The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt in Palestine: Secret Meetings and Negotiations 9780755647637, 9780755647668, 9780755647644

Table of contents :
Cover
Halftitle page
Series page
Title page
Copyright page
Contents
Introduction
1 The Zionist Intelligence Service: The Beginnings of Espionage on Arabs
I Zionist Intelligence Institutions
II The Joint Bureau of Jewish Institutions in Palestine
2 Negotiations between the Jewish Agency and the National Bloc in Syria
I JA Intelligence Activity in Syria Increases
II The Syrian National Bloc Turns to the Jewish Agency for Help
III Contacts between the National Bloc and the Jewish Agency Begin
IV Eliyahu Epstein Meets Fakhri al-Baroudi in Douma
V The First Official Meeting between the National Bloc and the Jewish Agency
VI The Second Official Meeting between the National Bloc and the Jewish Agency
3 The Zionist Disinformation Campaign in Syria and Lebanon during the Arab Revolt
I Laying the Ground in the Early 1930s
II Al-Sharq News Agency
III The Syrian and Lebanese Press During the Arab Revolt
IV Eliyahu Sasson Sets to Work
V Tactical Differences between Shertok and Sasson
VI Sasson Proposes a Work Schedule to Shertok
VII Branching Out into New Areas
VIII Efforts to influence the Conference of Arab Parliamentarians in Cairo
IX The End of the Project
4 From Negotiation to Penetration Relations between the Jewish Agency, the National Bloc, and the Shahbandari Opposition
I. Sustained Contact between the Jewish Agency and Syria’s National Bloc Leaders
II Eliyahu Epstein and David Hoz Meet with Jamil Mardam
III. Eliyahu Sasson and Reuven Zaslansky meet Lutfi al-Haffar
IV Recruitment of Nasib al-Bakri
V The Beginning of Nasib al-Bakri’s Collaborating with the Jewish Agency
VI. Nasib al-Bakri’s Conditional Recruitment
VII Nasib al-Bakri’s Comprehensive Report on the Palestinian Revolutionaries
VIII Eliyahu Sasson Spends March in Damascus to Follow the Work of Nasib al-Bakri
IX The Attempted Recruitment of Muhammad al-Ashmar
X The Jewish Agency’s Relationship with the Shahbandari Opposition
XI ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar’s Negotiations with Chaim Weizmann
XII The Meeting of Nazih al-Mu’ayyad and Eliyahu Sasson
XIII The Meeting of Muhammad al-Ashmar with Abba Hushi
XIV The Meeting between Eliyahu Sasson and Nasuh Babil
XV. The Search for Agents while Nasib al-Bakri Continues to Spy
XVI Nasib al-Bakri’s Status Rises
XVII Jamil Mardam Reassures Sasson: No Support for the Revolt in Palestine
XVIII Al-Bakri Active on the Popular and Political Level to Stop Syrian Support for the Arab Revolt
IXX. Attempts to Block the Parliamentary Conference in Cairo
XX The Roundtable Conference
XXI Jamil Mardam Resigns and Nasib al-Bakri Becomes Minister under Lutfi al-Haffar
XXII The Lutfi al-Haffar Government ‘Purges’ the Interior Ministry of Supporters of the Arab Revolt
XXIII Nasib al-Bakri Seeks to Head the Government with Jewish Agency Support
XXIV Eliyahu Sasson Proposes Working Against the Treaty in Paris
XXV Eliyahu Sasson Meets Jamil Mardam
XXVI Eliyahu Sasson’s Proposals to David Ben-Gurion
XXVII The Plan to Assassinate Shukri al-Quwatli
5 Relations between the JA and Druze Leaders in Syria
I The Jabal al-Druze Revolt and the Rise of Sultan al-Atrash
II Zionist Interest in the Druze
III Early Harbingers
IV The Beginning of Yusuf al-‘Aysami’s Contact with the Zionist Movement
V Relations after Sultan al-Atrash’s Return to Syria
VI Abba Hushi’s First Visit to Jabal al-Druze
VII The Internal Zionist Debate Over the Relationship with the Druze
VIII The Significance of Yusuf al-‘Aysami’s Collaboration with the Zionist Movement
IX Attempts to Influence Asaad Kanj and the Position of Sultan al-Atrash
X. Eliyahu Sasson Meets Sheikh al-‘Aql Husayn Hamada
XI. Abba Hushi and Sultan al-Atrash Meet in Jabal al-Druze
XII Preparations for the Transfer of Palestine’sDruze to Syria
XIII. The Quest to Implement the Transfer Plan to Jabal al-Druze
XIV. The Second Meeting between Sultanal-Atrash and Abba Hushi and Dov Hoz
XV Chaim Weizmann and the Transfer Project
XVI Abba Hushi’s Memorandum on the Druze Transfer
XVII Failure of the Zionist Project to Transfer the Druze of Palestine to Jabal al-Druze
XVIII The Jabal al-Druze Delegation to Palestine
XIX The Meeting with Asaad Kanj
XX The meeting with Zayd al-Atrash
XXI The Meeting with Hamza Darwish
XXII Penetration
Conclusion
Appendix
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt in Palestine

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SOAS Palestine Studies This book series aims at promoting innovative research in the study of Palestine, Palestinians and the Israel-Palestine conflict as a crucial component of Middle Eastern and world politics. The first ever Western academic series entirely dedicated to this topic, SOAS Palestine Studies draws from a variety of disciplinary fields, including history, politics, media, visual arts, social anthropology, and development studies. The series is published under the academic direction of the Centre for Palestine Studies (CPS) at the London Middle East Institute (LMEI) of SOAS, University of London.

Series Editor: Dina Matar, PhD, Chair, Centre for Palestine Studies, and Reader in Political Communication, Centre for Global Media and Communications, SOAS Adam Hanieh, PhD, Reader in Development Studies and Advisory Committee Member for Centre for Palestine Studies, SOAS

Board Advisor: Hassan Hakimian, Director of the London Middle East Institute at SOAS

Current and Forthcoming Titles: Palestine Ltd: Neoliberalism and Nationalism in the Occupied Territory, Toufic Haddad Palestinian Literature in Exile: Gender, Aesthetics and Resistance in the Short Story, Joseph R. Farag Palestinian Citizens of Israel: Power, Resistance and the Struggle for Space, Sharri Plonski Representing Palestine Media and Journalism in Australia Since World War I, Peter Manning Folktales of Palestine: Cultural Identity, Memory and the Politics of Storytelling, Farah Aboubakr Dialogue in Palestine: The People-to-People Diplomacy Programme and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Nadia Naser-Najjab Palestinian Youth Activism in the Internet Age: Social Media and Networks after the Arab Spring, Albana Dwonch Palestinian National Movement in Lebanon: A Political History of the ‘Ayn al-Hilwe Camp, Erling Sogge Occupying Habits: Everyday Media as Warfare in Israel-Palestine, Daniel Mann The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt: Secret Meetings and Negotiations, Mahmoud Muhareb Palestine in the World: International Solidarity with the Palestinian Liberation Movement, Sorcha Thomson and Pelle Valentin Olsen

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The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt in Palestine Secret Meetings and Negotiations Mahmoud Muhareb

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I.B. TAURIS Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA 29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland BLOOMSBURY, I.B. TAURIS and the I.B. Tauris logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2023 Published in Beirut by Josour, in 2021, as The Secret Relations Between the Jewish Agency and Syrian Leaders, During the Arab Revolt. Translated by Raphael Cohen. Copyright © Mahmoud Muhareb, 2023 Mahmoud Muhareb has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. Cover image: Damascus, Syria, 1920. G. Eric and Edith Matson Photograph Collection, Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN:

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Contents Introduction 1

2

3

4

5

The Zionist Intelligence Service: The Beginnings of Espionage on Arabs

1

7

Negotiations between the Jewish Agency and the National Bloc in Syria

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The Zionist Disinformation Campaign in Syria and Lebanon during the Arab Revolt

39

From Negotiation to Penetration Relations between the Jewish Agency, the National Bloc, and the Shahbandari Opposition

57

Relations between the Jewish Agency and Druze Leaders in Syria

107

Conclusion

159

Appendix Notes Bibliography Index

163 173 197 201

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Introduction

This book examines the clandestine relations formed between the Jewish Agency and Syria’s political and media elites, before the establishment of Israel, primarily during the Arab Revolt 1936–1939. It reveals another history of relations during this critical period, contradicting Syrian and Israeli narratives. It examines the depth of Zionist infiltration in Syria and the Jewish Agency’s (JA) quest to create common interests with Syrian leaders, working against Syrian and Arab national interests and the national rights of the Palestinian people. Throughout the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, many secret contacts, meetings, and negotiations took place between the JA and Arab countries neighbouring Palestine, reaching their peak during the Arab Revolt. Israeli and other foreign studies have previously examined the JA’s relations with Jordanian, Lebanese, and Egyptian leaders and elites during this period but, until now, the extent of relations established with Syrian leaders has not been adequately explored. Contrary to the prevalent narrative claiming there was no contact between the JA and Syria, this book reveals a multitude of contacts and meetings initiated by the JA, mainly with the Syrian National Bloc, the Shahbandari opposition and leaders of Jabal al-Druze. In both academic and historical terms, the ramifications of these relationships on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and on the course and outcomes of the 1936–1939 Arab Revolt and the 1948 war, have not been given the attention they deserve. The complexity and diversity of relations established by the JA’s political department with Syrian elites in that period have thus been ignored from both the Arab and Israeli perspective, which means this book often covers unexplored territory. Existing studies that have addressed these ties have at most devoted passages, or chapters, to relations between the JA, the National Bloc and the Druze community, but none have researched the subject in its own right, setting it in its historical context in the Arab-Israeli conflict, nor have they analyzed the Jewish Agency’s real motives behind these contacts. The book disproves the Israeli narrative claiming the JA’s goal behind approaching Arab leaders was to achieve peace between the JA and the Arab 1

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The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt

states. In fact, it proves their goal was the exact opposite. Documentation of discussions, reports, and decisions taken by the leadership of the JA at the time, shows that the main historic objective of the JA was to reach agreements with Arab leaders and Arab states, behind the back of the Palestinians and at their expense, and to normalize its relations with the Arab states while it continued to deny the national rights of the Palestinians. Thus, it reveals that this objective was deeply rooted in Zionist political thought and practice. The book discloses as well that all the emissaries of the JA who met Syrian leaders and elites in the 1930s, and who claimed in these meetings that Zionism brought blessings and benefits for the Palestinians, were also at that time members of two secret Transfer Committees of the JA, to transfer the Palestinians from Palestine to Syria and Iraq and other Arab states. This book substantiates in detail not only the Palestinian narrative, but also some Israeli new historian narratives, particularly Avi Shlaim and Illan Pappe, who exposed Israel’s strategy and policies towards the Palestinians and its efforts to settle the Palestinian question and the Arab-Israeli conflict, between itself and the Arab states, behind the back of the Palestinians and at their expense. The book shows that the JA’s objective was primarily to attack and weaken the Palestinian national movement and isolate it from its Arab lifeblood; deny the national rights of the Palestinian people; obtain the approval of Arab states for the Zionist aim to establish a national homeland, and a Jewish state in Palestine; keep the Arab countries weak and fragmented; block the establishment of a united Arab front against the Zionist movement; weaken joint Arab action and the Arab national movement and nurture disputes and conflicts in Arab societies along sectarian, ethnic, tribal, and regional lines. In the mid-1930s, the Jewish Agency had started to recognize the critical role played by Syria in the struggle of the Palestinian national movement. They knew that since the beginning of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, Syria had become one of its key centers and major support bases, prompting the Jewish Agency to pay close attention to Syria. Syria thus became the highest priority for the JA Political Department’s intelligence service, at a time of deadlock in Franco-Syrian relations following the refusal of the French parliament and government to ratify the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936. By approaching Syrian leaders the Jewish Agency aspired for the following: ●

●

stop the diverse and critical support provided by the Syrian people and its national forces to the Arab Revolt; create a rift between the Syrian leadership and elites (the National Bloc, the Shahbandari opposition, and the leaders of Jabal al-Druze) and the Palestinian national movement;

Introduction ●

●

●

●

3

obtain the support of these leaders for the establishment of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine; create common interests between the Jewish Agency and these Syrian leaders and elites; deny and marginalize these rights and brand the national movement of the Palestinian people as extremism and terrorism; and resolve the Palestinian issue in the framework of a comprehensive JewishArab agreement between the Jewish Agency and Syrian leaders, who claimed to represent the Arab national movement, behind the back of the palestinians.

This book is based on primary sources which include reports written by leaders from the JA Political Department’s Arab Division; the minutes of official and unofficial meetings between the two sides taken by JA delegates who attended the meetings; reports by Syrian agents recruited by the JA, most of which were handwritten in Arabic and some on letterheaded paper showing the writer’s name and address. These reports are preserved in Israeli archives, mainly the Central Zionist Archive and the Haganah Archive, which were top secret at the time and inaccessible to researchers for decades. They provide us with a unique opportunity to enter the mindset of the JA leadership at the time, giving us insight into the JA’s political department objectives and methods, and the internal discussions among its leaders on the most effective way to achieve Zionist goals, and how far they would go to achieve them. Also consulted were the memoirs and papers written by leaders of the Zionist movement, principally David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Shertok (Sharett) and Chaim Weizmann, as well as memoirs and biographies by leaders of the JA Political Department Arab Division and of Syrian leaders at that period, especially those in contact with the Jewish Agency. Other literature and relevant references in Arabic, Hebrew and English dealing with the period were also consulted. Unlike Zionist leaders, who made explicit reference to their relationship with Arab leaders in memoirs and autobiographies, Syrian leaders in talks with the JA kept these meetings undisclosed. At the time, relations with Zionists were at the very least denied, and those who engaged in them were described as being outside the national fold or deemed collaborators. This might explain, but not justify at all, why documents related to the secret relations between the Arab states and the JA in the archives of the Arab states, are still inaccessible to researchers until today. It is important to note that although dealings with the Jewish Agency were condemned by Syrians, not everyone involved collaborated or wanted to

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The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt

collaborate with the JA. The book makes it clear that many of those who held secret meetings with the JA were and remained patriots, advocated the Syrian national position in the few meetings they held with the JA and were among those who resisted most fiercely, as evidenced in the book. These include Shukri al-Quwatli, whom the JA planned to assassinate in 1941 and Fakhri al-Baroudi, who participated in initial contacts and negotiations, but was soon active against them. It is also made clear in this book that al-Quwatli, al-Baroudi, and Syrian national leaders who did not meet the JA, such as brothers Nabih and ‘Adil al‘Azma, Munir al-Rayyes, and others, prioritized the Arab Revolt in Palestine and supported it wholeheartedly. The JA did, however, manage to penetrate the Syrian national movement and attract a number of important Syrian leaders of the period, who collaborated with it and which this book examines carefully. Yet this book examines, as well, with meticulous accuracy, and exposes the relations that JA created with many Syrian leaders who were not officially collaborators with JA, but were ready to reach agreements with it behind the back of the Palestinians and at their expense. Divided in five chapters, the book’s first chapter deals with the beginnings of Zionist intelligence work against Arabs. It follows the institutional development of Zionist intelligence in Palestine and its activity against the Arabs, from its foundation in late 1918 until the mid-1930s. It also reveals the Zionist organization’s early pursuit of political relations with King Faisal’s government in Damascus in 1919 and 1920. Chapter 2 follows the beginning of contacts between the Syrian National Bloc and the Jewish Agency and discusses in detail the two official meetings held between the JA and the Syrian National Bloc. Chapter 3 deals with the efforts exerted by the JA to influence public opinion and the elites in Syria and Lebanon and the entire Arab region during the 1936– 1939 Arab Revolt, primarily by planting Zionist articles in Syrian and Lebanese newspapers and by acquiring some of these countries’ newspapers. It explores how the JA’s political department approached and worked with Arab owners and editors of various Syrian and Lebanese newspapers. A review of Zionist articles planted in Arab national newspapers show that the JA was not simply concerned with putting forward a Zionist viewpoint, but distorted facts and planted fake news. Chapter 4 deals with relationships formed with members of the National Bloc and the Shahbandari opposition, including Syrian leaders Jamil Mardam, Lutfi al-Haffar and Nasib al-Bakri from the National Bloc and ‘Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar, Muhammad al-Ashmar and Nasuh Babil from the Shahbandari

Introduction

5

opposition. It also details the opposition’s attempt to use the Jewish Agency against the Syrian National Bloc to gain power. It then describes, in detail, the JA’s penetration of one of the most prominent leaders of the National Bloc, Nasib al-Bakri, and the JA’s role in his bid to become Syrian prime minister in the Spring of 1939. Chapter 5 explores contacts made by the JA with Druze leaders in Syria in an attempt to neutralize them and stop them from joining the Arab Revolt in Palestine. The chapter discusses the question of alliance between the Zionist movement and the Jabal al-Druze in Syria and details the Zionist project to transfer the Druze of Palestine to Jabal al-Druze in Syria. It reviews the contact made by the Jewish Agency with Sultan al-Atrash during his residence in Transjordan including details on two meetings held by the Jewish Agency with al-Atrash during the Arab revolt. The chapter also looks into Yusuf al-‘Aysami’s relations with the JA, with whom he worked for many years, as well as the JA’s contacts with other Jabal al-Druze leaders, such as Asaad Kanj and Zayd and ‘Ali al-Atrash.

6

1

The Zionist Intelligence Service: The Beginnings of Espionage on Arabs

Two key factors led Zionist leaders to gather and analyze information about the Palestinian people and spy on them. The first was the ongoing Zionist quest to seize as much Arab land as possible, especially from landlords who lived outside Palestine, to build Jewish settlements. To this end, the Zionist leadership established institutions that gathered information on the nature of land ownership in Palestine and their owners. They were interested in their background, whether they were foreigners from outside Palestine or Palestinian Arabs, Palestinian Jews or foreign missions and consulates in Palestine and dug up information on the owners’ economic status, social relations and the means of pushing them into debt to facilitate blackmail. The second, most dangerous, factor in the eyes of Zionists was the growing Arab-Palestinian resistance to the Zionist project, which aimed to turn Palestine into a national home for the Jewish people and expel Palestinians. Espionage on Palestinians and Arabs was closely interlinked with the Palestinian national liberation movement and the pace of its struggle. The more the Palestinian national struggle escalated, the greater the Zionist intelligence interest in the Arabs. In the aftermath of the 1920 and 1921 uprisings and the Buraq Revolt of 1929, which took Zionist leaders by surprise, Zionist espionage activity intensified. It increased with the Palestinian popular upheaval in the first half of the 1930s, which was accompanied by demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins, the formation of youth organizations and secret societies, and the emergence of Palestinian political parties, and reached unprecedented levels during the Great Arab Revolt. In parallel with the conflict taking place between Palestinians and Zionists and their British backers another conflict was simmering in the background over Arab public opinion. Both the Palestinian national movement and the Zionist movement struggled to win the attention of the Arab ruling elites of neighboring countries who shared rule of their countries with French or British 7

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The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt

colonial powers. Palestine’s national struggle drew sympathy from its Arab neighbours, attracting hundreds of young Arabs from across the region who were inspired by national and pan-Arab struggles. The Palestinian cause had become a sore point for Arab elites prompting the Jewish Agency (JA) to try to get Arab public opinion on their side, win over the elites and gain their support against the Palestinian Arab national movement. By 1921, with the establishment of the Emirate of Transjordan, Zionist leaders had already taken an interest in establishing relations with Emir Abdullah. During the Great Arab Revolt (1936–1939), the Arab Bureau, the intelligence wing of the JA, worked on solidifying relations with the Emir of Transjordan.1 In the same period, the JA turned its attention to Syria and Lebanon, which had by then become centres for Palestinian revolutionaries and important support centres for the revolt. Intelligence interest in these countries reached an all-time high after Haj Amin al-Husayni left Palestine following British attempts to arrest him, and his asylum in Beirut in 1937. In the 1930s they turned to Iraq. Being the first Arab state to gain independence, Iraq held considerable weight, and played an important role in the Arab East. Interest in Iraq further grew after Haj Amin al-Husayni moved there at the beginning of the Second World War. In the 1940s, Egypt captured their attention in the run up to the establishment of the League of Arab States, and following its emerging power as leader of Arab action in the region. Developments in Egypt remained the prime focus of Zionist intelligence activity, which only increased with the arrival of Haj Amin alHusayni to Cairo from Paris in 1946.

I Zionist Intelligence Institutions The founding of the first Zionist institution devoted to intelligence and espionage on the Arabs dates back to late 1918. Before the end of World War I, in April 1918, when Britain, author of the Balfour Declaration, occupied half of Palestine, the Zionist Commission, chaired by Chaim Weizmann arrived in Palestine. Weizmann was the rising star of the Zionist movement and became Chairman of the Executive Committee of the World Zionist Organization in 1921.2 The Zionist Commission’s task, which Weizmann had created in cooperation with the British government from his headquarters in Britain, was to lead the community of colonial Jewish settlers in Palestine, to represent them before the British authorities, and to work to implement the Balfour Declaration.3

The Zionist Intelligence Service

9

Weizmann attached the highest importance to intelligence work and espionage on the Arabs and made great efforts in the aftermath of World War I to establish a Zionist intelligence agency in Palestine.4 After numerous consultations between Weizmann and members of the Zionist Commission in Jerusalem, including Ze’ev Jabotinsky (who later founded and led the revisionist movement in Zionism), the Zionist Commission decided, at the end of 1918, to establish the ‘Information Bureau’ (Misrad Ha-Yedi‘ot) as an affiliated body.5 It defined the chief tasks of this bureau as studying the situation of the Palestinian Arab people by gathering information and espionage. The bureau’s ultimate political objective was to collect information and place it at the disposal of the Zionist Commission in Jerusalem and the Zionist leadership, so that they could refute any ‘allegations’ originating from British anti-Zionist leaders or figures in the British administration regarding the intensity of Arab resistance to the Balfour Declaration, risking a change in British policy on the declaration.6 At the time, Jewish immigrants in Palestine had little experience in spying and information gathering. The limited experience they had was confined to the Jewish spy network in Palestine, NILI, which had worked for British intelligence against Turkey7 in the last two years of World War I, and to the paramilitary organization Hashomer (The Guard), which was set up in 1909 to guard Zionist settlements.8 The Zionist Commission in Jerusalem appointed Levi Isaac Schneerson, one of the most prominent former activists in the NILI spy ring, to set up and head the Information Bureau.9 Upon his appointment, Schneerson recruited informants with experience in clandestine work, many of whom were from the NILI network.10 He also opened the HQ for the Information Office in Jaffa where it operated for a short period until the beginning of 1920, when it was moved to Jerusalem.11 The Information Bureau deployed staff and informants in many parts of Palestine, and began monitoring Palestinians. They gathered information about their property and land, the main developments and changes in their rank. They were primarily interested in the Palestinian National Movement, which began to organize in the aftermath of World War I, prompting the Bureau to monitor Islamic-Christian associations, national conferences, political events and Arab political and cultural clubs. In its investigation into the Palestinian leadership, the Information Bureau prepared individual ‘cards’ containing relevant information on senior Palestinian personalities and leaders, prominent field activists, and group cards for major Palestinian families throughout Palestine.12

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The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt

Many studies on different areas in Palestine were undertaken, investigating their inhabitants and what they owned. There was also an interest in the Arab tribes in the Negev, in the context of an ambitious programme to survey all Palestine, only part of which was completed.13 The Information Bureau paid particular attention to major landowners, whether they were Palestinian Arabs or Arabs from outside Palestine, digging their weak spots in order to blackmail them. In its first year of operation (1919), the Information Bureau had a budget of £1,528, appropriated from a fund organized by Weizmann rather than the budget allocated to the Zionist Commission that set up and supervised the Bureau.14 Since its inception, the Information Bureau provided intelligence services to the British occupation authorities and its various agencies. It translated the news and reports it received concerning Palestinian arms caches or Palestinians wanted by the British occupation authorities and the like into English and submitted them to the Criminal Investigations Department (CID).15 Shortly after its establishment, and with the escalation in the Palestinian national struggle, the Information Bureau began submitting a weekly report to the Office of the British High Commissioner in Palestine and to the Zionist Administration in London, which passed it on to the British Ministry of War.16

1 Chaim Weizmann In late February 1920, demonstrations took place in Jerusalem and other Palestinian cities in protest against British pro-Zionist policy and against Zionist activity seeking to turn Palestine into a national home for Jews. On 1 March 1920, Palestinian gunmen attacked the settlements of Tel Hai and Kfar Giladi, in northern Palestine. Palestinian fighters occupied the two settlements and killed seven Zionist settlers, including Joseph Trumpeldor, a prominent Zionist leader.17 A week later, Arab-Palestinian demonstrations erupted again after the Syrian Congress’s declaration of the independence of Syria within its natural borders – Syria, Palestine, Lebanon and Transjordan – and the investiture of Prince Faisal bin Hussein as king. On 1 April 1920, marches from neighbouring Palestinian towns and villages headed to Jerusalem to participate in the celebrations to mark the occasion. The celebration soon turned into demonstrations and clashes with Jewish settlers, which led to many deaths and hundreds of injuries. In mid-March 1920, in an atmosphere fraught with tension, Weizmann visited Palestine, having met with the British leadership in Cairo on his way there. Resistance to Zionism and pro-Zionist British policy and prevalent Arab sympathy for the Palestinian struggle against Zionism, worried Weizmann,

The Zionist Intelligence Service

11

raising concerns about whether Britain would abide by the Balfour Declaration, which stipulated the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. In response, he sought to buy and even fake ‘petitions’ signed by Palestinians to convince the British that the Zionist project could be implemented without harming them and with their consent.18 Like most Zionist leaders of his time, Weizmann denied the existence of a Palestinian Arab people or of an Arab people in Palestine. He understood that the recognition of the existence of an Arab Palestinian people necessitated an acknowledgment of their national rights, including the right of self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, facts which would undermine the entire Zionist project. Weizmann thus rejected the existence of a Palestinian national movement while, at the same time, he sought to establish an alternative to the Palestinian national movement leadership, and actively tried to fuel divisions between Palestinian Muslims and Christians, between the inhabitants of cities, villages and bedouins and between families, clans and communities. Weizmann pressed the Information Bureau for reports and intelligence that would help achieve the Zionist movement’s political goals. During his visit to Palestine, which was in revolt against Britain and Zionism, Weizmann toured Palestine in the company of two bodyguards, one of whom was Schneerson, Head of the Information Bureau.19 Weizmann instructed Schneerson to wage political warfare among the Palestinian Arabs. He ordered the Information Bureau to pursue six objectives:20 ● ● ●

●

●

stirring up strife between Arab Christians and Muslims; buying anti-Zionist Arab newspapers and persuading them to support Zionism; buy off ‘notables’ in the Nablus area, to work against the Palestinian national movement active in the city of Nablus, and coopting them, by bribes, forgery, or both, to collect ‘petitions’ calling for a British Mandate on Palestine and also demanding Jewish immigration to Palestine and the establishment of a club as a base for those who supported collaboration with Zionism; working to form an alliance with tribal sheikhs in Transjordan, so as to undermine their relationship with Syria, counteract their support for the Palestinian national movement and get them to produce ‘petitions’ in support of Zionism, Jewish immigration and a British Mandate; seeking to establish relations with Bedouin sheikhs in the Negev in an attempt to disrupt the relationships developing between them and the leaders of the Palestinian national movement; and

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The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt

establishing joint clubs for Jews and Arabs to spread Zionist ideas and propaganda and to incite against the Palestinian national movement and its leadership.

Carrying out Weizmann’s requests, the Information Bureau arranged a meeting between him and a ‘notable’ from Nablus, which at the time was playing a leading role in the Palestinian national struggle. Weizmann gave him £1,000 to organize and pay for ‘petitions’ supportive of Zionism, Jewish immigration and the British mandate over Palestine.21 The Information Bureau also invited several sheikhs in Transjordan to meet Weizmann in Jericho and forge an alliance with Zionism; ten leading sheikhs responded positively.22 However, the outbreak of Palestinian demonstrations and clashes between Palestinians and Zionists meant Weizmann never made it to Jericho.23 The Information Bureau organized another meeting for Weizmann on 6 April at the Rehovot settlement with a number of sheikhs from the Negev. Again, Weizmann was unable to attend the meeting, this time because of clashes in Jerusalem.24 Expenses for the two meetings he failed to attend came to £260, which were disbursed by the Information Bureau in the form of bribes, petty cash, and travel expenses.25 The Information Bureau expended other large sums to foment discord among Arab Muslims and Christians in Jerusalem and elsewhere in Palestine,26 as well as £125 to acquire an Arabic newspaper in Jaffa, whose editor was replaced and the paper turned into a Zionist mouthpiece.27

2 Chaim Weizmann’s Man with King Faisal in Damascus In the aftermath of the First World War, Weizmann realized that Damascus had become an important centre for Arab nationalism and the activities of the Palestinian national movement, both before and after the declaration of Syrian independence. In September 1919, he dispatched Dr Shlomo Pelman to Damascus, assigning him two tasks: the first (public) mission was to serve as an unofficial representative of the World Zionist Organization to King Faisal in Damascus.28 The second (clandestine) mission was to spy on events in Damascus and on Syrian for Weizmann and the Zionist Commission’s Information Bureau in Jerusalem.29 Upon his arrival in Damascus, Pelman set to work on both missions and continued to do so until the fall of the Faisal government and the occupation of Damascus by the French army in July 1920. During his time in Damascus, Pelman regularly collected and sent information to Weizmann and the Zionist

The Zionist Intelligence Service

13

Commission in Jerusalem on a wide range of issues, most notably relations between General Allenby and Lawrence on the one hand, and King Faisal on the other; Faisal’s letters to Damascus from Paris during his stay there to attend the peace conference; Syrian-French and Syrian-British relations; the activities of Syrian and Palestinian political parties and associations and relations between them; the activities of secret societies; recruitment to the Syrian army; and monitoring of the Syrian press. Pelman noted growing criticism of King Faisal for his conciliatory stance on Zionism. In one of his reports, he suggested that Weizmann buy Syrian newspapers and bribe Syrian newspaper owners, journalists, and activists so as to turn them pro-Zionist.30 In his open mission, as an unofficial representative of Weizmann and the Zionist Organization to King Faisal in Damascus, Pelman nurtured relations between King Faisal and Weizmann by delivering Weizmann’s letters to King Faisal and making contacts. He also held long negotiations with King Faisal on the terms of a loan to be provided by the Zionist Organization to Faisal’s government, which was in the midst of a severe financial crisis. The political price King Faisal would pay in return was his government’s support of Zionist ambitions in Palestine in terms of immigration, settlement, and the creation of a Jewish national home.31 While Pelman was spying in Damascus, Jewish journalist Jacques Kalmi was spying for Weizmann in Beirut. Kalmi began working for Weizmann and the Zionist Organization in April 1920 and provided Weizmann with information on the situation in Lebanon and Syria, and on French-Arab relations, while working as a liaison between the Zionist Commission in Jerusalem and the French authorities in Lebanon.32 Weizmann and the Zionist Commission in Jerusalem also made use of some Beiruti Jews as spies, most notably Kalaiv, a journalist who furnished Weizmann and the Zionist Commission in Jerusalem with information about the positions and coverage of the Syrian press regarding the events in Palestine and developments in Syria.33

3 Closure of the Information Bureau The Information Bureau was eventually closed down. A series of factors led the Head of the Zionist Commission, David Eder, to put an end to its operations. These included: ●

political and institutional conflict within the Jewish settler community in Palestine regarding policy towards the Arabs over which Zionist body should take responsibility in dealing with the ‘Arab question’;

14 ●

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The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt

lack of funds, given the new financial burdens on the Zionist Commission following increasing Jewish immigration to Palestine and the cost of absorbing the new settlers; and the San Remo Conference’s approval of the British Mandate for Palestine, the fall of the Faisal government and the withdrawal of Weizmann, who stopped pumping money into the Information Bureau.34

On 20 August 1920, Eder, Head of the Zionist Commission in Jerusalem, announced his decision to close the Information Bureau to its director, Schneerson. He initially refused to accept it, demanding that the Bureau continue to operate until he could meet Weizmann and brief him on the importance of its continued existence. Eder was adamant, telling Schneerson that he had to close the office and hand over all the material accumulated during the two years of its operation to the Zionist Commission in Jerusalem.35

4 The Arab Secretariat In 1922, the Jewish National Council (JNC) in Palestine (Ha-Vaad Ha-Leumi) established its Arab Secretariat (Ha-Mazkirut Ha-Aravit), which was concerned with the Arab question and anything to do with Zionist policy and intelligence work on Arabs. The Arab Secretariat was headed by Chaim Kalvarisky, who worked to recruit Arab support for the Zionist project by offering bribes and loans, but his achievements in this respect were very limited.36 The Arab Secretariat did not last long, primarily because of a shortage of funds and conflict between the two ‘national’ institutions active in the Jewish settler community in Palestine – the JNC and the Zionist Organization in Jerusalem. These two factors, coupled with the establishment of the British Mandate in Palestine in 1922 and the return of relative calm, led to the dissolution of the Arab Secretariat in 1923.37 That same year, the political department of the Zionist Executive (known as the Jewish Agency (JA) for Palestine for the purposes of the Mandate) in Jerusalem set up the Arab Bureau (Ha-Lishkah Ha-Aravit) to handle intelligence work on Arabs. Frederick Kisch headed the JA’s political department in Jerusalem from 1922 to 1931, and his biography perhaps reveals the extent and depth of the Zionist-British engagement and alliance. Prior to this, Frederick Kisch served in the British Army, including as an intelligence officer in the British mission to the peace conference talks of 1919–1921. In 1939, he returned to the British army and rose to the rank of brigadier. Kisch was killed by a landmine in Tunisia in 1943 during the Second World War.38

The Zionist Intelligence Service

15

Kisch, who did not speak either Arabic or Hebrew, appointed Kalvarisky as Director of the Arab Bureau. Kisch and Kalvarisky led Zionist intelligence and espionage efforts against the Arabs until 1931. Born in Poland in 1868, Kalvarisky immigrated to Palestine and settled in 1895. He worked as a manager of the Zionist settlements supported by Baron Rothschild and gained considerable experience not only in the running of settlements, but also in how to seize Arab lands, especially in Galilee, and how to deal with Arabs. Kalvarisky mixed a great deal with Arabs and mastered the Arabic language; for a long period he is described in the annals of Zionism as practically the only Zionist expert on the Arab question. He was a member of the Advisory Council to the Government of Palestine, established by the British authorities in 1920 and 1921. From 1923– 1927 and 1929–1931, he directed the espionage agency of the Arab Bureau. In 1925, Kalvarisky was one of the founders of the left-wing Zionist movement Brit Shalom (Covenant of Peace) and a prominent editor of its newspaper. Being one of the founders of the movement, which advocated the achievement of Zionist goals by reaching an understanding with Arabs (its leaders being sceptical of Zionism’s ability to achieve its goals by force against the will of the Arabs), greatly facilitated his espionage work.39 Following the imposition of the British Mandate on Palestine in 1922, the period 1923–1928 witnessed a lull in the Palestinian national struggle. The work of the Arab Bureau headed, at this stage by Kalvarisky, focused on monitoring and following up on Palestinian national activity and identify trends in the development of the Palestinian national movement. Apart from its activities in Palestine, the Arab Bureau followed the situation in neighbouring Arab countries, although not in a systematic fashion. The Arab Bureau frequently used Zionist journalists working on foreign newspapers to gather information on Arabs. After the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 1925, the Arab Press Office twice sent Gershon Agronsky (Agron), correspondent for the British newspapers The Guardian and Christian Science Monitor, to Syria. During his visits, Agronsky met with Syrian leaders and submitted a detailed report to the Arab Bureau and the Zionist leadership.40

II The Joint Bureau of Jewish Institutions in Palestine There were several reasons why Frederick Kisch decided to dismiss Kalvarisky from his position in January 1928 and disband the Arab Bureau of the Zionist Organization in Jerusalem. Prime among these were the relative calm of the

16

The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt

Palestinian national movement in the mid-1920s; growing criticism from Zionist quarters for Kalvarisky’s style of working; and talk of his wasting money on bribing Arabs without achieving the desired goals at a time when the Zionist movement was in dire need of funds to absorb the waves of Jewish immigration to Palestine.41 Less than a year after Kalvarisky’s dismissal, however, Kisch called on the ‘sole expert’ to return urgently from Paris to Jerusalem to rebuild and head the bureau. Two important events for both the Zionist movement and the Palestinian national struggle took place in 1929. The Zionist Organization wanted to strengthen the role of Jews around the world who were not involved in the activities of the World Zionist Organization, who did not consider themselves Zionists, or rather did not want to appear publicly as Zionists. To this end, and for other reasons, including the representation of Jews before the British Mandate authorities in Palestine, in 1929 the World Zionist Organization established the JA.42 The JA incorporated important Jewish figures from around the world, most notably, French socialist leader Léon Blum, physicist Albert Einstein and American Jewish leader Louis Marshall. In the autumn of 1929, the Buraq (Wailing Wall) Uprising broke out in Palestine, surpassing those of 1920 and 1921 in its inclusive scope and intensity. Zionist leaders were stunned by the outbreak of the uprising and by the number of Jewish casualties. It is against this backdrop that the Zionist leadership in London asked Frederick Kisch, Head of the Organization’s Political Department, to urgently provide information and analysis on the uprising, the Palestinian national movement and its leaders, the role of Haj Amin al-Husayni, and so on. Following the outbreak of the Buraq uprising, it became clear to the two ‘national’ institutions in the Jewish Yishuv43 (the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Council) that their respective separate work and activities around the ‘Arab Question’ was a waste of energy. At a meeting in late November 1929, they decided to unite their efforts and established the ‘Joint Bureau of Jewish Institutions in Palestine’. In order for this agreement to cover all segments of the Jewish settler and immigrant community in Palestine, the JA and the JNC agreed to add representatives from non-Zionist Jewish religious party Agudat Yisrael to the administration of the Joint Bureau for Jewish Institutions in Palestine.44 These two institutions also agreed to deal with all matters relating to Arabs, including policies towards them, and espionage against them through the Joint Bureau, and appointed Frederick Kisch, a representative of the JNC and head of its political department, as head of the Joint Bureau, and Yitzhak BenZvi, a representative of the JNC, who went on to become the second president of

The Zionist Intelligence Service

17

Israel, as his deputy. The two institutions agreed with the Agudat Yisrael party to appoint two of its members to the nine-member advisory council.45 After its establishment and the appointment of Kalvarisky as its director, the Joint Bureau chose a new headquarters in Jerusalem separate from the headquarters of the JA and the JNC so that its operatives could be received without arousing suspicion. The Joint Bureau operated according to its founding remit until January 1931, when the JNC representatives withdrew, after which it was administered and supervised by the JA’s political department.46 When it was formed, the Joint Bureau laid down a broad and ambitious work programme, which included the following objectives:47 ●

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● ●

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obtaining information in a systematic fashion about developments in Arab ranks, in the Arab press and in Arab institutions, parties and groups in Palestine; collecting and organizing statistical information on all issues related to Arab life, while studying the impact of Zionist activity on Arab economic and cultural life; preparation of materials necessary to explain the objectives and methods of the Jews to Arab circles; establishing relations with Arabs who do not oppose Zionist activity in Palestine and assisting them in their organization and activity; dealing with the fellahin and their economic problems; addressing outstanding issues regarding Jewish and Arab views in the municipal councils; developing friendly relations between Jewish settlements and Arab villages; and establishing relations with the Arab press in Palestine and neighbouring Arab countries and supplying them with material.

To achieve these objectives the Joint Bureau established and housed an agency called the ‘Information Service’ (Sherut Yediot, known by its Hebrew acronym Shai).48 Set up by Kalvarisky, Shai was very small and only a handful of people worked with him, most notably Aharon Chaim Cohen, who was responsible for preparing ‘cards’ on Arab figures and activists, and Joseph Hassoun, a Jew born in Palestine, who was responsible for information on the Arab press and assigned to prepare a periodic report on what Arab newspapers were saying on issues relevant to Zionist interests.49 In the preparation of his reports, Hassoun relied on all the Arabic newspapers published in Palestine and on the most important Arab newspapers published in the neighbouring Arab countries, to which the

18

The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt

Joint Bureau subscribed. This periodic report was one of the first internal bulletins to be distributed to a limited number of leading Zionist officials. At the beginning of 1930, Shai began to prepare cards on important and influential Arab figures from Palestine and neighbouring Arab countries. The information on these cards detailed the person’s status, financial status, property, culture, importance, their circles and their role and activity in the public and national spheres. By the end of 1930, these cards covered around 800 Arab individuals from Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Yemen. The files also contained 200 photographs of Arab personalities and leaders.50 In their information-gathering efforts, the Joint Bureau and its adjunct Shai employed David Tidhar, a Jew born in Jaffa in 1897, who served as a British police officer in Jerusalem from 1921 to 1926, before travelling to Egypt to work as a ‘private investigator’. In late 1929, Tidhar began collecting information on political activities related to the Palestinian issue taking place in Egypt and sending reports to the Joint Bureau, including many on the activity of the SyrianPalestinian Committee in Egypt, its most prominent activists and their relations with Egyptian nationalist figures. He also sent information and pictures about the Arabic press in Egypt and information concerning its owners and editors.51 The Joint Bureau and Shai adopted a variety of sources to collect information, some public and some confidential, including: ● ● ● ● ●

●

●

Arab press in Palestine; Arab press published in neighbouring Arab countries; Arab informants, whether in Palestine or in Arab countries; Jews in Palestine who had economic or social relations with Arabs; Jews employed by the mandate state in Palestine, especially in the police and civil service; Jews in neighbouring Arab countries, especially Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Iraq; and eavesdropping on the telephone conversations of leaders of the Palestinian national struggle by means of Jewish employees at the Jerusalem telephone exchange. For example, beginning in early October 1929 and continuing for several years, Shai tapped the telephone of the central headquarters of the Supreme Muslim Council in Jerusalem.52

The effectiveness of the JA political department increased significantly after 1931, when Chaim Arlosoroff became director upon Kisch’s resignation. Arlosoroff, a major Mapai party leader and strategist, expanded the department’s espionage and propaganda activities in the Arab countries. In his efforts to build

The Zionist Intelligence Service

19

a modern intelligence service,53 he actively recruited members of the younger generation. Among his finds was a then-student in the Hebrew University Department of Oriental Studies named Reuven Zaslansky (later Shiloah, destined to become the first director of Mossad),54 whom he dispatched to Baghdad for a year in 1931. He also hired Eliyahu Epstein55 (later Elath, who would have a long diplomatic career), a graduate student at the American University of Beirut (AUB), charging him with spying on Lebanon and Syria and submitting weekly reports on the two countries. Most importantly, Arlosoroff appointed Moshe Shertok (later Sharett) as secretary of the political department. After Arlosoroff was assassinated in Tel Aviv in 1933 when the bitter rivalry between Labor and Revisionist Zionism turned deadly,56 Shertok replaced him. He remained in that position until 1948, when he became foreign minister of the newly formed Jewish state, eventually becoming prime minister (1954–1955). Along with David Ben-Gurion, Shertok formulated and led Zionist policy toward the Arab world throughout the 1930s and 1940s. As Head of the JA’s political department, Shertok continued Arlosoroff ’s policy of recruiting young talent, appointing Eliyahu Epstein head of the department’s Middle and Near East Division.57 In 1933, he employed the Damascus-born Eliyahu Sasson,58 a former journalist fluent in Arabic and wellconnected in Syrian and Lebanese press circles, as part of the department’s intelligence services. It was Sasson, who later become head of the JA Political Department’s Arab Division, who became the principal conduit for articles planted in the Syrian and Lebanese press. In late 1933, Shertok employed Amos Lundmann and Aviva Turovsky, both graduate students at AUB; Turovsky’s choice of the Arab nationalist movement as her thesis topic served as good cover for her monitoring of Lebanese and Syrian politics. The two married while in Beirut and together they formed an espionage cell that remained active for several years.59

20

2

Negotiations between the Jewish Agency and the National Bloc in Syria

By the mid-1930s, the Jewish Agency realized the vital role played by Syria in the Palestinian national movement, well aware of the fact that since the start of the Arab Revolt in 1936, Syria had come to form a key centre and support base for the Revolt. As a result, the Jewish Agency (JA) stepped up its intelligence activity in Syria. Senior figures in the intelligence service had established extensive contacts with various Syrian elites and held negotiations with the leaders of the National Bloc in Syria, with the following goals: ●

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to stop the varied and highly significant support provided by Syria and its national forces to the Palestine revolution; to create a rift between the National Bloc in Syria and the Palestinian national movement; to obtain the support of the leaders of the National Bloc and other Syrian elites for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine; to create common interests between the JA and the leaders of the National Bloc; to deny or marginalize the national rights of the Palestinian people, and branding the Palestinian national movement as extremist and terrorist; and to solve the Palestinian issue within the framework of a comprehensive JewishArab agreement between the JA and the Arab nationalist movement led by the National Bloc behind the back of the Palestinians and at their expense.

I JA Intelligence Activity in Syria Increases Moshe Shertok attached great importance to the work of the JA political department’s Arab Division and its role in furthering Zionist goals through information gathering, espionage, and contacts with Arab elites in neighbouring countries. The department’s mission and activities thus expanded considerably. 21

22

The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt

The Jewish Agency was able to closely follow events in Syria and observe developments in the ranks of the National Bloc and other Syrian political actors, including their aims and political priorities, challenges they faced and so forth, due to several factors: ●

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the activity of the Arab Division (the intelligence) in collecting information and providing analysis on developments in Syria, and providing accurate information on the directions, priorities, and political inclinations of Syrian leaders and activists;1 the direct contacts, relationships, and meetings held by the Arab Division with the Syrian elites; the success in recruiting a group of agents in Syria in the mid-1930s, on the eve of the outbreak of the Arab Revolt, the most important of whom was Abdullah Abboud. Thanks to him the JA kept abreast of what was going on in the National Bloc and with other Syrian leaders and elites. Abboud started collaborating with the JA in September 1935, sending his first report on 13 September 1935, and continued to work regularly until at least 1948;2 and the successful recruitment of three leaders of the Syrian Jewish community in Damascus to work for the Jewish Agency: David Lawziyyah, a businessman and owner of a textile mill in Damascus;3 Dr David Pinto, Chairman of the Committee of the Jewish Community in Damascus;4 and Yusuf Linyadu, a member of the Syrian Parliament.5

Syria’s Jewish community, who numbered 16,000 at the end of the First World War, was part of Syria’s social and political fabric and its leadership had established good relations with the Damascene political and social elites and, importantly, with a number of National Bloc leaders in Damascus. The reports sent by Lawziyyah, Pinto and Linyadu to the Arab Division show that the motives for their involvement with the Arab Division and service to the JA were primarily ideological and political not financial. Aboud, Lawziyyah, Pinto and Linyadu provided the JA with vital information. Their reports contained information on the development of events in Syria, on the decisions, tactics, and policies of the Syrian National Bloc; on Syrian activities in support of the Arab Revolt; and on the activity of Palestinian and Syrian revolutionaries – how they entered Palestine and how they smuggled weapons. They helped Eliyahu Sasson publish pro-Zionist disinformation in Syrian and Lebanese newspapers, and recruited Syrians as agents. One of the most important things they did, however, was to make extensive contact with a number of leaders from the National Bloc in Damascus, paving the way for the major penetration

Negotiations between the Jewish Agency and the National Bloc in Syria

23

achieved by the Arab Division in their recruitment of National Bloc leaders as agents, which considerably helped the JA in confronting the Arab Revolt. Thanks to them, the head of the JA’s political department, Moshe Shertok, and the JA leadership, acquired a very clear picture of events in Syria, an appreciation best expressed in a letter to the Zionist Organization in which Shertok said: Young people in the Arab Division work with exemplary efficacy, and they quickly provide us with accurate information about what is happening in the other camp. Of course, we cannot enter minds, hearts, and hidden intentions, but decisions and actions reach us immediately. In two cases, I could prove that the information in my possession was obtained faster than that of the [British] High Commissioner.6

II The Syrian National Bloc Turns to the Jewish Agency for Help From the beginning of the 1930s, the National Bloc led the struggle of the Syrian people against the French mandate, until Syria gained independence. When it was founded, it sought to unite all political actors and frameworks under its umbrella but failed because of a number of radical Syrian parties who did not join its ranks. Opposition to the National Bloc in Syria crystallized under the leadership of Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar,7 especially after his return to Syria in May 1937 when he was pardoned by the French Mandate authorities. However, the National Bloc in Syria remained the broadest, most popular, largest, and most geographically widespread Syrian political grouping, and the most diverse in the class makeup of its masses and supporters.8 The National Bloc’s constitution, which was approved by the Homs conference in November 1932, defined its goal as being to ‘liberate the Syrian lands formerly part of the Ottoman Empire from all foreign authority, bring them to full independence and full sovereignty, and gather their fragmented territories into a state with one government’.9 In its first few years, the National Bloc adopted a policy of ‘honest cooperation’ with France in its pursuit of independence,10 through peaceful political means, mass struggle, and direct negotiations with the French Mandate authorities in Syria and the French government, avoiding violent confrontation and armed struggle. From time to time it organized protests, demonstrations, and general strikes against the French Mandate authorities, but these did not take a violent turn. In the mid-1930s, the National Bloc escalated its peaceful political and mass struggle and demanded

24

The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt

independence, whereby the mandate would be turned into a Syrian-French treaty of friendship and alliance, similar to the Iraqi-British treaty of 1930.11 In March 1936, a Syrian delegation from the National Bloc travelled to Paris to negotiate with the French government. Immediately after Léon Blum formed the Popular Front government on 4 June 1936, following the fall of Albert Sarraut’s government, negotiations between the French and Syrian parties moved forward. On 9 September 1936, the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was signed, which stipulated a three-year transitional period, during which the responsibilities of the mandate authority would be transferred to the Syrian government. After the treaty was signed, general elections were held in November 1936. The National Bloc won a landslide victory; a new government headed by Jamil Mardam was formed, and parliament elected Hashim al-Atassi as president of Syria. In December 1936, the Syrian parliament ratified the treaty, but the French parliament refused to follow suit. The Mardam government continued to exert efforts over the following two years to push the French parliament to ratify the treaty and put it into effect, but to no avail.12 In its national charter, issued on 10 January 1936, the National Bloc pledged to reject the Balfour Declaration, to resist the Jewish national homeland in Palestine, and to strive to bring about the unification of Arab countries.13 When the Arab Revolt erupted, the Syrian National Bloc was dealing with its own domestic issues and its own struggle for Syrian independence. When the Arab Revolt erupted in Palestine in 1936, several important questions faced the leadership of the Syrian National Block at a decisive period in its struggle for Syrian independence: ●

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Would the National Bloc support the Arab Revolt in its struggle against the Jewish national homeland in Palestine and the entire Zionist movement, in accord with its stance against the Balfour Declaration and its commitment to resist the Jewish national home in Palestine? Would it take a neutral stance and refrain from providing support and backing to the Arab Revolt, for fear of the effect this support would have on the positions of Britain, France, the Zionist movement, and ‘world Jewry’ on Syria’s independence? Would the National Bloc oppose the Syrian people and their national forces providing support to the Arab Revolt in Palestine? How did the National Bloc understand the relationship between the Syrian national struggle for independence and the Palestinian national struggle

Negotiations between the Jewish Agency and the National Bloc in Syria

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25

against Zionism and British colonialism, for the independence of Palestine, and for the preservation of its Arab identity? What was the position of the National Bloc on the Palestinian national movement and the continuation of the Arab Revolt? Should it be treated as an ally, or would the continuation of the revolt inhibit the National Bloc in its pursuit of independence? Were the Zionist movement and the JA enemies that had to be resisted or should they be negotiated with in order to achieve Syrian independence? Did negotiating with the JA really serve the struggle for Syria’s independence? Was the Palestinian issue a card that could be used in the struggle of the National Bloc to achieve Syrian independence?

It is clear from the reports of the JA’s Arab Division that the National Bloc was divided when it came to support the Arab Revolt. Shukri al-Quwatli, together with several other Syrian nationalist leaders – prominently, Nabih al-Azma and Adil al-Azma, whom the French Mandate authorities pursued until 1936 and who lived outside Syria – led support for the Arab Revolt. This entailed collecting financial donations, arms smuggling, and encouraging Syrian fighters to take part in the revolt in Palestine. Other National Bloc figures – prominently, Jamil Mardam, Nasib al-Bakri, Lutfi al-Haffar, and Fawzi Al-Bakri – were instead very reserved about support for the Arab Revolt and conciliatory towards the JA. The National Bloc’s dilemma over its stance on the Arab Revolt was exacerbated by a series of conflicting factors, pushing the leadership of the Syrian National Bloc in different directions. In the summer of 1936, there was broad support from the Syrian people and their national forces for the Arab Revolt. Funds were raised, arms were smuggled, and hundreds of Syrians joined the fight in Palestine alongside Palestinian rebels. However, the leadership of the National Bloc was unsure about how the British, the Zionist movement, and ‘world Jewry’ would react to support for the revolt in Palestine. Many important leaders of the bloc feared the loss of Britain’s political backing in the struggle for Syrian independence since the Arab Revolt was directed against both Zionism and Britain. In addition, as Palestine was an important market for Syrian products, the Syrian economy was being damaged by the general strike and the Arab Revolt. The National Bloc was also fearful that the various Syrian activities in support of the Arab Revolt, such as demonstrations and general strikes, would spin out of control and turn into actions against France, which might prompt the French Mandate authorities to use an iron fist against the leaders of the bloc by

26

The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt

putting them in jail, deport them, and marginalize their role and that of the bloc in its entirety.14 At this critical stage in its quest for Syrian independence, the National Bloc was looking for any party able to influence France to grant Syria independence. Ironically, at a time when the momentum for the Arab Revolt was growing, a large section of the leadership of Syria’s National Bloc hoped that the party to help it influence France was the JA. The rise to power of Léon Blum in France – the leader of the leftist Popular Front who had helped found the Jewish Agency in 1929 – raised hopes among the leadership of the bloc that it might be possible to influence France by establishing relations with the JA. This was of course based on common misconceptions about Zionists and Jews and their alleged control of the policies of the great powers, the media, and global capital. In its endeavor to obtain the JA’s help in influencing France in granting Syria its independence, the National Bloc expressed in their negotiations with the JA its readiness to play a mediating role between the Jewish Agency and the Palestinian national movement.

III Contacts between the National Bloc and the Jewish Agency Begin In September 1935, Fakhri al-Baroudi, a leading member of the National Bloc, head of the Iron Shirts organization, and founder of the Propaganda and Publication Office, visited Palestine. Baroudi was interested to learn about the state of the Zionist project in Palestine and met, through one of his Palestinian Arab friends, JA representative Eliyahu Epstein. Al-Baroudi stayed with Epstein for two full days, during which he visited various Jewish and Zionist educational and agricultural projects and institutions, kibbutzim, and the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.15 The visit of an Arab national leader of al-Baroudi’s standing to Zionist institutions was unusual at the time. Al-Baroudi was clear with Epstein about how impressed he was with the scientific and technical level of the projects and institutions he visited. At the same time, however, he feared the dangers that the scientifically advanced Zionist project posed to Arabs. Al-Baroudi inquired about political issues; chief among them the position of the Zionist movement towards Arab nationalism and Arab unity, and the possibility of Jews and Arabs in the Arab countries reaching an understanding based on living together in a single political framework. Epstein suggested that he meet with Moshe Shertok for answers to those questions. Al-Baroudi, however, was cautious, and rejected

Negotiations between the Jewish Agency and the National Bloc in Syria

27

the proposal to avoid his visit taking on a political dimension.16 At the end of his visit, he invited Epstein to resume their conversation if he decided to visit Damascus. Al-Baroudi wrote to Epstein from Lebanon requesting him to send publications and information on Zionist institutions in Palestine, such as the Histadrut, the Haganah, the Jewish National Fund, and Revisionist Zionism, and the decisions of the Zionist Organization, as well as statistics on agricultural, industrial and commercial schools at their various levels.17 In June 1936, the JA’s political department discussed the policy required in the region given the expansion of the revolt in Palestine and developments in Syria. One of the decisions taken was to seek to establish relations with the National Bloc in Syria, with the aim of stopping, or reducing, the various forms of Syrian support for the Arab Revolt. Besides this, the JA feared that the struggle of the Syrian people, led by the National Bloc, would lead to full or nearly full independence for Syria, and that Syria could conclude a treaty with France along the lines of the treaty that existed between Iraq and Britain, which would strengthen Syria’s own capabilities and increase the possibility of its support for the Palestinian people.18 Acting on the instructions of Shertok, Epstein and his delegation travelled to Damascus in July 1936 to make contact with the National Bloc and meet with its leadership. Epstein visited his former guest, Fakhri alBaroudi, with the aim of organizing an official meeting with the National Bloc in Syria. Before discussing what happened in these meetings between representatives of the JA and leaders of the National Bloc, it is important to note that JA representatives in these meetings were strong adherents of the Zionist project and its aim to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine, and attempted at the same time to give this project a benign face and claim that it did not harm the Palestinians. During the negotiations with the leaders of the National Bloc, JA representatives avoided talking about the real policy and strategy of the Zionist movement towards the Palestinians, which was to expel them and establish a Jewish state in Palestine. In this context at the beginning of the twentieth century the Zionist movement raised three main slogans: ‘occupation of [ِArab] land’, ‘occupation of labor’ (Jewish labor) and ‘Jewish production’. In the 1930s, during the Arab Revolt, a consensus formed among all the various Zionist parties, bodies, and organizations that called for the transfer of Palestinian Arabs from Palestine.19 The JA formed three transfer committees to develop operational plans for the transfer of the Palestinians to Arab states, the first in 1937, the second in 1942 and the third in 1948.20 Ironically, the JA representatives who conducted formal negotiations with the National Bloc, all of whom shrouded

28

The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt

Zionism as a blessing for Palestinians, were important members of these transfer committees. Eliyahu Epstein was Secretary-General of the first transfer committee; he himself made plans to transfer the Palestinians to the Jazeera region of Syria after he visited the region at the request of the first transfer committee and submitted an extensive report to the committee.21 Eliyahu Sasson, Dov Hoz, David Hacohen, and Joseph Nahmani were also important members of the transfer committees.22 It goes without saying that these three transfer committees were secret at the time, and the leaders of the National Bloc and other Syrian elites had no knowledge of them, or the fact that the JA representatives they met with were important members of the committee to transfer the Palestinians.

IV Eliyahu Epstein Meets Fakhri al-Baroudi in Douma On 17 July 1936, a meeting was held between Epstein and al-Baroudi in Douma, near Damascus, in the presence of Amos Lundmann23 and David Lawziyyah. The two sides discussed the situation in Palestine and Syria and the prospects of reaching a peace agreement between the Jewish Agency and the Arab nationalist movement.24 Epstein told al-Baroudi that the Zionist project did not harm Palestinian people but, on the contrary, would benefit them. Epstein denied that the cause of the Arab Revolt was the damage the Zionist project was inflicting on the Palestinian people and the threat it posed to their existence. He stressed that the JA was committed to continuing Jewish immigration to Palestine, and categorically refused to stop or reduce it. The acquisition of Palestinian lands by the JA would not lead to the uprooting of the fellahin, Epstein claimed. On Arab nationalism and Syrian independence, Epstein said that Zionism supported the Arabs’ national aspirations and those of the Syrians in particular. He pointed out that the Syrians were on the threshold of independence, and that strengthening independence once it was gained would require material and technical strength and good relations with Syria’s neighbours. The Zionist movement was ready, he asserted, to assist the Arab nationalist movement to enhance the independence of the Arab states. He also claimed that the Zionist movement did not conflict with or harm Arab national interests, and that the Arabs did not appreciate the importance of the Zionist movement in developing the Mashreq, and the great benefit they could gain from the prospering of Zionism, blaming Syrian Arab nationalists for failing to understand this.

