The Italian Communist Party: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow 0313209952, 9780313209956

Table of contents :
Contents
Tables
Preface
Acknowledgments
Part I. The Party’s Domestic Strategy through the Cold War: From Gramsci to Berlinguer
1. The Theoretical Roots of Italian Communism: Worker
Democracy and Political Party in Gramsci’s Thinking
Notes
2. From Gramsci to Togliatti: The Partito Nuovo and the Mass Basis of Italian Communism
Notes
3. The United States and the PCI: The Years of Policy Formation, 1942-1946
Notes
4. The United States and the PCI: The Year of Decision, 1947
Notes
5. From Togliatti to the Compromesso Storico: A Party with a Governmental Vocation
Notes
Part II. The Party’s Foreign Policies: Challenge and Response from the United States, the Soviet Union, and Western Europe
6. The PCI and International Relations, 1945-1975: The Politics of Accommodation
Notes
7. The PCI, Eurocommunism, and the Soviet Union
Notes
8. The PCI, Italy, and NATO
9. The PCI and Other Eurocommunist Parties: Implications for Atlantic Relations
10. The PCI and the International Economic Crisis
Notes
11. The PCI, Eurocommunism, and Universal Reconciliation: The International Dimension of the Golden Dream,
1975-1979
Bibliographic Essay
Index
Contributors

Citation preview

T H E ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Recent Titles in Contributions in Political Science Series E d itor Bernard K. Johnpoll Th e Fall and Rise o f the Pentagon: American Defense Policies in the 1970s Law rence J. K orb Calling a Truce to T e n o r Th e American Response to International Terrorism Ernest Evans Spain in the Twentieth Century World: Essays on Spanish Diplomacy, 1 8 9 8 -1 9 7 8 James W. Cortada From Rationality to Liberation: Th e Evolution o f Feminist Ideology Judith A Sabrosky Truman's Crises: A Political Biography o f H arry S. Truman H arold F. Gosnetl "B igotry!” : Ethnic, Machine, and Sexual Politics in a Senatorial Election Maria J. Falco Furious Fancies: American Political Thought in the Post-Liberal Era Philip Abbott Politicians, Judges, and the People: A Study in Citizens’ Participation Chartes H . Sheldon and Frank P . W eaver The European Parliam ent Th e Three-D ecade Search for a United Europe Paula Scalingl Presidential Primaries: Road to the W hite House James IV. Davis Th e V oice o f T error A Biography o f Johann Most Frederic Trautmann Presidential Secrecy and Deception: Beyond the Pow er to Persuade John M . O rm an The N ew Red Legions Richard A . G abriel Contem porary Perspectives on European Integration: Attitudes, Nongovernm ental Behavior, and C ollective Decision Making L eo n Hurwitz, ed itor

TH E ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow edited by Simon Serfaty and Lawrence Gray

C O NTRIB U TIO NS IN PO L IT IC A L SCIENCE, NUM BER 46

G R E E N W O O D PRESS W estport, Connecticut

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Main entry under tide: T h e Italian Communist Party. (Contributions in political science; no. 46 ISSN 0147-1066) Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Partito comunista italiano—History.

L Gray,

Lawrence. II. Serfaty, Simon. DL Series. JN5657.C63I68 324.245075 79-6833 ISBN 0-313-20995-2 lib. b d g Copyright © 1980 by Sim on Serfaty and Law rence G ray AD rights reserved. N o portion o f this book m ay b e reproduced, b y any process or technique, without the express written consent o f the publisher.

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Library o f Congress C atalog Card N u m ber 79-6833 ISBN: 0-313-20995-2 ISSN: 0147-1066 First published in 1980 G reenw ood Press A division o f Congressional Information Service, In c 88 Post Road W est, W estport, Connecticut 06881 Printed in the United States o f Am erica 10

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T o the mem ory of CH ARLES GROVE HAINES

CO N TEN TS

Preface Acknowledgments

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Part I. The Party’s Dom estic Strategy through the C old W ar: From Gram sci to Berlinguer 1. The Theoretical Roots o f Italian Communism: W orker Democracy and Political Party in Gramsd’ s Thinking Federico Mancini 2.

From Gramsci to Togliatti: The Partito N u ovo and the Mass Basis o f Italian Communism Law rence Gray

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The United States and the PCI: The Years o f Policy Formation, 1942 -1 9 4 6 Ennio di N o lfo

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The United States and the PCI: The Year o f Decision, 1947 Sim on Serfafy

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5. From Togliatti to the Com prom esso S torico: A Party with a Governm ental Vocation Gianfranco Pasquino

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vili

Contents

Part II. The Party’s Foreign Policies: Challenge and Response from the United States, the Soviet Union, and W estern Europe ((p T h e PC I and International Relations, 1945-1975: The Politics o f Accom modation

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__ £nna Maria Gentili and A n gelo Panebianco ( r ^ h e PCI, Eurocommunism, and the Soviet Union Claudio T erzi

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, ((& )T h e PCI, Italy, and N A T O , ^ R obert E. Osgood

143

79. The PC I and Other Eurocommunist Parties: Implications for Atlantic Relations M ichael M . Harrison 10. The PC I and the International Economic Crisis G iacom o Luciani and Giuseppe Sacco 11. The PCI, Eurocommunism, and Universal Reconciliation: The International Dimension o f the Golden Dream, 19 75 -1 9 7 9 Pierre Hassner

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Bibliographic Essay

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Index

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Contributors

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TA B L E S

1. Percentage o f Votes and Number o f Seats Gained by the National Parties in 1972, 1976, and 1979 76 2. Communist Parliamentarians’ Turnover Rate

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3. Occupational Breakdown o f PC I Membership, 1 9 47 -1 9 7 3

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4. Preferred Governmental Formula after the Signing of the Programmatic Agreem ent (July 1977) 92

PREFA CE

The aim o f this book is to provide a sophisticated introduction to the domestic and international history o f the most successful Communist party in Western Europe: the Italian Communist party (PC I). The first five chapters deal with questions o f party strategy, as affected by the legacy o f Antonio Gramsd, as shaped during the early years o f the cold war, and as refined during the subsequent years o f growth. The following six chapters focus on the international dimensions o f PC I policies in the contemporary world, with particular emphasis on those issues that are o f special relevance to U.S. interests and concerns. W hile there is a broad measure o f agreem ent on many o f the questions raised in this volume, numerous differences o f opinion remain am ong the various authors. These will em erge clearly enough from chapter to chapter. Beyond these differences, however, loom s one important tie between all contributors and editors, namely, their institutional and personal involvem ent— past or present— with the Johns Hopkins Center o f Advanced International Studies in Bologna, Italy. Although they are scattered am ong four different countries and nearly as many academic disciplines, all the con­ tributors in this collection have been associated with the “ Bologna Center” over the past fifteen years either as students, professors, and/or adminis­ trators. It is therefore fitting that, on the twenty-fifth anniversary o f the Center, this volum e should be dedicated to the m em ory o f Charles G rove Haines. Dr. Haines founded the Center in 1955 and remained its director until his retire­ ment in 1972, when he was replaced by one o f the two coeditore. It was Dr.

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Haines’ s total commitment to the Center (in fact, the physical extension to Italy o f the Johns Hopkins School o f Advanced International Studies in Washington, D .C.) that made it possible for this truly unusual institution to overcom e the difficult political circumstances o f the 1950s and the no less difficult econom ic conditions o f the late 1960s. AD o f us who have been associated with the Center are in a sense indebted to Dr. Haines for shaping our professional lives. By hopefully providing an impetus for further research on the PC I specifically and on Italy m ore generally, this collection o f essays wiU help us pay that d eb t Lawrence Gray Johns H opkins B ologna C enter Simon Serfaty Johns Hopkins S ch ool o f Advanced International Studies

ACKNOW LEDGM ENTS

The quotations on pages 4 to 8 ,1 2 to 14 from 2000 pagine di Gramsci by Antonio Gramsci, published in 1964 by II Saggiatore, Milan, are reprinted with the permission o f the Istituto Gramsci, Rome. The quotations on pages 132 and 139 from Progetti di tesi p e r il X V Congresso nazionale del P C I (Supplement o f L'Unita, Decem ber 10, 1978), are reprinted with the permission o f the publisher, Editori Riuniti, Rome. The quotations by G iorgio Am endola on page 195 taken from II P C I e il capitalismo occidentale, copyright in 1977, are reprinted with the permission o f Longanesi, Milan. The quotations on pages 196 and 207 to 209 from Austerità: occasione p er trasformare l'Italia by Enrico Berlinguer, copyright 1977, are reprinted with the permission o f the publisher, Editori Riuniti, Rom e. The quotations on pages 198 to 200 from Crisi econom ica e condiziona­ menti intemazionali dell'Italia by Eugenio Peggio, copyright 1977, are reprinted with the permission o f the publisher, Editori Riuniti, Rome. The quotations on page 206 from Intervista sul P C I by G iorn o Napolitano published in 1976 by Laterza, Bari, are reprinted by permission o f Lawrence Hill & Com pany, Westport, Connecticut for the United States and Journey­ man Press, London, for the United Kingdom. The quotations on pages 230 to 231 from Proposta di progetto a m edio termine, by the Partito Comunista Italiano, copyright 1977, are reprinted with the permission o f the publisher, Editori Riuniti, Rome.

FA R TI THE PARTY’S DOMESTIC STRATEGY THROUGH THE COLD WAR: FROM GRAMSCI TO BERLINGUER

THE TH EO RETIC A L R O O T S OF ITALIAN COMMUNISM: W ORKER DEM OCRACY AND PO LITICA L PARTY IN GRA M SCI’S THINKING

1 Federico Mancini

Trade unionism as the only possible achievement o f the spontaneous action o f die working class did not enjoy Lenin’ s favor. T o be sure, in his famous theoretical pamphlet o f 1902, What is to be done?, Lenin did recognize its necessity and even imparted directions for its organization: it should be occu­ pational, broad (that is, inclusive o f all segments o f opinion), and it should function openly. Yet, it is impossible not to detect a trace o f condescension in this attitude toward it What really interested Lenin was the party, which he saw as the repository o f revolutionary consciousness and therefore endowed with hegem ony over the whole working class and its homegrown institutions. A similar lack o f confidence and sympathy vis-à-vis the trade-union m ove­ ment o f his own country can be found in the writings o f the man who contributed most to the formation and the ideological characterization o f the Italian Communist party: Antonio Gramsci. In 1919, the majority o f the non-Catholic segment o f organized labor was controlled by the socialist re­ formists, and a substantial minority was under syndicalist rule. The latter trend is more harshly criticized by Gramsd ( “ a conglomerate o f demagoguery, o f pseudo-revolutionary and emphatic verboseness, o f irresponsible and undis­ ciplined spirit” ), but not to the point o f giving the form er too much credit either. M ore specifically, according to Gramsd, reformist trade unions are worthy o f respect only for what they did when the workers’ m ovem ent was taking its first steps. It was the reformist craft organization, wrote Gramsd, that was then “ best suited to the purpose o f defending the workers and improving

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The Party's Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

their living conditions.” In the first period o f capitalist expansion, he says elsewhere in an even more eulogistic m ood: W hen individuals cany weight to the extent that they are owners o f commodities and trade in such commodities, the workers too are forced to bow to the iron law o f general necessity and becom e traders o f the only com m odity they own, their ability to work and their professional intelligence. M ore exposed to the risks o f competition, the workers accumulated such property in larger and larger, m ore and m ore inclusive “ firms” ; they created this enormous cartel o f laboring flesh, im posed on their masters pieces and timetables, disciplined the m arket Th ey hired from without or developed from within a trustworthy staff, skilled in this kind o f speculation, capable o f mastering the conditions o f the market place, stipulating contracts, assessing commercial risks, undertaking profitable transactions.1

This was a necessary stage— Gramsci goes on to say— that had to be super­ seded by m ore mature forms o f organization. In the first place, the kind o f business unionism that the workers created at the outset was bound to de­ generate: Th e usual developm ent o f trade unions is marked by a decadence o f the revolutionary spirit o f the masses. W hile material strength grows, the spirit o f conquest drops, the vital force weakens, heroic intransigence is follow ed by the practice o f opportunism, the practice o f bread and butter. Growth in terms o f quantity brings about im­ poverishm ent in quality and a lazy adjustment to the social framework o f capitalism; it gives rise to a small-minded, miserly, petty-bourgeois mentality.2

But even if this decay did not occur, unions would be unable to play a leading role in the revolutionary process. Unions cannot be instrumental in a radical change o f societal structures precisely because they are institutions connected and consistent with the structures that should be changed. The point is m ade with great clarity: The craft and industrial unions, the labor chambers, the Confederazione Generale del La voro (C G L ) are forms o f proletarian organization typical o f the period o f history which is characterized by the dominance o f capital. In a sense, one could say that they are part and parcel o f the capitalist society and the function o f a system based on private property; the unions organize the workers not as producers, but as w ageearners, as vendors o f their work, namely as creatures o f the capitalist system o f private property. Unions combine the workers according to the tool they use or the material they transform. Using one certain tool, transforming one given material, reveals in the worker a specific aptitude for toil and earning. The worker settles, so to speak, in his particular aptitude and tends to regard i t . .. as the sheer means to make a living. T o the extent that they com bine him with his fellow workers w ho use the same

The Theoretical Roots o f Italian Communism

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tool or transform the same material, the craft or industrial unions rue instrumental in strengthening this mentality, in averting m ore and m ore the possibility o f the worker regarding himself as a producer, and they prompt him to think o f himself as a com ­ modity . . . which, through competition, fixes its own price.3

S o far, Gramsd follows in the footsteps o f Lenin, and, although more articu­ late, his position substantially coincides with Lenin’ s stance.4 The two men separate at this stage o f Gramsci’s developm ent over the issue o f the role o f the party. Gramsd did not think that the Socialist party (P S I), o f which he was a member, was or should have been the revolutionary agency o f the Italian working class. The difference is at least partly understandable in terms o f the party’s nature. W hen Lenin wrote What is to be done?, the Russian Sodai Democratic Workers’ party had been in existence for three years, and Lenin could hope to mold it upon the pattern he regarded as best suited to achieve the original purpose o f its formation. On the other hand, when Gramsd began editing L'O rd in e N u ovo, the Socialist Party was already twenty-three years old and had solidified in a pattem that could hardly be changed. It is interest­ ing, however, to observe how Gramsd tried to universalize the Italian experience— in other words, to present the unfitness o f the party for a revo­ lutionary role, not as a consequence o f Italian conditions but as a nearly logical datum. His argument here was basically the same one he used to deny the possibil­ ity o f a similar role for the unions: the unions are part and parcel o f the capitalist econom ic system, the party is part and parcel o f the bourgeois democratic system: The party sprang from political freedom and bourgeois dem ocracy, as an assertion and a developm ent o f this freedom and dem ocracy, and is based on the existing relationships between citizen and state and am ong the dtizens themselves. On the contrary, the revolutionary process takes place in the field o f production, in the factory, where there is but one relationship, that o f oppressor and oppressed, o f exploiter and exploited. . . , where the workingman has nothing and wants to conquer everything, where the pow er o f the owner is unlimited.3

The party may set the revolutionary process in motion, but it cannot em body such a process. W hen the party tries to do so, it jeopardizes the process and is doom ed as a worker’s party. A perfect example, suggested Gramsd, is the experience o f German Sodai Democracy (SPD ): The SPD violently forced the process o f the German proletarian revolution in tire m old o f its ow n organization and thought it was mastering history. Actually, the SPD has only succeeded in clogging and taming the revolution. Today, the only contact it has with historical reality is the contact o f Noske’s guns with the napes o f the workers’

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The Party's Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

necks,6 and the revolutionary process follow s an unchecked and sdii mysterious course that will sprout and em erge on the surface from unknown sources o f violence and sorrow.7

The Factory Council If unions and party are out o f the question, what institutions will em body and lead the revolutionary process? Gramsd’s answer is well known: the factory council. Before W orld W ar I, the Italian industrial workers had suc­ ceeded in winning from their employers the right to be represented on the plant level by institutions called commissioni interne. The com m issioni served as grievance committees, and the workers— especially those from Turin, the seat o f the Italian automobile industry— were greatly attached to them. Gramsd, who maintained a continuous and creative exchange o f ideas with the most intelligent, highly trained, and class-conscious workers in Turin, understood this attitude and prized it as a means to steer the commissions in a revolutionary direction. The commissions should be transformed into factory councils— institutions whose main purpose he described as “ preparing men and organizations in order that they be ready to replace management’s power in the factory” and, at the same time, “ to organize the whole social life in a new order.” 8 In entrusting the leadership o f the revolutionary m ovem ent to the factory councils, Gramsd was subjected to a variety o f influences. It cannot be doubted, for example, that he was strongly attracted by the “ spontaneist” current o f the late Marxist thinking (Rosa Luxemburg, Anton Pannekoek, even Daniel de Leon). H ow ever, the most important external contribution to Gramsd’s ideology o f the councils was given by the Russian Revolution itself. Thus, time and again, Gramsd pointed out that the revolution would have proved im­ possible without the Soviety. H e asks himself, “ Is there in Italy anything comparable to the Soviet, anything enabling us to say that the Soviet is not only a Russian institution, but a universal form, the universal form o f selfgovernm ent o f the working masses?” And the answer is Yes, there is in Italy, in Turin, the germ o f a workers’ governm ent, an em bryonic S o v iet the internal commission. L et us study this institution, let us also study the capitalist factory as a necessary form o f the working class, as a political organism, as the national territory o f the workers’s self-governm ent9

Yet, it would be improper to overrate these external influences. Gramsd never tried to translate the experience o f Russian sovietism into the dialect o f Turin. H e said it himself: “ W ill the Italian Communist revolutionary imitate the Russian Bolshevik? H e will, but only in the latter’ s intransigence, in the ludd coolness with which he shall analyze the course o f Italian events.”

The Theoretical Hoots o f Italian Communism

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Fundamentally, the ideology o f the councils is a creature o f Gramsd’s mind, the result o f his own theoretical meditation as applied to the Turinese industri­ al situation, and, at the same time, one o f his most important contributions to Marxism. His starting point is the perception that the worker becom es a revolutionary being— that is, places himself out o f the capitalist system— only when he thinks o f himself as a producer. S o long as the worker regards himself as a mere wage earner, he is still a creature o f the system and therefore an ob ject W ages are indeed a quid pro quo for the work he sells; and since his work cannot be abstractly isolated from him, it is really himself that he sells. But how does a worker arrive at the realization that he is a producer? H e does, in Gramsci’s answer, if he sees himself as an inseparable part o f the w hole process which is synthetized by the manufactured good, if he understands and lives the unity o f the industrial process which requests the work o f the unskilled worker, o f the white-collar worker, o f the engineer, o f the executive. But this is not enough. Th e worker can arrive at the realization that he is a producer if, after psychologically injecting himself into the particular production process o f a given factory (e .g , an autom obile plant in Turin) and thinking o f himself as a necessary elem ent o f this process, he transcends this stage and thinks o f Turin as a production unit characterized by the automobile, and under­ stands that most firms in Turin exist and develop only because an autom obile industry exists and develops, and sees the em ployees o f these firms as producers o f the autom obile industry too, because they create the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence o f such industry. Starting from the basic cell, the factory, com ­ prehended as a unit, the worker rises to the understanding o f larger units, and ulti­ mately o f the nation which is at its base a gigantic organization o f production, charac­ terized by its exports and imports, by the com m odities it exchanges for other com ­ modities com ing from all over the world. Thus the worker is a producer, because he has understood his functions in the process o f production on aO o f its levels, from the factory to the nation, to the world. Then he becom es a Communist because private property is not a function o f production, and he becom es a revolutionary because he understands that the property-owner, the capitalist, is a dead weight, an obstacle that has to be rem oved.10

In this process o f self-revelation, the worker can be powerfully helped by the existence o f a council. Proletarian dictatorship can be em bodied in an organization tailored for the producer rather than for the wage-earner. Th e factory council is the basic cell o f this organization because its rationale is work, industrial production, which is a permanent datum, rather than wages, which is a transient datum. Therefore, the council realizes the unity o f the working class, gives the masses a cohesion and a form that d o not differ from those which the masses take on in the general organization o f society. The factory council Is the m odel o f the proletarian state. AD the problem s inherent in the organiza­

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The Patty's Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

tion o f this state are also inherent in the organization o f the council. Both in the state and in the council the notion o f “ citizen” disappears and is replaced by the notion o f “ comrade.” Collaboration given by everybody for a better and larger production develops solidarity and multiplies the ties o f brotherhood. Each man is indispensable, each man occupies his proper place, each man has a function. Even the most back­ ward blue collar worker, even the vainest engineer can ultimately grasp this truth; aD eventually acquire a Communist consciousness and understand what a great step forward die realization o f a Communist econom ic system is. Th e council is the best tool o f education and developm ent o f the new social spirit that the proletariat has ever possessed. Workers’ solidarity, which in the trade unions o f old developed through the struggle against the em ployers, through suffering and sacrifices, is, in the council, positive and permanent.“

Factory Council, Trade Union and Political Party But what about the prerevolutionary phase in which Gramsci was active? In such a stage, the council does not exist in a vacuum. The working class has other institutions that, despite their inborn inadequacies, must be reckoned with. What were the relationships between these institutions (union, party, council) going to be? H ow could the prevalence o f the council be insured without causing dangerous ruptures am ong the workers, most o f whom still had strong emotional ties with their old organizations? These very important practical questions were given five successive an­ swers by Gramsci, revealing m ore and m ore clearly his deep-seated convic­ tions. On Novem ber 8, 1919, he wrote that the councils “ recognize the usefulness o f the craft and the industrial unions in the history o f class struggle and the need for the unions to continue carrying out their task. . . ; they recognize that the unions are an indispensable form o f organization and deem that all workers should join them.” 12 On June 5 ,1920, he said that the party and the unions “ should not be the guardians o f the councils, the new institu­ tions em bodying the historical process o f the revolution, but should confine themselves to establishing the external political conditions for a faster de­ velopm ent o f this process.” 13 On August 21, 1920, he maintained that “ the factory councils aim at destroying the old kind o f trade union organization.” 14 Seven days later, he made d ie same point in a m ore articulate way: “ The factory councils make their own laws; they cannot abide by the laws made by the unions, precisely because their immediate goal is to rem old the unions from top to bottom .” 13 Finally, on March 5, 1921, came the last, and most drastic, statem ent “ The unions must dissolve as such and merge with the councils, as happened in Soviet Russia.” 16 The reason for this escalation o f antiunion feeling is quite clear. As Gramsd’ s ideas were meeting increasing resistance am ong union and party bureaucrats, he, too, was growing increasingly impatient with them. Union

The Theoretical Roots o f Italian Communism

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resistance was caused by various factors. In som e cases, there was a genuine incomprehension o f Gramsd’s lucubrations. Thus, G. M. Serrati, the leader o f the party's Maximalist (revolutionary) wing, charged Gramsd with “ an odd confusion between the Soviefy, which are political institutions and, since the triumph o f the revolution, organs o f government, and the factory councils, which are technical organs o f production.” This is a justifiable criticism if one bears in mind that in the Western experience, wherever such councils existed (shop stewards' committees, com ités d'établissement, Betriebsräte), they were precisely institutions endowed with powers concerning the sheeriy tech­ nical aspects o f em ployer-em ployee relations in the plant In most cases, however, Gramsd’s stand clashed with vested interests, and it solidified ideological attitudes and psychologically understandable jealousies. The party leaders, and Serrati himself, had always firmly believed drat “ the dictatorship o f the proletariat would be the consdous dictatorship o f the Socialist party,” and the teachings o f Lenin, although hardly assimilated in their essence, had strengthened the leaders in this faith. Naturally enough, they were bound to be annoyed by the young Turinese com rade w h o— with a sort o f “ serene rudeness” 17 that was deem ed worse than arrogance— was claiming that in order for fire revolution to be successful, it should be carried out by the councils, the party being necessarily and organically “ destined to fetter and tame i t ” As to the unions, their reaction was bound to be even m ore bitter. Indeed, unlike the party, they were under the sway o f the refor­ mist wing, and all the talk about the com ing revolution quite naturally made their leaders nervous. N or were the historical precedents o f such a nature as to soothe them. As Gramsd diligently pointed out, in 1917 the Russian con­ federation o f labor was controlled by the Mensheviks, whereas the league o f the factory Soviefy was under the leadership o f the Bolsheviks, and everyone knows which organization eventually triumphed. Those being the terms o f the debate, Gramsd clearly m ade a major strategic blunder in antagonizing the party and the unions m ore than the natural dash o f interests would have warranted. Therefore, when he needed their help, he did not get it, or he got it in an insuffident degree. The reference here is to the tw o tests that the m ovem ent o f the councils faced in 1920. The first one occurred in April, when a minor dispute at the R at steel plant was converted by Gramsd’s group into a strike that extended to the entire Pied­ mont region and whose objective soon became recognition for the councils. When Gramsd and his friends, elated by the initial success o f their action, asked the Sodalist Party and the C G L (which they had up to that point ignored) to extend the strike outside o f Piedmont, the only area where they had influence and following, both the party and the union flatly refused. This refusal— it should be added— was not so much an expression o f their pique as a result o f their judgment that a general political strike would have petered out

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The Party’s Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

in a few days. Confined to Piedmont, the strike ended in defeat, and the workers were fortunate enough to secure a settlement on the basis o f main­ taining preexisting conditions. The second test— the occupation o f the industrial plants for twenty-seven days in Septem ber— is well known and does not require much description. Suffice to say that this time the union and the party had been carried into the position o f supporting the demand for worker control; but the indecision and the wavering o f their action proved in the clearest possible way that theirs was a superficial conversion only. A t a certain moment, the party washed its hands o f the dispute, and die C G L sought a traditional settlement based on eco­ nomic concessions by the employers. Despite promises o f governm ent action over the issue, the m ovem ent o f the councils had been defeated for the second time. Yet, the failure itself was relative, for the councils themselves had by and large passed the test o f the occupation, obviously the most difficult one to which, as newborn institutions, they could be subjected. Gramsci, who had said that the factory was “ the territory o f die workers’ self-government,” wrote during the occupation that “ each factory, which in the capitalist system is a little state ruled by a despotic master, is now an illegal state, a proletarian republic living day-by-day.” 18 These proletarian republics were run by the factory councils. If production continued within the limits o f the available raw materials (at Rat, as much as 70 percent o f die usual level), if practically no act o f sabotage occurred, and if wages were, to a point, regularly paid, it was because o f the factory councils. In die hardest circumstances— the white-collar workers and the technicians having refused to participate in the occupation— the councils revealed an organizational ability that has been recognized even by unsympathetic histo­ rians. And Piero Gobetti can be trusted when he described their leaders as “ young proletarians who devoted themselves to revolutionary propaganda, devoid o f messianic and humanitarian expectations, who unconsciously spoke the language o f Hegel, who at the top o f their thoughts had an arid and stem ideal o f state.” 19 In other words, Gramsd’ s theory and strategy may have been wrong; but, in relying upon the maturity o f the Italian workers’ elite, he was undoubtedly right After March 1921, for all practical purposes, the councils disappeared from Gramsd’s writings. Besides the disastrous failures o f 1920, one last issue caused this sudden change, and it is to this issue that w e must now turn. In 1919, the PSI, then under Maximalist control, had joined the Comintern, thereby approving the twenty-one points that the affiliates o f the new Com ­ munist International were required to accept O ne o f those points called for the expulsion o f the reformists— the Kautskys, the Hillquits, the Macdonalds — from the various Sodalist parties, a requirement that, as the Italian party understood it, had been fulfilled as early as 1912, when Bissolati and Bonomi, two extrem e rightwingers who had approved the Libyan war, had been ousted.

