

to do”.471 Had redress been sought not at common law but in terms of the 2021 Act, the statute would apparently have required Ms Lamond further to show that it was “credible” for her audiences to have looked bored and miserable. Arguably it would have been more appropriate for the statute to cast the credibility of D’s statement, not as an element that P required to prove, but as a defence, allowing D to escape liability by showing that D’s statement was opinion only and not credible as fact.

(b) Malice: indifference to truth and malicious motivation 18.137

18.138

As discussed in general terms in chapter 15, the concept of malice is open to both generic and specific meanings – the former applicable to conduct in the knowledge that injurious consequences are substantially certain to result, and the latter to conduct that is maliciously motivated.472 In the common law verbal injuries, malice in this second sense appeared to be required; but as a concession to the difficulties of obtaining direct evidence of malicious motivation, it was generally sufficient for P to aver facts and circumstances from which such motivation could be inferred.473 The main ground for drawing that inference was that the defender knew that the statement was false474 or was “reckless” in regard to its truth.475 In English law, similarly, it is generally sufficient for the tort of malicious falsehood for it to be proved that “the words were calculated to produce damage and that the defendant knew when he published the words that they were false or was reckless as to whether they were false or not”.476 The formulation in section 21(2)(b) of the 2021 Act, quoted above,477 is more exacting. As in the common law, evidence is required that the statement was maliciously motivated; but rather than allowing that this may be inferred from absence of honest belief in its truth, the statute requires proof of malicious motivation over and above proof of knowledge that the statement was false. Furthermore, it must be shown, as regards the former, that the harm intended by D was specifically targeted at the business activities of P. So if D, an acquaintance with a grudge, circulates lies about P’s solvency or capacity, but has no knowledge of P’s business affairs, the 471 472 473 474 475

1923 SLT 512 per Lord Constable at 517–518. See in particular paras 15.17–15.20 above. Steele v Scottish Daily Record and Sunday Mail Ltd 1970 SLT 53 per Lord Fraser at 65. Craig v Inveresk Paper Merchants Ltd 1970 SLT (Notes) 50. Barratt International Resorts Ltd v Barratt Owners’ Group 2003 GWD 1–19 per Lord Wheatley at para 32; Lamond v The Daily Record (Glasgow) Ltd 1923 SLT 512 per Lord Constable at 517. 476 Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 per Glidewell LJ at 67. Indeed, it is suggested in England that there is no distinction between the meaning of malice in malicious falsehood and the form of malice understood as defeating privilege in defamation: Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1993] 2 All ER 273 per Glidewell LJ at 288 (revd on a different point [1995] 2 AC 296). 477 At para 18.133.

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requirement appears not to be met, since it is difficult to see how D can be said to be motivated by an intention to cause harm to something of which D is not aware. While, therefore, D’s knowledge that the statement was false may still, probably, be taken as evidence of malice in general, it must also be shown that D knew of P’s business activities and had malicious intent in respect of them. On that basis, the statutory reformulation presents an even more challenging hurdle for P than the common law, in which successful claims for verbal injury in this context had already become rare.

(2) Statements causing doubt as to title to property In the common law, slander of title was constituted by statements that cast doubt on P’s title to property, with the intention of jeopardising a sale or other business dealing relating to that property, thus causing P loss. The case law was sparse, particularly in recent years, but the paradigm nineteenth-century example was Philp v Morton478 in which the defender’s agent protested (wrongly) at a public roup that the pursuer was not entitled to sell the articles offered for sale. The pursuer was awarded damages to compensate for the difference between the expected sale proceeds and those achieved after this unfortunate intervention. This form of verbal injury has now been abolished479 and reformulated in section 22 of the 2021 Act as “statements causing doubt as to title to property”. It occurs when:

18.139

• D has made a false and malicious statement about P’s title to land or other property;480 • D published that statement to a third party;481 and • the statement has caused or is likely to cause financial loss to P.482 Malice is construed in the same way as discussed above in relation to section 21,483 with the sole difference that P must prove that the “malicious intention” that “motivated” D was not general ill will, but specifically “to delay or jeopardise a transaction involving the land or other property” of P.484 In view of the considerations discussed above, proving malice in terms of the statute is likely to be a greater stumbling block for P than it had been previously in regard to common law slander of title, in which

478 479 480 481 482 483 484

(1816) Hume 865. See also Yeo v Wallace (1867) 5 SLR 253. Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 27(1). s 22(1)(a)(i). s 22(1)(a)(ii). s 22(1)(b). See s 21(2) and paras 18.137–18.138 above. s 22(2)(b)(ii).

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18.141

the relevant degree of malice might be inferred from actings regarded as “hardly commensurate with acting in good faith”.485 Proof of financial loss may also pose significant difficulty. P must be able to demonstrate the specific nature and amount of the loss allegedly caused by D’s statement, by reference to the initial probability of selling the property in question and the financial impact of delay in sales or of loss of custom.486

(3) Statements criticising assets 18.142

18.143

Slander of property at common law was perpetrated by untrue and malicious statements as to the quality of P’s property or goods which resulted in a specific loss to P. An early case provides the paradigm; in Hamilton v Arbuthnott487 damages were awarded for the loss suffered by a merchant whose goods had been slandered by another merchant as “rotten and mildewed trash”. Modern case law is largely absent, but an illustration is suggested by the facts of Continental Tyre Group Ltd v Robertson,488 in which the defender had told potential customers that tyres manufactured by the pursuers were likely to explode and he “would not put them on his worst enemy’s car”. Interdict was granted on the doubtful grounds489 that the pursuers had been defamed but, as the sheriff principal observed, the case was more truly one of verbal injury and specifically slander of goods.490 While, however, slander of property was recognised in the common law, “the ingredients of the particular type of wrong . . . [were] not particularly well illustrated by decision, possibly because the distinction between actions of slander proper involving injury to character or reputation and actions of verbal injury has not always been clearly maintained”.491 This form of verbal injury has now been abolished492 and replaced, on a more secure footing, by the statutory delict set out in section 23 of the 2021 Act. This requires that: 485 See McIrvine v McIrvine [2012] CSOH 23, 2012 GWD 9–171 per Lord Brodie at para 23; but cf Yeo v Wallace (1867) 5 SLR 253, in which a landlord’s agent disputed the title of a tenant to sell at a sale of furniture but desisted from protest after the tenant showed that his rent had been fully paid. A claim for the loss of sale proceeds failed, because the tenant could not establish the necessary element of malice (nor that any loss had been caused by the agent’s remarks). 486 See e.g. Harpers v Greenwood & Batley (1896) 4 SLT 116 (common law slander of title); Kennedy v Aldington [2005] CSOH 58 per Temporary Judge T G Coutts QC at para 53. 487 (1750) Mor 7682. 488 2011 GWD 14–321. 489 For comment, see R T Whelan, “Slander of Property: Continental Tyre Group Ltd v Robertson” (2011) 15 EdinLR 437. 490 2011 GWD 14–321 per Sheriff Principal Bowen at para 23, adding that “this distinction may not matter greatly for the purpose of an action for interdict”. 491 Argyllshire Weavers Ltd v A Macaulay (Tweeds) Ltd 1965 SLT 21 per Lord Hunter at 35; see also Bruce v J M Smith Ltd (1898) 1 F 327. 492 Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 27(1).

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• D has made a false and malicious statement criticising or denigrating the quality, condition, use or treatment of assets owned, possessed or controlled by P;493 • D published that statement to a third party;494 and • the statement has caused or is likely to cause financial loss to P.495 A boundary may therefore be observed between trade puffs, by which it is excusable for traders to compare their own goods or services favourably with those of their competitors,496 and lies about the quality or characteristics of the latter, which, if told maliciously, attract liability.497 Statements are unlikely to be regarded as actionable if the only untruth alleged was to the effect that D’s goods were better than P’s.498 Malice in this context is construed in the same way as discussed above in relation to section 21,499 with the difference that the “malicious intention” which must be proved to have “motivated” D is pitched in more general terms, as to cause P “financial loss”.500 Proving malice in terms of the statute is nonetheless likely to be attended with significant difficulty, as already explained.501 A further consideration in relation to this particular wrong is that, while malice might conceivably be shown where the parties were rival traders, it is likely to be extremely difficult to establish where D might be seen as having acted from a sense of public responsibility, even if D’s assertions were completely wrong. This is well demonstrated by cases involving the common law. The outcome of Hamilton v Arbuthnott,502 in which the parties were rival merchants, compares with that of Broomfield v Greig,503 in which the defender was a surgeon and local magistrate. He had stated that the baker’s bread was poisonous and unfit as human food. Although there was evidence of bad feeling between the parties, the court held in that case that those who considered a particular baker’s bread unwholesome were entitled to say so.504 Similarly 493 s 23(1)(a)(i). 494 s 23(1)(a)(ii). 495 s 23(1)(b). 496 See Vodafone Group plc v Orange Personal Communications Services Ltd [1997] EMLR 84 per Jacob J at 89 on the capacity of the public to see through “knocking copy”. See also White v Mellin [1895] AC 154. 497 See e.g. DSG Retail Ltd v Comet Group plc [2002] EWHC 116, [2002] FSR 58. 498 See Hubbuck & Sons Ltd v Wilkinson Heywood & Clark Ltd [1899] 1 QB 86 per Lindley MR at 91–92. 499 See s 21(2) and paras 18.137–18.138 above. 500 s 23(2)(b)(ii). 501 See paras 18.137–18.138 above. 502 (1750) Mor 7682. 503 (1868) 6 M 563. 504 The court did allow that a relevant case of defamation might be made if there had been an allegation that the baker kept adulterated bread or flour in his premises, since this imputed dishonesty to him.

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18.146

in M’Lean v Adam,505 the chairman of a public health committee mistakenly asserted that a case of typhoid could be traced to milk from the pursuer’s cow. In consequence, the pursuer’s dairy business was destroyed, yet his claim for verbal injury was unsuccessful because the court was persuaded that the defender acted not maliciously but in fulfilment of his public duty. Although Lord Justice-Clerk Macdonald appeared to concede in McLean that, in extreme cases, statements that were “utterly reckless” might be taken as “malicious calumny”,506 this concession is now of little assistance to P in the light of the statutory definition of malice, which entails that P proves both that D was “recklessly indifferent” to the truth of the statement and in addition that D was “motivated” by malicious intention to cause loss. On the other hand, a claim of negligent misrepresentation might now succeed in these circumstances if duty and the necessary element of want of care could be proved.507 In this form of malicious publication, in particular, the offending false statements may be open to parallel interpretations – as disparaging the objects in question or alternatively as defaming their owner.508 In Bruce v J M Smith Ltd,509 for example, an article in the defender’s newspaper alleged that a building erected by the pursuer had collapsed and that a new structure put up at the site had insecure foundations. The Inner House upheld the Lord Ordinary’s decision that a relevant case of slander of property was made out, but did so tentatively, with Lord Moncreiff adding that “I think that we have here not merely slander of property, but slander of the pursuer himself in connection with his trade”.510 Clearly, if the offending remarks are open to an interpretation which is defamatory of P, perhaps imputing incompetence or dishonesty in the conduct of P’s business, and the alleged financial loss amounts to serious harm, then the easier route may be to bring an action for defamation, in which falsity and malice are presumed, rather than malicious publication, in which they are not.

(4) Public authorities and malicious publication 18.147

The prohibition on public authorities bringing proceedings, found in section 2 of the 2021 Act, is stated as relating specifically to “defamation

505 (1888) 16 R 175. 506 (1888) 16 R 175 at 179. For an example recognising that a mistake made in a “slipshod” and “autocratic” fashion might constitute slander of property, see Paterson v The Corporation of the City of Glasgow (1908) 16 SLT 224 per Lord Johnston at 229. 507 But on the difficulties of establishing a duty on the part of a public authority in regard to economic loss, even where investigatory powers have been exercised in a slipshod manner to reach inaccurate conclusions, see e.g. Jain v Trent Strategic Health Authority [2009] UKHL 4, [2009] 1 AC 853, discussed at para 7.29 above. 508 As e.g. in Broomfield v Greig (1868) 6 M 563. 509 (1898) 1 F 327. 510 (1898) 1 F 327 at 332.

Defamation and Malicious Publication   679

proceedings”. It is arguable therefore that a public authority might make a claim for malicious publication where financial loss has been caused thereby. This is consistent with the position in English law, in which it appears to be accepted that a claim for malicious falsehood by a public authority is competent, even if one for defamation is not.511 Aside from the formidable difficulties of proving malice as already mentioned, however, it may be equally challenging to prove actual financial loss, particularly given that clients of public authorities are often not in a position whereby their custom can be readily transferred to a rival “business”.

(5) Defences The defences set out in sections 5, 6, and 7 of the 2021 Act (truth, publication on a matter of public interest, and honest opinion) are expressed as being available in “defamation proceedings”, and there is no mention of their applicability to the malicious publication delicts as set out in Part 2 of the Act. But, in any event, the defences of truth or honest opinion can hardly apply where P is able to establish that the false statement was spoken with malice in the statutory sense; the same is probably true of a defence of publication on a matter of public interest.512 Qualified privilege would similarly fall away, since all of these delicts are by definition perpetrated with malice; absolute privilege, however, remains.

18.148

P. LIMITATION (1) One-year limitation period Section 18A of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, as amended by section 32 of the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021, provides for a one-year limitation period in relation to actions for defamation, and for malicious publication in terms of sections 21, 22 or 23 of the 2021 Act. This one-year rule replaces earlier provisions allowing three years, and adopts the English model, found in the Limitation Act 1980, section 4A. The limitation period runs for one year from the date “when the right of action accrued”,513 and this is construed as the date at which the defamatory

511 The House of Lords decision in Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers [1993] AC 534 per Lord Keith at 551 appeared to support the observation of the Court of Appeal to this effect: see [1992] QB 770 per Ralph Gibson LJ at para 824, Butler-Sloss LJ at 834. 512 It is unlikely that a defender who knew that the statement was false and was motivated by a malicious intention to harm the pursuer’s business interests (as required in the malicious publication delicts) could on the other hand demonstrate a reasonable belief that publication of the statement was in the public interest, as s 6(1)(a) requires. 513 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, s 18A(1).

18.149

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680   The Law of Delict in Scotland

statement was published.514 The limitation period is, however, suspended while the person allegedly defamed is still under the age of 16 or suffering from “unsoundness of mind”.515

(2) Multiple publication and single limitation period 18.151

18.152

An important innovation in the 2021 Act was its introduction, in section 32(3), of what English law has called a “single publication rule”. New subsections (1A)–(1C) were inserted into section 18A of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, which followed the wording of section 8(1) of the Defamation Act 2013 in England and Wales. These provide that, where a person publishes a statement to the public, or to a section of the public, and subsequently publishes the same statement, or a statement that is “substantially the same”, any right of action against that person for defamation or malicious publication in respect of the subsequent publication is to be treated as having accrued as at the date of the first publication.516 In other words, although there may be multiple publications, there is a single limitation period of one year, determined by reference to the first publication. This provision replaces the previous rule whereby each successive publication of defamatory or malicious material triggered its own limitation period.517 While a non-substantive change in presentation is unlikely to constitute a new publication, the rule above does not apply where the court determines that the manner of the subsequent publication is “materially different” from the manner of the first publication.518 In deciding this, the court is directed to have regard to: “the level of prominence that the statement is given”; “the extent of the subsequent publication”; and “any other matter that the court considers relevant”.519 The Explanatory Notes to the 2021 Act (mirroring those to the 2013 Act) suggest that the manner of publication may be regarded as “materially different” where, for example, the offending content first appeared in a relatively obscure position on a 514 s 18A(4)(b). “Published” is not defined in the 1973 Act, although, as noted above, s 1(4)(b) of the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 states that “a reference to publishing a statement is a reference to communicating the statement by any means to a person in a manner that the person can access and understand”, and s 1(4)(c) that “a statement is published when the recipient has seen or heard it”. 515 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, s 18A(2). 516 s 18A(1A). 517 Under the previous rules it had been arguable, e.g., that there was a new publication on each occasion when a defamatory statement was accessed on a website, so that the time bar on initiating proceedings might be deferred for long periods: see Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1805, [2002] QB 783. On the concerns raised by operation of a single publication rule in this context, see A Mullis and A Scott, “Tilting at Windmills: The Defamation Act 2013” (2014) 77 MLR 87 at 103. 518 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 s 18A(1B). 519 s 18A(1C).

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website and was moved on subsequent publication to somewhere more obvious and accessible.520 Notwithstanding the reduction in the length of the limitation period the court retains its discretion under section 19A of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 to allow an action to be brought, even although the specified limitation period in regard to the first publication has been exceeded. Section 33 of the 2021 Act inserted a new section 19CB into the 1973 Act, which provides for supplementary rules in relation to cases where parties have engaged in mediation, allowing for periods of mediation to be disregarded in computing the limitation period. Similarly, section 34 inserted a new section 19CC, to the effect that the limitation period may be calculated without including periods during which the parties have referred their dispute to an independent “complaints process” or to an “expert determination”. No change was made by the 2021 Act to the prescriptive period in regard to defamation and malicious publication. However, it was considered that alongside the restrictive rules on limitation the twenty-year prescriptive period521 was unlikely to come into play in practice.522

520 Explanatory Notes, para 147. 521 Sch 1 para 2(gg). 522 See Scottish Law Commission, Report on Defamation (Scot Law Com No 248, 2017) para 7.32.

18.153

18.154

18.155

Chapter 19

Breach of Confidence

Para A. INTRODUCTION����������������������������������������������������������������� 19.01 B. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT������������������������������������������� 19.02 (1) Contractual relationships��������������������������������������������������� 19.03 (2) Property rights?����������������������������������������������������������������� 19.05 (3) Delictual liability��������������������������������������������������������������� 19.10 (a) Private correspondence����������������������������������������������� 19.11 (b) Information obtained by inducing confidant to breach contract����������������������������������������������������������� 19.14 (c) Information obtained outwith a contractual relationship����������������������������������������������������������������� 19.16 (d) Information obtained by third parties��������������������������� 19.19 C. EQUITY AND DELICTUAL LIABILITY������������������������������ 19.20 (1) Disclosure in pre-contractual negotiations�������������������������� 19.21 (2) Information obtained by third parties��������������������������������� 19.22 D. THE OBLIGATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY��������������������� 19.25 (1) The confidential quality of the information������������������������ 19.26 (a) Relative inaccessibility������������������������������������������������� 19.27 (b) Triviality��������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.33 (2) The circumstances in which the information was acquired����� 19.34 (a) Healthcare professionals���������������������������������������������� 19.36 (b) Legal advisers������������������������������������������������������������� 19.37 (c) Bankers���������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.40 (d) Family or social relationships��������������������������������������� 19.41 E. MISAPPROPRIATION OF INFORMATION (1) Forms of misappropriation������������������������������������������������ 19.45 (2) Misappropriation by third parties��������������������������������������� 19.48 (3) Information received for one purpose and appropriated for another������������������������������������������������������������������������ 19.55 (4) Negligent guarding of information������������������������������������� 19.56 F. DETRIMENT������������������������������������������������������������������������ 19.57 G. PUBLIC INTEREST (1) Public interest as a limiting factor�������������������������������������� 19.61 (2) Balancing public interest in disclosure against public interest in confidentiality.�������������������������������������������������� 19.65

682

Breach of Confidence   683

H. REMEDIES (1) Interdict��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.70 (2) Damages�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.72 (3) Accounting for profits������������������������������������������������������� 19.74 (4) Statutory protection for trade secrets���������������������������������� 19.75

A. INTRODUCTION Breach of confidence does not fit readily within a single juridical category. The standard work on the subject in English law classifies it as a “sui generis action” in which different areas of private law are applied “on a pragmatic basis”.1 In Scotland, similarly, there is no single juridical basis for enforcing the obligation of confidentiality. The transmission of confidential information is restrained primarily by means of an express or implied term of a contract between confider and confidant, in particular in commercial relationships2 and perhaps most conspicuously in the employment context.3 Alternatively, as in England, a property analysis has sometimes been adopted where third parties have come into possession of information, in particular information of commercial value.4 Finally, whereas in England tort law has had only a limited role in protecting confidentiality,5 in Scotland the law of delict has had a longer reach, notably into those types of case addressed in England by recourse to equity. The primary focus of this chapter is on the role of delictual liability in this context, and so breach of confidence as a breach of an express or implied contractual term will not be considered in detail. The use of the law of confidentiality to protect individuals against misuse of their “image rights” is not considered in this chapter but as part of a wider discussion of such rights in chapter 20 below.6   1 T Aplin et al, Gurry on Breach of Confidence, 2nd edn (2012) paras 4.09–4.10. See also the Explanatory Notes to the Trade Secrets (Enforcement, etc) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/597, referring to “the principles of the law of confidence”.   2 See also the Trade Secrets (Enforcement, etc) Regulations 2018, which supplement (rather than supplant – see reg 3) the common law in regard to liability for infringement of trade secrets: see para 19.75 below.   3 For an overview, see Scottish Law Commission, Report on Breach of Confidence (Scot Law Com No 90, 1984) paras 2.3–2.10.   4 See paras 19.05–19.09 below.   5 Except in circumstances where a third party induced the confidant to breach his or her contract with the confider, arguments for recognising liability in tort for breach of confidence have had limited impact: see P M North, “Breach of Confidence: Is There a New Tort” (1972–1973) 12 Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 149; see also G Jones, “Restitution of Benefits Obtained in Breach of Confidence” (1970) 86 LQR 463 at 464. Moreover, the form of action prompted by ECHR Art 8 to deal with misuse of private information is generally regarded as a new tort distinct from breach of confidence: see Gurry on Breach of Confidence paras 4.109–4.117. 6 See paras 20.59–20.73 below.

19.01

684   The Law of Delict in Scotland

B. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 19.02

That secrets should be kept is a principle long-established in Scots law. The Institutional writers gave particular attention to confidentiality in the course of litigation. Advocates were “bound by their office” not to reveal their clients’ secrets,7 nor could agents, factors or trustees be made to disclose such secrets as were committed to them.8 Bankton observed that clerks to the signet were held bound on their admission to office “not to reveal what they write or do for their employers”,9 while Mackenzie wrote cogently of the reasons why advocates were “by their Honour and Interest, obliged to keep up a Secret” in relation to their clients’ affairs, and applied the same principle to “mediators” in criminal and civil matters and to arbiters.10 Confidentiality extended to information divulged in domestic and professional relationships alike.11 Outside of the courtroom, however, less attention was accorded to the principles by which sensitive material should be protected against disclosure, except perhaps in the limited context of verbal injury.12 It was not until the nineteenth century that significant numbers of cases began to appear featuring claims for “breach of confidence” in the types of circumstance associated with the modern use of that term.

(1) Contractual relationships 19.03

In nineteenth-century case law the obligation of confidentiality was more often than not seen as deriving from a contractual relationship between

 7 Bankton, Inst 4.3.27; see also Erskine, Inst 4.2.25.  8 Stair, Inst 4.43.9; see also Creditors of Wamphray v Lady Wamphray (1675) Mor 347; Earl of Northesk v Cheyn (1680) Mor 353; Adam v Braco (1743) Mor 16745; Lindsays v Ramsay (1743) Mor 16746. The early sources on the privilege of confidentiality are drawn together and analysed in J H Begg, A Treatise on the Law of Scotland relating to Law Agents, 2nd edn (1883) 312–322.  9 Bankton, Inst 4.4.10. 10 G Mackenzie, Observations upon the XVIII Act of Parliament XXIII K James VI against dispositions made in defraud of creditors (1699) 58–60. For discussion of Mackenzie’s treatment of “secrets”, see J Blackie, “Unity in Diversity: the History of Personality Rights in Scots Law”, in N R Whitty and R Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective (2009) 31 at para 2.2.5. 11 Thus wives and children could not be compelled to give testimony against their husbands or parents: Erskine, Inst 4.2.24; see also Erskine v Smith (1700) Mor 16703; Drummond v Alexander (1700) Mor 16703. 12 E.g. the disclosure by the confidant that the confider suffered from a “noisome disease” (liability for verbal injury did not require any kind of pre-existing relationship of confidentiality between the parties). For discussion of common law liability for verbal injury in relation to truthful disclosures, see E C Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law (2010) para 8.01–8.15. The common law verbal injuries were abolished by the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021 s 27, and the malicious publication delicts by which they have been replaced relate exclusively to the business context: see paras 18.130–18.148 above.

Breach of Confidence   685

confider and confidant.13 The category most frequently encountered was commercial information – or “trade secrets” – typically as disclosed between employer and employee. Where confidential information had been imparted in such a context, the obligation to maintain the other party’s secrets might be dealt with by provisions expressed or implied in the contract. In appropriate cases, interdict might be granted to restrain disclosure,14 or damages claimed in the event of loss where disclosure had already occurred.15 Moreover, the parties were bound by an implied term of confidentiality even after the employment had ended:16 “[W]here a servant acquires confidential information in the course of his service, the law implies a contract that the information shall not then or afterwards be ultroneously disclosed to a third party. To constitute a breach of this contract, it is not necessary that the confidential information should be published to the world, nor that the information is communicated gratuitously. It is enough that the information so acquired is supplied to a third person without any just or legitimate occasion for supplying it.”

Those providing professional services were likewise subject to a contractual obligation to maintain the secrecy of their clients’ confidences.17 Thus a “deeply founded”18 obligation of confidentiality was demanded of law agents and other professionals whose contractual relationships with their clients placed them in a position of trust. In AB v CD,19 for example, decided in the middle of the nineteenth century, the pursuer had engaged a doctor to advise on whether the child borne by his wife had been conceived before marriage. The doctor made available his report (concluding that the child had been so conceived) not only to the pursuer but also to the local minister for the attention of the kirk-session. This unauthorised disclosure was regarded as a relevant ground for an action in damages, and liability was cast in contractual terms. The question was whether the defender had acted “in breach of the duty undertaken by him in respect of such employment”.20 Lord Ivory observed that “If it could ever have been doubted that such a confidential relation subsists between a medical man 13 See e.g. Craig v Collie (1828) 6 S 1147, in which the court held that there was nothing contractual in the relationship between a member of a dissenting church and its Synod which would entitle the member to interdict publication of the proceedings in which a disciplinary charge was made against him. 14 See e.g. Roxburgh v McArthur (1841) 3 D 556. 15 Neuman & Co Ltd v A & W Kennedy (1905) 12 SLT 763 (in which printers who had contracted to print highly original advertising material for a firm of tailors disclosed its content to a trade rival). 16 Liverpool Victoria Legal Friendly Society v Houston (1900) 3 F 42 at 47–48 per the Lord Ordinary, Lord Pearson. 17 See e.g. J H Begg, A Treatise on the Law of Scotland relating to Law Agents, 2nd edn (1883) 319. 18 Kerr v Duke of Roxburgh (1822) 3 Mur 126 per Lord Chief Commissioner Adam at 141. 19 (1851) 14 D 177. 20 (1851) 14 D 177 at 178.

19.04

686   The Law of Delict in Scotland

and his employer, I think it high time that such a doubt should now be set at rest for ever”.21 In M’Cosh v Crow & Co,22 similarly, the court accepted that the relationship between photographers and their customers was a “confidential one” and that an implied term of the contract between them was that photographs should not be used or disposed of except in accordance with the subject’s wishes.23

(2) Property rights? 19.05

19.06

A significant development in the eighteenth century was the advent of copyright law following the enactment of the Copyright Statute in the reign of Queen Anne.24 In the same way as with modern legislation, the 1710 statute could be invoked not only to protect an author’s exclusive right to commercial exploitation of literary and artistic material but also to prevent publication of material originally intended for a private audience. The leading English case of Pope v Curl 25 in the mid-eighteenth century involved the correspondence of Alexander Pope. In granting an injunction to prevent its unauthorised use, the court held that the protection of the statute was available for letters not initially destined for publication just as to “any other learned work”. The sending of letters transferred ownership of the paper upon which they were written, but not the “licence to any person whatsoever to publish them to the world, for at most the receiver has only a joint property with the writer”. Thus an injunction was granted against publication of letters written by Pope, although not of those written to him. Similarly the Scottish case of Dodsley v M’Farquhar26 in 1775 involved a pirated edition in Scotland of the Earl of Chesterfield’s Letters to His Son. The Earl had requested his son to keep the correspondence secret, and indeed it had remained so while they were both alive. After they both died, the son’s widow hastened to sell the letters to Dodsley, an English publisher, a settlement having been reached with the Earl’s executors. Dodsley, who had published his version of the letters in 1774 and registered his copyright, was successful in obtaining interdict of their publication in Scotland. The 21 (1851) 14 D 177 at 180. This case was cited and breach of medical confidentiality pled in similar terms – although unsuccessfully for other reasons – in AB v CD (1904) 7 F 72, revd (in regard to defamation) sub nom McEwan v Watson (1905) 7 F (HL) 109 (details of a consultation with a pregnant woman alleged to have been wrongfully disclosed by her doctor). 22 (1903) 5 F 670. 23 (1903) 5 F 670 per Lord Trayner at 679. 24 8 Anne c 19. For an account of copyright in Scotland before 1710, see A Mann, “Scottish Copyright before the Statute of 1710” 2000 JR 11. 25 (1741) 2 Atk 342; see R Deazley, “Commentary on Pope v Curl (1741)”, in L Bently and M Kretschmer (eds), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450–1900) (2008) (published online at http:// www.copyrighthistory.org). 26 (1775) Mor 8308, fuller report in 27 July 1775 FC (Appendix to vol 7, 485).

Breach of Confidence   687

court rejected the defenders’ argument that the statute did not allow copyright to be transmitted after the author’s death. Moreover, it was not swayed by the suggestion that “[t]he statute of Queen Anne was intended for the encouragement of learned men to write useful books; but by no means as an encouragement to persons to write letters to their friends”.27 The fact that the letters had not originally been intended for publication did not bar the person who had first published them from acquiring copyright. No “less secure right”28 under the statute attached to letters than to any other work. Even where the Copyright Statute did not apply, however, it came to be accepted that authors might claim a species of property right allowing them to restrain others from appropriating their work. In Prince Albert v Strange,29 an English case from the middle of the nineteenth century, Queen Victoria’s husband was successful in preventing the commercial distribution of etchings which he had intended for the eyes only of family and friends. A printer’s employee entrusted with making a limited number of copies had taken surreptitious copies for himself and sold them to the defendants. Prince Albert sought orders not only to destroy the unauthorised copies but also to stop the defendants circulating a descriptive catalogue of the works. The Copyright Act did not apply to these unpublished compositions, which in any event were not reproduced in the defendant’s catalogue in the exact form originally created by the Prince. Nonetheless, rejecting the defendants’ analysis that any right claimed over the content was “shadowy and evanescent”,30 the court reasoned that the Prince had an “undisputed” property right that entitled him to control circulation of the catalogue:31

19.07

“The property of an author or composer of any work, whether of literature, art, or science, in such work unpublished and kept for his private use or pleasure, cannot be disputed, after the many decisions in which that proposition has been affirmed or assumed . . . If, then, such right and property exist in the author of such works, it must so exist exclusively of all other persons.”

The existence of a property right over unpublished material was endorsed by the Scottish courts some years later in Caird v Sime,32 in which the 27 27 July 1775 FC (Appendix to vol 7, 485 at 487). 28 27 July 1775 FC (Appendix to vol 7, 485 at 490). 29 (1849) 1 Mac & G 25, 41 ER 1171 and (1849) 1 H & Tw 1, 47 ER 1302, affd (1849) 2 De G & Sm 652, 64 ER 293. For the background, see A N Wilson, Prince Albert: The Man who saved the Monarchy (2019) 194–195. 30 (1849) 1 Mac & G 25 at 33, 41 ER 1171 at 1175. 31 (1849) 1 Mac & G 25 at 42–43, 41 ER 1171 at 1178 per Lord Cottenham LC. At the same time, Lord Cottenham added that the plaintiff’s right “by no means depends solely upon the question of property, for a breach of trust, confidence, or contract, would of itself entitle the Plaintiff to an injunction”. 32 (1887) 14 R (HL) 37. While the Publication of Lectures Act 1835 extended the protection of copyright to lectures, it excluded those given in universities, which were left to be dealt with by the existing law.

19.08

688   The Law of Delict in Scotland

19.09

Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow sought to interdict unauthorised publication of a “crib” of his lecture texts, derived from the notes taken by one of his students. The existence of an implied contract between the Professor and his students could not be established, since the lectures were public and the Professor had no control over the membership of his audience or the terms on which they were admitted.33 The central question was therefore whether the Professor might assert a right of property over the unpublished lecture text which would permit him to restrict its subsequent use notwithstanding that it had already been read to the students. The Whole Court of the Court of Session was almost evenly divided on the point,34 but on the case being remitted to the Second Division interdict was refused, although not unanimously, since a university teacher could have no “sort of patent right in the order, arrangement and method of his public teaching”.35 That decision was, however, reversed by the House of Lords, which referred to the “undoubted” principle that the author had a “right of property in his unpublished work” and that he might “communicate it to others under such limitations as will not interfere with the continuance of the right”.36 The disputed material in Caird v Sime – lectures delivered to a public audience – was hardly confidential37 in the same way as the etchings in Prince Albert v Strange, which were produced only for the Prince’s private circle. But the view that a property right might protect sensitive unpublished material was endorsed a decade later in Brown’s Trustees v Hay, in which Lord McLaren treated as settled law the following two principles:38 “[F]irst, that the ownership of manuscript papers, which have either a literary or a commercial value, gives their author, or the person for whose benefit they were compiled, a right of property in their contents so long as the owner chooses to keep their contents private; and secondly, that the person to whom the papers are entrusted for a special purpose has only a qualified possession for that purpose, so that any ultroneous use of the papers by him is an infringement of the proprietary rights of their owner.”

33 In this respect, Caird was to be distinguished from the English case of Abernethy v Hutchinson (1825) 1 H & Tw 28, 47 ER 1313, in which the obligation of confidentiality derived from an “implied contract”. 34 (1885) 13 R 23. Six judges held that a professor was so entitled, five that he was not, and two gave no opinion, holding that the offending text did not, as a matter of fact, reproduce the lectures as such. See in particular the judgment of Lord Fraser at 47–54 who cited detailed comparative research into US, French, German and English law to substantiate the conclusion that the unpublished text might be protected despite having been spoken to the students. 35 (1885) 13 R 23 per Lord Young at 65. 36 (1887) 14 R (HL) 37 per Lord Watson at 42. 37 Indeed the court rejected the notion of a fiduciary relationship between students and professor; as Lord Young remarked at 62, Professor Caird’s duty with regard to his audience was “not to read confidentially an unpublished work, but to teach moral philosophy”. 38 (1898) 25 R 1112 at 1117.

Breach of Confidence   689

It should be added, however, that this form of “common law copyright” has received little attention in more recent case law,39 and the main importance of the decision in Brown’s Trustees is in relation to delictual liability.40

(3) Delictual liability Over the course of the nineteenth century it was increasingly accepted that delictual liability might arise from breach of confidentiality in situations where the original confidant could not point to a property right or to a contractual relationship with the party seeking to use confidential information.

19.10

(a) Private correspondence The notion that disclosure was prevented by a non-contractual obligation, arising by operation of law, can be seen in early cases involving private correspondence. The English case of Pope v Curl,41 discussed above as applying the Copyright Act to private letters,42 was cited in the celebrated Scottish case of Cadell and Davies v Stewart43 in 1804. The holders of copyright in Robert Burns’ compositions, having enlisted the concurrence of his brother and his children’s curator, sought to prevent the unauthorised posthumous publication of Burns’ letters to his close friend, “Clarinda” (Agnes Craig or Maclehose). Counsel for the pursuers, George Joseph Bell, argued that “the iniuria of ‘breach of confidence’ was not only a delict but also a crime as a betrayal of trust”.44 The defenders, on the other hand, maintained that the letters, as distinct from Burns’ published verse, were not protected by the “Act of Queen Anne” (not having been entered at Stationers Hall), and that although such “breach of confidence” might be “a question of morality” no legal sanction should be applied. Interdict was nonetheless granted, “the same to be perpetual”, and expenses were awarded to the pursuers. The decision of the court was not based upon the Copyright Act, nor on the concept of “joint property” upon which the court had relied in Pope v Curl.45 Instead liability was framed in delictual 39 See H L MacQueen, “Breach of Confidence”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 18 (1993) para 1460 n 8; although see Exchange Telegraph Co v Giulianotti 1959 SC 19 (property rights over information were asserted by the pursuer, but not further discussed in the judgment, since interdict was in any event granted on the basis that the defender had induced breach of contract). 40 See paras 19.16 and 19.17 below. 41 (1741) 2 Atk 342. 42 See para 19.05 above. 43 (1804) Mor App Literary Property No 4, 1 June 1804 FC. For extended analysis of this case, see H L MacQueen, “Ae Fond Kiss: A Private Matter”, in A Burrows et al (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (2013) 473. 44 MacQueen, “Ae Fond Kiss: A Private Matter” 482, providing an account of the pleadings based on analysis of the Session Papers. 45 See Cadell and Davies v Robertson (1804) Mor App Literary Property No 5, 5 Pat 493, per Lord Gardenston, speaking at 513 of the “plea of property”: “[i]t is an upstart property in this country, which authors have never claimed, and our lawyers have never asserted”.

19.11

690   The Law of Delict in Scotland

terms, based upon betrayal of confidence and the potential injury to reputation were the publication of private communications not to be restrained: “[C]ommunication in letters is always made under the implied confidence that they shall not be published without the consent of the writer, and . . . the representatives of Burns had a sufficient interest, for the vindication of his literary character, to restrain this publication.”

19.12

Bell cited this decision in his Commentaries as a leading authority for the broad proposition that “the ideas of a man’s mind [were] so identified with himself” that the individual was entitled to prevent publication “beyond the point to which he has given consent”.46 He distinguished the English cases, explaining that the joint property analysis and classification of the right to information as proprietary was necessary to found equitable jurisdiction in the courts of Chancery.47 Control over the publication of private letters was not so much a matter for the Copyright Act and property rights as “a just and expedient interference for the protection of reputation”.48 Interdict should be granted, Bell argued, where “breach of epistolary confidence” threatened reputation and private feelings with “outrage and invasion”:49 “It is one of the great charms of epistolary correspondence, that one writes not under the awe of a misjudging world; but throws out unscrupulously his genuine and undisguised sentiments, utters his most secret thoughts, and, with as little reserve as in the secrecy of his own chamber, expresses his feeling of affection, or his murmurs of disapprobation or of censure, in full reliance that they are confided to a friendly ear. By the publication of such effusions, confidential, careless, unthinking of consequences, a man may be wounded in the tenderest part; his literary reputation hurt; his character traduced. It is, accordingly, the understood or implied condition of the communication, the implied limitation of the right conferred, that such communications are not to be published. With these natural feelings on the breach of epistolary confidence, the determinations of the Court of Session have accorded.”

46 Bell, Comm, vol I, 111. 47 Bell, Comm, vol I, 112, although the equitable basis of protection for breach of epistolary confidence in England was overlaid, even at the time when Bell was writing, with references to the obligation of confidence and injury to feelings. Lord Eldon LC observed in Gee v Pritchard (1818) 2 Swans 402 at 426, continuing an injunction against publication of private letters: “I do not say that I am to interfere because the letters are written in confidence, or because the publication of them may wound the feelings of the Plaintiff; but if mischievous effects of that kind can be apprehended in cases in which this Court has been accustomed, on the ground of property, to forbid publication, it would not become me to abandon the jurisdiction which my predecessors have exercised, and refuse to forbid it.” 48 Bell, Principles § 1357. 49 Bell, Comm, vol I, 111–112.

Breach of Confidence   691

The opportunity to review Bell’s analysis arose several decades later, in White v Dickson,50 decided in 1881. There the defenders threatened to publish correspondence sent “on the faith of confidential communication”, but which had no literary pretensions and served only to substantiate the arguments for one faction in a family feud. Interdict was refused, since it was considered that publication would neither hurt any kind of “literary reputation” nor “traduce” the pursuers’ character. At the same time, the court referred with approval to Bell’s analysis that, unlike in England, this was not a “matter of property”, but a question of “interference for the protection of reputation”.51 The court also indicated that damages might be claimed if injury was ultimately caused by publication.52

19.13

(b) Information obtained by inducing confidant to breach contract It was not only private correspondence to which an obligation of confidentiality attached. By the early nineteenth century it had been established that third parties might be answerable for appropriating information revealed by a contracting party in breach of a contractual obligation of secrecy, and that such conduct was to be categorise as delictual wrongdoing. In Kerr v Duke of Roxburgh,53 a law clerk was persuaded by the defender to divulge information confidential to his employer’s client. The potential for delictual liability to arise was directly addressed by the court: “If a delict is established, and that delict is attended with damage to an individual, that renders it the foundation of an action, and . . . ought to go to the Jury.”54 The basis for delictual liability was taken up again a few years later in Roxburgh v McArthur.55 The pursuers and defenders were rival manufacturers of Paisley pattern shawls. The defenders persuaded a weaver employed by the pursuers to give them a copy of a pattern newly devised by his employers, and then used this to produce their own goods, undercutting the price of their rivals’ shawls in that design. When an action was raised claiming damages for lost profits, there was deliberation in the Inner House as to the required form of the issue. It was accepted as uncontentious that the employee had been under a duty “not to betray the secrets

50 (1881) 8 R 896. 51 (1881) 8 R 896 per Lord Craighill at 899–890. Lord Craighill refers to Bell, Principles § 1356, but the relevant passage is to be found at § 1357. 52 (1881) 8 R 896 per Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff at 901. 53 (1822) 3 Mur 126. 54 (1822) 3 Mur 126 per Lord Chief Commissioner Adam at 141. 55 (1841) 3 D 556. See also Rutherfoord v Boak (1836) 14 S 732, in which a previous employer was awarded substantial damages in respect of a workman’s having been “seduced” into the employment of another. However, the issue whether the second employer had induced him to reveal trade secrets was refused since the pleadings disclosed no detail of the secrets alleged to have been disclosed.

19.14

19.15

692   The Law of Delict in Scotland

of his employer”.56 It was further accepted that a relevant case against the other manufacturers could be framed without necessarily making out an “act of fraud”,57 but on the basis that the defenders had acted “wrongfully” – in the sense that, in the knowledge of trade custom as to secrecy, they had prevailed upon the employee to reveal the pattern. As observed by Guthrie Smith:58 “These cases have sometimes been considered an anomaly, being an exception from the general law, that for breach of a contract no remedy exists beyond the contracting parties themselves. But there is ground for saying that it is no exception, but only an instance of a wider principle, that any wrongful act calculated and designed to affect a subsisting legal relation is illegal.”

(c) Information obtained outwith a contractual relationship 19.16

Liability might similarly arise where no contractual nexus was involved but where disclosure of information was otherwise regarded as a “betrayal of confidence”.59 In Brown’s Trustees v Hay,60 an accountant winding up a solicitor’s affairs suspected that the accounts of one of the solicitor’s clients were inaccurate. He passed the client’s accounts to the Inland Revenue, which investigated the case and found the client’s tax affairs to be in order. Thereafter the client sued the accountant for damages. There had been no contractual relationship between the pursuer and defender, and although the court acknowledged that appropriation of unpublished material might infringe the property rights of the author,61 the asset in the present case had neither literary value nor commercial worth. The appropriation of the accounts had not caused loss of profits to the pursuer, or indeed financial harm of any kind, since the Inland 56 (1841) 3 D 556 per Lord Medwyn at 559. 57 Cf the English case of Abernethy v Hutchinson (1825) 1 H & Tw 28, 47 ER 1313, in which a surgeon obtained an injunction against publishers who had produced a text of lectures given by him at St Bartholomew’s Hospital. These were private lectures, to which students were admitted only by permission of the lecturer. The student whose transcription had been used had, by paying his fee, bought a right to attend and record the lectures for his own use, but not to publish them. Since it was not within his right to publish the text, it was held to be a “fraud in a third party” for the publishers to do so (per Lord Eldon LC at 40). 58 Law of Damages, 2nd edn (1889) 59. Roxburgh v McArthur was also one of the main illustrations cited by Glegg of delictual liability arising from “malicious procurement of breach of contract”: see Reparation, 1st edn (1892) 221, altered in subsequent editions to “inciting to breach of contract”. See also Bell, Principles § 2033 (“Reparation for seduction”), to which a further paragraph on “Seduction of Servants and Workmen” was added by Bell’s editor, William Guthrie, in the 8th edn of 1885 to the effect that reparation was due not only where employees were seduced away from their employment but also where “workmen” were enticed into revealing trade secrets. 59 Brown’s Trs v Hay (1898) 25 R 1112 per Lord McLaren at 1118. 60 (1898) 25 R 1112. 61 (1898) 25 R 1112 per Lord McLaren at 1117.

Breach of Confidence   693

Revenue took no further action. Nonetheless, it was recognised that an actionable injury had been inflicted by the intrusion into the pursuer’s business affairs, for which damages of £20 were awarded. Lord McLaren declared the unauthorised disclosure to be a “wrongful act” and cast liability in delictual terms:62 “[T]he injury to a trader resulting from publicity being given to the contents of his ledger, or his bankbook, lists of customers, and the like, if not identical, is at least not less real than the injury to feeling or reputation which may result from the indiscreet publication of private correspondence . . . If the pursuers were entitled to prevent the misuse of the information which the defender was possessed of by interdict, this must be because the publication of such information to anyone would be a wrongful act. But the wrongful act has been accomplished, the obligation of secrecy is no longer prestable, and reparation in the shape of damages is therefore due.”

Brown’s Trustees v Hay might conceivably be decided differently today, since more recent English authority suggests that public interest arguments are available to those who in good faith disclose suspected financial irregularity and relevant confidential information to the appropriate regulatory body or tax authority.63 Nonetheless, the case confirms that by the end of the nineteenth century appropriation of confidential information gave rise to liability in delict, and indeed, presaging twenty-first-century terminology, the Court of Session classified this as “misuse” of information. Liability might be found even if the defender was not the original confidant and had not induced disclosure of the material in question. C was obliged to maintain the secrecy of information confided between A and B, even if C did not come upon that information by underhand means. In the introduction to his Practical Treatise on the Law of Reparation, Glegg described this rule as illustrating the distinction between duty arising under contract and duty “fixed by law”.64 At the same time, even though such a duty was fixed by law rather than by contract, it rested upon the notion of a “betrayal of confidence”. In Fulton v Stubbs Ltd,65 for example, the proprietors of a newspaper which published an account of a meeting of the pursuer’s creditors were held not

62 (1898) 25 R 1112 at 1118–1119, citing Cadell and Davies v Stewart 1804) Mor App Literary Property No 4, 1 June 1804 FC, and Caird v Sime (1887) 14 R (HL) 37 (discussed above as supporting delictual liability). 63 In Re A Company’s Application [1989] Ch 477 (disclosure by former employee to the Inland Revenue and to the Financial Investment Management and Brokers’ Regulatory Authority, to which his employer’s business was subject). 64 This text appeared in the 2nd edition (1905) at 4 and was carried forward to both subsequent editions (1939 and 1955). 65 (1903) 5 F 814. See also Craig v Collie (1828) 6 S 1147.

19.17

19.18

694   The Law of Delict in Scotland

to be liable for breach of confidence. The Lord Ordinary, Lord StormonthDarling, reasoned as follows:66 “I take the case of a creditor, or the representative of a creditor, having been present at this meeting, and having joined the other creditors in accepting the composition offered. He then goes into the street and tells a friend of what has passed. Has he any legal duty to refrain from doing so? Such conduct may be shabby, and may result in injurious consequences to the insolvent, but I know no law against his doing so. The person to whom the information has thus been communicated may equally pass it on to another. It may be no better than gossip – malevolent gossip if you will – but such action is not illegal, for the persons I have been figuring are under no sort of obligation towards the insolvent to keep silent; there is no relation of confidentiality between them. The case would have been entirely different had these persons been in the employment of the insolvent, or had they obtained the information through having had access to private papers for a limited purpose.”

In other words, there required to be some sort of prior interaction between the confider and the initial confidant, as well as a subsequent betrayal of trust.67 Outwith such established contexts there was little enthusiasm for inferring an obligation of confidentiality where this was not implicit in earlier dealings and no express undertaking had been given.68

(d) Information obtained by third parties 19.19

Where an obligation of confidentiality arose from an initial relationship, there were already by the beginning of the twentieth century “traces of a principle”69 by which that obligation transmitted to successors in possession of the relevant confidential information. M’Cosh v Crow & Co70 is one of the earliest cases to point in this direction. In M’Cosh, interdict was granted to prevent the defenders from displaying on the wall of their photographic studio photographs that a previous proprietor of the studio had taken of the pursuer’s young daughters. The pursuer claimed that their continuing display of the photographs breached a term of confidentiality that was implicit

66 At 816–817. 67 See e.g. Roxburgh v Seven Seas Engineering 1980 SLT (Notes) 49 per Lord Robertson at 50 (involving trade secrets), emphasising the need for a pre-existing relationship and finding no “wrong in law”, “whatever may be thought of the propriety or morals of the respondents’ action”. 68 E.g. Mushets Ltd v Mackenzie Bros (1899) 1 F 756; see also Scottish Law Commission, Report on Breach of Confidence (Scot Law Com No 90, 1984) para 4.5. 69 As perceived by Lord McDonald in Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd 1989 SC (HL) 122 at 160. 70 (1903) 5 F 670. The reasoning in M’Cosh was accepted in William Morton & Co v Muir Brothers & Co 1907 SC 1211, which recognised that an obligation of confidentiality was implied in a contract for the sale of pattern cards, and that successive owners of the cards were similarly bound.

Breach of Confidence   695

in his contract with the defenders’ predecessor. The majority of the court71 readily agreed that the contract was to be so construed, and in addition that the pursuer retained a “right of veto” over the use of the photographs.72 An enduring obligation of confidentiality was to be imposed upon successors in possession of confidential information where they could be attributed with the knowledge that they were not entitled to use or dispose of it “without the consent of the subject”.73 However, the judgments did not provide a satisfactory account of the juridical basis for imposing this obligation upon successors.74 In a contemporary case note, Macgillivray suggested that cases such as M’Cosh were to be understood as examples of “equity” protecting the photographic subject “under the cloak of confidential relationship”,75 but the term “equity” was absent from the judgments in M’Cosh. It was to be several decades before the nature and reach of the relation of confidentiality in regard to third parties came under renewed judicial scrutiny.

C. EQUITY AND DELICTUAL LIABILITY The leading Scottish case of Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd acknowledged that, although the juridical basis for the law of confidentiality in Scotland and in England “may differ to some extent . . . the substance of the law in both of them is the same”.76 The obvious basis for such difference is in regard to the role of equity. It is easy to see why crossborder equivalence should be perceived as unproblematic in the extensive areas where protection for confidentiality interests is derived from the law of contract.77 But the law of equity plays an important role in England, not only as ancillary to contract law in providing the basis for equitable remedies such as injunctions, but also as an independent cause of action, underpinning the obligation to respect confidentiality where such an action does not have a foundation at law.78 By contrast, the absence of a separate 71 Lord Young dissented, at 678, doubting whether one could make a confidential communication of one’s features, and in any event pointing out that if the obligation of confidentiality derived from contract then it bound only the parties to that contract. 72 (1903) 5 F 670 per Lord Moncreiff at 680. 73 (1903) 5 F 670 per Lord Trayner at 679. 74 See W M Gloag, The Law of Contract, 1st edn (1914) 383–384. Gloag commented that it was “difficult to understand” the basis for the judgment in M’Cosh, or the reasons why the majority rejected the “cogent” dissent of Lord Young. Curiously, the sentence in question was omitted from the 2nd edition of 1929, at 269. For commentary, see also K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) para 353. 75 E J Macgillivray, contributing to Notes on Decided Cases (1903) 15 JR 319 at 324. 76 1989 SC (HL) 122 per Lord Keith at 164. Lord Jauncey, the other Scottish judge sitting in the case, appeared to accept without qualification, at 170ff, the applicability of the principles formulated in the English case of Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109, a case in which jurisdiction was founded in equity. 77 See William Morton & Co v Muir Brothers & Co 1907 SC 1211 per Lord McLaren at 1224. 78 For a historical survey, see M Richardson et al, Breach of Confidence: Social Origins and Modern Developments (2012).

19.20

696   The Law of Delict in Scotland

system of equity in Scotland79 has meant that the reach of the law of delict into protection of confidentiality has had to be more extensive than that of the law of tort in England.

(1) Disclosure in pre-contractual negotiations 19.21

Confidentiality may be insisted upon for information disclosed by one person to another regarding projects or inventions in which the former hopes the latter will participate or invest. The obligation to observe the confidentiality of information imparted in pre-contractual negotiations is said in England to rest upon an independent equitable principle of confidence.80 Even if negotiations have come to nothing, one party may thereby be prevented from exploiting for its own benefit information revealed by the other. In Seager v Copydex Ltd,81 for example, the parties had been in protracted negotiations with a view to the defendant marketing a new form of carpet grip devised by the plaintiff. An agreement was never reached, but when the defendant subsequently marketed a carpet grip in a format suggested by the plaintiff, the plaintiff was held entitled to compensation for the use of this confidential information. The court referred to “the broad principle of equity that he who has received information in confidence shall not take unfair advantage of it”.82 In Scots law, the equivalent obligation to respect secrets obtained during pre-contractual negotiations derives from the law of delict. In Levin v Caledonian Produce (Holdings) Ltd83 proof before answer was allowed so as to determine whether the defender had breached confidentiality in using technical information disclosed by the pursuer during pre-contractual negotiations regarding commercial production of fructose. The Lord Ordinary, Lord Robertson, regarded it as “well settled in law that a relationship of trust or confidence may exist independently of contract” and that “this branch of law is based on delict”.84

(2) Information obtained by third parties 19.22

Where a confidant disregards a duty to maintain the confidentiality of information and passes that information on to a third party, it is accepted 79 Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203; Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41; Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109. On the equitable jurisdiction of the Scottish courts in the absence of a separate system of equity, see D M Walker, “Equity in Scots Law” (1954) 66 JR 103 at 106; D N MacCormick, “Sources of Law”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 22 (1987) para 432; D J Carr, Ideas of Equity (Studies in Scots Law vol 5, 2017). 80 Gurry on Breach of Confidence para 9.12. 81 [1967] 1 WLR 923. 82 [1967] 1 WLR 923 per Lord Denning at 931. (The grip did not infringe a patent obtained by the claimant.) 83 1975 SLT (Notes) 69. 84 1975 SLT (Notes) 69 at 70, citing, inter alia, Walker, Delict 916.

Breach of Confidence   697

in Scotland and in England alike that the third party may in turn become bound to maintain confidentiality. In the leading English case of AttorneyGeneral v Guardian Newspapers Ltd,85 newspapers which acquired the memoirs of a former member of the security services were said to be subject to the same obligation of confidentiality that the author himself had owed to the Crown. The injunction on publication was lifted in the particular circumstances of the case since the information in question had ceased to be confidential. Nonetheless, the “general rule”, set out by Lord Keith, was that “a third party who comes into possession of confidential information which he knows to be such, may come under a duty not to pass it on to anyone else”.86 Its basis in English law is that equity requires the third parties to be prevented from disclosing information once they have notice that it is be regarded as confidential.87 The existence of an equivalent Scottish rule was confirmed in Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd,88 decided a short time after Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd and with similar facts. In that case also, interdict was refused in the particular circumstances that had arisen, but it was accepted in principle that the various media outlets in possession of the memoir of a former MI6 agent came under an obligation of confidentiality in regard to its content. Although the Lord Ordinary, Lord Coulsfield, identified “substantial difficulties” in imposing such an obligation upon third parties,89 the Inner House was less troubled by such misgivings and, on appeal, its reasoning on this point was endorsed by the House of Lords. The importance of equity in a general sense was acknowledged,90 so that, while the law of confidence in relation to third parties might not yet be “fully developed”,91 such an obligation could be construed as an incremental development from the reasoning in the Scottish authorities.92 That

85 86 87 88 89

90

91 92

[1990] 1 AC 109. [1990] 1 AC 109 at 260. Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] Ch 344 per Sir Robert Megarry V-C at 361. 1989 SC (HL) 122 (although permanent interdict was ultimately refused because the information concerned has lost the necessary quality of confidentiality). 1989 SC (HL) 122 at 134. However, Lord Coulsfield’s judgment was delivered before the decision of the House of Lords in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd, and his main concern was whether such an obligation could bind third parties who had come into possession of information “innocently”. I.e. in the sense that had recently been characterised by D N MacCormick in “Sources of Law”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 22 (1987) para 432: “Judges will inevitably respond to changing economic and social patterns by engaging in interstitial, incremental lawmaking, and in doing so they will be guided by their conceptions of equity and justice inter alia.” See also D J Carr, Ideas of Equity (2017) paras 2.76–2.79, arguing that this case demonstrates a “vibrant understanding of Scottish equity”. 1989 SC (HL) 122 per Lord Ross at 142. Lord Dunpark likewise reflected that “legal principles are capable of being developed and applied by the courts to new circumstances”: 1989 SC (HL) 122 at 152.

19.23

698   The Law of Delict in Scotland

19.24

reasoning was “wide enough to cover a situation where no right of property or contract is involved” and indicated that an obligation of confidentiality attached to the possession of information where there was knowledge of its confidential nature.93 The authorities in question included various of the cases already discussed in this chapter. The principal sources regarded by Lord Dunpark as providing the foundation for this development were Bell’s Commentaries and White v Dickson,94 both involving application of the law of delict to protect the confidentiality of private correspondence. Lord Ross and Lord McDonald referred to Brown’s Trustees v Hay,95 the case mentioned earlier as involving “misuse of information” and instanced by Glegg as illustrating a duty “fixed by law” distinct from one arising under contract. Lord Ross also cited M’Cosh v Crow & Co,96 the case which recognised an enduring obligation of confidentiality binding successors acquiring photographs knowing them to be confidential. To the extent that these authorities supported the enforceability of confidentiality extending beyond contract, they did so primarily by reference to the law of delict. Since Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd there has been further acceptance that “a third party obtaining information which was confidential to another person and who thereafter used it, might breach a duty owed by him to the original confider so not to do”; moreover, such a duty is to be characterised as “a delictual one.”97 The remedies of interdict and damages are therefore available, or in appropriate cases an accounting for profits.98 In framing liability in delictual terms, Scots law aligns itself with other European legal systems. The Draft Common Frame of Reference, for example, in recommending a frame of reference for tort law in Europe, made specific provision for loss upon breach of confidence as legally relevant damage,99 including as “illustrations” problem scenarios from both the commercial and the private sphere.100   93 1989 SC (HL) 122 per Lord Ross at 142.   94 (1881) 8 R 896; see paras 19.12 and 19.13 above.   95 (1898) 25 R 1112; see paras 19.16 and 19.17 above.   96 (1903) 5 F 670; see para 19.19 above.  97 Hardey v Russel & Aitken 2003 GWD 2–50 per Lord Johnston at paras 11–12.   98 See paras 19.70–19.74 below.  99 DCFR VI.–2:205: “Loss caused to a person as a result of the communication of information which, either from its nature or the circumstances in which it was obtained, the person communicating the information knows or could reasonably be expected to know is confidential to the person suffering the loss is legally relevant damage.” The Commentary accompanying this provision cites a significant number of European jurisdictions as dealing with liability for breach of confidence by means of tort law: see C von Bar and E Clive (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (2010) vol IV, 3304–3312. See also, on the application of the law of tort to unconsented disclosures of personal information in the US, A B Vickery, “Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort” (1982) 82 Columbia L Rev 1426. 100 The scenarios for illustrations 1 and 2 were in fact closely based on Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 923 and X Health Authority v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648, cases decided on the basis of the English equitable wrong, and on breach of contract respectively.

Breach of Confidence   699

D. THE OBLIGATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY Two essential points must be addressed in order to state a relevant case of breach of confidence. First, as discussed in this section, it must be demonstrated that the defender was subject to an obligation of confidentiality, and secondly, as discussed in the next section, there must be misappropriation, or threatened misappropriation, of that information in breach of the obligation of confidentiality.101 The question whether an obligation of confidentiality has arisen in the first place requires consideration of: (i) the quality of the information; and (ii) the circumstances of its acquisition by the defender.

19.25

(1) The confidential quality of the information Confidential information may be embodied in various ways. It commonly takes the form of words, in handwritten, print or digital form, but confidentiality may also attach to pictures, photographs, diagrams, sound recordings, software programs and so on. Indeed there is no absolute requirement that confidential information should be committed to a particular format. Ideas or sentiments communicated by the spoken word may be protected against disclosure, assuming their content can be proved, although an idea communicated orally between parties may be protected only if it contains a significant element of originality, can be clearly identified as the confider’s own, and is sufficiently well-developed to be capable of “being realised as an actuality”.102

19.26

(a) Relative inaccessibility For information to be classified as confidential, it must not be readily accessible to others outwith the interaction between the particular parties.103 Thus, even within a relationship of trust, not all information is worthy of protection; the example suggested by Sir Anthony Clarke MR in Browne v Associated Newspapers Ltd104 was that of a “husband telling his 101 A parallel may be drawn with the three elements summarised by Megarry J in Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 47: (i) Did the information have “the necessary quality of confidence”? (ii) Was it “imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence”? (iii) Was there “an unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the party communicating it”? These were subsequently referred to in Levin v Caledonian Produce (Holdings) Ltd 1975 SLT (Notes) 69; Hardey v Russel & Aitken 2003 GWD 2–50; Pine Energy Consultants Ltd v Talisman Energy (UK) Ltd [2008] CSOH 10, 2008 GWD 4–60. 102 Fraser v Thames Television Ltd [1984] QB 44 per Hirst J at 65–66 (basic concept for new television series). Cf De Maudsley v Palumbo [1996] EMLR 460, in which the idea, communicated socially, for a new nightclub did not have significantly original elements or novel features and had been expressed only in vague terms. 103 Gurry on Breach of Confidence para 5.14. 104 [2007] EWCA Civ 295, [2008] QB 103 at para 29.

19.27

700   The Law of Delict in Scotland

wife that Oxford or Cambridge won the boat race in a particular year”. Such information is “public property and public knowledge”105 and clearly does not have the necessary quality of confidentiality. So while the content of marital communications was protected against disclosure in Duchess of Argyll v Duke of Argyll,106 in Lennon v News Group Newspapers Ltd107 an injunction was refused against publication of widely-known details of the parties’ life together before their divorce, details which they themselves had put into the public domain. Similarly, in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd,108 the House of Lords discharged an injunction that had previously restrained publication of a book in England. As the book had become widely available in other jurisdictions, and imported copies were circulating widely in the UK also, its content had therefore lost its quality of confidentiality. Lord Goff reasoned that:109 “artificially to restrict the readership of a widely accessible book in this way is unacceptable: if the information in the book is in the public domain and many people in this country are already able to read it, I do not see why anybody else in this country who wants to read it should be prevented from doing so.”

19.28

The quality of confidentiality is not, however, contingent upon the material being absolutely out of reach. As noted in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd, this may be a “question of degree”.110 A restricted domain may be well-populated without compromising the confidentiality of the information released to it. In HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd,111 copies of the claimant’s journal had been circulated to at least twenty-one individuals in the claimant’s close circle of friends, but even if the figure had been seventy-five, this would not have signified to the court that its confidentiality had been lost.112 The comparator cited in that case was Douglas v Hello! Ltd,113 in which pirated photographs taken at a wedding celebration were deemed deserving of protection by the law of confidentiality, despite the fact that the event had been attended by 350 guests and countless staff. It appears to have been accepted similarly in Lord

105 Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203 per Lord Greene MR at 215. 106 [1967] Ch 302. 107 [1978] FSR 573. 108 [1990] 1 AC 109. 109 [1990] 1 AC 109 per Lord Goff at 289. 110 [1990] 1 AC 109 per Sir John Donaldson MR at 177. 111 [2006] EWCA Civ 1776, [2008] Ch 57. 112 [2006] EWCA Civ 1776, [2008] Ch 57 per Blackburne J at para 75. 113 [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125. Only the magazine’s claim, and not that of the Douglases, was the subject of the appeal to the House of Lords, where the report at [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 is headed OBG Ltd v Allan, a case with which it was conjoined.

Breach of Confidence   701

Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd that prior circulation of a book to 279 recipients would not automatically have entailed that its contents ceased to be confidential.114 On the other hand in Woodward v Hutchins it was held that details of an “unsavoury incident in a Jumbo Jet”,115 involving the singer Tom Jones, were already in the public domain since they were “known to all the passengers on the flight”.116 An important distinguishing feature was that in HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd and Douglas v Hello! Ltd, the claimants had gone to considerable lengths so that those receiving the information had notice of its confidentiality; in Woodward, on the other hand, no attempt had been made at the time to urge upon the numerous members of the public present a duty to regard the incident in the same light. This relative approach to accessibility is evident also in the Human Rights Act 1998, which, in section 12(4), provides that publication of journalistic, literary or artistic material should be restrained only after considering “the extent to which” material has already become available to the public. Similarly where the information is commercial in nature, material which has been disseminated to a limited extent does not necessarily lose its confidentiality. In Barclays Bank plc v Guardian News and Media Ltd, the fact that the material had appeared on the defendant newspaper’s website for four hours was not of itself enough to divest it of the quality of confidentiality with reference to further publication.117 Similarly in AB v Sunday Newspapers,118 allegations that the plaintiff had been active in dissident Republican circles and was an informant could have been accessed by online research, since they were contained in a blog that appeared some two years previously. The Northern Ireland Court of Appeal was nevertheless satisfied that this information remained unknown to “a wide circle of the public”, and an injunction was granted preventing publication. Confidentiality is not therefore lost where the availability of

114 1989 SC (HL) 122 per Lord Justice-Clerk Ross at 144. However, in the House of Lords (per Lord Keith at 166) the abandonment of the contention that the contents of the disputed material included any material damaging to national security, together with the circumstance that the book has been distributed in this way, led to the prima facie conclusion that further publication would do no material damage. 115 [1977] 1 WLR 760 per Lord Denning MR at 762. 116 [1977] 1 WLR 760 per Lord Denning at 764. The Jumbo Jet, a Boeing 747, accommodated between 400 and 500 passengers depending upon seat configuration. 117 Barclays Bank plc v Guardian News and Media Ltd [2009] EWHC 591 (QB). Blake J, at para 26, was influenced by the consideration that any potential further availability of the documents was probably a result of the brief period that the documents were available on the defendant’s website. “It is therefore somewhat unattractive for the defendant to rely upon publication by others if that publication was caused by their wrongful publication on their own web site in the first place.” 118 [2014] NICA 58.

19.29

702   The Law of Delict in Scotland

19.30

19.31

information is in effect “theoretical” and it is “not generally accessible to the public”119 The accessibility of information on a public record tends to indicate that it has entered the public domain, but this is not necessarily conclusive in every case.120 The relevant question is whether the material has become so public that there is “no longer any realistic prospect” of maintaining confidentiality.121 It has been held, for example, that information contained in a patent specification can no longer be regarded as confidential;122 by contrast, the Supreme Court has stated that information about an individual’s criminal convictions, which are a matter of public record, may nonetheless fall within the scope of private life within the meaning of ECHR Article 8(1),123 from which it is arguable that the quality of confidentiality may also attach to it.124 On a similar basis, information disclosed in open court proceedings does not in all circumstances lose its confidentiality. In X v BBC,125 for example, where no public record had been made and general publication was likely to be highly injurious, it was not accepted that personal information disclosed in criminal proceedings, and revealed in social enquiry reports presented at those proceedings, had necessarily entered the public domain. As far as personal information is concerned, as stated at first instance in McKennitt v Ash, “the protection of the law will not be withdrawn unless and until it is clear that a stage has been reached where there is no longer anything left to be protected”.126 In this connection, information captured 119 Attorney General v Greater Manchester Newspapers Ltd [2001] All ER (D) 32 (Dec) at para 33. Note, however, that the information concerned the identity of two convicted child-killers, so that disclosure risked their personal safety at the hands of vengeful members of the public, to the extent that ECHR Arts 2 and 3 were engaged. Cf Mills v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EMLR 41, in which injunction against publication of a celebrity’s address was refused on the basis that the newspaper editor had given his assurance that he would publish only if that information had become publicly available through other sources, and in any event publication presented no specific threat to the celebrity’s personal security. 120 C Phipps et al, Toulson & Phipps on Confidentiality, 4th edn (2020) para 4.097. 121 KGM v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2010] EWHC 3145 (QB) per Eady J at para 30. 122 O Mustad & Son v Dosen [1964] 1 WLR 109 (decision of the House of Lords issued on 19 June 1928). 123 R (on the application of L) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKSC 3, [2010] 1 AC 410 per Lord Hope at para 27. 124 Toulson and Phipps on Confidentiality para 4.086. 125 [2005] CSOH 80, 2005 SLT 796; but cf the English case of Long Beach Ltd v Global Witness Ltd [2007] EWHC 1980 (QB), involving commercial information, in which the court proceeded upon the assumption that sufficient reference had been made to the material in question in open court as to remove its confidentiality. 126 McKennitt v Ash [2005] EWHC 3003 (QB), [2006] EMLR 10 per Eady J at para 81 (affd [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73), (under reference to Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109 per Lord Keith at 260; R v Broadcasting Complaints Commission, ex p Granada TV [1995] EMLR 163; B v H Bauer Publishing Ltd [2002] EMLR 8). See also PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26, [2016] AC 1081, in which the publication of material already published in another newspaper was nonetheless capable of constituting invasion of privacy.

Breach of Confidence   703

in audio-visual form, or in still photographs, is not readily regarded as having lost its confidentiality, even if it has already been published, since there is said to be a new intrusion into privacy each time confidential material of this nature is viewed afresh.127 Technical know-how in initial stages of development and exploitation may have a high quality of confidentiality, and a concept or formula may be invested with that attribute, even although it draws upon information generally available, if it has been constructed only as a result of the application of significant additional intellectual skill or labour.128 Once a product has become publicly available and is legitimately purchased, the fact that information has been encrypted therein does not entail that it should enjoy enduring confidentiality. In Mars UK Ltd v Teknowledge Ltd129 the claimant had designed a “discriminator” for coin-operated machines that could be recalibrated to handle new types of coin. The recalibration facility was encrypted so as to prevent others from reprogramming machines. The defendant acquired the product and reverse-engineered the recalibrating process so as to be able to achieve recalibration itself. Its actions were held to breach copyright, but confidentiality was not breached, the reason being that the machine was:130 “on the market. Anyone can buy it. And anyone with the skills to de-encrypt has access to the information. The fact that only a few have those skills is, as it seems to me, neither here nor there. Anyone can acquire the skills and anyway, a buyer is free to go to a man who has them.”

By contrast, in Volkswagen AG v Garcia131 the defendants were academics who had acquired software from a “murky”132 internet source, which enabled them to discover the algorithm used in the immobilisers in cars manufactured by the claimant. An injunction was granted to prevent the defendants from discussing the algorithm at an academic conference. Whereas the recalibration facility in Mars had been legitimately obtained, the algorithm in this case was not considered to have lost its quality of confidentiality, since it had been brought to light only by using software acquired not from the claimant but from a questionable website.

127 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125 per Lord Phillips MR at para 105. 128 Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203 per Lord Greene MR at 215. 129 [1999] EWHC 226 (Pat), [2000] FSR 138. 130 [1999] EWHC 226 (Pat), [2000] FSR 138 per Jacob J at para 31. 131 [2013] EWHC 1832 (Ch), [2014] FSR 12. 132 [2013] EWHC 1832 (Ch), [2014] FSR 12 per Birss J at para 37.

19.32

704   The Law of Delict in Scotland

(b) Triviality 19.33

As expressed by Lord Goff in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd,133 one of the “limiting principles” that restricts the reach of confidentiality is that the duty of confidence applies “neither to useless information, nor to trivia”; thus interdict was refused in relation to publication of the memoirs of a former member of MI6, since it was conceded that further disclosure of the information contained therein was entirely innocuous in its potential impact upon national security. Megarry J had similarly remarked in Coco v A N Clark134 (Engineers) Ltd that confidences in the commercial context are not to be protected if they amount to “trivial tittle-tattle”. However, a different approach is called for in relation to personal confidences. As pointed out in Douglas v Hello! Ltd,135 the “argument that information is trivial or anodyne carries much less weight in a case concerned with facts about an individual’s private life, which that individual reasonably expects to be kept confidential”. It is improbable that information concerning an individual’s sexual relationships,136 say, or health problems137 would be regarded as trivial, and it would certainly not be thought of in that way by the individual asserting its confidentiality.138 The responsible journalist, it is said, serves no legitimate public interest in publishing false information that constitutes mere “vapid tittle-tattle about the activities of footballers’ wives and girlfriends”.139 Even where that information is true and apparently banal, public interest should only very rarely prevent footballers and their partners, like other individuals, from asserting the confidentiality of family life and personal relationships.

(2) The circumstances in which the information was acquired 19.34

The circumstances in which information was acquired are highly relevant in determining whether an obligation to maintain its confidentiality was imported. Neither an explicit agreement nor a pre-existing relationship between the parties is required, although they may often feature. The obligation of confidence may arise from a direct interaction between confider and confidant, but it may also arise where third parties have come into possession of confidential information. If in English law the equitable doctrine

133 134 135 136 137 138 139

[1990] 1 AC 109 at 282. [1969] RPC 41 at 48. [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Walker at para 291. Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449 per Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C at 454. Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lady Hale at paras 145–147. See P Stanley, The Law of Confidentiality: A Restatement (2008) 43–44. Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359 per Lady Hale at para 147.

Breach of Confidence   705

of notice is key, in Scots law liability is founded upon the defender’s knowledge, actual or constructive, that an obligation of confidence followed from acquisition of the information in question. Often it is plain that information confided by one person to another was to be understood as confidential. In such cases the test, of whether the reasonable person would have understood an interaction as importing an “obligation of confidence”,140 is obviously met. The paradigm relationships of trust, as described by Lord Keith in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd,141are those of “doctor and patient, priest and penitent, solicitor and client, banker and customer”. The relationship between such professional advisors and their clients may often have a contractual basis, but breach of the obligation of confidentiality which is an incident of that relationship may also be regarded as a delictual wrong.142 Of course, the high expectation of secrecy in such circumstances is seldom disappointed; it is rare for professional confidants to be sued for breach of confidence.

19.35

(a) Healthcare professionals The legal, as well as the ethical, aspects of the obligation of confidentiality upon doctors are clearly acknowledged by the General Medical Council’s guidelines on Confidentiality: Good Practice in Handling Patient Information, which require that such information is effectively protected against improper disclosure.143 The obligation of confidentiality binds all healthcare professionals,144 and is stated unequivocally in the various codes of conduct compiled for the guidance of those professions.145 In earlier times, revelations about serious disease might constitute verbal injury for which, at least until the nineteenth century, truth was not necessarily a defence.146 In the modern law, privacy for health problems and their treatment has

140 Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 per Megarry J at 48. 141 [1990] 1 AC 109 at 255. 142 See e.g. on medical confidentiality, M Earle and N R Whitty, “Medical Law”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2006) para 287; on law agent and client, see J H Begg, A Treatise on the Law of Scotland relating to Law Agents, 2nd edn (1883) 235, 319. On the interface between contract and delict in this context, see Glegg, Reparation, 4th edn by J L Duncan (1955) 4–5. 143 General Medical Council, Confidentiality: Good Practice in Handling Patient Information (https:// www.gmc-uk.org/ethical-guidance/ethical-guidance-for-doctors/confidentiality/ethical-and-legal-dutiesof-confidentiality). 144 E.g. psychiatrists: see W v Egdell [1990] Ch 359; Cornelius v de Taranto [2001] EWCA Civ 1511, [2002] EMLR 6. 145 See e.g. the Nursing and Midwifery Council’s Code (https://www.nmc.org.uk/standards/code/) para 5; General Dental Council’s Focus on Standards (https://standards.gdc-uk.org/) para 4; and see also NHS Scotland’s Charter of Patient Rights and Responsibilities (https://www.gov.scot/publications/ charter-patient-rights-responsibilities-2/). 146 See E C Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law (2010) para 8.06.

19.36

706   The Law of Delict in Scotland

more readily been protected by the law of confidentiality. Patients undergoing treatment of any kind have long been regarded as entitled to shield the nature of that treatment from public attention. While in early cases the obligation of confidentiality was considered to rest upon the contract between doctor and patient, in more recent times, when medical care is likely to have been provided under the auspices of the National Health Service, the obligation of confidentiality between healthcare professionals and their patients has been regarded as arising in delict.147 Moreover, a third party who acquires information about a patient’s illness and treatment is similarly bound by an obligation of confidentiality, and commits a wrong by disclosing it to others without authorisation.148 As with other categories of information, public interest may, exceptionally, be a limiting factor upon confidentiality, as explored below.149

(b) Legal advisers 19.37

As noted above,150 high importance was placed by the Institutional writers upon the privilege of confidentiality enjoyed by lawyers, allowing sensitive information concerning their clients to be withheld.151 In the modern law, privilege continues to apply to all communications passing between client and lawyer in connection with legal advice which “relates to the rights, liabilities, obligations or remedies of the client either under private law or under public law”.152 Most commonly the issue arises in relation to demands for disclosure of evidence held by law agents for one of the parties in a litigation.153 The general principle as stated in the nineteenthcentury case Munro v Fraser154 remains applicable today: “[C]ommunications passing between client and agent are confidential. A party is entitled to have advice, and to communicate with his law adviser confidentially, and such communication is not to be laid open except in particular circumstances and questions. Of course fraud supersedes all rules. But it cannot be said that the privilege of communication is limited to 147 M Earle and N R Whitty, “Medical Law”, in SME, Reissue (2006) para 287. 148 M Earle and N R Whitty, “Medical Law”, in SME, Reissue (2006) para 287; Hardey v Russel & Aitken 2003 GWD 2–50 per Lord Johnston at para 11. See also discussion in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457. 149 See paras 19.61ff below. 150 See para 19.02 above; J H Begg, A Treatise on the Law of Scotland relating to Law Agents, 2nd edn (1883) 312–322. 151 See R (on the application of Prudential plc) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2013] UKSC 1, [2013] 2 AC 185, in which the Supreme Court declined to recognise “legal advice privilege” in relation to advice provided on legal matters by professional persons other than lawyers (in this case, accountants). 152 Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England [2004] UKHL 48, [2005] 1 AC 610 per Lord Scott at para 38. 153 E.g. Micosta SA v Shetland Islands Council 1983 SLT 483; Teece v Ayrshire & Arran Health Board 1990 SLT 512. 154 Munro v Fraser (1858) 21 D 103 per Lord President McNeill at 107.

Breach of Confidence   707 correspondence in reference to a depending action. It goes far beyond that. Neither is it limited to a communication in reference to a contemplated action. A person may take confidential advice in reference to his position, which he is under the apprehension may be assailed. Each case of course rests on its particular circumstances.”

Privilege cannot be invoked as a means of concealing a fraudulent or criminal enterprise.155 Munro v Fraser was cited in Micosta SA v Shetlands Islands Council156 by Lord President Emslie, who added that this general rule might be superseded “where fraud or some other illegal act is alleged against a party and where his law agent has been directly concerned in the carrying out of the very transaction which is the subject-matter of inquiry”. In Conoco (UK) Ltd v The Commercial Law Practice,157 for example, this “fraud” exception was extended to allow privilege to be lifted where a solicitor was keeping client details confidential in order to allow the client to benefit from his knowledge of a fraud committed by another party. The duty of legal advisers to maintain the confidentiality of information concerning their clients’ affairs has no time limit and does not come to an end when the adviser ceases to provide professional services to the particular client.158 It is established practice not only that a solicitor should not act for two or more clients in any matter where there is a conflict of interest between those clients, but also that, where a law agent has provided services to one particular client in the past, the confidentiality of that client’s details should not be breached for the purposes of another client in future.159 Against that background, cases involving unauthorised disclosure by law agents are rare.160 A similar duty applies to accountants in regard to their clients’, and former clients’, financial affairs.161

19.38

19.39

(c) Bankers A bank is under a duty of confidence not to disclose to third parties information about its customers or its customer’s financial affairs. That duty

155 Begg, A Treatise on the Law of Scotland relating to Law Agents 320. 156 1983 SLT 483 at 485. 157 1997 SLT 372. 158 See Law Society of Scotland, Standards for Solicitors (https://www.lawscot.org.uk/for-the-public/clientprotection/standards-for-solicitors/) para 2; Faculty of Advocates, Guide to the Professional Conduct of Advocates (http://www.advocates.org.uk/media/3199/guide-to-conduct-7th-edition-october-2019.pdf ) para 2.3.3. 159 See Law Society of Scotland, Standards for Solicitors para 13. 160 As Sir Frederick Pollock observed of the English legal profession, “betrayal of a client’s confidence is so rare as to be practically unheard of”: see The Genius of the Common Law (1912) 46. For a case in which there was held to be no duty of confidentiality, see Bogle v Cameron (1844) 6 D 682 (no duty, on being instructed in a conveyancing transaction, to maintain silence on a fundamental defect in the client’s title). 161 Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (A Firm) [1999] 2 AC 222 per Lord Millett at 235–236.

19.40

708   The Law of Delict in Scotland

arises impliedly from the contract between the parties.162 It applies to information obtained during the customer’s relationship with the bank, and it continues in relation to such information even after the customer’s account is closed.163 Disclosure may nonetheless be permitted in four exceptional circumstances: (i) where disclosure is under compulsion by law; (ii) where there is a duty to the public to disclose; (iii) where the interests of the bank require disclosure; or (iv) where the disclosure is made with the express or implied consent of the customer.164

(d) Family or social relationships 19.41

19.42

Early Scottish authorities were clear that spouses and children should not be compelled to give evidence against family members.165 Moreover, confidentiality might be breached by disclosure of family or social confidences outwith the courtroom. In Cadell and Davies v Stewart, discussed above,166 a third party was interdicted from publishing letters between Robert Burns and a close woman friend because publication would breach the “implied confidence” that private letters should not be published without the consent of the writer. Similarly, in White v Dickson,167 although the court refused to interdict the publication of family correspondence, on the grounds that the content appeared innocuous, it also warned that damages might be claimed if publication caused injury to feelings in these circumstances. Although modern authority is scarce in Scotland, the leading English case in this context, Duchess of Argyll v Duke of Argyll,168 has been cited as persuasive authority in the Scottish courts.169 In that case an injunction was granted to prevent the Duke of Argyll from publishing his reminiscences in a popular newspaper, including details of his life with his ex-wife,

162 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461 per Bankes LJ at 471–472, as cited in British Bank of Commerce Ltd v Graham 1961 SLT (Notes) 27; see also Turner v Royal Bank of Scotland [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 664. 163 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461; Barclays Bank plc v Taylor [1989] 1 WLR 1066. 164 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461 per Bankes LJ at 473, as approved in Barclays Bank plc v Taylor [1989] 1 WLR 1066 (where the bank disclosed client information on being required to do so under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s 9). 165 Wives and children could not be compelled to give testimony against their husbands or parents, since this offended “the natural tie and reverence” between the parties: Erskine, Inst 4.2. 24; Erskine v Smith (1700) Mor 16703; see also Drummond v Alexander (1700) Mor 16703. 166 (1804) Mor App Literary Property No 4, 1 June 1804 FC, noted above at para 19.11. 167 (1881) 8 R 896. 168 [1967] Ch 302. Although it involved parties who had been resident in Scotland (the preceding divorce case, reported at 1962 SC (HL) 88, was brought in the Scottish courts), the threatened publication was in England. 169 E.g. Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd 1989 SC (HL) 122 per Lord Justice-Clerk Ross at 142; for comment, see Anon, “The Argyll Charade” (1999) 44(7) JLSS 22.

Breach of Confidence   709

from whom he had recently been divorced. Although there was no English precedent directly in point, the court held that there could hardly be anything “more intimate or confidential” than the marital relationship, or the “mutual trust and confidences” between spouses.170 Independent of any right of property or contract therefore, breach of confidentiality in such a relationship might be restrained by the court in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction. It seems likely that an equivalent level of protection would be granted in Scotland to information shared within marriage or the immediate family. In a subsequent English case, an obligation of confidentiality was recognised in restraining disclosure of information by unmarried partners in long-term sexual relationships. In Browne v Associated Newspapers Ltd,171 for example, the claimant was awarded an injunction against revelation by his former partner of details of their life together, which he might reasonably have expected to be kept private.172 “Private conversations in a domestic environment (including at any rate some discussion about business matters)”, it was said,173 were deserving of protection since:

19.43

“one would expect most people from time to time to come home from work and to feel free to unburden themselves about the horrors of the day – whether to a wife, husband, lover, mistress or partner . . . People feel free in the privacy of their own homes to have a moan about colleagues or employers. What puts such communications, potentially, under the protection of the law is that revelations of such information would infringe the reasonable expectation people have that intimate and uninhibited discussions in a domestic environment will be respected.”

The tie of friendship may also be sufficient to create the obligation of confidentiality in relation to information which is sufficiently sensitive. An example is seen in the English case of Stephens v Avery174 in which the plaintiff might reasonably have expected that the defendant, her (former) friend, would have not have disclosed information confided to her about the plaintiff’s sexual relationship with a married woman. The court refused to strike out an action for damages, by reference to the doctrine of notice: “If, as is here alleged, the information was communicated and accepted expressly in confidence, the conscience of Mrs Avery is just as 170 [1967] Ch 302 per Ungoed-Thomas J at 322. 171 [2007] EWCA Civ 295, [2008] QB 103. 172 This included details of their personal life together but not, in the circumstances of the particular case, details of business dealings, although the court held that in principle information about business activities imparted in the course of a personal relationship was capable of qualifying as private. 173 Browne v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] EMLR 19 per Eady J at para 45 (revd in part [2007] EWCA Civ 295, [2008] QB 103). 174 [1988] Ch 449.

19.44

710   The Law of Delict in Scotland

much affected as in any other case.”175 The closeness of the relationship is another factor that assists in determining whether information had the requisite quality of confidentiality. In McKennitt v Ash, closeness was relevant in respect that information had been confided by the claimant to the defendant as one of her “closest friends” upon whom the claimant relied for “unqualified loyalty” and in whom “trust was implicit”.176 In a Scottish court such a defender would almost certainly be deemed to have appreciated that sensitive information imparted in the course of that kind of social relationship carried with it an obligation of confidentiality.

E. MISAPPROPRIATION OF INFORMATION (1) Forms of misappropriation 19.45

Where information has the necessary quality of confidentiality, its misappropriation may be interdicted, and where it has already been misappropriated, liability may arise for the loss suffered by the confider as a result. Misappropriation may take various forms, including communication of the information to third parties, or application of information to a purpose of the confidant’s own. The question of whether the confidant’s use of the information is to be regarded as a misappropriation depends to an extent upon the nature of the interaction between the parties. If at the time of information being confided they were in a relationship of some kind, it is important to consider what was reasonably understood as permissible within the terms of that relationship. Did the confidant’s use of the information go beyond what was reasonably understood by the parties as proper? It may have been accepted that some types of use were appropriate, or that disclosure should be permitted to certain persons but not to others. By contrast, where there was no pre-existing relationship between the parties, particularly in circumstances where information was obtained surreptitiously, any type of use is likely to be regarded as misappropriation, whether or not further disclosure is involved. Thus it has been accepted by the English courts that simply taking or copying a confidential document in these circumstances is sufficient. As explained by Lord Neuberger in Imerman v Tchenguiz:177 “It is of the essence of the claimant’s right to confidentiality that he can choose whether, and, if so, to whom and in what circumstances and on what terms, to reveal the information which has the protection of the 175 [1988] Ch 449 per Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C at 456. 176 [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73 as recounted by Buxton LJ at para 16 from the trial judge’s account. 177 [2010] EWCA Civ 908, [2011] Fam 116 per Lord Neuberger MR at para 69. Cf Gulati v MGN Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1291, [2017] QB 149, in which it was similarly held that merely tapping the claimant’s phone line, even without publishing the substance of the calls, was sufficient to constitute misuse of private information.

Breach of Confidence   711 confidence . . . [A] claimant who establishes a right of confidence in certain information contained in a document should be able to restrain any threat by an unauthorised defendant to look at, copy, distribute any copies of, or to communicate, or utilise the contents of the document (or any copy), and also be able to enforce the return (or destruction) of any such document or copy.”

There must, however, be some form of appropriation of the information. So where for example the information takes the form of know-how, it cannot be taken for granted, simply because the defender’s ideas resemble the pursuer’s, that the pursuer’s ideas have been used by the defender. Difficult issues of proof may arise where the parties have initially collaborated, but then worked separately to develop a product commercially. Where collaborator P alleges that collaborator D has appropriated P’s know-how to D’s advantage and P’s detriment, the inference that copying has occurred may be substantiated by demonstrating “sufficient similarities between their work and the defendant’s work, coupled with a sufficient opportunity for the defendant to copy their work”.178 That inference may in turn be rebutted by evidence of independent derivation.179 However, P is required to specify clearly the information at issue and the specific manner in which it has been taken up by D. In CMI-Centres v Phytopharm Ltd,180 a case in which the plaintiff argued that the defendants were applying his research in developing a new pharmaceutical product, a series of indicators were considered as assisting in this enquiry: “The first is to produce direct evidence of use, for example from an employee of the defendant who has seen the information being put into practice or by finding documents showing what the defendant has done. Secondly, it may be possible to prove use indirectly by demonstrating the existence of some significant fingerprint. For example the defendant’s product may have dimensions, a design, composition or behaviour which is only to be found in the plaintiff’s and which is consistent with the use of the information and inconsistent with use of non-contaminated sources . . . Thirdly, it may be possible to persuade the court that the defendant could not have got to the position he has with the speed he has had he simply started from legitimate sources and worked everything out for himself.”

In Phytopharm there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the three points, in the face of the defendants’ evidence that they had begun their own research before they met the plaintiff, and that they had carried out independent development. The allegation of misappropriation was not therefore credible. 178 Wade v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1214 per Briggs LJ at para 3. 179 Wade v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1214 per Briggs LJ at para 3. 180 [1999] FSR 235 per Laddie J at para 60.

19.46

712   The Law of Delict in Scotland

19.47

English authority suggests that it is no defence for the confidant to maintain that appropriation was subconscious, in cases where the confidant has appropriated the confider’s know-how and used it as a springboard for activities to the confidant’s advantage.181 If D can be shown to have known of P’s ideas, and to have been prompted in the development of D’s own product by the presence of those ideas in D’s memory, such plagiarism, conscious or otherwise, constitutes a breach of the obligation of confidentiality earlier undertaken.182 In order for P to succeed, however, it is necessary to identify clearly the information alleged so to have been used.183

(2) Misappropriation by third parties 19.48

19.49

When P passes on confidential information to X, and X in turn passes that information on to D, a third party, D also may be bound by confidentiality, even if D had not set out to induce X to make the disclosure. A common example is that of publishers, to whom information of a confidential nature may be passed, and who may be restrained from publication where that information has the necessary quality of confidentiality.184 D is regarded as having submitted to the obligation of confidentiality where D knows, or ought to have known, that the information in question was disclosed in breach of a relationship of trust between P and X. As was recognised in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd,185 a “duty of confidence” arises out of “particular relationships”; yet the existence of a prior relationship between the parties is not essential. The extensive reach of that duty in English law is based upon the equitable doctrine of notice:186 “[A] duty of confidence arises when confidential information comes to the knowledge of a person (the confidant) in circumstances where he has notice, or is held to have agreed, that the information is confidential, with the effect that it would be just in all the circumstances that he should be precluded from disclosing the information to others.”

In Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd the offending information was contained in the memoirs of a former employee of the security services, so there had been an initial relationship of confidentiality between the employee and his former employers, on whose behalf the Attorney-General sought to 181 Paymaster (Jamaica) Ltd v Grace Kennedy Remittance Services Ltd [2017] UKPC 40, [2018] Bus LR 492 per Lord Hodge at para 41. 182 Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 923; Terrapin v Builders’ Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd [1967] RPC 375, referred to with approval in Levin v Farmers’ Supply Association of Scotland 1973 SLT (Notes) 43. 183 Paymaster (Jamaica) Ltd v Grace Kennedy Remittance Services Ltd [2017] UKPC 40, [2018] Bus LR 492 per Lord Hodge at para 41. 184 E.g. Cadell and Davies v Stewart (1804) Mor App Literary Property No 4, 1 June 1804 FC; Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd 1989 SC (HL) 122. 185 [1990] 1 AC 109 at 255. 186 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109 per Lord Goff at 281.

Breach of Confidence   713

restrain publication. The court was called upon to decide whether third-party publishers acquiring that information were similarly subject to an obligation of confidentiality. Lord Goff stated that liability arose in equity, even without a prior agreement between the parties, where the third party had received some form of notice, broadly defined, that the information was confidential.187 In the Scottish case of Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd,188 on the other hand, where the relevant duty was confirmed as a delictual one,189 the question whether third parties coming into possession of information were bound by confidentiality turned instead on intentional breach – whether or not those third parties knew of the confidential character of information that they had acquired from a source other than its subject.190 In more egregious cases, information may be obtained by subterfuge. In such a scenario, even without a prior chain of relationships connecting the parties, it appears uncontroversial that the requisite level of knowledge should be found if the third party has set out surreptitiously to obtain information which another has self-evidently attempted to protect against disclosure. This would include, for example, the theft of documents or trade secrets, or, as increasingly encountered in the modern case law, covert recording or filming.191 In this way Scots law, like English, can accommodate the “purloining” of information.192 Indeed, where there has been no pre-existing relationship between the parties, there may be a high expectation of confidentiality precisely because there has been no warning that information would be purloined and compromised – those who are aware of the possibility of eavesdropping are likely to be more circumspect than those who are not.193 In the private sphere especially, surreptitious gathering of information by unsuspected means is often in circumstances where individuals have let down their guard and have not “responded to observation with their usual self-presentation methods”.194 187 [1990] 1 AC 109 per Lord Goff at 281. See also McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73 per Buxton LJ at para 15 to the effect that “it is the recipient’s perception of its confidential nature that imposes the obligation on him”. 188 1989 SC (HL) 122. 189 See para 19.24 above. 190 1989 SC (HL) 122 per Lord Justice-Clerk Ross at 141, Lord Dunpark at 151, Lord McDonald at 160, and Lord Keith at 164. Even in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109, the Scottish judges, Lord Keith, with whom Lord Jauncey agreed, appeared similarly to emphasise the significance of knowledge, at 261 and 263. 191 E.g. Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125 (CA), affd (on this point) [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1; Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457. 192 McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73 per Buxton LJ at para 8. 193 E.g. Jagger v Darling [2005] EWHC 683 (Ch), in which the offending images of the plaintiff, in an otherwise relatively discreet location, were captured by a CCTV camera which she had not noticed; Cox v MGN Ltd [2006] EWHC 1235 (QB), [2006] 5 Costs LR 764, in which the offending photos were taken from a distance, unbeknown to the subjects, by a camera with a telephoto lens. 194 N Moreham, “Privacy in Public Places” (2006) 65 CLJ 606 at 629–630; see also Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EWHC 137 (QB), [2002] EMLR 22 per Ouseley J at para 78: “It did not seem to me remotely inherent in going to a brothel that what was done inside would be photographed, let alone that any photographs would be published.”

19.50

714   The Law of Delict in Scotland

19.51

19.52

19.53

The position is more difficult in the absence both of a prior relationship or chain of relationships between the parties and also of subterfuge. In Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd,195 Lord Goff suggested that the doctrine of notice would bind third parties to confidentiality in “certain situations, beloved of law teachers – where an obviously confidential document is wafted by an electric fan out of a window into a crowded street, or where an obviously confidential document, such as a private diary, is dropped in a public place, and is then picked up by a passer-by”. The potential liability of the “innocent” third party in Scots law cannot of course be explained in the same terms, as was pointed out by the Lord Ordinary, Lord Coulsfield, in Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd.196 Even so, third parties cannot always expect to use confidential information freely simply because it was innocently acquired. The reasoning in the Scotsman case indicates that, as in England, knowledge is key to the Scots analysis. Lord Justice-Clerk Ross stated that “the person to whom the duty of confidence was owed would have a right to protect confidentiality against third parties who had received the information with the knowledge that it had originally been communicated in confidence”.197 In the House of Lords, Lord Keith, with whom Lord Jauncey agreed, similarly thought that the obligation of confidentiality would bind third parties coming into possession of confidential information “knowing it to be such”.198 The importance of knowledge as the foundation of liability was also emphasised a few years later in the Outer House case of Quilty v Windsor, in which Lord Kingarth would have looked for “clear averments that . . . the first defender knew that the documents had been transmitted in confidence . . . [or] that the circumstances of the first defender obtaining the documents were such as to indicate that he knew that they were communicated to him in breach of an obligation of confidence”.199 This emphasis upon actual or constructive knowledge indicates that an obligation of confidentiality arises where a reasonable person in a position equivalent to that of the third party “would in all the circumstances

195 [1990] 1 AC 109 at 281. 196 1989 SC (HL) 122 at 134, to the effect that “there has been no clear recognition in Scots law of a right to protect confidentiality effective against third parties who have come into possession of the information innocently”. Note, however, that Lord Coulsfield’s judgment in the Scotsman case predated the decision of the House of Lords in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd by eight months. 197 1990 SC (HL) 122 at 141. 198 1990 SC (HL) 122 per Lord Keith at 164. 199 1999 SLT 346 at 356. (The averments in regard to breach of confidence were in any event found to be irrelevant as lacking in specification.) Lord Kingarth did not think that the Scottish judges in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109 “took the matter further”, and “any development of the law in England at least to this extent would appear to rest on and take its force from different underlying principles, being based apparently on an obligation of conscience or an equitable right of property”.

Breach of Confidence   715

of the case . . . have regarded himself as bound to treat the information as confidential”.200 By contrast, a third party should not be regarded as liable for disclosing information acquired by chance where there was no cause to suspect its confidential nature. The obligation of confidentiality may arise subsequently, however, from the point when the recipient of information discovers, or ought to have discovered, it to be confidential.201 In practical terms, therefore, the position of the third party in Scotland is unlikely to differ from that of the third-party recipient of confidential information in England, recently analysed as follows:202 “An equitable obligation of confidence will arise not only where confidential information is disclosed in breach of an obligation of confidence (which may itself be contractual or equitable) and the recipient knows, or has notice, that that is the case, but also where confidential information is acquired or received without having been disclosed in breach of confidence and the acquirer or recipient knows, or has notice, that the information is confidential. Either way, whether a person has notice is to be objectively assessed by reference to a reasonable person standing in the position of the recipient”.

Thus the assurances offered by the Second Division in the Scotsman case that the laws of England and Scotland were equivalent “in substance” remain defensible. Indeed it is of interest that knowledge, rather than “notice”, figured in the analysis of Lord Griffiths in the Attorney-General case, to the effect that the duty of confidence was said to be imposed “on a third party who is in possession of information which he knows is subject to an obligation of confidence”.203 Similarly, in Campbell v MGN Ltd the English courts have taken the view that in such a context:204

200 This was the recommendation of the Scottish Law Commission in its Report on Breach of Confidence (Scot Law Com No 90, 1984) para 4.33. The Report predated Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd, but in this recommendation it appeared to anticipate the statement of the law in that case. 201 Compare, in relation to passing off, the statement by Lord McLaren in Great North of Scotland Railway Co v Mann (1892) 19 R 1035 at 1041: “The absence of fraudulent intention might be a good answer to an action of damages, but it will not entitle the party who has done the wrong to persist in using the trade-name after it has been brought home to him that the use of the name is injurious.” 202 Primary Group (UK) Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2014] EWHC 1082 (Ch), [2014] RPC 26 per Arnold J at para 223. See also Vestergaard Frandsen A/S and others v Bestnet Europe Ltd [2013] UKSC 31, [2013] 1 WLR 1556, in which the defendant had gone to work for a trade rival of the claimant, but was not to be held liable for breach of confidence because she herself had received no relevant confidential information, and she did not know that her previous employer’s confidential information was being used to develop her new employer’s competing product. 203 [1990] 1 AC 109 at 268. See also Fraser v Thames Television Ltd [1984] QB 44 per Hirst J at 65: “in order to be fixed with an obligation of confidence, a third party must know that the information was confidential”. 204 [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Nicholls at para 14. Lord Nicholls was in the minority in Campbell, but his dissent from the majority was on a different issue.

19.50

716   The Law of Delict in Scotland “This cause of action has now firmly shaken off the limiting constraint of the need for an initial confidential relationship . . . Now the law imposes a ‘duty of confidence’ whenever a person receives information he knows or ought to know is fairly and reasonably to be regarded as confidential.”

Indeed recent English commentary has argued that, where third parties have acquired information by chance, the more appropriate focus should be on knowledge, actual or constructive, rather than notice, since “the policy . . . must be serving the purpose of protecting the confidential information, as opposed to any confidential relationship and it is the knowledge that the information is confidential which leads to the imposition of the duty”.205 As in Scotland, therefore, it would appear that knowledge is now indicated as the foundation for the obligation of confidentiality in these circumstances.

(3) Information received for one purpose and appropriated for another 19.55

Sensitive information disclosed for a limited purpose should not be taken up and used for an independent purpose of the confidant’s own. Thus, even if no contract ensues, information shared during pre-contractual negotiations should not be misappropriated by one of the parties for its own ends.206 In the same vein, where information has been disclosed for a specific and limited purpose to a person acting in the exercise of a legal power, it must be used only in that way. The Inland Revenue, for example, requires information from taxpayers regarding their financial affairs, but is under a duty of confidence not to pass on that information to third parties.207 Similarly, information communicated to the police as part of an investigation into a criminal offence is confidential, for use only in that investigation, and can be disclosed only where this is supported by powerful public policy reasons.208 An instance in which public policy was found to support disclosure can be seen in C v Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland,209 in which a police officer investigating an unrelated crime discovered electronic messaging between a

205 Gurry on Breach of Confidence para 7.51; see also Toulson and Phipps on Confidentiality para 3.116– 3.117. 206 Levin v Caledonian Produce (Holdings) Ltd 1975 SLT (Notes) 69. 207 Mount Murray Country Club Ltd v Macleod [2003] UKPC 53, [2003] STC 1525 per Lord Walker at paras 33–34; R (on the application of Ingenious Media Holdings plc) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2016] UKSC 54, [2016] 1 WLR 4164. 208 Marcel v Commissioner of Police [1992] Ch 225. 209 [2019] CSOH 48, 2019 SLT 875, affd [2020] CSIH 61, 2020 SLT 1021. See also Woolgar v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2000] 1 WLR 25, in which no crime was found to have been committed, but the police were held to be justified in disclosing information obtained during investigations to the regulator of the plaintiff’s profession; see also R (on the application of Nakash) v Metropolitan Police Service [2014] EWHC 3810 (Admin).

Breach of Confidence   717

group of police officers that indicated a breach of professional standards of conduct. In principle the referral of this content to the police Professional Standards Department breached confidentiality, but a petition for judicial review, seeking orders that its use was unlawful, was refused, on the basis that disclosure might be justified “where it is in the public interest and in order to protect the public”.210

(4) Negligent guarding of information The relationship between confider and confidant may be such that the confidant is regarded as having assumed a duty of care, in terms of the law of negligence, to keep the information safe against wrongful appropriation by others. If, then, the confidant fails to take due care and, as a result, the information finds its way into the hands of a third party, the confidant may be held liable for detriment caused that was a foreseeable risk of the lack of care.211 In Swinney v Chief Constable of Northumbria,212 an informant had provided the police with details of a person suspected of serious crime. The police failed to take adequate care to ensure that the information identifying the suspect and the informant was kept secure. This fell into the hands of a third party, resulting in the informant being threatened with violence. It was held that a relevant case might be made against the chief constable on the basis that a duty of care had been assumed towards the informant.213

19.56

F. DETRIMENT It is often apparent that breach of confidence has resulted, or will be likely to result, in detriment to the confider. Yet proof of specific financial detriment is not essential, and confidants may be entitled to interdict to protect confidences, and to compensation for loss of confidentiality, even where there is no question of pecuniary loss.214 At the same time, as already noted,215 confidentiality cannot be invoked to protect trivial information where disclosure will have little impact in any terms. Detriment may be self-evident, as often where there is misappropriation of a commercial confidence.216 But breach of confidence may be actionable even if no specific financial loss is identified. In Coco v A N Clark

210 [2019] CSOH 48, 2019 SLT 875 per Lord Bannatyne at para 185 (affd [2020] CSIH 61, 2020 SLT 1021). 211 Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1920] AC 956. 212 [1997] QB 464. 213 It was subsequently held, however, that the police had not failed in that duty: (1999) 11 Admin LR 811. 214 See also Walker, Civil Remedies 1013. 215 See para 19.33 above. 216 See CF Partners (UK) LLP v Barclays Bank plc [2014] EWHC 3049 (Ch) per Hildyard J at para 142.

19.57

19.58

718   The Law of Delict in Scotland

(Engineers) Ltd (a case involving an industrial design), Megarry J explained that “an unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the party communicating it” was “normally” a required element, but not always:217 “I can conceive of cases where a plaintiff might have substantial motives for seeking the aid of equity and yet suffer nothing which could fairly be called detriment to him, as when the confidential information shows him in a favourable light but gravely injures some relation or friend of his whom he wishes to protect. The point does not arise for decision in this case, for detriment to the plaintiff plainly exists. I need therefore say no more than that although for the purposes of this case I have stated the propositions in the stricter form, I wish to keep open the possibility of the true proposition being that in the wider form.”

19.59

Scottish authority similarly indicates that breach of confidence not only may be interdicted218 but also give rise to liability in damages even where no specific financial loss has been suffered. In Brown’s Trustees v Hay,219 for example, no “special damage” was proved, following from the defender’s unauthorised disclosure of the pursuers’ financial affairs, but Lord McLaren nonetheless considered that “the wrongful act has been accomplished, the obligation of secrecy is no longer prestable, and reparation in the shape of damages is therefore due”. Similarly where the information is personal in nature it is not necessary to show financial detriment or potential detriment in order to obtain interdict or an award of solatium for the injury to feelings caused by disclosure. As Lord Keith observed in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd, 220 it is in such cases “a sufficient detriment to the confider that information given in confidence is to be disclosed to persons whom he would prefer not to know of it, even though the disclosure would not be harmful to him in any positive way”. In other words, harmful impact is considered in a broad sense as including not only financial loss but other hurtful consequences such as loss of control over private information and the distress that this 217 [1969] RPC 41 at 48. See also Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Secretary to the Department of Community Services and Health [1990] FSR 617 per Gummow J at 664, observing that where commercial information is shown to have been appropriated, it is sufficient that there is “apprehended prejudice” to the claimant from the presence on the market of a rival product. Cf Levin v Caledonian Produce (Holdings) Ltd 1975 SLT (Notes) 69 at 70, in which Lord Robertson suggested that misuse of confidential information had to be “to the detriment” of the owner of the information. However, Lord Robertson did not expand on what was meant by this, and in setting out the framework for Scottish cases he himself had referred to Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd. 218 See e.g. Oil Technics v Ltd v Thistle Chemicals Ltd 1997 SLT 416, in which recall of interim interdict was refused where the pursuer’s averments referred to the commercial advantage to be gained by the defenders, without quantifying a specific loss. 219 (1898) 25 R 1112 at 1119, discussed at paras 19.16 and 19.17 above. 220 [1990] 1 AC 109 at 256.

Breach of Confidence   719

entails. In Duchess of Argyll v Duke of Argyll,221 for example, it was accepted that betrayal of matrimonial confidences was a “mischief” without further need for the Duchess to show that financial loss would flow therefrom. In the leading case of Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers222 there were conflicting dicta on the requirement for detriment. The case, however, concerned unauthorised disclosure of state secrets by a former member of the security services, and the background for discussion of detriment was the public interest arguments made in favour of publishing the contentious material. As emphasised in Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd,223 in cases of this nature, where the public interest in freedom of information is invoked as a reason for limiting confidentiality, detriment such as risk to national security is necessarily a countervailing factor in determining whether public interest should prevail.

19.60

G. PUBLIC INTEREST (1) Public interest as a “limiting factor” Public interest is an important “limiting factor” that restricts the reach of confidentiality.224 In both Scotland and England, the law of confidentiality has traditionally recognised the existence of a legitimate public interest in subjects such as: the proper administration of civil and criminal justice;225 the fitness for office of those in public roles;226 threats to public health or public order;227 matters on which the public may have been misled; or “matters carried out or contemplated, in breach of the country’s security, or in breach of law, including statutory duty, fraud or otherwise destructive of the country or its people, including matters medically dangerous to the public; and doubtless other misdeeds of similar gravity”.228 As Lord Bracadale remarked in Response Handling Ltd v BBC:229

221 [1967] Ch 302; see also AB v CD (1851) 14 D 177 (breach of medical confidentiality); Hardey v Russel & Aitken 2003 GWD 2–50 (in which a relevant case was made in regard to disclosure of medical records where there was no patrimonial loss but solatium was claimed for hurt, disgrace and embarrassment). 222 [1990] 1 AC 109. E.g. Lord Goff observed that he wished to keep that question open, but that detriment “may not always be necessary” (281–282). On the other hand, Lord Griffiths stated, at 270, that detriment, or potential detriment, was an element that must be shown. 223 1989 SC (HL) 122 per Lord Jauncey at 171–172. 224 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109 per Lord Goff at 282. 225 Lion Laboratories v Evans [1985] QB 526. 226 BC v Chief Constable Police Service of Scotland [2020] CSIH 61, 2020 SLT 1021. 227 Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84; cf Wood v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] EWCA Civ 414, [2010] 1 WLR 123, where the risk to public order was insufficiently made out. 228 Beloff v Pressdram Ltd [1973] 1 All ER 241 per Ungoed-Thomas J at 260; see also Re A Company’s Application [1989] Ch 477 (disclosure by former employee of suspected irregularities to regulatory body to which his employer’s business was subject). 229 [2007] CSOH 102, 2008 SLT 51 at para 20.

19.61

720   The Law of Delict in Scotland “There is confidential information which the public may have a right to receive and others, in particular the press, now extended to the media, may have a right and even a duty to publish, even if the information has been unlawfully obtained in flagrant breach of confidence and irrespective of the motive of the informer.”

19.62

19.63

In Response Handling the defenders proposed to broadcast a television programme based upon information disclosed in breach of confidence by a reporter who had worked undercover at the pursuers’ call centre. It was held that programme could go ahead because there was strong public interest in learning about security lapses at such call centres and the extent to which these contributed to bank account and credit card fraud. The common law’s recognition of the public interest in freedom of expression is matched in the Human Rights Act 1998. In cases where a pursuer seeks to prevent publication of journalistic, literary or artistic material, section 12(4) of the Act requires the court to have particular regard to the importance of freedom of expression, as well as the extent to which it is “in the public interest for the material to be published”. In Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers,230 Lord Goff traced the origins of the public interest limitation to the so-called “defence of iniquity” in English law – the principle that no one should be made the confidant of a crime or a fraud.231 References to this rule remain in modern case law,232 but the meaning of “iniquity”, perhaps self-evident in the mid-nineteenth century, had become highly problematic by the end of the twentieth. “Iniquity” may no longer be a reliable guide to denial of confidentiality.233 Plainly, confidences concerning crime or fraud need not be kept, since there is obvious public interest in the investigation234 and prevention235 of crime. However, public interest may also be invoked to justify disclosure, not only of “outrageous wrongdoing”,236 but also of “serious misdeeds or grave misconduct”237 or even malpractice with no criminal or fraudulent aspect, such as confidential details regarding professional misconduct.238 230 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109 at 282. 231 Authority for the principle is traced back to the English case of Gartside v Outram (1856) 26 LJ Ch 113 per Wood VC at 114: “There is no confidence as to the disclosure of iniquity.” 232 E.g. in Harrods Ltd v Times Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 294; see also observations on the meaning of “iniquity” by the Lord Ordinary, Lord Coulsfield, in Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd 1989 SC (HL) 122 at 127. 233 Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396 per Salmon LJ at 410: “what was iniquity in 1856 may be too narrow or . . . too wide for 1967”. 234 See Conoco (UK) Ltd v The Commercial Law Practice 1997 SLT 372. 235 W v Egdell [1990] Ch 359. 236 Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd 1989 SC (HL) 122 per Lord Coulsfield at 127. 237 Lion Laboratories v Evans [1985] QB 526 per Stephenson LJ at 537; Response Handling Ltd v BBC [2007] CSOH 102, 2008 SLT 51. 238 E.g. Woolgar v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2000] 1 WLR 25 (disclosure of failure in care at nursing home, which specifically did not constitute criminal conduct, to local council’s registration and inspection unit).

Breach of Confidence   721

Public interest considerations are similarly relevant in countering a claim for confidentiality made for reports of mismanagement by a public body, if disclosure would serve to avert a serious risk of public harm.239 In the personal sphere, in particular, the concept of iniquity is now outmoded and has no place in supporting revelation of details of an individual’s romantic or sexual encounters.240 The fact of a relationship being outwith marriage no longer removes the expectation of confidentiality.241 Although no doubt interesting to the public, such relationships are not of public interest in the legal sense, even if “distasteful” or “unconventional”,242 unless publication exposes abuse of influence or corruption,243 or prevents the public from being “seriously misled”.244

19.64

(2) Balancing public interest in disclosure against public interest in confidentiality The crucial question in determining whether public interest should prevail over confidentiality is not simply whether the information relates to a matter of public interest but, more specifically, whether it is in the public interest that disclosure should be permitted notwithstanding the obligation of confidentiality. The strength of public interest supporting disclosure rather than confidentiality must be properly made out.245 Where the information in question relates to wrongdoing, the seriousness of that conduct is an important factor. Disclosure is almost always warranted in relation to a serious crime or civil wrong;246 generally speaking there is no confidence in a crime, although, as the Institutional writers noted,247 it is in the interests of justice that lawyers should keep their clients’ secrets, even regarding a crime already committed, although communications made before the commission of a crime for the purposes of being advised in the commission of it are not privileged from disclosure.248 Strength of evidence is also significant. A more cogent case may be made for revealing details of wrongdoing

239 London Regional Transport v Mayor of London [2001] EWCA Civ 1491 per Walker LJ at para 36. 240 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20 per Eady J at para 106. 241 CC v AB [2006] EWHC 3083 (QB), [2007] EMLR 11; Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449. 242 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20 per Eady J at para 128. 243 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Hoffmann at para 60. 244 Browne v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] EWHC 202 (QB), [2007] EMLR 19 per Eady J at para 46 (revd in part [2007] EWCA Civ 295, [2008] QB 103). 245 Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396. 246 Conoco (UK) Ltd v The Commercial Law Practice 1997 SLT 372; McKennitt v Ash [2005] EWHC 3003 (QB), [2006] EMLR 10 per Eady J at para 137 (affd [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73). 247 See paras 19.37–19.39 above. 248 R v Cox and Railton (1884–85) LR 14 QBD 153; Kelly v Vannet 1999 JC 109.

19.65

722   The Law of Delict in Scotland

19.66

where there is a “credible allegation from an apparently reliable source”249 rather than an unsubstantiated suspicion. At the same time, public interest does not prevail over confidentiality to allow media publication of the details and identity of a suspect where wrongdoing is merely suspected or is still under investigation.250 Even a doctor’s obligation to maintain patient confidentiality may in exceptional circumstances yield to public interest. The General Medical Council’s guidelines advise that disclosure may be permissible where it is necessary to protect individuals or society from risks of serious harm, such as from serious communicable diseases or serious crime, especially crimes against the person.251 In the case of W v Egdell,252 for example, the plaintiff, a prisoner convicted of murder, had employed a psychiatrist to prepare a report in connection with his transfer out of a secure unit. The report revealed that the plaintiff, a paranoid schizophrenic, had a continuing interest in guns and bomb-making. The plaintiff withdrew the application, but refused to consent to the psychiatrist disclosing the report to the medical officer at the secure hospital. The psychiatrist was so perturbed by the threat to public safety were the plaintiff to be released that he disclosed the report to the medical officer and to the government minister with responsibility for the unit. When the plaintiff sued to restrain further publication and to have copies of the report delivered up, it was held that the plaintiff’s strong interest in confidentiality was overridden by public safety considerations, and reference was also made to the ECHR Article 8(2). Disclosure of confidential information may thus be justified if there is significant risk to public safety, although such disclosure should be no more than is necessary to reduce the risk in question, and disclosure should be made not to the media but to the appropriate authority charged with investigating or dealing with the safety threat in question.253 As discussed in chapter 4, exceptional circumstances may actually create an affirmative duty on the part of medical professionals to warn third parties of the risk presented by a patient, even though disclosure of that risk breaches patient confidentiality.254

249 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109 per Lord Goff at 283. 250 ZXC v Bloomberg LP [2020] EWCA Civ 611, [2021] QB 28. 251 See General Medical Council, Confidentiality: Good Practice in Handling Patient Information paras 22–23. See also ABC v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust [2020] EWHC 455 (QB), [2020] PIQR P13, holding that the defendants had not been under a positive duty to break confidentiality so as to reveal to the claimant that her father had a genetic disease (which meant that she and her future children were also at risk). 252 [1990] Ch 359; see also R v Crozier (1990–91) 12 Cr App R (S) 206. 253 See also X v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648. 254 See paras 4.66–4.70 above.

Breach of Confidence   723

Set against the public interest in freedom of expression, there is also an obvious public interest in preserving and protecting confidences.255 Unless there is a cogent public interest argument to the contrary, confidences generally should be protected, in particular where the confidant undertook an express contractual obligation of confidence.256 There is reluctance to stand in the way of enforcing non-disclosure agreements where they have been freely entered into, in particular where disclosure might compromise the ECHR Article 8 right to private and family life. The Court of Appeal has given a firm steer that, in the absence of fraud or impropriety:257

19.67

“Parties are of course generally free to determine for themselves what primary obligations they accept; and legal certainty requires that they do so in the knowledge that if something happens for which the contract has made express provision, then other things being equal, the contract will be enforced (pacta sunt servanda). This is a rule of public policy of considerable importance.”

This reasoning also applies to non-disclosure agreements entered into between employers and their former employees, unless agreement was procured by bullying or harassment.258 Even where the material which the employees wish to publish relates to a matter of public interest, it is not necessarily in the public interest that it should be disclosed, taking into consideration the “important and legitimate role” played by non-disclosure agreements in the consensual settlement of disputes, both generally and in particular in the employment field.259 In cases where the public interest in disclosure and the public interest in confidentiality are finely balanced, the former may be adequately served by disclosure to the appropriate regulatory or investigatory authority, rather than to the public at large.260 In W v Egdell,261 for example, it is likely that 255 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109 per Lord Goff at 282. See also HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1776, [2008] Ch 57 per Lord Phillips CJ at para 67: “a significant element to be weighed in the balance is the importance in a democratic society of upholding duties of confidence that are created between individuals”. 256 Campbell v Frisbee [2002] EWCA Civ 1374, [2003] EMLR 3 per Lord Phillips CJ at para 22. See also Brevan Howard Asset Management LLP v Reuters Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 950, [2017] EMLR 28. 257 Mionis v Democratic Press SA [2017] EWCA Civ 1194, [2018] QB 662 per Sharp LJ at para 91. The parties had previously agreed, in settling libel proceedings, that the defendant newspaper would not publish further details of the claimant, his family, or their affairs. An injunction and inquiry into damages were therefore granted when further articles were published in breach of that agreement. 258 ABC v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2329, [2019] 2 All ER 684 at para 43. 259 ABC v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2329, [2019] 2 All ER 684 at para 41. 260 Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396 per Lord Denning at 405–406; see also Baigent v McCulloch 1998 SLT 780, a defamation case in which, for the purposes of the defence of qualified privilege, it was held that complaints regarding the management of a nursing home should have been made to the appropriate regulatory authority rather than to the media. 261 [1990] Ch 359, discussed at para 19.66 above.

19.68

19.69

724   The Law of Delict in Scotland

disclosure would have been restrained had the psychiatrist proposed to send his report to a newspaper, rather than to the medical officer and to the government minister with responsibility for the unit caring for his patient. Restricted disclosure of this nature may be appropriate when the weight of the evidence is in doubt, or impropriety is suspected rather than evident and further investigation is required. In Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd,262 for example, the defendant newspaper proposed to publish illegally obtained details of telephone conversations which would implicate the plaintiff in a breach of racing rules. Publication was enjoined, but the defendants were permitted to make application to disclose the information to the police and the Jockey Club so that further enquiries might be made.

H. REMEDIES (1) Interdict 19.70

A confidence once breached loses its quality of confidentiality,263 and so the primary remedy in enforcing the obligation of confidentiality is interdict.264 Cross-border differences may be noted, however. The “enormously flexible” English injunction265 is discretionary in nature, whether the injunction sought is interim or permanent.266 In Scotland, while interim interdict is necessarily “almost wholly discretional in exercise”,267 sometimes granted on the basis of “little more than a rough prima facie view of the facts”,268 perpetual interdict is “claimed as of right and not merely as of grace or discretion”.269 Considerations of fairness or “equity”, Burn-Murdoch suggested, might exceptionally modify strict legal rights,270 but the courts have no general discretion to refuse interdict merely because damages may offer an adequate alternative remedy.271 In Scotland there is no direct equivalent of the “super-injunctions” which, in English law, restrain defendants not only from doing something but also from publishing or informing others of the content of the court order and of the fact that it was made.272 262 [1984] 1 WLR 892. 263 As in Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd 1989 SC (HL) 122. 264 H Burn-Murdoch, Interdict in the Law of Scotland (1933) para 378. 265 S Worthington, Equity, 2nd edn (2006) 29. 266 See Toulson and Phipps on Confidentiality para 6.036–6.037; Gurry on Breach of Confidence para 18.03. 267 Burn-Murdoch, Interdict para 2. 268 Burn-Murdoch, Interdict para 143. 269 Burn-Murdoch, Interdict para 2. 270 Burn-Murdoch, Interdict para 2. 271 See Bank of Scotland v Stewart (1891) 18 R 957 per Lord President Inglis at 971–972; William Grant & Sons Ltd v Glen Catrine Bonded Warehouse Ltd 2001 SC 901 per Lord President Rodger at 947–948. 272 For discussion, see Lord Neuberger MR, Report of the Committee on Super-Injunctions: SuperInjunctions, Anonymised Injunctions and Open Justice (2011) (at https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Reports/super-injunction-report-20052011.pdf).

Breach of Confidence   725

Where interim interdict is sought against publication in the media, section 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires due regard to be paid to freedom of expression. Moreover, according to section 12(3), the court must be “satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed”. The word “likely” is open to interpretation, and Scottish courts, following the lead of the House of Lords in the English case of Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee,273 have tended to favour disclosure.274 In that case Lord Nicholls stated that:275

19.71

“[O]n its proper construction the effect of section 12(3) is that the court is not to make an interim restraint order unless satisfied the applicant’s prospects of success at the trial are sufficiently favourable to justify such an order being made in the particular circumstances of the case. As to what degree of likelihood makes the prospect of success ‘sufficiently favourable’, the general approach should be that courts will be exceedingly slow to make interim restraint orders where the applicant has not satisfied the court he will probably (‘more likely than not’) succeed at the trial. In general, that should be the threshold an applicant must cross before the court embarks on exercising its discretion, duly taking into account the relevant jurisprudence on article 10 and any countervailing Convention rights.”

But while “more likely than not” is the standard test, it was recognised in Cream that a measure of flexibility should be applied. In some cases a lesser degree of likelihood is acceptable, where for example the potential adverse consequences of disclosure would be particularly grave, or where a short-lived interdict is necessary to allow the court to give proper consideration to an application for interim relief pending the trial or appeal.276

(2) Damages Damages may be claimed to compensate patrimonial loss suffered due to disclosure of confidential information.277 As discussed above,278 however, patrimonial loss need not be proved in every case, and in addition to, or in some cases instead of, patrimonial loss, compensation may also be

273 [2004] UKHL 44, [2005] 1 AC 253. 274 X v BBC [2005] CSOH 80, 2005 SLT 796 per Temporary Judge M G Thomson QC at para 16; Response Handling Ltd v BBC [2007] CSOH 102, 2008 SLT 51 per Lord Bracadale at para 10 (describing the guidance offered in Cream Holdings as “authoritative”); see also Dickson Minto, WS v Bonnier Media Ltd 2002 SLT 776; R M M McInnes, “Undercover Filming and Corporate Privacy: Response Handling Ltd v BBC” 2007 SLT (News) 150. 275 [2004] UKHL 44, [2005] 1 AC 253 at para 22. 276 [2004] UKHL 44, [2005] 1 AC 253 per Lord Nicholls at para 22. 277 See discussion in Scottish Law Commission, Report on Breach of Confidence (Scot Law Com No 90, 1984) paras 4.91–4.93. 278 See paras 19.57–19.60.

19.72

726   The Law of Delict in Scotland

19.73

claimed for injury to feelings and to reputation,279 even where the confidential information derives from the commercial rather than the personal sphere.280 Recent Scottish authority is scarce on the level of damages considered appropriate for injury to feelings in relation to breach of confidence in personal matters, but the amounts awarded in the English courts have been significantly below the level of damages for physical or psychiatric injury,281 or for misuse of private information (discussed further in chapter 20).

(3) Accounting for profits 19.74

Where commercial gain has been made from misuse of confidential information, the party wronged may seek an account of profits as an alternative to damages.282 The disgorgement of an enrichment acquired by act of D without mirror loss to P is a matter for the law of unjustified enrichment and not for the law of delict, where damages are in the main compensatory.283 Whereas an award of damages is determined by P’s loss, an accounting for profits may yield a rather different figure since it is based upon the profit made by D, who is treated “as if he conducted his business and made profits on behalf of [P]”.284 However, P is entitled only to those profits shown to be directly attributable to the wrongful use of the confidential information,285 an amount “notoriously difficult to work out”.286 Often that figure is rather less than P’s estimated loss, and it is only in exceptional cases, where other remedies are inadequate, that questions of accounting for profits tend to arise.287 English examples have included cases where trade secrets were pirated,288 or the defendant profited from the use of protected information in publishing the memoirs of former employees of the security

279 White and Fletcher, Delictual Damages 148 (and to that extent breach of confidence is comparable with delicts of intention such as wrongful deprivation of liberty or defamation, discussed at 43ff); see also D M Walker, Civil Remedies (1974) 1013. 280 Brown’s Trs v Hay (1898) 25 R 1112 at 1119, discussed at paras 19.16–19.17 and 19.58 above. 281 See e.g. Archer v Williams [2003] EWHC 1670 (QB), [2003] EMLR 38 per Jackson J at para 76, recommending that “damages for injury to feelings should be kept to a modest level and should be proportionate to the injury suffered”. 282 Walker, Civil Remedies 1059; H L MacQueen, “Intellectual Property”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 18 (1993) para 1490; see also Scottish Law Commission, Report on Breach of Confidence (Scot Law Com No 90, 1984) paras 4.96–4.97. 283 See discussion in N R Whitty, “Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots law”, in N R Whitty and R Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality (2009) para 3.7.7; J Blackie and I Farlam, “Enrichment by Act of the Party Enriched”, in R Zimmermann, D Visser and K Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004) 469. 284 Celanese International Corp v BP Chemicals Ltd [1999] RPC 203 per Laddie J at para 36. 285 Pine Energy Consultants Ltd v Talisman Energy (UK) Ltd [2008] CSOH 10. 286 G Jones, “Restitution of Benefits Obtained in Breach of Another’s Confidence” (1970) 86 LQR 463 at 487. 287 Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 per Lord Nicholls at 285. 288 Peter Pan Manufacturing Corp v Corsets Silhouette Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 96.

Breach of Confidence   727

services.289 Scottish authority is more rare, but a claim of this nature has been recognised as competent in cases involving the use of trade secrets,290 and there seems no reason in principle why such a remedy might not be available where personal information has been misused for the defender’s profit.291 In this connection a parallel may be drawn with cases involving infringement of intellectual property rights such as patents, where damages may be fixed by analogy with the “hire or royalty” that the patentee might have expected from the unauthorised use of the property.292

(4) Statutory protection for trade secrets As already mentioned,293 confidential information constituting a trade secret enjoys additional statutory protection in the form of the Trade Secrets (Enforcement, etc) Regulations 2018,294 which supplement, rather than supplant, common law liability in this context. The 2018 Regulations provide for a range of remedies, including orders to cease use of the trade secret, deliver up the infringing goods, or pay compensation.295 For the purposes of the Regulations, trade secrets are defined as information which:296 “(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its components, generally known among, or readily accessible to, persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question,   (b) has commercial value because it is secret, and   (c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.”

The onus is upon any person seeking to rely on these provisions to demonstrate, not the inaccessibility of the information in absolute terms, but that “reasonable steps” have been taken to keep it secret. It will not be sufficient for the purposes of the Regulations simply to impute constructive knowledge to recipients of the information if it cannot be shown that information was flagged up as confidential and that measures were taken to prevent it from being misappropriated. 289 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109; Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268. 290 Levin v Caledonian Produce (Holdings) Ltd 1975 SLT (Notes) 69; Pine Energy Consultants Ltd v Talisman Energy (UK) Ltd [2008] CSOH 10. 291 For discussion in relation to the gain obtained by passing off, see paras 21.105–21.106 below. 292 See Watson, Laidlaw & Co Ltd v Pott, Cassels, & Williamson 1914 SC (HL) 18; Mellor v William Beardmore & Co 1927 SC 597. 293 See para 19.01 n 2 above. 294 SI 2018/597. This incorporated into domestic law the Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure. 295 SI 2018/597 regs 11, 14 and 16. 296 SI 2018/597 reg 2.

19.75

Chapter 20

Invasion of Privacy

Para A. INTRODUCTION����������������������������������������������������������������� 20.01 B. THE COMPARATIVE CONTEXT (1) The United States������������������������������������������������������������� 20.03 (2) France������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 20.04 (3) Germany�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.05 (4) England and Wales����������������������������������������������������������� 20.07 C. TWO QUESTIONS FOR SCOTS LAW��������������������������������� 20.12 D. MISUSE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION (1) Misuse of private information as a tort in English law��������� 20.14 (2) Misuse of private information as a delict in Scots law���������� 20.16 (3) The extent of the private sphere (a) Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������� 20.20 (b) Assessing reasonable expectations of privacy����������������� 20.24 (c) The individual’s prior interaction with the media���������� 20.30 (d) The intrusive power of images������������������������������������� 20.32 (4) The concept of misuse������������������������������������������������������� 20.33 (5) The conflict with freedom of expression����������������������������� 20.40 (a) The relative nature of the entitlement to privacy����������� 20.41 (b) Freedom of expression and public interest�������������������� 20.42 (c) The importance of correcting false impressions������������ 20.48 (d) The consequences of disclosure����������������������������������� 20.50 (6) The significance of prior publication���������������������������������� 20.52 (7) Privacy and false information��������������������������������������������� 20.53 (8) Remedies (a) Interdict��������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.55 (b) Damages�������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.57 (c) Extrajudicial complaints procedures����������������������������� 20.58 E. APPROPRIATION OF INDICIA OF IDENTITY FOR COMMERCIAL GAIN����������������������������������������������������������� 20.59 (1) Publicity rights in the United States����������������������������������� 20.60 (2) Protection for image rights in England and Scotland����������� 20.62 (3) Breach of confidence��������������������������������������������������������� 20.63 (a) Douglas v Hello!: the subject of the information������������� 20.65 (b) Third-party rights to exploit identity���������������������������� 20.69 (4) Defamation and false representation of endorsement���������� 20.72 728

Invasion of Privacy   729

(5) Passing off and false representation of endorsement������������ 20.73 F. BEYOND MISUSE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION�������������� 20.74 (1) Territorial privacy������������������������������������������������������������� 20.76 (2) Privacy of the person��������������������������������������������������������� 20.82 (3) Recognition of breach of privacy: beyond information?������� 20.86

A. INTRODUCTION As the previous chapter shows, the law of confidentiality protects a range of private information against unauthorised disclosure. Even where there is no pre-existing relationship between confider and confidant, and information is obtained clandestinely, a delictual “duty fixed by law”1 may oblige the confidant and any third-party recipients of the information to maintain its secrecy. But although breach of confidence has today a wide reach, it cannot be regarded as standing proxy for breach of privacy more generally. This chapter examines the protection found in the law of delict for privacy interests in the broad sense, including not only informational privacy but also privacy of the person and privacy of the home. Until the early years of the twenty-first century the existence of a tort of breach of privacy was flatly denied by English lawyers,2 and the English judiciary hesitated even to pronounce the “P word”.3 On the whole, Scottish lawyers have been more receptive, and the possibility of delictual liability for breach of privacy has for many years been a “popular subject of professional conversation”.4 The courts, however, have remained tentative.5 This diffidence in dealing with privacy in England and in Scotland contrasts markedly with developments in other jurisdictions with which comparisons are often drawn.

20.01

20.02

B. THE COMPARATIVE CONTEXT6 (1) The United States Across the Atlantic in the United States the case for recognition of “The Right to Privacy” was made as long ago as 1890 in a seminal article in  1 Glegg, Reparation. This text appeared in the 2nd edn (1905) at 4 and was carried forward to both subsequent editions (1939 and 1955).  2 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406 per Lord Hoffmann at para 35.   3 In the account of Lord Justice Sedley, “Towards a Right to Privacy” (2006) 28(11) London Review of Books 20 (text of the Blackstone Lecture, delivered on 13 May 2006).   4 Lord Kilbrandon, “The Law of Privacy in Scotland” (1971) 2 Cambrian L Rev 35 at 35.   5 See observations in BC v Chief Constable Police Service of Scotland [2020] CSIH 61, 2020 SLT 1021, in which the Second Division suggested that the Lord Ordinary ([2019] CSOH 48, 2019 SLT 875) had gone too far in recognising a “fully developed” common law right to privacy. See also Martin v McGuiness 2003 SLT 1424, in which Lord Bonomy observed at para 28 that no authority had been cited establishing that no right to privacy existed.   6 For more extended discussion, see E C Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy (2010) ch 1.

20.03

730   The Law of Delict in Scotland

the Harvard Law Review by Warren and Brandeis.7 “[R]ecent inventions and business methods” and in particular “instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise” had made it essential to secure for the individual the right “to be let alone” from the “evil of the invasion of privacy by the newspapers”.8 Although piecemeal protection for private life already existed in the law of defamation, breach of confidence, and infringement of property or implied contractual rights, these were wrongs directed at remedying a “radically different class of effects from those for which attention [was] asked”.9 Over time, Warren and Brandeis’ arguments for direct recognition of a general privacy right steadily gathered support in the courts of a number of states,10 as well as in the academic press.11 By the time that the first US Restatement of Torts was published in 1939 the weight of authority led to the inclusion of a tort of interference with privacy.12 In 1960 Prosser analysed the burgeoning case law to formulate a taxonomy that divided invasions of privacy into four categories: (i) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion or solitude of another, or into that person’s private affairs; (ii) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; (iii) publicity which places a person in a false light in the public eye; and (iv) appropriation of another’s name or likeness.13 This taxonomy was carried forward into a revision of the Restatement Second of Torts14 in 1977 and survives to this day,15 although debates continue as to privacy problems created by evolving technologies16 and as to the distinct issues arising from the commercial exploitation of personality and image.

(2) France 20.04

Civil remedies for breach of privacy are equally long-established in Europe. In France a new Article 9 was inserted into the Code civil in 1970, echoing Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights: “Everyone has the

  7   8   9 10

11

12 13 14 15 16

S Warren and L D Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4 Harvard LR 193. Warren and Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy” 195. Warren and Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy” 197. Starting with the Supreme Court of Georgia in Pavesich v New England Life Insurance Co 122 Ga 190, 50 SE 68 (Ga 1905), although courts in some states continued to follow the reasoning of cases such as Roberson v Rochester Folding Box Co 9 Bedell 538, 64 NE 442 (NY 1902). See in particular R Pound, “Interests of Personality” (1915) 28 Harvard LR 343 and 445, reviewing European as well as Anglo-American authorities and concluding, at 362–363, that the right to defend private life was “another phase” of the rights to protect physical integrity and personal liberty, so that the law should “do more in the attempt to secure this interest than merely take incidental account of infringements of it”. § 827. W Prosser, “Privacy” (1960) 48 California LR 383. §§ 652A–E. See Dobbs, Law of Torts § 578. See D Solove, Understanding Privacy (2008) 101.

Invasion of Privacy   731

right to respect for his or her private life”.17 Case law establishing liability for the unauthorised use of personal images is, however, much older, dating back to the mid-nineteenth century18 and supplemented by legislation controlling the freedom of the press to publish revelations concerning private life.19 Indeed the 1970 reform was in response to continuing judicial expansion of the range of rights protected under the general delictual provisions in the Code civil20 – in particular, a series of landmark decisions in the 1950s and 1960s in which remedies were granted against unauthorised use of image21 or name, as well as the publication of private facts and assertions.22

(3) Germany In Germany, the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) of 1900 made no reference to privacy rights.23 However, the post-war Grundgesetz, the Constitution of 1949, provided for the inviolability of the dignity of the individual in Article 1, followed by the right to free development of personality (Article 2(1)), life, physical integrity and liberty (Article 2(2)), privacy of correspondence and communications (Article 10), and the inviolability of the home (Article 13). In 1954 the Bundesgerichtshof ruled that the civil law should recognise these Constitutional rights as effective against private entities and individuals as well as public authorities,24 and shortly afterwards these “personality rights” 17 Loi n° 70–643 du 17 juillet 1970, Art 22: “Chacun a droit au respect de sa vie privée. Les juges peuvent, sans préjudice de la réparation du dommage subi, prescrire toutes mesures, telles que séquestre, saisie et autres, propres à empêcher ou faire cesser une atteinte à l’intimité de la vie privée: ces mesures peuvent, s’il y a urgence, être ordonnées en référé.” 18 An early case (Trib civ Seine, 16.6.1858, D 1858, 3, 62) concerned the pirating of deathbed sketches of a famous actress (Rachel). The sketches were ordered to be destroyed and the court ruled that deathbed images should not be reproduced without the family’s consent, honouring the “feelings of nature that were the most intimate and worthy of respect” as well as “familial piety”. A subsequent decision in 1887 affirmed the principle that photographic materials remained “incontestably the property of their subjects, and, after their death, their heirs”: CA Lyon 8.7.1887, D 1888, 2, 180; also Trib civ Seine 30.4.1896, D 1896, 2, 376. 19 Law Relative to the Press 1868; Freedom of the Press Act 1881. 20 This process is analysed in R Lindon, Les droits de la personnalité (1974) 64–67; see also H BeverleySmith, A Ohly and A Lucas-Schloetter, Privacy, Property and Personality: Civil Law Perspectives on Commercial Appropriation (2005) 147–153. 21 As in the Philippe case, Cass Civ 2e, 12.7.1966, D 1967 Jur 181. 22 See the leading case, involving Marlène Dietrich, CA Paris, 16.3.1955, D 1955 Jur 295, in which the actress obtained damages against a periodical that purported, without having interviewed her or obtained authorisation, to publish reminiscences of her private life. Such material formed part of the individual’s “moral patrimony” (“son patrimoine moral”) which others had no right to publish, even if in good faith. 23 Even prior to the enactment of the BGB, however, jurists had argued that the interests protected by the law of delict should include not only physical integrity and liberty but also name and reputation: see e.g. K Gareis, Introduction to the Science of Law, 3rd edn (tr A Kocourek, 1911) 122–135. Moreover, legislation enacted soon after the BGB, the Law of Artistic Creation (Kunsturhebergesetz) of 1907, provided in § 22 that images of private individuals were not to be published without their consent. 24 BGHZ 13, 334 (Schachtbrief, translated in B S Markesinis et al, Markesinis’s German Law of Torts, 5th edn (2019) Appendix 2, case 12, 284–287).

20.05

732   The Law of Delict in Scotland

20.06

were expressly acknowledged as coming within the category of “other rights” protected by § 823(1) BGB (the general clause on delictual liability).25 The foundation for privacy rights is therefore laid in fundamental constitutional guarantees, but the civil courts have progressively built on this to consolidate the private law framework by which they are defended.26 Even in codified systems of law, therefore, remedies for breach of privacy have been fashioned through the “interstices” of the Code.27 Moreover, the courts have often taken the lead over the legislature, responding to changes in technology and in social expectations by interpreting the general principles of delictual liability in such a way as to recognise infringement of privacy as relevant damage.28

(4) England and Wales 20.07

20.08

The approach followed in England and Wales has, however, been otherwise. In “The Right to Privacy” Warren and Brandeis had made ample reference to English case law,29 but their argument that “invasion of personal privacy . . . ought to be a tort in English law”30 did not prevail.31 It was not until the twenty-first century that the English law of torts adapted itself to breach of privacy, but even then it was to accommodate informational privacy only. The “essentially fragmentary” character of English tort law,32 said to be, at least in part, a legacy of the forms of action, meant that there was no general framework of liability on to which protection for a new type of interest could be grafted,33 and there was insufficient legislative enthusiasm 25 BGHZ 24, 72 (disclosure of medical report without consent). 26 The landmark case, in 1958, was the so-called Herrenreiter decision, BGHZ 26, 349, translated in Markesinis’s German Law of Torts Appendix 2, case 13, 287–291. Compensation for pain and suffering (Schmerzensgeld) under § 847 BGB (now replaced by § 253(2)), hitherto awarded only for attacks on the person, health or liberty, was granted in respect of serious injury to personality. In this case the claimant’s photograph had been used without his consent in an advertisement for a tonic which was said to enhance sexual performance. R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 1094 characterised this development as “blatantly contra legem” but also as an indication that “a codification as monumental as the BGB is not completely detached from the ebb and flow of legal development”. 27 See R Zimmermann, “Civil Code and Civil Law” (1994–95) 1 Columbia Journal of European Law 63 at 94ff. 28 And see now DCFR Art VI.-2:203(1), providing that infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy is “legally relevant damage” in terms of Art VI.-1:101. 29 S Warren and L D Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4 Harvard LR 193. 30 P H Winfield, “Privacy” (1931) 47 LQR 23 at 39. 31 For discussion, see W Cornish, “Personal Reputation, Privacy and Intellectual Property”, in W Cornish et al, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol XIII, 1820–1914: Fields of Development (2010) 847 at 847–851, 900, 989. 32 D J Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations 1999) 178. 33 As J Gordley, Foundations of Private Law (2006) 241 explained, “it was only in the 19th century that jurists tried explicitly to identify rights that the traditional forms of action were supposed to protect. The result of that effort was to leave unexplained gaps in the rights protected.”

Invasion of Privacy   733

or judicial boldness to create a new tort of breach of privacy. Throughout the twentieth century, therefore, privacy interests continued to be protected piecemeal by a range of discrete torts such as trespass, nuisance, defamation and malicious falsehood, and the equitable action for breach of confidence.34 There were important statutory developments towards the close of the century, notably the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and the Data Protection Acts,35 both statutes extending to Scotland also, but these too were limited to specific contexts. The United Kingdom ratified the European Convention on Human Rights in 1951, enshrining in Article 8 protection for private and family life, home and correspondence,36 but it was nearly fifty years before the Human Rights Act 1998 made further provision for the compatibility of domestic law with Convention rights. In the intervening period, the ECHR occasionally served as an aid to interpretation where domestic legislation was ambiguous or uncertain,37 or as a point of reference in developing or clarifying the common law,38 but the Convention was not an independent source of rights and obligations, and a gap between the scope of Article 8 and common-law protection for private life remained. While the ECHR embodied “many of the familiar principles of our own law and of our concept of justice”, under English law, it continued to be said that “there is in general nothing unlawful about a breach of privacy”.39 In 1998 the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly resolved that “the right to privacy afforded by Article 8 . . . should not only protect an individual against interference by public authorities, but also against interference by private persons or institutions, including the mass media”. 40 A call in that document for the governments of member states to pass legislation protecting the right to privacy41 did not result in legislation in any part 34 For a case study, see Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62, in which journalists purported to obtain an “interview” with a well-known actor in hospital after a road accident, although at the time he was semi-conscious and incapable of consent. When proceedings were brought to enjoin publication, the court identified a “monstrous invasion of his privacy”, but lamented the failure of both common law and statute “to protect in an effective way the personal privacy of individual citizens” (per Bingham LJ at 70, Leggatt LJ at 71). A remedy, necessarily of a limited kind, could be found only in the law of malicious falsehood. 35 Successive legislation was enacted in 1984, 1998, and 2018. 36 ECHR Art 8. 37 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Brind [1991] 1 AC 696. 38 Rantzen v Mirror Group Newspapers [1994] QB 670 per Neill LJ at 691. 39 R v Khan (Sultan) [1997] AC 558 per Lord Nolan at 580–581. The appellants subsequently were successful in their case against the UK in the ECtHR: see Khan v UK (2001) 31 EHRR 45. See also Lord Woolf, “European Court of Human Rights on the Occasion of the Opening of the Judicial Year” [2003] European Human Rights L Rev 257 at 258: “the values to which the Convention gives effect are very much the same values that have been recognised by the common law for hundreds of years”. 40 Resolution 1165 of 26 June 1998 (available at https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTMLen.asp?fileid=16641&lang%20=en) para 12. 41 Resolution 1165 of 26 June 26 1998, para 14.

20.09

20.10

734   The Law of Delict in Scotland

20.11

of the United Kingdom, but the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 foreshadowed significant change. As noted in chapter 2,42 the 1998 Act requires all legislation, whether primary or secondary, to be read in a way that is compatible with Convention rights,43 and provides a mechanism for declaring its incompatibility where it cannot.44 The Act also compels all public authorities to act in a way that is ECHR compliant.45 It does not provide that Article 8, or any other of the articles of the Convention, can be directly invoked as the basis of a claim between private parties, but the courts are included within the definition of public authorities for the purposes of the Act,46 and thus require to act compatibly with Convention rights not only in deciding cases brought against public bodies but, arguably, also in developing the common law more generally.47 In response to the Human Rights Act, it was soon to be asserted in the context of privacy protection that the Articles of the Convention had ceased to be “merely of persuasive or parallel effect” but had infused “the very content” of the common law,48 which was thus expressly concerned “to prevent the violation of a citizen’s autonomy, dignity and self-esteem”.49 In the leading case of Campbell v MGN Ltd in 2004, the House of Lords stated that the values embodied in the Convention were “as much applicable in disputes between individuals or between an individual and a non-governmental body such as a newspaper as they are in disputes between individuals and a public authority”.50 There was thus an important impetus to make good the gap left between common-law protection for private life and the standards set by Article 8.51 The means used to achieve this was the acknowledgment, in Campbell, that a new tort of misuse of private information had emerged from the shell of the equitable wrong of breach of confidence.52 Since then, a wave 42 See paras 2.45–2.47 above. 43 Human Rights Act 1998 s 3. The Scotland Act 1998 s 29(1)(d) had already provided that the competence of the Scottish Parliament excluded legislation incompatible with the Convention. 44 Human Rights Act 1998 s 4. 45 Human Rights Act 1998 s 6. From the time of its formation the Scottish Government had been required to act compatibly with the Convention: Scotland Act 1998 s 57. 46 Human Rights Act 1998 s 6(3). 47 See J Murdoch, Reed and Murdoch: Human Rights Law in Scotland, 4th edn (2017) para 1.81; see e.g. treatment in Attorney General’s Reference No 3 of 1999 [2009] UKHL 34, [2010] 1 AC 145 per Lord Hope at paras 18–19, Lord Brown at para 54. 48 McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73 per Buxton LJ at para 11, citing Lord Woolf CJ in A v B plc [2002] EWCA Civ 337, [2003] QB 195 at para 4. 49 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) per Eady J at para 7. 50 [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Nicholls at para 17. 51 See also DCFR § VI.–2:203, including within “legally relevant damage” “loss caused to a natural person as a result of infringement of his or her right to respect for his or her dignity, such as the rights to liberty and privacy”. 52 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Nicholls at para 14: “The continuing use of the phrase ‘duty of confidence’ and the description of the information as ‘confidential’ is not altogether comfortable. Information about an individual’s private life would not, in ordinary usage, be called ‘confidential’. The more natural description today is that such information is private. The essence of the tort is better encapsulated now as misuse of private information.”