Negotiations between the Jewish Agency and the National Bloc in Syria

29

Throughout his discussion with Epstein, not once did Fakhri al-Baroudi allude to the prevalent view that the Zionist movement was a colonial settler enemy foreign to the region, and that it was seeking, through immigration and settlement, to establish its presence in alliance with the colonial powers at the expense of the existence of the Palestinian people. He shared Epstein’s thoughts on the ‘great benefit’ that ‘the entire Arab people’ might gain if it cooperated with the ‘Jewish people’. The Arab national movement, he added, had not yet matured enough to comprehend these matters or take a position on them according to its interests, and not according to existing contradictions. Al- Baroudi digressed to Epstein: ‘Do not forget that you have been thinking about the Zionist project for two millennia, so it is no wonder that you have a programme with a long-term vision with clear milestones on the path’. Al-Baroudi suggested to Epstein that Zionism clearly signal its good intentions towards the Arabs in order to gain their trust. The Arabs were aware of the Jews’ power in the world and did not underestimate it, he added. ‘You control half the international press, or twothirds of it. Try to make this press serve our interests as well as your own, and try to use your great influence in European and American circles to our advantage and yours.’25 One should add that such misconceptions and partial information about Judaism and Zionism was not unique to Baroudi, but widespread among Arab leaders and elites in that period, even one of the most prominent Arab thinkers, Constantin Zureiq, was not spared. In his book The Meaning of the Nakba, when analyzing the causes of the Nakba he stated: However, in all justice we must hasten to say that the causes of this calamity are not all attributable to the Arabs themselves. The enemy confronting them is determined, has plentiful resources, and great influence. Years, even generations, passed during which he prepared for this struggle. He extended his influence and his power to the ends of the earth. He got control over many of the sources of power within the great nations, so that they were either forced into partiality toward him or submitted to him. If he masses his forces against one of these nations, he exhausts it and takes possession of many of its interests, as history, old and new, has shown in all the great nations.26

At the July 1936 meeting, al-Baroudi also said that Zionism had so far been orientated towards Western states, and that it had to correct its course towards the East if it wished to reach a full understanding with the Arabs. Al-Baroudi did not explain the basis of this full understanding between the Arabs and Zionism but expressed his confidence in joint work between the Jewish Agency and the

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Arabs: ‘You have the experience and the money, we have the land and the workforce. If we cooperate, I can see that from now on our children will learn Hebrew and your children Arabic.’ Al-Baroudi added that what he had said could not be repeated to his wife or his best friend, because they would be unable to understand it due to their upbringing. On the revolt in Palestine, Baroudi said: I have done everything I can to ensure that the situation in Palestine does not worsen. Thousands of young Syrians wished to go to Palestine to help their brothers, and we stopped them. We have also obstructed arms smuggling. You should know that arms smuggling to Palestine is only carried out to make money, not for nationalist motives. We have stopped the smuggling of weapons driven by nationalist motives.

Al-Baroudi touched on the issue of stopping the Arab Revolt, and the role of mediator between the Palestinian national movement and the Jewish Agency that he hoped the Syrian National Bloc would play. He stressed that ‘there is no power in the world that can stop the Arab Revolt without meeting preconditions’ adding: ‘The key to stopping the revolt in Palestine is in your hands: stopping Jewish immigration to Palestine. Stopping it for a certain period of time will enable us to approach the Palestinian leadership and prepare the ground for an agreement between you.’ Epstein’s response was clear when he said that the JA would never agree to a halt to Jewish immigration to Palestine, or even a temporary moratorium. AlBaroudi replied that without a halt to immigration, it would be impossible to discuss an agreement between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. The demand that Jewish immigration cease was the most important demand of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, and the Palestinians would not end it without an end to Jewish immigration. He added, ‘If you give me a hint that you are ready to accept this condition, then I and many National Bloc leaders in Syria, such as Shukri alQuwatli, Lutfi al-Haffar, and others, will urge the Palestinian leadership to negotiate with you. Otherwise, we will not accept any role in this issue.’ Epstein suggested that al-Baroudi address the issue of Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine, not through the Arab Revolt in Palestine and the Palestinian national movement’s demand for an end to Jewish immigration to Palestine, but rather through ‘dealing with and studying all aspects of Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine’. AlBaroudi promised to think about the subject from the angle Epstein proposed and said that he would inform the leadership of the National Bloc about their discussions and propose a meeting between the National Bloc and the Jewish

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Agency to conduct a comprehensive and radical dialogue between the two parties, regarding all aspects of Arab-Jewish relations. Lawziyyah would then inform Epstein of the bloc’s decision. Epstein then mentioned he intended to travel to Europe and would be visiting Paris. Al- Baroudi offered to give him a letter of recommendation so he could meet with the Syrian delegation in Paris. Asking how he could be of help, alBaroudi told Epstein to warn the French that if the Syrian delegation returned empty-handed, Syria would erupt like it never had before. While saying goodbye to his guests at the end of the meeting, al-Baroudi told Epstein: ‘If the Jewish Agency were to assist the Syrian delegation in Paris, that would prove the friendly intentions the Jewish people have for Arabs, despite the revolt and the ongoing conflict with the Palestinian Arabs. Such a move would give the National Bloc a powerful weapon to initiate the topics discussed.’27 From Lawziyyah and Pinto’s reports to the JA it seems that Baroudi submitted a report on his meeting with Epstein to the leadership of the National Bloc, who were unclear about whether the meeting between the two sides had been personal or official. Epstein asked Lawziyyah to explain to the leadership of the National Bloc that the meeting had been official; he had met with al-Baroudi in his capacity as a leader of the National Bloc, and had sent him the materials about Zionist institutions in that capacity.28

V The First Official Meeting between the National Bloc and the Jewish Agency Two weeks after the al-Baroudi–Epstein meeting, on 1 August 1936, the National Bloc and the JA held their first official meeting at al-Baroudi’s house in the village of Bloudan. The meeting lasted two-and-a-half hours and included Shukri alQuwatli, Fakhri al-Baroudi and Lutfi al-Haffar representing the National Bloc and Eliyahu Epstein and Amos Lundmann representing the JA, with David Pinto also participating.29 In his opening, al-Baroudi noted that he had submitted a report on his meeting with Epstein to the leadership of the National Bloc, which, based on the report, had decided to hold a meeting with JA representatives to clarify its own position and obtain information and clarifications from them. The National Bloc would then decide if there was any point in continuing to negotiate with the JA. Al-Baroudi stressed the importance of this meeting, showing that relations between the National Bloc and the JA were no longer limited to personal contacts, but were entering a new stage.

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Epstein began by remarking that the meeting was not the first to be held by representatives of the JA with Arab leaders. Zionist leaders had met Arab leaders before, but this meeting was the first official one between representatives of the Jewish Agency and the National Bloc. Epstein then presented the Zionist historical narrative on the Arab-Zionist conflict, the Jewish question in Europe and the emergence of Zionism, and noted how Jews around the world were simultaneously a nation, a people and a religion, and that the Zionist movement was ‘the national liberation movement for Jews in the world’. He linked the Jews living in European countries with the ancient practitioners of Judaism who had lived in the East. Epstein moved on to two main topics: the situation in Palestine and Arab-Jewish relations and the possibility of reaching a comprehensive ArabJewish agreement between the JA and the National Bloc in Syria. Epstein commended the Zionist colonial settlement project in Palestine to create a Jewish national home. He claimed that this did not come at the expense of the Palestinian people and did not cause Palestinians harm, but was to their advantage and raised their economic level. Epstein noted that the 400,000 Jews in Palestine were supported by 17 million Jews around the world. Those 400,000 were seeking to establish a Jewish national home, not just for them, but for Jews across the world, who would immigrate to Palestine. He added, ‘There is no power, external or internal, that can prevent the establishment of the Jewish national home in Palestine’. Epstein moved on to say that the Arab Revolt could not be said to have erupted because Zionism had caused material, or any other, damage to the Palestinian people. According to Epstein, Zionism had not harmed the Palestinians, but if they were afraid that the development of the Jewish homeland would harm them, then the Jewish Agency was ready to provide the requisite guarantees to ensure that did not happen. Epstein suggested that such guarantees be discussed at future meetings between the two sides. Epstein pointed out that the leaders of the National Bloc in Syria were the best placed among Arab nationalists to appreciate the importance of this issue and the best able to find a solution to the Palestinian question that served Arabs and Jews in Palestine. He noted that the JA supported Syria’s independence because he believed this would lead to peace in the entire region and ensure the building of relations between Syria and the JA, especially economically. Jews around the world, Epstein noted, were a significant force in important fields in many countries, and Syria would continue to need major scientific, logistical, technological and financial capabilities post-independence, which the Arab world lacked. The JA, he said, had those capabilities, and ‘we can put them at your disposal without raising the fear and anxiety of the Arabs, because our national

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aspirations do not extend beyond the borders of Palestine’. In conclusion, Epstein stated: ‘In order to reach a Jewish-Arab agreement, the National Bloc has to demonstrate its understanding and recognition of the national aspirations of the Jewish people, and accept its historical right to establish its national home in Palestine. It is clear that is conditional on our giving the Palestinians adequate guarantees that safeguard their interests.’ Shukri al-Quwatli began his response to Epstein with the customary formalities at such meetings and expressed his hope that the two sides could reach an understanding. The idea of an understanding between Arabs and Jews was not new for Syrian leaders: ‘We cooperated with the late King Faisal in this regard from the beginning, before and after he was crowned king of Syria.’ Al-Quwatli then addressed the central issues raised by Epstein, including the Zionist position and its policy towards the Palestinians, the National Bloc in Syria, the Arab nationalist movement and the question of a comprehensive Jewish-Arab agreement. Al-Quwatli rejected the Zionist claim that the Jews had an historical right in Palestine on the basis that Jews had lived in Palestine 2,000 years ago, and made a distinction between the Jews having lived in peace with the Arabs in past ages and the Zionists’ effort to establish a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine. Had it not been for the Zionist attempt to set up a Jewish national home in Palestine, he stated, Palestinians and Arabs would not have opposed Jewish immigration to Palestine and Arab countries. On Epstein’s claim that the Zionist project in Palestine had raised the level of the Palestinians, al-Quwatli said that the fundamental issue in the eyes of the Palestinians lay in the danger from the Zionist project itself, that is, the danger posed to the Palestinians by the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine by means of immigration by Jews from all over the world to Palestine. Sooner or later, this would result in Jewish rule in Palestine, which would mean the Palestinians losing out on everything, including their standard of living, which Epstein claimed Zionism was raising. Al-Quwatli then inquired about Epstein’s brief reference to guarantees that the Jewish national home would not harm the Palestinian people and asked him to specify them. Al-Quwatli continued that the problem was further complicated by the fact that the Jewish Agency did not clearly define the ‘Jewish national home’, nor clarify whether this term meant the occupation of all of Palestine, as advocated by Ze’ev Jabotinsky, which would lead to the transfer of the Palestinians from Palestine. ‘Do you want to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine, or do you want to transform Palestine into a Jewish national home? If you intend the second possibility, we are resolutely against it, and there is no possibility of reaching an understanding. But if you are referring to the first

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The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt

possibility, we are ready to discuss the guarantees you referred to and find a solution that will serve both parties concerned.’ Al-Quwatli did not indicate the kind of solution he wanted, but his differentiation between the two scenarios opened up space for negotiations with the JA on very comfortable terrain. ‘We do not deny, nor underestimate the power and influence of Jews around the world’, al Quwatli continued.‘We appreciate this, and we realize how significant assistance can be provided by Jews.’ He went on that the Arab Revolt in Palestine would continue, but if it were suppressed, it would start again with greater force and violence, unless a lasting solution was found to the problem of Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine. The Syrians, led by the National Bloc, he stated, were the most suitable party to work to resolve this issue, and they were ready to play this role, thus paving the way for a comprehensive agreement between the Jewish Agency and the Arabs in general. Al-Quwatli added that, despite the difficulties faced by the nationalists in Syria, they always raised the slogan of Arab independence and made an effort to achieve it. When Syria achieved its independence, he said, it would bring an agreement between Arabs and Jews closer. Therefore, he said, ‘it is important that you help us by all means to achieve independence, which will benefit you in concrete terms’. Al-Quwatli concluded by expressing the readiness of the National Bloc to continue meeting with the Jewish Agency and expressed his hope that these meetings would lead to an agreement between the National Bloc and the Jewish Agency. He suggested that their next meeting focus on two central and interlinked issues: relations between Arabs and Jews in Palestine and reaching an agreement between the Jews and all the Arabs. At the conclusion of the meeting, the two parties agreed to keep the meetings confidential. In a short comment, Eliyahu Epstein thanked Shukri al-Quwatli for his contribution and stated that many in the West believed that the inhabitants of the East were unable to live together, and that this prevalent view in the West was a great obstacle to Arabs achieving their goal of governing themselves. Reaching a peaceful solution to the Arab-Jewish issue would therefore serve the Arabs and raise the status of the East.30

VI The Second Official Meeting between the National Bloc and the Jewish Agency The second official meeting between the Syrian National Bloc and the Jewish Agency was held in Damascus on 9 September 1936, at Lutfi al-Haffar’s house.31 Lasting three-and-a-half hours, the meeting included members from the

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National Bloc, represented by Shukri al-Quwatli, Lutfi al-Haffar and Fayiz alKhoury, and from the JA Dov Hoz,32 Eliyahu Epstein, David Hacohen,33 Yusuf Nahmani34 and Amos Lundmann. David Pinto also attended. At the beginning of the meeting, Epstein explained that the JA had added three of its specialists on the Arab issue to its negotiating team, given that at the previous meeting the National Bloc had agreed to continue the negotiations. This delegation would submit a full report on the meeting to the leadership of the Jewish Agency to take the appropriate decisions. Then, Epstein asked Shukri al-Quwatli to give a brief presentation on the previous meeting between the two parties. Following that, al-Quwatli suggested that the JA delegation take the minutes of the meeting, as it had previously. On behalf of the Syrian delegation, he asked them not to publish anything about these meetings without the prior approval of both parties, and those present agreed. Hoz then took the floor and raised three initial points: Palestinian fears about the Zionists were imagined, which made ‘reaching an agreement between them and the Jews more difficult than reaching an agreement if these fears were based on reality’; second, the negotiations would be of greater value if their length was fixed; and third, the negotiations would succeed if each side perceived the benefit that it would gain from reaching an Arab-Jewish agreement. Then Hoz presented the prevalent Zionist historical narrative that the Jews had continued to fight for 2,000 years for ‘the return to Zion’ to establish their national homeland. Hoz further claimed that the establishment of a national homeland for the Jews was a blessing to the Palestinians and improved their economic conditions. He claimed that the establishment of the Jewish national home in Palestine would not be at the expense of the Palestinians, would not cause any injustice or exploitation and would not lead to them being uprooted from their homeland. He also claimed that it was in the interests of the Zionist movement to raise the standards of living of Palestinians and defend the interests of the Palestinian fellah. At this point in his version of the facts, Hoz (who was a member of the JA transfer committee that drew up plans for the transfer of the Palestinians from Palestine) said: Now I want you to tell me frankly if you believe what I have told you, and express your opinion if you think the Jews can benefit you with their talent, effort, and money. There is no power in the world that can drive the Jews out of Palestine. On the other hand, if these two great powers – the Arabs and the Jews – combine their efforts, they will benefit greatly from that act.

In his response, Shukri al-Quwatli quoted an Arabic proverb: ‘I laid out a wonderful spread and put the stick next to it’, explaining that, on the one hand,

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The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt

Hoz had said that he wanted to reach an agreement between the Jews and the Arabs, while, on the other hand, saying that there was no force in the world that could remove the Jews from Palestine. Al-Quwatli questioned whether this meant the 400,000 Jews who had immigrated to Palestine up until then, or whether it meant an unlimited number of Jews who would immigrate in the future. He explained that the issue here was political, not religious, and emphasized that Judaism was a religion, not a nationality – the Syrian Jew, for example, was a Syrian Arab whose religion was Judaism, just as the Syrian Arab might follow Islam or Christianity. He continued that if Jews had emigrated to Palestine without the Balfour Declaration, that is, without their goal being to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine, there would never have been a problem. The problem here was a political one, represented by Zionism seeking to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine. Al-Quwatli addressed the repeated Zionist claim that the Zionist project brought economic and social blessings to the Palestinians and questioned the usefulness of this – if it was true – when the Jews became a majority through emigration and settlement. He compared the Zionist project with French colonialism in Syria, in that both claimed to be improving the economic situation. He pointed out that the French had always declared that they wanted to bring economic benefits to Syria, were working to improve the Syrian economy and had postponed granting political rights to the Syrians. The Syrians did not agree with this; they wanted to be masters of their homeland, and would fight for independence, whether French colonialism improved their economic situation or not. Al-Quwatli added that even if the Palestinian economic situation improved, this would be temporary because the Palestinians would lose everything they owned if events continued on their current trajectory. Al-Quwatli denied that the Palestinians’ fears of the Zionist project were imaginary. They were real, he explained, and stemmed from real reasons, primarily, the Zionist movement’s ongoing land appropriation and ongoing Jewish immigration to Palestine. He said: ‘If I were an Arab from Jaffa, I would ask you where are the Zionists heading and what is their goal? I would not be interested in myself alone but also in my children and grandchildren, and want to know what their future will be?’ Despite everything he had said about the Palestinian issue, al-Quwatli concluded by saying that the two delegations had good intentions about working together and were examining the points of disagreement between them in order to reach an agreement as ‘relatives and friends without the need for the help of outsiders’. Following al-Quwatli, Fayiz al-Khoury asked how many Jews would immigrate to Palestine. Dov Hoz replied that ‘the number of Jewish immigrants

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depends on Palestine’s absorptive capacity, and therefore cannot be specified. Next year, it might reach two thousand, five thousand, or one hundred thousand Jewish immigrants’. Hoz added that the existence of Zionism had become a fact, and that ‘you have to understand the Zionist question in all its aspects and think about its causes and objectives, as happened at today’s meeting and at the previous meeting’. Nahmani then spoke about Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine and their positive benefits for Palestinian Arabs. He was followed by Hacohen who talked about the possibilities of reaching a joint Arab-Jewish agreement, and the positive results for both parties. Then, Epstein, who, like the rest of the JA’s negotiation team occupied a prominent position on the three JA transfer committees set up to transfer the Palestinians from Palestine, summed up the two fundamental conditions of the JA for any Arab-Jewish agreement between the JA and the National Bloc. These were the continuation of Jewish immigration to Palestine from all over the world, without any limitation on numbers or rate, and based on the JA’s assessment of Palestine’s absorptive capacity; and the JA’s continued acquisition of Arab lands in Palestine. Shukri al-Quwatli then concluded the meeting by speaking briefly, and in general, about the importance of the two sides meeting to discuss issues to reach mutual understanding.35 In the two official meetings it held with the National Bloc on reaching a comprehensive ‘Arab-Jewish agreement’, the JA sought to influence the National Bloc and put a stop to the various form of support provided by Syria to the Arab Revolt in Palestine, and obtain their support for a Jewish national home in Palestine and for Jewish immigration to Palestine, at the size and pace it wanted. The JA claimed that, in return, it would support the National Bloc in its quest for Syrian independence and the realization of Arab unity. It seems that the motive of al-Quwatli, who headed the National Bloc delegation at two official meetings with the JA, was to explore the possibility of obtaining JA support for Syrian independence, in exchange for acting as a mediator between the JA and the Palestinian national movement, in accordance with a prevailing belief in the National Bloc and in large segments of Arab elites that the Jewish Agency, the Zionist movement, and ‘world Jewry’ had influence over France and the Great Powers. Al-Quwatli, who stood out from many of his fellow National Bloc leaders in his commitment to supporting the revolt in Palestine, appears to have concluded from these two meetings that there was no point to the negotiations. He discontinued them and proceeded to expend all his efforts on providing support to the Arab Revolt. However, that a National Bloc delegation, under his leadership, had conducted formal, secret negotiations with the JA in such

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circumstances created an atmosphere that neither prevented nor prohibited secret contacts or meetings between National Bloc leaders and the JA. That second meeting between the National Bloc and the JA was the last formal meeting in that round of negotiations and the last time the Syrian National Bloc leadership would have advanced knowledge of meetings or be informed of their results. It was, however, by no means the last meeting or encounter between JA representatives and many leaders of the Syrian National Bloc. In the months and years that followed, many such meetings occurred and contacts were formed with leaders of the National Bloc, including Jamil Mardam, Nasib al-Bakri, Lutfi al-Haffar and Fawzi al-Bakri, and with the leaders of the Shahbandari ‘opposition’, particularly Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar and Nasuh Babil, as well as with leaders in Jabal al-Arab (Jabal al-Druze), led by Sultan al-Atrash and Yusuf alAysami. These meetings generally went in the direction the Jewish Agency wanted. The series of meetings, as well as the infiltrations achieved by the JA with leaders in the National Bloc, the Shahbandari opposition, and other Syrian elites and leaders will be explored in Chapter 4. Before that, it is important to explore the JA’s effort to influence Arab public opinion and the Arab elites in Syria and Lebanon and the Arab world more generally. The next chapter will illustrate the relationships established by the JA with newspaper owners and editors in Syria and Lebanon, and discuss the articles planted in the Syrian and Lebanese press.

3

The Zionist Disinformation Campaign in Syria and Lebanon during the Arab Revolt

From the time Britain’s intention to impose the Balfour Declaration’s Jewish National Home project on Palestine became clear at the peace conferences dividing the spoils of the First World War, the Palestine question and Zionism were favoured topics in the newspapers and periodicals proliferating across the Arab world. Zionist leaders and particularly the Jewish Agency (JA), were well aware of the press’s potential to shape Arab opinion, especially as public education spread and literacy levels rose. As the body responsible for promoting Jewish immigration to Palestine, the JA was equally cognizant of spontaneous Arab opposition to the Zionist project, and, through its political department, decided to do something about it. This chapter examines the JA political department’s efforts to influence Syrian and Lebanese public opinion on the question of Palestine and Zionism in the mid-1930s. More specifically, the timeframe is two crucial years –1937 and 1938 – during the Great Arab Revolt that erupted in Palestine in 1936 and was definitively crushed by the British military in summer 1939. The JA’s efforts, directed from the highest levels, mostly involved the placement of pro-Zionist articles and news reports in Syrian and Lebanese newspapers, but they also included direct lobbying with prominent personalities in the two countries. Syria and to a lesser extent Lebanon, were providing political and material support for the Palestinian rebels, while their shared borders with Palestine gave Syrian and Lebanese public opinion lasting strategic importance. The articles, reports, and editorials in question were all written or approved by JA intelligence. All the pieces, however, were purportedly written by Arabs, ostensibly from their own perspective and representing local interests. But whereas the slightest suspicion of the articles’ true origin among the readers would have provoked public outrage, the editors and owners of the Syrian and Lebanese newspapers that published them were fully aware of what they were publishing and actively negotiated the terms and payments. In terms of content, 39

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the pieces covered a broad range of issues of concern to the local populations, though their underlying intent was clearly to deflect attention from the Palestinian cause, disparage the Palestinian leadership, raise doubts about the Arab Revolt and the consequences of supporting it, promote the need for accommodation with the Jews, and so on. To maximize the impact of the articles, the JA’s political department frequently reprinted them, either in full or summarized, for dissemination by the Arabiclanguage al-Sharq News Agency, which it secretly owned, as well as in the Hebrew daily Davar, organ of the Mapai (Labor) party, which controlled the JA. In many cases the JA also managed to bring these articles to the attention of decision makers in London and Paris, presenting them as coming from Arab newspaper editors and expressing the views of important sections of Arab public opinion in Syria and Lebanon. The ability of the JA operatives to entice many Arab journalists, editors, and others in Lebanon and Syria to collaborate with them was facilitated by the conditions of the time: the open borders between Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria; the routine and thoroughly unremarkable nature of travel among these countries; and the relatively short distances that permitted easy day trips between Jerusalem and Beirut or Damascus.

I Laying the Ground in the Early 1930s It was after the 1929 al-Buraq uprising, which erupted in Jerusalem in response to Zionist demonstrations at the Wailing Wall and spread from there, that the JA Political Department stepped up its efforts to influence Arab opinion via the press. The daily coverage of the unfolding events, sensationalized by the involvement for the first time of the holy places, had galvanized the Arab world behind the Palestinian Arab people. For the Zionist leadership, the need for countermeasures was clear. In January 1930, Chaim Kalvarisky, head of intelligence of the JA’s political department, visited Beirut where he helped organize a committee of four Lebanese Jewish activists who were assigned to influence Lebanese and Syrian newspapers to adopt pro-Zionist positions.1 He gave them a budget of 150 Palestinian pounds (£P) to carry out this mission.2 In his report on the visit, Kalvarisky noted the committee’s success in getting some Beirut newspapers, including the Arabic-language al-Ahwal and the French-language L’Orient and La Syrie, to modify their editorial lines.3 He also reported on a meeting he had

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with Khayr al-Din al-Ahdab, editor of the daily al-‘Ahd al-Jadid and later prime minister of Lebanon (1937–1938), during which he spoke at great length on the need for ‘mutual understanding between Arabs and Jews’ and asked al-Ahdab to help by publishing articles sympathetic to Zionism. In response to Kalvarisky’s question as to the appropriate recompense for this service, al-Ahdab suggested £P400 per year. When Kalvarisky found this sum excessive, the two men agreed on £P200, to be paid in quarterly installments.4 While Kalvarisky was occupied in Beirut, his boss, Colonel Frederick Kisch, director of the JA’s political department, was in Cairo, where he had been preceded by JA intelligence official David Yellin. According to Kisch, the meetings they held with Egyptian officials and leaders of the local Jewish community achieved three important results: (1) a group of Egyptian Jews was formed to persuade the Egyptian press to adopt positions supportive of Zionism; (2) the Egyptian government agreed to confiscate locally published anti-Zionist pamphlets; and (3) a group of informants was set up to work for the JA’s intelligence services.5

II Al-Sharq News Agency As part of its efforts to penetrate the Arab press and influence Arab public opinion, the JA’s political department set up its own Arabic-language news agency – al-Sharq Agency – officially registered in Cairo in January 1934. From then on, the JA supplied al-Sharq with Zionist materials and news stories – political, economic, and financial – for publication and dissemination, particularly in Arab newspapers.6 Moshe Shertok instructed Nahum Vilensky, the head of al-Sharq, to conceal any connection between the news agency and the JA, to appear neutral, and to emphasize facts and figures in coverage relating to the Zionist project so that ‘alSharq Agency will not be boycotted by the Arab press’. Shertok added that they needed to ‘gain the good will’ of the Arab press by providing sensational and important information concerning political developments in the Middle East, but that ‘when we want to draw particular attention to a subject, you must do so with caution and tactical awareness, as you have been doing so far’.7 In a report to Shertok, Vilensky set out his political goal: to prevent the establishment of a unified Arab anti-Zionist front, first by creating a rift between the Palestinian national movement and the Arab countries, second by placing obstacles in the path of the Palestinian national movement.8 Noting the growing

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Arab sympathy for the Palestinian cause, Vilensky proposed launching a ‘peace campaign’ in the Arab press. Specifically, he proposed composing a series of articles calling for peace to be published in Palestine’s Hebrew press, which would then be translated and published in the Arab press (as coming from the Jewish press) via al-Sharq Agency to convey a positive image of Zionism as peace-loving and peace-seeking. According to Vilensky, the target of the campaign should not be Palestinians but Arab countries open to its message and Europeans interested in Palestine.9 Al-Sharq Agency continued for many years to disseminate disinformation intended to undermine the Palestinian national movement, spark and fuel interArab conflicts, and create the impression of a Zionist quest for peace. Moreover, many JA intelligence agents – chief among them Sasson and Epstein – used the cover of ‘al-Sharq Agency correspondent’ when in Arab capitals.10

III The Syrian and Lebanese Press During the Arab Revolt The outbreak of the Palestinian rebellion in April 1936 with the declaration of a general strike met with widespread support in the Arab countries, especially Syria, whose own nationalist movement, the National Bloc, had conducted its own 43-day general strike in January. The Syrian strike’s success had compelled French Mandatory officials to open negotiations on a treaty of independence and, in November 1936, the National Bloc decisively won the Syrian parliamentary elections, enabling it to form the new government. Syrians saw the Arab Revolt next door as part of the same wider Arab movement towards independence. Support from both the population at large and the political leadership was expressed in the press and through popular strikes and demonstrations, the boycott of Jewish Zionist products, and direct material assistance to the Palestinians organized by the Palestine Defense Committee established in Damascus that year. Armed Syrian volunteers also crossed into Palestine to help the rebels. Although the National Bloc, as the lead party in the government, now had to be careful not to alienate Britain, on which Syria depended in its quest for independence from France, many of Syria’s most active Palestinian supporters were affiliated with it.11 Though Lebanon was also under French Mandate, the situation there was quite different. With the Sunni population far from reconciled to the FrancoMaronite project of ‘Greater Lebanon’, whose frontiers included substantial Sunni-majority areas annexed by force against the wishes of the inhabitants, the

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Lebanese Mandatory government was largely a Maronite Christian affair. Lebanon’s Sunni (nationalist) leaders were either in exile or remained resolutely uncooperative; the Sunni politicians who cooperated with the government (such as the above-mentioned Khayr al-Din al-Ahdab) were widely seen as collaborationist. The result was a government representative of prevailing Maronite sentiment and mostly indifferent to the situation in Palestine. At the same time, the overwhelming majority of Muslims, as well as large sectors of the Christian (including Maronite) population, strongly supported the Palestinians. It was against this background that the Zionist leadership sought ways to dampen Syrian and Lebanese popular support for the Palestinians. Documents in the CZA, particularly the reports by Sasson and Epstein, reveal that the JA was keenly aware of the importance of Syria and Lebanon for the Arab Revolt, and continued to deploy great efforts to influence the press in the two countries. In January 1937, Sasson and Epstein met Wadi ‘Talhuq, an editor with the Syrian newspaper al-Insha’, at the Umayyad Hotel in Damascus concerning the publication of pro-Zionist articles in the Syrian press. Talhuq agreed to publish material supplied to him by the JA provided it was of a ‘moderate’ nature.12 After returning to Jerusalem, Epstein sent Talhuq ‘an article discussing economic relations between Palestine and Syria, based on facts and figures and extremely moderate in style and construction’ and asked him to publish it in al-Insha’ or another leading Damascus paper, adding that more such articles would soon follow. He also asked Talhuq to send the JA copies of the published article, and specifically gave him ‘the freedom to take his pen to these articles, when necessary, to make them suitable for publication in Syrian papers without causing him any headaches’.13 The implications of the developments in Syria and Lebanon were not lost on Sasson and his colleagues. In his report filed in early October 1936, Sasson noted having seen ‘with [his] own eyes [in Beirut] people running after newspaper vendors, grabbing at papers to read the latest news on the situation in Palestine’. He further observed that the Lebanese public appeared far more interested in the situation in Palestine than in the Lebanese parliamentary elections taking place at the same time.14 From Damascus he reported that ‘Adil al-‘Azma, Nabih al-‘Azma, Dr. Subhi Abu Ghanima, Shakib Arslan, and Shaykh Kamal al-Qassab – all important nationalist leaders – supported the Palestinian rebels and were pressuring Syria’s National Bloc-led government not to do anything that might compromise the Arab Revolt. According to Sasson, the government, beset by internal conflicts and provincial unrest and faced with France’s refusal to ratify the Syrian-French treaty, would not dare interfere with the operations of Syrian

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The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt

and Palestinian activists inside Syria.15 Under the circumstances, he proposed that the JA take a number of steps to influence conditions there, including: ●

●

●

●

●

urging the French government to pressure Syria to put an end to antiZionist propaganda in the Syrian press; urging Paris not to ratify the Syrian-French treaty. This would force Syria to exercise restraint on the Palestinian issue while increasing Syrian opposition to their own government, thereby weakening the government and diminishing popular interest in the Palestinian cause; publishing near-daily articles supporting Zionist positions in the Syrian press; raising the issue of Syria’s Alexandretta (İskenderun) district west of Aleppo, which was then heating up as Turkey’s claims to the ethnically mixed area became more pressing. Sasson recommended that articles on Alexandretta, as well as pamphlets reproducing speeches on the subject by Syrian leaders, be published to divert the Syrian population’s attention from Palestine. According to Sasson, strong anti-government opposition in Aleppo over Alexandretta could easily be exploited through articles, which the Aleppo papers would be prepared to publish, attacking the government and the National Bloc; and urging the British papers to attack both the French and Syrian governments for allowing the Syrian press and population to intervene actively in the Palestinian struggle.16

Concerning Lebanon, Sasson wrote to Bernard Joseph, deputy director of the JA’s political department, suggesting that he send a personal letter to Lebanese President Emile Eddé drawing his attention to what the Lebanese press was publishing about Palestine. Specifically, Sasson advised Joseph to express hope that ‘the government of Lebanon, which has maintained its neutrality regarding the issue of Palestine throughout this period, would ask the Lebanese press to stop interfering in the matter’.17

IV Eliyahu Sasson Sets to Work In early October 1937, Sasson himself sent three articles to the Syrian Arab journalist Abdullah Aboud (AA), a JA collaborator in Damascus, who planted two of them in Damascus papers and the third in Aleppo’s al-Dustur. This last, published on 3 October 1937 as a front-page editorial headlined ‘We need a

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Defense Committee for Syria more than for Palestine or the rest of the Arab world’ (in reference to the Alexandretta issue), raised a furor. The editorial argued that for the Syrians—in their current state of abject poverty, unrest, conflict, and factionalism—to devote themselves to Palestine and other problems while they are moreover divided and weak would, besides keeping them from dealing with a situation that could result in death and destruction, also expose them to the ridicule and contempt of covetous foreigners. [. . .] In such circumstances, we need a defense committee for Syria more than for Palestine or any other spot of precious Arab land. [. . .] We do not believe that a reasonable person, however swayed by rashness and radicalism, would leave his own door open while gangs of thieves are eying him from all sides in order to rush to save a neighbor threatened by those same thieves.18

On 10 October 1937, Sasson reported to Joseph from Beirut that he had written 12 articles for Lebanese and Syrian papers and asked ‘A A’ to come to Beirut to help deliver those intended for Lebanon to the newspaper editors. This done, Sasson and ‘A A’ left for Aleppo, from where Sasson wrote to Joseph that seven articles had been successfully placed in al-Dustur and al-Jihad. The articles for al-Dustur, Sasson wrote, attacked the Palestine Defense Committee and called on the Syrian government to seize all the funds the committee had raised for Palestine and to distribute the money to Syria’s poor and starving labourers. The articles for al-Jihad criticized the Syrian government and people for neglecting Alexandretta (whose detachment from Syria had become a probability when the League of Nations recommended its independence in May 1937) and called on the Syrian people to ‘wake up’ and form defense committees for Alexandretta. He added that he had promised to send the two dailies more articles, commenting that ‘clearly, this is a low-cost effort yielding high returns’. Finally, he asked Joseph to write to Vilensky suggesting that he provide shortened versions of the articles to al-Sharq Agency and to reprint them in full in Davar so as ‘to demonstrate to both the Arabs and the English that not all Syrians are in solidarity with the Arabs of Palestine’.19 In another report to Joseph dated 14 October 1937, Sasson attached copies of the articles planted in the Syrian papers that day, all of which dealt with Alexandretta. Some criticized the government’s position and others emphasized the looming Turkish threat, Sasson noted, but all exhorted the Syrian people and government to do everything possible to protect Alexandretta’s integrity as an Arab district. He also emphasized the importance of the fact that one of his

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The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt

articles had been published in al-Qabas, the newspaper of the ruling National Bloc.20 During an 11-day visit to Beirut in December 1937, Sasson succeeded in planting some two dozen articles in the Lebanese and Damascene press, which he catalogued in reports to his superiors, often enclosing copies. On 14 December 1937, for example, he described five such articles to Shertok.21 One of these, which focused on Alexandretta and stressed that the Arab world had a higher obligation to that district than to Palestine, was published in Damascus’s Fata al-‘Arab. The other four were published in Beirut papers. Two appeared as news reports from Palestine: one, in Lisan al-Hal, reported the killing of two Christian Arab policemen near Acre, with the clear aim of sowing discord between Lebanese Muslims and Christians; the other, in Sawt al-Ahrar, about confusion in the Arab ranks and advising, in light of the Peel Commission’s recommendations, that the Arabs had either to reach an understanding with the Jews or accept partition if they wanted to resolve the problem. A third article, appearing in Beirut, warned of the need to counter ‘foreign propaganda’, namely German and Italian, in Arab countries.22 The last article, published in al-Bilad under a pseudonym suggesting authorship by a Beirut-based Palestinian militant, criticized the Palestinian struggle for its failings, which included the leadership’s incompetence and failure to summon the courage to negotiate with the JA, and the country’s lack of security. After characterizing the Arab Revolt as an ‘ethnic war’ and calling for the establishment of friendly relations between Islam and Judaism, the article warned of the risks inherent in Palestinian attempts to exploit the conflict brewing between Germany and Italy on one side and France and Britain on the other. Sasson concluded by noting that he had published eight articles since arriving in Beirut and hoped to place 20 more within a week.23 In his report of 15 December 1937,24 Sasson described the three articles planted in Beirut papers that day: two ‘news reports’ from Jerusalem about Arab ‘terrorism’ in Palestine (one in Sawt al-Ahrar and the other in Beirut) and a piece in al-Nahda attacking the Bureau for National Propaganda, which supplied the Arab press with pro-Palestinian information and analyses, and its director, the Syrian politician Fakhri al-Barudi. Reflecting on his mission to date, Sasson remarked that he had not expected to be able to get 11 articles published in the Lebanese and Syrian press or that the two ‘widest circulation’ dailies, Beirut and Sawt al-Ahrar, would accept articles condemning and calling for an end to Arab ‘terrorism’ in Palestine, attacking Palestinian leaders, and justifying Britain’s iron-fist policy. Sasson explicitly asked Shertok to read the Sawt al-Ahrar article to appreciate its logic and power, suggesting that further use could be made of it

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in Egyptian, English, and French papers, as well as in Whitehall and the Quai d’Orsay. Since many newspapers in Syria and Lebanon were ‘prepared to publish the materials we give them’, and since such articles constituted the best way to ‘wage war against terrorism, defeat its leaders, and humiliate them in the eyes of East and West’, Sasson urged that they continue to be published. Otherwise, he warned, the JA could lose the papers where it had gained a foothold and public opinion could shift to the Palestinians. Noting his intention to devote the coming days to writing articles for placement in diverse newspapers, he assured Shertok that the effort ‘would not cost much, as I pay no more than two Palestinian pounds for each article published, and there are papers that accept as little as one and a half Palestinian pounds, or even only one pound, per article’.25 Sasson reported to Shertok on 16 December 1937 that four of his pieces had appeared that day, two in Damascus and two in Beirut.26 The article in the Damascene Fata al-‘Arab reported the ‘grave accusations’ against Syrian officials in the British press, which blamed their position on Palestine for impeding France’s ratification of the Syrian-French treaty, and warned the Syrian government, parliament, and press against involvement in the Palestinian struggle. The article in al-Insha’ denounced the ‘negative policy’ adopted by Palestinian leaders for the past 17 years, accusing them of shutting the door in the face of a ‘positive policy’, and calling on all Arabs in favour of a ‘positive policy’ to come forward and work for its implementation. As for the articles placed that day in Beirut dailies, Sasson reported that Lisan al-Hal’s was a news report datelined Jerusalem attacking Palestinian ‘acts of violence’ (blamed on the Palestinian leadership) and expressing astonishment that Muslim clerics could remain silent about such acts while Jewish leaders condemned ‘retaliatory operations’ launched by ‘many of their young people’. The Sawt al-Ahrar piece was an investigative report on the Mandatory government’s ‘decisive’ resolution to restore law and order to the country by all possible means and its decision to go forward with partition even if Arabs and Jews remained unconvinced. After describing Arabs who committed ‘acts of violence’ as being incapable of distinguishing between good and evil, the article attacked Palestinian leaders, criticized foreign propaganda that ‘exploited the situation and poured oil on fire’, and called on the Mandate government to allow the ‘Palestinian leaders’ still in the country (i.e., anti-nationalists or collaborationists) to take the lead in ending the ‘terrorism’ and abnormal conditions prevailing there. As in his other reports, Sasson concluded by urging Shertok to read his articles both to understand the overall picture and to gauge

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The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt

their impact on readers. He further added that since arriving in Beirut he had published fifteen articles and hoped soon to place articles in al-Nahar and alIttihad ‘for our takeover [of the press] to be complete’.27

V Tactical Differences between Shertok and Sasson When Sasson returned to Jerusalem, proud of his accomplishment of planting 28 articles in 11 Damascene and Beirut newspapers at an average cost of £P 1.75 per article, he was confronted by Shertok’s decision to limit the number of articles to only two per week, in Sasson’s opinion, threatening the entire project. The particulars of the tactical disagreement between the two emerge from a long letter dated 22 December 1937 that Sasson, greatly upset, wrote to Shertok in an effort to dissuade him from his decision. It seems that Shertok was motivated by two considerations: (1) the political department’s budget did not permit the placement of articles with such frequency, and (2) the publication of 28 such articles in 11 days would inevitably raise suspicion and risk exposing their provenance.28 Sasson’s rebuttal of Shertok’s reasoning and defence of his own concept included the following arguments:29 ●

●

●

Readers would have no reason to suspect that the articles were dubious or planted by Jews because of their range of subject matter and diverse formats, some being news reports purportedly by correspondents in Palestine, others having by-lines with fictitious Arab names. Furthermore, the articles were clear, in-depth, based on a solid knowledge of Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian issues, and written to express genuine concern for Arab economic, political and social interests. Between them, Beirut and Damascus produced 27 Arabic-language dailies (18 in Beirut, nine in Damascus). Each has its own readership and circulation, and most, if not all, ‘print on a daily basis venomous, anti-Zionist articles about our conspiracies and colonial ambitions in Palestine and neighboring countries’. In such a setting, Sasson argued, just two articles would have no effect whatsoever. If the purpose of the articles was merely to counter foreign propaganda, two articles per week might have been enough. ‘But our purpose is not limited to dealing with only one subject. We treat numerous matters, all of which are serious, important, and urgent: “terrorism” and the support it receives from

The Zionist Disinformation Campaign in Syria and Lebanon

●

●

49

Arab states; foreign propaganda; Arab state involvement in the Palestine problem; partition; mutual understanding; the strength of the Yishuv in Palestine; the fight against Haj Amin Al-Husayni and his supporters; problems and issues in neighbouring countries and their impact on Palestine, etc.’ Worsening conditions of late make such articles even more necessary. Syria, now a base for the Palestinian national movement, is playing an increasingly important role in the Palestinian struggle, while foreign propaganda in Lebanon and Syria is intensifying. Publishing only two articles a week, one in Damascus and the other in Beirut, will not work. No Syrian or Lebanese newspaper would agree to take an isolated position against ‘radicals’ and ‘nationalists’ by publishing a single article on the subject. A mere two articles in just two papers would expose them for what they are and raise suspicions about them, which is not in the JA’s interests.30

VI Sasson Proposes a Work Schedule to Shertok Sasson concluded his letter with an appeal to his superior to reconsider and, after further exchanges, Shertok relented. Less than a week later, at the end of December 1937, Sasson followed up with a work schedule. His cover letter began with a caveat: the impact of the articles on Syrian and Lebanese elite and popular opinion would take at least six months and perhaps up to a year to be felt – and this only if the publication schedule proceeded uninterrupted and at the recommended pace. The work schedule was based on Sasson’s knowledge and experience of the Syrian and Lebanese press and the relationships he had built with various publishers and editors; it also took into account the circulations of the seven newspapers he proposed for the project: three Syrian (Fata al-‘Arab, al-Insha’, and al-Ayyam) and four Lebanese (Sawt al-Ahrar, Beirut, Lisan al-Hal, and al-Nahar) dailies.31 Other newspapers could be brought in if and when possible. Laying out the relative merits of the Syrian versus Lebanese press for placing the JA articles, Sasson’s letter stated his preference for the Syrian but warned of its diligence in examining the content and orientation of articles, sometimes refusing to publish them even when offered much higher prices. He attributed this to the papers’ concern for their ‘prestige’, their relations with Palestinian

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The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt

leaders in Syria and Lebanon and the financial support they received from the Syrian government, Palestinian leaders, and foreign governments. The Lebanese papers, on the other hand, particularly the four he recommended, enjoyed a wider circulation in Palestine and other Arab countries. In addition, he noted, ‘some Lebanese papers, for economic and political reasons, were in favor of ending terrorism in Palestine, combating foreign propaganda, and the development of the Zionist project’.32 Sasson’s schedule called for a publication rate of one item per week in each of the seven papers, or a total of 28 articles per month. He did not consider this to be too much, particularly given ‘the activities of Haj Amin al-Husayni and foreign propaganda’ in the region. This rhythm, he noted, would also allow the JA to treat various topics while meeting the financial demands of the newspapers involved; their number, moreover, would deflect suspicion from any single publication. Based on his experience, Sasson thought £P60 per month would suffice for compensation and placement. He also made his habitual recommendation that further use be made of the planted articles through republication in English and European papers and citations in al-Sharq Agency dispatches. To optimize the effort’s utility and profitability, and to provide a forum for discussing article topics, Sasson proposed weekly meetings of senior members of the JA’s intelligence services to include himself, Epstein, and Aaron Haim Cohen.33

VII Branching Out into New Areas For the first six months of 1938, the files contain almost nothing concerning the publication project. This does not mean that there were no reports or correspondence during the period, since keeping files during the pre-state era was somewhat haphazard, lacking the systematic archiving of later years. It also does not mean that the project slowed down; in fact, it branched out into new areas. A 19 July 1938 memorandum from Sasson to Shertok summarizing the Arab Division’s activities during the first half of the year notes the launch at the start of 1938 of a new bulletin entitled Jewish News.34 The newsletter, which appeared five times a week with a print run of 300, presented Jewish affairs in a favourable light and was sent to leading newspapers, ministries, and political figures in Syria, Lebanon, and other Arab countries. The Arab Division of the JA’s political department also published two large pamphlets in early summer on the

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economic benefits brought by the Jews to Palestine, contrasting these with the negative impact of the Arab boycott of the Jewish economy. It also printed numerous leaflets decrying Arab ‘terrorism’ in Palestine, which were distributed by the thousands in Syria, Lebanon and other Arab capitals. All these publications were written under assumed Arab names.35 These activities were above and beyond the regular planting of articles in the Syrian and Lebanese press, which according to the memorandum now reached 280 since the project began.36 Sasson’s 19 July 1938 memorandum from Jerusalem was followed by his report dated 21 July from Beirut.37 From this and subsequent reports, it transpires that Sasson’s work plan of late December 1937 had not been implemented as drafted. For example, the 21 July report describes seven articles he had planted over the last few days in the Lebanese and Syrian press, but none of the three dailies in which they appeared – the Damascene al-Rabita (14, 16, 19, and 21 July) and the Beirut papers al-Hadith (20 July) and al-Ittihad (20 and 21 July) – was listed in Sasson’s work schedule. Most of these were leading articles signed by the newspapers’ editorial boards and dealt with the Interparliamentary Conference of Arab and Islamic States on Palestine due to be held in Cairo.38 Nonetheless, the field reports contain interesting details about Sasson’s efforts to branch out and secure new outlets, as well as about his ‘lobbying’ activities. On 29 August 1938, he met for three hours in Damascus with Tawfiq Jana, owner of al-Istiqlal al-‘Arabi newspaper, in the house of Yusuf Linyadu, who represented the Jewish community in the Syrian parliament and was a JA agent in the city. According to Sasson’s report, Jana agreed to publish JA-inspired articles (to be provided by Sasson) in return for £P12 per month, with the agreement to take effect on 1 September 1938. Sasson mentioned that the terms were identical to those he had reached earlier with Ilyas Harfush, owner of Beirut’s al-Hadith, and with Sam‘an Sayf, owner of al-Ahwal.39 In his report of 7 September 1938, Sasson recounted another important meeting, held at his initiative, in Damascus on 5 September with Nasuh Babil, owner of the Damascus daily al-Ayyam and a leading opposition (i.e., against the National Bloc) figure in Syria at the time. This was neither the first nor was it the last time that Sasson met Babil, but at this particular meeting, which lasted three hours, the two men deepened their understanding on several matters. Sasson began by speaking about the urgent need for the Syrian press – in the interests both of Syria and the Jews of Palestine – to redouble its efforts to dampen the Syrian popular agitation in support of the Palestinian struggle. According to Sasson’s report, Babil expressed doubts that the Syrian journalists would respond to the JA’s wishes, since, he claimed, most were in the pay of Haj Amin al-

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The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt

Husayni; Babil himself ‘had received without asking the sum of £P 100 from him to pay the employees of his newspaper when it had been closed during the previous 3 months’. Babil further advised, according to Sasson, that there was no point in the JA’s ‘buying’ several or even all the Syrian newspapers as long as the Syrian Bureau for National Propaganda continued to operate under the direction of Fakhri al-Barudi, the reason being, he claimed, that Haj Amin was providing this office with generous monthly payments. According to Babil, the only way to silence the Bureau would be pressure from Paris and London. Despite such reservations, however, by the end of the meeting Babil had agreed to al-Ayyam’s participation in the efforts to calm the pro-Palestinian agitation in Syria in exchange for an (undisclosed) sum.40

VIII Efforts to influence the Conference of Arab Parliamentarians in Cairo Much of the Zionist disinformation effort in early autumn 1938 was focused on the Conference of Arab and Islamic Parliamentarians on Palestine, held in Cairo in October 1938 as a follow-up to the September 1937 Bludan Conference. As the date of the Cairo Conference approached, Sasson redoubled his efforts with Lebanese and Syrian press and personalities to sabotage the conference by getting the largest possible number of parliamentarians of both countries to boycott it. During his four-day visit to Beirut at the end of September and beginning of October 1938, he had meetings with numerous journalists, editors, and newspaper owners, including three with Ilyas Harfush (al-Hadith), two with Sam‘an Sayf (al-Ahwal), and one with As‘ad ‘Aql, the editor of al-Bayraq. During this brief visit, Sasson also managed to get in three trips to Damascus to confer with Tawfiq Jana (Istiqlal al-‘Arabi) and other Syrian personalities.41 The meetings all focused on the Cairo Conference and, in most cases, the editors and newspaper owners he met with agreed to call, in the name of their editorial, for the non-participation of the Lebanese and Syrian parliamentarians. According to Sasson’s report, eight articles inveighing against the parliamentarians’ participation in the conference were published in the Beirut dailies al-Ahwal, alIttihad, Lisan al-Hal, and Sawt al-Ahrar due to his personal efforts. The articles emphasized that anyone attending the conference could do so only in his personal capacity. In a long lead article, Sawt al-Ahrar demanded that the conference call for an end to the ‘disorderly conduct’ in Palestine and for negotiations between the parties to reach a reasonable resolution to the Palestine problem.42

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Sasson also reports Harfush’s promise to visit Lebanese president Emile Eddé and the head of the political section in the French Legation in Beirut to urge that they ask the parliamentarians planning to attend the conference to withdraw so as to ‘preserve Lebanon’s neutrality and avoid the disapproval of the British and the Jews’. According to Sasson, Harfush also committed himself to publishing in the next two days strongly worded articles against the conference aims in general and the participation of Lebanese parliamentarians in particular. Harfush added that he intended to say that these individuals had received money from Nabih al-‘Azma, a Syrian pan-Arabist and head of the Palestine Defense Committee, to participate in the conference to show the solidarity of Lebanon with the Palestinian rebels.43 Summing up, Sasson mentions his success in mobilizing a number of Lebanese and Syrian personalities to use their influence with members of parliament to persuade them not to go to Cairo. For example, through former Lebanese Premier Khayr al-Din al-Ahdab he was able to dissuade Musa Namur, a leading Maronite who had agreed to head the Lebanese delegation, from participating, and Harfush helped him convince Lebanese parliamentarians Farid al-Khazn and Ayyub Kan‘an to withdraw from the conference.44 The congress nonetheless went forward and passed similar resolutions as those passed at the Bludan Congress, though with only 130 delegates from 11 Arab and Muslim countries. It should be noted that the planting of pro-Zionist articles in the Lebanese and Syrian press did not always come from JA initiatives but in several cases resulted from private citizens of the two countries. In a 13 May 1938 memorandum to Shertok,45 Sasson recounts his meeting in Jerusalem with the journalist ‘MN’, who had contacted the JA about publishing pro-Zionist articles in Syrian and Lebanese newspapers: ‘Today, in keeping with your instructions, I met MN. We discussed his proposal to publish articles in the Beirut and Damascene newspapers.’ After receiving clarifications and guidelines from Sasson, MN proposed to submit 75 pro-Zionist articles to the JA Political Department every three months for publication in four newspapers: three in Beirut (al-Nahar, alAhwal, and al-Hadith) and one in Damascus (al-Istiqlal). For this, MN demanded £P2 for the writing and publication of each article plus an additional sum of £P12 at the end of each quarter. The articles, which would deal with political, economic, and social topics to be determined weekly by the JA’s political department, would be signed either by the editorial committees of the newspapers in question or under the name of well-known journalists. Sasson told MN that he would have Shertok’s reply within a few days, before he left Jerusalem.46 From

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other reports, it appears that MN did begin working in accordance with the formula reached with Sassoon, but with less frequency than had been agreed.47

IX The End of the Project The last item found in the archives pertaining to the publishing project is from December 1938. Although there is no specific indication that the project was terminated, it is likely that it did not continue into 1939. The main reason seems to have been financial. Shertok, as director of the JA’s political department, was constantly faced with competing priorities and forced to balance between them in keeping with evolving events. Indeed, the issue of money was a constant subtext of almost all Sasson’s reports, as evidenced by his endless emphasis on the effectiveness and impact of his articles; his urgent warnings, seemingly unprompted, of the dire consequences of discontinuing the project; his insistence on the negligible sums paid to place each article or, as he put it, the high returns yielded at low cost. The tensions over money come out most explicitly in Sasson’s urgent response, discussed above, to Shertok’s December 1937 decision to cut back the publishing programme. It was clearly the push-and-pull over budget between a reluctant Shertok and an eager Sasson that prompted the latter to write his 19 July 1938 report reviewing – or defending – the programme to date. In doing so, Sasson made a surprising revelation: In addition to placing articles in Arab newspapers, the Arabic division carried out a far more important operation, namely, buying Arabic newspapers in Syria and Lebanon. In the summer of 1938 we succeeded in buying five newspapers: three in Beirut and two in Damascus. We could have bought more, but we didn’t have the budget, and for the same reason we were soon compelled to suspend the relationship, even with the papers we had actually bought.48

What Sasson meant by ‘buying’ becomes apparent in his description of the tasks required of the newspapers in exchange for the set payments they were to receive. The scope of these sums, or the cost of the entire ‘purchase’ venture, are nowhere spelled out in the memorandum, nor could any such reference be found elsewhere in the files. According to the memorandum, the ‘bought’ newspapers were obliged ‘to publish articles and news that we supply to them, to refrain from publishing material hostile to Zionism provided by the other side and foreign sources, to bring together Arab and Jewish viewpoints, denounce Arab

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terrorism in Palestine, and to adopt a pro-Zionist/Jewish posture on all political issues’.49 Sasson’s eagerness to justify or sell his programme to his superiors led him to go so far as to claim at least partial credit for the growth of the Palestinian collaborationist movement funded by the British in opposition to the Palestinian national leadership. This had led to the organization under Britain of Palestinian armed groups, the ‘Peace brigades’, to fight the nationalist guerrillas. Specifically, Sasson’s memorandum stated: It is important to emphasize that the articles published in the newspapers we bought, as well as in the other papers, against Arab terrorism and concerning the conspiracies and initiatives of the Mufti and his henchmen indirectly encouraged the Nashashibi party to emerge into open warfare against the AHC and the leadership of the terrorism.50

While Sasson’s claim is certainly exaggerated, the proliferation of articles supposedly written by well-meaning Arabs and Palestinians depicting the rebellion as terrorism may have swayed readers, especially outside Palestine. It is difficult to assess the impact of the JA’s covert placement of articles on Syrian, Lebanese and wider Arab support for the Palestinian cause. As noted above, a total of 280 articles had been planted in the Syrian and Lebanese press up to mid-July 1938,51 with dozens more placed before the programme came to an end. In all likelihood, it was not great, but whatever the case the JA’s political department’s 1937–1938 publication programme, as documented in the CZA, sheds important light on several issues. Firstly, the reports paint a very unflattering picture of the press and political elite in Lebanon and Syria – or certain segments of it – in the decade before the 1948 war. The success of the JA’s political department’s intelligence in so easily infiltrating widely distributed Lebanese and Syrian newspapers at the time cannot be attributed to its exceptional skills or financial resources. Rather, it was basically due to the feebleness of Arab society, the effeteness and corruption of sectors of the elite, the widespread shortage of cash (and capital) at the time, and endemic internal conflicts on grounds of clan, sect and region. It is worth noting that the same parties who succumbed to the JA’s financial inducements were vociferous in their public denunciations of the influence and power of Jews and Zionists over the Western press. Secondly, the reports in the archives make abundantly clear that the JA’s political department was not content merely to present the Zionist point of view, to misrepresent the Palestinian national struggle, or to offer alternative solutions

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to the Palestine problem. It exceeded these limits to distort and even invent facts outright, planting fabricated news reports about non-existent conspiracies or besmirching the reputations of established public figures (notably Arab nationalist figures deeply concerned about the Palestine problem) with false accusations. By these means, the JA’s political department hoped to foster an Arab public opinion that would oppose the national rights of the Palestinian people and accept the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

4

From Negotiation to Penetration Relations between the Jewish Agency, the National Bloc, and the Shahbandari Opposition

I. Sustained Contact between the Jewish Agency and Syria’s National Bloc Leaders The two official meetings held between the Jewish Agency (JA) and the National Bloc, in August and September 1936 were discussed extensively in Chapter 2. No further formal discussions were held between the two parties, but on the heels of those two meetings, the JA, through its Arab Division, unofficially met with leaders from the National Bloc and the Shahbandari opposition and approached several other Syrian leaders and elites. In January 1937, Eliyahu Sasson and Eliyahu Epstein went to Damascus to share with the Presidency of the National Bloc the minutes of the two meetings and to congratulate the National Bloc on the formation of the new Syrian government. On this visit, they met with Syrian Prime Minister Jamil Mardam, Minister of Defence and Finance Shukri al-Quwatli, Fakhri al-Baroudi, Fayez al-Khoury, Nasuh Babil, Wadi‘ Talhuq, and Farid Zeineddine,1 all figures from the National Bloc and the Shahbandari opposition. Sasson and Epstein, accompanied by JA agent David Pinto who was based in Damascus, made a courtesy call to al-Quwatli at his home on 2 January 1937. They apologized for the delay and after congratulating him on the formation of the Syrian government, they presented him with the minutes of the two previous meetings. Al-Quwatli explained that the Syrian government had only been formed ten days prior to their visit and was too involved with domestic issues to negotiate.2 Two days later, Sasson, Epstein and Pinto met with Mardam at the offices of the Syrian government in Damascus. Epstein delivered a message from the President of the World Zionist Organization, Chaim Weizmann, in which he 57

