The Iran Nuclear Deal: Non-proliferation and US-Iran Conflict Resolution (Studies in Iranian Politics) 3031501950, 9783031501951

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements
Contents
Abbreviations
List of Figures
1 Introduction
Part I Iran Nuclear Deal and Its Fracture
2 The Much-Awaited Deal of 2015
Reaching the Deal—The Presidents
Other Key Players
Complexities Surrounding the Deal
The Deal
The Pros and Cons of the Deal
JCPOA and Non-proliferation
Summary
3 The US Exit from the Deal in 2018
US Withdrawal from the Nuclear Deal
Trump’s Overinflated Concerns
A Wrong Decision by Trump?
Major Consequences of the Withdrawal
At the Core of the Mistake
Summary
4 Scholarship on the Ramifications of the Fractured Deal
Summary
Part II Theory
5 Cooperation, Spill-over Effects, and Integration
Functionalism and Neo-functionalism
Enduring Rivalries and Protracted Conflicts
Cooperation and Enduring Rivalry
Trust in Cooperation
Habit of Cooperation
Spill-over Effects of Cooperation
Conflict Transformation
Summary
6 Fast-Paced Spill-Back Effect
Spill-Back Effect
Spill-Back and Negative Reciprocity
Spill-Back and Nexus Between Foreign and Domestic Policy
Crisis-Induced Spill-Back
Misperceptions and Spill-Back
Pace of Spill-Back
Summary
7 Fractured Deal and Triggers to Renewed Proliferation Interest
Triggers to Renewed Proliferation Interest
Long-Standing Rivalries as Catalysts
Nuclear Latency as Drivers
Swaggering to Establish Lost Identity and Prestige
Territorial Loss and National Identity
Conflict and Strategies for Regaining Lost Territories
Zero-Sum Nature of Lost Territories
Desire to Obtain Trade and Aid Benefits as Drivers
Precipitating Factor: Differences Between the Major Powers in a Nuclear Deal
Summary
Part III Case Study: Iran
8 Iran’s Nuclear Ambition and Its Conflicts in the Pre-deal Period
History of Iran’s Nuclear Program
Linking Iran’s Nuclear Pursuits to Persistent Conflicts
Iran-US Conflict
Iran and the Regional Conflicts
The Nuclear Program
Summary
9 The Deal and Iran’s Muted Nuclear Status
Understanding the Period, 2015–2018
Comprehensive Commitment to the Nuclear Deal
Trust-Building and Loyalty
Crucial Years of Implementation
Optimism and Expectations
Trust and Patience During the Sunshine Years
Observing Adherence to Deal Terms
Implementation and Surveillance
Compliance and Inspections
Iran becomes a Muted Proliferator
Latent Proliferator Too?
Summary
10 US Exit from the Deal and Tehran’s Intense Proliferation Interest
Tehran’s Shift in Proliferation Approach in Mid-2019
Tehran Adopts a Spill-Back Strategy
Trust Deficit Becomes the Pillar of Spill-Back Strategy
Latency Helps Spill-Back
Protracted Conflicts Fuel Spill-Back
Unlocking Bargaining Potential by Leveraging Spill-Back Effects
Iran’s Nuclear Swagger, Persian Identity, and Regional Dominance Through Spill-Back
Spill-Back Is Boosted by Major Power Differences
Comprehending Iranian Spill-Back Effects of Fractured Nuclear Deal
Summary
Part IV The Final Chapter
11 Conclusion
Index

Citation preview

STUDIES IN IRANIAN POLITICS SERIES EDITOR: SHAHRAM AKBARZADEH

The Iran Nuclear Deal Non-proliferation and US-Iran Conflict Resolution

Saira Khan

Studies in Iranian Politics

Series Editor Shahram Akbarzadeh, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship & Globalisation, Deakin University, Burwood, VIC, Australia

Editorial Board Mohammed Ayoob, Department of Political Science, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA Anoush Ehteshami, Sch of Govt Intl Affairs, Durham University, Durham, UK Mehran Kamrava, Georgetown University in Qatar, Doha, Qatar Mahmood Sariolghalam, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

This series offers much-needed insights into the internal and external dynamics of the Islamic Republic of Iran. A major player in the Middle East, Iran faces a range of challenges and opportunities that have significant ramifications for its citizens and the neighbourhood. Questions of political representation, Islamic rule, as well as youth and civil society movements are contentious topics in a state that feels besieged by hostile forces. The intersection of such factors present fascinating case-studies. Studies in Iranian Politics will publish ground-breaking research that draw on original sources and contribute to our understanding of contemporary Iran. The Advisory Board for this series includes Prof. Mohammed Ayoob (Michigan State University), Prof. Anoush Ehteshami (Durham University), Prof. Mehran Kamrava (Georgetown University) and Prof. Mahmood Sariolghalam (Shahid Beheshti University).

Saira Khan

The Iran Nuclear Deal Non-proliferation and US-Iran Conflict Resolution

Saira Khan Montreal, QC, Canada

ISSN 2524-4132 ISSN 2524-4140 (electronic) Studies in Iranian Politics ISBN 978-3-031-50195-1 ISBN 978-3-031-50196-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50196-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: RGB Ventures/SuperStock/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Dedicated to my dearest son, Andaleeb

Acknowledgements

The book is greatly indebted to two individuals, whose contributions may have gone unnoticed by them. The first is the former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General, Mohammad El Baradei, whom I had the privilege of speaking with in the early 2000s in Cairo while I was teaching at the American University in Cairo. His positive perspective regarding the IAEA’s role in nuclear site inspections, provided that the concerned countries grant access to these sites, emphasized the importance of the nuclear watchdog in non-proliferation efforts. The second individual is the former Indian Prime Minister, whom I interviewed for a book on South Asian conflicts during the same period. His visionary leadership compelled me to broaden my perspective beyond protracted conflicts and focus on factors that contribute to the resolution of such conflicts. After several years, I became engrossed in the concept of cooperation within protracted conflicts. I developed a theory centered primarily on soft power resources and proceeded to test it within the context of bilateral conflicts between India and China, as well as India and Pakistan. While I was a faculty member at the University of British Columbia, I had the opportunity to conduct this research, and it was later presented at the International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention in San Francisco in March 2008. I am deeply grateful for the generous financial support provided by the Canadian Security and Defense Forum during this endeavor. In the subsequent years, I began pondering the potential

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outcomes when cooperation proves successful at one level and whether that confidence-building measure can be leveraged for cooperation at other levels. I presented additional papers on similar projects at ISA conferences. When the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed, I was particularly excited because it offered an opportunity to probe this subject matter and comprehend the significance of institutionalized cooperative efforts through spill-over effects. My focus shifted towards exploring the potential of US-Iran protracted conflict resolution through the functional aspects of the JCPOA. Hence, a multitude of people played vital roles during both the research and writing phases of this book, including my colleagues, professional acquaintances, scholars, and friends. For their support and contributions, I am eternally grateful. The successful completion of this project owes a debt of gratitude to the support and invaluable assistance of numerous individuals. While it is not possible to list them all here, their significant contributions played a pivotal role in the creation of this book. I am grateful to all who granted me interviews and shared their perspectives, which I have carefully considered to either validate or challenge my arguments. I am also indebted to those who participated in interviews and preferred to remain anonymous; their insights have also played a crucial role in sparking new ideas and enriching my research. I extend my special thanks to Trita Parsi, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, and Heinz Gaertner for their invaluable insights and contributions during the creation of this book. I would like to express my gratitude to Eliza Gheorghe for her insightful remarks on the earlier version of the project presented at the ISA’s conference in Nashville. Their perspectives greatly enriched my research thinking and expanded my horizons. I extend my heartfelt appreciation to Nobel Laureate Mohammad Yunus for his invaluable perspectives on global conflict resolution, economic progress, and the pursuit of peace and prosperity. I would like to express my gratitude to Lucy Everitt, the commissioning editor of Palgrave MacMillan, and the dedicated editorial team at Palgrave for their invaluable assistance in bringing this book to publication. I extend special thanks to friends and family who understood my need to prioritize this work over social obligations. A heartfelt thanks to Nipa Barua and Rosario Fuentes Cabello, dear friends who provided me with a platform to unwind during this intense period. I also want to express my appreciation to my nephews, Faris Khan and Ibraaz Manzoor, for their

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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unwavering love and support. Additionally, I am thankful to two family members, my brother, Mahmudul Khan, and cousin Ehsanur Rahman, for being constants in my life. It is with great pleasure that I dedicate this book to my son, Andaleeb Ahmed, who has been a constant source of joy in my life. He has consistently been a patient and attentive listener to my research endeavors, enduring my demanding schedules and challenges with unwavering support. His steadfast belief in my ability to comprehend complex issues such as nuclear proliferation has been a source of inspiration.

Contents

1

Introduction

1

Part I Iran Nuclear Deal and Its Fracture 2

The Much-Awaited Deal of 2015 Reaching the Deal—The Presidents Other Key Players Complexities Surrounding the Deal The Deal The Pros and Cons of the Deal JCPOA and Non-proliferation Summary

11 12 17 21 25 30 34 37

3

The US Exit from the Deal in 2018 US Withdrawal from the Nuclear Deal Trump’s Overinflated Concerns A Wrong Decision by Trump? Major Consequences of the Withdrawal At the Core of the Mistake Summary

39 40 42 44 52 58 59

4

Scholarship on the Ramifications of the Fractured Deal Summary

61 72

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CONTENTS

Part II Theory 5

Cooperation, Spill-over Effects, and Integration Functionalism and Neo-functionalism Enduring Rivalries and Protracted Conflicts Cooperation and Enduring Rivalry Trust in Cooperation Habit of Cooperation Spill-over Effects of Cooperation Conflict Transformation Summary

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Fast-Paced Spill-Back Effect Spill-Back Effect Spill-Back and Negative Reciprocity Spill-Back and Nexus Between Foreign and Domestic Policy Crisis-Induced Spill-Back Misperceptions and Spill-Back Pace of Spill-Back Summary

7

Fractured Deal and Triggers to Renewed Proliferation Interest Triggers to Renewed Proliferation Interest Long-Standing Rivalries as Catalysts Nuclear Latency as Drivers Swaggering to Establish Lost Identity and Prestige Territorial Loss and National Identity Conflict and Strategies for Regaining Lost Territories Zero-Sum Nature of Lost Territories Desire to Obtain Trade and Aid Benefits as Drivers Precipitating Factor: Differences Between the Major Powers in a Nuclear Deal Summary

75 77 79 81 85 88 91 95 96 99 100 104 106 114 116 119 123 125 125 128 132 141 144 144 144 147 151 157

Part III Case Study: Iran 8

Iran’s Nuclear Ambition and Its Conflicts in the Pre-deal Period History of Iran’s Nuclear Program Linking Iran’s Nuclear Pursuits to Persistent Conflicts

161 162 169

CONTENTS

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Iran-US Conflict Iran and the Regional Conflicts The Nuclear Program Summary

170 173 179 186

9

The Deal and Iran’s Muted Nuclear Status Understanding the Period, 2015–2018 Comprehensive Commitment to the Nuclear Deal Trust-Building and Loyalty Crucial Years of Implementation Optimism and Expectations Trust and Patience During the Sunshine Years Observing Adherence to Deal Terms Implementation and Surveillance Compliance and Inspections Iran becomes a Muted Proliferator Latent Proliferator Too? Summary

187 190 190 196 197 198 200 201 202 203 205 207 212

10

US Exit from the Deal and Tehran’s Intense Proliferation Interest Tehran’s Shift in Proliferation Approach in Mid-2019 Tehran Adopts a Spill-Back Strategy Trust Deficit Becomes the Pillar of Spill-Back Strategy Latency Helps Spill-Back Protracted Conflicts Fuel Spill-Back Unlocking Bargaining Potential by Leveraging Spill-Back Effects Iran’s Nuclear Swagger, Persian Identity, and Regional Dominance Through Spill-Back Spill-Back Is Boosted by Major Power Differences Comprehending Iranian Spill-Back Effects of Fractured Nuclear Deal Summary

213 214 216 223 231 234 238 244 248 256 260

Part IV The Final Chapter 11

Conclusion

Index

265 283

Abbreviations

ABM AEOI BRI BRICS CANDU CIA E3/EU+3 EU EU4 FEP HEU HWPP IAEA ICBMs INARA JCPOA JPOA LEU NATO NPT P5+1 SALT

Anti-Ballistic Missile Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Belt and Road Initiative Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa Canadian Deuterium Uranium Central Intelligence Agency China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States —plus Germany European Union Germany, UK, France, and Italy Fuel Enrichment Plant Highly Enriched Uranium Heavy Water Production Plant International Atomic Energy Agency Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Nuclear Agreement Review Act Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Joint Plan of Action Low-Enriched Uranium North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

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ABBREVIATIONS

TPP UN UNSC UOC

Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement United Nations United Nations Security Council Uranium Ore Concentrate

List of Figures

Fig. 5.1 Fig. 6.1 Fig. 7.1

Cooperation, spill-over effects, and institutionalized cooperation Proliferation-related spill-back effect Triggers to Renewed Proliferation Interest

97 123 158

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, is an agreement reached in 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 countries, the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China, along with the European Union. The primary goal of the JCPOA is to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program remains peaceful and to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Negotiations for the JCPOA began in 2013 and were concluded on July 14, 2015, when Iran and the P5+1 countries reached a final agreement. The deal was endorsed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. The JCPOA contains several key provisions aimed at limiting Iran’s nuclear program. These provisions are primarily connected to Iran’s uranium enrichment, stockpile reduction, its Fordow facility, inspection and monitoring, sanctions relief, and implementation and duration. Iran agreed to limit its uranium enrichment capacity by reducing its number of centrifuges and keeping the level of enrichment to 3.67%, which is significantly below the enrichment level required for weapons-grade uranium. It also agreed to reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium by 98% to a maximum of 300 kilograms for 15 years.1 With regard to Iran’s Fordow facility, it agreed to convert its Fordow nuclear facility into a nuclear research center, which 1 “The Historic Deal that will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon,” The White House. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal.

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means it would not be conducting enrichment activities at that site.2 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was granted extensive access and monitoring rights to ensure Iran’s compliance with the deal. This includes regular inspections of declared nuclear facilities and the ability to investigate suspicious sites. In exchange for Iran’s compliance with the nuclear restrictions, the P5+1 countries agreed to provide sanctions relief to Iran. This included lifting or suspending certain economic and financial sanctions imposed previously by the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations. The JCPOA’s implementation began on January 16, 2016. The deal has a duration of 15 years, with some provisions lasting for longer periods. After that, Iran would have greater flexibility in its nuclear program, subject to the IAEA’s ongoing monitoring and verification. According to reports from the IAEA, Iran was found to be in compliance with its obligations under the JCPOA in the first two years of the deal. The IAEA, which is responsible for verifying Iran’s compliance with the deal, consistently reported that Iran was implementing its nuclear-related commitments as stipulated in the agreement. The nuclear watchdog conducted regular inspections and monitoring activities to ensure Iran’s compliance. It had access to Iran’s declared nuclear facilities and conducted rigorous inspections to verify that Iran was adhering to the agreed-upon restrictions on its nuclear program, such as limits on uranium enrichment levels, reduction of stockpiles, and dismantling certain facilities. The reports of the IAEA indicated that Iran was fulfilling its obligations under the JCPOA, and there was no evidence of diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes. However, it is important to note that the IAEA’s verification process focused on declared sites and activities, and there were some limitations on access to certain military sites. In November 2016, Donald Trump was elected as the 45th President of the United States. During his campaign and throughout his presidency, he consistently voiced strong criticism of the JCPOA, often referring to it as a “bad deal.” Trump’s objections to the JCPOA centered on his belief that it was overly lenient toward Iran and failed to address critical issues, including Iran’s ballistic missile program and its regional activities. He surrounded himself with like-minded officials who shared 2 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, US Department of State. https://2009-2017. state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/.

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his critical stance on the JCPOA, notably appointing individuals such as Mike Pompeo as CIA Director and later as Secretary of State, as well as John Bolton as National Security Advisor. Both Pompeo and Bolton were outspoken opponents of the JCPOA and advocated for a tougher approach to Iran’s nuclear program. In April 2017, the Trump administration embarked on a comprehensive review of its Iran policy, evaluating whether to continue certifying Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA and assessing whether the agreement served the national interests of the United States. It is worth noting that, while the JCPOA itself did not require the president to certify compliance every 90 days, the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) mandated this certification. Ultimately, in October 2017, President Trump announced his decision not to certify Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA in accordance with INARA. On May 8, 2018, President Trump officially declared the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA. This decision was made despite opposition from other signatories, European allies, and the IAEA’s confirmation of Iran’s compliance with the agreement. Subsequent to the withdrawal, the US reinstated sanctions on Iran, including secondary sanctions targeting entities engaged in business with Iran. President Trump’s choice to exit the JCPOA was primarily rooted in his belief that the deal failed to adequately address Iran’s various problematic behaviors in the region and did not provide sufficient assurances regarding Iran’s long-term nuclear program. It also did not include Iran’s missile proliferation. These actions during Trump’s presidency, leading to the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, were interconnected and aimed at exerting maximum pressure on Iran through sanctions, with the ultimate goal of negotiating a new agreement that would encompass these concerns and impose broader restrictions. These actions strained the JCPOA, creating uncertainty regarding the future of the nuclear deal, Iran’s nuclear proliferation efforts, and any prospects for improving relations with the United States. The United States’ decision to withdraw from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal did not prompt the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China to follow suit. Instead, these nations remained committed to upholding their obligations under the agreement in an effort to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons while maintaining its missile capabilities. Despite their well-intentioned stance, it was anticipated that Iran may intensify its pursuit of nuclear proliferation in the absence of American participation in the deal. That is exactly what Iran eventually did. Iran

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presently has enough highly enriched uranium to build several nuclear weapons. The objective of this book is to investigate the underlying causes of Iran’s actions in this context. The book posits that Iran’s pre-nuclear deal proliferation activities were primarily driven by its protracted conflicts with Iraq, Israel, and the United States, all unfolding simultaneously.3 The nuclear deal had the potential to play a crucial role in resolving the enduring rivalry between Iran and the United States, which could have subsequently eased tensions in Iran’s relationship with Israel. Furthermore, a more amicable American presence in Iraq could have alleviated Tehran’s concerns stemming from developments in Baghdad. For Iran, the nuclear deal loses its significance without its primary rival, the United States, as its long-term objective was the resolution of conflicts with Washington. The US withdrawal from the agreement, coupled with accusations of Iran sponsoring terrorism, heightens Tehran’s sense of threat and compels it to consider nuclear deterrence in the event of a potential conflict with the United States. Moreover, the United States’ intention to transfer nuclear reactors to Saudi Arabia, Iran’s regional adversary,4 underscored Washington’s inconsistent approach to security policies in the Middle East. The breakdown of the nuclear deal also fosters a substantial trust deficit between the parties involved, creating a menacing environment for the weaker state in the asymmetric conflictual relationship, which ultimately seeks to bolster its military security through a deterrent capability. Assurance of security through agreements becomes unreliable, and confidence-building measures lose their credibility, consequently prompting accelerated proliferation efforts. This is facilitated by the fact that nuclear weapons development is more achievable under conditions of nuclear latency, a status that Iran maintained when the JCPOA was signed. On the domestic front, Iranian leaders perceive America’s withdrawal from the deal as a betrayal aimed at crippling Iran’s economy, diminishing its regional influence, and promoting regime change. Additionally, Iran’s strong Persian identity makes it intolerant of insults on any level. The US withdrawal from the agreement and its branding of Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism have offended the proud Persian nation. A nuclear-capable Tehran could 3 Saira Khan, Iran and Nuclear Weapons: Protracted Conflict and Proliferation (London and New York: Routledge, 2011). 4 They were rivals of each other until the recent improvement of relations between the two due to the China-brokered deal of 2023.

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potentially receive substantial economic and military assistance from the United States, serving to underscore Iran’s Persian identity on the global stage. Finally, the fracture of the alliance among the major powers in the deal provided Tehran with an opportunity to reconsider its commitments. China, Russia, Japan, and the European powers all expressed dissatisfaction with America’s withdrawal from the agreement. Iran’s renewed interest in proliferation is, thus, influenced by a complex interplay of global, regional, and domestic political dynamics. Iran currently has enough highly enriched uranium to build several nuclear weapons, but diplomatic efforts in limiting its nuclear activity through the restoration of the JCPOA seem unlikely now as Tehran assists Moscow with arms in its war on Ukraine and in the context of the domestic unrest in Iran. The book’s goal is to highlight the JCPOA’s relevance in the global and regional realms. Tehran still does not have a viable nuclear weapon design or a suitable explosive detonation system. An effective JCPOA could restrict them by setting limits on Iran’s enriched uranium and heavy water stockpiles and compelling the program to be under strict IAEA inspections. JCPOA—a product of effective diplomacy—could be a key tool for resolving the intractable conflict between Iran and the US and serve as a model of conflict resolution through negotiation and compromise instead of a war. A renewed JCPOA could bring Iran closer to the west, thereby allowing the latter to control Iran’s military assistance to Russia. A cap on Iran’s current nuclear program will decrease the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and have stabilizing regional security consequences. The subject of this investigation is of current relevance, and consequently, the available literature on it is quite limited. Among the existing literature, many works primarily consist of descriptive analyses that offer predictions about the future of Iran’s nuclear weapons aspirations in the absence of the United States’ participation in the nuclear deal. These works often lack robust arguments to substantiate their claims. What is notably missing in the current body of literature is an in-depth exploration of why a fractured Iran nuclear deal is likely to stimulate greater interest in Iran to pursue nuclear weapons. Furthermore, there is a lack of comprehensive explanations regarding the interplay between the nuclear deal, confidence-building measures, spill-over effects into other areas, the potential for conflict resolution, and Iran’s subdued or intensified proliferation tendencies and interests. An additional gap in the literature is the

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absence of a theoretical framework to underpin the research question at hand, which is precisely what this book endeavors to provide. This study carries significant theoretical implications within the field of international relations. Realism, a predominant theoretical paradigm in this field, generally anticipates that states engaged in conflict will seek to acquire nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes, and it posits that the pace of nuclear weapons development should not be influenced by cooperative agreements or arrangements with rival states. Additionally, Realism assumes that states would be hesitant to cooperate due to concerns about potential cheating or defection within such cooperative arrangements. Interestingly, Iran, in a complex and intractable conflict with the United States, entered into a nuclear deal alongside other major powers to limit its nuclear activities for a 15-year period. While Iran’s nuclear activities proceeded at a low-to-moderate pace before the deal, became muted during the deal’s implementation, the pace increased significantly in the post-fractured deal period. This shift demonstrates a clear link between cooperative arrangements and the intensity of a state’s interest in nuclear proliferation—a connection that Realism often overlooks. On the other hand, Liberalism, another influential perspective in international relations, expects states to honor the commitments of cooperative agreements or deals. The United States, as a strong advocate of Liberalism, did not uphold this principle when it unilaterally withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal. Furthermore, Liberals typically do not consider the potential consequences of a failed agreement to be worse than having no agreement at all. In the case of Iran, its nuclear proliferation activity was relatively low to moderate before the deal, paused during the deal’s implementation, but resumed with greater intensity in the postfractured deal period. This pattern highlights a significant connection between security arrangements with rivals and the proliferation decisions of aspiring nuclear states. While Liberalism emphasizes the importance and benefits of interstate cooperation, it often overlooks the negative consequences, such as heightened trust deficits and insecurity, resulting from failed cooperative endeavors, which can be more detrimental than not having a negotiated arrangement at all. While the book may not explicitly apply these theoretical paradigms to analyze the Iranian nuclear case, it implicitly highlights the shortcomings of these paradigms throughout its content. By presenting the case of Iran’s nuclear program and its interactions with the international community, the book underscores the limitations of these major international

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relations paradigms in fully explaining the complexities of real-world international relations. The implicit shortcomings of Realism become evident as the book demonstrates that cooperative arrangements, such as the Iran nuclear deal, can indeed impact the proliferation decisions of states in conflict. This challenges the realist assumption that such decisions are solely driven by security concerns and deterrence, showing that factors like negotiated agreements can play a substantial role in shaping state behavior. Similarly, the book implicitly questions the Liberalist assumption that states will consistently uphold their commitments in cooperative agreements. The unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the Iran nuclear deal highlights the unpredictability and potential consequences of states failing to honor their commitments, which Liberalism may not adequately account for. By highlighting these implicit shortcomings, the book prompts readers to consider alternative perspectives and the need for more nuanced theoretical frameworks to understand the complex dynamics of international relations in cases like Iran’s nuclear program. The book is organized into three main sections. The first section offers a foundational understanding of the Iran nuclear deal and its subsequent fracture, along with an overview of existing scholarly perspectives on the consequences of the United States’ withdrawal from the agreement. In the second section, the theoretical framework of the study is developed, encompassing three crucial chapters that elucidate the benefits of cooperative arrangements between rival states, the potential spill-over effects in various domains, the responses of affected states when such cooperative deals are disrupted by their rivals, and the key factors, both primary and precipitating, that influence a victim state’s resurgence in pursuing nuclear proliferation under altered circumstances. The third section applies these theoretical constructs to the Iranian nuclear case, comprising three chapters that focus at Iran’s proliferation status before the deal, its relatively restrained nuclear activities during the initial years of the agreement, and the rapid acceleration of its proliferation efforts following the US exit from the deal. A comprehensive conclusion synthesizes the study’s findings, extracting theoretical and policy implications and highlighting the potential applicability of the study’s theory to other instances involving nuclear agreements between enduring rival states.