The Theoretical Roots o f Italian Communism

11

After a while, however, it becam e evident that M oscow's call for the expul­ sion o f the reformists covered the entire right wing o f the party— the Turatis, the Treves, the D’Aragonas— in other words, the men who had run the PSI until 1912 and, although presently a minority, who were still in control o f the powerful C G L and the no less powerful Cooperative League. For about, a year, the Comintern refrained from pressing the Socialist directorate too hard In the summer o f 1920, however, the issue could no longer be avoided. Confronted by M oscow's pressure, the party leadership stiffened. Costantino Lazzari pointed out that the Italian party could not be treated like the ordinary sodal-patriotic, collaborationist parties o f the Second International; that the reformists within it had accepted with discipline the pacifist policies o f the Maximalist majority in 1915; that they, too, had participated in the Zimmer­ wald movement, the very m ovem ent from which the Third International leadership had originated. Serrati added that "it was childish to believe that the revolution had not yet com e about in Italy because it had becom e entan­ gled in the beards o f Turati, D’Aragona, or Modigliani” ; and asserting, as the Russians did, that die expulsion o f these men would have paved the way for it was tantamount to "presenting the revolution in a falsely miraculous light, as something that could be accomplished by the stroke o f a magic w an d."20 Lazzari and Serrati were obviously right; but, no less obviously, they failed to understand the essence o f the Comintern’s stance. M oscow was not much concerned by Filippo Turati’s past merits, and it understood quite well that Turati still had a large following in the Italian working class (as a matter o f fact, Lenin’s advice to Serrati had been to part from Turati and then form an alliance with him). What M oscow wanted was a streamlined, 100-percentrevolutionary party in Italy, a party m olded on the Bolshevik pattern; and no party could be such while maintaining a strong reformist minority in its ranks. But, if Serrati— who, despite his revolutionary verbiage, was at heart an oldfashioned, sentimental Italian Socialist— did not understand, other men within the party did, or thought they did; namely, a Neapolitan group centered around an engineer, Am adeo Bordiga, and Gramsd’s Turinese group. Ever since Serrati, and with him the bulk o f the Maximalist leadership, rose against Moscow, these tw o factions had but one objective: to organize the split from the PSI and form a Communist party o f Italy. In January 1921, at Leghorn, this goal was attained: 59,000 workers, approximately one-third o f the PSI membership, joined the new m ovem ent The implication o f such developments, o f course, is that Gramsd lost inter­ est in the councils because at the very moment o f their failure, a new hope o f revolutionary action loom ed out o f the fog in the form o f the Communist party. But how could such a shift be possible? In Gramsd’ s previous thinking, the role o f the councils had been justified in terms o f their "naturalness,” o f their correspondence with the reality o f the production process and, hence, with the self-liberated worker's condition; while the party itself had always

12

The Patty's Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

been view ed as a somewhat artificial superstructure, running the risk o f stop­ ping the worker’s process o f self-revelation and regimenting the spontaneous march o f the working class toward the revolution. Now, if the large, loosely organized, internally fragmented Socialist party o f old had appeared to Gramsd so potentially dangerous, should he not have seen all the m ore readily a mortal danger in the small, closely-knit, hierarchical party o f Lenin? That he would have nevertheless “ accepted” the Communist party does not necessarily imply a radical change o f mind on his part Instead, it simply shows that Gramsci did not yet fully grasp the essence o f Lenin’s concept o f the vanguard. H e did see one thing clearly, though: the new party was not democratic in the traditional sense. “ Rising from the ashes o f the old Socialist parties” — Gramsd wrote— “ the Communist party repudiates its democratic and parliamentary origins, and reveals distinctive features that are original in history.” 21 But, far from bothering him, such a feature was bound to attract a man who had seen the cause o f the Socialist party’s revolutionary impotence in its being bom “ in the field o f freedom and dem ocracy.” As to the remainder o f Lenin’ s concept o f the vanguard, it escaped him almost completely, and the writings devoted by Gramsd to the subject for one m ore year prove quite dearly that to him the new party was not going to be an elite o f militaryminded professionell revolutionaries imposing itself on the working class. In­ stead, the PC I would be an organic expression o f that class, the repository o f all the values autonomously produced by it In this sense, then, one can safely assume that, in Gramsd’s vision, the party m erely took the place o f the councils, or rather, the party carried on, within a different framework, the experience o f the councils. The continuity o f Gramsd’s inspiration is made especially evident in a text written in September 1920, on the eve o f the Leghorn schism that prefigured the new party. Similarities in the role assigned to the party and the function that had been previously assigned to the councils appear most vividly in the second part o f die quotation that follows. The text itself is quoted at length to show further— particularly in its first half— the virile, austere, and yet passionate quality o f his humanism, a humanism that made him so incurably different from the prototypes o f the old Italian Sodalists and the leaders o f the new International. The Communist party is nowadays the only institution which can be seriously likened with the religious communities o f primitive Christianity.. . . The Communist is cer­ tainly not inferior to the Christian o f the catacombs. Th e opposite is true. The ineffable aim that Christianity gave its champions is, because o f its suggestive mystery, a full justification o f heroism, thirst for martyrdom, holiness; such human qualities as a strong character or an iron will are not necessary to stimulate the spirit o f sacrifice in those w ho believe in a heavenly reward. Th e Communist worker w ho, after eight hours in his factory, disinterestedly d evotes. . . eight m ore hours to the party is, from

The Theoretical R od s o f Italian Communism

13

the viewpoint o f the history o f mankind, a greater human being than the slave or the craftsman o f old, w ho dared aO dangers to attend the clandestine m eeting o f prayer. In the same sense, Rosa Luxem burg and Kar! Liebknecht are greater than Christ’ s greatest saints; greater precisely because the purpose o f their struggle was human, concrete, limited. On the other hand, the m ore defined the aim which the fighters o f the working class assign to themselves, the greater the m oral forces which support their will____Isn’t the very fact that the worker can still think, although forced to work without knowing the how’ s and the why’s o f his activity, a miracle in itself? This miracle o f the worker w ho day-by-day conquers his spiritual autonomy, wins his freedom to build in the realm o f ideas, struggling against his weariness, his boredom , toe m onotony o f his gestures which tend to mechanize and hence to destroy Ms inner life, this miracle is recognized in the Communist party and is expressed by their will to fight and to bu ild The functions o f a factory worker are sheerty executive. H e does not understand toe general process o f production. H e is not a point that m oves to form a line. Rather, he is like a nail hammered into a given place, and toe line results from toe succession o f nails that an extraneous hand has arranged for its own goals. Th e worker tends to cany over this conception o f himself to all other facets o f life. H e readily accepts everyw here the status o f a material executor, the status o f a “ mass” guided by an outside will. H e is intellectually lazy, he cannot or does not want to face problems that do not im m ediately concern him; therefore, he lacks judgem ent in the choice o f his leaders and allows himself to be deceived by phony promises. H e likes to believe that he can gain much with little effort, with little thought. Th e Communist party is the instrument and toe historical form o f toe worker’ s process o f inner Hberation, the process through which toe executor grows into an initiator, toe mass-man becom es a leader, the arm turns into brains and will. In toe formation o f the Communist party there is a germ o f freedom that will develop and fully expand once the necessary material conditions are organized by the proletarian state. Th e slave or toe craftsman o f toe Roman w orld learned to know himself, liberated himself by joining a Christian community, w here he concretely felt he weis equal, w here he was toe brother being toe son o f toe same father. Th e same happens to toe worker when he joins the Communist party; because in the party he cooperates in discovering, in inventing new ways o f life, he thinks, he foresees, he is given a responsibility, he organizes besides being organized, he feels part o f a vanguard that runs on ahead, leaving toe mass o f the people trailing behind.22

Prince and People? As everyone knows, the grim reality o f the late twenties and o f the thirties betrayed these expectations, and one can only make conjectures about how a free and active Gramsd would have responded to such a betrayal. Unfortu­ nately, Gramsd was forced to follow the course o f events mostly from prison; and in the last years o f his political militancy, though for the most part in jail, he turned to the Leninist doctrine o f the party. N or should this conversion unduly surprise the observer. On the one hand, Gramsd was not directly

14

The Party’s Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

exposed to the honors o f Stalinist rule. On the other hand, one should bear in mind that the theory o f the councils and o f the party as vehicles through which the working class directly wields its power was founded on the hypothesis, then shared by all Communists, that the revolution in Italy and in Europe was within sight Once this hypothesis had been proven wrong and the Italian party was confronted by the dreary prospect, first, o f a hopeless opposition against triumphant fascism, later, o f many years o f clandestine work, that theory lost much o f its significance. The Leninist party— that is, in Lenin’ s own words, “ an organization containing primarily and chiefly people whose occupation is revolutionary activity” — was now a necessity, precisely because Italy found herself in a political condition similar to that o f Russia at die beginning o f the century, when Lenin wrote What is to be done?, and Gramsd bow ed to this necessity. It was not, however, an unconditional surrender. The pattem o f the revolu­ tion as an autonomous and creative act o f the great majority was given up, and, conversely, the legitimacy o f a self-investiture by the party was acknowl­ edged while the aspect o f authority was revalued. During the fight against Bordiga for control o f the party, Gramsd went so far as to view dissent as a token o f betrayal and to justify the repression o f factionalism and heresy in terms o f a moral imperative. But, in spite o f this, he left no stone unturned in avoiding the danger o f isolation o f the party from the working class. One can indeed say that the more he saw the need for the party to becom e disdplined and dosed, the m ore he sought to deepen and broaden its roots. During the two years preceding his imprisonment, precisely while he was accepting Leninism, he did his best to depict the party as the continuator and the redpient o f die Italian Sodalist tradition. In his beautiful obituaries o f Matteotti and Serrati, reformism and maximalism are harshly criticized, but they are also view ed in a historical perspective; and the living part o f their legades is said to find its new location in communism. Yesterday while the mortal remains o f G iacom o Matteotti w ere being laid to rest and the thoughts o f the workers in the factories and the fields from every com er o f Italy w ere turned to this sad cerem ony; while slaves, w ho d o not yet despair o f their redemption, w ere m oving in flocks from the areas around R ovigo and Ferrara to attend it in person— yesterday, in comm emorating Matteotti, a group o f reformist workers applied for membership in the Communist party. W e feel that in this gesture there is something which breaks the vidous drcle o f the vain efforts and the useless sacrifices, something which forever overcom es the contradictions (o f old Reform ism ), which shows the Italian proletariat what lesson should be drawn from the death o f the pioneer, fallen in his own footsteps, with no path open before him.23

In jail, Gramsd went even further. The Communist party had by then becom e an integral part o f the whole national tradition; its historical role, its very struggle for sodalism, was view ed as the continuation and the condusion o f

The Theoretical Roots o f Italian Communism

15

the Risorgim ento, a work that the bourgeoisie left unfinished This was the last and, in terms o f its consequences, possibly die most important develop­ ment in Gramsci’ s thinking. The Risorgim ento fell short o f its promises, and the nation-state that em erged from it never really solidified because the bourgeois elite that led the m ovem ent failed to create “ a collective national and popular will.” The peasants, then the immense majority o f the popula­ tion, were particularly ignored and left to the political hegem ony o f the landed gentry and the church. Com pleting the Risorgim ento meant, therefore, that the Communist party must do what the bourgeoisie had not been able or had not wanted to do: lead the forgotten masses, the peasants, and the other subaltern social groups from behind the backdrops into the limelight o f na­ tional politics— in other words, forge the collective national and popular will that, throughout Italy’s history, had never coalesced. N or— Gramsd went on to say— are w e short o f historical examples from which to draw our inspira­ tion: the Jacobins did it in France during the Revolution; N icolò Machiavelli theorized it in Italy during the sixteenth century.24 Gramsci was not the first Leninist to be attracted by the Florentine sec­ retary. The latter’ s attempt to point to the useful as com pared to the good or the just, his notion o f “ virtue” as a combination o f intelligence, energy, and resoluteness, his conviction that such virtue, if properly applied, can defeat “ fortune,” were all bound to appeal to men who reduced ethics to politics and, within Marxism, emphasized the role o f human volition as opposed to a sheerly deterministic view o f historical developm ent25 In our case, however, the Machiavelli who interested Gramsci was not so much the founder o f the science o f politics, or toe realistic observer o f human nature, but toe man who speculated on toe possibility o f building a powerful, bourgeois nation-state in Italy. This task is entrusted by Machiavelli to toe Prince, and one o f toe prerequisites o f toe Prince’s success is that he involve all toe people in his struggle in such ways as, for example, substituting a national militia o f citizens and countrymen for toe traditional mercenary armies used in Italian wars. Now, this pattem— an autocratic and, in M achiavelli^ sense, “ virtuous” ruler forming and leading a people in toe foundation o f a coherent state— deeply impressed Gramsci, as a préfiguration o f toe job that lay ahead o f toe Communist party during his time. In toe twentieth century, Gramsci wrote: Th e prince cannot be a real person, a concrete in d ivid u al. . . In the m odem world, only an im m ediate political action characterized by the need o f a flashing decisionmaking process, may becom e incarnate in a concrete individual. Such a need can only b e prom pted by a great and imminent danger, capable o f making passions red-hot, o f giving rise to fanaticism and o f annihilating the critical sense and the ironical corrosive­ ness that might otherwise destroy the charismatic character o f the leader. Because o f its very nature, however, an immediate action o f this sort cannot be o f great im port In most cases, it will be restorational or reorganizational; not the kind o f action consisting in the foundation o f new states or new national and social structures.. . . It will be

16

The Party’s Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

defensive, not creative; it will be an action presupposing that an already existing collective will has becom e enervated and dispersed, has suffered a dangerous, threatening, but not decisive or catastrophic breakdown, and therefore needs a re­ charging and a strengthening; not an action presupposing that a collective will has to b e forged out o f nothing and to be directed towards goals whose concreteness and rationality have not yet been tested by an actual and universally known historical experience. Today, such an action can only be undertaken by an organism, a group containing a germ o f collective will: this organism has already been provided by history: it is the political party.26

The Communist party as the m odem Prince was therefore Gramsd’s final formula: the formula reconciling his natural “ democratic” bent, as expressed previously by his vision o f the council and now by his insistence on die role o f the “ collective will,” and the Leninist superstructure that the political condi­ tions o f the twenties and the thirties im pelled him to superimpose on the former. In effect, the conciliation was to a large extent only in his mind. Machiavel­ li’s formula (Prince and people) might have been appropriate to his own time as a means to create in Italy an absolute kingdom after the French or the Spanish exam ple; but in the twentieth century and in a country that had undergone a m ore or less democratic experience after Giolitti’ s com ing to power, it was not tenable. The history o f the PC I after W orld W ar II proves it The party remained loyal to Leninism and to its original revolutionary ver­ balism, while at the same time trying to be a national and popular m ovem ent that could appeal to all segments o f the Italian population. But, on the one hand, it was Leninism that scared away large social groups, thus making it impossible for the party to capture direct or indirect control o f a majority electorate. On the other hand, the conquest o f a large minority electorate (one-third o f the total vote) was made possible only by a gradual shift toward the Right, thus causing a considerable dilution o f the original Leninist sub­ stance, which— revolutionary impulses having been set aside— had by then shrunk to a mortifying and, under the circumstances, less and less under­ standable prohibition o f organized dissent within the party ranks. This is the strictly political consequence o f the conciliation attempted by Gramsd. The ideological consequence that in a way preceded and facilitated the form er is even m ore banehil. It can be defined as a watering o f the very Marxist inspiration o f the party by a generous addition o f populism. During its long history, o f course, Marxism has been many things: at its outset, it was a critical theory that would transform the world by exposing its inner contradictions; in the 1890s, it became, mainly due to the contribution o f Engels, a cast-iron system o f laws from which the inevitability o f socialism could be deduced with almost mathematical certainty;27 it reverted to its form er outlook without giving up the latter in its Leninist version. But

The Theoretical Roots o f Italian Communism

17

throughout all these stages, it held fest to the notion o f a working class, even if sometimes merely in terms o f a lip service. Populism, in all its historical forms and national variants, has nothing to do with this notion. Indeed, the notion o f a working class implies a vertical rupture o f society, whereas the notion o f “ people,” even in the narrow sense o f the word, does n o t One is a m ember o f the proletariat if one is exploited— that is, technically— if the surplus value o f one’s labor is extorted by the owner o f the means o f production; one is a member o f the people if one is poor, humble, oppressed (the small landholder, the small retailer, the artisan, are members o f the people, they are in no sense proletarians). Hence, the notion o f working class contains a total critique o f the societal structures and involves a struggle aiming at their overthrow; the notion o f people only involves a redress. M oreover, the working class is an international reality, whereas the concept o f people is always a national reality, unthinkable without the con­ nective tissue o f a geographically limited tradition and sometimes without a particular linguistic and literary heritage. The notion o f working class is firmly rooted in a materialistic world outlook; the notion o f people often expresses its frustration in religious terms and tends to identify itself with religious movements. The contrast could be qualified in many m ore ways. But what has been said so far is sufficient to conclude that populism and Marxism are fundamentally at variance, even when the former paves the way for the latter (as happened in Russia) or when a Marxist party puts on, for tactical reasons and for som e time, a populist dress (for example, the Popular Front in France in the thirties). Gramsci’ s “ collective popular and national will” is undoubtedly a populist notion. O f course, his populism is very sophisticated, but— as Alberto Asor Rosa has shown in a brilliant essay28— also quite authentic. Thus, Gramsci avoids chauvinistic tones; but the Risorgim ento writer he prefers is Vincenzo Gioberti, who had pictured in a book o f 1843 the supremacy o f Italy, brought about by the restoration o f the papacy as a moral dominion, founded on religion and public opinion (and it is interesting to observe that it was Gioberti who first emphasized the national-popular nexus). This conception is not religiously inspired, but it takes into account very seriously the religious faith o f the p eo p le “ The word ‘dem ocracy’ ,” Gramsd says in a bewildering pas­ sage, “ should be taken not only in its secular meaning, but also in its Catholic, even reactionary, meaning. What really matters is to get in touch with the people, with the nation, v iew ed . . . as an active, living unit, whatever the contents o f this life may be.” 29 Gramsd’s late populist attitude is also evident in his meditations about Italian literature, whose plight progressively becam e his primary concern. A national and popular will is above all expressed by a corresponding literature. Italian literature had never been popular and therefore national; it had been and still was a literature o f and for cosmopolitan intellectuals. This was an

18

The Party's Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

age-old complaint in Italy: one finds it in Gioberti and in another mentor o f Gramsd, Francesco de Sanctis. In his famous Storia della Letteratura Italiana, de Sanctis maintained that the divorce between intellectuals and people took place at the end o f the Middle Ages, and he finds it symbolized by the very scheme o f the last m edieval masterpiece o f Italian literature, Boccaccio’s Decam eron (1353). The Black Death was raging in Florence, and ten members o f the learned aristocracy fled from the town to the exquisite seclusion o f a great villa garden on the slopes under Fiesole, where they spent their time telling stories about the people in their infinite variety— the priests, the monks, the peasants, die artisans, the humble burghers, the petty merchants— and all are mocked, all are shown in their meanness and their vulgarity. H ere is the cleavage: this intellectual laughing at the people from the outside, with the awareness o f not being part o f it Gramsci accepted this view and prompted the Italian in­ tellectuals to “ g o down to the people,” “ to take root in the popular humus, as it is, with its cheap taste, its moral and intellectual inclinations, however back­ ward and conventional they may be.” 30 H e reminded them again and again that there would not be a new renaissance if they did not first go to the people: and never mind if, in order to d o so, “ one should start writing serial stories o f the lowest kind or third-rate operas.” 31 AD this, o f course, has to be seen in perspective. Gramsd aimed at the creation o f a new integrated culture o f a mass character, but, apart from the fact that this is not a spedfically Marxist aspiration (it was shared by Catholics and bourgeois radicals), the course he advised the intellectuals to follow in order to attain this end showed very dear traces o f his conversion to the “ religion o f the people,” to a way o f viewing the people as a m odel and the object o f a progressive political hypothesis.32 I have called this conversion “ baneful” ; it might be christened a “ regression.” Although undergoing a crisis in both its Social-Democratic and its Leninist wings, Marxism has proved and still proves its ability to cope with m odem industrial sodety. In som e countries, it has grafted itself into die industrial sodety, profoundly m odifying its values; elsewhere, it has produced its own constellation o f values, challenging as an equal the values expressed by indus­ trial sodety; it has been capable o f growing young again and adjusting itself— as Leninism, Maoism, and the Swedish Meidner plan have shown— to the most varied conditions; contemporary critical theories o f the industrial sodety still find it necessary to reckon with this old guest Populism is a much weaker opponent o f the capitalist system, particularly o f its present consumption-geared version, because it lacks Marxism’s ambition to remake men, to rem odel relations am ong men by changing the basic relations o f production. Thus, after an intense and usually short blaze, it has always been crushed and hegem onized by the system. The Greenback, Free-Silver, and People’s parties in the United States and the Social Credit party in the

The Theoretical Roots o f Italian Communism

19

Canadian prairies are, as such, old curiosities, and, although they have had a lasting impact by influencing other and more vital political movements, they have been com pletely integrated by them. This is not to say, although som e observers in Italy do, that the Italian Communist party should be added to this depressing list But certainly som e o f its less successful policies in the last thirty years can only be accounted for by its having becom e drenched, under the powerful influence o f Gramsd, by a populist mentality. Professor Hughes writes that “ it is one o f the major ironies o f interwar history that the one man capable o f swinging at least part o f international communism in the direction o f humane and tolerant values should have languished a prisoner during the decisive years o f Stalinist or­ thodoxy.” 33 This is a perfectly acceptable assessment from a non-Marxist view point From a Marxist angle, how ever revised and modernized, the real irony is that the most gifted, cultivated, sensitive, and morally unimpeachable leader o f international communism in the interwar period should have, al­ though unwittingly, contributed so much to the depletion o f his party’s poten­ tial for radical change.

N otes 1. Antonio Gramsd, “ Sindacati e consigli,” L ’Ordine Nuovo (October 11,1919), in Antonio Gramsd, 2000 pagine di Gramsd (Milan: U Saggiatore, 1964), voL 1, p. 422. 2. Antonio Gramsd, “ Sindacalismo e consigli,” L ’Ordine Nuovo (November 8, 1919), in 2000 pagine, vol. 1, p. 428. 3. Ibid. 4. As Professor Stuart Hughes put it, Gramsd’s fragmentary writings reveal him “ as a Marxist thinker of unparalleled range and depth of culture: alongside them, Lenin’s theoretical works look crude indeed." Henry Stuart Hughes, Consdousness and Sodefy: The Reorientation of European Sodai Thought, 1890-1930, 1st ed (New York: Knopf, 1958), p. 101. 5. Gramsd, “ Sindacalismo e consigli,” in 2000 pagine, vol. 1, p. 430. 6. Gustav Noske was Ebert’s Sodalist minister of war and, in 1919, he ordered the police to fire at the insurgent Spartakan. 7. Gramsd, “ Sindacalismo e consigli," in 2000 pagine, vol. 1, p. 431. 8. Gramsd, “ Sindacati e consigli,” in 2000 pagine, vol. 1, pp. 423V424. 9. Ibid, p. 424. 10. Ibid, 429. 11. Ibid., pp. 422-23. 12. Antonio Gramsd, “ U Programma dei commissari di reparto,” in 2000 pagine, voL 1, 433. 13. Antonio Gramsd, “ 0 consiglio di fabbrica,” L ’Ordine Nuovo (June 5,1920), in 2000 pagine, vol. 1, p. 465. 14. Antonio Gramsd, “ Partito e sindacati,” L ’Ordine Nuovo, (August 21,1920), in 2000 pagine, vo i 1, p. 485.