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congratulated him on the formation of the new Syrian government. He also conveyed congratulations from the Head of the JA’s political department Moshe Shertok. Mardam thanked Weizmann and Shertok for their messages and said that the two meetings held with Weizmann had left a profound impact. He said that as long as there were politicians like Weizmann, and seasoned Middle East experts like Shertok, he was optimistic that relations between Jews and Arabs would find the desired solution. Mardam added that he had considered the previous meetings between the Syrian National Bloc and the JA, and explained that the Syrian government was very busy with domestic Syrian issues but would address the issue of negotiations at the first opportunity. He expressed his regret over the failure to achieve peace between the Arab and Jewish peoples, stating that the conflict was one between relatives and not between strangers.3

II Eliyahu Epstein and David Hoz Meet with Jamil Mardam In the wake of the fierce outbreak of the 1936 Arab Revolt, the British government formed a Royal Commission in November 1936 to investigate the situation in Palestine, known as the Peel Commission, after its president, Lord Peel. The Peel Commission Report, submitted to the British government and ratified in July 1937, recommended that Palestine be partitioned into three regions: an Arab area annexed to Transjordan; a Jewish area where a Jewish state would be established and its approximately 300,000 Palestinian Arabs expelled; and an area – comprising Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth, a corridor from Jerusalem to Jaffa taking in the cities it passed through, such as Lydda and Ramleh, Haifa, Tiberias, Safed, Acre, and a large part of the Negev – that would remain under British Mandate.4 The Arab Higher Committee, led by Haj Amin al-Husayni, rejected the Peel Commission recommendations and worked to mobilize Arab countries against them. The Zionist movement’s initial reaction was also one of dismay, given that the Commission’s recommendations only granted the Jews a ‘small part’ of Palestine. Opposition, however,gradually softened due to a clause that stipulated the transfer of Palestinians from the proposed Jewish state. David Ben-Gurion attached utmost importance to transfer recommendation and stressed that the Zionist movement must . . . adhere to the recommendation as we adhere to the Balfour Declaration, or even to Zionism itself. We must adhere to this recommendation with our utmost

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strength, will, and hopes, because in this recommendation out of all the recommendations, there is some compensation for sloughing off other parts of the country [. . .]. The transfer clause, I believe, is more important than all our demands to increase the area [. . .] since we are not able to get the Arabs out of our midst now and transfer them to Arab regions – which is the proposal of a British Royal Commission – and it is something we could not do easily, if at all, after the establishment of the state, when the whole hostile world is watching how we treat our minority.5

As debate raged about the Peel Commission and what it might recommend, on 26 February 1937, Epstein and David Hoz took a small plane from Lydda Airport in Palestine to Damascus Airport to meet with Jamil Mardam. The JA saw the visit as a chance to strengthen relations with Mardam and formulate a common position on the Peel Commission. The JA’s leadership opposed the partition of Palestine between Palestinians and Jewish settlers, keen to establish a Jewish state in all of Palestine. The JA also sought to reach an understanding with Mardam where any solution to the Palestinian question had to take into account the demands of all parties, especially those of the Zionist movement, not just those of the Arabs and Britain.6. Pinto, who met them at the airport, had arranged the meeting and informed them on the way that Syrian Prime Minister Jamil Mardam was facing great difficulties. Senior officials of the French Mandate authorities in Syria opposed the French government’s flexible policy towards the Syrian government and Mardam was subject to severe criticism and opposition from some of the leaders of the Syrian National Bloc who were dissatisfied with his moderate policy towards France and the slow pace in achieving Syrian objectives. Members of both the National Bloc and the Shahbandari opposition orchestrated campaigns against him. Hoz immediately addressed the rumours spreading that the Peel Commission might recommend the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state: ‘If the Peel Commission recommends the partition of Palestine, and it actually happens, it would harm Jewish and Arab interests in Palestine, and Syria as well.’ Epstein explained that the JA was not asking the Syrian government to intervene in the Palestinian question in the way Arab monarchs had – which dealt with only two parties, the Arabs and Britain, ignoring the Jewish party. Epstein stressed that any attempt to follow the approach of the Arab kings would end in failure. There would be no solution to the Palestinian issue, he stressed, without including the Jewish side. Mardam replied that he and his colleagues in the National Bloc accepted the fact that there were three parties to the Palestinian issue and agreed that real peace

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would be achieved if the interests of all these parties were taken into account. Mardam added, according to Epstein’s report, that the Syrians were practical people, and their view of the Palestinian issue was a practical one. He agreed with the JA representatives about opposing the partition of Palestine and stressed that any solution to the Palestinian issue had to be based on peace and cooperation between Arabs and Jews. The National Bloc, he added, sought to understand the JA’s demands thoroughly and comprehensively and sought to understand aspects of the Palestinian issue through an understanding of ‘the national vision of the Jewish Agency and an appreciation of the gains that the entire Arab people and the Palestinian Arabs themselves may derive from the Zionist project in Palestine’. He explained that this did not mean that the National Bloc was in agreement with what JA representatives had said at previous meetings, but equally, it wished to pursue negotiations with it, patiently and in good faith, in the hope of reaching reasonable results. At the end of the meeting, Mardam told the JA delegates that he would brief his government on the meeting and contact Haj Amin al-Husayni, Head of the Arab Higher Committee, to influence him and other Palestinian leaders.7 Attempts by Mardam to persuade Haj al-Husayni and Palestinian leaders to respond to the JA’s demands failed. The Palestinian leadership demanded a complete halt to Jewish immigration and the independence of Palestine. This they would achieve through militancy and pressure on Britain, not through negotiations with the Zionist movement, which rejected the independence of Palestine. At his meeting with Epstein on 10 June 1937 in Paris – the fifth meeting between the two men in six months – Mardam told him that he had failed to persuade the Palestinian leadership to negotiate with the JA.8 Whether Mardam really tried to persuade Haj al-Husayni, or had merely claimed to in one of the pragmatic moves he was known for, is unclear. When they met in Paris, Mardam maintained that the Peel Committee would not come up with a permanent solution to the Palestinian question. The solution, according to Mardam, could only be reached through direct negotiations between the two parties. He said that he knew from reliable sources that the Peel Commission would recommend partition. The Arab part of Palestine, he said would be annexed to Transjordan under the leadership of Emir Abdullah and since Haj Amin al-Husayni strongly opposed this he would fight it with all his power. Mardam added that once Syria’s urgent problems had been resolved in the coming months, he would make every effort to reach an agreement between the Palestinians and the JA. Mardam then told Epstein that he did not oppose Zionism, and never had, that he had always valued the talents of its leaders, had and still supported

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reaching an Arab-Jewish agreement, and had told the senior French officials he met during his visit to Paris that Syria needed experts in various fields, and that the assistance of the Jews in those areas would be useful. Mardam indicated that he would relay this to French Prime Minister Léon Blum. He praised Blum and was confident he could work towards reaching an understanding between Jews and Arabs. As part of his charm offensive, Mardam told Epstein that he had written a long letter to King Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia about the need to reach an agreement between Jews and Arabs, and assured Epstein that he intended to raise the issue again with the King at the earliest opportunity. At the end of the meeting, Epstein thanked Mardam and assured him that the JA highly valued his and his colleagues’ friendly position toward the Agency, and he would continue relations with him and the National Bloc regardless of the Peel Commission’s final recommendations.9 At the beginning of November 1937, heavy rain affected Damascus and other parts of Syria, particularly some farming villages, resulting in loss of life and property. David Pinto suggested that the JA offer its condolences to the Syrian government and, as a way of fostering relations, provide funds to aid the victims. The JA was afraid that the Syrian government would refuse the offer, so Sasson asked Pinto to take soundings with the Syrian government. Pinto made inquiries with Syrian Prime Minister Jamil Mardam, who accepted.10 Moshe Shertok then sent a cheque from the JA drawn from the Anglo-Palestine Bank for 2,000 Syrian pounds (£S). Syrian Prime Minister Jamil Mardam accepted it and thanked Shertok in a letter.11

III. Eliyahu Sasson and Reuven Zaslansky meet Lutfi al-Haffar In late January 1938, JA agent and Syrian MP for the Jewish community, Yusuf Linyadu asked Shertok to send JA representatives to meet Lutfi al-Haffar and Nasib al-Bakri, two leaders in the Syrian National Bloc. The request came in the wake of Linyadu’s meeting with al-Haffar and al-Bakri, who had discussed the Arab Revolt revolt in Palestine and the impact of ongoing Palestinian armed struggle on Syria. In the meeting, Linyadu urged them to invite JA representatives ‘to confer on joint action with the Jewish Agency against the continuation of the Arab Revolt in Palestine and against foreign propaganda’ serving Germany and Italy.12 Al-Haffar and al-Bakri agreed to Linyadu’s proposal, and Linyadu wrote to the JA, inviting it to hold a meeting in Damascus.13 The JA sent Sasson and Reuven Zaslansky (Shiloah) to Damascus and on 30 January 1938, Sasson and

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Shiloah, accompanied by Linyadu, met with al-Haffar at his home (Al-Bakri did not attend because he was not in Damascus that day, according to Sasson and Shiloah’s report to Shertok).14 In welcoming his guests, al-Haffar reassured them the National Bloc had always believed it necessary to find a solution to the Palestinian question. ‘The Arab and Jewish people are cousins and a solution to the Palestinian issue cannot be found without taking the Jewish side into account.’ In their report to Shertok, Sasson and Shiloah stated that they tried to digress from talks on a political solution, and said that before talking about a political solution to the Palestinian issue, consultation and thought were needed on how to overcome the violence and lack of security prevailing in Palestine. In answer to al-Haffar’s question on who was responsible for the violence in Palestine, the JA representatives blamed the Palestinian leadership, accusing it of receiving financial support from Germany and Italy. Al-Haffar denied the accusation noting that the leadership of the Syrian National Bloc, which had no relations with Germany or Italy, had been similarly accused. Sasson and Shiloah then raised the issue of support provided by Syria to the Arab Revolt. Many of the dead and injured in Palestine recently, they said, had been Syrian. Al-Haffar assured them that while some Syrians might have joined the Arab Revolt in Palestine ‘to make money’, Syria was not providing aid to the Arab Revolt. He explained the challenges facing the National Bloc and the Syrian government. With the renewed uprising in Palestine and the British army’s increased repression against the Palestinians – including the expulsion of many Palestinian leaders – the Syrian people’s sympathy with the Arab Revolt increased along with calls from various Syrian bodies to help the Arab Revolt. These bodies, hugely influential in the neighbourhoods of Damascus and other parts of Syria, were calling on the National Bloc and the Syrian government to end its neutrality and back the Arab Revolt in Palestine. Such pressure put the Syrian government and the National Bloc in an extremely delicate position, but, in spite of this, he maintained, the National Bloc went to great lengths to prevent Syrians from joining the Arab Revolt in Palestine. Ending the Arab Revolt in Palestine, he said, was in their interest. Al-Haffar stressed that the Syrians, with some individual exceptions, were not participating in the Arab Revolt in Palestine thanks to the efforts of the National Bloc and the Syrian government. Sasson and Shiloah praised the efforts of the National Bloc and the Syrian government but insisted that Damascus remained a centre for the leadership of the Arab Revolt in Palestine which was organizing various forms of support for the Revolt. On why Syria hosted Palestinian leaders in Damascus al-Haffar said

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‘our national duty compels us to host them because we are Arab nationalists, but we have clearly warned them against any activity that supports the Arab Revolt in Palestine and we have tightened control over them. I do not believe they are doing much’. He added that the Syrian people and press were highly critical of the position of the Bloc and the Syrian government regarding the Arab Revolt in Palestine, especially in light of the British army’s brutal repression of the Palestinians. He stressed that the National Bloc was seeking a solution to the Palestinian question and it understood the importance of the ‘Jewish people’ – whom it saw as a productive force that could bring good things to the East and Palestine – and that the Palestinian issue could not be resolved without taking them into account.15 Relations fostered with the Syrian National Bloc were critical to Shertok. They featured prominently in his speeches at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Mapai Party (which led the JA and the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine) on 2 February 1938, and at the JA’s board meeting on 6 February 1938.16 In the latter speech, Shertok said that men from the JA’s political department would from time to time go to Syria and Lebanon to monitor the activities of the Head of the Higher Arab Commitee Haj Amin al-Husayni and the leaders of the Arab Revolt residing in Syria and Lebanon. Shertok added that Yusuf Linyadu, a member of the Syrian Parliament, had recently asked the JA to send one of its activists to Damascus so that Linyadu could provide him with important information about the Palestinian revolutionaries, and so that he could conduct negotiations with the National Bloc on the prospect of achieving an Arab-Jewish agreement. Shertok believed that the Syrian government and the National Bloc were serious about their relationship with the JA and were keen to reach an ArabJewish agreement. He maintained that the Syrian government was genuinely interested in stopping the Arab Revolt in Palestine for several reasons, primarily, its belief that its continuation was delaying the French parliament’s ratification of the Syrian-French treaty, an issue that was being exploited by the Syrian opposition led by ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar against the government, and the economic impact on Syria. Their interest in the Palestinian issue and in negotiations with the Jewish Agency stemmed from domestic political developments. The Palestinian issue was as well an important subject for alShahbandar, leader of the opposition, who used it and negotiations between Arabs and Jews, against the Syrian government for political purposes. The Syrian government and the National Bloc were trying to take the sting out of Shahbandar’s position and keep the matter in their own hands, according to Shertok.17

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IV Recruitment of Nasib al-Bakri In a significant accomplishment, in February 1938 the JA recruited Nasib alBakri, a leader of the National Bloc, to work as a spy. Al-Bakri, who occupied an important position in the leadership of the National Bloc and the Syrian national movement in general, was an ideal candidate given the timing of recruitment at the height of the Arab Revolt and at the peak of its threat to the Zionist project. Born in Damascus to an aristocratic family who claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad, al-Bakri (1888–1966) studied at the Preparatory School in Damascus and the Sultaniyyah School in Beirut, where he graduated in 1912. With his brothers Fawzi and Sami, he joined the secret al Arabiyah al - fatat Society (the Young Arab Society), served as its secretary and was one of the first to join the revolution of Emir Faisal who, in 1918, appointed him as his personal adviser.18 After the fall of the Faisal government and the French army’s occupation of Damascus, al-Bakri was considered as a candidate for the throne in Syria. When the Syrian revolution erupted in 1925, he was one of the first to join in support. In 1932, he was elected to the Syrian Parliament as a member for Damascus and re-elected in 1936. He was one of the founders and leaders of the National Bloc and head of its Damascus branch, the 1936 National Bloc government appointed him governor of Jabal alDruz. In late 1939, al-Bakri moved closer to the Shahbandar camp and came to be counted part of it.19 He was the Minister of Justice from February to June 1939, then that of Agriculture and Economy. He was elected to the Syrian Parliament in 1943 and 1949 and was a prominent founder of the People’s Party in 1948, having been elected party vice-president. He was more religiously conservative than his colleagues and enjoyed support among the traditional masses in ordinary neighbourhoods. His strong ties with the veterans of the 1925 revolution also boosted his popularity.20 Israeli archival documents show that al-Bakri remained the JA’s agent for several years.21 Through their dealings with him, the JA achieved a number of significant goals, most prominently: ●

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obtaining accurate information about the Palestinian revolutionaries, their Syrian supporters, their ways of entering Palestine and smuggling weapons from Syria to Palestine, and about the sources and quantities of these weapons; obtaining important and accurate information about the decisions and policies of the National Bloc and the Syrian government, especially regarding the Palestinian issue and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, the Jewish Agency, and the Zionist project; and

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after he became a minister in the Syrian government, influencing many of the policies and decisions of the Syrian government and the National Bloc on the Arab Revolt, Syrian support for it, and attitudes towards the Jewish Agency.

V The Beginning of Nasib al-Bakri’s Collaborating with the Jewish Agency Nasib al-Bakri got on well with Syrian parliamentarian and JA agent, Yusuf Linyadu. At the beginning of February 1938, Linyadu sent a report to the Arab Division of the JA’s political department indicating that al-Bakri was ready to cooperate with the Agency and had important information to pass on. Sasson travelled from Jerusalem to Damascus to meet him. Between 4 to 6 February 1938, Sasson met al-Bakri in Damascus three times. On the third meeting – held at his house on the evening of 6 February 1938 with the participation of Linyadu and lasting for two hours – al-Bakri agreed to start cooperating with the JA.22 In his report to Moshe Shertok, Sasson noted that he and al-Bakri had spoken openly. Al-Bakri said that he and Yusuf Linyadu had ‘talked several times about the situation in Palestine’, and both of them had concluded ‘the necessity of inviting representatives from the Jewish Agency to discuss with them the measures to be taken in Syria, Paris, and London to bring about positive, rapid, and concrete change to the situation in Palestine’. Sasson thanked al-Bakri and asked him about his alleged information on Italian and German propaganda in Syria, on the rebels’ organizations, and on arms-smuggling to Palestine and asked him whether he was ready to cooperate with the JA. Al-Bakri said that he was ‘ready to undertake serious research to disclose all these matters’, and that he was ‘confident’ that he would ‘receive all the required help from his friends who participated in the Syrian revolution in 1925, some of whom smuggle weapons and recruit revolutionaries. Through his brother, Mazhar al-Bakri, Director-General of the Damascus Police, he could recruit all the police and their informants to investigate the activities of Palestinian revolutionaries in Syria. Through his acquaintance with Colonel Panké, Director-General of the Syrian Police, he could make fundamental changes to border security, despite Adel al-‘Azma, Director of the Interior Department’. Al-Bakri added that he knew of ‘the existing relations between Adel al-‘Azma and his brother Nabih, and the Palestinian revolutionaries’ and claimed that he could stop them through government leaders in Syria. He also claimed to have acquaintances, friends, and

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relatives in most of the banks in Damascus, so he could review all transfers from outside Syria in the names of Palestinian revolutionaries and their supporters and friends in Damascus. He also knew that ‘Muhammad al-Ashmar [was] the leading arms smuggler to Palestine, and heard two weeks prior from al-Ashmar himself that he had smuggled into Palestine in just one week 220 rifles, and a large quantity of ammunition. Muhammad al-Ashmar would travel that week to Iraq and the Hejaz’, and al-Bakri knew ‘the people who work for him, and by talking to them, once or twice, he could find out the names and methods of the smugglers, and the names of the Palestinian revolutionaries responsible for smuggling’23. At the end of his statements, al-Bakri asked Sasson whether the JA agency was ready to ‘seriously discuss all these matters with him’. According to his report, Sasson believed al-Bakri had not sufficiently studied the issue and that it would be better for him to first become familiar with all its aspects and prepare in a week or two a concrete plan to submit to the JA. AlBakri then asked about ‘expenses’, and whether they should be included in the plan. Sasson told him that expenses should be addressed so that everything was clear and known from the start and added that if his director decided for some reason to reject the plan, this should not affect their relationship. Al-Bakri answered that him undertaking this task was not intended to serve the JA alone, but also Syria. He and his friends acknowledged the threat to Syria from the continuation of the Arab Revolt in Palestine. Sassoon focused on four issues he needed Al-Bakri to work on: (a) ‘stopping the Arab Revolt in Palestine; (b) stopping the poisonous anti-Zionist propaganda in the Syrian press, mosque sermons, and various meetings in Syria; (c) trying to make whatever possible support for the Jewish Agency from the Syrian people, especially its leaders; and (d) trying to find an appropriate solution to the Palestinian issue’24

Al-Bakri said that he was willing to address the first issue, and that the National Bloc might deal with the fourth, while the Jewish Agency should follow up on and deal with the second and third issues with his and his friends’ help. Before the end of the meeting, al-Bakri committed to submit his plan within ten days. At the end of the meeting, al-Bakri told his guest Sasson that the Syrian government had offered him the position of governor of Damascus as compensation for his resignation as governor of Jabal al-Druz.25 About two weeks later, al-Bakri sent his proposal, which included key provisions al-Bakri committed to achieve, primarily: stopping anti-Zionist

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propaganda in the press and the mosques; preventing Syrians from joining the Arab Revolt in Palestine; preventing Palestinian revolutionaries from entering Syria; stopping the arms trade in Damascus; monitoring and guarding the routes to Palestine; and tightening measures at border posts.26

VI. Nasib al-Bakri’s Conditional Recruitment On 24 February 1938, leaders of the Arab Division of the JA’s political department discussed al-Bakri’s proposal. Sasson and the rest of the intelligence chiefs knew, through Linyadu, that al-Bakri was asking for a large sum of money in exchange for working for the JA. The budget of the Intelligence Service was modest at that time, and al-Bakri’s proposals were of a general nature, making it difficult for the JA Agency to verify his ability to implement them. Given that the security situation of the Yishuv had worsened due to the escalation of Palestinian revolutionary operations, the intelligence chiefs decided to pay him in exchange for his cooperation with the JA. His proposal, however, was deemed inadequate. The JA made it known to him that they were interested in operations whose results were clear, and was only willing to pay for work of which actual implementation could be verified. For the JA the most important and pressing information and issues consisted of: ‘Detailed information about the situation and organizational status of the Palestinian revolutionaries in Syria and obtaining information in advance about the entry of groups of rebels and arms smugglers from Syria to Palestine, so that it is possible to take pre-emptive measures to arrest them’.27 The meeting resolved that the Intelligence Service of the JA’s political department was willing to pay al-Bakri generously, and allocated him £P500, with more to come once the worth of his work was clear, but he would not be paid in advance, and only £P150–200 would be allocated at that time.28 It was also decided that Reuven Shiloah would travel with Sasson to Damascus to meet al-Bakri. On 27 February 1938, Sasson and Shiloah met al-Bakri at his house in Damascus, with Yusuf Linyadu for a two-hour meeting. Sasson and Shiloah told al-Bakri that the JA was only willing to pay money for work that could be verified and gave him three tasks: (a) ‘a comprehensive and detailed report on the activities, relations, plans, financial sources, etc. of the Palestinian revolutionaries; (b) information that can be used to ask the French authorities to deport Palestinians from Damascus and Beirut, as it did with Mu‘in al-Madi; and

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The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt (c) clear information on the dates for the smuggling of rebel groups and weapons into Palestine in order to make preparations to arrest them.’

Sasson and Shiloah emphasized that the third point was the most crucial for the JA, and that it was willing to pay handsomely to achieve that particular aim.29 Discussions at the meeting centred on the methods al-Bakri would use to gather the required information. Al-Bakri referred to his manifold relations with the elites and different circles in Syria, especially those who had participated in the Syrian revolts against France, some of whom supported the Arab Revolt in Palestine. He also said that he was sure that his brother, the Director of the Damascus Police, would put the police at his disposal. As an important leader in the National Bloc, al-Bakri added, he enjoyed good relations with the Syrian government, which he would use when necessary, especially since the Syrian government, according to him, did not support the continuation of the Arab Revolt in Palestine. At the end of the meeting, Sasson asked al-Bakri what fee he would charge to carry out the three tasks. Al-Bakri said that he would think carefully and inform them through Linyadu. Some hours later, Linyadu conveyed Bakri’s reply to Sasson and Shiloah, who were waiting for him at a Damascus hotel. Al-Bakri asked for £P1,000 in exchange of fully carrying out the tasks assigned to him, to be paid in five instalments. Sasson and Shiloah initially rejected it, but, after bargaining and Linyadu’s mediation, it was agreed on 28 February 1938 that the Jewish Agency would pay al-Bakri £P50 at the outset, £P50 after he had submitted his detailed report on Palestinian revolutionaries in Syria, £P50 once he had provided accurate information on many leaders of the Palestinian revolutionaries, and £P50 once he had provided information on armed groups and arms smugglers resulting in the arrest of one of them entering Palestine from Syria. Sasson and Shiloah agreed with Linyadu that he should continue monitoring al-Bakri’s work and liaise between al-Bakri and the JA. The arrangements by which Linyadu would transfer information and letters from al-Bakri to the headquarters of the JA’s political department in Jerusalem were also agreed.30 Sasson and Shiloah relished their success in recruiting al-Bakri as a JA spy, and suggested in their report to Moshe Shertok, that one of them soon leave Jerusalem for Damascus and stay there for several weeks to monitor al-Bakri up close. Linyadu, although faithful in his work for the Agency, was old and ill, while JA agent Dr. David Pinto did not have enough time to keep tabs on al-Bakri because of his work, and Al- Bakri would not work with JA agent David Lawziyyeh since they were not on good terms.

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On 10 March 1938, barely a week after Sasson and Shiloah had asked Shertok to let one of them travel to Damascus, Sasson arrived there. Linyadu was waiting for him and informed him that al-Bakri was working diligently. He had recruited 30 men and assigned them a number of missions, including observing and gathering information on Palestinian revolutionaries, arms smugglers from Syria to Palestine, and smuggling routes.31 Linyadu also told him that Damascus Police Director Mazhar al-Bakri had put 20 informants at Nasib’s disposal for information gathering and other tasks assigned to them. Sasson gave Linyadu £P50 to deliver immediately to Nasib al-Bakri and asked him to make an urgent appointment with him. Linyadu briefed Sasson on the information that al-Bakri had provided the day before, which went as follows: ●

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four days ago, ‘Izzat Darwaza had received £S8,000 from Nabih al-‘Azma from the funds deposited with him to cover the expenses of a mission that would travel in the next few days to the Kurdistan region of Turkey to buy weapons; Hussein Mahmoud al-‘Ali from the village of Tuba near Safed had visited Damascus last week, picked up a large quantity of rifles and ammunition from Darwaza, and delivered them to Palestine, vowing to attack Jewish settlements near his village; al-Bakri had visited Muhammad al-Ashmar yesterday and congratulated him on his safe return from the Hijaz. Al-Bakri and al-Ashmar spoke about the Arab Revolt in Palestine. Al-Ashmar spoke about his discussions with the Mufti and his aides in Beirut and how he was asked to work seriously organizing the revolutionaries in Damascus. Al-Bakri had promised that he would rein in al-Ashmar and bring him over to his side; in the past week, many wounded [revolutionaries] had arrived in Damascus. Musa Haj Husayn had arranged for them to stay in private homes in Damascus and found doctors to care for them. Al-Bakri found out the names of the wounded and the addresses of the homes; according to rumours, large groups of armed revolutionaries had recently been smuggled into Palestine across the Lebanese and Syrian borders, and they were massing near Acre, Beisan and Safed. The Syrian authorities were not monitoring the Palestinian rebels seriously because they were preoccupied with domestic affairs, while the French authorities were exerting little pressure on the Syrian authorities in this regard, and serious work was needed in Paris to remedy this; and the Syrian government had taken a decision to prevent fundraising in Syria for the benefit of any non-Syrian project. The aim of this decision was to prevent fundraising for the Arab Revolt in Palestine.32

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VII Nasib al-Bakri’s Comprehensive Report on the Palestinian Revolutionaries Sasson followed al-Bakri’s activity closely and stepped up his meetings with him. On 18 March 1938, based on information obtained from al-Bakri and other agents, Sasson sent Shertok a comprehensive and detailed report on the Palestinian revolutionaries, their movements from Syria and Lebanon to Palestine, arms smuggling to Palestine and its sources, and Syrians working for the Arab Revolt. The report included:33 ● ●

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● ● ●

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a list of 26 Palestinians leading the Arab Revolt in Palestine; a list of 12 revolutionaries moving back and forth from Syria and Lebanon to Palestine to communicate between the leadership of the Arab Revolt in Damascus and Beirut and the revolutionaries in Palestine; the name of a photographer who would accompany the revolutionaries in battles and operations in Palestine and send photographs to Arab newspapers; a list of six revolutionaries who were traveling to establish a link between rebel positions in Palestine and supporters of Haj Amin al-Husayni in Jerusalem; a list of seven Syrians and Lebanese buying weapons for the revolutionaries; a list of nine men smuggling weapons from Syria to Palestine; the names of two drivers from Damascus smuggling weapons in their cars to Palestine; a list of the cities and regions where the rebels bought arms, including Damascus, Beirut, Aleppo, Iskenderun, Kurdistan, Iraq, Greece, and Germany, and from the French in Syria; a list of ten routes for the transfer of weapons from Syria and Lebanon to Palestine; a list of 12 men working to recruit revolutionaries and transfer them to Palestine; a list of nine senior Syrian leaders and officials who supported the Arab Revolt in Palestine and helped transport revolutionaries and weapons from Syria to Palestine, including Munir al-Rayyes, ‘Adil al-‘Azma, and Fakhri al-Baroudi; a list of 13 men who communicated and coordinated between the Palestinian rebels and the German and Italian consulates in Damascus; a list of seven men running pro-Palestinian propaganda;

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a list of 15 Syrian and Lebanese leaders who supported Haj Amin alHusayni; and a list of the names of ten leaders of the Arab Revolt in Syria, with details of their missions.34

VIII Eliyahu Sasson Spends March in Damascus to Follow the Work of Nasib al-Bakri Eliyahu Sasson spent most of March 1938 between Damascus and Beirut gathering information and monitoring the activities of several JA agents, Nasib al-Bakri in particular. Sasson met with al-Bakri for three hours on 29 March 1938 at Yusef Linyadu’s house in Damascus. Al-Bakri gave a detailed presentation on the political situation in Syria and his espionage activities on behalf of the JA. On the heels of this meeting, Sasson submitted two reports to Moshe Shertok, one political and one dealing with security.

1 The Political Dimension Al-Bakri gave a thorough and detailed account of political developments within the National Bloc. He explained that Syrian Prime Minister Jamil Mardam had resolved tensions between the Syrian government and the National Bloc, and that the Bloc’s leadership had agreed to Mardam’s proposal that the number of ministers in the Syrian government be restricted to three, including the prime minister, until the French parliament ratified the Franco-Syrian agreement. Al-Bakri reviewed the detailed report presented by Mardam to the leadership of the National Bloc on the progress of negotiations with France, then conveyed to Sasson the discussions of the National Bloc leadership on the regional and international situation, noting Mardam’s fear that Turkey would occupy large parts of northern Syria (Alexandretta, Aleppo, the Jazeera, and Deir Ezzor) if a world war or a war between Syria and Turkey erupted. National Bloc leaders also expressed fears that Britain would agree with France and Turkey to partition Syria, al-Bakri informed Sasson. In such a scenario, Turkey would occupy northern Syria, southern Syria would be annexed to Transjordan, Palestine would be under British occupation, and Lebanon would remain under French occupation. At the National Bloc meeting it was decided that Mardam should follow a friendly policy towards Britain, and to continue to consult on this with the leaders of the National Bloc.35

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Al-Bakri also told Sasson what happened when the bloc’s leadership met with Nuri al-Sa‘id. There had been discussions about the tense international situation, fears that a world war might break out, the threats facing the Arab countries, especially Iraq and Syria, and the need for joint action between Arab states to counter German, Italian, and Turkish propaganda in Syria and Iraq, and clearly stand by Britain. According to al-Bakri, Nuri al-Sa‘id spoke of the need to stop the Arab Revolt in Palestine and to take a position in support of Britain and France and told the leaders of the National Bloc that he had no new plan to solve the Palestinian question. He touched on a recent important meeting with Lord Lloyd, who had made clear to him that Britain would stand by France and reach an agreement with it regarding all the outstanding disputes between the two countries. The Arabs too had to direct all their energies to help Britain achieve its goals, if they wished to preserve their existing national borders, Lord Lloyd told Nuri al-Sa‘id. Al-Bakri then informed Sasson that the National Bloc and the Syrian government had decided to assert control over the internal situation in Syria and act firmly against the opposition; it would boost its activities by establishing neighbourhood branches in Syrian cities and, in cooperation with the Syrian government, endeavour to control the press and monitor the activities of the Propaganda and Publication Office of Fakhri al-Baroudi. The National Bloc would also work to supply Syria with large quantities of weapons both officially and unofficially. At the end of his report, Sasson stated that ‘Nasib al-Bakri made me swear to keep all his statements confidential’.36.

2. The Security Dimension Sasson stated that al-Bakri hoped ‘the Jews would succeed in arresting the gang of 120 gunmen that he had told us about three days ago, so that we could be sure he was not sitting idly and appreciate his actions’.37 Sasson also said that he had encouraged al-Bakri to approach Haj Amin al-Husayni and Palestinian revolutionary leaders in Damascus and Beirut and learn what they were doing. But al-Bakri, who did not have a relationship with al-Husayni, told Sasson that he feared suspicions might be raised if he approached him and his men. He asked Sasson not to pressure him about the matter and let him work on behalf of the JA as he saw fit and according to political and social conditions in Syria, and that ‘we should trust he works with honesty and sincerity’. Al-Bakri added, ‘It is impossible to demolish in one month what Haj Amin al-Husayni and his supporters have built up over the past few years, especially when these are fired-

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up and fanatical people.’ He added that he was working to enhance his position and influence with the Syrian government, the National Bloc, the Syrian parliament, and the Syrian masses, so that after a month or two he could speak publicly about the economic damage being inflicted on Syria as a result of the continued Arab Revolt in Palestine, and the political damage being caused by the presence of Palestinian rebels with their anti-British policy in Syria. Al-Bakri told Sasson that he had learned from a reliable Syrian government source that Shukri al-Quwatli had spoken with King Abdulaziz bin Saud about the need for Saudi Arabia and Syria to support the Arab Revolt in Palestine. AlBakri said that he would visit al-Quwatli immediately to discuss this matter with him, as well as his relationship with Palestinian revolutionary leaders. Al-Bakri explained that in the Syrian government and the leadership of the Syrian National Bloc there were friends and enemies of Zionism, the enemies outnumbering the friends in the National Bloc, and that al-Quwatli was considered an enemy of Zionism, while Mardam was considered one of its friends. At the end of the meeting, al-Bakri agreed to Sasson’s request to arrange and see Fakhri al-Baroudi, spy on him and obtain information about his recent visit to Iraq and Kuwait and about the current mission of Akram Zuʻaytir in Baghdad. Sasson concluded his report to Moshe Shertok saying: ‘Nasib al-Bakri’s only request was that I visit him frequently.’38.

IX The Attempted Recruitment of Muhammad al-Ashmar In a report sent to Eliyahu Sasson in November 1937, a JA agent in Damascus, Abdullah Abboud, suggested that the Agency recruit Muhammad al-Ashmar to work on its behalf. In his report, Abboud indicated that he had met with alAshmar and believed that the JA could ‘buy him’.39 Al-Ashmar’s role in the Syrian and Palestinian national struggle would have been an asset for the JA. Muhammad al-Ashmar (1892–1960) was one of the leaders of the 1925 Syrian revolution. He had joined the Arab Revolt and entered Palestine through Transjordan in August 1936 at the head of a large group of Syrian revolutionaries and had joined up with the Arab revolutionaries who had entered Palestine at the time under the leadership of Fawzi al-Qawuqji. After obtaining the approval of the JA’s political department Head Shertok, Sasson asked al-Bakri to recruit al-Ashmar to work for the JA Agency. Al-Bakri was cautious and felt he could not openly propose to al-Ashmar that he ‘sell himself to the Jews’. He suggested to Sasson that Yusuf

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Linyadu do the job and, if he succeeded in recruiting al-Ashmar, then al-Bakri would take him on for joint work.40 Al-Bakri told Sasson that at his recent meeting with al-Ashmar he had spoken to him about the need to stop the support of Syrians for the Arab Revolt, and that he had explained to him the strength of the Jews’ influence in France, and how they could harm Syria and put pressure on Léon Blum, the Jewish Prime Minister of France and his party, which contained many Jews, and delay the ratification of the agreement between Syria and France. Al-Ashmar had listened attentively, believed him, al-Bakri said, and he had promised to talk with his men. AlAshmar told al-Bakri that the Palestinian leaders of the Arab Revolt, were pressing him to support the Arab Revolt in Palestine with weapons and volunteers but that he put the matter off week after week, and that the Syrian opposition led by Dr ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar was demanding that he devoted himself to Syrian issues alone.41 At Sasson’s request, Linyadu met al-Ashmar twice to try to recruit him. At both meetings, al-Ashmar expressed his readiness to assist the JA in putting an end to the Arab Revolt in Palestine. He said he would influence Damascenes who were recruiting revolutionaries and smuggling weapons to stop and provide information about the rebel organizations, their activities, entryways into Palestine, and information that would lead to their arrest. Linyadu and alAshmar did not address how much al-Ashmar would charge for his services. He was mainly concerned with establishing political relations with the JA and asked Linyadu to arrange a meeting for him with an official representative of the Agency. In that period, the JA was making informal contacts with the Syrian National Bloc and did not want to make parallel contacts with al-Ashmar, who was known to belong to the Syrian Shahbandari opposition, a rival of the National Bloc. The JA, however, did not want to miss this valuable opportunity, particularly since he could have proved useful in efforts to curb the Arab Revolt in Palestine. The JA decided to send Abba Hushi to Damascus to meet with Muhammad al-Ashmar. Hushi was not an official JA employee, but had gained extensive experience in dealing with Arabs, recruiting some of them to work on behalf of Zionism, through his activities in the Histadrut, and his specialization in monitoring JA relations with the Druze Arabs of Jabal al-Druz in Syria. Before dealing with Hushi’s meeting with Syrian opposition figure, al-Ashmar, we will address the JA’s relations with the Syrian opposition at the time, led by Dr ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar.

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X The Jewish Agency’s Relationship with the Shahbandari Opposition ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar met several times with leaders of the Zionist movement and many of its operatives before and during the Arab Revolt in Palestine, in Egypt, Syria and Europe. Shahbandar (1879–1940) was born in Damascus, where he received his primary and secondary education and studied medicine at the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut (later the American University). Although he did not belong to Damascene aristocracy, he married the sister of Nazih al-Mu’ayyad al-‘Azm, daughter of Taqieddine Bek al-‘Azm, which helped to open up his political horizons, as well as improving his income, thanks to his wife’s landholdings and property he had inherited.42 Al-Shahbandar was foreign minister in the Syrian government formed by Hashim al-Atassi in May 1920. He founded the People’s Party in 1925 and joined the Syrian revolution that erupted in the same year, becoming one of its most prominent political leaders. After the French forces suppressed the Syrian revolution, he fled to Iraq, and then Egypt, where he stayed for about ten years. Al-Shahbandar was loyal to the Hashemites and Britain, having established strong relations with Emir Abdullah and with British political officers in the Arab Bureau.43 Shahbandar returned to Syria on 14 May 1937 to wide popular and official acclaim.44 From his return to Syria until his assassination in July 1940, al-Shahbandar was fiercely critical of the National Bloc and the Syrian government. In his continuous campaign against them, he made use of a range of issues, primarily:45 ●

●

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rejection of the Syrian-French treaty – severely attacking the National Bloc and the Syrian government for signing the treaty; setting the issue of Alexandretta (occupied by Turkey at the time) as the key issue for Syria; and efforts after his return to Syria to use the Palestinian cause and the negotiations that he and his group in the Syrian opposition had undertaken with the JA to serve his and the Syrian opposition’s interests against the National Bloc and the Syrian government. His meetings and those of many leaders of the Shahbandari opposition with the Jewish Agency came during the intensification of the conflict between the National Bloc and the Shahbandari opposition, especially in 1938, such as the meetings of Nazih al-Mu’ayyad, Muhammad al-Ashmar, and Nasuh Babil with the JA.

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Al-Shahbandar met on several occasions with the leaders of the JA, before and during the Arab Revolt, in Egypt, Syria and Europe. He met with the Head of the World Zionist Organization Chaim Weizmann, Head of the JA’s political department Moshe Shertok, his deputy Dov Joseph (Bernard Joseph 1899–1980), and Eliyahu Sasson. He established strong relations with the Head of al-Sharq Agency and JA agent in Cairo, Nahum Vilensky, whom he ‘met with countless times’.46 Shahbandar’s meetings with JA leaders and activists – which he initiated – often centred on the Palestinian issue and the possibility of reaching a comprehensive Arab-Zionist Jewish agreement. In these meetings, al-Shahbandar proposed several suggestions for a solution to the Palestinian issue that did not commit to basic Palestinian demands, primarily, a complete halt to Jewish immigration and the independence of Palestine. AlShahbandar’s views on solving the Palestinian issue were based on an acceptance of Jewish immigration to Palestine, provided that the number of Jews in Palestine remained less than the number of Arabs. In his memoires, Shertok wrote that the talks held by al-Shahbandar with the JA did not lead to tangible results, because in his initial role as mediator he failed to bring the Palestinian side to the table. Shertok added that when al-Shahbandar himself began to negotiate with the Agency’s leaders, mainly through Vilensky, regarding an Arab-Zionist Jewish agreement, it became clear that the gap between his and the JA’s position was still wide, and that his position – despite his acceptance of Jewish immigration to Palestine provided that the Jews did not outnumber the Arabs – could not serve as a basis for negotiations for the Jewish Agency47. Shertok noted that at that point negotiations between al-Shahbandar and Vilensky stopped. Al-Shahbandar tried unsuccessfully to meet Weizmann in Europe, and Shertok pointed out that Al-Shahbandar’s desire to meet with Weizmann ‘raises doubts about his motives’, because Shertok had ‘learned through experience that the Arabs who ask to meet with Weizmann after they met with us here, do so based on an illusion they have that they will find open ears with Weizmann for the same thing that we have rejected, which is our remaining a minority in Palestine. They are not satisfied with us because we seem extremists in their view, and they want moderate Jews and Zionists’.48

XI ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar’s Negotiations with Chaim Weizmann After sustained effort, al-Shahbandar managed to meet with Chaim Weizmann in Cairo, thanks to the assistance of two leaders of the Jewish community in

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Egypt, Yusuf Aslan Cattaui Pasha and Elie Mousseri, who established good relations with Shahbandar during his years in Cairo. In the first week of February 1938, Weizmann visited Cattaui Pasha at his home, where he also found Mousseri. Cattaui and Mousseri told Weizmann that they had invited ‘Abd al-Rahman alShahbandar. Until that point, Weizmann was in the dark about the arrangement. Arriving shortly after Weizmann, in the meeting al-Shahbandar quickly realized that there was no hope of finding a listening ear with Weizmann, who stressed the two non-negotiable conditions important to the JA. First, there could not be an Arab-Jewish agreement that depended on the Jews remaining a minority in Palestine. Second, there would be no negotiations on the rate of Jewish immigration to Palestine; the numbers had to remain a decision for the JA alone. Al-Shahbandar responded that he understood that there should be no talk of the Jews remaining a minority in Palestine but talked about determining the size of Jewish immigration over the next five years, during which time conditions for peace between Arabs and Jews would be clarified. Weizmann asked him how he perceived the extent of Jewish immigration to Palestine over the five-year period. When al-Shahbandar tried to evade the answer, Weizmann pressured him, and al-Shahbandar asked how many Jewish immigrants the JA wanted to enter Palestine over the five-year period. Weizmann replied, ‘A quarter of a million’. Al-Shahbandar noted that the issue was very complicated and needed studying, but he expressed his desire to enter into serious negotiations with the JA to reach peace between Jews and Arabs. He concluded by saying that there was one thing clear to him: that the head of the Arab Higher Committee Haj Amin al-Husayni should be removed from those negotiations, because it would be very difficult to reach any agreement with him. Al-Shahbandar asked Weizmann to keep what had happened at the meeting top secret.49

XII The Meeting of Nazih al-Mu’ayyad and Eliyahu Sasson In the midst of the Shahbandari opposition’s struggle with the Syrian government and the National Bloc, Nazih al-Mu’ayyad – an opposition leader and a relative of ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar – initiated a meeting with Eliyahu Sasson, inviting him to his home on 11 March 1938.50 In the meeting, al-Mu’ayyad told Sasson that he had supported the Arab Revolt in Palestine in its early stages in 1936, but had completely stopped supporting it at the request of al-Shahbandar. He added that had it not been for al-Shahbandar’s intervention requesting the opposition leaders in Syria, led by Muhammad al-Ashmar, to stop supporting

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the Arab Revolt, al-Ashmar would have rejoined the Arab Revolt in Palestine. Many Palestinian leaders asked al-Ashmar to engage in the Revolt and assume responsibility for its leadership, but he had refused based on al-Shahbandar’s instructions. Al-Mu’ayyad explained to Sasson that the al-Shahbandar-led opposition was much more concerned with the Syrian issue than the Palestinian issue, and that, at this particular time, it was competing with Palestinian leaders to recruit Syrians for the Syrian cause, and making every effort to attract Syrians, especially the revolutionaries who went to Palestine. This was because it was very likely that the opposition, al-Mu’ayyad stated, would be forced to take a bold step and demand the resignation of the Jamil Mardam government, or force him to resign. Al-Mu’ayyad indicated that the Mardam government would not dare to arrest opposition leaders and launch a fierce attack on Shahbandar without the support of the French government, particularly that of French High Commissioner Damien de Martel. The opposition, however, would know how to settle scores with Mardam and his government sooner or later, al-Mu’ayyad said, and that the day before he had discussed with al-Ashmar how to increase the opposition forces. Al-Mu’ayyad confirmed that the opposition was strongly against the continuation of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, and that he and his companions were trying very hard to stop it through their own methods. They could not, however, make their position public, so that the National Bloc and the Syrian government did not use it against them and sully their reputation with the Syrian people. He claimed that al-Shahbandar had a plan to resolve the Palestinian issue favorably for both the Arab and Jewish peoples, and that al-Shahbandar had spoken with the Arab, British, and Jewish sides regarding his plan, which he would not disclose until his situation in Syria was consolidated and the popularity of the National Bloc had been curtailed. When al-Shahbandar became stronger and revealed his plan, no Syrian, Palestinian, or Iraqi politician would dare to oppose or criticize him51.

XIII The Meeting of Muhammad al-Ashmar with Abba Hushi The meeting between Muhammad al-Ashmar and Abba Hushi came at the request of Muhammad al-Ashmar and in the midst of the Shahbandari opposition’s struggle with the Syrian government and the National Bloc. That

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this meeting took place without the knowledge and approval of Dr al-Shahbandar is inconceivable. At the meeting, al-Ashmar spoke in the name of the Shahbandari opposition and asked the Zionist movement to help the Syrian opposition reach power through the Zionist movement’s relations with France. On 23 March 1938, al-Ashmar and Abba Hushi met in the town of Harasta, near Damascus.52 Al-Ashmar told Hushi that he had heard good things about him from Yusuf al-‘Aysami and another person – whose name Hushi did not mention in his report – and about his relations with Arabs. Al-Ashmar then told him that many Arab parties had pushed for him to accept the leadership of the armed Arab Revolt in Palestine, and that after his recent return from the pilgrimage to Mecca, he had met twice with Haj Amin al-Husayni at the latter’s request. At the second meeting held that previous week, al-Husayni had asked him to lead the armed Arab Revolt in Palestine, in response to which al-Ashmar had laid out a set of conditions that would need to be met if he had to take on the leadership of the armed Revolt in Palestine. Al- Husayni refused. Al-Ashmar added that the internal situation in Syria had changed, and that this called him to devote himself to the Syrian issue. On his last meeting with Haj Amin alHusayni, he had told him that he would not lead the armed Arab Revolt in Palestine. Al-Ashmar said that the real reason for his stance was that the opposition in Syria was secretly planning to forcefully take power in Syria. At this point in his report, Abba Hushi wrote that Muhammad al-Ashmar asked him to follow him and continued: ‘I walked with him about 150–200 steps from the room we were in, and he took me into a cellar. We went down 16 steps and he lit a candle. I saw an arms cache in the cellar, which was about three meters wide and between eight and ten meters long. Half of it was full of different types of weapons, piles of rifles and pistols, ammunition, explosives, and grenades’. Al-Ashmar then returned with his guest to the meeting room, and Hushi adds in his report that al-Ashmar reached ‘the important issue behind his invitation to me’. Al-Ashmar told Hushi that the Syrian opposition was unhappy with the Syrian government because it was corrupt, and had brought the country to a predicament. The opposition wanted to seize power. Al-Ashmar asked Hushi to have the Zionist movement influence French Prime Minister Blum and take a position in support of the Syrian opposition. The Syrian opposition knew that it was impossible to seize power without the consent of France, which still had significant power in Syria, and that the Zionist movement had great influence in France since the French Prime Minister was Jewish and a socialist. Al-Ashmar added, according to Abba Hushi’s report, that Dr al-Shahbandar was leading the Syrian opposition

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and wanted to achieve peace between Jews and Arabs, and had a plan to do so, and if the JA responded to the request to influence Blum and France in the interest of the opposition and Dr al-Shahbandar, then he (al-Ashmar) was ‘ready to help us with everything he can do’. Until the opposition reached power in Syria, al-Ashmar was ‘ready to prevent fighting men from joining the Arab Revolt’. If the opposition reached power in Syria, it would ‘prevent Syrians from joining the Arab Revolt in Palestine and use a strong hand against the Palestinian revolutionaries’ present in Syria.53

XIV The Meeting between Eliyahu Sasson and Nasuh Babil On 3 September 1938, Eliyahu Sasson met in Damascus with Nasuh Babil, owner of al-Ayyam newspaper and a leader of the Shahbandari opposition.54 It was not their first meeting but this three-hour meeting strengthened Babil’s cooperation with the Jewish Agency. Babil would not only work to calm the inflamed support in Syria for the Arab Revolt in Palestine through al-Ayyam – in exchange for payment– but would seek to reach an agreement between the Shahbandari opposition and the JA. Babil told Sasson that al-Shahbandar knew from his sources in Paris and London that the Jews were making a huge effort in France and Britain to thwart the Syrian-French treaty and ensure the French parliament did not ratify it. He added that he understood and vindicated this position, because if Syria, in its current complex political situation, supported the Arab Revolt in Palestine with supplies and manpower and allowed open incitement against the Zionist project, then, upon obtaining full independence, it would undoubtedly provide twice the support. Babil pointed to the shared interests of the Shahbandari opposition and the JA in the abrogation of the Syrian-French treaty; abrogating the treaty and causing the government of Jamil Mardam to fail were top priorities for the opposition, because, he maintained, failure to abrogate the treaty might put an end to the Greater Syria project advocated by al-Shahbandar, while the success of the Mardam government might strengthen the National Bloc and weaken the Shahbandari opposition or lead to its suppression. Babil expressed his fears of a revolution erupting in Syria if Jamil Mardam returned from France without having ratified the Syrian-French treaty. He stressed that the Shahbandari opposition had no interest in and nothing to gain from a revolution in Syria since this could effectively enhance the position of the National Bloc and push the opposition into the awkward position of having to

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support a revolution while power remained in the hands of Mardam and the National Bloc. The Shahbandari opposition continued to strategize on the best way to cause the abrogation of the treaty and the fall of the Mardam government without an anti-French revolution in Syria. They concluded that the best way to achieve this was to conduct negotiations with the Jewish Agency on the ground of common interests between them and reach an agreement as soon as possible. At the end of the meeting, Babil asked Sasson to meet with prominent leaders in the Shahbandari opposition, Zaki al-Khatib and Dr Munir al-‘Ajlani. Sasson was not authorized to hold such a meeting but promised Babil he would present his proposals to the JA leadership. Babil asked him to do this as soon as possible and stressed the need to maintain the confidentiality of what had been discussed.55

XV. The Search for Agents while Nasib al-Bakri Continues to Spy Nasib al-Bakri continued to provide information about Palestinian revolutionaries, the quantities and sources of weapon they were obtaining, and transit and arms-smuggling routes into Palestine. From a report based on information from al-Bakri that Eliyahu Sasson sent to Moshe Shertok on 10 April 1938, it is clear that Muhammad al-Ashmar visited al-Bakri at his home on 6 April 1938, when al-Bakri learned that Saudi Arabia was providing Palestinian revolutionaries with weapons. 300 rifles and 12 machine guns had arrived from Saudi Arabia and were soon to be transferred to Palestine. Al-Bakri suggested that the Jewish Agency report this information to the British Consulate in Jeddah to pressure Saudi Arabia to stop supplying weapons to Palestinians. As in his previous disclosures, al-Bakri detailed the methods used by Palestinian and Arab revolutionaries to enter Palestine from Syria and Lebanon.56 Additionally, Sasson reported that al-Bakri had asked his brother, Mazhar, director of the Damascus police, to place many Palestinian revolutionaries and Syrian activists supporting them under strict supervision, and he had done so.57 The JA’s political department passed on the information obtained from alBakri to the British authorities in Palestine, who then set up ambushes and hunted down Palestinian and Arab revolutionaries. This is evident from a report sent by JA agent Abdullah Abboud to Eliyahu Sasson, in which he stated that information had arrived from the leaders of the Arab Revolt in Palestine to two Palestinian leaders in Damascus, Izzat Darwaza and Dr Subhi Abu Ghanima,

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that the British authorities had tightened control of the routes used by the Palestinian revolutionaries to move from Syria and Lebanon to Palestine, and were hunting them down and ambushing them. He said that the leaders of the Arab Revolt in Palestine believed that there were traitors among those who knew about the Palestinian revolutionary movement and the smuggling of weapons from Syria and Lebanon to Palestine.58 Darwaza and Dr Abu Ghanima, it seemed, had consulted with ‘Adil al-‘Azma – then director of the Syrian Interior Ministry – about uncovering the traitors. Al-‘Azma discussed this matter this matter with Munir al-Rayyes, then director of the counter-espionage division at the Interior Ministry. Following those discussions, Munir al-Rayyes decided to assign 30 Syrian informants and officers to follow up and try to uncover the traitors. The operation did not bear fruit, however, as the counter-espionage division at the Interior Ministry kept tabs on the wrong people.59

XVI Nasib al-Bakri’s Status Rises On 23 April 1938, Sasson met with al-Bakri for three hours at Yusuf Linyadu’s house in Damascus. In his lengthy report to Shertok, Sasson said that ‘the conversation was solely about the political situation in Syria and revealed several valuable issues that are very important for us to know’. It was decided to arrange another meeting with al-Bakri to follow up on his ‘security espionage’ activities.60 From this report, it is evident that in that period al-Bakri not only supplied the JA with highly detailed information about developments in the National Bloc and the Syrian government, but also worked to establish a relationship between the National Bloc and the JA, and asked for help to influence developments in Syria, including a possible intervention with France to change the Syrian government. Al-Bakri talked about the crisis afflicting the Syrian government and the debates and conflicts among the leaders of the National Bloc over many issues, including its policy towards France given the French parliament’s refusal to ratify the Syrian-French agreement. Al-Bakri claimed that Syrian Prime Minister Jamil Mardam had asked the National Bloc to help him obtain the Syrian parliament’s ratification of the treaty and its new annexes, to improve the chances of ratification by the French parliament. The leaders of the National Bloc had asked to be shown these new annexes, but Mardam had refused and said he would present them directly to Parliament. Syria’s National Bloc leaders said that they would not commit to supporting parliament’s ratification without seeing

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the annexes. They had proposed an expansion of the Syrian government with the addition of four Bloc figures, three from Damascus – Lutfi al-Haffar, Fayez alKhoury and Nasib al-Bakri – and one from the Alawite Mountains. Jamil Mardam accepted this proposal, while Sa‘d Allah al-Jabri rejected it and threatened to resign. The National Bloc leadership, including the three candidates to join the government, demanded that the government resign and it be reformed without al-Jabri. In intense meetings held over ten days, the National Bloc leadership failed to reach any agreement or compromise. Having presented the dire situation above, al-Bakri asked Sasson to give frank answers to three questions, and said that once he had heard the answers, he would explain the reasoning behind the following questions: ●

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Does the Jewish Agency know of the efforts being made in France to abrogate the treaty? Is the Jewish Agency intersted in the French parliament’s refusal to ratify the treaty? Can the Jews help the Syrians to get the French parliament to ratify the treaty and its annexes?

Sasson said that he could not answer those questions officially, because he did not have authority to do so, but he could express his personal opinion. In answer to the first question Sasson said that elements in France opposed the agreement, especially those with economic interests. To the second question, Sasson answered that the JA did not interfere in the political and internal affairs of neighbouring Arab countries, but in Britain and France Jews were protesting over the Syrians allowing their country to become a centre of anti-British and anti-Zionist propaganda and a base for Palestinian revolutionaries. Responding to his third question, Sasson said that the JA was ready to provide political and economic assistance not only to the Syrians but to all Arab countries, if the Arabs recognized the political rights of Jews in Palestine, and demonstrated their willingness to cooperate with them. Al-Bakri then proceeded to ask Sasson the following: ●

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Do you not think that the final solution to the Syrian issue is closely related to a solution between Jews and Arabs in Palestine? Is it possible to obtain a formal commitment from the leaders of the Zionist movement to work to make the French parliament ratify the agreement and its annexes, if we clearly promise them that we will work to influence the Arab world in general, and the Palestinians in particular, to agree to reach an Arab-Jewish solution that is mutually acceptable?

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Is it possible to obtain a clear promise from the leaders of the Zionist movement that they will do their best with France to form a new government in Syria, on our terms, if the current government refuses to support our steps towards the Arab-Jewish agreement?

