The Jews are Coming Back: The Return of the Jews to Their Countries of Origin After WWII 1571815279, 9781571815279

Table of contents :
Table of Contents
Introduction
Return to a Vanished World: European Societies and the Remnants of their Jewish Communities, 1945-1947
French Apprehensions, Jewish Expectations: From a Social Imaginary to a Political Practice
The Return of Jews in the Nationality or in the Territory of France (1943-1973)
The Reintegration of Jewish Survivors Into Belgian Society; 1943-1947
Bitter Homecoming: The Return and Reception of Dutch and Stateless Jews in the Netherlands
Revolution and Reconstruction: Dutch Jewry after the Holocaust
The Abrogation of Racial Laws and the Reintegration of Jews in Italian Society (1943-1948)
The Written Memoir: Italy 1945-1947
The Reconstruction of Jewish Communities in the USSR, 1944-1947
The Holocaust and Its Aftermath as Perceived in Poland: Voices of Polish Intellectuals, 1945-1947
“The New Jewish Invasion ” - The Return of the Survivors from Transnistria
Reconstruction Efforts in Hostile Surroundings - Slovaks and Jews after World War II
Different Interpretations of Reconstruction: The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the World Jewish Congress in Hungary after the Holocaust
“Shylock is Whetting his Blade": Fear of the Jews ' revenge in Hungary during World War II
List of Contributors
Index of Names and Places

Citation preview

The Jews are Coming Back

The Jews are Coming Back The return of the Jews to their countries of origin after WW II

Edited by David Bankier

Jerusalem 2005

Berghahn Books New York-Oxford

Yad Vashem Jerusalem

Copyright © 200S by Yad Vashem, Jerusalem Published in association with Berghahn Books The responsibility for the views expressed in this publication rests solely with the authors. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording or any infonnation storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher Yad Vashem The Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Authority. This publication and the conference on which it is based were made possible through the generous support of the G ertner Center for International Holocaust Conferences endowed by Danek D. and the late Jadzia B. Gertner

Language Editor: Heather Rockman Typesetting: Judith Sternberg Printing: Daf-Noi, Jerusalem

Danacode 268-386

Printed in Israel

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Jews are coming back: the return of the Jews to their countries of origin after WW II / edited by David Bankier, p. cm. Papers from an international conference held at Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, in May 2001. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-57181-527-9 (alk. paper) 1. Jews-Europe-Migrations-Congresses. 2. Return migration-Europe-Congresses. 3. Europe-Emigration and immigration-Congresses. 4. Refugees, Jewish-Europe-Public opinion-Congresses. 5. Public opinion-Europe-Congresses. 6. Holocaust survivors -Europe-Congresses. 1. Bankier, David. DS 135.E83J62 2004 940.53’18142-dc22

2004065966

Table o f Contents

Introduction....................................................................................

vii

Return to a Vanished World. European Societies and the Remnants of their Jewish Communities, 1945-1947 Pieter L agrou........................................................................... 1 French Apprehensions, Jewish Expectations: From a Social Imaginary to a Political Practice Renée P oznanski........................................................................25 The Return of Jews in the Nationality or in the Territory of France (1943-1973) Patrick W eil...............................................................................58 The Reintegration of Jewish Survivors into Belgian Society, 1943-1947 Frank C aestecker..................................................................... 72 Bitter Homecoming: The Return and Reception of Dutch and Stateless Jews in the Netherlands Dienke Hondius ...................................................................... 108 Revolution and Reconstruction: Dutch Jewry after the Holocaust Conny K ristel...........................................................................136 The Abrogation of Racial Laws and the Reintegration of Jews in Italian Society (1943-1948) Mario Toscano........................................................................ 148 The Written Memoir Italy 1945-1947 Manuela C o n so n n i................................................................. 169

The Reconstruction of Jewish Communities in the USSR, 1944-1947 Yaacov R o’i .......................................................................... 186 The Holocaust and Its Aftermath as Perceived in Poland: Voices of Polish Intellectuals, 1945-1947 Joanna M ichlic........................................................................206 “The New Jewish Invasion”- The Return of the Survivors from Transni stria Jean A n ce l...............................................................................231 Reconstruction Efforts in Hostile Sunoundings-Slovaks and Jews after World War II Yehoshua R. B ü ch ler.............................................................. 257 Different Interpretations of Reconstruction: The AJDC and the WJC in Hungary after the Holocaust Kinga Frojimovics .................................................................277 “Shylock is Whetting his blade”: Fear of the Jews* revenge in Hungary during World War II Laszlo K a rsa i.......................................................................... 293 List of Contributors........................................................................312 Index of Names and P laces............................................................ 315

Introduction

What were the views concerning the return, or prospective return of the Jews to their countries o f origin after World War II? This volume, an outgrowth o f the papers delivered or sent to an international conference that took place in Yad Vashem, Jerusalem in May 2001, intends to answer this question, giving a comparative overview o f attitudes in the various European countries during and after the Second World War. With the end of the war in the offing, American Jewish organizations gradually adopted an increasingly pro-Zionist stance for they concluded that Jewish integration in post-Hitler Europe would not work. They stated their positions explicitly, first demanding the total and retroactive nullification of all anti-Jewish measures enacted before and during the war by the Axis powers. Second, they insisted on the rights of all refugees, victims o f Nazi persecution, to return to their places of residence and resume the former positions from which they had been driven. Third, they claimed the right for survivors to return to their former occupations or to obtain new positions in the post-war economy. The Jewish organizations also understood that, after the war, apart from the criminal courts, special property courts would be created to determine disputes involving restitution o f property. Each conquered nation would appoint commissions to investigate and gather evidence concerning the stolen property. Jews unwilling, or unable, to return to their countries of origin would be in a disadvantageous position, because their stolen goods would be returned to the government of the country from which they were removed. They could hardly have imagined that more than fifty years later this issue would still make headlines in the world’s media. The Zionist leadership went obviously further, calling for complete civic equality and full parity of economic opportunity, and requested the resettlement of the refugees in Palestine. What about the Allies and the governments in exile? As early as 1941 and 1942 the Allies made preliminary plans for how to organize post-Hitler Europe. Yet the Jewish question did not feature in these early American, British and Russian schemes for the continent’s future. vii

DAVID BANKIER

Neither can any significant references to the future of the Jews be found in the discussions of governments in exile, either in London or elsewhere. All of them formally pledged themselves to restore rights and property to Jews and to reestablish them in their former positions. For example, the Belgian government in exile decided on 10 January 1941 to nullify all “Aryanizations.” In addition, George Theunis, ambassador extraordinary of Belgium to the United States declared, while addressing a mass meeting in New York on 21 July 1942, that wrongs done to the Jews would be annulled and the guilty punished. Similarly, The Czech government in exile issued an official declaration in November 1941 invalidating anti-Jewish measures taken by the German and Czech authorities since September 1938. What is more, an official declaration of the Czech government in December 1941 declared invalid the transfer or disposal of Jewish property and threatened to conduct criminal proceedings against the “Aryanizers.” Yet the governments in exile also knew that, however great the sympathy for the Jews aroused by their persecution, in practice the restitution of property would confront many difficulties as many governments were unlikely to agree to it. It was doubted that even countries without an antisemitic tradition, having been devastated and impoverished by the war, would be willing to receive returning Jews, for who would invest hundreds of millions of dollars in the repatriation and absorption of refugees? Even Edvard BeneS, President of the Czech government in exile, stated in London that the repatriation of Czech Jews after the war “will confront the regime with difficulty.” Bene§ statement, although vague, confirmed the belief that Czech leaders were not particularly anxious to have Jews back. Similar attitudes are often expressed in the reports that reached London on the public mood in the Protectorate. The Czech people were beyond doubt shocked by the Nazi antisemitic murderous policy. At the same time, they asked Bene§ and his Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk not to bring the Jews back and to avoid creating the impression that they wanted them to return. It is plain that the problem extended far beyond Czechoslovakia. It was obvious to many that post-war governments in many countries would not be able to tell people to vacate their formerly Jewish-owned houses and other properties, or to leave formerly Jewish-held jobs. Any government that would dare to do so would be committing political suicide. Vlll

INTRODUCTION

If a truly democratic people such as the Czechs showed so little enthusiasm for the return o f its Jewish citizens, what could be expected from countries in eastern Europe where the fundamental antagonism with the ethnic majority had not been radically altered by the Holocaust and where a considerable proportion of the population long harbored desires to eliminate Jews from commercial and urban occupations in order to make room for itself? Poland is a case in point. The Polish government in London, when making statements on the Jewish question, was under constraints. It had to be careful in its declarations, which would be examined by the British, the Americans and Jewish organizations. Typically it promised that, after the war, all surviving Jews could return and that their rights would be restored, and it assured world public opinion that there would be no antisemitism in post-war Poland. But this would be true only on condition that the Jews who were saved from the massacres did not attempt to return in large numbers to the Polish cities and towns. Representatives of the Polish government made it clear that economic factors played a major role in the anti-Jewish messages emanating from the Polish underground and that a mass homecoming of Jews would be regarded by the population not as a return to the previous status quo but as an invasion. This became even clearer when the Jews returned to Poland after the war and were murdered or subjected to violence. Most Polish underground organizations believed that post-Hitler Poland would be a country without Jews. A view expressed even in the Zegota, an organization set up by the Polish resistance movement to find hiding places for Jews, was that those Jews who remained would have to leave Poland after the war. Most notably, Zofia Kossak-Szczucka, a founder of Zegota, a devout Catholic and a famous writer, never considered Jews a part of the fabric o f Polish society and, therefore, she wrote, Poland was not a country where Jews should live after the war. France is another case in point. As the war progressed, de Gaulle received recommendations from the French underground not to declare that he would bring the Jews back to France, since that would harm his image. Let us not forget that an association of Frenchmen that had taken over Jewish property was formed in 1944 in order to retain their gains. Moreover, both a member o f the State Council and a leading lawyer suggested that, after the war, the status of French Jews should be reconsidered. In their view, the Jews were not as discreet as they should IX

DAVID BANKIER

have been, and they were pushing themselves into places where they were not wanted. In addition, existentialist Catholic philosopher Gabriel Marcel, in the Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien, touched upon the question of Jews’ behavior after the Liberation and strongly advised them to be “discreet in their demands.” Furthermore, even among anti-Nazi Frenchmen, one could find those who openly wondered whether France’s pre-war policy toward the Jews had been right. In the center-right underground group Organisation Civile et Militaire there were those who said that France should reconsider the status of the Jews. Their opinion was that only the small minority o f Jews of old stock, mainly from the Alsace-Lorraine and Avignon areas, should remain French citizens. All others, who had come to France from Russia, Romania and Poland - and even those who were naturalized in France after the First World War - should be regarded as foreigners. After the war, one and a half million people - prisoners of war, slave laborers, political refugees, etc. - returned to France. There were very few Jews among them, perhaps only 2,500 since most of the over 77,000 who were deported had been gassed in Poland, and still there were demonstrations in the streets of Paris against the return of Jews who wanted their apartments back. Germany is a case apart. As there was no German government in exile to make declarations on the Jews’ future, one can leam about the attitudes towards the Jews’ return from the declarations of the individual political parties in exile. For the socialists, the Jewish question had never been important. They declared that after the war the Nuremberg Laws would be revoked, Jews would return to Germany and their civil rights would be restored. Willy Brandt, then in exile in Stockholm, was the only important socialist to contemplate an alternative solution. He personally wanted all German Jews to return to Germany. He was well aware, however, that they would not, either because they had been murdered or because many survivors would not want to return. In April 1944, he recommended the establishment o f a fund, using money the Nazis had confiscated during their years of rule, to help Jews who had arrived in Palestine to establish a national home of their own. There are very few references to the Jews’ future in opposition circles within Germany itself. One of them is the Freiburg circle, which comprised conservative academic teachers at the city’s university who x

INTRODUCTION

started meeting around November 1942. Their views followed conservative thinking that Germany can assimilate only a small number of Jews. Constantin Von Dietze, for example, believed that discrim­ ination against the Jews was unnecessary because “the number of surviving returning Jews would be so small, they would pose no threat to the German people.” Another example from German conservative circles concerns Carl Goerdeler, the pre-war mayor of Leipzig. He was meant to become Germany’s prime minister had the attempted assassination of Hitler by Graf Stauffenberg succeeded. He believed that it was impossible to solve the Jewish question in Europe. It could only be resolved by establishing a Jewish state in Palestine, parts of South America or somewhere in Canada. German citizenship should be granted only to a small elitist minority of Jews, willing to assimilate completely. Goerdeler, von Dietze, as well as others with similar attitudes, did not subscribe to the crude stereotypes that placed the Jews outside the universe of moral obligation. Yet they viewed them as a category that was separate from their own realm, thus perpetuating the myths o f Jewish otherness. David Bankier, Jerusalem 2005

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Return to a Vanished World: European Societies and the Remnants o f their Jewish Communities, 1945-1947 PIETER LAGROU Between 1938 and 1945, Nazi Germany tried to transform the European continent into the Nazi utopia by means of boundless brutality. Nazi visions o f a European ’new order’ were often inconsistent. Instead o f their proclaimed goal of ruling for one thousand years, the Reich achieved a mere twelve years between the Nazi seizure of power and final defeat, and from conquest until retreat a time span of two to seven years o f mastery over other European countries. Nazi hubris had to abandon most of its grand designs of colonization, exploitation and nazification, but, with an acute awareness of their shrinking temporal horizon, one obsessive criminal plan was implemented with absolute priority: the destruction of Europe’s Jewish population. By the end of 1943, the Nazi elite prided itself on its accomplishment o f the historical task of the “final solution of the Jewish problem,” in spite o f a looming defeat.1 After 1945, with Nazism defeated, the question is whether it was possible for the minority of Jews who had survived the slaughter to return to the societies, the towns and villages from where they had been deported or chased. The world they had left had vanished; what good could the post-war era bring them? Europe after 1945 was a grim place - less grim than in the preceding years, but still a continent disrupted by demographic, social and political turmoil, stricken by physical destruction, haunted by recollections of violence and killing. The future was a source of hope and sometimes of euphoric expectations,

1 See, for example, Himmler’s speech in Posen of 6 October 1943, Bradley Smith and Agnes Peterson (eds.), Heinrich Himmler. Geheimreden 1933 bis 1945 und andere Ansprachen, Frankfurt, 1974, pp. 167-69. 1

PIETER LAGROU

but it was also a source of profound anxiety and insecurity. If this was the common lot of all Europeans, for the Jews among them there was incommensurably more of the latter, and it was incommensurably more difficult to be capable of the former. Europe, no less after 1945 than before, was also a very heterogeneous and fragmented continent. There was much less that united the experiences of Romania and Denmark, France and Poland or the Netherlands and Italy, than what set them apart. Yet, the Holocaust, realized in very different degrees and striking very divergent local situations, was a catastrophe they had all shared. In this article, I will try to suggest some elements, some reactions, some contours of a common European context. In the other chapters of this volume, diversity will be restored to the continent.

The War H itler Won In 1947, at the end of the period considered in this book, the Dutch Jewish author Heinz Wielek published one of the first comprehensive accounts o f the persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands, under the title The War Hitler Won? Wielek, the pen name o f W. Kwekzylbei; had fled Nazi Germany in 1933 and settled in Amsterdam, where he survived the war as a partner in a mixed marriage and a protégé of the Jewish Council. Wielek only implicitly alludes to the meaning of the book’s title, when describing his first walk through Amsterdam’s former Jewish quarter on 9 May 1945. Dilapidation and desolation gape from these empty and dying houses. The vacant buildings have been tom down by the mob (...) Sometimes, in your dreams visions emerge of a street, black and empty, with houses whose haunting holes and yawning windows follow you like the caved-in eye-holes of a death-mask. This vision becomes a reality when you walk down these streets. The houses lean on each other and seem to be willing to collapse at any time, in order to bury everything that still lives and walks down there under the pile of their debris. Before there was a popular cinema theater here, innocent amusement for Jews2

2

2

Amsterdam, Amsterdamse Boek- en Courantmij NV, 1947. For the identification of Wielek, see Ido de Haan, Na de Ondergang. De herinnering aan de Jodenvervolging in Nederland, 1945-1995, The Hague, 1997, p. 19, and Bob Moore, Victims and Survivors. The Nazi Persecution o f the Jews in the Netherlands, 1940-1945, London, 1997, p. 3.

EUROPEAN SOCIETIES AND THE REMNANTS OF THEIR JEWISH COMMUNITIES

without money who could divert themselves like small children for four hours on end. The Jews have been removed and the billboards Judenviertel have also disappeared. The orphanage, the Dutch-Jewish hospital, the home for the elderly: empty, empty, empty. The crippled inhabitants of the Jewish Invalid were, like garbage on a dungeon, thrown on the train on the Borneo Quay. Three years ago? Three and a half years ago? I don’t remember. Everything, all this becomes one immense memory that seizes me time and again. Here the stately synagogue of the Portuguese, there the Ashkenazis: empty. There are still a few pious Jews in Amsterdam and on the major holy days, they met in a forgotten back-street shul near the Stadhouderskade to speak to God. These are the mixed marriages; some have wives who converted to Judaism, a fact the Zentralstelle fortunately ignored, if not it would have considered these unions as fully Jewish. One came and asked the other: “When is Pesach? When Yom Kippur? If P. doesn’t know, then L. probably does...” In Amsterdam...3

In the Netherlands, indeed, Hitler had come close to realizing one of his main war aims, the annihilation o f the Jewish community.4 The country had been home to one of the oldest and, relative to the total population, largest Jewish communities in Western Europe. The German occupier killed 100,000 of the 140,000 individuals he considered as Volljuden. Emigration to Israel and the United States during the first five years after the end of the war was particularly strong among this decimated community, with one out of every five survivors leaving the country after 1945. Jewish cultural organizations estimated that the post-war Jewish community in the Netherlands consisted o f no more than twenty-five thousand individuals, about half o f them affiliated to religious organizations. The Netherlands were no exception.5 A similar picture could be drawn for Greece, for example, particularly the Jewish quarter of Thessaloniki, once home to fifty thousand Jews. Poland, once the heartland of Jewish Europe, was also transformed into a Jewish cemetery. Bitter memories of local Poles participating in pogroms, looting and massacres both during the war and in 1945 and 1946 3 4

5

Wielek, De Oorlog die Hitler won, pp. 340-41. See the excellent study of de Haan, Na de Ondergang, pp. 61-77. See also Chaya Brasz, “Na de tweede wereldoorlog: van kerkgenootschap naar culturele minderheid,” In: Geschiedenis van de Joden in Nederland, Amsterdam, 1995, pp. 351403. For useful reference, see Wolfgang Benz (ed.), Dimension des Völkermords. Die Zahl der jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus, Munich, 1996.

3

PIETER LAGROU

prompted an exodus o f the great majority o f Jewish survivors, who would populate the DP camps in the western occupation zones of Germany.6 In Romania, the country with the third largest Jewish community in Europe prior to 1939, mass deportations, mass killing by Romanian and German troops, and emigration had reduced the Jewish community by 1948 to one-sixth of its pre-war size. The Jewish population of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were virtually wiped out. Other communities, while far smaller, suffered relatively less losses. The tiny Jewish communities of Norway and Denmark lost 750 and 116 people respectively; and Italy, the first fascist nation, lost one-fifth (about 5,600 victims) of its relatively small Jewish community. In Belgium, twenty-five thousand Jews, 40 percent o f the local community, were killed. Compared to its Dutch neighbor, the pre-war Belgian Jewish community was less than half the size, for a comparable total population, and it was constituted overwhelmingly by recent immigrants. Only in Hungary and France did sizable Jewish communities survive. In Hungary the Jews of Budapest, home to one-fifth of the half a million Hungarian Jews, survived, while 400,000 others died in a tragic last chapter of the genocide. In France, in spite of Vichy’s home­ grown antisemitism, three-quarters of the Jewish population escaped mass murder. After 1945, France was home to the largest Jewish community in Europe (not counting the Russian and Ukraine Republics of the Soviet Union, which numbered about 800,000 Jewish survivors each).7 A total of 230,000 Jews had survived the persecutions, and by the late 1950s, demographic growth and immigration from Eastern Europe brought this number close to 300,000 (which was the estimated 6

7

4

For recent works on Polish participation in the genocide see particularly: Jan Gross, Neighbors: The Destruction o f a Jewish Community in Poland, Princeton, 2001, and idem, “A Tangled Web: Confronting Stereotypes Concerning Relations between Poles, Germans, Jews and Communists,” in: Jan Gross, Tony Judt and Istvàn Deâk (eds.) The Politics o f Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath, Princeton, 2000, pp. 74-129. See Anne Grynberg, “Après la tourmente,” in: Jean-Jacques Becker and Annette Wieviorka (eds.), Les Juifs de France de la Révolution française à nos jours, Paris, 1998, particularly pp. 267-76, and Michel Abitbol, “La cinquième République et l’accueil des Juifs d’Afrique du Nord,” ibid., pp. 287-327. For the Soviet figures, see Benjamin Pinkus, The Jews o f the Soviet Union. The History o f a National Minority, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 261-63.

EUROPEAN SOCIETIES AND THE REMNANTS OF THEIR JEWISH COMMUNITIES

number o f Jews living in France in 1939). The exodus between 1956 and 1962 o f North African Jews to France would almost double the post-war community. Even though the colonial wars were much more central to their personal experience than the Holocaust, which took place in Europe, it was the legacy of the Nazi genocide and the French participation in it that conditioned the terms of cohabitation of their identities as both Jews and French citizens, a situation not very different from Israel. The near total destruction of the Jewish population of Europe was the most dramatic and deliberately intended consequence of Nazi warfare, but it was not the only demographic transformation occasioned by the Second World War. After 1918, the Wilsonian utopia of national selfdetermination had proved incompatible with the reality of the intricate multi-ethnic nature of the population of most European states. After 1945, genocide, massive population transfers, expulsions and border revisions had drastically reduced the diversity. The mass exodus and later expulsion of thirteen million Volksdeutsche from Central and Eastern Europe - the backlash of Nazi plans for racial colonization of the region - was quantitatively the major unintended effect of Nazi warfare. Before 1938, one-third o f the population of Czechoslovakia was neither Czech nor Slovak, but German (22.1 percent), Hungarian (4.8 percent), Ukrainian (3.8 percent), or Jewish (2.4 percent).8 A decade later, “national minorities'’ added up to less than 5 percent o f the population. In Poland, Ukrainians (13.8 percent), Jews (8.5 percent), Belorussians (5.3 percent) and Germans (2.3 percent) similarly represented almost one-third o f the population before 1938 and less than 3 percent ten years later. Wielek’s title The War Hitler Won had an even more general bearing than the author imagined at the time. Through the implementation of massive and ruthless violence on an unprecedented scale, the Nazi rhetoric of "ein Volk, ein Staat ” had become more of a reality than ever before in European history. Germany itself became more German than it had ever been, due to the departure of over eight million slave laborers that the Nazi regime had imported and their replacement by an even greater number of German refugees. German society after 1945 8 Statistics from Mark Mazower, Dark Continent. Europe's Twentieth Century, New York, 1999, p. 414.

5

PIETER LAGROU

was a very hostile environment for immigrants, to the extent that, by 1946, even old and assimilated immigrant communities, such as the Dutch peasant immigrants who settled in the German borderlands at the end of the nineteenth century, chose to leave the country and “return” to the country of their ancestors.9 The years 1945-1960 stand out as an exceptional period o f frightening ethnic homogeneity in European history, before the economic boom and decolonization restored pluralism and hetero­ geneity to at least part of the continent. Jewish expectations and apprehensions have to be placed in this context. The period between 1945 and 1948 was not only a bright dawn brought by the liberation from Nazi rule. It was also a dark period, when alternative solutions such as immigration to America and Palestine were blocked by the United States and Great Britain respectively, while the prospects for a “return” to a vanished world in Europe were bleak.10

H om ecom ing? In one episode of his chronicle 11 romanzo di Ferrara, Gioigio Bassani narrates the unexpected return, in August 1945, of Geo Jozs.11 In Ferrara, a medium-sized town in the Po valley, north of Bologna, almost half of the local Jewish community of about four hundred, pre­ war size, had been killed, among them Geo Jozs’ parents and his brother. The young man finds his parents’ home occupied by the local partisan movement, which had installed their headquarters there after 9

See Lagrou, The Legacy o f Nazi Occupation in Western Europe. Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in Western Europe, 1945-1965, Cambridge, Mass., 2000, pp. 177-79. 10 See Leonard Dinnerstein, America and the Survivors o f the Holocaust, New York, 1982. 11 Giorgio Bassani “Una lapida in via Mazzini,” in, II romanzo di Ferrara, Milan, 1991, pp. 87-127. For the post-war context in Italy, see Guri Schwartz, “Gli ebrei italiani e la memoria della persecuzione fascista (1945-1955),” Passato e Presente, 47 (1999), pp. 109-30, and Michele Sarfatti (ed.), Il ritomo alia vita: vicende e diriti degli ebrei in Italia dopo la seconda guerra mondiale, Florence, 1998. See also the review article by Enzo Collotti, “Antisemitismo e leggi razziali in Italia,” Passato e Presente, 50 (2000), pp. 169-90.

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EUROPEAN SOCIETIES AND THE REMNANTS OF THEIR JEWISH COMMUNITIES

having chased the black brigades from the same house four months earlier in April 1945. He would only recoup his house after the defeat of the Communist Party in the 1948 elections. Geo Jozs’ appearance disturbs his neighbors and relatives, both the former fascists, eager to put the excesses of the Mussolini regime and the Salö Republic behind them, and the neo-communists, who were “so honestly convinced that the bright era o f democracy and universal brotherhood had finally started.“ 12 Jozs embarrasses his fellow citizens by publicly denouncing a local notable as the man who betrayed his family. In protest against his impunity, he then posts himself on the terrace of the Caffé della Borsa in his concentration camp outfit as a living reminder of the past crimes that the town wanted to forget in order “to make a new start.” At the end o f 1948, Geo Jozs suddenly disappears from Ferrara, to the general relief. Some report that he had thrown himself in the Po River; while others prefer to believe he migrated to Israel. Bassani writes: “He came from very far away, further even than where he really came from. Returning when no one expected him any longer; what did he want now? To be able to face this kind of questioning, would have required other times, and another town.” 13 Recent attention has focused on the problems that Jewish survivors encountered in reclaiming their assets - their houses, their possessions, their jobs - or those o f deceased relatives, including insurance premiums and bank deposits. The class action suits to seek judicial redress o f past injustices have received wide coverage, often presenting the issue as a recent discovery, an unveiling of well-kept secrets. Yet, the indifference and, even, the hostility that met Jewish survivors at their return have been described in great detail long before they hit the courts and the media. Long before Giorgio Bassani (cited above), the Dutch novelist Marga Minco started publishing autobiographical novels in the 1950s. In Het bittere kruid (The Bitter Herb), published in 1957, she describes her unsuccessful attempt to recover the belongings of her murdered parents from neighbors who had offered to hide and guard them. This attitude was widespread enough to have occasioned the coining of a Dutch neologism, bewariërs, which could be translated as guardaryans, a contraction o f guardian and “Aryan.” Jan Gross has 12 Bassani, Il Romanzo di Ferrara, p. 104. 13 Ibidem, p. 92.

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PIETER LAGROU

underlined the importance of the material rewards that ensued from anti-Jewish persecutions and pogroms for the local population in Poland and how this helps explain both wartime popular participation in the violence and post-war hostility.14 Without going to the extremes of violence such as the Kielce pogrom of 4 July 1946, in which fortytwo Jews were killed, popular hostility to the returning Jews took very public and organized forms elsewhere too. On 19 April 1945 a demonstration gathered 250 to 300 persons in the very central fourth arrondissement of Paris, shouting “France to the French,” in protest against the “expulsion” of a person from his apartment, reclaimed by its previous, Jewish occupant upon his return from deportation.15 The protesters later got into a fight with some Jewish inhabitants of the neighborhood. Similar incidents gave rise to the creation of associations for the protection of “tenants of good faith” who opposed legal restitution. Conflicts over property reveal the human pettiness, even following a tragedy of exceptional magnitude. As such they are only an indication of a wider context of indifference towards the plight of European Jewry during and immediately after World War II. During the last two decades, historiographical attention has been redirected from the singular focus on the perpetrators to the bystanders, occupied societies and wartime regimes, exile governments and even the Allies.16 More particularly, a host of fairly recent studies have indicted post-war governments, post-war societies and post-war ideologies for mishan­ dling the consequences of the genocide, and even for open hostility towards the survivors themselves. Some of these publications reveal truly appalling events. Dienke Hondius’ work on the Netherlands is an outstanding example of this.17 Hondius documents the internment in 14 Gross, Neighbors, and “A Tangled Web.” 15 See Lagrou, “Victims of Genocide and National Memory: Belgium, France and the Netherlands 1945-1965,” Past and Present, 154 (1997), p. 182. 16 For a critical assessment, see Peter Novick’s treatment of knowledge by the Allies and allied inaction in his The Holocaust in American Life, Boston-New York, 1999, pp. 19-59. 17 Dienke Hondius, Terugkeer. Antisémitisme in Nederland rond de bevrijding, The Hague, 1990 (second revised edition 1998), and Idem, “A Cold Reception: Holocaust Survivors in The Netherlands and their Return,” Patterns o f Prejudice, 28 (1994), pp. 47-65. Renewed commotion and controversies over assets prompted

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EUROPEAN SOCIETIES AND THE REMNANTS OF THEIR JEWISH COMMUNITIES

June 1945 of Jewish repatriates from Bergen-Belsen in detention camps, together with Nazi criminals, as “former enemy DPs.” Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany during the 1930s had lost their German nationality by their departure and had not been able to acquire the nationality of their host country. During the repatriation, they became the repeated object of antisemitic reactions, including by government officials. Popular reactions were also particularly harsh, motivated by collective self-pity over the famine and destruction during the last winter o f war in the central region of the country. Jewish survivors heard: “Well, quite a lot of your kind came back. Just be happy you were not here. How we suffered from hunger.” 18 Quite another approach is pursued by authors who criticize the wider context in which the genocide and its survivors were received by post-war societies as a concerted attempt at “dejudification.” In The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, Tony Kushner denounces the post-war liberal ideology prevalent in Great Britain for its systematic refusal to recognize the Jewish character of the victims. In a perplexing combination, universalism and antisemitism, assimilationism and exclusivism stand accused of this evil.19 Maxime Steinberg, the foremost scholar of the Holocaust in Belgium, places the blame for the same “fabricated universality” and “mythical amalgamation” on the left-wing ideology

the Dutch government in 1998 to set up a vast research initiative, employing fifty historians for a two year period. The Stichling Onderzoek Terugkeer en Opvang (Research Foundation Return and Relief)» initially focused on Jewish returnees, broadened its research to include all repatriates, including from the Dutch Indies in the late 1940s. Its explicit aim was to investigate the “immaterial aspects” of the repatriation, since matters regarding restitution are the competence of other governmental commissions. The report of the Foundation was published in November 2001. It includes new details on local and regional conditions and on groups of repatriates who have received little attention so far, such as Sinti, Roma, and Jehovah's Witnesses. Given the eminently political mission of the Foundation, it is an open question whether its research results will add much to the scientific debate as initiated by Hondius. 18 Hondius, Terugkeer, p. 94. 19 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination: A Social and Cultural History, Oxford, 1994.

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or some form of “Polish anti-fascism,” which was blindfolding Western European intellectuals.2021 Present-day disappointment with either liberalism or anti-fascism is probably not the best standpoint to reconstruct the mental context with which Jewish survivors were confronted on their return. However, it is not impossible to avoid anachronism and to return briefly to three distinct notions that spring up in almost every treatment of this subject and that are central to the issues discussed in this book: antisemitism, anti-fascism and patriotism.

A ntisem itism Antisemitism did not disappear from European societies after 1945, societies that had witnessed the horrible outcome of Nazi antisemitism. To suppose that antisemitism suddenly evaporated in the light of the evidence of Nazi crimes would be to underestimate the inveterate nature of antisemitism in Western European societies. After all, both blatant and latent antisemitism had been necessary preconditions for the massive deportations from the occupied countries, which the occupier would not have been able to carry out without local accomplices and impassive bystanders. From Kielce to Paris and from Amsterdam to the Po valley, antisemitic incidents continued to occur in the years 19451947. In France, the Gendarmerie Nationale registered antisemitic graffiti appearing in the first six months of 1945, like the one discovered in Courbevoie on 19 February: “Down with the wai; down with the denouncers, the firing squad for all Jews.” Repatriation officials in Toulouse observed in the same period: Immediately after the liberation, a certain number of Jews of foreign origin have engaged in an activism excessive both because of their small number and because of the fact that they are foreigners. The regional direction has been assailed by requests for assistance emanating from the different Jewish organizations, which all appeared remarkably well coordinated. As a result, I mandated my 20 “Les Dérives plurielles de la mémoire d'Auschwitz,” Centrale: périodique trimestriel de la communauté juive, 254 (1993), pp. 6-9; 260 (1993), pp. 11-14 (reprinted in Steinberg, Un pays occupé et ses juifs. Belgique entre France et PaysBas, Brussels, 1998, pp. 179-90). 21 Lagrou, “Victims of Genocide,” pp. 192-93.

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information service to run a survey of all Jewish organizations of Toulouse and its region. (...) In order to put an end to the scheming of certain foreigners in this category, who were liable to provoke or foster a new crisis of antisemitism, 1 have deemed proper, at the occasion of the creation of the departmental association of political and racial deportees to appeal, on the one hand, to the rabbi and, on the other, to two members of very old Toulouse families of a great local standing, to represent the Jews, judging that the interests of a particularly oppressed category would thus be served under the best conditions.22

The end of the war, with millions of individuals on the move, liberating armies, workers and prisoners of war returning from Germany, war criminals and former collaborators trying to escape prosecution, was a period of generalized turmoil and acute fear. Repatriation planners were obsessed by a contamination psychosis and drafted reports on the prophylactics of the Plague. Rumors abounded on the evil schemes of a fifth column of revenge-prone Nazis and on a planned communist seizure of power. Xenophobia proved to be a powerful trigger of the popular imagination: east of the Elbe Cossacks were credited with massive plundering, rape and cruelty. The behavior of Soviet troops was a genuine source of alarm, but the images of savage Asian hordes associated with it were much more ancient. West of the Elbe, black American soldiers and French colonial troops bore the popular - and part of the official - blame for similar crimes and misdemeanors. In the midst of this period of confusion, when liberators and enemies, traitors and victims mingled and were each a source of different fears, the Hun, the Negro and the wandering Jew were easily identifiable targets of diffuse feelings of disorientation and Überfremdung. Yet, there was nothing banal about the persistence of antisemitism precisely in this period. It does come as a shock that awareness of the mass killing of Jews by the Nazis did not rule out antisemitism after 1945. On occasions it even seemed to strengthen it, taking up new themes, such as the lack of Jewish resistance or Jewish treason; and a general tendency developed o f thinking that if the Jews attracted such unprecedented persecution they must be guilty of something. Tradi­ tional Christian antisemitism felt the need to re-appropriate a theme of which it had been dispossessed by the Nazis. In the spring months of 1945, a Dutch author living in liberated Belgium, when the majority of the Netherlands was still occupied, took stock of the years of the 22 Ibid.

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German occupation in both countries and of the challenges ahead. The book was published in May 1945 by a publisher situated close to the border, and was immediately distributed in the Netherlands. In the chapter on the persecution of Jews by the Nazis, the author felt compelled to wam his readers not to credit Hitler for his accomplish­ ments: Even if we accept that the power and influence of Jewry in our modem society are not imaginary, yes, if we even willingly admit that the righteous resistance and fair measures against numerous Jewish practices positively benefit Christian society, then it still remains no less true that no Christian of conviction can approve the phenomena that present themselves nowadays under the universal as well as meaningless name of antisemitism. If today we find a certain category o f Christians (and this is not unimportant) which sympathizes with this persecution, we should not in the first place forget that if we Christians had in general shown more courage and conviction and faith, Jewish and liberal influences would never have permeated society to the degree they did. The Jews were guilty of the murder of the Son of God, but Pontius Pilate was no less guilty when he nailed an innocent to the cross out of cowardice. [...] Of course, the Jewish problem is a burning question, but those who wish its solution from the perspective of hatred and often of angry envy, have rejected Christian love and with it their Christianity. [...] Christian love requires a different struggle, a different antisemitism. The mass-murder of the Jewish people is the clearest proof that national-socialism is not antisemitic, but anti-Christian. Of course the Christian world will have to fight its war against Jewish hegemony, but in a struggle according to its own principles and not according to the whispering of some evil spirit. [...] The freedom we yearn for must not lead to licentiousness and anarchism, because they are the trump cards through which the liberal-Jewish hegemony can establish itself.23

The persistence of prejudice is a powerful reminder that the end of the war did not signal a radical new start and a radical new mentality. Traces of continuity also existed in the administrative sphere. Liberated prisoners from Belsen had their food rationing cards stamped by requisitioned German civilian personnel with the infamous Jude stamp of the Nazi era, that is, of a few days earlier.24 Similar incidents were repeated further on their repatriation journey. For example in Paris, in the hotel Lutetia, requisitioned by the French government for receiving

23 Ibidem., p. 194. 24 See Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter zum heimatlosen Ausländer. Die Displaced Persons in Westdeutschland, 1945-1951, Göttingen, 1985, p. 44.

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concentration camp survivors, where a French police officer marked a repatriation card with the mention “Jew”; or in Amsterdam, where the officer o f the population register refused to alter the inscription “Jew” under the heading “religion” in spite of the explicit request of a repatriate. Contrary to what critics of the “de-judaization” claim today, repatriates were often horrified at being singled out once again as Jews upon their escape from racial persecution. Refusing to distinguish between Jewish and other victims might have been a fundamental error in the planning of the repatriation and the anticipation of the return, since extermination and “ordinary” persecution were very different realities. In receiving the repatriates, it was also a moral imperative, or, as the Belgian Repatriation Commission stated in its final report: “These principles (of non-discrimination on the basis of race, religion or opinion) are part of the spiritual heritage we have fought to defend and that has been safeguarded through victory.”25 Forced assimilation did occur, but in a very different context, when Christian religious communities refused to hand Jewish orphans over to their relatives, abducted them and hid them under false identities, as happened in notorious cases in France and the Netherlands.26 However, the strong reactions - provoked both by administrative practices that singularized Jews and by the forced conversions by Christian churches - show that if antisemitism had not disappeared, it had become anathema to all major political creeds prevalent in post-war Europe. Other discourses on the past war and the remedies to build a new post-war society were far more influential in conditioning the reinsertion of Jewish survivors in their countries of origin.

P atriotism a n d A nti-F ascism Pretending that after 1945 World War II had discredited nationalism in Europe for good is a pious myth of European federalists. Triumphant

25 Lagrou, “Victims of Genocide,” p. 192. 26 For the Netherlands, see Elma Verhey, Om het joodse kind, Amsterdam, 1991, p. 279. For France, particularly the Finally affair, see Henry Rousso, Le syndrome de Vichy, Paris, 1987, pp. 66-67, and Annette Wieviorka, Déportation et Génocide. Entre la mémoire et l ’oubli, Paris, 1992, pp. 368-90.

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and vindictive nationalism was the central discourse of national reconstruction in the countries liberated from Nazi domination to the east and to the west o f Germany. However European patriotism did have to re-invent itself after 1945. Partly this was for political reasons, because a certain nationalism had often chosen the wrong side - in Croatia and Slovakia, in Romania and France. More fundamentally, though, this had to do with the very experience of the war. With the exception of Germany and Soviet Russia, nation-states had lost much o f their relevance in this experience. National armies were mostly eliminated in a very short time, and military deaths accounted for only a modest part in overall war-related mortality. For Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, the Blitz o f 1940 had lasted only a few days and liberation in 1945 followed German surrender. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia had been dismembered. Italy, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria entered the war on Germany’s side and finished it in confusion and occupation. Countries like Greece, Poland and France were all too painfully aware that their role in the decisive events of this war had essentially been that of the impotent onlooker and that their national self-determination depended on the good or other grace of their liberators. This did not prevent the resurgence of a combatant patriotism priding itself on the contribution of the national resistance from within or without. To some extent, it even increased the need for such a discourse. Rituals stemming from a military context - banners, parades, monuments to the Unknown Soldier - and celebrating victory through combat were staged in all the liberated countries of Europe. Obviously, however, war in the traditional sense had lost its centrality: the regular army and with it the figure of the soldier, a consenting participant in the violence o f war, sanctioned by the task conferred on him by the State; the notion of front-line and battlefield and with it the geographic location of death at war and the possibility of creating collective burial sites charged with meaning, referring to events, battles lost or won. The sheer weight of civilian victims of persecution, deportation and murder in the war experience challenged traditional ways of making sense of death at war. As a result, civilian victims were included in a holistic tribute to national martyrdom and combat. Mass death and the metaphor of the front, which had impregnated European societies after 1918, became the dominant way of remembering World War II, even in countries that had not 14

EUROPEAN SOCIETIES AND THE REMNANTS OF THEIR JEWISH COMMUNITIES

participated in World War I, such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway. The metaphor of collective suffering allowed nations to avoid the disruptive legacy of Nazi occupation. Compared to World War I, the victims had not been conscripts of the national army, equally spread out over the population, but taigeted minorities. Rebuilding a national community, so ran the argument, required a nationalization of the memories o f the war, both in countries where the idea of collective suffering was a manifest abstraction, such as in the Netherlands, where Jewish victims represented more than half of all war-related deaths, not to mention Denmark, and in countries where it was not, such as, primarily, Poland. The Nazi concentration camp was a central symbol of this narrative of national martyrdom. Not only did the shock of the carnage and the image o f the skeleton-like survivors provoke a shock of comparable impact with the slaughter o f the war in the trenches during World War I, it also allowed for a different patriotic commemoration. Among the returning survivors o f concentration camps, the arrested resistance fighters and political opponents represented a new generation of veterans of a new war o f unprecedented cruelty and heroism. Symbols of their extreme experience - barbed wire, camp barracks, human beings packed in freight cars, prison uniforms, shaved heads, SS prison guards, dogs and watchtowers - constituted a powerful language representing the war experience tout court, including the experience of groups of the population whose individual trajectory had never included any of it. Brochures, best-selling survivor accounts, public lectures, monuments, and even traveling exhibitions with spectacular reproductions of camp barracks and deportation cattle wagons, permeated post-war European societies with the imagery of this univers concentrationnaire. Commemorations establishing a direct link be­ tween the horror of the “deportation” and the horror of the Great War were at least as influential as the ones establishing a link between the victory o f 1918 and the “victory” of the resistance in 1945. The memory of resistance and deportation became indistinguishable in their public representation. On the one hand, undisputed resistance heroes were the ones who had proven and paid for their heroism with deportation to Nazi camps. On the other hand, all survivors of the camps were represented as resistance heroes, whose deportation had been the consequence of their patriotic or at least anti-fascist opinions and activities. 15

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Post-war patriotism was not only about monuments and official commemorations, but also about healthcare and social recognition, jobs and citizenship. Underneath the apparent consensus around the contours of a patriotic “univers concentrationnaire,” a violent confrontation took place regarding the inclusion or exclusion o f different categories of victims and most prominently regarding the place of Jewish victims of the genocide. The standard-bearers o f traditional patriotism defended an exclusive patriotic interpretation o f the veteran, whose merit resided in his defense of the fatherland. National honor had to be reserved for a fighting elite. There was a world of difference between the national martyr, who had died for the cause of the fatherland, and the arbitrary victim. For traditional patriots, victims of the genocide very explicitly did not deserve any form o f national recognition. In Western Europe, the patriots set up separate organizations, separate commemorations and campaigned for a separate legal recognition, with separate, superior entitlements to financial compensation and other material and symbolical benefits. Their declared hostility to the “anti-fascist amalgamation” of various victims and dubious heroes was not always devoid of antisemitic accents. Also in Western Europe, “anti-fascist organizations,” often, though not always controlled by the Communist Party, mounted an explicit defense of the rights of Jewish victims, grounded not in any recognition of the singularity of their experience but in their membership of a broad anti-fascist family. The alternative to anti-fascist assimilation was exclusion from any form of recognition and patriotic contempt as practiced by nationalist, anti-communist and pro-colonial milieus in most Western European countries. The examples of the Netherlands, where narrow patriotic memories gained the upper hand and where government and civil society, with the exception of the ostracized Communist Party, withheld any form of recognition or assistance to survivors of the genocide until the 1970s, or Belgium, where such recognition was limited to the narrow minority of Belgian citizens among the mostly migrant population of victims of the genocide, serve to underscore the importance of an inclusive anti-fascist definition of national martyrdom.27 In France, for example, laws regulating reparation payments or access to citizenship; social organizations 27 Lagrou, Legacy, pp. 210-61.

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EUROPEAN SOCIETIES AND THE REMNANTS OF THEIR JEWISH COMMUNITIES

offering support and solidarity; elementary sociability and common narratives o f a traumatic past concerned tens o f thousands of individuals.2829Anti-fascism under communist inspiration did contribute in Western Europe to an innovation o f patriotic traditions or at least to rid them of their nastiest and most intolerant overtones. The campaign to honor the memory o f the victims of Nazism, conferring on them a special entitlement to national recognition, implied a reversal of patriotic stereotypes. After all, in France for example, they represented what Vichy had defined as Vanti-France: Bolsheviks, Jews, foreigners, masons and terrorists, if possible all combined in one individual. For the xenophobic right in most parts of the world, a good patriot first of all needed a familiar-sounding last name. Anti-fascist commemoration, as witnessed in necrologies and monuments, did diversify this creed, even if it encountered inveterate resistance, not least in communist ranks. The posterity of the FTP-MO!, the immigrant brigades of the French communist partisans, whose awkward-sounding names were removed from the party’s official commemoration at the end o f the 1940s, illustrates this eloquently enough. Present-day anti-communist sensibilities have led distinguished authors such as Maxime Steinberg and Annette Wieviorka to indict the anti-fascist commemoration as an intolerant communist plot.30 Yet, in the period we are concerned with here, before the outbreak of the Cold War, the anti-fascist commemoration was widely shared by a broad left wing. Communist parties were in government coalitions in France, Italy and Belgium; and even in countries like the Netherlands, where State anti-communism was very strong, the party was not yet the isolated and beleaguered sect it would later become. For Jewish survivors, the Communist Party was a more welcoming family than most other political formations, and one more compatible with their own sympathies on matters such as immigration and foreign policy, not to mention the programs o f conservative reconstruction o f the confessional parties on the right. As far as support for the creation of a Jewish State was concerned, Zionism was a socialist and anti-colonial 28 Ibidem. 29 See Stéphane Courtois, Denis Pechanski and Adam Rayski, Le sang de l ’étranger. Les immigrés de la MOI dans la Résistance, Paris, 1989, and Boris Holban, Testament, Paris, 1989. 30 Annette Wieviorka, Déportation et génocide, and Steinberg, “Les dérives.”

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creed, endorsed, before 1948, by the Soviet Union against Great Britain. Even after the rapidly changing alliances and to some extent until the late 1960s, in Western Europe there was no incompatibility between a pro-communist and a Jewish allegiance. The Six Days’ War in 1967 and the antisemitic purges in Poland one year later would create an irrevocable rupture. In Central and Eastern Europe, the national debates on the legacy of war, occupation and genocide used a very similar language in a very different setting. The relationship between the local Jewish commu­ nities and the new communist regimes is a long-standing source of controversy and stereotype. Were the new regimes welcomed by the surviving Jews, and did they massively staff their government apparatus and secret police services as the anti-communist and antisemitic version has it? Or were the Jews the first victims of their policy of expropriation and their refusal to undo the effects of Nazi “Aryanization” and later of the State antisemitism of the Stalinist regimes and their newfound ethnic nationalism? Recent studies by Jan Gross and Jeffrey Herf offer a balanced analysis of these two opposing views. Jan Gross describes convincingly for Poland how the arrival of the Soviet Army and the establishment of the new regime first offered protection to local Jewish communities and was hence welcomed by them. This was first the case in the summer of 1941, when the Red Army brought the promise of a return of public order in the midst o f generalized violence in the eastern part of the country and of protection from Nazi brutality. Sovietization and deportations soon reversed this situation completely, and in a matter o f weeks volunteers for a suicidal return to the German-occupied western part lined up in front of the German consulate of Lvov.31 In 1945 and 1946, and particularly after the Kielce pogrom, Jewish survivors again looked to the authorities for protection and some engaged in organizing self-protection units under the umbrella of the Central Special Commission.32 Physical protection is quite a minimal motivation for support, however. In spite of an official ideology o f minority rights, it rapidly became clear that what 31 Gross, “Tangled Web,” p. 99. See also his Revolution from Abroad: Soviet Conquest o f Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, Princeton, 1988. 32 “Tangled Web,” pp. 107-14.

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EUROPEAN SOCIETIES AND THE REMNANTS OF THEIR JEWISH COMMUNITIES

the new authorities had to offer was not emancipation for the Jews, but emancipation of Jewishness. Even if a minority of shtetl youth did welcome the latter option, the disaffection of the overwhelming majority was radical. By 1948, a quarter of a million Jews had chosen to leave the country - an exceptional mass migration by peacetime standards and, contrary to the exodus of the German minority, induced in the absence of any government policy of expulsion. Jeffrey H erf s Divided Memory; a comparative study o f the political debates in East and West Germany on the Nazi past and particularly on the place o f the mass murder of the Jews in these debates, is particularly revealing for the period that concerns us here, the years 1945-1948.33 In the milieus of the anti-Nazi emigration in the late 1930s and early 1940s, there was both a concrete solidarity and, to a certain extent, a community of views on the post-war reconstruction of Germany between communists, social democrats and Jews. The exiles came to play a much more prominent role in the eastern occupation zone, where the Soviet occupier mistrusted the local population and tried to implant a new regime on “anti-fascist premises,” than in the western zones. Denazification was at least quantitatively much more thorough than in the western zones, and, in the commemoration of anti-fascist martyr­ dom, the fate of the Jewish population of Europe initially played a more prominent role than in the politics of conservative reconstruction of someone like the future chancellor Konrad Adenauer. On 9 September 1945, a “national day of memory for the victims of fascism” was created in the Soviet zone. The victims of the antisemitic persecutions were explicitly included in the tribute, and the presidency of the Central Committee for the Victims of Fascism (OdF or Hauptausschuß fiir die Opfer des Faschismus) was entrusted to Julius Meyer, a member of the East-German communist party (KPD) and leader of the Berlin Jewish community. Social policies for Nazi victims were strikingly similar to the ones implemented in France in the same period. Jews were recognized as “racially persecuted” and received pension benefits, additional vacation days and free public transport, but at the same time a “hierarchy of victims” was created, giving special honors and entitlements to the “fighters.” By June 1946, the administration had 33 Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory. The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys, Cambridge, Mass., 1997.

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registered more than 42,000 victims {Opfer) and about 15,500 fighters {Kämpfer)?* February 1947 saw the creation of the governmentsupported Union of Victims of Nazi Persecution {Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes, W N ), an organization that prided itself on the prominent role of former Nazi victims in the government and administration of the Soviet zone. If all of this compared favorably with the Western occupation zone, there was one important exception: restitution. In 1946 and 1947, restitution laws for Jewish survivors were passed in the Western zone. High-ranking party officials (the new Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland, SED, had absorbed the Socialist and Communist Parties) most prominently Paul Merker and Leo Zuckermann, petitioned the government to create similar laws in the Eastern zone, arguing that an anti-fascist regime could not allow itself to be outdone by its capitalist contender in its policy towards the victims o f fascism. Their pleas remained unanswered. Restitution was not only incompatible with the aim of the sovietization of the national economy, it was rejected with the overtly antisemitic argument that it was unacceptable for the party of the German working class to return property to Jewish capitalists. The same group of people also demonstrated explicit support for the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine, both as a consequence of the solidarity between former victims of fascism and as part of the anti­ colonial struggle against Great Britain and the “Anglo-American oil companies.”3435 The re-stalinization of all Central European communist parties between 1948-1949 and 1953 and the “anti-cosmopolitan campaign” started in Moscow in 1949 would taiget this group and durably change the policy regarding the memory of Nazi persecution o f the Jews. Anti-western paranoia and spy-scare turned quickly into a purge of party members who had been exiled in the west before 1945 and particularly, Jews. Between the Laszlo Rajk trial in Budapest in September 1949 and the Rudolph Slansky trial in Prague in November 1952, successive waves of purges and denunciations would hit highranking party members in most Soviet bloc countries, accused o f acting as capitalist or Zionist spies. (Interestingly, the spy-scare of McCarthyism on the opposite side of the Cold War barrier was not devoid of an 34 Ibid., p. 83. 35 Ibid., p. 98.

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EUROPEAN SOCIETIES AND THE REMNANTS OF THEIR JEWISH COMMUNITIES

antisemitic stereotype either and similarly dissuaded any tendency towards Jewish distinctiveness in the United States).36 In East Germany, the initial mistrust of the local - nazified - population and Soviet reliance on exile milieus was wholly replaced by a new nationalist and anti-western ideology of building socialism for the German working class in which there was no room for an explicit acknowledgment o f the plight of European Jewry under Nazi rule. In 1953, the inclusive Union of Victims o f Nazi Persecution ( Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes) was transformed into an obedient Committee of Antifascist Resistance Fighters (Komittee der Anti­ faschistischen Widerstandskämpfer), which would take the fore in the organization of commemorations and the construction of monuments, memorials and museums in the German Democratic Republic, including the concentration camp sites of Sachsenhausen, Ravensbrück and Buchenwald. A short but crucial intermezzo was thus irrevocably brought to an end.

Conclusion To what kind of a world did Jewish survivors return - the very few who survived deportation and were repatriated, those who survived in hiding and re-emeiged, those who came back from exile in allied or neutral countries? Most trajectories were much too complicated to represent the events of the war years and the first post-war years as a return journey. The “comeback” was often only a transitory stop on a migration to further destinations. Most importantly, the place where war and persecution had struck them in most cases no longer existed - their home and their belongings, their relatives, their community, their neighborhood. Even the social, political and demographic make-up of the country they had known was most often radically transformed by wan This paper has dwelled very little on the harrowing experiences of the returning survivors themselves and limits itself to a description of some general features of the societies they returned to. European societies in the years 1945-1947 were absorbed by the turmoil war had created and by the challenge of reconstruction. Public 36 See Novick, The Holocaust in American Life, particularly pp. 92-102.

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attention was often not available for compassion and solidarity with the survivors of the genocide. Material goods were scarce and there was a housing shortage, all of which made restitution an unpopular issue. Antisemitism had been driven underground, but it resurfaced in some popular reactions, ranging from insidious remarks and clandestine graffiti to spontaneous demonstrations and even small-scale pogroms. Recognition of Jewish distinctiveness was therefore frequently still linked in the minds of Jewish survivors with reactions of fear. Moreover, post-war European societies set out to “nationalize” memories of the war in narratives of collective martyrdom and resistance as a means of consolidating re-emerging national identities. In this context there was little room for the acknowledgment that Europe's Jews had been subject to a Nazi project of annihilation that set their experience apart from the collective ordeal of war and occupation. However, this failed acknowledgment and the insensitivity it implied was neither the product of widespread antisemitism nor of a generalized attempt to de-judify the victims. Even if there was an awareness and the occasional public recognition of the fact that “the Jews suffered more,” the historical understanding of the continental project to destroy European Jewry as transpires in the present-day terminology o f “genocide,” “Holocaust” and “Shoah,” only emerged in later years. Post-war societies were not in the first instance concerned with historical truth, but with social justice, or at least they should have been. The modalities and the language by which victims of the Holocaust were recognized as national victims in post-war European countries did not carry any recognition of the specific nature of their experience; on the contrary in fact. Their persecution was assimilated with a service to the nation - in the terms of the time they had “contributed to the salvation of the Nation.”37 As victims of the national enemy they had become honorary citizens, and as victims of fascism part of the anti­ fascist struggle. The national remembrance honored the dead and provided aid for the survivors as victims of deportation, as patriots and anti-fascists, not because of extermination as Jews. That being said, no other forms of social recognition were available at the time. The anti­ fascist commemoration offered a formal legal recognition to survivors 37 In the wording of the preamble of the French law for “political deportees.'’ See Loi no. 48-1404 (9 September 1948), Journal Officiel (10 September 1948).

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EUROPEAN SOCIETIES AND THE REMNANTS OF THEIR JEWISH COMMUNITIES

of the Holocaust, with both symbolic and material benefits; it offered social support and sociability through organizations capable of delivering a powerful sense o f mission. The “anti-fascist amalga­ mation” was partly imposed upon many survivors, partly welcomed and interiorized, as a strategy for re-integration and as an identity. Anti­ fascism was a powerful narrative, a heroic and dynamic posture, a means o f overcoming the appallingly arbitrary affliction that had hit them, and thus a way to take possession of their own destiny. Forced assimilationism and ideological hegemony were not incompatible with receptivity among Jewish survivors for this interpretation. Accordingly, after 1945, a measure of social justice for victims of the Holocaust in post-war Europe did not depend on the establishment of the historical truth about the distinct experience of their persecution; quite the opposite. Only insofar as they presented themselves as anti­ fascists and patriots could they legitimately claim public attention and official recognition. In the terms of the immediate post-war and from the perspective of the survivors, the conflict between an identification as Jew or anti-fascist was also a conflict between a categorization by the persecutor and a free-floating categorization whereby the victim could choose her or his identification. To the extent that antisemitic hyper­ patriots pleaded for the exclusion of Jewish victims from post-war legal recognition on precisely this basis, historical untruth collided with social injustice. European Holocaust survivors who had internalized a militant anti-fascist and patriotic identity spoke a language that was understood by their contemporaries and provided social legitimacy, self-esteem and a sense of purpose. In their aspiration for justice, they inscribed their personal experience in collective narratives and escaped moral solitude. This implied conforming to the codes and paradigms capable o f providing social legitimacy, first of all that of the fighter and the militant, the hero. Recognition for their historically specific suffering was dependent on their identification with universal values of patriotism, anti-fascism and humanism. Post-war Europe was not a promising setting for the emergence of a multi-cultural, tolerant and cosmopolitan society. Indeed, quite the reverse. The emigration of hundreds of thousands of Jews from Europe during these years, including the miserable conditions of a protracted period o f transit in DP camps where emigrants were hostage to the political arm-twisting between Britain and the United States about the 23

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emigration quota to Palestine and America respectively, is a powerful illustration of this. The advent of the Cold War after 1948 would only darken this picture, increase suspicion and xenophobia, and leave even more Jews politically homeless in a hostile environment. In this light, the debates over the inclusion or exclusion of Jewish victims in national memories, social policies and restitution processes are important, in part for what they can contribute to a better understanding of the experience of Jewish survivors, but, more centrally even, for what they can reveal about the way European countries reconstructed themselves after the catastrophe of Nazism and the degree to which they succeeded or failed to re-invent themselves and evolve towards more open and tolerant societies.

24

French Apprehensions, Jewish Expectations: From a Social Imaginary to a Political Practice RENÉE POZNANSKI The term “return” was not neutral in France after the Liberation. Throughout the German Occupation the French people had been waiting for the return of more than two million absentees - prisoners of war, labor conscripts, resistance fighters, political deportees. Jews - socalled racial deportees - accounted for only a small minority of all the absentees. At the time it was believed that about one hundred and twenty thousand Jews had been deported. Following the Liberation, the absentees were in fact very much present in people’s minds; and an “Absentees’ Week,” 14 to 21 December 1944, was organized by the Ministry of Prisoners, Deportees and Refugees.1 The actual return began in the spring of 1945. But whereas the vast majority of prisoners of war and labor conscripts returned and 60 percent of political deportees took the road back to France,2 only 2,500 Jews had survived the death camps - a mere 3 percent of the 76,000 Jews deported from France.3 On 1 June 1945, the arrival was celebrated of the one-millionth returnee - a prisoner of war. At the end of June 1945, Libération referred to the fate of the Jews of France: “More than a hundred thousand Jews living in France were deported beyond the Rhine. To date, only two thousand have been found. One must, alas, expect a 95 percent casualty rate.”4

1 ' 2 3 4

Edouard Lynch, “Les filtres successifs de l’information,” in: Marie-Anne MatardBonucci and Edouard Lynch (eds.), La Libération des camps et le retour des déportés, Brussels, 1995, pp. 163-75. Sixty percent of the 63,000 resistance and political deportees; see Jean-Pierre Azéma, De Munich à la Libération, 1938-1944, Paris, 1979, p. 189. Pieter Lagrou, “Victims of Genocide and National Memory: Belgium, France and the Netherlands, 1945-1965,” Past and Present, 154 (1997), pp. 187-90. Lynch, “Les filtres successifs de l’information,” p. 179.

25

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For the French population as a whole, the idea of “return” - both during the war and after the Liberation - applied mainly to the labor conscripts and prisoners of war. The collective expectation of “return” gave little thought to the return of a few Jews. Furthermore, two-thirds of the Jews deported from France were aliens; some eight thousand o f them did hold French citizenship, but they were in fact immigrants who had been naturalized in the 1920s and 1930s. The return to France was thus a return to the country from which they had been deported during the war, a country that had accepted them without great enthusiasm but was nevertheless open to immigration when other countries were closing their borders. For the Jews of France, however, “return” also meant the return o f their rights. During the Occupation, German and French ordinances alike had expelled the Jews from most of the jobs they had held before the war. They had been dismissed from the civil service, excluded from all artistic activity, barred from journalism, banned from professions associated with finance, subjected to a numerus clausus if they were physicians or attorneys, and in the Occupied zone were debarred from any position that would bring them into contact with the general public. This legislation was intended to limit the influence of the Jews, which was represented as excessive in the cultural, social and political life o f France. In this domain, the return meant a return to the pre-war legislation that made no distinction between Jews and non-Jews, as well as reinstatement in their jobs. In addition, under the cover of the “Aryanization” of French economic life, Jewish assets had been confiscated and frequently sold off. Frenchmen now occupied apart­ ments, especially in the Paris region, that had been abandoned when their Jewish tenants, some of them not French citizens, fled to places considered to be less dangerous. The Jews’ return posed a concrete threat of dispossession for the current occupants of formerly Jewish owned property. This points to another important aspect of what return might mean. Beyond the desire, shared by the entire population, to resume normal life, beyond the exigencies of the reconstruction of a France that had been tom apart by something close to civil war, beyond the call to unity that quickly came to dominate everything, there loomed a specter that cast its shadow throughout the war years and was embodied in the fear of a return to the pre-war situation. Whatever may have come of the 26

FRENCH APPREHENSIONS, JEWISH EXPECTATIONS

numerous and grandiose projects to transform France, most of them took into account the image of the 1930s as an era of a corrupt parliamentary regime in which the Jews - supposedly too numerous and too hastily naturalized - had played a disproportionate and harmful role. The hope for a rapid return of deported Frenchmen and prisoners o f war and the fear of a return to the pre-war situation framed the French apprehensions. For the Jews of France, the hope that their relatives and friends would return was quickly extinguished, but they certainly expected a return to their own pre-war situation. These expectations were linked to the hopes raised by the restoration of France of the Rights o f Man, after the disappointments of the Occupation years.

B efore the Liberation During 1943 it became increasingly clear that the Allies would win the war. Hence this year is pivotal for trying to understand how various groups envisioned the effects of the Liberation, which arrived in France in the summer of 1944. • French apprehensions

By 1943, a majority o f the French population thoroughly disapproved of the persecution of the Jews - the manhunts, roundups, arrests. The brutality of these actions was extreme. They were inspired or planned by a hated occupier, and carried out by a government whose legitimacy was becoming questionable and which people understood would not last. “The current persecutions are too drastic,” remarked a certain Madame P. in January 1943.5 But she was also afraid of “a pro-semitic reaction after the war.” The same tone, if different terms, could be heard everywhere. “The Allied victory must not have as a consequence the plain and simple return of Jewish personnel, returning as conquerors.”6 This phrase, taken from a report on public opinion sent to London in 5 6

Jean Grenier, Sous / ’Occupation, Paris, 1997, p. 348. Archives nationales, Paris (hereinafter AN), 3 AG 2/334, Notes sur l’état de l’opinion en France, February 1943.

27

RENÉE POZNANSKI

February 1943, is the leitmotif of all the reports of this type that reached the Free French intelligence services.7 Some referred to the possibility of a numerus clausus.8 In a report drawn up for General de Gaulle on 30 April 1943 on behalf of the political chiefs of Combat in the northern zone, Henri Frenay, the famous leader of that movement, underlined the unanimity of opinion on one point: “The Jews must be kept away from positions of influence (politics, press, radio).” He added, “The General must not be ‘the man who brings back the Jews’.” His conclusion was clear: “Even though it is our duty to do away with any ‘racial’ distinction, in practice we must take account o f the attitude of the population, which has effectively changed during the last two years.”9 On this last point one need not necessarily accept Frenay’s diagnosis. Like the authors of all these reports, he attributed the antisemitism that he claimed had developed among the French population to the effect o f German propaganda. Yet one might rather see here the traces o f an ambiguous attitude that was widespread in France during the 1930s. The idea that France had “a Jewish problem” had been solidly entrenched in all circles, and these reports merely passed on notions that had been circulating before the war. They expressed a mood and reflected an uneasiness that seemed to trouble even the various resistance movements. At the beginning of 1944, analysts of public opinion began to express a more specific fear: that antisemitism might be adopted “by all those for whom the elimination o f the Jews has made it possible to achieve posts they could never have hoped for and now they are afraid of being dismissed.” 10 The first French Association of Owners o f Aryanized Property had been founded on 25 September 1943, with the “object of bringing together the Aryan proprietors of all property or holdings that had belonged to Jews and were acquired pursuant to the orders, laws, decrees, and statutes applying to the Jews.” The 7

For other examples and an analysis, see Renée Poznanski, “The French Resistance: An Alternative Society for the Jews?”, in: David Bankier and Israel Gutman (eds.), Nazi Europe and the Final Solution, Jerusalem, 2003, pp. 411-434. 8 Report by Lavergne on Paris, 2 March 1943, AN, AG 2/334. 9 London, 30 April 1943, report drafted for de Gaulle by the political chiefs of Combat in the northern zone (Charvet), AN, AG 2/334. 10 AN, AG 2/334, report for February 1944.

28

FRENCH APPREHENSIONS, JEWISH EXPECTATIONS

association proposed “to provide special assistance, by all available means, to organizations striving to create a favorable public climate toward Aryanized enterprises.”11 The idea of an organization of this type had first been raised two weeks earlier by Marcel Déat in L ’Œuvre} 2 In London, reading these reports must have reinforced the fears o f some o f the Free French in de Gaulle’s immediate entourage. Free French circles were not free o f antisemitism, in fact. There is abundant evidence of this. On 30 June 1940, Georges Boris, who had been the head o f Léon Blum’s economic bureau in 1938, was denied access to de Gaulle’s office in St. Stephen’s House by the chief of staff, Pierre Tissier. Boris was not brought into Free France until after the General learned o f the affair and was furious.13 In his diary on 10 March 1941, René Cassin, who stood by de Gaulle from the start, criticized Tissier, Escarra, and other “moderates” who “accepted the racial laws in a weakened form.” 14 After the war, André Weill-Curiel, another early resister who had joined General de Gaulle in London, denounced the antisemitism that had been endemic in the general’s entourage.15 JeanPierre Lévy, the head of the Franc-Tireur organization, remembered the shock he felt on his arrival in London in April 1943 when confronted by the antisemitism of certain individuals.16 11 AN, AJ 38, 1075. 12 “I advise the hundreds of thousands of French people (for they number in the hundreds of thousands) who have purchased Jewish property, large or small, considerable or minimal, to associate in a bloc to defend their rights. If they do not do this, they risk being taken for fools. United, people will have to listen to them. And thus we have an army in the service of the New Order,” he wrote (L 'Œuvre, 9 September 1943). 13 Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac, La France Libre: De l ’A ppel du 18 juin à la Libération, Paris, 1996, p. 195. 14 Claude Singer, “Servir la France. Le journal de René Cassin à Londres,” Nouveaux Cahiers, 81 (1985), pp. 56-64. 15 André Weill-Curiel, Le temps de la honte, Paris, 1945,3 volumes. Vol. 1, Lejour se lève à Londres, pp. 269-71. 16 Jean-Pierre Lévy, with Dominique Veillon, Mémoires d ’un franc-Tireur: Itinéraire d ’un résistant (1940-1944), Brussels, 1998. In particular he mentions a remark by “Saint-Jacques,” [Maurice Duclos]. Duclos, who had been a member of the extreme right-wing oiganization La Cagoule before the war, was a member of the first mission sent to France, landing on the coast of Brittany on 4 August 1940. A pioneer o f military intelligence, he had no political influence in London.

29

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The case o f Pierre Tissier is particularly interesting. A passage in a book he wrote in English in 1942 created a scandal. “The Jewish problem exists, even in France,” wrote the only member of the Council of State who escaped to London in 1940. He added, “The Jewish race constitutes an international community” and consequently it was “more difficult for the Jews to assimilate.” 17 These statements infuriated the World Jewish Congress in the United States. Because that organization was thought to exert considerable influence, Tissier had to explain himself.18 He did so quickly enough: he explained there were no grounds for commotion. He also condemned the Vichy race laws. If integration of the Jews was difficult (“because the Jewish race is international”) it was nevertheless possible. The true problem was that of the “Jewish immigrants of recent date” who remained totally unassimilated. It was “legitimate that some recently naturalized Jews who, like all recently naturalized foreigners, could not be regarded as fully assimilated, be excluded from certain public positions.” He continued in this vein and argued in favor of the forced integration o f foreigners (depriving them of anything that might link them to their country of origin, a ban on the public use of their language and on the purchase of publications in a foreign language, scattering them around the country, assimilating them by force), with the objective of achieving “a homogeneous French population.” 19 Obviously, xenophobia re­ mained alive during the war, even in London. In another of his works from 1942, this one published simulta­ neously in French and English, Tissier focused on the race laws and condemned them unequivocally. This book was a study of the nature o f Dominique Veillon mentions the testimony of Jean-Pierre Lévy to the effect that he had heard antisemitic remarks voiced by several resistance fighters, and not necessarily low-ranking ones. 17 The Government o f Vichy, London, 1942, in the chapter dealing with France’s renovation quoted by Patrick Weil, “Racisme et discrimination dans la politique française de l’immigration, 1938-1945/1974-1995,” XXè siècle. Revue d ’histoire, 47 (1995), pp. 77-102. Pierre Tissier was the author of the Déclaration organique signed by de Gaulle at Brazzaville on 16 November 1940, one of the founding texts of Free France, which declared the illegality and unconstitutionality of the Vichy government. See Crémieux-Brilhac, La France Libre, pp. 138-39. 18 Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris (hereinafter: MAE), 207,235-42, 15 October 1942, from Libfrance (Washington) to London. 19 Tissier’s note about this telegram, MAE, 207, 235-42.

30

FRENCH APPREHENSIONS, JEWISH EXPECTATIONS

the Vichy regime and the intended reader was the Allies: Tissier wanted to persuade them that Pétain’s France was not neutral and was in fact undergoing a process of Nazification. The question of the regime in France had “become an international problem the day that Pétain modified the French organization in ways that, instead of being determined by what he believed, rightly or wrongly, to be the national interest, had the essential goal of providing the enemy with increasingly active assistance,” he wrote. He added, “That the French nation still has confidence in Pétain stems from the fact that it thinks that the benevolence of the Allied powers toward him proves that he may in fact be playing a double game and biding his time... Today the internal regime in France is no more than an instrument in the hands of the enemy yet, by an inexplicable paradox, this regime is consolidated precisely by those who have the greatest interest in seeing it disappear.”20 In this text, meant for external consumption and addressed to the United States, whose policies were thought to be strongly influenced by American Jews, the condemnation of the antisemitic measures adopted by Vichy was central. On 15 September 1942, the same Pierre Tissier, broadcasting over the BBC, and this time in French, issued a clear warning to those who might be tempted by the lure of Jewish property. The sales of Jewish property “ ...are invalid. The property involved will in principle [emphasis added] be restored to its rightful owners. The purchasers may be assured in every case that they will be deprived o f the property thus acquired and will generally forfeit, in addition, the purchase price.”21 This broadcast declaration seems to mark the start o f Tissier’s personal evolution in which he moved away from the questionable terminology he had used in his previous writings about the Jews. The example of Jean Escarra, mentioned by René Cassin, is also of interest. On 5 May 1941, this law professor, who joined de Gaulle’s cause in January 1941, sent a memorandum to René Pleven, who had handled foreign affairs for the Free French since 15 July 1940. Escarra noted, “It would be better if Cassin did not learn of this note.” He

20 Pierre Tissier, La nazification de la France de Vichy, La France Combattante, n. F.l, Oxford, 1942; (second impression 1943), pp. 4-5. 21 Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac (ed.), Les voix de la liberté: Ici London, 1940-1944, Paris, 1976, 5 volumes; vol. 2, p. 215.

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wrote: “O f all the domestic actions taken by Vichy, [the enactment o f the Jewish statute] was among those least criticized by the country as a whole.” He explained the existence of antisemitic feelings in France as caused by the excessively hasty naturalization o f too many Jews from central Europe - “undesirable elements” - who had “little by little invaded public institutions and the liberal professions in France.” He described “the characteristic features of the Jewish race, which are dangerous for the moral and political stability of the country, namely: a taste for utopia, a love for abstract intelligence carried to the point o f dilettantism, a frequent lack of character and moral courage, negative and destructive tendencies, etc.” While making a distinction between “an Israelite of old French stock and one of these Jews from central Europe who have no value for the community and for whom France has become a sort of dumping ground,” he concluded that this was only a “fine distinction for the French masses.” He added, “One of the dominant elements in the propaganda conducted in France against the Free French Forces evokes the Jews’ control o f de Gaulle’s movement,” and “ ...some outward appearances o f our movement do sometimes seem to justify this.” This was followed by the practical implications of his analysis. Echoing an introductory paragraph in which he rejected “a brutally antisemitic policy that is odious to all generous spirits” and recognized that “the Vichy law, however moderate it may be as compared to the German law, still needs significant relaxation,” he counseled prudence. He was afraid that “promising the Jews, for example, that after the victory we will impose the abolition of all the discriminatory acts and return, pure and simple, to the status quo ante would compromise our cause, which must remain intact” - “ all the more so because the Jewish mind is quick to seize hold o f any mark o f sympathy and turn it into a basis for making ever-increasing demands. The invading, ‘grasping’ character of this mindset is, in fact, a well-known trait of the race.” Escarra was hoping to block permanent cooperation between the World Jewish Congress and de Gaulle; otherwise, “no one will be able to determine whether Free France is defending the Jews, or just France.” He wanted to limit the relationship to exchanges o f information and financial contributions - preferably by individuals.2 22 MAE, 207, Escarra to Pleven, 5 May 1941.

32

FRENCH APPREHENSIONS. JEWISH EXPECTATIONS

The question is what influence these statements - some of them frankly antisemitic, others expressing an ambiguous Z e itg e ist - had on political choices. Escarra’s memorandum had the intended effect. Two days after it was sent, de Gaulle asked the New York representative of France Forever - the Free French affiliate in the United States - to suspend implementation of a cooperation agreement that had been concluded with the World Jewish Congress.2324 On 9 May 1941, Escarra wrote to the author Albert Cohen that it was not possible for the Free French Forces, which had a public character and are conducting an independent national action, to reach an agreement for political cooperation with any private organization, “however important it may be or lofty its purpose.”25 “It was beyond the General’s power to overcome at once, within and all the more so outside the circle of our minions in metropolitan France, the prejudices so amply nourished by the enemy which spread from their forces to the overseas territories and French colonies abroad,”26 wrote René Cassin. De Gaulle had no hesitations about surrounding himself with Jewish supporters and gave them important responsibili­ ties: Georges Boris edited the economics page o f La Marseillaise, the Free French weekly, first published on 14 June 1942. In 1943 and 1944 he became the main inspiration of broadcast policy. When de Gaulle left London for Algiers in May 1943, London retained its role as the center of propaganda and links with Europe. Boris and, until his death, Jacques Bingen, had sole responsibility for liaison with the under­ ground in France. 23 Referring to what he calls “the initial political ambiguities," Jean-Louis CrémieuxBrilhac wrote: “The officers of the regular army, the first cadres of Free France, are for the most part right-wing, antisemitic, and in agreement in blaming the defeat on the Popular Front or even on the parliamentary system” (La France Libre, p. 195). One can also refer, however, to other remarks reported by Jean Grenier and attributed to Ferdinand Lot (the father-in-law of Boris Vildé and of Berthold Mahn’s son): “Against antisemitism, which lived it up in his own generation [...] recognize that the Jews want all the jobs and help each other out” (Grenier, Sous l ’Occupation, p. 383). 24 MAE, 207, 7 May 1941, coded telegram to the consul general in New York for Garreau-Dombasle. 25 MAE, 207, 9 May 1941, Escarra to Albert Cohen. 26 René Cassin, Les hommes partis de rien: Le réveil de la France abattue, Paris, 1975, p. 136.

33

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It was René Cassin, who stood by de Gaulle from the start, who prepared the draft cooperation agreement with Great Britain that culminated, on 7 August 1940, in the Fighting French Charter in which Churchill officially recognized the movement and its head, General de Gaulle. When the Imperial Defense Council (Conseil de Défense de I ’E mpire), the first political body with territorial jurisdiction set up by the Free French, was established by de Gaulle in a decree signed at Brazzaville, “on French soil,” on 27 October 1940, Cassin was one o f its nine members.2728When de Gaulle was in the Near East, from June to September 1941, he left Cassin to oversee the various agencies and departments in London on his behalf. That, however, was Cassin’s last decision-making position. Later, he was responsible for the administrative structure of de Gaulle’s unified command o f all French military personnel who came over to Free France and made a hundred and forty speeches over the BBC.29 In Algeria, from 1 September 1943, he headed the legal committee o f the Comité Français de Libération Nationale (French National Liberation Committee). This legal committee drafted the order o f 9 August 1944 (one among 415 others), which repealed all racist laws and restored the pre-war legal situation.30 Many other examples could be added. With regard to the Vichy Jewish Law, de Gaulle’s attitude was no less clear. On 4 October 1941, he sent a message to Rabbi Stephen Wise, the president o f the American Jewish Congress in New York, to mark the 150th anniversary of the emancipation of French Jewry. With no ambiguity, he declared: “The famous decree for the emancipation o f the Jews of France, just like the Declaration of the Rights o f Man, remains in full force and cannot be abrogated by the Vichyites.... Free France, which, wherever it is in power, respects the constitution and laws of the Republic, is determined to reestablish, after its victory, the equality, in dignity as in duties, of all citizens everywhere on French territory.”31 This repeated the content of a letter he had sent on 22 August 1940 to the above mentioned author Albert Cohen, then serving as the political 27 28 29 30 31

34

Crémieux-Brilhac, La France Libre, p. 133. Ibid., p. 183. Marc Agi, René Cassin, 1887-1976, Paris, 1998, p. 126. Ibid., pp. 172-74. MAE, 207, 162.

FRENCH APPREHENSIONS, JEWISH EXPECTATIONS

counselor o f the World Jewish Congress in London. Assuring Cohen of his “feelings of sympathy for the Jewish communities subject to the oppression of totalitarian regimes,” de Gaulle wrote that he was “convinced that when France has recovered its liberty, assuring thereby the free play of its traditional democratic institutions, all French citizens, of whatever religion, must enjoy a just equality of rights.”32 Does this mean that the anti-Jewish statements and ambiguities were without effect? Hardly. First of all, as we have seen, they may have had a direct influence on the nature of the relations between Free France and the World Jewish Congress. The key word seems to be discretion. And discretion there certainly was in the propaganda emanating from London, which, in the battle for public opinion against Vichy, gave minimal place to the anti-Jewish persecutions on French territory.33 Discretion was also the watchword for de Gaulle, who exercised maximum restraint in his use of the unreserved support accorded him almost at once by Léon Blum. Only in 1950, when the fifth volume of Blum’s collected works was published, was it revealed that under­ ground messengers had delivered three letters from the former premier to de Gaulle in London. Evidently de Gaulle thought, as Churchill noted, that “Blum’s name will not open any doors in France after the war.”34 Spontaneous discretion was also exercised by many Jews who had joined Free France. Thus René Cassin avoided making a “flashy broadcast” over the BBC to announce his adherence to the cause immediately after his arrival in London.35 For the same reason, he noted in his diary on 2 July 1940, he was making “the sacrifice of not being directly involved in all foreign affairs” and preferred, in August, not to put his name to the text he had drafted for de Gaulle because his “signature at that moment would be too embarrassing for [him].”36 But why was Cassin shunted aside from any specifically political 32 MAE, 207. 33 On this question, see Poznanski, “What Sort of Alternative Society?” op. cit. 34 Crémieux-Brilhac, La France Libre, p. 379. Before he was deported to Germany in March 1943, Blum received at least two messages from de Gaulle. At the latter’s request, Blum went so far as to certify his democratic inclinations for Churchill and Roosevelt. 35 Cassin, Les hommes partis de rien, p. 137. 36 Singer, “Servir la France,” p. 61.