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The Peaty’s Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

15. Antonio Gramsd, “ D Programma dell’Ordine Nuovo,” L ’Ordine Nuovo (Au­ gust 28, 1920), in 2000 pagine, vol. 1, p. 482. 16. Antonio Gramsci, “ Sindacati e consigli,” L ’Ordine Nuovo (March 5,1921), in 2000 pagine, vol 1, p. 563. 17. Piero Gobetti, La rivolutone liberale: saggio sulla lotta politica in Italia (Turin: Einaudi Editore, 1972), p. 106. 18. Antonio Gramsd, “ Domenica rossa,” Avanti! (September 5, 1920), in 2000 pagine, vo l 1, p. 498. 19. Gobetti, La rivoluzione liberale, pp. 112—13. 20. Gaetano Arfè, Storia del socialismo italiano (1892—1926) (Turin: Piccola Bib­ lioteca Einaudi, 1972), pp. 292-93. 21. Antonio Gramsd, “ Il Partito Comunista,” L ’Ordine Nuovo (September 4, 1920), in 2000 pagine, vo l 1, p. 492. 22. Ibid., pp. 490-91. 23. Antonio Gramsd, “Ddestino di Matteotti,” Lo Stato Operaio, August 28,1924, in 2000 pagine, v o l 1, pp. 426-27, and “ Qcompagno G. M. Serrali e le generazioni del sodalismo italiano,” L ’Unità (May 14, 1926), in 2000 pagine, vol. 1, p. 768. 24. Antonio Gramsd, Quaderni del carcere, Edizione critica dell’Istituto Gramsd (Turin: Nuova Serie Einaudi, 1975), vo i 3, p. 1560. 25. Machiavelli’s well-known statement on the femininity of fortune is particularly applicable to the 1917 conflid between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. In dealing with fortune, Machiavelli wrote, “ One should be vehement rather than respectful, because fortune is a woman, and in order to subdue her, one should hit her and knock her.. . . And being a woman, she is friendlier to the young, because they are less respectful, more ferocious and give her orders with more audadty.” The Prince (Baltimore: Penguin, 1971), p. 133. 26. Gramsd, Quaderni, vol. 3, p. 1558. 27. George Lichtheim, Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study (New York: Ptaeger Publishers, 1961), chap. 4 passim. 28. Alberto Asor Rosa, Scrittori e popolo (Rome: Savelli, 1979), p. 183. 29. Gramsd, Quaderni, vol. 3, p. 1740. 30. Ibid., p. 1822. 31. Ibid., p. 1741. 32. Asor Rosa, Scrittori e popolo, p. 19. 33. Hughes, Consciousness and Society, p. 102.

FROM GRAM SCI TO TO G LIA TTI: THE P A R T IT O N U O V O AND THE M ASS B A S IS O F ITALIAN COMMUNISM

Lawrence Gray

The Italian Communist party (P C I) was a member o f coalition governments before the end o f W orld W ar II and during the immediate postwar period (1 9 4 4 -1 9 4 7 ). In later years, this developm ent was known as the svolta di Salerno (Salerno turning point)1 and was consistent with the PCI’ s open advocacy o f a parliamentary, rather than a revolutionary, road to socialism. M oreover, the svolta di Salerno heralded the creation o f the partito nuovo (new party): the transformation o f the PC I from a Leninist cadre party to a m odem mass political party. The svolta di Salerno and the partito nuovo, both fundamental to the future electoral advance o f the PCI, were consonant with party leader Paimiro Togliatti’s long-held belief in the utility o f the dem o­ cratic process.

The Gramsci-Togliatti Nexus The pragmatic, gradualist path o f the PC I throughout the postwar period was a natural consequence o f the strategic outlook o f Paimiro Togliatti, who was party secretary-general from the late 1930s until his death in 1964. And the political outlook o f Togliatti developed as part o f an Italian Marxist tradi­ tion whose principal creative expression was the career and writings o f An­ tonio Gramsci. From Gramsd, the PC I acquired an identity o f its own that enabled it to play an important part in the political and intellectual life o f the country after the overthrow o f the Fascist dictatorship in 1944. Indeed, Gramsd becam e something o f an apostolic figure in the post-1945 history o f

21

22

The Party's Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

Italian communism, vitally important to the party when it set out to invent an “ Italian road to socialism.” 2 The relationship between Gramsci and Togliatti was close and complex. Both were among the small group o f militants who broke away from the Italian Socialist party to found the PC I in 1921. Both leaders consistently emphasized the need to approach the bourgeoisie as well as the proletariat on their own terms. By the late 1920s, Togliatti came to share Gramsd’s outlook regarding the possibility o f a transitional stage between capitalism and so­ cialism, and the legitimacy o f Communist advocacy o f intermediate dem o­ cratic objectives. Both consistently underscored the intrinsic nexus between intermediate democratic objectives and the need for a strategy o f alliances with all the “ subordinate” classes in Italian society. Yet, while it is important to note the intimate connection between many o f their ideas, it is also necessary briefly to mention their fundamental dif­ ferences.9 On the one hand, Gramsd, as a Marxist thinker, was the more profound o f the tw o leaders. Gramsci attempted to analyze the form s o f integration in bourgeois society as a precondition for devising a suitable revo­ lutionary strategy. The concepts o f “ hegem ony” and “ historical bloc” and the role o f the “ intellectual” testify to the enormous importance that Gramsd attributed to “ culture” (in the broad meaning o f ideologies, values, world views) in his efforts to analyze m odem capitalist sodety. On the other hand, Togliatti, as a political leader, devoted little time to such questions.4 The response o f both leaders to events o f the 1930s reflects these differences: whereas Gramsd firmly disagreed with the PC I line and its subservience to Stalinist needs during the Comintern era, Togliatti proved himself to be an obedient Communist and unswervingly follow ed M oscow’ s temporary line o f immediate proletarian revolution. M oreover, shortly after Gramsd’s death in 1937 and the open acknowledgment o f Togliatti as his successor, there began a kind o f official PC I recasting o f the Gramsd-Togliatti nexus to the advantage o f Togliatti. During the early part o f the postwar period, the links between the two were deliberately idealized by the PC I at the price o f a near-total silence on the phases o f dissent and con flid between Gramsd and the rest o f the PC I leadership that had developed during Gramsd’ s imprisonment In recent years, however, the PC I leadership has gradually taken a m ore open and honest attitude toward Gramsd’s theoretical work and political positions.5 But even when the differences are acknowledged, it would seem that T o ­ gliatti was indeed the successor o f Gramsd in terms o f stratège outlook. For example, during the early years o f W orld W ar II and while he was still in exile in Moscow, Togliatti devoted considerable time to rethinking m odem Italian history. H e was aided in this activity by a d ose study o f Gramsd’ s voluminous Prison N otebooks, which had been sm ugged out o f Italy in 1938 and sent to Togliatti in M oscow for safekeeping. U ang a series o f ingenious metaphors,6 Gramsd had written meticulously— on scraps o f paper available to him in

From Gramsci to Togliatti

23

prison— his analysis o f m odem Italian capitalist society. Through a careful reading o f the Notebooks, Togliatti discovered Gramsci’ s own reflection upon the entire course o f events that follow ed the Italian Risorgim ento .7 Gramsci’s work would provide Togliatti with the historical framework necessary for outlining the design o f PC I domestic strategy in the postwar period. Thus, while the historical experiences o f Gramsd and Togliatti were indeed widely different, their com mon strategic preferences began to appear anew before the eve o f the national liberation from fascism. B elow the surface o f con­ formity with the needs o f Soviet foreign policy, Togliatti’ s postwar actions suggest that he stood ready to implement these strategic preferences should circumstances perm it

The Svolta D l Salerno Apart from the wartime demands o f Soviet foreign policy, Italian Com ­ munist participation in a national coalition governm ent in 1944— known as the svolta di Salerno8— was to be a significant developm ent in Italian political history. W hile it was essentially a Soviet tactical m ove on an international level, the svolta was a strategic m ove within the context o f Italian politics, which prepared the way for the creation o f the partito nuovo. Hence, the svolta was the first step in chancing the PC I from a Leninist cadre party to a m odem mass party. Togliatti opted for a gradualist approach in the conquest o f state pow er through the integration o f the working class into the Italian political system. The need to control the radicalized Communist partisans prompted him to give top priority to party reorganization. Increases in party membership were encouraged, and the PC I strove to achieve a presence in all sectors o f Italian society. Extremist tendencies am ong the rank-and-file were quickly smothered, while ideological fervor was tem pered in favor o f pragma­ tic politiceli goals. Indeed, the creation o f the partito nuovo in 1945 not only reflected the constraints on revolutionary activism that the PC I had accepted in the Resistance, but it also forecast the nature and even the extent o f Italian Communist party growth in later years. That a convergence o f interests existed between M oscow and the PC I was evidenced by the attitude o f die Soviet Union upon Togliatti’s return to Italy after a long exile in Moscow. This attitude was expressed in the Soviet recog­ nition o f the coédition governm ent headed by Marshal Pietro Badoglio9 and the PC I's decision to participate in this coalition. The PC I decision was an­ nounced by Togliatti in a press conference on April 1, 1944 when he had been in Italy for only five days.10 The terms o f the svolta di Salerno— participation in the Badoglio govern­ ment, recognition o f the Italian monarchy, political peace between the parties, and social peace between the classes— gave a very specific quality o f com ­ promise to both Togliatti’s initiative and the entire 19 43 -1 9 4 5 period.11 A t

24

The Party’s Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

the moment o f his return to Italy, Togliatti’ s political strategy for the postwar period appeared to be based upon the following assumption: there would be a stable peace and cooperation between M oscow and the W est that would, in turn, guarantee a slow but peaceful Communist conquest q f political hegem ony.12 In order to be successful, the terms o f the svolta demanded, in the long run, a stable political context on both an international and a national level. A cooperative, functional agreem ent on a world level between M oscow and the West was a necessary condition for an agreem ent o f national unity between the parties within Italy. What was implied was a gradualist perspective for the Italian Left. And, the svolta tended to reinforce the credibility o f the party’s professed belief in the validity o f the democratic process, and even thrust the PC I into a preeminent political position in relation to the other political parties. But there were costs as well. The international situation was not evolving in a way that was favorable to Togliatti’ s plans. Togliatti’s goal o f “ national unity” am ong all political parties remained unchanged, even as the political climate in Italy, reflecting the beginnings o f the cold war, grew increasingly conservative. By courting a broad coalition, rather than m oving firmly into opposition, the PC I reduced the prospects o f a m ore effective operational unity with the Socialists (P S I) and, perhaps, the Actionists (P d ’A ) as well. In a certain way, the Communists’ willingness to compromise on nearly all issues13 only accentuated the widespread fears am ong non-Communist forces about the PC I's doppiezza (ambiguity) over real intentions. This fear, in turn, re­ flected the dualism o f Italian political culture, which was split between Marxist and non-Communist political parties. This also explains the PC I’s own diffi­ dence about an aggressive policy lest it shatter the equilibrium established within the broadbased anti-Fasdst coalition.14 But this diffidence, which may have cost the PC I opportunities in the cold-war context o f the late forties, also proved to be the strength o f PC I strategy in the years to com e. Togliatti was constantly aware o f the exam ple o f 1919—1922 when extremism within the workers m ovem ent nearly destroyed the Italian Left.15One o f the most impor­ tant consequences o f the svolta, confirmed with the creation o f the partito nuovo, was the maturing o f the PC I into a prudent and responsible political force, conscious o f the danger o f a conservative offensive and determined to avoid provoking it at all costs.16 Throughout the postwar period, this chosen evolution o f the PC I would consistently predispose Togliatti to caution rather than to audacity.

The “New Party” Near the end o f W orld W ar II, one o f Togliatti’ s major goals was to lay the mass bads for Italian communism. T o this end, the PC I strove to becom e a

From Gramsci to Togliatti

25

“ new party."17 This new type o f Communist party would no longer be a Leninist cadre party ( “ few er but better” ), but it would open its ranks to anyone in the broad masses o f the population willing to join.18 It would, m ore­ over, play a positive role in resolving national problems, while not, o f course, abandoning its ultimate objective o f socialism.19 The essence o f the new party was outlined by Togliatti in numerous speeches during the years 1 9 44 -1 9 4 5 .20 The partito nuovo em erged conceptually during the height o f W orld W ar II, at a time when the PCI, as an individual Communist party, began to develop in a more autonomous direction.21 As indicated earlier, the terms o f the svolta di Salerno revealed m ore than just a clever strategy for collaboration with the other anti-Fasdst parties. It revealed a political line that gave top priority to national liberation well before the end o f the war and to national reconstruc­ tion in the postwar period.22 The transformation o f toe PC I into a new party would be part and parcel o f toe politics o f toe svolta and would indicate that Italian communism aspired to a position o f political leadership within a con­ text o f national unity.23 Togliatti coined toe term partito nuovo following toe liberation o f Rom e and toe early 1944 formation o f a coalition governm ent led by Ivanoe Bonomi. In an attempt to define what was implied in the term partito nuovo, Togliatti asserted in numerous speeches and articles that the PC I was confronting a developm ent far m ore com plex than just toe simple passage from illegality to legal status. In a major speech during 1944, he noted that toe partito nuovo implied a vast social and political presence o f Italian com ­ munism in Italian society: We are the party of the working class.. . . But the working class has never been foreign to the national interest. We want a democratic Italy, but we want a strong democracy which will not let anything which resembles Fascism or reproduces it to rise again. As a Communist party, as the party of the working class, we claim the right to participate in the construction of this new Italy, conscious of the fact that if we do not claim this right or were not able to fulfill this function now or in the future, Italy would not be reconstructed and the prospects for our country would be very grave indeed— 24 Togliatti advanced three essential qualities o f toe new party, and these qual­ ities implicitly revealed toe future stratège choices o f Italian communism in toe postwar period. First, toe PC I was to be a national party. Second, toe PC I was to abolish a purely propagandists function and becom e a governing party (partito di govern o).25 Last, but most important, toe PC I would no longer be just toe party o f toe working class, but would becom e a m odem mass party.26 “ W e do not emphasize toe class struggle but toe national strug­ g e ." Togliatti said it was toe adoption o f this new strategy that would make toe PC I “ a new party."27

26

The Party's Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

The rebuilding o f the PC I began on a clandestine level in northern Italy in 1941 and spread throughout the peninsula by the following year. Based mainly on an individual level, party reorganization was conducted by the older party militants. The liberation o f the majority o f the m iddle-level party leaders horn Fascist prisons supplied the PC I in 1944 with most o f its organiz­ ers and cadres.28 The new influx o f adherents— nearly 1,500,000 by the end o f 194529— surpassed even the most optimistic forecasts o f the party leader­ ship.30 By the end o f die clandestine period, the PC I was a strong, respected, and well-established party, endowed with com petent cadres on a local level. The growth o f the party developed with incredible rapidity, even if mem­ bership was a spontaneous act for many. Thousands o f workers joined, yet the majority o f them held but a vague notion o f what a Communist should be.31 Party documents revealed that it was m ore o f a “ class instinct” based on an “ intuition o f what the PC I should be” that m otivated many workers to join.32 For this reason, the Italian Communist party experienced an uneven developm ent, and the political orientation o f the members was often judged to be “ unsatisfactory.” N ew members often had trouble understanding either the principles or the perspectives o f the party leadership. Instead, the aspir­ ations o f the members reflected, and at times reproduced, the spontaneous reactions o f the population as a whole. Enthusiasm for the party’ s political activity was volatile and could easily shift to disillusionment For the party’ s leadership, such a situation left much to be desired, since many spokesmen often stressed that while the PC I was indeed a mass party, members should also becom e disciplined cadres. Thus, while the partisan experience provided the PC I with its greatest source o f new recruits, this new strength carried new political difficulties. Togliatti was able to isolate the small political groups that believed the PC I had “ betrayed” the Resistance. But he was not always able to convince party members and som e leaders o f the need to direct PC I strategy toward im­ mediate national and local needs rather than toward m ore traditional revo­ lutionary long-range goals.33 M oreover, many within the party believed that the partito nuovo was nothing m ore than a tactical expression for propaganda purposes, which would eventually be replaced by a revolutionary strategy.34 Togliatti was aware o f this tendency within the party, and he warned local party leaders not to succumb to extremist influence.35 The partito nuovo had to avoid the sectarian errors o f the past and give political leadership to the country. Togliatti recognized that the PC I needed to control and condition the energies o f the people who had been released after twenty years o f fascism. Up through the PC I Fifth Congress, held in Rom e in late 1945, there were essentially two conflicting views o f party organization. This split within the party reflected, in turn, different notions o f overall PC I national strategy for the postwar period. As indicated earlier, Togliatti insisted on the m odem

From Gramsci to Togliatti

27

notion o f the partito nuovo as a mass political force, which would be the fulcrum point for a wide system o f alliances with the middle classes and especially the Christian Democratic party.36 On the other hand, PC I leader Pietro Secchia view ed the partito nuovo as a party o f the working class. Strongly influenced by his own experience as a partisan leader in the Resis­ tance struggle, Secchia view ed— at least initially— the partito nuovo as be­ coming the partito unico (only party) o f the working class and nothing more. M oreover, Secchia tended to see the left-dominated Com mittee o f National Liberation as the expression o f real pow er and the embryonic nucleus o f future state power. In essence, Secchia argued for a unity-of-the-left strategy and proposed the fusion o f the PC I with the PSL In the end, Togliatti’s view clearly prevailed, and his authority was largely unchallenged.37 Together with G iorgio Am endola and others, Togliatti criti­ cized the views o f Secchia as being limited to a partial vision o f the postwar Italian political situation. Yet, the criticism o f Secchia and others did strike a real problem for local PC I leaders: that o f actually building the partito nuovo, which already had a mass dimension because o f the large influx o f members during the Resistance. In fact, the PC I’ s rapid transformation during the anti­ fascist liberation struggle from a cadre to a mass basis strongly accentuated the differences between Togliatti’s new strategic line and the political views o f the party’ s older militants. Indeed, many o f these older members were more “ revolutionary” in a traditional Communist sense than the majority o f the party elite. Furthermore, while the PC I leadership had for a long time partici­ pated in an ongoing debate on the nature o f the partito nuovo, the rank-andfile had n o t There was no time for a widespread discussion o f the party’ s political line. The war had to be won, and the bulk o f the PC I’ s members and sympathizers had to be pushed into action. At the center o f this ‘ ‘incomprehension” by the party’ s rank-and-file militants— including both the older cadres released from prison as well as the new “ mass-party” members— lay a different and indeed m ore traditional Communist notion o f the hegemonic role o f the working class. For a working class that defined victory over fascism as the defeat o f capitalism and its ruling industrial class, it was difficult to adjust the old ideas o f a hegemonic revo­ lutionary role to the new strategy o f national solidarity between capitalists, middle classes, and workers.38 During 1944-1945, in the midst o f the partisan struggle, the relations between the PC I and the other mass political parties stood out above all the other questions.39 Unity o f action with the PSI came to be seen as the best strategy for a united labor union, as well as for greater coordination and unity with the Christian Democratic party (D C ).40 Thus, an alliance o f sorts between the three mass parties was to emanate from the strength o f a united Communist-Socialist front Togliatti made this aspect o f PC I strategy clear in his Brancaccio Theater speech in Rom e on July 9, 1944:

28

The Party’s Domestic Strategy through the Coki War

We know that in the ranks of the Christian Democratic Party there are large numbers of workers, peasants, young people, intellectuals and others who at bottom have the same aspirations that we have. Like us they also want a democratic Italy. . . We aspire to unity of action with these Catholic masses and we are willing to discuss the condi­ tions of- this unity with the leaders of the Christian Democratic Party. The Italian Communist Party, allied with the Italian Socialist Party, is willing to reach a common unify of action pact with the Christian Democrats. This pact would bind the Com­ munist, Socialist, and Christian Democratic masses together for a common program of economic, political and social regeneration.41 During the fall months o f 1944, the m ovem ent for an alliance between S o­ cialist, Communist, and Christian Democratic forces was intensified.42 In par­ ticular, a strong effort was made by TogHatti to com e to an agreem ent with the DC.43 As Togliatti frequently argued throughout 1944, the mass politics o f the PC I would mean unity o f action with the Socialists and an alliance with the DC in order to divide up the responsibilities o f governm ent am ong the three mass parties.44 According to Togliatti, the PC I was to exercise a “ leading role,” not only am ong the Catholic masses, but also am ong a rejuvenated new bourgeoisie. The common ground among these varied classes was the struggle to defend liberal democracy. Indeed, Togliatti envisaged the PC I as the guarantor o f a process o f renewal, a democratic revolution that had been interrupted by the Fascist experience.45 The instruments for this democracy in 1 9 44 -1 9 4 5 were still fluid. But Togliatti did not exclude the developm ent o f the Italian working class into a position analogous to that o f the British Labour m ovem ent Togliatti’s efforts for an alliance between the PCI, PSI, and D C may well have reflected his preference for compromise, rather than conflict, solutions. By the same token, however, his alliance strategy was a necessary, albeit elaborate, attempt to survive politically by mingling with parties more accept­ able to the militarily dominant Western allies. M oreover, the P C I’ s attempt to reach an agreement with the DC may very well have been dictated by Stalin’s hope o f gaining the Western Allies’ acceptance o f Russia’ s eastern gains by ostentatiously acknowledging Anglo-American hegem ony in the W est44 The Italian Communist party’s Fifth Congress convened in Rom e on D e­ cem ber 29, 1945. Togliatti and the other leaders confronted the representa­ tives o f the partito nuovo: 1,800 delegates, representing an overall member­ ship o f nearly 1,800,000.47 The program outlined by the leadership and approved by the congress was little m ore than a restatement o f PC I policy first articulated by Togliatti in April 1944. The revised party statutes revealed that PC I membership was not to be determined by ideological convictions. The PC I would be open literally to anyone. “ All honest laborers o f either sex who have reached the age o f 18 years, regardless o f race, religious faith or philosophical convictions” were welcom ed into its ranks.48 The PC I asked all who joined only to accept the party’ s practical political platform.

From Gramsci to Togliatti

29

The political strategy o f the PC I was, in many respects, essentially reformist and, in later years, it came to be known as the “ Italian road to socialism” (via italiana al socialismo). Togliatti was careful to dwell in the early postwar years on the nature o f the party’s strategy. In October 1944, he noted that the PC I would face new tasks: The feet is that we communists in Italy, first among the communists of ail of Western Europe, are faced with a new problem which has never been posed before, never during the years of legality and even less during the years of illegality and perse­ cution .. . we must intervene in the question of power in the government of this nation. What do I mean when we say nation? We mean the working class, the peasants, the intellectuals, the salaried laborers, the professional classes.... This is why our party must become a mass party, and it is why we tell our older party members—those who would have the tendency to stay in a small group and would remain “ pure” and faithful to traditional communist ideals and thought—that is why we tell them: “ You are wrong!” We will be a leading party in so far as we will be able to transform our party of cadres into a large, mass party able to establish links with all the social categories of the Italian people.49 The instrument for implementing this strategy was to be found in the organiza­ tion o f the partito nuovo. Thus, the partito nuovo would be a mass party with a branchlike structure. The basic unit o f the party would remain the cell, with a self-elected executive body and usually located at the place o f work. By 1948, however, the more heterogeneous and geographically located sections becam e the more preva­ lent organizational units. But while Italian communism transformed itself from a cadre to a mass party, the internal direction remained firmly Leninist Inter­ nal party democracy continued to be governed by the Leninist principle o f “ democratic centralism.” Organized internal party factions were not permit­ ted. Dissent from the party line could not contradict established party policies. In sum, there was neither a progressive liberalization o f the party’ s internal direction nor a secular trend toward de-Leninization o f the PCI. With the creation o f the partito nuovo, the Italian Communist party in 1 9 44 -1945 did not, o f course, renounce its ultimate goal o f a Socialist Italy. But Togliatti did propose that the party free itself from the rigidity o f m ore traditional Communist views and, in this sense, he did indeed inherit Gramsd’s creativity. On a domestic level, this meant PC I participation in the governm ent and its promotion o f a “ constructive role” for the working classes. It was a m ove that the party could never have m ade in the past without provoking, among its members, the reactions o f a Maximalist Socialist tradition. The relationship between the party and the working class in this new strategical perspective was determined by the historical origins o f Italian communism. M oreover, the label “ national party” came to mean that while the PC I had its roots in the working class, it tended to becom e the party o f aO

30

The Party’s Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

the Italian people (Ilp o p o lo ).60There would be emphasis on the compatibility o f interests and ideas between the working class and the middle classes. The sophisticated nature o f the partito nuovo strategy would not be free o f complications. A major weakness was what one scholar has termed its “ lack o f credibility.” 51 That is, PC I strategy for the postwar period would be too m odem, too com plex, and too subtle to be understood by the majority o f the PC I recruits and accepted by the rest o f society. Rather, it would prove to be much easier for everyone to believe in, and for many party members to propagate, if there were a simple identification o f PC I methods and goals with those o f the Bolshevik Revolution o f 1917.52 Another problem with partito nuovo strategy involved the class nature o f the party. The PC I portrayed itself as a party leading both the working class and the nation, and any kind o f alliance linking the form er to the latter was considered useful, regardless o f whether it had anything to do with Socialist goals.53 It was enough that such alliances were m ade in the good o f the “ national interest,” understood in the broadest sense. The creation o f the partito nuovo and the PCI’ s new electoral strategy were consonant with Togliatti’s belief in the importance o f the democratic process. The partito nuovo was the organizational expression o f the via italiana al socialismo; it was the instrument for the full legitimization o f PC I strategy. Togliatti hoped to see the PC I develop into a party with as large a base as possible for its eventual dominance as a governing force. In time, the partito nuovo became, especially during the post-Togliatti years, the fulcrum point for a mass electoral alliance o f citizens profoundly concerned with maintaining interclass solidarity.

Notes 1. For a treatment of similar strategies by Western European Communist parties during the Popular Front era of the mid-1930s, see Franco de Felice, Fascismo, democrazia, fronte popolare. Il movimento comunista alla svolta del VII Congresso dell’Intemazionale (Bari: Laterza, 1974). 2. The “ Italian road to socialism” has come to project the peaceful transformation of Italy into a Socialist society by utilizing democratic institutions to impose reforms on a recalcitrant, obtuse ruling class. The precondition for success of the via italiana is the construction of a broad system of alliances capable of cutting deep into many sodai strata. See Luciano Gruppi, La via italiana al socialismo (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1974). 3. Botti Togliatti and Gramsd emphasized the need to approach the bourgeoisie as well as the proletariat on their own terms. It is noteworthy that both leaders oper­ ated in different political situations. Gramsd spent the major part of his intellectually productive life in prison, a reflective if harsh existence, whereas Togliatti headed a mass movement and operated with more practical constraints on his theoretical imagi­ nation.