PART I

Iran Nuclear Deal and Its Fracture

CHAPTER 2

The Much-Awaited Deal of 2015

The chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and its significance in addressing the Iranian nuclear issue. It highlights the key actors involved in the negotiations, the challenges faced, and the diplomatic efforts that ultimately led to the signing of the agreement. The chapter underscores the commitment of the Obama administration to finding a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear challenge and emphasizes the importance of diplomacy in averting potential military conflicts. It also demonstrates the transformation of attitudes and perceptions that occurred during the negotiation process, leading from initial skepticism and mistrust to a willingness to engage in diplomacy. Furthermore, the chapter focuses on the details of the JCPOA, including the restrictions imposed on Iran’s civilian nuclear enrichment program, the monitoring and verification mechanisms established, and the sanctions relief provided. It provides a balanced analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the deal for both Iran and the United States, as well as its broader implications for global non-proliferation efforts. Overall, the chapter serves as a comprehensive introduction to the study, setting the stage for a detailed examination of the Iran nuclear deal and its broader implications for international relations and security. It underscores the potential of diplomacy as a means to

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address complex global challenges and highlights the importance of leadership, compromise, and multilateral cooperation in achieving diplomatic success. Negotiating the JCPOA was a formidable diplomatic endeavor involving the P5+1 nations—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, plus Germany. This diplomatic initiative was spurred by deep-seated concerns regarding the potential military nature of Iran’s nuclear program, which had created considerable apprehension within the international community. The Obama administration was particularly committed to finding a diplomatic resolution to this issue, as military action and further escalation were seen as undesirable outcomes. Prior to the JCPOA, extensive negotiations had taken place over several years, with the international community offering various incentives to persuade Iran to halt its uranium enrichment activities. Notably, after the election of President Hassan Rouhani in Iran in 2013, who was viewed as a reformist leader, a preliminary agreement was reached to guide comprehensive negotiations.1 Iran’s primary motivation for participating in the JCPOA was the relief from stringent international sanctions that had severely impacted its economy. Thus, Iran primarily agreed to the deal for relief from international sanctions, which “starved its economy of more than $100 billion in revenues in 2012–14 alone.”2 However, navigating the complexities of these negotiations and reaching a mutually agreeable deal was a formidable challenge.

Reaching the Deal---The Presidents Both Republican and Democratic US policymakers were in full agreement regarding the grave threat posed by the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. They shared a common belief that such an eventuality would not only spark a nuclear arms race in the highly volatile Middle East, but also have profoundly detrimental effects on global non-proliferation efforts. Although no one within the American administration desired to see Iran possess nuclear weapons, the harsh reality was that Iran was progressing rapidly toward achieving nuclear weapon capabilities. Despite 1 Kali Robinson, “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 21, 2023. 2 Kali Robinson, “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 21, 2023.

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the imposition of sanctions on Tehran for an extended period, it was becoming increasingly apparent that sanctions alone had their limitations in effectively curbing Iran’s nuclear program. Faced with this challenging situation and with two primary options available—either engaging in military conflict with Iran or seeking a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issue—President Obama chose the latter course of action. When President Barak Obama took office, tackling the Iranian nuclear problem became a top priority for his administration. The international community had become increasingly alarmed by Iran’s nuclear program, primarily due to suspicions about its objectives. There were well-founded concerns that Iran was actively working toward building nuclear weapons, thereby creating a substantial threat to both regional and global stability. Recognizing the imperative of avoiding a potentially devastating military conflict, President Obama and his administration were fully cognizant of the need to urgently pursue a peaceful resolution to this critical issue. Analyzing the motivations of individual presidents, namely President Obama and President Rouhani, is vital on the individual level. This is because, irrespective of the administration’s goals, actions cannot come to fruition if the presidents themselves do not possess the determination to pursue them. Indeed, visionary leaders play an indispensable role when it comes to pursuing objectives like the Iran nuclear deal. President Obama had several key motivations for pursuing the JCPOA. His primary objective was to address the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic means. The growing concerns over Iran’s nuclear program, with suspicions of military intentions, posed significant threats to regional and global security, as stated before. Obama aimed to find a peaceful solution through negotiations, thus avoiding the potential risks and consequences of a military conflict with Iran. In 2015 right after the Iran nuclear deal was signed Obama stated, “Even before taking office, I made clear that Iran would not be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon on my watch, and it’s been my policy throughout my presidency to keep all options—including possible military options—on the table to achieve that objective. But I have also made clear my preference for a peaceful, diplomatic resolution of the issue—not just because of the costs of war, but also because a negotiated agreement offered a more effective, verifiable and durable resolution.”3 3 Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal. https://obamawhitehouse.arc hives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-deal.

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Throughout his presidency, Obama remained committed to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and he emphasized the importance of diplomacy as the preferred approach. He recognized that a diplomatic resolution was not only more cost-effective than military action, but also offered a more effective, verifiable, and lasting solution. Essentially, President Obama was a firm believer in diplomatic engagement and international cooperation. He prioritized diplomacy and multilateralism as essential tools for addressing complex international challenges. His approach was rooted in the belief that diplomatic solutions could be both pragmatic and effective in promoting stability and preventing nuclear proliferation. President Obama’s commitment to pursuing diplomatic solutions to the Iranian nuclear issue was deeply rooted in his personal mindset and principles. He aimed to demonstrate the effectiveness of diplomacy and build international consensus on non-proliferation efforts by engaging in negotiations with Iran and other world powers. His strong personal interest lay in actively promoting diplomatic resolutions, showcasing their pragmatic value, and challenging the prevailing preference for military action in international conflicts. Despite Iran’s initial reluctance to engage in negotiations, President Obama remained resolute in his efforts to transform the attitudes of both Iranian administrations and certain American officials. His motivation was grounded in a mindset that prioritized peace, compromise, and the avoidance of military confrontations. He believed in ending the mindset that favored military action over diplomacy, unilateralism over international consensus, and exaggerated threats beyond intelligence assessments. The following statement of Obama reveals further his mindset on wars and military confrontations. He stated, “…when I ran for President eight years ago as a candidate who had opposed the decision to go to war in Iraq, I said that America didn’t just have to end that war – we had to end the mindset that got us there in the first place. It was a mindset characterized by a preference for military action over diplomacy; a mindset that put a premium on unilateral U.S. action over the painstaking work of building international consensus; a mindset that exaggerated threats beyond what the intelligence supported.”4 In this context, President Obama emerged as a

4 Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal. https://obamawhitehouse.arc hives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-deal.

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visionary leader who saw the world through the lens of peace and prosperity. His commitment to diplomatic solutions underscored his strength as a president and contradicted any perception of weakness. His approach to the Iranian nuclear issue was a reflection of his determination to reshape the narrative around international conflict resolution. President Obama’s support for the JCPOA was also influenced by his recognition of the economic opportunities and benefits it could bring to Iran. He saw the deal as a means of not only addressing the nuclear issue, but also of facilitating Iran’s reintegration into the global community. The sanctions relief provided by the JCPOA was intended to serve as an incentive for Iran to comply with its nuclear obligations and, in turn, open up avenues for increased economic activity, trade, and investment. Additionally, President Obama viewed the JCPOA as a significant contribution to strengthening the global non-proliferation regime. By ensuring that Iran’s nuclear program remained peaceful and subject to rigorous monitoring and verification measures, the deal aimed to enhance regional security and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These motivations were rooted in President Obama’s strategic objectives and his belief in the efficacy of diplomacy as a means to address complex international challenges. The Iran nuclear deal was a substantial achievement of his administration, reflecting a diplomatic approach to tackle issues related to nuclear non-proliferation and regional stability. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani had several compelling reasons to pursue the JCPOA. A primary motivation for Rouhani and his administration was the need to secure economic advantages for Iran. The country had suffered greatly under international sanctions imposed due to its nuclear program, resulting in a struggling economy and isolation from the global financial system. Rouhani perceived the JCPOA as a means to alleviate sanctions, attract foreign investments, and rejuvenate Iran’s economy. Notably, similar to his US counterpart, Rouhani shared a belief in diplomatic engagement and reintegration. He aimed to enhance Iran’s position on the global stage and reestablish diplomatic relations with Western nations. By participating in negotiations and endorsing the JCPOA, he sought to demonstrate Iran’s readiness to cooperate in matters of nuclear non-proliferation and adhere to international norms. The deal presented an opportunity for Iran to reintegrate into the international community, strengthen diplomatic alliances, and expand its global influence.

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Rouhani held the belief that Iran’s nuclear program needed to advance, maintaining that it was intended solely for peaceful purposes. However, the JCPOA provided a structured framework to ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities. By endorsing the deal, Rouhani aimed to dispel suspicions and secure international recognition of Iran’s right to pursue a civilian nuclear program. The agreement permitted Iran to continue its nuclear research and development within the parameters defined by the deal, creating opportunities for technological progress. Additionally, Rouhani recognized the potential for enhanced regional stability through the JCPOA. The agreement sought to allay concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program and reduce tensions between Iran and its regional neighbors, particularly Gulf states and Israel. Rouhani hoped that by diplomatically resolving the nuclear issue, and it could contribute to regional security and foster greater cooperation among Middle Eastern countries. It is essential to emphasize that the broader Iranian perspective favored the idea that animosity with the United States need not persist indefinitely and that a certain level of cooperation could coexist alongside the conflict. Within this strategic framework, the Iran nuclear deal was seen as a significant step. Therefore, while Rouhani’s personal commitment played a vital role in bringing Iran to the negotiating table for the nuclear deal, Iranian foreign policy elites had reached a consensus by 2011 that maintaining some form of relationship with the United States served Iran’s national interests.5 It is further argued that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, stressed that the diplomacy surrounding the JCPOA should remain focused on the nuclear issue, but should not entirely rule out the possibility of broader cooperation.6 The implicit idea was that if the nuclear deal proved successful, and it might pave the way for exploring cooperation in various other domains. While not explicitly stated, this underlying motive was present when the Iranian Supreme Leader approved the deal, and it forms a central aspect of the current study. On a personal level, the JCPOA offered President Rouhani valuable political capital on the domestic front. When he was elected as Iran’s president in 2013, one of his key campaign promises was to alleviate the 5 Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 376. 6 Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 376.

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sanctions burdening the country. By effectively negotiating the JCPOA, Rouhani aimed to strengthen his political position and garner support from moderate and reformist factions within Iran. He viewed the agreement as a substantial accomplishment for his administration, showcasing his capacity to fulfill campaign commitments and pursue a more pragmatic foreign policy. However, it is important to note that Rouhani’s motivations and the expected benefits of the JCPOA sparked controversy within Iran. Critics of the deal argued that it did not adequately address Iran’s concerns and that the anticipated economic gains were not fully realized. Nevertheless, Rouhani and his administration perceived the JCPOA as an opportunity to enhance Iran’s economic prospects, bolster diplomatic ties, and secure the country’s right to maintain a civilian nuclear program under international scrutiny. After the JCPOA was signed, President Hassan Rouhani expressed that the Iranian people’s “prayers had been answered.”7 Interestingly, the emphasis on preserving “national dignity,” a critical concern for Iran’s Supreme Leader, appeared to wane after the deal’s signing. He remarked, “I really do not care if this is a victory for us or not…I want relations with the West. If we compromised, so be it.”8 This shift in priorities highlighted the potential transformative impact of the JCPOA on Iran’s foreign policy and international relations.

Other Key Players The European nations played active and pivotal roles throughout the intricate negotiation process leading to the JCPOA. Their involvement was significant, and the European Union (EU) High Representative spearheaded diplomatic efforts on behalf of the E3/EU+3 group, which included China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in negotiations with Iran. This collective effort was aimed at achieving the JCPOA, a crucial agreement designed to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program would be exclusively peaceful while facilitating the comprehensive lifting of nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the United Nations (UN), the EU, and the United States. The EU remained steadfastly committed to supporting the full and effective implementation of 7 Michael R. Gordon and David E. Sanger, “Deal Reached on Iran Nuclear Program: Limits on Fuel Will Lesson with Time,” The New York Times, July 14, 2015. 8 Michael R. Gordon and David E. Sanger, “Deal Reached on Iran Nuclear Program: Limits on Fuel Will Lesson with Time,” The New York Times, July 14, 2015.

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the JCPOA, which included the lifting of nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions. Furthermore, the EU actively engaged with the private sector and economic operators, particularly banks, to stimulate growth in trade and investment.9 However, it is essential to clarify that while the JCPOA addressed nuclear-related sanctions, other sanctions imposed by the EU on Iran, pertaining to concerns such as human rights violations and support for terrorism, remained in force and were not part of the JCPOA negotiations or agreements.10 Russia and China both played distinct roles in the negotiations surrounding the Iran nuclear deal. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov asserted that without Russia’s support, the JCPOA would not have materialized. While Lavrov did attend some of the negotiation sessions in locations such as Vienna, Lausanne, and Geneva, there is limited evidence to suggest that Russia actively contributed to forging key compromises during the talks. In fact, at various points during the negotiations, Russia appeared to complicate or challenge the positions of the P5+1 group. “To the contrary, there is much to suggest that Moscow sought to complicate—if not undermine—the P5+1 position at several delicate moments in the negotiations.”11 Russia’s primary concerns in relation to the Iran deal were centered around the potential impact on energy prices, with less emphasis on Iran’s nuclear program’s transparency. Furthermore, within the nuclear energy sector, Iran was more inclined toward diversification rather than exclusively entering into contracts with Russia.12 Russia’s aspirations to expand its arms exports were hindered by the continuation of the embargo on advanced weaponry, despite Russia’s extensive lobbying efforts. For the Obama administration, securing Russia’s passive acceptance of the Iran deal was a challenging task, considering that Russia was often viewed as an “existential threat.” Nonetheless, the administration

9 Nuclear Agreement—JCPOA. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/nuclear-agreement-% E2%80%93-jcpoa_en. 10 Nuclear Agreement—JCPOA. ent-%E2%80%93-jcpoa_en.

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/nuclear-agreem

11 Pavel K. Baev, “The China Factor in Russia Support for the Iran Deal,” Washington, DC: Brookings, July 21, 2015. 12 Pavel K. Baev, “The China Factor in Russia Support for the Iran Deal,” Washington, DC: Brookings, July 21, 2015.

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acknowledged Russian President Vladimir Putin’s willingness to compartmentalize certain issues and maintain areas of cooperation in an attempt to gain Russia’s support for the JCPOA. Moscow understood that the Iran nuclear deal would not be to its advantage, and the primary beneficiary would likely be China. China was prepared to make substantial investments in Iranian oil and gas projects. Furthermore, lower energy prices resulting from the deal would benefit the Chinese economy, which heavily relies on energy imports. The strong inclination of China to pursue the deal was a significant factor that influenced Russia’s decision not to disrupt the Vienna negotiations,13 despite Moscow’s reservations about the deal’s impact on its interests. The negotiations leading to the signing of the JCPOA in July 2015 were marked by the tireless efforts of two key individuals: John F. Kerry and Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Kerry, the United States Secretary of State, played a crucial role in the final rounds of negotiations. His prior experience as the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee positioned him as a central figure behind the secret Oman channel with Iranian officials. Kerry believed, in contrast to some within the administration, that the Oman channel could yield positive outcomes. Both Kerry and President Obama possessed the unique ability to view the world from the perspective of their counterparts, which facilitated understanding of national interests and strategic maneuvers, ultimately building trust in the negotiation process. Kerry, similar to Obama, carried a highly significant attribute, the “unusual ability to see the world through the eyes of their counterparts.”14 Kerry adeptly managed criticism from domestic policymakers and Iranian counterparts alike. He firmly stated that under the deal, Iran would refrain from producing or acquiring highly enriched uranium or plutonium for at least 15 years. Additionally, he assured American critics that verification measures would remain in place permanently. He emphasized that Tehran and the International Atomic Energy Agency had entered into an agreement to address all questions regarding Iran’s past actions within three

13 Pavel K. Baev, “The China Factor in Russia Support for the Iran Deal,” Washington, DC: Brookings, July 21, 2015. 14 Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 371.

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months, characterizing the completion of this task as fundamental for sanctions relief.15 Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s Foreign Minister, shared a similar commitment to diplomatic success over military confrontation. He consistently emphasized the importance of trust and mutual respect16 as the foundational elements of any successful deal. Zarif firmly believed that diplomacy could only thrive when conducted with “mutual respect.” Furthermore, he expressed the view that the proper implementation of the Iran nuclear deal had the potential to open doors to further cooperation between Iran and the United States. In 2016, a year after the deal was signed, he articulated his belief that the future leaders of both Iran and the United States would see the value in safeguarding and perpetuating the deal, as it was mutually beneficial and served the interests of the international community. He stated, “I’m more interested in seeing this process come to fruition during the Obama Administration. I believe that, once it does, the future Presidents of both Iran and the United States will see it is in their interest to safeguard it and to make sure that it continues, because we believe it’s a good deal. We believe it’s a deal that is in the interest of both sides and in the interest of the international community. We believe that, once it is fully implemented, everybody will see the beneficial side effects or spillovers in other areas. So, my focus—and we have quite a bit of time—is to entrench this agreement during the months that are left of Secretary Kerry’s tenure, and of my own, and make sure that everybody recognizes the benefit of being compliant with the deal.”17 Thus, he emphasized the positive side effects or spill-over effects that would become evident in other areas once the deal was fully implemented. This underscores two critical aspects: the potential for multiple benefits arising from the deal and the urgency of initiating its implementation while individuals supportive of diplomacy and moderation remained in positions of influence. The historic phone call that took place on September 27, 2013, between Presidents Obama and Rouhani marked a significant turning 15 Michael R. Gordon and David E. Sanger, “Deal Reached on Iran Nuclear Program: Limits on Fuel Will Lesson with Time,” The New York Times, July 14, 2015. 16 Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 272. 17 Robin Wright, “Iran’s Javad Zarif on the Fraying Nuclear Deal, US Relations, and the Holocaust Cartoons,” The New Yorker, April 25, 2016.

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point that paved the way for the eventual signing of the Iran nuclear deal. This call underscored the political will and urgency on both sides to address the Iranian nuclear crisis. President Rouhani expressed a strong commitment to resolving the nuclear issue swiftly, emphasizing Iran’s unwavering will to do so. Rouhani said, “Step by step, we will build confidence between our presidents and our countries…With sufficient will on both sides – and I assure you that on Iran’s side the will is 100% – the nuclear file will be resolved in a short period of time.”18 President Obama, in his statement from the White House, acknowledged the substantial challenges ahead but expressed his belief in the possibility of reaching a comprehensive solution. Obama, in his White House statement, said: “While there will be significant obstacles and success is by no means guaranteed, I believe we can reach a comprehensive solution. I do believe that there is a basis for a resolution.”19 This phone call was the culmination of extensive diplomatic efforts and negotiations between the White House and Rouhani’s office leading up to the United Nations General Assembly meeting.20 The commitment and persistence of the negotiators, coupled with the involvement of high-level diplomats, played a pivotal role in bridging gaps and reaching a consensus. The final agreement represented a delicate equilibrium of interests and compromises, addressing concerns about Iran’s nuclear program while providing sanctions relief and a path for Iran’s reintegration into the global community.

Complexities Surrounding the Deal The negotiations leading to the Iran nuclear deal, which was eventually implemented in 2016, were exceptionally intricate and protracted. These negotiations spanned nearly two years and encompassed both public and covert meetings. Led by the United States, the P5+1 nations engaged in extensive dialogues with Iranian representatives, aiming to identify common ground and forge a mutually agreeable accord. These diplomatic efforts underscored the belief in the significance of dialogue and 18 Dan Roberts and Julian Borger, “Obama Holds Historic Phone Call with Rouhani and Hints at End to Sanctions,” The Guardian, September 28, 2013. 19 Dan Roberts and Julian Borger, “Obama Holds Historic Phone Call with Rouhani and Hints at End to Sanctions,” The Guardian, September 28, 2013. 20 Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 225.

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diplomacy in resolving contentious issues while averting the specter of armed conflict. Nonetheless, the backdrop against which these negotiations unfolded was one of profound initial skepticism and mistrust, particularly between Iran and the United States. The two nations had been protracted conflict rivals since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, and historical tensions colored their interactions. Iran, which had experienced strained relations with Western powers in the past, harbored deep-seated suspicions about their intentions and perceived attempts to meddle in its internal affairs. Iran’s apprehension was rooted in the concern that entering into an agreement with the United States would inevitably entail yielding to Western influence. Conversely, the United States and its allies were profoundly skeptical of Iran’s nuclear aspirations and its commitment to upholding international non-proliferation norms. This mutual skepticism presented a formidable challenge to the negotiation process. Nonetheless, despite the initial cloud of doubts and mutual mistrust, sustained efforts and a willingness to engage in constructive dialogue played pivotal roles in transforming skepticism into cautious optimism. Key to this transformation were confidence-building measures implemented to foster trust and create an environment conducive to negotiation. These measures included transparency initiatives, verification mechanisms, and mutual commitments designed to demonstrate the genuine intent of both parties to reach a comprehensive and enduring agreement. The formulation of the Iran nuclear deal was a notably intricate and arduous process. This historic agreement demanded extensive negotiations and required substantial compromises from all involved parties to establish an accord that would be mutually acceptable. Several factors contributed to the complexity and difficulties that characterized these negotiations. Distinct objectives existed, with Iran seeking relief from debilitating economic sanctions while the P5+1 nations, particularly the United States and its allies, prioritized constraining Iran’s nuclear program for security reasons. This focus on security added intricacy to the negotiations. Domestic opposition was another challenge, as both the Iranian and American administrations encountered resistance. Hardliners in Iran were wary of perceived concessions, while skepticism and opposition to the deal were evident in the United States among lawmakers and interest groups. Technical complexity arose from the intricacies of nuclear technology and the need for a robust monitoring and verification regime. The multilateral nature of the negotiations added complexity,

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as coordinating the positions and interests of multiple world powers in the P5+1 group introduced additional layers of intricacy. Pressure from regional actors, such as Israel and Gulf states, further complicated matters. Leadership changes in both Iran and the United States during the negotiation process influenced the dynamics of the talks. Additionally, the extended duration of nearly two years required sustained diplomatic efforts and posed challenges in maintaining focus and momentum. Crafting a comprehensive agreement covering nuclear restrictions, verification mechanisms, sanctions relief, and dispute resolution mechanisms demanded intricate and detailed negotiations. Despite these considerable challenges, the willingness of all parties to engage in dialogue, the commitment to finding common ground, and the belief in the power of diplomacy ultimately led to the successful conclusion of the JCPOA, marking a significant diplomatic achievement in addressing a critical international security issue. As Seyed Hossein Mousavian states, “When nuclear negotiations started between Iran and the US, many in the world, the US, and in Iran believed that this negotiation was not going to go anywhere because the US will not accept the enrichment and Iran will not give up enrichment. But, it was a miracle, 2013–2015, when the two foreign ministers, the deputy ministers, general directors negotiated directly. In less than two years they could agree on the nuclear deal and the US accepted the rights of Iran on the NPT and Iran gave every guarantee that they would not go after nuclear power.”21 However, it is crucial to highlight the challenging issues that emerged during the negotiation phase of the deal. The P5+1 countries, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, along with Germany, each had their own national interests and concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Balancing these diverse interests and finding common ground required extensive discussions and compromises. The technical aspects of the agreement, such as uranium enrichment capacity, centrifuge numbers, and verification mechanisms, required in-depth scientific knowledge and expertise. Negotiators had to navigate complex technical details and ensure that the agreement

21 Interview with Seyed Hossein Mousavian, September 10, 2023. Mousavian was an Iranian policymaker and a spokesperson for Iran’s nuclear negotiators. He served on Iran’s nuclear diplomacy team in negotiations with the EU and International Atomic Energy Agency. He is a Middle East Security and Nuclear Policy specialist at Princeton University.