Invasion of Privacy   735

of judicial activity, marked by a “new boldness of spirit”, has continued to fill out the content of this tort,53 and, as discussed below, the terminology of “breach of privacy” has entered the case law in this context. There is acknowledgment that “an individual’s personal autonomy makes him . . . master of all those facts about his own identity, such as his name, health, sexuality, ethnicity, his own image”.54 The concept of misuse of private information remains pivotal to liability, however, albeit with tentative moves towards recognition of intrusion into “private space”.55 Neither the English courts nor the legislature has demonstrated enthusiasm for a general tort of breach of privacy encompassing all aspects of private life,56 and there has been no retraction of the declaration in Campbell that there is “no over-arching, all-embracing cause of action for ‘invasion of privacy’”.57

C. TWO QUESTIONS FOR SCOTS LAW By the end of the nineteenth century, delictual protection for the “absolute rights of the person”, encompassing personal safety, liberty and reputation, was clearly recognised in Scots law, and the foundation for the modern law was in place, as discussed in chapter 1. Yet over the course of the twentieth century, in Scotland as in England, there was little engagement with the developments under way in other jurisdictions that were expanding and rationalising the law of privacy to take account of modern conditions.58 A survey by Lord Kilbrandon in 1970 pointed out that, although the Scottish landscape differed from the English, Scots law still lacked “a common law remedy for invasion of privacy as such”,59 leaving privacy to be protected 53 J N E Varuhas and N A Moreham, “Remedies for Breach of Privacy”, in J N E Varuhas and N A Moreham (eds), Remedies for Breach of Privacy (2019) 1 at 2. 54 Wood v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] EWCA Civ 414, [2010] 1 WLR 123 per Laws LJ at para 21. 55 PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26, [2016] AC 1081 per Lord Neuberger at para 58; Gulati v MGN Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1291, [2017] QB 149. 56 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406 per Lord Hoffmann at para 35; cf the (now lapsed) Bill placed before the legislature of the Republic of Ireland on 22 March 2012 “to provide for a Tort of Violation of Privacy” (Bill 19 of 2012). 57 [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Nicholls at para 11. 58 Even if the work of German and French jurists was relatively well known. E.g. Guthrie Smith, in his treatment of injury to reputation, cited Puchta in relation to injury to reputation: Treatise on the Law of Reparation, 1st edn (1864) 188, citing Pandekten § 387 (on “iniuria”) and Institutionen § 277; but he did not discuss personality rights more generally (Persönlichkeitsrecht) or Puchta’s writing on this subject. The Scottish jurist, William Miller, similarly, cited numerous German sources in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Law (1884) and The Data of Jurisprudence (1903) but made no reference to a right of personality in this sense. Guthrie Smith was one of a number of Scottish lawyers of the period who had studied law in Germany, in his case at the University of Heidelberg where he matriculated on 28 October 1854: see G Toepke and P Hintzelmann, Die Matrikel der Universität Heidelberg (7 vols, 1884–1916, repr 1976) vol VI 236 no 436. On this topic see generally A Rodger, ‘Scottish advocates in the nineteenth century: the German connection’ (1994) 110 LQR 563; K G C Reid, “Scottish Law Students in Germany in the Nineteenth Century and their Influence on Legal Culture in Scotland”, forthcoming, 2022. 59 Lord Kilbrandon, “The Law of Privacy in Scotland” (1971) 2 Cambrian L Rev 35 at 36.

20.12

736   The Law of Delict in Scotland

20.13

by a miscellany of distinct wrongs such as breach of confidence, defamation and verbal injury as well as the criminal offence of breach of the peace. The wave of disputes involving private parties, in particular media organisations, that increasingly took up the attention of the English courts after enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, largely passed Scotland by. Opportunities for judicial development of the law have presented themselves only rarely. Two important questions persist therefore. The first is whether the Scottish courts should follow the lead of the English courts by acknowledging misuse of private information as a basis for delictual liability. It will be argued in section D below that this question can be answered in the affirmative. The second question is connected to the first, but is more fundamental. Can the Scots law of delict, with an “intellectual superstructure” that differs significantly from the English,60 accommodate a general privacy delict to deal with not only informational privacy, but also privacy of the person and personal space?61 That question is considered in the final section of this chapter.

D. MISUSE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION (1) Misuse of private information as a tort in English law 20.14

In the absence of a general tort of breach of privacy English law has adapted itself to privacy in a limited way, by fashioning a new juridical category out of the law of confidentiality to deal with intrusive misuse of private information. This required two specific manoeuvres. The first was a shift in the interest protected from “confidentiality” to “privacy”. The protection extended by Article 8 ECHR to private life, after all, may encompass material which is hardly “confidential”, in the natural sense of having at some point been confided by one person to another:62 information disclosing an individual’s conduct in a public place is an example.63 As Lord Nicholls conceded in Campbell v MGN Ltd, the traditional nomenclature is misleading:64

60 H L MacQueen and W D H Sellar, “Negligence”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 517 at 547. 61 As indeed advocated by P H Winfield, addressing the privacy of the person and of property: “Privacy” (1931) 47 LQR 23 at 24. 62 If “confidential” means “spoken or written in confidence”, or “betokening private intimacy, or the confiding of private secrets” (Oxford English Dictionary), such a definition hardly fits, e.g., the information purloined in Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1, viz photographs of an event attended by 350 guests and numerous hotel staff, closely resembling other pictures published in the world press. 63 E.g. Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41. 64 [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 at para 14.

Invasion of Privacy   737 “The continuing use of the phrase ‘duty of confidence’ and the description of the information as ‘confidential’ is not altogether comfortable. Information about an individual’s private life would not, in ordinary usage, be called ‘confidential’. The more natural description today is that such information is private.”

The label “misuse of private information” was chosen by the House of Lords as being capable of extending to those situations where there was no element of confidentiality in the traditional sense. As discussed below, the claimant’s “expectation of privacy” has become established as the key criterion for instances of misuse of information, whether or not the information was confidential “in ordinary usage”, and indeed the term “breach of privacy” has increasingly come into currency as shorthand for this wrong.65 The second manoeuvre was in regard to juridical category. Lord Hoffmann referred in Campbell to the equitable origins of breach of confidence as a form of unconscionable conduct and explained that:66 “[A]lthough the action for breach of confidence could be used to protect privacy in the sense of preserving the confidentiality of personal information, it was not founded on the notion that such information was in itself entitled to protection. Breach of confidence was an equitable remedy and equity traditionally fastens on the conscience of one party to enforce equitable duties which arise out of his relationship with the other. So the action did not depend upon the personal nature of the information or extent of publication but upon whether a confidential relationship existed between the person who imparted the information and the person who received it.”

But if, as Article 8 required, it had become necessary to recognise the privacy of personal information as something worthy of protection in its own right, it was no longer appropriate to cast protection for information in terms of the obligations created by a pre-existing, or even an imputed, confidential relationship. The move away from the need for such a relationship, and the new focus on the expectations generated by the information itself, entailed a shift in the “centre of gravity”67 in this area. The relevant wrong had effectively “changed its nature”, and could be “rechristened” 68

65 E.g. McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73; HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1776, [2008] Ch 57; Browne v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 295, [2008] QB 103; Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20. 66 [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 at para 44. 67 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Hoffmann at para 51. 68 McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73 per Buxton LJ at para 8.

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as a tort, of which the “essence” was “better encapsulated . . . as misuse of private information.”69

(2) Misuse of private information as a delict in Scots law 20.16

20.17

20.18

In the wake of this English development the question for Scottish lawyers is whether an equivalent delict of misuse of private information is to be recognised. Since the decision in Campbell v MGN Ltd, there have been few occasions for judicial consideration of this question in Scotland, but it appears that it can now be answered in the affirmative, and indeed recognition of misuse of information as a delict entails a shift much less dramatic than was required in England. As discussed in chapter 19, remedies for misuse of information in the form of breach of confidence are well-established, and unlike in England, where breach of confidence is an equitable wrong, in Scotland this is already classified as a delict.70 If therefore in England a sideways manoeuvre into the law of tort was needed to accommodate misuse of private information, in Scotland the juridical “centre of gravity” in dealing with such issues already lay in delictual liability. Thus the notion that delictual remedies for the misuse of confidential information should be extended to misuse of private information in a broader sense poses few problems north of the border. In accepting that third parties should be bound to keep secrets where they knew or ought to have known that material was confidential, the Scottish courts, like the English, had already been moving away from the need always to establish a pre-existing confidential relationship.71 Moreover, the factors that have impelled English law in this direction in recent years are of equal cogency north of the border, where similar care must be taken that the values enshrined in ECHR Article 8 are adequately supported in the common law “to protect autonomy and dignity”.72 In short, the case for recognition of misuse of private information as a delict, whether or not there is a prior relationship between the subject of the information and the party appropriating it, is no less convincing in Scotland than for the equivalent tort in England.

69 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Nicholls at para 14. For subsequent confirmation of the status of misuse of private information as a tort distinct from the equitable wrong of breach of confidence, see Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2015] EWCA Civ 311, [2016] QB 1003, and for exploration of differences in the scope of protection, see PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26, [2016] AC 1081 per Lord Mance at paras 25–37. 70 See paras 19.20–19.24 above. Indeed “misuse of the information” was the expression used in Brown’s Trs v Hay (1898) 25 R 1112 per Lord McLaren at 1118. 71 See paras 19.48–19.54 above. 72 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Hoffmann at para 51.

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There have, admittedly, been very few reported cases in which a “right to privacy” has been asserted against private entities.73 On the other hand, although they do not address the point directly, the authors of the leading textbook on Human Rights Law in Scotland appear to assume that English case law establishing liability in tort in these circumstances is also relevant to Scots law.74 Moreover, such cases as there are acknowledge that a right to informational privacy exists in parallel with that already recognised in English authorities. In one of the first of these, X v BBC, Temporary Judge M G Thomson QC accepted the validity of the “test formulated in Campbell v MGN Ltd” for the purposes of determining that interim interdict should be granted against the screening of a television documentary showing the pursuer, a seventeen-year-old, in a bad light.75 And in concluding her discussion of Campbell, in the context of a petition for judicial review, the Lord Justice-Clerk, Lady Dorrian, observed more recently:76

20.19

“The existence in Scotland of an obligation of confidence has long been recognised, and here too the need for a confidential relationship has given way to a focus on the knowledge of those possessing the information that it had been imparted in confidence . . . I see no reason to think that the effect of arts 8 and 10 in respect of this area of the law in Scotland is any different to that in England.”

In short, although there has as yet been no reported case involving a successful claim for damages on this basis, it is difficult to see a challenge being made as to the relevancy of misuse of private information as a delict.

(3) The extent of the private sphere (a) Introduction On the basis that a delict of misuse of private information is now acknowledged, the fundamental question is the extent of the private sphere to 73 However, English authority, and indeed Strasbourg jurisprudence, are of indisputable relevance in cases where the subject argues that a public authority has misused information in a manner that is incompatible with Art 8, and therefore in breach of the Human Rights Act 1998 s 6(1), as e.g. in Potter v Scottish Ministers [2007] CSIH 67, 2007 SLT 1019. 74 J Murdoch, Reed and Murdoch: Human Rights Law in Scotland, 4th edn (2017) paras 6.133–6.137. See also Scottish Law Commission, Report on Defamation (Scot Law Com No 248, 2017) para 9.30, stating, under reference to English authority, that “breach of privacy is increasingly recognised as a free-standing delict”. 75 2005 SLT 796 at para 57. See also Response Handling Ltd v BBC [2007] CSOH 102, 2008 SLT 51, in which interim interdict was refused, on public interest grounds and by reference to the Human Rights Act 1998 s 12, against the broadcast of a programme detailing the insecure working practices of a call centre. However, it was accepted that in principle it was relevant to consider that the broadcast not only breached confidentiality but also threatened the pursuer’s rights under Art 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR, relating to its intellectual property (not under Art 8). 76 BC v Chief Constable Police Service of Scotland [2020] CSIH 61, 2020 SLT 1021 at para 83.

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20.21

which it relates. There is little guidance to be found on this point in the Scottish jurisprudence thus far. Unsurprisingly, given the background to the development of the English tort, the starting point adopted in English case law has been to consider the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the ambit of ECHR Article 8. This suggests that the private sphere has a broad scope. At least in most circumstances, the conduct of close personal or family relationships,77 and in particular sexual relationships,78 is regarded as deserving of being kept secret. Details of family life merit specific protection in terms of Article 8,79 as do any particulars, especially photographs, allowing children to be identified by the public at large.80 In this connection a child’s need for privacy is arguably increased, rather than diminished, by the fame of the child’s parent.81 Similarly, information about physical or mental health and treatment82 is sensitive, particularly where vulnerable individuals are likely to be damaged by having details of their condition made public.83 The private realm may also extend to intimate personal services that are not necessarily connected with health matters, such as the fact of a person having had cosmetic surgery.84 Information about a person’s business affairs85 or professional activities86 likewise commands an expectation of privacy. Personal correspondence is specifically mentioned in the text of Article 8 as meriting protection, and this applies whether communications are in a traditional paper format or transmitted by electronic means.87 Telephone calls are treated similarly.88 The importance of a person’s home is specifically noted by Article 8, and information about this is treated as sensitive, although the simple disclosure of a person’s address is unlikely to be regarded as sufficiently significant to

77 E.g. McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73. 78 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20 per Eady J at paras 98–100; PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26, [2016] AC 1081; Bull v Desporte [2019] EWHC 1650 (QB). 79 Compare von Hannover v Germany (No 1) (2005) 40 EHRR 1 and von Hannover v Germany (No 2) (2012) 55 EHRR 15. 80 Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481; cf In Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2005] 1 AC 593; In re JR38 [2015] UKSC 42, [2016] AC 1131 (unsuccessful challenge to a police decision to release to the press the image of a 14-yearold child implicated in public order offences, where public interest considerations supported publication and there had been no legitimate expectation of privacy in the circumstances). 81 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1176, [2016] 1 WLR 1541. 82 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457; Cooper v Turrell [2011] EWHC 3269 (QB). 83 Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41. 84 Archer v Williams [2003] EWHC 1670 (QB), [2003] EMLR 38. 85 Browne v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 295, [2008] QB 103 per Sir Anthony Clarke MR at paras 34–36. 86 Axon v Ministry of Defence [2016] EWHC 787 (QB), [2016] EMLR 20 per Nicol J at para 41. 87 See e.g. BC v Chief Constable Police Service of Scotland [2020] CSIH 61, 2020 SLT 1021 at para 87. 88 Gulati v MGN Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1291, [2017] QB 149.

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trigger an expectation of privacy89 unless disclosure is likely to compromise safety or otherwise cause harm.90 Those suspected of having committed a crime have a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to details of any police investigation into their conduct, and in particular of a police search of their home.91 A blow-by-blow account of individuals being evicted from their home for non-payment of rent similarly infringes their expectation of privacy.92 The problems of balancing privacy interests against freedom of expression are dealt with below.93 To anticipate the discussion, there is a hierarchy of “degrees of privacy”,94 encompassing a range of subject matters ranging from the highly sensitive to the mundane and innocuous. Generally speaking the conduct of intimate relationships,95 including reactions to bereavement,96 and health matters, in particular details of treatment,97 are more jealously protected than private but mundane activities such as “pop[ping] out to the shops for a bottle of milk”,98 or “an individual leaving his car and going to his front gate”.99 In Campbell v MGN Ltd100 the claimant was a famous fashion model who had proclaimed publicly that she did not take drugs. The defendant newspaper published articles disclosing not only her drug addiction but details of therapy she was receiving from Narcotics Anonymous. These also featured photographs taken in the street as the claimant left a group meeting of Narcotics Anonymous. While the claimant accepted that the newspaper was entitled to publish the fact of her drug addiction and the bare fact that she was receiving treatment, she argued, successfully, that disclosing information about her therapy and the accompanying photographs intruded too far into the private sphere. Over and above the essential character of the information, the level of detail to be disclosed may also be relevant to whether the private sphere  89 Mills v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EMLR 41.  90 AM v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWHC 308 (QB).  91 Richard v BBC [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch), [2019] Ch 169 per Mann J at para 248 (charges were never brought against Richard). Note, however, that the reporting of crime of itself does not breach privacy, and see also Axel Springer AG v Germany (2012) 55 EHRR 6, holding that it was legitimate in the public interest to publish details of a well-known actor’s arrest and conviction in regard to drug offences.  92 Ali v Channel 5 Broadcasting Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 677.   93 See paras 20.40–20.51 below.  94 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Hope at para 118.  95 CC v AB [2006] EWHC 3083 (QB), [2007] EMLR 11; Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20 (“the private conduct of adults is essentially noone else’s business”, per Eady J at para 128).  96 McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73.  97 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457.  98 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lady Hale at para 154. In McKennitt v Ash [2005] EWHC 3003 (QB), [2006] EMLR 10 at para 139 (affd [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73), Eady J similarly regarded shopping trips to be “of no consequence”.  99 John v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWHC 1611 (QB), [2006] EMLR 27. 100 [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457.

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has been invaded to an unacceptable degree. Details of sexual relationships, even on the part of the famous, are normally to be regarded as private, but a distinction might in some circumstances be drawn between revelation of “the bare fact of a relationship” and disclosure of “information as to the contents or detail of that relationship”.101 Information that public figures have deceived their partners or spouses may have a bearing on their fitness for office, in particular if they have put themselves forward for a leadership role, and it might therefore be acceptable to disclose the fact of an extramarital relationship.102 It would not, however, be acceptable to divulge the more prurient detail of that relationship. By the same token, a revelation that a person is suffering from a particular psychotic disorder is more likely to be considered intrusive than, for example, a vague comment that a person is unwell.

(b) Assessing reasonable expectations of privacy 20.24

The basic test of whether the private sphere has been breached is “whether in respect of the disclosed facts the person in question had a reasonable expectation of privacy”.103 As applied in the English courts this test has attempted to strike balance between objective and subjective considerations. In Campbell v MGN Ltd the Court of Appeal had applied the test of how “a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities”104 would have reacted in learning of the disclosures in question. However, the majority in the House of Lords favoured an approach that had greater concern for context. Lord Hope referred to the commentary on § 652 of the US Restatement Second of Torts, which in comment (c) suggests that “The protection afforded to the plaintiff’s interest in his privacy must be relative to the customs of the time and place, to the occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits of his neighbors and fellow citizens.”105 It was similarly accepted in Campbell that the enquiry should be adjusted to consider specifically “what a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities would feel if she was placed in the same position as the claimant and faced with the same publicity”.106 In this particular case, the test was accordingly adjusted to take account of the sensibilities of the reasonable person placed in the position of being a recovering drug addict and having

101 Hutcheson v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 808, [2012] EMLR 2 per Gross LJ at para 26; see also Goodwin v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1437 (QB), [2011] EMLR 27. 102 As in e.g. Ferdinand v MGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB). 103 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Nicholls at para 21. 104 [2002] EWCA Civ 1373, [2003] QB 633 per Lord Phillips MR at para 54 (revd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457). 105 [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Hope at para 100. 106 [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Hope at para 99 (emphasis added).

Invasion of Privacy   743

details of her treatment prominently publicised. On that basis the majority found the test to have been met. In judging what a reasonable person of sensibilities would feel if placed in the same position, this test appears capable of making allowance for subjective characteristics such as a person’s medical status, as in Campbell itself. Age is also an attribute that must be taken into account.107 In the Scottish case of X v BBC, for example, interim interdict was granted to prevent the broadcast of a television programme showing the teenaged pursuer in an unfavourable light. The court read “the test formulated in Campbell v MGN Ltd”108 as requiring it to adopt the standpoint of a reasonable person of the pursuer’s youth and mental fragility, and noted that from this perspective the broadcast carried a “significant risk of . . . serious harm”.109 In BC v Chief Constable Police Service of Scotland it was further held that “the fact that a person holds a particular office, with recognised responsibilities, duties and restrictions, may well form part of an ‘attribute’” that affects that person’s expectation of privacy.110 This meant in BC that the petitioners’ status reduced their expectations of privacy in regard to the content of WhatsApp messages that had a bearing on their conduct as serving police officers. Location is a significant, but not always conclusive, factor in measuring the expectation of privacy. The private sphere has “spatial” as well as “functional” markers,111 so that the intrusiveness of the defender’s actions must be judged against not just what the pursuer was doing, but also where this was going on. Interactions within the home, for example, are often considered to be particularly intrusive due to the “traditional sanctity accorded to hearth and home”, even where the information is mundane in nature.112 As well as descriptions of the building and its contents, accounts of conversations taking place within the individual’s home are also to be regarded as private.113 Thus in the “hierarchy”114 of locations meriting protection, a person’s home is near

107 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1176, [2016] 1 WLR 1541 per Lord Dyson MR at para 31; see also Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481 per Sir Anthony Clarke MR at para 36. 108 2005 SLT 796 per Temporary Judge M G Thomson QC at para 57. 109 2005 SLT 796 per Temporary Judge M G Thomson QC at para 56. 110 [2020] CSIH 61, 2020 SLT 1021 per Lord Menzies at para 126. 111 See von Hannover v Germany (No 1) (2005) 40 EHRR 1. 112 McKennitt v Ash [2005] EWHC 3003 (QB), [2006] EMLR 10 per Eady J at para 135 (affd [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73): “To describe a person’s home, the décor, the layout, the state of cleanliness, or how the occupiers behave inside it, is generally regarded as unacceptable. To convey such details, without permission, to the general public is almost as objectionable as spying into the home with a long distance lens and publishing the resulting photographs.” See also Beckham v MGN Ltd [2001] All ER (D) 307 (Jun). 113 McKennitt v Ash [2005] EWHC 3003 (QB), [2006] EMLR 10 per Eady J at para 137 (affd [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73). 114 R v Tessling (1988) 244 DLR (4th) 541, 2004 SCC 67 per Binnie J at para 22.

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the top, and a comparable expectation of privacy might reasonably extend also to locations such as hotel rooms,115 restaurants or private clubs,116 private cars,117 office premises,118 or even a detainee’s cell in a police station.119 The expectation of privacy in public places and at public events is correspondingly less,120 but not in all circumstances abandoned.121 Indeed the Independent Press Standards Organisation’s Editors’ Code of Practice acknowledges that “It is unacceptable to photograph individuals, without their consent, in public or private places where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.”122 In Campbell Lord Hoffmann took the view that the publication of “a photograph of someone which reveals him to be in a situation of humiliation or severe embarrassment, even if taken in a public place, may be an infringement of the privacy of his personal information”.123 Similarly, in X v BBC,124 interim interdict was granted against screening a film even though much of the footage of the pursuer was shot in public places, and in Murray v Express Newspapers plc125 damages were awarded after a clandestine photograph was taken of a small child (the son of a famous author) being pushed in his pram along an Edinburgh street. While persons who “happen to be” in a public place cannot normally object to their incidental inclusion in photographs taken of the passing scene, the situation differs where the public place is merely the backdrop and the photographer has specifically targeted a person who is engaged upon a private activity.126 The degree to which the expectation of privacy subsists even in public places was considered at length in von Hannover v Germany (No 1).127 In that case the European Court of Human Rights held that Germany had breached Article 8 ECHR by failing to provide adequate remedies for Princess Caroline of Monaco after the German press had persistently published photographs of

115 American Law Institute, Restatement Second of Torts § 652B, comment b); cf Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406 per Lord Hoffmann at para 51. 116 Jagger v Darling [2005] EWHC 683 (Ch). 117 R v Wise [1992] 1 SCR 527 (Supreme Court of Canada). 118 Niemietz v Germany (1993) 16 EHRR 97. See also Response Handling Ltd v BBC [2007] CSOH 102, 2008 SLT 51, accepting that a company’s right to privacy of possessions, on the authority of Art 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR, extended in principle to working practices in its office. 119 PG v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 51. 120 Couderc v France [2016] EMLR 19 at para 136. 121 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1176, [2016] 1 WLR 1541 per Lord Dyson MR at para 18. 122 Clause 2(iii) (available at https://www.ipso.co.uk/editors-code-of-practice). 123 [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 at para 75. 124 2005 SLT 796. 125 [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481. 126 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Hope at para 122, also Lady Hale at para 154; Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481 per Sir Anthony Clarke MR at para 50. 127 (2005) 40 EHRR 1.

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her and her family engaged in everyday activities such as shopping, sporting activities, relaxing at a beach club and eating in the garden of a restaurant with her then partner. The balance struck by the German courts between freedom of expression and the Princess’s right to respect for her private life had not been fair. Public figures such as the Princess were not entitled to privacy only in “secluded” places out of the public eye. Even in public places interaction with others had to be considered not just from a spatial point of view but also in its functional aspect.128 Famous people were entitled to privacy for activities which had no bearing upon their public functions. In the case of politicians exercising official functions that private “zone” might be more restricted, but in the case of a person such as the Princess who was merely well-known and had no significant public role, it was much more extensive. Well-known figures and their families, just as the lesser-known, have thus a legitimate expectation of privacy for their “private recreation time”,129 even where this is enjoyed in public spaces. This case, however, contrasted with a subsequent case brought by Princess Caroline130 in which the European Court of Human Rights held that a photograph of her and her then husband out and about at a ski resort could be published. The photograph had been used as background to an article discussing the illness of her father, Prince Rainier, sovereign of Monaco, and its impact on his family. Its publication thus contributed “at least to some degree, to a debate of general interest” on which the press was free to report.131 Blogging is regarded as an activity carried out in the public sphere, of which the blogger has no expectation of privacy. This means that even if bloggers have adopted a pseudonym to conceal their identity, those who are able to deduce the identity are not restrained from revealing it.132

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(c) The individual’s prior interaction with the media The individual’s prior conduct, and in particular interaction with the media, are also relevant in framing reasonable expectations of privacy. Famous persons who have consistently courted media attention may have little expectation of suppressing press photographs of an expedition to the local shops, for example. By contrast, an ordinary member of the public who has committed no offence may have grounds for complaint if a police photographer takes and retains photographs of him, even if the shots merely show him walking along a public street.133 128 (2005) 40 EHRR 1 at para 54. 129 Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481 per Sir Anthony Clarke MR at para 55. 130 von Hannover v Germany (No 2) (2012) 55 EHRR 15. 131 (2012) 55 EHRR 15 at para 118. 132 Author of a Blog v Times Newspapers Ltd [2009] EWHC 1358 (QB), [2009] EMLR 22. 133 As in Wood v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] EWCA Civ 414, [2010] 1 WLR 123.

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746   The Law of Delict in Scotland

20.31

It is readily accepted, however, that “the mere fact of having cooperated with the press on previous occasions cannot serve as an argument for depriving the party concerned of all protection against publication of the report or photo at issue”.134 In Campbell, for example, the claimant (a famous fashion model) and the media had for a long time “fed upon each other. She [had] given them stories to sell their papers and they [had] given her publicity to promote her career.”135 Nonetheless, Campbell’s previous dealings with the press did not deprive her of the expectation of a “residual area of privacy”.136 The disputed newspaper coverage had included: (i) the fact that the claimant was a drug addict; (ii) the fact that she was receiving treatment for her addiction; (iii) the fact that she was receiving treatment at Narcotics Anonymous; (iv) the details of the treatment; and (v) a photograph of the claimant leaving a meeting of Narcotics Anonymous. It was common ground between the parties that all five elements would have merited privacy had the claimant been an ordinary individual, but even the claimant’s counsel conceded that her right to insist on confidentiality for the first and second elements was precluded by her “public lies”. By repeatedly insisting publicly that, unlike many fashion models, she did not take drugs, when in fact she had a serious addiction problem, she had forfeited the expectation that this part of her life should remain private.137 However, particular importance was attached to the third, fourth and fifth elements of the newspaper’s story – specific information about how her addiction was being addressed. The claimant had not previously courted publicity on these sensitive matters and an expectation of confidentiality subsisted.

(d) The intrusive power of images 20.32

The medium by which information is conveyed affects its impact; audiovisual media typically have a more immediate and intrusive effect than the print media. As noted by the European Court of Human Rights in von Hannover v Germany (No 2), “photos may contain very personal or even intimate information”.138 Even still photographs are regarded as “more vivid” than textual description and therefore “worth a thousand words”.139

Axel Springer AG v Germany (2012) 55 EHRR 6 at para 92. [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Hoffmann at para 66. Per Lord Hoffmann at para 68. [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457, as paraphrased by Lord Nicholls at para 24. See also Lord Hoffmann’s comments at para 56. 138 von Hannover v Germany (No 2) (2012) 55 EHRR 15 at para 103. 139 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Nicholls at para 31, Lord Hoffmann, at para 72, Lady Hale at para 155. See also In re JR38 [2015] UKSC 42, [2016] AC 1131; but cf Mahmood v Galloway [2006] EWHC 1286 (QB), [2006] EMLR 26, in which the publication of a passport-style photograph of the claimant was not judged to merit protection as private or confidential. 134 135 136 137

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Thus in Campbell v MGN Ltd140 publication of photographs of the claimant leaving a Narcotics Anonymous meeting increased the impact made by the revelation of her treatment for drug addiction and compounded the intrusiveness of the press coverage. Photographs and moving images often have greater potential than the written word to intrude “into the claimant’s own individual personality” and may do so in a “peculiarly humiliating and damaging way”.141 For this reason it has been accepted that even where the verbal description of a particular activity is unexceptionable, accompanying photographs may be deemed private. Thus in Campbell, publication of photographs could not be justified by the assertion that a verbal description of the same scene would not attract liability.142 Similarly in Theakston v MGN Ltd it was held that, while there was no legitimate expectation of privacy in regard to a newspaper article reporting a well-known television personality’s visit to a brothel, he would have had no expectation that photographs of his activities there would be made public, and the images were therefore to remain private.143

(4) The concept of misuse The concept of misuse is applied flexibly so as to extend not only to wrongful disclosure of information, but also to accessing information over which the subject had a reasonable expectation of privacy. As with breach of confidence, the conduct element of misuse of information typically includes disclosure, often by the press; yet, according to modern case law, it is enough that information should have been appropriated, and it is not necessarily required that the information should have been transmitted to another party. The concept of misuse was addressed in the English case of Gulati v MGN Ltd.144 A group of claimants discovered that their telephone calls had been hacked by journalists over a protracted period. There was little question that use of the hacked material to provide content for newspaper articles constituted misuse of private information. However, not all of the hacked material was actually put to this purpose, and in the case of one of the claimants, Yentob, his calls had been intercepted without any of the content subsequently appearing in the press. Nonetheless, Mann J held that merely by acquiring private information the defendant had infringed the claimants’ right to privacy, irrespective of whether an article was published.145 The defendant had “helped itself, 140 141 142 143 144

[2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457. Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EWHC 137 (QB), [2002] EMLR 22 per Ouseley J at para 78. [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Hoffmann at para 72. [2002] EWHC 137 (QB), [2002] EMLR 22 per Ouseley J at para 78. [2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch), [2016] FSR 12, affd [2015] EWCA Civ 1291, [2017] QB 149. For commentary, see N A Moreham, “Liability for Listening: Why Phone Hacking is an Actionable Breach of Privacy” (2015) 7 Journal of Media Law 155. 145 [2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch), [2016] FSR 12 at para 155 (affd [2015] EWCA Civ 1291, [2017] QB 149).

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748   The Law of Delict in Scotland

20.34

20.35

over an extended period of time, to large amounts of personal and private information and treated it as its own to deal with as it thought fit”, 146 thereby depriving the claimants of “the right to control the dissemination of information” about their private lives.147 In essence, therefore, “misappropriating” private information was sufficient without further disclosure.148 Even in Yentob’s case a valid claim could be made in respect of “infringement of a right which is sustained and serious”.149 Gulati therefore indicates that privacy is infringed, not just by enabling others to find out about the subject’s private life, but by the very fact of collecting private information in the first place. By analogy it is arguable that information is similarly appropriated by the use of other forms of surveillance that observe and record the subject’s private life, whether or not the information is subsequently disclosed or applied to another purpose. If telephone tapping, of itself, constitutes misuse of the information thereby gleaned, so too do activities such as the covert monitoring of email and internet usage,150 or the video recording of private acts.151 Typically, misuse is intentional, in the sense that private information is deliberately appropriated. However, there has been no indication in the case law thus far, in England or in Scotland, that intention is a necessary element of misuse. Where information has been disclosed with injurious consequences to the subject, it is hard to see why compensation should be withheld on the basis that the defender acted negligently rather than intentionally.152 On the other hand, where the defender acted negligently rather than by design, and the only consequence was distress to the subject,

146 [2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch), [2016] FSR 12 at para 132. 147 [2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch), [2016] FSR 12 at para 111. 148 [2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch), [2016] FSR 12 at para 143. See also Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908, [2011] Fam 116, to the effect that merely obtaining confidential documents in itself constituted breach of confidence. 149 [2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch), [2016] FSR 12 at para 132. 150 See e.g. Copland v United Kingdom (2007) 45 EHRR 37 (in which such activities, on the part of a public authority, were held to breach the subject’s reasonable expectation of privacy); Barbulescu v Romania (61496/08) [2017] IRLR 1032. 151 See e.g. S v Sweden (2014) 58 EHRR 36; In re Application by Flannigan for Judicial Review [2016] NIQB 27 (involving a public authority, in which the video-recording of a body search and retention of the recording, and the resulting “loss of control over the use of the search subject’s nakedness”, constituted an invasion of his privacy, regardless of whether the recording was ever to be used at a later date). 152 See Dobbs, Law of Torts para 580, citing Prince v St Francis-St George Hosp, Inc 20 Ohio App 3d 4, 484 NE 2d 265 (1985), in which a successful claim for invasion of privacy was brought against doctors who, in sending their account to the plaintiff’s medical insurer as agreed, had also in error included information about her chronic alcoholism. Cf J T McCarthy and R E Schechter, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy (2021 update) para 5.82(6), noting that, while intent is not normally listed as an element of the tort of disclosure, “most courts” that have examined the question have required a finding of intention, but “reckless conduct” is often considered its “functional equivalent”. See also NM v Smith [2007] 5 SA 250 (CC).

Invasion of Privacy   749

such as in cases where there was no disclosure, there may be reluctance to recognise a duty of care.153 This is in keeping with the restrictions on duty in respect of allegedly negligent infringement of other personality interests such as bodily and mental integrity or liberty.154 As with other delicts against the person,155 misuse is actionable only where it occurs against a person’s wishes; there is no misuse where the subject of the private information has consented, whether expressly or by implication, to its use. Indeed there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy over information willingly disclosed. Consent might be inferred where, for example, the subject of a photograph had behaved in a way that indicated a willingness to be photographed, but as in other contexts this would be a matter for the defender to establish.156 If the circumstances otherwise created an expectation of privacy for the pursuer, the inference is more readily drawn that consent was absent.157 Plainly the use of subterfuge to obtain information is unlikely to be consensual. Indeed, the Code of Practice of the Independent Press Standards Organisation provides specifically that:158 “The press must not seek to obtain or publish material acquired by using hidden cameras or clandestine listening devices; or by intercepting private or mobile telephone calls, messages or emails; or by the unauthorised removal of documents or photographs; or by accessing digitally-held information without consent.”

153 On this point see Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406 per Lord Hoffmann at para 51: “It is one thing to wander carelessly into the wrong hotel bedroom and another to hide in the wardrobe to take photographs.” See also American Law Institute, Restatement Second of Torts § 652B, providing that “One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person” (emphasis added). 154 See ch 6 and paras 17.50–17.51 above. Note, however, that where the information meets the definition of “data” and the act of appropriation entails “processing” (as set out in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation) (“GDPR”) Art 4(1) and Art 4(2)), the Data Protection Act 2018 s 168 recognises an entitlement to damages for “distress” without further requirement for recognised psychiatric injury. 155 See para 16.42 above. 156 See paras 16.45–16.46 above. 157 See e.g. Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481 per Sir Anthony Clarke MR at para 17: “It is a reasonable inference on the alleged facts that BPL knew that, if they had asked [the parents] for their consent to the taking and publication of such a photograph of their child, that consent would have been refused.” See also Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 1163 (QB), [2014] EMLR 24, affd [2015] EWCA Civ 1176, [2016] 1 WLR 1541, in which Dingemans J held, at paras 160–161, that the defendant newspaper did not know of the harassment of the subjects by the photographer, but must have known that the photographs had been taken without consent “because of the wording of the accompanying caption and the use of the word ‘spotted’” to describe the sighting of the subjects. See also para 37. 158 At para 10(i) (available at https://www.ipso.co.uk/editors-code-of-practice/).

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20.38

20.39

The use of information obtained by such methods is normally a misuse. A notable case of breach of the ethics of journalism can be seen in Gulati v MGN Ltd,159 discussed above. Little attempt was made to argue that the information obtained served the public interest,160 and the court was withering in its criticism of the “disgraceful” methods used. Similarly, in Mosley, where a hidden camera took photographs of sexual activity in a setting of which the parties had a high expectation of privacy, the court held that “the very fact of clandestine recording” pointed to “an intrusion and an unacceptable infringement of Article 8”.161 The Independent Press Standards Organisation’s Code of Practice further states that “Engaging in misrepresentation or subterfuge, including by agents or intermediaries, can generally be justified only in the public interest and then only when the material cannot be obtained by other means.”162 The stance adopted by the courts is likewise that use of surreptitious means to infiltrate a private zone weakens the journalist’s position.163 Admittedly, journalistic subterfuge is not always to be regarded as unethical. It might in exceptional instances be justifiable, where freedom of expression requires publication on a matter of clear public interest that could not otherwise have been brought to light.164 As a general rule, however, the freedom of expression exercised by journalists and others, discussed further below, is contingent on the notion that “they are acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and provide ‘reliable and precise’ information in accordance with the ethics of journalism”.165

(5) The conflict with freedom of expression 20.40

Not every use of private information without consent is an actionable misuse of that information. Just as freedom of expression and public interest may sometimes prevail against the interests of confidentiality,166 so too they have a role in preventing the use of private information from being deemed wrongful. As Lord Kilbrandon commented in the 1970s: “Privacy law affords an excellent example of how legal doctrines have to compromise between lawful but contradictory interests.”167 In judging whether private information has been misused the considerations which the common law 159 [2015] EWCA Civ 1291, [2017] QB 149. 160 See report of first instance decision at [2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch), [2016] FSR 12. 161 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20 per Eady J at para 17. See also Cooper v Turrell [2011] EWHC 3269 (QB) (secret audio recording). 162 At para 10(ii) (available at https://www.ipso.co.uk/editors-code-of-practice/). 163 Richard v BBC [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch), [2019] Ch 169 per Mann J at para 292; Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1. 164 As e.g. in Response Handling Ltd v BBC [2007] CSOH 102, 2008 SLT 51. 165 Axel Springer AG v Germany (2012) 55 EHRR 6 at para 93. 166 See paras 19.61–19.66 above. 167 “The Law of Privacy in Scotland” (1971) 2 Cambrian L Rev 35 at 35.

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has traditionally brought to bear in this regard are now reinforced by the content of ECHR Articles 8 and 10, as well as the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.168 The “balancing exercise” which this entails accords privacy and freedom of expression “equal respect”.169

(a) The relative nature of the entitlement to privacy It follows that the entitlement to privacy, just as the right to private life enshrined in Article 8,170 is relative, not absolute, and greater weight is attributed to some areas of private life than to others. The different degrees of privacy were mentioned above.171 The relative nature of the entitlement to privacy also means that those who have voluntarily placed themselves in the public eye, such as figures in the entertainment world,172 politicians,173 or even civil servants in influential positions,174 must tolerate a closer degree of media attention to some aspects of their personal lives, as compared with individuals without fame or public status.175 In particular, scrutiny might be justified if this casts light on issues of public interest, such as criminal activities,176 misuse of influence177 or lack of capacity to

168 A v B plc [2002] EWCA Civ 337, [2003] QB 195 per Lord Woolf at para 4, as cited in McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73 per Buxton LJ at para 11. See e.g. Axel Springer AG v Germany (2012) 55 EHRR 6 at paras 89–95, identifying the following core criteria as relevant to this balancing exercise: (i) whether the information made a contribution to a debate of general interest; (ii) the extent to which the person concerned was well known and his or her prior conduct; (iii) the method of obtaining the information; and (iv) the content, form and consequences of the publication. 169 See In Re S [2004] UKHL 47, [2005] 1 AC 593 per Lord Steyn at para 17. For examples, see McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73 per Buxton LJ at para 11; PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26, [2016] AC 1081; Richard v BBC [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch), [2019] Ch 169 per Mann J at para 229. 170 Article 8(2) allows for interference with privacy rights “such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. 171 See para 20.22 above. 172 A v B plc [2002] EWCA Civ 337, [2003] QB 195; see also Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481, in which the mother of the child claimant, the writer J K Rowling, had specifically “not sought to protect herself from the press, no doubt on the basis that she recognises that because of her fame the media are likely to be interested in her” (per Sir Anthony Clarke MR at para 13). 173 Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407. 174 Stoll v Switzerland (2007) 44 EHRR 53 at para 47. 175 E.g. in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457, the claimant could not “insist upon too great a nicety of judgment in the circumstantial detail with which the story is presented” (per Lord Hoffmann at para 66). 176 McKennitt v Ash [2005] EWHC 3003 (QB), [2006] EMLR 10 per Eady J at para 137 (affd [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73). 177 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Hoffmann at para 60, citing the example of a sexual relationship between a politician and someone whom she has appointed to public office.

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do their job,178 or if they have pronounced publicly on a particular matter, such as the claimant in Campbell, who had stated publicly that she did not have a problem with drug abuse.

(b) Freedom of expression and public interest 20.42

20.43

20.44

The “essential” role of the media as “public watchdog” entails that it has a duty to impart, and the public has a “right to receive”, information and ideas on matters of public interest.179 Moreover, journalistic freedom requires that the media should be permitted “possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation”.180 Until recently, however, the assessment of what was a legitimate subject of public interest appeared frequently to turn upon generalisations such as “public figures must expect to have less privacy”,181 and indeed the public interest defence was observed to operate on an ad hoc basis as “not so much a rule of law as an invitation to judicial idiosyncrasy”.182 The new methodology that has evolved since recognition of misuse of private information as a wrong purports to reduce “judicial idiosyncrasy” in favour of an approach that is “more carefully focussed and more penetrating”.183 At the top of the range of subject matter deserving of public interest are questions of national security (although national security may also present countervailing arguments for restraining disclosure).184 The workings of government, or public institutions,185 and material informing debate on, for instance, social policy186 are further examples of matters of serious public debate. Lower down the scale of importance, although still of consequence, are issues of impropriety or mismanagement in the commercial sector.187 However, the right to express oneself freely with regard to the personal lives of others has a more contested place on the order of importance – except insofar as this has broader implications for the subjects mentioned above. Certainly, information about the private life of public figures may sometimes contribute to a debate of public interest, although it is important to note that “what interests the public is not necessarily in the public 178 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lady Hale at para 157. 179 Axel Springer AG v Germany (2012) 55 EHRR 6 at para 79. 180 Axel Springer AG v Germany (2012) 55 EHRR 6 at para 81. 181 As pointed out by Eady J in Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20 at para 12, and see e.g. Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 WLR 760. 182 Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Secretary to the Department of Community Services and Health [1990] FSR 617 per Gummow J at 663. See also Toulson & Phipps on Confidentiality para 5–078, describing the “unstructured balancing exercise” previously applied. 183 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Hope at para 86. 184 See e.g. R v Shayler [2002] UKHL 11, [2003] 1 AC 247; Ministry of Defence v Griffin [2008] EWHC 1542 (QB). 185 E.g. London Regional Transport v Mayor of London [2001] EWCA Civ 1491, [2003] EMLR 4. 186 X v BBC 2005 SLT 796 per Temporary Judge M G Thomson QC at para 58. 187 E.g. Response Handling Ltd v BBC [2007] CSOH 102, 2008 SLT 51.

Invasion of Privacy   753

interest”.188 The sex lives of famous persons, for example, may interest the public, but even if the conduct of such persons has been “distasteful” or “unconventional”,189 publication is not justified except to the extent that it sheds light upon abuse of influence190 or corruption,191 or prevents the public from being “seriously misled”.192 There is no general entitlement to expose any conduct deemed by the press to be “socially harmful”, although “the court is perhaps even less well-equipped . . . than a newspaper editor” to act as an arbiter in this regard.193 As explained by Laing J in AMC v News Group Newspapers Ltd, a case in which an injunction was granted to prevent the defendant newspaper from publishing details of the relationship between a well-known sportsman and a former girlfriend:194 “[T]here is a risk that the phrase ‘socially harmful’ can become a pretext for judging others by reference to moral positions which those others do not, or might not, share. This is a particular risk for a court in an increasingly secular society in which some issues, especially questions of sexual conduct, do not attract the consensus which they once did. In my judgment, few people, other than adherents to strict religious codes, could rationally consider that this conduct is so fundamentally inconsistent with being a role model of the kind which [the claimant] is that there is a public interest in exposing it.”

Similarly, in PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd195 it was held that there could be no public-interest justification for circulating details of the claimant’s infidelities, even though he and his partner were well-known figures in the entertainment world. The court was at pains to emphasise that publication of “kiss and tell” stories did not of itself serve the public interest, unless there was a further dimension of abuse of power or professional misconduct, and “criticism of supposed infidelity” did not therefore offer an adequate “guise” that would entitle the media to disclose such matters.196

188 McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73 per Buxton LJ at para 66. 189 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20 per Eady J at para 128. 190 See e.g. Goodwin v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1437 (QB), [2011] EMLR 27 per Tugendhat J at para 103, in which it was held to be of public interest to expose “the extent to which men in positions of power benefit from that power in forming relationships with sexual partners who are less senior within the same organisation”. 191 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Hoffmann at para 60. 192 Browne v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] EWHC 202, [2007] EMLR 19 per Eady J at para 46 (revd in part [2007] EWCA Civ 295, [2008] QB 103). See e.g. Ferdinand v MGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB), holding that it was in the public interest to expose details of the claimant’s extramarital affair. This was relevant to the wholesome image that he had cultivated in support of his suitability for the role of captain of the England football team. 193 AMC v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWHC 2361 (QB) per Laing J at para 27. 194 [2015] EWHC 2361 (QB) at para 27. 195 [2016] UKSC 26, [2016] AC 1081. 196 [2016] UKSC 26, [2016] AC 1081 per Lord Mance at para 22.

754   The Law of Delict in Scotland

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20.47

Thus, as noted above, the European Court of Human Rights held in von Hannover v Germany (No 1)197 that press coverage of Princess Caroline’s day-to-day activities with her family did not contribute to a debate of public interest, but a subsequent case198 held that it was legitimate to publish a photograph of her and her husband on holiday where the photograph formed the background to an article discussing the illness of her father, Prince Rainier, sovereign of Monaco, and its impact upon other members of the royal family. Similarly, in a subsequent case involving her brother, Prince Albert II, who was by then sovereign,199 a news article accompanied by a photograph revealed that the Prince had an illegitimate son whose existence he had previously sought to keep secret. Publication was held to have been lawful as the subject was a matter of public concern. This information had dynastic and financial implications for Monaco’s ruling family and also provided insights into the Prince’s conduct that had a bearing on the way in which he discharged his public responsibilities. In general, however, while there may be legitimate public interest in scrutinising the conduct of those who exercise official functions, privacy is not lost merely through association with such individuals. In Archer v Williams200 the claimant was granted an injunction to prevent publication of material from her diaries as well as damages against her former secretary, who had disclosed details of her private life to a newspaper. The claimant was not a public figure in her own right but had come into the public eye following prosecution of her politician husband on criminal charges. She had not sought to bring her private life under the media spotlight and had not “by her way of life or her activities generated legitimate public interest in any of the matters which the defendant [was] seeking to publicise”.201 Notwithstanding the notoriety of her husband, therefore, the claimant’s right to protect the confidentiality of her private life outweighed her former employee’s right to freedom of expression. As noted above, freedom of expression rarely trumps the need to protect children,202 including those born to the famous, from interference with their privacy, family and home, even though the children themselves may be too young to register distress as a result of media exposure.203 The arguments for maintaining privacy are equally persuasive when the individual concerned was hitherto unknown and has unexpectedly become the subject of media attention. As comment (h) on § 652 of the 197 198 199 200 201 202

(2005) 40 EHRR 1. von Hannover v Germany (No 2) (2012) 55 EHRR 15. Couderc v France [2016] EMLR 19. [2003] EWHC 1670 (QB), [2003] EMLR 38. [2003] EWHC 1670 (QB), [2003] EMLR 38 per Jackson J at para 66. See para 20.21 above, and see also Reklos v Greece [2009] EMLR 16 (unpublished photographs taken of a new-born with the consent of the hospital but without the consent of his parents, held by the ECtHR to violate Art 8). 203 Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481.

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US Restatement Second of Torts points out: “Revelations that may properly be made concerning a murderer or the President of the United States would not be privileged if they were to be made concerning one who is merely injured in an automobile accident.” In X v BBC,204 the pursuer was a teenager whose consent to being filmed for the purposes of a television documentary was compromised by her age, poor literacy skills, and state of intoxication. In granting an interim interdict to prevent the film from being broadcast, the court referred to paragraph 16 of the then applicable Broadcasting Standards Commission’s Code on Fairness and Privacy and to the importance of ensuring that “when, for a short time, people are caught up, however involuntarily, in events which have a place in the news, their situation is not abused or exploited either at the time or in later programmes which revisit those events”.205

(c) The importance of correcting false impressions It was accepted in principle in Campbell that it might be in the public interest for a “false image”206 presented by a famous person to be corrected. Those who have misled the public are not entitled to complain where details of their private lives are exposed in order to “put the record straight”.207 In the Campbell case, the claimant had previously spoken out about drug addiction and the fact that she herself was not afflicted by it. The fact of her addiction was therefore a legitimate subject of public interest and, as Lady Hale pointed out, possession and use of illegal drugs is a crime and prima facie a matter of public concern.208 However, when the reality lying behind a misleading impression has no criminal dimension and is no more than the subject for mild reproach, it becomes more difficult to justify its exposure. In McKennitt v Ash the defendant argued that disclosure of details of the claimant’s private life in the defendant’s memoir was justified in order to expose the claimant’s hypocrisy in the sense that she had failed to meet with standards of behaviour that she had set herself and published on her website. In the event it was established that the allegations with which the defendant purported to expose the claimant’s true character were incorrect. The court, however, accepted that, even if the claimant had been presenting a false impression, disclosure was not justified simply because she had attempted to cultivate an unduly flattering image as a wholesome and generous individual.209 204 2005 SLT 796. 205 2005 SLT 796 per Temporary Judge M G Thomson QC at para 12. The Ofcom Broadcasting Code, which has now replaced the BSC’s Code, contains a similar provision in section 8. 206 [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Nicholls at para 24. 207 [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Hope at para 82. 208 [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lady Hale at para 151. 209 McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73 per Buxton LJ at para 69 (the claimant had posted on her personal website a list of wholesome values which she claimed were her “compass points”).

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20.49

Where a person has pretentions to being a significant role-model, there is a public interest in exposing failings that make that image undeserved. However, even a role-model is not required to set “an example in every sphere of his existence”.210 In AMC v News Group Newspapers Ltd an injunction was granted to a well-known sportsman to prevent disclosure of a past sexual relationship. Since the claimant was well-known, it was legitimate to consider whether the newspaper story would serve to expose his unsuitability as a role-model. The court, however, considered it important to focus on “what sort of a role model”.211 If he was a role-model for aspiring sportspersons, scrutiny of his conduct outside sport was relevant only to the extent that it had a bearing on his sporting activities. In this case the court concluded that “few people . . . could rationally consider that this conduct is so fundamentally inconsistent with being a role model of the kind which [the claimant] is that there is a public interest in exposing it”.212

(d) The consequences of disclosure 20.50

In cases where interdict is sought, the risk of the pursuer suffering specific harm in the event of disclosure weighs against freedom of expression and in favour of maintaining privacy, particularly where there is a threat to physical safety. Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd213 presents an extreme example. The claimants were teenagers who, as children, had murdered a toddler in shocking and widely-publicised circumstances. They successfully sought an injunction to prevent the defendant newspapers from publishing details of their identity and whereabouts, since there was a danger that such information would enable them to be tracked down by individuals still seeking revenge. Given the real possibility of serious physical harm or even death in the event of disclosure, reference was made to ECHR Article 10(2), which envisages restrictions on freedom of expression “such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. Articles 2 and 3 ECHR (regarding the right to life and the prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment) were also cited as providing clear support for denying freedom of expression in regard to this information. A subsequent application for the injunction to be lifted in regard to one of the offenders when he reached adult life was

210 AMC v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWHC 2361 (QB) per Laing J at para 20. 211 [2015] EWHC 2361 (QB) per Laing J at para 20. 212 [2015] EWHC 2361 (QB) per Laing J at para 27. Contrast Ferdinand v MGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB), in which the fact of the claimant’s extramarital affair was considered relevant to the image that he had cultivated in his role as captain of the England football team. 213 [2001] Fam 430.

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similarly refused on the basis of the gravity of the risk to his physical safety that this would entail.214 Cases involving the risk of direct physical violence are rare, but lesser threats to a person’s physical or mental well-being must also be weighed in the balance. Moreover, in considering the consequences of disclosure allowance must be made for the pursuer’s physical or mental condition. X (A Woman formerly known as Mary Bell) v O’Brien215 concerned an adult, now rehabilitated, who, when a child, had killed two other children. A threat to disclose her identity and whereabouts and those of her child was not thought to endanger her life in terms of Article 2. However, in considering her entitlement to privacy, the court gave careful attention to the impact of disclosure upon the claimant’s mental stability.216 There was already enough information in the public domain to allow the media to comment freely on her case, including her rehabilitation, but if her name and whereabouts were to be revealed, the ensuing media attention would exacerbate her fragile mental condition.217 The circumstances were therefore held to justify the grant of a lifetime injunction against publication of identifying details.218

20.51

(6) The significance of prior publication As noted in the previous chapter, once information has become widely known, it loses its confidential quality and its disclosure is no longer an actionable breach of confidence.219 An important distinction, however, between breach of confidence and breach of privacy is that “privacy can be invaded by further publication of information or photographs already disclosed to the public”.220 That distinction was illustrated in PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd221 in which the claimant and his husband were wellknown figures in the entertainment business and had a young family. A story had already circulated in US, Canadian and Scottish newspapers 214 Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2019] EWHC 494 (Fam), [2019] EMLR 17; see also A (A Protected Party) v Persons Unknown [2016] EWHC 3295 (Ch), [2017] EMLR 11. 215 [2003] EWHC 1101 (QB), [2003] EMLR 37. 216 [2003] EWHC 1101 (QB), [2003] EMLR 37 per Butler-Sloss P at paras 41–45. 217 [2003] EWHC 1101 (QB), [2003] EMLR 37 per Butler-Sloss P at para 60. 218 See also Callaghan v Independent News and Media Ltd [2009] NIQB 1, in which it was relevant in granting an injunction that disclosure of the claimant’s identity would prejudice his rehabilitation and increase the risk of his reoffending. See further Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Hope at para 98, Lady Hale at paras 157–158, in which damages were awarded on the basis that disclosure of information concerning the claimant’s treatment for addiction was not just “highly offensive” but also likely to have a damaging effect upon its chances of success. 219 On the limited scope of confidentiality with regard to material in the public domain, see paras 19.27–19.31 above. 220 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Nicholls at para 255. 221 [2016] UKSC 26, [2016] AC 1081.

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identifying the parties and detailing the claimant’s involvement in extramarital affairs. That information was further available in any location by means of a determined internet search, which meant that an estimated 20–25 per cent of the population in England and Wales was already aware of it. An injunction was nonetheless granted to restrain publication of essentially the same story in England and Wales. The Supreme Court observed that had the case been based upon confidentiality, it would have had “substantial difficulties”,222 since the case had already passed the point at which it was realistic for a court to prevent publication on the ground of confidentiality. However, as the main focus of misuse of private information is the wrong represented by intrusion into the private sphere,223 the court was persuaded that, although the information might already have been available online, fresh publication in mass-circulation newspapers had the potential to “magnify” the intrusion that had already occurred and the distress thereby caused to the claimant and his family. Repetition of the disclosure was therefore “capable of constituting a further tort of invasion of privacy, even in relation to persons to whom disclosure or publication was previously made – especially if it occurs in a different medium”.224 In this connection it has been accepted that photographs have particularly intrusive potential and therefore there is in effect a fresh invasion of privacy when each additional viewer sees a photograph “and even when one who has seen a previous publication of the photograph is confronted by a fresh publication of it”.225

(7) Privacy and false information 20.53

Misuse of private information is capable of extending to false as well as truthful information, so that defamation is not the only route to redress where private information is published that is substantially false and has caused serious harm.226 Private information is misused even where facts have been embroidered, distorted, or made up by the defender.227

222 223 224 225

[2016] UKSC 26, [2016] AC 1081 per Lord Neuberger at para 57. CTB v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1326 (QB) per Eady J at para 23. [2016] UKSC 26, [2016] AC 1081 per Lord Mance at para 32. Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125 per Lord Phillips MR at para 105. 226 Hannon v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2015] EMLR 1; McKennitt v Ash [2005] EWHC 3003 (QB), [2006] EMLR 10 per Eady J at para 78 (affd [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73): “the protection of the law would be illusory if a claimant, in relation to a long and garbled story, was obliged to spell out which of the revelations are accepted as true, and which are said to be false or distorted”. See also Cornelius v de Taranto [2001] EWCA Civ 1511, [2002] EMLR 6; and for the US position see D A Elder, Privacy Torts (2020 update) para 3.1. 227 See e.g. P v Quigley [2008] EWHC 1051 (QB), in which the threatened publication of an entirely “fictitious” account of sexual activities by the claimants constituted an actionable infringement of privacy.

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In McKennitt v Ash,228 for example, the defendant had published a book recounting details of her friendship with the claimant. Certain parts of the book were found to be untrue, but the important question was “whether the information is private”.229 The claim for misuse of private information did not “disappear” if the information was false; moreover, the veracity or otherwise of the text was relevant in determining whether the defendant’s right to freedom of expression merited protection.230 Defamation differs from misuse of information in that the former is contingent upon falsity whereas the latter obviously is not. But that is not the only difference. The primary concern of defamation is the extent to which D’s conduct has caused harm to P’s reputation; misuse of information, on the other hand focuses upon the extent of the intrusion into P’s private sphere. As explained by Tugendhat J in Cooper v Turrell:231

20.54

“Damages for defamation are a remedy to vindicate a claimant’s reputation from the damage done by the publication of false statements. Damages for misuse of private information are to compensate for the damage, and injury to feelings and distress, caused by the publication of information which may be either true or false.”

The distinction is illustrated in Cooper itself. The defendant misused private information by the false disclosure that the claimant, who was suffering from a different medical condition, had a brain tumour. That allegation could not be said in itself to damage the claimant’s reputation, but it was false and intrusive, and damages were payable for the distress thereby caused. In addition, the claimant and the company of which he was a director brought a parallel claim for defamation. This arose out of allegations by the defendant that the director’s state of health made him unfit for office and meant that the company was mismanaged. These allegations clearly did impugn the reputation of the director and the company, and damages were awarded on that basis.

(8) Remedies232 (a) Interdict Where disclosure of private information is anticipated, the subject of the information may seek interdict to restrain publication, with interim interdict 228 [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73. 229 [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73 per Longmore LJ at para 86. 230 [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73 per Longmore LJ at para 87. Buxton LJ similarly stated, at para 80, that “the defendant cannot deprive the claimant of his Article 8 protection simply by demonstrating that the matter is untrue”. 231 [2011] EWHC 3269 (QB) at para 102. 232 For an account of remedies in English law see J N E Varuhas and N A Moreham (eds), Remedies for Breach of Privacy (2018).

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20.56

available pending a full hearing of the facts. Even where limited disclosure has already occurred, this does not necessarily argue against the availability of interdict if further publication is likely to add significantly to the “overall intrusiveness and distress involved”.233 Unlike the law of defamation, in which lies may ultimately be exposed as such at proof, the law of privacy typically involves information that is true. An invasion of privacy cannot therefore be redressed in similar fashion after publication, since the pursuer’s main interest is in ensuring that private information remains so.234 For that reason, it may often be the case that privacy rights can only be adequately protected by the grant of interdict, rather than damages after the event.235 As in the case of breach of confidence,236 an important consideration is the effect of section 12(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998, which stipulates that interim interdict is not to be granted “so as to restrain publication before trial unless the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed”. Section 12(4) requires the court to “have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to freedom of expression” in this assessment. The test of what is “likely” is of course extremely fluid. This was interpreted by Temporary Judge Thomson in X v BBC237 as meaning that interim interdict should not be granted unless the pursuer had established that the prospect of success at proof was “more likely than not”. This is, however, subject to the qualification that:238 “there will be cases where it is necessary for a court to depart from this general approach and a lesser degree of likelihood will suffice as a prerequisite. Circumstances where this may be so include those mentioned above: where the potential adverse consequences of disclosure are particularly grave, or where a short-lived injunction is needed to enable the court to hear and give proper consideration to an application for interim relief pending the trial or any relevant appeal.”

In X, even though it could not be established that the pursuer was more likely than not to succeed at proof, the risk of serious harm in the event of disclosure meant that it was nonetheless appropriate for interim interdict to be granted in order to protect her. 233 PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26, [2016] AC 1081 per Lord Mance at para 26. 234 Spelman v Express Newspapers [2012] EWHC 355 (QB) per Tugendhat J at 110. 235 PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26, [2016] AC 1081 per Lord Mance at para 41; cf White v Dickson (1881) 8 R 896, in which the court indicated that, if injury was caused by publication, the fact that the court refused interdict would not save the defender from liability to pay damages. 236 See para 19.71 above. 237 2005 SLT 796. 238 Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee [2004] UKHL 44, [2005] 1 AC 253 per Lord Nicholls at para 22, cited in X v BBC 2005 SLT 796 at para 16.

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(b) Damages After disclosure, an award of damages serves the purpose of vindicating the right to privacy as well as compensating for the distress and loss caused by the infringement,239 “affording some degree of solatium to the injured party”.240 The English courts have not so far recognised misuse of private information as attracting the award of exemplary damages.241 That question does not arise in Scots law; but where loss or injury is established in cases of deliberate wrongdoing, “outrageous conduct” by the defender may be a factor which “aggravates” the damages awarded.242

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(c) Extrajudicial complaints procedures Self-regulation has for many years been one of the main forms of control over the activities of the media in reporting the lives of individuals. Especially for those without the wherewithal to embark upon litigation, the complaints procedures set up for the various sectors of the media provide an important route for resolving grievances. The Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO), which is the independent regulator for the newspaper and magazine industry in the UK, oversees compliance with the Editors’ Code of Practice.243 Similarly Ofcom oversees compliance with the Ofcom Broadcasting Code.244 As compared with the small numbers of cases on breach of confidentiality and privacy brought before the civil courts in any given year, IPSO, for example, processed 9,766 enquiries and complaints in 2019.245

239 See generally para 31.04 below. In the absence of recent Scottish authority on privacy, see Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20 per Eady J at para 216; Gulati v MGN Ltd [2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch), [2016] FSR 12, affd [2015] EWCA Civ 1291, [2017] QB 149 per Mann J at para 168: the “damages should compensate not merely for distress . . ., but should also compensate (if appropriate) for the loss of privacy or autonomy as such arising out the infringement”. See also R (on the application of Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 1 AC 245 per Lord Dyson at para 100, rejecting, in the context of false imprisonment, a category of “vindicatory damages” as such, but acknowledging that in English law compensatory damages may serve a “vindicatory purpose”. For discussion of current levels of damages in relation to misuse of private information, see McGregor, Damages para 47–008. 240 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20 per Eady J at para 231. 241 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20. On the potential for the statutory award of exemplary damages in England, see N A Moreham and M Warby (eds), Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and the Media, 3rd edn (2016) para 12.135. 242 Walker, Delict 461–462. 243 Editors’ Code of Practice (https://www.ipso.co.uk/editors-code-of-practice/ ). 244 Ofcom Broadcasting Code (https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/132073/BroadcastCode-Full.pdf ). 245 IPSO Annual Report 2019 (https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1968/ar_2019_.pdf) 10.

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E. APPROPRIATION OF INDICIA OF IDENTITY FOR COMMERCIAL GAIN 20.59

In the cases considered so far, pursuers did not wish the information to be publicised in any circumstances, and the social impact of misuse of information was the paramount consideration. In a further category of cases, D infringes P’s “right to be let alone” by appropriating P’s name, image, voice, or “other singular or notable characteristics associated peculiarly”246 with P’s identity, and typically does so for commercial advantage. The paradigm case is where D appropriates the name or image of P, a “celebrity”, without P’s consent, in order to promote D’s products. In that context, P’s objective in challenging D’s appropriation is to control the use made of publicity for P’s name or image – not to prevent publicity altogether. Loss of control over the use of personal information may result in some injury to feelings or dignity,247 but the commercial impact is likely to be the more significant consideration. The legal issue is therefore the extent to which the indicia of personality can be protected when they are already in the public domain.

(1) Publicity rights in the United States 20.60

In certain jurisdictions,248 including perhaps most notably some of those in the United States, express recognition is given to the right of individuals to control the commercial use of distinctive features of their persona. This “right of publicity”, although “still a relatively raw and brash newcomer”,249 has developed alongside privacy law. Prosser’s fourth privacy tort250 – invasion of privacy by appropriation of the plaintiff’s identity – is split into two subcategories, the first providing redress for damage to the plaintiff’s “psyche” and the second for damage to his or her “pocketbook”.251 In the majority of US states such rights of publicity have now come to be recognised, at common law or by statute, typically as a form of intellectual property right the infringement of which constitutes a “species

246 Dobbs, Law of Torts § 740. 247 E.g. where the pursuer’s image has been associated with an inappropriate product or activity, such as the picture associating the plaintiff with a “Playgirl” in Ali v Playgirl, Inc 447 F Supp 723 (DCNY 1978). 248 See also the Image Rights (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Ordinance 2012, allowing persons to register personal attributes such as appearance, voice or mannerisms in a Register of Personalities and Images. Registered “image rights” have extensive protection and may be licensed and assigned. 249 J T McCarthy and R E Schechter, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy (2021 update) Preface. See also American Law Institute, Restatement Third of Unfair Competition §§ 46–49. 250 See para 20.03 above. 251 McCarthy and Schechter, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy §§ 1.7 and 5.63–5.67. For discussion of coincidence of emotional and commercial harm, see Restatement Third of Unfair Competition § 46, comment b.

Invasion of Privacy   763

within the genus of ‘unfair competition’ law”.252 And whereas the right of famous persons to maintain the informational privacy of their personal lives may frequently be trumped by the newsworthiness of stories about them and the right of the press to freedom of expression, the merchandising or advertising value attached to personality, often created by application of the individual’s own time, energy, and skill, is likely to be more jealously guarded.253 For instance, while the use of a Bette Midler “soundalike” in an advertisement for cars was clearly actionable,254 the singing star would have experienced more difficulty in silencing press coverage of troubles in her personal life.255 Attempts to control the commercial appropriation of personality are most often made by individuals thought of as “celebrities”, and the greater their fame or notoriety, the greater will be the extent of the economic injury suffered.256 Nevertheless, even ordinary individuals who have only briefly come to public attention are generally considered to be entitled to restrain commercial appropriation of their identity.257 And not only name and image are protected; the scope of the right of publicity has expanded to encompass a wide range of the “indicia of identity”258 extending beyond voice and signature to dress and pose,259 nicknames260 and catchphrases.261

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(2) Protection for image rights in England and Scotland In England and Wales, by contrast, the basis upon which such “publicity rights” might be vindicated is more problematic. It has been plainly stated that, in English law at least, “the right to one’s own image” is not independently recognised and that an alleged invasion of such a right does not of itself give rise to liability.262 The “basic principle” has been reasserted that:

252 McCarthy and Schechter, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy §§ 1.7; 6.3; see also Restatement Third of Unfair Competition § 46. 253 See M Madow, “Private Ownership of Public Image” (1993) 81 Calif L Rev 125 at 130–131. 254 Midler v Ford Motor Co 849 F 2d 460 (9th Cir 1988). 255 Example suggested in Madow, “Private Ownership of Public Image” 131. 256 Motschenbacher v R J Reynolds Tobacco Co 498 F 2d 821 (9th Cir 1974) at 825. 257 J T McCarthy and R E Schechter, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, 2nd edn (2019) § 4.16; see also Waits v Frito-Lay, Inc 978 F 2d 1093 CA9 (Cal 1992) (“superstardom” not a prerequisite). 258 See D Westfall and D Landau, “Publicity Rights as Property Rights” (2005–06) 23 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 71 at 91ff. 259 White v Samsung Electronics America, Inc 971 F 2d 1395 (9th Cir 1992). 260 Hirsch v S C Johnson & Son, Inc 280 NW 2d 129 (Wis 1979). 261 Carson v Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc 698 F 2d 831 (6th Cir 1983). 262 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lady Hale at para 154. Lady Hale contrasted the position in Quebec where, in Aubry v Éditions Vice-Versa Inc [1998] 1 SCR 59, 157 DLR (4th) 577, the Supreme Court of Canada awarded damages to an individual whose photograph was taken in a public place without her consent and published in the defendants’ magazine. This infringed her right to privacy, which included the right to control the use of her image.

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764   The Law of Delict in Scotland

“There is in English law no ‘image right’ or ‘character right’ which allows a celebrity to control the use of his or her name or image”.263 No comparable denial of a right to image is to be found in the Scottish reports, but there is little authority directly in point. At the same time, neither jurisdiction simply permits the commercial exploitation of individuals’ image rights without their consent. Aside from statutory protections available for protection of intellectual property rights,264 a range of common law remedies may be invoked, including breach of confidence, defamation, and passing off.

(3) Breach of confidence 20.63

20.64

One of the few Scottish cases to deal specifically with image rights is one in which the reasoning ultimately appeared to rest on breach of confidence. In M’Cosh v Crow & Co,265 interdict was granted to prevent the defender from displaying in its photographic studio photographs that a previous proprietor had taken of the pursuer’s young daughters. The photographs were chosen because, as the pursuer acknowledged,266 they were flattering rather than hurtful, and no injury to reputation or dignity was inflicted. Across the Atlantic, M’Cosh triggered the announcement that “Scotland has had a ‘Right to privacy’ case”,267 but it was not interpreted in this way back home.268 As discussed in greater detail in the previous chapter,269 the court did not fully clarify the basis by which a successor of the original photographer was compelled to withdraw the photographs from display, but it appeared to recognise an enduring obligation of confidentiality which extended to those in possession of confidential information, knowing it to be such. The twentieth-century developments discussed in chapter 19 extend the reach of breach of confidence to third parties who are unrelated to the original confidant but who receive information in the knowledge, actual or constructive, that it should be treated as confidential. The difficulty with this category of case in the present context is that features such as image or name are, by and large, publicly observable and cannot in themselves be considered “confidential” in any normal sense of the word. Indeed, in the case of “celebrities”, the individual’s career may have been built precisely upon 263 Fenty v Arcadia Group Brands Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 3, [2015] 1 WLR 3291 per Kitchin LJ at para 29. 264 E.g. in terms of the Trade Marks Act 1994 to the extent that characteristics are incorporated within a trade mark, or in terms of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to the extent that they are incorporated within an artistic work etc. 265 (1903) 5 F 670. 266 As noted in the account of proceedings in the sheriff court: (1903) 5 F 670 at 681. 267 (1903) 65 Albany LJ 170. 268 For commentary see E J Macgillivray, contributing to “Notes on Decided Cases” (1903) 15 JR 319. 269 See para 19.19 above.

Invasion of Privacy   765

courting publicity for name and image. As noted above, the key feature in such cases is not intrusion into secrets or private life per se, but infringement of the individual’s right to control how such personal information is used and disseminated by others.

(a) Douglas v Hello!: the subject of the information In England the paradigm case is Douglas v Hello! Ltd270 in which the claimants, the film stars Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones, had negotiated a large fee in return for granting OK! magazine the exclusive right to publish photographs of their wedding in New York. Despite elaborate security arrangements, a paparazzo contrived to take clandestine photographs of the reception. These were sold to Hello! magazine, which duly published them. The Douglases brought a successful action for breach of confidence against the publishers of Hello!, claiming compensation both for intrusion into their private life and for the commercial damage suffered by the loss of exclusive control over the wedding pictures.271 Separately, the publishers of OK! magazine were also successful in their own claim for breach of confidence.272 The artificiality of “shoehorning” claims of this nature into the law of confidentiality was noted by the court.273 The Douglases themselves had agreed with OK! magazine that most of the salient visual details were to be made very public indeed immediately after the wedding,274 but Hello!’s argument that this undermined the couple’s expectation of privacy was rejected in the Court of Appeal, and not pursued further in the House of Lords. Lord Phillips conceded that: “To the extent that an individual authorises photographs taken on a private occasion to be made public, the potential for distress at the publication of other, unauthorised, photographs, taken on the same occasion, will be reduced.”275 This affected the amount of damages, but it did not mean that confidentiality had been lost altogether. Some of the unapproved photographs were more candid than those published by OK! and were deemed to be intrusive in allowing “the viewer to focus on

270 [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125. For commentary, see C Michalos, “Image Rights and Privacy: After Douglas v Hello” (2005) 27 European Intellectual Property Rev 384. Only the magazine’s claim, and not that of the Douglases, was the subject of the appeal to the House of Lords, where the report at [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 is headed OBG Ltd v Allan, a case with which it was conjoined. 271 [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125. 272 [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1, but OK! was unsuccessful in its claim that the defendants had interfered in its contract with the Douglases by unlawful means. 273 [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125 per Lord Phillips MR at para 53. 274 Aside from the many readers who would see the authorised pictures, the event itself was attended by 350 guests and large numbers of hotel staff. 275 [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125 at para 107.

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20.67

20.68

intimate personal detail”.276 Furthermore, publication of the unauthorised images constituted “a fresh intrusion of privacy when each additional viewer sees the photograph and even when one who has seen a previous publication of the photograph is confronted by a fresh publication of it”.277 In recognition of the distress which they had suffered as a result, the Douglases were awarded damages set at the modest level of £3,750 each. It was further accepted that the bridal couple’s claim had a commercial aspect. Their counsel had emphasised that “what was complained of here was the loss of control over the photographs to be published”.278 The cultivation of an appropriate image off-screen was of major importance to the Douglases, as to others in the acting profession, because of the “inevitable spillover of their persona and public image into their livelihoods”.279 It was important to them, from a professional point of view, not to keep their image hidden from the world, but it was also important to retain power over the way in which their image was captured and disseminated. The difficult question was the appropriate mechanism by which this could be achieved. Lord Phillips made passing reference to the recognition of publicity or image rights in other jurisdictions, but did not seek to import these concepts into English law. Instead, he saw no reason why equity should not be invoked to “protect the opportunity to profit from confidential information about oneself in the same circumstances that it protects the opportunity to profit from confidential information in the nature of a trade secret”.280 Applying the analogy of trade secret cases, the court accepted that the Douglases would have been entitled to an account of profits if any profit had been made by the defendants from the unauthorised publication.281 In the absence of such a profit, further damages of £7,000282 were awarded to compensate the Douglases for the expense and disruption suffered in having to select photographs quickly in order to bring forward the publication of the wedding issue of OK!. There are no recent reported authorities to indicate how a case such as Douglas v Hello! Ltd would be resolved in Scotland. Yet, as discussed 276 277 278 279

[2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125 per Lord Phillips MR at para 105. [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125 per Lord Phillips MR at para 105. As narrated by Keene LJ, [2001] QB 967 at 1013 (interlocutory stage). [2001] QB 967 per Brooke LJ at 978. Sedley J also remarked (at 1006) upon the care taken by the Douglases “to retain a right of veto over publication of ‘OK!’s’ photographs in order to maintain the kind of image which is professionally and no doubt also personally important to them”. 280 [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125 at para 113. 281 [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125 per Lord Phillips MR at para 249. 282 The claimants had argued, citing Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch), [2002] 1 WLR 2355, that damages should be fixed by reference to the notional licence fee that they would have charged Hello! for use of the photographs. This approach was rejected ([2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125 per Lord Phillips MR at paras 246–247), partly because the fiction of fixing a notional licence fee was inappropriate where, as here, there was no question of an actual licence being granted, and partly because this would have resulted in an unjust enrichment to the Douglases, who had already been paid £1 million by OK! for the right to publish wedding photographs.

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in Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd,283 gaps in the modern law of breach of confidence have typically been filled by assimilation of English authority. Since the “substance of the law” has been regarded as “the same” on both sides of the border,284 discussion of the position of third parties in receipt of confidential information has been informed by reasoning from English cases. It is therefore likely that the Scottish courts will draw upon the reasoning of English cases such as Douglas to recognise a breach of confidence in this context also. An important difference, however, is that the acknowledged crossborder differences in the “juridical basis” 285 for the law of confidentiality entail recognition that a delict has been committed in these circumstances; in other words, as with trade secrets, a party who has obtained access to personal information about another is under a delictual duty not to make use of that information for the party’s own profit.

(b) Third-party rights to exploit identity In Douglas v Hello! Ltd the publishers of OK! magazine argued that they too were entitled to damages, since the Douglases’ right to protect the wedding images had transmitted to them as a trade secret or comparable commercial right. Indeed at the interlocutory stage, Douglas v Hello! Ltd had been characterised as “essentially a commercial dispute between two magazine enterprises”.286 The Court of Appeal rejected OK!’s claim. While OK! had a licence to exploit the photographs, there was, said the Court of Appeal, no right to the benefit of confidential information relating to the Douglases, still less to sue third parties for infringement of rights which remained vested in the Douglases.287 The House of Lords, however, thought that, having bought the benefit of the obligation of confidence imposed by the Douglases on those attending the wedding, OK! was entitled to protect that benefit against any third party who sought to destroy it.288 The jurisprudential basis for this view was not fully elucidated. The House of Lords expressly set itself against recognition of a free-standing, fully transmissible, proprietorial interest in personal information, with Lord Hoffmann declaring that there was “no question of creating an ‘image right’ or any other unorthodox form of intellectual property”.289 But the House of Lords took the view that where a recipient of information knew that a third party had put in place measures to keep the information confidential and had a financial interest in maintaining such confidentiality, 283 284 285 286 287 288 289

See paras 19.20–19.24 above. Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd 1989 SC (HL) 122 per Lord Keith at 164. Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd 1989 SC (HL) 122 per Lord Keith at 164. [2001] QB 967 per Brooke LJ at 996. [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125 per Lord Phillips MR at paras 134–135. [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1. [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 124, also Lord Walker at para 293.

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768   The Law of Delict in Scotland

an obligation was owed to that party as well as to the individual subjects of the information. In upholding OK!’s claim on the ground of breach of confidence, Lord Hoffmann stated:290 “‘OK!’ had paid £1m for the benefit of the obligation of confidence imposed upon all those present at the wedding in respect of any photographs of the wedding. That was quite clear. Unless there is some conceptual or policy reason why they should not have the benefit of that obligation, I cannot see why they were not entitled to enforce it. And in my opinion there are no such reasons. Provided that one keeps one’s eye firmly on the money and why it was paid, the case is . . . quite straightforward.”

20.71

Lord Brown remarked similarly that “Having paid £1m for an exclusive right it seems to me that ‘OK!’ ought to be in a position to protect that right and to look to the law for redress were a third party intentionally to destroy it.”291 Importantly, the House of Lords did not disturb the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that breach of confidence, in this context at least, was not to be treated as a tort.292 Thus just as the Douglases’ right to protect their position arose in “equity”,293 so the right of third parties to protect the transferred right was also “equitable”.294 The decision is therefore a pragmatic English response to commercial arrangements which the commodification of celebrity has made commonplace. How it will play in Scotland is less clear. A particular difficulty is title to sue. Aside from statutory intellectual property rights, no common-law mechanism has developed by which a person might assign image, name, or honour to another, and these are extra-patrimonial rights to which creditors do not lay claim in the event of bankruptcy. Without the possibilities of divided interests opened out by the law of equity for English law, it seems unlikely that a remedy could be found for a person in the position of OK! unless there is recognition of a form of intellectual property right, akin to goodwill, which could be assigned to third parties – an idea that was firmly rejected by the House of Lords in Douglas.295

(4) Defamation and false representation of endorsement 20.72

In Bradley v Menley & James Ltd296 a professor of veterinary medicine successfully invoked the law of defamation where it was established that the 290 [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 at para 117. 291 [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 at para 325. 292 [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125 per Lord Phillips MR at para 96 (considering the issue for the purposes of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 s 9(1)). 293 [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125 per Lord Phillips MR at para 113. 294 [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 1. 295 For further discussion, see G Black, Publicity Rights and Image: Exploitation and Legal Control (2011). 296 1913 SC 923.

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defenders had falsely suggested that he had endorsed their medical preparations. It was recognised that use of his name might impugn his professional reputation, although the damages considered appropriate by the jury in the circumstances of the case were nominal only. Similar reasoning was seen in the later English case of Tolley v J S Fry and Sons Ltd297 in which it was held that an amateur golfer had been defamed by the use of his image, without his consent, in an advertisement by a chocolate manufacturer, as those seeing the advertisement would conclude that he had “prostituted” his reputation for commercial gain. The role of defamation in addressing appropriation of image is obviously limited, however. In many cases, false endorsements are unlikely to impugn the reputation of the person falsely represented as the endorser. Typically such a person is presented in a flattering light, and it is only in the more particular circumstances of cases such as Bradley or Tolley, or where the product itself is of dubious reputation, that being misrepresented as having provided a commercial endorsement is in itself damaging to the standing of the putative endorser.

(5) Passing off and false representation of endorsement Even where reputational damage does not result, the law of passing off may provide a remedy where the goodwill attached to an individual’s name or image has been appropriated for the purposes of promoting the goods or services of another. The application of the law of passing off in this context is discussed further in chapter 21.298

20.73

F. BEYOND MISUSE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION As discussed above, there is a firm basis for recognition in Scotland of a delict of misuse of private information, paralleling the tort brought into existence by Campbell v MGN Ltd.299 But, as acknowledged in Campbell,300 the right to control the collection, processing and dissemination of information about oneself is only one facet of the right to private life. Prosser’s taxonomy of privacy,301 and modern discussions which have flowed from it,302 allow for other forms of invasion of the private sphere, including intrusion into the solitude of the home, and infringement of

297 298 299 300 301 302

[1931] AC 333. See paras 21.101–21.106 below. [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457. [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Nicholls at para 12. See para 20.03 above. See e.g. the taxonomy provided by D Solove, Understanding Privacy (2008) 10–11.

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the physical privacy of the person.303 The US Restatement Second of Torts, for example, provides in § 652B for “Intrusion upon seclusion”, to the effect that: “One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”

20.75

In this form, invasion of privacy does not depend on publicity attaching to the person whose interest is invaded.304 It can be constituted by any form of intrusion into a “place in which the plaintiff has secluded himself”, potentially including not only the home, but a hotel room, for example.305 Other common law jurisdictions have similarly extended liability in tort law to deal with such “intrusion upon seclusion”;306 and although the tort acknowledged by the House of Lords in Campbell related only to the informational dimension of privacy, in England, too, the standard work on the topic now argues that invasion of privacy in these other dimensions should be recognised as a wrong.307 The question therefore arises how privacy in its broader aspects should be treated in Scotland by the law of delict. In this connection it should of course be noted that there are already important statutory remedies for intrusions upon the private sphere, even where there is no publication or onward transmission of the information thereby obtained. These include the Human Rights Act 1998 where the perpetrator is a public authority,308 and the Data Protection Act 2018 where the information meets the definition of “data”309 and the act of 303 See R v Dyment (1988) 55 DLR (4th) 503, [1988] 2 SCR 417 per La Forest J at para 30 on those “zones” of privacy that involve its “territorial or spatial aspects” and “those related to the person”. Dyment was cited to the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457. See also N A Moreham and M Warby (eds), Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and the Media, 3rd edn (2016) paras 2.04–2.37. 304 American Law Institute, Restatement Second of Torts § 652B, comment a. 305 Restatement Second of Torts § 652B, comment b. 306 See e.g. Jones v Tsige 108 OR (3d) 24, 2012 ONCA 32 (Ontario). See also C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155 (New Zealand), acknowledging, at para 75, that “a feature of the common law is its capacity to adapt to vindicate rights in light of a changing social context”, and therefore recognising a tort of intrusion upon seclusion, where there is (para 94) (a) an intentional and unauthorised intrusion (b) into seclusion (namely intimate personal activity, space or affairs), (c) involving infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy (d) that is highly offensive to a reasonable person. 307 N A Moreham and M Warby (eds), Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and the Media, 3rd edn (2016) ch 10, “Intrusion into Physical Privacy”. 308 See also Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000; Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000; Investigatory Powers Act 2016; and the Codes of Practice derived therefrom, providing a regulatory framework for surveillance. 309 As set out in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation) (“GDPR”) Art 4(1).

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misappropriation entails “processing”.310 Nonetheless, such statutory remedies would not extend, for example, to the principal act complained of in Martin v McGuiness,311 namely the watching of the subject’s house by a private individual.

(1) Territorial privacy The well-known proposition in English law that “the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress”312 finds ready parallels in ius commune and Scots Institutional writings.313 In the criminal law, Hume explained the seriousness of the offence of hamesucken (assault committed by an assailant who has broken into the victim’s home) as follows:314

20.76

“[B]eside the present alarm and terror of such an invasion, it tends to the disturbance of a man’s peace for the future, that the violence of a ruffian has once been able to reach him in that place which is more peculiarly his own, and which the law has carefully fenced for him, as his sanctuary and surest refuge from all manner of harm.”

The nineteenth-century authorities supporting civil remedies in the event of incursion into the home are few but plain in their terms. The allegation that the defenders had entered the pursuer’s home without consent and without legal authority was recognised as relevant to found a claim of damages in the mid-nineteenth-century case of Banaghan v Smith,315 where the defenders had barged into the pursuer’s house at seven in the morning searching for goods claimed to be theirs. The Lord Justice-Clerk, Lord Hope in a brief judgment, reflected:316 “It would be very strange were we to dismiss this action. They say in England that a man’s house is his castle; and although a search is much more easily made here than in England, no man is entitled to force his way into a house in this way without a warrant.”

310 As set out in GDPR Art 4(2). 311 2003 SLT 1424. 312 Semayne’s Case (1604) 5 Co Rep 91, 77 ER 194: “the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose . . . domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium”. 313 For discussion of these sources, see J Blackie, “Unity in Diversity: the History of Personality Rights in Scots Law”, in N R Whitty and R Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective (2009) 31 at para 2.2.5. 314 Comm, vol I, 312. It was observed in Forbes v HM Advocate 1994 JC 71 per Lord Justice-General Hope at 72, delivering the Opinion of the Court, that hamesucken is no longer charged as a specific crime. 315 (1857) 19 D 317. 316 (1857) 19 D 317 at 317.

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20.78

20.79

It was accepted also in Pringle v Bremner and Stirling that an action for damages was relevant where the pursuer alleged “wrongous entry” into his house by police officers and a search of his effects without valid warrant.317 Even where the threshold was not crossed physically, there was recognition in the 1936 case of Robertson v Keith that, in principle, police surveillance of a private home “in circumstances that attract public attention and give rise to suspicion in the public mind, may, if done without just cause, amount to an invasion of the liberty of the citizen as truly and effectively as if the citizen were subjected to physical restraint”.318 In the modern law only limited remedies are available in regard to trespass on land;319 but while the right to make responsible recreational use of land owned by others is given statutory recognition in the “access rights” granted by Part 1 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, the Act provides that there should be no such rights in the land immediately adjacent to dwelling houses.320 In addition, as noted above,321 the delict of misuse of private information accords the home precedence in the “hierarchy” of locations where the individual’s expectation of privacy is greatest, and the concept of “misuse” has been progressively extended to embrace surveillance, such as the recording of telephone conversations even where there is no later disclosure of the information thereby extracted.322 In various aspects, therefore, the common law already gives some effect to the “fundamental right of privacy in one’s own home”.323 Nonetheless, there is as yet no recognition of a general delict of breach of privacy, capable of dealing with all types of physical intrusion into the individual’s private sphere. The persisting uncertainty that this leaves was apparent in the early twenty-first-century case of Martin v McGuiness.324 The pursuer in this personal injuries action argued that evidence was inadmissible, and damages should be awarded to compensate him for his distress, where the defender’s private investigator had not only watched the pursuer’s home but also entered the house and interviewed his wife. The 317 (1867) 5 M (HL) 55; see also Walker v Cumming (1868) 6 M 318, in which an action of damages for wrongful entry of the pursuer’s house and removal of his goods (by ordinary citizens, although accompanied by a police officer) was relevant. For discussion of the circumstances in which entry of the home by police officers might be justified without warrant, see Peggie v Clark (1868) 7 M 89; for a modern view on the admissibility of evidence obtained thereby, see Gillies v Ralph 2009 JC 25. 318 1936 SC 29 per Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison at 48, although it was held in this case that there was just cause. 319 See paras 23.01–23.10 below. 320 Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 s 6(1)(b)(iv). For discussion of the ambit of privacy in this context, see e.g. Snowie v Stirling Council 2008 SLT (Sh Ct) 61, and also M M Combe, The ScotWays Guide to the Law of Access to Land in Scotland (2018) 55–60. 321 See para 20.26 above. 322 Gulati v MGN Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1291, [2017] QB 149. 323 See Morris v Beardmore [1981] AC 446 per Lord Scarman at 465. 324 2003 SLT 1424.

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Lord Ordinary, Lord Bonomy, did not doubt that the private investigator’s conduct was “capable of being viewed as an infringement of Article 8(1)”,325 but, in the event, the investigator’s enquiries to check out the extent of the pursuer’s injuries were considered to be reasonable and proportionate measures to protect the defender’s own position in the litigation.326 The evidence was therefore held to be admissible and the case for damages irrelevant. The court did, however, consider the possible basis for a claim for damages had the evidence been recognised as unlawfully obtained. The nineteenth-century authorities mentioned above were not discussed, but the pursuer suggested that the common law should be developed to take account of Article 8. Lord Bonomy merely noted the defender’s counter-argument that remedies should be found only by reference to “recognised principles such as those relating to copyright or breach of contract or defamation”327 and offered the tentative conclusion that:328 “it does not follow that, because a specific right to privacy has not so far been recognised, such a right does not fall within existing principles of the law. Significantly my attention was not drawn to any case in which it was said in terms that there is no right to privacy.”

A further “rather cautious submission” was made to the effect that the actio iniuriarum was “sufficiently wide to cover any deliberate conduct causing affront or offence to the dignity, security or privacy of the individual”. Again Lord Bonomy did not offer a definite view on the applicability of the actio iniuriarum in these circumstances, reflecting simply that “[i]t may . . . be only a short step from an assault on personality of the nature of an insult to the dignity, honour or reputation of a person, causing hurt to his feelings, to deliberate conduct involving unwarranted intrusion into the personal or family life of which the natural consequence is distress”.329

325 2003 SLT 1424 at para 8. 326 See also Jones v Warwick University [2003] EWCA Civ 151, [2003] 1 WLR 954 (holding that Art 8 was engaged by the defendants’ improper intrusion into the claimant’s home in order to obtain evidence of her true level of disability in relation to a personal injuries claim, but this was to be balanced against the public interest in ascertaining the truth in litigation and the evidence was held admissible); McGowan v Scottish Water [2005] IRLR 167 (in which the level of surveillance of the pursuer’s home was held to be “proportionate” in relation to the defender’s right to protect its own position in an unfair dismissal claim); cf Keegan v Chief Constable of Merseyside (2007) 44 EHRR 33 (in which the ECtHR identified a breach of Art 8 where the police had, without malice, obtained a warrant to search the wrong house, broken into the house and searched it). 327 2003 SLT 1424 at paras 25–28. 328 2003 SLT 1424 at para 28. 329 2003 SLT 1424 at para 29. Lord Bonomy also mentioned the defender’s reference to the Digest (noted at para 29 as “Digest of Justinian, Mommsen (ed), at para 21.7 and 21.18”, although it is not clear which passages are indicated by this reference), and R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 1053–1059 (on “The different forms of iniuria”).

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20.81

The possible remedies for infringement of the privacy of the home were thus left to be determined in a future case where these problems arose as a “live issues”.330 Such a case, however, has yet to come before the Scottish courts, and the question marks left by Martin v McGuiness remain as to liability where a defender which is not a public authority simply enters or watches premises and no issue of use or misuse of information arises. In England, on the other hand, covert surveillance of the home, even without onward transmission of the information thereby collected, is apparently recognised as an intrusion into private life, capable of being subsumed within the misuse of private information tort. This was demonstrated in Gulati v MGN Ltd,331 discussed above,332 in which misuse was made out by the fact of a newspaper having tapped the telephones of celebrities and thereby “helped itself” to information, without in one case publishing material based on that information.333

(2) Privacy of the person 20.82

Article 8 ECHR extends to “physical and psychological integrity” and, as has been said, intrusion upon the individual’s person threatens “the most intimate aspect of one’s private life”.334 Non-consensual contact with, or exposure of, a person’s body therefore constitutes an interference with Article 8 rights, even if no physical injury is inflicted. A compulsory medical examination, for example, even if “of minor importance”,335 violates the patient’s dignity and autonomy, as does the taking of physical samples without consent.336 Strip searches have also been found by the European Court of Human Rights to infringe Article 8 rights, even if there is no physical contact with the person conducting the search and the circumstances do not suggest inhuman or degrading treatment for the purposes of Article 3 ECHR.337 Yet while an action may now be brought directly against a public authority acting in breach of such rights, it is not clear on 330 331 332 333

2003 SLT 1424 at para 30. [2015] EWHC 1482, (Ch) [2016] FSR 12 affd [2015] EWCA Civ 1291, [2017] QB 149. At para 20.33. See also Gerrard v Eurasian Natural Resources Corp Ltd [2020] EWHC 3241 (QB), [2021] EMLR 8, in which the court refused to strike out a claim brought under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 3, on the basis that it might be possible to characterise a campaign of surveillance as harassment for the purposes of the Act. 334 YF v Turkey (2004) 39 EHRR 34 at para 33. 335 Ibid. 336 See e.g. the Canadian case of R v Pohoretsky [1987] 1 SCR 945 (taking of blood samples from detainee incapable of giving consent); cf (non-invasive) collection of stool sample in R v Monney (1999) 6 BHRC 336, where Art 8 was engaged but intervention was held justified in order to detect the presence of drugs. 337 Wainwright v United Kingdom (2007) 44 EHRR 40 (although Art 3 is engaged if the search is carried out in a degrading manner): Wieser v Austria (2007) 45 EHRR 44). See also De Reus v Gray [2003] 9 VR 432, [2003] VSCA 84.

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what basis the common law provides a remedy for this type of infringement of private life. As far as English law is concerned, the House of Lords held in Wainwright v Home Office,338 a case decided shortly before Campbell v MGN Ltd, that there was no “principle of privacy so abstract as to include the circumstances”339 of an inappropriate strip search of prison visitors by prison officers. While breach of confidence might protect against the disclosure of personal information, there was no general tort of invasion of privacy in English law and no “high level principle of privacy [was] necessary to comply with article 8 of the Convention”.340 In introducing the tort of misuse of private information, the court in Campbell referred back to Wainwright and restated the position that in England, “unlike the United States of America, there is no over-arching, all-embracing cause of action for ‘invasion of privacy’”.341 However, an Outer House case twenty years earlier had suggested that the Scots authorities were not as clear-cut. In Henderson v Chief Constable, Fife Police342 a woman detainee was awarded damages to compensate for the invasion of “privacy and liberty” suffered by being compelled to remove her bra while in police custody. Lord Jauncey’s judgment took a “broad axe” approach, reasoning that “since such removal must amount to an infringement of liberty I see no reason why the law should not protect the individual from this infringement”. He identified no “Scottish case in which it had been held that removal of clothing forcibly or by requirement could constitute a wrong”.343 Instead he relied upon the authority of the English case of Lindley v Rutter, in which Lord Donaldson had reviewed English materials at length to support the finding that an inappropriate body search was an “affront to the dignity and privacy of the individual”.344 Both Henderson and Lindley were apparently cited to the House of Lords in Wainwright, although it is not clear why neither was considered further. In another Scottish case heard shortly before Wainwright, McKie v Chief Constable of Strathclyde,345 the pursuer claimed that the manner of her wrongful arrest and detention, constituted “an invasion of her privacy and liberty and an assault” upon her person.346 The indignities suffered

338 [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406. The events of the case took place before the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force. See now the decision of the ECtHR in Wainwright v United Kingdom (2007) 44 EHRR 40. 339 Para 30. 340 Para 32. 341 [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Nicholls at para 11. 342 1988 SLT 361. 343 1988 SLT 361 at 367. 344 [1981] QB 128 at 135. 345 2002 Rep LR 137, affd 2003 SC 317. 346 As detailed in the judgment of the Lord Ordinary, Lord Emslie: 2002 Rep LR 137 at para 8.

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20.84

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776   The Law of Delict in Scotland

included being watched while she urinated and showered, and undergoing a strip search in a room alleged to be insufficiently screened. The incident had occurred in 1998, before the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, with its requirement that public authorities must act in a way that is incompatible with Convention rights.347 No reference in the case was made to Strasbourg jurisprudence, and the question of infringement of privacy was not discussed in any detail, since it was held that a case against the police required proof of malice, a requirement which the pursuer did not meet. However, the Lord Ordinary, Lord Emslie, did observe that348 “the intimate watching of the pursuer as she prepared herself to leave the house [and] the intimate nature of the search carried out . . . could . . . conceivably be held, depending on how the evidence came out, to have gone well beyond what was necessary in the circumstances and to have amounted to assaults on the pursuer for the purposes of a civil claim.”

These remarks, taken with those made by Lord Jauncey in Henderson, suggest that infringements of the privacy of the person are in principle to be recognised as a wrong in Scotland. In the absence of further case law,349 however, they tell us little about the precise juridical basis upon which civil remedies rest.350

(3) Recognition of breach of privacy: beyond information? 20.86

Leaving aside the specific delict of misuse of private information, therefore, the scarcity of modern authority leaves delictual liability for breach of privacy in a state of regrettable uncertainty. Most recently of all, in BC v Chief Constable Police Service of Scotland,351 the Second Division cast doubt on observations of the Lord Ordinary352 to the effect that a “common law right to privacy” was already in existence.353 In the continuing absence

347 Human Rights Act 1998 s 6. 348 2002 Rep LR 137 at para 31. 349 For a missed opportunity, see Beyts v Trump International Golf Club Scotland Ltd [2017] SC EDIN 21, 2017 SLT (Sh Ct) 93, in which the pursuer argued unsuccessfully that the defenders’ actions in photographing her as she urinated in a secluded spot constituted a breach of the Data Protection Act 1998, but did not attempt to argue that they were actionable as an invasion of her privacy. 350 Note, however, that the activities of “peeping Toms” who clandestinely watch or film others undress have been held to constitute the criminal offence of breach of the peace: see MacDougall v Dochree 1992 JC 154; Bryce v Normand 1997 SLT 1351. 351 [2020] CSIH 61, 2020 SLT 1021. 352 [2019] CSOH 48, 2019 SLT 875. 353 The discussion in the Inner House appeared to be sealed by the limits that the House of Lords had placed upon the tort of misuse of private information in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457, and did not give wider consideration to the structural differences between the English law of torts and the Scots law of delict. This topic is pursued further below.

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of such a general privacy delict, a remedy for alleged invasions of privacy rights by public authorities may be found in the Human Rights Act 1998 section 8.354 Further, the Data Protection Act 2018355 provides that all persons processing personal data are subject to strict controls in the storage and use of that information, regardless of whether there is any question of it being published.356 And in the common law, misuse of private information may be expansively construed to extend to surveillance of the home. Gaps, however, remain. The question posed earlier in the chapter was whether the Scots law of delict could accommodate a general privacy delict to deal with not only informational privacy but also privacy of the person and personal space.357 In Campbell358 the English courts signalled a restrictive approach, confining breach of privacy to informational privacy only although, as already noted, subsequent case law has indicated an expansive interpretation of “misuse”, and the increasing importance of protection for physical privacy is noted in the standard English textbook.359 But in any event, the constraints set down in Campbell do not bind the Scottish courts. Admittedly, the intentional delicts have traditionally been conceptualised on the basis of discrete wrongs, in keeping with the Institutional treatment of delinquences,360 and there has been no great enthusiasm for expanding the established list. The heads of delictual liability in Scots law may therefore bear more than a passing resemblance to the “tangle of crisscrossing categories” at the heart of English tort law.361 Yet, as Peter Birks once noted, the “true difference” between English and Scots law is not in regard to the content of particular rules, but in regard to structure.362 As Campbell demonstrates,363 the forms of action continue to clank their chains in the English courts.364 The consequences are seen in the particularised, incrementalist approach which has funnelled the development of

354 355 356 357 358 359

360 361 362 363 364

See para 2.45 above. Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation) (“GDPR”). See para 20.75 above. As indeed advocated by P H Winfield, addressing privacy of the person and of property: “Privacy” (1931) 47 LQR 23 at 24. Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457. For discussion, see N A Moreham and M Warby (eds), Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and the Media, 3rd edn (2016) paras 2.04–2.37. For a comparative perspective, see T D C Bennett, “Emerging Privacy Torts in Canada and New Zealand: An English Perspective” (2014) 36 European Intellectual Property Rev 298. See paras 1.08–1.09 above. P Birks, “Harassment and Hubris” (1997) 31 Irish Jurist 1 at 32. On this point, see ch 1 above. [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457. See e.g. Lady Hale at para 133: “the courts will not invent a new cause of action to cover types of activity which were not previously covered”. See para 1.37 above. See also United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1 in which Lord Atkin had counselled, at 29: “When these ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice clanking their mediæval chains the proper course for the judge is to pass through them undeterred.”

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English privacy law through breach of confidence, thereby confining it to informational privacy. But these chains have no place in Parliament Hall. In Scots law Birks discerned a “commitment to the institutional scheme or, in other words, to a more systematic approach”.365 In keeping with its civilian roots, the Scots law of delict has always been rights-based, and the specific categories of delictual liability are underpinned by general principle. As Lord Dunedin once explained: “the question in Scotland was never as to the remedy – it was always as to the right”. He continued: “You may not get what you want, but that will be because you failed to show that you had the right to get it.”366 The primary concern for the future development of the law in Scotland is not therefore whether, as in England, a partial remedy for breach of privacy is to remain “shoehorned” 367 within another nominate category of delict. The more appropriate response to the challenges of protecting private life is to consider whether the right to private life is worthy of acknowledgement. The example of jurisdictions other than England,368 as well as the impetus provided by Article 8, confirm the cogency of arguments for recognising privacy as a further aspect to the dignitary interests already protected by the law of delict. If such a right is worthy of recognition, the conceptual structure of law of delict does not fetter judicial discretion within an immutable list of delictual categories.369 The inherent flexibility of the Scots law of delict should allow remedies to be found. As explained by Lord Hope:370 365 P Birks, “More Logic and Less Experience”, in D L Carey Miller and R Zimmermann (eds), The Civilian Tradition in Scots Law (1997) 167 at 174. 366 Lord Dunedin, The Divergencies and Convergencies of English and Scottish Law (Fifth lecture on the David Murray Foundation, University of Glasgow, 21 May 1935). 367 The term seems to have been used first in this context (privacy claims “shoehorned” into existing categories of tort) in H Beale and N Pittam, “The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1988”, in D Friedmann and D Barak-Erez (eds), Human Rights in Private Law (2001) 131 at 140; also by A Sims, “‘A Shift in the Centre of Gravity’: The Dangers of Protecting Privacy through Breach of Confidence” [2005] Intellectual Property Quarterly 27 at 51. The term was taken up by Lord Phillips in Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125 at para 53, and repeated frequently thereafter in case law. Applying a different metaphor, it was argued elsewhere that “trying to stuff this cause of action into breach of confidence is like trying to stuff an outsized octopus into carry-on luggage: impossible, pointless and just as it looks neatly packed in, another tentacle escapes”: C Michalos “Douglas v Hello: the Final Frontier” [2005] European Intellectual Property Rev 384 at 386. 368 See paras 20.03–20.06 above. See also P McDonagh-Forde, “If Mum Is the Word, Is It the Law: Irish Privacy Law: A Comparative Perspective” (2017) 20 Trinity College Law Review 64, for an analysis of Irish acknowledgement of a constitutional right to privacy as well as a review of developments in other common law jurisdictions. 369 See Micosta SA v Shetland Islands Council 1986 SLT 193 per Lord Ross at 198, citing Walker, Delict 9: “The decision to recognise a particular interest, and consequently to grant a remedy for its infringement, is a question of social policy, and the list recognised has grown over the years.” 370 “The Strange Habits of the English”, in H L MacQueen (ed), Miscellany VI (Stair Society Vol 54, 2009) 308 at 317. The same point was made, in relation to privacy, in T B Smith, A Short Commentary of the Law of Scotland (1962) 655.

Invasion of Privacy   779 “With us, of course, delict is a part of the law of obligations. It is a broad concept, embracing all civil claims for reparation which lie outside the area of contract. In England the law of torts has grown up by the use of precedent. Lawyers accustomed to relying upon precedent are troubled when they come across something new. The creation of a new tort is a bold, some would say an irresponsible, exercise – not to be undertaken lightly. To embrace something new within the concept of delict is so much easier.”

Privacy in itself may not be “something new”, but changing technologies and social conditions have resulted in new potential for invasion of the private sphere. It is a mark of the distinctiveness of the Scots law of delict that its structure allows it to “embrace” the injuries entailed thereby, just as it has long provided remedies for injury to other rights of personality.

Chapter 21

The Economic Delicts

Para A. INTRODUCTION����������������������������������������������������������������� 21.01 B. INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT (1) Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.04 (2) T must breach T’s contract with P������������������������������������� 21.08 (3) D must know that D’s acts will induce T’s breach�������������� 21.10 (4) D must intend to procure the breach of contract���������������� 21.19 (5) Inducement by persuading, encouraging or assisting����������� 21.21 (6) Absence of lawful justification�������������������������������������������� 21.26 (7) Inducing breach of contract and the “offside goals” rule����� 21.31 C. CAUSING LOSS BY UNLAWFUL MEANS (1) Components��������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.33 (2) Intention�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.35 (3) Unlawful means���������������������������������������������������������������� 21.38 (4) D’s unlawful acts must affect T’s freedom to deal with P���� 21.42 (5) Loss��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.44 (6) Justification����������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.47 (7) Intimidation and two-party cases��������������������������������������� 21.48 D. CONSPIRACY����������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.51 (1) Lawful-means conspiracy�������������������������������������������������� 21.53 (2) Unlawful-means conspiracy����������������������������������������������� 21.56 (a) Intention�������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.57 (b) Unlawful means���������������������������������������������������������� 21.59 E. FRAUD���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.63 (1) Mode of deception������������������������������������������������������������ 21.66 (2) D’s state of mind��������������������������������������������������������������� 21.69 (3) Reliance by P�������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.72 (4) Harm������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.74 (5) Vicarious liability�������������������������������������������������������������� 21.77 (6) The law agent’s duty to disclose fraud�������������������������������� 21.79 F. PASSING OFF����������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.82 (1) Goodwill�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.84 (2) Misrepresentation������������������������������������������������������������� 21.88 (a) Name������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.91 (b) Appearance of goods��������������������������������������������������� 21.94 (c) Character merchandising��������������������������������������������� 21.95 780

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(3) (4) (5) (6)

Likelihood of damage�������������������������������������������������������� 21.96 In the course of trade�������������������������������������������������������� 21.99 Geographical reach����������������������������������������������������������21.100 The protection of personal characteristics��������������������������21.101 (a) Goodwill�������������������������������������������������������������������21.103 (b) Misrepresentation������������������������������������������������������21.104 (c) Damage���������������������������������������������������������������������21.105 G.  AEMULATIO VICINI AND THE “PRIMA FACIE” TORT��� 21.107

A. INTRODUCTION As chapter 5 showed, the remedies provided by the law of negligence in cases of pure economic loss are more restricted that those available in cases of injury to the person or to property. But even where economic harm is inflicted intentionally, the delictual remedies are limited, as this chapter now explores. The economic delicts broadly divide into two categories:1 the “general” delicts, including inducing breach of contract, causing loss by unlawful means, and conspiracy; and the “misrepresentation” delicts, including fraud and passing off. Although the “general” delicts are long-established, the rules by which they operate remain ill-defined and disputed. Various factors underlie their “ramshackle” nature.2 The first and most obvious is the shifting ground on which these delicts are found, situated as they are on the borders of delict and contract, and in some cases of the criminal law as well.3 A second factor is their changing target. Much of the case law from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries involved attempts by employers to curb the tactics of trades unions in industrial disputes, and judicial abstentionism in regard to protecting economic interests played alongside intolerance of the growing muscle of the trades unions.4 These types of case receded in importance in the twentieth century with the codification of labour law. In particular the Trade Disputes Act 1906, as subsequently amended and extended,5 conferred immunity upon trade unions from delictual liability arising from industrial disputes. Although this immunity was later eroded, by a series of enactments in the 1980s,6 the current position as governed by the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, section 219, provides immunity in respect of inducing

  1 See Carty, Economic Torts 3.   2 Lord Wedderburn, “Rocking the Torts” (1983) 46 MLR 224 at 229.   3 Wedderburn, “Rocking the Torts” 229.  4 Carty, Economic Torts 5–9.   5 In particular by the Trade Disputes Act 1965 (extending the range of acts in respect of which immunity was granted to include threats) and the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974.   6 See in particular the Employment Act 1982.

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782   The Law of Delict in Scotland

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breach of contract, interference with contract and threats of such interference, and conspiracy.7 With the dwindling of case law in the context of labour relations, the economic delicts have increasingly served as a weapon against unfair practices between businesses. Alongside statutory regulation of competition, they have taken up “a new role in resolving the boundaries of commercial ethics, of what can and cannot be done to further one’s own economic interests at the expense of competitors”.8 Nonetheless, their framework remains rooted in employment cases from a different era, creating an obvious difficulty for the modern law. A further source of uncertainty has been the changing nomenclature of the general economic delicts, and the notion that there should be a general delict or tort of “unfair competition” to address this has not found support.9 Prior to the decision of the House of Lords in OBG Ltd v Allan10 the boundaries were not always strictly demarcated,11 shifting between the four broad categories found in the case law, namely: intervention in contract, (direct and indirect), interference with contractual relations, intimidation, and conspiracy. OBG Ltd v Allan12 narrowed down the list to two redefined torts: inducing breach of contract and causing loss by unlawful means. The latter encompassed conduct previously labelled under interference with contractual relations and under intimidation.13 Less than a year later, in Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL,14 the House of Lord revisited these categories and restored conspiracy to its status as a discrete tort, in both its lawful and unlawful variants. The modern framework for these three torts – inducing breach of contract, causing loss by unlawful means, and conspiracy – is considered in the next sections.   7 The tort or delict of causing loss by unlawful means is not included in this list because the list predates the reclassification of the economic torts by OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1; but it is thought that immunity extends to this “new” tort also: see S Deakin and Z Adams, Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law, 8th edn (2019) 483.  8 See J O’Sullivan, “Intentional Economic Torts, Commercial Transactions and Professional Liability” (2008) 24 Professional Negligence 164 at 164.   9 On the common law’s traditional reluctance to become involved in devising rules of fair competition, see OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 56. For a Scottish perspective on the possible reconceptualisation of passing off, see Q Stewart, “The Law of Passing Off – A Scottish Perspective” (1983) 3 European Intellectual Property Rev 64. 10 [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1. 11 Writing in 2002, Tony Weir described the economic torts as forming “an archipelago rather than a continent or even a peninsula”: see review of H Carty, An Analysis of the Economic Torts (2002) 118 LQR 164 at 167. 12 [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1. See also Carty, Economic Torts 18–23. 13 [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 47. Only three-party intimidation was included under this head because Lord Hoffmann considered that two-party intimidation raised “different issues” (para 61). However, the House of Lords’ treatment of two-party intimidation in Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] UKHL 19, [2008] 1 AC 1174 indicated acceptance of a two-party scenario as part of the unlawful means tort (Lord Hope at para 43, Lord Mance at para 119, Lord Walker at paras 99–100). 14 [2008] UKHL 19, [2008] 1 AC 1174.

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B. INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT (1) Introduction A delict is committed where D knowingly induces T to breach a contract between T and P, resulting in loss to P. This delict presents a form of accessory liability. The primary wrong is the breach of contract by T, and this is distinct from the delictual wrong committed by D in procuring that breach. In the result, P may exact a remedy from T for breach of contract, and also have a “supplemental”15 delictual remedy against D for inducing that breach. The earliest cases concerned employees being enticed away by rival employers.16 In Dickson v Taylor,17 for example, the manager of one coal mine successfully claimed compensation from the manager of another after the latter enticed away a collier from the former’s employ.18 In principle, however, all types of contract may be protected in this way. Early cases centring upon employment relationships were “only instances of the wider rule” and that “wider rule, as more fully developed in England, must be considered as part of the law of Scotland”.19 The leading English case, which provided the starting point for analysis in the modern law, concerned a contract for services rather than a contract of service. In Lumley v Gye20 a contract had been agreed between a famous singer and Lumley, in terms of which the singer agreed to perform exclusively at Lumley’s theatre for a certain period. In breach of that agreement the singer was persuaded by Gye, a rival theatre owner, to perform at his opera house instead. The court held that Gye’s conduct, if proved, would constitute a tort, giving rise to a remedy in damages.21 On the basis of Lumley v Gye, this tort (or delict) has been described as: “Direct persuasion or procurement 15 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Nicholls at para 172; Global Resources Group v Mackay [2008] CSOH 148, 2009 SLT 104 per Lord Hodge at para 14. See also Petershill Football Club v St Bernard’s Football Club Ltd 1926 SLT (Sh Ct) 42. Cf Belmont Laundry Co Ltd v Aberdeen Steam Laundry Co Ltd (1898) 1 F 45, which must now be regarded as wrongly decided insofar as it indicated that inducing a breach of contract constituted a form of joint, rather than accessory, wrongdoing. 16 See P Fraser, Treatise on Master and Servant, Employer and Workman, and Master and Apprentice, according to the Law of Scotland, 3rd edn by W Campbell (1882) 308, on the master’s right to damages where his servant has been “enticed away” by the defender in the knowledge of the servant’s prior engagement. 17 (1816) 1 Mur 141. See also James Couper & Sons v Macfarlane (1879) 6 R 683; Rose Street Foundry and Engineering Co v Lewis & Sons 1917 SC 341; Petershill Football Club v St Bernard’s Football Club Ltd 1926 SLT (Sh Ct) 42. 18 (1816) 1 Mur 141 at 147. 19 British Motor Trade Association v Gray 1951 SC 586 per Lord President Cooper at 599; Global Resources Group v Mackay [2008] CSOH 148, 2009 SLT 104 per Lord Hodge at para 9. See also Glegg, Reparation, 1st edn (1892) 221–222. 20 (1853) 2 E & B 216, 118 ER 749. 21 At trial, damages were denied: see n 31 below.

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784   The Law of Delict in Scotland

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or inducement applied by the third party to the contract breaker, with knowledge of the contract and the intention of bringing about its breach”.22 A modern Scottish analysis is found in Global Resources Group v Mackay, where Lord Hodge identified this delict as having five essential characteristics:23 “D commits the delict or tort of inducing a breach of contract where T and P are contracting parties and D, knowing of the terms of their contract and without lawful justification, induces T to break that contract. When that occurs, T is liable to P for breach of contract and D is liable to P for the delict of inducing that breach. The delict has the following five characteristics. First, there is no delictual liability unless T breaks his contract . . . Secondly, for D to be liable for inducing breach of contract, he must know that his acts will have that effect . . . Thirdly, D must intend to procure the breach of the contract either as an end in itself or as the means by which he achieves some further end . . . Fourthly, D must induce T to break his contract with P by persuading, encouraging or assisting him to do so. Fifthly, if D has a lawful justification for inducing T to break his contract with P, that may provide a defence against delictual liability.”

These characteristics are now considered in turn.

(2) T must breach T’s contract with P 21.08

As a form of accessory liability, the delict of inducing breach of contract is contingent upon the primary wrong having been committed. Thus the starting point is to establish that the loss alleged by P derived from the breach of an enforceable contract between P and T. A claim for inducing breach of contract will lie only if T could itself be sued for the breach which D procured.24 If the contract between P and T was valid but voidable, for instance on the grounds of the minority of the contracting party, D does not as a general rule incur delictual liability simply by inducing T lawfully to exercise T’s right to avoid the contract.25

22 D C Thomson & Co Ltd v Deakin [1952] Ch 646 per Jenkins LJ at 694. For a lengthier account of the “elements of the Lumley v Gye tort”, see OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at paras 39–44. 23 [2008] CSOH 148, 2009 SLT 104 at paras 11–14 (but, in the interests of consistency with usage adopted in this chapter, changing the lettering from A, B and C to D, T and P). See also the earlier summary by Lord Russell in British Motor Trade Association v Gray 1951 SC 586 at 603, to the effect that the pursuer is required to establish that the defender’s actings were: (i) intentional; (ii) without lawful justification; (iii) productive of damage to the pursuer; and (iv) a “procuring or inducement” of the breach of the relevant contract. 24 See discussion in T Weir, Economic Torts (1997) 36 n 44. 25 Proform Sports Management Ltd v Proactive Sports Management Ltd [2006] EWHC 2903 (Ch), [2007] 1 All ER 542.

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The breach of contract by T must, moreover, be the source of the specific loss claimed by P from D. In Calor Gas Ltd v Express Fuels (Scotland) Ltd,26 for example, the pursuers were suppliers of gas sold in cylinders, and the defenders were dealers with whom they had a five-year agreement. One of its conditions was that for the duration of the agreement the defenders would sell only the pursuers’ gas, and on its termination the defenders undertook not to handle the pursuers’ cylinders. When purchasing gas, consumers were similarly obliged to sign an agreement requiring them to return the cylinder when empty only to one of the pursuers’ authorised dealers. After the termination of their agreement with the pursuers, the defenders entered into an agreement with another supplier, but continued to accept the pursuers’ cylinders when returned by customers. The pursuers therefore brought an action alleging, inter alia,27 that by accepting the pursuers’ gas cylinders in exchange for cylinders from the new supplier, the defenders were inducing customers to breach their agreements with the pursuers, thereby depriving the pursuers of the opportunity of maintaining the connection with their customers, with consequent loss of sales. This claim was rejected. Although the customers had acted contrary to their agreement with the pursuers by returning cylinders to a dealer who was no longer authorised by them, the loss suffered due to this breach was negligible, given that the defenders had eventually returned the empty cylinders to the pursuers. The real loss claimed by the pursuers was the loss of continuing custom thereafter, but there had been no provision in the customers’ agreements obliging them on a continuing basis to buy only the pursuers’ gas. Since the customer could not be held liable in damages for failure to make a repeat purchase from the pursuers, the defenders in turn could not be held liable for their part in procuring this.28

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(3) D must know that D’s acts will induce T’s breach D cannot be held liable unless D knew that there was a subsisting contract between T and P, and that D’s conduct would result in a breach of that contract.29 Thus in Dickson v Taylor,30 noted above, involving a dispute between rival employers over an employee who had been enticed away from the employment of one by the other, Lord Chief Commissioner Adam directed the jury that “From the moment the defender knew 26 [2008] CSOH 13, 2008 SLT 123. 27 Although the defenders were in breach of their agreement with the pursuers, the restrictions which it imposed could not be enforced as they were in conflict with European competition law. A further claim for damages on the basis of spuilzie was also unsuccessful. 28 See also Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Glasgow Fleshers Trade Defence Association (1897) 5 SLT 263. 29 Global Resources Group v Mackay [2008] CSOH 148, 2009 SLT 104 per Lord Hodge at para 11. 30 (1816) 1 Mur 141 at 147.

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786   The Law of Delict in Scotland

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of the engagement, he was bound to turn [the employee] off”. Damages were awarded because the second employer was found to have retained the employee after that point. By contrast, this test is not satisfied where it can be shown that D honestly believed that T’s conduct, as induced by D, did not breach a contract between T and P.31 Thus in Mainstream Properties Ltd v Young, one of the three conjoined cases reported under OBG Ltd v Allan,32 two employees of a property development company diverted a development opportunity to their own joint venture which was to be funded by the defendant. This was in breach of their contract of employment. The defendant knew that they were employed by the claimant, but specifically asked the two employees whether this scheme presented a conflict of interest. The employees told him that there was no problem because the claimant had been offered the site in question and refused it. This was a lie, but it was accepted that the defendant honestly believed it to be true. He did not therefore have the requisite level of knowledge that his venture with the third parties would lead them to breach their contract with the claimants, and he could not be held liable. In OBG Ltd v Allan the House of Lords regarded the knowledge requirement as an exacting one:33 “It is not enough that you [the defendant] know that you are procuring an act which, as a matter of law or construction of the contract, is a breach. You must actually realize that it will have this effect. Nor does it matter that you ought reasonably to have done so.”

Thus in English law the defendant’s honest, if unreasonable or even “muddle-headed and illogical”, belief appears to exculpate him or her,34 although “wilful blindness” does not; as both Lord Hoffmann and Lord Nicholls pointed out in OBG Ltd v Allan, the defendant cannot walk away

31 This was in the end the stumbling block for the plaintiff in Lumley v Gye since at the subsequent trial the jury was satisfied that Gye had honestly (if mistakenly) believed that the singer was legally entitled to terminate the prior contract with Lumley. For a full account, see S Waddams, “Johanna Wagner and the Rival Opera Houses” (2001) 117 LQR 431. 32 [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1. 33 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 39. 34 Reference was made in OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 39 to British Industrial Plastics Ltd v Ferguson [1940] 1 All ER 479, in which a former employee of the plaintiffs offered to share with the defendants trade secrets gained in the plaintiffs’ employ. The defendants were under the misapprehension that if the process in question was patentable then it would belong to the employee not the employer, and therefore there was no breach of the employee’s contract with the plaintiffs. Since the court accepted that the defendants actually believed this, even if “muddle-headedly and illogically” (per Lord Russell at 481), there could be no liability for inducing breach of contract.

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from liability simply by refusing to look at the detail of the contract where this is perfectly accessible.35 An example of such culpable disregard can be seen in the English case of Emerald Construction Co Ltd v Lowthian.36 The defendants, who were union officials, threatened the main contractors in a large construction project that they would call for industrial action at the site unless a contract with the plaintiff, a subcontractor, was discontinued. It transpired that the defendants had not initially seen the contract between the main contractors and the plaintiff, but assumed that it might be terminated on short notice. Subsequently, the defendants were offered but refused the opportunity to examine its terms. Had they read the contract they would have discovered that it could not be terminated without longer notice. When the industrial action continued, the plaintiff brought proceedings to prevent the defendants from inducing the main contractors to terminate its subcontract. The Court of Appeal found the case for the injunction to be made out, with Lord Denning commenting:37

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“Even if they did not know of the actual terms of the contract, but had the means of knowledge – which they deliberately disregarded – that would be enough. Like the man who turns a blind eye. So here, if the officers deliberately sought to get this contract terminated, heedless of its terms, regardless whether it was terminated by breach or not, they would do wrong. For it is unlawful for a third person to procure a breach of contract knowingly, or recklessly, indifferent whether it is a breach or not.”

This statement was endorsed in OBG Ltd v Allan as meaning that the defendant could not escape liability where he had “made a conscious decision not to inquire in case he discovered a disagreeable truth”.38 There is Scottish authority suggesting divergence from the English stance on this issue, but if a difference does indeed exist, its precise extent is difficult to calibrate. In Rossleigh Motors v Leader Cars Ltd, Lord Mayfield commented on Emerald Construction Co Ltd v Lowthian and related English case law:39 “Accepting as I do that British Motor Trade Association v Gray40 is the leading Scottish authority, I am not persuaded that I should accept as part of Scots law the views expressed in the [English] cases referred to, that mere recklessness or ‘turning a blind eye’ is a sufficient factor unless such actings are tantamount to enable the court to conclude that such actings were in effect intentional.” 35 36 37 38 39 40

[2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 at paras 40 and 192 respectively. [1966] 1 WLR 691. [1966] 1 WLR 691 per Lord Denning at 700–701. [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 69. 1987 SLT 355 at 360. 1951 SC 586.

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788   The Law of Delict in Scotland

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On that basis he held in Rossleigh that knowledge of the relevant terms of the contract could not be imputed to the defenders, and that their conduct in causing it to be breached did not give rise to a claim for damages. Yet in the Scottish case to which Lord Mayfield referred, British Motor Trade Association v Gray, both Lord President Cooper and Lord Russell acknowledged the paucity of Scots authorities, and affirmed that the rule “as more fully developed in England, must be considered as part of the law of Scotland”.41 The court in British Motor Trade Association did not address the question of knowledge in any detail since the defender did not dispute that he knew about the covenants which he had allegedly induced the third parties to break. There was only brief reference therefore to the need for relevant averments from which “to infer a deliberate course of conduct” by the defender “in the knowledge” and “with the intention” of inducing the breach of contract.42 The finer distinctions between actual and constructive knowledge, or reasonableness of belief, were not discussed because there was no need to do so. In any event, the facts of Rossleigh Ltd v Leader Cars Ltd43 presented a different scenario from those of Emerald Construction Co Ltd v Lowthian, not least because damages was the remedy claimed in the former, not an interdict or injunction as in the latter. In Rossleigh the pursuers had let an area of ground for use as a motor garage to a limited company. The lease required the tenant to occupy and trade from the premises and to maintain sufficient plenishings to secure two years’ rent. As trading conditions in the motor industry deteriorated, the management of the tenant’s business was taken over by the defender, another limited company. By the time the tenant company went into voluntary liquidation, the landlord was unable to recover the rent arrears because the stock had all been removed by the defender from the subjects of let, in contravention of the terms of the lease. The landlord claimed damages from the defender on the basis that it had induced the tenant to breach the terms of the lease dealing with occupation and plenishing of the premises. However, the landlord conceded that the directors of the defender did not have direct knowledge of the terms of the lease, and there were no circumstances allowing such knowledge to be imputed. It would no doubt have been prudent for them to look at the terms of the lease, but, unlike in Emerald Construction, there was no evidence that these were drawn to their attention. Lord Mayfield’s remarks in Rossleigh on cross-border difference were noted by Lord Hodge in Global Resources Group v Mackay, but in the event he adopted substantially the same position on this point as that indicated

41 1951 SC 586 at 599; see also Lord Russell at 603 to similar effect. 42 1951 SC 586 per Lord Russell at 603. 43 1987 SLT 355.

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by the House of Lords in OBG Ltd v Allan. “D is not liable if he ought reasonably to have known that the act which he was inducing T to perform involved a breach of contract by T”, Lord Hodge stated, “if in fact he did not know that.”44 Furthermore: “if D consciously decided not to inquire into the terms of the contract between T and P in the knowledge that there was a contract and that his actions were likely to induce a breach of that contract, that knowledge and the wilful turning of a blind eye as to the details of the contract would be sufficient knowledge.”

In practice, where the remedy pursued is an interdict or injunction, as in Emerald Construction Co Ltd v Lowthian, this particular requirement is in most cases readily satisfied, since by the very act of bringing proceedings P is drawing the relevant contract forcibly to D’s attention. In an action for damages, such as Rossleigh Motors v Leader Cars Ltd, it is a rather different matter to establish the relevant degree of knowledge as a matter of historical fact. But there is no clear basis for regarding Lord Hoffmann’s formulation in OBG v Allan, cited above, as inconsistent with Scots delict, and Lord Hodge’s analysis in Global Resources Group reaffirms that, even where there is no actual knowledge on D’s part, wilful blindness is sufficient. In any event, it would seem wrong that D should be able to evade liability simply by declining to look at the relevant provisions of the contract where these have been readily accessible to D.

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(4) D must intend to procure the breach of contract The delict of inducing breach of contract requires intention on the part of D. Although a specific intention to harm P’s interests is not essential,45 there must be evidence that in D’s interaction with T, D intended to bring about T’s breach of the contract with P. For these purposes Lord Hoffmann distinguished, in OBG Ltd v Allan, between “ends, means and consequences”. In most cases the breach of contract is not in itself the end sought after by D, but simply a means to achieve it. Nonetheless, if D sets out to induce a third party to breach a contract with another, it is of little importance that this is not D’s ultimate objective. As Lord Hoffmann pointed out, “Mr Gye would very likely have preferred to be able to obtain [the singer’s] services without her having to break her contract. But that

44 [2008] CSOH 148, 2009 SLT 104 at para 11. In this and the next quotation the lettering has been changed. 45 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Nicholls at para 192; see also South Wales Miners’ Federation v Glamorgan Coal Co Ltd [1905] AC 239.

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did not matter.”46 In South Wales Miners’ Federation v Glamorgan Coal Co Ltd,47 for example, the defendant miners’ union had called a series of oneday stoppages. Its purpose in doing so was to restrict coal production and thereby cause the price of coal to increase, an objective which, at least in the union’s perspective, would ultimately benefit not only the workforce but also the employers. Nonetheless, the requisite level of intention was present because, as a means to achieve that objective, the union had set out intentionally to induce the workforce to breach their contracts of employment. Intention cannot, however, be inferred on the basis of foreseeability alone, and to this extent Lord Hoffmann criticised the decision of the Court of Appeal in Millar v Bassey.48 In that case a famous singer reneged on her contract to make a record with a particular record production company. In consequence the production company broke off its agreements with the record producer and the musicians whom it had signed up for the recording. The producer and musicians then took up proceedings against the singer, alleging that she had induced breach of contract by the record company. The Court of Appeal allowed the action to proceed because, although there was no specific intention to induce the breach, it was enough that the singer knew that the recording company would be unable to fulfil its contractual obligations to the plaintiffs. However, this reasoning was simply “wrong” in Lord Hoffmann’s view. The singer might well have been able to foresee that the contracts between the recording company and the manager and the musicians would be broken, but this was neither an end that she had set out to achieve, nor a “necessary and deliberate step”49 towards achieving an end desired by her.

(5) Inducement by persuading, encouraging or assisting 21.21

D must in some way have persuaded, encouraged or assisted T, thereby inducing T to breach the contract.50 The inducement must be targeted directly at T. It is not sufficient that D sought to influence the dealings between a fourth party and T, and thereby to place indirect pressure upon T.51 Moreover, T 46 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 at para 42. 47 [1905] AC 239. 48 [1994] EMLR 44, criticised by Lord Hoffmann in OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 at para 43. 49 Global Resources Group v Mackay [2008] CSOH 148, 2009 SLT 104 per Lord Hodge at para 12. 50 See also Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1303, [2008] Ch 244 per Arden LJ at para 86; OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 3. 51 See Middlebrook Mushrooms Ltd v TGWU [1993] ICR 612, in which the defendant trade union had been in dispute with the plaintiff in regard to the dismissal of a large number of mushroom pickers. The defendant proposed to leaflet supermarkets in an attempt to persuade consumers not to buy the plaintiff’s mushrooms and in this way indirectly to pressurise the supermarkets into discontinuing supply from the plaintiff. The Court of Appeal held this did not fall within the “Lumley v Gye principle” since “the persuasion has to be directed at one of the parties to the contract” (per Neill LJ at 620). Neill LJ also noted that in cases of this nature attention had to be given to ECHR Art 10, so that freedom of speech was not disproportionately compromised.

The Economic Delicts   791

must have been actively influenced by D. It is not enough that D offered advice to T, in the sense of “a mere statement of, or drawing of the attention of the party addressed to, the state of facts as they were”.52 A distinction is apparently to be drawn between advice, in the sense of pointing out the desirability of not fulfilling the contract, and inducement, in the sense of making fulfilment of the contract seem less desirable,53 although in practice the degrees of persuasion between advice and inducement may be difficult to calibrate.54 Much may depend, Lord Hoffmann indicated in OBG Ltd v Allan, upon the sufficiency of the “causal connection” between D’s acts of encouragement and the breach of contract by T.55 Was D “the person in the background who pulls the strings”?56 If D’s conduct was designed to procure the breach, in the sense discussed above, and was a substantial factor in bringing it about, then it is not clear that liability should be denied by bringing it within the definition of “advice”. Conversely, the link would be insufficient if breach was merely a foreseeable consequence of the D’s conduct; more specifically, failure to stop T breaking the contract does not provide an adequate causal link in the modern law.57 In Square Grip Reinforcement Co Ltd v Macdonald, Lord Milligan further suggested that context may be provided for this enquiry by examination of “the relative positions of the persons involved”, so that where D was “desperately anxious” for the contract to be broken, it might be considered more likely that D would have attempted to bring pressure on T.58 As mentioned above,59 the classification of the economic torts was reviewed in OBG Ltd v Allan in such a way as to clarify the distinction between inducing breach of contract (as discussed in this section) and causing loss by unlawful means (as discussed in the next section). In the course of this discussion it was explained that:60 “There is a crucial difference between cases where the defendant induces a contracting party not to perform his contractual obligations and cases where the defendant prevents a contracting party from carrying out his contractual obligations.”

52 D C Thomson & Co Ltd v Deakin [1952] Ch 646 per Evershed MR at 686; see also OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 36. 53 See H L A Hart and T Honoré, Causation in the Law, 2nd edn (1985) 187–188; Carty, Economic Torts 37. 54 See Torquay Hotel Co Ltd v Cousins [1969] 2 Ch 106 per Winn LJ at 147. 55 [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 36; see also Square Grip Reinforcement Co Ltd v Macdonald 1968 SLT 65 per Lord Milligan at 73; Calor Gas Ltd v Express Fuels (Scotland) Ltd [2008] CSOH 13, 2008 SLT 123 per Lord Malcolm at para 47. 56 Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1 per Lord MacNaghten at 152. 57 Calor Gas Ltd v Express Fuels (Scotland) Ltd [2008] CSOH 13, 2008 SLT 123 per Lord Malcolm at paras 47–48. 58 1968 SLT 65 per Lord Milligan at 73. 59 See para 21.03 above. 60 [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Nicholls at para 178.

21.22

21.23

792   The Law of Delict in Scotland

21.24

21.25

Cases of the second type are to be categorised as instances of causing loss of unlawful means. In other words, preventing another person from acting is not to be viewed as a mode of inducing breach of contract, despite some suggestions in earlier case law to the contrary.61 The concept of inducement necessarily entails a two-stage process: D exerts a form of persuasion that in turn triggers conduct by T in breach of the contract with P. It is not enough that D itself acts in such a way which puts T in breach of a contract with P, regardless of whether there has been any interaction between D and T. As Lord Hodge reasoned in Global Resources Group v Mackay, to accept otherwise would produce the “startling result” that “in a standard building contract in which there was an employer, a main contractor and a subcontractor, the subcontractor, who would be aware of the standard terms of the main contract, could expose himself to a claim in delict from the employer whenever he acted without lawful justification in a way which put the main contractor in breach of his contract with the employer”.62 The requirement for a two-stage process presented a particular difficulty in Global Resources Group v Mackay. The defender in that case had provided his services to the pursuers as a consultant, but through the medium of a company, G & D Pallets Ltd (“GDP”), of which the defender was the sole shareholder and the sole director. In breach of a condition in the contract between the pursuers and GDP, stipulating that neither GDP nor the defender was to disclose trade secrets, the defender allegedly supplied a trade rival with sensitive data concerning the pursuers’ business. This assisted the rival to secure work for which the pursuers had also bid. In the subsequent action brought against the defender as an individual the pursuers argued that the defender had “unlawfully induced and caused breach or breaches of the contract between” the pursuers and GDP. Lord Hodge held that the pursuers’ averments were not necessarily irrelevant, but that the pleadings were not yet in a state at which the case could be permitted to proceed to proof. On the face of things, the breach of contract had been brought about directly by the defender (or arguably directly by GDP on whose behalf the defender had been acting at the time of the alleged misuse of information). The defender might be said to have acted in such a way as to put GDP in breach of contract, but there were no averments to the effect that the defender had induced GDP itself to act in breach of contract.

(6) Absence of lawful justification 21.26

A lawful justification for inducing T to breach T’s contract with P may provide a complete defence, but the strong presumption that contracts 61 See the fuller explanation at [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Nicholls at paras 174–180. 62 [2008] CSOH 148, 2009 SLT 104 at para 15.

The Economic Delicts   793

should be upheld means that such a defence is only recognised exceptionally. The question whether a justification is adequate in this regard depends upon “the nature of the contract broken; the position of the parties to the contract; the grounds for the breach; the means employed to procure the breach; the relation of the person procuring the breach to the person who breaks the contract; and . . . the object of the person in procuring the breach.” 63 The prior existence of an “equal or superior right” vis-à-vis T held by D provides the most likely justification for inducing T to breach a subsequent contract with P.64 Thus a pre-existing contract between D and T may excuse conduct undermining a subsequent, inconsistent, contract between P and T.65 In Edwin Hill and Partners v First National Finance Corporation,66 for example, a finance company held a legal charge, as security for a loan, over a site owned by a developer. The developer was unable either to repay the loan or to raise sufficient additional finance to develop the site. Rather than exercising its power of sale, the finance company agreed that it would take over the financing of the development at the site, but with the condition that the original architects appointed by the developer were replaced. The architects claimed damages from the finance company for procuring a breach of their contract with the developer. Their claim was, however, dismissed since this arrangement was viewed as one which protected the finance company’s “equal or superior right” as a secured creditor.67 Perhaps the most obvious practical example of an “equal right” providing justification is where a bank refuses to honour an account-holder’s instruction to pay a third party, thereby precipitating a breakdown of the contractual relationship between the account-holder and that third party. The contract between the bank and the account-holder will usually have entitled the bank to refuse payment in a range of circumstances. As Lord Penrose pointed out, when the Clydesdale Bank was alleged to have induced a breach of contract between Mercedes-Benz and one of its Scottish dealers, in Mercedes-Benz Finance Ltd v Clydesdale Bank plc:68 “If one considers the issue as one of the ordinary operation of the accounts involved, it is impossible to support the idea that a banker is liable to third parties on stopping a cheque, or otherwise refusing payment on an instruction from his customer, simply because doing so may prevent the customer from meeting a contractual obligation to a third party.”

63 South Wales Miners’ Federation v Glamorgan Coal Co Ltd [1903] 2 KB 545 per Romer LJ at 574 (affd [1905] AC 239). 64 Read v Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons [1902] 2 KB 88 per Darling J at 96. 65 Smithies v National Association of Operative Plasterers [1909] 1 KB 310 per Buckley LJ at 337. 66 [1989] 1 WLR 225. 67 [1989] 1 WLR 225 per Stuart-Smith LJ at 233. 68 1997 SLT 905 at 911.

21.27

794   The Law of Delict in Scotland

21.28

21.29

There is older authority to suggest that, more unusually, the defence of justification may succeed where D was under a moral responsibility to protect the interests of T. In the English case of Brimelow v Casson,69 the plaintiff was the manager of a touring theatrical troupe who paid his performers such meagre rates that they were apparently obliged to resort to sex work in order to make a living. The defendants were a group of performers’ unions who, in an effort to force an improvement in working conditions, exhorted theatre owners not to engage the plaintiff’s troupe and to break off existing contracts with it. In an action for inducing breach of contract the defence of justification was held to be made out, although the reasoning in the case provided little insight into what exactly makes this defence successful. Russell J concluded simply that “no general rule can be laid down as a general guide in such cases, but I confess that if justification does not exist here I can hardly conceive the case in which it would be present”. A similarly broad-brush approach was indicated in the Scottish case of Findlay v Blaylock,70 in which a father intervened on the eve of his minor son’s marriage to his pregnant girlfriend to induce him to break off the engagement. This was held to be justified since it was the duty of a “right-minded” father to dissuade his son, particularly a minor son, from entering into a marriage if he thought it would not be conducive to his future happiness. No question of inducing breach of contract would now arise in the circumstances of Findlay,71 of course, but the authority of Brimelow apparently remains that intervention in the interests of the third party’s moral welfare may, in exceptional circumstances at least, be regarded as justified.72 It is no justification, however, that D acted in the belief that P would be financially better off without the contract. In South Wales Miners’ Federation v Glamorgan Coal Co Ltd,73 discussed above,74 the unions were acting primarily to further the interests of their members, but they also argued that the employers would benefit in the long term from price increases that the work stoppages would bring.75 However, the court reasoned that a supposed benefit which the plaintiffs had themselves declined to accept could not be used to justify interference with their contractual rights.

69 [1924] 1 Ch 302. 70 1937 SC 21. 71 See Law Reform (Husband and Wife) (Scotland) Act 1984 s 1, providing that agreements between two persons to marry one another are no longer legally enforceable. 72 See e.g. Timeplan Education Group Ltd v National Union of Teachers [1997] IRLR 457 per Gibson LJ at 460. 73 [1905] AC 239. 74 At para 21.19. 75 As Lord Halsbury commented, “It seems to me to be absurd to suppose that a benefit which he refuses to accept justified an intentional breach of contractual rights” ([1905] AC 239 at 244).

The Economic Delicts   795

A justification can be accepted as such only where it was the primary impetus for all of D’s conduct,76 and it will be defeated by evidence of an alternative, ulterior purpose. In Findlay v Blaylock77 the disappointed fiancée might have succeeded in her claim had she been able to show that her absent groom’s father had been motivated by malice, rather than concern for his son’s welfare, in inducing him to abscond. In the absence of sufficient evidence to this effect, however, the defence of justification stood.

21.30

(7) Inducing breach of contract and the “offside goals” rule As an alternative to seeking damages to compensate for the breach of contract which the defender induced, the injured party may in certain circumstances pursue a remedy in the so-called “offside goals” rule. This rule applies where: (i) P has a personal right against T obliging T to grant a real right to P; (ii) T subsequently grants a real right to D in breach of the obligation to P; and (iii) D is in bad faith in the sense of knowing about the breach, or alternatively the grant of the real right was gratuitous. In these circumstances the real right granted to D may be reduced at the instance of P. The typical scenario might be where P enters into a binding contract for the purchase of land from T. D finds out about this. Before a disposition is delivered, T accepts a better offer from D, who takes delivery of and registers a disposition. In these circumstances P may have the disposition to D set aside.78 As MacLeod has shown,79 the “offside goals” rule is itself best analysed as an economic delict, but a delict in which the primary actor is T and not D. Thus in granting a real right to D, T has put the performance of T’s contract with P out of T’s power. And in this fraud on T’s creditor (i.e. on P), D, by virtue of bad faith, is liable as T’s accomplice and hence as an accessory to the fraud. Reduction of D’s title undoes the fraudulent transaction. As MacLeod has pointed out,80 the “offside goals” rule operates on the basis of similar requirements to those for inducing breach of contract. Both require a prior contract between P and T; in entering into a contract with T, D might be said to be inducing T to breach that prior contract; and the breach is a means towards D’s desired end of acquiring the property. In principle, inducing breach of contract is narrower in its ambit. It requires some form of active inducement by D, whereas an offside goal is scored even if the initiative for the second contract comes from T rather than D. But in practice there are likely to be few cases where the knowledge requirement is met for

76 77 78 79 80

Read v Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons [1902] 2 KB 732. 1937 SC 21, discussed above at para 21.28. K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) paras 695–700. J MacLeod, Fraud and Voidable Transfer (Studies in Scots Law vol 9, 2020) ch 7. J MacLeod, “Offside Goals and Induced Breaches of Contract” (2009) 13 EdinLR 278.

21.31

21.32

796   The Law of Delict in Scotland

the “offside goals” rule but not also for inducing breach of contract.81 For the former, an awareness of prior dealings between T and P puts D on a duty of enquiry,82 whereas the notion of wilful blindness, which suffices for the latter, means that many offside goals may also be categorised as inducement of breach of contract. The difference between them is not so much “whether a remedy is available”,83 but the remedy itself, which for offside goals usually means reduction of D’s real right, and for inducing breach of contract means interdict or damages.

C. CAUSING LOSS BY UNLAWFUL MEANS (1) Components 21.33

21.34

The essential components of the delict of causing loss by unlawful means are: (i) an intention on the part of D to cause loss to P; (ii) the use by D of unlawful means in relation to T, which affects the T’s freedom to deal with or honour a contract with P; and (iii) consequent loss to P.84 So characterised, this delict encompasses the wrongs labelled in older case law as “interference with contractual relations” and “intimidation”.85 Causing loss by unlawful means differs from inducing breach of contract in the important respect that, where D induces breach of contract, D is liable only as an accessory to the primary liability of T as the contracting party. In the delict of causing loss by unlawful means, it is D who has committed the “illegality”, and therefore primary liability for the loss lies with D, irrespective of whether P might have had an independent right of action against T.86 The following are instances of causing loss by unlawful means: (a) D acts unlawfully in regard to T in such a way as to prevent T from fulfilling contractual obligations to P. Thus in Lumley v Gye,87 Gye 81 MacLeod, Fraud and Voidable Transfer paras 7.78–7.82. 82 Rodger (Builders) Ltd v Fawdry 1950 SC 483. 83 MacLeod, Fraud and Voidable Transfer para 7.82. 84 Global Resources Group v Mackay [2008] CSOH 148, 2009 SLT 104 as set out by Lord Hodge at para 17, under reference to the English tort, stated by Lord Hoffmann in OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 at para 47 as requiring: “(a) a wrongful interference with the actions of a third party in which the claimant has an economic interest and (b) an intention thereby to cause loss to the claimant”. See also McLeod v Rooney [2009] CSOH 158, 2010 SLT 499 per Lord Glennie at para 17 (requiring “(a) that the defender had the intention to cause economic harm to the pursuer; (b) that the defender . . . acted unlawfully in relation to a third party; and (c) that such unlawful action affected that third party’s freedom to deal with the pursuer”); Kivuwatt Ltd v Dane Associates Ltd [2011] CSOH 118, 2011 GWD 24–530 per Lord Drummond Young at para 15. 85 See discussion in OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at paras 7 and 44; Carty, Economic Torts 114–116. 86 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at paras 5–6 and 8. 87 (1853) 2 E & B 216, 118 ER 749; see para 21.06 above.