Sasson answered briefly that France and Britain had common interests in the Middle East; that the Syrian and Palestinian issues were interrelated; and this demanded that Britain and France help each other to find a solution to the issue of the country under its mandate, and, logically, Britain would not agree to France resolving the issue in Syria as long as Britain had not resolved matters in Palestine. To the second question, Sasson answered that Jews and the JA could not be asked to give an official commitment that the French parliament would ratify the treaty – Jews did not rule France or any other European country. He added that it was possible to ask Jews for help in influencing French public opinion to pave the way for the ratification of the agreement, and expressed his conviction that the Jews would do so if the Syrians committed to help them achieve their national aspirations in Palestine. In answer to the third question, Sasson claimed that, personally, he believed that the JA was trying to remain neutral in regard to these conflicts. What prompted these questions, said al-Bakri, was the fact that the leaders of the National Bloc were at odds with the Syrian government over the position and policy towards France, and how the Syrian government was handling the treaty and its annexes. The National Bloc knew that the military establishment in France strongly opposed the agreement, and demanded its abrogation, and that the French military command in France had asked the leadership of the French army in Syria to find evidence that confirmed that there would not be a mass upheaval in Syria if the French parliament refused to ratify the agreement. The French army had, therefore, taken the initiative in Syria and fomented unrest in the Syrian Jazeera, to ensure that Syrians did not participate in protests if the treaty was not ratified. For the same reason, the French army was stirring unrest in the Alawite area and elsewhere in Syria. Al-Bakri added that the debate among the leadership of the National Bloc on the situation in Syria had expanded, leading to discussions on the situation in Palestine, Britain’s policy in the Middle East and the extent its policy towards Palestine influenced France’s policy in Syria, and the question of the power of Jews in Paris and London. Al-Bakri added, ‘Some of us accused the Jews of causing Syria’s problems; some talked about the need to end the Arab Revolt in Palestine and work to reach an agreement between Arabs and Jews; some talked about the power of the

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Jews in Paris and London and the need to exploit this power for the Arabs’ benefit; some said that, by means of the Jews, it was possible to overthrow the existing government in Syria and form a new government that will reach an understanding with France, Britain, and the Jews on all matters relating to Syria and Palestine. Some opposed any relationship with the Jews, saying that it was forbidden to sacrifice the Palestinian Arabs for the benefit of the Syrian issue.’ Al-Bakri said that these discussions among the National Bloc leadership had led to new alignments and alliances and the emergence of various groups within it. He pointed out that these deliberations were still ongoing and said: ‘We have been meeting for a week, morning and evening, at my house and at the home of Lutfi al-Haffar, and mainly discuss the issue of Palestine and the establishment of relations with the Jews. It was those deliberations that led me to make use of your visit to Damascus to think clearly about the position of the Jews, and to furnish myself with material in my conversations with my colleagues in the upcoming meetings.’ Sasson asked him the names of his colleagues, and al-Bakri stated that they were ‘Lutfi al-Haffar, Faris al-Khoury, Fayez al-Khoury, Dr. Tawfiq alShishakli, ‘Afif al-Solh, and others’. Sasson asked him why they did not include Prime Minister Jamil Mardam in their deliberations and meetings, since it was known that Jamil Mardam was not ‘a stubborn person’ and did not deny ‘the influence of the Jews in France’. He continued: ‘If Jamil Mardam was with you and you took a decision to initiate formal or informal talks with the Jews on all the questions I have mentioned, there is no doubt that Jamil Mardam, as prime minister, would find willing ears to a request for assistance from the Jewish Agency.’ At the end of the meeting, al-Bakri asked Sasson to informally probe the leadership of the JA with regard to the issues raised, in the hope of obtaining clearer answers from Sasson when needed.61 Al-Bakri, meanwhile, continued to provide Sasson with critical information. On 27 April 1938, Sasson told the JA, in a telephone call from Beirut, that a weapons cache stored in a house near the home of Muhammad al-Ashmar in Damascus, comprising more than 5,000 bullets, was being prepared to be sent to revolutionaries in Palestine, and that 72 armed rebels would cross the border into Palestine in the coming days. From Sasson’s report it is evident that al-Bakri was not just providing the agency with information, but also acted to influence events in Syria to the JA’s benefit. Sasson mentioned that al-Bakri had taken the necessary steps in Damascus to thwart the Palestine Defence Committee’s call for a general strike and demonstrations on 28 April 1938 to mark the arrival of the Royal Commission in Palestine.62 On 9 April 1938, Sasson informed the JA, again by telephone from

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Beirut and based on information from al-Bakri, that there was a large arms shipment in the city of Baalbek ready to be smuggled into Palestine. al-Bakri had provided him with the names of the smugglers and thought that, in addition to informing the French authorities, the British consul in Beirut should be informed of this matter and urged to act.63

XVII Jamil Mardam Reassures Sasson: No Support for the Revolt in Palestine In a meeting with Nasib al-Bakri, Eliyahu Sasson criticized the Syrian government for allowing Syria to become a major support centre for the Arab Revolt in Palestine and noted that this might lead the Zionist movement to pressure France not to ratify the Syrian-French treaty. Al-Bakri conveyed this to Syrian Prime Minister Jamil Mardam, prompting him to invite Sasson to his home. On 25 July 1938, Mardam met Sasson for about an hour.64 In his report to Moshe Shertok, Sasson stated that he presented to Jamil Mardam the information he had about Syrian support for the Arab Revolt in Palestine, mentioning the names of ‘Adil al‘Azma, Nabih al-‘Azma, Munir al-Rayyes, Haj Adib Khayr, Nafi‘ al-Qudsi, and others. He also referred to the holding of the pro-Palestinian conference in Bludan in Syria; the freedom enjoyed by Palestinian revolutionaries in Syria; the smuggling of weapons and revolutionaries from Syria to Palestine; Syrian press support for the Arab Revolt in Palestine (especially Fakhri al-Baroudi’s office); the proPalestinian propaganda in schools, mosques, clubs, and cafés; the meetings and activities organized by the Palestine Defence Committee; and the interparliamentary conference in support of the Palestinian Arab Revolt due to be held in the coming months in Cairo with the participation of Syrian parliamentarians. Sasson told Mardam that all this information confirmed that Syria supported the Arab Revolt in Palestine, in contradiction with the promises of the leaders of the National Bloc to the JA, which might lead the Zionist movement to use means to make the Syrian government aware of its mistake, and also realize that, by supporting the Arab Revolt, it had harmed its political and economic interests – a reference to potential JA pressure on France not to ratify the Syrian-French treaty. Mardam replied that it was clear that the JA was obtaining incorrect information from unreliable sources, and it was not alone in this, as the British consulate was also obtaining erroneous information. Mardam added that he thought it was necessary to correct these errors, just as he had done previously with the British consulate in Damascus. He then pointed to the following:

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There had been no change in the Syrian government’s stance towards Zionism and it still believed in reaching an Arab-Jewish agreement. The reason why the Syrian government had not started formal negotiations with the JA was because it was preoccupied with internal Syrian issues. However, he noted that some National Bloc leaders had held meetings with JA representatives and that he was fully aware of Lutfi al-Haffar’s recent meetings with Zaslansky and Sasson. The Bludan conference had indeed caused great harm to the interests of Syria. Mardam pointed out that this conference had taken place while he was in Paris, and stressed that if he had been in Syria, he would not have allowed it. His colleagues had, over time, become aware of the great political damage this conference had caused to Syria. Mardam made it clear that he had vehemently rejected holding the parliamentary conference for Palestine in Syria and was insisting that Syrian MPs participate in their personal capacity, not as representatives of the Syrian Parliament.65 The Syrian government had not invited Palestinian revolutionaries to come to Syria, and when it was asked about the desire of the Head of the Arab Higher Committee Haj Amin al-Husayni to take up residence in Damascus, it refused, and confidentially requested the High Commissioner to oppose it. The Syrian government could not, however, mistreat ‘Izzat Darwaza and other Palestinian leaders resident in Damascus, while the governments of Egypt and Iraq, which were under British influence, treated Palestinian leaders in those countries with respect. While it was true that the Syrian press generally supported the Arab Revolt in Palestine and stood against Zionism and Britain, it was considered moderate in comparison to the Arabic press in Palestine, Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon. Mardam added that he had told the British consul in Damascus several times that the best way to stop Syrian newspapers’ backing for the Palestinian Arab Revolt was for the British authorities to prevent Palestinian newspapers and Egyptian newspaper correspondents in Palestine from publishing news supporting the Arab Revolt. Syrian newspapers had no special correspondents in Palestine, and usually carried reports from Palestinian and Egyptian newspapers. Another important way to stop newspapers from supporting the Arab Revolt in Palestine was to buy them, added Mardam. Mardam confirmed that he had made – and was still making – a great effort to influence Syrian leaders to stop their support for the Arab Revolt in

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Palestine and focus solely on the Syrian issue. He said that he stood firmly against any Syrian government employee who provided support to the Arab Revolt in Palestine, and asked Sasson to inform him of any such persons for the Syrian government to take the appropriate measures against them. Syria was not supporting the Arab Revolt in Palestine with weapons or revolutionaries. The smuggling of arms and revolutionaries into Palestine was not across the Syrian border, but from Lebanon. The Syrian government, which only had a small police force, was not responsible for the borders with Palestine, but only the French were. The JA should, therefore, ask France to guard the borders with Palestine to stop the smuggling of weapons and revolutionaries. Mardam added that if Syria was independent, the situation would be completely different, and the government would seal the borders, prevent the smuggling of weapons and revolutionaries, and totally stop Syrian support for the Arab Revolt in Palestine. Three months previously, the Syrian government had issued strict instructions to all officials at schools, mosques, clubs, cafes, and cinemas to stop propaganda in support of the Arab Revolt in Palestine. The day before, Mardam had asked al-Bakri – recently appointed head of the National Bloc branch in Damascus – to invite members and supporters of the National Bloc in particular, and Syrians in general, to stop supporting the Arab Revolt in Palestine.66

XVIII Al-Bakri Active on the Popular and Political Level to Stop Syrian Support for the Arab Revolt In June 1938, al-Bakri took another step in stopping forms of Syrian support for the Arab Revolt in Palestine, this time using notables and prominent figures from various neighbourhoods in Damascus to influence public opinion. In his report to Shertok, Sasson stated that on 7 June 1938 Nasib al-Bakri had invited 70 neighbourhood notables to a meeting at his house in Qaboun, where, for five hours, they discussed the political situation in Syria. After discussing Alexandretta and the problems and protests that had occurred at that period in the Syrian Jazeera, al-Bakri told his audience that the continuation of the Arab Revolt in Palestine was the main reason why France had refused to ratify the SyrianFrench treaty. Britain, he said, had asked France not to ratify the treaty, but postpone it until after Britain had been able to suppress the Arab Revolt in

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Palestine and find a political solution to the conflict there. Britain would not have asked France to do this, according to al-Bakri, if Syria knew how to maintain its neutrality toward the Arab Revolt, and those Syrians who agreed to turn their country into a base for Palestinian revolutionaries and a centre of anti-British propaganda were responsible for this.67 In his report, Sasson stated that the majority of those present supported al-Bakri’s statements. A second meeting would be held at the house of Ahmad al-Mardini, headman of the Bab Sraijeh neighbourhood, to continue discussions on the political situation in Syria and take steps towards neutrality towards the Arab Revolt in Palestine.68 Al-Bakri’s work also extended to Lebanon. In his report, Sasson stated that on 8 June 1938, al-Bakri hosted Sheikh Toufiq al-Hibri, Head of the Islamic Makassed Association in Beirut, who had been sent by several Lebanese Muslim leaders in Beirut to consult with al-Bakri on the situation in Palestine and learn his position on the Arab Revolt. Al- Bakri had reiterated what he had said at his meeting of the previous day with the 70 Damascene notables, and stressed the necessity of stopping the Arab Revolt in Palestine and the urgent need to find the appropriate way to get Palestinian revolutionaries out of Syria and Lebanon and warn Nabih al-‘Azma and his associates against supporting the Arab Revolt in Palestine. Al-Hibri promised to pass on al-Bakri’s views to al-Daouq, Salam, and Beyhum, and maintain a close relationship with al-Bakri, whom he would invite to participate in the meeting due to be held shortly after in Beirut to discuss the situation in Palestine.69

IXX. Attempts to Block the Parliamentary Conference in Cairo A conference of Arab and Islamic parliaments to support the Arab Palestinian people was convened in Cairo on 7 October 1938 at the invitation of the Head of the Egyptian Parliamentary Committee for the Defence of Palestine, Muhammad ‘Alouba Pasha. In the run up to the conference, the JA made notable efforts to block it and reduce the number of Syrian and Lebanese MPs participating. To this end, Sasson stepped up his contacts with leading figures, journalists, editors, and newspaper owners in Syria and Lebanon. On the eve of the conference, al-Ahwal, al-Ittihad, Lisan al-Hal, Sawt al-Ahrar, and some Damascus newspapers – after having agreed with Sasson – published editorials critical of the conference and its goals and calling for its boycott. In his report to Shertok on his activities to derail the Parliamentary Conference, Sasson stated that he had proposed to Syrian MP ‘Afif al-Sulh that

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he visit the Head of the Arab Higher Committee Haj Amin al-Husayni, which al-Sulh did, asking al-Husayni about his directives to the Syrian parliamentary delegation at the conference.70 Al-Sulh told Sasson that al-Husayni requested that al-Sulh and his Syrian colleagues participating in the Parliamentary Conference support the Arab Revolt in Palestine, oppose the partition of Palestine, and take decisions similar to those of the previous year’s Bludan conference. Al-Sulh added that al-Husayni had told him that he wanted to participate in the Cairo Parliamentary Conference, but the French authorities in Lebanon had asked him not to leave Lebanon, so that the British and the Zionists not take advantage of this, and press France not to allow him to return.71 In his report, Sasson stated that at the end of September and the beginning of October he had met al-Bakri on three occasions, who told him the names of the 13 Syrian MPs participating in the conference. At Sasson’s request, al-Bakri, before the departure of the Syrian MPs intending to participate, invited them to three separate meetings to review their positions and inform Sasson about them. Al-Bakri told Sasson that the Palestinian leader ‘Izzat Darwaza participated in these meetings, and spoke about the Palestinian issue, the dangers of Zionism for Arabs, and Arab demands. Al-Bakri added that when asking Darwaza about the strength of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, he answered that the Palestinian revolutionaries had the ability and means to keep the Arab Revolt going for two years. According to Sasson, al-Bakri promised to raise directly or indirectly the issues of Zionist concern, including the situation in Syria, the need to stop the Arab Revolt in Palestine and conduct direct negotiations between the Arabs and the Zionist movement. Sasson added that al-Bakri would try to do this with the political committee of the conference, and other important committees, and that he would keep in close contact with Sasson, who would be present at the conference, and that al-Bakri would try to arrange meetings for Sasson with some Egyptian officials participating at the conference and some members of the Syrian delegation, in the hope of influencing them or clarify matters related to Zionist positions. In his report, Sasson stated that Lutfi al-Haffar had responded to Sasson’s request and convinced five Syrian MPs not to participate in the conference, and that al-Haffar had asked Linyadu to inform Sasson of that. Sasson added that it was clear to him that Jamil Mardam had not sent any directives to Syrian MPs regarding their participation in the Parliamentary Conference, and if he had taken a position against participation, the number of Syrian participants would have been cut in half, as al-Bakri had told him.72

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XX The Roundtable Conference The perseverance of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, its leadership’s commitment to the national rights of the Palestinian people and rejection of the Peel Commission’s recommendations, and the clouds of war gathering over Europe, forced Britain to change its policy towards the Palestinian question and the Peel Commission’s recommendations. The Commission had recommended the partition of Palestine into three regions: an Arab region annexed to the Emirate of Transjordan, a Jewish region, and a British region. The new British policy adopted the establishment of one independent Palestinian state, to be established in stages, during which cooperation would be built between the Palestinian people and Zionist Jews in Palestine.73 To achieve this, in November 1938 the British government called for a roundtable conference, where representatives of the Palestinian people, the JA, Egypt, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Yemen would gather.74 The conference opened at St James’s Palace, London, on 7 February 1939 and lasted until 17 March 1939. In the conference, Britain sought to bring the Arabs over to its side given the prospect of war in Europe. Germany invaded Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939, and Italy invaded Albania on 17 March 1939. The JA was worried about British policy at this stage and the holding of the conference, and its leadership was keen to have eyes and ears behind the scenes. During the British preparations for the conference, whether Syria and Lebanon would participate was uncertain since France had reservations. The JA wanted Syria to participate because of its close relations with many Syrian leaders, and by means of them, to be able to follow the machinations of the Arab delegations at the conference. When it became clear to the JA that Syria would not be participating, Sasson made an effort to persuade al-Bakri that Syria participate as an observer, with al-Bakri himself as the representative. On 26 November 1938, Sasson sent al-Bakri a long letter explaining why he, in particular, should represent Syria at this roundtable. Sasson stated that Syria was Palestine’s nearest neighbour; and it was important for the Syrian government to follow the developments of the Palestinian issue and to ‘send someone to London to be close to and monitor the negotiators, participate unofficially in their talks, and provide the Syrian government with the details and developments of the negotiations, and if the Syrian government found that something might affect its interest, policy, or economy, it should revert to its ally, the French government, and ask it to address the matter at once’.75 Sasson asked al-Bakri to explain to both the Syrian government and the French authorities in Damascus

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why a Syrian figure needed to travel to London to monitor the negotiations and inform them of developments. This figure should not be extreme ‘in his nationalist and Arabist tendencies’ so that the French did not object to him, and should not be a minister or a former minister so that he did not have official status. Sasson added: ‘The most suitable person and the most likely to succeed is yourself. [. . .] You should not be ashamed of proposing yourself, because there is no being shy in public life. In the interest of the nation everything pales away.’ In his letter, Sasson instructed al-Bakri to obtain a letter of recommendation from the Syrian government to the delegates of the conference, so that he would be included in the conference, as well as a letter of recommendation from the French authorities in Damascus to the French ambassador in London, so that al-Bakri could inform him about developments at the conference. If the Syrian government objected to this trip on the grounds that funds were not available, then: You can make yourself appear twice as zealous and offer to travel at your own expense, thereby earning everyone’s praise and thanks, and setting an example in true patriotism. This will also make it easier for you to carry out your mission and help you convince the government of the necessity of your going, especially since it will not cost the government anything, and enable it to see everything and show its solidarity with the Arabs and its fervor on the Palestinian issue.

Sasson asked al-Bakri to reply within a few days, if he managed to persuade the Syrian government to agree to his trip, and then Sasson would immediately come to Damascus to discuss ‘all aspects of the matter’76 and request funds for al-Bakri. Al-Bakri never made the trip to London. In a letter to Sasson, David Lawziyyah noted that the main issue preventing al-Bakri from going to London was financial since most of al-Bakri’s friends knew very well that he did not have enough money to meet his travel costs to London, ‘so they will rightly ask where Bakri had obtained the money?’.77 Other exacerbating factors for the government of Jamil Mardam were the French government’s refusal to ratify the SyrianFrench treaty and the intensifying conflict among the National Bloc leadership. In his letter to Shertok, Sasson stated that al-Bakri had informed him on 1 January 1939 that the political situation in Damascus had become more dangerous due to the French government’s refusal to ratify the treaty and that al-Bakri doubted his ability to obtain approval from the Syrian government and the French authorities to travel to London.78 Al-Bakri told Sasson that leaders of the National Bloc had held a closed meeting at its headquarters in Damascus and discussed Syria’s position on the

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French government’s refusal to ratify the treaty. He added that this meeting had been stormy, and that many leaders of the National Bloc had attacked Jamil Mardam because of the concessions he had made in Paris and asked him to resign ‘before he burned himself and burned the National Bloc with him, and handed over the administration of the state to the leaders of the extremist bloc at this dangerous hour when the world only understands the language of force’. Al-Bakri added that the National Bloc had decided to turn against France if the new French High Commissioner, who was due to arrive in Damascus, did not make a clear commitment on ratifying the treaty, without additional changes. Al-Bakri added that, after the meeting, Jamil Mardam had invited him to his home and asked him to give up the idea of travelling to London, because, according to Mardam, the Syrian issue took priority over any other issue, and because al-Bakri had to get ready to participate in the upcoming protests that would be organized by the National Bloc, and even prepare to lead them. Mardam asked al-Bakri, to organize over the next ten days – that is, before the arrival of the new French High Commissioner to Damascus – groups in and around Damascus, Houran, and other areas of Syria, to protest and cause unrest when the High Commissioner arrived. Al-Bakri told Sasson that he believed the Syrians would be defeated if they used force against France, and that he did not want to be a partner of the National Bloc in its upcoming battle against France that might lead to its destruction.79 At this point, Nasib al-Bakri resigned as Deputy Head of the National Bloc, which was by then experiencing conflicts between its various camps,80 and began to draw close to Dr ‘Abd al- Rahman al-Shahbandar. In a letter to Eliyahu Sasson in January 1939, David Lawziyyah noted that the popularity of ‘Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar was growing rapidly, while that of Jamil Mardam was falling. Lawziyyah added that the demonstrations supporting Shahbandar had increased recently, and that every such demonstration also passed in front of al-Bakri’s house, in a sign of support for him, before continuing to al-Shahbandar’s residence.81 At that time al-Bakri continued to deal with the JA and receive payment in exchange. In a letter to Sasson, Lawziyyah states that in January 1939 he gave alBakri £P60. Nasib al-Bakri appears, around this time, to have told his brother, Fawzi al-Bakri, about his relationship with the JA. In a letter to Lawziyyah, Sasson tells him of his wish to meet him soon and separately with Nasib al-Bakri and his brother Fawzi al-Bakri, now that Nasib al-Bakri had told his brother about his relationship with the Jewish Agency.82

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XXI Jamil Mardam Resigns and Nasib al-Bakri Becomes Minister under Lutfi al-Haffar In late 1938 and early 1939, intense disputes were rampant between rival camps within the National Bloc due to France’s continued stalling in ratifying the treaty. Political tension in Syria increased and criticism of Jamil Mardam and his government escalated, when in November 1938 France refused to ratify the treaty. Mardam’s political credibility depended on the treaty, over which, to persuade France to ratify it, he had made many concessions. After France’s categorical refusal to ratify the treaty became clear to Mardam, he chose to clash with the French High Commission over an issue that had wide popular support. The Mardam government refused to implement the legal amendment made by the French High Commission in mid-December 1938 regulating religious confessions and personal status. The amendment, among other things, permitted Muslims to change their religion and allowed Muslim women to marry nonMuslims. Mardam’s government issued orders to the Syrian courts to ignore this decree, prompting the French authorities in Damascus to intervene and call on the government to withdraw its orders. Mardam refused and submitted his resignation on 18 February 1939.83 After Mardam’s resignation, President Hashim al-Atassi appointed Lutfi alHaffar to form a new government. On 23 February 1939, Lutfi al-Haffar formed his cabinet with Mazhar Raslan as Minister of Interior and Defence, Fayez alKhoury as Minister of Finance and Foreign Affairs, Nasib al-Bakri as Minister of Justice, and Sélim Jambart as Minister of National Economy.

XXII The Lutfi al-Haffar Government ‘Purges’ the Interior Ministry of Supporters of the Arab Revolt As soon as Nasib al-Bakri became minister in the new government, Eliyahu Sasson met him at his home in Damascus for three hours on 24 February 1939. The meeting resumed the next morning and continued for several more hours. Al-Bakri told Sasson that the Syrians were following with interest the development of the round table negotiations in London and believed that if Britain solved the Palestinian issue in a way that satisfied the Arabs, France would be forced to make concessions to the Syrians, especially regarding its ratification of the SyrianFrench treaty. Al-Bakri told Sasson that at the first meeting of his government,

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which was also attended by President Hashim al-Atassi, Syrian Prime Minister Lutfi al-Haffar had indicated that the ‘strong war’ the Zionists had launched against the treaty was one of the reasons that led to France’s refusal to ratify it and said that work should be done to stop this war. In response to a minister’s question about how to stop the Zionist war against the treaty, al-Haffar said that any discussion on the issue within the Syrian government should be postponed until the end of the round table discussions in London. If those talks led to a tripartite agreement between the British, Arabs, and Jews, the Zionist war against the treaty would naturally stop. But if the negotiations failed, the Syrian government would try to mediate between Arabs and Jews in Palestine to reach an agreement that satisfied both parties. At the cabinet meeting, al-Haffar added that Syria was more interested than any other country in reaching a Jewish-Arab agreement in Palestine, because achieving its independence was closely linked to this agreement. In his meeting with Sasson, al-Bakri told him that there was no possibility of an uprising in Syria, because Syrians did not have enough weapons.84 In a letter to the Deputy Head of the JA’s political department, Bernard Joseph, Sasson drew attention to al-Bakri’s financial needs after coming to power in Damascus, noting how al-Bakri had asked him for funds, which Sasson had promised he would try to acquire from the JA leadership.85 The funds were to cover the steps that he, as Minister of Justice, had decided to take against supporters of the Palestinian Arab Revolt in Damascus. In his brief period in office as Minister of Justice, al-Bakri dealt a severe blow to many leading Syrian supporters of the Arab Revolt in Damascus who worked for the Syrian government apparatus. In a report, Sasson stated that, based on the proposal of Minister of Justice Nasib alBakri, the government had dissolved the Syrian political department headed by Munir al-Rayyes, a known supporter of the Arab Revolt, who was dismissed along with all 50 of its staff. Sasson also reported that, after his dismissal, Munir alRayyes joined the ‘Arab Club’, while his deputy Khalid al-Qanawati joined in Damascus the leadership of the Palestinian Arab Revolt. According to the Sasson report, the Syrian government was also pressuring the Head of the Interior Department, Adil al-‘Azma, and forced him to take a month off work.86 On 10 March 1939, Sasson sent a letter to David Lawziyyah, informing him that he had obtained the approval of the JA leadership to pay Nasib al-Bakr £S500, that he had sent him a telegram asking him to pay al-Bakri on account, and that a cheque was on its way.87 The Lutfi al-Haffar government did not last long. He submitted his resignation after 20 days, following his clash with the anti-treaty policy of High Commissioner Gabriel Puaux.88

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XXIII Nasib al-Bakri Seeks to Head the Government with Jewish Agency Support Al-Bakri aspired to become Syrian prime minister after Lutfi al-Haffar’s resignation. On 14 March 1939, David Lawziyyah sent Sasson a letter informing him that he had met that day with al-Bakri, who had informed him about problems between the Syrian government and the French and that its resignation was imminent. Lawziyyah added that al-Bakri told him that he had close ties with President Hashim al-Atassi and believed that, should the government resign, the president would appoint him to form the new government. In the letter, Lawziyyah also said that he had paid al-Bakri the £S500.89 From the correspondence between JA’s agent in Damascus, David Lawziyyah, and the JA leadership, it appears that, in this period, Nasib al-Bakri needed financial support to facilitate his becoming prime minister of Syria. Lawziyyah stated in his communications with Sasson that al-Bakri was in urgent need of money, and that of the £S500, which Lawziyyah had recently delivered, a portion had gone to al-Bakri’s men, and the rest in sacks of wheat to youth leaders and heads of the neighbourhoods. Lawziyyah urged Sasson to make every effort to provide a generous sum of money to al-Bakri as soon as possible.90 Lawziyyah strongly believed that the JA should financially support al-Bakri to help him become prime minister and continued to press Sasson on the matter. He telephoned Sasson from Damascus and urged him to persuade the JA leadership to urgently provide financial support to al-Bakri. Sasson explained that he fully understood the need to meet this request but added that it was difficult to persuade the JA leadership in view of the challenging times it faced. Sasson asked Lawziyyah to act wisely with al-Bakri, and not let him think ‘that he can get new help from us now, particularly as we gave him £S500 two weeks ago’.91 Lawziyyah notified the JA that he had visited al-Bakri, who told him that he had visited President Hashim al-Atassi on 4 May 1939, who had assured him he would provide every assistance to enable al-Bakri to form the government. Lawziyyah added that al-Bakri, Fayez al-Khoury, and others were campaigning for al-Bakri, and had so far obtained the support of 52 Syrian MPs, and he would certainly obtain a majority. Munir al-‘Ajlani and his group visited al-Bakri every day and supported him, Lawziyyah added. Lawziyyah appealed to Sasson to do his best to have the JA provide financial support to al-Bakri, ‘because he is in urgent need of our financial assistance these days. And if you want his help, you should do it now’.92

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Shortly before the publication of the White Paper, the JA’s leadership was anxious about any change in British policy towards the Palestinian issue it might contain. At the time, the JA’s leadership was busy working to influence the content of the White Paper to prevent it damaging the Zionist project, especially concerning the independence of Palestine, Jewish immigration to Palestine, and limitations on the sale of land. Sasson found it necessary to make it clear to Lawziyyah that the JA leadership was in a difficult situation at the time, and preoccupied: ‘I cannot broach any matter with them, so please appreciate and understand the situation. I also hope that you do not expect, and do not let [alBakri] expect, any financial assistance at this critical time. But after the storm has passed, and we hope it passes well, we will reconsider your proposal’.93 There is no doubt al-Bakri was serious in his quest to become the Syrian prime minister at the time, and Lawziyyah continued to visit him daily. In his communications, Lawziyyah noted how many well-known personalities visited al-Bakri in support of him, and how al-Bakri was careful not to make statements before knowing the reaction of some National Bloc leaders. Lawziyyah reported that in the first week of June 1939, al-Bakri met several times with President Hashim al-Atassi, who asked him to form a cabinet, and with Dr. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar and several National Bloc leaders. Lawziyyah added that the French had yet to disclose their position over whom they supported to form the government: ‘Ata al-Ayoubi or Nasib al-Bakri. Lawziyyah expressed his hope that Sasson had found an appropriate opportunity to speak with Moshe Shertok regarding the provision of financial assistance to Nasib al-Bakri.94 In his reply, Sasson told Lawziyyah that he would visit Damascus in the next few days, and that he would bring with him a sum of money for al-Bakri. Sasson asked Lawziyyah to arrange two meetings for him, one with Nasib al-Bakri and the other with Fawzi al-Bakri ‘who has asked you to open relations with us’.95

XXIV Eliyahu Sasson Proposes Working Against the Treaty in Paris On 19 March 1939, Eliyahu Sasson sent a letter to the Deputy Head of the JA’s political department Bernard Joseph, in which he proposed that the JA undertake Zionist activity in Paris against the treaty to weaken and fragment Syria. In his letter, Sasson stated that the French High Commissioner in Syria, Gabriel Puaux, intended to travel to Paris to present a detailed report to the French government

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on the situation in Syria and the position France should take regarding the Syrian-French treaty. Sasson pointed out that the prevailing view among Syrian leaders was that Puaux would recommend the French government make amendments to the treaty that would wreck it. To that end, Sasson added, Puaux would make several proposals: first, the establishment of a federal government in Damascus rather than a central national government, in order to give the sects and ethnic minorities in Syria an important position; second, significantly increasing the size of the French army in Syria to strengthen the French grip; and third, France should play a greater role in managing the economic affairs of the Syrian state, especially with regard to customs.96 Sasson pointed out that French High Commissioner Puaux’s proposals meant the fragmentation of Syria and would grant senior French officials effective authority over it. Sasson affirmed that Puaux’s plan fully conformed with Zionist interests, that it might lead to the abrogation or suspension of the treaty, and might help the Zionist movement demonstrate to Britain, the Arabs, and the whole world that the partition of Palestine was the best solution to the Palestinian issue, as well as demonstrating the justice of the Zionist demand for Jewish selfrule in Palestine. Sasson recommended that the Jewish Agency mobilize its men and supporters in France to support Puaux’s proposals and influence the French government to accept them.97 Sasson continued his meetings with al-Bakri at a time when Syria was experiencing a crisis in forming a government acceptable to the National Bloc, as well as witnessing demonstrations and strikes against French policy. On 30 March 1939, Sasson met al-Bakri at his home in Damascus for two hours, and al-Bakri told him that all attempts by President Hashim al-Atassi to form a new government had failed, following the declaration by the National Bloc – which had a large majority in parliament – that it would oppose the establishment of any government outside the parameters of the Syrian-French treaty. Al-Bakri told Sasson that the leaders of the National Bloc were meeting daily and trying to find a solution to the impasse, especially since they were under pressure from businessmen demanding an end to the strike that had lasted eighteen days. Al-Bakri added that the National Bloc, at its meeting on 29 March, had mandated President Hashim al-Atassi to start negotiations with the French authorities to find a way out of the crisis. Al-Bakri told Sasson that the French controlled the situation in Syria, and there was no serious threat of an uprising. He denied what was being reported in some newspapers in those days that the National Bloc had decided to boycott French products to force France to change its policy towards Syria. The National Bloc realized, according to al-Bakri, that

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this boycott would not work and would paralyze the Syrian economy. The Syrian boycott movement against Jewish products from Palestine was only a propaganda move carried out by radical Syrian politicians, added al-Bakri, since the boycott harmed Syrians more than it harmed Jews. In his conversation with Sasson, al-Bakri maintained that the JA had to adopt a plan of action in the Arab states following the failure of the round table talks in London. Al-Bakri assured Sasson that the JA would find listening ears in the National Bloc when it came to finding a solution to the Syrian and Palestinian issues. The National Bloc leadership was fully convinced that the Syrian issue would remain pending as long as the Palestinian issue was not satisfactorily resolved. Al-Bakri suggested that Sasson propose that the leadership of the JA’s political department conduct negotiations with the National Bloc, and that Sasson obtain an official mandate from the JA to conduct negotiations with Jamil Mardam, Faris al-Khoury, Mazhar Raslan and others. Sasson stated in his report that al-Bakri was willing to assist in this matter, based on his belief that Sasson’s talks with the leaders of the National Bloc would lead to a formal meeting between the leaders of the National Bloc and the JA to solve the Syrian and Palestinian issues. Al-Bakri added that an official meeting might be a good way for the JA to influence Britain to postpone the announcement of its new policy for a few weeks. Al-Bakri told Sasson that the JA should make better use of the fact that Syrians considered Jews an active player in the Levant, and acknowledged the influence of Jews over France and Britain. Al-Bakri added that if the JA presented him with a plan for a peace agreement between Jews and Arabs, that included the minimum demands of the Jews in Palestine, and a draft solution to the Syrian and Palestinian issues through the establishment of a federation between them or any other solution, he would present it to the National Bloc leadership and Syrian President Hashim al-Atassi.98

XXV Eliyahu Sasson Meets Jamil Mardam It seems that the JA’s political department accepted al-Bakri’s proposal, and commissioned Eliyahu Sasson to negotiate with Jamil Mardam. On 11 April 1939, Sasson met Mardam at his home in Damascus and discussed with him the political situation in Syria, and the possibility of joint work between the National Bloc and the JA to find a solution to Syrian and Palestinian issues.99 Mardam spoke for about an hour about the international situation and its impact on Syria

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and the Arab countries. He said that France had increased the size of its army in Syria and Lebanon to 55,000 soldiers. He had recently met with the French High Commissioner, Mardam told Sasson, and assured him that, in the event of war, he would be the first to call upon the Syrian people to delay a resolution to the Syrian issue and volunteer for the French army. Mardam also told Sasson that on 10 April 1939 at his home in Damascus, he had met with Fouad Hamza, the Saudi Foreign Minister, who had briefed him on the details of the round table talks, British policy towards Arab countries and Britain’s vision of a solution to the Palestinian issue. He maintained that Britain’s proposal for solving the Palestinian issue was logical and positive, and on its basis, it was possible to reach a satisfactory solution to the Palestinian question. Mardam added that Arab leaders participating in the round table conference were striving to bridge the gap between the positions of the Palestinian leadership and Britain, and that discussions between the two parties involved three fundamental issues: the duration of the transitional period before Palestine gained its independence, the involvement of the Palestinians in government, and a British amnesty for Palestinians who had participated in the Arab Revolt. Mardam expressed his regret at the continuation of the general strike in Damascus, which aimed to pressure France to ratify the treaty. He thought the strike harmed Syrian economic interests and would not help to bring about a political solution to the Syrian issue. France would not ratify the treaty in light of the new international situation that threatened the outbreak of a world war, and the most that the Syrians and Arabs could obtain, according to Mardam, was an explicit promise from France and Britain pledging that they would grant Syria and Palestine full independence after the international crisis was over. Sasson indicated to Mardam that achieving cooperation between Arabs and Jews could only happen when the Arabs recognized the rights of Jews in Palestine. Mardam replied that the Jewish presence in Palestine was a fact that Arabs could not ignore, saying that had it not been for the Jews’ opposition to the independence of Palestine, Britain would have resolved the Palestinian issue to the satisfaction of the Arabs, and had it not been for the Jews’ war against the Syrian-French treaty, the French Parliament would have ratified it years ago. In response to Sasson’s question as to whether Mardam believed that the partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state could serve as a basis for direct talks between Arabs and Jews, Mardam said that he did not consider partition as harmful to the Palestinians and the Arab countries, nor was partition unachievable. Sasson and Mardam agreed to continue their meetings.100

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XXVI Eliyahu Sasson’s Proposals to David Ben-Gurion With war looming in Europe, and increasing signs that Britain intended to change its policy towards the Palestinian question in favour of Arabs, David Ben-Gurion held a series of consultations with Zionist specialists in Arab affairs concerning developments in the Palestinian question. On 21 April 1939, the Head of the Arab Division of the JA’s political department, Eliyahu Sasson, presented a plan of action to Ben-Gurion on the political steps forward. Sasson explained that this plan of action should aim to instill on the regional and international levels the idea of partitioning Palestine and the creation of one Jewish and one Arab state. The most important points in Sasson’s plan were:101 ●

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Reinforcing the JA’s existing ties with the Arab elites in the Arab countries bordering Palestine and creating new relationships with other Arab elites. Encouraging separatist movements in Syria. Encouraged by the French authorities, separatist movements in several regions of Syria had provided the French government with a means to justify the French parliament’s refusal to ratify the Syrian-French treaty, and seek another solution to the Syrian issue. According to the information available to the Jewish Agency, the only solution that France was considering was a federal one. Such a solution would prove that the JA was right to oppose any form of Arab rule in Palestine. What was required was the strengthening and encouragement of separatist movements in Syria. Working to increase the number of Arab newspapers in the Arab countries neighbouring Palestine, especially Syria, which agreed to publish pro-Zionist articles in support of an Arab-Jewish agreement; the distribution of the Histadrut’s Arabic-language newspaper, Haqiqat al-Amr, in neighbouring Arab countries; developing the political department’s bulletin in Arabic, which was distributed to elites in neighbouring Arab countries; and revamping the publication of propaganda brochures in the Arabic. Taking care that products of the Jewish Yishuv were marketed in Palestine by Arab agents, not by Jews. Arab agents could increase marketing and access new markets and were better able to counter the Arab boycott against Jewish products. Working to strengthen the opposition in Palestine. The developments of events, and the roundtable talks in London, had demonstrated that it was impossible to reach an understanding with Haj Amin al-Husayni and his men. Although the opposition in Palestine was not bold, their moderation and realism allowed for a rapprochement with the JA. Unlike al-Husayni, who

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sought to be a key leader in the Arab world, Raghib al-Nashashibi limited his aspirations and focused his activities inside Palestine only. Recently, attempts had been made by the JA’s political department to draw closer to the opposition in Palestine and to influence the direction of its activities. The majority of these attempts, with the help of the British military authorities, had succeeded. After the collapse of the Palestinian armed groups, however, there was now a need to establish relations with the opposition in Palestine based on a political programme. Otherwise, this opposition might be used by the British government to implement its new policy towards the Palestinian question.102 On 29 June 1939, Sasson and al-Bakri met for two hours at his home. Al-Bakri gave a full explanation of the internal political situation in Syria, his contacts with French officials in Damascus and details of his visit a month before to Emir Abdullah in Amman at the head of a 40-strong delegation.103 Al-Bakri stated that Emir Abdullah asked him to support his effort to ascend the throne of Syria and to meet with Britain’s representative in Transjordan, Alec Kirkbride, and tell him that Nasib al-Bakri supported Emir Abdullah’s appointment as King of Syria and Transjordan. Al-Bakri met with Kirkbride, and it became evident to him that Britain was positive about the appointment of Emir Abdullah as King of Syria, according to what he told Sasson. After his return from Amman to Damascus, he met with French officials and briefed them on the details of his meetings with Emir Abdullah and Kirkbride. He got the impression from officials that France was not averse to Emir Abdullah’s campaign to be appointed King of Syria. Al-Bakri explained to Sasson the conflict in Syria between the Syrian opposition led by ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar, which was seeking to install Emir Abdullah as king over Syria and Transjordan, and the Syrian National Bloc and other broad groups, which were committed to the republican system, were vehemently opposed to Emir Abdullah becoming king and had strong support from the leaders of the Palestinian national movement in Damascus. Al-Bakri disclosed to Sasson the contacts of the Syrian National Bloc and the leadership of the Palestinian national movement in Damascus and Beirut with Saudi King Abdulaziz to confront the project to install Emir Abdullah as King of Syria. AlBakri stated that the King of Saudi Arabia had responded to the request of the Syrian National Bloc and provided it with financial aid and pledged to intervene militarily if necessary and occupy Aqaba initially should Prince Abdullah actually try to have himself crowned king. At the conclusion of his meeting with Sasson, al-Bakri suggested that Sasson meet with his brother, Fawzi al-Bakri, who had close ties with Emir Abdullah, to

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obtain reliable and more detailed information about the Emir’s attempt to ascend the throne of Syria.104 On the morning of 30 June 1939, Sasson met Fawzi alBakri at his home, with Nasib al-Bakri and David Lawziyyah in attendance. Fawzi al-Bakri gave a full explanation of Emir Abdullah’s efforts to become King of Syria, and named Syrian leaders who supported him in this, such as ‘Abd alRahman al-Shahbandar, Sultan al-Atrash, and the al-Bakri, al-Khatib and al‘Ajlani families, and Syrian leaders who opposed him in this. Fawzi al-Bakri also gave Sasson details of ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar’s recent visit to Emir Abdullah and said that they had discussed the possibility of Paris, London and Ankara reaching an agreement to establish some form of Arab federation that included Syria and Transjordan, and perhaps also Palestine, and the installation of Emir Abdullah as its king. Fawzi al-Bakri then gave a full explanation of the role of Saudi Arabia and Iraq in Syria, and the position of these two countries on Emir Abdullah’s efforts towards the throne of Syria.105 In his letter, Sasson indicated that he met Fawzi al-Bakri again that same evening, and they talked about Fawzi al-Bakri’s relationship with the JA.106 Indeed, Fawzi al-Bakri began cooperating with the agency in return for payment. Despite the increasing difficulty in travelling from Palestine to Syria after the outbreak of the Second World War, Eliyahu Sasson and Eliyahu Epstein travelled to Syria and Lebanon on 18 January 1940 to learn about the situation there and to further strengthen relations between the Jewish Agency and leaders in the two countries.107 In Damascus, they met with Lutfi al-Haffar, Fawzi, Nasib, and Bahaa al-Din al-Bakri, David Lawziyyah, and David Pinto. Their lengthy report on the details of the political situation in Syria and the condition of the National Bloc and the Shahbandari opposition was based on what Fawzi al-Bakri told them. Details on the political situation in Iraq and the development of relations between its political elites were based on what they were told by Bahaa al-Din al-Bakri, whom Sasson described as a relative of Taha al-Hashimi, who lived in Baghdad.108 At the end of his report, Sasson noted that the al-Bakri brothers, Nasib and Fawzi, had offered their services to the JA at this hour: Nasib would travel to Egypt and Fawzi to Iraq to present a report to the JA on developments in these two countries. Sasson added that the al-Bakri brothers believed that their good relations with government leaders and political activists in Egypt and Iraq would enable them to obtain clear and reliable information about the situation in the two countries and about Arab plans and activities. Sasson asked Bernard Joseph to study their request as soon as possible and decide on it.109 Nasib and Fawzi alBakri obtained a generous sum from the Intelligence Service of the JA’s political department, whose financial situation had improved following its cooperation

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with British Intelligence. In the summer of 1940, cooperation between the Intelligence Service and the British Special Operation Executive (SOE) was strengthened following the German occupation of France and the establishment in July 1940 of the Vichy government, which took control of Syria. British Intelligence gave the Intelligence Service of the JA’s political department £5,000 – a very large sum at the time –to increase its activity in Syria and Lebanon. The al-Bakri brothers, Nasib and Fawzi, received £1,400 from the Jewish Agency.110

XXVII The Plan to Assassinate Shukri al-Quwatli Following a cash injection from British intelligence, the Intelligence Service of the JA’s political department established a new network of informants in Syria and Lebanon, led by Tuvia Arazi and Yousef Fine. Eliyahu Sasson gave guidance to Arazi on setting up the new network, and provided names and addresses of several contacts, including his brother Jamil Sasson in Beirut and Shulamit Zaghal, the 20-year-old sister of Eliyahu Sasson’s wife. Sasson said that Zaghal had no experience, but was loyal to Sasson personally, and would faithfully carry out the work he requested. Sasson advised Arazi that he should use Zaghal to contact a number of Jews and Arabs in Syria and Lebanon, among whom were Nazih al-Mu’ayyad, a relative of Dr ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar (who was assassinated in July 1940). Sasson described Nazih al-Mu’ayyad, in his instructions to Arazi, as a brave man with experience in revolutions, an old friend of his and a person who could be talked to ‘clearly and openly’.111 Arazi and his network were arrested by the authorities in Lebanon. Yousef Fine then took over the network and worked to develop it in many fields.112 It appears that the Intelligence Service developed an ambitious programme at that time to raise the quality of its work. According to a report from Fine to the JA’s Intelligence Service, he had hired Lebanese Arabs to assassinate Shukri alQuwatli and carry out sabotage operations in Syria and Lebanon, by putting explosives in several places. Yousef Fine told Reuven Shiloah that Michel Jarjoura would ‘take responsibility for the assassination of Shukri al-Quwatli, who killed al-Shahbandar, and his men have been observing him for ten days. The killing will be carried out in the very near days. They are asking for £P10 petty cash, and £P200 after carrying out the operation. The man gives a serious impression and shows great experience’.113 Shiloah added that Yousef Fine believed that the JA had to agree to pay the amount Jarjoura was requesting.114

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The JA’s leadership wanted to exploit the assassination of ‘Abd al-Rahman alShahbandar and the suspicions hanging over the National Bloc leadership, Shukri al-Quwatli in particular, to assassinate the leader of the National Bloc most consistently hostile to the Zionist project in Palestine and supportive of the Arab Revolt, and to foment strife and conflict between the National Bloc and the Shahbandari opposition. Clearly, the decision to assassinate an important Syrian leadership figure of the standing of Shukri al-Quwatli would have been taken at the highest levels of the JA, and not without the approval and agreement of David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Shertok. It seems, however, that the failure to implement the decision was due either to the inability of the Jarjoura gang to carry it out, or because the JA leadership refused to pay the required amount. Overall, the JA’s relations with Syrian leaders and elites during this period was perhaps best summarized by Eliyahu Sasson in a report to Moshe Shertok in July 1939, in which he assesses the previous two-year’s activity of the JA’s political department. Sasson summarized the relationship established with three Syrian prime ministers as follows: Over the past two years, we have established friendly relations with two Lebanese prime ministers, Khayr al-Din al-Ahdab and Emir Khalid Shehab, and with three prime ministers in Syria, Jamil Mardam, Lutfi al-Haffar, and Nasuh alBukhari. Our relationship with the three prime ministers in Damascus was largely confined to talks on joint work between the Jewish and Arab peoples, a peaceful resolution to the Palestinian issue, and recognition of the rights of both parties. Although our accomplishments were few, mainly due to the lack of funds, these few were crowned with success and demonstrated the importance of this relationship. Thanks to it, we obtained first-hand information and succeeded in influencing, to a certain degree, the development of affairs in both countries, especially in Syria. We were able to penetrate the Arab Parliamentary Conference in Cairo, learn its confidential plans and decisions, and raise a number of questions that highlighted the importance of the Zionist project in Palestine and its impact on the Levant countries. Through this relationship, we were able to learn what was going on, not only among the various political organizations in Syria, but also in the corridors of power, and we had no small degree of influence over their orientations, whether in terms of their composition or their activity. Recently, following the fall of the Syrian National Bloc and the collapse of the national government in Syria, we have been keen to establish good relations with the Syrian opposition. At a recent meeting of one of our envoys with two opposition leaders in Damascus, we heard encouraging statements, and they expressed their willingness to work together with us.115

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Upon occupying Syria, France partitioned it into a number of ‘states’ and followed a policy of divide and rule. The French pitted one sect against another, isolated sectarian minorities in the mountains such as the Druze and Alawites from the rest of the population, incited one class against the other, the countryside against the city, and manipulated elites by bringing some closer to power while keeping others at a distance. As soon as the French army occupied Damascus in July 1920, putting an end to Arab governance, the French authorities began to divide Syria along sectarian and regional lines. In the two years following the occupation, French general Henri Gouraud issued several decrees that led to the partitioning into the state of Greater Lebanon, the state of Damascus, the state of Aleppo, the Alawite state, Jabal al-Druze, and the Sanjak of Alexandretta, which was linked to the state of Aleppo and enjoyed a special administrative system under direct French rule.1 In November 1920, the French authorities began negotiations with the Druze which culminated, on 4 March 1921, with an agreement on the formation of the ‘Jabal al-Druze State’.2 The agreement granted Jabal al-Druze local autonomy. Its government was headed by a local governor elected for a period of four years, but whose election and endorsement depended on the French. The governor was assisted by two councils: the ‘Government Council’ and the ‘Administrative Committee’. The Government Council was elected for a three-year term and met once a year to review the government budget and make proposals. The Administrative Committee sat permanently and consisted of officials appointed by the Governor, and delegates elected by the Government Council. The Mandate government had a monopoly on providing the Jabal al-Druze government with assistance in the technical, financial, economic, and military fields. It also had a monopoly on its representation abroad, and on their power, pledged under the agreement ‘not to force the government of Jabal al-Druze to enter any possible unification with the Syrian states, except in relation to economic issues that 107

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benefitted the Druze government and other Syrian provinces’. The agreement stipulated that no customs barriers would be established between the government of Jabal al-Druze and that of Damascus, that the mandate government and the government of Jabal al-Druze would not interfere in religious matters and was not permitted to dismiss religious leaders.3 In January 1925, the Mandate authorities dismantled the ‘Syrian Union’ and created the Syrian state encompassing Damascus and Aleppo. The ‘Alawite State’ and the ‘Jabal al-Druze State’4 remained separate from Syria, until the National Bloc and France signed a Friendship Treaty in September 1936, which provided for the incorporation of the Alawite and Druze regions into the Syrian state. In November 1936, general elections were held throughout Syria. The National Bloc won an overwhelming victory and formed a government headed by Jamil Mardam. The Syrian government appointed Nasib al-Bakri, who had good relations with the leaders of Jabal al-Druze, as governor of the area. His appointment was opposed, however, by leaders of Jabal al-Druze who wanted the governor to be a Druze – this against the backdrop of local fanaticism that was stoked by the Mandate authorities in the Alawite Mountains, the Syrian Jazeera, and Jabal al-Druze. Tensions led al-Bakri to resign just six months after his appointment. The process of incorporating these two regions faced many obstacles for two reasons. First, the French authorities’ continued interference and their encouragement of local separatist forces in the two regions to hinder the implementation of the Syrian-French treaty and prolong the mandate over Syria. Second, the presence of separatist, conservative social forces that were opposed to or had reservations on integration. In 1939, following attempts to fan the disputes between the two regions and the Syrian state, and the success of the French authorities in attracting conservative separatist groups, France revoked the incorporation of these two regions into the Syrian state and kept them under its rule. After the return of constitutional life and the general elections to the Syrian Parliament in 1943, and the National Bloc’s coming to power under the leadership of Shukri al-Quwatli, the Syrian state, with Britain’s assistance, was able to extend its influence over these two regions in 1944 and 1945. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, however, the relationship between the Jabal al-Druze leaders and the Syrian state was not on a clear footing. While the National Bloc and the governments it formed sought to integrate Jabal al-Druze into the Syrian state, Druze leaders had conflicting views concerning their future and their relationship with the Syrian state, ranging from full absorption into the

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state, absorption conditional on Jabal al-Druze obtaining self-rule, separation, or annexation to Transjordan.

I The Jabal al-Druze Revolt and the Rise of Sultan al-Atrash Druze migration, first from Lebanon and then from other regions, to Mount Houran began in the late seventeenth century.5 After the gradual settlement of the Druze in the mountains spanning many decades, the Druze fostered relations with the local population consisting of Arab Christians, Bedouins, and Hourani, whose relationship with the Druze varied between conflict, agreement, acceptance, rejection, war and peace.6 The Druze lived in the mountains in relative social isolation from their surroundings, and were always keen on managing their internal affairs, and averse to the interference of those who surrounded them or the central authority. Throughout history, the general perception of the Druze community was that it was united and cohesive. They relied on themselves for self-defence and in extending their influence within and around the mountain.7 They were helped to achieve that by the tribal feudal social system, the shared values they were brought up with and the geographical nature of the mountain region where they lived. The clan formed the framework of the social structure in Jabal al-Druze. Each Druze clan, or, more precisely, every family or ‘home’, settled in a small area or village. The hierarchy of families or ‘homes’ was determined primarily by land ownership and productivity and military strength (number of its men and their bravery) and the role this played in protecting the sect from external threats or in extending their influence over their surroundings. The clan or family had a strong role in the life of the Druze, which often concealed, especially in times of peace, the seeds of division and conflict. The common sectarian affiliation, however, and the important role of the religious community, especially in times of war, were key factors in uniting the Druze before any common danger threatening them. The prevailing social values and norms on the mountain were very close to Bedouin values imprinted with the sectarian principles of the sect.8 The clan-based feudal system and upbringing according to these values, alongside the dangers surrounding the mountain on the one hand, and the aspirations of the mountain leaders to increase the influence in the vicinity of the mountain on the other, led to the creation of a military force always ready to fight, and significantly large relative to the population of Jabal al-Druze.9

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The spark of the Revolt flared in Jabal al-Druze in July 1925 in reaction to the policies and practices of the French authorities in the mountains. It had been preceded by Sultan Pasha al-Atrash’s giving asylum to the Syrian freedom fighter, Adham Khanjar, who had been condemned to death by a French military court for his participation in the failed assassination attempt on General Gouraud on 23 June 1921. He sought asylum and protection with Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, but the French Consul arrested him and sent him to Damascus, pushing al-Atrash to begin his first uprising against the French on 21 July 1922, when he tried to free Khanjar and killed the leader of the convoy transporting him to Damascus prison, Lieutenant Bouxin, along with three soldiers, and seized two armoured vehicles (which the revolutionaries could not use and destroyed).10 From the outset, the Great Syrian Revolt gained momentum once the People’s Party led by ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar (1879–1940) allied with it and formulated its programme for Syrian independence. At the beginning of the revolt, which was sparked and led by Sultan al-Atrash (1891–1982), the revolutionaries in Jabal al-Druze won major victories in many battles against the French army. The victories and bravery shown by the revolutionaries aroused great enthusiasm in Jabal al-Druze. Druze in the Jabal joined the revolt very quickly, so the rebel army grew from a few hundred to begin with to about 8–10,000 fighters, in a region whose Druze population was no more than 45,000. The victories achieved by the revolutionaries in the Jabal al-Druze fired up Syrians throughout Syria, so the People’s Party led by ‘Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar allied with it. The revolt soon spread to different regions of Syria and a unified Syrian leadership was formed in all regions of Syria with Sultan al-Atrash as its commander-in-chief. The revolt lasted about two years, until 1927, when the French army managed to re-occupy the mountains, seize control of Syria and defeat the revolutionaries. Sultan al-Atrash and many of the rebel leaders and their families took refuge in Transjordan, where most of them remained until the French issued a general amnesty in April 1937. In May 1937, the leaders from Jabal al-Druze returned to Syria, led by Sultan al-Atrash.11 The revolt raised the status of Sultan al-Atrash and that of the Druze in Syria. Thanks to his leadership, al-Atrash became an important Syrian national symbol and, at the same time, the leader and figurehead of all the Druze in the Levant, a status previously held by the Arslan family in Lebanon. In his endeavour to strengthen his position in Syria and in Jabal al-Druze, alAtrash built ties with the National Bloc, the Syrian government and the Syrian Shahbandari opposition, who aligned with him from the start. He did this while also taking care not to formally join any of them. Regionally, he established close

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relations with Emir Abdullah of Transjordan, and developed good relations with Britain. In the second half of the 1930s and the beginning of the 1940s, the JA began communicating with him through some of the elements it had cultivated among the Druze of Palestine.

II Zionist Interest in the Druze In the aftermath of the 1929 al-Buraq Revolt in Palestine, leaders of the Zionist movement paid closer attention to the Druze in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. They became even more interested during the 1930s, especially during the 1936– 1939 Arab Revolt in Palestine. The Zionists wanted to keep the Druze out of the Palestinian national struggle, prevent them from joining the Arab Revolt and, once neutralized, bring them over to support the Zionist project in Palestine. The Druze in Palestine – about 10,000 in the mid-1930s – generally lived in poor villages and worked in rain-fed agriculture and raising flocks. Illiteracy was high, exceeding 90 per cent in 1918, and still more than 80 per cent at the end of the British Mandate in 1948. An educated segment failed to emerge, and until 1948 they boasted only one university graduate. Internal influence in the Druze villages and towns was shared by religious sheikhs and family leaders, from the Tarif and Khayr families in particular.12 The Zionist movement managed to attract a few dozen Druze in Palestine in the 1930s to work for the security services of the Zionist movement, a large part of whom were from the villages of Isfiya and Daliyat al-Karmel located on Mount Carmel, and from the town of Shafa ‘Amr in the Lower Galilee, and in lesser numbers from other Druze villages in the Galilee. Zionist leaders sought to use Palestinian Druze who collaborated with the Zionist movement as a tool to influence the position of the Druze in Palestine. More importantly, they wanted to influence Druze leaders in Syria and Lebanon and change their stance on the Arab Revolt in Palestine, the question of Palestine in general and the Zionist project. They were keen to prevent the participation of Druze in Syria and Lebanon in the Arab Revolt, especially when Zionist reports noted considerable Druze participation. From the directives of Zionist leaders to Druze collaborators, and from the reports that these collaborators presented to the leadership of the Zionist movement about their meetings with Druze leaders in Syria and Lebanon, it appears that these collaborators were trying to persuade Druze leaders and sheikhs in Syria and Lebanon about the following:

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that the Druze in Syria and Lebanon should not interfere in the Palestinian issue since relations between the Druze in Palestine and the Zionist movement were good, and their intervention in support of the Palestinians would harm the interests of the Palestinian Druze and threaten their relations with the Zionist movement; that the Zionist movement in Palestine had become an important force, and enjoyed close relations with Britain, and it would be futile for the Druze to stand against it; that support of the Syrian and Lebanese Druze for the Arab Revolt in Palestine would damage the Druze’s historical relations with Britain; that the interests of the Druze in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon required improving their relations with the Zionist movement in Palestine, enabling the Druze community to benefit from economic and technical fields; and that they should work to discredit the Arab Revolt in Palestine, resort to sectarian incitement against the Revolt and rebels in Palestine, exaggerate any problem that occurred between rebels in Palestine and any Druze and present it as a sectarian conflict, as if the rebels in Palestine were mistreating the Druze in Palestine for sectarian reasons.