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would effectively address the concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Additionally, the negotiations took place in an atmosphere of mistrust and historical tensions between Iran and Western powers, particularly the United States. Overcoming this trust deficit and building confidence between the parties required significant diplomatic efforts and sustained dialogue. With regard to political considerations, the negotiations were influenced by domestic politics within each participating country. Political dynamics, public opinion, and pressure from interest groups shaped the negotiating positions and added complexity to the process. Ensuring that the final agreement would be politically acceptable and viable domestically for all parties was a challenging task. Each participating country faced domestic political opposition to the negotiations. In the United States, for example, there were concerns about the potential risks of the deal, including the verification process and Iran’s regional behavior. Addressing these concerns and building domestic support for the agreement added complexity to the negotiation process. Several critical issues presented major challenges during the negotiations. These included the scope and duration of restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, the timing and pace of sanctions relief, the mechanism for resolving potential disputes, and the access and transparency of inspections. Finding mutually agreeable solutions to these sticking points required extensive discussions and creativity in problem-solving.22 The key specific matters that sparked major disagreements pertained to the following: Uranium Enrichment Capacity: One of the key challenges was determining the acceptable level of uranium enrichment capacity for Iran. The P5+1 countries initially sought significant reductions, while Iran insisted on maintaining a larger enrichment program. Finding a compromise that addressed both parties’ concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear capabilities was a difficult task. Timing and Pace of Sanctions Relief: The issue of sanctions relief was contentious. Iran sought immediate and substantial relief, while the P5+1 countries were cautious about the timing and pace of lifting sanctions. Balancing Iran’s economic needs with the concerns about

22 See Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).

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ensuring Iran’s compliance with the agreement required delicate negotiations. Verification and Inspections: Establishing a robust monitoring and verification mechanism to ensure Iran’s compliance with the deal was a significant challenge. Iran was reluctant to allow intrusive inspections at its military sites, raising concerns about the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities. Finding a mutually acceptable approach to verification and inspections required detailed negotiations and compromises. Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Creating an effective mechanism for resolving potential disputes was another challenge. The parties had to design a process that allowed for addressing concerns and alleged violations promptly and effectively. Determining the appropriate measures and consequences for non-compliance without jeopardizing the stability of the agreement required careful negotiation. These are just a few examples of the problems that arose during the negotiation process. The challenges were multifaceted, and negotiators had to navigate through various technical, political, and diplomatic issues to reach a consensus. The ability to address and overcome these challenges demonstrates the complexity and sensitivity of the negotiations leading to the Iran nuclear deal.

The Deal The negotiation process leading to the signing of the JCPOA involved several significant milestones. These milestones encompassed key agreements, including the interim Joint Plan of Action reached in November 2013, as well as the final agreement concluded in July 2015. Throughout the negotiations, critical issues were addressed, including Iran’s uranium enrichment activities, the phased removal of economic sanctions, the establishment of inspection mechanisms by the IAEA, and the determination of the agreement’s duration. These milestones collectively shaped the comprehensive framework of the JCPOA. The JCPOA entailed specific restrictions on Iran’s civilian nuclear enrichment program and designed to guarantee its peaceful nature and establish robust monitoring and verification mechanisms for compliance. Additionally, the agreement outlined provisions for sanctions relief. It

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is essential to assess the advantages and disadvantages that the deal presented to both Iran and the United States. The JCPOA placed substantial constraints on Iran’s civilian nuclear enrichment program, with the primary objective of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. These limitations were implemented to guarantee that Iran’s nuclear endeavors remained exclusively for peaceful purposes. The agreement required Iran to take steps such as reducing its stockpile of enriched uranium, constraining its uranium enrichment capacity, and modifying the Arak heavy water reactor to prevent the production of weapons-grade plutonium. To ensure the strict adherence of these restrictions, comprehensive monitoring and verification systems were established. The IAEA was granted extensive access to Iran’s nuclear facilities to confirm the country’s compliance with the JCPOA. This access encompassed regular inspections, supervision of uranium mining and milling activities, and entry to Iran’s centrifuge production facilities. These robust monitoring and verification mechanisms were pivotal in promoting transparency and instilling confidence in Iran’s nuclear program. A significant component of the JCPOA was the provision of sanctions relief to Iran as part of the agreement. The international sanctions imposed on Iran in response to its nuclear program had inflicted severe damage on the country’s economy. In exchange for Iran’s adherence to the specified restrictions, the United States and other parties to the agreement committed to either lifting or suspending certain nuclear-related sanctions. The primary objective of this sanctions relief was to incentivize Iran to comply with the JCPOA’s terms and deliver economic advantages to the nation. It is important to note that sanctions had proven ineffective in the case of Iran. Instead, they often intensified Iran’s motivation for nuclear proliferation as a means of deterring perceived threats. In fact, sanctions had the potential to escalate tensions and push Iran and the United States closer to the brink of conflict.23 On July 20, 2015, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2231(2015) concerning the JCPOA, which had been agreed upon by Iran and the P5+1. This resolution officially endorsed the JCPOA, permitting specific exemptions to existing restrictive measures and establishing the timetable and commitments necessary for all parties 23 Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).

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to facilitate the eventual termination of these restrictive measures against Iran.24 The JCPOA’s framework included several significant milestones, each carrying distinct importance in the process: Adoption Day: This milestone was declared on October 18, 2015, following legislative reviews of the JCPOA in both the United States and Iran. Adoption Day marked the initiation of the JCPOA’s provisions. On this day, the EU adopted the legislative framework for lifting all its nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions. Implementation Day: Occurring on January 16, 2016, Implementation Day signified a critical moment in the JCPOA timeline. It was reached after the IAEA verified that Iran had fulfilled its commitments outlined in the agreement. On Implementation Day, the EU’s legislative framework for lifting economic and financial nuclear-related sanctions took effect. Additionally, UN financial nuclear-related sanctions and US secondary nuclear-related sanctions were lifted. An Information Note providing guidance to EU business operators on the new regulatory environment was issued on the same day. Transition Day: It is the next stage of the JCPOA, anticipated to occur 8 years after Adoption Day, in 2023, or when the IAEA reaches the broader conclusion that all remaining nuclear material in Iran is exclusively for peaceful activities, whichever comes first. Transition Day will trigger the lifting of the remaining nuclear-related sanctions, ballistic missile restrictions, and related designations. Termination Day: Scheduled to happen 10 years after Adoption Day, in 2025, Termination Day will mark the conclusion of remaining EU measures. It will also signal the conclusion of the United Nations Security Council’s consideration of the Iran nuclear issue and the termination of UNSC resolution 2231 (2015). To oversee JCPOA implementation and address potential issues or disputes, a Joint Commission was established under the agreement. The Joint Commission comprises all members of the E3/EU+3 and Iran,

24 Nuclear Agreement—JCPOA. ent-%E2%80%93-jcpoa_en.

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/nuclear-agreem

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with the EU High Representative/Vice President taking on the role of coordinating its work. This body manages JCPOA implementation and addresses any challenges that may arise during the process. Within the Joint Commission, various working groups were formed, including the Procurement Working Group, the Technical Working Group, the Arak Working Group, and the Sanctions Working Group. All of these groups, except for the Arak Working Group, are coordinated by a representative of the EU High Representative.25 The JCPOA is a multifaceted agreement with intricacies that may necessitate elucidation and adaptations as circumstances evolve. Its efficacious execution hinges on the unceasing vigilance and verification endeavors led by the IAEA and the unwavering commitment of all participating parties. Here are the pivotal stipulations and components of the nuclear accord26 : Firstly, Iran pledged to curtail its stockpile of enriched uranium and restrict its uranium enrichment capacity, an imperative measure to ensure the unequivocal peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. Secondly, Iran agreed to undertake a substantial redesign of its heavy water reactor at Arak, effectively preventing the production of weapons-grade plutonium. This critical action aimed to allay apprehensions regarding potential pathways to nuclear weapons development. Thirdly, stringent monitoring and verification mechanisms were established, granting the IAEA comprehensive access to Iran’s nuclear facilities. This access facilitated regular inspections and oversight, affirming compliance with the JCPOA’s provisions. Fourthly, as an inducement for Iran’s compliance with nuclear constraints, the United States and other signatories concurred to lift or suspend specific nuclear-related sanctions. This sanctions relief was intended to incentivize Iran’s adherence to the JCPOA and provide a boost to its economy. Fifthly, Resolution 2231(2015) was adopted by the United Nations Security Council to formally endorse the JCPOA. This resolution permitted targeted exemptions to existing restrictive measures and delineated a timeline and commitments culminating in the termination of sanctions against Iran. Lastly, the JCPOA established

25 Nuclear Agreement—JCPOA. ent-%E2%80%93-jcpoa_en.

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/nuclear-agreem

26 Nuclear Agreement—JCPOA. ent-%E2%80%93-jcpoa_en.

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/nuclear-agreem

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several significant milestones, encompassing Adoption Day, Implementation Day, Transition Day, and Termination Day. These milestones were pivotal in orchestrating the timeline for JCPOA execution and the alleviation of sanctions. Moreover, a Joint Commission, comprising all members of the E3/EU+3 and Iran, was constituted to oversee the implementation of the JCPOA. This Commission plays a pivotal role in managing the agreement, addressing potential concerns, and mediating disputes. It is essential to recognize that the precise details and interpretations of these provisions may evolve over time, influenced by ongoing developments and negotiations. The JCPOA embodies a delicate equilibrium of interests and concessions, intended to address apprehensions regarding Iran’s nuclear program while offering incentives for compliance and the reintegration of Iran into the global community. Uranium Enrichment: (a) Limitations on Enrichment Capacity: Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to limit its uranium enrichment capacity by reducing the number of installed centrifuges at its Natanz facility. It would only operate around 5,060 first-generation centrifuges for ten years, with additional restrictions on advanced centrifuge research and development. (b) Cap on Enriched Uranium Stockpile: Iran agreed to reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium from approximately 12,000 kilograms to 300 kilograms of up to 3.67% enriched uranium for fifteen years. The excess enriched uranium was to be either downblended,27 sold, or transferred out of the country. (c) Fordow Facility Conversion: The Fordow uranium enrichment facility was to be converted into a nuclear, physics, and technology research center. It would no longer house uranium enrichment activities but would retain centrifuges for isotope production. Sanctions Relief: (a) Nuclear-Related Sanctions: The JCPOA committed the United States, the EU, and the UN Security Council to lift or suspend nuclear-related sanctions imposed on Iran. This included the removal of nuclear-related secondary sanctions that targeted non-U.S. entities conducting business with Iran. (b) UN Resolutions: The JCPOA called for the termination of all previous UN Security Council resolutions 27 “Downblended” is a term used in the context of nuclear materials. It refers to the process of reducing the concentration of fissile material, typically highly enriched uranium (HEU), in a nuclear mixture. This reduction in concentration makes the material less suitable for use in nuclear weapons and more suitable for peaceful purposes, such as nuclear power generation or research. Downblending is often done as a non-proliferation measure to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation by making the material less weapons-usable.

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relating to Iran’s nuclear program, thus lifting the international sanctions framework. (c) EU and U.S. Sanctions: The EU and the United States were to lift or suspend nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions, including measures targeting Iran’s banking, oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors. However, certain non-nuclear sanctions, such as those related to human rights abuses or support for terrorism, were not affected by the JCPOA.

The Pros and Cons of the Deal The JCPOA’s advantages and disadvantages must be comprehensively examined from the perspectives of both Iran and the United States. For Iran, the deal held the promise of much-needed relief from the harsh economic sanctions that had crippled its economy and isolated the nation on the global stage. This sanctions relief offered Iran the opportunity to revitalize its economy, engage in international trade, and potentially reintegrate into the global marketplace. However, it is essential to acknowledge that within Iran, and there were critics who believed that the deal did not sufficiently address the nation’s needs and concerns. Trita Parsi in his book28 presents a thorough analysis of the negotiations and the outcomes of the Iran nuclear deal, shedding light on its potential downsides and the criticisms it faced from various quarters. Moreover, there exists a body of scholarship that examines the nuances of the Iran nuclear deal, scrutinizing both its merits and demerits. These analyses explore the multifaceted implications of the agreement for Iran, taking into account its economic, political, and security dimensions. Questions have arisen regarding how the deal might influence Iran’s regional sway, domestic political landscape, and diplomatic relationships with other nations.29 Importantly, scholars have offered explicit critiques, assessing the consequences of the JCPOA on Iran from various angles. These assessments focus on the potential challenges and risks that Iran

28 Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017). 29 Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar, “The Iran Nuclear Deal: Benefits and Risks for Iran,” Washington, DC: The Washington Quarterly, 39(2), 2016.

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might encounter due to the agreement, offering a more comprehensive understanding of its ramifications.30 From the perspective of the United States, the JCPOA brought forth a nuanced landscape of advantages and challenges. On the one hand, the agreement was designed to act as a deterrent, preventing Iran from progressing toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This contributed significantly to regional and global stability, averting the potentially catastrophic scenario of a nuclear-armed Iran. The JCPOA, as a diplomatic achievement, underscored the effectiveness of multilateral negotiations and the power of diplomacy in resolving complex international issues, offering an alternative to military confrontation. However, it is essential to note that there were critics within the United States who raised concerns about certain aspects of the deal. Some argued that the JCPOA did not address Iran’s ballistic missile program, which remained a matter of concern due to its potential to be a delivery mechanism for nuclear weapons. Additionally, the agreement did not directly address Iran’s regional activities, which some viewed as destabilizing, particularly its support for proxy groups in the Middle East. Moreover, opponents of the deal were wary that the sanctions relief provided to Iran could potentially furnish the country with additional resources that might be diverted toward activities that could undermine regional stability and security. These complexities and divergent perspectives within the United States underscored the multifaceted nature of the JCPOA and its implications for the country’s foreign policy and national security considerations. During the negotiation period and subsequent to the signing of the Iran nuclear deal, a crucial research and policy topic revolved around why the agreement might be viewed unfavorably from the perspective of the United States. J. E. Dyer conducted an analysis, delving into the potential adverse consequences of the Iran nuclear deal for the United

30 Ali Fathollah-Nejad, “The Iran Nuclear Deal and Its Consequences for Iran,” Insight Turkey, 18(3), 2016. Also see George Perkovich and Pranay Vaddi, The Iran Nuclear Deal: Bombs, Bureaucrats, and Billionaires (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020). While this book provides a broader analysis of the Iran nuclear deal, it also discusses the concerns and criticisms surrounding the agreement, particularly from a non-proliferation perspective. It examines the potential risks and negative consequences for Iran in the context of regional dynamics and international security.

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States.31 This assessment encompassed examinations of the geopolitical implications, risks posed to regional stability, and the impact on US national security interests. It is noteworthy that not all critical perspectives sought outright rejection of the deal; some advocated for a process involving breaking and then revising the agreement, aligning with the approach favored by the Trump administration.32 Elliott Abrams, as early as 2016, presented a critical evaluation of the Iran nuclear deal from a US standpoint. He contended, along with numerous others, including proponents of the Trump administration, that the agreement was fundamentally flawed and proposed alternative strategies for more effectively addressing Iran’s nuclear program. Several scholars and policymakers criticized the Iran nuclear deal and argued that President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the agreement was justified. They pointed out weaknesses in the deal that had potential negative implications for U.S. interests.33 Intriguingly, many elements of the JCPOA were widely regarded as positive, even among skeptics,34 although they had been fiercely debated during the negotiation phase. For instance, there was consensus among critics that substantial reductions in installed centrifuges and enriched uranium stocks, coupled with constraints on enrichment capacity, would significantly extend the time required for Iran to produce sufficient weapons-grade uranium for a single bomb, potentially up to one year for at least the first decade of the agreement.35 Additionally, provisions like the redesigning of the Arak heavy water reactor, the removal of its spent fuel from Iran, and a 15-year ban on reprocessing were seen as effective measures to block the plutonium pathway to a bomb for the foreseeable future. Equally noteworthy were 31 J. E. Dyer, “The Iran Deal and the Decline of the American Empire,” CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2017. Also see Michael Singh, “The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2017. 32 Elliott Abrams “The Case Against the Iran Nuclear Deal: How to Break It and Then Fix It,” Foreign Affairs, 95(3), 2016. 33 Michael Doran and Peter Rough, “Why Trump Is Right on Iran,” Foreign Affairs, 97(1), 2018. 34 Robert Einhorn, “Debating the Iran Nuclear Deal: A Former American Negotiator Outlines the Battleground Issues,” Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, August 12, 2015. 35 Robert Einhorn, “Debating the Iran Nuclear Deal: A Former American Negotiator Outlines the Battleground Issues,” Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, August 12, 2015.

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the strict limitations on research and development of advanced centrifuges for the initial 10 years, allowing Iran to test only single machines or small cascades. The testing of Iran’s most advanced centrifuges in larger, operationally sized cascades could only occur after a decade, delaying their deployment in significant numbers. A point of general consensus was that the deal would ensure a high level of confidence in the ability to detect non-compliance at declared facilities. This confidence stemmed from the utilization of advanced verification technologies and the comprehensive monitoring arrangements in place, which encompassed continuous surveillance and inventory accounting of activities not typically subject to such rigorous scrutiny. Thus, it is stated that there was general consensus on the fact that the deal would ensure high level of confidence “in the ability to detect noncompliance at declared facilities because of the use of advanced verification technologies and the scope and intensity of monitoring arrangements, including continuous surveillance and inventory accounting of activities not usually subject to such rigorous monitoring.”36 Furthermore, they found satisfaction in the JCPOA’s explicit provisions, which clarified the sequence of events regarding sanctions relief. This was particularly important in light of previous Iranian statements that had suggested sanctions would be immediately terminated upon reaching a deal. The JCPOA underscored that Tehran would not receive sanctions relief until the IAEA had verified Iran’s fulfillment of its key nuclear commitments. These commitments included actions such as relocating approximately 13,000 excess centrifuges to monitored storage, reducing enriched uranium stocks from well over 10,000 kilograms to a mere 300 kilograms, and removing and disabling the core of the Arak heavy water reactor. An essential point to emphasize is the significant leverage the United States retained even in the post-deal period. It was stipulated that through an unprecedented snap-back procedure, if the United States accused Iran of substantial non-compliance with its commitments, previous Security Council sanctions would be reinstated. This would occur unless a new Security Council resolution, subject to veto, was passed to maintain the

36 Robert Einhorn, “Debating the Iran Nuclear Deal: A Former American Negotiator Outlines the Battleground Issues,” Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, August 12, 2015.

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suspension of sanctions. It was stated, “Under an unprecedented snapback procedure, if the United States charges Iran with significant nonperformance of its commitments, previous Security Council sanctions will be restored, unless a new, veto-able Security Council resolution is adopted that maintains the suspension of sanctions.”37

JCPOA and Non-proliferation The JCPOA played a pivotal role in bolstering non-proliferation efforts by effectively addressing the concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. This agreement was strategically designed to thwart Iran’s path to acquiring nuclear weapons, ultimately reinforcing the global nonproliferation framework while simultaneously enhancing regional and international security. The Iran nuclear deal garnered widespread support, with endorsements from nuclear physicists, military authorities, nonproliferation experts, and more than 100 countries worldwide. “Nuclear physicists, military officials, non-proliferation experts, and more than 100 countries across the globe have all voiced their support for the Iran nuclear deal because it is the best solution available to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon without taking military action.”38 These endorsements underscored the agreement’s status as the most viable solution to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons without resorting to military action. The following discussion focuses on the JCPOA’s contributions to non-proliferation, shedding light on its notable achievements and the challenges it encountered. Verifiable Limits on Iran’s Nuclear Program: The JCPOA made substantial strides in promoting non-proliferation by imposing verifiable constraints on Iran’s nuclear endeavors. These constraints encompassed various aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, comprising reductions in its uranium enrichment capacity, strict limitations on enriched uranium stockpiles, and alterations to the Arak heavy water reactor. Collectively, these measures acted as effective deterrents, severely hampering Iran’s capacity to pursue nuclear weapons and firmly establishing the 37 Robert Einhorn, “Debating the Iran Nuclear Deal: A Former American Negotiator Outlines the Battleground Issues,” Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, August 12, 2015. 38 The Historic Deal that Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon. https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal.

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program’s focus on peaceful applications. To bolster accountability, the agreement introduced a robust monitoring and verification mechanism, expertly overseen by the IAEA. This mechanism ensured transparency and instilled confidence in Iran’s adherence to its nuclear commitments, further fortifying global non-proliferation efforts. The JCPOA played a pivotal role in preventing nuclear weapons proliferation, particularly by thwarting Iran’s potential to acquire such weapons. It served as a potent example of how diplomatic channels and multilateral agreements can successfully tackle concerns related to proliferation. This landmark agreement not only curbed Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but also established a significant precedent for resolving similar global issues through peaceful, diplomatic means. It underscored the value of dialogue, negotiations, and international collaboration in the broader effort to deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It also played a significant role in bolstering non-proliferation norms by consolidating international unity against the pursuit of nuclear weapons. It reaffirmed the dedication of its participating nations to the NPT and its associated non-proliferation responsibilities. Through its stringent oversight of Iran and the guarantee of its adherence, the Iran nuclear deal contributed to maintaining the trustworthiness and robustness of the NPT framework. The JCPOA also fostered confidence and transparency in Iran’s nuclear endeavors. It compelled Iran to institute extensive monitoring and inspection protocols to validate its adherence. These measures encompassed expanded access to nuclear facilities, continual surveillance of uranium mining and milling, and the deployment of advanced monitoring technologies for Iran’s centrifuge production. By upholding transparency, the JCPOA delivered assurance to the global community regarding the peaceful character of Iran’s nuclear initiatives. In terms of regional and global security, the JCPOA played a pivotal role in enhancing regional and global security by diminishing the prospects of nuclear proliferation and potential armed conflicts. The agreement alleviated tensions in the Middle East, especially between Iran and its neighboring states. It facilitated a more secure regional milieu by tackling a paramount security issue in the area. Through averting additional nuclear proliferation, the agreement upheld the equilibrium of power and stability in the Middle East. The enduring success of the JCPOA relies on sustained adherence by all participating parties. Iran’s commitment to the agreement has come under scrutiny and apprehension, particularly concerning access

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to military installations and possible undisclosed nuclear undertakings. The challenge remains in assuring ongoing compliance from all involved parties. The intricate geopolitical landscape in the region, characterized by Iran’s strained relations with neighboring states and evolving alliances, introduces uncertainty into the JCPOA’s sustainability. Shifting political dynamics, regional conflicts, and broader geopolitical interests have the potential to affect the agreement’s implementation and its overall impact on non-proliferation endeavors. In essence, the JCPOA has played a pivotal role in advancing non-proliferation objectives by imposing verifiable restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities, averting nuclear weapons proliferation, and reinforcing global non-proliferation norms. It has fostered confidence, transparency, and regional stability. Nevertheless, challenges in terms of ensuring ongoing compliance and navigating complex geopolitical dynamics remain. Upholding and fortifying the JCPOA necessitate continuous diplomatic engagement, unwavering commitment to agreed-upon terms, and a steadfast dedication to non-proliferation principles. The broader implications of the JCPOA for global non-proliferation efforts were noteworthy. This agreement marked a substantial advancement in halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, showcasing the efficacy of diplomatic negotiations in tackling proliferation issues. It established a model for future negotiations, underscoring the significance of international collaboration in resolving intricate security issues. Nevertheless, the enduring prosperity and viability of the agreement hinge on the dedication and compliance of all participating parties. On May 8, 2018, the United States withdrew from the JCPOA. Therefore, as of 9 May, the United States does not participate in any JCPOArelated activities or meetings. The United States’ withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal casts doubt on the agreement’s future. The reinstatement of US sanctions against Iran strained the deal’s efficacy and introduced uncertainties. The preservation and development of the JCPOA hinge on diplomatic endeavors and the dedication of the remaining signatories to uphold the accord. On December 21, 2020, participants of the JCPOA acknowledged at ministerial level the prospect of a return of the US to the JCPOA and underlined their readiness to positively address this in a joint effort. The coordinator has been leading diplomatic talks in Vienna, since April 2021, to negotiate the return of the United States to

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the JCPOA and to ensure once again the full and effective implementation of the agreement by all sides.39 The negotiations since then have not yielded any positive outcomes. The subsequent chapter discusses these, by focusing on their intricacies and providing detailed analysis.

Summary The chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the JCPOA, and its various components. It analyzes the specifics of the deal, including Iran’s commitments to limit its nuclear enrichment activities, the mechanisms for international monitoring and verification of these commitments, and the sanctions relief offered in exchange for compliance. It also highlights the potential advantages and disadvantages of the JCPOA for both Iran and the United States. The study emphasizes the significance of addressing the Iranian nuclear issue during the Obama administration. It outlines the concerns and challenges associated with Iran’s nuclear program and how these issues were tackled through diplomatic means. It underscores the dedication of the Obama administration to seeking a peaceful resolution to the problem. Furthermore, it provides insight into the intricate negotiations that unfolded, highlighting the initial skepticism and mistrust among the parties involved. It highlights how these negotiations gradually led to a change in attitudes and a willingness to engage in diplomacy, ultimately resulting in the signing of the JCPOA. Overall, this chapter portrays the negotiation process as a compelling example of the effectiveness of diplomacy in resolving complex and contentious international issues. It demonstrates how diplomacy, when approached with commitment and persistence, can avert potential military conflicts and promote peaceful solutions to global challenges. Moreover, the chapter places the JCPOA in a broader context, considering its implications for global nonproliferation efforts and regional security dynamics. It acknowledges the diplomatic significance of the agreement in addressing concerns about Iran’s nuclear program through peaceful means, and the role it played in preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. It concludes by underscoring the multifaceted nature of the JCPOA, which aimed not only to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions but also to establish a 39 Nuclear Agreement—JCPOA. ent-%E2%80%93-jcpoa_en.

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/nuclear-agreem

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framework for ongoing monitoring, dispute resolution, and cooperation. The gradual lifting of economic sanctions was intended to provide an incentive for Iran to adhere to its nuclear commitments while fostering improved diplomatic relations.