From Gramsci to Togliatti

31

This essay does not, of course, attempt to examine the full body of Gramsci’ s work. For an introduction to Gramsd’s work, see John Cammett, Antonio Gramsd and the Origins o f Italian Communism (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967) and Cari Boggs, Gramsd’s Marxism (London: Pluto Press, 1976). 4. However, TogBatti’s role as a Comintern emissary to the republican forces during the Spanish Civil War in 1936 gave him an opportunity to reflect upon these questions. See Paimiro Togliatti, “ Note sul carattere del fascismo spagnolo,” Lo Stato operaio 9 (July 1936) and Paimiro Togliatti, “ Sulle particolarità della rivoluzione spagnola," Lo Stato operaio 10 (November 1936), both now in Paimiro Togliatti, Opere (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1979), v o i 4. 5. Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks were first published in the late 1940s, giving rise to “ Gramscism,” —innumerable interpretations, with each claiming to present the “ true” Gramsd. After World War II, the PCI as well as left-wing intellectuals have frequently appealed to Gramsd and have found in his work the legitimation of spedile positions, claims, and demands. This often happened without much rigorous concern for an effective critical appraisal of Gramsd’s thought. In the midst of particularly heated polemics or for tactical reasons, “ Gramsdsm” on the left in general produced more or less arbitrary “ cuts” in the body of Gramsd’s work and obscured important aspects of his activity as a political leader, or, again, accentuated certain elements at the expense of others, as demanded by contingent tactical needs. On this point, see the article by Federico Manditi and G iogo Gain, “ Gramsd’s Presence,” Government and Opposition 3 (Summer 1968). With the beginning of the post-Worid War K period, a new identification between Gramsd and TogBatti gradually developed for a number of reasons. First, the PCI was greatly divided between a weak and often adventurist-prone position in southern Italy and a strong, highly organized, partisan presence in northern Italy. Yet TogBatti had to maintain a global view of party needs. To find the stratège design to lead the party to new strength, TogBatti could not ignore the toots of PCI intellectual and cultural history. And he certainly could not expect to present the party to potential allies as a mere servant of Soviet foreign policy. In Gramsd and his stratège perspectives, To­ gliatti found the legtimacy and perhaps the inspiration he needed. By the late 1940s, Gramsd was a higher authority, deeply and respectively inserted in PCI history, as well as a homegrown product rooted in Italian politics and culture. 6. In order to escape the prison censor’s attention, Gramsd had to “ conceal” many names and much of his subjed matter in metaphorical disguise. 7. Some of these events were, for example, the problems of national unity and the development of southern Italy. 8. For a detailed analysis of the svolta dl Salerno, see AureBo Lepre, La svolta dl Salerno (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1964). 9. The Soviet Union recognized the BadogBo government on March 13, 1944, thirteen days before TogBatti’s arrival in Rome following a long exile in Moscow. 10. It appears that Togliatti’s first public reference regarding eventual PCI desires to partidpate in a coafition government led by BadogBo or anyone else was made during a Moscow speech on October 16, 1943, translated as “ Per un governo nazionale anti-fasdsta e democratico,” first pubBshed in L ’Unità, January 24, 1971. 11. See Ludo Colieti, Lulg Cortesi, Giuseppe Fiori, and Fabrizio Onofri, “ Conver­ sando su TogBatti,” L ’Espresso (March 25, 1973), p. 7.

32

The Party’s Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

12. For a critical reflection on the PCI coalition government experience, see Paimiro Togliatti, “ Il governo di Salerno,” in Franco AntonceDl, ed., Trentanni di storia ital­ iana 1915-1945 (Turin: Einaudi, 1961). 13. For example, the PCI did not pressure for a reform of the legal system that operated under law codes devised during the early years of the Fascist regime. More­ over, the PCI recognized the 1929 Fascist Lateran Pact, which regulated church-state relations, by voting for its inclusion (article 7) in the new 1946 republican constitution. 14. Only in the fall of 1944 did Togliatti begin to speak out against toe conservative threat in Italy. See Paimiro Togliatti, “ Che cosa chiediamo al governo,” L ’Unità (July 15, 1944). See also Paolo Spriano, Intervista sulla Storia del PC I (Bari: Laterza, 1979), pp. 116-67. 15. On PCI history during toe early 1920s and the extremist tendencies within the Communist party during that period, see Paolo Spriano, Storia del partito comunista italiano (Turin: Einaudi, 1967), vol. 1. 16. In later years, Togliatti would note the PCFs underestimation of toe strength of political conservatism in Italy during the 1943-1946 period. See Paimiro Togliatti, “ La vittoria e i suoi limiti,” Rinascita 21 (Aprii 24,1965). See also Giampiero Carocci, “ Togliatti e la Resistenza,” Nuovi argomenti 13 (November 1961-February 1962). 17. Paimiro Togliatti, “ Ai comunisti napoletani,” speech delivered at toe First Or­ ganizational Conference of toe Naples Federation of toe PCI, June 1944, published for toe first time in Rinascita 27 (January 29, 1971). 18. Norman Kogan notes that Stalin objected to toe transformation of toe PCI into a mass party. However, Kogan provides no evidence for this assertion. See Norman Kogan, “ Socialism and Communism in Italian Life,” in Edward R. Tannenbaum and Emiliana P. Noether, eds., Modem Italy: A Topical History Since 1861 (New York New York University Press, 1974), p. 113. At toe 1957 Moscow Conference of Communist Parties, TogHatH outlined toe recent history of the PCI and gave a number of theoretical justifications for toe strategic choices made by toe PCI at toe close of World War D. TogHatti noted, “ In 1945 we said that we must build a ‘new party.’ Why did we use toe term ‘new party’ instead of toe Leninist formula ‘party of a new type’? Because a communist party had already been created in 1921 and our party needed to be renewed. It needed to acquire a number of new qualities to enable it to become a mass party.“ See Paimiro Togliatti, “ L’Intervento del compagno Togliatti alla Conferenza dei 64 partiti comunisti e operai del novembre 1957. Su gli orientamenti politici del nostro partito,” Documenti politici e direttive del PC I dalIVIII al IX congresso (Rome: SETI, 1960), pp. 488-89. 19. For a vivid and moving description of Togliatti’s first days in Salerno and Naples in April 1944, and for a critical interpretation from a Leninist viewpoint of toe foun­ dations of toe “ new party,” see Maria Antonietta Macciocchi, Lettere dall’interno del PC I a Lotäs Althusser (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1969), pp. 118-35. 20. See, for example, toe collection of Togliatti’s speeches in Politica comunista (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1945). 21. In Moscow in 1942, Togliatti declared to his party comrades, “ We should not think that toe creation of a democratic regime in Italy, after twenty years of dictatorship will be an easy task Even in toe organization and activity of our party we will have to turn to new forms for which there is no precedent” See also Paolo Robotti, La prova (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1955).

From Gramsci to Togliatti

33

22. See Pedinilo Togliatti, “ Un partito di governo e di massa,” Politica nazionale e Emilia rossa (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1974), pp. 52—58. 23. In his instructions to PCI leaders in occupied Italy, on June 6, 1944, Togliatti made it clear that “ the kind of insurrection which we want has nothing to do with political and social transformation in a communist or socialist sense but is dedicated to national liberation and the destruction of Fascism." See Paimiro Togliatti, “ Le istruz­ ioni alle organizzazioni di partito nelle regioni occupate,” Per la salvezza dei nostro paese (Rome: Einaudi, 1946), p. 156. 24. See Paimiro Togliatti, “ La politica di unità nazionale dei comunisti,” speech given to the Naples Communist organization, April 11, 1944, now in Aurelio Lepre, ed., La politica di Salerno, aprile-dicembre 1944 (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1965). 25. See Paimiro Togliatti, “ Un partito di governo e di massa,” Politica nazionale e Emilia rossa, pp. 54—55. 26. As Togliatti wrote in Rinascita, “ First of all, and this is the essential point, the new party is not only a party of the working class but of the people, which no longer limits itself to a role of criticism and propaganda but enters positively and constructively in the life of the country. The working class, which in the past limited itself to a role of opposition and criticism, intends today to assume a position of leadership along with other consistently democratic forces. The new party is a party which is able to translate into action this new stand of the working class, by means of its own policies and its own activities, by transforming therefore its own organization for this aim. At the same time, the party that we have in mind has to be an Italian, national party.” See Paimiro Togliatti, “ Che cosa è il ‘partito nuovo’,” Rinascita 1 (October-Novem ber-December 1944). 27. See Paimiro Togliatti, “ La democrazia si conquista,” L ’Unità (November 5, 1944) . 28. Per la libertà e l'indipendenza d’ltaHa, report of the PCI Directorate to the Fifth Congress (Rome: Editori L’Unità, 1945). 29. L ’Attività del partito in cifre, official publication for delegates to the PCI Fifth Congress (Rome: UESISA, 1948), p. 10. 30. Due anni di lotta del comunisti italiani (Rome: La Stampa Moderna, 1947), p. 14. In contrast, membership in the Christian Democratic party in 1945 was less than 50,000. For a careful study of PCland DC membership from 1944through 1950, see Giordano Sivini, “ GH iscritti alla Democrazia Cristiana e al Partito Comunista Italiano," Rassegna italiana di sociologia 8 (January 1967), pp. 429-70. 31. Partito Comunista Italiano, La politica dei comunisti dal V a l VI congresso, p.

100. 32. Partito Comunista Italiano, La nostra lotta per l’unità (Rome: Editori L’ Unità, 1945) , p. 13. 33. See Maurizio Valenzi, “ La difficile vittoria di Togliatti,” Rinascita 30 (March 29, 1974), pp. 29-30. 34. Among works that point to this tendency among party members, see Claudio di Toro and Augusto Illuminati, Prima e dopo il centrosinistra (Rome: Editori Idealogie, 1970). 35. See, for example, Paimiro Togliatti, “ Istruzioni per le conferenze provinciali di organizzazione,” La politica dei comunisti dal V a l VI congresso, pp. 99-112. Else­ where, Togliatti notes that this attitude must change, for it limits the party to “ recita-

34

The Party's Domestic StnMegy through the Cold War

ttons, boasts, and threats which keeps many o f the masses away from us and creates tn others a dangerous state o f excitement and isolation. In the last analysis, this ex­ tremism is translated into a real forni of passivity, which hides itself behind the osten­ tatious mask of out-dated methods which are left over from the dvd war.... Thus it happens that the party tends here and there to assume the nature of an organization devoted only to the poorest and most desperate social strata; thus it happens that the party loses its capacity to penetrate among the less enlightened sectors of the working dass, the middle classes, the intellectuals, the women.” See “ I risultati della consul­ tazione popolare del 2 giugno e i compiti dei comunisti,” “ Risoluzione dela Direzione del PCI,” now in La politica dei comunisti dal V a l VI congresso, p. 80. 36. See Giorgio Amendola, “ Come nacque il partito nuovo,” Rinascita 31 (November 28,1975), pp. 32-33. 37. It is noteworthy that neither the Socialists flor the Christian Democrats were receptive to either of these two views. See Giorgio Amendola, “ I contrasti fra Secchia e Togliatti,” Rinascita 17 (May 4, 1979), pp. 23-26. 38. That these problems were fully recognized by the party leadership is evidenced by the L ’Unità articles at the time. See, for example, TogKatfi, “ Concorso di tutte le forze democratiche; continuità delà pofitica di unità nazionale,” L ’Unità, June 3, 1944. See also Liliana Lanzardo, Classe operaia e partito comunista atta FIAT 1945-1949 (Turin: Einaudi, 1971). 39. See Paimiro Togliatti, “ La nostra politica di unità non è un gioco,” letter from Togliatti to Longo of December 9,1944, now in Rinascita 27 (August 20,1966), p. 19. 40. See Paimiro TogHatti, “ La nostra lotta per l’unità,” L'Unità (August 22,1944). 41. Paimiro Togliatti, “ Per la libertà d’ Italia! Per la creazione di un vero regtane democratico!” in Aurelio Lepre, La politica di Salerno, pp. 75-76. 42. Franco de Felice, “ La construzione del ’partito nuovo’,” Rinascita 47 (November 28, 1975), pp. 18-19. 43. See Paimiro Togliatti, “ Unità nazionale,” Rinascita 1 (August-September, 1944). 44. See Paimiro Togliatti, “ Classe operaia e partecipazione al governo,” Rinascita 1 (June 5, 1944), p. 2. 45. See Paimiro TogHatti, “ Il partito e la nazione,” Rinascita 2 (August 4,1946), p. 3. 46. On this point, see Gabriel Kolko, The Politics o f War. The World and United States Foreign Policy 1943-1947 (New York Vintage Books, 1970), chapter 1 and David EDwood, L ’alleato nemico. La politica dell’occupazione anglo-americana in Italia 1943-1946 (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1977). 47. In early November 1945, the PCI had 1,718,863 members; by late December, this number had risen to approximately 1,760,000; Togliatti, “ Il programma dei com­ unisti per la costituente,” L ’Unità, December 30,1945, p. 3. By late 1946, member­ ship had risen to 2,150,000, and by January 1949, it had reached over 2,300,000. See Mario Einaudi, Communism in Western Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955), p. 200. 48. Statuto del Partito Comunista Italiano (Approvato dal V Congresso Nazionale del PCI) (Rome, 1946), pp. 5 -6 . 49. See Paimiro Togliatti, “ I compiti del partito nella situazione attuale,” Politica

From Gramsci to Togliatti

35

comunista, pp. 182-83. And, in January 1947, Togfiatti would note in a speech in Florence, “ We can find new roads different from those, for example, followed by the working class and working masses of the Soviet Union.” “ La nostra lotta per la democrazia e il socialismo,” now in Romano Ledda, ed., Il partito (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1966), pp. 111-25. 50. See Paimiro Togliatti, “ Ceto medio e Emilia rossa,” speech given at Reggio Emilia on September 24, 1946, now in Politica nationale e Emilia rossa, p. 30. 51. See Alessandro Plzzomo, “ Le parti comuniste dans le système politique Ha­ ben,” unpublished monograph (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1968), p. 19. 52. Regis Debray points to this problem in Revolution In the Revolution? “ We are never completely contemporaneous with our present History advances in disguise: H appears on stage wearing the mask of the preceding scene, and we tend to lose the meaning of the play. Each time the curtain rises, continuity has to be re-established. The blame, of course, is not history’s, but lies in our vision, encumbered with the memory of the past We see the past superimposed on the present, even when the present is a revolution___ ” Regis Debray, Revolution In the Revolution? (New York Bantam, 1967), p. 19. 53. On October 6,1946, Togliatti criticized Florence PCI organizers for their reluc­ tance in building political alliances at a local level. See TogHatti, “ D partito nei primi mesi della repubblica,” published tor the first time in Rinascita 28 (August 25,1972), pp. 14-16.

THE UNITED ST A T E S AND THE PCI: THE YEA R S OF PO LIC Y FORMATION, 1942-1946

3 Ennio di Nolfo

Until W orld W ar II, there was no American foreign policy specifically designed for Italy. Instead, more general policies, shaped by common European prob­ lems, encompassed Italy in a way that was further conditioned by the electoral influence o f the Italo-American ethnic community in the United States. Preva­ lently pro-Fascist, such influence was only barely counterbalanced by the anti-Italian sentiment stirred up by the Ethiopian W ar and the formation o f the Axis.1 Following Italy’s attack on France on June 10,1940 (an attack charac­ terized by President Roosevelt as Mussolini’s “ stab in the back” to the French), the U.S. perception o f Italy deteriorated, with an emphasis, how­ ever, that was m ore anti-Fasdst and anti-Mussolini than specifically antiItalian as the weight o f the Italo-American community continued to be fe lt Even after the entry o f the United States in the war, the Italian problem was viewed with only rem ote interest, as if, once the war had been won, Italy would not concern the United States in any way and would becom e the exclusive province o f the British and, perhaps, the French. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the issues raised by Italian communism received at first limited attention: U.S. preoccupation was with communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular, and the Italian Communist party (P C I) was seen as only one o f the channels which the international Com ­ munist m ovem ent relied upon under a confident and monolithic Soviet lead­ ership. The United States looked to M oscow with that mixture o f admiration, diffidence, and deep, instinctive hostility that marked the history o f the origins o f the cold war, as has been shown by studies on the subject2 At the time, the

37

38

The Parly's Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

PC I did not, in fact, merit particular attention. Up to the crisis o f fascism— until, that is, the autumn o f 1942— the party was paralyzed by the general conditions that also hampered the action o f other anti-Fasdst parties. Even when Italy began to suffer the military defeats that were to lead to the fall o f fascism, the PCFs role appeared to be restricted to that o f a well-organized, fairly disciplined, but numerically small, minority.3 Information filtered out o f Italy confirmed such an assessment if there was a Communist movement, it was limited and had no influence. Thus, in January 1943, in response to a question raised at the State Department’s Postwar Foreign Policy Advisory Com mittee over the possibility that some wed-organized revolutionary group might em erge in Italy, Under Secretary o f State Sumner W elles indicated that “ he had no reason to believe that there was a powerful organized group, although there did exist som e groups in certain parts o f Italy.“ 4 Later that year, with fascism in disarray and Mussolini overthrown by his own supporters who had now rallied to Vittorio Emanuele III, the opinion o f the American experts on the same committee was no different: There does not appear to be serious possibility of a communist régime in Italy unless the subsequent course of the war should lead to serious social disturbances and full-blown popular revolution. The Communist party, although wed integrated, re­ mains small, even when its reputed gains among the industrial classes are taken into consideration.5 This is not to imply that fire American administration was totally unaware o f the problem, especially as events in 1943 came to involve the United States m ore directly and m ore predominantly in the Mediterranean. Italian com ­ munism might still be a “ nuance” only, but it was one which, according to some, required further attention. And, as was also to happen later, the Italians themselves forcefully pointed to the potential danger o f communism in their country and asked the United States to work against it, even before such danger manifested itself more explicitly.

Antifascism and Anticommunism The principal exponents o f moderate antifascism had long hesitated before taking decisive action in forcing the king to free himself o f Mussolini. For a while fearful o f the German reprisals that might follow a possible military victory o f the Axis, they were deterred above all by the uncertainties that continued to prevail over the future o f Italy after the fall o f fascism. In Sep­ tem ber 1942, Myron Taylor, Roosevelt’s personal envoy to the Pope, noted, upon his return from Rom e, at a time when the war and the crisis o f fascism were at their height

The United States and the PC I, 1942—1946

39

The Vatican would be much more enthusiastic about the prospect of an Allied victory in Europe if it could be assured that this would not mean a period of anarchy after victory. Have the Allies practical plans for maintaining order after the cessation of hostilities?6 Implicit In the account given to Taylor, the equating o f communism and anarchy was confirmed in the peace overtures made by the Italians prior to July 25, 1943, as it was then argued that only a separate peace and the generosity o f the Allies would save Italy from communism.7 Even though such analysis probably did not reflect accurately Italy’ s immediate situation, it nevertheless anticipated well subsequent developments. In fact, the strategy follow ed in an almost spontaneous way by the Italian political and sodai elites was to seek help and spread the alarm in order to persuade the country that was going to help—but was holding back because it was not convinced o f the seriousness o f the risk— that a crisis o f the first order was about to erupt in a way that might involve the fundamental interests o f the Great Powers. Com ­ ing before the armistice o f 1943, and still far from the tensions o f the cold war, this line was made somewhat m ore difficult to argue because o f what it showed: the impHdt acceptance o f the view that it was more important to fight communism than to fight fascism. This could be accepted on the bads o f either one o f two ideas: first, that fascism, in itself, was not necessarily an evil, or second, that fascism had been overthrown and was now on the verge o f being destroyed by anti-Fasdst forces. W hile any initiative for a separate peace com ing from countries within the Axis and inspired by splinter Fascist goups was (until 1943) based on the first o f these tw o presuppositions,8 the second view was to attract the natural adhesion o f most moderate Italian anti-Fasdsts. The only voice— and it was one that carried som e weight in the United States— that opposed this second view was that o f Gaetano Salvemini (w ho was then teaching at Harvard University) and his followers. In Decem ber 1942, in a long essay written for C om m on Sense, Salvemini divided the anti-Fasdst political forces in Italy into tw o categories: the Com ­ munists and toe democratic anti-Fasdsts. Although admittedly better or­ ganized, but certainly less numerous than the democratic anti-Fasdsts, the Communists did not constitute a danger because, according to Salvemini, no revolution was possible outside Eastern Europe without armed Soviet inter­ vention. Consequently, Salvemini recomm ended a peace treaty that would prove to be suffidentiy satisfadory to Stalin to circumscribe his territorial ambitions and keep the political future o f communism in Western Europe within bounds.9 T o be sure, Salvemini noted in June 1943, the presence o f Allied troops in Italy would hinder the possibility o f Communist advances. This, however,

40

The Party's Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

would not be sufficient unless the Allies abstained from any veiled collabora­ tion with pro-Fasdst governments, and, following the traditions o f Jefferson, Lincoln, and Wilson, refused to yield to the pressures o f the m ore conserva­ tive forces. N ot without reason, Salvemini feared that the U.S. State Depart­ ment was too sensitive to the influence o f the Catholic hierarchy, an influence which, at election time, might bring about a resurgence o f the traditional profasdsm o f the Italo-American ethnic community. There was only one alternative for the Allies: once conquered and disarmed, Italy should be left free to choose her own political destiny.10 Salvemini’ s diagnosis, however, was not optimistic. Thus, in August 1943, he charged Roosevelt and Churchill with waging two simultaneous wars in Italy— one for unconditional surrender, and another to prevent the revolu­ tion. But, Salvemini predicted, if forced to choose between a new version o f fascism in disguise and the revolution, democratic Italians would choose the Communist revolution, even while cursing those who were imposing such a choice upon them, that is, the Allied Chiefs o f Staff.11 Salvemini saw the beginnings o f the Communist problem in Italy as the result o f the Allies’ fatal errors both in dealing with the Soviet Union and in failing to uphold dem o­ cratic ideals in dealing with Italy. H e already perceived a process that was only starting to unfold: the creation o f a bond between the social forces in Italy that had supported fascism, and U.S. foreign policy. In turn, this entailed a choice which, according to Salvemini, the Americans had accepted, namely that, all things considered, it was really m ore important to fight communism than fascism in Italy. Nonetheless, Salvemini concluded, the irony o f such a choice was that in the end it would actually favor a Communist revolution. Salvemini’s analysis, however, was shared by very few other exponents o f antifasdsm in the United States who considered Salvemini as a moralist un­ able to adapt himself to the necessities o f political realism. Since fascism was on its way out, it was argued instead that it would be wise to avoid the other extreme, namely, communism. Therefore, instead o f questioning the Am eri­ can governm ent’s antifasdsm, it was m ore constructive to accept it at face value and becom e its instrument T o this end, it was deem ed important to avoid any suspidon o f collusion with the Communists through the endorse­ ment o f such ambiguous formulas as the “ united fron t” which was then prom oted by Communist exiles in Latin America, M exico, and the United States.12Although there had been no spedfic statements on the subject these anti-Fasdst groups understood that this type o f anti-Communist reasoning was the one most likely to induce the Americans to consider the problem o f the formation o f Italy’ s future government, within which they were anxious to darify their own role. In January 1943, Luigi Antonini, head o f the ItalianAmerican Labor Council, purposely took exception to the O ffice o f W ar Information’ s anti-Fasdst and pro-united-front tendendes; he accused the director, Elmer Davis, o f Communist sympathies that were “ . . . demoralizing

The United States and the PC I, 1942—1946

41

the democratic forces in the Italian communities o f America/’ 19 Similarly, Vanni Montana, secretary o f the Italian Socialist party in N ew York and Antonini’ s main collaborator, “ warned against the dangers o f communist collaboration under the guise o f a united front and said that he and his group were constantly on the alert to prevent any break in the unity o f the dem o­ cratic elements.” 14 But it was Count Cado Sforza, the most authoritative representative o f Italian antifascism in the United States and the nominal head o f the Italian governm ent in exile, who formulated the essential terms o f the problem with the greatest diplomatic subtlety and finesse. Conferring a certain political dignity upon such professions o f anticommunism, he rose above political infighting and reasoned in a clear and acceptable way with a country which was, after all, still at war with Fascist Italy. Following his forced departure from defeated France and his arrival in the United States in July 1940, Count Sforza set out with determination to trace the broad outlines o f a political plan for post-Fasdst Italy. Although Sforza himself had a central role in this plan, the general problems o f the restoration o f democracy and the prevention o f communism were also essential, as Sforza imagined the future Italy as a democracy, not unlike the great Western ones: republican if possible, but necessarily liberal; parliamentary, socially advanced, but not collectivist T o realize his objectives, Sforza took numerous initiatives o f service to the U.S. government, including the organization o f the anti-Fasdst Congress o f M ontevideo, which, in the summer o f 1942, helped to weaken Fascist influ­ ence in Latin Am erica.15 Although he also accepted many compromises (which soon turned the intransigent Salvemini against him), he did not lose sight o f his essential goals: to impress upon the American governm ent the concept o f a democratic Italy and to link this concept with a specific, but as yet implicit, American interest— namely, not to allow Italy to fall either directly or indirectly into the Soviet orb it For, Sforza argyed, the problem o f com ­ munism in Italy was not restricted to the limited perspective o f party politics but had to be seen in the context o f all its international implications. Errors by the U.S. governm ent would exacerbate internal tensions after the fall o f fas­ cism, alienating the Italians and playing into the hands o f the Communists and the Soviet Union. Accordingly, Sforza favored vigorous anti-Fasdst action by the U.S. Department o f State, and criticized its propensity for compromise with the monarchy. Either courageous initiatives would be taken, he told Sumner W elles in February 1943, or the Soviet Government would conduct an intensive propaganda campaign both in Italy and among Italian resistance forces outside of Italy to the effect that the American and British governments were planning to maintain power in Italy after the end of the war through some Italian government of a reactionary character, and that this would result in a vigorous swing to communism on the part of the Italian people which would inevitably end in a serious dvil war in Italy.16

42

The Patty's Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

While the Roosevelt administration tended to minimize the problem o f com ­ munism in Italy, a swelling chorus o f incitements came from within the coun­ try, from the Vatican, and from large sectors o f antl-Fasdst émigrés— not to mention the Italian ethnic associations, which, like the Sons o f Italy and the Knights o f Columbus, had dropped their pro-Fasdst line, but certainly did not conceal their anticommunism.17They pointed out the Communist danger and asked for a policy to deal with it either a straightforwardly conservative (or even reactionary) line, or a democratic, reformist one. They were asking for something that had not yet been elaborated. It is hard to assess the extent to which these appeals were heard. T o be sure, many in the United States feared that the end o f the war would bring deep, revolutionary discontent into all o f Europe, including, o f course, Italy. Yet, a first concrete opportunity to display its ability to influence postwar events was lost by the United States when resistance in Italy began to crumble after the invasion, the fall o f Mussolini occurred, and secret armistice negotia­ tions began. It becam e clear, then, that Washington was not prepared adequately for the administrative and political democratization o f Italy. In­ deed, until the armistice o f Septem ber 8, 1943, the United States lacked a project o f political reorganization that might m eet the existing situation. There was clear support for the idea that the problem o f Italy’s institutions— namely, whether she should remain a monarchy or becom e a republic—ought to be voted on by the people, as shown on toe eve o f toe armistice, during toe M oscow conference, and immediately afterward over toe form toe interim period o f governm ent would take pending a final choice by toe people. But insofar as its actual relationship with Italian political and social forces is con­ cerned, Washington was swayed by toe strong political intentions o f toe British and by General Eisenhower’s interpretation o f military priorities. Thus, toe United States ended up by cooperating with exponents o f toe old Italian conservatism, who, only a few weeks earlier, had been collaborating with Mussolini. They accepted Marshal Pietro Badoglio as an anti-Fascist leader, they expressed minimal reservations about Vittorio Emanuele IH; and went so far as to show themselves willing to have dealings with his son, Prince Um­ berto, despite his even m ore compromised position.18 The problems o f Italy’s democratization were put o ff— problems that boto Salvemini and Sforza con­ sidered essential to ensure genuine anti-Fasdst political developm ents and to avoid toe extreme o f a pro-Communist reaction. The Americans failed to use toe exceptional opportunities created by toe Italian defeat to provide an alternative not only to fascism but also to communism.