The Economic Delicts   797

(b)

(c)

(d) (e)

would have caused loss to Lumley by unlawful means if, instead of persuading the singer not to sing for Lumley, he had falsely imprisoned her in her hotel room. A further illustration is GWK Ltd v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd88 in which it had been agreed that, when certain car manufacturers displayed their cars at exhibitions, they would ensure that they were fitted with “Bal-lon-ette” tyres made by the plaintiffs. Two cars were sent to an exhibition, duly fitted with the tyres as specified, but the night before the opening the defendants’ employees removed them and substituted Dunlop tyres. In thus interfering with the third party’s cars the defendants had used unlawful means to prevent the plaintiffs from deriving the agreed benefit from the contract. D breaches D’s own contract with T and in so doing makes it impossible for T to fulfil T’s contract with P. No form of inducement has been applied, but D has prevented the contract with P from being performed. Working through a chain of contracts in order to inflict loss on P, D induces a fourth party to breach a contract with T, with the result that it is impossible for T to fulfil T’s contract with P. In J T Stratford & Son Ltd v Lindley89 the defendants were officials of a watermen’s union who were in dispute with a subsidiary of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was in the business of hiring out and repairing river barges, in terms of which its customers took on responsibility for conducting the barges to and from the plaintiff’s depot or the point of hire. The defendants directed union members not to handle the plaintiff’s barges or to take barges to the plaintiff’s repair yard. This was in breach of the union members’ contracts with their employers. In consequence their employers were prevented from fulfilling their contracts as customers of the plaintiff. D threatens T with unlawful means (e.g. violence or another delict or a breach of contract) so as to intimidate T into breaching a contract with P. D threatens P with unlawful means (e.g. violence or another delict) so as to intimidate P into acting to P’s loss.

(2) Intention The delict of causing loss by unlawful means requires that D should have intended to cause the loss to P, although it is sufficient if such loss is intended as a means to a further end. As Lord Hodge explained in Global Resources Group v Mackay, the relevant intention is found “either where [D] wishes to inflict loss on [P] or where [P]’s loss is a means by which [D] 88 (1926) 42 TLR 376. 89 [1965] AC 269.

21.35

798   The Law of Delict in Scotland

21.36

attains some further end such as his own economic advantage”.90 Thus while some cases may be inspired by a specific grudge against P, in many others the loss to P is intended only as a means of securing a gain to D.91 In Douglas v Hello! Ltd, one of the cases heard with OBG Ltd v Allan,92 the defendants were the publishers of a magazine which had reproduced pirated pictures of the Douglases’ celebrity wedding, thus greatly diminishing the value of the exclusive contract which the Douglases had granted to OK!, a rival magazine, for the wedding coverage. For reasons noted further below, the court held that the tort of causing loss by unlawful means was not made out, but at the same time it found that the necessary level of intention would have been present. The court was entirely persuaded that the defendants had acted out of self-interest, rather than with the primary aim of causing loss to the claimants. However, Lord Hoffmann commented that “The injury which [the publisher] inflicted on ‘OK!’ in order to achieve the end of keeping up his sales was simply the other side of the same coin.”93 By contrast, in one of the other appeals heard in the same proceedings, OBG Ltd v Allan itself, the defendants had been appointed, invalidly, as receivers of the claimant companies, and during the period of their control the claimants alleged that the claimants’ profitability was irretrievably damaged. The tort of inducing loss by unlawful means was not made out because there was no evidence of any intention to cause loss.94 The delicts of causing loss by unlawful means and inducing breach of contract have an important point of difference in this regard. For the latter, P must show merely that D intended the contract to be breached, not necessarily that loss was intended.95 By contrast, in order to substantiate the delict of causing loss by unlawful means, D must have intended that loss would be occasioned to P, if not as an end in itself then as a means to an end desired by D.96

90 [2008] CSOH 148, 2009 SLT 104 at para 17. 91 See OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Nicholls at para 167, under reference to Sorrell v Smith [1925] AC 700 per Lord Sumner at 742. See also McLeod v Rooney [2009] CSOH 158, 2010 SLT 499. However, Carty, Economic Torts 79–84 points out that in the cases under appeal in OBG Ltd v Allan the Court of Appeal had adopted a narrower approach to intention, requiring harm to the claimant to have been the predominant aim (Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125 per Lord Phillips at para 166; Mainstream Properties Ltd v Young [2005] IRLR 964). She criticises the House of Lords for replacing the Court of Appeal’s “straightforward (and deliberately narrow) definition” with one that has an uncertain scope, and argues that a more restricted concept of targeted harm should have been retained in order to distinguish intention to harm from intention to make a profit at the claimant’s expense. 92 [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1. 93 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 at para 134. 94 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 93. 95 See para 21.19 above. 96 See OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 62.

The Economic Delicts   799

On the other hand, it is not enough that loss was occasioned to P as an incidental consequence of D’s unlawful conduct, even if the loss was foreseeable. As a practical illustration, Lord Hoffmann referred in OBG Ltd v Allan to the case of Barretts & Baird Ltd v Institution of Professional Civil Servants97 in which the defendant trade union had called a series of one-day strikes of civil servants working for the Meat and Livestock Commission. The strikes were in support of a pay claim, but also had the consequence that the plaintiffs, abattoir owners and others involved in the meat trade, were unable to obtain the certification necessary to continue running their businesses smoothly. The requisite level of intention was not present for the tort then known as interference with contract by unlawful means, since, as Lord Hoffmann commented, “The damage to the abattoir was neither the purpose of the strike nor the means of achieving that purpose, which was to put pressure on the government.”98

21.37

(3) Unlawful means What constitutes unlawful or wrongful means is not entirely straightforward, not least because a wide spectrum of conduct might be labelled in this way, ranging from civil wrongs, including delicts, and breach of contract, but also perhaps encompassing breach of statutory provisions and crimes which are not in themselves civilly actionable.99 In reconceptualising the tort of causing loss by unlawful means, the House of Lords gave detailed consideration to this issue in OBG Ltd v Allan. Lord Nicholls advocated a broad interpretation, suggesting that unlawfulness should embrace “all acts a defendant is not permitted to do, whether by the civil law or the criminal law.”100 It was unacceptable, in his view, that a remedy should be available where the D had threatened T with a breach of contract but not where D menaced T with criminal conduct.101 However,   97 [1987] IRLR 3.  98 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 64.  99 For full discussion of the categories of unlawfulness and their treatment in the case law, see Carty, Economic Torts 84–92. 100 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 at para 162. Indeed at para 153 Lord Nicholls referred simply to “unacceptable”, rather than “unlawful”, means. 101 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 at para 152. In Lord Nicholls’ view the control device that limited the otherwise far-reaching scope of this tort was the concept of the “instrumentality” of the third party; liability would arise only where the direction of unlawful means at the third party had resulted in the third party becoming the “instrument” by which the loss was caused (para 159). He adopted a more guarded position on breach of statutory provisions, however (paras 156–158), admitting that where a statutory scheme had provided for a system of remedies, it would be inconsistent for this common law tort to add yet another. See, however, Tiscali UK Limited v British Telecommunications plc [2008] EWHC 3129 (QB), in which the claimant was permitted to proceed with a claim for causing loss by unlawful means on the basis not only of malicious falsehood but also a breach of the criminal law provisions in the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, SI 2008/1277, and the Business Protection from Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008, SI 2008/1276.

21.38

800   The Law of Delict in Scotland

21.39

21.40

21.41

this expansive view of unlawfulness was at odds with the more restrictive definition put forward by Lord Hoffmann and supported by the majority.102 For Lord Hoffmann, unlawful means were acts against a third party that were “actionable by that third party”. They were equally unlawful, however, “if the only reason why they are not actionable is because the third party has suffered no loss”.103 In other words, unlawful means were confined to civil wrongs, actual or threatened. This appears also to accord with Lord Hodge’s understanding of unlawfulness as explained in Global Resources Group v Mackay: “it is necessary that [T] has a right of legal redress against [D] for his use of the unlawful means if [T] has suffered loss thereby or that he would have been so entitled had he suffered loss.”104 So D causes loss to P by unlawful means where D breaches a contract with T or commits a delict vis-à-vis T that affects the economic activity of P. A classic example of the latter is found in the early English case of Tarleton v M’Gawley.105 The plaintiffs’ ship was anchored off the coast of Cameroon. A number of local inhabitants came on board for the purpose of trading goods. As the locals were on their way back to shore, the defendants, who were on board a rival trading vessel, fired at them with the intention of frightening them from doing business with the plaintiffs in future. This was a tort perpetrated on third parties with the purpose of causing loss to the plaintiffs. An extended example of tortious unlawful means is found in National Phonographic Co Ltd v Edison-Bell Consolidated Phonographic Co Ltd.106 The plaintiffs refused to trade with the defendants except on restricted terms. In order to get around this the defendants assumed false identities in order fraudulently to induce other suppliers to sell the plaintiffs’ products to them, and thereafter sold on the products at cut prices. This could not be said to constitute the tort of deceit because the third party suppliers had suffered no loss; but means remain unlawful for these purposes “if the only reason why they are not actionable is because the third party has suffered no loss”.107 The plaintiffs were therefore held to be entitled to damages. This understanding of unlawfulness extends also to threats which are not carried through. As Lord Reid pointed out in Rookes v Barnard, “What is material to [P’s]’s cause of action is the threat and [T’s] submission to it. 102 Lady Hale and Lord Brown. For a detailed analysis of the differing judicial interpretations of “unlawful means” in OBG Ltd v Allan, see Carty, Economic Torts 92–95; B Ong, “Two tripartite economic torts” (2008) Journal of Business Law 723 at 736–743. 103 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 at para 49. 104 [2008] CSOH 148, 2009 SLT 104 per Lord Hodge at para 17. 105 (1794) Peake 270. 106 [1908] 1 Ch 335. 107 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 49. Commenting upon National Phonographic Co Ltd v Edison-Bell Consolidated Phonographic Co Ltd, Lord Hoffman explained: “The fraud was unlawful means because it would have been actionable if the third party had suffered any loss, even though in the event it was the plaintiff who suffered.”

The Economic Delicts   801

Whether the threat is executed or not is in law quite immaterial.”108 This is illustrated in Rookes itself,109 in which the defendants, who were union officials, threatened an employer with strike action unless the plaintiff, one of its employees, was dismissed. This was a threat to breach contracts of employment, by striking, with the intention of causing loss to the plaintiff. In response to the threat, the employer dismissed the plaintiff, and the threat was not executed. The plaintiff was nonetheless held entitled to damages to compensate him for the loss suffered due to the employer’s action. The tort or delict of causing loss by unlawful means may thus encompass wrongs previously labelled as “intimidation”, as discussed further below.110

(4) D’s unlawful acts must affect T’s freedom to deal with P In Lord Hoffmann’s definition of the English tort, it is not sufficient that D should have acted unlawfully in regard to T, and that D should have intended to cause loss to P as a consequence. In addition to unlawfulness and intention to cause loss, a further control mechanism is provided by the requirement that D’s unlawful actings must have affected T’s “freedom to deal with the claimant”.111 A “dealing requirement” of this kind reflects the concern that the scope of this tort should be kept within reasonable bounds.112 Thus failure to establish this third element in Douglas v Hello! Ltd113 meant that the tort of causing loss by unlawful means could not be made out. In publishing the unauthorised photographs of the Douglases’ wedding, Hello! had caused loss to OK!, and they had acted unlawfully by breaching the confidentiality surrounding the ceremony. But while OK!’s rights under the contract with the Douglases were thereby made less lucrative than they would otherwise have been, Hello! had not done anything to interfere with the Douglases’ freedom to perform their obligations under that contract, since the wedding pictures could in any event be published

108 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 at 1208. 109 [1964] AC 1129 at 1208, instanced by Lord Hoffmann in OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 at para 47. For a Scottish perspective on Rookes, see J T Cameron, “Intimidation and Right to Strike” 1964 SLT (News) 81, commenting, at 83, that it might “safely be assumed that a wrong of the same kind as or parallel to the tort of intimidation will be recognised by the Scottish courts”. 110 See OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 at para 7, and see discussion at paras 21.48–21.49 below. 111 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 at para 51. 112 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 56: “the courts should be . . . cautious in extending a tort which was designed only to enforce basic standards of civilised behaviour in economic competition”. See also Secretary of State for Health v Servier Laboratories Ltd [2021] UKSC 24 per Lord Hamblen at paras 59 and 69 and Lord Sales at para 103. 113 [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1.

21.42

802   The Law of Delict in Scotland

21.43

in OK!.114 Similarly in Secretary of State for Health v Servier Laboratories Ltd115 the defendants were pharmaceutical manufacturers whose patent for a drug, perindopril, had been revoked by the European Patent Office after earlier assertions as to its novelty were disproved. The claimants argued that in the meantime they had incurred greatly increased costs in procuring the drug, because manufacturers of (cheaper) generic perindopril had been prevented from entering the market earlier. The tort of causing loss by unlawful means was not made out, however, because, even accepting that the defendants’ actions were unlawful in the required sense, their actions could not be said to have affected the freedom of third parties to deal with the claimant. The Supreme Court confirmed the “dealing requirement” as part of the ratio of OBG Ltd v Allan,116 and found no compelling or sufficient reason why it should depart from the decision of the House of Lords in this matter.117 This additional requirement has been criticised,118 but it has nonetheless been accepted as a feature of the Scottish delict also. In McLeod v Rooney Lord Glennie restated the delict of causing loss by unlawful means as entailing:119 “(a) that defender had the intention to cause economic harm to the pursuer; (b) that the defender . . . acted unlawfully in relation to a third party; and (c) that such unlawful action affected that third party’s freedom to deal with the pursuer.”

114 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 129. Lord Hoffmann commented at paras 52–54 that this was an important feature in RCA v Pollard [1983] Ch 135 and Oren v Red Box Toy Factory Ltd [1999] FSR 785. In RCA v Pollard the plaintiff had exclusive rights to sell Elvis Presley records. The defendant was selling bootleg copies, and the Presley estate would have had a cause of action against the defendant. But while the defendant was reducing the profits derived from the contract between the Presley estate and the plaintiff, it was not compromising the Presley estate’s freedom to perform its obligations under that contract, and the tort of interference with contractual relations was not made out. Oren v Red Box Toy Factory Ltd involved a similar claim brought by the licensee of a registered design against a manufacturer who sold products infringing the design. In OBG Ltd v Allan, Lord Nicholls similarly spoke, at para 159, of the requirement that the claimant should be harmed through the “instrumentality” of the third party, whereas here there was “no question of Hello! injuring OK! through an intermediary” (para 261). 115 [2021] UKSC 24. 116 [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1. See Secretary of State for Health v Servier Laboratories Ltd [2021] UKSC 24 per Lord Hamblen at paras 64–71 noting that this requirement was consistent with previous authorities in England and in the Commonwealth and formed part of the understanding of academic commentators. 117 [2021] UKSC 24 per Lord Hamblen at para 100. 118 See Carty, Economic Torts 95–98 arguing that this “gloss” on unlawful means adds a further layer of complexity to the tort, and that the necessary control mechanism is provided by a properly focused requirement for “targeted” harm. See also Secretary of State for Health v Servier Laboratories Ltd [2021] UKSC 24, and the discussion by Lord Hamblen at paras 75–99 under the heading “should OBG be departed from?”. 119 [2009] CSOH 158, 2010 SLT 499 at para 17.

The Economic Delicts   803

As in Douglas v Hello! Ltd, it was the absence of this third element that prevented the delict of causing loss by unlawful means from being established in McLeod v Rooney. The defender had been the operations manager of a company, and the pursuers had been directors and majority shareholders. The pursuers alleged that the defender, in breach of his duties, deliberately compromised the trading position of the company to such a level that it was brought to the brink of insolvency, thereby much reducing the value of its shares. The pursuers then found themselves in a position whereby they had no alternative but to sell their own shares to the defender, standing down also as directors. Thereafter the defender undid the damage that he had done previously and returned the company to profitability. These circumstances, if made out, indicated that the defender had set out intentionally to harm the pursuers, even if only as a means towards securing his own personal gain. They also indicated that he had used unlawful means to do so. However, the loss suffered was caused to the pursuers directly, not through the “instrument” of the company. The defender’s alleged conduct had reduced the value of the shares, but it had not interfered with the company’s freedom to deal with the pursuers as its shareholders.120 Lord Glennie conjectured that it might have been possible to make a case for “a different delict”, but a relevant claim under causing loss by unlawful means was not made out.121

(5) Loss P must demonstrate loss incurred as a result of the unlawful means applied by D. In Chalfont St Peter Parish Council v Holy Cross Sisters Trs,122 for example, it was alleged that the defendants had fraudulently misrepresented the previous uses of a plot of ground. This was to facilitate their application for planning permission, thereby frustrating the claimants’ plans for the site. The court found, however, that the untruths told by the defendants had not influenced the planning authority’s decision to grant permission, and therefore the tort of causing loss by unlawful means was not made out. Earlier cases were stated as protecting P from loss sustained in “trade” or “business”,123 but it is not clear that there is continuing reason or support for restricting loss to this context.124 In reformulating the tort in OBG

120 [2009] CSOH 158, 2010 SLT 499 at para 21. 121 [2009] CSOH 158, 2010 SLT 499 at para 22. Averments to the effect that the defender and a third party had acted in concert might conceivably have permitted a claim to be formulated under conspiracy. Similarly, in Global Resources Group v Mackay [2008] CSOH 148, 2009 SLT 104 the delict of causing loss by unlawful means was not made out where the pursuers had not asserted that the defender had used unlawful means in relation to the third party (per Lord Hodge at para 17). 122 [2019] EWHC 1128 (QB). At the time of writing, an appeal was outstanding. 123 Carty, Economic Torts 99. 124 See D Stilitz and P Sales, “Intentional Infliction of Harm by Unlawful Means” (1999) 115 LQR 411.

21.44

21.45

804   The Law of Delict in Scotland

21.46

Ltd v Allan the House of Lords for the most part adopted the broader terminology of “economic loss” or damage to “economic interests”.125 Similarly, in the Scottish courts this delict has been defined by its capacity to inflict “economic harm”.126 Admittedly, the reported cases have derived almost exclusively from the commercial sphere, but there is no obvious barrier to recovery for economic loss suffered in a private context. It is arguable, therefore, that financial loss should be recoverable where, for instance, the pursuer had missed out on a lucrative opportunity to sell his or her home due to the defender threatening the potential purchaser before conclusion of missives.127 It is less certain that loss to non-economic interests is covered by the delict. In Chalfont St Peter Parish Council v Holy Cross Sisters Trs,128 where the tort was not case made out on grounds of causation (as noted above), the court would in any event have rejected the claim because the loss alleged by the claimant was not financial. The defendants’ successful planning application meant that the claimant would be unable to fulfil its own local development plan for the area, but the court noted that no authority had been cited to it that the interests protected by the unlawful means tort extended beyond economic interests.129 By the same token, however, there is no clear authority (aside from this case) to the effect that the delict (or tort) should be limited to cases of specific financial loss, and no obvious policy reasons why such a restriction should be imposed.

(6) Justification 21.47

Although the House of Lords in OBG Ltd v Allan discussed the circumstances in which inducing breach of contract might be justified, it made no comment on whether the defence of justification should also be available in

125 [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 47 and Lord Brown at para 320, but see Lord Nicholls at para 141, stating that “The gist of this tort is intentionally damaging another’s business by unlawful means.” See also Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] UKHL 19, [2008] 1 AC 1174 per Lord Walker at para 100, distinguishing conspiracy from the other economic torts in that it did not necessary involve harm to a “trader who is injured in his trade”. 126 See references to “economic harm” in Global Resources Group v Mackay [2008] CSOH 148, 2009 SLT 104 per Lord Hodge at para 17; McLeod v Rooney [2009] CSOH 158, 2010 SLT 499 per Lord Glennie at para 17. 127 A more expansionist view is that this delict provides the courts with “the opportunity to develop general and coherent principles of tort liability” for all types of harm suffered intentionally: see Stilitz and Sales, “Intentional Infliction of Harm by Unlawful Means” 436. For a rebuttal of this suggestion, and the argument that “The economic torts exist to govern market relations and in particular to police the competitive process”, see S Deakin and J Randall, “Rethinking the Economic Torts” (2009) 72 MLR 519 at 553. 128 [2019] EWHC 1128 (QB). 129 [2019] EWHC 1128 (QB) per Swift J at para 99, remarking that there was “no reason why private law should protect the political aspirations of the Parish Council in this way”.

The Economic Delicts   805

respect of causing loss by unlawful means. Since that time some academic commentators have found there to be “no possibility” of invoking a justification defence to this delict.130 Others have been less categorical,131 while at the same time identifying good reason for judicial reluctance to countenance it.132 Given that the concept of unlawfulness is already a broad category, the possibility of indeterminate further considerations being brought to bear in justification would add an undesirable level of uncertainty to a delict which the House of Lords set out to simplify.133 Moreover, a justification defence would often require the courts to “assess the fairness or unfairness of the defendant’s conduct towards the claimant, and to draw lines between fair and unfair modes of competition – a role which the English courts have consistently declined to perform”.134 Finally, it is difficult to envisage the circumstances in which such a defence could be argued in practice. Even at its least reprehensible, the foundational requirement of unlawfulness still involves a civil wrong. It is not obvious what factors could be accepted in justification of that wrong, given that, as a further prerequisite of liability for this delict, the defender intended to cause loss to the pursuer.135

(7) Intimidation and two-party cases The delict of intimidation is committed where D uses an unlawful threat to coerce either P or T into acting (or failing to act) in a particular way. Injury136 or loss is then sustained by P as a result of that act (or failure to act). Intimidation can in principle entail a two-party or a three-party scenario. In OBG Ltd v Allan, the House of Lords indicated that the three-party version, as illustrated by the case of Rookes v Barnard,137 was simply one of the variants within the broader category of causing loss by unlawful means.138 On the other hand, Lord Hoffmann noted that two-party intimidation “raises

130 Deakin and Randall, “Rethinking the Economic Torts” 551, although the authors also argue that this is an “unsatisfactorily rigid position”. 131 Carty, Economic Torts 101, concluding that “at best” the scope of this defence would be “very residual”. 132 B Ong, “Two Tripartite Economic Torts” [2008] Journal of Business Law 723 at 744–745. 133 See OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Brown at para 320, commenting that this delict “has been plagued by uncertainty for far too long. Your Lordships now have the opportunity to give it a coherent shape. This surely is an opportunity to be taken.” 134 Ong, “Two Tripartite Economic Torts” 744–745. 135 In this respect, causing loss by unlawful means differs from inducing breach of contract, where justification can be recognised, in that the latter only requires intention to induce the breach. 136 See Godwin v Uzoigwe [1993] Fam Law 65 (an unusual case in which the injury suffered was deprivation of liberty); Gumpo v Church of Scientology Religious Education College Inc [2000] CP Rep 38. 137 [1964] AC 1129, discussed at para 21.41 above. 138 [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 7.

21.48

806   The Law of Delict in Scotland

different issues”.139 There was no suggestion, however, that two- party intimidation had fallen into desuetude, and this wrong has continued to be invoked in subsequent cases.140 The essential ingredients of this delict have been described as follows:141 “(1) a threat by the defendant to do something unlawful or ‘illegitimate’; (2) the threat must be intended to coerce the claimant to take or refrain from taking some course of action; (3) the threat must in fact coerce the claimant to take such action; (4) loss or damage must be incurred by the claimant as a result.”

21.49

By making the threat D must have intended to coerce P into a particular course of action that would be injurious to P’s interests.142 The injurious consequences are typically financial, but intimidation may be relevantly averred where there is loss or damage to other interests.143 D’s threat must be to do something unlawful. Clearly, personal violence comes within this category,144 but the threat of another wrong which would be actionable as a delict also qualifies.145 Where, however, the threat is to breach a contract between the parties, it is not clear that a relevant case of two-party intimidation is made out.146 In three-party intimidation, where a contract with a third party was under threat, the law of delict provided a remedy where none was available otherwise. By contrast, in two-party intimidation, the pursuer who is threatened with breach of contract can have recourse to

139 [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 at para 61. See also J T Stratford & Son Ltd v Lindley [1965] AC 269 per Lord Reid at 325: “a case where a defendant presents to the plaintiff the alternative of doing what the defendant wants him to do or suffering loss which the defendant can cause him to incur is not necessarily in pari casu and may involve questions which cannot arise where there is intimidation of a third person”. Similarly in Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] UKHL 19, [2008] 1 AC 1174, Lord Mance at para 124 referred to the importance of the distinction between two-party and three-party conspiracy. 140 See e.g. Berezovsky v Abramovich [2011] EWCA Civ 153, [2011] 1 WLR 2290. 141 Berezovsky v Abramovich [2011] EWCA Civ 153, [2011] 1 WLR 2290 per Longmore LJ at para 5, citing a previous definition by Lord Denning in Morgan v Fry [1968] 2 QB 710 at 724: “there must be a threat by one person to use unlawful means (such as violence or a tort or a breach of contract) so as to compel another to obey his wishes: and the person so threatened must comply with the demand rather than risk the threat being carried into execution. In such circumstance the person damnified by the compliance can sue for intimidation.” 142 See News Group Newspapers Ltd v Society of Graphical and Allied Trades ’82 [1987] ICR 181 per Stuart-Smith J at 204: “The tort is one of intention and the plaintiff . . . must be a person whom [the defendant] intended to injure.” 143 See e.g. Godwin v Uzoigwe [1993] Fam Law 65, in which the plaintiff not only suffered loss of earnings, but also suffered injury to feelings and deprivation of educational opportunity. 144 See discussion in Hodges v Webb [1920] 2 Ch 70. 145 Godwin v Uzoigwe [1993] Fam Law 65 (threat of assault); see also discussion in Micosta SA v Shetland Islands Council 1986 SLT 193 per Lord Ross at 199. 146 See Morgan v Fry [1968] 2 QB 710 per Lord Denning at 724, referring to the threat of “violence or a tort or a breach of contract” as relevant in this regard.

The Economic Delicts   807

contractual remedies, notably in respect of anticipatory breach.147 Academic commentators have therefore argued for excluding two-party cases from the ambit of the tort of intimidation where the unlawful threat is that the contract between P and D will be breached.148 Set against this, there is first-instance English authority149 indicating recognition of the tort of intimidation where the defendants had threatened not to deliver the goods under a contract, thereby coercing the claimants into accepting significant price increases for an order that was urgently required. Where threatening behaviour is used more than once, remedies are available under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, which in section 8(6) provides that damages are available in an action of harassment not only for any anxiety caused by the harassment but also for “any financial loss resulting from it”. In such cases the 1997 Act may provide a more certain route to redress than the common law delict.

21.50

D. CONSPIRACY The civil wrong of conspiracy occurs when a group of persons collude with the intention of harming another person. Until the late nineteenth century, the term “conspiracy” was found in the Scottish authorities as describing not an independent wrong but rather the joint wrongdoing of parties in committing a delict which would in any event have attracted liability had any of them acted alone.150 In Scotland, as in England,151 “conspiracy” was actionable “where the acts agreed to be done, and in fact done, would, had they been without preconcert, have involved a civil injury to the plaintiff”.152 The delict or tort of conspiracy came to the fore, however, at the

147 McBryde, Contract para 20–32. 148 For a summary, see Carty, Economic Torts 118–119. 149 Kolmar Group AG v Traxpo Enterprises Pvt Ltd [2010] EWHC 113 (Comm), [2010] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 653. The defendant was not represented in proceedings. 150 See e.g. Auchincloss v Black (1793) Hume 595 (alleged conspiracy to defame the pursuer, extracting a false confession by a combination of “importunity and threats of persecution” and false promises); M’Cosh v M’Cosh (1832) 10 S 579 (alleged wrongful conspiracy “to deprive the pursuer of his liberty, and to confine him in a madhouse”). 151 The English courts trace the origins of this tort, like those of the crime, to the writ of conspiracy, giving remedy for abuse of legal procedure: see Carty, Economic Torts 124; Midland Bank Trust Co v Green (No 3) [1979] Ch 496 per Oliver J at 520–525 (affd [1982] Ch 529). 152 Huttley v Simmons [1898] 1 QB 181 per Darling J at 185, citing Kearney v Lloyd (1890) 26 LR Ir 268. See also R H Thomson & Co v Pattison, Elder, & Co (1895) 22 R 432 per Lord President Robertson at 436: “If A, the servant of B, conspires with C, that he shall continue to act ostensibly as B’s servant and receive his wages, but shall, instead of promoting B’s interests, betray them by diverting his business to C, then it is surely clear that A and C are guilty of fraud against B, and are jointly and severally liable in damages to him on the ground of their common fraud.” But cf James Couper & Sons v Macfarlane (1879) 6 R 683 per Lord Ormidale at 697: “I think it the law of Scotland . . . that where an act would not be unlawful if done by one person, it does not become unlawful or criminal when two or more persons combine to do it.”

21.51

808   The Law of Delict in Scotland

21.52

end of the nineteenth century in cases where employers challenged concerted action by trades union officials, or union officials and employees.153 Trades unions are now protected by statute against civil law liability in this context,154 but cases continue to arise from time to time. Typically (but not exclusively)155 they are found in the commercial sphere, where businesses seek to protect themselves against unfair competitive practices by their rivals.156 The notion that a conspiracy directed at harming another’s business should be actionable where it was achieved by unlawful means is unremarkable. Indeed some have questioned whether there is a need in the modern law for a separate wrong of “unlawful-means” conspiracy, given that such action is in any case “caught” by well-established principles of liability, including the rule that where the defenders have joined together in order to assist one or more of them to commit a delict all are jointly liable.157 But an important departure in the case law of the Victorian era was acceptance of the principle that liability might be found even where conspirators had applied lawful means, if in so acting they had been motivated by malice.158 This form of “lawful-means” conspiracy, rendered actionable by malice, became established as an exception to the general rule in English law, as stated in Allen v Flood,159 that an act that was legal in itself was not rendered illegal by a malicious motive. The analysis applied in the English courts thereafter found its way into the Scottish case law, with no indication that it was not also applicable north of the border.160 When a Scots case on conspiracy came before the House of Lords in the midtwentieth century therefore, none of the parties sought to argue that “as regards the law applicable to the present action, there was any material difference between the Scottish law of delict and the English law of tort”.161 153 For discussion, see M Lobban, “Intentional and Economic Torts”, in W Cornish et al, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol XII, 1820–1914: Private Law (2010) 1060–1067; JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov [2018] UKSC 19, [2020] AC 727 per Lord Sumption and Lord Lloyd-Jones at para 7. See e.g. Temperton v Russell [1893] 1 QB 715; Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495; Reynolds v Shipping Federation Ltd [1924] 1 Ch 28. 154 See para 21.02 above. 155 See e.g. Midland Bank Trust Co v Green (No 3) [1982] Ch 529, in which it was alleged that a married couple had conspired to deprive their son of an option to purchase property. 156 The leading case is Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co [1892] AC 25. 157 See Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] UKHL 19, [2008] 1 AC 1174 per Lord Neuberger at paras 225–226, citing R Stevens, Torts and Rights (2007) 248–253. 158 Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495; see also Temperton v Russell [1893] 1 QB 715. 159 [1898] AC 1. 160 See Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Glasgow Fleshers Trade Defence Association (1897) 5 SLT 263 per Lord Kincairney at 267; Mackenzie v Iron Trades Employers Insurance Association Ltd 1910 SC 79. 161 Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch 1942 SC (HL) 1 per Viscount Simon at 2–3. For discussion, see J Thomson, “An Island Legacy – the Delict of Conspiracy”, in D L Carey Miller and D W Meyers (eds), Comparative and Historical Essays in Scots Law: A Tribute to Professor Sir Thomas Smith (1992) 137.

The Economic Delicts   809

A distinction continues to be made between lawful-means conspiracy and unlawful-means conspiracy, and this has important implications for the issue of intention.162

(1) Lawful-means conspiracy Liability for lawful-means conspiracy is triggered by conduct which would be unexceptionable if carried out by a single defender. It is the fact of combination with the predominant purpose of causing harming163 that renders it actionable. The original rationale of lawful-means conspiracy was said to be that “a combination may make oppressive or dangerous that which if it proceeded only from a single person would be otherwise”.164 This no longer persuades, for as Lord Diplock commented in Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2):165

21.53

“[T]o suggest today that acts done by one street-corner grocer in concert with a second are more oppressive and dangerous to a competitor than the same acts done by a string of supermarkets under a single ownership or that a multinational conglomerate such as Lonrho or oil company such as Shell or BP does not exercise greater economic power than any combination of small businesses, is to shut one’s eyes to what has been happening in the business and industrial world since the turn of the century and, in particular, since the end of World War II.”

Nonetheless, lawful-means conspiracy has become “too well-established to be discarded however anomalous it may seem today”,166 and its continuing relevance is acknowledged.167 Liability is established only if the predominant purpose of the conspirators was to harm another person. This, therefore, is negated by the assertion

162 JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov [2018] UKSC 19, [2020] AC 727 per Lord Sumption and Lord Lloyd-Jones at para 8. 163 Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch 1942 SC (HL) 1. 164 Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co (1889) 23 QBD 598 per Bowen LJ at 616 (affd [1892] AC 25). 165 [1982] AC 173 at 189. See also S Daly, “The Aberrant Tort of Lawful Means Conspiracy?” (2020) 31 King’s Law Journal 145, arguing that lawful-means conspiracy is not properly understood when “lumped together” with the economic torts, and that the common law tort is now superseded by statutory control of competition. 166 [1982] AC 173 per Lord Diplock at 189. 167 JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov [2018] UKSC 19, [2020] AC 727 per Lord Sumption and Lord Lloyd-Jones at para 8. See, however, P S Davies and P Sales, “Intentional Harm, Accessories and Conspiracies” (2018) 134 LQR 69, arguing that, after clarification of the economic torts in decisions such as OBG Ltd v Allan and Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] UKHL 19, [2008] 1 AC 1174, there is no need for a separate tort of conspiracy, and no reason why conduct which is not actionable when committed by one party should be actionable simply because that party acted in combination with another.

21.54

810   The Law of Delict in Scotland

21.55

of an object regarded as legitimate, including the pursuit of self-interest, even where the conspirators were bound to have realised that another person would suffer as a consequence of their collective action. The leading Scottish case of Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch168 arose out of a dispute regarding unfair competition in the production of Harris Tweed on the Isle of Lewis. Various of the manufacturers had cut their costs by producing tweed from imported yarn rather than from the yarn spun according to traditional methods on the island. This had the effect of pushing down not only the price of the cloth, but also the earnings of workers in the mills using the time-honoured methods. The mill workers and the dock labourers on the island were largely members of the same union – the Transport and General Workers Union. As a means of putting pressure upon the manufacturers in question, TGWU officials ordered the dockers not to handle consignments of yarn arriving on the island or outgoing consignments of tweed produced by using imported yarn. The affected manufacturers sought interdict against the union officials, alleging that they had conspired to damage their right to trade. The House of Lords accepted that there had been collusion designed to harm the pursuers, and that damage had been suffered, but refused to grant interdict. There was doubtless a variety of objectives as between dockers, mill workers and officials, but the predominant aim, in which there was sufficient “community of interest”, was not to do damage to the manufacturers but to further their legitimate collective interests.169 The “determining feature” of lawful-means conspiracy – intention to injure – was thereby rebutted.170 While discussion in Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch was largely focussed on the promotion of self interest in terms of trade or business interests, legitimate purpose may be found in spheres other than material gain. The objective of furthering moral or community interests, such as discouraging racial discrimination,171 would likewise point away from intention to harm.172 Conversely, conspiracies would not be regarded as lawful if the common purpose was fuelled by hostility on grounds of religion, politics or race.173 As Evatt J explained in the Australian case of McKernan v Fraser:174

168 1942 SC (HL) 1. 169 Viscount Simon identified the “predominant object” of the embargo as benefiting trade union members “by preventing under-cutting and unregulated competition, and so helping to secure the economic stability of the island industry. The result they aimed at achieving was to create a better basis for collective bargaining, and thus directly to improve wage prospects.” See 1942 SC (HL) 1 at 11. 170 1942 SC (HL) 1 per Lord Wright at 30. 171 Scala Ballroom (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Ratcliffe [1958] 1 WLR 1057. 172 1942 SC (HL) 1 per Lord Wright at 36. 173 1942 SC (HL) 1 per Viscount Maugham at 15. 174 (1931) 46 CLR 343 at 403.

The Economic Delicts   811 “[A]ny proved hostility or dislike to the plaintiff must be further analysed in order to ascertain whether it is a motive related to a clash of economic or professional interests, and arises from strong opinions as to the plaintiff’s own conduct in relation thereto; whether, on the other hand, the hostility or dislike is not a result of the feelings and attachments of the defendants to the economic and professional interests which they allege they are advancing or defending, but has its true source in personal hatred or bitterness.”

Malice will not be imputed to all participants in a conspiracy simply because it has been detected in one.175 Overall, the adoption of a broad reading of legitimate self-interest negates intention to harm unless the common purpose of all the conspirators can be shown to be driven by personal malevolence.

(2) Unlawful-means conspiracy By contrast, where persons have conspired together to cause harm to another by use of unlawful means, liability does not turn on whether the harm was their predominant purpose (as in lawful means conspiracy). Liability may arise even where the harm was only a means to an end, and it is no defence that the main purpose was legitimate self-interest:176

21.56

“A conspiracy to injure by unlawful means is actionable where the claimant proves that he has suffered loss or damage as a result of unlawful action taken pursuant to a combination or agreement between the defendant and another person or persons to injure him by unlawful means, whether or not it is the predominant purpose of the defendant to do so.”

The key elements in this delict are therefore (a) an intention to injure the interests of another, coupled with (b) a common design between the parties using unlawful means to achieve this.

(a) Intention Unlike lawful-means conspiracy, unlawful-means conspiracy does not require that the predominant purpose should have been to harm another person.177 175 McKernan v Fraser (1931) 46 CLR 343. 176 Kuwait Oil Tanker Co SAK v Al Bader [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 271 per Nourse LJ at 312; see also Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1303, [2008] Ch 244 per Toulson LJ at para 172. 177 See Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] UKHL 19, [2008] 1 AC 1174 per Lord Walker at 82, highlighting the “clear distinction between the requirement of predominant purpose under one variety of the tort of conspiracy and the lower requirement of intentional injury needed for the other variety” and referring also, at paras 98–100, to Lord Hoffmann’s analysis in OBG v Allan in regard to causing loss by unlawful means. It might be added that there was perhaps little reason to consider the question of intention in detail in this particular case, since intention was evident in the defendants’ deliberate scheme to cheat the Revenue.

21.57

812   The Law of Delict in Scotland

21.58

The meaning of intention for the purposes of unlawful-means conspiracy thus parallels that applied in OBG Ltd v Allan to the delict of causing loss by unlawful means.178 In other words, if the injury is not actually intended as an end in itself, it is sufficient that it was intended as a means towards a different end.179 The requisite level of intention is therefore present where the primary intention was to advance the parties’ own economic interests but they intended to do so by a means that would injure the interests of another person.180 Thus in JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov,181 the claimant bank alleged that A had conspired with K to conceal and dispose of assets in defiance of a freezing order obtained during proceedings by the claimant to recover funds that A had allegedly embezzled from it. In other words, the claimant alleged that A had conspired with K to cause it damage by acting in contempt of court. The predominant purpose of the conspirators was to protect A’s financial interests, not to injure the claimant. Nonetheless, the requisite level of intention was present, because damage to the claimant’s interests was intended as a means of achieving that purpose. The freezing order had been obtained by the claimant in order to protect its right of recovery in claims against A, and the disposal of the assets in breach of the freezing order was intended to prevent the claimant from enforcing those claims in the event of success. Constructive knowledge suffices in this regard: it is sufficient that “the defenders intended to, or objectively knew that they would, cause harm to the pursuer.”182 It is no defence to an action for unlawful-means conspiracy that the conspirators acted in the belief that they had a lawful right to act as they did. Knowledge of the unlawfulness of the means is not required, subject to the qualification that knowledge of unlawfulness is of course necessary if such knowledge is an essential element of the civil wrong or criminal conduct alleged to constitute the unlawful means.183

178 See para 21.35 above (although it should be noted that, as discussed at para 21.62 below, the scope of unlawfulness differs as between the different wrongs). 179 See Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1303, [2008] Ch 244 per Arden LJ at para 146, accepting that no “distinction could be drawn between what was held in the OBG case about intention to cause loss by unlawful means and conspiracy”, and that the defendants must therefore have acted with the intention that their conduct would cause loss. See also Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd v Baskan Gida Sanayi Ve Pazarlama AS [2009] EWHC 1276 (Ch), [2010] Bus LR D1 per Briggs J at paras 825 and 833. 180 See Racing Partnership Ltd v Sports Information Services Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 1300, [2021] 2 WLR 469 per Arnold LJ at para 154. 181 [2018] UKSC 19, [2020] AC 727. 182 Kidd v Lime Rock Management LLP [2020] CSOH 96, 2021 SLT 35 per Lord Clark at para 57. 183 Racing Partnership Ltd v Sports Information Services Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 1300, [2021] 2 WLR 469 per Arnold LJ at paras 104–144. Note, however, the dissenting judgment of Lewison LJ at paras 213–265.

The Economic Delicts   813

(b) Unlawful means By “unlawful means” is meant not only civil wrongs but, potentially, also conduct contrary to the criminal law.184 In Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL the defendants were alleged to have colluded to perpetrate a complex “carousel fraud”. The aim was to induce the claimants to repay value added tax in respect of goods for which the tax had never been paid in the first place. Although it was accepted that this scheme was not in itself tortious,185 it did provide the basis for the common law crime of cheating the revenue authorities. As such it was recognised as unlawful means for the purposes of conspiracy and accordingly the House of Lords refused to strike out the claim for the loss suffered thereby. This extension to criminal wrongs was reaffirmed in JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov,186 in which the alleged unlawful means was conduct in contempt of court. Although this was a criminal offence, not a civil wrong, the court held that it was necessary to look beyond the nature of the conduct to its “relationship with the resultant damage to the claimant”.187 On that basis, tortious conduct might more readily meet the criteria for this tort,188 but other types of conduct were not to be excluded. In JSC BTA Bank the requisite relationship was made out between the criminal conduct and the damage suffered by the claimant because “The object of the conspiracy and the overt acts done pursuant to it was to prevent the bank from enforcing its judgments against Mr Ablyazov, and the benefit to him was exactly concomitant with the detriment to the bank as both defendants must have appreciated.”189 JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov did not give a clear steer on what exactly was to be looked for in the “relationship” between the defendants’ conduct and the damage to the claimant. However, the main factors in this assessment seemed to amount to: (i) whether, in perpetrating the unlawfulness, the defendants had the requisite level of intent to cause damage (as discussed above); and (ii) whether there was a sufficient causal relationship between the alleged unlawfulness and the damage. In relation to the latter, the unlawful conduct must be the “instrumentality” by which the harm occurred, and it is not enough that there was an incidental “element of unlawfulness somewhere in the story”.190 This means that the 184 Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] UKHL 19, [2008] 1 AC 1174 per Lord Hope at para 45. In this connection Powell v Boladz (1998) 39 BMLR 35, supporting a narrower construction of lawful means, was overruled. 185 See discussion by Lord Mance: [2008] UKHL 19, [2008] 1 AC 1174 at paras 121–122. 186 [2018] UKSC 19, [2020] AC 727. 187 [2018] UKSC 19, [2020] AC 727 per Lord Sumption and Lord Lloyd-Jones at para 11. 188 E.g. the allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations said to have been made in Kidd v Lime Rock Management LLP [2020] CSOH 96, 2021 SLT 35 (see Lord Clark at para 57). 189 [2018] UKSC 19, [2020] AC 727 per Lord Sumption and Lord Lloyd-Jones at para 16. 190 [2008] UKHL 19, [2008] 1 AC 1174 per Lord Walker at para 96.

21.59

21.60

21.61

814   The Law of Delict in Scotland

21.62

conduct must have caused the loss, rather than “merely being the occasion of such loss being sustained.”191 So, for example, a conspirator who committed a road-traffic offence in the course of inflicting harm upon a person would not be regarded, on that ground alone, as having applied unlawful means,192 unless the commission of that offence was itself part of a sequence of conduct directed at causing the harm.193 In its inclusion of criminal conduct, the concept of unlawfulness in unlawful means conspiracy is thus broader than that applied in the delict of causing loss by unlawful means.194 But aside from imposing the requirement of a “relationship” between the unlawful means and the damage to the claimant’s interests, the analysis in JSC BTA Bank does not offer firm guidance on the extent to which criminal conduct may be categorised as unlawful means, or indeed on the circumstances in which, say, breach of statutory duty or breach of contract might also fall within this category.195 It is possible that this potentially open-ended view of unlawfulness will tempt litigants to channel their pleadings towards conspiracy, in preference to the more narrowly framed delict or tort of causing loss by unlawful means.196

E. FRAUD 21.63

Fraud, broadly defined in Scots law as “a machination or contrivance to deceive”,197 may be perpetrated by false representations, concealment of material circumstances, or other “underhand dealing” which induces the

191 Racing Partnership Ltd v Sports Information Services Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 1300, [2021] 2 WLR 469 per Arnold LJ at para 154. See also Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] UKHL 19, [2008] 1 AC 1174 per Lord Walker at para 119, to the effect that there is no liability in respect of conduct that was “wrongful for reasons which have nothing to do with the damage inflicted on the claimant” (referring to OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 59). 192 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Nicholls at para 160. 193 See JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov [2018] UKSC 19, [2020] AC 727 per Lord Sumption and Lord Lloyd-Jones at para 14; Racing Partnership Ltd v Sports Information Services Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 1300, [2021] 2 WLR 469 per Arnold LJ at para 154 and Phillips LJ at para 172. 194 As confirmed in OBG Ltd v Allan, and as discussed at para 21.38 above, to cause loss by unlawful means is to engage in conduct against a third party that would be actionable by that third party; this means civil wrongs only, actual or threatened. 195 [2018] UKSC 19, [2020] AC 727 per Lord Sumption and Lord Lloyd-Jones at para 15. 196 See also Secretary of State for Health v Servier Laboratories Ltd [2021] UKSC 24 per Lord Sales at para 102, to the effect that the decision in Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL raises questions as to “how well, or coherently, the unlawful means tort as analysed by the majority in the OBG case fits with the unlawful means conspiracy tort as analysed in Total Network. I venture to think that this is an issue which will have to be resolved at some stage, along with the relationship between these torts and general concepts of accessory liability in civil law.” 197 Erskine, Inst 3.1.16; Bell, Principles § 13; see also Stair, Inst 1.9.9, defining fraud as an act “whereby a person is induced to a deed or obligation by deceit”.

The Economic Delicts   815

victim to act to the victim’s disadvantage.198 Separately, there can also be “fraud on creditors” where the debtor in an obligation disposes of assets or performs some other act designed to frustrate the creditor or creditors.199 Fraud on creditors is not pursued further here except incidentally.200 As for fraud in the more normal sense of deceit, this is explained by Stair as a delinquence for which reparation is due, over and above any contractual remedies available to the injured party:201 “Fraud gives remeid by reparation to all that are damnified thereby, against the actor of the fraud, either by annulling of the contract or other deed elicit or induced by fraud, or by making up the damage sustained by the fraud, at the option of the injured”.

Much of the early treatment of fraud related to the processes of insolvency and unfair treatment of creditors, and fraud in this sense of fraud on creditors has long since developed its own specific rules.202 More generally, the discussion of fraud as a basis of delictual liability has often been interlinked with that of fraud as a ground for negativing consent in relation to voluntary obligations. Some indeed have suggested that the same range of conduct constitutes fraud in both the contractual and the delictual contexts.203 But while fraud as a factor vitiating consent in voluntary obligations extends to conduct which can be characterised as merely contrary to good faith, such conduct does not necessarily provide the basis for an action in delict.204 Indeed it has been argued that confusion in the modern

198 Bell, Principles § 14. For a full treatment of the modern law, see J Thomson, “Fraud”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 11 (1989) paras 701–800; see also J Blackie and J Chalmers, “Mixing and Matching in Scottish Delict and Crime”, in M Dyson (ed), Comparing Tort and Crime (2015) 271 at 295–296. For a historical treatment of fraud as an intentional delict, see K McK Norrie, “The Intentional Delicts”, in Reid and Zimmermann (eds), History, vol 2, 477 at 495–496, and for a historical treatment of fraud in contract and in delict, see D Reid, Fraud in Scots Law (PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2012). 199 See generally J MacLeod, Fraud and Voidable Transfer (2020); there is a definition at para 1–09. 200 But see para 21.31 above. 201 Stair, Inst 1.9.14. 202 Including Bankruptcy Act 1621, RPS 1621/6/30, APS iv, 615 c 18, and Bankruptcy Act 1696, RPS 1696/9/57, APS x, 33 c 5. On the first of these, see MacLeod, Fraud and Voidable Transfer ch 4. The modern provisions are Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 ss 98 (gratuitous alienations) and 99 (unfair preferences). 203 See McBryde, Contract paras 14–04 to 14–08, citing Stair, Inst 1.9.14 (reproduced above) as giving no indication that the scope of the delictual remedy was to be more narrowly construed than that of the rescission remedy, and Bankton, Inst 1.10.64 (“in all cases where deceit is the cause of the obligation, or incident, concerning any substantial part of it, the party lesed may insist either to have the deed reduced, or his damages repaired”). While Bell, Comm I, 262 suggested a difference in scope between the remedies, this was disputed by the editor of the 7th edition, McLaren, at n 2. 204 J Thomson, “Fraud”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 11 (1989) para 720, citing T B Smith, A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland (1962) 828ff; D Reid, Fraud in Scots Law (PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2012).

816   The Law of Delict in Scotland

21.64

21.65

authorities has arisen from a failure properly to distinguish the rules for identifying fraud in these two separate contexts.205 Writing in 1958, Hector McKechnie noted that, while intentional injuries generally “bulked very small” in the courts, fraud alone was a “usual ground of action”.206 That was soon to change. Following the opening up of liability for negligent misrepresentation by the landmark decision of Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd in 1963,207 allegations of negligent, rather than fraudulent, misrepresentation quickly predominated. But while negligence is generally more readily established, fraud, as an intentional delict, may offer a remedy in circumstances where the limited scope of duty in relation to pure economic loss precludes recovery for negligent misrepresentation. Where it is claimed that D’s fraudulent behaviour induced P to enter into a disadvantageous contract, P may have the choice of delictual or contractual remedies.208 As stated by Lord Anderson in Bryson & Co Ltd v Bryson, the buyer in a sale tainted by the seller’s fraud has a choice between: “first, rescission of the contract involving the return of the subject-matter of the sale and a claim of damages; and second, a claim of damages without rescission or restitution.”209 But sometimes a delictual claim may present the only remedy, such as where the fraud was perpetrated by a third party to the contract.210 In that case rescission is unlikely to be available (assuming the innocence of the counterparty), but delictual damages may be demanded for the resultant loss from the third party whose fraud induced the pursuer to enter into the bargain.211

(1) Mode of deception 21.66

When a delictual remedy for fraud is claimed, the conduct of which P complains is typically a misrepresentation by which D has deceived P into entering a disadvantageous contract.212 The misrepresentation may contain a

205 Reid, Fraud in Scots Law 145–168, discussing the impact of Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337. 206 H McKechnie, “Delict and Quasi Delict”, in G C H Paton (ed), Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Stair Society vol 20, 1958) 265 at 279. See also W W McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 3rd edn (2007) para 14–59 on the increase in volume of case law in the nineteenth century. 207 [1964] AC 465. See also Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985 s 10(1). For discussion, see paras 5.27–5.28 above. 208 McBryde, Contract para 14–60. 209 1916 1 SLT 361 at 364. 210 For discussion, see McBryde, Contract para 14–62. 211 Thin & Sinclair v Archibald Arrol & Sons (1896) 24 R 198 per Lord President Robertson at 206. 212 For an analysis of the requirements for fraudulent misrepresentation, see J MacLeod, Fraud and Voidable Transfer (2020) paras 3–40 to 3–70.

The Economic Delicts   817

factual untruth in regard to the transaction proposed,213 for example, or false assertions regarding the parties’ legal status.214 Fraud may be perpetrated other than by words, so that conduct such as altering the mileage registered by a used car offered for sale is equivalent to a representation that this is the correct figure. Similarly, taking a seat and ordering a meal in a restaurant has been regarded as representing that the diner intends to pay for the food consumed.215 While mere silence does not normally constitute actionable fraud, “intentional suppression” of a material fact may do so.216 In some circumstances a positive duty to disclose information may arise and, if so, liability will be incurred where D “does not say the thing he was bound to say, if that was done with the intention of inducing the other party to act upon the belief that the reason why he did not speak was because he had nothing to say”.217 An example of failure to disclose, which was regarded as culpable concealment of a material fact, can be seen in Gibson v National Cash Register Co Ltd.218 The defender sold cash registers to the pursuers without disclosing that they were second-hand. It was established that the pursuer had wished to buy new machines, and that the defender had held itself out as a seller of such machines. In these circumstances the onus of proof fell upon the defender to show that it had duly informed the pursuer of the machine’s provenance. The defender was unable to discharge this burden and was liable in damages accordingly. A representation made by D to P is of continuing effect from the time at which it is made until the point at which it is acted upon by P.219 Where a statement was originally true but ceases to be so because of altered circumstances within D’s knowledge, D comes under an obligation to disclose that change to P before the transaction in question is completed.220

213 See e.g. Marine & Offshore (Scotland) Ltd v Hill [2018] CSIH 9, 2018 SLT 239 (false and misleading pricing information); Kidd v Lime Rock Management LLP [2020] CSOH 96, 2021 SLT 35 per Lord Clark at para 59 (action incompetent for other reasons, but a false representation that one of the defenders was not acting in conflict of interest would otherwise have supported the relevancy of a case based upon fraudulent misrepresentation). For a basic example, see Murray v Donaldson [2019] SC AIR 28, 2019 GWD 17–260, involving use of an employer’s credit card for goods claimed to be for office use but in fact for the defender’s personal benefit. 214 West London Commercial Bank Ltd v Kitson (1884) 13 QBD 360; Menzies v Menzies (1893) 20 R (HL) 108. Note that while some English authorities previously indicated that the misrepresentation required to relate to fact rather than law, the better view would now appear to be that such a distinction has no role in this context: see Clerk and Lindsell on Torts paras 17.05 and 17.15. 215 DPP v Ray [1974] AC 370 (criminal fraud). 216 Cullen’s Tr v Thomson’s Trs (1865) 3 M 935 per Lord President McNeill at 936. 217 Brownlie v Miller (1880) 7 R (HL) 66 per Lord Blackburn at 79. 218 1925 SC 500. 219 Briess v Woolley [1954] AC 333 per Lord Tucker at 353, approved in Cramaso LLP v Viscount Reidhaven’s Trustees [2014] UKSC 9, 2014 SC (UKSC) 121. For discussion of Cramaso, see para 5.49 above. 220 Brownlie v Miller (1880) 7 R (HL) 66 per Lord Blackburn at 79.

21.67

21.68

818   The Law of Delict in Scotland

(2) D’s state of mind 21.69

There is little doubt that a representation which D knows to be false is fraudulent. By contrast, a representation made in the honest belief of its truth is not (although it may constitute negligence), and proving that D lacked such belief may not be straightforward. In the English case of Derry v Peek,221 the directors of a tramway company issued a prospectus stating that they had the right to run their trams by steam power rather than by use of horses, and the plaintiff bought shares on the strength of this statement. However, the reality was that negotiations were still in progress with the Board of Trade to secure permission to use steam power. In the end permission was refused, the company was wound up, and the plaintiff brought an action of deceit, claiming compensation from the directors for the loss suffered as a result of their misrepresentations. That action was unsuccessful because the plaintiff failed to show that the directors did not have honest belief in the prospectus statement, whether or not their belief was reasonable.222 Reflecting upon both English and Scottish authorities, Lord Herschell stated fraud to be proved only where a false statement was shown to have been made “(1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false.”223 He continued: Although I have treated the second and third as distinct cases, I think the third is but an instance of the second, for one who makes a statement under such circumstances can have no real belief in the truth of what he states. To prevent a false statement being fraudulent, there must, I think, always be an honest belief in its truth.”

21.70

This analysis was taken up by the courts as part of Scots law224 and was to become influential in delimiting civil liability for fraud.225 According to Derry v Peek, P must prove that D did not “honestly believe” the representation to be true, and it is not enough to establish that there were no reasonable grounds for that belief. Credulity or “want of care”226 does not constitute fraud, although negligence now provides an alternative basis of

221 (1889) 14 App Cas 337. 222 The prospectus, although inaccurate, was at least “morally true”, in the estimation of Lord Fitzgerald at 356. Note the mischief of that case was swiftly remedied by the Directors’ Liability Act 1890 s 3, and see now the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 s 90, giving right to compensation to those who have acquired securities on the strength of misleading particulars in a company prospectus. 223 (1889) 14 App Cas 337 at 374. 224 See e.g. Robinson v National Bank of Scotland 1916 SC (HL) 154 per Viscount Haldane at 157. 225 For an evaluation, see D Reid, Fraud in Scots Law (PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2012) 145–168. 226 Zurich CSG Ltd v Gray & Kellas [2007] CSOH 91, 2007 SLT 917.

The Economic Delicts   819

liability if duty of care can be established. On the other hand, in judging the honesty of D’s state of belief, the court may take into account material to which a “blind eye”227 has been turned. P is also required to show that there was an intention to deceive, in the sense that D intended to produce in P’s mind a belief which D personally did not entertain.228 Moreover, D must have acted with the intention that this representation should be acted upon by P, or by a class of persons that included P, in the manner which ultimately resulted in damage to P.229 D’s underlying motivation in making the representation is immaterial, so that it is no defence that D wished P to benefit from the transaction,230 or at least did not desire that P should be defrauded.231

21.71

(3) Reliance by P P must further show that D’s fraud induced P to act to P’s detriment.232 Averments are needed to the effect that there was a direct connection between D’s fraud and P’s subsequent course of action; it is not enough simply to assert that P would have withdrawn had P been made aware of D’s conduct. D’s misrepresentation need not have been the sole inducement to P, but it needs to have played “a real and substantial part, albeit not a decisive part in inducing the representee to act”.233 If the misrepresentation was of a kind that would be likely to play a part in the decision of a reasonable person to enter into a transaction, it will be presumed that it did so. That “presumption of inducement”, as an inference of fact, may

227 Angus v Clifford [1891] 2 Ch 449 per Bowen LJ at 471; Barings plc v Coopers & Lybrand [2002] EWHC 461, [2002] PNLR 39. On “blind-eye” knowledge, see Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v UniPolaris Insurance Co Ltd [2001] UKHL 1, [2003] 1 AC 469 per Lord Scott at para 116, to the effect that “untargeted or speculative suspicion” was not enough for “blind-eye knowledge”. This required “a suspicion that the relevant facts do exist and a deliberate decision to avoid confirming that they exist. But a warning should be sounded. Suspicion is a word that can be used to describe a state-of-mind that may, at one extreme, be no more than a vague feeling of unease and, at the other extreme, reflect a firm belief in the existence of the relevant facts. In my opinion, in order for there to be blind-eye knowledge, the suspicion must be firmly grounded and targeted on specific facts. The deliberate decision must be a decision to avoid obtaining confirmation of facts in whose existence the individual has good reason to believe.” 228 Lees v Tod (1882) 9 R 807 per Lord President Inglis at 854. 229 Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v Borders [1941] 2 All ER 205 per Viscount Maugham at 211; Kidd v Paull and Williamsons LLP [2017] CSOH 16, 2018 SC 193 per Lord Tyre at para 33; Hayward v Zurich Insurance Co plc [2016] UKSC 48, [2017] AC 142. 230 Smith v Chadwick (1884) 9 App Cas 187 per Lord Blackburn at 201. 231 Brown Jenkinson & Co Ltd v Percy Dalton (London) Ltd [1957] 2 QB 621. 232 H & J M Bennett (Potatoes) Ltd v Secretary of State for Scotland 1990 SC (HL) 27; Hayward v Zurich Insurance Co plc [2016] UKSC 48, [2017] AC 142 per Lord Clark at para 27. 233 Dadourian Group International Inc v Simms [2009] EWCA Civ 169, [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 601 per Arden LJ at para 99. See also Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459 per Bowen LJ at 482: “you must shew that the statement was either the sole cause of the plaintiff’s act, or materially contributed to his so acting”.

21.72

820   The Law of Delict in Scotland

21.73

be rebutted if D can show that the misrepresentation did not influence P’s decision,234 but in practice this is likely to be difficult.235 Those to whom fraudulent statements are made are not expected to pursue independent enquiries into their veracity. It is therefore no defence to a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation that P was not “careful, suspicious or diligent in research”,236 even if the wherewithal to carry out that research was readily available.237 Moreover, there is no requirement to establish that P positively believed in the truth of the representation, and indeed it is accepted that persons may in some circumstances be induced to act on the strength of representations which they suspect of being inaccurate.238 However, where it can be shown that P had no doubt of the falsity of the representation, the “presumption of inducement” necessarily falls away, since it is improbable that a person would have been induced to enter into a transaction by a lie known to be such.239

(4) Harm 21.74

21.75

It is also necessary to show that P suffered harm by acting in reliance upon D’s fraud. Typically such harm takes the form of financial loss suffered as a result of entering into a disadvantageous transaction, but fraud may be relevantly averred as having caused damage to other interests. More unusually, damages may be recovered, for example, for personal injury caused as a direct consequence of the misrepresentation,240 as well as for distress and injury to feelings experienced in association with the deception.241 The victim of a fraudulent misrepresentation is entitled to compensation for the loss directly flowing from the actions in which the fraudster induced him or her to engage, whether or not that loss was foreseeable.242 234 Dadourian Group International Inc v Simms [2009] EWCA Civ 169, [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 601 per Arden LJ at para 99; Hayward v Zurich Insurance Co plc [2016] UKSC 48, [2017] AC 142 per Lord Clarke at paras 34–38; Barton v County Natwest Ltd [2002] 4 All ER 494 (Note), [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 408. 235 Hayward v Zurich Insurance Co plc [2016] UKSC 48, [2017] AC 142 per Lord Clarke at para 37. 236 Hayward v Zurich Insurance Co plc [2016] UKSC 48, [2017] AC 142 per Lord Clarke at para 39. 237 Central Railway Co of Venezuela v Kisch (1867) LR 2 HL 99. Note also that the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 does not apply to fraudulent misrepresentation: Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp [2002] UKHL 43, [2003] 1 AC 959. 238 Hayward v Zurich Insurance Co plc [2016] UKSC 48, [2017] AC 142. 239 See Holyoake v Candy [2017] EWHC 3397 (Ch) per Nugee J at para 388. 240 Langridge v Levy (1837) 2 M & W 519, 150 ER 863 (misrepresentation that gun was safe, although note that there is now strict liability for selling goods with safety defects, in terms of the Consumer Protection Act 1987, as discussed below in ch 26); Banks v Cox [2002] EWHC 2166 (Ch) (damages awarded for financial loss and for depressive illness experienced in association with this). 241 A v B [2007] EWHC 1246 (QB), [2007] 2 FLR 1051 (distress caused as a result of discovering former partner’s deception over paternity of child); Kinch v Rosling [2009] EWHC 286 (QB) (distress and anxiety suffered as a consequence of bankruptcy). 242 Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA [1997] AC 254; Barry v Sutherland 2002 SLT 413 per Lord Eassie at paras 22–23; Kidd v Paull and Williamsons LLP [2017] CSOH 16, 2018 SC 193 per Lord Tyre at para 47.

The Economic Delicts   821

Thus where P has been induced by the fraud to buy goods or property at an inflated value, the measure of the loss is likely to be the difference between the price paid and the market value of the property at the time it was acquired. P may also claim for expenses incurred in maintaining and disposing of the asset,243 and for the interest charged on loans taken out to fund the purchase.244 Where it can be established that, but for the fraud, the funds taken up thereby would have been invested profitably elsewhere, there is English authority to indicate that P should be compensated for the loss of that opportunity.245 The availability of damages for losses directly caused means that the calculation may make allowance not only for delay in the fraud coming to light, but also for P being “locked” by the circumstances of the fraud into retaining an asset for a protracted period. In Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA246 the defendants falsely represented that, in buying shares in a public company, the plaintiff would be competing with two other bidders. On the strength of this the plaintiff bought 28,141,424 shares in the company at 82 pence each, but would have offered only 78 pence had this false information not been given. Two months later it emerged that a fraud had been perpetrated on the company, which caused a slump in the value of its shares. However, commercial circumstances “locked” the plaintiffs into ownership of the shares and it was several months before the plaintiff was finally able to dispose of its holding, by which time the value of the shares had fallen further, to 44 pence. It was held nonetheless that, at the time of acquisition, the shares were “already pregnant with disaster” because of the defendants’ fraud.247 The correct measure of damages was the difference between the price of 82 pence per share paid by the plaintiff and the price of 44 pence to which they fell.

21.76

(5) Vicarious liability The operation of vicarious liability in relation to fraud is discussed elsewhere in this volume.248 As explained there, partnerships are vicariously liable to third parties for the wrongful acts or omissions of a partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the firm, in terms of section 10 of the Partnership Act 1890, and this includes cases of fraud committed by partners.249 However,

243 Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 QB 158. 244 Archer v Brown [1985] QB 401. 245 Parabola Investments Ltd v Browallia Cal Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 486, [2011] QB 477; see also East v Maurer [1991] 1 WLR 461. 246 [1997] AC 254. 247 [1997] AC 254 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 267. 248 See paras 3.64–3.66 above, and see e.g. Taylor v City of Glasgow District Council 1997 SC 183. 249 See para 3.77 above.

21.77 21.78

822   The Law of Delict in Scotland

the partnership is not vicariously liable for a partner’s fraud where the partner in question did not personally know, and could not reasonably have known, that the representation being made was false. Although the Partnership Act 1890 provides, in section 16, that notice to a single partner operates as notice to all the partners in the firm, a partner who in good faith makes a representation which another partner in the same firm has learned to be false does not have the required level of knowledge for that representation to be considered fraudulent. In Zurich CSG Ltd v Gray & Kellas,250 a partner in a solicitors’ firm certified that there were no claims against an executry estate, although, unbeknown to him, another partner in the firm had received notice of such a claim. Lord Brodie held that a relevant case of fraud was not made out:251 “An intentionally false and therefore dishonest statement requires actual knowledge on the part of the person making the statement that the statement he is making is false. A firm, which is not a natural person, is incapable of dishonesty, although it might be vicariously liable for the dishonest actions of its individual partners (or employees), whether acting alone or together. Only individuals can lack an honest belief. Only individuals therefore can make fraudulent misrepresentations.”

(6) The law agent’s duty to disclose fraud 21.79

21.80

In the law of negligence, there is no general duty to prevent wrongdoing by a third party. Normally, therefore, solicitors have no duty of care towards parties in a transaction other than their own clients, except where there has been a specific assumption of responsibility.252 This was demonstrated in the leading case of NRAM plc v Steel, in which it was stated to be “presumptively inappropriate” that a party to a transaction should rely upon the opposite party’s solicitor.253 However, there is earlier Scottish authority suggesting that a solicitor who knows but does not disclose that a client is fraudulently misrepresenting material facts to the other party in a transaction risks being held liable for the losses suffered as a result of that fraud. This was the outcome in Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP,254 in which a person fraudulently obtained funds from the pursuer by granting it an “all sums” standard security over property which the 250 [2007] CSOH 91, 2007 SLT 917. 251 [2007] CSOH 91, 2007 SLT 917 at para 23. 252 E.g. where the solicitor has given an express undertaking as to the probity of the solicitor’s client: see Edwards v Lee, The Times, 5 Nov 1991, [1991] NLJ 1517; see also Gran Gelato Ltd v Richcliff Ltd [1992] Ch 560 per Sir Donald Nicholls VC at 571–572. 253 [2018] UKSC 13, 2018 SC (UKSC) 141 per Lord Wilson at para 32, discussed at para 5.43 above; see also P & P Property Ltd v Owen White & Catlin LLP [2018] EWCA Civ 1082, [2019] Ch 273. 254 [2014] CSIH 79, 2015 SC 187.

The Economic Delicts   823

fraudster did not own but whose owner he impersonated. The defender acted as his solicitor in the transaction and was initially unaware of the deception. When the agents for the true owner of the property later contacted the defender, the defender confronted the fraudster but received an undertaking that the security would be discharged and was persuaded not to alert the pursuer.255 In the meantime additional monies were advanced to the fraudster, all of which were ultimately lost to the pursuer. The Inner House upheld the decision of the Lord Ordinary256 that the defender should be held liable for the additional advance made to the fraudster after the defender had become aware of the deception. The basis of liability as set out in Houlgate was not altogether obvious, however. Two of the judges, Lord Menzies and Lord McEwan, considered that a solicitor’s professional duty entailed a continuing implied representation to a third party dealing with the solicitor’s client that there was no fundamental dishonesty in the client’s conduct. They also regarded the defender as having made himself an accessory to the continuing fraud and therefore as jointly and severally liable with the fraudster.257 Lord Malcolm, on the other hand, thought the continuing representation analysis overcomplicated, and in any event considered that a person could not be an accessory “without having, to some degree, the mental element necessary for commission of the wrong itself”. However, he agreed that the defender should be liable since his conduct constituted a form of “culpable omission”.258 In effect, therefore, the decision appeared to hinge upon either: (i) a form of negligent misrepresentation; or (ii) a form of accessory liability for fraud. If the first was the dominant reasoning, then the basis upon which liability to third parties can be said to be assumed by solicitors in these circumstances will require clarification, particularly in the wake of the decision in NRAM. If the second is accepted, notwithstanding Lord Malcolm’s dissent on this point, and a form of accessory liability for fraud is acknowledged, then it would seem that an accessory may be found liable 255 The Lord Ordinary, Lord Hodge, had called this “wishful unthinking”: [2013] CSOH 80, 2013 SLT 993 at para 42. 256 [2013] CSOH 80, 2013 SLT 993. 257 [2014] CSIH 79, 2015 SC 187 per Lord Menzies at para 456, Lord McEwan at para 88. Lord McEwan also relied upon the analysis of J Guthrie Smith in his Treatise on the Law of Reparation of 1864, at 59 (not his Law of Damages of 1889), but the passage cited is from a discussion of the Roman law of culpa and in particular the distinction between culpa lata and culpa levis – a distinction no longer regarded as relevant in Scotland: see para 1.23 above. 258 [2014] CSIH 79, 2015 SC 187 at para 74. This was in breach of an “autonomous and independent obligation incumbent upon the solicitor springing from the particular circumstances of the case, which include the background of the communications and information passing between the two solicitors” (para 79). At para 72 Lord Malcolm cited T B Smith, A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland (1962) 655 to the effect that “there is a general right to reparation though the fact situation cannot be allocated to any of the familiar categories”. However, Smith’s statement was made in discussing affront in general and privacy in particular, the basic argument being that the interests protected were not fixed, not that the concept of fault itself was infinitely flexible.

21.81

824   The Law of Delict in Scotland

for fraud with a state of mind significantly different from that of the fraudster. No doubt the solicitor did not “say the thing he was bound to say”, but in his case, unlike that of the fraudster, this was clearly not “done with the intention of inducing the other party to act”.259 Firmer guidance will therefore be needed upon the precise level of intention deemed to be culpable on the part of accessories.260

F. PASSING OFF 21.82

21.83

The delict of passing off is committed when one party (D) presents its product in such a way as to make the public believe that it is, or has a connection with, the product of another party (P), thus diverting the competitor’s goodwill to itself. It rests upon the principle that “nobody has any right to represent his goods as the goods of somebody else”.261 Confusion may be engendered by D’s use of a device which is associated in the market with P,262 whether it be the name of a product,263 the words describing it,264 its packaging and presentation,265 or even the domain name occupied by D.266 The complex evolution of passing off through the English courts of Law and Equity267 has no direct parallel in Scotland, where “the action for

259 See Brownlie v Miller (1880) 7 R (HL) 66 per Lord Blackburn at 79, discussed at para 21.67 above. 260 See e.g. G L Williams, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence: A Study of Concurrent Fault in Great Britain, Ireland and the Common-Law Dominions (1951) para 4 (15), suggesting that there may be circumstances in which “each defendant should as a matter of justice be considered separately”. Fraud was not included specifically in the list of intentional torts discussed by Williams, but he noted the problems of joint libel where, in relation to qualified privilege, it might be appropriate to look for differing levels of “malice” as between the wrongdoers. See also the “two-tier” approach to assessing the mental element in the US Restatement Third of Torts (Apportionment of Liability) § 14, which provides for liability on the part of a person who, negligently or otherwise, has failed to protect the plaintiff “from the specific risk of an intentional tort” at the hand of another. 261 Reddaway v Banham [1896] AC 199 per Lord Halsbury at 204; A G Spalding Brothers v A W Gamage Ltd [1915] 32 RPC 273 per Lord Parker at 283. 262 H L MacQueen, “Passing Off”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 18 (1993) para 1361. 263 E.g. Woolley v Ultimate Products Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1038. 264 E.g. Erven Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd [1979] AC 731; Carlsberg Bryggeriene og Tuborgs Bryggerier de Forene de Bryggerier Aktieselskabet v Tennent Caledonian Breweries [1972] RPC 847. 265 E.g. John Haig and Co Ltd v Forth Blending Co Ltd 1954 SC 35; Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] 1 WLR 491. 266 E.g. British Telecommunications plc v One in a Million Ltd [1999] 1 WLR 903; Phones 4U Ltd v Phone4U.co.uk Internet Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 244, [2007] RPC 83. 267 See Carty, Economic Torts 225–229; C Wadlow, The Law of Passing Off: Unfair Competition by Misrepresentation, 5th edn (2016) paras 1–37 to 1–61. An interpretation based on property rights has run through the English case law and has been attributed partly to the need in earlier times to ground jurisdiction in the courts of Equity in cases where there had been no fraud: see D Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (1999) 186.

The Economic Delicts   825

passing off is based on the general right which everyone possesses not to have published about him or his goods, statements which are both untrue and prejudicial to his pecuniary interests”. 268 In modern analysis, however, there has been a degree of convergence between the two jurisdictions. In England, passing off is classified as a branch of the law of tort, protecting a property right which is the goodwill that P has in its business.269 In Scotland, passing off is similarly seen as delictual in nature, protecting property rights from attack – specifically commercial goodwill, which is characterised as incorporeal moveable property.270 Considerable weight has therefore been accorded to English authority in this field, and the Scottish courts271 have accepted as authoritative the statement by Lord Diplock in Erven Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd, identifying five characteristics as the essentials of the modern tort of passing off: 272 “(1) a misrepresentation (2) made by a trader in the course of trade, (3) to prospective customers of his or ultimate consumers of goods or services supplied by him, (4) which is calculated to injure the business or goodwill of another trader (in the sense that this is a reasonably foreseeable consequence) and (5) which causes actual damage to a business or goodwill of the trader by whom the action is brought or (in a quia timet action) will probably do so.”

This lengthy definition subsequently became compressed into what Lord Oliver described as the “classic trinity” of requirements, namely: (i) goodwill or reputation attached to the goods or services supplied by P; (ii) a misrepresentation by D to the public, leading consumers to believe that goods or services offered by D are the goods or services of P; and (iii) damage, or likelihood of damage, as a result of that misrepresentation.273 This formulation has likewise been acknowledged as summarising the

268 E M Clive, “The Action for Passing Off” 1963 JR 117 at 134. Cf Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc (No 3) [1990] 1 WLR 491 per Lord Oliver at 509: “The essence of passing off is that ‘no man is entitled to steal another’s trade by deceit’.” 269 C Wadlow, The Law of Passing Off: Unfair Competition by Misrepresentation, 5th edn (2016) para 2–3. 270 H L MacQueen, “Passing Off”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 18 (1993) para 1364; C Ng, “A Common Law of Passing-off? English and Scottish perspectives” (2009) 13 EdinLR 134. 271 E.g. in Lang Bros Ltd v Goldwell Ltd 1980 SC 237; William Grant & Sons Ltd v Glen Catrine Bonded Warehouse Ltd 1995 SLT 936; and see discussion in E M Clive, “The Action for Passing Off” 1963 JR 117. 272 [1979] AC 731 at 742. In the same case Lord Fraser, at 755–756, formulated a slightly different list of five essential features, focusing more specifically on the facts of the particular case. It has been commented that these are not to be read as indicating a fundamental difference of approach, and that Lord Fraser “cannot be taken to have intended to give as comprehensive a definition of the tort as did Lord Diplock”: see Wadlow, The Law of Passing Off para 1–22; also MacQueen, “Passing Off” para 1362. 273 As stated in Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] 1 WLR 491 per Lord Oliver at 499.

826   The Law of Delict in Scotland

basic requirements of the Scots delict.274 Each requirement may now be considered in turn.

(1) Goodwill 21.84

21.85

An action for passing off is not founded upon an independent right to a name, image or other characteristic but is instead directed at protecting the goodwill, or distinctive “customer connection”,275 which P has established in its trade or business. In this context goodwill has been described as “the benefit and advantage of the good name, reputation, and connection of a business. It is the attractive force which brings in custom. It is the one thing which distinguishes an old-established business from a new business at its first start.”276 Goodwill is thus to be distinguished from reputation, although the two concepts are connected: so a business can enjoy an excellent reputation without necessarily commanding customer goodwill; customer goodwill normally entails good reputation but does not invariably do so. As bluntly expressed by Dillon LJ in Lonrho plc v Fayed, goodwill “cannot mean some airy-fairy general reputation in the business or commercial community which is unrelated to the buying and selling or dealing with customers which is the essence of the business of any trading company.”277 The protection of reputation is the province of the law of defamation, or malicious publication, rather than passing off. Goodwill is typically claimed by the party that manufactures the goods in question or provides services at source, but it may also be possessed by others in the supply chain. As explained by Buckley LJ in Dental Manufacturing Co Ltd v C de Trey & Co:278 “The plaintiff’s goods . . . may be goods which he purchases, or which he imports, or otherwise acquires, and which he sells under some ‘get-up’ which conveys that they are goods which, whether made, imported, or sold by him, carry with them the advantage of the reputation that the plaintiff’s well-known firm are responsible for their quality or their character.”

Thus in William Grant & Sons Ltd v Glen Catrine Bonded Warehouse Ltd279 it was held that not only the manufacturer of a particular brand of alcoholic 274 E.g., Treadwell’s Drifters Inc v RCL Ltd 1996 SLT 1048; William Grant & Sons Ltd v Glen Catrine Bonded Warehouse Ltd 2001 SC 901; Gleneagles Hotels Ltd v Quillco 100 Ltd 2003 SLT 812; Wise Property Care Ltd v White Thomson Preservation Ltd [2008] CSIH 44, 2008 GWD 28–440. 275 William Grant & Sons Ltd v Glen Catrine Bonded Warehouse Ltd 1995 SLT 936 per Lord Abernethy at 943. 276 Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Muller & Co Ltd [1901] AC 217 per Lord Macnaghten at 223–224. 277 [1993] 1 WLR 1489 at 1496. 278 [1912] 3 KB 76. 279 1995 SLT 936. See also Scandecor Development AB v Scandecor Marketing AB [1999] FSR 26 (UK distributor).

The Economic Delicts   827

beverage but also the subsidiary company involved in its export had a stake in the goodwill attached to the product, and was therefore entitled to bring an action for passing off. Goodwill is typically attributed to the product of an individual party. However, it is also possible for goodwill to attach to a general product category so that it can be claimed by the various parties involved in its production and sale. In Erven Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd280 the plaintiff was the manufacturer and UK distributor of advocaat, an alcoholic beverage made by various producers, largely in the Netherlands, from a distinctive recipe that combined egg and spirits. The defendant was the manufacturer of “Keeling’s Old English Advocaat”, a drink made with similar ingredients but using sherry which, as a fortified wine, attracted a lower rate of duty. Its cheaper price meant that it won over British sales of advocaat that had previously been the preserve of the producers making the drink to the traditional, spirit-based formula. The House of Lords recognised that advocaat had established a market reputation by dint of its recognisable and distinctive qualities and that this had built up customer goodwill. It also accepted that the goodwill attached to the use of its name was shared by a number of traders and that “if one can define with reasonable precision the type of product that has acquired the reputation, one can identify the members of the class entitled to share in the goodwill as being all those traders who have supplied and still supply to the English market a product which possesses those recognisable and distinctive qualities”.281 The plaintiff was able to demonstrate that it was a member of such a class, and it was therefore entitled to an injunction restraining the defendant from passing off as advocaat a drink which used different ingredients.282 In such cases of extended passing off the distinctiveness of the name is “critical”;283 the more general and descriptive the name of the product, the more difficult it is for P to establish goodwill in respect of that name, and the corresponding existence of a misrepresentation by D in using the same name.284 A geographical descriptor may make it easier to define the type of product and to establish its recognisable and distinctive qualities; in Erven Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd285 almost all the producers making 280 [1979] AC 731. 281 [1979] AC 731 per Lord Diplock at 747. 282 See also J Bollinger SA v Costa Brava Wine Co Ltd [1960] Ch 262 (use of “champagne”); Lang Brothers Ltd v Goldwell Ltd 1980 SC 237 (Scotch whisky); Diageo North America Inc v Intercontinental Brands (ICB) Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 920, [2011] 1 All ER 242 (“vodkat”) 283 Diageo North America Inc v Intercontinental Brands (ICB) Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 920, [2011] 1 All ER 242 per Patten LJ at para 28. 284 Diageo North America Inc v Intercontinental Brands (ICB) Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 920, [2011] 1 All ER 242 per Patten LJ at para 24. 285 [1979] AC 731; see also J Bollinger SA v Costa Brava Wine Co Ltd [1960] Ch 262 (use of “champagne”); Lang Brothers Ltd v Goldwell Ltd 1980 SC 237 (Scottish whisky).

21.86

21.87

828   The Law of Delict in Scotland

advocaat to its traditional recipe were Dutch. On the other hand, it is not enough to establish the necessary element of goodwill if the distinctiveness claimed for the product derives solely from its origins in a particular locality. Names which denote a particular provenance may be protected in an action for passing off only if they have acquired a secondary meaning which is distinctive of the goods of one or more traders.286 As Wadlow has explained:287 “For the misrepresentation to be a material one the descriptive or generic term must have a reasonably definite meaning and some attraction for the customer, or no one would ever rely on it and any misrepresentation would be immaterial. In other words, it must have some drawing power in its own right.”

In Argyllshire Weavers Ltd v A Macaulay (Tweeds) Ltd,288 for example, it was held that the term “Harris Tweed” did not denote simply that the fabric in question came from Harris. In the customer perception, the essential characteristics of “Harris Tweed” were not only that it was manufactured in the Outer Hebrides, but also that it was made from pure Scottish wool and hand woven at the homes of the islanders. Producers of mill-produced tweed were not therefore entitled to pass off their fabric as being the same as the genuine hand-made article.289

(2) Misrepresentation 21.88

The second required element in passing off is that there should have been a misrepresentation by D, leading consumers to believe that goods or services offered by D are the goods or services of P. It is not enough that consumers are confused on this score, for consumers may well make “make assumptions, jump to unjustified conclusions”.290 The key question is whether it is D’s misrepresentation that has induced customer confusion: were a substantial number of members of the public misled by D into purchasing D’s product in the belief that it was P’s?291 Where a product is offered only to a specialised market, it may be more difficult to establish the likelihood of confusion, given that consumers are likely to have a more

286 Fage UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5, [2014] ETMR 26, [2014] FSR 29 (Greek yoghurt). 287 C Wadlow, The Law of Passing Off: Unfair Competition by Misrepresentation, 5th edn (2016) para 7–166. 288 1965 SLT 21. See also Gleneagles Hotels Ltd v Quillco 100 Ltd 2003 SLT 812. 289 Although interdict was refused on other grounds. 290 HFC Bank plc v Midland Bank plc [2000] FSR 176 per Lloyd J at 201. 291 Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] 1 WLR 491 per Lord Oliver at 500. See also Schuh Ltd v SHHH . . . Ltd [2011] CSOH 123, 2011 GWD 26–593; Tartan Army Ltd v SETT GmbH [2017] CSOH 22, 2017 SLT 532.

The Economic Delicts   829

educated eye.292 D’s misrepresentation in copying P’s get-up need not be intentional; and even where D was initially unaware of the existence of P’s product, interdict will be granted against the use of packaging and so on which is likely to mislead the public.293 In earlier cases this element of consumer confusion was thought to entail that the parties were engaged in a “common line of activity”.294 More recently, this has been found not to be an essential requirement, although whether or not the parties occupied “overlapping fields of activity” is of course highly relevant to determining the likelihood of consumer confusion.295 The misrepresentation by the rival trader may take various forms.

21.89

21.90

(a) Name Consumers may be misled by a name which is similar to that used by P, but as a general rule if the words chosen by D to design its product are primarily descriptive, even minor differences from the formulation used by P will be sufficient to avoid passing off.296 The courts are reluctant to let individual traders “fence in the common of the English language”, or to “monopolise” descriptions which others may wish legitimately to apply to their products.297 No one trader, for example, can claim exclusive use of a term such as “vacuum cleaner”.298 On the other hand, a combination of more unusual descriptors may, over time, attain the status of a term of art, so that its use by a trade rival would mislead consumers. In Reddaway v Banham, for example, the expression “camel hair belting” was judged to have acquired “a kind of technical signification” which denoted not only that it was made of camel’s hair, but also that it was belting manufactured by the plaintiffs.299 The use of surnames is more problematic. Traders are normally free to use their own name in giving a title to their business. In Dunlop Pneumatic 292 Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd v Wards Mobility Services Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 1564 (healthcare professionals distinguishing between wheelchair cushions). 293 Haig & Co v Forth Blending Co 1954 SC 35 per Lord Hill Watson at 40 (proposition 10). 294 See McCulloch v Lewis A May (1948) 65 RPC 58, in which the plaintiff was a presenter of children’s radio programmes and the defendants manufacturers of breakfast cereal, and in which the claim failed due to the lack of a “common field of activity”. 295 Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch), [2002] 1 WLR 2355 per Laddie J at para 29. 296 Office Cleaning Services Ltd v Westminster Office Cleaning Association [1944] 2 All ER 269 affd [1946] 1 All ER 320. 297 Antec International Ltd v South Western Chicks (Warren) Ltd [1997] FSR 278 per Laddie J at 285. 298 British Vacuum Cleaner Co Ltd v New Vacuum Cleaner Co Ltd [1907] 2 Ch 312. Cf Phones 4u Ltd v Phone4u.co.uk. Internet Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 244, [2007] RPC 83, in which the name “Phone4u” was not descriptive in the sense that anyone would describe a business selling mobile phones as a “Phones 4u” business. Rather, it was an invented name that not only told customers what the business was but also denoted a particular business. 299 [1896] AC 199.

21.91

21.92

830   The Law of Delict in Scotland

21.93

Tyre Co Ltd v Dunlop Motor Co Ltd 300 the pursuers, makers of a well-known brand of tyre, were held not to be entitled to prevent the Dunlop brothers of Kilmarnock from running their local garage business under the name of the Dunlop Motor Company Ltd. The court was satisfied that the Dunlop brothers had used their own name in the business title without intending to mislead the public into believing that their services were those of the pursuers; there was little likelihood that the “the average citizen of Kilmarnock” would be deceived. 301 On the other hand, use of one’s own name is not permitted if a person acts dishonestly, setting out deliberately to cause confusion, and the test of dishonesty is readily met if the person knows that use of the name is likely to have this effect.302 Moreover, the exception applies only to the naming of a business; it does not excuse the use of a personal name as part of the name for goods if this will result in confusion with the established reputation of another party.303 Names may come to be known as denoting goods made by particular persons; and if the name in question has acquired such a “secondary meaning” the court must consider whether D’s use of the same name is likely to mislead a “substantial section of the purchasing public” into believing that D’s goods are those of P.304 In William Grant & Sons Ltd v Glen Catrine Bonded Warehouse Ltd305 the pursuer had been making whisky labelled with the family name of Grant’s for over a century. The defender, on the other hand, laid claim to labelling bottles of spirits as “Grant’s” following its much more recent acquisition of a non-trading company also by the name of Grant. In these circumstances the court accepted that the defender’s use of “Grant’s” as a brand name caused confusion among the public and within the trade, and falsely suggested a connection between the businesses of the defenders and that of the pursuers.306 Passing off may also be effected by the registering and use of domain names. The registration by D of a domain name incorporating the name or mark of P may be sufficient to be considered a representation that the registrant is associated with that name or mark,307 although it remains for P to show that the deception perpetrated thereby is “really likely” to damage P’s goodwill or divert trade from P.308 300 1907 SC (HL) 15. 301 1907 SC (HL) 15 per Lord James at 17. 302 O’Briens v Watts 1987 SLT 101; Parker-Knoll Ltd v Knoll International Ltd (1962) RPC 265; W Cornish, D Llewelyn, and T Aplin, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights, 9th edn (2019) para 17–013. 303 Cornish, Llewelyn, and Aplin, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights para 17–013. 304 Parker-Knoll Ltd v Knoll International Ltd [1962] RPC 265. 305 1995 SLT 936. 306 See also O’Briens v Watts 1987 SLT 101. 307 British Telecommunications plc v One in a Million Ltd [1999] 1 WLR 903; Vertical Leisure Ltd v Poleplus Ltd [2014] EWHC 2077 (IPEC). 308 Phones 4U Ltd v Phone4U.co.uk Internet Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 244, [2007] RPC 83 per Jacob LJ at para 19.

The Economic Delicts   831

(b) Appearance of goods Alternatively goods may be misrepresented where D has imitated the “getup” of P’s goods, in the sense of their distinctive packaging or presentation – “the dress in which the goods are offered to the public”.309 The important question is whether particular features of the appearance of the goods are associated in the consumer perception with P. Generally speaking, it is more difficult to acquire reputation and goodwill in the get-up of a product than in its name. The specific purpose of a name is to denote the product’s origin, whereas the shape and get-up do not necessarily have this function. P must therefore establish that the get-up of its goods has come to denote a particular source to the relevant public.310 In Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc311 the plaintiff had for many years been selling lemon juice in distinctive yellow plastic lemon-shaped containers. When the defendant started to market lemon juice in similar containers the court took the view that it had deliberately adopted the leading features of the plaintiff’s goods without taking sufficient steps to distinguish the get-up of its products from that of the plaintiff. As there was ample evidence that customers would be deceived, injunction was granted. Similarly, in John Haig and Co Ltd v Forth Blending Co Ltd312 the court held that the peculiarly shaped “dimpled” bottle in which the pursuer’s whisky was sold was so clearly associated in the minds of the public with the pursuer that the defender’s use of a similar shape for its own whisky was passing off. Traders are unlikely to be permitted a monopoly over features of their product’s get-up which are linked to its functionality, or have a “value in use”.313 As remarked in Tot Toys Ltd v Mitchell, a case from New Zealand, “If both the presence of the feature and the particular way in which it has been expressed have been dictated solely by utilitarian considerations it should not qualify for passing off protection.”314 Such functional attributes would include, for example, the particular colour and markings of an animal toy where these imitated the natural appearance of the animal in question. Where functional features are substantially similar, the rival trader may nonetheless be prevented from marketing its product if it has not “done enough” in regard to the other aspects of the product’s presentation to avoid

309 Haig & Co v Forth Blending Co 1954 SC 35 per Lord Hill Watson at 38 (proposition 5). 310 Numatic International Ltd v Qualtex Ltd [2010] EWHC 1237 (Ch), [2010] RPC 25 per Floyd J at para 39; see also Carrick Jewellery v Ortak, unreported, CSOH, Lord Sutherland, 27 September 1989, in which interdict was granted against the use of the word “Mackintosh” in a particular stylised typeface, since this was confusingly similar to that used in the labelling of a competitor jewellery manufacturer. 311 [1990] 1 WLR 491. 312 1954 SC 35. 313 J B Williams Co v Bronnley and Co Ltd (1909) 26 RPC 765 per Fletcher Moulton LJ at 773. 314 Tot Toys Ltd v Mitchell [1993] 1 NZLR 325 per Fisher J at 340.

21.94

832   The Law of Delict in Scotland

consumer deception.315 On the other hand, use of the same colour in packaging is unlikely of itself to be considered a misrepresentation generating customer confusion.316

(c) Character merchandising 21.95

Considerable goodwill attaches to the names and likenesses of fictional characters and media personalities and to their use in the manufacture and marketing of various types of merchandise. Often, of course, the name or image will in any event be protected by a registered trade mark, but its unauthorised use may also be prevented by an action for passing off. An action for passing off may succeed where a similar name or likeness is used in such a way that members of the public would be likely to believe it to have been approved or licensed by the personality or the creator of the character in question, thus damaging the goodwill or reputation of the original business. The leading case is Mirage Studies v Counter-Feat Clothing Co Ltd,317 in which an injunction was granted to prevent unauthorised use on clothing of images similar to that of the cartoon characters known as “Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles”. The use of passing off in cases involving bogus celebrity endorsements is discussed further below.318

(3) Likelihood of damage 21.96

21.97

The third of the “classic trinity” of requirements in an action for passing off is damage. The misrepresentation must cause, or be likely to cause, damage to P’s business or goodwill.319 In straightforward cases, where D markets goods which are similar to those of P, loss can generally be accepted as a likely consequence of consumer confusion.320 Direct loss of sales, however, is by no means the only form of damage that may be taken into account. The perceived association between P, and goods or services marketed by D, may threaten to damage P’s goodwill in other ways. In A G Spalding Brothers v A W Gamage Ltd,321 for example, the defendant had procured

315 Edge & Sons Ltd v William Niccolls & Sons Ltd [1911] AC 693; Numatic International Ltd v Qualtex Ltd [2010] EWHC 1237 (Ch), [2010] RPC 25. See also Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] 1 WLR 491 per Lord Jauncey at 519. 316 Glaxo Wellcome UK Ltd v Sandoz Ltd [2019] EWHC 2545 (Ch). 317 [1991] FSR 145. 318 See paras 21.101–21.106 below. 319 Erven Warnink v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd [1979] AC 731 per Lord Diplock at 742. For extended discussion of this requirement, see Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd v Alfred McAlpine plc [2004] RPC 36 per Mann J at paras 42–51. See also Schuh Ltd v SHHH . . . Ltd [2011] CSOH 123, 2011 GWD 26–593. 320 Woolley v Ultimate Products Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1038. 321 [1915] 32 RPC 273.

The Economic Delicts   833

substandard footballs discarded and sold off by the plaintiff for scrap, which the defendant then offered for sale as the plaintiff’s first quality goods. The necessary elements of misrepresentation having been made out, the plaintiff was held entitled to an inquiry into the level of damage that it had sustained thereby. Exceptionally, damage may be anticipated even where the goods or services are not of the same type. In Annabel’s (Berkeley Square) Limited v G Schock,322 the proprietors of a “high-class” nightclub named “Annabel’s” were held entitled to an injunction to prevent an escort agency from using the same name. Although there was no suggestion that applications for membership of the club had declined as a result, evidence was produced that some people had been confused as to a possible association between the two enterprises. The court ruled that this “attack . . . on the general good will of a plaintiff . . . requires the protection of an interlocutory injunction, because there is never going to be any means at the end of the road to see how much harm has been done by this kind of possible reputation being acquired in the mind of the public in regard to a perfectly respectable organisation and activity such as is the plaintiffs’.”323 In general, though, an action has little prospect of success where the parties do not share a common field of activity and there is no reasonable prospect of consumer confusion, far less damage to goodwill. For example, in another case involving a nightclub, Stringfellow v McCain Foods, the court was not persuaded that the club would suffer damage to its image and goodwill when a manufacturer copied its name for a brand of oven chips.324

21.98

(4) In the course of trade The second of Lord Diplock’s five essential characteristics required in an action for passing off is that the offending misrepresentation should have been made “by a trader in the course of trade”.325 There is no authority to suggest that passing off can protect distinctive devices used in the domestic context, since P must “establish a goodwill or reputation attached to the goods or services which he supplies in the mind of the purchasing public by association with the identifying ‘get-up’ . . . under which his particular goods or services are offered to the public, such that the get-up is recognised by the public as distinctive specifically of the plaintiff’s goods or services.”326 Thus personal matters such as domestic addresses cannot

322 323 324 325 326

[1972] FSR 261. [1972] FSR 261 per Russell LJ at 270. [1984] RPC 501; see also Harrods Ltd v Harrodian School Ltd [1996] RPC 697. [1979] AC 731 at 742; see para 21.83 above. Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] 1 WLR 491 per Lord Oliver at 499.

21.99

834   The Law of Delict in Scotland

normally be protected by an action for passing off.327 Nonetheless, the notion of trade in this context is broadly understood. It is competent, for example, for one fund-raising charity to restrain another against use of a similar name that threatens to appropriate and damage the former’s goodwill.328 Public bodies may likewise pursue an action for passing off insofar as they are involved in trading activities that create goodwill.329 Those who are engaged commercially in the entertainment industry as sportsmen or as performing or creative artists330 may also be regarded as traders for these purposes.331

(5) Geographical reach 21.100

Where goods have been produced in Scotland with a name or get-up likely to engender consumer confusion, it is no defence in an action for passing off brought in a Scottish court that the goods are intended for the export market and thus that any deception would be perpetrated upon a foreign public.332 The position is less clear where the pursuer operates from a foreign jurisdiction but seeks to protect the reach of its reputation to Scotland. Although there is little Scottish authority on this point, English case law indicates that the claimant must convince the court that it has sufficient goodwill in this jurisdiction, meaning that it should have customers for its products or services. Where the claimant’s business is abroad, “people who are in the jurisdiction, but who are not customers of the claimant in the jurisdiction, will not do, even if they are customers of the claimant when they go abroad”.333 Thus in Starbucks (HK) Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Group plc334 a Hong Kong provider of online television entitled “NOW TV” failed to prevent another provider from setting up an online television service in the United Kingdom under the same title. Although the claimant had established a reputation of sorts in England, and some English-based residents accessed its services free of charge in 327 Day v Brownrigg (1878) 10 Ch D 294 (use of identical house name); but cf Street v Union Bank of Spain and England (1885) 30 Ch D 156, in which the court refused to restrain the defendant from using a telegraphic address similar to that of the plaintiff “where there was no attempt to interfere with trade; no legal injury done; but where there simply was a matter of inconvenience” (per Pearson J at 158). 328 British Diabetic Association v Diabetic Society [1996] FSR 1. 329 C Wadlow, The Law of Passing Off: Unfair Competition by Misrepresentation, 5th edn (2016) paras 3–25 to 3–28. 330 E.g. Clark v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 1558. 331 Wadlow, The Law of Passing Off para 3–31. 332 William Grant & Sons Ltd v Glen Catrine Bonded Warehouse Ltd 2001 SC 901; John Walker & Sons Ltd v Henry Ost & Co Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 917. 333 Starbucks (HK) Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Group plc [2015] UKSC 31, [2015] 1 WLR 2628 per Lord Neuberger at para 47. 334 [2015] UKSC 31, [2015] 1 WLR 2628 per Lord Neuberger at para 47; see also Banner Universal Motion Pictures Ltd v Endemol Shine Group Ltd [2017] EWHC 2600 (Ch).

The Economic Delicts   835

England by means of YouTube and other open-access sources, this was insufficient to demonstrate that it had built up protectable commercial goodwill.

(6) The protection of personal characteristics The law of passing off may provide a remedy where a person’s name or image has been appropriated for the purposes of promoting the goods or services of another. One of the earliest Scottish authorities is Wilkie v M’Culloch.335 The pursuer was the inventor of new type of plough. He had not obtained a patent and did not claim any exclusive privilege for making or selling ploughs of this type, but he argued that he was “entitled, at common law, to prevent any one from impressing his name on those which were not made by him, or under his authority.”336 Interdict was granted to stop another manufacturer from selling ploughs on which it had stamped “Wilkie” or “Wilkie’s newest pattern”. The reasoning that supported Lord Meadowbank’s decision was not reported in detail, but Bell instanced Wilkie as demonstrating the principle that “an inventor may prevent any person from vending a machine or manufacture as his, so as to take, without authority, the advantage of his personal character and credit as an artist”.337 From a modern perspective, Wilkie has been seen as an early example of passing off by a false representation of endorsement, entailing appropriation of the goodwill attached to an individual’s name.338 More recent case law in England has, however, seen further developments in the context of bogus celebrity endorsements. In such cases the law of passing off has adapted itself to the “realities of the market place”339 by applying a very specific reading of the “classic trinity” elements to the appropriation of name and image.

21.101

21.102

(a) Goodwill As seen above, the general law of passing off protects not the right to name or image as such but the goodwill – the distinctive “customer connection”340 that P has established in its trade or business. Traditionally, P is required to “establish a goodwill or reputation attached to the goods or services which he supplies in the mind of the purchasing public 335 (1823) 2 S 413. 336 (1823) 2 S 413, as reported at 414. 337 Bell, Comm I, 111. This was a final reflection in the section on “inventions secured by patent”, dealing with inventions which the inventor “has already disclosed for public use”. 338 H L MacQueen, “Passing Off”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 18 (1993) paras 1376 and 1397. 339 [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch), [2002] 1 WLR 2355 per Laddie J at para 43. 340 William Grant & Sons Ltd v Glen Catrine Bonded Warehouse Ltd 1995 SLT 936 per Lord Abernethy at 943.

21.103

836   The Law of Delict in Scotland

by association with the identifying ‘get-up’”.341 Typically, P and D have been engaged in a “common line of activity”, making it more likely that customers will be confused about a connection between the products of each.342 In cases involving appropriation of name or image, however, the element of goodwill is conceptualised in a different way. In the leading English case of Irvine v Talksport Ltd,343 a famous Formula 1 racing driver brought a successful action in passing off after a radio station published a brochure featuring a doctored image of him listening to a radio with the radio station’s logo. The parties had no common line of activity, of course, but that was regarded as only one consideration “in the ultimate decision whether there is likely to be confusion” amongst the public.344 There did not have to be a direct “goods-for-goods substitution” of D’s product for P’s.345 The attempted appropriation, for advertising purposes, of the goodwill derived from Irvine’s celebrity status was sufficient.346 Irvine thus construes goodwill as existing independently of P’s primary area of activity, or of any broad category of goods or services directly provided by P to consumers.347 Instead, goodwill may attach entirely to the personal “fame or notoriety”348 which, in cases such as Irvine’s, might potentially have been exploited by merchandising or endorsing the products of others in fields unrelated to his own.

(b) Misrepresentation 21.104

The central question, in traditional passing off cases, is whether D’s misrepresentation induced customer confusion as to whether the product was produced by P or there was at least a link between the products of P and D. 349 In cases involving appropriation of name or image, the enquiry is, more specifically, whether D misrepresented P as having endorsed D’s product.350 In Irvine such deception was all the more plausible because 341 Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] 1 WLR 491 per Lord Oliver at 499. 342 See McCulloch v Lewis A May (1948) 65 RPC 58 (the claim failed due to the lack of a “common field of activity” where the plaintiff was a presenter of children’s radio programmes and the defendants manufacturers of breakfast cereal). 343 [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch), [2002] 1 WLR 2355; see also [2003] EWCA Civ 423, [2003] 2 All ER 881 on quantum of damages. 344 [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch), [2002] 1 WLR 2355 per Laddie J at para 29. 345 [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch), [2002] 1 WLR 2355 per Laddie J at para 18. 346 [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch), [2002] 1 WLR 2355 per Laddie J at para 75. 347 For detailed commentary, see C W Ng, “The Law of Passing Off – Goodwill beyond Goods” (2016) 47 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 817. 348 [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch), [2002] 1 WLR 2355 per Laddie J at para 39. On the distinction between goodwill and reputation in this context, see S Fletcher and J Mitchell, “Court of Appeal Found no Love for Topshop Tank” (2015) 37 European Intellectual Property Review 394. 349 H L MacQueen, “Passing Off”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 18 (1993) para 1364. 350 Fenty v Arcadia Group Brands Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 3, [2015] 1 WLR 3291 per Kitchin LJ at para 48.

The Economic Delicts   837

Irvine was already in the business of offering product endorsements. Similarly, in Fenty v Arcadia Group Brands Ltd351 the claimant, a well-known singer, was successful in restraining a chain of fashion stores from printing her image on a batch of its T-shirts and selling them in its stores. There was sufficient evidence that the public would be misled into thinking that she had endorsed the use of the picture, particularly given that she had recently had an association with the defendant.

(c) Damage Typically in passing off, the damage to P is quantified in terms of a transfer of business from P to D. But in false endorsement cases, where there is no goods-for-goods substitution, this is unlikely to occur. Instead P is deprived of a fee which D would ordinarily have been required to pay for P’s services. The sums involved might be “considerable”.352 In Fenty v Arcadia Group Brands Ltd353 the claimant herself had an established business in licensing her name and image for different types of merchandise. Once it was established that the defendants’ T-shirt was liable to be misperceived as having been endorsed by her, it was readily accepted that there had been sufficient damage to her goodwill and to her own merchandising business to justify the award of an injunction preventing further dealings in the offending T-shirt. In Irvine v Talksport Ltd,354similarly, the claimant had already endorsed other products, and in that sense the defendants had exploited the goodwill that the claimant had built up in that sphere. Since the offending brochure had already been distributed, the claimant sought damages. In fixing the appropriate amount the court, by analogy with the rules for infringement of patents, decided that the defendant should pay a reasonable endorsement fee for the service that it had appropriated, based on the amounts that Irvine had previously charged others.355 In Scotland there are as yet no reported cases of passing off in circumstances similar to Irvine, but it is likely that the assessment of damages would be informed by principles analogous to those applied to infringement of intellectual property rights, such as trademarks and patents,356 and therefore that the calculation would be based upon the notional endorsement fee for unauthorised use of the pursuer’s image.357 351 [2015] EWCA Civ 3, [2015] 1 WLR 3291. See commentary in H Carty, “The Common Law and the Quest for the IP effect” [2007] Intellectual Property Quarterly 237 at 257. 352 Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch), [2002] 1 WLR 2355 per Laddie J at para 74. 353 [2015] EWCA Civ 3, [2015] 1 WLR 3291. 354 [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch), [2002] 1 WLR 2355. 355 [2003] EWCA Civ 423, [2003] 2 All ER 881. At first instance, damages of £2000 had been awarded. The Court of Appeal raised this figure to £25,000. 356 See Watson, Laidlaw, & Co Ltd v Pott, Cassels, & Williamson 1914 SC (HL) 18 per Lord Shaw at 32: a patentee is “entitled to hire or royalty in respect of each unauthorised use of his property”. 357 See R Buchan and G Grassie, “Personality Rights: A Brand New Species?” (2004) 49(5) JLSS 48.

21.105

21.106

838   The Law of Delict in Scotland

G. AEMULATIO VICINI AND THE “PRIMA FACIE” TORT 21.107

21.108

The delicts discussed above indicate that the protection of economic interests against intentional harm is closely circumscribed within a series of specific categories of liability. Yet some jurisdictions, including some American states, have accepted the principle that an intended and unjustified interference with the economic interests of another is in itself a “prima facie” tort.358 This was exemplified in the famous Minnesota case of Tuttle v Buck359 in which a barber successfully stated a case against a wealthy banker who set up a barber shop in the same town, employed a barber to carry on the business, and enticed customers away from the plaintiff’s shop. This was said not to be for any legitimate purpose of his own, but for the sole purpose of maliciously injuring the plaintiff’s business. The notion that intention to injure should of itself form the basis of liability has been rejected by the English courts,360 except in the specific circumstances of lawful-means conspiracy discussed above.361 There are, however, some circumstances in which Scots law accords malicious motive a significance that is denied in English law. Chapter 22 discusses the importance attached in Scots Institutional writings to the doctrine of aemulatio vicini, to the effect that “no one . . . is entitled . . . to act wantonly, with the mere purpose of producing inconvenience and loss to his neighbour”.362 Conduct which deprives a neighbour of a “benefit or conveniency”,363 and which is not normally actionable, may thus give rise to liability if the defender can be shown to have acted with malice.364 In the early seventeenth century this doctrine was applied in cases concerning competing fairs or markets,365 but there is little indication of its survival in later periods in contexts other than neighbour law. For example, in Craig v Millar366 a tenant who operated a lodging house was unsuccessful in an action against 358 The use of this term can be traced back to the judgment of Justice Holmes in Aikens v State of Wisconsin 25 S Ct 3 (1904) at 5. See discussion in K J Vandevelde, “The Modern Prima Facie Tort Doctrine” (1990–1991) 79 Kentucky Law Journal 519; K J Vandevelde, “A History of Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of a General Theory of Intentional Tort” (1990) 19 Hofstra Law Review 447; C Witting, “Of Principle and Prima Facie Tort” (1999) 25 Monash U L Rev 295. It is said, however, that, to the extent that it was initially accepted, most states have moved away from a general doctrine in favour of more specific categories of liability: see Dobbs, Law of Torts § 643. 359 107 Minn 145, 119 NW 946 (1909); for comment, see T Weir, Economic Torts (1997) 72–74. 360 See OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 per Lord Hoffmann at para 14 (observing that the acceptance of “bad motive” as a basis for liability seemed “to have created a good deal of uncertainty in the countries which have adopted such a principle”), and Lord Nicholls at para 147. 361 See para 21.54 above. 362 Bell, Principles § 964. 363 Bankton, Inst 4.45.110. 364 See paras 22.79–22.81 below. 365 Falconer v Glenbervie (1642) Mor 4146; Farquharson v Earl of Aboyn (1679) Mor 4147; see also Anderson v Blackwood (1629) Mor 8033. See further H McKechnie, “Delict and Quasi-Delict”, in G C H Paton (ed), Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Stair Society vol 20, 1958) 265 at 272. 366 (1888) 15 R 1005.

The Economic Delicts   839

his landlord who had set up a rival lodging close by. Although the tenant argued the landlord had acted in violation of the good faith of the contract, the court took strongly against recognising any restraint “inconsistent with the free exercise of proprietary rights”.367 While therefore the doctrine of aemulatio vicini has continuing application in disputes between neighbours, modern authority does not support a Scottish version of the prima facie tort doctrine or indicate judicial sympathy for the broad principle that the intentional infliction of economic harm should of itself be actionable.368

367 (1888) 15 R 1005 per Lord President Inglis at 1031. See also Mackenzie v Iron Trades Employers Insurance Association Ltd 1910 SC 79. 368 See E Reid, “Strange Gods in the Twenty-First Century: The Doctrine of Aemulatio Vicini”, in E Reid and D Carey Miller (eds), A Mixed Legal System in Transition: T B Smith and the Progress of Scots Law (Edinburgh Studies in Law vol 1, 2005) 239.

Chapter 22

Nuisance

Para A. INTRODUCTION (1) Origins����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 22.01 (2) Physical damage contrasted with impairment of amenity����� 22.02 (3) The shadow of Rylands v Fletcher��������������������������������������� 22.05 (4) A mixed doctrine�������������������������������������������������������������� 22.08 B. AMBIT AND TYPOLOGY���������������������������������������������������� 22.09 (1) Continuing invasions of use or enjoyment of neighbouring property���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 22.10 (2) Single incidents of damage������������������������������������������������ 22.12 (3) Personal injury������������������������������������������������������������������ 22.13 (4) Economic loss������������������������������������������������������������������� 22.14 C. INTERDICT (1) Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������� 22.15 (2) Unreasonableness and the plus quam tolerabile test��������������� 22.19 (a) The extent of the harm������������������������������������������������ 22.21 (b) The character of the locality���������������������������������������� 22.23 (c) The feasibility of protective measures��������������������������� 22.26 (d) Public interest?����������������������������������������������������������� 22.27 (3) Nuisance caused by multiple parties����������������������������������� 22.28 (4) Prospective damages in lieu of interdict?���������������������������� 22.29 D. DAMAGES����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 22.32 (1) The first requirement: sufficient gravity of harm����������������� 22.33 (2) The second requirement: fault������������������������������������������� 22.35 (3) Malice������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 22.36 (4) Intention�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 22.38 (5) Recklessness and negligence���������������������������������������������� 22.39 (a) Duty of care���������������������������������������������������������������� 22.40 (b) Standard of care���������������������������������������������������������� 22.41 (6) Conduct giving rise to a special risk of abnormal damage or danger (a) A distinctive category of liability?��������������������������������� 22.42 (b) Cases in which “no precautions will prevent injury”������ 22.44 (c) Overlap with case law relating to independent contractors������������������������������������������������������������������ 22.46 (7) Continued and adopted nuisances������������������������������������� 22.47 840

Nuisance  841

(8) The fault requirement and interference with the course of a natural stream������������������������������������������������������������ 22.52 E. TITLE TO SUE��������������������������������������������������������������������� 22.53 F. LIABILITY FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS (1) Introduction 22.56 (2) The basis of fault: two variants������������������������������������������ 22.59 (3) Proprietors implementing “reasonable precautions”: a third variant?������������������������������������������������������������������ 22.61 (4) “Casual negligence” of contractors������������������������������������ 22.62 G. LIABILITY OF LANDLORDS����������������������������������������������� 22.63 H. DEFENCES (1) Statutory authority������������������������������������������������������������ 22.64 (2) Prescription���������������������������������������������������������������������� 22.67 (3) “Coming to the nuisance”������������������������������������������������� 22.70 (4) Acquiescence�������������������������������������������������������������������� 22.72 I. THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY DEFENDERS������������������������������������������������� 22.73 J. AEMULATIO VICINI��������������������������������������������������������� 22.79 K. THE ACTIO DE EFFUSIS VEL DEJECTIS AND THE ACTIO DE POSITIS VEL SUSPENSIS����������������������������������� 22.82 L. PUBLIC NUISANCE������������������������������������������������������������� 22.87

A. INTRODUCTION (1) Origins Long before the term “nuisance” came to be used, there was acceptance in Scottish legal literature that land and buildings should not be used in such a way as to cause intolerable levels of damage or inconvenience to neighbouring proprietors.1 Early case law shows that reparation was due where operations caused physical damage to adjacent property,2 and references to the doctrine of aemulatio vicini3 indicate recognition, at least by the seventeenth century, that antisocial uses of property should be controlled.

  1 For more detailed historical accounts, see: N R Whitty, “Nuisance”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) paras 1, 7–16; D Johnston, “Owners and Neighbours: from Rome to Scotland”, in R Evans-Jones (ed), The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland (Stair Society sup vol 2, 1995) 176; R Zimmermann and P Simpson, “Liability among Neighbours”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann, A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 612; G D L Cameron, “Neighbourhood Liability in Scotland, 1850–2000”, in J Gordley (ed), The Development of Liability between Neighbours (2010) 132; see also J Broun, The Law of Nuisance in Scotland (1891) 6.  2 E.g. RPS 1427/3/7–16, APS ii, 12 c 23; Sibbald v Lady Rosyth (1685) Mor 13976 (liability for spread of fire); Hay v Littlejohn (1666) Mor 13974 (damage from collapse of adjacent building).   3 See para 22.79 below.

22.01

842   The Law of Delict in Scotland

By this stage there had also been acceptance of the immissio principle, to the effect that proprietors should be restrained from activities that result in noxious emissions into their neighbours’ land or buildings.4 However, the term “nuisance” itself appears to have come into currency only in the early eighteenth century. Forbes wrote in his Institutes that “nusance” (as he spelled it) is derived “from the French nuire to hurt” and means “a Thing done to the Annoyance of another”. He distinguished “common Nusance”, which is “an Offence against the Publick”, from “private Nusance, whereby some particular Persons are, or may be more grieved or injured than others”.5 His more detailed treatment in his Great Body made a similar distinction in the chapter “Of Common Nusances”, and pointed out that annoyances to “particular persons” were not punishable by public prosecution but were “left to be redressed by the private action of the parties aggrieved by them”.6 Bankton likewise discussed “Nusance”, adding comparative reflections at the end of a section of “Observations on the Law of England”. After his description of common and private nusances in English law, Bankton noted that “Our law does not precisely agree with the above positions, tho’ for most part it does”.7 More specifically, a proprietor “cannot so build, as the casing drop shall fall upon his neighbour’s house, or that the same shall be incommoded with smoke ascending from his new built house; for, in both these cases, imittit in alienum¸ he disturbs his neighbour in the use of his property, by a nusance coming from his house, or occasioned thereby”.8 In the second edition of Principles of Equity, Kames took up the term “nuisance” as he found it in English authority and Scottish case law.9 As a general rule, neighbours should refrain from activities that “directly” harmed another, although in exercising their property rights they were “not answerable for any indirect or consequential damage that another may suffer”. In addition, “common nuisances” were not to be tolerated, and the principle ne immittas in alienum should be extended “a great way further”, obliging proprietors “to abstain from every operation that has directly the effect to make our

 4 Bankton, Inst 4.45.111; Erskine, Inst 2.9.9. See also Whitty, “Nuisance” para 9; Mayor of Berwick v Laird of Hayning (1661) Mor 12772, discussed in G Mackenzie, Pleadings in Some Remarkable Cases before the Supreme Courts of Scotland since the year 1661, 2nd edn (1704) 42; Hall v Corbet (1698) Mor 12775. For comparative discussion, see J Gordley, Foundations of Private Law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust Enrichment (2007) 66–80.   5 W Forbes, The Institutes of the Law of Scotland (1722, repr as Old Studies in Scots Law vol 3, 2012) 614.   6 W Forbes, Great Body of the Law of Scotland (unpublished, written between 1714 and 1739, and available online at http://www.forbes.gla.ac.uk/contents/#forbes-53-0152) 293.  7 Bankton, Inst 1.10. 96 (Observations on the Law of England) [322].  8 Bankton, Inst 1.10. 96 (Observations on the Law of England) [322].  9 Principles of Equity, 2nd edn (1767) 59, under reference to M Bacon, New Abridgment of the Law, 1st edn, vol 3 (1740) 686, and Kinloch v Robertson (1756) Mor 13163 (working a forge in the upper storey of tenement was “nuisance”); see also Fleming v Ure (1750) Mor 13159 (disturbance from adjacent fencing school). The passage does not appear in the 1st edition of Principles of Equity (1760).

Nuisance  843

neighbour’s property useless or incomfortable to him”. Kames added that “Neighbours in a town must submit to inconveniences from each other; but they must be protected from extraordinary disturbances that render their property in a great measure useless to them.”10

(2) Physical damage contrasted with impairment of amenity As in earlier writing, the growing case law11 arising from disputes between neighbours was dealt with in Hume’s Lectures not in the context of delict and quasi-delict, but as part of an account of “the powers and privileges that wait on a right of property”.12 Hume followed Kames’ classification in distinguishing between “direct and immediate” and “indirect” injuries to property. As an example of direct injury, a proprietor digging foundations for a new building was required to take care not to “bring down his neighbour’s house”,13 while, as an example of indirect injury, a proprietor could not generally be prevented from building in such a way as to block light from a neighbour’s window.14 Hume went on to use the term “nuisance” to describe interferences with neighbouring property, including noise, smell, fumes, and fire risk.15 Manuals produced for the legal profession in the early nineteenth century similarly distinguished “actions for injuries to houses or structures of any description” from “actions brought for nuisance” (meaning interference with enjoyment of property).16 In his discussion of ownership of land, Bell likewise differentiated between “faulty or careless” use of property occasioning “real or actual damage to the property of another”17 and “nuisance”, in the sense of interference with enjoyment of property.18 In similar vein, both editions of Guthrie Smith’s

10 Principles of Equity, 2nd edn (1767) 58–59. 11 An important procedural development at this time was that, while in the 18th century disputes between neighbours were resolved for the most part in the Dean of Guild or burgh courts exercising their jurisdiction in matter of “neighbourhood” or “public police” (see Whitty, “Nuisance” paras 11–14), by the early 19th century nuisance was no longer seen as merely a matter of municipal law, and it came to be accepted that it might appropriately be dealt with, as a matter of the ordinary common law, in the Court of Session, in the Jury Courts (Court of Session Act 1825 s 28), as well as in the sheriff courts (Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1838 s 15; see now Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 s 38(2)(f)). 12 Hume, Lectures III, 201–228. 13 Hume, Lectures III, 208. 14 Hume, Lectures III, 210. 15 Hume, Lectures III, 214–216. 16 See W Adam, A Practical Treatise and Observations on Trial by Jury in Civil Causes (1836) 116 and 129; see also G Hutcheson, Treatise on the Offices of Justice of Peace, Constable, Commissioner of Supply, and Commissioner under Comprehending Acts, in Scotland (1806) 96–97, understanding “nuisances” as interferences with enjoyment. 17 Bell, Principles §§ 963–964. 18 Bell, Principles §§ 973–974; see also Bell’s Dictionary 748, defining “nuisance” as “anything noxious or offensive, or which makes life uncomfortable”.

22.02

844   The Law of Delict in Scotland

22.03

nineteenth-century textbook gave separate treatment to the “negligent use of land” causing physical damage, on the one hand, and “nuisance”, on the other.19 In other words, the framework for dealing with physical damage, generated by operations on a neighbour’s land, was clearly distinguished from “nuisance” as an impairment of amenity. This distinction between physical damage to property and impairment of amenity continued to be observed in the courts for much of the nineteenth century. Isolated incidents of structural damage caused by failure of building works20 or malfunction of machinery21 were generally addressed as a separate category of liability without reference to the framework of nuisance.22 Actions brought in nuisance typically related to fumes,23 smell,24 noise and vibration,25 pollution of air26 or water by sewage or industrial effluent,27 or the hosting of socially undesirable enterprises such as pig-sties,28 slaughterhouses,29 public urinals,30 or bawdy-houses.31 The gist of the action in such cases was that the nuisance-maker should be interdicted from causing material discomfort and annoyance to a neighbour. As Rankine commented, they reflected a “conflict between liberty and order, between the rights and duties incident to the enjoyment of real property”,32 although increasingly such conflicts were regulated by public law, rather than by private litigation, particularly in the urban setting.33 In summary, while one-off injuries to property caused by collapse

19 Guthrie Smith, Reparation 361 and 379; Guthrie Smith, Damages 198ff and 216–218. 20 See e.g. Cameron v Fraser (1881) 9 R 26 (disturbance by demolition works); Edinburgh Railway Access & Property Co Ltd v John Ritchie & Co (1903) 5 F 299 (damage by blasting in construction works). 21 Weston v Incorporation of Tailors of Potterrow (1839) 1 D 1218. 22 An isolated reference to “nuisance” can be found in one of the judgments in Cleghorn v Taylor (1856) 18 D 664 per Lord Cowan at 671 (involving liability of a proprietor for the fault of a contractor who erected a chimney can that collapsed soon after on to adjoining property). 23 Laing v Muirhead (1822) 2 S 73; Arrott v Whyte and Hamilton (1826) 4 Murr 149; Trotter v Farnie (1832) 10 S 423; Arnott v Brown and Common (1847) 10 D 95; Fraser’s Trs v Cran (1879) 6 R 451 (manure works). 24 Scott v Leith Commissioners of Police (1835) 13 S 646; Anderson v Burnet (1849) 12 D 131; Robertson v Stewarts and Livingston (1872) 11 M 189. 25 Johnston v Constable (1841) 3 D 1263; M’Culloch v Wallace (1846) 9 D 32. 26 Alison v Watt (1829) 7 S 786; Cooper v North British Railway Co (1863) 1 M 499. 27 Eyre v Earl of Moray (1827) 5 S 912; Young v Bowie and Dobie (1824) 3 S 307; Dunn v Hamilton (1837) 15 S 853; Mackay v Greenhill (1858) 20 D 1251; Duke of Buccleuch v Cowan (1866) 5 M 214; Rigby and Beardmore v Downie (1872) 10 M 568; Robertson v Stewarts and Livingston (1872) 11 M 189. 28 M’Creadie v M’Broom (1860) 22 D 405. 29 Porteous v Grieve (1839) 1 D 561; Swinton v Pedie (1837) 15 S 775, affd (1839) Macl & R 1018; Pentland v Henderson (1855) 17 D 542. 30 Adam v Commissioners of Police of Alloa (1874) 2 R 143. 31 Bell, Principles § 974. 32 J Rankine, The Law of Land-Ownership in Scotland, 4th edn (1909) 368 (as expressed by the maxims “qui utitur jure suo neminem laedit and sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas, meaning by alienum not the property but the rights of another”). 33 As in e.g. Smoke Nuisance (Scotland) Act 1857; General Police and Improvement Act 1862; Public Health (Scotland) Act 1867; Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876.

Nuisance  845

of opera manufacta (man-made works) constituted a separate category of harm, to be dealt with by the law of reparation,34 ongoing disturbance to neighbouring property, such as fumes, or water pollution, was classified as nuisance.35 Gradually, however, the terminology of “nuisance” came to extend beyond impairment of amenity to include disputes arising from isolated incidents of property damage. By the time that the first Scottish book on nuisance, Broun’s Law of Nuisance, was published in 1891, nuisance was understood as encompassing not only pollution of water and air, unusual noise or vibration or heat, and nuisances “contra bonos mores”, but also “dangerous nuisances”. This last category was constituted by “any operation by one person” creating “real danger to life and property”36 and included risks imported by the defender to the neighbourhood such as the storage of volatile chemicals and other inflammable substances, or the use of explosives. The case law cited by Broun as illustrating the scope of such dangerous nuisance was largely drawn from England.37 Despite this terminological shift, however, the distinction between physical damage to property and impairment of amenity remains important in the modern law.38

22.04

(3) The shadow of Rylands v Fletcher A related development from the late nineteenth century onwards was the notice taken north of the border of the leading English case of Rylands v Fletcher (1868).39 The defendant in that case was a mill owner who employed contractors to construct a reservoir on his land. During the works the contractors failed to take appropriate action to seal off shafts to disused mine workings, so that when the reservoir was filled the water penetrated the shafts and flooded the plaintiffs’ mine next door. The mill owner was found liable, despite the absence of personal fault, according to the general principle that:40

34 E.g. flooding: see Samuel v Edinburgh & Glasgow Railway Co (1850) 13 D 312; Kerr v Earl of Orkney (1857) 20 D 298; Pirie and Sons v Mags of Aberdeen (1871) 9 M 412; Hanley v Mags of Edinburgh 1913 SC (HL) 27; Caledonian Railway Co v Greenock Corporation 1917 SC (HL) 56. 35 Montgomerie v Buchanan’s Trs (1853) 15 D 853 (water pollution); Chalmers v William Dixon Ltd (1876) 3 R 461 (fumes); Caledonian Railway Co v Baird (1876) 3 R 839 (water pollution); M’Gavin v M’Intyre (1890) 17 R 818, affd (1893) 20 R (HL) 49 (water pollution). 36 Broun, Nuisance 71. 37 The only exception in this part, Broun, Nuisance 71–76, was a reference to an obiter dictum in Fleming v Hislop (1886) 13 R (HL) 43 at 48, although even here the judge, Lord Halsbury, was English. 38 See para 22.08 below. 39 (1868) LR 3 HL 330. 40 (1865–66) LR 1 Ex 265 per Blackburn J at 279 (affd (1868) LR 3 HL 330).

22.05

846   The Law of Delict in Scotland “the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is primâ facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.”

22.06

Although the offending substance in Rylands v Fletcher was water, dangerous only because of its volume, the rule as stated in that case was taken as applying strict liability for the consequences of the escape from the defendant’s land of any form of inherently hazardous substance.41 An important restriction was that the rule excluded “natural” uses of land42, a concept which has been broadly construed as “the ordinary use of land or such a use as is proper for the general use of the community”.43 This proved to be a significant curb on the scope of the doctrine, which judicial interpretation has progressively limited over the years.44 But although the continuing validity of the Rylands v Fletcher rule has frequently been questioned,45 it continues to be recognised as a distinct doctrine within the English law of nuisance.46 For several decades the Rylands v Fletcher rule cast a shadow of strict liability over the Scottish courts in cases where physical damage had been caused by an unusually dangerous operation on the defender’s land.47 In some instances the courts appeared to refer to the doctrine as having equal

41 Cf Gore v Stannard (t/a Wyvern Tyres) [2012] EWCA Civ 1248, [2014] QB 1, holding the rule inapplicable to fire per se, where the defendants brought on to their land a thing which ignited, and the fire, but not the thing, escaped from their land. 42 (1868) LR 3 HL 330 per Lord Cairns at 338–339. 43 Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263 per Lord Moulton at 280. 44 The main restrictions are: (i) the noxious substance must escape out of the defendant’s premises – there is no liability in respect of property damage suffered as a result of an escape which has remained within the defendant’s boundaries (Read v Lyons [1947] AC 156); (ii) the damage suffered must have been a foreseeable result of the escape (Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264); and (iii) the damage must be non-continuing, or, if it is continuing, the escape must still be within the control of the defendant, since if the damage is continuing and now outside the defendant’s control, the ordinary rules of negligence apply (Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264). 45 And see Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520 in which the High Court of Australia concluded that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher was now to be regarded “as absorbed by the principles of ordinary negligence”. 46 See Cambridge Water Company v Eastern Counties Leather [1994] 2 AC 264; Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2003] UKHL 61, [2004] 2 AC 1 (acknowledging the continuing validity of the rule but its inapplicability in the circumstances of the case). For discussion, see D Nolan, “The Distinctiveness of Rylands v Fletcher” (2005) 121 LQR 421. 47 For a detailed history of references to Rylands v Fletcher in Scottish case law, see R Zimmermann and P Simpson, “Liability among Neighbours”, in Reid and Zimmermann, History, vol 2, 612 at 616–629; and see F H Lawson, “Notes on the History of Tort in the Civil Law” (1940) 22 Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 136 at 149, suggesting “that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher has become a bogey to some Scots lawyers”.

Nuisance  847

validity in Scots law,48 or saw its strict liability regime for non-natural uses as parallel to the Scots rules for damage occurring as a result of an opus manufactum.49 In others, the centrality of the fault principle was restated.50 Some sources, again, offered conflicting views in the matter.51 In the midtwentieth century, a firm steer was given by Lord President Cooper on the “wide distinction in principle” between the English and Scots law on this point,52 and in 1985 Scottish distinctiveness was put beyond doubt. In RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council, a House of Lords case involving the sudden flooding of the pursuer’s premises due to the collapse of a sewer, Lord Fraser pronounced that the Rylands v Fletcher strict liability rule had “no place in Scots law, and the suggestion that it has is a heresy which ought to be extirpated”. Where reparation was sought for damage, culpa was the “essential basis in Scots law for the liability of the proprietor of land to a neighbour”.53 Following RHM Bakeries, therefore, fault must be shown if damages are to be claimed. Moreover, in rejecting the English doctrine of strict liability for isolated dangerous escapes, Lord Fraser affirmed this general principle as applicable not only to one-off incidents of the type under consideration but to all types of nuisance for which reparation is sought. The authorities discussed by Lord Fraser related in the main to cases of physical damage, and no specific comment was made on what earlier writers had called “indirect” damage – nuisances that disturbed enjoyment of property but caused no tangible damage. Today it is uncontentious that, in general, the English and the Scottish laws of nuisance differ not only in their historical origins but in the architecture of the law.54 The main control device in English law is that of the “unreasonable user of land”,55 whereas Scots law adopts a structured approach,

48 See e.g. Miller v Robert Addie & Sons’ Collieries 1934 SC 150 (although the rule was inapplicable in the particular circumstances of the case); Western Silver Fox Ranch v Ross and Cromarty County Council 1940 SC 601. W M Gloag and R C Henderson, Introduction to the Law of Scotland (1927) 348–349 hailed Rylands v Fletcher as the “leading case” as regards non-natural use of property, an assessment that was retained until the 7th edition of 1969, in which its editors, A M Johnston and J A D Hope, stated that previous editors were “not justified” in treating the Rylands v Fletcher rule as applicable to Scotland. 49 See Chalmers v William Dixon Ltd (1876) 3 R 461; Caledonian Railway Co v Greenock Corporation 1917 SC (HL) 56; Rankine, Landownership 379. 50 See e.g. Laurent v Lord Advocate (1869) 7 M 607. 51 See e.g. Glegg, Reparation, 1st edn (1892), noting in the “Introduction” at 19 that “the practical distinction between the English and the Scotch doctrines remains . . . and in this country a pursuer must still be prepared to prove negligence”, but later (283–285) treating the rule in Rylands v Fletcher as applicable in discussing remedies for nuisance. 52 McLaughlan v Craig 1946 SC 599 at 610. 53 RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council 1985 SC (HL) 17 per Lord Fraser at 41. 54 N R Whitty, “Nuisance”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) paras 15–25. 55 J Murphy, The Law of Nuisance (2010) para 1.14 and ch 2.

22.07

848   The Law of Delict in Scotland

with the plus quam tolerabile56 test to assess the gravity of the alleged harm and a complex fault requirement57 where damages are sought.

(4) A mixed doctrine 22.08

Nuisance straddles the law of delict and the law of property.58 It functions as a property law doctrine when it mediates between the competing interests of proprietors in the use and enjoyment of land.59 This means that where the pursuer seeks only interdict or declarator in relation to a disputed land use, the issue is simply whether that use is lawful or unlawful as a matter of property law. A proprietor has no entitlement to carry on an activity that constitutes an unreasonable disturbance to neighbours, and in order to determine what is unreasonable, the plus quam tolerabile test is applied, as discussed further below.60 Injury to property rights, however, fall to be addressed by the law of delict. Consequently, where a person seeks to recover damages for loss or damage already suffered as a result of operations on a neighbour’s land, the rules of reparation are applied as appropriate to this context. And as Lord Fraser made clear in RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council, the context of nuisance requires that culpa be established. The sections below will explore what this entails, as well as the possible anomalies to which this universal rule gives rise.

B. AMBIT AND TYPOLOGY 22.09

In the modern law nuisance is characterised in broad terms as “an invasion of an interest in the private use and enjoyment of land” that causes either “disturbance or substantial inconvenience” to a neighbouring proprietor or “material damage” to neighbouring land or buildings.61 A nuisance may in some cases arise due to the active use of property,62 but in others it occurs due to the omission to rectify a hazard,63 including in

56 57 58 59 60 61

62 63

See paras 22.19–22.27 and 22.33–22.34 below. See paras 22.35–22.51 below. See para 22.02 above on the analysis of Hume and Bell, and see also Whitty, “Nuisance” para 17. See also A Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance (2013) 7, describing nuisance in English law as “the law’s mechanism for prioritising property rights”. See paras 22.19–22.27 below. Watt v Jamieson 1954 SC 56 per Lord President Cooper at 58. For a detailed exploration of the meanings of “nuisance” see Whitty, “Nuisance” paras 1–6; see also para 159 on the meaning of “public” nuisance in Scots law. E.g. in Watt v Jamieson 1954 SC 56 (installation of a water heater that allegedly emitted noxious fumes). E.g. in RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council 1985 SC (HL) 17 (failure to maintain the structure of a sewer).

Nuisance  849

some instances hazards created by a third party or by natural forces.64 For example, in the leading case of RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council,65 the alleged nuisance was a flood, the state of affairs on neighbouring property to which the pursuers attributed the nuisance was a defective sewer, and its consequence was damage to the pursuers’ buildings and goods.66 These different forms of nuisance may now be examined in more detail.

(1) Continuing invasions of use or enjoyment of neighbouring property As discussed earlier, a nuisance may be constituted by a continuing disturbance rendering an owner’s use or enjoyment of property uncomfortable. This type of case typically involves allegedly excessive levels of noise,67 odour,68 fumes,69 vapours,70 vibration,71 heat,72 cold,73 light,74

64 As in Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880 (failure to rectify a flood-prone culvert installed by a third party); Sabet v Fife Council [2019] CSOH 26, 2019 SLT 514 (failure to clear weir); Leakey v National Trust [1980] QB 485 (failure to take action to avert a landslide). 65 1985 SC (HL) 17. 66 Whitty, “Nuisance” para 5. 67 E.g. Ireland v Smith (1895) 33 SLR 156 (flock of hens in suburban garden); Shanlin v Collins 1973 SLT (Sh Ct) 21 (commercial dog kennels); Webster v Lord Advocate 1985 SC 173 (Edinburgh Military Tattoo, erection of metal seating); Dennis v Ministry of Defence [2003] EWHC 793 (QB), [2003] Env LR 34 (low-flying military aircraft); Milne v Stuartfield Windpower Ltd [2019] SC ABE 25 (wind turbines); Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] AC 822 (motor sports stadium and track). Cf cases in which nuisance was not established: Maguire v Charles McNeil Ltd 1922 SC 174 (industrial steam hammer); Davidson v Kerr 1997 Hous LR 11 (domestic noises at unsocial hours); King v Advocate General for Scotland [2009] CSOH 169, 2010 GWD 1–15 (low-flying military aircraft); Morris v Curran [2019] SC KIR 77, 2019 GWD 31–496 (upstairs toilet macerator unit). 68 E.g. Fraser’s Trs v Cran (1879) 6 R 451 (manure works); City of Glasgow District Council v Carroll 1991 SLT (Sh Ct) 46 (smell of cat urine); Wheeler v J J Saunders Ltd [1996] Ch 19 (pig unit); Dobson v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2011] EWHC 3253 (TCC), 140 Con LR 135 (sewage treatment works); Barr v Biffa Waste Services Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 312, [2013] QB 455 (waste at landfill site). Cf Wilson v Gibb and Brattesani (1903) 10 SLT 293 (vapours from fish-and-chip shop, nuisance not established). 69 Fraser’s Trs v Cran (1879) 6 R 451 (manure works); Chalmers v William Dixon Ltd (1876) 3 R 461 (smouldering mineral waste); Inglis v Shotts Iron Co (1882) 9 R (HL) 78 (fumes from calcining ironstone); Fleming v Hislop (1886) 13 R (HL) 43 (smouldering mineral waste); Farley v G Adam of Hillington 1977 SLT (Sh Ct) 81. 70 Macnab v McDevitt 1971 SLT (Sh Ct) 41 (fumes from dry-cleaning machines). 71 M’Ewen v Steedman & M’Alister 1912 SC 156 (gas engine). Cf Maguire v Charles McNeil Ltd 1922 SC 174 (industrial steam hammer); Macnab v McDevitt 1971 SLT (Sh Ct) 41 (machinery in launderette). 72 Wilsons v Brydone (1877) 14 SLR 667; Reinhardt v Mentasti (1889) 42 Ch D 685; Wilson v Gibb and Brattesani (1903) 10 SLT 293 (nuisance not established). 73 Dublin (South) City Market Co v McCabes Ltd [1953] IR 283. 74 Bank of New Zealand v Greenwood [1984] 1 NZLR 525.

22.10

850   The Law of Delict in Scotland

22.11

damp,75 dust,76 infestation of vermin,77 health risk,78 water pollution,79 or invasive vegetation.80 The primary remedy is interdict,81 although damages may also be claimed where harm has already occurred, as discussed below. In some cases a nuisance has been recognised where land use has adverse social consequences, including obstruction of access by encouraging crowds to gather,82or the use of property for unwelcome enterprises such as public urinals,83 brothels,84 or sex shops.85 However, in English law at least, there is no nuisance where a public building is so structured as to allow neighbouring proprietors to be closely overlooked and their privacy compromised; “even in modern times the law does not always provide a remedy for every annoyance to a neighbour, however considerable that annoyance may be”.86 As well as interfering with the comfortable enjoyment of property, continuing nuisances may sometimes occasion ongoing physical damage, such as the impact made on the fabric of buildings by exposure to noxious fumes, pollution or vibration.87 While the English law of nuisance has traditionally distinguished interference with property which produces “material injury” from that which “is productive of sensible personal discomfort”,88 the prevailing view in Scots law is that a sharp divide should 75 Powrie Castle Properties Ltd v Dundee City Council 2001 SCLR 146. 76 Ireland v Smith (1895) 33 SLR 156; Pwllbach Colliery Co Ltd v Woodman [1915] AC 634; Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655. 77 Blair v Springfield Stores Ltd (1911) 27 Sh Ct Rep 178 (grain weevils); Hodder v Tower Hamlets LBC [1993] CLY 1371 (cockroaches); Pemberton v Southwark LBC [2000] 1 WLR 1672 (cockroaches). 78 See Metropolitan Asylum District Managers v Hill (1881) 6 App Cas 193 (hospital treating infectious diseases), but cf Mutter v Fyfe (1848) 11 D 303, holding that a cholera hospital would not be nauseous or hurtful to the neighbourhood. See also Ogston v Aberdeen District Tramways Co [1897] AC 111, challenging a local authority’s practice of spreading salt on streets in winter to the extent that injury was caused to horses. 79 Earl of Southesk v Inch Bleaching Co (1881) 8 R 573; Scott v Scott (1881) 8 R 851; Armistead v Bowerman (1888) 15 R 814; Berry v Forgan School Board (1898) 6 SLT 330; Countess of Seafield v Kemp (1899) 1 F 402; Black Loch Angling Club v Tarmac Ltd 2012 SCLR 501. 80 Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Williams [2018] EWCA Civ 1514, [2019] QB 601. 81 See paras 22.15ff below. 82 Lyons Sons & Co v Gulliver [1914] 1 Ch 63; Central Motors (St Andrews) Ltd v Magistrates of St Andrews 1961 SLT 290. 83 Adam v Commissioners of Police of Alloa (1874) 2 R 143; cf Pusey v Somerset District Council [2012] EWCA Civ 988, holding nuisance not to be proved in the use of a layby as an outdoor toilet for motorists. 84 Thompson-Schwab v Costaki [1956] 1 WLR 335; see also Bell Principles § 974. 85 Laws v Florinplace Ltd [1981] 1 All ER 65. 86 Fearn v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery [2020] EWCA Civ 104, [2020] Ch 621 at para 79. 87 Ben Nevis Distillery (Fort William) Ltd v North British Aluminium Co Ltd 1948 SC 592 (fluorine fumes from aluminium plant); Watt v Jamieson 1954 SC 56 (sulphur-impregnated vapour from water heater); Chalmers v Diageo Scotland Ltd [2017] CSOH 36, 2017 GWD 9–126 (fumes from whisky bond causing fungal growth). 88 See in particular St Helens Smelting Co v Tipping (1865) 11 HL Cas 642 per Lord Westbury at 650–651. For the modern view of this case (that physical damage is not necessarily actionable in all circumstances, but that the English courts are more prepared to protect the physical integrity of property), see Murphy, Nuisance para 2.22.

Nuisance  851

not be made between the two forms of nuisance.89 At the same time, it is likely that the courts are more readily persuaded to recognise a continuing nuisance that threatens the physical integrity of property, as compared with the property’s comfortable enjoyment. The criteria applied to determine whether the harm suffered by the pursuer is sufficiently grave to give rise to liability are discussed further below.

(2) Single incidents of damage The law of nuisance may also be applied where the alleged nuisance is the source not of a continuing disturbance but of damage that that occurs in a single incident. The remedy sought in such cases is damages.90 Thus it has been accepted that a relevant case of nuisance may be made following episodes of flooding by water,91 flooding by sewage,92 structural works in buildings causing damage to contiguous property,93 or the eventuation of a fire risk.94

22.12

(3) Personal injury Although the concern of nuisance is with injury to property or with interference with its enjoyment, the question arises as to whether a claim may be made under the law of nuisance for personal injury deriving therefrom. In England, damage to health may be presented as evidence of detriment to the amenity value of the land,95 but it seems that the law of nuisance allows no claim for personal injury as such.96 In Scotland, there is limited sheriff court authority to support an award of damages to reflect “material 89 Whitty, “Nuisance” para 49. 90 See paras 22.32ff below. 91 Hanley v Magistrates of Edinburgh 1913 SC (HL) 27; Caledonian Railway Co v Greenock Corporation 1917 SC (HL) 56; Gourock Ropework Co Ltd v Greenock Corporation 1966 SLT 125; Plean Precast Ltd v National Coal Board 1985 SC 77; G B & A M Anderson v White 2000 SLT 37; Viewpoint Housing Association Ltd v City of Edinburgh Council 2007 SLT 772. 92 Tontine Hotel (Greenock) Ltd v Greenock Corporation 1967 SLT 180; Rae v Musselburgh Town Council 1973 SC 291. 93 Cameron v Fraser (1881) 9 R 26; Edinburgh Railway Access & Property Co Ltd v John Ritchie & Co (1903) 5 F 299; Macnab v McDevitt 1971 SLT (Sh Ct) 41; Duncan’s Hotel (Glasgow) Ltd v J & A Ferguson Ltd 1974 SC 191; Lord Advocate v Reo Stakis Organisation Ltd 1981 SC 104; Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd 1996 SC 95. 94 Robertson v Thomas (1887) 14 R 822; Cunningham v Cameron [2013] CSOH 193, 2014 GWD 3–69; cf Canmore Housing Association Ltd v Bairnsfather 2004 SLT 673. 95 J Murphy, The Law of Nuisance (2010) paras 3.09–3.10. 96 Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655 per Lord Lloyd at 696. For an Australian perspective, see M Davies, “Private Nuisance, Fault and Personal Injuries” (1990) 20 University of Western Australia Law Review 129. On the non-applicability of the Rylands v Fletcher rule to personal injury, see Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2003] UKHL 61, [2004] 2 AC 1 per Lord Bingham at para 9. However, personal injury does meet the criteria of special damage for the purposes of public nuisance and is therefore recoverable in that context: see Murphy, Nuisance paras 7.19–7.20.

22.13

852   The Law of Delict in Scotland

injury” to the pursuer’s health,97 but it is even less clear that an action lies in nuisance for traumatic physical injury caused as a direct consequence of operations on the defender’s land.98 In two cases from the early twentieth century, damages were awarded in respect of the death of a relative of the pursuer following from a gas escape.99 However, these cases dated from an era when the Rylands v Fletcher rule was thought to apply in Scotland, and that rule was thought to extend to personal injury – premises both of which have now been overturned.100 Authority on this point is therefore slender, and the safer course is to frame an action for personal injury in negligence rather than nuisance.101 Indeed as the modern law requires fault to be proved under either head, there is little advantage in claiming on the basis of nuisance.

(4) Economic loss 22.14

As a matter of general principle, proprietors may recover damages in respect of economic loss deriving from physical damage to their property.102 In this connection, contamination of land by radioactive material has been recognised as property damage by the English courts, allowing consequential economic loss to be recovered.103 There is also both Scots104 and English authority105 to support recovery for economic loss associated with injury to the comfortable enjoyment of the pursuer’s property. A relevant case  97 Shanlin v Collins 1973 SLT (Sh Ct) 21 (noise of dogs in neighbouring kennels seriously affected health of pursuer’s wife) As regards interdict, see also Fraser’s Trs v Cran (1877) 4 R 794; M’Ewen v Steedman & M’Alister 1912 SC 156.   98 Whitty, “Nuisance” para 80.  99 Giblin v The Middle Ward District Committee of the Lanarkshire County Council 1927 SLT 563 (pursuer’s mother suffered gas poisoning); Spiers v Newton-on-Ayr Gas Company Ltd 1942 SLT (Sh Ct) 2 (pursuer’s wife killed in gas explosion). Giblin was disapproved by Lord Fraser in RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council 1985 SC (HL) 17 at 42 insofar as it supported a rule of strict liability in nuisance, but Lord Fraser did not comment on the relevance of Giblin as regards recoverability for personal injury. See also the South African case of De Charmoy v Day Star Hatchery (Pty) Ltd 1967 4 SA 188 (D) (damage to nerves and general health). 100 On the non-applicability of Rylands v Fletcher in Scotland, see para 22.06 above. The recoverability of damages for personal injury under Rylands v Fletcher was previously more contentious in England (see J Murphy, “The merits of Rylands v Fletcher” (2004) 24 OJLS 643 at 653–654), but see now Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2003] UKHL 61, [2004] 2 AC 1 per Lord Bingham at para 9, excluding claims for death or personal injury from the rule. 101 Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655 per Lord Lloyd at 696. 102 Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655 per Lord Hoffmann at 706; Hand v North of Scotland Water Authority 2002 SLT 798 (flooding of premises of which pursuer was tenant); Black Loch Angling Club v Tarmac Ltd 2012 SCLR 501; Jan de Nul (UK) Ltd v AXA Royale Belge SA [2002] EWCA Civ 209, [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 583. See also Laurent v Lord Advocate (1869) 7 M 607; Cameron v Fraser (1881) 9 R 26 (cases which were not specifically argued in nuisance, but dating from a period when physical damage was typically pled as a separate category of liability). 103 Blue Circle Industries plc v Ministry of Defence [1999] Ch 289. 104 Swinton v Pedie (1837) 15 S 775, affd (1839) Macl & R 1018; Adam v Commissioners of Police of Alloa (1874) 2 R 143; see also Andreae v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1938] Ch 1. 105 Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655 per Lord Hoffmann at 706.