III Early Harbingers Contact between the Chairman of the National Committee of the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi and Druze notables and sheikhs in Palestine began in 1930. In fact, their relationship dated back to an incident that happened in July of that year, which entailed the murder of an Arab policeman near the village of al-Maghar in the Galilee. The police arrested the Druze headman in al-Maghar, Muhammad al-Husayn and his two sons, Wahsh and Nimr. Wahsh confessed to killing the policeman, but later maintained his innocence, stating that his confession had been extracted under torture. Sheikh Muhammad al-Husayn went to Yousef Nahmani, the Zionist land dealer in Tiberias, and asked for his help to have his son Wahsh released. Nahmani advised him to go to Jerusalem and meet with Ben-Zvi, who was also the Deputy Head of the Zionist Intelligence Service (the Joint Bureau) at the time, to help him meet with British police chiefs in Jerusalem. On 2 August 1930, al-Husayn went to Jerusalem with Sheikh Salman Tarif to meet Ben-Zvi and asked for his help. Ben-Zvi hosted them at a Jerusalem hotel at the expense of the Zionist National Committee and helped them to meet with British police chiefs. Sometime after, the police released

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Wahsh. Following the meeting, Ben-Zvi wrote a report to the Head of the JA’s political department, Frederick Kisch, in which he stressed the usefulness of establishing relations with the Druze in Palestine and how this would positively affect the Zionist movement’s relations with the Druze in Houran in Syria.13 That same month, Ben-Zvi visited many Druze villages in the Galilee, met with their notables and sheikhs, and worked to strengthen the relationship of the Zionist movement with Sheikh Muhammad al-Husayn. As the Palestinian national struggle escalated in the early 1930s, at the beginning of 1931 the Arab division of the JA’s political department sent Eliyahu Epstein to Transjordan to study the situation.14 There Epstein met with Zayd al-Atrash, brother of Sultan al-Atrash, and ‘Aqlah al-Qatami, a confidant of Sultan al-Atrash.15 On 30 September 1932, Ben-Zvi16 made another tour of the Druze villages in the Galilee, where he was hosted for a week. In his report, he said that he had visited Sheikh Muhammad al-Husayn in the village of al-Maghar, who had previously asked Ben-Zvi to get the Zionist movement to mediate between Sultan al-Atrash and the French government to obtain a pardon for al-Atrash and the Druze rebels and allow them to return to Syria.17 Ben-Zvi added that he met separately with Sheikh Wahsh, al-Husayn’s son, who told him18 that he had visited al-Atrash in Karak in Transjordan many times, most recently a few days before, and that al-Atrash had asked him to address the leaders of the Zionist movement and ask them to intervene with France in order to allow him to return to Syria.19 In his report, Ben-Zvi said that he had visited Sheikh Salman Khayr in the village of Abu Sinan, staying with him for two days, and that Khayr told him that he knew that Sheikh Muhammad al-Husayn had travelled to Jerusalem concerning Sultan al-Atrash, and from there to Karak in Transjordan to meet with him. Khayr asked Ben-Zvi to be frank with him on this matter, so that he could advise him. Ben-Zvi revealed to Khayr that al-Husayn had indeed visited Jerusalem and met with officials of the JA, as an intermediary with Sultan alAtrash. Khayr said that the request for the intervention of the Zionist movement with France undoubtedly came from al-Atrash but noted that Sheikh Wahsh Muhammad al-Husayn’s role as intermediary between Sultan al-Atrash and the Zionist movement would not bring respect to Sultan al-Atrash or the Zionist movement, because Sheikh Wahsh did not belong to an important Druze family.20 In 1934, Zayd al-Atrash visited some Druze villages in northern Palestine, and during a visit to Ramah, he met with Aharon Haim Cohen, one of the first

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employees of the Intelligence Service of the JA’s political department, who had established strong relations with many Druze in Palestine.21

IV The Beginning of Yusuf al-‘Aysami’s Contact with the Zionist Movement Sheikh Yusuf al-‘Aysami, known as Abu Hamad, was born in the village of Imtan in Jabal al-Druze in 1885. He was the father of Shibli al-‘Aysami, who served as Assistant Secretary-General of the Arab Socialist Baath Party before the military coup in Syria coup of 23 February 1966.22 Yusuf al-‘Aysami was a member of the General Command of the revolt in Jabal al-Druze in 1925, which soon turned into a revolt against the French occupation in Syria. Al-‘Aysami took refuge in Transjordan with Sultan al-Atrash and other leaders after the suppression of the revolt and was one of al-Atrash’s key aides and his special adviser on foreign affairs. The two men returned to Syria in May 1937. In the early 1930s, al-‘Aysami regularly visited the village of Isfiya in Palestine and stayed with relatives.23 In July1936, al-‘Aysami, most probably through Hasan Abu Rukn who had started collaborating with the Zionist movement, initiated relations between the Zionist movement and the leadership of Jabal al-Druze. On 2 July 1936, al-‘Aysami met in Haifa with the Head of the General Union of Jewish Workers (the Histadrut) there, Abba Hushi24 and his assistant, Shlomo (Salim) Alfiah. Al-‘Aysami introduced himself as ‘the representative of Sultan Pasha al-Atrash in Palestine,’ and said that the leaders of Jabal al-Druze, who had taken refuge in Transjordan, had held consultations five months previously and decided to establish friendly relations with the Jews in Palestine, having become aware of their rising power. Al-‘Aysami added that these leaders had instructed him to approach representatives of the Zionist movement in Palestine, to establish friendly and neighbourly relations with them, and to relay the fact that the leaders of Jabal al-Druze were optimistic now that Léon Blum had become French prime minister, and that they hoped to reach an understanding with him regarding their return to Syria and the rule of Jabal al-Druze.25 Abba Hushi and Shlomo Alfiah affirmed how the Zionist movement in Palestine was happy to establish friendly relations with the leaders of Jabal alDruze. Al-‘Aysami suggested that Hushi visit Sultan al-Atrash in Karak. Al-‘Aysami told Hushi that after returning to Jabal al-Druze, al-Atrash would seek to obtain full autonomy for Jabal al-Druze, while at the same time partnering Damascus in foreign policy issues, and that most of the leaders in the mountains supported

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al-Atrash’s vision, while a minority supported ‘Abd al-Ghaffar al-Atrash, Sultan’s cousin, who demanded complete independence for Jabal al-Druze. Hushi suggested that al-‘Aysami meet with Yitzhak Ben-Zvi in Jerusalem, but al-‘Aysami was not comfortable with travelling to Jerusalem, fearing it would raise suspicions, and that he preferred to meet Ben-Zvi in Haifa.26 Ben-Zvi and al-‘Aysami did meet in Haifa, where al-‘Aysami reiterated their will to establish friendly relations with the Zionist movement in Palestine. It soon became apparent, however, that the Druze in both Syria and Lebanon, despite what Yusuf al-‘Aysami claimed, were still involved in the Arab Revolt. This worried Zionist leaders, who noted with concern the significant proportion of Druze in Syria and Lebanon, and from Jabal al-Druze in particular, joining the Arab Revolt in Palestine. They were also worried because they were aware of the combat experience and bravery of the Druze. Keen to set things in motion, Abba Hushi, who was working on communications with the Druze in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon, sent two Palestinian Druze collaborators to the Syrian and Lebanese Druze leaderships. On 16 August 1936, Hushi sent Sheikh Zayed Abu Rukn to Lebanon and guided him about the issues he should address with the Druze leaders in Lebanon to influence them not to join the Arab Revolt in Palestine and take a neutral stance between the Palestinians and the Zionists. Zayed Abu Rukn visited 35 Druze towns and villages and met with numerous Druze leaders and influential figures in Lebanon, including Sheikh al-‘Aqil Husayn Hamada, Sheikh ‘Ali al-Gharib, Sheikh Husayn al-Gharib, Sheikh Husayn Tali‘, Sheikh Najib Qays, and Mrs Nazira Jumblatt. In all of his meetings, Abu Rukn noted, as he was instructed by Hushi, how relations between the Druze in Palestine and the Zionist movement were good, and that the Zionist project had contributed to the development of Palestine and demanded that they work to prevent the Druze in Lebanon from joining the Arab Revolt in Palestine, stressing that such action would damage Druze-Zionist relations in Palestine and harm the Druze there. According to Abu Rukn’s report, the leaders he met promised to adopt a neutral position and work to stop the Druze in Lebanon’s involvement in Palestine. Sheikh Husayn Hamada promised to work to stop the Druze joining the Arab Revolt and, in secret, to contact the French authorities in Beirut and ask them to reinforce security on the Lebanese-Palestinian borders, according to Abu Rukn’s report.27 On 20 September 1936, Abba Hushi sent Sheikh Hasan Abu Rukn to Transjordan to meet with the leaders from Jabal al-Druze based there. The day before Abu Rukn’s departure, Hushi arranged for him to meet in Jerusalem with Yitzhak Ben-Zvi and Eliyahu Epstein, who provided him with appropriate

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guidance on his meetings with Syrian Druze leaders taking refuge in Transjordan, foremost among them Sultan al-Atrash. On his return from Transjordan, Abu Rukn presented a report to Abba Hushi and his assistant Shlomo Alfiah, in which he stated that he had met with Sultan al-Atrash, ‘Ali al-Atrash, and Sayyah alAtrash, and had reinforced the narrative that relations between the Druze in Palestine and the Zionist movement along with their British backers were good, that the Zionist movement was extending a helping hand to the Druze in Palestine especially in employment, and that the Zionist project had developed Palestine considerably. Abu Rukn added that he had met with Sultan al-Atrash separately and tried to persuade him to stop Druze from Jabal al-Druze and the rest of Syria and Lebanon joining the Arab Revolt in Palestine. Persuading Sultan al-Atrash was not easy but in the end he succumbed to Abu Rukn’s request that the Druze should remain neutral.28 The contacts established with Druze leaders based in Transjordan, especially Sultan al-Atrash, were vital to Zionist leaders as was every effort spent to stop Druze involvement in the Arab Revolt in Palestine. Zionist leaders understood from Hasan Abu Rukn’s meeting with Sultan al-Atrash that the Sultan was committed to making efforts and using his influence to stop the Druze in Syria and Lebanon joining the Arab Revolt in Palestine. In a letter to Abba Hushi, BenZvi mentioned that he had received information that Sa‘id al-‘As,29 leader of a Syrian group who had been killed in clashes around the Hebron area a week prior, was Druze. Ben-Zvi added that he did not know if al-‘As had entered Palestine before or after Abu Rukn’s visit to Sultan al-Atrash in Karak and that this was an important question: ‘You know what the Druze promised us and what I confirmed to Sheikh Abu Rukn when he came to Jerusalem’ before he travelled to see Sultan al-Atrash. ‘Our promise to work for the Druze in Paris still stands. So we must know very well where we stand with Sultan al-Atrash. It is not reasonable that his men are leading armed groups and he does not know. And if he does know, then he should let us know and not conceal it from us.’ In his letter, Ben-Zvi asked Abba Hushi to clarify whether Sa‘id al-‘As was Druze.30 In the end it transpired that he was not. In a letter to Ben-Zvi of 5 February 1937, Shlomo Alfiah said that Yusuf al‘Aysami had visited him and briefed him on several letters he had received from Sultan and Zayd al-Atrash. Sultan al-Atrash’s letter authorized al-‘Aysami to be his representative in Palestine in everything related to Druze affairs, while Zayd al-Atrash’s letter, according to Alfiah, dealt with ‘our affairs’ and his ‘agreement to meet us as well’. Alfiah added that it was necessary for al-‘Aysami to travel to Transjordan, as had been agreed at the previous meeting attended by Ben-Zvi,

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but the journey had been delayed due to a lack of travel expenses. In his letter, Alfiah asked Ben-Zvi to send al-‘Aysami £P10 for him to travel to Transjordan.31 On 25 February 1937, Alfiah wrote to Ben-Zvi that, along with Abba Hushi and Sheikh Hasan Abu Rukn, he had met the day before with al-‘Aysami to say goodbye to him before he travelled to see Sultan al-Atrash in Transjordan. Al‘Aysami complained of the slow progress in relations between the leadership of Jabal al-Druze and the JA. He noted how the leaders of Jabal al-Druze had proposed drawing up a written agreement between the Druze and the JA, so Abba Hushi asked him to prepare a draft agreement for the JA to consider. For his part, Abu Rukn stated that Palestinian Arab leaders were pressuring Sultan al-Atrash to recruit 160 Druze to take part in the Revolt in Palestine, and that Sultan al-Atrash had refused.32.

V Relations after Sultan al-Atrash’s Return to Syria After signing the treaty in September 1936, the French authorities issued a general amnesty for the leaders from Jabal al-Druze who participated in the 1925 revolt and taken refuge in Transjordan in April 1937. In May 1937, they returned to Syria, led by Sultan al-Atrash. Upon their return, Druze leaders were occupied with internal issues, which meant the JA preferred to wait a while before resuming contact. In June 1937, David Lawziyyah, the JA’s agent in Damascus, suggested that the Agency send a high-level delegation to Jabal al-Druze to congratulate Sultan alAtrash and his associates on their return. In August 1937, Moshe Nahmani travelled to Damascus to prepare for a visit that was supposed to have been made by the Head of the National Committee of the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi. To begin with, Nahmani met businessman Zaki Sukar who, in cooperation with David Lawziyyah and David Pinto, was mediating between the JA and Sultan al-Atrash. The report of these meetings states that Zaki Sukar was a major grain dealer, a Freemason, a member of the Damascus Municipal Council and that he had business links with Jewish firms in Palestine. Sukar advised Nahmani that the JA send Sultan al-Atrash special gifts, not the usual rice, sugar, or coffee, of which he had plenty, but, for example, Persian rugs, provided that the value of the gifts was over £P200.33 Through the JA agents in Damascus, David Lawziyyah and David Pinto, Nahmani met with ‘Aqla al-Qatami,34 who presented himself to them as a representative of Sultan al-Atrash. Al-Qatami stressed the importance of the

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idea of a visit to al-Atrash and that it would be a precursor to other visits. He told Nahmani: ‘There can be no doubt that you want our help and we want your help when necessary, so it is in the interest of both parties to be circumspect and not rush.’ Al-Qatami added that the situation was tense in Jabal al-Druze at the time, and the visit of an official Jewish delegation led by the Head of the National Committee of the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine would attract the attention of people who might use the visit to incite against the two parties. If wanting to establish permanent and successful relations, the JA should, for the time being, content itself with sending a letter of congratulations to Sultan al-Atrash.35 On 8 and 9 September 1937, the Bludan Conference in support of the Palestinian people was held at the invitation of the Palestine Defence Committee, founded by Nabih al-‘Azma in Damascus after his return to Syria from Palestine. The committee had established branches in many Arab capitals. Some 450 Arab leaders and activists from Arab countries attended, about 120 of them from Palestine. Former Iraqi Prime Minister Naji al-Suwaydi, Muhammad ‘Alouba, Riad al-Sulh, Bishop Ignatius Hreika, Sabri al-‘Asali and Fouad Khalil Moufarrej, chaired the conference.36 The Syrian government was absent from the conference, as was Sultan al-Atrash or any of his family. The JA wasted no time in resuming contact with the Jabal al-Druze leaders. On 9 September 1937, Abba Hushi met with Sheikh Hasan Abu Rukn in Haifa, where they discussed developments in the situation of the Druze in Syria and Lebanon. Hushi decided to send Abu Rukn to both countries to review developments, and to resume contact with the leadership of Jabal al-Druze, especially with Yusuf al‘Aysami. On 10 September 1937, Abu Rukn travelled to Lebanon, staying six days, during which time he visited Druze villages and towns, met with many influential people and called on them to stop the participation of Lebanese Druze in the Arab Revolt in Palestine. Then he moved on to Syria, where he stayed as a guest of Yusuf al-‘Aysami at Imtan village in Jabal al-Druze. There he met with Sultan al-Atrash, ‘Ali al-Atrash, ‘Abd al-Ghaffar al-Atrash and other leaders from Jabal al-Druze and reiterated his call for them to completely put an end to the participation of Syrian Druze in the Arab Revolt in Palestine. Before his departure from Syria, on 24 September 1937, Abu Rukn had a long meeting with al-‘Aysami, and spoke to him frankly about al-‘Aysami’s relations with the Jewish Agency, according to Abu Rukn’s report to Hushi.37 On the same day, al-‘Aysami wrote a short letter to Hushi in which he stated that Abu Rukn ‘made me understand the friendship and affection you have’ for him, and that al-‘Aysami had informed Abu Rukn in detail about ‘all I seek from cooperation with you, and he will explain the necessary to you’. In his letter, al-‘Aysami then invited Abba Hushi to visit him in Jabal al-Druze.38

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On 13 October 1937, JA’s agent in Damascus, David Lawziyyah, told Eliyahu Sasson and David Pinto that he had in the last few days met several times with ‘Aqla al-Qatami, who was still in Damascus, and who had inquired about the possibility of a JA delegation visiting Sultan al-Atrash and questioned the motives behind this meeting. Lawziyyah added that al-Qatami had told him that Haj Amin al-Husayni had sent letters to the leaders of Jabal al-Druze and other Syrian leaders, asking for their help with fighters and weapons for the Arab Revolt in Palestine. Al-Qatami suggested to Lawziyyah that the JA work together with the leaders of Jabal al-Druze, to thwart what al-Husayni wanted to achieve and prevent the Druze, especially those from Jabal al-Druze, from taking part in the Arab Revolt in Palestine. It seems that when Sasson heard this, he had doubts about al-Qatami’s motives, and asked David Lawziyyah what was making him pass on this information to the JA and what lay behind his proposal to establish relations between the leaders of Jabal al-Druze and the Zionist movement. Lawziyyah answered that the leaders of Jabal al-Druze required financial aid and seemed to think an agreement with the JA would make it happen.39 Sasson met al-Qatami in person to find out more about why he wanted to establish relations with the JA. At Pinto’s House in Damascus, Sasson met alQatami who brought Damascus businessman Zaki Sukar with him. In a threehour meeting, al-Qatami spoke about the effort being made by Haj al-Husayni’s men in Damascus to get fighters and weapons from Jabal al-Druze in support of the Arab Revolt in Palestine. In his report, Sasson added that al-Qatami asked him whether the JA wanted to do something to thwart the efforts of the Palestinian leadership to recruit fighters and obtain weapons from Jabal alDruze, and whether the JA had considered developing a plan for cooperation with the Jabal al-Druze leadership to address this. According to Sasson’s report, al-Qatami added ‘Sultan al-Atrash and his men are ready to negotiate with us’ in this regard. Sasson answered that, as far as he knew, the JA had no plans to deal with this matter and that he was ‘glad to hear that you are ready to cooperate’ and would be ‘happier if I hear proposals from you to present to my superiors in Jerusalem’.40 Before the end of the meeting, al-Qatami said that he told the Druze in Damascus not to cooperate with or contact Mu‘in al-Madi and other Palestinian leaders in Damascus without the prior knowledge of Sultan alAtrash. Lawziyyah believed that there was a real opportunity to reach an understanding with Sultan al-Atrash, and he was ready to go to Jerusalem to explain his view to the JA’s leadership, given his disagreement with Sasson, who at the time opposed relations with Jabal al- Druze.41 Lawziyyah did not travel to Jerusalem but he did

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send a letter to the JA inviting it to develop its relationship with the leaders of Jabal al-Druze and urging it to work to reach an agreement with the Druze leadership. Lawziyyah urged the JA leadership not to be put off by the fee they would have to pay the Druze leaders, but rather to consider the many benefits the Agency would gain from such an agreement, and also the ramifications of not bringing the Druze over to the side of the Jewish Agency.42 About ten days after his meeting with al-Qatami, Sasson sent a letter to Head of the JA’s political department, Moshe Shertok, pointing out an issue that needed the utmost attention. The Syrian press had published a statement in protest at the Palestinian issue, sent from Jabal al-Druze to Paris, London, and Geneva, all of whose signatories were supporters of the Syrian National Bloc, while none of the supporters of Sultan al-Atrash had signed it. ‘Was it pure coincidence, or was it related to al-Qatami’s promise to me that the al-Atrash clan would remain neutral?’ Sasson said in his letter to Shertok.43

VI Abba Hushi’s First Visit to Jabal al-Druze Abba Hushi accepted Yusuf al-‘Aysami’s invitation to visit him in Jabal al-Druze. He was keen to coordinate this visit with Sasson and, a day before his departure, he telephoned Sasson, who was then in Damascus, and agreed to meet the next morning.44 On 25 October 1937, Hushi left Haifa for Lebanon accompanied by Hasan Abu Rukn. They went to the town of Hasbaya, where they were received by Dr Tawfiq Hamada and other sheikhs from the town. From his hosts, Hushi heard that attempts were being made in the town and in other Druze villages in Lebanon to recruit Druze youngsters for the Arab Revolt in Palestine, but the sheikhs in the villages were against it, thanks to the effort made by Hasan Abu Rukn on a visit some six weeks previously.45 Hushi and Abu Rukn then left for Damascus, where they met Sasson before travelling to Jabal al-Druze. Sasson told him about his meeting with al-Qatami some ten days prior and asked him specifically not to visit Sultan al-Atrash during his trip and not to take any action that could provoke the opposition of the Syrian government. Sasson was concerned that Hushi’s visit to Jabal al-Druze might provoke the Syrian government and the National Bloc and that it would anger ‘Aqla al-Qatami and his group’, who might claim ‘that they were the ones who planted the seed while others came and reaped the fruits’. Sasson was cautious about the JA’s dealings with Jabal al-Druze but at the same time cared

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for relations established with Jabal al-Druze, which he wanted to run wisely so as not to anger the National Bloc and the Syrian government.46 After his meeting with Sasson, Hushi – accompanied by Hasan Abu Rukn – travelled to the village of Imtan in Jabal al-Druze, where Yusef al-‘Aysami lived. They were received by al-‘Aysami, the village sheikhs and notables, and a group of young men in a ‘royal welcome’, according to Hushi’s report.47 After lunch, according to his report, Hushi and Abu Rukn talked ‘business’ with al-‘Aysami in private, and Hushi suggested that he cooperate with the JA on the following basis: ●

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Providing the JA with information on everything that was happening in Jabal al-Druze and Damascus related to the Palestinian issue. Using his wide influence in Jabal al-Druze to prevent the Druze from involvement in the Arab Revolt in Palestine and intervention in the Palestinian issue. Working to influence Sultan al-Atrash and his family members to conclude an alliance and friendship agreement between Jabal al-Druze and the Zionist movement in Palestine.

In his report, Hushi said that he had explained to al-‘Aysami that the first two requirements should be implemented quickly, while the third needed careful preparation to achieve. Hushi was aware that there was a big difference between reaching an understanding with Sultan al-Atrash over stopping Druze involvement in the Palestinian issue and concluding an alliance and friendship agreement between Sultan al-Atrash and the Zionist movement. Such an alliance would need careful preparation and ongoing efforts to achieve it. Al-‘Aysami, he continues, had accepted his offer to cooperate fully with the JA, and that in exchange he was requesting £P12 per month plus travel expenses. He also said that al-‘Aysami had informed him that since the beginning of October he had already been working for the JA, as requested by Abu Rukn during his visit in September 1937. Al-‘Aysami said that the leadership of the Arab Revolt resident in Damascus had invited him to meet them in mid-October, and that he had met with Mu‘in al-Madi, Akram Zu‘aytar,‘Izzat Darwaza and Ahmad al‘Afifi, who had asked him to do his best to influence the youth of Jabal al-Druze to join the Arab Revolt in Palestine. They had asked him to recruit 100–150 young Druze and offered to pay them about £P4 per month and gave him a letter for Sultan al-Atrash stressing the need for Druze involvement in the Arab Revolt in Palestine and urging him to respond to this request. Al-‘Aysami added that he returned to the Jabal al-Druze and delivered the message to Sultan al-Atrash,

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whom he met along with his brothers, and persuaded them to do the opposite of the letter. He had explained to them the strength of the Zionist movement in Palestine and the friendly relations between them and the Druze in Palestine, and that the interest of the poor Jabal al-Druze, with its few resources, required cooperation with the Zionist movement, particularly given the tense relations between Jabal al-Druze and the French authorities. Al-‘Aysami added that Sultan al-Atrash and his brothers were in agreement and rejected the request of the Palestinian leaders.48 To build an alliance and strengthen relations between the two parties, Abba Hushi pointed out that al-‘Aysami requested that the JA in Palestine assist Jabal Druze in the following: sending Jewish agricultural experts from the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine; helping to find sources of water and developing irrigation methods; influencing Jewish banks in Palestine and abroad to give the authorities in Jabal al-Druze loans for development; and using the Zionist movement’s influence in France for the benefit of Jabal al-Druze. Hushi said that Sultan al-Atrash and Hasan and ‘Ali al-Atrash sent messengers during his meeting with al-‘Aysami, and they invited Hushi to visit them, but he declined. Hushi described al-‘Aysami in his report as an intellectual, genuine, someone who weighed his every word, a spokesman for Sultan al-Atrash and representative in external relations concerning Jabal al-Druze and without whom Sultan al-Atrash could not make any decision on external relations. Hushi believed that the relationship he had formed with al-‘Aysami during this visit was critical, especially if the JA worked to maintain and nurture it and expand its circle of relations and contacts in Jabal al-Druze. Hushi asked the JA’s leadership to state its position on the contents of his report and give him directions on what he should do.49

VII The Internal Zionist Debate Over the Relationship with the Druze Abba Hushi’s report on his trip to Jabal al-Druze, complete with recommendations to strengthen the JA’s links with it, sparked a dispute in the Arab Division of the JA’s political department. Whereas Eliyahu Sasson and Eliyahu Epstein had reservations about Hushi’s report and were directly monitoring the JA’s ties with the Syrian government and the National Bloc, Aharon Haim Cohen was all for developing ties with Jabal al-Druze. In a short letter to Moshe Shertok, Epstein revealed two main reasons for his reservations about Hushi’s report. First, the Syrian government, with which the

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JA had good relations, would suspect that the JA would help the Druze area break away from Syria if it concluded an agreement with the Druze leadership. This would harm the JA’s relations with the Syrian government and the National Bloc, especially given the severe tension between the Syrian government and the Druze leadership at the time. Second, the French authorities in Syria would suspect that Britain was using the JA to interfere in Jabal al-Druze, and that this interference was only a tool in the service of British policy. Epstein recommended that the JA should refrain from visiting Jabal al-Druze for the present, limiting its ties to the intelligence level, and meet its informants outside Jabal al- Druze.50 Aharon Haim Cohen, in an internal memorandum, backed Hushi’s report.51 Cohen began his memo by agreeing with the importance of Hushi’s findings, especially parts related to security, and further agreed with Hushi that the Druze were sincere in their pursuit of relationships with the JA. He pointed out that this was not the first time that the leaders of Jabal al-Druze had tried to get close to the JA and that Sultan al-Atrash knew that the JA had endeavoured to help him by mediating between him and France, and had considered providing him with material assistance while he was a refugee in Transjordan. Cohen added that it was no surprise that David Lawziyyah and David Pinto had directed Druze leaders towards the JA, and that he did not understand its hesitation about developing relations with Jabal al-Druze. Cohen rejected suggestions that creating strong ties between the JA and Jabal al-Druze might provoke British and French opposition and indignation. He added that the only party opposed to the development of relations between the JA and Jabal al-Druze was the leadership of the Arab nationalist movement and the Arab governments, chief among them the Syrian National Bloc and the Syrian government, excluding the leaderships of Transjordan and Lebanon. Cohen suggested ignoring this opposition, because the likelihood of reaching an understanding in the foreseeable future between the JA and Arab governments was slim. Even if a Jewish state was established in Palestine, it would take years before the governments of those Arab countries came to terms with it, because the influence of the Arab nationalist movement, which was opposed to coming to terms with the Jewish state, would remain strong for a long time. Cohen concluded that the JA should continue on the path it had taken so far, which was ‘moving to achieve minor things so we can get to the major things. We managed to arrange our relationship with Transjordan in the best way, and we also succeeded in establishing friendly – if not perfect – relations with Lebanon. Now we have to establish strong relations with the Druze’. The JA should follow the path of ‘establishing points of light in the dark Arab sea that surrounds us: one in

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Transjordan, another in Lebanon, a third in Jabal al-Druze, a fourth somewhere else, and so on’. He added that only actions like that would ‘reinforce our position in the eyes of the major Arab governments and force them to deal with us as one of the main parties in the Near East’.52 Besides this, Cohen raised another interesting point towards building relations with Jabal al-Druze. He observed that within the area designated for the Jewish state, as recommended by the Peel Commission’s partition of Palestine, there were 18 Druze villages inhabited by 10,000 Druze. Cohen believed that the establishment of firm relations between the JA and the Jabal al-Druze, would help in the transfer of the Druze from these villages in Palestine to Jabal alDruze in Syria.53 Eliyahu Sasson, in an internal memorandum to Moshe Shertok,54 indicated a number of shortcomings in Cohen’s assessment as follows: ●

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Cohen’s claim that, after the return of Sultan al-Atrash to Jabal al-Druze, it was the Druze who had initiated the establishment of relations with the JA via David Lawziyyah was not correct. In fact, the proposal came from Lawziyyah himself, who initiated contacts with the Druze leadership and, after obtaining their approval, contacted the JA. Contrary to Cohen’s claim, the JA’s leadership had no reservations about establishing relations with the leadership of Jabal al-Druze. The issue had nothing to do with reluctance or the lack thereof, but rather whether the current time was appropriate for establishing close ties between the JA and Jabal al-Druze. It was a mistake to think, as Cohen claimed, that Britain and France supported the establishment of firm ties between the JA and Jabal al-Druze. Colonial rivalry hindered their adoption of a unified position on the issue, and for their own reasons, each was hesitant about the development of such a relationship. It was a mistake to compare the situation of Jabal al-Druze with Transjordan and Lebanon, which were, to a certain extent, independent countries, while Jabal al-Druze was part of the Syrian state. This fact was reflected in the provisions of the treaty that France signed with the Syrian National Bloc. Sasson added that although relations between the leaders of Jabal al-Druze and the Syrian government were at present variable and not based on sufficiently clear foundations, there was no basis for assuming that this would reach a point where the leadership of Jabal al-Druze would break off relations with Syria and demand full independence.

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It would be a mistake for the JA to form an alliance with Jabal al-Druze both in light of the current situation in Jabal al-Druze, and the JA’s relations with the Syrian government. The Syrian government would consider such an alliance ‘a stab in the back and a Zionist plot against it’ and would not accept any justification for it. Any agreement implied non-recognition of Syrian authority over Jabal al-Druze, and no confidence in the position of Prime Minister Jamil Mardam, who had recently expressed regret for the renewal of the Arab Revolt in Palestine and confirmed that his government was working with the French and British authorities to prevent the smuggling of weapons and fighters into Palestine. Cohen’s conclusion that ‘we have to move to achieve minor things so we can get to the major things’, was not appropriate in this case, for he knew that the JA had established relations with Transjordan, not through the residents of Transjordan but through the Emir himself. Likewise, the JA did not establish its relationship with Lebanon through the opposition or via the residents of Tyre and Sidon, for example, but rather the government in Lebanon and the leading parties in it. Sasson concluded that this same approach should also be pursued with Syria, that is, seeking to reach an agreement with the Syrian government and the National Bloc, because trying to conclude an agreement with Jabal al-Druze would not hinder reaching an agreement with Syria.55

The dispute in the Arab Division reached Moshe Shertok who was all for continuing to enhance its security and intelligence relations with Jabal al-Druze, but at a low level, indirectly and via Abba Hushi with oversight from the Arab Division. Shertok opposed a formal alliance or agreement at the time with Jabal al-Druze for many reasons, prime among them the JA’s relations with the Syrian government and the National Bloc, and because a formal agreement at present would ‘encourage exaggerated expectations’ among the Druze, ‘increase their appetite for selfish benefits’ and would in the end lead to disappointment among the Druze when the Agency did not fulfil their exaggerated demands.56 The JA dallied a while in responding to Abba Hushi’s request for £P12 a month to be allocated to Yusuf al-‘Aysami. In a letter to the JA’s directorate, Hushi indicated that he had travelled to Jabal al-Druze in accordance with the JA’s decision, and submitted his report four weeks prior, but had not yet received an answer. Hushi urged the JA’s administration to expedite the decision and transfer £P12 to send to al-‘Aysami. The JA leadership thought £P12 per month was excessive and agreed to £P8.57

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Hushi travelled to Damascus and met with al-‘Aysami on 15 December 1937. In his report on this meeting, Hushi said that al-‘Aysami was working on the three principles agreed upon: preventing the Druze of Jabal al-Druze from joining the Arab Revolt in Palestine; collecting information on Palestinian activities in Damascus and everything related to the Palestinian issue; and influencing the leaders of Jabal al-Druze, especially Sultan al-Atrash and other leaders of the al-Atrash family, in the direction of an alliance with the JA in Palestine.58 He mentioned that al-‘Aysami had been able to stop three groups from Jabal al-Druze who were about to go to Palestine to join the Arab Revolt.He had been assisted in that, according to al-‘Aysami, by Sultan al-Atrash, who acted as an intermediary to find some of them employment in the local police rather than going to Palestine.59 Al-‘Aysami told Hushi that young men from Jabal al-Druze were motivated to join the Arab Revolt in Palestine because of dire economic circumstances and widespread unemployment. Al-‘Aysami added that he tried to prevent the Druze from becoming involved in the Arab Revolt in Palestine by trying to find them work. Sultan and ‘Ali al-Atrash had helped him with this and, together with al‘Aysami, had held several meetings with influential people in the mountain towns and villages, including friends of Sultan al-Atrash who had joined him in leading the 1925 revolt. Sultan al-Atrash, according to al-‘Aysami, asked all of them to work in their villages to stop Druze involvement in the Arab Revolt in Palestine.60 Meanwhile, Al-‘Aysami also reported that he was developing good relations with Palestinian leaders in Damascus and that he reciprocated their friendship to maintain a relationship with them, all the while using all his influence to keep the leaders of Jabal al-Druze, led by Sultan al-Atrash, from providing assistance to the Arab Revolt in Palestine. According to Hushi, al-‘Aysami had been able to persuade Sultan al-Atrash, and Zayd and ‘Ali al-Atrash – the leader of the youth in al-‘Aysami’s description – not to interfere in the Palestinian conflict. Al‘Aysami told Hushi that the leaders of Jabal Druze – Sultan al-Atrash, Zayd alAtrash, Yusuf al-‘Aysami, ‘Ali al-Atrash and about five others – had met in AsSuwayda on 5 December 1937, and that they had decided to focus on addressing the internal issues of Jabal al-Druze and oppose the nationalist orientation of the Palestinian leaders in Damascus who were asking them to support the Arab Revolt in Palestine. They also refused Haj Amin al-Husayni’s request to visit AsSuwayda which had been relayed by Nabih al-‘Azma and ‘Izzat Darwaza to Sultan al-Atrash.61

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On the alliance between Jabal al-Druze and the Zionist movement in Palestine, al-‘Aysami said that he had spoken with Sultan al-Atrash and Zayd and ‘Ali al-Atrash several times on the matter, and that they had expressed their desire to invite Abba Hushi, alone or with other JA officials, to visit them in Jabal al-Druze during the next two or three weeks, where he would be welcomed very warmly. In his report, Hushi added that he asked al-‘Aysami to postpone this visit to the coming spring. Considering the position of the JA’s political department on relations with Jabal al-Druze, it was impossible to obtain approval for the visit at this period. At the end of his report, Hushi mentioned how al-‘Aysami had told him that the financial donation that the JA had sent to the Syrian government in the aftermath of the floods had left a positive impression in Syria.62 According to his report, Hushi agreed at this meeting the means of communication with al‘Aysami, that they should continue to meet regularly in Damascus and that al‘Aysami would write a weekly report and send it to Hushi in Haifa.63

VIII The Significance of Yusuf al-‘Aysami’s Collaboration with the Zionist Movement Yusuf al-‘Aysami turned out to be an ideal agent for the JA. His high political standing in Jabal al-Druze, leadership role in the 1925 Revolt, personal relationship with Sultan al-Atrash, wide contacts with the al-Atrash family and the Druze in Syria and Lebanon, not to mention his relations with Syria’s political classes all made him extremely useful. Al-‘Aysami provided the Zionist movement with key information about what was going on in Jabal al-Druze and also among the Druze in Syria and Lebanon. He provided accurate information about the Druze from Jabal al-Druze, the Golan Heights and Lebanon who were supporting and participating in the Arab Revolt in Palestine, and details of their movements as well as routes and the timing of their entry into Palestine, in the hope that they would be arrested. Al-‘Aysami also provided the JA with a lot of information about the activities of the Palestinian leadership of the Arab Revolt based in Damascus and its relations with the various parties in Syria, as well as information about the National Bloc, the Syrian government and the Shahbandari opposition. The JA wanted more from al-‘Aysami than valuable information, and sought through him and his networks to influence events in Syria. More importantly, the JA hoped to influence the policy of Sultan al-Atrash and the rest of the al-Atrash family. Throughout his many years of collaboration with the JA, al-‘Aysami, under its direction, sought to influence Sultan al-Atrash and the

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al-Atrash family to form an alliance with the Zionist movement. Besides this, he made a huge effort to prevent the Druze from Jabal al-Druze, the Golan Heights (called the Balan region at that period), and Lebanon from joining the Arab Revolt in Palestine, calling on the assistance of Sultan al-Atrash to that end, according to many of his reports to Hushi. He further worked to turn public opinion in Jabal al-Druze against solidarity with the Palestinian people. For example, in cooperation with leaders in Jabal al-Druze, he worked to undermine the general strike there on 28 April 1938, called by the Committee for the Defence of Palestine, and to derail the demonstration in the city of As-Swayda on that day.64 Al-‘Aysami also made efforts to implement the Zionist project to transfer the Druze of Palestine from their 18 villages in Palestine for resettlement in Jabal al-Druze in Syria, as we shall see below.

IX Attempts to Influence Asaad Kanj and the Position of Sultan al-Atrash Asaad Kanj (1879–1963) was born in Majdal Shams in the northern Golan. He had considerable influence in the Druze villages in his area and had joined the1925 Revolt. He fled to Palestine after the failure of the revolt and then returned to Majdal Shams. In late 1937 and early 1938, Abba Hushi received reports from Yusuf al-‘Aysami,65 Hasan Abu Rukn,66 and other sources that Asaad Kanj was recruiting Druze fighters from Majdal Shams and its surroundings to join the Arab Revolt in Palestine. In his efforts to foil the participation of Kanj and his group in the Arab Revolt in Palestine, Hushi used several Druze collaborators in Palestine to make contact with influential people among the Druze leaderships in Syria and Lebanon to stop the participation of Kanj and others in the Arab Revolt in Palestine. In parallel, Hushi instructed Sheikh Zayed Abu Rukn, to send a message in the name of ‘the Druze of the Carmel’ to the sheikhs of the al-Bayada Sanctuary in Lebanon, in their capacity as the highest Druze religious authority, and call upon them to prevent Kanj and his large armed group of Druze from participating in the Arab Revolt in Palestine. It is worth noting at this point that the Zionist movement was not the only party exerting pressure on the Druze sheikhs and leaders in Syria and Lebanon not to join the Arab Revolt in Palestine. The British authorities, who had historically established good relations with the Druze, had also pressured the Druze sheikhs and leaders in Syria and Lebanon to stop Druze participation in the Arab Revolt in Palestine. The British Consul in Damascus met with the

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sheikhs of the al-Bayada Sanctuary in Hasbaya and the sheikhs of Jabal al-Druze and called for them to work to stop the participation of the Syrian and Lebanese Druze in the Arab Revolt. The sheikhs of the al-Bayada Sanctuary, as the highest religious authority among the Druze, responded by issuing a statement calling for a boycott of any Druze in Lebanon and Syria who joined the Arab Revolt.67 On 3 February 1938, a letter to Hushi from Hasbaya stated that the sheikhs of the al-Bayada Sanctuary had travelled to all the Druze villages in Lebanon and in Jabal al-Druze and announced that they had issued a fatwa calling for the boycott of every Druze who joined the Arab Revolt in Palestine.68 A brief discussion of the contents of the letter Hushi initiated from the ‘Druze of the Carmel’ to the sheikhs of the al-Bayada Sanctuary, and to some influential Druze leaders in Lebanon and Syria, including that of Sultan al-Atrash, is useful because it sheds light on their stance. The letter from the ‘Druze of the Carmel’, prompted by Abba Hushi, stated that its authors had learned from a reliable source that Sheikh Asaad Kanj Abu Salih was trying to enter Palestine to join the Arab Revolt ‘in the company of a group from the Druze community’.69 The letter added that there were few Druze in Palestine, yet the British authorities stood by them because they were ‘a peaceful people’ and indicated that there were many Jews in ‘high positions in government departments, and also leaders with influence and decision-making powers’, by means of whom there had been ‘an improvement in our rights, and we are safe and secure despite the presence of revolts and gangs next to us’. But if Asaad Kanj entered this country, the British authorities would look at the Druze in Palestine, according to the letter, ‘with an eye of betrayal and revenge’. Then the letter referred to the atrocities of the British army against the ‘villages of Islam’ that were subjected to ‘wilful destruction’ and were in a deplorable state. Mentioned in the letter was an event that occurred during that period: An armed gang attacked a Jewish colony near Isfiya and Daliyah in the Carmel, killing one and wounding two. British soldiers arrived immediately and followed the tracks of the gang, who had passed near the village of Daliyah. The soldiers wanted to take revenge against the residents of Daliyah, and had it not been for Jewish commanders and officers, they would have destroyed Daliyah as they did other towns.

The letter appealed to the sheikhs of the al-Bayada Sanctuary as the sect’s ‘highest authority’ to ‘convince Asaad Kanj and others’ not to enter Palestine for two reasons: first, out of fear for him; and second because it would cause harm to the Druze in Palestine when ‘we are compelled to resist and repulse with all our

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strength, if we witness our and our children’s abuse and the destruction of our homes’.70 When the letter ‘from the Druze of the Carmel’ reached the Bayada sheikhs, the ‘Bayada Council’ decided to send a delegation of sheikhs to Asaad Kanj to persuade him to ‘refrain from going to Palestine’. If he didn’t, the ‘Qadi of the Druze and all the sheikhs would ‘excommunicate him, his brother, and all his family’71. Indeed, the day after the arrival of the letter, a delegation of four sheikhs, headed by Sheikh Jamal al-Din Shuja, went from al-Bayada in Lebanon to Asaad Kanj in Majdal Shams in the Golan in Syria, and informed him of this decision, but he was adamant. Kanj told the delegation that he had taken £P500 from the leadership of the Arab Revolt and had committed himself to forming a large group of Druze fighters and would not renege on his commitment. The letter added that Kanj’s brother pressed him to respond to the delegation’s request, but Kanj stuck to his position. The delegation returned to al-Bayada, where the sheikhs decided to send another delegation, this time to Sultan al-Atrash in Jabal al-Druze ‘to obtain a letter asking Asaad Kanj to change his mind’. Five sheikhs set off, among them ‘Sheikh ‘Ali Qais and Sheikh ‘Alamuddin Badawi, and they stayed in Jabal al-Druze for two days, then returned with a letter from commander Sultan Pasha which they delivered to Asaad Kanj’. Kanj was reportedly torn between going back on his word or facing the wrath of the sect as laid out in the letter. The sheikhs, according to the letter, kept his movements under close observation, monitoring and constraining his every move.72

X. Eliyahu Sasson Meets Sheikh al-‘Aql Husayn Hamada In the flurry of Zionist activity to prevent the Druze from joining the Arab Revolt, on 6 June 1938 Eliyahu Sasson met with Sheikh al-‘Aql Husayn Hamada and his son Rashid in their home in Baakleen. According to Sasson’s report, Najib Sfeir, who was in the process of negotiating with Chaim Weizmann to form a Zionist–Maronite–Druze alliance, helped arrange the meeting and took part in it.73 Hamada spoke at the beginning of the meeting about strong ties between the Druze and Maronite in Lebanon, and about the recognition of a need to initiate negotiations with Zionist on how to ‘suppress the growing Islamic influence in Palestine and Lebanon in the recent period’. He added that it was difficult in the current situation to talk about a broad political plan that would enable the Zionist movement to control Palestine and assist the Maronites and Druze to control Lebanon, as long as the Arab Revolt continued in Palestine, and

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as long as the Palestinian leadership was present in Lebanon, working to encourage the Arab nationalist movement there. Hamada added that he was ready to engage in the war against the Palestinians, and that he was convinced that the leaders of the Maronite community in Bkerki had adopted this same position. In order for the Druze and Maronite leadership to do this, the Zionist movement had to provide them with the financial means to fight a war.74 Hamada stressed to Sasson that money was crucial for this war, because there were many greedy people among the Druze in Jabal al-Druze, Lebanon, and Palestine who traded in arms and supplied the Arab Revolt in Palestine with weapons and men, in exchange for money provided by the leadership of the Arab Revolt. He continued that for nearly three weeks he had turned down the requests of many Druze leaders in Lebanon to hold a Druze conference in Baakleen to condemn British policy towards Palestine, and to support Arab nationalist demands there. He went on to say that he was making every effort to prevent arms being sent to the Arab Revolt in Palestine, and that ‘his heart is pained when he reads in the newspapers about the deaths of Jews and Englishmen in Palestine, and that he was more and more pained when he hears about any help provided by some Druze to the Arab Revolt in Palestine’. He added that his son Rashid had informed the British Consulate in Beirut about arms smuggling from Lebanon to Palestine and that he himself had gone several times to Sultan al-Atrash and asked him to prevent the Druze from participating in the Arab Revolt and had also approached the leaders of the Druze villages in Hasbaya and Rashaya, and asked them to stop their men from joining. Hamada explained that the Druze leaders had not yet been able to influence Asaad Kanj to stop his relations with the leadership of the Arab Revolt, because he had taken a sum of money from them and it was difficult for him to go back on his commitment. Hamada then asked Sasson to commission his son Rashid to visit the Druze villages in Jabal al-Druze, Lebanon, and Palestine to negotiate with the Druze who supported the Arab Revolt in Palestine. Sasson, unable to make that decision, said he was willing to convey this proposal to his superior and recommend its acceptance, provided that a detailed factual report on the participation of the Druze in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine in the Arab Revolt was prepared within one week, along with a detailed and researched plan of the means that should be taken in the villages to stop Druze participation in the Arab Revolt. Hamada and his son Rashid agreed to prepare the report within the time requested. At the end of the two-hour meeting, Hamada reminded Sasson how important friendship with the Druze was for the Jews, and how mistaken the Jews would be in not taking advantage of this friendship. He concluded that the

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Jews should pay attention to the political fate of the Druze, just as they had paid attention to the fate of the Jews themselves.75

XI. Abba Hushi and Sultan al-Atrash Meet in Jabal al-Druze From the correspondence between Yusuf al-‘Aysami and Abba Hushi’s assistant Shlomo (Salim) Alfiah, it appears that the subject of Hushi’s visit to Jabal al-Druze to meet Sultan al-Atrash was raised several times. For example, in his letter to Alfiah of 24 April 1938, al-‘Aysami stated that al-Atrash had visited him a week prior and stayed for three days, during which time they exchanged views on the future, relations with the JA, and the need for a meeting between al-Atrash and Hushi.76 Al-‘Aysami wanted the meeting to take place at al-Atrash’s house in Jabal al-Druze, while al-Atrash wanted the meeting to take place in Damascus. Al-‘Aysami added that he would accompany Sultan al-Atrash at the first opportunity of his travelling to Damascus, and that he would inform Alfiah in advance of their arrival date. Al‘Aysami also indicated in his letter that every time he learned of an attempt to recruit fighters from Jabal al-Druze to go to Palestine, ‘we work to prevent them’. Asaad Kanj had assembled 17 men from Jabal al-Druze to send to Palestine, but ‘we prevented them from going to Palestine with the help of Sultan al-Atrash’.77 On 21 July 1938, Alfiah sent a letter to al-‘Aysami informing him that he and Abba Hushi wanted to visit Syria to meet al-Atrash.78 Three days later, al-‘Aysami replied to Alfiah, stating that, as soon as he had received Alfiah’s letter, he had taken a car and gone to Sultan al-Atrash’s village to tell him, and that Sultan was happy for them to visit him there.79 At the beginning of August 1938, Hushi and his assistant Alfiah travelled from Haifa to Damascus. Upon their arrival, they met with al-‘Aysami, who briefed them on the recent developments. Asaad Kanj had informed al-Aysami that both the Arabs and the British spoke with him: the Arabs imploring him to help the Arab Revolt in Palestine, the English asking him not to.80 Kanj sought al-‘Aysami’s advice and he told him that the Druze had mounted a revolt and made sacrifices, but had not gained anything by it, while those who had not fought had become ministers. Al-‘Aysami advised him to take care of himself and not provide assistance to the Arab Revolt in Palestine, advice Kanj accepted, according to al-‘Aysami. As for his commitment to the Palestinian leadership of the Arab Revolt based in Damascus, and the sum of money he had taken from them, Kanj told al-‘Aysami that he had told them that he had carried out two operations at the fence on the Palestinian border.81

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Next morning, Hushi, Alfiah, and al-‘Aysami set off from Damascus for the town of al-Qurayyah in Jabal al-Druze to visit Sultan al-Atrash, who, along with a group of notables, received them at his home. Al- Atrash told Hushi that the Syrian Prime Minister Jamil Mardam, together with a large number of Syrian leaders and officials, had visited him at his house 20 days prior. They had given him gifts and promised him to supply the village with water, build a road and rebuild and repair the houses that had been destroyed or damaged during the 1925 revolt. In his report, Hushi stated that al-Atrash stressed several times that the Syrian government was poor and that it was difficult to advance the situation in one go.82 After lunch, Hushi, Alfiah, al-Atrash and al-‘Aysami met alone. Al-‘Aysami opened the meeting and explained the purpose of Hushi’s visit. Then Hushi spoke and said that he had been wanting to visit Sultan al-Atrash and congratulate him on his return for many months, but his visit had been postponed for many reasons. Hushi expressed his hope that Sultan al-Atrash and the leaders of Jabal al-Druze would be able to develop their country and proceeded to go into detail about developing good relations between the Jews and Druze in Palestine. In his reply Sultan al-Atrash said: Since we were refugees in Wadi al-Sarhan, we heard from the Palestinian Druze who visited us about your good treatment of the Druze in Palestine, and about the assistance you provided them from time to time. When we were in Karak, I spoke to my friend Abu Hamad [al-‘Aysami] many times about meeting you, and strengthening relations between us and you. Upon returning home I was busy with local issues, and despite my deep wish to meet with you, a matter that Yusuf my friend and my right-hand man reminded me of from time to time, I have only now been able to allocate time for this, and I thank God that I have finally had the opportunity to see you. Certainly, you will have heard from my friend Abu Hamad about the attempts of Syrian and Palestinian leaders to involve us in the Palestinian issue, but you must know that we are not a blind tool in the hands of others to do what they want with and exploit for their ends. We want the interests of our people and we are concerned with peace and friendship with our neighbors in general, and with our neighbor the Jewish people in particular

He added: Two weeks ago, one of the Druze leaders in Palestine, Sheikh Wahsh,83visited me here and told me about the situation in Palestine and the path the Druze are taking in Palestine which is the path of peace, and I told him that they should continue on this path because other times will come and the Jews and the English will remember their good behavior.

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He then approached the issue of achieving peace in Palestine and said: ‘All of us here, and me especially, will be delighted if you find a good way to make peace with Muslims in Palestine, and I realize that such peace can be achieved if the full rights of both parties are guaranteed.’ Al-Atrash then expressed his appreciation for what the Zionist movement had achieved in Palestine and said: We are well aware of the construction and development that you have done in Palestine. We know what Palestine was twenty years ago and what it is today thanks to your work. As you stated, a good neighbor takes care of himself and his neighbors, so I hope you will inform your institutions and intellectuals of my greetings and my wishes that you soon get to enjoy peace and blessings. I know that the Jews want real peace with the Arabs in Palestine and good neighborly relations with the neighboring Arab countries’. He added, ‘My country, Jabal al-Druze needs advice, guidance, and assistance in finding water sources and in learning farming and planting trees. I have heard from Yusuf Bek and the Druze in Palestine – if calm prevails in Palestine and friendly relations are established – then my countrymen can learn from the Jews and obtain their advice and guidance.84

Hushi, according to his report, thanked al-Atrash for his statements, and told him that the Jews were willing, despite everything that had happened, to bring about peace based on respect and the rights of both parties, and that they would not give up their rights as a people. Al-Atrash said that he understood the position of the Jews and that he was aware that they were a great power in Palestine, and that he hoped that the day would come when they would achieve happiness and be able to help others. Al-Atrash invited Hushi to visit him again once his new house was built.85 At the meeting, according to Hushi’s report to Pinhas Rutenberg,86 al-Atrash expressed his hope ‘that Britain will finally decide in the next few months to partition Palestine and establish a Jewish state’, at which point he would be willing to ‘form an alliance of friendship and neighborly relations with the Jewish state’, based on mutual interests between the two sides. In his report, Hushi added that al-Atrash hoped that he would obtain the help of the Jews in guiding the Druze in how to find water sources and develop agriculture in Jabal al-Druze and to obtain loans. For his part, al-Atrash would maintain his policy towards the conflict in Palestine, which was based on friendly neutrality towards the Jews, and at the same time influence the Druze in Lebanon and Palestine to adopt this position.87 In the reports on this meeting, there is no indication that the Zionist plan to transfer the Druze of Palestine to Jabal al-Druze in Syria was touched upon.

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Reports sent by al-‘Aysami and other Druze collaborators reveal that Sultan alAtrash and the rest of the al-Atrash clan were committed to working to stop support from Jabal al-Druze for the Arab Revolt, especially when it came to participation or the supply of weapons. In a letter to Alfiah of October 1938, in response to his inquiry about a rumour that had reached the leaders of the Zionist movement that one of Sultan al-Atrash’s brothers had entered Palestine with the rebels, al-‘Aysami asserted that none of al-Atrash’s brothers or relatives was participating in the Arab Revolt in Palestine, ‘because he and I together gave you categorical assurances, without deceit or flattery, that we are among your friends and those who always seek to find love and harmony between the two sides, so rest assured in that regard today and forever’. Al-‘Aysami explained in his letter that ‘only a few people escaped our hands; we do not know their exact number, 10–12 headed by Qasim Zahr al-Din and Deeb Sallam’. Al-‘Aysami added that those people had left As-Suwayda five days ago, and gone to Transjordan, from where they would enter Palestine. Al-‘Aysami asked Alfiah to be on the alert at the borders, in the hope that they would be arrested, ‘so that we can rest from the invidious people who do not accept our advice. Hopefully, you trust what I say and your minds may rest easy, and you appreciate your loyal brother, may the Lord Almighty protect and keep you’.88

XII Preparations for the Transfer of Palestine’s Druze to Syria In its report to the British government in July 1937, the British Palestine Royal Commission (the Peel Commission) recommended that Palestine be partitioned into three parts: the largest to be annexed to the Emirate of Transjordan; a part where the Jewish state would be established; and a part to remain under British Mandate. The area allocated for the proposed Jewish state amounted to 5,000 square kilometres, and included the Galilee, Marj ibn Amer, and the Palestinian coast from Galilee in the north to Tel Aviv in the south. The number of Palestinian Arabs in the area designated for the Jewish state amounted to some 300,000 people. The Peel Commission recommended that they be transferred from this area into the area to be annexed to Transjordan.89 Included in this population were about 10,000 Arab Druze residing in 18 villages, 16 of them in the Galilee and two on Mount Carmel. The Zionist movement attached utmost importance to the Peel Commission’s recommendation to expel the Arab population from the area designated for the

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Jewish state, under the guise of ‘population exchange’. David Ben-Gurion stressed that the Zionist movement should adhere to this recommendation as it adhered to the Balfour Declaration.90 With the escalation of the Arab Revolt in Palestine and the strengthening of the alliance between the Zionist movement and the British, a Zionist consensus, led by the Mapai party, emerged to transfer the Palestinian Arabs to Syria and Iraq, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Against this backdrop, Aharon Haim Cohen proposed the idea of transferring the Druze from Palestine to Jabal al-Druze in Syria. In his memo (referred to above), which he submitted to the JA’s leadership and in which he defended the necessity of strengthening the Zionist movement’s relationship with Jabal alDruze, Cohen argued: ‘We are standing on the threshold of the partition of the country and the establishment of a Jewish state that also includes, according to the proposed plan, eighteen villages inhabited by ten thousand Druze. Relations with the Druze people in Jabal al-Druze will help us transfer these Druze, who live here, to Jabal al-Druze or some other place in Syria.’91 Starting in 1938, the leadership of the Zionist movement did indeed look into how to transfer the Druze from Palestine to Jabal al-Druze and drew up a ‘transfer plan’ for the purpose.92 Chaim Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Shertok, Bernard Joseph, Abba Hushi, Dov Hoz, Eliyahu Sasson, Eliyahu Epstein and other Zionist officials participated in the formulation of this transfer plan. Hushi was the driving force behind it, and made every effort to succeed with the assistance of JA agent Yusuf al-‘Aysami. The plan remained on the agenda of the Zionist movement from 1938 until the mid-1940s. Advocacy for it and efforts to achieve it waxed and waned according to a range of factors. It is useful to look at the efforts made by the Zionist movement to implement this plan, not only because of its importance per se, but also because it clarifies the nature of the relations between the Zionist movement and Sultan al-Atrash in particular, and the al-Atrash clan in general. It was clear to the leadership of the Zionist movement that in order to implement this plan political conditions, such as the stance of Britain and France, would have to be favourable, and two essential conditions would have to be met: the agreement of the Druze in Palestine to move from Palestine to Jabal alDruze, and its acceptance by the leadership of Jabal al-Druze, especially Sultan al-Atrash. To achieve these two conditions, Abba Hushi, along with some Druze collaborators, worked diligently to create supportive public opinion among the Druze in Palestine and backing among the Jabal al-Druze leadership. To do this they worked to strain relations and escalate or fuel conflicts between the Druze and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, claiming that Druze life in Palestine was

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threatened by the Arab Revolt, and that the best solution to this ‘problem’ was to transfer the Palestinian Druze to Jabal al-Druze. Hushi, through Druze collaborators, exploited any event, error, mistreatment, or misunderstanding between the Arab Revolt in Palestine and the Druze, or any act the Arab Revolt carried out against Druze in Palestine collaborating with the Zionist movement, to exacerbate the dispute and fuel the conflict between the Arab Revolt and the Druze. Hushi and his Druze collaborators claimed that the Arab Revolt targeted and took action against them for being Druze. In cases where the Arab Revolt resorted to the punishment of Druze collaborating with the Zionist movement, such as the execution of Hasan Abu Rukn93 after he had been given a number of warnings to stop collaborating with the Zionist movement, Hushi and his men took to the Druze villages and portrayed the execution as a result of his being a Druze, not a punishment for a collaborator with the enemy, just the same as the punishment for other Palestinian collaborators with the enemy. When a dispute erupted between the Arab Revolt and the Druze in Isfiya and Daliyat al-Karmel, following Abu Rukn’s execution and the attempt of the Revolt’s leadership to recruit the Druze for the Arab Revolt and collect taxes from the two villages as it was doing from other Palestinian villages, Hushi sought to exploit this situation to achieve his goal, which was no longer just to prevent Druze in Syria and Lebanon from joining the Arab Revolt, but also and essentially to propagate the notion among Druze leaders in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine that a transfer of the Palestinian Druze to Syria was a solution to what he claimed was a threat to them. Hushi wrote to al-‘Aysami urging him to exploit the situation. ‘The time has come to work’, he said. ‘Druze public opinion must be fired up in Jabal al-Druze and in Lebanon.’ He added, ‘there are other things we would have liked to advise you about, but for many reasons we have not written to you about them’.94 Hushi had been actively encouraging his collaborators in Isfiya and Daliyat al-Karmel to take advantage of the situation and spread fake news and move quickly to influence the Druze. He wrote to the Jewish Agency:‘In our consultations with the men of the two villages, Isfiya and Daliyat al-Karmel, we decided to send a delegation of representatives from the two villages to the Druze sheikhs in Jabal al-Druze and Lebanon, as well as to Sultan Pasha al-Atrash.’ Hushi added that what had happened in Isfiya ‘kindled the fire of revenge in the hearts of the Druze. And if anyone takes advantage of this matter, it will bring positive results.’95 Hushi was the first to take advantage and sent one envoy after another to Jabal al-Druze and Lebanon to influence religious, political, and tribal leaders, and pit

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them against the Arab Revolt in Palestine, spreading fake news such as that the Druze in Palestine, especially in Isfiya and Daliyat al-Karmel, were subjected to brutal treatment and persecution by the Arab Revolt in Palestine. Many of the faked news spread by Hushi and his collaborators touched on two main issues provoking the Druze: the allegation that the Arab Revolt desecrated religious books and assaulted Druze women in Isfiya.96 Before dispatching his men to Lebanon and Jabal al-Druze, Hushi went over the key issues they needed to raise and, upon their return, they wrote handwritten reports in Arabic detailing their missions.97 Besides al-‘Aysami, working on this campaign were also Labib Abu Rukn, his brother Zayed and Salih Tarabiyyah. The extent of the campaign organized by Hushi is best depicted in the reports of the JA’s Druze collaborators. Labib Abu Rukn stated in a detailed report that he left Palestine and arrived in Hasbaya on 30 November 1938 and, upon his arrival, he informed some of the Hasbaya sheikhs ‘of the repeated acts carried out by gangs in the village of Isfiya’.98 The sheikhs of al-Bayada held a meeting the following day where Abu Rukn spoke to them at length ‘about the atrocities the gangs committed in Isfiya and Daliyat al-Carmel – the looting of homes and religious books, the beating of women, the breaking of storehouses, and the insulting of elders and young men’. After deliberations, the al-Bayada sheikhs decided to write to the leaders of Jabal al-Druze and mobilize them to help the Druze in Palestine. A short letter was written to 13 leaders and sheikhs from Jabal al-Druze, calling on them to intervene.99 Before travelling to Jabal al-Druze, Labib Abu Rukn sent a letter to Hushi on 1 December, informing him of his activity in Hasbaya and asking him to send five pounds to cover his travel expenses with his envoy who was due in Damascus.100 On the same day, Abu Rukn travelled to Imtan as a guest of Yusuf al-‘Aysami, from where they went on together to the leaders of Jabal al-Druze. Abu Rukn and al-‘Aysami visited Druze leaders in the mountain over four consecutive days; they delivered the letter from the sheikhs of al-Bayada and gave lengthy spoken accounts, as requested, on the difficult situation of the Druze in Palestine. From reports of Abu Rukn and al-‘Aysami it appears that their mission succeeded. The reaction – at least initially – of the 13 Druze leaders and sheikhs who met with them was marked by indignation, anger and threats to intervene against the Arab Revolt in Palestine. Sultan al-Atrash was the first to receive a visit from Abu Rukn and al-‘Aysami, on 4 December 1938. In his report to Abba Hushi, al-‘Aysami stated that, along with the written letter, they spoke about ‘the incidents that had occurred in the Carmel with our Druze brothers, the excessive

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atrocity, and the reprehensible acts Islamic gangs carried out there’. Al-‘Aysami, according to his report, asked Sultan al-Atrash to end this injustice and mistreatment. His answer was very zealous, stressing that ‘we do not accept the mistreatment of our brothers in Palestine in any way, and that we are ready to rescue them if those sinister gangs continue their actions against our brothers’.101 In his report, Labib Abu Rukn stated that Sultan al-Atrash described the Palestinian or Arab revolutionaries as ‘people who do not know what a favor is; we struggled so much before them and it did not bear fruit and did not work’.102 Sultan al-Atrash wrote a letter to his brother Zayd, a member of the Syrian Parliament, and sent it with him to deliver to Damascus, asking him to meet with the Palestinian Committee. According to Abu Rukn’s report, Sultan al-Atrash wrote: ‘Tell them if your group continues this action, we know how to rescue our people.’ Sultan al-Atrash told them that he would ‘go to As-Suwayda in two days’ time and do what needs to be done in conjunction with the rest of the Druze’.103 After Emir Hasan al-Atrash, then-governor of Jabal al-Druze, received the letter and listened to their statements, he was furious and told them that he would go to Damascus to meet with the Palestinian Committee and tell them that ‘if any such act happens after this, I will head two thousand Druze fighters and leave my job, go to Palestine, and destroy the entire Arab Revolt’.104 ‘Abd alGhaffar al-Atrash was with a ‘large body of Druze leaders’ when they visited him and they also heard what the two men had to say. This ‘body’ then addressed ‘Abd al-Ghaffar al-Atrash: ‘You are our leader and must not be indolent about this reality when the rebels covet our brothers in Palestine.’ ‘Abd al-Ghaffar al-Atrash said that he thought he should go ‘to Damascus with a thousand men . . . and hold a big demonstration and persecute all the revolutionaries of Palestine in Damascus’.105 Abu Rukn and al-‘Aysami went to Damascus and delivered his brother’s letter. Zayd told them that he would meet the members of the Palestinian Committee the next day and demand they put an end to their alleged actions. Then he added: ‘Protests and the like are of no use to us, only force is of use and standing full-square against every aggressor, nothing else is worthwhile.’ Zayd al-Atrash asked Abu Rukn to go to Hasbaya to continue working with the sheikhs there, and told him that al-‘Aysami would write to him about developments. Labib Abu Rukn did go to Hasbaya via Beirut, where he met Eliyahu Sasson and briefed him on his activities in Jabal al-Druze and Damascus, before arriving in Hasbaya late at night. The next day, two men sent by Hushi, Salih Tarabiyyah and Masaad Hamdan, arrived in Hasbaya and informed the sheikhs, according

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to Abu Rukn’s report, ‘more than I reported to them, and added greatly to my elaboration about repeated operations and ongoing persecution’. Hushi had provided his two envoys with three copies of a short but inflammatory letter full of falsified informations and exaggerations, addressed to Sultan al-Atrash, Emir Majid Arslan, and Asaad Kanj and signed ‘Your Brother Druze in the Carmel’ to be seen by the al-Bayada sheikhs before being delivered to the three leaders.106 As a result, the sheikhs of al-Bayada decided to send one delegation from Hasbaya to Majdal Shams and Jabal al-Druze and another to the Druze in Lebanon, and the two to come together later in Damascus. In his report, Labib Abu Rukn stated that about 200 Druze youths demonstrated in Hasbaya and vowed to go to Palestine to support the Druze against the Arab Revolt in Palestine and that several hundred armed Druze demonstrated in Majdal Shams.107 In 1939, Abba Hushi continued his fake news campaign and sent some Druze collaborators with the Zionist movement to Druze leaders in Lebanon and Syria, especially Sultan al-Atrash. In September 1939, for example, Sheikh Salih Tarabiyyah travelled from Shafa ‘Amr to Lebanon, and then to Jabal al-Druze in Syria. In his report to Hushi, Tarabiyyah stated that he had travelled to Hasbaya, met with the religious leaders there and gone on at length about the Arab Revolt’s ‘egregious treatment’ of the Druze of Palestine and ‘the favors our Jewish brothers do for us’. The religious leaders in Hasbaya recommended that the Druze and the Jews be ‘one hand and of permanent assistance to each other’.108 Tarabiyyah then travelled to Jabal al-Druze and met some of its leaders, chief among them Sultan al-Atrash. He told him about what was occurring between the Arab Revolt and the Druze in Palestine, and about ‘the friendship between us and the Jews’. In his report to Hushi, Tarabiyyah added that he had ‘passed on your personal greetings given the acquaintance and friendship between you and him. We expatiated on all the sympathy and assistance that you have shown the Druze community’. In his report, Tarabiyyah stated that Sultan al-Atrash ‘showed great admiration and much gratitude and praise for you and for all the Zionist people. He said, ‘I salute the President [Hushi] and that people for those emotions’ and ‘I highly recommend you to stick with these steadfast brothers’ and ‘We are named the sons of kindness for our steadfast preservation and appreciation for kindness and our constant friendship. You must not forget that kindness and stand firmly by the Zionist people’. He said: ‘I would like to write to President Abba Hushi a few words of thanks and praise, but you are acting for me [in] writing. So convey to him my warmest greetings and profound thanks.’109

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XIII. The Quest to Implement the Transfer Plan to Jabal al-Druze Following discussions and correspondence between Abba Hushi and Yusuf al‘Aysami on the transfer of Palestine’s Druze to Syria, on 3 March 1939 al-‘Aysami sent him a letter telling him that he had ‘come to complete agreement with Sultan, Sayyah, and their brothers, except for Mut‘ib and ‘Abd al-Ghaffar. And when we meet I have to reassure you about something that will make you happy, God willing’.110 Hushi and Shlomo Alfiah realized that ‘this agreement’ reached by al-‘Aysami ‘with Sultan, Sayyah, and their brothers’ concerned the transfer of the Druze of Palestine to Jabal al-Druze. In response to al-‘Aysami’s letter, Alfiah wrote that he and Abba Hushi would soon come to Damascus to meet him and hear the details of this good news.111 Hushi and Alfiah travelled to Damascus and, in his report on the meeting with al-‘Aysami, Hushi claimed that Sultan alAtrash had agreed to the plan to transfer the Druze of Palestine to Jabal alDruze.112 Hushi added in his report that in Damascus he had discussed with Druze leaders from Jabal al-Druze and Lebanon the formation of an ‘alliance of the minorities’ in the Near East that included Jews, Druze and Christians in Lebanon and that the Druze leaders he met had expressed their conviction that this alliance was achievable and that work should start to bring it about. Druze leaders suggested, according to Hushi’s report, that an ‘alliance of the minorities’ between Druze and Jews be formed initially, and then negotiations be held with Christians in Lebanon to join this alliance, which could then be expanded to include all minorities in the region. These leaders suggested, according to Hushi’s report, that a Zionist Jewish delegation should officially visit Sultan al-Atrash.113 Some ten days after meeting with al-‘Aysami, Hushi sent him a letter in which he asked him to arrange a meeting with Sultan al-Atrash and, prior to that meeting, prepare a detailed plan for the implementation of the project to transfer the Druze of Palestine to Jabal al-Druze.114 The goal of the proposed meeting with Sultan al-Atrash was to discuss two main issues: the formation of an alliance between the Zionist movement and Jabal al-Druze as a prelude to the ‘Alliance of Minorities’, as had been discussed between Abba Hushi and leaders from Jabal al-Druze and Lebanon; and, second, to discuss the implementation of the plan to transfer the Druze of Palestine to Jabal al-Druze. In a letter to Abba Hushi, al‘Aysami stated that after his meeting with Hushi, he began working to achieve the main objective officially assigned to him by Hushi, which was to prepare the ground for Sultan al-Atrash to meet with Abba Hushi and well-known Zionist leaders. Al-‘Aysami was very enthusiastic about an alliance between the Zionist

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movement and Jabal al-Druze and the implementation of the project to transfer the Druze of Palestine. He was also interested in expediting the meeting between Sultan al-Atrash and Abba Hushi. It seems that al-‘Aysami was facing a real problem in persuading Sultan al-Atrash to conclude an ‘alliance’, that was at one and the same time secret and official, between Jabal al-Druze and the Zionist movement, as a prelude to forming the ‘minority alliance’ with the Zionist movement. This may explain why al-‘Aysami was somewhat late in responding to Abba Hushi’s letter, as he was the one urging Hushi to expedite implementation of the two matters. Al-‘Aysami responded to Hushi by letter on 17 March 1939. He apologized at the beginning for his slow response, which he attributed to the difficult conditions facing Jabal al-Druze, and sometimes ‘the wind is against you’. In his letter, al‘Aysami said: After meeting with you in Damascus, I started seeking the main objective that you formally mandated me to undertake, viz, to pave the way with the big brother to meet you and other well-known leaders. I told the big brother about your desire for this meeting. He, in turn, welcomes your visit with all his heart, but he sees that present circumstances call for care, lest the French authorities become suspicious of him when it is said that he is visited by foreigners from outside the region or the country.