From Marginal to Grave Concern The Italian surrender in Septem ber 1943 gave these problems a concrete reality. With toe whole o f toe peninsula south o f Cassino occupied in a few

The United States and the PC I, 1942—1946

43

weeks, numerous questions were raised: Allied relations with the Badoglio government; what powers this government should exercise; how the adminis­ tration o f the Allied military government should proceed. On the battlefield was bom a sharp confrontation between the British and the American proj­ ects, a confrontation that was to influence much o f Italian affairs until 1945. But regarding the Communist problem, the first months did not bring any fundamental novelties, partly because the situation seem ed to contradict an alarmist diagnosis. On the international front, Soviet interference in Italian affairs appeared to have been contained, both in August, when Stalin expressed his irritation at tire Soviet Union’s exclusion from the armistice preparations, and in October, when the conference o f foreign ministers in M oscow seem ed to be turning the problem o f control over occupied territories into a colossal gam e o f reciprocal ambiguities and deceptions. This was also true in Novem ber and Decem ber 1943, when the ambiguities o f the M oscow conference were exposed, when the firm intention o f the Allies to exclude the Soviet Union from any effective participation in the exercise o f control in Italy becam e evident, and when the so-called Italian precedent was instituted.19 The situation within the country was not alarming, even taking into account the fact that part o f the peninsula was still under German occupation. In the south, the Allies exercised military and civil control without encountering obstacles; what little remained o f the Italian state administration collaborated readily; and the decision to maintain institutional continuity by recognizing the government o f the king and Marshal Badoglio seem ed to be proving ex­ tremely useful to this end. The anti-Fasdst parties were still on the scene, but they were in an embryonic stage o f organization and hence incapable o f being really effective. The occupying forces most probably believed that the political life o f southern Italy was dominated solely by the personality dashes between a few eminent representatives o f the pre-Fasdst political world, induding Count Sforza, who had returned to Italy. But neither Sforza, nor the philosopher Benedetto Croce (then a Liberal party leader), nor the Socialist, Christian Democrat, and Communist parties seem ed capable o f exercising any hold upon a public opinion that was still absorbed by the terrible experi­ ence o f war, hunger, and the struggle for survival. Although the anti-Fasdst Resistance m ovem ent in the north had more pronounced political characteris­ tics, its dominating tendendes did not give cause for alarm. At the end o f 1943, a report o f the Research and Analysis Branch o f the OSS reached these reassuring condusions: It has been suggested that the Communists, in view of their revolutionary aims, may in

fad be encouraging anti-Anglo-American trends. At present there is no evidence to support this assumption, aside from the widespread and deep-seated belief in the tenacity of revolutionary aims. Though the present policy of collaboration and oppor­

44

The Party’s Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

tunism may ultimately change to active opposition to the moderate as well as reaction­ ary elements, at present, neither the foreign policy of the Soviet Union nor the policy of the Italian Communists would justify such a suspicion. It has been thought that the physical remoteness of Russia from Italy has led the Russians to consider this country outside [of] their sphere of European interests; if so it does not appear likely that the Communists would wish to endanger the unity of the United Nations at the present critical juncture in favor of a policy which, if it exists, would bear fruits only in the comparatively distant future.20 These conclusions were reflected in the continuing lack o f any separate American policy regarding Italy, thereby indicating the marginal importance o f the Italian problem at the time. H ow ever, this state o f affairs was to be m odified by subsequent events and by the discovery o f the fragility o f the solution im posed by London. If, between the end o f 1943 and the first few months o f 1944, the international picture did not seem to change, the internal Italian picture was showing all the political weakness o f the dynastic, military solution, and was revealing— especially after the anti-Fasdst congress held in Bari in late January 1944— the growing strength o f the parties and their vital importance to the democratic reconstruction o f Italy. As had been said many times before, Adlai Stevenson, having concluded a study o f Italy’ s economic reconstruction, repeated, in late February 1944, that the United States’ longrange interests in Europe, including the end o f fascism and the advent o f democracy in Italy, required that appropriate political decisions be made. “ The present Italian government o f the King and General Badoglio,” Steven­ son observed, “ commands little respect or support am ong the people.” Such an “ unhappy political situation,” Stevenson warned, would constitute “ a formidable obstacle to orderly and effective realization o f our econom ic aims and preparations.” 21 Stevenson’s findings coherently expressed aspects o f a problem already perceived by other Americans, both inside and outside Italy: a failure to outline an autonomous American policy was, in the long run, likely to make the reconstruction o f democracy in Italy fail, and lead to a Communist victory. Yet, other events were required to jolt the United States into seeing these risks and take a more active interest in the problem o f Italian communism. O f crucial importance in this respect were the Soviet diplomatic recognition o f Italy (13 March 1944), and the return to Italy from the Soviet Union o f party leader Paimiro Togliatti (27 March 1944). The change in the party line that Togliatti brought with him was, in fact, to lead to the formation o f an Italian governm ent in which, for the first time ever, members o f the C om ­ munist party took part These two events were o f course closely related. The negotiations for recognition, begun in January 1944 by the Russian Allied representative, Andrei Vishinsky, reflected the modification o f Soviet policy concerning the Allies that had taken place immediately after the M oscow

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Conference. Togliatti’s return to Italy too was dosely tied to the new Soviet moves. H e becam e the spokesman for a program that emphasized the su­ preme importance o f fighting the Germans above aO else, and hence o f sinking, for the time being at least, domestic political differences by withdraw­ ing hostility to the king and the monarchy. This program was to open the doors o f governm ent to the Communists and force the other anti-Fasdst parties, if only temporarily, to withdraw their previous objections to agree­ m ent Unity against the Germans was a laudable prindple in itself, b u t signifi­ cantly enough, Togliatti’ s return— as Professor Mario Toscano has noted— was the object o f negotiations between Vishinsky and Ambassador Renato Pranas, secretary-general o f the Italian foreign ministry. It was, at the same time, the reason behind the Italian Communists’ changed party line.22 Both the domestic and international aspects o f the Soviet and Communist presence in Italy were profoundly m odified by this important chain o f events. From the international point o f view, the events taking place during this phase o f inter-Allied diplomacy in W orld W ar II showed dearly that the apparent meekness with which M oscow had accepted its exdusion from any control over the application o f the armistice in Italy was an illusion. The Soviet Union wanted to exercise the greatest possible influence in Italy, despite the feet o f the latter’ s occupation by the Anglo-American troops, who were determined to fight against both Communist-inspired revolutionary turmoil and fascism. Therefore, the view according to which, having made its choices, “ the Soviet Governm ent appeared to have abandoned the Italian Left, and to have gracefully accepted that Italy should lie within fire Western sphere o f influ­ ence,” 23 seem ed contradicted by the shrewd use that Soviet diplomacy and the Italian leaders made o f the Machiavellian diplom acy being exercised by the monarchy in order to regain the influence denied it by the Allies. Pranas himself realized this, as he wrote in a memorandum for Marshal Badoglio: The Anglo-Americans seem gravely perplexed by the Soviet autonomy of decisions and action which this gesture represents. The agreement made at Teheran is seriously compromised by it it seems that the Soviet Union means to reaffirm openly their intention to act autonomously in the political sector, in precisely the same way that the Allies have permitted them to act—with all the consequent sacrifices—in the military sector.24 This new situation did not involve a mere secondary aspect o f relations with the Soviet Union. In the spring o f 1944, according to the U.S. State Depart­ ment, this situation, together with the question o f Poland and the Baltic States, constituted one o f the only three points o f “ important divergences o f policy between the Soviet and the United States Governments.” 25 W hat helped make this situation still m ore serious was the idea that it involved m ore than the defeat o f Western diplomacy and would lead to the outright defeat o f

46

The Patty's Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

American policy in Italy. It seem ed possible that the very forces that the United States opposed— communism and the monarchy— might prevail. It was as though a bond or compromise was being created between Soviet interests in Western Europe and British interests in Eastern Europe; it was a bond that the new British attitude toward Tito and the subsequent agreement o f October 1944 between Stalin and Churchill would appear to confirm. In other words, the Soviet initiatives changed the international picture in the sense that they closed o ff to the Americans, or tended to do so, any potential field o f action in Italy. With perhaps a touch o f malice, BadogUo spoke regret­ fully with Samuel Reber, Robert Murphy’ s substitute in the Allied govern­ ment, o f “ the decision o f the United States Governm ent to ‘pull out o f’ the Mediterranean both politically and militarily leaving to others the dominant role.” 26 With less malice and greater apprehension, Count Sforza called Robert Murphy’s attention to the “ extraordinary progress made by the Italian Communist Party rince the arrival in Naples from M oscow o f Paimiro T o­ gliatti.” The report continues: Sforza said that although the problem might appear to be one of minor significance to the United States. . . he saw it as the first step in the “ diplomatic sovietization of Europe.” A similar process he Believed would be applied in the Balkans, in France, and in Spain.27 Sforza blam ed all this on Prime Minister Churchill’ s “ failure to comprehend the true value o f this problem .” Churchill was fighting Communist expansion in Central and Eastern Europe, but, according to Sforza, “ because o f his obtuseness [he] could not grasp the necessity o f pursuing a different line o f action than the one he had adopted for Italy.” In his alarmism, Sforza thought that it was difficult to overemphasize toe importance o f an immediate initiative “ designed to prevent toe w hole o f Italy falling under absolute Soviet domina­ tion.” The change in toe Mediterranean diplomatic situation was truly significant, and if such alarmist diagnoses were doubtless m otivated by personal interests and therefore exaggerated toe actual risks, there were, nevertheless, suffi­ cient elements to create new problems for American diplomacy. The need to elaborate a Mediterranean strategy already constituted one o f toe State De­ partment’s greatest worries.28 But toe Soviet and Communist action also changed internal Italian affairs in a m ore tangible way. After March 1944, toe question was whether it was still possible to play down toe importance and strength o f toe Italian Communist party. Attitudes on the subject had already begun to evolve on the eve o f toe March turning point— that is to say, o f Togliatti’s return. A t the beginning o f February, Elbridge Durbrow, from toe State Department’s Division o f Eastern European Affairs, analyzed toe changes in Communist strategy and gave this diagnosis o f toe Italian case:

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In Italy there being, because of the collapse of fascism, no strong organized nationalist group to back, the Communist Party apparently hopes to base its program on a policy of organizing the masses during the period of political vacuum, by making attractive promises and thus assure that the Communist Party obtains a very substantial follow­ ing if not a political majority control in the country.. . . The Soviet Government’s desire to attain at least some of the Communist aims outlined above, is apparently manifested by its assignment of a large staff headed by Vlshinsky, First Vice Commis­ sar for Foreign Affairs, to the Italian Advisory Council. Moreover toe Soviet Gov­ ernment’s maneuvers to assure itself a place on toe Italian Armistice Control Commis­ sion and its efforts to have Eredi [Togliatti] proceed from Moscow to Italy may have the same object in view.29 Thus, m ore guarded opinions were beginning to replace reassuring diag­ noses. When, in March, only a few m oves were required for the Italian Communists to succeed in becom ing part o f the pow er structure, it had to be admitted that they had indeed grown as a party and that this growth and their changed role also made it necessary for the Americans to take up som e position. There was an immediate undercurrent o f alarm fed by two. states o f mind: the discovery o f a previously underestimated danger o f which the Americans had several times been warned, together with the realization that in these new circumstances Washington did not have an adequate political Une, lacked trustworthy collaborators, and had insufficient room for political maneuver. Men like Sforza had been sacrificed to British friendship. It had becom e difficult to see how and with whom an alternative policy might be developed.30 A t this point, the representatives o f the U.S. governm ent in Italy, from Murphy to Reber, began to emphasize the urgent need for a decision that would check the Communist advance. Referring to toe reactions o f toe anti-Communist forces in Italy, an O SS report gave an acute evaluation o f toe terms o f the problem: A Government which includes Communists is viewed with grave concern. “ The Communists do not go into a government to be ministers or for the sake of holding public offices,” is one way toe concern is expressed___ The Communists do not sit in toe government as a party as do the others, for toe reason that a powerful foreign nation is expected to back them up and to direct them___ The representative of the Communist Party speaks with toe authority of a party that is also toe reflection of toe aspirations of an ally, a singular advantage which no other party has, but one which each would very much like to have.31 The American administration was eventually forced to deal with toe Italian case in new terms. This was brought about in part by a series o f alarmist appeals that had repeated themselves each time toe threat o f a Communist advance had appeared, with toe intention o f trying to secure a more deter­ mined U.S. intervention. In addition, toe Americans’ own military and strategic needs made them gradually realize that there was a problem with

48

The Party's Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

considerable implications. It was a turning point caused by the crises brought on by Soviet strategy, but it marked the beginning o f American involvem ent in Italy. A t that time, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., expressed the new awareness in informal and blunt language, which was nevertheless effective: I am very much disturbed the way things are going in Italy. It looks to me as though they are headed straight for Bolshevism, and we go through all this process and liberate the country, lose an enormous number of American soldiers, and when we are through we may have a much more chaotic condition than when we went in there. . .. If we are going to go through the process and free these countries from Fascism and then end up with Bolshevism, I am notatali happy about i t . .. I feel there is a job to be done___ At present we have spent ninety per cent, roughly, of the money. But every time we have got to move, we have to consult these English people with the result that it takes months, months and months.. . . By the time you get through you have people dying on the streets. I would much rather stand up publicly and say, “ In order to keep Bolshevism from spreading through Europe, 1, the Secretary of the Treasury, am willing to recommend that we take the whole job, that we will bill each country what we think their share is, and have a final settlement around the peace table___ ” I want action, I want to give these people the chance to be decent people. That is what we went in there for.32 Thus, it was now possible to discern the direction Am erica's new involvem ent with Italy was going to take. The Communist influence was attributed, in a rather elementary way, to the difficult econom ic conditions Italy was facing, particularly in the sphere o f food supplies. U.S. policy was thought o f in terms o f aid, as a duty in itself, and as a necessity in order to contain, together with famine, the spread o f communism. Thus, American foreign policy toward Italy was bom , conditioned by the necessity o f “ avoiding” certain dangers rather than by the desire to “ achieve” certain goals. Its purpose was to oppose English exclusiveness and Soviet interference, and its chief aspiration was to check communism, rather than to help the Italian people and to strengthen democracy. The terms in which the American action expressed itself were also dictated, in a sense, by the circumstances o f the m om ent T o o many favorable opportunities had been ignored, including a time in 1943 when only Britain would have opposed American policy, since the Russians were in effect too far away and the Italian Communists were still in the process o f reorganization.

In Search of a Policy After April 1944, the image o f tire PC I as an insidious force opposing the Allies and democracy, and as the tool o f Soviet policy in Italy, becam e Am eri­ ca’s idée fixe in Italy. But if the choices made by the Soviet Union (and in part entrusted to international cooperation with the Italian Communist party) rep­

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49

resented their answer to the exclusion willed on them by the Allies, they also helped to feed the many currents o f mutual suspicion that, after the suspen­ sion o f hostilities, were to flow into the mainstream o f the cold war. Therefore, the elaboration o f an autonomous policy toward Italy, in these circumstances, was to be a process that was neither straightforward nor short It was not easy to translate what had initially been only diffidence into positive decisions, and the American administration was both unprepared for such a task and divided in its aims. H ow were they going to oppose the powerful Communist influence without becom ing the foil o f those traditional and m od­ erate forces that had previously supported fascism? T o bring Count Sforza back into the picture and give him the task o f directing a coalition o f antiCommunist forces was useless. After a few months o f occupation, the Am eri­ cans themselves had understood that, although London’ s hostility to Sforza was personal and anti-American, he only had a limited political following and was not much liked by the big parties. An initial solution seem ed to be the attempt, despite Winston Churchill’s bitter hostility, to force Vittorio Emanuele Ill’s retirement and to favor the formation, immediately after the liberation o f Rom e in June 1944, o f a governm ent that was no longer under the king, but that was the expression o f the political will o f the anti-Fasdst parties grouped together in the C om itato di Liberazione Nazionale (Com m it­ tee o f National Liberation [C L N ].33This gave rise to the governm ent o f Ivanoe Bonomi that was to last until the conclusion o f hostilities in the peninsula, although from Decem ber 1944, the Socialist and Action parties withdrew their support But it was difficult to believe that Bonom i and his governm ent could represent a credible alternative to the spread o f communism: an elderly and astute politician open to many compromises, Bonomi was unlikely to be the best natural focus for democratic antifascism.34 During the entire second half o f 1944 and until the summer o f 1945 (that is, until the liberation o f northern Italy), the dilemma was sensed with increasing alarm, without the appearance o f a viable alternative. In late 1944—early 1945, an O SS report (Research and Analysis Branch) precisely indicated the problems and the responsibilities:

The spectacular growth of the Italian Communist Party during the past year seems to be attributable in large measure to the situation resulting from British support of the Monarchy. All the available information on the Italian situation would indicate that in the long run no attempt to maintain an unpopular conservative government can succeed except at a heavy cost, possibly involving either mifitary occupation or domes­ tic military dictatorship. Moreover, an unsuccessful attempt to reduce Italy to a position of political and military subservience would prove even more dangerous to British interests than a successful one. It would tend to antagonize the Italian population, particularly the leftists and democratic elements while fostering the growth of reaction­ ary nationalistic groups interested in discrediting democratic government It would

50

The Party’s Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

tend to place Italy in any future camp of revisionist countries interested in upsetting the post-war status quo, which in turn would prejudice the interests of other Allied nations, including the United States.35 A d ear vision underlies this analysis o f the dangers o f a conservative swing and the consequent failure o f the democratic plan advocated by the Am eri­ cans. But this vision was never to be translated fully into continuous, coherent action, remaining limited to relatively unimportant and symbolic gestures. In October 1944, Roosevelt’s order to increase bread rations from 200 to 300 grams per person may have been inspired in part by an ambiguous and naive materialism, but it was also dictated by electoral concerns and certainly did not express a coherent policy.36 The well-known episode o f Edward R. Stettinius’s condemnation o f the English veto to putting Count Sforza in as prime minister or foreign minister follows the same line; its importance was symbolic rather than political— symbolic o f America’ s desire to becom e involved and o f her disapproval o f the English— and nothing m ore.37 The tendency to be m ote receptive to the Resistance forces and to consider parties o f the C L N as the true representatives o f the country, rather than the king and his govern­ ment, were steps in a new direction, but they did not consolidate into sus­ tained initiatives. Quite a number o f reasons can be found to explain this slowness and hesitation. In the first place, there were different and conflicting necessities caused by the turn that the war operations were taking. In the second place there were diverse influences that converged to determine U.S. policy toward Italy. Those working in areas similar to the Research and Analysis Branch, together with many O SS exponents, leaned toward a reformist and antiBritish line as the only antidote to the spread o f communism. A long report by the Psychological Warfare Branch on the developm ent o f communism in Italy discerned the causes o f Communist success perspicadously, even if its prog­ nosis was exceedingly optim istic In spite of the strength of Communism I do not believe that it represents a real imminent possibility for Italy. There is a large mass of Italians who are tired of any form of authoritarian government If explained and shown the working of democracy they would welcome a democratic regime rather than a communist one. Fear of com­ munism inevitably produces fascism. There is a small minority of Italians who believe sufficiently deeply in liberty and democracy not to be afraid of communism. These Italians who are in the Socialist Action or Christian Democrat parties look toward the Anglo-Saxon powers for financial and moral support. . . If the Allies implement the Atlantic Charter and show that the democracies intend to create a harmonious Europe based on economic and social justice, then it seems to me the possibility of com­ munism will recede, but there is no doubt that rather than revert to some form of reactionary government Italians would turn to communism.3*

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51

Such feelings echoed strikingly those expressed publicly by Salvemini two years before; they were repeated in successive requests formulated by G en­ eral William Donovan, head o f the OSS, and apparently received by the State Departm ent Donovan suggested and warned: In a Europe racked by war and suffering widespread misery, Russia has a strong drawing card in the proletarian philosophy of communism___ The one hope of build­ ing a West-European-American power system with a strength and vitality comparable to that of the Russian bloc would be to encourage progressive, popular movements.. . . The democratic forces in Europe are many. What they require is organization, sup­ port and leadership.39 Immediately after Italy was liberated and die first governm ent able to adminis­ ter the whole peninsula was set up under Fenucdo Pani, a leader o f the partito d 'A d on e (Action party, one o f the most democratic and progressive political forces), Donovan, consistent with this judgment, gave him hill sup­ port, appropriating the words o f Allen Dulles: “ If w e can now do anything for Italy in die way o f additional econom ic aid w e could not find a better man to whom to extend this aid than to Pani.” 40Within the State Department as well, it was being suggested that in order to avoid a return to totalitarianism, or else a Communist success, Italy should be encouraged to form “ a moderate left m ovem ent. . . to give scope to the essentially sound peasant and laboring classes and in order to avoid exasperating by vain opposition a natural trend.” 41 But alongside this line, which was progressive and had affinities with the reformist spirit o f the American Democratic party, there also existed forces in the United States and in Italy that were pushing in the opposite direction. They, too, were aiming at greater American involvement, and they did not rule out the possibility o f the United States largely replacing Great Britain in an attempt to make a satellite o f Italy. Their intention, however, was to take over and consolidate the same anti-Communist and fiercely conservative attitude that London maintained until the end o f the hostilities. They accepted the suspicions expressed regarding the intentions o f the left-wing parties and especially o f the Communists; they consistently supported views aim ed at promoting a monarchist solution to the institutional problem; and they rec­ om m ended prolonging the stay o f the Allied troops in Italy. Som e very influ­ ential men were m oving in this direction: men such as Admiral Stone, head o f the Allied Commission; Alexander Kirk, the ambassador in Rom e; and Myron C. Taylor, who had taken up his post as envoy to the pope and had becom e involved with the latter's pained but tenacious and resentful anti­ communism.42 The end o f the hostilities in Europe in M ay 1945 and the Potsdam Conference arrived without a clear choice having been made be­

52

The Party's Domestic Strategy through the Cobi War

tween these diverging political orientations. Although the problem had finally been dearly focused on, there were international circumstances that made a solution impossible. The Potsdam Conference set in motion the long negotia­ tions required to define the terms o f peace treaties with the minor Axis countries, Italy included. Relations with die Soviet Union had deteriorated to a point where it was not possible to add the complications o f abrupt changes in internal polides to those that were already making agreem ent difficult The fact that Italy was in the Western sphere o f influence was never actually dis­ cussed; b u t had the Americans made a point o f stressing this, then it would probably have prevented a peace treaty. Perhaps most importantly, American intentions failed to becom e less am­ biguous because the internal Italian situation itself was far from dear. From the spring o f 1944, the adversary o f American policy in Italy had been iden­ tified with the Communist party (the disagreements with the British were margined and soon would be overcom e). This adversary appeared all the m ore dangerous as it had succeeded in setting itself up in power and partidpated in a coalition government that represented the unity o f the powers that had fought fascism. Y et there was no sign o f any ally or partner willing to collaborate with the American governm ent (or the Allied authorities) in back­ ing the need to pursue one o f two possible alternative solutions— either the democratic progressive one, or the m ore moderate one supporting som e important reforms. In view o f this, the situation seem ed to call for a policy o f waiting until the relations between the political forces within Italy becam e dearer. This was considered necessary in order to determine the will and the ability o f the anti-Fasdst coalition to survive, as well as the degree to which the American governm ent intended to becom e involved in Italy and to pursue its aims with suitable means.