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responsibility? Was it because he did not show himself sufficiently steadfast in 1941 against the scheming by de Gaulle’s opponents in London, as is suggested by Crémieux-Brilhac?3738Or was it due perhaps to the fact that Cassin did not hesitate to speak clearly on subjects that concerned the Jews? Indeed, from an initial discretion, Cassin moved toward putting more and more emphasis on defending the rights of Jews wherever they were violated. The case of T issier- another example of change in attitude, as noted earlier - illuminates another point: the imagined influence o f American Jews on the United States government. “The influence [in the United States] of the circles represented by the Jewish Congress remains considerable,” underlined the cable from Washington reporting on the commotion occasioned by the incriminating chapter in Tissier’s book. This influence was o f course imaginary, as demonstrated by the debate that accompanied the second repeal and subsequent restoration o f the Crémieux Decree in Algeria after the Allied landing in North Africa. But its impact was real: it meant that the anti-Jewish policy could be condemned unequivocally when addressing the American public. Condemnation of the race laws was indeed the first point in Tissier’s text, whose intention was to gain the support o f American public opinion and the American government for Free France. No Free French spokesman ever gave similar prominence to Vichy antisemitism in any other setting. And it was to the American Jewish Congress that de Gaulle made his declaration - namely, a Jewish organization with its headquarters in the United States rather than a French or French-Jewish one. His primary audience was the American Jewish community. It was René Cassin’s role to speak directly to French Jews over the BBC.39

37 Crémieux-Brilhac, La France Libre, p. 183. 38 MAE, 207, 235-42, 15 October 1942, from Librefrance (Washington) to London. 39 Crémieux-Brilhac, Les voix de la liberté, vol. 1, p. 217. “French Jews, you know very well that the French people are not responsible for the measures with which the enemy and its collaborators strike you, even more in your human dignity than in your material interests,” Cassin told them. At the same time he underscored the unity among the spiritual families of France, its most precious strength, and noted that the Nazis, “modem barbarians,” had ‘‘undermined and sought to destroy every creed, every principle, every civilization that could oppose their totalitarian domination.”

36

FRENCH APPREHENSIONS, JEWISH EXPECTATIONS

The call for discretion, prevailing in all Resistance circles during the war, led to the fear, as the Liberation approached, that Jews might demand reparations. Quoting Jean-Jacques Bernard, who, when liberated from the Compiègne camp, had declared, “All the same, there is no room to submit a bill," Maurice Martin du Gard, who had been a supporter of the Vichy regime, wrote as early as June 1943 that “ ...one hopes for them that their co-religionists will be as sensible and intelligent”40 These apprehensions were clearly shared by those whom Jean-Paul Sartre called “the democrats,” when he wrote in October 1944, echoing the words of Madame P. reported earlier: “During the occupation, the democrat was deeply and sincerely indignant about the antisemitic persecutions, but from time to time he would sigh, ‘the Jews are going to come back from exile with an appetite for revenge so I fear a fresh wave o f antisemitism’.”41 • Jew ish expectations

There was no appetite for revenge among the Jews, but a changing attitude toward the discretion they were expected to display did characterize the behavior of the organized Jews in France. In May 1943, the hour had come for a merger of the various streams, groups and movements, emulating the unification under de Gaulle’s authority of the various Resistance organizations with the creation of the CNR - the Conseil national de la Résistance (National Council of the Resis­ tance).42 A similar development occurred on the Jewish scene. The picture of Jewish disunity after the First World War was not forgotten43 All Jewish leaders were convinced that this time they must present a united 40 Maurice Martin du Gard, La chronique de Vichy, 1940-1944, Paris, 1948, pp. 34849. 41 Jean-Paul Sartre, Réflexions sur la question juive, Paris, 1954; it was written in October 1944 and published in 1946. The first section, “Portrait of the Antisémite,” was first published in Les Temps Modernes in November 1945. It bears noting that Sartre uppercased the word “Juif,” which means that he was relating to the Jews as a nationality rather than as a religion, p. 70. 42 On 27 May 1943. See Jean-Pierre Azéma, “Des résistances à la Résistance,” in: Jean-Pierre Azéma and François Bédarida (eds.), La France des années noires, Paris, 1993, vol. 2, pp. 241-70. 43 Michel Abitbol, Les deux terres promises, Paris, 1989, pp. 68ff.

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front. The legitimate Jewish authorities of the post-war era, to judge by what was taking place on the French political scene, could emerge only from the resistance. The rapprochement of all the organized Jewish “political” forces that called for Jewish Resistance was thus foreseeable and culminated in the establishment in Grenoble, at the end of July 1943, of the CGDy the Comité général de défense (General Defense Committee), which brought communists, Zionists of all stripes, and Jewish socialists (Bundists) together under one roof. The CGD applied for membership in the CNR.44 The authors of the letter explained that they had delayed asking to join out of concern lest “people say that the resistance movement was controlled by the Jews, on their behalf and at their instigation, or that the Jews only take political action. Had we openly made common cause with you earlier, it would have been exploited against us and against you.” But, the letter went on, “The time has come when we no longer have to make distinctions and practice mutual caution. The cause has become too clear and too similar for you and us.”45 The writers of the letter justified the creation of a specifically Jewish organization: the clear objective was to demonstrate that to the specific situation of the persecuted Jews there was a corresponding specific response - that of the organized Jews. The specific nature of the action to be taken by the Jews is clearly highlighted in the document, along with the coincidence of interests: Our resistance movements were not bom at the same time and, initially, did not have the same nature.... The law condemned us... to being plundered without recourse and, for most of us, to misery without recourse. Consequently our first form of resistance was one of mutual assistance.... [This was followed by a second form of resistance], the resistance of flight and defense. This brought us closer to you. Our methods became yours. We hid, discarded our identities, and snatched people from slow death, while you snatched them from violent death. We wrote, spread the watchwords. You helped us. We helped you.

Joint effort could still be effective: By joining the CNR, we commit ourselves to persevering, with still more ardor and determination, in the assistance and protection work conducted parallel to yours. We commit ourselves to devoting to the common effort all the resources 44 I have not located any indication of the date of this application. 45 Yad Vashem Archives, Jerusalem (hereinafter: YV), Marc Jarblum collection, P737.

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that we can. We commit ourselves to sharing your propaganda, conducting and distributing it in agreement with you. We commit ourselves to taking part in all the general actions and to being at all points of the common front of the resistance.

Finally, the letter contains a rather vague and modest paragraph about what the CGD expects: We ask the CNR, where we lack of the means and there are gaps in our defense, to support us and reinforce us. And when the hour arrives to draft the future laws of the country, to include among them redress for the crying injustice done to the Jews.46

This is the first exception to the rule of discretion: the CGD affirms that the time for circumspection has passed, while affirming the special nature o f its activity made necessary by the particular situation of the Jews in France. In January 1944, the unity movement was duplicated in Paris with the creation of the CUDJF’ the Comité Uni de Défense des Juifs de France (United Committee for the Defense o f the Jews of France). The first application to join the CNR having been demonstratively left unanswered, the CUDJF tried again on 10 April 1944. The text of the second application differed from the first one. The situation had changed swiftly during these last months of the Occupation and the communists’ influence on the choice of words was apparent. First of all, a new panel has been added to the Resistance actions: We have set up combat and Resistance groups whose mission, in addition to using all means to protect the Jews against their aggressors, is to mobilize the Jewish masses so they can take part, alongside all the fighting patriots, in the struggle to liberate France.

The establishment o f a specifically Jewish fighting force nevertheless required an explanation: The Defense Committee would like to underscore that the creation of Jewish fighting groups was dictated by the desire to drive the Jewish masses to action. To succeed in this, the creation of ethnic resistance units is indispensable, independent of the greater participation by Jews in the French Resistance movement.47 46 YV, P/7, 37. 47 Le Comité Uni de Défense des Juifs à Messieurs les membres du Conseil National de la Résistance, 10 April 1944, Centre de documentation juive contemporaine, Paris (hereinafter: CDJC), David Diamant collection (hereinafter: DD).

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But discretion received the coup de grace when the authors of this text explained what they expected of the CNR and in their list of post-war demands. Joining was only a first step. They expected the CNR to provide effective assistance to help Jews hide (notably the production of false papers), hoped to receive weapons to enable a more effective contribution to the common struggle, and asked for material assistance to permit “thousands o f Jewish families to survive.” The most important point, which appeared at the top of the list, concerned propaganda: It would be of the greatest importance for our common cause to have the Resistance newspapers and the radio publish many articles on Jewish problems. This voice of the Resistance would be the best reaction against the attempt to poison the national organism with the venom of antisemitism. We believe that a CNR manifesto devoted to the persecution of the Jews would be of capital importance for our cause. Let the French people hear the voice of its leaders calling for helping and defending the Jewish victims of Nazi racism.

No such manifesto was ever published. As far as the Jews of the CUDJF were concerned, discretion, which had been appropriate when it was necessary to coddle antisemitic public opinion, ceased to be the order o f the day now that an Allied victory was on the horizon. This certainty was blatantly clear in the CUDJF list of demands on “the future government of France”: A condemnation of antisemitism as a means of government policy... pJnishment of all those who incited, ordered, or executed the antisemitic measures and aided the Nazis in their policy of exterminating the Jews... repeal of all the antisemitic laws... repatriation as civilian prisoners of war, with the political and material assistance of the state, of all Jews deported or expelled from France, whatever their nationality [emphasis added]... compensation for damages suffered by the Jews and the restoration of their confiscated properties, by granting long-term loans to impoverished Jews, by rehiring Jewish civilian and military personnel, as well as the employees and workers of commercial establishments and industry... granting the right of citizenship to those foreign Jews and their families who enlisted as volunteers during the wars of 1914-18 or 39-40 and to all those who participated in units fighting for the liberation of France, and this independent of measures aimed at naturalizing useful foreign elements.

As the Liberation approached and the reconstitution o f the Jewish political world proceeded, the process of unification came to include more veteran organizations like the Consistoire central This is how the 40

FRENCH APPREHENSIONS. JEWISH EXPECTATIONS

CRIF, the Conseil Représentatif des Israélites de France (Representa­ tive Council of the Israelites of France, today the Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France, or Representative Council of the Jewish Institutions of France) was bom and became “the political representative of the Jews of France. Its charter, the subject of protracted negotiations among the various political elements of the organized Jewish world, included the core of these demands. AO

• A test case?

This clash between French apprehensions and Jewish expectations was made manifestly clear in North Africa after its liberation in November 1942: it was prominently on display in the debate on the reinstatement of the “Crémieux Decree,” which had extended French citizenship to the Jews of Algeria. The liberation of North Africa owed a special debt to Jews: of the 377 conspirators who participated in the takeover of Algeria on the night of 7-8 November 1942, 315 were Jewish. Their leaders came from the Jewish upper-middle class of Algiers and Oran.4849 But neither Admiral Darlan nor General Giraud, henceforth in control, instituted the hoped-for change. President Roosevelt, endeavoring to justify the agreement that had brought Darlan, Pétain’s one-time prime minister, to power, announced in a speech on 17 November 1942 that he had “demanded the repeal o f all the laws and decrees inspired by the Nazi governments or Nazi ideologues.”50 The new French authorities did not understand it this way, however. On 10 December 1942, the Consultative Commission on Jewish Affairs in Algeria, which had been set up by the French high commissioner for Africa on 23 November, enacted a series o f proposals that were unanimously adopted and implemented. The idea of major revisions to the laws and regulations was ruled out from the start, on the pretext that it was unthinkable, “in haste and with war raging, to propose a new Jewish Law without consulting the government and public opinion in 48 Archives of the Musée de la Résistance et de la Déportation (hereinafter: MRD), Champigny, David Diamant collection (DD), minutes of the meeting of the CUDJF secretariat, 30 September 1944. 49 Michel Abitbol, Les Juifs d'Afrique du Nord sous Vichy, Paris, 1983, p. 116. 50 Quoted in ibid., p. 119.

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metropolitan France, which is sovereign in this domain as in others.”51 What is more, “Outright repeal would immediately provoke a strong reaction on the part of the extremely volatile and powerful Muslim community, which has been stirred up by the enemy propaganda, at the very moment when all the indigenous forces must be united in pursuit of victory in the war.” The provisional measures that were accordingly recommended - and which, it was stated explicitly, should not be given any publicity (still discretion) - could have only an individual character: reinstatement “within the limits of the demand, which has in any case been increased by the state of war, while respecting the fa it accompli o f the replacement of Jewish managers by other elements, chiefly Muslim”; reinstatement that must “take account, first of all, o f signs of violent opposition that may appear within the Muslim community.” As for property, only individual exemptions would be allowed. In the case of banned professions, access to some would be “liberalized” by a general grant of waivers, but others would remain rigorously barred to Jews (advertising, journalism, publishing, printing, cinema, theater, show business, radio broadcasting), while in the liberal professions and public services such reinstatement would be provi­ sional and on an individual basis, with jobs that included the delegation of authority remaining off-limits and no modification to the numerus clausus in the schools.52 When mobilization was decreed, the Jews were placed under the authority of commanders - whose antisemitism was obvious - and sent to break rocks or chop wood.53 This was very far from a repeal o f the race laws. It was not until 14 March 1943, that, thanks to the skill of Jean Monnet, who had been charged by the Americans with effecting a compromise between the two generals, General Giraud delivered a “democratic” speech frankly departed from Vichy, denouncing the armistice of 1940 and proclaiming the reestablishment of the republican institutions. He specifically mentioned the repeal of the race laws, but renewed the repeal o f the Crémieux Decree. The Jews of Algeria, who had been granted French citizenship by this decree in 1871 and seen it 51 MAE, 1036, 4-5, 17-23. 52 Ibid. 53 Abitbol, Les Juifs d'Afrique du Nord, p. 151.

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withdrawn by a Vichy statute of 7 October 1940, were witnessing another repeal of that decree. General de Gaulle arrived in Algiers on 30 May 1943. On 31 July and 4 August 1943, the CFLN, the Comité Français de Libération Nationale (French National Liberation Committee), established on 1 June, informed de Gaulle about the direction of general policy, leaving military operations in the hands of Giraud. The outcome of the confrontation between the two generals was no longer in doubt. Nevertheless, it was only on 20 October 1943, almost a year after the Allied landing, that the Crémieux Decree was reinstated. The Americans had made no explicit statement on that matter and the Gaullists had adopted a dilatory attitude. French expatriates and refugees in America did express their indignation - notably Jacques Maritain, who was then serving as director of the École libre des Hautes Études in New York and whose letter to the editor of the New York Times was published on 27 April.54 The minister plenipotentiary representing the provisional government of the French Republic, Henri Hoppenot, sent a telegram to Algeria about the call paid on him by the Chairman of the World Jewish Congress Nahum Goldmann, and entreated: “This sole survival of the antisemitic Vichy legislation must absolutely be supressed one day or another. Why can’t we gain on our own, already now, the moral benefit of this decision?’’55 But the need for discretion was invariably urged upon those who pleaded for a firm and public position on behalf of the restoration of the Algerian Jews’ French citizenship and reinstatement of the Crémieux Decree. In an internal memorandum dated 15 March, René Cassin vigorously protested Giraud’s withdrawal of the reinstatement the day before. In London, however, a public reaction was deemed untimely, because, while remaining steadfast about some things, it was necessary to avoid causing any additional disturbance to “the current negotiations with General Giraud whose objective is to unify the French Resistance.”56

54 MAE, 1036, 78. Henri de Kirillis, in an article published on 24 July, also denounced the “antisemitic development” of Gaullism, MAE, 1036, 137, from Librefrance, Washington, 2 August 1943. 55 MAE, 1036, 173, 13 October 1943, diplofrance, Washington, Hoppenot. 56 Agi, René Cassin, p. 170.

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On 15 May 1943, Cassin was finally authorized to instruct the Fighting France press service to issue a communiqué that “the Comité national. .. has reinstated the laws of the Republic in all the territories liberated from enemy control since 1940. As such it cannot be associated with any measure that denies to any category of French persons the rights granted them by the Republic.”57 The first official internal memorandum circulated by Cassin as president of the legal committee of the CFLN had to do with the reinstatement of the Crémieux decree.58 But discretion was still the order of the day. On 19 April 1943, the parliamentary group of Free France met in London. Jean-Pierre Bloch, a socialist deputy from the Aisne, who was named deputy commis­ sioner of the interior for the CFLN in November 1943, was assigned to review the history of the Crémieux Decree. All were in agreement about the need to put an end to a shocking injustice. The parliamentarians decided, however, not to make “...this question the object of a special action that might be misinterpreted outside.”59 This preference for discretion was reconfirmed in August 1943, despite Albert Cohen’s efforts to have the parliamentary group’s position made public.60 And more discretion: Even when they finally reinstated the Crémieux decree on 20 October 1943, there was no official text to solemnly repeal the Giraud order. The official communiqué merely announced the reinstatement of the Crémieux Decree because the Giraud order had not been followed up by conditions for implementa­ tion and had consequently become a dead letter.61 This discretion would also prevail in metropolitan France after the Liberation.

57 Ibid., p. 171. 58 Ibid., p. 172. 59 Minutes of the meeting, in: Jean Pierre-Bloch, Le vent souffle sur l ’histoire, Paris, 1956, pp. 102-3. 60 Ibid., pp. 162-63. 61 Abitbol, Les Juifs d ’A frique du Nord, p. 174.

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A fter the Liberation • French apprehensions

The first de Gaulle government, set up in September 1944, was an alliance o f traditional political forces and the Resistance movements. Given the context of the Liberation and the purge - however imperfect or incomplete of collaborators - all French political forces (Gaullists, socialists, the Mouvement Républicain Populaire, and the communists) had been involved in the Resistance. This reversal, which did not touch all levels of the civil service with the same rigor, profoundly altered the periodical press, henceforth dominated by the socialists and communists, who also enjoyed the support of a large section of the nonparty press.6263 France of the Liberation, the product of the Resistance, was indeed the France that was heir to the achievements of the French Revolution, the France that, in the name of equality, had emancipated the Jews on its territory, the France that had been defeated in June 1940 by a handful of traitors and collaborators (according to the version that was canonized immediately after the Liberation), the France of the Rights of Man. As early as 8 August 1944, a law reinstated the pre-war legal situation and declared null and void all enactments that established or applied any discrimination whatsoever based on Jewishness (article 3).64 As far as the law was concerned, there was no longer a Jewish problem. This was also the response received by the heads of the Jewish organizations in their contacts with the French authorities: “We are emerging from four years of racism, don’t be racist yourself.... The French government does not know of any distinct Jewish problem.”65 Nevertheless, the famous Jewish problem did not disappear. For the Jews the problem was how to resume a normal existence. For the £ *\

62 Peter Novick, L ’épuration française. 1944/1949, Paris, 1985, p. 182. Novick wrote, in particular, that “the parliamentary purge was, in relative terms, more severe than that in any other domain.” 63 Ibid., pp. 196-97. 64 Archives of the Paris Prefecture of Police, BA/1813. 65 YV, Joseph Fisher collection, 2, 21 September 1944, Simon Lévitte to Joseph Fisher.

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French social imagination, it was the place of the Jews in French society: the place of the Jews in the French society constituted a problem. Social workers were sometimes aware of the special situation that faced the Jews after four years of persecution. As one of them wrote in a report she drafted in November 1944 for the social commission o f the Paris Liberation Committee. “As long as concrete and specific measures are not taken to remedy the effects and consequences of the racist measures, the victims will continue to bear their full burden.” She noted the difficulties faced by the twenty-five thousand Parisian Jewish families who had been evicted from their homes. She underlined the ill will of some and the bad faith of others. No more than 20 percent of Jewish homes were occupied by war victims. Nevertheless, “ ...they have been denied vacant lodgings by the administrator, who disregarded the eviction order against the defaulting Jewish tenant or who demanded the immediate payment of back rent, or even refused the premises to the children of a father who had been deported.” The nonJews, tenants and administrators, had even been backed up in this attitude by a circular issued by the prefect o f police on 30 October, “...recognizing that the current tenants be kept in possession, even if they were placed there by the German authorities.” As a result, Jews without legal domicile did not have either a ration card or a coal card and were ineligible for official benefits. The wives of prisoners with French nationality had stopped collecting their allowances because they had had to go into hiding to avoid deportation. The foreign Jews who wanted to legalize their identity papers were asked to pay up their arrears. Artisans with no place to live also found themselves without a workshop; their machines had disappeared and their stock had been stolen. Thousands of children and teenagers had lost their families and had no legal status. The social worker suggested massive assistance by the public authorities. “We must consider the Jews, victims o f the Nazi persecution, as a special category of victims of the enemy.” But this was also the interest of the state and of society, she added.66 66 CDJC, DD, Report from November 1944, written by a social worker of the Paris municipality for the Social Commission of the CPL, on “The current situation of the assisted Jewish population of Paris.”

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This was undoubtedly a minority opinion in French society; another minority view was that reflected in the sometimes savage antisemitic pamphlets inspired or issued by the various associations to protect those who had purchased Jewish property. These associations proliferated, especially after the two laws of 14 November 1944 (which were actually quite cautious) decreed the restoration of Jewish property held by provisional custodians and the Jews' reinstatement in apartments from which they had been evicted.67 “Between the Nazi plague and the Jewish cholera, the French people have no choice. For France to be free, happy, and prosperous, its soil must no longer support Germans, traitors, or Jews,”68 stated one such pamphlet, entitled The Jewish Peril. But other pamphlets, more prudent in their wording, may very well have represented more widespread views, echoing the ambiguities of the pre-war era as well as a state of mind that, as we have seen, had not waned during the years of occupation. For example, consider a leaflet signed and circulated by the Association intercorporative du commerce, de l ’industrie et de l ’artisanat (The association of commercial, industrial, and crafts organizations), an umbrella organization of thirty-two guilds. It claimed that those who had purchased Jewish property had acted in the national interest by looking after this property (a valuable asset for the French economy) and that the sales had paid into the state treasury significant tax arrears left unpaid by the Jews for a number of years. In passing there was mention of “the flight of capital in which foreign Jews engage willingly.”69 67 The application of the law was, however, quite limited: war victims, evacuees, and refugees could not be evicted, nor could the spouses, parents, children, dependants o f servicemen, prisoners of war, or political or labor deportees. In addition, claimants had to provide proof that they had been evicted from their apartment involuntarily. See Joseph Lubetzki’s study on this issue, CDJC, Lubetzki collection. A law of 7 May 1946 limited the application to French citizens only. See E. Szereszewski, “Les Étrangers spoliés et la loi du 7 mai 1946,“ Le Monde ju if, 6 (February 1947), pp. 8-10. Definitively dissolved in December 1944, these associations were soon refounded under another name. See Zosa Szajkowski, Analytical Franco-Jewish Gazetteer, 1939-1945, New York, 1966, p. 108; American Jewish Conference, Jews in Liberated Europe, Survey o f Conditions and Prospects o f Rehabilitation, New York, 1945. 68 Archives of the Consistoire central, Paris (hereinafter: CC), Antisémitisme file. 69 CC, Spoliations 1944-45 file.

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Or consider this piece, signed by “A group of average voters” and addressed to their “Jewish compatriots.” It reproached them for “going a bit too far” and added: “It is easy to say, when one has lived in England or underground for four years, that one would have done this or one would have done that... YOU MUST CONSIDER YOURSELF TO BE VICTIMS OF THE WAR and get it into your head that all victims of the war will not be compensated. This is quite regrettable, but that’s the way it is... Do not expose yourselves to the charge o f trying to take revenge on your compatriots for what the Germans did to you! ACCEPT WHAT IS IRREPARABLE AS THE OTHER SONS OF FRANCE ACCEPT THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE WAR. There must not be any category of PRIVILEGED VICTIMS. You will stir up a wind of antisemitism that may already be blowing.”70 This was the tone of the threats made by the organizations o f purchasers of Jewish property to the authorities, and which the authorities passed on to the Jewish organizations. These associations also used more direct methods. There was an outburst o f antisemitism in the spring of 1945. Antisemitic demonstrations took place in the 3rd, 4th, 11th and 20th arrondissements of Paris.71 Demonstrators marched through the streets of Paris, shouting “Jews to the crematoria.”72 When a Jewish shoemaker tried to recover his modest workshop, the purchaser replied: “Screw the government orders” and went on to organize a demonstration.73 On 19 April 1945, on the rue des Guillemites in the 4th arrondissement of Paris, several hundred antisémites gathered and chanted “France for the French” and “Death to 70 CDJC, Lubetzki collection; also CC, Antisémitisme file. In August 1945, the Union confédérale des locataires de France (Union of French tenants) appealed to the authorities to limit still further the scope of the order, “so as not to risk reinforcing the current of antisemitism that already exists in the country.” See Danièle Voldman, “Crise du logement et intervention de l’État: l’ordonnance du October 11, 1945,” Les cahiers du Groupement pour la recherche sur les mouvements familiaux, 7 (1993), pp. 28-29. 71 See the pamphlets that report on some of these incidents and call on the population to oppose them: MRD, Champigny, DD. The antisemitic schemes were the focus of the correspondence exchanged in April-May 1945 by the Comité d’Unité in Paris and the local committees. See also La Terre Retrouvée, 12 (20 June 1945). 72 Juifs de Paris et de la région parisienne, dimanche, 27 mai, 1945. Appel à manifester au Mûr des Fédérés, MRD, Champigny, DD, box 50B. 73 In Paris on 10 April 1945: MRD, Champigny, DD, box 50B.

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the Jews” and attempted to prevent a Jew from returning to his apartment from which a Frenchman was being evicted. At first the police stood by idly when the demonstrators prevented the eviction because one of the police officers was in league with them. When the police did intervene, it was against the Jews who tried to oppose the demonstrators. Seven Jews were taken into custody but were released after a few hours; they included the legal owner o f the premises, taken prisoner in June 1940, who had returned from Germany eight days earlier. Six Jews were wounded.74 In the 20th arrondissement, a woman with three children, whose deportee husband had not yet returned, was attacked soon after she re-entered her apartment (the tenant, an ex-collaborator who had worked for Nazi-run Radio Paris, had just been evicted). All her furniture was thrown out the window and burned. On 3 October 1945, the associations of purchasers of Jewish property organized a meeting in the Salle Wagram in Paris, during which the heads o f these associations, which had been dissolved and merged for the occasion in the Union Républicaine des Familles françaises (Republican union of French families), recommended, among other measures, a numerus clausus for foreigners and a review of all naturalizations performed since 1930.75 These manifestations of an antisemitism that did not hesitate to speak its mind and to act, even violently, sometimes even received a sympathetic reception in the civil service, the police, and certain Resistance circles. On 13 October 1944, one of the participants at a meeting o f the central committee of the reconstituted International League against Antisemitism (the LICA) noted “a renewal of antisemitic sentiments, even in certain circles of the Resistance where, if the question is not posed candidly, it is nevertheless considered.” Another observed that ‘‘if antisemitism is not official, it exists nonetheless, especially among the functionaries of the département of the Seine.”76 As we have seen, when demonstrations occurred, the 74 See the report on these incidents in MRD, Champigny, DD, box SOB. 75 See the report by Maître Kiefe at the CRIF session on 10 October 1945, minutes of that meeting, CDJC, CRIF files. 76 The two speakers were Gaston Monnerville and Otto Rosenstrauch; minutes of the meeting of the central committee of the LICA, 13 October 1944: MRD, Champigny, DD, box 31.

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police sometimes attacked the Jews who were trying to recover their homes in accordance with the law. At a meeting of the CRIF, someone announced that the local chairman of one of these associations in the 11th arrondissement of Paris had been a member of one of the Resistance movements.77 Signs of such support could also be found in the provinces. Thus at Grenoble, on 5 October 1944, members of the United Defense Committee met with a representative of the French authorities, only to find themselves confronted by a long list of charges: “The Jews were too loud in demonstrating their joy at being saved.... In their haste to regain their former homes, they are bidding up the price o f means o f transport.... Their gatherings raise suspicions.... They showed coward­ ice“ during the Occupation; and, finally “the Jews are buying up the best places.” All of this was addressed to a group of refugees who had been robbed of everything they owned, as the Jews remarked to their interlocutor.78 All of these reproaches, which collapse at the slightest argument, bear the same label - ‘antisemitism,’ responded the representatives o f the United Defense Committee. They added: It is very hard for us to see that antisemitism, which caused so much damage to France during these recent years, still finds adherents among the patriots or some of their circle.... Antisemitism represents a danger not only for the Jews but also for all of France and must be fought against rigorously. To allow the danger it poses to pass in silence is prejudicial to the vital interests of the country. Thus we think that the authorities, official institutions, and all people who love liberty must openly fight against this scourge, which came very close to endangering the independence of France.79

As we see, the Grenoble representatives of the United Defense Committee did not hesitate to call a spade a spade. The influence of the general climate is manifested in the general watchword of discretion that was repeated as a leitmotif everywhere. There was widespread discretion about the Jews’ unique fate during the four years of the Occupation. Jean-Paul Sartre was the most prominent of those to note it: 77 Minutes of the CRIF meetings, 10 October 1945, CDJC, CRIF files. 78 CDJC, DD. 79 CDJC, DD.

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All France rejoiced or fraternized in the streets. The social conflicts seemed, for the moment, to have been forgotten; the newspapers devoted entire columns to the prisoners of wars, to the deportees. Would they talk about the Jews? Would they greet the return among us of the survivors, would they give a thought to those who had died in the gas chambers of Lublin? Not a word. Not a line in the daily papers. One mustn’t provoke the antisémites. France needs unity, now more than ever.80

The press, too, was discreet in its treatment of the upsurge in popular antisemitism. When antisemitic incidents erupted in several arrondisse­ ments o f Paris, the reticence in reporting about them was noted and deplored at a CRIF committee meeting.81 So, too, political movements, which on receiving a note recounting an antisemitic incident, discreetly acknowledged its reception but did no more.82 Discretion also applied to reinstatement in places of employment. Here it seems that when other categories of French people were involved, and not only Jews, reinstatement proceeded rapidly and comprehensively. This was the case, for example, in the Department of Education.83 Similarly, the results of examinations taken under a false name during the Occupation were automatically confirmed for all students.84 Again, an order dated 4 August 1945 fully exempted from university tuition fees all students who had been “prevented from pursuing their studies for at least one year.” The categories covered were listed: they included “prisoners of war, volunteers or conscripts in the French army, political prisoners and deportees, Resistance fighters, forced labor conscripts, victims o f the extraordinary laws (lois d ’exception)", meaning here the discriminatory laws. Though not explicitly mentioned, the Jews belonged to the last of these categories. 80 Sartre, Reflexions sur la question juive, pp. 86-87. 81 Minutes of the meeting of the propaganda commission of CRIF, 21 June I94S, speech by Lattés, CDJC, CRIF files. 82 This radical-socialist group merely acknowledged receipt when it received a detailed report about a rally organized at the Salle Wagram by the associations of purchasers of Jewish property on 3 October 1945: minutes of CRIF meeting, 24 October 1945, CDJC, CRIF files. 83 An order of 29 November 1944 called for the reinstatement of all civil servants; but the Department of Education had anticipated the step in a bulletin dated 10 October 1944, which stated that reinstatement applied in principle to all those penalized by Vichy. See Claude Singer, L ’université libérée, l ’université épurée, 1943-1947, Paris, 1997, p. 135. 84 Bulletin of 7 May 1945, quoted in ibid., p. 160.

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They had been forgotten in the first published version of the order and were added to the others by a later decree.85 Finally, the Jews were called on to show discretion. In an article published in Témoignage chrétien in October 1944, Gabriel Marcel strongly advised the Jews, when the persecutions were over, to be “discreet in their demands.”86 This was echoed by the disillusioned remarks of André Weill-Curiel, who had spent the war years with General de Gaulle, when he offered his advice “to a young Jewish friend” in the following words: “Don’t flaunt your rights; that would be going too far. Don’t parade your medals; that would be insolent.” Instead, “Act so that the good French people of France who hoped they would never see you again forget that you exist.”87 An official could reproach the Jews for continuing to maintain a Jewish defense organization even after the laws were no longer antisemitic.88 The Toulouse Press Committee considered shutting down the paper Renaissance, the organ of the Jewish Combat Organization, because “by speaking of ‘a Jewish people’ this paper was liable to provoke antisemitism.”89 At the same time, however, no one had any hesitation about calling on the Jewish organizations to finance the investigations of the crimes committed against Jews during the Occupation. In May 1945, one o f the department heads in the War Crimes Division requested that the major Jewish organizations pay two hundred and fifty thousand francs a month to cover the cost o f the personnel suggested by these organizations to deal with the question of the punishment of crimes in the various administrative regions of the country.90 85 Adopted on 9 August (ibid., pp. 162-63). 86 Gabriel Marcel, “Lendemain de persecution,” Témoignage chrétien, 21 October 1944, front page. Quoted by Henry Rousso, Le syndrome de Vichy de 1944 à nos jours, Paris, 1987, p. 135. 87 André Weill-Curiel, Régies de savoir-vivre à l'usage d ’un jeune ju if de mes amis, Paris, 1945. 88 Archives of the Musée de la Résistance et de la Déportation, Champigny, David Diamant Collection, Chavanis to CGD (Paris, 23 October 1944). 89 Avraham Polonski Archives, D 11 bis III-6, 30 October 1944, the editor of Renaissance to the commissioner of information in Toulouse. 90 Minutes of CRIF meeting, 15 May 1945, speech by Maître, R. Kiefe, CDJC, CRIF files. The question was referred for study by a committee; the idea was floated of asking the Joint Distribution Committee for financial assistance.

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FRENCH APPREHENSIONS, JEWISH EXPECTATIONS

• Jew ish expectations

Ultimately the Jews subscribed to the demand for discretion. We must say at the outset, however that the idea that they were glad to have their special fate hushed up and included in the general destiny is, at the very least, mistaken. At the first legal assembly of the Jewish communists in Paris, on 3 September 1944, one of the speakers, referring to the restoration of rights to Jews, noted: “There isn’t a single word about the subject in any newspaper.... We must conduct the struggle to return their homes to Jews.”9192 A month later, the student section of the Union of Jewish Youth sent a letter to the rector of the University of Paris, asking him expressly to take into account the persecution suffered by the Jewish students and to take a number of steps applicable specifically to them. Among the measures listed were dropping the age limit for tests, giving Jewish students priority for some jobs (tutors and housemasters), providing scholarships to those who requested them, making it easier to transfer degrees obtained under false names to one’s true identity, and the purging of racist and antisemitic professors. A long letter sent by the UJRE, the Union des Juifs pour la Résistance et l ’Entraide (Union of Jews for Resistance and Mutual Assistance), an organization of Jewish communists, to the secretarygeneral of the MLN, the Mouvement de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Movement) in December 1944 is representative: We believe that it would be wrong to try to remedy the current situation facing the Jews by saying that there is no Jewish problem. ...The facts unfortunately speak against this assertion. Those who believe that the Jewish question existed only because of the presence of the enemy on our territory are mistaken, because there are particular problems in matters that concern the Jews. Keeping silent about this can only serve the racists and antisémites who have had four years to poison public opinion with a cleverly orchestrated propaganda supported by extremely powerful methods.93

91 Minutes of the first legal assembly of the Jewish Communists, 3 September 1944, in Paris, in the offices of the Jewish Patriotic Militia of the 18th arrondissement, 12 rue des Saules: MRD, Champigny, DD, box 30, speech by Jacques Kaminsky. 92 MRD, Champigny, DD, box 7. 93 MRD, Champigny, DD, 22 December 1944.

53

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On 6 September 1944, the Paris Liberation Committee was asked to forward the memorandum from the CUDJF to the CNR,94 requesting recognition of the former for all France. That same day, it was decided to send a letter to the head of the provisional government.95 In it, the chairman of the CUDJF\ Alpérine, requested a meeting with de Gaulle “at which we will be permitted to express our joy and our hope and to advance several proposals on behalf of the Jews of France, proposals that would make it possible for them to be reintegrated into the productive life of the country.”96 First the CUDJF (in October 1944) and then the CRIF (in February 1945) decided to renew the request for membership in the CNR, because the initial efforts in this direction had not succeeded.97 The preliminary texts often mentioned, in addition to reinstatement, the restitution of property, compensation for losses suffered as a consequence o f the anti-Jewish laws, and so on. The Jewish Communists of the Limousin proposed “ ...the creation of a national fund based on the confiscation of the property o f those who profited from the anti-Jewish laws.”98 A draft of the CRIF charter called for “the creation of a national fund to assist all the victims o f the race laws, Jewish resistance fighters, and the families of those who disappeared in the struggle to protect the Jews and protect the country.”99 This passage was not included in the final text of the charter. The militancy o f the Jewish communists was not seconded by circles linked to the Consistoire, which were more prudent. At the meeting on 2 October 1944, the CRIF decided to create a commission on Jewish deportees to “study the political and social problems posed by the problem of defending the interests of the Jewish deportees and prisoners of war, and especially their repatriation.” 100 On 94 MRD, Champigny, DD, minutes of the meeting of the CUDJF secretariat, 6 September 1944. 95 Ibid. 96 MRD, Champigny, DD, box 15. 97 MRD, Champigny, DD, CUDJF meeting of 4 October 1944; minutes of CRIF meeting, 7 February, 1945, CDJC, CRIF files. 98 MRD, Champigny, DD, box 30, Books of claims. National and local (Limousin). On letterhead of the Commissariat Général aux Questions Juives. 99 MRD, Champigny, DD, box 53 B. 100 Minutes of CRIF meeting on 2 October 1944, CDJC, CRIF files.

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several occasions it petitioned the Interior Ministry to demand the dissolution o f an association of purchasers of Jewish property.101 On 6 April 1945, the government’s slowness in implementing laws passed by the Consultative Assembly on the restoration of stolen and confiscated property was discussed. Various means to counter the antisemitic schemes of the associations o f purchasers of Jewish property were envisioned, notably drawing up a memorandum to the prefect of police demanding that he act to enforce the ordinances regarding the return of apartments and restoration of property. The question of antisemitism came up at every meeting of the CR1F. On 24 October 1945, for example, a letter sent by a barrister to the Archbishop of Paris Cardinal Suhard and forwarded by the latter to the president of the Consistoire central was discussed. In this letter, “Attorney Bonnard underlines that the Jews must insist that any disagreements that might arise with their temporary administrators not be brought before the penal authorities; otherwise an upsurge of antisemitism would certainly be produced.” 102 This letter was immediately interpreted as an attempt at blackmail.103 No doubt they stammered a bit in trying to agree on an appropriate response; but this was already October 1945, and the Jewish leaders understood, more than a year after the Liberation, that their room for maneuver was more limited than they had expected. Time had done its work and the pressures o f society had succeeded. In the minutes of CRIF meetings, the delegates of the Consistoire demonstrated caution as compared to communists or Zionist circles. Nevertheless, it was Léon Meiss, president o f the Consistoire central as well as o f the CRIF, who, on 28 April 1945, told the special committee of the French Foreign Ministry set up to consider the totality of Jewish affairs that “...the French Jews who were hitherto considered to be integrated into the French nation tend today, under the press of events, to tighten the bonds that link them to Jewish communities abroad.” 104 Isaïe Schwartz, the chief rabbi o f France, reiterated this idea and 101 See, for example, the minutes of CRIF meeting on 23 October 1944, CDJC, CRIF

files. 102 Minutes of CRIF meeting, 24 October 1945, CDJC, CRIF files. 103 Ibid. 104 MAE, uncatalogued files: File généralités - Comité d'études des Affaires Juives, April and May 1945.

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underscored that “during this war French Jews did not enjoy the protection to which they had a right and felt that they had been abandoned by the authorities. They no longer feel the same reservations about Zionism as formerly; henceforth they feel a true and effective sympathy for this movement.” 105

C onclusion Does this mean that the Jewish organizations persisted in an attitude that highlighted the unique Jewish fate during the war? Can we say that the Jewish population as a whole represented itself as Jewish, in all situations, which would have been a total reversal of the situation that prevailed before the war? The answer to both questions is an emphatic no. “French Judaism has changed,” wrote the president of the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemeth Leisrael) Joseph Fisher on 13 October 1944. “The question that divides us is no longer that of Palestine, but the tragic question of whether one should remain a Jew.” Assimilation, he added, concerned only those of French stock.106 Changes of surname, denounced by the Jewish newspapers, became very frequent.107 Many kept the assumed name they had adopted during the Occupation. Some 85 percent of all name changes by French Jews registered between 1803 and 1957 date from after 1945! The Jews aspired above all to return to a normal life. Hence Jewish militancy was out of the question. What is more, generally speaking, equality was reestablished, people were reinstated in their jobs, and some property was returned. But the Zionist or pro-Zionist activity that now developed unhindered, conducted in public and supported by the representative institutions of French Jews, confirms the thesis advanced here. French public opinion and the French press followed the course of the Jewish community in Palestine and its struggle for independence sympathetically. In this favorable atmosphere and on this point, the

105 Ibid. 106 Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, Z 4/10, 300, Fisher to A. Granovsky, 13 October 1944. 107 For example, Joseph Fisher, “Déchéance,” La Terre retrouvée, 9 (1 May 1945).

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FRENCH APPREHENSIONS, JEWISH EXPECTATIONS

Jews had no problem displaying their support for a Jewish cause. As for the “expectations” associated with an official recognition of the special persecution they had suffered, they soon realized that French society, like the French authorities, would not follow through. So they yielded to discretion, because the chief point had been achieved. A study of this transitional period, 1944 and 1945, seems to be essential. Everything was settled then: the eclipse o f the Jews’ unique destiny during the Second World War and the Jewish organizations’ gradual acceptance o f this state of things. All the interpretations maintaining that the vast majority of Jews did not want to see their suffering singled out are based on the end o f the process and ignore the dialectic of relations between French society and the Jews immediately after the Liberation.

57

The Return o f Jews in the Nationality or in the Territory o f France PATRICK W EIL On the eve of World War II, approximately 330,000 Jews were living in France. Serge Klarsfeld evaluates that between 190,000 and 200,000 o f them were French, of whom approximately 55,000 were naturalized citizens. The remaining 140,000 Jews were foreigners.1 In his testimony before the Vichy Court of Riom, the antisemitic immigration expert Georges Mauco also assessed the number of Jews in France to be 330,000. However, he included the naturalized citizens among the foreigners, thus labeling only 140,000 Jews as French and the remaining 200,000 as foreigners. These “foreigners” included: 70,000 Jews from Poland among a total of 515,000 Poles living in France; 40,000 German and Austrian Jews among 54,000; 18,000 Russian Jews among 71,000; 10,000 Rumanian, 7,000 Hungarian and 3,000 Bulgarian Jews among 57,000 persons o f Balkan origin; 5,000 Czechoslovakian Jews among 51,000; 20 to 25,000 of diverse origins; and 12,000 stateless persons.2 Very soon after the defeat of France in June 1940, thousands o f those French and foreign Jews alike attempted, sometimes successfully, to flee to countries such as England or America via Spain and Portugal, or even in the direction of Palestine. Following the armistice with Germany, the French Vichy regime took control over France’s “nonoccupied” zone while the Nazis ruled over the occupied zone. Some Jewish French soldiers were taken with their compatriots to captivity in Germany. Also beginning in 1940, German refugees in France were handed over to the Nazis. Later, tens of thousands of foreign and 1 2

58

Serge Klarsfeld, Vichy-Auchwitz. Le rôle de Vichy dans la solution finale de la question juive, Paris, 1983, Vol. I, p. 20. Archives nationales, cote 2W/66. On Mauco and its activities from 1938 to 1946, see Patrick Weil, “Georges Mauco: un itinéraire camouflé, ethnoracisme pratique et antisémitisme fielleux,” in: Pierre André Taguieff (ed.), L ’antisémitisme de plume 1940-1944, études et documents, Paris, 1999, pp. 267-76.

THE RETURN OF JEWS IN THE NATIONALITY OR TERRITORY OF FRANCE

French Jews alike were deported to either Germany or Poland; most of them were exterminated. According to Serge Klarsfeld, 75,721 Jews were deported from France, of whom roughly 50,000 were foreigners, and only 2,560 survivors returned after the war.3 Yet, the majority of Jews remained in France, many of them surviving in hiding. At the same time, as a result o f the implementation of the Vichy laws of 22 and 23 July 1940, 15,154 French were denaturalized and 446 deprived of their French nationality; among them many were Jews. Meanwhile, in Algeria, the Vichy regime’s abrogation of the Crémieux Decree on 7 October 1940 reduced all Jews to their pre-emancipatoiy nineteenth century status of subjects and not citizens. This article is limited to the legal aspects of the “return” of Jews to France following these events - either as French citizens or legal foreign residents in French territory. The Jewish individuals in question faced drastically diverse and complex situations - as emigrant refugees in the free world, traumatized Holocaust survivors or prisoners in Germany, or clandestine persons hidden in France. Before the war, they were either foreigners living legally or illegally in France, or they were French citizens. Many of those who were citizens were deprived of their nationality for having escaped from France, denaturalized of their recently acquired citizenship by the Vichy regime, or, if they were from Algeria, reduced to the status of subject without citizenship.

The “R egularization ” o f the Status o f F oreign Jew s in France On 18 October 1944, a few weeks after the installation - on 9 September 1944 - of General de Gaulle’s provisional government in Paris, the Minister o f Internal Affairs Adrien Tixier4 ordered the

3 4

Serge Klarsfeld, Vichy-Auchwitz. Le rôle de Vichy dans la solution finale de la question juive, Paris, 1985, Vol. Il, p. 393. A socialist, Adrien Tixier was Director of the International Labor Office before World War II. He joined the Free French in 1940 and was their official representative in Washington between 1941 and 1943. National Commissioner, then Minister of Labor and Social Protection in the gouvernement provisoire de la République française (7 June 1943 to 9 September 1944). Was Minister o f Interior (9 September 1944 to 26 January 1946).

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preparation of a set of decisions that would redefine the situation o f foreigners in France.5 As a result of his directives, the National Security Department proposed the legalization of all illegal foreigners, and the suppression of “a particular and rigid regulation” that reduced “foreigners’ possibility of assimilation.”6 On 21 December 1944, Tixier sent an administrative memorandum to all prefects that reestablished the pre-war protective status of foreign refugees. For those of “enemy” nationality, Tixier guaranteed legal status to those who had been members of the Resistance, while ordering that those who collaborated with the enemy face punishment: “a regulation that would discriminate on the sole basis of the nationality o f foreigners would miss this goal.”7 With regard to citizens of enemy nations (principally Germany and Italy), in view of “the persecutions suffered by a great number of people among them, for either political or racial reasons, and given their particular attitudes towards France and the resistance, a measure of confinement would constitute, in many cases, an unjust and useless coercion.” Therefore, the Minister directed that the only “enemy nationals” to be imprisoned would be those whose past or present attitudes were deemed a threat to public order. The others, with the exception of those who had participated in the Resistance, were assigned a residency and subject to weekly checks.8 This first memorandum of 21 December 1944 was followed by one o f far greater importance a few weeks later. On 3 February 1945,9 Adrien Tixier ordered that a census be conducted between 1 March and 15 April 1945 in order to verify the identities and nationalities o f all foreigners then living in France. Above all, he decided to legalize all foreigners present in France, stating: “those among them who were forced to live hidden during the occupation years deserve to be regularized.” The Minister ordered the Prefects to “organize the process of regularization in a spirit of sympathy.” Moreover, the census would

5 6 7 8 9

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Archives nationales, MI 34375. Note of M. Pelabon for the Minister of Interior, 21 December 1944, Archives nationales, F7 16102. Memorandum of 21 December 1944, Archives nationales, F7 16102. Ibid. AD Somme, 19W40. A special thanks to Alexis Spire who furnished me the text o f this memorandum.

THE RETURN OF JEWS IN THE NATIONALITY OR TERRITORY OF FRANCE

be useful because it would provide the necessary information to allow a general revision of the situation of foreigners residing in France: The nature and length of many permits does not correspond to the nature of the real jobs. Many foreigners had remained under the threat of an old expulsion’s decision - often lacking justification - and under a regime of temporary permits. Public interest requires to put an end to such situations that maintain these foreigners at the margin of legality and thus opposes their integration into our economy or the French community.

At the same time, Tixier insisted that Prefects “detect suspicious and undesirable elements who could profit from the circumstances to live secretly under false aliases” and to deal harshly with “these undesirable and inassimilable elements whose expulsion out of the French territory should be implemented as soon as the situation will permit it.” Jewish foreign refugees living in France were therefore awarded a stable status of foreign resident, a status not all of them had enjoyed before World War II. The legalization of foreigners was organized in a fairly way even if the attempt to exclude the “undesirables” led to some difficulties. This open approach was not only directed at foreigners living in France but towards everyone who had been deported from France during the war. Thus, by a simple declaration, any deportee was granted the right of return.10 For example, the repatriation from Italy to France o f Jewish refugees of various national origins did not pose any problems. In a letter sent on 8 October 1944, Maurice Couve de Murville, the French Delegate to the Consultative Council on Italian affairs, informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Georges Bidault, that approximately seven hundred refugees were seeking legal entry into France from central and southern Italy.11 A week earlier, among the 402 already registered candidates, Couve de Murville had counted 68 French adults and 176 French children, while the remaining 158 were foreigners (Italians, Jews of diverse origins, fathers of French children), .. .many of [whom] left France to escape deportation - this is almost always the case for the Jews. However, there are numerous Italians whose links with France are more or less strong and who returned to Italy for purely personal reasons;

10 Cf. Annette Wieviorka, Déportation et Génocide, Entre la mémoire et l'oubli, Paris, 1992, Ch. 1 and 2. 11 Archives nationales, F 60 395.

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they are now trying to present themselves as authentic refugees in order to claim repatriation.12

In anticipation of the liberation of northern Italy, which will increase “considerably the number of people to repatriate” 13 he proposed the recruitment of new officers to conduct a strict examination and selection of foreigners who would be authorized to re-enter. In the case of foreigners who had never lived in France before the Holocaust, a process of sorting was used that would always include the Jews among the “true refugees,” but at the same time would try to exclude undesirable elements. From May 1945 until March 1946, approximately three thousand displaced persons were admitted to France. However, it was not long before the issue of maintaining this liberal approach towards refugees was called into question.14 By March 1945, the High Consultative Committee on Population and Family created by de Gaulle began preparing a new immigration law.15 In fact, the reestablishment of a refugee’s protective status was immediately opposed by Georges Mauco, the Secretary General o f the committee: During the inter-war period, the imposed immigration of refugees of all origins brought into France Russians, Armenians, Assyrians and Jews whose adaptation and assimilation were particularly difficult. Contrary to the voluntary immigra­ tion of workers, the forced immigration of refugees attracts persons often diminished psychologically and physically by distress or persecution. Further­ more, the majority of refugees are unable to access the productive workforce. They settle in overpopulated urban areas and occupations, creating the problem of competition with natives and of foreign influence at the nerve center o f the country.16

In the ordinance draft that he submitted, Mauco advocated an immigration policy that would severely restrict the right of entry into France of refugees he referred to as “fugitives.” 17 The High Committee 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Archives nationales, Note on ONI. CAC 19770623 art. 144. This information was given by Alexis Spire. 15 Patrick Weil, “Racisme et discrimination dans la politique française de l’immigration: 1938-1945 / 1974-1995,“ Vingtième Siècle, 47 (1995), pp. 77-102. 16 Archives nationales, CAC 860 269/0007. 17 Archives nationales, Cote F60/ 493.

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THE RETURN OF JEWS IN THE NATIONALITY OR TERRITORY OF FRANCE

approved his proposal that entry into France should only be granted to immigrants seeking refuge and to stateless persons subject to the joint authorization of the Ministries of Interior and of Labor. However, the committee rejected Mauco’s proposal to detain refugees in camps until their request to enter France was approved and they were allocated a job by the Ministry of Labor. Rather, the camps of forced labor would be created for undesirable refugees, fugitives and stateless persons “unable to leave France.” In these camps, they would join other foreigners awaiting expulsion.18 Both Alexandre Parodi, the Minister of Labor19 and Pierre Tissier,20 the Chief o f Staff of Interior Minister Adrien Tixier, vehemently opposed this proposal. Parodi stated that it was “dangerous to reintroduce into our system of regulation the principle of work camps that are regretfully remindful o f the Vichy institutions.”21 From Tissier’s point of view, “it appears absolutely inappropriate to create centers that would function as centers of internment where foreigners would virtually be kept in perpetuity. Regardless of all other disadvantages, France’s reputation in the world would be at stake, would this approach be adopted.”22 In the draft that the government sent to the Conseil d'Etat, France’s highest administrative court, for final approval, restrictions against refugees were removed. Instead, the government proposed that refugees and other foreigners living in France be assimilated and receive an equal status.23 However, the permanent commission of the Conseil 18 Ibid., CAC 860269/0001. 19 Alexandre Parodi entered the Conseil d ’Etat in 1926. In January 1939 he served as director of the Labor Department at the Ministry of Labor. Discharged in October 1940, he returned to the Conseil d ’Etat and became one of the leaders of the Résistance. From September 1944 to November 1945 he was minister of Labor and Social Security in the Government of de Gaulle. 20 Pierre Tissier entered the Conseil d ’Etat in the same year as Alexandre Parodi. He joined de Gaulle in London in June 1940 and became his Chief of Staff. In July 1943, he presided over the Comité du Contentieux of the CFLN together with René Cassin who presided over the Comitéjuridique. From London, in 1942, he wrote in English The Government o f Vichy; a propaganda book for the cause of Free France. In 1944-1945, he was the Chief of Staff of Adrien Tixier, the Minister of Interior. 21 Archives nationales, CAC 860269 art. 7. 22 Ibid. 23 Article 28 of the project of ordinance (archives of the Conseil d ’Etat).

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d ’Etat revised the final text by removing any reference to refugees or asylum seekers; thus, neither was mentioned in the definitive ordinance. Later, the Geneva Convention would govern the status o f refugees. In the interim, the International Organization for Refugees was respon­ sible for the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons waiting in central Europe for a country of refuge. Their selection as eligible refugees was determined by almost identical criteria to those proposed, for example, by Couve de Murville for the Italian immigrants: Volksdeutsche and Nazi collaborators were refused.24

The return o f the Jew s in F rench nationality • The annulm ent o f the Vichy “Laws”

If the policy towards refugees and foreigners could be considered liberal, the treatment of those who had lost their French nationality or their citizenship, for instance Algerian Jews, was the opposite. Soon after the birth of the Vichy regime, the law of 22 July 1940 empowered the government to revise not only all naturalizations but also all acquisitions of French nationality (for example, by children bom in France of foreign parents) that had been registered since the adoption of the liberal law of 27 August 1927. This measure meant that 900,000 people risked losing their citizenship, and by the end of the war, 15,154 men, women and children did in fact lose their French nationality. Bernard Laguerre estimates that among them, approxi­ mately 6,000 were Jewish.25 The law of 23 July 1940 further allowed the government to revoke the citizenship of French nationals who left France between 20 May and 30 June 1940 without proper authorization. Following this deprivation o f citizenship, the goods of these former citizens were confiscated. By 23 February 1941, this same law applied to all French citizens who, “outside of metropolitan territory, betrayed the national community by their acts,

24 Daniel Cohen, “Naissance d’une nation: les personnes déplacées de l’aprèsguerre,” Genèses, 38 (2000), pp. 56-78. 25 Cf. Bernard Laguerre, “Les Dénaturalisés de Vichy 1940-1944,” Vingtième Siècle, 20 (1988), pp. 3-15.

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THE RETURN OF JEWS IN THE NATIONALITY OR TERRITORY OF FRANCE

discourses and writings."26 The 446 cases to which this law was applied were handled by a commission led by General Dufieux of the Ministry of Defense. At first, they were aimed to punish and degrade the Free French whom the Vichy regime dubbed “dissidents,” notably de Gaulle, Georges Catroux and René Cassin; but the deprived also included many Jews who had left France in order to escape the Nazis. Finally, the Vichy Law of 7 October 1940 repealed the full French citizenship of Algerian Jews that had been granted them by the Crémieux Decree o f 24 October 1870. As a result, 110,000 Algerian French Jews, although in theory still formal French nationals, recovered their nineteenth century “personal” status that was equivalent to the sub-national status o f Algerian Muslims.27 • T h e annulm ent o f the Law o f 23 July 1940

After the Allies landed in November 1942, authority over the North African Administration was transferred to Admiral Jean-Francois Darlan, closely followed by General Henri Giraud on 14 March 1943. All constitutional acts, laws and decrees subsequent to the date of 22 July 1940 were annulled. Furthermore, in an ordinance dated 18 April 1943, General Giraud explicitly specified the annulment of the law o f 23 July 1940 related to deprivation of nationality. De Gaulle, but also Giraud himself and all the Jews who had been deprived o f their French citizenship by this Vichy law were “re-integrated as French citizens, with all legal consequences.”28 • T he difficult reestablishment o f the Crémieux Decree

It was only latei; on 21 October 1943, by a declaration o f the French Committee of Liberation, that Algerian Jews regained their full citizenship.29 When, on 14 March 1943, General Giraud had 26 On 10 September 1940, the scope of the law was extended to the French citizens who had left the overseas territories; and on 8 March 1941 to any French who “starting on I December 1940, had gone or will go to a dissident zone.” 27 On the history of Vichy’s law annulment cf. Patrick Weil, Q u’est-ce q u ’un Français?, Paris, 2002, chap. 4 & 5. 28 Ordinance n° 17 of the French Commander in Chief, published on 22 April 1943 in the Journal Officiel. 29 Cf. Michel Ansky, Les Juifs d'Algérie du décret Crémieux à la Libération, Paris, 1950, pp. 318-19.

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invalidated all constitutional acts, laws and decrees subsequent to the date of 22 July 1940, the Vichy’s abrogation of the Crémieux Decree o f 7 October 1940 was also annulled.30 Ironically, however, the Crémieux Decree reestablished by this ordinance was immediately repealed the same day, by another ordinance of Giraud.3132Since the Allies’ landing in North Africa in November 1942, all antisemitic legislation formally instituted by the Vichy Regime - more severe in Algeria than in metropolitan France - had been maintained by Admiral Darlan, head o f the North African Administration, and then by General Giraud under the pretext of “equality” between the status of Jews and Muslims. According to historians Michael Marrus and Robert Paxton, Giraud had declared that “Jews were responsible for the defeat” and that racial laws were “essential conditions for the armistice.” However, the 14 March decision of Giraud elicited heated reactions in the American press. Algerian Jews also mobilized against this policy, and the French National Gaullist Committee voiced its official disapproval on 24 March.33 Finally, on 20 October 1943, the French National Liberation Committee (Comité Français de Libération Nationale, CFLN) “announced... that the Crémieux Decree is in effect.” However, with its reestablishment again raising the delicate question of the inferior status of Muslims, the declaration of the CFLN left open the question o f a “definitive status of indigenous Israelites but also of other categories of the indigenous population of Algeria.”34 • The late annulm ent o f the Law o f 22 July 1940

If General Giraud, in his ordinance of 14 March 1943, had annulled the acts o f the Vichy regime subsequent to 22 July 1940, it was with the obvious purpose not to annul the denaturalizations that had been decided under the law of 22 July 1940. If finally, that Vichy law was 30 Cf. André Nouschi, L'Algérie Amère 1914-1994, Paris, 1995, pp. 156-157. 31 Easy access to these ordinances is available on the CD, La persécution des juifs de France 1940-1944 et le rétablissement de la légalité républicaine. Recueil des textes officiels 1940-1999, Paris, 2000. 32 Cf. Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, Stanford, 1995, pp. 191-97. 33 Ansky, Les Juifs d ’Algérie, p. 298. 34 Communiqué of the CFLN, Algiers 20 October 1943, quoted in Ansky, Les Juifs d ’Algérie, pp. 318-19.

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also annulled, it was only in May 1944, with numerous difficulties and objections. In a letter sent on 9 September 1943, François de Menthon,35 commissioner of Justice in the French National Liberation Committee, asked René Cassin, President o f the Legal Committee (Comité juridique) o f the CFLN,36 his opinion on nationality issues. Concerning the Law o f 22 July 1940, which authorized the Vichy regime to revise any naturalization decided since 1927, Menthon surprisingly indicated: “I envision maintaining this new institution.” In his letter to Cassin, Menthon explained his view: annulling the denaturalization authorized by the Vichy regime “could, in certain cases, present the most serious inconveniences;” moreover, ...the too numerous naturalizations of dubious Jews decided during the years immediately preceding the war have given the pretext for antisemitism that could pose a particular problem the day of our return to France. We would not face this problem, by the annulment a priori of all the denaturalizations which have been decided.37

Reacting strongly on 11 January 1944, the Legal Committee o f the CFLN adopted a text, which was a crushing response to Menthon: Vichy’s legislation regarding this matter is one of the most shameful of this regime. It will remain forever linked in the minds of the French people and of the peoples who respect France, to the memory of the persecutions suffered by patriots who had refused to accept the defeat of France as well as the infamous decisions taken to deliver to the enemy the foreign refugees and stateless persons

35 François de Menthon ( 1900-1984) was a Professor of Law before the war. In 1940 he served as a Captain in the French Army and was captured by the Germans. After his evasion, he contacted his colleagues, the law professors Teitgen, Coste-Floret, Capitant, and René Courtin who, like him, decided to oppose the Germans. Together they launched, in November 1940, the clandestine newspaper Liberté. In November 1941, their group merged with Henri Frenay’s Movement of National Liberation. Combat, co-run by Frenay and Menthon, was the origin of the Comité GénéraI d ‘Etudes which tried to anticipate and to prepare the public policies to be implemented by France after its Liberation. On 7 September 1943, he went to Algiers to replace M. Abadie as Commissioner of Justice. 36 Created by a decree on 6 August 1943 on the model of the Conseil dE tat, the Comité juridique legally advised the French authorities in Algiers on all projects of ordinances and laws to be promulgated by the CFLN. Originally, it was composed of five members: René Cassin, Pierre P. Rodière, Paul Coste Floret and M. Groslière, president of the Algiers bar of lawyers. 37 Conseil dE ta t, archives of the Comité juridique, 9938/2.

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who had become French, under a false juridical pretext. The French National Liberation Committee would assume a heavy responsibility to the nation as well as to the universal conscience, if it will not break categorically with the unjust measures undertaken by the Vichy regime. All Vichy Laws have to be considered as a whole and no serious distinction can be made between them.38

Therefore, the Legal Committee o f Free France proposed to immediately annul all Vichy laws not already overturned and to reexamine each decision of denaturalization within the standard o f pre­ war legislation “reinforced enough between 1938 and 1939 to avoid the massive revision of naturalization that was made during the war of 1914-1918.”39 Nevertheless, Menthon did not comply. On 10 February 1944, he sent to the legal committee a draft of a new ordinance that would annul the Vichy Law of 22 July 1943, but only for the future: “In order to avoid an automatic and massive reintegration of all the denaturalized that would operate without concern for the circumstances that could have provoked each previous decision,”40 he proposed to validate the denaturalization of citizens effected by the Vichy regime, but to permit these denaturalized former citizens to appeal these decisions within six months following the end of the war. The Committee, following the report of François Marion, one o f its members, again reacted vigorously to this new proposal: Considering that the de facto organism, the so-called government of the French State, attributed to itself, in the domain of nationality, exorbitant powers that are contrary to human and international rights... that, by application of these texts, it has made many denaturalizations that had, among many others effects, struck foreigners, who had obtained their citizenship after a long waiting period, who had given evidence of their attachment to France, but who, in the eyes o f the Vichy rulers, were guilty either of continuing the struggle against the foreign enemy, not only inside but also outside France, or of having manifested their hostility toward a government not only guilty of treason but of collaboration with the Nazis.... It is true that those naturalizations were numerous and thoughtlessly applied to non-assimilated individuals who were not providing satisfactory guarantees. Although, if these objections are sufficient to refuse a naturalization, they cannot, in any case, justify the withdrawal of a naturalization.41 38 39 40 41

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Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Proceedings of the 42nd session of the Comité juridique, archives of the Conseil d'Etat.

THE RETURN OF JEWS IN THE NATIONALITY OR TERRITORY OF FRANCE

The committee recalled that “the Law o f 1927 and its subsequent texts gave the government the necessary powers to withdraw the nationality of any naturalized citizen that had become unworthy. The committee proposed to annul the Law of 22 July 1940 and all the Vichy denaturalizations, even if the “naturalized citizens who merited a withdrawal of their citizenship” would have their case submitted to the previous legislation.4243 This proposal was finally accepted. In accordance with the deliberations of 18 February and 28 March 1944 of the Legal Committee of the French National Liberation Committee of Algiers, on the report of Marion, the ordinance of 24 May 1944 annulled the so-called Law o f 22 July 1940 related to the revision of naturalizations.44 Following the provisional government’s return to Paris, all the denaturalizations were reexamined by a team of four magistrates. They checked each case to verify that it was not covered by legislation that existed prior to the war. For Jewish individuals, this examination was rapid; all those who were denaturalized regained their citizenship without difficulty. It is only when a denaturalization had been decided in response to a demand of the individual - as was the case for certain Italians - when the person in question no longer resided in France, and when the individual had clearly manifested pro-fascist opinions, that the Vichy regime’s denaturalization was confirmed in accordance with previous legislation. • The re-integration o f Jewish em igrants w ho had “lost” their French nationality

Many years later, from the 1950s onward, Jewish individuals attempting to regain French citizenship that they had lost during the war found themselves faced with very different circumstances. After 1945 several thousand Jews who had fled France during the war to other countries, such as the United States, again found themselves to be foreigners. Others, who had been deported to Nazi camps for example, decided not to return to France at the end of the war but rather to emigrate to Palestine; they became Israelis when the State of Israel was 42 Conseil d'Etat, archives of the Comité juridique, 9938/2. 43 Conseil d ’Etat, archives of the Comité juridique. 44 Article 21 of the ordinance of 24 May 1944 (published in the Journal Officiel de la république française), 45 (1 June 1944).

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created. Two French laws successively addressed the situation of French Jews who had lost their French nationality due to their naturalization in the USA, or to their acquiring the nationality o f Israel. The explicit aim o f the law of 28 December 1967 was to deal with the situation of French bom citizens, mostly Jewish emigrants in the United States, who had lost their French nationality by becoming citizens of another country. Indeed, this law allowed these French-bom individuals to reclaim their French nationality by simply registering a declaration of will “before a judicial authority if they reside in France or before French diplomatic agents and the French consulate if they reside abroad.“ The only condition set by the law was that they must have conserved or acquired links with France either moral, intellectual, economic, professional or familial. In 1973, a new reform o f the Nationality Law went far beyond the previous change to deal explicitly with the situation of “French Jewish women deportees, who had survived the extermination camps and reside now in Israel.”45 They had already become Israelis and the Law permitted them to recover their French nationality and to keep it for the future.46

C onclusion In February 1945, France adopted a practice o f liberally regularizing the situation of foreign refugees, while in March 1943 the Crémieux Decree was abrogated again and in November of the same year it was hoped that the “new institution” of Vichy’s Law of 23 July 1940 permitting massive denaturalizations could be maintained. How can these 45 Léon Motais de Narbonne, Avis n°307 présenté au nom de la commission des Affaires Etrangères sur le projet de loi complétant et modifiant le code de la nationalité française, Sénat seconde session ordinaire de 1970-1971 annexé au procès verbal de la séance du 11 juin 1971, p. 9. 46 The article 22 of the law of 9 January 1973 stated: “the loss of the French nationality cannot be the result of not using a faculty of repudiation.” For future cases another article of the Law of 1973 resolved the problem of dual nationality cases: the acquisition, even voluntarily, of a foreign nationality would no longer result in the loss of French nationality, except at the express request of a citizen with dual nationality living abroad.

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contradictions be explained? From 1943 to 1947 there was a constant battle between, on one side, an egalitarian conception o f the French Republic expressed in Algiers in 1943 by René Cassin or François M arion, or in Paris by Adrien Tixiei; his Chief of Staff Pierre Tissier and Cassin again; and on the other side, more timorous and even clearly antisem itic approaches represented by Giraud, member o f the Resistance Menthon and Vichy collaborator Mauco. This battle was w aged on topics ranging from the status of refugees to general nationality policies. Each time, it ultimately ended with the victory of the “egalitarian republicans.“ Questions of context and o f configuration appear to have been key here: the nearer the impending victory o f the Allies and the more that was known about the horrors of the persecution, the further the scales were tipped to the side of dedicated egalitarians like Cassin - who were at first quite alone - and allowed their ideas to become legitimate and finally victorious.

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The Reintegration o f Jewish Survivors Into Belgian Society ; 1943-1947 FRANK CAESTECKER This paper analyzes the extent to which the Belgian authorities acknowledged the tragedy of the Holocaust in its immediate aftermath. In it we look at the extent to which the authorities anticipated the problems that would ensue from the Holocaust. In view o f the Jews’ unique and unprecedented fate during the war, the question is whether they were differentiated from other war victims.

The Jew ish Population in Belgium (1830-1945) • Migration and legal absorption in the Belgian nation When Belgium was founded in 1830 there were very few Jews within its territory. Jewish immigration to Belgium became significant in the last decades o f the nineteenth century when they emigrated en masse from the German and Russian Empires.1 In the period between the First and Second World Wars Jewish immigration continued unabated, mainly from Poland. In the 1920s their number increased, reaching a pinnacle in 1929-1930. The depression, which drastically diminished the occupational opportunities in Belgium and led to the implementa­ tion of a strict immigration policy, effectively put a stop to the incoming of migrants in 1931-1932. After 1933 Jewish immigration rose again, now originating from Nazi Germany. After the Anschluss and the Reichskristallnacht the number o f Jews fleeing Nazi Germany reached another peak. In 1940 there were about sixty-five thousand Jews in

I

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Jean-Philippe Schreiber, L'immigration juive en Belgique du moyen age à la première guerre mondiale, Brussels, 19%.

REINTEGRATION OF JEWISH SURVIVORS INTO BELGIAN SOCIETY

Belgium.2 The vast majority were immigrants who were not legally absorbed into the Belgian nation. At the end o f the nineteenth century the Belgian nationality law was decidedly liberal: naturalization could be granted by Parliament after five years of residence in Belgium, and aliens bom in Belgium could claim Belgian nationality upon reaching the age o f majority by a declaration of indigenousness. The nationality legislation of 1909 liberalized this provision even further: Belgiumbom aliens were automatically granted Belgian nationality. Given their recent arrival at that time, Jewish immigrants and their descendants tried to become Belgians, mainly by naturalization. Parliament, which granted this favor, reacted restricted^ to this request by Jewish immigrants. Between 1884 and 1913, Parliament refused 10 percent of the applications for naturalization. Among the Jewish immigrants who applied for naturalization about 15 percent were refused by Parliament. The Catholic MPs, who held a considerable majority in Parliament, were responsible for this bias against Jews.3 The German occupation of the country during the First World War and the alleged collaboration by Belgians o f German extraction led to a revision o f the nationality legislation. One could no longer become Belgian just by having been bom in Belgium. Aliens bom in Belgium could still claim Belgian nationality upon reaching the age of majority by a declaration of indigenousness, but the Belgium-bom alien had to prove an affective bond with Belgium. Every candidate for Belgian nationality had to revoke his or her former nationality, and the Judiciary would determine whether the candidate for Belgian nationality could be counted on by the Belgian nation. The slightest presumption of a lack of loyalty with regard to the future home was enough to be refused 2 Frank Caestecker, Ongewenste gasten, joodse vluchtelingen en migranten in de dertiger jaren, Brussels, 1993; idem, Alien Policy in Belgium, 1840-1940. The Creation o f Guest Workers, Refugees and Illegal Aliens, Oxford, 2000, pp. 104-9. 3 The definition of Jewishness is based on the “Jewishness’' of names. Immigrants could apply for naturalization which brought about the right to vote (the grande naturalization). This more expensive and thus less popular route to become Belgian was sometimes used by immigrants who had acquired the Belgian nationality without voting rights (the regular naturalization). These applications for grande naturalization were turned down much more often by Parliament (about 30 percent). Tom De Meester, Naturalisatie- en vreemdelingenbeleid in de twintigste eeuw, insluiting o f uitsluiting, unpublished paper for the annual meeting of Belgian contemporary historians, 1998.

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citizenship of the country where the applicant was bom. The criteria for naturalization were also tightened. From 1932 a minimum period o f ten years residence was required. Thus, in 1932, the applications for Belgian nationality o f thousands of Jewish immigrants who had settled in Belgium in the 1920s were refused. When, a few years later, the Jewish immigrants of the 1920s had again acquired the necessary duration of stay, the already high costs of naturalization were stepped up to make it virtually impossible for the impoverished Jewish immigrants to become Belgian citizens. Very few immigrants o f the interwar period became Belgian. Among those who applied for naturalization and fulfilled the basic requirements, hardly any were refused, but among those few, Jews were again over-represented.4 As a result, only about five thousand Jews registered by the German authorities in 1940 had Belgian nationality. These Belgian Jews were mostly descendants o f immigrants who had left the German Empire, France and the Netherlands in the nineteenth century. At the time of occupation, 90 percent of the Jewish residents of Belgium had foreign nationality, and they were mainly Poles and Germans.5 • The Belgian Holocaust Experience O f the sixty-five thousand Jews in Belgium in 1940, approximately half of them perished in Auschwitz. This number includes 25,475 Jews who were deported from Belgium to Germany and of whom only 1,335 survived. When we include the Jews deported or interned in camps and prisons in Belgium, France and the Netherlands during the Nazi occupation, 5,900 of the 34,800 deportees survived.6 The chance of survival depended to a large extent on the city where one lived at the time the deportations began. The four cities in which Jews were permitted to reside after August 1942 had distinctive death tolls. For example, in Antwerp, a northern Flemish city, only 35 percent of the Jews survived, whereas in the bilingual capital, Brussels, 63 percent of the Jews were still alive when the Germans capitulated. In the smaller towns of Liège and Charleroi, the survival rate was 65 and

4 5 6

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Tom De Meester, Naturalisatie- en vreemdelingenbeleid. Maxime Steinberg, La question juive 1940-1941, Brussels, 1983. Maxime Steinberg, La Traque des Juifs 1942-1944, Brussels, 1986.

REINTEGRATION OF JEWISH SURVIVORS INTO BELGIAN SOCIETY

58 percent respectively.7 The higher death toll in Antwerp may partly be due to the geographic, economic and social characteristics o f the Jewish communities in that city - that is, respectively, the concentration in one city district, the importance o f a strategic diamond industry, and the presence of more recent immigrants and traditional Jews. Equally important, the deportations from Belgium started in Antwerp, more Antwerp citizens were involved as perpetrators, and the bystanders in Antwerp were more indifferent to the lot of their Jewish fellow-citizens than in other Belgian cities. Another factor contributing to their chances o f survival was the nationality of those who the Germans considered Jews. The German occupation authorities took into account the sensibilities of the Belgian authorities - using xenophobia to enlist the (passive) acquiescence of the Belgian administration and reassuring the Belgian authorities that the Belgian Jews were exempted from deportation. In 1942 Jews with foreign nationality, mainly Polish and German, were deported en masse. Only in the summer of 1943 did the small minority of Jews with Belgian nationality also become a target for deportation. Even for these Belgian Jews, living in Antwerp turned out to be more dangerous than living in Brussels (33 percent of Belgian Jews were deported from Belgium, and 47 percent from Antwerp). During the war one of the most significant tasks o f the Jewish resistance (Comité de Defence des Juifs - CDJ) was to provide hiding places for Jewish children. Several thousand children were hidden by the CDJ with gentile families or in institutions. Other networks, mostly linked to the Catholic Church, also operated in similar endeavors. There were also private arrangements between Jews who, before being deported, had asked their gentile friends to take care of their children.8

7

Lieven Saerens, Vreemdelingen in een wereldstad. Een geschiedenis van Antwerpen en zijn joodse bevolking (1880-1944), Tielt, 2000, p. 648. 8 There were probably 2.571 Jewish children hidden during the war by the CDJ, but the CDJ was eager to support financially Catholic institutions or gentile families for any Jewish child they took care of in order to reclaim these children after the war. Some Catholic organizations who had accepted to hide CDJ-children did not reveal to the CDJ that they had obtained Jewish children through private arrangements. They refused financial support of the CDJ for all “their” Jewish children, as they did not want the CDJ to have a monopoly over these children. B. Reynders, Notes sur la situation légale des enfants israélites, 9.1.1945. Quoted in Hanne Hellemans,

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• A passive Belgian govemment-in-exile during the Holocaust: foreign Jews The Belgian authorities in London were well informed of the tragic events that were overtaking the Jews in occupied Belgium. Already at the end of 1942, Leon Kubowitzki and Max Gottschalk, two influential members of the Belgian Jewish community, had provided extensive information to the Belgian ambassador in New York, George Theunis, on the deportation of the Jews and the fate that awaited them. By May 1943, the existence of other sources, including reports from Maurice Benedictus, the administrator o f the Association des Juifs en Belgique AJB (Jewish Council) who fled to Lisbon, meant that the Belgian authorities knew of the catastrophe that had befallen the Jews in occupied Belgium. Despite the Nazi persecution of the Jews, the Belgian govemment-in-exile, hardly pressed by the London-based assimilated Belgian Jews, did little to support the Jews trapped in Belgium. The main argument for refraining to help was the foreign nationality of most of these Jews.9 • The Belgian govemment-in-exile (1944): Jews, a difficult category to handle The preparations for the post-war period and the decisions taken immediately after the liberation are testimony to the desire o f the Belgian authorities to eradicate the Nazi heritage of racial discrimi­ nation. They wanted to return to the traditional liberal policy o f non­ discrimination on religious (or racial) grounds. Any racial distinction between people was repudiated, and religion was regarded as a strictly

Zij die verloren zijn, zullen niet vergeten worden. Pogingen tot herintegratie van kinderen in de joodse gemeenschap na de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Een ideologisch debat, unpublished MA thesis in Contemporary History, University of Ghent, 2002, p. 18. For a general overview see Saerens, Vreemdelingen, pp. 487-750; Maxime Steinberg, ‘The Jews in the Years 1940-1944: Three Strategies for Coping with a Tragedy,” in: Dan Michman, Belgium and the Holocaust, Jerusalem, 1998, pp. 34772. Caestecker, Ongewenste gasten; idem, Alien Policy. 9 Véronique Laureys, “The Attitude of the Belgian Govemment-in-Exile in London Toward the Jews and the Jewish Question during World War II,” in: Michman Belgium and the Holocaust, pp. 296 ff. Council of Ministers, 11 February 1942. Steinberg, La Traque des Juifs, pp. 229-263.

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private affair of the individual. This implied that the authorities refused to countenance any special help for Jews since no such distinction should be made between members of a liberal state. Thus, special facilities for Jewish survivors would be seen as recognition of a specific “Jewish question” in Belgium, something totally undesirable. For Liberals, the only legitimate grounds for discrimination was citizenship. In the interwar period, citizenship was used to distinguish between those who were eligible for all kinds of advantages that the Belgian (welfare) state offered and those who were not. Inhabitants of Belgium of foreign nationality, independent of their social status and the length of their stay in the country, were excluded from most o f the benefits the Belgian state offered. Aliens could benefit from these advantages only if the state of which they were formally members offered the same advantages to Belgian emigrants in that country. Inhabitants o f Belgium who were stateless were, of course, the victims par excellence of this state of affairs. Also citizens of Eastern Europe most o f the Jews residing in Belgium in 1940 - were not eligible to receive generous treatment since their countries of citizenship, countries at the periphery of the world economy, were not considered a worthy party by the Belgian State for any bilateral agreement. The liberal principle of not distinguishing between people on the basis o f race, religion or ethnicity left citizenship as the only discriminative criterion - a criterion that did not take into account the innovative reality of the post-Holocaust era. Nazi persecution had used racial criteria in such a dramatic manner that certainly immediately after the war (and even beyond), this liberal principle was outdated. This became obvious in the preparations for the repatriation. Nationality was to be the only discriminative criterion to rule the repatriation effort. In early 1944 an interdepartmental committee decided that all foreigners, citizens of allied countries who had been residing in Belgium prior to May 1940, could return. For all other former inhabitants of Belgium the government had to decide on the categories for admittance. The committee insisted that any discrimi­ nation on the basis of race, religion or ideology be banned. The only acceptable discriminatory criterion was nationality.10 Following this 10 “The committee decided that for (ex)-enemy nationals their return would only be tolerated if no public interest was opposed. The Belgian authorities would have to

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decision, the Royal Decree o f 27 June 1944, issued in London by the Belgian govemment-in-exile, stipulated that the legal situation of foreigners who had been residing in Belgium in May 1940 was to be restored. It appears that no decision was taken concerning which categories of (former) enemy nationals could return.

L iberated B elgium and the R eturn o f the Survivors (1944-1945) In September 1944 the govemment-in-exile returned from London and incorporated some politicians who had remained in Belgium, including three members o f the communist-led resistance. These communists left the government only two months later; in November in order to support the resistance in its fight for recognition in post-war Belgium. In February 1945 a new government was installed in which all political parties were represented (Liberals, Communists, Socialists and Catholics). Heading the Ministry of War Victims was Pauwels, a Catholic. Due to the tensions caused by the return of the king the Catholics left this government in July 1945. In the meantime, the Jewish community was being reoiganized. In October 1944 the Aide aux Israélites Victimes de la Guerre (AIVG) was founded as the successor of the CDJ. This organizational change came about because the CDJ leadership wanted to enlaige the base o f their Jewish organization. The CDJ activists were limited to a left-wing and secularized milieu, and with the AIVG a broader appeal was hoped for. Sections were established in all cities with a Jewish community. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee-JDC, the main sponsor of the reconstruction of Jewish life in Belgium, channeled all its funds for Belgium through the AIVG. Moreover; the Belgian authorities agreed to consider the AIVG as the sole representative of the Jewish community. Shortly after Liberation, the Minister of Interior Affairs handed over to the AIVG the Jewish registers that had been compiled by the Belgian municipalities on order of the Germans. Some Jewish registers had been burned at Liberation by local authorities who felt that determine the categories which will be admitted to find (eventually again) asylum in Belgium,” J. Bondas (Labor Ministry) to Minister of Information, 12 February 1944. Stichting Oorlog en Hedendaagse Maatschappij (further SOMA), 4LG-1338.