Al-‘Aysami explained in his letter that the French authorities in Jabal al-Druze kept Sultan al-Atrash under tight surveillance, and him too. According to his letter, al-‘Aysami had returned and met Sultan Pasha three days before on the outskirts of the town, after taking all necessary measures to conceal the meeting from the authorities. At that meeting, al-‘Aysami told Sultan al-Atrash: ‘The deadline has come near, so what answer do you give?’ Al-Atrash asked him: ‘Do you know the purpose of this visit and what these leaders intend?’ Al-‘Aysami replied, ‘I do not know the intention in its entirety, but they want to consolidate pillars of friendship with the two peoples’ who are ‘in urgent need of a treaty’ that serves them financially and morally. Al-‘Aysami added: ‘I also do not know what is new and you will see what is, and there is no doubt that the outcome will be good, God willing.’ Al-Atrash answered that he was afraid of the surveillance of the French authorities because he had promised that he would remain neutral, and added: ‘When I see the time is right, I will let you know.’ Sultan al-Atrash continued, according to al-‘Aysami’s letter, with the suggestion that he meet the delegation led by Hushi ‘in Barad, east of Basrah, where there is no one watching, and we may talk as long as necessary’.

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In his letter, al-‘Aysami added that one day after his meeting with al-Atrash, he had received a phone call ‘from one of you in Beirut’ inviting him to go to Damascus, which he did. Al-‘Aysami met the person he spoke to on the phone, but did not say in his letter what happened, although he did state that he would go ‘to the town of the Pasha and make him understand your firm desire to meet’.115 On 19 April, al-‘Aysami told Hushi that he would go to visit al-Atrash within two days to set the final date for the visit. Al-‘Aysami added in his letter that he had told Zayd al-Atrash about the planned visit, and that he had expressed his desire to be introduced to the high-level Zionist delegation.116 A few days later, al-‘Aysami set the date for the meeting between Sultan al-Atrash and Abba Hushi for 27–28 April 1939.117

XIV. The Second Meeting between Sultan al-Atrash and Abba Hushi and Dov Hoz On 26 April 1939, Abba Hushi, Dov Hoz, and Shlomo Alfiah left Haifa for Damascus. Yusuf al-‘Aysami was waiting for them, and provided them with information about developments in Syria and told them that Nabih al-‘Azma’s detention by the authorities had greatly weakened pro-Palestinian activity in Syria. The next morning, the Zionist delegation headed to Qurayyah, the town of Sultan al-Atrash, who received them very cordially.118 Yusuf al-‘Aysami opened the meeting, welcomed the guests, and addressed two main topics: relations between the Zionist movement and Jabal al-Druze, and the project to transfer the Druze of Palestine to Jabal al-Druze. On the first topic, al-‘Aysami addressed Sultan al-Atrash: Our distinguished guests and brothers with whom I have ties, as you know and according to your will, visit us from time to time to cement relations between them and us and to find ways and means to help each other in these difficult days that the world in general, and we are in the Levant in particular, are going through. As you know, these guests present speak for the Jews in Palestine and also for the Jews who will arrive there in the future. They are always extending their hands to all the peoples of the East, especially to us, in order to achieve peace. But they want to achieve this friendship by means of useful actions for both sides, and there is something that must be done in the interest of the two peoples, the interest of the Jews in Palestine and the interest of Jabal al-Druze.

Al-‘Aysami then moved on to the second main goal of the meeting and reiterated faked news about the suffering of the Druze of Palestine:

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It is well known that our Druze brothers in Palestine, who number ten thousand people and live in fifteen villages, have suffered a lot during these events; they have been exposed to and lied about by every swindler and thief, people who have no connection with patriotism. The Druze have suffered greatly, both with their lives and their property. Many of them have come here and complained to us about the severe abuse they have suffered and their great pain.

At this point, al-‘Aysami reached the ‘heart of the matter’ and said: ‘Many, many of them are now thinking about leaving Palestine and coming to Syria. But here the question arises, how do we respond to this matter and what can we do to help them?’ Addressing Sultan al-Atrash, al-‘Aysami added: ‘Here, Pasha, good will happen to all parties. To the Druze people who will gather in this place, to the Jewish people who will buy their lands, and to our country Jabal al-Druze to which this wealth will be introduced. In this way, we can save them and save ourselves from ruin, weakness, and poverty. There are a lot of ruined abandoned villages here and vast areas of land; our Palestinian Druze brothers will come and live among us and cultivate the abandoned lands. This will benefit everyone. As a result of their coming to Jabal al-Druze, we will not have to worry about them or manage their problems.

Shlomo Alfiah then briefly reviewed the development of relations between the Druze and the Zionist movement in Palestine since the end of the First World War and extoled the assistance he claimed the Zionist movement had provided to the Druze in Palestine ‘such as medical assistance, providing work, and assistance to defend property and life’ in the 1930s, particularly during the Arab Revolt. In his response, al-Atrash said: I told you during your first visit that there are no disagreements between us and you in our relations and friendship. Since we were in asylum we have been instructing our men in Palestine, Lebanon, and the Jabal al- Druze not to interfere with what is going on with you [in Palestine]. In all this battle, we stand neutral and pray that God will guide everyone to replace haste and hostility with common sense and reason in the minds of your own men and the men of the other side, and that you find a good solution for both parties. Our positions will not change.

He added: as for the second issue, if our brothers want to come here of their own free will and see this as a benefit to them, then we do not object. But I think there are many risks here, such as money, housing, acclimatization, etc. It is necessary to

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think about this and prepare plans so that our Muslim brothers do not see us as traitors.119

It does not appear from Alfiah’s report that Sultan al-Atrash was surprised or shocked by the Zionist project to transfer the Druze of Palestine to Jabal al-Druze. He was cautious in dealing with it and made the agreement of the Druze of Palestine a condition for its implementation, as stated in Alfiah’s report. It is clear from what al-Atrash said that he was aware of the obstacles to the implementation of this project such as money, housing and acclimatization, and also aware of the political risks involved, because the Syrians and the Palestinians might consider this project and the Jabal al-Druze leadership’s approval of it as traitorous. In his report, Alfiah indicated that the project to transfer the Druze of Palestine to Jabal al-Druze took up most of the meeting.120 Abba Hushi and Dov Hoz talked about the benefits of the project for all parties and told al-Atrash: ‘We do not accept that the Druze who move to Jabal al-Druze should suffer, God forbid, from a lack of job opportunities or a lack of housing. We want the interest of the three parties, the interest of the Druze in Palestine and the interest of Jabal al-Druze and its development, as well as our own interest.’ After the discussions and deliberations on the transfer project at this meeting, al-Atrash proposed, according to Alfiah’s report, that Yusuf al-‘Aysami follow up on the transfer plan with the Zionist side, and Sultan al-Atrash pledged that, for his part, he would accept all that his representative al-‘Aysami agreed with the Zionist side regarding the transfer plan. At the end of the meeting, al-‘Aysami and the Zionist delegation went, with the blessing of Sultan al-Atrash, to visit Sayyah al-Atrash, Sultan al-Atrash’s cousin, at his home in the village of Baka, near the town of al-Qurayyah. His cousin was to be involved in the implementation of the transfer project.121 The Zionist delegation briefed Sayyah al-Atrash about their visit to Jabal al-Druze and Sultan al-Atrash. At the conclusion of a tour of Jabal al-Druze, the Zionist delegation agreed with al-‘Aysami that he would prepare a detailed plan of the ruined villages in Jabal al-Druze, giving their names, locations, their associated land holdings, details of ownership, etc. Passports would be provided to him and Sayyah alAtrash so they could go to Palestine to follow up on the transfer plan.122

XV Chaim Weizmann and the Transfer Project Upon their return from Jabal al-Druze, Abba Hushi and Dov Hoz met with Chaim Weizmann to update him on their visit. Weizmann was enthusiastic and

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asked them to immediately provide him with a written memorandum on the transfer plan. He saw in this project the workings of the Zionist strategy that aimed to transfer Palestinians out of Palestine, especially to Syria and Iraq, which had become an essential part of Zionist diplomacy in the 1930s. He considered the Druze project a prelude to the wider Zionist goal of transferring Palestinians to Iraq and Syria. This was evident in Weizmann’s letter of 28 April 1939 to Solomon Goldman, Head of the Zionist Organization of America, in which he explained the importance of the project.123 He began his letter to Goldman by noting that Ben-Gurion had sent him a copy of Goldman’s letter of 6 April 1939, in which he gave details of his meeting with US President Franklin D Roosevelt. Goldman said that in that meeting President Roosevelt had, in the context of finding a comprehensive solution to the situation in Palestine, referred to the possibility of transferring hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs to Iraq and said: ‘We must not forget our Palestine.’124 In his letter to Solomon Goldman, Weizmann said that there was a significant opportunity to purchase large areas of land in the Galilee, owned by Palestinian Druze, and transfer the Druze owners to Jabal al-Druze in Syria. Weizmann made no reference to Druze villages, towns and homes, as if the Druze lived in thin air. However, he was keen to clarify that achieving this project would be of two-fold benefit to the Zionist movement: they would acquire vast land holdings while simultaneously getting rid of 10,000 Arab owners. Meanwhile, the acquisition of these lands would strengthen Jewish settlement over the next five or ten years. Weizmann added that he was closely following the transfer project, which would cost about £3 million sterling, at a price of £10 per dunam. He pointed out that the vast majority of the Druze in Palestine lived in the upper Galilee, and that their transfer would strengthen the Zionist movement’s grip over the region, enabling Jewish geographic contiguity from the far east of the upper Galilee to the far west of the Mediterranean coast. Weizmann continued that part of the Druze land was located on the eastern slopes of Mount Carmel, and that its purchase by the Zionist movement would make the vast majority of the area Jewish. He added that the project had numerous benefits, noting that it was the greatest opportunity for the Zionist movement in the last 50 years, one that would solve many of the Zionist movement’s problems for a long time to come and strengthen the grip of the Zionist movement on the upper Galilee. ‘We will be able to expand more and more when the time comes’ wrote Weizmann. He added that this would set an important precedent, that other Arabs in Palestine would follow the example and do the same and expressed his belief that ‘the US President’s proposal to provide a loan to transfer the Arabs from Palestine to Iraq will become a viable project’.125

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XVI Abba Hushi’s Memorandum on the Druze Transfer On 9 May 1939, Abba Hushi presented a memorandum to Weizmann, in which he briefed him on the latest developments regarding the transfer plan.126 In his memo, he said that it was evident from his talks with Sultan al-Atrash and other Jabal al-Druze leaders that ‘Sultan Pasha and his men’ viewed the project to transfer the Druze of Palestine to Jabal al-Druze in a positive light.127 Hushi stressed the need to implement the plan in a systematic and organized manner, claiming that it would benefit the Druze in Palestine and Jabal al-Druze and, of course, the Zionist movement. The Zionist movement, which was ‘in dire need of land’, would ‘obtain the lands of the Druze of Palestine and their villages to settle in. And the Druze of Palestine will move to live among their brothers in Jabal al-Druze’ and, by this, ‘they will be freed from the constant pressure of their enemies and return to the bosom of their homeland and people’. For Jabal alDruze, this project would strengthen its power by adding human energy and ways to develop it economically. Hushi mentioned that two notables from Jabal al-Druze, Yusuf al-‘Aysami and Sayyah al-Atrash, would shortly come to Palestine to explain the idea of transfer to their Druze brothers in Palestine and sway them in the requisite direction. A third person, a Palestinian Druze chosen by them with the cognizance of the Zionist movement, would join these two notables, to form a committee whose task would be to follow up promotion of the project and pave the way for its implementation. With the approval of Sultan al-Atrash, this committee would soon provide the Zionist movement with a list of areas in Jabal al-Druze where the Druze of Palestine would be resettled. The Zionist movement would then send a committee of experts in agriculture, forestry, housing, etc., and draw up a masterplan to construct the villages to which the Palestinian Druze would relocate. Hushi stressed the need to keep the transfer project completely confidential for as long as possible, until the actual stage of implementation was reached. He recommended that the JA appoint one person to be responsible for following up on the project in coordination with Hushi. In his memo, he requested that the JA provide an initial budget to enable the ‘Druze Committee’ – comprising Yusuf al-‘Aysami and Sayyah al-Atrash – to carry out its work promoting and preparing for the project, because the two members of this committee would have to leave their work and devote themselves to the project, travel to Palestine and visit the Druze villages there. Hushi estimated this budget at about £P50–65 per month for half a year, approximately half of which would be disbursed monthly to al‘Aysami and al-Atrash, with the remainder allocated for travel and the like.

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Hushi indicated that it was necessary to send at least one agricultural expert to Jabal al-Druze in response to the request of Sultan al-Atrash. He added that if the JA could send a doctor to two or three villages in Jabal al-Druze, ‘We would have done a work of supreme value that would strengthen the friendship between us and Jabal al-Druze and undoubtedly affect the transfer project that we wish and hope will happen.’128 Chaim Weizmann agreed with the proposals. He assigned Hushi to continue working to bring about the transfer plan and allocated him the £P50 per month requested.129 The Arab Division appointed Eliyahu Epstein to follow up on the transfer project with Hushi. On 3 May 1939, Epstein presented a memorandum to the leaders of the Zionist movement, entitled ‘Memorandum on the Druze in Palestine and the plan to transfer them from the country to Jabal al-Druze’. Divided into two sections, the first, prepared years earlier and making up most of the memorandum, dealt with the history of the Druze in Palestine, their faith, regions, number of villages, towns, and properties, their economic, social and political reality, and their relations with the Druze in Jabal al-Druze and Lebanon. The second section, marked ‘top secret’, was entitled ‘Remarks on the plan to transfer the Druze of Palestine to Jabal al-Druze’. In it, Epstein analyzed the positions of Britain, France, and the Druze in Palestine, in Jabal al-Druze in Syria, and in Lebanon on the transfer plan. Epstein was concerned with the British position, noting that it might be the biggest obstacle to the project. In his memorandum, Epstein stressed the need to maintain absolute secrecy. If the transfer plan was known about prematurely, then Haj Amin al-Husayni would be the first to work to thwart it even before it reached the operational phase.130 Yusuf al-‘Aysami was eager to ensure the transfer of the Druze of Palestine to Jabal al-Druze. He went to great lengths, along with some Druze Zionist collaborators, to persuade some Palestinian Druze, especially those in Isfiya, Daliyat al-Karmel, Shafa ‘Amr, and al-Maghar, to accept this project, as many archival records indicate. For example, a few dozen Druze from Shafa ‘Amr signed authorizations allowing seven of them to sell their lands and homes to the Zionist movement so they could move and be housed in Jabal al-Druze.131 Similarly, the mukhtar of Daliyat al-Karmel sent a letter to Zionist institutions and companies declaring his desire to sell all the land and houses of Daliyat al-Karmel to these Zionist bodies.132 In contrast with al-‘Aysami’s eagerness to get this project done, Sultan al-Atrash was cautious and refused to call upon the Druze in Palestine to sell their lands and homes before the Zionist movement built housing for them in Jabal al-Druze. His stance is clearly illustrated by Yusuf al-‘Aysami’s letter to

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Shlomo Alfiah, in which he says that he had been to al-Qurayyah and spoken with ‘the beneficent Pasha about the need to renew the invitation to our brothers there and see their conditions and what they might think if we invited them to live among us and leave behind the problems and disturbances. I informed him of the desire of many people I know who intend to leave to come and live with us and get rid of the problems of Palestine’.133 According to al-‘Aysami’s letter, Sultan al-Atrash replied, ‘Inviting them is premature. It would not be right to invite them to leave before they complete the housing that we talked about with your friends’. Al-‘Aysami countered that the Druze in Palestine ‘need advice from us’ and that ‘some have written to me saying we have written to the Pasha and he has not answered us yet’. Sultan al-Atrash told him that this was correct and explained: ‘This group that we talked with, we don’t know what’s happened with them regarding the reconstruction of the ruined villages and housing our group in them. I am afraid they failed to do anything because of the British.’ Al-‘Aysami told al-Atrash: ‘I confronted them and asked them about this project, and they answered that research was still going on in this regard. They assured us that it would be easy to find housing for our group if they want to sell in their entirety or in every village a majority or in their entirety.’ Al-‘Aysami added ‘but if they are working on this project and find no one’s interested, why should they take on the trouble’? Al - ‘Aysami added “on the other hand, we have to try harder with the group because we will get much benefit in return, whether over the sale or the known values as we have previously informed you” ’.134 From this letter, we learn that Sultan al-Atrash, despite al-‘Aysami’s persistence, remained cautious and would not have the Druze of Palestine move to Jabal al-Druze before the Zionist movement had reconstructed the ruined villages and built housing for them. This in spite of the large financial benefits arising from a percentage obtained from the sale of land or from the known financial value that al-‘Aysami had spoken to al-Atrash about. Abba Hushi was well aware that the Zionist organization needed to quickly provide funds for the implementation of the transfer project. On the eve of the World Zionist Congress on 16–25 August 1939 – whose sessions ended a few days before the outbreak of the Second World War – Hushi sent a letter to Chaim Weizmann in which he appealed for him to provide the necessary funds to implement the project to transfer the Druze of Palestine to Syria.135 In the letter, Hushi noted that he had held two meetings with leaders from Jabal al-Druze since the previous May, and that the development of events in Syria and the French authorities having separated Jabal al-Druze from the Syrian state had increased the chances of the transfer plan succeeding. Hushi further claimed

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that Sultan al-Atrash had told him, via Yusuf al-‘Aysami, that the separation of Jabal al-Druze from the Syrian state would facilitate the implementation of the transfer project. In his letter, Hushi indicated that Jabal al-Druze needed men, money and development, and that the transfer plan would provide those things. He said that, in recent days, a number of Druze sheikhs from Shafa ‘Amr had approached him to buy 5,000–8,000 dunums of their land adjacent to land owned by Jews. He also said that his Druze collaborators were able to sway Druze religious leaders in the desired direction for the implementation of the transfer. At the end of his letter, Hushi said that events were developing in the right direction much more rapidly than expected. However, he feared two things might disrupt the transfer plan. The first, the Zionist institutions might delay in providing the necessary funding for implementation the transfer. The second, that the governments of Britain and France might disturb it.136

XVII Failure of the Zionist Project to Transfer the Druze of Palestine to Jabal al-Druze Despite eagerness to transfer the Druze of Palestine to Jabal al-Druze, the project failed because of a series of factors: ●

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The outbreak of the Second World War depleted the financial resources of the Zionist movement. Chaim Weizmann assessed the price of the Druze land holdings in Palestine at about £3 million pounds sterling. Added to that was the price of Druze houses and their other properties, as well as the money required to reclaim the ruined villages in Jabal al-Druze. The cost of the project would have amounted to well over £3 million pounds sterling, a substantial amount that the World Zionist organization did not have at the time. The vast majority of Druze in Palestine did not want to sell their lands and emigrate to Jabal al-Druze. It is true that the Zionist movement succeeded in attracting and buying a handful of Druze collaborators in Palestine, especially from Isfiya, Daliyat al-Karmel and Shafa ‘Amr, including the mukhtar of Daliyat al-Karmel, who sent a letter to Zionist institutions stating his desire to sell the lands of Daliyat al-Karmel and all its houses.137 Nonetheless, the vast majority of Palestinian Druze were not even aware of the plan. The reasons put forward by Druze Zionist collaborators to spur the migration to Jabal al-Druze were weak and baseless, chief among them the

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claim that there was a threat to their security and existence in Palestine. In spite of the great effort made by the leadership of the Zionist movement to win over the Druze of Palestine and prevent them from joining the Arab Revolt, the vast majority of Druze – even if part of them remained neutral – still maintained good relations with the Palestinian national movement and were well aware that there was absolutely no danger to the Druze from the Palestinian people and its national movement, in spite of the tension that had appeared at times between some Palestinian Druze and the Arab Revolt. Sultan al-Atrash was very cautious and only gave his ultimate blessing for the plan conditional on the Druze of Palestine’s consent and the Zionist movement’s implementation of basic measures, such as the reconstruction of the ruined villages in Jabal al-Druze. The publication of the British White Paper, in May 1939, which limited the ability of Jews to buy Arab land in Palestine, followed in February 1940 by the Land Law, which prohibited the transfer of ownership of Arab land to Jews. Britain’s opposition to the plan, and the British authorities’ efforts to end the tension between some Druze in Palestine and the rest of the Palestinian people, which was exploited by the Zionist movement and its Druze collaborators in Palestine as a pretext for the transfer plan.

XVIII The Jabal al-Druze Delegation to Palestine In late 1939, the judge of Safed city, Asaad Qaddoura, approached leaders of Jabal al-Druze in Syria to intervene to resolve the tensions in Shafa ‘Amr. During the Arab Revolt in Palestine revolutionaries had assassinated Sheikh Hasan Khunayfis as he was leaving a Zionist settlement, on suspicion of collaboration with the Zionist movement. Death sentences were handed out by the British authorities to six Palestinian rebels convicted of carrying out the assassination. The call for intervention received the backing of the British authorities, who at the time were seeking to calm the situation in Palestine in light of the outbreak of the Second World War. A delegation from Jabal al-Druze was formed, headed by Sheikh ‘Abd al-Ghaffar al-Atrash, who was well known for his loyalty to Britain and to Emir Abdullah of Transjordan. Many leaders from Jabal al-Druze joined the delegation, including Zayd al-Atrash, Asaad Kanj and Hamza Darwish. The leaders of the Zionist movement in Palestine feared that the delegation would succeed in holding a sulha (reconciliation) in Shafa ‘Amr over Khunayfis’s

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assassination, which would resolve the sectarian tension there and lead to the release of the condemned Palestinian revolutionaries. Abba Hushi indicated to some of his Druze collaborators, one of whom was Salih Khunayfis, the son of Sheikh Hasan Khunayfis, to work to foil the sulha, but it went ahead. The Jabal al-Druze delegation stayed in Palestine for several weeks and held reconciliations in Arab villages, be they Druze or otherwise. The delegation also met with many leaders of the ‘peace brigades’ set up by the British authorities, with secret Zionist support, to strike a blow at the Arab Revolt. Abba Hushi took advantage of the presence of many Jabal al-Druze leaders to enhance relations with them and attract them to work for the Zionist movement. Hushi held several meetings in private with three of the delegation’s most prominent leaders, Asaad Kanj, Zayd al-Atrash and Hamza Darwish. They reached an understanding about the need to boost relations and strengthen cooperation between Jabal al-Druze and the Zionist movement, and to exchange visits. Before dealing with the breakthrough that these meetings set the stage for, it is important to review the contents of the meetings that took place during the visit of the Jabal al-Druze delegation, based on Shlomo Alfiah’s reports.

XIX The Meeting with Asaad Kanj At the beginning of his report on his and Abba Hushi’s meeting with Asaad Kanj, Shlomo Alfiah indicated that there were 15 Druze villages in the Jabal al-Sheikh region under the sway of Asaad Kanj. He said: ‘We know him from meetings with him in Damascus in June 1938, when he was the head of an armed group intending to enter Palestine.’138 Alfiah stated that he and Hushi had met Kanj several times during the visit of the Jabal al-Druze delegation to Palestine and that, at the last meeting, on 1 February 1940, Kanj had said he was interested in developing relations between his region and the Zionist movement because that would benefit both parties. Kanj complained that the Zionist movement had not kept its promise to him. While working for the Arab Revolt in Palestine, he had taken a sum of money from the leadership of the Arab Revolt based in Damascus in exchange for his leadership and the recruitment of groups of Druze fighters to support the Arab Revolt in Palestine. During that period, he had met with the Zionist land dealer Reuven Trifon, who had promised him that the Zionist movement would give him a sum of money equal to the amount that he had taken from the Palestinian leaders so that he could return it to them if he finally stopped supporting the Arab Revolt. Trifon did not keep his promise, even

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though Kanj stopped supporting the Arab Revolt in Palestine. Alfiah added that at the meeting, Kanj confirmed that he would be the first to enter into an alliance with the Zionist movement in this region, that he was always ready to ‘come to help us whenever we need it’ and that he invited Hushi and Alfiah to visit him in his village Majdal Shams.139

XX The meeting with Zayd al-Atrash During the visit of the Jabal al-Druze delegation, Zayd al-Atrash met with Abba Hushi and Shlomo Alfiah three times.140 In one meeting, al-Atrash conveyed to them the Palestinian Druze’s gratitude to the Zionist movement ‘for the considerable assistance it has provided to the Druze in Palestine’ during the Arab Revolt in Palestine. In his report on these meetings, Alfiah stated that al-Atrash told them that he knew that there was: rapprochement and negotiations between us and the Druze leaders. He supports reaching an understanding with us for the benefit of both parties, but the final word on the matter lies with his brother Sultan Pasha because he is the one who decides these things.

Alfiah also stated in his report that Zayd al-Atrash had visited the settlement of Mishmar Ha-Emek with him and Abba Hushi on 19 February 1940, and that while eating lunch with officials of the settlement, he had said that Palestine had developed significantly thanks to the Zionist movement and Jewish immigration, since the Jewish population of Palestine had reached about half a million thanks to immigration. Al-Atrash added that one must not overlook the fact that the Jews in Palestine, thanks to immigration, had become a major force for the development of the country in general, and agriculture and industry in particular. He said that he did not in the least consider Jewish settlers in Palestine as strangers to the East, and assured his hosts, ‘you come here to stay and develop the East’ and expressed his belief that the Arabs would come to cooperate with the Zionist movement so as to reach an understanding with them in the near future, and that the Druze would lead the way.141 Zayd al-Atrash’s relations with Abba Hushi extended to other spheres. During the visit of the Jabal al-Druze delegation, he sent a letter on 16 January 1940 from Haifa to Salman al-Faris, who was known for his collaboration with the Zionist movement, stating: ‘Please meet the President immediately, and send a car to take us to the colony he instructs, and complete the paperwork and make an

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installment bond for a small amount needed, according to the legal interest rate, and he’ll be very happy, God willing. Yours sincerely, Zayd al-Atrash.’142 On 7 February 1940, Zayd al-Atrash sent another letter to Salman al-Faris as follows: Dear cousin of ours, Salman al-Faris. Go at once to meet the President, and make him see that I am asking him [to fulfill] his promise and that I will only accept out of respect for his word, in whatever way, provided that no one knows about this secret except you alone, and the discussion should be held with you, and before you come to the Jabal al- Duruz you should have the final answer so that I’m in the picture. Greetings to the President. Yours sincerely, Zayd al-Atrash.143

From these two letters, it appears that Zayd al-Atrash sought to obtain a sum of money from Abba Hushi – whom Druze collaborators in Palestine called ‘the President’ – in the form of a loan, and that Hushi promised him to meet his request. It seems that Hushi set a condition or conditions and that al-Atrash accepted this, as he writes: ‘I only accept out of respect for his word’ provided that no one knows this secret. Whatever the case, many reports of the meetings that subsequently took place among the leaders of the Intelligence Service of the JA Political Department indicate that Zayd al-Atrash collaborated with the JA in 1940 and 1941 in exchange for payment, as we will see below.

XXI The Meeting with Hamza Darwish Hamza Darwish was born in 1881 in the village of al-Harisa in Jabal al-Druze. In 1921 he was elected to the first Druze Parliament after France’s establishment of the ‘Druze state’ and was one of the first to join the revolt in Jabal al-Druze in 1925, becoming a prominent leader in its early stages, although he soon fell out with Sultan al-Atrash. After the fall of France in the Second World War and Vichy government forces taking control of Syria, Darwish, in cooperation with the Vichy authorities, formed a Druze battalion of around 1,000 soldiers, which was called the ‘Druze Society’ (al-mujtam‘a al-Durzi). This battalion disbanded after the British army occupied Syria. Darwish was a leader of the popular movement founded in the 1940s against the influence of the al-Atrash family in Jabal al-Druze, which was close to the authorities in Damascus. He was killed in 1947 during the conflict that raged in that period between the al-Atrash clan and the popular movement in Jabal al-Druze. On 2 February 1940, Hamza Darwish met with Abba Hushi and Shlomo Alfiah at Hushi’s house in Haifa. Darwish started by saying: ‘The Arabs, or the

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Muslims to be more accurate, will not forget that you are coming to take away their homeland, and you will not forget that they killed your children.144 Therefore, the Zionist movement should woo and approach the different minorities that live in the East to enjoy their help in the pursuit of its goals.’ Darwish added that he had heard about the considerable assistance that the Zionist movement had given to the Druze in Palestine and the strong friendship between the Zionist movement and the leaders of Jabal al-Druze. He was worried about rumours he had heard about preparations taking place and major operations being planned to attack Jews in Palestine. He also mentioned he had been approached to recruit and lead several hundred Druze young men for this purpose. Warning of the dangers lying in wait for the Jews in Palestine, Darwish said: ‘I am ready to assist you in everything you need, even if this leads to great sacrifices from me and my men.’ That was in exchange for ‘sharing joys and sorrows together’ and receiving payment. Abba Hushi thanked his guest and assured him that the Jewish people hoped to work with the Druze people to strengthen relations between them. At the end of the two-hour meeting, Darwish invited Hushi to visit him and to keep in touch, and he stressed that he was ‘ready to help any time he was asked’.145

XXII Penetration In 1940 the Zionist movement made a significant penetration of the ranks of prominent Druze leaders in Syria. In the wake of the above-mentioned visit of the Syrian Druze delegation to Palestine, the Zionist movement this succeeded in attracting Asaad Kanj and Zayd and ‘Ali al-Atrash to work for it. Abba Hushi was keen to build on the relations with Druze leaders initiated during the delegation’s visit and recruit them to work for the Zionist movement. In a report, Hushi stated that on 9 July 1940 he had met with Asaad Kanj at Kibbutz Dafna, located in the north of the Hula Valley in northern Palestine near the Syrian border.146 It is clear from this report that Asaad Kanj was working for the Zionist movement. The meeting dealt with four main topics: (1) arrangements for passing on information from Asaad Kanj to Abba Hushi; (2) Kanj’s purchase of weapons in Syria for the Haganah – Hushi asked him to take advantage of the turmoil in the French army in Syria, after the fall of Paris to the Germans and the formation of the Vichy government in France, and buy weapons, in which there was a relatively brisk trade in Syria at that time, for the Haganah; (3) agreeing on a mutual assistance plan between the Druze villages in the Golan under the sway

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of Kanj and the Jewish settlements adjacent to the Syrian border; and (4) drawing up a plan of action in Jabal al-Druze to take advantage of the new situation resulting from the fall of France and the formation of the Vichy government.147 The Arab Division (Intelligence Service) of the JA’s political department attached great importance to Hushi’s success in attracting Kanj to work for the Zionist movement. About two weeks after their meeting at Kibbutz Dafna, they met there again, this time with Eliyahu Sasson who provided detailed guidance and instructions to Kanj on the information the JA required and the means to pass it on.148 In the first week of August 1940, Hushi and Kanj met in Kibbutz Dan where Kanj presented a detailed report on the development of the situation in Jabal alDruze and developments in Syria in general. Kanj gave an account of the tensions between Sultan al-Atrash and the al-Atrash family and the French authorities in the Jabal al- Druze and relayed that the leaders of the People’s Party had asked Sultan al-Atrash to lead it after the killing of ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar, but Sultan al-Atrash had not responded. As for Kanj’s purchase of weapons for the Haganah, Hushi agreed with him about organizing a meeting with an expert from the Haganah to brief him on the type, quantity and price of the weapons the Haganah wanted.149 In the summer of 1940, the JA’s political department intensified its cooperation with the British Secret Service. British Intelligence gave the JA £5,000 to increase its activities in Syria and Lebanon. Thanks to these funds, the JA’s intelligence was able to increase its activity in Syria and Lebanon and recruit important collaborators, including Zayd and ‘Ali al-Atrash, as well as Asaad Kanj. In the second half of 1940, the JA’s intelligence service paid Zayd al-Atrash, ‘Ali alAtrash, Asaad Kanj, and Yusuf al-‘Aysami £750.150 The foursome worked as one group. Some meetings between them and the intelligence agency took place at one of the kibbutzim located in the north of the Hula Valley, close to the Palestinian-Syrian border, and in strict secrecy, since the Vichy authorities in Syria had tightened control of the Syrian-Palestinian border at the time. Before each meeting, arrangements were made on the exact date and location of the meeting, usually by David Lawziyyah, the JA’s agent in Damascus, as well as by an agent in Lebanon who communicated details from Hushi in Haifa to Kanj in Majdal Shams and to Zayd al-Atrash, ‘Ali al-Atrash, and Yusuf al-‘Aysami in Jabal al-Druze. Kanj would smuggle the others from Majdal Shams to the arranged meeting place in one of the kibbutzim on the Syrian-Palestinian border.151 Despite the great secrecy in which these meetings took place, the authorities of the Vichy government in Syria suspected that Kanj was secretly crossing the

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border into Palestine, so he was summoned for questioning and ordered to stop.152 Contacts did not stop, however, despite the tightening of border controls and the Vichy authorities’ warning to Kanj. Shlomo Alfiah visited Jabal al-Druze several times in 1941, and continued intelligence contacts with these four. In July 1941, Eliyahu Sasson met in Damascus with Zayd al-Atrash and ‘Ali al-Atrash, who briefed him in a three-hour meeting on the situation in Jabal Druze, and on the determination of the Jabal Druze leadership to cooperate with Britain to resolve the Syrian question. In a letter, Sasson stated that he had spoken to Zayd al-Atrash and ‘Ali al-Atrash about their cooperation with the Jewish Agency, and that he had promised ‘to visit them in Jabal Druze’.153 It appears that the relationship of Zayd al-Atrash,‘Ali al-Atrash and Asaad Kanj with the intelligence service of the JA’s political department halted in 1942. But it was not final, as Zayd al-Atrash renewed this relationship during the second armistice period of the 1948 war.

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Conclusion

Since Palestine’s fall under British occupation in 1918, Zionists became deeply concerned with the position of Arab leaders and elites on the Zionist project in Palestine. They created an intelligence service specializing in Arab affairs, that would gather information and produce studies and analyses about Arabs to put before Zionist decision makers. The intelligence service was to be the Zionist movement’s fundamental tool in establishing relations with Arabs. Ever since its creation, Zionist intelligence sought to build secret relations with Arab political and media leaders and elites, notably the owners and editors of Arab newspapers in Palestine and neighbouring Arab countries, with the aim of winning them over, reducing their hostility to Zionism, neutralizing them, or buying them off. Despite its limited financial resources and staff, the Arab Division of the JA’s political department, the responsible leading unit charged with contacting Arab leaders and elites in the decades before the establishment of Israel, succeeded in establishing a broad range of relationships with Syrian elites and easily penetrated some of them. With similar ease, during two years of the Arab Revolt, it surreptitiously published about 280 Zionist articles in the highest-circulation Syrian and Lebanese newspapers at the time, as well as acquiring five Syrian and Lebanese newspapers. In its pursuit of Syrian elites and leaders, Zionist intelligence took advantage of the weak spots in Syrian society and that of its neighbours, exploiting their ignorance of the Zionist threat to the Arabs and the widespread false assumptions regarding Jews and Zionism. Misconceptions, such that Jews around the world constituted one nation, controlled the world, its press, and the policy of the great nations, and had vast amounts of money, the lack of a clear distinction between Judaism as a religion and Zionism’s endeavour to turn it into a settler national community with historical and national rights in Palestine, and the belief that Arab elites and Zionists had common interests that did not necessarily contradict the national rights of the Arab Palestinian people – all bolstered the sway of the Zionist movement and its intelligence apparatus among many who believed in these ideas. 159

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In the 1930s, during the Arab Revolt, a Zionist consensus calling for the transfer of the Palestinian people from Palestine emerged among the various Zionist parties, bodies, and organizations. The JA secretly formed three Zionist transfer committees to develop operational plans for transferring the Palestinians to the Arab states, the first in 1937, the second in 1942 and the third in 1948. Ironically, the JA representatives who conducted formal negotiations with the Syrian National Bloc and the Shahbandari opposition and claimed that Zionism brought bounty and blessing to the Palestinian people, were senior members of these transfer committees. Throughout its struggle to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine, and a Jewish state thereafter, the Zionist movement ignored the existence of Palestinians. In meetings held with Syrian leaders and elites, especially in the two official meetings held with the National Bloc on reaching a comprehensive ‘ArabJewish agreement’ behind the back of Palestinians, at their expense and to their detriment, the Jewish Agency worked to influence the Syrian National Bloc to stop or curtail their support for the Arab Revolt in Palestine. They wanted to get the Syrian National Bloc’s support for the Jewish national homeland in Palestine and for Jewish emigration to Palestine, of the size and pace desired by the JA. In contradiction to its true position and policy, the JA claimed that, in return, it supported the National Bloc’s demand for Syrian independence and Arab unity. The National Bloc at the time deluded itself into thinking that it could obtain the JA’s support in achieving independence for Syria, even if only to reduce or neutralize its opposition, in exchange for acting as a mediator between the JA and the Palestinian national movement, in line with the naive belief prevalent at the time that ‘world Jewry’ had great influence over France and the great powers. Shukri al-Quwatli, who stood out among many of his colleagues in the National Bloc leadership for his commitment in supporting the Arab Revolt in Palestine, concluded from the two official meetings he held with the JA that there was no point in continuing the negotiations, and focused his efforts on supporting the Arab Revolt in Palestine. However, that a National Bloc delegation, under his leadership, had conducted negotiations with the JA in those circumstances and against that background, set a precedent and created an atmosphere whereby secret contacts or meetings between the leaders of the National Bloc and the JA were not entirely prohibited. The second meeting between the National Bloc and the JA was the last official meeting in that round of negotiations, but it was by no means the last meeting or encounter between representatives of the JA and leaders from the Syrian National Bloc. In the months and years that followed, there were many secret

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meetings and contacts between representatives of the JA and a number of National Bloc leaders, some of whom the JA formed intimate ties with, including the likes of Jamil Mardam, Nasib al-Bakri, Lutfi al-Haffar, Fawzi al-Bakri, and leaders from the Shahbandari opposition, especially ‘Abd al-Rahman alShahbandar, Nasuh Babil, and Nazih Al-Mu’ayyad, as well as with leaders in Jabal al-Druze. In 1938, the JA had a significant breakthrough with the recruitment of one of the National Bloc leaders, Nasib al-Bakri, to work as a spy. From him, and agent Abdullah Abboud the JA obtained important and accurate information about the Palestinian revolutionaries and their Syrian supporters, the routes and dates of their entering Palestine, and sources of weapons and methods of smuggling them into Palestine. It also obtained accurate information on the decisions and policies of the National Bloc and the Syrian government regarding the Palestinian issue, the Arab Revolt in Palestine, and other important issues. Another breakthrough came with the recruitment of prominent leaders of Jabal al-Druze. The JA’s intelligence service managed to attract few top-rung Druze leaders in Syria to work for the agency during the Arab Revolt, foremost among them Yusuf al-‘Aysami, who spied for the JA for many years, staring in 1937, and who was paid a monthly salary. Al-‘Aysami provided the JA with accurate and important information on the Palestinian revolutionaries, their Syrian Druze supporters in Jabal al-Druze, methods for smuggling weapons into Palestine, and the routes and timing of Palestinian and Druze rebels entering Palestine. The JA also recruited Asaad Kanj and Zayd and ‘Ali Al-Atrash (brothers of Sultan Al-Atrash) in 1940. The JA also reached an understanding with Sultan al-Atrash whereby he committed to working to stop the participation of the Druze in the Arab Revolt in Palestine, and to establish friendly relations between Jabal al-Druze and the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine. The JA went to great lengths to befriend Sultan alAtrash and have him approve the project to transfer the Druze of Palestine to Syria. Sultan al-Atrash, however, proved cautious and refused to call upon the Druze of Palestine to move to Jabal al-Druze unless the Zionist movement obtained their agreement and had undertaken all necessary steps such as building homes for them in Jabal al-Druze. The secret relations, established by the JA with the various elites referred to in the book helped to keep it accurately informed about what was going on in Syria, and helped to influence the attitudes of some of these important elites on the Arab Revolt in Palestine, not to mention much of their decision making. It also managed to significantly reduce the various forms of support the Syrian people

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and its national forces were providing, which meant it directly weakened the Arab Revolt in Palestine, especially in its final year. The damage caused by the JA’s relations with Syrian elites was not limited to the 1936 Revolt, but also influenced the 1948 war. The JA built on the secret relations it had formed during the Arab Revolt with elites in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt, and paid them a lot of attention during the 1948 war. It developed them, created a common cause with some, and penetrated others, which had an impact on the 1948 war. This book disproves the official Israeli narrative claiming the JA’s goal behind approaching Arab leaders was to achieve peace between Arabs and Jews. In fact, it proves their goal was the exact opposite. Documentation of discussions, reports and decisions taken by the JA’s leadership at the time, show that its objective was primarily to weaken the Palestinian national movement, to isolate it from the Arab states, deny the national rights of the Palestinian people, to obtain the approval of the Arab parties to establish a Jewish homeland and a Jewish state in Palestine, keep the Arab states weak and fragmented, block the establishment of a united Arab front against the Zionist movement, nurture disputes in Arab societies along sectarian, ethnic, tribal and regional lines, and to resolve Palestinian national issue behind the backs of the Palestinian people and at their expense, in a framework of a comprehensive Jewish-Arab agreements between the JA and the Arab states. This research gives an historic background for the Abraham Accord reached lately between Israel and some Arab states and exposes the main Israeli historic objective to normalize its relations with Arab states, while oppressing the Palestinians and denying them their national rights, thus revealing that this was deep rooted in the Zionist political thought and practice.

Appendix Document 1: Eliyahu Sasson’s Report on the Activities of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, which he sent to Moshe Shertok, titled ‘Some of the Political Department’s Activity in Syria and Lebanon’, CZA, file S25/22210 Jerusalem, 19-7-39

Some of the activities of the Political Department in Syria and Lebanon Relations with Arab countries Our work in the Arab countries has become difficult over the last two years. During normal years our work has been limited to establishing good neighborly relations, but since the outbreak of the events in Palestine and the exodus of the Mufti and his men to Syria and Lebanon, these two countries have become a center of poisonous propaganda against the Zionist project, and as a result, we have been assigned additional tasks in our activity in the Arab countries: a war against the Mufti and his plots; a war against foreign propaganda that has exploited the riots in Palestine and the Arabs’ hatred for Zionism in order to undermine Britain’s position in the Near East; a war against all kinds of support provided by Arab countries to Arab terrorism in Palestine; a war against the aspirations for Arab unity among Arab politicians who aim to make Palestine an integral part of the future greater Arab state; explaining our situation and the nature of our movement to the Arabs, etc. The implementation of these missions faced many difficulties. First, the financial problem, for while our opponents were in possession of large sums, our budget was meager. Second, public opinion in the countries in which we operated was not supportive of us, but rather hostile to us and our project. What made the burden heavier and our war more difficult is that we were often forced to use the methods of our enemies in order to gain the support of public opinion, such as: buying newspapers, issuing publications and pamphlets, making contacts with people and relations with governments,

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etc. The use of these methods was very comfortable for our enemies and very difficult for us, because while our enemies used these methods openly, that is, they wrote and published their names and acted openly in Syria and Lebanon without having to hide, and were received with respect everywhere, we had to use the same methods, but meekly, and we had to find Arab people to write what we ask them to write, in newspapers, bulletins, and pamphlets, under their own names in order for their writings to have some value, and we also had to carry out our activities secretly because the danger that was lying in wait for Zionist activists in Palestine was also awaiting them in the neighboring Arab countries (and indeed, a Zionist envoy in Lebanon was once beaten up). Besides this, Arab politicians and leaders lacked the boldness to openly meet our envoys and express their positions publicly.

Relations with Iraq Iraq has been completely closed to us for the last two years: the Jews of Iraq have asked us not to go to Iraq to conduct any Zionist work for fear that their lives and status will be endangered. The Iraqi authorities absolutely refused to allow Jews from Palestine to enter Iraq, and the leaders of Iraq have more than once in public meetings and parliament sessions and in their statements to the press declared their anti-Zionist stance, their strong desire to eliminate Zionism, and their support for the Mufti, the Arab Higher Committee, and the terrorists. Iraq stood at the forefront of the Arab countries that have encouraged Arab terrorism in Palestine in terms of material and moral support. Many organizations have been established in Iraq that aim to collect donations for the benefit of terrorism. Newspapers, lectures in schools and on the radio, and debates in Parliament have become tools for anti-Zionist propaganda. Being prevented from entry into Iraq did not, however, prevent us from obtaining reliable information about the plots being hatched against us in the country. In addition to the information we obtained from our informants in Iraq and from Iraqi Jewish volunteers, we sent trusted Arab informants above suspicion, who provided us with the information. This information has been used fully in the Hebrew, English, and French press and in talks with the British authorities in Palestine and London.

Our relationship with the authorities in Syria and Lebanon Envoys of the Political Department visited Syria and Lebanon many times over the past two years. We had hoped to obtain substantial assistance from the French authorities for our activities in these two countries. But we received

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almost no help. Not only that, but our activities sometimes conflicted with the ‘interests’ of the French authorities. For example, despite our continuous explanation, and despite the many irrefutable proofs that we presented to the French authorities regarding the damage that the freedom of movement of the Mufti and his men and Palestinian terrorists in Lebanon and Syria was doing to French interests, the French authorities have refrained from exerting any, even basic, pressure on them during the events of the past three years. Three factors led to this: a) France feared that Muslims would be incited in its various colonies, particularly in North Africa, if measures were taken against the Mufti; b) France found an appropriate opportunity to take revenge against England for its support for the Druze revolt in 1926, and decided to take a lenient stance towards Palestinian terrorists who turned Syria into a center for their activities; and c) by providing facilities to the Mufti, treating terrorists benevolently, and allowing anti-Zionist and anti-British propaganda, France believed that it could distract the Syrians from France’s firm decision to abrogate the Syrian-French treaty of 1936 and defuse the bad impression this would have for Syrians. However, the tension in international relations in Europe, the increase in Nazi propaganda in the Levant, and the threats of Syrian politicians that they will forcefully resist any infringement on Syria’s independence, are factors that finally opened France’s eyes and proved to it how correct our warnings had been, and how much its lenient policy towards terrorists had harmed France. The French are now in a situation that compels them to take the steps that we asked them to take one and two years ago, which they rejected at the time, namely: pressuring the Mufti, arresting agitators, imposing tight control to prevent arms smuggling, dissolving organizations suspected of having ties to the Nazis, dismissing employees who have relations with the Mufti and the terrorists, tightening censorship on newspapers, expelling Nazi agents, looking into illegal persons, limiting Arab nationalist aspirations, etc.

Relations with the civilian authorities in Syria and Lebanon We have always aspired to form good relations with the civilian authorities in Syria and Lebanon. Over the past two years, we have established friendly relations with two Lebanese prime ministers, Khayr al-Din al-Ahdab and Emir Khalid Shehab, and with three prime ministers in Syria, Jamil Mardam, Lutfi al-Haffar, and Nasuh al-Bukhari. The first two provided us with assistance in many cases: The first of them provided us with assistance in the case of building the settlement of Hanita, as

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well as sending memoranda to Paris on the activity of the Mufti and his men that was inconsistent with France’s interests in the Levant. The second provided us with assistance in curbing the Lebanese agitators, who received help from the Mufti to organize demonstrations, strikes, protests, and attacks on the Jewish neighborhoods of Beirut and Sidon. Our relationship with these two persons also remained strong after they resigned from office. The first, who moved to Paris for some reason, takes advantage of any opportunity to attack the Mufti and Syrian and Lebanese politicians with Arab nationalist tendencies. As for the second, he still receives our envoys at his house, exchanges views with them, and gives them advice on our activities in Lebanon. Our relationship with the three prime ministers in Damascus was largely confined to talks on joint work between the Jewish and Arab peoples, a peaceful resolution to the Palestinian issue, and recognition of the rights of both parties. Our envoys have always been received with respect and found attentive ears for their words and allegations. The first expressed his willingness, after he retires from office, to visit different Arab countries and call for a Jewish-Arab agreement. The second too expressed his willingness to help establish good relations between us and Ibn Saud. But the development of political events in Syria has always taken up their time and forced them to respect the well-known saying ‘home comes first.’ It is important to note that our envoys’ talks with heads of government in Syria and Lebanon have always provided us with reliable information on what is happening in Syria in particular and in the Arab countries in general.

Relationships with individuals In addition to the good relations we established with the heads of government in Syria and Lebanon, we sought to establish friendly relations with Arab people with influence in their constituencies. Although our accomplishments were few, mainly due to the lack of funds, these few were crowned with success and demonstrated the importance of this relationship. Thanks to it, we obtained firsthand information and succeeded in influencing, to a certain degree, the development of affairs in both countries, especially in Syria. We were able to penetrate the Arab Parliamentary Conference in Cairo, learn its confidential plans and decisions, and raise a number of questions that highlighted the importance of the Zionist project in Palestine and its impact on the Levant countries. Through this relationship, we were able to learn what was going on, not only among the various political organizations in Syria, but also in the corridors of power, and we had no small degree of influence over their orientations, whether in terms of their

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composition or their activity. Recently, following the fall of the Syrian National Bloc and the collapse of the national government in Syria, we have been keen to establish good relations with the Syrian opposition. At a recent meeting of one of our envoys with two opposition leaders in Damascus, we heard encouraging statements, and they expressed their willingness to work together with us.

Informants in Syria and Lebanon The Political Department has permanent Arab informants in Syria and Lebanon. All of them occupy a prominent place in their circles. Their role is not only to provide information, but also includes carrying out part of the work. Our informants have been excellent in all the kinds of information they have provided, whether it is related to political matters, terrorism, or foreign propaganda. The Political Department made the most of this information. It has constantly been passed on to the British authorities in Palestine and the French authorities in Syria, and part of it has also been published in various newspapers in the country and abroad. We refer here to the most important activities carried out by the Political Department over the past two years.

Propaganda bulletin in Arabic This bulletin started seven months ago. This bulletin is entitled Jewish News and appears five times a week. It consists of one page, except in some cases. Three hundred copies are printed and sent to Islamic countries: Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Aden, Tunisia, Iran, and Turkey. It is obtained by all the important newspapers in the Near East, ministries, departments in ministries, clubs, Arab broadcasting companies, chambers of commerce, printing houses, Arab leaders and politicians, etc. There have been 170 issues to date. The bulletin aims to convey to Arab circles alternative information on what is happening in the ranks of Zionism in particular, and among Jews in general. It also aims to highlight the great benefit that the Jews have brought to Palestine, and to show that it is not the objective of the Jews in Palestine to control the Arabs of Palestine or penetrate neighboring countries. On the other hand, this bulletin aims to stress that the Jews will not give up their right to Palestine. Also included in the leaflet are anti-Nazi information and propaganda. It should be noted that this publication not only deals with the development of events, but also includes a summary of articles from the Hebrew newspapers as well as Zionist and JewishArab issues. The bulletin also includes a summary of the pro-Zionist articles published in newspapers abroad.