A Policy Is Found The negotiations for the Italian peace treaty lasted until Novem ber 1946; the treaty itself was signed in February 1947 and ratified during the second half o f that year. Only through this process was Italy to regain full international sovereignty. Meanwhile, the conflicts o f the cold war had intensified in all the areas o f major friction in the world. The growing tendon appeared almost to bypass Italy, as it only affected Trieste on her eastern border. Italian political life seem ed to be dominated by the apparent collaboration between the six parties o f the C LN , particularly the three largest ones— the Christian Dem o­ crat, Sodalist, and Communist parties. H ow ever, behind this facade o f unity raged a hidden battle in which each party was trying to strengthen its own position. The Communists could count on their international ties, but was this true for the other parties? Certainly, various international ties worked in their favor, particularly in the econom ic sphere, where Italy had to be taken into

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consideration as an integral part o f the whole Western industrial and commer­ cial system that was in the process o f reconstruction. The problem becam e m ore complicated, however, when it came to the political and diplomatic sphere. The center parties were weak from an organizational point o f view and were handicapped by the small amount o f international support that had been shown. The Socialists, whom the Americans had thought o f approach­ ing in 1945 and 1946 about the possibility o f collaboration, must have felt discouraged by the conservative line that the most powerful American expo­ nents in Italy seem ed to prefer. As a result, they were attracted by hopes o f neutrality or by pro-Communist solutions. If, at the opportune moment, the Americans had sought collaboration in that direction, they would have found little response from the Socialist group. The great concentration o f antiCommunist forces was to be found elsewhere, operating within the Christian Democratic party. This was the heir o f the Popular, Catholic tradition and was reformist and Christian in its inspiration.43 A t that time, however, this party was dominated by the moderate exponents who, between 1944 and 1946, had rapidly swollen its ranks precisely in view o f its capacity to constitute a rallying point for anti-Communist action. This was confirmed by the results o f the elections for the Constituent Assembly o f June 2, 1946. A t the end o f 1946, once the air had been cleared o f international problems, these forces were determined to proceed to a clarification o f internal party relations. They were ready to put an end to the “ mess” o f a heterogeneous alliance, held together solely by the remembrance o f a common anti-Fasdst battle, but divided over the fundamental choices to be made for the reconstruction o f the country. While this was taking place in Italy, the Truman administration— especially after the midterm elections in 1946—was also taking steps to clarify its in­ volvem ent in Europe and was considering the various options that might enhance the unity o f the Western world. A bove all, the administration was going to favor European allies and friends, whose weaknesses they had until then failed fully to appreciate. In this context the policies o f the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the Atlantic Pact eventually evolved: the policy o f anti-Communist containment permitted no m ore ambiguities be­ cause Italy was strategically necessary, indeed “ vitally important” — in G en­ eral G eorge Marshall's words— to American policy in the Mediterranean.44 A closer, m ore careful look at Italy finally made the United States see which were the main political forces in Italy. It becam e clear that the center parties were no longer able to stem the tide o f communism. The Truman administra­ tion felt, for example, that however desirable it might be to help the Socialists, their internal conflicts basically ruled out the possibility o f any effective collab­ oration with them. It was under these circumstances that the Italian political situation came to be considered as though it were exclusively dominated by

54

The Party's Domestic Strategy through the Coki War

tw o opposing forces— the Communist party, the eternal enem y, and the Christian Democrat party, the trusted ally. This was not a new situation. The existence o f the Communist party and its growing influence had been known since at least 1944; from that time on, it had been considered a wily adversary to contend with. N ow , in order to fight it m ore effectively, the Americans began to present it as an imminent danger. In their search for a force to oppose to it, since they had abandoned any hope o f a reformist solution, the only alternative seem ed to lie in relying on the desire for collaboration by those who, like the Christian Democrats, showed their readiness to oppose resolutely the Communists. Radier than the ideals o f social and democratic progress discussed in 1945, the important yardstick for the Americans was now the degree o f anticommunism shown. The desire to collaborate with the moderate Left was submerged by the approaching overwhelm ing victory o f the Christian Democrats. N ot even the cautious attempts made by General Marshall to revive the old formulas were sufficient to alter the direction being taken by American foreign policy.45 The basic formation o f this alliance between two political forces, which preceded any actually made between their governments, took place, as is known, in the first six months o f 1947.46 The Communist problem was openly acknowledged to be the cement holding the structure together. The State Department saw the situation in the following terms: The rise of Communism to power in Italy would seriously menace U.S. interests. Apart from the influence this development would have on the future orientation of Western Europe and the repercussions to be expected in South America, a Communist regime in Italy could nullify the achievement of U.S. objectives in Greece and Turkey. It is recognized that the Italian Communist Party cannot be eliminated as a powerful political force with the means available to the U.S. during the next five months. But energetic effective action by a moderate non-Communist government, with open U.S. support, to improve Italy’s political and economic position offers the best chance fb check Communist Party growth and prevent its emergence from the... elections with a parliamentary majority.47 In M ay 1947, particularly after the split in January within the Socialist party, there was no credible and serious danger o f the Communists rising to power, this would have only been possible in the extremely unlikely event o f an electoral victory or an international crisis o f incalculable dimensions. There was no m ore danger than in past years— no m ore than in April 1945 or June 1946. Nevertheless, now that the right moment had arrived for the Italian political forces to make their choice, and the American governm ent had decided to implement a m ore direct and involved foreign policy with Italy, communism becam e the ideal and natural reason to explain this choice. The primary importance attached to the fight against communism erased the memory o f all that had not been done since 1943 and prepared the way for the Christian Democrats* landslide electoral victory o f 1948.

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Notes 1. Brice Harris, The UnBed States and the Italo-Ethiopian War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964); John P. Digglns, Mussolini and Fascism. The View from America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 317-43; Ennio' di Nolfo, “ Stati Uniti e Italia tra la seconda guerra mondiale e il sorgere della guerra fredda,” in Atti del Primo Congresso Intemazionale di Storia Americana, Italia e Stati Uniti dall’Indipendenza Americana a Oggi (Genova: Higher, 1978), pp. 123-35; James Miller, “ The Search for Stability: An Interpretation of American Policy in Italy: 1943-1946,” The Journal o f Italian History 1 (Autumn 1978). 2. The different viewpoints are summarized in John L Gaddis, The Unfed States and the Origins o f the Cold War 1941 —1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 32-62; Gabriel Kolko, The Politics o f War. The World and Unfed States Foreign Policy 1943-1947 (New York Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 33-37. 3. Paolo Sprlano, Storia del Partito communlsta italiano. La Resistenza Togliatti e II Partito nuovo (Turin: Einaudi, 1975), pp. 83-86, 104, 109, 159, 177; see also Donald Blackmer, Unity In Diversity. Italian Communism and the Communist World (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1968), pp. 6-13. 4. Record Group 59 (hereafter RG), Notter File, box 66, Political Subcommittee, P. Minutes 39, January 2,1943, National Archives (hereafter NA), Washington, D.C., p. 18. 5. RG 59, Notter File, box 62, Political Subcommittee, Document H. 25, August 4, 1943, NA, p. 13. 6. See the points brought out by Count Della Torre, September 1942, Myron C. Taylor Papers, box 1, volume entitled Report 1942, F. D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Now printed in Ennio di Nolfo, Vaticano e Stati Until 1939-1952 (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1978), pp. 198-200. 7. Mario Toscano, Designs in Diplomacy. Pages from European Diplomatic History In the Twentieth Century (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 373-405; The Countess of ListoweQ, Crusader In the Secret War (London: Macmil­ lan, 1952), pp. 106-36. * ® B e e Ennio di Nolfo, “ Operazione Sunrise: spunti e documenti,” Storia e politica (June-December 1975), pp. 345-76 and 501-22; Antonio Varsori, “ Italy, Britain and the Problem of a Separate Peace During the Second World War 1940-43,” The Journal o f Italian History 1 (Winter 1978). 9. Now in Enzo Tagliacozzo, ed., L ’Italia vista dall'America (Mian: Feltrinelli, 1969), vols. 1 and 2, pp. 74-80. 10. “ Free World,” June 1943, now in Tagliacozzo, ed., L ’Italia vista dall’America, pp. 145-50. v ì i . “ The New Republic,” August 15,1943, now in Tagfiacozzo, ed., L ’Italia vista dall’America, pp. 402-407. 12. Aldo Garosci, Storia del fuorusciti (Bari: Laterza, 1953), pp. 212-21. See also Memorandum from the Foreign Nationalities Branch to Donovan, May 15, 1943, Current Italian Politics in the United States, Office of Strategic Services, N. 34485, NA. 13. Press release, Official File, 233 A, folder 194, FDR Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. 14. RG 59; 865.20211/231, memorandum of a conversation between Vanni Mon­ tana and J. W. Jones, March 23, 1943, NA. ^15. For Count Sforza’s activities and role, see James Miller, “ Carlo Sforza e

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l’evoluzione della politica americana verso fltafia,” Storio contemporanea 4 (De­ cember 1976), pp. 825-53; Antonio Versori, “ Antifasdsmo e potenze alleate di fronte alla Conferenza di Montevideo dell’agosto 1942,” Dimensioni 3 (Aprii 1979), pp. 120-42; Antonio Varsori, “ La politica inglese e il conte Sforza (1941-1943),” Rivista ài studi politici intemazionali 1 (November 1976), pp. 31—57. 16. RG 59,865.01-188, Memorandum of a conversation Sforza-WeUes, February 8,1943, NA. *17. Daniel Crosby, S.J., “ The Politics of Religion. American Catholics and the Anti-Communist Impulse,” in Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis, The Specter. Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins o f McCarthysm (New York New Viewpoints, 1974), pp. 23-38; James Miller, “A Question of Loyalty: American Liberals, Propaganda and The Italian-American Community, 1939-1943,” The Maryland Historian 2 (September 1978), pp. 49-71; Gerald Flynn, Roosevelt and Romanism, Catholicism and American Diplomacy, 1937-1945 (London: Longmans, 1976), pp. 72,125-26,142,150-89; di Nolfo, Vaticano e Stati Uniti, pp. 38-58. 18. Elena Aga Rossi Sitzia, “ La politica degli Alleati verso l’ Italia nel 1943,” in Renzo de Felke, ed., L'Italia fra tedeschi e alleati (Bologna: D Mulino, 1973), pp. 191-219; David W. EDwood, L'alleato nemico. La politica dell’occupazione angloamericana in Italia 1943-1946 (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1977), pp. 48-63. ■S19. Robert BeitzeD, The Uneasy Alliance. America, Britain and Russia, 1941 —1943 (New York Knopf, 1972), pp. 118-23, 159-87, 209-19, Godfrey Warner, “ Italy and the Powers 1943-1949,” in Stuart J. Woolf, ed., The Rebirth o f Italy 1943—50 (London: Longmans, 1972), pp. 31—36; Kolko, The Politics o f War, pp. 128-31. V" 20. “ The Radical Trend in Occupied Italy,” OSS Report, Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Strategk Services, No. 1681, NA (no date); see also Kolko, The Politics o f War, pp. 48-49. 21. The conclusions of this report are reprinted in Walter Johnson and Charles Evans, eds., The Papers o f Adld E. Stevenson. Washington to Springfield 1941 -1948, voi. 2 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), pp. 196-201. ▼ 22. On the Soviet recognition of Italy, see Toscano, Designs in Diplomacy, pp. 268-94; Spriano, Storia del Partito comunista, pp. 110-77, 282-337; EDwood, L'alleato nemico, pp. 68-80; Ennio di Nolfo, “ Sistema intemarionale e sistema politico italiano: interazione e compatibilità,” in Sidney Tarrow and Luigi Graziano, eds., La crisi italiana, vol. 1 (Turin: Einaudi, 1979), pp. 87—108. 23. John Bagguley, “ The World War and the Cold War,” in David Horowitz, ed., Studies In Imperialism and the Cold War, N.1, Containment and Revolution. Western Policy Towards Revolution: 1917 to Vietnam (London: McGibbon and Kee, 1967), p. 100; see also the Introduction of David Horowitz, p. 11. This thesis implies the existence of a different Soviet foreign policy prior to 1943—that is, the specific en­ couragement of European revolutionary movements, whkh is rather difficult to estab­ lish for the Stalin period. 24. Prunas to Badoglio, March 24,1944, Archivio storico del Ministero degD Esteri, Roma. 25. Memorandum prepared in the Division of European Affairs, March 24, 1944, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), U.S. Department of State, 1944 voL 4, p. 842. 26. ’ Reber to HuD, March 22, 1944, FRUS, 1944, voi. 3, pp. 1071-72; on the

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effect of these words of BadogBo, see RG 59,865.01/2233, memorandum prepared for Adolph A. Bede, Jr., March 31,1944, NA. 27. RG 59,865.01/2404, Murphy to HuO, April 1944, NA. On the same conversation, see also Murphy to Hull, April 10,1944, FRUS, 1944, voi. 3, pp. 1090-91; Harry L Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs. Soldiers Become Governors (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Dept of the Army, 1964), pp. 450-51. n/28. On this process, see William Reitzell, The Mediterranean: Its Role In American Foreign Policy (New York Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1948). 29. RG 59 761.00/2-344, “ Certain Aspects of Present Soviet Policy,” a memoran­ dum prepared by E. Durbrow, February 3, 1944, NA, p. 18. 30. On this feeling, see Memorandum by Harold Macmillan, April 19,1944, FRUS, 1944, vol. 1, pp. 1112-14; see also Coles and Weinberg, Soldiers, pp. 449—51; Harold Macmillan, The Blast o f War 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 489-90, Warner, “ Italy and the Powers,” pp. 39-40. 31. OSS Report, No. 70758, originated April 5,1944, rated B -l, NA. 32. From a meeting of June 20, 1944. See the text in Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Papers, Diaries,. 745, pp. 195-97, F.D.R. Library, Hyde Park; see also Ellwood, L ’alleato nemico, pp. 317-19. 33. Coles and Weinberg, Soldiers, pp. 466-67; Ernest L Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, voi. 2 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1971), pp. 542-45. 34. On this point, see Ennio di Nolfo, “ Come h/anoe Bonomi e Aldde De Gasperi convinsero gli Americani a volere il referendum istituzionale,” Corriere della seta, June 2, 1976. 35. “ British Policy in Italy,” undated secret OSS Research and Analysis Branch Report, No. 23185. 36. Coles and Weinberg, Soldiers, pp. 500-506. 37. Ibid., pp. 453-66; Woodward, British Foreign Policy, voi. 3, pp. 461-65. 38. RG 59, 865.00B/2-2345, PWB Report, December 14,1944, NA. This docu­ ment has been partially used in Roberto Faenza and Marco Fini, GH Americani In Italia (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1976). 39. “ Problems and Objectives of United States Policy,” Donovan report to Truman, April 2,1945, H. S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo., White House Central File, OSS papers. 40. Donovan to Truman, June 19, 1945, H. S. Truman, library, White House Central File, OSS papers. See also Ennio di Nolfo, “ Dite al re Vittorio che l’America non vi abbandona,” Corriere detta sera, June 22, 1975. 41. RG 59, WEA Papers, box 3, Memorandum of the Western European Affairs Office, June 23, 1945, NA. 42. See FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, pp. 983-85, 1008, 1013-15; FRUS, 1945, Potsdam, vol. 1, pp. 681-94; Woodward, British Foreign Policy, vol. 3, pp. 481—84; Antonio Gambino, Storia del dopoguerra dalla liberazione al potere DC (Bari: Laterza, 1975), pp. 3-139. 43. Faenza and Fini, GH americani, pp. 129-31; Di Nolfo, Vaticano e Stati Urtiti, pp. 60-71; Sandro Magister, La politica vaticana e /’/tallo, 1943—1978 (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1979), pp. 3—26, 33-65.

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44. FRUS, 1947, voi. 3, p. 889. 45. FRUS, 1947, voi. 3, p. 912. See also, on the meaning of De Gasperi’s trip to America in January 1947, Alan Platt and Robert Leonardi, “ American Foreign Policy and the Postwar Italian Left,” Political Science Quarterly 2 (Summer 1978), p. 198. 46. Ennio di Nolfo, “ Problemi della politica estera italiana: 1943-1950,” Storia e politica 1 (January-February 1975), pp. 307-14; Platt and Leonardi, “American Foreign Policy,” pp. 198-99; Simon Serfaty, “ An International Anomaly: the United States and the Communist Parties in France and Italy,” Studies in Comparative Communism 2 (Spring-Summer 1975), pp. 123-46. 47. RG 59,865.01/5-847, Memorandum from H. Freeman Matthews to Marshall, May 8, 1947, NA.

THE UNITED ST A T E S AND THE PCI: TH E YEAR OF D ECISIO N , 1 9 4 7

4 Simon Serfaty

American postwar diplomacy— far from being defensive, inconsistent, or naive— showed a keen appreciation o f power politics that revisionist histo­ rians o f latter days have helped rediscover. N o Santa Claus, the Truman administration— strongly influenced by a bureaucracy that relentlessly painted the picture o f an omnipotent, expansionist, deceitful, and amoral Soviet Union— exploited opportunities where it found them and where it created them. American resources, seemingly unlimited at the time, enabled it to extend or deny aid to nations anxious to receive such support in the aftermath o f the war. “ W e are favoring the countries which w e trust,” frankly acknowl­ edged orthodox historian Herbert Feis in early 1947, “ using loans to prove our good will to rulers inclined to bargain; encouraging countries that are wavering in their allegiance to our purposes or our interests; denying those w e fear.” 1 In so doing, however, such dollar diplomacy unfortunately helped distort the very democratic principles it meant to preserve, as, in the end, qualifying for American help and protection brought about the virtual disen­ franchisement o f parts o f the electorate o f the countries involved. Then, as now, there is no need to deplore such American policies. There existed after the war an amount o f military and ideological pow er in the Soviet Union, the use o f which might tempt its leadership (whether for defensive or aggressive reasons), and the containment o f which was compelling to the American leadership (for reasons that com bined aU at once the need for physical preservation, the imperative o f econom ic expansion, and the com ­ mitment to a certain vision o f Western civilization). W hatever excesses oc­

59

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curred must be assessed in the light o f existing circumstances as they w ere known and understood at the time: history is remembered, it is not to be im agined On June 23,1945, C hief Commissioner Admiral Ellery Stone forwarded a lengthy memorandum to the supreme allied commander in the Mediterra­ nean, Harold Alexander. “ Italy," Stone wrote, “ is at the parting o f the way___ [It] is fertile for the growth o f an anarchical m ovem ent fostered by Moscow to bring Italy within the sphere o f Russian influence. Already there are signs that, if present conditions long continue, Communism will triumph— possibly by force."2 A similar case could have been made for the rest o f Europe. Although there was at the time no solid consensus in Washington on the issue o f Communist subversion in Europe (and indeed, Stone’s memorandum was itself moderate as it went on to stress that “ com ­ munist growth cannot be blocked by restrictive or repressive m easures"), the questions raised by the prospect o f cooperation between the United States and governments that included the Communist party in their midst w ere difficult ones to answer. T o be sure, with their national credibility restored and enhanced from within by the crucial role they had assumed in the under­ ground war against fascism, the Communist parties seem ed to satisfy well the postwar m ood o f national rebirth.3 Yet, a political landscape that permitted the flourishing o f Communist parties was not quite what the Truman adminis­ tration envisioned. Granted an early decision to help with the reconstruction o f Europe, such a decision was part o f a commitment to the defeat o f totalita­ rian forces that were said to grow out o f conditions o f econom ic poverty and social injustice: therefore, American policy progressively aimed at the expul­ sion o f Communist parties from ally governments. But, as w e shall see, such policies did not com e out o f decisions made in Washington alone. Instead, in repeated instances, they were influenced heavily by the pleas o f those states­ men and diplomats whom they affected m ost The Italian governm ent was an especially gifted practitioner o f the antiCommunist argum ent Overwhelm ed by the burdens o f postwar leadership, personally motivated by a political philosophy that was dearly at odds with Communist ideology, and hampered by Communist obstruction within the cabinet, Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi came to rely heavily on the dis­ patches and the analysis o f Ambassador Alberto Tarchiati!, who had assumed his post in Washington soon after De Gasperi’s arrival at the foreign ministry in Decem ber 1944. From that moment on, Tarchiani’s message in Washington was consistent “ Italy was not in a strong position to resist [a] m ovem ent towards the left because the Italian people were beginning to feel that the Anglo-Saxon powers were no longer deeply concerned with Italy’ s welfare.’ ’4 Aid would be the barometer o f American confidence. T o this day, it remains difficult to say precisely who was using whom. Although admittedly dependent on Washington’s good will, Rom e remained in control o f its ow n

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national setting. Although faced with explicit American preferences that relied essentially on timing and innuendos, the Christian Democrats themselves determined when the time had com e for a dramatic end to the mess— as Ennio di N olfo has put it— “ o f a heterogeneous alliance held together solely by the remembrance o f a common anti-Fasdst battle, but divided over the fundamental choices to be made for the reconstruction o f the country.” 5 And the time had com e because, in this period o f increasingly tight international bipolarity, the multipolarity o f the Italian governm ent was seen as an illegiti­ mate anomaly.

De Gasperi, The Communists, and The United States From the start, De Gasperi’ s second governm ent and Italy’s first experi­ ment in tripartism lacked stability. From within, deprived o f the unifying effect o f the fight against fascism, there was little stimulus for the major groups that were part o f the governm ent to com e to a lasting agreem ent on any one subject, and positions reached privately in cabinet meetings were soon dis­ carded at the council door, as individual ministers often took an opposing position in public for the sake o f ideological and tactical gains. As noted by Giuseppe Mammarella, such resistance inevitably inhibited and hampered government action. De Gasperi and the Christian Democratic ministers, who had the major government respon­ sibilities, were forced continually to reach compromises with their Communist and Socialist colleagues in the Cabinet over a part of their program. Progress in one direction was paid for by concession in another, which the Prime Minister was com­ pelled to make so that die tension inside the Cabinet should not reach the point of rupture.6 It was a harsh introduction to a pattem o f give, take, and weaken, which was to characterize the postwar Italian political game. From without, as U NRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Admin­ istration) assistance was scheduled to end shortly, dispatches from Washington regarding future aid added to De Gasperi’s bleak perception o f Italy’ s potential for recovery: such econom ic assistance was still needed, and only Am erica could provide it “ Almost everything Italy made was exported. . . . There was no buying pow er within Italy,” complained the then directorgeneral o f the Bank o f Italy.7 In sum, from within and from without, pres­ sures were being exerted on the prime minister, who was himself probably in favor o f tripartism, to dismantle his coalition at the earliest possible opportu­ nity.8 For the domestic and international settings could not be disassociated. Since the end o f the war, Italy had been facing three major problems: secu­

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rity, reconstruction, and acceptance. Reconstruction could not be achieved without an amount o f external support that was itself dependent on the erosion o f the suspicion aroused by Italy’ s wartime status. T o gain such reacceptance, Italy could depend on the special relationship that linked the country to the United States, where a substantial Itelo-American lobby was naturally m ore inclined toward temperance, so long as the politics o f the mother country remained legitimate, that is, non-Communist The Truman administration was encouraged further, therefore, to exert a moderating influ­ ence on the harsher policies endorsed by som e o f its Allies. Security, too, was a function o f both Soviet and American good will: neither side could b e offended without risking retaliation from the other. Thus, De Gasperi was caught between Ambassador Tarchiani’ s frequent warnings that American assistance was directly linked to the developm ent and preservation o f dem o­ cratic practices (thereby pointing to the need to speak out against com ­ munism), and Communist admonitions against “ selling” Italy’ s sovereignty “ for a mess o f potage” (thereby pointing to the obligation not to speak out against the P C I).9 It was in order to examine the conditions under which Italy might becom e a full recipient o f American aid that De Gasperi accepted an invitation from Tim e magazine to attend an international conference in Cleveland, Ohio, in early January 1947. Although it was unofficial, his trip soon gained increasing importance. From Washington, following consultations with Ambassador James Dunn, Secretary James Byrnes invited the Italian prime minister to m eet with him for an exchange o f ideas on the current situation in his country, thereby furthering De Gasperi’s hope that a proper presentation o f Italy’ s case— its “ vital importance in relation to U.S. policy in [the] Mediterranean” as Secretary G eorge Marshall put it10— would open the door to massive American assistance. I have to present myself [he nervously confided to his daughter] to a group of men who know neither my history, my language, or my life, and gain their confi­ dence___ The Americans will ask themselves who guarantees that this De Gasperi will still be in power within six months? In Paris, in London I have been treated as a former enemy; they invite me to Cleveland as a free member of human society, but I must succeed in being accepted and believed as a friend if I want to win some advantage for Italy. The position of our party, of the current government and my personal position depend at this moment on the results of this trip. If I know how to earn the faith and respect of those that will listen to me perhaps things will not go so bad---- But it is a world that I do not know and that I do not know how to confront11 Yet, De Gasperi was undertaking a dialogue o f unequals. W hen he left Rom e, he had been seen o ff at the airport, not only by provisional President Enrico de Nicola, but also by nearly the entire cabinet, as well as by a large delega-

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tion o f high U.S. Embassy representatives, including the chargé d’affaires, and by the chief Allied commissioner. W hen he arrived in Washington, he was therefore concerned to see that neither Secretary o f State Byrnes, nor even Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson, was on hand to greet him. Thus received almost as a polite afterthought— a thirty-minute meeting with Byrnes and a thirteen-minute meeting with President Truman12— De Gasperi relied heavily on the Communist threat as his main trump card. “ The greatest political pressure,” he told Byrnes, “ was being brought at this time by the Communist Party to bring Italy within the orbit o f Russian influence---- ” O f course De Gasperi added that his entire effort was to combat this movement, as he was o f an entirely different opinion. But for such an effort to be success­ ful, help was required at once, as there were “ no stocks and no reserves, and the delay o f one ship in arriving in Italy m eant. . . semirevolutionary riots and disturbances in the country.” 19 Reading from the record o f the meeting, it is hardly possible to say who was manipulating whom. W hile the Italian prime minister was telling the American secretary o f state what the Italian ambassador thought the secretary wanted to hear, the setting in Washington was so arranged as to expose the prime minister to the widespread anticommunism that the American ambassador in Rom e had thought De Gasperi should see. Thus, the Senate’ s “ good will” would be extended, Senator Taft pledged, to “ meriting nations that are struggling strenuously for their rebirth.” And Senator Vandenberg lectured De Gasperi on America’s unwillingness to “ waste [its] resources aiding ten­ dencies that are contrary to [its] principles and [its] goals o f internal and international democracy.” 14 Thus, upon his return to Rom e with only a small loan and a few promises, De Gasperi announced his resignation, giving as reasons for his limited suc­ cess in Washington America’s lack o f confidence in the stability o f the Italian democratic system, and adding that, without a clarification o f party relations, such confidence could not be prom oted further. “ N o political conditions have been set by the American governm ent for its help,” said De Gasperi to the press.16 “ I dodged indiscreet questions, and recalled the contributions with blood made by Communists to toe struggle for liberation.” 16 Yet, dearly enough, Am erica’s implidt prodding was tempting, and toe Italian prime minister was tempted. A t the same time, however, De Gasperi, too, was im plidfiy making a tempting offer, and, not su rprisin g, Am erica was temp­ ted. “ A prominent Christian Democratic party member told us today,” Dunn reported to Washington that [the] Prime Minister has decided to submit his government’s resignation in order to form [a] new government “ with less pressure from the Communists” . . . De Gas­ peri will attempt to form a more broadly based government including some Liberals

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The Party's Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

and Saragat Socialists.* The relative strength of the Communists will probably then be reduced in the new government*7 But the possibility o f actually expelling the Communists was not seriously entertained yet, either by De Gasperi or by Dunn. Responding to a perceived interest in America, De Gasperi was also responding to the interest shown by his political colleagues in a cabinet reshuffle: while he was still in the United States, the majority o f the parliamentary group o f his party requested a break with the Communist party, thus reasserting a position made dear the previous fall, a position that De Gasperi had opposed then and that he continued to oppose at the time o f the January crisis.18 Thus, the cabinet crisis was proba­ bly accelerated but certainly not caused by De Gasperi’s visit to Washington. It follow ed weeks o f restless and speculative political atmosphere when the Christian Democrats, on the one side, and the Communists and Socialists, on the other, had been fighting each other bitterly, both inside and outside the governm ent19 T o be sure, as Dunn saw it, there were still “ elements for polemics and distrust” Yet, he still foresaw “ no other workable basis for [the] governm ent than [a] coalition cabinet comprised o f [the] three mass par­ ties.” 20

From Cooperation to Showdown From February to M ay 1947, the deterioration o f the international setting, Washington’s perception o f that deterioration, and Rom e’s understanding o f the American m ood went hand in hand. From Washington, Ambassador Tarchiani’s cables becam e ever m ore urgent The government, the Congress and the economic powers of the country are preoc­ cupied by the possible victory of the Sodal-Communists in the coming elections. This is the reason why the credits and aid we have received have been relatively so slow. The new [Italian] government is looked upon with greater favor than the last, but there is fear of a counter-attack by the extreme left and some electoral surprise. There is here a dislike and suspicion for Russia which is comparable to that. . . toward Japan be­ tween 1940 and 1941. Our every act toward Moscow. . . arouses suspicion, if not real and true irritation___ You know that today the destiny of the world—and our fate— depends on the progressive accord or conflict between the Russians and the Ameri­ cans. . . . I am not among those who believe that we are able to remain perfectly neutral. .. it seems to me to be extremely difficult to conserve theoretical equidistance toward this country, because our economic conditions will periodically compel us to turn to the United States as they are the only ones capable of helping us. *De Gasperi was in Cleveland when he received word of the schism that had taken place within the Socialist party. According to Tarchiani’s account, he merely took note of the situation, “ adding that only after his return to Italy would he be able to ascertain the impact and consequences.”