CHAPTER 3

The US Exit from the Deal in 2018

This chapter examines the reasons behind the US administration, led by President Donald Trump, choosing to withdraw from the nuclear deal and the subsequent global threat of proliferation caused by this decision. It explores the primary rationale provided by the Trump administration for pulling Washington out of the agreement, particularly the argument that the deal failed to adequately address Iran’s ballistic missile program, its involvement in terrorism, and its role in regional conflicts. Additionally, it analyzes the global proliferation threat that arose as a result of this decision. The chapter provides a comprehensive discussion of some of the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) from the Trump administration’s perspective, highlighting the administration’s view of the flaws in the 2015 nuclear agreement. It also examines the consequences of the US reimposing sanctions and implementing measures to eliminate Iran’s oil exports after withdrawing from the deal. It also briefly covers the primary impacts of these decisions on Iranian nuclear politics, as a more detailed analysis is provided in a separate case study chapter. Additionally, the chapter highlights Iran’s immediate resumption of certain nuclear activities following the US withdrawal and underscores the failure of multilateral diplomacy and the security regime resulting from the US’s departure from the deal.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 S. Khan, The Iran Nuclear Deal, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50196-8_3

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As analyzed in the previous chapter, the Iran nuclear deal, which was a diplomatic agreement between Iran and the P5+1 countries— the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany—aimed to limit Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for lifting economic sanctions. Building on the discussion of the terms of the JCPOA in the previous chapter, this chapter comprehensively examines these terms from the perspective of the Trump administration. The aim is to understand the administration’s justification for its exit policy and its assessment of the flaws in the 2015 nuclear deal. The unwavering dedication of diplomats in negotiating and maintaining a deal underwent a sudden and drastic transformation with a single decision made by the new US administration. “Months of intense negotiations with the Europeans to keep the accord in place collapsed over Mr. Trump’s insistence that the limits placed by the agreement on Iran’s nuclear fuel production were inadequate. Under the provisions of the deal, those limits, or “sunset clauses,” were to expire in 2030 — 15 years after the deal was signed.”1 This deal was absolutely unacceptable to the Trump administration. Thus, in 2018, the US withdrew from the deal, which led to the deal’s collapse and the reimposition of economic sanctions on Iran. Despite this setback, all parties to the deal are still part of it. This means that the deal has somehow managed to hold together without the US. Iran has, however, fallen short of its obligations concerning uranium enrichment, which represents a deviation from the terms set forth in the JCPOA. This non-compliance with agreed-upon limits on uranium enrichment has contributed to heightened tensions and raised concerns regarding the JCPOA’s implementation. The question of Iran’s adherence to its nuclear commitments has been a source of disagreement in the global arena and has had a substantial impact on the direction of diplomatic endeavors and discussions pertaining to the JCPOA.

US Withdrawal from the Nuclear Deal President Trump made the decision to withdraw the United States from the JCPOA in May 2018. He subsequently signed a presidential memorandum to reintroduce all US sanctions that had been lifted or waived in connection with the Iran deal. This action was at odds with United 1 Mark Landler, “Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned,” The New York Times, May 18, 2018.

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Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2231, which called for the promotion and facilitation of “the development of normal economic and trade contacts and cooperation with Iran” as a crucial component of the JCPOA. President Trump condemned the agreement from the start of his presidency. His behavior and motives were predictable. First, Trump tried to implement his campaign promises of 2016. Second, he wanted to reverse every achievement of President Obama. Third, he rejected international, mainly multilateral agreements, like the Paris climate accord, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and NAFTA among the US, Canada, and Mexico.2 All these three criteria apply to the JCPOA: during the election campaign in 2016 Trump called the agreement “the worst deal ever;” the JCPOA has been negotiated during Obama’s presidency; and the JCPOA is a multilateral agreement.3 In his speech on May 8, 2018, Trump highlighted several significant concerns with the JCPOA. His primary contention was that the Iran nuclear deal had fundamental flaws. He argued that the agreement was so poorly negotiated that even if Iran fully complied, and the regime could still approach the threshold of nuclear weapons capability in a relatively short time. Trump emphasized that the deal, in exchange for lifting crippling economic sanctions on Iran, imposed very weak limits on the regime’s nuclear activities. He further pointed out that as key restrictions faded away within just a few years, and Iran could rapidly advance toward acquiring nuclear weapons. The president also underscored that the JCPOA failed to effectively curb Iran’s destabilizing activities, including its support for terrorism. In his view, it was impossible to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear bomb under the existing agreement, which he characterized as decayed and ineffective. Related to the above are the following quotes of Donald Trump4 :

2 The follow-up agreement to NAFTA, known as USMCA, is rather a double bilateral

deal than a multilateral one. 3 Heinz Gartner, “The Vienna Negotiations on Iran’s Nuclear Program: The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),” Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, Ifrane, June 21–23, 2023. 4 Salvador Rizzo and Meg Kelly, “Fact-Checking President Trump’s Reasons for Leaving the Iran Nuclear Deal,” The Washington Post, May 9, 2018.

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In fact, the deal allowed Iran to continue enriching uranium and — over time — reach the brink of a nuclear breakout. … The agreement was so poorly negotiated that even if Iran fully complies, the regime can still be on the verge of a nuclear breakout in just a short period of time. The deal’s sunset provisions are totally unacceptable. … If we do nothing, we know exactly what will happen. In just a short period of time, the world’s leading state sponsor of terror will be on the cusp of acquiring the world’s most dangerous weapons. This disastrous deal gave this regime — and it’s a regime of great terror — many billions of dollars, some of it in actual cash — a great embarrassment to me as a citizen and to all citizens of the United States. At the heart of the Iran deal was a giant fiction that a murderous regime desired only a peaceful nuclear energy program. Today, we have definitive proof that this Iranian promise was a lie. Last week, Israel published intelligence documents long concealed by Iran, conclusively showing the Iranian regime and its history of pursuing nuclear weapons. In the years since the deal was reached, Iran’s military budget has grown by almost 40 percent — while its economy is doing very badly.

These quotes from Trump’s speech underscore his concerns about the fundamental flaws of the JCPOA, its limited restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, and the lack of provisions addressing Iran’s other destabilizing activities.

Trump’s Overinflated Concerns Trump expressed concerns that approximately seven years after 2018, the nuclear deal would expire, potentially allowing Iran to proceed with the development of nuclear weapons. However, it is important to note that Trump and his supporters may not have fully grasped a fundamental fact: the JCPOA’s prohibition on Iran’s nuclear weapons development does not have a “sunset” clause. Additionally, Iran has committed itself to other international agreements, such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which also explicitly forbids the development of nuclear weapons. Iran is a signatory to the NPT and has pledged to ratify the IAEA’s Additional Protocol in 2023. The NPT effectively bars Iran from ever pursuing nuclear weapons, while the Additional Protocol grants international inspectors extensive access to monitor nuclear-related activities

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conducted within Iran’s borders.5 Regrettably, critics of the JCPOA, including Trump, believed that despite these existing agreements, and Iran could potentially work toward nuclear weapons development under the guise of pursuing peaceful objectives, such as a nuclear energy program. Trump suggested that the Iran nuclear deal includes provisions that gradually lift restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities and uranium enrichment levels, with these provisions having sunset clauses ranging from 10 to 25 years.6 The president argued that this gradual easing of restrictions could enable Iran to eventually attain nuclear weapons capability, rendering the JCPOA ineffective. However, supporters of the Iran deal contested this assertion, stating that, at a minimum, the JCPOA provides a period during which significant constraints are placed on Iran’s nuclear activities, spanning from 10 to 25 years. They argue that without the JCPOA, Iran might expedite its nuclear weapons development on a shorter timeline than what Trump considered inadequate. The proponents’ argument holds considerable significance for two primary reasons: building trust and buying time. The JCPOA had the potential to function as a confidence-building measure between the United States and Iran, two historical adversaries. If the agreement had been implemented as intended, it could have gradually cultivated trust between the involved parties. Even with the presence of sunset clauses, Iran might have been incentivized to uphold the deal if it experienced the benefits of this evolving relationship. Over time, the establishment of trust could have opened the door to cooperation in other areas, which Iran would be hesitant to jeopardize, even if the deal eventually expired and there was an opportunity to pursue nuclear weapons. Along the same lines, President Obama responded to Trump’s announcement, “Even as some of the provisions in the JCPOA do become less strict with time, this won’t happen until ten, fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five years into the deal, so there is little reason to put those restrictions at risk today.”7 This suggests that the JCPOA 5 Salvador Rizzo and Meg Kelly, “Fact-Checking President Trump’s Reasons for Leaving the Iran Nuclear Deal,” The Washington Post, May 9, 2018. 6 For a detailed information on the sunset clause, see Mark Fitzpatrick, Uncertain Future: The JCPOA and Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Program (London: Routledge, 2019). 7 Mike Calia, “‘A Serious Mistake’: Read Barak Obama’s Statement on President Trump’s Decision to Pull Out of the Iran Nuclear Deal,” CNBC, May 8, 2018.

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yielded benefits within its specific timeframe, acknowledging that the future remains uncertain. Therefore, why not grant Iran the opportunity to uphold the agreement’s terms at present and monitor how circumstances evolve over time? Allowing Iran the necessary time and space to comply with the deal’s provisions offers a chance to evaluate the resulting outcomes and progress. This approach paves the way for fostering trust, assessing Iran’s commitment, and potentially exploring broader collaboration across various areas beyond the nuclear issue. Adopting a patient stance recognizes the inherent unpredictability of tomorrow’s challenges and developments. Instead of prematurely assuming negative outcomes, it advocates for a pragmatic and measured assessment of Iran’s actions and intentions. It also acknowledges the potential for positive developments and the preservation of a constructive relationship. Such an approach may dissuade Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons, particularly if it witnesses the benefits of engagement and cooperation under the agreement’s framework.

A Wrong Decision by Trump? President Trump’s choice to withdraw from the JCPOA without taking into account the possible advantages of allowing Iran time to comply with the agreement demonstrates a lack of strategic foresight. By not thoroughly exploring the potential outcomes of sustained engagement, Trump may have overlooked the chance to use the agreement as a means to build trust and nurture a more constructive relationship with Iran. From a strategic perspective, providing Iran with an opportunity to adhere to the deal’s terms and monitoring progress in the future could have offered several benefits. Firstly, it could have established a track record for verifying Iran’s compliance and commitment to its obligations. This track record could have served as a foundation for further negotiations and potential concessions from Iran on other critical issues, such as regional conflicts and terrorism. Secondly, upholding the JCPOA could have provided a platform for ongoing dialogue and diplomatic engagement. The communication channels established through the agreement could have been used to address concerns, resolve disputes, and explore cooperation in other areas of mutual interest beyond the nuclear issue. Furthermore, a commitment to the JCPOA could have garnered support and cooperation from international partners who were parties to the agreement. By collaborating to hold Iran accountable and address

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potential violations collectively, the US could have bolstered its position and exerted more significant influence on Iran’s behavior. However, President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the agreement without fully considering these potential benefits suggests a more unilateral and confrontational approach. This lack of strategic thinking may have led to missed opportunities for dialogue, cooperation, and long-term stability in the region. It is essential to note that this analysis is based on an evaluation of the strategic implications and does not investigate the broader political considerations and objectives that shaped President Trump’s decision-making process. Amid widespread speculation and intense diplomatic efforts by European nations, Donald Trump made a decision of immense significance during his unorthodox presidency by reinstating U.S. sanctions on Iran. This deliberate and provocative step directly contravened the 2015 nuclear agreement. Trump’s disregard for the United States’ commitment to the accord effectively set it on a course toward imminent collapse. As a result, this action cleared the path for Iran to resume its nuclear program without any limitations and introduced unpredictable escalatory tensions into an already volatile Middle East region.8 In this quote, “This disastrous deal gave this regime — and it’s a regime of great terror — many billions of dollars, some of it in actual cash — a great embarrassment to me as a citizen and to all citizens of the United States,”9 Donald Trump expressed his strong opposition to the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. In the cited statement, President Trump employed strong rhetoric to condemn the JCPOA, labeling it a “disastrous deal.” It is essential to recognize that this characterization is inherently subjective and mirrors the stance of his administration, which was not universally supported. Trump’s mention of the financial aspects of the JCPOA, notably the release of Iranian assets and a specific cash payment, is indeed grounded in factual accuracy, but benefits from additional context. Crucially, the funds that were unfrozen were not fresh funds, but rather Iranian assets that had been frozen due to international sanctions. The reference to “actual cash” pertained to a specific 8 Susanne Maloney, “After Dumping the Nuclear Deal, Trump Has No Strategy for Iran,” Washington, DC: Brookings, May 9, 2018. 9 Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—The White House. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presid ent-trump-joint-comprehensive-plan-action/.

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payment unrelated to the JCPOA, linked to a long-standing financial dispute dating back to the late 1970s, not connected to the nuclear agreement. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the primary focus of the JCPOA was to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, rather than addressing broader issues like Iran’s regional activities or its human rights record. Trump’s characterization of the Iranian government as a “regime of great terror” reflects the perspective of his administration, but falls short of encapsulating the intricate dynamics of Iran’s role in the region. His expression of embarrassment as a US citizen regarding the deal represents his personal opinion, and it is important to note that public sentiment on the JCPOA was divided, indicative of contrasting viewpoints concerning its effectiveness and concessions. Ultimately, this statement underscores the contentious nature of the JCPOA and the multitude of perspectives surrounding it. The quote in question, despite its strong language, contained inaccuracies and subjective viewpoints within Trump’s arguments. The JCPOA was designed to tackle the specific concern of Iran’s nuclear program and was widely regarded as a means to prevent further nuclear proliferation in the region. Characterizing it solely as a “disastrous deal” or a “great embarrassment” oversimplifies the intricate nature of the agreement and its far-reaching implications. The JCPOA represented a nuanced and multifaceted diplomatic effort aimed at addressing complex global security challenges. It was not without its controversies, but it sought to provide a framework for managing Iran’s nuclear activities and fostering international stability. The notable increase in Iran’s military budget, approximately 40%, raises legitimate concerns, particularly in terms of regional stability and security. Critics of the JCPOA have contended that the sanctions relief provided to Iran could potentially enable the country to allocate more resources to its military and potentially support proxy groups in the region. However, it is crucial to clarify that this increase in military spending lacks a direct link to the JCPOA. President Trump’s statement implies a direct correlation between the JCPOA and Iran’s expanded military budget, which oversimplifies the situation. The growth in Iran’s military budget can be influenced by various factors, including regional security considerations and domestic priorities. Additionally, Trump’s assertion that Iran’s economy was “doing very badly” following the deal oversimplifies a complex situation. While Iran did face economic challenges, it is essential to consider a broader context. Economic difficulties

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were partially rooted in pre-existing issues like mismanagement, corruption, and the impact of international sanctions that were in place before the JCPOA. Moreover, the U.S. withdrawal from the deal and the subsequent reimposition of sanctions significantly exacerbated Iran’s economic woes. This decision undermined the economic benefits Iran was supposed to receive under the JCPOA, discouraged international trade and investment with Iran, and resulted in economic contraction and currency devaluation. In sum, President Trump’s statement highlights the intricate nature of the situation and the mixed consequences of the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. While concerns about Iran’s military budget growth are valid, attributing all of Iran’s economic challenges to the deal overlooks other contributing factors and the adverse effects of the US’s own actions. This analysis underscores the importance of considering a broader range of factors when evaluating the impact of complex international agreements. President Trump’s statement that “the deal does nothing to constrain Iran’s destabilizing activities, including its support for terrorism” reflected his belief that the JCPOA did not adequately address Iran’s broader regional behavior and actions beyond its nuclear program. However, it is important to examine this statement in a balanced manner, taking into account both sides of the argument. The JCPOA’s primary objective was to address concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program and prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. Consequently, it did not directly target Iran’s regional activities or its support for terrorist groups. Critics of the deal argue that this focus on nuclear issues may have allowed Iran to continue its destabilizing actions. They contend that by not addressing these other concerns, and the JCPOA may have inadvertently provided Iran with resources to further pursue its regional activities. The deliberate limitation of the JCPOA’s scope to nuclear matters was a strategic decision aimed at achieving a focused and attainable agreement. Negotiating a comprehensive deal that encompassed Iran’s broader regional behavior, support for terrorism, and human rights violations would have been considerably more challenging and might not have resulted in any agreement at all. Supporters of the JCPOA argued that by concentrating on the nuclear issue, the deal had the potential to deescalate tensions and reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation in the region. They believed that resolving the nuclear matter could create opportunities for future diplomatic engagement to address other concerns. Critics also maintained that the US’s withdrawal from the

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JCPOA and the reimposition of sanctions had actually made it more challenging to address Iran’s destabilizing activities. By abandoning the deal, the U.S. lost its ability to monitor and verify Iran’s nuclear program, and the subsequent economic pressure may have incentivized Iran to intensify its regional actions in response. Trump’s statement highlights the complexities of addressing Iran’s multifaceted behavior and the strategic choices made in the negotiation of the JCPOA. It also underscores the broader implications of the US withdrawal from the agreement on regional dynamics and diplomatic efforts. Additionally, Trump’s statement oversimplifies the complexities of the issues at hand. While it is accurate that the JCPOA was not designed to directly tackle Iran’s regional activities, this was not its intended purpose. Expecting a nuclear agreement to resolve broader regional concerns, such as Iran’s support for terrorism, is unrealistic and places an undue burden on a single accord. Moreover, this perspective overlooks the potential positive consequences of resolving the nuclear issue and establishing diplomatic channels with Iran. It disregards the possibility that the JCPOA could have served as a foundation for future negotiations on other matters of concern. By fixating solely on perceived flaws in the deal, it dismisses the progress made in preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. The key point here is that while the statement highlights a valid concern about the JCPOA’s limited scope; it fails to recognize the intricacies of diplomacy and the potential advantages of initially addressing the nuclear issue. It oversimplifies a nuanced situation and disregards the broader implications of the US withdrawal from the agreement. To effectively address Iran’s destabilizing activities, a multifaceted and comprehensive approach is needed, surpassing the scope of a single nuclear accord. Donald Trump and other critics of the JCPOA contended that the nuclear deal fell short in addressing Iran’s missile proliferation. This critique, shared by opponents of the agreement, was a prominent argument against the JCPOA, particularly during the Trump administration’s tenure. While the primary focus of the JCPOA was on Iran’s nuclear program, critics maintained that the deal should have incorporated provisions to tackle Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and its regional activities. This aspect of the criticism underscores a perceived gap in the JCPOA’s

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scope, with opponents advocating for a more comprehensive approach that includes Iran’s missile development and its broader regional role.10 Evidence supporting this criticism includes: Missile Testing: Despite the JCPOA being in effect, Iran continued to conduct ballistic missile tests. These tests were seen as a clear demonstration of Iran’s determination to advance its missile program, raising concerns among countries in the region and beyond. UN Resolution 2231: The UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA, included language calling on Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. However, this language was not legally binding and did not impose punitive measures for noncompliance. Iranian Statements: Iranian officials repeatedly asserted that their ballistic missile program was non-negotiable and separate from the nuclear deal. They argued that the program was essential for Iran’s defense and deterrence against potential adversaries in the region. Regional Concerns: Iran’s neighbors, particularly countries like Israel and Saudi Arabia, expressed deep concerns over Iran’s ballistic missile program. They viewed the program as a threat to regional stability and security and criticized the JCPOA for not addressing this critical issue. US Government Reports: The US State Department’s annual report on global terrorism consistently mentioned Iran’s support for terrorism and its development and testing of ballistic missiles. These reports highlighted the need for stronger measures to address these non-nuclear activities. Despite these concerns, proponents of the JCPOA correctly argued that addressing Iran’s ballistic missile program was beyond the scope of the

10 Mark Fitzpatrick, Uncertain Future: The JCPOA and Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs (London: Routledge, 2019).

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nuclear deal.11 The contention over missile-related issues during negotiations presented a significant challenge, potentially jeopardizing the entire agreement on Iran’s nuclear program. While the JCPOA effectively dealt with the nuclear aspect, it notably lacked specific provisions to curtail Iran’s ballistic missile development. Critics cited Iran’s continuous missile testing and regional involvement as evidence that the agreement had shortcomings in this area. However, supporters of the JCPOA emphasized that the deal’s primary goal was to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.12 Addressing ballistic missiles would have necessitated a separate and potentially more complex negotiation process. Consequently, negotiating missile-related concerns within the same agreement could have risked the overall success of the JCPOA, highlighting the delicate balance that negotiators had to strike between these intertwined but distinct issues. Proponents of the JCPOA had several key justifications for the deal’s primary focus on Iran’s nuclear program13 and its decision not to address Iran’s ballistic missile program directly. These points merit consideration, but they are also subject to interpretation and debate: Scope of the Agreement: Proponents emphasized that the JCPOA had a specific scope, which was solely focused on curbing Iran’s nuclear activities to prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons. Negotiating a comprehensive agreement that encompassed Iran’s ballistic missile program and regional activities would have likely made reaching any deal much more challenging, potentially leading to no agreement at all. In this sense, focusing on the nuclear issue was seen as a pragmatic approach. Achievability: Addressing Iran’s ballistic missile program would have been a complex and contentious task. Iran considers its missile capabilities as integral to its national defense and security posture, making it a non-negotiable aspect for them. Attempting to include ballistic 11 See Mark Fitzpatrick, Uncertain Future: The JCPOA and Iran’s Nuclear and Missile

Programs (London: Routledge, 2019). 12 “The Historic Deal That Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon,” The White House, President Barak Obama. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/for eign-policy/iran-deal. 13 Robert Einhorn, “Debating the Iran Nuclear Deal: A Former American Negotiator Outlines the Battleground Issues,” Washington, DC: Brookings, August 12, 2015.

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missiles in the JCPOA might have resulted in an impasse, making it more difficult to achieve the critical goal of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Leveraging Trust-Building: The JCPOA was viewed by proponents as a confidence-building measure. By successfully addressing the nuclear issue, it was hoped that trust could be built over time, leading to further diplomatic engagement on other concerns, including ballistic missiles. The agreement’s implementation would create a framework for continued dialogue and negotiation. International Consensus: The JCPOA was the result of extensive negotiations involving multiple parties, including the United States, European countries, China, Russia, and Iran. Focusing on Iran’s nuclear program garnered consensus among these nations, facilitating a united approach to prevent nuclear proliferation. It is crucial to acknowledge here that the justification of these arguments is inherently subjective, and critics of the JCPOA indeed had valid concerns.14 They contended that Iran’s ballistic missile program and regional activities were intricately connected to its nuclear aspirations and had the potential to undermine regional security. Critics argued that by omitting these issues from the agreement, Iran might exploit its missile capabilities to indirectly advance its nuclear agenda. The key conclusion here is that proponents’ arguments were grounded in the specific objectives and scope of the JCPOA, which aimed primarily to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, critics voiced apprehensions regarding the potential consequences of not addressing Iran’s ballistic missile program within the agreement. The ongoing debate underscores the intricate nature of international diplomacy and the challenges associated with balancing immediate objectives against broader regional security concerns.

14 Mark Fitzpatrick, Uncertain Future: The JCPOA and Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs (London: Routledge, 2019).

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Major Consequences of the Withdrawal Following the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran adopted a patient approach, refraining from immediate action for nearly a year. However, in May 2019, Iranian President Rouhani announced that Tehran would cease complying with certain aspects of the JCPOA if its banking sector was not shielded from US sanctions within a 60day period. Representatives of the remaining signatories expressed their continued support for the agreement and urged Iran to maintain its compliance with the JCPOA, as it had done previously, and avoid any escalatory measures. President Trump stated his willingness to negotiate a new deal, emphasizing that his objective was the elimination of all nuclear weapons, rather than regime change. However, by July 2019, Iran began to violate the terms of the 2015 agreement. Iran stored more low-enriched uranium than permitted, exceeded the predetermined 3.67% enrichment limit, and initiated testing of an excessive number of advanced centrifuges.15 President Hassan Rouhani expressed his willingness to return to negotiations with President Trump if the US administration agreed to lift sanctions and return to the 2015 agreement. Nonetheless, it was evident that Iran was not rushing to propose renegotiations, and the situation remained complex and contentious. By December of that year, President Rouhani publicly announced that Iran was testing new advanced centrifuges—further violating the terms of the JCPOA. European countries continued to criticize Iran’s violations, but insisted that the JCPOA was still valid. In January of the following year, Iran announces that it will no longer abide by the 2015 restrictions on the enrichment of uranium and on the limit to its operational centrifuges. By the end of the year, the IAEA announced that Iran had enriched 12 times the amount of enriched uranium permitted by the 2015 nuclear deal. Experts warned that Iran’s stockpile could produce two nuclear bombs if it were to be enriched to 90%. That was in 2020 and, since then, more than three years have passed. The principal highlights of 2021 were that in February, Iran suspended its compliance with the “Iran Rejects Deadlines, ‘Politically Motivated’ Claims in Nuclear Talks,”16 and

15 Mark Fitzpatrick, Uncertain Future: The JCPOA and Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs (London: Routledge, 2019). 16 Reuters, February 11, 2022.