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liberated Belgium must eliminate immediately any distinction between Jews and non-Jews. The Minister of Interior agreed that these registers should no longer be kept by the municipalities, but insisted that this official proof of persecution against Jews be retained to enable their rehabilitation. He held that keeping these registers was not the task of the public authorities, who should be blind to this distinction, and passed the guardianship of these registers over to the AIVG. As a result of this, the AIVG was able to play a pivotal role in the post-war settlement between those persecuted for being Jewish and the Belgian state.11 At that time there was no specific policy regarding Jewish survivors. The impact of the discovery o f the genocide had been weak even among those involved in administering the repatriation.12 The press barely perceived the specific nature of the Jewish experience, and for the Belgian authorities the Jewish question ceased to exist after the departure of the Germans. Jewish survivors were assimilated into an undifferentiated mass of persons displaced by the war. The Jewish fate was thus linked to the general population displacements as a result of the war, and the tragedy of European Jewry was ignored. The liberal tradition was upheld: Jews no longer existed; at most they were called

11 L ’appel. Bulletin mensuel d ’information de I'AIVG, 5 (10/1946), p. 4. 12 During the immediate post war period little attention was paid in the press to the specificity of the Holocaust. The Socialist press paid slightly more attention to the persecution of the Jews than the Liberal and Catholic press, but the unique persecution of the Jews as we perceive it nowadays was only to be found in a long article in the Flemish socialist newspaper Vooruit in the fall of 1944, see Eva Smets, De collectieve herinnering aan nazi-genocide in het joods en Belgisch-nationaal discours, 1944-1951, Unpublished MA thesis, University of Brussels (VUB), 2001. In line with the changing ideological strategy the communist press reported specifically on the extermination of Jews from the summer of 1945 onwards. From 1947 onwards attention for the Jewish fate disappeared, see José Gotovitch, “Juif sur la pointe des pieds: Le Parti Communiste Belge et les Juifs dans l’immédiate après-guerre,” in: Jean Philippe Schreiber, (ed.), Hertz Jospa, juif, résistant, communiste, Brussels, 1997, pp. 101-112. A study on the Flemish press in the second half of 1940s found 957 articles dedicated to the concentration camps. Only 4% of the articles were dealing exclusively with the Jewish fate in these camps, see, Luk Van Gerven, Reacties in de Vlaamse Pers op de ontdekking van het concentrationair systeem, unpublished MA thesis, University o f Gent, 1990.

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Israélites13 who were only to be distinguished from the rest o f society by their religion. Max Gottschalk, an influential Belgian Jew who had fled to the United States during the war, made a short visit to Belgium in March 1945. He observed that the public knew almost nothing o f the systematic murder of the Jews by the Nazis. Even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed unaware o f the mass murder. Gottschalk insisted that the JDC put its documentation at the disposal o f a Belgian figure to spread in Belgium.14 In the immediate post-war period the Holocaust as an unprecedented tragedy became known only gradually to the political elite, let alone to the general public. Only in 1948 did the Belgian Commission on War Crimes publish an official report on the Holocaust. This commission was founded in 1944 and was to identify war criminals and inform the public about the war experience. The report on the Holocaust was written in close collaboration with the Jewish organizations and analyzed accurately the process of extermination of the Jews in Belgium.15 This unconsciousness of the genocide meant that immediately after Liberation, about a hundred Jewish refugees from Germany became victims of the witch-hunt against all that was German. Although innocent, they were arrested and put in prison for alleged pro-German activities, sometimes for months.16 According to an organization o f German Jews, the Comité Israélite des Réfugiés Victimes des Lois Raciales, the German Jews were “for the Belgian population and very 13 In the parliamentary debates and documents concerning the Jewish survivors the word Jew was only rarely used, see for example, Parliamentary Documents Senate (PDS), 6.12.1945, Parliamentary Documents Chamber (PDC), 12.12.1946, Parliamentary Handelingen Senate (PHS), 20.12.1945 see also M. Herremans, Personnes déplacées (rapatriées, disparus, réfugiés), Nivelles, 1948, p. 261. 14 Report by Gottschalk about his visit to Belgium, March 1945. Archives Joint Distribution Committee New York (further JDC), 200. 15 The lawyer Katzenelenbogen was asked as the delegate of the Conseil des Associations Juives de Belgique to write the report. He finished the report in January 1946, the commission immediately approved it, but it was only published two years later, SOMA, AA 120, VII 2. and III. 16 Caestecker, “Holocaust Survivors in Belgium 1944-49,” p. 358; Frank Caestecker, “Joodse vluchtelingen in West-Europa voor en na de Holocaust (1933-1950),” Driemaandelijks Tijdschrift van de Auschwitz Stichting, 66 (2000), pp. 96-98.

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often also for the authorities, in the first place Germans, which means Nazis] only in the second place Jews, which means as a result of the intense antisemitic propaganda unwanted aliens. Only exceptionally are they considered Jewish refugees who need to be helped.” 17 • Survivors: Foreigners and Belgians When in July 1944 two stateless Jewish diamond traders applied for visas at the Belgian Embassy in Lisbon to return to Antwerp, the Minister of Foreign Affairs wanted a clear-cut decision by the government so that he could give instructions to the embassies.18 The question was put before the Belgian Commission for Repatriation, which had just been established on 27 June 1944. The commissioner, socialist Max Buset, made a decision in line with that of the interdepartmental committee to grant the right of return to foreigners who had been residing legally in Belgium and had left the country because o f the war. This did not apply to enemy nationals, and only those who could prove that they had behaved irreproachably during the war could exceptionally be granted the right to return. Buset proposed that the terms of return for returnees with foreign nationality be different from those for the Belgian nationals. The Belgian authorities would only subsidize the travel, welfare and medical care of these foreigners if Belgian nationals could count on the same treatment by the countries of these foreigners. The principle of reciprocity, based on the nation-state, would govern the Belgian repatriation effort.19 Buset’s proposal totally ignored the specificity of the Jewish experience. Within his guidelines for the Belgian repatriation effort - that is, reciprocity he did not mention those who were former inhabitants o f Belgium but were persecuted as Jews and were stateless (including the former Germans at that time), or nationals of enemy countries (Italians, Hungarians). Preparations for the repatriation began only after the nomination of Max Buset’s successor - the political heavyweight and former Prime 17 Archives Jewish Museum (further AJMB), Comité des Réfugiés Victimes des Lois Raciales (further COREF), 8 June 1945. 18 Bondas (Labor Ministry) to Delfosse, Minister of Justice, 16 August 1944, SOMA, 4LG-1338. 19 Max Buset to Minister of Justice Delfosse, 21 August 1944, SOMA, 4LG-1338.

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Minister Paul Van Zeeland - at the beginning of October 1944. Notwithstanding the limited and late preparation, repatriation pro­ gressed at high speed. We found no information on the decision-making process regarding which categories of (former) enemy nationals were to be admitted. We also do not know if “Jew” was a category in the Belgian repatriation effort. Before August 1945 about three hundred thousand people had returned from Germany, including nine thousand concentration camp survivors. The repatriation was mainly handled by private organizations that were subcontracted by the Belgian State to receive the returnees.20 The authorization to return was subject to an identity check. Deportees who had no identifying documents or had been deported under a false name had to reveal their true identity, which was subsequently checked by the Belgian authorities. The repatriation o f Belgian residents holding foreign nationality who had been deported as Jews proceeded smoothly, because the Belgian authorities had at their disposal a centralized register o f all aliens who had resided in Belgium prior to 1940. This made it relatively easy to check if an alien had been staying legally in Belgium in May 1940.21 However, this process sometimes took a long time, and some Jewish deportees waiting to return had the impression that they were no longer wanted in Belgium. Finally, the postponement of the repatriation of a number of Jews from Buchenwald invoked protest against the so-called xenophobic policy o f the Belgian authorities, and authorizations were quick to follow.22 20 Pieter Lagrou, The legacy o f Nazi Occupation. Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in Western Europe, 1945-1965, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 92ff. 21 In 1945 foreigners who had a permanent residence (registered in the population register) and still had their identity card could be repatriated on the same terms as Belgians. All the others needed an authorization, those found in the population or foreigners’ register were authorized to return. Jews only tolerated in pre-war Belgium with a permit to remain in transit {feuille de route) - in particular some German refugees - could not return if they had no relatives or specific interests in Belgium. Internal notes of alien police, 9.4.1945 and 3.1947. Archives alien police, 223 and 224. 22 Archive High Commissariat for Refugees, Brussels (further AHCRB), Rapport de l'activité de la délégation du comité intergovernm ental au cours du trimestre avril/juin 1945, p. 4; Ofipresse, 6, 1945, 2ff. and 10, p. 12. Processing the application to return to Belgium of Jews in Germany took only a few weeks, while Jews who had fled to France had to wait three to six months before their application

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We assume that in the course of the Belgian repatriation effort the category “Jew” continued to be banned.23 The refusal to explicitly acknowledge the experience of the Jews is especially evident when considering the policy towards two categories o f survivors - German Jews and the newly immigrating Jews. • Germans Jews or Jewish Germans An important group o f Jewish survivors were the approximately four thousand Jews from Germany and Austria who had found asylum in Belgium before May 1940 and were still residing in Belgium after the war. The German Jews had been stripped o f their nationality collectively on order from Berlin by the law o f 24 November 1941. In most countries after the war, German Jews remained stateless, an acknowledgment of the specificity of the fate of Jews. Although the law that stripped Jews of their German nationality was annulled by the occupation authorities on 20 September 1945, the German Jews in Germany did not regain their German nationality automatically. In most countries where they had found asylum, German Jews only regained their German nationality upon their explicit demand.24 In Belgium, a ministerial decision o f 6 October 1944 newly ascribed German nationality to these Jewish survivors in Belgium. That the Belgian authorities restored the nationality of the German Jews was a radical expression o f the rejection of the Nazi distinction between Jews and “Aryans.” As a result of this decision to eradicate the Nazi heritage of racial discrimination, the Jewish survivors who had fled Germany in the was processed. By early 1946,668 such applications from France had been decided upon. Internal notes alien police, 3.1947, Archives of the alien police, 224. 23 Notwithstanding the liberal principles it seems that the returning survivors were sometimes registered as “Jews” on official repatriation documents. We do not know if this was an official or unofficial category. A report mentions that these repatriated survivors very much resented once again being singled out as Jews, after they had barely survived racial persecution, see Rapport sur l'activité du Commissariat Belge, p. 8, quoted in Lagrou, The Legacy. 24 In the Netherlands a decision on the nationality of the (former) German Jews was only decided in the summer of 1946 when their statelessness was confirmed, Corrie K. Berghuis, Geheel ontdaan van onbaatzuchtigheid. Het Nederlandse toelatingsbeleid voor vluchtelingen en displaced persons van 1945 tot 1956, Amsterdam, 1999, pp. 20ff. Belgium only conformed to the international standard in 1952 when it declared all German Jews stateless once again.

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1930s for Belgium were put on the same footing as their gentile “countrymen” in Belgium. They were all Germans. Being German classified these persons as enemy aliens who had to be interned to investigate what their attitude had been during the war. Furthermore, their possessions were impounded.25 This implied that bank accounts were blocked, which meant that these German Jews could not touch the money that relatives abroad had sent them. Neither could they conduct any commercial transaction, not even paying their insurance or accident premium. That the German Jews became Jewish Germans was not merely a bureaucratic decision with perverse side effects. Quite the contrary: the Belgian authorities considered all Germans, including the Jews who had been persecuted by the Nazi regime for eleven years, highly suspect. When the tragedy of the Holocaust became more widely known, the Belgian authorities hardly changed their attitude: they believed that among those Jewish German survivors who had survived the war there must be a large number of collaborators.26 • Jewish Immigrants: Refugees or Illegal Aliens Similar reasoning, according to which the Belgian authorities returned to the pre-war policy and ignored the specific wartime experience o f the Jews, was apparent in the treatment of survivors who had entered Belgium in the confusion of the Liberation but had not been residents of Belgium before the war. These Jews, mainly bearing Polish nationality, were treated as any other unwanted immigrants. When it was decided, in the summer of 1945, to expel the recent immigrants, these Jewish survivors were included in this decision. Like any other aliens, they too had to report to an assembly point of the British army from which they would be repatriated to their country of origin or eventually sent to a refugee camp in Germany. 25 The property of Jews classified as Germans was confiscated according to the law of 23.8.1944 (Belgische Staatsblad (further BS), 4.9.1944) and ministerial decision of 6 October 1944. While other enemy nationals who had not collaborated with the occupation authorities had their property returned within a year (for Italians who could submit a proof of non-collaboration, already on 1 August 1945 (Ofipresse, 20, 21.9.1945, p. 4), it took a much longer time for Germans. 26 Caestecker, “Holocaust Survivors,” pp. 359 and 375.

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The L im its o f Liberalism (1945-1947) In the summer of 1945, after the departure o f the Catholics, a new government was installed that incorporated politically marginal Catholics who had been active in the resistance. Among them was Minister of Justice Grégoire, a left-wing Catholic, and Minister o f War Victims van den Branden de Reeth who replaced Pauwels. Although knowledge o f the genocide had spread throughout Belgium, antisemitic sentiments were not ruled out. As a result of their horrific wartime experience Jews were very sensitive towards any expression o f antisemitism. According to Régine Orfinger, legal adviser of the JDC and the AIVG, Jew-consciousness, which was practically unknown in Belgium before the war, was now part of the common opinion. The war had left a clearly acknowledged distinction between Jews and non-Jews in Belgian society.27 The Jews, whose tragic war experience was scarcely acknowledged in official policy, worked hard immediately after the war to redress the wrong done to them. This was mostly done through discrete lobbying, but some radical Jews took their demands to the street. In the Labor Day parade in Brussels on 1 May 1945 a Jewish group carried a poster demanding more rights for Jews. This radical strategy was strongly opposed by most Jewish organizations.28 The fear of antisemitism led most Jewish organizations to adopt more moderate strategies to rehabilitate their lot. They seemed to agree that xenophobia, if not antisemitism, was a danger to take into account and they advocated a prudent approach to redress the injustices done to them.29 Some gentiles who were sympathetic to the Jewish plight nonetheless considered the Jewish organizations too demanding, and urged them to be more prudent in their demands for immediate facilities for the Jewish survivors. They held that an (even) more prudent approach was

27 American Jewish Year Book, 49 (1947-1948), p. 328. 28 Protokoll der Sitzung des Verwaltungsrates des COREF, 7 May 1945. AJMB, COREF, 3. 29 Catherine Massange, “Hirondelles et Aiglons. Les adolescents de l’AIVG,” Bijdragen lot de eigentijdse herinnering, 3 (2001), p. 185 and idem, Bâtir le lendemain. L ’A ide aux Israélites Victimes de la Guerre et le Service Social Ju if de 1944 à nos jours, Brussels, 2002, p. 88.

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necessary; otherwise, they warned, the Jewish organizations would nurture, in the short run, an antisemitic current.30 Expressions of antisemitism were, in contrast to the interwar period, limited to the political margins. The political elite was clearly opposed to such racist attitudes. When a presiding judge of an Antwerp military court, Lieutenant Colonel Van den Bonheden, made some antisemitic remarks, he was suspended for “mental instability.”31 However, pretending the war was just an interlude, and that the prewar world in which nationality was the main identifier of a person could simply be restored after the Holocaust, turned out to be a misjudgment. The authorities had already learned from the incident with the survivors of Buchenwald that distinguishing survivors of the war tragedy by virtue of their nationality was a delicate issue. • Jewish Germans Become German Jews (April 1945) The ministerial decision of 6 October 1944, which restored German nationality to German Jews, was the most blatant expression o f the insensitivity towards the Jewish suffering. Already ten days after publication of this decision, the Minister of Justice urged the local authorities not to intern Germans who had clearly not collaborated during the Occupation. The Belgian authorities still refused to declare all German Jews collectively as victims of Nazism, but on a case-by­ case basis German Jews who had not collaborated were to be exempted of the distrust. Nonetheless, they were still to be subject to strict police control, whereby they had to present themselves regularly to the authorities. Only half a year later, in April 1945, and mainly due to international Jewish pressure, was this police surveillance removed from German Jews whose loyalty during the war had been officially confirmed. Even more important, their Belgian residence permit now 30 AHCRB, Report o f the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (further IGCR) for second trimester 1945, p. 2. Also L. Piérard, a Socialist MP called upon the Jewish community to be prudent in the Socialist newpaper Le Peuple, 14. 3.1945, p. 1, and warned against a spirit of reprisals. 31 The lieutenant colonel who was presiding a court case against Jews who were accused of theft at the detriment of the allied forces said in court: “Shut up, you lie, all Jews do black marketing... It is not because the Germans are left that one can not prosecute the Jews,” Le Peuple, 14.3.1945, p. 2. American Jewish Year Book, 47 (1945-1946), p. 382.

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REINTEGRATION OF JEWISH SURVIVORS INTO BELGIAN SOCIETY

included, next to their newly ascribed German nationality, the inscription “Non-enemy.” Any other more sympathetic qualification (such as refugee, emigrant, victim of Nazism) that the local Jewish organizations had proposed was rejected by the authorities. The reasoning was that any other ethnic, political or religious group could claim a specific mention on their identity cards, which illustrates the ignorance of the unique Jewish experience during the war. Although the inscription “Non-enemy” on the Belgian residence permit and later also on the ration coupons was designed for German Jews, the local authorities implemented it much more broadly to include all Germans who had not collaborated during the Occupation.32 The reluctance to grant the German Jews an exceptional status was not due to ideological convictions, but was grounded in the desire to preserve the state’s sovereign power. The Belgian authorities wanted to avoid any action that might result in German Jewish survivors settling in Belgium. Those German Jews who had applied for asylum in Belgium from persecution in Nazi Germany since June 193833 were seeking a final destination. They were not to acquire the right to settle in Belgium. The German Jews had to wait for almost a year to be treated differently from the other Germans regarding the issue of their impounded possessions. A law passed on 13 January 1946 finally recognized that there was a difference between Jewish Germans and Austrians on the one hand and gentile Germans on the other, and allowed German Jews to dispose freely o f possessions that until then had been under custodianship. The sequestration of the property o f German Jews was only annulled in early 1947.34 32 Caestecker, “Holocaust Survivors.” 33 In July 1946 the cut-off date for granting permanent residency status to German Jews who had found asylum in Belgium before the war was postponed to February 1939. 34 Belgisch Staatsblad, 23 January 1947, pp. 6S4 ff. Because of a lack of legal base the administration of sequestration refused in July 1945 to treat Germans who had an identity card as non enemy differently as other Germans. Anne Godffoid, Office des Séquestres. Index des Notes de Services de 1945 à 1961. Commission d ’étude sur le sort des biens de membres de la Communauté juive de Belgique spoliés ou délaissés pendant la guerre 1940-1945/ Studiecommissie betreffende het lot van de bezittingen van de leden van de joodse gemeenschap in België, geplunderd o f achtergelaten tijdens de oorlog 1940-1945, Brussels, 1999, p. 6. However the Commission d ’étude/Studiecomnûssie, Brussels, 2002, p. 187, mentions that the

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• Illegally Immigrated Survivors: Refugees? A similar policy can be discerned towards the survivors who fled occupied Germany for Belgium. The rapid economic recovery of Belgium and the presence of Jewish communities in Belgium were the main pull factors. The mostly illegal immigration of these survivors was pardoned and they were tolerated, on the condition that they prepare themselves to leave for their final destination. The Belgian government made this humanitarian gesture because, at least it was so believed, it would cost the Belgian state little or nothing. The Belgian authorities believed that the international community would cater for the needs of these survivors and that emigration would proceed smoothly. All survivors who fled to Belgium after the war had to seek a final destination. While not one of these survivors was actually expelled, the pressure on them to leave Belgium was strong. An uncertain residence status and scarce occupational opportunities (very few obtained official authorization to work in Belgium) made it clear to these immigrants that they had to take their chances elsewhere. This tolerance enabled the Belgian authorities to both know the whereabouts of this politically sensitive group in the country and to meet the demands of the Jewish lobby at home as well as abroad; it also enhanced Belgian international prestige.35 Tolerance of Jewish survivors was not considered refugee policy. It was part o f immigration policy, which was not antisemitic but anti-foreigner and all uninvited guests had to move along.

administration decided somewhere in 1945-1946 that German Jews could apply to dispose freely of their property. The Minister of Finance postponed taking a decision on the German non enemies until the Interallied Conference of Reparations would annul the sequestration of property of non enemy Germans. Only in October 1946 did the Minister of Finance finally decide to prepare a draft to be put before Parliament. Isabelle Blume and Minister of Finances, 10.1945. Institute Emile Vandervelde, papers Isabelle Blume, 125A, 36. The law of 13 January 1947 granted German nationals with an identity card indicating their non enemy status, the possibility to be exempted from confiscation of their property, see Commission detude/Studiecommissie, Brussels, 2002, p. 187. 35 Caestecker, “Holocaust Survivors,” p. 360; Yoav Gelber, “The Jewish Brigade in Belgium,” in: Michman, Belgium and the Holocaust, p. 480.

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• Jewish Deportees of Foreign Nationality Become Jewish Denizens36 After the war, most survivors who had resided in Belgium prior to the war were able to return. The repatriation procedure provided a considerable re-integration premium, but only for Belgian survivors. In the summer o f 1945 when the government was rearranged after the departure o f the Catholics and van den Branden de Reeth became Minister of War Victims, the exclusion o f survivors with foreign nationality from this provision was discontinued. Everyone returning from the concentration camps to Belgium, independent of their nationality, received a significant allowance as political prisoner.37 The Belgian authorities also supported under-aged Jews o f foreign nationality whose parents had been deported from Belgium (see below). The unique wartime experience of the Jews was acknowledged in these decisions, which uprooted traditional criteria o f belonging that typified a liberal nation-state. Having been a victim of the Nazi terror in 36 “Denizen” was the intermediary category in old English law between alien and citizen and re-introduced by Tomas Hammar (Democracy and the Nation-State, Aldershot, 1990, pp. 14-17) in political science. “Denizen” was used in England until the 1840s for those privileged aliens who were not citizens. The concept “denizen” is used for those aliens whose residency status was fully guaranteed and who had full access, on equal terms with the nationals, to the labor market, business, social welfare, education, etc. It is a status that permits aliens to remain indefinitely in the host country and to participate in social and economic, but not political, life on the same terms as nationals. 37 In the winter of 1945 an allowance was granted to about 5,000 foreigners, deportees and their heirs lawfully residing in Belgium at the time of the war, while 17.714 Belgian war victims, or their heirs, granted already such a monthly allowance of 2000/ 2500 Belgian francs from the fall of 1945 onwards on the basis of the law of 9 February 1945 (BS 18.2.1945). The law of 29 April 1945 extended this financial support to deportees of foreign nationality and the law of 19 September 1945 respectively in BS, 27.4.1945 and 1.10.1945 enlarged this exceptional provision to their heirs too. This two stage process in which the first opening towards war victims of foreign nationality was created by Minister Pauwels is not confirmed by archival data at our disposal. In the minutes of the AIVG, Minister van den Branden de Reeth was presented as the one changing course radically by catering indiscriminately to all survivors in Belgium. "L 'AIVG obtient, suite aux démarches accomplies par Mme Sorokine auprès du Ministère des Victimes de la Guerre, que soient accordés aux Juifs rescapés des camps les mêmes advantages," Conseil d’administration AIVG, 8.1945. Archive Service Social Juif. Ofipress, 6 (15 June 1945), p. 6. and 25 (2 November 1945), p. 9.

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Belgium became the sole criterion to qualify for protection by the Belgian state. The decision to grant an allowance to all Jewish deportees or their heirs, irrespective of whether they had foreign nationality, was crucial for the rehabilitation of the Jews in Belgium. In 1946 an official allowance was given to 2,670 adult survivors and 2,791 children. As Table 1 illustrates, only a small number o f these beneficiaries had Belgian nationality. Table 1: Citizenship o f 2,670 adult survivors who received state support, and their relationship to a deportee, 194638

Wife Mother

Belgian

Polish

German

Austrian

Stateless

Other

Total

145

918

331

197

247

301

2,139

5

61

15

18

20

6

125

2

4

6

Sister 150

980

347

215

267

311

2,270

Spouse

10

145

27

8

47

34

271

Father

2

63

22

7

27

6

127

Brother

0

1

0

0

1

0

2

12

209

49

15

75

40

400

Total female beneficiaries

Total male beneficiaries

• The Fate of Jewish Children Orphaned by the Holocaust Jewish children orphaned by the genocide were totally dependent on the support that the Jewish organizations and the Belgian state granted war victims. As Table 2 illustrates, almost three thousand children of deportees survived the war and were supported through the AIVG. Although very few of these children were of Belgian nationality, they were, at least from the summer of 1945 onwards, eligible for state support.38

38 AIVG, Note relative aux prisonniers politiques israélites, destinées a Monsieur le Ministre de la Reconstruction, 2S.3.I946. Institute Emile Vandervelde, papers Isabelle Blume, 125A, 36.

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T able 2: Num ber o f minor-aged survivors (former deportees and their dependants) eligible for state support, 194639 Persons (families)

Children with one 1,652 parent who survived deportation Orphans 1,139 (836)3940

Born in Belgium

Born abroad

1,111

541

744

395

A significant proportion o f these minor-aged survivors were children who had been hidden by the CDJ. At the end of 1944 these children were still spread throughout the country: 816 were held in Catholic institutions (416 of them in convents) and about 1,000 were with gentile foster families. Some children could reunite with their parents, others had only one parent who survived, and still others were taken care of by relatives, Jewish foster families or Jewish institutions. It seems, however, that only a few remained with those who had taken care o f them during the war. All Jewish parties favored the return of these children to a Jewish environment, but there was considerable disagreement as to how to organize this return. Immediately after the Liberation, Jewish organizations adopted several strategies for the future of the Jewish orphans. Some proposed a Jewish organization that would have guardianship over all Jewish orphans; others favored an official state organization that would take care o f all war orphans, independent of the persecution that their parents had been victim to. Some insisted strongly that this state agency should safeguard the Jewishness of these orphans; others were less adamant in this respect41

39 Ibid. In 1945 the AIVG supported itself about 1500 children, see Massange, Bâtir le lendemain, p. 30, Gotovitch, “Juif sur la pointe des pieds,” p. 154. 40 Few children were born between 1940 and 1945, but all other ages were about equally represented. There was also a equal gender distribution (559 boys and 580 girls). 41 L. Papeleux, “Le réseau Van den Berg qui sauva des centaines de juifs,” La vie Walonne, 55 (1981), pp. 129-208. Ofipresse, 24 (19 October 1945) and 28 (14 December 1945).

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There was radical opposition to the daim s o f the Jewish organizations. In January 1945, Father Dom Bruno (Reynders), a Benedictine monk who had been involved in rescue operations for Jewish children during the war, opposed the Jewish presumptions on “their” children. He stated that these children should decide freely for themselves, and furthermore that their eventual conversion to Catholicism during the war should be respected. He refuted the existence of a Jewish community to which these children belonged. He pointed out that the Jewish community did not constitute a community on the basis of religious unity or citizenship. The only possible binding criterion for this community was the notion of race, but this notion did not have any legal value in Belgium and would be contrary to the Belgian tradition. Only in Nazi doctrine did it exist. Father Bruno Reynders reduced Jewish claims to Nazi ideology and was strongly opposed to the introduction of any exceptional provision for Jewish orphans. Negotiations between the Jewish organizations and the Ministers of Justice on how to organize the custodianship over the “Jewish” orphans lasted for years. The Belgian authorities were not eager to settle the issue because it entailed the introduction o f the definition of who was a Jew in Belgian public law.42 In the end no legislative change was enacted, and the Jewish orphan issue was “settled” under the existing legislation. Notwithstanding this setback, the Jewish organizations embarked on a vigorous campaign to remove the children from the Catholic institutions and gentile families where they had been in hiding during the war.43 As Table 3 shows, the first children to be re-integrated in a Jewish environment were those who had been in Catholic institutions. In cases where the family had not survived the war or was incapable of

42 Ibid, p. 196; Massange, Bâtir le lendemain, p. 97. 43 V. Teitelbaum-Hirsch, Les larmes sous le masque. Enfants cachés, Brussels, 1994, pp. 170ff, Arye Riesel, “Re-education of War-orphaned Jewish Children and Adolescents in Children's and Youth Homes in Belgium, 1945-1949,” in: Michman, Belgium and the Holocaust, pp. 488 ff., Papeleux, “Le réseau Van den Berg,” p. 200; Bijdragen tot de eigentijdse herinnering, 1 (1999), p. 159; Transcript Interview of Régine Orfmger, 1977(?) in Foundation of Contemporary Memory, Brussels.

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caring for their children, they were mostly placed in Jewish orphanages since there was a shortage o f Jewish foster families.4445 Table 3: Jewish children (probably) enlisted by the CDJ during the war but not re-allocated by the AIVG, 1944-194645

Convents Other Catholic institutions Gentile families Total

Nov 1944 416 400

1,000 1,816

July 1945 146

Nov 1945 60 100

Dec 1945 42 65

June 1946

Sept 1946 13

Dec 1946 4 64

500

465

217

19

17

572

87

Catholic convents were not always eager to hand “their” children over to Jewish families or orphanages, because they feared that the children would lose their new Catholic belief46 Removing Jewish children from

44 Teitelbaum-Hirsch, Les larmes sous le masque, p. 170. 45 Hanne Hellemans, Zij die verloren zijn, p. 107; Gotovitch, “Juif sur la pointe des pieds,” p. 154; Régine Orfinger, Report o f my activity during the year 1947 as legal counsel ofAJDC and AIVG, 1.3.1948, p. 5. JDC, 200. Jewish Children in Liberated Europe. Their needs and the JDC. Child care work, p. 8. Research Departments Report n° 1. Archive Belgian Ministry of Social Affairs, Service War Victims, 2669. As Hellemans mentions, these figures have to be handled with caution as in the struggle between the liberal AIVG and the Orthodox and Zionist Jewish organizations the AIVG had interest to underrate the number of childen which had not returned to the Jewish fold. In April 1948 the AIVG was aware that a number of orphans in Gentile families or institutions was unknown to them, i.e. children placed on a private base by their parents before their deportation. To make an accurate overview one should distinguish between those hidden by the CDJ and other children. The listings do in general not refer to the children’s war experience. AIVG estimated in April 1948 that 92 children lived outside the Jewish fold (in 1961, 80 and in 1969, 116), while the Mizrachi (Orthodox Zionists) estimated the number o f children in a Gentile environment in 1947 to be 350, see, Hellemans, Zij die verloren zijn, p. 107. 46 Frank Decat, “Een priester in het verzet: E. H. Camille Engelbos,” Militaria, 1995; Hellemans, Zij die verloren zijn, p. 107.

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their non-Jewish foster parents, who in many cases had grown attached to them, encountered even more opposition.47 Sometimes Jewish organizations took recourse in legal action to force gentile foster families or Catholic institutions to hand the child over to his/her relatives. Article 142 o f the civil code stipulated that in the absence of the parents, a family council could decide to pass the guardianship of the child to the closest relatives.48 The Napoleonic Civil Code had been amended in the matter of adoption with the law of 22 March 1940, which had put the interest o f the orphans central. In the court, the judge ruled what was in the best interest o f the child: to stay where he or she was or be handed over to the relative designated by the family council. Thus, finding relatives of these orphans was an important task of the Jewish organizations; and the more radical among them, who were adamant about removing these children from a nonJewish environment, exerted strong pressure on relatives, even distant relatives, demanding that they take over the guardianship o f these children. Evidently the Belgian Courts accepted most o f the claims of Jewish relatives. A first court decision was ruled in the court of first instance in Brussels on 24 September 1945. In the case of a child whose parents were deported and where the gentile family who had hidden the child during the war was resolute to keep the child, the judge ruled that the family council obtain custody of the child. The foster family had to pass the child to the guardian designated by the family council. The judge ruled in accordance with the law of 22 March 1940 that this was in the child’s best interests. He explicitly referred to the Jewishness o f the child by stating “it is advisable that the young A.E., Israelite, return to her traditional environment.”49 47 Teitelbaum-Hirsch, Les larmes sous le masque, p. 176. 48 Article 142 of the civil code stipulated that the family council could decide about the guardianship of the child six months alter the disappearance of the father and the death of the mother or her disappearance during or before this period. 49 Ofipress, 27 (30 November 1945), pp. 5f. A similar ruling of 19 March 1947 of the Brussels’ Court of First Instance stipulated: “// est extrêmement souhaitable que l ’enfant ju if retrouve, dans son milieu d ’origine, les traditions fam iliales et religieuses auxquelles il fut, par la guerre, arraché et qui furent celles de son père et de sa mère, ” L'appel. Bulletin mensuel d ’information de l ’AIVG, 12 (5/1947), p. 8. The Brussels’ Court of Appeal ruled on January 16, 1946 that it agreed to the return of young children bom of Jewish parents to their traditional environment.

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When no relatives were alive, the issue was more difficult to resolve. Since Belgium did not officially recognize racial and religious differences, the claims o f the Jewish community to raise the Jewish children itself even in Jewish orphanages, rather than leave them with foster parents or Christian institutions, were not that easy to uphold before court. Article 142 of the civil code, which stipulated that in the absence o f the parents or a relative the family council could decide to pass the guardianship to a temporary guardian, opened up all kind o f possibilities. Be it the gentile foster family, the convent, or the Jewish organization, each could set up a family council, but this council had to be recognized by the Justice of the Peace (juges de paix/vrederechters) and it was up to the judge to decide whether the temporary guardian be given custody of the child. Jewish organizations created family councils to obtain legal rights over the children. In this way members of the boards of the various Jewish organizations - without being related to a child - became each, in turn, an official guardian of a child.50 The principle that it was in the interest of the Jewish child to return to his or her traditional environment was sometimes accepted by the judge, and the family council linked to the Jewish organization was granted legal rights over the child. When the conditions for the child with one or the other contending parties were equal, the Jewish argument could be the decisive factor in favor o f a return. However, the ruling of the court could also be negative.51

Archive of the Aliens’ Department, Brussels (further AAD), 279. There was however a case of two girls where the Court of Appeal decided at the end of the 1940s, early 1950s that the children could remain in a convent and had not to be handed over to two not close members of the family, see Hellemans, Zij die verloren zijn, p. 212. 50 Bijdragen tot de eigentijdse herinnering, 1 (1999), p. 78 ff. Ofipresse, 28 (12.12.1945), p. 2. 51 A ruling of the Antwerp court in 1948 stipulated: “In general it is advisable that children of Jewish origin are raised in a Jewish environment, but when a Jewish child is raised in a excellent manner by a gentile family an exception to the rule has to be accepted. A stiff Jewish racial position has to be rejected... Consideration based on the race to which the children belong may not be decisive in this matter,” see Hellemans, Zij die verloren zijn, p. 172.

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The AI VG followed a moderate course. Being a stronghold of liberal Jews, the AIVG was not radically opposed to the assimilation o f Jewish children within the Belgian gentile population. Not all children had to be returned to a Jewish environment. The interests of the child were taken into account and the AIVG did not contest that some children remain with gentile families. In the immediate post-war years, twelve Jewish child-care workers linked to the AIVG regularly visited the CDJ children who were still with their wartime families, so that the AIVG was well informed about the way the foster family took care o f the children.52 The cases of guardianship that the AIVG did bring to court were those where it considered that the gentile family was not fulfilling the obligations of guardianship. In only a few of these cases did the judge disagree with the AIVG.53 Organized Orthodoxy, but also the HISO, the Antwerp branch o f the AIVG, pursued a more radical course. Shortly after creation o f the AIVG, the Comité Central Israélite (CCI) was founded, which aimed at the restoration of the Jewish Orthodox community in Belgium. The CCI was financially supported by the Vaad Hahatzala (Rescue Committee o f the American Orthodox Rabbis). Other organizations from the Orthodox community included the anti-Zionist Agudath Israel and the Zionist Mizrachi movement. In July 1947 these three organizations joined forces in the Organization de Regroupement Familial du Bahad et de I ’A goudas Israel affiliées au Vaad Hahatzala. Organized Orthodoxy aimed at the return of all Jewish children to the Jewish fold. Abduction or “buying o ff’ gentile foster families were means justified by the cause to which these organizations adhered. For these organizations, returning Jewish children to the Jewish fold was not a pragmatic decision but a principle essential to the survival o f the Jewish people after the Holocaust.54

52 Jewish Children in Liberated Europe. Their needs and the JDC. Child care work, p. 8. Research Department Report n°l. Archive of the Belgian Ministry of Social Affairs, Service War Victims, 2669. 53 Note pour la conférence internationale des droits humains, 11.6.1947. Institute Emile Vandervelde, papers Isabelle Blume, VIII, 126. 54 These organizations claim to have returned between 1945 and 1947,100 children to the Jewish fold. Hellemans, Zij die verloren zijn, pp. 66-70, Massange, “Hirondelles et Aiglons,” p. 180.

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• Back to normality (1946-1947): the hidden Jewish tragedy In February 1946 the first post-war election was held, in which the Catholics won a landslide victory. The relatively high score of the communists, however, enabled the continuation of a government without Catholic participation but with an extremely small majority. A reshuffle in the government resulted in Van den Branden de Reeth being replaced by the communist Terfve. The strong communist presence in the government and its hold o f the post of Minister of War Victims, a crucial department for the Jewish survivors, was of little support for Jewish rehabilitation as the communists refuted any Jewish particularism at that time.55 The upcoming Cold War and the instability o f the government led to the Catholics re-entering the government in March 1947. In 1946-1947 a normalization process took place with respect to the war experience. One of the signs of this process was the resurgence of xenophobic or antisemitic agitation. Two topics were used as vehicles for this agitation: the so-called impertinence of the Jews and the economic threat of Jewish competition to the middle-class. Concerning the latter, already in the 1930s antisemitism and xenophobia were closely linked and both used economic discourse to bring their message across. The depression had hit the local middle-class severely and the organized middle-class fulminated strongly against the unfair Jewish competition. The war had not changed the reasoning of the organized middle-classes. In a meeting in October 1947, the MP Dexters, of the Catholic middle-class movement, NCMV, referred to the prewar Jewish hucksters and blamed them for the unemployment of the 1930s. The demise of many tradesmen and the decline of the moral, religious and ethical values during those days were also attributed to them. By then an obligatory reference to the Holocaust was necessary, but it did not diminish Dexters’ argument: Because of the tragedy which the Jews have known during the last years, I do not want to emphasize their case too strongly, also because the aliens’ problem is not only a Jewish issue and anyway is not a race issue.... The war liberated us from many aliens, mostly dubious elements, but the number of aliens has increased considerably after the liberation. These aliens, and especially the Jews, have

55 Gotovitch, “Juif sur la pointe des pieds,” p. 106, footnote.

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made use of the right of the strongest in the capitalist system, which implies brutal exploitation by the most dishonest and cunning.56

The so-called impertinence of the Jews, the second topic around which the xenophobic, if not antisemitic discourse, was structured, referred mainly to the arrival of Jews from Central and Eastern Europe, immigrants who arrived in Belgium uninvited. The Christian democratic newspaper Het Volk reported on 30 April 1946: It seems quite unbelievable how many aliens are living illegally in Belgium at this time... There should be organizations that facilitate the stay of these not very interesting fellows in our country, especially if they are Jewish. For that matter, before the war, 75,000 Jews were residing in Belgium and now, in spite of their persecution by the Germans, there are at least 40,000 to 50,000.... It is to be hoped that one can go through with a wide broom, because it is a secret to nobody that the aliens here keep themselves busy with things that, at the very least, are not to be called all that clean.57

The illegal activities that the article cites refers mainly to the blackmarketing of Jewish survivors. Aware that this nurtured anti­ semitism, the Jewish organizations in Belgium were active in seeking acceptable livelihoods for the survivors or final destinations for those who had no right of abode in Belgium.58 • Belgian-Born Jewish Deportees of Foreign Nationality: Outsiders From the summer of 1945, all those returning from the concentration camps to Belgium received a significant allowance as political prisoners independent o f their nationality. The assimilation between Jews and non-Jews, between Belgians and foreigners, as war victims who deserved to be supported by the Belgian state was shortlived: in the spring of 1946 Jewish deportees of foreign nationality and their 56 Dexters, “Het Vreemdelingenvraagstuk in België“ in Handelsproblemen, verslagen van de sociale studiedagen van de Middenstand, 11-12 October 1947, Brussels, p. 114. (with thanks to Peter Heyrman). 57 L. W. “The aliens’ plague,” in Het Volk, 30 April 1946, pp. 5-6. Xenophobia, for Orfinger only a cover for attacks on Jews, was expressed by a minority of the Belgian press. Régine Orfinger-Karlin, Note pour la conférence internationale des droits humains, 11.6.1947. Institute Emile Vandervelde, papers Isabelle Blume, VIII, 126. Herment to Sillem, London. AHCRB, D5A1. 58 Massange, “Hirondelles et Aiglons,” p. 185 and idem, Bâtir le lendemain, p. 88. L'appel. Bulletin mensuel d'information de l ’AIVG, 6 (11/1946), p. 2.

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heirs were excluded from any state support.59 By excluding those holding foreign nationality from receiving war-related welfare, a large number of deportees who qualified for Belgian nationality began to apply for it.60 For the A1VG the decision to exclude Jewish deportees of foreign nationality was a disaster. As a result, they had to support about five thousand Jews o f foreign nationality; about half o f these needy individuals had Polish nationality, 25 percent had German nationality and only 5 percent Belgian nationality. A quarter of them comprised children staying with their own families.61 • Jewish Orphans with Foreign Nationality: Denizens The decision o f the AIVG to take the Jewish orphans under its wing backlashed financially when, in the spring o f 1946, the Belgian authorities stopped financial support for foreigners. Even children with foreign nationality whose parents had been deported and had never returned were cut off from welfare.62 The AIVG became solely responsible for the upkeep of those under-aged survivors and found itself facing serious financial problems.63 In 1947 the government decided to consider, at the request of the Jewish relief organizations, children bom on Belgian soil who de jure had foreign nationality but who could claim Belgian nationality on reaching majority age, as de facto having Belgian nationality. This concession benefited between 2,000 and 3,000 children bom in

59 Ibid, 3 (6/1946), p. 3. 60 On the sample of 216 administrative files at the administration of war victims (a random sample taken out of the 1,323 survivors of the 25,124 deported from Belgium as Jews) only 4% of these deportees had the Belgian nationality upon return and 20% obtained the Belgian nationality after their return to Belgium, mostly after a first application for the status of political prisoner was refused due to their foreign nationality. L. Schram, La mémoire des rescapés juifs d ’Auschwitz, unpublished mémoire de licence, Brussels, 1993, pp. 44-52. 61 L ’appel. Bulletin mensuel d ’information de l ’AIVG, (1/1946), p. 2. 62 Conseil d’administration AIVG, 5.3.1946. Archive o f the Service Social Juive, Brussels. Subsidies to children’s homes became dependent on the Belgian nationality of the child (BS, 19 July 1946, p. 6014). 63 Report o f activity during the year 1947 as legal counsel of the AJDC and AIVG, 1 March 1948. AJDC, 200. Conseils d’administration AIVG, 1946-1947. Archive of the Service Social Juif, Brussels.

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Belgium to Jewish parents with foreign nationality.64 In this manner, in May 1947 the orphanages of the Jewish communities came to be recognized by the authorities and the financial situation of the AIVG improved.65 Although a legislative innovation to settle the issue of Jewish orphans once and for all was a long-gone hope, the Jewish organizations insisted that the existing legislation be modified in two respects. First, one of the major problems encountered by the Jewish organizations in seeking a solution for the Jewish children hidden during the war was to find them. Since these children were given false names during the war, tracing them was extremely difficult. The Jewish organizations demanded a change in the law to oblige all guardians of minor-aged war victims to disclose the true identity of “their” children.66 A second innovation that the AIVG insisted upon was that the setting up of a family council be preceded by a social investigation so to provide the judge with information on whether the family council was motivated by the best interests of the child. In early 1947, Orfinger obtained the agreement of the Ministers of Justice and o f Reconstruc­ tion for the bills she had drafted to modify the existing legislation regarding guardianship. The change of government meant that she had to start all over again.67 It appears that she could not convince the Catholic Minister of Justice to change the law regarding guardianship. • Uninvited Survivors in 1947: No Longer Refugees Until early 1947 the stay of survivors who had immigrated illegally was legalized. The Belgian authorities granted short-term residence permits to survivors who had succeeded in outwitting the border patrol, to 64 “With great difficulty it has been possible to obtain that children bom in Belgium who therefore have the right to acquire Belgian nationality if they so desire, should be assimilated to Belgians,” Report of JDC lawyer, Mrs. Regine Orfinger-Karlh, 30 April 1947 in JDC, 200, see also a shortened version in American Jewish Year Book, 49 (1947-1948), p. 328. 65 Conseil d'administration AIVG, 21 May 1947. Archive of the Service Social Juive. 66 L ’appel. Bulletin mensuel d'informations de l ’AIVG, 2 May 1946, p. 4. Belgian section of Vaad Hahatzala to Minister van Glabekke, 3 May 1946, AAD, 279. 67 American Jewish Year Book, 49 (1947-1948), p. 328. Régine Orfinger, Report o f my activity during the year 1947 as legal counsel o f AJDC and AIVG, 1.3.1948, p. 3. JDC, 200.

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enable them to organize their further emigration. The prospects for emigration seemed to be bright. The Belgian authorities even invited fifteen hundred survivors from German camps to wait in Belgium in preparation for their final emigration to Palestine. While until 1946 the Belgian authorities had shown some under­ standing for the plight of the Jewish survivors stranded in Germany, they changed course in early 1947. Survivors arriving illegally in Belgium, now mostly from Romania and Hungary, were treated as any other illegal immigrants - arrested, sent to jail, and eventually expelled. The Belgian authorities legitimized this change of course by denying Jewish survivors any basis for or claim to privileged treatment. The war was over and thus there were no longer genuine humanitarian reasons for granting Jews asylum. The subjective notion of fear of persecution and the emotional trauma that the Holocaust had caused were not considered reasons for asylum. With this line of reasoning, the xenophobic incidents in Eastern Europe (especially the pogrom of Kielce in 1946) were minimized. This argument had been put forward before, but the hardening of the Belgian attitude was due to the economic downturn and, more importantly, to the lack o f prospects for emigration and the pressure from Britain to stop illegal emigration to Palestine. The Belgian authorities felt that the great powers were less ready to contribute to the solution of the refugee problem than was hoped for in the spring of 1946. It looked as if Belgium would be stuck with these survivors. This worry was accentuated in 1947 when the A1VQ whose income could no longer meet the rising costs, demanded, in vain, that the public authorities include some survivors on the public relief rolls.68 • A Hierarchic Recognition o f the Suffering, at the Expense of the Jews In 1947, when the life-long allowance and title of national hero became the object of heated political discussion, the suffering o f Jews deported from Belgium became a bargaining point in a political fight. Deportees of Belgian nationality who had been deported as Jews remained eligible for the status of political prisoner which guaranteed them material benefits, but they were excluded from the title of political prisoner. To

68 AAD.279.

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extend this title indiscriminately to all victims of Nazi terror encountered opposition among the Catholic MPs. These MPs agreed that all victims of Nazi terror were to be compensated for their suffering, but only those who had acted out o f patriotic conviction were to be granted the honorary title of political prisoner. The left-wing organizations of deportees succeeded in obtaining an extension o f the heroic group to include hostages and those who had been arrested because of their political and philosophical beliefs. Those deported for being Jewish could benefit only from the material support, and their suffering was not given the symbolic recognition of the title “political prisoner.”69 Only Jewish deportees, be they of Belgian or foreign nationality, with a resistance record were symbolically honored as heroes. That Jews of foreign nationality who had been active as resistance fighters could also have been persecuted as Jews was o f no importance; only their resistance activities granted them both a material and symbolic recognition of their suffering.70 Most Jews applied for the title of political prisoner, but in vain.71 In the parlance o f that time “the victims of duty” - namely, those who became victims because of voluntary and unselfish resistance to the occupation authorities - were distinguished from those who were “only” persecuted because o f their origin, “the victims by mere accident.”72 In 1947 the retreat from a generously liberal Belgium seemed to be total. Nationality - the traditional hallmark of belonging to a liberal nation-state - was restored. Immigration policy, the ultimate act of sovereignity, largely ignored the Jewish suffering. The issue o f the 69 Pieter Lagrou, “Victims of Genocide and National Memory: Belgium, France and the Netherlands 1945-1965,” Past and Present, 154 (1997), pp. 197-201. 70 BS, 15.2.1947 and 10.6.1948. 941 foreigners with a resistance record obtained the recognition as political prisoner. 71 The study of Schram, La mémoire des rescapés juifs d ’Auschwitz, pp. 44 and 52 on repatriated deportees, reveals that 81% of the returnees did apply for recognition as a political prisoner, only 11% of the sample obtained the title of political prisoner on the base of a documented resistance record, but 37% of the sample were granted the status, i.e. all those bom in Belgium or who had the Belgian nationality. The latter had either the Belgian nationality upon return from the KZ or obtained it in post war Belgium. 72 La Libre Belgique, 11.10.1946 ; see also La Libre Belgique, 4.7.1946, La Nation Beige quoted in L ’A lerte, 22.8.1946; L ’Occident, 29.1.1946, 26.3.1946 and 11.10.1946.

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Jewish orphans had not elicited the slightest legislative innovation, but in administrative practice Belgian-born orphans were considered again denizens. The unique wartime experience of the Jews had not shaken the liberal order. After the short-lived and hesitant solidarity of 1945, its heritage was largely disregarded. Only one innovation in Belgian legislation was introduced as a response to the Nazi persecution o f Jews: the law of 12 April 1947 which made a legal assumption to the benefit of victims of moral coercion. This law made explicit mention of racial persecution and enabled annulment of any agreement concluded during the war that could be assumed to have been reached under (indirect) coercion. In those cases the onus of proof shifted away from those being persecuted who had “agreed” to the agreement, towards those who had acquired seemingly extraordinary advantages out of the deal. Initially the bill referred to persecution because of citizenship, political beliefs and race; but the law itself also covered persecution due to residence in order to cover the population of Antwerp who was forced to hand in their radios in 1942. Still, the legislator clearly stipulated that the judge could take at face value the persecution o f Jews, while for all others an in-depth investigation was deemed necessary. This legislative innovation, which established a precedent in Belgian legislation, was an exceptional stand. The heritage of the genocide was hardly felt in public policy. A decision o f the judiciary in 1950 to grant Belgian nationality to a Jewish orphan bom in Belgium in 1931 was reminiscent o f the anti-Nazi solidarity of 1945, which included also the Jewish victims. This young man had been in hiding between 1942 and 1944 when the Nazis exterminated his family. In 1948 he participated in a failed armed robbery and was condemned provisionally. When he73

73 Initially the law would only be to the benefit of the Jews who had a legal residence in Belgium, but finally it was extended to all victims independent of their legal status. PHS, 20.12.1945, p. 80; PDS, 18.7.1946, 84; PHS, 15.10.1946, p. 769; PDC, 12.12.1946, nr. 49, p. 6. PDC, 28.3.1945, 79; PDS, 6.12.1945, 9; PDC, 17.8.1945, 173; PDS, 18.7.1946, 84; PDC, 12.12.1946, 49, p. 6. PHS, 15.10.1946 and 20.12.1945. France and the Netherlands knew similar bills, respectively ordonnance 21.4.1945 {Journal officiel, 22.4.1945) and Dutch decree of 17.9.1944. According to a MP the Belgian law was generous in the sense that it covered agreements which had been concluded before the Nazi authorities had pressurized directly the victim.

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claimed Belgian nationality the public prosecutor advised negatively. The judge, however, considered that the application’s lapse was due to the tragic circumstances of the war. Given that “the applicant and his family had paid with their blood for their faith in the cause of humanity which Belgium had defended during the war,” the Belgian-born Jew was granted Belgian nationality. With this statement, Jewish deportees were depicted as resistance fighters however, their war experience was not acknowledged.74 Although the court ruling expressed strong solidarity with the Jews, it ignored the fact that Jews were victims of their origin. By denying the judeocide its proper commemoration, it opened the way for allegations o f Jews as victims by accident.

C onclusion In 1944, after the departure of the Germans, the Belgian authorities considered that the Jewish question had ceased to exist. The Nazi persecution of the Jews belonged definitively to the past. The authorities wanted to return to the traditional liberal policy o f non­ discrimination on religious or racial grounds. This implied that the authorities refused to countenance any special help for Jews, the victims par excellence of Nazi terror. Facilities for Jewish survivors would be seen as recognition of a specific “Jewish question” in Belgium, something totally undesirable. The liberal tradition had to be restored. Jews no longer existed, at most they were called Israélites who were only to be distinguished from the rest of society by their religion. The Holocaust - inasmuch as the horror of this historic experience had been understood and acknowledged - was hardly an element in the immediate post-war policy towards survivors. The Belgian authorities refused to think along racial categories of Nazi times, although these categories were real categories of human suffering. The liberal principle of not making a distinction between people on the basis of race, religion or ethnicity left citizenship as the only discriminative criterion - a criterion that did not take into account the innovative reality of the postHolocaust era. Jews in Belgium, independent of their citizenship, had

74 Journal des Tribunaux, 1950, p. 677.

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been victims of Nazi persecution. Nazi persecution had used racial criteria in such a dramatic manner that a restoration of liberal categories turned out to be extremely difficult. This became obvious in the reception of Jewish survivors. Most of the Jewish deportees from Belgium did not have Belgian nationality and were therefore excluded from support by the state. The Belgian authorities classified all (former) citizens of enemy states indiscriminately, even if they had been persecuted by the Occupation authorities. The most blatant expression of the insensitivity towards Jewish suffering was that even German Jews became Jewish Germans. Illegally immigrated aliens, whether they were Jewish survivors or not, were all considered unwanted aliens. The tension of managing the legacy of Nazi crimes was particularly high in the policy towards Jewish orphans. Left behind by their parents who were deported to the East, these orphans were, according to some Jewish circles, to be considered as Jews and to be raised in a Jewish environment. Negotiations with the government lasted for years. In line with their liberal worldview, the Belgian authorities rejected the Jewish demand, as this would entail the introduction o f the category “Jew” in Belgian public law. Pretending that the war was merely an interlude, and that the prewar world could simply be restored after the Holocaust, turned out to be a misjudgment. The prewar world was one o f nationalist egoism, where the scarce resources o f the incipient welfare state had been distributed along nationalist lines. Foreigners had been excluded to a large extent from these provisions. By trying to restore the old order the Belgian authorities put survivors under considerable hardship. Survivors could hardly count on an exceptional regime; no specific refugee or welfare policy was designed for them. The actual way in which issues regarding Jewish survivors were handled in 1945 was much more pragmatic than one would expect from the preparations in 1944. In 1945, all inhabitants of Belgium who had been victims of Nazi terror - orphans, foreigners and Belgian, Jews and gentiles - were treated alike and considered political prisoners. Some issues were not decided by the authorities but by the judiciary, and here, too, pragmatic considerations dominated. On the question of the guardianship of Jewish orphans, the courts settled the cases by applying the notion of “the interest of the child,” whereby the judges ruled frequently in favor of the return to the child’s traditional (Jewish) 105

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environment. Also, the decision to make German Jews into Germans, at most Jewish Germans, was quickly overturned. For these Jews, the inscription “Non-enemy” appeared on their Belgian residence permit, next to their newly ascribed German nationality. Also, new immigrants who had survived the horror of the war were not expelled but tolerated. It would be wrong to attribute the discrepancy in 1945 between the plans and the actual way that the issues relating to Jewish survivors were handled to ideological convictions. Solidarity between deportees, pressure of the Jewish lobby and support by international interest in the matter, as well as the impasse created by the decision to return to prewar policy brought about a more flexible approach. The Jewish organizations were prudent in their demands for facilities for the Jewish survivors. They believed that otherwise they would nurture, in the short run, an antisemitic current Notwithstanding the Holocaust, xenopho­ bia, if not antisemitism, still had to be taken into account. The concessions were, however, only of a temporary nature. In 1946 the attitude of the Belgian authorities returned to its previous restrictive position. The benevolence towards survivors in 1945 gave way to a policy in which the unique persecution of the Jewish population was not given due attention. In 1946 Jews with foreign nationality no longer warranted government support, and in 1947 the crackdown on illegally immigrated survivors meant an end for Jews being regarded as an exceptional category within immigration policy. In the same year, the exclusion of Jews from the status of political prisoner was the culminating point in a normalization process by which the Jewish tragedy was overlooked. In 1947 it appeared that the generosity had ended. The only exceptions were the Jewish orphans for whom concessions continued to be made, and the law of 12 April 1947 that established a precedent in Belgian legislation by explicitly mentioning racial persecution. Within the parameters of the liberal handling of the wartime legacy, only marginal concessions were made: concessions that alleviated human suffering without fundamentally questioning the criteria for delineating the state’s community. Although Nazi criteria were clearly an anathema to liberal policy, a more imaginative handling of the Nazi legacy that took into account the distinct characteristics of this terror could have been more efficient and with less costs incurred by the victims. Extending the nation to include those who had settled in 106

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Belgium, independent o f their nationality, would have done more justice to the victims than reinstating the category “Jew.” The exclusion inherent to the nation-state, however, survived the war. It was not until the 1960s and 1970s that the state’s community was expanded to include the post-national citizen. At the same time the Jewish war experience was acknowledged as being distinct from those o f all other war victims. The Jewish war victims were no longer only victims by mere accident, but victims of an unprecedented plan to annihilate a whole “people.” Only in those decades did the unique and extremely brutal judeocide become a part of the European collective consciousness. The survivors in Belgium who struggled to start a new life after the war probably found some solace in this belated recognition.

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Bitter Homecoming: The Return and Reception o f Dutch and Stateless Jews in the Netherlands DIENKE HONDIUS More than fifty years after the liberation, Dutch Holocaust survivors and in particular their children are speaking up and speaking out on the shortcomings of the Dutch state and the non-Jews during and after the deportations. The anger o f Dutch Jews is something new in the Netherlands, where the Holocaust was usually remembered as a national and collective tragedy. In the 1980s and 1990s the silence was broken. Holocaust survivors were no longer simply seen and treated as victims, as people deserving of pity, but as eyewitnesses. In the 1990s came the call and the opportunity for restitution of Jewish properties: survivors were now declared entitled to compensation of material loss. The initiative for compensation, restitution and for acknowledgment of the harsh treatment did not come from the Dutch Jewish community, nor did it come from the Dutch authorities. As was frequently the case, the Dutch were more followers than initiators. It is a sign of emancipation, an expression of feeling sufficiently safe, when a small minority openly voices its anger. Yet, together with the anger, fear still exists in the Dutch Jewish communities. The fear of being known as Jewish remains a real phenomenon. I believe this fear is a late but direct effect of antisemitism that is palpable even today. How can such a primitive sentiment as anti-Jewish feeling continue to be influential so long after the liberation? This is an important question that has hardly been addressed and needs further research, both on a national and a comparative level. However, in this article I shall focus on Dutch antisemitism in its specific immediate post-liberation context.1 1

I am grateful to David Bankier for his comments on an earlier version of this text. This article is partially based on the translation, by David Colmer, of my book Terugkeer: Antisémitisme in Nederland rond de bevrijding, Hague 1998. I thank Shelly Shapiro, Steve Hess, Jack and Ina Polak for making this translation possible.

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D utch A ntisem itism : W hat it Is, a n d What it D oes Dutch antisemitism warrants a closer look. Before the Holocaust antisemitism was widespread, but it was mild and not a blind hatred. It was more the sense o f distance that non-Jews felt towards Jews, a difference, an otherness. This awareness of difference - “The Jews have a different religion, they do their daily things differently“ - had negative overtones: “You must be careful with Jews, especially with money, in trade.“ It is astonishing to realize that it did not take much more than that. In the circumstances of the Holocaust this form of antisemitism was sufficient; hate was not necessary, and passivity, resulting from the distance, was enough. I place this Dutch form of antisemitism against Daniel Goldhagen’s “eliminationist“ antisemitism - by no means dismissing his work since we need to know much more about the perpetrators and the bystanders - and also against Saul Friedländer’s “redemptive” antisemitism. In my opinion neither of these terms are the most appropriate for what we see in Holland.2 Antisemitism in the Netherlands was more a sense of non-Jewish superiority, and of self-evident Christian, liberal or socialist supremacy. Tony Kushner has written about the liberal mind.3 But I believe that this goes beyond the liberals, the Christians or the socialists; therefore I use the term non-Jewish feelings o f superiority. This state of mind resulted

2

3

Now published as Dienke Hondius, Return: Holocaust Survivors and Dutch Antisemitism, Westport CT, 2003. See also Dienke Hondius, “A Cold Reception. Holocaust Survivors in the Netherlands and their Return,” Patterns o f Prejudice, 28 (1994), pp. 47-67; and Dienke Hondius, “Welcome in Amsterdam? Return and reception of survivors: new research and findings,” in: Remembering fo r the Future, London, 2001. In 1999 I undertook new research on the city of Amsterdam, specifically Central Station as a reception and “categorization” center for returning survivors and many other groups in 1945. This was published as Dienke Hondius, “Welkom in Amsterdam? Aankomst en ontvangst van repatrianten in de hoofdstad in 1945,” in: Conny Kristel (ed.), Polderschouw, Amsterdam, 2002. An English summary of this new research is included in Hondius Return. A comparative study of Dutch and German antisemitism is lacking. An inspiring beginning for such a study is Eric A. Johnson, Nazi Terror: Gestapo, Jews and Ordinary Germans, New York, 2000. See for example, Tony Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, Oxford, 1994.

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in a profound neglect: the neglect o f Jewish needs, which led to denying Jewish identity, denying Jewish specificity, and overlooking the Jews. This was the case before, during and after the Holocaust. In my book Return: Holocaust Survivors and Dutch Anti-Semitism I call this the “chain reaction of exclusion.“ This chain of attitudes, which may have stemmed from good intentions on the part of non-Jews, ranged from (1) indignation and disapproval about what the Nazis were doing to the Jews, to (2) compassion and assistance for Jews; from (3) helping and rescuing Jews to (4) patronizing and arrogation of property; from (5) arrogating and appropriating Jews (I help you, so therefore you belong to me) to (6) denial of the Jews’ specificity, namely the denial of Jewish identity and Jewish interests. The bitter aspect of this chain reaction is that it derives from and is defended with good intentions based on the notion of non-discrimination. At a conference at Yad Vashem in May 2001, during the discussion on this type of antisemitism the French historian Henry Rousso aptly named it “antisémitisme d ’anticipation.”4 I regard this antisemitism as a patronizing attitude o f a government towards a minority in its society, determining what is good for the minority, and as such controlling the relations between the majority and the minority. This chain reaction does not exemplify a hate-filled aggressive antisemitism, but the effects for Jews were nonetheless very negative. Moreover, the position taken by the Dutch govemment-in-exile was supported by attitudes in resistance circles. The very groups that had made the greatest effort to help Jews in hiding and risked their lives for Jews - and whose brave and exceptional courage we indeed honor pleaded for a policy of radical non-differentiation after the liberation. They opposed any special help for Jewish survivors, and preferred not to mention Jews as a category if it could be avoided. A new social hierarchy was bom of World War II: the resistance at the top, collaborators at the bottom and in prison, and everyone else, including Jewish survivors, somewhere in between. This hierarchy was accepted widely and essentially has not changed since 1945. Most people - non-Jews and Jews alike - felt that those who fought in the 4

Henry Rousso, introduction to the discussion session on 24 May at the conference: The Return of the Jews to their countries of origin. Expectations and apprehensions, 1943-1947. Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, 22-24 May 2001.

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resistance deserved something extra at the time. By 1947 the Dutch former resistance organizations had succeeded in obtaining the Dutch government’s recognition for their own pension plan based on their own criteria. In contrast, Jewish survivors were not recognized as a category in need until the early 1970s. Today however, this rigid hierarchy is shifting, due partly to international trends towards more recognition of the impact of the Holocaust, and partly to a generation effect: i.e., the children of Jews are Jews, the children of resistance fighters are not resistance fighters. The topic o f the immediate post-war period was not researched thoroughly until the 1980s. In the [Netherlands, 1945 was a year of crisis. After five years of German occupation during which the vast majority of Dutch Jews were deported and killed, the German troops left. Now the Dutch - Jews and non-Jews - were among themselves again and had to come to terms with what had happened. The period after the liberation was one of intense uncertainty about the future. Especially in the summer of 1945, many people were still waiting for information about family members and were hoping for the return of more survivors. The national and local governments were installed once again and had to win the population’s respect. Rigorous procedures of internal control were carried out with the aim of removing former Nazi collaborators from office. Former resistance groups were involved in this early intelligence work, reporting about who had been “right” (goed) and who “wrong” (fout) during the war. This process resulted in a new social hierarchy in post-war Dutch society. Based on an inventory o f memoirs, diaries, interviews and other personal documents of Jewish survivors, I reached the conclusion that many o f the surviving Jews who returned from the concentration camps or from hiding in summer 1945 encountered negative reactions from the Dutch non-Jewish population. For most survivors these negative reactions were totally unexpected and therefore all the more shocking. This is not to say that all reactions of non-Jews can be considered antisemitic; far from it, by far the most frequent reaction was indifference, lack of understanding and lack of knowledge about what had happened in the camps, with people quickly shrugging off feelings of uneasiness when confronted with returning Jews. I have categorized the reactions into the following themes: • bureaucracy, red tape, coldness 111

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• antisemitic prejudice • lack of understanding and disbelief • warnings to the Jews that they should know their place, be more modest and grateful to non-Jews • open, conscious or aggressive antisemitism • envy • pleas for institutional antisemitism and discrimination against Jews in the labor market • materialism and self-interest regarding the return of Jewish possessions. In my inventory, less than half the cases warrant the term antisemitism; the rest do not. However, the very existence of the phenomenon at all is sufficiently important to suggest that there was a substantial problem. The extent of these feelings is impossible to measure, but the negative reactions partly explain the silence among survivors in the Netherlands after 1945. The lack o f understanding and the blunt reactions had silencing effects too. The Netherlands were liberated in autumn 1944, beginning with the southern provinces. The Dutch govemment-in-exile in London had been preparing for the repatriation of its citizens. The dominant Dutch policy that there be no distinction between various categories of repatriates and survivors was not a new, but a consistent policy from the 1930s onwards. The same policy was followed with regard to German and Austrian Jewish refugees trying to enter the Netherlands in the 1930s: no specific recognition of the refugees, and any help for Jewish refugees was regarded as the duty of Dutch Jews. The same idea dominated Dutch policy during the deportations: there was never any special help for the deported Jews, and the govemment-in-exile never made the persecutions of the Jews a specific point for discussion at their cabinet meetings. During the preparations for the repatriation, as well as during the actual return and reception of survivors, the same idea was upheld. The Dutch government’s primary aim was an orderly restoration of the pre-war situation; it feared chaos. As far as the government was concerned, Jews were not recognized as a category of survivors: there were only Dutch nationals and non-Dutch nationals. As a result of this policy, surviving stateless Jews fell between the categories. They were regarded and treated as Germans and as collaborators, for example, at various border stations and repatriation 112

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centers in the south and the east of the country. Stateless Jewish survivors returning from Bergen-Belsen via Tröbitz in June 1945 were incarcerated together with arrested Dutch collaborators (National Socialists and Dutch SS members) in the town of Vilt, near Maastricht. When I first found the archives of this specific case, I regarded it as extreme and exceptional, but I later found several more examples of the same harsh treatment of stateless survivors in other locations.

F oreign O bservers ' Im pressions o f the N etherlands, 1945-1946 “ Everything we told the people up here about the outside world was new to them.”5 (Laura Maigolis) In their reports, British and American aid workers expressed surprise at how little the newly liberated Dutch people knew about the persecution o f European Jews. The largest Jewish aid organization, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, known as the Joint or the JDC, began supporting the Jewish Coordination Committee in Eindhoven soon after the liberation of the southern Netherlands. This was primarily emergency relief intended to meet the most pressing needs such as housing, food and clothing. At the same time, the JDC swiftly became involved in efforts to reestablish Jewish community work and aid Jewish children in hiding. The JDC representatives’ reports on the Netherlands make fascinating reading. They are the observations of outsiders who rapidly, usually in just a few days, assessed the situation and then made far-ieaching decisions on financial support based on these assessments. The reports I have found cover the period April 1945 through April 1946. Laura Margolis was the JDC representative in Belgium and the Netherlands in April 1945. After her first visit to the Netherlands - 20 to 22 April 1945 - she returned to Brussels and wrote a report for JDC headquarters in New York:

5

Laura Margolis, Report on Visit to Holland, 20-22 April 1945, p. 6. JDC Brussels. JDC Archives, New York. 485, Holland Reports.

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General impressions: There is no doubt that Holland is one of the most devastated countries in Europe. The shops are empty, food is scanty, the people look ill, depressed and badly dressed. I had the impression that even members of our own committee hadn’t had enough to eat, and Mrs. Verway [Hilda Verwey-Jonker; D.H.] looks half starved. There aren’t many phones working, there is no gas, no transportation, and electricity is rationed. The night I visited Mrs. Verway, we sat in the dark until I had to take some notes and then she felt justified in turning on the light. The people coming out of hiding are completely disoriented, in addition to being nervous and bewildered. I spoke to a young Jewish girl of eighteen working at the SHAEF Mission in Eindhoven. She had only come out of hiding recently. She had seen her parents deported, but had only just heard o f the horrors of the gas chambers and mass murders. Until then she had thought her people might still be in Poland. She asked me if all she heard about the atrocities could possibly be true. This is only one example. Everything we told the people up here about the outside world was new to them. These people have suffered, and it makes one wonder how able they are to really work and act on behalf of others.6

Margolis had visited Eindhoven, to which many repatriates were returning and the situation was changing from hour to hour. She produced a summary of the number o f known Jewish returnees at that time. In April the Jewish Coordination Committee had counted 2,460 in the three southern provinces, mostly in Brabant and Limburg.7 During this visit Margolis heard of stateless Jews encountering problems on their return: “In some cities, such as Maastricht, the stateless have been refused public aid.” After her visit she decided that a “search bureau” should be set up by her colleague Linowell, who already had experience in this work in France. Margolis was pessimistic about the management o f the Jewish Coordination Committee as there was no clear leader. From her perspective, the most likely candidate was someone she called Mr. Root - presumably S. Roet. A former trustee of the Jewish Boys’ Orphanage in Amsterdam, he had also been financial head of the Jewish Council’s Department for Aid to Departees.8 In October 1944 he had founded the Committee for Jewish Interests in Maastricht.9 Unfortunately Roet had 6 7 8 9

Ibid. Margolis, report April 1945, p. 1. See I. Lipschits, “T s e d a k a E e n halve eeuw Joods Maatschappelijk Werk in Nederland, Zutphen 1997, pp. 55, 57, 62 fF. Mireille Berman, Herstel en Verlies. De reconstructie van het Nederlands Israëlietisch Kerkgenootschap, Ph.D. thesis, Amsterdam University, 1995, p. 21.

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just suffered a heart attack and was bedridden. Margolis was less positive about Abraham de Jong, who was already very active in helping Jewish children in the south: “A kindly and sincere person, but he is inflexible and limited and definitely not a leader for a committee.” 10 “C om plete hysteria”

Margolis was most concerned about the Jewish orphans. She consulted in depth with Verwey-Jonker, who had set up a home for children in Eindhoven. Verwey-Jonker wanted to continue operating this home until there was more clarity about the children's parents. De Jong opposed this and argued that a new home for Jewish children should be established under Jewish leadership. However, he failed to convince Margolis who was very critical of the atmosphere surrounding the Jewish orphans in Eindhoven: ‘‘The attitude one encounters everywhere is one of complete hysteria, with no recognition of realities (...) and with little respect for the personality and will either of the child or what his parents might have wanted for him.” 11 Margolis quizzed Verwey-Jonker on the issue, particularly about the rumor that the children had been baptized. When this turned out not to be the case - Verwey-Jonker reported that only ten of the eight hundred children under guardianship had been baptized, and the bishop had officially banned further baptisms - the JDC decided to provide provisional financial support for Verwey-Jonker’s home. By May and June 1945 repatriation was in full swing. Four JDC reports covering June 1945 are extant, all emphasizing major shortages of clothing, food, transport and fuel. Many people were still uncertain about the fate of their families. Leonard Cohen, representing both the Central British Fund and the JDC, discussed this issue in Amsterdam on 20 May 1945 with David de Miranda o f the Sephardic community and the pediatrician Prof, van Creveld o f the Ashkenazi community.12 10 Margolis, report April 194S, op. cit., p. S. 11 Ibid., p. 3. 12 Lipschits reports that Van Creveld became the chairman of a foundation that would provisionally administer all Jewish organizations: this was first called the Stichting Joodsch Herstel, later the Stichting Joodsche Gemeenschap, Lipschits, “Tsedaka,” p. 72.

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In that same week a decision was made to reopen the Sephardic hospital: “[Van Creveld] was very concerned to know what had happened to the twenty-five thousand Dutch children who had been deported. Where had they been sent to? Were they in Poland?” 13 In the first week of June many Jews arrived at Amsterdam’s Central Station. A delegation of the JDC and the Jewish Relief Unit was in the city at the time. Sadie Rinka Imma de Miranda, one o f the delegates, reported on her experiences in Amsterdam on 3 June 1945: Driving through the town, displaying our very prominent Magen David, we were hailed, halted and barricaded and a volley of questions was fired at the truck as it made its way laboriously through the city.... Questions which we were unfortunately not always in a position to answer... Where could we obtain clothes? How do we apply for kosher food? What of our property? Who will give money? When is the Joint coming? And finally, who, if anybody, was supervising Jewish affairs in Amsterdam...14

This report places a heavy emphasis on the squabbling and tensions between Jewish organizations in Amsterdam. Every Jew in Amsterdam, prominent or otherwise, was a committee unto himself; each impressed with their personal capabilities, none doing very much about the immediate problem of returning Jewish repatriates who were daily arriving at the Central Station from the German and Polish camps.15

“Inadequate and shortsighted”

Hoping to set an example, the Jewish Relief Unit delegation hurried to Central Station after hearing that a train with repatriates had arrived.16

13 Letter to Laura Margolis, 2 June 194S, to JDC headquarters New York, with attached report by Leonard Cohen of the Central British Fund, visit to Rotterdam, Utrecht and Amsterdam on 20 May 1945. 14 Report on Amsterdam Jewry, June 1945, by Sadie Rinka Imma de Miranda, Jewish Relief Unit, 6-8-1945, p. 1. JDC Archives, Holland Reports, 1945. 15 Report on Amsterdam Jewry, Jewish Relief Unit, 8 June 1945, p. 1. 16 It is questionable how much material aid the Jewish Relief Unit really had to distribute. The 1945 annual report of the Jewish Coordination Committee states that the Jewish Relief Unit, also the Jewish Committee for Relief Abroad, had contributed NLG 533.65 that year; this was very minor in comparison to the Joint’s contribution of NLG 424,780.88. Lipschits, “Tsedaka,” p. 73.

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The reception of these repatriates, under the direction o f “Welkom Amsterdam,” a voluntary organization, was hardly disorganized... it was merely inadequate and shortsighted. All categories were treated equally and forced labor deportees who had only been away six months and Jews who had been in camps for years suffered the same questions, when it appeared quite obvious that their mental and physical condition and the extent of their belongings and contacts in Amsterdam could never be compared.17

Despite this “equal” treatment, some arrivals managed to obtain extra assistance. We never discovered which set of people received financial help because there were no hard and fast rules. It appeared that any individual who summoned the energy or courage to ask was handed a few guilders, but the less insistent people were ignored. No clothing was distributed, and a Jewish boy wearing an SS uniform was a common and revolting sight.18

The Jewish Relief Unit decided that a reception center and an extra hostel were urgently needed and met the next day with representatives of Jewish organizations. Before approaching the head of Volksherstel for assistance, however, it was necessary to pacify the Jewish organizations' bickering representatives; Dr. Pereira, Dr. de Miranda, Mr. and Mrs. Vreedenburg and Mr. Abrahams are mentioned by name. “The early indications were not entirely friendly and at one point we all but refereed a fight.” 19 “T hose people w ho tactlessly insist on Jew ish segregation”

The purpose of meeting with Volksherstel was to obtain a building to use as a reception center for Jewish repatriates. It emerged that earlier attempts to convince Volksherstel to allocate premises to a Jewish organization had failed because Volksherstel refused to consider the provision of separate aid for Jews. The report’s authors accuse the Jewish representatives who had preceded them of failing to approach this issue tactically: Whether we approve or not, the fact remains that the intention to treat all repatriates on an equal basis is an intention which originates in the policy of the Netherlands Military Government, and that those people who tactlessly insist on 17 Report on Amsterdam Jewry, Jewish Relief Unit, 8 June 194S, p. 1. 18 Idem, p. 1. 19 Idem, p. 2.

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Jewish segregation without diplomatically explaining their insistence, will meet blank walls all the way.20

Rather than again requesting specific aid for Jews, the Jewish Relief Unit proposed asking for general aid and improvements to benefit all repatriates, including Jews. They presented a plan for improved and more efficient reception of all repatriates. As part of this plan, they proposed that the existing and future reception centers could cater for different categories of repatriates. For instance, one building could be earmarked for people, such as forced laborers, who only needed temporary accommodation to rest before continuing on to family or friends. Another building could function as a hospital, while another could provide semi-permanent accommodation for those who had lost all their contacts in Amsterdam - and here the Jewish Relief Unit clearly had the Jews in mind: We made practical not religious distinctions and as such, our plan was welcomed and it is to be acted upon accordingly. Furniture and equipment are our present headache. [...] With luck the building will be ready in two or three days. Meanwhile the municipal authorities have given permission for a special Jewish desk to be set up in the Central Station, which is to be the link between the incoming transports and the hostel.21

Later documents show that progress had indeed been made. In 1945 and 1946 the Jewish Coordination Committee (JCC) was allocated a number of buildings that allowed for a reception center for repatriates, a child welfare office, a warehouse, a garage and an office. In August the head office, the registration office and the relief unit were located at 18 Johannes Vermeerstraat, the child welfare office was at 22 Gabriel Metsustraat, and a warehouse was opened at 13 Museumplein. The JCC rented tables and chairs, and had several typewriters, three cars and a truck at its disposal. Goods were distributed from both the Johannes Vermeerstraat and Museumplein offices, and included second-hand clothing, shoes and food parcels. By late August, four hundred and fifty people had received goods, mainly clothing. The warehouse on Museumplein was mostly used for household items: pots and pans, kitchen utensils, blankets, cupboards and other small items. Rather than being 20 Idem, p. 3. 21 Idem, pp. 3-4.

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distributed to individuals, these were provided to the larger reception centers and homes.22 “The desire to em igrate”

The most detailed report in the JDC archives is dated 1 October 1945 and was written by Harry Viteles. It is well-documented and based on extensive research.2324Viteles sketches the situation in the Netherlands in fairly gloomy terms. He notes that the areas o f greatest need are housing, repair of the railroad system, and shortages of coal and other fuel, food and clothing. Pessimism about the future is widespread among all classes and there is a growing belief that there are no hopes for a complete psychological and moral recovery by the people. Senior government officials for instance have expressed their intention to emigrate. Jews who have been living for centuries in the Netherlands also desire to emigrate, because they do not want to be second class citizens de facto?*

Emigration plans were directly related to the desperate situation at that moment. August and September brought definite news of the deaths of many Jews, and the most keenly felt loss was that of family members, which affected everyone. In addition, the atmosphere within the Jewish organizations was strongly tainted by the question of whether people had been involved with the Jewish Council during the war, and to what degree. At the same time the extent to which money and goods had been expropriated, including houses and their contents, became clear to most Jews. Viteles noted that at the start of autumn 1945 there were still seven reception centers for homeless people, operated by Volksherstel and home to approximately a thousand people, mostly Jews. The provision of practical emergency relief would soon pass into the hands o f a new distribution organization, HAARK. Meanwhile, the JDC

22 Report concerning the JCC (Jewish Coordination Committee) Amsterdam, Johannes Vermeerstraat 18, 30 August 1945. Signed J. Voet., JDC Archives, Holland Reports. Voet was the Joint’s Dutch representative from 1947 to 1948. Lipschits, “Tsedaka,” p. 446. 23 Summary of Findings Attached to Report on the Netherlands. Submitted by Harry Viteles, 1 October 1945, JDC Archives, Holland Reports. 24 Harry Viteles, report 1 October 1945, p. 2.

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continued to support the Jewish community work of the Jewish Coordination Committee and various other Jewish groups. “The best o f the Jew s and o f Jew ish life has been destroyed”

The composition of the Jewish segment of the population had changed drastically. Viteles reported that everyone told him that relative to their numbers many more poor Jews had been murdered: It is the general opinion [...] that the best of the Jews and of Jewish life has been destroyed. [...] Fewer than 100 of 2,500 Jewish diamond workers and fewer than 100 o f 2,000 Jewish artisans of Amsterdam are alive. On the other hand 80 of the 160 Jewish doctors, and 80 of 140 Jewish lawyers survived.25

The survivors were unsure whether there would be enough work for so many highly educated people within the now reduced Jewish community and were afraid that competition for work outside the community might stimulate anti-Jewish sentiments. In 1989, historian Johannes Houwink ten Cate calculated that rather than social class, age was the primary indicator for mortality, with higher death rates among younger (up to age 16) and older Jews. These figures were, however, unavailable in 1945. Here our primary interest is the impression that evidently existed after liberation: many people were convinced, or able to be easily convinced, that fewer poor Jews survived than wealthy Jews.26 This conviction was very persistent. The Dutch Jewish historian Jacob Presser took the same position in his book about the destruction of Dutch Jewry, Ondergang, published in 1965. It must have felt very difficult and painful for the survivors to hear this frequently repeated theory. Implicitly it amounted to claiming that the survivors were somehow “inferior” to those who had not survived. The stateless Jew s: caught betw een A nti-Jew ish and A nti-G erm an feelings

According to Viteles’s report there were still considerable tensions between German Jews and Dutch Jews in 1945. He writes that the 25 Harry Viteles, report 1 October 1945, p. 4. 26 Johannes Houwink ten Cate, “Het jongere deel. Demografische en sociale kenmerken van het jodendom in Nederland tijdens de vervolging,” Jaarboek van het Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie ’40-'45, 1 (1989), pp. 9-66.