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Even m ore explicitly, the ambassador concluded: The United States has by now smartened up. . . they only intend to aid countries considered secure, among which we are at this moment counted.... Even leaving aside arguments based on history, geography, interest, national temperament, and the opportunity to avoid betting on a loser, the iron necessity of material needs leaves us no other choice but to hold this country [the U.S.] in particular consideration.21 Tarchiani’s aim over the next months was to align Italy with the United States, and, in his first meeting with Secretary Marshall, he forcefully equated the future o f Italian stability with ties to the Western powers.22 In Washington, in the aftermath o f the Truman message to Congress on G reece and Turkey, the State Department was indeed growing increasingly concerned over Communist gains in Europe. A t the well-known meeting o f February 25 between members o f Congress and the executive, Dean Acheson explained that Soviet pressure on the straits, on ban, and on northern Greece had brought the Balkans to a point where a highly possible Soviet break-through might open these continents to Soviet penetration. Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east It would also cany infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt and to Europe through Italy and France, already threatened by the strongest domestic Communist parties in Western Europe. The Soviet Union was playing one of the greatest gambles in history at minimal cost It did not need to win all the possibilities. Even one or two offered immense gains.22 The stage was set for an escalation that, nine weeks later, had Marshall asking Ambassador Dunn “ what political and econom ic steps, if any, this govern­ ment should and could take toward strengthening democratic, pio-U.S. forces."24 The ambassador’s prompt answer on M ay 3 was much to the point and deserves to be quoted at length: We are [he wrote] convinced that no improvement in conditions here can take place under [the] government as at present composed. [The] Communists who are repre­ sented in Cabinet by [a] second-string team are doing everything possible outside and within the Government to bring about inflation and chaotic economic conditions. ... The pity is that there exists all over Italy a real will to work and there could easily be a general confidence in the future if it were not for the political agitation of the Communists and I doubt if there can be any real effective measures taken to improve the situation as long as the Communists participate In the Government The Com­ munist party would, of course, fight hard against any effort to form a Government without its participation but I do not believe it is too late for a government to be formed without their participation and there appears to be a growing realization that the Communist party is not really trying to bring about the restoration of economic stabil­ ity.

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In short, Dunn concluded: 1If they [the Italians] had any idea that adoption of Communism in Italy would cut them off from relations with the U.S., I feel sure the vast majority would reject Communist advances.“ In the meanwhile, Dunn added a few days later that there was little the U.S. could and should do, beyond providing wheat “ so as to maintain life and hope.” 26 In Rom e, De Gasperi’s own views had also evolved, and, increasingly sensitive to Tarchiani’s arguments, he had com e out openly in support o f American policies. Thus, on April 22, 1947, The N ew York Tim es had d e­ scribed him in fervor o f “ continued and increased American participation in European and Mediterranean affairs. . . as the key to the solution o f both international dispute and Italian internal problems.” The Times added that De Gasperi “ spoke with full knowledge that the publication o f his views might increase the difficulty o f holding together his coalition governm ent” 27A few days later, De Gasperi took another significant step, as he publicly criticized the opposition o f the Socialists and the Communists “ within the state administration and in the legislation on public matters.” 28 The U.S. Embassy in Rom e found such first steps encouraging, but not sufficient Thus, looking to the future, Ambassador Dunn reported on May 7: Outside aid per-se will provide neither leadership, confidence, nor courage. What the United States can and should however do is, first provide wheat no matter how bad the situation. .. and second, when the appropriate time comes, to give moral and material support to an eventual competent government who promises some measure of success.29 Accordingly, Dunn advised: To bring to the attention of the Italian people. . . a dear indication of what might be the result of their going over to the Communist line and in order to build up a sound resistance to the siren call of the insidious propaganda now being pushed around here. .. tee President might consider... [to] say teat tee U.S. has deep and friendly interest in tee growth of real democracy in Italy... and will be happy to continue to lend our support to these elements here who have deep and abiding faith in the democratic processes and the preservation of the freedom and liberty of the Italian people and who are opposed to government in Italy by totalitarian regimes either of the extreme right or the extreme left. .. and that we are confident teat tee Italian people will not desire a totalitarian regime which would invariably break down the close ties teat bind together the Italian and American people20 In sum, as the U.S. Embassy saw it, a “ com petent government” would em erge if the present one were to be expanded so that Communist influence

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could be reduced, or better, if the Communists were to be excluded from the governm ent altogether.31 Dunn’s reports were echoed by Tarchiani’s comments. Thus, in conversa­ tions held at the State Department on M ay 8 and 16, Tarchiani’ s “ pessimistic picture” was much in evidence: “ the growth o f Communist strength” might give an absolute majority o f the Italian Parliament to the PC I and the Nenni Socialists after the October elections, in spite o f De Gasperi’s determination “ to do everything possible” to prevent it Moscow, the Italian ambassador pointed out on M ay 16, attached special importance to obtaining Communist control o f Italy: Moscow can do little in France since that country is cut-off from Russia by the Anglo-American zones of Germany. On the contrary, through Yugoslavia, Italy is in effect directly linked to Russia.. . . Italy as a base would serve to flank Greece and Turkey, to extend Communist influence north to Germany and Austria west to France and Spain*... [and] facilitate Communist penetration into North Africa. Tarchiati! had told Freeman Matthews on M ay 8: “ De Gasperi is considering reorganizing his governm ent either through the exclusion o f the Communists or through broadening its base, thus diluting Communist influence in the governm ent” Now, on M ay 16, he m ore cautiously told Secretary Marshall: “ Whether it would be possible at the present stage to form a governm ent without any Communist participation he could not say.” In both instances, though, having first dwelt on the Communist threat, and next raised the possibility that De Gasperi might take firm action, Tarchiani naturally con­ cluded that when the time came, the prime minister would need m ore Am eri­ can support When and if the new government is formed, Mr. Tarchiani thought it of highest importance that the United States give its support and encouragement in every way possible___ He said [on May 8] that even though the picture looked dark we should not forget that the overwhelming majority of the Italian populace is basically proAmerican. “ If the Italian populace had any thought that they were choosing between the United States and the Soviet Union in their support of the Communist Party,” he said, “ there would be no doubt of their decision.” And Tarchiani urged Secretary Marshall on May 16 that “ everything possible be done to assist Italy between now and the elections next October.. . . For all their talk and oratory the Italians are essentially a realistic people.” 3* The American response— as relayed to the Embassy— urged support o f any action De Gasperi might take to disengage himself from his ties on the L e ft Such support was also envisioned should the prime minister only re­ duce, rather titan eliminate, leftist participation in his governm ent The de­ partment’s policy now was that

68

The Party’s Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

every available source [of] economic assistance [to] Italy be utilized, including postUNRRA relief. Congress is to be urged [to] pass promptly enabling legislation for return to Italy [of] assets in the United States. . . Eximbank [Export-Import Bank] to be urged [to] expedite [the] availability [of the] $100 million earmarked loan; [the] War De­ partment [is] to be asked to expedite [the] final settlement [of] suspense accounts. But such aid was to be granted only after a new governm ent had been form ed.33 A few days later, the denouement was precipitated by rumors that were said to have originated in Washington. On May 28, The New York Times reported that “ a crisis within the Italian Cabinet was precipitated today by unfavorable reports reaching Rom e concerning the progress o f the econom ic mission at present in the U.S. headed by Deputy Ivan Matteo Lom bardo.” The latter, it was further reported, “ as a consequence. . . o f attacks made b y . . . Paimiro Togliatti. . . on the American people gen erally. . . [had] suc­ ceeded in seeing few American officials o f importance and even those that did receive him seem ed hardly inclined to take him seriously.” As a consequence, The Tim es concluded, “ hopes that Italy h a d . . . , ranging from a settlement o f all outstanding financial questions to the concession o f a sizeable loan, seem ed to be receding into the distance.” 34 On that same day, the minister o f the treasury, Campilli, met at his request with Henry Tasca to discuss postU NRRA aid for the remainder o f 1947. The reply was d e a r “ unless [a] totally new situation developed [aid] beyond post-UNRRA year [was] unlikely.” Yet, fire question still remained as to what kind o f “ totally new situation” tire Em­ bassy and the State Department m eant Campilli seem ed to interpret Tasca’s statement as a prelude to a firm American com m itm ent He, therefore, spoke o f the possibility o f forming a governm ent without the Communists. “ Such [a] government,” he observed, “ would, o f course, be very difficult to form and would have to have something spectacular to offer Italian people in order to make it a success.” 35 T o be sure, Tasca could not make any such commit­ ment at that time. But once the crisis had been settled and a Christian Demo­ cratic governm ent had been established (with the help o f som e independent technicians), the American ambassador pointedly reported: Now that a government has been formed by the Christian Democrats. . . with out­ side experts but without Communists or their affiliates, I recommend most strongly that our government take whatever steps may be possible to demonstrate our support and readiness to aid in their efforts to save toe lira and secure their economy.36 The expulsion was a daring act on De Gasperi’ s part As recorded by his daughter, Even members of toe Christian Democrats were fearful of toe Sodal-Communists’ expulsion from government The honorable Pella, then a young undersecretary, was

The United States and the PCI, 1947

69

summoned one day by Rcdonl who in his capacity as party secretary confided to him how inopportune he believed the operation to be and asked him to speak tp De Gasperi. De Gasperi responded to Pella, “ I know that I am alone, but I would do it again even now, because within six months it would already be too late.” 37 But in the following weeks, De Gasperi’ s new governm ent received numerous indications o f both moral and material support from the United States: De Gasperi was not alone after all. Indeed, the “ appropriate time” had com e, and a “ new situation” had developed— one that the United States not only preferred, but actively sought to prom ote and maintain.

After the Fall In fact, the United States did not openly demand that Communists be excluded from the Italian cabinet as a prerequisite to American econom ic a id Rather, the Christian Democrats published an excessive list o f such “ de­ mands.” It was a shrewd maneuver designed to convince the Italian public that Communist exclusion was the only effective key to America’s pocketbook. Did De Gasperi, then, exploit Am erica’s anticommunism? This is likely, as the maneuvering o f 1947 seems to show. Was there an actual American demand for expulsion? The Tasca statement notwithstanding, there are few specific and direct statements o f that nature by governm ent officials. Was aid tied to a change in government? American communications between the embassies in Rom e and Washington and the timing o f American aid leave little doubt o f it Was the American stand crucial to the expulsion? Yes, to the extent that it m oved De Gasperi to implement an objective that had becom e increasingly his own since January and then provided him with die material bounty with which he could pacify the public. Secretary o f State Marshall’s public statement o f June 2, on the occasion o f the formation o f De Gasperi’ s new government, provided the endorsement that both the American Embassy in Rom e and the Italian Embassy in Washington had requested. It stressed the strong bonds between the Am eri­ can and Italian peoples and America’ s commitment to the reconstruction o f the Italian econom y. And, no less importantly, its promise o f future aid was phrased so that it could also be interpreted as a threat o f cutoff should the Sodal-Communists gain control o f the country. Hence, the dual reading o f the statement, “ W e shall continue to give aid to the Italian people who have demonstrated their sincere and abiding faith in the democratic processes for the preservation o f their individual liberties and basic rights.” Thus, even before the dust had settled in Rom e, Washington began to assume a more vigorous profile. In a telegram to Dunn, Marshall expressed alarm at Com ­ munist charges that the United States was “ supporting reactionary Italian elements.” Marshall asked that steps be taken by d ie Embassy to intimate to

70

The Patty's Domestic Strategy through the Coki War

the Christian Democrat (D C ) and Social Democrat (PSD I) leaders “ som e disappointment that agreement could not be reached for PSDI participation in [the] C abinet” 3* Washington feared that without an enlargement o f the go v­ ernment beyond the m onocolore to include moderate leftist elements, the D C would continue to shun the social reforms that were vitally needed if the Communists were to be rolled back. In the following weeks, De Gasperi and Tarchiani continued to press Washington for increased econom ic aid. Italians emphasized the precarious­ ness o f their new situation and pointed continuously to Communist agitation and the possibility o f a defeat at the polls in the com ing autumn. Though expecting to tace civil disorder, the prime minister remained convinced that if he could maintain the governm ent in pow er for a while longer, he would then probably be safe until the next elections. But to do so, he required American assistance— as he told Ambassador Dunn, “ a grant o f 100 million dollars in addition to [the] present Export-Import credit and the placing o f the latter at the disposition o f the governm ent to cover the deficit in the balance o f pay­ ments rather than waiting for its application to specific factories for raw mate­ rials.” And De Gasperi concluded: “ A failure on the part o f his governm ent would bring on in Italy, without any doubt, a governm ent o f the extrem e le ft” 39 The American governm ent obviously opposed the reentry o f the C om ­ munist party in the government, let alone a governm ent o f the Left only. A telegram from the U.S. Embassy dated August 28 reflects the manner in which American representatives now made their feeling on Communist par­ ticipation known. As can be seen from Randolfo Pacciardi’ s introductory remarks, it was at this point seldom necessary for the United States to exert itself in order to make its preferences heard. Pacdardi (then the head o f the Italian Republican party) illustrated this well when he is reported to have said that “ the attitude o f the United States. . . was so important to the future o f Italy not only on a moral and sentimental basis, but to the very econom ic life o f the country that [his] party wanted to take no step out o f line with United States thinking for Italy’s future. [In substance he] wanted to know what [the] United States’ attitude would be toward re-inclusion o f [the] Communists in the G overnm ent” The answer was clear and to the poin t Regarding the re-inclusion of the Communists in the government we said that we thought the disadvantages in such a move for outweighed any advantages which might be gained by sharing even nominally the responsibility of government with them.. . . Bringing them back so soon after having formed a government without them and now sharing responsibility of government with them would certainly add to their prestige in the country and abroad and would be exploited by them to the last degree as evidence of the inability of any Italian Cabinet to govern without them; furthermore... their inclusion in government was no guarantee of their cooperation in a government program as the old tripartite formula had so clearly evidenced___ Re­

The United States and the PCI, 1947

71

cent international incidents plus their defeat on several issues in die Assembly since the present government came to power was tending to weaken the influence and prestige o f the PCI in the country which could only be reversed by bringing them back into the government In sum, collaboration was impossible since the ultimate aim was so entirely divergent and that any steps to bring them back in at this time appeared gratuitous and unwarranted under present circumstances.40

Am erica's concern with Italy's domestic affairs, which first assumed a more active profile around M ay 1, not only continued but increased as summer gave way to fall. With Am erica's aid, G reece and Turkey had seemingly stopped the expansion o f communism in the Eastern Mediterranean, and American attention now focused on Italy as die next soft spot in the West’ s armor. The boundary dispute with Yugoslavia over Trieste, and the w ave o f strikes and demonstrations that the Italian governm ent faced, were inter­ preted in many quarters as the next phase o f Soviet aggression. Steadily, Tarchiati! advised the State Department o f the precariousness o f De Gasperi’ s governm ent As he had done forcefully so many times before, he underlined the importance o f American aid as the kingpin to the survival o f De Gasperi’s leadership and, consequently, as a bulwark against the L e ft W hile TogBatti could not muster the votes needed to topple the De Gasperi government, he could nevertheless exert enough pressure and manage enough disruption to force De Gasperi out o f office. As Tarchiani saw it, TogHatü’s strategy was but one part o f a globed Soviet policy that was now centered on Italy, rince Greece and Turkey were under "direct U.S. protection” both in a military and econom ic sense, whereas Allied troops were being withdrawn from Italy where the econom ic situation was growing ever worse. And De Gasperi concluded pointedly that "w hile he felt sure the Italian communists could count on Yugoslav and Soviet support he wondered what assistance the Italian governm ent would obtain.” 41 The cold war had m oved in fully. Echoing Tarchiani’ s request o f Sep­ tem ber 11, Dunn asked on Septem ber 22 for "im m ediate measures o f sup­ port” to influence "decisively” a vote o f confidence that was to take place on October 4.42 The State Department heeded the Embassy’s advice at once, and immediate action was initiated accordingly. Indeed, by the first o f the following month, concern in Washington had reached the point where the policy planning staff evaluated the actions that might be taken by the United States "in the event o f Communist seizure o f North Italy” — a contingency that had been periodically raised by both Tarchiani and Dunn in recent months.43 1947 closed on that note. The decisions had been made; the policies had been set There was already widespread preoccupation over future elections. "Since the early part o f Decem ber,” Tasca later wrote to a staff m ember o f the then Congressman Christian Herter, "all reliable indications have pointed

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The Party’s Domestic StnMegy through the C old War

to increasing p r o b a b le s o f success for the Com m unst-dom inaled Popular Front in Italy in the forthcoming d éd ion s o f April 19 [1948]/’ 4* Direct Am eri­ can intervention in these elections was now required: campaign funds w ere provided; Ambassador Dunn toured the country to cajole and to warn, thereby acting at last on his impfidt complaint o f M ay 3 that the United States had “ assumed in the eyes o f Italians a passive role as regards the growth o f Itafian Com m unism ."46 On March 19, 1948, Secretary Marshall explicitly threatened that American aid would cease if the Communists won. A s tim e had progressed, Italy had becom e a focal point o f American policy. It was on e o f the many battlefields on which the cold war was fought

Noies 1. Herbert Feis, “ Diplomacy of the Dolar," Atlantic Monthly (January 1947), p. 26. I wrote another version of this essay under the title “ G l Stati Uniti, Thalia e b guerra fredda: L’anno della decisione, 1947," Il Mulino (M ay-June, 1976), pp. 143-66. 2. Memorandum dted in David EDwood, L'alleato nemico, la poBtica delToccupadone Anglo-Americana in Hata 1943—1946 (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1977), pp. 147-48. Quoted and discussed in John Harper, “ The U.S. and the Italian Economy, 1944-1947’ (Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, forthcoming). 3. For a discussion of the French case, see Simon Serfaty, “ The United States and the Communist Parties in France and Italy, 1945-47," Studies in Comparative Communism (Spring 1975), pp. 123-46; and Facing Partnership: America and Europe After 30 Years (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 83ff. 4. Memorandum of a conversation with William Philfips, then a special assistant to the secretary of state (and the U.S. ambassador to Italy 1937—1941), May 30,1945. Cited in EDwood, L'alleato nemico, p. 150. 5. Ennio di Nodo, “ The United States and Italian Communism, 1942-1946: World War to the Cold War," The Journal o f Italian History (Spring 1978), p. 92. 6. Giuseppe MammareDa, L'Italia dopo il Fascismo: 1943-1973 (Bologna: 0 Mulino, 1970), p. 160. 7. Memorandum of meeting between Mr. Clayton, undersecretary of stete for economic affairs, and Mr. De Gasperi, January 7, 1947, Foreign Relations o f the United States (hereafter FRUS), U.S. Department of State, 1947, voL 3, p. 848. 8. On De Gasperl’s views, see Norman Kogan, A Political History o f Postwar Italy (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 34. 9. Alberto Tarchiati!, America-ItaHa, le died giornate cß De Gasperi negli Stati Uniti (Milan: Rizzoli, 1947), p. 30; The New York Times, January 4,1947, p. 7. 10. FRUS, 1947, voL 3, p. 889. 11. Maria Romana Gatti De Gasperi, De Gasperi, uomo sob (Verona: Mondadori, 1965), p. 240«. 12. An account of the meeting with Byrnes can be found in FRUS, 1947, voi. 3, pp. 851-52. No mention is made of the meeting with Truman in the tetter's Memoirs. A

The United States and the PCI, 1947

73

fourteen-line account of the meeting—“ The interview was general” —can be found in FRUS, 1947, voi. 3, p. 850. 13. FRUS, 1947, vo i 3, p. 839. 14. Tarchiani, America-ItaHa, pp. 68 and 46, respectively. 15. The New York Times, January 9, 1947, p. 7. 16. As reported by the U.S. Embassy in Rome from an article in the Messaggero. Telegram to the State Department, No. 176, January 23, 1947. 17. From the Embassy to the State Department, No. 158, January 21, 1947. 18. Sari Gilbert, “ From Armistice to Alliance, Goals and Methods in Italian Foreign Policy, 1943 to 1949” (Ph.D. thesis, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, 1969), p. 128. 19. The New York Times, January 21,1947, p. 5. 20. FRUS, 1947, voi. 3, p. 871. 21. Alberto Tarchiani, Died anni tra Roma e Washington (Milan: Rizzoli, 1955), pp. 134-35. 22. State Department, Memorandum of meeting between Ambassador Tarchiani and Secretary of State Marshall, February 28, 1947. 23. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 219. 24. FRUS, 1947, voi. 3, p. 889. 25. Ibid., pp. 890-91. (Emphasis mine.) 26. Ibid., pp. 896-97. 27. The New York Times, April 22, 1947, p. 20. 28. MammareUa, L ’Italia dopo if fascismo, p. 170. 29. FRUS, 1947, vol. 3, p. 896. (Emphasis mine.) 30. Ibid., pp. 891-92. 31. Ibid., p. 896. 32. U.S. State Department, Memorandum of meeting between Ambassador Tar­ chiani and H. Freeman Matthews, director of European Affairs, May 8,1947. For the meeting with Secretary Marshall, see, FRUS 1947, voi. 3, pp. 904-908. See also the memorandum of a third meeting between Tarchiani and Matthews on May 20, FRUS, 1947, voi. 3, p. 908. 33. Ibid., pp. 909-10. 34. The New York Times, May 28, 1947, p. 5. 35. Telegram from the Embassy in Rome to the State Department, No. 1328, May 28.1947. (Emphasis mine.) 36. Ibid., No. 1364, June 1, 1947. 37. Maria Romana Gatti De Gasperi, De Gasperi, p. 253. 38. FRUS, 1947, vol 3, p. 919. 39. Telegram from the Embassy in Rome to the State Department, No. 1816, July 3.1947. 40. Ibid., No. 1540, August 28, 1947. 41. Meeting with Acting Secretary Robert Lovett, September 16, 1947, FRUS, 1947, voi. 3, p. 970. 42. Telegram from the Embassy in Rome to the State Department, No. 2871,

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September 22,1947; ibid., p. 976. Tarchiani’s own request was made on September 11; ibid., p. 967. 43. Ibid., pp. 977-81. See, for example, Dunn's assessment of the potential for such insurrection on June 18, and Tarchiani’s warning of September 16, in FRUS, 1947, voi. 3, pp. 923-24 and 970, respectively. 44. Ambassador Dunn to Mr. Red Dowling, March 17,1948, enclosing letter from Tasca to Mr. Frank Lindsay, member of the staff of Congressman Christian Herter, as quoted by John Harper, The U.S. and the Italian Economy, from the MatthewsHkkerson flies, RG 59, box 3. 45. FRUS, 1947, voL 3, p. 891.