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voluntary “Additional Protocol,” which allowed the IAEA snap inspections. That meant that IAEA could not inspect the Iranian sites anymore when required. White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki states, “Under the Iran nuclear deal, Iran’s nuclear program was tightly constrained and monitored by international inspectors.”17 By March, IAEA reported that Iran had been unable to justify the presence of uranium particles at an undeclared site that had previously been flagged by Israeli and American officials as a possible secret nuclear warehouse. This led to more developments. By July of 2021, Iran started to produce enriched uranium metal that could be used in the core of nuclear weapons. The IAEA reported in the summer of that year that Iran had already produced 200 grams of uranium metal that was enriched to 20%. In three years, Iran accumulated enough enriched uranium which will enable it to construct a number of bombs if its leaders choose to purify the heavy metal to the 90% level, typically used in weapons. Tehran has not only returned to enriching to 20%, but has for the first time gone to 60%, a level of purity the IAEA says is technically indistinguishable from weapons-grade fuel. International inspectors reported that as of February 16, Iran had stockpiled about 2,670 kilograms of uranium enriched from 2% to 5%, 182 kilograms of the material enriched to 20% purity, and 33 kilograms enriched to 60%.18 It has been stated by some that “Iran is likely to have enriched its uranium to 80 per cent—10 per cent away from making it viable for

17 Katherine Fung, “White House ‘Worries’ Iran Could Be Nuclear Weapon Ready in Weeks,” Newsweek, April 26, 2022. 18 “The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action at a Glance,” The Arms Control Association provides a concise overview of the key provisions and benefits of the JCPOA, including its impact on non-proliferation and regional stability. https://www.armscontrol. org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance; “Why the Iran Nuclear Deal Is Still Important,” This article of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace discusses the ongoing significance of the JCPOA and its implications for nuclear non-proliferation, diplomacy, and regional stability. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/09/19/why-iran-nuclear-deal-is-still-imp ortant-pub-79829; “The Importance of the Iran Nuclear Deal for Global Security,” The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University provides an analysis of the JCPOA’s importance in preventing nuclear proliferation, reducing regional tensions, and promoting stability. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/imp ortance-iran-nuclear-deal-global-security; “The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide,” This comprehensive guide by the BBC explains the JCPOA’s background, its significance, and the potential consequences of its collapse. It provides a balanced perspective on the deal’s importance and challenges. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east33521655; “The Iran Nuclear Deal: Why It Matters,” The United Nations Office for

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a nuclear device, which could happen within months.”19 It has further been reported that “once it reached the 90 per cent threshold, the regime could become ‘a de facto nuclear state’ without doing public detonation tests or ‘announcing it in a provocative way’.”20 Iran’s nuclear activity since 2018 and its current status are analyzed in the case study chapter. Was it inevitable for Iran to alter its nuclear stance, and could this scenario have been avoided? Did Donald Trump fully understand the repercussions of withdrawing from the nuclear deal? The outcomes might have been different if the United States had honored its commitment to the agreement. Without US involvement, the deal lost much of its relevance for Iran. Consequently, while Iran’s nuclear actions are deemed unacceptable, they were somewhat expected under the prevailing circumstances. Under the original nuclear deal negotiated during the Obama administration, Iran operated under constraints that would have hindered its ability to rapidly produce sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon. In the event that Iran opted to breach the agreement and pursue nuclear bomb development, it would have required approximately 12 months or more to attain that capability. This period, referred to as the “breakout time,” provided the international community with a window to respond and implement necessary measures to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, the dynamics shifted significantly after the United States, led by the Trump administration, withdrew from the agreement. General Mark Milley, who served as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that Iran’s advancements in enhancing its technical capabilities and expanding its stockpiles have substantially shortened the breakout time.21 This development raises concerns about the international community’s ability to respond effectively to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear

Disarmament Affairs discusses the importance of the JCPOA in promoting peace and security, reinforcing the NPT, and encouraging dialogue and diplomatic solutions. https:// www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/iran. 19 Thomas Harding, “Iran’s Nuclear ‘Threshold’ Opens Window for Engagement,” The

National News, UK, June 16, 2023. 20 Thomas Harding, “Iran’s Nuclear ‘Threshold’ Opens Window for Engagement,” The National News, UK, June 16, 2023. 21 “Five Years On: Where Trump’s Iran Deal Exit Leaves Us Now,” Iran Diplomacy Works. https://irandiplomacyworks.org/5-years-on-where-trumps-iran-deal-exit-leaves-usnow/.

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weapons. In March 2023, General Milley stated22 that Iran could now potentially produce the necessary fissile material for a nuclear weapon in less than two weeks. Moreover, he added that they would only require a few more months to complete the actual construction of a nuclear weapon.23 The original Iran nuclear deal included stringent restrictions on Iran’s nuclear facilities and the quantity and types of centrifuges they were permitted to possess for uranium enrichment. These restrictions were designed to ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and to subject it to rigorous international monitoring. General Mark Milley’s testimony underscores the profound ramifications of the United States’ withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal on Iran’s potential nuclear weapons development. While the initial agreement had safeguards in place to impede rapid weaponization, the removal of these restrictions has empowered Iran to advance its nuclear program and substantially reduce the time required for fissile material production. This development elicits grave concerns within the international community regarding regional stability and the potential for nuclear proliferation. The shortened breakout time may limit available response options to forestall Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon, underscoring the critical importance of diplomatic efforts and international cooperation. It is worth noting that the information is derived from General Mark Milley’s congressional testimony in March 2023, and the situation may have evolved since then. Nevertheless, this statement highlights the intricate and delicate nature of global nuclear agreements and non-proliferation endeavors. President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and openly violate its provisions has had consequences24 that extend beyond mere advantages for Tehran, deeply affecting the United States in several adverse ways. The decision has had several negative implications for the 22 “Five Years On: Where Trump’s Iran Deal Exit Leaves Us Now,” Iran Diplomacy Works. https://irandiplomacyworks.org/5-years-on-where-trumps-iran-deal-exit-leaves-usnow/. 23 “Five Years On: Where Trump’s Iran Deal Exit Leaves Us Now,” Iran Diplomacy Works. https://irandiplomacyworks.org/5-years-on-where-trumps-iran-deal-exit-leaves-usnow/. 24 Yusa Djuyandi, Shafa Ghaisani Salsabila Brahmantika, and Bima Riandy Tarigan, “The Collapse of Global Governance: When the US Leaves the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),” DOAJ , 9(2), December 2021, pp. 504–521. https://doaj.org/article/ 53982a6f5d4a47d3a6f0a346628dae15.

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US on both a diplomatic and practical level.25 Firstly, the withdrawal has led to the isolation of the United States, casting it as the disruptor of a multilateral agreement. By diverging from an international accord endorsed by multiple nations, the US has eroded its reputation as a reliable negotiating partner, especially in dealings with Iran. This breach of trust may reverberate beyond the Iran issue, potentially impacting the US’s credibility in other diplomatic negotiations. Secondly, the move has created a schism between the US and its European allies, who vehemently oppose the decision. This division weakens the transatlantic alliance and complicates efforts to address global challenges collaboratively. As Payam Mohseni stated on the consequences of Trump’s decision that it “greatly undermines US national interests by eroding its credibility, by splitting the United States from its European allies and the international community, by upending an agreement that effectively blocked Iran’s nuclear aspirations at the weapons level, and by wasting billions of dollars of political, financial, and human capital the United States invested to reach the JCPOA.”26 Thirdly, the withdrawal has presented Iran with an opportunity to foster closer collaboration with Europe, Russia, and China, establishing arrangements that exclude the United States— an aspect central to the book’s theory. This isolation serves to further diminish the US’s influence and leverage over Iran, impairing its capacity to shape regional developments. Additionally, by forsaking the JCPOA, the US has enabled Iran to potentially evade the rigorous restrictions and robust monitoring mechanisms that were previously enforced under the agreement. This prospect raises concerns about the possibility of a less constrained Iranian nuclear program, thereby heightening apprehensions about regional stability and non-proliferation endeavors, as mentioned earlier. The decision has placed the US in a challenging predicament. Seeking additional sanctions against Iran may encounter resistance from the international community, which acknowledges Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA. Such resistance could undermine the effectiveness of US sanctions and grant Iran greater economic and diplomatic maneuverability.

25 Steven E. Miller, “Consequences of the US Withdrawal from the JCPOA,” Belfour Center for Science and International Affairs, May 16, 2018. 26 Payam Mohseni, “Consequences of the US Withdrawal from the JCPOA,” Belfour Center for Science and International Affairs, May 16, 2018.

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The withdrawal has also introduced the possibility of US sanctions gradually losing their effectiveness over time while Iran’s nuclear program continues its advancement. This scenario could escalate regional tensions and heighten the risk of nuclear proliferation. Most significantly, the decision marks a return to a primarily confrontational approach, reminiscent of past years when such an approach failed to impede Iran’s nuclear progress—an issue explored in the final section of the chapter. “…it marks a turning point in the post-revolutionary history of modern Iran as the first major bitter experience of the country’s youth with the United States and the first direct public negotiation with America--inflaming Iranian nationalism, undermining the value of engaging the West, and shifting the domestic discourse to a hardline position. This was a gift to Ayatollah Khamenei as it undermines the platform of moderate President Rouhani, claiming he was right to tell everyone not to trust the Americans. Now Khamenei will turn to undermine the credibility of the Europeans by turning all eyes on the EU powers, before Iran uses the U.S. violation and withdrawal of the agreement to move beyond the deal.”27 It ignores the potential benefits of diplomatic engagement and multilateral agreements, which the JCPOA had represented. “Trump’s decision undermines the value and significance of multilateralism and international institutions, especially those operating towards the global nuclear non-proliferation regime such as the IAEA.”28 The choice to withdraw from the JCPOA, thus, had extensive consequences, impacting the United States’ global reputation, regional dynamics, and the efficacy of addressing Iran’s nuclear program. The decision encountered substantial criticism and engendered apprehensions regarding the future of US-Iran relations and the stability of the region.

27 Payam Mohseni, “Consequences of the US Withdrawal from the JCPOA,” Belfour Center for Science and International Affairs, May 16, 2018. Also, see Susanne Maloney, “After Dumping the Nuclear Deal, Trump has No Strategy for Iran,” Washington, DC: Brookings, May 9, 2018. 28 Payam Mohseni, “Consequences of the US Withdrawal from the JCPOA,” Belfour Center for Science and International Affairs, May 16, 2018.

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At the Core of the Mistake The United States’ decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal with Iran represents a missed opportunity for improving relations with a longstanding adversary. Maintaining commitment to the agreement could have paved the way for the US to engage with Iran on broader fronts beyond security concerns, potentially facilitating the development of a more comprehensive relationship. Such an approach might have catalyzed constructive changes in the long-standing conflict between the two nations, ultimately contributing to global and regional peace. The agreement’s core objective was to curtail Iran’s nuclear program, offering sanctions relief as an incentive to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons while also granting access to the global economy. It represented a pivotal opportunity for the United States and Iran to discover common ground and endeavor toward enhanced relations. Through diplomatic dialogue and strict adherence to the agreement’s stipulations, both nations had the prospect of establishing trust and pursuing collaboration across a range of areas extending beyond security concerns. This broader engagement could have encompassed economic partnerships, cultural exchanges, and the diplomatic resolution of regional issues, fostering a more multifaceted and constructive relationship between the two countries. The backing for this viewpoint is substantiated by the constructive developments observed during the initial stages of the JCPOA’s implementation. Following the agreement’s signing, there was a discernible enhancement in diplomatic exchanges and dialogues between the United States and Iran, as detailed in the case study chapter. Both nations collaborated on implementing the agreement, and some areas of shared interest were explored. However, the dynamic took a turn when the United States opted to withdraw from the JCPOA in May 2018 and reinstated sanctions against Iran. This decision strained relations between the two countries, escalating tensions and reverting to a more confrontational approach, a scenario that had been anticipated. As Gary Samore stated in 2018, “President Trump thinks he can crash the nuclear deal, reimpose international economic sanctions, and force Iran to negotiate a better deal. He is mistaken. For now, Iran will try to salvage the JCPOA with the other parties to the deal (the Europeans, Russia, and China), promising to retain nuclear constraints if the other parties give assurances that they

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will resist secondary US sanctions. Over time, however, as secondary sanctions reduce the flow of economic benefits to Iran, Iran will threaten to unwind nuclear constraints under the JCPOA.”29 The case study chapter illuminates the substantial shift in Iran’s attitude toward the United States within just one year of Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA. This shift had the consequential effect of severely constraining opportunities for expanded cooperation and engagement across various domains. If the United States had upheld its commitment to the JCPOA, it could have leveraged the diplomatic channels established by the agreement to tackle additional areas of concern. Through ongoing dialogue and heightened interactions, there was the potential for gradual, positive transformations in the broader relationship between the United States and Iran. This evolution might have served to diminish hostilities and contribute to enhanced regional stability over time. Indeed, it is crucial to emphasize that the geopolitical complexities and deep-seated historical grievances between the United States and Iran have long made diplomatic efforts exceptionally challenging. Nevertheless, the JCPOA represented a critical framework to commence addressing these challenges in a constructive manner. Although the ultimate fate of the deal remains uncertain, the experience of diplomatic engagement facilitated by the JCPOA underscores the paramount significance of dialogue and negotiation in effectively managing conflicts and advancing the cause of peace within the region.

Summary This chapter investigated the intricacies of the US decision, under President Donald Trump’s administration, to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, JCPOA, in May 2018. It dissects the arguments put forth by the Trump administration to justify this withdrawal, emphasizing the purported failures of the JCPOA in addressing Iran’s ballistic missile program, its support for terrorism, and regional conflicts. The chapter conducts a comprehensive analysis of key JCPOA terms, scrutinizing them from the perspective of the Trump administration, thereby shedding light on the connection between their exit policy and perceived flaws in the 2015 nuclear deal. It also examines the US’s subsequent actions, 29 Gary Samore, “Consequences of the US Withdrawal from the JCPOA,” Belfour Center for Science and International Affairs, May 16, 2018.

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such as the reimposition of sanctions and efforts to eliminate Iran’s oil exports, and their implications for Iranian nuclear politics. Furthermore, the chapter underscores the immediate consequences of the US withdrawal, including Iran’s resumption of certain nuclear activities, while also providing insights into the broader repercussions for multilateral diplomacy and the global security regime. Overall, this chapter offers a detailed exploration of the US’s withdrawal from the JCPOA and the far-reaching global proliferation challenges it generated.

CHAPTER 4

Scholarship on the Ramifications of the Fractured Deal

This chapter conducts an analysis of existing research on the topic, encompassing the various factors that scholars have employed to comprehend Iran’s current pursuit of nuclear capabilities. Through a thorough examination of these factors and an elucidation of their scholarly significance, it underscores the limitations of these prior studies in fully grasping Iran’s renewed nuclear aspirations. By examining key works within the field, the chapter argues that while each endeavor contributes valuable insights, there remains a noticeable absence of a comprehensive theoretical framework to explain Iran’s rekindled interest in nuclear development. This absence can be attributed, in part, to the relatively recent withdrawal of the United States from the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear agreement. While current scholarship primarily offers descriptive accounts of Iran’s nuclear activities, it remains crucial to explore why the 2015 agreement has, over time, lost much of its capacity to curtail Iran’s nuclear program effectively. A comprehensive understanding is needed to unravel the reasons behind Iran’s diminishing adherence to the JCPOA and its apparent reluctance to engage in renegotiating a revised agreement. This stance persists despite the United States persistently applying its “Maximum Pressure” strategy on Iran. Equally, there is a notable gap in existing scholarship when it comes to explaining why Iran appears unfazed by its breaches of the deal’s terms. The present study draws upon prior © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 S. Khan, The Iran Nuclear Deal, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50196-8_4

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research in the realms of protracted conflict and proliferation interest. This body of work underscores that states entrenched in protracted conflicts tend to exhibit a heightened propensity for nuclear proliferation, driven by various conflict-related factors. It is argued that the inclination of potential proliferators to pursue nuclear capabilities intensifies when their conflict adversary defects or breaches a cooperative arrangement that had been established between them. By probing these critical dimensions, the current work provides a comprehensive insight into the complex dynamics influencing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, its stance on renegotiation, and its seemingly relaxed approach to JCPOA violations. Ultimately, cooperation arises when actors recognize that their policies are, or could be, in conflict. It is essential to understand that cooperation should not be seen as the absence of conflict, but rather as a mechanism for managing and addressing conflicts. Without the presence of conflict, there would be no necessity for cooperation. Therefore, when this conflict management mechanism, the cooperative arrangement, breaks down, the state of the conflict often deteriorates beyond its precooperation levels. In the realm of nuclear dynamics, a victimized state often responds with a robust “spillback” policy. The absence of any prior scholarship addressing the concept of a “spillback policy” in the context of understanding Iran’s resurgent nuclear ambitions following the fracture of the JCPOA underscores the unique value of the current study. This novel perspective enriches the understanding of Iran’s post-JCPOA nuclear trajectory. Theoretical underpinnings of this study are elaborated upon in chapters four, five, and six. One of the salient books is Europe and Iran: The Nuclear Deal and Beyond,1 where Cornelius Adebhar analyzes the importance of the nuclear deal to the European Union and Iran. He argues that The JCPOA was a function of effective multilateralism and discusses how hard the three European powers worked to bring Iran and the US on board.2 In essence, this work provides a meticulously crafted chronological analysis, tracing the nuclear negotiations‘ trajectory from the inception of the 2002-03 crisis to the historic July 2015 nuclear accord. This comprehensive examination holds particular significance for the current book, 1 Cornelius Adebhar, Europe and Iran: The Nuclear Deal and Beyond (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017). 2 Cornelius Adebahr, Europe and Iran: The Nuclear Deal and Beyond (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017).

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as it focuses on the intricacies of the JCPOA negotiation process, shedding light on the formidable challenges faced along the way. The book was published before the nuclear deal was fractured in 2018, and, consequently, it does not incorporate Iran’s renewed proliferation drive after the fractured deal. Additionally, while the book gives a detailed analysis of the efforts that made the deal possible and why the Europeans wanted Tehran to not have nuclear weapons, it does not give an account of the two non-European partners’—Russia and China’s—discreet contacts with the three European states to bring the US in the deal. The fact that the European states were the ones that brought all on board makes it evident that there has always been a less-than-cordial relationship between Russia and China with the US on the Iranian nuclear issue. The current book uses this uneasy relationship between the US on the one hand and China and Russia on the other, as well as America’s difficult relationship with the three European powers as a precipitating factor which Iran is taking advantage of in making its current renewed proliferation strides. Susanne Maloney’s book, Iran Reconsidered: The Nuclear Deal and the Quest for a New Moderation,3 focuses on Iran’s moderation possibility as a function of the nuclear deal, which is not only interesting, but something that the current book indirectly focuses on when it discusses the spill-over effects of the deal in its original form. Maloney portrays a negative picture of Tehran’s moderate behavior in the future. She argues that the Islamic Republic has been engaged in different types of reforms for most of its life, but each of those experiments pertaining to moderation has drifted away from the expected course of action. She further focuses on Iran’s revolutionary theocracy, its ideology, and institutions since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and questions whether or not the nuclear deal would be able to transform the Islamic Republic and change its turbulent relationship with the world. She asserts that Iran would not be moderate even if the deal in its original form with the US in it would be existing today.4 The present book argues the exact opposite of this. Iranian behavior toward the world also proves otherwise between 201518 period. While history may not have shown a moderate Iran since 1979, a functional nuclear deal had the potential of transforming Tehran. The 3 Suzanne Maloney, Iran Reconsidered: The Nuclear Deal and the Quest for a New Moderation (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2020). 4 Suzanne Maloney, Iran Reconsidered: The Nuclear Deal and the Quest for a New Moderation (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2020).

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need to comprehend cooperation under intractable conflicts and its effects on proliferation decisions is essential in this regard. The Iranian leadership would have no choice but to amend the turbulent relationship with the world due to Tehran’s interactions with states—including the US— on several levels. The Islamic leaders would not be able to ignore the salience of these socio-economic interactions given Iran’s economic needs and popular expectations in the country. Islamic leaders cannot overlook the significance of these socio-economic interactions, considering Iran’s economic necessities and the expectations of its populace. It would have undoubtedly taken time for a confrontational state to ease tensions and become more conciliatory. However, once trust-building measures were established, solidified, and proven reliable, Iran likely began the journey toward earning recognition from both global and regional powers. Time alone will validate this hypothesis. In March 2023, Iran concluded a deal with Saudi Arabia, a longstanding regional adversary, with the assistance of China. This agreement serves as evidence of Iran’s willingness and capability to engage in diplomacy with its archrival and adopt a more tempered approach toward it. It underscores that, when given the opportunity, Iran seeks to temper its behavior in relations with rival nations. The book, The Iran Nuclear Deal: Bombs, Bureaucrats, and Billionaires5 by Dennis C. Jett looks at the domestic actors—including nongovernmental organizations, media, and activists—and the tactics they employed to influence US policy before and after the international negotiations pertaining to the Iran nuclear deal.6 Domestic politics did indeed play a significant role both during the negotiation period and after the JCPOA was fractured in both Iran and the United States. In both countries, Iran and the US, internal political dynamics, including the influence of various interest groups, public opinion, and the role of key individuals or organizations, had a substantial impact on the negotiation process and the subsequent reactions to the deal. This influence can be seen in shaping the positions of the negotiators, the reception of the agreement by the public, and the decisions made by political leaders. The current book and Jett’s book both recognize the importance of domestic politics 5 Dennis C. Jett, The Iran Nuclear Deal: Bombs, Bureaucrats, and Billionaires (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). 6 Dennis C. Jett, The Iran Nuclear Deal: Bombs, Bureaucrats, and Billionaires (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

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in shaping the Iran nuclear deal’s trajectory. While Jett’s book focuses more on the role of domestic actors and their tactics, the present study aims to explore how the fractured deal and the related domestic political dynamics have influenced Iran’s proliferation decisions. This nuanced analysis is a valuable contribution to understanding the complex relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy in this context. While this is important and interesting because it demonstrates the very complicated connections between domestic politics and foreign policy that are often neglected by the presidents and diplomats engaged in the deals, it does not focus on the fractured deal and how that is likely to have a negative impact on Iran’s proliferation decision, which the current book attempts to understand. The current study has a distinct emphasis on understanding the consequences of the fractured JCPOA and its potential implications for Iran’s future decisions regarding nuclear proliferation. The research investigates the specifics of how this fracture has influenced Iran’s strategic choices in this regard. The book, Maximum Pressure: America’s Flight to Stop the Nuclear Deal7 by Daniel P. Ahn, provides a detailed account of the Trump administration’s efforts to stop the Iran nuclear deal, including the imposition of sanctions and the use of diplomatic pressure. It gives an in-depth analysis of Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, which was aimed at stopping Iran’s nuclear program and forcing it to renegotiate the Iran nuclear deal. The period from the early days of the Trump administration through its decision to withdraw from the deal and up to the end of Trump’s term is covered. This aligns somewhat with the themes explored in Mark Fitzpatrick and Michael Elleman, Paulina Izewicz’s book, discussed below, as both works focus on the errors made by Trump when exiting the JCPOA, grounded in flawed arguments. While their messaging bears similarities, it remains pertinent to the current study. Ahn argues that the maximum pressure strategy was a flawed one, which failed to achieve its objectives. According to him, the campaign was based on faulty assumptions about Iran’s motivations and the effectiveness of economic sanctions, and it ultimately strengthened Iran’s hardliners and undermined its moderates. He also contends that the strategy had negative consequences and it damaged the United States’ relationship with its European allies. He situates the campaign within the 7 Daniel P. Ahn, Maximum Pressure: America’s Fight to Stop the Nuclear Deal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).

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broader context of US-Iran relations and the history of US foreign policy in the Middle East.8 While this book does provide an understanding of Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, it does not provide any valuable insight on what the ramifications of that withdrawal were in the realms of Iran’s proliferation and the Iran-US rivalry, which the current book focuses on. One of the most intriguing and substantial analyses of the JCPOA’s breakdown and its underlying causes is presented by Mark Fitzpatrick and Michael Elleman, Paulina Izewicz in their book, Uncertain future: The JCPOA and Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs.9 The book presents a compelling argument that President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the JCPOA was a significant mistake. The authors, drawing on their extensive knowledge of the non-proliferation regime and technical expertise, thoroughly assess the main criticisms of the JCPOA. They highlight the effectiveness of the Procurement Channel, and a mechanism established by the JCPOA to allow Iran to procure goods and services for its limited nuclear program. Contrary to some concerns, the authors argue that this channel has successfully served as a check on Iran’s illicit nuclear procurement activities. Furthermore, the authors challenge the notion that Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs are inherently linked. They demonstrate that not all of Iran’s missiles were designed to be nuclear-capable, suggesting that separating these issues could be a more viable approach to address Iran’s actions.10 They recognize that the fate of the JCPOA remains uncertain, with its survival dependent on Iran’s actions going forward. As Iran holds the key to preserving the agreement, the international community will closely monitor the country’s adherence to its commitments under the deal. Looking at its analysis aspect, their book provides an in-depth evaluation of the JCPOA’s strengths and weaknesses, offering valuable insights into the complexities of the Iran nuclear deal and its potential implications for non-proliferation efforts. By challenging common criticisms and highlighting the effectiveness of certain mechanisms within the deal, 8 Daniel P. Ahn, Maximum Pressure: America’s Fight to Stop the Nuclear Deal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021). 9 Mark Fitzpatrick and Michael Elleman, Paulina Izewicz, Uncertain future: The JCPOA and Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs (London: Routledge, 2019). 10 Mark Fitzpatrick and Michael Elleman, Paulina Izewicz, Uncertain future: The JCPOA and Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs (London: Routledge, 2019).