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Dutch Jews were convinced that the German Jews were primarily to blame for the increased antisemitism, particularly as the administrative and general staff of the Jewish Council had included a number of German Jews. Almost all German Jews had become stateless, and Viteles believed that the negative attitude to the stateless Jews was fueled not only by ignorant Dutch officials but also by Dutch Jews: “Government officials and others stated that not only non-Jewish Netherlanders, but also Jewish Netherlanders are pressing for the expulsion of the Stateless, nearly all Germans.”27 Explaining increased antisemitism Viteles carefully considered the increased antisemitism in the summer o f 1945. He discussed the issue with many Jews and non-Jews and discovered a general agreement that there was “more” antisemitism. He presented a number o f explanations and reasons that were current at that time in the Netherlands. Viteles considered the following explanations to be plausible:28 • People who helped those in hiding were not pro-Jewish, but chiefly anti-German. Since many non-Jewish Dutchmen saw all Jews as Germans, anti-German feelings could readily become anti-Jewish feelings. • A considerable number of “helpers” had made money from their actions, despite the danger involved. • Non-Jews were angry about the pressure for the return of Jewish possessions. • There was a latent fear o f competition, in both the business world and among doctors and lawyers. • Non-Jews were extremely displeased about their Jewish colleagues’ attempts to regain their former clients. The explanation based on competition and jealousy is consistent with some of the survivors’ testimonies that I found. Again, this is a case of what Evelien Gans has called “goyish envy.”29

27 Harry Viteles, report 1 October 1945, p. 5. 28 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 29 Evelien Gans, Goyse nijd en joods narcisme. De verhouding tussen joden en niet­ joden in Nederland, Amsterdam, 1994.

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In addition to these plausible explanations, Viteles also listed several rumors that he heard repeatedly but considered much less believable, and for which he was unable to find any confirmation. Among these were: • Nine out of ten Jews in hiding who were arrested had reputedly betrayed the names of their helpers. • The Military Government was supposedly under Jewish com­ mand. • Protestants and Catholics resented Jewish resistance to their proselytizing. These summaries reflect the general concern about antisemitism; it was discussed widely and explanations were sought avidly. This concern had been absent from earlier reports, most probably because until June 1945 the recovery of material was considered most urgent. It is unclear when exactly this concern began to wane, but the JDC report o f late April 1946 is remarkably mild in its tone. In September 1945 Gertrude D. Pinsky was appointed as the first JDC representative in the Netherlands (her predecessor, Laura Margolis, had been based in Brussels). Pinksy died in an airplane crash in Prague in March 1946 after only six months on the job.30 In her last report on the Netherlands, published in April 1946 together with a report by W. Zielenziger o f the JDC office in Holland, Pinsky was optimistic about the progress that had been made: There has been increasing employment in Holland. The problems of the Jewish population are illness, old age, and lack of trained people due to years of internment. There is no discrimination in employment. Permits for employees must be secured by the employers in Holland. There have been no refusals for work permits on the basis of Stateless, which have come to my attention.31

Zielenziger’s report, dated 29 April 1946, is also markedly optimistic: “Since the liberation, reconstruction has progressed. In the spring of 1946, the condition of Holland and Belgium may be considered as the

30 Lipschits, “Tsedaka,” p. 416, notes that Pinsky was much loved in the Netherlands. See NIW, in memoriam by S. Kleerekoper, 15 March 1946. 31 Gertrude D. Pinsky, JDC Archives, Holland reports, 1946, undated, presumably March 1946, p. 6.

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most favorable among the liberated countries.”32 According to the report the problems of stateless Jews had been resolved and they were no longer discriminated against: “The obtaining of work permits is at the present time in some respects easier than it was before the war.”33 R evival o f antisem itism

In the spring of 1946 there were still manifold economic problems. The return of Jewish-owned buildings seized during the occupation was progressing. O f the unresolved problems, one of the most pressing was the restitution of rights: the return of money, goods, jewelry, shares and stocks transferred to the Lippmann-Rosenthal Bank, and insurance premiums confiscated by the Nazis. Last but not least, there was also the problem of housing and whether or not Jews should be able to reclaim their apartments. These questions had not been specifically regulated and the related issues continued to play a role for decades to come. In the light of the reactions of survivors, the press and foreign observers, one can conclude that there was widespread concern about antisemitism in the Netherlands in 1945. Journalists wrote of the issue in various newspapers and magazines. The establishment of the study group “Antisemitic Attitudes in the Netherlands?” was another sign of this concern. Further expressions were the pamphlet by J.W. Matthijssen, Het antisémitisme in na-oorlogstijd (Postwar antisemiti­ sm) and H.W.J. Sannes’s book Onze Joden en Duitsland's greep naar de wereldmacht (Our Jews and Germany’s Bid for World Power). To my knowledge the issue never reached the stage o f official consideration by government bodies. With the exception of the excesses in the treatment of Jewish repatriates in south Limburg, when protests from resistance circles and others led to rapid action, the examples described before were so individual and intangible that it is unlikely that national policy decisions could have significantly altered them.

32 American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Holland, 29 April 1946: Conditions in Holland, report presumably by Mr. Zielenziger, JDC Holland, with shared responsibility with the deceased Gertrude D. Pinsky. p. 1., JDC Archives. 33 Idem, p. 1.

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Prime Minister Gerbrandy responded only once. Visiting Eindhoven on 13 April 1945, he was asked about his position on “antisemitism in the south.“ He replied: “That is impermissible. I cannot understand someone being an antisémite. It is unchristian, our Jews have suffered most horribly.”34 Perhaps we can see this reaction as the dawn of the post-war period, when the open expression of antisemitism rapidly became a taboo that was rarely broken. As a result the subject was discussed as little as possible. There are virtually no examples o f the authorities extending simple moral support for the handful of Jewish survivors. Actions like the government expressly welcoming the repatriates or calling upon the population to assist them with their return could have led to more positive individual experiences. Heroes are more popular than victims. As several recent studies have shown, the Netherlands was not the only country where this was so. International comparative research into this phenomenon is still in its infancy, although Ido de Haan has produced a good summary (1997).35 French philosopher Alain Finkielkraut observed: “In France, too, those who are called ‘les déportés raciaux’ in order to differentiate them from the resistance fighters were received with a certain degree of embarrassment.”36 According to Finkielkraut, the former members of the resistance wished to distinguish themselves from the Jewish survivors. They emphasized that they were deported because of their deeds, not because o f what they happened to be. He quotes Auschwitz survivor Simone Veil: “We only had to start to tell our story and we

34 See Ido de Haan, Na de ondergang: De herinnering aan de Jodenvervolging in Nederland 1945-1995, Hague, 1997, Ch. 6. See also: Pieter Lagrou, “Victims of Genocide and National Memory: Belgium, France and the Netherlands, 19451965,” Past & Present, 154 (1997), pp. 181-222. 35 Ido de Haan, Na de ondergang; See also Pieter Lagrou, The Politics of Memory. Resistance as a Collective Myth in Postwar France, Belgium and the Netherlands, 1945-1965. Paper at the conference: Memory and the Second World War in International Perspective, Amsterdam, RIOD, April 1995. Marie-Anne MatardBonucci and Edouard Lynch (eds.), La libération des camps et le retour des déportés, Brussels, 1995. 36 Alain Finkielkraut, La mémoire vaine. Du crime contre l ’humanité, Paris, 1989, p. 36.

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would be interrupted, like excited, overactive children being cut short by parents burdened by ‘real’ worries.”37 Many former political prisoners were also disappointed on their return by the sluggishness of denazification and the prosecution of collaborators. Because of their Communist sympathies, many left-wing resistance fighters were seen as enemies rather than heroes in the early post-war period. This was a cause of great bittemess. Those who had sheltered Jews in their homes also experienced the liberation with mixed feelings. Their joy was often tempered by sorrow at having failed to rescue all those in hiding. The children of these “helpers” were often profoundly influenced after the war by these events.38 In a collection of interviews with Dutch men and women who had helped people in hiding and later emigrated to Canada, many respondents described the period immediately following the liberation as a time of disillusionment and depression. They were often keenly disappointed by the reactions o f neighbors and acquaintances, especially in rural environments (the majority came from Friesland). It was not easy to end a secret life and become more open.39 Jan Gies, who took care of Jews in hiding in Amsterdam, described this phenomenon: People who looked after those in hiding also had experienced a particular kind of life. They might have become somewhat withdrawn. They weren’t as free to express themselves. I can imagine it. Because it is, well, actually a terrible life in such a small community. Having to be silent about those things, and cope with them, and keep everyone at arm’s length - while acting as if everything is normal...40

No research has been conducted in the Netherlands comparing the reactions of the different groups - those that were involved in the 37 Ibid., p. 39. 38 See Anke Manschot, “Mijn vader moest zo nodig joodse kinderen redden,” ICODO Info, 3/4 (1995), pp. 77-80. 39 André Stein, Quiet Heroes. True Stories o f the Rescue o f Jews by Christians in Nazi-Occupied Holland, Toronto, 1988. 40 Interview with Jan Gies, 20 December 1989. Miep and Jan Gies took care of eight hidden Jews for more than two years, including the Frank family, on Prinsengracht in Amsterdam. After the liberation they took Otto Frank, the only survivor of his family, into their own home, where he lived until his second marriage in 1953. See: Miep Gies, Herinneringen aan Anne Frank, Amsterdam, 1987.

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persecution, and the resistance. In a pioneering study that compared post-war reactions to the persecution of the Jews in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, Belgian historian Pieter Lagrou shows that the return of Jews to France, specifically Paris and Toulouse, was accompanied by a resurgence of antisemitism and even anti-Jewish demonstrations that erupted when Jewish survivors tried to regain their apartments and other possessions. According to Lagrou, there was no awareness in 1945 that the experiences of Jews during the deportations had been completely different to those of other people. Only in recent decades, since the 1980s, has a “reversal of memories” occurred in which the balance of the memories of resistance on one side, and persecution on the other, tipped in favor o f the memories of the persecution of the Jews. In Belgium and France, according to Lagrou, this reversal has aroused significant frustration in the circles o f the former “patriotic” resistance.41 Silence and anger

In Jewish families and organizations there was mourning and silence, but also intense anger about what had happened. In the post-war social order, Dutch Jews had difficulty finding a voice and a place of respect, partly because they were mainly regarded as ‘passive’ survivors. This was not the case with resistance workers. The former resistance workers - with the exception of the communists, who were silenced soon after 1945-46 - gained respect based on their wartime activities and were therefore often regarded as heroes. The balance o f attention for and recognition of victims of persecution on the one hand, and resistance fighters on the other, remained with the latter until the 1980s. The emancipation of the second and third generation of Jews in the Netherlands, the recognition of survivors as eyewitnesses and primary sources o f information rather than as traumatized patients, and international developments that increased the general ‘weight’ o f the history and memory of the Shoah, have contributed to the shift o f this balance toward the victims and survivors of the persecution. For the

41 Lagrou, “Victims of Genocide and National Memory,” pp. 184-85. idem, The Legacy o f Nazi Occupation. Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in Western Europe, 1945-1965, Cambridge, 2000.

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first time since 1945, there is more - albeit still hesitant - room for anger about the basic facts of the Holocaust in the Netherlands: namely, the high percentage of victims, the lack of adequate help and assistance to Jews, the inadequate and harsh reception o f survivors at the border stations and within Dutch cities and provinces, etc. There was a short revival of antisemitism in the Netherlands around the liberation. I have analyzed various responses o f non-Jews towards Jewish survivors and found that stateless Jews in particular were treated harshly. The Dutch government refused special help to Jewish survivors, preferring only to distinguish between Dutch and non-Dutch citizens. Government policy, the massive loss and mourning, and the process of the formation of a new social hierarchy reinforced each other, and together these developments and facts had a strong silencing effect on what was left of the Jewish communities in the Netherlands. Dutch antisemitism of long standing continued to exist, as did the idea that Jews were “different” to non-Jews. These factors were evidently enough to allow the deportations to succeed; it was not necessary that the entire population be antisemitic. The deportations could proceed smoothly as long as the local population did not cause too much commotion, did not become too concerned or involved, and did not organize active resistance to prevent them. The Netherlands satisfied these conditions. The docile atmosphere was definitely not the only reason for the very high death rate of 75-80 percent of the Jewish community. Rather, the major factors were the effective and wellorganized SS occupying forces, the availability of sufficient trains at the crucial phase of the deportations, and the geography of the Netherlands that favored neither flight nor going into hiding. Towards the end of the occupation, a number o f underground newspapers noted a rise in antisemitism. They attributed this to the isolation of the Jews, which had encouraged non-Jews to perceive Jews as foreign and different. Tensions between Jews in hiding and their helpers were cited as another possible factor. Apart from merely touching on this subject, the underground press did not go on to consider either the persecution of the Jews or antisemitism in detail. The Dutch government did not regard the persecution of Jews as an important issue. Aid to deportees was sluggish and seen as a task for Jewish organizations. When planning the repatriation, the government answered aid requests from Jewish organizations by formulating its 127

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policy intentions regarding Jewish repatriates. Essential to this policy was that no distinction should be made between Jews and non-Jews. Although it is difficult to trace the precise motivation for this decision, my impression is that it was not by definition based on principle. A factor of equal significance was that the authorities did not see the urgency of these aid measures and preferred to postpone decision­ making; they would take care of it once the country was liberated. The policy of non-distinction between Jews and non-Jews was applied in practice, and as a result Jews are not represented as a separate category in the government archives on the repatriation. Inasmuch as preparations for the repatriation o f the deported Jews were made, all government estimates of the number of Jewish repatriates were far too high. Considering these inflated estimates, it would be logical to expect that the Repatriation Service would have had no difficulties in coping with the five thousand Jewish survivors of the concentration camps. I found nothing in the archives to contradict this expectation: the repatriation of the Jewish survivors did not present the various governmental bodies with any major surprises or difficulties. The only “Jewish question,” named as such in the archives o f the Military Government, is the sad case of a group of stateless German Jews who were interned in Limburg. The government considered itself responsible for the repatriation of all Dutch citizens. Specific aid for Jewish deportees was seen as the responsibility of other Jews, such as local committees of Dutch Jews who had managed to avoid deportation. There are no indications that this position was either reviewed or questioned during the period of repatriation before and after the liberation. Government policy for the Jewish community shows remarkable continuity: a continuing rejection of responsibility for “separate” categories of Dutch citizens and a continuing attitude of “non­ involvement.” The main consequence o f this policy was that returning Jews were not considered a separate category. They were not registered as Jews at the border and, in principle, no separate reception centers or camps were provided for them. They had no special rights to extra assistance in the form of money, housing, clothing or food. It was up to Jewish organizations, particularly the Jewish Coordination Commis­ sion, to establish local sections and provide practical relief financed by international Jewish organizations such as the JDC. 128

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For the Dutch authorities and the Military Government, everyone was equal, including the youths and men returning from workplaces in Germany, people who had been arrested as members of the resistance, and the Jewish survivors of camps like Bergen-Belsen and Auschwitz. In reality, however, the worlds these groups had been removed from and returned to were very different. The Jews were incomparably worse off. Furthermore, many o f them also encountered antisemitic reactions. The Dutch government was later sharply criticized for this position. The Jews felt abandoned and denied the recognition they deserved as victims o f persecution and antisemitism. Some commentators have labeled the government’s refusal to recognize the exceptional suffering o f the Jews as a group as antisemitism in itself. Without denying that there were also cases o f government bodies and representatives expressing antisemitism, I assert that the government as a whole cannot be accused o f antisemitic policies or attitudes. I do, however, see a distressing failure to recognize the suffering o f the Jewish section of the population and a consistent denial of governmental responsibility. Nonetheless, there is a danger in drawing these kinds of conclusions about the past. Clearly, opinions about a government’s responsibility for the well-being of its citizens have changed considerably in the Netherlands since 1945. The moment o f liberation was perceived very differently by Jews and non-Jews, with the Jewish camp survivors at one end of the spectrum and non-Jews who experienced the liberation at home in the Netherlands at the other. For the survivors of the concentration camps, liberation was a drawn-out event: first the realization that the guards had left; then weeks of waiting for transport and recovering from malnutrition, disease and exhaustion; and finally, bizarre journeys home across Europe, sometimes lasting months. There was a remarkable difference in survivors’ contact with Americans and with Russians. Specific research into this subject would be interesting. It seems that the Russians were better able to understand the world o f the Jewish camp survivors. Rather than await develop­ ments, many survivors began their journey back from Eastern Europe on their own. Encounters with Dutch officials were extremely rare. The Dutch Repatriation Service was not actually involved in the liberation of the Polish camps and the repatriation of their survivors. In Germany 129

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some survivors of Theresienstadt and Bergen-Belsen occasionally encountered representatives of the Dutch government, but this too was exceptional. In the Netherlands the Military Government established a wellorganized Border Guard, dividing the frontier into eight sections. Most repatriates crossed the border in Gelderland, north Brabant or Limburg, and repatriation peaked in the months o f April, May and June 1945. Schools, monasteries, convents and homes all over the southern provinces were requisitioned to provide for the repatriates. Maastricht and Eindhoven were the cities through which the majority o f the repatriates returned. Most Jewish camp survivors were profoundly disappointed on their return to the Netherlands. Procedures at border crossings and repatriation centers were typically formalistic, with an emphasis on registration, checks and medical examinations (often leading to temporary quarantine). There was no hint of a welcoming reception or heartfelt interest. Many nurses and volunteers did what they could, nuns helped in the requisitioned convents, and some friendly neighbors returned all the goods they had been given for safekeeping, but the negative and disappointing experiences far outweighed these positive encounters. The first post-liberation contacts between Jews and non-Jews were characterized by a lack of understanding, and the problem was exacerbated by an upsurge of antisemitism in the summer of 1945. Antisemitic prejudices were regularly voiced, along with related fears that “the Jews: would take power” (or jobs, or the government, etc.). There were calls for anti-Jewish discrimination in the labor market, and more intense, aggressive antisemitic remarks and abuse were heard. Lastly, there were a number of warnings to “the Jews” that they should be grateful and modest and not overstep the mark in post-war Netherlands. Despite this generally negative atmosphere, many o f the experiences listed above were not directly related to antisemitism and many o f the negative reactions of non-Jews cannot justly be labeled antisemitic. The tragic stories of painstaking negotiations for the return of possessions given to non-Jews for safekeeping can be more rightly seen as examples of pure selfishness or callous materialism. Various other reactions fall under the heading of envy. 130

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I refer to “an upsurge o f antisemitism“ because there was a definite increase, but this increase was, in my opinion, temporary and eventually the number o f expressions o f antisemitism declined. The word upsurge also implies a degree of continuity in the relationship between Jews and non-Jews. In the Netherlands, this relationship is characterized by the presence of a generally latent, relatively mild form o f antisemitism within a society that is otherwise fairly tolerant - albeit somewhat indifferent - to its Jewish citizens. At the same time, widely held anti-Jewish prejudices were an ongoing reality in Dutch society both before and throughout the 1930s. This situation or atmosphere could explain the lack of concern about and solidarity with Jewish refugees, victims of persecution, and returnees. I believe that it is correct to speak of continuity: the 1940-1945 occupation did not change this atmosphere or the attitude of the nonJewish majority - or, at least, no change was apparent immediately after the country’s liberation in May 1945. Perhaps it was this continuity that was so shocking for Jewish returnees. After all, for them the war represented a breach in their existence. No matter how “integrated“ many o f them were in the 1930s, no matter how few had defined themselves as Jews, they had all been designated as Jews and separated out. As Jews they had lost their jobs, their places of education, their homes and their familiar surroundings; as Jews they had fled, gone into hiding or been deported. Most survivors had lost their families and friends and returned to Dutch society as individuals. After experiencing such atrocities, some Jewish survivors were no longer able to appreciate an attitude that they had perceived before the war as tolerance. The taste o f tolerance turned bitter. Instead they now saw it as gross indifference, a lack of understanding, and denial of what had happened. Although many survivors owed their lives to pure coincidence and few generalizations can be made in this area, many have emphasized that it was of vital importance to maintain some hope of survival and freedom. In the concentration camps and in places of hiding, they embraced the slightest of hopes and fantasized about their liberation. These exaggerated expectations were often dashed by the reality of liberation from the camp, the journey home, and their experiences at the border, at the reception centers and even in their own streets. Even without antisemitic reactions, most Jewish homecomings were far from joyous and the freedom they had hoped for never came. This made the 131

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negative attitudes on the part of non-Jews even harder to accept. The survivors were deeply shocked to discover that many people had not expected them to return at all. It is important to note that Jews were not alone in noticing the amount of post-liberation antisemitism. This is evidenced by the formation of the study group “Antisemitic Attitudes in the Nether­ lands?” The existence and activities of this group show an increasing alertness for antisemitism within intellectual circles, or perhaps an alertness that had developed during the occupation. Articles and editorials in daily and weekly newspapers, together with several pamphlets and books, indicate a more general concern. For the Jews who came back, the war was a breach in their lives. The great majority had lost many o f their relatives, friends and acquaintances. Often they had also lost their homes and employment, and almost all returned to a devastated social environment. Astonish­ ingly, however, the material surroundings to which they returned were mostly intact and unaltered (with the exception o f war-tom cities like Rotterdam and Arnhem). And not only the material surroundings: although the war had been a difficult period for non-Jews as well, most of them were able to resume their normal lives afterwards. In this experience of the war as a breach in their existence, the Jewish survivors stood alone compared to the overwhelming majority o f the Dutch population. In this atmosphere o f death, destruction, sorrow and loneliness, it was almost impossible to simply “act normal again.” After suffering many negative reactions and a clear lack o f understanding of their experiences, most Jews decided not to talk about them and a long silence descended, not only between Jews and non-Jews, but also within the Jewish community itself. Feelings of guilt and shame undoubtedly contributed to this, but these should not be overestimated. A major reason for the Jews’ silence was their failure to find an ear for their stories. The non-Jews were also silent, perhaps because of disinterest and a preoccupation with their own worries, but also because they felt powerless, embarrassed and self-conscious. To what degree do the developments during the occupation explain the upsurge in antisemitism in the summer of 1945? I believe that the chief explanation lies in the German occupiers’ systematic introduction of a distinction between Jews and non-Jews. Jews were progressively isolated in what Jacob Presser has called a game of cat and mouse. 132

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Anti-Jewish measures were introduced singly, and it is possible that the separate measures may not have made such a deep impression on many non-Jews. Although established insidiously, the distinction between Jews and non-Jews was almost absolute by the end of 1941. A rift had been forged between Jews and non-Jews, and the resulting lack of public contact between the two groups allowed the deportations to begin fairly discreetly in 1942. Non-Jews were not always completely aware of this ongoing process of separation. Much more than before, Jews were identified and seen as Jews. Consciously or unconsciously, the Dutch people learned to think in terms of “Jew,”“ non-Jew,”“ half-Jew” and “Aryan.” The comparative distance that existed in pre-war society became a separation. This separation depended for its effectiveness on the above-mentioned continuity, the undercurrent o f latent antisemitism. The virtual absence of day-to-day contact between Jews and non-Jews at the time o f the liberation opened the door to old prejudices and collective accusations against the Jews. Another stimulus for post-war antisemitism might be found in feelings of aggression and recriminations against the few surviving Jews. In the epilogue of Ondergang, Presser writes: “Humans tend to hate those they have harmed.” I believe it would be an exaggeration to say that this is invariably so, but it is clear that victims do not always arouse pity. Furthermore, pity is far from being an expression of respect or the recognition of equality. Hate might be too strong a word, but isolation and total dependence on outside help could have encouraged an increase in a sense of superiority over the victims of discrimination. How long did this upsurge of antisemitism last? This question is hard to answer and is ultimately beyond the scope of this article. My provisional impression is that six months after the liberation o f the Netherlands, expressions of antisemitism were already evoking greater indignation among the general public, which had by that time become more aware of the totality and unparalleled horror of the persecution of the Jews. This awareness and reaction became an inhibiting factor for further expressions of antisemitism. Despite this, the remarkable silence about the persecution continued. The Dutch government’s refusal to make a distinction between Jews and non-Jews - to help Jewish refugees in the 1930s, to support deported Jews during the years o f persecution, or while repatriating or 133

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providing relief for Jewish survivors - arouses both astonishment and bitterness. During the preparations for the repatriation and at the time of the liberation o f the camps, foreign observers pleaded for recognition of the Jews’ specific circumstances. I discovered that the position taken by the govemment-in-exile was remarkably close to, and supported by, the attitudes prevailing in resistance circles, specifically in Christian resistance groups. The very groups that had made the greatest effort for Jews in hiding, risking their lives to do so, pleaded for a policy of radical non-differentiation. This effect was most apparent in the Jewish war orphans issue, where a chain of interlinked attitudes of non-Jews to Jews can be traced, as I mentioned at the beginning o f this article: a “chain reaction of exclusion.” From non-Jewish indignation and pity to compassion and assistance for Jews, from help and rescuing to patronizing and arrogation, and from arrogation to denial of the Jews’ specificity and otherness - the denial of the Jewish identity and Jewish interests. However, this inteipretation brings with it a danger of projecting contemporary values on the past. We live in an age in which “one’s own identity” is seen as a great good and a powerful right: “identity matters,” and calls for “recognition” of one’s own self are now felt strongly everywhere. It is questionable whether these issues played a comparable role fifty years ago. It is also questionable whether most Jews argued so forcefully at that time for recognition of a “Jewish identity.” There were at least some Jewish dissenters, as evidenced by attempts to change names. Many Dutch Jews believed that the occupation, the Nazi persecution and the Nazi race laws had “made” them Jews; they experienced Jewishness as an imposed, forced identification, whose only purpose was their death. In 1945, only a few years had passed since 1939 when it was agreed, in consultation with the authorities, to build Westerbork, a separate center for Jewish refugees. With the benefit of hindsight, this was an example of “specific” aid that was realized only with difficulty and paid for by the Jewish community itself, but nevertheless a deviation from the policy of non-distinction. Westerbork became a transit camp, and an ordinary Jewish identity amounted to a death sentence. The Nazi plan was nothing less than the extermination of every Jew: man, woman and child. In 1945, these experiences had hardly filtered through to the general population, which was far from coming to terms with them. It 134

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was a chaotic period in which impulsive reactions were not implausible: after years in which there had been a direct relationship between the degree of Jewishness and the degree o f mortal risk, some people - nonJewish authorities, Christians and some Jews - tried to avert further evil by eradicating and denying all differences wherever possible. The Jewish repatriates returned to this remarkable mixture of good intentions, indifference, jealousy, shame and guilt, in a society where a gulf now separated Jews and non-Jews. At the same time they were overcome by equally mixed feelings of loss, grief, despair, insecurity, shame, guilt, jealousy, and also rage at the gross theft, the appropriation o f property and the lack of understanding. In retrospect the subsequent period o f silence between Jews and non-Jews is hardly surprising.

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Revolution and Reconstruction: Dutch Jewry after the Holocaust CONNY KRISTEL In 1950, the American Jewish Yearbook characterized the situation of Dutch Jewry as a paradox. It remarked that the Netherlands was safe for Jews and that it had “one of the best-organized and economically stable Jewish communities in the world.” Yet the community’s leaders were convinced there was no future for Jews in the Netherlands. Most leaders o f the Jewish community had either emigrated or were preparing to leave. “While Dutch Jews were financially prosperous,” the Yearbook continued, “they were psychologically unhappy.” The Jewish leaders had told a representative of the American Jewish Committee that “to live both as a Dutchman and a Jew involved an intolerable split in loyalties,” and that they were “openly declaring their choice of life as Jews rather than Dutchmen.” This choice, the Yearbook added with surprise, met with understanding by non-Jews and apparently did not even provoke antisemitism.1 It is not hard to imagine why the Jews were psychologically disturbed at that time. Nazi policies had led to the murder of more than a hundred thousand Jews from the Netherlands between 1940 and 1945. The estimated thirty thousand who survived had been robbed of their families, friends and property. During the war, the Jews had watched themselves being cut off from Dutch society with terrible speed. The events of the war had radically changed their attitude towards Dutch society. In short, there was ample reason for the Jews to experience intense psychological hardship.2

1 2

American Jewish Yearbook, 1950, p. 306. For the number of Jews in the Netherlands after World War II, see F. Chaya Brasz, “After the Second World War: From ‘Jewish Church to cultural minority’,” in: J. C. H. Blom, R. G. Fuks-Mansfeld and I. Schöffer (eds.), The History o f the Jews in the Netherlands, Oxford, 2002, pp. 336-391, 336.

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The Jewish leaders themselves, however, did not attribute their psychological condition to a loss of faith in Dutch society or to the deaths of so many friends and relatives. Instead, their reasons for seeking a life elsewhere were ideological. This is, from a present-day perspective at least, quite surprising. ♦ ♦ ♦ Since the late 1980s, Dutch public debate about World War II has been dominated by the issue of negligence; the common perception being that the Dutch government and population inadequately responded to the plight o f the Jews during the war. In recent years the public’s attention has focused on the post-war period. In an intense public debate many sharply criticized the way in which Jews were received upon returning from the death camps and from hiding, and for the meagre support offered to them. There are countless stories o f Jewish survivors who were greeted with insensitivity, formalism and hostility after the war. In response, the Dutch government has established a number o f commissions that have been investigating aspects of this treatment, primarily the handling of certain financial matters - a highly sensitive issue for both Jews and gentiles. The government has also commissioned a major study of the return and reception o f World War II victims.3 From all of the current debate and literature on the war, one might think that the Jewish-Dutch leaders o f the post-war period were driven to leave the Netherlands because o f the attitudes of the gentile population. In their comments to the correspondent o f the American Jewish Yearbook, however, these leaders used the Zionist argument par excellence, namely, they no longer wanted to live with divided loyalties and they had made a radical choice to be Jewish rather than Dutch. It would be naive to take these remarks at face value and to conclude that Jews in the Netherlands had had a mainly positive experience with their non-Jewish surroundings. As a historian, several questions come 3

This study has been carried out by SOTO, an independent foundation researching the reception of World War II victims in the Netherlands. This paper is based on research into the role of international Jewish organizations in the reception of World War II victims, carried out as part of the SOTO foundation project. SOTO published its results in 2001 and 2002.

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to mind. Who was this American correspondent? Who did he or she talk to? To what extent did these interviewees and their perceptions reflect Dutch Jewry in general? And how well did the correspondent understand the Dutch situation? These questions have not yet been answered, but I must mention that I have seen an enormous number of reports, written mainly by foreign observers, that put the situation of Jews in the Netherlands in a positive light. In this paper, 1 will limit myself to editions of the American Jewish Yearbook from 1945 to 1951.4 The 1944/1945 Yearbook called “the attitude of the Christian population admirable” when referring to the number of Jews it helped hide from the Nazis.5 The 1945/1946 edition mentioned that “the traditional good neighborly relations between Dutch Christians and Jews [had] withstood the test of time.” This is followed by an example of the Dutch population’s commendable attitude: The people helped the Jews who returned to the country to rebuild their synagogues and reorganize their communal life, and generally gave material and moral support to those emerging from their hiding places. At the first synagogue service held in Amsterdam after liberation, in May 1945, four-fifths of the congregants consisted of non-Jews who came to express their sympathy with their Jewish neighbors. (...) Many Dutch Christians who had acquired Jewish homes and businesses voluntarily restored them to their original owners.6

However, such solidarity was only one side of the coin. Virtually every Yearbook also mentions that antisemitism had become prevalent among some sections of the population. This was especially true of those who had profited from the theft of Jewish property and had been forced to return these ill-gotten gains after the war. But the 1946/1947 Yearbook hastened to add that there was “nothing in the way of organized antisemitism” or any “trace of antisemitism in government policy.”7 Moreover, the Yearbook maintained, the Dutch government did all it could to eradicate antisemitism.8

4 5 6 7 8

Incidentally, the passages about the Netherlands were written by a different author every year. American Jewish Yearbook, 1944-45, p. 223. American Jewish Yearbook, 1945-46, p. 383. American Jewish Yearbook, 1946-47, pp. 296-97. American Jewish Yearbook, 1945-46, p. 383.

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Abel Herzberg, a prominent Zionist and a survivor o f Bergen-Belsen, reached a similar conclusion about antisemitism in 1950. In one of the first historical studies on the persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands, he emphatically distinguished between social and political antisemi­ tism. According to Herzberg, the persecution had driven a wedge between the persecuted and the rest of society. This had increased social antisemitism. Political antisemitism, however, had not taken root in the Netherlands. On the contrary, Herzberg felt that the Nazi occupation had only reinforced the aversion to political antisemitism.9 In the autumn of 1945 he wrote to friends in Palestine that antisemitism was “very widespread.” But at the same time he voiced his faith that a “very strong countercurrent” had the upper hand. He concluded that “In general, they’re doing things right here, I believe.”10 These favorable judgments pose a serious problem for historians. How can such generally positive assessments from the past be reconciled with today’s mainly negative perception? I will attempt to explain this paradox. The glowing reports by foreign observers will be my point of departure. To begin with, the optimistic tone of these evaluations might be explained by the fact that the American Jewish Committee’s representatives viewed the situation in the Netherlands in a wider, international context. After all, the Jews in the Netherlands had it much better than their counterparts in Poland, for instance. However, the influence of the international perspective is limited. In all the Yearbook reports, the foreign correspondents based themselves on interviews with local Jewish leaders. In this paper I will argue that the Jewish leaders’ perception of the situation was laigely determined by ideology. I will also examine some of the consequences of their ideological concerns. ♦ ♦ ♦

9

Abel J. Herzberg, Kroniek der Jodenvervolging 1940-1945, Amsterdam, 1985, pp. 17 and 251 -53. This work was first published as a separate volume in the collection entitled Onderdrukkingen Verzet. Nederland in Oorlogstijd, J. J. Bolhuis (ed.), vol. Ill, Arnhem, n.d. [1950]. 10 Letter dated 5 November 1945, Nederlands Archief, Ghetto Fighters’ House Archive, Kibbutz Lohamei Hagetaot, nr. 90/25/01.

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Before the Nazi period, Jews in the Netherlands had been a very divided and heterogeneous group and were assimilated into Dutch society. Many were attracted to the political philosophies of liberalism and socialism. Only a small minority was interested in Zionism. However, wartime persecution radically altered the scope of issues such as assimilation and integration. Although most Jews were rather well integrated, it did not take long for them to be excised completely from Dutch society. Matters of “solidarity and neutrality, help and betrayal, life and death, tested the relationship between Jews and gentiles to the extreme.” 11 During the war, Jewish refugees intensely debated their future in the Netherlands. A Dutchman named Max Gans (Mozes Heiman Gans, 1917-1987) had founded the Jewish Coordination Commission (JCC) in Switzerland, which spared no effort to help Jews in the occupied Netherlands and in the concentration camps. Members o f the JCC also participated in a committee that organized cultural activities for Dutch refugees in Switzerland. This committee regularly engaged speakers to address its members on various topics, for instance the recurrent theme of the “Jewish question.” Most of these lecturers expressed a deep attachment to the Netherlands and a desire to continue living there after the war. Often, these feelings went hand in hand with a pro-Zionist stance. However, not every Jew would be willing or able to live in a Jewish state. Many of them, it was believed, would prefer to continue living “as a guest in the Diaspora” without giving up their Jewishness. That the “Jewish question” was seen as a real issue is evident, for example, from the roundabout, cautious references to “the Jewish section of the population within Dutch society.” The title of one o f the lectures is another example: “What can the Netherlands expect from its Jewish citizens and what can Jewish Dutchmen expect from their state?” 12 Similarly, the writings of historian Lou de Jong, who spent the duration of the war in London, also reflect this desire to integrate. In 1945 de Jong lauded the unshakable solidarity between Jews and 11 See P. Romijn, “The War (1940-1945),” in: Blom, Fuks-Mansfeld and Schöffer, The History o f the Jews in the Netherlands, pp. 296-335, 296 and 310. 12 The transcripts of these lectures belong to the JCC Switzerland archives and are accessible through Yad Vashem. See especially “Nederland en de joden,” M -16/32, nrs. 60-65 and M-16/14, nrs. 100-15.

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gentiles and expressed the hope that both groups “after having gone such separate ways [...] would again find common ground.”13 Once the full extent of the catastrophe for Dutch Jews became apparent after the war, many survivors felt compelled to decide upon their place in the world. The dividing line between the assimilated and the so-called conscious Jews became much sharper than it had been before the war. Many Jews had trouble relating to a society that had failed to protect more than hundred thousand of its people from the Nazis. To be confronted with antisemitism must have been more than unsettling. The psychological chasm that had opened up during the war widened in its aftermath. As their distance from the rest of Dutch society increased, Jews felt a growing bond with other Jews in the Netherlands and abroad. Dutch Jews had experienced a totally separate fate from the rest of their society, but at the same time their exceptional position was something they shared with other Jews in Europe. To Dutch Jewry, the Second World War meant primarily the murder of more than a hundred thousand of its people. Beyond that, however, the war also marked the end of their isolation. Before the war, Dutch Jews had had very little to do with international Jewish organizations. They had been a well-off community that took care of its own. The funds made available in the pre-war years by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (the Joint) for the direct aid to refugees had been an exception.14 Migration was rare before the war, so there was little personal contact with Jews abroad. After the war, what little remained of the Dutch Jewish community received substantial financial aid from the Joint. Other Jewish relief organizations were also active in the Netherlands. Contact with international Jewish organizations and the support these organizations provided were o f tremendous importance to survivors in the Netherlands - not only in a material sense, but also culturally and

13 Lou de Jong, Je Maintiendrai IV, London, 1945, p. 172. For de Jong’s analysis and conclusions on the relations between Jews and non-Jews in the Netherlands during Nazi rule, see Conny Kristel, Geschiedschrijving als opdracht. Abel Herzberg, Jacques Presser en Loe de Jong over de jodenvervolging, Amsterdam, 1998. 14 J. C. H. Blom and J. J. Cahen, “Joodse Nederlanders, Nederlandse joden en joden in Nederland,” in: Blom, Fuks-Mansfeld and Schöffer, The History o f the Jews in the Netherlands, pp. 230-295, 283.

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psychologically. In the wasteland where Jews found themselves, Zionism held hope for a better future. The Zionist movement, which before the war had had only limited appeal to Dutch Jews, attracted a great number of survivors in the immediate post-war years. Virtually every report by a foreign observer at that time mentions the immense interest there was in everything Zionist. This was a time when the entire Dutch population had fallen prey to deep pessimism about the future. Many were worried about their material welfare and feared another war. A large number o f Dutch people - as many as one-third of those surveyed in a 1947/1948 opinion poll - said they would prefer to emigrate.15 This overall gloom is probably one reason why so many Jews had plans to leave the Netherlands. Looking back on this period, Bram de Jong (1913-1995) described just how intense the Zionist zeal could be. He had been a Zionist since his youth and played a leading role in the new Jewish organizations that sprung up in the immediate post-war period. In 1947, he left to make Palestine his permanent home. I was totally crazy... Not mentally insane, it was just that I was obsessing about my ideals. I was a Zionist, the war was over and Zion had to be built.... There was only one thing on my mind: taking care of the Jews and the land. God was not important, orthodoxy was unimportant, everything was unimportant except for the Jews. Zion and the people. The Jewish children. That was what it was about.16

The mouthpiece of the Dutch Zionist Association, whose first edition after the war appeared in August 1945, expressed a similar zeal and impatience. The mass murder of European Jews had dramatically underscored the correctness of the Zionist analysis: “ ... no more hollow phrases, no more beating around the bush. Both the youth and the adults must constantly be reminded of their personal duty to aliyah [immigration to Israel].” All effort had to be focused on what was known as “liquidating the galut [Diaspora].” 17 15 J. C. H. Blom, “Jaren van tucht en ascese. Enige beschouwingen over de stemming in herrijzend Nederland (1945-1950),” in: J. C. H. Blom, Crisis, bezetting en herstel. Tien studies over Nederland 1930-1950, Rotterdam 1989, pp. 184-217. For the results of the polls on emigration, see page 199. 16 Interview with Bram de Jong (Awraham Yinnon) by Tamarah Benima, in: Leezrath Ha-am, Assen/Maastricht, LII-LVIII, LV1II. 17 De Joodse Wächter (August 1945), p. 4.

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The efforts of the Zionist activists paid off, though their goal of “liquidating” Jewish life in the Netherlands was not achieved. At first, the Zionists worked on illegal emigration to Palestine. In 1945, the Jewish Agency stopped issuing immigration certificates to Dutch Jews. The Agency gave priority to Jews in the Displaced Persons camps in Germany, who had no home to return to. Abel Herzberg and his family, for instance, were refused certificates in September 1945. However, Herzberg’s two oldest children were not to be denied; in the spring of 1946, they left for Palestine by way o f southern France. This illegal emigration was organized by soldiers of the Jewish Brigade, a British army unit stationed in the Netherlands until June 1946. Most of those who took the leap and emigrated illegally were young people. In the years before Israel gained statehood, hundreds of Jews left the Netherlands for Palestine. According to sources from that time, many more were waiting their turn to do the same. A huge number of emigrants in those years were Jews of German origin. Surprisingly, many of those who had signed up for emigration were not Zionists at all. Apparently, they were mainly interested in leaving the Nether­ lands.18 After Israel achieved statehood, Jews no longer needed to wait for a certificate to emigrate to the Jewish state. As it turned out, many were too daunted by such a drastic move to actually go through with it. Israel offered few career opportunities and many survivors feared another war in the Middle East. O f the 4,492 Jews who emigrated between 1948 and 1953, only 1,500 went to Israel. The majority opted for the United States or Canada. For this wave of emigrants too, the desire to leave the Netherlands was evidently more important than Zionism.19 After the war, the Zionists set the tone of organized Jewish life. This was a complete role reversal compared to the pre-war era when they were heavily criticized by Orthodox Jews. The pre-war Jewish leaders who had survived Nazi rule were now highly controversial because of their membership in the Jewish Council. They were even accused of

18 For the emigration of Jews from the Netherlands, see Brasz, “After the Second World War,” in: Blom, Fuks-Mansfeld and Schöffer, The History o f the Jews in the Netherlands, pp. 351-352. For the emigration of Herzberg’s children, see Herzberg’s succinct biography in Kristel, p. 35. 19 Brasz, “After the Second World War,” p. 366.

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collaborating with the enemy. Religious leaders were held responsible for the failure o f Jews to take action during the war. After the liberation, the people who proclaimed themselves the new leaders formed an organization they called the Jewish Coordination Commission, analogous to the previously mentioned JCC in Switzerland. This had also been the name of the commission established in 1940 by the Dutch Zionist Association and other Jewish organizations and congregations to represent Jews in the Netherlands. The German authorities, however, had refused to deal with anyone but the Jewish Council and ordered the JCC to disband in the autumn o f 1941. By calling themselves the JCC, the post-war leaders were sending a clear signal that they distanced themselves from the much maligned Jewish Council. Former prominent members o f the Jewish Council were barred from positions of authority in the new Jewish organizations. The fact that Zionists such as Bram de Jong and Jaap van Amerongen20 now held top positions was a revolution, both politically and socially. When Bram de Jong contended for a post in a Jewish organization, his competitor was a member of the pre-war Amsterdam Jewish establishment that was often collectively referred to as “the regency.” In an interview in the 1980s, De Jong expressed the satisfaction he had felt upon getting the job: “The fact that I held my own against the regents back then did me a world of good. ... It helped me shed the poor Jew’s inferiority complex towards the rich Jew.”21 The Zionists’ new influence in organized Jewish life also had its drawbacks. They were convinced there was no future for Jews in the Netherlands and this belief steered their activism. One example is the visit by board members o f the Dutch Zionist Association and A. de Leeuw, president of Irgun Olei Holland, [organization of immigrants from Holland in the Land of Israel] to Dutch Prime Minister W. Schermerhom in December 1945. They explained to him that it was impossible and undesirable to rebuild the Jewish community o f the Netherlands. They tried to convince him o f the importance of

20 Along with Bram de Jong, Van Amerongen (1913-1995) was one of the driving forces behind the post-war Dutch JCC and he later became president of the Dutch Zionist Association. He left for Palestine in March 1948. 21 Interview with Bram de Jong by Tamarah Benima, in: Le-ezrath Ha-am, LVIIII.

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emigration to Palestine.22 Another example is an article written by Van Amerongen in the autumn of 1944, shortly after the liberation of the southern part of the Netherlands. Proposing a solution to the “Jewish question,” his article advocated the creation of a Jewish state, arguing that this would also serve the interests o f the Dutch people. He suggested that if the Jews were granted the “national home” he so fervently endorsed, they would no longer need to be involved in Dutch economic life.23 Further research might reveal whether, and if so, how, the position taken by prominent Zionists influenced Dutch government policy. What seems certain is that the Zionists were so focused on Palestine they could hardly concern themselves with the problems o f Jews in the Netherlands. After all, their top priority was to encourage emigration to Palestine, not to reinforce the position o f Jewry in Holland. Personal accounts by Jews who had already decided to leave the Netherlands also show a remarkable indifference to hostilities from non-Jews. In a sense, they had grown immune to their non-Jewish environment. In their minds, they had already left the country. Perhaps this is why the Jewish leaders interviewed by the American Jewish Yearbook in 1950 discussed only the issue of divided loyalties and said nothing about the other problems facing Jews in the Netherlands at that time. Still, many Jews never actually left the Netherlands. Among them were Zionists who continued to have doubts or who ultimately never made the decision to leave. But there were also Jews who never even entertained thoughts of leaving. Among them were Max and Jenny Gans, who had returned to the Netherlands after the war from exile in Switzerland. Despite their unpleasant experiences with Dutch repre­ sentatives in Switzerland, they never once doubted wanting to be “Dutch citizens” again.24 In 1947, Gans wrote a report for the commission that was investigating the role o f the Red Cross during the war. He was bitterly disappointed and angry at the passivity and indifference of the Dutch authorities. He believed that thousands of 22 Brasz, “After the Second World War,“ p. 358. See also Evelien Gans, De kleine verschillen die het leven uitmaken. Een historische Studie naar joodse sociaaldemocraten en socialistisch-zionisten in Nederland, Amsterdam, 1999, 683 ff. 23 Veritas (19 October 1944), the first part of a two-part series of articles, the second of which was published on 23 October 1944. 24 Jenny Gans-Premsela, Vluchtweg. Aan de bezetter ontsnapt, Baam, 1990, p. 153.

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deaths had been caused by their failure to assume responsibility. He concluded his report with a passionate appeal to honor the Jewish people’s desire for their own nation. But, apparently, he felt there were enough people left in the Netherlands he could trust; his final remark was that he felt fortunate to belong to both the Jewish and the Dutch people. And the Gans couple were certainly not the only ones.25 One of the problems, however, was that the people who wanted to stay simply had less political clout in those days. They were preoccupied with rebuilding their existence. When they openly protested against something, it was usually a reaction to some Zionist act or statement. For example, several people wrote critical responses to the 1944 article by Van Amerongen that supported emigration to Palestine. One of these reactions was written by a Jew from Amsterdam who was then living in the liberated southern part o f the Netherlands. In a letter to the editor, he described his great love of Amsterdam and made clear that he had no intention of ever leaving the Netherlands. Should Amsterdam be destroyed in the final stages of the war, he wrote, he would “help rebuild [the city] with his bare hands.”26 Another Jew wrote that the Jews already had a fatherland: ... our Netherlands, that is so dear to us that we would not trade for ten Palestines.... We Dutch Jews - who feel with all of our being that we are Jews and Dutchmen alike - we do not want to leave, we want to stay in the Netherlands, to join our non-Jewish compatriots and do our very best to help rebuild our Holland.27

However, such letters to the editor are always responses to earlier articles and as such they have less impact. The Zionists were in the driver’s seat. As I said before, the Zionists did not manage to liquidate the galut. But between 1945 and 1953, some five thousand Jews in all left the Netherlands. This is a considerable percentage of the thirty thousand who were left after the war. The emigrants were mostly young people;

25 The report in question was included as an appendix in Jenny Gans-Premsela, Vluchtweg, pp. 165-80. 26 Veritas (3 November 1944). 27 Veritas (31 October 1944). See also Tamarah Benima, “Knel tussen papierschaarste en polemiek: joodse berichten in de niet-joodse pers,” in: Le-ezrath ha-am, XLIILI, XLV.

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the majority of those who were active in the community left the country. Their departure led to a noticeable decline in political and cultural activity. The emigration of leading figures, regarded at the time as “the cream of the crop,” was a bloodletting for the Jewish community which over a short span of time saw its leaders disappear one by one. And so, deprived of its leaders, the Jewish community made an anemic impression on the foreign observers reporting for the American Jewish Yearbook in the early 1950s. The revolutionary wind that had swept the ruins of the Jewish community immediately after the war had subsided. The pre-war organizational structure of the Jewish con­ gregations had been reinstated. Any attempt at innovation had failed, while the main advocates of change had departed. What was left was a small and vulnerable group, scarred by the mass destruction of Jewish life and deprived o f its leaders. Translation M ischa Hoyinck.

147

The Abrogation o f Racial Laws and the Reintegration o f Jews in Italian Society (1943-1948) MARIO TOSCANO A study of the reintegration of Jews in Italian society during the period from the fall of fascism to implementation of the new republican Constitution requires a thorough evaluation of specific and complex historical events and situations. These concern Italian history after WW II, the history of the Italian Jewish community - a community not very large but with significant experiences - and the Italian chapter o f the racial persecutions. In analyzing the Italian chapter of the Shoah, we must make a clear distinction between the racial policy implemented by the fascist regime from July 1938 to July 1943 and the new situation that emerged after 8 September 1943 with the German occupation and the creation of the Italian Social Republic of Salô, which itself issued new antisemitic laws and participated in the deportation of Jews from Italy.1 The inextricably interwoven histories - Italian, Italian Jewish, and Jewish during the Second World War and the racial persecutions - call for an analysis of the impact of these events on the identity and organization of the Italian Jewish world after the storm, as well as an analysis of the answers given to the tragedy of the Shoah (and to the war) by both the new anti-fascist leadership that rose after 8 September 1943 and the different strata of a civil society embarking on the country’s material and moral rebuilding. Italian society had to settle its scores with fascism, but it was mistaken in believing it had done so by distancing itself from Mussolini’s regime from the end of 1942. In fact, this attitude allowed

1

For a general outline, see Renzo De Felice, Storia degli ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo, Turin, 1993 (1st ed. 1961), pp. XXXIV-647; Liliana Picciotto Fargion, II libro della memoria. Gli Ebrei deportati dalVltalia (1943-1945), Milan, 1991, p. 947.

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Italian society to shed its responsibility for fascism. The Resistenza (the anti-fascist and anti-German struggle) seemed to be a purifying bath, an atonement for the consensus previously given to the regime, and an expression of the true Italy opposed to the mistakes of the Republic of Salô. In the long term, however, the answers given could not provide the base for a new widely shared national identity.2 Italy and its complex and tormented society also had to settle scores with the racist and antisemitic chapter of its fascist history, to restore its Jews as citizens with equal rights. To do so, Italy could appeal to the liberal tradition of the Risorgimento and to the behavior of the fascist regime before its racist and antisemitic turn in the mid-1930s, and use the tools provided by the anti-fascist political culture and traditions. The anti-fascist political cultures, however, hardly allowed an in-depth study necessary to understand the seriousness of the rift in the relations between Italy and its Jewish citizens created by the racial policy and the war. In reconstructing the discussions and events that occurred from 1943 to 1948, it is important not to distort the historical context, as was done in some writings that appeared lately in Italy. These analyses of the events and memory-building of the period 1943-1945 make it difficult to understand the events in a satisfactory way. ♦

♦

♦

The fall of fascism on 25 July 1943 was not accompanied by the abrogation of racial laws. According to what the prime minister Pietro Badoglio later declared, the anti-Jewish laws remained “inoperative,” and no steps were taken that might have made the German ally suspicious. In reality, besides these statements, other statements of that time and the procedures adopted after 8 September 1943 to annul the racial laws indicate that this matter was not a priority for either the

2

On these issues, see Simona Colarizi, L'opinione degli italiani sotto il regime, Rome-Bari, 1991; Ernesto Galli della Loggia, La morte della patria, Rome-Bari, 1996; Aurelio Lepre, Storia della prima Repubblica, Bologna, 1993, pp. 9, 13; Gian Enrico Rusconi, Se cessiamo di essere una nazione, Bologna, 1993; Furio Colombo, preface to Susan Zuccotti, L ’olocausto in Italia, Milan, 1988.

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Badoglio government or the bureaucracy in Rome, nor for the media o r some distinguished representatives of the Holy See.3 It was only after the announcement of the armistice on 8 September, the flight of the king and Badoglio to Brindisi, the division of the country into two parts and the establishment o f the kingdom in southern Italy with the four provinces o f Puglia, that the work to abrogate the racial laws began. This task that the Italian government undertook was twisted and full of contradictions; it was undertaken also because the Italian government was pressed by certain clauses in the “long armistice“ imposed by the Allied forces and signed by Badoglio on 29 September in Malta.4 The royal decrees, numbers 25 and 26, issued on 20 January 1944 were the result of this action. The first one, published in the “Official Gazette” on 9 February 1944, set the return o f civil and political rights to “Italian and foreign citizens declared or considered o f Jewish race”. It also annulled the racial laws issued by the regime. The second decree established the restoration o f patrimonial rights. However, its implementation was postponed until after the ceasefire with Germany, to avoid - so it was stated - a worsening o f the treatment reserved for the Jews in the Republic o f Salö, which was occupied by the German army. Only on 20 October 1944 was the decree published in the “Official Gazette”.5 Despite the limitations o f these initiatives, these two decrees paved the way for an important process, but one that had only a minor impact due to the small number of Jews in the southern regions already liberated by the Allied forces. The split of the country on 8 September 1943 had a profound impact on the destiny of Jews who were mainly concentrated in middle and large-size cities o f northern and central Italy (Rome, Florence, Livorno, Milan, Turin, Trieste). They regained their freedom only after the tardy arrival of the Allied forces. The chronology 3

4 5

De Felice, op.cit., p. 441 ff.; Mario Toscano, “Dali’ ‘antirisorgimento’ al postfascismo: l’abrogazione delle leggi razziali e il reinserimento degli ebrei nella società italiana,” In: Mario Toscano (ed.), L 'Abrogazione delle leggi razziali in Italia (1943-1987), Rome, 1988, foreword by Guido Spadolini, and with the introduction of Mario Toscano, Rome, Senate of the Republic, 1988, pp.30-33 and quoted bibliography. Toscano, Dali’ “antirisorgimento,” pp. 33ff. Ibid., pp. 40-42, 52.

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o f these events - 4 June 1944 the liberation o f Rome; August 1944 the liberation o f Florence; 25 April 1945 the liberation o f northern cities by the partisan insurrection and the Allied troops (Trieste was occupied by the Yugoslavs) - had a direct effect on the Jewish communities and individual Jews and on the development of the laws restoring their rights. The liberation of Rome on 4 June 1944 was a key step in the process o f Jewish reintegration into Italian society. This was followed by other important events: the establishment o f the Ivanoe Bonomi government on 18 June, the step-by-step reorganization of the Italian administrative system - albeit under the control o f the Allied Control Commission, and the resumption o f activities o f the Union of Italian Jewish Communities in Rome (seat of the largest Jewish community). In fact, the problems mentioned at the beginning of this analysis became clear in the summer o f 1944 in the effervescent reality o f Rome, characterized after the liberation by material difficulties but at the same time by a lively social and cultural atmosphere and would later dominate the national scene after liberation: namely, the attitudes o f the new anti-fascist political establishment and civil society towards the condition o f the Jews after the war, and the initial answers given by the small, diversified and weakened Jewish community to questions concerning their identity and reorganization. As for the annulment of the racial laws and the issuing o f new laws to fully reintegrate the Jews as citizens, a fruitful period started in the summer of 1944 and lasted until 1947. This was followed by other legislative phases, from the 1950s to the end of the century, each with different problems and issues.6 From a quantitative point o f view, the measures adopted between 1944 and 1947, following the decree on the restoration of civil and political rights issued on 20 January 1944, were significant. Decree number 26 on the restoration of patrimonial rights, issued on 20 January 1944, finally came into force on 5 October of that year. This was a necessary step for returning Jewish assets to their rightful owners, assets that had been expropriated beginning in 1939 and those sequestrated or confiscated during the rule o f the Republic of Salö and the German occupation, starting with the housing problem, a 6

Ibid., pp. 43ff; Guido Fubirti, La condizione giuridica dell’ebraismo italiano, Turin, 1998, pp. 85-89.

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dramatic issue in the big cities devastated by repeated bombing. Other restoration and reintegration laws were issued to compensate for an antisemitic legislation that had been extraordinarily intrusive in its two phases: from 1938 and from 1943. In this matter, the steps taken during 1944 and 1947 by the governments based upon the collaboration of the anti-fascist parties of the National Liberation Committee, were a huge undertaking, despite the appearance o f some problems linked to a sometimes rigid ideological vision of social reality.7 There were views that the steps in favor of the Jews were exaggerated. For example, the communist Minister of Finances Pesenti noted that “the Council of Ministers was exaggerating its measures in favor of the Jews.”8 His criticism, however was not shared by the rest o f the government. It must also be said, however, that the minimal involvement o f the Jewish communities in the preparation of measures in this first phase made it necessary for official representatives o f the Italian Jewish world (the Union) to exert some pressure on the government, which was dealing with the Italian reconstruction, urging it to restore equality to Jewish citizens.9 For instance, on 21 September 1944, the President of the Union of Jewish Communities, Dante Almansi, wrote to the President of the Council of Ministers and demanded that the laws clearly interpret the needs and wishes o f the concerned people, and pressed for the issuing of the restoration decree on patrimonial rights, the return of private and public positions previously held by Jews, as well as compensation for damages incurred. His letter reflected the hope held by Jews that their wounds might be soothed by these reparative acts, which would signal the renewal of Italian society and a 7

8 9

Mario Toscano, “L’abrogazione delle leggi razziali,” In: Michele Sarfatti (ed.), II ritorno alia vita: vicende e diritti degii ebrei in Italia dopo la seconda guerra mondiale, Florence, 1998, p. 59. See Verbali del Consiglio dei Ministri, IV Governo Bonomi 12 dicembre 1944-21 giugno 1945, ed. A.G. Ricci, Roma, 1955, pp. 530, 538-541. Toscano, “DalF ‘antirisorgimento’,” pp. 47-49, on a project to abrogate racial laws prepared in 1944 by a commission of legal experts upon the request of the Action Party, in which Jewish lawyers and legal experts operated, but not taken into consideration by the authorities; and pp. 56-58 on another text prepared by the legal Council of the Union of the Communities presented to the Chancellor on 24 August 1946; see also the editorials “Democrazia” in Israel, 4 January 1945 and “Non precipitare” in Israel, 1 March 1945.

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recovery of the ideals of peaceful coexistence that had shaped seventy years o f life in unified Italy.10 To this end, the step taken two years later by the next president of the Union, Raffaele Cantoni, was particularly important. Despite difficul­ ties with the ministerial bureaucracy, he succeeded in obtaining the promulgation of a decree entitling the Union to receive the assets of Jews, without heirs, who had perished in the Shoah.11 It was the crowning achievement of a great effort by the Union o f Italian Jewish communities, but this decree - virtually concluding an important phase o f the reintegration policy - was implemented with difficulty due to its wording. As already noted, in drafting these laws “the intention of the legislator did not always correspond to equally clear arrangements.“ 12 These important regulations met with difficulties o f implementation due to their obscure points and some resistance by the magistracy and bureaucracy. While public administrations immediately complied with the reintegration laws, some private individuals whose interests clashed with the norms, generated legal disputes.13 However, the available documents show that these laws did indeed result in the substantial return o f property taken from Jews in compliance with law number 126 issued in 1939 (on property exceeding the limits set by racial laws). In some cases, however, the Jews were forced to take legal action against third parties who had purchased this property; in other cases, they waived their rights to the return of property in exchange for financial compensation.14 10 Archivio Centraledello Stato (hereafter ACS), PCM 1944-47 b.3.2.2 f.11472 sf.l, 21 September 1944, letter n.79/44 by Almansi to the President of the Council; Toscano, Dali’ “antirisorgimento,” pp. 51-52. 11 Decreto legislative del capo prowisorio dello Stato, 11 May 1947, n. 364 Succession of deceased people, without heirs, who died in the Holocaust after 8 September 1943; Toscano, Dali’ “antirisorgimento,” pp. 58-59. 12 Andrea Tabet, Ebrei, In: “Enciclopedia forense,” Vol. HI, Turin, 1960, pp. 396-97. 13 Ibid., Toscano, Dali’ “antirisorgimento,” p. 60; Fubini, La condizione giuridica, p. 89ff. Union of Italian Jewish Communities, IV Congress of the Communities (1951-5711), Relazione del Consiglio bozze di stampa, p. 15; Roberto Finzi, “Da perseguitati a ‘usurpatori’: per una storia della reintegrazione dei docenti ebrei nelle université italiane,” In: Sarfatti, II ritomo, pp. 95-97. 14 See Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Committee for the reconstruction of events on the acquisition of Italian Jewish assets by Italian public and private organizations, Rapporto generale, Rome, April 2001, the chapter “L’abrogazione delle leggi razziali: l’Egeli e le restituzioni,” pp. 263-70.

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♦

♦

♦

The return of assets taken during the era o f the Republic of Said and the German occupation was even more complex. In general, we can say that there was an almost complete return of movable property and real assets confiscated in compliance with the laws issued by the Republic of Salô in 1943-1944 and claimed by the Jews who had survived Nazi and fascist persecutions. However, this restoration did not include all the assets taken from the Jews (for instance those stolen in the pillage o f Jewish houses and shops by Germans and fascists). Neither did it include assets (not exactly quantified) deposited in credit institutions, not claimed since they belonged to deceased Jewish deportees without heirs.15 Examining how the return of assets was conducted reveals some of the general problems mentioned earlier. Started after the various Italian regions had been liberated, the process took place without detailed arrangements, by government decision and through the same bureau­ cratic organization Egeli (Ente gestione e liquidazione immobiliare), the organization for the management and liquidation of real estate, of course with other officers than those who had expropriated it. The rules governing this return of assets were set by a decree (number 393) issued only on 5 May 1946, an overdue step to regulate a process already begun in the previous year. This time lapse led to bureaucratic obstacles that delayed the procedures and to the introduction of a clause that would have a heavy impact on the return o f assets: namely, Jews had to refund the expenses of the credit institutions that managed their assets during the months of the persecutions of the R.S.I. period. This clause, inserted into the bill presented by De Gasperi’s government, by a Committee of the Consulta (Council), was bitterly criticized by Luigi Einaudi, member o f the Council in 1946 and President o f the Republic from 1948. The introduction of this clause, the attempt to implement it immediately after the war by the Egeli, and the protest by Italian Jews represented by the Union, reflect the complexity of the reintegration process and its imprecise regulations. Add to this, the rigid application of the law by a bureaucracy that in most cases dealt with the issue as a normal administrative procedure - all exacerbated by the Union’s

15 See Ibid., pp. 7, 36, 263-70, 536.

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financial difficulties that limited its ability to both safeguard the legitimate rights of Jewish citizens and play a leading role.16 The problems were magnified even more with regard to the assets of deceased deportees without heirs. Firstly, the decree (number 364) of 11 May 1947 sparked the interest o f politicians in the matter. There were also problems of implementation since the law required that the Union seek possible heirs down to the sixth degree o f relation, this at a time when the Union was operating with minimal funds and lacked the requisite documentation on the deportation, which would come only many decades later. Consequently, despite the promptly begun process o f returning Jewish assets to their owners and the wide range of actions undertaken, some complex problems remained unresolved for many years. Among them in particular was the question of the refund for managing expenses, opposed by the Jews, and the issue o f unclaimed assets held in credit institutions. After some attempts to find a solution through informal contacts with Union representatives, the issue was resolved in May 1958 by a unilateral decision of the Ministry of Treasury, to “abandon the very odious recovery actions made against seriously persecuted people” to avoid political and press discussions on an issue that had already led to “many protests . ..from a moral point o f view.” However, although it ended a long dispute, that same document opened the way to the acquisition of a number of unclaimed assets by the State and the banks.17 The present state of research prevents us from sheding further light on this issue. As to the first point, we can state that thanks to the opinion expressed by the Attorney General’s Department on 23 March 1960 on the availability of these assets, some were acquisitioned by the State during the 1960s.1819On 2 May 2001, the President of the Council o f Ministers, Giuliano Amato, commenting on the General Report of the “committee for the reconstruction of the events that characterized the acquisition of assets o f Jewish citizens by Italian public and private organizations,” underlined the cultural and political distance from these trends during the first decades after the war. 19 16 17 18 19

Rapporto generale, pp. 271-77. Ibid., pp. 282-87. Ibid., pp. 293, 297. Corriere Della Sera, 3 May 2001.

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♦

♦

♦

As concerns the evaluation of the political behavior of Italy in the post­ war years, we must remember that the politicians dealing with the reintegration of Jews and the drafting o f the much needed laws, between 1945 and 1948 were also facing the problem of tens o f thousands of Jewish refugees and survivors from the camps who came to Italy in search o f a clandestine journey to Palestine. Despite the catastrophic conditions of a country in ruins, the Italian government greeted the refugees and gave its support to the aliya bet (illegal immigration to Palestine). Italy was, of course, realizing its political goals - where humanitarian motives were mixed with legitimate hopes for the outflow of refugees from Italy to the Palestine coast and, most of all, with the desire to strike at British interests in a vital strategic area. We should bear in mind that Britain was openly hostile to the drafting of a peace treaty with Italy, which would reaffirm the role and presence of Italy in the Mediterranean basin.20 But beyond these aspects and despite the poor commitment o f the media in the deepening o f the political and cultural meaning o f these events, through the hospitality granted to the refugees and the political support given to Jewish illegal immigration to Palestine, the new Italian political establishment Alcide De Gasperi, Pietro Nenni, Giuseppe Romita, Rodolfo Morandi contributed to turn the page of persecutions and inaugurated a new phase of political relations with Zionism and new approaches towards the Jewish world. The drafting of the Constitution o f the Italian Republic belongs to this phase. Beginning with the institutional referendum and the elections held on 2 June 1946, the Constitution came into force on 1 January 1948 and ratified the Jewish reintegration process by clearly stating the principles of freedom and equality.21 Besides this seminal acknowledgement, the new constitutional situation o f Italian Jews between 1946 and 1948 must be analyzed from a double perspective: that is, to detect the political and juridical contribution o f Italian Jews to the drafting of the Constitution, and to identify their expectations by 20 See Mario Toscano, La Porta di Sion. L'ltalia e I ’immigrazione clandestina ebraica in Palestina (1945-1948), Bologna, 1990, p. 351. 21 Davide Jona Falco, “La legislazione italiana contro antisemitismo e razzismo,” In: Sarfatti, Il ritorno, pp. 116-17.

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evaluating “to what extent the general and specific requests of the Jews and the protection of fundamental rights of citizens, as individuals and as groups, were guaranteed by the Constitution, with particular attention to the freedom of religion and cult and to the banning of discrimination.”22 As we will see later, the leadership of Italian Jewry in those years starting with the charismatic and active leader, Raffaele Cantoni carefully avoided mixing the needs o f “Jewish politics” with the political action of each party, whose anti-fascist approach seemed to offer sufficient guarantees 23 From this perspective we must analyze the actions of the Union of Jewish Communities towards constitutional perspectives and the specific work o f the Constituent Assembly. At the first congress of Jewish communities held after the war in Rome, in March 1946, the approved agenda requested that the “principle of absolute equality o f all religions and all rights and duties for all citizens” be stressed and inserted in the Constitution, codes, laws and regulations.24 After the elections of the Constituent Assembly and the institutional referendum on 2 June 1946 (about which the proZionist weekly Israel, semi-official paper of Italian Jewry, expressed a pro-Republic approach),25 the new president of the Union, Raffaele Cantoni, sent a letter to the Jewish deputies elected to the Constituent Assembly (all people of stature: Ugo Della Seta, Vittorio Foa, Giuseppe Emanuele Modigliani, Rita Montagnana Togliatti, Emilio Sereni, Umberto Terracini, Paolo Treves) assuring them of the Union’s cooperation. The action of the Union towards the insertion of the principle of equality o f religions in the Constitution was developed through some direct political contacts and the preparation of a 22 Giorgio Sacerdoti, “Gli ebrei e la Costituzione,” In: Sarfatti, II ritorno, p. 47. 23 Sergio 1. Minerbi, Un ebreo fra D 'Amunzio e il sionismo: Raffaele Cantoni, Rome, 1992, p. 202; Guri Schwarz, “Appunti per una storia degli ebrei in Italia dopo le persecuzioni (1945-1956),” Studi Storici, 41 (2000), pp. 777-78. 24 See Gianni Long, Alle origini del pluralismo confessionale, Bologna, 1990, pp. 288ff. On the congress, see Aucei, Fondo Ucii dal 1945 b.l5B III Congresso 1946; Sacerdoti, “Gli ebrei e la Costituzione,” p. 50. 25 Long, Alle origini, p. 289; Schwarz, “Appunti,” pp. 776-77. 26 Minerbi, Un ebreo, p. 203. 27 On 21 March 1947 Cantoni was received in audience by De Gasperi and Terracini; on 22 March, together with the protestants of Piedmonte by De Nicola (first, and temporary, president of Republic, 1946-1948). Not all the members of the Council

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document sent to the Constituent members on 3 March 1947. This document underlined the Jews’ discontent with the emerging approach that recognized the special position of the Catholic Church, a position that invalidated the equality of the different religions.28 In short, the approval o f article 7 o f the Constitution, which stated that Church-State relations were ruled by the Concordat o f 1929, and the particular wording of article 8 that all religions had “equal freedom” before the law, thwarted the expectations of the Jews and confirmed a situation o f inequality since the Catholic Church was given a privileged position. Moreover, article 8 was not to be implemented for a long time, which had significant repercussions on the equal freedom and dignity of religions.29 However, in the long term this event acquired very different features: not only do articles 3 and 19 o f the Constitution ratify the principle of equality o f citizens irrespective of their religion, but, as Mazzamuto writes, article 8 shows that: The legislator of the Constitution turned his back to the glorious liberal tradition that gave many satisfactions to the Jews immediately after the unification o f Italy, a tradition mentioned in articles 19 and 20, as said above, and made a new basis for new relations between the State and the religious confessions. In fact, besides the principle of equal freedom before the law, article 8 states the innovative principles of self-organization of confessions other than the Catholic one and the negotiation of the relations between the State and the confessions, although mediated by state laws. In this case, too, the republican Constitution found a successful compromise between the liberal tradition and the most modem suggestions of the Catholic pluralism and juridical institutionalism, and saw the religious confessions as active actors in the building up of an open and democratic society, actors with original juridical authority, although submitted to the state verification.30

of the Union were in favor of a clear position; Minerbi, Un ebreo, p. 204; see also Long, Alle origini, pp. 297-98, 291-94. 28 Long, Alle origini, pp. 294-99; “Rilievi e proposte presentati dall’Unione delle Comunità Israelitiche Italiane sul progetto di Costituzione della Repubblica formulate dalla Commissione per la Costituzione,” La Rassegna mensile di Israel (1985), pp. 467-76; Sacerdoti, “Gli ebrei e la Costituzione,” pp. 51-53. 29 Sacerdoti, ibid., p. 52; Salvatore Mazzamuto, “Ebraismo e diritto dalla prima emancipazione all’età repubblicana,” Storia d'ltalia. Annali, In: Corrado Vivanti (ed.), Storia d ’ltalia. Annali XI: Gli ebrei in Italia II D all’emancipazione a oggi, Turin, 1997, pp. 1796-97. 30 Mazzamuto, “Ebraismo e diritto,” pp. 1795-96.

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♦

♦

♦

Together with acknowledging the problematic development o f democracy in Italy, in which the reintegration o f the Jews took place, we should also discuss the evolution of Italian Jewry, with particular reference to their identity and their analysis o f their suffering during the persecutions, and, more generally, the transformation o f their relations with politics, society and the State in those crucial years.3132 After liberation, the condition o f the Jewish population was pitiable. Their numbers were drastically reduced and they were experiencing enormous economic hardship; they had lost their jobs and professional standing, had been excluded socially and culturally - all resulting from the racial laws and persecutions. O f the approximately forty-eight thousand Italian Jews and ten thousand foreign Jews recorded in 1938 according to the racial criteria, after the war they numbered only thirty thousand. About eight thousand Jews had been deported, six thousand had emigrated, and four thousand had converted to Christianity. In their rebuiliding efforts, both material and organizational, Italian Jews could rely on the help of international organizations such as the American Joint Distribution Committee, on the input and boost provided by Jewish soldiers in the Allied armies and the Jewish Brigade, on the presence o f the military rabbis in the Allied Forces, and on the support provided by Italian Jews who had emigrated to the United States,33 Palestine,34 and Switzerland, where on 8 and 9 April 1945 an important assembly was held on the future o f Italian Jewry.35

31 On the nature of Jewish society before the war and its various trends there are many studies. Apart from the cited studies by Renzo de Felice see Michele Sarfatti, Gli ebrei nell ’Italia fascista, Turin, 2000, pp. XI-377; Mario Toscano, Ebrei ed ebraismo in Italia. Dal 1848 alia guerra dei sei giom i, Milan, 2003, pp. 316. 32 See De Felice, Storia degli ebrei, pp. 6, 8, 334, 367; Picciotto Fargion, II libro; Schwarz, Appunti, pp. 759-60. The number of Jews deported from Italy and the Dodecanesos were 8,566 (of these 7,557 perished), 303 perished in Italy (Picciotto Fargion, ibid, p.26). 33 Mario Toscano, “L’emigrazione ebraica italiana dopo il 1938,” Storia contemporanea, 19 (1988), pp. 1303-4; Minerbi, Un ebreo, p. 135. 34 Amos Luzzatto, “Autocoscienza e identité ebraica,” In: Vivanti, Storia d ’ltalia, pp. 1874-75; Toscano, L ’emigrazione ebraica, p. 311. 35 Toscano, “Gli ebrei in Italia dall’emancipazione alle persecuzioni,” Storia contemporanea, 17 (1986), p. 943.

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Besides their need for rehabilitation, the Jews had to deal with the redefinition of their identity in a context crossed by stimulating suggestions but also painful uncertainties. This process has not been clearly explained by historiography, but some quotations may help us understand the core aspects of this situation. On 31 May 1970, in his opening speech to the congress o f Italian Jewish Communities, Andrea Tabet recalled the atmosphere of pain, enthusiasm and exultation that prevailed at the congress of 1946, the first after the liberation. He said: Italian Jews were physically, morally and economically destroyed.... All of them, despite the reintegration, got closer to the State that had been their persecutor and stepfather for six years with a mix of hope and uncertainty. Mistrust towards a deeply unfair State, felt especially by young people, was a serious sign.... The State did not realize how serious was the problem of Italian Jewish youth, did not invite them to take again a place in the national society, nor did show any interest in solving the problem.36

This was a retrospective view, but one not very different from the feelings expressed in a letter dated 16 July 1945 and sent by Giuseppe Nathan, commissioner of the Union, to Ferruccio Parri, president o f the Italian Council of Ministers: The Jews... expect a word of acknowledgment and support by the Government to help in reducing the seeds of hatred largely widespread .... during the fascist period. The Jews, Italian citizens, were... deprived of their assets, but not so much as of their dignity. Later on, a decree of abrogation put an end to such an infamy; until now, however, the Jews waited in vain for an authoritative declaration that could tell them by which heart and intentions they are readmitted in the places from where they had been expelled.37

The issue of leadership was closely connected to the search for a new identity and organization. The persecutions and the war had profoundly affected the old leadership. A few months after Rome was liberated, 36 Andrea Tabet, “Venticinque anni di libertà costituzionale,” La Rassegna mensile di Israel (1970), pp. 292-93. 37 ACS, PCM 1944-1947 b.3.2.2 f.12573 sf.l, 16 July 1946 letter 683/45 from Nathan to Parri; see also, and mainly for social consequences, the Report of the Extraordinary Commissioner of the Rome Jewish Community, Aw. Silvio Ottolenghi, read in the aula magna of the ‘Vittorio Polacco’ school on 19 October 1944, in ACS, PCM 1944-1947 b.3.2.2 f. 12573 sf.l, and the correspondence from Livorno in Israel, 18 January 1945, on the wide but insufficient distribution of clothes to the needy Jews of the city.

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Dante Almansi, who headed the Union o f Jewish Communties since 1939 during its most difficult period, asked to be replaced. Giuseppe Nathan was appointed as Special Commissioner, but this choice led to vehement protests because he had not participated in Jewish community life.38 In February 1945, when all the communities in the north were still waiting to be liberated, the liberated Jews of Rome were stunned by the sensational news that Eugenio Zolli, the Chief Rabbi of Rome, had been baptized. In an article entitled “The Right Path” that appeared in Israel, the author lambasted the lack o f “Masters, Leaders, Shepherds” in the uncertain reality that had followed the chaos after the “despicable fascist prohibitions and cruel Nazi persecutions”; too many institutions were lacking “leaders, or led by people not prepared for that task.”39 Perhaps this judgment was particularly severe since the weekly Israel was a militant paper. Nonetheless, it was recording the ferment especially among the Zionists and the youth animating the Roman Jewish life in those weeks, as well as the immense obstacles still to be overcome. In April 1945, after the liberation of Jewish communities in the North, the process of formation o f a new leadership was accelerated thanks to the contribution made by new people who previously had been active in various frameworks: they had lived through the experiences of northern Italy, persecutions, escape to Switzerland and resistance until April 1945. The Union leader, Nathan, was assisted by four vice-commissioners, including Renzo Levi and Raffaele Cantoni,40 the latter bringing into the management of Jewish affairs his anti-fascist political experience of the Resistenza, which had been strong in the north.41 But this was not the sole innovation. The new Jewish Council of Rome42 called on 38 Stefano Caviglia, “La speranza tradita: i primi due anni di attività delFUnione delle Comunità Israelitiche Italiane,” In: Sarfatti, II ritomo, pp. 182-86; Luzzatto, “Autocoscienza e identité ebraica,” pp. 1871-72. 39 “La via giusta,” in Israel, 22 February 1945; see also “Una clamorosa defezione,” Israel, 15 February 1945. 40 Caviglia, “La speranza tradita,“ p. 187; Luzzatto, “Autocoscienza e identité ebraica,” p. 1872. 41 On Cantoni’s personality and activities in 1945-1946, see Minerbi, Un ebreo, pp. 148-49, 153, 155, 160, 166, 169, 175. 42 Israel, 17 May 1945.

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David Prato, who had emigrated to Palestine in 1939 because o f his conflicts with the old leadership, to take on the mantle o f rabbi again. The Union congress held in March 1946 ratified the establishment of a new executive, with Raffaele Cantoni as president. Cantoni, already active in the Socialist party, chose to be active in the Jewish community as well. He succeeded in keeping these two environments separate - in order not to harm the autonomy and independence of the institution representing Italian Jews,43 to which he gave “an exceptional vitality and Zionist spirit.”44 His work mirrored the new values and trends of the new leadership, based on the ties connecting Zionism, the Shoah and the Resistenza, all elements that had become the basis for the new identity and image o f Italian Jews. The new Italian Jewish leadership - a small active minority in a community with fervent internal discussions - was shaped also by the return of important people who had emigrated, including even from the Land of Israel which was the dream of a generation educated on the texts o f religious tradition and Zionist thinking. Among them were David Prato and Dante Lattes. From the summer of 1943 other Jews who had left Italy after promulgation of the racial laws began to organize their return, some to fight fascism, and others later to simply resume their lives.45 It should be noted that soon after the war Italian Jews did not choose aliya, unlike other Jews who wanted to leave Europe. Between 1945 and 1956, 1,041 Jews emigrated from Italy to Israel, but the majority chose to rebuild their lives in their native land.46 These data warrant investigation to understand how and why Italian Jews tried to rebuild 43 Mineibi, Un ebreo, p. 153. 44 Ibid., p. 176. “He fully engaged the Union in the support of aliya bet and sometimes even in the funding for the weapons needed for the future Jewish State. He developed links with foreign Jewish organizations, such as Joint [American Joint Distribution Committee], CME [World Jewish Congress], OSE [Oeuvre Secours aux Enfants] and ORT, to contribute to humanitarian projects. He made use of his fellow members and eminent acquaintances to influence the top Italian authorities to agree to the Union’s appeal for justice for Italian Jews;” Luzzatto, “Autocoscienza e identité ebraica,” p. 1873. 45 Toscano, L 'emigrazione, p. 1311 46 Schwarz, Appunti, pp. 794-95; Luzzatto, “Autocoscienza e identité ebraica,” p. 1879; Sergio Della Pergola and Amedeo Tagliacozzo, Gli italiani in Israele, Rome, 1978, pp. X-153.