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Propaganda pamphlets in Arabic In the past two years, the Arab Division has published four pamphlets in Arabic: two under the name of the Jewish Agency and two under borrowed Arab names. The first two were issued in Jerusalem; the first in December 1937, set out the position of the Jewish Agency towards the rumors then rife about negotiations between Jews and Arabs, and the second in July 1939, explained the position of major Jewish institutions and the entire Jewish Yishuv towards reprehensible acts of violence against innocent Arabs. The latter two publications were issued in Beirut in the summer of 1938. Both dealt with the economic blessing that Jews brought to Palestine, as well as the economic boycott movement that some people tried to adopt in Beirut and Damascus.

Articles in Arab newspapers During the past two years, we have succeeded in penetrating a number of Arab newspapers affiliated with Christians and Muslims in Lebanon and Syria. We have published about 280 articles on various topics: the rights of the Jews in Palestine, the desire of the Jews to cooperate with the Arabs of Palestine and neighboring countries, foreign propaganda and its dangers, Arab terrorism in Palestine and its harm, the personal ambitions of Palestinian leaders, the economic blessing that Jews have brought to Palestine and its effect on the Levant, the White Paper and its decisions from the Jewish and Arab perspectives, the opposition of the Jews to bloodshed, etc.

Purchase of Arab newspapers In addition to placing articles in Arab newspapers, the Arabic Division carried out a far more important operation, namely, buying Arabic newspapers in Syria and Lebanon. In the summer of 1938 we succeeded in buying five newspapers: three in Beirut and two in Damascus. We could have bought more, but we didn’t have the budget, and for the same reason we were soon compelled to suspend the relationship, even with the papers we had actually bought. The purpose of buying newspapers was to publish articles and news supplied by us, to refrain from publishing material hostile to Zionism provided by the other side and foreign sources, to bring together Arab and Jewish viewpoints, to denounce Arab terrorism in Palestine, and to adopt a pro-Zionist/Jewish posture on all political issues. These newspapers supported the Jews’ campaign against the White Paper and fundamentally attacked the Land Law. It is important to note that the articles against Arab terrorism and against the Mufti’s personal ambitions and plots that

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were priorly published in the newspapers we bought and in other newspapers, indirectly gave impetus to the Nashashibi party to conduct a public campaign against the Higher Arab Committee and against the leaders of terrorism.

Arabic publications In addition to propaganda in Arab newspapers, the Political Department was keen to issue Arabic-language publications under assumed Arabic names, against Arab terrorism in Palestine and against foreign propaganda in the Levant. Thousands of copies of these publications were printed and sent to all Arab countries. It should be noted that these publications indirectly paved the way for the Nashashibi party to express its positions publicly since all the Arab newspapers in Palestine and abroad refused to publish them. *

*

*

*

Document 2: Shlomo Alfiah’s report to the Jewish Agency, 30 April 1939 on the visit of Abba Hushi, Dov Hoz, and Shlomo Alfiah to Sultan al-Atrash in Jabal al-Druze, Haganah Archives, 8/Hushi/2. Shlomo Alfiah’s report on the visit of Abba Hushi, Dov Hoz, and Alfiah to Sultan al-Atrash Report on the visit to Sultan Pasha al-Atrash On Wednesday morning, April 26, D. Hoz, A. Hushi, and the writer of these lines left Haifa and headed to Syria to visit Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, based on his invitation to us, and on the date set between us by means of our friend Yusuf Bey al-‘Aysami. We arrived in Damascus that same day before evening, and our abovementioned friend was waiting to join us. He told us the following: a) the arrest of Nabih al-‘Azma has greatly weakened the activities of the Solidarity Committee with the Palestinian People, because everything was concentrated in his hand, and because the activists for this cause were confused, and their only hope is the Cairo-London talks. b) Nabih is indicted on two charges: conspiracy against the French army and relations with foreign countries against the Mandate government. Accordingly, he will be tried by a French court, and his lawyer must be French, because of military and state testimonies, and only a French citizen is

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permitted to see them. Two French lawyers requested a sum of £P1,000 to defend him. Further arrests will also take place among the ranks of the extremist bloc. c) The split that occurred in the ranks of the National Bloc is an artificial one for two reasons: to alleviate the increasing criticism of the masses against them and to give them freedom in their activities, especially outside the country. Next morning, on Thursday, April 27, we left Damascus and headed to alQurayyah in Jabal al-Druze Sultan’s hometown. On the way we crossed the Houran with its fertile tracts of agricultural land. On both sides of the road, abandoned areas of land stretched as far as one could see. There is no one planting or plowing. We went through Daraa, the capital of the Houran, and headed to the city of Busra. At the entrance to this city is a gate with a large and strong fortress inside, and part of it is used as a military base for the local army. About 15 km from Busra, the village of al-Qurayyah is located at the foot of the mountain. When we entered the village, we saw that many changes had happened since our last visit nine months ago. Preparations to lay the water pipes are finished. Sultan has built several huts for sheep, cattle, and chickens. Around the house he has planted a garden with different fruit trees, and he is busy building a large house that will be used for guests and as a meeting hall. The welcome was very friendly. He made an effort for us. We went straight into the guest room. After the usual compliments on such occasions, Yusuf al-‘Aysami opened the meeting and said to Sultan: Our distinguished guests and brothers with whom I have ties, as you know and according to your will, visit us from time to time to cement relations between them and us and to find ways and means to help each other in these difficult days that the world in general, and we are in the Levant in particular, are going through. As you know, these guests present speak for the Jews in Palestine and also for the Jews who will arrive there in the future. They are always extending their hands to all the peoples of the East, especially to us, in order to achieve peace. But they want to achieve this friendship by means of useful actions for both sides, and there is something that must be done in the interest of the two peoples, the interest of the Jews in Palestine and the interest of Jabal al-Druze. It is well known that our Druze brothers in Palestine, who number ten thousand people and live in fifteen villages, have suffered a lot during these events; they have been exposed to and lied about by every swindler and thief, people who have no connection with patriotism. The Druze have suffered greatly in terms of lives and property. Many of them have come here and complained to us about the severe abuse they have suffered and their great pain. Many, many of them are now thinking about leaving Palestine and coming to Syria. But here the question arises, how do we respond to this matter and what can we do to help them?

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Here, Pasha, good will happen to all parties. To the Druze people who will gather in this place, to the Jewish people who will buy their lands, and to our country Jabal al-Druze to which this wealth will be introduced. In this way, we can save them and save ourselves from ruin, weakness, and poverty. There are a lot of ruined abandoned villages here and vast areas of land; our Palestinian Druze brothers will come and live among us and cultivate the abandoned lands. This will benefit everyone. As a result of their coming to Jabal al-Druze, we will not have to worry about them and deal with their problems.

Then Alfiah briefly explained what form our assistance to the Druze of Palestine had taken since the occupation, especially during these difficult events: medical assistance, arranging employment, and assistance in defending property and life. Then Sultan said: ‘I told you during your first visit that there are no disagreements between us and you regarding our relations and friendship. Since we were in asylum, we have been ordering our men in Palestine, Lebanon, and Jabal al-Druze not to interfere with what is going on with you [in Palestine]. In all this battle, we stand neutral and pray that God will guide everyone to replace haste and hostility with common sense and reason in the minds of your own men and the men of the other side, and that you find a good solution for both parties. These positions of ours will not change.’ Sultan al-Atrash added: ‘As for the second issue, if our brothers want to come here of their own free will and see this as a benefit to them, then we do not object. But I think there are many risks here, such as money, housing, acclimatization, etc. It is necessary to think about this and prepare plans so that our Muslim brothers do not see us as traitors.’ This topic took up most of the meeting, and it was clearly explained to Sultan that we do not agree that the Druze who move to Jabal al-Druze would suffer, God forbid, from a lack of job opportunities or a lack of housing. We want the interest of the three parties, the interest of the Druze in Palestine and the interest of Jabal al-Druze and its development, as well as our own interest. Sultan’s answer was for us to follow up with Yusuf Bey, and that he will accept everything he does. After eating lunch, as is customary we toured the village and then bade them farewell and invited them to visit us in Palestine, and we left the village. During lunch, his younger brother Ali Bey entered and welcomed us very warmly. As we were leaving the village, our friend, Yusuf Bey, told the Pasha that we would visit his cousin, Sayyah Bey al-Atrash, for a few hours because he would be a party to the implementation of this project, and he obtained his agreement to that. Not far from the village of al-Qurayyah, the village of Beka is

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located on the other side of the road. Our friend told us that during the revolt, Sayyah Bey was Sultan’s military commander and right-hand man, whom he consulted on every matter. Sayyah Bey is similar in age and appearance to Sultan, but has superior understanding in political and practical issues, while our friend Yusuf Bey is superior to both of them. But according to al-‘Aysami and Sayyah, they do not do anything without consulting Sultan and obtaining his approval. The conversation with Sayyah did not last long as time was short. Our friend briefly told him about the purpose of the visit and the visit with Sultan, and that this issue is now in the hands of both of them to bring about. We arrived in Damascus at sunset today, and we were supposed to meet with Sultan’s younger brother Zayd Bey, a member of the Syrian Parliament, but the meeting was postponed for unexpected reasons. In order to implement the plan, our friend was assigned to: a) prepare an accurate list of the ruined villages in Jabal al-Druze, giving their names, locations, their associated land holdings, details of ownership, etc.; b) prepare passports for him and Sayyah Bey so they could go to Palestine and lay the groundwork for this plan; and c) on our part, working to implement the plan and providing them with information, etc. On Friday, April 28, we left Damascus and after an hour’s break in Beirut we continued on our way to Haifa.

Notes 1 The Zionist Intelligence Service: The Beginnings of Espionage on Arabs 1 Avi Shlaim, The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine 1921–1951, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) and, for the same author, Collusion Across the Jordan: Kibg Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). See also Anis Sayigh, Al- hashemiyun walthawra al‘arabiya alkubra, (The Hashemites and the Great Arab Revolt), (Beirut: Dar al-Tali‘a, 1966). 2 Evyatar Friesel, Hamdiniyut hatsiyonit leahar hatsharat Balfour,[Zionist Policy after the Balfour Declaration 1917–1922](Tel Aviv: University of Tel Aviv, Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Me’uhad, 1977), pp. 35–8. (In Hebrew.) 3 Ibid. 4 Yaacov Shavit, ‘Yousef Davidsko: Papers from the Diary of a Spy, 1918,’ Katedra, no 36 (June 1985), p. 185. (In Hebrew.) 5 Yoav Gelber, Shorshei Ha-chavatzelet: ha-modi‘in ba-yishuv 1918–1947 [Growing a Fleur-de-Lis: The Intelligence Services of the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine, 1918–1947], vol 1 (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1992), pp. 14–15. (In Hebrew.) 6 Shavit, p. 183. 7 For more on the NILI network, see: Eliezer Livneh (ed) Nili:Toldotaha shel ta‘ zhah medinit, [NILI: The History of Political Daring](Tel Aviv: Shochen, 1961). (In Hebrew.) 8 For more on Hashomer, see: Yitzhak Ben-Zvi (ed.), Sefer Hashomer, [The Guardian Book] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1957). (In Hebrew.) 9 Shavit, p. 185. 10 Ibid. 11 Gelber, vol. 1, p. 25. 12 Reports on important Palestinian families are found in many files at the CZA, including Z4/3886, L4/752, and L4/769. 13 Gelber, vol. 1, pp. 15–17. 14 Ibid, p. 15; see: ‘Report on Disbursement for Intelligence’ attached to the letter of the Zionist Commission accountant to Weizmann, 16 February 1920, CZA, file Z4/16033. 15 Gelber, vol. 1, p. 14.

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16 Ibid. 17 Uri Milstein, Bedam va-aish Yehuda: tsmihatah shel ha’ otsmah ha-yisraelit mereshit hatsiyonut v’ad ahre melhemet yom kiporim [By Blood and Fire Judea: the Growing of the Israeli Power from the Beginning of Zionizm until Aftermath of Kipur War], 2nd edn. (Tel Aviv: Levin Epstein, 1974), p. 44. (In Hebrew.) 18 Neil Caplan, Futile Diplomacy: Early Arab-Zionist Negotiation Attempts, 1913–1931, vol. 1 (London: Routledge; New Jersey: Frank Cass, 1983), p. 63. 19 Gelber, vol. 1, p. 32. 20 ‘Letter from the Zionist Commission in Jerusalem to the Organization in London – Budget Request’, CZA, Z4/2800. 21 Hillel Cohen, Tsva Hatslalim: mashtafim falastinim beshirut hatsiyonut 1917–1948, [Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaborators in the Service of Zionism, 1917–1948] (Jerusalem: Ivrit, 2004), p. 21. (In Hebrew.) 22 Gelber, vol. 1, p. 34. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 On 3 April 1919, Weizmann told the Executive Committee of the World Zionist Organization that he had met with Faisal and that they would send a permanent representative to the Faisal government in Damascus; see ibid., pp. 279 and 296; and Muthakarat Rustum Haydar [Memoranda of Rustum Haydar] ed. Najdat Fathi Safwat (Beirut: Arab Encyclopedia House, 1988), p. 304. 29 Ibid., p. 294. 30 During his time in Damascus, Pelman wrote 15 detailed reports in French. These are in CZA files Z4/16078, Z4/2332, Z4/14427, L3/278, and L4/52. Nakdimon Rogel translated them into Hebrew and published them in Hatsiyonut, vol. 8, pp. 308–53. 31 Rogel, pp. 297–98. 32 Letter to Weizmann, 29 April 1920, CZA, file Z4/1336. 33 Kalmi’s letter to Weizmann, 6 June 1920, CZA, file S25/9970. 34 Concerning the financial difficulties facing the Zionist Commission in Jerusalem, see Eder’s letter to the Zionist Organization in London of 13 August 1920, CZA, file L3/289. 35 Gelber, vol. 1, p. 39. 36 On the activities and work of the Arab Secretariat see the reports of Chaim Kalvarisky, CZA, file S25/4380. 37 Gelber, vol. 1, p. 53. 38 On Frederick Kisch and his activities, see: FH Kisch, Palestine Diary (London: Gollancz, 1938), and see also Frederick Kisch, Yoman Erets- Yisraeli, [Erets- Yisraeli Memoire of Frederick Kisch] (Jerusalem: Ahiasaf, 1939). (In Hebrew.)

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39 For more on the life and activities of Kalvarisky see: Joseph Heller, Mebrit shalom leichud: Yehuda Magnes vehamavak lehakamat medinah du-leumit, [From Brit Shalom to Ichud: Yehuda Magnes and the Struggle to Establish a bi-National State], (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 2003), (In Hebrew.) 40 See: Report of Agronsky to Kisch on his Syrian trip, 6 January 1926, CZA, file S25/3847. 41 On the financial situation and the circumstances around Kalvarisky’s dismissal, see Report of Kisch to the Accountant of the Zionist Organization in London, 12 January 1928, CZA, file S25/3066. 42 Sabri Jiryis, Tarikh al-sahyuniyah:1862–1948 [The History of Zionism: 1862–1948], vol. 2 (Nicosia: Palestine Research Center, 1986), p. 201. 43 The Hebrew word yishuv means settlement and is used by extension for the society of Jewish colonial settlers in Palestine before the establishment of Israel in 1948. 44 Col FH Kisch, Letter to the Chairman of the Political Commission, XVIIth Zionist Congress, and the Chairman of the Political Commission Second Assembly of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. Accompanied by a Report on the work of the Joint Bureau for Arab Relations, 1931, p. 22. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid., p. 24. 47 Ibid. 48 Report on the activities of the Joint Bureau for 1930, CZA, file S25/3554. 49 Ibid. 50 CZA, file S25/4158. 51 Ibid; for more on David Tidhar’s activity in Egypt, see: David Tidhar, Besherut hamoledet: 1860–1912,[Serving the Homeland: 1912–1960], (Tel Aviv: Friends Publishers, 1960). (In Hebrew.) 52 Reports on eavesdropping on the Supreme Muslim Council, CZA, file S25/22329. 53 Elyakim Rubinstein, ‘Ha-tipul ba-sh’elah ha-‘aravit bi-shanot ha-‘esrim ve-hasheloshim: hebetim mosadiyim [Dealing with the Arab Question in the ‘20s and ‘30s: An Institutional View]’, Hatsiyonut 12 (1987). 54 Reuven Shiloah played a significant role in the foundation and consolidation of Israel’s intelligence services, heading Mossad immediately after the establishment of the State of Israel. For further information see Haggai Eshed, Mosad shel ish ehad: Re’uven Shiloah: avi ha-modi’in ha-Yisre’eli [Mossad of One Man: Reuven Shiloah the Father of the Israeli Intelligence] (Jerusalem: Edanin, 1988.) 55 Eliyahu Epstein (Elath) (1903–1990) was born in Russia and immigrated to Palestine in 1924. He studied in the Oriental Department at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and then at AUB. In 1934 he joined the Arab Section, and along with Sasson maintained contacts and relations with the Arab elites, especially in Syria and

176

56

57 58

59

Notes

Lebanon, throughout the 1930s. He was an important member of the transfer committees, serving as Secretary General of the first transfer committee. The JA appointed him as its representative to Washington for the period 1945–1948. He went on to serve as Israeli ambassador to the United States from 1949 to 1950, ambassador to the UK 1950–1959, and president of the Hebrew University (1962–1968). See Eliyahu Elath, Shivat Tsiyon ve- ‘Arav: Pirke ‘iyun ve-ma’ase [The Return to Zion and the Arabs: Reflections and Deeds] (Tel-Aviv: Dvir, 1974), p. 11. (In Hebrew.) ‘Abd al-Hafiz Muhareb, Haghanah, Itsil, Lihi: al-‘ilaqat bayn al-tanzimat al sahyawniyya al-musallaha, 1947–1948 [Haganah, Etzel, Lehi: Relations Between Armed Zionist Organizations, 1937–1948] (Beirut: Palestine Research Center, 1981), p. 40. (In Arabic.) Rubenstein. Eliyahu (Ilyas) Sasson (1902–1978) was born in Damascus and immigrated to Turkey in 1920 where he spent several years. He then moved to Palestine and joined the Arab Section (the intelligence service) of the JA’s political department in 1933, soon becoming its director. He was then appointed Director of the Middle East Department. He was an important member of the transfer committees set up by Shertok in 1937, 1942, and 1948, which drew up plans to transfer the Palestinian people from their homeland. Following the establishment of Israel, Sasson headed up the Middle East Department of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and participated in the Rhodes talks of 1949 to sign the armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt and Lebanon. He was a minister in successive Israeli governments throughout the 1960s. See: Eliyahu Sasson, Be-derekh el ha-shalom [On the Road to Peace] (Tel-Aviv: ‘Am ‘Oved, 1978), p. 48. (In Hebrew.) Gelber, p. 128.

2 Negotiations between the Jewish Agency and the National Bloc in Syria 1 CZA, file S25/22129, which includes the information gathered by the intelligence service of the JA Political Department on Syria’s elites. 2 For an internal report on the expenditure of the Arab Division on agents in Arab countries, see: ‘Payments to our men in neighboring countries’, CZA, April 1946, file S25/22298. Abboud was an ideal agent for the JA; by virtue of his journalistic work, he had a wide number of relationships with various Syrian elites, and was close to a large number of Syrian political leaders. This gave him a close-up view of the progress of the situation and the evolution of events in Syria, and on the confidential deliberations and decisions of Syrian political actors, about which he sent reports to the JA in timely fashion. Faithfully and with dedication, he carried out the many and different tasks that the JA assigned to him, including spying on the Syrian National

Notes

3

4

5

6

177

Bloc, the Syrian elites, and Palestinian revolutionaries in Syria. His espionage activities also extended to Lebanon and Iraq. At the beginning of his dealings with the JA, Abboud wrote his reports by hand, under his own letterhead using his own name, Abdullah Abboud, and the address, Damascus (Syria), PO Box 115, and he signed his reports with his signature. Aharon Cohen, his then handler in the Arab Division, wrote to him on 25 September 1935, sending clear instructions: ‘[. . .] We are interested in knowing what is going on and said behind the scenes’, and indicated that he should have comprehensive knowledge of and good relations with all political bodies and parties in order to inform the JA ‘of every tiny detail’. Abboud usually wrote two reports a week, more if necessary. From his early reports, it is clear that he was motivated by money, as in his letters to the JA he insisted on being paid during his trial period and per piece. The Arab Division at that time assigned him more tasks and sent him a small amount of money in payment for his reports, while at the same time assiduously maintaining relations with him, such as sending greetings on holidays like Eid al-Adha. After working for a few months, he began receiving a monthly salary of £5. In 1946, his monthly salary was £17, plus expenses. David (Dawoud) Lawziyyah (1902–1961) was born in Damascus to a pro-Zionist Jewish family, and was recruited by the Arab Division of the JA’s political department in the mid-1930s. He wrote most of his reports to the JA in Hebrew, and a large portion of them under his own letterhead with his full name and postal address in Damascus. See, for example, CZA, S25/22835 and S25/22229. Lawziyyah immigrated from Syria to Palestine in 1943, where he continued his intelligence work, especially in smuggling Jewish immigrants from Syria and Lebanon to Palestine. After 1948, he was active in organizing clandestine Jewish immigration from the Maghreb to Israel. David Pinto was born in Damascus and had a wide circle of contacts there as a medical doctor. In the 1930s, he headed the Committee of the Damascus Jewish Community, and the Arab Division recruited him in the mid-1930s. Most of his reports were in Arabic, usually under his letterhead, and with his signature. See, for example, CZA, S25/22210 and S25/22229. Yusuf Linyadu was born in Damascus, and in the 1930s was elected as a member of the Syrian Parliament. The Arab Division arranged for him to work with them in the mid-1930s. In his public statements to Arab media at that period, Linyadu expressed his opposition to the Zionist project in Palestine, and his support for the Syrian national movement and Arab rights, in harmony with the general nationalist atmosphere in Syria. At the same time, however, he was working actively and faithfully for the JA and the Arab Division, its intelligence service. See, for example, CZA, file S25/4550. Letter of Moshe Shertok to the Zionist Organization, 7 May 1936, in: Moshe Shertok, Yoman Medini [Political Diary], vol. 1 (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968), p. 103. (In Hebrew.)

178

Notes

7 For more on the Shahbandari opposition, see: Philip Khoury, Suriya wal-intidab al-farinsi: siyasat al-qawmiya al-‘arabiya 1920–1945 [Syria and the French Mandate: the policy of Arab nationalism 1920–1945] (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Abhath al‘Arabiya, 1997), pp. 629–35, (In Arabic). And for more on the conflict between the Shahbandari opposition and the National Bloc in the aftermath of Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar’s return to Syria, see: Nasuh Babil, Sahafah wa-siyasah: suriya fi al-qarn al-‘ashsrin [Press and Politics: Syria in the Twentieth Century], 2nd edn. (Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 2001), pp. 114–22. (In Arabic.) 8 See: Khoury, pp. 293–370. 9 Text of the Basic Law of the Syrian National Bloc, in: Walid Muallem, Suriya 1918–1958: al-tahaddi wal-muwajahah [Syria 1918–1958: Challenge and Confrontation] (Nicosia, Babel Press, 1985), pp. 263–68; and Babil, pp. 90–4. (In Arabic.) 10 For more on the honourable cooperation policy adopted by the National Bloc, see: Khoury, pp. 371–443. 11 Dhawqan Qarqout, Tatawwur al-harakah al-wataniyah fi suriya 1920–1939 [The development of the national movement in Syria 1920–1939] (Beirut: Dar al-Tali‘ah), p. 152. (In Arabic.) 12 Nizar Kiyali, Dirasah fi tarikh suriya al-siyasiyah al-mu‘asir 1920–1950 [A study of Syria’s modern political history 1920–1950] (Damascus: Dar Talas, 1997) pp. 89–90, (In Arabic.) 13 Shams al-Din al-Kilani, Tahawwulat fi mawaqif al-nukhub al-suriyah fi lubnan 1920–2011 [Transformations in the positions of the Syrian elites on Lebanon 1920–2011] (Doha; Beirut: ACRPS, 2012), p. 93. (In Arabic.) 14 See: Khoury, pp. 602–4. 15 Epstein, pp. 286–7. 16 Ibid. 17 Fakhri al-Baroudi’s letter to Eliyahu Epstein, CZA, 22 September 1935, file S25/10121. 18 Epstein, p. 88. 19 For more on the Zionist consensus calling for the transfer of the Palestinian Arabs, see: Mahmoud Muhareb, ‘Al-sahyuniyah wal-hajis al-dimughurafi’ [Zionism and the demographic obsession], Shu’un Filistiniyah, no. 194 (May 1989); and Nur al-Din Musalha, Tard al-filistiniyin: fi mafhum al-transfir fi al-fikr wal-takhtit alsahyuniyayn 1948–1982 [Expulsion of the Palestinians: on the idea of transfer in Zionist thought and planning 1948–1982] (Beirut: Palestine Studies Institute, 1992). 20 Ibid, for more details on the establishment of the transfer committee in 1948 and its members and activities see: Yousef Weitz, Yomani ve-igrotai lebanim, [My Diary and Letters to the Children] (Ramat Gan:Massada,1965, Vol 3, pp. 293–347, (In Hebrew). 21 Eliyahu Epstein published this report under the title ‘Al-Jazeera’, Elath, pp. 160–70.

Notes

179

22 Ibid., p. 160. 23 Amos Lundmann (1904–1987) was born in Beirut and graduated from the American University. From the mid-1930s he was a spy for the Arab Division in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. He helped smuggle Jewish immigrants into Palestine via Beirut. He immigrated to Palestine at the end of the 1930s. 24 Minutes of the meeting between Eliyahu Epstein and Fakhri Baroudi, CZA, 17 July 1936, file S25/9783. See the same minutes in Elath, pp. 417–21. 25 Ibid. 26 Constantin Zureiq, Al-a‘mal al-fikriyah al-‘amah lil-duktur qustantin zurayq [General Intellectual Works of Dr. Constantin Zureiq], vol. 1 (Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1994), p. 202. Zureiq also states on the same page: ‘Dispersion and homelessness shifted from the Jews to the Arabs’, as if Judaism was not the spread of a religion but the dispersion of a race. On the global political, financial, and cultural power of the Jews, see, ibid., p. 253. 27 Minutes of the meeting between Eliyahu Epstein and Fakhri al-Baroudi. 28 Letter of Eliyahu Epstein to David Lawziyyah, 26 July 1936, CZA, file S5/10121. 29 Minutes of the meeting between the Jewish Agency and the National Bloc at Bloudan, 1 August 1936, CZA, file S25/10093; see the same minutes also in Elath, pp. 422–28. 30 Ibid. 31 Minutes of the meeting between JA representatives and the National Bloc, Haganah Archive, file Nahmani 2. 32 Dov Hoz (1894–1940) was born in Belorussia and immigrated to Palestine with his family in 1906. He served in the Ottoman military and was a founder (in 1920) and early commander of the Zionist military organization, the Haganah, and a promising leader of Mapai. He represented the Histadrut and Mapai in London and played a major part in developing relations between the JA and the British Labour Party. He was an important member of the first transfer committee, which was set up by Head of the JA’s political department, Moshe Shertok, in 1937 to lay the plans for the transfer of the Palestinians. He died with his wife – Shertok’s sister – and other members of his family in a road accident in Palestine at the end of 1940. 33 David Hacohen (1897–1984) was born in Russia and immigrated to Palestine in 1907. He served in the Ottoman army in the First World War and was a leader in Mapai and the Haganah. He was a member of the three transfer committees set up by Moshe Shertok in 1937, 1942, and 1948. He was an MK for Mapai, then the Labour Party, for many years, and was head of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. 34 Joseph Nahmani (1891–1965) was born in Russia and immigrated to Palestine in 1907. He joined Hashomer (founded 1909). In 1922 he was appointed to the Land Department of the JNF (Keren Kayemet) and became one of its senior officials in the

180

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Galilee, specializing in the purchase of Arab land. He was an important member of the three transfer committees. 35 Minutes of the meeting between JA representatives and the National Bloc, Haganah Archive, file Nahmani 2; see the same minutes in Elath, pp. 228–34.

3 The Zionist Disinformation Campaign in Syria and Lebanon during the Arab Revolt 1 Colonel F.H. Kisch, letter to the chairman, Political Commission, XVIIth Zionist Congress, Political Commission, 2nd Assembly of the Council of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, accompanied by a report on the work of the Joint Bureau for Arab relations, 1931, p. 28. 2 Report by Chaim Kalvarisky, 12 January 1930, CZA, S25/3562. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Kisch. 6 Elyakim Rubinstein, ‘Ha-tipul ba-sh’elah ha-‘aravit bi-shanot ha-‘esrim ve-hasheloshim: hebetim mosadiyim’ [Dealing with the Arab Question in the ‘20s and ‘30s: An Institutional View], Hatsiyonut 12 (1987). 7 Ibid. 8 Letter from Vilensky to Epstein, 15 December 1934, CZA, S25/3135. 9 Letter from Vilensky to Moshe Shertok, 9 December 1934, CZA, S25/3135. 10 Rubinstein. 11 For a detailed discussion of Syrian reactions to the Arab Revolt, see Philip S Khoury, Suriya wal-intidab al-farinsi: siyasat al-qawmiya al-‘arabiya 1920–1945 [Syria and the French Mandate: the politics of Arab nationalism 1920–1945] (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Abhath al-‘Arabiya, chapter 21. (In Arabic.) 12 Eliyahu Sasson, Be-derekh el ha-shalom [On the Road to Peace] (Tel-Aviv: ‘Am ‘Oved, 1978), p. 48. This book leaves out many of Sasson’s reports and letters, and references to Sasson’s communications and relations with his intelligence ‘clients’ have been excised from reports that are published in the book. 13 Letter from Eliyahu Epstein to Wadi‘ Talhuq, 24 January 1937, CZA, S25/22229. 14 Sasson, p. 78. 15 Ibid., p. 80. 16 Ibid., pp. 80–1. 17 Ibid., p. 82. 18 A copy of the issue of al-Dustur containing this surreptitiously placed article, CZA, S/25/22229.

Notes

181

19 Sasson, p. 85. 20 Ibid. 21 Report by Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, from Beirut, 14 December 1937, CZA, S25/22179. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Report by Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, from Beirut, 15 December 1937, CZA, S25/22179. 25 Report by Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, from Beirut, 16 December 1937, CZA, S25/22179. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Letter from Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, from Jerusalem, 22 December 1937, CZA, S25/22179 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Letter from Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, from Jerusalem, 29 December 1937, CZA, S25/22179. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Report of Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, from Jerusalem, 19 July 1938, CZA, S25/22210. For more, see the complete text of this report in the Appendix, Document 28. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Report of Eliyahu Sasson, 21 July 1938, CZA, file S25/4550. 38 Ibid. 39 Report of Eliyahu Sasson from Beirut to Moshe Shertok, 30 August 1938, CZA, file S25/4550. 40 Report of Eliyahu Sasson from Jerusalem to Moshe Shertok, 7 September 1938, CZA, file S25/5568. 41 Sasson to Shertok, from Beirut, 2 October 1938, CZA, S25/22211. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Sasson to Shertok, from Jerusalem 13 May 1938, CZA, S25/5568. 46 Ibid. 47 Letter from David Lawziyyah (a leader of the Jewish community in Damascus and an agent of the intelligence in the JA Political Department) to Elias Sasson, from Damascus, 6 December 1938, CZA, S25/22835.

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48 Report from Sasson to Shertok, from Jerusalem, on the activities of the JA Political Department, 19 July 1938, CZA, S25/22210. For more, see the full text of this report in the Appendix, Document 1. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid.

4 From Negotiation to Penetration Relations between the Jewish Agency, the National Bloc, and the Shahbandari Opposition 1 Report of Eliyahu Epstein and Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, entitled ‘Syria Visit’, 7 January 1937, CZA, file S25/5570. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Muhammad ‘Izzat Darwaza, Al-qadiya al-filistiniya fi mukhtalif marahiliha [The Palestinian Issue at All its Stages], vol. 1. 2nd edn. (Tyre/Beirut: Modern Library Press, 1959), pp. 158–59. 5 Mahmoud Muhareb, ‘Al-sahyuniyah wal-hajis al-dimughurafi’ [Zionism and the demographic obsession], Shu’un Filistiniyah, no. 194 (May 1989); and David Ben-Gurion, Zichronot [Memoires], vol. 4 (Tel Aviv: ‘Am ‘Oved, 1974), pp. 298–99. (In Hebrew). 6 Report of Eliyahu Epstein to Moshe Shertok on Dov Hoz and Epstein’s meeting with Syrian prime minister Jamil Mardam in Damascus, 26 February 1937, Haganah Archive, Ben Zvi file 4. 7 Ibid. 8 Report of Eliyahu Epstein to Moshe Shertok from Paris, 10 June 1937, CZA, file S25/22179. 9 Ibid. 10 Letter of David Pinto to Eliyahu Sasson, 4 November 1937, CZA, file S25/22229. 11 Letter of Syrian Prime Minister Jamil Mardam to Moshe Shertok, Head of the JA’s political department, 14 November 1937, CZA, file S25/22179. 12 Report of Eliyahu Sasson and Reuven Zaslansky to Moshe Shertok, 2 February 1938, CZA, file S25/22211. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Moshe Shertok, Yoman Medini [Political Diary], vol. 3 (Tel Aviv: ‘Am ‘Oved, 1972), pp. 26–34. (In Hebrew.)

Notes

183

17 Ibid. 18 Philip Khoury, Suriya wal-intidab al-farinsi: siyasat al-qawmiya al-‘arabiya 1920– 1945 [Syria and the French Mandate: The policy of Arab nationalism 1920–1945] (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Abhath al-‘Arabiya, 1997), pp. 198–99. 19 Ibid., p. 634. 20 Ibid., p. 360. 21 There are many reports on Nasib al-Bakri’s dealings with the JA over coming years. See for example: Report of Eliyahu Sasson to Y. Joseph, 23 January 1940, CZA, file S25/6568. 22 Report of Eliyahu Sasson from Damascus to Moshe Shertok, 6 February 1938, CZA, file S25/22211. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Report of Eliyahu Sasson and Reuven Zaslansky to Moshe Shertok from Jerusalem, 4 March 1938, CZA, file S25/22211. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Report of Eliyahu Sasson from Damascus to Moshe Shertok, 10 March 1938, CZA, file S25/22211. 32 Ibid. 33 Report of Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, 18 March 1938, CZA, file S25/4550. 34 Ibid. 35 Report of Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok from Damascus, 29 March 1938, CZA, file S25/10103. 36 Ibid. 37 Report of Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok from Damascus on his meeting with Nasib al-Bakri. 38 Ibid. 39 Letter of Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok,16 November 1937, CZA, S25/5569. 40 Report of Eliyahu Sasson sent to Moshe Shertok from Damascus. 41 Ibid. 42 Khoury, p. 152. 43 Ibid., p. 269. 44 Nasuh Babil, Sahafah wa-siyasah: suriya fi al-qarn al-‘ashsrin [Press and politics: Syria in the twentieth century], 2nd edn. (Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 2001), pp. 114–15. 45 In his fight against the National Bloc, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar said that he was from the national bloc, but not the National Bloc Party. He explained this by

184

46 47 48 49 50 51 52

53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

Notes

saying, ‘I am from the national bloc that is ready to extend a hand to every useful man in the country and attract him to the workplace, and which does not keep a good man outside the national fold, and I am the enemy of the National Bloc Party, a severe enemy, and you will know my severity if the partisanship of the Bloc prevents the nation from speaking with one voice.’ For more, see: ibid., pp. 117–18. Sharett, vol. 3, p. 10. Ibid. Ibid., p. 11. Ibid., pp. 36–7. Report of Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, 12 March 1938, CZA, file S25/22211. Ibid. Report of Abba Hushi to the JA on his meeting with Muhammad al-Ashmar, 25 March 1938, Haganah Archive, Abba Hushi file 8/Hushi/5. In his report, Abba Hushi stated that when he arrived at the specified location in the al-Midan neighbourhood in Damascus, he found a person waiting who invited him to accompany him in a taxi to the town of Harasta, near Damascus. Upon arriving at a spacious house in Harasta, he found Muhammad al-Ashmar busy cauterizing the sole of his foot. Al-Ashmar immediately got up and welcomed Abba Hushi and apologized to him for changing the place of the meeting that was supposed to take place in his home in the al-Midan neighbourhood of Damascus. Ibid. Report of Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, ‘Meeting with the Owner of al-Ayyam’, 7 September 1938, CZA, file S25/5568. Ibid. Report of Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, 10 April 1938, CZA, file S25/10103. Ibid. Report of Sasson to Shertok, 11 April 1938, CZA, file S25/10103. Ibid. Report of Sasson to Shertok, 23 April 1938, CZA, file S25/5568. Ibid. Report of Reuven Zaslansky to Moshe Shertok, 27 April 1938, CZA, file S25/22211. Report of Reuven Zaslansky to Moshe Shertok, 9 May 1938, CZA, file S25/22211. Report of Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, 25 July 1938, CZA, file S25/22211. It seems that Jamil Mardam really rejected the holding of a parliamentary conference in Bludan. In his memoirs, Akram Zu‘aytar stated that Muhammad ‘Ali ‘Alouba Pasha, the head of the Egyptian Parliamentary Committee for the Defence of Palestine, proposed in June 1938 that a general Arab parliamentary conference be held in Bludan, Syria, and that ‘Alouba Pasha had contacted Faris al-Khoury, head of the Syrian Parliament about holding this conference there. The contacts between them resulted in the conference being held in Egypt, and ‘Alouba Pasha accepted the

Notes

66 67

68 69 70 71 72 73

74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

89 90 91 92

185

invitation to hold it in Cairo. See: Akram Zu‘aytar, Al-harakah al-wataniyah al-filistiniyah 1935–1939: yawmiyat Akram Zu‘aytar [The Palestinian National Movement 1935–1939: Akram Zu‘aytar’s Diaries], 2nd edn. (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), p. 461. Ibid. Report of Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, 14 June 1938, CZA, file S25/22211. In this report, Sasson states that included among the 70 notables who participated at this meeting were Muhammad al-Ashmar, Jamal al-‘Abid, Zaki al-Daroubi, Bakri al-Hayek, Muslim Kaddour, Fawzi al-Bakri, Hamdi al-Zaybak, Abdelaziz Karayim, Bashir al-Bakri, and ‘Ali al-Dhahabi. Ibid. Ibid. Report of Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, 2 October 1938, CZA, file S25/22211. Ibid. Ibid. Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hout, Al-qiyadat wal-mu’asassat al-siyasiyah fi filistin 1917–1948 [Political Leaderships and Institutions in Palestine 1917–1948], 3rd edn. (Beirut: Palestine Studies Institute, 1986), pp. 366–67. Darwaza, vol. 3, p. 231. Letter of Eliyahu Sasson to Nasib al-Bakri, 26 November 1938, CZA, file S25/22275. Ibid. Letter of David Lawziyyah to Eliyahu Sasson, 6 December 1938, CZA, file S25/22835. Letter of Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, 1 January 1939, CZA, file S25/3139. Ibid. Khoury, p. 634. Letter of David Lawziyyah to Eliyahu Sasson, 16 January 1939, CZA, file S25/22835. Letter of Eliyahu Sasson to David Lawziyyah, 10 February 1939, CZA, file S25/22835. Khoury, p. 637. Eliyahu Sasson, Be-derekh el ha-shalom [On the Road to Peace] (Tel-Aviv: ‘Am ‘Oved, 1978), pp. 151–52. (In Hebrew.) Letter of Eliyahu Sasson to Bernard Joseph, 7 March 1939, CZA, file S25/3139. Report of Eliyahu Sasson, 2 March 1939, CZA, S25/22210. Letter of Eliyahu Sasson to David Lawziyyah, 10 March 1939, CZA, file S25/22835. Salma al-Haffar al-Kuzbari, Lutfi al-Haffar 1885–1968: mudhakkarat hayatihi wa-‘asrihi [Lutfi al-Haffar 1885–1968: Memoire of his Life and Times] (London/ Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 1997), pp. 281–82. Letter of David Lawziyyah to Eliyahu Sasson, 14 March 1939, CZA, file S25/22835. Letter of David Lawziyyah to Eliyahu Sasson, 26 March 1939, CZA, file S25/22835. Letter of Eliyahu Sasson to David Lawziyyah, 28 March 1939, CZA, file S25/22835. Letter of David Lawziyyah to Eliyahu Sasson, 6 May 1939, CZA, file S25/22835.

186 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110

111 112

113 114 115

Notes Letter of Eliyahu Sasson to David Lawziyyah, 10 May 1939, CZA, file S25/22835. Letter of David Lawziyyah to Eliyahu Sasson, 6 June 1939, CZA, file S25/22835. Letter of Eliyahu Sasson to David Lawziyyah, 26 June 1939, CZA, file S25/22835. Ibid. Ibid. Report of Eliyahu Sasson to Dr Bernard Joseph, entitled ‘Conversation with Nasib al-Bakri’, 2 April 1939, CZA, file S25/5568. Report of Eliyahu Sasson on his meeting with Jamil Mardam: Sasson, pp. 154–57. Ibid. Memorandum of Eliyahu Sasson to Ben-Gurion, 21 April 1939, CZA, file S25/22834. Ibid. Letter of Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, 30 June 1939, CZA, file S25/5568. Ibid. Letter of Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, 30 June 1939, CZA, file S25/5568. Ibid. Report of Eliyahu Sasson to B. Joseph, 23 January 1940, CZA, file S25/5568. Ibid. Ibid. Yoav Gelber, Shorshei ha-hevatzelet: ha-modi‘in ba-yishuv 1918–1947 [Growing a Fleur-de-Lis: The Intelligence Services of the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine, 1918– 1947], vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1992), p. 469. (In Hebrew.) Letter of Sasson to Arazi, 1 November 1940, CZA, S25/8913. Testimony of Tuvia Arazi, in: Zrubavel Gilad and Galia Yardeni (eds), Magen be-seter: mi-peʻulot ha-mah.teret ha-Eretz-Yiśreʼelit be-Milh.emet-ha-ʻolam hasheniyah : ʻeduyot, teʻudot v.a-ʻalilot [Defense in Secret: Operation of the Secret Organization in the Land of Israel during World War II: Testimonies, documents, and stories] (Jerusalem: Jewish Agency Press, 1949), pp. 74–88. (In Hebrew.) Reports from Yousef Fine, early April 1941, CZA, file S25/22352. For more see: Appendix, Document 2. Ibid. Report of Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, entitled ‘Activities of the JA Political Department in Syria and Lebanon’, 19 July 1939. To read the full document, see: Appendix, Document 1.

5 Relations between the JA and Druze Leaders in Syria 1 Nizar al-Kiyali, Dirasah fi tarikh suriya al-siyasiyah al-mu‘asir 1920–1950 [A study of Syria’s modern political history 1920–1950] (Damascus: Dar Talas, 1997) pp. 47–8

Notes

2

3 4

5 6 7 8

9 10

11

12

187

(In Arabic); See: Walid Muallem, Suriya 1918–1958: al-tahaddi wal-muwajahah [Syria 1918–1958: Challenge and Confrontation] (Nicosia, Babel Press, 1985), p. 11, (In Arabic.); Wajih Kawtharani, Bilad al-sham fi matla‘ al-qarn al-‘ashrin: al-sukan wal-iqtisad wa-fililistin wal-mashru‘ al-sahyuni qira’atun fi watha’iq al-diblumasiyyah al-firinisyyah [The Levant at the beginning of the twentieth century: people, economy, Palestine, and the Zionist project, a reading of French diplomatic papers], 3rd edn. (Doha/Beirut: ACRPS, 2013), pp. 270–1. (In Arabic.). Hasan Amin al-Bu‘ayni, Jabal al-‘arab: safahat fi tarikh al-muwahhidin al-druz 1685–1927 [Jabal al-Druze: pages from the history of the Druze 1685–1927] (Beirut: ‘Uwaydat Press, 1985), p. 289 (In Arabic.) Text of ‘Franco-Druze Agreement or the Basic Law for the Independence of Jabal al-Druze 1921’ in: ibid., pp. 418–20. At the beginning of the French Mandate, the population of the State of Jabal al-Druze was 51,328, including 43,686 Druze and around 7,000 Christians, and its area was around 10,000 km2. Most of the territory was mountains, with little fertile agricultural land. See: Kawtharani, p. 52. Al-Bu‘ayni, p. 183. Ibid., p. 172. Ibid., pp. 285–86. These values included pride in courage, conquest, generosity, taking revenge, prohibiting revenge after reconciliation, blood-money, mediation between clans and families to resolve disputes between them, intervention of a notable in a dispute in order to prevent further acts of violence until it could be resolved (ramy al-wajh), and the obligation to protect a guest or a person seeking protection even before arriving at the home of the host or protector. For more on the feudal-clan structure prevalent in Jabal al-Druze, see: Kawtharani, pp. 93–113. Munir al-Rayyes, Al-Kitab al-dhahabi lil-thawrat al-wataniyyah fil-mashriq al-‘arabi: al-thawra al-suriya al-kubra [The golden book of Arab nationalist revolutions in the Arab East: the Greater Syrian Revolt] (Beirut: Dar al-Tali‘a, 1969), pp. 142–45,(in Arabic); Ihsan al-Hindi, Kifah al-sha’b al-suri [The struggle of the Syrian people] (Damascus: Department of Public Affairs and Moral Guidance, 1962), pp. 112–13, (in Arabic). On the background and course of the revolt and Sultan al-Atrash’s role, see: Mustafa Talas: Ahdath al-thawra al-suriyyah kama saradaha qa’iduha al-‘amm sultan basha al-atrash 1925–1927 [The events of the Syrian Revolt as told by its commander-inchief Sultan Pasha al-Atrash 1927–1927] (Damascus: Dar Talas, 2007). (In Arabic.) For information on the situation of the Druze in Palestine, see: Raja Sa‘id Faraj, Druz Filastin fi fatrat al-intidab al-baritani 1918–1948 [The Druze of Palestine during the British Mandate 1918–1948] (Daliat al-Karmel: Kalimah Press, 1991) (In Arabic.)

188

Notes

13 Report of Yitzhak Ben-Zvi to Kisch, entitled ‘To Form Good Relations with the Druze in Palestine’, early August 1930, CZA, file S25/3567. 14 Eliyahu Epstein spent two months in Transjordan as a guest of Sheikh Bani Sakhr Mithqal al-Fayez, who hosted him without knowing that he was working for the intelligence services of the JA’s political department. For details of his stay, see: Eliyahu Elath, Shivat Tsiyon [The Return to Zion] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1974), pp. 125–37. (In Hebrew.) 15 Report of Eliyahu Epstein on his trip to Jordan, February 1931, Haganah Archive, Golomb 6. 16 In the years 1929–1931 Ben-Zvi was the Deputy Director of the Intelligence Service (Joint Bureau) of the two major institutions of the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine, the Jewish Agency and the National Committee. 17 Report of Yitzhak Ben-Zvi entitled ‘Report on Visits to the Druze in the North of the Country, 30 September–6 October 1932’, 20 October 1932, CZA, file S25/6638. In this eight-page report, which Ben-Zvi sent to Head of the JA’s political department Chaim Arlosoroff, he states that his week-long visit to the Druze villages was undertaken with the approval of the JA’s political department. The report summarizes the beginning of contacts between the Zionist movement and the Druze in Palestine, as well as providing a comprehensive report on the many meetings he held with many sheikhs and influential people in the villages he visited. 18 In his report, Ben-Zvi states that the Khayr family, which had extensive land holdings and great political influence among the Druze in Palestine, had been organizing fundraising from the Druze of Palestine for Sultan al-Atrash and the other exiles with him, and that Sheikh Wahsh son of Sheikh Muhammad al-Husayn was delivering it to Sultan al-Atrash in Transjordan. 19 Ibid., p. 3. 20 Ibid., p. 5. 21 Report of A.H. Cohen to Shertok, 13 September 1934, CZA, file S25/3542. See also: Raja Sa‘id Faraj, Relations Between the Druze and the Jews Till the Establishment of the State of Israel (1948) (Tarshiha: Makhul Press, 2002), p. 54 (In Hebrew.) Yehoshua Porat, From Disturbances to Revolt (Tel Aviv, Am Oved, 1978), p. 322. (In Hebrew.) 22 Shibli al-‘Aysami served as Assistant Secretary-General of the Arab Socialist Baath Party before the coup of 23 February 1966 in Syria. After his brief detention, he fled to Lebanon, and then went to Iraq after the Baath Party came to power there in 1968. That same year he was elected to the post of Assistant Secretary-General of the Baath Party in Iraq and remained in post until 1992. 23 Kais M Firro, The Druzes in the Jewish State (Leiden; Boston; Cologne: E.J. Brill, 1999), p. 26. 24 Abba Hushi (1898–1969) was born in Galicia (in Ukraine today). He immigrated and settled in Palestine in 1920, and in 1932 he was elected secretary of the

Notes

25 26 27

28

29

30 31 32 33 34

35 36

189

Histadrut in Haifa. He led the Histadrut in Haifa and established strong relations with some Druze, especially in the villages of Isfiya and Daliyat al-Karmel who used to call him ‘the President’. During the Arab Revolt (1936–1939), Hushi consolidated the JA’s relations with the Druze in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. He was active in the Haganah and, in 1949, he was elected a member of the first Knesset. He was elected mayor of Haifa in 1951, an office he held until his death in 1969. Report of Abba Hushi and Shlomo Alfiah to Moshe Shertok, 3 July 1936, CZA, file S25/9165. Ibid. Report of Abba Hushi and Shlomo Alfiah to Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, entitled ‘Report from Sheikh Zayed Abu Rukn from Isfiya, who was sent to the Druze villages in Lebanon,’ 4 October 1936, CZA, file S25/9165. Tzadok Eshel, Abba Hushi: Man of Haifa (Tel Aviv, Ministry of Security, 2002), p. 83. (In Hebrew.) Faraj, Relations between the Druze and the Jews, p. 74 (In Hebrew.) David Cohen, Faithful Relations: the Druze and the Haganah (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Security, 1991), p. 30 (In Hebrew.) Sa‘id al-‘As was not a Druze, but Yitzhak Ben-Zvi’s interest in the question of whether or not he was indicates the importance he attached to reaching an understanding with Sultan al-Atrash that the Druze would not participate in the revolt in Palestine. Sa‘id al-‘As was born in Hama in 1889; he was a fighter with extensive experience in revolutions in defence of Arab rights. He participated in the revolution of Sheikh Salih al-Ali, the Ibrahim Hananu revolt and the Great Syrian Revolt. He joined the revolution in Palestine in 1936 and was killed in the Battle of Khader to the south of Jerusalem on 6 October 1936. Letter from Yitzhak Ben-Zvi to Abba Hushi, 16 October 1936, CZA, file S25/9165. Letter from Shlomo Alfiah to Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 5 February 1937, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/5a. Ibid. Report of Moshe Nahmani on his visit to Damascus, 24 August 1937, CZA, file S25/5570. ‘Aqla al-Qatami (1889–1953) was born in Jabal al-Druze to a well-to-do Syrian Christian family. He was among 15 mountain notables who signed the agreement to establish the ‘State of Jabal al-Druze’ in 1921. He participated in the revolution of 1925 from the beginning, and was close to Sultan al-Atrash. He took refuge with the leaders of the revolution in Transjordan and returned to Syria in 1937 after the amnesty. Report of Moshe Nahmani on his visit to Damascus, 24 August 1937. Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hout, Al-qiyadat wal-mu’asassat al-siyasiyah fi filistin 1917–1948 [Political Leaderships and Institutions in Palestine 1917–1948], 3rd edn. (Beirut: Palestine Studies Institute, 1986), pp. 366–37. (In Arabic.)

190

Notes

37 Letter from Hasan Abu Rukn to Abba Hushi, 5 October 1937, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/5a. 38 Letter from Yusuf al-‘Aysami to Abba Hushi, 24 September 1937, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/5a. 39 Report of Eliyahu Sasson to Dr B Joseph, 14 October 1937, CZA, file S25/5569. 40 Ibid. See also: Eliyahu Sasson, Be-derekh el ha-shalom [On the Road to Peace] (Tel-Aviv: ‘Am ‘Oved, 1978), pp. 86–7. (In Hebrew.) 41 Ibid. 42 Letter from David Lawziyyah to the Jewish Agency, 16 October 1937, CZA, file S25/22229. 43 Sasson, p. 97. 44 Ibid., p. 98. 45 Report of Abba Hushi to Zaslansky on his visit to Jabal al-Druze, 1 November 1937, CZA, file S25/5570. 46 Report of Eliyahu Sasson from Damascus to Moshe Shertok, 26 October 1937, CZA, file S25/5569. 47 Report of Abba Hushi to Zaslansky on his visit to Jabal al-Druze, 1 November 1937. Hushi’s visit to Yusuf al-‘Aysami raised the suspicions of government officials in Jabal al-Druze. After the visit, al-‘Aysami wrote to Hushi that the gendarmerie commander in As-Suwayda had come to his home and asked him about his guests. Al-‘Aysami had replies that they were his friends from Haifa, and that no one was more vigilant than him about the safety of the country. See: Letter of Yusuf al-‘Aysami to Abba Hushi, 6 November 1937, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/5a. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Letter from Eliyahu Epstein to Moshe Shertok, 2 November 1937, CZA, file S25/5570. 51 Three-page memorandum of Aharon Haim Cohen entitled, ‘On Future Relations with the Druze People: Comment on Abba Hushi’s Report’, 2 November 1937, CZA, S25/3539. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Memorandum of Eliyahu Sasson entitled, ‘Concerning Future Relations with the Druze People’, 5 November 1937, CZA, file S25/6638. 55 Ibid. 56 Yoav Gelber, ‘Beginning of the Jewish-Druze Alliance 1930–1948,’ Qatedra (June 1991), p. 151. (In Hebrew.) 57 Abba Hushi’s letter to the JA’s directorate for the attention of Dr Joseph Bernard entitled, ‘Relations with As-Suwayda’, 29 November 1937, CZA, file S25/3600. 58 Report of Abba Hushi on his visit to Damascus and his meetings with Yusuf al-‘Aysami, 17 December 1937, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/5a.

Notes 59 60 61 62 63

64

65 66 67 68 69 70 71

72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81

191

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Al-‘Aysami wrote hundreds of secret reports in his own hand in Arabic, which he sent to Abba Hushi and Shlomo Alfiah. He signed them in his own name, Yusuf al-‘Aysami, or Abu Shibli. They were preserved in the Haganah Archive and the CZA; after several decades they became available to researchers. Letter of Yusuf al-‘Aysami to Shlomo Alfiah, 5 May 1938, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/5a, and see Letter of Yusuf al-‘Aysami to Shlomo Alfiah, 10 May 1938, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/5a. Letter of Yusuf al-‘Aysami to Abba Hushi, 22 November 1937, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/5a. Letter of Hasan Abu Rukn to Abba Hushi, 31 December 1937, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/5a. Shakib Salih, History of the Druze (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Security and Bar Ilan University, 1989), p. 203. (In Hebrew.) Letter from Hasbaya, 3 February 1938, CZA, file S25/6638. Letter signed ‘Z. K. your brothers the Druze of the Carmel’, 2 April 1938, CZA, file S25/6638. Ibid. Letter of Abbas Qays to Labib Abu Rukn, 26 April 1938, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/5a. Abbas Qays sent this letter to Labib Abu Rukn because the latter had sent him a letter requesting him to ask the sheikhs of al-Bayada to hurry up in their response to the letter sent to them by his brother, Sheikh Zayed Abu Rukn, and signed in the name of the ‘Druze of the Carmel’. Ibid. Report of Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, 12 June 1938, CZA, S25/5568. Ibid. Ibid. Letter of Yusuf al-‘Aysami to Shlomo Alfiah, 24 April 1938, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/5a. Ibid. Letter of Shlomo Alfiah to Yusuf al-‘Aysami, 21 July 1938, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/5a. Letter of Yusuf al-‘Aysami to Shlomo Alfiah, 24 July 1938, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/5a. Report of Abba Hushi to the Jewish Agency on his visit to Jabal al-Druze with Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, 4 August 1938, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/5a. Ibid.

192

Notes

82 Ibid. 83 Namely, Sheikh Wahsh Muhammad al-Husayn from the village of al-Maghar, to whom we referred earlier. He was collaborating with the Zionist movement, and distributed the publication written by Yusuf Nahmani that called on the Druze not to support the revolt in Palestine and maintain friendly relations with the Zionist movement. 84 Report of Abba Hushi to the Jewish Agency on his visit to Jabal al-Druze with Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, 4 August 1938, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/5a. 85 Ibid. 86 Report of Abba Hushi to Rutenberg, 17 August 1938, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/5a. 87 Ibid. 88 Letter of Yusuf al-‘Aysami to Shlomo Alfiah, 13 October 1938, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/5a. 89 Muhammad ‘Izzat Darwaza, Al-qadiya al-filistiniya fi mukhtalif marahiliha [The Palestinian Issue at All its Stages], vol. 3. 2nd edn. (Tyre/Beirut: Modern Library Press, 1959), pp. 158–59. (In Arabic.) 90 Mahmoud Muhareb, ‘Al-sahyuniyah wal-hajis al-dimughurafi’ [Zionism and the demographic obsession], Shu’un Filistiniyah, no. 194 (May 1989); and David Ben-Gurion, Zichronot [Memoires], vol. 4 (Tel Aviv: ‘Am ‘Oved, 1974), pp. 298–99. (In Hebrew.) 91 Memorandum of Aharon Haim Cohen. 92 Yehuda Azrieli and Jabr Abu Rukn, The Brothers who Passed the Test (Tel Aviv: World Zionist Organization, 1989), p. 35. (In Hebrew.) 93 Hasan Abu Rukn was a well-known collaborator with the Zionist movement security services, and he was sent by Abba Hushi and Yitzhak Ben-Zvi to meet with the Jabal Druze leaders, primarily Sultan al-Atrash, in Transjordan as we mentioned earlier. Hushi sent him to Syria and Lebanon a number of times on missions to serve the Zionist movement by meeting the Druze leaders there. Palestinian revolutionaries kept him under observation and became certain that he was dealing with the Zionist movement’s security services. Tawfiq Abu Hamdan, deputy to Yusuf Abu Dura, commander of the Palestinian revolution’s northern region, asked him to stop dealing with Abba Hushi; Abu Rukn refused. After his refusal, Haj Amin al-Husayni sent someone to warn him and ask him to stop dealing with the Zionist movement. Abu Rukn again refused and fled to the city of Acre to hide from the rebels. Palestinian revolutionaries arrested him, took him to a command headquarters in the village of Kawkab in the Galilee, where he was tried before a Revolutionary Court, and executed on 27 November 1938, see: Faraj, Relations between the Druze and the Jews, p. 69. 94 Letter from Abba Hushi to Yusuf al-‘Aysami, 29 November 1938, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/5a. 95 Report of Abba Hushi, 7 December 1938, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/5a. 96 Qays Madi Firu, Druz fi zaman ‘al-ghafla’: min al-mihrathalfilastini ilaalbundunqiyah al-israiliyah, [Druze in the Time of ‘Inattention’: From the Palestinian

Notes

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Plow to the Israeli Gun] (Beirut:Institute for Palestine Studies, 2019), pp. 70–74. The well-known historian, Qays Firu, himself an arab Druze from Isfiya, gave some details about the fake news of Hushi and his Druze collaboraters. Some of these were related to his close family, his father and his aunt; Hushi claimed that they were ‘brutally attacked’. See ibid, p. 73. 97 Abba Hushi spoke Arabic, and his assistant Shlomo Alfiah translated these reports into Hebrew for submission to the leadership of the JA’s political department. 98 Report of Labib Abu Rukn to Abba Hushi, 16 December 1938, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/5b. 99 The verbatim text of this letter is given in the above-mentioned report of Labib Abu Rukn. It was addressed to Sultan al-Atrash, Hasan al-Atrash, ‘Abd al-Ghaffar al-Atrash, Ali al-Atrash, Muhammad al-Halabi, Suleiman Nassar, Muhammad Abu Ali, Sheikh Ahmad al-Hajri, Mahmoud Abu Fakhr, Ahmad Jarbu‘, Ali al-Hinnawi, Salman Abu Ali, and Salih Abu Ali. 100 Letter of Labib Abu Rukn to Abba Hushi, 1 December 1938, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/5a. 101 Report of Yusuf al-‘Aysami to Abba Hushi, 5 December 1938, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/5b. 102 Report of Labib Abu Rukn to Abba Hushi, 16 December 1938. 103 Report of Yusuf al-‘Aysami to Abba Hushi, 5 December 1938. 104 Report of Labib Abu Rukn to Abba Hushi, 16 December 1938. 105 Ibid. 106 This letter was sent to Sultan al-Atrash, Emir Majid Arslan and Asaad Kanj, 4 December 1938, Haganah Archive, Abba Hushi file, 8/Hushi/5a. It is written in dramatic style and reads in full: ‘We send this letter to act on our behalf to request your thoughts and then your action. Save us from the threat to us. Save the three thousand Druze souls of Daliyat al-Karmel and Isfiya. More than three hundred Muslim men attacked us, men who are not patriots but rather thieves of money and livelihoods. After they disarmed us, they took away our men after insulting them and insulting the religion and saying that our money was plunder for Muslims. They insulted our women and our children and took the holy books they found with us after they had desecrated them. Their leader, Abu Durra, knows no respect for religion or patriotism, only theft and looting of money. We Druze, it is well known that if we had wanted to fight them, was would have done so, even if their number had not been three hundred but thousands, since our young people are very ardent, especially after they despised the holy books. Save us from this destruction that the Palestinian leadership brought upon us. Your brothers, the Druze of the Carmel.’ 107 Report of Labib Abu Rukn to Abba Hushi, 16 December 1938.