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the authors present a nuanced perspective on the agreement’s significance. The analysis is crucial in the context of the JCPOA’s uncertain future, given the complexities of regional and global politics surrounding Iran’s nuclear ambitions. It underscores the delicate balance between nonproliferation objectives and Iran’s concerns regarding its nuclear program, emphasizing that diplomatic efforts and engagement are vital to achieve a sustainable resolution. According to the book, the assessment is that Trump’s decision to withdraw was a significant mistake. While not flawless, the multilateral agreement had seen Iran adhering to its commitments. Grounded in a strong grasp of non-proliferation principles and technical knowledge, the authors investigate the origins of opposition to the JCPOA and expose the factual inaccuracies in many of the politically charged criticisms directed at the accord. The book argues that the relatively obscure Procurement Channel, a facet of the JCPOA that allowed Iran to legitimately acquire goods and services for its now-restrained nuclear program, has effectively prevented Iran from illicitly procuring nuclear-related materials. Furthermore, the book establishes that Iran’s nuclear pursuits and its development of ballistic missiles are not inherently intertwined, as not all of Iran’s missiles are designed for nuclear capabilities. These facts serve as crucial foundational information for the current book. While the Iran nuclear deal persists at the moment, its long-term survival will ultimately hinge on Iran’s actions. On focus and context, the current book probes the connection between breached cooperative agreements and nuclear proliferation, suggesting that the collapse of a cooperative arrangement can lead to heightened tensions and increased proliferation efforts. The work emphasizes the magnification of a potential proliferant state’s interest in proliferation when a conflict rival defects or betrays a cooperative deal, potentially leading to more intense conflict and spill-back policies. With regard to conceptual underpinning, the current book engages with the liberal perspective on cooperation, stating that it emerges from conflicts of interest rather than peaceful coexistence. Cooperation serves as a tool for managing conflicts, and its disruption intensifies the conflict. It also discusses a specific context where nuclear proliferation serves as a response to the breakdown of cooperation and heightened conflict, resulting in a retaliatory “spillback” policy. As for scope and application, the present study focuses on the broader idea of cooperation and conflict escalation, within a variety of international relations contexts beyond just nuclear

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proliferation. The work specifically addresses nuclear proliferation as the outcome of breached cooperative agreements and its impact on conflict dynamics. In terms of policy implications, the current book explores general implications for managing conflicts and preserving cooperative agreements as a means to prevent proliferation and conflict escalation. It highlights that when cooperative mechanisms fail in the nuclear realm, and there is a tendency for victim states to respond with more aggressive nuclear policies, “spillback.” In terms of depth and analysis, the present work emphasizes on the broader theoretical framework of cooperation and conflict escalation. It has a specific focus on nuclear proliferation and how breached cooperative agreements can lead to a particular response, “spillback.” The present study focuses on the idea that a potential proliferating state’s inclination to pursue nuclear proliferation increases if its adversary, with whom it had previously established a cooperative agreement, breaches or undermines that arrangement. This breach can exacerbate the conflict between the two parties, leading to a situation where cooperation, as perceived by liberals, arises due to conflicting interests rather than their absence. Cooperation here is seen as a strategy for managing conflict rather than eradicating it. The breakdown of this cooperative mechanism intensifies the conflict beyond its state before the cooperative arrangement was made. In response, the victim state adopts a robust defensive policy, particularly in the nuclear domain. In a nut shell, while both works touch on the connection between cooperative agreements and potential nuclear proliferation, the current study has a broader theoretical context regarding cooperation and conflict management. Fitzpatrick’s book concentrates specifically on the consequences of broken cooperation agreements in the nuclear context. While both works examine the JCPOA and its intricacies regarding nuclear proliferation, they diverge in their approach to connecting the JCPOA with conflict resolution between Iran and the US. The respective studies have distinct focuses, with one concentrating on the JCPOA’s implications for non-proliferation efforts and the other, the current study, honing in on how the JCPOA influences conflict resolution dynamics as well between Iran and the US. As a result, although both studies center on the JCPOA, their core emphases are different in terms of examining the agreement’s impact.

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Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State11 by David Patrikarakos provides a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s nuclear program, its historical development, and the broader implications of nuclear ambitions for nonproliferation efforts and regional security. While not exclusively focused on the JCPOA, the book focuses on the complexities surrounding Iran’s nuclear pursuits and the various challenges it presents to the international community. Patrikarakos explores the historical context of Iran’s nuclear program, tracing its origins back to the Shah’s regime in the 1970s and the aspirations of the Islamic Republic after the 1979 revolution, and analyzes Tehran’s motivations for seeking nuclear capabilities, examining factors such as national security concerns, regional dynamics, and aspirations for regional influence. He examines the global response to Iran’s nuclear program, covering diplomatic negotiations, sanctions, and other actions to address non-proliferation worries. While not the central theme, the book acknowledges the importance of the JCPOA in diplomatically handling Iran’s nuclear pursuits and reducing its activities in exchange for eased sanctions. Additionally, the book evaluates the influence of Iran’s nuclear ambitions on regional security dynamics and the concerns of neighboring nations and global stakeholders. Both, the current work and Patrikarakos,’ share a focus on Iran’s nuclear program, but they appear to approach the subject from different angles and levels of emphasis. Looking at the focus on proliferation and conflict resolution, the current book concentrates on the interplay between conflict and cooperation in nuclear proliferation, particularly the heightened incentive for proliferation when cooperative arrangements break down due to a conflict rival’s actions. Patrikarakos’ book offers a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s nuclear program, its historical context, and the broader implications of nuclear ambitions for non-proliferation and regional security. It seems to provide a more holistic examination of Iran’s nuclear pursuits. On the theoretical versus case study approach, this work offers a theoretical framework that can be applied to multiple scenarios involving nuclear proliferation and cooperation, while Patrikarakos’ book appears to adopt a case study approach by examining Iran’s nuclear program in-depth, tracing its historical development and contextualizing it within Iran’s national security concerns, regional dynamics, and aspirations. The depth of analysis is also different. The

11 David Patrikarakos, Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State, (I.B. Taurus, 2020).

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current one emphasizes on a specific aspect of the interaction between conflict, cooperation, and proliferation and Patrikarakos’ book provides a detailed historical narrative of Iran’s nuclear program and explores various dimensions, including motivations, responses from the international community, and the impact on regional security. It must be noted that Patrikarakos’ book does not extensively examine the factors that the present study employs to comprehend Tehran’s renewed nuclear interest. It centers on international responses to Iran’s nuclear program, covering diplomatic efforts, sanctions, and countermeasures. It briefly mentions the JCPOA’s role and the impact of Iran’s nuclear ambitions on regional security. However, it does not probe the factors underlying Iran’s current nuclear pursuits, as the current study does. Instead, it concentrates on Iran’s proliferation goals and the global strategies to address them. In a nut shell, this study and Patrikarakos’ book share common ground in their exploration of Iran’s nuclear program and the international response. However, the current study is more theoretical and specific in its focus on the interaction between conflict, cooperation, and proliferation. Patrikarakos’ book offers a comprehensive historical analysis of Iran’s nuclear pursuits and the broader implications for non-proliferation and regional security. In his book, Iran’s Nuclear Program: A Study in Proliferation and Rollback,12 Farhad Rezaei offers a comprehensive examination of Iran’s nuclear program, focusing on the complex dynamics of proliferation and efforts to curb it. The book investigates the historical, political, and strategic factors that have shaped Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities. Rezaei’s work explores Iran’s motivations for developing a nuclear program, considering both domestic and international influences. It analyzes Iran’s interactions with various international agreements, including the JCPOA, to provide insights into the negotiation processes and the concessions made by Iran to address concerns about nuclear proliferation. Moreover, the book assesses the challenges and strategies involved in attempts to roll back Iran’s nuclear ambitions. It considers the implications of diplomatic efforts, sanctions, and other measures designed to curb Iran’s nuclear program. While the book doesn’t explicitly focus on the ramifications of the JCPOA’s withdrawal, it provides a foundation for understanding the broader context of Iran’s nuclear interests 12 Farhad Rezaei, Iran’s Nuclear Program: A Study in Proliferation and Rollback (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

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and the complexities of managing proliferation concerns. Throughout its pages, Rezaei’s work offers readers an extensive insight into Iran’s nuclear program, its historical evolution, and the ongoing international efforts aimed at tackling the associated proliferation concerns. By meticulously examining Iran’s interactions with the global community and exploring the nuanced details of its nuclear pursuits, the book significantly contributes to discussions surrounding non-proliferation strategies, international diplomacy, and the shifting dynamics of regional security. The current work focuses on how the interest of a potential proliferant13 in nuclear proliferation is heightened if its conflict rival abandons or undermines a cooperative agreement between them. It argues that cooperation does not necessarily mean the absence of conflict; it is a mechanism to manage conflict. When the cooperative arrangement breaks down, the conflict can escalate beyond its initial state, and the victim state might adopt a strong “spillback” policy in the nuclear realm. Comparing the current work with Farhad Rezaei’s work, it appears that while both works address aspects related to nuclear proliferation, cooperation, and conflict, and there are some key differences. The current work looks at the interaction between conflict and cooperation in the context of nuclear proliferation, particularly how the breakdown of cooperation can lead to an increased incentive for nuclear proliferation. Rezaei’s book, on the other hand, provides a broader analysis of Iran’s nuclear program, considering historical, political, and strategic factors that have influenced its proliferation ambitions. In terms of specificity and case study, there is also difference. The current one offers a theoretical framework or argument that can be applied to various situations where nuclear proliferation and cooperation are involved, such as the North Korean case. Rezaei’s book centers on the Iranian case, exploring its nuclear program, interactions with international agreements like the JCPOA, and efforts to manage proliferation. In other words, the current study focuses on a theoretical proposition that applies to various situations. Rezaei’s book takes a deeper look into the Iranian case and its specifics. Although both works touch on nuclear proliferation, cooperation, and conflict, the current book is theoretical and broadly applicable, while Rezaei’s book is more focused on a specific case, Iran, and involves in-depth research into the historical, political, and strategic dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program.

13 A state seeking to develop nuclear weapons is a potential proliferant.

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There has been a notable absence of a single comprehensive book that formulates a theoretical framework for assessing Iran’s renewed proliferation ambitions following the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA under the Trump administration. This gap in existing literature underscores the significance of the current study, as it aims to fill this void by providing a theoretical foundation for analyzing Iran’s evolving nuclear intentions and actions in the aftermath of the JCPOA’s disruption. A theoretical work provides a causal connection between the variables under consideration, enabling one to understand why a decision was or is made. However, in a descriptive work the entire focus is on what decision was made and laying out the facts of the decisions. The basic strength of the present book compared to the studies, mentioned above, lies in the fact that it provides a theoretical analysis of the current renewed Iranian nuclear drive and focuses on the salient factors that have not been investigated by scholars and policymakers. It also provides an understanding on the connection between nuclear deals on the one hand and nonproliferation and conflict resolution/termination potential on the other. This research offers a unique and valuable perspective to better understand the complex dynamics surrounding Iran’s nuclear program and its potential implications for regional and global security.

Summary Chapter three critically examines some works on Iran’s nuclear drive, highlighting their limitations in comprehending the current state of affairs with regard to Iran’s renewed nuclear ambition after the fracture of the JCPOA. It underscores the need for a theoretical explanation for Iran’s renewed nuclear interest, addressing gaps in previous scholarship. The chapter introduces the concept of spill-back policy and the role of protracted conflicts in shaping proliferation dynamics. Theoretical explanations are further developed in subsequent chapters. The intent of this chapter is not to diminish the significance of the current body of literature. Instead, it aims to draw attention to the absence of research concerning the potential role of the JCPOA in facilitating conflict resolution with the US. Furthermore, this chapter underscores the notable gap in scholarly exploration: no previous studies have investigated why the intensity of proliferation interest rises following the breakdown of a cooperative arrangement like the JCPOA.

PART II

Theory

CHAPTER 5

Cooperation, Spill-over Effects, and Integration

This chapter provides a theoretical framework for this study. It posits that cooperation on security matters, particularly nuclear proliferation, is feasible between long-standing rivals and states embroiled in protracted conflicts, given certain conducive conditions. The core premise is that sustained collaborative efforts, coupled with trust and confidencebuilding measures, can yield spill-over effects, leading to institutionalized cooperation. As cooperation becomes ingrained, non-cooperation becomes an untenable policy choice. To elucidate this central theoretical assertion, the chapter commences by focusing on the theory of functional integration within global politics, elucidating its relevance in the high-stakes realm of proliferation. Essentially, it fuses the theory of functional integration with neo-functional integration, offering insights into understanding the security dynamics among states. The chapter delineates key elements facilitating security-level integration and expounds upon the process of such integration. Emphasis is placed on the pivotal role of trust within cooperative endeavors; once parties demonstrate their trustworthiness, the initial collaborative arrangement—focused on specific objectives like non-proliferation—becomes an institutionalized norm. Over time, cooperation becomes ingrained in the political fabric of these states. Departing from this cost-effective habit, consolidated in their political systems, becomes increasingly arduous. Eventually, these actors are inclined to entertain more cooperative arrangements, with the confidence © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 S. Khan, The Iran Nuclear Deal, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50196-8_5

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that defection is unlikely. Consequently, as trust solidifies, the spill-over effects of cooperation on various fronts, including trade, communication, and transactions, come into play. The chapter underscores the role of these spill-over effects in fostering a deeper understanding between contentious parties. It contends that under circumstances where such spill-over effects are observed, states become progressively disinclined to revert to the previous stage of interstate relations that preceded their cooperative negotiations. In the context of proliferation, successful initial cooperative efforts and agreements—whether bilateral or multilateral— crafted to address non-proliferation objectives are likely to encourage further collaborative ventures among states. This spill-over effect of cooperation in other domains serves as a deterrent against proliferation, as it would jeopardize their positive relationships with cooperating states. This non-belligerent and cooperative approach to foreign and security policy is not only cost-effective, but also rational, grounded primarily in the credibility of trust forged among the concerned states. These theoretical arguments are applicable to all enduring rivals and states grappling with protracted conflicts, provided they are willing to cooperate on security matters. The above theoretical framework underscores the advantages of a cooperative framework between states engaged in conflicts. It argues that in the absence of cheating or defection during the initial phase of cooperation, it becomes an accepted and rational policy for one state in relation to another. This perspective suggests that when a cooperative arrangement is firmly established at one level; it fosters trust, making cooperation a habitual practice. States have little incentive to deviate from this habit and instead develop a positive attitude toward further cooperative endeavors on different levels. These subsequent cooperative actions represent the spill-over effects of effective cooperation at the initial level. It is important to note that building confidence takes time, and this also applies to the emergence of spill-over effects. The process leading to the first cooperative arrangement is lengthy, especially between enduring rivals, as trust and intentions are often in question. As an example, it took six years from 2009 to 2015 for the US to convince Iran of its genuine commitment to a nuclear deal. During this initial cooperative phase, states must exercise patience with each other. The longer it takes to establish trust, the more beneficial it is for future cooperative endeavors. As trust solidifies, states are less likely to make purely rational cost–benefit calculations when negotiating subsequent cooperative agreements. This reduced calculation

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is a result of the confidence already built in their interactions. Therefore, as the first deal’s expiration date approaches, there is a slim chance of the involved state failing to honor the arrangement. This is because, by that time, multiple cooperative arrangements may have been established in various domains—such as trade, communication, transactions, and socio-cultural exchanges—which states would be reluctant to jeopardize. This consistent pattern of peaceful behavior has the potential to positively transform the conflict between the original opposing states.

Functionalism and Neo-functionalism Functionalism and neo-functionalism are prominent theoretical frameworks that shed light on the dynamics of international integration. Functionalism, in essence, serves as a descriptive theory outlining the fundamental principles governing the process of international integration. It contends that the contemporary international landscape is characterized by divisions stemming from conflicts revolving around seemingly elusive objectives, such as nationalism and high politics. These objectives are primarily pursued by governments, which are upheld by the often-misdirected loyalty of their citizens.1 The concept of integration, as portrayed by functionalism, places significant emphasis on the educational aspect of the process, with a specific focus on fostering attitude changes. Successful international integration experiences, coupled with the perceived benefits it offers in terms of well-being, are believed to redirect loyalties away from national governments. “Functionalism embodies a theory of community-building through collective learning and technocratic management.”2 Essentially, functionalism highlights the role of collective learning and technocratic management as instruments for building a sense of community among nations through the integration process.

1 David Mitrany, “Cooperation in Action,” International Associations XI , September 1959, p. 647; David Mitrany, A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization, (London: RIIA, 1943); J. P. Sewell, Functionalism and World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). 2 Charles Pentland, “Functionalism and Theories of International Political Integration,” in A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor, eds., Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1975), p. 16.

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The statist perspective on the nation-state system maintains that, while international cooperation and coordination can be advantageous and desirable for specific purposes, yielding to a higher authority would be unnatural and ultimately counterproductive. While this viewpoint holds true, it is worth noting that states engaged in enduring conflicts have demonstrated the ability to collaborate, even on matters of security, for extended periods without necessitating submission to a higher authority. For instance, during the Cold War era, the United States and the former Soviet Union engaged in security cooperation based on their individual interests. Agreements like the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I, and SALT II serve as notable examples of such cooperative efforts. Although these arrangements may have extended the duration of their conflict,3 they nevertheless illustrate that states embroiled in profound conflicts have found means to engage in security cooperation independently. This study draws upon the fundamental concept of functionalism, which posits that states can learn to collaborate and recognize the benefits of cooperation, ultimately leading to a shift in their attitudes. Successful integration is viewed as a process that entails the building of a sense of community, even in the case of two states, through shared learning experiences. Additionally, the study embraces the statist perspective by underscoring the notion that rational actors, particularly enduring conflict rivals within an anarchic system, are unlikely to engage in cooperation that necessitates compromising nationalism and sovereignty or yielding to a higher authority as the ultimate objective. The study contends that cooperation can indeed occur among protracted conflict parties regarding specific security objectives without requiring submission to a higher authority, all while establishing a sense of community through trust and confidence-building measures. It is crucial to emphasize that functionalist-style agreements may not inherently or immediately result in the reduction of conflicts. Instead, once these agreements are institutionalized, they may foster greater mutual understanding between the conflicting parties. The significance of cooperation becomes evident, and there is a propensity to avoid undermining cooperative efforts. While a conflict transformed through cooperation is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient for conflict termination. 3 See Saira Khan, Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation: The Case of India Pakistan (London: Routledge, 2009).

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At this juncture, it is important to introduce the concepts of enduring rivalries and protracted conflicts, which are utilized interchangeably in this study.

Enduring Rivalries and Protracted Conflicts Enduring rivalries and protracted conflicts emerge when two states identify each other as competitors and adversaries.4 In such situations, the propensity for conflict is high, and they tend to respond differently to external factors like shifts in military capabilities. These rival states often develop entrenched enmity and marked by negative perceptions and enemy images.5 Additionally, these conflicts can endure for extended periods because the underlying issues driving the rivalry remain unresolved. Sometimes, the complexity of these rivalries is compounded by the involvement of multiple contentious issues, further complicating efforts to reach a resolution. The concept of protracted conflicts is defined in the literature as situations characterized by prolonged and hostile interactions, often spanning extended periods of time, with sporadic episodes of open warfare that vary in frequency and intensity. These conflicts typically involve stakes of significant importance. While they might experience occasional pauses in overt violence, they persist over time without a clear and distinct endpoint. As Edward E. Azar states, protracted conflicts are “hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity. They are conflict situations in which stakes are very high… While they may exhibit some breakpoints during which there is a cessation of overt violence, they may linger on in time and have no distinguishable point of termination.”6 Involvement in protracted conflicts tends to foster suspicion and negative expectations among the parties involved, deepening the cycle of hostility, as noted by scholars like Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. Protracted

4 Michael Colaresi and William R. Thompson, “Strategic Rivalry, Protracted Conflict, and Crisis Escalation,” Journal of Peace Research, 39(3), 2002, pp. 263–287. 5 Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns,” International Studies Quarterly, 37(2), 993, pp. 147–171. 6 Edward E. Azar et al., “Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Practice in the Middle East,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 8(1), 1978, p. 50.

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conflicts usually encompass multiple contentious issues, making the relationship between the parties increasingly complex.7 Furthermore, the intermittent outbreaks of violence can lead to the acceptance of violence as a normal aspect of their interactions, often resulting in the development of a culture of violence within the conflict.8 Protracted conflicts pose significant challenges when it comes to resolution, primarily due to the entrenched cycle of reciprocal hostilities that tends to dominate the course of events. These conflicts persist even when a rational analysis of future costs and benefits would suggest that terminating the conflict is the more advantageous option, as prolonged wars incur substantial economic, social, and political costs compared to peaceful cooperation.9 A notable issue with protracted conflicts is that they often stem from pathological psychological dynamics, including dehumanization of the enemy, misperceptions, negative stereotypes, and breakdowns in communication.10 According to Azar et al., protracted conflicts tend to foster mutual perceptions of deception and increase the likelihood of confusion in direct and indirect communications between the conflicting parties.11 This negative cycle limits the range of potential solutions and makes it challenging for reciprocity to function as an efficient and effective tool for achieving cooperation. Remarkably, states involved in protracted conflicts sometimes manage to find ways to cooperate, even on matters of high politics like proliferation, as previously mentioned. Therefore, it is essential to present a detailed discussion of cooperation within the context of protracted conflicts.

7 Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 2–4, 8–11. 8 Michael Brecher and Patrick James, “Patterns of Crisis Management,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32(3), 1988, pp. 426–456. 9 Gil Friedman, “Commercial Pacifism and Protracted Conflict: Models from the Palestinian-Israeli Case,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(3), June 2005, pp. 360– 382. 10 P. T. Coleman, “Intractable Conflict,” in M. Deutsch and Peter T. Coleman, eds., The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice (Francisco: Jossey- Bass Publishers, 2000). 11 Edward E. Azar et al., “Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Practice in the Middle East,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 8(1), 1978, p. 51.

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Cooperation and Enduring Rivalry It is a common notion in international relations that enduring rivalries rarely engage in cooperation due to the deep-seated animosity that develops over prolonged periods and the absence of common interests to incentivize cooperation. Nevertheless, historical evidence challenges this notion. For instance, during the Cold War’s apex, the world’s two superpowers, the United States and the former Soviet Union, managed to find ways to collaborate on regional issues, as stated before. An exceptional example of this cooperation occurred in 1968 when they worked together to establish the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) with the aim of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Realist and neo-realist theories in international relations often emphasize the primacy of power and interests over ideological affinities and treaty commitments. They state, “ideological affinities and treaty commitments will always accede to the logic of power and interests. Cooperation between states is contingent on their success in the competition for power. All alliances are conditional on changing circumstances and the rapport of force among states. Conflict and defection are the expected modes of behavior both for rivals of the moment and for temporary allies.”12 According to this perspective, state cooperation is contingent upon the balance of power and is subject to change based on shifting circumstances. Alliances are seen as conditional and may evolve or dissolve depending on the relative power of states. Conflict and defection are considered typical modes of behavior, even among temporary allies. An illustrative example of this perspective is the United States’ withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018. Although the US initially negotiated and signed the deal in 2015, its national interests changed with a shift in administration, leading to a unilateral decision to exit the agreement, which caused dissatisfaction among other signatories, including European powers, China, and Russia. In this case, Iran, whose trust in the negotiated deal was shattered, played a significant role. While the realist interpretation appears valid in cases like these, it is equally important to acknowledge that states, particularly enduring rivals, sometimes engage willingly in cooperative arrangements. The Iran nuclear deal is a prime example of limited cooperation for specific security 12 Edward A. Kolozdiej, Security and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.133.