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their relationship with their old homeland and harmonize it with their Jewish origin. This identity issue must be seen as both rooted in the political and cultural debate and also in the material difficulties o f the post war period and linked to the Jewish historical experience in unified Italy to understand its ways, content and limits. On 7 December 1944, when it resumed publication, Israel launched a bridge between the old and the new. The war was about to end, it wrote, yet nothing remained the same for the Jews and for Italy, both in need of freedom and peace. It hoped for the return of “Jewish citizens... to cooperate in rebuilding the country together with all the other Italians.... We Italian Jews... just ask to help... the real Italy, the country we love and respect, restore its fortunes,” while asking support and justice for all the Jews, from the other fellow citizens, as well as the “restoration o f Israel as a people in its land.”47 The blend o f Jewish identity revived by Zionism, and Italian identity purified o f the fascist horrors, was the core of the role played by the already liberated Italian Jews. These attitudes anticipated those of the majority o f Italian Jews after 25 April 1945 4849In examining values and aspects animating the Jewish identity reconstruction after the war, we must not understimate that the understanding o f the tragedy just experienced as Jews and Italians was made difficult by the post war 49

situation.

47 “Liberazione,” Israel, 7 December 1944 ; see also “Elezioni,” Bollettino Ebraico d ’informazioni, 16 October 1944. 48 The judgment made by Guri Schwarz is harsh, Appunti, p. 797; he wrote: after the persecution, “Italian Jews were mostly engaged in finding again their place in the society, striving to conquer a place again, and finding a meaning in Republican Italy, instead of finding again their place in history by giving a new and full interpretation of their identity.” But the need for a new place in society, for a material rebuilding of the lives of individuals and community was a priority in that internal and international context. The huge effort to regain identity went hand in hand with this rebuilding. The author also underlines the poor intellectual and political capacity of the Union leadership in those years. We must, however, mention Guri Schwarz’s intelligent contributions to the issue of Jewish identity rebuilding in those years and mentioned here below. 49 Federica Barozzi, “L’uscita degli ebrei di Roma dalla clandestinità,” In: Sarfatti, II ritomo, wrote (p. 34) that “in almost all oral testimonies examined, the memory of persecution is associated still today with that of help”; further on (p. 41), after hinting at the aspects of reconstructing Jewish life in Rome and the meeting with

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In this context we have to frame limits and contradictions, particularly the fascination of youth for different ideologies that they saw as a salvation tool: Zionism, for instance, with its proposal o f a new Jew; or communism, with its appeal of equality and opposition to antisemitic fascism and Nazism.50 Most people, however, were attracted by more general political references, ranging from the Risorgimento tradition of emancipation to the myth of Resistenza as an instrument of renewal.51 The activities of the Jewish leadership deeply involved in the experiences of its community - took place in this unsteady and changing situation. The role of the different elements shaping the identity of the Italian Jewish community o f that time is difficult to assess. To this end, the two speeches by Raffaele Cantoni broadcast on Radio Milan on 30 April 1945 and Tel Aviv Radio on 25 May 1948 can be seen as an expression both o f the ideologies and values of the Italian Jewish leadership and the feelings and opinions of most Italian Jews. His first speech emphasized the importance o f the partisans’ Resistenza, which had sanctioned the equality of Jewish citizens through the common bloodshed and had removed the “shame” inflicted on Italy by fascism. Cantoni’s wording grouped together the “military, racial or any other type of deportees,” but he stressed the sad “privilege of martyrdom” bestowed on the Jews. In conclusion, he voiced a precise ideological and planned approach: “The human solidarity shown by the healthy strata of the Italian population, often risking their lives, is positive evidence that Italy will eradicate the weed of Nazi theories....” It was time for “all actions towards a new social justice that should become the basis on which to build the New Italy.”

Jewish soldiers from Palestine, she quotes a letter sent in the fall of 1944 to Benedetto Sermoneta in Palestine by his mother, where one may read signs of non­ participation with Italians, among whom old spies are present: “We can no longer make a distinction between the good and the bad." 50 On the appeal exerted by communism, see Luzzatto, “Autocoscienza e identité ebraica,” pp. 1860, 1866-68. 51 Luzzatto wrote, ibid., p. 1860: “It is very difficult to make a global evaluation of the effects provoked by the Shoa on the Jewish majority that remained mid-way between these two extremes [Zionism and communism]." We do not have many written testimonies on this. On p. 1859 he also recalls the choice of abandoning the Jewish faith by some people after the war.

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In his speech o f 25 May, he “shouted”52 the participation o f Italian Jews in the destiny o f the yishuv (Jewish community o f the Land of Israel), and grouped together the Shoah, Zionism and resistance:53 In walking on the roads of this country and passing by Israeli soldiers, I recalled the memory of the liberation of Italy.... The certainty that the souls of millions of Jewish martyrs - victims of the greatest tragedy in history - will not rest in peace unless they meet those of the youngest martyrs, since only then will they know that their sacrifice has not been in vain.54

Among the basic elements of a new identity, persecution held a major role. The peculiarity of Italian events began to be stressed. Two phases were delineated - 1938 to 1943, and 1943 to 1945. The solidarity shown towards the Jews by the majority o f Italians was emphasized as well. On 26 September 1944, in Rome, the Committee for the Search and Rescue of Jewish Deportees55 was established under the lead o f the Union of Jewish Communities. The commemoration o f victims was launched with the same speed and carried out in a way that tried to give meaning to the catastrophe, linking it to Zionism, Resistenza, as a continuation of centuries o f persecutions.56 While the latter tried to insert the current tragedy into the history of the Jewish diaspora, and the link to Zionism offered an ideological perspective to the future o f world Jews, the Resistenza held the decisive appeal for Italian Jews. In reestablishing a national Italian identity, the Resistenza repre­ sented for the Jews a function o f emancipation and nationalization similar to that of the Risorgimento one century earlier. It was seen as one o f the pillars o f the new Jewish identity, charged with many meanings: the Jews had made political choices and participated in the Resistenza as Italians, but it was clear that the defeat of fascism and the victory o f the anti-fascist movement were the basis for their full national reintegration.57 The central role given to the Resistenza, seen as a “second Risorgimeno,” established it as the basis of a new national 52 53 54 55

La Rassegna Mensile di Israel, June-August 1950, pp. 21-22. Minerbi, Un ebreo, p. 212. La Rassegna Mensile di Israel, June-August 1950, p. 23. Lilliana Picciotto Fargion, “La liberazione dai campi di concentramento e il rintraccio degli ebrei italiani dispersi,” In: Sarfatti, II ritomo, pp. 13-30. 56 Guri Schwarz, “L’elaborazione del lutto. La classe diligente ebraica italiana e la memoria dello sterminio (1944-1948),” In: Sarfatti, II ritomo, pp. 167-80. 57 Luzzatto, “Autocoscienza e identité ebraica,” pp. 1856-57.

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deal joining Italian Jews and their fellow citizens, both having shared a common experience o f oppression swept away and purified by the fight against the Germans and fascists. This interpretation involved a diminution of the consensus, weight and role of fascism in the country’s history. Fascism was seen as an interruption between two more important periods of tolerant liberalism and growing democracy.58 This interpretation of recent events was also supported by some Italian Jews,59 who saw it as reassuring and comforting and vital for the construction o f a new identity. In some cases, the exalted generosity shown by the Italian population to the victims o f the persecution also had political consequences.60 However, this self-portrait o f their condition after the war should not be seen as self-deception, an incapacity to understand the reality. Rather, it is the self-portrait o f their relationship with fascism that was widespread among Italians at that time, and the emphasis made by antifascism since the second half o f the twenties on the distinction between Italy and fascism. This distinction was embodied in all the propaganda used by exiled representatives of democratic anti-fascism, who presented themselves as the representatives of the true Italy. After 1938, this propaganda helped many emigrated Jews to support anti-fascist groups, including the Resistenza's mythic regenerating function of the nation. It remained the background of anti-fascist forces against the past regime and the Allied powers, which were so harsh towards the new Italy.61 These elements were reinforced in subsequent years and created a background of ideas and values destined to last for a long time, until the crisis produced by the Six Day War in 1967 and, in some ways, until the events of 1982 the consequences of the Lebanon war and the terrorist attack to the Sinagogue of Rome, on 9 October, 1982. Many 58 Schwarz, L ’elaborazione, p. 173-74; and Appunti, p. 786; less convincing are the statements expressed on pages 784-85. 59 Schwarz, “Identità ebraica e identità italiana nel ricordo dell’antisemitismo fascista,” In: idem., La memoria della legislazione e della persecuzione antiebraica nella storia dell’Italia repubblicana, Milan, 1999, pp. 31-34. 60 Minerbi, Un ebreo, p. 186. 61 See the references on this matter in Toscano, L ’emigrazioner, Idem., “Dalla democrazia risorgimentale allTtalia nuova: il Partito Repubblicano Italiano e il problema della nazione (1943-1946),” Storia contemporanea, 25 (1994), pp. 10591107.

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Italian Jews, however, did not fail to notice the consequences of subsuming their Jewish specific fate into the overwhelming antifascist myth, destined to come again to the surface in new crises. This attitude derived from the inner lacks of the Jewish world and the political situation that reigned in those years, as well as the cultural atmosphere that characterized Italy after the war. This reality was shared also by the Jews and contributed to the diminishing of information and processing o f the Jewish tragedy, in particular the tragedy of Italian Jews. O f course, several intellectuals of that time voiced their opinions on this issue, but they lacked the tools to understand it.6263 The same can be said for the Catholic culture - still carrying traditional prejudices that only the pontificate o f John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) began to dismantle; the socialist culture - with the Communist Party especially linked to the Soviet experience and unable to understand the specific dimension o f the Jewish persecution; the liberal culture - arrested in an enlightened vision of the Jewish condition and foreign to the modem plurality of cultures,64 and manifest in the position taken by the philosopher Benedetto Croce in 1946 demanding that Jews assimilate. This demand raised protest by Dante Lattes.65

62 Marie-Anne Matard-Bonucci, “La libération des camps de concentration et le retour des déportés à travers la presse quotidienne italienne,” In: Annette Wieviorka and Claude Mouchard (eds.), La Shoah. Témoignages, savoirs, oeuvres, Orleans, 1999, pp. 101-14. 63 Alberto Cavaglion, “Sopra alcuni contestati giudizi intomo alla storia degli ebrei in Italia (1945-1949),” In: Sarfatti, Il ritorno, pp. 151-56. 64 Finzi, “Da perseguitati,” pp. 112-13; Giovanni Miccoli, “Tra rimozione e memoria: antisemitismo e Shoah nel mondo cattolico,” In: La memoria, pp. 9-26: MatardBonucci, “La libération,” p. 108; some remarks on this in the introduction to Mario Toscano and Francesca Sofia (eds.), Stato nazionale ed emancipazione ebraica: atti del Convegno “Stato nazionale, societa civile e minoranze religiose: l 'emancipazione degli ebrei in Francia, Germania e Italia tra rigenerazione morale e intolleranza" (Roma, 23-25 ottobre 1991), Rome, 1992, pp. 9-12. 65 Cavaglion, “Sopra alcuni contestati,” pp. 158 ff; Finzi, “Da perseguitati,” pp. 10812; See also in Israel, 11 January 1945, the double review dedicated to 16 ottobre 1943 and Otto ebrei by Giacomo De Benedetti. The paper praised 16 Ottobre 1943, basic text to historical reconstruction of persecutions, and critized Otto ebrei because “sullied by the manifestation of a false and inconsistent Jewish faith”.

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It was not by chance that two volumes expressing the Risorgimento vision o f emancipation were reprinted in that era. Gli ebrei sono uominf*6 by Massimo D ’Azeglio and Suite interdizioni israelitiche6 67 6 by Carlo Cattaneo seemed to offer some clues to understanding the new tragedy in order to return to the liberal and democratic tradition of the Risorgimento. These last examples help to underline the impossible simplification of such a complex issue. O f course, in its immediate consequences, the process of reintegration led to Jews participating in Italian life. Despite demands to the Risorgimento, however, nothing was as before, since the wound inflicted in 1938 to a community that had always been active in national events since 1848 was too deep and had affronted the Italian identity of that community. Today, after half a century, we have the perspective to see the contours of the reintegration process caused by the specific ideological and cultural horizons that influenced the integration process. Analyzing from this point of view the relationship between state, society and Italian Jews the wound of the antisemitic legislation although healed by the arriving democracy, remained an unfinished business in the process of national integration.

66 Rome, 1944 (review in Israel, 4 January 1945). 67 Rome, 1944 (review in Israel, 21 December 1944).

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The Written Memoir: Italy 1945-1947 MANUELA CONSONNI How can a survivor o f the ultimate evil, the “unspeakable,” communicate, recount and relate events and experiences beyond the limitations o f language? Bridging the chasm between the lived event and what is told of that event that surpasses imagination. This was described in 1947 by Robert Antelme, a member of the French Resistance who was deported to Gandersheim in 1944: “We saw that it was impossible to bridge the gap that we discovered between the words at our disposal and that experience which, in the case of most of us, was still going on within our bodies. No sooner would we begin to tell our story than we would be choking over it. And then, even to us, what we had to tell would start to seem unimaginable.”' Without trying to forge a mystique of the ‘ “unspeakability”’ of the concentration camp experience, but in an attempt to fix our gaze on what is described as “unspeakable,” I want to rebuild the pattern of the writings of the concentration camp experience in Italy between the years 1945 and 1947. A writing that contains by definition what the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben calls the “aporia of Auschwitz,” the discrepancy that invests the very same structure of the witnessing; a discrepancy that is, in his words, “the very aporia o f the historical knowledge: the non-coincidence between facts and truth, between verification and comprehension.”12

1

2

Robert Antelme, The Human Race, Vermont, 1992, p. 3 (Original edition, L 'espèce humaine, Paris, 1947); Marguerite Duras, La Douleur, Paris, 1985. Antelme was bom in Corsica in 1919 but lived all his life in Paris. He was arrested in 1944 and deported to Gandersheim, a sub-camp of Buchenwald. He was liberated at Dachau at the end of April 1945. Giorgio Agamben, Remnants o f Auschwitz. The Witness and the Archive, New York, 1999, p. 12. (Original edition, Quel ehe resta di Auschwitz', i'archivio e il testimone, Turin, 1998).

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Talking about the “unspeakable” of Auschwitz means not only describing the kind o f testimony, its internal essence - a testimony b y definition incomplete, fragmented and full of gaps. But, as stated above, the unspeakable describes also the frontal collision between a world fallen apart and its language, which remains the same as before. These two aspects are very much intertwined. The difficulty with this writing is not only o f a semantic nature, the absence o f words to describe an extreme reality, but it involves the very testimony itself. The impossibility o f fully depicting that reality makes the testimony incomplete and fragmented. Therefore the testimony becomes in itself unspeakable. In other words, the survivor testified about something that cannot be testified. As Primo Levi points out very clearly in his last book: I must repeat it - we, the survivors, are not the true witnesses [...] but they are, the Muselmann,3 the submerged, the complete witnesses, the one whose deposition would have a general significance [...] we who were favored by fate tried, with more or less wisdom, to recount not only our fate but also that of the others, the submerged. But this was a discourse on “behalf of third parties” the story of things seen from close by, not experienced personally.4

This is the central theme o f the Italian written memoir o f the years 1945-1947 - the “unspeakable” as the essence o f what has been felt and experienced in the encounter with the extreme evil.5 Jean Amery wrote that if we cannot transmit how the pain o f this encounter was, we can still try to describe what this pain was: “Since the how o f pain defies communication through language, perhaps I can at least approximately state what it was.”6 We can use his reflections on

3 4 3

6

A term, used by prisoners in concentration camps, which referred to an inmate who was on the brink of death from starvation, and hopelessness [ed.]. Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, London, 1988, pp. 63-64. (Original edition, I Sommersi e I Salvati, Turin, 1986). Anna Bravo and Daniele Jalla, Una misura onesta. Gli scritti di memoria della deportazione, 1944-1993, Milan, 1994. On this problem see also, Sidra EzrahiDeKoven, By Words Alone: the Holocaust in Literature, Chicago, 1980; Saul Friedländer (ed.), Probing the Limits o f Representation, Cambridge, 1992; Dominick LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz, Ithaca, 1998. Jean Amery, At the M ind’s Limit, London, 1999, p. 33. (Original edition, Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne. Bewältigungsversuche eines Überwältigten, Munich, 1966).

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torture and extend them as a possible interpretation o f the concentra­ tionary experience. In a certain way, this writing constitutes the ultimate violation of the border between the “I” and the “Other;” a violation that, as Amery puts it, can be neither neutralized by the hope for rescue nor resolved by self-defense actions. This pain remains as it is: invasive and pervasive, most of the time without adequate words to express it. There are no words, written or spoken. The “verbum,” the word, died in Auschwitz.7 And not only the metaphysical word, but the written and spoken word as well. That is why we cannot bend this core of experience to the word suited for normal channels of communication and expression placed at culture's disposal to describe it. The absence o f a socio-temporal codification of this kind of pain experience, spiritual and physical at once, makes its social re-integration an impossible goal. We still have a problem in reading and understanding this writing, because of the missing agents o f the discourse, If it is correct to state that “only through an ideal and social mediation can the pain be introduced as discourse, only through indirect ways,” we will call them representational ways; “humanity dispels the silence that inevitable falls whereas the pain struck.”8 There is also another aspect, not less important for our study, related to the word “unspeakable.”9 In the story telling, the listener can at any moment shirk the effort o f imagining a reality that he or she prefers to avoid and even to remove. But this “event without witnesses” 10 - in its double meaning of something that “is impossible to bear witness from the inside since no one can bear witness from the inside of death, and there is no voice for the disappearance of voice, and from outside since

7 8

Ibid., p. 20. Salvatore Natoli, L'esperiema del dolore. Le form e del patire nella cultura occidentale, Milan, 1986, p. 10. (My translation) 9 Bravo and Jalla, Una misura onesta. On this subject see: Jean-Michel Chaumont, “L'inimaginable, l’indicible et ('intransmissible au service de la trasmission,’’ Histoire et memoire des crimes et genocides nazis, Brussels, 1992; Yannis Thanassekos, “Milieux de memoire: survivants et formation des heritiers. Bilan et perspectives," ibid; Carlo Ginzburg, “Unus Testis. Lo sterminio degli ebrei e il principio di realtà,” Quademi Storici, 80 (1992), pp. 529-48; Agamben, Quel ehe resta di Auschwitz, pp. 39-44. 10 Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises o f Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History, New York, 1992.

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the ‘outsider’ is by definition excluded from the event” 11 - is at the core of the memoir literature on the concentration camps. In this tension between the inside and the outside, the writing of the years 1945-1947 acquires a far greater importance. The major part of Italian knowledge on the deportations and the Shoah derives, at least until the middle o f the 1950s, from these written memoirs and not from its history. The survivors’ memory turns to be the conditio sine qua non to penetrate the gray zones of which this history is full. The experiences of the Italian Jews, anti-fascists and military internees sent to extermination and concentration camps have been saved, to a substantial degree, thanks to the written memoir recollected by the survivors. The “unspeakable” as an experience and the decision to leave it as is, is therefore a result o f a political, ideological and social decision o f individuals and institutions, who, by choosing the option of silence, transferred responsibility from themselves to the protagonists, and from history to memory. As time goes by, the chasm between memory and history, rather than closing up, becomes deeper. As one author put it: “the first becomes more painful, the second more sterile, as memory takes to itself the entire burden of anguish and guilt that these events bear, while history avoids it completely.” 12 The texts discussed here are scattered, published by small and unknown publishers, with just a few hundred copies printed, circulated among a small circle of people and of such short shelf life duration that some of them are practically unknown and others quite impossible to find. But they are fundamental to our attempt to grasp the various aspects o f this memory, the modes and the forms in which memory expressed itself and was passed on, so similar and at the same time so different.13 These books portray the plurality o f experiences and 11 Agamben, Quel ehe resta di Auschwitz, p. 35. Amos Goldberg, “I" Text and Powerlessness: diaries that were written by Jews during the Holocaust, PhD dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 2004. 12 Anna Rossi Doria, “Memoria e storia dei lager nazisti. A proposito de La vita offesa,” Movimento operaio e socialista, 1-2 (1987), pp. 91-92. By the same author see also Memoria e storia: il caso della deportazione, Catanzaro, 1998 (My translation). 13 Anna Bravo and Daniele Jalla, “Myth, Impotence and Survival in the Concentration Camp,” in: Raphael Samuel and Paul Thompson (eds.), The Myths We Live By, London-New York, 1990; Bravo and Jalla, Una misura onesta. By

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THE WRITTEN MEMOIR: ITALY 1945-1947

memories so typical o f the ‘“ concentration camp’ discourse.” All the major camps and many of their sub-camps appear: Auschwitz, Mauthausen, Buchenwald, Ravensbrück, Flossenburg, Dachau, etc. Military internees, political deportees, Jews, men and women, young­ sters and the not so young, people from different social and cultural backgrounds and ideological orientation - all are shown and heard in these books. Together with significant fragments of events previous to the deportations comes the chain of events leading to the camp: from arrest to detention in Italian prisons and transit camps, the journey in the sealed wagons, the arrival at the camps, selection, quarantine, numbering, relations between the different national groups, loneliness, tensions and conflicts, the resistance, solidarity, hunger and cold, punishment, the deaths o f comrades, their faces, their names, the Kapos and their names, the gas chamber and the crematorium. Owing to the personal point of view on which each story is based, every book offers specific elements of knowledge and suggests particular reflections. As the Italian historian Anna Bravo suggests, through a constant process of accumulation in time, the texts propose a first attempt at a larger synthesis, offering an exceptionally significant and extraordinary corpus o f primary sources, extraordinary but mostly ignored. A “literary” production that has hardly been acknowledged. Such a modest echo evidently reflects, if not a lack of interest, certainly the problematic attitude of an entire society. Everywhere - and not only in Italy - the attention from the beginning, the participation, the awareness of individuals and the collective consciousness of society to the survivors’ story, neither fulfilled expectations o f survivors nor measured up to the magnitude o f events. And maybe they receive, as such, far less attention than that apparently granted to other events o f that period in Italian national history.14 The fate o f these books reflects society’s pronounced deafness in this area, its rejection o f the deportation and the events of the Shoah, and

Anna Bravo see also: “Social Perception of the Shoah in Italy,” in: Bernard Dov Cooperman and Barbara Garvin (eds.), The Jews o f Italy; Memory and Identity, London, 2000. 14 Claudio Pavone, Una guerra civile; Saggio storico sulla moralità nella Resistenza, Turin, 1994; idem, Alle origini della Repubblica. Scritti su fascismo, antifascismo e continuité dello stato, Turin, 1995.

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illustrates the conflict between the word and its impact, marking the passage from written expression to memory. Only a tiny minority of the survivors succeeded in writing. Inside the camps the act o f recollection was in itself a risky business. In order to fully understand its significance it is necessary to think o f the physical weakness, the permanent anxiety, the vital need of gauging and dealing with the trauma o f watching and feeling, the focusing first and foremost on that supreme effort of surviving that ordeal. The prisoners, hardly believing that what was happening was real, found it almost impossible to fit things into preexistent mental patterns: “We were indeed dealing then with one o f those realities which cause one to say that they defy imagining. It became clear henceforth that only through a sifting, that is only through that self-same imagining could there be any attempting to tell something about it.” 15 But before we go any further, a first distinction is mandatory here. Military internees maintained diaries and wrote books inside the camps; they were usually permitted to read and study, to draw and to paint. For those people these activities were included in the framework of “acquired rights” and therefore tolerated. Numerous are the testimonies on this subject. That was not the case o f the Jews in the extermination camps: few written documents emerged from those camps, in general, and there are very few exceptions. There are no testimonies o f Italian Jews from the inside o f the camp, and Primo Levi is the only one who recollects that in Auschwitz he tried to write, conscious o f the privilege o f being able to work in the close environment of the Buna laboratory, to have a place to sit down that was warm, having a notebook and a pencil available; and when he felt “the sorrow o f remembering, the old strong longing o f feeling human,”16 he wrote what he was not able to tell anyone. But he would remember afterwards, in an interview many years later, that he had a notebook in which he put down notes that were not more than twenty lines: I was too afraid, writing was particularly dangerous. The act itself of writing was suspicious. From here the desire to make notes, with pencil and paper always at hand; the wish of transmitting to my mother, to my sister, to my beloved, this

15 Antelme, The Human Race, p. 5. 16 Primo Levi, Survival in Auschwitz: the Nazi Assault on Humanity, New York, 1996.

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THE WRITTEN MEMOIR: ITALY 1945-1947

human experience I was undergoing, but there were no notes. I knew so much, I would not be able to keep them. It was materially impossible. Should 1 keep them in that container... in my pocket? We had nothing.... There was no way to keep anything, only in the memory.17

In Mauthausen, Gino Gregori, anti-fascist and painter, portrays comrades and then buries the drawings with the hope that “others, not him, will find them when the ordeal is over.” Mino Micheli, in his introduction to the book that displays a collection of those drawings, comments that “very few o f the survivors really thought they would come back, and indeed few did return.” 18 Survivors also wrote in an attempt to communicate, to break the silence and to extract from the “prison experience” a human and culturally enriching core. The choice of writing went hand in hand with the need to generate a bridge between the past and the future; it became a vital force shared by those uprooted from home, segregated, vulnerable and absolutely alone. The thoughts of those who wrote are with their families, in an attempt to bring them closer. Partisan women, for example, in the attempt to solve the acute loneliness, compiled small multilingual vocabularies and wrote cooking recipes on sheets of paper recovered in various ways. As told by Pierina Bianco Struzzi in her recollections: I took waste paper which I found in bins, paper no longer useful in the office; I set it right, sewed with needle and thread and made it into a small book, and with the Russians, the French, with whoever I would talk, each gave her me recipes... Oh, there were so many recipes! Cod, meat. ... And then I made a small dictionary of all the languages.19

The initial reasons for writing were various; and the contents, the notes on events, the names, dates, worlds, recollections of moments, thoughts and emotions, all differ. But common to all were the risks, the difficulties, the revolutionary potential of the act, in frontal conflict with the “zero setting policy” practiced in the camp, which reaffirmed the 17 Primo Levi, in: Anna Bravo and Daniele Jalla (eds.), La vita offesa, Milan, 1987, p. 2S9. (My translation) 18 Gino Gregori, Ecce home & Mauthausen: Testimonianze del pittore Gino Gregori, Milan, 1946. Bom in Milan in 1906, he was arrested by the Gestapo in Zagreb. In October 1944, he was deported to Mauthausen. Bravo and Jalla, Una misura onesta, p. 428. 19 Pierina Bianco Struzzi, in: Bravo and Jalla, La vita offesa, p. 215.

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self, human dignity and one’s own existence.20 Even the moment immediately following liberation in which the memory becomes writing, could be considered part of the above process. The most important texts of this period are even more numerous than those that were published. As already said, most of them remain unpublished. An example is the diary by Tosca Di Segni Tagliacozzo. This manuscript, which she started to write during her eventful journey back to Italy, was completed in a few months. It is short, structured and precise, full of reflections, information and hope. It chronicles the events from 14 February 1944 (the day of her arrest in Rome) up until 7 a.m. o f 10 June 1945, the hour and the date on which she left the Theresienstadt concentration camp, and includes her additional handwritten note dated 10 August 1945, the day on which she finally reached Rome, her hometown.21 Often, these books published right after the war were conceived before, inside the just liberated camps, in hospitals, during the survivors’ long convalescence, during the journey back home - not as a preliminary project but as initial and final drafts. Many among the survivors wrote in an attempt to “fix” the memory. These autobio­ graphical sketches and briefs constitute a kind of diary a posteriori. It is worth mentioning the books drafted by the national and international committees, by appointees o f the Jewish communities. Immediately after the liberation, they worked on documents recovered from the offices o f the camps, on the census of the deportees, or on recollections of the survivors themselves; for example, the list o f the Comitato Ricerche Deportati Ebrei (Jewish Community’s Committee for the Search o f Jewish Survivors) created in Rome already in 1944. These accounting reports, these lists o f the living and dead, are themselves expressions o f a memory that works to form itself. One of these lists, brought to Italy by the delegation sent to assist the return of

20 Bravo and Jalla, Una misura onesta, pp. 57-67. 21 Tosca Di Segni Tagliacozzo, Questo è il riassunto di 14 mesi di una vita di prigioniera di guerra del barbaro popolo tedesco. Bom in Rome in 1905, she was arrested in Rome in February 1944, imprisoned in Regina Coeli, and sent to the Fossoli di Carpi concentration camp and from there to Auschwitz in April 1944. She was liberated in Theresienstadt. Liliana Picciotto Fargion, II libro della memoria. Gli ebrei deportati dall ’Italia (1943-1945), Milan, 1991, p. 244.

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THE WRITTEN MEMOIR: ITALY 1945-1947

the survivors o f Mauthausen, and read on the radio on 26 May 1945, was among the first testimonies o f deportations of Italians to reach the Italian public at large.22 As the survivors returned, additional witnessing followed: from the story told to family or friends, to articles in newspapers, interviews and even books and brochures. If returning to tell was the dream of everyone before, now the struggle was against the fear o f not being believed or listened to. All the survivors, Jews and not Jews, shared this concern: During the first days after our return, I think we were all prey to a genuine delirium. We wanted at last to speak, to be heard. We were told that by itself our physical appearance was eloquent enough; but we had only just returned, with us we brought back our memory of our experience, an experience that was still very much alive, and we felt a frantic desire to describe it such as it had been.23

A vivid and intense dream, full o f anguish, a dream dreamed not once but many times; a pain translated in the scene of the narration made but never heard. This did in fact take place, at least partially. The reasons for this “deafness” can be found in the climate of the times, which diluted the problems and the expectations of the survivors within a comprehensive framework of the war drama, in a way rejecting the extreme nature of their suffering: “Whoever would listen to you - but then he did not - because he too had his own story inside (but we too, you know, the bombs, the fear, the cold, think about it, we too) and there was no place for yours.”24 This was the environment in which the first books and memoirs on the concentration and extermination camps came out, one after the other: eleven in 1945, fourteen in 1946 and three in 1947. The numbers and dates of these productions are significant. In the aftermath o f their return, the survivors recounted and almost immediately began to write. Some texts were printed, other remained unpublished waiting for an editor, like the book o f Bruno Piazza, which was reviewed as a manuscript in the communist newspaper Unità in 1945 but was

22 “Salviamo 1 deportati politici,” L 'Unità, 27 May 1945; Giuliano Pajetta in L ’Unità, 29 May 1945. 23 Antelme, The Human Race, p. 3. 24 Bravo, La vita offesa, pp. 96-97.

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published only 10 years later. The publishing houses that printed them and the number o f copies printed present a picture o f a struggle for “the memory for the memory itself.” In this passage from memory to writing by many who were not professional writers or journalists we can grasp a small measure o f the survivors’ struggle to be listened to. Together with the problems connected to the war there was both a resistance and a certain deafness affecting not just the spoken but the written word as well. To illustrate that it was considered sufficient to remember, Natalia Ginzburg, o f the publishing house Einaudi, rejected in 1947 Primo Levi’s I f this is a Man. If the generic formulation o f the rejection does not allow interpreting the reasons, the fact remains that the book was printed by the small editing house De Silva due to the pressure exerted by the anti­ fascist Italian intellectual Franco Antonicelli, its creator and director. Only two thousand five hundred copies were printed, of which a thousand remained unsold and were to be lost in the flooding of Florence in 1967.2526 Like De Silva, the publishers of the books are almost exclusively the small enterprises, sometimes with very simple typography, enabling the human spirit to prevail over market logic, but too weak to obtain success. The difficulties in recovering data on the number of prints and of tracing the texts are already a significant indication of their lack of effective circulation. If in the authors’ intention the memory refers to everybody, who specifically buys and reads these books? In testimonies by military internees, a large part o f the public was represented by the protagonists themselves, which ensured success in getting the message across.27 But this is not the case when we approach 25 Bruno Piazza, Perché gli altri dimenticano, Milan, 1956. Bom in Trieste in 1899, he was arrested in July 1944, imprisoned in San Sabba concentration camp and deported to Auschwitz in July 1944. He was liberated in Auschwitz and died in Trieste a few months later. 26 Henry Stuart Hughes, Prigionieri della speranza: alia ricerca dell 'identité ebraica nella letteratura italiana contemporanea, Bologna, 1983, pp. 90-91. 27 650,000 military internees were deported to the concentrations camps, such as Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Ebensee. The death rate among the military internees was close to 10 percent. Immediately after the war the military internees organized themselves in the Associazione Nazionale ex-Intemati Militari-ANEI (National Association of the ex-Military Internees).

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THE WRITTEN MEMOIR: ITALY 1945-1947

the deportations of Jews and political prisoners. Only a few thousand among them survived the concentration and extermination camps. Jews and political prisoners were still scattered and trying to get organized. On the other hand the world of the Resistance, which was more coherent, extensive and influential, was too focused on the reconstruc­ tion of its own memory to really grasp the meaning o f the Jewish extermination. The Jews tried to be part of this Resistance ethos, they desperately wanted to be part o f it. As Giacomo Debenedetti, one o f the most important literary critics, pointed out very clearly: And if one day, to those who fell, an award for bravery is intended, obviously not us, the surviving Jews will reject it; but no medals should be coined, no citations printed: What can be inscribed on medals and citations? “Private Coen... Private Levi... Private Abramovic... Private Chaim Blumenthal... killed in Leopoli,” while with his family, with his hands tied behind his back, still defending, still witnessing the cause of freedom.2 829

The vicissitudes o f the entire literary genre could also be explained by the increasing difficulty o f the market, with its fast saturation and lack o f support by intellectual ranks. However, this “cultural inertia” reflects the political and social inertia o f a state apparatus and civil society that did not understand and support the right of the survivors and the families of the dead to a material and symbolic indemnity, nor did they recognize the deportations and the Holocaust as crucial historical events. This memoir literature encountered such an unfavorable constellation that even the literary quality of the books was placed on less important ground, so much so that the fate that fell upon I f this is a Man, by Primo Levi, showed that even the highest literary quality was not enough to ensure success. It could not have happened otherwise. In the dimension o f the document, a dense and spare document until the chronicle: “an honest measure” as the historian Armanda Guiducci puts it, for those who wrote without belonging to the mainstream of literature.30 The works published between 1945 and 1947 are all direct testimonies, mostly

28 In 1945 the Associazione Nazionale ex-Deportati-ANED (National Association of ex-Deportees) was created in Turin and included Jews and political prisoners alike. 29 Giacomo De Benedetti, 16 ottobre. Otto ebrei, Rome, 1944 (my translation). 30 Armanda Guiducci, “Sulla letteratura dei campi di sterminio,” Società, 1 (1955), pp. 110-22.

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written by individuals and written in different ways, as different as the lives o f the survivors inside the concentration camps. Some texts assumed the form o f a trial report, with facts, dates, names, numbers on which the words flow without stopping. Let us take as an example the book by Bruno Vasari, Mauthausen, Refuge o f Death, in which the personal story provides the occasion to describe the organization o f the camp, the deportees, the gas chambers.3132Others prefer the narrative record, from autobiography to testimony, from the short recount to the novel, from the drawing to the portrayal. All the texts raise, again, the oscillations between the willingness to show facts and the need to express emotions, between the descriptive and the evocative codes, the accumulation o f details and universal tension. The narrative is a request to the memory, becoming a testimonial event that wishes to go beyond the personal experience. Thus the book by Gaetano De Martino, From the San Vittore Prison to the German Lager: Under the Nazifascist Whip. And another, like the book The Inferno o f Mauthausen, with its subtitle “The Death o f 5,000 Italian Deportees,” by Gino Valenzano, that declares the defense of liberty, the absence of literary purpose, the search for justice for the dead.33

31 Bruno Vasari, Mauthausen bivacco della morte, Milan, 1943. He was bom in Trieste in 1911, served as administrative director of the Eiar (the former name of the R.A.I., the Italian national television), and was a member of the Resistance Movement in Turin and Milan. He was arrested by the SS in November 1944, imprisoned in San Vittore and in the Bolzano prison. He was deported to Mauthausen in December 1944, transferred to the Gunskirchen sub-camp, and then back to Mauthausen where he remained until liberation. He returned to Italy in June 1943. Bravo and Jalla, Una misura onesta, p. 449. 32 Gaetano De Martino, Dal carcere di San Vittore ai “Lager” tedeschi: sotto la sferza nazifascista, Milan, 1945. Bom in Irsina near Matera in 1899, a lawyer and a communist, he was arrested in Milan in November 1943 and taken to the San Vittore prison. He was deported to Mauthausen and to Ebensee, where he remained until liberation. Bravo and Jalla, Una misura onesta, p. 424. 33 Gino Valenzano, L ’inferno di Mauthausen (come morirono 5.000 italiani deportati), Turin, 1945. Bom in Asti in 1920, he was arrested in Rome together with his brother Piero. He was deported to Mauthausen and then to the sub-camp of Wien-Florisdorf and St. Valentin. He was transferred to Mauthausen, where he was liberated. Bravo and Jalla, Una misura onesta, p. 449.

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THE WRITTEN MEMOIR: ITALY 1945-1947

The memories of Dachau by Ettore Siegrist, manager at the Ansaldo factory in northern Italy, were published thanks to the intervention of the company. The author indicated in the book that “almost all the Italian editors” rejected and refused to publish it “without even evaluating the manuscript.”34 In the clinic where he was recovering, Giovanni Baima Besquet began to recount his own experience in thirty-seven drawings accompanied by brief comments.35 Thus was a “delegated writing” bom, to borrow an expression from Primo Levi, from those who wrote for others, to tell their story. Like Giancarlo Ottani who in his book, One People Cries: the tragedy o f the Italian Jews, reconstructs with the testimonies o f Italian Jews deported or victims o f racial persecutions the climate of terror suffered by the Jewish community after 1943.36 Another type of book is the novel such as Martyrdom by Enzo Rava, in which the main character is structured on the testimonies o f the other non-Jews, Ligurian and Piedmontian deportees, from adolescence through his enlisting with the partisans to his arrest and imprisonment in Mauthausen.37 Historical writing characterizes the pamphlet-book of the Communist leader Giuliano Pajetta, Mauthausen... The SS... With the Iron Bars and Finished Them All. This booklet was the sole public contribution, apart from a series of articles published in Unità in 1945, by the author who held a key role in the clandestine resistance organization in Mauthausen.38

34 Ettore Siegrist, Dachau: dimenticare sarebbe una colpa, Genova-Sampierdarena, 1945. Bom in Genoa and very active in the Resistance Movement. He was arrested in January 1944, imprisoned in Marassi and then deported to Dachau in the winter of 1944 where he remained until liberation. Bravo and Jalla, Una misura onesta, p. 444. 35 Giovanni Baima Besquet, Deportati a Mauthausen, Turin, 1946. A partisan, he was arrested in Turin in October 1943, transferred to the Nuove, Turin prison, and from there deported to Mauthausen in the winter of 1944. He was transferred to Ebensee where he remained until his liberation. He died in 1946 from tuberculosis contracted in the concentration camp. Bravo and Jalla, Una misura onesta, p. 413. 36 Giancarlo Ottani, Un popolo piange: la tragedia degli ebrei italiani, Milan, 1945. 37 Enzo Rava, Martirio, Genoa, 1945. Bravo and Jalla, Una misura onesta, p. 169. 38 Giuliano Pajetta, Mauthausen & Le SS presero delle sbarre di ferro e li fm irono tutti. Pochi minuti dopo dei carri trainati da uomini portavano 1 cadaveri al

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Informative, like a documentary report, is the book by Aldo Bizzarri, Mauthausen: Hermetic City. Bizzarri wrote about himself in the third person: “Only now that those images are in certain degree removed from the conscious to remain on paper... he feels a normal man again. »»39 A very interesting aspect o f this “right after the war memoir writing” is the presence of five female testimonies published between 1945 and 1947. The writers are five Jewish women, all Auschwitz survivors: Lina Millu, Frida Misul, Luciana Nissim, Giuliana Tedeschi and Albina Valech. Primo Levi in his introduction to The Smoke o f Birkenau, written by Millu, defines it as “One of the most intense European testimonies on the women's camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau.” The tales that make up the book recount the story o f six women in the camp.40 Frida Misul structures her book, Between the Jaws o f the Nazi Monster, in a similar way. “The reader does not search in my writing lyric for excerpts or discursive digressions. 1 start by saying that 1 am not a writer and with these pages 1 simply want to narrate... the experiences that had me as protagonist in the period o f time elapsing *

crematorio, Milan, 1946. Bom in Turin, he was a member of the Communist leadership and fled illegally to France in 1931. He participated in the Civil War in Spain, fighting in the International Brigades. During World War II he fought in France with the Maquis. He arrived in Italy and was arrested in Milan in October 1944 and imprisoned in San Vittore and then in Bolzano. He was deported to Mauthausen in November 1944 where he represented the Italians in the camp’s clandestine resistance committee. Bravo and Jalla, Una misura onesta, p. 438. 39 Aldo Bizzarri, Mauthausen: città ermetica, Rome, 1946. Bom in Rome in 1907, he was a university professor, journalist and writer; between 1934 and 1944 he lived and worked in Santiago de Chile, Rennes, Lisbon and Budapest. He was arrested in Budapest by the Gestapo in March 1944 for anti-fascist activities, detained in the prison of the city and then deported to Mauthausen in May 1944. He was liberated in Mauthausen. Bizzarri, Mauthausen, pp. 2-3; Bravo and Jalla, Una misura onesta, p. 417. 40 Liana Millu, IIfum o di Birkenau, Milan, 1947. Millu (Mlillul) was bom in Pisa in 1914; she was an active member of the Resistance Movement in Genoa, and was arrested in March 1944, brought to Fossoli di Carpi, and then to Auschwitz where she arrived at the end of May 1944. She was transferred to Birkenau and was liberated during the March evacuation in the Malkow area. Bravo and Jalla, Una misura onesta, pp. 435-36; Picciotto Fargion, II libro della memoria, p. 420.

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under the merciless yoke o f those evil creatures.”41 With very short chapters, the book starts with the arrest of the author, narrates the internment in Fossoli, the deportation to Auschwitz, the work in an ammunition factory, and the liberation. In Women Against the Monster, with an introduction by Camilla Ravera, the author Luciana Nissim presents two female testimonies of concentration life in Auschwitz, two parallel stories. The first part o f the book offers a precise description o f the medical-sanitary situation inside the camp where Luciana Nissim worked as a doctor. The second part is the narrative of Pelagia Lewinska, also an Auschwitz survivor, which is placed as background, as a general descriptive scenario of the female conditions inside the concentration camp.42 A “flat” narrative registry was also chosen by Albina Valech, Sienese in origin, in her book A24029. Structured in brief chapters, after a long section dedicated to the racial persecution suffered by her family, she recounts the deportation to Fossoli and then to Birkenau. The introduction to the book states: “The author, previous to the tragedy she endured, had no literary ambitions. ... Rather than a continued narration... she preferred an episodic structure.”43 41 Frida Misul, Fra gli artigli del mostro nazista: la più romanzesca delle realtà il più realistico dei romanzi, Livorno, 1946. Bom in Leghorn 1919, she was arrested in Ardenza at the beginning of April 1944 and sent to the Leghorn prison and later to the transit camp Fossoli di Carpi. She arrived at Auschwitz on May 1944 and was transferred to Theresienstadt where she was liberated. Bravo and Jalla, Una misura onesta, p. 436; Picciotto Fargion, II libro della memoria, p. 422. 42 Luciana Nissim, Ricordi della casa dei morti, in: Luciana Nissim and Pelagia Lewinska (eds.), Donne contro il mostro, Turin, 1946. Bom in Turin in 1919, she was a doctor and active in the Resistance Movement. She was arrested in Brusson, Aosta, in the middle of December 1943 together with Primo Levi. After being interned in the transit camp Fossoli di Carpi, she was deported to Auschwitz in February 1944 where she was used as a physician. She was later deported to Hessisch-Lichtenau, a sub-camp of Buchenwald and liberated in the Leipzig area in April 1945. Bravo and Jalla, Una misura onesta, p. 437; Picciotto Fargion, II libro della memoria, p. 447. 43 Alba (Albina) Valech Capozzi, A 24029, Siena, 1946. Bom in Milan in 1916, she was arrested with her family in Siena in April 1944, imprisoned in Milan and then deported to the transit camp Fossoli di Carpi and later to Auschwitz where she arrived in August 1944. She was liberated during the evacuation march from the camp. Bravo and Jalla, Una misura onesta, pp. 448-49; Picciotto Fargion, II libro della memoria, p. 595.

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The book by Giuliana Tedeschi, This Poor Body, written immediately after her return to Italy and published in 1946, was completely forgotten by the public, so much so that she decided to re­ publish it in 1978 under a new title: There is a Point on Earth. ... A Woman in the Birkenau Lager. It is very different in its structure from her first book, although the thematic succession still parallels the chronological recount. The memory is thus entrusted to the small events gathered and it is their capability to narrate experiences that would be “unspeakable” otherwise.44 The fact that all the above are women representing in this phase the Jewish experience, once again addresses the subject of the hegemony of the Resistance in the deportation and extermination memory and its footprint in the national ‘“gendered” ’ memory. Although there are Jews among the authors, they do not consider themselves as passively persecuted but rather in their capacity as political activists and partisans. Primo Levi is an exception to this rule, minimizing his experiences as a partisan in the mountains, and writing: “My period as partisan in Valle d*Aosta has been, undoubtedly, the colorless time of my career and 1 will not recount it voluntarily: it is a story o f well intentioned but foolish boys, and remains well among the forgettable things.”45 Only after his book I f this is a Man became a symbol during the 1950s was a different path opened to the memory of the Holocaust, a path wider than the one proposed by the resistance model. In this phase of the memory the voices of the Jews remain confused among those of the other deportees, whether voluntarily or as demanded by an exterior world inattentive and indifferent. Annette Wieviorka presents the hypothesis that the recognition o f the Holocaust needs time, a “history,” in order “to form and acquire its own specificity.” The deportations are not yet “clearly and forcefully avenged, if not as an extension of the Resistance. ... The terms o f the

44 Giuliana Tedeschi, Questo povero corpo, Milan, 1946; C e un punto sulla terra... una donna net Lager di Birkenau, Florence, 1978. Bom in Milan in 1914, she was arrested with her husband and mother-in-law in March 1944 in Turin following a denunciation. She was brought to the transit camp Fossoli di Carpi and deported to Auschwitz in April 1944; she was later sent to Malkow and Leipzig. Picciotto Fargion, // libro della memoria, p. 580. 45 Primo Levi, The Periodic Table, New York, 1984.

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debate on the deportations and the internment, slip from the initial object of the discourse, to the Resistance.”46 In conclusion, the post-war period is truly post-war, with all its still unresolved problems. That period can be defined as the time when the memory has not been historicized; a period in which the Jews chose to lose their Jewish “quality” in order to vanquish not only the fear that defining themselves as Jews would bring with it other risks, but also to prevent being treated as “Other.” The post-war period could be defined as the attempt of reconciliation, o f community with the other victims. The memoir literature on the concentration camps of these years speaks about the attempts o f the deportees to socially construct their individual memory inside the collective memory, and their failure, due to the lack o f systematization. Maintaining an almost prophetic mode, Giacomo Debenedetti wrote in September 1944: “In the liberated areas they tried to compensate by loving the few surviving Jews.” The author of the booklet tries to avoid this ‘“persecution o f love’,” that still presents the danger of distinguishing, although as a privilege, the Jewish “race” from the human race: “it is clear that this availability of love, instead of accumulating in passionate discharge when there is no more remedy, could be better used in a long-lasting, equal solidarity capable of preventing evil.”47

46 Annette Wieviorka, Déportation et génocide: entre la mémoire et l'oubli, Paris, 1992, pp 141-58. 47 Giacomo Debenedetti, 16 ottobre. Otto ebrei, p. 65 ff.

185

The Reconstruction o f Jewish Communities in the USSR, 1944-1947 YAACOV RO’I The expulsion o f the German occupation force from large areas o f the Soviet Union between the spring o f 1943 and the summer o f 1944 led to a gradual return to these parts of Jews who had evacuated to the country’s interior. In light of the hardships they had endured during the war, including the loss o f families, and their unwelcome reception by the local population with all that this implied,1 it was natural that these returning Jews would seek to consolidate their ranks. This was all the truer, given the revival o f Jewish awareness and national consciousness against the background of the Holocaust. It soon transpired that any non-institutional expression o f solidarity or attempt at mutual cooperation would expose the Jews to suspicion and repression. Even sporadic meetings in commemoration of Holocaust victims were considered by the authorities as nationalistic activity,2 and so by definition invited condemnation. There was therefore no alternative for Jews other than to institutionalize their fraternity. Endeavors to do this within the framework o f philanthropic or cultural associations, however, met with dismal results, despite the manifest need for such activity.3 Official requests to erect memorials to 1

2

3

For refusals to grant permission to Jews to return or the fixing of quotas for such permits, as well as reluctance to return apartments to their previous owners, and manifestations of outright antisemitism in Ukraine in the last two years of the war, see Mordechai Altshuler, “Antisemitism in Ukraine toward the End of World War II,” in: Zvi Gitelman (ed.), Bitter Legacy: Confronting the Holocaust in the USSR, Bloomington, 1997, pp. 77-90. The Yiddish writer David Hofshtein, for example, was said to have taken up nationalistic activity, which included specifically an attempt in autumn 1944 to “organize in Kiev a mass demonstration of the Jewish population on the anniversary of the German massacre at Babi Yar,” Letter sent by senior officials in the CP(b)U Central Committee apparatus to Secretary D. S. Korotchenko, [November] 1944, ibid., p. 310. For a discussion of attempts by Jewish organizations in the United States to send aid to Jewish individuals and communities in the liberated areas, see Shimon

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the Jewish victims o f Nazi atrocities were also turned down on the grounds that there could be no discriminating between victims of different nationalities.4 In effect, these refusals almost certainly emanated from a sense in official circles that this would create a framewoik for Jewish national activity. Be this as it may, it became evident that the sole option for coming together as a community was within a registered religious association, even if most o f the Jews were in fact non-believers. In the 1937 population census, which provided data for religiosity, Jews appeared at the bottom of the list,5 and, while the Holocaust had aroused their national awareness and identity, there is no hard evidence to suggest that it had increased the numbers or proportion o f Jewish believers. ♦

♦

♦

The years 1944-1945 saw a certain restoration of public religious activity in the Soviet Union. This came in the wake o f a change in official policy towards religion in the context of World War II and the Soviet leadership’s efforts to mobilize maximum support for its war effort, specifically among strata of citizenry that were not renowned for

4

5

Redlich, War, Holocaust and Stalinism: A Documented History o f the Jewish AntiFascist Committee in the USSR, New York, 1995, pp. 40-43; and documents 54,57, 58, 62 and 63. In addition to appealing to the Soviet authorities to enable such aid to reach Jewish communities and individuals, the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAFC) was also instrumental in trying to resuscitate Jewish culture, with equally little success, ibid., pp. 50-53 and documents 69-72. As the sole public all-union Jewish organization, the JAFC received numerous letters from Jews describing the difficulties they were encountering as they returned to the cities where they had lived before the war and the manifestations of antisemitism on the part of the local authorities and population, ibid., pp. 37-40. The projected Black Book on Nazi atrocities against the Jews, which was to be another such memorial to the Jewish communities exterminated by the Nazis, similarly fell through because Stalin rejected the idea of highlighting Jewish suffering, ibid., Chapter 5 and documents 121-35. For further discussion of endeavors by Jewish communities to commemorate Holocaust victims, see the text below, pp. 194, 199. Felix Corley, “Believers’ Responses to the 1937 and 1939 Soviet Censuses,” Religion, State and Society, 22 (1991), pp. 407-8. Just 281, 112 Jews declared themselves believers and Jews in their fifties who declared themselves religious outnumbered those in their teens, i.e. aged 16-19, by over 21 to 1.

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their “Soviet patriotism.” Overt religious praxis, which had to all intents and purposes come to a standstill by the end o f the 1930s, once again became possible. Conditions were created for renewing community life and registering religious communities and their clergy, albeit under strict supervision by the secular authority. While the primary target audience of the new line was the Russian Orthodox population, for whom more opportunities had remained a priori, it also encompassed Muslims and members of other recognized faiths and, so, affected Jews as well. Two councils were actually set up officially at the Council o f People’s Commissars, as the Soviet government was called until 1946, in order to mediate between the Soviet state and the country’s religious population - the Council for the Affairs o f the Russian Orthodox Church in September 1943 and the Council for the Affairs o f Religious Cults (henceforth CARC) in May 1944.6 The great majority o f communities that succeeded in registering did so during the course of 1945 and 1946. By the beginning o f 1946, just over a year after the decree that laid down the procedure for opening prayer-houses, there were throughout the Soviet Union approximately ninety officially functioning Jewish communities.7 The registration procedure of the late war and immediate post-war period was highly complex and protracted, so that the number o f communities that applied to register or contemplated processing applications was far larger than

6

7

Decree No. 572 and Appendix No.l of Decree No. 628 of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars, 19 and 29 May 1944; State Archive of the Russian Federation (hereafter GARF), f.6991, o.4, d.l, 11.1 and 4-5. See also Otto Luchterhandt, “The Council for Religious Affairs,” in: Sabrina Petra Ramet (ed.), Religious Policy in the Soviet Union, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 57-58. According to one source, the exact number was 85, according to another - 94. Further data in the former document report that only one-half of the communities were using nationalized buildings as synagogues, 20 percent praying in municipally owned buildings and 30 percent in privately owned ones, a far higher percent than for any other faith except for the Seventh Day Adventists and Evangelical Christiansand Baptists, Statistical report, 1 April 1946; GARF, f.6991s, o.4, d .l96, 1.1. O f the 85, just 21 were in the RSFSR, ibid., 1.2. The report also noted that there still existed over 400 former synagogue buildings throughout the country, 70 percent of which had been sequestrated for other uses (cultural-educational institutions, residential homes or storehouses and “productive organizations”) and 30 percent of which stood empty. The source for the higher figure, 94, is “A survey o f the Jewish religion in 1948,” 18 March 1949; GARF, f.6991, o.4, d.23, 1.20.

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the number o f those that actually succeeded in registering. While there are no data for the number of Jewish communities that applied to register in late 1944 and throughout 1945, nearly two hundred applications were filed with the CARC in Moscow in each o f the two following years. There was probably a considerable number, moreover, that never reached Moscow because they were thwarted by the local authorities.8 Nonetheless, by mid-1947, when instructions from the Central Committee apparatus prohibited any further registra­ tion of synagogues - and of Roman Catholic and Lutheran churches except in special circumstances, 235 applications had been rejected by the Council,9 as against 185 registered communities that operated in the entire country.10 O f the 185, 49 were in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia (31 in Georgia, 10 in Uzbekistan, 3 each in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, and 1 each in Kazakhstan and Kirgiziia)11 and are therefore not pertinent to our study.12 O f the communities in the European part of the Soviet Union, not all were in areas that had been under Nazi occupation, yet they, too, can be considered “reconstructed” and therefore must be included in this discussion. The largest numbers were in Ukraine, all of which had been overrun by the Germans, with the RSFSR (Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic) a distant second. At the end o f 1947, by which time 190 synagogues were functioning officially in the USSR, 79 were in Ukraine, 38 in the RSFSR, 14 in

8 9

See below. [I.V. Polianskii] to G. F. Aleksandrov, 1 July 1947; Archive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR (hereafter RTsKhIDNI), f.17, 0 . 125 , d.506, 1.129. There was also an unknown number of applications pending discussion and a decision. In 1946, 197 communities applied to register, and another 188 in 1947,1. V. Gostev, Information on the number of prayer-houses and the performance of religious rites, 15 November 1950; RTsKhIDNI, f.17, 0.132, d.285, 11.205-6. 10 Report on the work of the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults in 1947 and the first quarter of 1948; GARF, f.6991s, o.3, d .5 9 ,1.5. 11 Although in these parts the religious communities seem to have functioned throughout, their registration, too, was, protracted. Thus, in early 1946 there were just fifteen registered Jewish communities in Transcaucasia, Statistical report, 1 April 1946; GARF, f.R-6991s, o.3, d.38., 1.59. 12 An argument might well be made that the communities in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, particularly in the latter region, were also in a sense reconstructed. Nevertheless, this discussion will not include them.

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Moldavia, 5 in Latvia, 3 in Lithuania and 1 each in Belorussia and Estonia.13 (This was the point at which the number of functioning registered synagogues was largest; from early 1948 a bout o f closures was begun).14 The Jews were described by the head of the CARC, Ivan Polianskii, and other officials as being particularly adamant and zealous in their efforts to register religious associations. Polianskii also noted that Jews were ready to expend large sums in order to reconstruct and renovate their synagogues.15 But they ran into endless obstacles. In order to receive permission to register as a religious association it was necessary to fulfil certain requirements. Among others, the community had to have a suitable prayer-house, a minister of religion and an executive and inspection committee, and its application had to be signed by twenty local residents. Since many o f the former synagogues that the Jewish communities were now asking to re-acquire were in use, the chances of success depended first o f all on the availability o f an alternative building for those who were using it and on the goodwill of the local authorities that had to consent to granting an application prior to its transmission to Moscow.16 Rabbis, moreover, were in short supply at the end of the war, and many o f them were old and infirm. As time passed, the dearth o f rabbis became a major obstacle in the 13 “A survey of the Jewish religion in 1948” [as in n. 7], 1.20. Twenty of [the] Ukraine’s synagogues - those in Transcarpathia - while operating officially were not formally registered. For additional information concerning the applications of Jewish communities to register, see Yaacov Ro’i, “The Jewish Religion in the Soviet Union after World War II,” In: Y. Ro’i (ed.), Jews and Jewish Life in Russia and the Soviet Union, London, 1993, pp. 265-66. 14 Whereas in 1947, three new synagogues were opened and six were registered as having functioned previously and a single synagogue was closed, in the following year not a single synagogue was either opened or registered and ten were closed down, “A survey of the Jewish religion in 1948,” 11.19-20. 15 For example, Report of the CARC representative in Zhitomir Oblast for 1945; GARF, f.6991s, o.3, d.28, 1.227; and I. V. Polianskii to G. F. Aleksandrov, 31 August 1945; RTsKhIDNI, f.17, 0.125, d.313. 16 Sometimes the reservations or opposition of the local authority resulted from a desire not to sully its image by having a religious community under its jurisdiction. More usually, however, the reason was the inexpediency of evacuating the building being requested and the lack of any alternative building for those who were using it, for example in Homel in 1945, CARC representative in Gomel’ Oblast to I. V. Polianskii and P. Maslov, [?] June 1945; GARF, f.6991, o.3, d .2 4 ,1.2.

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registration process. Protests by representatives o f communities that Jewish law did not require a community to have a rabbi (as distinct from the Russian Orthodox Church, whose circumstances provided the terms o f reference for legislation on religion) fell on deaf ears.1718The authorities suggested that statements to this effect merely reflected the community’s desire to give the communities a national rather than a religious character. Finally, it was not always easy to find twenty people who were prepared to stick out their necks by giving their personal details to the authorities and assuming responsibility for the lawful conduct o f the community and the upkeep o f its synagogue.19 Nor can we restrict our discussion to those communities that in fact were successful in registering. In a rather large number of cities and small towns, communities operated for some time without actually registering, their existence being condoned by the local authorities, either on the assumption that their applications to formalize their activity would eventually be crowned with success, or as a result of some informal agreement.20 In 1945, in particular, reports from CARC representatives in Ukraine and Belorussia were replete with information concerning communities that were in fact functioning without registration. As late as summer 1947 the CARC reported that there were no less than forty-seven such synagogues.21 Moreover, there were large numbers of minyanim, small groups o f at least 10 adult males who convened for prayers in private apartments. These minyanim operated in cities both with and without registered synagogues. In Belorussia, 17 F. Berezin to I. V. Polianskii, 9 July 1945; GARF, f.6991, o.3, d .2 5 ,11.169-70. In Sverdlovsk a person capable of functioning as a rabbi returned from evacuation, but was not prepared to officiate so as not to harm the reputation of the members of his family who worked “as specialists in various local enterprises and institutions.’’. 18 Letter of instruction No. 2 to Council representatives, October 1945; GARF, f.6991, o.3, d .2 3 ,1.74. 19 This, of course, held for all faiths and constituted a main constraint when a group of believers contemplated registration. 20 The CARC representative in Zhitomir Oblast in his above report for 1945 said that Jews hinted that they were prepared to pay bribes in order to register, and meanwhile, although forbidden to conduct prayer services, did so in all towns, large and small, under his jurisdiction. 21 I. V. Polianskii to G. F. Aleksandrov, 1 July 1947, Appendix No.l; RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, 0.125, d.506, 1.129. Altogether, there were said to be 1,535 unregistered communities of the 14 faiths under the CARC’s jurisdiction.

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where only two synagogues were allowed to register, Jews conducted prayer services illegally in private homes in many towns.2223 In some cities there were reportedly numerous minyanim. By the very nature of the regime, until the KGB archives divulge their secrets, there will be no way of divining the dimensions o f this phenomenon.24 In the specific circumstances of the late war and immediate post-war period Jewish religious communities were not able to restrict their operation to the performance of religious rites, as laid down by Soviet legislation. This meant that when the situation changed in the second half o f 1947 and the line toward religion once again became more repressive, the Jewish communities received the thick end of the wedge. Well before this, in December 1945, Polianskii, wrote to Deputy Prime Minister Molotov that these communities had more o f a political and social, than a religious, character. Both the applicants who asked to register a community and those they represented, he contended, were “far from religion,” seeking the formation of religious communities as “a form o f national association.” Community leaders who sought to ensure that their communities bore a totally religious character were accused by “nationally minded elements” that the course they were taking was one o f Jewry’s “assimilation and elimination as a nationality.”25 In another memorandum, Polianskii argued that the Jewish religious communities served as intermediaries between the “Jewish public” and the Soviet government “on matters o f political selfdetermination on an ethnic basis.” A group o f Moscow Jews had approached the head of that city’s religious community26 with a

22 Synagogues had been allowed to register in Minsk and Kalinkovichi, and fifteen communities functioned without registration. In 1948 a synagogue was officially registered in Bobruisk as well but was closed down within a few months; see Leonid Smilovitsky, “Jewish Religious Life in Bobruisk, 1944-1954,” Jews in Eastern Europe, 2 (27), (1995), pp. 48-49. 23 P. Maslov to I. V. Polianskii, 25 December 1945; GARF, f.6991, o.3, d .3 0 ,1.83. 24 For some figures, see my article “The Jewish Religion in the Soviet Union,” pp. 267-69. 25 I. V. Polianskii to V. M. Molotov. 7 December 1945; GARF, f.6991, o.3, d.10, 11.140-1. 26 Moscow had several religious communities but there was no formal link between them. Polianskii was assuredly referring to the Choral Synagogue, which was the city’s main community.

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THE RECONSTRUCTION OF JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN THE USSR, 1944-1947

statement to the effect that the Soviet government had solved the national problem for all the country’s nationalities, including the Jews, for whom it had established a Jewish Autonomous Oblast in Birobidzhan in the Far East. The gaze o f the country’s Jews was now directed to that region, and their request was that hundreds of thousands be settled there and that its status be raised to that o f a Jewish union republic. The same group had handed a document to Solomon Mikhoels, head o f the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, asking for its support o f their political demands, adding further requests relating to Yiddish and to the Jews’ right to educate their children in the national tongue. This second document stressed the need for a nationwide conference of Jewish communities, in which non-believers would also participate, to discuss these issues.2728Such suggestions were indeed a can o f worms from the point of view of the Soviet authorities. A letter to Polianskii from two officials o f his Council noted a marked tendency to expand the functions o f Jewish religious communities, giving them “a national character” and transforming them into foci of “Jewish national life.” In fact, they pointed out, Jews who were not in any way connected with the community contributed to the reconstruction of synagogues, and on the Day of Atonement they actually attended synagogue since on that day all Jews felt their Jewishness. The same source also stressed that “inordinate” commercial activity and “speculation” went on within the community. In Lvov, where Jews sought to open a second synagogue, they perceived the community’s basic aims as: achieving “the national-cultural and religious unity o f the Jewish population of Lvov”; raising that population’s “political, national and cultural consciousness;” and implementing measures “to improve [its] living conditions.”29 The CARC representative in Belorussia wrote to Belorussian Communist

27 I. V. Polianskii to K. E. Voroshilov, 5 April 1946; GARF, f.6991, o.3, d.34,11.47-8. 28 G. I. Vrachev and I. N. Uzkov to Polianskii, 29 November 1946; RTsKhIDNI, f.17, 0.125, d.405,11.98-9. The authors of the letter talk of the Days of Judgment, and it is just possible that the reference is to the High Holidays, i.e., including the Jewish New Year. 29 Report of the activity of the CARC representative in Ukraine, July-Sept. 1945; GARF, f.6991,0.3, d.28,1.349. (The quotes are taken from the Lvov community’s charter.)

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Party First Secretary Panteleymon Ponomarenko in 1947 that before the war Jews had shown no interest in religion “yet now they seem to have shifted over to religion more than any other nationality.... In the guise of religiosity, nationalists are trying to bring home to the Jews” that they should stick more closely together, restore and maintain ties with Zionist organizations abroad, talk about the Jewish people’s sacrifices during the war and erect monuments to the war dead.30 A report from early 1947 talked o f the evolution o f “a distinctive ‘Soviet’ Zionism,” according to whose “representatives... ‘the synagogue is the sole venue of national concentration and the sole seat o f national culture.’ Against this background, the synagogues were becoming a confluence not only o f religious Jews, but also of people who have nothing in common with religion, including Communists.” This enhanced nationalist mood was also the context for “the revival of old rites and traditions” which had surfaced as “symbols and tokens of ‘Israel’s being chosen by God’.”31 In order to sever Jewish ritual from nationalist content, the words “Next year in Jerusalem” (Leshana haba a birushalaiyim) were ordered to be deleted from the prayer service on the Day of Atonement and Passover.32 ♦

♦

♦

Unquestionably, the activity of the Jewish communities was rather variegated. In the very early period some communities had collected money to help the Soviet war effort.33 Similar collections, undertaken

30 Quoted in Leonid Smilovitsky, “Attempt to Erect Memorial to Holocaust Victims Blocked by Soviet Byelorussian Authorities,” East European Jewish Affairs, 27 (1997), pp. 78-79. 31 I. V. Polianskii to Stalin, Molotov, Beria and Voroshilov at the Council of Ministers; and Zhdanov, Khrushchev, A. A. Kuznetsov, N. S. Patolichev, G. M. Popov and M. A. Türkin in the Central Committee, 27 February 1947; GARF, f.6991s, o.3, d.47, 1.94. 32 Mikhail Mitsel’, Obshchiny iudeiskogo veroispovedaniia v Ukraine (Kiev, L vov: 1945-198Jgg.), Kiev, 1998, p. 23. The republican CARC representative had all prayer-books with these words removed from the Kiev synagogue. 33 In winter and spring 1944 Soviet Jews collected 10 million rubles for an air squadron and tank unit, Leonid Smilovitskii, “Jewish Religious Leadership in Belorussia, 1939-1953,” Shvut, 8 (1999), p. 97.

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by religious associations o f other faiths as well,34 were clearly designed to demonstrate the patriotism o f the believer community and so, perhaps, to serve as an insurance policy for their continued existence and activity. In similar vein, Jewish communities subscribed to state loans for the country’s economic reconstruction, participated in sowing and harvesting crops, and collected funds to help war victims, families o f fallen soldiers, war invalids and orphans.35 Such activity naturally did not distinguish between Soviet citizens but was designed for all indiscriminately. On the whole, however, the philanthropic activity o f religious associations was earmarked specif­ ically for members of the faith. Indeed, the distribution of charity by religious institutions, a traditional attribute o f the various religious faiths, had been anathema to, and prohibited by, the Soviet regime since its earliest days. It did not come within the performance o f strictly religious rites; it presupposed the existence of needy citizens in Soviet society; and it differentiated citizens by criteria that were unacceptable to Marxist-Leninist thinking. Nonetheless, a number of Jewish com­ munities (and also communities o f other faiths) were eager, particularly in the difficult days at the end of the war and its immediate aftermath, to initiate charitable activity designed specifically to aid Jews. Such violations o f the law were noted in a number of cities, including Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov, Irkutsk and Tambov.36 In Chernovtsy, the community established a special fund and organized concerts to help the needy. The Zhitomir community set up a fraternity with this purpose in mind and collected money from well-to-do Jews; in Kharkov, community representatives sought to organize a home for the elderly and people without families; and the community in Berdichev extended aid to Jews returning from evacuation.37 The Jewish

34 See, for example, Yaacov Ro’i, Islam in the Soviet Union from World War II to Gorbachev, New York, 2000, p. 229. 35 Smilovitskii, “Jewish Religious Leadership in Belorussia,” p. 105. These activities, too, were subscribed to by religious communities of other faiths; see Ro’i, Islam in the Soviet Union, p. 230. 36 I. V. Polianskii to A. A. Zhdanov and K. E. Voroshilov, 7 July 1947; RTsKhIDNI, f.17, 0.125, d.506,1.149. 37 Vrachev and Uzkov to Polianskii, 29 November 1946; RTsKhIDNI, fl 17, 0.125, d .4 05,1.99.

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community in Lvov was said to be expending considerable efforts to assist fellow Jews - war invalids and orphans, students and demobilized soldiers, and those repatriating to Poland.38 Indeed, in Lvov and in Chernovtsy the community aided repatriates to Poland and Romania respectively, these two towns being situated along the route taken by former citizens of these countries returning home in accordance with [the] agreements reached with the Soviet government in 1944 and 1945. Nor was this assistance restricted, apparently, to Jews repatriating officially, but was extended also to those seeking to cross the border illegally.39 (Among its other effects, this emigration significantly diminished a number o f Jewish communities in the so-called Western territories annexed by the Soviet Union during and immediately after the war40). Many communities received parcels from Jewish organizations and communities abroad, which in some instances would be distributed to the needy in the synagogue. There were even cases where Jews in towns without a functioning religious association created fictitious ones to enable them to provide addresses for foreign parcels and other aid, for example in Borislav, Pinsk, Grodno and Lida.41 In some cases the contents o f the parcels were sold to help the Jews reconstruct their synagogues.42 In addition to the transfer o f aid, communities maintained contacts with Jewish organizations abroad to help Jews in

38 Mitsel’, Obshchiny iudeiskogo veroispovedaniia v Ukraine, pp. 148-49. The Lvov community created a special commission for questions relating to Jewish war orphans, I. V. Polianskii to A. A. Zhdanov and K. E. Voroshilov, 7 July 1947; RTsKhIDNl, f.17, 0.125, d.506, 1.149, and Mitsel', Obshchiny iudeiskogo veroispovedaniia, pp. 18, 19 and 160. 39 Mitsel’, Obshchiny iudeiskogo veroispvedaniia v Ukraine, p. 18. The Lvov synagogue served as a shelter and lodging for repatriates on their way to Poland, ibid., p. 148. 40 See, for example, Report of the CARC representative in Rovno Oblast to P. Vilkhovyi for the period 15 December 1944 through 25 November 1945; GARF, f.6991s, o.3s, d.28,1.33ob, and Report of the CARC representative in Chernovtsy Oblast to P. Vilkhovyi for the third quarter of 1945; GARF, ibid., 1.244. 41 Vrachev and Uzkov to Polianskii, 29 November 1946, 1.101. 42 CARC’s representative in Zhitomir Oblast said that nearly all the communities in his oblast were connected with religious Jews in the U.S. who sent them valuable parcels for this end, GARF, f.6991s, o.3, d .2 8 ,1.227.

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Members o f a group o f approx. 160 Jewish children, concealed in Christians’ homes during the war, are gathered by members o f a relief unit that the Yishuv sent to the Jews o f Greece, 1945

Director o f a Jewish orphanage in Domanovka, Transni stria, with several children, returning to Romania, 1944

T he Jermis fam ily waits for its return trip to Poland from Kazakhstan, 1946

“Beriha” - A group o f survivors, among them a woman and her infant sleeping on a m akeshift bed in an unknown collection station.

“Beriha” - A woman feeding an infant, surrounded by people on their way to Western Europe waiting in a train station.

Eschw ege, Germany, A demonstration in the DP camp in favour o f unrestricted immigration to Eretz Israel

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN THE USSR, 1944-1947

the west seek out surviving relatives.43 (These contacts, too, were terminated by the Soviet authorities shortly after the end o f the war). ♦

♦

♦

Another traditional preoccupation of Jewish communities was Jewish learning. This was an especially problematic sphere, given the specific prohibition by Soviet law of all religious teaching, following from the separation of the school from the church in the very first period after the October Revolution. Yet, a few communities nonetheless took the risk, especially, but not solely in the “Western territories.”44 In Chernovtsy, soon after the city’s liberation, the Jewish community endeavored to open what the Soviet authorities described as a school for training rabbis - probably a yeshiva - for boys aged thirteen to fourteen.45 Over a year later “special children’s groups” were said to be gathering in the town’s synagogues, where Jewish songs and Talmud were taught under the aegis o f the rabbis.46 In Moldavia, rabbis wanted to open schools for children at the synagogues for supplementary Jewish studies since, they insisted, Jews were forgetting both their language and their customs.47 In one town, Novgorod-Rodynsk, a heder, an elementaiy

43 The Riga community, for instance, received parcels from an organization called Riga Relief in New York, October 1945; Latvijas Valsts Arhivs, f.1419, o.l, d.48, 11.17-8; while the Moscow community had in 1942 received permission to maintain contact with the World Jewish Congress and the Union of Russian Jews in New York for the purpose of helping them seek relatives. As of autumn 1944 requests from the United States became increasingly numerous and in spring 1945 the community was instructed to put an end to this correspondence on the grounds that it went beyond the tasks of a religious community, I. V. Polianskii to A. Ia. Vishinskii, [?] March 1945; GARF, f.6991, o.3, d.20, 1.128. 44 Another example of the greater daring of Jews in the Western territories was a request by the Chernovtsy Jewish community in 1945 to absolve believers from work on the New Year and the Day of Atonement, Report of the CARC representative for Chernovtsy Oblast for the third quarter of 1945,11 October 1945; GARF, f.6991s, o.3, d.28,1.244. 45 Zelen'iuk to Khrushchev and D.S. Korotchenko, 16 July 1944, quoted in Gitelman (ed.), Bitter Legacy, pp. 315-16. 46 I. V. Polianskii to G. F. Aleksandrov, 31 August 1945; RTsKhIDNI, f.17, 0.125, d.313. 47 Report of the CARC representative in Moldavia on the activity of the religious cults in Moldavia, 23 January 1948; GARF, f.6991, o.4, d.22.

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school for Jewish studies, for children up to thirteen years old operated for about two years after the war, where an octogenerian first taught some twenty children in his home, and later in the apartments o f their parents.48 In Zhitomir, the community was reported to have organized a school for adults to study Torah.49 Other activities of the Jewish communities included the restoration and repair of synagogues and the acquisition, restoration and cleaning up of cemeteries.50 In some places the community contemplated renovating synagogue buildings demolished in the 1920s and 1930s or sequestrated in the same period for other uses. In others, Jews hoped to rebuild synagogues destroyed by the Nazis. While having a prayerhouse was a prerequisite for registration, obtaining a building or even a plot on which to build was no easy task and often met with heavy opposition from the local authorities. In some places the cemetery, which, according to Soviet law, was supposed to come under the jurisdiction of the organs of local government, was run by the community, which would fence it off and erect a construct where the requisite funeral rites were held. Some communities actually estab­ lished a burial society (Hevra Kadisha), which sold burial plots and monopolized the conduct of funeral rites. As a result, the authorities contended, non-believers as well had no alternative but to bury their relatives according to Jewish tradition.51 In one Ukrainian town the community asked the authorities over a period o f three years to allow Jewish tombstones that the Germans had used to pave streets to be replaced with other stones, but the request was met by repeated refusals.52

48 Report of CARC activity for 1947 and the first quarter of 1948, 9 June 1948; GARF, f.6991, o.3, d.53,1.30. 49 MitseP, Obshchiny iudeiskogo veroispovedaniia v Ukraine, p. 18. 50 Smilovitskii, “Jewish Religious Leadership in Belorussia,” p. 109; and MitseP, Obshchiny iudeiskogo veroispovedaniia v Ukraine, pp. 18 and 149. 51 Vrachev and Uzkov to Polianskii, 29 November 1946, 1.100. In Nal’chik in the Caucasus the community was said to have sold burial plots to community members to grow vegetables, I. V. Polianskii to A. A. Zhdanov, 22 July 1947; RTsKhIDNI, f.17, o.l25, d.506,1.174. 52 MitseP, Obshchiny iudeiskogo veroispovedaniia v Ukraine, p. 21. (The town was Kamenetsk-Podolsk.)

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Particular concern was shown to mark the mass graves o f the victims o f German atrocities and to erect monuments to their memory. This was a major objective of all communities in the areas that had been under German occupation. In most cases, approaches to the local authorities met with an outright rejection, for instance in Odessa, Poltava and Chernigov oblasts. In the words o f one Belorussian official, there was no place for private initiative in this sphere, for “it is the bodies o f Soviet power that are charged with erecting monuments and doing other work to perpetuate the memory o f people killed in the struggle against Hitlerism.“ Moreover, it was out o f the question to have monuments to the war dead o f a single nationality, since Belorussians, Russians and Ukrainians were also among the victims. But in one instance at least, in the town of Ternopol, a monument was erected, inscribed in Russian and Yiddish, and dedicated in the presence of the chairman of the local town council and o f the secretary o f the town party committee. Here, too, however, the case was reviewed by the oblast party committee,53 and the monument was presumably demolished. Often, as in this instance, a community would seek and obtain the aid of Jewish officials in the local bureaucracy, especially, but not solely, regarding the cemetery and plans to erect monuments to the victims of the Nazis.54 Jewish communities commemorated the victims of Nazism in other ways as well, notably special prayer services held in the synagogues. The major fast proclaimed by the Palestine Chief Rabbinate for Jews the world over some two months prior to the end o f the war was the occasion for a major prayer gathering in the Moscow Choral Synagogue. Although tickets had been sold to restrict attendance, thousands gathered in the street outside, and the service was attended 53 Smilovitskii, “Jewish Religious Leadership in Belorussia,” p. 109; I. Poliakov to V. I. Kozlov, quoted in Smilovitsky, “Attempt to Erect Memorial to Holocaust Victims Blocked by Soviet Byelorussian Authorities,” p. 72; and Mitsel’, Obshchiny iudeiskogo veroispovedaniia v Ukraine, pp. 17-18 and 21-22. 54 Cf. again Vrachev and Uzkov to Polianskii, 29 November 1946; RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, o. 125, d.405,1.99. In Kiev a colonel of the local NKVD (the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs), who was an engineer by profession, and the deputy head of the board of the Fuel Trust helped in “a roundabout way” in renovating the synagogue and resolving managerial problems, Report of CARC representative in Kiev Oblast Zaretskii for March-November 1945, 20 November 1945; GARF, f.6991s, o.3, d .2 6 ,1.117.

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by senior officials o f Jewish origin, including Molotov’s wife, Polina Zhemchuzhina. It seemed, indeed, that a new context had been created - the condemnation of fascism - when any Jew could attend synagogue without apprehension.55 Yet, in the provinces the authorities were less pliant than in the capital. Jews in Zhitomir Oblast who appealed to the CARC representative for Jews to be given the day off from work in order to go to the cemeteries to pray and grieve for the Jews killed by the Nazis throughout the USSR were turned down.56 The following year the Simferopol Jewish community organized a ceremonial meeting to mark the anniversary of the liberation o f Crimea; the event was attended not only by local Jews, but also by Krymchaks, the Crimea’s indigenous Jewish population, and by Russians. In similar fashion, the community of Mozyr in Belorussia celebrated the anniversary o f the ejection of German troops from that republic with a prayer service in which a portion from the Torah was read and a prayer recited for Jews who had fallen at the hands of the Nazis. Members of the local soviet and other institutions, including party members, participated and money was raised for the Red Cross and for the reconstruction o f the synagogue.5758 Some communities also engaged in the sale o f kosher meat and the baking of matzot for Passover. The Kiev community asked permission in 1945 to construct an oven for baking matzot.5* In a letter to Kliment Voroshilov, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, Polianskii noted that the CARC had received petitions from Rabbi Shlomo Shlifer in Moscow and from believers in Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Vilnius,

55 Imanuel Mikhlin, Hagehelet. Jerusalem: Shamir, 1986, pp. 84-86. 56 Report of the CARC representative in Zhitomir Oblast for 1945; GARF, f.6991s, o.3, d .2 8 ,1.227. 57 CARC representative in Polessk Oblast Kinkumo to I.V. Polianski and P. Maslov, 18 September 1945; GARF, f.6991s, o.3, d.30,1.57a, and CARC representative in Crime 1. Makedonov to I. V. Polianskii, 1 July 1946; GARF, f.6991, o.3, d.39, 1.164. The party members who participated in the occasion were excluded from the party, removed from their positions and punished. 58 The request was refused, together with requests to organize funeral rites for a specific group of people, i.e. Jews - Soviet law provdied for universal civic burial rites - and to provide religious services on festivals for Jewish prisoners-of-war, Report of Zaretskii, CARC representative in Kiev Oblast, March-November 1945, 20 November 1945; GARF, f.6991s, o.3s, d.28 ,11.116-7.