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108 Report of Sheikh Salih Tarabiyyah to Abba Hushi entitled, ‘Dear President Abba Hushi’, 18 September 1939, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/5b. 109 Ibid. 110 Letter from Yusuf al-‘Aysami to Abba Hushi, 3 March 1939, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/5b. 111 Letter from Shlomo Alfiah to Yusuf al-‘Aysami, 9 March 1939, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/5b. 112 Report by Abba Hushi on his visit to Damascus from 14–17 March 1939 entitled, ‘Negotiations with Sultan al-Atrash and his representative,’ Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/2. 113 Ibid. 114 Letter from Abba Hushi to al-‘Aysami, 27 March 1939, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/2. 115 Letter from Yusuf al-‘Aysami to Abba Hushi, 17 April 1939, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/5b. 116 Letter from Yusuf al-‘Aysami to Abba Hushi, 19 April 1939, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/5b. 117 Letter from Yusuf al-‘Aysami to Abba Hushi, 22 April 1939, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/5b. 118 Report of Shlomo Alfiah on the visit of Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, 30 April 1939, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/2. For more see Appendix 2. 119 Ibid. 120 Shlomo Alfiah’s report on the trip to Syria 12–16 May 1939, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/2. 121 Report of Shlomo Alfiah on the visit of Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, 30 April 1939. 122 Ibid. 123 Chaim Weizmann, The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, vol. 19 (Jerusalem: Rutgers University and Israel University Press, 1979), pp. 53–56. 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid., p. 55. 126 Memorandum of Abba Hushi to Chaim Weizmann, 9 May 1939, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/2. 127 Ibid. 128 Ibid. 129 Letter of Eliyahu Epstein to Abba Hushi, 11 July 1939, Haganah Archive, 8/Hoshi/2; also Letter of Eliyahu Epstein to Abba Hushi, 20 July 1939, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hoshi/2, to which Epstein appended a check for £P50 for the transfer plan. 130 Memorandum of Eliyahu Epstein entitled, ‘Memorandum on the Druze in Palestine and the plan to transfer them from the country to Jabal al-Druze,’ 3 May 1939, CZA, S25/6638. 131 Signed proxy of 27 August 1939, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/3.

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132 Letter of the mukhtar of Daliyat al-Karmel entitled, ‘Dear Associations and Agents of Jewish Companies in Palestine,’ 1 February 1940, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/5b. 133 Letter of Yusuf al-‘Aysami to Shlomo Alfiah, 22 August 1939, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/2. 134 Ibid. 135 Letter from Abba Hushi to Chaim Weizmann, 8 August 1939, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/2. 136 Ibid. 137 Letter from the mukhtar of Daliyat al-Karmel entitled, ‘Dear Associations and Agents of Jewish Companies in Palestine,’ 1 February 1940, Haganah Archive, 8/ Hushi/5b. 138 Report of Shlomo Alfiah entitled, ‘Meeting with Asaad Kanj, member of the Druze delegation,’ 20 February 1940, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/5b. 139 Ibid. 140 Report of Shlomo Alfiah entitled, ‘Report on meetings with Zayd Bek al-Atrash,’ 20 February 1940, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/5b. 141 Ibid. 142 Text of the letter in Zayd al-Atrash’s own hand and signed by him, 16 January 1940, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/5b. 143 Text of the letter in Zayd al-Atrash’s own hand and signed by him, 7 February 1940, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/5a. 144 Report of Abba Hushi, ‘Meeting with member of the Druze delegation Hamza Darwish,’ 20 February 1940, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/5b. 145 Ibid. 146 Report of Abba Hushi, ‘Meeting with Asaad Bek Kanj,’ 9 July 1940, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/5b. When the Second World War erupted, movement between Palestine and Syria became more difficult. In his report on his meeting with Kanj, Hushi stated that he had sent Mahmoud Ghaydan, a collaborator from Hasbaya in Lebanon, to tell Kanj to come to Kibbutz Dafna, which Ghaydan did. 147 Ibid. 148 Report of Eliyahu Sasson to Moshe Shertok, 24 July 1940, CZA, S25/3140. 149 Report of Abba Hushi on his meeting with Asaad Kanj at Kibbutz Dan, 6 August 1940, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/3. 150 Yoav Gelber, Shorshei ha-hevatzelet: ha-modi‘in ba-yishuv 1918–1947 [Growing a Fleur-de-Lis: The Intelligence Services of the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine, 1918– 1947], vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1992), p. 469. (In Hebrew.) 151 Details of the operation to arrange these meetings appear in the Report of Shlomo Alfiah to Moshe Shertok, October 6, 1940, CZA, file 25/22518. 152 Report of Ben-Eliyhau, 16 October 1940, CZA, file S25/22640. 153 Letter of Eliyahu Sasson to Abba Hushi, 11 July 1941, Haganah Archive, 8/Hushi/3.

196

Bibliography Books and Articles in Arabic Babil, Nasuh, Sahafah wa-siyasah: suriya fi al-qarn al-‘ashsrin [Press and Politics: Syria in the Twentieth Century], 2nd edn. (Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 2001). al-Bu‘ayni Hasan, Amin, Jabal al-‘arab: safahat fi tarikh al-muwahhidin al-druz 1685– 1927 [Jabal al-Druze: Pages from the History of the Druze 1685–1927] (Beirut: ‘Uwaydat Press, 1985). Darwaza, Muhammad ‘Izzat, Al-qadiya al-filistiniyah fi mukhtalif marahiliha [The Palestinian Issue at All its Stages], vol. 1. 2nd edn. (Tyre/Beirut: Modern Library Press, 1959). Darwaza, Muhammad ‘Izzat, Al-qadiya al-filistiniyah fi mukhtalif marahiliha [The Palestinian Issue at All its Stages], vol. 3. 2nd edn. (Tyre/Beirut: Modern Library Press, 1959). Faraj Raja, Sa‘id, Druz Filastin fi fatrat al-intidab al-baritani 1918–1948 [The Druze of Palestine during the British Mandate 1918–1948] (Daliat al-Karmel: Kalimah Press, 1991). al-Haffar al-Kuzbari, Salma, Lutfi al-Haffar 1885–1968: mudhakkarat hayatihi wa-‘asrihi [Lutfi al-Haffar 1885–1968: Memoirs of his Life and Times] (London/Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 1997). al-Hindi, Ihsan, Kifah al-sha’b al-suri [The Struggle of the Syrian People] (Damascus: Department of Public Affairs and Moral Guidance, 1962). Kawtharani, Wajih, Bilad al-sham fi matla‘ al-qarn al-‘ashrin: al-sukan wal-iqtisad wa-fililistin wal-mashru‘ al-sahyuni qira’ah fi watha’iq al-diblumasiyyah al-firinisyyah [The Levant at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century: People, Economy, Palestine, and the Zionist Project, a Reading of French Diplomatic Papers], 3rd edn. (Doha/ Beirut: ACRPS, 2013). Khoury, Philip, Suriya wal-intidab al-farinsi: siyasat al-qawmiyah al-‘arabiyah 1920– 1945 [Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920–1945] (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Abhath al-‘Arabiya, 1997). al-Kilani, Shams al-Din, Tahawwulat fi mawaqif al-nukhub al-suriyah fi lubnan 1920–2011 [Transformations in the Positions of the Syrian Elites on Lebanon 1920–2011] (Doha; Beirut: ACRPS, 2012). Kiyali, Nizar, Dirasah fi tarikh suriya al-siyasiyah al-mu‘asir 1920–1950 [A Study of Syria’s Modern Political History 1920–1950] (Damascus: Dar Talas, 1997). Jiryis, Sabri, Tarikh al-sahyuniyah:1862–1948 [The History of Zionism: 1862–1948], vol. 2 (Nicosia: Palestine Research Center, 1986).

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Masalha, Nur al-Din, Tard al-filistiniyin: fi mafhum al-transfir fi al-fikr wal-takhtit alsahyuniyayn 1948–1982 [Expulsion of the Palestinians: On the Idea of Transfer in Zionist Thought and Planning 1948–1982] (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992). Muallem, Walid, Suriya 1918–1958: al-tahaddi wal-muwajahah [Syria 1918–1958: Challenge and Confrontation] (Nicosia, Babel Press, 1985). Muhareb, Abd al-Hafiz, Haghanah, Itsil, Lihi: al-‘ilaqat bayn al-tanzimat al sahyawniyya al-musallaha, 1937–1948 [Haganah, Etzel, Lehi: Relations Between Armed Zionist Organizations, 1937–1948] (Beirut: Palestine Research Center, 1981). Muhareb, Mahmoud, ‘Al-sahyuniyah wal-hajis al-dimughurafi’ [Zionism and the Demographic obsession], Shu’un Filistiniyah, no. 194 (May 1989). Nuwayhid al-Hout, Bayan, Al-qiyadat wal-mu’asassat al-siyasiyah fi filistin 1917–1948 [Political Leaderships and Institutions in Palestine 1917–1948], 3rd edn. (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1986). Qarqout, Dhawqan, Tatawwur al-harakah al-wataniyah fi suriya 1920–1939 [The Development of the National Movement in Syria 1920–1939] (Beirut: Dar al-Tali‘ah, 1975). Qays, Madi Firu, Druz fi zaman ‘al-ghafla’: min al-mihrath alfilastini ila al-bundunqiyah al-israiliyah [Druze in the Time of ‘Inattention’: From the Palestinian Plow to the Israeli Gun] (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2019). al-Rayyes, Munir, Al-Kitab al-dhahabi lil-thawrat al-wataniyyah fil-mashriq al-‘arabi: al-thawra al-suriya al-kubra [The Golden Book of Arab Nationalist Revolutions in the Arab East: The Greater Syrian Revolt] (Beirut: Dar al-Tali‘ah, 1969). Safwat, Najdat Fathi, ed. Muthakarat Rustum Haydar [Memoranda of Rustum Haydar] (Beirut: Arab Encyclopedia House, 1988). Sayigh, Anis, Al- hashemiyun walthawra al‘arabiya alkubra, [The Hashemites and the great Arab Revolution] (Beirut: Dar al-Tali‘a, 1966). Talas, Mustafa: Ahdath al-thawra al-suriyyah kama saradaha qa’iduha al-‘amm sultan basha al-atrash 1925–1927 [The Events of the Syrian Revolt as told by its Commanderin-chief Sultan Pasha al-Atrash 1927–1927] (Damascus: Dar Talas, 2007). Zu‘aytar, Akram, Al-harakah al-wataniyah al-filistiniyah 1935–1939: yawmiyat Akram Zu‘aytar [The Palestinian National Movement 1935–1939: Akram Zu‘aytar’s Diaries], 2nd edn. (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992). Zureiq, Constantin, Al-a‘mal al-fikriyah al-‘amah lil-duktur qustantin zurayq [General Intellectual Works of Dr Constantin Zureiq], vol. 1 (Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1994) (In Arabic).

Books and Articles in Hebrew Azrieli, Yehuda and Abu Rukn Jabr, Achava she’amdah bamivhan [The Brotherhood that Passed the Test] (Tel Aviv : World Zionist Organization, 1989).

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Ben-Gurion, David, Zichronot [Memoires], vol. 4 (Tel Aviv: ‘Am‘Oved, 1974). Ben-Zvi Yitzhak, Ben (ed.), Sefer hashomer [The Hashomer Book] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1957). Cohen, Hillel, Tsva hatslalim: mashtafim falastinim beshirut hatsiyonut 1917–1948 [Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaborators in the Servce of Zionism, 1917–1948] (Jerusalem: Ivrit, 2004). Coren, David, Kesher niman: ha-Druzim ve-hahaganah [Faithful Relations: The Druze and the Haganah] (Tel Aviv : Ministry of Defense, 1991). Elath, Eliyahu, Shivat Zion ve- ‘Arav: Pirke ‘iyun ve-ma’ase [The Return to Zion and the Arabs: Reflections and Deeds] (Tel-Aviv : Dvir, 1974). Eshed, Haggai, Mosad shel ish ehad: Re’uven Shiloah: avi ha-modi’in ha-Yisraeli [Mosad of one man: Re’uven Shiloah the Father of the Israeli Intelligence] (Jerusalem: Edanin, 1988). Eshel, Tzadok, Abba Hushi:ish Haifa [Abba Hushi: Man of Haifa] (Tel Aviv, Ministry of Defence, 2002). Faraj Raja, Sa‘id, Haksharim bein hadruzim vehayihudim a‘d hakamat mdedinat Yisrael 1948 [Relations between the Druze and the Jews until the Establishment of the State of Israel in 1948] (Tarshiha: Makhul Press, 2002). Friesel, Evyatar, Hamdiniyut hatsiyonit leahar hatsharat Balfour [Zionist Policy after the Balfour Declaration 1917–1922] (Tel Aviv : University of Tel Aviv, Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Me’uhad, 1977). Gelber, Yoav, Shorshei Ha-chavatzelet: ha-modi‘in ba-yishuv 1918–1947 [Roots of a Fleur-de-Lis: The Intelligence Services of the Jewish Yishuv, 1918–1947], vol. 1 (Tel Aviv : Ministry of Defense, 1992). Gelber, Yoav, Shorshei Ha-chavatzelet: ha-modi‘in ba-yishuv 1918–1947 [Roots of a Fleur-de-Lis: The Intelligence Services of the Jewish Yishuv, 1918–1947], vol. 2 (Tel Aviv : Ministry of Defense, 1992). Heller, Yoseph, Mebrit shalom leichud: Yehuda Magnes vehamavak lehakamat medinah du-leumit [From Brit Shalom to Ichud: Yehuda Magnes and the Struggle to Establish a bi-National State] (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 2003). Kisch, Frederick, Yoman Erets- Yisraeli [Erets- Yisraeli Memoires of Frederick] (Jerusalem: Ahiasaf, 1939). Livneh, Eliezer (ed.), Nili:Toldotaha shel ha‘ zhah medinit [Nili: the History of Political Daring] (Tel Aviv : Shochen, 1980). Milstein, Uri, Bedam va-aish Yehuda: tsmihatah shel ha’ otsmah ha-yisraelit mereshit hatsiyonut v’ad ahre melhemet yom kiporim [By Blood and Fire Judea: the Growing of the Israeli Power from the Beginning of Zionism until the Aftermath of Kipur War], 2nd edn. (Tel Aviv : Levin Epstein, 1974). Porat, Yehoshua, Memhumot lemeridah:Hatnu’a hleiumit ha’a ravit falastinit 1929–1939 [From Disturbances to Revolt: the Palestinian National Movement 1929–1939](Tel Aviv, Am Oved, 1978).

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Rubinstein, Elyakim, ‘Ha-tipul ba-sh’elah ha-‘aravit bi-shanot ha-‘esrim ve-ha-sheloshim: hebetim mosadiyim [Dealing with the Arab Question in the ‘20s and ‘30s: An Institutional View] Hatsiyonut 12 (1987). Salih, Shakib, Toldot ha- Druzim [History of the Druze] (Tel Aviv : Ministry of Defence and Bar Ilan University, 1989). Sasson, Eliyahu, Baderekh el ha-shalom [On the Road to Peace] (Tel-Aviv: ‘Am ‘Oved, 1978). Shavit, Yaacov, ‘Yousef Davidsko: Papers from the Diary of a Spy, 1918’, Katedra, no. 36 (June 1985). Shertok, Moshe, Yoman Medini [Political Diary], vol. 1 (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968). Shertok, Moshe, Yoman Medini [Political Diary], vol. 3 (Tel Aviv: ‘Am ‘Oved, 1972). Tidhar, David, Besherut hamoledet: 1860–1912 [Serving the Homeland: 1912–1960] (Tel Aviv: Friends Publishers, 1960). Weitz, Yousef, Yomani ve-igrotai lebanim [My Diary and Letters to the Children], vol. 3 (Ramat Gan: Massada, 1965). Zrubavel, Gilad and Yardeni Galia (eds), Magen be-seter: mi-peʻulot ha-mah.teret ha-Eretz-Yiśreʼelit be-Milh.emet-ha-ʻolam ha-sheniyah : ʻeduyot, teʻudot v.a-ʻalilot [Defense in Secret: Operation of the Secret Organization in the Land of Israel during World War II: Testimonies, documents, and stories] (Jerusalem: Jewish Agency Press, 1949).

Books in English Caplan, Neil, Futile Diplomacy:Early Arab-Zionist Negotiation Attempts, 1913–1931 (London: Routledge; New Jersey : Frank Cass, 1983). Kais, M. and Firro Kais, M., The Druze in the Jewish State (Leiden: Boston; Cologne: E. J. Brill, 1999). Kisch, F.H. Palestine Diary (London: V. Gollancz, 1938). Kisch F.H., Letter to the Chairman of the Political Commission, XVIIth Zionist Congress, and the Chairman of the Political Commission Second Assembly of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. Accompanied by a Report on the work of the Joint Bureau for Arab Relations, 1931. Shlaim, Avi, Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). Shlaim, Avi, The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine 1921–1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). Weizmann, Chaim, The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, vol. 19 (Jerusalem: Rutgers University and Israel University Press, 1979).

Index 1948 war, 162 Abboud, Abdullah, 22, 44–45, 73, 81–82, 161 Abdulaziz (king of Saudi Arabia), 61, 73, 102 Abdullah I (emir of Transjordan), 75 Abdullah I, Emir of Transjordan, 8, 102–3, 111 Abraham Accord, 162 Abu Ghanima, Subhi, 81–82 Abu Hamad. See al-‘Aysami, Yusuf (Abu Hamad) Abu Rukn, Hasan, 114 Abu Rukn, Hasan (Zionist collaborator), 115–16, 118, 120–21, 137 Abu Rukn, Labib, 138–40 Abu Rukn, Zayed, 115, 138 Advisory Council to the Government of Palestine, 15 al-‘Afifi, Ahmad, 121 Agronsky (Agron), Gershon, 15 Agudat Yisrael, 16, 17 al-Ahdab, Khary al-Din, 41, 53 al-‘Ajlani, Munir, 81 Alawite State, 108 Alexandretta, Syria, 44, 45–46, 75 Alfiah, Shlomo (Salim) continued contact with Jabal al-Druze, 157 handling Druze collaborators, 114, 116–17, 132–35, 143–45, 153–55, 169–72 transfer plan for Druze, 141 Zionism’s benefits for Druze, 144 al-‘Ali, Hussein Mahmoud, 69 al-Madi, Mu’in, 119, 121 ‘Aql, As’ad, 52 Arab Bureau (Ha-Lishkah Ha-Aravit), 8, 14, 15–16, 75 Arab Division of Jewish Agency (ja ), 21–22, 23, 122–27, 148, 159. See also espionage; publication project

Arab High Committee, 58–59, 63 Arab-Jewish agreement and al-Shahbandar, 76, 77, 79–80 goal of ja , 3 and King Abdulaziz, 61 and National Bloc, 63 Syrian government’s support for, 87, 95 terms of, 76, 77, 83, 100 Arab nationalism, 12, 28–29, 62–63, 130–31, 160 Arab Press Office, 15 Arab question, 13, 14, 16. See also Palestinian question Arab Revolt al-Bakri (Fawzi) on, 25 and Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine, 34 al-Ashmar asked to lead, 79 al-Ashmar on, 77–78, 79 al-Bakri (Nasib) on, 25, 61, 74, 88–89, 95 al-Baroudi on, 30, 70, 86 causes of, per Epstein, 28, 32 concern over traitors, 82 disinformation about, 3, 137–38, 140, 143–44 divisions between Druze and, 136–39 Druze discouraged from supporting, 111–12, 115–16, 118, 126, 128–29, 131–32, 135 Druze recruitment, 120, 121, 128 Druze support for, 126, 131, 135 economic impacts, 25, 63, 73 economic prospects fueling fighters, 126 al-Haffar on, 25, 61–63 al-Husayni’s support for, 90, 119 ja ’s reducing support for (summary), 161–62 Kanj’s involvement in, 128, 152 leaders spied on by ja , 63 Lebanese response, 42–43

201

202

Index

Mardam on, 25, 86–88, 125 National Bloc in Syria, 24–26, 34, 42, 61–63, 160 newspaper articles and press, 39–40, 42–44, 46, 80, 86, 87 propaganda in Syria, 88 al-Quwatli on, 25, 37, 160 Saudi Arabian support, 73 Shahbandari opposition to, 78, 80 spied on by ja , 64–65 strength of, 90 stymieing plans for Maronites and Druze in Lebanon, 130–31 supporters purged in Syria, 94–95 Syrian-French treaty’s ratification delay, 63, 88–89 Syrian opposition, 37, 61–63, 66, 68, 69, 72, 74, 78 Syrian popular support, 24–26, 42, 43, 62–63, 70–71, 73 Syria’s key role, 21 Arab Secretariat (Ha-Mazkirut HaAravit), 14–15 Arazi, Tuvia, 104 Arlosoroff, Chaim, 18–19 al-‘As, Sa’id, 116 al-Ashmar, Muhammad, 66, 69, 73–74, 75, 77–80 al-Atassi, Hashim, 24, 75, 94, 95, 98–99 al-Atrash, ‘Abd al-Ghaffar, 115, 118, 139, 141, 151–52 al-Atrash, ‘Ali, 116, 118, 127, 157 al-Atrash, Hasan, 139 al-Atrash, Mut’ib, 141 al-Atrash, Pasha (Sultan al-Atrash) caution over transfer plan, 148–49, 151 cultivated by ja , 111, 127–28, 161 cultivating ties with Syrian leaders, 110–11 discouraging Druze from supporting Arab Revolt, 126, 135 and Druze transfer plan, 138–39, 140, 141, 144–45 and Emir Abdullah, 111 Great Syrian Revolt, 110 Jabal al-Druze’s full autonomy, 114–15 ja delegation raises concerns, 119 ja ’s mediating with France, 113, 123 meeting with Abu Rukn, 116, 118

meeting with ja representatives, 132–35, 143–45 Palestinian partition, 134 policy of friendly neutrality toward Jews, 134, 144 pressure on Asaad Kanj, 130 relationship with France, 123, 142, 156 return to Syria, 117 as Syrian national symbol, 110 Zionist alliance, 127, 142 al-Atrash, Sayyah, 116, 141, 145, 147 al-Atrash, Zayd, 113–14, 127, 139, 151–52, 153–54, 157 al-‘Aysami, Yusuf (Abu Hamad) alliance between Jabal al-Druze and Zionists, 141–45 arranging meeting between Hushi and al-Atrash, 132–35 biography, 114 compensation from ja , 117, 121, 125 contact with Zionist movement, 118 dissuading participation in Arab Revolt, 126 disuading participation in Arab Revolt, 128, 132 Druze Committee, 147 Druze transfer plan, 136, 138–40, 141–42, 145, 148–49 on Hushi, 79 Hushi’s assessment of, 122 intelligence operations for ja , 126–27, 161 ja recruitment of, 118, 121 Kanj sought advice from, 132 meeting with Abu Rukhn, 118, 121 meeting with Hushi, 121 relationship with Palestinian leaders, 126 Sultan al-Atrash’s representative in Palestine, 116 and Zionist movement, 114–17, 127–28, 141–45 al-‘Azm, Nazih al-Mu’ayyad, 75 al-‘Azm, Taqieddine Bek, 75 al-‘Azma, ‘Adel, 25, 65, 70, 82, 95 al-‘Azma, Nabih, 25, 53, 65, 69, 89, 118, 143 Babil, Nasuh, 51–52, 57, 75, 80–81 al-Bakri, Bahaa al-Din, 103

Index al-Bakri, Fawzi, 25, 93, 97, 102–3, 104 al-Bakri, Mazhar, 65, 69, 81 al-Bakri, Nasib Arab Revolt, 25, 61, 74, 88–89, 95 becomes Minister of Justice, 94 biography, 64 compensation from ja , 66, 67, 68, 69, 93, 95, 96, 104 Conference of Arab Parliamentarians, 90 espionage accomplishments, 69, 82, 85–86, 88–89 espionage contacts and resources, 65–66, 68, 69 espionage in Egypt, 103 espionage proposal and goals, 66–68 financial constraints, 92, 96 growing closeness with al-Shahbandar, 93, 97 on al-Husayni, 72–73 intelligence from, 70–71, 81–82, 85, 161 ja ’s relationship with France and Syria, 83 meeting with Emir Abdullah, 102 National Bloc-ja relationship fostered, 82, 99 Palestinian question roundtable conference, 66, 91–92, 93 political positions and aspirations, 64, 82–86, 93, 96–97 recruitment of al-Ashmar, 73–74 recruitment to ja , 64–65, 66, 67–68, 161 refusal to work with Lawziyyah, 68 relationship with al-Atassi, 96, 97 relationship with Jabal al-Druze, 108 resistance to approaching al-Husayni, 72 spying on al-Baroudi, 73 Syrian-French agreement, 83–84 use of police in espionage, 65, 68, 69, 81 work in Lebanon, 89 Balfour Declaration, 8, 9, 24, 136 al-Baroudi, Fakhri al-Bakri’s spying on, 73 Arab Revolt, 30, 70, 86 on Arab-Zionist relations, 29–30 attacked by ja -planted news stories, 46 meetings with ja agents, 26, 28–31, 57

203

Propaganda and Publication Office monitored, 72 resistance to ja , 4 Shertok meeting refused, 26–27 Syrian Bureau for National Propaganda, 52 Ben-Gurion, David response to Peel Commission Report, 58–59 Sasson’s political proposal, 101–4 transfer of Arabs out of Jewish state, 136 transfer plan for Druze, 136 Ben-Zvi, Yitzhak, 16–17, 112–13, 115–16 Bludan Conference, 52, 87, 118 Blum, Léon, 16, 24, 26, 61, 74, 114 British Intelligence, 81–82, 103–4, 156 British Mandate for Palestine, 10, 11, 14, 15–16, 58–59 Brit Shalom (Covenant of Peace), 15 Buraq Revolt, 7, 16, 111 Bureau for National Propaganda, 52 Cattaui Pasha, Yusuf Aslan, 77 Cohen, Aharon Chaim, 17, 50, 113–14, 122, 123–24, 136 Conference of Arab and Islamic Parliamentarians on Palestine, 52–54, 89–90 Criminal Investigations Department, 10 Darwaza, ‘Izzat, 69, 81–82, 90, 121 Darwish, Hamza, 151–52, 154–55 al-Din Shuja, Jamal, 130 disinformation. See also newspapers and press; propaganda; publication project Arab Revolt, 3, 137–38, 140, 143–44 against Druze, 137–38, 140–44, 152–57, 161 fake petitions, 10–11 ja ’s claim to support Arab unity, 160 against National Bloc, 2–4, 160–61 newspaper articles, 22, 44–45, 46–47 on Palestine, 52, 160 on Syrian independence, 160 terrorism, 46, 47, 51, 55 Zionist use of, generally, 159–60

204

Index

Druze. See also al-Atrash, Pasha (Sultan al-Atrash); Jabal al-Druze leadership; Jabal al-Druze State; transfer of Druze Arab nationalism, 130–31 Arab Revolt, discouraged from supporting, 111–12, 115–16, 118, 126, 128–29, 131–32, 135 Arab Revolt, recruitment, 120, 121, 128 Arab Revolt, support for, 126, 131, 135 and British, 116, 123, 124, 129, 150 division between Arab Revolt and, 136–39 Druze Committee, 147 and French, 113, 123, 124, 150 importance of friendship for the Jews, 131–32 Jabal al-Druze Revolt, 110, 114, 117 ja disinformation against, 137–38, 140, 143–44 letter from the ‘Druze of the Carmel,’ 128, 129–30 and Maronites, 130 nature of contact with ja , 118 and Palestinian national movement, 151 relations with Zionists and ja , 115–16, 117–18, 120–21, 122–23 settlement history, 109 social and clan structure, 109, 111 Zionism as beneficial to, 133, 144, 153, 155 Zionist interest in, 111–14 Zionist-Maronite-Druze alliance, 130 Zionist mediation with French government, 113 and Zionist movement in Palestine, 114–15 Zionist penetration into leadership, summary, 155–57 Druze Committee, 147 Eddé, Emile, 44, 53 Eder, David, 13–14 Einstein, Albert, 16 Epstein (Elath), Eliyahu on causes of Arab Revolt, 28, 32 concern over ja ’s relationship with Druze, 122–23

description of Zionist movement, 32 Druze transfer plan, 136, 148 influencing Syrian and Lebanese press, 43, 50 on Jewish immigration to Palestine, 37 meeting with Abu Rukn, 115–16 meeting with al-Baroudi, 26, 28–31 meeting with Mardam, 59–61 meeting with al-Quwatli, 57 and National Bloc, 31, 35, 57–58 Palestinian question requires Jewish input, 59 Palestinian transfer committees, 37 recruited to ja , 19 as al-Sharq Agency correspondent, 42 visit to Damascus, 27 Zionist interest in Druze, 113 Zionist policy towards Palestinians, 28 espionage, generally on Arab High Committee, 63 on Arab Revolt, 64–65 in Beirut, 13 Buraq Revolt, 7, 16 in Damascus, 12–13 in Egypt, 8, 18, 41 expansion under ja , 18–19 on Great Arab Revolt, 7 Hashomer (The Guard), 9 on National Bloc and Syrian government, 64–65 on nature of land ownership, 7 nili , 9, 10 on Palestinian revolutionaries and Arabs, 7, 9–10, 64, 70–71 reasons for, 7 on Syria-Palestine relationship, 64 use of police, 65, 68, 69, 81 Weizmann’s role, 9 Zionist Commission, 9 Faisal bin Hussein (king of Syria), 10, 12, 13, 14, 64 fake news. See disinformation; newspapers and press; propaganda; publication project al-Faris, Salman, 153–54 Fine, Yousef, 104 France. See also Syrian-French treaty army in Syria and Lebanon, 84, 100

Index Blum’s prime ministership, 16, 24, 26, 61, 74, 114 fomenting division in Syria, 84, 107, 108 French Mandate, 23–24, 59, 92–93, 107–8 Friendship Treaty (1936), 24, 108 Great Syrian Revolt, 110, 117 High Commission’s clash with Mardam, 94 ja ’s potential influence in, 83 ja ’s support of France against Syria, 97–98 Jewish influence in, 74, 99 negotiations with al-Atassi Syria, 98–99 Palestinian question roundtable conference, 91–92 partition of Syria, 107–8 relationship with Druze, 113, 123, 124, 150 Sultan al-Atrash surveilled, 142 Friendship Treaty, 24, 108 Goldman, Solomon, 146 Gouraud, Henri, 107, 110 Great Arab Revolt, 7 Great Britain British Mandate, 10, 11, 14, 15–16, 58–59 Druze discouraged from supporting Arab Revolt, 128–29 Druze transfer plan, 151 ja concern over British policy, 91 ja intelligence utilized, 81–82 Jewish influence in, 99 Land Law, 151 Palestinian question roundtable conference, 91–93, 100 Peel Commission and Report, 58–59, 60, 61, 91, 135–36 relationship with Druze, 116, 123, 124, 129, 150 relationship with France, 72, 88–89 relationship with King Faisal, 13 repression of Palestinians, 62, 63 al-Shahbandar’s loyalty to, 75 Syrian-French treaty ratification, 88–89 White Paper, 97, 151 and Zionism, 136 Great Syrian Revolt, 110, 114, 117

205

Hacohen, David, 28, 35 al-Haffar, Lutfi Arab Revolt, 25, 61–63 Conference of Arab Parliamentarians, 90 meeting with ja , 31, 34–35 and Syrian government, 83, 85, 94, 95 Hamada, al-‘Qal Husayn, 130–32 Hamada, Tawfiq, 120 Hamdan, Masaad, 139–40 Hamza, Fouad, 100 Harfush, Ilyas, 51, 52, 53 al-Hashimi, Taha, 103 Hashomer (The Guard), 9 Hassoun, Joseph, 17 al-Hibri, Toufiq, 89 Hoz, Dov Druze transfer plan, 136, 145 Jewish immigration to Palestine, 36–37 meeting with Mardam, 59–61 meeting with Sultan al-Atrash, 143–45 negotiations with National Bloc, 35 Palestinian transfer committees, 28, 35 Peel Commission Report, 59 Husayn, Musa Haj, 69 al-Husayn, Muhammad, 112–13 al-Husayn, Nimr, 112 al-Husayn, Wahsh, 112–13 al-Husayni, Haj Amin al-Bakri on, 72–73 Conference of Arab Parliamentarians, 90 meeting with al-Ashmar, 78–80 movements of, 8 negotiations with ja , 60 partition of Palestine, 90 Peel Commission Report, 58–59 relationship with Jabal al-Druze, 119 spied on by ja , 63 support for Arab Revolt, 90, 119 Syrian and Lebanese support, 71 and Syrian journalists, 50–52 Hushi, Abba alliance of the minorities of Near East, 141, 155 assessment of al-‘Aysami, 122 contact with and handling of Druze, 114–16, 118, 120–22, 125–26, 133, 152–55

206

Index

Druze transfer plan, 136–38, 140, 141, 145, 147–50 Jabal al-Druze delegation to Palestine, 152 letter from the ‘Druze of the Carmel,’ 128, 129–30 meeting with al-Ashmar, 74, 78–80 meeting with al-‘Aysami, 114 meeting with Darwish, 154–55 meeting with Kanj, 152–53 meeting with Sultan al-Atrash, 132–35, 143–45 meeting with Zayd al-Atrash, 153–54 trip to Jabal al-Druze, 120–21 immigration of Jews to Palestine. See also Palestine; Palestinian question; Palestinians; settlements of Jews in Palestine; transfer of Druze; transfer of Palestinians as beneficial for Palestinians, 37 concerns over numbers, 36–37, 77 as inevitable, 32, 35–36 National Bloc and ja sticking point, 30–31 Palestinian leaders call for stop, 60 al-Shahbandar’s acceptance of, 76 Zionist position rejected, 33–34, 36 Information Bureau (Misrad Ha’Yedi‘ot), 9–10, 11–12, 13–14 Intelligence Service (Sherut Yediot, Shai), 17–18, 67, 104–5, 155–57 Interior Ministry (Syria), 82 Iraq, 8, 72, 103 Iron Shirts organization, 26 Jabal al-Druze leadership. See also Druze; Jabal al-Druze State; transfer of Druze alliance with ja , 122 concerns over Syrian state, 108–9 contact with al-Husayni, 119 cooperation with British, 157 delegation to Palestine, 151–52 early relations with Zionists, 113–14 financial aid needed, 119 financial need, 119, 131, 156 and France, 114 ja ’s cultivation and misleading of, 161

Lawziyyah advocating ja relationship with, 119–20 Mardam’s visit, 133 relationship with ja , 117, 143–44, 152–57, 161 Sasson opposed ja relationship with, 119–21 tensions with Syrian government, 123 Zionist movement as beneficial, 122 Zionist penetration into, summary, 155–57 Zionist penetration into leadership, summary, 155–57 Jabal al-Druze Revolt, 110, 114, 117 Jabal al-Druze State, 107–8, 109, 114–15, 128, 136. See also Druze; Jabal al-Druze leadership; transfer of Druze Jabotinsky, Ze’ev, 9, 33 al-Jabri, Sa’d Allah, 83 Jambart, Sélim, 94 Jana, Tawfiq, 51, 52 Jarjoura, Michel, 104–5 Jewish Agency (ja ). See also Arab-Jewish agreement; Arab Revolt; espionage, generally; Palestine; Palestinian question; Syria; Zionism and Zionist movement acquisition of Palestinian land, 37 Arab Bureau, 14, 15–16 Arab Division, 21–22, 23, 122–27, 148, 159 Arab question, 13, 14, 16 belief in its global influence and power, 26, 37 concerns over Syrian independence, 27 establishment, 16 Mapai (Labor) party, 40, 63, 136 Political Department, 2, 40–41 primary purpose and goals, 1–2, 3, 8, 21, 32–33, 159, 162 al-Sharq connection, 41, 42 Jewish National Council (jnc ) in Palestine (Ha-Vaad Ha-Leumi), 14, 16 Joint Bureau of Jewish Institutions in Palestine, 16–18 Joseph, Bernard, 44–45, 76, 95, 136 Joseph, Dov. See Joseph, Bernard Judaism, religion vs ethnicity, 36

Index Kalaiv, 13 Kalmi, Jacques, 13 Kalvarisky, Chaim, 14, 15, 16, 17, 40–41 Kan’an, Ayyub, 53 Kanj, Asaad, 128–30, 131, 132, 151–53, 155–57 Khanjar, Adham, 110 al-Khatib, Zaki, 81 Khayr, Salman, 113 al-Khazn, Farid, 53 al-Khoury, Faris, 85 al-Khoury, Fayez, 34–35, 36–37, 57, 83, 85, 94 Khunayfis, Hasan, 151 Khunayfis, Salih, 152 Kirkbride, Alec, 102 Kisch, Frederick, 14–15, 16, 41, 113 Lawziyyah, David and al-Bakri, 68, 96, 97 on ja ’s relationship with Druze, 117, 119–20 meeting with al-Baroudi, 28, 31 recruited by ja , 22 Lebanon, 13, 40–41, 42–44, 50, 100, 104 Linyadu, Yusuf, 51 and al-Bakri, 65, 67–68, 69 cooperation with ja , 51, 63 fostering ja -Syrian relations, 61 recruited by ja , 22 recruitment of al-Ashmar, 73–74 Lundmann, Amos, 19, 28, 31, 35 Mapai (Labor) party, 40, 63, 136 Mardam, Jamil. See also National Bloc (Syria); Shahbandari opposition (Syria); Syria; Syrian Mardam government on Arab Revolt, 25, 86–88, 125 clash with French High Commission, 94 Conference of Arab Parliamentarians, 90 criticism and opposition, 59, 93, 94 fostering relations with ja , 57–58, 59–61 Jabal al-Druze visit, 133 meeting with ja agents, 59–61, 86–88, 99–100

207

and National Bloc, 59, 71, 82–83, 92–93 new government formed, 24 on Palestinian question, 59–60, 100 Peel Commission Report, 60 resignation, 94 and Shahbandari opposition, 59 Syrian-French treaty, 82, 92 Syrian issue takes precedence (go back for earlier), 93 Syrian policy towards Britain, 71 on Zionism, 60–61 al-Mardini, Ahmad, 89 Maronites, 130–31 Marshall, Louis, 16 Martel, Damien de, 78 Mashreq, 28 Mousseri, Elie, 77 al-Mu’ayyad, Nazih, 75, 77–78, 104 Nahmani, Joseph, 28 Nahmani, Moshe, 117–18 Nahmani, Yusuf, 35, 37, 112 Nakba, 29 Namur, Musa, 53 al-Nashashibi, Raghib, 102 National Bloc (Syria). See also Mardam, Jamil; Shahbandari opposition (Syria); Syrian Mardam government Arab-Jewish agreement, 63 Arab Revolt, 24–26, 34, 42, 61–63, 160 and Blum, 26 constitution, 23 contacts with ja operatives, 22–23, 31–38, 57–58 desire for negotations with ja , 60, 63 desire for negotiations with ja , 26–28 dissention within, 84–85, 92, 93 on Emir Abdullah as king of Syria, 102 and France, 23–24, 25–26, 31, 93, 98–99 general strike, 42 intelligence on political developments in, 71–72 ja fomenting strife with opposition, 105 ja infiltration, 38

208 ja ’s care not to anger, 120–21, 122–23 ja ’s cultivation and misleading of, 2–4, 22–23, 160–61 on Jewish immigration to Palestine, 30–31 and King Abdulaziz, 102 and Mardam government, 59, 71, 82–83, 84 as mediators between ja and Palestinian national movement, 26, 30, 34, 37, 160 monitoring press and Propaganda and Publication Office, 72 opposition to, 23 opposition to Balfour Declaration, 24 opposition to new governments, 98 and Palestine, 24–25, 26, 30–31, 34, 37, 160 Palestinian question, 61–63 policies, 23 relationship with ja , 21, 26–28, 37, 82, 83–84, 99 spied on by ja , 64–65 and Sultan al-Atrash, 110 supplying Syria with weapons, 72 suspicions over al-Shahbandar’s assassination, 105 Syrian independence, 26 Syrian partition, 71 tensions with Mardam, 92–93 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (1936), 24 and Zionism, 63, 73 newspapers and press. See also disinformation; propaganda; publication project anti-Zionist propaganda, 66 Arab press ‘peace campaign,’ 42 Arab Revolt articles and press, 39–40, 42–44, 46, 63, 80, 86, 87 criticism of Palestine, 46–47, 52 dissemination of ja -directed articles, 40, 48–49, 50 distribution, 101 Egyptian press, 41 encouraged to adopt pro-Zionist positions, 40–41 keeping tabs on, 17–18 Lebanese press, 40–41, 42–48, 50

Index planted stories, 19, 39–40, 42, 43, 44–48, 51 proposed reduction to planted stories, 48–49, 54 pro-Zionist articles from private citizens, 53–54 publishing pro-Zionist disinformation, 22 ‘purchase’ of Arabic newspapers, 54–55 Sasson’s pro-Zionist plan for, 101 Sasson’s work schedule, 51 al-Sharq News Agency, 40, 41–42, 45, 76 Syrian journalists and al-Husayni, 50–52 Syrian press, 42–48, 49–50, 63, 80, 86, 87 terminology of terrorism, 46, 47, 51, 55 Zionist-friendly journalists, 15 nili , 9, 10 Palestine. See also Arab Revolt; Druze; immigration of Jews to Palestine; Palestinian question; Palestinians; settlements of Jews in Palestine; transfer of Druze; transfer of Palestinians Advisory Council to the Government, 15 Arab rule opposed by ja , 101 Bludan Conference, 118 British ambushes, 81 British Mandate, 10, 11, 14, 15–16, 58–59 Buraq Revolt, 7, 16, 111 Druze in, 111 economic benefit of Jewish presence, 32, 35, 51 funding of leadership, 62 independence, 60 Jabal al-Druze delegation to, 151–52 ja ’s cultivation of the opposition, 101–2 Jews as great power in, 134 Land Law, 151 and National Bloc, 24–25 as national home for Jewish people, 2, 3, 7, 32–33, 35, 162 opposition to partition, 58–59, 60 partition, generally, 60, 90–91, 100, 134, 135 partition supported by ja , 98

Index Peel Commission Report, 58–59, 60, 61, 91, 135 refusal to negotiate with ja , 60 responsibility for violence in, 62 White Paper, 151 Zionist disinformation, 160 Palestine Defense Committee (Syria), 42, 45, 85, 86 Palestinian national liberation movement anti-British policy in Syria, 73 Arab sympathy for, 7–8, 41–42 Buraq Revolt, 7, 16, 111 and Germany, 70 Great Arab Revolt, 7 Information Bureau, 9, 11 and Italy, 70 ja ’s primary goal was to weaken, 2, 3, 11–12, 162 lull after British Mandate on Palestine, 15–16 National Bloc as mediators between ja and, 26, 30, 34, 37, 160 Peel Commission Report, 91 relationship with Druze, 151 al-Sharq’s operations against, 41 spied on by ja , 64, 70–71 Syria important centre for, 2, 12, 21, 83 and Zionist espionage, 7, 9–10, 64, 70–71 Palestinian question al-Bakri’s espionage, 66 British policy as logical and positive, 100 Great Britain’s change on, 91 National Bloc, 61–63 roundtable conference, 91–93, 100 three parties (Arab, British, Jewish), 59–60, 62, 63 Palestinians. See also Arab Revolt; immigration of Jews to Palestine; Palestine; Palestinian question; settlements of Jews in Palestine; transfer of Palestinians British repression, 62, 63 existence ignored by Zionists, 2, 160 ja ’s guarantees to, 32–33 settlements as beneficial to, 37 undermining of Druze’s solidarity with, 128

209

undermining of Syrian support for, 44–45, 46–47, 51 Zionism as beneficial to, 32, 35, 60, 115, 116, 134 Zionist policy towards, 27–28 Pappe, Illan, 2 Parliamentary Conference, 52–54, 89–90 Pasha, Muhammad ‘Alouba, 89 Peel Commission and Report, 58–59, 60, 61, 91, 135–36 Pelman, Shlomo, 12–13 People’s Party, 110 Pinto, David fostering Syrian relations, 31, 35, 59, 61 meeting with al-Quwatli (1937), 57 recruited by ja , 22 work with Druze, 117 Political Department, Jewish Agency, 2, 40–41 Popular Front government, 24 propaganda anti-British, 83 anti-Zionist, 66, 83 Arab Revolt, 87, 88 expansion under ja , 18–19 German, 61, 65, 72 in Iraq, 72 Italian, 61, 65, 72 Propaganda and Publication Office, 26 Propaganda and Publicaton Office, 72 Syrian Bureau for National Propaganda, 52 Turkish, 72 Propaganda and Publication Office (Syria), 26, 72 Puaux, Gabriel, 95, 97–98 publication project. See also disinformation; newspapers and press; propaganda accomplishments of, 159 committee for, 50 Conference of Arab Parliamentarians sabotage attempt, 52–53, 89 cost of influencing, 40–41, 47, 48, 49–50, 51, 53 end of project, 54–56 goals and impact of, 55–56 infiltration of Syrian and Lebanese press, 55

210

Index

influencing of Syrian and Lebanese press, 43, 50 ja ’s influence on press, generally, 44, 50, 101 justifications for, 48–49, 54–55 matter of Alexandretta, 44, 45–46 new avenues, 50–52 number of articles planted, 55 ‘purchase’ of Arabic newspapers, 11, 12, 13 Sasson’s work schedule, 49–50 strategies to make press pro-Zionist, 11, 12, 13, 40–41 Qaddoura, Asaad, 151 al-Qanawati, Khalid, 95 al-Qatami, ‘Aqlah, 113 al-Qatami, ‘Aqlah (confidant of Sultan al-Atrash), 117–18, 119 al-Qawuqji, Fawzi, 73 al-Quwatli, Shukri Arab Revolt, 25, 37, 73, 160 assassination plan, 104–5 as enemy of Zionism, 73 and ja , 4, 31, 34–35, 57 ja support for Syrian independence, 37 on Jewish immigration to Palestine, 33–34, 36 relationship with Palestinian revolutionary leaders, 73 al-Shahbandar’s assassination, 104–5 Raslan, Mazhar, 94 al-Rayyes, Munir, 70, 82, 95 Roosevelt, Franklin D, 146 Rutenberg, Pinhas, 134 al-Sa’id, Nuri, 72 Sarraut, Albert, 24 Sasson, Eliyahu Arab Revolt, 61–63 attacking Palestine Defense Committee, 45 attacking Palestine in news stories, 46–47 al-Bakri (Nasib) monitored, 68–70, 71 Conference of Arab Parliamentarians, 52–53, 89–90 countering al-Husayni, 49, 50

doubts about al-Qatami’s motives, 119–20 Druze transfer plan, 136 fomenting Syrian separatism, 97–98 fomenting Syrian seperatism, 101 influencing Syrian politics, 43–44, 47, 85 intelligence on British operations in Palestine, 81–82 on Jabal al-Druze, 119–20 on ja ’s relationship with Druze, 120–22, 124–25 on limits of ja ’s help with National Bloc priorities, 83–84 meeting with al-Mu’ayyad, 77–78 meeting with al-Shahbandar, 76 meeting with Babil, 51–52, 80–81 meeting with Fawzi al-Bakri, 102–3 meeting with Hamada, 130–32 meeting with Kanj, 156 meeting with Mardam, 86–88, 99–100 meeting with ‘MN,’ 53–54 meeting with al-Quwatli, 57 negotiations between ja and National Bloc, 57–58, 99–100 new network of informants, 104 overview of ja ’s relationship with Syrian leaders, 105 Palestinian question roundtable conference, 91–92 Palestinian transfer committees, 28 partition of Palestine, 100, 101 proposals to Ben-Gurion, 101–4 publishing project, 22, 43–47, 48–50, 51, 54–55 recruited to ja , 19 recruitment of al-Bakri, 64–65, 66, 67–68 report on activities of ja , 163–69 al-Sharq Agency correspondent as cover, 42 on Syrian-French treaty, 97–99, 101 undermining Syrian support for Palestine, 44–45, 46–47, 51 Sasson, Jamil, 104 Saudi Arabia, 61, 73, 81, 102 Sayf, Sam’an, 51, 52 Schneerson, Levi Isaac, 9, 11, 14

Index settlements of Jews in Palestine. See also immigration of Jews to Palestine; Palestine; Palestinian question; Palestinians; transfer of Druze; transfer of Palestinians attack on Kfar Giladi, 10 attack on Tel Hai, 10 as beneficial for Palestinians, 37 cost of new settlers, 14, 16 Hashomer (The Guard), 9 as inevitable, 32, 35–36 Jewish settlement building, 7 strengthened by transfer plans, 146 Zionist Commission, 8 Sfeir, Najib, 130 al-Shahbandar, Abd al-Rahman. See also National Bloc (Syria); Shahbandari opposition (Syria); Syrian Mardam government al-Bakri’s becoming close to, 93, 97 allied with Great Syrian Revolt, 110 Arab-Jewish agreement, 76, 77, 79–80 assassination of, 104–5 biography, 75 and British, 75 critical of National Bloc and Syrian government, 23, 75–76 matter of Alexandretta, 75 meeting with ja , 75, 76–77 Palestinian question, 63, 76 popularity of, 93 pressure on al-Ashmar, 74 relationship with ja , 75 relations with al-Sharq News Agency, 76 on Syrian-French treaty, 75 as Syrian opposition leader, 63, 75 Shahbandari opposition (Syria). See also National Bloc (Syria); alShahbandar, Abd al-Rahman; Syrian Mardam government al-Ashmar’s connection to, 74, 79 Arab Revolt, 78, 80 concern with Syria over Palestine, 78 on Emir Abdullah as king of Syria, 102 ja fomenting strife with National Bloc, 105 ja infiltration, 38 Mardam’s resignation, 78

211

need for French support, 79 plan to seize power, 79, 81 relationship with ja , 57, 75–76, 80–81 against Syrian-French treaty, 80 Syrian government as corrupt, 79 ties with Sultan al-Atrash, 110 Zionist assistance, 79 Shai (Information Service, Sherut Yediot), 17–18 Sharett, Moshe. See Shertok (Sharett), Moshe al-Sharq News Agency, 40, 41–42, 45, 76. See also disinformation; espionage, generally; newspapers and press; propaganda; publication project Shertok (Sharett), Moshe Arab-Jewish agreement sought, 63 al-Baroudi refuses meeting, 26–27 congratulating Syria’s new government, 57–58 Druze transfer plan, 136 fostering Syrian relations, 61, 63 on Jabal al-Druze, 125 ja connection to al-Sharq, 41, 42 ja ’s increased activity in Syria, 21 meeting with al-Shahbandar, 76 praise for Arab Division, 23 publishing project, 47–49, 54 recruited to ja , 19 Shiloah (Zaslansky), Reuven, 19, 61–63, 67–68 al-Shishakli, Tawfiq, 85 Shlaim, Avi, 2 al-Solh, ‘Afif, 85 spying. See espionage, generally Sukar, Zaki, 117, 119 al-Sulh, ‘Afif, 89–90 Syria. See also Druze; Mardam, Jamil; National Bloc (Syria); SyrianFrench treaty; Syrian al-Haffar government; Syrian Mardam government; transfer of Druze anti-Zionist propaganda, 66 Arab nationalism in, 12, 62–63 Arab Revolt opposition, 37, 61–63, 66, 68, 69, 72, 74, 78 Arab Revolt popular support, 24–26, 42, 43, 62–63, 70–71, 73 Bludan conference, 52, 87, 118

212 boycotts, 98–99 Bureau for National Propaganda, 52 as centre anti-British propaganda, 83 as centre anti-Zionist propaganda, 83 concerns over Turkey, 71 division fomented in, 84, 107, 108 Emir Abdullah as king of Syria, 102–3 fall of Faisal government, 12, 14 foreign propaganda in, 61, 65, 72 formation of new government, 94 and France, 36, 59, 84, 92–93, 100, 104, 107 French Mandate, 59, 92–93 Friendship Treaty (1936), 24, 108 incorporation of Jabal al-Druze and Alawite states, 108–9 independence and Zionist movement, 28, 32, 34, 37 independence movement, 23–24, 26, 27, 32, 37, 42, 160 interest in ending Arab Revolt, 63 ja ’s espionage in, generally, 21–23, 104 ja ’s financial assistance, 127 ja ’s influencing of Syrian politics, 43–44 ja ’s work to fragment, 97–98 Jewish community, 22 Jewish protest of, 83 Jews’ harm to, 74 Palestine Defense Committee, 42, 45, 85, 86 Palestinian national movement, 2, 12, 21, 83 Palestinian question roundtable conference, 91–92, 93 partition, 71, 107–8 plan to transfer Druze to, 135–40 policy toward Britain, 71 support for Palestine undermined, 44–45, 46–47, 51 Syrian Congress’s declaration of independence, 10 Vichy government control, 104 Syrian-French treaty Arab Revolt reason for delayed ratification, 63, 88–89 British involvement, 88–89 France’s refusal to ratify, 2, 94, 95, 100 ja assistance, 83–84

Index Mardam government on, 82, 92 ratification, 74, 95 al-Shahbandari on, 75 Shahbandari opposition to, 80 World War II, 100 Zionist and Jewish opposition to, 80, 86, 97–99, 101 Syrian al-Haffar government, 94–95, 96. See also National Bloc (Syria); Shahbandari opposition (Syria) Syrian Mardam government. See also Mardam, Jamil; National Bloc (Syria); Shahbandari opposition (Syria) Arab-Jewish agreement, 87 Arab Revolt, 86 as corrupt, 79 criticism of, 94 formation, 108 ja ’s care not to anger over Druze issue, 120–21, 122–23, 125 ja ’s cultivation and misleading of, 2–4, 160–61 ja ’s financial assistance, 127 Palestinian border under French control, 87 Palestinian question roundtable conference, 91–92, 93 and Palestinian revolutionaries, 87 policy towards Britain, 71 policy towards France, 84 al-Shahbandar as foreign minister, 75 spied on by ja , 64–65 tensions with National Bloc, 82–83, 84 ties with Sultan al-Atrash, 110 and Zionism, 73, 87 Syrian-Palestinian Committee in Egypt, 18 ‘Talhuq, Wadi, 43, 57 Tarabiyyah, Salih, 138, 139–40 Tarif, Salman (sheikh), 112 Tidhar, David, 18 transfer of Druze approval of plan, 148 failure of, 150–51 funding, 149–50 Hushi’s memo, 147–50 implementation, 141–45, 148–49 plan, 135–40

Index strengthening Jewish settlements, 146 to Syria, 136–40 transfer of Palestinians to Arab states, 27–28, 33, 136 benefits of, 146, 147 expulsion of Palestinians, 7 strengthening Jewish settlements, 146 to Syria, 28 transfer committees, 2, 27–28, 35, 37, 160 Transjordan, 8, 11, 75, 102–3 Zionist alliance with tribal sheikhs, 12 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (1936), 24, 108 Trifon, Reuven, 152 Trumpeldor, Joseph, 10 Turovsky, Aviva, 19 Vichy government, 104, 156–57 Vilensky, Nahum, 41, 45, 76 Weizmann, Chaim congratulating Syria’s new government, 57–58 denial of existence of Palestinian Arab people, 11 Druze transfer plan, 136, 145–46, 148 fake petitions, 10–11 Information Bureau, 11–12, 14 and King Faisal, 13 meeting with al-Shahbandar, 76–77 Palestinians transfer plan, 146 undermining Palestinian national movement, 11–12 Zionist Commission, 8 Zionist-Maronite-Druze alliance, 130 ‘world Jewry,’ 26, 37, 160 World War II, 71–72, 100, 150 World Zionist Organization. See Zionism and Zionist movement Yellin, David, 41 Zaghal, Shulamit, 104 Zaslansky (Shiloah), Reuven, 19, 61–63, 67–68 Zeineddine, Farid, 57 Zionism and Zionist movement. See also Arab-Jewish agreement; Arab

213 Revolt; immigration of Jews to Palestine; Jewish Agency (ja ); settlements of Jews in Palestine; transfer of Druze; transfer of Palestinians alliance of the minorities of Near East, 155 and Arab nationalism, 28–29, 160 Arab-Palestinian resistance to, 7, 10–11, 12 Arab Secretariat, 14 assistance to Syrian opposition, 79 belief in its global influence and power, 26, 37 as beneficial for National Bloc, 63 as beneficial to Druze, 115, 116, 122, 133, 144, 153, 155 as beneficial to Palestinians, 32, 35, 60, 115, 116, 134 blamed for Syrian-French treaty’s non-ratification, 95 and British, 136 as colonialist project, 29, 32, 36 conflation with Judaism, 29 cultivation of Palestinian collaborators, 11 as danger for Arabs, 90 as described by Epstein, 32 Druze alliance, 127, 141–45, 152 Druze Committee, 147 Emir Abdullah, 8 establishment of the ja , 16 financial resources depleted, 150 fomenting division between Druze and Arab Revolt, 136–39 fragmentation of Syria, 97–98 intelligence service movement’s fundamental tool, 159 interest in the Druze, 111–13, 114, 122–27 Jabal al-Druze relations with, 114, 143, 151–52 ja ’s role in preventing Arab unity, 2, 162 Jewish national home, 2, 3, 7, 32–33, 35, 162 loans to King Faisal, 13 Mardam’s position on, 60–61 mediators between Druze and France, 122

214

Index

need for direct negotiations with Arabs, 90 Palestinian existence ignored, 2, 11, 160 Palestinian policy, 27–28, 33 penetration into Druze leadership, summary, 155–57 protests against, 10 recruiting Arab support for, 14

rejection of Palestinian independence, 60 relationship with Jabal al-Druze, 143 slogans of the movement, 27 and Syrian independence, 28, 34 White Paper, 97 Zionist Commission, 8, 9 Zu’aytir, Akram, 73, 121 Zureiq, Constantin, 29

215

216

217

218