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objectives between rivals. These engagements are rational decisions made by leaders seeking mutual benefits from such arrangements. The deal demonstrates that cooperation under protracted conflicts can occur under specific conditions.13 However, it is crucial to understand the factors that lead to cooperative strategies between enduring rivals and whether the lesser state in a conflict engages in such arrangements based on rational calculations. Enduring rivalries often reflect the strategies chosen by states to achieve their objectives concerning the opposing side. Typically, dyads engaged in such rivalries tend to employ conflictual strategies in their interactions.14 Scholars suggest that a crucial moment in a rivalry occurs when leadership recognizes that transitioning to more cooperative strategies would better serve their state’s interests than persisting with conflictual approaches. This recognition of the viability of cooperation tends to increase as the costs of ongoing conflict become increasingly apparent.15 In this context, and by taking actions that reinforce opposition to conflict, an international mission or effort has the potential to make a difference in extending the duration of peace.16 If effective enough, such efforts may even prolong the peace long enough to facilitate the termination of the rivalry. In the domain of proliferation, enduring rivals have, at times, turned to cooperative strategies for mutual gains. Both North Korea and Iran have attempted to cooperate with their principal rival, the United States, for financial benefits, although the circumstances and approaches in these two cases are distinct. North Korea, for instance, leveraged its nuclear weapons as bargaining chips to secure financial stability during economic downturns. The country even engaged in negotiations with the US, aiming to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in exchange for light water reactors and economic aid. The United States’ overarching interest was to promote non-proliferation globally and ensure the

13 Saira Khan, “Cooperation under Enduring Rivalry: India-Pakistan.” International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, April 1–4, 2012. 14 J. Michael Greig, “Moments of Opportunity: Recognizing Conditions of Ripeness

for International Mediation between Enduring Rivals,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(6), December 2001, pp. 691–718. 15 Ben Mor, “Peace Initiatives and Public Opinion: The Domestic Costs of Conflict Resolution,” Journal of Peace Research, 34, 1997, pp. 197–215. 16 Daniel S. Morey, “Conflict and the Duration of Peace in Enduring Rivalries,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 26(4), 2009, pp. 331–345.

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security of its allies, South Korea and Japan, in the Pacific. In contrast, Iran did not explicitly declare its intention to acquire nuclear weapons and did not possess the same leverage as North Korea. However, Iran’s enrichment program and missile proliferation efforts brought it to the negotiating table with the United States, resulting in the Iran nuclear deal. Iran’s decision to pursue this cooperative strategy can be seen as a rational choice, especially given the changing domestic and economic circumstances. Tehran expected reciprocity in cooperation from its adversary, Washington. These examples illustrate that even states involved in enduring rivalries can shift from conflictual to cooperative strategies when rational cost–benefit calculations suggest such a transition. However, they often anticipate reciprocal cooperation from their rivals. Michael Colaresi states that “two leaders sitting on opposite ends of a rivalry are most likely to cooperate with each other when they are relatively secure that cooperation will be reciprocated.”17 His observation that leaders from rival states are most likely to cooperate when they are relatively confident about receiving reciprocal cooperation holds significant weight. Similarly, Scott D. Bennett’s point that conditions increasing the costliness of the rivalry for both parties simultaneously can boost their confidence in reciprocation is noteworthy.18 Indeed, one of the primary methods to garner domestic support for cooperation with a rival is to demonstrate tangible forms of reciprocation from that adversary. If such reciprocation fails to materialize or remains incomplete, it opens the door for other elites to criticize and highlight the shortcomings in foreign policy endeavors.19 These insights collectively emphasize a crucial aspect: rivals engage in cooperative ventures only after conducting comprehensive cost–benefit analyses in their respective contexts. Cooperation becomes more likely when the perceived benefits outweigh the costs or when a cost–benefit equilibrium is reached. In the enduring rivalry between Iran and the United States, Iran, being the lesser power in the dyad, made a

17 Michael Colaresi, “When Doves Cry: International Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and Leadership Turnover,” American Journal of Political Science, 48(3), July 2004, p. 566. 18 Scott D. Bennett, “Security, Bargaining, and the End of Interstate Rivalry,” International Studies Quarterly, 40(2), 1996, pp. 157–183. 19 Michael Colaresi, “When Doves Cry: International Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and Leadership Turnover,” American Journal of Political Science, 48(3), July 2004, p. 557.

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strategic decision to accept the nuclear deal after years of deliberation and calculations within its domestic political sphere. Iran also assessed the seriousness and commitment of the American administration to such a deal, a process that spanned several years. The chapter on the Iran nuclear deal provides a detailed account of Iran’s internal deliberations and rational calculations during this period. Rivals’ initial cooperation can be seen through the lens of optimistic realists, a perspective that distinguishes itself from structural and neorealists. According to this viewpoint, rivals can indeed learn to cooperate when they perceive mutual benefits and a need to manage or control their conflicts. In essence, cooperation serves as a mechanism for conflict management. Optimistic realists argue that states, driven by rational selfinterest, can sustain cooperation under specific conditions.20 Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that limited cooperation in one issue area can potentially spill-over into other areas of interaction.21 This anticipation of spill-over effects resulting from initial limited cooperation can motivate states to engage in cooperative endeavors. This perspective holds significant relevance for the Iran nuclear deal, which represented limited cooperation specifically concerning Iran’s uranium enrichment program. The deal involved Iran, the United States, and five other parties. Had this arrangement persisted in its original form for several years, it might have facilitated cooperation in other domains of interaction. Tehran’s leadership likely harbored such expectations. It can be argued that, over time and with an improved understanding of each other, states become less inclined to defect or return to a confrontational stance. Through repeated interactions and experiences of mutually beneficial cooperation, political learning can reinforce a cooperative strategy over short-term gains obtained through defection.22 The concept of iterated games is crucial to grasp in this context. If the Iran nuclear deal had continued in its original form for the entire 15-year duration, Iran might have learned the value of cooperation for strategic purposes. Over this extended period, confidence would have been built, 20 Edward A. Kolozdiej, Security and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 21 Edward A. Kolozdiej, Security and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 22 Edward A. Kolozdiej, Security and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

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and Iran might have engaged in various other cooperative ventures with the United States. These iterated interactions on different levels could have led Iran to realize that pursuing short-term gains through antagonistic policies, such as uranium enrichment activities and threats to develop nuclear weapons, ultimately would not be worthwhile. The prospect of defection by one party in a cooperative arrangement often raises concerns, particularly for the lesser state in a rivalry relationship at the outset of any deal. However, addressing this issue can be relatively straightforward. The principle is simple: if one party defects, the other party follows suit. In the case of the Iran nuclear deal, when the United States withdrew from the agreement, Iran also began to diverge from its commitments, and vice versa. This tit-for-tat approach aligns with Robert Axelrod’s Tit for Tat strategy, which posits that a straightforward strategy can evolve into a consistent and sustained pattern of cooperation.23 The strategy penalizes a state for exploiting a cooperating partner. If the defector later returns to the cooperative arrangement, it is forgiven and rewarded with the mutual benefits that stem from cooperation. In the context of the Iran nuclear deal, Iran’s behavior aligns with Axelrod’s theory. Iran is penalizing the United States for defecting from the cooperative arrangement and violating the deal’s commitments by enriching uranium beyond the permitted levels. Iranian leaders are effectively punishing the US for its non-cooperative and confrontational conduct, all while potentially hoping for the U.S. to eventually return to the deal in some capacity. However, it is important to note that forgiveness and reintegration of a defector, especially in the realm of proliferation, may not be straightforward. This is primarily due to the trust issues that arise when a party breaks a deal, a topic that will be discussed further in the third chapter of the theory section. Understanding the intricate connection between trust and cooperation is crucial at this stage.

Trust in Cooperation Trust plays a paramount role in the dynamics of cooperative endeavors among states. Without trust in the goodwill and reliability of another state, cooperation remains elusive. Conversely, a deficit of trust can swiftly 23 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).

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fracture an interstate relationship that was previously built on trust, often leading to heightened bitterness and animosity between the original conflicting states. Scholars contend that “trust refers to an attitude involving a willingness to place the fate of one’s interests under the control of others. This willingness is based on a belief, for which there is some uncertainty, that potential trustees will avoid using their discretion to harm the interests of the first.”24 Trust in this context refers to an attitude characterized by a willingness to entrust one’s interests to the control of others. This willingness is rooted in a belief, albeit with some degree of uncertainty, that the other party will refrain from using their discretion to harm one’s interests. Trusting relationships are behavioral manifestations of trust which develop when states grant other states discretion over their interests based on the belief that those interests will not be harmed.25 Essentially, states place their fate in the hands of others through trust. Initially, trusting another state can feel like a gamble, as there is inherent uncertainty about whether it is the right choice. However, even in these early stages, a certain level of trust is present, triggering a willingness to cooperate. This belief in trustworthiness is cultivated over time and through actions, often facilitated by interactions, goodwill displayed by leadership, and their consistent engagement over the years. Establishing trust, especially in the context of enduring rivals and security issues, can be particularly challenging, especially for the weaker state in an asymmetric relationship. Nevertheless, it is feasible due to friendly gestures from leaders, repeated assurances, and the involvement of neutral and friendly parties in cooperative arrangements. This trust can evolve into trusting relationships, which are tangible expressions of trust. Trusting relationships develop when states grant one another discretion over their interests, guided by the belief that these interests won’t be harmed. Many argue that trust between parties can extend beyond specific 24 Aaron Hoffman, “A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations, 8(3), 2002, pp. 376–377; Annette Baier, “Trust and Antitrust,” Ethics 96(2), 1986, ppp. 231–260; George G. Brenkert, “Trust, Morality, and International Business,” in Christel Lane and Reinhard Bachmann, eds., Trust Within and Between Organizations: Conceptual Issues and Empirical Applications, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 273–297; Diego Gambetta, “Can We Trust Trust?,” in Diego Gambetta, ed., Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 213–237; Deborah Welch Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 25 Chris Snijders, Trust and Commitments (Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers, 1996).

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interactions, encompassing the entirety of their dealings with each other. In essence, when trust is established at one level of cooperation, it often leads to the exploration of other levels where cooperative behavior can yield benefits for the involved states.26 Cooperation hinges on trust, and successful cooperative efforts pave the way for further cooperation at that same level. Consequently, the success of initiatives at one level encourages the pursuit of additional cooperative endeavors. Before the deal was established, Iran’s pace of nuclear activity was generally low to moderate. During the deal’s enforcement, Iran adhered to its terms, resulting in a muted pace of nuclear activity. However, following the fracture of the deal, Iran has significantly increased the intensity of its nuclear activities. This trend underscores a significant connection between cooperative arrangements and a state’s proliferation interests—something that realists often overlook. Iran’s decision to trust the United States and other parties in the deal was a pivotal aspect of this process. During the early stages of the deal, Iran’s trust was put to the test, and it demonstrated a high level of commitment to the deal’s terms. This initial trust was established through several factors, including the Obama administration’s persistent efforts to engage with Iran and the personal initiative of Iran’s President Rouhani. Rouhani’s election victory in 2009 marked a turning point. He extended a hand of friendship to Washington, emphasizing Iran’s unwavering commitment to its rights and dignity while signaling a willingness to address the nuclear issue through constructive engagement.27 He further stated, “We have to enhance mutual trust between Iran and other countries,”28 He stated that an “old wound” “must be healed.”29 A visionary leader’s role in changing a protracted conflict into a friendly relationship is undeniable.30 Rouhani stressed the importance of building 26 Aaron Hoffman, “A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations, 8(3), 2002, p. 377. 27 Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 213. 28 Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 213. 29 Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 213. 30 Saira Khan, Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation: The Case of India Pakistan (London: Routledge, 2009), Chapter 10.

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mutual trust between Iran and other nations, describing it as a necessary step toward healing old wounds. These interactions between Iran and the United States, driven by visionary leadership and facilitated by the involvement of neutral and friendly parties like China and Russia, played a crucial role in establishing the trust upon which Iran based its negotiations with the United States. This example challenges the conventional realist viewpoint by showcasing the potential for cooperation even among enduring rivals under the right circumstances. Trust forms the basis for cooperation among nations. When states make the decision to cooperate, they essentially place their interests in the hands of other states, contingent on the belief that these other parties will act in a manner that does not harm their interests. Trust is integral to this process, as it determines the willingness to continue cooperation. The success of any cooperative endeavor hinges on trust and the effective adherence to the established rules and agreements. Positive spill-over effects, where cooperation in one area leads to cooperative efforts in other domains, are directly linked to trust. Trust enables states to extend their cooperative relationships and develop a habit of cooperation over time. In essence, trust is the cornerstone of successful cooperation, fostering an environment where states can comfortably engage with one another over extended periods. This trust is built through interactions, the fulfillment of commitments, and the demonstration of reliability, ultimately paving the way for sustained cooperation.

Habit of Cooperation The concept of the “habit of cooperation” is a crucial aspect, which is often overlooked in international relations. International politics typically places emphasis on deliberate actions taken by state actors, with a focus on rational cost–benefit calculations. However, states do not always base their decisions solely on a rational calculus of consequences. In some instances, states’ choices are influenced by a habit of cooperation, which can be just as beneficial as decisions made through strict cost–benefit analysis. This suggests that states may engage in cooperative behaviors not solely due to strategic calculations but also because cooperation has become a routine or habitual way of interacting with other states. This idea underscores the notion that international relations involve a complex interplay of factors,

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including not only strategic considerations but also historical patterns of behavior and ingrained habits that influence state actions and decisions. Functionalism in international relations is not merely a response to an objective sense of common need. It does not automatically emerge when states face a shared challenge. Rather, functionalist activity typically arises from a convergence of perceived interests, which are influenced by political and economic circumstances. Political and economic conditions play a crucial role in shaping states’ perceived interests. When states recognize that integration can lead to improved economic situations, functionalist activities tend to surface. However, the critical element in this context is the “habit of cooperation.” Once states engage in cooperative endeavors and experience positive outcomes, they tend to seek further cooperation. However, developing this habit is not a straightforward process. The repetition of cooperation with the same partners builds trust, and this trust should be institutionalized. As states become accustomed to cooperation, they develop a “cooperation syndrome” that becomes difficult to abandon unless faced with extremely adverse political or economic conditions. This aspect is vital in getting states to cooperate and appreciate the benefits of cooperation. When the benefits are significant, and states begin to value them, they become more interested in future cooperative ventures. Interestingly, states that have experienced the benefits of cooperation and come to value them are less likely to engage in extensive calculations when considering future cooperative endeavors. While decision-makers are indeed rational thinkers, they conduct the critical cost–benefit analysis during the initial stages of a cooperative arrangement. This rationality guides their future actions. A state can be “habituated to being purposive, to having preferences, and to relying on a coherent set of goals as a guide to behavior. The preferences and goals themselves thus become habitual rather than stimuli to impulsive action.”31 A state can develop a “habit” of being purposeful, forming preferences, and relying on a coherent set of goals to guide its behavior. These preferences and goals become habitual rather than triggers for impulsive actions. As a result, states are generally well-served by their cooperative habits, which enable them to navigate various situations and meet diverse challenges. “So there are good reasons to be comfortable as a habit-driven 31 James N. Rosenau, “Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit-driven Actors in World Politics,” International Organization, 40 (4), Autumn 1986, p. 862.

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actor and, as such, to eschew capricious behavior.”32 In essence, such habits discourage capricious behavior. In the context of China-US relations, scholars have suggested that creating “habits of cooperation” can help China adopt “international norms.”33 This indicates that fostering a habit of cooperation can lead to states aligning more closely with established international standards and practices. What is particularly intriguing is that when cooperation between enduring rivals becomes a habit after several years of success, the idea of non-cooperation tends to fade away. It becomes an integral part of interstate relations and is challenging to avoid. This is why initiating dialogue with a problematic state is often the most challenging part, followed by convincing them to participate in negotiations, which is the second most challenging task. Once these two hurdles are overcome, the success of the deal’s implementation becomes pivotal in building the concerned state’s confidence in the good intentions of the other party or parties involved in the arrangement. When confidence is established through the proper implementation of the deal’s norms, the momentum tends to carry forward because of the habit of being in a cooperative arrangement. In such circumstances, even for enduring rivals and states that were initially concerned about the security dilemma and the potential negative consequences of cooperation, rational cost–benefit calculations become less critical. “The logic of habit necessarily precludes rationality, agency, and uncertainty and, so offers a different interpretation of cooperation, security dilemmas, enduring rivalries, and security communities in international politics.”34 This perspective underscores the importance of habits in shaping international relations and how they can override traditional notions of rational decision-making and security concerns. States tend to form alignments with other states they trust and have confidence in. This preference for alignment can be driven by various factors, such as a desire for a balance of power or bandwagoning with a stronger partner. Trust and confidence between states typically develop over time through cooperation, and eventually, they become accustomed 32 James N. Rosenau, “Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit-driven Actors in World Politics,” International Organization, 40 (4), Autumn 1986, p. 862. 33 Carla A. Hill, “U.S.-Chinese Relations Need ‘Habits of Cooperation’,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 10, 2007. 34 Ted Hopf, “The Logic of Habit in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations, 16(4), 2010, pp. 539–561.

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to aligning with each other. Once a pattern of alignment and cooperation is established, it becomes a habitual part of their international relations. Breaking this pattern is not something states do lightly; it usually requires exceptional national, political, or security circumstances to compel such a change. The concept of the spill-over effect often arises from the trust that has been built over the years and the habit of cooperating for an extended period. This trust and habit of cooperation can lead to states engaging in broader and deeper forms of collaboration beyond their initial alignment, contributing to the development of more robust relationships.

Spill-over Effects of Cooperation The classical theories of integration put forth by Altiero Spinelli, David Mitrany, and Karl Deutsch in the twentieth century introduced different perspectives on how international cooperation and integration could be achieved. Spinelli’s approach emphasized federalism, which proposed that integration should start with the establishment of a constitutional assembly. This approach aimed to create a more centralized and unified political entity. Mitrany’s functionalism, on the other hand, focused on the idea that integration should stem from functional cooperation and the natural processes of communication and exchange between national societies. It highlighted the importance of technical bodies being formed to address specific issues and tasks. Karl Deutsch introduced communicative interactionism, which suggested that integration would arise from ongoing communication and interaction between national societies. Ernest B. Haas contributed to these theories with the concept of “spill-over” as part of his neofunctionalism theory. Haas argued that integration would be driven by the convergence of diverse interests, leading to the establishment of a new political community. This process would be facilitated by a shift in loyalty or focus among political elites, which could result from positive or negative long-term expectations of the integration process. In essence, spill-over effects were seen as a catalyst for deeper integration and the development of new political entities.35

35 P. C. Schmitter, “Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neofunctionalism,” Journal of European Public Policy, 12(2), 2005; Ernest B. Hass, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950–1957 , (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968).

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The concept of “spillover” is at the core of neo-functionalism, a theory that suggests that an initial action or effort related to a specific goal can create a situation where achieving that goal necessitates further actions. These subsequent actions, in turn, create new conditions and requirements for even more actions, creating a chain reaction of integration and cooperation. In the context of the Iran nuclear deal, if the deal had succeeded in its original form and the United States and other parties had continued to engage with Iran on various levels, it could have led to the assurance of the original goal, which was non-proliferation. Neofunctionalists believed that once integration began, and it would foster two types of spillover: functional and political. Functional spillover refers to cooperation in areas directly related to the initial issue, while political spillover involves a broader shift in political attitudes and loyalties toward integration. The neo-functionalists believed that this dual mechanism would make integration self-sustaining. In the Iranian case, if the initial cooperative efforts had succeeded, it was expected that Iran’s integration into the international community would continue and expand, leading to greater cooperation on various fronts beyond the nuclear issue. This self-sustaining nature of integration was considered a key feature of the neo-functionalism theory. Philippe Schmitter36 expanded upon the concept of spillover as part of a broader family of related ideas. Spillover, in his conceptualization, is characterized by two defining variables: scope and level. Scope refers to the coverage of issue areas, while level pertains to the decisional capacity or authority. Spillover occurs when there is a simultaneous increase in both scope and level. In contrast to spillover, when both scope and level decline simultaneously, it is referred to as “spillback.” When there is an increase in decisional authority along with a decrease in the coverage of issue areas, it is termed “retrench.” Conversely, when there is a decrease in decisional authority accompanied by an increase in the coverage of issue areas, it is called “muddle about.” Schmitter also introduced two additional possibilities: “spill-around” and “buildup.” Spill-around occurs when there is an increase in the coverage of issue areas with no change in the level of decisional authority. Buildup, on the other hand, implies greater levels of decisional authority irrespective of any change in the 36 Philippe Schmitter, “Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses About International Integration,” International Organization, 23(1), 1969, pp. 161–166.

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scope of coverage. In this conceptual framework, both spillover and buildup are oriented toward the construction of a political community, where decision-making authority and issue coverage evolve in a coordinated manner. These concepts help to understand how integration and cooperation can progress within a political entity or community. Spillover, in essence, represents the internal dynamics within a cooperative arrangement where member states feel compelled to expand either the range of issues they cooperate on (scope) or the depth of their commitments (level), or possibly both. This tendency arises from the increasing confidence and trust that members have developed in each other over time. Moreover, it is closely tied to the habit of cooperation, which has been previously discussed. When states experience success in their cooperation on a particular issue, it fosters a sense of trust and confidence. This, in turn, motivates them to seek greater benefits by cooperating on additional matters. Spillover effects can be particularly potent because success tends to lead to more success. In this way, cooperation can become a self-reinforcing process as member states find that their positive experiences with cooperation encourage them to pursue further collaborative efforts. The concept of spillover is closely tied to the idea of reciprocity in the field of international relations. Reciprocity is seen as a powerful tool that can open up more opportunities for cooperation and the resolution of international issues.37 It is also viewed as a means of building lasting trust and obligations, which can help overcome the inherent problem of mistrust in the anarchical international system. Reciprocity is also understood as an instrument that develops protracted trust and obligation, thus overcoming the inherent problem of mistrust in the anarchical international system38 Reciprocity plays a significant role in shaping international norms and behaviors, including those related to international law and 37 Robert Axelrod. “The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists,” American Political Science Review, 75, 1981, pp. 306–318; Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane. “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics, 38(1), 1985, pp. 226–254; Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy,” in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 1–24. 38 Robert O. Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

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trade agreements. Some scholars argue that many norms of international behavior, such as those embodied in international law and trade agreements, rely heavily on reciprocity.39 In other words, these international regimes may not have developed and maintained stability without the presence of reciprocity. This relationship between international regimes and reciprocity is often seen as a mutually reinforcing one. Reciprocity helps create the conditions for international regimes to emerge and function effectively. Conversely, these regimes can support and sustain reciprocity by improving communication between states and reducing transaction costs, thereby facilitating continued cooperation and trust-building among nations.40 Russell Leng’s41 perspective underscores the critical role of reciprocity as the guiding principle in interactions within anarchic systems like the international Westphalian system. In an environment characterized by a lack of trust and concerns about cheating, reciprocity can serve as a mechanism to reduce distrust and foster better working relations between states. Trust can be built slowly by using conditional cooperation with a clear threat of retaliation in case of defection, and cooperation is institutionalized over time.42 Reciprocity operates on the principle that cooperation is conditional and comes with the expectation of like behavior from other states. This conditionality is essential in an anarchic international system, as it provides states with an incentive to adhere to norms and rules. It helps bring a degree of order and predictability to the international system and creates opportunities for cooperation.43 Moreover, research has shown that reciprocity is not limited to routine diplomatic interactions but also

39 Paul R. Hensel and Paul F. Diehl, “It Takes Two to Tango: Nonmilitarized Response in Interstate Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38(3), 1994, pp. 479–506. 40 Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997). 41 Russell J. Leng, Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816–1980: Realism Versus Reciprocity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 42 Charles E. Morris and Amardo Rodriguez, “Toward an Existential Model of Trust,” Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 17(1), 2005, pp. 95–102. 43 Anat Niv Solomon, Cooperation and Protracted Conflict in International Relations: Cycles of Reciprocity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p. 4.

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applies to crisis situations resolution.44 In crises, reciprocity can become a crucial element for states and leaders as they seek to manage and resolve conflicts successfully. It offers a pathway to build trust and navigate crises through mutual cooperation and response. To recap, reciprocity plays a fundamental role in international relations, serving as a key mechanism for reducing distrust, promoting cooperation, and enhancing crisis management and resolution efforts in the anarchic international system.

Conflict Transformation Scholars specializing in conflict studies have extensively explored various aspects of managing, resolving, terminating, and transforming conflicts. In the lifespan of a conflict, all these stages can be identified, and they each hold distinct meanings. Transformation, in particular, encompasses the other three stages, acting as an overarching concept. Conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict termination are essentially different approaches to conflict transformation. For instance, employing a deterrence strategy serves as a conflict management technique, effectively transforming the conflict into a prolonged state of uncertainty with minimal chances of erupting into war, which characterizes conflict termination.45 Conflict resolution and termination, although closely intertwined, are not synonymous. It is entirely possible for two nations to resolve their longstanding issues that fueled the conflict, yet this doesn’t automatically lead to conflict termination, even though it serves as a prerequisite. A conflict undergoes transformation when there are discernible changes in the relationship between the involved states. These changes can result in a relationship that is either improved or worsened for the parties involved. When conflicting states engage in cooperative ventures that deescalate hostilities and gradually foster trust, the stage is set for further cooperation on different levels. These endeavors become firmly established, and cooperation evolves into a potent tool for managing conflicts. This phase of conflict management lays the foundation for conflict transformation. While the resolution of high-stakes political issues may not be immediate, the conflict is gradually transformed into a more constructive state. In 44 Russell J. Leng, Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816–1980: Realism Versus Reciprocity, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 45 See Saira Khan, Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation: The Case of India Pakistan (London: Routledge, 2009).

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situations where trust and confidence are firmly established, with visible spill-over effects of cooperation, the conflict can eventually progress to a point where resolution or cessation becomes a plausible option,46 although full termination may still remain a distant goal (Fig. 5.1). Conversely, when trust and confidence are shattered, conflicts transform into intense bitterness and hostility, and this negative transformation often unfolds rapidly, a phenomenon explored in the following chapter.