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Kuibyshev and other towns concerning the need to make kosher meat and matzot available to Jews.59 Thus, for example, kosher meat was sold and poultry slaughtered in the courtyard o f the Leningrad synagogue,60 and in Berdichev, the Jews obtained permission to slaughter four heads o f cattle every week and chickens according to Jewish rites, and organized the sale o f kosher meat.61 A few communities even had, or sought to have, a mikveh (ritual bath), either on the synagogue precincts or, as in Kharkov for example, at the city bath-house.62 ♦

♦

♦

An indication of the concerns of Jewish communities in this post-war period is provided by a recorded meeting between the Moscow Choral Synagogue’s Rabbi Solomon Shlifer and deputy head of the CARC, Iurii Sadovskii, in late 1946. The rabbi raised the following issues: he asked for the synagogue to be allowed to continue giving aid to the needy, for which end congregants donated money, tsdakah, in the synagogue; he requested permission for the synagogue to be responsible for the entire procedure o f burying the dead; he inquired about the provision o f matzot to Moscow’s observant Jews; he wanted permission to resolve with other rabbis the issue of agunot, namely enabling the remarriage of wives of men who were missing as a result of the war and presumed dead, without there being any concrete evidence that they were in fact deceased; and, finally, he inquired what was to be done with the letters that the synagogue received from Jews who were seeking missing relatives.63 Rabbi Shlifer did not specify whether these letters came from Soviet Jews or from abroad. In either

59 I. V. Polianskii to K. E. Voroshilov, 21 August 1947; GARF, f.6991, o.3, d.48, 11.20 - 1. 60 I. V. Polianskii to A. A. Zhdanov, 22 July 1947; RTsKhlDNI, f.17, 0.125, d.506. 61 Vrachev and Uzkov to Polianskii, 29 November 1946,1.99. 62 I. V. Polianskii to A. A. Zhdanov, 22 July 1947; RTsKhlDNI, f.17. 0.125, d.506. According to the CARC, nearly every synagogue had its own mikveh, but this seems to be an exaggeration. 63 Reception by lu. V. Sadovskii of Rabbi S. M. Shlifer, 29 December 1946; GARF, f.6991, o.3, d .8 ,11.88-90. According to Jewish law, a decision of three rabbis was required in order to declare a woman an aguna.

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case, the synagogue was clearly acquiring a status, given the exigencies o f the post-war years, reminiscent o f its traditional, pre-Soviet position. The broad range o f communal activity that the communities intended initiating and maintaining necessitated the collection o f funds. In addition to voluntary payments by community members - the law forbade religious associations to obligate members to make donations some communities sold the contents o f parcels received from abroad or held lectures and concerts for which tickets were sold.64 The authorities disallowed a priori all activity that they deemed primarily pecuniary, such as these concerts, the sale of seats in the synagogue, or auctioning the honor o f being called to the Torah reading (aliyot).65 Yet, special services held on different occasions would be accompanied by lectures, reminiscences or musical programs, and again tickets were sold among the local Jewish population at large,66 in other words among Jews who were not believers or community members. Indeed, one o f the undesirable concomitants o f all this activity from the point o f view of the authorities was that it roped in Jews who were not believers and did not consider themselves members o f the religious association or in any way connected with it. This applied to charity, the sale of kosher meat and matzot, the conduct o f funerals, and the commemoration of Holocaust victims. It was thought in Moscow that the holding of concerts and other cultural activity was explicitly designed to attract non-believers to the synagogue.67 Synagogue attendance, too, in the period under discussion often embraced broad strata o f the Jewish population, especially on festivals. Reports told of festival services being attended by thousands of people.68 Many of

64 For example, in Chernovtsy, Lvov and Moldavia, Report o f the activity o f the CARC representative in Ukraine, July-September 1945, and Report of the CARC representative in Moldavia, 23 January 1948; GARF, f.6991, o.3, d.28, p. 349, and o.4, d.22. 65 Nevertheless, Polianskii reported to Zhdanov, 22 July 1947, as above, that the Leningrad synagogue had sold seats for the High Holidays in 1946. 66 Vrachev and Uzkov to Polianskii, 29 November 1946, p. 100. 67 I. V. Polianskii to A. A. Zhdanov and K. E. Voroshilov, 7 July 1947; RTsKhIDNI, f.17, 0.125, d.506,1.149. 68 2,500 worshippers attended synagogue in Kiev on Passover in 1946, when the American Yiddish writer Ben-Zion Goldberg addressed the congregation and entertained questions, Mitsel’, Obshchiny iudeiskogo veroispovedaniia, p. 65. On

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THE RECONSTRUCTION OF JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN THE USSR, 1944-1947

these could only “with difficulty be designated believers,” testimony to the considerable influence the various communities exercised over the Jewish population at large.69 However, by 1947, synagogue attendance was beginning to decline. This was particularly true in the smaller towns of Ukraine and Belorussia to which Jews had returned in the immediate aftermath of the war. Outbreaks o f antisemitism soon induced these Jews to migrate to larger cities, leaving the smaller communities with a negligible, steadily decreasing membership.70 By this time, too, the intense Jewish feeling and enhanced Jewish identity o f the late war period may have been waning. Perhaps, also, as the hostility of the authorities became more manifest, people did not want to take the risk of associating even with a registered community. Yet, still in 1947, people who were not considered believers attended synagogue on festivals. In Birobidzhan, for example, a number of young seamstresses skirted work to attend prayers on the fall festivals.71 In addition to communal activity, individual Jews were returning to rites that had been abandoned in the hard pre-war years. Apparently the most common o f these was circumcision which, according to the CARC, was now being conducted by all believing Jews and some non­ believers as well.72 Some communities took upon themselves to

69

70 71 72

the previous New Year, when the synagogue precincts had held at least 2,000 worshippers, 1,500 within the building and the rest in the courtyard, these had included many young people, especially girls, as well as soldiers and war invalids, CARC representative in Kiev Oblast to I. V. Polianskii [September 1945]; GARF, f.699Is, o.3s, d.28,1.98. In Minsk, the community sought to rent a building for the autumn festivals that would accommodate 1,500 to 2,000 worshippers, K. Usalevich to I. V. Polianskii, N. I. Gusarov and P. K. Ponomarenko, 1 July 1947; GARF, f.6991, o.3, d.257,11.194-5. Thus, those who attended synagogues in Kiev Oblast on the 1945 High Holidays included “officers in the Soviet armed forces, heads of Soviet organizations and even representatives of the world of learning,” Report of Zaretskii, CARC representative in Kiev Oblast for the period March-November 1945, 20 November 1945; GARF, f.6991, o.3s, d.27,11.116-7. Another proof of this was the short time it took to renovate the buildings the communities had obtained for use as synagogues. This was in addition to the drain on these communities as a result of the Polish repatriation, see above. “A survey of the Jewish religion in 1948,” 18 March 1949; GARF, f.6991, o.4, d .2 3 ,1.25. Ro’i, “Jewish Religion after World War II,” p. 272.

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maintain a mohel (ritual circumciser); for example, the community in Berdichev brought over such a person from nearby Shepetovka.73 ♦

♦

♦

In a long report on the religious situation in the Soviet Union in early 1947, Polianskii informed the party and state leadership that the time had come to adopt a clear policy regarding the Jewish religion. This entailed two principle points: neutralizing the communities' national­ istic activities so that they might focus solely on “the performance o f the faith,” and conducting “a persistent struggle against customs and traditions which had lost their religious meaning but have been artificially reanimated in recent years and [which] fanned nationalist sentiment” Specifically, efforts should be made to restrict “charity on the basis of nationalism,” the exaggeration of the importance o f matzoty the ritual slaughter to provide meat, burial fraternities and the sale o f seats in the synagogue.74 This, together with the decision taken shortly afterwards to terminate the registration o f Jewish religious associations, meant both restraining the activity o f the Jewish communities and curtailing the number of communities that were allowed to operate. Over the course o f about three years Jewish communities had endeavored to reconstruct their existence and activity following two decades of repression and the Nazi occupation. Seen in perspective, it must be said that although in absolute terms their achievements were not monumental, they made considerable headway given the forces with which they had to contend. Indeed, in many ways these were the peak years of Jewish community activity in the entire post-war period until the Soviet state began mitigating its rigorous anti-Jewish policy in the late 1980s. Certainly, the odds against the Jewish communities were enormous. Almost alone of the recognized faiths, they had no official seminary to train rabbis (until the Moscow yeshiva was opened in early 1957) and the average age o f the ordained rabbis was extremely high. Judaism was also discriminated against in that it had no umbrella organization, leaving every community to fend for itself. Moreover, Jews had no access to religious artefacts (tashmishei kedusha) or 73 A survey of the Jewish religion in 1948; GARF, f.6991, o.4, d .2 3 ,1.31. 74 I. V. Polianskii to the state and party leaders (as in n.31), 27 February 1947; GARF, f.6991, o.3, d.47,1.95.

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religious literature. When we add to this the constant surveillance and fear, which accompanied all religious communities in the Soviet Union, and the knowledge that in addition to the regime’s general anti-religious policy, it was tainted with manifest anti-Jewish tendencies, there was no real chance of a major breakthrough. In this context, the temporary success o f having nearly two hundred communities registered and recognized and serving as focal points for the local Jewish population w as no mean feat.

205

The Holocaust and Its Aftermath as Perceived in Poland: Voices o f Polish Intellectuals, 1945-1947 JOANNA MICHLIC This paper closely examines the writings o f the intellectual elite in early post-war Poland (1945-1947) on the genocide o f Polish Jewry and its remnants within Polish society. I shall focus on the ways in which this elite dealt with a particular subject - Polish attitudes towards the Jewish minority during the Holocaust and the early post-war period. Undoubtedly, this was a subject of prime importance in the writings of a section of the intellectual elite of that period and one calling for a high degree of moral engagement on their part. Moreover, this was a challenging topic that could be categorized as belonging to the terrain of “the difficult past” and “the difficult present,” since it covered those aspects of relations with the Jewish minority that reflected negatively on the ethnic Polish majority, both as the key witness to the Nazi genocide of Polish Jews and as neighbors to those Jewish survivors who were returning to their pre-war homes.1 Characteristically, evaluations and descriptions o f ensuing events in the writings o f these intellectuals vary significantly from official interpretations and

1 The term “difficult past” is used in the studies of collective memory. See for example, Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, Frames o f Remembrance, New Brunswick and London, 1994; Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, Neutralizing Memory. The Jew in Contemporary Poland, New Brunswick and Oxford, 1989; Joanna Michlic, “The Troubling Past: Polish Collective Memory of the Holocaust. An Overview,” East European Jewish Studies, 29 (1999), pp. 75-85; and Jeffrey K. Olick and Joyce Robbins, “Social Memory Studies: From ‘Collective Memory’ to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices,” Annual Review o f Sociology, 24 (1998), pp. 105-40.

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THE HOLOCAUST AND ITS AFTERMATH AS PERCEIVED IN POLAND

descriptions of the same events provided both by the communist political elite and its political opposition. The questions I ask here are: What were the approaches of these intellectuals to “the difficult immediate past” and “the difficult recent present”? And in what ways were their approaches different to the thenofficial presentations o f the topics? My main argumentation is that it is here, in the early post-war period, that a section of the intellectual elite, for the first time, began to initiate a reckoning with the “difficult past and present” in a bold and courageous manner, and that this manner stood in sharp contrast to the official presentations of Polish relations with the Jewish minority during and after the war. Such an approach can be defined as a selfcritical inquiry into one’s own national history and collective selfimage. As we now know, this approach was soon to be silenced as well as excluded from intellectual discourse for more than four decades. For it was not until the 1980s that this type o f self-critical inquiry was to reappear in a series o f confrontations with the difficult and challenging past. It began with the publication in 1987 of Jan Bloriski’s article “The Poor Poles Look at the Ghetto,” and currently continues within the debate surrounding the recently published book Neighbors by Jan Tomasz Gross. I base my analysis of these early post-war intellectual writings on press material published in prominent social and literary journals such as the weekly Odrodzenie and the monthlies Twôrczosc and Kuznica. Initial issues of each o f these journals appeared on the following dates: Odrodzenie on 3 September 1944, Kuznica on 1 June 1945, Twôrczosc in August 1945. All three periodicals were representative of the Marxist ideological profile but were characterized by a certain degree of openness, particularly Odrodzenie, which frequently published articles by authors who had a record o f a different ideological profile, for example, the pre-war catholic writer Jerzy Andrzejewski. Openness towards points of view that could not be categorized as strictly Marxist sprang from the fact that during the first three years of the post-war period the communist power was not yet fully consolidated and the Stalinist system not yet imposed. Therefore the entire legal press was still, to some degree, enjoying freedom o f speech. In this context, one can view Kuznica, Odrodzenie and Twôrczosc as press that provided one of the main forums for the left-wing intellectual 207

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discourse on social, economic and cultural matters in Polish society, including the issue o f Polish relations with the Jewish minority.2 These three journals appeared to address the latter more frequently than other press of that time.3 O f course, the overall number o f articles published between 1945 and 1947 can in no way be viewed as comparable to the huge volume of articles on similar issues published in the contemporary Polish press. It is my contention, however, that an analysis of these early post-war writings will not only enable us to understand the main intellectual approaches of that period to “the difficult past and present,” but will also reveal some o f these approaches to be still relevant in contemporary intellectual debate on Polish relations with the Jewish minority during the Holocaust and after the war. Moreover, these intellectual writings will enhance our understanding of the dynamics of the process of reckoning with the difficult past. Before I move on to the main subject o f this paper, I shall briefly summarize some o f the major socio-political developments o f the early post-war period, which I view as important historical background to my analysis. Firstly, the Polish polity in many respects was transformed beyond recognition from a pre-war multinational Polish state, with one-third of its population comprised o f minorities, into an almost entirely homogenous nation-state - all this a result of the war, the German genocide of Polish Jews, and the ensuing territorial-political changes. Human losses had been high, with 5 percent o f the ethnic Polish population and 90 percent of the Polish Jewish population destroyed.4 2

3

4

It is worth noting here that in analysis of the content of these papers, discussion of the issue of the Jewish minority is generally not addressed. See for example, Wieslaw P. Szymahski, “Odrodzenie" and "Twôrczosc” w Krakowie 1945-1950, Wroclaw, 1981. The Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny also addressed the issue of Polish relations with the Jewish minority. Its major articles dedicated to this issue appeared after the Kielce pogrom of 4 July 1946. The official press of the All-Polish League to Fight Racism Prawo Czlowieka whose first issue appeared on IS September 1946 in the aftermath of the Kielce pogrom also questioned anti-Jewish actions and attitudes in Poland. The content of Prawo Czlowieka deserves a separate analysis. On the subject of losses suffered by Poland in WWII and on territorial and ethnic changes, see for example, Jôzef Andelson, “W Polsce Zwanej Ludowa,” in: Jerzy Tomaszewski (ed.), Najnowsze Dzieje Êydow W Polsce (w zarysie do 1950 roku),

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The number o f Polish Jews who survived the war is estimated at three hundred and eighty thousand, with 70 percent o f these survivors in the territories of the Soviet Union and the remaining 30 percent in Poland (in concentration and death camps) and in hiding on the Aryan side. Secondly, the state’s political system was in a process of dramatic change. Assisted by and under the control o f the Soviet Union, the Communist party Polska Partia Robotnicza (PPR) had began, as early as 1944, to prepare itself for the taking over of political power.5 The establishment in Moscow o f the Polish Committee o f National Liberation (PKWN) on 21 July 1944 and the creation of the state administration over Polish territories were the initial major steps in this process. Another step was the initiation o f action against the constitutional opposition, namely the Polish Peasant Movement (PSL) chaired by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, and against the illegal political and military opposition. In their struggle for power the Communist Party did not hesitate to use intimidation, arrests, terror and political murder. Thirdly, with regard to the issue of equality of rights for all Polish citizens and a particular vision of a new Polish nation-state, there were important detectable contradictions in the policies and practices o f the PPR in this early post-war period. On the one hand, the PPR stressed its complete departure from everything “reactionary” and discriminatory in the Polish past, in particular from the heritage of “antisemitism,” and was officially committed to the recognition o f equality o f rights for all citizens o f Poland, a commitment already declared in the PKWN manifesto of 22 July 1944. On the other hand, in various addresses to the Polish population, leading communist politicians emphasized the PPR's commitment to the creation of a homogenized ethno-national model o f the Polish state with a uniform culture.6 This has prompted some historians to conclude that the chief goal advocated by the pre-

5

6

Warsaw, 1993, pp. 400-4 and Andrzej Paczkowski, Zdobycie Wladzy 1945-1947, Warsaw, 1993, pp. 10-15. On the PPR methods of consolidating power, see for example, Paczkowski, Zdobycie wladzy, pp. 28-33, and Krystyna Kersten, Miqdzy wyzwoleniem a zniewoleniem: Polska 1944-1956, London, 1993, pp. 5-27. See for example, Kersten, Miqdzy wyzwoleniem a zniewoleniem, pp. 12-13.

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war Polish nationalists was realized by the communist regime.7 Some Jewish communists noted and criticized the presence o f contradictions between equality of rights and advocacy of a homogenous model o f the nation-state.8 However, this issue was generally overlooked by the western allies and western press, which saw in the new communist government a regime with the potential of overcoming all ethnic inequalities and discriminations that had been present under the pre-war Polish regimes. Contradictions between policies and practices were evident in the treatment of ordinary members o f the Jewish community by some members o f the new communist institutions and state apparatus at the local level. In many instances such institutions were characterized by a varying degree o f prejudice and discriminatory treatment towards Jewish citizens and, in some cases, by participation in anti-Jewish hostilities. Fourthly, while some sections o f the communist local parties and state apparatus did not always treat the Jews without prejudice, the illegal opposition frequently referred to the communist takeover o f power as the rule of “Judeo-Communism” and to the Jew as the political enemy o f the Polish nation-state and its people. In fact, the notion o f the Jew as the political enemy of Poland was disseminated in most of the illegal press circulated in Polish territories - newspapers, pamphlets and leaflets. The fact that a section of surviving Polish Jews were communists, and that some o f them held visible and highly ranked positions within the Communist Party and the state apparatus only reinforced such a notion. In contrast to the illegal opposition, the constitutional opposition abstained from open declaration o f its attitudes towards the Jewish minority. Nevertheless, in some o f its 7

8

This conclusion was reached, for example, by Jerzy Jedlicki, in his “Nationalism and State Formation,” in: Andrea Gerrits and Nanci Adler (eds.), Vampires Unstaked. National Images, Stereotypes and Myths in East Central Europe, Amsterdam, Oxford, 1995, p. 130; and by Michael C. Steinlauf, in Bondage to the Dead, Syracuse, 1997, p. 43. The problem of critical reactions on the part of the Jewish section of the PPR towards the advocacy of a homogenized Polish nation-state for Poles, and the negative effects o f such a notion on ethnic minorities, has been noted by Krystyna Kersten, “Polish Stalinism and the Jewish Question,” in: Leonid Luks (ed.), Der Spätstalinismus und die j‘üdische Frage:' zur antisemitischen Wendung des Kommunismus, Weimar, 1998, pp. 222-23.

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members’ public pronouncements one can find an identification of Jews with the new communist regime similar to that of the illegal opposition. Finally, the social position of the surviving remnants o f Polish Jews with regard to society as a whole was precarious. The common social experience of this group was a sense o f fear, lack o f physical safety and exposure to violence.9 It is estimated that between fifteen hundred and two thousand Jews lost their lives in collective and individual murders that swept Poland between 1945 and 1947. This anti-Jewish violence was characterized by extreme brutality and by the active participation o f different social agents, including military units o f the illegal opposition, ordinary citizens and, in some instances, members o f the communist state apparatus, i.e., soldiers and militiamen. The Kielce pogrom o f 4 July 1946 was the most horrifying example o f such violence and indicated that Jews were not welcome to restore their lives among their co-citizens, the ethnic Polish community. Overall, the wave o f anti-Jewish hostilities also indicated that the reality o f the Holocaust had not been acknowledged by society and that prejudiced perceptions about Jews were still powerful elements in the social belief system and social action.

Self-C ritical Inquiry am ong Intellectuals One o f the central elements o f wartime national mythology was the self-image of Poland as a community o f heroes and martyrs only. This image, in different versions, was subsequently maintained in the post­ war reality, both in communist Poland and in émigré circles. Moreover until very recently, this image constituted the most publicly acceptable self-image in collective memory. Were there any aspects of Polish history that could throw dark shadows over it? One can clearly see that, right from the end of the war, the major serious threats to this self-image were the emotional and moral distance 9

On the subject of insecurity and violence affecting the remaining Jewish community, see for example, Andelson, “W Polsce Zwanej Ludowa,” pp. 400-4; David Engel, “Patterns of Anti-Jewish Violence in Poland, 1944-1946,” Yad Vashem Studies, 26 (1998), pp. 43-86; Jan Tomasz Gross, Upioma Dekada, Cracow, 1998, pp. 93-113; and Joanna Michlic, “Anti-Jewish Violence in Poland, 1918-1939 and 1945-1947,” Polin, 13 (2000), pp. 34-61.

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from the war-time tragedy of Polish Jewry, and the existence o f antiJewish prejudiced perceptions and actions within society during and after the Holocaust. These issues were to become the most embarrass­ ing and challenging aspects of recent Polish history, issues that had long been treated with omission, silence and distortion. The case in point is the official Polish position in the early post-war period, which aimed at sweeping the terrain of the difficult past and present under the carpet. What exceptions were there to such a position in the early post-war period? And what attempts were made at challenging it during that time? The writings o f Jerzy Andrzejewski, Mieczystaw Jastrun, Zdzistaw Libera, Stanislaw Ossowski, Stefan Otwinowski and Kazimierz Wyka, among others, reveal that such attempts did indeed take place in the intellectual discourse of the early post-war period. Characteristically, most o f these intellectuals were non-historically trained, the great majority of them being writers and literary critics. Also among them was the distinguished sociologist Stanislaw Ossowski. Interestingly, the professional make-up of this group was similar to that of the leading figures of contemporary self-critical inquiries: Jan Blonski and Maria Janion are literary critics, Joanna Tokarska-Bakir is an anthropologist, and Hanna Swida-Ziemba and Jan T. Gross are sociologists. This would indicate that in the Polish context the self-critical mode o f inquiry was clearly more advanced and developed among non-historically trained intellectuals.10 I shall now examine examples o f such early post-war writings, starting with the poet Mieczystaw Jastrun’s article “Potçga Ciemnoty” (The Power of Darkness), which was published in Odrodzenie on 17 June 1945. This was perhaps the most influential article o f the selfcritical genre of that time, since it succeeded in generating discussion in the press. In “Potçga Ciemnoty” Jastrun raises various social and ethical concerns. His main arguments are that a continuity of the pre-war forms

10 On various approaches of intellectuals in contemporary debate about Gross’s Neighbors see, for example, Joanna Tokarska-Bakir, “Historiajako fetysz,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 15-16 (February 2003), pp. 20-22; and Joanna Michlic, “Pamiçc o mrocznej przeszlosci. Intelektualtéci o Jedwabnem,” Midrasz, 4 (2003), pp. 33-37.

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o f antisemitism in post-war society exists, despite the almost total destruction of Polish Jewry, and that the so-called sprawa zydowska (Jewish question) still continued to incite ethnic hatred against a small group o f Jewish survivors, whom he calls “the shadow of the people.” As a result o f this, he states, Jews who survived on the “Aryan” side during the war are now unwilling to disclose their true pre-war identity in a country now free of the Germans. Such unwillingness is dictated by what Jastrun calls “a strong instinct o f self-preservation.” Furthermore, Jastrun views the persistence o f pre-war antisemitic notions as morally appalling. And he calls for an intensive program of reeducation in the schools and media to contribute to the eradication of all antisemitic stereotypes within society. He also poses the question about the apparent lack of empathy with the Jewish minority during the war on the part of the ethnic Polish community, which, he acknowledges, also suffered great losses from the common enemy - the Germans. He claims that, with the exception o f the left-wing and democratic groups, common suffering under the German occupation has not manifested in unity with and sympathy for Polish Jewry on the part o f significant sections o f the middle class and intelligentsia. Instead, evident in these two social groups was a public acceptance of anti-Jewish utterances, which had most frequently been heard during the destruction o f the Warsaw Ghetto. And he attributes this phenomenon to the destructive social and moral influence o f pre­ war antisemitism. During the Great Deportation of Jews from the Warsaw Ghetto in the summer of 1942, and during Easter of 1943, when the remnants of Warsaw Jewry were burnt alive, one could frequently have heard the following comments: “It is good that our hands are not involved in this,” “What a shame that the buildings are being destroyed but still we shall rebuild new and better ones,” “Look! The Germans have anticipated the Jewish action against us," and “Come and have a look at the Jews being fried like cutlets.” If someone thinks that these comments were made out of some extraordinary “desire for blood” he is definitely mistaken. [The authors of these comments] were simply victims of the long generated influence of the power of darkness [antisemitism].’11

The perceptiveness o f Jastrun’s observations can be discerned in the light o f various sociological and psychological studies that confirm a

11 Mieczyslaw Jastrun, “Potçga Ciemnoty,” Odrodzenie, 29 (17 June 1945), p. 1.

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positive correlation between the holding of anti-group prejudice and a lack of empathy for the suffering o f that group.12 Furthermore, empiric studies of various historical data from both the wartime and early post­ war periods show that the comments cited by Jastrun were not marginal, but rather typical examples o f the publicly acceptable comments voiced during the destruction o f Warsaw Jewry. Interest­ ingly, another Polish writer o f Jewish origin, Adolf Rudnicki, in his Dzienniki (Diary), made similar observations on the reactions o f the local population towards the final destruction o f the Warsaw Ghetto in the spring of 1943. The excerpt from Rudnicki’s Dzienniki was published in the first issue of Kuznica in 1945.13 Jastrun’s article met with heavy criticism by the journalist Zbigniew Przygörski. In his article “Przeciw Potçdze Ciemnoty” (Against the Power of Darkness), published in Odrodzenie on 22 July 1945, Przygörski dismisses Jastrun’s arguments as false. Articles such as Przygörski’s can be categorized as an early example of the genre of self-defensive writings that since the end o f the war developed into a huge bulk of literature o f different ideological provenance. The foremost aim of such writings was to provide an image o f Poles as exclusively heroes and victims, thereby proclaiming and protecting the good name of Poland and its people. In this genre, such a protection necessitates a complete refusal to accept any critical inquiry into one’s own history. This refusal may be accompanied by both the negative portrayal of the Jewish minority and the shifting o f responsibility for any wrongdoings upon the Jewish minority itself. In Przygörski’s article we find all the above-described elements. Here the official communist interpretation of antisemitism is inter­ twined with prejudiced perceptions o f Jews, and with the theme o f the solidarity of the great majority of the ethnic Polish population with Polish Jews during the Holocaust. Przygörski claims that the antisemitism of the early post-war period is just one o f the elements of reactionary forces, which are, after all, not only directed against Jews but also against the new democratic Polish state, and therefore does not

12 See for example, Vamik Volkan, “The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach,” Political Psychology; 6 (1985), pp. 219-47. 13 Adolf Rudnicki, “Dzienniki,” Kuznica, 1 (1945), pp. 18-20.

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require much attention (and separate) investigation.14 His following comments about the Jewish minority include the themes o f Jewish passivity during the Holocaust, of the particularities of the Jewish psyche, which prevent the Jews from a realistic evaluation o f events, and o f the existence of the “Jewish question” in post-war Poland. The psyche of the Jewish nation is characterized by a large mystical element, which prevents the Jews from a proper evaluation of reality and leads to the support of unjustified illusions... The present discussion about “the Jewish Question” should be moved on to another level. If [in post-war Poland] there really was just a small group of Jews, as Jastrun claims, the Jewish Question would be irrelevant.15

His assessment o f Polish reactions towards the Jewish minority during the Holocaust lacks internal consistency. On the one hand, he argues that regardless of any anti- or pro-Jewish sympathies within Polish society, the main pattem o f behavior towards Jews was characterized by an understandable passivity. On the other hand, he argues that the Polish population was extremely dedicated to the rescuing of Jews and he contrasts such heroic behavior with the behavior o f the Jews themselves, who, according to him, were passive in the face of their impending extermination. Two distinguished literary critics, Zdzislaw Libera and Kazimierz Wyka, supported Jastrun. Like Jastrun, Zdzislaw Libera perceives antisemitism as an important social problem that was continuing to have dam aging effects on post-w ar society. In the article “Antisemitism” published in Kuznica in 1945, Libera provides a short historical overview o f the development in society o f the perception of the Jew as the enemy.16 In discussions of the wartime period, Libera observes that the official Polish-language press under German control constantly disseminated the notion o f the Jew as a parasitic threat to all aspects of life, similar in some aspects to the image o f the Jew as disseminated by domestic pre-war propaganda. Furthermore, he

14 He writes: “Contemporaiy antisemitism is just a matter of reactionary forces and there is no need for exaggerating its scope and nature. After all, reactionary forces are directed not only against Jews but also against democratic Poland.” Zbigniew Przygôrski, “Przeciw potçdze ciemnoty,” Odrodzenie, 34 (22 July 1945), p. 3. 15 Ibid., p. 3. 16 Zdzislaw Libera, “Antysemityzm,” Kuznica, 4 (1945), pp. 17-19.

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maintains that, during the war, society had grown accustomed to the fact of the extermination of the Jewish minority and that such conditioning combined with the long-term and continuous exposure to anti-Jewish propaganda had a damaging and long-lasting effect on society’s attitudes and behavior towards Jews. Libera recognizes the many different forms that antisemitism manifests itself in the new post­ war reality. And he insists that society needs to be completely reeducated in the spirit of rationality and democratic values. He also argues that the official communist declaration of equality of civil rights cannot be seen as a final achievement, but only as a first step on the way to the implementation of equality o f rights. Therefore, he calls upon the new government to create social and political conditions that would provide the remaining Jews and Poles o f Jewish origin with a sense of true civic equality. Libera ends his article on a rather prematurely optimistic note o f hope that such a civic equality would be realized in the new Poland. Jastrun’s voice was echoed in Kazimierz Wyka’s article “Potçga ciemnoty potwierdzona” (Confirmation o f the Existence of the Powers o f Darkness), published in Odrodzenie on 23 September 1945. Wyka begins the article with a statement in which he alludes to his experience of personal pain felt while reading Jastrun’s article. Yet, he immediately acknowledges that Jastrun’s observations of society’s reactions towards the remaining Jewish survivors are regrettably correct. Moreover, he gives examples of the existence o f anti-Jewish emotions and reactions among the population of his own city Cracow, where, on 11 August 1945, a pogrom had taken place at the Kupa Synagogue at 27 Miodowa Street. Wyka describes the attitude o f Cracow’s lower-middle classes towards the returning Jewish survivors as that o f prejudice, hostility, and firm refusal to accept the idea of the reconstruction o f Jewish life in their midst. Furthermore, he states that this kind of attitude is not limited to one social group only, but can also be found among members o f the intelligentsia. He concludes that, in the Polish context, antisemitism has not become a discredited ideology but has instead remained one of the significant elements of a patriotic position. Here we come across a sad paradox: There were no Quislings in wartime Poland, but the country is perhaps the only state in Europe in which antisemitism has persisted and resulted in political and moral crimes. A country in which Jews have almost entirely been destroyed and in which the resistance against Germany

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has been widespread... Antisemitism has been an integral part of patriotic gestures and artifacts.17

It is worth noting here that Wyka’s conclusions are very close to those reached forty years later by another Polish intellectual, Aleksander Smolar, who states the following in his article “Jews as a Polish Problem.” Only in Poland was antisemitism compatible with patriotism and also with democracy. Precisely because Polish antisemitism was not tainted by any trace of collaboration with the Germans, it could prosper, not only in the street, but also in the underground press, in political parties and in the armed forces.18

Wyka is also the author of another important article representing the genre o f self-critical inquiry, entitled “Gospodarka wytqczona” (The Excluded Economy), which appeared in the first issue of Twôrczosc in August 1945.19 This issue also included the well-known poem of Czeslaw Milosz, “Campo di Fiori.”20 In “Gospodarka wylqczona,” in which various social and economic matters are discussed from the point o f view of Marxist economics, Wyka provides a critique of the pre-war nationalist evaluation of commerce as an “unethical activity” in “the hands of Jews” and as an “ethical activity” in “the hands of ethnic Poles.” He also discusses the morally degenerating impact o f such thinking on the ethnic Polish population during the war, when Poles were, to some degree, permitted by the Germans to replace the Jewish minority in some sections of commerce. He observes that as a result o f the impact of nationalist thinking, this replacement was generally treated as a positive phenomenon by members of the ethnic Polish population who benefited from it and accepted it as a “rightful” chance for upward social mobility, but without a trace o f reflection about the fate of those whom they were replacing. Wyka also argues that the moral degeneration of the Polish population during the war in the sphere o f the economy also 17 Kazimierz Wyka, “Potçga ciemnoty potwierdzona,” Odrodzenie, 43 (23 September 1945), p. 7. 18 Aleksander Smolar, “Jews as a Polish Problem,'’ Daedalus, 116 (1987), p. 41. 19 Kazimierz Wyka, “Gospodarka wylqczona,” Twôrczosc, 1 (August 1945), pp. 14670. The article was republished in a collection of essays, Zycie na niby, CracowWrodaw, 1984, pp. 155-60. 20 Czeslaw Milosz, “Campo di Fiori,” Twôrczosc, 1 (August 1945), pp. 49-50.

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spread to those who materially benefited from the German extermina­ tion o f the Jewish minority. Hence, Wyka advocates, out o f moral necessity, the urgent need for greater awareness of both the unethical nature of wartime developments in the economic sphere and their damaging impact. Similar reflections can also be found in a little-known story “Galqzka Akacji” (The Branch o f the Acacia Tree), written by the theatrical critic Edmund Wiercinski and published in Twôrczosc in 1947.21 In this story, Wiercinski provides us with a picture of simple and uneducated members of a small town community, who are completely detached morally and emotionally from the murder o f their Jewish neighbors by the Germans. They are unable to shed even a single tear.22 Instead, they focus on their physical survival and the material gains to be made by grabbing the possessions left behind in the ghetto by the Jews. Importantly, the issue of the moral degeneration of wartime society in an economic context has reappeared in contemporary writings o f the self-critical genre, including social and historical essays. For example, in the essay “Poduszka Pani Marx” (The Pillow o f Mrs. Marx), Jan T. Gross discusses the ethical implications of the acquisition o f Jewish assets by Poles during the Holocaust.2324The historian Feliks Tych, in his collection of historical essays Dlugi Cien Zagiady (The Long Shadow o f the Destruction), also discusses this issue. In the essay “Wspôlny los” (Common Fate), published in August 1945 in Odrodzenie, the playwright Stefan Otwinowski addresses two o f the most highly emotionally charged issues o f “the immediate difficult past” - the scope o f denunciation of Jews by a segment o f the Polish population, and the asymmetry o f Polish and Jewish fates during the German occupation of Poland. These questions have frequently

21 See Edmund Wiercinski, “Gak(zka Akacji,” Twôrczosc, 1 (January 1947), pp. 4458. See also the article by the Communist writer Jerzy Putrament, “Odbudowa psychiczna,” Odrodzenie, 4-5 (1 October 1944), p. 1, 3. 22 The complete moral and emotional detachment from the fate of Jews was one o f the main issues discussed in the diary of the survivor Arnold Szyfman, from which excerpts were published in Twôrczosc, 4 (1946), pp. 100-18. 23 Jan T. Gross, “Poduszka Pani Marx,” Tygodnik Powszechny, 6(11 February 2001), p. 9. 24 Feliks Tych, Dlugi Cien Zagiady, Warsaw, 1999, pp. 57-67.

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reappeared as central to contemporary public debates and have become the subject o f recent critical scholarly analysis.25 Otwinowski sees these two issues as intertwined; the phenomenon o f denunciation providing supporting evidence for the argument that the drawing of symmetries between Jewish and Polish fates during the war is both historically false and morally wrong. In relation to the latter, Otwinowski simply states the following: “We should not deceive ourselves that the fate of Poles was equal to the fate o f Jews. In this matter we should not lose a proper sense o f perspective and judgment.”26 In relation to the issue o f denunciation, the playwright bases his observations on his own personal wartime experiences; due to his physical appearance, Otwinowski was mistakenly identified by his compatriots as being a Jew on the Aryan side. This made him aware that the group of so-called szmalcownicy (informers) had not been limited, as the official Polish narrative claimed, to a marginal and rotten part o f society only, but had included what could be called its ordinary and decent members.2728 I was fully aware of the dangers of the streets of Warsaw during the German occupation. I knew such dangers very well since I myself walking these streets was perceived by “the keen Polish patriots,” not as a Pole but as a Jew, because o f my face and black hair. I remember the many glances not only of the professional blackmailers and amateurs of quick money, but also of cultured people... I myself know how hard it is to forget that it was not the Germans, but a supposedly decent looking person who would sometimes casually warn me: “You better give me all your assets, otherwise... you see this police station on the ______ *»28 comer. 25 See for example, Jan T. Gross, “A Tangled Web: Confronting Stereotypes Concerning Relations between Poles, Germans, Jews and Communists,” in: Istvan Deak, Jan T. Gross and Tony Judt (eds.), The Politics o f Retribution in Europe, Princeton, 2000, pp. 74-130. 26 Stefan Otwinowski, “Wspolny los,” Odrodzenie, 37 (12 August 1945), p. 6. 27 Otwinowski also dealt with the issue of informers in Polish society in his novel Pomylka from which excerpts were published in Twôrczosc, 4 (1946), pp. 77-93. It is worth noting that he is also the author of the drama Wielkanoc, commemorating the Warsaw Jewish Uprising of 1943. The Jewish Historical Commission in Cracow published Otwinowski’s Wielkanoc in 1946, with a preface by Michal M. Borwicz. See also, review of this work by Tadeusz Bereza, “Wielkanoc Stefana Otwinowskiego,” Odrodzenie, 19 (1946), p. 10. 28 Otwinowski, “Wspôlny los,” p. 6.

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One can see here that Otwinowski was already engaged in polemics in 1945 with the position, then publicly disseminated, that society as a whole had behaved in a righteous and honorable manner towards Jews, and that Jewish survivors, without reason, were voicing unjustifiable and false accusations against Poles. Otwinowski clearly opposes keeping skeletons in the cupboard. In fact, he suggests that such shameful aspects o f Polish behavior towards members of the Jewish minority be aired out in the open for réévaluation. During the German occupation I had witnessed an increase in hatred towards Jews. This is why I am not surprised by the bitterness of some of the accusations, which have been voiced by Poles of Jewish origin. We have refused to accept these accusations as truth... However, the truth about the inhuman behavior [towards Jews] on the part of a segment of society should be accepted, and correctly evaluated and remembered.29

Along with Otwinowski’s struggle with the “immediate difficult past,” Jerzy A ndrzejew ski in his article “Z agadnienie p o lsk ieg o antysemitizmu” (The Problem o f Polish Antisemitism) embarks on a “struggle with the difficult past and present.” This two-part article, published in Odrodzenie in the summer of 1946, provides an overview of the problem of antisemitism from a cultural standpoint, and critically discusses its present manifestations and their treatment by the new communist authorities.30 This can be viewed as one of the most insightful articles o f the time. At the outset Andrzejewski states that there is a continuity o f pre-war negative patterns o f thinking about and behavior towards the remnants of the Polish Jewish minority, and an evident lack o f moral shock within society over the almost total destruction o f Polish Jewry. Next he acknowledges the various social and emotional attitudes that may be conducive to the omission and ignorance, in the public sphere, o f these painful issues. Nevertheless, he insists that they should not be ignored and silenced but fully and openly discussed. Furthermore, he criticizes the communist government’s stance on antisemitism, which it has categorized merely as an element o f reactionary forces. Andrzejewski

29 Ibid. p. 6. 30 Jerzy Andrzejewski, “Zagadnienie polskiego antysemityzmu,” Odrodzenie, 27 (1946), p. 4; and 28 (1946), p. 3.

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correctly defines such categorization as a manifestation o f the political struggle with the opposition, and as a government propaganda tool that aims at the delegitimization of the political opposition. Unfortunately, over the last year, the term “reactionary forces” has become a sack into which all hot social issues are thrown in haste. The sack is vast and able to contain what may metaphorically be called our contemporary “Dante’s Inferno”: General Anders sits in it next to metaphysics, and a common looter sits besides a member of the National Armed Forces (NSZ)... Today, to call someone a reactionary person can mean so many different things that in the end it does not mean anything.31

Moreover, he considers that the term “reactionary forces” in relation to anti-Jewish attitudes and behavior contributes nothing to an under­ standing of the phenomenon o f antisemitism. He observes that such labeling can only lead to further confusion among the public, and in fact obstructs the emergence of necessary and urgent questions about the nature and the roots o f anti-Jewish prejudice within Polish society. Defining antisemitism as a reactionary and fascist force does not explain the phenomenon of Polish antisemitism... [It does not provide an explanation of the important questions]: What are its roots? What are its main manifestations? Why it is manifested in particular forms and not in others?32

He also makes the correct observation that the prevalent form of antisemitism within the ethnic Polish population is not that o f genocidal antisemitism as “advocated and realized by Hitler.” However, he insists that anti-Jewish prejudice exists among different social groups, including both the uneducated lower social classes and among the intelligentsia. Here it can be seen that he contests both the official communist and the publicly acceptable narratives claiming that antisemitic manifestations are confined only to a small and degenerate social element that stands outside the healthy fabric of society. From my observations of what has happened in the recent past in Poland and of what is still happening... from my observations of the reactions and gestures that are naturally manifested by persons of different social and educational backgrounds, 1 can only come to the one conclusion that the Polish nation throughout its entire spectrum has remained prone to anti-Jewish attitudes. The most common anti-Jewish attitudes manifest themselves in different forms, from

31 Andrzejewski, “Zagadnienie,” Odrodzenie 27 (1946), p. 4. 32 Ibid., p. 4.

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innocent jokes, through allegedly factual critiques o f Jews by those who claim they are not antisémites, to brutal forms of hostility.33

Interestingly, Andrzejewski’s discussion o f the nature and origin o f anti-Jewish attitudes in some aspects resembles contemporary analyses conducted respectively by the literary critic Maria Janion and the sociologist Hanna Swida-Ziemba.34 Like Janion, Andrzejewski too searches for explanations of the nature and persistence of antisemitism in the collective culture. According to Andrzejewski, the traditional Polish moral-cultural code developed by historical process over centuries has been characterized by clearly prejudiced and disrespectful notions towards the moral-cultural code o f Jews. As a result, despising and laughing at Jewish traditions and rituals, at Jewish ways of dressing, and at culturally assimilated and integrated Jews has become the practiced norm among Poles, regardless of educational and social status. Thus he concludes that disrespect o f the moral-cultural code of Polish Jewry lies at the root of the perception of the Jew as an alien and enemy. The writer posits that this type o f antisemitism has had a damaging influence on Polish patterns o f behavior towards its Jewish minority over a long period. Furthermore, like Swida-Ziemba, he is not about to underestimate its dangerous potential. In fact, he points out that given the right social and political circumstances, this kind o f “nondangerous” antisemitism can be transformed into the violent type; the supposedly innocent anti-Jewish joke may eventually lead to the eruption of anti-Jewish hostilities. To Andrzejewski, the antidote solution to anti-Jewish patterns of behavior and thinking lies in discarding the anti-Jewish elements of the heritage of the past. And he calls upon Polish society to free itself from all past and deformed patterns of such thinking, which “history has bestowed on it.”35 Contemporary self-critical examination reveals that Andrzejewski’s call

33 Ibid., p. 4. 34 See Maria Janion, Do Europy tak, ale razem z naszymi umarfymi, Warsaw, 2000, pp. 101-65; and Hanna Swida- Ziemba, “Krôtkowzrocznoéc ‘kulturalnych’,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 7-8 April 2001, pp. 18-19. 35 Jerzy Andrzejewski is also the author of another critical article on the mythologization of the past in the Polish collective mind. See Jerzy Andrzejewski, “Uwagi i notatki,” Odrodzenie, 19 (1945), p. 6.

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is still being advocated by its proponents as a salient social and cultural goal yet to be fully achieved. The article “Na tie wydarzen kieleckich” (At the Background of the Events in Kielce), written by the sociologist Stanislaw Ossowski, can be viewed as another brave and insightful piece o f writing confronting “the difficult present.” This article, which appeared in Kuznica two months afterwards the Kielce pogrom, represents a critical analysis of factors conducive to the Kielce pogrom and to anti-Jewish violence in general, as well as of reactions to the violence. Ossowski’s contention is that the remaining Jews are being murdered in post-war Poland only because they are Jews and that the nature of these murders is extremely brutal, with neither children nor elderly people being spared. In his opinion, this violence appears to follow the pattem o f “killings introduced by Hitler.” .. .In Poland [free of the German occupier] what has survived is the tendency to a continuation of Hitler’s system of killings... mature men, fragile babies and old women are all victims. Kielce was not the first place where this appalling heritage manifested itself. Before the Kielce pogrom approximately hundreds of Jewish survivors of the Holocaust had been already murdered only because they...had escaped the extermination process.3637

Another important issue raised by Ossowski is the way in which the anti-Jewish violence o f the early post-war period is being assessed. Here Ossowski touches upon a salient issue that has rarely been discussed in scholarly works, namely, the way that this violence was perceived and interpreted by different segments o f society. For example, my own historical examination o f both the official communist and the illegal oppositional press of the early post-war period reveals that the Kielce pogrom was primarily evaluated as an event that “slandered the good name o f Poland and its people” rather than a terrible tragedy that befell the Jewish survivors. Furthermore, in such interpretations Jews were accorded a secondary place. To Ossowski such an inteipretation is per se problematic. To him, condemnation of

36 Stanislaw Ossowski, “Na tie wydarzen Kieleckich,” Kuznica, 38 (1946), p. 4. 37 For a more detailed analysis of this problem, see Joanna Michlic, “Old Wine in a New Bottle: Jews as Perceived in Post-war Communist Poland, 1945-47,” in: Robert B. Pynsent (ed.), The Phoney Peace. Power and Culture in Central Europe 1945-49, London, 2000, pp. 87-99.

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the Kielce pogrom because the event makes a bad impression abroad is both morally disturbing and lacking in basic humanitarian concern. The way in which the pogrom is condemned also varies. I saw a person honestly saddened by the Kielce crime who stated: “Such things should not be done because they wreck our reputation abroad.” This politically aware person was not, for sure, concerned with “soft” humanitarian issues.38

In his analysis o f the existence o f post-war antisemitism, Ossowski points to two different developments. Firstly, he recognizes that one of the main features of post-war political antisemitism is the notion of Judeo-communism, according to which Jews as a collectivity are supporters of communism. Ossowski argues that this powerful notion, disseminated in Polish nationalist propaganda of the pre-war period as well as in German propaganda o f the wartime period, now appears to be an intrinsic element o f the oppositional political stance against the Soviet Union; that being an opponent o f the new communist government is often equivalent to advocating the notion o f Judeocommunism. j Secondly, he states that ethno-nationalist ideas and resentments are manipulated and channeled not only by the right-wing press but by the official left-wing press as well. In fact, Ossowski suggests a glaring similarity between the two otherwise oppositional political camps concerning the issue o f the homogeneity of the Polish nation-state. Moreover, he argues that advocacy o f a homogenous national character for the polity on the part o f the communist authorities and press is similar to that advocated by the pre-war nationalists. Furthermore, this process is conducive to an increasing intolerance and hatred towards the returning members of Jewish and other minorities, such an intolerance being detectable not only in central Poland, but also in the Western Territories where both ethnic Polish and Jewish populations are newcomers. Concerning the matter of national make-up and inter-ethnic relations, a high level of agreement can surprisingly be found between our right-wing and left-wing press. By advancing the concept of a homogenous [ethno-national] state, we leam to categorize people on the basis of ethnic/national principle, and to distinguish between “us and them.” Articles, political declarations and speeches,

38 Ibid., p. 6.

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made at different national celebrations, create a climate resembling that of pre­ war nationalism, a climate in which immunity to those phrases responsible for inciting the Kielce pogrom is weakened.39

Finally, I shall briefly mention two other articles that deal critically with th e phenomenon o f early post-war anti-Jewish violence: Jan Szczepariski’s “Po zamordowaniu Jözefa Oppenheima” (After the Murder o f Jözef Oppenheim), and Franciszek Gil’s “Powröt z Kiele” (Return from Kielce).40 Like Ossowski, Szczepahski and Gil are morally shocked by the eruption of anti-Jewish violence, and focus on the unspeakable tragedy o f the remnants o f the Polish Jewish community. They also pay attention to the discussion o f the suffering and losses of Polish Jewry during the Holocaust. Szczepahski’s article, published in Kuznica in 1946, is dedicated to the memory of Jözef Oppenheim, a chairman in the Tatra Mountains’ Volunteer Emergency Services, 1914-1939, an organization set up before the First World War. Oppenheim, a long-term member of the Polish Socialist Party, was murdered in his home in Zakopane when he returned after the war to take up his pre-war occupation.41 He was killed by a member o f the extreme right-wing military forces that were still influential in the southern part o f Poland. In the article, Szczepahski disagrees with the popular version of Oppenheim’s murder as a category o f crime motivated by greed. Like Ossowski, Szczepahski argues that murders are committed against Jewish individuals just because they are Jewish. And to support his argument Szczepahski refers to the increasing number of such murders taking place in Polish territories. It is worth adding here that this position has since been confirmed in a historical inquiry by David Engel, which convincingly proved that Jews were murdered in early post-war Poland

39 Ibid., p. 5. 40 Another example, in the category of confronting the issue of anti-Jewish violence, is Wladystaw Broniewski’s preface to the translation of the French work by Julian Benda “Antysemita z przekonania.” This preface was published in Kuznica, 22 (1946), p. 10. 41 During the Second World War Jözef Oppenheim first was in Kowel in Eastern Territories under the Soviet occupation and later moved to Warsaw where he lived on the Aryan side. I would like to thank Prof. Andrey Rackowski for this information.

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not on economic or political grounds but because o f their ethnic affiliation.42 Oppenheim was not killed because of blankets... he was killed because he was of Jewish origin. The motivation behind his death was exactly the same as the motivation behind the recent murder of David Grasgrün, the chairman o f the Jewish Committee in nearby Nowy Targ, and of many other murders taking place in different parts of Poland in recent weeks. Those who were murdered were murdered because of “their blood” as they attempted to rebuild their lives on the ruins of their past world.43

Szczepanski also points out that, as in the pre-war period, social and political attitudes towards Polish Jewry still continue to be a litmus test o f Polish democracy and its maturity. He also argues that in matters concerning the safety of the remaining Jewish community, there is a visible level of opportunism and disinterest that cannot be justified either on moral or ideological grounds. He also implies that the government is not doing enough to fight anti-Jewish hostility. Finally, he calls for the urgent launching o f a program that would effectively counter such hostility. In “Powrôt z Kiele,” Gil takes a critical look at segments o f the local Kielce community in the aftermath o f the Kielce pogrom. The picture he paints is grim and devastating. The Kielce population is a community unable to reflect upon the criminal nature of the murder o f the forty-two Jews committed in their own familiar locality, or upon the Nazi destruction of the majority of Polish Jewry during the Holocaust. The inability to mourn, to use the famous psychoanalytical term, first applied in discussion on the German population’s reactions to the destruction o f their Jews, constitutes the main feature o f their behavior.44 Gil provides a plausible explanation for this kind o f silence, which is the result o f a long-term exposure to thinking about Jews as aliens and enemies. Consequently, the community was emotionally detached as witnesses to the Holocaust. This pattern o f thinking continues after the war to have a similar damaging impact on the way 42 See Engel, “Patterns of Anti-Jewish Violence,” pp. 43-86. 43 Jan Alfred Szczepanski, “Po zamordowaniu Jôzefa Oppenheima,” Kuznica, 13 (1946), p. 8. 44 The term “inability to mourn” was first used by two German psychoanalysts Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich in what is now known as a classic study, Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern, Munich, 1967.

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the community relates to the returning Jewish survivors. As a result, they are perceived as a people who do not belong and who should leave the country. A revolt of thinking or at least a sense of affinity with [Jews] in the time of their slavery [the Holocaust] was needed in order to accept them back on equal rights, into the community. However, when Jews were ordered [by the Germans] to put on the yellow badge, just such a sense of affinity within large segments of the Polish population did not exist, since it had already been absent within society [during the inter-war period].45

Gil also recognizes that the general conditions o f war and German occupation contributed to further emotional and moral detachment from the Jewish community. One of the best illustrations of the deep social and moral damage caused by these factors is the opinion of the time, claiming that if the Jews were good people, God would, after all, have not permitted such a harsh punishment to be enforced upon them. How can we summarize these examples of self-critical writings as presented above? Can any common features be identified? Looking closely at these writings, I differentiate the following necessary features. The first is a recognition o f the existence o f the difficult past and present, followed by the need to confront the difficult past and present out o f moral and social necessities and regardless o f the emotional discomfort and social conflict that may ensue. There is also the expression of the need for a non-distorted picture of one’s own national history. Secondly, the perception o f Polish society as comprised only of heroes and martyrs is not allowed to interfere with the self-critical approach in any meaningful way. Rather it is entirely absent. Moreover, there is a recognition of the possibility of one’s own wrongdoings to others and a need to somehow repair such wrongdoings and prevent them from further continuity in either the physical sense (as in the case of anti-Jewish violence and in providing Jews with equality of rights on a practical level) or the symbolic sense (accepting the wrongdoings that took place during the war as an integral part o f the Polish collective memory). Thirdly, we can clearly see that emphasis is put on nuances o f social behavior and patterns that are defined as wrongdoings. Here different 45 Franciszek Gil, “Powrôt z Kiele,” Odrodzenie, 34 (1946), pp. 1-2.

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forms can be found, including hostile indifference, “an inability to mourn” for the Jewish community both during and after the Holocaust, and the existence of negative attitudes towards the remaining Jewish survivors. Fourthly and lastly, the narrative of the self-critical approach allocates a significant space to a positive description o f the other the victim of the wrongdoings - the Jewish minority, for its fate during the Second World War, and to the social position o f Jewish survivors in the post-war reality. Such description and themes o f wrongdoings constitute the main body o f the self-critical genre. Can we find such features in the official communist stance o f the early post-war period? Most features of the self-critical approach, perhaps with the exception of the last one, were absent from the official communist narrative concerning society's relations with the Jewish minority during the immediate past and present.46 The official communist narrative appropriated and adjusted to its own ideological needs the major national themes o f heroism and martyrdom disseminated at the time by the opposing political camp.47 This was done in order to legitimize the new regime in the eyes of the nation. The appropriation of these themes is perhaps most demonstrable in the development of the official narrative on the Holocaust period. Here the theme of a high level o f solidarity of Polish society with the Jewish minority, and of a high level of rescue operations and assistance during wartime period came to play a central role. With regard to the early post-war period, as has already been indicated, the official communist narrative highly politicized the issue of society's relations to the remaining Jewish minority. Within this narrative, antisemitism was viewed as a political issue belonging to a general struggle against reactionary and fascist forces, by which it was understood, all oppositional political movements against the communist government, including critical voices from left-wing parties and 46 This subject still awaits a proper scholarly investigation. For a general background and a discussion of some of its aspects, see Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead, pp. 4361. 47 On the issue of appropriation of themes of heroism and martyrdom by different communist regimes in East-Central Europe, see for example, Tony Judt, “The Past Is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe,” in: Istvan Deak et. al., The Politics o f Retribution, pp. 293-324.

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organizations. Furthermore, the narrative rejected the idea that in the early post-war period antisemitism was a separate and serious social problem that had damaging ethical and social effects on the healthy fabric o f society. Instead, the narrative insisted that Polish society was embarking on a new Zero Point in its history, the Zero Point defined by the new communist reality, from which it was claimed the past would simply be erased. One can also argue that coming to terms with the difficult past and present within the official communist narrative meant, to use the words of Theodor W. Adorno, “wishing to turn the page, and if possible, wiping it from memory.”48 As we are now fully aware, this sweeping of skeletons under the carpets was achieved and was to last for more than forty years. I should in addition briefly state that the self-critical approach to the immediate past and present was clearly absent from official narratives common to many different factions of the oppositional political camp, with the exception perhaps of the socialist and democratic groups. As I indicated earlier on, themes of a high level of solidarity with the Jewish minority and themes o f rescue operations were the main elements of these narratives on the Second World War period. In respect to the early post-war period, we come across a particular development, that is, the emergence of a powerful and potent theme according to which the wrongdoings are attributed to the Jewish minority and suffering is attributed to the Poles. It is obvious that this theme is rooted in the notions o f Judeo-bolshevism and Judeo-communism. It can be seen that with this kind of distorted perception of reality, the possibility of developing any self-critical approaches to one's own past and present was completely nil. It is worth adding here that a positive correlation between the perception of Jews as communists and the lack o f a selfcritical approach can still be detectable to a significant degree in contemporary public and intellectual discourse.49 Returning for a moment to the writings o f the intellectuals and members of the left-wing intelligentsia as discussed earlier, I should 48 Theodor W. Adomo, “What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?” in: Geoffrey Hartman (ed.), Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective, Bloomington, 1986, pp. 115. 49 See for example, Tomasz Strzembosz, “Przemilczana kolaboracja,” Rzeczpospolita, 27-28 January 2001, pp. 5-6; and “Za Winy Nasze i Winy Wasze,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 4 May 2001, p. 1.

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add here two points. Firstly, that already in 1947 the Polish Jewish historian Michat M. Borwicz acknowledged the importance o f such writings in his collection o f critical historical essays entitled Organizowanie Wscieklosci (Preparations of Hatred), which dealt, among other issues, with “the difficult immediate past and difficult present.”50 Secondly, that much more recently, in the 1990s, Jan T. Gross also paid tribute to some o f these intellectuals in his article “A Tangled Web: Confronting Stereotypes Concerning Relations between Poles, Germans, Jews and Communists.”51

C onclusions One can summarize that the writings of a part o f the intellectual elite of the early post-war period reveal the terrain o f “the difficult past and present” concerning Polish society’s relations with the Jewish minority during the Holocaust and early post-war period. Moreover it represents the first significant attempt at confronting it. It also provides us with a good illustration of features necessary for such a confrontation. Although this process was almost completely silenced in public and intellectual debate for more than forty years, it has nevertheless reemerged in the last two decades. Moreover, it has been taken up by an increasing segment o f cultural elites, as well as by a segment of mainstream political elites and o f non-elites. This development indicates that the acquired distortions and omissions within the publicly acceptable narratives o f the past may be fully deconstructed and, thus, eradicated from future narratives. In my opinion, it would be extremely interesting and valuable to conduct a comparative analysis of the self-critical approaches (as well as the self-defensive approaches) regarding relations with the Jewish minority in different European polities during the Holocaust and early post-war period. Such an analysis might throw more light on common social and cultural processes involved in coming to terms with the difficult past and present, regardless of the varying content o f such a past and present in different European states. 50 See Michal M. Borwicz, Organizowanie Wsciekiosci, Warsaw, 1947. 51 Gross, “A Tangled Web,” p. 129.

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“The New Jewish Invasion ” - The Return o f the Survivors from Transnistria JEAN ANCEL O f the 195,000 Jews deported to Transnistria in the autumn and winter o f 1941 and summer of 1942, the number o f those who survived was 50,000 at the end of 1943. There were also about 20,000 survivors of the approximately 300,000 Ukrainian Jews who had lived in the district w hen Romania annexed Transnistria.12 The question of the survivors’ return to Romania was debated at various levels of the regime in Bucharest from late November 1942 - the start o f the debacle at Stalingrad. But except for an attempt to extort money from Romanian Jews and even from world Jewry, the project did not bear fruit. Immense obstacles stood in the way of their return to Romania. Nevertheless, following Ion Antonescu’s rejection of the Nazi plan to deport all Romanian Jews to Poland and the recognition at various levels o f the Romanian government that the war was lost, a number of opportunities were created for the Antonescu regime, before its overthrow in August 1944, to bring back the deportees. Even before the discussions about bringing back the surviving deportees, there were dozens of Jews living in Bukovina who had been allowed to stay because of their professional importance and expertise; for example, physicians, pharmacists, and experts in the lumber industry. In July 1942, approval was given for twelve families (thirty individuals) to return from Mogilev to the town o f Vatra Domei; the husbands in these families were wood-processing experts. The local population protested the decision. According to a confidential report,

1 The new figures on the scale of the deportations are based on Jean Ancel, History o f the Holocaust. Romania, Jerusalem, 2002 (Hebrew). See the section on statistics in Vol. II, Ch. 38, pp. 147ff. See also Matatias Carp, Cartea Neagrä, vol. 3, Bucharest, 1947, pp. 450-51. 2 See Jean Ancel, “Plans for Deportation of the Romanian Jews, and their Discontinuation in the Light of Documentary Evidence, July-October 1942,” Yad Vashem Studies, 16 (1984), pp. 381-420.

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these Jews were housed in a single building under protective guard because their return “provoked great unrest among all sectors o f the population.”3 There were isolated cases of Jews (a few dozen, along with their families) released from Transnistria in the summer o f 1942 and early 1943 - each one an expert whose presence was vital for the operation of plants that were manufacturing for the military.4 The first to raise the alarm was the governor of Bukovina, Constantin Calotescu, who wrote to the Prime Minister’s Office that the return o f several dozen Jews to the towns “was liable to provoke great anger among the Romanian population, which heartily supported the deportation decision.”5 The appearance o f two Jewish families in the town of Frasin, near Câmpulung, to which they were brought by a wood­ processing company that obtained their release from Transnistria, enraged the local citizens. It was reported: “The population is upset and threatening to harm them. Consequently they have been placed under guard and cannot reach their place o f work.”6 The company gave in to the threats of the local residents, removed the Jews from the town, and transferred them to its plants in Moldova (part of the Regat - Old Romania).7 These cases demonstrate that opposition to the return of Jews, even in symbolic numbers, was extremely strong in areas from which all the Jews had been deported, such as Bukovina, Dorohoi county in the Regat, and the like, where their property had been nationalized, expropriated, plundered, or distributed to the local population. In November 1943, after great efforts by the Jewish leadership and after three-fourths o f all the deportees had perished, Antonescu finally 3

4

5 6 7

Justice Ministry Bulletin, 10 July 1942, Prime Minister’s Office, Collection of Antonescu’s Cabinet, file 104/1941, p. 45; report from Alexianu, the governor of Transnistria, about the release of the Jews on the order of the Prime Minister's Office because they were experts in the lumber industry, 30 July 1942, ibid., p. 47. The Dacia wood-processing company requested the Prime Minister’s Office to permit it to employ the Jewish experts who had been brought back from Transnistria at its request, according to the needs of its plants, 23 June 1942, Foreign Ministry Archives, Jewish Problem collection, vol. 23, pp. 778-80. Constantin Calotescu, governor of Bukovina, to the Prime Minister’s Office, 22 May 1942, ibid., p. 786. Abstract of the report from the Interior Ministry to the Prime Minister’s Office, 29 August 1942, ibid., p. 765. Memorandum of the Prime Minister’s Office, 30 September 1942, ibid., p. 761.

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agreed to the return o f certain categories of deportees, chiefly those bom in the Regat. Owing to the slow implementation o f the decision and the rapid advance by the Soviet army, the only Jews allowed to return were those bom in Old Romania, survivors of the deportees from Dorohoi county, and orphans who had lost both their parents. On 20 December 1943, the first group o f 1,500 deportees from Dorohoi left Mogilev in Transnistria; by the end of the month, 6,053 Jews of the 10,068 who had been deported from Dorohoi had been brought back to Romania.89 All the rest had perished. The maltreatment o f the deportees continued to the very last moment. Government officials and the gendarmerie conducted group humiliation ceremonies for the deport­ ees: in the small ghettoes in the Mogilev district, the men were beaten one last time as a “farewell gesture.” Gendarme commanders demanded bribes to include Jews bom in the Regat on the list of returnees, claiming that they had not been bom there. In Mogilev, Jewish women and girls were also humiliated by being forced to stand naked for “delousing” in the presence of gendarmes and Romanian officials, while the district physician struck them with his whip.10 On 15 February 1944, Romania agreed that orphans who had lost both parents could return from Transnistria, but only those aged fifteen and under. The Antonescu government had conveyed its agreement in principle to a representative of the International Red Cross as early as May 1943. But instructions were not sent to Transnistria until October 1943, and it was February 1944 before two delegations representing the Refugee Aid Committee were allowed to go to Transnistria to bring back the orphans. During the months o f stalling, the number of survivors decreased steadily. Finally, a total of 1,846 orphans were brought back in early March 1944, in two transports: 1,400 through Mogilev and 446 through Tiraspol.11 The two groups were sent to Ia§i, from where they were distributed among the Jewish communities in Moldova and Walachia. The Soviet offensive along the entire southern Ukrainian front, which began on 14 March 1943, put an end to the O

8 Decision of the Council on Public Order in the Prime Minister’s Office to repatriate the deportees from Transnistria, 16 November 1943, Cartea Neagrà, vol. 3, no. 249, pp. 451-52. 9 See below, n. 18. 10 Cartea Neagrä, p. 411. 11 Ibid., p. 412.

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repatriation operation. It should be noted that the return o f the deportees by a regime that had vowed two years earlier to liquidate all its Jews is a phenomenon unique to Romania and has no parallel in other fascist countries. On the other hand, the Antonescu government was responsible for the hostility to the deportees’ return, which continued after its overthrow. Before it agreed to bring back a single refugee, the regime - in an attempt to spur the army to continue fighting on the front - linked the specter o f losing the war, a Soviet takeover o f the country, and Jewish domination o f the Romanian people. ♦

♦

♦

As early as February 1943, the defeat at Stalingrad had raised the question of the price that the Romanian people would have to pay for participating on the side o f Nazi Germany in the war against the Soviet Union and against the Jewish people. That month, Antonescu sent a letter to his army commanders, describing the calamity that would befall the Romanian nation should the Russians defeat the Romanian and German armies. “Let no one forget that in the event o f defeat the Russian victors will bring Bolshevism to the country, wipe out the entire leadership stratum, impose the Jews on us, and deport masses of our people.”12 The “natural opposition” to the deportees’ return expressed by the Romanian population, which had taken over houses, lots, factories, farms, stores and other property, was augmented by the danger that a vanquished Romania would become prey to the Jews, the allies of Bolshevik Russia. After Stalingrad, the governor o f Bessarabia, which had become Judenrein, hastened to state that by no means “and for no reason whatsoever should the Jews being held in ghettoes in Transnistria be permitted to return to Bessarabia.” 13 The Antonescu government’s decision to repatriate some o f the deportees provoked popular opposition all over Bessarabia and Bukovina, in large parts o f Moldova, especially Dorohoi county, and to a lesser extent in 12 Confidential letter from the supreme military commander, Marshal Antonescu, to the commanders of the Romanian divisions on the front, collection o f Antonescu’s Military Cabinet, 6 February 1943, Special Archives in Moscow, Collection 492-16, p. 196. 13 Activity report of the Military Cabinet of the governor of Bessarabia, 9 April 1943, Interior Ministry Archives, file 20725, p. 371.

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other parts o f Romania as well. The prefect o f Dorohoi county protested the decision and emphasized that “the [Romanian] population is not happy with the return of the Jews.” 14 The town o f Drbani in Dorohoi county imposed a night-time curfew on the Jews who had been returned from Transnistria, banned any contact between them and the peasants, forbade them to engage in commerce and the like, and prohibited Romanians from “talking with the Jews” about any matter what­ soever.15 The Special Intelligence Service, the SSI, reported from Bukovina and Dorohoi in late December 1943 that the entire region was infuriated by the government’s decision to bring back the Jews. “Hundreds wonder why so much Romanian blood has been shed at the front while the kikes, who fought against this country by joining up w ith the Bolsheviks, are being brought back.” 16 The SSI added that the anger against the decision to return the deportees was directed against the regime as well, amid allegations o f corruption in the circles closest to the C onductor. Some were o f the opinion that “it was an act of cowardice on the part o f the government, which was afraid o f the possible repercussions o f the deportation [of the Jews] to Transnistria and was not trying somehow to remedy this action.” 17 In early 1944, police commanders reported that the Jews who had been repatriated from Transnistria were undermining morale with their tales o f atrocities: “The deportees are telling their co-religionists about all sorts o f incidents and events that happened in Transnistria. They must be warned that if they continue to conduct ’such propaganda’ they will be sent back to Transnistria.” 18 The Red Army’s occupation o f Romania put an end to the operation to return the deportees that had been initiated by the Antonescu government, leaving 43,519 Romanian Jewish citizens who had been 14 Note by the head of the Refugee Aid Committee, Arnold Schwefelbeig, 23 December 1943. See Jean Ancel (ed.), Documents Concerning the Fate o f Romanian Jewry during the Holocaust, Jerusalem, 1986, vol. 4, no. 376, p. 704. 15 Decree No. 356 by the mayor of Däräbani, 26 January 1944, ibid., vol. 8, no. 5, p. 12. 16 Report by the SSI office (rezidence) in Czemowitz, 26 December 1943, Securitate Archives, file 2814, vol. 144, “The Jewish Problem,” p. 284. 17 Ibid. 18 District police headquarters in Kishinev to the Soroca police, 14 February 1944, Kishinev Archives, 696-1-84, p. 301.

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deported from Bessarabia and Bukovina in Transnistria19 - 31,141 survivors from Bukovina and 11,683 from Bessarabia. There were also about ten thousand Jews in Czemowitz, who were unable to flee to Romania before the Red Army entered the city. In theory, only Jews from southern Bukovina were eligible to return to Romania. All the rest were now considered as citizens o f the Soviet Union, because they had been bom in territories annexed to it. The Jewish organizations in Bucharest did not know precisely how many deportees were still alive in Transnistria. Between April and December 1944, all repatriation activities were suspended. The Soviet army did not permit any organized movement o f Jews or non-Jews between the re-annexed Romanian territory and Romania proper. The Romanian people suffered its own tragedy when millions of Romanians were cut off from their relatives in the Soviet annexed Romanian territories o f Bessarabia and North Bukovina and trapped in the shrunken Romanian state. The leaders o f the Jewish community quickly realized that they could not demand that the armistice commission, which was under Soviet control, permit tens o f thousands of Jews originally from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to “return to the homeland." Hence, the first request submitted to the commission chairman, General Vinogradov, related only to the return o f “Jews from the Regat, southern Bukovina, and Transylvania, that is, from territories not ceded to the Soviet Union ... who found themselves in Soviet territory as a result of the war.”20 Vinogradov approved the request for the return o f two thousand Jews to Romania, and the Romanian authorities had no choice but to accede. A special committee, composed of representatives o f the police, the gendarmerie, and the Union of Romanian Jews, plus a Soviet liaison officer, was established to receive the deportees.21 At the same time, Wilhelm Filderman, head o f the 19 The figures are those of the Romanian Interior Ministry for the number o f Jews in Transnistria on 1 March 1944, Interior Ministry Archives, Fond Documentai file 40010, vol. 59, p. 81. On 15 December 1943, there were 49,927 Jews in Transnistria, including 6,425 from Dorohoi county. About 6,100 had been repatriated to Romania. Table on the number o f Jews in Transnistria, Foreign Ministry Archives, Problem 33, vol. 22, p. 589. 20 Memorandum from the Union of Romanian Jews to the chairman o f the Armistice Commission, General Vinogradov, 20 November 1944, Curierul Israelit, 31 December 1944. 21 Announcement of the appointment of the reception committee, ibid.

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Jewish Council (a short-lived Jewish organization that was set up with the Jewish communists and operated in September-November 1944), contacted the Joint Distribution Committee in the United States and asked that it assist in the operation to bring back the deportees. The Joint did indeed fund a large part o f the operation. But on the two dates set for the start o f the operation, the end o f November and the end of December, no Jews showed up at the border; the Soviet authorities had not allowed it.2223 A new date for the repatriation operation - the beginning o f March 1945 - was set for border crossings: Ungheni-Ia§i, Adâncata-Hlyboka in southern Bukovina, Hertsa-Dorohoi in northern Moldova, and Galati-Reni on the Danube. This time the Romanian authorities cooperated. The Jewish delegations, including representa­ tives o f the Joint and the Communist Fatherland Defense Organization, again returned empty-handed. Two Soviet Jewish officers on the Armistice Commission, Major Levy, formerly an editor at the Soviet Yiddish paper Ernes, and David Feuerstein, helped the Jewish Council to speed up the operation; but the Jewish delegates again returned alone. The deportees had been gathered on the Soviet side o f the border in several places but were not permitted to approach the border. The repatriation operation finally got under way in April 1945, and about seventeen thousand Jews entered Romania in the first stage. As we have seen, the Romanian authorities were powerless to interfere with the repatriation, even if they noticed that some of the returnees had not originally come from the Regat or southern Bukovina. They could, however, influence their dispersal throughout the country. The idea was to keep them out o f southern Bukovina and to settle most o f them in northern Transylvania, which had just been liberated from Hungarian and Nazi occupation, while moving them as far as possible from the eastern border. The border with the Soviet Union was opened several times in 1946, generally without prior notice. Thousands of additional

22 Testimony by the Communist Shaul Schnapp, who represented the Joint in the reception committee for the deportees at the border, 16 January 1969, Yad Vashem Archives, 011-39, pp. 7-8. 23 SSI report on the situation among the Jews, noting that the Jewish delegation to greet the survivors returned to Bucharest “because the approval had not arrived from Moscow,” 20 March 1945, Securitate Archives, Fond Documentai file 2711, p. 451.

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deportees crossed into Romania, making a total o f about forty thousand, not all o f them Romanian Jews. ♦

♦

♦

In October 1946, the World Jewish Congress established the Committee to Coordinate Assistance to Refugees, with representatives from all the Jewish organizations, including the Communist Jewish Democratic Committee.24 Some o f the deportees returning to Romania were in fact Jewish refugees from regions near and far. They streamed in increasing numbers to Romania, which at the time was the only country with Joint depots.2526The refugees believed that from here they could continue to the Land o f Israel or other countries. It must not be forgotten that the war continued to rage in central Europe until May 1945, and even after that it was no simple matter to reach western or southern Europe. These refugees included Jews from Poland, Hungary, and other countries, as well as from territories annexed by the Soviet Union, such as CarpathoRus, Lithuania, and Latvia, and later from other regions o f the Soviet Union proper. While helping these refugees was important, doing so made it much more difficult to help the Jews o f Romania itself. Refugees and Holocaust survivors took advantage o f the opportunity represented by the opening o f the Romanian border, declaring themselves to be Romanian citizens or their relatives and mingling with the Transnistria deportees and refugees from the Soviet Union who did have Romanian nationality. In early 1946 these “imposters” accounted for about a quarter o f all those who returned to Romania. Filderman, taken aback by this phenomenon, reported it to the authorities. It is impossible to estimate the number o f refugees in Romania during this time (1944-1947), since many o f them found ways to leave the country for other destinations. The Red Cross estimated

24 SSI report on the situation among the Jews, 15 October 1946, ibid., p. 369. 25 Filderman, who was also head of the Joint in Romania, noted this in his records, Yad Vashem Archives, Filderman files, P-6/29, p. 282. It must be remembered that in all of Romania only one Joint office, that in Bucharest, was active. 26 Filderman noted in his memoirs that these Jews “do not know a single word of Romanian.” This must be seen against the background of the wild antisemitic incitement in the press against the “new Jewish invasion,” Yad Vashem Archives, Filderman files, P-6/31, ibid. pp. 205-205b.

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that in 1945 about six thousand refugees reached Romania from Hungary. The World Jewish Congress and Romanian Jewish organizations estimated the number o f refugees who arrived in 19451947 at between twenty thousand and twenty-eight thousand.27 There are various estimates for northern Transylvania. Holocaust survivors who returned from the death camps in Poland via Germany, and from Hungarian labor battalions, numbered between 30,000 and 35,000 - about 20,000 from Germany and 15,000 from the labor battalions. The survival rate was between 20 and 23 percent. On 1 September 1945, the Romanian authorities came up with an estimate o f 29,405 survivors, based on a count o f those entering the country.2829 Some o f these individuals, too, were Jews from other countries, Holocaust survivors, or refugees. Not all of those who had been deported to Transnistria were able to return to Romania. Right after the liberation o f the ghettoes the men were not allowed to leave, and those aged eighteen and over were conscripted into the Soviet army. Most o f those drafted in Mogilev were sent to the front after a few weeks o f basic training; hundreds o f them were killed or wounded in a German bombing raid near Briansk. Other Jews were drafted into Soviet labor battalions and sent to labor camps in the Soviet hinterland. The joy o f liberation was brief, wrote one o f the survivors. The Soviet authorities, too, displayed a hostile attitude toward the Jews.30 Young Jewish men from Suceava “were 27 Memorandum from the Federation of Jewish Communities in Romania, sent to the United Nations inquiry commission, 19 February 1946, ibid., pp. 80-87; interview with Filderman in the Romanian press after the antisemitic ferment caused by the spread of rumors about the admission to Romania o f two million Jews from the Soviet Union and other countries, Jum alul de Dimineafä, 10 August 1946. Various reports by the Joint and other relief organizations operating under its auspices, Yad Vashem Archives, Filderman files, P-6/27, pp. 104-11, 137-41; P-6/29, pp. 281-92; P-6/31, pp. 1-5,29-35,46-47; P-6/32, p. 39-45, 77-97, 181-88. See also the figures in the pamphlet issued by the World Jewish Congress, Romanian Jewry in the Postwar Period, Tel Aviv, no date. (Hebrew). 28 Carp, Cartea Neagrä, p. 18. 29 Testimony of Mordechai Cagan from Bälfi, Holon (Israel), 20 April 1958, Yad Vashem Archives, 03-900, pp. 7-8; testimony of Pesach Rosenberg from Czemowitz, Holon, 27 February 1959, ibid., 03-1232, p. 8. 30 Testimony of Esther Burg of Czemowitz, whose two sons were sent to labor camps in Arkhangelsk, Jaffa, 2 April 1959, ibid., 03-1417, p. 214.

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conscripted into the army, even though they were not Soviet citizens.” Jewish (and non-Jewish) young women, picked up at random on the streets, were sent to work in the coal mines in the Donbas.31 Sudden arrests were made on the streets o f Czemowitz to locate men, including Jews, who had survived from Transnistria, and conscript them into the Red Army and send them to the front.32 The conscription o f their men prevented survivor families from returning to Romania while the border was open. The husband or sons were their only support and after the Holocaust it was impossible to imagine losing again a son or a husband, to leave them and move on. In Romania itself, a hostile mood developed toward the repatriated deportees. The anti-Jewish campaign was conducted during the fierce political struggle between the Romanian Communist Party on one side and traditional forces and the king on the other. The Communist Party, supported by the Soviet army o f occupation, had gradually seized control o f all state institutions. Yet, the traditional forces and the king, although denounced as “reactionaries,” in fact represented the Romanian people and Romanian democracy. Rumors circulated about the entry of two million Jews from the Soviet empire who would support the Communist Party and tilt the results of the general elections scheduled for 19 November 1946. The Antonescu government propaganda about what the Romanian people could expect if the Red Army occupied the country and the role that Jews would play in the new regime was about to be realized. In August 1946 the Special Security Service reported: “Hatred o f the Jewish element is on the rise. Among the things contributing to this are rumors that Jews have come to Romania from various areas in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Russia, and will remain here as settlers.”33 In various parts of Romania, especially southern Bukovina and northern Transylvania, in villages and towns from which the Jews had been evicted in June 1941, as well as in Moldova, Jews who tried to return to their homes were attacked 31 Testimony of Selig-Ascher Hofer of Vijnita (Vizhnitz), Tel Aviv, July 1959, ibid., 03-1453, p. 34. 32 Testimony of M alta Velner of Suceava, Petah Tiqva (Israel), 31 July 1958, ibid., 03-916, p. 10. 33 Report by SSI office in southern Transylvania, 12 August 1946, Securitate Archives, file 2699, p. 331 [copy in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives (USHMM)/RG2504M, reel 10].