Nuisance  853

was made, for example, in Globe (Aberdeen) Ltd v North of Scotland Water Authority,106 in which the defender’s sewer replacement works had made the pavements around the pursuer’s public house muddy and uninviting, and this obstruction of access had caused customer numbers to decline. The pursuer’s averments of loss based upon shortfall in profits were permitted to go to proof, on the basis that a claim for “mere” financial loss was not necessarily too remote. Although there was discussion in Globe (Aberdeen) of analogy with the restriction on recovery for “pure” economic loss in negligence, the better view of such cases is that the economic loss is not “pure” but derivative from the interference with amenity caused by the nuisance (in the case of Globe (Aberdeen), interference with access).107

C. INTERDICT (1) Introduction The remedy most often sought in nuisance cases is interdict, with or without a preliminary declarator. In such cases the primary question for the court is whether the disputed use is unlawful. The issue of fault, which is central to liability in damages, is inapt and need not be considered.108 Use is unlawful where it interferes unreasonably with the enjoyment of neighbouring land. And in determining whether use is unlawful, a court must seek to balance the respective property rights – each entitled to equal weight – of owner and neighbour.109 As we will see, the task is sometimes far from being an easy one. Where a use is found to be unlawful, it is not to be tolerated simply because it is being carried out with reasonable care. In determining whether a use is unreasonable, the courts have traditionally regarded the physical integrity of heritable property as having more pressing need of protection than its amenity value.110 Thus tangible physical damage of any significance is generally judged to be unreasonable,111 but a more nuanced evaluation is often required in the case of interference with 106 2000 SC 392. For commentary, see G Cameron, “Muddy Pavements and Murky Law: Intentional and Unintentional Nuisance and the Recovery of Pure Economic Loss” 2001 JR 223. 107 In Globe (Aberdeen) it was noted that averments of nuisance had not been challenged as such in the earlier debate in the sheriff court: 2000 SC 392 per Lord Coulsfield at 395; see also Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Scottish Ministers [2015] CSOH 21, 2015 GWD 7–134. 108 See N R Whitty, “Nuisance”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) paras 94 and 144. 109 Although this is expressed in terms of ownership, the parties in dispute might not be owners: see paras 22.53–22.55 and 22.63 below. For a wrong to be actionable in nuisance, as opposed to under the general law of delict, not only must the damage or injury stem from one plot of land and affect another plot of land, but the parties must themselves have some legal tie to the land. Typically, the tie is ownership but it can include lesser rights such as lease and, probably (although the point has never been determined), a personal right to occupy such as a contractual licence. 110 See discussion in J Murphy, The Law of Nuisance (2010) paras 2.22–2.24. 111 See e.g. Inglis v Shotts Iron Co (1882) 9 R (HL) 78.

22.15

854   The Law of Delict in Scotland

22.16

22.17

22.18

enjoyment of property. For interdict to be granted, it must, of course, be the defender’s conduct, rather than factors beyond the defender’s control, that threatens harm or disturbance to the enjoyment of the pursuer’s property.112 Title to sue is considered later in the chapter.113 Since nuisance is actionable only where the enjoyment of the pursuer’s property has been impaired to an unreasonable degree, the court, in considering the ambit of the interdict, may take into account not only the minimum restriction on the defender’s conduct needed to reduce disturbance to tolerable levels,114 but also the viability of proposals of remedial measures by the defender.115 As in all cases where interdict is requested, the court must consider the likelihood of the harm continuing or recurring, and must be satisfied that there is a “strong case of probability” of its arising from the defender’s operations.116 Interdict may competently be granted with regard to a nuisance-making activity that is anticipated but has not yet occurred.117 This can be straightforward in relation to very obvious nuisances that have traditionally been “ticketed by law” in the sense that they relate to activities that “cannot be carried on without constituting a nuisance”, a traditional example being a glue factory on a city main street.118 In other circumstances, however, interdict is not granted unless the pursuer can convince the court of the high degree of probability that intolerable levels of disturbance will result from the defender’s operations.119 A grant of interim interdict is a matter for judicial discretion, taking into account the balance of convenience as affecting both parties, as well as public interest considerations.120 It will be refused where conditions might readily be imposed upon the defender which would contain the disturbance within tolerable levels.121 Although the entitlement to final or perpetual interdict is in principle a matter of right, in practice considerations of fairness and “equity” may be brought to bear.122 Moreover, in appropriate circumstances the court, 112 In the sense that “nuisance is in a practical sense a necessary and virtually inevitable consequence” of the defender’s operations: Gavin v Ayrshire County Council 1950 SC 197 per Lord President Cooper at 207. 113 Paras 22.53–22.55. 114 See Inglis v Shotts Iron Co (1882) 9 R (HL) 78. 115 H Burn-Murdoch, Interdict in the Law of Scotland (1933) para 227. See e.g. Arnott v Brown and Common (1847) 10 D 95; Inglis v Shotts Iron Co (1882) 9 R (HL) 78; Manson v Forrest (1887) 14 R 802; Ben Nevis Distillery (Fort William) Ltd v North British Aluminium Co Ltd 1948 SC 592; Webster v Lord Advocate 1985 SC 173. 116 Burn-Murdoch, Interdict para 226. 117 Arnot v Brown (1852) 1 Macq 229; Gavin v Ayrshire County Council 1950 SC 197. 118 Kirkwood’s Trs v Leith (1888) 16 R 255 per Lord President Inglis at 259. 119 Steel v Commissioners of Police of Gourock (1872) 10 M 954; Manson v Forrest (1887) 14 R 802: Gavin v Ayrshire County Council 1950 SC 197. 120 Burn-Murdoch, Interdict para 145. 121 Burn-Murdoch, Interdict para 145; Whitty, “Nuisance” para 146. 122 Burn-Murdoch, Interdict para 2; Whitty, “Nuisance” para 146.

Nuisance  855

while acknowledging the existence of the nuisance, may suspend the operation of the interdict to allow remedial measures to be put in place.123

(2) Unreasonableness and the plus quam tolerabile test The basic test that determines whether the disputed land use is unreasonable is set out by Lord President Cooper in Watt v Jamieson:124 “The balance in all cases has to be held between the freedom of a proprietor to use his property as he pleases and the duty on a proprietor not to inflict material loss or inconvenience on adjoining proprietors or adjoining property; and in every case the answer depends on considerations of fact and of degree. I cannot accept the extreme view that in order to make a relevant case of nuisance it is always necessary for the pursuer to aver that the type of user complained of was in itself non-natural, unreasonable and unusual . . .The critical question is whether what he [the pursuer] was exposed to was plus quam tolerabile when due weight has been given to all the surrounding circumstances of the offensive conduct and its effects.”

The essential question is therefore whether the consequences for the pursuer of the defender’s conduct exceed the bounds of what is to be tolerated by the reasonable proprietor. The key feature of this “plus quam tolerabile” test (“more than is tolerable”) is that its application is context-dependent, taking into account “all the surrounding circumstances”.125 The disturbance in Watt v Jamieson took the form of physical damage to the pursuer’s property,126 but the test as set out in that case is accepted as relevant to both physical damage127 and to interference with the pursuer’s enjoyment of the property.128 Although no rigid division is made, physical harm

123 Webster v Lord Advocate 1985 SC 173. 124 1954 SC 56 per Lord President Cooper at 58. 125 Whitty has shown that the origin of this test was not in nuisance but in case law relating to a different type of enduring relationship, that of landlord and tenant, and the rules regarding compensation for loss of the benefit of land due to natural disaster: see N Whitty, “The Source of the Plus Quam Tolerabile Concept in Nuisance” (2003) 7 EdinLR 218. As explained by Erskine, Inst 2.6.41, “the landlord cannot, by the Roman law, claim any part of the rent of that year, if inundation, the calamity of war, the corruption of the air, or the inclemency of the weather by earthquakes, lightning, etc hath brought upon the crop a damage plus quam tolerabile; but if the loss be more moderate, he may exact the full rent”. The threshold of what was tolerable in that context would have been considerably higher than the threshold applied in cases of intentional nuisance. See also Lloyds TSB Foundation for Scotland v Lloyds Banking Group plc [2013] UKSC 3, 2013 SC (UKSC) 169. 126 By the release of sulphur-impregnated water vapour into the common flue in tenemented property. 127 See e.g. RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council 1985 SC (HL) 17; Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd 1996 SC 95; Cunningham v Cameron [2013] CSOH 193, 2014 GWD 3–69. 128 See e.g. Central Motors (St Andrews) Ltd v Magistrates of St Andrews 1961 SLT 290; Shanlin v Collins 1973 SLT (Sh Ct) 21; Davidson v Kerr 1997 Hous LR 11.

22.19

856   The Law of Delict in Scotland

22.20

is more readily regarded as intolerable as compared with non-physical interference with use, and it is the latter which typically gives rise to more detailed consideration of the test. In practice this general test of what is tolerable normally turns upon a variety of more specific ancillary criteria. These take as their primary point of reference the level of disturbance that is excessive from the standpoint of the pursuer,129 but some circumstances relative to the defender also form part of the calculation.

(a) The extent of the harm 22.21

22.22

Some level of disturbance is the price to be paid for living or working in proximity to others,130 and it is impossible to identify with precision a standard beyond which interference with enjoyment of one’s property becomes intolerable. The law disregards “any sentimental, speculative, trivial discomfort or personal annoyance of that kind”; the harm, whether physical or non-physical, must be “material” in the sense that the “ordinary purposes” of the property in question are compromised.131 In the words of Lord President Cooper in Watt v Jamieson, the defender’s use of his property must have occasioned “serious disturbance or substantial inconvenience to his neighbour or material damage to his neighbour’s property”.132 Although it is relevant to consider any threat to health presented by the alleged nuisance,133 it is not necessary that the disturbance should be so severe as to have caused illness in those affected by it.134 In assessing the materiality of the harm the court must gauge not only its intensity, in terms of decibel level, frequency of vibration, or density of pollution, but also its timing, frequency and duration. In Ireland v Smith,135 for example, the fact that the defender’s flock of hens regularly made significant levels of noise very early in the morning was an important consideration in determining that its residence in a suburban garden constituted a nuisance. On the other hand, in Harrison v Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co136 no nuisance was created by building works which,

129 130 131 132 133 134 135

136

Watt v Jamieson 1954 SC 56 per Lord President Cooper at 58. Watt v Jamieson 1954 SC 56 per Lord President Cooper at 58. Fleming v Hislop (1886) 13 R (HL) 43 per the Earl of Selborne at 45. Watt v Jamieson 1954 SC 56 per Lord President Cooper at 58; see also Davidson v Kerr 1997 Hous LR 11; Canmore Housing Association Ltd v Bairnsfather 2004 SLT 673. Fraser’s Trs v Cran (1877) 4 R 794; M’Ewen v Steedman & M’Alister 1912 SC 156; Shanlin v Collins 1973 SLT (Sh Ct) 21. Fleming v Hislop (1886) 13 R (HL) 43; Bone v Seale [1975] 1 WLR 797. (1895) 33 SLR 156. See also Western Silver Fox Ranch v Ross and Cromarty County Council 1940 SC 601, indicating that the defender’s use of explosives during the breeding season for the pursuer’s livestock was unreasonable, but that it would not be so at another time of year. [1891] 2 Ch 409.

Nuisance  857

had they not been only temporary in nature, might otherwise have been regarded as creating an intolerable degree of disturbance.

(b) The character of the locality The character of the neighbourhood must also be considered as the background to the parties’ respective uses of their properties. The threshold of what is tolerable in terms of noise, fumes and other disturbances varies according to the location of the pursuer’s house or premises. As was said in a well-known American case, a nuisance is often “merely the right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of in the barnyard”.137 The level at which nuisance becomes actionable is thus likely to be set relatively low in a residential neighbourhood,138 whereas in an industrial neighbourhood it will be necessary to look at the nature of the businesses carried on there and to the noise and disturbance already prevalent.139 Similarly, a proprietor living in property adjacent to Edinburgh Castle, for example, must accept that this “is not a typical residential locality” and that heavy tourist traffic as well as military pageantry and public events are to be tolerated as being in keeping with such an area.140 If the defender’s operations add little to existing levels of noise and traffic then it is doubtful that they can be singled out as creating a nuisance.141 In effect, this means that proprietors who choose to set up homes or offices in industrial areas cannot require their neighbour to maintain the same levels of quiet and tranquillity to be found in residential areas or office developments. That does not of itself exclude the possibility of interdict, but a nuisance is recognised only if the defender’s activities add significantly to existing levels of disturbance.142 Of course the character of the locality may change over time, with urbanisation – or indeed with “gentrification” of inner city areas. The point at which the character of the locality is to be assessed is the time when a remedy is sought by the pursuer, not the time when the pursuer’s current use of the property began.143 Thus in a commercial area that was at one time residential, for example, proprietors cannot be held indefinitely to the more rigorous limits on noise and other disturbance that originally prevailed there.

137 Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co 272 US 365 (1926) per Sutherland J at 388. 138 Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852; Ireland v Smith (1895) 33 SLR 156. See also ThompsonSchwab v Costaki [1956] 1 WLR 335 (brothel in residential area); Laws v Florinplace Ltd [1981] 1 All ER 659 (sex shop in residential area). 139 Murdoch v Glacier Metal Co Ltd [1998] Env LR 732. 140 Webster v Lord Advocate 1985 SC 173 per the Lord Ordinary (Lord Stott) at 181. 141 Maguire v Charles McNeil Ltd 1922 SC 174. 142 Rushmer v Polsue [1907] AC 121; M’Ewen v Steedman & M’Alister 1912 SC 156. 143 Whitty, “Nuisance” para 59.

22.23

22.24

858   The Law of Delict in Scotland

22.25

In some instances, changes in the character of a neighbourhood come about by virtue of a development authorised by statute. Such statutory authority effectively provides a defence against liability in nuisance in relation to disturbances that are the inevitable result of the operations thereby authorised.144 This defence of statutory authority is discussed further below.145 It is further possible that the defender’s use of land is pursuant to the grant of planning permission. As noted below, planning permission cannot be taken to extinguish a neighbour’s right of action in respect of an activity that would otherwise constitute a nuisance.146 At the same time, however, dicta in English cases have suggested that the long-term effect of a grant of planning permission may be to change the locality, so that the disputed activity eventually ceases to be a nuisance when looked at in the context of the neighbourhood as a whole.147 It is acknowledged that, in exceptional cases, planning permission for a “strategic” development might have transformed the area in a way which the court cannot “sensibly” ignore in judging the acceptability of the defenders’ activities.148 English authority further suggests that where a planning permission has specified a detailed framework of acceptable noise levels and time limits, this may provide a “starting-point” for assessing whether the ensuing disturbance has exceeded tolerable thresholds for the purposes of the law of nuisance.149

(c) The feasibility of protective measures 22.26

The feasibility of measures by the pursuer to reduce the disturbance suffered is also relevant to whether an activity is judged to be intolerable. Although in most cases the scope for such measures is limited, there is an expectation that the pursuer will use readily achievable means to reduce the impact of the alleged nuisance. However, these should not involve significant expense or inconvenience. While one case suggests that a proprietor might reasonably be expected to open windows from time to time to dissipate smells and fumes,150 a proprietor need do no more than “conform to the ordinary habits of life as a reasonable person”. This does not extend to keeping windows

144 Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd [1981] AC 1001. 145 At paras 22.64–22.66. 146 Wheeler v J J Saunders Ltd [1996] Ch 19; Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] AC 822. See also Pentland v Henderson (1855) 17 D 542 (public authority permission to use premises as slaughterhouse did not license defender to commit nuisance). 147 Gillingham BC v Medway (Chatham Docks) Co Ltd [1993] QB 343; Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655 per Lord Cooke at 722; Barr v Biffa Waste Services Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 312, [2013] QB 455 per Carnwath LJ at paras 46 and 80–82; see also Central Motors (St Andrews) Limited v Magistrates of St Andrews 1961 SLT 290 (conflict with right to hold public fair conferred by Royal Charter). 148 Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] AC 822 per Lord Carnwath at para 223. 149 Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] AC 822 per Lord Carnwath at paras 218 and 224–229. 150 Wilson v Gibb and Brattesani (1903) 10 SLT 293 (smells penetrating from fish-and-chip shop on floor below).

Nuisance  859

closed shut all summer to prevent penetration of noise,151 installing double glazing,152 or avoiding the use of one’s garden for extended periods.153 On the other hand, if the pursuer has put property to a use which renders it abnormally sensitive in the context of the character of the neighbourhood, the pursuer, rather than the defender, is expected to bear the expense of special measures to protect that use.154

(d) Public interest? In principle “interest cannot overrule law”;155 the public interest value of particular activities does not entitle proprietors to cause intolerable levels of disturbance to their neighbours.156 Even if the nuisance-making activity is of direct benefit to the wider community, it is not for individual proprietors to bear its cost, and a private law remedy is not denied on that ground alone.157 At the same time, the social utility of the defender’s conduct inevitably colours the court’s deliberations as to whether the disturbance to the pursuer has exceeded tolerable levels.158 As stated in Inglis v Shotts Iron Co, “when large interests are at stake persons should not stand on their extreme rights”.159 Accordingly, in cases where the immediate grant of interdict would have damaging consequences not just for the defender but for the wider community, interdict may be suspended for a finite period in order to allow the defender to implement remedial measures reducing disturbance to tolerable levels.160 In Webster v Lord Advocate,161 for example, interdict was granted restraining noise levels in constructing the seating for the Edinburgh Military Tattoo, but suspended for six months so that consideration could be given to a system of works that would not constitute a nuisance.

22.27

(3) Nuisance caused by multiple parties In some cases it may be alleged that the actions of several proprietors have had a combined impact in creating a nuisance. In Duke of Buccleuch v Cowan, 151 152 153 154 155

156 157 158 159 160 161

Webster v Lord Advocate 1985 SC 173 per the Lord Ordinary (Lord Stott) at 181. Webster v Lord Advocate 1985 SC 173 per the Lord Ordinary (Lord Stott) at 181. Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966 per Geoffrey Lane LJ at 985. Armistead v Bowerman (1888) 15 R 814; see also the South African case of De Charmoy v Day Star Hatchery (Pty) Ltd 1967 4 SA 188 (D). Webster v Lord Advocate 1985 SC 173 per the Lord Ordinary (Lord Stott) at 180, citing Duke of Buccleuch v Cowan (1866) 5 M 214; see also Bamford v Turnley 122 ER 27, (1862) 3 B & S 66 per Bramwell B at 33, 85. Ben Nevis Distillery (Fort William) Ltd v North British Aluminium Co Ltd 1948 SC 592. Dennis v Ministry of Defence [2003] Env LR 34. N R Whitty, “Nuisance”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) para 72. (1881) 8 R 1006 per Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff at 1021 (affd (1882) 9 R (HL) 78). Ben Nevis Distillery (Fort William) Ltd v North British Aluminium Co Ltd 1948 SC 592 per Lord President Cooper at 598. 1985 SC 173.

22.28

860   The Law of Delict in Scotland

for example, a number of mill owners had been discharging their effluent into the River Esk in such a way as to pollute the river downstream. It was held competent for the downstream proprietors to bring a single action to interdict all the mill owners identified as responsible. Although without the actions of any one of them, the river would still have been polluted, each was making a “material contribution to the nuisance”.162 Most of the case law on this point concerns water pollution in circumstances that would now be addressed by public law controls,163 but in principle the possibility of combined nuisance remains in other contexts.

(4) Prospective damages in lieu of interdict? 22.29

The traditional view of nuisance in Scotland is that there is no power to award prospective damages in lieu of interdict:164 “an undisputed right is [not] to be taken away because it would be for the pecuniary advantage of another person that [the right-holder] should lose it”.165 A property rule cannot be downgraded to a liability rule.166 By contrast, the English courts are empowered by statute to grant damages as an alternative to an injunction.167 Moreover, their traditionally restrictive attitude towards exercise of this power, as set out in Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Company,168 has in recent years been reconsidered and a more flexible approach endorsed. In Coventry v Lawrence169 the majority in the Supreme Court, while regarding the award of an injunction as the “prima facie position”,170 suggested that the court should be free to take into account a variety of considerations in determining whether damages might be granted instead, including such matters as whether the nuisance was produced by an activity for which planning permission had been granted. This option to award damages in lieu of interdict would appear not to be open to the Scottish courts.171 162 (1866) 5 M 214 per Lord Cowan at 228 (affd (1876) 4 R (HL) 14), discussed further at para 13.13 above. 163 Kincaid Smith v Cameron (1900) 2 F 1179; Fleming v Gemmill 1908 SC 340. 164 Burn-Murdoch, Interdict 102–104; Whitty, “Nuisance” para 150, noting that there was no Scots equivalent to the Chancery Amendment Act 1858 s 2 (now re-enacted in the Senior Courts Act 1981 s 50). 165 Bank of Scotland v Stewart (1891) 18 R 957 per Lord President Inglis at 971. 166 To use the language of law and economics: see in particular G Calabresi and A D Melamed, “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: one view of the cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089. 167 Senior Courts Act 1981 s 50. 168 [1895] 1 Ch 287 at 322–323 per A L Smith LJ, stating the “working rule” that damages may be awarded instead of an injunction where the injury to the plaintiff’s legal rights (i) is small, (ii) is capable of being estimated in money, (iii) can be adequately compensated by a small money payment, and (iv) it would be “oppressive” to the defendant to grant an injunction. 169 [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] AC 822. 170 [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] AC 822 per Lord Neuberger at para 121. Lord Sumption went so far as to suggest, at para 161, that much was “to be said for the view that damages are ordinarily an adequate remedy for nuisance”. 171 Whitty, “Nuisance” para 146.

Nuisance  861

Yet, as noted elsewhere in this volume, an equitable discretion to substitute damages for the vindication of a property right is sometimes recognised in relation to encroachment, in circumstances where the intrusion into the pursuer’s property is minor and the inconvenience of removal is disproportionate to the advantage gained thereby.172 The justification for this difference in treatment between tangible and intangible incursions into neighbouring property is not clear. Admittedly, there is no equivalent in Scotland to section 50 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 in England, which, in recognition of their legal and equitable jurisdiction, confers upon the Court of Appeal and the High Court specific power to award damages in addition to, or in substitution for, an injunction or specific performance. At the same time, there is arguably no need for such legislative provision in Scotland, where there has never been an institutional or doctrinal separation between law and equity.173 Interdict should not lightly be refused in relation to nuisance, no doubt, but it is possible that the changing interface between public and private law controls may prompt judicial re-examination of the absolute prohibition on damages as an alternative. As the reporter to the American Law Institute commented in relation to § 822(d) of the Restatement Second of Torts:

22.30

“Even when there is present harm, it is one thing to say that a defendant should pay damages for the harm his factory is causing but it is a different thing to say that he must close his factory if the harm cannot be stopped. For the purpose of determining liability for damages for private nuisance, an invasion may be regarded as unreasonable even though the utility of the conduct is great and the amount of harm is relatively small . . . But for the purpose of determining whether the conduct producing the invasion should be enjoined, additional factors must be considered. It may be reasonable to continue an important activity if payment is made for the harm it is causing but unreasonable to initiate or continue it without paying.”

While prospective damages appear not to be available, at present, as an alternative to interdict, there are cases in which future damages were awarded to proprietors who, having suffered harm, remained at risk of further harm emanating from their neighbours’ property. If interdict is not “practicable or sufficient” to remove risk altogether, such proprietors may be entitled to recover as damages the cost of protective measures against a repetition of natural hazards such as flooding.174

172 See paras 23.11–23.14 below. 173 See Bankton, Inst 4.7.23. For comprehensive discussion, see D M Walker, Equity in Scots Law (PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1952). The main arguments from the thesis were distilled into D M Walker, “Equity in Scots Law” (1954) 66 JR 103. See also D J Carr, Ideas of Equity (Studies in Scots Law vol 5, 2017). 174 G A Estates Ltd v Caviapen Trustees Ltd 1993 SLT 1037 per Lord Coulsfield at 1041.

22.31

862   The Law of Delict in Scotland

D. DAMAGES 22.32

As well as interdict, or instead of it where damage was the result of an incident that is not expected to recur, the pursuer may seek damages from the defender. Title to sue is considered later in the chapter.175 Liability turns upon two elements. As with interdict, the pursuer requires to show that the alleged disturbance is sufficiently grave as to be actionable in nuisance. In addition, fault must be established, as variously demonstrated in the form of malice, intent, recklessness, negligence, or conduct which creates a special risk of abnormal damage.176

(1) The first requirement: sufficient gravity of harm 22.33

22.34

As in the case of interdict, discussed above, the plus quam tolerabile test remains applicable in determining whether the harm is sufficiently grave as to be actionable. Harm that takes the form of physical damage to property, as opposed to impact upon amenity, is almost always regarded as sufficiently grave to meet the required threshold. Thus in most cases of damages the threshold will be readily surmounted. The plus quam tolerabile test is relevant both where the damage is alleged to be the consequence of the defender’s intentional conduct177 and also where it was allegedly caused by negligence.178 In regard to the latter, however, as discussed below,179 the ordinary principles of the law of negligence are brought into play. This means that this test for the gravity of harm is only one factor balanced against others in setting the relevant standard of care. As discussed in chapter 10, these include considerations such as the probability of harm, the burden of precautions, and also custom and practice.180 Where, for example, the risk of harm was low and the burden of precautions considerable, the harm is actionable only if it is relatively serious, whereas less serious harm may be actionable where it was inflicted intentionally, or where the risk was high and precautions would have been readily achieved.181 Where, as is typical in negligence cases, harm takes the form of physical property damage, such harm is likely in itself to be considered sufficiently grave, but the other factors mentioned above remain 175 Paras 22.53–22.55. 176 Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd 1996 SC 95 per Lord President Hope at 100–101. 177 As in Watt v Jamieson 1954 SC 56. 178 As in Watt v Jamieson 1954 SC 56. 179 Paras 22.39–22.41. 180 See Mackintosh v Mackintosh (1864) 2 M 1357 per Lord Neaves at 1263. 181 Cf Whitty, “Nuisance” para 106, arguing that the plus quam tolerabile test is inappropriate to negligence, since it sets the threshold of actionability too low. This argument may be questioned as failing to take fully into account that the test for the gravity of harm is only one strand of the assessment of standard of care. For discussion, see M P Gatica Rodríguez, Fault-based and Strict Liability in the Law of Neighbours (Studies in Scots Law vol 13, 2022) paras 5.07–5.10.

Nuisance  863

relevant in determining whether the defender has failed in the requisite standard of care.

(2) The second requirement: fault The decision of the House of Lords in RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council182 settled once and for all that there is no liability in damages for nuisance in the absence of fault. However, since the pursuers’ averments of fault in that case were inadequate and dismissed as irrelevant, the court, while affirming the general principle, did little to clarify the precise form that fault might take. Subsequent case law suggests that a significant level of detail is required in setting out the basis of fault. It is not enough to aver, in relation to a flood, for example, that “properly maintained” water mains do not burst.183 The pursuer is expected to aver facts and circumstances from which fault can be inferred, by giving notice either of the precise fault founded upon or of facts and circumstances which, in the absence of a better explanation, indicate fault on the defender’s part.184 The leading judicial statement of the nature of fault in nuisance actions is that of Lord President Hope in Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd,185 a case in which the pursuers’ tenement flat had suffered damage following their neighbours’ removal of a structural wall in the basement:186 “The essential requirement is that fault or culpa must be established. That may be done by demonstrating negligence, in which case the ordinary principles of the law of negligence will provide an equivalent remedy. Or it may be done by demonstrating that the defender was at fault in some other respect. This may be because his action was malicious, or because it was deliberate in the knowledge that his action would result in harm to the other party, or because it was reckless as he had no regard to the question whether his action, if it was of a kind likely to cause harm to the other party, would have that result. Or it may be – and this is perhaps just another example of recklessness – because the defender has indulged in conduct

182 1985 SC (HL) 17, discussed at para 22.06 above. Lord Fraser observed, however, that some authorities supported the survival of a strict-liability rule where the damage had occurred as a result of the defender interfering with the course of a natural stream. These authorities are discussed below at para 22.52. 183 Argyll and Clyde Health Board v Strathclyde Regional Council 1988 SLT 381. 184 Argyll and Clyde Health Board v Strathclyde Regional Council 1988 SLT 381 per Lord McCluskey at 383. Cf McKenna v O’Hare [2017] SAC (Civ) 16, 2017 SC (SAC) 33, in which the Sheriff Appeal Court indicated that an inference of fault might be drawn from the assertion that “properly managed tanks do not lose substantial quantities of oil into the ground”. However, although this decision relied upon Lord Fraser’s observations in RHM Bakeries on the proper format for averments of fault, it also appeared to proceed upon the assumption that the averments of fault in RHM Bakeries were relevant; in fact they were dismissed as irrelevant. 185 1996 SC 95. 186 Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd 1996 SC 95 at 100–101.

22.35

864   The Law of Delict in Scotland which gives rise to a special risk of abnormal damage, from which fault is implied if damage results from that conduct. In each case personal responsibility rests on the defender because he has conducted himself in a respect which is recognised as inferring culpa by our law. So what is required is a deliberate act of negligence or some other conduct from which culpa or fault may be inferred.”

As Lord Hope acknowledged,187 the analysis in this passage was shaped by the pioneering account of the law provided by the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia title on “Nuisance”, in which Whitty described the categories of fault in nuisance as existing within a range that spanned “malice, intent, recklessness, negligence and conduct which creates a special risk of abnormal danger”.188 Whitty in turn had apparently drawn inspiration from the United States Restatement Second of Torts,189 which in § 822 mapped out the categories of conduct in nuisance in similar terms. Although Whitty presented this as a “continuum” of degrees of fault, this is perhaps not the best way of understanding the different categories. While malice, intent and recklessness are identified by reference to the defender’s mental state,190 negligence is assessed in an entirely different way, by measuring the defender’s conduct against the relevant standard of care.191 Moreover, the final category (special risk of abnormal danger) bears to be defined by the risk inherent in the activity rather than by looking at the defender’s state of mind or behaviour. These categories are therefore considered separately below.

(3) Malice 22.36

Malice as such is rarely established in the neighbourhood context. Even where harm is deemed intentional, in the sense (discussed below) that the defender acted in the substantial certainty that some level of disturbance to the pursuer would ensue, it is only very seldom that the defender is shown to have been motivated by the desire to harm the pursuer.192 However, where such malicious motivation is found, or can be reasonably imputed, it would appear that the threshold of actionability is set so low that even a minor disturbance is not to be tolerated if it is perpetrated from 187 1996 SC 95 at 99. 188 N R Whitty, “Nuisance”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) paras 89 and 108. 189 As explained in Whitty, “Nuisance” para 17. 190 Whitty, “Nuisance” para 108. 191 For detailed analysis of the “continuum”, see M P Gatica Rodríguez, Fault-based and Strict Liability in the Law of Neighbours (Studies in Scots Law vol 13, 2022) paras 3.26–3.42. 192 As in, e.g., Christie v Davey [1893] 1 Ch 316. See also Armistead v Bowerman (1888) 15 R 814 per Lord Young at 822; Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468; MacGibbon v Robinson [1952] 4 DLR 142.

Nuisance  865

spite.193 Among the facts taken into account by the plus quam tolerabile test in determining whether intentional harm is actionable is the utility of the defender’s conduct; malicious conduct, however, has no defensible utility value. The continuing relevance of the doctrine of aemulatio vicini to those situations where one proprietor has emulously deprived another of an amenity such as water or light is discussed later in the chapter.194

22.37

(4) Intention The typical scenario for intentional nuisance is that the defender has deliberately used property in a way which is known to cause disturbance to neighbours if it exceeds a certain degree of intensity. The defender is not motivated by personal spite, but in furthering his or her interests either disregards the effects of the conduct or misjudges them as remaining within what is tolerable. Nonetheless, the question of what, precisely, constitutes culpable intention has not been much considered by the courts. In Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd, intentional conduct was differentiated from negligence, on the basis that the former entailed “conduct which is deliberate, involving the intention to carry out the operation which proves inevitably to be harmful”.195 That definition risks being over-inclusive, because liability in negligence can also be said to arise on the basis of deliberate conduct from which the risk of harm is foreseeable. The question of actual or constructive knowledge is key to identifying a sufficient level of intent. A person can be regarded as having acted intentionally if the person has persisted in a use of land which he or she knew or ought to have known was substantially certain to cause disturbance to other proprietors beyond a level that was reasonably tolerable.196 Thus in Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd itself, a case of intentional nuisance was relevantly pled where the pursuers offered to prove that the defenders had removed the basement wall:197 “in the knowledge that, as this was a load-bearing wall, the result of this interference with it would be to cause damage to the pursuers’ property on the upper floors. It was not being suggested that the second defenders’

193 Armistead v Bowerman (1888) 15 R 814 per Lord Young at 822; Davidson v Kerr 1997 Hous LR 11 per Sheriff Poole at para 3–25. Cf English law in which the presence of malice confirms that the defendant’s use of the property was unreasonable: see Salmond and Heuston on Torts 62. For contemporary commentary on Christie v Davey [1893] 1 Ch 316, see F Pollock, The Law of Torts, 5th edn (1897) 381: “Where nuisance is once proved, the defendant’s intention is not material; but a proved intention to annoy the plaintiff may be relevant to show that the defendant is not using his property in an ordinary and legitimate way such as good neighbours mutually tolerate.” 194 See paras 22.79–22.81. 195 Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd 1996 SC 95 per Lord President Hope at 99–100. 196 Whitty, “Nuisance” para 105. 197 1996 SC 95 at 101.

22.38

866   The Law of Delict in Scotland action was malicious, in the sense that they were setting out to cause damage to the pursuers’ property. But the action was a deliberate one, as it was done in the knowledge that damage would result from it. This was sufficient to show that they were at fault and thus liable in damages for the nuisance.”

Similarly, in Powrie Castle Properties Ltd v Dundee City Council,198 nuisance could be regarded as intentional where the defenders’ building works had caused damp penetration to the adjacent property, and the defenders admitted to knowing that damage would occur if protective measures were not taken. By contrast, in Morris Amusements Ltd v Glasgow City Council,199 a case arising out of similar circumstances, the pursuers’ pleadings were inadequate to establish intentional nuisance where they did not address the defenders’ “specific state of knowledge”.

(5) Recklessness and negligence 22.39

Liability in nuisance arises under the rules of negligence where the risk of the disturbance, if not a substantial certainty, was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defender’s activities.200 The defender was therefore under a duty to take care to avoid the eventuation of this risk.201 In Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd Lord President Hope indicated that where culpa in nuisance is constituted by negligence, “the ordinary principles of the law of negligence” are applicable,202 but the operation of these “ordinary principles” requires some further explanation to account for the neighbourhood context.

(a) Duty of care 22.40

While the law of negligence frequently makes legal opponents out of strangers, the fixed and often enduring neighbourhood relationship in negligent-nuisance cases normally means that duty of care is readily recognised.203 Alongside proximity in a physical as well as a legal sense, there is also a high degree of foreseeability, in that neighbours are very likely to be affected by works carried out without due care. The particular nature of the neighbourhood relationship means also that duty of care may more 198 2001 SCLR 146; see also G B & A M Anderson v White 2000 SLT 37; Viewpoint Housing Association Ltd v City of Edinburgh Council [2007] CSOH 114, 2007 SLT 772 in which, “having . . . created a serious potential for flooding within the neighbouring area, [the defenders] thereafter maintained that state of affairs over many years when (on the pursuers’ averments) they knew that repeated flooding and property damage had occurred, and when they were in possession of reports in which the grossly inadequate capacity of the culvert was made clear” (per Lord Emslie at para 20). 199 [2009] CSOH 84, 2009 SLT 697 per Lord Emslie at para 46. 200 Whitty, “Nuisance” para 106. 201 Whitty, “Nuisance” para 89. 202 Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd 1996 SC 95 at 100. 203 For duty of care in general, see ch 4 above.

Nuisance  867

readily be recognised in regard to hazards created by natural forces204 or by the actions of a third party.205 Liability for such continuing or “adopted” nuisances is considered further below.206

(b) Standard of care The relevant standard of care in this context is “proportionate to the degree of risk run, and to the magnitude of the mischief which may be occasioned”.207 If the foreseeable levels of risk are slight and the potential harm only minor, then little is expected by way of neighbours in terms of precautionary measures; if, on the other hand, the risk is significant and/or the potential harm is grave, then the expectations of standard of care are correspondingly greater. A distinctive feature of the neighbourhood context is that, while standard of care is normally fixed by reference to the objective standard of the reasonable proprietor, in nuisance cases the defender’s individual resources and capabilities may be considered, in particular in assessing the defender’s response to a hazard created by a third party or arising by forces of nature.208 Indeed, the resources of the defender may be compared against those of the pursuer in order to determine who was more able to protect the pursuer’s property against harm.209 In a leading Privy Council case from Australia, this was acknowledged to be a “measured duty of care”210 which in effect adopted a subjectivised approach, looking at which of the parties was better placed to address the risk.

22.41

(6) Conduct giving rise to a special risk of abnormal damage or danger (a) A distinctive category of liability? Notwithstanding their unequivocal rejection of the English Rylands v Fletcher rule,211 the Scottish courts have traditionally recognised that a special regime 204 Leakey v National Trust [1980] QB 485. 205 Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880; see also Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd 1987 SC (HL) 37 per Lord Mackay at 68. 206 See paras 22.47–22.51 below. 207 Mackintosh v Mackintosh (1864) 2 M 1357 per Lord Neaves at 1263. For standard of care in general, see ch 10 above. 208 The reasoning to this effect, as applied in Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645 per Lord Wilberforce at 663, was followed in Leakey v National Trust [1980] QB 485 and Holbeck Hall Hotel Ltd v Scarborough BC [2000] QB 836. It was also approved in the Scottish case of Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd 1987 SC (HL) 37, a case argued in negligence rather than nuisance. 209 Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645 per Lord Wilberforce at 662. 210 Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645 per Lord Wilberforce at 662–663; Holbeck Hall Hotel Ltd v Scarborough Borough Council [2000] QB 836 per Stuart-Smith LJ at para 39; Lambert v Barratt Homes Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 681, [2011] HLR 1 per Sir Anthony May at paras 15–17; Vernon Knights Associates v Cornwall Council [2013] EWCA Civ 950, [2014] Env LR 6 per Jackson LJ at para 38. 211 See paras 22.05–22.07 above.

22.42

868   The Law of Delict in Scotland

22.43

is appropriate for abnormally dangerous activities endangering neighbouring land.212 That tradition continues in the final category of fault noted by Lord President Hope in Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd: “conduct which gives rise to a special risk of abnormal damage, from which fault is implied if damage results from that conduct”.213 As Whitty remarks, this “impure taxonomic category” is an anomaly within the continuum of fault, since it is marked out by reference to gravity of risk, not the consideration of the defender’s conduct by which the other categories of fault are defined.214 It is unproblematic where it simply overlaps with the other categories – where, in other words, abnormally risky conduct is undertaken recklessly, intentionally, or even negligently. The question arises, however, as to whether there a distinctive role for this category where it does not overlap with any of these other types of fault. As mentioned above, Lord President Hope’s formulation of this and the other categories of fault was influenced by Whitty’s path-breaking analysis in the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia. For both Whitty and Lord Hope the leading authority215 explaining liability for abnormally dangerous conduct was Chalmers v William Dixon Ltd,216 a case in which noxious fumes from burning mineral waste had caused damage to neighbouring agricultural land. In Chalmers, Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff decided that liability in such circumstances was contingent on fault:217 “I think that culpa does lie at the root of the matter. If a man puts upon his land a new combination of materials, which he knows, or ought to know, are of a dangerous nature, then either due care will prevent injury, in which case he is liable if injury occurs for not taking that due care, or else no precautions will prevent injury, in which case he is liable for his original act in placing the materials upon the ground.”

On this analysis, there is no liability where the danger was unknowable and where the operation in question was carried out with a level of care appropriate to circumstances in which the particular danger was unknown. 212 See McLaughlan v Craig 1948 SC 599 per Lord President Cooper at 611, firmly rejecting Rylands v Fletcher but observing: “There are of course cases in which there is little difference in the result between the application of the English rule of absolute liability and the Scottish rule of culpa, where the facts raise a presumption of negligence so compelling as to be practically incapable of being displaced.” 213 1996 SC 95 at 100. 214 N R Whitty, “Nuisance”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) para 108 (i.e. the defender’s “mental element”, in relation to intention, or the standard of care exercised, in cases of alleged negligence). 215 For detailed analysis of the sources cited in Lord Hope’s judgment, see M P Gatica Rodríguez, Fault-based and Strict Liability in the Law of Neighbours (Studies in Scots Law vol 13, 2022) paras 6.63–6.76. 216 (1876) 3 R 461. 217 (1876) 3 R 461 at 464.

Nuisance  869

Where the danger was known or knowable, this passage distinguishes between two types of case.218 In the first, fault is identified in failing to take due precautions which would have prevented the harm. Of course in relation to a known danger the standard of care would be pitched high, particularly where the potential harm was severe, and so this standard would have been difficult for the defender to attain. Nonetheless, this failure to exercise due care can plainly be seen as a manifestation of negligence, as Lord Hope acknowledged.219 It is the second type of case that is distinctive – cases in which “no precautions” would have prevented harm, so that simply carrying out operations of this sort is in itself considered to be culpable. Such cases do not always sit comfortably on the fault continuum, however.

(b) Cases in which “no precautions will prevent injury” A person can be regarded as having acted intentionally, or at least recklessly, in pressing ahead with an operation which the person knew to be dangerous and incapable of being made safe by any feasible precautions. Such cases clearly demonstrate fault. However, the formulation above from Chalmers v William Dixon Ltd also lays fault at the door of a person who knows the operation to be dangerous, but does not realise that no precautions can prevent injury and therefore exercises “due care” in going ahead with it in a reasonable, if mistaken, belief that harm can be avoided. If the person acted in the reasonable belief that a dangerous operation could be completely safe, if handled with care, then the basis for fault is doubtful. A framework that was truly fault-based would allow the reasonableness of that belief, and the reasonableness of precautions taken, to be taken into account, although with a heavy onus on the defender where the danger itself was known. On the other hand, a framework such as suggested here, which applies liability by dispensing with all enquiry into whether due care was applied, is hardly fault-based. Indeed this scenario seems to fit more readily within the definition of strict liability, which, as stated by Walker, entails the imposition of liability on a defender who has created the risk of a particular type of harm and operates “despite the absence of ‘fault’ in the ordinary sense”.220 218 As pointed out even before Kennedy, however, a third scenario is in fact possible “where some precautions would have prevented injury but due care would not” (e.g. where the precautions were so extravagant that the reasonable person would not have undertaken them). The “true alternative” is perhaps therefore that “either due care will prevent injury . . . or due care will not”: see E M Clive, “The Thirteenth Report of the Law Reform Committee for Scotland” 1964 JR 250 at 257. 219 1996 SC 95 at 100. 220 Walker, Delict 284. On this point, see Clive, “The Thirteenth Report of the Law Reform Committee for Scotland” 258. See also M P Gatica Rodríguez, Fault-based and Strict Liability in the Law of Neighbours (Studies in Scots Law vol 13, 2022) ch 7, arguing for recognition that strict liability applies where: (i) conduct creates a high risk of grave physical harm, which risk remains even if reasonable precautions are adopted; (ii) the conduct is not the consequence of a common usage; and (iii) the risk is known or should be known by the person engaging in such conduct.

22.44

870   The Law of Delict in Scotland

22.45

It is perhaps unsurprising that this form of “fault” should operate in much the same way as strict liability, since Whitty specifically acknowledged the United States Restatement Second of Torts as a source of inspiration in theorising the continuum of fault,221 and the Restatement therefore influenced Lord Hope’s analysis in Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd, at any rate indirectly. The framework of liability for nuisance as set out in the Restatement made specific provision for abnormally dangerous activities as a separate category, and that category was generally regarded as based upon strict liability.222

(c) Overlap with case law relating to independent contractors 22.46

In practice, cases in which a defender has executed abnormally dangerous operations in person are likely to be relatively few. Many proprietors embarking upon construction or other works on their property engage contractors to carry out the necessary work for them. In the event that damage occurs, the focus then shifts from the framework of liability imposed upon those who have themselves engaged in dangerous activities to the conditions in which liability is imposed upon those who have instructed independent contractors to undertake such activities.223 Although cases relevant to the latter are often cited in discussion of the former,224 the criteria for liability do not entirely overlap. The circumstances in which proprietors may be found liable in nuisance for the consequences of conduct by independent contractors are discussed further below.225

(7) Continued and adopted nuisances 22.47

In some situations liability arises, not as a result of positive conduct by the defender, but because the defender has failed to take reasonable steps to address a potential hazard or irritant. Although the potential nuisance may originally have been attributable to the acts of others, or to the forces of nature, the occupier of land is said in such cases to have “continued” or

221 Whitty, “Nuisance” para 17. 222 The basic rules on nuisance are set out in Restatement Second of Torts § 822, and cross-reference is made to the sections on abnormally dangerous activities at §§ 519–520 (see § 822, comment k). The multifactorial definition of abnormally dangerous activities in Restatement Second has now been distilled into a more succinct definition in the Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 20(b), to the effect that “an activity is abnormally dangerous if, and strict liability attaches, if: (1) the activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors; and (2) the activity is not one of common usage.” See also commentary in Dobbs, Law of Torts § 441. 223 For discussion, see M P Gatica Rodríguez, Fault-based and Strict Liability in the Law of Neighbours (Studies in Scots Law vol 13, 2022) paras 6.78–6.88. 224 E.g. Noble’s Trustees v Economic Forestry (Scotland) Ltd 1988 SLT 662 was cited in Kennedy. 225 See paras 22.56–22.61 below.

Nuisance  871

“adopted” the nuisance. Broadly speaking, “an occupier of land ‘continues’ a nuisance if with knowledge or presumed knowledge of its existence he fails to take any reasonable means to bring it to an end though with ample time to do so. He ‘adopts’ it if he makes any use of the erection, building, bank or artificial contrivance which constitutes the nuisance.”226 As noted above,227 occupiers are under a “measured duty” in such circumstances; in determining what steps would have been reasonable for the occupier to take in order to avert harm, the court may take into account all the circumstances of the case including the limitations on the occupier’s financial and practical resources. Thus occupiers who do nothing to remedy a hazardous state of affairs that they know, or ought to know, has been created on their land by a third party can be held liable for the damage that results. Liability may arise even if the hazardous state of affairs has its origins in a period before the defender’s acquisition of the land.228 In Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan a local authority had constructed a culvert some time previously on the boundary of the defendants’ land. They had done so without the defendants’ knowledge, but the defendants were deemed to have learned of its existence some time before the events in question. Due to its mode of construction the culvert was prone to blockage and this feature was not remedied. The defendants therefore “knew the danger, they were able to prevent it and they omitted to prevent it” when it would be have been reasonable for them to have done so.229 Moreover, they had “adopted the nuisance” because they had continued to use the drainage system “without taking the proper means for rendering it safe”.230 They were therefore held liable in damages after the culvert choked in heavy rain and flooded the neighbouring property. A similar approach is adopted in regard to a hazardous state of affairs that has arisen due to an act of nature. Liability arises where the occupier, although blameless in relation to the original source of harm, knows, or is deemed to know, of the potential danger and fails to take reasonable steps to address it. In Goldman v Hargrave,231 a case involving the spread of fire from a tree on the defendant’s land that was struck by lightning, the Privy Council referred to the reasoning in Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan and made no distinction between hazards brought about by human agency and Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880 per Viscount Maugham at 894. See para 22.41 above. British Road Services Ltd v Slater [1964] 1 WLR 498. Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880 per Lord Atkin at 899; cf Lambert v Barratt Homes Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 681, [2011] HLR 1 where it would not have been reasonable to expect the defendants to do more. 230 Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880 per Viscount Maugham at 895. 231 [1967] 1 AC 645. Note that this case was in fact argued in negligence, although the Privy Council recognised an “overlap” with nuisance (per Lord Wilberforce at 657). 226 227 228 229

22.48

22.49

872   The Law of Delict in Scotland

22.50

those arising from natural causes. The defendant’s negligence in dealing with the spread of the fire therefore rendered him liable to his neighbours for the resulting damage. This reasoning was further endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Leakey v National Trust,232 in which the defendants had been warned by their neighbours that a mound of earth on the defendants’ land was in danger of giving way, but had done nothing to shore it up; they were found liable for the damage caused by a landslip to the neighbouring property. The absence of a distinction between nuisance caused by the acts of third parties and by acts of nature was further emphasised by the House of Lords in Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd.233 The onus of proof remains upon the pursuer, however, in that the pursuer must show that there were reasonable steps which the defendant could have taken to avert the danger and did not take.234 Ongoing antisocial behaviour by third parties on the defender’s land may also be classed as a nuisance insofar as it impinges upon the comfortable enjoyment of neighbouring property. Occupiers may be liable if they expressly consented to the nuisance-making activity, or if they allowed others in occupation to persist in such activity.235 In Lippiatt v South Gloucestershire Council236 a local council was held liable in nuisance for the antisocial activities of a group of travelling people whom it had permitted to camp on its land. This involved a sustained campaign of vandalism, dumping rubbish, and disturbing livestock on neighbouring farm land. The case was permitted to go to trial on the basis that the Council had known of the scale of the problem and had in effect adopted the nuisance by failing to exercise its power to turn out the temporary residents once the consequences of their behaviour became apparent. Similarly, SedleighDenfield v O’Callaghan was cited and followed in the Scots case of Gray v Dunlop237 involving the emptying of a chamber pot from the window of a hostel so that the contents landed on the pursuer’s head. The court held that the pursuer was entitled to succeed in his claim against the proprietor of the hostel if he could show that “the incident was part of a practice the existence of which was known or ought to have been known to the defenders”,238 and proof was allowed on this issue.

232 [1980] QB 485. 233 [2003] UKHL 66, [2004] 2 AC 42; see also Lambert v Barratt Homes Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 681, [2011] HLR 1. 234 Green v Lord Somerleyton [2003] EWCA Civ 198, [2004] 1 P & CR 33; on the nature of this “measured duty” see para 22.41 above. 235 Whitty, Nuisance para 141; see also Cocking v Eacott [2016] EWCA Civ 140, [2016] QB 1080 (excessive barking by dog owned by occupier’s daughter who lived at the property). 236 [2000] QB 51. 237 1954 SLT (Sh Ct) 75. 238 1954 SLT (Sh Ct) 75 per Sheriff-Substitute Walker at 76.

Nuisance  873

Within the framework of fault outlined in Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd, such “continued” or “adopted” nuisances are typically examples of negligence. Indeed cross-reference was made to Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan in Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd,239 the leading Scottish authority on liability in negligence for hazards arising from the acts of third parties. Lord Mackay acknowledged that a duty of care was made out as between neighbour D and neighbour P with regard to hazards created by a trespasser on neighbour D’s land of which neighbour D had knowledge. This meant that neighbour D would be liable in negligence where neighbour D failed to take “reasonable care” to address those hazards and damage to neighbour P’s land resulted.240 In Maloco, by contrast, no liability arose because the court accepted that the defenders had no knowledge of the fire hazard created by third parties unknown.

22.51

(8) The fault requirement and interference with the course of a natural stream Although in RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council the House of Lords firmly rejected application of the English Rylands v Fletcher rule in Scotland, it observed that the decision in Caledonian Railway Co v Greenock Corporation241 might be read as supporting the imposition of strict liability in restricted circumstances where damage had been caused due to the defender’s interference with the flow of a natural stream.242 However, the better reading of Caledonian Railway Co is that the decision rested upon fault, not strict liability.243 It is of course possible that an enterprise of this nature might entail conduct giving rise to a special risk of abnormal damage or danger, and that liability might be established on that basis.244

239 1987 SC (HL) 37; see also M’Laren v British Railways Board 1971 SC 182; G B & A M Anderson v White 2000 SLT 37. However, 19th-century authority casts the scope of the proprietor’s duty more narrowly in Scots law: see Pirie and Sons v Magistrates of Aberdeen (1871) 9 M 412 per Lord Cowan at 420: “the defenders are entitled to be assoilzied, – unless it has been established by the proof that through acts of theirs, whether of fault or of negligence, the damage suffered by the pursuers through the overflow of water on the occasion libelled was directly caused.” 240 Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd 1987 SC (HL) 37 at 68; see para 4.46 above. 241 1917 SC (HL) 56; see also Viewpoint Housing Association v City of Edinburgh Council [2007] CSOH 114, 2007 SLT 772, where strict liability had not been relevantly pled, but counsel for the defenders appeared to accept, at para 5(iv), that it would have been possible to argue for strict liability where the natural flow of a stream or watercourse had been artificially obstructed. For commentary, see G D L Cameron, “Interference with Natural Watercourses: Nuisance, Negligence and Strict Liability” (2008) 12 EdinLR 105. 242 1985 SC (HL) 17 per Lord Fraser at 42. 243 G D L Cameron “Strict Liability and the Rule in Caledonian Railway Co v Greenock Corporation” 2000 SLPQ 356; Whitty, “Nuisance” para 108. 244 See paras 22.42–22.46 above. For further discussion, see M P Gatica Rodríguez, Fault-based and Strict Liability in the Law of Neighbours (Studies in Scots Law vol 13, 2022) paras 8.43–8.74.

22.52

874   The Law of Delict in Scotland

E. TITLE TO SUE 22.53

22.54

Nuisance being about the use and enjoyment of land, a right of action has in the past been restricted to those who have title to the affected property as owners or as tenants.245 Even in cases where the owners are not in possession, they may interdict a nuisance that affects,246 or threatens to affect,247 the use and enjoyment of their property by themselves or others, notwithstanding that the owners themselves may suffer no personal discomfort thereby.248 Tenants likewise have title to protect their enjoyment of the subjects leased,249 and an action by tenants is competent even when it is the landlord who has caused the disturbance from a neighbouring property.250 English law similarly has traditionally restricted the right of action to owners and tenants, excluding members of the householder’s family or friends who simply happened to be living in the property as the time when the nuisance occurred.251 Whitty has suggested that a nuisance may “possibly” be actionable insofar as it disturbs the possession of a “non-entitled spouse” with occupancy rights in the affected property in terms of the Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981, but there has been no case law in point and the position as regards the equivalent English provisions remains doubtful.252 The English High Court has in one instance253 accepted the argument that, if Article 8 and Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR afford 245 There is limited authority to indicate that those who happen to be in “possession” may also be so entitled, but it is doubtful whether this would be followed: see Whitty, “Nuisance” para 134; Neilson v Waterstone (1823) 2 S 259; Shanlin v Collins 1973 SLT (Sh Ct) 21 (in which no challenge was made to the spouse of the owner joining in the action). 246 Fleming v Ure (1750) Mor 13159; Adam v Alloa Police Commissioners (1874) 2 R 143; Fleming v Gemmill 1908 SC 340; Canmore Housing Association Ltd v Bairnsfather 2004 SLT 673. See also Scott v Leith Police Commissioners (1830) 2 R 143 (trustee for creditors seeking interdict of nuisance affecting land that had belonged to the bankrupt). 247 Harvie v Robertson (1903) 5 F 338. 248 M’Ewen v Steedman & M’Alister 1912 SC 156. For the corresponding liability of landlords for the nuisances of their tenants, see para 22.63 below. 249 Chalmers v William Dixon Ltd (1876) 3 R 461; Hand v North of Scotland Water Authority 2002 SLT 798. 250 Laurent v Lord Advocate (1869) 7 M 607. 251 See Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655, disallowing claims by relatives, acquaintances, and lodgers of the householders (and overruling Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727 in which it had been accepted that the daughter of the householder was permitted to invoke the tort of private nuisance). 252 Whitty, “Nuisance” para 134. In this connection see the Family Law Act 1996 s 30 in England and Wales, which confers “home rights” on spouses without a proprietary interest in a matrimonial home in which the other spouse has a proprietary interest. It remains a moot point whether such “home rights” provide sufficient possessory interest to allow the non-entitled spouse to claim in nuisance: see J Murphy, The Law of Nuisance (2010) paras 4.20–4.24. 253 McKenna v British Aluminium [2002] Env LR 30 per Neuberger J at paras 52–53. See also Khatun v UK (1998) 26 EHRR CD212, in which the European Court of Human Rights rejected applications brought by the unsuccessful plaintiffs in Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655. The Court was unable to find that a fair balance had not been struck in that case between public interest and private right, but at the same time it noted that “The Commission considers that Article 8(1) applies to all the applicants in the present case whether they are the owners of the property or merely occupiers living on the property, for example the children of the owner of the property.”

Nuisance  875

individuals protection for their “home” and “possessions”, then title to sue under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher should not be restricted to those with proprietary rights. This reasoning has not been further developed in English case law. North of the border judicial consideration has not yet been given to whether the requirement that the courts, as public authorities, should act compatibly with Convention rights254 means that title to sue in common law nuisance should be similarly extended. On the other hand, whatever the limits on title to sue in common law nuisance, section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 may provide a remedy to occupiers of property who are neither owners nor tenants but whose enjoyment of their home has been impaired by the conduct of a public authority, to an extent that is incompatible with Article 8 ECHR. A right of action under the 1998 Act is not contingent on formal title.255 Damages may be awarded if the court is satisfied that this is necessary to afford just satisfaction to the person affected.256 However, all the surrounding circumstances must be taken into consideration in determining whether an award is necessary. This means that the court will take into account whether related persons as owners or tenants of the property have recovered damages in nuisance. If they have already done so, it is possible that just satisfaction under Article 8 may not require a further award to be made to the pursuer.257

22.55

F. LIABILITY FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS (1) Introduction As discussed in chapter 3, employers are not as a general rule held liable for the wrongdoing of independent contractors whom they instruct to carry out work on their behalf.258 However, the law of nuisance admits exceptions to this rule. In certain circumstances proprietors undertaking operations likely to damage neighbouring property do not avoid liability by engaging contractors to carry out the necessary work.259 The English strict-liability rule deriving from Rylands v Fletcher was discussed earlier in the chapter.260 Its practical consequence was that an

254 255 256 257 258 259

Human Rights Act 1998 s 6(3). Dobson v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 28, [2009] HRLR 19. Human Rights Act 1998 s 8. Dobson v Thames Water Utilities [2009] EWCA Civ 28, [2009] HRLR 19. See para 3.02 above. Stewart v Malik [2009] CSIH 5, 2009 SC 265 per Lord President Hamilton at para 26; see also Powrie Castle Properties Ltd v Dundee City Council 2001 SCLR 146 per Sheriff Principal Dunlop at 149; Cameron v Fraser (1881) 9 R 26; Hamilton v Wahla 1999 Rep LR 118; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Scottish Ministers [2016] CSOH 15, 2016 SCLR 539 per Lord Tyre at para 23. For the position of subcontractors, see MTM Construction Ltd v William Reid Engineering Ltd 1998 SLT 211. 260 Paras 22.05–22.07.

22.56

22.57

876   The Law of Delict in Scotland

22.58

aggrieved neighbour was entitled to claim against the proprietor who instructed the offending works, rather than only against the contractor who carried them out. But a decade later, another doctrine came to the fore in England, which addressed more directly the mischief remedied in Rylands and so had the effect of marginalising it. The decision in Bower v Peate261 imposed a direct duty on a proprietor undertaking an operation attended with risk to neighbouring property, notwithstanding that an independent contractor was engaged to carry out the work, and so the proprietor was liable if the risk eventuated. This recognition of duty on the part of those instructing contractors was an important parallel development in the regime of liability for dangerous activities, and in England has overtaken the marginalised Rylands v Fletcher rule in its practical importance. However, while in England the rules on independent contractors coexist with a framework of liability in the law of nuisance still considered to be strict,262 in Scotland they must function alongside a system that is declared to be based on fault. The tension between strict and fault-based liability underlies continuing uncertainty as regards the scope of the independent contractors rule. So far as the English law of nuisance is concerned,263 it remains unsettled whether liability for work by contractors is: (i) cast broadly, as relating to operations “from which, in the natural course of things, injurious consequences to [the defendant’s] neighbour must be expected to arise”;264 or (ii) imposed on proprietors only where hazardous operations involve “special danger”.265 In Scotland the Inner House has reserved its judgment on whether acceptance of English authority in this field is “well founded”,266 but in any event a distinctive Scottish approach can be traced in recent nuisance cases.

(2) The basis of fault: two variants 22.59

In the modern case law the starting point for analysis is usually taken267 to be a dictum by Lord Jauncey in the Outer House case of Noble’s Trustees 261 (1876) 1 QBD 321 per Cockburn CJ at 326: “a man who orders a work to be executed, from which, in the natural course of things, injurious consequences to his neighbour must be expected to arise, unless means are adopted by which such consequences may be prevented, is bound to see to the doing of that which is necessary to prevent the mischief, and cannot relieve himself of his responsibility by employing some one else – whether it be the contractor employed to do the work from which the danger arises or some independent person – to do what is necessary to prevent the act he has ordered to be done from becoming wrongful.” 262 For discussion see Murphy, Nuisance paras 2.43–2.50. 263 See Murphy, Nuisance para 4.42. 264 Bower v Peate (1876) 1 QBD 321 per Cockburn CJ at 326. 265 As in Matania v The National Provincial Bank Ltd and The Elevenist Syndicate Ltd [1936] 2 All ER 633 per Slesser LJ at 645–646. 266 Stewart v Malik [2009] CSIH 5, 2009 SC 265 per Lord President Hamilton at para 22. 267 E.g., in Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd 1996 SC 95; Powrie Castle Properties Ltd v Dundee City Council 2001 SCLR 146; Crolla v Hussain 2008 SLT (Sh Ct) 145; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Scottish Ministers [2016] CSOH 15, 2016 SCLR 539.

Nuisance  877

v Economic Forestry (Scotland) Ltd in 1988. The pursuers alleged that the construction of a dirt road by the defenders’ contractors upstream from the pursuers’ property had caused sand, silt and gravel to wash into the nearby river, causing damage to their land. Lord Jauncey held that liability did not arise, because the pursuers had made no averments that the forestry operations instructed by the defenders were inherently dangerous, or that they were likely to be conducted in a way which would require particular precautions to be taken against damage to others. Lord Jauncey explained the framework of liability in such cases as follows:268 “A landowner will be liable to his neighbour if he carries out operations on his land which will or are likely to cause damage to his neighbour’s land however much care is exercised. Similarly will a landowner be liable in respect of carrying out operations, either at his own hand or at the hand of the contractor, if it is necessary to take steps in the carrying out of those operations to prevent damage to a neighbour, and he, the landlord, does not take or instruct those steps. In the former case the landowner’s culpa lies in the actual carrying out of his operations in the knowledge actual or implied of their likely consequences. In the latter case culpa lies in not taking steps to avoid consequences which he should have foreseen would be likely to flow from one method of carrying out the operation.”

As explained by Lord Jauncey, this framework is one of direct, not vicarious, liability, and his insistence that it is based upon the personal fault of the proprietor is in keeping with the decision in RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council,269 issued a short time previously. The two central elements are knowledge270 and risk.271 If actual knowledge on the part of the defender is difficult to establish, as it will be in most contexts, the pursuer must be able to aver circumstances from which the requisite constructive knowledge can be inferred.272 There is no fault, and liability does not arise, where there is nothing to suggest that the proprietor was aware, or ought to have been aware, that the works instructed were attended with risk to neighbouring proprietors.273 The two variants suggested by Lord Jauncey in the passage quoted above are readily accommodated within a fault-based analysis. In Lord Jauncey’s first variant, liability arises where it can be shown that proprietors embarked 268 1988 SLT 662 at 664 (emphasis added), under reference to Bower v Peate (1876) 1 QBD 321. 269 1985 SC (HL) 17. 270 See also, on the importance of knowledge, Gourock Ropework Co Ltd v Greenock Corporation 1966 SLT 125; Powrie Castle Properties Ltd v Dundee City Council 2001 SCLR 146. 271 See GA Estates Ltd v Caviapen Trustees Ltd 1993 SLT 1037 per Lord Coulsfield at 1042 (relevant case made where the pursuers were “aware of the character of the risk”). 272 See Morris Amusements Ltd v Glasgow City Council [2009] CSOH 84, 2009 SLT 697 per Lord Emslie at para 46. 273 Borders Regional Council v Roxburgh District Council 1989 SLT 837.

22.60

878   The Law of Delict in Scotland

upon operations on their land which they knew, or ought to have known, were “likely” to cause damage to neighbours. There is no specific requirement that the likelihood should be of “abnormal” danger or damage, of the type discussed in Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd.274 However, fault can readily be made out, in that a proprietor in such circumstances may be taken to have intended harm, or, at the very least, to have been reckless as to its likelihood. In the second variant, proprietors knew, or ought to have known, that damage was a likely consequence without precautions being taken, which meant that they were obliged either to attend to those precautions themselves, or to ensure that their contractors did so. In those circumstances similarly, fault, in the form of intention or recklessness, can be imputed to their embarking upon works regardless.

(3) Proprietors implementing “reasonable precautions”: a third variant? 22.61

But what of proprietors who instruct contractors to carry out work which they know is likely to cause harm unless precautions are taken, but who do implement precautions, or instruct contractors to implement precautions, which they reasonably believe will be adequate to prevent eventuation of the risk? Their status is unclear where damage results. Such cases do not fit within Lord Jauncey’s first variant if they are “likely to cause damage” only if care is not exercised. On the other hand, they do not match the second variant, in that steps were taken to prevent damage. There would no doubt be a heavy onus on proprietors to show that they have informed themselves as to the efficacy of possible precautions, but if harm occurred despite due precautions, such proprietors might argue, on the basis of Lord Jauncey’s analysis, that they were not at fault, because they could not reasonably have foreseen that harm was “likely to flow from one method of carrying out the operation”. Indeed, in Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Scottish Ministers, Lord Tyre’s analysis of Lord Jauncey’s second variant excluded circumstances where “reasonable precautions [were taken] when carrying out a hazardous operation to prevent a risk of damage or injury from eventuating”.275 It is arguable, therefore, that a third set of circumstances is possible, in which the proprietor has instructed a contractor in an operation where harm was likely to occur if precautions were not taken, where precautions were taken that were reasonably believed to be adequate to the risk, but where harm occurred nevertheless. Such proprietors cannot, therefore, be regarded as having been at fault on Lord Jauncey’s analysis. 274 See paras 22.42–22.46. 275 [2016] CSOH 15, 2016 SCLR 539 at para 23. Lord Tyre added that “The reasonableness of the steps taken specifically to avoid damage to neighbouring land is to be assessed at the time when the operation was undertaken, and not with the benefit of hindsight after damage or injury has occurred.”

Nuisance  879

A possible alternative argument where the operations in question carry a “special risk of abnormal damage”; then the conduct of a proprietor in undertaking the operations, may, whatever precautions were taken, fall within final (and anomalous) category of “fault” as set out in Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd, which, as argued above, functions much as strict liability.276

(4) “Casual negligence” of contractors Proprietors are not liable where the damage suffered by neighbours was due to the “casual” or “collateral” negligence of the contractors in carrying out work on the proprietors’ land.277 Negligence comes within this category where it does not arise as incidental to a risk inherent in the nature of the work that the contractor was instructed to perform.278

22.62

G. LIABILITY OF LANDLORDS Where operations creating intolerable levels of disturbance have been undertaken or instructed by tenants, it is proper to bring interdict proceedings against the landlord also, as the party having the “permanent interest” in the subjects let.279 Liability in damages, however, is contingent upon the terms of the lease. A landlord will be jointly liable with the tenant in damages if the lease expressly sanctions the nuisance-making activity, or if the occupation of the subjects as envisaged in the lease is such as would ordinarily create a nuisance.280 In Coventry v Lawrence (No 2),281 by contrast, the landlords were held not to be liable, even although they were aware that the premises were to be used as a stadium and race track, because these activities might properly have taken place without undue disturbance, and indeed had been carried out there in the past without giving rise to nuisance. Moreover, it is not enough that a landlord has become aware of the nuisance and has taken no steps to prevent it.282 A landlord is not necessarily regarded as having participated in a nuisance merely by a failure to prevent a tenant from causing a nuisance which was

276 See paras 22.44–22.45. 277 Powrie Castle Properties Ltd v Dundee City Council 2001 SCLR 146 per Sheriff Principal Dunlop at 149. 278 For an example of “collateral negligence”, see Padbury v Holliday and Greenwood Ltd (1912) 28 TLR 494, in which an employee of subcontractors allowed a tool to drop from a window-ledge at a building site operated by the defendants, injuring a passer-by. 279 Dunn v Hamilton (1837) 15 S 853 per Lord Gillies at 871; see also H Burn Murdoch, Interdict in the Law of Scotland (1933) 69–70. 280 Dunn v Hamilton (1838) 3 S & McL 356 at 378–379; Fleming v Gemmill 1908 SC 340. But cf Henderson and Thomson v Stewart (1818) Hume 522; see also Tetley v Chitty [1986] 1 All ER 663 (go-kart track). 281 [2014] UKSC 46, [2015] AC 106. 282 Coventry v Lawrence No 2 [2014] UKSC 46, [2015] AC 106.

22.63

880   The Law of Delict in Scotland

not anticipated in the lease.283 In Hussain v Lancaster City Council, local authority landlords were held not to be liable for the racial harassment and vandalism suffered by shopkeepers at the hands of tenants on a Councilowned housing estate.284 There was no question of the Council expressly authorising such behaviour and it was not a necessary consequence of letting the homes to the culprits.

H. DEFENCES (1) Statutory authority 22.64

22.65

It is a defence to an action in nuisance that the defender – typically a public authority – was authorised by statute to carry out operations which had the disturbance in question as their necessary consequence. Careful construction of the statute is needed in order to determine whether the disputed works come within the authority conferred. The defence is available where the statute expressly authorised the nuisance, or alternatively if the creation of a nuisance was an inevitable consequence of operations expressly authorised. In the leading case of Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd,285 for example, a private Act of Parliament286 had conferred authority upon the defendants to acquire a designated site for the construction of an oil refinery and for purposes ancillary thereto, although, rather surprisingly, it made no specific provision for the operation of the refinery at the site thereafter. Nonetheless, as a matter of statutory construction, the Act was regarded as providing a defence in relation to nuisances such as smell, noise and vibration to the extent that these could be shown to be the “inevitable result” of erecting a refinery upon the site, however carefully operated.287 The onus of proving that such nuisance was inevitable rested with the defendants. The possibility of a remedy in nuisance remained only to the extent that the alleged nuisance-making operations exceeded those for which the statute conferred immunity.288 Moreover, no immunity would be provided where the defendants acted without reasonable care and diligence, even if the operations in question were authorised in principle.289 On the other hand, where the statute gives a measure of discretion as to how a particular operation is to be accomplished, care should be taken to avoid disturbance to neighbours as far as possible. In Metropolitan Asylum

Coventry v Lawrence No 2 [2014] UKSC 46, [2015] AC 106. [2000] QB 1. [1981] AC 1001. Gulf Oil Refining Act 1965. Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd [1981] AC 1001 per Lord Wilberforce at 1014; see also Manchester Corporation v Farmworth [1930] AC 171 per Viscount Dunedin at 183. 288 Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd [1981] AC 1001 per Lord Wilberforce at 1014. 289 See also Rae v Musselburgh Town Council 1973 SC 291. 283 284 285 286 287

Nuisance  881

District Managers v Hill,290 for example, the statute in question authorised the defendants to institute asylums for the care of the sick, and to acquire land and construct buildings for that purpose. Local residents subsequently complained that a smallpox hospital sited in a populated area constituted a nuisance. The defence of statutory authority was rejected because the defendants should have exercised its discretion to locate the hospital in such a way that no nuisance was created. Liability in nuisance, however, is not strict, as already seen,291 and so no damages are due in the absence of fault. Thus even where a statute makes specific provision for liability in nuisance to be preserved, the defence of statutory authority may be maintained if the defender was acting without fault and pursuant to a duty to carry out the operation in question.292 In Tontine Hotel (Greenock) Ltd v Greenock Corporation,293 the defenders were empowered by statute to construct such sewers as they considered necessary within their district. Although, under the legislation, they were to “cause their sewers to be so constructed, maintained, kept and cleansed as not to be a nuisance”,294 this was read not as an absolute duty but only as “a duty to take reasonable care”.295 Liability could not therefore be established in the absence of proof of negligence, despite several episodes of flooding of the pursuers’ premises.296 Even where the statutory authority defence is successfully invoked in relation to nuisance, the door is not closed to a direct action under the Human Rights Act 1998, alleging breach of the pursuer’s rights under Article 8 ECHR by a public authority. As noted below,297 however, Article 8 is not couched in absolute terms. In considering whether it has been infringed, the court will consider whether the defender has struck a fair balance between individual and community interests in performing its statutory functions. English case law thus far suggests a reluctance to interfere in locally-made decisions in these matters.

22.66

(2) Prescription The Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 makes no express provision for nuisance, and it is unlikely that any right to create a nuisance could be established by positive prescription. While section 3 of the Act refers to positive servitudes over land, and the category of existing positive

290 291 292 293 294 295 296

(1881) 6 App Cas 193. See paras 22.35ff above. Department of Transport v North West Water Authority [1984] AC 336 per Lord Fraser at 359. 1967 SLT 180. As per the Public Health (Scotland) Act 1897 s 103. 1967 SLT 180 per Lord Fraser at 184. See also Rae v Musselburgh Town Council 1973 SC 291; RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council 1985 SC (HL) 17. 297 See para 22.74 below.

22.67

882   The Law of Delict in Scotland

22.68

servitudes may sometimes be extended,298 the prevailing view is that a servitude right to create a nuisance, such as excessive noise etc, would not be recognised.299 It appears, therefore, that the question of positive prescription does not arise in relation to nuisance.300 Negative prescription, on the other hand, may come into play, extinguishing rights to restrain an ongoing nuisance or to exact reparation from the nuisance-maker.301 The period is twenty years in relation to the former but only five in relation to the latter.302 On one view, an ongoing nuisance is a nuisance that is continuously reborn, and hence the prescriptive clock is continuously restarting.303 The result would be that prescription could never run. Such a view seems implausible. There is much instead to be said for Johnston’s suggestion: (i) that ordinarily prescription begins to run from the first moment the nuisance occurs; but (ii) that the prescriptive period restarts if the nuisance increases or if a fresh harm is initiated.304 Even viewed in this way, however, prescription is unlikely to assist a defender in many cases. A neighbour would have to be remarkably complacent, and tardy, to wait twenty years before initiating proceedings; but if such a long delay were to occur, the defender would be left with the task of demonstrating, as a matter of historical fact, that the alleged nuisance was ongoing at a level which was constant and exceeded what was plus quam tolerabile throughout the whole of the twenty-year period.

298 W M Gordon and S Wortley, Scottish Land Law, 3rd edn, vol II (2020) paras 25–25 to 25–31. See e.g. Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42, 2008 SC (HL) 1; see also Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 s 76, applying to servitudes created in writing and by registration after 28 November 2004, and abolishing the rule that they must be of a “known type”. 299 D J Cusine and R R M Paisley, Servitudes and Rights of Way (1998) para 3.39, arguing that noise “arises directly from personal behaviour” and cannot therefore be “made into a real right”; although see Harvie v Robertson (1903) 5 R 338 per Lord Kinnear at 344, referring to the defender establishing “a prescriptive right to use his own property in the way he is using it now”. Cf English law in which it is possible in principle for a proprietor to acquire by prescription an easement to carry on an activity causing a disturbance which would otherwise constitute an actionable nuisance: Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] AC 822. 300 Note, however, that Hume, Lectures III, 216 declared that even the most “noisome and unwholesome” uses might become lawful “by long usage”. 301 See N R Whitty, “Nuisance”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) para 123. On negative prescription in this context, see Harvie v Robertson (1903) 5 R 338 per Lord President Balfour at 343. 302 Respectively s 7 and s 6 of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973. Notwithstanding the view expressed in Webster v Lord Advocate 1985 SC 173, the relevant provision in respect of an ongoing nuisance is s 7 and not s 8 (although the period of prescription is in any event the same under the two provisions): for discussion, see D Johnston, Prescription and Limitation, 2nd edn (2012) para 7.14(2). 303 See Stevenson v Pontifex & Wood (1887) 15 R 125 per Lord President Inglis at 129 observing: “he who commits the nuisance is under a constant legal obligation to abate it, and so long as he fails in performing that legal obligation he is every day committing a fresh nuisance”. 304 Johnston, Prescription and Limitation para 7.14(2). See also Harvie v Robertson (1903) 5 R 338 (which was cited as mirroring South African law in R G McKerron, The Law of Delict, 7th edn (1971) 233).

Nuisance  883

In practice, acquiescence is likely to be a more promising defence than negative prescription.305 These difficulties do not affect the right to exact reparation, which is typically a response to a one-off act. Here the prescriptive clock begins to run as at the date when the right became enforceable, which is the date when the loss, injury or damage occurred.306 Where, however, the damage occurred as a result of a continuing operation, prescription begins to run from the date when the continuing “act, neglect or default” ceased.307 Once prescription has started to run, the right to reparation, and the corresponding obligation to pay damages,308 are extinguished after five years309 unless prescription is interrupted, for example by the raising of proceedings.

22.69

(3) “Coming to the nuisance” It is no defence that the pursuer has “come” to the nuisance, even where the pursuer has moved to the area in the knowledge that the defender was already carrying out the activity to which objection is now being made.310 Yet, although this rule is well-established,311 its justification is not clearcut. When, in former times, public law controls on urban development were still weak, the rule served to expand the scope of private law nuisance, by preventing nuisance-makers from compromising indefinitely the enjoyment of land that was not their own. Nowadays, though, it can appear unjust.312 Indeed other jurisdictions do not recognise it as an absolute rule, but as one of the factors to be taken into account alongside assessment of the nature of the locality.313 Where the pursuer made itself vulnerable to disturbance by building upon or changing the use of the land after coming to the property, it is arguable that a defence might be made out if: (i) the nuisance was of a type that only affected the senses of those on the pursuer’s land; (ii) it was not a 305 306 307 308 309

310

311 312 313

See para 22.72 below. Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 s 11(1). s 11(2). s 15(2). There is a faint argument that the five-year prescription of s 6 is excluded by Sch 1 para 2(e) on the basis that the obligation to pay damages is an “obligation relating to land”, but Johnston, Prescription and Limitation paras 6.61 and 6.62 is correct to reject the argument. As in Miller v Stein (1791) Mor 12823; Fleming v Hislop (1886) 13 R (HL) 43 per Lord Halsbury at 49; Webster v Lord Advocate 1985 SC 173 (in which counsel were agreed that the fact that an alleged nuisance was already in existence at the date when the pursuer came to it could not preclude her from seeking interdict). See also, in English law, Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] AC 822 per Lord Neuberger at para 52: since “nuisance is a property-based tort . . . the right to allege a nuisance should . . . run with the land”. See Whitty, “Nuisance” para 132 n 1. See A Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance (2013) 59. See e.g. A J van der Walt, The Law of Neighbours (2010) para 6.2.5, discussing South African law, also noting Dutch and German law; Dobbs, Law of Torts § 401, on US law.

22.70

22.71

884   The Law of Delict in Scotland

nuisance before the pursuer’s change of use; (iii) it constituted a “reasonable and otherwise lawful use of the defender’s land”; (iv) it was carried out “in a reasonable way”; and (v) it caused no greater nuisance than when the pursuer first changed the use.314

(4) Acquiescence 22.72

Acquiescence may bar later objection. This potentially occurs where a neighbour expressly consented, or failed to object given reasonable opportunity, at the point when the defender initiated a potentially offensive use of its property.315 Moreover, where the pursuer had expressly indicated willingness to accept a specific risk to its property, no action will lie following the defenders’ negligent failure to avert that danger.316

I. THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY DEFENDERS 22.73

22.74

The Human Rights Act 1998, section 6, makes it unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a right enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, and section 7 offers proprietors the opportunity to bring proceedings directly against public authorities which have so acted. Damages may be awarded if the court is satisfied that this is necessary to afford just satisfaction to the person affected.317 In the neighbourhood context, the rights likely to be put at issue are those arising under Article 8, protecting the right of individuals to enjoy their home, or under Article 1 of the First Protocol, protecting peaceful enjoyment of possessions. An interference with the comfortable enjoyment of property that exceeds what is reasonably tolerable prima facie represents a violation of both provisions.318 For such cases a direct remedy under the 1998 Act is, therefore, an alternative to the remedies available under the common law of nuisance, where the harm suffered by the pursuer is attributable to the activities of a public authority. Convention rights, however, are not absolute. In determining whether a public authority has acted unlawfully in terms of the 1998 Act, private right must be balanced against public interest. The public interest requires an even-handed balancing not just of one proprietor’s claim against the other’s, but against the needs of the community more generally.319 Article 8 expressly Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] AC 822 per Lord Neuberger at para 56. E C Reid and J W G Blackie, Personal Bar (2006) paras 18–13 to 18–17. See comments by Megaw LJ in Leakey v National Trust [1980] QB 485 at 515. Human Rights Act 1998 s 8. Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2003] UKHL 66, [2004] 2 AC 42 per Lord Nicholls at para 37. 319 Arscott v The Coal Authority [2004] EWCA Civ 892, [2005] Env LR 6 per Laws LJ at para 46.

314 315 316 317 318

Nuisance  885

provides for the possibility that respect for the individual’s home might require to be tempered by community interests such as “public safety”, “economic well-being”, “protection of health” or the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. The essential enquiry in such cases, as stated by the European Court of Human Rights, is “whether a fair balance was struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights”.320 As discussed below, the English courts have been reluctant to disturb the assessments made by public authorities in balancing the competing needs of the communities which they serve. The European Court of Human Rights, similarly, has typically allowed a wide margin of appreciation to member states and has only exceptionally interfered with locally-made decisions of this nature.321 An example of this balancing exercise is found in the leading English case of Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd.322 The claimant brought an action for damages against a sewerage authority after his garden had flooded on numerous occasions due to overloading of the local sewerage system. The problem arose not because of positive action by the water authority but because too many users had been added to the sewerage network over the years and the system could not cope with the level of usage. At first instance and in the Court of Appeal it was held that the defendant’s failure to remedy the repeated flooding of the claimant’s property constituted an interference with the exercise of his rights under Article 8, and that he had thereby been deprived of the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions contrary to Article 1 of the First Protocol. The House of Lords, however, considered this prima facie infringement of his Convention rights against the background of the statutory framework within which the public authority was operating. This included a mechanism for customer complaints to be directed to an independent regulator, whose decisions were in turn subject to judicial review. The claimant had not availed himself of this procedure. In their Lordships’ analysis, this statutory framework provided an appropriate means to prioritise individual customer demands against the needs of users of the sewerage network generally. Given that adequate safeguards were thus in place for individual consumer interests, the defendants were judged not to have been acting incompatibly with the claimant’s Convention rights.323 Of particular significance in Marcic was the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights in Hatton v United Kingdom,324 a case in which the

320 Sporrong & Lonnroth v Sweden (A/52) (1983) 5 EHRR 35 at para 69. 321 See Buckley v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 101. 322 [2003] UKHL 66, [2004] 2 AC 42. 323 [2003] UKHL 66, [2004] 2 AC 42 per Lord Nicholls at paras 42–43 and Lord Hoffmann at para 71. 324 (2003) 37 EHRR 28, cited in Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2003] UKHL 66, [2004] 2 AC 42 per Lord Nicholls at para 41 and Lord Hoffmann at para 71.

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applicants, who lived near Heathrow Airport, argued that UK Government policy on quotas for night flights violated their rights under Article 8. In Hatton the Grand Chamber did not confine itself to ascertaining whether a suitable framework was in place for adjudicating competing interests, but considered in some detail whether in the given circumstances a fair balance had been struck between individual and community interests.325 In determining that there had been no violation of Article 8, the court emphasised the “fundamentally subsidiary role of the Convention”, and in doing so acknowledged that national authorities were usually better placed than the courts to evaluate local needs and conditions: “In matters of general policy, on which opinions within a democratic society may reasonably differ widely, the role of the domestic policy maker should be given special weight.”326 The greater the public interest, the greater the expectation that the individual can be expected to tolerate some degree of disturbance.327 However, public interest does not trump private right in all cases, and an activity which is of overall public benefit does not confer immunity from claims under Article 8.328 In Dennis v Ministry of Defence,329 the complaint related to aircraft noise from a military airbase. Although it was clearly in the public interest for the training of military pilots to continue, the court considered that it was disproportionate to give effect to that interest without compensation to the individuals who suffered highly intrusive levels of noise and vibration as a consequence. The defender’s activities were deemed to constitute a common law nuisance, and a claim under the Human Rights Act 1998 was also stated to be relevant.330 The high public value of the defendant’s activities persuaded the court that it should exercise its equitable discretion to refuse an injunction, and to award substantial damages to the claimants in lieu.331 Typically a claim under the Human Rights Act 1998 for infringement of Article 8 and of Article 1 of the First Protocol is made in tandem with a claim under common law nuisance. However, it is unlikely that any award 325 (2003) 37 EHRR 28 at paras 122–129, looking at the economic arguments for night flights as against the measurements of disturbance to local residents. 326 (2003) 37 EHRR 28 at para 97. 327 See Dennis v Ministry of Defence [2003] EWHC 793 (QB), [2003] Env LR 34 per Buckley J at para 46. 328 Dennis v Ministry of Defence [2003] EWHC 793 (QB), [2003] Env LR 34; see also Andrews v Reading Borough Council [2005] EWHC 256 (QB), [2006] RVR 56. 329 [2003] EWHC 793 (QB), [2003] Env LR 34. 330 [2003] EWHC 793 (QB), [2003] Env LR 34 per Buckley J at para 92. Contrast the Scottish case of King v Lord Advocate [2005] CSOH 169 in which the disturbance from low-flying military aircraft was not proved to have reached actionable levels, and in which Lord Pentland, at para 17, therefore saw no need to express a view on the defence of “public utility” and “whether the approach taken by Buckley J in Dennis v Ministry of Defence towards the interaction of the common law of nuisance with Human Rights considerations should be followed in Scotland”. 331 This course of action is apparently not open to the Scottish courts: see paras 22.29–22.31 above.

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for infringement of Convention rights would exceed the amount of damages at common law. Moreover, the award of damages at common law to a property owner would normally be considered as “just satisfaction” for the purposes of section 8 of the 1998 Act, so that no additional award of compensation would be necessary under that head.332

J. AEMULATIO VICINI The doctrine of aemulatio vicini (spite towards one’s neighbour)333 means that conduct by landowners, even if lawful in itself, is unlawful if it is carried out predominantly for the purpose of causing detriment or annoyance to a neighbour.334 It can thus be understood as a restricted form of the general doctrine of abuse of rights, which is found in civilian legal systems and in modern civil codes.335 Although its role has always been a marginal one,336 aemulatio vicini has a long history in Scots law.337 Its first appearance is commonly attributed to a line of cases concerning fairs or markets beginning in the early seventeenth century,338 but it occurred more typically in the neighbourhood context, such as water disputes in a rural setting and disputes over light in towns and cities.339 There is ample discussion of both contexts, but particularly of the latter, in Institutional writings.340 The doctrine was usefully summarised by Bell as an application of the law of “neighbourhood”, to the effect that “no 332 Dobson v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 28, [2009] HRLR 19 per Waller LJ at para 52. 333 N R Whitty, “Nuisance”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) para 8. 334 For discussion, see Whitty, “Nuisance” paras 33–36; E Reid, “Strange Gods in the Twenty-First Century: the Doctrine of Aemulatio Vicini”, in E Reid and D L Carey Miller (eds), A Mixed Legal System in Transition: T B Smith and the Progress of Scots Law (Edinburgh Studies in Law vol 1, 2005) 239. 335 The Civilian doctrine of abuse of rights applies across private law to contexts including landlord and tenant, contract and family law. For further detail, see J E Scholtens, “Abuse of Rights” (1958) 75 South African Law Journal 39; E Reid, “Abuse of Rights in Scots Law” (1998) 2 EdinLR 129. 336 See Reid “Strange Gods in the Twenty-First Century: the Doctrine of Aemulatio Vicini”. 337 See Whitty, “Nuisance” para 8; D Johnson, “Owners and Neighbours: from Rome to Scotland”, in R Evans-Jones (ed), The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland (Stair Society sup vol 2, 1995) 176. 338 H McKechnie, “Delict and Quasi Delict”, in G C H Paton (ed), An Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Stair Society vol 20, 1958) 265 at 272. See e.g. Falconer v Glenbervie (1642) Mor 4146; Farquharson v Earl of Aboyn (1679) Mor 4147. See also Martin v Thomson 16 June 1818 FC; Weir v Aiton (1858) 20 D 968 (right of ferry). 339 E.g. Anderson v Blackwood (1629) Mor 8033; Town of Berwick v Scot of Haining (1661) 2 Bro Sup 292; Fairly v Earl of Eglinton (1744) Mor 12780; Trotter v Hume (1757) Mor 12798; Dewar v Fraser (1767) Mor 12803; Kelso v Boyds (1768) Mor 12807; Ralston v Pettigrew (1768) Mor 12808. For a detailed survey, see Whitty, “Nuisance” para 8 nn 2 and 3. 340 Bankton, Inst 1.10.40, 2.7.15, and 4.45.112; Erskine, Inst 2.1.2; Lord Kames, Principles of Equity, 3rd edn (1778, reprinted as Old Studies in Scots Law vol 4, 2013) vol 1, 55–57; Hume, Lectures III, 207–208.

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one is entitled, even within his own limits, to act wantonly, with the mere purpose of producing inconvenience and loss to his neighbour in aemulationem vicini”.341 Moreover, any objection to a neighbour’s activities might be challenged if it was made in aemulationem vicini.342 Doubt was cast on the doctrine’s continuing validity by an observation made by Lord Watson in the late nineteenth-century English case of Mayor of Bradford, representing the doctrine as having fallen into desuetude in Scots law.343 However, there is now clear recognition that Lord Watson’s denial of the doctrine was “far too widely stated”,344 and “the clear weight of authority is that the doctrine of aemulatio vicini is still part of the law of Scotland in an appropriate case”.345 Thus in More v Boyle,346 for example, the defender had cut off the supply in a water pipe running through his garden and serving his neighbour’s property. Given that there appeared to be no incidental benefit in doing so, the pursuers’ case based upon the defender having acted in aemulationem vicini was held to be relevant. In practice, however, the role of aemulatio vicini is limited. A doctrine which curtails the exercise of otherwise lawful rights solely on the basis of motivation is bound to be narrowly construed. The requirement to demonstrate that malice was the predominant motive for the disputed conduct is a demanding one, and this is unlikely to be met where there is evidence of any benefit, patrimonial or non-patrimonial, to the defender. In consequence, aemulatio vicini is now seen as a residual doctrine, invoked only where there are no other rules that might be more readily applied. This

341 Bell, Principles § 964. Aemulatio is constituted by “mere malice, or at least useful caprice or annoyance”: § 966. 342 Bell, Principles § 966. 343 [1895] AC 587 at 598: “I am aware that the phrase ‘in aemulationem vicini’ was at one time frequently, and is even now occasionally, very loosely used by Scottish lawyers. But I know of no case in which the act of a proprietor has been found to be illegal, or restrained as being in aemulationem, where it was not attended with offence or injury to the legal rights of his neighbour . . . The law of Scotland, if it differs in that, is in all other respects the same with the law of England. No use of property, which would be legal if due to a proper motive, can become illegal because it is prompted by a motive which is improper or even malicious.” 344 Whitty, “Nuisance” para 34. See also A T Glegg, The Law of Reparation in Scotland, 4th edn by J L Duncan (1955) 16; W M Gordon and S Wortley, Scottish Land Law, 3rd edn, vol II (2020) para 28–24. 345 More v Boyle 1967 SLT (Sh Ct) 38 per Sheriff McDonald at 40. See also Campbell v Muir 1908 SC 387 (holding that fishing in such a way as to obstruct the fishing of an immediate neighbour could be actionable as aemulatio vicini); Fothringham v Passmore 1984 SC (HL) 96 (in which the existence of the doctrine was acknowledged). 346 1967 SLT (Sh Ct) 38. But cf Canmore Housing Association Ltd v Bairnsfather 2004 SLT 673, in which the petitioner averred that the respondent had acted in aemulationem vicini, but its counsel at the same time accepted as applicable the entirely contrary dictum by Lord Watson in the English case of Mayor of Bradford v Pickles [1895] AC 587 at 598, as cited above at n 343. As the Lord Ordinary, Lord Brodie, noted, this ruled out a fuller consideration of the doctrine, which was thereby relegated to a subordinate role in assessing malice for the purposes of the law of nuisance.

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means that, although the issue of aemulatio vicini might be raised regarding any malicious use of land, the general law of nuisance is normally the starting point in cases of active intrusions upon the pursuer’s enjoyment of land. The distinctive role for aemulatio vicini remains in those cases where, as in More v Boyle, the pursuer has been deprived of an amenity, such as water or light, and where the law of nuisance would not apply.

K. THE ACTIO DE EFFUSIS VEL DEJECTIS AND THE ACTIO DE POSITIS VEL SUSPENSIS There has been much discussion over the years as to whether two Roman law actions, the actio de effusis vel dejectis and the actio de positis vel suspensis, have been received into Scots law.347 The former was a strict-liability action for reparation348 brought against the householder where a substance or an object had been poured or thrown from a building, thereby causing damage to property or injury to a passer-by. The latter was a penal action, obliging occupiers to remove any object placed on or suspended from a building where it was in danger of falling, but the obligation to pay a financial penalty in the event of non-compliance could also be enforced as an actio popularis.349 Bankton discussed the liability of householders “where anything is thrown over or poured out, from windows of houses, into the street”, indicating that a regime equivalent to the actio de effusis vel dejectis had become part of Scots law, although he provided little detail as to the framework of liability.350 Hume explained similar obligations on the part of “proprietors of houses” in his treatment of “obligations quasi ex delicto”,351 to the effect that, where servants caused damage by throwing objects from windows on to the street, the liability of the householder was based on fault, in the form of “negligence or inadvertency”.352 Modern case law offers no firm guidance on the action’s continuing relevance. In one of the few cases, Gray v Dunlop,353 the child pursuer had been soaked by the contents of a chamber pot emptied 347 For detailed discussion, see P G Stein, “The Actio de Effusis vel Dejectis and the Concept of QuasiDelict in Scots Law” (1955) 4 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 356; W M Gordon, Roman Law, Scots Law and Legal History: Selected Essays (Edinburgh Studies in Law vol 4, 2007) 148. See also McDyer v The Celtic Football and Athletic Co Ltd 2000 SC 379 per Lord President Rodger at 387–390. 348 W W Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law, 3rd edn by P G Stein (1963) 598. 349 Buckland, Textbook of Roman Law 599. 350 Bankton, Inst 1.4.31; see also Kames, Principles of Equity, vol 1, 63–64. For an early form of strict criminal liability imposed by municipal statute on proprietors from whose windows chamberpots were emptied, see H M Milne (ed), The Legal Papers of James Boswell, vol 1 (Stair Society vol 60, 2013) LP28 [219]. 351 Hume, Lectures III, 186ff. On obligations quasi ex delicto, see para 1.18 above. 352 Hume, Lectures III, 188–189 (fault was inferred from their failure to keep better order in their households). 353 1954 SLT (Sh Ct) 75; see also Weston v Incorporation of Tailors of Potterrow (1839) 1 D 1218, in which reference was made to the action but the case was decided on different grounds.

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from a window as he passed by a building in Glasgow. The sheriff-substitute acknowledged that common law liability in nuisance or in negligence might arise in such circumstances if fault were shown on the part of the occupier, but did not recognise the actio de effusis vel dejectis as providing a basis for strict liability in the modern law. The actio de positis vel suspensis was also discussed by Bankton, but with the obvious objection to its reception in Scots law that “no penalty can be due with us without an express statute”.354 A similar stance was taken when, much more recently, in MacColl v Hoo,355 the pursuer argued for strict liability under the actio de positis vel suspensis after her car was damaged by a slate falling from the roof of the pursuer’s house. The sheriff principal pointed out that this action entailed “penal liability and an obligation to take down a thing which might do harm if it fell but no liability in reparation”.356 Of course liability might arise in negligence in such circumstances, and indeed Hume dealt specifically with the “negligence or inadvertency” of householders where parts of buildings collapsed or objects fell from them to the injury of neighbours or passers-by.357 However, in MacColl no fault could be shown since the house was a new one and there was no reason to suspect loose slates. Liability did not therefore arise. The question of the reception of the Roman law actions was the subject of detailed discussion in McDyer v The Celtic Football and Athletic Co Ltd.358 Mr McDyer was injured as a result of a piece of timber falling from the roof of a sports stadium into the seating area below, and the question arose whether strict liability might apply on the basis of the actio de positis vel suspensis. Lord President Rodger’s lengthy discussion of Roman law and Institutional authority found evidence, in Institutional writings and in case law, for assimilation of both of forms of action into Scots law, and the weight of authority seemed to indicate that liability in the modern law was based upon fault. However, Lord Rodger also took the view that liability was relevant only to objects falling outwith the defender’s premises, not hazards occurring within those premises.359 It was not therefore applicable to the case in hand and there was no need to consider the conditions of liability in detail. The liability of the stadium proprietors was instead to be determined in accordance with section 2(1) of the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960. As Gordon observed, “it was not only unfortunate for McDyer but for the clarity of the law that the injury that he suffered

354 Bankton, Inst 1.4.32. 355 1983 SLT (Sh Ct) 23. 356 1983 SLT (Sh Ct) 23 per Sheriff Principal R A Bennett QC at 25. 357 Hume, Lectures III, 186. 358 2000 SC 379. 359 For commentary on that distinction, see T Wallinga, “Effusis vel Deiectis in Rome and Glasgow” (2002) 6 EdinLR 117.

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was suffered when he had already entered the stadium and not as he was entering it”.360 On the assumption that these actions were received into Scots law, it is doubtful that the forms in which they survive entail strict liability. This is in keeping with Hume’s view of liability as based upon negligence, as well as with modern developments within neighbour law – in particular the general rule as stated in RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council361 that liability for damages is based upon fault.362 Indeed if strict liability were to be imposed in relation to objects falling out of buildings, but not for comparable mishaps inside, the practical effect would be that a more generous regime applied to injuries suffered by passers-by as compared with those injured within the premises (in terms of the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960). There are no obvious policy reasons why this should be so. In any event, both contexts leave room for application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,363 so that, where appropriate, fault can readily be established, as accepted in McDyer.

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L. PUBLIC NUISANCE English law divides “private” nuisance from “public” nuisance, which exists as both a crime and a tort.364 Although the importance of the tort has been progressively eroded by public regulation, it still has a function to perform in respect of disturbances that affect a “class of Her Majesty’s subjects”.365 The key element is that a “common injury” should have been suffered “by members of the public by interference with rights enjoyed by them as such”,366 but a right of action is available only where claimants can demonstrate that they have suffered “particular damage” over and above that suffered by the community more generally.367 The ambit of public nuisance, although potentially broad, is in modern English law mainly confined to complaints such as obstructions on or projections over

360 W M Gordon, Roman Law, Scots Law and Legal History: Selected Essays (Edinburgh Studies in Law vol 4, 2007) 163. 361 1985 SC (HL) 17. 362 See para 22.06 above, although cf Walker, Delict 288, to the effect that it was “on the whole submitted that” liability could be attributed without proof of fault. 363 Indeed the classic English case demonstrating the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, Scott v London & St Katherine Docks Co (1865) 3 H & C 596, discussed at para 10.60 above, involved an object falling out of a building. 364 See J Murphy, The Law of Nuisance (2010) ch 7. 365 Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169 per Lord Romer at 184. 366 R v Rimmington [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 AC 459 per Lord Bingham at para 6 (a case involving the criminal offence of public nuisance). 367 See G Kodilinye, “Public Nuisance and Particular Damage in the Modern Law” (1986) 6 Legal Studies 182.

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public thoroughfares.368 Scots law, by contrast, does not recognise a criminal offence of public nuisance. Moreover, while the term “public nuisance” is loosely used, typically where a number of proprietors have been affected, this does not denote a category of civil liability distinct from the general law of nuisance.369

368 See discussion in Murphy, Nuisance paras 1.46–1.49. 369 Bell, Principles § 974; see N R Whitty, “Nuisance”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) para 159.

Chapter 23

Interference with Property Rights

Para A. TRESPASS (1) Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������� 23.01 (2) Interdict��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23.04 (3) Damages: two heads of claim��������������������������������������������� 23.05 (4) Self-help��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23.10 B. ENCROACHMENT��������������������������������������������������������������� 23.11 C. INTERFERENCE WITH SUPPORT������������������������������������� 23.15 (1) Liability based upon fault (a) Adjacent support to land and buildings������������������������ 23.16 (b) Adjacent support by building to building���������������������� 23.18 (c) Support within buildings��������������������������������������������� 23.20 (d) Positive obligation to anticipate collapse of support due to natural causes?�������������������������������������������������� 23.21 (2) Strict liability (a) Subjacent support to land�������������������������������������������� 23.22 (b) Structures built on land relying upon support��������������� 23.28 (c) Statutory compensation in relation to coal mining�������� 23.30 (3) Relationship between support and nuisance����������������������� 23.31 D. TENEMENTS: CONTRIBUTORS TO MAINTENANCE���� 23.32 E. WATER���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23.33 (1) Issues of supply: common interest�������������������������������������� 23.34 (2) Drainage��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23.36

A. TRESPASS (1) Introduction Intrusion upon another’s land has long been recognised as a form of delinquence, bringing with it the obligation to make reparation.1 The term “trespass”, however, is more modern. It did not appear, in this context,   1 For an early source, see the Act of 1555 “Concerning the slaying of wild beasts, wild fowl, hawking and hunting”, RPS A1555/6/26, APS ii, 497 c 25, providing that: “No person [shall] roam in other men’s woods, parks, enclosures within dykes or broom without licence of the owner of the ground, under the pain of refunding of the damage and harm to the parties upon whose corns they walk or ride, or in whose woods, parks, enclosures within dykes or broom they shall happen to roam”.

893

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in the Institutional writings, although straying upon land as an incident of poaching was regarded as a civil wrong,2 and some instances of what today is termed trespass would have been regarded as a form of molestation – the “troubling of possession . . . whereby the party injurer is obliged to refund the damage to the party injured”.3 Remedies for protecting exclusive possession assumed greater importance as more land came to be enclosed.4 Meanwhile, the setting up of the Register of Sasines in 1617 as a public register for deeds relating to land had made the location of boundaries more apparent. By the eighteenth century a significant number of cases were being litigated, and at the same time the terminology of “trespass” began to gain currency.5 In the modern law, trespass is defined as the “temporary or transient intrusion into land which is owned or otherwise lawfully possessed by someone else”.6 In addition to land it may involve expanses of water,7 or airspace to such height as is necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of the land.8 The intrusion may be by animals9 or by things,10 but is most usually by persons.11 In this regard, however, the practical application of the law of trespass has been significantly reduced by the enactment of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, which grants the public at large a right of access over much of Scotland’s open land, regardless of ownership.12 Where land is leased, the landlord and tenant may sue in joint names,13 although a tenant with exclusive use of property is entitled to take action alone.14 There is no right to exclude if the alleged trespasser has the

  2 See Stair, Inst 2.1.33: “men may be hindered to come within the grounds of others” (in the context of pursuit of game). See also Erskine, Inst 2.1.1 to the effect that all “encroachments” upon the right of proprietors found them in an action of damages.  3 Stair, Inst 1.9.28; Erskine, Inst 4.1.48; see also discussion in Hume, Lectures III, 204–207.   4 K McK Norrie, “The Intentional Delicts”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 477 at 508.  5 See e.g. Coutts v Blake (1775) Mor 7375; Marquis of Tweedale v Dalrymple (1778) Mor 4992; Govan v Lang (1794) Mor 10499; Ronaldson v Ballantine (1804) Mor 15270.   6 K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) para 180.   7 J Rankine, The Law of Land-Ownership in Scotland, 4th edn (1909) 139.  8 See Bernstein v Skyviews and General Ltd [1978] QB 479; see also Brown v Lee Constructions Ltd 1977 SLT (Notes) 61. The overflying of land by aircraft at a “reasonable” height is not trespass (Civil Aviation Act 1982 s 76(1)), but the owner of the aircraft is strictly liable in respect of loss or damage caused on the ground by any object, animal or person falling from it (Civil Aviation Act 1982 s 76(2)).  9 Robertson v Wright (1885) 13 R 174; Wilson v Fleming 1970 SLT (Sh Ct) 49. 10 Brown v Lee Constructions Ltd 1977 SLT (Notes) 61. 11 E.g. Brocket Estates Ltd v M’Phee 1949 SLT (Notes) 35. 12 Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 s 5(1) provides that the responsible exercise of access rights does not constitute trespass. The categories of land over which access rights are not exercisable are listed in s 6. For public access rights, see M M Combe, The ScotWays Guide to the Law of Access to Land in Scotland (2018); W M Gordon and S Wortley, Scottish Land Law, 3rd edn, vol II (2020) ch 27. 13 Jolly v Brown (1828) 6 S 872. 14 Merry & Cuninghame v Aitken (1895) 22 R 247; G Cameron, “Land”, in Delict (SULI) para 14.123.

Interference with Property Rights   895

landowner’s express or implied consent to be on the land, or if there is statutory authority for the intrusion.15

(2) Interdict The primary remedy for trespass is interdict,16 although, as in other contexts, interdict is not generally appropriate unless an invasion of the pursuer’s rights is reasonably apprehended, and there is evidence of the defender’s intention to trespass.17 A mere assertion by the defender of a right to enter the pursuer’s land is not of itself sufficient to justify interdict proceedings.18 Likewise, interdict is unlikely to be granted if the incursion is an isolated event with little cause to anticipate a recurrence, or if the threatened disturbance is trivial.19 In determining whether to grant or withhold interdict the court may consider whether a defender who had previously trespassed on the pursuer’s land had been acting in good faith in the sense of not intending “to commit a trespass or to give offence to any party”.20 Straying animals pose particular problems given the recognised difficulties of restricting the movements of grazing livestock.21 In principle, interdict may be granted against the keeper of an animal if the pursuer can establish that the defender failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent the animal from straying and causing damage,22 but in practice this onus is difficult to discharge, particularly in relation to grazing animals.23

23.04

(3) Damages: two heads of claim Discussion of the remedy of damages often conflates two separate heads of claim. The first issue is whether, and on what basis, damages should be available for the act of trespass in itself. The second is whether, and on 15 E.g. Shepherd v Menzies (1900) 2 F 443 (power under Cruelty to Animals (Scotland) Act 1850 s 6); Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 s 20; Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 ss 5 and 99. Even where no warrant has been obtained, the police have some (limited) powers to search premises in cases of urgency (Renton and Brown, Criminal Procedure para 7.26) or if the presence of stolen goods is suspected (Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 s 60). 16 See generally, H Burn-Murdoch, Interdict in the Law of Scotland (1933) paras 244–248; see e.g. PIK Facilities Ltd v Watson’s Ayr Park Ltd 2005 SLT 1041. 17 Rankin v M’Lachlan (1864) 3 M 128 per Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis at 133; Hogg v Campbell 1993 GWD 27–1712. 18 S Scott Robinson, The Law of Interdict, 2nd edn (1994) 1; Inverurie Magistrates v Sorrie 1956 SC 175; Hogg v Campbell 1993 GWD 27–1712. 19 Winans v Macrae (1885) 12 R 1051; Robertson v Wright (1885) 13 R 174. 20 Hay’s Trs v Young (1877) 4 R 398 per Lord Ormidale at 402. 21 See Reid, Property para 187. 22 Wilson v Fleming 1970 SLT (Sh Ct) 49. 23 Winans v Macrae (1885) 12 R 1051; Robertson v Wright (1885) 13 R 174; Paterson v M’Pherson (1917) 33 Sh Ct Rep 237; and see Campbell v Mackay 1959 SLT (Sh Ct) 34. In relation to birds and poultry, see Cameron v Carlaw (1918) 34 Sh Ct Rep 286 (a decision of 1899); Tindall v Bisset (1918) 34 Sh Ct Rep 292.

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23.06

23.07

what basis, the trespasser should be liable for damage caused to the pursuer’s land and other property while trespassing. The first issue divides opinion. Guthrie Smith stated that “The man who has without leave walked across another’s field is liable in damages, although the field is not a farthing the worse.”24 Rankine, on the other hand, declared that in cases of “simple trespass” the only remedy was interdict.25 On any view it is unlikely that a claim would be successful where a person strayed unintentionally on to someone else’s land. But where the trespass was intentional, in the sense that the person knew, or ought to have known, that the person was entering the property of another without permission, comparative authority supports an entitlement to damages.26 In South African law, for example, Milton’s classic study of neighbourhood law distinguishes negligent and intentional trespass, stating that liability arises “if the act is done under a claim of right or contumeliously”, although not if trespass has occurred “by accident”.27 That liability should arise in respect of damage to the property28 or personal injury29 caused by trespassers while on the pursuer’s land is less controversial. But the mere fact that the defender was located on the property of another does not prevent application of the normal rules of delictual liability, and these almost invariably require proof of fault.30 Where harm occurs by human agency, there is no basis for suggesting that strict liability should apply simply by virtue of the place where the delict was committed, although a statutory strict-liability regime does apply in relation to damage by animals, as noted below.31 24 J Guthrie Smith, The Law of Damages, 2nd edn (1889) 40 and 215; see also Shand v Henderson (1814) 2 Dow 519 per Lord Eldon at 524–525 (to the effect that damages were due if the defenders, as “trespassers”, “did any thing which the law did not authorize them to do, though the damages might be nominal”, and that “if the acts done were not within the [defenders’] powers, then redress was to be sought for the wrong in the same manner as for other wrongs”); Cock v Neville (1797) Hume 602 (in which no damage to crops or fences was proved, but the court thought it proper to mark their opinion of the defenders’ conduct as intemperate and unwarrantable and therefore remitted to the sheriff to award 5 shillings in damages). 25 Rankine, Landownership 141. The cases cited by Rankine do not, however, address this point specifically. The cases are: Watson v Earl of Errol (1763) Mor 4991; Marquis of Tweedale v Dalrymple (1778) Mor 4992; Baird v Thomson (1825) 3 S 448. Walker gives the same rule (Delict 41 and 939) citing as authority Rankine and also Lord Advocate v Glengarnock Iron and Steel Co Ltd 1909 1 SLT 15 (in which Lord Low doubted whether the claim of the pursuer would be permitted where no actual damage was sustained). 26 Fleming, Torts para 3.80; e.g. where police officers have unlawfully entered premises occupied by a suspect: Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635 at para 11; New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638 at para 30. 27 J R L Milton, “The Law of Neighbours in South Africa” 1969 Acta Juridica 123 at 250; see also P Q R Boberg, The Law of Delict (1984) 171. 28 Baird v Thomson (1825) 3 S 313. 29 Grahame v M’Kenzie (1810) Hume 641, in which damages of £25 were awarded, although no property damage occurred, where the defender had used “opprobrious terms” to the pursuer, knocked him down and threatened him with a whip. 30 Reid, Property para 185. 31 Para 23.09 below.

Interference with Property Rights   897

The normal rules of vicarious liability apply where the trespasser’s conduct in committing trespass, or in causing property damage or personal injury, falls within the scope of the trespasser’s employment.32 Conversely, no liability attaches for trespass by persons for whom the defender is not vicariously liable, unless the defender has in some way incited them to enter the pursuer’s property in circumstances where damage was foreseeable.33 Where damage was caused by straying animals, the common law required that negligence be established with regard to the trespass itself. This entailed that the keeper failed to exercise due care in permitting animals to stray in circumstances where it was foreseeable it would cause damage or injury.34 However, for practical purposes, where damage is caused to land by “foraging animals”, meaning cattle, horses, asses, mules, hinnies, sheep, pigs, goats and deer, the common law has been largely superseded by the provisions of the Animals (Scotland) Act 1987, which imposes strict liability on the keepers.35

23.08

23.09

(4) Self-help Limited self-help remedies remain to landowners wishing to discourage trespassers or to remove them from their land. The use of preventive measures is subject to the power of local authorities to order the removal of fences and walls that prevent public access to land in terms of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003.36 Where no legitimate access right is being exercised, landowners are entitled to order trespassers off their land, and statute confers limited power to apprehend trespassers in certain contexts.37

32 E.g. Hill v Merricks and Hay (1813) Hume 397; see also ch 3 above. 33 Scott’s Trs v H E Moss (1889) 17 R 32; see also Buchanan v Alexandra Golf Club 1916 1 SLT 353. 34 Harvie v Turner (1916) 32 Sh Ct Rep 267 (a decision of 1910), holding the defender liable in damages in regard to his culpable failure to prevent trespass by a bull in circumstances where damage was foreseeable. See also Daniel Logan and Son v Rodger 1952 SLT (Sh Ct) 99 in which an inference of “negligence” was created, throwing the onus upon the defender to show that the precautions which he took to avoid his animals straying were reasonably safe. Cf Macatee v Montgomery 1949 SLT (Sh Ct) 5 (holding that the keeper was not liable for the injury inflicted by a marauding heifer where the beast was not known to have a vicious or mischievous propensity and the defender was not bound to anticipate injury to the pursuer); Cameron v Hamilton’s Auction Marts Ltd 1955 SLT (Sh Ct) 74 (in which the train of damage caused by an escaped cow was too remote); Allen v Hargreaves [2019] SC STO 67, 2019 GWD 26–415 (in which the defenders’ bull had impregnated the pursuers’ pedigree heifer, but the defenders were not proved to have been negligent in preventing the bull from straying into the pursuers’ croft). 35 Animals (Scotland) Act 1987 s 1. For further discussion see ch 27 below. 36 Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 s 14. See e.g. Forbes v Fife Council 2009 SLT (Sh Ct) 71; Manson v Midlothian Council [2018] SC EDIN 50, 2019 SCLR 723. 37 See e.g Bell v Shand (1870) 7 SLR 267, in which the landowner was empowered under the Day Trespass Act 1832 s 2 (also known as the Game (Scotland) Act 1832; since repealed by the Wildlife and Natural Environment (Scotland) Act 2011 Sch 1 Pt 2) to require the name of the trespasser and to apprehend him and convey him to a Justice of the Peace. But cf Wood v North British Railway Co (1899) 2 F 1, regarding a civil claim by a cab-driver forcibly detained by railway staff, as empowered by the Railway Regulation Act 1840 s 16 to seize and detain trespassers in railway stations.

23.10

898   The Law of Delict in Scotland

Although Rankine stated that violence should not be used,38 the weight of authority indicates that limited application of force is permissible,39 but only to the extent necessary to compel trespassers to leave, or required in proportionate self-defence.40 Where the measures applied exceed that limit, the landowner risks being held liable in damages for assault.41 Public law may come to the landowner’s assistance: if two or more persons continue to trespass after reasonable steps have been taken by or on behalf of the occupier to ask them to leave, the police are empowered to direct them to leave, and failure to do so constitutes a criminal offence.42

B. ENCROACHMENT 23.11

Encroachment is the “permanent or quasi-permanent intrusion into land which is owned or otherwise lawfully possessed by another person”.43 In principle a proprietor is not permitted to encroach upon a neighbour’s property “even to the extent of driving a nail into it”.44 Encroachment may be by buildings, parts of buildings, or other works sited on or over a neighbour’s land,45 by accessory items attached to a neighbour’s building, including signage46 or pipework,47 or by vegetation that spreads over a neighbour’s boundary.48 In practice the offending works are almost always carried out by adjacent proprietors, but there is no reason why the rules of liability might not also extend to a third party who appropriates the use of another’s land.49

38 Rankine, Landownership 140; see also Hume, Lectures IV, 266–267: a trespasser who refuses to leave “may not . . . be struck, laid hold of – or confined, or made prisoner of, or be in any wise personally abused, or assaulted, on account of his trespass, which is not of so deep or serious a nature, as to require those strong and summary remedies”. 39 See W M Gloag, “Limits of the Right of Self-Redress” (1917) 29 JR 124 at 127–131. 40 Aitchison v Thorburn (1870) 7 SLR 347. 41 See Macdonald v Watson (1883) 10 R. 1079 per Lord President Inglis at 1082: “an ejectment may be carried out in so violent a way as to amount to an assault on the persons who are being ejected”. Cf Bell v Shand (1870) 7 SLR 267, in which the landowner was held not to be liable, since it was not proved that any injury was sustained beyond the landowner “collaring” the fifteen-year old trespasser to remove him from his land, which he was statutorily empowered to do under the Day Trespass Act 1832 s 2. 42 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s 61. 43 K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) para 175; see also discussion in Hume, Lectures III, 202–204; Orr Ewing v Colquhoun’s Trs (1877) 4 R (HL) 116 per Lord Shand at 126: encroachment is “a present sensible injuria to the proprietary right of the owner”. 44 Leonard v Lindsay & Benzie (1886) 13 R 958 per Lord Young at 964. 45 Duke of Buccleuch v Magistrates of Edinburgh (1865) 3 M 528; Jack v Begg (1875) 3 R 35; Wilson v Pottinger 1908 SC 580; Brown v Baty 1957 SC 351; Strathclyde Regional Council v Persimmon Homes (Scotland) Ltd 1996 SLT 176 (road); Trs of the Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 3 SA 281 (C) (house built 80 per cent on land belonging to another). 46 Alexander v Butchart (1875) 3 R 156. 47 Anderson v Brattisanni’s 1978 SLT (Notes) 42. 48 Halkerston v Wedderburn (1781) Mor 10495. 49 See also William Tracey Ltd v SP Transmission plc [2016] CSOH 14, 2016 SLT 678 (alleged encroachment by operator of an electricity transmission network in laying electricity power lines).

Interference with Property Rights   899

Interdict may be obtained where the works that threaten to encroach are anticipated but not yet begun, or begun but not yet completed, provided that the pursuer is in lawful possession of the land affected.50 Where the encroachment is already in place, or works are substantially complete, the affected proprietor may seek an order to have the encroachment removed, and there is no requirement to demonstrate specific patrimonial loss, or any “special or immediate damage”.51 As with nuisance, no proof of fault is needed for interdict or for an order to remove an encroachment.52 However, the court has an equitable power to refuse an order to remove an encroachment in limited circumstances:53 “when the exact restoration of things to their former condition is either impossible or would be attended with unreasonable loss and expense quite disproportionate to the advantage which it would give to the successful party. The power will, however, be exercised sparingly and . . . the court will have to be satisfied that the encroachment was made in good faith in the belief that it was unobjectionable, that it is inconsiderable and does not materially impair the proprietor in the enjoyment of his property, and that its removal would cause to the encroacher a loss wholly disproportionate to the advantage which it would confer upon the proprietor.”

For an order to be refused, therefore, the encroacher must have acted in good faith, in the sense of having reasonably believed that the encroaching structure was sited within his or her own property,54 or that the encroachment was of such a character as would not trouble the affected proprietor.55 In addition the encroachment must be “inconsiderable”,56 and the disadvantage to the 50 See e.g. Houston v M’Laren (1894) 21 R 923; see also Bell, Principles §§ 940–942; Reid, Property para 178. 51 Hume, Lectures III, 205; Miln v Mudie (1828) 6 S 967; Ewing v Colquhoun’s Trs (1877) 4 R (HL) 116 per Lord Shand at 126. 52 Taylor & Co v Smellie (1869) 6 SLR 677. 53 Anderson v Brattisanni’s 1978 SLT (Notes) 42 at 43; see also Murdoch v Dunbar (1783) Mor 13184; Begg v Jack (1875) 3 R 35 per Lord Gifford at 43; Grahame v Mags of Kirkcaldy (1882) 9 R (HL) 91; Wilson v Pottinger 1908 SC 580 per Lord McLaren at 586–587; Smith v Crombie [2012] CSOH 52, 2012 GWD 16–331 per Lord Matthews at para 59. 54 Contrast the circumstances in which the affected proprietor must tolerate an encroachment, as provided in Germany in BGB § 912(1): “If the owner of a plot of land, when erecting a building, built over the boundary, but this was neither intentional nor the result of gross negligence, the neighbour must tolerate the encroachment, unless the neighbour filed an objection before or immediately after the encroachment across the boundary” (emphasis added). 55 See also Taylor & Co v Smellie (1869) 6 SLR 677 per Lord Ardmillan at 679, interpreting good faith as indicating that the encroacher had “not unreasonably” expected that the encroachment would go unchallenged; but cf McLellan v J & D Pierce (Contracts) Ltd [2015] CSIH 80, 2015 GWD 37–594 in which an order to remove was granted where the boundaries were apparent from the Land Register and the defenders had unsuccessfully attempted earlier to buy the land in question. 56 See Munro v Finlayson 2015 SLT (Sh Ct) 123, in which interdict and an order for removal were granted where an encroachment amounting to “the creation in anything other than name” of a servitude right of vehicular access over the disputed ground could not be characterised as inconsiderable and did “materially impair” the pursuer’s enjoyment of his property.

23.12

900   The Law of Delict in Scotland

23.13

encroacher resulting from removal must be disproportionate to any benefit to be gained by the owner. Thus in Anderson v Brattisanni’s, the court refused to order the removal of an eleven-inch flue that removed fumes from a groundfloor fish-and-chip shop where the encroachment was simply by two spikes driven into the external wall of the pursuer’s flat on an upper storey and where the flue was essential for the defender’s business. Where an order to remove is refused, a number of uncertainties surround the alternatives. In cases where damages are claimed, it is not entirely clear how they should be calculated. Patrimonial loss may be compensated, although, as noted above, remedies for encroachment are not contingent on any such loss having been suffered. Loss of amenity is similarly relevant,57 although this may be so slight in relation to minor encroachment that little value can be attributed to it.58 Where structures have been sited wholly or substantially on another’s land so as effectively to dispossess the proprietor of its use, the “fair value” of the affected ground should be paid,59 but the decided cases give little guidance on the meaning of “fair” in this context. In Strathclyde Regional Council v Persimmon Homes, for example, the amount of compensation was to be determined after proof, but the court indicated it might be appropriate to consider “the standard of a bargain between two willing parties each with particular strengths and weaknesses in the bargain”.60 Where the pursuer has refused reasonable offers by the defender to remove the encroachment and to restore the status quo the amount of damages awarded may be reduced to take account of the pursuer’s failure to mitigate its loss.61 Alongside the possibility of making a financial award to the affected proprietor, nineteenth-century authorities suggested that the court had a discretion as regards other forms 57 Alvis v Harrison 1989 SLT 746 (revd on another issue, 1991 SLT 64) approving an award of £5,000 in compensation for “loss of amenity”. See also Wilson v Pottinger 1908 SC 580 per Lord Kinnear at 587, indicating that compensation should reflect “any prejudice” that the affected proprietor might suffer. 58 See Anderson v Brattisanni’s 1978 SLT (Notes) 42 at 43 in which the court was not prepared to say that “the fact that an encroachment . . . is small would, by itself, entitle the court to refuse to permit the proprietor of the invaded property to vindicate his undoubted right to have the encroachment removed”. 59 Macnair v Cathcart (1802) Mor 12832. 60 Strathclyde Regional Council v Persimmon Homes 1996 SLT 176 per Lord Clyde at 182. An analogy may be drawn with those cases in which the English courts have refused to grant injunctive relief to a proprietor complaining of a nuisance and instead have exercised their equitable power to grant damages. In Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] AC 822, Lord Neuberger observed at para 128 that: “it seems to me at least arguable that, where a claimant has a prima facie right to an injunction to restrain a nuisance, and the court decides to award damages instead, those damages should not always be limited to the value of the consequent reduction in the value of the claimant’s property. While double counting must be avoided, the damages might well, at least where it was appropriate, also include the loss of the claimant’s ability to enforce her rights, which may often be assessed by reference to the benefit to the defendant of not suffering an injunction”. 61 Nolan v Advance Construction (Scotland) Ltd [2014] CSOH 4, 2014 SCLR 351; see further para 31.69 below.

Interference with Property Rights   901

of “equitable compensation”. This enabled it, for example, to approve the defender’s provision of an equivalent area of ground to that encroached upon,62 or to permit an encroachment to stand on condition that the pursuers were entitled, if they so chose, to use it as a mutual gable without payment to the defenders.63 However, the property consequences of such alternative remedies to removal have even now not been fully elaborated in the case law.64 Where the defender is a successor to the original party who carried out the encroaching works, there remains a prima facie right to recover possession of the land,65 subject to the equitable power of the court to refuse an order to remove, as discussed above. However, there is no basis for requiring a successor to pay for removal of items or structures for which they were not responsible, and which, by definition, are not situated on their land, unless they have in some way “adopted” them, in the sense that “in knowledge of the existence of the encroachment, the singular successor made use of or occupied it or a building of which it formed an integral part”.66 An affected proprietor who fails to challenge an encroachment may be barred by acquiescence from subsequently requiring its removal, but acquiescence, in principle, cannot be pled against successors.67

23.14

C. INTERFERENCE WITH SUPPORT The entitlement to support from neighbouring land has traditionally been characterised as “one of the natural rights incident to the ownership of land”, as distinct from an “acquired or servitude right”.68 However, the correlative obligation is negative in nature only. While the servient proprietor is obliged to desist from any operation which would reduce existing levels of support,69 there is no positive obligation to take active steps in order to shore up support that is deteriorating.70 The threat of interference 62 Grahame v Mags of Kirkcaldy (1882) 9 R (HL) 91. 63 Begg v Jack (1875) 3 R 35; see also Sanderson v Geddes (1874) 1 R 1198. 64 Although see Compugraphics International Ltd v Nikolic [2011] CSIH 34, 2011 SC 744, suggesting that a servitude of projection might be established by positive prescription, allowing an encroaching pipe and ductwork to remain on the affected land. For discussion of the property law implications of awarding compensation rather than ordering removal in the context of South African law, see A J van der Walt, The Law of Neighbours (2010) 132–203. 65 Taylor & Co v Smellie (1869) 6 SLR 677. 66 Property Selection & Investment Trust Ltd v United Friendly Insurance plc 1999 SLT 975 per Lord Macfadyen at 983. 67 E C Reid and J W G Blackie, Personal Bar (2006) paras 6–01 to 6–28. 68 J Rankine, The Law of Land-Ownership in Scotland, 4th edn (1909) 489; Walker, Delict 946; K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) paras 257–258. An analysis based on common interest, by analogy with the obligation of support in the law of the tenement, is found in some 19th-century sources, but is not regarded as the “dominant analysis”: Reid, Property paras 255 and 258. 69 Reid, Property paras 253 and 259; Rogano v British Railways Board 1979 SC 297. 70 Geddes’ Trs v Haldane (1906) 14 SLT 328.

23.15

902   The Law of Delict in Scotland

with support may be addressed by interdict as well as by declarator that the defender is not entitled to proceed with works compromising support.71 It is not a ground for refusing interdict that it would cause inconvenience or loss to the defender out of all proportion to the loss which would result to the pursuer if interdict were refused.72 Where support fails and damage occurs, reparation may be claimed from the proprietor responsible,73 but there is a lack of clarity as to the basis of liability.74 This is not helped by conflation of reasoning drawn from cases involving contractual liability, and by the relative scarcity of Scottish cases. However, the main difficulty is a blurring of distinctions between the limited contexts in which liability is strict and those which follow the general rule, as stated in RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council, that “culpa is the essential basis in Scots law for the liability of the proprietor of land to a neighbour”.75 Those contexts are considered in turn below.

(1) Liability based upon fault (a) Adjacent support to land and buildings 23.16

Early Scots authority is scarce, but seventeenth-century English texts already contained discussion of the obligation of lateral support to adjacent property. Rolle’s Abridgment stated that “A man who has land next adjoining to my land cannot dig his land so near my land that thereby my land shall go into his pit”.76 Gale’s first edition of his Treatise on the Law of Easements in 1839 cited Rolle’s Abridgement as vouching for “a right of property . . . necessarily and naturally attached to the soil”, for without it, “if the neighbouring owners might excavate their soil on every side up to the boundary line to an indefinite depth, land thus deprived of support

71 See e.g. White’s Trs v Duke of Hamilton (1887) 14 R 597. 72 Bank of Scotland v Stewart (1891) 18 R 957 per Lord Adam at 971; but cf Governors of Stewart’s Hospital v Waddell (1890) 17 R 1077 per Lord Young at 1082, to the effect that interdict may be refused where the damage to the pursuer would be “very inconsiderable indeed”. 73 Stewart v Malik [2009] CSIH 5, 2009 SC 265. There is no entitlement to damages until subsidence occurs. Where ownership of the servient property has changed by that point, the party liable remains the party responsible for withdrawing support, not the party currently in ownership, unless that party has in some way contributed to the occurrence of harm: see W M Gordon and S Wortley, Scottish Land Law, 3rd edn, vol I (2009) para 5–113. 74 See Rogano v British Railways Board 1979 SC 297 per Lord Maxwell at 301 on the “curiously obscure and undeveloped” state of the law in this area. 75 1985 SC (HL) 17 per Lord Fraser at 41. 76 H Rolle, Un Abridgment des Plusieurs Cases et Resolutions del Common Ley (1668) vol 2, 565 line 10 sv “Trespass, Justification”, abridging the case of Wilde v Minsterley; a translation is available in C Viner, A General Abridgment of Law and Equity, Alphabetically Digested under Proper Titles, with Notes and References to the Whole, 2nd edn (1793) vol 20, 513. The same rule was cited in J Comyn, Digest of the Laws of England (1762) vol 1, 231 sv “Action upon the Case for a Nusance”.

Interference with Property Rights   903

on all sides could not stand by its own coherence alone”.77 Some of the early cases referred to “actionable negligence” in this context,78 but by the mid-nineteenth century it came to be accepted in English law that the presence or absence of negligence was immaterial in attributing liability for withdrawal of adjacent support.79 The modern English law continues to impose strict liability for infringement of landowners’ “natural right” to lateral support from their neighbours’ land, although, in the absence of a duly constituted easement of support, this right does not extend to buildings erected upon the land.80 Scots law appears to have followed a different path. Bell, it is true, wrote that: “Although a proprietor may, to the very verge of his property, dig his ground and remove the earth, he is not entitled to do any direct injury to his neighbour; or take away the support of his property; or to occasion reasonable apprehensions of danger.”81 But liability in the nineteenth-century cases turned upon the works having been “improperly” or “negligently” carried out,82 in the sense of lacking of “skill and prudence”.83 There has been surprisingly little later authority, aside from Lord Advocate v Reo Stakis Organisation Ltd, in which piling operations on a construction site caused an adjacent property to subside.84 The main point at issue was whether a relevant case of nuisance had been made out in relation to the disputed works, and, in an era before RHM Bakeries resolved the question whether fault was required in the law of nuisance, it was conceded that in a “true”

77 C J Gale and T D Whatley, Treatise on the Law of Easements, 1st edn (1839) 216, citing also Wyatt v Harrison (1832) 3 B & Adol 871. According to Gale and Whatley 217–218, such a rule was not peculiar to English law but was consistent also with Roman law and contemporary French law, citing for the latter J-M Pardessus, Traité des servitudes (the first edition of which appeared in 1806), and Art 674 of the Code Napoléon. 78 See e.g. Dodd v Holme (1834) 1 Ad & El 493. 79 Brown v Robins (1859) 4 H & N 186 per Martin B at 193. 80 K Gray and S F Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th edn (2008) paras 1.2.24–1.2.28. See also A J van der Walt, The Law of Neighbours (2010) para 3.4.2, to the effect that liability for withdrawal of adjacent support is strict in South African law. 81 Bell, Principles § 970, under reference to § 965. 82 Callendar v Eddington (1826) 4 Mur 108; Douglas v Monteith (1826) 4 Mur 130 (in which the report at 132 narrates the pursuer’s successful argument that “every thing done within burgh which brings down a neighbour’s house is wrong”). For a gloss on Callendar and Douglas, see M’Intosh v Scott and Co (1859) 21 D 363 per Lord President McNeill at 368, explaining that the defender’s “unskilfulness” was key in both cases, being cases which he remembered “very well”. See also Robertson v Strang (1825) 4 S 6. 83 M’Intosh v Scott and Co (1859) 21 D 363 per Lord Deas at 368. See also Campbell’s Trs v Henderson (1884) 11 R 520, to the effect that exercise of property rights was not “wrongful” where “fault or negligence” could not be shown, although Lord Young declared, at 525, that the case could be disposed of without “the necessity of determining any general question of law respecting lateral support”. See also Rankine, Landownership 373, to the effect that no action would lie if works on an adjacent property could be demonstrated to have been carried out with skill and care. 84 1981 SC 104.

23.17

904   The Law of Delict in Scotland

nuisance case liability was “strict”.85 Only passing reference was made to remedies based upon “infringement of an acquired right of support” and there was no direct discussion of the basis of liability.86 Thus, in relation to withdrawal of adjacent support, no recent case indicates that there has been a shift from the position indicated by the nineteenth-century Scottish cases that liability for withdrawal of adjacent support is fault-based. That position is also consistent with the general requirement for fault in the modern law of nuisance as stated in RHM Bakeries.

(b) Adjacent support by building to building 23.18

23.19

Where buildings share a common gable, so that neighbouring proprietors each own it to the mid-point, each has a duty in common interest to support the other half. This is a positive obligation, so that each proprietor can be required to maintain his or her own part to the necessary degree.87 While the proprietors may carry out alterations to their own part of a common gable without the consent of their neighbours, they may be restrained by interdict from works that threaten support to the other part.88 The obligation to support is not absolute, however. In the event that the collapse of the supporting portion of wall causes damage to the neighbouring property, liability to make reparation arises only where the supporting proprietor is demonstrated to have been at fault.89 The defender’s conduct is to be “measured by the standard of the bonus paterfamilias”, so that if, for example, the basis of fault is failure to detect and repair a defect, the relevant duty to inspect must be made out.90 Where, on the other hand, the supporting structure lies wholly within the ownership of the party from whom support is claimed, no obligation arises in the absence of a servitude of support.91 Even where there is a servitude, there is no liability to make reparation for damage caused by the collapse of the supporting wall in the absence of fault.

85 Lord Advocate v Reo Stakis Organisation Ltd 1981 SC 104 per Lord President Emslie at 107; and see RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council 1985 SC (HL) 17 per Lord Fraser at 44, to the effect that the reasoning in Reo Stakis “gives no support whatever to the contention that nuisance gives rise to liability even if culpa is not proved”. 86 1981 SC 104 at 110. 87 K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) para 226. 88 Johnston v White (1877) 4 R 721 per Lord Shand at 724; Cochran’s Trs v Caledonian Railway Co (1898) 25 R 572 per Lord McLaren at 579; Thom v Hetherington 1988 SC 185. 89 Thomson v St Cuthbert’s Co-operative Association Ltd 1958 SC 380; Kerr v McGreevy 1970 SLT (Sh Ct) 7; Doran v Smith 1971 SLT (Sh Ct) 46; see also K G C Reid and G L Gretton, Conveyancing 2011 (2012) 16. 90 Thomson v St Cuthbert’s Co-operative Association Ltd 1958 SC 380 per Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson at 392. 91 Reid, Property para 484.

Interference with Property Rights   905

(c) Support within buildings The doctrine of common interest as it applied to subdivided buildings was abolished by the Tenements (Scotland) Act 2004,92 so that the obligations as between proprietors of parts of the same building are now governed by a statutory framework. Section 8 of the 2004 Act sets out a duty to maintain so as to provide support and shelter to other flats in the same building. The duty to provide support is not absolute, but may be enforced only insofar as it is “reasonable to do so, having regard to all the circumstances (and including, in particular, the age of the tenement building, its condition and the likely cost of any maintenance)”.93 The duty may be enforced by any neighbour “who is, or would be, directly affected by any breach of the duty”.94 The Act further prohibits operations likely to impair support or shelter to a material extent, and similarly confers on neighbours the right to enforce this prohibition.95 In essence, therefore, the Act follows the common law, which obliged proprietors to desist from operations within their property that endangered support to other parts of the building, and allowed their neighbours to seek interdict where proposed alterations “were of a nature to be productive of danger to the upper floors”.96 There is nothing in the Act to disturb the common law requirement of fault in a case where damages are claimed for loss of support.97

23.20

(d) Positive obligation to anticipate collapse of support due to natural causes? Since the common law obligation of support is essentially negative in nature, as discussed above, it does not require proprietors to take active steps to anticipate and address threats to support caused by natural events such as landslides. Liability, however, may arise under the law of nuisance where a proprietor fails to take reasonable steps to deal with a threat represented by a natural hazard present on the proprietor’s own land, and it was reasonably foreseeable that the resultant failure of support would cause damage to a neighbour’s property. As discussed in chapter 22, the proprietor’s conduct would then be determined by reference to whether the proprietor had breached the “measured duty of care” owed to neighbours in such circumstances.98

92 93 94 95 96

Tenements (Scotland) Act 2004 s 7. s 8(2). s 8(3). s 9. Dennistoun v Bell and Brown (1824) 2 S 649 at 650; Taylor v Dunlop (1872) 11 M 25 per Lord Ardmillan at 30–31. 97 Stewart v Malik [2009] CSIH 5, 2009 SC 265 per Lord President Hamilton at para 25. 98 Holbeck Hall Hotel Ltd v Scarborough BC [2000] QB 836, and see para 22.49 above.

23.21

906   The Law of Delict in Scotland

(2) Strict liability (a) Subjacent support to land 23.22

23.23

While there is little case law on failure of adjacent support to land, litigation has been more plentiful in the context of subjacent support, no doubt because much of it has been occasioned by the damage caused by mining subsidence. This provided the background for a significant body of case law from the latter part of the nineteenth century onwards, although since 1946 a statutory regime has governed liability for subsidence caused by coal mines.99 Much of the case law in this area has involved interpretation of provisions in conveyancing deeds. Where ownership of a subjacent seam of minerals is being separated from ownership of the surface, it has been standard practice to make provision in the break-off conveyance for the rights and obligations relative to the working of the minerals.100 Aside from such provisions, the early cases categorised withdrawal of subjacent support as a “wrongous act” for which liability also arose in delict. Liability turned upon whether the minerals had been worked “improperly”, in the sense of neglecting “the precautions which ought to have been taken”.101 There was little reflection upon the required standard of care, beyond the duty to “work with due care and caution in the circumstances”.102 At the same time, this was a context in which fault came readily to be presumed. Fault might be inferred from the fact that the defenders undertook “for their mutual profit and advantage operations which they both knew would be productive of injury to the pursuers, without caring to take any precautions, either because they entertained erroneous opinions of their rights, or because they preferred taking the risk to incurring the expense of the necessary precautions”.103 In effect therefore, a party who withdrew support did so “at his peril”.104   99 See para 23.30 below. 100 For discussion of the effect of provisions contracting in and contracting out of the obligation of support and providing compensation for damage, see Reid, Property paras 264–265. For examples of cases in which the parties had effectively contracted out of the common law obligations of support, see Buchanan v Andrew (1873) 11 M (HL) 13; Barr v Baird & Co (1904) 6 F 524. For coal mining, the obligation to carry out remedial works and pay compensation is now governed by statute, as discussed further in para 23.30 below. 101 Bald v Alloa Colliery Co (1854) 16 D 870 per Lord President McNeill at 875 (pumping out of water which had supported the roof of the mine by hydrostatic pressure); see also Hamilton v Turner (1867) 5 M 1086 per Lord President Inglis at 1095, holding the landowner liable ex contractu, and the mineral tenants liable ex delicto where they “did not use due care and diligence” and “omitted to use the precautions usual and reasonable for the protection of the surface”. Where by contract the parties had agreed that compensation should be paid for “improper working” of the minerals, the precise meaning of “improper” was a matter of construction determined by the contractual context: see Buchanan v Andrew (1873) 11 M (HL) 13 per Lord Selborne LC at 19–20. 102 Hamilton v Turner (1867) 5 M 1086 per Lord Ardmillan at 1100. 103 Bald v Alloa Colliery Co (1854) 16 D 870 per Lord President McNeill at 876. 104 Bald v Alloa Colliery Co (1854) 16 D 870 per Lord President McNeill at 875.

Interference with Property Rights   907

The early English cases presented a similar picture, in that the basis of liability was often not addressed. Some authorities suggested that an action lay where mining operations had been carried out “negligently, incautiously and improvidently”,105 but until around the mid-nineteenth century, as Lobban has observed, the English courts “imposed different standards of duty on defendants” in relation to accidental damage to real property, and “in a number of cases mid-century . . . had difficulties in deciding which to apply”.106 By the later nineteenth century, the imposition of liability “notwithstanding the negation of negligence”107 reconciled the imperative that mines should be “profitably worked”108 with a fair allocation of the considerable risk presented to the surface by mining operations. A comparable shift in Scots law can be discerned from comparison between the first and second editions of Glegg’s Practical Treatise on the Law of Reparation. The rule as stated in the first edition in 1892 predicated liability upon fault: “If from want of usual and reasonable precautions, or due care and diligence, the property of the surface proprietor is injured, the mine owner will be liable in damages.”109 However, by the time of the second edition in 1904, Glegg had altered the wording of this section to a formulation closer to the form of strict liability by then established in English law: “If by the operations of the mine-owner the property of the surface proprietor is injured, he will be liable in damages”.110 Rankine’s account similarly supported a form of liability which was not contingent on “actual negligence”,111 and in the early twentieth-century case of Dryburgh v Fife Coal Co, liability 105 Earl of Lonsdale v Littledale (1793) 2 H Bl 267. 106 M Lobban, “Property Torts”, in W Cornish et al (eds), The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol XII, 1820–1914: Private Law (2010) 1112 at 1127. For an explanation of the evolution of the English property torts in this period, see A W B Simpson, “Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs: the Historical Context of Rylands v Fletcher” (1984) 13 Journal of Legal Studies 209 at 215: “Before the nineteenth century, questions of fault, contributory fault, assumption of risk, standards of proper behaviour, remoteness of damage, and so forth, certainly arose in litigation, and this is in the nature of things. But they were treated as jury questions, to be handled in the main by lay common sense, and insofar as judicial guidance was given to the jury about how they should be handled, such guidance was not regularly a subject of review. There was in consequence little or no law on these matters, and what happened in the nineteenth century was not the substitution of new law for old law, but the creation of law where there had been none before.” 107 Humphries v Brogden (1850) 12 QB 739 per Lord Campbell CJ at 757; also Bonomi v Backhouse (1861) 9 HL Cas 503 (both cases cited in Rankine, Landownership 489); Roberts, Fereday and Smith v Haines (1856) 6 E & B 643. See further G Banks, A Treatise on the Law of Support for Land, Buildings, & Public Works (1894) 70–71. Rather curiously, Lord Campbell CJ concluded a wide-ranging survey of comparative law in Humphries v Brogden at 756–757 by citation of Erskine, Inst 2.9.11 on obligations of support as between proprietors in tenement buildings, an area which Scots law has traditionally regarded as distinct from subjacent support to land, and in which liability is based on fault. 108 Humphries v Brogden (1850) 12 QB 739 per Lord Campbell CJ at 747. 109 At 264, citing Hamilton v Turner (1867) 5 M 1086. 110 At 350, still citing Hamilton v Turner but adding Aitken’s Trs v Rawyards Colliery (1894) 22 R 201, which, however, contains no direct statement on strict liability. 111 J Rankine, The Law of Land-Ownership in Scotland, 4th edn (1909) 489.

23.24

23.25

908   The Law of Delict in Scotland

for surface damage was imposed upon the tenants of minerals even although they had brought down the surface “working quite properly, and without negligence”.112 Later authority is sparse. The leading case to which reference is often made as vouching for strict liability in this context is Angus v NCB,113 a case which was not in fact directly in point. In Angus v NCB liability was rejected in respect of personal injury suffered when land gave way due to the collapse of the defenders’ mine workings, but Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson took the opportunity to observe that, where the injury was to the land itself, negligence need not be established:114 “The right of support is an incident of property, and here we are dealing with the simple case of agricultural land with no complications through the erection of buildings. The owner, in virtue of his ownership, has the right to have his land left in its natural state, and he enjoys that right qua owner. If the owner’s right of support is breached, he becomes entitled to damages for surface damage without requiring to establish negligence. This brings out that it is the property alone which is affected, and that it is only in so far as it is affected that the owner has a remedy.”

23.26

23.27

No Scots authority was cited to vouch directly for this statement of the law. However, it has not been challenged since, and has been accepted by the modern textbook writers,115 notwithstanding the problematic foundation for strict liability in this context. This unexpected recourse to strict liability is explicable as a device for the allocation of the risk presented by the economically vital mining industry, even if the presumption of fault entailed in the traditional analysis of culpa in this context may have meant that, in reality, the distinction between fault-based and strict liability was relatively slight. It should be added that this strict liability exception for withdrawal of support is now of much reduced practical significance in the framework of the common law, since, as discussed below, liability for coal mining subsidence has for over half a century been the subject of a separate statutory framework. Withdrawal of support does not of itself give right to a claim in damages. A right of action arises only if and when actual damage occurs, and this is also the date from which the prescriptive period runs for the purposes of 112 (1905) 7 F 1083 per Lord Kyllachy at 1099. 113 1955 SC 175 (as cited e.g. by Walker, Delict 947; N R Whitty, “Nuisance”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) para 29). 114 1955 SC 175 at 181. 115 K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) para 261; R Rennie, Minerals and the Law of Scotland (2001) para 4.9. See also W M Gordon and S Wortley, Scottish Land Law, 3rd edn, vol I (2009) para 5–117, implying that liability is strict for damage perpetrated by “improper working” or an activity “which necessarily brings down the surface”, since it is stated that an action in negligence is appropriate where the working has been “proper” and was caused by a mode of working that did not “necessarily interfere with support”.