FROM TO GLIA TTI TO THE C O M P R O M E S S O S T O R IC O : A PARTY

WITH A GOVERNMENTAL VOCATION

5 Gianfranco Pasquino

On June 20, 1976, the Italian Communist party (P C I) polled its highest electoral percentage ever— which was also the highest percentage reached by a Communist party in free elections in a Western country: 34.4. N ever before so d ose to governmental power, the PC I fundamentally supported allChristian Democratic (D C ) governments led by Giulio Andreotti in the period from August 1976 to January 1979. W hen it reiterated its request for full participation in the governm ent— a request already made in January 1978, which A ld o M oro had answered by opening to the PC I the doors to entry in the parliamentary majority— the cabinet crisis once again led to early elec­ tions. Yet, the idea o f sharing pow er had not been fully accepted either by the DC (leaders and members) or by Communist rank-and-file and militants. Many Communist voters were deeply dissatisfied with the evolution o f the political situation. Their dissent with the historic compromise was expressed in 1979 by voting for other leftist parties, above all the Radical party, which was the adamant opponent o f the Christian Democratic regime. Thus, although the Left as a whole lost very little, the PC I suffered its first electoral defeat since toe beginning o f toe Republican era. (S ee Table 1.) The results o f June 3,1979, however, were not a victory for toe DC either. With a stable governmental coalition as elusive as before, it is worthwhile to reflect on the reasons for toe electoral and political strength o f toe PC I and on its coalitional availability. Accordingly, this essay will first analyze toe nature and evolution o f toe PC I in terms o f its political strategy, parliamentary be­ havior, and management o f local power. On this basis, an attempt will be

75

76

The Party's Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

Table 1 Percentage o f Vote* and Number o f Seats Gained by the National Partiee in 1972,1976, and 1979 (House o f Deputies) 1979

1976

% Christian Democrats Communists Socialist party Social Democrats Republican party Liberal party Neo-Fascists P dU P' Radical party

38.3 30.4 9.8 3.8 3.0 1.9 5.3 1.4 3.4

262 201 62 20 16 9 30 6 18

1972

%

Seats

38.7 34.4 9.6 3.4 3.1 1.3 6.1 1.5 1.1

262 226 57 15 14 5 35 6 4

% 38.7 27.2 9.6 5.1 2.9 3.9 8.7 0.7 —

Seats 267 179 61 29 15 20 56 —

—

'Partito di Unita Proletaria (Party of Proletarian Unity); in 1976, in a coalition called “Pro* letarian Democracy*'; In 1972, using the label “/I Mantfeato." made to explain the motivations o f Communist tactics and choices, as well as the reasons for its success. Finally, w e shall try to identify som e o f the prob­ lems faced by the PC I at the threshold o f power, and the implications o f its participation in the governm ent for the operation o f the Italian political system on the eve o f the eighties.

Continuity in Change The overall experience o f the Italian Communist party can be appropriately situated between two landmarks in the history o f contemporary Communist movements: the “ lesson” o f G reece (1 9 4 4 -4 9 ) and the tragedy o f Chile (Septem ber 1973). In addition, throughout the postwar period, the party’s long-term strategy, short-term choices, and day-to-day policies have been dominated by the attempt to reacquire legitimacy as a truly national, Italian party that was bent on transforming the system, not destroying it Hence, the emphasis on the Italian road to socialism: necessarily democratic, essen­ tially parliamentary, and, in principle at least, peaceful. H owever, one must remember Paimiro Togliatti’s warning that “ a painless ‘peaceful’ developm ent will depend upon a com plex interlacing o f conditions, some o f which depend on us, some on the objective course o f events, and some on the actions o f the enem y.” 1 W hile the various elements that constitute the Italian road to socialism were spelled out most clearly in 1973, its basic assumptions g o back to Togliatti’ s interpretation o f the Italian situation in 1944 and immediately after, in the light o f the crushing defeat o f Communist guerrilla warfare in G reece.2According to

From TogHatti to the Compromesso Storico

77

Togliatti, Western Communist parties had to learn two things from the Greek experience: first, that in a world divided into two spheres o f influence (Allied troops remained in Italy until 1947), the armed road to pow er was not feasi­ ble; and second, that even if political pow er could have been conquered by means o f an armed revolution, a viable form o f governm ent could not be created in such a com plex and pluralistic society as the Italian society without mustering the support o f a very large alliance o f political and social forces that had to include a sizable section o f the Catholic masses. The so-called strategy o f alliances, therefore, found its practical motivation in the inescapable neces­ sity to avoid die mistakes made by the Greek Communists and its theoretical foundation in a comprehensive analysis o f the nature o f Western societies— an analysis that was substantially based on Antonio Gramsd’s Prison N otebooks (edited by Togliatti himself). That Togliatti really meant to implement such a collaboration with different sectors o f Italian society— most particularly with the party representing the Catholics— is easily shown by his two well-known compromises. The first o f these was the so-called svolta (turnabout) o f Salerno (March 31 -A p ril 1, 1944): when he returned from the Soviet Union, Togliatti agreed to recognize a governm ent led by Pietro Badoglio, over and against the vehem ent opposi­ tion o f all the other leftist parties and groups. The abandonment o f the institu­ tional pregiudiziale (prejudgment)— the moral impossibility o f any collabora­ tion with the monarchy and monarchist parties, heavily compromised with fascism— and the postponement o f the decision over which form o f state until the liberation o f the country had been completed, made it possible for m od­ erate and conservative forces— including first and foremost the Christian Democrats— not to face this potentially disruptive issue. Anxious to build a mass party and to consolidate a truly “ progressive democracy,” Togliatti later justified his momentous decision by the necessity for the PC I to “ analyze every problem from the point o f view o f the nation, o f the Italian State.” 3 Again going against the unity o f leftist forces, a second “ compromise” was reached with the Christian Democrats over the approval o f article 7 o f the constitution, which inserted the Lateran Pacts into d ie constitutional charter. Signed by Mussolini and the pope in 1929, the pacts recognized a privileged position for the Catholic church in Italian society and politics— a position the church still enjoys and one the PC I rarely challenges openly. Behind each o f these two choices can be found the desire to legitimize the PCI as a national party concerned with the general interests o f the country, as well as Togliatti’s desire not to break with the Christian Democrats. At the time, the PC I rightly acknowledged the D C s identification with the Catholic masses and the peasants (ceti contadini), but it underestimated the D C s ties with moderate and conservative groups and with the bourgeoisie.4 T o this day, indeed, some Communist leaders pointedly observe that while they may

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The Party's Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

not have much in common with Christian Democratic leaders, they share one fundamental experience: “ After all, w e made the Constitution together."5 This overall approach to Italian politics, based as it was on a strategy o f collaboration and on the avoidance o f mass armed actions, was so ingrained in top Communist leadership that, even after an attempt on Togtiatti's life in July 1948, thousands o f Communist militants were ordered to keep under control the spontaneous manifestations erupting all over Italy, including the implementation o f a general strike. The Communists were expelled horn the governm ent in May 1947, but they still hoped for a renewed alliance with the Christian Democrats. Granted that Communist willingness to cooperate both at the level o f the labor m ovement and at the governmental level has never been unconditional, the motivations behind the overall party strategy have nevertheless been successfully com bined with a genuine concern for the national interest A case in point is the offer o f collaboration extended by the Communist-dominated C G IL ( C on fed eratone G en erd e Italiana del L a v oro ) to the governm ent (and the entrepreneurs) as late as February 1950 (a work­ ing program entitled Piano del L a v oro )— that is, well after the resounding defeat o f the Popular Front in the general elections o f April 1948, as well as after the split provoked by Christian Democratic forces in the labor m ovem ent in July 1948.5 The importance o f the above-m entioned compromises and the relevance o f the various elements o f a comprehensive strategy o f alliances, whose initial formulation goes back to the 1 9 4 4 -4 8 period, are dear. Since there is as much continuity as adaptation in the politics o f the PCI, a full understanding o f the background to the present situation is fundamental in evaluating the evolution, the success, and the prospects for the party, even if, o f course, there is much m ore to Communist politics than a mere attempt to create the broadest possible coalition o f progressive and popular forces.

Major Principles of Communist Strategy Generally speaking, the strategy o f the Italian Communist party can be defined by three main prindples, whose importance and impact have cer­ tainly been m odified over time, but which still constitute the fundamental core o f party activities and decisions. M ore spedfically, these prindples refer to and deal with, in Donald Blackmer’s words, “ three central aspects o f party behavior— organization, domestic strategy, and international relations— no one o f which seems. . . to have a clear general priority over the others."7 O ne might add, in fact, that the ascendancy o f any one o f these prindples over the others has always been in the past both a sign and an accelerator o f crisis.8 Furthermore, these prindples are subjed to different interpretations by various Communist leaders and militants and can be manipulated in positive and negative ways by Communist and non-Communist public opinion.

From Togliatti to the Compromesso Storico

79

Power of the leadership group; link with the USSR; [and] effective interest representa­ tion are three elements of reality whose priority ranking is modified in appearance for the militant interest representation becomes a class expression, the link with the USSR is defined as proletarian internationalism, the power of the top as unify of the party. Through the new definitions, reality appears upside down.9 Since these principles can be, and are, interpreted differently, it becomes necessary, therefore, to identify their contradictions both within toe functioning o f toe party and for the external image o f toe party.

The Constraints of Proletarian Internationalism For toe most part, until toe early sixties or, for lack o f a better cutoff point, until the drafting o f Togliatü’ s Yalta memorandum in August 1964, references to proletarian internationalism could simply be understood as an understate­ ment for toe neatly unconditional support given by toe party to the policies o f toe Soviet Union. During most o f this period, the large influx o f Soviet finan­ cial help under different guises kept the party in good working order. Mean­ while, toe party’s support o f toe Soviet Union and praise o f its achievements provided party members with a symbolic identification with toe fatherland o f socialism, whose im age in turn com peted effectively with that o f American society, which was being extolled by toe Christian Democrats and other Italian moderate and conservative forces. H owever, Communist party members and sympathizers had as much cause to rejoice as to regret a very close identification with the USSR: toe first Sputnik and the first man in space were on toe positive side; but Soviet armed interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia were on the negative side, as well as the Sino-Soviet rift, which caused an unsolved sore spot This ambiguous relationship with toe Soviet system also influenced toe PC I's response to the Twentieth Congress o f the Communist Party o f the Soviet Union (C PSU ). As a matter o f fact, most o f toe difficulties and embar­ rassment o f toe Italian Communists in dealing with internal events o f toe Communist W orld derive, even today, from the incomplete and unsatisfac­ tory debate on the cult o f personality and de-Stalinization carried out within toe party since 1956. W hile Togliatti’s interview for N u ovi A rgom enti cer­ tainly went much further than toe debate being suppressed by French Com ­ munist intellectuals with toe famous sentence: “ i/ ne faut pas désespérer Billancourt” ( “ one must not drive Billancourt” — toe working-class suburb o f Paris— “ into hopelessness” ), toe dividing line between Stalin’ s crimes and toe structural factors that made such crimes possible remained quite blurred.10 On toe whole, it is therefore correct to conclude: first, that “ despite toe sometimes unorthodox quality o f his thought, at least by M oscow standards, Togliatti had in action proven m ore o f a conformist than a rebel” ;11 and second, that, at

80

The Party's Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

least until 1964, there existed an informal division o f labor between the P C I and the C PSU as to statements on international affairs.12 But the Yalta memorandum— TogHatti’ s political testament— introduced an important elem ent o f accelerated change in the process o f gradual dissocia­ tion by the PC I from the Soviet model: it was the theoretical justification o f “ unity in diversity.” Another important step was taken in 1968 through a d ear expression o f sharp dissent and criticism o f the Soviet invasion o f Czechoslovakia, even though the implications o f this opposition were not fully drawn at once because o f the so-called “ immaturity” o f many grassroots “ comrades.” There is little doubt that this alleged immaturity— the existence o f remnants o f Stalinism— had to be blamed on a leadership group that had, after all, stifled the debate on the nature o f the Soviet and Chinese models. In any case, and summing up, there are three main reasons why the PC I did not take an even more autonomous and original stand on Czechoslovakia and the Sino-Soviet split In ascending order o f importance, these are, first, the perception o f the Italian Communists, until the late sixties, o f “ som e strategic links between Soviet military and diplomatic strength and the pros­ pects for a Communist victory in Italy” 13 as a guarantee for the maintenance o f a balance o f pow er in Europe. Second, committed as it was to the par­ liamentary road to socialism, the PC I also felt bound to accept and support the Soviet interpretation o f the theory o f peaceful coexistence and its implicit American counterpart, which entail a measure o f control over political changes in the regimes within the sphere o f influence o f one or the other superpower. Third, even if Italian Communists have repeatedly underlined the specificity o f the Italian situation— which calls for different solutions from those implemented either in the Soviet Union or in China— they have not carried the debate on “ models o f socialism” to the grassroots level for fear o f provoking centrifugal tendencies (and, perhaps, jeopardizing the unify o f the ruling group). As Rossana Rossanda, a form er prominent Communist member and today one o f the leaders o f the dissident Communist group il Manifesto, has force­ fully remarked, support for the Soviet Union was, at that time, “ the only guarantee o f the continuity and authority o f the ruling groups: to sever the ties with the Soviet Union mean[t] to play without a safety net against a m ove­ ment from below which might even becom e unmanageable.” 14 This difficult situation also explains why positive evaluations o f Chinese society and be­ havior are often criticized by the party; and even if disillusionment with the Soviet way o f life is widespread and loom s large in the party (witness many reports in the party daily L ’Unità rince 1969 and the relative silence o f other party journals), critical analyses o f the overall Soviet experience have com e late and somewhat reluctantly.15 H ow ever, recent events have'show n that, without proceeding to flam­ boyant statements, Italian Communist leaders have decided to acquire a fully

From Togliatti to the Compromesso Storico

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independent position on internal and international affairs, as well as on cul­ tural and ideological matters. “ The PC I has probably been unique am ong Communist parties in the extent to which it has carefully cultivated a high­ brow im age as a defender o f creative freedom and progressive trends in literature and the arts.” 16And it has lived up to its reputation in upholding the right to cultural and political dissent in the Soviet Union and in all Eastern European countries, particularly in most recent instances. But the most important changes concern the relationship with other south­ ern European Communist parties— that is to say, the em ergence o f Eurocommunism. N ot only did the PC I openly express its dissent from the policies and strategy follow ed by the general secretary o f the Portuguese Communist party, Alvaro Cun hai, but it did so under very difficult circum­ stances: at the party's Fourteenth Congress (March 1975). Later, the joint declarations by Enrico Berlinguer and Santiago Carrillo (July 11, 1975), by Berlinguer and G eorges Marchais (N ovem ber 15, 1975), and by the three Eurocommunist leaders at the “ Madrid Summit” (March 1977), placed very strong emphasis on a democratic toad to socialism to be pursued through large alliances o f social and political forces (thereby discarding in practice the dogma o f the dictatorship o f the proletariat) and to be preserved through the acceptance and the respect o f pluralism. Finally, BeriinguerV carefully worded speech at the C PSU Congress in March *1976 probably marked the decisive step in the redefinition o f the concept, nature, and role o f proletarian internationalism (a phrase that is, significantly enough, no longer em ployed by the Italian Communist, leader). In sum, while the history o f the relation­ ships between the PC I and C PSU clearly shows the existence, from Gramsd on, o f a certain ideological and political autonomy, such autonomy appears lately to have becom e stronger and, in all likelihood, irreversible.

Party Unity and Flexibility W hile the relationship with the Soviet Union had a clear impact on the party, the PC I was also responding, in its evolution, to stimuli and changes taking place in Italian society. In the fifties and early sixties— dark years when the party was besieged and isolated (one authoritative interpretation o f the targets o f the Center Left experience, launched in 1962, was the curtailment o f the “ Communist area o f influence” )— party unity was an indispensable requisite for political survival. Later, in a more favorable domestic situation, party unity became a prerequisite for withstanding possible Soviet pressures to conform: “ The most obvious risk [o f a formal renunciation o f proletarian internationalism and a break with the Soviet Union] would be a Sovietsupported split which could destroy the party’ s unity.” 17 Finally, as w e shall see, the unity o f the party not only projects a favorable and reassuring image to the electorate— especially when compared to the extreme internal frag­

82

The Party’s Domestic Strategy through the Cold War

mentation o f the other major Italian parties— but it is also a guarantee o f effectiveness and responsibility in running local affairs and in fulfilling an active parliamentary role. The integral organization o f the party still retains many features o f the Leninist doctrine o f democratic centralism— that is, close control by and sub­ ordination to the top —and, to say the least, dissent is not encouraged.1* But the mere existence o f a great variety o f organizations affiliated with the party, the important role attributed to the intellectuals, the deliberate attempt to relate to diversified sectors o f society, and, no less importantly, a high rate o f membership turnover assure a comparatively lively circulation o f ideas within the party. The changing role o f flanking organizations is especially important in pro­ moting the image o f a party that is disciplined and at the same time responsive and able to adapt to emerging demands and new situations. For example, it is well known that throughout the fifties, the C G IL acted as the party’s transmis­ sion b elt Yet, when it became apparent that too close a relationship and too strict a dependence by the workers on the party were counterproductive for the trade union as well as for the party and, above all, that they further prevented the achievement o f an alliance with the Catholic working class organized by the Italian Confederation o f Workers Trade Unions (C1SL), a more flexible relationship was sought and prom oted by C G IL trade unionists and was accepted by party leaders. Today, C G IL-PC I ties are probably less intense than those between the Trade Union Congress and the Labour party in Great Britain. The Union o f Italian W om en (U D I) might provide another significant example. Essentially the wom en’s branch o f the party in the fifties and sixties, this organization has since acquired a m ore autonomous status and posture, particularly in evidence on such issues as divorce and abortion. On these issues, indeed, UDI pressures m oved the party away from its initial preference for a compromise with the Christian Democrats and toward a position m ore in line with the desires o f Communist wom en as a whole. This, o f course, is in striking contrast with the forties and early fifties, when all flanking organiza­ tions were mere institutional creatures o f the Communist party. T o be a Communist militant then meant first and foremost to ow e one’s allegiance to the party. The role militants had to play in the trade union (C G IL), in the wom en’s organization, in the peasants’ m ovem ent (Alleanza Nationale C on ­ tadini), in the partisans’ association (A N P I), and even in the Youth Federation (FG C I) would be considered secondary to their very allegiance to the party.19 Today, the situation is substantially changed, and the high level o f party responsiveness to the various demands from a changing society cannot be understood without reference to the m ore flexible relationship that now exists between the party and its flanking organizations. An achievement in itself, such modified relationships have also em erged as highly effective instruments

From Togliatti to the Compromesso Storico

83

for pursuing the strategy o f alliance with other non-Communist social forces. In the future, it might even becom e an important factor for implementing a policy o f structural reforms in the Italian socioeconom ic system.20 Needless to say, the overall pattern o f relationships with flanking organiza­ tions has not always been characterized by increasing smoothness and flexibil­ ity: in the early sixties, for instance, the Youth Federation was purged and was dissolved for some years, and tensions developed within the CG IL. In addi­ tion, the attempt to preserve the unity o f the party has often meant that the leadership needed to be very cautious in reacting to unforeseen events. At times, party leaders had to strike an uneasy balance between different ten­ dencies, and they were unable to com e to terms quickly enough with major changes in Italian society— such as the student m ovem ent o f 1968 and the “ hot autumn” o f 1969 (a wave o f workers’ strikes and renewed militancy)— whose subsequent important achievements could have been even m ore far reaching had they enjoyed the active support o f the Com ­ munist party. Thus, the continued tendency to identify always and anywhere the mainte­ nance o f party unify with the group o f the major leaders at the top and with their policies— a very irritating manifestation o f extreme partisanship, particu­ larly evident in the treatment o f outside criticism— represents the negative side o f the coin and may still produce dangerous renewed tendencies toward leadership crystallization and party bureaucratization. Yet, there have been important changes in the composition o f top Com ­ munist leadership since the fifties. Today, the core o f the leadership includes approximately one hundred persons in their late forties and fifties, plus a few historic leaders over sixty-five (Luigi Longo, G iorgio Amendola, Gian Carlo Pajetta). Most o f the leaders are members o f Parliament; but some, signifi­ cantly, are regional secretaries o f the party (most regional secretaries have a place in the 177-member Central Committee, and three out o f twenty are members o f the m ore exclusive Direzione com posed o f thirty-two members). Finally, there is a seven-mem ber secretariat, fully reshuffled after the 1979 electoral defeat, under the leadership o f Berlinguer and com posed o f Mario Birardi, Gerardo Chiaromonte, Pio La Torre, Alberto Minucci, Giorgio Napolitano, and Alessandro Natta. While the Direzione is very representative o f the various components o f the party, o f the various “ lines,” the secretariat is made up o f members who fundamentally share BerÜnguer’s policy and at the same time have som e power o f their own. As for parliamentarians, unlike other parties, the PC I has constantly and strictly adhered to its avow ed intention to change at least one-third o f its parliamentary representatives at each national election. (S ee Table 2 .) O f course, this procedure was not fully implemented in 1979 because many parliamentarians had been reelected only three years before. The constant and vast renewal o f the parliamentary representation entails

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two beneficial consequences for the party. First, the presence o f new par­ liamentarians, who perceive their jobs as promotions and are eager to learn the procedural and substantial techniques and apply them, accounts for im­ portant contributions in the field o f policymaking (well-drafted bills and amendments). Second, frequent and numerous changes offer an opportunity to expand the area o f party recruitment beyond party members to profession­ als, intellectuals, and other prominent personalities; indeed, it culminated in die dramatic candidacy for the 1976 Parliament o f five prominent Catholic intellectuals, as well as the well-known federalist leader and EEC commis­ sioner to industry, Altiero Spinelli, and in their “ inevitable" election, thanks to the discipline o f the Communist electorate. Furthermore, this practice, whose main purpose is to broaden the Communist appeal and attract competent, influential, and representative personalities, is often follow ed in local elections as well. An additional important consequence o f the turnover in parliamentary membership is that it brings back to the party (and to the political system at large) individuals who are experienced in parliamentary mechanisms and executive-administrative relationships and who are therefore even more ca­ pable o f effectively staffing city and regional councils (and party offices). A further side effect is that all form er members o f Parliament enjoy a pension allowance, which reduces the party’s financial burden in maintaining a large group o f full-time party w c ^rs and functionaries. This group, in turn, is com posed o f presumably four to five thousand people, most o f them full-time party workers o f low - and middle-class origins, whose activities may shift from city councillor to shop steward, from represen­ tative o f the Alleanza Contadini to secretary o f an important party section.21 Full-time party workers constitute a fundamental elem ent o f the organiza­ tional nucleus: they are the militants or activists, where the party’ s real strength lies and its influence is shaped and expanded. In the fifties, the number o f activists reached a peak o f 80,000, a figure that has probably not changed in spite o f the different political climate o f today and the impact o f a consumption-oriented society. The official position o f these activists within the party organization is that o f cadres o f the sections and the remaining cells.22 They constitute the indispensable trait d'union (connecting link) between the leadership, the 1 .5 -1 .8 million card-bearing members, and the Communist and non-Communist electorate at large. If the previous consideration is correct— that is, if the relationship between the leadership and the militants is really the backbone o f the party— then, not too much emphasis should be put on the sheer number o f party members, their shifts over time, and their sociological composition. Yet, a brief consider­ ation o f these questions may be useful, especially since they are related to the third main principle o f Communist strategy: representation o f class interests. In terms o f the sociological composition o f its membership, the PC I is still

86

The Party's Domestic Strategy through the Coki War

predominantly the party o f the industrial working class: while the number is considerable in absolute terms, the relative decline o f working-class members between 1947 and 1973 has been negligible— from 45.5 to 41.05 percent A sharper decline, though due to external factors, has been experienced in the categories o f farmhands and laborers (from 16.9 to 6.26 percent), and sharecroppers and small farmers (from 15.8 to 7.0 percent). The overall decline o f membership in the agricultural sectors, therefore, amounts to Ì9 .4 4 percent— from 32.70 to 13.26 percent— but it must not be forgotten that the percentage o f the population em ployed in agriculture decreased from 44.0 to 18.9 percent in the period o f 1 9 51 -7 1 (census data). A slight increase has been recorded in the categories o f professionals (from 0.8 to 1.43 percent), white-collar workers and technicians (from 3.2 to 4.22 percent), and students (from 0.7 to 1.63 percent), for an overall 2.58 percent increase in these pivotal groups in an industrial society. Com pleting the picture are: a notable percentage increase for artisans and shopkeepers, as well as for housewives, and a substantial increase for retired people (from 2.1 to 16.74 percent), w ho have now becom e the second largest category behind industrial workers. (See Table 3 .) These figures and shifts, to which the Communist leadership has always given careful attention, suggest, on the one hand, that party membership is getting somewhat older and that the party o f the industrial workers is slowly, but increasingly, becom ing the party o f working-class families. On the other hand, the figures indicate that, at least at the membership level, the strategy o f attracting the middle strata— to whom not only Communist propaganda, but also the very mildness o f the policies enacted in Communist-dominated cities and regions have been directed— has encountered som e major obstacles.23 T o be sure, that the average age o f the party membership would be increas­ ing reflects a general reluctance on the part o f the Italian population as a whole to seek full membership in a party, so that as many as one-sixth o f the party membership now consists o f old militants. Nonetheless, an organization such as the Communist Youth Federation, which was very strong in the fifties (when it reached four hundred thousand members) and then suffered a tremendous setback following the em ergence o f the student m ovem ent (its membership declining from 135,510 in 1967 to an all-time low 66,451 in 1970), is climbing again, having reached 134,343 in 1975. Even more signifi­ cantly, in the last three years, new members have constituted one-third o f the total membership. With a turnover rate o f this magnitude, though, no effec­ tive political socialization can be achieved, and official Communist publica­ tions now bitterly complain o f “ too great a political and organizational frailty” leading to a “ worrisome lack o f continuity.” 24 Tw o general conclusions must then be drawn from this analysis. First, it is probably untrue and misleading to speak o f an em bourgeoisem ent o f the PCI. Even if the nature o f its following, particularly in the central regions o f

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