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and dozens were murdered. The censor prevented publication o f reports about this then, but the facts are available now. According to a previously unknown report by the SSI, “In various parts o f the country, Jews had been and continue to be murdered, and their murderers have not been identified or have not been punished. ... Zionist circles, in particular, exploit these antisemitic eruptions to increase the psychosis o f immigration to Palestine. ” 3 4 Jews who had been settled in villages in southern Transylvania, in place o f Germans who had fled, were attacked. In Timis-Torontal county, “The local [Romanian] population greeted them with great hostility and even physically attacked them and refused to accept them in the villages. ” 3 5 The authorities attributed these outbursts to the propaganda campaign against the Jews conducted by “reactionary circles.” How many Jews were murdered in these circumstances is not known for certain; but according to the documents already available to researchers they certainly numbered in the hundreds. The authorities, whose political complexion changed rapidly as the Communists tightened their control over the country, could not ignore the problem. As far as they were concerned, the more Jews who left the country, the closer the problem o f the deportees and refugees came to a “solution.” The successive Romanian governments could not deal with the problems created by the occupation: namely, the flight of Romanians from areas occupied by the Soviet Union, the confiscation of food and animals by the occupation forces, the dismantling of industrial plants and their transfer eastward, galloping inflation, and two years o f severe drought in 1946-47. However, we know today, following the opening of the archives in Eastern Europe, that the government was well aware of the hardships faced by the repatriated deportees. In a report dated 15 October 1946, we read: “They found nothing left. All their property had been expropriated by the previous government or stolen.” This applied to the repatriated Romanian-born Jews, but not to Jews from northern Bukovina and Bessarabia who managed to enter Romania with forged papers or with no documents. 34 35 36 37

SSI report no. 42, 29 January 1946, ibid., p. 308. SSI report, 7 May 1946, ibid., p. 322. SSI report on the situation among the Jews, 15 October 1946, ibid., p. 369. Youth Aliyah trainees used the documents o f Transnistria survivors to leave Romania for the Land of Israel. The authorities were aware of this but preferred to

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There were tens o f thousands o f Jewish refugees from Bukovina, as well as from other areas in Eastern Europe. Bessarabian Jewry had been almost entirely destroyed and the survivors were trapped in the newly Soviet annexed territory o f Bessarabia. Most o f the Romanian Jewish refugees in Bucharest, came from Bukovina and “many o f them managed somehow, but several thousand remained, some o f them old and sick, as well as orphans waiting for the chance to emigrate to the Land of Israel. ” 3 8 The economic integration o f thousands o f Holocaust survivors would have been a difficult task even in normal times, but it was almost impossible in a period o f economic crisis and fierce political struggle, which deteriorated into attacks on the Jews. Rebuilding the devastation left by the war in areas that had been battle zones proceeded very slowly. Most o f the survivors and refugees did not even want to be rehabilitated in Romania or did not have the emotional capacity to work toward this. “Those who have returned [from deportation] are consumed by diseases. The problem of their integration into normal life,” as the authorities called this phenomenon, “will be difficult. Many problems have arisen on account o f the diseased mentality (mentalitäfi viciate) of people who have suffered, on the one hand, and o f the difficulty of finding work in the present circumstances, on the other . ” 3 9 The Communists, who seized power after publication o f the forged results o f the elections at the end o f November 1946, recognized the problem but did not consider that the predicament o f the survivors and refugees needed rapid resolution. For them, the Jews had to take part in the “struggle” for democracy, that is, to support the Communist Party in its struggle against the traditional forces, and not to keep demanding the restoration o f their property, rights, special consideration and allowances, and the like: “The Jewish masses cannot conduct a private struggle separate from the struggle o f the Romanian people to strengthen democracy and develop the country, ” 4 0 we read in an turn a blind eye. “They carry the documents of former deportees to Transnistria or Poland, but in fact most of them are young people affiliated with the Ihud socialist labor party.“ SSI report on the situation among the Jews and the departure o f four hundred young Jews for Yugoslavia, 7 September 1946, ibid., pp. 348-49. 38 SSI report on the situation among the Jews, 30 November 1947, ibid., p. 410. 39 ‘The Condition of the Jews in Romania during the Second World War,” 11 January 1947, memorandum of the Siguranfa (Security Police) about the Jewish problem, ibid., p. 423. 40 Ibid., p.426.

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internal report. The Communist Party officially ignored the tension resulting from the hatred felt by most o f the Romanians towards the Jews - especially the Holocaust survivors among them. The people’s hatred for the survivors and refugees was intensified by the failure o f thousands o f Jews to find their place in the economy, the black-market activities of some o f them, the creation o f a large concentration o f such Jews in Bucharest, the sense o f transience due to their waiting for the chance to emigrate or go to the Land o f Israel; and the humiliation that the Romanian masses felt as a result o f the Soviet occupation and the link created in previous years between the occupation and Communist takeover o f the country, on the one hand, and the “Jewish invasion” on the other. “The relations between the Jewish and Romanian populations were further aggravated by the presence of survivors who have not yet found work. In most cases it was not their fault that they sank to speculating , ” 4 1 wrote an undercover agent o f the Siguranfa (the secret police o f the Communist-controlled Interior Ministry) who was active among the Jews. Antisemitism, he added, had spread among the railway workers and university students and in entire districts in Moldova and southern Bukovina. “A substantial increase is evident in the nationalist current among the Jewish masses and o f antisemitism among the Christian population.... Despite all the risks, the tide toward emigration has grown , ” 4 2 concluded the agent. “The nationalist current” among the Jews means that the authorities were aware that support for the Zionist movement had increased among the Jews, who felt that the Jewish minority had no future in Romania. Most o f the survivors and refugees in Romania had not been able to re-integrate on their own; in early January 1947 the Communist authorities acknowl­ edged that “tens o f thousands [of survivors] still do not have a roof over their heads . ” 4 3 These tens of thousands o f Holocaust survivors were augmented by tens o f thousands o f internal Jewish displaced persons who had been forcibly evicted from the villages and small towns in June and July of 41 Periodic report of an agent of the Siguranfa, evidently a Jew, about important events among the Jews in October 1946, Interior Ministry Archives, file 7632, vol. 2, p. 29. 42. Ibid. 43 'T h e Condition of the Jews in Romania during the Second World War” (above, n. 38), p. 427.

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1941 - some of them being confined to camps in southern Romania and others concentrated in larger towns. All their property had been expropriated or stolen, and they too had been unable to recover. This situation was unique to Romania, because the eviction and concen­ tration had been a stage in the aborted plan to deport all Romanian Jews to death camps in Poland. There were about sixty thousand o f these displaced Jews. 4 4 Most o f the towns in northern Moldova, where rural Jews had been concentrated, including Ia$i, had been partially destroyed. Thus, for example, the entire region between Botoçani and Iaçi in northern Moldova was devastated. Thousands o f buildings had been destroyed in Ia§i, a major Jewish center. Reporters for Jewish newspapers who visited the Jewish town o f Târgu-Neamf in early 1945 described the situation as follows: “The houses are like holes, in which everyone according to his luck has installed a wooden contraption called a bed or table or chair. They are waiting for help from their uncle in America and dream about the Land o f Israel. ” 4 5 The towns of Rädäufi and Siret in Bukovina, to which survivors returned from Transnistria, were described in March 1945 as places of “naked people in empty cities.” In Dorohoi and Säveni, to which survivors o f the ghettoes in Transnistria as well as displaced Jews returned, there were only “burned walls, without doors, windows, or roofs . ” 4 6 The magnitude of the calamity faced by the displaced persons (and the survivors) was not fully grasped by the Jewish establishment in Bucharest, even though it shocked even the new Romanian govern­ ment. Entire communities with a tradition of centuries, the flourishing branches o f the Jews o f Old Romania - the Regat - which could be compared only with similar communities in Polish Jewry, had been destroyed. The general secretary o f the Ministry o f Labor, Ilie Dumitru, toured Moldova and was appalled by what he saw. He wrote: “The Jews o f Moldova are like characters from a horror show.” He visited six 44 38,920 Jews were evicted in June 1941, and another 15,000 in 1942. See the figures arranged by Filderman by towns and counties in preparation for his memoirs: “Chiffres se référent à la population juive de Roumanie,” Yad Vashem Archives, Filderman files, P-6/68, pp. 99-100. 45 Renaçterea Noastrà, 6 January 1945. 46 Newspaper clippings and reports from the towns in Moldova, collected by Filderman, Yad Vashem Archives, Filderman files, P-6/11, pp. 117, 118, 214, 23839, 243-46.

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cities in Moldova and Bukovina and was astonished to discover that nothing had been done for the survivors and displaced persons. He added: Not a single family is intact. ... Even those who were not deported cannot support themselves. They took their houses, their businesses, artisans’ tools. For years these people have been living in shameful poverty. ... [The survivors] are naked, just as I heard they were in Transnistria. They have no clothes, no shoes, no homes. They wander aimlessly through the streets, demeaning themselves and begging for a handout. People who were once solid homeowners or clerks have become piteous wrecks.47

Did the Romanian state have the capacity to rehabilitate the many thousands o f “piteous wrecks”? Evidently not. Furthermore, the various governments that held office between 1944 and 1947 did not display good will, even with regard to the return of Jewish property. The Communist representatives in the government quickly realized that they must not be viewed as Jew-lovers and consequently must not do anything that would affect the many Romanians - most o f them former supporters of the fascist regime - who had plundered the property o f Jews deported to Transnistria or evicted from their homes and jobs. The various compromise proposals advanced by Jewish organizations to rectify this situation were rejected. The first law to restore property, known as the Pàtràçcanu law (named for the Communist justice minister, Lucrefiu Pàtràçcanu), was published on 19 November 1944, four months after the fall o f the Antonescu regime .4 8 The law itself, the manner o f its implementation, and the administrative restrictions tacked onto it brought about the return o f only a small fraction o f the Jews’ property, especially their homes, and jobs. The state paid no compensation to Jews for property that had been nationalized in the wake o f the race laws, and it barred the displaced Jews from returning to the villages. By the time the first property restoration law was published, many Romanians had managed to sell whatever items of movable property they had that could be identified as having belonged to Jews. The Communists, who were aiming at complete power, chose to disregard their own promises and 47 Ilie Dumitru, the general secretary of the Ministry o f Labor, Curierul Israelit, 14 January 1945. 48 Law no. 641, Monitorul Oficial, no. 294, 19 December 1944.

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proclamations about restoring Jewish property and began to defend the many Romanians who had taken it. Even the Jewish Communists supported and implemented this policy and did not hesitate to threaten Jews who asked for justice. One Communist functionary, Israel Bacal, was explicit on the subject: “If we are refusing to give compensation to war widows, disabled veterans, and war orphans [the reference is to the war against the Soviet Union], to laborers and farmers, to those wounded by Romanian air attacks - then it is impossible to compensate only the Jews. That would provoke incredible tension . “ 4 9 ♦

♦

♦

Another serious problem that prevented the integration o f the many survivors and refugees who were unable to leave Romania was that of citizenship. The issue o f their nationality was associated with another problem, namely, the 1938 revocation o f Romanian citizenship o f about fifty thousand Jews. All Romanian governments after August 1944 took over the antisemitic attitudes and ideas o f the past. It is true that the new regime did not divide the Jews into “categories,” as Antonescu had done; on the other hand, neither did it officially repeal the Citizenship Review Law enacted by the antisemitic Goga-Cuza government in 1938. This law also deprived the many thousands of those who returned from Transnistria o f Romanian citizenship. The Romanian authorities broadened the interpretation o f the law and determined, without turning to any judicial authority, that the citizen­ ship o f all Jews who left Romania for the Soviet Union after 28 June 1940 - the date when Bessarabia and northern Bukovina were ceded to the Soviet Union - would be withdrawn . 5 0 For three years (1944-1947), Justice Minister Pàtràçcanu and the Jewish organizations conducted a running debate about this matter (which also meant the delay in payment o f pensions to widows and orphans of those who had perished in Transnistria), with the minister making repeated promises to rectify the situation. The Romanian authorities demanded birth certificates, army papers, certificates from various agencies, and so on, before they would issue identity papers. 49 Note by Filderman on his conversation with Israel Bacal, 24 December 1944, Yad Vashem Archives, Filderman files, P-6/99, p. 130b. 50 Interior Ministry guidelines, ibid., P-6/98, pp. 166-68.

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The deportees’ identity papers had been confiscated in 1941 and, pursuant to a secret decree, were destroyed the moment they crossed the Dniester. The review was so meticulous that in cases where local Interior Ministry officials issued identity papers to Jews who had not submitted the required documentation, police were sent looking for these Jews to add a handwritten endorsement to the documents: “Soviet citizen” or “foreign national. ” 5 1 52 In the authorities’ eyes, the twenty thousand Jews o f Czemowitz both those who escaped deportation and those who managed to flee to the Romanian interior - were aliens. Rumors that they would be forced to return to the Soviet Union spawned panic among them. The Romanian authorities designated them, along with all those who could not provide documentation o f their Romanian citizenship, as “Soviet citizens.” The Ministry of the Interior announced that it would return them to the Soviet Union, “because more than a hundred thousand of them are found in Bucharest alone . ” S 3 The Ministry of Religions asked Filderman to have the communities prepare a list o f names o f all the “Soviet citizens” among them so that they could be repatriated . 5 4 With regard to documents and papers, the authorities and the deportees and refugees were running a race against the clock. The vast majority of deportees returned from the Soviet Union with no Romanian documents. Pàtràçcanu, who participated in the Paris peace conference, assured the representatives o f the international Jewish organizations that the law had been repealed and showed them “a draft law to grant Romanian citizenship , ” 5 5 which satisfied and calmed them. But the promise made in Paris was not honored in Bucharest. The draft law was not approved. Before the November 1946 elections, the Communist Party again promised to approve the law. This time the promise was made to representatives o f the Jewish organizations, including the Jewish 51 Notes on the return of the deportees and of the authorities’ attitude toward them, November-December 1945, ibid., P-6/101, pp. 222-25, 234. 52 Notes by Filderman on the maltreatment of Jews in Czemowitz, April-May 1945, Ibid., P-6/44, p. 35b. 53 Ibid., p. 59. 54 Ibid. 55 Pàtrâçcanu’s draft law, 1946, ibid., Yad Vashem Archives, Romania collection, 011/52.

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Democratic Committee, by Gheorghiu-Dej, who had been appointed first secretary of the party in October 1945.56 This promise should be seen in the context o f the efforts by the Communist Party to guarantee Jewish support in the elections. The newspapers reported the impending approval of the law, but after the elections the whole matter was forgotten. By May 1947 the question of citizenship for Jews whose citizenship had been revoked in 1938, for some o f the Transnistria survivors, and for several thousand Jews from northern Transylvania, had still not been resolved. This is an example o f the new regime’s adoption of antisemitic views. P. Iscovici, one of the heads o f the Jewish Democratic Committee that was set up by the Communist Party, considered “the grant of identity documents to widows and orphans from Transnistria” to be an achievement for the Jewish Communists. 5 7 It should be emphasized that for two years (1945-1947) the Interior Ministry was headed by a Communist, Teohari Georgescu. ♦

♦

♦

During this period a hidden but sometimes visible rift developed between two factions: the many Romanian Jews who wanted to rehabilitate themselves, stormed the schools and universities, found jobs in the government bureaucracy, and opened businesses and workshops - and the thousands o f Holocaust survivors, displaced persons, and refugees who did not wish to or could not be rehabilitated in Romania. For them, the only solution was illegal emigration by means o f the Beriha 5 8 network. The Zionist youth movements did what they could to help young people leave Romania by every possible route, but they could not offer legal or illegal immigration to the Land 56 Survey of the negotiations to gain the support of the Jewish organizations for the (Communist) “Democratic Parties Bloc,” October 1946, Ibid., Filderman files, P-6/ 25, p. 56. 57 Survey of the efforts by the Jewish organizations to have the antisemitic laws repealed, April 1946, Ibid., P-6/28, p. 222. On this matter in general, see the chapter on “The Legal Status of the Jews of Romania,” In: Jean Ancel, Romanian Jewry between Aug. 23, 1944, and Dec. 31, 1947, doctoral dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1975, pp. 96-117. 58 Beriha (Hebrew “flight”), the post-World War II movement of Holocaust survivors, mainly from eastern Europe to the West [Ed.].

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o f Israel to the thousands o f survivors and displaced persons. Yugoslavia and Hungary were the chief destinations for those who fled the country. There are no accurate figures on the number of Jews who fled to Yugoslavia, and from Yugoslavia to Italy. Yet we do know that between May 1945 and 1 January 1947, clandestine immigration ships that sailed from Yugoslavia to the Land o f Israel carried 4,322 Romanian Jews . 5 9 The second major route ran through Hungary. The first people who arrived in Budapest were refugees threatened with deportation to Poland or the Soviet Union. They were housed in apartments before being sent to Austria (Graz or Vienna) en route to Italy. This path out of Romania was taken by about 3,500 Polish citizens, 1,700 refugees from the Soviet Union, and 600 Hungarian nationals. 6 0 According to a report written by a Beriha operative, “As long as there were refugees, we did not take Romanians. Now that we have finished with all the Poles and H ungarians, it has been decided to concentrate on sending Romanians . ” 6 1 62 This time priority was given to the Transnistria deportees and to refugees from Bessarabia and Bukovina. Next came halutzim (young Zionist pioneers), and finally ordinary Jews. From the summer of 1945 through July 1946, about fifteen thousand Jews left Romania via Hungary. 6 3 After the refugees and many o f the Transnistria deportees had been smuggled out o f the country, the Beriha organization restricted its efforts to halutzim. At the time, Zionist leaders in Romania favored a large but controlled immigration to the Land o f Israel campaign . 6 4 Within a relatively short period (about a year), this principle, which was observed meticulously, emptied the natural pool for aliya - namely, the

59 Shraga Amiel, Constanta, “Port of Exit,” In: On Romanian Jews in their Land o f Exile and their H om elandTel Aviv, 1958, p. 187. 60 Yehuda Slutsky, The History o f the Haganah: From Struggle to War, vol. 3, Tel Aviv, 1972, Book 2, p. 1033. 61 Report by C-D. David, dated 19 August 1945, Haganah Archives, Beriha files, 10/ a. 62 Report by S. L. Dekel, dated 8 April 1947, ibid. 63 Yehuda Bauer, Flight and Rescue: Brichah, New York, 1970, p. 284. 64 This was stated publicly by the chairman of Romanian Zionists, Mishu Benvenisti, at a festive meeting of the organization in Bucharest on 5 May 1946, Renafterea Noastrâ, no. 88, 11 May 1946.

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members o f the Zionist youth movements. A reporter for the Jewish paper Renaçterea Noasträ, who visited the town o f Vatra Domei in June 1947, found that “most of the young people are missing. They have left; they are in the Land of Israel, in displaced person camps, in Cyprus, in Italy, in Germany, in Zionist training groups. Only a few young women have remained, waiting to be married . ” 6 5 At the same time, the authorized spokespersons of the Zionist organization continued to call on Jews to go and build the Land of Israel; they ignored the organization’s official stance, that “opening the gates [to the Land o f Israel] for all who are interested is no longer possible . ” 6 6 This contradiction produced a bizarre situation. There was organized flight for members o f youth movements, concern for “oldtime” Zionists, courses to teach trades, pre-aliya courses and propaganda for immigration, and a regular sea link on the Romanian ship SS Transylvania for those in possession o f immigration certificates, some o f which were acquired by bribery. 6 7 But mass immigration to the Land of Israel was impossible. One o f the emissaries, Dov Berger, wrote in a report dated 18 August 1946: “a hundred thousand certificates, if provided to Romania at once, would certainly not be enough. But the Zionist Organization cannot turn this potential into an organization [emphasis in original] with political capacity and weight. ” 6 8 The imbalance between the Zionist propaganda machine, which continued to call, day and night, for aliya, and the movement’s inability, for which it was not responsible, to get Jews out o f Romania because the British authorities prevented Jewish immigration - (even while the chosen few were departing in organized fashion), sparked tension and gave rise to a lack o f trust in the organization’s institutions and leaders and in their promises, speeches, and festive pronounce­ ments. But the straw that broke the camel’s back was the terrible famine 65 Shmaya Avni, “Aspecte din Vatra Domei,” Renaçterea Noasträ, no. 140, 7 June 1947. 66 Iancu Mendelovici, “Einigrare” Renafterea Noasträ, no. 155, 18 October 1947. 67 On 3 July 1947, a “court of honor” (juriul de onoare) was convened and found S. Schwartz and I. Katz guilty of an extreme breach of Zionist discipline because they had sold false immigration certificates. The two were expelled from the movement. Ibid., No. 152, 27 September 1947. 68 Report by Dov Berger, 18 August 1946, Central Zionist Archives, S 5/810.

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that struck Romania in the winter o f 1946 and lasted until the summer o f 1947. In fact, the interplay o f three factors - drought, antisemitism, and emigration - prevailed in Romania for the preceding eighty years. Similar phenomena had occurred in 1899 and 1907. Then, too, famine and antisemitic incitement by the opposition had triggered a mass exodus o f Jews to the United States and other countries. An emissary of Hashomer Hatza ’ir (a left-wing Zionist youth movement), who visited Romania in the summer o f 1947, described what he saw in Ia$i: O f the 36,000 Jews in the city, in September of the present year [1946] 12,000 got their food from soup kitchens run by the Joint - food that amounted to no more then 100 grams of com and three-quarters of a liter of soup. Because of the Joint’s financial situation, they were going to strike one-third of the needy from the rolls of food recipients. You had to see their fear to understand what this scanty ration means for these people. Visiting these soup kitchens and the poor Jewish neighborhoods in Ia$i can traumatize even a person who has already seen penury and hardship and was prepared for horrible sights. Anyone who saw these living dead, the exhausted old men and women, and people aged 40-something with dimmed eyes, the pale children, with swollen bellies and covered with boils, who walk around almost naked even in the autumn chill, the “houses” in which these unfortunates live in unimaginable overcrowding - would never be able to forget what he saw.69

These Jews had lost all hope for the future. The official Zionist organization had disappointed them, or may not have even reached them. Those who affiliated with some branch of the organization did so in the hope of getting out o f Romania, but the competition among the different Zionist youth movements to increase their membership, which generated promises that could not be kept, soon disillusioned them too. In this climate, there was pressure for mass immigration movement by every means possible. It should be emphasized that this movement, which the Jewish Communists referred to as “chaotic,” sprang up among the masses o f starving Jews with no direct connection to the institutionalized official Zionist organization . 7 0 As noted, the fact that these Jews were on the margins o f the organized Zionist organization was emphasized in the Zionist press and

69 Aharon Cohen, “The Jews and Zionism in the New Romania,” Mishmar, 19 December 1947. 70 From a report by the Zionist Executive Committee in Romania, sent to Jerusalem and received there on 24 June 1947. See Central Zionist Archives, S 5/810.

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in reports to Jerusalem, sometimes with obvious contempt. Instead of attempting to understand the problem, the newspapers and reports highlighted the fact that “few o f them were Zionists. Most o f them knew about the Land of Israel only that it is a country where the Irgun (a Jewish underground armed organization) blows up the English and that Eretz Israel is a vast sandpit that is home to Jews who sell razor blades and live in a number of cities surrounded by barbed wire. Many were convinced that Theodor Herzl is the mayor of Tel Aviv - but nevertheless they wanted to go there. ” 7 1 The implication o f this article, and o f official reports, was clear: these were Jews who were unorganized and undisciplined, who lacked even a basic knowledge of the history o f Zionism, who had not studied in any o f the educational or cultural framewoiks o f the Zionist organizations. These words express the view that Eretz Israel belongs first o f all to Jews with a Zionist outlook and that it was up to the responsible Zionist agencies to define the privilege o f aliya or Beriha-assisted flight. 7 2 The “famine flight” was the last spontaneous Jewish popular movement in Europe. It was accompanied by a number o f hallmarks o f a quasi-messianic movement. With the speed o f light, rumors spread about the opening o f borders, about assistance provided by the Joint to everyone who managed to reach Budapest, about clothes in which American Jews hid cash for their poor and starving relatives, about special railway cars to take them to ports, and so on. These rumors found fertile soil both among the Transnistria survivors who had been unable to leave Romania and among the poor Jews o f Moldova and Walachia. They sold their few possessions and set out for the unknown without the slightest doubt that somewhere out there people were waiting for them and would take care o f them. A sort o f mystical belief developed among these Jews: “It can only be better and there is someone who will take care o f us.” They were confident that all they had to do was cross the border to Austria and their brethren in America would speed to their rescue. Every letter, every infrequent success by 71 Solei Bonda, “Dudeçti-Palestina - Via ‘Joint,’ ” Renafterea Noasträ, No. 138, 25 May 1947. 72 After the fact, Romanian Zionist leaders (who in the meantime had come to Israel) were warm in their praises of the “famine flight.” See Itzhak Artzi, “Romania: A Source and Route for Mass Aliya,” in: On Romanian Jews in their Land o f Exile and their Homeland, p. 207.

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Jews to reach the United States or the Land o f Israel, took on unrecognizable proportions. On the other hand, many - those who were more realistic - were convinced that their situation anywhere else in Europe could not be any worse than it was in Romania. The organized Zionist organization failed to grasp the full significance o f this movement, which could be seen as a delayed collective reaction to the horrors o f the Holocaust, and an expression o f the dead-end in which the Jewish masses found themselves. The inability of the organized Zionist organization in Romania to comprehend the depth o f the problem was reflected in the “solutions” advanced to fend off those who were storming the borders: “sending special emissaries to investigate the situation and conducting counter-propaganda,” 7 3 and especially distributing a few emigration certificates. The Zionist organization, which was “caught off guard” when thousands o f Jews streamed to the Hungarian border in the spring o f 1947, launched a vigorous propaganda campaign on the pages o f its newspapers against the unorganized aliya and the “aliya hysteria.” Official calls o f “don’t turn aliya into flight” were given prominence in the Zionist press . 7 4 This campaign was joined by the Jewish Communists, who accused the Jews of unwillingness and failure to adapt themselves to the rapid and revolutionary changes that had taken place in the Romanian economy as if most o f those who were fleeing had owned businesses, factories, and shops. They stated: We must understand that we cannot continue to live from speculation or by exploiting the labor of others. The great capitalists and those who never worked themselves, the black-market profiteers, the experts in getting around the law, and the middlemen of various sorts cannot accept the fact that their day is over and that this state of affairs has totally passed from the Romanian state.75

What truly concerned the heads of the Zionist organization in Romania were not the attacks by the Jewish Communists, but the famine flight. The unauthorized emigration either by Communists or by the Zionist organization disrupted the various understandings and arrange-

73 See “Summary of a Report Received from the Zionist Organization in Romania,” p. 2, 18 April 1947, Central Zionist Archives, S 5/810. 74 Renaçterea Noastrâ, No. 132, 12 April 1947; No. 137, 17 May 1947; No. 139, 31 May 1947. 75 Sorin Negrin, “Emigräri Haotice,” Buletinul C.D.E., year I, No. 3-4, pp. 3-4.

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ments that had been made with the Romanian authorities and this challenged the Zionist organization from an unexpected direction. “The current to leave is so strong that not only are people paying no attention to the organizations that advise them to wait patiently for the [appropriate] moment for organized aliya, they even dismiss them as liars. ” 7 6 7 At first the Romanian authorities attempted to prevent Jews from leaving for Hungary and Bulgaria. Many fled on their own, while many others hired local smugglers who exploited them mercilessly. Dozens of Jews were killed in the attempt to cross the border. After that the authorities demanded that the Zionist organization organize the Jews' exodus. “We have advanced to the point,” reported the Beriha commander in Romania, M. Salomon, on 21 February 1947, “that they have opened all the borders for legal exit under the patronage of the authorities.” The exodus from Romania was halted in the autumn of 1947 after the Romanian authorities decided to tighten supervision of the borders. Once again dozens o f Jews were killed and hundreds of others were arrested. Military courts in Timiçoara, Oradea, and Cluj sentenced them to terms o f between six months and several years in prison . 7 8 The government enjoyed the cooperation o f the Zionist organization in everything connected with preventing the exodus, because it made the organization’s continued freedom o f action and approval of sea-borne aliya conditional on this. In other words, whereas the mass spontaneous, unorganized and unapproved exodus left by land, the silent arrangements with the Zionist organization referred to aliya by sea. At a conference o f Beriha operatives, held in Bratislava in 76 This was noted in a special survey conducted in June 1947 by the Federation of Jewish Communities. Its emissaries investigated the reasons for the flight in Moldova and southern Bukovina. The reasons noted in the report included the following: “More than 40% of the local Jews live on welfare. About 100% o f the refugees from the Soviet Union have no means of support, so leaving seems to be the only solution,” Yad Vashem Archives, Filderman files, P-6/25, p. 144. In its report to Jerusalem, dated 1 August 1947, the Zionist Executive Committee noted the inclination of the flight movement “to bypass the organized frameworks o f the Zionist movement and turn into an uncontrolled movement” (Central Zionist Archives, S 5/810, p. 8). 77 History o f the Haganah, vol. 3, book 2, p. 1056. 78 Notes by Filderman, September-October 1947, Yad Vashem Archives, Filderman files, P-6/25, p. 163.

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November 1947, Moshe Sneh, the head o f the Haganah declared: “An end to the overland movement is a condition for the survival o f Zionism in the country [Romania] and for aliya by sea . ” 7 9 80 A total o f about nineteen thousand persons left Romania illegally in 1 9 4 7 8 ° g ut t^e scaje 0f the exodus cannot be judged on the basis of this number alone. It must be remembered that sixteen thousand Jews fled from Romania in 1946 - not as part o f the famine flight. In addition, many thousands sold all their property and moved to towns and cities in northern Transylvania, where there were Jewish communities, in the hope of getting across the border to Hungary. The closure o f the borders put an end to their dreams; many were forced to return to their previous homes with empty hands. There are no precise figures on would-be emigrants who did not manage to cross the border. Various publications o f the Jewish Democratic Committee suggest, however, that they numbered in the thousands. The famine flight from Romania proved that it was neither Zionist education nor Zionist propaganda that motivated the Jews to flee Romania in every direction, including to the Land o f Israel. It is a fact that until May 1947 the heads o f the Beriha in Europe were opposed to providing assistance to those trying to escape Romania, because they were considered in the Land o f Israel to be “inferior human material,” if they in fact ever got there . 8 1 In conclusion, the “new Jewish invasion” from Transnistria and other regions flooded Romania with more than a hundred and fifty thousand broken and ailing Jews, remnants o f the Jewish community that the Romanian authorities and the Nazis had tried to annihilate. These Jews did not and could not integrate into the “new” Romania, which, even without the antisemitic legacy o f the fascist regime, displayed no empathy for the Jews whom the previous regime had not managed to eliminate. Nor did this starving, broken, and diseased multitude correspond to the self-image that the Zionist organization, and especially its youth branch, wanted its members to have. These Jews 79 Haganah Archives, Beriha files, General A. 80 Bauer, Flight and Rescue, p. 284. 81 Ibid., pp. 285-86. Asher Ben-Natan, who coordinated Beriha activities from Vienna, had previously told a conference of Beriha operatives that “it is possible to decide that we don’t have to help them. Those Jews are not going to The Land of Israel - they are running away from Romania.”

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could not integrate into the Romanian labor market and economy, and could not or did not want to be rehabilitated in a country they no longer saw as home. Neither the new regime in Romania nor the organized Zionist organization had anything to offer them - other than joining their ranks. From the perspective o f the yishuv (the Jewish community in the Land of Israel), which was preparing for an armed struggle, only young people were important and, therefore, the only ones who had to be organized and smuggled out. The “human dust” in Romania was placed in an intolerable situation from which the only escape was to storm the borders of Romania in a spontaneous campaign, the “famine flight”- a name that is not merely metaphorical.

256

Reconstruction Efforts in H ostile Surroundings - Slovaks and Jews after World War II YEHOSHUA R. BÜCHLER Slovakia, part of the Czechoslovak Republic, had a Jewish population o f nearly one hundred and forty thousand before World War II. Most o f these Jews were deported to extermination camps in 1942-1944 - some from the Slovakian state, a satellite of Nazi Germany, and others from the areas annexed to Hungary in 1938-1939 and restored to Czechoslovakia at the end o f the war. It is estimated that only thirtytwo thousand Jews survived (less than 23 percent o f the 1938 Jewish population), and nearly all o f them returned to Slovakia after the liberation. About two-thirds o f them were survivors o f the camps and the “Labor Service” (of the Hungarian army); the remainder survived by hiding with Slovak peasants or in forests. 1 The civil and legal status o f the Jewish survivors who returned to Slovakia after the liberation was vague, and the authorities did not take the steps required by the new situation to regularize their status. Paradoxically, the anti-Jewish legislation that the Slovak fascist regime had enacted during the war had not really been repealed. The new administration behaved in accordance with an inclusive principle that had been adopted at the time o f the Slovak uprising (in September 1944). According to this principle, all provisions and laws from the occupation era that did not correspond to the spirit o f democracy and the democratic nature o f the Czechoslovak Republic were null and void . 2 However, the authorities did not define and explain what this principle really meant. Neither did they issue instructions that would give the principle the force o f law. Consequently, every petty official treated the Jews as capriciously and arbitrarily as he wished. 1 See Yehoshua Büchler, ‘The Profile of the Jews in Slovakia after World War II,” Yalkut Moreshet 65 (1998), pp. 119-32 (Hebrew). 2 See Helena KrejCovâ, “Czech and Slovak antisemitism, 1945-1948,” in: Karel Jech (ed.), Pages o f Contemporary History, Prague, 1993, pp. 158-73.

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The inhabitants o f Slovakia, most o f whom had been supporters of the Slovak state, Germany’s satellite, were given far-reaching autonomy within the structure o f the Czechoslovak Republic. The regime in Slovakia was run by the Slovak National Council, which was made up o f two parties: the Slovak Communist Party and the Democratic Party. Other parties were not allowed to operate. Masses o f supporters o f the antisemitic fascist regime, as well as collaborators, joined these parties - especially the Democratic Party. They adjusted to the new conditions and swiftly integrated into the new political structures. However, most of them continued to believe in the ideology o f the old regime and, especially antisemitism .3 The Slovak National Council was both a legislator and an executive branch. It managed its executive affairs by means o f the Board of Commissioners, a government of sorts that had sweeping powers. In the period immediately after the liberation, the Slovak National Council had only partial and limited relations with the central government in Prague; in general, it acted independently. The regime in Slovakia, consisting of two parties with equal entitlements, was unstable and weak. The continual friction and rivalries between the partners in the coalition known as the National Front (the Communists and the Democrats) prevented governing institutions from functioning properly. Above all, they interfered with decision-making processes and prevented decisions that had to be made in view of the changing situation .4 Although several leading officials in Slovakia had belonged to resistance movements and had fought against the Nazis and their Slovak accomplices, they adopted a populistnationalist policy in order to curry favor with the “people.” Although the Slovak National Council resolved (on 15 May 1945) to establish people’s tribunals to try criminals and traitors, these tribunals dealt mainly with criminals who had been leading figures in the fascist regime, thus leaving the middle and lower echelons unscathed . 5 Dr. Gustav Husak, a leader in the Communist Party and the chairman o f the 3 4 5

Michal Branovsky, “K profilu a Cinnosti Demokratickej strany (1944-1948),’’ Soudobé dëjiny; 2-3 (1996), pp. 227-28. See Victor Mamatey-Radomir Lu2a, A History o f the Czechoslovak Republic 19181948, Princeton, 1973, p. 373 ff. Report on the activity of the National and People Courts in Slovakia, Archives of the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic, (hereafter AMV) 215-10/ 1-7.

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Board o f Commissioners, stated that legal proceedings would be brought only against “legal criminals,” as he defined them, and not against persons whom he deemed to be “passive members” o f pro-Nazi organizations . 6 As a result, the Slovakian public services were not properly purged after the liberation. Most o f the fascist and antisemitic bureaucrats who had served the Nazi-satellite Slovak state kept their jobs. Antisemitism was deeply rooted among much o f the Slovak population and it gathered considerable strength during World War II. At the end of the war, hatred o f Jews not only persisted but in several senses intensified. In Slovakia, as in several other countries, it is easy to identify the connection between the persecution o f Jews during the war and hostility toward the Jewish survivors after the liberation. 7 When Jews returned to their places o f residence after the liberation, the inhabitants and the authorities greeted them with suspicion and antipathy. These feelings increased when the Jews began to rehabilitate themselves, and it became an overt hatred when they began to demand their rights and property back. From the very start, the survivors were confronted by corrupt and antisemitic bureaucrats who, a short time previously, had been part of the apparatus that had persecuted Jews. Many of them had even enriched themselves on Jewish property. However, the Jews hoped that at least the government in Prague, which included several representatives o f the pre-war democratic Czechoslo­ vak regime, would side with them in their struggle for moral and legal restitutioa However, the Jews quickly realized that the post-liberation Czechoslovak Republic was different from that o f the interwar era, especially in terms o f its social climate. Although the Jews were harassed by the inhabitants and treated with indifference by the authorities, they were not deterred. In fact, they stepped up their efforts to rehabilitate themselves at both the personal and the public levels. They treated the resurrection of Jewish life in Slovakia as a challenge o f the highest order and as a response to the hostility shown them by the inhabitants and the authorities. They established new households, embarked on economic activity, reorga6 Quoted in: Pravda, 4 April 1945. 7 Gila Fatran, “The Slovak and Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective,” Acta Judaica Slovaca, 4 (1998), pp. 9-37.

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nized community life, revitalized community institutions, and establi­ shed various social and other organizations. In 135 localities, religious communities (kehilot) were reestablished; these bodies, in addition to providing religious services, instituted diverse social activities. Due to the Holocaust, the demographic makeup o f the survivors was severely distorted. Most Holocaust survivors belonged to “productive” age groups, i.e., they were young men and women. The “weak” components, children and the elderly, were lacking. The Jews of Slovakia had a somewhat different profile. In some communities, mainly in the areas that had been on the borders o f the Slovak state during the war, as many as 15 to 2 0 percent o f survivors were children, and nearly all of them had survived on Slovak soil. In quite a few communities, 1 0 percent were children and a similar fraction were elderly. In contrast, in the areas that had been annexed to Hungary during the war, almost no children and elderly remained . 89 A large majority o f Slovak Jews before the war had been Orthodox and staunchly traditional. After the liberation, several features o f the pre-war Jewish society changed: Jews distanced themselves from the traditional way o f life and the Zionist-national consciousness increased in strength. (Of some eight thousand card-carrying members o f the Zionist Organization in Czechoslovakia, about six thousand lived in Slovakia.10) Nonetheless, most o f the Jews continued to interrelate with community institutions to some extent. Only a small minority attempted to integrate and assimilate into society at large. In post-war Slovakia, in contrast to several neighboring countries, no Jewish communal organization dependent on the authorities (or regime) came into being. The Association o f Jewish Religious Communities in Slovakia maintained its autonomy until the 1949 emigration and most o f its leaders belonged to the Zionist camp . 11 As stated, the return o f the survivors to their former places of residence and their vigorous efforts to rehabilitate themselves evoked displeasure and hatred among Slovaks at large and among some leading Q

8

See Emanuel Frieder, To Deliver Their Souls, Jerusalem, 1986, pp. 223 ff. (Hebrew). 9 Yehoshua Büchler, “The Profile,” pp. 122-23. 10 Report of the Zionist Organization in Czechoslovakia, July 1946, AMV: 425-227-2. 11 Frieder, To Deliver Their Souls, pp. 225 f.

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officials. They were afraid o f the Jews’ claims for moral and legal restitution and, above all, for property restitution. The acrid confrontations that erupted between Slovaks and Jews with regard to property escalated into a severe and complex social and political problem. Both ruling parties intended to suspend legislation concerning restitution and, especially, the statute regarding restitution o f property. Slovak politicians argued repeatedly that a maximum o f consideration for the sensitivities o f the Slovak people should be applied in matters of 1O restitution. The Jews’ perseverance in struggling for their rights led to a wave of incitement and an antisemitic eruption. This activity sometimes received covert or overt encouragement and support from the authorities, especially at the local level. The anti-Jewish campaign was fought at several levels, and its main purpose was to delegitimize the Jews’ claims. For example, it was falsely claimed that the Jews had not taken part in the war against the Nazis and, therefore, were nationally and politically unreliable. Notably, some sixteen hundred Jews had participated in the Slovak uprising and had fought as partisans and soldiers against the Nazis and their accomplices, and hundreds of Slovak Jews had seen action on the western and eastern fronts while serving in the Czechoslovak army. 12 3 The “patriotic” press accused the Jews o f preventing, due to their greed (as the Jews’ restitution claims were called), the reconstruction o f partisans’ localities that had been destroyed during the war. This allegation carried a clear indication that the properties taken from the Jews during the war would not be returned to their legal owners but would be used to reconstruct villages that the Germans had demolished . 1 4 In other words, the Jews’ restitution claims contradicted previous government decisions and were therefore deemed illegitimate. The antisemitic inciters levelled accusations which were backed by the most authoritative sources. One leading senior official in the Slovak Communist Party accused the Jews, at the time o f the Slovak uprising, of having been “nationally and politically unreliable

12 Krejiovâ, “Czech and Slovak Antisemitism,” pp. 166 f. 13 Ibid., p. 168, On the Jewish participation in the war against Nazis, see Ladislav Lipscher, Die Juden im Slowakischen Staat 1939-1945, Munich, 1980, pp. 159 ff. 14 See “Report to the Prime Minister” (undated), State Central Archives Prague (hereafter SUA), 100/24, file 49.

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and greedy and some o f them have collaborated with the Gestapo . ” 1 5 Several senior personalities argued that the status of Jews as survivors o f concentration camps did not necessarily entitle them to an official assurance o f economic well-being and a political career. Even with regard to former camp prisoners, they insisted, “one must first examine their national affiliation before the war and what language they spoke at home, and only afterwards determine whether they are nationally and politically reliable . ” 1 6 The authorities formulated their own criterion of political reliability: national affiliation. Thus, the supporters and admirers of the fascist regime were “reliable” because they were Slovak nationals. In contrast, many Jews who had just returned from concentration camps were pronounced “unreliable” because in 1930 they might have defined themselves as o f Jewish or Hungarian nationality. As stated, it was not only the economic aspect that fomented the antisemitic climate that pervaded post-liberation Slovakia. Social aspects - the other side o f the same coin - also played an important role. Jews were besmirched for having not participated meaningfully in the struggle to liberate the homeland in order to deny them the right to social and economic integration and to participate in “shaping the new state.” Most of Slovak society quickly classified the Jews as secondclass citizens, like Hungarians or Germans, and attempted to thwart any change in their legal and civil status. It deserves emphasis that the Jewish legislation enacted by the fascist Slovak government during the war was not repealed until 1946, after the government in Prague applied heavy pressure and after a new wave o f anti-Jewish violence erupted both in Slovakia and in the Czech areas . 1 7 The struggle to recover rights and property stood at the forefront of Jewish activity and lasted until half o f Slovak Jewry settled in Israel in 1948-1949. The Jews considered this struggle not only a matter of economic advantage but also, and primarily, a moral issue and the restoration o f justice. This activity was also an integral part of the effort to reconstruct Jewish life and the struggle for Jews’ status in society at 15 See Report of Gustâv Husék on the situation end development in Slovakia (September 1944), a copy of the document is in possession o f the author. 16 Krejfiovâ, “Czech and Slovak Antisemitism,” p. 167. 17 Ibid., p. 166 ff. On the Anti-Jewish violence in Slovakia 1946, see Reports, SUA, 05/11, file 39.

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large. The Jews’ resolve in these matters had sweeping implications for the tapestry o f their relations with the Slovak inhabitants, which were tense to begin with. As a result, relations with the authorities also steadily worsened, as the latter disregarded the Jews’ distress and acted belatedly in seeking appropriate solutions. The leaders of Slovakia realized that the restoration o f Jews’ rights was fiercely opposed by the population at laige. Furthermore, some leading officials, in both parties, looked askance at Jews and, particularly, their restitution claims from the outset. 1 8 In their demand for moral and material restitution, the Jews faced a coalition o f two ostensibly clashing forces. One side was composed of supporters and admirers o f the antisemitic fascist regime of the Slovak state, the satellite o f Nazi Germany. The other part comprised that regime’s professed opponents: partisans (or persons who posed as partisans) and members o f the resistance movements that had seemingly become the pillars o f the new Czechoslovakia. The factor that linked them was the Jewish property that they held. The former had looted it during the war, and the latter had taken possession o f some o f it at the end o f the war as a ’reward’ for having fought the Nazis and their accomplices. After the liberation, this “antisemitic coalition” spearheaded innumerable anti-Jewish provocations, demonstrations, acts o f looting, and assaults, the most severe o f which took place in September 1945 in Topolëany. 1 9 The mayhem was designed to make the Jews personally insecure and frightened and would result, the antisémites hoped, in them beating a panicked retreat from the places to which they had just returned. The local and central authorities in Slovakia did little to protect the Jews. In many cases they even accused the Jews o f enraging the public with their “provocative” behavior (in daring to demand their basic rights). Even senior Slovak officials who were considered “close to the Jews” (members o f the resistance movement, several Communist Party activists, etc.) gave the Jews “friendly” advice and attempted to instruct them how to behave so as not to stir public ferment. 2 0 The events in Topolöany shed a powerful 18 Krejëovà, “Czech and Slovak antisemitism,” p. 160 IT. 19 Concerning the anti-Jewish provocation in TopolCany, see collection o f documents, Military Historical Archives of the Czech Army (hereafter VHA), MNO st. tajomnik, 334/1945. 20 Quoted in Slobodne noviny, 18 October 1945.

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light on the Jews’ miserable situation in post-liberation Slovakia. They also stressed the authorities’ indifference and disregard o f the existential problems o f the Jewish survivors. Topolöany is located in a fertile area in western Slovakia, about eighty kilometers from the capital, Bratislava. Before the war it had a population of twelve thousand - three thousand Jews and nine thousand Catholic Slovaks. It was a county seat that served as an administrative and economic center for about a hundred localities. The Jews in Topolöany were economically well off. Most made a living at trade, a field that was almost totally in their hands. The Jewish community, controlled by ultra-Orthodox circles, was one o f the oldest and most established in Slovakia. The Jews had long been involved in city life, held senior positions on the town council, and made a decisive contribution to the town’s economy and prosperity. Their relations with the Slovak townspeople were casual and, for the most part, were limited to economic affairs. The two population groups - the Slovak, mainly devout Catholics, and the Jewish, mostly strictly Orthodox - led separate lives and rarely mingled socially. Antisemitism was rife among the inhabitants but largely latent. Until World War II, no exceptional ^ incidents occurred in the city. During the war, Topolöany became one o f the bastions o f the antisemitic fascist Slovak regime. A majority o f townspeople favored the regime’s radical anti-Jewish policy. Several o f them took over the many properties and belongings o f the Jews and afterwards looked on approvingly as the Jews were deported to extermination camps. There were also cases where Jews, at their own initiative, deposited properties, large sums o f money, and valuables with Slovak neighbors in the hope o f reclaiming them after the war. 21 2 After the liberation, about seven hundred Jews returned to Topolöany, which was less than one-fourth o f the town’s Jewish population before the deportations. Most had been interned in the labor camp near Novâky. When the Slovak uprising broke out, they managed to flee to central Slovakia and survived in the forests with the partisans or in hiding in distant villages. A few were survivors o f extermination 1

21 On the Jewish Community of Topolöany see, Yehoshua R. Büchler, The Story and Source o f the Jewish Community o f Topolöany, Jeusalem, 1976. 22 Ibid., See p. 67 ff.

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and concentration camps. The Jews o f Topolöany were distinct from the other Jewish survivors in Slovakia in several ways. They had a relatively large share o f intact families, and most of them were among the prisoners o f the Novâky camp who had survived in hiding. The proportion o f children among them, about 2 0 percent, also exceeded the average in Slovakia. In Topolöany, intensive efforts were made by the Jews to reestablish personal and community life. When the first survivors returned to the city, a soup kitchen and a hostel were opened in an initial response to provide for the most basic needs o f life: housing and food. Dwellings that had belonged to Jews before the deportations had been seized by Slovaks. Concurrently, public buildings were cleaned, the synagogue was renovated - only one o f three synagogues in the town survived - and community life was set in motion again. Most Jews re-integrated into economic affairs and organized their lives in diverse Jewish settings . 2 3 When the first survivors returned to Topolöany, the town was swept by a bitter anti-Jewish climate and many inhabitants treated the survivors with open enmity. When the Jews began to demand their belongings and dwellings back, their neighbors’ hostility toward them increased further. Townspeople began to incite wildly against the Jews and even threatened them with assault. The antisemitic ferocity was meant primarily to undermine the Jews’ personal security, deter them from demanding their property back and, eventually, force them to leave town. To speed up the process, an antisemitic provocation that had all the ingredients o f a medieval blood libel was staged. Shortly before the beginning o f the 1945/46 school year, rumors circulated in Topolöany that Jews intended to take over the Catholic school, situated next to the convent, and turn it into a Jewish school. On the morning o f 24 September 1945, several hundred women and men gathered at the National Committee o f the County, the executive authority in that location, to protest against the nationalization of the school and its ostensible Judaization . 2 4 The incited and enraged women broke into the office o f the deputy chairman, Matej Durka. This man, who was supposed to represent the new regime, fully agreed with the 23 Büchler, “The Profile,” p. 124. 24 See Report of the chief of the local police, 26 September 1945, VHA: MNO, 334/ 1945 2-4.

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women’s claims but claimed that the matter did not come under his purview. According to the testimony o f one o f those in attendance, Durka also remarked, “From my standpoint, you can take up automatic rifles and put the Jews into order. ” 2 5 Afterwards, the women headed toward the convent to demonstrate and were joined on the way by a large mob of women, men, and teenagers. As they headed for the convent, people in the crowd falsely accused the Jews o f having begun to evict Christian children from the school and vandalizing sacred implements in the classrooms. The mob broke into the school to “get rid of the Jews.” As they did so, they came upon the district physician, Dr. Karol Berger, a survivor o f Auschwitz, who was inoculating the schoolchildren against smallpox. As tempers flared, people were heard shouting, “The Jewish doctor is injecting the Christian children with poison ! ” 2 6 Men in the mob assaulted the doctor with blunt objects that they were clutching “by chance” and seriously injured him. With the last o f his strength, Dr. Berger fled to a police station about a hundred meters from the convent and was given first aid. He was subsequently taken to a hospital, where he underwent surgery. As the poisoning slander spread quickly around the town, the angry mob turned on the Jews. At first, Jews were attacked in the streets or in their businesses. Afterwards, rioters broke into apartments and forced Jews into the street, where the raging mob pounced on them and brutally beat them. Another flank o f rioters burgled and looted empty apartments. Fortyseven Jews, mostly men, were injured by the rioters; fifteen were wounded seriously enough to be taken to the district hospital. 2 7 It is important to note that Topolôany had never witnessed a pogrom as severe and extensive as this, even during World War II. It turned out that the local police had been informed in advance about the mayhem that was about to occur but delayed their response and did nothing whatsoever to frustrate the scheme and maintain order. Only when the riots were in progress did the police attempt to calm tempers. By that time, however, things were totally out o f control. According to the police, more than five thousand persons participated in the anti25 Statement of the Chief of the National Security Corps, the Commisioner for Internal Affairs in Bratislava, 1 October 1945, VHA: MNO, 334/1945 17-19. 26 See Statement of the National Committee of TopolCany, 24 September 1945, VHA: MNO 334-1945/ 31-32. 27 Büchler, ‘The Profile,” p. 124.

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Jewish attack. As the tumult escalated, the chief o f police requested that the army place reinforcements o f soldiers under his command to help impose order. About thirty soldiers from the local garrison force were sent to quell the riots; most o f them joined the rioters and attacked the Jews as well. Only a further reinforcement o f two companies, headed by the commander o f the garrison force, managed several hours later to disperse the mob . 2 8 Even afterwards, small groups o f rioters attempted to waylay Jews. Nevertheless, the antisémites failed to attain their main goal o f driving the Jews out o f town. The Jews’ response was the opposite o f what the rioters had expected. Only a few Jews in Topolöany left town after the pogrom. Some had intended to move to the large cities in any case and the pogrom may have hastened their departure. The large majority stayed put and continued to reconstruct their personal and community lives. Despite their grim situation, they were determined to continue struggling to recover their rights. As it turned out, their efforts paid off. The pogrom in Topolöany on 24 September 1945, and the extensive foreign media coverage that it attracted, embarrassed the Czechoslovak authorities. Reluctantly, the central government in Prague and the administration in Slovakia placed the matter on the agenda and gave it their attention. It was not the Jews’ welfare that was their main concern, but the helplessness o f the security forces and the local authorities’ shirking of duties. The administration also feared that the ferment among the Slovaks would spread and that similar incidents would occur elsewhere, potentially destabilizing governance countrywide. To prevent this, the relevant authorities at both the national and local levels were ordered to investigate the sequence o f events and learn from them. Documents that we discovered recently in the archives o f the Czech Republic allow us to reconstruct the sequence o f events and examine the responses o f the local and national governing institutions during and after the pogrom in Topolöany. 2 9 The numerous documents shed 28 See Documents and Reports regarding the sequence o f events in Topolöany, VHA: MNO 334/1945 and AMV: 304-4. 29 Documents concerning the pogrom of Topolöany and the anti-Jewish atmosphere in Slovakia: Archives of the Ministry of Interior o f the Czech Republic, Collection 304, also Military and Historical Archives of the Czech Army, Collection 334, both in Prague.

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instructive light on the shameful behavior and ambivalence o f the authorities, both local and national. Their attitude largely reflects their general stance toward the Jewish Holocaust survivors - tepid condemnation of the violence, coupled with attempts to belittle the severity of the situation and evade responsibility. The documents show that the authorities tried to foist the blame on opponents of the new regime and claimed that the riots had been concocted by supporters of the fascist Slovak state. They did not absolve the Jews either; they accused the Jews of having stirred ferment among the Slovaks by their provocative behavior. 3 0 However, most o f these allegations failed the test of reality, as shown by reports handed in after the pogrom. A report by the local chief o f police states unequivocally that the riots were neither planned nor organized in advance. It also stresses that the riots had definitely not been devised and perpetrated by supporters o f the fascist Slovak state. To prove this, the report noted that many rioters identified with supporters o f the new government and regime: “members o f the Communist Party and the Democratic Party, and also non-partisan people.” Some rioters who stood out for acts o f thuggery, for which they were arrested, were “partisans,” students, and people with criminal records. The chief o f police claimed that the riots had merely been a popular uprising, carried out by a frustrated mob that had been suffering from severe economic distress, and that they had focused on the Jews “because they are enjoying all sorts o f benefits. ” 3 1 The same tenor with even harsher contents is reflected in a report from the National Committee o f Topolôany County, submitted on 27 September 1945, to the office o f the Commissioner for Internal Affairs in Bratislava. As we recall, one o f the leaders o f this committee had urged demonstrators who had broken into his office to “take up automatic rifles and put the Jews into order.” Obviously, when the events were investigated this official flatly denied having said anything o f the sort. The report states that the riots on 24 September 1945 had broken out “for unknown reasons” and that the crowd o f demonstrators had perpetrated a “lynch” (this word was used) against the Jews . 3 2 The report also shows that the local National Committee had contacted the 30 See report from 26 September 1945, VHA: MNO 334/1945. 31 Ibid., See report of Michal Zido, Chief of the local Police, 26 September 1945. 32 Ibid., See statement of the National Committee, 27 September 1945.

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authorities in Bratislava at 9:30 a.m. and asked for forces to quell the riots. It took a special forces unit o f the state police until 18:15 to reach TopolCany, even though the town was about one hour’s travel time from Bratislava. By that time, the rioters had tired o f their savagery against the Jews and had dispersed. In a report to his superiors, the commander o f this unit repeated the antisemitic allegations that the local authorities had expressed. As he put it, the Jews had stirred up ferment among the Slovaks by their provocative behavior - “evading reconstruction work, trading on the black market, accusing inhabitants o f having looted Jewish property, and even threatening them . ” 3 3 A memorandum from public representatives who looked into the chain o f events in Topoldany stands out for its severity. The panel was headed by the deputy chair o f the county committee, Jan Melu§, who identified himself as a partisan and a member o f the Communist Party. The memo was forwarded to the governing institutions in Slovakia and to the Commissioner for Internal Security Affairs at the Ministry of the Interior, Lieutenant-Colonel Viktorin. 3 4 Written in an extreme anti­ semitic tone, it contains lies and false accusations against the Jews. First it states that the riots damaged Slovakia’s image abroad and therefore deserve disapproval and condemnation. Further on, it states, “The Jewish-controlled Western media are exploiting the event and besmirching the Slovakian people.” The authors o f the memo accuse the Jews o f causing ferment among Slovaks by their outrageous behavior with regard to restitution. “The Jews once accounted for almost half of the population o f the town” and controlled its economy. They were accused o f having amassed their vast property by shamefully exploiting the Slovak inhabitants. The public representa­ tives also expressed resentment that the Jews, by virtue o f their being survivors o f the camps, were receiving various benefits. Especially, they were getting enhanced food rations while the (Slovak) inhabitants were starving for bread and Christian children had no milk. “They also receive food parcels from America, evade reconstruction work, and trade on the black market.” At the end o f the memo, the authors conclude that the riots were motivated not by antisemitism per se but by 33 Ibid., See Report of the commander of the Special Force Unit of the State Police, 26 September 1945. 34 See Memorandum, 25 September 1945, VHA: MNO 334/1945, 42-56.

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the inhabitants’ anger over the unjust allocation o f basic commodities and the preference shown to the Jews. According to the authors, the pogrom was a Slovakia-style “French Revolution,” an uprising by a starving people, foremost women, against their abusers. 3 5 They also unequivocally traced the tumult in Topolcany to a social background and not to an antisemitic and racist one, as foreign sources were portraying it. Five days after the pogrom, on 29 September 1945, Viliam Siroky visited Topolöany. Chairman o f the Slovak Communist Party and Deputy Prime Minister o f Czechoslovakia, Siroky was evidently concerned about the serious incident and wanted to gauge the public mood first-hand. Notably, Siroky was not sent by any institution; he came o f his own initiative and acted on his own counsel. In a closed meeting with Communist Party activists and partisans, Siroky condemned the riots against the Jews and expressed his concern about the authorities’ helplessness. Those in attendance, including Party delegates to institutions o f public administration, occasionally inter­ rupted his remarks with antisemitic comments and accusations against the Jews for ostensibly having caused the distress from which the people were suffering. As the Deputy Prime Minister listened, the participants also accused the central government o f favoring the Jews over the masses. 3 6 37 Siroky apparently got the message and realized that condemning antisemitic actions was unpopular among Slovaks and was harmful to Party interests. The Slovak Communist Party adopted a principled position o f overlooking the Jews’ hardships and deprecating the severity of the antisemitic manifestations. The rival party, the Democrats, took the same approach. Its leader, Dr. Jozef Letrich, also a senior political personality in Slovakia, even stipulated several days after the pogrom - without mentioning it even in one word - that the Jews must behave with restraint in order to avoid enraging the local people. Letrich referred particularly to the Jews’ claims for restitution o f rights and property. He stressed that the matter o f property restitution for Jews was a very complicated problem that should be tackled cautiously and in consideration o f everyone involved, i.e., including 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid., See “Official Statement,” Command of the National Security Corps (SNB), 1 October 1945. 37 Letrich’s statement quoted in: Nârodnà obroda, 30 September 1945.

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those who had stolen the Jews’ property, had taken possession o f it, and were refusing to return it to its legal owners. On 29 September 1945, the security services forwarded a detailed if deficient report about the riots in Topoldany to the Bureau o f the President Dr. BeneS, the Prime Minister o f Czechoslovakia, and several senior ministers. This report, too, tends to “smooth rough edges” and blame the pogrom on the opponents o f the new regime. The report insinuates that the anti-Jewish rioters were former members o f the Hlinka Guard, “Aryanizers,” and activists in the Slovak People’s Party. However, their report confirms that Durka, the deputy chair of the National Committee of the County had indeed told the demonstrators, “I don’t care about the Jews, From my standpoint, you can take up automatic rifles and put the Jews into order.” The report added that his statements had encouraged and energized the rioters in their actions . 3 8 It was evidently these grave findings that prompted Deputy Prime Minister Siroky to set out for Topolöany. Despite the severity o f the situation, it took time for the government to address itself to the matter and to respond. It dealt with the issue randomly, pursuant to an interpellation by Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk at a government meeting on 2 October 1945. The minutes of this meeting, which are in our possession, allow us to track the discussion; they also reveal a certain facet o f the government ministers’ attitude toward the problem o f the Jewish survivors. 3 9 Masaryk’s interpellation apparently embarrassed the heads o f the regime, particularly the Slovak authorities who had been attempting to downplay the severity o f the situation and conceal information. Several ministers, including the Minister o f Defense who had not been kept informed about his soldiers’ disgraceful conduct, protested that the matter o f the pogrom had not been brought to their knowledge. The situation reached such a state that the Secretary o f State at the Ministry o f Defense, a Slovak national, demanded that severe measures be taken against those responsible for concealing the information. He alleged that Slovakia was being engulfed in chaos, legislative matters were not

38 Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Prague (AMZV), A- Gen. Sekretariat, 97, Z-21026/1945. 39 See “Minutes of meetings of the first government o f the liberated Republic,” SUA: 100/24, file 138/1494.

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moving ahead, and new laws were not being enforced. There was neither justice nor judge, he continued; every bureaucrat acted on his own counsel and caprice.40 Ministers in charge attempted to evade ministerial responsibility by claiming that they were not empowered to intervene in developments in Slovakia, or that they had been informed belatedly and provided with fabricated and unreliable details. Evidently, the Prime Minister refrained from placing the pogrom on the agenda because the issue o f Slovakia generally and Jewish affairs particularly were problematic and charged with tension. Foreign Minister Masaryk was horrified. Expressing abhorrence and disgust, he demanded that the government take the severest o f measures against the rioters and against members o f the security forces who had failed to uphold law and order. Deputy Prime Minister Klement Gottwald, chairman o f the Czechoslovak Communist Party, who apparently had been brought up to date by Deputy Sirokÿ, also took a staunch and unequivocal stance. In contrast, most o f the Slovak ministers expressed ambivalent views and remarks that resounded with hypocrisy and deliberate vilification o f what had occurred. The Slovak ministers in the central government, who were well acquainted with the details o f what had happened in Topoldany, sided with their colleagues in Slovakia.41 Deputy Prime Minister Siroky, who as stated had visited Topolcany after the pogrom, reported to the government that the affair had been touched off by irresponsible remarks by the Jewish doctor who had been inoculating the schoolchildren. Siroky reserved his strongest criticism for the army, which, instead o f imposing order, had joined the rioters. To discharge his minimum responsibility, he proposed that the Slovak National Council enact legislation assuring equal rights for Jews in civil affairs, including restitution o f property.42 Deputy Prime Minister representing the Democratic Party, Jân Ursiny, also condemned the pogrom in Topoldany in halfhearted terms but also seized the moment to defame the Jews and single them out as supporters of Hungary and Germany. He alleged that the Jews were in a grim mental state and were treating their Slovakian neighbors insolently. In this, he referred mainly to the Jews’ property restitution 40 Ibid., p. 12. 41 Ibid., See pp. 5-12. 42 Ibid., See pp. 8-9.

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claims. Ursiny then took the extreme step o f accusing the Jews of collaborating with the enemy and falsely alleged that no fewer than fifty-two Jews had served the pro-Nazi security services as informers and had been among the most dangerous o f them. Therefore, Ursiny said, “It is no wonder that the rage o f the people is directed against the Jews.”43 Another Slovak minister, Vavro Srobar, also condemned the pogrom but in the same breath singled out the Jewish community o f Topolöany as a hotbed of irredentism that had long supported Hungary and acted against the interests o f Czechoslovakia. He attempted to defend the townspeople who, he said, had been suffering from a grave shortage of basic foods and severe economic hardship.44 The government meeting that was supposed to discuss the lessons of the pogrom in Topolöany became a forum for debate between Slovakian and Czech ministers concerning the ostensible deprivation of the Slovaks and the disputation between Communists and Democrats concerning domestic policy. A majority o f Slovak ministers tried to disregard the problems o f Jewish survivors and shifted the debate to the question o f Slovak-Czech relations. Nevertheless, at the end o f the debate the government resolved by majority vote to speed up legislation concerning restitution. Several rioters from Topolöany who had been arrested emerged from the affair with slaps on the wrist. The judicial authorities in Slovakia treated them forgivingly and refrained from imposing penalties that would deter others from following their lead.45 On 16 May 1946, after hesitations and delays and under heavy pressure from central government, the Slovak National Council passed a restitution law (law 128/1946) that included clauses concerning the restitution o f property looted in World War II.46 Although the law as phrased was a favorable measure, enforcement was sluggish and claimants found themselves ensnared in red tape and daunting difficulties. For example, property restitution claimants were charged a stiff “enrichment tax,” and offspring who attempted to claim

43 44 45 46

Ibid., See p. 10. Ibid., See p. 11. AMV: 425-233-3 See Collection o f Laws and Regulations o f the Czechoslovak Republic, Vol. 55, 17. June 1946 (in Czech).

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property that had belonged to parents or relatives who had been murdered during the war were forced to drop their claims because the tax authorities had imposed an exorbitant estate tax.47 Few agricultural properties that had belonged to Jews were restored to their original owners; most o f these properties were placed under “national management” of a Slovak “administrator” (usually a partisan) or were expropriated by the authorities.48 The passage of the restitution law touched off much public ferment, which led to a new wave o f antisemitic incitement and pogroms in several locations.49 The most brutal o f them took place in Bratislava in early August 1946, at the time o f a meeting o f partisans who, as stated, had long been generating fierce antisemitic activity and opposed the restoration o f Jews’ rights with particular ferocity. Many Jews were wounded, most lightly; ten Jewish-owned apartments were burgled and looted; a restaurant and an Orthodox Beit Yaakov girls’ hostel were burgled and their equipment and contents vandalized and destroyed. Anti-Jewish riots took place in fifteen additional towns and localities.50 The Slovak administration responded much as it had in 1945. An official statement from the chairman o f the Board o f Commissioners (Gustav Husàk) stated that the reports in foreign newspapers about antiJewish riots that had purportedly raged in Bratislava were groundless and that participants in the partisans’ meeting neither demonstrated nor rioted against the Jews. The statement added that the fascist circles that had attempted to instigate riots had been dispersed by security forces even before they could organize.51 However, the central government in Prague had to admit that a spate o f riots had taken place in Slovakia and also resolved to send an investigator to Slovakia to look into the situation and report on what had transpired in Slovakia during the partisans’ meeting. In view o f the attitude taken by the government in Prague, Slovak ruling circles also had to concede that there had been

47 See Memorandum of the Council of the Jewish Religious Communities, quoted in Vëstnik 2NO, no. 19 1947. 48 Quoted in Vëstnik 2NO, no. 15, 1947. 49 See Statement of the Ministry of Interior, 2 November 1946, AMV: 304-4-1. 50 See Reports of the Police and Security Forces, AMV: 13352, AMV: 215-10-/1-7, AMV: 425-367. 51 AMV: 13352/ 14-16.

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“demonstrations” at that time, spearheaded by “nationalists, fascists, and Hungarians”- anyone but partisans.52 The antisemitic coalition got its way, at least in part. Implementation o f the restitution law was postponed in Slovakia (until the end o f a reexamination period).53 A truly paradoxical situation came about: in response to the pogrom in Topolöany, the authorities had promised to legislate a restitution law promptly. Less than a year later, the same law was suspended in order to silence and mollify the rioters who had savaged the Jews at the time o f the partisans’ meeting.

Conclusion Notwithstanding the climate o f hostility and recurrent assaults, the Jews o f Slovakia attained impressive achievements in reconstructing individual and community life. In their struggle to recover their property rights, their success was less impressive. Only part o f the property plundered from Jews during the war was returned to its legal owners. Due to the impressive revitalization, economic consolidation, and personal security, which gained strength over time, only about half o f the Jews in Slovakia seized the relatively convenient opportunity to resettle in Israel or emigrate to other countries. The others preferred to remain in Slovakia, all disadvantages notwithstanding.54 The pre-war Czechoslovak Republic had been noteworthy for its tolerant attitude toward Jewish inhabitants and stood out in this respect among neighboring countries where a vitriolic antisemitic climate prevailed at that time. The favorable attitude toward Jews enhanced the stature and reputation of Czechoslovakia among the democracies and earned their respect. Post-war Czechoslovakia attempted to tie into the tradition o f a “humane and democratic state that understands the suffering o f the Jews.” Notwithstanding this favorable image, to which the Jews subscribed in particular post-war Czechoslovakia did not resemble Masaryk’s pre-war republic. It is true that the governments o f

52 SUA: 05/11, file 39, quoted in Vestnik ZNO, no. 9, 1946. 53 Ibid., also Krejéovâ, “Czech and Slovak antisemitism,” p. 169. 54 See Büchler, “The Profile,” p. 127-29, Report by the AJDC on the Emigration from Czechoslovakia 1946-1950, AMV: 425-370-1-3.

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Czechoslovakia allowed hundreds o f thousands o f Polish and Eastern European Jews to cross the country without hindrance in their way to Palestine. Czechoslovakia sold laige quantities o f military equipment to Israel during the latter country’s War o f Independence and allowed members of the Israel Air Force and other corps to train on its soil. The government of Czechoslovakia also agreed to induct and train on its soil about eighteen hundred o f its Jewish citizens (the Czech brigade), who subsequently joined the Israel Defense Forces.55 The government of Czechoslovakia also allowed 18,500 o f its citizens to emigrate to Israel and to remove some o f their property.56 Nevertheless, in Czechoslo­ vakia as in other countries, the favorable attitude toward Jews in Israel and support of the Jewish people’s struggle for independence was apparently the province of individual people and it stemmed at least partly horn pragmatic considerations.

55 Concerning the military aid to Israel, see Jifi Dufek, Karel Kaplan and Vladimir Slosar, Czechoslovakia and Israel 1947-1953, Prague, 1993. 56 Ibid., pp. 23-40.

276

Different Interpretations o f Reconstruction: The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the World Jewish Congress in Hungary after the H olocaust KINGA FROJIMOVICS In Hungary, similar to other countries o f Europe, the counting o f the survivors of the Holocaust and providing them with the barest necessities called for the active participation of international Jewish organizations. The two organizations that primarily took upon themselves the task o f relief were the World Jewish Congress (WJC) and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (the Joint). Jean Ancel claims that in Rumania the Joint saved the majority of survivors from certain death by hunger.1 His claim is also valid for other countries o f Central and Eastern Europe that were in ruins after the war and came under Soviet occupation. According to a census that was completed on 31 October 1946, there were about one hundred and eighty thousand Jewish survivors in Hungary, and the overwhelming majority o f them had been dispossessed o f all that they had owned before the war.2

Rehabilitating the Jews o f Hungary Scholars concerned with this era generally agree that the relief work immediately after the Holocaust focused upon two separate but intertwined objectives. One o f them was to recover and restore the 1

2

Jean Ancel, “She erit Hapleta in Romania dining the Transition Period to a Communist Regime, August 1944-December 1947,” in: Yisrael Gutman and Avital Saf (eds.), She'erit Hapleta, 1944-1948, Jerusalem, 1990, p. 156. A Zsidô Vilâgkongresszus Magyarorszâgi Képviseletének 2. szâmü ôsszefoglalô jelentése, 1946. jûlius 1. - oktôber 31. p. 8. (Hungarian Jewish Archives, WJC XXXIII-3-1) (hereafter HJA, WJC, Report 2).

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Jews' civil rights as well as their communal and individual possessions. The othei; through a multi-phased process, was to help the communities and individuals become self-sufficient once again and take their part in the social and economic structure o f their respective countries.3 When tracing the process o f getting the Jews o f Hungary back on their feet, we can see a clear division o f labor between the WJC and the Joint. In the immediate years after the war, 1945-1946, when the birth o f an independent Jewish state was not considered conceivable, both organizations saw their primary goal as aiding the local Jewish communities in Europe. The WJC, a political organization that took upon itself the representation o f Jews throughout the world, aimed at creating security for the local Jewish communities in terms of rights and property. The Joint, an apolitical altruistic relief organization, took upon itself the task o f integrating the Jews into the developing local economic and social structures. Achieving these seemingly natural and ordinary aims proved to be problematic in almost all countries. While all European countries guaranteed the legal security o f Jews and condemned the deprivation of civil rights, the issue o f returning confiscated properties evoked serious disagreements between Jews and non-Jews. Since in most cases a significant part o f the properties confiscated from the Jews fell into the hands o f local citizens, the efforts of the Jews to get them back - efforts legally endorsed by the countries concerned - met with firm resistance. Against their own laws, the political elite wanted to prevent the Jews from retrieving their possessions owing to the widespread opinion that non-Jewish citizens also suffered terrible privations during the war. Masses had become poverty-stricken and the political elite thought it unfair to take away the little that these people had. Disregarding current laws characterized more the countries o f the Eastern block, but we can find examples of this also in Western Europe.4

3

4

Concerning the reconstruction of the local Jewish communities in respective countries of Europe and the difficulties pertaining to this task, see the appropriate studies in the collection of studies: Gutman and Saf, She'erit Hapleta, 1944-1948. See, for example, the not very successful struggle of the Jews of France to retrieve their confiscated properties, David Weinberg, “The Reconstruction o f the French Jewish Community After World War II,” in: Gutman and Saf, She ’erit Hapleta, 1944-1948, pp. 170-74.

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The aim o f integrating the Jews and their communities into the economy and society o f their countries rested on the assumption that after the war democracies would emerge or reemerge in Europe. And into democracies, it is worthwhile to re-integrate the Jews. The error of this assumption regarding the countries o f the Eastern block became evident only by the end o f the 1940s. By that time the construction o f a Stalinist dictatorship had been completed in all o f these countries except for Yugoslavia. After the “iron curtain” was established until the end o f the 1980s when the Communist regime collapsed, it was very difficult to emigrate from these countries, countries where the Jews had to a greater or lesser extent found their place thanks to the efforts of the Joint and the WJC. From this viewpoint the Joint, together with the WJC, against their own ideologies and as a consequence o f a false assumption, thus condemned hundreds of thousands of survivors and their offspring to live under various phases of dictatorship. In 1949, after the take-over by the Communist Party in Hungary at the end o f 1948 and the establishment of a totalitarian Communist dictatorship, the international Jewish organizations operating in Hungary realized that their strategy for the re-integration o f the Jews entailed immense problems. This is indicated, for example, by the desperate effort of Joseph J. Schwartz, the European Chairman o f the Joint, to obtain permits for those wishing to leave the country despite the fact that legal emigration from Hungary had become practically impossible since December 1948. The paradox is clean one o f the top leaders of the Joint - an organization that declared itself to be non­ political and striving hard to avoid all appearances o f “complicity” with Zionism - initiated talks with the leaders o f the Hungarian state about permits for Jews to emigrate to the new Jewish state. Initially, Schwartz offered Hungary two million dollars for twenty-five thousand permits. Later, the sum was changed to one million dollars for five thousand Jews.5 Yehuda Bauer commented on the final results o f the Schwartz talks: “Nothing came o f these schemes, but they indicated the line some o f the governments in Eastern Europe would take in the future: it was worthwhile, sometimes, to sell Jews for good money.”6 5 6

Yehuda Bauer: Out o f the Ashes. The Impact o f American Jews on Post-Holocaust European Jewry, Oxford, 1989, p. 145. Ibid., p. 146.

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The fact that the Jewish survivors could survive the immediate aftermath while scarcely getting any help from the countries they had returned to, can be attributed to the enormous efforts o f the Joint and the WJC. At the end o f the war, in 1945, the Joint distributed various forms o f aid to the value o f $17,508,000 in fifteen European countries. Hungary received 23 percent of this sum ($3,837,000). In 1948, Hungary received even more, 27 percent o f the total sum spent on Europe ($8,463,000). In that year the Joint supported the Jewish communities of only nine European countries.7 The Jews o f Hungary received the largest amount o f funding from the Joint - more than fiftytwo million dollars8 - until the Joint ceased its activities in the country at the beginning o f 1953. Furthermore, assisting the Jews o f Hungary between 1945 and 1953 was the most expensive project in the history o f the Joint until then. In harmony with the amount o f money spent, the Joint’s project o f re-integrating the Jews proved to be more successful in Hungary than in other countries o f the Eastern block. Immediately after the war, in 1945 and the first months o f 1946, the rate o f Jews who wanted to leave Hungary was around 70-80 percent, similar to other Eastern and Central European countries.9 From the other Communist countries a very significant proportion o f Jews indeed emigrated. By contrast, even though emigration was on a massive scale, the majority o f Jews stayed in Hungary. The success o f the Joint’s re-integration project, thus, could be indirectly measured by data on the intention to emigrate. The surviving original documents on the activities o f the Joint and the WJC in Hungary, which became public after the fall o f the Communist regime in 1989, have made it possible to thoroughly trace the reconstruction process o f a European Jewish community, with its distinct phases in the years following the war. 7 8 9

Ibid., p. XVIII. Herbert Agar, The Surviving Remnant. An Account o f Jewish Survival Since 1914, London, 1960, p. 177. This can be read in a report written at the beginning of 1946. The report was signed both by the leaders of the Neolog and Orthodox Central Boards, by the Hungarian Zionist Association, and by the leaders of the Hungarian Department o f the WJC. “Most Hungarian Jews wish to emigrate due to economic and psychological reasons. They do not want to live in a country which became a graveyard o f their families.” Quoted in Azriel Carlibach (ed.), The Anglo-American Commission o f Inquiry on Palestine, Tel Aviv, 1946, Vol. I, p. 290.

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The Struggle to Reintroduce Legal and Property Security fo r Jews: The Activities o f the WJC in Hungary in the Years Following World War II The Hungarian Department o f the WJC was officially opened on 4 March 1946 under the leadership of Albert Geyer and Siegfried Roth,10 but it began functioning in an organized manner only from November o f that year. From that point on, the WJC had a monthly budget o f four thousand dollars. One half o f it was provided by the head office o f the WJC and the other half by the Joint. The Joint specified that they would not support the social and child welfare programs o f the WJC since they had similar programs o f their own.11 In a report that includes an analysis o f the changed attitude o f the Jews of Hungary as a result o f the Holocaust, the WJC defined its main spheres of activity. The report stated that before World War II, committed and patriotic Hungarian Jews were not concerned about their brethren abroad, they showed no interest in them and expected no help from them either. The situation was profoundly altered by the Holocaust. “Since then, foreign aid has been pouring into the country - we expect food from abroad to feed the hungry and clothes to cover those who are cold. What the Joint did in this sphere, the World Jewish Congress aimed to do in the spheres o f legal aid, the protection o f life and property, the revival o f intellectual life, and in many other spheres.” 12 The WJC set for itself six different, but interrelated sub-tasks.13 The first objective, legal and political activities, was in line with the main objective o f the WJC - namely, safeguarding the interests o f the Jewish people at international forums. In order to represent the Jews of Hungary at the peace negotiations following the war, the WJC intensively studied the legal regulations concerning the Jews o f the 10 A Zsidô Vilâgkongresszus Magyarorszâgi Képviseletének 1. szâmû összefoglalö jelentése. 1946. jünius 30-ig. pp. 2-3. (HJA, WJC XXXIII-3-1) (hereafter WJC, Report 1). 11 WJC, Report 2, p. 3. 12 Összefoglalö jelentés a Zsidô Vilâgkongresszus Magyarorszâgi Képviseletének egyéves munkâssâgârôl, 1946. m â rc iu s-1947. mârcius. p. 1. (HJA, WJC XXXIII3-1) (hereafter WJC, Summary). 13 See the description of the various sub-tasks in WJC, Summary, p. 1.

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country before, during and after the war. It also conducted talks with post-war Hungarian governments regarding the confiscated property of those who perished in the Holocaust, of survivors, and o f the Jewish communities. This activity was aimed at creating legal security and security of property for the local Jewish community, which was considered by the WJC to be the fundamental condition o f a successful revival. The second task and one that required considerable preliminary work was the collecting and processing o f statistical data in order to appropriately represent Jewish survivors, since none o f the country’s organs had reliable data on them. Consequently, the WJC began to conduct a census in the summer o f 1945, which was completed in October 1946 and listed about one hundred and eighty thousand Jews. The census o f individual survivors was followed by a community census aimed at assessing the losses o f the Jewish communities that resumed functioning after the war. The census contains information on the losses of the Jewish communities - both o f members and property, on their current demographic and financial situation, and on their cultural and religious life. Another objective o f the WJC was the acquisition o f historical documents relating to the persecution o f Jews anywhere; and it intentionally collected documents in Hungary as well. The WJC took over documents from the Documentation Department o f the Jewish Agency in June 1946. This material included protocols taken with survivors of forced labor and death camps, legal files o f post-war People’s Tribunals, documents and photographs o f the persecution of Jews in Hungary, as well as a collection o f articles on Jewish subjects beginning with 1919. The WJC supplemented these documents, and on the basis o f the collected data initiated legal action against war criminals. Until the end of October 1946 the WJC had filed 1,220 reports. The WJC felt that an information service was essential. This department o f the WJC, founded in July 1945, systematically collected data on Jewish survivors residing in Hungary, on Jews who had been in the death camps and in camps for prisoners o f war, on those who emigrated and on those who perished. With this information the WJC was able to help unite families whose members had lost contact with one another. Also, their success in convincing the Hungarian govem282

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ment to accept the casualty list of the WJC as a basis upon which it was possible to declare a missing person legally dead enabled the WJC to help survivors resume their lives, as issues concerning property, marriage and inheritance could be addressed. Cultural and social work constituted the last two subdivisions in the WJC’s spheres o f activity. While all the organizations that provided post-war aid were active in these two fields, the WJC specifically found in these two arenas the tasks that best suited its profile - the representation o f the Jewish people. Thus, the WJC focused on cultivating international Jewish relations. It assessed the damage to Jewish schools, libraries and museums in Hungary, and compiled a bibliography o f books published after the war on Jewish subjects. The WJC saw to it that the Jews abroad and the Jews in Hungary mutually learn about the intellectual products o f the other. In the service o f this goal, books, periodicals, scholarly lectures, etc. were sent abroad and brought to Hungary.14 In the field o f social work, supporting the totally impoverished Jewish intelligentsia (writers, artists, scientists, journa­ lists, teachers) and caring for and educating orphaned children were considered by the WJC to be its most important tasks. In supporting the intelligentsia the WJC initiated a so-called adoption program whereby (mostly) American individuals “adopted” Jewish intellectuals by sending them parcels or any other sort o f aid.15 With regard to the care o f orphans, the WJC founded a home where the children (numbering about 50-60), most of them under the age o f six, were given a religious education. A report from March 1947 states the main purpose o f this education as follows: “The atmosphere of the home is positively Jewish. The older children learn Hebrew and the younger ones sing Hebrew songs according to their level o f maturity.” 16 The activity of the WJC in Hungary thus served a dual purpose. On the one hand it aimed at creating the necessary legal security and security o f property for Jews who wanted to start a new life in Hungary after the war. On the other hand, as the representative o f the whole 14 WJC, Summary, p. 5. 15 WJC, Summary, p. 10. 16 The Louise Wise Home for Children was opened on 28 July 1946 in Budapest on the Szabadsâg-hegy (Cinege st. No. 10.). WJC, Summary, p. 9. This home for children was taken over by the Joint in January 1948. See: Jegyzökönyv, 1948. januâr 19. p. 2. (HJA, Joint XXXIII-4a-l).