Interference with Property Rights   909

negative prescription.116 A subsequent episode of subsidence which causes damage will give rise to a fresh right of action, even although underground operations may have ceased.117 Strict liability is confined to damage to buildings and other structures on the surface: the right of support is said to be “an incident of property”.118 Recovery for personal injury suffered in the collapse of land or buildings requires proof of negligence.119 Similarly, third parties who undermine support may be held liable for the damage caused on proof of negligence.120

(b) Structures built on land relying upon support In English law, the obligation of subjacent support does not extend to buildings or other structures erected on the surface.121 Scots law does not make the same sharp distinction between bare land and land that has been built upon,122 so that the obligation not to interfere with support encompasses any buildings on the land, and including buildings erected after ownership of the surface and of the subjacent stratum were separated.123 As with the land itself, the obligation in relation to structures built on the land is negative in nature; reparation is due where breach causes damage, liability being strict. There is some uncertainty as to the extent of the obligation where there has been intensive development of the surface after ownership was divided. No reported case has deemed the right to support forfeited by excessive building.124 Nonetheless, some authors suggest that the surface owner may rely upon the obligation to support only to the extent of such construction works as would have been in the ordinary contemplation of the parties at the time when the rights of surface and minerals were separated, or might otherwise constitute a reasonable use of the surface.125 Of course, even in 116 Bonomi v Backhouse (1861) 9 HL Cas 503; Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 s 11(1). 117 Darley Main Colliery Company v Mitchell (1886) 11 App Cas 127; Geddes v Haldane (1905) 13 SLT 707; Duke of Abercorn v Merry & Cuninghame Ltd 1909 SC 750. 118 Angus v National Coal Board 1955 SC 175 per Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson at 181 and Lord Birnam at 182. 119 M’Cormick v Fife Coal Co 1931 SC 19; Angus v National Coal Board 1955 SC 175. 120 Hill’s Trs v Mags of Edinburgh 1912 2 SLT 284. 121 Dalton v Henry Angus & Co (1881) 6 App Cas 740. An obligation of support in respect of buildings can, however, be constituted as an easement. 122 Reid, Property para 260. 123 Dunlop v Corbet 20 June 1809 FC; Hamilton v Turner (1867) 5 M 1086; compare Neill’s Tr v William Dixon (1880) 7 R 741 per Lord Ormidale at 745, construing the obligation of support in a break-off conveyance as covering “damages done to the land as the support of buildings or erections suitable and necessary for the owners or occupiers of the landed or surface estate”. 124 Reid, Property para 260. 125 Gordon and Wortley, Scottish Land Law para 5–92; R Rennie, Minerals and the Law of Scotland (2001) para 4.6. See also Caledonian Railway Co v Sprot (1856) 2 M 449; Aitken’s Trs v Rawyards Colliery (1894) 22 R 201; North British Railway Co v Turners Ltd (1904) 6 F 900.

23.28

23.29

910   The Law of Delict in Scotland

circumstances where the defender is judged not to have been under an obligation to support, liability may arise in negligence where the damage has been caused by the defender’s failure to exercise due care in operations at a subjacent or adjacent level. Similarly, the law of negligence applies in providing a remedy for damage caused by failure of support to property which does not belong to the owner of the surface.126

(c) Statutory compensation in relation to coal mining 23.30

The Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946, section 48, set in place a statutory framework of liability for subsidence damage arising from mining operations,127 and the current provisions are now contained in the Coal Mining Subsidence Act 1991.128 These impose extensive obligations on mining operators licensed under the Coal Industry Act 1994129 to remedy damage, to reimburse the cost of repairs carried out by others, or, in some circumstances, to make compensation for “depreciation” in the value of the affected property.130 Liability is strict, in the sense that fault need not be proved. Common law remedies continue to be available for interference with support,131 but a particular advantage for the affected proprietor in seeking a remedy under the statutory regime is that where “the nature of the damage and the circumstances” are such that subsidence damage is indicated, the onus transfers to the operator to show that the facts are otherwise.132 The aggrieved proprietor must serve a damage notice on the operator responsible within six years of becoming aware of the damage.133 If subsidence damage is anticipated, the person who would ultimately be responsible may undertake remedial work to prevent or reduce this, as long as the consent of the owner of the affected property is obtained.134

126 Mid and East Calder Gas-Light Co v The Oakbank Oil Co Ltd (1891) 18 R 788 (owner of pipeline damaged by subsidence – no remedy against owner of minerals in the absence of negligence or “improper working”). 127 Subsequent legislation provided a procedure whereby support might be withdrawn on payment of compensation (Coal Industry Act 1975 s 2), or on completion of remedial works (Coal-Mining (Subsidence) Act 1957). 128 For detailed commentary, see Gordon and Wortley, Scottish Land Law paras 5–119 and 5–120; R Rennie, Minerals and the Law of Scotland (2001) para 4.14. 129 Coal Industry Act 1994 s 43. 130 Coal Mining Subsidence Act 1991 ss 2 and 7–12. 131 See discussion in Castle Rock Edinvar Housing Association Ltd v Coal Authority 2013 SLT (Lands Tr) 2. 132 Coal Mining Subsidence Act 1991 s 40(2). For an example where damage was caused by other factors, see Marquis of Lothian v British Coal Authority [1996] RVR 252. 133 Coal Mining Subsidence Act 1991 s 3(3). 134 Coal Mining Subsidence Act 1991 s 33(2); liability is reduced if the owner’s consent is unreasonably withheld: s 33(3).

Interference with Property Rights   911

(3) Relationship between support and nuisance It has been observed that, while issues such as loss of adjacent or subjacent support to land or buildings are treated by English law as part of the law of nuisance, in Scots law such interference with property rights is traditionally regarded as a discrete category of liability.135 Following the decision of the Inner House in Lord Advocate v Reo Stakis Organisation Ltd136 in 1981, however, the law of nuisance has been recognised as providing an alternative ground of action. Indeed the leading case on the nature of fault in the law of nuisance, Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd,137 involved the withdrawal of support to an upper storey by the removal of a basement wall in a tenement building. It is now uncontentious, therefore, that interference with support may be actionable under the law of nuisance. The law of nuisance requires fault to be shown in all cases if damages are to be claimed, although, as discussed in the previous chapter, this requirement is met where the defender’s conduct caused a “special risk of abnormal damage”.138 Both routes may therefore be open to an aggrieved proprietor – both the law of nuisance and the liability rules relevant specifically to interference with support. In the limited contexts where strict liability applies (which appears to be only in cases of interference with subjacent support to land), the latter will be the more attractive of the two.

23.31

D. TENEMENTS: CONTRIBUTORS TO MAINTENANCE The Tenements (Scotland) Act 2004 establishes a framework by which all flat-owners must contribute towards the maintenance of certain key parts of tenement buildings.139 Section 24 allows those who do not own a particular part, whether in sole or common property, but are nonetheless liable for its maintenance, to recover damages where the part is damaged due to the fault of another party.140 This avoids the restrictions on duty of care that might otherwise affect the possibility of recovery for what is essentially pure economic loss.

135 N R Whitty, “Nuisance”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) para 19. 136 1981 SC 104. See also Macnab v McDevitt 1971 SLT (Sh Ct) 41. 137 1996 SC 95; see also Borders Regional Council v Roxburgh District Council 1989 SLT 837; Hamilton v Wahla 1999 Rep LR 118. 138 Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd 1996 SC 95 per Lord President Hope at 99; see paras 22.42–22.43 above. 139 Tenements (Scotland) Act s 4 and Sch 1 (Tenement Management Scheme): see e.g. K G C Reid and G L Gretton, Conveyancing, 5th edn (2018) ch 15. 140 Fault is defined in s 24(2) as “wrongful act, breach of statutory duty or negligent act or omission which gives rise to liability in damages”. For background to this provision, see Scottish Law Commission, Report on the Law of the Tenement (Scot Law Com No 162, 1998) paras 10.31–10.33.

23.32

912   The Law of Delict in Scotland

E. WATER 23.33

Many of the issues of water supply, pollution and flooding that were dealt with in earlier times by way of private law litigation are now addressed by public law measures. The extensive public law framework that provides for the management of water resources, supply, drainage, and flood prevention is considered in comprehensive detail in other works,141 as are property rights in regard to water.142 However, the law of delict has a role to play in providing remedies in the event of interference with water rights. In particular, as the previous chapter showed, the law of nuisance extends to many instances of damage caused by flood or pollution originating in neighbouring land. The question to be considered here is whether there are delictual remedies distinctive to the context of water in addition to those available under the law of nuisance.

(1) Issues of supply: common interest 23.34

Almost always, the alveus of tidal waters remains in the ownership of the Crown, so that adjacent proprietors have no rights in the water other than those held by the public generally.143 Where a body of non-tidal water, such as loch, is situated wholly within the land belonging to a single proprietor, it is for that proprietor to use it as he or she chooses, and to defend it against threat, for example, of pollution.144 Where a non-tidal river or stream flows through several landholdings, the alveus of the river is owned, in sections, by the proprietors of the adjacent land and, although the running water itself is ownerless, the doctrine of common interest imposes rights and obligations on all.145 The common interest regime requires proprietors to refrain from activities compromising the natural flow of the river, as regards both the quality and quantity of the water, so that their neighbours receive the water “undiminished in quantity, unpolluted in 141 See W M Gordon and S Wortley, Scottish Land Law, 3rd edn, vol I (2009) paras 6–64 to 6–82: B Clark, “Water Law in Scotland: the Water Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act 2003 and the European Convention on Human Rights” (2006) 10 EdinLR 60; S Hendry, “The EU Water Framework Directive – Challenges, Gaps and Potential for the Future” (2017) 14 Journal for European Environmental & Planning Law 249. For an assessment of the legislation of the Scottish Parliament since devolution, see C Reid, “Environment and Sustainable Development”, in E Sutherland et al (eds), Law Making and the Scottish Parliament (Edinburgh Studies in Law vol 9, 2011) 317 at 331–333. 142 See J Robbie, Private Water Rights (Studies in Scots Law vol 4, 2015); J Ferguson, The Law of Water and Water Rights in Scotland (1907); N Whitty, “Water Law Regimes”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 1, 420. 143 Reid, Property para 312; Robbie, Private Water Rights paras 3–50 and 3–51. 144 Robbie, Private Water Rights para 6–56. For application of the law of nuisance, see e.g. Black Loch Angling Club v Tarmac Ltd 2012 SCLR 501. 145 See K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) paras 282–290; Gordon and Wortley, Scottish Land Law para 6–24.

Interference with Property Rights   913

quality, and unaffected in force and natural direction and current, except insofar as the primary uses of it may legitimately operate upon it within the lands of the upper heritor”.146 This is a negative obligation only; there is no requirement to take active measures to restore the status quo if, for example, pollution has occurred or water has been diverted due to the actions of a third party. Most reported cases involve interdict only, but an action lies in damages where harm has resulted from infringement of the common interest obligation.147 In this respect, there is a significant overlap between the doctrine of common interest and the law of nuisance in protecting the right of riparian proprietors to wholesome and undiminished quantities of water.148 Although the authorities are not entirely clear on the point, the better view is that liability under the law of common interest turns upon proof of fault, intentional or negligent,149 as under the law of nuisance. There is therefore little advantage to be gained by pursuing a right to reparation in terms of the former rather than the latter. Indeed there appears to have been a preference among litigators for the law of nuisance, perhaps partly because of the uncertainties that have traditionally surrounded common interest.150 Moreover, the law of nuisance allows fault to be recognised where the defender’s conduct has caused a “special risk of abnormal damage”.151

146 Morris v Bicket (1864) 2 M 1082 per Lord Neaves at 1092. “Primary” and “secondary” purposes are distinguished, the former comprising domestic use, and the latter industrial or agricultural uses. Use of the water for primary purposes is permitted to an unrestricted degree as regards volume, but there is no right to contaminate a river so that it is made “noxious and unwholesome in the rest of its course” even if the use made of it is domestic in nature: Duke of Buccleuch v Cowan (1866) 5 M 214 per Lord Cowan at 226. On the other hand, any use for secondary purposes is unacceptable to the extent that it interferes materially with quality or quantity in the natural flow of the water, unless a relevant servitude right to draw water has been duly constituted: see Robbie, Private Water Rights paras 7–36 to 7–42. 147 Robbie, Private Water Rights paras 7–93 and 7–94; see also M P Gatica Rodríguez, Fault-based and Strict Liability in the Law of Neighbours (Studies in Scots Law vol 13, 2022) paras 8.16–8.22. 148 See discussion at N Whitty, “Water Law Regimes”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 1, 420 at 461 n 389; N R Whitty, “Nuisance”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) para 31; M P Gatica Rodríguez, Fault-based and Strict Liability in the Law of Neighbours (Studies in Scots Law vol 13, 2022) ch 8. 149 In Young and Co v Bankier Distillery Co (1893) 20 R (HL) 76, a case where there was expressly no right of common interest in the disputed water supply ((1892) 19 R 1083 per Lord McLaren at 1089), a right to reparation appears to have been recognised without proof of fault where a water supply had been polluted by operations on neighbouring land. It seems implausible, however, that strict liability would be recognised in this context after the decision in RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council 1985 SC (HL) 17 (discussed at para 22.06 above). Moreover, since the decision in Thomson v St Cuthbert’s Co-operative Association Ltd 1958 SC 380, it has been accepted that the right to reparation for breach of the common interest obligation of support is contingent upon proof of fault. 150 For historical discussion, see Whitty, “Water Law Regimes” 460–461. 151 Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd 1996 SC 95 per Lord President Hope at 99; see paras 22.42–22.43 above.

23.35

914   The Law of Delict in Scotland

(2) Drainage 23.36

The proprietor of land containing water which does not form part of a running channel is entitled both to use the water without restriction and to drain it at will.152 Unless a servitude right has been duly constituted on the part of a lower proprietor, an upper proprietor may intercept and retain water which would otherwise percolate on to the property of the lower proprietor.153 Similarly, no wrong is committed where water is permitted to run on to lower ground, or where works altering drainage are carried out on the higher ground, as long as such works remain within the “natural use” of that property.154 At the same time, the right of the upper proprietor must not be “overstretched . . . without necessity, to the prejudice of the inferior grounds”, and the “nimious” exercise of that right may be interdicted by neighbouring proprietors who are prejudiced thereby.155 Damages may also be claimed where excessive drainage waters have caused damage to the inferior proprietor. However, modern authority indicates that, in this context also, proprietors are liable to neighbours only where fault is shown.156 There is therefore a clear overlap with the law of nuisance, which also requires proof of fault, but which in addition offers the pursuer the possibility of establishing fault where the defender’s conduct is shown to have created a “special risk of abnormal damage”.

152 Reid, Property para 337; Gordon and Wortley, Scottish Land Law paras 6–61 and 6–62. 153 See e.g. Harper v Stuart (1907) 15 SLT 550. 154 Erskine, Inst 2.9.2; Gordon and Wortley, Scottish Land Law para 6–62; Campbell v Bryson (1864) 3 M 254; Anderson v Robertson 1958 SC 367. 155 Erskine, Inst 2.9.2 156 Noble’s Trustees v Economic Forestry (Scotland) Ltd 1988 SLT 662 per Lord Jauncey at 664; Logan v Wang (UK) Ltd 1991 SLT 580 per Lord Prosser at 583.

PART V

STATUTORY LIABILITY

Chapter 24

Breach of Statutory Duty

Para A. INTRODUCTION����������������������������������������������������������������� 24.01 B. INTERACTION WITH THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE�������� 24.03 C. INDICATORS OF A RIGHT OF ACTION���������������������������� 24.05 (1) Protection of “a particular class of persons”����������������������� 24.06 (2) The availability of other remedies�������������������������������������� 24.09 (3) The public law background����������������������������������������������� 24.14 (4) Human Rights Act 1998���������������������������������������������������� 24.16 D. THE HARM SUFFERED������������������������������������������������������� 24.18 E. THE BREACH OF DUTY����������������������������������������������������� 24.20 F. CAUSATION������������������������������������������������������������������������� 24.22 G. THE PERSON LIABLE���������������������������������������������������������� 24.26 H. DEFENCES��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 24.27

A. INTRODUCTION Today many areas of commercial and social activity are regulated by statutes which make provision for breach by imposing public law penalties. The question arises as to whether, when D causes injury to P by acting in breach of a statute, P has a private law right of action against D. In this respect statutes may be said to fall within one of three categories. Some statutes expressly preclude the possibility of civil liability in the event of breach: the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, for example, provides in section 47(1) that there is no right of action in civil proceedings in respect of failure to comply with duties imposed by sections 2–8 of the Act. By contrast, other statutes make specific provision for a right of civil action; the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960, the Consumer Protection Act 1987, the Animals (Scotland) Act 1987, and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 are examples considered in detail in the chapters that follow. A further and common possibility, however, is that the statute is simply silent on the matter, and it is this third category that forms the main focus of this chapter.1

  1 For more detailed treatment, see E Russell, “Breach of Statutory Duty”, in Delict (SULI) paras 6.01–6.133; K Stanton, Statutory Torts (2003).

917

24.01

918   The Law of Delict in Scotland

24.02

Until the mid-nineteenth century there was a general rule that a party found to be in breach of a statutory duty could be held answerable in damages by a person injured thereby.2 From the late nineteenth century onwards, however, the courts in Scotland, as in England,3 moved to a more cautious approach whereby breach of a statutory duty did not of itself give rise to civil liability. Where a statute was silent on the matter, everything depended upon whether civil liability was consistent with “the intent and purpose of the particular statute”.4 In the modern law, therefore, the essential question remains whether the statute in question is to be construed as giving rise to a right of action in the event of breach. Actions based on breach of statutory duty are thus to be distinguished from those founded upon alleged breach of a duty of care by a statutory body. In the latter, the question is “whether the statute excludes a private law remedy”; in the former it is “whether from the provisions and structure of the statute an intention can be gathered to create a private law remedy”.5 This is a matter of statutory interpretation in relation to which a very particular jurisprudence has evolved.

B. INTERACTION WITH THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 24.03

The questions (i) whether D is liable in delict for a breach of statutory duty, and (ii) whether D is liable for breach of a duty of care in the common law of negligence, are conceptually distinct. As Lord Steyn pointed out in Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council:6 “[I]n a case founded on breach of statutory duty the central question is whether from the provisions and structure of the statute an intention can be gathered to create a private law remedy? In contradistinction in a case framed in negligence, against the background of a statutory duty or power, a basic question is whether the statute excludes a private law remedy? An assimilation of the two inquiries will sometimes produce wrong results.”

Of course it may well be that the act of performing a statutory duty creates a close relationship between the person upon whom the statutory duty is imposed and the person to whom the duty is owed. If the criteria for common law duty of care are then met, there is no procedural barrier to claims being brought together in the same action, framed respectively in breach  2 Ferguson v Kinnoull (1842) 1 Bell 662 per Lord Brougham at 702.  3 Atkinson v Newcastle and Gateshead Waterworks Co (1877) 2 Ex D 441.  4 M’Mullan v Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co Ltd 1933 SC 235 per Lord Murray at 250; Pullar v Window Clean Ltd 1956 SC 13.  5 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 per Lord Steyn at para 3.   6 [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 at para 3.

Breach of Statutory Duty   919

of statutory duty and in the common law of negligence. A common law duty of care which would otherwise exist is not denied “just because there is a statutory scheme which addresses the same problem”.7 But while in practice such claims often stand or fall together, they do not necessarily do so. D’s common law duty “does not arise by reason of the imposition of the statutory duty but arises out of the relationship so created”8. Accordingly, a right of action may exist for breach of statute in the absence of a parallel common law duty of care.9 By the same token, in circumstances where a statute regulating D’s activities does not allow for a private right of action, it does not necessary follow that a common law duty of care is also excluded.10 In the absence of a private law right of action deriving from the statute governing D’s activities, or a common law duty of care between D and P, there is no third way allowing for an alternative form of liability based upon careless performance of a statutory duty.11

24.04

C. INDICATORS OF A RIGHT OF ACTION The primary focus in determining whether a statute gives rise to a private law right of action is the wording employed and the intention of Parliament in enacting the provisions in question.12 Of course, ascertaining legislative intention is by no means straightforward where the statute itself is silent on this issue, and in practice Parliamentarians may well have given little or no thought to the matter.13 Where primary legislation is at issue, a wide range of circumstances must be considered, including the statute as a whole and the context in which it was enacted, including the previous law.14 If a right  7 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 765.  8 Green v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2013] EWCA Civ 1197, [2014] Bus LR 168 per Tomlinson LJ at para 29 (emphasis added).   9 See e.g. Green v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2013] EWCA Civ 1197, [2014] Bus LR 168, in which the existence of a statutory code of conduct for financial institutions did not also entail a common law duty of care in regard to clients entering into a “swap” transaction where there was no evidence of assumption of responsibility by the defendant bank. See also Boyle v Kodak Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 661, discussed below at para 24.23. 10 See e.g. Neil Martin Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2007] EWCA Civ 1041, [2008] Bus LR 663, in which it could not be said that the defendants were in breach of their statutory duty in regard to the issue of Construction Industry Scheme certificates, but a duty of care was recognised in the light of evidence that one of its employees had assumed responsibility for the efficient processing of the claimants’ application. See also K2 Restaurants Ltd v Glasgow City Council [2013] CSIH 49, 2013 GWD 21–420. 11 See X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 734–735; see also Paton v Scottish Ministers [2019] SAC (Civ) 31, 2019 GWD 27–436. 12 Gorringe v Calderdale MBC [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 per Lord Steyn at para 3. 13 See observations in Campbell v Peter Gordon Joiners Ltd [2016] UKSC 38, 2017 SC (UKSC) 13 per Lord Toulson at para 35. 14 Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] AC 398 per Lord Simonds at 407; Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223. See e.g. discussion in St John Poulton’s Tr in Bankruptcy v Ministry of Justice [2010] EWCA Civ 392, [2011] Ch 1.

24.05

920   The Law of Delict in Scotland

of action is said to derive from secondary legislation, the intention to confer such a right must be found in the enabling statute.15 It is competent also to refer to Hansard, although it is rare that Parliamentary proceedings shed direct light on this issue.16 In practice a series of factors have emerged from the case law as relevant to this enquiry.

(1) Protection of “a particular class of persons”17 24.06

24.07

A telling factor in determining whether a private law right of action arises is whether it can be shown “as a matter of construction of the statute, that the statutory duty was imposed for the protection of a limited class of the public and that Parliament intended to confer on members of that class a private right of action for breach of the duty”.18 A statute setting out a general regulatory scheme for the benefit of the population at large is unlikely to confer such a right.19 Although Lord Atkin, and others since,20 have questioned why, if a duty was of great importance, a “limited” class merited greater protection against infringement than the public at large,21 this restriction has nonetheless continued to be considered of significance.22 The obvious question in applying this factor is how “limited” the class must be before the statute can be interpreted in this way. For example, until the reforms introduced by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013,23 the courts appeared receptive to arguments that legislation designed to promote health and safety at work was to be construed as conferring a right of action on any employees injured by breach, a class extremely broad in its membership.24 Similarly in Rickless v United Artists

15 Morrison Sports Ltd v Scottish Power UK plc [2010] UKSC 37, 2011 SC (UKSC) 1; Todd v Adams (The Margaretha Maria) [2002] EWCA Civ 509, [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 97. 16 For an exception, see Richardson v Pitt-Stanley [1995] QB 123 per Russell LJ at 128. 17 Groves v Lord Wimborne [1898] 2 QB 402 per Smith LJ at 407; see also Atkinson v Newcastle and Gateshead Waterworks Co (1877) 2 Ex D 441. 18 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 731. 19 Morrison Sports Ltd v Scottish Power UK plc [2010] UKSC 37, 2011 SC (UKSC) 1. 20 Todd v Adams (The Margaretha Maria) [2002] EWCA Civ 509, [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 97 per Neuberger J at para 18; see also the judgment of the Lord Ordinary, Lord Wheatley, in Morrison Sports Ltd v Scottish Power UK plc [2007] CSOH 131, 2007 SLT 1103 at para 31 (his decision, allowing the pursuers a proof before answer, was upheld by the Inner House, [2009] CSIH 92, 2010 SC 285, but overturned by the Supreme Court, [2010] UKSC 37, 2011 SC (UKSC) 1). 21 Phillips v Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co Ltd [1923] 2 KB 832 per Atkin LJ at 841. 22 See e.g. Weir v East of Scotland Water Authority 2001 SLT 1205; Morrison Sports Ltd v Scottish Power UK plc [2010] UKSC 37, 2011 SC (UKSC) 1; McDonald v National Grid Electricity Transmission plc [2014] UKSC 53, [2015] AC 1128 per Lady Hale at para 101 (conceding that the class may be “very wide”, but “there must be some limit”). 23 Discussed at para 12.31 above. 24 See e.g. Black v Fife Coal Co Ltd 1912 SC (HL) 33; Groves v Lord Wimborne [1898] 2 QB 402; Wigley v British Vinegars Ltd [1964] AC 307 (interpreting the Factories Act 1937 (now repealed) as conferring a right of action on any person working for the purposes of the factory, including maintenance workers such as the plaintiff, who was cleaning windows at the time of his accident).

Breach of Statutory Duty   921

Corp25 the “limited” class regarded as enjoying a right of action in respect of breach of the Dramatic and Musical Performers’ Protection Act 1958 encompassed “performers” generally. By contrast, legislation concerning the provision of public services is seldom read as conferring a right of action against a public authority provider, even if the class of users of those services is capable of being narrowed down to categories such as the homeless,26 hospital patients,27 or the owners and occupiers of premises within the area served by a particular water authority.28 Similarly, in Morrison Sports Ltd v Scottish Power UK plc29 the pursuer failed to persuade the Supreme Court that the Electricity Supply Regulations 198830 might be construed as conferring a right of action on the class of “those affected by the risks of damage to property” as a result of the defender’s failure to carry out electricity installation works properly. Even if the class of persons protected by the legislation is regarded as limited to the requisite extent, this of itself is not conclusive in establishing a right of action, for Parliament must also have intended to confer such a right.31 In Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd,32 for example, a bookmaker relied on the Betting and Lotteries Act 1934, which stipulated that space should be made available to bookmakers at dog-racing tracks “where they can conveniently carry on bookmaking in connexion with dog races”. On that basis he instituted proceedings to compel the defendant to make appropriate space available to him at its racecourse. His right of action was, however, denied by the court. Although the legislation worked to the bookmakers’ advantage, its overriding purpose was not to serve as a “charter of bookmakers”, but to ensure a fair environment in which the public could place their bets, As Lord Simonds explained:33 “[W]here an Act regulates the way in which a place of amusement is to be managed, the interests of the public who resort to it may be expected to be the primary consideration of the legislature. If from the work of regulation any class of persons derives an advantage, that does not spring from the primary purpose and intention of the Act.”

An incidental benefit conferred upon a group of individuals by a statute regulating an activity in which they are participants is therefore insufficient

25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

[1988] QB 40. O’Rourke v Camden LBC [1998] AC 188. R v Secretary of State for Social Services, ex p Hincks (1980) 1 BMLR 93. Weir v East of Scotland Water Authority 2001 SLT 1205. [2010] UKSC 37, 2011 SC (UKSC) 1. SI 1988/1057. Pullar v Window Clean Ltd 1956 SC 13; Simpson v Edinburgh Corporation 1960 SC 313. [1949] AC 398. [1949] AC 398 at 409.

24.08

922   The Law of Delict in Scotland

to confer upon them a right of action, unless this is a specific purpose of the legislation.

(2) The availability of other remedies 24.09

24.10

The enforcement structure envisaged by the statute must also be considered, and in this regard the absence of express provision on remedies is an indicator pointing to a private right of action. As Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council, a right of action is more likely to be made out in cases where a Parliamentary intention to protect a limited class is shown and the statute in question provides no other remedy for breach, “since otherwise there is no method of securing the protection the statute was intended to confer”.34 This, however, is subject to the overall statutory context, from which a different conclusion might be drawn. In R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, ex parte Hague35 it was arguable that the plaintiff, a prisoner dissatisfied with the conditions of his confinement, was one of the particular class of individuals affected by the proper operation of the Prison Rules 1964,36 made pursuant to the Prison Act 1952. Despite the lack of any provision to deal with breach of those Rules, the House of Lords held that a right of action did not arise. On examining the legislation as a whole the House of Lords determined that its object was the proper administration of prisons, including the management and control of inmates, that it was regulatory in character, and that there was nothing in the Act or in the Rules to suggest that a right of action had been envisaged for individual prisoners. This legislation was not therefore to be compared in this regard with, say, health and safety legislation which was specifically targeted at the protecting the safety of employees in the workplace.37 Most statutes do, however, provide some mechanism, whether by means of an administrative procedure or criminal penalties, for ensuring compliance with the legislation, and the existence of such provisions is likely to undermine the argument for a separate private law right of action. For example, in refusing to recognise such a right of action in Keating v Bromley LBC (No 2), which was heard together with X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council, 34 [1995] 2 AC 633 at 731; Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] AC 398 per Lord Simonds at 407 and Lord Normand at 413: “If there is no penalty and no other special means of enforcement provided by the statute, it may be presumed that those who have an interest to enforce one of the statutory duties have an individual right of action. Otherwise the duty might never be performed.” But see also St John Poulton’s Tr in Bankruptcy v Ministry of Justice [2010] EWCA Civ 392, [2011] Ch 1, suggesting, perhaps rather controversially, that certain public officials such as court officials can be expected to fulfil their statutory duties efficiently as a matter of course and that there is therefore no need in such cases for further mechanisms to ensure compliance. 35 [1992] 1 AC 58; see also St John Poulton’s Tr in Bankruptcy v Ministry of Justice [2010] EWCA Civ 392, [2011] Ch 1. 36 SI 1964/388. 37 [1992] 1 AC 58 per Lord Jauncey at 171; see also Olotu v Home Office [1997] 1 WLR 328.

Breach of Statutory Duty   923

Lord Browne-Wilkinson found that the administrative machinery set out in the (English) Education Acts of 1944 and 1981, whereby the minister could enforce the duties imposed upon the education authority, indicated that Parliament did not intend to confer a private right of action. The case for such a right was made even less convincing by the inclusion of a statutory procedure that allowed “close involvement of those who would be affected by a decision in the making of that decision” and “generous rights of appeal”.38 The availability of criminal penalties is a further important consideration. The inclusion of criminal penalties in legislation relating to the health and safety of the workplace has not generally been regarded as inconsistent with a Parliamentary intention to allow a private law right of action.39 In other contexts, however, it is a factor pointing firmly against. Limited exceptions are recognised where either it was apparent that the obligation imposed in the legislation was imposed “for the benefit or protection of a particular class of individuals”, or the legislation created a “public right” and a particular member of the public suffered “particular, direct, and substantial damage other and different from that which was common to all the rest of the public”.40 The possible scope of this first exception was explored above.41 The second is more problematic, since the definition of “public right” is open to a variety of interpretations, as is the concept of “particular” damage. In practice, the exception has tended to be construed, narrowly, as applicable in a neighbourhood context to those who have suffered interference with the enjoyment of property rights.42 The relevance of criminal penalties to private law rights was explored in detail in Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2),43 in which the plaintiffs accused the defendants of “sanctions-busting” by supplying oil to the white minority Government in Rhodesia during the period when the British Government had legislated to impose sanctions on trade.44 The

38 [1995] 2 AC 633 at 769. See also Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2003] UKHL 66, [2004] 2 AC 42, in which the detailed provision for a regulatory framework in the Water Industry Act 1991 was said to point against a right of action in nuisance. 39 G Williams, “The Effect of Penal Legislation in the Law of Tort” (1960) 23 MLR 233. However, account must now be taken of the changes introduced by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, which significantly restrict private law actions in this context: see para 12.31 above. See also Campbell v Peter Gordon Joiners Ltd [2016] UKSC 38, 2017 SC (UKSC) 13. 40 Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) [1982] AC 173 per Lord Diplock at 185, citing Brett J in Benjamin v Storr (1874) LR 9 CP 400 at 407. The reasoning in Lonrho in effect cut back the more generous reading of the concurrence of criminal penalties and private law rights as set out by Lord Denning in Ex parte Island Records Ltd [1978] Ch 122 at 135, that if an individual showed “a private right which is being interfered with by the criminal act – thus causing or threatening to cause him special damage over and above the generality of the public – then he can come to the court as a private individual and ask that his private right be protected.” 41 See paras 24.06–24.08. 42 Boyce v Paddington Borough Council [1903] 1 Ch 109. 43 [1982] AC 173. 44 The sanctions were provided for in the Southern Rhodesia (Petroleum) Order 1965, SI 1965/2140, replaced by a further Order in 1968, both in terms of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965.

24.11

24.12

924   The Law of Delict in Scotland

24.13

plaintiffs had built a pipeline in the region, which they were unable to use during the period of the sanctions, and they alleged that the defendants’ breach of the sanctions prolonged the period during which they sustained loss on that account. The prior question for the court to determine, assuming these allegations could be proved, was whether the sanctions legislation conferred upon the plaintiffs a private right of action in respect of breach. The legislation set out significant criminal penalties to enforce the prohibition on the supply of oil (although criminal proceedings had not in fact been brought against the defendants). The House of Lords therefore invoked the “general rule” that “where an Act creates an obligation, and enforces the performance in a specified manner . . . that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner”.45 The two exceptions set out in the previous paragraph were acknowledged, but neither applied in this case. As regards the first, the sanctions were plainly not imposed for the “benefit or protection” of a particular class of individuals including the plaintiffs; rather than assisting those engaged in the supply of oil in the region, they were intended to suspend such operations entirely. In regard to the second, the sanctions orders did not create any kind of public right but were “instruments of state policy in an international matter” which withdrew economic rights from parties trading with Rhodesia.46 An additional situation in which a right of action might exceptionally be recognised is where remedies are provided by the statute in question but are regarded as inadequate, although the leading authority is a case concerning safety in the workplace, a context in which a private law right of action has traditionally been more readily recognised. In Groves v Lord Wimborne47 an employer had failed to fence dangerous machinery, in breach of a statutory duty imposed by the Factory and Workshop Act 1878, section 5, as a result of which the plaintiff, his employee, was gravely injured. Section 82 of the Act provided for imposition of a fine not exceeding £100. The Act made no provision for an award of damages to the injured person, although the Secretary of State had discretion to make over all or part of the fine to him. In these circumstances, it was held that a direct right of action could be read into the statute, since in the first place the fine was not proportionate to the offence, and, secondly, the fact that the fine was not necessarily payable to the injured person suggested that it was “not the intention of the Legislature that the provision which imposes upon the employer a fine as a punishment for neglect of his statutory duty should take away the prima facie right of the workman to be fully compensated for injury occasioned to him by that neglect”.48 As with the other indicators, however, the perceived inadequacy 45 [1982] AC 173 per Lord Diplock at 185, citing Lord Tenterden CJ in Doe dem Murray v Bridges (1831) 1 B & Ad 847 at 859. 46 [1982] AC 173 at 185. 47 [1898] 2 QB 402. 48 [1898] 2 QB 402 per A L Smith LJ at 408; see also Reffell v Surrey County Council [1964] 1 WLR 358.

Breach of Statutory Duty   925

of remedies must be considered in the context of the legislation as a whole. This issue was taken up in Morrison Sports Ltd v Scottish Power UK plc. The Lord Ordinary, Lord Wheatley, regarded the criminal penalties in the event of breach of regulations 17, 24 and 25 of the Electricity Supply Regulations 198849 as “quite insufficient”;50 the Supreme Court ruled nonetheless that the scheme of the legislation, and its “carefully worked-out provisions for various forms of enforcement on behalf of the public”, pointed conclusively against a private right of action in favour of those whose property was at risk in the event of breach.51

(3) The public law background Many of the actions for breach of statutory duty are brought against public authorities. Where the statutory provisions at issue confer a broad discretion upon a public authority to provide public services, particularly in areas such as health or education, it is unlikely that a right of private action will be recognised.52 It is normally difficult to demonstrate a Parliamentary intention to confer rights on specific individuals where the statute relates to the provision of a service for the benefit of the public at large. As Lord Slynn remarked in Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council, of the English Education Acts 1944 and 1981:53

24.14

“[A]lthough the duties were intended to benefit a particular group, mainly children with special educational needs, the Act is essentially providing a general structure for all local education authorities in respect of all children who fall within its provision. The general nature of the duties imposed on local authorities in the context of a national system of education and the remedies available by way of appeal and judicial review indicate that Parliament did not intend to create a statutory remedy by way of damages. Much of the Act is concerned with conferring discretionary powers or administrative duties in an area of social welfare where normally damages have not been awarded when there has been a failure to perform a statutory duty.”

A further consideration is the availability of judicial review as an alternative avenue for the pursuer; the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session may be invoked where a person to which a statutory power has been entrusted has allegedly “exceeded or abused” its jurisdiction or failed to do what was required of it.54 While the possibility of judicial review

49 50 51 52 53 54

SI 1988/1057. 2007 SLT 1103 at para 35, upheld by the Inner House, [2009] CSIH 92, 2010 SC 285. [2010] UKSC 37, 2011 SC (UKSC) 1 per Lord Rodger at para 37. X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633. [2001] 2 AC 619 at 652. Ruddy v Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police [2012] UKSC 57, 2013 SC (UKSC) 126 per Lord Hope at para 18.

24.15

926   The Law of Delict in Scotland

does not of itself preclude a private law right of action,55 this may present itself as a more appropriate means of addressing an alleged breach of duty by a public authority.56 In Cullen v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary,57 for example, the plaintiff had been arrested under section 14(1)(b) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 and had asked to see a solicitor. During his period in custody the police deferred his right to consult a solicitor, as was permitted by section 15 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1987. However, in contravention of section 15(9)(a) of the 1987 Act, the police did not give reasons for so doing. The plaintiff subsequently brought an action against the chief constable for damages in respect of the failure to give reasons for the deferral of access. The claim was refused, primarily because the plaintiff had suffered no harm or injury as a result of the police conduct, and the court did not recognise this breach of statutory duty as a tort “actionable per se”, that is to say without proof of damage.58 However, the court also reflected that “the speedy hearing of an application for judicial review (which could be brought on the grounds, inter alia, of a failure to give reasons for authorising a delay in complying with a request to consult a solicitor) is a much more effective remedy for a claimant to seek than the bringing of an action for nominal damages months or years after the period of detention has ended”.59

(4) Human Rights Act 1998 24.16

Regardless of whether a private law right of action is rejected, and even in circumstances where a petition for judicial review might appear appropriate, it may further be possible for the pursuer to bring a direct action against a public authority defender in terms of the Human Rights Act 1998, on the basis that it has acted incompatible with the ECHR.60 In X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council,61 which predated the 1998 Act, some of the plaintiffs made a successful application to the European Court of Human Rights62 to have it declared that the public authority’s failure to have them removed from their abusive home background constituted a breach of Article 3 of the Convention (prohibiting inhuman or degrading treatment), and damages were awarded accordingly. 55 See discussion in Roy v Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Family Practitioner Committee [1992] 1 AC 624. 56 Calveley v Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police [1989] AC 1228. 57 [2003] UKHL 39, [2003] 1 WLR 1763. 58 Although in their joint dissenting speech at [2003] UKHL 39, [2003] 1 WLR 1763 para 10, Lords Bingham and Steyn read the legislation as “apt to create private law rights”. 59 [2003] UKHL 39, [2003] 1 WLR 1763 per Lord Hutton at para 39; see also Lord Rodger in similar vein at para 86. 60 See paras 7.31–7.34 above. 61 [1995] 2 AC 633. 62 Z v United Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 3.

Breach of Statutory Duty   927

The interface between petitions for judicial review and remedies under the Human Rights Act 1998 was considered in Ruddy v Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police.63 The pursuer alleged that he had been assaulted by the police and that his subsequent complaint was not properly investigated. Claims were brought against the Chief Constable and the Lord Advocate, citing the Human Rights Act 1998 and breaches of ECHR Articles 2 and 3. The procedural history was complex,64 but in brief the Court of Session dismissed the pursuer’s claims. These were said to be incompetent because they were fundamentally challenges to administrative processes and therefore required first to be addressed by way of judicial review.65 The Supreme Court, however, overturned the decision of the Inner House, giving a strong steer that, when individuals claim “just satisfaction” for breach of their human rights by a public authority, there is no prior requirement to determine by judicial review whether the authority’s actions were illegal. The Inner House’s assumption that the pursuer sought an exercise of the court’s supervisory jurisdiction was a “fallacy” and misconceived”, since his allegations related to “completed acts or failures to act”, not to processes which he was asking to be corrected. His claims were for just satisfaction for breach of his Article 3 rights and therefore in “essence” were claims for damages in relation to which the judicial review procedure would have been inappropriate.66

24.17

D. THE HARM SUFFERED Even where the statutory context might otherwise be read as supporting a private law right of action, no claim can be made unless the harm suffered falls within the scope of the legislation as being of a type which it set out to prevent.67 The classic illustration of this point is found in the English case of Gorris v Scott,68 in which the defendant had agreed to transport the plaintiffs’ sheep by sea from Hamburg to Newcastle. During the voyage the sheep, which were kept on deck, were washed overboard. The Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act 1869, section 75, required animals being carried by ship to be kept in separate, battened-down, pens of specified dimensions. There were no such pens on the defendant’s vessel, and if there had been the sheep would not have been lost. But although the defendant’s breach of his statutory duty had, as a matter of fact, caused

63 [2012] UKSC 57, 2013 SC (UKSC) 126. 64 For full discussion, see G Gordon, “A Supreme Case of Incompetence: Ruddy v Chief Constable of Strathclyde Police” (2013) 17 EdinLR 241. 65 [2011] CSIH 16, 2011 SC 527 per Lord Clarke at para 14. 66 [2012] UKSC 57, 2013 SC (UKSC) 126 per Lord Hope at paras 15–18. See thereafter [2013] CSIH 73, 2014 SC 58, allowing a proof. 67 Grant v National Coal Board 1956 SC (HL) 48 per Viscount Simonds at 52. 68 (1873–74) LR 9 Ex 125.

24.18

928   The Law of Delict in Scotland

24.19

the plaintiffs’ loss, the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in claiming damages for this breach. The object of the statute was to secure the welfare of animals in transit and to prevent the spread of disease, not to protect their owners in the event of the animals being lost at sea. The plaintiffs’ loss did not therefore fall within the scope of the statute and they could not recover by invoking its provisions. Similarly in Wentworth v Wiltshire County Council,69 the plaintiff’s dairy farm was situated at the end of a road which, he alleged, the local authority had failed to maintain properly in keeping with its obligations under the Highways Act 1959. As a result, the Milk Marketing Board stopped collection of milk from the farm and the plaintiff’s dairy business was closed. Although the defendant’s breach of their statutory obligations had caused economic loss to the plaintiff, a right of action did not, it was held, arise under the 1959 Act. The object of the Act was to prevent the highway’s state of disrepair causing personal injury or property damage to road users; it was not to prevent economic loss to road users whose customers were discouraged from travelling on it. By contrast, in Boryk v National Coal Board70 a miner claimed damages from his employers, alleging that their failure to enclose a coal-cutting machine resulted in part of the machine striking a wooden support which was then thrown against his hand. The employers were thus in breach of section 55 of the Coal Mines Act 1911, requiring dangerous machinery to be “kept securely fenced”. Despite the employers’ argument that the legislation was targeted at preventing injury due to direct contact between workers and machine parts, not indirect injury due to the machinery striking other objects, the miner’s claim was found to be relevant, because there was no justification for reading the legislation as so limited in regard to the mode by which the injury might occur.

E. THE BREACH OF DUTY 24.20

It goes without saying that there must be a breach of the statute from which the pursuer derives a right of action. It is for the pursuer to specify the statutory provision allegedly breached and the statutory duty which that provision imposed upon the defender. In Fytche v Wincanton Logistics,71 for example, a tanker driver’s employers had provided him with steel-capped boots that developed a small hole in the sole. This caused him to suffer frostbite after wearing the boots while digging his tanker out of a snowdrift. The driver claimed damages from his employers on the basis that his injury had been caused because the personal protective equipment provided, namely the boots, was not “in an efficient state . . . and in good repair”

69 [1993] QB 654. 70 1959 SC 1, distinguishing Carroll v Andrew Barclay & Sons Ltd 1948 SC (HL) 100. 71 [2004] UKHL 31, [2004] 4 All ER 221.

Breach of Statutory Duty   929

and this breached the Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992,72 regulation 7(1). His claim was, however, unsuccessful because the House of Lords found that there had been no breach of the Regulations. The steel-capped boots had been provided for protection against the risk of heavy items falling on the driver’s feet, and the hole in the sole did not detract from their suitability or “efficiency” for that purpose. The boots were not provided with weather risks in view, because the driver was not expected to have to deal with severe conditions. For ordinary purposes the boots were adequate. The injury suffered was thus unrelated to the risk for which the boots were intended; in terms of the Regulations “The employer has a duty to maintain [equipment] so that it continues to be suitable [personal protective equipment]. But he does not have a duty to do repairs and maintenance which have nothing to do with its function as [personal protective equipment].”73 There was accordingly no breach of the statutory duty invoked by the claimant.74 It is also for the pursuer to establish that the defender fell short of the standard of conduct prescribed by the statute. Some statutes impose absolute liability, so that the defender is required to ensure that a certain state of affairs is maintained.75 But although absolute liability was at one time encountered frequently in legislation relating to health and safety in the workplace, it has tended to give way to a duty to take such care as was “reasonably practicable”, with the onus falling on the defender of proving that it has exercised care to the required level.76 This means that if the state of affairs required by the legislation is not achieved, the defender is considered to be in breach of a statutory duty unless it can show that it was not reasonably practicable for it to have done more.77 The implications for the defender in such cases were spelled out by Lord Reid in Gibson v British Insulated Callenders Construction Co, as follows:78 “[T]he defender has to prove a negative – that it was not reasonably practicable to make the place safer. That must, I think, mean that the defender need do no more than aver this in general terms, and lead evidence in equally

72 SI 1992/2966. 73 [2004] UKHL 31, [2004] 4 All ER 221 per Lord Hoffmann at para 18. There were strong dissenting speeches from Lord Hope and Lady Hale, arguing that the Regulations imposed an absolute obligation to keep the boots in good repair, an obligation which extended to keeping them free from defects that exposed the driver to risks at the places where he had to work. 74 See also Chipchase v British Titan Products Co [1956] 1 QB 545. 75 E.g. Millar v Galashiels Gas Co 1949 SC (HL) 31 (Factories Act 1937). 76 Nimmo v Alexander Cowan & Sons Ltd 1967 SC (HL) 79; see also Cairns v Northern Lighthouse Board [2013] CSOH 22, 2013 SLT 645; Dow v Amec Group Ltd [2017] CSIH 75, 2018 SC 247. 77 R v Chargot Ltd [2008] UKHL 73, [2009] 1 WLR 1 per Lord Hope at para 17 (in regard to criminal liability, but on the parallels between criminal and delictual liability on this point, see Cairns v Northern Lighthouse Board [2013] CSOH 22, 2013 SLT 645 per Lord Drummond Young at para 35). 78 1973 SC (HL) 15 at 20, discussed in Dow v Amec Group Ltd [2017] CSIH 75, 2018 SC 247 per Lord Brodie at paras 89–91.

24.21

930   The Law of Delict in Scotland general terms. His skilled witnesses might say that they had been unable to think of any method of making the place safer and, in the absence of successful cross-examination, that would discharge the onus on the defender. But it would be open to the cross-examiner to ask: ‘Have you considered method A, and why is that not reasonably practicable?’ If he could get an admission that method A was reasonably practicable and would have prevented the accident, the defender would have failed to discharge the onus and the pursuer would succeed. But if he could not get such an admission, he could not lead positive evidence that method A was reasonably practicable, because he had not made any averment to that effect.”

To the extent that a burden of proof lies on the defender, this is more challenging for the defender than common law negligence. Nonetheless, in determining what was reasonably practicable in a given context a parallel may be drawn with the enquiry as to standard of care in negligence:79 “The criteria relevant to reasonable practicability must on any view very largely reflect the criteria relevant to satisfaction of the common law duty to take care. Both require consideration of the nature, gravity and imminence of the risk and its consequences, as well as of the nature and proportionality of the steps by which it might be addressed, and a balancing of the one against the other. Respectable general practice is no more than a factor, having more or less weight according to the circumstances, which may, on any view at common law, guide the court when performing this balancing exercise.”

F. CAUSATION 24.22

24.23

As with common law liability, the pursuer must prove causation – prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the defender’s breach of statutory duty caused the damage complained of. In many cases this is straightforward, and the but-for test is readily satisfied. However, one or two points of difficulty arise specifically in the context of legislation on safety in the workplace – a context in which the scope for a private law right of action has already been limited by the provisions of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013.80 As discussed in chapter 13,81 the counterfactual implicit in the butfor test is capable of factoring in the pursuer’s hypothetical response had the defender not acted in breach of statute. Where the breach of statute takes the form of a culpable omission to provide the wherewithal to avert danger, the but-for test is not met if the defender can bring convincing evidence that the pursuer would not have used the safety device in question 79 Baker v Quantum Clothing Group Ltd [2011] UKSC 17, [2011] 1 WLR 1003 per Lord Mance at para 82. 80 Discussed at para 12.31 above. 81 See para 13.08 above.

Breach of Statutory Duty   931

even if it had been provided.82 Nonetheless, statutes requiring employers to supply the wherewithal to make the workplace safe entail, in addition, an obligation to oversee compliance by the employee, in particular where dangers are not necessarily apparent, or where the employee is inexperienced. In Boyle v Kodak Ltd83 the employee was a painter who fell from an unstable ladder that he was using to access the upper parts of a large oil tank. There was a statutory requirement to ensure that ladders were fixed,84 but the employee he had not received specific instruction on this, and there was no evidence to suggest that he would have disobeyed safety advice had it been offered. The employers were found liable for breach of their statutory duty, subject to 50 per cent contributory negligence on the part of the employee. There may be little need to offer instruction on obvious dangers, but as Lord Diplock explained in Boyle, the less obvious the danger, the greater the need to remind even experienced employees about it.85 A further difficulty in the workplace context arises where adherence to a statutory duty has been delegated to an employee and the employee’s own wrongful conduct has put the employer in breach. In Ginty v Belmont Building Supplies Ltd86 an experienced asbestos sheeter had been instructed by his employer, in accordance with the Building (Safety, Health and Welfare) Regulations 1948,87 regulation 31(3), and Factories Act 1937, section 26(2), not to work on asbestos roofs without using crawling boards. Although boards were provided, he went on to a roof without them and fell to his serious injury. The employee had thus acted in breach of the legislation, and, through the employee, the employer was also vicariously liable. In a civil action, however, the court held that the employee should not be permitted to recover damages from the employer if “in substance and reality the accident was solely due to the fault of the plaintiff”. This did not follow simply because the employee’s conduct was the immediate cause of the accident, but by asking:88 “whether the fault of the employer under the statutory regulations consists of, and is co-extensive with, the wrongful act of the employee. If there is 82 See McWilliams v Sir William Arrol & Co Ltd 1962 SC (HL) 70, discussed at para 13.08 above. The employer’s failure to provide the pursuer’s husband with a safety harness in principle contravened s 26(2) of the Factories Act 1937, but the evidence indicated that he would not have worn a harness even if one had been made available. 83 [1969] 1 WLR 661. 84 The Building (Safety, Health and Welfare) Regulations 1948, SI 1948/1145, reg 29(4) imposed a duty to ensure that ladders were “so far as practicable” anchored top and bottom. 85 [1969] 1 WLR 661 at 674. 86 [1959] 1 All ER 414. 87 SI 1948/1145. 88 [1959] 1 All ER 414 per Pearson J at 424. See also Brumder v Motornet Service and Repairs Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 195, [2013] 1 WLR 2783, applying similar reasoning where the defendant was a company and the claimant was the sole director and shareholder.

24.24

932   The Law of Delict in Scotland some fault on the part of the employer which goes beyond or is independent of the wrongful act of the employee, and was a cause of the accident, the employer has some liability.”

24.25

In Ginty no breach was attributed to the employer independently, with the result that the employer was not liable. Thus the employer escapes civil liability where statutory non-compliance is entirely attributable to the act or default of the employee.89 If, on the other hand, the employer can be shown independently to have acted in breach of its statutory duty, whether by failure to instruct the employee as in Boyle v Kodak Ltd, or by some other means, that liability is not displaced, although the award of damages may be reduced to reflect contributory negligence by the employee. Even if the breach of duty is shown to be a factual cause of injury, as a matter of general principle90 the question of legal causation arises if harm has been triggered by a significant intervening act. In Horton v Taplin,91 for example, an employee was injured in falling from scaffolding which had toppled on being intentionally pushed over by a colleague. The court was not persuaded that the employers had been in breach of their statutory duty in failing to secure the scaffolding more firmly, but, even if they had been, it regarded the “extraneous deliberate and unpredictable behaviour” of the fellow employee to be a novus actus interveniens which would have broken the chain of causation.

G. THE PERSON LIABLE 24.26

Where the party in breach of a statutory obligation is a company, and the statute allows for civil liability, the question arises whether liability can also be attributed to the directors of the company as individuals. This issue was raised in Campbell v Peter Gordon Joiners Ltd92 in which am employee suffered an accident at work and might in the normal course of events have sued his employer for damages on the basis of common law negligence and breach of statutory duty. The employer, a company, was by this stage insolvent, however, and did not have relevant insurance in place. The employee therefore sued the company’s sole director. This was on the basis of a breach of statutory duty to arrange proper and adequate insurance in terms of the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969. The policy of the 1969 Act, it was argued, was to protect employees against just such a failure on the employer’s part to make appropriate provision in the event of accident, and that a right of action against the sole director was 89 90 91 92

Boyle v Kodak Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 661 per Lord Diplock at 672–673. See paras 14.04–14.09 above. [2002] EWCA Civ 1604, [2003] ICR 179. [2016] UKSC 38, 2017 SC (UKSC) 13.

Breach of Statutory Duty   933

consistent with that legislative intention. However, the Supreme Court, by a bare majority,93 adopted a “formalist” approach to the statutory wording and upheld the decision of the Inner House to the effect that the claim was irrelevant.94 Section 5 of the 1969 Act provided that where an offence committed by a corporation was committed “with the consent or connivance of, or facilitated by any neglect on the part of, any director” then the director, as well as the corporation, was deemed guilty of a criminal offence, but there was no mention of civil liability. Since this wording was directed specifically at criminal liability, and was used in other statutes in that context only, the majority were not persuaded to “infer an intention to impose by implication a more general liability of which there is no hint in its actual language”.95

H. DEFENCES A finding of contributory negligence reduces the amount of damages payable where the pursuer shares some of the responsibility for the harm suffered.96 As discussed more generally in chapter 29,97 that reduction should reflect the relative blameworthiness and “causal potency” of the acts of the pursuer as against those of the defender, and a reduction may be made even where the pursuer’s fault lies merely in “inadvertence or inattention”.98 The general view is that, unless the statute makes specific provision to the contrary,99 the defence of volenti non fit injuria should not apply in relation to breach of statutory duty,100 since it is unlikely to have been the Parliamentary intention that parties should be able to contract out of duties imposed by statute.101 There is no authority, however, to suggest that this is an absolute rule, and as in other matters where Parliamentary intention must be inferred, exceptions are recognised. A notable example is seen in a case decided by the House of Lords in 1964, ICI Ltd v Shatwell,102 where an employer was not directly at fault and was liable for breach of statutory

  93 Lords Mance, Reed and Carnwath were in the majority, and Lady Hale and Lord Toulson in the minority, with Lord Toulson arguing, at para 30, for a “functional approach” to interpreting statutory wording that was directed at “protection of a vulnerable group, a company’s employees”.  94 Following the approach in Richardson v Pitt-Stanley [1995] QB 123 and disagreeing with the reasoning applied in Quinn v McGinty 1999 SLT (Sh Ct) 27.   95 [2016] UKSC 38, 2017 SC (UKSC) 13 at para 23.   96 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 s 1(1).   97 See paras 29.56–29.59 below.  98 Hill v Norside Ltd [2013] CSIH 44, 2013 GWD 19–387; see also McLachlan v Early Learning Centre Ltd [2011] CSOH 25, 2011 Rep LR 30.   99 See e.g. Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 s 2(3); Animals (Scotland) Act 1987 s 2(1)(b). 100 See Wheeler v New Merton Board Mills Ltd [1933] 2 KB 669; K Stanton, Statutory Torts (2003) para 9.006. 101 ICI Ltd v Shatwell [1965] AC 656 per Lord Donovan at 693. 102 [1965] AC 656; see also Hugh v National Coal Board 1972 SC 252.

24.27

24.28

934   The Law of Delict in Scotland

duty only vicariously, through the actions of a colleague acting in collaboration with the injured employee. The plaintiff and his brother were both experienced shotfirers in the defendants’ quarry, but had decided to carry out a testfire of detonators without retiring to a place of safety as required by statutory Regulations103 and by the specific instructions issued by the defendants. The Regulations were worded so that the relevant duty was imposed directly on the shotfirers and not on the employer. In the course of this operation a detonator exploded prematurely and both brothers were injured. The plaintiff thereafter brought an action for damages, arguing that he had been injured as a result of his brother’s negligence and breach of statutory duty, for which the defendants were vicariously liable. The House of Lords reasoned that the volenti defence might not operate where the employer was itself directly in breach of a statutory obligation, or a breach of duty had been committed by an employee “of superior rank and whose commands the plaintiff was bound to obey”.104 But there was no barrier to application of the defence where, as here, the employer itself was not directly in breach, and the two employees deliberated collaborated to breach a statutory duty, contrary to their employer’s instructions, in the knowledge of the risk entailed.

103 Quarries (Explosives) Regulations 1959, SI 1959/2259, reg 27(4). 104 [1965] AC 656 per Lord Pearce at 687.

Chapter 25

Occupiers’ Liability

Para A. INTRODUCTION����������������������������������������������������������������� 25.01 (1) Developments in the common law prior to 1960���������������� 25.02 (2) The common law and the 1960 Act ���������������������������������� 25.05 B. THE OCCUPIER (1) The importance of “control” �������������������������������������������� 25.07 (2) Landlords and tenants ������������������������������������������������������ 25.15 C. “LAND OR OTHER PREMISES” ����������������������������������������� 25.18 D. RELEVANT DANGERS�������������������������������������������������������� 25.20 (1) The state of the premises��������������������������������������������������� 25.21 (2) “Anything done or omitted to be done” on the premises����� 25.22 (3) Natural features of the landscape �������������������������������������� 26.26 E. THE EXTENT OF THE OCCUPIER’S DUTY TO SHOW CARE ������������������������������������������������������������������������ 25.30 F. RELEVANT FACTORS IN ASSESSING STANDARD OF CARE������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 25.36 (1) Known vulnerabilities of persons visiting the premises�������� 25.37 (2) Uninvited visitors�������������������������������������������������������������� 25.41 (3) Emergencies��������������������������������������������������������������������� 25.45 G. RES IPSA LOQUITUR������������������������������������������������������������ 25.47 H. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS (1) Contractors as occupiers��������������������������������������������������� 25.50 (2) Liability of occupiers for fault by contractors���������������������� 25.51 I. DEFENCES (1) Contributory negligence���������������������������������������������������� 25.54 (2) Willing acceptance of risk�������������������������������������������������� 25.55 J. RESTRICTION OF LIABILITY BY AGREEMENT�������������� 25.61

A. INTRODUCTION Occupiers of land, buildings and other structures owe a duty to persons entering therein in regard to the hazardous condition of those premises or to dangerous activities carried on there. The framework of liability in the modern law is for the most part contained in the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960, which sets out in detail the content of the occupier’s duty of care. However, a duty has long been imposed upon occupiers by 935

25.01

936   The Law of Delict in Scotland

the common law, as indicated, perhaps most notably, in the leading case of Muir v Glasgow Corporation.1

(1) Developments in the common law prior to 1960 25.02

25.03

The common law has traditionally recognised occupiers as subject to a duty to address hazards on their premises so as to avoid injury to others.2 For Guthrie Smith, writing in the mid-nineteenth century, the “active or passive” fault of occupiers in either creating danger, or failing to address dangers already on their land, provided one of the principal “examples of negligence”.3 Early cases identified such negligence where occupiers had failed adequately to fence off pits or trenches,4 to make safe treacherous passageways,5 or to secure common stairways in tenements.6 This duty to keep premises free of hazards was general in its scope and was not displaced where a person had entered uninvited,7 although whether or not a person had been trespassing was a factor in assessing the relevant standard of care.8 Prior to 1929 the Scottish courts noted the distinctions made by the English common law between duties owed by occupiers to “trespassers”, “licensees”, “and “invitees” respectively,9 but declined to categorise duties by reference to the status of the pursuer.10 A landmark decision in 1929, however, brought about the importation of these categories into Scots law. In Dumbreck v Robert Addie & Sons   1 1943 SC (HL) 3.   2 For an account of the historical development of occupiers’ liability, see B Gill, “Occupiers’ Liability”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 15 (1995) paras 313–315; A McAllister, “Occupiers’ Liability”, in Delict (SULI) paras 17.04–17.08.   3 J Guthrie Smith, A Treatise on The Law of Reparation (1864) 63 and 65  4 Black v Caddell (1804) Mor 13905; Hislop v Durham (1842) 4 D 1168; M’Feat v Rankin (1879) 6 R 1043.  5 M’Ewen v Lowden (1881) 19 SLR 22; Copeland v Burnet (1896) 3 SLT 293; Murphy v D Y Stewart & Co Ltd (1906) 14 SLT 336.  6 M’Martin v Hannay (1872) 10 M 411; Mellon v Henderson 1913 SC 1207; Shillinglaw v J G & R Turner 1925 SC 807.  7 See M’Martin v Hannay (1872) 10 M 411 per Lord Neaves at 413.   8 See e.g. M’Feat v Rankin (1879) 6 R 1043.   9 For discussion of these common law divisions, see P North, Occupiers’ Liability, 2nd edn (2014) paras 1.05–1.09. 10 See Shillinglaw v J G & R Turner 1925 SC 807 per Lord President Clyde at 816: “[I]n Scotland, where no artificial classification of actions has ever been observed, every action founded on negligence and breach of duty is presented to the Court as an action ‘on the case’. Most of those duties (whereof the breach constitutes negligence) arise simply out of the relation into which the complexities of social life bring the defender with the pursuer. Those relations are infinitely various, and in Scotland we have been slow and unwilling to classify and categorise them. This has been extensively done in England; hence the figures of ‘trap’ and ‘allurement’, and hence the evergrowing list of ‘trespassers’, ‘bare licensees’, ‘licensees’, ‘licensees with interest’, ‘invitees’, and so on. I speak with nothing but respect of distinctions which I doubt not are useful and convenient in the administration of a system which, however much it resembles our own, is none the less animated by a genius which is subtly different from that which inspires ours. The plan we follow may be thought to err on the side of looseness, but it has the advantage of adaptability to the constantly varying materials with which it is devised to deal.”

Occupiers’ Liability   937

(Collieries) Ltd11 a four-year-old child was crushed and killed by mining machinery after he had strayed on to the grounds of a colliery near his home. The colliery owners knew that local children had a habit of playing on their land but had done little to exclude them or to close the gaps in their perimeter hedge. In English parlance, the child could be said to have been a “trespasser”. Nonetheless, the decision of the Inner House12 was to the effect that, since the colliery owners knew that their land was frequented by children, even though uninvited, they owed a duty to take reasonable care that those children should not be injured by the mining machinery. In Scotland the term “trespasser” was, said Lord President Clyde, a “popular term, not a legal one”, and even if the child was to be regarded as such, the defenders could not avoid liability on that account alone.13 The decision of the Inner House was, however, overturned on appeal to the House of Lords. The traditional Scottish approach, based upon a generalised concept of duty, was rejected in favour of the English category-based framework in which trespassers, as distinct from licensees or invitees, could recover only for intentional harm. It is interesting to note that the speeches of the two Scots on the Judicial Committee, Lords Dunedin and Shaw, were central in assuring their brethren that English and Scots law were already at one in this area, with Lord Dunedin stating emphatically that the line between these categories was “rigid” – there was no “half-way house”.14 In the years which followed, however, the Scottish courts demonstrated increasing reluctance in observing the “rigid line” as drawn in Dumbreck between the categories of invitee, licensee and trespasser,15 and a restrictive view was taken as to the types of premises for which the rule was applicable.16 By the 1950s Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson was expressing his regret that the courts “had no option but to approach the problem on the footing that the pursuer must be either an invitee, a licensee or a trespasser”. He continued: “It may be that we are within reach of the demise of the doctrine. If this is a funeral oration its theme must be burial rather than praise.”17 So serious were expressions of discontent that occupiers’ liability became the subject of the First Report of the Law Reform Committee for Scotland in 1957.18 This followed on closely from the Third Report of the Law Reform Committee for England,19 which had similarly taken as its subject the 11 12 13 14 15

16 17 18 19

1929 SC (HL) 51. 1928 SC 547. 1928 SC 547 at 554. Dumbreck v Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries) Ltd 1929 SC (HL) 51 per Lord Dunedin at 59. See B Gill, “Occupiers’ Liability”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 15 (1995) para 315; also McPhail v Lanarkshire County Council 1951 SC 301 per Lord President Cooper at 314. Carney v Smith 1953 SC 19. Plank v Mags of Stirling 1956 SC 92 at 104. Cmnd 88, 1957. Cmd 9305, 1954.

25.04

938   The Law of Delict in Scotland

anomalies and confusion to which this inflexible categorisation had given rise. The Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 enacted thereafter for England and Wales provided, in section 2(1), that “an occupier of premises owes the same duty, the ‘common duty of care’, to all his visitors”. The corresponding Scottish statute, passed in 1960, likewise dispensed with specific distinctions between persons entering premises. The occupier’s duty became “such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable”,20 and the fact that the injured person had entered the premises uninvited became simply one of the “circumstances of the case”. Scots law had turned “full circle”21 by reinstating the general principle of culpa. In reading authorities from the middle decades of the twentieth century, however, allowance should be made for the shadow of the English categories.

(2) The common law and the 1960 Act 25.05

25.06

The Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 does not displace the rules of the common law in their entirety.22 Section 1 is headed “Variation of rules of common law as to duty of care owed by occupiers”, not “abolition”, suggesting that common law rules may still subsist. Section 1(1), on the other hand, states that the provisions of section 2 have effect “in place of the rules of the common law” for the purpose of determining the care which occupiers are required to show towards persons entering on the premises. This statutory formulation of “the extent of occupiers’ duty to take care” thus takes the “place” of – in other words supersedes – the common law, and of course the particular mischief thereby removed is the controversial restrictions on duty to the uninvited, as discussed above.23 However, the rules of the common law are preserved by section 1(2) to the extent that they determine the persons categorised as occupiers and on whom duty falls.24 Section 2(1) can therefore be regarded as supplanting the common law when a question arises as to the extent of the duty imposed upon an occupier by reason of “occupation or control” of the premises “in respect of dangers which are due to the state of the premises or to anything done or omitted to be done on them”.25 That is not to say, however, that those 20 Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 s 2(1). 21 T B Smith, Studies Critical and Comparative (1962) 163. 22 For discussion, see Gill, “Occupiers’ Liability” para 318; W J Stewart, “Pleading the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act and the Common Law: A Solution to a Logical Problem” 2007 JR 53. 23 See Dawson v Page [2013] CSIH 24, 2013 SC 432 per Lord McGhie at para 14: “It is well understood that the aim of the 1960 Act was to define the degree of care required of an occupier in place of the complex situation by then arrived at under common law. The established need to identify categories of persons entering upon premises had led to fine distinctions which made little practical sense. The fundamental aim was to restore a broad test of reasonableness.” 24 See Brown v East Lothian Council [2013] CSOH 62, 2013 SLT 721 per Lord Jones at para 28. 25 See e.g. Leonard v Loch Lomond and the Trossachs National Park Authority [2014] CSOH 38, 2014 Rep LR 46 per Lord Uist at para 15 (affd [2015] CSIH 44, 2016 SCLR 102, although this point was not addressed by the Inner House); see also Wallace v City of Glasgow District Council 1985

Occupiers’ Liability   939

whom the Act categorises as occupiers may not additionally, or instead, be subject to duties of care at common law arising other than by reason of their occupation of the premises. This distinction is illustrated in Heary v Phinn,26 in which a customer brought a claim against the owner of a breakers’ yard in respect of injuries sustained when he fell from a high gate in an attempt to escape the yard after being locked in. The pursuer had visited the yard in search of spare parts, and his presence had been overlooked as the occupiers went off on their lunch break and the premises were closed. His claim was based both on a breach of the duty arising under section 2(1) of the 1960 Act and on a breach of a common law duty of care. The alleged breach of section 2(1) related to the occupiers’ control of the gate but, as the sheriff pointed out, a gate functioning normally could not of itself be regarded as a “danger”, so that the premises were not inherently hazardous. That part of the claim, therefore, could not stand. On the other hand, having admitted the pursuer to their premises as a potential customer, the occupiers assumed a common law duty of care to take reasonable care for his safety, and that duty was breached by their failure to check for his presence before closing up, although the damages awarded to the pursuer were reduced by 50 per cent to reflect his contributory negligence.

B. THE OCCUPIER (1) The importance of “control” The Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 deals with the liability of the “occupier”, defined as “the person occupying or having control of land or other premises”.27 The concept of “control”, which was key in the common law,28 is now replicated in the statutory wording, and ties in with the notion of having the power to take the necessary steps to make the premises safe.29 In these terms it is possible for more than one party to be regarded as occupier at any given time. The occupier need not have exclusive control or occupation; it is sufficient that there is a degree of control, SLT 23. However, cf the following cases in which duty under the 1960 Act and common law duty were both pled without clear articulation of the distinction between them: Dawson v Scottish Power plc 1999 SLT 672; Porter v Scottish Borders Council [2008] CSOH 163, 2009 Rep LR 46; Anderson v Scottish Ministers [2009] CSOH 92, 2009 Rep LR 122; Syme v East Lothian Council 2012 Rep LR 66; Cowan v Hopetoun House Preservation Trust [2013] CSOH 9, 2013 Rep LR 62; Shepherd v Travelodge Hotels Ltd [2014] CSOH 162, 2015 Rep LR 2. 26 2013 SLT (Sh Ct) 145. 27 Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 s 1(1). 28 See A T Glegg, Reparation, 4th edn by J L Duncan (1955) 295; Kennedy v Shotts Iron Co 1913 SC 1143. 29 See Feely v Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd 1990 SLT 547 per Lord Dervaird at 549: “Unless a person is in a position to do or refrain from doing whatever is statutorily requisite in relation to the state of the premises, I do not consider that he can properly be regarded as having control relevant to the Act.” See also Wright v National Galleries of Scotland [2020] SAC (Civ) 6, 2020 SLT (Sh Ct) 175.

25.07

940   The Law of Delict in Scotland

25.08

25.09

25.10

which may be shared with others. Where two or more parties are occupiers in this sense, each is under a duty of care, as defined in the Act, towards persons entering the premises, and each may be held liable if such persons suffer injury as a result of a failure in that duty. Nothing in the Act is to be “taken to alter the rules of the common law which determine the person on whom in relation to any premises a duty to show care as aforesaid towards persons entering thereon is incumbent”.30 In effect, therefore, the Act allows for reference to be made to the preexisting common law in determining whether the defender is subject to duty as an occupier. In many circumstances the owner of premises will be regarded as their occupier, although, exceptionally, ownership may not of itself make the owner the occupier if the criterion of control is not met. So owners may escape duty as occupiers if they do not exercise at least some degree of physical control over the premises in question. In Gallagher v Kleinwort Benson (Trs) Ltd,31 for example, the pursuer had fallen from the roof of a tenement when a hand rail gave way. His business on the roof had been to estimate for scaffolding required in connection with roof repairs. A claim was brought under the 1960 Act against various parties, including the owners of the ground floor and basement premises, who also had a right in common property to the roof. However, in the absence of averments that those defenders had any degree of physical control of the roof area, and despite their right of common ownership, the case against them was held to be irrelevant. In most cases, however, an owner does exercise the requisite degree of control. Owners do not necessarily cease to be occupiers simply by relinquishing physical occupation of the property. In Telfer v Glasgow Corporation32 a young boy was injured in a disused building belonging to the Co-operative Wholesale Society. The Society had moved out of the building, having negotiated a sale to Glasgow Corporation, and meanwhile had done little to discourage large numbers of local children from treating the premises as a playground. At the time of the accident, the Society still retained the keys, and it had control in the sense of the power and authority to make the property lockfast. It was held that the Society continued to be liable, as occupier, for the building’s safety. Similarly, in Dawson v Page,33 the owner of domestic premises continued as occupier, even though she had moved out temporarily while extensive building work was in progress, but returned on a daily basis to monitor progress, check her mail, and see to a dog kept in a kennel there. 30 31 32 33

Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 s 1(2). 2003 SCLR 384. 1974 SLT (Notes) 51; see also Feely v Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd 1990 SLT 547. [2013] CSIH 24, 2013 SC 432.

Occupiers’ Liability   941

Owners may continue to be occupiers even when someone else has taken up physical possession, as long as the owner has maintained control over the safety of the premises.34 Where premises have been hired out on a short-term basis for a specific event the owner normally continues to be regarded as occupier, even although exclusive use has been temporarily ceded to another party.35 However, the party which has taken up residence for that event may, as well as the owner, be regarded as occupier, to the extent that it has shared control over the hazardous feature in question.36 The position for leased property is considered separately below.37 Since the status of occupier is tied to the concept of control, non-owners may also come within this category where they are in a position to manage the safety of premises. In Mallon v Spook Erections Ltd38 a child was scalded as she was served hot soup from a stall at an open-air market. The stall took the form of a van to which a serving counter had been fitted, but at a level too high for the child to reach safely. She brought a claim against not only the stall-holder but also the operator of the market. The market operators did not own the ground on which the market was held, but merely leased it from the local authority for the purposes of the market; nor did they own the van at which the incident occurred. However, they were regarded as having been in control of the market in the sense that they “exercised control over people who traded at the market not only in respect of whether they traded and from where, but also in respect of matters of nuisance and safety. They promulgated rules applicable to market traders.”39 There were therefore subject to the duty of care as set out in the 1960 Act. By contrast, in Feely v Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd40 the pursuer was injured when a derelict building in which he had been sleeping rough collapsed on top of him. He brought a claim against both the Co-operative

34 Wheat v Lacon & Co Ltd [1966] AC 552, concerning interpretation of the (English) Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957, in which “control” is similarly key in determining who is occupier. The defendants, a brewery, owned a pub in which their manager was given living accommodation above the bar. Although it was specifically provided that no tenancy was created, the manager’s wife was permitted to take in paying guests. One of the modes of access between the bar and the living accommodation was an outside staircase, which was missing part of its handrail and had defective lighting. A paying guest sustained fatal injuries falling down the staircase after dark. In an action brought by his widow, the brewery was held to have been an occupier within the meaning of the 1957 Act. It had relinquished physical possession of the upstairs premises, but it retained residual control in the sense that it had given permission for paying guests and it had retained the right to enter the premises for the purpose of maintenance and repairs. In the circumstances of the case, however, it had not failed in the standard of care incumbent upon it. 35 Muir v Glasgow Corporation 1943 SC (HL) 3 per Lord Wright at 14; McDyer v The Celtic Football and Athletic Co Ltd 2000 SC 379. 36 McDyer v The Celtic Football and Athletic Co Ltd 2000 SC 379 per Lord President Rodger at 386–387. 37 See paras 25.15–25.17 below. 38 1993 SCLR 845. 39 1993 SCLR 845 per Sheriff I C Simpson at 846. 40 1990 SLT 547.

25.11

25.12

25.13

942   The Law of Delict in Scotland

25.14

Wholesale Society Ltd and Glasgow District Council. The Society still owned the property at the time of the collapse, but Glasgow District Council had previously made a control of occupation order under the Housing (Scotland) Act 1974, and had thereafter served a compulsory purchase order although the general vesting declaration transferring ownership did not take effect until after the date of the accident. As, without ownership, the Council did not yet have the power to do what was necessary to shut the building off or make it safe, the Council was deemed not yet to be in control and the case against it was dismissed. It is further possible that the dominant proprietor in a servitude exercises a degree of control in regard to the servient tenement, and there may be some contexts in which the level of that control is sufficient for that proprietor to be considered as occupier for the purposes of the 1960 Act. The examples suggested by Cusine and Paisley are servitudes permitting the construction of a dam or septic tank, or allowing a right of pasturage.41 Relatively speaking, however, examples of this kind are rare. In the more typical case of a servitude right of way, for example, access is likely to be intermittent, and so even if the dominant proprietor is entitled to maintain the route of access, it is the servient proprietor who is normally regarded as “occupying or having control” of the servient tenement.42

(2) Landlords and tenants 25.15

The Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 specifically provides in section 3(1) that, where premises are occupied by virtue of a tenancy under which the landlord is responsible for their maintenance or repair, the landlord takes on the duty of care incumbent upon the occupier as specified in section 2. That duty is owed to tenants, alongside any contractual duties in terms of the lease, and also to parties other than the tenant who are present in the rented premises.43 Section 3(2) extends the same principle to subtenancies, so that landlords retaining responsibility for maintenance or repair are subject to the equivalent duty. However, the difficulties encountered in establishing that a landlord might reasonably have addressed a latent hazard in rented premises are noted further below.44 41 D J Cusine and R R M Paisley, Servitudes and Rights of Way (1998) para 1.71. 42 Cusine and Paisley, Servitudes and Rights of Way para 12.130; Cooper v Strathclyde Regional Council 1993 GWD 31–2013. But see also Rule v Hazelhaw Properties [2017] SC GLA 1, 2017 GWD 2–16 per Sheriff A Y Anwar at para 50, doubting whether Cusine and Paisley provide authority “that a dominant proprietor in a servitude right of access can never be regarded as having the requisite possession and control to qualify as an occupier for the purposes of the 1960 Act. Much will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, including the nature of the servitude right and the manner in which it is exercised.” 43 See e.g. Haggarty v Glasgow Corporation 1964 SLT (Notes) 54; Muir v North Ayrshire Council [2005] CSOH 127, 2005 SLT 963; Bell v North Ayrshire Council 2007 Rep LR 108. 44 See para 25.34; see also Murray v Edinburgh District Council 1981 SLT 253; Kirkham v Link Housing Group [2012] CSIH 58, 2012 Hous LR 87.

Occupiers’ Liability   943

On the other hand, tenants are to be regarded as the occupiers where (as would be the position in most commercial leases) the lease has placed responsibility for repairs with those tenants so that they are in “control” in the sense discussed above.45 Whether or not landlords are subject to duty in relation to individual units of let, they are regarded as occupiers of common parts in premises with multiple tenants if they have retained responsibility for maintenance and repair of those parts.46

25.16

25.17

C. “LAND OR OTHER PREMISES” Section 1(1) of the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 states that the Act applies to “land or other premises”, and section 1(3) further provides that it extends to “any fixed or moveable structure, including any vessel, vehicle or aircraft”. Much of the case law has concerned the allegedly hazardous condition of land, including features such as parks47 and playgrounds,48 gardens,49 golf courses,50 sports pitches,51 car parks,52 race tracks,53 railway lines,54 and airports.55 Relevant premises may also include not just conventional buildings but also “fixed or moveable structures” such as vessels,56 vehicles and aircraft,57 as well as scaffolding,58 offshore installations59, and even temporary structures such as inflatable art installations.60 Prior to 1960 a common law duty of care attached to the occupiers of harbours in relation to hazards to shipping,61 and the English courts appear to have accepted that the provisions of the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 extend to the safe condition of harbour berths.62 45 Devlin v Jeffray’s Trs (1902) 5 F 130; Kennedy v Shotts Iron Co 1913 SC 1143; McCallum v S & D Properties (Commercial) Ltd 2000 Rep LR 24. 46 Wilkinson v Hjaltland Housing Association Ltd [2015] SC LER 22, 2015 Rep LR 62. 47 Anderson v Scottish Ministers [2009] CSOH 92, 2009 Rep LR 122 (cycle path in Holyrood Park). 48 Plank v Mags of Stirling 1956 SC 92; O’Hara v Glasgow Corporation 1966 SLT (Notes) 24; Bye v Fife Council 2007 Rep LR 40. 49 Taylor v Glasgow Corporation 1922 SC (HL) 1; Hill v Lovett 1992 SLT 994; Cowan v Hopetoun House Preservation Trust [2013] CSOH 9, 2013 Rep LR 62. 50 Phee v Gordon [2013] CSIH 18, 2013 SC 379. 51 Hall v Holker Estate Co Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 1422. 52 Shepherd v Travelodge Hotels Ltd [2014] CSOH 162, 2015 Rep LR 2. 53 Craven v Riches [2002] PIQR P23. 54 Titchener v British Railways Board 1984 SC (HL) 34. 55 Monarch Airlines Ltd v London Luton Airport Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 403 (Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957); Toner v Glasgow Airport Ltd [2019] SC EDIN 78, 2019 GWD 33–527 (operation of security doors). 56 Hollingworth v Southern Ferries Ltd (The Eagle) [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 70. 57 Lappin v Britannia Airways Ltd 1989 SLT 181. 58 Poliskie v Lane 1981 SLT 282; Morton v Glasgow City Council 2007 SLT (Sh Ct) 81. 59 Clark v Maersk Co Ltd 2000 SLT (Sh Ct) 9. 60 Furmedge v Chester-Le-Street District Council [2011] EWHC 1226 (QB). 61 Anchor Line v Dundee Harbour Trs 1922 SC (HL) 79; Cormack v Dundee Harbour Trs 1930 SC 112; Firth Shipping Co Ltd v Morton’s Trs (No 2) 1938 SC 177. 62 Carisbrooke Shipping CV5 v Bird Port Ltd [2005] EWHC 1974 (Admlty), [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 626.

25.18

944   The Law of Delict in Scotland

25.19

Every edition of Gloag and Henderson, Law of Scotland published since the enactment of the 1960 Act has stated that the Act’s provisions do not apply to public roads, streets or footpaths which public bodies are bound to maintain.63 No authority was provided for this assertion when first made, and such case law as exists on this point rests, in turn, upon the authority of Gloag and Henderson.64 It is not, however, immediately obvious why public roads should be excluded from the scope of the Act.65 While in England the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 provides, in section 1(7), that no duty is owed “to persons using the highway”,66 the 1960 Act makes no such provision. Admittedly, a duty of care to road users arises out of the functions of roads authorities as specified by the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984, and discussed in chapter 8, but in other contexts the incidence of duty in terms of a different statutory scheme does not generally preclude the operation of the 1960 Act. The duty of roads authorities to road users is said to have been established at common law “well before the modern statutory system of roads legislation came into being” and does not require to be “spelled out of any statutory power”.67 Prior to 1960, even after the maintenance and repair obligations of public authorities was well-established as the subject of statutory regulation, the existence of a common law duty was not, in principle, contentious, and, in Glegg’s treatment, the liability of public bodies to inspect and guard against dangers on public roads was one facet of the general duty to maintain property.68 The basis for then excluding highways from scheme of the 1960 Act seems doubtful, given that the Act has been taken to apply to areas used by motor vehicles, such as car parks,69 as well as to infrastructure for other forms of transport, such as railway lines,70 63 H MacQueen and Lord Eassie (eds), Gloag and Henderson: The Law of Scotland, 14th edn (2017) para 27.09. The first edition to contain this assertion is the 7th of 1968. 64 In Lamont v Monklands District Council 1992 SLT 428 the defenders contended that the 1960 Act did not extend to a public authority in respect of a public footpath. Reference was made to Gloag and Henderson, Law of Scotland in its 9th edn (1987) and, faced with this authority, the pursuer’s counsel did not dispute that the 1960 Act did not apply. In turn, Kirkpatrick v Dumfries and Galloway Council 2001 SCLR 261 rests on the authority of Gloag and Henderson and Lamont, as does Syme v East Lothian Council 2012 Rep LR 66 at para 35. 65 A McAllister, “Occupiers’ Liability”, in Delict (SULI) para 17.33. 66 Following from the Law Commission’s recommendation in Report on Liability for Damage or Injury to Trespassers and Related Questions of Occupiers’ Liability (Law Com No 75, 1976) para 80(1)(ii). 67 Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council [2013] CSIH 83, 2014 SC 114 per Lord Drummond Young at para 78; see also Gibson v Orr 1999 SC 420 per Lord Hamilton at 435, explaining that this is “a duty not directly under the statute but a duty arising out of the relationship between those authorities and road users created by the control vested by statute in the former over the public roads in their charge”. See also Glegg, Reparation 301, pointing out that the statutory obligations of roads authorities seemed “to be mainly declaratory of the common law”, and that the cases were “as a rule decided without special reference to the statutes”. 68 Glegg, Reparation 301–304, and cases cited therein, part of ch 14, entitled “Liability of Proprietors of Corporal Immoveables to Public”. 69 As e.g. in Shepherd v Travelodge Hotels Ltd [2014] CSOH 162, 2015 Rep LR 2. 70 As e.g. in Titchener v British Railways Board 1984 SC (HL) 34.

Occupiers’ Liability   945

and given that roads authority might readily be said to be in “control” of the safety of roads in the sense envisaged by section 1(1). That said, the practical significance of excluding highways from the 1960 Act is limited, since there may not be a great deal to separate the content of the occupier’s statutory duty to take “such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable”71 from that of a roads authority to address hazards as far as reasonably practicable.72

D. RELEVANT DANGERS The specific focus of the occupier’s duty under the 1960 Act is to address “dangers which are due to the state of the premises or to anything done or omitted to be done on them”.73 Potential hazards thus divide into two categories: those arising from the state of the premises, and those arising from activities carried on there. The identical wording found in the English legislation74 has been explained by Lord Hobhouse as follows:75

25.20

“There are two alternatives. The first is that it must be due to the state of the premises. The state of the premises is the physical features of the premises as they exist at the relevant time. It can include footpaths covered in ice and open mine-shafts. It will not normally include parts of the landscape, say, steep slopes or difficult terrain in mountainous areas or cliffs close to cliff paths. There will certainly be dangers requiring care and experience from the visitor but it normally would be a misuse of language to describe such features as ‘the state of the premises’. The same could be said about trees and, at any rate, natural lakes and rivers. The second alternative is dangers due to things done or omitted to be done on the premises. Thus if shooting is taking place on the premises, a danger to visitors may arise from that fact. If speedboats are allowed to go into an area where swimmers are, the safety of the swimmers may be endangered.”

(1) The state of the premises Most of the case law has concerned the first of those alternatives – the state of the premises. An obvious hazard is the potential for collapse in dilapidated or poorly maintained buildings, where occupiers have a duty either to make the structure safe or to exclude the unwary, even if uninvited.76

71 Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 s 2(1). 72 Discussed in detail in ch 9 above. 73 Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 s 2(1). 74 Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 s 1(1); Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 s 1(1)(a). 75 Tomlinson v Congleton BC [2003] UKHL 47, [2004] 1 AC 46 at para 69. 76 E.g. Telfer v Glasgow Corporation 1974 SLT (Notes) 51; Feely v Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd 1990 SLT 547.

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946   The Law of Delict in Scotland

Other cases have involved tripping and falling hazards on pathways,77 cycle paths,78 and other outdoor areas to which individuals are known to have access,79 as well as interior floor surfaces,80 or staircases.81 Another potential danger is the absence of adequate fencing either round a hazard, such as steep drops or pools of water situated on the defender’s property,82 or at the boundary of the defender’s property where it borders on such a hazard.83 The alleged threat to safety may arise from a specific feature, such as a heavy object liable to collapse,84 an electricity transformer,85 hazardous substances insecurely stored or handled,86 a tree with poisonous berries growing close to an area where children are known to play,87 or even the presence of aggressive animals such as dogs.88 The design or layout of the premises may in itself constitute a danger; in Phee v Gordon, for example, the awkward layout of a golf course, whereby players risked being struck by mis-hits as between adjacent holes, was capable of giving rise to liability under the Act.89 Unwholesome conditions, such as damp or mould, capable of causing illness are also recognised as hazards.90

77 E.g. Kirkham v Link Housing Group [2012] CSIH 58, 2012 Hous LR 87; Leonard v Loch Lomond and the Trossachs National Park Authority [2014] CSOH 38, 2014 Rep LR 46 affd [2015] CSIH 44, 2016 SCLR 102. 78 Anderson v Scottish Ministers [2009] CSOH 92, 2009 Rep LR 122. 79 E.g. Cowan v Hopetoun House Preservation Trust [2013] CSOH 9, 2013 Rep LR 62; Dawson v Page [2013] CSIH 24, 2013 SC 432; Glennie v University Court of the University of Aberdeen [2013] CSOH 71, 2013 GWD 17–362; Shepherd v Travelodge Hotels Ltd [2014] CSOH 162, 2015 Rep LR 2; Wilkinson v Hjaltland Housing Association Ltd 2015 SC LER 22, 2015 Rep LR 62; Rule v Hazelhaw Properties 2017 GWD 2–16; Cairns v Dundee City Council [2017] CSOH 86, 2017 GWD 21–352. 80 E.g. Ward v Tesco Stores Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 810; Porter v Strathclyde Regional Council 1991 SLT 446; Black v CB Richard Ellis Management Services Ltd 2006 Rep LR 36; Dillon v Inverclyde Leisure [2007] CSOH 82; Porter v Scottish Borders Council [2008] CSOH 163, 2009 Rep LR 46. 81 Davie v Edinburgh Corporation 1977 SLT (Notes) 5; Cole v Weir Pumps Ltd 1995 SLT 12; Muir v North Ayrshire Council [2005] CSOH 127, 2005 SLT 963; Brown v Lakeland Ltd [2012] CSOH 105, 2012 Rep LR 140. 82 Graham v East of Scotland Water Authority 2002 Rep LR 58; Fegan v Highland Council [2007] CSIH 44, 2007 SC 723. 83 Duff v East Dunbartonshire Council 2002 Rep LR 98. 84 Walker v Eastern Scottish Omnibuses Ltd, CSOH, 28 December 1989, Lord Dervaird (bus stance signpost); Anderson v Imrie [2016] CSOH 171, 2017 Rep LR 21 affd [2018] CSIH 14, 2018 SC 328 (heavy farm gate). 85 McGlone v British Railways Board 1966 SC (HL) 1. 86 Ross v McCallum’s Trs 1922 SC 322 (bucket of petrol left out in petrol station where it was readily mistaken for water); Dunn v Carlin 2003 SLT 342. 87 Taylor v Glasgow Corporation 1922 SC (HL) 1. 88 Hill v Lovett 1992 SLT 994; but cf Kelly v Riverside Inverclyde (Property Holdings) Ltd [2014] CSOH 86, 2014 GWD 18–355, in which no duty arose in relation to a swooping seagull where it could not be proved that the bird in question came from a nest on the defenders’ premises. 89 [2013] CSIH 18, 2013 SC 379. See also Bygate v Edinburgh Corporation 1967 SLT (Notes) 65; Muir v North Ayrshire Council [2005] CSOH 127, 2005 SLT 963. 90 Guy v Strathkelvin District Council 1997 Hous LR 14.

Occupiers’ Liability   947

(2) “Anything done or omitted to be done” on the premises There is substantial overlap between this second alternative and the first insofar as it relates to omissions. An omission properly to maintain premises may ultimately cause the state of the premises to become dangerous. It is more unusual, however, for a successful claim to be brought based upon positive conduct within the premises. The mere fact that the pursuer has been injured on the defender’s premises by the positive act of another is plainly not sufficient of itself to bring the circumstances within the ambit of the 1960 Act. In Honeybourne v Burgess91 the pursuer was injured when he was violently ejected from the defenders’ nightclub by a bouncer employed by a third-party contractor. The 1960 Act was held not to apply because, in Lady Smith’s view, the bouncer was not “a danger arising because of something done or not done in the nightclub premises”.92 By contrast, in Falconer v Edinburgh City Transport Longstone Social Club93 the fact of a dancing troupe spilling oil and causing the dance floor to become slippery was in principle capable of constituting a danger in terms of section 2(1).94 A distinction must therefore be drawn between: (i) harm which occurs as the result of something done or not done on the premises which affects the safety of the premises themselves; and (ii) harm which occurs due simply to something done or not done on the premises. A duty may arise under the 1960 Act in relation to the first, as in Falconer, but not the second, of which Honeybourne was an example. This distinction is illustrated by incidents involving use of guns – an example mentioned by Lord Hobhouse in the passage quoted above.95 A shooting incident was the subject of the English case of Revill v Newbery,96 in which the defendant had taken a pot-shot at the plaintiff, a youth intent on breaking into the shed on the defendant’s allotment. The Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 was held not to apply to a one-off act of violence on the premises, although liability arose at common law. As Neill LJ commented:97 “[I]f an occupier of land arranges for a party to shoot on his land and one of the party negligently injures a trespasser the occupier might be liable under

91 [2005] CSOH 151, 2006 SLT 585. 92 [2005] CSOH 151, 2006 SLT 585 at para 15. See also King v Common Thread Ltd [2019] SC EDIN 76, 2019 GWD 28–452. 93 2003 Rep LR 39. 94 Although, as discussed further below, there was no breach of duty in terms of the Act where there was neither averment nor proof that the occupier knew or ought to have known that there would be oil on the floor. 95 At para 25.20. 96 [1996] QB 567. 97 [1996] QB 567 at 575.

25.22

25.23

25.24

948   The Law of Delict in Scotland section 1 of the Act of 1984 . . . On the other hand if he goes out shooting alone his liability, if any, would be determined under the common law of negligence.”

25.25

Similarly, in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd,98 in which workers had been exposed to asbestos dust in working for various employers, no liability was held to arise under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. No doubt the 1957 Act imposed a duty on the occupiers of the various workplaces to see that workers were reasonably safe in their use of those premises for the purposes for which they entered them. But the workers encountered no dangers in their use of the premises as such, as they would have done if, for example, they had fallen through an unguarded hole in the floor. It was the tasks to which they were set in those premises which caused injury and therefore to the extent that duty arose at all it did so at common law.99 A further fact pattern also giving rise to liability in terms of section 2(1) is where the underlying danger is the defective state of the premises, which the occupier has omitted to remedy, but the immediate trigger of the injury is the act of a third party. In Hosie v Arbroath Football Club,100 the pursuer was seriously injured after being trampled by a crowd rushing an exit gate in order to gain entry to a football stadium. Although the immediate trigger for the accident was the unruly behaviour of the crowd, the stadium owner was held liable for failing in its duty to deal with the weakened state of the gate and to install appropriate safety devices to prevent its collapse in these circumstances.101

(3) Natural features of the landscape 25.26

25.27

A number of cases have involved injuries sustained out of doors when the victim was negotiating natural hazards. However, features of the landscape are not normally regarded as dangerous for the purposes of the 1960 Act. Visitors are themselves expected to exercise reasonable care in meeting with the dangers which are normally to be encountered in such environments. In this connection reference has been made to the leading English authority, Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council,102 in which the claimant,

  98 [2001] EWCA Civ 1881, [2002] 1 WLR 1052, revd (but not on this issue) [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32.   99 [2001] EWCA Civ 1881, [2002] 1 WLR 1052 per Brooke LJ at paras 149–150. 100 1978 SLT 122. 101 See also Cunningham v Reading Football Club Ltd [1992] PIQR P141, in which the plaintiff, a policeman, was injured by a piece of concrete thrown by a football hooligan inside the defendant’s stadium. The breach of duty under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 was the defendants’ failure to remedy the condition of the concrete inside their stadium once they had been put on notice that it might readily be broken up for this sort of purpose. 102 [2003] UKHL 47, [2004] 1 AC 46.

Occupiers’ Liability   949

an eighteen-year-old youth, was injured after diving head-first into the lake in a country park. The defenders had formed the lake out of what had been a disused quarry and had prohibited swimming there. Prominent notices were displayed, reading “dangerous water: no swimming”, and rangers were employed to patrol the lake and warn off bathers. Regardless, the claimant dived into the lake from a standing position, striking his head on the sandy bottom in the shallow water and breaking his neck. He subsequently brought a claim under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984, section 1, alleging that he had suffered injury due to the dangerous state of the premises, the particular hazard being the configuration of the lake. His claim was unsuccessful. There had been nothing about this particular stretch of open water which was any more dangerous than any other, or any more likely to trigger this type of accident. As Lord Hoffmann noted, “there were no hidden dangers. It was shallow in some places and deep in others, but that is the nature of lakes.”103 The lake was not therefore regarded as intrinsically dangerous for the purposes of the 1984 Act, and the court took the view that the claimant suffered his injury “because he chose to indulge in an activity which had inherent dangers, not because the premises were in a dangerous state”.104 Likewise under the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960, the general position is as stated in Fegan v Highland Council:105 “[A]n occupier of land containing natural phenomena such as rivers or cliffs, which present obvious dangers, is not required to take precautions against persons becoming injured by reason of those dangers unless there are special risks such as unusual or unseen sources of danger.”

Thus the existence of risk is not in itself enough for a feature of the landscape to be classified as dangerous if that risk is an obvious one regarding which visitors might reasonably be expected to exercise appropriate care. In Leonard v Loch Lomond and the Trossachs National Park Authority106 the pursuer was a twelve-year-old child who was injured when he lost his footing and slipped down a path on a hillside. Under reference to Tomlinson, the Lord Ordinary, Lord Uist, reflected that the path was an “ordinary” feature of the landscape and did not conceal “any special or unfamiliar hazard”. Any hillside path presented some risk of tripping or slipping, “but that is a risk which those venturing upon the hill must be taken to have accepted”.107

103 [2003] UKHL 47, [2004] 1 AC 46 at para 26. 104 [2003] UKHL 47, [2004] 1 AC 46 at para 26. 105 [2007] CSIH 44, 2007 SC 723 at para 17 (pursuer who fell from cliffs near Thurso argued that a safety barrier should have been erected). See also Strachan v Highland Council 1999 GWD 38–1863 (fall from cliff); Graham v East of Scotland Water Authority 2002 Rep LR 58 (fall into reservoir). 106 [2014] CSOH 38, 2014 Rep LR 46 affd [2015] CSIH 44, 2016 SCLR 102. 107 [2014] CSOH 38, 2014 Rep LR 46 at para 25.

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950   The Law of Delict in Scotland

25.29

By contrast, in Duff v East Dunbartonshire Council108 a relevant case was made where the premises bordered upon a steeply sloping embankment, the nature of which was not immediately obvious to visitors. The potential social cost of classifying features of the landscape as dangerous, and thereby imposing a duty upon occupiers to make them secure, is plainly a factor in cases of this kind. Even before the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 formally granted extensive rights of public access,109 it was not considered reasonable that occupiers of tracts of the countryside should be required to close off, or install safety barriers around, all features that might conceivably present a tripping or falling hazard.110 This point is addressed at length in Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council, in which various of the speeches considered “the cost, not only in money but also in deprivation of liberty” 111 of eliminating all dangers. As summarised by Lord Hobhouse:112 “[I]t is not, and should never be, the policy of the law to require the protection of the foolhardy or reckless few to deprive, or interfere with, the enjoyment by the remainder of society of the liberties and amenities to which they are rightly entitled. Does the law require that all trees be cut down because some youths may climb them and fall? Does the law require the coastline and other beauty spots to be lined with warning notices? Does the law require that attractive waterside picnic spots be destroyed because of a few foolhardy individuals who choose to ignore warning notices and indulge in activities dangerous only to themselves? The answer to all these questions is, of course, no. But this is the road down which your Lordships, like other courts before, have been invited to travel and which the councils in the present case found so inviting. In truth, the arguments for the claimant have involved an attack upon the liberties of the citizen which should not be countenanced. They attack the liberty of the individual to engage in dangerous, but otherwise harmless, pastimes at his own risk and the liberty of citizens as a whole fully to enjoy the variety and quality of the landscape of this country.”

Thus in determining whether a duty should be imposed in relation to a feature of the landscape, regard is to be had not only to the burden placed upon the occupier but also to the importance of preserving the amenity of the countryside for all visitors. 108 2002 Rep LR 98. 109 Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 s 5(2) provides that the existing extent of the duty of care owed by occupiers of land is not to be affected by the operation of the Act. For discussion, see D McKenzie Skene and A-M Slater, “Liability and Access to the Countryside: The Impact of Part 1 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003” 2004 JR 353. 110 Fegan v Highland Council [2007] CSIH 44, 2007 SC 723; Leonard v Loch Lomond and the Trossachs National Park Authority [2014] CSOH 38, 2014 Rep LR 46, affd [2015] CSIH 44, 2016 SCLR 102. 111 [2003] UKHL 47, [2004] 1 AC 46 per Lord Hoffmann at para 47. 112 [2003] UKHL 47, [2004] 1 AC 46 at para 81.

Occupiers’ Liability   951

E. THE EXTENT OF THE OCCUPIER’S DUTY TO SHOW CARE Liability under the 1960 Act is not strict. In order to establish a valid claim, a person must show not only that a relevant danger existed on the premises and that he or she suffered injury or damage, but also that this injury or damage was caused by reason of the occupier’s failure to take due care in addressing that danger. The extent of the occupier’s duty of care is set out in section 2(1) (emphasis added):

25.30

“The care which an occupier of premises is required, by reason of his occupation or control of the premises, to show towards a person entering thereon in respect of dangers which are due to the state of the premises or to anything done or omitted to be done on them and for which the occupier is in law responsible shall, except in so far as he is entitled to and does extend, restrict, modify or exclude by agreement his obligations towards that person, be such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable to see that that person will not suffer injury or damage by reason of any such danger.”

In setting duty of care by reference to a reasonableness standard the 1960 Act was broadly following the common law, which recognised no warranty that property should be made “absolutely safe”, but required the occupier “to take such reasonable and ordinary precautions” as was prudent for the safety of those entering the property.113 Indeed reference is sometimes made back to the common law to give content to the standard of care contained in the 1960 Act.114 If the common law of negligence was generally slow to recognise liability in respect of omissions, in this context it was more readily accepted that occupiers had a duty to act in dealing with potential hazards. Under the statutory regime, similarly, it is frequently recognised that an occupier’s duty has been breached not just by positive conduct in making the premises unsafe but also by failures to address potential threats to safety. The test for establishing breach, as set out in section 2(1), requires the pursuer to prove not only that a relevant danger existed, but also that: (i) the occupier either knew about the danger or ought to have known about it; (ii) there were reasonably practicable measures which ought to have been taken to make the danger safe; and (iii) the occupier failed to take such measures.115 In the absence of evidence that the occupier actually knew about the hazard, it is enough that the occupier ought to have known about the threat that it represented. This can be established by showing that there were

113 A T Glegg, Reparation, 4th edn by J L Duncan (1955) 294 and 298. 114 See e.g. Fegan v Highland Council [2007] CSIH 44, 2007 SC 723 at para 17. 115 Wallace v City of Glasgow District Council 1985 SLT 23 at 24.

25.31

25.32

952   The Law of Delict in Scotland

25.33

25.34

reasonable and practicable steps which ought to have been taken to detect it, typically by the proper operation of an appropriate system of inspection.116 In making a case, the pursuer must specify the details of such a system, including the intervals at which inspection ought to have taken place in order to reduce the danger to acceptable levels. In Davie v Edinburgh Corporation,117 for example, a resident in a block of flats owned by Edinburgh Corporation sustained fatal injuries when he fell down the common stair. The stairway was in darkness because the lighting system was not functioning and no maintenance had been performed for a period of six weeks. Nonetheless, his family failed in a claim brought against the Corporation under the 1960 Act. It was not enough for them simply to aver that the stair had been unlit for six weeks and that the Corporation had failed to carry out frequent and regular inspections. More detail would have been required as to why the defenders were at fault in failing to discover that the lighting had been out for such a period, and why this was too long a period to leave the stair uninspected. Crucially, the pursuers had made no averments as to what would have constituted a reasonably safe system; the defenders were “entitled to have notice of what system the defenders ought to have instituted in the exercise of their duty to take reasonable care to see to it that the lights on the stair were operating”.118 Where the hazard in question arose on a one-off basis, it must still be established that danger was reasonably foreseeable. In Falconer v Edinburgh City Transport Longstone Social Club,119 for example, the occupiers of social club premises permitted a cabaret troupe to perform on their dance floor. As part of the act, and without the defenders’ knowledge, baby oil was spilled on the floor, on which a member of the audience slipped when later she got up to dance. Breach of duty was not established because there was no evidence to suggest that the defenders should have foreseen that this unsafe spillage would occur and that they might reasonably have been expected to take precautions against it. Where a landlord is alleged to have failed in its duty as provided by section 3 of the 1960 Act in regard to tenanted property,120 the burden of 116 Hanlon v British Railways Board 1991 SLT 228; see also Walker v Eastern Scottish Omnibuses Ltd, CSOH, 28 December 1989, Lord Dervaird, in which the action was dismissed because the pursuer did not offer to prove that the offending insecure structure was loose to such a degree as would have been ascertained by inspection at any stage prior to the date of the accident itself. 117 1977 SLT (Notes) 5. 118 1977 SLT (Notes) 5 per Lord Kincraig at 7. Cf Porter v Strathclyde Regional Council 1991 SLT 446, in which breach of common law duty was established in relation to a slipping hazard caused by a food spillage on the floor of a children’s nursery. It was accepted that the nursery should have had a system whereby employees kept an eye on what was happening and immediately cleaned any food that they saw being spilled in a place where it might endanger others, or covered it until there was an opportunity to clean it. 119 2003 Rep LR 39. 120 As to which see para 25.15 above.

Occupiers’ Liability   953

establishing that the hazard might reasonably have been addressed by an appropriate system of inspection is particularly challenging. The tenant is required to set out in detail the content of the landlord’s obligation to inspect premises, particularly in circumstances where the alleged defect had not been notified by the tenant to the landlord.121 Thus in Muir v North Ayrshire Council,122 in which the pursuer, the tenant’s home help, had slipped and fallen, proof before answer was allowed where the pursuer averred that the tenant had made a specific complaint to the landlord that the door sill where she tripped was too high. Moreover, the pursuer had given clear notice in her pleadings of the content of the complaint, the locus, and a precautionary measure which had been specifically requested by the tenant. By contrast, where it cannot be shown that the landlord has been told about the defect, the pursuer must specify in detail what the landlord should have done to make itself aware of it. The pursuer in Kirkham v Link Housing Group123 tripped on a loose paving slab on the path to her front door, maintenance of which was the responsibility of her landlord, but did not specify how the landlord had fallen short of an adequate system of inspection and thus did not show how the landlord had failed to take reasonable care for her safety.124 Similarly in Murray v Edinburgh District Council,125 in which a wall panel collapsed on top of the pursuer in a tenanted property, a case under section 3 was held to be irrelevant where the pleadings contained “vague generalisations” but did not indicate how frequently such inspections by the landlord should have taken place or what they would have revealed. Knowledge of the hazard is not sufficient in itself for the occupier to be in breach of duty. The standard set by section 2(1) is that the occupier should have exercised such care as was reasonable in the circumstances of the case, not that it should have adopted the best possible safety system.126 The burden lies on the pursuer to point to a system that might reasonably have been put in place to avert the hazard.127 It must therefore be possible to identify practicable measures. In Porter v Scottish Borders Council,128 for

121 Bell v North Ayrshire Council 2007 Rep LR 108. 122 [2005] CSOH 127, 2005 SLT 963. 123 [2012] CSIH 58, 2012 Hous LR 87. 124 [2012] CSIH 58, 2012 Hous LR 87. In this regard it would have been relevant to provide evidence of what other landlords, similarly situated to the defenders, did by way of periodic inspection. As narrated at para 32, the Lord Ordinary noted that: “The evidence about the ad hoc system of inspection and the frequency of visits to properties was vague. There was no satisfactory evidence as to what a reasonable inspection of common parts or a reasonably diligent implementation of the ad hoc system would have amounted to.” 125 1981 SLT 253; see also Haggarty v Glasgow Corporation 1964 SLT (Notes) 54. 126 See e.g. McKevitt v National Trust for Scotland [2018] SC EDIN 20, 2018 Rep LR 76. 127 Jarrett v Kirkcaldy Ice Rink 2009 GWD 27–444. 128 [2008] CSOH 163, 2009 Rep LR 46.

25.35

954   The Law of Delict in Scotland

example, the pursuer slipped and injured himself on the wet floor of a public toilet. It was accepted that the occupiers (the local authority) knew about the floor becoming wet from time to time, whether from the ingress of rain water or from other sources, but the pursuer failed to establish that the local authority had breached their standard of care. He was unable to satisfy the court that occasional wet floors presented a substantial risk that required action to be taken. Nor, even accepting the risk to have been substantial, did he indicate what further action might reasonably have been expected of the occupiers to keep the floor less wet or less slippery, such as by replacing the flooring. By contrast, the pursuer in Lowe v Cairnstar Ltd,129 who similarly slipped on the wet floor of a toilet in the defender’s premises, led evidence to show that the tiled surface became hazardous when wet, and that the system of inspection operated by the defender was inadequate for the risk this presented. Her claim was successful, although subject to a finding of contributory negligence assessed at 25 per cent.

F. RELEVANT FACTORS IN ASSESSING STANDARD OF CARE 25.36

The standard of care required of the occupier in terms of the 1960 Act is contingent upon “all the circumstances of the case”.130 This means that consideration is to be given not only to the nature of the premises but also to what is known, or ought to have been known, of the persons present there. For example, the extent of an occupier’s duty in regard to domestic premises visited only by family and friends is necessarily different from that applicable to a venue open to the general public including children.

(1) Known vulnerabilities of persons visiting the premises 25.37

The known vulnerabilities of persons entering the property are an important “circumstance of the case” within the reasonable contemplation of the occupier, particularly where the occupier is aware that such persons are regular visitors. In particular, occupiers of premises that are known to constitute an allurement to children must take account of potential hazards. In this regard a shift in judicial attitudes is clearly discernible in the case law. Many of the early cases involved injuries to children playing unsupervised in the vicinity of hazards such as machinery, pits or deep water. As a general rule, it was expected that parents should exercise

129 [2020] SC EDIN 16, 2020 SLT (Sh Ct) 151. See also C v City of Edinburgh Council [2017] SC EDIN 84, 2018 SLT (Sh Ct) 34, showing that a reasonable system of inspection would have identified the hazard (a sign that fell from the wall). 130 Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 s 2(1).

Occupiers’ Liability   955

greater control over their offspring rather than expecting the occupier to put in place additional precautions to keep them safe. Special dangers that did not pose a threat to adults but arose from the “immature intelligence” of the visiting person were no concern of the occupier. This principle was discussed at length in Stevenson v Glasgow Corporation,131 decided in 1908, in which the pursuer’s small son had drowned in the River Kelvin where it flowed through the Glasgow Botanic Gardens, and in which it was held that there was “no authority for imposing on the proprietors or managers of public parks a duty to protect children from such risks as are incident to their childhood”.132 However, even before the enactment of the 1960 Act, there was a growing acceptance in early twentieth-century case law that dangers constituting a particular “allurement” to children gave rise to a duty to protect those children from injury. In Taylor v Glasgow Corporation133 the small son of the pursuer had died after eating the berries from a belladonna shrub growing close to where children played in the Glasgow Botanic Gardens. Holding the occupiers of the Gardens to have been negligent, Lord Atkinson explained:134 “The liability of defendants in cases of this kind rests . . . upon their knowledge that, by their action, they may bring children of tender years, unable to take care of themselves yet inquisitive and easily tempted, into contact, in a place in which they, the children, have a right to be, with things alluring or tempting to them, and possibly in appearance harmless, but which, unknown to them and well known to the defendants, are hurtful or dangerous if meddled with. I am quite unable to see any difference in principle between placing amongst children a dangerous but tempting machine, of whose parts and action they are ignorant, and growing in the vicinity of their playground a shrub whose fruit is harmless in appearance and alluring, but, in fact, most poisonous. I think, in the latter case, as in the former, the defendant would be bound, by notice or warning or some other adequate means, to protect the children from injury.”

By the same token operators of public parks were under a common-law duty of care to maintain play equipment as “reasonably safe” for its child users.135

131 1908 SC 1034. 132 1908 SC 1034 per Lord Kinnear at 1043. See also Hastie v Mags of Edinburgh 1907 SC 1102 per Lord President Dunedin at 1105–1106: “The proximate cause [of the child drowning] was not the existence of the pond, but, the fact of the child being unattended . . . [I]f the parents of children of such tender years cannot provide nurses to look after them, those children run risks which other children who are more carefully looked after do not. That cannot be altered by law – it is just one of the results of the world as we find it.” 133 1922 SC (HL) 1. 134 1922 SC (HL) 1 at 12. 135 Plank v Mags of Stirling 1956 SC 92.

25.38

956   The Law of Delict in Scotland

25.39

25.40

While in England the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 stated specifically, in section 2(3)(a), that the occupier should be “prepared for children to be less careful than adults”, no corresponding provision was included in the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960. Nonetheless, the general duty set out in section 2(1) continues to entail a high onus to protect children from risk where the occupier has purported to provide a safe area for them to play.136 One of the key “circumstances of the case” is the “age and intelligence” of persons entering the premises.137 Moreover, duty is not negated even if the children in question were on the premises uninvited. In Telfer v Glasgow Corporation138 the defenders had allowed unoccupied commercial premises to become derelict and took no steps after it became a “glorified adventure playground for the children of the neighbourhood and a highly dangerous one”.139 Although the children had no permission to be there, it was known that they were frequenting the building, and there was therefore “a very high onus on [the occupiers] to make strenuous efforts to keep it reasonably secure”.140 That duty was not an absolute one, but the court was persuaded that effective measures to exclude the children would have been reasonably practicable, and, having failed to implement these, the occupier was liable to a ten-year old child who fell through the roof of the building while playing there. By contrast in Devlin v Strathclyde Regional Council141 the pursuers’ fourteen-year-old son was killed falling through the perspex dome of a school roof while the building was empty over the weekend. Children were aware that they should not go on to the school roof, and the occupiers had taken measures to discourage them from doing so. In order to get there they would have had to negotiate fences, walls, and rhone pipes, and the roof contained no special or unusual danger in itself. In these circumstances the pursuers were unable to show that occupiers had failed to take reasonable care. Generally speaking, therefore, the vulnerabilities of known users of the property, such as children or the disabled, can be one of the factors which make up the circumstances of the case in terms of section 2(1) and may therefore result in a more exacting duty being imposed upon occupiers. This, however, does not normally apply where the vulnerability was selfinflicted. In Davie v Edinburgh Corporation,142 discussed above,143 in which the deceased had fallen down the unlit staircase of a block of flats, it was 136 Wardle v Scottish Borders Council 2011 SLT (Sh Ct) 199; see also O’Hara v Glasgow Corporation 1966 SLT (Notes) 24; Bye v Fife Council 2007 Rep LR 40. 137 Titchener v British Railways Board 1984 SC (HL) 34 per Lord Fraser at 54. 138 1974 SLT (Notes) 51. 139 1974 SLT (Notes) 51 per Lord Stott at 51. 140 1974 SLT (Notes) 51 per Lord Stott at 51. 141 1993 SLT 699. 142 1977 SLT (Notes) 5. 143 At para 25.32.

Occupiers’ Liability   957

admitted that he was returning home from a night out and had been under the influence of drink at the time of the accident. The claim was unsuccessful on other grounds, but Lord Kincraig observed that “the occupier of the common stair is not bound to make them reasonably safe for use by intoxicated persons, only for persons in normal possession of their faculties”.144

(2) Uninvited visitors As cases such as Telfer v Glasgow Corporation,145 discussed above,146 indicate, the fact of the pursuer having been on the premises uninvited is not enough to preclude the existence of a duty of care on the part of the occupier. It is, however, a relevant factor in assessing the standard of care in terms of section 2(1). The question therefore arises as to what lengths occupiers must go in their responsibility to such persons. In the leading Scottish case, McGlone v British Railways Board,147 the pursuer was a twelve-year-old boy who had been playing with a friend in a railway cutting owned by the defenders. The railway cutting in question had for many years been used by children as a playground and the defenders had taken no serious steps to exclude them from it. However, on this occasion the pursuer was severely injured by an electric shock after climbing the twenty-foot framework supporting an electricity transformer that powered the railway line. The transformer had been surrounded partly by a concrete wall and partly by robust fencing, and the child had apparently clambered through barbed wire to reach it. In doing so he had ignored notices on display reading “Danger – overhead live wires”. The crucial question was whether the occupiers had met the appropriate standard of care in regard to the danger represented by the transformer. Lord Reid, noting that the 1960 Act did not distinguish between trespassers and other categories of visitor, continued:148 “But that does not mean that the occupier must always show equal care for the safety of all such persons. The care required is such care as is reasonable and it may be reasonable to require a greater degree of care in one such case than in another. In deciding what degree of care is required, in my view regard must be had both to the position of the occupier and to the position of the person entering his premises and it may often be reasonable to hold that an occupier must do more to protect a person whom he permits to be on his property than he need do to protect a person who enters his property without his permission.”

144 145 146 147 148

1977 SLT (Notes) 5 at 7; see also Driver v Dover Roman Painted House [2014] EWHC 1929 (QB). 1974 SLT (Notes) 51. At para 25.39. 1966 SC (HL) 1. 1966 SC (HL) 1 at 11.

25.41

25.42

25.43

958   The Law of Delict in Scotland

25.44

In other words, in determining the extent of the occupier’s duty it is a relevant circumstance that the injured person was a determined trespasser, as in McGlone, rather than, for example, a child visiting a public play-park. Even if the hazard is a serious one, there is a limit to the measures considered reasonable in order to exclude an intrepid intruder such as the young McGlone. Lord Guest emphasised that the occupier’s duty was not to “ensure the entrant’s safety but only to show reasonable care”149 in the circumstances. The occupier was expected to adopt protective measures “sufficient to indicate a serious intention to exclude the intruder”, but this did not entail the erection of a “perfect boy-proof fence”; nor was it necessary to go to the lengths of such precautions as would repel a “deliberate invader”.150 Moreover, where the hazard was as obvious as an electricity transformer, it was enough, according to Lord Pearce, “if the occupier makes it clear beyond the possibility of mistake that all persons are forbidden to enter, and, in addition, backs up that manifestation by some serious obstruction which can only be overcome by a deliberate act intended to defeat its obvious function”.151 In the present case the occupiers had achieved the standard of care required of them by posting unequivocal warning notices and by erecting formidable barriers round the transformer.152 Care must be taken, however, that those barriers to entry do not constitute a hazard in their own right. In Dawson v Scottish Power plc,153 an eleven-year-old child was injured as he went to retrieve his football by climbing over a fence into an electricity substation. The substation was situated in a residential area and it was accepted that children playing ball games in the vicinity regularly scaled the fence to retrieve footballs. The fence was mostly six feet high, and there were prominent warning signs, which may arguably have been sufficient for the occupier to have discharged its duty in regard to danger of electrocution present within the fenced area. However, the fencing was topped with spikes and barbs, and for part of its extent the surrounding earth had built up so that the fence was effectively only four feet high. The pursuer climbed the fence at this point and in so doing injured himself on one of the spikes. In this case, therefore, it was the spikes and barbs on the fencing which constituted the relevant danger rather than the risk of electrocution. In this regard the occupiers were held to have fallen below the requisite standard of care in failing to maintain the ground so as to ensure that the fence remained six feet high. A four-foot fence “encouraged” the children to attempt to climb it, thus exposing them to the risk of injuries of this type. 149 150 151 152

1966 SC (HL) 1 at 15. 1966 SC (HL) 1 at 15–16. 1966 SC (HL) 1 at 18. See also Titchener v British Railways Board 1984 SC (HL) 34, in which the dangers of trespassing to cross a railway line were regarded as so obvious that the occupiers were not required to go to significant lengths in order to make their fencing impregnable. 153 1999 SLT 672.

Occupiers’ Liability   959

(3) Emergencies How should an occupier’s duty be assessed in relation to the emergency services, such as firefighters attending a fire on the premises? The fact that the presence of such persons is unlikely to be other than one-off and unexpected does not absolve occupiers of their duty in respect of the state of the premises. However, it is not considered reasonable that an occupier should guarantee safe passage to firefighters attending a fire which has not been caused by the occupier’s fault. In Bermingham v Sher Brothers,154 several firemen, including the pursuer’s husband, were fatally injured while fighting a fire at a warehouse premises. A ceiling, which turned out to have been highly inflammable, had suddenly erupted in flames, cutting off a staircase and trapping the firemen in an upper floor. The House of Lords held that occupiers’ duty did in principle extend to firemen, but it would constitute “an impossible burden” for occupiers if they were required to anticipate the ways in which a fire might suddenly take hold and to provide a method of escape from the building which would remain viable in these extreme circumstances.155 That the state of the premises would have been hazardous in the event of a fire is not enough of itself, therefore, to indicate a breach of duty. Nonetheless, it might well be considered reasonable “in all the circumstances of the case” for the occupier to warn firefighters of the presence of unexpected or unusual dangers, such as a hazardous chemical or explosive material.156 Where, however, a fire has been caused by the negligence of the occupier, English authority indicates that an occupier owes a common law duty of care to firefighters attending to extinguish it. In Ogwo v Taylor,157 the plaintiff fireman was seriously injured fighting a fire sparked by the occupier’s negligent operation of a blow torch in a confined attic area. A common law duty of care was said to arise in relation to the foreseeable risks created by the occupier’s negligence, and it was a foreseeable risk that firefighters would be exposed to danger in dealing with the ensuing conflagration.

25.45

25.46

G. RES IPSA LOQUITUR The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may exceptionally be invoked to argue that the mere occurrence of an accident creates an inference that, as a matter of fact, the occupier did not exercise such care as was in all the circumstances of the case reasonable, as required in terms of section 2(1) of the 1960 Act. 154 1980 SC (HL) 67. 155 1980 SC (HL) 67 per Lord Fraser at 72. 156 See Merrington v Ironbridge Metal Works Ltd [1952] 2 All ER 1101, although cf Flannigan v British Dyewood Co Ltd 1970 SLT 285, in which a fireman failed to establish that duty was owed to him in terms of s 29(1) of the Factories Act 1961. 157 [1988] AC 431; see also Salmon v Seafarer Restaurants Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 1264.

25.47

960   The Law of Delict in Scotland

25.48

25.49

As noted elsewhere in this volume,158 the doctrine requires the pursuer to so show both that: (i) the thing which caused the damage was under the defender’s management; and (ii) the accident was of a type that does not ordinarily occur if proper care is taken. The inference is then accepted only if the defender can offer no explanation consistent with absence of fault on the defender’s part. If, on the other hand, the defender offers evidence to indicate the exercise of such care as was in all the circumstances of the case reasonable, that evidence must be evaluated in order to determine whether the inference can stand. Thus in McDyer v The Celtic Football and Athletic Co Ltd,159 for example, the pursuer was injured by piece of timber falling on him from the canopy of Celtic Park football stadium. A relevant case was made against the occupier of the stadium only when the pursuer amended his pleadings to aver: (i) that works undertaken in the relevant area of the stadium canopy shortly before the accident could not have been carried out unless with the occupier’s concurrence as the area was inaccessible to the public; and (ii) that this type of accident was not consistent with wear and tear or weather damage but was consistent with negligence in recent works. It remained open for the occupier at proof to rebut the inference of fault by providing an explanation for the accident that was consistent with the exercise of reasonable care on its part.160 By contrast, the res ipsa loquitur inference is not adequately supported by vague assertions as to the hazardous condition of premises. In Murray v Edinburgh District Council,161 the pursuer was injured when a section of wooden wall-panelling fell off and injured her as she worked as a home help in a house of which the defenders were the landlords. The court did not accept that the res ipsa loquitur inference could be drawn in these circumstances. As this was a tenanted property, it was impossible to say that the panel had been the exclusive management of the defenders. Moreover, the collapse of such fittings after an unspecified period might have various explanations and did not clearly point to a failure of reasonable care on any particular person’s part.

H. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS (1) Contractors as occupiers 25.50

Since the status of occupier turns not on title to the land or premises in question but upon the concept of control, it is possible that in certain circumstances contractors may be regarded as the occupiers of sites at which 158 159 160 161

See paras 10.59–10.69 above. 2000 SC 379. The defenders failed to do so: see note of subsequent proof at 2001 SLT 1387. 1981 SLT 253; see also McQueen v Ballater Golf Club 1975 SLT 160.

Occupiers’ Liability   961

they are working. As Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson explained in Murdoch v A & R Scott, a case involving the potential liability of contractors in occupation of a building site, the status of occupier was not confined to owners and tenants:162 “The important thing is the degree of possession and control which the occupier exercises over the land. The title of the occupier, whether it be property, lease or something else, may be an important element in discovering whether the occupier exercises such a degree of possession and control as to put him in a position to invite, license or exclude. But title is not an essential element, as the owner or the tenant may have ceded possession and control to another in such a way as to divest himself of any right to come on the land.”

A contractor may therefore be regarded as an occupier if it has taken over direct control of premises on a temporary basis, and was therefore in a position to take reasonable care for their safety, as well as to exclude those for whom the premises were hazardous. But while the main contractor working on a construction site may be considered as an occupier,163 contractors visiting a site for a limited purpose, such as painting and decorating, are unlikely to have control to a sufficient degree.164

(2) Liability of occupiers for fault by contractors In England and Wales, the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 provides expressly, in section 2(4)(b), for the role of contractors in maintaining property: “where damage is caused to a visitor by a danger due to the faulty execution of any work of construction, maintenance or repair by an independent contractor employed by the occupier, the occupier is not to be treated without more as answerable for the danger if in all the circumstances he had acted reasonably in entrusting the work to an independent contractor and had taken such steps (if any) as he reasonably ought in order to satisfy himself that the contractor was competent and that the work had been properly done.”

An occupier, therefore, has met the relevant standard of care, in terms of the 1957 Act, if the occupier has acted reasonably in selecting and supervising a contractor to carry out work. The occupier is not therefore liable for hazards created unforeseeably by a contractor in those circumstances.

162 1956 SC 309 at 312. The contractors escaped liability, however, on the basis of the common law doctrine which imposed only a limited duty in relation to trespassers. 163 Murdoch v A & R Scott 1956 SC 309; see also Bunker v Charles Brand & Son Ltd [1969] 2 QB 480. 164 See Page v Read (1984) 134 NLJ 723.

25.51

962   The Law of Delict in Scotland

25.52

The Scottish legislation makes no such specific provision, however, and the pre-1960 case law is not entirely clear on the point. In Cremin v Thomson165 a stevedore’s labourer unloading a ship in Glasgow was injured by the collapse of a structure negligently fixed by a contractor who – and this was perhaps of significance in this war-time decision – was based in distant Fremantle. The House of Lords upheld the injured man’s claim against the owner, who, it considered, could not disclaim liability by virtue of the defective structure having been put in place by a contractor. In MacDonald v Reid’s Trs,166 a few years later, the pursuer was unsuccessful in her claim against the occupier after her husband, a chimney sweep, was killed in falling from a collapsed chimney stack. The court held that she had failed to prove that a reasonable inspection of the structure would have revealed the defect. Lord Birnam, however, observed that:167 ”Where [a duty of inspection] rests upon owners of property it may be discharged by the owners themselves, by their own servants, by their agents, or by independent contractors upon their instructions. If the duty is not efficiently discharged and injury is thereby occasioned to a third party, it does not seem to me to matter whether the imperfect inspection was carried out by the owners themselves or by someone else on their behalf. The third party’s claim is in law against the owners of the property because the legal duty rests upon them.”

25.53

These decisions may be compared with Paterson v Kidd’s Trs,168 decided in 1896, where the pursuer failed in his claim against the occupier where he had fallen through a defective floor in a granary. He was unable to show that the collapse was attributable to fault on the occupier’s part where the occupier had instructed a competent joiner to overhaul the floor two years previously and no cause for concern had manifested itself to the occupier or his employees in the intervening period. The regime of the 1960 Act is fault-based, with section 2(1) requiring of the occupier “such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable”. Such a regime appears incompatible with any semblance of strict liability for the fault of contractors. As in the law of nuisance,169 there is no doubt an argument that occupiers may held be liable for injuries result165 1956 SLT 357 (judgment of 20 Oct 1941). This decision was the subject of criticism in the Third Report of the Law Reform Committee for England (Cmd 9305, 1954) which, in making recommendations for the form of what became the 1957 legislation, described the imposition of liability for the shortcomings of an independent contractor as being of “doubtful validity” (para 52). Cremin was also noted in the First Report of the Law Reform Committee for Scotland (Cmnd 88, 1957), but its implications in terms of liability for contractors were not aired. 166 1947 SC 726. 167 1947 SC 726 at 727–728. 168 (1896) 24 R 99. 169 See paras 22.56–22.62 above.

Occupiers’ Liability   963

ing from operations which the occupier instructed a contractor to carry out with a known risk of damage to a neighbour. It may also be argued that an occupier has not exercised reasonable care in terms of section 2(1) where insufficient attention was given to the selection of the contractor or to the supervision of the work. However, the scheme of the 1960 Act cannot readily be reconciled with the imposition of liability on an occupier who has acted with due care in such matters. In other words, the position of occupiers instructing contractors may in practice differ little as between those subject to the specific rule contained in section (2)(4)(b) of the (English) Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957, and those subject to the general rule on standard of care as set out in section 2(1) of the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960.

I. DEFENCES (1) Contributory negligence The Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 does not make specific provision for contributory negligence, but it is clear that where a person has suffered damage as the result partly of the person’s own fault, a claim made under the 1960 Act may be reduced in keeping with section 1 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. Examples of such contributory negligence include a failure to watch footing,170 a failure to keep a proper lookout in unlit surroundings,171 and, in the case of children, playing in forbidden places.172

25.54

(2) Willing acceptance of risk The defence of volenti non fit injuria,173 previously available to occupiers in cases brought against them under the common law, was in effect “restated”174 by the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960, which in section 2(3) absolves the occupier of “any obligation to a person entering on his premises in respect of risks which that person has willingly accepted as his; and any question whether a risk was so accepted shall be decided on the same principles as in other cases in which one person owes to another a duty to show care”. The key to the operation of this defence is thus the “willing” acceptance of risk, sometimes expressly articulated but more typically inferred 170 Porter v Strathclyde Regional Council 1991 SLT 446 (50%). 171 Cowan v Hopetoun House Preservation Trust [2013] CSOH 9, 2013 Rep LR 62 (75%). 172 Telfer v Glasgow Corporation 1974 SLT (Notes) 51 (50%); Dawson v Scottish Power plc 1999 SLT 672 (33%); Morton v Glasgow City Council 2007 SLT (Sh Ct) 81 (25%); Anderson v Imrie [2016] CSOH 171, 2017 Rep LR 21, affd [2018] CSIH 14, 2018 SC 328 (25%). 173 For this defence more generally, see paras 29.02–29.23 below. 174 Dawson v Page [2013] CSIH 24, 2013 SC 432 per Lord McGhie at para 12.

25.55

25.56

964   The Law of Delict in Scotland

25.57

from the circumstances. In Titchener v British Railways Board,175 one of the leading cases, the pursuer, under cross-examination, provided clear indication of the state of mind necessary for the operation of the defence. The pursuer was a fifteen-year-old girl who had been knocked down by a train. After making their way through a gap in fencing erected by the defenders, she and her boyfriend had been crossing a railway line in order to get to disused brickworks on the other side. She argued that, in failing to install more robust fencing, the defenders had fallen short of the standard of care required of them as occupiers. However, she admitted that she knew it was dangerous to cross the railway line. Counsel for the defenders put it to her that: “You mean to say that you put your life in danger through the presence of these trains, simply because it was shorter to get to the brickworks?” She responded: “it was just a chance that I took”.176 The view of the Lord Ordinary, Lord Ross, endorsed by the Inner House and by the House of Lords, was that “A person who takes a chance necessarily consents to take what comes.” An understanding of the relevant hazard is also a prerequisite of acceptance of risk. If a person enters premises fully understanding the nature of the hazard contained therein – such as passing trains on a railway line – the person may be said to have accepted the risk of injury from that source.177 By contrast, it is not possible “willingly” to accept hazards whose nature is not fully apparent, as in the case of latent safety defects which the occupier has failed to address. This is demonstrated in the English case of White v Blackmore,178 in which a person was fatally injured due to the collapse of safety ropes as he watched a motor-racing event. The defence of volenti did not apply because, although he might be taken to have consented to the known risks of being a spectator at such an event,179 he did not willingly consent to the risk of inadequate safety precautions of which he was unaware:180 “No doubt the visitor takes on himself the risks inherent in motor racing, but he does not take on himself the risk of injury due to the defaults of the organisers . . . If the organisers do everything that is reasonable, they are not liable if a racing car leaps the barriers and crashes into the crowd . . . But, if the organisers fail to take reasonable precautions, they cannot excuse

175 1984 SC (HL) 34. 176 1981 SLT 208 at 212. 177 See also Devlin v Strathclyde Regional Council 1993 SLT 699, in which the deceased fourteenyear-old youth was regarded as having “voluntarily” accepted the risk of falling by jumping on top of a section of perspex roofing. 178 [1972] 2 QB 651. See also Slack v Glenie [2000] All ER (D) 592, in which the claimant was a motor cyclist who was injured on the defendants’ race track. The defence could not succeed because it was not apparent to the claimant that the layout of the track at the accident locus did not comply with industry safety standards. 179 See Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club [1933] 1 KB 205. 180 [1972] 2 QB 651 per Lord Denning at 663, referring to comparable wording in the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 s 2(5).

Occupiers’ Liability   965 themselves from liability by invoking the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria; for the simple reason that the person injured or killed does not willingly accept the risks arising from their want of reasonable care.”

The pursuer’s level of understanding of the hazard is thus key to the operation of this defence, as is apparent by comparing Titchener, discussed above, with Morton v Glasgow City Council.181 The fourteen-year-old pursuer in Morton was of an age with the pursuer in Titchener when he climbed fifteen feet up the scaffolding surrounding the defenders’ premises. Ms Titchener was deemed to have understood the relevant risk, even though she thought that she “would never get hit by a train”. In Morton, on the other hand, the pursuer said that he did not think he would fall, which helped to convince the court that he had not “worked out in detail” the risk of falling from the scaffolding, even if it was “at the back of his mind”.182 He had not willingly accepted risk therefore. The relevant risk must have been freely accepted, not forced upon the pursuer, so that the pursuer is truly “willing”.183 In Hughes’ Tutrix v Glasgow DC184 the pursuer was a young child whose mother had complained repeatedly to the defender, her landlord, regarding a cracked toilet bowl in their flat, but had remained in the accommodation. When the child seriously injured her hand on the broken part of the bowl she brought a claim against the landlord on the basis of section 3(1)185 of the 1960 Act. The defender invoked section 2(3) to the effect that, by continuing to live in the flat knowing of the condition of the toilet bowl, the pursuer’s mother had accepted the danger and thereby barred her child from claiming damages. However, the court found that the mother had put up with the disrepair of the toilet because she had no alternative “in the face of the intransigence of the defenders and her own poverty”,186 and that one could not therefore read into this a willingness to relieve the defender of its obligations as occupier. In any event, section 2(3) required the person injured to accept risk, which the child pursuer herself had clearly not done. By the same token, the acquiescence by a worker in an unsafe workplace does not of its own connote willing acceptance of risk without “something much more” to indicate that the worker is prepared to absolve the occupier of liability.187 In Bunker v Charles Brand & Son Ltd188 the plaintiff was a 181 2007 SLT (Sh Ct) 81. 182 2007 SLT (Sh Ct) 81 per Sheriff B Kearney at para 16. 183 See e.g. Heary v Phinn 2013 SLT (Sh Ct) 145, discussed at para 25.06 above, in which the pursuer could not be regarded as having willingly accepted the risk of injury. As Sheriff McGowan commented at para 100, other than climbing the gate, “there was no ‘shortcut’ or safer route, as with Titchener”. 184 1982 SLT (Sh Ct) 70. 185 This is the provision which places liability on landlords where, under the lease, they are responsible for repairs: see paras 25.15–25.17 above. 186 1982 SLT (Sh Ct) 70 per Sheriff G H Gordon QC at 73 187 Millar v Rooney [2006] NIQB 7 per Deeney J at para 18. 188 [1969] 2 QB 480.

25.58

25.59

25.60

966   The Law of Delict in Scotland

welder working on the construction of the new Victoria line for the London Underground, on a site where the main contractors were deemed to be the occupiers. In order to access the front of the tunnel-boring machine, where he had been set to work, the plaintiff required to pick a difficult route across a series of free-running rollers supported on angle irons. As he did so he slipped and was injured. The route had shown to him by his employers, and so he had full knowledge of the risk involved in walking over the rollers, namely the risk that he might lose his footing and fall. He used it only because he had been ordered to do so by his employers, with the knowledge of the occupiers. In those circumstances the plaintiff could not be regarded as having “willingly” consented to the risk,189 and the occupiers were held liable for his injuries.

J. RESTRICTION OF LIABILITY BY AGREEMENT 25.61

The Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 provides, in section 2(1), for the possibility to “extend, restrict, modify or exclude by agreement” the occupier’s obligations. In requiring an agreement, which in effect means a contract,190 the wording of the 1960 Act appears to offer less latitude than the wording of the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 section 2(1), which, for England and Wales, allows for duty to be extended, restricted, modified or excluded “by agreement or otherwise”. In practice, agreements of this kind are most likely to be found in the context of contractual relationships, such as between operators of car parks or visitor attractions and their customers. In such contexts the terms of the contract may simply be displayed on a notice, and in principle these will bind if they are sufficiently conspicuous to be read at the time of the contract being made.191 However, any such agreement, or notice, which is made in the course of business or relates to premises used for the business purposes of the occupier,192 is subject to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, section 16. Hence agreements made in these contexts are void in so far as they restrict liability for death or injury; in other circumstances, such as in relation to property damage, they “have no effect if it was not fair and reasonable to incorporate the term in the contract”.193 Section 65 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 has similar effect where a contractual term or provision in a consumer contract or a consumer notice194 purports to exclude or restrict liability for death 189 [1969] 2 QB 480 per O’Connor J at 489. 190 On this point, see A McAllister, “Occupiers’ Liability”, in Delict (SULI) para 17.79; H L MacQueen, MacQueen and Thomson on Contract Law in Scotland, 5th edn (2020) para 8.65; but cf P North, Occupiers’ Liability, 2nd edn (2014) para 8.28. 191 W W McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 3rd edn (2007) paras 7–16 and 7–18. 192 For discussion, see Harrison v West of Scotland Kart Club 2001 SC 367, revd in part 2004 SC 615. 193 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 s 16(1). 194 “Consumer” is defined in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 s 2(3) as “an individual acting for purposes that are wholly or mainly outside that individual’s trade, business, craft or profession”.

Occupiers’ Liability   967

or personal injury caused by a failure of duty in terms of the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960.195 Notices disclaiming liability where there is no agreement between the parties, and notices which incorporate contractual terms which purport to restrict liability for death or injury, do not therefore achieve their desired effect in excluding liability. Nonetheless, the fact of an occupier having posted a warning notice may be a factor indicating that the occupier has exercised reasonable care for the safety of those entering the premises.196

195 Consumer Rights Act 2015 s 65(4). Section 65 does not apply to the liability of an occupier to a person obtaining access to the premises for recreational purposes if allowing the person access for those purposes is not within the scope of the occupier’s trade, business, craft or profession (s 66(4)). 196 See discussion in Dawson v Page [2013] CSIH 24, 2013 SC 432.

25.62

Chapter 26

Product Liability

Para A. INTRODUCTION ���������������������������������������������������������������� 26.01 B. LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 26.04 (1) The scope of duty ������������������������������������������������������������ 26.07 (2) Intervention by third parties���������������������������������������������� 26.10 (3) Duty to warn of defects after supply����������������������������������� 26.12 (4) Proof of negligence������������������������������������������������������������ 26.13 (5) Types of defect ���������������������������������������������������������������� 26.15 (6) Proof of causation ������������������������������������������������������������ 26.19 C. THE ADVENT OF STRICT LIABILITY ������������������������������ 26.20 D. THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1987: SCOPE�������� 26.25 (1) Who can bring a claim? ���������������������������������������������������� 26.26 (2) Who is liable? (a) The producer ������������������������������������������������������������� 26.27 (b) The “own-brander” ���������������������������������������������������� 26.30 (c) Importers ������������������������������������������������������������������� 26.31 (d) Suppliers ������������������������������������������������������������������� 26.32 (e) Producers of components�������������������������������������������� 26.33 (3) Excluded transactions������������������������������������������������������� 26.34 (4) The meaning of “product” ����������������������������������������������� 26.36 (5) Damage ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 26.41 E. THE TEST FOR DEFECTIVENESS (1) Introduction �������������������������������������������������������������������� 26.46 (2) The three factors in section 3(2)���������������������������������������� 26.49 (a) The manner in which the product has been marketed, including Instructions and warnings����������������������������� 26.50 (b) What might reasonably be expected to be done with the product��������������������������������������������������������� 26.53 (c) The time when the product was supplied��������������������� 26.54 (3) Section 3(2): “all the circumstances” �������������������������������� 26.56 (a) Manufacturing defects: standard and non-standard products �������������������������������������������������������������������� 26.57 (b) Design and instruction defects: avoidability ����������������� 26.61 (c) Compliance with safety standards ������������������������������� 26.64 F. CAUSATION ������������������������������������������������������������������������ 26.65 968

Product Liability   969

G. DEFENCES �������������������������������������������������������������������������� 26.69 (1) Compliance with an enactment or retained EU obligation �� 26.70 (2) Product not supplied by the defender to another ��������������� 26.71 (3) Product not supplied in the course of a business ���������������� 26.73 (4) Defect did not exist in the product at the time of supply ���� 26.76 (5) The “development risks” defence �������������������������������������� 26.79 (6) Component parts in products defective only because of inappropriate design or specification ��������������������������������� 26.87 (7) Prescription and limitation ����������������������������������������������� 26.88 (8) Contributory negligence ��������������������������������������������������� 26.93 (9) Exclusion clauses ������������������������������������������������������������� 26.96 H. SAFETY REGULATIONS AND THEIR BREACH �������������� 26.97

A. INTRODUCTION The term “product liability”, denoting the liability of manufacturers and others in the supply chain for loss or injury caused by defective products, is a latecomer to delict textbooks, appearing as a term of art only in the latter part of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, the subject itself has a long and eventful history, informed by changing attitudes towards consumers as well as the increasing availability of mass-produced products from the nineteenth century onwards. At one time the common law had implied a general warranty of quality into contracts for sale of goods, but this was largely taken away by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act Scotland 1856.1 In line with its stated purpose of removing the “inconvenience” occasioned by differences between the laws of Scotland and of England in matters of trade, that legislation provided that the seller should be liable for unknown defects or failings in quality only where an express warranty had been given of quality or sufficiency or where the goods had been expressly sold for a specified purpose.2 An implied warranty, albeit of a limited kind, was restored by the Sale of Goods Act 18933 and by the successor Sale of Goods Act of 1979 (as later amended by the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994) for sales in the course of a business.4 What began in 1893 as a warranty

  1 W M Gordon, “Sale”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 305 at 326.   2 Mercantile Law Amendment Act Scotland 1856 s 5.   3 For an account of the passage of the 1856 and 1893 Acts from a Scottish perspective, see Gordon, “Sale” 326–331. For a detailed history of the law in England, see M Lobban, “Contractual Terms and their Performance”, in W Cornish et al, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol XII, 1820–1914: Private Law (2010) 473–521.   4 See also the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, which provides for similar protection in regard to the supply of goods as part of a contract for services.

26.01

26.02

970   The Law of Delict in Scotland

26.03

regarding merchantability and fitness for purpose has become, in the modern law,5 an implied term that goods supplied under a contract of sale are of “satisfactory quality”. This means that they must “meet the standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory”, taking account of considerations that include safety.6 For those who suffer loss or injury due to a defective product, a claim in contract against the seller is usually more attractive than a claim in delict against the manufacturer (or someone else); for there is no requirement to show fault or that the defect affected the safety of the goods, but only that the goods were of unsatisfactory quality. When, furthermore, a claim is made under a contract of sale, losses are recoverable regardless of whether they relate to property damage or physical injury or are purely economic in character. These are significant advantages. But a claim in contract is not always available. It is not available, for example, for a purchaser who wishes to call the producer, and not the seller, to account, or for an injured party who was not the purchaser of the defective goods. In circumstances such as these a remedy must be sought in the law of delict.

B. LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS 26.04

The decision of the House of Lords in Donoghue v Stevenson7 resolved once and for all the question whether the law of negligence might provide a remedy where there was no contractual relationship between the manufacturer and the person ultimately injured by a defective product.8 The wider implications of Donoghue in providing a general framework of principle for duty of care are considered elsewhere in this volume.9 At a more specific level, however, the decision established the principle that the manufacturer of products which could not be inspected prior to consumption owed a duty to consumers to take reasonable care for their safety. Lord Macmillan’s speech in Donoghue examined the reasoning in the then recent case of Mullen v A G Barr & Co,10 in which the Second Division had reached the opposite conclusion on almost identical facts, and he explained why that decision was misconceived in its

  5   6   7   8

Sale of Goods Act 1979 s 14; Consumer Rights Act 2015 s 9. 1979 Act s 14(2A), (2B)(d); 2015 Act s 9(2), (3). 1932 SC (HL) 31. An earlier decision from New York, MacPherson v Buick Motor Co 217 NY 382, 111 NE 1050 (1916) (concerning a defective automobile wheel), reasoned that if liability arose in relation to accidents caused by dangerous substances such as poisons and explosives, it should also flow from the failure of products where “the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made” (per Cardozo J at 389). 9 See paras 4.03–4.12 above. 10 1929 SC 461.

Product Liability   971

reading of English authority.11 Indeed the draft of Lord Macmillan’s speech reveals that, in material not in the event used, he had analysed the Scots authorities in detail and concluded that, aside from Mullen, there was no “authority in the institutional texts or the law reports of Scotland” to support the proposition that the manufacturer of food products intended for human consumption did not owe a duty of care to consumers.12 The essential ratio of Donoghue was framed by Lord Atkin as follows:13

26.05

“[A] manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him, with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the products will result in an injury to the consumer’s life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care.”

Broadly speaking, that statement continues to hold good as representing the common law position in regard to liability in negligence for defective products. The law of negligence retains an important role in those circumstances where the framework of strict liability created by the Consumer Protection Act 1987 (discussed below) is inapplicable, such as where damage has been caused to property which is in commercial use.14 In addition to manufacturers, common law liability may extend to wholesalers15 and retailers,16 in circumstances where it was a reasonable expectation that the wholesaler or retailer should have examined the goods before they were passed on. The provision of free samples of goods seems also to give rise to a duty of care.17 Liability may similarly be imposed upon repairers18 and those who have provided goods on hire.19 The category of those liable is thus not as restricted as that set out in section 2 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987. Repairers, for example, escape liability under the 1987 Act but not at common law, as do those who have merely assembled goods rather than manufactured them.20

11 At 62–63. 12 Reproduced in the Appendix to A Rodger, “Lord Macmillan’s Speech in Donoghue v Stevenson” (1992) 108 LQR 236 at 248–259. 13 1932 SC (HL) 31 per Lord Atkin at 57. 14 See para 26.44 below. 15 Watson v Buckley, Osborne, Garrett & Co Ltd [1940] 1 All ER 174. 16 Kubach v Hollands [1937] 3 All ER 907 (chemist); Andrews v Hopkinson [1957] 1 QB 229 (secondhand car salesman). 17 Hawkins v Coulsdon and Purley Urban District Council [1954] 1 QB 319 per Denning J at 333. 18 Stennett v Hancock and Peters [1939] 2 All ER 578; Haseldine v C A Daw and Son Ltd [1941] 2 KB 343. 19 Griffiths v Arch Engineering Co (Newport) Ltd [1968] 3 All ER 217. 20 For discussion, see C J Miller and R S Goldberg, Product Liability, 2nd edn (2004) paras 8.07–8.08; and for the common law position, see e.g. Malfroot v Noxal Ltd (1935) 79 Sol Jo 610, 51 TLR 551.