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Jewish people, it aimed at connecting the Jewish community in Hungary - which had cut itself off from the Jewish communities of other countries before the war - to the Jewish world. However, the WJC could not fully accomplish what it had set for itself, especially concerning legal security and security o f property, because their strategies, which were founded on basically democratic principles, were incompatible with a totalitarian system even in its initial stages. Let us now examine the case o f the Joint from this angle.

The Reconstruction o f the Jewish Community in Hungary: The Activity o f the Joint in Hungary in the Years afier World War II The “Joint Committee in Hungary” began to operate in the country in March 1945. For the first few months its activities were under the aegis o f the Bucharest and Geneva offices o f the Joint. It became independent when the leading body o f the “Joint Committee in Hungary” - the Joint Committee consisting o f twelve members - was established on 22 June.17 The Neolog (Liberal) and the Orthodox trends, as well as the Zionists delegated members to the Committee. Frigyes Görög served as chairman.18 In addition, the National Jewish Relief Committee (NJRC), the major relief organ in Hungary, was founded on 31 August 1945 by the Joint, the Hungarian Zionist Association, and the Central Boards o f the Neolog and Orthodox trends. Frigyes Görög was elected chairman of this organization as well.19 The Joint recognized the NJRC as “the central executive organ o f the relief project for the Jews o f Hungary,” and used the organization for the distribution o f foreign aid.20 However, the Joint reserved the right to provide financial support directly, independently of the NJRC, to the Central Boards o f the Neolog and Orthodox trends, to the Jewish communities, to various Zionist 17 Randolph L. Braham: A népirtâs politikâja. A Holocaust Magyarorszàgon, Budapest, 1997, Vol. II. p. 1251. 18 Pro Memoria. 1945.jûnius 22. p. 1. (HJA, Joint XXXIII-4a-l). 19 Megâllapodâs az Orszâgos Zsidô Segitô Bizottsàg létrehozàsârôl, 1945. augusztus 31. p. 1. (HJA, OZsSB XXXIII-7a-l). 20 Az Zsidô Vilâgkongresszus Magyarorszàgi Képviseletének mûkôdésére vonatkozô tervezet, 1945. augusztus 31. p. 1. (HJA, OZsSB XXXIII-7a-l)

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associations and their training camps, and to the Office o f Statistics and Information that operated within the framework o f the WJC.21 Thus, the Joint reserved for itself the freedom to conduct its own reconstruction program. Evidently, the Joint had a dual goal from the very beginning. It aimed at promoting the re-integration o f the Jewish community in Hungary, but, as we can see from the aid distributed to the various Zionist organizations, it also aimed at supporting those who wanted to emigrate. M.W. Beckelman, deputy chairman o f the Joint’s European Department, explained this dual goal during a visit to Hungary in the summer o f 1948. He stated that although the Joint had not dealt at all with emigration before 1933, from 1933 on - i.e., from the Nazi take-over until the end o f the war - it concentrated solely upon the promotion o f emigration. After the war, the Joint was characterized by the dual activity “o f supporting Jews who want to stay in their country by providing relief and helping them to make a living, and o f fully recognizing the strivings o f others who want to leave Europe, whether for personal reasons or on principle. Therefore, the Joint will do its best to make legal emigration possible for those who want to leave.”22 Supporting the Zionist training camps {hakhsharot and p lu g o t\ where different kinds o f agricultural labor and industrial work were done and taught, could also be interpreted as an attempt by the Joint to promote the integration o f the local Jewish community, whose professional profile was perceived to be alien to the needs o f the post-war economy and society o f Hungary. Indeed, the Joint tried to present the support o f Zionist organizations in this way to the regime, which was observing it with increasing animosity. The activity of the Joint in Hungary after the war, from 1945 to 1953, can be divided into three phases according to its relief policy and relationship with the regime. Studying the activity o f the Joint in Hungary provides an excellent opportunity to observe the successful reconstruction of a European Jewish community. We can also witness how the appropriateness of the Joint’s strategy became increasingly

21 ibid, p. 1. 22 Jegyzôkônyv, 1948. augusztus 23. Melléklete: M. W. Beckelman 'eurôpai alelnök beszéde a magyarorszàgi Joint munka jelenérôl és jôvôjérôl. p. 1. (HJA, Joint XXXIII-4a-l)

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problematic by the gradual consolidation o f the Communist dictator­ ship. Indeed, it was the success o f the reconstruction project that enabled the majority o f the Jewish community to stay in Hungary even though four-fifths o f them stated their wish to leave the country at the turn o f 1945-1946. The phases can simply be named for the leaders o f the Joint in Hungary. The phase hallmarked by Frigyes Görög encompasses the period from the spring of 1945 to February 1948.2324 In this phase, immediately after the war, the Joint focused upon immediate relief; that is, providing impoverished Jewish survivors with accommodation, medical care, food, clothing and money. The Department for Individual Relief, founded in May 1945, was one o f the first departments. Furthermore, from June 1945, the Joint became the sole sponsor o f the National Relief Committee for Deportees. This was a Hungarian Jewish organization that provided aid for survivors who returned to the country and for those who passed through Hungary in the framework o f the Bricha.25 Apart from immediate relief, the Joint was active in two other fields from the very outset. It supported the Central Boards o f the two major religious trends in Hungary - Neology and Orthodoxy - together with their respective Jewish communities. The main goal o f this support was to provide the minimum needed for the revival o f religious life. At first, the Central Boards o f the two trends were given equal amounts of money, but from November 1945 the proportion changed to 65:35 in favor of the Neologs.26 This proportion was approximately appropriate 23 Frigyes Görög resigned his post on 10 February 1948. See: Jegyzökönyv, 1948. februâr 10. p. 1. (HJA, Joint XXXIII-4a-l). Görög, who headed the Joint in Hungary between 1945 and 1948, at the time of a coalition government, was on friendly terms with the leading power, the Independent Party of Small Landowners (Független Kisgazda Fôldmunkâs és Polgäri Part). This connection was of considerable concern to the Communists who wanted to get rid of Görög, which they succeeded in doing by the beginning of 1948. Görög immigrated to the United States, where he established and led for several years the World Association of Hungarian Jews. (Braham, A népirtàs politikàja, Vol. II. pp. 478-79.) 24 Jegyzökönyv, 1945. màjus 23. p. 1. (HJA, Joint XXXIII-4a-l) 25 Concerning the work of the National Relief Committee for Deportees, see: Rita Horvath: A Magyarorszàgi Zsidôk Deportâltakat Gondozô Orszâgos Bizottsàga (DEGOB) tôrténete. (MAKOR 1, Magyar Zsidô Levéltâr, Budapest, 1997. 26 Jegyzökönyv, 1945. november 27-28. p. 2. (HJA, Joint XXXIII-4a-l)

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to the post-war shift o f power between Orthodoxy and Neology in Hungary. The Joint also supported various Zionist organizations and institutions already from the spring o f 1945,27 in addition to the revival o f community life. The so-called Work and Workshop Organization Department o f the Joint supported the Zionist hakhsharot and plugot. In May 1946, the Joint was supporting 119 agricultural and 60 industrial ventures with a 5,228-strong work force.28 Their support o f various Zionist organizations led to the first open conflict between the Joint and the Communist party. In July 1945, the Joint leaders in Hungary met with Zoltan Vas, the Communist Mayor o f Budapest, who objected to the fact that the Joint promoted the propaganda o f the Hungarian Zionist Association. In its response, the Joint issued a statement declaring “... that the activity o f the Joint is completely apolitical. Concerning social work and charity it does not distinguish between Zionist and non-Zionist persons and goals, since it intends to serve universal Jewish goals by its work.”29 The statement did not stop the attacks against the Joint. In March 1946, ministerial commissioner Jenö Zeitinger became a member o f the Joint Committee on behalf of the Ministry o f Welfare, which was already in the hands of the Communist Party. His task was to supervise the activity of the Joint.30 On 31 July 1947, two years after the meeting with Zoltàn Vas, Jenö Zeitinger evaluated the role o f the Joint in the economic and social life o f Hungary in his report for the “Party”: It continuously promotes and keeps alive the separation of Jews in Hungary from the Hungarians. It keeps several thousands of young men and women in 110 training camps under its control in a reactionary spirit for the purpose of sending them to Palestine as immigrants. Through its so-called “Work and Workshop Organization Department” it sponsors industrial cooperatives, factories, and

27 For example, the Joint granted money for the Hechalutz to buy 215 blankets, as well as providing some cash on 23 May 1945. See: Jegyzökönyv, 1945. mâjus 23, p. 2. (HJA, Joint XXXIII-4a-l) 28 A Munka- és Üzemszervezô Csoport jelentése Dr. J. Schwartznak, 1946. junius 28, pp. 1-2. (HJA, Joint XXXIII-4a-8). Concerning the work and Zionist education in the hakhsharot and plugot, see: Attila Novak: Âtmenetben. A cionista mozgalom négy éve Magyarorszàgon, Budapest, 2000, especially pp. 129-44. 29 Jegyzökönyv, 1945. jûlius 2, p.l. (HJA, Joint XXXIIMa-1). 30 Jegyzökönyv, 1946. mârcius 29, p. 1. (HJA, Joint XXXIII-4a-l).

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agricultural cooperatives, which constitute centers of infection full o f pus on the body of the Hungarian democracy both in Budapest and in the countryside.31

Zeitinger later remarked that the work o f the Joint was still needed in Hungary “because it is by all means advantageous from the economic and social points o f view,” but that Frigyes Görög should be removed from his leading position at the Joint.32 The specific economic and social advantages were indeed very significant for both Hungary and the Communist Party, since the social work o f the Joint took a significant burden off the shoulders o f the government. Moreover, the Joint, as the largest foreign organization operating in Hungary after World War II, was the country’s major supplier o f foreign currency every year. Already at the preliminary talks regarding the Joint’s work in Hungary, the representative o f the Hungarian state made it clear that license to operate in Hungary would be granted only if the money to be used in the country was supplied in the form o f foreign currency and changed into Hungarian currency at the Hungarian National Bank.3334 The Hungarian government devised another way o f “taxing” the Joint that was unprecedented in the history o f the organization. It imposed the condition that the Joint allocate 5 percent o f the monthly relief that enters the country, whether in money or in kind, to nonJewish projects, such as leftist youth groups and social organizations. In May 1946, under the pressure o f Zeitinger, the Joint issued a statement concerning non-Jewish relief. The Joint Committee declared that the Joint is an international organization primarily for helping Jews but has cooperated with non-Jewish relief organizations since its establishment, helping all the needy in circumstances of crisis, irrespective o f race or religion. Consequently, it is only natural that it helps non-Jewish people in need in war-afflicted Hungary. The statement also asserted that the largest part of the aid for non-Jews had not been distributed by the Joint but had been sent to the Ministry o f Welfare and the Budapest Town Hall for distribution since the beginning o f 1946. In short, the Joint had to pay some kind o f tax from as early as the beginning o f 1946. 31 A népjôléti minisztériumi biztos jelentése az MKP központi tömegszervezeti osztâlyànak a Joint magyarorszâgi kirendeltsége gazdasâgi, politikai szerepérôl, 1947. jülius 31 (Politikatôrténeti Intézet Levéltâra, 274. f. 17/11. Ö. e.) 32 ibid. 33 Bauer, Out o f the Ashes, p. 134. 34 Jegyzökönyv, 1946. màjus 13, pp. 1-2. (HJA, Joint XXXIII-4a-l)

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Surveying the first phase o f the Joint’s operation in Hungary, which was characterized by immediate relief and meeting the survivors’ basic needs, reveals that to a certain extent it was already in conflict with the Communist Party. By the beginning o f 1948, the Party succeeded both in pressuring Frigyes Görög to emigrate, and in securing the continuation o f the Joint’s work in Hungary which brought tens o f millions o f dollars into the country. Following the departure o f Frigyes Görög, Israel Gaynor Jacobson, an American who had come to Hungary in September 1947, took up the position o f chairman o f the Joint. Before his arrival he had worked in Italy and Greece as a representative o f the Joint. Whereas Görög considered the distribution o f aid as the most important task o f the Joint, Jacobson pursued another strategy. According to Jacobson and the European Chairman Joseph J. Schwartz, in the three years after the war the Joint had spent most o f its money in Hungary in vain, as the Jewish community had not become any stronger; rather, masses o f Jews had become dependent on Joint relief. Therefore, Jacobson focused on helping these dependents to get back on their feet, to become independent and integrated into the Hungarian social and economic life. In order to implement his reconstruction project, Jacobson totally reorganized the Joint in Hungary. His first step, in 1948, was to downsize the administrative apparatus o f the Joint; this was followed by placing the entire relief policy on new foundations. From that point on, the Joint provided relief only to those who clearly were unable to support themselves and could not expect help from their families. Reducing the number o f people on relief was applied also to the care of the young and the old. Old people’s homes could accept only persons who were completely helpless and who received no support at all from their families. From the beginning o f 1948, the homes for children run by the Joint accepted only orphans who had no family whatsoever. Children who had relatives elsewhere in the country were sent to live with them. On this issue, Jacobson acted according to the principles accepted at the Paris Conference o f National Directors o f the Joint. The participants o f the conference stated that beyond the reconstruction o f communities, major emphasis should be placed on strengthening family life. Therefore, the children should be placed with families if there is an opportunity to do so. It became clear that institutional education is not 289

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only the most expensive way o f education, but also the least effective one. 35 Besides cuts in the Joint's own apparatus and in the number o f people receiving relief from the Joint, Jacobson also established institutions to serve as the basis for the work o f reconstruction. The Reconstruction Credit Cooperative and the Reconstruction Department became the two most significant institutions, replacing the previous Work and Workshop Organization Department and the so-called Existential Loans Departments for providing relief. Through these new institutions the Joint aimed at fostering the economic recovery o f people with professional training who lacked the capital to start an enterprise. Following the example o f Poland and Rumania, the Joint also established Jewish cooperatives in Hungary through which many Jews could became self-supporting and integrated into the local economic and social life.3536 The first signs o f success in becoming economically independent soon became evident. On 1 July 1948, the Reconstruction Department already reported to the Joint Committee that 73.5 percent o f the loans for individual economic recovery were given to Jews who were previously living on Joint relief.37 In the Jacobson era, 1948-1949, the strategy o f the Joint in Hungary proved to be successful, with local Jews becoming integrated into the economic and social life o f the country. Present-day historians agree with the opinions of contemporary observers in this respect. Yehuda Bauer evaluates the activity o f the Joint in Hungary in this period as follows: in the Hungarian conditions, a mixture o f relief, child care, loans and producers’ co-ops were the best one could manage, whether it was part of a communist government’s takeover strategy or not.”38 There is no doubt regarding the success o f this strategy. However, I doubt that this strategy was appropriate in the framewoik o f a Communist dictatorship. The problematic nature o f the Joint’s strategy 35 Segélyezési programmokra vonatkozô alapszabâlyok és irânyelvek, 1948. pp. 3-5. (HJA, Joint XXXIII-4a-2) 36 Concerning the aims of the institutions for reconstruction and the initial difficulties in their creation, see: Beszâm olô a vidéki zsidôsâg hitelellàtâsânak megszervezésérô, 1948. jünius 7; Aaron Berkowitz jelentése a Joint Committee 1948. jûnius 7-i ülésére (HJA, Joint XXXIII-4a-l) 37 Jegyzökönyv, 1948. jülius 1, pp. 1-2. (HJA, Joint XXXIII-4a-l) 38 Bauer, Out o f the Ashes, pp. 144-45.

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could have been observed even by contemporaries precisely because o f the process of how the Communist Party after its take-over made it increasingly difficult for the greatest foreign organization in Hungary to operate already in the Jacobson era. The new reconstruction strategy o f the Joint accommodated the wishes o f the Communist Party. For the Jews - who constituted one o f the most problematic groups in Hungarian society from the point of view o f integration into the Communist dictatorship - the integration was made relatively smooth by the activity o f the Joint. Once it had been accomplished, by the end of 1949, the actual presence of the Joint was no longer needed. Moreover, imposing severe restrictions on the Joint, the largest foreign organization, could be used as a show o f power by the already strong Stalinist dictatorship at the beginning o f the Cold War. The Communist regime succeeded in eradicating the authority and influence o f the Joint, but without losing the money that it provided. From 1948 on, the Communists turned against foreign citizens working at the Joint. The campaign against foreigners reached its peak in December 1949, when Jacobson was arrested, interrogated for 12 days and finally expelled from Hungary, on the charge of spying. This was an unprecedented event for the Joint. After a discussion, the American and European leaders o f the Joint decided that the Joint would continue sending money in the interests o f the Jews of Hungary; it would also maintain its department but would not send anyone to replace Jacobson.39 O f course, by the time the Joint was declared a symbol o f western imperialism - the arch-foe o f the Communist regime - it no longer had the opportunity to influence the use o f its money. In 1950, even the NJRC lost its independence and came under full Communist control. It became an institution that dealt with relief work in the narrowest sense of the word. This final phase o f the Joint lasted until January 1953, when the Joint stopped sending money and officially closed down its department in Hungary.40 To summarize, the Joint successfully accomplished its goal with the help o f the WJC, but failed to understand the mechanisms o f the Stalinist dictatorship. By the time it realized what the consequences 39 Ibid., p. 147. 40 After the expulsion of Jacobson, Aaron Berkowitz, who had arrived in Hungary in 1947 together with Jacobson, headed the Joint in Hungary.

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were o f the successful application o f its primary objective - which was to help survivors become integrated in the economic and social life of post-war countries - in the countries o f the Eastern block there was no way out. Once the Iron Curtain was drawn, it was impossible to evacuate the Jews from these countries, which could have been achieved until 1948. Paradoxically, the traditional strategy of the Joint, which also proved to be the most successful in Eastern European countries after the war, ultimately became a sort o f trap. The flawed nature o f the Joint’s strategy becomes strikingly apparent, precisely in the country where this strategy was most successful. In Hungary where almost four-fifths of the survivors claimed to want to leave the country for economic, personal or ideological reasons at the turn of 1945-1946 - more than half o f the Jews stayed in the country, as a result of the outstandingly successful reconstruction work carried out by the Joint.

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“Shylock is Whetting his Blade": F ear o f the Jews ' revenge in Hungary during World War II LÂSZLÔ KARSAI In the summer of 1943 in a speech made before his fellow intellectuals and writers and soon to appear in print, the distinguished Hungarian writer Làszlô Németh appraised the prospectives o f the war. He said he had been watching the war “with deep pessimism from the first moment” because, irrespective o f who was going to win it - the Germans, the English or the Russians - it would be a great trial for Hungarians. It was clear to Németh that the Germans could not win and the following consequences could be expected: “ ...the revengeful Jewry, lacking self-criticism, must have grown extremely strong during the last four or five years as opposed to the shy respecters o f culture, and whoever must be deaf for knife whetting ... fails to hear that it is the heart that Shylock wants.” 1 His fellow writer Gyula Gömbös spoke even more explicitly when rejecting both a bourgeois democratic and a socialist-leftist development for the same reason: one could not expect anything concrete from either option but the “wild revenge o f the Jews.”2 Had a Jewish refugee from Poland heard or read these speeches, he would probably have wondered what these Hungarian writers were afraid of; after all, the Jews had hardly been harmed in the Carpathian Basin. The “Arrow-Cross” party, and other extreme right-wing members in the House o f Representatives showered reproaches upon the govern­ ment o f Miklôs Kâllay even in the winter o f 1943 because o f the “fruitlessness” o f its Jewish policy. According to Count Miklôs 1 2

Làszlô Németh spoke during the lectures and discussions at the summer camp of Magyar Êlet at Balatonszàrszô, Budapest, 1943, p. 49. Gyula Gömbös, “Magyar ut” (The Magyar way) quoted in: Gyula Juhâsz, Uralkodô eszmék Magyarorszàgon 1939-1944 (Prevailing ideas in Hungary 19391944), Budapest, 1983, p. 306.

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Serényi,3 the Jews were still able to exploit Hungarian peasants on a million and a half acres, one could hardly see an open shop window in Budapest at Yom Kippur, and the industry is still “firmly held by Jewish hands.”4 ♦ ♦ ♦ In an endeavor to answer the question o f what the local people thought o f the Jews during World War II, a few fundamental characteristics of the Hungarian Holocaust need to be considered. Regarding only the number of Jews who had died, the Hungarian Holocaust might appear “average.” The Nazis and their Hungarian accomplices murdered about 550,000 o f the 825,000 Jews who lived within the borders o f Hungary as redrawn by 1941.5 However, on 19 March 1944, the day German troops occupied Hungary, more than 90 percent o f those Jews were still alive. Hungary was the only ally o f the Nazis during the war that tried to settle the Jewish question in a constitutional way: namely, by legislative acts.6 The so-called Jewish Acts between 1938 and 1942 and a series of executive orders connected to them excluded the Jews from civic equality. Their economic, entrepreneurial and employment possibilities were restricted, the latter especially for professionals. Marriage between Jews and gentiles was prohibited, and extramarital sexual relationships between them qualified as race defilement (Rassenschande).7 In the summer o f 1941 more than eighteen thousand 3

4 5

6

7

Count Serényi was one of the best friends of vitéz Lészlô Endre. Endre was sub­ prefect in Pest County, the largest county in Hungary between 1938 and 1944, and became one of the most zealous collaborators o f Eichmann as under-secretary in the Ministry of the Interior from the spring of 1944. Képviselôhâzi Naplô (Journals of the House o f Representatives) (henceforth: KN), 1939-1944-XIX. k.-52 (14 December 1943). Between 1938 and 1941, parts of historical Felvidék (northern Hungary), Subcarpathia, Northern Transylvania and parts o f Délvidék (southern Hungary), dis-annexed after World War I, were re-annexed with the assistance o f Hitler and Mussolini. This was pointed out by Géza Benkö, MP of the governing party, in a criticism of the radical proposals (demanding ghettos, yellow stars, and deportation) o f the extreme right. KN-1939-1944-XVI. k.427 (2 December 1942). For the Hungarian Holocaust in detail, see Randolph L. Braham, The Politics o f Genocide. The Holocaust in Hungary, Vols. I-II, New York, 1994. Revised and enlarged Hungarian edition, Budapest, 1997.

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Jews o f allegedly irregular citizenship were handed over to the Nazi murderers at Körösmezö. In January 1942, more than seven hundred Jews (and thousands o f Serbs) were massacred at Üjvidék (Novi Sad). Apart from these cases, however, the only Jews in imminent danger were those enlisted for unarmed forced military labor. Approximately one and a half million acres o f land owned by Jews were expropriated, but the factories, banks and even real estate o f the Jews were not touched. As a police report on the mood o f the population pointed out in the autumn of 1941, “The Jews admit that there are no other countries in Europe where they could live so comfortably.” Despite repeated demands by the Germans, the cabinet o f Kâllay (9 March 1942 to 22 March 1944) would not force the Jews to wear the yellow star of David, move them to ghettos and, finally, deport them. There are several explanations for the “Jew-protecting” policy o f the Kâllay cabinet. Firstly, it was feared that if the Jews were deported the Hungarian economy would collapse. Secondly, in the wake o f Stalingrad, the influence o f conservative, moderate antisémites, who were looking primarily to Mussolini, had increased. As long as Rome refused to surrender its Jews, Budapest (and Bucharest) had something to refer to.89 Who feared the Jews’ revenge in Hungary, when and why? To answer these questions with approximate precision, I have studied the records o f parliamentary debates, police and gendarmerie reports on the mood o f the population, as well as newspapers that were published under the conditions o f a functioning, though restricted, parliamentary system and limited by military censorship. According to one o f the oldest antisemitic prejudices: the God o f the Jews is vengeful, as are the Jews themselves. According to antisémites, the Jews live by the principle o f “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” (Leviticus 24:20), whereas the foigiving God o f Christians teaches “ye resist no evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other Q

8

9

Report on the mood of the population no. 41/8-1941 (concerning the period from September 11 to October 10) from the police headquarters at Nagyvârad to the Public Security Department of the Ministry of the Interior. (Magyar Orszâgos Levéltâr [Hungarian National Archives] (henceforth: OL)-K149-Belügyminisztéhum reservâlt i.-651.f.-2-1941 -7-6000). Christopher Browning, The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office: A Study o f Referat D II. o f Abteilung Deutschland 1940-1943, New York, 1978.

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also” (Matthew 5:39). Üj Magyarsäg, the daily paper o f Laszlo Baky’s 10 National Socialist Party, quoted Goebbels’ deputy press chief Helmut Sündermann with deep approval, namely that Germany regards itself at war with the Jews o f the world, whose every act barely hides Jewish “faces distorted by Old Testament hatred.” 1112One of the authors o f Magyarsàg, the paper o f Arrow-Cross leader Ferenc Szàlasi, held forth thus: “Jews embody hatred on earth, they are prototypes of inhumanity. How could it be otherwise, when their national religion itself prescribes as a commandment the humiliation, hatred, and indeed, the elimination of non-Jews.” Following a brief historical survey, the writer continues: “We can feel no pity for the Jewish people, since the complete elimination o f the twenty million Jews o f the world could only partially compensate for the horrible evil deeds they have committed against mankind as a whole.” The figure o f the criminal, bloodthirsty Jew appears also in medieval anti-Jewish writings. Jews, the murderers o f Christ, were regarded as satanic creatures capable o f all kinds o f other crimes. The Nazis and their Hungarian comrades craftily built in some o f the elements o f antiJewish Christian teaching into their antisemitic propaganda. The Jewish bioterrorist, infecting the Aryan race and spreading diseases like syphilis; the moral terrorist, causing moral destruction and spreading prostitution; and the cultural terrorist, spoiling traditional arts and inventing avant garde and surrealism, were joined after 1918 by the Judeo-Bolshevik revolutionary terrorist, spreading pacifism and stabbing the fighting army in the back. In the winter o f 1942-1943, these Jews were complemented by the figure o f the military terrorist Jew, who had initiated the world war and was generally responsible for the protraction of the hostilities and for the barbaric bombings that inflicted so much suffering on the civilian population. The Hungarian press discussed the massacre at Katyn as proof o f the vengefulness and inhumane cruelty o f the Jews. Referring to sources in Berlin, Üj Magyarsàg reported that the massacre at Katyn was executed 10 Lészlo Baky, retired gendarme major, confidant o f the Nazis, was one o f the chief organizers of the deportation of the Jews as under-secretaiy of the Ministry o f the Interior from 24 March 1944. 11 Üj Magyarsàg, 10 October 1943, p. 4. 12 L. (evatich), L.(észlô) “Szânalom nélkül” (Without pity) Magyarsàg, 18 April 1944, p. 5.

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by “Jewish kosher butchers” commissioned by Stalin and followed the blueprint provided by Soviet-Jewish writer Ilya Ehrenburg, their ultimate goal being the extermination o f all European races.13 Its editor-in-chief Istvan Milotay reports the extermination o f one and half million Polish civilians carried off to Siberia and o f ten thousand Polish officers, prisoners o f war - projecting a vision o f “Siberian horrors, Europe thrown to mass death, mass extermination, massacre, and the depths o f mass graves” in the event o f a Soviet victory. What Milotay writes about is darkness and cruelty inconceivable to the European mind, heart and imagination, a demonic and satanic depravity, a true apocalypse.14 The perpetrators o f the massacres at Katyn and elsewhere were Jews, the GPU units were commanded by Jews, and even 60 percent o f the assigned executioners were Jews, another journalist wrote.15 In Hungary, the defeat in World War I and the territorial loss o f twothirds o f historical Hungary were blamed by antisémites on the subversive activities o f Jewish liberal Bolsheviks. They remembered with fury and dread the Hungarian Soviet Republic proclaimed on 21 March 1919 and its Jewish leaders headed by Béla Kun.16 The reign of terror by the “brigand Jews o f the sewers” in 1919 turned Hungarians into “hunted animals” for four months, the journalists o f the extreme right wrote frequently during 1942-1944.17 It was precisely that another Jewish-communist “reign o f terror” - that the antisémites o f the political right were afraid of. And they really began to be afraid when, prisoners of their own propaganda, they slowly realized that the Axis powers would not win the war. Laszlo Baky, Ferenc Szâlasi and their 13 Ûj Magyarsâg, 16 April 1943, p. 2. 14 Istvàn Milotay, “Katyn,” Üj Magyarsâg, 2 May 1943, p. 1. 15 Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, “A leàlcàzott kommunizmus” (Communism in disguise), Üj Magyarsâg, 20 August 1943, p. 3. 16 “ ...it took the horrors of the Bolshevik terror for hatred to flare up in us against them [i.e., the Jews; L.K.], along with the feeling of mortal danger,” wrote Istvàn Milotay in his article entitled “Gyülölettel vagy gyülölet nélkül?” (With or without hatred?) Üj Magyarsâg, 13 September 1942, p. 1. See also Lajos Marschalkô, Kik ârultâk el 1918-ban Magyarorszâgot (Who betrayed Hungary in 1918?), Budapest, 1944. Reprinted: Gede Testvérek K, Budapest 2000. (Gede Brothers Publishing House is the most notorious antisemitic publisher in Hungary today). 17 Istvàn Milotay, “Közös cél, közös sors, közös hare” (Common goal, common destiny, common struggle), Üj Magyarsâg, 1 February 1942, p. 2.

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comrades, i.e., representatives o f the Hungarian extreme right, trusted in the final victory o f the Axis until as late as April 1945. The conservative, moderate antisémites, watching the military develop­ ments o f the war more realistically, began to fear the Red Army and the revenge o f the Jews right after Stalingrad. The war was regarded both in Budapest and in Berlin as a Jewish war, a world war started by Jews and waged for Jewish interests. Zoltân Bosnyâk, one of the most notorious Hungarian antisémites declared in the spring o f 1943: .. .there can be no doubt that the Jews of the whole world, filled with unrestrained hatred and insatiable vengefulness, wanted this war. United in one tight spiritual unit, all the Jews in the world, from the ghettos in the Ukraine to the City of London and Wallstreet [51c/] in New York, wanted retribution and satisfaction at any price.

The only reason, he said, was because Germany and Italy had dared to defy their aspirations to world hegemony .18 Following Goebbels, right-wing journalists in Hungary also claimed that Bolshevism exposed a people numbering nearly two hundred million to Jewish terror.1920Since the officer corps o f the Red Army had been Judaized, they claimed, that army was nothing but “the obedient and willing instrument o f Jewish world imperialism.” The expres­ sions “Bolshevik scepter” and “red terror” gained acceptance in official usage. Calling upon the inhabitants o f his town to cultivate unploughed lands and to contribute to charities, the mayor o f Mohâcs often mentioned the struggle against the “red, Bolshevik scepter.”21 Robert Haala MP watched what he called the rumor-mongering, subversive machinations o f the Jews that were disrupting the unity of the nation because, as he said, “ ...the war is waged to eliminate the Jews from Europe, therefore, they are defending themselves.”22 18 Zoltân Bosnyâk, “A zsidôkérdés jövöje” (The future of the Jewish question), Nemzetôr, 7 May 1943, pp. 1, 3. 19 Jôzsef Ambras, “Dobjâtok el az Istent, testvérkék!” (Drop God, little brothers!), Nemzetôr, 5 March 1943, p. 1. 20 Sz.N., “Zsidôk a Szovjetuniô hadseregében és flottâjâban” (Jews in the Army and the Navy of the Soviet Union), Magyarsdg, 13 February, 1944, p. 8. 21 Baranya Megyei Levéltâr - Pécs - Mohâcsi polgârmesteri i. - 2759/1943 and 3475/1943 (Baranya County Archives - Pécs - papers o f the mayor of Mohâcs. 22 KN-1939-1944-XVIII. k. 575 (3 December 1943).

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A great number o f gendarmes also held that the Jews, all o f them, were enemies, worse than the bloodiest-minded communists. One gendarme second-lieutenant reported to his superiors already in the summer of 1941 : “The truth is that Jews are the enemies o f the system developing at present - all Jews, without exception, whether they are poor, rich, merchants, landowners, religious or converts, etc.” He also made concrete proposals: Jewish men between the ages o f eighteen and fifty ought to be interned and their radios and firearms confiscated.23 The author o f a confidential report delivered to deputy chief commissioner of police Jôzsef Sombor-Schweinitzer was o f the opinion that with the anti-Jewish acts and decrees passed and issued so far “we have excited [the Jews] against ourselves,” but “no significant or final measures have been taken.”24 “Let us not stop at halfway,” demanded Gyôrgy Olâh MP; if we take away the lands o f the Jews, its “logical consequence” can only be locking them up in ghettos. The Jew, divested of his property, Olâh argued, “is fearfully dangerous.” The publican without his liquor licence, the tobacconist without a tobacco market, the timber merchant, the cement merchant and the paraffin merchant stripped o f their concessions are now being joined by impoverished Jewish proletarian elements, Jewish landowners, ten­ ants.25 More than one million Jews in Hungary today are an enemy within, declared Âkos Eimer MP. Once the government “has thrown down the gauntlet to the Jew s..., they ought to expect that the Jews accept that challenge, and inveterate hatred and vengefulness are among the racial qualities o f the Jews,” argued Eimer.26 It was not only low grade gendarme or police officers that bombarded their superiors with proposals concerning the Jews. Arrow-Cross MP Gâbor Vajna, who would be Szâlasi’s Minister o f the Interior after 15 October 1944, demanded in the House of Representatives in the spring o f 1942 the suppression o f the Social Democratic Party and the trade unions cooperating with it, as one o f

23 Report No. 201/1941 of the mixed station at Törökszentmiklös to the detective subdepartment HQ, VI. Gendarmerie District, 2 July 1941 (OL-K.149-651. f. 11/ 33). 24 OL-K.149-651. f.-. -12-3. 25 KN-1939-1944-XID. k. 460 (10 June 1942). 26 KN-1939-1944-XVI. k.-329 (27 November 1942).

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“the urgent measures to be taken towards the solution o f the Jewish question.”27 Vajna submitted his proposal with reference to battle-worn valiant soldiers, to “the public mood o f the whole Christian Hungary,” emphasizing that upon learning o f “all those horrors and crimes that the Jewry o f the world have committed against the nations and peoples of Europe,” Hungarians unanimously demand the solution o f the Jewish question. Vajna proposed decreeing the mandatoiy wearing o f the yellow patch, compulsory earlocks for Jewish men,2829the marking of Jewish businesses, restrictions on Jews traveling, and sending them to labor camps in the Ukraine. His fellow MP, Kâroly Marothy, remarked regretfully a few months later that “we do not dare to collect [the Jews] in ghettos” despite the fact that “it was they themselves that declared war on us” and that they listen to Moscow and London radio, commit acts o f sabotage; indeed, some Jews would like to see the streets paved with Hungarian skulls. According to the mood report o f the Ministry o f National Defense and Propaganda (Nemzetvédelmi és Propaganda Minisztérium, henceforth: NPM), industrial workers all over the country were convinced that the Jewish managers o f the factories were sabotaging, “even under the strictest control,” by, for example, employing their workers only parttime under the pretext of shortage o f raw materials.30 The fear o f Jews was increased by the news o f Jewish partisans. One journalist wrote of Tito's partisans, known never to take prisoners, as escaped convicts, international, bloodthirsty terrorists, and emphasized that a number o f “communist agitators o f the Jewish race” were fighting among their ranks. They claimed that Mosha (Moses) Pijadet was one o f Tito’s deputies, and that his other lieutenant was originally called Fisher and was therefore a Jew.31 Further, it was regarded as a really horrifying example o f Jewish inhumanity and moral depravity that Jewish girls also fought among the Jewish partisans on the Russian

27 KN-1939-1944-XIII. k.- 196 (29 April 1942). 28 This proposal, according to the Journals of the House of Representatives, excited “considerable amusement” in the House. 29 KN-1939-1944-XIII. k.-321, 324 (June 2, 1942). 30 OL-K64-1943-41 -664. Strictly confidential mood report of the NPM for 26 April to 1 May 1943. 31 Vince Görgey, “Tito,” Üj Magyarsâg, 29 December 1943, p. 1.

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front behind the German lines, and, what is more, “they showed great self-sacrifice” in the process.32 In the summer o f 1943, the NPM was informed of two thousand five hundred Russian parachutists dropped at Körösmezö, accompanied by a great number o f Jewish forced military laborers who “intended to sneak into the country to start disruptive activities.”33 ♦ ♦ ♦ The editors of right-wing newspapers were watching out for signs that could be interpreted as indicative o f the vengefulness o f Jews. A Jewish poet, according to Üj Magyarsâg, encouraged his readers to take notes of the many cruel words and deeds they come up against and to add them to the others. One journalist believed that instead o f working diligently, the Jews “were collecting documents for the revenge.”34 The newspapers also published judicial decisions that punished Jews who behaved in a threatening way. Merchant Ede Fisher was sentenced to seven months imprisonment for saying, “All Christians will have been hanged before the last Jew is carried out o f Hungary.” Office-boy Laszlo Berkovics received two months for claiming that “Only the Soviet [Union] has order, there the roads are paved with Christian heads. In Palestine we shall do the same.”35 It was cited that an American Jew Theodore Kaufmann demanded the sterilization of the German people, that Varga, a Hungarian, wanted to send ten million German men to do forced labor for life in Siberia, that Félix Langer would plunder the Germans and have their men work for years rebuilding the destroyed countries. The papers went on and on in that vein, reporting the alleged revengeful designs o f Jews.36 The above-mentioned Milotay, in an editorial o f his paper, tells o f regularly receiving anonymous letters trying to intimidate him, promising

32 Üj Magyarsâg, 16 May 1943, p. 4. 33 OL-K64-1943-41 -664. Strictly confidential mood report of the NPM for 26 July to 1 August 1943. 34 Üj Magyarsâg, 20 May 1942, p. 4. 35 Üj Magyarsâg, 13 May 1942, p. 2. 36 Ferenc Vajta, “Béketervek béke nélkûl” (Peace plans without peace), Üj Magyarsâg, 18 May 1943, p. 1 and Magyarsâg, 18 June 1944, p. 9.

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“merciless retribution, calling to account, and punishment” for him and his extreme right-wing comrades. Undaunted, Milotay continued his antisemitic incitement, but in 1943 the number of those watching the developments on the military scene with growing anxiety was steadily increasing. The Ministry o f the Interior regularly had the German and Slavic language broadcasts o f the Moscow and Kuybishev radio stations monitored, and their contents summed up and reported. Newscasters in Moscow noticed as early as January 1943 that Prime Minister Kàllay, who had earlier introduced anti-Jewish measures by the dozen, had completely stopped paying attention to the Jews. According to a commentary from Moscow, “Hungarian government circles can see that Hitler’s boat is sinking and are trying to save their skins.”3 738 Antal Pândi, one o f the Arrow-Cross MPs, stated as such outright to the government MPs in the House, “ ...w e know that you had one opinion before Stalingrad, and had a different opinion after Stalingrad.”39 Before the winter o f 1942-1943, the Jews were verbally abused but they were not feared. In September 1942, a military specialist discussed the “death throes of the Red Army at Stalingrad.”40 The landing o f the British and American forces in North Africa (7 November 1942) and the fall o f Mussolini (25 July 1943) created a great stir in Hungary. The confidential mood report o f the NPM 'm May 1943, based on a national survey and collection o f data, emphasized that since the defeat of Rommel’s army in Africa the behavior o f Jews has become “gloating and offensive.”41 Jews were exerting a fatal, destructive influence on the Hungarian public opinion as well, the Arrow-Cross claimed. Vajna asked indignantly in the House o f Representatives, “How could militarist propaganda be made in this country when at least a hundred thousand 37 Istvân Milotay, “Fenyegetnek” (Being threatened), Vj Magyarsàg, 31 October 1943, p. 1. 38 OL-K149-65l.f.-l0/21-BM Kôzponti Râdiôâllomâs jelentései (reports o f Central Radio Station, Ministry of the Interior), 5/1943 (5 January). 39 KN-1939-1944-XIXJc.-77 (15 December 1943). 40 Vince Görgey, “A legnagyobb gyözelem” (The greatest victory). Üj Magyarsàg, 24 September 1942, p. 1. 41 OL-K64-Külügyminisztérium reservâlt politikai I (confidential political papers of the Foreign Ministry) -1943-41-664. Mood report of NPM, 10-16 May 1943.

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radios below London and Moscow and at least one and a half million Jews and Jewish hirelings spread the news o f Moscow and London every day?”42 Jewish propaganda was successful, if Ferenc Rajniss MP, member o f the right-wing M agyar M egùjulâs Pârtja (Party o f Hungarian Renewal) is to be trusted, who said, “Nor can we afford to have some people who work for our look upon Soviet Russia, armed to the teeth, like hypnotized chickens, and spread destruction at home saying there is nothing to do, Hungary is unable to defend herself.”43 The mood report of the NPM for July 1943 comments that the conspicuous wealth o f the Jews, the advantages they enjoy in terms of housing, the salary o f the physicians in forced military labor, and the good time that the Jews enlisted for military forced labor are having in general, ” ... is not so much generating passions as rather reflecting a feeling of resignation” because people relate the “good time” of the Jews to the development o f the war.44 Fearing, among other things, the revenge o f the Jews, the frightened people started manoevering for position, tried cautiously to render services, or at least to indicate that they had not meant whatever they had been doing or saying in the previous years. According to the mood report o f the NPM for May 1943, many people all over the country believed that the estates owned by Jews that had been “aryanized” were given to “state employees, military officers and administrators with connections because in the case o f changes they would return the estates o f their own will to the original owners.”45 The mood report of the N PM for July 1943 established again that “manoevering phenomena” could be observed among the public.46 In November 1943, Milotay wrote about a society “living in blind carelessness, selfconfidence, or anonymous anxiety” (italics in the original) sharply criticizing those who could only take the good times. In the old days these people had outdone everyone in antisemitism, glorifying Hitler­ ism and fascism, but then “they started, first silently, then with growing speed, slipping away, and turning against, first secretly, later more and more openly, everything they had noisily been swearing upon and 42 43 44 45 46

KN-1939-1944-XVII Je.-164 (24 November 1943). KN-1939-1944-XVIII Jc.- 270 (26 November 1943). OL-K64-1943-41-664-. Confidential mood report o f the NPM for 5-11 July 1943. OL-K64-1943-41 -664-. Confidential mood report of the NPM for 17-23 May 1943. OL-K64-1943-41 -664-. Confidential mood report o f the NPM for 19-25 July 1943.

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pledging their word to when there were victories only, and belonging there meant success and advantages.”47 The businesses o f Jews had been claimed and taken by citizens, and by peasants living “in blind carelessness, self-confidence.” During the research commissioned by the Yad Vashem Archives that I have been conducting with my colleagues48 in the provincial archives o f Hungary, we found masses of documents proving that as long as it could be done “legally,” assisted by the authority of the state, common people claimed the businesses, lands, etc. of their Jewish neighbors without inhibition. However, because of developments on the military stage, more and more people started living in what Milotay called “anonymous anxiety,” trying to oblige the “other” side as well. Zoltan Szitnyai wrote with jeering contempt about a friend o f his whose political coat was always cut according to the latest fashion. When the Maginot line seemed impenetrable he was humming French songs, then started to abuse the decadent Gallic spirit and glorify the German genius bulging with natural force. Now he has turned his coat again: worried about the fate of the country, he is renewing his connections with leftist persons, old friends, and whispering with them in hidden comers o f cafés. According to Szitnyai, his friend would be on the march forever, always on the side o f the victor, contemptuous of those who remain true to themselves.49 Robert Haâla MP was also of the opinion that because o f fear, turn-coats were spreading all over the place. Many people only whine and fear. In high society bets are made about the outcome of the war, and “a great game o f manoevering for position is going on because everyone would like to know where to step, to the left, to the right, or to the middle because the outcome o f the war is dubious,” said Haâla.50 The “evasive operations” o f the German army were celebrated in vain by the right-wing press. The maps published every day in the papers clearly showed how the front was approaching the Carpathian 47 Istvàn Milotay, “Marxék szinészei” (The actors of Marx and Co.), Üj Magyarsâg, 21 November 1943, p. 1. 48 Judit Molnàr, Zoltan Vâgi, Gâbor Kâdâr, Lâszlé Csösz, Zsuzsa Tomyai, Sândor Gâspàr, Tamâs Majsai. 49 Zoltân Szitnyai, “Köpönyeggondok” (Coat problems), Üj M agyarsâg, 19 December 1943, p. 8. 50 KN-1939-1944-XVIIIJc.-573-575 (3 December 1943).

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Basin from the east. Until the spring o f 1944, those on the extreme right in Hungary were hoping that if the British and Americans tried to penetrate the second front, the invasion would be frustrated.51 Laszlo Baky declared in February that the eastern front would be dwarfed in significance by the second front and the decision would be made in the west, “ ...and we believe that Europe will be victorious.”52 A perusal of the June issues o f Magyarsâg reveals that until 12 June 1944 it was firmly believed that the invaders would be repelled from the Atlantic Wall with bloodied noses. It was only on 14 June that the Magyarsâg correspondent reported from Berlin that “Germany wants to give her enemies the decisive battle in the heart o f France.”53 Perhaps this is where the answer lies to why the Hungarian authorities were ghettoizing and deporting Jews in such an orderly way, and sometimes enthusiastically, in the spring o f 1944. There are a number o f possible reasons for the behavior o f the Hungarian authorities in 1944. Regent Miklôs Horthy remained in place, appointing Dôme Sztôjay, his former ambassador to Berlin, as Prime Minister, thus giving serious legitimacy to the new cabinet. The decadelong antisemitic propaganda, the “legal” deprivation o f Jews o f their rights and property had made officials, police and gendarme officers, as well as the population at large accustomed to viewing the Jews as enemies and as second-class citizens. Hungarian civil servants and members of the armed forces were well disciplined and knew their duty. Now they were ordered to plunder and deport the Jews, and that is exactly what they did: they carried out their orders. ♦ ♦ ♦ It was, to some extent at least, the successes o f the invasion forces that forced Regent Horthy to stop the deportations on 6 July 1944, thereby 51 “ .. .the year 1943, with its four, unexpected crises - the defeat at Stalingrad and the Don, the surrender of the Italians, the one caused by the German evasive operations early in the autumn, and finally the one intended by the terror bombings - have failed to stagger Europe,” wrote the military expert of Magyarsâg with forced optimism. Emil Zàch, “Gondolatok az öszi csata mélyén” (Thoughts in the depths of the autumn battle), Magyarsâg, 21 December 1943, p. 4. 52 Magyarsâg, 10 February 1944, p. 1. 53 Magyarsâg, 14 June 1944, p. 1.

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temporarily saving the lives o f approximately two hundred and fifty thousand Jews in Budapest. Horthy’s decision derived from other motives as well: he was under serious pressure by his conservative friends and advisors, including former Prime Minister Istvân Bethlen and others. At the end o f June, he received telegrams from King Gustave V of Sweden, President Roosevelt, and Pope Pius XII. The leaders of the Hungarian churches, including Calvinist bishop Làszlô Ravasz, also asked him to reconsider his Jewish policies. It is possible that he believed that under-secretary o f the Interior Baky was concentrating considerable gendarmerie forces around Budapest at the end of June 1944, not in order to deport the Jews of the capital but in preparation o f a coup d ’état against him. The Central Jewish Council was also diligently spreading the rumor that if the Jews were taken from the capital, the western Allies would carpet-bomb Budapest. Fearing for his power and for the population o f the capital, the Regent finally gave in to pressure, stopped the deportations, and even ordered the gendarmes to leave Budapest.54 The German occupation o f Hungary, the stigmatization o f the Jews by the yellow star, the organization o f ghettos, the collecting camps and then the deportations - all contributed to the growing fear o f the Jews. One o f the reasons for fear was the increasingly devastating bombing raids by the British and American air forces. Before the spring o f 1944 major cities and railway junctions had not been bombed. The Hungarian press, however, regularly reported on the “terror raids” against German cities. This is what a German woman said to the military correspondent o f Üj Magyarsäg in May 1943: “What goes on here has nothing to do with the war. The international Jews are exercising their sadistic instincts here. The English, the Americans, and their Negro pilots are merely blind instruments in the hands o f that satanic race.”55 The figure o f the barbaric, murderous Jew appeared often in the Hungarian press in 1944. One extreme right-wing journalist wrote: We must indict the Jews for the increasing savagery of the war, for the bombing of the civil population, women, and children, for the destruction of hospitals.... Why do they stain themselves with crimes that cry to heaven, with mass 54 Braham, The Politics, Chapter 25. 55 Vince Görgey, “Zaporozsje-Berlin-Ostende,” Üj Magyarsâg, 6 October 1943, p. 5.

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murder.... It is they who drive hatred to fury, who demand the destruction of Europe...56

It was a view widely held among people that the British and American bombers were sparing the lives o f Jews. The “pollsters” o f the NPM reported in June 1943 that “according to rumor-mongers,” the war was lost. However, many people believed that “Hungary is not bombed because the Jews here are not treated as they are in other countries, and because there are many Jews in Hungary and in Budapest.”57 After the first seriously damaging air raid in the spring o f 1944, the military correspondent o f Magyarsâg was obliged to point out, not without some surprise, that “On April 3 the fallacy was proved wrong that Budapest would be exempted against all kinds o f terrorist attacks by the three hundred thousand people of an alien race [i.e., the Jews; L.K.] residing there.”58 However, what the military expert understood and wrote did not convince the inhabitants o f the major cities. When it became widely known that the Jews in Budapest would be moved to ghettos, under­ secretary of the Interior Endre hastened to set the minds o f the capital’s population at rest: “We do not intend to collect the Jews into a closed Jewish quarter. Jews will be concentrated everywhere, i.e., in the vicinity o f factory buildings, railway stations, etc. where hostile air raids can be expected.”59 In all likelihood Endre was aware that the Allies did not care who were settled where. He probably had Jews moved into the neighbourhood o f railway stations in Csepel because he wanted as many Jews as possible to be killed if war factories or railways were bombed. The air raids provided the Arrow-Cross with a new opportunity to write articles about the demonic warfare o f the Jews, a manifestation of their six thousand-year-old sadism.60 A constantly recurring claim of these articles is that the terrorist bombers dropped satanic devices in the form of dolls, which, when picked up by innocent children, exploded in 56 Kamill Koltai, “Vàdirat a zsidôsàg eilen,” [Indictment against the Jews] Magyarsâg, 16 April 1944, p. 17. 57 OL-K64-1943-41-664- Confidential mood report of the NPM for 7-13 June 1943. 58 Emil Zäch, “Schaffhausentöl - Budapestig,” [From Schaffhausen to Budapest] Magyarsâg, 5 April 1944, p. 1. 59 Magyarsâg, 16 April 1944, p. 4. 60 Magyarsâg, 25 April 1944, p. 1.

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their hands.61 After visiting a German camp for prisoners of war, Vince Görgey wrote an article describing his experiences among “Jewish, Indians, and Negro” pilots.62 However, the fear o f Jews, o f the Red Army fighting for the Jews, and o f Jewish-Negro-Indian terrorist bombers was not general. Tens of thousands of Hungarians were only too glad to jump at the opportunity and eagerly grabbed the fortunes o f the Jews who had been assembled in ghettos, collecting camps, and finally cattle-trucks. In the major cities, where city mayors had the right to distribute the flats o f the Jews among the non-Jews, the houses were besieged and the movables o f the Jews, where possible, were stolen.63 Hungarian writer Sândor Mârai wrote with deep contempt and desperation in the spring o f 1944: Cold May. I shiver in the sun. Nothing to talk about with people. Like you cannot argue with a drunk or a lunatic: the Hungarian middle classes have gone mad and drunk from the Jewish question. The Russians are at Körösmezö, the English and the Americans over Budapest, and this society, obsessed and foaming at the mouth, wants to talk about nothing but the Jews.64

♦ ♦ ♦ To the genuine satisfaction o f Adolf Eichmann, more than 437,000 people were deported from Hungary between 15 May and 6 July 1944, most of them to Auschwitz, as the result of the coordinated, orderly, at times definitely enthusiastic “work” of tens of thousands o f gendarmes, policemen and railwaymen. In May 1944, Mârai prayed in his diary for God to give the Jews enough strength to bear the persecution, torture and oppression. “And then,” he continued, “if they have survived the persecutions, give them strength not to lose their heads, not to become hunters running amok. Give them strength to be strong enough to have human stature and patience. Because all that revenge begets is new passions.”65 Mârai also knew very well that hundreds o f thousands 61 Magyarsàg, 9 May 1944, p. 5; 10 May, p. 4. 62 Vince Görgey, “Amerikai terrorbombazôk târsasâgâban, zsidô, indiàn és néger pilôtâk között,” [In the company of American terrorist bombers, among Jewish, Indian, and Negro pilots] Üj Magyarsàg, 22 April 1944, pp. 5-6. 63 Braham, The Politics, Chapters 19-21. 64 Sândor Mârai, Naplô 1943-1944 (Diary 1943-1944), Budapest, 1990, p. 156. 65 Ibid., p. 160 (cc. May 1944).

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were being plundered and carried off to their deaths in the spring and summer o f 1944 by the Hungarian authorities, the accomplices o f the Nazis. The Jews would indeed have needed God's help to suffer all that peacefully, without wishing to retaliate. Otto Komoly, one o f the leaders o f the Zionist resistance in Hungary, wrote in his diary on 9 September 1944 that a meeting was held in the Ministry o f the Interior (according to the information he had, at the Department o f Public Safety) to discuss what was to be done if “the understandable and just despair o f the Jewish masses” exploded. Miklos Mester, under­ secretary o f the Ministry o f Education, one o f Komoly’s high ranking patrons, went as far as asking him what the Zionists thought could be done to avert the explosion o f the “understandable despair” o f the Jews.66 If Komoly was really well informed, it has to be assumed that those in the Ministry o f the Interior were very much afraid. They were mostly afraid that with Romania changing sides (23 August 1944), the front would collapse and the Red Army would be welcomed joyously in Budapest as their liberator by hundreds o f thousands o f Jews. We should remember that most Jewish men, at least most able-bodied men capable o f bearing arms, were at this time doing forced military labor service either on the front or in the hinterland. It takes very desperate or very frightened people to expect women, children and old people to revolt. General Géza Lakatos, the new Prime Minister (29 August to 15 October 1944) openly admitted in the House that “The military advantage today is obviously with the other side.”67 The seventh detective sub-department o f the VII (Miskolc) Gendarmerie District near the eastern border reported at the end o f September that a unit of twenty-one partisans had parachuted in their district, and Hungarian Jewish forced military laborers in a number o f prisoners’ camps were preparing to fight as partisans on the side o f the Red Army. The report mentions seventeen Jewish forced military laborers by name.68

66 For the passage in Ottô Komoly’s diary in Hungarian, see Méria Schmidt ed., “Kollaborâciô vagy kooperâciô? A Budapesti Zsidô Tanâcs” (Collaboration or cooperation? The Budapest Jewish Council), Budapest, 1990, p. 193. 67 KN-1939-1944-XIXk.-260 (21 September 1944). 68 Report no. 1734/B. 1944 (25 September) of VII. (Miskolc) Gendarmerie District to the Gendarmerie Intelligence Center (OL-K149-651.f.-ll/53).

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The news reports o f the advancing Soviet troops late in the autumn o f 1944, after the Arrow-Cross take-over on 15 October 1944, were full o f words like blood, death, horror. And the red bandits, the ArrowCross press roared, were led by Jewish forced military laborers.69 Robert Haâla called the Red Army “Asian hordes organized by Jews.”70

Epilogue In the words of the Hungarian poet Attila Jôzsef, the activities o f many people (politicians, policemen, gendarmes, those o f the middle class, workers, and peasants) in Hungary during World War II were controlled by “cunning fear.”71 Most politicians knew that whatever was being done to the Jews, in whatever “legal” and “parliamentarian” way, was against justice and the law. However, not every Hungarian politician wished the Jews dead. Many would have been satisfied with having some (or all) o f the wealth o f the Jews confiscated and their civic rights curtailed. Even more would have been glad to see them emigrate. The plundering and the death o f the Jews were wished by a smaller group, but they, to quote another Hungarian poet, “killed willingly and with pleasure, not obeying orders.”72 It would be legitimate to ask whether (one of) the reason(s) the Hungarian Jews were deported to their death was because they were feared. The antisémites were afraid o f the Jews primarily because of their own antisemitic prejudices. They “knew” that the people o f the Old Testament were cruel, despicable and vengeful. But they also knew that the Hungarian Jews were treated cruelly, despicably, and unlawfully. The Nazi war propaganda and, in its wake, the Hungarian propaganda, changed its tone and subject after Stalingrad. The 69 Nemzetör, 4 November 1944, “They rape even demented women,” the newspaper wrote. 70 Journals of the Arrow-Cross House of Representatives, Sopron (the Arrow Cross House of Representatives moved from Budapest to the Western borders o f Hungary at the end of November 1944, and held its meetings in this city.), 12 January 1945, 141. 71 Attila Jôzsef, Hazàm (My homeland), (1937). 72 Miklôs Radnôti, Tôredék (Fragment), (19 May 1944).

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propaganda o f success was followed by the propaganda o f fear. The struggle of life and death became a constant central motif. Either we win, or the Jewish Bolsheviks will exterminate the Germans and the Hungarians, the press of the extreme right shouted. Until the spring o f 1945, the Hungarian National Socialists and the Arrow-Cross, the most faithful collaborators of the Nazis, were confident in the final victory of the Germans. The development o f military events and the fear o f Jews or o f the Red Army never had any impact on the behavior o f civil servants, gendarmes, soldiers, or the people at large. Tens o f thousands claimed and obtained the businesses and the property o f the Jews and plundered the movables the latter had left behind. And thousands of civil servants, gendarme and police officers, with the exception o f very few decent individuals, organized the deportation o f the Jews in 1944 in a highly orderly manner. Fear of the revenge o f Jews was selective rather than general. According to Hungarian political thinker Istvân Bibö, humans are the only creatures that know they will die. Fear o f death or o f being killed by another human being is one o f the most fundamental fears. Bibo says that the meaning and aim o f European social development is the humanization of power, the elimination o f the dangers threatening the lives o f people.73 If we try to understand what happened to the Jews during World War II and why, it will be obvious that the Holocaust was, among others, the failure o f Judeo-Christian European civilization.

73 Istvân Bibô, Az eurôpai târsadalomfejIodés értelme (The meaning of European social development), Budapest, 1986, pp. 11-13.

311

List o f Contributors Ancel, Jean is an independent historian, author and editor of numerous works on the Holocaust of Romanian Jewry. He is co-editor of the E ncyclopedia o f Jew ish C om m unities in Rom ania , 2 vols (Jerusalem, 1970-1980) and of D ocum ents C oncerning the F ate o f R om anian Jew ry d u rin g the H olocaust, 12 vols. (New York, 1986). He is also the author of The H istory o f H olocaust: Rom ania (Jerusalem, 2003); Transnistria, The R om anian M ass M urder C am paigns (Tel Aviv, 2003), Prelude to Murder. The Pogrom in Jassy, June 29, 1941 (Jerusalem, 2003).

Büchler, Yehoshua R. is an historian and head of the Moreshet Archives at Givat Haviva. He is editor of the Encyclopedia o f the Jew ish C om m unities in Slovakia (Jerusalem, 2003) and the author of several books and numerous articles on the Holocaust and on the history of the Jews in Czechoslovakia. Caestecker, Frank is currently affiliated with SOMA (Study and Documen­ tation Centre on War and Contemporary Society) in Brussels. He studied history at the University of Ghent, and taught at the Universities of Brussels, Warsaw and Madison. He has published extensively on alien policy, among others: R efugee p o licy in the p o st w ar Belgium (Brussels, 1991) and U nw anted Guests, Jew ish M igrants a n d R efugees in the 1930s in Belgium (Brussels, 1993) (both in Dutch); A lien P olicy in Belgium , 1840-1940. The C reation o f G uest Workers, Refugees a n d Illeg a l A liens

(Oxford, 2000). Consonni, Manuela Margherita teaches at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Her Ph.D. thesis, “Memory and History: War, Resistance, and the Shaoh in Italy, 1945-1985” was awarded the Pridan Prize. Among her publications are: B iblioteca ItaloEbraica, 1986-1995, coed, with Shlomo Simonsohn (Rome, 1997); “Auschwitz: the Women of the Block 10. Oral History as Historical and Literary Document,” In: Women fro m the M inorities (Turin, 1999), pp. 309-20. Frojimovics, Klnga was the chief archivist of the Hungarian Jewish Archives from 1993 until 1997 and is a specialist in the field of history of the Jews in Hungary in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. She has co-edited with Jôzsef Schweitzer, Jew ish C om m unities in H ungary, A p ril 1944: 312

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

D ata fro m a C ensus O rganized by the C entral C ouncil o f H ungarian Jew s on the O rder o f G erm an Authorities. P art I (Budapest, 1994), and wrote

together with Géza Komorôczy, Viktoria Pusztai, and Andrea Strbik the monograph Jew ish Budapest: M em ories, Services, H istory (Budapest, 1999). Hondius, Dienke is an historian and sociologist, working at the history faculties of both Erasmus University Rotterdam and Free University Amsterdam. She is also a staff member of the Anne Frank House, Amsterdam. She has published widely about antisemitism, racism and intolerance in Dutch society. Among her books are The W orld o f A nne F rank , Amsterdam, 1985; A bsent: M em ories o f the Jew ish Lyceum in Am sterdam , 1941-1943 (Amsterdam, 2001); M ixed M arriages, M ixed F eelings: the A cceptance and Avoidance o f Ethnic, R eligious a n d R acial D ifference (Den Haag, 1999); and Return: H olocaust Survivors and D utch A ntisem itism (Westport, 2003). Her present research project is the history

of racism in Dutch national and colonial society since 1600. Karsai, Lâszlô teaches history at the University of Szeged. Has written extensively on Hungarian antisemitism, on history of the Jews, the gypsies and the Holocaust in Hungary. His latest publications include (in Hungarian): The Welcomers. W ritings against A nti-Sem itism 1882-1993 (Budapest, 1993); The E ndre-B aky-Jaross Trial (Budapest, 1994) and H olocaust (Budapest, 2001). Kristel, Conny is an historian, specialist on the Nazi persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands and on postwar Dutch-Jewish history at the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation. She wrote her Ph.D. at the University of Amsterdam on Dutch Holocaust historiography. Her most recent publications include: Binnenskam ers. Terugkeer en Opvang. B esluitvorm ing (Amsterdam, 2002) and Polderschouw . Terugkeer en O pvang. R egionale verschillen (Amsterdam, 2002). Lagrou, Pieter holds the chair in Comparative History of States and Societies Since 1914 at the Université Libre de Bruxelles and he is a researcher at the Institut d’Histoire du Temps Présent in Paris. Among his many publications is The Legacy o f N azi O ccupation. P atriotic M em ory and N ational R ecovery in W estern Europe, 1945-1965 (Cambridge, 2000). Michlic, Joanna received her doctorate from University College London (UCL). Her research interests include the histoiy and culture of East European Jewry, particularly Polish-Jewish relations in the modem era, social history of Polish Jewry, the Holocaust and its memory in Eastern 313

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Europe. She co-edited with Antony Polonsky N eighbors R espond: the C ontroversy about Jedw abne (Princeton, 2004) and is currently preparing the book The Jew as P o la n d ’s Threatening O ther: The C ontinuity and Transform ation o f the Im age, 1880-2000. She has written articles for East European Jew ish Studies, P olin, M idrasz and other publications. Poznanski, Renée is the Yaacov and Poria Avnon Professor of Holocaust

Studies at Ben Gurion University of the Negev. She is a specialist on French Jewry in the Modem and Contemporary period. She recently published, Jew s in F rance D uring W orld War Two (Hanover, 2001). Ro’i, Yaacov is the incumbent of the Zvi and Sara Beiger Chair of Russian

Jewish History and director of the Cummings Center at Tel Aviv University. His books and monographs include The Struggle fo r Soviet Jew ish E m igration 1948-1967 (Cambridge, 1991); Islam in the Soviet Union fro m W orld War I I to G orbachev (London/New York, 2000) and with Noah Lewin-Epstein and Paul Ritterband, R ussian Jew s on Three Continents. E m igration and R esettlem ent (London, 1997). Toscano, Mario is associate professor at Rome University “La Sapienza.” He

has written several studies on the origins of Fascism in Tuscany, the Italian political culture after Fascism and the history of Italian Jewry in the XX century. He is author of La "P orta di Sion". L 'Italia e I ’im m igrazione clandestina ebraica in P alestina (1945-1948) (Bologna, 1990), and Ebraism o e antisem itism o in Italia. D al 1848 alia guerra dei se i g io m i (Milan, 2003). He also edited with Francesca Sofia: Stato nazionale ed em ancipazione ebraica (Rome, 1992) and Integrazione e identità. L ’esperienza ebraica in G erm ania e Ita lia dallT llum inism o a l fa scism o (Milan, 1998). He serves on the editorial board of Zakhor. R ivista d i storia degli ebrei d ’Italia.

Weil, Patrick is a senior research fellow at CNRS (National Center for

Scientific Research) and serves as the director of CEPIC (Center for the Study of Immigration, Integration and Citizenship Policies) in the university of Paris 1-Sorbonne. He has studied and published on Comparative Immigration, Citizenship and Integration Policies. His most recent books are Q u ’est ce q u ’un fra n ça is? H istoire de la nationalité fra n ça ise depuis la Révolution (Paris, 2002), and co-ed. with Andreas Fahrmeir and Olivier Faron, From E urope to N orth Am erica, M igration C ontrol in the N ineteenth C entury (New York, 2003).

314

Index o f Names and Places Abrahams 117 Adâncata-Hlyboka 237 Adenauer, Konrad 19 Adomo, Theodor W. 229 Aisne 44 Algeria 34 36 41-43 59 66 Algiers 33 41 43 59 69 71 Almansi, Dante 152 161 Alpérine 54 Amato, Giulio 155 Amery, Jean 170 Amsterdam 2 3 10 13 114-118 120 125 138 144 146 Ancel, Jean 277 Anders, Wladislaw 221 Andrzejewski, Jerzy 207 212 220

221 222 Antonescu, Ion 231-235 240 245 246 Antonicelli, Franco 178 Antwerp 74 75 81 103 Arnhem 132 Auschwitz 74 124 129 173 174 182 183 266 308 Austria 83 249 252 Azerbaijan 189 Bacal, Israel 246 Badoglio, Pietro 149 150 Baima Besquet, Giovanni 181 Baky, Lâszlô 296 297 305 306 Bassani, Giorgio 6 7 Bauer, Yehuda 279 290 Beckelman, M. W. 285 Belgium 4 9 11 16 17 72-85 87-92 95 96 98 100-105 107 113 122 126 Belorussia 190 191 193 200 203 Benedictus, Maurice 76 BeneS, Edvard 271 Berdichev 195 201 204 Bergen-Belsen 9 12 113 129 130 139

Berger, Dov 250 Berger, Karol 266 Berkovics, Làszlô 301 Berlin 83 296 298 305 Bernard, Jean-Jacques 37 Bessarabia 234 236 241 242 246 249 Bethlen, Istvân 306 Bibô, Istvân 311 Bidault, Georges 61 Bingen, Jacques 33 Birkenau 183 184 Birobidzhan 193 203 Bizzarri, Aldo 182 Bloch, Jean-Pierre 44 Blonski, Jan 207 212 Blum, Léon 29 35 Blumenthal, Chaim 179 Bologna 6 Bonnard 55 Bonomi, Ivanoe 151 Boris, Georges 29 33 Borislav 196 Borwicz, Michat M. 230 Bosnyâk, Zoltân 298 Botoçani 244 Brabant 114 130 Bratislava 254 264 268 269 274 Brazzaville 34 Briansk 239 Brindisi 150 Brussels 74 75 85 94 113 122 Bucharest 231 236 242 243 244 247 284 295 Buchenwald 21 82 173 Budapest 4 20 249 252 287 288 294 295 298 306-309 Bukovina 231 232 234-237 240 241 246 249 Bulgaria 14 254

315

INDEX OF NAMES AND PLACES

Buset, Max 81 Calotescu, Constantin 232 Câmpulung 232 Canada 125 143 Cantoni, Raffaele 153 157 161 162 164 Carpathians 238 305 Cassin, René 29 31 33-43 44 65 67 71 Catroux, Georges 65 Cattaneo, Carlo 168 Charleroi 74 Chernigov 199 Chernovtsy (see also Czemowitz) 195-197 Churchill, Winston 34 35 Cluj 254 Cohen, Albert 33-35 44 Cohen, Leonard 115 Compiègne 37 Courbevoie 10 Couve de Murville, Maurice 61 64 Crémieux, Adolphe 41-44 59 65 66 70 Crémieux-Brilhac, Jean Louis 36 Crimea 200 Croatia 14 Croce, Benedetto 167 Csepel 307 Cuza, Alexandra 246 Cyprus 250 Czechoslovakia 4 5 14 240 257-260 263 267 270 271 273 275 276 Czemowitz (see also Chernovtsy) 236 240 247 Dachau 173 181 Darabani 235 Darlan, Jean Francois 41 65 66 D ’Azeglio, Massimo 168 De Gasperi, Alcide 154 De Gaulle, Charles 28 29 31-37 43 45 52 54 59 62 65 De Jong, Abraham 115 142 144 De Jong, Lou 140 De Leeuw, A. 144

316

De Martino, Gaetano 180 De Menthon, François 67 71 De Miranda, David 115 117 De Miranda, Sadie Rinka Imma 116 Déat, Marcel 29 Debenedetti, Giacomo 179 185 Della Seta, Ugo 157 Denmark 2 4 14 15 Dexters MP 97 Dorohoi 232-235 244 Du Gard, Maurice Martin 37 Du fieux, General 65 Dumitra, Ilie 244 Durka, Matej 265 266 Ehrenburg, Ilya 297 Eichmann, A dolf 308 Einaudi, Luigi 154 Eindhoven 113-115 124 130 Eitner, Akos 299 Elbe 11 Endre, Lazio 307 Engel, David 225 Escarra, Jean 29 31-33 Estonia 190 Ferrara 6 7 Feuerstein, David 237 Filderman, Wilhelm 236 238 247 Finkielkraut, Alain 124 Fisher, Ede 300 301 Fisher, Joseph 56 Florence 150 151 178 Flossenburg 173 Foa, Vittorio 157 Fossoli 183 France 2 4 5 8 10 13 14 16 17 19 2537 39-42 44 45 47 50-52 54 55 5864 66-70 74 114 124 126 143 305 Frasin 232 Frenay, Henri 28 Friedländer, Saul 109 Friesland 125 Galati-Reni 237 Gans, Evelien 121 Gans, Jenny 145 146 Gans, Max 140 145 146

INDEX OF NAMES AND PLACES

Gelderland 130 Geneva 64 284 Georgescu, Teohari 248 Georgia 189 Gerbrandy, Pieter 124 Germany 1 2 4 5 9 11 14 19 4 9 5 8 5 9 60 72 74 82-84 87 88 101 123 129 143 150 217 234 239 250 257 258 263 272 298 Germany [East] 21 Geyer, Albert 281 Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe 248 Gies, Jan 125 Gil, Franciszek 225 226 Ginzburg, Natalia 178 Giraud, Henri 41-44 65 66 71 Goebbels, Josef 298 Goga, Octavian 246 Goldhagen, Daniel 109 Goldmann, Nahum 43 Gömbös, Gyula 293 Görgey, Vince 308 Görög, Frigyes 284 286 288 289 Gottschalk, Max 76 80 Gottwald, Klement 272 Grasgrün, David 226 Graz 249 Great Britain 6 9 18 20 23 34 48 58 101 Greece 3 14 289 Gregori, Gino 175 Grenoble 38 50 Grodno 196 Gross, Jan T. 7 18 207 212 218 230 Guiducci. Armanda 179 Gustave V. 306 Haâla, Robert 298 304 310 Herf, Jeffrey 18 19 Hertsa-Dorohoi 237 Herzberg, Abel 139 143 Herzl, Theodor 252 Hitler, A dolf 2 3 5 12 221 223 302 Hondius, Dienke 8 Hoppenot, Henri 43 Horthy, Miklôs 305

Houwink ten Cate, Johannes 120 Hungary 4 14 101 238 239 249 254 255 257 260 272 273 277-292 294 295 297-310 Husék, Gustav 258 274 Ia$i 244 Irkutsk 195 Iscovici, P. 248 Israel 3 5 7 70 143 238 242 244 249 250 252 253 255 256 262 Italy 2 14 17 60 61 62 148-150 153 156 158 159 162-166 169 173 176 181 184 249 250 289 298 Jacobson, Israel Gaynor 289-291 Janion, Maria 212 222 Jastrun Mieczystaw 212-216 John XXIII 167 Jozs, Geo 6 7 Jôzsef, Attila 310 Kâllay, Miklôs 293 295 302 Katyn 296 297 Kaufmann 301 Kazakhstan 189 Kharkov 195 200 201 Kielce 8 10 18 101 211 223-226 Kiev 195 200 Kirgiziia 189 Klarsfeld, Serge 58 59 Komoly, Ottô 309 Körösmezö 295 301 308 Kubowitzki, Leon 76 Kuibyshev 201 302 Kun, Béla 297 Kushner, Tony 9 109 Kwekzylber see Wielek 2 Lagrou, Pieter 126 Laguerre, Bernard 64 Lakatos, Géza 309 Langer, Félix 301 Lattes, Dante 162 Latvia 190 238 Leningrad 195 201 Leopoli 179 Letrich, Jozef 270

317

INDEX OF NAMES AND PLACES

Levi, Primo 174 177 179 181 182 184 Levi, Renzo 161 Lévy, Jean-Pierre 29 Levy, Major 237 Lewinska 183 Libera, Zdzislaw 212 215 216 Lida 196 Liège 74 Liguria 181 Limburg 114 123 128 130 Limousin 54 Linowell 114 Lisbon 76 81 Lithuania 190 238 Livorno 150 London 27 29 30 33-36 43 44 76 78 298 300 303 Lublin 51 Lvov 18 193 196 Maastricht 113 114 130 Malta 150 Mârai, Sândor 308 Marcel, Gabriel 52 Margolis, Laura 113-115 122 Marion, François 68 69 71 Maritain, Jacques 43 Marôthy, Kâroly 300 Marras, Michael 66 Masaryk, Jan 271 272 275 Matthijssen, J. W. 123 Mauco, Georges 58 62 63 71 Mauthausen 173 175 177 180-182 Meiss, Léon 55 Meluç, Jân 269 Menthon 67 Merker, Paul 20 Mester, Miklôs 309 Meyer, Julius 19 Micheli, Gino 175 Mikhoels, Solomon 193 Mikotajczyk, Stanislaw 209 Milan 150 164 Millu, Lina 182 Milosz, Czeslaw 217

318

Milotay, Istvân 297 301-304 Minco, Marga 7 Misul, Frida 182 Modigliani, Giuseppe Emanuele 157 Mogilev 231 233 239 Mohàcs 298 Moldavia 190 197 Moldova 232-234 240 243-245 252 Molotov, Polina Zhemchuzhina 200 Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich 192 Monnet, Jean 42 Montagnana, Togliatti Rita 157 Moscow 20 189 190 192 195 199 200-202 204 209 300 302 303 Mozyr 200 Mussolini, Benito 7 148 302 Nathan, Giuseppe 160 161 Németh, Lâszlô 293 Netherlands 2 3 8 11 13-17 74 108 109 111-113 117 119 121-127 129133 136-146 New York 34 43 76 114 Nissim, Luciana 182 183 Norway 4 14 15 Novéky 264 Novgorod-Rodynsk 197 Nowy Targ 226 Odessa 199 200 Oläh, György 299 Oppenheim, Jôzef 225 226 Oradea 254 Oran 41 Orfinger, Régine 85 100 Ossowski, Stanislaw 212 223-225 Ottani, Giancarlo 181 Otwinowski, Stefan 212 218-220 Pajetta, Giuliano 181 Palestine 6 20 24 58 70 101 142 143 145 146 156 159 162 199 241 243 255 301 Pândi, Antal 302 Paris 8 10 12 26 39 46 48-51 53 54 59 69 71 126 247 289 Parodi, Alexandre 63

INDEX OF NAMES AND PLACES

Parri, Ferruccio 160 Päträscanu, Lucretiu 245-247 Pauwels, Minister 78 85 Paxton, Robert 66 Pereira, Dr. 117 Pétain, Philippe 31 41 Piedmonte 181 Pijadet, Mosha (Moses) 300 Pilate, Pontius 12 Pinsk 196 Pinsky, Gertrude D. 122 Pius XII 306 Pleven, René 31 Poland 2 3 5 8 14 15 18 59 72 114 116 139 196 206 209-211 214-218 221 223-226 231 238-240 244 249 290 293 Polianskii, Ivan 190 192 193 200 204 Poltava 199 Ponomarenko, Panteleymon 194 Portugal 58 Prague 20 122 258 259 262 267 274 Prato, David 162 Presser, Jacob 120 132 133 Przygôrski, Zbigniew 214 Puglia 150 Rädäufi 244 Rajk, Lâszlô 20 Rajniss, Ferenc 303 Rava, Enzo 181 Ravasz, Lâszlô 306 Ravensbrück 21 173 Ravera, Camilla 183 Regat 232 233 236 237 244 Reynders, Dorn Bruno 92 Riom 58 Roet, S. 114 Romania 2 4 14 101 196 231-244 246 248-256 277 290 309 Rome 150 151 157 160 161 165 295 Rommel, Erwin 302 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 41 306 Roth, Siegfried 114 281 Rotterdam 132 Rousso, Henry 110

Rudnicki, A dolf 214 Sachsenhausen 21 Sadovskii, lurii 201 Salo 7 Salomon, M. 254 Sannes, H. W. J. 123 Sartre, Jean-Paul 37 50 Säveni 244 Schermerhom, W. 144 Schwartz, Isaïe 55 Schwartz, Joseph J. 279 289 Sereni, Emilio 157 Serényi, Miklôs 294 Shepetovka 204 Shlifer, Solomon 200 201 Siberia 297 301 Siegrist, Ettore 181 Simferopol 200 Siret 244 Siroky, Viliam 270 271 272 Slansky, Rudolph 20 Slovakia 14 257-260 262-265 267 269 270-275 Smolar, Aleksander 217 Sneh, Moshe 255 Sombor-Schweinitzer, Jôzsef 299 Soviet Union 4 14 18 186-189 196 204 205 209 224 234 236-238 240 241 246 247 249 301 303 Spain 58 Srobâr, Vavro 273 Stalin, Josef 297 Stalingrad 231 234 295 298 302 310 Steinberg, Maxime 9 17 Suceava 239 Suhard, Emmanuel Célestin 55 Sündermann, Helmut 296 Sweden 306 &wida-Ziemba, Hanna 212 222 Switzerland 140 144 145 159 Szalasi, Ferenc 296 297 299 Szczepanski, Jan 225 226 Szitnyai, Zoltân 304 Sztôjay, Dôme 305 Tabet, Andrea 160

319

INDEX OF NAMES AND PLACES

Tajikistan 189 Tambov 195 Târgu-Neamt 244 Tatra 225 Tedeschi, Giuliana 182 184 Tel Aviv 164 252 Ternopol 199 Terracini, Umberto 157 Theresienstadt 130 Thessaloniki 3 Theunis, George 76 Timis-Torontal 241 Timisoara 254 Tiraspol 233 Tissier, Pierre 29-31 36 63 71 Tito [Broz, Joseph] 300 Tixier, Adrien 59-61 63 71 Topolöany 263-275 Toulouse 10 11 52 126 Transnistria 231-236 238-240 244246 248 249 252 255 Transylvania 236 237 239-241 248 255 Treves, Paolo 157 Trieste 150 151 Tröbitz 113 Turin 150 Tych, Feliks 218 Üjvidék (Novi Sad) 295 Ukraine 4 189 191 203 298 300 Ungheni-Iasi 237 United States 3 6 21 23 24 30 31 36 58 69 80 143 159 237 251-253 269 Ursiny, Jân 272 Uzbekistan 189 Vajna, Gébor 299 300 302 Valech, Albina 182 183 Valenzano, Gino 180 Valle d ’Aosta 184 Van Amerongen, Jaap 144-146 Van Crefeld, prof. 115 116

320

Van den Branden de Reeth 85 86 89 97 Van Zeeland, Paul 82 Varga 301 Vas, Zoltân 287 Vasari, Bruno 180 Vatican 150 Vatra, Domei 231 250 Veil, Simone 124 Verwey-Jonker, Hilda 114 115 Vichy 30-32 34-37 42 43 58 59 6369 71 Vienna 249 Viktorin, Lt. Colonel 269 Vilnius 200 Vilt 113 Vinogradov, General 236 Viteles, Harry 119-122 Volksherstel 117 119 Voroshilov, Kliment 200 Vreedenburg 117 Walachia 233 252 Warsaw 213 214 219 Washington 36 Weill-Curiel, André 29 52 Westeibork 134 Wielek, Heinz 2 5 Wiercinski, Edmund 218 Wieviorka, Annette 17 184 185 Wilson, Woodrow 5 Wise, Stephen 34 Wyka, Kazimierz 212 215-218 Yugoslavia 4 14 249 Zakopane 225 Zeitinger, Jenö 287 288 Zhitomir 195 198 200 Zielenziger, W. 122 Zolli, Israel 161 Zoltân 287 Zuckermann, Leo 20