26.06

972   The Law of Delict in Scotland

(1) The scope of duty 26.07

26.08

Although Donoghue v Stevenson concerned foodstuffs, the ratio of the decision has lent itself to other types of unsafe products, not only food and drink,21 but also items such as clothing,22 hair dye,23 pharmaceuticals,24 motor vehicles25 and vehicle parts,26 as well as the containers for those goods.27 The manufacturer’s duty also extends to taking reasonable care that component parts made by others can properly be used in the end product without threat to customer safety,28 although it may be more difficult to show that reasonable care has not been exercised in this regard.29 As well as the duty to avoid injury to consumers, manufacturers are obliged to take care against the risk of damage to property.30 Moreover, the duty imposed upon manufacturers may relate to loss or damage arising in the commercial as well as in the private sphere.31 Duty extends to damage to other property caused by the defect in the product, although only where such damage arose from uses to which the product might foreseeably have been put.32 By contrast, loss derived from damage to the defective product itself may not be recovered. In Hamble

21 Lockhart v Barr 1941 SC 578 (iron brew contaminated with phenol); Barnes v Irwell Valley Water Board [1939] 1 KB 21 (water contaminated with lead). 22 Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd [1936] AC 85 (underwear containing irritant chemical). 23 Watson v Buckley, Osborne, Garrett & Co Ltd [1940] 1 All ER 174. 24 Buchan v Ortho Pharmaceutical (Can) Ltd (1986) 25 DLR (4th) 658. 25 Herschtal v Stewart & Ardern Ltd [1940] 1 KB 155. 26 Stennett v Hancock and Peters [1939] 2 All ER 578; Carroll v Fearon, Bent and Dunlop Ltd [1998] PIQR P416. 27 Hart v Dominion Stores (1968) 67 DLR (2d) 675 (exploding bottle); Hill v James Crowe (Cases) Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 812 (crate containing televisions). 28 See MacPherson v Buick Motor Co 217 NY 382, 111 NE 1050 (1916) (wooden car wheel). 29 Although manufacturers of the end product would be expected to apply reasonable care in inspecting component parts, that duty may be limited, for example, where the component part was in a sealed unit, or where a part obtained from a reputable source appeared to all intents and purposes to conform to specification. See also Taylor v Rover Co Ltd [1966] 2 All ER 181 per Baker J at 186 (provision of tools): “The second defendants were entitled to assume, in my view, having got competent hardeners to do the hardening of this guilty chisel for them, that the work was properly done, and it was no part of their duty in law or in good sense to set about the chisel when they received it from the hardeners and to examine it and test it by hardness test.” 30 Ruegger v Shell Oil Co of Canada (1963) 41 DLR (2d) 183 (damage to crops); and see discussion in D Pride & Partners v Institute for Animal Health [2009] EWHC 685 (QB) per Tugendhat J at paras 54–75. 31 Vacwell Engineering Co Ltd v BDH Chemicals Ltd [1971] 1 QB 88 (exploding chemicals causing damage to factory). Cf Consumer Protection Act 1987 s 5(3), excluding liability for damage to property that is not “ordinarily intended for private use or consumption”. 32 See M/s Aswan Engineering Establishment Co v Lupdine Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 1, where the defendants had provided buckets for a waterproofing compound which, on being exported to Kuwait, were left on the quayside in containers for several days. The temperature in the containers reached 70 degrees and the buckets collapsed. Under reference to Donoghue, storage in this fashion was held not to be foreseeable, and the loss of the buckets and their contents was therefore beyond the scope of the bucket manufacturer’s duty. See also Eccles v Cross 1938 SC 697.

Product Liability   973

Fisheries Limited v L Gardner & Sons Ltd,33 for example, the plaintiffs had bought a boat fitted with an engine supplied by the defendants. Some time after the contractual warranty expired, the pistons in the engine failed, damaging the engine but causing no damage to the ship. The repair costs of the engine were held to be economic loss for which the engine manufacturers were not liable in the absence of any special circumstances indicating an assumption of responsibility to warn the plaintiffs of the risk of such loss. As well as being owed to purchasers and to those who have received defective products directly from purchasers, a duty of care is also owed to those have been exposed to their dangers in other circumstances,34 such as employees injured by defective products while at work,35 those who have borrowed such items,36 those travelling in defective motor vehicles,37 as well as bystanders finding themselves within the range of foreseeable risk.38

26.07

(2) Intervention by third parties In order for the manufacturer to be held liable, the court must be persuaded, on the balance of probabilities, that the product was already defective when it left the manufacturer’s control, rather than having become so due to subsequent interference by a third party.39 In Evans v Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd,40 for example, the windscreen on the plaintiff’s car disintegrated without warning a year after he had bought it. A manufacturing defect was held not to be proved, given the other factors that might have affected the integrity of the windscreen in the intervening period, including the possibility that it had been fitted ineptly. In Carroll v Fearon, Bent and Dunlop Ltd,41 on the other hand, a tyre blew out on the car in which the plaintiffs were travelling, causing an accident. The tyre was seven years old, showed signs of wear, and had been underinflated, but there was evidence

33 [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1; see also Simaan General Contracting Co v Pilkington Glass Ltd [1988] QB 758. 34 Barnett v H & J Packer & Co Ltd [1940] 3 All ER 575 (retailer). 35 Mason v Williams & Williams Ltd [1955] 1 All ER 808; Vacwell Engineering Co Ltd v BDH Chemicals Ltd [1971] 1 QB 88; Hill v James Crowe (Cases) Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 812. 36 Griffiths v Arch Engineering Co (Newport) Ltd [1968] 3 All ER 217. 37 Carroll v Fearon, Bent and Dunlop Ltd [1998] PIQR P416. 38 Stennett v Hancock and Peters [1939] 2 All ER 578. 39 See Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31 per Lord Macmillan at 72; Evans v Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd [1936] 1 All ER 283 per Porter J at 286. See e.g. Renfrew Golf Club v Motocaddy Ltd [2015] CSOH 173, 2016 SLT 345, affd [2016] CSIH 57, 2016 SC 860, in which a claim in common law negligence against the manufacturers of a golf trolley was dismissed as irrelevant where, as the Lord Ordinary, Lord Philip, pointed out at para 20: “The defenders had no control over the maintenance of the trolley, or over the use of the trolley in the three years since it came into the owner’s possession. The owner had changed the battery to a 36 hole battery. The capacity of the previous battery is not averred. The defenders had no control over the place where the trolley was left on the night in question.” 40 [1936] 1 All ER 283. 41 [1998] PIQR P416.

26.10

974   The Law of Delict in Scotland

26.11

to show that there had been fault in the manufacturing process and the manufacturer was therefore found liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. The dictum by Lord Atkin in Donoghue, quoted above,42 implied that manufacturers might escape liability if there had been a “reasonable possibility” of intermediate examination by a third party between the product leaving the manufacturer’s control and the point at which it caused injury to the consumer. Subsequent authority has treated manufacturers less leniently on this point, absolving them only in the more limited circumstances where this form of intermediate inspection was not merely possible, but probable.43 In addition, the manufacturer must reasonably have expected that the intermediary would use the opportunity for inspection in such a way that the risk would be revealed, and that an appropriate means would be available of warning subsequent users of the article.44

(3) Duty to warn of defects after supply 26.12

Plainly, the duty of care of the manufacturer or other supplier encompasses a duty to warn of safety defects known at the time of supplying the product, although that duty is to be read in all the circumstances of the case.45 The duty, furthermore, is capable of extension after the point at which goods are supplied. If, after marketing a product in which there is no known defect, the manufacturer becomes aware of a problem that compromises safety, that product should be withdrawn from the market, and the manufacturer breaches its duty of care towards potential users if it fails to do so.46 The manufacturer is, moreover, under a duty to take appropriate action by recalling all affected products already in circulation and taking reasonable steps to warn past customers who are continuing to use them.47 On the other hand, users who have been alerted to the dangerous condition of a product but continue to make use of it as before are normally considered to be doing so at their own risk, unless 42 At para 26.05. 43 Thus in Griffiths v Arch Engineering Co (Newport) Ltd [1968] 3 All ER 217, the plaintiff was employed by contractors engaged in dockside repair works, but asked to borrow a grinding machine hired by sub-contractors from the defendants. The machine malfunctioned, causing him serious injury. In holding the defendants liable the court noted that, when the defendants handed the machine to the sub-contractors, it was foreseeable that it would be used by others at the site. It was also known that the machine was wanted for immediate use, and there was no reason to suppose that the sub-contractors or anyone else would make an independent examination of it before switching it on – i.e. the possibility of intermediate examination was possible but not probable. 44 Griffiths v Arch Engineering Co (Newport) Ltd [1968] 3 All ER 217 per Chapman J at 222. 45 See Hurley v Dyke [1979] RTR 265, in which vendors who had sold a second-hand car at auction “as seen with all its faults and without warranty” were held to have discharged their duty to warn of its potentially defective condition and were not therefore liable in respect of the injuries suffered by the car’s occupants when the chassis collapsed. 46 Wright v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd (1972) 13 KIR 255. 47 E Hobbs (Farms) Ltd v Baxenden (Chemical Co) Ltd [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 54 per Sir Michael Ogden at 65.

Product Liability   975

there were compelling circumstances in which they had been left with no choice but to do so.48

(4) Proof of negligence A manufacturer’s common law duty is only to take such care as is reasonable in the circumstances. Naturally, the burden of proving the negative – that reasonable care was not applied – falls upon the pursuer. It may be an onerous one. In Donoghue v Stevenson, Lord Macmillan concluded his speech with the observation that the burden of proving breach of duty should not be eased by the “presumption of negligence” or by application of the res ipsa loquitur principle.49 Subsequent case law, however, has adopted a more flexible approach to the use of inference.50 In Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd,51 decided only a few years after Donoghue, the plaintiff contracted dermatitis after wearing underwear manufactured by the defendants and contaminated with an irritant chemical. The Privy Council reasoned that:52

26.13

“If excess sulphites were left in the garment that could only be because some one was at fault. The appellant is not required to lay his finger on the exact person in all the chain who was responsible, or to specify what he did wrong. Negligence is found as a matter of inference from the existence of the defects taken in connection with all the known circumstances: even if the manufacturers could by apt evidence have rebutted that inference they have not done so.”

In the Court of Session similarly, in Lockhart v Barr,53 Lord Justice-Clerk Cooper addressed the role of inference in easing what might sometimes be a barely surmountable burden of proving negligence in relation to manufacturing defects. In Lockhart the pursuer had been injured by drinking iron brew, manufactured by the defenders, that had been contaminated with phenol. Lord Cooper did not regard the circumstances as suitable for application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, but held that they were sufficiently clear to support an inference of negligence:54 “[T]he reasonable and just inference from the whole of the evidence is that every fact in this case can be completely explained upon the view

48 Howmet Ltd v Economy Devices Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 847, [2016] BLR 555 per Jackson LJ at para 92. 49 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 72. 50 Mason v Williams & Williams Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 549; Carroll v Fearon, Bent and Dunlop Ltd [1998] PIQR P416; Divya v Toyo Tire and Rubber Co Ltd [2011] EWHC 1993 (QB). 51 [1936] AC 85. 52 [1936] AC 85 per Lord Wright at 101 (emphasis added). 53 1941 SC 578, affd 1943 SC (HL) 1. 54 1941 SC 578 at 586 (emphasis added). Cf Daniels and Daniels v R White & Sons Ltd [1938] 4 All ER 258 (lemonade similarly contaminated with carbolic acid – i.e. phenol), doubting whether it was for the manufacturer to rebut an inference of negligence, but holding it established in any event that due care had been exercised in the bottling process (doubted in Hill v James Crowe (Cases) Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 812).

26.14

976   The Law of Delict in Scotland that an operative at the filling plant . . . took an unwashed bottle from the incoming supply and sent it into the filling plant direct; and that the facts can be explained upon no other view. I am further of opinion that this operative’s improper act, coupled with the defective lay-out and system of working which made that act not only possible but easy, and which made no effective provision for its subsequent detection and correction, justifies an inference of negligence on the part of the defenders, – that is of failure to exercise the high standard of care which the circumstances impose upon them in this case. It would not, in my view, be justifiable to describe such a happening, in the words used in certain of the cases, as a ‘pure accident’ or an ‘inevitable accident,’ nor to require the pursuer to demonstrate precisely when, why, or by whom the mistake was made; for to impose any such duty on pursuers in cases of this kind would be to render illusory the remedy which Donoghue v Stevenson affirmed.”

It is not therefore necessary in all cases that the pursuer should provide an explanation of the precise cause of the product failure; negligence may be found as a matter of inference from the fact that a defective product was released into circulation.55 As in the law of negligence generally, the standard of care required of the manufacturer varies according to the risk of a defect arising.56 Where the risk was high, the inference that the necessary level of care was not observed is more readily accepted, and more difficult to rebut in the absence of evidence of fault on the part of a third party.

(5) Types of defect 26.15

The difficulty of proving negligence varies according to the type of defect at issue. Perhaps the more straightforward cases, and those in which an inference of negligence is more readily accepted, relate to manufacturing defects in which, as the result of an alleged error in the manufacturing process, the finished product has departed from the manufacturer’s specification, thereby becoming unsafe. Such cases may involve, for instance, flaws in the manufacturing process,57 the adulteration of the product by extraneous matter or bacterial contamination,58 or the use of packaging or containers inadequate to contain the product.59

55 Donoghue v Concrete Products (Kirkcaldy) Ltd 1976 SLT 58 per Lord Wylie at 60; see also Steer v Durable Rubber Manufacturing Co Ltd, The Times, 20 November 1958. 56 Lockhart v Barr 1941 SC 578 per Lord Justice-Clerk Cooper at 584: “The standard of care may fairly be said to vary directly with the risk of contamination.” 57 E.g. failures in assembling the product: see also Hill v James Crowe (Cases) Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 812 (defective crate); Carroll v Fearon, Bent and Dunlop Ltd [1998] PIQR P416 (car tyre with defective tread). 58 Such as a snail in ginger beer, or phenol in iron brew. For contamination by the typhoid bacillus, see Read v Croydon Corporation [1938] 4 All ER 631. 59 E.g. Hart v Dominion Stores (1968) 67 DLR (2d) 675 (exploding bottle).

Product Liability   977

The inference of negligence is less readily established, however, in cases arising from alleged design defects, where the product has been manufactured as intended but the injury suffered is caused by an alleged flaw in its design which is attributed to negligence on the part of the manufacturer. The difficulty is that many products are capable of enhancement to make them safer, but design decisions must often be balanced by the manufacturer against considerations of utility and price. Motor vehicles provide an obvious example. There is almost always some device which could be added to a vehicle to improve its safety – including, taking such precautions to the extreme, a cap on speed of 10 miles per hour. In order to prove negligence, however, it must be shown that it was unreasonable for such a device not to have been included. In Wyngrove’s Executrix v Scottish Omnibuses,60 for example, the pursuer’s husband had fallen on to the road from the rear platform of a bus as he waited to alight at the next stop. The passenger doors of such buses were generally left open, and the pursuer argued that a necessary safety feature in these circumstances was a central pillar for passengers to grip and steady themselves on the rear platform. But while this would no doubt have made the vehicle safer, the House of Lords was persuaded that a pillar would cause “general inconvenience” to passengers getting on and off the bus. It was not therefore unreasonable that a safety-enhancing pillar should have been omitted in the design of the vehicle, and negligence was not established. Particular difficulties arise in relation to alleged design failures in pharmaceutical products. One of the best-known instances was the flaw in the composition of the drug thalidomide, which resulted in damage to the unborn children of the pregnant women to whom it was prescribed.61 All pharmaceuticals involve some element of risk.62 A claim in negligence requires the pursuer to obtain and interpret complex technical data from the drug’s research and development process in order to establish that the safeguards built into its development were inadequate, balancing the risk of adverse consequences against the potential medical benefits. Problems in proving negligence also arise where the danger is said to have lain in the manufacturer’s failure to provide adequate warnings or instructions regarding safe use. Warnings are not required for products whose risk is self-evident, such as a sharp kitchen knife, but they must be included as far as practicable where the risk is less obvious. A manufacturer’s common law duty of care does not extend to providing notice of all risk, but users should be told about hazards of which they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware. In order to show that the 60 1966 SC (HL) 47. 61 See S v Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 114, although a settlement in that case, involving a large group of the child victims, was agreed without the manufacturer admitting negligence. 62 See Richards v Pharmacia Ltd [2018] CSIH 31, 2018 SLT 492 per Lord Brodie at para 52.

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978   The Law of Delict in Scotland

manufacturer did not exercise due care, the pursuer must address contentious questions as to the level of warning necessary to counterbalance risk, and in some cases whether a misuse of the product was foreseeable.

(6) Proof of causation 26.19

The burden of proof is on the pursuer to prove causation on the balance of probabilities.63 Even if the product is shown to have been defective, proving causation can be challenging where a range of environmental or lifestyle factors means that there are competing theories as to whether they or the product defect have caused harm. In McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd,64 the pursuer’s husband died of lung cancer having smoked cigarettes manufactured by the defenders for twenty-eight years. The Lord Ordinary, Lord Nimmo Smith, declined to accept as a matter of judicial knowledge that there was a causal connection between smoking and lung cancer,65 and noted that the pursuer had failed to cite adequate epidemiological evidence on that point.66 But in any event, Lord Nimmo Smith questioned whether epidemiology, and the use of statistics applicable to the general population, could be used as conclusive evidence of causation in individual cases. There were various potential causes of lung cancer other than cigarette smoking, including lifestyle, environmental and genetic factors, and the pursuer had failed to produce evidence of a definitive method for determining whether in an individual case lung cancer was caused by smoking the defender’s cigarettes or by some other cause. The pursuer failed therefore to prove that, but for smoking the defender’s cigarettes, her husband probably would not have contracted lung cancer.67 63 See Hanke v Resurfice Corp 2007 SCC 7, [2007] 1 SCR 333, in which the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that the customary but-for test for causation applied in this context and it was not appropriate to depart from it by applying the material-contribution test (on which see paras 13.29–13.31 above). But see also Hastings v Finsbury Orthopaedics Ltd [2021] CSIH 6, 2021 SLT 187 per Lord President Carloway at para 68, to the effect that “the court should not impose excessively exacting standards on pursuers, whatever the nature of the case or the defender. It should not expect the ordinary citizen to be able to mount an in-depth challenge which requires a detailed examination of a defender’s manufacturing processes and subsequent product safety analysis of the type which might be seen in a commercial litigation between multinationals. The pursuer must be able to access the courts and have his claim adjudicated upon in a proportionate manner. Insurmountable or excessive obstacles should not be placed in the way.” 64 [2005] CSOH 69, 2005 2 SC 1; see also Loveday v Renton [1990] 1 Med LR 117. 65 [2005] CSOH 69, 2005 2 SC 1 at para 9.7. 66 [2005] CSOH 69, 2005 2 SC 1 at paras 9.8–9.9. 67 [2005] CSOH 69, 2005 2 SC 1 at para 9.10. For similar problems in proving causation under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 s 2(1), see XYZ v Schering Health Care Ltd [2002] EWHC 1420 (QB), (2003) 70 BMLR 88. McTear contrasts with recent cases involving exposure to carcinogenic substances in the workplace, in which a causal link between smoking and cancer has been accepted for the purposes of finding employees contributorily negligent in claims against their employers: see e.g. Blackmore v Department for Communities and Local Government [2017] EWCA Civ 1136, [2018] QB 471, discussed at para 29.64 below.

Product Liability   979

C. THE ADVENT OF STRICT LIABILITY Donoghue v Stevenson68 remains an important landmark in establishing the manufacturer’s duty of care in the common law of negligence. Yet in many jurisdictions an increasing interest in consumer protection meant that attention began to turn, in the latter part of the twentieth century, towards stricter standards of liability, and in particular to remedies which would not require the injured consumer to undertake the difficult task of proving that the producer had been at fault.69 In the United States, the landmark case of Greenman v Yuba Power Products Inc70 signalled a growing sympathy towards the public policy justifications for strict liability, which would shift more of the cost of accidents on to those who put defective products on the market and thus provide support to injured persons who might be “powerless to protect themselves”. In holding the defendant liable for injuries sustained by the plaintiff while using a power tool manufactured by it, but which the plaintiff himself had not purchased, the Supreme Court of California stated unambiguously that “A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.”71 This shift towards strict liability was taken up in the American Law Institute’s Restatement Second of Torts, adopted in 1964. The framework set out in § 402 provided a strict liability model, which was copied across into product liability statutes in numerous states. Meanwhile on the other side of the Atlantic there had been increasing disquiet that existing liability regimes did not provide appropriate redress for injured consumers. Concern had been raised in particular by the difficulties in obtaining compensation encountered by the victims of a series of mass disasters involving defective products, most notably the thalidomide drug cases in the early 1960s, in which children across Europe whose mothers had taken the offending medicine to counter nausea during pregnancy

68 1932 SC (HL) 31. 69 For a comparative overview, see M Reimann, “Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century” (2003) 51 American Journal of Comparative Law 751; M Reimann, “Product Liability”, in M Bussani and A J Sebok (eds), Comparative Tort Law: Global Perspectives (2015) 250. See also the United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection, adopted in 1985 by Resolution 39/85 (available at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/publications/ consumption_en.pdf). The Guidelines aspired to adequate protection for consumers in all countries, “recognizing that consumers often face imbalances in economic terms, educational levels and bargaining power; and bearing in mind that consumers should have the right of access to non-hazardous products”. Two of the prime objectives were “the protection of consumers from hazards to their health and safety” and “the promotion and protection of the economic interests of consumers”. 70 59 Cal 2d 57 (1963). 71 Per Traynor J, 59 Cal 2d 57 (1963) at 62.

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980   The Law of Delict in Scotland

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had suffered a range of significant birth defects.72 In the United Kingdom, the Scottish Law Commission and the Law Commission of England and Wales were requested in 1971 to investigate remedies for loss and injury caused by defective products, and the main conclusion in their joint report in 1977 was that liability in delict/tort should be strict.73 A significant consideration in reaching that conclusion was reference to the 1976 Strasbourg Convention on Products Liability in regard to Personal Injury and Death, which, broadly speaking, had accepted the principle of strict liability.74 A series of draft European Directives were by then in circulation, culminating in the Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products.75 In its preamble the Directive set out the combined aims of harmonising the conditions of competition in the internal European market, ensuring adequate protection for victims of unsafe products across the Member States, and achieving fair apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technological production. The extent to which the interests of fair competition were furthered by the Directive was perhaps limited, since, as discussed below, there are various important areas of liability which it did not touch, most notably in relation to damage to property in commercial use.76 Moreover, the preamble to the Directive envisaged that, although the way would be opened towards greater harmonisation, this would not immediately be “total”. Article 13 of the Directive recognised that alternative sources of liability, which would not be harmonised, would continue in terms of the law

72 See the account in Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Liability for Defective Products (Law Com No 82, Scot Law Com No 45, 1977) 1–2; see also H Teff and C R Munro, Thalidomide: The Legal Aftermath (1976). Subsequent catastrophes included the colza oil scandal in Spain in 1981, in which over 600 people were alleged to have been fatally poisoned by contaminated cooking oil, and the contaminated blood scandal in France, in which the French National Centre for Blood Transfusion used blood products known potentially to be contaminated with HIV in transfusions to haemophiliacs in the mid-1980s. 73 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Liability for Defective Products (Law Com No 82, Scot Law Com No 45, 1977) para 38. The Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (Cmnd 7054, 1978) (known as the “Pearson Commission”) similarly concluded that tort liability for defective products should be strict: para 1230. 74 This was included in the Appendix to the joint Report. However, not all states ratified the Convention – possibly for fear of putting their own producers at a disadvantage. 75 On the processes which preceded the adoption of the Directive in 1985, see J Stapleton, Product Liability (1994) ch 3; G Howells “Product Liability – A History of Harmonisation”, in D Fairgrieve (ed), Product Liability in Comparative Perspective (2005) 202. Consensus upon the Directive was achieved at the expense of permitting derogations with regard to: (a) the exclusion of primary agricultural products and game (since removed, following concern over provision of infected beef, pursuant to Directive 1999/34/EC); (b) the defence based on the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time of production (the defence is permitted under Art 7(e), but Art 15(1)(b) permits derogation excluding the defence); and (c) the capping of liability under Art 16(1) (member states may adopt an upper limit on liability of not less than 70 million ecu). 76 Art 9(b).

Product Liability   981

of contract, common law negligence, and any “special liability systems” existing as at 1985.77 Nonetheless, from the point of view of the consumer in the United Kingdom, the strict liability framework of the Consumer Protection Act 1987, Part I, enacted in implementation of the Directive, was an important step forward. At the same time, significant challenges continue to confront the injured consumer, notably in relation to the standard of defectiveness which must be proved, while important defences remain available to the producer. Meanwhile, continuing debate in the United States on the appropriate form of liability culminated in the publication in 1998 of the Restatement Third of Torts (Products Liability).78 The Restatement formulated differing standards for three distinct categories of product defect: manufacturing defects, design defects, and warning defects. In effect, strict liability was retained for manufacturing defects, but there was a return to conductbased liability for design and warning defects, leaving the plaintiff with the onus of proving that a “reasonable alternative design” existed and could have been adopted, or that the “provision of reasonable instructions or warnings” would have reduced risk. In this way the earlier model of strict liability for products provided by § 402A of the Restatement Second of Torts was superseded by a more nuanced framework, apparently reflecting what the courts had “long been doing if rarely saying”.79 Despite various consultation exercises and reports on the effectiveness of the Directive,80 there is little sign that such a change would command support in Europe.

77 See S Whittaker, “Introduction to Fault in Product Liability”, in S Whittaker (ed), The Development of Product Liability (2010) 1, on the economic factors as “makeweight arguments” (at 49) for the Directive, and noting that the Directive has had little impact on the liability insurance premiums of producers (at 50). 78 On the comparison of American and European legal environments, see G G Howells and M Mildred, “Is European Products Liability more Protective than the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?” (1998) 65 Tennessee L Rev 985; G Howells, “The Relationship between Product Liability and Product Safety – Understanding a Necessary Element in European Product Liability through a Comparison with the US Position” (2000) 39 Washburn LJ 305; J Stapleton, “Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective” (2000) 39 Washburn LJ 363. 79 D G Owen, “Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the ‘Strict’ Products Liability Myth” [1996] University of Illinois L Rev 743 at 749. 80 See Green Paper on Liability for Defective Products, COM (1999) 396 final (available at http://europa. eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com1999-396_en.pdf). A subsequent consultation exercise into the Directive’s effectiveness (reported at COM (2000) 893 final, and available at http://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52000DC0893&from=EN) was followed by further reports in 2006 (COM (2006) 496, final, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0496&from=EN), and 2011 (COM (2011) 547, final, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0547:FIN:EN:PDF). None of these initiatives has so far resulted in fundamental change to the framework of liability.

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D. THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1987: SCOPE 26.25

The Consumer Protection Act 1987, Part I, gives effect to the Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products. It extends to Scotland as well as to England and Wales81 and applies to products supplied after 1 March 1988.82 Section 1(1), as amended,83 states that Part I was enacted “for the purpose of making such provision as was necessary in order to comply with the product liability Directive and shall be construed accordingly”.84 Where, therefore, there is possible variance in meaning between the text of the Directive and that of the 1987 Act, there is judicial acceptance that the former is to be preferred, so that in matters of close interpretation it is expedient “to go straight to the fount, the Directive itself”.85 The UK’s departure from the EU is not expected to change the practice in this respect.

(1) Who can bring a claim? 26.26

Despite the title of the legislation, claims under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 are not restricted to consumers in the narrow sense of, for example, the Consumer Rights Act 2015.86 Liability under the 1987 Act arises in respect of “damage . . . caused wholly or partly by a defect in a product”,87 and “damage” is defined as “death or personal injury or any loss of or damage to any property (including land)”.88 A claim may therefore be brought by any person who has suffered such injury or damage, or whose relative has suffered fatal injury,89 as a result of a product defect. There is no requirement that the injured party should have been the purchaser or even in possession of the product. If, for example, a

81 But see s 49 on Northern Ireland. 82 Consumer Protection Act 1987 (Commencement No 1) Order 1987, SI 1987/1680. 83 By the Product Safety and Metrology etc (Amendment etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, SI 2019/696, Sch 3. 84 See European Commission v United Kingdom, Case C–300/95, [1997] 3 CMLR 923, in which the European Commission challenged the wording of s 4(1)(e) of the 1987 Act as providing a version of the “development risks” defence that was capable of an interpretation more lenient to producers than that envisaged by Art 7(e) of the Directive. In the absence of case law demonstrating that the Act had been so interpreted, however, the European Court of Justice was not persuaded that this inconsistency would arise. 85 A v National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289 per Burton J at para 2. 86 The 2015 Act s 2(3) defines “consumer” as meaning “an individual acting for purposes that are wholly or mainly outside that individual’s trade, business, craft or profession”. By contrast, a claim can be brought under Part I of the 1987 Act by, for example, an employee injured while using a defective piece of equipment. Part I refers to “persons” rather than “consumers”. 87 Consumer Protection Act 1987 s 2(1). 88 s 5(1). 89 s 6(1)(c).

Product Liability   983

car crashes due to a defect in terms of the Act, thereby injuring both the driver (who is its owner) and a pedestrian, both may sue in respect of their injuries. However, there is no liability for property damage unless the property in question was “of a type ordinarily intended for private use or consumption, and was used by the injured person mainly for his or her own private use or consumption”.90 In effect, therefore, owners of commercial property have no remedy under the Act when such property is damaged by a defective product. The scope of damage giving rise to liability is discussed further below.

(2) Who is liable? (a) The producer The provisions of the 1987 Act are directed primarily, although not exclusively, at the “producers”91 of defective products, defined in section 1(2) as: (i) the manufacturer; (ii) in the case of a substance which has not been manufactured but has been won or abstracted (such as minerals), the person who won or abstracted it; or (iii) in the case of a product the essential characteristics of which are attributable to an industrial or other process having been carried out (for example, in relation to agricultural produce), the person who carried out that process. In O’Byrne v Sanofi Pasteur MSD Ltd92 the European Court of Justice held that, where the distributor of goods was a wholly owned subsidiary of the producer and under the producer’s close control, reference to the “producer” in the Directive was capable of including the distributor also. For the purposes of the ten-year time limit set out in Article 11 of the Directive, goods might therefore be regarded as having been put into circulation by the producer at the time when they were released for sale by the distributor, not at the time when they left the producer’s factory.93 Where a complex product is defective because a component part is unsafe, the producer of the complex product is jointly and severally liable, along with

90 s 5(3); see also Renfrew Golf Club v Motocaddy Ltd [2016] CSIH 57, 2016 SC 860. 91 s 2(2)(a). 92 Case C–127/04, [2006] 1 WLR 1606. The child claimant had suffered injury due to an alleged defect in a vaccine. The vaccine had been part of a consignment sent by a French parent company to its wholly-owned subsidiary in the United Kingdom and then sold to the Department of Health. An action was first raised against the UK subsidiary in the mistaken belief that it was the manufacturer. By the point when proceedings were begun against the French manufacturer, the ten-year time limit set out in Art 11 of the Directive had elapsed. 93 See also O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur SA [2010] UKSC 23, [2010] 1 WLR 1412, in which the Supreme Court held that, if the parent company retained the right to decide when the product was to be distributed, then the subsidiary was integrated into the manufacturing process and controlled by the parent company to the extent that proceedings against the subsidiary could properly be regarded as proceedings against the parent company.

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producer of the component part,94 for the damage caused thereby.95 This is a significant difference from the common law of negligence, which imposes liability on the producer of a complex product in these circumstances only if it failed in the appropriate standard of care in selecting and instructing suppliers or in inspecting the component before use.96

(b) The “own-brander” 26.30

Liability also extends to any person who, by putting its name on the product or using a trade mark or other distinguishing mark in relation to the product, has held itself out to be the producer,97 such as a supermarket selling its “own-brand” product range.

(c) Importers 26.31

Any person who has imported a product into the United Kingdom may be held liable in respect of that product.98 Parties are thus saved from the procedural difficulties of bringing a claim against producers outwith the UK.

(d) Suppliers 26.32

Suppliers at intermediate points along the supply chain may in certain circumstances find themselves liable under the Act. Where it is not reasonably practicable for a person who has suffered damage to identify the producer or importer of the offending product, that person may, within a reasonable period after the damage, ask the supplier to identify the producer or importer. If the supplier does not identify the producer within a reasonable time, or the importer, or the party from whom the supplier obtained the goods, the supplier itself becomes liable.99 This provision thus represents an important incentive for suppliers to maintain records of the provenance of goods, so that liability can be shifted up the supply chain. The bare denial by the supplier that it was the producer of goods does not relieve it of liability unless this is also coupled with information about the identity of the producer, importer, or its own supplier.100

(e) Producers of components 26.33

The definition of “product” includes component parts.101 Thus if a defective component within a product has rendered a complex product dangerous,   94   95   96   97   98   99 100 101

See para 26.33 below. s 2(5). See para 26.07 above. s 2(2)(b). s 2(2)(c). s 2(3). O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur SA, Case C–358/08, [2010] 2 CMLR 16. s 1(2).

Product Liability   985

the producer of the component will be jointly and severally liable with the producer of the finished article.102 However, where a question arises as to the potential liability of a supplier of a complex product, it is sufficient for the supplier to avoid liability if it can name the producer, importer or supplier to it of the finished product; the supplier does not require to identify the producers, etc, of each and every component part in the product.103

(3) Excluded transactions Liability arises only in relation to goods supplied in the course of a business.104 It does not therefore extend to personal gifts, for example, although the giving away of goods as a prize or otherwise making a gift of them comes within the ambit of the Act if this occurs as part of a commercial enterprise, such as a sales promotion. In this connection the understanding of what constitutes a business is relatively broad. It would appear that the supply of medical products by a publicly-funded health service is to be regarded as supply in the course of a business. The provision of contaminated blood products has accordingly been held to give rise to liability under the Act,105 and in Veedfald v Arhus Amtskommune,106 similarly, the European Court of Justice held that the supply by a hospital of contaminated cleaning fluid in anticipation of washing a kidney ready for transplant was capable of giving rise to liability under the equivalent provision in Danish law. Although the range of those potentially liable under the Act is extensive, it has some notable omissions. The seller, who in the American Restatement models is the primary target of liability,107 is liable only to the extent of being a supplier, and even then escapes if it can identify where the goods came from.108 Repairers of goods are not included; nor are designers and inventors, even in relation to design defects, except to the extent that they were also the producers of the goods in question. Builders are also passed by to a large extent, since the definition of “supply” for the purposes of the Act excludes the supply of goods included in a transaction whereby an interest in land is being created or disposed of, such as in the sale of a house.109 However, liability does extend to builders supplying goods as part of construction work where the contract between the builder and the customer does not entail the creation or disposal of an interest in land, such as the supply of goods fitted within a house extension.110 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109

s 2(5). s 1(3). s 4(1)(c). A v National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289. Case C–203/99, [2003] 1 CMLR 41. Restatement Second of Torts § 402A, now replaced by Restatement Third of Torts (Products Liability) § 1. s 2(3). Section 46(4) excludes the supply of goods comprised in land “where the supply is effected by the creation or disposal of an interest in the land”. 110 s 46(3).

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(4) The meaning of “product” 26.36

26.37

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“Product” is defined by the Act in broad terms as meaning “any goods or electricity”, including component parts or raw materials incorporated into complex products.111 “Goods”, in turn, is taken to mean “substances, growing crops and things comprised in land by virtue of being attached to it and any ship, aircraft or vehicle”.112 This definition is also wide enough to include biological products such as blood products.113 The inclusion of “things comprised in land” within the definition of “goods” means that the fact of an item being attached and acceding to heritable property, for example a replacement boiler fitted to a house, does not take it outwith the scope of the Act. However, as noted above, the supply of goods as part of a transaction entailing the creation or disposal of an interest in land, such as the sale of a house, is specifically excluded from the ambit of the Act.114 On the other hand, the supply of goods as part of a different type of transaction, such as where repair works are being carried out at the property, remains within its framework. The status of information as a product in terms of the Act, or indeed in terms of the Directive,115 is unclear. Any instructions or warnings included with the product to render it less dangerous will be taken into consideration, in terms of section 3(2), when looking at whether the product overall is deemed to be defective. The problem of classification arises when the provision of information is the main function of a product. Even although the physical properties of the medium on which information is stored may be entirely innocuous, the intellectual content which it carries may be capable of causing injury. A recipe book which invites the reader to make a dish out of poisonous mushrooms, for example, is harmless in terms of the paper on which it is printed, but the words contained there are capable of causing significant injury. Nonetheless, there would appear to be reluctance, as a general rule, to classify verbal content as a defective product in respect of which strict liability might be imposed. In the leading American case of Winter v GP Putnam’s,116 the plaintiffs became severely ill after picking and eating mushrooms in reliance upon information found in The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms published by the defendants. In declining to categorise the Encyclopedia as a defective product, Judge Sneed reflected: “Although there is always some appeal to the involuntary spreading of costs of injuries in any area, the costs in any comprehensive cost/benefit analysis 111 s 1(2). 112 s 45(1). 113 A v National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289. On a sperm sample as a defective product, see Donovan v Idant Laboratories 625 F Supp 2d 256 (2009). 114 s 46(4). 115 For discussion, see S Whittaker, “European Product Liability and Intellectual Products” (1989) 105 LQR 125. 116 938 F 2d 1033 (1991); see also Brocklesby v US 767 F 2d 1288 (1985).

Product Liability   987 would be quite different were strict liability concepts applied to words and ideas. We place a high priority on the unfettered exchange of ideas. We accept the risk that words and ideas have wings we cannot clip and which carry them we know not where. The threat of liability without fault . . . could seriously inhibit those who wish to share thoughts and theories.”

There is a similar view that, under the European Directive, the principle of freedom of expression argues against liability for the defective content of printed matter, where its informational properties, rather than any physical defect as such, are the cause of harm. Certain American authority suggests that technical manuals (in relation to which freedom of speech is less of an issue) may be considered as defective products if they contain dangerously misleading factual information, 117 but such authority has not been taken up on this side of the Atlantic.118 Where a product has malfunctioned in a dangerous way due to a problem with the software embedded within it, such as the control system within a car or a domestic appliance, the finished product is to be considered defective and the producer of the finished product liable.119 However, the status of software as a defective product in itself remains uncertain. English authority has the past drawn a hardly convincing distinction between the disks or other hardware on which software is stored, which as tangible media qualify as “goods” within the definition of section 18 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, and the software contained thereon, which as an intangible, does not.120 Where the software content within a device is the cause of property damage or personal injury, a claim in negligence may nevertheless be available against the producer of the software, although the required standard of care is likely to take into account the difficulty of eliminating all bugs in software from the outset and the practice of fixing problems as they come to light. In addition the Consumer Rights

117 See Saloomey v Jeppesen & Co 707 F 2d 671 (2d Cir 1983); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co v Jeppesen & Co 642 F 2d 339 (9th Cir 1981) (Restatement Second of Torts § 402A extended to aeronautical charts with misleading information on distance and altitude, causing planes to crash). 118 See e.g. Munro v Sturrock [2010] CSOH 116, 2010 GWD 29–608, affd [2012] CSIH 35, 2012 GWD 15–312, in which a motor-rally driver alleged that he had crashed his car because the manufacturer of the route notes had miscalibrated a bend. The pursuer, who failed to prove his case, attempted to argue that the manufacturers had been negligent, without reference to the 1987 Act. 119 See also the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 s 2, which, when in force, will impose liability without proof of fault upon the insurers and owners of automated vehicles that cause accidents. 120 St Albans City and District Council v International Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 481 per Glidewell LJ at 493. See also The Software Incubator Ltd v Computer Associates UK Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 518, [2019] Bus LR 522; although see Beta Computers (Europe) Ltd v Adobe Systems (Europe) Ltd 1996 SLT 604 per Lord Penrose at 609, questioning the “result that the dominant characteristic of the complex product, in terms of value or of the significant interests of parties, would be subordinated to the medium by which it was transmitted to the user in analysing the true nature and effect of the contract”.

26.39

988   The Law of Delict in Scotland

26.40

Act 2015, section 46, provides that where the digital content121 supplied by a trader122 causes damage to a device or to other digital content, and the damage is of a kind that would not have occurred if the trader had exercised reasonable care and skill, the consumer to whom the damaged items belong can require the trader either to repair the damage or provide compensation. The Consumer Protection Act 1987 as originally enacted had, in line with the Directive, specifically excluded liability for defects in unprocessed agricultural produce. However, concerns surrounding an outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) from the late 1980s onwards prompted an amendment to the Directive,123 and a consequent amendment to the Act,124 so that primary agricultural products were brought within the strict liability framework.

(5) Damage 26.41

26.42

Liability arises under the 1987 Act for “damage”, which, according to section 5(1), means “death or personal injury or any loss of or damage to any property (including land)”. This is subject to a lower limit of £275 on the damages claimed.125 “Personal injury” is defined in section 45(1) as including “any disease and any other impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition”. Thus, in addition to physical injury, psychiatric illness is included where it affects those directly injured, for example where the primary victim of an accident caused by a defective car has suffered post-traumatic stress disorder. It is unclear, however, whether liability also extends to psychiatric illness suffered by secondary victims – those who witness physical injury caused to another by a defective product, such as a bystander at an accident caused by a defective car.126 It has been suggested that the restrictions imposed by the common law in this respect would be read

121 Defined by s 2(9) as “data which are produced and supplied in digital form”. 122 Defined by s 2(2) as “a person acting for purposes relating to that person’s trade, business, craft or profession, whether acting personally or through another person acting in the trader’s name or on the trader’s behalf”. 123 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive amending Council Directive 85/374/ EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, OJ 1997 C337/54. 124 Consumer Protection Act 1987 (Product Liability) (Modification) (Scotland) Order 2001, SSI 2001/265; for England and Wales, see Consumer Protection Act 1987 (Product Liability) (Modification) Order 2000, SI 2000/2771. 125 Consumer Protection Act 1987 s 5(4) (the equivalent of 500 ecu as stated in Art 9(b) of the Directive). 126 For the distinction between primary and secondary victims, see para 6.05 above.

Product Liability   989

into such cases,127 so that the secondary victims of injury to another would require in effect to meet the Alcock criteria,128 although this point has not been settled in any reported case. The case of Richardson v LRC Products Ltd129 suggests that conception of a child contrary to the wishes of the parents represents a personal injury in terms of section 5(1). The claim in Richardson was brought by a woman who became pregnant after a condom manufactured by the defendants burst during sexual intercourse. Her claim failed because she failed to prove that the condom was defective within the meaning of section 3 of the 1987 Act, but it was accepted that a relevant injury had been suffered, although Kennedy J took the opportunity to observe, under reference to McFarlane v Tayside Health Board,130 that it was “the policy of the law” to exclude the costs of the child’s upbringing from such a claim.131 Property damage does not give rise to liability under the Act unless the property in question was “of a type ordinarily intended for private use or consumption, and was used by the injured person mainly for his or her own private use or consumption”.132 Damage to property in commercial use is therefore excluded. Both parts of this description must be met; it is not enough that the property was of a type ordinarily intended for private use or consumption if the injured party did not intend it for his or her own private use. For instance, kitchen electrical equipment may be ultimately destined for consumer use but if it malfunctions causing injury and property damage while still on display in a shop, then it is not being used for the private use of the injured party and liability does not arise. The boundaries of “private use” were tested in the Scottish case of Renfrew Golf Club v Motocaddy Ltd,133 in which the defender was the importer of

127 See C J Miller and S J Goldberg, Product Liability, 2nd edn (2004) para 16.12. (J Stapleton, Product Liability (1994) 276 leaves the question open.) Miller and Goldberg cite Glen v Korean Airlines Co Ltd [2003] EWHC 643 (QB), [2003] QB 1386, in which the claimants suffered psychiatric injury as a result of witnessing an aircraft crash and claimed damages under s 76(2) of the Civil Aviation Act 1982, which provides for liability without proof of fault in respect of damage caused by aircraft accidents “as if the loss or damage had been caused by the wilful act, neglect, or default of the owner of the aircraft”. The court held that “loss or damage” was capable of including psychiatric injury, but since liability was to be imposed “as if” the common law applied in cases of “neglect”, this imported the common law restrictions on duty, so that secondary victims of injury to another required to meet the Alcock criteria. It is arguable that a similar restriction on liability might, by analogy, be extended to the 1987 Act. However, unlike in the Civil Aviation Act 1982, nothing in the wording of either the 1987 Act (ss 5(1) and 45(1)) or the Directive (Art 9(a)) expressly aligns liability with the common law so as to limit duty in this way. 128 See paras 6.15–6.27 above. 129 (2001) 59 BMLR 185. 130 2000 SC (HL) 1. See further discussion at paras 16.77–16.79 above. 131 (2001) 59 BMLR 185 at 195. 132 Consumer Protection Act 1987 s 5(3). 133 [2016] CSIH 57, 2016 SC 860.

26.43

26.44

990   The Law of Delict in Scotland

26.45

a motorised golf trolley supplied to the pursuer, an unincorporated golf club. It was alleged that an electrical fault in the buggy had caused a fire, resulting in substantial damage to the clubhouse where it had been stored. The question before the court was whether damage to the clubhouse constituted damage to property in “private use”. Although the pursuer was a private club, the court did not regard the damaged clubhouse as having been “ordinarily intended for private use, such as that of an individual or perhaps a family or even a small group of friends”. An ordinary reading of “private use” did not, in the court’s view, extend to use by a large number of individuals, whether they were club members, had paid a green fee, or were simply attending a function at the club.134 The club’s case under the 1987 Act was therefore held to be irrelevant. Since, in defining “damage”, section 5(1) mentions only death or personal injury or any loss of or damage to property, “damage” does not include pure economic loss, although there is no reason why consequential economic loss should not be included, such as loss of earnings following on personal injury caused by a defective product. In addition, section 5(2) specifically excludes “loss of or any damage to the product itself”. Thus, whatever contractual remedies might arise, liability does not arise under the Act if a product malfunctions in such a way that no one is injured and surrounding property is not affected, or if the user discovers the defect and rectifies it before an accident occurs. Section 5(2) also excludes “the loss of or any damage to the whole or any part of any product which has been supplied with the product in question comprised in it”. This means that producers are not liable for damage to the complex product itself where it has been caused by a defective component part or raw material incorporated within it. The exclusion only operates, however, where the component or raw material has been supplied “with” the complex product. Where a car is badly damaged in a crash caused by defective brakes, for example, this creates the awkward distinction that the manufacturer of the brakes is not liable for damage to the car if the brakes were supplied with the car but is liable if they were fitted as a spare part at a later date.135

E. THE TEST FOR DEFECTIVENESS (1) Introduction 26.46

Liability arises under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 for damage “caused wholly or partly by a defect in a product”.136 There is no requirement to prove fault, but it must be proved that a product “defect” within the meaning of the Act caused the damage in question, and proving defectiveness is one of the main challenges in bringing a claim. It is not conclusive 134 [2016] CSIH 57, 2016 SC 860 per Lord President Carloway at paras 27–29. 135 For discussion, see C J Miller and S J Goldberg, Product Liability, 2nd edn (2004) paras 16.58–16.59.

Product Liability   991

of the presence of a defect merely that the product failed and that damage occurred. The meaning of “defect” is given in section 3(1): “there is a defect in a product . . . if the safety of the product is not such as persons generally are entitled to expect”.137 Products are not therefore defective, in terms of the statute, simply because they do not function as expected, or wear out rapidly. The alleged defect must involve some kind of threat to safety. Moreover, safety is assessed by reference to what persons are entitled to expect rather than what consumers actually expect (after all, most consumers expect a product to be safe). The concept of “entitlement” means that this is a relative rather than an absolute standard.138 It is implicit in this wording that persons are not necessarily “entitled” to expect that products are 100 per cent safe. A great many products involve a risk of some sort, and the greater the risk,139 the more likely a product is to be judged defective; but, as stated in section 3(2), safety considerations must be balanced against “all the circumstances of the case”. The “entitled expectation” in relation to the safety of a given product is a matter of law, which is ultimately for the court, rather than for expert witnesses, to decide.140 But the Act gives surprisingly little guidance as to the level of risk against which persons are entitled to be protected, aside from directing the court’s attention to three specific factors as listed in section 3(2). The test of defectiveness remains therefore “essentially an empty vessel” which is only gradually being “filled by judicial analysis”.141

26.47

26.48

(1) The three factors in section 3(2) Section 3(2) provides that in determining what “persons generally are entitled to expect”, the following specific factors are to be taken into account: “(a) the manner in which, and purposes for which, the product has been marketed, its get-up, the use of any mark in relation to the product and any instructions for, or warnings with respect to, doing or refraining from doing anything with or in relation to the product; 136 Consumer Protection Act 1987 s 2(1). 137 Art 6(1) of the Directive reads: “A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect.” 138 See AH v Greater Glasgow Health Board [2018] CSOH 57, 2018 SLT 535 per Lord Boyd at para 116: “an objective test but a relative concept”. 139 See e.g. Abouzaid v Mothercare (UK) Ltd [2000] All ER (D) 2436 per Pill LJ at para 27, in which a significant factor in determining whether an accessory for a child’s pushchair was defective was that its malfunction was likely to injure the eye, with all the “serious consequences which may follow from a blunt injury to the eye. Expectations would be different if the worst which could occur was an impact of elastic on the hand.” 140 Hastings v Finsbury Orthopaedics Ltd [2019] CSOH 96, 2019 SLT 1411 per Lord Tyre at para 113 (affd [2021] CSIH 6, 2021 SLT 187); Wilkes v DePuy International Ltd [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB), [2018] QB 627 per Hickinbottom J at para 77. 141 D Nolan, “Strict Product Liability for Design Defects” (2018) 134 LQR 176 at 181.

26.49

992   The Law of Delict in Scotland (b) what might reasonably be expected to be done with or in relation to the product; and (c)  the time when the product was supplied by its producer to another.”

This list is not exhaustive, since section 3(2) also directs that “all the circumstances of the case” are to be considered.142 Nonetheless, one or more of these three factors is often significant.

(a) The manner in which the product has been marketed, including instructions and warnings143 26.50

26.51

Many products of undoubted utility are dangerous, but that danger may be neutralised for the purposes of the statutory meaning of “defective” if the manufacturer or supplier has supplied the product with instructions or warnings sufficient to educate the user as to the relevant risk. Some dangers are obvious, such as that represented by a sharp kitchen knife, and require little by way of warning. In B v McDonald’s Restaurants Ltd,144 for example, a groups of claimants had been injured in various incidents involving spillages from a cups of hot drinks at McDonald’s restaurants. They maintained that the cups should have been printed with the warnings about the temperature of hot drinks and the seriousness of the injury they could cause, and indeed McDonald’s had eventually included such warnings on its cups. However, the court rejected the argument that the products were defective in the absence of such warnings. Persons generally expected hot drinks to be served hot, and expected that hot drinks might scald if spilled so that care should be taken with them, and therefore serving them in this way did not breach the standard of safety that persons generally were entitled to expect.145 Other dangers are less apparent, so that a poisonous product such as bleach requires clear warnings about its toxicity and safe use and storage. In Abouzaid v Mothercare,146 for example, in which the claimant was injured in the eye when fastening an accessory to a children’s pushchair, the court referred to the possibility of making the product less hazardous by providing a warning as well as instructions on how to fasten it safely from behind. More complex products, such as a power-driven chainsaw, may not need much by way of warning as to their dangers, which are largely obvious, but may require detailed, clear instructions on their safe use. Safety warnings must therefore be adequate to the risk represented by the product. All pharmaceuticals, for example, are likely to have a mix of 142 As does Art 6(1) of the Directive. See also Wilkes v DePuy International Ltd [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB), [2018] QB 627 per Hickinbottom J at para 77. 143 Consumer Protection Act 1987 s 3(2)(a). 144 [2002] EWHC 490. 145 [2002] EWHC 490 at para 80. 146 [2000] All ER (D) 2436.

Product Liability   993

side effects, and are not defective on that ground alone, but a drug that carries a significant health risk is defective if it is marketed without adequate warning of its risks.147 The more serious the risk, the more care should be taken to bring it to the fore and the more prominence it should be given. This issue was explored in Worsley v Tambrands148 in which the claimant became serious ill with toxic shock syndrome after using one of the defendants’ brand of tampon. That particular risk was noted on the product packaging, which also referred users to the more detailed instruction booklet enclosed with every box of the product. The claimant had not referred back to the instruction booklet when she started to fall ill, and it appeared that the booklet had in any event been discarded when the box was opened. While she accepted that the instructions were true and accurate, she argued that the box itself should have featured a fuller health warning and that the warning should have been more emphatic. She argued that, in the absence of such a warning, the product was defective. The court, however, held that the producer had done all that a consumer was entitled to expect. The product was not therefore defective within the meaning of section 3. In appropriate cases a product may be made safe by the provision of warnings and instructions, not to the ultimate consumer but to an intermediary who has the specialist knowledge to advise on the warnings and to implement the instructions. The average patient receiving a chemotherapy drug, for example, is unlikely to be able to assimilate all the safety information that requires to accompany such a product. That information is instead properly directed not to the patient but to the clinician administering the drug, and in considering whether the product was defective it is the adequacy of the information as provided to the clinician that requires to be considered.149 The doctrine of the “learned intermediary” already existed in the common law150 and, although not expressly, it has been acknowledged as compatible with the regime of the Directive and the 1987 Act.151 Most typically, the role of the intermediary is recognised in relation to pharmaceuticals and medical devices.152 The fact that instructions or warnings have been channelled through such a “learned intermediary” does not of itself constitute a defence for the producer, but the presence of 147 Richards v Pharmacia Ltd [2018] CSIH 31, 2018 SLT 492. 148 [2000] PIQR P95. 149 See also AH v Greater Glasgow Health Board [2018] CSOH 57, 2018 SLT 535 per Lord Boyd at para 125. 150 See e.g. Holmes v Ashford [1950] 2 All ER 76 (manufacturer of hair dye had discharged the duty to warn of the risk of dermatitis where a warning had been provided to the hairdresser applying the product, rather than directly to the customer). 151 See Wilkes v DePuy International Ltd [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB), [2018] QB 627; Gee v DePuy International Ltd [2018] EWHC 1208 (QB), [2018] Med LR 347. 152 It may also be accepted, e.g., where sophisticated machinery is provided in a workplace for use by numerous individuals, and where the employer will receive the instructions from the producer and relay them to individual users: see Lewis v University of Bristol [1999] EWCA Civ 1569, cited in McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2005] CSOH 69, 2005 2 SC 1.

26.52

994   The Law of Delict in Scotland

such an individual to advise on the choice and use of the product is one of the “circumstances of the case” which the court may take into account in determining whether the product was defective.153 As the court reflected in Gee v DePuy International Ltd,154 the producer of complex products such as pharmaceuticals would expect a learned intermediary to read up on the risks, and to pass on to the patient sufficient information in order to obtain informed consent to any procedure involving use of the product. If, in an individual case, a clinician has failed to do this, that professional failure should not have an adverse impact on the assessment of the objective safety of the product.

(b) What might reasonably be expected to be done with the product155 26.53

It is also relevant to consider what might reasonably be expected to be done with or in relation to the product. A thoughtless user who is injured by putting the product to outlandish misuse – for example, using kitchen bleach to shampoo hair – cannot expect to hold the producer liable for the ensuing injury. On the other hand, steps should be taken to warn against any form of misuse that is reasonably foreseeable. This is illustrated by an Austrian case in which the producer had made lightweight bicycle handlebars for general use, not for racing purposes, but was aware that racing cyclists were also using them. In those circumstances the producer required to meet the expectations not only of the average cyclist but also of the racing cyclist, which meant either warning against their use for racing or offering instructions on how they might be used safely in that context.156

(c) The time when the product was supplied157 26.54

Regardless of when the injury occurs, it is the time when the product was initially supplied that determines the level of safety that the public was entitled to expect and consequently the assessment of whether the product was defective. Article 6(2) of the Directive is explicit: “A product shall not be considered defective for the sole reason that a better product is subsequently put into circulation.” In other words, the product is not regarded as having become defective simply because newer and safer models have been made.158 Airbags in cars have now become standard, for example, but in earlier years the victim of an accident involving an older car, initially 153 Wilkes v DePuy International Ltd [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB), [2018] QB 627 per Hickinbottom J at para 108. 154 [2018] EWHC 1208 (QB), [2018] Med LR 347 per Andrews J at paras 169 and 490. 155 Consumer Protection Act 1987 s 3(2)(b). 156 OGH 28 April 1998, Az 10 Ob 399/97, discussed in H-W Micklitz et al, Cases, Materials and Text on Consumer Law: Ius Commune Casebooks for a Common Law of Europe (2010) 481. 157 Consumer Protection Act 1987 s 3(2)(c). 158 See Wilkes v DePuy International Ltd [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB), [2018] QB 627 per Hickinbottom J at para 126.

Product Liability   995

supplied by its producer at a time when the availability of airbags was unknown, could not complain that it was defective because it did not include such a feature. A difference between the wording of the 1987 Act and that of the Directive is that whereas the former refers to “the time when the product was supplied by its producer to another”, the latter, in Article 6(1), refers to “the time when the product was put into circulation”, which need not necessarily be the same point. On the basis of authority indicating that the text of the Directive should be followed where there is possible variance between the Act and the Directive,159 the latter should prevail in the event that this discrepancy would make a material difference to the assessment of defectiveness.160

26.55

(3) Section 3(2): “all the circumstances” As the 1987 Act purports to impose liability without fault, the test for defectiveness appears to bypass the considerations used to assess breach of duty in common law negligence. While a fault-based regime focuses upon the acts and omissions of producers and suppliers, it was fundamental to the strict-liability regime established by the Directive and the 1987 Act that it should focus upon the condition of the product itself, rather than the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct of the producer.161 Yet in allowing, through section 3(2), “all the circumstances” of the case to be taken into account in determining whether a product is defective, the Act opens the way for reflections on whether “persons generally” were “entitled to expect” that the producer should have done more, as explored further below.

26.56

(a) Manufacturing defects: standard and non-standard products The distinction between defects of manufacturing, design and instruction has already been noted above in connection with negligence liability.162 Such a distinction is not mentioned in the 1987 Act, but it remains a relevant circumstance in the assessment of defectiveness. 159 See para 26.25 above. 160 On this point see Gee v DePuy International Ltd [2018] EWHC 1208 (QB), [2018] Med LR 347, in which it was apparently “common ground” (at para 84) that the level of safety that the public was entitled to expect was to be evaluated at the time when the product was “first put on the market by the producer”. This interpretation was accepted in Hastings v Finsbury Orthopaedics Ltd [2019] CSOH 96, 2019 SLT 1411, affd [2021] CSIH 6, 2021 SLT 187. However, in AH v Greater Glasgow Health Board [2018] CSOH 57, 2018 SLT 535 at para 126 Lord Boyd referred simply to “the time of supply”. 161 See A v National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289 per Burton J at para 57, to the effect that this regime “was intended to eliminate proof of fault or negligence. [I]it was . . . intended to make it easier for claimants to prove their case, such that not only would a consumer not have to prove that the producer did not take reasonable steps, or all reasonable steps, to comply with his duty of care, but also that the producer did not take all legitimately expectable steps either.” 162 See paras 26.15–26.18 above.

26.57

996   The Law of Delict in Scotland

26.58

26.59

Generally speaking, defects may be easiest to establish where they relate to a flaw in the manufacturing process, since the legitimate expectations of persons generally are readily assessed by reference to the intended design and operation of similar products. In this connection a further distinction has been ventured, which is particularly relevant in relation to manufacturing defects. In A v National Blood Authority, Burton J distinguished between “standard” and “non-standard” products. A standard product performed as the manufacturer had intended and was alleged to be defective in so doing. Non-standard products, on the other hand, were rogue products – “isolated or rare specimens which are different from the other products of a similar series, different from the products as intended or desired by the producer”. For non-standard products, the overriding question in the legitimate expectation test was whether the “public at large” accepted the nonstandard nature of the product in question, in the sense that they accepted that a proportion of the products might be defective.163 The rogue products in A – isolated contaminated batches in stocks of blood products – were defective according to this definition, in that no warnings or publicity about risk had been issued to the public and therefore the “public at large” could not be deemed to have accepted a risk of which they were ignorant.164 Subsequent case law has not taken up the labels of “standard” and “non-standard” products as a “rigid categorisation”.165 However, there is acceptance that the question whether a particular product was within the producer’s specification is a relevant circumstance in identifying whether or not it is to be deemed defective.166 There is necessarily a difference of approach as between those cases in which the alleged defect relates to every item in a product line, and those in which the threat to safety is contained in only isolated rogue examples of a given product that have not turned out as the producer intended.167 As indicated in A v National Blood Authority, persons generally, unless they have been informed otherwise, are entitled to expect that all products will perform as the producer intended. Where a product does not do so, its level of safety does not meet that expectation, and it is therefore difficult to argue with the conclusion that it is defective in terms of section 3(1) of the 1987 Act.

163 [2001] 3 All ER 289 at para 68 (subject to the qualification that public expectations should be pitched at a level that was neither too high nor too low). 164 [2001] 3 All ER 289 at para 80. 165 See Wilkes v DePuy International Ltd [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB), [2018] QB 627 per Hickinbottom J at para 94, pointing out that this classification is not found in the wording of the Directive or the 1987 Act and suggesting that a rigid categorisation was “positively unhelpful and potentially dangerous”. See also Gee v DePuy International Ltd [2018] EWHC 1208 (QB), [2018] Med LR 347 per Andrews J at paras 157–160. 166 Hastings v Finsbury Orthopaedics Ltd [2019] CSOH 96, 2019 SLT 1411 per Lord Tyre at para 105 (affd [2021] CSIH 6, 2021 SLT 187); see also D Nolan, “Strict Product Liability for Design Defects” (2018) 134 LQR 176. 167 In Germany the term for the latter is “Ausreisser” (outlier), and in the US “lemon”.

Product Liability   997

The problems that arise where the alleged defect is the suspected presence of rogue products were considered in Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH v AOK Sachsen-Anhalt – Die Gesundheitskasse,168 a case concerning a defect in a line of medical products. Potential technical problems had been detected in a series of pacemakers and implantable cardioverter defibrillators imported into Germany. The specific individual products in use by the claimants had not themselves been identified as defective, but the producer had recommended that they should be replaced as a precautionary measure. Following a reference from the German court, the European Court of Justice directed that where products belonging to the same group or series were found to have a potential defect, it was “possible to classify as defective all the products in that group or series, without there being any need to show that the product in question is defective”.169 Moreover, the costs of the operations upon the claimants to replace these devices were payable by the producer, since compensation was payable to the extent of “all that is necessary to eliminate harmful consequences and to restore the level of safety which a person is entitled to expect”.170 This judgment thus gives an extended meaning to the concept of a product defect, as capable of including suspected defects in a product group, whether or not a defect is established in the actual sample that was used. However, particular emphasis in this case was laid upon the exacting expectations placed upon implanted medical devices,171 and it remains to be seen whether its reasoning would be followed in regard to other consumer products which might more readily be inspected to detect the actual presence of safety defects in particular items.

26.60

(b) Design and instruction defects: avoidability There can be no fixed public expectations in relation to design defects or instruction defects. Almost all products are capable of some design enhancement to make them safer. The general expectation, however, must be that some design trade-off is made against safety to accommodate utility and price considerations, meaning that it may not be easy to assemble the necessary technical data in order to persuade the court that a producer has compromised safety excessively in this regard. Similarly, in relation to instruction defects, it is almost always possible that more information or warnings could have been provided. Where, therefore, a product was

168 Cases C–503/13 and C–504/13, [2015] 3 CMLR 6. 169 Cases C–503/13 and C–504/13, [2015] 3 CMLR 6 at para 41 (in terms of Art 6 of the Directive). 170 Cases C–503/13 and C–504/13, [2015] 3 CMLR 6 at para 49. In relation to certain of the patients for whom it was possible simply to deactivate the defibrillators, it was for the national court to determine whether replacement was necessary in addition. 171 It is also the case that, unlike other products such as electrical equipment, such implanted medical products cannot readily be inspected to determine the actual presence of a threat to safety.

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accompanied by at least some instructions, or where the risk from the product was obvious or marginal, it can be difficult to demonstrate that yet more was necessary to achieve required levels of safety. Recent case law has acknowledged that safety is “inherently and necessarily a relative concept”,172 and that the extent to which a risk was avoidable is a relevant consideration is assessing what persons generally are entitled to expect, even although this may in turn involve weighing up possible precautions against those actually implemented by the producer. Of course, in cases involving “non-standard” products the avoidability of the threat to safety is not normally to be considered. The fact of a product failing to perform to the producer’s own specification is sufficient to establish that it was defective, without further consideration of whether it was possible for the producer to have done more to eliminate the presence of individual rogue products.173 In regard to standard products, however, where there is an alleged design or instruction defect, the question of what “persons generally are entitled to expect” is a more nuanced one, since it can almost always be alleged that more could have been done to enhance safety. Assessing defectiveness inevitably involves discussion of acceptable levels of risk, balanced against the reasonableness of measures taken to address that risk.174 In other words, avoidability of risk may be a relevant circumstance,175 with reference made to the precautions that persons were entitled to expect of the producer, in objective terms, as against those that were actually implemented.176 The challenges faced by claimants arguing that a product was defective on account of its design are illustrated in a series of cases involving adverse outcomes where artificial hip joints had been fitted. In Wilkes v DePuy International Ltd177 the claimant experienced a fracture in his artificial hip joint three years after it was implanted. He argued that the joint was defective because its design meant that there was excessive stress at the part where it had eventually fractured. However, various factors led the court to the conclusion that the joint had not been defective within the 172 Wilkes v DePuy International Ltd [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB), [2018] QB 627 per Hickinbottom J at para 65. 173 A v National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289 per Burton J at para 68. 174 Wilkes v DePuy International Ltd [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB), [2018] QB 627 per Hickinbottom J at paras 81–89. 175 See Gee v DePuy International Ltd [2018] EWHC 1208 (QB), [2018] Med LR 347 per Andrews J at para 146: avoidability “might legitimately form part of a holistic evaluation of whether that level of safety falls below the threshold set in section 3 of the Act – i.e. the level that the public generally was entitled to expect”. See also Hastings v Finsbury Orthopaedics Ltd [2019] CSOH 96, 2019 SLT 1411 per Lord Tyre at para 104 (affd [2021] CSIH 6, 2021 SLT 187). 176 See e.g. Abouzaid v Mothercare (UK) Ltd [2000] All ER (D) 2436 per Pill LJ at para 27, in discussing whether a product was defective: “It is not necessary for the Court to determine precisely what more should have been done. It is clear that more could have been done [by the producer].” Cf Richardson v LRC Products Ltd (2001) 59 BMLR 185 at 188 (burst condom, allegedly due to manufacturing defect, leading to unwanted pregnancy): “The overall precautions which the defendants took and the design of the equipment seems to be all that one could reasonably expect.” 177 [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB), [2018] QB 627.

Product Liability   999

meaning of the Act. These included: the relative difficulty of avoiding or mitigating the defect;178 the “disbenefits” of an alternative design in terms of convenience and comfort;179 the fact that other producers had used a similar design;180 the fact that the product had complied with applicable mandatory standards and regulatory requirements;181 the provision of an appropriate warning as to the risk of fracture as well as to the circumstances that increased that risk;182 and the fact that the consequences of a fracture, although unpleasant, could be remedied with relative ease by the fitting of a new hip joint.183 Similarly in Gee v DePuy International Ltd184 a group of patients suffered an adverse immunological reaction to metal-wear debris shed from the artificial hip, but the hip was not judged to be defective. Following a similar approach to that adopted in Wilkes, the court reached that conclusion by evaluating of all the circumstances, including the avoidability of harm, the weighing of the risks to safety as against the benefits of the product, and conformity with regulatory standards.

(c) Compliance with safety standards Non-compliance with mandatory safety standards for a product is generally persuasive evidence that the product is defective, whereas compliance with such standards, although not a defence as such, will tend to suggest that the product has achieved the level of safety required by the 1987 Act.185 However, this is only one of the possible circumstances of the case, and the significance placed upon compliance or otherwise is likely to vary. Thus a court may determine that the level of safety the public is entitled to expect is lower than a particular safety standard – or indeed higher, where the product complied with the requirements of the regulatory regime but there was some additional feature that made it unsafe.186 The English courts have, moreover, 178 [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB), [2018] QB 627 at paras 85–89 and 125. For discussion of avoidability, see also Hastings v Finsbury Orthopaedics Ltd [2019] CSOH 96, 2019 SLT 1411 per Lord Tyre at paras 101–104 (affd [2021] CSIH 6, 2021 SLT 187) and commentary thereon in E Russell, “A Scottish First: Hip Replacement Product Ruled not to be ‘Defective’” 2020 JR 55. 179 [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB), [2018] QB 627 at paras 82 and 121–122. Hickinbottom J also noted, at para 83, that the cost of an alternative design, while not a factor in this particular case, might be relevant in judging defectiveness. 180 [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB), [2018] QB 627 at para 123. 181 [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB), [2018] QB 627 at 124. 182 [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB), [2018] QB 627 at paras 127–128. 183 [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB), [2018] QB 627 at para 132; see also Hastings v Finsbury Orthopaedics Ltd [2019] CSOH 96, 2019 SLT 1411 per Lord Tyre at paras 157–162 (affd [2021] CSIH 6, 2021 SLT 187). Cf AH v Greater Glasgow Health Board [2018] CSOH 57, 2018 SLT 535 at para 136, in which Lord Boyd accepted the argument that the difficulty of removing the offending implant (vaginal mesh) might be one of the relevant “circumstances of the case”. 184 [2018] EWHC 1208 (QB), [2018] Med LR 347. 185 Wilkes v DePuy International Ltd [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB), [2018] QB 627 per Hickinbottom J at para 97. 186 Gee v DePuy International Ltd [2018] EWHC 1208 (QB), [2018] Med LR 347 per Andrews J at para 175.

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rejected the proposition that failure to adhere to “British Standards”187 of itself constitutes evidence that a product is defective in terms of section 3 of the 1987 Act. In Tesco Stores Ltd v Pollard,188 for example, the infant claimant had been injured when, aged thirteen months, he contrived to open a container of the defendants’ own-brand dishwasher detergent and consume some of its contents. The defendants had fitted the containers with a childproof closure, which, it transpired, did not confirm to the widely recognised British Standards of safety for such closures. However, there had been no mandatory requirement for products such as this to have a childproof closure, and the defendants had not indicated anywhere on the packaging that closure conformed to the British Standards. The court therefore held that the standard of safety that persons generally were entitled to expect, in terms of section 3(1), was only that such bottles “would be more difficult to open than if it had an ordinary screwtop”.189 That expectation had been met, and therefore the product was not defective. An undercurrent in that decision was a reluctance to read into the 1987 Act a right to sue as if such standards formed the basis for a specific warranty, overriding the generality of the public expectations test.

F. CAUSATION 26.65

The onus throughout proceedings lies upon the pursuer to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the damage complained of was “caused wholly or partly by a defect in a product”.190 It must be shown not only that a defect existed in the product, but also that this defect, rather than any other factor, caused the damage to occur.191 Neither the Directive nor the Consumer Protection Act 1987 makes provision for easing that burden of proof and, as noted above in discussion of the common law rules of causation,192 this represents a substantial hurdle for pursuers, particularly where the product in question has been ingested, or has perished, or where environmental or lifestyle factors may also be implicated in the adverse outcome.193 187 Many products demonstrate their adherence to the British Standards fixed for the safety of a range of different types of products and services. These appear under the letters BS, followed by a number, have traditionally been given a “kitemark”, and are administered by the BSI group (https://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/). While these Standards command considerable respect, they do not have statutory force. 188 [2006] EWCA Civ 393, [2006] All ER (D) 186 (Apr). 189 [2006] EWCA Civ 393, [2006] All ER (D) 186 (Apr) per Laws LJ at para 18. 190 Consumer Protection Act 1987 s 2(1). 191 See e.g. McGlinchey v General Motors UK Ltd [2011] CSOH 206, 2012 Rep LR 20 affd [2012] CSIH 91, 2013 GWD 1–47; Hufford v Samsung Electronics (UK) Ltd [2014] EWHC 2956 (TCC), [2014] All ER (D) 60 (Sep). 192 See para 26.19 above. 193 See XYZ v Schering Health Care Ltd [2002] EWHC 1420 (QB), (2003) 70 BMLR 88, in which seven lead claims were brought to trial in group litigation against three drug companies regarding “third generation” oral contraceptive drugs alleged to have caused cardiovascular injury. In a

Product Liability   1001

The pursuer is not, however, required to establish how the defect was itself caused, although the process of reasoning in determining the cause of the damage may involve an explanation of that point.194 Thus, an appliance that suddenly catches fire due to an electrical fault can be regarded as having caused the damage in the ensuing house fire, without any additional requirement for the pursuer to establish what in particular caused the electrical fault.195 On the other hand, more searching evidence on causation is required if it was possible for the damage in question to have been caused by something other than a product defect within the meaning of the Act, for example if a product has failed in circumstances that might be attributable to fair wear and tear.196 Where there are only two probable causes of the damage, one of which has been rejected, the court is entitled to accept the other as the operative cause.197 In Ide v ATB Sales Ltd, for example, the claimant was seriously injured in falling from his mountain bike, the handlebar of which was found to have fractured. Only two possible causes of the accident were suggested to the court, neither of which was improbable. The first was that the claimant had lost control of the bike and the handlebar had fractured in the resulting accident; the second was that the handlebar had disintegrated, causing the accident. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the trial judge, who, having rejected the first suggested cause as the more unlikely to be correct, was entitled to infer that the handlebar had failed in its normal use.198

194

195 196 197 198

200-page judgment Mackay J concluded, after detailed consideration of complex epidemiological evidence, that the risk factor was established at 1:7, which was therefore insufficient to establish causation on the balance of probabilities (although, on the basis of that figure, for one-seventh of the claimants the drug had been the cause of their injuries). Ide v ATB Sales Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 424, [2009] RTR 8 per Thomas LJ at paras 7 and 19. In Foster v Biosil (2000) 59 BMLR 178, a county court case, the Recorder read into s 2(1) a requirement to prove not only that the product had failed in a way which was unsafe and which was contrary to what persons generally were entitled to expect but also what caused the defect itself (a ruptured breast implant). The reasoning in that case has attracted criticism (see C J Miller and S J Goldberg, Product Liability, 2nd edn (2004) para 10.08), on the basis that it imposes an additional causal requirement beyond that stated in the Directive. In Ide, decided subsequently, the Court of Appeal expressly rejected this interpretation of the 1987 Act, holding that it is unnecessary to ascertain the cause of the defect. See also Gee v DePuy International Ltd [2018] EWHC 1208 (QB), [2018] Med LR 347 per Andrews J at para 86; AH v Greater Glasgow Health Board [2018] CSOH 57, 2018 SLT 535 per Lord Boyd at para 116. Gee v DePuy International Ltd [2018] EWHC 1208 (QB), [2018] Med LR 347 per Andrews J at para 99. Gee v DePuy International Ltd [2018] EWHC 1208 (QB), [2018] Med LR 347 per Andrews J at para 100. Ide v ATB Sales Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 424, [2009] RTR 8 per Thomas LJ at para 6. In an appeal conjoined with Ide, Lexus Financial Services v Russell, similar reasoning was applied where fire had destroyed two cars in a garage. Three possible causes for the fire were considered at trial: an arson attack, a defect in the wiring in the garage, and a defect in the electrics of the car. The decision of the trial judge was upheld in rejecting arson as an explanation and concluding, on the balance of probabilities, that the fire had been caused by a defect in the car electrics. Cf Love v Halfords Ltd [2014] EWHC 1057 (QB), [2014] RTR 32 in which the more probable explanation for the failure of a bicycle part was a botched repair, and causation was not therefore established.

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Of course, the mere fact of two competing explanations being put before the court does not compel the court to accept one of them unless, after rejecting the first, it finds the second to be sufficiently probable. Proof of causation may be particularly challenging where the alleged defect is a deficiency in the instructions or warning provided with the product. If such a defect is to be regarded as having caused the accident the court must be satisfied that the injured person would have noted and acted upon the instructions or warning in such a way that injury would have been avoided.199

G. DEFENCES 26.69

Section 4(1) of the 1987 Act provides for six distinct defences, closely following the wording of Article 7 of the Directive. A defect does not give rise to liability in any of the following circumstances.

(1) Compliance with an enactment or retained EU obligation200 26.70

It will happen only rarely that compliance with a statutory provision results in an alleged safety defect. Producers who have adhered to such a provision should not be held civilly liable, but the defence is available only where the defect is an inevitable result of such compliance.

(2) Product not supplied by the defender to another201 26.71

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This defence follows from Article 7(a) of the Directive, providing for the situation where the producer “did not put the product into circulation”. It has limited scope since “supply” is defined broadly by section 46(1) as including sale, hire, loan, entering into a hire-purchase agreement, exchange, and even offering goods as a prize. It is likely therefore that the defence would be available only in very restricted circumstances such as where the product caused injury before it left the factory, or the product was stolen from the defender. Where the defender has produced a product with a view to it being used in providing a service, that product is put into circulation at the point when

199 See e.g. H v The Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children [1990] 1 Med LR 297 per Badgery-Parker J at 317, a case from New South Wales argued in negligence, in which the producer had not included a warning of risk of infection in the labelling of blood products, but in any event the court was not persuaded that the behaviour of the physicians using the product would have been affected by such a warning. 200 Consumer Protection Act 1987 s 4(1)(a). 201 s 4(1)(b).

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it is so used. This is demonstrated in Veedfald v Arhus Amtskommune,202 involving the interpretation of the Danish legislation transposing Article 7(a) of the Directive. The product in question was cleaning fluid which, due to contamination, had rendered a kidney unsuitable for transplant. The same hospital authority was responsible both for the hospital where the fluid was produced and for the hospital where the kidney was to have been transplanted. The authority argued that, as the fluid did not leave its control, it had not been put into circulation. The European Court of Justice, however, rejected the defence on the basis that a product was put into circulation when it was used in the provision of a service, as the fluid had been in this case. It was therefore irrelevant whether that product was made by a third party, or by the service provider or by an entity linked to the service provider.

(3) Product not supplied in the course of a business203 For this defence it must be shown that: (i) the supply of the product was otherwise than in the course of a business; and also (ii) the defender’s activities in supplying the goods were carried out “otherwise than with a view to profit”. A “business” for this purpose includes “a trade or profession and the activities of a professional or trade association or of a local authority or other public authority”.204 It is not entirely clear exactly what types of enterprise might find themselves supplying goods but without being classified as a business in these terms. In a joint report published a decade before the Act, the Law Commissions envisaged that a defence should be available for acquaintances transferring goods informally, and for amateurs producing goods non-commercially for purposes such as charitable events.205 As for the second condition (supply “otherwise than with a view to profit”), a person donating goods to be sold for charity would appear to come within this category, but the trading arm of a large charity importing and supplying goods almost certainly does not; such activities are carried out “with a view to profit”, even if those profits are mostly diverted to charitable goals. The narrow application of this defence, as inapplicable even to publicly-funded producers such as hospitals, was illustrated in Veedfald v Arhus Amtskommune,206 in which the offending product was contaminated 202 203 204 205

Case C–203/99, [2003] 1 CMLR 41. s 4(1)(c). s 45(1). Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Liability for Defective Products (Law Com No 82, Scot Law Com No 45, 1977) para 43, indicating that it would be “unreasonable” for liability to be imposed upon those who did not act in the course of a business, such as individuals making jam for a church sale of work or selling apples to neighbours over the garden wall. 206 Case C–203/99, [2003] 1 CMLR 41, noted at para 26.72 above.

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cleaning fluid which rendered a kidney unsuitable for transplant. The regional hospital authority under whose auspices the fluid was produced attempted to invoke the equivalent defence under Article 7(c) of the Directive. This was rejected by the court because, although the product was supplied as part of a medical service for which patients did not pay directly, and was supported from public funds, this did not take away from the “economic and business character of that manufacture”.207

(4) Defect did not exist in the product at the time of supply208 26.76

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Section 2(1) of the Act requires the pursuer to prove there was a defect in a product of which the defender was a producer, importer or supplier, and that the defect caused the damage complained of. But even if the existence of a defect and causation are both proved, the defender may challenge the chronology, and escape liability, where it can show that defect came about after the defender ceased to have responsibility for the product. More precisely, the defence is that the defect did not exist “at the relevant time”. For producers, importers and “own-branders”, the “relevant time” is the date of that person supplying the product to another. For others – essentially suppliers – the “relevant time” is the date when the product was last supplied by a person within the scope of section 2(2), namely a producer, importer or “own-brander”.209 An obvious application of this defence is where a product that was initially safe has become unsafe due to a person modifying it or carrying out inappropriate maintenance. The burden of proof is on the defender to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the product was sound “at the relevant time”, so that the defect must have developed subsequently. This may also involve addressing the probability or otherwise of subsequent interference.210 Plainly, most products cannot be expected to last forever, and some deterioration due to fair wear and tear must be within consumer expectation. Even if there is an inherent tendency for a product to become progressively less safe, this does not mean that the product was defective on leaving the factory.211 On the other hand, a product which has the propensity to deteriorate rapidly due to weaknesses of manufacture or design may be regarded as defective from the outset,212 thus precluding operation of the defence. 207 Case C–203/99, [2003] 1 CMLR 41 at para 21. 208 s 4(1)(d). 209 s 4(2). 210 See Love v Halfords Ltd [2014] EWHC 1057 (QB), [2014] RTR 32, where it was found to be probable that a botched repair had been performed on the product. 211 See discussion of wear and tear in McGlinchey v General Motors UK Ltd [2011] CSOH 206, 2012 Rep LR 20, affd [2012] CSIH 91, 2013 GWD 1–47. 212 See e.g. Baker v KTM Sportmotorcycle UK Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 378.

Product Liability   1005

(5) The “development risks” defence213 A topic of debate prior to the adoption of the Directive was whether it was reasonable to impose liability upon producers in regard to so-called “development risks”. These are risks that become apparent as new products come into wider circulation but which were not discoverable at the time when they were first released on to the market. It therefore has most significance in regard to industries operating in the forefront of new technology. A standard example is a new type of drug which, after a period of time, turns out to have side-effects undetected by trials before it was marketed. The Directive permitted each member state to choose whether to provide in its national liability regime “that the producer shall be liable even if he proves that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of a defect to be discovered”,214 which would mean that liability was strict, in the sense that the producer would be liable even where the defect could not have been known and therefore could not have been avoided. Alternatively, member states had the option of incorporating a “development risk” defence into its national liability regime, as set out in Article 7(e), providing a defence in cases where “the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when [the producer] put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered”. Most member states, including the United Kingdom, selected the second of these options. Its effect is to make the liability regime less strict, in that producers are shielded from liability where the defect was not knowable.215 As transposed into section 4(1)(e) of the 1987 Act, the defence is:

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“that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the relevant time was not such that a producer of products of the same description as the product in question might be expected to have discovered the defect if it had existed in his products while they were under his control”.

The “relevant time” at which the state of knowledge must be assessed is defined in section 4(2) as the time of supply. On one view, the wording of section 4(1)(e) of the 1987 Act is more favourable to the producer than that of the Directive, in that the Directive requires the state of knowledge to be measured by a fixed objective standard (“the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time”), whereas the

213 Consumer Protection Act 1987 s 4(1)(e). 214 Article 15(1)(b). 215 On this point see J Stapleton, “Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective” (2000) 39 Washburn Law Rev 363 at 369.

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Act apparently allows for a more relative assessment, by reference to what one might expect of the reasonable producer. Indeed the European Commission brought a case against the United Kingdom before the European Court of Justice,216 arguing that the more generous scope of section 4(1)(e) meant that the United Kingdom had failed properly to transpose the objective test of Article 7(e). In the end the alleged failure of transposition was held not to have been proved, given the “general legal context”, the absence of case law interpreting the Act in this way, and in particular section 1(1) of the Act stipulating that the Act was to be construed so as to comply with the Directive. Indeed it has since been judicially accepted that reference should be made to the text of the Directive, in preference to the Act, when the wording of this particular defence is under scrutiny.217 In seeking to satisfy the court that a product defect was not discoverable, a defender is likely to refer to the detail of its own research and development processes. However, “the state of scientific and technical knowledge” relevant to this defence is assessed objectively, by reference not to the individual producer, but to the state of knowledge of a hypothetical “expert in the sector”.218 Moreover, a defect is known once it is acknowledged by a minority in that sector, even if the majority remains ignorant or sceptical, since it cannot be said after that point that the defect was not discoverable.219 The knowledge in question must, however, be accessible to that hypothetical expert. When back in 1997 the defence received detailed consideration by the European Court of Justice in European Commission v United Kingdom,220 the Advocate General spoke of the need to consider factors such as the place of origin of the information, the language in which it was given, and the “circulation of the journals” in which it was published. Thus, he suggested, producers in Europe would not be expected to have found out the results of research carried out by a Manchurian academic and published in a local scientific journal in Chinese.221 So it is possible for producers to argue that a particular defect could not have been discovered in circumstances where the information was available only in a printed source with

216 European Commission v United Kingdom, Case C–300/95, [1997] 3 CMLR 923. 217 A v National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289 per Burton J at para 2. 218 European Commission v United Kingdom, Case C–300/95, [1997] 3 CMLR 923, Advocate General’s opinion at para 20. 219 European Commission v United Kingdom, Case C–300/95, [1997] 3 CMLR 923, Advocate General’s opinion at para 21. 220 Case C–300/95, [1997] 3 CMLR 923. 221 Case C–300/95, [1997] 3 CMLR 923 at para 23. The standard of “‘non-Manchurianly accessible’ knowledge” was referred to in A v National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289, but subject to the observation that Manchuria would be an inappropriate point of reference if Manchurian experts were known for particular expertise in regard to the product in question.

Product Liability   1007

limited circulation in a distant country. On the other hand, the notion of the Manchurian, Chinese-language, scientific journal representing the frontier of permissible ignorance dates from an era when technical knowledge was mostly acquired from specialist journals in print form. Today, however, provenance does not represent the same barrier to discovery in regard to information which is available electronically, and with the ready availability of translation software even the language of publication has become less crucial. Producers might now therefore be expected to access information available online on open access or in relevant trade sources, no matter how physically remote its place of publication. Although in essence the “development risks” defence thus allows producers to escape liability by showing that they were not negligent, there are important differences from the common law of negligence. First of all, the onus is on the producer to prove that the risk was not discoverable, not upon the pursuer to prove fault. Secondly, the test of what was discoverable refers not to what a reasonable producer would have discovered but to an extremely broad category of what was “accessible”. The defence is inapplicable in cases where the possible existence of defects was known about in principle, even if, given scientific and technical knowledge at the relevant time, there was no means of detecting it in any given sample of the product. In A v National Blood Authority222 it was known that some batches of blood supplied for transfusion might be contaminated by the hepatitis C virus, although no effective screening test had been developed so as to identify which ones. The court held that once the question mark over safety became known, even if contamination was undiscoverable in any given sample of the product, it was a known risk. A known risk was not within the scope of the defence, even if unavoidable.223

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(6) Component parts in products defective only because of inappropriate design or specification224 As noted above, producers of component parts in defective products may be found jointly and severally liable with the producer of the finished article if the components supplied by them have rendered the product defective.225 This defence allows such component producers to escape liability where, in effect, the component part was not of itself dangerous or defective but has

222 223 224 225

[2001] 3 All ER 289. [2001] 3 All ER 289 at para 77. Consumer Protection Act 1987 s 4(1)(f). s 2(5), and see para 26.33 above.

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become so because it has been put to inappropriate use. More precisely, the defence as set out in section 4(1)(f) is: “that the defect– (i) constituted a defect in a product (‘the subsequent product’) in which the product in question had been comprised; and (ii) was wholly attributable to the design of the subsequent product or to compliance by the producer of the product in question with instructions given by the producer of the subsequent product”.

Take, for instance, a high-specification mountain bike that has been assembled by producer A using brakes manufactured by producer B. The brakes fail and the mountain bike crashes, causing injury to its rider. In principle producers A and B may be held jointly and severally liable. However, the defence is available to producer B if it can show that that the unsafe condition of the bike was wholly attributable to the design of the mountain bike, for which the brakes were not suitable, or due to inappropriate technical specifications for the brake parts set by producer A.

(7) Prescription and limitation 26.88

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Article 11 of the Directive required member states to provide in their domestic legislation that the right to bring a claim was extinguished ten years after “the date on which the producer put into circulation the actual product which caused the damage”, unless proceedings had been instituted before that date. Amendment was made accordingly to the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 to deal with obligations arising under section 2 of the 1987 Act.226 Section 22A of the 1973 Act provides for a ten-year period of negative prescription, so that such obligations are “extinguished” unless a relevant claim has been brought within ten years of the “relevant time” and has not yet been disposed of. “Relevant time” has the meaning given to it in section 4(2) of the 1987 Act, namely the time of supply, interpreted by reference to the status of the particular defender: for producers, importers and “own-branders”, this is the date of that person supplying the product to another; for suppliers, this is the date when the product was last supplied by a producer, importer or “own-brander”. The question as to the exact starting-point for the ten-year period arose in O’Byrne v Sanofi Pasteur MSD Ltd,227 noted above,228 in which the defective product had been sent by a French parent company to its wholly-owned subsidiary in the United Kingdom and then sold to the

226 For detailed commentary, see D Johnston, Prescription and Limitation, 2nd edn (2012) chs 9 and 15. 227 Case C–127/04, [2006] 1 WLR 1606. 228 At para 26.28.

Product Liability   1009

Department of Health. An action was first raised against the United Kingdom subsidiary in the mistaken belief that it was the manufacturer, and against the French parent company only after the ten-year time limit had elapsed. On the question of whether the claim was time-barred, the European Court of Justice held that the time at which the product was “put into circulation”, and at which the ten-year period began, was “the moment at which the producer voluntarily relinquishes control over the product by transferring it for commercial reasons to someone unrelated to the group to which the producer belongs”.229 In other words, the time limit was to be calculated from the point at which the subsidiary supplied the product to the Department of Health, rather than the point at which the product was sent from the French parent company to its subsidiary. This ten-year prescriptive period may appear ungenerous to the injured person by comparison with the general rule for personal injuries, in relation to which the obligation to make reparation does not prescribe.230 Even where the ten-year period has passed, however, it will sometimes be possible to bring a claim in common law negligence, assuming that there is cause for extending the three-year limitation period.231 Section 22B of the 1973 Act makes further provision for a three-year limitation period, beyond which claims under the 1987 Act may not be brought. Except where the defect caused fatal injury, the three-year period runs from the point at which the pursuer became aware that: (i) there was a defect in the product; (ii) the damage was caused or partly caused by the defect; (iii) the damage was sufficiently serious to justify the pursuer in bringing an action; and (iv) the defender was a person liable for the damage.232 The limitation period may, however, be suspended during the pursuer’s nonage or during any period of the pursuer’s unsoundness of mind,233 and, in addition, the court may allow actions for personal injury actions to proceed beyond the three-year period where “it seems to it equitable to do so”.234 Further provision is made in section 22C of the 1973 Act for those cases in which death has resulted from injury caused by the defective product – in other words, claims brought by the executor in the deceased’s stead or by the relatives of the deceased. The three-year period runs from whichever is the later of the date of death, or the earliest date on which the pursuer became aware that: (i) there was a defect in the product; (ii) the 229 230 231 232 233 234

Case C–127/04, [2006] 1 WLR 1606 at para 52. Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 s 7(2). Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 ss 17 and 18, and see paras 30.22–30.24 below. s 22B(3). s 22B(4). s 22B(6) (making similar provision to that contained in s 19A, as discussed at paras 30.22–30.23 below). For discussion see AH v Greater Glasgow Health Board [2018] CSOH 57, 2018 SLT 535 per Lord Boyd at paras 193–206.

26.90

26.91

26.92

1010   The Law of Delict in Scotland

deceased’s injuries were caused by the defect; and (iii) the defender was a person liable for the damage.235 In claims brought by relatives, the threeyear period is suspended during the pursuer’s nonage or during any period of unsoundness of mind.236 In addition, the court may allow actions to proceed beyond the three-year period where “it seems to it equitable to do so”.237 Again, these provisions are subject to the claim being extinguished altogether after the expiry of the ten-year prescriptive period.

(8) Contributory negligence 26.93

26.94

26.95

In circumstances where the damage has been caused “partly by a defect in a product and partly by the fault of the person suffering the damage”, section 6(4) of the 1987 Act allows the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 to be applied. This means that any sum awarded by way of damages is reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the pursuer’s share in the responsibility for the damage. Section 6(4) thus entails an awkward apportionment of responsibility as between the producer, in relation to whom considerations of fault are in principle irrelevant, and the injured person, whose fault is to be measured. As discussed above, section 3(2) of the 1987 Act allows various factors to be taken into consideration when deciding whether a product is defective.238 These include the instructions and warnings issued with the product, as well as what might reasonably be expected to be done with the product. If a product has been supplied with adequate warnings which the injured person ignored, or if it has been put to a dangerous use which the producer could not reasonably have anticipated, it is open to a court to decide that the product was not in any event defective, in which case the issue of contributory negligence does not arise. However, in cases where the product is judged to be defective, as not meeting the standard of safety that persons generally are entitled to expect, contributory negligence is unlikely to be recognised simply because the pursuer failed to discover a hitherto undetected defect, or did not react to it in the most prudent possible manner on being confronted with such a defect. Compensation in regard to damage caused in a car accident, for example, cannot be contingent upon the motorist dealing in an optimal manner with an emergency created by the sudden failure of defective brakes. On the other hand, there is no reason to suppose that the strict-liability regime imposed upon the producer relieves the consumer of a general responsibility to act reasonably.239 Thus contributory negligence may be recognised 235 236 237 238 239

s 22C(2). s 22C(3). s 22C(5). See paras 22.56–22.64 above. See discussion in General Motors v Sanchez 997 S W 2d 584 (Tex 1999).

Product Liability   1011

where the injuries of a motorist involved in such an accident were made more severe because of failure to wear a seat belt, for instance.

(9) Exclusion clauses Section 7 of the 1987 Act240 provides that:

26.96

“The liability of a person by virtue of this Part to a person who has suffered damage caused wholly or partly by a defect in a product, or to a dependant or relative of such a person, shall not be limited or excluded by any contract term, by any notice or by any other provision.”

Thus exclusion clauses are in all circumstances ineffective in contracting out of the strict-liability framework of the 1987 Act, irrespective of their reasonableness or otherwise. Nonetheless, where a producer provides comprehensive warnings detailing specific risks, the product is unlikely to be judged defective, under reference to section 3(2)(a), and the producer may in that way avoid liability.

H. SAFETY REGULATIONS AND THEIR BREACH Under section 11 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 the Secretary of State can lay down safety regulations in relation to the composition or contents, design, construction, finish or packing of goods, and in relation to the withdrawal or recall of goods that are discovered to be unsafe.241 Section 12 of the Act imposes criminal liability on those who supply goods in breach of such regulations. By section 41(1) a civil claim may also be brought,242 although breaches of safety regulations made under section 11 are thought not to be actionable under section 41(1) if the breach would in any event trigger liability within the terms of section 2(1).243 In addition, safety measures prescribed by the General Product Safety Regulations 2005244 make it an offence for a product to be placed on the marked, supplied or distributed unless that product is safe.245

240 See also Art 12 of the Directive. 241 On the common law duty to recall products discovered to be unsafe, see para 26.12 above. 242 See e.g. Howmet Ltd v Economy Devices Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 847, [2016] BLR 555 (although causation was not proved). 243 See discussion in Wilson v Beko plc [2019] EWHC 3362 (QB), [2021] 1 WLR 1711 (to hold otherwise would deprive defendants of the defences in s 4 of the 1987 Act). 244 SI 2005/1803, made under the European Communities Act 1972 s 2(2), and implementing Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on general product safety. 245 regs 5, 8 and 20. “Safe” is defined in reg 2.

26.97

Chapter 27

Statutory Liability for Harm Caused by Animals

Para A. BACKGROUND�������������������������������������������������������������������� 27.01 B. THE ANIMALS (SCOTLAND) ACT 1987���������������������������� 27.04 (1) Injury or damage��������������������������������������������������������������� 27.05 (2) The keeper����������������������������������������������������������������������� 27.06 (3) The species to which the Act applies���������������������������������� 27.09 (4) “Directly referable” injury or damage��������������������������������� 27.12 (5) Exclusions from liability���������������������������������������������������� 27.18 (6) Contributory negligence���������������������������������������������������� 27.22 (7) Self help��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 27.24

A. BACKGROUND 27.01

This chapter considers issues of liability where harm is caused by the actions of an animal. Much of the case law involving animals, of course, is no more than an application of rules discussed elsewhere in this volume. Thus the failure to observe due care in keeping animals may render their keepers liable in negligence,1 for example, or as occupiers in terms of the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960.2 Alternatively, the creation of noise or smell by animals may create a nuisance.3 It is even possible that the delict of assault may be perpetrated by using an animal to inflict injury.4 However, the capacity of animals for autonomous action, together with their unpredictability, mean that they have significant potential to cause harm that is unintended, and sometimes unforeseen, by their keepers. A specialised body of strict liability rules has long been in place, therefore, to provide redress for those harmed in certain contexts where it is appropriate to require the owner or keeper to bear the risk of harm.5  1 Gilligan v Robb 1910 SC 856; Gardiner v Miller 1967 SLT 29; Draper v Hodder [1972] 2 QB 556.   2 See e.g. Hill v Lovett 1992 SLT 994.  3 Ireland v Smith (1895) 3 SLT 180; Shanlin v Collins 1973 SLT (Sh Ct) 21.  4 E.g. Ewing v Earl of Mar (1851) 14 D 314.   5 For a detailed history of liability for animals in Scots law, see R Zimmermann and P Simpson, “Strict Liability”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann, A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 548 at 550–566. See also B S Jackson, “Liability for Animals in Scottish Legal Literature: From the Auld Lawes to the Sixteenth Century” (1975) 10 Irish Jurist 334; D L Carey Miller, “The Scottish Institutional Writers on Animal Liability: Civilian or Scienter” 1974 JR 1.

1012

Statutory Liability for Harm Caused by Animals   1013

The Winter Herding Act of 1686,6 which remained in force until 1987, provided a right of compensation against owners of “horses, nolt,[7] sheep, swine and goats” which ate or destroyed their neighbours’ ground, woods, hedges or planting. The Dogs Act 1906, similarly in place until 1987, imposed liability on the owners of dogs which injured cattle, without any requirement to show that the dog had a previous “mischievous propensity” or that the injury was attributable to “neglect” by the owner.8 Moreover, a form of strict liability evolved in the common law in respect of certain types of animal which the owner or keeper knew, or was deemed to know, had dangerous propensities. Owners were deemed to know that animals ferae naturae – wild beasts such as lions, bears, wolves, gnus, apes or monkeys9 – were likely to cause harm if not properly controlled, and they were liable for such harm without further need for proof of fault. On the other hand, the owners or keepers of animals mansuetae naturae or domitae naturae – domestic and farm animals such as dogs, cats or horses – were liable only if it could be shown that they were aware that the offending animal had “vicious propensities”.10 The complexity of these distinctions, the changing nature of problems involving animals, as well as awareness of reform elsewhere,11 combined to spark new interest12 in reform in Scotland. This culminated in the enactment of the Animals (Scotland) Act 1987, which followed closely the recommendations of the Scottish Law Commission in its 1985 report on Civil Liability in Relation to Animals.13 The policy of the reform was to rationalise the rules of strict liability by recasting them in a modern form appropriate to the special risks posed by animals. The provisions of the 1987 Act are discussed in detail in the remainder of this chapter. However, it is important to note that the 1987 Act left untouched the common law rules providing for

 6 RPS 1686/4/37, APS viii, 595 c 21.   7 I.e. cattle.   8 Dogs Act 1906 s 1.   9 Instances suggested in Burton v Moorhead (1881) 8 R 892. 10 Fleeming v Orr (1855) 2 Macq 14. See also Dobbie v Henderson 1970 SLT (Sh Ct) 27, holding that a bull’s urge to mate was not in itself a “vicious propensity”, and therefore the duty to ensure that it remained confined was not an absolute one. 11 In particular the Animals Act 1971, reforming strict liability in England and Wales. The Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (Pearson Commission) (Cmnd 7054 I–III, 1978) vol 1, para 1626 recommended that “provisions parallel to those of the Animals Act 1971 should be enacted for Scotland”. The authoritative text on the 1971 Act is P North, Civil Liability for Animals, 2nd edn (2012). 12 Earlier recommendations made by the Twelfth Law Reform Committee for Scotland, in its report on The Law Relating to Civil Liability for Loss, Injury and Damage Caused by Animals (Cmnd 2185, 1963) were not taken forward (to the effect that the rules on liability for animals should be recast as based solely on failure to exercise reasonable care). 13 Scot Law Com No 97, 1985. This had been preceded by a Consultative Memorandum on Civil Liability in Relation to Animals (Scot Law Com Con Mem No 55, 1982). For a discussion of the background to the 1987 Act, see K Norrie, “Liability for Animals”, in Delict (SULI) ch 21.

27.02

27.03

1014   The Law of Delict in Scotland

fault as a ground of liability. This means that, as before, in cases where the criteria for imposing strict liability cannot be met, it remains open to make a claim on the basis of negligence or other form of common law liability.14

B. THE ANIMALS (SCOTLAND) ACT 1987 27.04

The Animals (Scotland) Act 1987 supersedes pre-existing no-fault rules in respect of injury or damage caused by animals15 and provides a new framework of strict liability in certain specified circumstances. The essential framework of the Act is set out in section 1(1), which imposes three conditions for liability: “[A] person shall be liable for any injury or damage caused by an animal if – (a) at the time of the injury or damage complained of, he was a keeper of the animal; (b) the animal belongs to a species whose members generally are by virtue of their physical attributes or habits likely (unless controlled or restrained) to injure severely or kill persons or animals, or damage property to a material extent; and (c) the injury or damage complained of is directly referable to such physical attributes or habits.”

(1) Injury or damage 27.05

The keeper is liable for “any injury or damage” caused by an animal. In turn, section 7 defines “injury” as including “death, any abortion or other impairment of physical or mental condition and any loss of or diminution in the produce of an animal and, subject to section 1(4) of this Act,[16] disease”. Liability extends to injury to persons as well as to other animals. The property “damage” for which liability might arise is most obviously damage to land or its produce, or to things on land such as fences and buildings.

(2) The keeper 27.06

Liability is imposed on the keeper of the animal “at the time of the injury or damage complained of”.17 Section 5(1) states the “keeper” to be the person who “owns the animal or has possession of it; or . . . has actual

14 See e.g. Fairlie v Carruthers 1996 SLT (Sh Ct) 56; Robertson v Horses in Scotland Ltd [2007] CSOH 68; Welsh v Brady [2008] CSOH 45, 2008 SLT 363, affd [2009] CSIH 60, 2009 SLT 747; Ferguson v Ferguson [2015] CSIH 63, 2015 SLT 561; see also Henderson v John Stuart (Farms) Ltd 1963 SC 245. 15 Animals (Scotland) Act 1987 s 1(8). 16 Section 1(4), noted at para 27.16 below, excludes the communication of disease where it is “transmitted by means which are unlikely to cause severe injury other than disease”. 17 Animals (Scotland) Act 1987 s 1(1)(a).

Statutory Liability for Harm Caused by Animals   1015

care and control of a child under the age of 16 who owns the animal or has possession of it”.18 Excluded are those who have temporarily detained straying animals, and also the Crown which generally, but unknowingly, acquires ownership of abandoned animals.19 Where an animal is abandoned or has escaped, the keeper is the person who, at the time of the animal’s abandonment or escape, was the owner of it or had it in his possession.20 Thus, in addition to owners, liability is imposed upon any person who has “possession” of the animal. The wording of this provision appears to have been based on that of the Animals Act 1971, section 6(3),21 which applies in England and Wales, but neither Act explains what is meant by “possession” in this context. In proposing the draft Bill, the wording of which the Act follows closely, the Scottish Law Commission, similarly, did not seek to define “possession”. It would appear that the draftsman had in mind possession in a physical, non-technical, sense,22 so that civil possession (i.e. possession through another) would be excluded. But it remains unclear how, if at all, possession is to be distinguished from merely looking after an animal for a short period. Most cases brought under the Scottish legislation have in practice involved owners, but under the English legislation the persons regarded as a “keeper” have included, for example, a person taking a horse for a ride with the permission of the owner.23 In English common law, “harbouring [an animal] about one’s premises, or allowing him to be or resort there” was sufficient for the person concerned to be labelled as a keeper.24 This meant that liability might attach, for example, to an employer who allowed an employee’s dog to remain on his premises after the employee had left,25 a person looking after an animal on a commercial basis for its owner,26 or a person taking in a dog as a stray and keeping it as a guard dog.27

18 s 5(1). 19 s 5(2). The Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 s 74 provides that, other than in cases of stray dogs or livestock, ownership may instead pass to the finder of an animal where that person, by arrangement with the chief constable, looks after the animal for a period of more than two months, and no one claims it within that time. 20 s 5(2)(b). 21 The Animals Act 1971 s 6(3) provides that “a person is a keeper of an animal if – (a) he owns the animal or has it in his possession; or (b) he is the head of a household of which a member under the age of sixteen owns the animal or has it in his possession”. 22 See Scottish Law Commission, Report on Civil Liability in Relation to Animals (Scot Law Com No 97, 1985) paras 4.20–4.19. Indeed the term “custody” is apparently used in the Report as an equivalent concept. For possession in its technical sense as it relates to animals, see C Anderson, Possession of Corporeal Moveables (Studies in Scots Law vol 3, 2015) ch 7. 23 Flack v Hudson [2001] QB 698. 24 M’Kone v Wood (1831) 5 C & P 1. 25 M’Kone v Wood (1831) 5 C & P 1; see also Murray v Brown (1881) 19 SLR 253. 26 Walker v Hall (1876) 40 JP 456. 27 Smith v Prendergast, The Times, 18 October 1984.

27.07

1016   The Law of Delict in Scotland

27.08

The Act provides that where a non-owner is found to have been a “keeper” of an offending animal at the relevant time, he or she is jointly and severally liable with the owner, leaving it open to the court to apportion damages between them as it “deems just”.28 There would appear to be no obstacle to a keeper, in the sense of a non-owning possessor, bringing a claim against the owner, or against another keeper, if he or she was injured while looking after the animal.29

(3) The species to which the Act applies 27.09

27.10

Liability is imposed under the Act for injury or damage only if the animal causing it “belongs to a species whose members generally are by virtue of their physical attributes or habits likely (unless controlled or restrained) to injure severely or kill persons or animals, or damage property to a material extent”.30 No matter how serious the injury or damage caused by other types of animal, it does not trigger strict liability as provided by the Act, although liability may arise in negligence. “Species” can include “a form or variety of the species or a sub-division of the species, or [a] form or variety, identifiable by age, sex or such other criteria”.31 It is therefore possible to argue that certain subgroups of a species are known to be dangerous although others are not. In Foskett v McClymont,32 for example, the pursuer was held to be entitled to aver that bulls were a sub-species of cattle, whose members by virtue of their physical attributes or habits were likely to injure persons severely; it is less obvious that heifers meet this definition.33 In practice, most cases are uncontentious in this regard, since in terms of section 1(3) of the Act certain species are deemed to be likely (unless controlled or restrained) to injure severely or kill persons or animals by biting or otherwise savaging, attacking or harrying. This high-risk category includes dogs (the animal found most frequently in the case law),34 and the Act replaces the rules previously contained in the Dogs Act 1906 imposing strict liability on owners for damage done by dogs to cattle.35 The category also includes dangerous wild animals within the meaning of section 7(4) 28 Animals (Scotland) Act 1987 s 1(7), referring to the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 s 3. 29 See Flack v Hudson [2001] QB 698 on interpretation of the similarly-worded English provisions. 30 Animals (Scotland) Act 1987 s 1(1)(b). Section 7 further provides that “animal” does not include viruses, bacteria, algae, fungi or protozoa, unless the context otherwise requires. 31 s 1(2)(a). 32 1998 SC 96. 33 Although see Macatee v Montgomery 1949 SLT (Sh Ct) 5, in which a heifer charged the pursuer but negligence was not established in the absence of averments of the animal’s “vicious” propensities. See also Cameron v Hamilton’s Auction Marts Ltd 1955 SLT (Sh Ct) 74, in which liability in negligence did not arise for the significant property damage caused by an escaped heifer, on the grounds that this was too remote. 34 Animals (Scotland) Act 1987 s 1(3)(a). 35 Dogs Act 1906 s 1(1)–(3).

Statutory Liability for Harm Caused by Animals   1017

of and Schedule 1 to the Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976,36 most of which, admittedly, are not indigenous to Scotland. A further category of animal identified by the Act, but in this case as likely to cause damage to land or the produce of land in the course of foraging, is that of cattle, horses, asses, mules, hinnies, sheep, pigs, goats and deer.37 The Act in this respect replaces the rules previously contained in the Winter Herding Act 1686,38 noted above.39

27.11

(4) “Directly referable” injury or damage Strict liability is applied under the Act only where injury or damage was “directly referable” to the animal’s physical attributes or habits.40 In Foskett v McClymont,41 for example, the pursuer was charged by the bull, struck on his side and thrown into the air, thereby sustaining significant physical injury. It was competent to bring a case under the Act because the injury was directly referable to the “physical attributes or habits” of size and aggression typically associated with bulls. In practice, a great many cases involve dogs, which, as noted above,42 are deemed by the Act to be likely to injure severely or kill persons or animals by biting or otherwise savaging, attacking or harrying.43 Thus if P has been bitten and savaged by the D’s pit-bull terrier, strict liability arises under the Act, because the injuries sustained are directly referable to the dangerous attributes that the Act deems dogs to have. If, by contrast, P collides with the pit-bull terrier while cycling up D’s driveway, the injuries sustained in falling from the bicycle may be caused by the animal but are not directly referable to those attributes, and thus liability, if it arises at all, arises only in common law negligence.44 This point was illustrated in Fairlie v Carruthers45 in which the pursuer’s and the defender’s dogs were both being exercised in the same field. The 36 Animals (Scotland) Act 1987 s 1(3)(a). These include wild dogs and wolves, as well as lions, tigers, bears, wolves, elephants, ostriches, snakes, and so on. 37 s 1(3)(b). 38 s 1(8)(b). 39 At para 27.02. 40 s 1(1)(c). 41 1998 SC 96. Cf Dobbie v Henderson 1970 SLT (Sh Ct) 27, a case predating the 1987 Act, in which the pursuer attempted to invoke the strict liability rule in relation to bulls as animals ferae naturae. However, the injury suffered was that the defender’s bull had impregnated two of the pursuers’ heifers. To the extent that this was an injury, it was the result not of the bull’s “vicious propensity” but simply of a natural desire to mate, and therefore the law of negligence applied, rather than strict liability. In the event, negligence was not proved. 42 See para 27.10 above. 43 See Flynn v Lothian and Borders Police 2010 GWD 30–626 (proof before answer allowed where the pursuer had been pulled over by the dog whose lead she was holding, lunging at – and thereby “attacking and harrying” – not her but another dog). 44 See Sandison v Coope [2016] SC PER 33, 2016 Rep LR 70. 45 1996 SLT (Sh Ct) 56.

27.12

27.13

27.14

1018   The Law of Delict in Scotland

27.15

27.16

defender’s dog, a young and “lively” retriever, ran over to the pursuer and knocked her off balance, causing her to break her leg. Although the defender’s dog bumped into the pursuer, there was no evidence of it having bitten, savaged, attacked or harried her. Her injuries were not therefore directly referable to the dangerous physical attributes or habits of dogs, and strict liability did not therefore arise. A different approach, however, was adopted in Welsh v Brady,46 in which the pursuer was knocked over by a black labrador exercising off the lead in the same area as her own golden retriever. The pursuer did not attempt to argue that the labrador “bit, savaged, attacked or harried” her, so as to bring the deeming provision of section 1(3)(a) into play. Instead she referred back to the general wording of section 1(1)(b) and contended that black labradors were a species which, by virtue of their physical attributes or habits and in particular their boisterousness, were likely to injure severely or kill persons or animals. Evidence was led as to the excitability of the dog in question, but this fell far short of demonstrating that labradors as a species were likely to injure severely or kill, and it was therefore held that the conditions for strict liability had not been met. Similarly, in regard to foraging animals the relevant damage that (as set out in section 1(3)(b)) is directly referable to their deemed dangerous attributes is damage to land or to the produce of land.47 Thus if P invokes section 1(3)(b) to deem an animal dangerous, liability will only arise in relation to damage of this particular type. So there is strict liability under the Act in regard to pigs that damage crops, but not in regard to pigs that cause a nuisance to neighbours because of their smell.48 Alternatively, strict liability may also arise in respect of such foraging animals as (in terms of section 1(1) (b) of the Act) are of a “species whose members generally are by virtue of their physical attributes or habits likely (unless controlled or restrained) to injure severely or kill persons or animals, or damage property to a material extent”. This was the claim made by the pursuer in regard to the aggressive bull in Foskett v McClymont.49 As the injury suffered to the pursuer’s person was directly referable to the bull’s dangerous physical attributes, the case was brought under section 1(1)(b) rather than by invoking section 1(3)(b). Section 1(4) excludes liability for the communication of disease by an animal where it is “transmitted by means which are unlikely to cause severe injury other than disease”.50 This means that strict liability does not arise under the Act (although it may do so under the common law of negligence) 46 [2009] CSIH 60, 2009 SLT 747. 47 See para 27.11 above. 48 Although this may trigger liability under the common law of nuisance: see e.g. Wheeler v J J Saunders Ltd [1996] Ch 19. 49 1998 SC 96; see para 27.12 above. 50 The Scottish Law Commission explained that the statutory provisions imposing criminal liability on keepers of animals that spread disease did not apply where the keeper did not know of the disease or could not with reasonable diligence have known of it. It was therefore thought inappropriate that civil liability under the Act should be strict in these circumstances. See Report on Civil Liability

Statutory Liability for Harm Caused by Animals   1019

where an animal transmits a disease to a person by a means that is normally non-injurious, for example by licking, or by common contact with a medium such as soil. Section 1(5) further states expressly that the Act does not apply to “injury or damage caused by the mere fact that an animal is present on a road or in any other place”. Thus one of the most frequent contexts in which animals are the cause of accidents – road traffic accidents caused by straying animals – is removed from the strict liability ambit of the Act, although liability in negligence may arise.51

27.17

(5) Exclusions from liability Liability under the Act does not arise if the injury or damage is caused solely by the fault of the victim, or, where the injury is to an animal, by the keeper of the animal attacked.52 An example might be where the victim had opened the gate to an enclosure where a dangerous animal had otherwise been adequately confined. Similarly, liability under the Act does not arise if the victim, or the keeper of the animal injured, had willingly accepted the risk of injury.53 As with the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, “willingly” would appear to entail that the victim knew of and understood the risk. For example, from time to time instances are reported of individuals climbing into lion enclosures in zoos. Lions are certainly deemed dangerous by the Act, but, given that their dangerous attributes are well understood, and that invading such an enclosure requires considerable determination, such an individual would in all likelihood be regarded as having “willingly” accepted the risk of injury.54 A question not yet considered by case law subsequent to the 1987 Act is whether the employer of a person specifically employed to look after dangerous animals may escape strict liability, on the basis that the employee has willingly accepted the risk of injury by such animals. This possibility is expressly ruled out by the equivalent English legislation,”55 reversing the effects of Rands v McNeil 56 as well as a New Zealand decision, James v

51

52 53 54 55 56

in Relation to Animals (Scot Law Com No 97, 1985) para 3.23, referring to Animal Health (Scotland) Act 1981 s 79(2). See e.g. Gardiner v Miller 1967 SLT 29; Swan v Andrew Minto & Son 1998 Rep LR 42; Sandison v Coope [2016] SC PER 33, 2016 Rep LR 70; but cf Davidson v McIrvine 2007 GWD 23–389 (not foreseeable that bull would stray on road, and therefore negligence not established). Animals (Scotland) Act 1987 s 2(1)(a). s 2(1)(b). See also Sylvester v G B Chapman Ltd (1935) 79 Sol Jo 777. Animals Act 1971 s 6(5). [1955] 1 QB 253. The plaintiff was injured by an aggressive bull during the course of his employment as a farm worker. Neither strict liability nor negligence was established, but it was observed, per Jenkins LJ at 264, that the employee’s lack of care for his own safety was the sole cause of injury in circumstances where he “ran the risk, which was an obvious one, without being asked to do so and in disobedience if not of instructions about which he knew, at least of the promptings of ordinary common sense”.

27.18

27.19

27.20

1020   The Law of Delict in Scotland

27.21

Wellington City.57 The 1987 Act, however, is silent on this matter, although there is pre-1987 authority, in a case involving alleged negligence by a farmer whose employee was injured by a bull, indicating that Rands would not be followed.58 At the same time, the common law does not completely exclude the volenti defence in other employment contexts, although it recognises it only rarely. There is authority to indicate that an employee who continues to work in dangerous conditions does not consent to a breach of his or her employer’s statutory duty,59 but there is also authority to support the application of the volenti defence where an employee knowingly acts contrary to instructions and in breach of safety regulations.60 The silence of the 1987 Act would therefore appear to leave open the possibility that employees may be deemed to have accepted the risk of injury where they interact with a dangerous animal in disregard of the employer’s instructions and in breach of known safety standards. Liability under the Act is further excluded where the animal was on land which the victim entered without entitlement to do so, or, in a case where an animal is injured, that the animal did likewise.61 However, this exclusion is only partial in the context where it is most likely to arise – that of guard dogs.62 If the dog that inflicts injury was kept for the purpose of protecting persons or property, the keeper escapes liability if the keeping of the animal at that location and the use made of the animal for that purpose were reasonable. The keeper must also have complied with the requirements of the Guard Dogs Act 1975, which means that the animal must have been under the control of its handler or securely tethered, and warning notices must have been posted advertising the presence of the dog.

(6) Contributory negligence 27.22

The 1987 Act allows for the defence of contributory negligence; and although the Act imposes strict liability, any injury or damage for which the defender is found liable is treated as due to the defender’s “fault” for 57 [1972] NZLR 70. A zoo keeper was injured by a chimpanzee to which he had been tending. No negligence was suggested on the part of the zoo proprietors, and although the proprietors were regarded in principle as strictly liable for injuries inflicted by their chimpanzees, the Supreme Court of New Zealand refused the zoo keeper’s claim since, per Quilliam J at 77, “The very nature of the plaintiff’s employment from the moment he commenced it, was to work among dangerous animals, and he must be presumed to have known and accepted that fact.” 58 Henderson v John Stuart (Farms) Ltd 1963 SC 245 per Lord Hunter at 253. Lord Hunter also reviewed the decision in Clark v Armstrong (1862) 24 D 1315, similarly involving an attack on a farm worker by a bull, and in which liability was denied, but explained it as resting on a finding that there was no duty to confine the animal, since it was not proved that the bull was known to be vicious. 59 Stewart’s Executrix v Clyde Navigation Trs 1946 SC 317. 60 Hugh v National Coal Board 1972 SC 252, under reference to ICI Ltd v Shatwell [1965] AC 656. See also paras 29.16–19.18 below. 61 Animals (Scotland) Act 1987 s 2(1)(c). 62 s 2(2).

Statutory Liability for Harm Caused by Animals   1021

the purposes of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.63 Damages may thereby be reduced to such extent as the court thinks “just and equitable” having regard to the pursuer’s share in the responsibility for the damage.64 A potential difficulty in apportioning liability is that like is not being compared with like. The 1987 Act provides for strict liability, with no requirement that the pursuer should prove fault on the defender’s part. On the other hand, contributory negligence requires the pursuer’s fault to be measured in order to assess the justice and equity of the damages awarded. As explained in Ferguson v Ferguson,65 “where the pursuer is found to be some extent at fault that degree of fault, which may be small in absolute terms, will weigh heavily in relative terms because there is nothing by way of culpability on the other side of the balance”; the consequence may be an “artificial” increase in the proportion of contributory negligence ascribed to the pursuer. Ferguson v Ferguson itself offers an interesting case in point. The pursuer suffered facial injuries after being bitten by her brother-in-law’s aged, and previously well-behaved, pet dog. The incident took place at a New Year’s Day party, during which the pursuer had been drinking. She seated herself close to the dog on a sofa, rousing him from sleep, and by all accounts put her face close to his. At the subsequent jury trial the pursuer did not seek to criticise her brother-in-law’s management of the dog, since her case under the 1987 Act did not require fault on the part of the keeper to be established. Much of the evidence regarding causation and moral fault, therefore, centred on the pursuer herself, for the purposes of considering contributory negligence.66 Damages were awarded by the jury, but reduced by 85 per cent to reflect contributory negligence, a proportion with which the Extra Division did not feel entitled to interfere on appeal.

27.23

(7) Self help An animal which strays on to land and is not then under the control of any person may be detained by the occupier of the land in order to prevent it damaging property or causing injury to people or to animals.67 Moreover, no civil action will lie against a person who kills or injures an animal if that person acted either in self-defence or for the protection of another person or livestock, although notice must be given to the police within 48 hours of the incident.68 63 s 1(6). 64 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 s 1(1). 65 [2015] CSIH 63, 2015 SLT 561 per Lord Brodie at para 23, citing J Blackie, “The Provoking Dogs Problem 2” (1993) 38 JLSS 148. 66 [2015] CSIH 63, 2015 SLT 561 per Lord Brodie at para 23. 67 Animals (Scotland) Act 1987 s 3(1). 68 s 4.

27.24

Chapter 28

Protection from Harassment

Para A. PROTECTION FROM HARASSMENT ACT 1997 (1) Actions of harassment ������������������������������������������������������ 28.01 (2) Conduct constituting harassment��������������������������������������� 28.03 (3) Causing of “alarm or distress”������������������������������������������� 28.07 (4) Intention to cause harassment�������������������������������������������� 28.09 (5) Interdicting a course of conduct����������������������������������������� 28.12 (6) Non-harassment orders����������������������������������������������������� 28.14 (7) Vicarious liability�������������������������������������������������������������� 28.16 (8) Limitation������������������������������������������������������������������������ 28.18 B. LAWBURROWS��������������������������������������������������������������������� 28.20 C. MOLESTATION�������������������������������������������������������������������� 28.22

A. PROTECTION FROM HARASSMENT ACT 1997 (1) Actions of harassment 28.01

28.02

The principal legal recourse for victims of the anti-social conduct of others is to be found in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, sections 8–11 of which apply to Scotland (and only to Scotland).1 Section 8(1) imposes an obligation not to cause harassment to others and, in the event of an actual or feared breach, section 8(2) allows the victim to bring an “action of harassment”. The remedies available in such an action are damages,2 and interdict or a non-harassment order requiring the defender to refrain from specified conduct in relation to the pursuer.3 The threshold provision is section 8(1). This provides that: “Every individual has a right to be free from harassment and, accordingly, a person must not pursue a course of conduct which amounts to harassment of another and –

  1 Sections 1–7 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 apply to England and Wales only. The separate legislative treatment for England and Wales and for Scotland is mainly due to procedural differences. There is much common ground as to policy and terminology (e.g. in the key definitions contained in ss 7 and 8), and English authority is of assistance in those regards.   2 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 8(5)(a).   3 s 8(5)(b).

1022

Protection from Harassment   1023 (a) is intended to amount to harassment of that person; or (b) occurs in circumstances where it would appear to a reasonable person that it would amount to harassment of that person.”

It follows from this provision that, while only natural persons may claim to be the victims of harassment,4 “persons” generally may be the perpetrators, so that individuals or corporate bodies5 or unincorporated bodies6 may be held liable.

(2) Conduct constituting harassment The 1997 Act leaves the term “harassment” to its natural meaning rather than attempting a definition. To the extent that the scope of harassment is described, it is by reference not to the perpetrator’s conduct but to the victim’s reaction – under the Act it “includes causing the person alarm or distress”.7 As Lady Hale remarked of the equivalent English provisions,8 the open-ended nature of “harassment” means that “a great deal is left to the wisdom of the courts to draw sensible lines between the ordinary banter and badinage of life and genuinely offensive and unacceptable behaviour”.9 Harassment may readily be recognised where it is perpetrated by physical confrontation or by threats of violence, but it is not confined to such cases. Relevant conduct, under the Act, includes speech,10 so that verbal aggression may constitute harassment. Sometimes harassment takes the form of a persistent campaign of unneighbourly acts,11 or of unwanted romantic attentions, whether by physical stalking or by telephone, text or other forms of correspondence.12 A successful claim has even been brought for harassment by a series of newspaper articles.13 From time to time, harassment has been identified in   4 See e.g. Daiichi Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd v Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty [2003] EWHC 2337 (QB), [2004] 1 WLR 1503 (involving the equivalent English provisions of the 1997 Act).  5 E.g. Ferguson v British Gas Trading Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 46, [2010] 1 WLR 785.   6 E.g. in Daiichi Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd v Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty [2003] EWHC 2337 (QB), [2004] 1 WLR 1503 injunctions were granted against the activities of an animal rights pressure group, in so far as its activities affected individual employees, but not the pharmaceutical company for whom the members worked.   7 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 8(3).   8 ss 1–5.  9 Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224 at para 66. 10 s 8(3). 11 See Green v Chalmers [2017] SAC (Civ) 8, 2017 SLT (Sh Ct) 69. 12 See e.g. Moulds v Reid [2012] CSOH 13, 2012 GWD 8–159. 13 See Thomas v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1233, [2002] EMLR 4 (citing the English provisions in the 1997 Act) in which harassment was said to include any “conduct targeted at an individual which is calculated to produce the consequences described in section 7 [i.e. including “alarming the person or causing the person distress”] and which is oppressive and unreasonable” (per Lord Phillips MR at para 30). The defendant newspaper was thus held to have harassed the claimant by a series of articles narrating that she had made complaints about racist behaviour, but in terms that were foreseeably likely to stimulate a racist reaction by readers against her and cause her distress. See also Fulton v Sunday Newspapers Ltd [2017] NICA 45.

28.03

28.04

1024   The Law of Delict in Scotland

28.05

28.06

dealings between business entities and consumers. A relevant case was made, for example, in Ferguson v British Gas Trading Ltd,14 where the claimant had been upset and distressed by a series of computer-generated demands for payment and threats of legal action sent in error by the defendant. In Roberts v Bank of Scotland plc,15 a campaign of 547 telephone calls made to a customer by a bank asking to discuss the state of her (occasionally overdrawn) accounts was “unwarranted and unpleasant”, and the fact that the creditor was a bank rather than a private individual did not detract from its potential to cause distress and therefore to harass. On a similar basis, in Worthington v Metropolitan Housing Trust Ltd16 a housing association was found to have harassed two of its tenants where, without proper grounds, it sent a series of letters threatening an injunction and repossession proceedings. But while harassment may be constituted in many different ways, it must normally, under the Act, involve “a course of conduct”, that is to say, “conduct on at least two occasions”.17 There is, however, an exception for “harassment amounting to domestic abuse”, where the conduct complained of need not have occurred more than once.18 Moreover, harassment in this context can be constituted not only by words or deeds but even by the presence of the perpetrator in a particular place or area,19 for example by the perpetrator waiting and watching outside the victim’s home or place of work. Harassment can involve repeated instances of conduct each of which might be categorised as assault, defamation,20 or even nuisance.21 However, the individual actions within a person’s pattern of conduct need not be capable of giving rise to civil liability independently.22 Equally, there is no requirement that the person should have committed a criminal offence, such as breach of the peace, although the potential criminal consequences of conduct may “colour” the court’s view of it.23 The essential test is not whether individual acts were alarming or distressing in themselves, but whether the perpetrator’s activities, taken as a whole, crossed that line.24 14 [2009] EWCA Civ 46, [2010] 1 WLR 785. 15 [2013] EWCA Civ 882 per Jackson LJ at para 43. 16 [2018] EWCA Civ 1125, [2018] HLR 32; see also Allen v London Borough of Southwark [2008] EWCA Civ 1478. 17 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 8(1), (3); see McGlennan v McKinnon 1998 SLT 494. 18 s 8A(1), (2). 19 s 8A(3). 20 E.g., McWilliams v Russell [2017] SC GLA 64, 2017 GWD 32–510, affd [2018] SAC (Civ) 9, 2018 GWD 14–193. 21 E.g. Green v Chalmers [2017] SAC (Civ) 8, 2017 SLT (Sh Ct) 69. See also discussion of boundaries between nuisance and harassment in Fearn v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery [2019] EWHC 246 (Ch), [2019] Ch 369 per Mann J at para 174 (affd [2020] EWCA Civ 104, [2020] Ch 621). 22 See e.g. Iqbal v Dean Manson Solicitors [2011] EWCA Civ 123 per Rix LJ at para 41. 23 Dickie v Flexcon Glenrothes Ltd 2009 GWD 35–602 per Sheriff P Braid at para 77. 24 Worthington v Metropolitan Housing Trust Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 1125, [2018] HLR 32 per Kitchin LJ at para 60; see also Marinello v Edinburgh City Council [2011] CSIH 33, 2011 SC 736 per Lord Hardie at para 10, on the importance of looking at whether individual acts were “part and parcel” of a course of conduct.

Protection from Harassment   1025

(3) Causing of “alarm or distress” As already mentioned, insofar as the Act defines harassment at all, it does so by reference to the reaction of the victim: “‘harassment’ of a person”, says section 8(3), “includes causing the person alarm or distress”. Other forms of reaction are not excluded.25 So while the perpetrator’s actions may cause “recognised psychiatric illness”,26 harassment is also potentially in play where the result is anxiety falling short of such illness. In G v S,27 for example, an action of harassment was held to be competent where, owing to the persistent sexual attentions of the defender, the pursuer had “developed symptoms of anxiety and stress” and had received “psychological treatment” from her doctor. Moreover, conduct that causes distress can constitute harassment even where there is no element of physical aggression. Thus in Roberts v Bank of Scotland plc28 the claimant was awarded damages in recognition of the distress caused to her by the “bombardment” of 547 unwarranted phone calls from the defendant’s call centres. As section 8(6) makes clear, any award of damages in an action of harassment may include compensation both for anxiety caused and also for financial loss deriving from it, such as loss of earnings.

28.07

28.08

(4) Intention to cause harassment It is not a requirement in every case that the defender should be shown actually to have intended to cause alarm or distress. Section 8(1) (quoted above) stipulates that the conduct in question should either have been “intended to amount to harassment” of the victim29 or have occurred “in circumstances where it would appear to a reasonable person that it would amount to harassment”.30 Thus, even in the absence of evidence of intention, liability may be found if the conduct constituted harassment on an objective view. Moreover, the subjective and objective approaches are stated as alternatives. This means that liability may follow even where it would not have appeared to a reasonable person that the conduct would amount to harassment but nonetheless the perpetrator did intend to cause alarm and distress. On the other hand, conduct will not be regarded as harassment, even where distress resulted, if the conduct was not intended to amount to harassment and it would not have appeared to a reasonable

25 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 8(3). 26 See e.g. Robertson v Scottish Ministers [2007] CSOH 186 (psychiatric illness allegedly triggered by campaign of victimisation and intimidation on the part of the pursuer’s colleagues). 27 [2006] CSOH 88, 2006 SLT 795. See also Moulds v Reid [2012] CSOH 13, 2012 GWD 8–159. 28 [2013] EWCA Civ 882. 29 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 8(1)(a). 30 s 8(1)(b).

28.09

1026   The Law of Delict in Scotland

28.10

28.11

person to amount to harassment. In Dickie v Flexcon Glenrothes Ltd 31 the pursuer was affected by an adjustment disorder following an alleged campaign of harassment by his manager at a previous workplace. In the event, he failed to establish a sufficient causal connection between the disorder and the manager’s conduct, but even if he had done so the court indicated that his claim would have been rejected. The evidence showed that he had “a sensitive personality”, with “unrealistic expectations of how other people should behave towards him”, and “irrational beliefs that certain conduct was targeted at him when on any objective view clearly it was not”.32 Against that background, and taking the conduct as a whole, the sheriff dismissed the action. The sheriff was not persuaded either that the manager intended to harass the pursuer, or that a reasonable person would have regarded the manager’s conduct in that way. A course of conduct is capable of being construed as harassment only if it is in some way “targeted” at a victim.33 But although the wording of section 8 is framed in the singular,34 harassment may also extend to conduct affecting more than one person where “the necessary community of interest” is established.35 In Green v Chalmers,36 for example, the pursuers, a married couple living in the same house, were both on the receiving end of a series of hostile acts by their neighbours. The Sheriff Appeal Court held that an interdict could competently be granted where the action was brought in the name of both, thereby overturning the sheriff’s decision that there was a requirement for separate averments, separate craves, and separate pleas-in-law relating to each pursuer. Harassment targeted at A may cause collateral distress to B which may itself amount to harassment under the Act. In Levi v Bates,37 for example, a campaign of harassment caused distress to the claimant even although it had been specifically targeted at her husband. The Court of Appeal held that it was competent for her to bring a claim under the 1997 Act, since such claims were available not only to the “targeted” individual but also to others who had been “foreseeably, and directly, harmed by the course of targeted conduct of which complaint is made, to the extent that they can properly be described as victims of it”.38 This conclusion was based upon a reading of provisions applicable only to England and Wales,39 but as section 8(2) 31 2009 GWD 35–602. 32 2009 GWD 35–602 per Sheriff P Braid at para 10. 33 Thomas v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1233, [2002] EMLR 4; Dickie v Flexcon Glenrothes Ltd 2009 GWD 35–602 at paras 71–72. 34 See s 8(1): “Every individual has a right to be free from harassment and, accordingly, a person must not engage in conduct which amounts to harassment of another . . .”. 35 Green v Chalmers [2017] SAC (Civ) 8, 2017 SLT (Sh Ct) 69 per Sheriff Principal I R Abercrombie QC at para 14. 36 [2017] SAC (Civ) 8, 2017 SLT (Sh Ct) 69. 37 [2015] EWCA Civ 206, [2016] QB 91. 38 [2015] EWCA Civ 206, [2016] QB 91 per Briggs LJ at para 34. 39 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 ss 1(1) and 3(1).

Protection from Harassment   1027

(which applies to Scotland) allows proceedings to be brought “by the person who is or may be the victim of the course of conduct in question”, a wording which replicates the relevant English provision (section 3(1)), this reasoning is likely to be persuasive in Scottish cases also.

(5) Interdicting a course of conduct In some cases a “course of conduct”40 amounting to harassment may involve the repetition of essentially the same type of activity; in others it may be more varied. The latter in turn can present problems in framing a suitable crave for interdict.41 In Green v Chalmers42 the defenders had subjected their neighbours, the pursuers, to a programme of miscellaneous aggressions over several years. These were found, after proof, to have comprised:

28.12

“poisoning the pursuers’ dog with rat poison; killing their pot plants by spraying weed killer on them; spraying their western boundary hedge with chemicals, damaging it; carrying out significantly noisy operations using a grain dryer operated by a tractor engine into the early hours of the morning or throughout the night; causing grain dust to adversely affect the pursuers’ subjects; positioning grain dryers, combine harvesters and a cattle trailer close to the pursers’ boundary for no apparent reason, so that they were easily visible to and had a visual impact upon the pursuers; further deliberate spraying of weedkiller on their hedge and birch saplings . . . damaging and killing some of them; sealing the lid of the pursuers’ septic tank with silicone; positioning a tractor with its raised forks, plastic tanks and a large ‘bogey’ trailer in a tipped position, without reason, close to the pursuers’ property so that they were clearly visible from the pursuers’ house; intentionally opening, unwrapping and leaving silage bales close to the pursuers’ boundary so that they would deteriorate and create a foul smell which was very noticeable in the pursuers’ garden and house; driving a tractor at speed towards the second pursuer when she was weeding the hedge; positioning two harrowers for no reason close to the pursuers’ boundary so that they were clearly visible from the pursuers’ house; leaving a bogey filled with cattle dung close to the pursuers’ boundary for 18 days causing an unpleasant smell which prevented the pursuers from sitting in their garden or opening their windows and regularly burning rubbish including plastics, causing unpleasant acrid smoke and smells to permeate the pursuers’ house.”

In these circumstances the pursuers’ crave for interdict had been worded in relatively broad terms, presumably in order to anticipate further resourcefulness in the defenders’ conduct. Interdict was refused by the sheriff at 40 The expression comes from s 8(1). 41 The court is empowered to award interdict or interim interdict by s 8(5)(b)(i). 42 [2017] SAC (Civ) 8, 2017 SLT (Sh Ct) 69.

28.13

1028   The Law of Delict in Scotland

first instance on the basis that the pursuers’ craves were too imprecise, vague and uncertain, and that the specific individual actions by the defenders were in any event “one-off” in nature and unlikely to be repeated.43 That decision was overturned by the Sheriff Appeal Court, which awarded interdict in the general terms requested. It held that the relevant question was not whether a particular act was likely to be repeated, but whether the course of conduct constituting harassment was likely to continue,44 and given that there was apparently “no end to the defenders’ ingenuity in finding ways to harass the pursuers”, the court was readily persuaded that such conduct was likely to continue. In these circumstances the exact nature of the prohibited actions did not require to be spelled out. It was sufficient to ask that the defenders be interdicted “from pursuing a course of conduct which is intended to amount to harassment of the pursuers or of either of them . . . or which . . . occurs in circumstances where it would appear to a reasonable person that the course of conduct would amount to harassment”, provided that examples were added, such as those provided by the pursuers in this case, “to colour and provide a matrix within which the preceding words should be interpreted”.45

(6) Non-harassment orders 28.14

28.15

The 1997 Act also allows for the granting of non-harassment orders “requiring the defender to refrain from such conduct in relation to the pursuer as may be specified in the order for such period (including an indeterminate period) as may be so specified”.46 But such an order may not be granted where the defender is subject to the same prohibitions by interdict granted under the Act,47 as opposed to in other proceedings, such as divorce.48 In practice a non-harassment order is likely to be considered appropriate where interdict has been ineffective or is insufficient.49 In addition, where a person is convicted of an offence involving domestic abuse, the sentencing court is required, even without an application by the prosecutor, to consider whether to make a non-harassment order.50 Breach of a non-harassment order is a criminal offence, which renders the defender liable to imprisonment or a fine or both,51 and power of arrest

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

2016 SCLR 413 per Sheriff D R Foulis at 429–430. [2017] SAC (Civ) 8, 2017 SLT (Sh Ct) 69 per Sheriff Principal I R Abercrombie QC at para 38. [2017] SAC (Civ) 8, 2017 SLT (Sh Ct) 69 per Sheriff Principal I R Abercrombie QC at para 42. Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 8(5)(b)(ii). s 8(5)(b). McCann v McGurran 2002 SLT 592. McGuire v Kidston 2002 SLT (Sh Ct) 66. Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s 234AZA. For discussion, see Finlay v Corrins [2020] SAC (Crim) 1, 2020 SC (SAC) 7. 51 s 9(1).

Protection from Harassment   1029

is granted to police constables who reasonably believe a breach to have been committed.52 While there is no express provision that the defender must be heard in proceedings brought under the Act, it is said to be a breach of “natural justice” for a non-harassment order to be awarded without the defender being given an opportunity to be heard, and an order made in such circumstances is vulnerable to being recalled.53

(7) Vicarious liability The 1997 Act allows for the possibility of employers being vicariously liable for employees who harass others, such as customers, clients or fellow employees, in the course of their employment.54 This requires application of the close-connection test, as set out in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd55 (and discussed elsewhere in this book),56 which looks at the nature of the connection between the wrongdoing and the field of activities allocated to the employee by the employer. In the English case of Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust,57 for example, a clinical auditor claimed to have been bullied and intimidated by his departmental manager in such a way as to amount to harassment. In holding the employer vicariously liable the House of Lords reasoned:58 “Take a case where an employee, in the course of his employment, harasses a non-employee, such as a customer of the employer. In such a case the employer would be liable if his employee had assaulted the customer. Why should this not equally be so in respect of harassment? In principle, harassment arising from a dispute between two employees stands on the same footing. If, acting in the course of his employment, one employee assaults another, the employer is liable. Why should harassment be treated differently?”

The House of Lords concluded that in “most cases” there should be “little difficulty”59 in finding a sufficiently close connection between the employment and the harassment so that vicarious liability would apply. 52 s 9(3). 53 Alexandra v Murphy 2000 SLT (Sh Ct) 44 per Sheriff Principal D J Risk QC at 45. 54 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 10, on limitation, provides specifically for liability of the “employer or principal”. See Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224, in particular discussion by Lord Hope at paras 44–63; and see e.g. Robertson v Scottish Ministers [2007] CSOH 186. 55 [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215. See also Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677. 56 See paras 3.39–3.45 and, in relation to harassment, paras 3.60 and 3.61. 57 [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224. 58 [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224 per Lord Nicholls at para 28. 59 Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224 per Lord Nicholls at para 30.

28.16

1030   The Law of Delict in Scotland

28.17

Nonetheless, the requisite close connection is not always established. Such a connection is perhaps most readily found where, as in Majrowski, the harassment is perpetrated by the victim’s superior, and the offending conduct can be seen as closely connected with the superior’s duties in managing the victim’s work.60 The passage cited above from Majrowski suggests that a sufficiently close connection may similarly exist where an employee harasses a customer whom the employee was employed to serve.61 On the other hand, a close connection between the perpetrator’s employment and the harassment is not made out simply because the perpetrator and the victim happened to be employed in the same workplace. In Vaickuviene v J Sainsbury plc,62 a supermarket shelf-stacker embarked upon a campaign of racial harassment against a co-worker, which culminated in murder. The court found this to be an independent venture unrelated to the business of stacking shelves for which the employee had been engaged.63 Moreover, “the defender’s objectives did not carry with them a serious risk of their employee committing the kind of wrong which he in fact committed”.64 The employers were not therefore held to be vicariously liable.

(8) Limitation 28.18

The Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, section 18B(2), stipulates that actions of harassment must be brought with a period of three years after: “(a) the date on which the alleged harassment ceased; or

60 See also Marinello v Edinburgh City Council [2011] CSIH 33, 2011 SC 736 (proof before answer allowed where the alleged harassment had been by the pursuer’s superiors); Robertson v Scottish Ministers [2007] CSOH 186 (proof before answer allowed where the pursuer had allegedly been harassed by a group of colleagues including union officials, who, in Lord Emslie’s view, at para 11, might “be taken to have had a recognised status within the prison service, an acknowledged responsibility for inter alia the welfare of officers like the pursuer”); Dickie v Flexcon Glenrothes Ltd 2009 GWD 35–602 (harassment not made out but the employers did not dispute that they would have been vicariously liable in respect of a manager’s treatment of an employee). 61 See also Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] UKSC 1, [2016] AC 677, discussed at para 3.47 above, in which a supermarket chain was held vicariously liable for an assault carried out upon a customer by a petrol-station attendant. The case, however, was brought on the basis of common law and not the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. 62 [2013] CSIH 67, 2014 SC 147. 63 The Second Division referred to discussion in the Outer House case of Ward v Scotrail Railways Ltd 1999 SC 255, in which a female rail-ticket inspector had been harassed by a male colleague (although the conduct predated the 1997 Act). The Lord Ordinary, Lord Reed, observed, at 263–264, that this conduct had been an “unrelated and independent venture” of the employee’s own, and the pursuer’s concession that vicarious liability did not attach to such conduct was subsequently endorsed in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd as “soundly made”: see [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215 per Lord Clyde at para 48. 64 [2013] CSIH 67, 2014 SC 147 per Lord Justice-Clerk Carloway at para 30.

Protection from Harassment   1031 (b) the date, (if later than the date mentioned in paragraph (a) above) on which the pursuer in the action became, or on which, in the opinion of the court, it would have been reasonably practicable for him in all the circumstances to have become, aware, that the defender was a person responsible for the alleged harassment or the employer or principal of such a person.”

In similar fashion to other types of action, the limitation period is suspended while the person alleged to have suffered the harassment is under the age of sixteen or suffering from “unsoundness of mind”.65 Where the harassment comprises a sequence of activities, the limitation period under section 18B begins at the date of the last incident.66 Alternatively, but only if this results in a later date, it begins from the time when the pursuer became aware (or it was reasonably practicable for the pursuer to become aware), that the defender was a person responsible for the harassment, or the employer of such a person.67 A later starting point for the limitation period may therefore be permitted where harassment was carried on anonymously and it took time to establish the identity of the person responsible. In Moulds v Reid,68 for example, the defender had sent the pursuer a series of indecent photographs, sexually explicit letters, poems and items of clothing. He had also intimidated her with a number of silent or obscene phone calls. The defender was known to the pursuer, but he did not identify himself in the calls and correspondence, and the pursuer did not begin to suspect him until two years after the conduct started. Although she had contacted the police earlier, it was only once she mentioned her specific suspicions about the defender that the police were able to take steps to identify him as the culprit, using DNA and other technical evidence. The date of the last act of harassment was to be determined at proof. However, the court held that, even if the pursuer failed to establish this as having been less than three years before the action was raised, her assertions that it was not reasonably practicable for her to have discovered the defender’s identity any earlier provided a relevant case for the application of section 18B(2)(b).69 65 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 18B(3). 66 s 18B(2)(a). Accordingly, where the most recent event complained of by the pursuer is not regarded as part and parcel of the course of conduct constituting harassment, the relevant date for the commencement of the limitation period is that on which the latest incident occurred which is considered to have contributed to the harassment: see Marinello v Edinburgh City Council [2011] CSIH 33, 2011 SC 736. 67 s 18B(2)(b). 68 [2012] CSOH 13, 2012 GWD 8–159. 69 Her circumstances might also be sufficient to bring her within the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 s 17(2)(b), in that it was only after consulting an expert that she appreciated that her adjustment disorder stemmed from the experience of the harassment.

28.19

1032   The Law of Delict in Scotland

B. LAWBURROWS 28.20

28.21

A detailed treatment of the remedy of lawburrows is not offered here,70 since, although remaining competent, it has for practical purposes been superseded by the remedies available under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Already in the 1850s it was observed that the remedy of lawburrows was “little adapted” to the state of society in Scotland “where the restraining power of public law is generally sufficient for individual protection”.71 The last reported case in which an order was granted to find caution of lawburrows was Morton v Liddle in 1996 (i.e. just before the 1997 Act),72 and the preceding decades had seen a mere handful of cases.73 The remedy of lawburrows is provided for in a series of statutes, beginning with an Act of 1429,74 still in force, which says that a person who “haf ony doute of his life, outhir be dede or manauce or violent presumpsioun” might ask for “souerte”75 of the party complained against to guarantee his safety. Further legislation in 158176 extends protection to the “bodeis, landis, takkis, possessionis, guidis and geir” not only of the complainers but also of their “wyffis, bairnis, tenentis and servandis”. The modern procedure is set out in the Civil Imprisonment (Scotland) Act 1882, section 6. If a person has good reason to fear for the safety of person, family or property,77 application may be made to the local sheriff court or justice of the peace to order caution to be found to guarantee non-aggression on the part of the person complained against. On presentation of the application, notice is served, and a diet of proof may be held at which both sides may cite witnesses. In the event that the application is granted, the precise amount of caution is left to the sheriff’s or justice’s discretion, with the

70 But see G B Clark, “Lawburrows”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 13 (1992) paras 901–926. See also Morrow v Neil 1975 SLT (Sh Ct) 65 (for a full account by Sheriff I D Macphail QC); W J Stewart, “Lawburrows: Elegant Remedy or Absurd Form” 1988 SLT (News) 181. 71 Gadois v Baird (1856) 28 SJ 682 per Lord Ardmillan at 683. 72 1996 JC 194, although see the extended discussion in Duff v Strang [2008] HCJAC 4, 2008 JC 251, in which an application for lawburrows (as a means of calling a former chief constable to answer for past alleged misfeasance) was held to be incompetent. See also Duff v Chief Constable of Dumfries and Galloway 2014 SC DUM 33, 2014 GWD 26–513, affd [2012] CSIH 45, 2012 SLT 975, holding that although defamation might serve as a ground for lawburrows, an application for lawburrows was incompetent where the pursuer had not in any event stated a relevant case of defamation. 73 E.g. Mackenzie v Maclennan 1916 SC 617; Morrow v Neil 1975 SLT (Sh Ct) 65. By 1933 lawburrows had been described as “almost-obsolete”: H Burn-Murdoch, Interdict in the Law of Scotland (1933) para 371. 74 RPS 1430/24, APS ii, 19 c 20. 75 Surety. 76 “Additioun to the act of Lawborrowis” RPS 1581/10/41, APS iii, 222 c 22. 77 See e.g. Morton v Liddle 1996 JC 194 (repeated verbal threats, a skeleton hung on display, and significant damage to property including a log thrown through the Mortons’ glass front door, although no actual injury to the Mortons).

Protection from Harassment   1033

alternative of imprisonment in the event of failure to find caution. If caution is found and harm is subsequently caused to the complainer, an action of contravention of lawburrows may be brought craving forfeiture of the caution. The action, although a civil one, is brought with the concurrence of the procurator fiscal, and, if successful, the caution is paid half to the complainer and half to the Crown.78

C. MOLESTATION Notwithstanding the enactment of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, non-molestation interdicts remain competent. Traditionally, molestation was perpetrated by interference with possession in and about the marches of land.79 In modern practice, however, interdict may be sought in regard to various forms of molestation,80 including assault, nuisance,81 or any other obviously vexatious conduct such as “persistently following another person in the streets”.82 In practice, recent cases have typically arisen in the context of the breakdown of a matrimonial or similar relationship, where one of the parties is able to satisfy the court, on the basis of a previous pattern of conduct, that there is a specific danger of verbal abuse or physical threats, or that the defender will put his or her estranged partner or children into “a state of fear and alarm or distress”.83 Where interdict is sought for the purposes of obtaining protection against abuse, it may have powers of arrest attached to it in terms of the Protection from Abuse (Scotland) Act 2001, section 1.84

78 I D Macphail, Sheriff Court Practice, 3rd edn by T Welsh (2006) paras 24.02–24.05. 79 Stair, Inst 1.9.28. 80 See discussion by Lord Reed in Ward v Scotrail 1999 SC 255 at 259. 81 See N R Whitty, “Nuisance”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) para 46. 82 H Burn-Murdoch, Interdict in the Law of Scotland (1933) para 371. 83 See Murdoch v Murdoch 1973 SLT (Notes) 13; Gunn v Gunn 1955 SLT (Notes) 69; NB v EL [2017] SC DUN 62, 2017 GWD 32–511. 84 See e.g. Thomson v Thomson 2002 SLT (Sh Ct) 97; see also Byrne v Ross 1992 SC 498 (parties had previously cohabited).

28.22

PART VI

DEFENCES AND REMEDIES

Chapter 29

Defences and Contributory Negligence

Para A. INTRODUCTION����������������������������������������������������������������� 29.01 B. VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA��������������������������������������������� 29.02 (1) Essential elements������������������������������������������������������������� 29.03 (a) Assumption of risk without the possibility of redress����� 29.04 (b) Assumption of risk must be knowing���������������������������� 29.08 (c) Assumption of risk must be voluntary�������������������������� 29.10 (2) Assumption of risk or denial of negligence?������������������������ 29.14 (3) Workplace injuries������������������������������������������������������������ 29.16 (4) Motor-vehicle accidents���������������������������������������������������� 29.19 (5) Self-harm by those under another’s care����������������������������� 29.20 (6) The Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 and the acceptance of risk�������������������������������������������������������������� 29.21 (7) Statutory limits on exclusion of liability������������������������������ 29.23 C. ILLEGALITY (1) Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.24 (2) The concept of illegality���������������������������������������������������� 29.25 (3) The “trio of necessary considerations”: Patel v Mirza��������� 29.28 (4) The framework in Patel v Mirza�������������������������������������� 29.32 (5) Considerations (a) and (b): the purpose of the prohibition and other relevant public policy������������������������ 29.33 (6) Consideration (c): proportionality�������������������������������������� 29.36 (a) The seriousness of the conduct������������������������������������ 29.37 (b) The centrality of the illegal conduct to the transaction�� 29.38 (c) Whether the illegal conduct was intentional������������������ 29.41 (d) Disparity in the parties’ wrongdoing����������������������������� 29.42 (7) The “narrower” form of the defence���������������������������������� 29.43 (8) The illegality defence in claims by companies��������������������� 29.49 (9) Illegality affecting a specific head of loss����������������������������� 29.52 D. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE (1) Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.54 (2) The pursuer’s “own fault”������������������������������������������������� 29.56 (3) Self-harm�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.60 (4) Children��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.61 (5) Calculation of proportion�������������������������������������������������� 29.64 (6) Contributory negligence and joint fault������������������������������ 29.67 1037

1038   The Law of Delict in Scotland

A. INTRODUCTION 29.01

The term “defences” is used loosely to refer to doctrines that work in different ways.1 The effect of the first two defences considered here, volenti non fit injuria and illegality, is that liability is denied altogether, even where the elements of liability are otherwise adequately made out. The third, contributory negligence, at one time operated in the same way2 but now has the effect, not of denying liability but of mitigating the award of damages in the light of the pursuer’s conduct. Thus, although often listed by textbooks under the heading of defences, contributory negligence in its modern statutory form is more properly characterised as a rule that affects quantum. For the sake of convenience, this chapter groups together discussion of volenti, illegality, and contributory negligence, since all three involve evaluation of the pursuer’s conduct, and indeed contributory negligence is often pled in the alternative to volenti or illegality. The operation of these sets of rules will be considered in general terms, but it should be noted that in certain areas of liability, most notably the intentional delicts, the availability of defences is determined by means of rules that are context-specific, and these are considered in greater detail alongside treatment of those topics. Chapter 16 on protection of physical integrity, for example, deals with issues of justification for the use of force that are particular to that topic,3 and chapter 18 discusses the defences specific to the delicts set out in the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021.4

B. VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA 29.02

By convention always expressed in Latin, the defence of volenti non fit injuria means: to one who is willing, no wrong is done. In thus denying that a wrong has been done, it absolves the defender of all liability. For that reason it is accepted only rarely in the modern law. Instead, since the enactment of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, the courts have been more inclined to apply the rules of contributory negligence to reduce the award of damages, rather than rejecting liability altogether.5

(1) Essential elements 29.03

The essence of the volenti defence is that:6 “the pursuer has knowingly submitted himself to some special or exceptional risk in such circumstances that the court can infer from the whole   1 For discussion of the theoretical framework, see J Goudkamp, Tort Law Defences (2013).   2 See para 29.54 below.   3 See paras 16.24–16.35 above.   4 See paras 18.68–18.99 and 18.148 above.   5 See discussion in G Williams, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence (1951) para 74.  6 Fowler v Tierney 1974 SLT (Notes) 23 per Lord Maxwell at 23.

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1039 facts that he is consenting to run the risk of the other party’s negligence at his own expense or, to put the matter in another way, that he is consenting to lack of reasonable care on the part of the other party.”

Three main elements must therefore be shown by the defender. First, the pursuer must have assumed the risk of the defender’s wrongdoing, without the possibility of redress. Secondly, that assumption of risk must have been “knowing”, in the sense that the pursuer understood the nature of the risk involved. Thirdly, it must have been voluntary, rather than the product of coercion or necessity.

(a) Assumption of risk without the possibility of redress Assumption of risk may be express,7 but more usually the defender attempts 29.04 to infer from the conduct of the pursuer an agreement to assume risk. The object of that inferred agreement is highly specific: the court must be satisfied that the pursuer not only assumed the risk of the defender’s breach of duty, but also did so at the pursuer’s “own expense”.8 A distinction is therefore to be drawn between (i) the “physical risk” of damage, and (ii) the “legal risk” of damage without redress;9 both, not merely the first, must be accepted by the pursuer.10 Thus in the leading English case of Smith v Baker,11 involving a workplace accident, the defence as put forward by the employers was rejected, in the absence of evidence that the plaintiff not only knew of the relevant risk but also “consented to take the risk upon himself”. While, therefore, the interaction between the parties might well yield the 29.05 inference that the pursuer was prepared to tolerate the risk of the defender failing to exercise due care, it is altogether more problematic to extrapolate from this the pursuer’s agreement to give up the possibility of a claim against the defender arising from such lack of care.12 For example, consent to that effect cannot be inferred simply from the pursuer’s awareness that the defender had previously acted without due care.13 One of the rare instances in which the court was persuaded of such an unspoken agreement is ICI Ltd v Shatwell.14 The plaintiff and his brother were both experienced shot-firers

  7 Indeed a spoken exchange between the parties may possibly suffice for this but only if it is clear that the agreement has been properly understood by the pursuer, and the defender is able to “satisfy the court with reasonable precision what the defender said”: see Fowler v Tierney 1974 SLT (Notes) 23 per Lord Maxwell at 24.   8 See also Wallace v Culter Paper Mills Co Ltd (1892) 19 R 915; Stewart’s Exx v Clyde Navigation Trs 1946 SC 317; Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691 per Lord Denning at 701.   9 G Williams, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence (1951) para 74 (308). 10 Smith v Baker [1891] AC 325 per Lord Halsbury at 336–337. 11 [1891] AC 325 per Lord Halsbury at 338. 12 For extended discussion of this point, see Williams, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence para 74. 13 Morris v Murray [1991] 2 QB 6 per Fox LJ at 13. 14 [1965] AC 656.

1040   The Law of Delict in Scotland

working at the defendant’s quarry. Together they decided to carry out a test fire of detonators without retiring to a place of safety, thus deliberately disobeying statutory regulations as well as the defendant’s instructions. In the course of this operation a detonator exploded prematurely and both brothers were injured. The plaintiff claimed damages, arguing that he had been injured as a result of his brother’s negligence and breach of statutory duty, for which the defendant was vicariously liable. The court held that in the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria there was a complete defence. Lord Pearce commented as follows upon the interaction between the brothers:15 “[A]s between [the brothers] there was a voluntary assumption of risk. [The plaintiff] was clearly acting without any constraint or persuasion; he was in fact inaugurating the enterprise. On the facts it was an implied term . . . that [the plaintiff] would not sue [his brother] for any injury that he might suffer, if an accident occurred. Had an officious bystander raised the possibility, can one doubt that [the plaintiff] would have ridiculed it?”

29.06

29.07

Such post-hoc reading of a pursuer’s trajectory of thought can seem contrived in circumstances where it is highly unlikely that either party was considering the future options for litigation, far less any waiver of the right to sue. In practice it is only in exceptional cases that such a construction is placed upon the dealings between the parties. One such case is where the pursuer demonstrated “wild irresponsibility” for his or her own safety, as in Morris v Murray.16 Morris and Murray had spent the afternoon in a pub consuming excessive amounts of alcohol before deciding to take a flight in Murray’s light aircraft. Morris actively assisted Murray in getting the aircraft airborne, and was then severely injured when it crashed due to Murray’s erratic piloting. His claim against Murray’s estate was unsuccessful because, although nothing to this effect had been said, in embarking upon the flight after this sequence of the events he had, in the court’s view, “implicitly waived his rights in the event of injury consequent on Mr Murray’s failure to fly with reasonable care”.17 Since the risk impliedly assumed is that arising from the defender’s breach of duty, the relevant conduct on the part of the pursuer must normally be conduct which occurred immediately before, or contemporaneously with, that breach. As a rule, therefore, the pursuer’s acceptance of a risk created by the defender in the past does not provide the basis for the volenti defence, although the pursuer’s extreme lack of care for his or her own interests might instead be regarded as a novus actus interveniens breaking the causal chain.18 15 16 17 18

[1965] AC 656 at 688. [1991] 2 QB 6 per Fox LJ at 17. [1991] 2 QB 6 per Fox LJ at 17. Sabri-Tabrizi v Lothian Health Board 1998 SC 373. For novus actus, see paras 14.02ff above.

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1041

(b) Assumption of risk must be knowing The pursuer’s assumption of risk must be knowing, in the sense of involv- 29.08 ing an understanding of the nature and potential gravity of what is involved. The requisite level of understanding was demonstrated in ICI v Shatwell,19 noted above,20 in which the plaintiff was an experienced shot-firer who was injured after he and his colleague set off a test explosion without retiring to a place of safety. The volenti defence succeeded because the plaintiff had been aware of the safety implications of this course of action – it was a “known risk” to a person with his training and employment background. He attempted to argue that, although he knew of the risk, he believed it to be a remote one, unlikely to mature; but the fact that he did not know that the risk would mature on this particular occasion did not undermine the essential feature of the defence, namely that the risk was “known, and understood, and accepted”.21 As well as knowing that the defender’s course of action was dangerous 29.09 in a general sense, the pursuer must also have understood the precise form of risk involved. In the Canadian case of Stermer v Lawson,22 the teenaged defendant loaned the teenaged plaintiff his high-performance motorcycle, which the plaintiff, who had no experience of such motorcycles, then crashed, causing himself injury. It was held that the defendant had been negligent in loaning the motorcycle without properly instructing the plaintiff in its use. The plaintiff had also been contributorily negligent. The defence of volenti, however, was rejected. The plaintiff understood that he might be in jeopardy due to his inexperience, but the specific risks which eventuated in causing the crash derived from particular sophisticated features of the high-performance machine. Since he had not been fully informed of these features he could not be said to have appreciated, or consented to, the risk that he had undertaken.

(c) Assumption of risk must be voluntary It is not enough that the pursuer understood the risk involved; the assump- 29.10 tion of that risk must also have been voluntary. A risk is not freely undertaken if the pursuer was in some way coerced into a dangerous course of action, or driven by necessity, such as by the urgent need to rescue a person or property from immediate danger. Even if the pursuer knew the risk entailed, “The important word is volenti and not scienti”.23

19 20 21 22 23

[1965] AC 656. At para 29.05. [1965] AC 656 per Lord Donovan at 692. (1977) 79 DLR (3d) 366. Baker v T E Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 966 per Ormerod L J at 979. “Volenti” means “willing”, whereas “scienti” means “knowing”.

1042   The Law of Delict in Scotland

29.11

29.12

29.13

As demonstrated by Morris v Murray,24 discussed above,25 the blunting of mental faculties by the consumption of alcohol seems not to be regarded as removing the capacity to accept risk. The court acknowledged in Morris that, had the plaintiff been sober, he would not have gone on the fatal flight.26 At the same time, his actions prior to getting into the aircraft indicated that he was capable of understanding the implications of what he was doing, and he was therefore judged capable of agreeing to the risk of injury. On that basis it seems that pursuers require to be exceedingly intoxicated before being deemed incapable of assuming risk. The fact of still being in minority does not necessarily exclude capacity for these purposes, so long as the pursuer is judged to have understood the relevant risk.27 Similarly, individuals experiencing mental health issues are not necessarily incapable of assuming risk, but agreement to risk cannot be regarded as freely given where medical evidence shows their judgment to have been significantly impaired. In Kirkham v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police,28 police officers handing the plaintiff’s husband into the custody of prison authorities failed to give notice of his suicidal tendencies. He subsequently hanged himself when left unsupervised in his cell, and an action in negligence was brought against the police. The defence of volenti was rejected because it was recognised that the deceased was not “of sound mind” and therefore not “truly volens”; although he had exploited the defendants’ breach of duty, his mental state meant that he could not be said freely to have waived any claim arising therefrom.29 The volenti defence was similarly disregarded in Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd,30 another suicide case, but one in which the defendant’s alleged breach of duty was not failure to look after the deceased, but a safety failure in the workplace. After suffering an injury during the course of his employment with the defendant, the deceased succumbed to depression and ultimately took his own life. The chain of causation between the physical injury and the death was regarded as unbroken and, since the former was due to the employer’s negligence, the employer was found liable to make compensation for the consequences of the suicide. Although it was accepted that there was no liability where the victim had freely consented to injury, Mr Corr’s suicide “was not something to which Mr Corr

24 25 26 27

[1991] 2 QB 6. At para 29.06. [1991] 2 QB 6 per Fox LJ at 16. Devlin v Strathclyde Regional Council 1993 SLT 699 (although it seems questionable in that case whether the fourteen-year-old deceased fully understood the risk that followed from jumping on a PVC roof, or that he waived any right to make a claim in the event of injury); see also the discussion in Blake v Galloway [2004] EWCA Civ 814, [2004] 1 WLR 2844. 28 [1990] 2 QB 283; see also Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360. 29 [1990] 2 QB 283 per Lloyd LJ at 290. 30 [2008] UKHL 13, [2008] 1 AC 884; see para 13.80 above.

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1043

consented voluntarily and with his eyes open but an act performed because of the psychological condition which the employer’s breach of duty had induced”.31

(2) Assumption of risk or denial of negligence? Some sources suggest an overlap between the considerations supporting 29.14 the volenti doctrine and those pointing against breach of duty of care. In a dissenting judgment in Nettleship v Weston, Salmon LJ postulated the example of a passenger agreeing to get into a car with a driver known to be drunk:32 “The duty of care springs from relationship. The special relationship which the passenger has created by accepting a lift in the circumstances postulated surely cannot entitle him to expect the driver to discharge a duty of care or skill which ex hypothesi the passenger knows the driver is incapable of discharging. Accordingly, in such circumstances, no duty is owed by the driver to the passenger to drive safely, and therefore no question of volenti non fit injuria can arise.”

Indeed it has been argued more generally that, although voluntary assumption of risk may be presented as a defence, in determining whether it should apply the courts frequently fall back upon considerations of whether the defender has been negligent. In other words, “the plea of voluntary assumption of risk is, very often, a denial of the fault element” in negligence.33 It is certainly true that decisions do not always distinguish clearly 29.15 between those factors indicating that the pursuer has “taken the risk” of harm and those signifying that there was no negligence on the defender’s part in the first place.34 And indeed the same features of the parties’ interaction that support a finding of negligence may also make it difficult to sustain the inference that the pursuer has assumed risk.35 Nonetheless, 31 [2008] UKHL 13, [2008] 1 AC 884 per Lord Bingham at para 18. 32 [1971] 2 QB 691 at 704. See also Morris v Murray [1991] 2 QB 6 at 15, in which Fox LJ noted this passage and doubted whether the gap between an implied waiver of the right to claim or an implied discharge from the normal duty of care was “a very wide one”, but nonetheless thought that the volenti defence retained a role after issues of negligence had been dealt with. 33 See J Goudkamp, Tort Law Defences (2013) para 3.3.8, reviewing Common Law authority. 34 See e.g. Murray v Harringay Arena Ltd [1951] 2 KB 529. 35 See e.g. McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2005] CSOH 69, 2005 2 SC 1 per Lord Nimmo Smith at para 7.207, suggesting that, had the defender been negligent in marketing cigarettes, in that warnings were inadequate etc, it would have been difficult to sustain a plea that the pursuer had voluntarily assumed the risk of injury: “I do not see how the plea could effectively be engaged, separately from consideration of the question whether ITL were negligent.” See also McShane v Burnwynd Racing Stables Ltd [2015] CSOH 70, 2015 Rep LR 107, in which Lord Glennie stated that, had he found the defender to have been negligent, he would not have upheld the volenti defence.

1044   The Law of Delict in Scotland

Scottish authority regards the volenti defence as predicated upon negligence being separately established.36 Volenti is stated as a distinct plea-in-law by the defender, requiring specific averments as to the pursuer’s conduct and whether, in the circumstances, it bears the inference that the pursuer knowingly and willingly accepted the risk of the defender’s negligence.

(3) Workplace injuries 29.16

29.17

As discussed elsewhere in this work,37 the volenti defence is now seldom recognised in the workplace context.38 Where an employee has been working in intrinsically hazardous conditions, liability is likely to turn on the question of standard of care, so that the decisive issue is whether the risk of harm could have been reduced by due care on the part of the employer. If there is no liability, it is generally because there is found to have no breach of duty of care.39 Where breach is established, employees are unlikely to be deemed willingly to have assumed risks which could have been removed by the employer’s exercise of due care.40 It is equally rare for the volenti defence to succeed where an employee is alleged to have consented to a particular hazardous task. The inequality of bargaining power between the parties in the employment relationship is such that the employer is unlikely to be able to discharge the onus of proving that the employee understood the risk and willingly agreed that any right to compensation was waived.41 A further obstacle to the operation of the defence in relation to workplace injuries is section 16(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, 36 See discussion by Lord Justice-Clerk Wheatley in Winnik v Dick 1984 SC 48 at 51–53. Lord Wheatley considered English authority suggesting that the plea of volenti was to be regarded as a denial of duty, rather than an implied waiver of any claim, but concluded that in Scotland “the effect of the maxim was not to relieve the defender from any duty to take care … On the contrary the maxim proceeds on the basis that there is duty to take care and not be negligent.” See also discussion in Clerk and Lindsell on Torts para 3.114, reaching a similar conclusion that: “It is simply not helpful to conceive of a duty of care which varies according to the claimant’s reaction to the risk created by an ex hypothesi negligent defendant.” 37 See para 12.01 above. 38 Bowater v Rowley Regis Corporation [1944] KB 476 per Goddard LJ at 480. For a modern overview, see D Brodie, “Volenti Strikes Back?” (2012) 109 Employment Law Bulletin 4. 39 See e.g. Davies v Global Strategies Group (Hong Kong) Ltd [2009] EWHC 2342 (QB), affd [2010] EWCA Civ 648 (employee providing security protection for US services in Iraq); McShane v Burnwynd Racing Stables Ltd [2015] CSOH 70, 2015 Rep LR 107 per Lord Glennie at para 57: “Riding horses is an activity which involves the risk of falling, and accidents do happen without actionable fault on the part of another party.” 40 See Davies v Global Strategies Group (Hong Kong) Ltd [2009] EWHC 2342 (QB), affd [2010] EWCA Civ 648 per Burnett J at para 86: “Whilst it is clear that [the deceased] agreed to undertake a task that carried with it significant risk, it is quite impossible for the defendants successfully to argue that he consented to any breach of duty on their part.” 41 Bowater v Rowley Regis Corporation [1944] KB 476 per Goddard LJ at 481; see also Taylor v Malcolm Macalister & Son 1951 SLT (Notes) 65; Weir v Andrew Barclay & Co Ltd 1955 SLT (Notes) 54. For an example of the unusual circumstances in which the basis for such consent might be found, see Keenan v The City Line Ltd 1953 SLT 128.

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1045

which, as noted further below,42 invalidates any contractual agreement in so far as it excludes or restricts liability for death or personal injury negligently caused by a business or public authority. This may be relevant to terms of this nature incorporated into a contract of employment.43 Where a contractual term is invalidated in this way, the fact that an employee agreed to, or was aware of, the term in question is not to be regarded as sufficient evidence that a risk undertaken in employment was knowingly and voluntarily assumed for the purposes of the volenti defence.44 A possible, and unusual, scenario in which volenti might be recognised 29.18 is demonstrated by the case of ICI v Shatwell,45 discussed above,46 in which a hazardous operation was undertaken negligently by a fellow employee, for whom the employer was potentially vicariously liable, and with whom the pursuer had willingly collaborated.

(4) Motor-vehicle accidents Since 198847 the volenti defence may not be used to preclude a claim by 29.19 a passenger where the mode of transport was a motor vehicle to which the Road Traffic Act 1988, section 149 applies. This includes all vehicles for which third-party insurance is compulsory, in other words all motor vehicles used on a road or other public place.48 Any agreement, express or implied, is of no effect insofar as it purports to restrict the driver’s liability in regard to passengers. This does not, however, prevent damages being reduced to reflect contributory negligence where passengers take insufficient care for their own safety, such as by getting into a car driven by an obviously intoxicated driver.49 Nor does the 1988 Act bar the operation of the illegality defence where the parties have been engaged in a joint illegal enterprise, such as using the vehicle to escape after a theft.50 Moreover, the 1988 Act applies only to motor vehicles, so that the volenti defence remains available in relation to other forms of transport such as boats or planes.51 42 See para 29.23 below. 43 See Johnstone v Bloomsbury HA [1992] QB 333, holding that s 2(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (the equivalent English provision) might apply to a clause in the contract of employment that obliged the employee to work an excess, and allegedly unsafe, number of hours. 44 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 s 16(3). 45 [1965] AC 656. See also Hugh v National Coal Board 1972 SC 252. 46 At para 29.05. 47 The common law position was that passengers travelling with drivers known to have consumed alcohol were considered to have assumed the risk of injury without redress only in extreme cases. See Dann v Hamilton [1939] 1 KB 509 per Asquith J at 518, to the effect that the volenti defence became relevant only where “the drunkenness of the driver at the material time is so extreme and so glaring that to accept a lift from him is like engaging in an intrinsically and obviously dangerous occupation, intermeddling with an unexploded bomb or walking on the edge of an unfenced cliff.” 48 Road Traffic Act 1988 s 143. 49 See e.g. Currie v Clamp’s Exr 2002 SLT 196; see also McCracken v Smith [2015] EWCA Civ 380, [2015] PIQR P19. 50 E.g. Joyce v O’Brien [2013] EWCA Civ 546, [2014] 1 WLR 70. 51 As in Morris v Murray [1991] 2 QB 6, discussed in para 29.06 above.

1046   The Law of Delict in Scotland

(5) Self-harm by those under another’s care 29.20

The volenti defence turns upon the pursuer’s prior consent to the defender’s breach of duty. But if the duty allegedly breached is the duty to prevent self-harm on the part of the pursuer, and the pursuer succeeds in causing such harm, the volenti defence is not available to defeat a subsequent claim for damages. The case of Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis52 illustrates. The plaintiff claimed damages from the police after her partner, who was known to have been at risk of suicide, hanged himself in a police cell. A medical examination did not indicate the presence of mental illness, and so, unlike in Kirkham,53 discussed above,54 the deceased was apparently not of “unsound mind” and so was capable of giving consent.55 The question for the court to consider was whether he should be deemed to have consented to the risk of his own suicide. The defendant having conceded that police officers were under a duty to take care to prevent the deceased from harming himself, the court took the view that to uphold the volenti defence in these circumstances would “effectively negative the effect of any duty of care”,56 because the defendant could neglect that duty without fear of being held liable. Since the suicide had been caused by a combination of the police officers’ breach of duty,57 and the deceased’s “exploitation”58 of that breach, reduction of the award of damages by 50 per cent to reflect the deceased’s contributory fault59 was regarded as a more appropriate reflection of the division of responsibility.

(6) The Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 and the acceptance of risk 29.21

Liability may be denied under the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 where a person has accepted the risk to which the person then succumbs. Even where an occupier has failed to take such care as was reasonable in the circumstances,60 section 2(3) of the Act provides that: “Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act shall be held to impose on an occupier any obligation to a person entering on his premises in respect 52 [2000] 1 AC 360. 53 Kirkham v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police [1990] 2 QB 283. 54 At para 29.12. 55 See Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd [2008] UKHL 13, [2008] 1 AC 884 at para 64, in which Lord Neuberger commented of this diagnosis in Reeves “surprising though it might seem”. 56 [2000] 1 AC 360 per Lord Jauncey at 375. 57 [2000] 1 AC 360 per Lord Hoffmann at 368: “a duty to protect a person of full understanding from causing harm to himself is very rare indeed. But, once it is admitted that this is the rare case in which such a duty is owed, it seems to me self-contradictory to say that the breach could not have been a cause of the harm because the victim caused it to himself.” 58 [2000] 1 AC 360 per Lord Hope at 381. 59 See further at para 29.60. 60 As required in terms of Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 s 2(1).

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1047

of risks which that person has willingly accepted as his”.61 Acceptance of risk thus negates the occupier’s duty towards the individual concerned to address the risk in question. A distinctive feature of such acceptance of risk is that, whereas the com- 29.22 mon law generally requires consent to precede the breach of duty, that requirement is not insisted upon where the risk derives from an occupier’s failure to remedy a continuing state of affairs. There is no need for any prior interaction between the parties, and section 2(3) may operate to deny duty where a person has simply come upon an existing hazard on the occupier’s land. In Titchener v British Railways Board,62 the pursuer was injured on being hit by a train after she had squeezed through a fence on the defenders’ land to take a short cut across a railway line. She raised an action of damages against British Railways Board, averring that it had failed, in terms of section 2(1) of the Act, to take reasonable care in maintaining fencing adequate to deter persons such as herself from entering their land. It was held that the fencing was adequate in relation to such an obvious hazard as a railway line. But even if it had been found otherwise, the pursuer was judged to have consented to “take what comes”, since she admitted in cross-examination that crossing the railway line was “just a chance that I took”.63 It was no barrier to the defence that the defender’s alleged breach of duty – the failure to maintain the fence – had its origins long before the pursuer’s deemed consent to risk.

(7) Statutory limits on exclusion of liability The defender may have attempted to pre-empt a claim by the pursuer by 29.23 obtaining the pursuer’s express agreement to the risk of the defender’s future conduct, or perhaps by giving notice that the pursuer undertook a particular course of action at the pursuer’s, rather than defender’s, risk. However, the extent to which liability may be restricted in such ways is subject to statutory controls, as follows. • Section 16(1)(a) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 invalidates any contractual term, or provision in a notice, that excludes or restricts the liability of a business or public authority for death or personal injury caused by negligence or by a failure of duty in terms of the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960.64 Where a contractual term or notice is invalidated in this way, the fact that a person has agreed to, or was aware of, the term in question is insufficient 61 62 63 64

For more detailed discussion, see paras 25.55–25.60 above. 1984 SC (HL) 34. 1984 SC (HL) 34 per Lord Hunter at 45. See Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 s 25(1)(c).

1048   The Law of Delict in Scotland

•

•

• •

evidence that a risk was knowingly and voluntarily assumed for the purposes of the volenti defence.65 Section 65 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 has similar effect where a contractual term or provision in a consumer contract or a consumer notice66 purports to exclude or restrict liability for death or personal injury caused by negligence or by a failure of duty in terms of the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960.67 Section 16(1)(b) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 deals with other types of loss, such as property damage or economic loss, providing that any term or notice excluding the liability of a business or public authority is effective only insofar as it is fair and reasonable. Section 62 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 provides that terms in consumer contracts or consumer notices are not binding where they are “unfair”.68 As noted above,69 section 149 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 invalidates agreements between drivers of motor vehicles and their passengers insofar as such agreements restrict the driver’s liability in negligence.

C. ILLEGALITY (1) Introduction 29.24

The defence of illegality is available in the law of delict, as it is in the law of contract. Where successfully pled, it prevents a claim being enforced in its entirety. But although the Latin maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio (no right of action arises from a disgraceful or immoral consideration)70 has long been accepted in the Scottish sources as applicable to the law of obligations,71 its specific relevance to delictual claims appears to have been considered only relatively recently. After the defence was successfully employed in the Outer House case of Lindsay v Poole72 in 1982, a number of cases followed, accepting its validity in principle and making reference 65 s 16(3). 66 “Consumer” is defined in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 s 2(3) as “an individual acting for purposes that are wholly or mainly outside that individual’s trade, business, craft or profession”. 67 Consumer Rights Act 2015 s 65(4). 68 See s 62(4): “A term is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer.” 69 See para 29.19. 70 Trayner’s Latin Maxims 205. 71 For historical discussion, see L Macgregor, “Pacta Illicita”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 129; see also W W McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 3rd edn (2007) paras 19.17–19.27. 72 1984 SLT 269 (pursuer injured in accident after accepting a lift from the defender in a vehicle known to be stolen). This was the first reported case in Scotland in which the illegality defence was held to be established in relation to a delictual claim. The defence had previously been pled unsuccessfully in Winnik v Dick 1981 SLT (Sh Ct) 101, affd 1984 SC 48.

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1049

to English authority. Shortly after Lindsay, the Inner House had cause to discuss the illegality defence in Winnik v Dick,73 a case in which the pursuer, having accepted a lift with a driver who had been drinking alcohol, was injured when the car crashed. The driver (and defender) argued that any entitlement to damages should be excluded on the basis that the parties were engaged in a common criminal enterprise.74 This was dismissed by the court in the absence of sufficient evidence to support the plea. At the same time, however, the court acknowledged the existence of the defence, with Lord Hunter observing that its operation was “likely to be a question of fact and degree”.75 As that remark suggests, the ex turpi causa maxim requires qualification in relation to delict, for there is no absolute rule “denying to a person who is doing an unlawful thing the protection of the general law imposing upon others duties of care for his safety”.76 At the same time, the precise criteria upon which the illegality defence relies have proved difficult to formulate with precision. As Lord Bingham remarked in Saunders v Edwards, this is partly attributable to the difficult balance which it must achieve:77 “On the one hand it is unacceptable that any court of law should aid or lend its authority to a party seeking to pursue or enforce an object or agreement which the law prohibits. On the other hand, it is unacceptable that the court should, on the first indication of unlawfulness affecting any aspect of a transaction, draw up its skirts and refuse all assistance to the plaintiff, no matter how serious his loss nor how disproportionate his loss to the unlawfulness of his conduct.”

(2) The concept of illegality “The paradigm case of an illegal act engaging the defence”, Lord Sump- 29.25 tion observed in Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc,78 “is a criminal offence”, but the defence is not confined to illegality in this narrow sense.79 On the contrary, it may sometimes flow from conduct that is no more than “quasi-criminal” in the sense of being contrary to public interest,80 or

73 1984 SC 48. 74 The pursuer’s alleged participation in a common criminal enterprise on the basis that she had got into a car with a driver known to have consumed more than the permissible level of alcohol, in contravention of the Road Traffic Act 1972 s 6. 75 1984 SC 48 at 55. 76 Henwood v The Municipal Tramways Trust (1938) 60 CLR 438 per Dixon and McTiernan JJ at 462. 77 [1987] 1 WLR 1116 at 1134. 78 [2014] UKSC 55, [2015] AC 430 at para 23. See also Nayyar v Denton Wilde Sapte [2009] EWHC 3218 (QB), [2010] PNLR 15, in which attempted bribery was regarded as sufficient to attract the illegality defence. 79 Kirkham v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police [1990] 2 QB 283 per Lloyd LJ at 291. 80 Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc [2014] UKSC 55, [2015] AC 430 per Lord Sumption at para 25.

1050   The Law of Delict in Scotland

29.26

“possibly, certain aspects of public morality”.81 This category includes acts of dishonesty or corruption, the infringement of statutory rules protecting the public interest, and “some anomalous categories of misconduct, such as prostitution, which without itself being criminal are contrary to public policy and involve criminal liability on the part of secondary parties”.82 Yet in practice there have been few modern instances where the illegality defence was upheld in regard to conduct which did not otherwise give rise to criminal liability. As stated by the Law Commission of England and Wales, it is “difficult, although not impossible, to envisage a realistic modern day situation in which the conduct of the claimant is so immoral or reprehensible that the claim should be disallowed, without such conduct also being (potentially) criminal”.83 The availability of the illegality defence in cases of “immorality” was accepted as a matter of principle in Kirkham v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police,84 although the defence was firmly rejected in the particular circumstances that had arisen. In Kirkham an action in negligence was brought against police officers who, when handing the plaintiff’s husband into the custody of prison authorities, failed to give notice of his suicidal tendencies. The defendants argued that compensation should not be payable in respect of his subsequent suicide, on the basis that suicide was sufficiently immoral to bar the claim. Suicide had previously been a crime in English law, although it ceased to be so in 1961.85 However, the Court of Appeal ruled that suicide would not “affront the public conscience, or shock the ordinary citizen”, particularly in the circumstances in hand where the deceased had not been “in full possession of his mind”.86

81 Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467 per Lord Toulson at para 120, adding “the boundaries of which have never been made entirely clear”. 82 Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc [2014] UKSC 55, [2015] AC 430 per Lord Sumption at para 25, explaining, at para 28, that “Torts (other than those of which dishonesty is an essential element), breaches of contract, statutory and other civil wrongs, offend against interests which are essentially private, not public. There is no reason in such a case for the law to withhold its ordinary remedies. The public interest is sufficiently served by the availability of a system of corrective justice to regulate their consequences as between the parties affected.” 83 Law Commission, The Illegality Defence in Tort (Law Com Consultation Paper no 160, 2001) para 1.16. 84 [1990] 2 QB 283. See also see Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467 per Lord Toulson at para 120. For a dated example, which plainly would not constitute immorality from a modern perspective, see Hegarty v Shine (1878) LR 4 Ir 288, in which the plaintiff brought a claim for assault against her cohabitee on the basis that her consent to sexual intercourse was vitiated by his failure to disclose that he had a venereal disease. The Irish Court of Appeal refused to hear her claim since the unmarried relationship from which it arose was regarded as immoral. 85 Suicide Act 1961 s 1. 86 [1990] 2 QB 283 per Lloyd LJ at 291. In Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360 a similar view was taken where the plaintiff’s partner committed suicide in detention and where there was no evidence of his suffering from mental illness.

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1051

The relative seriousness of the alleged criminality or immorality is an 29.27 important consideration, as discussed further below.87 Minor transgressions, in particular, are unlikely to trigger the illegality defence. An example is the Australian case of Henwood v The Municipal Tramways Trust.88 The plaintiffs’ son felt nauseous while travelling on a tram and leaned out of the side in order to be sick. In so doing he was fatally injured when his head hit two metal poles situated at the side of the track and supporting the power lines. It was contrary to a municipal by-law to lean out of tramcars, for which a penalty of £5 was imposed, and to that extent he was acting illegally. Nonetheless, in an action for damages brought by his parents, the High Court of Australia ruled that, in the absence of clear legislative intention to that effect, a penal provision of this nature should not deprive a person offending against it of a private law right of action otherwise available to him or her. Serious wrongdoing falls into a different category, but even then is not always sufficient to close off civil law remedies.89 Other factors must also be considered over and above the fact of the pursuer’s conduct being illegal.

(3) The “trio of necessary considerations”: Patel v Mirza The illegality defence was not long ago considered by the Law Commis- 29.28 sion of England and Wales, which concluded in its final report, perhaps surprisingly, that further development of the defence should be left to the courts.90 That task was taken up a few years later in the Supreme Court’s extended analysis of the defence in the English case of Patel v Mirza.91 The claim in Patel was based not on tort but on unjust enrichment, but in rejecting the defence the Supreme Court took the opportunity to consider its operation in general terms. Seeking to avoid future need “to devise piecemeal and contrived exceptions to previous formulations of the illegality rule”,92 it set out general principles which were apparently to be applicable across all areas of law. 87 See para 29.37 below. 88 (1938) 60 CLR 438. See also Gray v Thames Trains Ltd [2009] UKHL 33, [2009] 1 AC 1339 per Lord Rodger at para 83. For Scottish examples of criminal conduct by the pursuer which the court regarded with leniency, see Weir v Wyper 1992 SLT 579; Taylor v Leslie 1998 SLT 1248. 89 See e.g. Revill v Newbery [1996] QB 567. 90 Law Commission, The Illegality Defence (Law Com No 320, 2010) paras 3.1–3.41 (noting greater judicial readiness in recent years to articulate the policy reasons behind operation of the defence). See, however, the Law Commission’s The Illegality Defence in Tort (Law Com Consultation Paper no 160, 2001), recommending at para 6.43 that the defence should be reconfigured, conferring upon the courts a structured discretion, based on similar factors to those recommended for contracts and trusts, but with the addition at least of the factor of closeness of connection between the claim and the illegal act. See also Illegal Transactions: The Effect of Illegality on Contracts and Trusts (Law Com Consultation Paper No 154, 1999). 91 [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467. 92 [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467 per Lord Kerr at para 123.

1052   The Law of Delict in Scotland

29.29

The analysis in Patel placed public interest at the heart of the defence. Its “essential rationale” was that claims should not be enforced where this would be harmful to the “integrity of the legal system”. More specifically, a “trio” of public policy considerations was identified by Lord Toulson93 from the case law as being necessary to the application of the defence:94 “In assessing whether the public interest would be harmed in that way, it is necessary (a) to consider the underlying purpose of the prohibition which has been transgressed and whether that purpose will be enhanced by denial of the claim, (b) to consider any other relevant public policy on which the denial of the claim may have an impact and (c) to consider whether denial of the claim would be a proportionate response to the illegality, bearing in mind that punishment is a matter for the criminal courts.”

Considerations (a) and (b) were to be considered “conversely”, weighing up the public policy considerations for and against denying the claim, with (c) acting as a check against “overkill” by requiring a “due sense of proportionality”.95 Lord Toulson went on to explain that, within that framework, various “factors” might be relevant. But although he warned against cases being decided “in an undisciplined way”,96 little more was said in Patel about how these factors should be tailored in order to deal appropriately with the defence in the law of delict/tort. Moreover, three of the nine judges sitting in Patel expressed concerns that the decision might leave the operation of the illegality defence open to a case-by-case evaluation of a “potentially unlimited range of factors”.97 Since then, Patel’s essential framework of three “necessary” considerations, supplemented by guiding

93 Lord Toulson had been chairman of the Law Commission for some of the period (2002–06) of the Law Commission’s project on illegality, and in giving the majority judgment in Patel he drew on the Law Commission’s work. 94 [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467 at para 120. 95 [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467 at para 101. 96 [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467 at para 120. Particular attention was given to those factors relevant to contract law: see [2017] AC 467 at para 93, citing A Burrows, Restatement of the English Law of Contract (2016) 229–230 (which factors were in turn similar to those identified by the Law Commission of England and Wales when it considered the defence in Illegal Transactions: The Effect of Illegality on Contracts and Trusts (Law Com Consultation Paper No 154, 1999). However, the policy considerations affecting whether the court should deny enforcement of a mutually agreed illegal contract, or reversal of an unjustified enrichment, do not necessarily coincide with those relevant to whether compensation should be denied for injury. See e.g. Revill v Newbery [1996] QB 567 per Evans LJ at 579: “it is one thing to deny to a plaintiff any fruits from his illegal conduct, but different and more far-reaching to deprive him even of compensation for injury which he suffers and which otherwise he is entitled to recover at law.” 97 [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467 per Lord Sumption at para 265. Three of the nine judges (Lords Mance, Clarke and Sumption) dissented from the decision.

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1053

factors, has been the subject of further comment in two judgments of the Supreme Court issued on the same day and both involving tort claims: Grondona v Stoffel & Co,98 and Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust.99 In Grondona, Lord Lloyd-Jones emphasised that the weighing of Lord 29.30 Toulson’s three considerations, although not “mechanistic”, was a “necessarily structured” process.100 Considerations (a) and (b) were to be identified at a relatively high level of generality, in order to answer the essential question of whether allowing the claim would damage the integrity of the legal system. Consideration (c) (proportionality), on the other hand, would require closer scrutiny of the detail of the case in hand. It would not always be required to examine each element of the trio. If considerations (a) and (b) clearly indicated that the defence should be rejected for reasons of public policy, then consideration (c) might be omitted; but if the conclusion after considerations (a) and (b) was that the claim should be denied, then consideration (c) should be taken into account. Lord Hamblen’s judgment in the second case, Henderson, offered further guidance. Where consideration (c) was brought into play, the factors likely to be relevant were those noted by Lord Toulson in Patel: “(i) the seriousness of the conduct; (ii) the centrality of the conduct to the transaction; (iii) whether the conduct was intentional; and (iv) whether there was a marked disparity in the parties’ respective wrongdoing”.101 As Lord Toulson had indicated, this list was neither prescriptive nor exhaustive. Additions would be needed to accommodate the wide variety of contexts in which the illegality defence might be asserted.102 And while Lord Toulson gave no guidance as to how these factors ranked among themselves, Lord Hamblen stated in Henderson that the second, the “centrality” of the illegal conduct to the claim, was “a factor of particular importance”.103 This analysis was hedged by an important caveat: Patel did not repre- 29.31 sent “year zero” and in future cases it was not “Patel and only Patel that [was] to be considered and applied”.104 Previous decisions remained of “precedential value” and assisted in addressing particular factual situations, except insofar as incompatible with the reasoning in Patel.105

  98   99 100 101 102 103 104 105

[2020] UKSC 42, [2020] 3 WLR 1156. [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124. [2020] UKSC 42, [2020] 3 WLR 1156 at para 26. [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 at para 138. Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467 at para 107. [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 at para 124. [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 per Lord Hamblen at para 77. Ibid. As Lord Toulson had acknowledged in Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467 at para 101, the “trio” of considerations was in any event constructed from the case law.

1054   The Law of Delict in Scotland

(4) The framework in Patel v Mirza 29.32

In outline, therefore, the framework for assessing the illegality defence that emerged from Patel, and was endorsed and amplified by Grondona and Henderson, is based upon the following considerations: (a) What was the underlying purpose of the prohibition which has been transgressed, and will that purpose will be enhanced by denial of the claim? (b) Is there any other relevant public policy on which the denial of the claim may have an impact? If considerations (a) and (b) indicate that the claim should be denied, then it is necessary to consider further the following: (c) Would denial of the claim would be a proportionate response to the illegality, bearing in mind that punishment is a matter for the criminal courts? Factors potentially relevant to consideration (c) include, but are not limited to: (i) the seriousness of the conduct; (ii) the centrality of the illegal conduct to the transaction; (iii) whether the conduct was intentional; and (iv) whether there was a marked disparity in the parties’ respective wrongdoing. Finally, this framework is not to be applied in the abstract, but by reference to previous decisions, except insofar as incompatible with Patel. In evaluating this framework – quasi-legislation by the courts as a substitute for the actual legislation rejected by the Law Commission – it is hard not to have sympathy with Lord Sumption’s warning, in a strong dissenting judgment in Patel, that: “We would be doing no service to the coherent development of the law if we simply substituted a new mess for the old one”.106 A particular difficulty for the courts may turn out to be the need to weigh, in every case, issues of the public policy which may be complex and, sometimes, incommensurable.

(5) Considerations (a) and (b): the purpose of the prohibition and other relevant public policy 29.33

Considerations (a) and (b) of the framework in Patel v Mirza entail broad public policy concerns, requiring the court to look at “the underlying 106 Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467 at para 265.

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1055

purpose of the prohibition which has been transgressed and whether that purpose will be enhanced by denial of the claim”, as against “any other relevant public policy on which the denial of the claim may have an impact”.107 A clear example of a case in which such considerations argued cogently against denial of the claim is Hounga v Allen.108 The teenaged claimant had travelled to the United Kingdom using false identity documents provided by a relative of the defendants, and in the knowledge that it was illegal for her to work. She lived with the defendants and looked after their children. After eighteen months of this arrangement, during which the claimant was not paid and suffered abuse and racial harassment from the defendants, she was evicted from the house. The illegality of the contract of employment precluded her claim for unfair dismissal, but her claim for compensation for the statutory tort of discrimination was upheld. The claimant’s conduct in entering and working in the United Kingdom constituted a criminal offence. But to refuse a remedy for the serious abuse she had suffered might be seen as encouraging other employers to behave as the defendants had done, in the belief that they could discriminate with impunity against employees in such a position. Moreover, it ran counter to public policy concerns to end human trafficking and protect its victims. Each of the later cases of Grondona v Stoffel & Co109 and Henderson v 29.34 Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust110 serves as an illustration of how considerations (a) and (b) interact in practice. In Grondona,111 they were decisive in the rejection of the defence. G claimed damages for breach of contract and professional negligence from S, a firm of solicitors who had acted for G in her purchase of a house from M. S had negligently failed to register in the Land Registry: (i) the transfer of title from M to G, (ii) G’s mortgage in favour of B, a building society; and (ii) a deed releasing the property from a pre-existing charge. This meant that title did not pass from M to G, that the mortgage in favour of B was not registered, and that the pre-existing charge remained in place. M had died in the meantime. When G eventually defaulted on her mortgage payments, B brought proceedings to recover the amount owing, which G in turn sought to claim from S. However, it transpired that, unknown to S, the transaction between M and G had been a sham. G had colluded with M, using G’s stronger credit profile to obtain a mortgage over the property, on the basis of an inflated price, but all the while agreeing that M was to retain control of the property, pay the mortgage payments and receive rent 107 [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467 per Lord Toulson at para 120. 108 [2014] UKSC 47, [2014] 1 WLR 2889. See also Weir v Wyper 1992 SLT 579 at 582–583, in which Lord Coulsfield discussed scenarios in which “the denial of a right to recover damages to a person driven by an unqualified driver would be plainly wrong”. 109 [2020] UKSC 42, [2020] 3 WLR 1156. 110 [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124. 111 [2020] UKSC 42, [2020] 3 WLR 1156.

1056   The Law of Delict in Scotland

29.35

from tenants. S admitted negligence, but pled the defence of illegality, arguing that G’s purpose in engaging their services had been to further a fraudulent transaction. In these circumstances there was an obvious public policy argument that mortgage fraud should be condemned. Yet denying this particular claim, thought the court, would be unlikely to deter future fraud, and the success of G’s claim would allow funds to be released in order that B, the party which had been wronged by the illegality, might be repaid.112 Moreover, equally cogent public policy considerations weighed in favour of requiring solicitors to perform their duties without negligence, and providing their clients with a remedy when they failed to do.113 A remedy should be denied only where to afford it would be “legally incoherent”.114 Public policy therefore tilted towards allowing the claim. Although it then became unnecessary to proceed to consideration (c), the Supreme Court commented upon the issue of proportionality. G’s fraud had already been perpetrated before S’s negligence occurred. The fraud was therefore merely the “background” to S’s professional dealing with G, and had not facilitated it. This “lack of centrality of the illegality to the breach of duty”115 would therefore have argued against denial of the defence had it been necessary to take consideration (c) into account. By contrast, in Henderson116 the defence of illegality was upheld and the claim denied. The factual background was very different to that of Grondona. H, who had a history of paranoid schizophrenia, killed her mother during a psychotic episode. At the time she had been a patient of D, an NHS Trust, under the care of a community mental health team. She pled guilty to manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility and was detained in a secure hospital. H claimed damages from D, arguing that, but for D’s negligence in failing to admit her to hospital when her condition deteriorated, she would not have committed this act. D admitted breach of duty, but invoked the illegality defence, on the basis that the damages claimed were the consequence of H’s criminal act of manslaughter and the sentence then imposed on H by a criminal court. The Supreme Court took the view that, unlike in Grondona, it was in the interests of legal coherence that the defence should be upheld, since it would produce inconsistency and disharmony if the civil law permitted a person to make a

112 [2020] UKSC 42, [2020] 3 WLR 1156 at paras 29–31. 113 Cf Khan v Hussain [2019] CSOH 11, 2019 SC 322, in which the defence succeeded where the court held that the loss suffered by the pursuer was caused by his own dishonesty, not his adherence to professional advice provided by the defender, his accountant. 114 [2020] UKSC 42, [2020] 3 WLR 1156 at para 32. Lord Lloyd-Jones also took into consideration, at paras 33–34, that G had acquired an “equitable interest” in the property, despite the fraud, an argument which would not be applicable in Scotland. 115 [2020] UKSC 42, [2020] 3 WLR 1156 at para 41. 116 Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124.

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1057

financial gain from an act which the criminal law had condemned.117 Other public policy concerns included the need to maintain public confidence in the law, and the gravity of H’s wrongdoing set against the public interest in the proper allocation of National Health Service resources.118 There was also said to be a public interest in the “public condemnation” of unlawful killing.119 Set against the above, there were no countervailing policies that outweighed those considerations.120 Since application of considerations (a) and (b) in Henderson indicated that the claim should be rejected, it was necessary also to take into account consideration (c), which was found to confirm this result by reference to the various factors discussed more fully below: the crime was a serious one; it was central to the loss claimed;121 it was intentional;122 and to the extent that there was a disparity in the parties’ respective wrongdoing, H’s killing of her mother was manifestly more serious that D’s negligent management of her treatment.123

(6) Consideration (c): proportionality In the event that the broad public policy considerations bracketed under (a) 29.36 and (b) favour application of the illegality defence, consideration (c) requires the court to consider whether denial of the claim would be a proportionate response to the illegality, bearing in mind that punishment is a matter for the criminal courts. The factors suggested as potentially relevant to this enquiry include: the seriousness of the conduct; the centrality of the illegal conduct to the transaction; whether the conduct was intentional; and whether there was a marked disparity in the parties’ respective wrongdoing.

(a) The seriousness of the conduct As Lord Hughes explained in Hounga v Allen,124 when the illegality defence 29.37 succeeds, “the defendant is the unworthy beneficiary of an undeserved windfall. But this is not because the defendant has the merits on his side; it is because the law cannot support the claimant’s claim to relief.” For that reason the court reflects upon the relative seriousness of the illegality before confirming application of the defence. The court is most likely to deny the claim where the pursuer’s illegal conduct took the form of a criminal offence 117 [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 per Lord Hamblen at para 119. This had also been recognised in Patel v Mirza: see [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467 per Lord Toulson at para 99. 118 [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 per Lord Hamblen at para 127. 119 [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 per Lord Hamblen at para 129. 120 [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 per Lord Hamblen at paras 133–137. 121 [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 per Lord Hamblen at para 128. 122 H “knew what she was doing and that it was legally and morally wrong”: [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 at para 139. 123 [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 at paras 138–142. 124 [2014] UKSC 47, [2014] 1 WLR 2889 at para 56.

1058   The Law of Delict in Scotland

giving rise to a serious sanction such as imprisonment125 or a significant fine.126 Conversely, the defence is unlikely to be applied where the pursuer has committed “a strict liability offence which may be committed without any real moral culpability”,127 a trifling misdemeanour such as that seen in Henwood v The Municipal Tramways Trust,128 or a minor traffic offence.129

(b) The centrality of the illegal conduct to the transaction 29.38

29.39

Under the framework in Patel v Mirza, the centrality of the illegal conduct to the transaction is, perhaps unexpectedly, no longer the determining feature that some previous cases had suggested.130 But as Lord Hamblen pointed out in Henderson,131 this factor is often of particular significance. Indeed, when considering reform of the defence, the Law Commission in England and Wales identified the “closeness of connection between the claim and the illegal act”132 as especially relevant to the tort law defence. A basic test for assessing the connection between the claim and the illegal conduct was suggested by Lord Hoffmann in Gray v Thames Trains Ltd:133 “Can one say that, although the damage would not have happened but for the tortious conduct of the defendant, it was caused by the criminal act of the claimant? (Vellino v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police . . .). Or is the position that although the damage would not have happened without the criminal act of the claimant, it was caused by the tortious act of the defendant? (Revill v Newbery . . . ).” 125 Vellino v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police [2001] EWCA Civ 1249, [2002] 1 WLR 218 per Sir Murray Stuart-Smith at para 70; see also Joyce v O’Brien [2013] EWCA Civ 546, [2014] 1 WLR 70 (in which the theft committed by the parties carried a seven-year maximum prison sentence); Beaumont and O’Neill v Ferrer [2014] EWHC 2398 (QB), [2015] PIQR P2 (in which dishonest evasion of a taxi fare would have carried a two-year maximum prison sentence). 126 The relevant fine in D Geddes (Contractors) Ltd v Neil Johnson Health & Safety Services Ltd [2017] CSOH 42, [2017] PNLR 21 was £200,000. 127 Joyce v O’Brien [2013] EWCA Civ 546, [2014] 1 WLR 70 per Elias J at para 52. 128 (1938) 60 CLR 438. See also Ashmore v Rock Steady Security Ltd [2006] CSOH 30, 2006 SLT 207 per Lord Emslie at para 45. 129 Joyce v O’Brien [2013] EWCA Civ 546, [2014] 1 WLR 70 per Elias LJ at para 51. E.g. see Taylor v Leslie 1998 SLT 1248, in which the nineteen-year-old passenger knew that the sixteen-yearold driver was unlicensed and uninsured when they took a car out on a farm track on a remote Orkney island. His parents were not, however, barred from claiming damages after he was killed in a collision with another car, since “skylarking” in cars, although illegal, was not untoward in this rural area and could not be regarded as seriously reprehensible. See also Weir v Wyper 1992 SLT 579; Currie v Clamp’s Exr 2002 SLT 196. For road-traffic offences which did meet the required level of seriousness, see Pitts v Hunt [1991] 1 QB 24; McCracken v Smith [2015] EWCA Civ 380, [2015] PIQR P19 (in which the illegality defence defeated the claim of a sixteen-yearold youth riding a powerful motorbike dangerously enough to attract a two-year prison sentence). 130 See discussion of the “reliance rule” in Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467 per Lord Toulson at para 110. 131 [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 at para 124. 132 Law Commission, The Illegality Defence in Tort (Law Com Consultation Paper no 160, 2001) para 6.43. 133 [2009] UKHL 33, [2009] 1 AC 1339 at para 54.

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1059

In Vellino,134 the claimant alleged the police to have been negligent in failing to prevent him from harming himself while under arrest. But since he had seriously injured himself in jumping out of a second-floor window to evade the arrest, the main cause of the injury was considered to be his illegal attempt to escape custody, and the illegality defence was upheld. In Revill,135 by contrast, the plaintiff had been shot by the defendant while the plaintiff was attempting to break in to a shed on the defendant’s allotment. He subsequently brought an action for damages alleging that the defendant had been negligent and in breach of section 1 of the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984. Burglary is clearly illegal, and but for the burglary attempt the plaintiff would not have been injured; but the defendant’s firing of his shotgun was seen by the court as superseding the burglary attempt as the cause of the injury, and the defence was rejected.136 Of course, in both cases other factors can also be seen as influencing the reasoning, including the disparity in the respective wrongdoing of the parties. This factor is thus only one of several, often overlapping, factors to be taken into account. A similar approach can be found in one of few Scottish cases in this 29.40 area, McLaughlin v Morrison.137 The pursuer was seriously injured after the defender deliberately drove a car at him. The background was that the pursuer and defender were affiliates of rival gangs. The defender believed that the pursuer had been one of those responsible for a stone and missile attack on a nearby pub shortly before, a pub that was associated with the defender’s gang. The defender’s actions, therefore, might be seen as a kind of reprisal, although the defender herself had not been hurt in the attack on the pub or at risk. But even if the pursuer had been part of the group that had attacked the pub, the two incidents were clearly separate in space and time. In rejecting the illegality defence, Lord Jones referred to the reasoning of Lord Hoffmann in Gray:138 “[T]he first defender took it upon herself to assault Mr Rennie139 with a car . . . [T]he cause of Mr Rennie’s injuries was the assault on him, not any criminal activity on his part. To adopt the distinction drawn by Lord Hoffmann between the facts of Vellino and the facts of Revill, it cannot be said that, although the damage would not have happened but for the alleged illegal conduct of the

134 Vellino v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police [2001] EWCA Civ 1249, [2002] 1 WLR 218. 135 Revill v Newbery [1996] QB 567. 136 For a further example, see Delaney v Pickett [2011] EWCA Civ 1532, [2012] 1 WLR 2149, in which the claimant was injured as the passenger of a car involved in a road accident. Although both he and the driver were found to have been transporting cannabis, the illegality defence was rejected because the legal cause of the accident was the driver’s negligent driving, not the incidental fact that both occupants were carrying cannabis at the time. 137 [2013] CSOH 163, 2014 SLT 111. 138 [2013] CSOH 163, 2014 SLT 111 at para 41. See also Gujra v Roath & Roath [2018] EWHC 854 (QB) per Spencer J at paras 31–32. 139 The victim, Mr Rennie, had been so seriously incapacitated by his injuries that a guardian, Mr McLaughlin, was appointed, who brought the action on his behalf.

1060   The Law of Delict in Scotland first defender, it was caused by the criminal act of Mr Rennie. (Vellino) The position is, rather, that although the damage would not have happened without the alleged criminal act of Mr Rennie, it was caused by the illegal act of the first defender. (Revill)”

(c) Whether the illegal conduct was intentional 29.41

In many cases where the defence is upheld, the illegality has been constituted by intentional criminal conduct. That is not of course to say that all cases of intentional criminal wrongdoing will result in the defence being applied; but intention on the part of the pursuer to cause harm or injury to others is likely to be considered significant.140 The issue of intention may be particularly troubling where the pursuer was afflicted by mental health problems at the time of the illegal conduct, as in Henderson.141 In Clunis v Camden and Islington Health Authority,142 for example, the plaintiff had a history of severe mental disorder, and when he was discharged from hospital into the community, inadequate support had been provided for him by the Health Authority. During this time he killed a stranger in an unprovoked attack. On pleading guilty to manslaughter subject to diminished responsibility, he was sentenced to detention in a secure hospital. He then sought compensation from the Health Authority, which, he said, had been negligent in failing to provide satisfactorily for his care. In upholding the illegality defence, the court conceded that, even where the plaintiff had been convicted of a criminal offence, his claim for compensation should not be barred if “he did not know the nature and quality of his act or that what he was doing was wrong”.143 In this case, however, although the plaintiff’s responsibility was diminished he had sufficient understanding of his actions. In Henderson,144 similarly, the court was persuaded by evidence that the claimant, despite her illness, had known “what she was doing was morally and legally wrong”. A plea of guilty to manslaughter subject to diminished responsibility did not mean that responsibility was removed. It indicated acceptance by the claimant that she possessed the mental prerequisites of criminal responsibility, namely an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm.145 The operation of the defence in this context is discussed further below.146 140 See e.g. Ashmore v Rock Steady Security Ltd [2006] CSOH 30, 2006 SLT 207 per Lord Emslie at para 45, finding that the pursuer was not proved to have head-butted the defender, but even if he had been, that the illegality defence would not have applied, since this would not have been “a considered or premeditated act of a kind liable to give rise to public concern, but merely the reaction of a very drunk man on the spur of the moment”. 141 Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124. 142 [1998] QB 978. 143 [1998] QB 978 per Beldam LJ at 989. 144 [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 per Lord Hamblen at para 112. For Henderson, see para 29.35 above. 145 [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 per Lord Hamblen at para 112. 146 At paras 29.44–29.46.

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1061

(d) Disparity in the parties’ wrongdoing Attention must also be given to the relative seriousness of the illegal- 29.42 ity affecting the pursuer’s conduct, as against the wrongfulness of the defender’s. Thus in Hounga v Allen,147 the claimant’s conduct in working illegally in the United Kingdom was seen as considerably less culpable that the defendants’ conduct in exploiting and abusing the claimant and participating in human trafficking.148 In Henderson,149 on the other hand, the seriousness of the claimant’s conduct in intentionally killing her mother plainly outweighed the defendant’s negligence in failing to admit her to hospital sooner. Similarly, in Gujra v Roath & Roath150 the claimant had agreed to set fire to the defendants’ cars as part of a conspiracy to defraud the defendants’ insurance company. The defendants did not, however, disclose to the police that the claimant had acted with their consent. The claimant later claimed damages for malicious prosecution, after having been remanded in custody, charged with arson, and acquitted only some months later. That claim was struck out, in keeping with the broader public policy goals of the illegality defence, since recognition of such a claim would have been an “affront” to the integrity of the legal system.151 In addition, the loss of an award of damages was regarded as proportionate to the unlawfulness of the claimant’s conduct in associating himself with a serious attempted fraud upon an insurance company.

(7) The “narrower” form of the defence In applying the framework set out in Patel,152 note may be taken of a dis- 29.43 tinction drawn by Lord Hoffmann in Gray v Thames Trains Ltd153 between the “wider” and “narrower” forms of the illegality defence.154 Whereas 147 [2014] UKSC 47, [2014] 1 WLR 2889. For Hounga, see para 29.33 above. See also Weir v Wyper 1992 SLT 579 at 582-583, in which Lord Coulsfield discussed scenarios in which “the denial of a right to recover damages to a person driven by an unqualified driver would be plainly wrong”. 148 Cf Vakante v Governing Body of Addey and Stanhope School (No 2) [2004] EWCA Civ 1065, [2004] 4 All ER 1056, in which the claimant had obtained a post working for the defendants, in breach of immigration law. On being dismissed after eight months, he presented a complaint of racial discrimination and victimisation before an employment tribunal but was barred from proceeding further by the illegality of his conduct. Unlike in Hounga, the defendants were unaware of the claimant’s true immigration status and believed his false assurance that he did not require a work permit. He could not therefore complain of discrimination in an employment situation that “was unlawful from top to bottom and from beginning to end” (para 34). 149 [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 per Lord Hamblen at para 112. For Henderson, see para 29.35 above. 150 [2018] EWHC 854 (QB), [2018] 1 WLR 3208. 151 [2018] EWHC 854 (QB) per Spencer J at para 30. 152 Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467. 153 [2009] UKHL 33, [2009] 1 AC 1339. 154 The distinction appeared to be acknowledged by Lord Toulson in Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467 at para 93. Its continuing validity, and the specificity of the reasoning underlying the “narrower” defence, were also accepted in the Scottish case of D Geddes (Contractors) Ltd v Neil Johnson Health & Safety Services Ltd [2017] CSOH 42, [2017] PNLR 21.

1062   The Law of Delict in Scotland

29.44

29.45

the defence in its wider form rests upon the general notion that “you cannot recover for damage which is the consequence of your own criminal act”,155 its narrower form is concerned with protecting the consistency and “integrity of the justice system” in the specific context where damages are claimed as compensation for the pursuer suffering a criminal penalty.156 It applies the principle that “the punishment inflicted by a criminal court is personal to the offender, and that the civil courts will not entertain an action by the offender to recover an indemnity against the consequences of that punishment”.157 In Henderson, the court remarked that Patel did not case doubt upon the correctness of the decision in Gray,158 and that “the fundamental policy consideration relied upon in Gray was the need for consistency so as to maintain the integrity of the legal system, the very matter that was held in Patel to be the underlying policy question”.159 The narrow form of the defence is illustrated in Clunis v Camden and Islington Health Authority, discussed above.160 The plaintiff alleged that, but for the defendant’s negligent lack of care, he would not have killed a stranger, and would not thereafter have been convicted of manslaughter and detained compulsorily in hospital. His claim for the loss, injury and damage he had suffered in consequence was rejected. The court found that although the plaintiff’s responsibility had been diminished at the time of the killing, he was still aware of that what he was doing was wrong, and that the court should not “allow itself to be made an instrument to enforce obligations alleged to arise out of the plaintiff’s own criminal act”.161 In Gray the court had also reflected upon whether it might sometimes be appropriate to uphold a claim where the degree of culpability in the claimant’s wrongdoing was reduced by reason of mental disorder.162 Mr Gray had been a passenger on a train involved in a railway accident caused by the negligence of the defendants. Although his physical injuries were minor, he experienced post-traumatic stress disorder, and while suffering from this he killed a stranger. He pled guilty to manslaughter subject to diminished responsibility and was detained in a secure hospital. Subsequently, he claimed damages from the train operator and the company responsible for the rail infrastructure in respect of loss of earnings after his detention, as well as loss of liberty, damage to reputation, and

155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162

[2009] UKHL 33, [2009] 1 AC 1339 at para 32. Gray v Thames Trains Ltd [2009] UKHL 33, [2009] 1 AC 1339 per Lord Brown at para 93. Askey v Golden Wine Co Ltd [1948] 2 All ER 35 per Denning J at 38. [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 per Lord Hamblen at para 95. [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 per Lord Hamblen at para 94. [1998] QB 978; see para 29.41 above. [1998] QB 978 per Beldam LJ at 990. [2009] UKHL 33, [2009] 1 AC 1339.

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1063

feelings of guilt and remorse consequent on the killing. He also sought an indemnity from the defendants against any claims brought by dependants of the man he had killed. The defendants accepted liability for Mr Gray’s physical injuries and for his losses including loss of earnings up until the date of the manslaughter, but they successfully argued that the illegality defence precluded recovery of losses incurred after that date. Since these losses derived from the sanctions imposed upon Mr Gray for his crime, it was regarded as inconsistent for the civil law to give with one hand what the criminal law had taken away with the other. At the same time, the opportunity was taken to discuss comparable circumstances in which the defence would not be recognised and damages might be awarded for losses following hospitalisation. Lord Phillips observed that where a person had been detained in a secure hospital for reasons unrelated to that person’s “offending behaviour”, then the hospital order should be treated as being a consequence of the person’s mental condition, not of the criminal act, and that the defence should not apply.163 Lord Rodger similarly thought that the defence might not be accepted where the offence of which a claimant was convicted was “trivial”, but the claimant’s involvement in that offence revealed a mental disorder, attributable to the defendant’s fault, in respect of which a hospital order required to be made.164 Lord Phillips had greater difficulty, however, with the situation where the criminal act demonstrated the need to detain the individual, but the individual was not regarded as bearing “significant personal responsibility” for the crime,165 but since none of these possibilities applied to Mr Gray,166 they were not developed further. In Henderson167 the Supreme Court returned once more to the prob- 29.46 lem of cases where the claimant did not bear “significant personal responsibility” for the crime, a view that the trial judge had taken in the case of Ms Henderson.168 This did not mean that her claim should necessarily succeed. It was noted that the bar for lack of criminal responsibility was a high one – effectively that the defendant should have been insane at the time of the offence. To adopt a more flexible standard in the civil law would, the court thought, risk inconsistency.169 It also held that the claimant’s diminished responsibility did not mean that there was “insufficient turpitude” to engage the defence. Manslaughter was a 163 164 165 166

[2009] UKHL 33, [2009] 1 AC 1339 at para 15. [2009] UKHL 33, [2009] 1 AC 1339 at para 83. [2009] UKHL 33, [2009] 1 AC 1339 at para 15. See [2009] UKHL 33, [2009] 1 AC 1339 per Lord Hoffmann at para 27: “The stress disorder diminished Mr Gray’s responsibility but did not extinguish it.” 167 [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 per Lord Hamblen at para 112. For Henderson, see para 29.35 above. 168 [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 per Lord Hamblen at para 97. 169 [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 per Lord Hamblen at para 108.

1064   The Law of Delict in Scotland

29.47

serious offence and the claimant’s plea of guilty acknowledged her criminal responsibility. Expert psychiatrists had agreed that she knew, when killing her mother, that what she was doing was morally and legally wrong, and the defence was thus applicable. Henderson appears therefore to close the door on claims for compensation in relation to criminal sanctions, except in “exceptional cases” where the criminal offence in question was “trivial”, or where strict liability had been applied to a pursuer who was “not privy to the facts making his act unlawful”.170 An instance of the latter can be seen in Osman v J Ralph Moss Ltd,171 in which a person convicted of driving without insurance was permitted to recover the amount of the fine, a strict-liability penalty, from the insurance broker who had led him to believe that his motor insurance was in order. The offence in Osman was a relatively minor one. The operation of the illegality defence in such circumstances was reviewed in the Scottish case of D Geddes (Contractors) Ltd v Neil Johnson Health & Safety Services Ltd,172 in which a strict-liability offence (breach of a statutory safety regulation) had attracted a fine of £200,000. The fine had been imposed upon the pursuer, a quarry operator, following a fatal accident to one of its employees. The pursuer, which had engaged the defender to advise on the safety of its operations, alleged that it had fallen foul of the regulation as a result of the defender’s breach of contract and negligence. When the pursuer brought an action to recover the amount of the fine it had paid, the defender argued that the claim was barred by the illegality of the pursuer’s own conduct. In holding that the pursuer’s case for recovery was relevant for proof, Lord Tyre also allowed that the illegality defence might apply if the defender were able to establish that the breach of statutory duty was caused by the pursuer’s fault. The question whether the pursuer had been at fault was also therefore to be determined at proof. Lord Tyre noted that “a different balancing of policy considerations is required” when the court was considering the position of persons who were not aware of what they were doing at the time of committing an offence for which they had been punished.173 He further observed that the “key concept” was “responsibility”, so that in principle the illegality defence might be engaged not only by intentional wrongdoing but also by the pursuer’s negligence.174 170 [2020] UKSC 43, [2020] 3 WLR 1124 per Lord Hamblen at para 112, as suggested by Lord Phillips in Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens [2009] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 AC 1391 at para 24. 171 [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 313. See also United Project Consultants Pte Ltd v Leong Kwok Onn [2005] SGCA 38, in which the plaintiff suffered a penalty for submitting an incorrect tax return. Since this was the result of the negligence of its accountant, it was held that the illegality defence did not bar recovery of the relevant amount from the accountant. 172 [2017] CSOH 42, [2017] PNLR 21. 173 [2017] CSOH 42, [2017] PNLR 21 at para 17. 174 [2017] CSOH 42, [2017] PNLR 21 at paras 18–19.

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1065

More unusually, the illegality defence has been invoked where the sanc- 29.48 tion imposed upon the pursuer took the form not of a criminal sentence but of disciplinary measures imposed by a regulator. In Khan v Hussain175 the pursuer sought damages from his accountant in respect of his loss of earnings due to sanctions imposed upon him by the Financial Services Agency. The FSA had determined that the pursuer had submitted false and misleading information in a personal mortgage application, and accordingly made an order preventing him from exercising functions as a financial adviser. The pursuer claimed that his accountant had been professionally negligent, and acted in breach of contract, in advising him in regard to the offending mortgage application. However, the illegality defence was held to bar the claim, because the court found the pursuer’s loss deriving from the sanction to have been a consequence of his own dishonest conduct, not of his acting in accordance with professional advice.176

(8) The illegality defence in claims by companies Illegality may be pled as a defence when a claim is made by a company, 29.49 just as when a claim is made by an individual.177 A further question arises, however, as to the circumstances in which illegal conduct on the part of company officers is to be attributed to the company itself, thus bringing the illegality defence into play. In Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens178 the claimant was in effect a one-man company, now in liquidation, which had been owned, controlled and managed by S. The claimant alleged that its auditors had been negligent in failing to detect dishonest activities by S in procuring the company to engage in frauds on banks. Finding S to have been the “directing mind and will of the company”, the court held that this justified departing from the normal rule that a company should not be fixed with the fraudulent intentions of its directors. The company was therefore imputed with awareness of the fraud and in consequence was a participant in the illegal conduct. This meant that its claim against the auditors was barred, even although fraud by a company officer was the “very thing” which the auditors had been employed to check. However, the reasoning in Stone & Rolls Ltd proved to be controversial and, while it was not overruled, the Supreme Court subsequently recommended that it should be put “on one side in a pile and marked ‘not to be looked at 175 [2019] CSOH 11, 2019 SC 322. 176 [2019] CSOH 11, 2019 SC 322 per Lord Ericht at para 35. Cf United Project Consultants Pte Ltd v Leong Kwok Onn [2005] SGCA 38, in which the court took the view that the errors in the plaintiff’s tax return were attributable to its accountant’s negligence and that it was not therefore barred from recovering from the accountant the amount it had suffered as a penalty. 177 See e.g. D Geddes (Contractors) Ltd v Neil Johnson Health & Safety Services Ltd [2017] CSOH 42, [2017] PNLR 21. 178 [2009] 1 AC 1391.

1066   The Law of Delict in Scotland

29.50

29.51

again’”.179 The reasoning in Stone & Rolls Ltd was nonetheless looked at a further time by the Supreme Court in Singularis Holdings Ltd v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Ltd.180 In Singularis, the defendant had been banker to the claimant, a company set up by a Mr Al Sanea, of which he was the sole shareholder, a director and the chairman, president and treasurer. Six other directors had no involvement in the management of the company. On receiving instructions fraudulently presented by Mr Al Sanea, the bank paid out to third parties the substantial funds at credit in the company’s account, leaving the company unable to pay its creditors. Liquidators were appointed who brought a claim against the bank for the amount of the payments, on the basis that the bank had breached its duty of care to the company in making them. The bank argued that, since this had been in effect a one-man company, and since Mr Al Sanea had been its controlling mind and will, his wrongdoing should be attributed to the company, so that the company’s claim was barred on the grounds of illegality, as constituted by Mr Al Sanea’s fraud and breach of fiduciary duty towards the company. In the event, the Supreme Court did not allow that Mr Al Sanea’s conduct was to be attributed to the company, but it commented upon the applicability of the illegality defence in these circumstances. Reference was made to the Patel considerations.181 Fiduciary duties were intended to protect a company from becoming the victim of fraud by the company’s officers, a purpose which would not be assisted by preventing the company from recovering money wrongfully removed from its account. There was a public interest in requiring banks to be vigilant in relation to financial crime. Public interest, and the interests of proportionality, would be better served, not by denying the claim in such cases but by a finding of contributory negligence. In reaching this decision the Supreme Court endorsed the view that there was “no principle of law that in any proceedings where the company is suing a third party for breach of a duty owed to it by that third party, the fraudulent conduct of a director is to be attributed to the company if it is a one-man company”.182 This meant that “the answer to any question whether to attribute the knowledge of the fraudulent director to the company is always to be found in consideration of the context and the purpose for which the attribution is relevant”.183 The framework of the illegality defence as set out in Patel must be applied in all cases, including the public policy considerations for and against application of the defence. 179 Bilta (UK) Ltd v Nazir [2015] UKSC 23, [2016] AC 1 per Lord Neuberger at para 30. 180 [2019] UKSC 50, [2020] AC 1189. 181 Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467. 182 [2019] UKSC 50, [2020] AC 1189 per Lady Hale at para 34, citing the trial judge, Rose J, [2017] EWHC 257 (Ch) at para 182. 183 Ibid.

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1067

In the light of this decision it remains possible that the illegality defence might be applicable to a claim by a company in regard to conduct by its officers, but only in narrow circumstances such as where “where there are no innocent shareholders or directors”.184

(9) Illegality affecting a specific head of loss A separate question is whether compensation should be denied, not because 29.52 the pursuer was engaged in illegal activity at the time of suffering injury, but because the amount claimed includes compensation for a benefit that the pursuer did not obtain, or could not have obtained legally. In Hewison v Meridian Shipping Pte Ltd,185 for example, the claimant had concealed information about his epilepsy from his employers, as this condition would have disqualified him from working as a merchant seaman. At the age of 35 he was injured in an accident at work, unrelated to his condition, for which his employers accepted liability. Some time after the accident he suffered a seizure, brought on by the accident, and he was dismissed on his condition coming to light. When a claim was brought following the accident, the employers challenged the view that future loss of earnings should be calculated on the basis that, but for the accident, the claimant would have continued to work as a seaman until normal retirement age. In working at sea the claimant had committed the criminal offence of obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception, within the meaning of the (English) Theft Act 1968, section 16. Those future earnings were therefore contingent on the claimant continuing to commit that offence until retirement. In holding that the claimant was barred from claiming compensation for earnings that would have been obtained illegally, the gloss provided by Clarke LJ was as follows:186 “The principle can perhaps be stated as a variation of the maxim so that it reads ex turpi causa non oritur damnum,187 where the damnum is the loss which would have been recovered but for the relevant illegal or immoral act. A classic example is the principle that a person who makes his living from burglary cannot have damages assessed on the basis of what he would have earned from burglary but for the defendant’s negligence.”

Similarly, in Morgan v Bryson Recycling Ltd188 the defendant admitted lia- 29.53 bility for a collision in which the claimant’s car had been damaged, and it did not dispute its liability to pay the cost of buying a new car. However, 184 Bilta (UK) Ltd v Nazir [2015] UKSC 23, [2016] AC 1 per Lord Neuberger at para 26; see also Lord Sumption at para 80. 185 [2002] EWCA Civ 1821, [2003] PIQR P17; see also B v Royal Devon and Exeter NHS Foundation Trust [2016] EWHC 1024 (QB). 186 [2002] EWCA Civ 1821, [2003] PIQR P17 at para 28. 187 “No loss arises from a disgraceful or immoral consideration.” 188 [2018] NIQB 12.

1068   The Law of Delict in Scotland

it argued that the claimant was not entitled to the cost of hiring a replacement vehicle in the interim. The damaged car did not have a valid MOT certificate, which invalidated the claimant’s motor insurance policy. In rejecting the claim for damages under that head, the court held that the claimant was barred from claiming the cost of a replacement vehicle for a car that he could not in any event have driven without committing the criminal offences of driving without a valid MOT certificate and driving without valid insurance.

D. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE (1) Introduction 29.54

Although there is little discussion of the concept of contributory negligence in the early sources,189 nineteenth-century case law indicated that, in some contexts at least, a pursuer’s lack of care for his or her own safety might have the effect not of absolving the defender entirely but of reducing the amount of any damages awarded. Instances include an “outside” passenger on a stagecoach who had “excited” the driver to overtake another coach at speed, thereby causing it to overturn; such conduct “materially affected” the question of damages payable in respect of the pursuer’s injuries, but it did not bar the action.190 In another case the relatives of a woman who had drowned by falling into an insecurely fenced coal pit were permitted to recover damages, even though the deceased had apparently been inebriated and had strayed from the road at night.191 The jury was directed that in fixing “fair and reasonable damages” they should “also take into consideration the state of the deceased”. Other cases in this period, however, tended to the view that the pursuer required to come to court “with clean hands”,192 so that even if the defender had not done “all that might and ought to have been done” a pursuer who had been “deficient in care” could not recover.193 The significance to be attached to such conduct by a pursuer was finally settled by the decision of the Second Division in McNaughton v Caledonian Rly Co, in which Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis arrived, “without any serious difficulty”, at the conclusion that:194

189 But see Regiam Majestatem 4.24, on the rules applicable where horses collided with pedestrians on the highway. An assythment was due where the horse collided with a pedestrian in front of it, but a proportion only of that sum was due where the horse had backed into a pedestrian, since pedestrians walking behind a horse should beware of such harm. 190 Allan v M’Leish (1819) 2 Mur 158. 191 Hislop v Durham (1842) 4 D 1168. 192 MacLachlan v Wigtownshire Road Trs (1827) 4 Mur 216, refusing liability where the pursuer had not acted “regularly and carefully”. 193 Millar v Edinburgh Road Trs (1828) 4 Mur 563. 194 (1858) 21 D 160 at 163.

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1069 “where an event is brought about directly by the culpa of two persons, whether joint or several, where the culpa of each has contributed to produce the event, and the event would not have been produced but for the culpa of both, there can be no claim as between these persons for reparation of injury flowing from that event.”

Despite disquiet as to the hardship produced by such a rule,195 it remained in place for nearly a century, so that a finding of contributory negligence on the pursuer’s part provided the defender with a complete defence. The rule was eventually changed by the Law Reform (Contributory 29.55 Negligence) Act 1945, section 1(1) of which provides that: “Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage.”

In this context, “fault”, as defined in section 5(a), “means wrongful act, breach of statutory duty or negligent act or omission which gives rise to liability in damages, or would apart from this Act, give rise to the defence of contributory negligence”. This broad definition of fault, as applied both to defender and pursuer, means that the defence may be raised not only in regard to allegations of negligence, but for other forms of culpable conduct as well, including breach of statutory duty. It is thought that contributory negligence is not open as a defence to a defender who had intended to harm the pursuer.196

(2) The pursuer’s “own fault” The wording of section 1(1) refers to damage suffered as the result partly 29.56 of the pursuer’s “own fault”, as defined in section 5(a) and noted above. The type of conduct which constitutes fault varies according to context. Examples of pursuers at fault in this way include: passengers who get into cars without fastening their safety belts,197 or in the knowledge that the driver has consumed an excess of alcohol;198 pedestrians who cross the

195 See e.g. A T Glegg, “Contributory Negligence” (1892) 3 JR 293. On the developments in the common law prior to the 1945 Act, see Walker, Delict 354–355. 196 Pritchard v Co-operative Group Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 329, [2012] QB 320; Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corporation [2002] UKHL 43, [2003] 1 AC 959 per Lord Rodger at paras 42–45. 197 Froom v Butcher [1976] QB 286; Hill v Chivers 1987 SLT 323. 198 Currie v Clamp’s Exr 2002 SLT 196.

1070   The Law of Delict in Scotland

29.57

29.58

road without looking out for traffic;199 motorcyclists who fail to secure their helmets;200 or persons who seek to extricate themselves from difficult situations by adopting an unreasonably hazardous mode of escape.201 Pursuers forced to weigh up conflicting safety advice are not necessarily considered to have been at fault where they make the wrong choice. In Pace v Cully202 the pursuer was a taxi driver injured in a road accident. He was not wearing a seat belt and his injuries were exacerbated by his being thrown against the windscreen. However, like other taxi drivers in the area, the pursuer had been advised by the local police that it was safer not to wear a seat belt, in order to allow greater opportunity of evasive action in the event of an attack by a passenger. He had perhaps made the wrong decision in not belting up, but the court took the view that this was “at most a decision which was in the nature of a misjudgment on the pursuer’s part rather than a failure to take care for his own safety”.203 This did not therefore constitute contributory negligence.204 The wording of section 1(1) requires the defender to establish not only that the pursuer was at fault in failing adequately to look after his or her own safety but also that this fault caused the pursuer to suffer greater damage or injury.205 The onus thus lies upon the defender to prove both elements – not upon the pursuer to prove the contrary – and damages are not to be reduced in the absence of evidence to show that the pursuer’s conduct increased the level of injury.206 In Neill v Doherty and Akram,207 for example, the plaintiff was a taxi passenger who suffered severe spinal injuries in a road-traffic accident caused by the dangerous driving of the driver of another car. The plaintiff had not been wearing a seat belt and she was thrown out of the vehicle after the crash. The driver therefore argued that she had been contributorily negligent. However, it was established that the pursuer had sustained the worst injuries at the moment of impact, not by being thrown from the taxi, and the evidence suggested that failure to wear a seat belt had not caused or contributed significantly to her injuries. This meant that although, in not wearing a seat belt, she had failed to take

Jackson v Murray [2015] UKSC 5, 2015 SC (UKSC) 105. Capps v Miller [1989] 1 WLR 839. Sayers v Harlow Urban DC [1958] 1 WLR 623. 1992 SLT 1073. 1992 SLT 1073 per Lord Weir at 1076. See also Mackay v Borthwick 1982 SLT 265, in which a passenger injured in a car crash had not been wearing a seat belt because she suffered from a hiatus hernia and this would have caused her discomfort. By avoiding such discomfort for what had been a short journey, she was held not to have failed to take sufficient care for her own safety. 205 See also discussion in Bowes v Highland Council [2018] CSIH 38, 2018 SC 499 per Lord JusticeClerk Dorrian at para 59. 206 Froom v Butcher [1976] QB 286 per Lord Denning MR at 296. 207 [1997] CLY 3772.

199 200 201 202 203 204

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1071

reasonable care for her safety, that failure had no causal impact on her level of injury, and no deduction was to be made for contributory negligence. Although the specific manner of injury need not have been foresee- 29.59 able to the pursuer,208 the risk created by the pursuer’s lack of care must broadly coincide with the risk which eventuated as a result of the defender’s wrongdoing. In Jones v Livox Quarries Ltd,209 for example, the claimant was a quarry worker who, in breach of his employer’s orders, had hitched a lift by perching on a tow-bar at the back of a traxcavator, a slow-moving quarry vehicle. He was badly injured when a dumper truck negligently drove into the back of the traxcavator and crushed him between the two vehicles. The question arose whether the quarry worker had been contributorily negligent in hitching a ride in this irresponsible manner. The plaintiff argued, unsuccessfully, that the specific risk to which his conduct made him vulnerable was the risk of being thrown from the vehicle, not the risk of being driven into from behind, and so there was an insufficient causal link between his contributory negligence and the degree of injury suffered. However, the court took the view that if a passenger rode a vehicle in a dangerous position, and was injured more severely in a collision than would otherwise have been the case, then the passenger had contributed to his or her injury. At the same time, the court accepted that if, while riding on the towbar, the plaintiff had been hit in the eye by a stray shot from a negligent sportsman, contributory negligence would not have applied. His dangerous mode of travel would not have laid him more open to the risk of being shot in a random manner than if he had been going about his business in the conventional way.

(3) Self-harm As already mentioned,210 the concept of “fault” in section 1(1) of the Law 29.60 Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 embraces a range of conduct which is not restricted to negligence, and it has been held that contributory negligence may be found where the pursuer has not merely been negligent but has intentionally sought out injury. This issue has come to the fore in cases where the defender has failed in a duty to prevent the pursuer harming himself or herself. In Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, discussed above,211 the deceased committed suicide while in police custody, despite being a known suicide risk. The police were held liable to his family for failing in their duty to protect him from a deliberate act against

208 209 210 211

Jones v Livox Quarries Ltd [1952] 2 QB 608 per Lord Denning at 616. [1952] 2 QB 608. At para 29.55 above. [2000] 1 AC 360; see para 29.20 above.

1072   The Law of Delict in Scotland

himself but, since the deceased’s deliberate act in exploiting their lack of care was also a substantial cause of his death, damages were reduced by 50 per cent to reflect contributory negligence.212

(4) Children 29.61

29.62

Significant numbers of accidents involve child victims whose own conduct has contributed towards the level of injury suffered. While contributory negligence may be found on the part of children, they plainly cannot be assessed in the same way as adults.213 The question of a child’s contributory negligence depends not only upon the nature of the danger created by the defender but also upon the child’s capacity to appreciate it.214 There is no set age below which a child may be regarded as of insufficient capacity to take a measure of responsibility for his or her own safety. Although very small children are judged incapable of contributory negligence,215 children as young as five216 or six217 years old have been regarded as of sufficient maturity to understand the dangers of traffic. On the other hand, if a parent or supervising adult breaches a duty owed to the child, such as by failing to secure the child’s safety belt in a car, that negligence should not be imputed to the child.218 In assessing whether a child has taken sufficient care for the child’s own safety, the relevant criterion is what might reasonably be expected of an ordinary child of the same age, who is neither a “paragon of prudence” nor “scatterbrained”.219 On that basis, even young children can be expected to understand, where normal conditions prevail, that they should not step out on to the road without looking out for traffic. However, where road conditions are not straightforward, allowance must be made for the child’s imperfect perception of dangers. In Jackson v Murray,220 the thirteen-year 212 See also Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd [2008] UKHL 13, [2008] 1 AC 884, in which the deceased committed suicide after developing depression, triggered by physical injury in an accident at work for which the employers admitted liability. The question of contributory negligence had not been raised in proceedings, and it was therefore inappropriate to reduce the damages to be awarded in the absence of relevant evidence. However, the majority in the House of Lords were doubtful whether such a reduction would have been appropriate, given that in committing suicide the deceased’s judgment had been impaired by the severe depression brought on as a consequence of the defendants’ negligence. 213 For assessment of the standard of care required of child defenders, see paras 10.31-10.35 above. 214 Galbraith’s Curator ad Litem v Stewart (No 2) 1998 SLT 1305. 215 See e.g. Campbell v Ord and Maddison (1873) 1 R 149 per Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff at 153, suggesting that a child of three years and eleven months was “unable from his tender years to appreciate the danger”. See also Fryer v North British Railway Co (1908) 15 SLT 886 (child of twenty-two months straying across railway track); Ducharme v Davies [1984] 1 WWR 699, 29 Sask R 54 (child of three not wearing safety belt). 216 McKinnell v White 1971 SLT (Notes) 61; Banner’s Tutor v Kennedy’s Trs 1978 SLT (Notes) 83. 217 Harvey v Cairns 1989 SLT 107. 218 Ducharme v Davies [1984] 1 WWR 699, 29 Sask R 54. 219 Gough v Thorne [1966] 1 WLR 1387 per Salmon LJ at 1391. 220 [2015] UKSC 5, 2015 SC (UKSC) 105.

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1073

old pursuer was knocked down by a car as she stepped out from behind a school minibus to cross an A-road in fading light in rural Aberdeenshire. Contributory negligence was fixed at 50 per cent, making concession for the pursuer’s youth to the extent that:221 “she was aged only 13 at the time, and a 13 year old will not necessarily have the same level of judgment and self-control as an adult . . . [S]he had to take account of the defender’s car approaching at speed, in very poor light conditions, with its headlights on . . . [T]he assessment of speed in those circumstances is far from easy, even for an adult, and even more so for a 13 year old. It is also necessary to bear in mind that the situation of a pedestrian attempting to cross a relatively major road with a 60 mph speed limit, after dusk and without street lighting, is not straightforward, even for an adult.”

Similarly, in Gough v Thorne222 the thirteen-year old plaintiff had been waiting to cross a busy road when a lorry stopped and the driver waved her across the road in front of him. As she crossed, she was knocked down by a small “bubble car” that overtook the lorry at speed. Putting itself in the shoes of an ordinary child of that age, the court decided that a deduction for contributory negligence was inappropriate. As Salmon LJ explained:223 “I think that any ordinary child of 13½, seeing a lorry stop to let her cross and the lorry driver, a grown-up person in whom she no doubt had some confidence, beckoning her to cross the road, would naturally go straight on, and no one in my view could blame her for so doing. I agree that if she had been a good deal older and hardened by experience and perhaps consequently with less confidence in adults, she might have said to herself: ‘I wonder if that man has given the proper signal to traffic coming up? I wonder if that traffic has heeded it? I wonder if he ought to have beckoned me across when he did and whether he looked behind him before doing so?’ She might not have gone past the front of the lorry without verifying for herself that it was safe to do so. But I think it would be quite wrong to hold that a child of 13½ is negligent because she fails to go through those mental processes and relies unquestioningly on the lorry driver’s signal.”

An ordinary child, even of tender years, is expected to understand the 29.63 more obvious dangers of playing in derelict buildings224 or climbing upon dangerous structures that are obviously designed to deter intruders.225 In 221 [2015] UKSC 5, 2015 SC (UKSC) 105 per Lord Reed at para 41. 222 [1966] 1 WLR 1387. 223 [1966] 1 WLR 1387 at 1391–1392. 224 E.g. Telfer v Glasgow Corporation 1974 SLT (Notes) 51 (“brittle and dangerous” character of roof must have been apparent to ten-year-old child and deduction of 50 per cent appropriate). 225 E.g. Dawson v Scottish Power plc 1999 SLT 672 (child of eleven climbing six-foot steel fence: deduction of one-third appropriate). See also Anderson v Imrie [2016] CSOH 171, 2017 Rep LR 21 affd [2018] CSIH 14, 2018 SC 328 (child of eight judged capable of understanding that it was dangerous to climb on to and interfere with a heavy stock gate on a farm, and deduction of 25 per cent appropriate).

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Galbraith’s Curator ad Litem v Stewart,226 however, the eight-year-old pursuer was injured playing on large pipes which contractors working on the sewage system had left out unsecured on the street overnight. Such pipes were regarded as an allurement to local children, all the more so because they resembled the play tunnels often found in adventure playgrounds. In the course of the decision, the hazards of rolling the pipes were weighed up against the capacity of a child of that age to appreciate the risks of doing so, and while older children might have appreciated the danger, it would not have been apparent to the average eight-year-old. He was therefore held not to have been contributorily negligent. Similarly, in Yachuk v Oliver Blais Co Ltd227 the nine-year-old plaintiff had gone to the defendant’s petrol station and asked to buy some petrol for his mother’s car, but in reality planning to use the fuel to light play-torches. The petrol station proprietor was held liable for the burn injuries which the boy suffered when the petrol ignited, and there was no contributory negligence, on the basis that a child of that age could not be expected to appreciate the extreme volatility of petrol.

(5) Calculation of proportion 29.64

When contributory negligence is established, the damages awarded to the pursuer are reduced, the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 says, “to such an extent as the court thinks just and equitable” having regard to the pursuer’s “share in the responsibility for the damage”.228 Account may be taken of both the relative importance of the pursuer’s acts in causing the damage and also the relative blameworthiness of the pursuer’s conduct.229 This evidence-based evaluation of causal impact in conjunction with a more impressionistic assessment of the parties’ relative culpability can result in a “rough and ready exercise”.230 As Lord Reed explained in Jackson v Murray:231 “The problem is not merely that the factors which the court is required to consider are incapable of precise measurement. More fundamentally, the blameworthiness of the pursuer and the defender are incommensurable. The defender has acted in breach of a duty (not necessarily a duty of care) which was owed to the pursuer; the pursuer, on the other hand, has acted with a want of regard for her own interests. The word ‘fault’ in sec 1(1) of the 1945

226 227 228 229

1998 SLT 1305. [1949] AC 386. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 s 1(1). Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd [1953] AC 663 per Lord Reid at 682; see also Blackmore v Department for Communities and Local Government [2017] EWCA Civ 1136, [2018] QB 471. 230 Jackson v Murray [2015] UKSC 5, 2015 SC (UKSC) 105 per Lord Reed at para 28. 231 [2015] UKSC 5, 2015 SC (UKSC) 105 at para 27.

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1075 Act, as applied to ‘the person suffering the damage’ on the one hand, and the ‘other person or persons’ on the other hand, is therefore being used in two different senses. The court is not comparing like with like.”

The “rough and ready” quality of this calculation is illustrated in Blackmore v Department for Communities and Local Government.232 The deceased had been exposed to asbestos in his employment with the defendants and subsequently died of lung cancer, but he had also smoked since he was a teenager. His estate brought an action against his employers in which causation and primary liability were conceded. It was established that the exposure to asbestos had doubled the risk of the deceased contracting lung cancer, but the risk from the deceased’s smoking habit was probably between double and treble the risk from asbestos exposure. The defendant therefore argued that the apportionment of damages on grounds of contributory negligence should reflect the causal impact of the smoking, which would have meant a reduction of 85–90 per cent. However, the trial judge reduced the award of damages by only 30 per cent, reflecting not only his findings on causal impact but also his view of the relative blameworthiness of the deceased’s and the defendant’s conduct. The Court of Appeal was not disposed to disturb this figure, rejecting a suggested analogy with apportionment in cases of joint fault where the relative contribution of different employers might be at issue. There was “no good reason, when determining responsibility under section 1 of the 1945 Act in cases such as the present, to limit consideration to matters of causation or to deny any role to blameworthiness”.233 The court also commented that there was no “general principle that in all cases greater weight should be attributed to negligent conduct outside the scope of the employer/employee relationship. Whether it is appropriate to do so will depend on the facts of each case.”234 The end result, however, was that the degree of contributory negligence was fixed by weighing up the “incommensurable” – the culpability of the deceased’s long-standing lifestyle choice, as against the employer’s negligence and breach of statutory duty in failing to make its premises secure against asbestos exposure. In practice, where the proportion attributed to the pursuer’s conduct is 29.65 assessed at less than 10 per cent, a deduction is unlikely to be made, and indeed a 10 per cent deduction is seldom encountered.235 Even in circumstances where the pursuer was momentarily inattentive to his or her own

232 233 234 235

[2017] EWCA Civ 1136, [2018] QB 471. See also para 13.66 above. [2017] EWCA Civ 1136, [2018] QB 471 per Lloyd Jones LJ at para 35. [2017] EWCA Civ 1136, [2018] QB 471 per Lloyd Jones LJ at para 25. See e.g. Capps v Miller [1989] 1 WLR 839 (in which the plaintiff had worn a motor-cycle helmet but omitted to fasten the straps); Delaney v McGregor Construction (Highlands) Ltd 2003 Rep LR 56; Tafa v Matsim Properties Ltd [2011] EWHC 1302 (QB).

1076   The Law of Delict in Scotland

wellbeing, there is general reluctance to find a marginal level of contributory negligence on the part of an employee whose employer has breached its duty to provide adequate protection for its employee’s safety.236 At the other end of the scale, a finding of 100 per cent contributory negligence is contrary to logic, since at that point negligence ceases to be “contributory” and constitutes the sole case of injury.237 The 1945 Act permits an allocation of responsibility for the damage, not a negation of it.238 A finding that the damage is wholly the result of the pursuer’s conduct indicates that no responsibility is attributed to the defender, and the issue of “contributory” negligence does not arise. As explained by the Court of Appeal in Anderson v Newham College of Further Education:239 “Whether the claim is in negligence or for breach of statutory duty, if the evidence, once it has been appraised as the law requires, shows the entire fault to lie with the claimant there is no liability on the defendant. If not, then the court will consider to what extent, if any, the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage makes it just and equitable to reduce his damages. The phrase ‘100% contributory negligence’, while expressive, is unhelpful, because it invites the court to treat a statutory qualification of the measure of damages as if it were a secondary or surrogate approach to liability, which it is not. If there is liability, contributory negligence can reduce its monetary quantification, but it cannot legally or logically nullify it.”

29.66

The appropriate percentage reduction is regarded as a question of fact, and, given the inherently imprecise nature of this exercise, an appeal court is normally reluctant to disturb the assessment of the trial court. It does so only if the trial court has manifestly and to a substantial degree “gone wrong”.240 This would include circumstances where there was “an identifiable error, such as an error of law, or the taking into account of an irrelevant matter, or the failure to take account of a relevant matter”, or where there is a difference of view on apportionment “which exceeds the ambit of reasonable disagreement”.241 A rare example of an apportionment being altered by the appeal court, on this final ground, can be seen in

236 Toole v Bolton MBC [2002] EWCA Civ 588. 237 Pitts v Hunt [1991] 1 QB 24. There was, however, some earlier authority in which a 100 per cent deduction was applied for “contributory” negligence: Jayes v IMI (Kynoch) Ltd [1985] ICR 155. See also Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360, in which the trial judge’s finding of 100 per cent contributory negligence was overturned as a “fiction”, but there was no more extended discussion of whether 100 per cent was in all circumstances to be considered illogical. 238 See Buyukardicli v Hammerson UK Properties plc [2002] EWCA Civ 683 per Sedley LJ at para 7. 239 [2002] EWCA Civ 505, [2003] ICR 212 per Sedley LJ at para 19. 240 See McCusker v Saveheat Cavity Wall Insulation Ltd 1987 SLT 24. 241 Jackson v Murray [2015] UKSC 5, 2015 SC (UKSC) 105 per Lord Reed at para 35.

Defences and Contributory Negligence   1077

the Scottish case of Jackson v Murray noted above.242 The Lord Ordinary assessed contributory negligence at 90 per cent, on the basis that a child of thirteen should have been aware of the dangers of crossing a major road, and had either failed to look, or not reacted sensibly when she saw a car approaching.243 On appeal, the Inner House reduced that proportion to 70 per cent, judging that the Lord Ordinary had miscalculated the relative “causative potency” of the parties’ conduct.244 On further appeal, the Supreme Court examined the reasoning of the courts below and found insufficient explanation as to why the major share of the responsibility for her injuries should rest with the child, particularly when adjustment was made for her age.245 This significant difference of views on the appropriate percentage exceeded the ambit of “reasonable disagreement”, and the Supreme Court therefore regarded an adjustment down to 50 per cent to be justified.246

(6) Contributory negligence and joint fault Where there has been contributory negligence on the part of the pursuer 29.67 but more than one defender was at fault, the apportionment as between the pursuer and the multiple defenders is followed by a further apportionment as between those defenders. In Fitzgerald v Lane,247 for example, the plaintiff was severely injured after he walked out on a pedestrian crossing against a red light and was struck by two cars in succession. The plaintiff himself was found contributorily negligent to the extent of 50 per cent. As each driver was at fault to an equal degree in driving without due care, so each was found liable to the extent of 25 per cent. The total damages payable without contributory negligence would have been £600,000, but this was reduced to £300,000 to reflect contributory negligence. That sum was then split between the two defendants so that each was liable to the extent of £150,000, although, since liability was joint and several, it would have been open to the plaintiff to obtain the full amount of £300,000 from one of the drivers who could then have recovered the balance of £150,000 from the other driver.

242 243 244 245 246

See para 29.62 above. [2012] CSOH 100, 2012 SCLR 605. [2012] CSIH 100, 2013 SLT 153. [2015] UKSC 5, 2015 SC (UKSC) 105. For an example of contributory negligence being adjusted upwards from 10 per cent to one-third, see Butcher v Cornwall County Council [2002] EWCA Civ 1640. 247 [1989] AC 328.

Chapter 30

Prescription and Limitation

Para A. PRESCRIPTION�������������������������������������������������������������������� 30.01 B. LIMITATION������������������������������������������������������������������������ 30.06 (1) Personal injuries not resulting in death������������������������������� 30.08 (a) That the injuries were sufficiently serious��������������������� 30.11 (b) That the injuries were attributable to an act or omission����������������������������������������������������������������� 30.12 (c) That the defender was a person to whose act or omission the injuries were attributable or the employer or principal of such a person������������������������� 30.13 (d) No allowance for “dithering time”������������������������������� 30.16 (2) Child-abuse actions����������������������������������������������������������� 30.17 (3) Personal injuries resulting in death������������������������������������� 30.20 (4) Equitable power to override time limits������������������������������ 30.22

A. PRESCRIPTION 30.01

In the law of delict, it is negative, rather than positive, prescription that is of particular relevance. Prescription in this sense is “the common extinction and abolishing of all rights”.1 It extinguishes the obligation to make reparation after a certain period has elapsed, as well as the correlative right to enforce the obligation.2 The modern law is largely contained in the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973. The Act provides that, as a general rule, the obligation arising from liability to make reparation prescribes if a continuous period of five years has passed without any relevant claim having been made in relation to the obligation and without the subsistence of the obligation having been relevantly acknowledged.3 That general rule is, however, subject to a number of important exceptions:

 1 Stair, Inst 2.12.1. For the historical background, see D Johnston, Prescription and Limitation, 2nd edn (2012) ch 1.   2 For the most part, the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 is formulated so as to extinguish obligations rather than rights; but s 15(2) provides that any reference in the Act to an obligation includes a reference to the correlative right.   3 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 s 6 and Sch 1 para 1(d).

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• The obligation to make reparation in respect of personal injuries, or death as a result of personal injury, does not prescribe (although the rules on limitation apply, as discussed further below).4 • The obligation to make reparation in respect of defamation prescribes after twenty years, as discussed further in chapter 18.5 • The obligation to make reparation in respect of damage caused by defective products, in terms of the Consumer Protection Act 1987, prescribes after ten years, as discussed further in chapter 26.6 • The obligation to make contribution between joint wrongdoers, by virtue of section 3(2) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940, prescribes two years after the date on which the right to recover the contribution became enforceable by the creditor in the obligation.7 As a general rule, the prescriptive period runs from the point at which 30.02 the obligation to make reparation becomes enforceable. In terms of section 11(1) of the 1973 Act this means “the date when the loss, injury or damage occurred”. As explained in Dunlop v McGowans,8 damnum must “concur with injuria; the obligation to make reparation arises at the point when the defender’s “act, neglect or default (injuria)” results in loss, injury or damage (damnum) to the pursuer.9 In many cases the effect produced upon the pursuer by the defender’s conduct is instant, so that there is little difficulty in identifying the point at which damnum and injuria have concurred. In other cases, however, some time may intervene between the defender’s conduct and the occurrence of loss, injury or damage, and in those circumstances the time period runs from the date when damnum results, not from the earlier date of the injuria. The meaning of the “concurrence” of injuria and damnum in this context 30.03 was considered in Dunlop v McGowans.10 The defenders, a firm of solicitors, were instructed to give notice to their client’s tenants, but failed to do so timeously, by Whitsunday 1971. The pursuer was their client, who, as a result of their negligence, was unable to obtain vacant possession and begin redevelopment of the tenanted premises until Whitsunday 1972. The pursuer did not, however, bring proceedings against his solicitors until November 1976, and the question therefore arose as to when the five-year prescriptive period   4   5   6   7   8   9

s 7(2) and Sch 1 para 2(g). s 7(2) and Sch1 para 2(gg). See also para 18.155 above. s 22A and Sch 1 para 2(ggg). See also paras 26.88–26.90 above. s 8A. 1980 SC (HL) 73 per Lord Keith at 81. See the explanation in David T Morrison & Co Ltd v ICL Plastics [2014] UKSC 48, 2014 SC (UKSC) 222 per Lord Reed at para 11, citing Dunlop v McGowans 1980 SC (HL) 73 per Lord Keith at 81. 10 1980 SC (HL) 73.

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30.04

30.05

had begun. The defenders argued that the relevant date was Whitsunday 1971, the point at which they had failed to give proper notice. The pursuer, on the other hand, argued by reference to section 11(1) that, since the loss continued to accrue throughout the subsequent year, the prescriptive clock continued to be reset throughout that year. The premise for this argument was that there was not a single obligation but a series of obligations recurring throughout the year. This argument was, however, rejected. The obligation to make reparation for loss was said to be a single and indivisible obligation, and one action only could be prosecuted for enforcing it. The legal wrong by the defenders and the loss to the pursuer “concurred” at Whitsunday 1971, even though the loss had continued to increase after that point. This meant that the prescriptive period had elapsed in relation to the obligation to make reparation, and the claim against the solicitors could not proceed. Where wrongdoing has been sustained on a continuing basis, however, section 11(2) provides that the prescriptive period runs from the date on which the continuing “act, neglect or default” ceases. Nuisance will sometimes involve a continuing wrong of this nature, as previously discussed.11 Section 11(2) may be invoked only where the wrongful conduct itself is of a continuing nature, not where the wrongful conduct has ceased but its harmful consequences have persisted.12 The commencement of the prescriptive period is postponed during such time that the pursuer has yet to become aware that a potential claim is available. In terms of section 11(3), (3A) and (3B), prescription does not begin to run until such time as the pursuer is aware, or could with reasonable diligence have become aware, of the following key facts: (i) that loss, injury or damage has occurred; (ii) that the loss, injury or damage was caused by a person’s act or omission; and (iii) the identity of that person. Section 11(3) was amended, and subsections 11(3A) and 11(3B) inserted, by the Prescription (Scotland) Act 2018, section 5. This amended wording clarifies the “discoverability” rules affecting the start date for the prescriptive period in cases where loss, injury or damage was initially latent or the circumstances of its occurrence were uncertain. These rules had been explored in the controversial decision of the Supreme Court in David T Morrison & Co Ltd v ICL Plastics Ltd.13 The case arose out of a fatal explosion in the defender’s plastics factory in May 2004 in which the pursuer’s nearby shop premises were damaged. A public inquiry established the cause of the explosion to have been gas leakage from a corroded pipeline, but the inquiry did not report until July 2009. The pursuer began proceedings in August 2009,

11 See para 22.69 above. 12 See e.g. Johnston v Scottish Ministers [2005] CSOH 68, 2006 SCLR 5. 13 [2014] UKSC 48, 2014 SC (UKSC) 222; see also Gordon’s Trs v Campbell Riddell Breeze Paterson LLP [2017] UKSC 75, 2017 SLT 1287, applying a similar interpretation of s 11(3).

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seeking reparation for the shop damage, on the basis that it was caused by the defender’s negligence, nuisance and breach of statutory duty. The claim was, however, held to have prescribed. The majority in the Supreme Court held that section 11(3), as then worded, meant that prescription ran from the point when the pursuer became aware of the occurrence of the loss; there was no requirement that the pursuer also had to know that the loss had been caused by an act, neglect or default. Thus the prescriptive period had commenced in 2004 when the pursuer first became aware of the damage, and it was not postponed until such time in 2009 when the pursuer was able to ascertain who and what had caused the explosion. Following changes made by the 2018 Act, the wording of section 11(3), (3A), and (3B) now provides for rules that are significantly more generous to pursuers. As already mentioned, it postpones the operation of prescription until such time as the pursuer was aware not only of the occurrence of loss, injury or damage, but also that it was caused by the conduct of a person or persons whom the pursuer can identify. Section 11(3B) makes clear, however, that it does not matter for the purposes of subsections (3) and (3A) whether the pursuer is aware that the act or omission that caused the loss, injury or damage is actionable. Where more than one person is potentially liable, but the pursuer gains knowledge about the identity of one of those persons earlier than that of the other or others, the starting point for the prescriptive period for claims against each will differ accordingly.

B. LIMITATION Unlike negative prescription, limitation does not extinguish the obliga- 30.06 tion to make reparation; instead it is “the procedural barring of an action after the lapse of a period during which the law insists that it must, if at all, be brought”.14 Even if the prescriptive period has not elapsed and the substantive obligation survives, a time limit is placed on the right to raise an action, so that after a certain period a claim cannot be heard. Limitation does not operate in regard to claims concerning damage to property or pure economic loss, although prescription generally extinguishes the obligation after five years, under the general rule noted above. It does, however, operate in regard to other types of action. Actions in respect of personal injuries, including personal injuries 30.07 resulting in death, are not subjection to prescription, but they are subject to limitation, in terms of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, unless proceedings have been brought within three years.15 A three-year limitation period also applies to actions of harassment within

14 D Johnston, Prescription and Limitation, 2nd edn (2012) para 1.03. 15 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 ss 17 and 18.

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the meaning of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997,16 and actions brought under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 in respect of personal injury or property damage caused by a defective product.17 However, actions in respect of defamation or malicious publication are subject to limitation unless proceedings have been brought within one year,18

(1) Personal injuries not resulting in death 30.08

30.09

30.10

In actions for personal injury where the injury has not resulted in death, section 17(2)(a) of the 1973 Act provides that, as a general rule, the threeyear limitation period runs from the date on which the injury was sustained. If the injury is caused by a continuing wrong, such as exposure to a noxious substance, the limitation period starts running either from the time when the defender’s offending act or omission ceases, or from the date when the pursuer suffers injury, whichever is the later.19 The calculation of the limitation period does not, however, include any period during which the injured person was suffering from legal incapacity, so that it disregards the time during which a child pursuer was under the age of sixteen, or during which the pursuer was of unsound mind.20 Moreover, section 17(2)(b) provides that the three-year limitation period cannot begin until such time as the pursuer became aware, or it was “reasonably practicable” for the pursuer to have become “aware”, of all of the following key facts: “(i) that the injuries in question were sufficiently serious to justify his bringing an action of damages on the assumption that the person against whom the action was brought did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a decree; (ii) that the injuries were attributable in whole or in part to an act or omission; and (iii) that the defender was a person to whose act or omission the injuries were attributable in whole or in part or the employer or principal of such a person.”

(a) That the injuries were sufficiently serious 30.11

The pursuer may not realise that the injuries suffered were sufficiently serious to justify bringing an action of damages where, for example, the pursuer was injured in an accident more than three years previously, but 16 17 18 19 20

s 18B, discussed at paras 28.18–28.19 above. s 22B, discussed at paras 26.91–26.92 above. s 18A, discussed at paras 18.149–18.150 above. s 17(2)(a). s 17(3). See e.g. D’s Curator Bonis v Lothian Health Board [2010] CSOH 61, 2010 SLT 725, in which the defenders attempted (unsuccessfully) to argue for mora, taciturnity and acquiescence, rather than limitation, after a delay of twenty-six years.

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the more serious long-term effects of the injury have become apparent only more recently.21 Such delayed awareness might also be a feature of industrial diseases where the effects of exposure to harmful working conditions might take some time to manifest themselves.22 However, the limitation period is not suspended until such time as the pursuer has acquired knowledge of the full extent of the injury or disease resulting from the defender’s wrongdoing; it begins at the point when the pursuer might reasonably have become aware that the injuries were serious enough to warrant bringing a claim.23

(b) That the injuries were attributable to an act or omission Commencement of the limitation period is similarly deferred until such 30.12 time as it is reasonably practicable for the pursuer to have become aware that his or her injury was attributable to an act or omission. This deferred start might apply, for example, where it was plausible for the pursuer to believe that the injury was attributable to natural causes. Allowance may be made for a time during which the pursuer had not yet become aware of “the essence of the act or omission to which the injury was attributable”24 and the possibility of its causal impact. Thus a period may be discounted during which the pursuer “thinks she knows the acts or omissions she should investigate but in fact is barking up the wrong tree: or if her knowledge of what the defendant did or did not do is so vague or general that she cannot fairly be expected to know what she should investigate”.25 On the other hand, the limitation period need not be suspended until the pursuer has acquired a full understanding of how the defender’s conduct came to cause the injury. In Young v Borders Health Board,26 for example, an action raised in 2011 was held to be time-barred. The pursuer had attended hospital in 2007 complaining of severe leg pain, but, after various mistaken diagnoses, there was a two-day delay in treating her appropriately for compartment syndrome with necrotising fasciitis. It was not, however, until 2008 that the pursuer began to investigate her condition further and the possibility that her significant long-term debility might be attributable

21 E.g. Blake v Lothian Health Board 1993 SLT 1248. 22 For discussion, see Johnston, Prescription and Limitation paras 10.42–10.46. 23 Forrest v Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd 2001 SLT (Sh Ct) 59, in which the pursuer suffered a back injury at work in 1988. The GP told him that the pain would pass with time, but an x-ray in 1991 indicated severe bruising at the base of his spine. A subsequent hospital investigation in 1995 revealed the need for major surgery. An action was raised in 1997. Although the specific diagnosis of the pursuer’s condition was not made until 1995, it was reasonably practicable for him, as of 1991, to realise that his injuries were serious. His action was therefore time-barred. See also Mackie v Currie 1991 SLT 407. 24 Nash v Eli Lilly & Co [1993] 1 WLR 782 per Purchas LJ at 799, on the equivalent English provision, Limitation Act 1980 s 14(1)(b). 25 Spargo v North Essex District Health Authority [1997] PIQR P235 per Brooke LJ at P242. 26 [2016] CSOH 13, 2016 GWD 8-162.

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to the hospital’s delay in proper diagnosis. It was held, nonetheless, that the start date for the limitation period was 2007, since the pursuer had been put on notice then of the key fact that the initial misdiagnoses were possibly negligent. Although it was accepted that she had experienced challenging health problems, she had not adequately explained why it was not reasonably practicable to take enquiries further at that stage.

(c) That the defender was a person to whose act or omission the injuries were attributable or the employer or principal of such a person 30.13

30.14

The commencement date may also be extended to take into account a period during which it was not reasonably practicable for the pursuer to identify who exactly was to be held responsible for his or her injuries. This provision has not often been invoked. It assists pursuers where a defender cannot immediately be identified, such as following a hit-and-run car accident, or following an accident on a building site where it may be difficult to determine who was responsible as between the various contractors and sub-contractors employed there. It is not aimed at situations where the pursuer has from the start known the person whom he or she holds liable but has initially misdesigned that person;27 nor does it serve to restart the limitation period in circumstances where a statutory successor has taken over from the original defender.28 In Elliot v J &C Finney,29 for example, the pursuer had been injured in a road accident in which an articulated lorry crashed into his car. He was treated in hospital for a period of ten days, but although he was visited by a police officer two days after the accident, he did not take steps to identify the driver responsible until nearly two months later. Due to a series of administrative mishaps, a summons was not served upon the defenders until three years and six days after the accident. The pursuer attempted to invoked section 17(2)(b)(iii), to the effect that he could not have been expected to initiate enquiries until he was released from hospital, ten days after the accident. This argument was, however, rejected, on the basis that whether or not the pursuer felt inclined to do so, it would have been 27 McHardy v Bawden International Ltd 1993 SCLR 893 (pursuer was injured in an accident at work during employment with Bawden International Ltd but initially raised an action against Bawden International Drilling (UK) Ltd). 28 In Stephen v North of Scotland Water Authority 1999 SLT 342, the pursuer was injured while working for Grampian Regional Council, which ceased to exist two years and ten months after the accident. The action was originally raised against Aberdeenshire Council but thereafter the North of Scotland Water Authority was substituted as defender by amendment, and the action was served eight days outwith the triennium. This was held not to be an appropriate case for the application of s 17(2)(b)(iii) because the pursuer had known from the start that the person responsible for his injuries was his then employer, Grampian Regional Council. In a subsequent hearing, however, it was accepted, in terms of s 17(2)(b)(i), that it was some time before the pursuer became aware that his injuries were sufficiently serious to justify his bringing an action of damages: 2000 GWD 1-28. 29 1989 SLT 208, affd 1989 SLT 605.

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reasonably practicable to ascertain the identity of the other driver when he was visited by the police officer two days after the accident. The limitation period therefore commenced at that point.30 Specific reference is made in this provision to employers, allowing for 30.15 the situation where the pursuer seeks to hold an employer vicariously liable for the conduct of an employee. Where the identity of the employee is known from the start, the limitation period for a claim brought against that person begins in the normal way as of the date of the injury. However, in an action brought against the employer, that period may be suspended until such time as it has become reasonably practicable for the pursuer to identify the employer as vicariously responsible for the alleged wrongdoer.31

(d) No allowance for “dithering time” The limitation period runs from the point at which the pursuer’s level 30.16 of awareness of all three of the above key facts has become “sufficiently firm to make it reasonable for him or her to investigate whether there is a case against the defender”.32 The commencement date is not to be deferred during a period when the pursuer was in fact unaware of these key facts but it would have been “reasonably practicable” to have become so aware.33 Moreover, once the pursuer has been put “on notice”34 of the key facts necessary to formulate a claim, no allowance is made for vacillation, even if the full details are yet to be established. In Agnew v Scott Lithgow Ltd (No 2),35 for example, the pursuer was found to be suffering from vibration white finger, a disability caused by working with heavy power tools. The pursuer had worked with such equipment in the defender’s shipyard, and his exposure ceased in September 1995. He already had experienced symptoms in the 1980s, but claimed that he had no awareness of the condition at that point. Although he learned in conversations with former colleagues around November 1995 that they had received a diagnosis of vibration white finger, he did not initially seek out a medical opinion for himself. He received intimation from a doctor of the condition only in February 1998, and a definitive diagnosis from a consultant vascular surgeon in March 1999. A summons was served upon the defender 30 Although the court exercised its discretion under s 19A of the 1973 Act to allow the action to proceed notwithstanding the expiry of the limitation period. 31 D Johnston, Prescription and Limitation, 2nd edn (2012) paras 10.66–10.67. 32 Johnston, Prescription and Limitation para 10.25. See also Spargo v North Essex District Health Authority [1997] PIQR P235, although the equivalent English provision, Limitation Act 1980 s 11(4), refers to “knowledge” rather than “awareness”, suggesting perhaps that a lesser level of certainty may be required in England to hold off the operation of limitation: see Johnston, Prescription and Limitation para 10.22. 33 See e.g. Elliot v J & C Finney 1989 SLT 208, affd 1989 SLT 605. 34 Young v Borders Health Board [2016] CSOH 13, 2016 GWD 8-162 per Temporary Judge P A Arthurson QC at para 24. 35 2003 SC 448.

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in June 1999, but the Lord Ordinary held that the action was time-barred under section 17 of the 1973 Act.36 Although the final diagnosis was not obtained until some time later, the pursuer should have begun enquiry at the end of 1995, after hearing talk of the incidence of the condition in former colleagues; that was the point at which he had become sufficiently aware of the material facts. In upholding the Lord Ordinary’s decision, the Extra Division made no allowance for “dithering time”:37 “It is incumbent on a pursuer to take all reasonably practicable steps to inform himself of all the material facts as soon as he is put on notice of the existence of any of these. And the onus is on the pursuer to establish that he has done so. The question is not whether he had a reasonable excuse for not taking steps to obtain the material information but whether it would have been reasonably practicable for him to do so . . . The fact that the pursuer did not like approaching officialdom or that he was a man who frequently had to be prompted by his relatives and friends to take action is not conclusive because an objective test must also be applied.”

(2) Child-abuse actions 30.17

The Limitation (Childhood Abuse) (Scotland) Act 2017 amended the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 to the extent of removing the three-year limitation period in actions relating to abuse where the pursuer was a child at the time of the alleged abuse. This was achieved by inserting new sections 17A–17D into the 1973 Act, creating a discrete set of rules to restrict the operation of limitation in such cases. The provisions apply to abuse occurring before as well as after the legislation took effect.38 Section 17A removes the three-year limitation period, normally applicable to personal injuries, in actions where the following four conditions are met:39 (a) The damages claimed are in respect of personal injuries. (b) The pursuer was a child at the time of the conduct to which the injuries are attributed, or, if the conduct was of a continuing nature, at the time when the conduct began. “Child” is defined as meaning a person under eighteen.40

36 2002 GWD 13-437. 37 2003 SC 448 per Lady Cosgrove at para 23. Cf Lambie v Toffolo Jackson Ltd 2003 SLT 1415, in which the pursuer’s GP had informed him in March 1996 that he had pleural plaques, but this was based on a misreading of the radiological evidence. He was informed by another doctor in May 1996 that he had pleural plaques, and this time there was a proper foundation for the diagnosis. An action raised in May 1999 was not time-barred because the pursuer could not be regarded as “aware” of the salient facts in March 1996 when there was no proper evidential basis for believing them to be true. 38 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 s 17B. 39 s 17A(1). 40 s 17A(2).

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(c) The conduct to which the injuries are attributed constituted abuse. “Abuse” is defined as including “sexual abuse, physical abuse, emotional abuse and abuse which takes the form of neglect”.41 (d) The pursuer (and not a third party) is the person who sustained the injuries. Section 17C of the 1973 Act further provides that actions relating to child 30.18 abuse may be raised again where this had already been the subject of litigation prior to the commencement of section 17A42 and disposed of due to the operation of the rules on limitation as contained in section 17 of the 1973 Act. Equally, it allows such actions to be raised again where they were disposed of by means of a settlement agreed by the parties “under the reasonable belief that, had the action proceeded, the court would have been likely to dispose of the initial action by reason of section 17”, and any sum of money paid by the defender to the pursuer under the settlement “did not exceed the pursuer’s expenses in connection with bringing and settling the initial action”.43 The action may not therefore be raised again if the pursuer agreed a settlement offering more than payment of expenses. By virtue of section 17D, an action cannot proceed under section 17A(1) 30.19 where the defender satisfies the court either that a fair hearing would be impossible,44 or that the defender would be subject to substantial prejudice.45

(3) Personal injuries resulting in death Where damages are claimed in respect of the death of a person from per- 30.20 sonal injuries, section 18(2) of the 1973 Act provides for the three-year limitation period to begin at the date of death or, if later, at the date when the person raising the action became aware, or it was reasonably practicable for that person to become aware, of the facts set out in section 18(2)(b). The section 18(2)(b) facts mirror those set out in section 17(2)(b)(ii) and (iii) relating to non-fatal personal injuries, as discussed above.46 Hence the limitation period does not commence until such time as the pursuer was aware, or it was reasonably practicable for the pursuer to become aware of both: (i) the fact that the deceased’s injuries were due to an act or omission;47

41 s 17A(2). 42 4 October 2017: see Limitation (Childhood Abuse) (Scotland) Act 2017 (Commencement) Regulations 2017, SSI 2017/279. A further action will not therefore be permitted if the initial action was brought after s 17A came into effect and has been disposed of. 43 s 17C(4)(b). 44 s 17D(2). 45 s 17D(3). See also M v DG’s Exr [2021] SAC (Civ) 3, 2021 SLT (Sh Ct) 87, holding that a preliminary proof may be required in order to determine whether a fair hearing is possible in the circumstances of the case. 46 See paras 30.12–30.15 above. 47 s 18(2)(b)(i).

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30.21

and (ii) the identity of the person responsible or of his or her employer or principal.48 Moreover, the calculation of the limitation period disregards any period when the relative bringing the claim was under the age of sixteen or was of unsound mind.49 Thus in Warner v Scapa Flow Charters,50 for example, an action was brought by the deceased’s widow suing both as an individual and as guardian on behalf of their young son who was under a year old at the time of the death. Although the pursuer’s claim as an individual was held to be time-barred, the claim brought on behalf of her son was not, since section 18(3) applied in calculating the limitation period so as discount the period of his nonage. Section 18(4) prevents an action from being brought where a person dies from the injuries without having brought an action for personal injury within the three-year limitation period set by section 17(2). The deceased’s executor is thus time-barred in the same way as the deceased would have been. The limitation period for these purposes is calculated according to section 17(2), which means that the three-year period did not start until such time as the deceased was aware, or it was reasonably practicable for the deceased to have become aware, of the key facts discussed above,51 and the limitation period does not include any period during which the deceased was of unsound mind or was under the age of sixteen.52 However, if the deceased dies within the limitation period due to the injuries for which the defender was responsible, then the period of limitation under section 18 commences only at the date of death, as already mentioned.53

(4) Equitable power to override time limits 30.22

Where an action would otherwise be time-barred in terms of section 17, 18, 18A or 18B of the 1973 Act, section 19A confers upon the court a power to override the time limits where it seems “equitable” to do so. The onus rests upon the pursuer to satisfy the court as to the equities of permitting the action to be brought.54 The statutory wording, however, gives no guidance as to how this is to be determined or which factors are relevant to the exercise of the court’s discretion.55 Although some earlier authorities signalled that 48 49 50 51 52 53

s 18(2)(b)(ii). s 18(3). [2018] UKSC 52, 2019 SC (UKSC) 1. At para 30.10. s 17(3). s 18(4) applies only where the deceased has not brought an action within the limitation period and dies “subsequently”. 54 AS v Poor Sisters of Nazareth [2008] UKHL 32, 2008 SC (HL) 146 per Lord Hope at para 25; see also Clark v McLean 1994 SC 410 per Lord MacLean at 413. 55 For a detailed account of the factors that have been considered relevant in practice, see D Johnston, Prescription and Limitation, 2nd edn (2012) paras 13.09–13.28; E Russell, “Prescription and Limitation”, in Delict (SULI) paras 9.114–9.122.

Prescription and Limitation   1089

the discretion should be exercised only “sparingly”,56 the accepted approach today is that there should be a “fair balancing of the interests and conduct of the parties and their advisers”.57 Full consideration is to be given to the pursuer’s explanation for the 30.23 delay and the circumstances prior to the expiry of the limitation period; a cogent account must be offered of specific logistic barriers that prevented earlier action.58 Ferguson v J &A Lawson,59 for example, concerned a claim arising from mesothelioma, from which the pursuer’s husband had already died. The disease was attributed to asbestos to which the deceased had been exposed in employment several decades previously. Those employers had long since ceased trading, and the pursuer’s agents encountered numerous obstacles in tracing the relevant insurer within the three-year period after the illness was diagnosed, as well as on fixing on the exact name of the employer alleged to be liable. The court was therefore persuaded in the light of these difficulties that it would be equitable to extend the time limit.60 The part played by the defender in hindering the pursuer’s compliance with the time limit must also be considered, in particular in circumstances where the defender may have misled the pursuer on a key fact.61 On the other hand, the court must take account of the possible prejudice to which the defender would be subjected, given the passage of time, in terms of his or her capacity to investigate the pursuer’s allegations and the possible loss of evidence relevant to the defence.62 56 Carson v Howard Doris Ltd 1981 SC 278 per Lord Ross at 282. 57 Donald v Rutherford 1984 SC 70 per Lord Cameron at 75; see also Johnston, Prescription and Limitation paras 13.06–13.07. 58 Gracie v City of Edinburgh Council [2018] CSOH 37, 2018 GWD 13-187 per Lord Tyre at para 9; Young v Borders Health Board [2016] CSOH 13, 2016 GWD 8-162. 59 [2014] CSIH 82, 2015 SC 243. 60 See, however, Quinn v Wright’s Insulations Limited [2020] CSOH 21, 2020 SCLR 731 per Lady Carmichael at para 59, holding that the circumstance that the claim arose out of mesothelioma as opposed to any other later developing condition did not of itself add weight to the pursuers’ case. 61 See e.g. Nicolson v Clyde Marine Training Ltd 2017 GWD 19-312, in which the party held responsible for the pursuer’s injuries had been called Zodiac Maritime Agencies Ltd at the time of the accident but had changed its name the next year to Zodiac Maritime Ltd, whereupon a different company took the name of Zodiac Maritime Agencies Ltd. Although the pursuers’ agents had been in contact with the defenders’ agents, these circumstances had not been properly disclosed. Shortly before the end of the limitation period a writ was served, citing the defenders under their old name, which was by then the name of a different company. The sheriff (G W M Liddle) exercised his discretion under s 19A to allow an action to proceed against the correct company, commenting, at para 24: “I am of the opinion that it would have been inappropriate to reach a conclusion that allowed the second defender to succeed in frustrating the pursuer’s claim through the name change activity. In my opinion it would be an unwelcome development of the law for the court generally to acquiesce in a pursuer’s personal injury claim being frustrated by the adoption of a tactic that mirrors what the second defender did in this case.” 62 For discussion, see M v O’Neill [2006] CSOH 93, 2006 SLT 823, but see e.g. Ferguson v J & A Lawson [2014] CSIH 82, 2015 SC 243, discussed above, in which the insurers were in no worse position in defending the action than they would have been had it proceeded within the triennium.

1090   The Law of Delict in Scotland

30.24

As a general rule the pursuer’s case is not assisted by the fact that delay was attributable to oversight or error on the part of the pursuer’s solicitor, rather than fault on the pursuer’s part.63 Indeed the availability of an alternative right of action against the solicitor is a relevant consideration pointing against exercise of the court’s discretion under section 19A.64 However, the court may nonetheless permit the action to proceed where the extension of the time limit would not cause significant prejudice to the defender and where the pursuer would otherwise encounter serious problems or unacceptable delay in raising a new action against the solicitor.65 In A v Glasgow City Council,66 for example, an action was permitted to proceed where the need to pursue an alternative remedy would have been likely to lead to material delay in resolution of the claim, and consequent risk to the pursuers’ mental health. Similarly in Elliot v J & C Finney,67 an action against the pursuer’s solicitors would not have been straightforward because of the possibility that the messengers-at-arms, who delayed in serving the summons, would be introduced as third parties, in which event it could have taken up to two years longer for the pursuer to obtain his compensation. In this connection it may also be relevant to consider whether the pursuer would encounter difficulties in accessing funding to meet the costs of pursuing the alternative remedy, as well as the expenses of the defender arising out of the dismissal of the action. This may be particularly challenging where the pursuer is uninsured, or without access to Legal Aid, or unsupported by a trade union or similar body.68

63 Morrice v Martin Retail Group Ltd 2003 SCLR 289; Kelly v Stoddart Sekers International plc 2005 Rep LR 12; Bates v George [2012] CSOH 102, 2012 GWD 23-464. 64 Clark v McLean 1994 SC 410; Wilson v Telling (Northern) Ltd 1996 SLT 380; Bates v George [2012] CSOH 102, 2012 GWD 23-464; Spencer v Cruddas [2018] CSOH 95, 2018 Rep LR 124. 65 Hill v McAlpine 2004 SLT 736; Peat’s Exrs v Assembly Theatre Ltd [2014] CSOH 144, 2014 SLT 1017. 66 [2019] CSIH 6, 2019 SC 295. 67 1989 SLT 208, affd 1989 SLT 605. 68 Campbell v Hewcon Ltd [2005] CSOH 173; Peat’s Exrs v Assembly Theatre Ltd [2014] CSOH 144, 2014 SLT 1017 per Lord Doherty at para 28: “The risks of failure are such that the pursuers (who do not have the benefit, or protection, of being legally assisted persons) would have to think long and hard about the merits of litigating.”

Chapter 31

Remedies

Para A. INTRODUCTION����������������������������������������������������������������� 31.01 B. THE FUNCTION OF DAMAGES (1) Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������� 31.02 (2) Damages as vindication����������������������������������������������������� 31.04 (3) Punitive or exemplary damages������������������������������������������ 31.07 (4) Nominal damages������������������������������������������������������������� 31.08 (5) Conventional awards��������������������������������������������������������� 31.09 C. DAMAGE TO PROPERTY���������������������������������������������������� 31.10 (1) Items damaged beyond repair�������������������������������������������� 31.11 (2) Items capable of being repaired������������������������������������������ 31.12 D. NEGLIGENT PROVISION OF INFORMATION������������������ 31.13 E. PERSONAL INJURY: IN GENERAL (1) Patrimonial loss and pain and distress�������������������������������� 31.15 (2) The meaning of “personal injury”�������������������������������������� 31.16 F. CLAIMS BY AN INJURED PERSON (1) Solatium��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 31.20 (2) Patrimonial loss���������������������������������������������������������������� 31.25 (a) Past patrimonial loss��������������������������������������������������� 31.26 (b) Future patrimonial loss����������������������������������������������� 31.29 (3) Calculation of future losses������������������������������������������������ 31.31 (a) The multiplicand�������������������������������������������������������� 31.32 (b) The multiplier������������������������������������������������������������� 31.33 (4) Deduction for the “lost period” between the predicted notional and actual dates of death�������������������������������������� 31.36 (5) The discount rate�������������������������������������������������������������� 31.37 (6) Past and future expenses��������������������������������������������������� 31.38 (7) Deduction of social security and other benefits������������������� 31.42 G. CLAIMS FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF AN INJURED PERSON�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 31.45 (1) Claims by the executor������������������������������������������������������ 31.46 (2) Claims by relatives������������������������������������������������������������ 31.49 (a) Loss of support����������������������������������������������������������� 31.50 (b) Loss of services����������������������������������������������������������� 31.52 (c) Non-patrimonial loss��������������������������������������������������� 31.53

1091

1092   The Law of Delict in Scotland

H. PERSONAL INJURY: INTERIM AND PROVISIONAL DAMAGES (1) Interim damages��������������������������������������������������������������� 31.57 (2) Provisional damages���������������������������������������������������������� 31.58 (3) Periodical payments���������������������������������������������������������� 31.63 I. INTEREST����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 31.64 J. MITIGATION OF LOSS������������������������������������������������������� 31.66 K. THE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND THE APPELLATE COURT���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 31.70 L. INTERDICT�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 31.72

A. INTRODUCTION 31.01

This chapter attempts only a brief overview of the remedies available in actions for delict, and readers are referred to more specialist texts for detailed guidance on such remedies and on their procedural aspects.1 Much of the chapter is given over to damages, and interdict is also discussed. More tailored treatment of remedies in respect of particular wrongs can be found in earlier chapters. Chapter 18, for example, deals with the statutory remedies provided for defamation and malicious publication,2 chapter 22 examines the particular problems encountered in seeking interdict against nuisance,3 and chapter 23 discusses the peculiarities of interdict, damages and self-help remedies as applied to trespass.4

B. THE FUNCTION OF DAMAGES (1) Introduction 31.02

In Stair’s account, “Damage is called damnum, à demendo, because it diminisheth or taketh away something from another, which of right he had”.5 The function of an award of damages is to repair that unjustified diminishing or taking away.6 The term “reparation” is commonly used7 to describe this process, and it has been said, in distinguishing the law of   1 E.g. D M Walker, The Law of Civil Remedies in Scotland (1974); A Paton, McEwan and Paton on Damages for Personal Injuries in Scotland, 2nd edn (looseleaf); R M White and M L Fletcher, Delictual Damages (1999); T Welsh (ed), Macphail’s Sheriff Court Practice, 3rd edn (2006); R E Conway, Personal Injury Practice in the Sheriff Court, 4th edn (2019); H Burn-Murdoch, Interdict in the Law of Scotland (1933); S Scott Robinson, The Law of Interdict, 2nd edn (1994).   2 See paras 18.128–18.129 above.   3 See paras 22.15–22.19 above.   4 See paras 23.01–23.10 above.  5 Stair, Inst 1.9.4.   6 For a modern Common Law perspective, see e.g. P Cane and J Goudkamp, Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 9th edn (2018) para 17.1.2, to the effect that compensation “makes good an undesirable aspect of [the pursuer’s] circumstances or situation in life that falls below some predetermined benchmark of acceptability”.   7 See e.g. Walker, Delict 460.

Remedies  1093

delict from the criminal law, that “money is the universal solvent; everything can be turned into money that is either a gain or a loss; money is asked and damages are due for reparation of every possible suffering and injury”.8 But plainly the objects of reparation in this sense may be various. The notion of compensation is straightforward where the defender’s 31.03 wrongdoing has had a particular economic consequence, and damages can be assessed in such a way as to restore or replace what has been lost. In this regard, “money . . . is the common token of exchange and hath in it the value of everything estimable”.9 On the other hand, delictual wrongdoing may have consequences that are “inestimable” in the sense that, while “reparable”, they are not amenable to a precise financial valuation”.10 An award of solatium may be thus used to provide redress – or solace – for physical pain and suffering and for other emotional and psychological effects of wrongdoing, to which no direct financial value can be ascribed.11

(2) Damages as vindication As Stair further notes, compensation may have a related object that goes 31.04 beyond simply restoring the pursuer’s previous position, namely to “vindicate” the interest that has been infringed.12 The specific context suggested by Stair as relevant to vindication is that of injury to reputation, and indeed the role of damages in providing vindication is most prominent in regard to the intentional delicts against the person. There the infringement of the pursuer’s interest in life, limb, liberty or reputation is recognised as a form of damage for which the pursuer may be compensated over and above any specific financial, physical, psychological or emotional impact suffered. The civil claim of damages in relation to assault, for example, is “not merely for damage sustained” but in solatium for “affront”.13 More recently, vindication  8 Auld v Shairp (1874) 2 R 191 per Lord Neaves at 199 (defamation), cited by the Inner House in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board 1998 SC 389 per Lord McCluskey at 400 (wrongful pregnancy).  9 Stair, Inst 1.9.4. 10 Stair, Inst 1.9.4. 11 See Walker, Delict 465; see also Watson, Laidlaw, & Co Ltd v Pott, Cassels, & Williamson 1914 SC (HL) 18 per Lord Shaw at 29–30: “In the cases of financial loss, injury to trade, and the like, caused either by breach of contract or by tort, the loss is capable of correct appreciation in stated figures. In a second class of cases, restoration being in point of fact difficult – as in the case of loss of reputation – or impossible – as in the case of loss of life, faculty, or limb – the task of restoration under the name of compensation calls into play inference, conjecture, and the like. And this is necessarily accompanied by those deficiencies which attach to the conversion into money of certain elements which are very real, which go to make up the happiness and usefulness of life, but which were never so converted or measured. The restoration by way of compensation is therefore accomplished to a large extent by the exercise of a sound imagination and the practice of the broad axe.” 12 Stair, Inst 1.9.4 (“vindication of the injured”). 13 Bell, Principles § 2032. See e.g. Mackenzie v Cluny Hill Hydropathic Co Ltd 1908 SC 200; see also Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 AC 962. For discussion of vindication in relation to the English torts actionable per se, see J Varuhas, “The Concept of ‘Vindication’ in the Law of Torts: Rights, Interests and Damages” (2014) 34 OJLS 253.

1094   The Law of Delict in Scotland

has been cited as a consideration in assessing damages for misuse of private information.14 As Guthrie Smith asserted:15 “The man who has without leave walked across another’s field is liable in damages, although the field is not a farthing the worse; and the like holds in an assault on the person, an attack on the reputation, and the wrongful detention of movables – these are all acts injurious in themselves, and no further proof is necessary.”

31.05

31.06

In addition, as noted elsewhere in this volume, discussion of the vindicatory function of damages has lately shifted into the law of negligence. As discussed in chapter 13,16 a prominent example relates to the interest of patients to be informed appropriately prior to medical procedures. In Chester v Afshar,17 although the deficiency in the information provided by the defendant surgeon could not be said to have caused the claimant’s injury on “conventional” principles, an award of damages was made so as to “vindicate” the claimant’s “right of autonomy and dignity”.18 A further context where vindication has come to play a role in the award of damages is in relation to violation by public officials of rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. It has been observed that damages awarded for an infringement of section 57(2) of the Scotland Act 1998 for breach of a Convention right by a member of the Scottish Government “appear to be essentially vindicatory in character . . . albeit restitution may be an important element in quantifying the award”.19 But while the expression “vindicatory damages” is encountered in this context, as well as in proceedings for judicial review of administrative action,20 it is not a term of art denoting a separate category of damages within the law of delict.21

(3) Punitive or exemplary damages 31.07

While one of the broader goals of the law of delict may be expressed as the discouragement of wrongdoing,22 the immediate object of the award of damages, Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20. J Guthrie Smith, The Law of Damages, 2nd edn (1889) 40. See para 13.84 above. [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134. [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134 per Lord Steyn at para 24. Docherty v Scottish Ministers [2011] CSIH 58, 2012 SC 150 at para 54. P v Advocate General for Scotland [2009] CSOH 121, 2009 GWD 29-461; KM (FE) Iran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] CSOH 8, 2010 GWD 6-107. 21 In English law similarly, while it is acknowledged that damages may have a vindicatory purpose, a separate category of vindicatory damages as distinct from other categories (including nominal or exemplary damages) does not appear to be recognised: see R (on the application of Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12, [2012] 1 AC 245 per Lord Dyson at paras 100–101 and Lord Collins at paras 236–237; commentary in J Varuhas, Damages and Human Rights (2016) 125-129. See also Lewis v Australian Capital Territory [2020] HCA 26, (2020) 381 ALR 375. 22 See discussion e.g. in Hobbin v Vertical Descents Ltd [2011] CSOH 207, 2012 GWD 3-53 per Lord Woolman at paras 27–28. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Remedies  1095

as stated above, is to provide appropriate reparation to the pursuer for the injury suffered, not to penalise the defender.23 Although nineteenth-century authority24 had suggested that the assessment of damages might competently take into account the level of culpa in the defender’s conduct, such authority was not followed in the twentieth century. In Black v North British Railway Co25 a court of seven judges categorically rejected the proposition that damages should be imposed partly as a penalty and that in consequence a greater degree of fault attracted a heavier penalty. It is therefore clear that the award of punitive or exemplary damages, as sometimes applied in English law,26 does not form part of modern Scots law.27

(4) Nominal damages Although the expression “nominal” damages is sometimes found in the 31.08 Scottish law reports, this should not be taken as indicating a formal category in terms of which damages are assessed at an amount less than the loss actually suffered.28 Nor does it denote a form of entitlement where no detriment of any significance has been experienced.29 The term is better understood as applicable simply where the insubstantial nature or scale of the detriment suffered is to be reflected in the level of damages awarded.30

(5) Conventional awards The term “conventional” award has in recent years come to be accepted in 31.09 relation to cases involving wrongful pregnancy. In English law this usage came into its own in Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust,31 in which the claimant had given birth to a child after a sterilisation procedure was negligently performed by the defenders. The “conventional” award of the sum of £15,000 in damages was regarded as acknowledging the denial of the claimant’s “personal autonomy” and vindicating “an important aspect of human dignity”.32 However, the basis for making such an award 23 McMillan v McDowall 1993 SLT 312. See also observations by Lord Hope in Watkins v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 17, [2006] 2 AC 395 at para 31. 24 Morton v Glasgow and Edinburgh Railway Co (1845) 8 D 288; see also Mackenzie, Inst 4.1.13: “Some [actions] are called Penal Actions, because we pursue not only for Repetition and real damage, but for extraordinary damages and Repetition by way of Penalty: such are Spulzies, Actions for Violent Profits etc.” 25 1908 SC 444. 26 Notably e.g. in Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire [2001] UKHL 29, [2002] 2 AC 122. 27 Winter v News Scotland Ltd 1991 SLT 828; see also J Blackie and J Chalmers, “Mixing and Matching in Scottish Delict and Crime”, in M Dyson (ed), Comparing Tort and Crime (2015) 271 at 277–278. 28 White and Fletcher, Delictual Damages 59. 29 Keith v Davidson Chalmers 2004 SC 287. 30 Walker, Civil Remedies 813, and see e.g. Morrison v Forsyth 1995 SLT 539. 31 [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309; see paras 16.85–16.86 above. 32 [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309 per Lord Bingham at para 123. This view of the award in Rees as serving a “vindicatory purpose” was endorsed in R (on the application of Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12, [2012] 1 AC 245 per Lord Collins at para 236.

1096   The Law of Delict in Scotland

was traced back to the dissenting speech of Lord Millett in a Scottish case decided by the House of Lords, McFarlane v Tayside Health Board,33 in which he had recommended that a “conventional” sum be awarded to the McFarlanes in recognition of the wrong done to them by way of loss of “personal autonomy”.34 The basis in principle for such awards has yet to be reconsidered in a comparable Scottish case, and the ratio of Rees may not apply beyond identical fact situations, but this may translate into an entitlement to solatium.35

C. DAMAGE TO PROPERTY 31.10

Where property has been damaged or destroyed due to the wrongdoing of the defender, the fundamental principle is that there should be restitutio in integrum, so that the pursuer is put “as nearly as possible into the position in which but for the accident he would have been”.36

(1) Items damaged beyond repair 31.11

In cases where an item has been destroyed, or damaged to the extent that repairs are uneconomic, and a like-for-like replacement is available, the aim of restoring the pursuer to his or her previous position is achieved by awarding the pursuer the market value of the item immediately before the damage, under deduction of any residual scrap value, along with the cost of hire of an alternative pending replacement.37 Account may also be taken of loss of profits. However, this method of assessment can operate only where there is “an available market in which a reasonably similar type of article as regards age, quality and utility can be purchased”, such as where the damaged item is a standard type of motor vehicle.38 In some circumstances, market value provides an unsatisfactory basis for compensation. This may be because the item in question had no direct comparator, so that a market value cannot readily be set. In Clyde Navigation Trs v Bowring Steamship Co,39 for example, the pursuers’ hopper digger barge was sunk in a collision for which the defender admitted liability. It appeared that there was no ready market for a

33 2000 SC (HL) 1; see paras 16.77–16.79 above. 34 2000 SC (HL) 1 at 44–45. 35 Lord Stewart observed in Holdich v Lothian Health Board [2013] CSOH 197, 2014 SLT 495 at para 101 that: Rees had not hitherto been discussed by any Scottish court; it was the decision of a bare majority; the reasoning of the judges in the majority was not identical; and the powerful dissent of the minority, including the only Scottish judge, Lord Hope, meant that it would be unsafe to apply the ratio of Rees beyond identical fact situations. 36 Pomphrey v James A Cuthbertson Ltd 1951 SC 147 per Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson at 152. 37 Pomphrey v James A Cuthbertson Ltd 1951 SC 147. 38 Fraser v J Morton Wilson Ltd 1965 SLT (Notes) 81 per Lord Hunter at 81; Hutchison v Davidson 1945 SC 395. 39 1929 SC 715.

Remedies  1097

specialist vessel of this type, so that a market value could not be fixed. Instead it was accepted that the pursuers should be awarded the replacement cost of a reasonable second-hand hopper barge, plus the cost of adapting it for their special purpose. Likewise, fixing damages on the basis of the market value may be inappropriate where the asset had distinctive characteristics or value to the pursuer which meant that it could not be directly replaced. Buildings, for example, often have a particular value to the pursuer in terms of their characteristics and location, so that their loss cannot fairly be compensated by reference to market value, and the cost of reinstatement may therefore be allowed as the proper basis for compensation.40

(2) Items capable of being repaired In cases where it is feasible and economic to repair an item, the measure 31.12 of damages is the amount by which its value has decreased as a result of the defender’s actions, which is normally ascertained by reference to the cost of repair.41 In addition, the pursuer is entitled to be compensated in respect of the inconvenience suffered while repairs are being carried out,42 including loss directly caused by being deprived of the item’s use.43 The estimated cost of repairs remains the applicable figure even if the pursuer chooses not to effect those repairs.44 If, however, notwithstanding the carrying out of reasonable repairs, the item has not been restored to its pre-accident value, the pursuer may be entitled to recover the residual diminution in its value over and above the repair cost.45 Similarly, if the property is disposed of unrepaired for a fair price, the measure of damage can be taken as the difference between that price and the price which it would have been likely to obtain in an undamaged condition.46

D. NEGLIGENT PROVISION OF INFORMATION Where the defender’s breach of duty has taken the form of negligent provi- 31.13 sion of information, the basic principle remains that the defender is liable to the pursuer for the losses suffered as a consequence of that negligence. 40 Hutchison v Davidson 1945 SC 395; Fraser v J Morton Wilson Ltd 1965 SLT (Notes) 81; see also Keystone Properties Ltd v Sun Alliance and London Insurance plc 1993 SC 494. By contrast, where the building was owned by a landlord purely as an investment, the market value may be appropriate: Hutchison v Davidson 1945 SC 395 per Lord Moncrieff at 411. 41 Pomphrey v James A Cuthbertson Ltd 1951 SC 147 per Lord Jamieson at 161; see also Coles v Hetherton [2013] EWCA Civ 1704, [2015] 1 WLR 160. The cost of repair is recoverable even if the pursuer has carried out the work himself or herself: Brown v Russell 1981 SLT (Sh Ct) 22. 42 McLaughlin v Malcolm 1965 SLT (Sh Ct) 70; George Porteous Arts Ltd v Regal Motors 1970 SLT (Notes) 75; see also The Mediana [1900] AC 113. 43 Scottish Eastern Omnibuses v Leslie 1996 SLT (Sh Ct) 53. 44 Porter v George Robb & Sons Ltd 1961 SLT (Sh Ct) 14; see also The Kingsway [1918] P 344. 45 Hunter v National Specialist Steeplejacks 2004 Rep LR 26. 46 GUS Property Management Ltd v Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd 1982 SC (HL) 157.

1098   The Law of Delict in Scotland

31.14

If, for example, a surveyor is found liable in negligence in respect of a prepurchase survey which omits to identify a defect in heritable property,47 the normal basis for the award of damages to the purchaser is the difference between the market value of the property in the condition it was reported to be in, and its actual market value.48 The expenditure properly incurred on repairs may also be a guide to the calculation.49 In addition, a purchaser who is a private individual may be entitled to recover solatium to compensate for the incidental worry and inconvenience caused by the surveyor’s negligence.50 However, the pursuer is entitled to recover only those losses which come within the scope of the defender’s duty and were caused by breach of that duty. Where the defender has been negligent by providing defective information, such as an accurate or incomplete survey report, compensation is due only for that part of the pursuer’s loss which is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the information defects. The defender will not be liable for any part of the pursuer’s loss which is attributable to other factors, such as an unforeseeable drop in the market value of the property post-dating the defender’s alleged negligence. This reflects the so-called “SAAMCO principle”, which is discussed in chapter 14.51

E. PERSONAL INJURY: IN GENERAL (1) Patrimonial loss and pain and distress 31.15

In personal injury cases, Bell said, “reparation includes not merely the pecuniary loss, but also a solatium for injury.”52 The basic principle, as explained by Hume to his students and which still obtains, is that an individual injured due to the wrongdoing of another “has a claim to be indemnified of this patrimonial damage, and the expense of his cure, and even a claim for a sum of money in solatium of his pain and distress, though not capable of a precise estimation”.53 Although a single claim only is made for reparation,54 it can be seen as having different component elements, namely: solatium for the pain and suffering resulting from the injury,55 and patrimonial loss, including loss

47 See paras 11.24–11.27 above. 48 Stewart v H A Brechin & Co 1959 SC 306; Upstone v G D W Carnegie and Co 1978 SLT (Sh Ct) 4; Martin v Bell-Ingram 1986 SC 208; Large v Hart [2021] EWCA Civ 24, [2021] PNLR 13 per Coulson LJ at para 50. 49 Stewart v H A Brechin & Co 1959 SC 306 per Lord Cameron at 309; see also Assirati v W M A Graham & Sibbald, unreported, CSOH, Lord Mayfield, 27 May 1983. 50 Martin v Bell-Ingram 1986 SC 208. 51 See South Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd [1997] AC 191, discussed at paras 14.46–14.53 above. 52 Bell, Principles § 552. 53 Hume, Lectures III, 120 54 See Irving v Hiddleston 1998 SC 759. 55 On the entitlement to damages for consequential psychiatric injury, see para 6.01 above.

Remedies  1099

of earnings, future loss of earning capacity, and expenses such as services or care costs.

(2) The meaning of “personal injury” “Personal injury” is a broad term, defined in the Court of Session Rules56 as including “any disease or impairment, whether physical or mental”. Further guidance, for the purposes of English law at least, was provided by the Supreme Court in Dryden v Johnson Matthey plc, holding that personal injury is constituted by a “more than negligible” “physical change which makes the claimant appreciably worse off in respect of his health or capability”; the term thus includes impairment of “a person’s physical capacity of enjoying life”.57 In recent years particular problems have been encountered in applying that definition to medical conditions that are asymptomatic. In Dryden v Johnson Matthey plc,58 the claimants had developed a platinum salt sensitisation following negligent exposure to platinum salts in the defendants’ factories. This condition was asymptomatic, but would be exacerbated by further exposure to the substance, and had the potential to lead to an allergic reaction with significant physical symptoms. In order to avoid the risk of further complications, the claimants were obliged to give up their existing work and either take on different, lower-paid, roles or leave the defendants’ employment altogether. This was held to be a “more than negligible” physical change which had made the claimants appreciably worse off in respect of their “health or capability”, and the defendants were liable accordingly. It might, however, be argued that what made asymptomatic physiological changes into an actionable impairment in this case was the economic and, to a lesser degree, social consequences which they carried. Comment has yet to be made upon Dryden in a reported Scottish case, but it seems likely that the Scottish courts would similarly regard sensitisation to a noxious substance, with equivalent consequences, as an “impairment” and therefore as a personal injury. At the same time, it is doubtful whether all asymptomatic conditions which require sufferers to adapt their lifestyles should be regarded in this way, except to the extent that they have significant social or economic impact. An important point of crossborder difference survives the analysis in Dryden. This relates to another, relatively common, asymptomatic condition – that of pleural plaques. Pleural plaques are constituted by 56 RCS 43.1. 57 Dryden v Johnson Matthey plc [2018] UKSC 18, [2019] AC 403 per Lady Black at paras 27–28, citing the reasoning in Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd [2007] UKHL 39, [2008] 1 AC 281. 58 [2018] UKSC 18, [2019] AC 403.

31.16

31.17

31.18

31.19

1100   The Law of Delict in Scotland

the fibrous thickening of the lining of the lungs or diaphragm. They are almost invariably caused by asbestos exposure, but they are often diagnosed only many years later. They present a non-cancerous, asymptomatic condition, which is not in itself causally linked with the subsequent development of more serious disease; but since they signify significant asbestos exposure at an earlier time, they may understandably give rise to anxiety about the future onset of a malignant asbestos-related condition. Some years before Dryden, the Supreme Court ruled in Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd, an English appeal, that neither the asymptomatic presence of pleural plaques, nor the understandable anxiety which they generate, constitutes actionable bodily injury.59 This was because they did not make the individual “appreciably worse off” in terms of health or susceptibility to other conditions, and anxiety of itself was not compensatable. The judgment in Dryden distinguished Rothwell,60 but there was no question of it being overruled. In Scotland, by contrast, it is now specifically provided by section 1 of the Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009 that “asbestos-related pleural plaques are a personal injury which is not negligible”, and that pleural plaques “constitute actionable harm for the purposes of an action of damages for personal injuries”.61

F. CLAIMS BY AN INJURED PERSON (1) Solatium 31.20

The solatium element of damages represents “solace”62 for intangible and non-pecuniary loss, including pain and physical and emotional suffering as well as wounded feelings.63 The term is found from the early nineteenth century onwards as a head of damages for negligent infliction of physical injury,64 but earlier use is seen in cases of intentional injury including defamation,65 assault,66 or wrongful use of diligence.67 Plainly, this head of 59 Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd [2007] UKHL 39, [2008] 1 AC 281. 60 [2018] UKSC 18, [2019] AC 403 per Lady Black at para 47. (Pleural plaques and platinum salt sensitisation both induced physiological change, but pleural plaques of themselves carried no further risk and therefore did not require the claimants to adapt their lifestyles. Platinum salt sensitisation, on the other hand, required those affected to change their everyday lives in order to avoid the risk of further complications.) 61 Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009 s 1; see also, in similar terms, the Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 s 1. For further discussion of provisional damages in cases of pleural plaques, see para 31.58 below. 62 Traynor’s Exrx v Bairds & Scottish Steel 1957 SC 311 per Lord Guthrie at 314; Macrae v Reed and Mallik Ltd 1961 SC 68 per Lord Patrick at 78. 63 For a historical survey, see D M Walker, “Solatium” (1950) 62 JR 144; see also discussion in Black v North British Railway Co 1908 SC 444 by Lord President Dunedin at 451–453. 64 Milne v Smith (1814) 2 Dow 390. 65 See e.g. Calder v M’Kenzie (1700) 5 Bro Sup 535; Wilkie v Wallace (1765) Mor 7360. 66 Cruickshanks v Forsyth (1747) Mor 4034. 67 Grant v Forbes and Henderson (1758) Mor 2081.

Remedies  1101

loss has no direct financial equivalent,68 but an award of solatium involves payment of “such sum of money as will reasonably mark the jury’s (or the judge’s) sense of the seriousness of the suffering, or as a reasonable recognition of its seriousness”.69 Solatium is represented by a single sum, covering the periods both prior 31.21 to the award of damages and after, although in practice that sum requires to be apportioned between these two separate periods so that interest can be appropriately calculated.70 Various interrelated elements of the pursuer’s experience merit compensation, including pain and suffering, loss of faculties and amenities, and suffering due to awareness of reduced life expectancy.71 Solatium may also include a measure of compensation for loss of congeniality of employment where injury has compelled the pursuer to give up an existing employment.72 The right to solatium is personal to the injured person, and in the event that an action is brought but not concluded before the injured person dies, it transmits to his or her executor only in respect of the period before death.73 The amount to be awarded in respect of pain and suffering must take 31.22 into consideration the actual injury or disfigurement suffered,74 or the disease or other medical condition caused by the defender’s conduct. Sensory loss or impairment is similarly relevant,75 as is loss of fertility.76 Regard may be had to the range of awards found in comparable cases where similar injury has been at issue, making appropriate allowance for inflation.77 In this connection it is competent to consider the regularly revised “tariffs” contained in textbooks such as McEwan and Paton on Damages for Personal Injuries in Scotland.78 Scottish cases have in addition made reference to Kemp & Kemp: Quantum of Damages,79 which reproduces, inter alia, the Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases compiled and regularly updated by the Judicial Studies Board in England.80 68 69 70 71 72

See para 31.03 above. McCallum v Paterson 1968 SC 280 per Lord Walker at 284. McManus v British Railways Board 1993 SC 553 per Lord Justice-Clerk Ross at 558. Dalgleish v Glasgow Corporation 1976 SC 32 per Lord Justice-Clerk Wheatley at 53. Although a separate award is not made under this head: see e.g. Stark v Lothian and Borders Fire Board 1993 SLT 652; Davidson v Lothian and Borders Fire Board 2003 SLT 363. 73 Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 2. 74 See e.g. Aitken v Laidlay 1938 SC 303. 75 Such as loss of hearing: see e.g. Docherty v City of Glasgow District Council 1982 SLT 273; Doyle v Advocate General for Scotland [2013] CSOH 164, 2013 GWD 35-698. 76 McGlone v Greater Glasgow Health Board [2012] CSOH 190, 2013 SCLR 459. 77 See McEwan and Paton on Damages ch 4. Figures over £10,000 found in cases prior to 2001 should be uplifted by a more substantial proportion of around one-third. A recommendation made on this point by the Law Commission of England and Wales (Damages for Personal Injury: Non-pecuniary Loss (Law Com No 257, 1999) paras 3.107–3.110) was taken up by the Court of Appeal in Heil v Rankin [2001] QB 272. In turn Heil has been cited in subsequent Scottish cases including Wallace v Paterson 2002 SLT 563, in which Lady Paton said, at para 64, that “Scottish courts can and should find assistance in the guidelines set out in Heil.” 78 See in particular CN1-00–CN38-00. 79 Regularly updated looseleaf publication by Sweet & Maxwell. 80 Currently in its 15th edn of 2019, and published by Oxford University Press.

1102   The Law of Delict in Scotland

31.23

31.24

The amount awarded by way of solatium also factors in the past and ongoing pain and discomfort which the pursuer has endured as a result of the pursuer’s injury or condition, taking into consideration its degree, intensity and duration. Pain and discomfort that will in all probability endure into the future is likewise compensated.81 The pursuer’s claim may also extend to the emotional and psychological suffering resulting from the injury.82 Where a standard form of medical treatment for the pursuer’s injuries sets in train complications that exacerbate the effects of that injury, the amount of solatium should take those consequences into account.83 The suffering attributable to the pursuer’s awareness of reduced life expectancy is also to be compensated,84 although only to the extent that the pursuer has been, is, or is likely to become aware of reduced life expectancy.85 The pursuer is further entitled to reparation in respect of loss of amenity, reflecting the impact that the injury or disease has made upon the capacity to enjoy life, and taking into account the pursuer’s previous lifestyle. It is legitimate to consider, for example, diminished social life,86 reduced capacity to participate in recreational pursuits such as sport,87 increased dependence upon others to go about day-to-day activities,88 loss of sexual capacity,89 or difficulties in interacting with children or grandchildren.90 In cases where the pursuer has lost the use of faculties to the extent of having no consciousness of his or her physical condition, although no award is made in respect of pain and suffering as such, the pursuer may nonetheless be compensated for loss of faculties and amenities.91

(2) Patrimonial loss 31.25

Patrimonial loss is loss to which a financial value can be ascribed, comprising diminution in the value of the pursuer’s patrimony. Damages under this head may be awarded to compensate for items such as damage to, or

81 See e.g. Morton v British Aluminium Co Ltd 1982 SLT 292. 82 M’Laurin v NB Railway Co (1892) 19 R 346, and see e.g. discussion in McPake v SRCL Ltd [2013] CSOH 157, 2014 SCLR 199. See also A v C [2018] CSOH 65, 2018 SLT 1194 on quantification of solatium in respect of the emotional and psychiatric sequelae of sexual abuse. 83 Hutchison v City of Dundee District Council 1996 Rep LR 181; see also Robinson v Post Office [1974] 1 WLR 1176. 84 Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 1(2), although s 1(4) provides that the court is not required to ascribe specifically any part of the award to loss of expectation of life. 85 Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 1(2), (3). 86 See e.g. Fullemann v McInnes’s Exrs 1993 SLT 259. 87 See e.g. Girvan v Inverness Farmers Dairy 1998 SC (HL) 1. 88 Ross v Harper 2004 SLT 353. 89 Cook v J L Kier & Co [1970] 1 WLR 774. 90 See e.g. Hoffman v Sofaer [1982] 1 WLR 1350; Ross v Harper 2004 SLT 353. 91 Dalgleish v Glasgow Corporation 1976 SC 32.

Remedies  1103

loss of, property, as well as loss of earnings following injury, loss of prospective earning power, and out-of-pocket expenses.

(a) Past patrimonial loss Where the pursuer has been incapacitated as a result of the defender’s 31.26 wrongdoing and is consequently unable to work, or unable to work to the same extent as previously, the pursuer (if successful in the action) will be compensated for loss of earnings from the point of the wrongdoing to the present time.92 This amount may be relatively straightforward to quantify where the pursuer has been an employee in receipt of a salary, in which case damages can be calculated on the basis of the pursuer’s average net salary, after deduction of tax,93 National Insurance94 and pension contributions.95 However, account must also be taken of factors other than the injury inflicted by the defender that might adversely have affected the pursuer’s employment prospects during this time.96 The claim for lost remuneration is more problematic where the pursuer 31.27 has been self-employed in his or her own business, a partner in a partnership, or a company director. The underlying principle is that the pursuer should be compensated for the amount that would have been drawn by way of remuneration for his or her services, and not for the loss in the value or profits of the business, partnership or company as such. In Anthony v Brabbs,97 for example, the pursuer was the director and sole employee of a limited company in which he and his wife were the only shareholders. He was paid a salary in respect of services rendered to the company and additional payments in the form of a dividend on his shareholding. Both of these elements were regarded by the court as constituting remuneration for “his labours”, and he was therefore to be compensated for the loss of both. By contrast, in Fullemann v McInnes’s Executors98 the pursuer held 99 per cent of the share capital in a company, the value of which was greatly diminished following his accident. Nonetheless, the loss sustained by the company and the loss in value of the company were not the pursuer’s loss and were held not to be recoverable by him; his loss was the loss of his income from the company only. 92 I.e. until the date of proof if the claim has not been settled: for more detailed discussion, see McEwan and Paton on Damages para 5.01. 93 British Transport Commission v Gourley [1956] AC 185. 94 Gibney v Eric Johnson Stubbs (Scotland) Ltd 1987 SLT 132. 95 Dews v National Coal Board [1988] AC 1; Anderson v Gerrard 1994 SLT 1326. 96 See e.g. T v The English Province of the Congregation of Christian Brothers [2020] SC EDIN 13, 2020 SLT (Sh Ct) 108, discussion by Sheriff K J McGowan at paras 276–284. 97 1998 SC 894; by contrast, the pursuer’s wife, who was the other shareholder, was unsuccessful in her claim for loss in dividend, by reference to Reavis v Clan Line Steamers 1925 SC 725. See also Cusick v Campbell 2002 SCLR 581. 98 1993 SLT 259.

1104   The Law of Delict in Scotland

31.28

The Administration of Justice Act 1982, section 10, provides that the following are not deducted from compensation for personal injury: (a) any contractual pension or benefit (including any payment by a friendly society or trade union); (b) any pension or retirement benefit payable from public funds; (c) any benefit payable from public funds, in respect of any period after the date of the award of damages, designed to secure a minimum level of subsistence to the injured person or any relative of the injured person; (d) any redundancy payment under the Employment Rights Act 1996, or any payment made in circumstances corresponding to those in which a right to a redundancy payment would have accrued if section 135 of that Act had applied; (e) any payment made to the injured person or to any relative of the injured person by the injured person’s employer following upon the injuries in question where the recipient is under an obligation to reimburse the employer in the event of damages being recovered in respect of those injuries; (f) subject to paragraph (iv) below, any payment of a benevolent character made to the injured person or to any relative of the injured person by any person following upon the injuries in question. However, under section 10 the following are to be taken into account in calculating damages: (i) any remuneration or earnings from employment; (ii) any contribution-based jobseeker’s allowance payable under the Jobseekers Act 1995; (iii) any benefit referred to in paragraph (c) above payable in respect of any period prior to the date of the award of damages; (iv) any payment of a benevolent character made to the injured person or to any relative of the injured person by the responsible person following on the injuries in question, where such a payment is made directly and not through a trust or other fund from which the injured person or the injured person’s relatives have benefited or may benefit.

(b) Future patrimonial loss 31.29

Recovery may also be made for future patrimonial loss. Here the aim is to anticipate future losses and future expenditure so as “to place the pursuer as near as may be in the same financial position as he would have been in

Remedies  1105

if the accident had not occurred”.99 The pursuer may be compensated for loss of earnings and loss of pension, as well as expenditure on items such as the services of relatives, nursing care, additional household expenses and transport costs, and special aids and equipment. The assessment of future earnings is often complex. Future earnings 31.30 from employment may be recovered, as well as predicted earnings by the self-employed, partners, and company directors, insofar as these are amounts that would have been drawn by way of remuneration for their services. As is the case with regard to loss until the date of proof, loss in the value or profits of the business, partnership or company with which the pursuer is associated are not recoverable as such.100 Arriving at a precise figure for future earnings is by no means straightforward, since a variety of elements must be factored into the calculation, including employment prospects, likely salary, and the estimated period of incapacity, but having regard to the hazards and uncertainties that must attend such considerations.101 In some cases the courts have regarded it as proper, in recognition of such future uncertainties, to compensate the pursuer for loss of employability, either in addition to, or, more usually, instead of following the usual multiplicand/multiplier approach102 to quantify future loss of earnings.103 An award for loss of employability may be relevant where there are so many uncertainties attached to any future earning potential that this is more appropriately valued by a lump-sum award,104 or where the pursuer is still in employment and has suffered little or no actual wage loss, but there is a substantial risk that the pursuer may lose that employment and thereafter find it difficult to obtain a position with comparable remuneration.105

(3) Calculation of future losses The standard method of calculating the capitalised value of future losses 31.31 is to decide upon a “multiplicand” and multiply it by the appropriate “multiplier”. The multiplicand is the present-day value of the annual loss likely to be experienced in future, to which a multiplier is applied in order

 99 O’Brien’s Curator Bonis v British Steel plc 1991 SC 315 per Lord President Hope at 319. For more detailed discussion, see McEwan and Paton on Damages para 5.02. 100 See para 31.27 above. 101 See e.g. T v The English Province of the Congregation of Christian Brothers [2020] SC EDIN 13, 2020 SLT (Sh Ct) 108 per Sheriff K J McGowan at paras 285–289. 102 See paras 31.31ff below. 103 McEwan and Paton on Damages para 6-01, and see Smith v Manchester Corp (1974) 17 KIR 1. 104 See e.g. Wilson v North Star Shipping (Aberdeen) Ltd [2014] CSOH 156, 2014 GWD 36-675; and see discussion in Glen v Lagwell Insulation Company Ltd [2017] CSOH 153, 2018 Rep LR 25. 105 See e.g. Paterson v Paterson [2012] CSOH 183, 2013 Rep LR 13; Smith v Muir Construction Ltd [2014] CSOH 171, 2015 Rep LR 8.

1106   The Law of Delict in Scotland

to arrive at a lump sum equivalent to the total capitalised value of the future losses year on year. The basis for the calculation is that the entire sum awarded, capital and interest, will be used up within the period projected as being the period of the pursuer’s life during which the loss is likely to continue.106

(a) The multiplicand 31.32

The base line for the multiplicand is the annual loss to the pursuer as a result of the accident, of which the most significant element is often loss of earnings. In this connection the court is required to take into account the estimated annual earnings that the pursuer would have been receiving as at the date of proof.107 That figure may, however, be adjusted if it is apparent that, leaving the injury out of account, the pursuer would have been earning at a different rate in the future. Thus allowance may be made, for example, for previously anticipated promotion prospects where these had been reasonably certain.108 Where the incapacity is such as to allow the pursuer to continue working, albeit to a reduced extent, the likely future earnings must be brought into the calculation. If the pursuer is a child, whose future earning potential is highly uncertain, national average earnings have been referred to as the basis for determining the multiplicand,109 making allowance also for environmental factors.110

(b) The multiplier 31.33

The starting point in determining the appropriate multiplier is the likely duration of the pursuer’s disability or incapacity. If a full recovery has taken place, or is predicted, this may be a finite period, but where the disability or incapacity is indicated as permanent the court is to assume, in assessing patrimonial loss, that the pursuer will live until the date when death would have been expected had the injuries not been suffered.111 Guidance in establishing the appropriate multiplier is obtained from the Ogden Tables,112 produced by the Government Actuary’s Department, and 106 See discussion in Wells v Wells [1999] 1 AC 345. 107 See Cookson v Knowles [1979] AC 556. 108 McLoone v British Railways Board 1981 SLT (Notes) 65; but see also Brand v Transocean North Sea Ltd [2011] CSOH 57, 2011 GWD 14-336, in which the prospects which the pursuer claimed previously to have enjoyed were insufficiently certain. 109 Croke v Wiseman [1982] 1 WLR 71; Geddes v Lothian Health Board 1992 SLT 986. 110 M (A Child) v Leeds Health Authority [2002] PIQR Q4. 111 Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 1(5). 112 Government Actuary’s Department, Actuarial Tables with Explanatory Notes for Use in Personal Injury and Fatal Accident Cases, currently in its 8th edition (2020) (available at https://www.gov.uk/ government/publications/ogden-tables-actuarial-compensation-tables-for-injury-and-death). For commentary on the 8th edition, see S Love and G Markie, “Ogden 8: Shifting the Balance” (2020) 65(9) JLSS 24.

Remedies  1107

compiled by a team of actuaries, legal practitioners, insurance experts and others. The admissibility of the Ogden Tables now has statutory authority in England,113 and they were accepted for use in the Scottish courts in O’Brien’s Curator Bonis v British Steel plc.114 The Ogden Tables are based upon an actuarial assessment of life expectancy, and they set out multipliers for patrimonial loss, loss of earnings to pension age, and loss of pension, according to actual age, gender, and pensionable age. The Tables thus make “reasonable provision” for “the levels of mortality which members of the population of the United Kingdom alive today may typically expect to experience in future”.115 The Tables themselves do not take account of any other risks or vicissitudes of life, but the accompanying text suggests adjustments to the multipliers for loss of earnings to allow for risks other than mortality, such as the possibility that the claimant would have had interruptions in employment for reasons such as ill-health, childcare and redundancy.116 Where the pursuer is still a child, there are particular difficulties in achieving an appropriate multiplier. This should similarly be based upon the likely duration of adult working life but for the disability, but adjustment may be made for the child’s expected level of educational attainment and the likely time at which he or she would have started work, as well as for the fact that the capital sum is available to the child for investment long before such time as his or her working life would have begun.117 Different multipliers may be appropriate for separate elements of loss. 31.34 The multiplier for loss of earnings is calculated by reference to the expected retirement age, whereas other losses, for example relating to care and accommodation needs, will continue until death, and therefore the multiplier turns on life expectancy.118 In some cases it may be accepted that it is not possible to arrive at 31.35 an appropriate multiplicand and multiplier, because there are so many “imponderables” regarding the course of events if the pursuer had not been injured, and the pursuer’s future capabilities. It is relatively unusual for such a conclusion to be reached, but in those circumstances it remains competent for the court to reject use of the Ogden Tables and to refer to

113 Civil Evidence Act 1995 s 10. See also Wells v Wells [1999] 1 AC 345, stating that the Ogden Tables were henceforth to be the “starting-point” for calculations rather than simply a check. 114 1991 SC 315; Lord President Hope expressed a caveat, in regard to an earlier edition of the Tables, that allowance should be made for geographical variations in life expectancy. More recent editions are more clearly based upon UK-wide data. For recent discussion, and on the need in complex cases to explain the use of the Ogden Tables to a jury, see Glen v Lagwell Insulation Company Ltd [2017] CSOH 153, 2018 Rep LR 25. 115 Ogden Tables, 8th edn (2020) Explanatory Notes, section A, para 40 116 Ogden Tables, 8th edn (2020) Explanatory Notes, section B (at 23–41). 117 Ogden Tables, 8th edn (2020) Explanatory Notes, section B, paras 79–80. 118 See e.g. Stevenson v Sweeney 1995 SLT 29; O’Connor v Matthews 1996 SLT 408.

1108   The Law of Delict in Scotland

more general considerations as the basis for an assessment of the figure for lost earnings.119

(4) Deduction for the “lost period” between the predicted notional and actual dates of death 31.36

The assessment of patrimonial loss following personal injury is based upon a calculation of the pursuer’s life expectancy had the injury or disease not occurred. As discussed above, an estimate is made of the amount that the pursuer would have earned had his or her working life not been reduced by injury, as well as the benefits to which the pursuer was likely to have become entitled during the projected lifetime.120 However, given that actual life expectancy may be reduced due to the injury, there may be a “lost period”121 between the expected actual date of death and the date of death that would have been anticipated before the injury or disease. In recognition of this, a deduction of 25 per cent is made in regard to “living expenses” during that “lost period”,122 with the possibility that the court may apply a different percentage if it is satisfied that “it is necessary to do so for the purpose of avoiding a manifestly and materially unfair result”.123

(5) The discount rate 31.37

Calculation of the total sum due must take account not only of the projected mortality of the pursuer and certain contingencies other than mortality, but also of the fact that the capital sum received by the pursuer is available immediately for investment and should produce some kind of annual return.124 A “discount” rate is therefore applied to reflect that the prudent litigant is expected to manage the capital in this way. However, in the English case of Wells v Wells125 the House of Lords expressed the view that, although the plaintiff was expected to invest that sum prudently, “it does not follow that prudent investment for the ordinary investor is a prudent investment for the plaintiffs”. The ordinary investor might take risks in the hope of higher yields, whereas the ordinary plaintiff, who might be entirely dependent for living expenses upon the capital received, is less 119 Blamire v South Cumbria Health Authority 1993 PIQR Q1. For discussion, and illustrations of that assessment, see Brand v Transocean North Sea Ltd [2011] CSOH 57, 2011 GWD 14-336; McGlone v Greater Glasgow Health Board [2012] CSOH 190, 2013 SCLR 459; and see McGhee v Diageo plc [2008] CSOH 74. 120 Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 1(5). 121 Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 1(6). For discussion, see Harris v Advocate General for Scotland [2016] CSOH 49, 2016 SLT 572. 122 Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 1(6). 123 Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 1(7). 124 O’Brien’s Curator Bonis v British Steel plc 1991 SC 315 per Lord President Hope at 319. 125 [1999] 1 AC 345 per Lord Lloyd at 366.

Remedies  1109

well-placed to accept risk and is justified in opting for investments with a safe, but correspondingly lower, rate of return. The appropriate discount rate in that case was therefore linked to that achieved by index-linked government securities. The mechanism for setting the discount rate is now provided by the Damages Act 1996, section B1, as inserted by the Damages (Investment Returns and Periodical Payments) (Scotland) Act 2019, section 1. This directs the court to take into account “the rate of return set by the official rate-assessor”, subject to the proviso that a different rate of return may be referred to if a party to the action shows that the different rate is more appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The rate-assessor is the Government Actuary, or a person appointed in place of the Government Actuary by regulations made by the Scottish Ministers.126

(6) Past and future expenses The pursuer is entitled to recover expenses incurred, as well as those likely 31.38 to be incurred in the future, where these are directly attributable to the injury caused by the defender.127 Recoverable expenses include reasonable medical costs, and, in determining what is reasonable by way of medical expenses, the court is directed to disregard the possibility that the expenditure might have been avoided by the pursuer obtaining the same services without charge from the National Health Service.128 Sums spent in good faith on treatment advised by medical experts, even if it eventually transpires that the expert advice was erroneous and the treatment unnecessary, qualify as reasonable expenses.129 Where the defender’s negligence has damaged the pursuer’s capacity to procreate, the cost of fertility treatment may also be claimed, and the Supreme Court has held in an English appeal130 that a claimant was entitled to the cost of commercial surrogacy arrangements in the United States, even though the provision of surrogacy services on a commercial basis was unlawful in the United Kingdom. The pursuer may also hold the defender accountable for special aids 31.39 and equipment, and for extra living costs attributable to disability, such as heating, laundry, dietary and clothing requirements. Transport costs may be recovered, but only insofar as these are additional on account of 126 Damages Act 1996 s B1(4). For the current determination, see https://www.gov.uk/government/ publications/the-personal-injury-discount-rate-review-and-determination-of-the-rate-in-scotland-by-thegovernment-actuary. 127 See general discussion in O’Brien’s Curator Bonis v British Steel plc 1991 SC 315 per Lord President Hope at 317–319. 128 Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948 s 2(4). If, however, the pursuer has been receiving National Health Service treatment, he or she will not be reimbursed for the notional costs of private health care in future without clear evidence that these will indeed be incurred: Harris v Brights Asphalt Contractors Ltd [1953] 1 QB 617 per Slade J at 635. 129 Rubens v Walker 1946 SC 215. 130 Whittington Hospital NHS Trust v XX [2020] UKSC 14, [2020] 2 WLR 972.

1110   The Law of Delict in Scotland

31.40

the pursuer’s injury or disease, such as those entailed in adapting a vehicle to accommodate the pursuer’s disability. Costs which would have arisen in any event (for example on buying an ordinary car) must therefore be left out of account.131 Special accommodation requirements entailing extra expenditure are included.132 This means that if the pursuer needs to move to alternative accommodation, a proportion of the outlay is recoverable, as illustrated in the English case of Roberts v Johnstone.133 The relevant amount is computed by looking at the difference between the cost of the new accommodation and the cost of the previous accommodation, and calculates the interest upon that difference over the period that the new accommodation is likely to be required (typically the pursuer’s lifetime).134 The pursuer may recover the full costs of adjustments made to property to provide for the pursuer’s disability, insofar as these do not enhance the market value of the property. Amounts spent on necessary nursing care and domestic support are similarly compensated. As set out in the Administration of Justice Act 1982, section 8, this includes reasonable remuneration for necessary services rendered by relatives135 in consequence of the pursuer’s injuries, even if those services were at the time rendered without charge,136 unless the relative has expressly agreed that no payment is to be made,137 or unless the relative providing care is the person responsible for the injury.138 Services of this type would include personal care and practical assistance with functions such as washing, dressing, eating and mobility.139 Services rendered both before and after the date of the award of damages may be compensated, and a future award will be calculated using a multiplicand for the likely annual cost and a multiplier to reflect the period for which the services will be required. In quantifying the appropriate rate, regard may be had to charges for equivalent services provided by outside agencies, for example those of a home help.140 The remuneration must be claimed by the injured 131 See Clark v Greater Glasgow Health Board [2016] CSOH 126, 2016 Rep LR 126. 132 See O’Brien’s Curator Bonis v British Steel plc 1991 SC 315 per Lord President Hope at 318–319. 133 Roberts v Johnstone [1989] QB 878. As followed in the Scottish courts: see e.g. Good v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] CSOH 75, 2015 Rep LR 99; but cf O’Connor v Matthews 1996 SLT 408, where the court took the view that a council house would be “perfectly adequate” for the pursuer’s needs. 134 If the full cost was allowed, this would leave extra value with the pursuer, or the pursuer’s estate, at the point when the accommodation is no longer required. For detailed explanation of the calculation, see McGregor on Damages paras 40.204–40.212; see also R Milligan, “Roberts v Johnstone and the Negative Discount Rate” (2017) 137 Reparation Bulletin 2. 135 As defined in Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 13(1). 136 Howie v Upper Clyde Shipbuilders Ltd 1991 SLT 2. 137 Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 8(1), (3). 138 Hunt v Severs [1994] 2 AC 350; Kozikowska v Kozikowski 1996 SLT 386. 139 See e.g. Forsyth’s Curator Bonis v Govan Shipbuilders Ltd 1988 SC 421. Section 8 does not, however, extend to provision of labour by a son on the farm run by his mother and by his injured father in partnership: Sturgeon v Gallagher 2003 SLT 67. 140 Gordon v Wilson 1992 SLT 849; McMillan v McDowall 1993 SLT 312.

Remedies  1111

person, not the relative rendering the services.141 The pursuer is in turn obliged to account to the relative for the amount recovered under this head, although that obligation relates to past services and not to future services.142 There is further provision, in the Administration of Justice Act 1982, sec- 31.41 tion 9, permitting recovery of a “reasonable sum” in respect of the pursuer’s own incapacity to render personal services to relatives143 where such services would have been expected but for the occurrence of the injury or disease. These must be services of a type which are normally offered gratuitously to relatives, but which, when rendered by a person other than a relative, are ordinarily obtainable only on payment.144 Section 9 requires such a claim to be made by the injured person – there is no direct right of action on the part of the relative – and such a claim transmits to the injured person’s executor in the event that he or she subsequently dies.145 As noted further below,146 where the personal injuries have resulted in death, section 6 of the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 permits relatives entitled to compensation for loss of support147 to bring a direct claim for loss of services in addition.

(7) Deduction of social security and other benefits Often those who have suffered personal injury are eligible for receipt of 31.42 social security benefits. Where such benefits have been claimed as a result of suffering disease or injury for which damages are also obtained, provision is made to ensure that the pursuer does not receive double benefit. On the one hand, the defender must repay the benefits; on the other hand, the amount repaid is deducted from the award of damages made to the pursuer. The framework for recovering benefits is contained in the Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997.148 The defender is answerable to the Department for Work and Pensions for an amount equivalent to the main benefits for which the pursuer is eligible in respect of the five-year period following the date of the accident or injury or the onset of disease (or alternatively, if earlier, until such time as a compensation payment is made in final discharge of the pursuer’s claim).149 The benefits recoverable in this way include those made in compensation to the pursuer for earnings lost, for the cost of care, and for loss of mobility.150 In turn, the 141 Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 8(4). 142 Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 8(2), (3). 143 As defined in Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 13(1). 144 See e.g. Mackinnon v Hadfield [2014] CSOH 15, 2014 SCLR 510 (personal care of pursuer’s elderly mother); Gallagher v SC Cheadle Hume Ltd [2014] CSOH 103, 2015 Rep LR 33 (domestic electrical and plumbing repairs, DIY and car maintenance). 145 Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 9(4). 146 Para 31.51. 147 In terms of the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 4(3)(a). 148 Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997 s 6. 149 s 3. 150 s 8 and Sch 2.

1112   The Law of Delict in Scotland

31.43

31.44

pursuer then receives from the defender the sum of damages under deduction of the amount paid by the defender to the Department for Work and Pensions.151 In order to ensure that the system is appropriately applied, the defender is required to obtain a certificate of recoverable benefits from the Secretary of State before making a compensation payment.152 The scheme for recovery of benefits, and the issuing of certificates, are dealt with by the Compensation Recovery Unit within the Department for Work and Pensions.153 In an action for damages for personal injuries any saving to the pursuer which is attributable to his or her maintenance wholly or partly at public expense in a hospital or other institution, or in accommodation provided by a care home service,154 is to be set off against any income lost by the pursuer as a result of the injuries.155 Deductions are also made for: (i) any earnings from employment; (ii) payment of a jobseeker’s allowance; (iii) any benefit payable from public funds, designed to secure to the injured person or to a relative a minimum level of subsistence, in respect of any period prior to the date of the award of damages; and (iv) any payment of a benevolent character paid directly to the injured person or to a relative by the defender following on the injuries in question.156 On the other hand, no deduction is made for: (i) any contractual pension or benefit, including payments by a friendly society or trade union; (ii) any pension or retirement benefit payable from public funds “other than any pension or benefit to which section 2(1) of the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948 applies”;157 (iii) any benefit payable from public funds, designed to secure to the injured person or to a relative a minimum level of subsistence, in respect of any period after the date of the award of damages; (iv) any statutory redundancy payment; (v) any payment made to the injured person or to a relative by the injured person’s employer following upon the injuries in question where the recipient is under an obligation to reimburse the employer in the event of damages being recovered in respect of those injuries; and (vi) any payment of a benevolent character made to the injured person or to any relative of the injured person, other than a payment made by the defender.158 151 s 8. 152 s 4. 153 Details are available on the Department for Work and Pensions website (see https://www.gov.uk/ government/collections/cru). 154 As now defined in the Public Services Reform (Scotland) Act 2010 Sch 12 para 2. 155 Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 11. 156 Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 10. See further para 31.28 above. 157 As stated by the Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 10(b).The Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948 s 2(1) was in fact repealed by the Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997 s 33(1), (2) and Sch 3 para 1 and Sch 4, but applied to “industrial injury benefit, industrial disablement benefit or sickness benefit for the five years beginning with the time when the cause of action accrued”. 158 Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 10. See further para 31.28 above.

Remedies  1113

G. CLAIMS FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF AN INJURED PERSON When a person dies as a result of the wrongdoing of another, any claim 31.45 or claims arising from that wrongdoing survive the victim’s death. Such claims take different forms.

(1) Claims by the executor A claim of damages is an incorporeal moveable right that forms part of 31.46 the deceased’s estate. If the deceased had already initiated proceedings to recover damages, and those proceedings had not yet been concluded, the executor is entitled to be sisted as pursuer and to continue the action on behalf of the estate.159 For these purposes, proceedings are not regarded as concluded if an appeal remains competent, or if an appeal taken has not yet been disposed of.160 But even if the deceased had not initiated proceedings, the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011, section 2, provides that the deceased’s rights to damages for patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss, insofar as vested by the date of death, transmit to the deceased’s executor. An example of patrimonial loss suffered prior to death would be where 31.47 the deceased was killed, and the deceased’s car written off, in a road-traffic accident caused by the defender’s negligence. In that case the value of the car would be patrimonial loss recoverable by the executor. If, instead, the deceased does not die immediately at the time of the defender’s wrongdoing but at a later date, whether as a result of that wrongdoing or due to unrelated causes, the executor may initiate proceedings. The claim would in these circumstances relate to patrimonial loss suffered as a result of defender’s wrongdoing, assessed up until the date of death,161 allowing the executor also to recover earnings lost during this period,162 or expenses arising from the consequences of the wrongdoing. By contrast, where an adviser’s negligence has meant that an opportunity has been lost to reduce the amount of inheritance tax levied on the deceased’s estate, no patrimonial loss will have been incurred during the deceased’s lifetime and therefore no right can transmit to the executor in this regard.163 A claim in respect of non-patrimonial loss may transmit to the executor, 31.48 but only “in respect of injuries suffered by the deceased (‘A’) and vested in A

159 Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 10(1). 160 s 10(2). 161 The rights transmitted to the executor do not extend to patrimonial loss attributable to any period after the date of death: s 2(2). 162 See Smith v Stewart & Co 1961 SC 91; Russell’s Exrx v British Railways Board 1965 SC 422. 163 Milligan’s Exrs v Hewats [2013] CSOH 60, 2013 SLT 758, although a duty of care may arise between the adviser and the recipient of the gift against which the inheritance tax is levied: see Steven v Hewats [2013] CSOH 61, 2013 SLT 763, discussed at para 5.74 above.

1114   The Law of Delict in Scotland

immediately before A’s death”.164 This means that where the deceased was killed outright, no claim for solatium is available,165 although there is authority to suggest that, where death was not instantaneous, an award may be made in respect of the feelings of pain and apprehensions of mortality experienced by the deceased, even if of short duration.166 On the other hand, an element of solatium remains transmissible if the deceased did not die as an immediate result of the defender’s wrongdoing, but does so at a late date, whether as a result of that wrongdoing or due to other causes. Thus, for example, if the deceased dies after suffering a disease caused by the defender’s negligence, damages may be recovered by the executor in recognition of the pain and suffering experienced by the deceased during the period of illness.167

(2) Claims by relatives 31.49

Where the injured person dies as a result of the defender’s wrongdoing, damages are payable to members of the deceased’s family, both for loss of material support and services and also for their non-patrimonial loss.168 The relatives’ claim is, however, contingent upon the claim of the deceased being sound in fact and law. A claim by relatives is not competent if, prior to death, the deceased had excluded or discharged the defender from liability.169 It is also subject to the same defences that would have been applied in a claim brought by the deceased, so that if, for example, the deceased can be shown to have suffered fatal injury as the result partly of the deceased’s own fault, a finding of contributory negligence will result in the overall amount awarded being reduced by a proportion reflecting the deceased’s share in the responsibility for his or her own death.170 164 Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 2(1). 165 Stewart v London, Midland and Scottish Railway Co 1943 SC (HL) 19. 166 In Beggs v Motherwell Bridge Fabricators Ltd 1998 SLT 1215, where the deceased had lost consciousness within minutes and died shortly afterwards, an award of £250 was considered appropriate. By contrast, in Wells v Hay 1999 Rep LR 44 the deceased, who had had suffered 60 per cent burns, was conscious and in extreme pain until arriving at hospital one hour after the accident. He regained consciousness once before his death 16 days later. An award of £50,000 was made in respect of his suffering during this time. 167 See e.g. Wolff v John Moulds (Kilmarnock) Ltd [2011] CSOH 159, 2012 SLT 231, in which £65,000 was regarded as an appropriate award of solatium in respect of the period between diagnosis and death, during which the deceased had experienced exceptionally serious pain due to mesothelioma. 168 Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 4. 169 s 4(2), but see s 5 preserving that claim where death was due to mesothelioma. 170 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 ss 1(4) and 5(c). Section 5(c) substitutes a wording for s 1(4) applicable in Scotland to the effect that: “Where any person dies as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim by any dependant of the first mentioned person for damages or solatium in respect of that person’s death shall not be defeated by reason of his fault, but the damages or solatium recoverable shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the share of the said person in the responsibility for his death.” Section 1(4) was repealed insofar as applicable to England and Wales by the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 but, by s 7, the Act does extend to Scotland, leaving s 1(4) of the 1945 Act still in force there.

Remedies  1115

(a) Loss of support Close relatives are entitled to compensation for any loss of support that 31.50 they have sustained, or are likely to be sustain, following the death of the deceased as a result of defender’s wrongdoing, and a claim may also be made for reimbursement of reasonable funeral expenses.171 The relatives who may be entitled to claim in this way are: spouses and civil partners; cohabitees; parents; children, including those who have been accepted by the deceased as a child of the deceased’s family;172 siblings, including those brought up in the same household as the deceased and accepted as a child of the family in which the deceased was a child; grandparents, including those who accepted the deceased as a grandchild; grandchildren, including those who were accepted by the deceased as a grandchild; other direct ascendants or descendants of the deceased; uncles and aunts; nieces and nephews; and former spouses or civil partners.173 In this connection a relationship of affinity (i.e. the relationship which a spouse has to the relations of the other spouse) is to be treated as a relationship by consanguinity, a relationship of the half blood is to be treated as a relationship of the whole blood, and a stepchild of the deceased is to be treated as the deceased’s child.174 Relationships arising between adopted children and those who have become their relatives after adoption are also included, but not those between biological parents and a child who has been adopted, or between biological siblings born after adoption and the adopted child.175 The amount which may be claimed can include past loss of support from 31.51 the date of death to the date of proof, as well as future loss, the latter being normally calculated using a multiplicand and multiplier.176 Section 7(1)(a) of the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 directs that the total amount available to support the deceased’s relatives should be taken as being an amount equivalent to 75 per cent of the deceased’s net annual income (leaving 25 per cent as the notional proportion that the deceased would have spent on his or her own living expenses).177 In the allocation of that amount, section 7 divides relatives into two categories. Where the relatives claiming support are the surviving spouse, civil partner, cohabitant or a dependent child or children,178 the amount awarded by way of loss of support will normally be

171 Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 4(3)(a). 172 There is no age restriction on “child”, a term which has been held to refer to the character of the relationship only: see Hunter’s Exrx v Advocate General for Scotland [2016] CSOH 166, 2016 SLT 1287. 173 Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 14(1). 174 s 14(2). 175 See Foreman v Advocate General for Scotland [2016] CSOH 94, 2016 SLT 962. 176 Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 7(1(d). 177 s 7(1)(a). 178 Defined in Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 7(3) as a child under the age of 18 to whom the deceased owed an obligation of aliment.

1116   The Law of Delict in Scotland

taken as the full 75 per cent figure.179 Where other relatives, including nondependent children, are claiming support, their entitlement is to the actual amount lost by way of support, subject to the 75 per cent maximum.180 In cases where a mix of the two categories (e.g. the surviving spouse and a non-dependent child) is claiming support, the amount awarded to relatives in the second category is deducted from the 75 per cent figure and the balance is awarded to the relatives in the first category.181 However, the court has a discretion to depart from this 75 per cent figure if it is necessary to do so in order to avoid “a manifestly and materially unfair result”.182 In cases where a dependent relative has died subsequent to the deceased, his or her claim for loss of support prior to death transmits to the executor of that dependent relative.

(b) Loss of services 31.52

Where applicable, the relatives who are entitled to claim damages for loss of support, as discussed above, are in addition entitled to claim for loss of personal services rendered to them by the deceased.183 For these purposes, “personal services” carries the same meaning as in section 9 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982, discussed above.184

(c) Non-patrimonial loss 31.53

A restricted category of relatives is further entitled to claim damages in respect of non-patrimonial loss.185 Only the “immediate family”186 may proceed in this way, i.e.: spouses, civil partners and cohabitees; parents; children, including those who have been accepted by the deceased as a child of the deceased’s family; siblings, including those brought up in the same household as the deceased and accepted as a child of the family in which the deceased was a child; grandparents, including those who accepted the deceased as a grandchild; and grandchildren, including those who were accepted by the deceased as a grandchild.187 As in relation to claims for loss of support, a relationship of affinity (i.e. the relationship which a spouse has to the relatives of the other spouse) is to be treated as a relationship by consanguinity, a relationship of the half blood is to be treated as a relationship of the whole blood, and a stepchild of the deceased is to be treated as his or 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187

s 7(1)(c)(i). s 7(1)(b). s 7(1)(c)(ii). s 7(2). s 6. Para 31.41 above. s 4(3)(b). s 4(1); immediate family is defined by reference to ss 4(3)(b) and 14(1). s 14(1).

Remedies  1117

her child.188 Relationships arising between adopted children and those who have become their relatives after adoption are also included.189 Relatives in the above categories are entitled to “just” compensation in 31.54 respect of: (i) distress and anxiety endured by the relative in contemplation of the suffering of the deceased before death; (ii) grief and sorrow of the relative caused by the death; and (iii) the loss of such non-patrimonial benefit as the relative might have been expected to derive from the deceased’s society and guidance if he or she had not died.190 An award in respect of head (i) is not considered appropriate in circumstances where the deceased immediately lost consciousness and did not recover consciousness before death, although the circumstances of a sudden death may heighten the grief and sorrow experienced by relatives in terms of head (ii).191 Money cannot ever properly compensate non-patrimonial loss of this 31.55 nature, but a financial value must nonetheless be ascribed to the degree of suffering experienced by the relative in question. That assessment cannot be carried out with precision, and is highly case- and fact-sensitive, depending upon “impression and imponderable considerations”.192 The prime focus is upon the relationship between the relative and the deceased, and how that relationship operated in practice.193 There may be evidence to suggest that a particular relationship was very close or that another relationship was less so, resulting in a higher award in the former case.194 Typically, the highest awards are made to spouses.195 At the other end of the scale, relatively lower awards are likely to be considered appropriate for the grandchildren of the deceased.196 In regard to head (iii) (the loss of benefit that may have been anticipated from the deceased’s continuing society and guidance), the length of time for which the relative is denied the deceased’s support is a “material consideration”, so that higher awards may be “just” in cases where the deceased would have anticipated significant longevity but for the wrongdoing of the defender.197 The court may, however, take into consideration 188 s 14(2). 189 See Foreman v Advocate General for Scotland [2016] CSOH 94, 2016 SLT 962. 190 s 4(3)(b). 191 Currie v Esure Services Ltd [2014] CSOH 34, 2014 SLT 631, affd [2014] CSIH 112, 2015 SC 351. 192 See e.g. comments in Young v MacVean [2015] CSIH 70, 2016 SC 135 per Lord Brodie at paras 37 and 40. 193 Manson v Henry Robb Ltd [2017] CSOH 126, 2017 SLT 1173. 194 Young v MacVean [2015] CSIH 70, 2016 SC 135 per Lord Brodie at para 37. 195 See e.g. Gallagher v SC Cheadle Hume Ltd [2014] CSOH 103, 2015 Rep LR 33; Manson v Henry Robb Ltd [2017] CSOH 126, 2017 SLT 1173. For an analysis of awards, grouped by category of relative, see A Hajducki, “The View after Hamilton: A Discussion of Recent Damages Awards for Bereaved Relatives in Wrongful Death Claims” 2014 SLT (News) 133. 196 See e.g. Stuart v Reid [2014] CSOH 117A, 2014 Rep LR 107; Gallagher v SC Cheadle Hume Ltd [2014] CSOH 103, 2015 Rep LR 33. 197 See e.g. Gallagher v SC Cheadle Hume Ltd [2014] CSOH 103, 2015 Rep LR 33; McCarn v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills [2014] CSOH 121, 2014 Rep LR 138; Manson v Henry Robb Ltd [2017] CSOH 126, 2017 SLT 1173; but see discussion in Cruickshank v Fairfield Rowan Ltd [2005] CSOH 1, 2005 SLT 462 per Lord Brodie at para 28.

1118   The Law of Delict in Scotland

31.56

particular aspects of the relationship which lend it a special significance, in terms of factors such as emotional ties or family circumstances.198 Until relatively recently, juries hearing personal injuries cases were given little guidance as to the appropriate levels of compensation for nonpatrimonial loss, and there appeared on occasion to be marked differences between judicial and jury awards, in particular in regard to awards for loss of society to parents or children.199 In Hamilton v Ferguson Transport (Spean Bridge) Ltd200 a court of five judges was convened to hear two cases in which the defenders, claiming that awards made against them by juries had been excessive, enrolled motions for a new trial. In allowing the motions, the court directed that judicial guidance should henceforth be provided to juries on the appropriate level of damages. The format for this, as prescribed in Hamilton, is that after the evidence has been heard, counsel should address the judge, in the absence of the jury, on their proposals as to appropriate levels of non-pecuniary damages. When charging the jury, the judge should then draw upon these proposed figures, together with the judge’s own knowledge and experience, to suggest a spectrum or reference points within which their award might lie, although those suggestions are not necessarily binding upon the jury.201

H. PERSONAL INJURY: INTERIM AND PROVISIONAL DAMAGES (1) Interim damages 31.57

In an action for personal injuries the pursuer may, at any time after defences have been lodged, apply by motion for an order for interim payment of damages by the defender.202 Such motions are competent where the defender is a person who is insured; a public authority; a person whose means and resources are such as to enable him to make the interim payment; or a person whose liability is to be met by the Motor Insurers’ Bureau.203 An order may be made to pay a “reasonable proportion” of the damages considered likely to be recoverable,204 but only where the defender has admitted liability, or, without such an admission, where the 198 See Young v MacVean [2015] CSIH 70, 2016 SC 135 per Lord Brodie at para 41, holding it relevant to consider the relationship of particular dependency between a bereaved mother and her deceased son, following the sudden death of her husband while the son was a child. 199 See Hamilton v Ferguson Transport (Spean Bridge) Ltd [2012] CSIH 52, 2012 SC 486. 200 [2012] CSIH 52, 2012 SC 486. 201 Hamilton v Ferguson Transport (Spean Bridge) Ltd [2012] CSIH 52, 2012 SC 486 per Lord President Hamilton at paras 76–77. 202 RCS 43.11–43.12; OCR 36.8–36.10. 203 RCS 43.11(5); OCR 36.9(5). 204 For interpretation of “reasonable proportion”, see Lennox v Bishop [2005] CSOH 87, 2005 Rep LR 109; Fletcher v Lunan [2008] CSOH 55, 2008 Rep LR 72; see also McEwan and Paton on Damages para 1-06; R Milligan, “Interim Damages” (2008) 83 Reparation Bulletin 2.

Remedies  1119

court is satisfied that, if the action proceeded to proof, the pursuer would succeed on the question of liability without any substantial finding of contributory negligence.205 When the final decree is pronounced in such cases, the court may make whatever order is appropriate to give effect to the final liability of the defender who has made an interim payment. This may include ordering repayment by the pursuer of any sum by which the interim payment exceeded the final amount due, or ordering payment by any other defender or a third party of any part of the interim payment which the defender who made it is entitled to recover from that person by way of contribution or indemnity or in respect of any remedy or relief.206

(2) Provisional damages As a general rule the award of damages is once and for all,207 but this can 31.58 lead to injustice where the defender’s wrongdoing has caused the pursuer to suffer a condition that could worsen significantly at a later stage. In order to deal with such cases, section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982 allows for the provisional award of damages where there is a “risk that at some definite or indefinite time in the future the injured person will, as a result of the act or omission which gave rise to the cause of the action, develop some serious disease or suffer some serious deterioration in his physical or mental condition”. Such awards may be made only where the defender is a public authority or is insured or otherwise indemnified in respect of the claim.208 In such cases the court may, on the application of the injured person, make an award of damages on the assumption that the pursuer will not develop the disease or suffer the deterioration in his condition, but also leaving open the proviso that the pursuer may obtain further damages if that serious disease or serious deterioration does in fact occur.209 In recent years, such applications have been made, for example, by those suffering from asbestos-induced pleural plaques. Provisional damages may be awarded in respect of this condition, which is generally asymptomatic, subject to the pursuer’s entitlement to apply for a further award in the event that he or she subsequently develops an asbestos-related disease.210 If “appropriate”, the court may order that an application for further damages may be made only within a specified period,211 although such a time 205 RCS 43.11(3); OCR 36.9(3). 206 RCS 43.12; OCR 36.10. 207 See Stevenson v Pontifex & Wood (1887) 15 R 125 per Lord President Inglis at 129. 208 Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 12(1)(b). 209 s 12(4). 210 See e.g. W v Advocate General for Scotland [2015] CSOH 111, 2015 SLT 537; Fraser v Kitsons Insulation Contractors Ltd [2015] CSOH 135, 2015 SLT 753; and see also Damages (Asbestosrelated Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009 s 1. 211 Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 12(2)(b). See also Bonar v Trafalgar House Offshore Fabrication Ltd 1996 SLT 548 per Lord Gill at 551, indicating that it is not appropriate to leave the possibility of a further claim as open-ended except in “exceptional circumstances”.

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31.59

31.60

31.61

limit is unlikely to be considered appropriate in cases involving pleural plaques, where the feared future disease is a malignant condition with a timescale that is difficult to predict.212 The courts are unlikely to exercise their discretion to make such an award, thereby exposing the defender or its insurers to a future contingent liability, where the risk of future disease or deterioration is a “minor” one.213 Equally, such awards will not be granted where deterioration is a certainty, rather than a possibility; in such cases the nature of the condition should be reflected in a “once and for all” award of solatium.214 If a provisional award is to be made, it must be established that the disease or deterioration in the pursuer’s condition foreseen as a future risk is itself “serious”.215 In this connection, the requirement for “seriousness” relates to the disease or deterioration itself, rather than its consequences,216 although the effects of the deterioration may often be taken into consideration in measuring its seriousness.217 The statutory wording also entails that deterioration or future disease should have been brought about as a result of the defender’s initial wrongdoing. Although the pursuer’s environment and the circumstances of the pursuer’s ordinary life cannot entirely be ignored,218 a provisional award is not appropriate if the projected deterioration is likely to be triggered by a supervening cause for which the defender has no responsibility. An additional requirement is that the pursuer should be able to point to a “clear cut event” or an “identifiable threshold” to describe the stage at which the right to seek an award of further damages is to be exercised,219 rather than to a choice of future possibilities.220 As Lord Gill reflected in Bonar v Trafalgar House Offshore Fabrication Ltd, “the court should not impose upon a defender or his insurers a contingent liability for final damages unless the

212 See e.g. Fraser v Kitsons Insulation Contractors Ltd [2015] CSOH 135, 2015 SLT 753, allowing that an application might be made by the pursuer during his lifetime or by his executor up to three years after the pursuer’s death. 213 Bonar v Trafalgar House Offshore Fabrication Ltd 1996 SLT 548 per Lord Gill at 551; see also observations by Lord Murray in White v Inveresk Paper Co Ltd 1987 SC 143 at 150 that a risk of more than 1 per cent might be regarded as material, not de minimis, justifying a provisional award. See e.g. Fraser v Kitsons Insulation Contractors Ltd [2015] CSOH 135, 2015 SLT 753, where a provisional award was appropriate to a pursuer who suffered from pleural plaques and had a 3 per cent lifetime risk of developing mesothelioma and bronchial carcinoma. 214 Prentice v William Thyne Ltd 1989 SLT 336. 215 Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 12(1)(a). 216 White v Inveresk Paper Co Ltd 1987 SC 143 per Lord Murray at 149–150: “the word ‘serious’ primarily qualifies the deterioration rather than its effects, though no doubt effects could be taken into account in estimating the extent of deterioration”. 217 Robertson v British Bakeries Ltd 1991 SLT 434 per Lord Osborne at 439. 218 Robertson v British Bakeries Ltd 1991 SLT 434 per Lord Osborne at 439. 219 Prentice v William Thyne Ltd 1989 SLT 336; White v Inveresk Paper Co Ltd 1987 SC 143. 220 Meek v Burton’s Gold Medal Biscuits Ltd 1989 SLT 338.

Remedies  1121

nature and the extent of that liability are clear”.221 The requisite degree of certainty is more readily achieved when that threshold is described in terms of a specific medical event or a narrow range of such events.222 By contrast, provisional damages are unlikely to be considered appropriate where the pursuer is prone to a gradual progression of worsening symptoms.223 Lord Gill also suggested in Bonar that, although there was no statutory requirement to do so, the court should specify the relevant threshold in its interlocutor or in its Opinion.224 Where the pursuer has received a provisional award of damages, and 31.62 subsequently dies, the making of that award does not prevent relatives from making a claim in terms of sections 4 or 6 of the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 (loss of support, funeral expenses, non-patrimonial loss and loss of personal services). However, in determining the amount payable to relatives for loss of support, the court is directed to take into account such part of the provisional award relating to future patrimonial loss as was intended to compensate the deceased for a period beyond the date on which he or she died.225

(3) Periodical payments The Damages Act 1996, section 2, empowers a court awarding damages 31.63 in an action for personal injury to order that damages are wholly or partly to take the form of periodical payments over a particular time span, usually represented by the pursuer’s lifetime. Such payments are generally provided for by the defender purchasing an annuity, although section 6 of the 1996 Act allows for the possibility of “public sector settlements” being guaranteed by the Scottish Government without the need for purchase of an annuity. Such orders have hitherto required the consent of the parties. The Damages (Investment Returns and Periodical Payments) (Scotland) Act 2019, section 3, amends the 1996 Act to allow for the possibility that the court may make such an order without the parties’ consent, although the court must “have special regard to the pursuer’s needs and preferences when doing so”.

I. INTEREST Once the amount of damages payable under the heads discussed above 31.64 is determined, it remains for the court to specify the interest due on that

221 222 223 224 225

1996 SLT 548 at 550. See e.g. Fraser v Kitsons Insulation Contractors Ltd [2015] CSOH 135, 2015 SLT 753. Young v Scottish Coal (Deep Mining) Co Ltd 2002 SLT 1215. Bonar v Trafalgar House Offshore Fabrication Ltd 1996 SLT 548 at 550. Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 s 8(3).

1122   The Law of Delict in Scotland

31.65

amount. As a general rule, the Interest on Damages (Scotland) Act 1958, section 1, allows the court discretion to include, in its interlocutor, decree for payment of interest on the sum of damages as it relates to the period between the date when the right of action arose and the date of the interlocutor. Where damages are awarded for personal injuries, section 1A of the 1958 Act226 requires the court to award interest on the damages relating to that period, unless there are special circumstances otherwise.227 This means that each head of claim – loss of wages, past expenses, nonpatrimonial loss – requires to be considered for the purposes of attributing the relevant amount to that period; the date from which interest is calculated may vary according to nature of what is being claimed. Interest is calculated upon the gross sum of damages before deduction of any social security benefits repaid.228 The judicial rate of interest is fixed by the court rules,229 although it is within judicial discretion to adjust that rate where this is merited by the circumstances.230 Whether the full judicial rate of interest is awarded, or a reduced rate, may also vary as between the different heads of damages claimed.231 Thus, in addition to setting out the principal sum of damages due, the court may require payment of interest on certain parts of the total sum, at specified rates, and for a specified period or periods up until the date of decree. The principal sum and the figure for interest are then totalled, and a further amount of interest is specified to run on that total from the date of decree until payment.232

J. MITIGATION OF LOSS 31.66

As a general rule, the pursuer is not entitled to compensation for losses that might reasonably have been avoided by taking appropriate action after

226 As added by the Interest on Damages (Scotland) Act 1971 s 1. 227 For an account of the treatment of interest in the common law and on the reasoning underlying awards based upon the statute, see Farstad Supply AS v Enviroco Ltd [2011] CSOH 153, 2012 SLT 348, affd [2013] CSIH 9, 2013 SC 302. See also Sheridan v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2018] CSIH 76, 2019 SC 203 per Lord President Carloway at paras 50–51, holding that the pursuer’s conduct in the course of the litigation was not a reason for refusing the award of interest. 228 Wisely v John Fulton (Plumbers) Ltd 2000 SC (HL) 95. 229 RCS 7.7; for the Sheriff Court, see Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Extracts Act 1892 s 9. The current rate as specified there is 8 per cent. A table of judicial rates for successive periods is set out in McEwan and Paton on Damages para 3-01. 230 See e.g. Farstad Supply AS v Enviroco Ltd [2013] CSIH 9, 2013 SC 302, indicating that a “clear mismatch” between the judicial rate and the market rate over recent years was a factor that should be taken into account. 231 For a detailed account of the rates of interest applied to different heads of damages, see McEwan and Paton on Damages paras 3-09–3-13 (e.g. interest on past loss of wages is typically awarded at 50 per cent of the judicial rate from the date of harm being sustained until the date of decree, whereas interest on specific outlays is typically awarded at the full rate). 232 See e.g. Smith v Middleton 1972 SC 30.

Remedies  1123

the defender’s wrongdoing occurred.233 Pursuers are not judged to have acted unreasonably simply because, in the light of subsequent events, it transpires that they did not adopt the optimum strategy, but the award of damages may be reduced if, balancing all known considerations, the pursuer is found to have failed to take reasonable measures in dealing with the harm created by the defender.234 Judicial expectations of what is “reasonable” in the law of delict are, however, pitched at a modest level, given that the pursuer has suffered loss that may have occurred unexpectedly and without prior warning in any interaction between the parties.235 A correspondingly heavy onus is placed upon the defender to establish that the pursuer’s response has been unreasonable.236 In cases arising out of motor vehicle collisions, the full cost of remedy- 31.67 ing the damage and meeting the pursuer’s expenses may not be awarded if it can be shown that the expenditure incurred exceeded what was reasonable.237 Thus a person whose car has been damaged is not generally permitted to recover the full cost of repair if it is established that the cost of writing off the car and buying a satisfactory replacement would have been less.238 At the same time, a person will not be regarded as having acted unreasonably if the circumstances left no choice in the manner of dealing with the loss.239 Thus if the expenditure incurred in repairing or replacing a vehicle was increased because lack of money forced the pursuer to set about matters in a less than optimum way, those additional costs may nonetheless be recovered.240 In Lagden v O’Connor,241 the claimant’s car had been damaged as a result of the defendant’s negligence and required to be repaired. The claimant could not afford to pay out for the hire of a replacement car in the meantime, and therefore entered into a credit agreement for the hire, an option which cost more than paying for hire in the normal way. The House of Lords held that this additional cost

233 See e.g. Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA [1997] AC 254 per Lord Steyn at 285: “The plaintiff is not entitled to damages in respect of loss which he could reasonably have avoided.” On the other hand, if the level of damage suffered by the pursuer is partly the result of his or her own fault prior to or at the time of the defender’s wrongdoing, damages may be reduced to reflect contributory negligence, in terms of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 s 1: see paras 29.54ff above. 234 British Railways Board v South of Scotland Electricity Board 1973 SLT (Notes) 9 per Lord Brand at 9. 235 See Walker, Civil Remedies 866–867. 236 See e.g. Manorgate Ltd v First Scottish Property Services Ltd [2013] CSOH 108, [2014] PNLR 1 per Lord Woolman at paras 71-74; see also Geest plc v Lansiquot [2002] UKPC 48, [2002] 1 WLR 3111; Morris v Richards [2003] EWCA Civ 232, [2004] PIQR Q3 per Schiemann LJ at para 16. 237 Clark v City of Edinburgh Council [2010] CSOH 144, 2011 Rep LR 11; cf Allan v Amlin UK Ltd [2013] CSOH 156, 2014 SLT 75. 238 Rolls-Royce (1971) v Hutchison 1976 SLT (Notes) 15; see also Darbishire v Warran [1963] 1 WLR 1067. 239 Medicina v Midlothian Council [2013] CSOH 106, 2014 Rep LR 36. 240 Carson v McDonald 1987 SCLR 415. 241 [2003] UKHL 64, [2004] 1 AC 1067.

1124   The Law of Delict in Scotland

31.68

31.69

could be recovered since it was reasonably foreseeable that some car owners would be unable to obtain a replacement car other than by using a credit hire company. As Lord Hope reasoned, in the case of such drivers: “the cost of paying for the provision of additional services by a credit hire company must be attributed in law not to the choice of the motorist but to the act or omission of the wrongdoer”.242 Those who have suffered personal injuries are perhaps treated with greater indulgence than those who have suffered property damage, but the principle that loss should be minimised may be invoked, for example, in cases where the pursuer has unreasonably refused medical treatment which would have restored the pursuer’s capacity to work. The amount awarded for loss of earnings is then adjusted to reflect the amount to which the pursuer would have been entitled had he or she benefited from the degree of recovery that the medical procedure would be likely to have brought.243 Similarly, damages may be reduced where the pursuer’s recovery has been hindered by the pursuer’s failure to co-operate in the medical treatment offered.244 However, the pursuer is not expected to submit to medical treatment where the outcome is uncertain or on which professional advice is conflicting.245 Similarly, pursuers are expected to take up a reasonable offer of alternative employment, and the figure awarded for loss of earnings is likely to be reduced if such an offer is refused. However, a pursuer does not lose the right to claim for loss of earnings if the pursuer takes up that offer then loses the new employment through no fault of his or her own.246 In assessing what measures might be expected of pursuers to minimise loss it is relevant to consider whether they have refused a reasonable offer by the defender of remediation. In Nolan v Advance Construction (Scotland) Ltd,247 the defenders accepted that they had been responsible for the deposit of contaminated waste on the pursuer’s land. Subsequently they made repeated offers to clean up and reinstate the site, all of which were refused.

242 [2003] UKHL 64, [2004] 1 AC 1067 at para 3. 243 See e.g. McCabe v British Domestic Appliances Ltd 1978 SLT (Notes) 31; McAuley v London Transport Executive [1957] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 500; for further examples, see McEwan and Paton on Damages para 8-04 n 8. 244 See Davidson v Lothian and Borders Fire Board 2003 SLT 363 (revd on another issue, 2003 SLT 939), where the pursuer failed to disclose his medical history to medical advisers, missed appointments for treatment, and failed to accept advice as to the treatment prescribed for him. 245 Savage v Wallis [1966] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 357; and see Gracie v Clyde Spinning Co Ltd 1915 SC 906, in which it was held not to be unreasonable to refuse an operation which the pursuer’s own doctor had advised against. 246 Morris v Richards [2003] EWCA Civ 232, [2004] PIQR Q3: see Schiemann LJ at para 16: “The question whether [the claimant] was at fault is one which in principle the trial judge should resolve bearing in mind that it was the wrongful act of the defendant which put the claimant in the position of having to find a new job and that therefore she should not be judged too harshly.” 247 [2014] CSOH 4, 2014 SCLR 351.

Remedies  1125

The pursuer instead raised an action against them, claiming substantial damages to meet the costs incurred as a result of the deposit of the waste. This included investigating the extent and content of the spoil and making the site secure, as well as remediation. The court held, however, that by refusing the offers made by the defenders the pursuer had passed over the opportunity to remedy the situation earlier and at less cost and without the expense of investigative procedures. He was therefore found to be entitled only to the cost of re-profiling the ground to address the difference in levels caused by the spoil.

K. THE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND THE APPELLATE COURT Appeal courts are reluctant to interfere with the assessment of damages 31.70 made by the court at first instance. They are likely to intervene only if the judge “has applied the wrong principles, in the sense of misdirecting himself materially on the law, misunderstood the facts or arrived at a manifestly unfair assessment”.248 While such an intervention may be regarded as justified in relation to patrimonial loss if the calculations supporting the award are demonstrably wrong, there is a particular reluctance to disturb awards made in relation to non-patrimonial loss.249 As explained in Young v MacVean:250 “To the extent that the translation of intangibles such as grief and suffering into a sum of money is possible at all, it is not an exercise that is capable of being carried out with precision. It is likely to depend on impression and imponderable considerations. Its purpose, however, is to provide just compensation. The award is not to be quantified simply by reference to a tariff. Rather, the sum of damages is to be assessed by reference to the particular circumstances of the case, as disclosed in the evidence. Accordingly, when an assessment of damages is made the subject of review by an appellate court that court must give full weight to the privileges enjoyed by the judge at first instance.”

Where there is dissatisfaction with an award made by a jury, an applica- 31.71 tion for a new trial may be made on grounds such as that the damages 248 Currie v Esure Services Ltd [2014] CSIH 112, 2015 SC 351 per Lord Justice-Clerk Carloway at para 16. 249 See e.g. Henry v Rentokil Initial plc [2008] CSIH 24, 2008 SC 447. See also Watson, Laidlaw, & Co Ltd v Pott, Cassels, & Williamson 1914 SC (HL) 18 per Lord Shaw at 30, speaking of actions for personal injury: “It is in such cases, whether the result has been attained by the verdict of a jury or the finding of a single Judge, that the greatest weight attaches to the decision of the Court of first instance. The reasons for this are not far to seek – such as the value of testimony at first hand, even down to the nuances of its expression, and they include, of course, the attitude and demeanour of the witnesses themselves.” 250 [2015] CSIH 70, 2016 SC 135 per Lord Brodie at para 40.

1126   The Law of Delict in Scotland

awarded are “excessive or inadequate”, or on “such other ground as is essential to the justice of the cause”.251 However, an application is likely to succeed only where the appeal court perceives “gross injustice” in relation to an amount of damages which no “jury of ordinary men fairly and without gross mistake exercising their functions, could have awarded”.252 The starting point in determining whether this level of injustice has occurred is to identify a benchmark figure by reference to assessments in comparable claims, looking both at awards made by judges and at those made by juries.253 In the case of patrimonial loss, where the pursuer’s entitlement is capable of reasonably precise calculation, a relatively small departure from the judicial assessment may be enough to enable the appeal court to say that there was a gross injustice or that the result was manifestly wrong.254 Non-patrimonial loss, on the other hand, is less amenable to exact valuation. Reference is made in the Scottish cases to a “working rule” by which the appeal court does not consider itself entitled to set aside a jury’s verdict unless it concludes that the verdict is out of line by a factor of more than 100 per cent.255 However, this is to be regarded as a “rule of thumb, rather than a “precise formula”,256 which is not binding upon the court in cases where the interests of justice are not likely to be served by a new trial.257

L. INTERDICT 31.72

As “an equitable remedy designed to afford protection against an anticipated violation of the legal rights of the pursuer”,258 an interdict takes the form of a court order requiring the cessation of a particular course of conduct.259 It is competent for the pursuer to seek interdict alone, but in practice a conclusion or crave for interdict often accompanies another remedy or remedies, commonly declarator or damages.260 Interdict is a

251 See Court of Session Act 1988 s 29(1); Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 s 69(2). 252 Landell v Landell (1841) 3 D 819 at 825, cited in e.g. Girvan v Inverness Farmers Dairy 1998 SC (HL) 1; Hamilton v Ferguson Transport (Spean Bridge) Ltd [2012] CSIH 52, 2012 SC 486. 253 Girvan v Inverness Farmers Dairy 1998 SC (HL) 1 per Lord Hope at 16–17; but see also Hamilton v Ferguson Transport (Spean Bridge) Ltd [2012] CSIH 52, 2012 SC 486 per Lord President Hamilton at paras 61–64 for discussion of the practicalities of this exercise. 254 Girvan v Inverness Farmers Dairy 1998 SC (HL) 1 per Lord Hope at 17. 255 The “working rule” is explained by Lord Hope in Girvan v Inverness Farmers Dairy 1998 SC (HL) 1 at 8-13. 256 Girvan v Inverness Farmers Dairy 1998 SC (HL) 1 per Lord Hope at 17. 257 See e.g. Ferguson v Ferguson [2015] CSIH 63, 2015 SLT 561, where the jury had awarded an amount by way of solatium that was less than half of the judicial assessment. However, the figures were in any event not excessive, and the amount was to be reduced by contributory negligence assessed at 85 per cent. Any potential gain to the pursuer to be expected from a new trial would therefore have been modest. 258 Murdoch v Murdoch 1973 SLT (Notes) 13 per Lord President Emslie at 13. 259 For detailed treatment, see H Burn-Murdoch, Interdict in the Law of Scotland (1933); S Scott Robinson, The Law of Interdict, 2nd edn (1994). 260 Burn-Murdoch, Interdict 10; Macphail’s Sheriff Court Practice para 21.84.

Remedies  1127

“preventive” measure,261 applicable to delictual wrongdoing that is continuing or that is apprehended as likely to occur, but inapplicable where the wrong has already been completed.262 It must be shown, therefore, that the defender’s activities are wrongful and ongoing, or that there are reasonable grounds to believe that wrongdoing will be perpetrated at a future point.263 In this connection evidence that similar wrongdoing has already taken place may be accepted as sufficient grounds for fear of recurrence.264 An interdict should not be granted in terms wider than necessary to 31.73 curb the wrongful conduct,265 and it must therefore be worded266 in such a way as to give the defender precise notice of the conduct complained of, and of what he or she is to be prevented from doing.267 In the context of defamation, for example, an interdict against the making of “defamatory statements” is likely to be refused as “too vague”,268 but where a particular statement carrying a defamatory meaning has already been made, interdict may be granted against its repetition, which would be understood as extending to “any other representation which was a mere paraphrase or colourable variation” of the statement complained of.269 A petition for breach of interdict was at one time regarded as a “quasi- 31.74 criminal proceeding”.270 The concurrence in the proceedings of the Lord Advocate is required,271 the standard of proof is proof beyond reasonable

261 Earl of Breadalbane v Jamieson (1877) 4 R 667 per Lord President Inglis at 672. 262 Hill v Council of the Law Society of Scotland 2000 SC 582. 263 William Hay’s Trs v Young (1877) 4 R 398 per Lord Ormidale at 401 (quoting the Sheriffsubstitute). Cf Inverurie Magistrates v Sorrie 1956 SC 175, in which interdict was refused against the defender taking horses on to the pursuers’ land. The defender had previously been unsuccessful in seeking declarator that he was entitled to exercise his horses there. However, in the absence of evidence as to actual trespass or of an explicit threat to trespass, it was said that interdict was not to be used by the pursuers as “a punishment for advancing a claim of right which turns out to be ill-founded” (per Lord Patrick at 181), but granted only where there was reasonable apprehension that the defender would indeed commit an illegal act. 264 Countess of Seafield v Kemp (1899) 1 F 402. See also Green v Chalmers [2017] SAC (Civ) 8, 2017 SLT (Sh Ct) 69, in which there might have been insufficient evidence that the defenders would repeat specific previous acts, but those previous acts were sufficient evidence of a continuing course of conduct constituting harassment for the purposes of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, and interdict was therefore granted. See para 28.12 above. 265 Murdoch v Murdoch 1973 SLT (Notes) 13 per Lord President Emslie at 13; Logan v Wang (UK) Ltd 1991 SLT 580 per Lord Prosser at 586 on the need to frame the interdict in terms “closely related to the apprehended wrongs”. 266 See Kelso School Board v Hunter (1874) 2 R 228 per Lord Deas at 232: “The responsibility of making it [sufficiently clear] lies upon the party asking the interdict, and the Court is not called upon to relieve him of that responsibility. He may be allowed to amend his prayer, but if interdict cannot be granted in accordance with the original or amended prayer it cannot be granted at all.” 267 Kelso School Board v Hunter (1874) 2 R 228; Webster v Lord Advocate 1985 SC 173; Green v Chalmers [2017] SAC (Civ) 8, 2017 SLT (Sh Ct) 69 at para 35. 268 Shinwell v National Sailors’ and Firemen’s Union 1913 2 SLT 83. 269 John Henderson & Son v Alexander Munro & Co (1905) 7 F 636 per Lord McLaren at 640; see e.g. Fairbairn v Scottish National Party 1979 SC 393. 270 H Burn-Murdoch, Interdict in the Law of Scotland (1933) para 451. 271 Gribben v Gribben 1976 SLT 266 at 269; see also discussion in Byrne v Ross 1992 SC 498.

1128   The Law of Delict in Scotland

31.75

31.76

doubt,272 and breach may attract sanctions including by fine or imprisonment.273 Nonetheless, the civil courts are empowered to impose those sanctions.274 Interdicts may be perpetual, effective without limit of time, or may be granted on an interim basis. A perpetual interdict is “an extraordinary remedy”, not to be given except for compelling reasons,275 but where such reasons have been made out, there is “a definite right to interdict”, unaffected by issues such as balance of convenience or loss to the defender.276 As a matter of general principle, the fact that “enforcement would cause great inconvenience or pecuniary loss to somebody else” is not accepted as a reason for denying enforcement of an established right.277 Similarly, considerations of public interest do not preclude the grant of perpetual interdict, even if the activities of the defender are of manifest benefit to the community at large.278 Such considerations may, however, be taken into account in persuading the court that interdict should be suspended for a limited period in order to allow the defender to attend to remedial measures.279 An application for interim interdict is typically made when a petition for perpetual interdict is presented, but it is competent to seek interim interdict at any time up until the case is resolved, with a view to the interdict remaining in force until recalled280 or until the final outcome of the proceedings is reached. The function of an interim interdict is “to prevent the object of a depending action from being defeated”,281 and it may therefore be appropriate where there is a prospect that “serious harm” would otherwise be suffered.282 A “prima facie case” must be made in support of an interdict of the kind requested,283 but in deciding whether to grant

272 Gribben v Gribben 1976 SLT 266 at 269. 273 S Scott Robinson, The Law of Interdict, 2nd edn (1994) 168. 274 Burn-Murdoch, Interdict para 451. See e.g. Sky plc v Stewart [2017] CSOH 141, 2017 GWD 36-55. 275 Kelso School Board v Hunter (1874) 2 R 228 per Lord Deas at 232. 276 Ferguson v Tennant 1978 SC (HL) 19 per Lord Justice-Clerk Wheatley at 47; Clippens Oil Company Ltd v Edinburgh and District Water Trustees (1897) 25 R 370 per Lord Adam at 382. 277 Bank of Scotland v Stewart (1891) 18 R 957 per Lord President Inglis at 972. 278 Webster v Lord Advocate 1985 SC 173. See in particular the Lord Ordinary, Lord Stott, at 180: refusal of perpetual interdict on grounds of public interest would mean “that a private citizen could seldom, if ever, resist any intrusion upon his rights through a development beneficial to the community and undertaken by a large employer or public authority. Interest cannot overrule law . . . and Lord Denning’s suggestion in Miller v Jackson [[1977] QB 966] that an Englishman’s home is no longer his castle cannot in my opinion apply to a Scotswoman’s flat.” 279 Webster v Lord Advocate 1985 SC 173; see also Clippens Oil Company Ltd v Edinburgh and District Water Trustees (1897) 25 R 370 per Lord McLaren at 383–384. 280 See e.g. Waddell v BBC 1973 SLT 246; Massie v McCaig [2013] CSIH 14, 2013 SC 343. 281 Kelso School Board v Hunter (1874) 2 R 228 per Lord Deas at 232. 282 See e.g. X v BBC 2005 SLT 796. 283 Osborne v BBC 2000 SC 29.

Remedies  1129

interdict on an interim basis (unlike perpetual interdict)284 the courts may consider “on which side the balance of convenience with regard to the interim regulation of the actings of parties (pending a decision on the merits of the dispute between them) lies”.285 Thus, although the threat of harm to the person seeking interdict is the central consideration, the possibility of significant inconvenience to the defender may also be taken into account.286

284 Clippens Oil Company Ltd v Edinburgh and District Water Trustees (1897) 25 R 370 at 382. 285 Scottish Milk Marketing Board v Paris 1935 SC 287 per Lord President Clyde at 296. 286 See e.g. Derwent Valley Foods v Forth Valley Foods, unreported, CSOH, Lord Cowie, 18 January 1990, where the balance of convenience favoured the defenders, given that the disruptive effect of interdict on the defenders’ business would be much more “devastating” than the likely effect of the defenders’ activities upon the pursuers.

Index

abnormal damage, 22.42–46 see also hazardous operations absolute privilege judicial proceedings, 17.58, 18.102–104 and malicious publication, 18.148 parliamentary proceedings, 18.101 see also immunity from suit absolute rights and personal rights overview, 2.01–05 bodily and mental integrity, 2.06–07, 2.27 economic well-being, 2.12–13 historical foundations, 1.20, 1.33 integrity of property, 2.10–11 liberty, 2.08, 2.27 reputation, 2.09 academic journals qualified privilege, 18.115 accessory liability, 2.42–44 see also inducing breach of contract accountants duty and standard of care, 11.30 accounting for profits breach of confidence, 17.74, 19.24

1130

acquiescence nuisance, 22.72 see also consent actio de effusis vel dejectis, 22.82–83, 22.85–86 actio de positis vel suspensis, 22.82, 22.84–86 Adam, W, Trial by Jury, 1.24 advocates absolute privilege, 18.102–103 duty of confidentiality, 19.02 immunity from suit, 7.16n69, 11.56 aemulatio vicini, 21.108, 22.79–81 affront and insult assault, 16.01, 16.03, 16.09, 16.12, 16.19–21 deprivation of liberty, 17.07, 17.09 agents, liability of principals direct liability, 3.71 vicarious liability, 3.72–76 agricultural produce product liability, 26.40 aircraft and trespass, 23.02 alterum non laedere, 1.13–14 ambulance service duty of care, 4.56, 9.54–58, 12.15 see also emergency services

Index  1131

animals, liability for, 27.01–24 overview, 27.01–03 liability in negligence, 27.01–03 joint and several liability, 13.15, 13.25 straying animals, 23.04, 23.09 statutory liability under Animals (Scotland) Act, 27.04–24 conditions for liability, 27.04 contributory negligence, 27.22–23 “directly referable” requirement, 27.12–17 exclusions, 27.18–21 meaning of “injury or damage”, 27.05 persons liable, 27.06–08 self help, 27.24 species covered, 27.09–11 see also nuisance antisocial behaviour, 22.50 apologies under 2016 Act, 1.38 offers to make amends, 18.119–123 apparent authority doctrine, 3.71 architects duty of care, 11.28 standard of care, 11.28–29 armed forces “combat immunity”, 7.16, 12.12 arrestment, breach of, 1.08–09 asbestos-related diseases mesothelioma, 2.51, 13.11, 13.37–46, 13.50–54 pleural plaques, 1.37, 6.49–50, 31.19, 31.58 assault, 16.01–72 overview, 16.01–03

affront and insult, 16.01, 16.03, 16.09, 16.12, 16.19–21, 31.04 battery, 16.02 consent, 16.42–55 nature of consent, 16.42–44 burden of proof, 16.45–47 and medical procedures, 16.51–55 and sport, 16.48–50 contributory negligence, 16.56–58 excessive use of force police, 16.36–39, 17.21 transport officials, 16.40–41 indirect assault, 16.19–20 Institutional writers on, 16.01 and intention, 15.04–05, 15.08, 15.18, 16.06–10 justifications for use of force, 16.24–35 chastisement of children, 16.35 protection of property, 16.33 provocation, 16.28–32 resistance to unlawful arrest, 16.34 self-defence, 16.24–27 liability of partnerships, 2.30 mental harm, 16.59–72 notional assault, 16.21 physical injury infliction of, 16.11–15 threat of, 16.15–18 relevance of criminal proceedings, 16.04 sexual assault, 16.22–23, 16.44 solatium, 16.01, 16.03, 31.04, 31.20 and stalking, 16.17–18

1132  Index

associations see unincorporated associations; voluntary associations assumption of responsibility, 5.27–94 development of concept, 5.27–32 summary, 5.92–94 and Caparo features of duty, 5.90–91 and contractual agreement on allocation of risk, 5.89–91 and contractual chains, 5.79–84 by emergency services, 7.24, 9.24–26 for negligent misrepresentation see negligent misrepresentation for negligent provision of services see negligent provision of services by public authorities, 7.19–24 voluntary acceptance requirement, 5.85–88 assumption of risk see volenti non fit injuria assythment, 1.03, 1.05, 1.08–09, 1.10, 1.15, 16.05 auctioneers standard of care, 11.15 audio-visual media and confidentiality, 19.31 and misuse of private information, 20.32 auditors duty and standard of care, 11.30 Balfour, Sir James, Practicks, 1.05 banks bank references, 5.27–28, 5.39, 5.47, 5.55

obligation of confidentiality, 19.40 Bankton, A McDouall, Lord on clerks to the signet, 19.02 on “Delinquencies”, 1.10, 1.12 on injury, 16.01, 18.65 on liability of householders, 22.83–84 on liability of masters, 3.05 on nuisance, 22.01 on quasi ex delicto obligations, 1.18 on remedies, 2.21n66 Bell, G J and absolute rights, 2.03n7, 2.05, 2.45 on aemulatio vicini doctrine, 22.80 on assault, 16.01, 16.02 on confidentiality, 19.11–13, 19.15n58 on delicts and quasi-delicts, 1.19–20, 1.33 on detention in asylum, 17.39 on liability of masters, 3.07 on liberty, 17.17 on nuisance, 1.34, 22.02 on solatium, 31.15 on support to adjacent property, 23.17 Blackstone, Sir William, 1.33n181 blogging and expectations of privacy, 20.29 bodily and mental integrity, right to, 2.06–07, 2.27, 16.01 breach of arrestment, 1.08–09 breach of confidence, 19.01–75 introduction, 19.01 and detriment, 19.57–60 historical development, 19.02–19

Index  1133

contractual relationships, 19.03–04 copyright, 19.05–09 delictual liability, 19.10–19 image rights, 20.63–71 information obtained by third parties, 19.22–24 and law of equity, 19.20–24 misappropriation of information, 19.45–56 forms of misappropriation, 19.45–47 negligent guarding of information, 19.56 by third parties, 19.48–54 used for different purpose, 19.55 misuse of private information distinguished, 20.01, 20.15, 20.52 obligation of confidentiality, 19.25–44 circumstances in which acquired, 19.34–35 confidential quality of information, 19.26–33 family members, 19.41–43 healthcare professionals, 19.04, 19.36, 19.66, 19.69 duty to warn non-patients, 4.66–70 legal advisers, 19.37–39, 19.65 ties of friendship, 19.41, 19.44 photographs, 19.04, 19.19, 19.28, 19.31 pre-contractual negotiations, 19.21 private correspondence, 19.05–06, 19.11–13 private journals, 19.28

and public interest, 19.61–69 remedies accounting for profits, 17.74, 19.24 damages, 17.72–73, 19.24 interdict, 19.24, 19.70–71 statutory protection for trade secrets, 19.75 breach of statutory duty, 24.01–28 introduction, 24.01–02 burden of proof, 24.21 causation, 24.22–25 company directors, 24.26 contributory negligence, 24.27 employers, 12.30–37 as evidence of common law liability, 12.34–35 harm within scope of statute, 24.18–19 indicators of right of action, 24.05–17 and negligent performance of statutory functions, 24.02, 24.03–04 specific provision to be specified, 24.20 and volenti non fit injuria, 24.28 see also animals, liability for; harassment; occupiers’ liability; product liability Broun, J, Nuisance, 22.04 builders product liability, 26.35 bullying, 9.34, 11.32 see also harassment “but-for” test, 13.04–10 Campbell, R, Negligence, 1.22, 1.29 care of the vulnerable as non-delegable duty, 3.87–92, 4.54–56

1134  Index

causation see factual causation; legal causation causing loss by unlawful means, 21.33–50 essential components, 21.33–46 intention, 21.35–37 loss caused to pursuer, 21.44–46 use of unlawful means, 21.38–41 dealing requirement, 21.42–43 examples, 21.34 historical background, 21.02–03 inducing breach of contract distinguished, 21.23, 21.33 and justification, 21.47 and non-commercial losses, 21.45 and non-economic interests, 21.46 trade union immunity, 21.02n7 charitable organisations actions for defamation, 18.49 duty of care, 11.42 qualified privilege, 18.110 relationships “akin to employment”, 3.26 standard of care, 11.42–44 child abuse actions restrictions on limitation, 30.17–19 children assumption of risk, 29.12 calculation of patrimonial loss, 31.33 chastisement of, 16.35 and contributory negligence, 10.31, 29.61–63 delictual liability, 2.22–23, 10.31 giving evidence against parents, 19.41 and lawful detention, 17.17n62 occupiers’ liability for, 25.37–40

parental liability for, 2.25, 3.02 parents’ duty of care to, 4.65 and privacy, 20.21, 20.25 sexual exploitation of, 16.22 standard of care, 10.32–35 suing parents, 2.24 supervision of duty of care, 4.54–55, 4.65 standard of care, 10.36–37, 11.31–35 see also care of the vulnerable circumvention, 1.08–09 citizen’s arrest, 17.12 civil partnerships, 3.02 clergy and qualified privilege, 18.111 relationships “akin to employment”, 3.23 and vicarious liability, 3.23 clubs see associations coal mining see mining operations “combat immunity”, 7.16, 12.12 commercial carriers duty of care, 4.57 early cases, 1.21 Commissary courts, 1.05 common employment doctrine, 3.09, 12.01–03 common interest doctrine, 23.34–35 companies actions in delict, 2.26–28 defamation, 18.49–50, 18.54–55 assumption of responsibility by employees, 5.50 directors’ liability for breach of statutory duty, 24.26 duty of care during takeovers, 5.37 illegality defence against, 29.49–51

Index  1135

qualified privilege for company reports, 18.118 Registrar of Companies’ responsibility to, 5.55 “complex structure” theory, 5.19–21 conscious recklessness, 15.07–08, 16.08 consent assault, 16.42–55 nature of consent, 16.42–44 burden of proof, 16.45–47 and medical procedures, 16.51–55 and sport, 16.48–50 detention by private persons, 17.13–15 nuisance, 22.72 see also volenti non fit injuria conspiracy, 21.51–62 historical background, 21.02–03, 21.51 lawful-means conspiracy, 21.52–55, 21.53–55 trade union immunity, 21.02 unlawful-means conspiracy, 21.52, 21.56–62 contract interference with see interference with contract restrictions of liability, 25.61–62, 29.23 contractors see independent contractors contractual chains, 5.79–84 contravention, 1.08–09 contributory negligence, 29.54–67 background and general rule, 29.54–55 and assault, 16.56–58 and breach of statutory duty, 24.27

calculation of proportion, 29.64–66 where joint fault, 29.67 and children, 10.31, 29.61–63 “fault” and “own fault”, 29.55–59 and liability for animals, 27.22–23 and novus actus interveniens, 14.15 and occupiers’ liability, 25.54 and product liability, 26.93–95 and self-harm, 29.60 and workplace accidents, 12.01 corporations see companies court reports absolute privilege, 18.104 qualified privilege, 18.117 reporting of crime, 20.21n91 criminal convictions confidentiality, 19.30 Crown actions by and against, 2.38–39 see also public authorities culpa historical development, 1.04, 1.12, 1.23 and nuisance, 22.06, 22.08, 22.35, 22.43, 22.59 culpa tenet suos auctore, 3.01 curfews, 17.03–05 damage, concept of, 1.08–14, 31.02 damages, 31.02–71 function of, 2.14–17, 31.02–09 appeal of award, 31.70 application for new trial, 31.71 breach of confidence, 17.72–73, 19.24 and common interest obligation, 23.35 conventional awards, 31.09 damage to property, 31.10–12 defective products, 26.41–45

1136  Index

damages (cont.) deprivation of liberty, 17.07, 17.09, 17.46 encroachment, 22.30, 23.13 fraud, 21.75–76 under Human Rights Act, 7.33 incursion into home, 20.77 interest, 31.64–65 interference with support, 23.15 misuse of private information, 20.57, 31.04 mitigation of loss, 31.66–69 and negligence, 2.14–15 negligent provision of information, 31.13–14 nominal damages, 31.08 passing off, 21.105–106 personal injury, 31.53–56 asymptomatic conditions, 31.16–19 claims by executor, 31.46–48 claims by relatives, 31.49–56 loss of personal services, 31.52 loss of support, 31.50–51 non-patrimonial loss, 31.53–56 interest, 31.64–65 interim damages, 31.57 meaning of term, 31.16 mitigation of loss, 31.68 and nuisance, 22.13 patrimonial loss, 31.25–44 nature of award, 31.15, 31.25 future loss, 31.29–37 past and future expenses, 31.38–41 past loss, 31.26–28 social security benefits, 31.42–44 periodical payments, 31.63 provisional damages, 31.58–62

solatium nature and calculation of award, 31.03, 31.15, 31.20–24 assault, 16.01, 16.03, 31.04, 31.20 claims by executor, 31.46, 31.48 Institutional writers on, 16.01, 31.04, 31.15 and legal persons, 18.49 medical negligence, 11.54–55, 14.41–42, 31.05 negligent misrepresentation, 31.13 psychiatric injury, 6.01–03 wrongful birth, 16.79, 16.92, 16.94–95 punitive or exemplary damages, 31.07 and strict liability, 2.20 trespass, 23.05–06 and vindication, 31.04–06 water pollution, 13.14 damnum iniuria datum, 1.12 defamation, 18.01–129 overview, 2.09, 18.01–04 actions by corporate bodies bodies trading for profit, 18.49–50 corporations, 18.54–55 partnerships, 18.56 political parties, 18.62 public authorities, 18.57–60 trades unions, 18.63 voluntary associations, 18.61 causing individual to be shunned, 18.34–36 “chaff and banter”, 18.29, 18.41 in commercial adverts, 18.06 defences overview, 18.68

Index  1137

absolute privilege judicial proceedings, 17.58, 18.102–104 parliamentary proceedings, 18.101 honest opinion, 18.88–99 public interest, 18.75–87 qualified privilege see qualified privilege reportage, 18.86–87 truth, 18.69–74 enactment of 2021 Act, 1.38, 18.03 and fictional characters, 18.07, 18.34, 18.51n193 and image rights, 20.72 innuendo, 18.15–16 and intention, 18.51–53, 18.105 libel and slander, 18.05, 18.39 limitation period, 18.149–155 meaning of “publication”, 18.37–38 meaning of “statement”, 18.05–09 misuse of private information distinguished, 20.54 “ordinary persons” test, 18.17, 18.19–21 physical actions, 18.08 prescription period, 18.155 principles of construction, 18.11–14 qualified privilege remarks in rixa, 18.32–33 remedies discursive remedies, 18.128 interim interdict, 18.129 offers to make amends, 18.119–123 reputation as right, 2.09 ridicule and irony, 18.27–30 “right-thinking” test, 18.17–18 secondary publishers, 18.124–127

serious harm requirement, 18.39–48 and social media, 18.13–14, 18.38, 18.46–47, 18.93 solatium, 31.20 statements made after death, 18.65–67 statements made before death, 18.64 types of defamatory imputation, 18.22–26 unmeaning abuse, 18.31 by use of images, 18.06 and verbal injury, 18.02 defective products see product liability defenders, multiple, 2.40, 13.24–27 industrial disease cases, 13.55–60 interdict in nuisance cases, 13.13, 22.28 deforcement, 1.08–09 deportation orders, 17.29–30 deprivation of liberty, 17.01–51 civil rights of detainees, 17.31–32 confinement defined, 17.03 and consent, 17.13–15 and corporations, 2.27 curfews, 17.03 and ECHR, 17.06 human trafficking, 17.16 judicial immunity, 17.33–38 liberty as right, 2.08, 17.01–02 malicious prosecution distinguished, 17.26, 17.56 police detention and arrest, 17.17–27 by private persons, 17.10–16 prolongation of imprisonment, 17.28 in psychiatric institutions, 17.39 quantification of damages, 17.07, 17.09, 17.46 remedies under Human Rights Act, 17.43–48

1138  Index

deprivation of liberty (cont.) resulting from negligence, 17.49–51 by transport officials, 17.40–42 unlawful deportation orders, 17.29–30 where detainee unaware, 17.09 designers product liability, 26.35 disability standard of care, 10.39–40 unforeseeable loss of control, 10.41–47 wrongful birth, 16.91–95 wrongful life, 16.96 wrongful pregnancy, 16.80–86, 16.88 “divisible” harm, 13.12–14, 13.48–49 doctors see medical professionals Donoghue v Stevenson, 1.30, 4.01, 4.03–12, 10.01, 11.01, 26.04–05 developments from, 4.13–26 “doubles the risk” test, 13.63–68 duty of care development of duty pre-Donoghue, 1.24–30 Donoghue v Stevenson, 1.30, 4.01, 4.03–12 Anns, Caparo and Robinson, 4.13–26 features of duty overview, 4.26 foreseeability of damage, 4.27–31, 4.34–36 proximity, 4.32–37 novel cases, 4.38–42 fairness, justice and reasonableness, 4.38–39 policy considerations, 4.37, 4.39–42 see also economic loss; emergency services;

non-delegable duties; omissions; psychiatric injury; public authorities; roads authorities and under animals, occupiers’ liability, product liability economic delicts see aemulatio vicini; causing loss by unlawful means; conspiracy; fraud; inducing breach of contract; passing off economic loss, 5.01–94 background and justification for no-duty rule, 5.01–04 assumption of responsibility, 5.27–94 development of concept, 5.27–32 summary, 5.92–94 and Caparo features of duty, 5.90–91 and contractual agreement on allocation of risk, 5.89–91 and contractual chains, 5.79–84 for negligent misrepresentation see below for negligent provision of services see below voluntary acceptance requirement, 5.85–88 employers’ duty to employees, 12.26–29 and insurance, 2.51, 5.03 juristic persons as advisers, 5.50 and limitation, 30.06 loss consequent on damage to property, 5.05–11 defective goods, 5.13–15 defects in buildings, 5.16–25 “complex structure” theory, 5.19–21 injury to another, 5.12

Index  1139

loss of employee’s services, 14.28 negligent misrepresentation, 5.33–58 in absence of fraud (1985 Act), 5.48 continuing representations, 5.49 duty of care, 5.33 employment references, 5.51–54, 5.56 indicators of duty, 5.34–47 juristic persons as advisers, 5.50 as to pursuer’s interests, 5.57–58 by Registrar of Companies, 5.55 negligent provision of services, 5.59–78 overview, 5.59 liability to third parties, 5.64–78 significance of contractual relationship, 5.60–63 and nuisance, 22.14 and police officers, 9.20, 9.36 and product liability, 5.13–15, 26.45 pure economic loss defined, 2.12, 5.02 and SAAMCO principle, 14.46–51, 14.53 economic well-being, right to, 2.12–13 education authorities occupiers’ liability, 11.33 see also teachers “eggshell skull” rule nature of rule, 14.38–40 and intentional assault, 16.14 and property damage, 14.45 and psychiatric injury, 6.11, 6.16, 6.41, 14.43–44 and underlying medical conditions, 14.41–42

ejection see wrongful occupation of land emergency services assumption of responsibility, 7.24 duty of care, 4.56 and occupiers’ liability, 25.45–46 standard of care, 11.36–41, 12.15 see also ambulance service; fire service; maritime and coastguard agency; police; rescuers employers duty/liability to employees, 12.01–37 bullying and harassment, 9.34 economic loss, 12.26–29 employment references, 4.35, 4.40, 5.51–54, 5.56, 12.29, 13.99, 18.110 firefighters, 9.51–52, 12.15 injury by animals, 27.20 occupational stress, 6.45, 9.34, 12.16–25 police officers, 9.33–37 qualified privilege, 18.110–111 safe working conditions breach of statutory duty, 12.30–37 competent staff, 12.05 hazardous workplaces, 12.12–15 historical background, 12.01–03 injuries caused by fellow employees, 3.09, 3.57–61, 12.01–03 as non-delegable duty, 3.09, 3.82–86, 12.03–04 plant and equipment, 12.06–08, 12.36–37 safe system of working, 12.09–11, 12.33

1140  Index

employers (cont.) volenti non fit injuria defence, 12.01–02, 12.25, 29.16–18 witnessing workplace accidents, 6.37, 12.16 vicarious liability for employees, 3.01–67 overview, 3.01–04 close-connection test, 3.39–66 customer-facing roles, 3.47, 3.51–53 “field of activities” criterion, 3.46–47 fraud by employees, 3.64–66 “frolics” of employee’s own, 3.48–49 importance of context, 3.50 interactions between employees, 3.57–61 nature of test, 3.39–45 police officers, 3.54–56 theft by employees, 3.62–63 common employment doctrine, 3.09, 12.01–03 employment relationships, 3.18–22 harassment, 3.59–61, 28.16–17 historic liability of masters, 3.05–08 loaned employees, 3.31–32 policy arguments, 3.10–16 enterprise liability, 2.16, 3.14 relationships “akin to employment”, 3.16, 3.20, 3.23–29 independent contractors distinguished, 3.02, 3.30 and res ipsa loquitur, 10.64 Salmond test, 3.35–45 shared responsibility, 3.33–34 suspension of limitation period, 30.15

travel in course of employment, 3.67–70 trespass, 23.08 see also breach of statutory duty employers’ liability insurance, 2.51, 3.03–04, 15.21 employment references, 4.35, 4.40, 5.51–54, 5.56, 12.29, 13.99, 18.110 encroachment, 22.30, 23.11–14 enterprise liability, 2.16, 3.14 Erskine, J on blameable omission, 4.44 general principle of liability, 1.13–14, 1.24 on plus quam tolerabile, 22.19n125 on slander and libel, 18.05n21 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment, 17.46 right to fair and public hearing, 7.14–15 right to freedom of expression, 18.42 right to liberty and security of person, 17.06, 17.17n62, 17.43 right to life, 7.34, 9.38–41 right to private and family life, 17.46, 18.01, 18.42, 19.30, 19.67, 20.20–21, 20.82, 22.66, 22.74 see also Human Rights Act 1998 Eurotort, 7.45 excessive use of force police, 16.36–39, 17.21 transport officials, 16.40–41 executors personal injury claims, 31.46–48

Index  1141

expert witnesses immunity from suit, 7.16n69, 11.56 professional negligence cases, 11.06, 11.09–13, 11.30 extortion, 1.08–09 ex turpi causa non oritur actio see illegality defence factual causation, 13.01–102 overview, 13.01–03 actions under Human Rights Act, 7.34 apportionment of liability, 13.24–27, 13.47–62 breach of statutory duty, 24.22–24 “but-for” test, 13.04–10 Chester v Afshar, 13.82–86 competing sources, 13.22–23 defective products, 26.19 “doubles the risk” test, 13.63–68 failure to disclosure medical risk, 11.53 independent wrongful acts, 13.16–21 “indivisible” and “divisible” harm distinguished, 13.11–12 joint and several liability, 13.14–27 loss of a chance, 13.87–102 overview, 13.87 commercial chance, 13.96–99 in litigation, 13.100–102 medical chance, 13.88–95 “material contribution” test, 13.13–14, 13.28–31, 13.69–75 “material increase in risk” test, 2.51, 13.32–46 occupational stress, 12.24 product liability, 26.19, 26.65–68 supervening events, 13.76–81 wrongdoers acting in concert, 13.15

Fairchild principle, 13.37–46 false imprisonment see deprivation of liberty family members actions for damages for death of relative, 2.41, 31.49–56 loss of personal services, 31.52 loss of support, 31.50–51 non-patrimonial loss, 31.53–56 and defamation of the dead, 18.64–67 litigation between, 2.24–25, 6.28 and obligation of confidentiality, 19.41–43 see also children; parents; spouses fictional characters and defamation, 18.07, 18.34, 18.51n193 and passing off, 21.95 fire service, 9.42–52 duty to extinguish fires, 9.43–49 duty to firefighters as employees, 9.51–52, 12.15 eventualities other than fire, 9.50 and occupiers’ liability, 25.45–46 psychiatric injury, 6.32–33 standard of care, 11.37 statutory duties, 9.42, 9.50 vicarious liability, 9.42 see also emergency services Forbes, W, Institutes, 22.01 foreseeability and assumption of responsibility, 5.90 and children, 10.31–34 duty of care, 4.27–31 occupational stress, 12.17–20 psychiatric injury, 6.09–14 legal causation, 14.04–05 remoteness of damage, 14.23–34 standard of care, 10.04–12

1142  Index

forgery, 1.08–09 France breach of privacy, 20.04 delicts and quasi-delicts, 1.18 “Francovich liability”, 7.45 fraud, 21.63–81 overview, 21.63–65 entitlement to damages, 21.75–76 law agent’s duty to disclose, 21.79–81 mode of deception, 21.66–68 reliance by pursuer, 21.72–73 state of mind of defender, 21.69–71 types of harm, 21.74 vicarious liability employers, 3.64–66 partnerships, 2.30, 21.78 principals, 3.73 freedom of expression see breach of confidence; defamation; privacy furtum, 1.08 Germany absolute rights, 2.05 encroachment, 23.12n54 privacy rights, 20.05–06 gifts product liability, 26.34 gig economy, 3.27 Glegg, A T, 1.22, 1.23n123, 1.28, 1.34, 4.12, 4.44, 13.03n6, 15.10, 18.16n57, 19.15n58, 23.25, 25.19 goodwill, 21.84–87 Grotius, H, 1.07 Guthrie Smith, J, 1.22, 1.23, 1.28, 1.34, 2.14n33, 2.14n35, 3.07, 4.44, 6.03n15, 10.39n103, 13.03n6, 16.57n244, 18.34, 18.51, 19.15, 21.81n257, 22.02, 23.06, 25.02, 31.04

hamesucken, 20.76 harassment, 28.01–19 overview, 28.01–02 conduct constituting harassment, 28.03–06 stalking, 16.17–18 distress caused, 28.07–08 to third parties, 28.11 of and by employees, 3.59–61, 9.34, 28.16–17 financial losses caused by, 21.50 and intention to cause, 28.09 interdict, 28.12–13 liability of legal persons, 2.28, 2.30, 28.02 limitation period, 28.18–19 multiple pursuers, 28.10 non-harassment orders, 28.14–15 see also bullying; lawburrows; molestation hazardous operations, 3.83–86 see also abnormal damage hazardous workplaces, 12.12–15 HIV infection, 16.13 Hope, Sir Thomas, Major Practicks, 1.05 hospital authorities duty of care, 3.91–92, 4.55 and product liability, 26.34, 26.75 vicarious liability of NHS, 3.22 see also medical negligence; medical professionals Human Rights Act 1998 overview and impact on delict, 2.45–47, 20.10 freedom of expression and breach of confidence, 19.29, 19.62, 19.71 and defamation, 18.75, 18.129 and privacy, 20.56 liability of police, 9.38–41

Index  1143

liability of public authorities overview, 2.46–47, 7.31–34 breach of statutory duty, 24.16–17 damages as vindication, 31.06 deprivation of liberty, 17.43–48 hybrid bodies, 7.01 misuse of private information, 20.75 nuisance, 22.54–55, 22.66, 22.73–78 human trafficking, 17.16 Hume, D, Baron on assault, 16.01 on crimes against reputation, 15.04n11 on criminal and civil actions, 1.32 on direct and indirect injuries to property, 22.02 on direct liability for tradesmen, 3.84 on ex delicto and quasi ex delicto obligations, 1.18 on “fault binds its authors”, 3.01 on liability of householders, 22.83 on liability of masters, 3.06n27 on nuisance, 1.34 on offence of hamesucken, 20.76 on solatium, 31.15 Hunter v Hanley test, 11.05–17 illegality defence, 29.24–53 introduction, 29.24 benefits obtained illegally, 29.52–53 in claims by companies, 29.49–51 concept of illegality, 29.25–27 framework and general principles, 29.28–42 “wider” and “narrower” forms, 29.43–48

image rights see indicia of identity immissio principle, 22.01 immunity from suit advocates and barristers, 7.16n69, 9.05, 11.56 armed forces, 7.16, 12.12 Crown, 2.38 expert witnesses, 7.16n69, 11.56 judges, 17.33–38 law agents, 7.16n69 police, 9.05–10, 9.13n40 prosecutors, 17.58–59 and public authorities, 7.14–16 solicitors, 11.56 trade unions, 21.02 witnesses, 17.57 see also absolute privilege; qualified privilege importers product liability, 26.31 independent contractors liability as occupiers, 25.50 liability of clients and proprietors general rule, 3.02, 3.30, 3.79, 3.89 hazardous operations, 3.83–86 nuisance, 22.46, 22.56–62 occupiers’ liability, 25.51–53 Independent Press Standards Organisation, 20.27, 20.37–39, 20.58 indicia of identity, 20.59–73 introduction, 20.59 image rights basic principle, 20.62 and breach of confidence, 20.63–71 and defamation, 20.72 and passing off, 20.73, 21.101–106 publicity rights in US, 20.60–61

1144  Index

“indivisible” harm, 13.11–12, 13.15–21 inducing breach of contract, 21.04–32 overview, 21.04–07 causing loss by unlawful means distinguished, 21.23, 21.33 characteristics, 21.07–30 breach of contract, 21.08–09 intention to procure breach, 21.19–20 knowledge that act will induce breach, 21.10–18 no lawful justification, 21.26–30 persuasion, encouragement or assistance, 21.21–25 historical background, 21.02–03 and “offside goals” rule, 21.31–32 trade union immunity, 21.02 industrial diseases and breach of statutory duty, 12.31 as “divisible” harms, 13.12, 13.14 factual causation, 13.28–68 apportionment of liability, 13.47–62 “material contribution” test, 13.14, 13.28–31, 13.69–75 “material increase in risk” test, 2.51, 13.32–46 and occupiers’ liability, 25.24 see also mesothelioma; pleural plaques infirmity standard of care, 10.39–40 unforeseeable loss of control, 10.41–47 informers, 17.52 iniuria (injury), 1.08, 1.10–12, 16.01n1

Institutional writers, 1.07–14, 1.36, 18.02, 19.02 see also under individual authors insult see affront and insult insurance role of, 2.48–51 “deliberate acts” exclusions, 15.21 employers’ liability insurance, 2.51, 3.03–04, 15.21 and interim or provisional damages, 31.57 motor vehicles, 2.51, 3.76 integrity of property, right to, 2.10–11 intention general framework, 15.01–16 overview, 15.01–03 concept in delict, 15.04–08 general role of, 15.18 problems of proof, 15.13–16 use of community standards, 15.04, 15.15–16 and assault, 15.04–05, 15.08, 15.18, 16.06–10 and causing loss by unlawful means, 21.35–37 and defamation, 18.51–53 and deprivation of liberty, 15.13, 17.11 and harassment, 28.09 and inducing breach of contract, 21.19–20 see also malice interdict nature of remedy, 31.72–76 interim interdict, 31.76 breach of confidence, 19.24, 19.70–71 defamation, 18.129 encroachment, 23.12 harassment, 28.12–13 misuse of private information, 20.55–56

Index  1145

nuisance, 22.15–31 introduction, 22.15–18 plus quam tolerabile test, 22.19–27 prospective damages in lieu, 22.29–31 where multiple parties, 13.13–14, 22.28 threat of interference with support, 23.15 trespass, 23.04 interference with contract, 21.02–03 interference with support, 23.15–31 lateral support to adjacent property, 23.16–17 positive obligations, 23.15, 23.21 relationship with nuisance, 23.31 remedies, 23.15 subjacent support to land, 23.22–30 support by building to building, 23.18–19 support within buildings, 23.20 interim damages, 31.57 internet intermediaries, 18.124–127 intervening events see legal causation intimidation, 21.03, 21.48–50 intoxication, responses to, 4.58, 4.60–61 inventors product liability, 26.35 involuntary conduct, 10.41–47, 15.02 joint and several liability, 2.40, 13.24–27 industrial disease cases, 13.55–60

judges absolute privilege, 18.102–103 immunity from suit, 17.33–38 judicial proceedings absolute privilege, 17.58, 18.102–104 judicial review and claims under Human Rights Act, 24.17 justification causing loss by unlawful means, 21.47 inducing breach of contract, 16.24–35, 21.26–30 wrongful imprisonment, 17.28 Justinian, Institutes, 1.07 Kames, H Home, Lord on nuisance, 22.01 on reparation, 1.15 Kent, J, Commentaries, 1.33n181 landlords actions for trespass, 23.03 liability for nuisance, 22.63 occupiers’ liability, 25.15–17 Land Register searches, 5.57–58 law agents see solicitors lawburrows, 28.20–21 legal causation, 14.04–20 overview, 13.01–03, 14.01–03 breach of statutory duty, 24.25 conduct by pursuer, 14.13–20 conduct by third party, 14.04–09 defective medical treatment, 14.10–11 natural events, 14.12 see also remoteness of damage Leges inter Brettos et Scotos, 1.02 liberty, right to see deprivation of liberty

1146  Index

limitation, 30.06–24 child abuse actions, 30.17–19 defamation and malicious publication, 18.149–155 equitable power to override, 30.22–24 harassment, 28.01–19 personal injury, 17.07n27, 30.07, 30.08–16, 30.20–21 product liability, 26.91–92 limited liability partnerships, 2.32 local authorities see public authorities loss of a chance overview, 13.87 commercial chance, 13.96–99 in litigation, 13.100–102 medical chance, 13.88–95 loss of support, 31.50–51 Mackenzie, Sir George, 1.08n41, 19.02 malice generally meanings and use of term, 15.09–12, 15.16 problems of proof, 15.13–16 roles of, 15.19–20 aemulatio vicini doctrine, 21.108, 22.79–81 and assault, 16.06, 16.37–39 and defamation, 15.20, 18.74 and detention or arrest, 17.20, 17.23–26 and lawful-means conspiracy, 21.52, 21.54–55 and malicious prosecution, 17.52–57 and malicious publication, 18.133–138, 18.140, 18.144–145 and misuse of statutory powers, 7.38–43

and nuisance, 22.36 and rebuttal of privilege, 15.20, 18.105–106 malicious prosecution overview, 17.52 deprivation of liberty distinguished, 17.26, 17.56 immunity of prosecutors, 17.58–59 malice and want of cause, 17.53–57 malicious publication, 18.130–155 overview, 18.130 actions by corporations, 2.27 defences, 18.148 historical background, 18.02 limitation period, 18.149–155 prescription period, 18.155 and public authorities, 18.145 statements causing doubt as to title to property, 18.139–141 causing harm to business interests, 18.131–138 criticising assets, 18.142–146 maritime and coastguard agency, 9.53 “material contribution” test, 13.13–14, 13.28–31, 13.69–75 “material increase in risk” test, 13.32–46 medical negligence factual causation “but-for” test (examples), 13.05–07 Chester v Afshar, 13.82–86 indivisible injuries, 13.20 loss of a chance, 13.88–95 “material contribution” test, 13.69–75 as intervening event, 14.10–11

Index  1147

and pursuer’s subsequent conduct, 14.14 and res ipsa loquitur, 10.70 solatium, 14.41–42, 31.05 see also ambulance service; hospital authorities; reproductive autonomy, infringement of medical professionals communication of medical information, 6.46–47 disclosure of risk, 11.45–55, 13.82–86, 16.55 hospital receptionists, 11.16 patient confidentiality, 19.04, 19.36, 19.66, 19.69 duty to warn non-patients, 4.66–70 patient consent to medical procedures, 16.51–55 standard of care, 10.50, 11.03–13, 11.45–55 vicarious liability of Health Boards, 3.22 as witnesses to road accidents, 4.53 mental harm intentional see under assault unintentional see psychiatric injury mesothelioma, 2.51, 13.11, 13.37–46, 13.50–54 mining operations liability for subsidence, 23.22–30 misuse of private information see under privacy molestation, 1.08–09, 28.22 motor vehicles disabled drivers, 10.39 driver’s duty of care, 14.46 and insurance, 2.51, 3.76 liability of car-owners for drivers, 3.74–76

standard of care, 10.03 young drivers, 10.35 see also road traffic accidents multiple parties accessories, 2.42–44 defenders, 2.40, 13.24–27 industrial disease cases, 13.55–60 interdict in nuisance cases, 13.13, 22.28 pursuers, 2.41, 28.10 National Health Service, 3.22 National House Building Council, 5.25 natural hazards nuisance, 22.49, 23.21 occupiers’ liability, 25.26–29 Natural Law influence, 1.07, 1.14, 1.24 negligence historical foundations early history, 1.03–05 Institutional writers, 1.07–14 introduction of concept, 1.15–17 foundations of modern law, 1.18–22 expansion of law, 1.23–32 see also contributory negligence; damages; duty of care; factual causation; illegality defence; legal causation; limitation; prescription; remoteness of damage; reproductive autonomy, infringement of; standard of care; vicarious liability; volenti non fit injuria and under deprivation of liberty; nuisance; public authorities

1148  Index

negligent misrepresentation, 5.33–58 in absence of fraud (1985 Act), 5.48 continuing representations, 5.49 damages for, 31.13–14 duty of care, 5.33 employment references, 5.51–54, 5.56 indicators of duty, 5.34–47 as to pursuer’s interests, 5.57–58 by Registrar of Companies, 5.55 negligent provision of services, 5.59–78 overview, 5.59 liability to third parties, 5.64–78 significance of contractual relationship, 5.60–63 see also professional negligence nervous shock see psychiatric injury New Zealand planning law, 5.23–24 non-delegable duties nature of duty, 3.79–80 care of the vulnerable, 3.87–92 principals and agents, 3.71 safe working conditions, 3.09, 3.82, 3.83–86, 12.03–04 see also under employers novel dissasine, 1.02 novus actus interveniens see legal causation nuisance, 22.01–87 abnormally dangerous conduct, 3.85–86, 22.42–46 broad definition, 22.09 and common interest doctrine, 23.35 continued and adopted nuisances, 22.47–51 natural hazards, 22.49, 23.21

continuing disturbance, 22.10–11 damages overview, 22.32 fault requirement, 22.35, 22.52 plus quam tolerabile test, 22.33–34 title to sue, 22.53–55 defences acquiescence, 22.72 “coming” to the nuisance, 22.70–71 prescription, 22.67–69 statutory authority, 22.25, 22.64–66 duty to mitigate hazards, 4.73–75 and economic loss, 22.14 historical development, 1.34, 22.01–07 Human Rights Act remedies, 22.73–78 intentional nuisance and malice, 22.36–38 interdict introduction, 22.15–18 against landlords, 22.63 plus quam tolerabile test, 22.19–27 prospective damages in lieu, 22.29–31 where multiple parties, 22.28 liability for independent contractors, 22.56–62 liability of landlords, 22.63 as mixed doctrine, 1.34, 22.08 multiple parties, 22.28 negligent nuisance, 22.39–41, 22.62 and personal injury, 22.13 and planning permission, 22.25 public nuisance, 22.87 and remoteness of damage, 14.55

Index  1149

risk of abnormal damage, 3.85–86 and Roman law actions, 22.82–86 Rylands v Fletcher rule, 22.05–06, 22.57 single incidents, 22.12 and support to land or buildings, 23.31 see also aemulatio vicini occupational stress, 6.45, 9.34, 12.16–25 occupiers’ liability, 25.01–62 overview, 25.01 common law development pre-1960 Act, 25.02–04 operation with 1960 Act, 25.05–6 Roman law actions, 22.82–86 contributory negligence, 25.54 control by occupier, 25.07–14 duty to mitigate hazards on land, 4.71–75 duty to show care, 25.30–35 employers’ duty to employees, 12.30 landlords and tenants, 25.15–17 natural features of landscape, 25.26–29 novus actus interveniens, 14.06 and public roads, 25.19 relevant dangers acts and omissions on premises, 25.20, 25.22–25 state of premises, 25.20–21 relevant premises, 25.18–19 res ipsa loquitur, 10.60–62, 10.65, 10.67–69, 25.47–49 restriction of liability by agreement, 25.61–62 school operators, 11.33 standard of care, relevant factors, 25.36–46

all circumstances of case, 25.36 emergencies, 25.45–46 known vulnerabilities of visitors, 25.37–40 uninvited visitors, 25.41–44 and trespass, 25.03–04 volenti non fit injuria defence, 25.55–60, 29.21–22 offers to make amends, 18.119–123 see also apologies “offside goals” rule, 21.31–32 Ogden Tables, 31.33–35 omissions, 4.43–75 overview, 4.44–45, 4.47–48 active conduct distinguished, 4.43, 4.49–50 “blameable” omissions, 4.51 commercial carriers, 4.57 deliberate misuse of statutory powers, 7.44 factual causation, 13.06, 13.08 as intervening events, 14.09 medical disclosures to third parties, 4.66–70 mitigating hazards on land, 4.71–75 and occupiers’ liability, 25.20, 25.22 parents, 4.65 prior relationship between defender and pursuer, 4.52–61 prison authorities, 4.62–64 professionals in supervisory role, 4.54–56 public authorities, 7.17–25 “pure” omissions, 4.44–48 responses to intoxication, 4.58, 4.60–61 roads authorities see under roads authorities

1150  Index

parents ante-natal incidents, 6.42–43, 26.17 duty of care, 4.65 standard of care, 10.36–37 suing children, 2.24 vicarious liability, 2.25, 3.02 see also reproductive autonomy parliamentary privilege, 18.101 partnerships actions in delict, 2.29 defamation, 18.49–50, 18.56 limited liability partnerships, 2.32 vicarious liability, 2.30–31, 3.77–78 passing off, 21.82–106 overview, 21.82–83 geographical reach, 21.100 and personal characteristics, 21.101–106 bogus endorsements, 21.102–106 and personal matters, 21.99 requirements for breach in course of trade, 21.99 goodwill, 21.84–87, 21.103 likelihood of damage, 21.96–98, 21.105 misrepresentation, 21.88–95, 21.104 patent specifications confidentiality, 19.30 patrimonial loss, 31.25–44 nature of award, 31.15, 31.25 future loss, 31.29–37 past and future expenses, 31.38–41 past loss, 31.26–28 social security benefits, 31.42–44 see also damages personal injury claims see under damages

personal rights see absolute rights and personal rights photographs and confidentiality, 19.04, 19.19, 19.28, 19.31 and misuse of private information, 20.21, 20.22, 20.27–28, 20.32, 20.37–38 see also indicia of identity planning permission and nuisance, 22.25 pleural plaques, 1.37, 6.49–50, 31.19, 31.58 plus quam tolerabile test, 22.19–27, 22.33–34 police, 9.03–41 assumption of responsibility, 9.24–26 care for safety of others, 9.16 “core principle”, Hill to Robinson, 4.18–19, 9.05–14 crowd control, 9.17 dangers created, 9.21–22 drivers, 9.15, 11.38–39 duties, 9.03 duty to colleagues, 9.33 duty to officers as employees, 9.33–37, 11.41 entry without warrant, 20.77, 23.03n15 excessive use of force, 16.36–39, 17.21 failure to prevent, 9.23 and Human Rights Act, 9.38–41 see also under Human Rights Act 1998 inflicting financial harm, 9.20 and kettling, 17.06 making situation worse, 9.30 and malicious prosecution, 17.55–57 privacy rights of suspects, 20.21 psychiatric injury, 6.12, 6.30, 6.32, 6.34–35, 9.19, 9.35

Index  1151

qualified privilege, 17.23–26, 18.108 safety of persons in custody, 4.55, 9.31–32 standard of care, 11.36–41 strip searches, 20.84–85 surveillance of suspects, 20.77 taking control of hazard, 9.27–28 over third party, 9.29 use of weapons, 4.49, 9.18 vicarious liability of Chief Constable, 3.22, 3.54–56, 9.33, 17.27 wrongful detention or arrest, 16.34, 17.17–27 political parties actions for defamation, 18.62 prescription general rule and exceptions to, 30.01 commencement of period, 30.02–05 defamation and malicious publication, 18.155 nuisance, 22.67–69 personal injury, 17.07n27, 30.01 product liability, 26.88–90 recovery from joint wrongdoers, 30.01 subsidence damage, 23.27 prima facie tort doctrine, 21.107–108 primary victims (psychiatric injury) duty of care, 6.09–14 secondary victims distinguished, 6.05–08, 6.10 principals, liability for agents direct liability, 3.71 vicarious liability, 3.72–76

prison authorities duty of care, 4.62–64 support mechanisms, 12.21 training exercises, 10.23, 12.14 vicarious liability, 3.24 wrongful detention or imprisonment, 17.28–32 see also under Human Rights Act 1998 privacy, 20.01–88 introduction, 20.01–02 comparative context, 20.03–11 England and Wales, 20.07–11 France, 20.04 Germany, 20.05–06 United States, 20.03 general privacy delict absence of, 20.12 possibility for, 20.13, 20.74–88 indicia of identity, 20.59–73 introduction, 20.59 image rights basic principle, 20.62 and breach of confidence, 20.63–71 and defamation, 20.72 and passing off, 20.73, 21.101–106 publicity rights in US, 20.60–61 misuse of private information, 20.14–58 establishment of English tort, 20.10–11, 20.14–15 recognition as delict, 20.16–19 concept of misuse, 20.33–39 extent of private sphere, 20.20–32 information covered, 20.20–23 power of images, 20.32 reasonable expectation of privacy test, 20.24–31 false information, 20.53–54

1152  Index

privacy (cont.) versus freedom of expression, 20.40–51 as balancing exercise, 20.40 consequences of disclosure, 20.50–51 correcting false impressions, 20.48–49 hierarchy of privacy, 20.22, 20.41 public interest, 20.42–49 and prior publication, 20.52 remedies damages, 20.57, 31.04 extrajudicial complaints procedures, 20.58 interdict, 20.55–56 statutory remedies, 20.75 physical privacy of the person, 20.74–75, 20.82–85 territorial privacy, 20.74–81 private correspondence and confidentiality, 19.05–06, 19.11–13 private prosecutions see malicious prosecution privilege see absolute privilege; qualified privilege product liability, 26.01–97 overview, 26.01–03 claims in contract, 26.03 contractual restrictions of liability, 29.23 “learned intermediary” doctrine, 26.52 liability in negligence, 26.04–19 nature and scope of duty, 26.04–09 causation, 26.19 design defects, 26.16–17 and economic loss, 5.13–15 and enterprise liability, 2.16 and intervention by third parties, 26.10–11

manufacturing defects, 26.15 product recalls, 26.12 role of inference, 26.13–14 warnings and instructions, 13.09, 26.12, 26.18 statutory liability under Consumer Protection Act, 26.25–97 scope of Act, 26.25–45 claimants, 26.26 excluded transactions, 26.34–35 meaning of “damage”, 5.14, 26.41–45 meaning of “personal injury”, 26.42–43 meaning of “product”, 26.36–40 persons liable, 26.27–33 causation, 26.65–68 contributory negligence, 26.93–95 defectiveness, test for, 26.46–64 compliance with safety standards, 26.64 design and instruction defects, 26.61–63 expectations of product, 26.53 manufacturing defects, 26.57–60 meaning of “defect”, 26.46–49 timing of supply, 26.54–55 warnings and instructions, 26.50–52, 26.68 defences, 26.69–96 compliance with statutory provision, 26.70 “development risks” defence, 26.79–86 no defect at time of supply, 26.76–78 not supplied by defender, 26.71–72

Index  1153

not supplied in course of business, 26.73–75 producers of component parts, 26.87 development of strict liability model, 26.20–24 and European Directive, 26.25 exclusion clauses, 26.96 limitation period, 26.91–92 prescription period, 26.88–90 safety regulations, 26.97 professional negligence accountants and auditors, 11.30 architects, 11.28–29 charitable organisations, 11.42–44 concurrent liability, 11.01 early cases, 1.21 emergency services, 11.36–41 medical professionals see medical negligence “ordinary skill” standard, 11.05–17 partnerships, 2.30–31 SAAMCO principle, 14.46–53 solicitors see under solicitors surveyors see under surveyors teachers see under teachers see also negligent provision of services property delicts see encroachment; interference with support; tenements; territorial privacy; trespass; water resources de proteccione regis infricta, 1.02 provisional damages, 31.58–62 provocation assault, 16.28–32 proximity and assumption of responsibility, 5.90

duty of care, 4.32–37 psychiatric injury, 6.17–21, 6.26n90 psychiatric injury, 6.01–50 overview, 2.07 classification of, 6.01–03 and “eggshell skull” rule, 6.11, 6.16, 6.41, 14.43–44 fire service, 6.32–33 future risk of physical harm, 6.48–50 intentional infliction of mental harm see under assault involuntary agents of injury, 6.36–41 mothers of children injured before birth, 6.42–43 occupational stress, 6.45, 9.34, 10.18, 12.16–25 police, 6.12, 6.30, 6.32, 6.34–35, 9.19, 9.35 primary victims, 6.05–14 duty of care, 6.09–14 secondary victims distinguished, 6.05–08, 6.10 and product liability, 26.42 pure psychiatric injury, 6.01, 6.03–04 relational duties of care, 6.44–47 rescuers, 6.30–35 Scottish Law Commission proposals, 1.38, 6.35 secondary victims duty of care, 4.28, 6.15–27 primary victims distinguished, 6.05–08, 6.10 where harm self-inflicted, 6.28 and self-harm, 14.19 solatium, 6.01–03 threat of physical injury see under assault threshold of severity, 6.04, 17.50

1154  Index

psychiatric institutions wrongful detention, 17.39 see also under Human Rights Act 1998 public authorities, 7.01–45 actions by and against Crown, 2.38–39 breach of statutory duty see breach of statutory duty and defamation proceedings, 18.57–60 definitions, 7.01 deliberate misuse of statutory powers, 7.35–44, 15.11n36 delictual liability, 2.38–39, 7.02–05 and “Francovich liability”, 7.45 historical liability of public officials, 1.04, 1.05 liability under Human Rights Act overview, 2.46–47, 7.31–34 breach of statutory duty, 24.16–17 damages as vindication, 31.06 deprivation of liberty, 17.43–48 hybrid bodies, 7.01 misuse of private information, 20.75 nuisance, 22.54–55, 22.66, 22.73–78 and malicious publication, 18.145, 18.147 negligent performance of statutory functions, 7.06–30 and breach of statutory duty, 24.02, 24.03–04 failure to intervene, 7.17–25 policy considerations, 7.06–14 public authority “immunity”, 7.14–16 and statutory discretion, 7.26–30, 8.24 vicarious liability, 3.25

see also education authorities; emergency services; hospital authorities; prison authorities; roads authorities public interest and confidentiality, 19.61–69 and defamation, 18.75–87, 18.148 and freedom of expression, 20.42–49 and plus quam tolerabile test, 22.27 publicity rights see indicia of identity Pufendorf, Samuel von, 1.07 pure economic loss see economic loss pursuers, multiple, 2.41, 28.10 qualified privilege overview, 18.105–107 administrative tribunal proceedings, 18.102 communications where duty or interest, 18.108–112 lawful justification for imprisonment, 17.28 and malicious publication, 18.148 parties to judicial proceedings, 18.103, 18.112 police officers, 17.23–26, 18.108 rebuttal by proof of malice, 15.20, 18.105–106 self-defence or fair retort, 18.113 under statute, 18.114–118 official reports, 18.116–118 peer-reviewed journals, 18.115 transport officials, 17.40–41 see also immunity from suit; public interest defence quasi delicts, 1.18–21

Index  1155

Rankine, J, 23.10 rapina, 1.08 recklessness see conscious recklessness Registrar of Companies, 5.55 relatives see family members; parents; spouses religious orders and qualified privilege, 18.111 relationships “akin to employment”, 3.23 vicarious liability, 3.23 remoteness of damage, 14.21–45 overview, 14.21–22 direct consequence rule, 14.54 “eggshell skull” rule, 14.38–45 foreseeability, 14.23–34 genus of harm and nature of risk, 14.33–37 nuisance, 14.55 risk outwith scope of duty (SAAMCO principle), 14.46–53, 31.14 repairers, 26.06 reparation historical foundations, 1.02–17 reportage, 18.86–87 reproductive autonomy, infringement of overview, 16.73 damaged sperm, 16.97–102 wrongful birth, 16.91–95 wrongful life, 16.96 wrongful pregnancy, 16.74–90 rescuers psychiatric injury, 6.30–35 risks of rescue, 14.17 res ipsa loquitur, 10.59–70, 25.47–49 restriction of movement, 17.06 roads authorities, 8.01–28 basis for duty of care, 8.01–02 cross-border differences, 8.16–22, 8.28

dangerous obstructions, 8.07 failure to improve road safety, 8.13–22 failure to maintain and repair, 8.04–06, 8.11–12 negligent performance of statutory functions, 7.28, 8.11–12, 8.16–18, 8.23, 8.24, 8.28 and occupiers’ liability, 25.19 snow and ice, 8.23–28 standard of care, 8.08–10 road traffic accidents caused by straying animals, 27.17 claims by executor following death, 31.47 and contributory negligence, 26.95 costs of repairing or replacing vehicle, 31.67 doctors as witnesses, 4.53 duty to other road users, 4.28, 4.30 indivisible injuries, 13.11, 13.17, 13.17–18 intervening events, 14.05 learner drivers, 10.49 and product liability, 26.45 and pure economic loss, 5.02, 5.03 secondary victims, 6.20–23, 6.25–28 unforeseeable loss of control, 10.41–47 vicarious liability, 3.74–76 volenti non fit injuria defence, 29.19 see also motor vehicles SAAMCO principle, 14.46–53, 31.14 Salmond test, 3.35–45 scientific journals qualified privilege, 18.115

1156  Index

secondary publishers, 18.124–127 secondary victims (psychiatric injury) duty of care, 4.28, 6.15–27 primary victims distinguished, 6.05–08, 6.10 where harm self-inflicted, 6.28 seduction, 16.23 self-defence assault, 16.24–27 self-harm see suicide and self-harm servitude rights and nuisance, 22.67 and occupiers’ liability, 25.14 sexual assault, 16.22–23, 16.44 shareholders right of action, 2.26 slander of property, 18.142–143 slander of title, 18.139 Smith, Adam, 16.02, 16.15 social media and defamation, 18.13–14, 18.38, 18.46–47, 18.93 and expectations of privacy, 20.25 see also internet intermediaries software product liability, 26.39 solatium nature and calculation of award, 31.03, 31.20–24 assault, 16.01, 16.03, 31.04, 31.20 claims by executor, 31.46, 31.48 Institutional writers on, 16.01, 31.04, 31.15 and legal persons, 18.49 medical negligence, 11.54–55, 14.41–42, 31.05 nature and calculation of award, 31.15

negligent misrepresentation, 31.13 psychiatric injury, 6.01–03 wrongful birth, 16.79, 16.92, 16.94–95 see also damages solicitors absolute privilege, 18.102–103 and accessory liability, 2.43 client confidentiality, 19.37–39, 19.65 duty to disclose fraud, 21.79–81 immunity from suit, 7.16n69, 11.56 liability to third parties, 5.43, 5.65–78 and loss of a chance, 13.96–102 standard of care, 11.18–23 South Africa negligent and intentional trespass, 23.06 sperm as defective product, 26.36n113 negligent storage of, 16.97–102 sport and consent, 16.48–49 foul play, 16.49 liability of operators of sports facilities, 10.57 see also occupiers’ liability participants to other participants, 10.51–54 participants to spectators, 10.51, 10.56 referees to participants, 10.55 school sports activities, 11.34–35 Spotiswoode, Sir Robert, Practicks, 1.01n2 spouses evidence by one against another, 19.41 and harassment, 28.10–11

Index  1157

“home rights” and claim in nuisance, 22.53–55 litigation between, 2.24 marital communications, 19.27 vicarious liability, 2.25, 3.02 where person already married, 16.23 spuilzie, 1.02, 1.03, 1.05, 1.08–09, 1.10, 5.08n27, 10.31 Stair, J Dalrymple, Viscount on damage and reparation, 1.07–09, 31.01–03 on defamation, 18.03 on fraud, 21.63 on immunity for judges, 17.33 on injury, 16.01 on liability of masters, 3.05 on liberty and deprivation of, 2.08, 17.01, 17.10 on quasi ex delicto obligations, 1.18 stalking, 16.17–18 standard of care children, 10.32–35 degrees of culpa, 1.23 and duty of care, 10.01 employers see under employers impact of insurance, 2.51 neighbourhood nuisance cases, 22.41 under occupiers’ liability, 25.30, 25.36–47 older persons, 10.38 ongoing infirmity or disability, 10.39–40 partners in partnerships, 2.31 professionals see professional negligence “prudent and conscientious person” standard foreseeability of risk, 10.04–12 normative test, 10.02–03 variables, 10.13–29

burden of precautions, 10.21–23 “calculus of risk”, 10.14 custom and practice, 10.27–29 gravity of harm, 10.19–20, 22.34 probability of harm, 10.15–20 utility of activities, 10.24–26 road defects and hazards, 8.08–10 tradespersons, 11.16–18 unforeseeable loss of control, 10.41–47 varying levels of skill, 10.48–50 statutory authority, defence of nuisance, 22.25, 22.64–66 strict liability overview, 2.20 and aircraft, 23.02n8 animals see under animals defective products see under product liability and nuisance, 22.05–06, 22.15, 22.52 and subsidence, 23.22–30 strip searches, 20.82–85 subsidence, 23.22–30 suicide and self-harm and contributory negligence, 29.60 duty of care, 4.55 and illegality defence, 29.26 and novus actus interveniens, 14.18–20 volenti non fit injuria defence, 29.20 suppliers product liability, 26.32 support to land and buildings see interference with support surveyors duty of care, 5.36, 5.42, 11.24–25 damages for breach, 31.13–14 standard of care, 10.50, 11.15, 11.26–27

1158  Index

teachers duty of care, 3.87–89, 4.54, 4.65 standard of care, 10.29, 10.36–37, 11.31–35 telephone calls and misuse of private information, 20.21, 20.37 tenants actions for trespass, 23.03 disturbance by, 22.63 occupiers’ liability, 25.15–17 tenements liabilities of proprietors, 23.20, 23.32 territorial privacy, 20.74–81 see also trespass theft duty to avoid risk of, 4.53 by employees, 3.62–63 “thin-skull” rule nature of rule, 14.38–40 and intentional assault, 16.14 and property damage, 14.45 and psychiatric injury, 6.11, 6.16, 6.41, 14.43–44 and underlying medical conditions, 14.41–42 trade secrets statutory protection, 19.75 tradespersons standard of care, 11.16–18 trade unions actions for defamation, 18.63 capacity to sue and be sued, 2.37 and economic delicts, 21.02, 21.51 transport officials excessive use of force, 16.40–41 wrongful detention, 17.40–42 see also under Human Rights Act 1998

travel in course of employment, 3.67–70 trespass by animals, 23.04, 23.09 damages, 23.05–06 definition, 23.02 fault requirement, 23.07 interdict, 23.04 and occupiers’ liability, 4.74–75, 25.03–04, 25.41–44 origins, 23.01 and public access rights, 23.02 remedies, 20.78, 23.10 and vicarious liability, 23.08 unincorporated associations, 2.33–37 United States liability for nuisance, 22.45 prima facie tort, 21.107 privacy rights, 20.03, 20.24, 20.74 product liability, 26.21, 26.24, 26.35 publicity rights, 20.60–61 reasonably careful person test, 10.08 torts by multiple actors, 13.39n86 use of force see excessive use of force valuers standard of care, 11.15 verbal injury, 18.02, 18.51, 18.130, 18.135, 18.139, 18.142–143, 19.02 see also malicious publication vicarious liability, 3.01–78 overview, 3.01–04 companies, 2.28 employers see under employers and enterprise liability, 2.16, 3.14

Index  1159

limited liability partnerships, 2.32 parents, 2.25, 3.02 partnerships, 2.30–31, 3.77–78, 21.78 principals, 3.72–76 and trespassers, 23.08 volenti non fit injuria, 29.02–23 breach of statutory duty, 24.28 and contributory negligence, 29.02 and denial of negligence, 29.14–15 deprivation of liberty, 17.14–15 English law of battery, 16.57n245 essential elements, 29.03–13 consent to risk at own expense, 29.04–07 understanding of risks involved, 29.08–09 voluntary nature of consent, 29.10–13 express assumption of risk, 29.04 inferred assumption of risk, 29.04–07 limits on exclusion of liability, 29.23 meaning, 29.02 and occupiers’ liability, 25.55–60, 29.21–22 and road traffic accidents, 29.19 and self-harm, 29.20

and workplace incidents, 12.01–02, 12.25, 29.16–18 voluntary associations actions for defamation, 18.61 Walker, D M, Delict, 1.01, 1.36, 14.21, 14.30n69, 14.54, 15.10n35, 16.10, 16.19–20, 16.45, 16.59, 17.51, 18.79 Wallace, G, Principles, 1.11 water resources common interest doctrine, 23.34–35 drainage, 23.36 water pollution, 13.13–14, 22.28 Whitty, N R, 1.09, 1.34, 14.55, 22.19n125, 22.34n181, 22.35, 22.42–43, 22.45, 22.53 wills and estate planning, 5.66–77 witnesses absolute privilege, 18.102–103 immunity from suit, 17.57 wrang and unlaw, actions of, 1.02 wrongful birth, 16.91–95 wrongful deprivation of liberty see deprivation of liberty wrongful life, 16.96 wrongful occupation of land, 1.02, 1.05, 1.08–09, 1.10 wrongful pregnancy, 16.74–90, 31.09