Summary The chapter introduces a comprehensive theoretical framework for this study, centering on the concept of integration and its applicability in understanding the dynamics of cooperation between long-standing rivals involved in protracted conflicts. These states can indeed find common ground on high-stakes issues like nuclear proliferation, but the journey toward cooperation is not without its challenges. It begins with the arduous process of getting these rivals to the negotiation table. Given their deeply rooted mistrust and skepticism, convincing domestic audiences of the merits of cooperation can be time-consuming. Leaders are naturally cautious about their adversary’s sudden display of goodwill. However, once they commit to a cooperative endeavor, like the Iran nuclear deal involving the US, Iran, European powers, Russia, and China, the next crucial step is unwavering adherence to the agreed-upon rules. Defection is the cardinal sin in cooperative arrangements. Maintaining trust is paramount and is gradually built over time as long as states honor the norms of the agreement. Confidence in cooperation grows and becomes ingrained as a habitual practice for these states. While this process requires patience, nurturing optimism in the relationship is equally vital. Positive spill-over effects from cooperation become evident and eventually institutionalized. This pattern of cooperation has the potential to elevate the conflict between these protracted rivals to a new level and holds promise for resolving their enduring disputes.

46 See, Life cycle of a protracted conflict in Saira Khan, Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation: The Case of India Pakistan (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 43.

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COOPERATION, SPILL-OVER EFFECTS, AND INTEGRATION

•Influencing Conditions • Strategic Calculations • Domestic Politics • Leadership Roles

Cooperation on Proliferation Under Protracted Conflicts

Consolidation of Cooperative Agreement

•Determing Factors • Loyalty • Trust Building • Avoidance of Defection

Habit to Cooperate / Behavioural Change

Spill-Over / Cooperation in Other Domains

•Domains • Trade • Transaction • Communication • Cultural

Cooperative Behaviour Institutionalized

Potential for Conflict Resolution

Fig. 5.1 Cooperation, spill-over effects, and institutionalized cooperation

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Fast-Paced Spill-Back Effect

This chapter provides a detailed explanation of the concept of a “spill back effect” in the context of international agreements and deals, particularly focusing on cooperative arrangements and their potential consequences when they fail. It highlights the idea that when a cooperative arrangement, such as a nuclear deal, breaks down due to a breach of trust or commitment, the affected state is likely to respond with non-cooperative and antagonistic policies. Key points in this chapter include: Trust and Confidence: The importance of trust and confidence in international cooperation and how a breach of trust can have severe consequences. Swift Retaliation: When trust is broken, affected states may react swiftly with antagonistic statements and foreign policy decisions, as well as breaking promises made as part of the deal. Reciprocity: The concept of reciprocity in international relations means where actions are met with corresponding reactions. Impact on Nuclear Proliferation: Emphasis is placed on how a spillback effect in the context of nuclear proliferation can lead to a rapid escalation of a state’s nuclear weapons development.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 S. Khan, The Iran Nuclear Deal, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50196-8_6

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Connection to Long-Running Conflicts: The pace and intensity of the spill-back effect are linked to the duration and depth of the underlying conflict between states. Total Trust Failure: Once trust is completely shattered, it may be challenging to rebuild it in the near future, leading to a determined and relentless pursuit of proliferation. This chapter sets the stage for the empirical analysis of the Iranian nuclear proliferation drive after the unilateral withdrawal of the US from the nuclear deal in 2018. It provides a theoretical framework for understanding the dynamics at play in such situations and the potential consequences of trust breaches in international agreements.

Spill-Back Effect Scholars1

have introduced a typology of spill-back encompassing three main categories: functional, political, and geographical. Functional spillback pertains to a reduction in the issue areas covered by an original agreement. Political spill-back involves a decrease in the level of political commitments, while geographical spill-back refers to a member state’s withdrawal from a cooperative arrangement. These spill-back types are examined in the context of the original cooperative agreement. Applying this typology to the current status of the Iranian nuclear deal, it is evident that there has not been functional spill-back; the original objectives of the deal remain intact. However, the US withdrawal in 2018 led to geographical spill-back, resulting in a 5 + 1 arrangement instead of 6 + 1. Iran’s subsequent actions, including uranium enrichment beyond the deal’s limits, generated political spill-back. Notably, political and geographical spill-back are interrelated, often triggered by each other. When one member state experiences geographical spill-back, it can lead to political spill-back by another, especially in enduring rivalries. Conversely, political spill-back can prompt geographical spill-back, as seen in the

1 Gerda Falkner, EU Social Policy in the 1990s: Towards a Corporatist Policy Community

(New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 10. Also see, S. Dosenrode, “Limits to Regional Integration: Equilibrium and Spill Back,” in S. Dosenrode, ed., Limits to Regional Integration (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), pp. 241–256; Ramunas Vilpisauskas, “Eurozone Crisis and European Integration: Functional Spillover, Political Spillback?,” European Integration, 35(3), 2013, pp. 361–373.

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North Korean case when the US and Japan’s failure to fulfill commitments resulted in Pyongyang’s geographical spill-back, ultimately leading to the breakdown of the arrangement. When the US and Japan failed to deliver on their promises to transfer light water reactors to Pyongyang, a political spill-back, North Korea responded with geographical spill-back, effectively breaking the arrangement. Reciprocity plays a central role in political and geographical spill-back policies. The key points are: Interconnectedness of Political and Geographical Spill Back: Political and geographical spill-back are often interconnected. When one member state engages in geographical spill-back (such as exiting the agreement), it can provoke a political spill-back (reduction in political commitments) by another member state. Long-standing rivalries between states can increase the likelihood of one state’s geographical spill-back leading to another state’s political spill-back. Role of Reciprocity: The concept of reciprocity is emphasized as a driving force behind political or geographical spill-back policies. Reciprocity implies that states respond to actions taken by other member states in a cooperative arrangement with corresponding actions. Application to the Iranian Nuclear Deal: There has not been a functional spill-back in the Iranian nuclear deal. The original objectives of the deal remain intact. However, the US’s decision to withdraw from the deal in 2018 led to a geographical spill-back, reducing the arrangement from 6 + Iran to 5 + Iran. Iran’s reciprocal action of enriching uranium beyond the deal’s limits triggered a political spill-back. This section provides a structured framework for understanding the dynamics of spill-back effects within international cooperative arrangements, particularly in the context of the Iranian nuclear deal. It underscores the importance of reciprocity and the interconnectedness between political and geographical spill-back in shaping the outcomes of these agreements. Similar to spill-over effects, spill-back, whether of a political or geographical nature, is a policy driven by reciprocity. Spill-over effects occur when there is a positive tit-for-tat reciprocity, meaning that both

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parties in an agreement engage in positive reciprocal actions over time, fostering confidence and leading to positive effects in other areas. For instance, in the context of the Iran nuclear deal, there was an expectation that positive reciprocity would improve the Iran-US relationship and result in positive spill-over effects related to other issues. However, the Trump administration’s violation of the JCPOA was viewed as a setback to reducing tensions between Iran and the United States and addressing global security concerns diplomatically. In this vein, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated in April 2015, “Now, this [nuclear negotiations] is a new experience. If the other side [the United States] sets aside its bad behavior, this will become a new experience for us, one that will tell us that, well, we can also negotiate with them about other issues. But, if they repeat the same behavior and take the wrong path, it [the negotiations] will only reinforce our past experience.”2 This illustrates that functional spill-over effects are closely linked to positive tit-for-tat reciprocity. Yet, it must be recognized that positive tit-for-tat strategies are effective primarily when actors perceive the issue similarly and prioritize it similarly. Positive tit-for-tat strategy can actually work in situations “where actors perceive the issue in a similar way and attach comparable priority to the issue at hand.”3 In protracted asymmetric conflicts where a superpower and a regional state are involved, their differing perceptions of the issue and priorities can hinder such reciprocity. The stronger state may find it easier to change commitments compared to the weaker state, which faces condemnation and sanctions for non-compliance. In the case of the Iran nuclear deal, the U.S., as a superpower, had different priorities compared to Iran, making its withdrawal more likely, irrespective of who initiated it. The following focuses more on the concept of spill-back effects, particularly the difference between spill-over and spill-back, and how they are linked to reciprocity in international cooperative arrangements. Here are the key points: Spill-Over vs. Spill Back Effects: Spill-over effects occur when positive tit-for-tat reciprocity leads to a cascade of positive outcomes 2 Seyed Hossein Mousavian, “A Win–Win for Iran and the Region,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Cairo, Spring 2019, p. 112. 3 Anat Niv-Solomon, Cooperation and Protracted Conflict in International Affairs: Cycles of Reciprocity (New York: Palgrave, 2017), p. 25.

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in various domains within a cooperative arrangement. For instance, in the context of the Iran nuclear deal, it was expected that positive reciprocity in the implementation of the deal would spill over into other aspects of Iran-US relations, fostering cooperation on other global security issues. In contrast, spill-back effects occur when a cooperative arrangement fails due to defection by one party, and this can result in reciprocal negative actions. Role of Positive Tit-for-Tat Reciprocity: Positive tit-for-tat reciprocity is a situation where both parties in a cooperative arrangement engage in mutually beneficial actions, building trust and confidence between them. This kind of reciprocity is desirable and can lead to spill-over effects. However, it is more likely to work when both parties perceive the issue at hand similarly and attach comparable importance to it. Asymmetric Protracted Conflicts: It highlights a challenge in situations of asymmetric protracted conflicts, where a superpower and a regional state are in a conflictual relationship. In such cases, the two parties often perceive the issue differently. The stronger state may not prioritize the issue as much as the weaker state, and it may have less to fear if it defects from the cooperative arrangement. In the case of the Iran nuclear deal, the United States, as a superpower, had different priorities than Iran, a regional state. Iran had a strong incentive to make the deal work to avoid sanctions and boost its economy. In contrast, the United States’ primary interest was global non-proliferation and safeguarding the security interests of its allies, particularly Israel and Saudi Arabia. These were secondary concerns, making it easier for the US to withdraw from the deal. Impact of Defection by Stronger States: Defection from a cooperative arrangement is more likely to be initiated by the stronger state, as the weaker state faces greater consequences, such as sanctions and condemnation, if it fails to fulfill its commitments. In the Iran nuclear deal, it is highlighted that while President Trump and his administration were responsible for the US withdrawal, such defections are generally more likely from the stronger state’s side. Overall, the section underscores the challenges posed by asymmetric protracted conflicts in cooperative arrangements and the dynamics of positive tit-for-tat reciprocity in such contexts. It uses the Iran nuclear deal as an illustrative example to highlight these dynamics.

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Spill-Back and Negative Reciprocity Spill-back represents a form of negative tit-for-tat reciprocity, particularly evident when one party in an arrangement defects, especially if they are a long-standing rival in a protracted conflict. The party directly impacted by the defector’s policies often has a strong inclination to defect as well. While complete defection might not be straightforward due to the involvement of other parties attempting to persuade, co-opt, or even pressure the affected state to stay within the deal’s parameters, it remains unlikely for the affected state to fully adhere to the agreement’s norms. Security interests, unlike other issues, are not easily compromised. Just as high-stakes matters like nuclear proliferation-related agreements are challenging to negotiate, it is equally or even more difficult to expect one of the parties to compromise its security interests once the deal is fractured by another party’s defection. This uncompromising stance is a direct consequence of the defector’s actions and is further facilitated within the affected state by various factors, such as intractable conflicts, regional and global threats, eroded trust stemming from the fractured deal, spontaneous spill-back effects, nuclear latency, the pursuit of prestige and identity through nuclear weapons acquisition, economic incentives tied to trade and aid benefits, differences among major powers on proliferation, and the conducive environment these factors create for the country to pursue its proliferation activities within this framework. The presence of these conditions within the affected state fosters a renewed belligerent policy stance, implying that antagonistic policies and breaches of commitments to the deal occur more readily due to the existence of these influential factors. The ease with which spill-back effects manifest when defectors withdraw from a security arrangement like the Iran nuclear deal can be attributed to these complex and interrelated factors. spill-back is characterized as a form of negative tit-for-tat reciprocity. It occurs when one party to a cooperative arrangement defects or violates the terms of the deal, triggering a reciprocal negative response from the affected party. In the context of international relations, this often relates to security arrangements. While the affected party may have a propensity to defect in response to a defector’s actions, absolute defection may not be easy or straightforward. Various factors can make absolute defection challenging, including the presence of other parties in the deal who may attempt to convince, co-opt, or coerce the state to remain within

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the limits of the deal. Additionally, the economic consequences of defection, such as sanctions, can deter absolute defection. Security interests are considered paramount and are not easily compromised, especially in security-related deals. In the case of a fractured deal due to another party’s defection, the affected state is less likely to compromise its security interests, and this non-compromising attitude is a direct result of the defector’s actions. Key conditions can be observed: Spill-over Effects Stop: The positive spill-over effects of cooperation, where success in one area leads to further cooperative moves in others, cease to work when a regional scheme or deal collapses. Instead of seeing cooperation spread to other issue areas, the breakdown of cooperation often leads to a reversal or decline in cooperative efforts. Increased Bitterness: The breakdown of cooperation tends to intensify the bitterness and animosity between the states involved. This bitterness can be a result of perceived betrayal or uncooperative behavior by one or more parties. When trust is eroded, it becomes difficult to rebuild and can lead to further hostility. Antagonistic Policies: States may resort to more antagonistic and belligerent policies following the failure of a cooperative arrangement. This can include actions such as increased military buildup, economic sanctions, or even open conflict, depending on the severity of the breakdown. Protracted Conflict: In cases where a breakdown in cooperation is not effectively managed or resolved, the conflict can become protracted and linger on indefinitely. This is often characterized by sporadic outbreaks of violence, heightened tensions, and a lack of progress toward conflict resolution. Reciprocity and Trust: The role of reciprocity and trust is crucial in determining the outcome. If trust is shattered and reciprocity is abandoned, it becomes more challenging to find common ground and reach new cooperative agreements. The breakdown of cooperation can, thus, have far-reaching consequences, and the direction in which the conflict transforms depends on various factors, including the willingness of the parties to rebuild trust and

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engage in renewed cooperation. Consolidated cooperation can indeed lead to further positive transformations, but the opposite is also true when cooperation collapses. The central question is: Why do spill-back effects tend to occur so easily when defectors exit security arrangements? These effects are facilitated by a combination of factors and conditions that create an environment in which the affected state is more likely to pursue antagonistic policies and breach commitments to the cooperative arrangements. Several factors or conditions can facilitate the renewed belligerent policies of the affected state in response to a fractured security arrangement. These factors include: The presence of intractable conflicts. Emerging regional and global threats. Acute trust deficits resulting from the fractured deal. The spontaneous nature of spill-back effects. The existence of nuclear latency (potential capability to develop nuclear weapons). The desire to reestablish prestige and identity through nuclear weapons acquisition. Economic incentives related to trade and aid benefits. Differences between major powers concerning the proliferation issue. In essence, the above information highlights that security-related deals are particularly sensitive, and the breach of such arrangements often triggers strong negative responses from affected parties due to their unwillingness to compromise on their security interests.

Spill-Back and Nexus Between Foreign and Domestic Policy To gain a comprehensive understanding of spill-back actions, it is crucial to explore the strong connection between foreign and domestic policies. Spill-back effects often stem directly from domestic politics, emphasizing that while external factors are significant, both internal and external pressures together shape the conditions for spill-back behaviors. When the public, and possibly elites, grow more insecure and distrustful of

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a rival, mobilizing domestic support for cooperation can become challenging. “As the public, and potentially elites, becomes more insecure and distrustful of a rival it may be more difficult to mobilize domestic support for cooperation. Any leader that attempts to offer concessions to a rival could be attacked as being weak or accommodating a dangerous.”4 Leaders attempting to make concessions to a rival may be attacked as weak or as accommodating a dangerous adversary, particularly when the regime is non-democratic, democratic legitimacy is questionable, or leadership lacks popularity domestically. In the case of Iran, for instance, President Rouhani, who worked tirelessly to secure the nuclear deal with the US despite domestic opposition, risks losing popularity and support if the government doesn’t respond reciprocally to the US’s actions against the deal and Iran. Such actions can discredit moderates and reformists within the government who had staked their political capital on the accord. Political accusations of weakness or treason are more potent when the public mistrusts that cooperation won’t be exploited by the rival. Additionally, “political accusations of weakness and even treason are more likely to be effective politically when the public mistrusts that any cooperation will not be taken advantage of by the rival.”5 Michael Colaresi argues that during the Cold War for example, “campaigning for a stronger foreign policy vis-à-vis the USSR would be successful after 1948, than before. In the Soviet leadership, Snyder found that increased conflict from the United States buoyed the position of hardliners, while compromise and cooperation supported the dovish Soviet elites.”6 In 2019, it was stated, “The Trump administration’s May 2018 abrogation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear program discredited the moderates and reformists inside the Iranian government who had staked their political capital on the accord and its expected economic benefits. Now, ahead of parliamentary elections in February 2020 and presidential

4 Michael Colaresi, “When Doves Cry: International Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and Leadership Turnover,” American Journal of Political Science, 48(3), July 2004, pp. 557. 5 Michael Colaresi, “When Doves Cry: International Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and Leadership Turnover,” American Journal of Political Science, 48(3), July 2004, pp. 557. 6 Michael Colaresi, “When Doves Cry: International Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and Leadership Turnover,” American Journal of Political Science, 48(3), July 2004, pp. 557.

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elections the following year, emboldened hardline forces view the current impasse with the United States as a historic opportunity and are in no rush to negotiate.”7 Therefore, spill-back effects often become a necessity, especially when national security interests are at stake, to avoid both an international crisis and a domestic one that could damage the government’s image further when its international standing has already been undermined by the defector state. Here are the key points on the nexus between foreign and domestic policies in the context of spill-back effects and their impact on international relations: Foreign and Domestic Policy Connection: There is a strong interconnection between a state’s foreign and domestic policies, and this relationship plays a crucial role in understanding the dynamics of spill-back effects. The passage suggests that while external factors are undoubtedly important in shaping a state’s behavior, internal and domestic pressures also contribute significantly to spill-back behaviors. Insecurity and Distrust: spill-back effects can be influenced by the level of insecurity and distrust among the public and potentially among elites within a state. When a rival state’s actions erode trust and create insecurity, it becomes challenging for a leader to mobilize domestic support for cooperation. Leaders who attempt to offer concessions to a rival may face criticism domestically, being labeled as weak or as accommodating a dangerous enemy. Leadership Popularity and Support: The domestic political landscape, including the level of popularity and support enjoyed by the leadership, plays a crucial role. In non-democratic regimes or in cases where the democratic process is questionable, leaders may need to maintain a tough stance in foreign policy to bolster their domestic image and retain support. Impact of Policy Reversals: Policy reversals or abrupt changes in foreign policy, such as the abrogation of international agreements, can have significant domestic political consequences. In the example of Iran, the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA

7 Sina Toossi, “Amid Fuel Protests, Iran’s Hardliners See Historic Opportunity,” National Iranian American Council, December 12, 2019.

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discredited moderates and reformists within the Iranian government who had supported the accord for its expected economic benefits. This shift in foreign policy influenced the domestic political landscape. Public Mistrust and Political Accusations: Public mistrust of a rival state can undermine efforts to cooperate. When the public believes that any cooperation will be taken advantage of by the rival, leaders may face accusations of weakness or even treason if they attempt to pursue diplomatic solutions. Impact on Political Dynamics: Domestic political dynamics are influenced by international conflicts. For instance, a state may adopt a more hardline foreign policy stance after being cheated by a powerful rival, as this approach may be more politically appealing to the domestic audience. Avoiding Domestic Crisis: When a state is confronted with an international crisis, it typically seeks to avoid exacerbating the situation with a domestic crisis. Therefore, negative reciprocity or pursuing a spill-back effect may become a political necessity, especially when the issue at hand relates to national security interests. In a nutshell, the above information underscores that foreign and domestic policies are intertwined, and leaders often need to balance international pressures and domestic political considerations when responding to violations of international agreements or other foreign policy challenges. Spill-back effects can emerge as a result of this delicate interplay between external and internal factors. When leaders confront a foreign policy crisis resulting from a state’s defection from a cooperative arrangement, it is important to recognize that they risk losing the trust of their own citizens. This often leads to questions about how the situation reached such a point and why the leadership could not foresee this behavior when the cooperative deal was initiated. This questioning process ultimately casts doubt on the leadership’s authority, comprehension, and credibility, potentially even resulting in their removal from office in some cases. Importantly, internal threats, whether or not externally supported, tend to pose a more significant challenge to the grip on power of the leaders of the developing countries compared to threats from other states. While only a few developing countries’ leaders have succumbed to external invasions, a large number

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have been toppled by internal adversaries.8 In fact, the majority of developing nations have experienced either a forceful internal government overthrow or a near-successful attempt. This underscores the complex interplay between external and internal threats in the wake of a foreign policy crisis. Unfortunately, addressing the internal threat often becomes as critical as addressing the external one, particularly in the developing world, where leaders may not consistently represent the interests of their people.9 In essence, this is due to the fact that many developing states are non-democratic, causing leaders to prioritize their own internal power and position over governments elected by the populace.10 The response of a legitimate government to external threats typically prioritizes those threats over internal ones, which may manifest as dialogues and debates in parliamentary settings. A case in point is President Trump, who faced scrutiny from democrats for provoking an unnecessary Iranian reaction, primarily the enrichment activities, in response to America’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal. However, Trump was not overly concerned about being removed from office due to this foreign policy crisis involving Iran. This exemplifies the security that democratic leaders enjoy compared to their non-democratic counterparts. A democratic decision maker generally makes a policy choice and asks, “How does this policy affect the power of the state?”11 On the contrary, a non-democratic leader takes reciprocal actions and the leader asks, “How does this policy affect the probability of my remaining in power?”12 Staying in power is extremely important to them.13 Not to lose 8 Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics, 43(2), January 1991, p. 238. 9 Joel S. Migdal, “Internal Structure and External Behaviour: Explaining Foreign Policies of Third World States,” International Relations 4, May I974, pp. 519–520. 10 For an excellent discussion of why internal threats are so common in the Third World, see Mohammed Ayoob, “Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn?” International Affairs, 60, Winter 1983–1984, pp. 41–52. 11 Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics, 43(2), January, 1991, p. 238. 12 Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics, 43(2), January, 1991, p. 238. 13 For example, Richard Ned Lebow cites political vulnerability of a leader as one of the key factors that can induce a policy of brinkmanship; Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 69–79.

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popular confidence is equally important. In a democratic framework then, decision-makers tend to assess policy choices with a focus on how they impact the power of the state. Conversely, non-democratic leaders prioritize reciprocal actions, driven by how those actions affect the likelihood of retaining power. Staying in power is of utmost importance to them, as is maintaining popular confidence. It is equally important to convey to the public that the nation is strong and secure under their leadership. Effectively navigating this two-level game, encompassing both external and internal fronts, becomes paramount. Security does not always rely on omni-balancing, as scholars often suggest. Instead, leaders may not consistently seek alignment with external powers to address both fronts. The key question may not always be, “Which external power is most likely to protect me from the various threats I face?”14 Rather, when a state feels betrayed by a defector state, it may prefer to address the issue independently without relying on external assistance. Omni-balancing is typically an issue-specific behavior, and in the context of proliferation, leaders of potential proliferants may not entertain this strategy, particularly when facing a defector in a nuclear cooperative arrangement. Grave issues like these are typically not delegated to others to resolve. Although Iran has special relationships with China and Russia, both parties to the nuclear deal, it did not seek their help in resolving the foreign policy crisis arising from the US’s exit from the deal, which triggered an internal threat related to the credibility of leadership. Instead, Iran opted for a more intense reciprocal action in uranium enrichment, simultaneously addressing both threats. This discussion on facing a two-front threat underscores the compulsion to respond assertively when confronted with a crisis-induced predicament. Here are the key points on the intricate relationship between foreign policy crises, domestic politics, and leadership survival: Loss of Trust and Leadership Credibility: When a foreign policy crisis erupts due to the defection of a state from a cooperative arrangement, it often leads to a loss of trust and credibility in the leadership of the affected

14 Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics, 43(2), January

1991, p. 238. He writes, “Whereas balance of power focuses on the state’s need to counter threats from other states, omni-balancing considers internal and external threats to the leadership, and, as a result, it fundamentally alters our understanding of why Third World leaders align as they do and also provides insights that explain a wide range of Third World Behavior.”

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state. People start questioning the competence and decision-making of their leaders, especially regarding why they couldn’t anticipate or prevent the crisis when the cooperative deal was forged. Potential for Leadership Overthrow: In certain cases, the loss of trust in leadership can escalate to the point where it threatens the leader’s hold on power. People may demand a change in leadership, which could lead to the overthrow of the existing government. Leaders of many developing countries have been overthrown by internal enemies, and external invasions are relatively rare. Internal Threat Linked to External Crisis: The emergence of internal threats is often closely linked to external foreign policy crises. When leaders are confronted with an external threat or crisis, they must also consider how their response will impact domestic stability. In authoritarian or non-democratic regimes, the leader’s primary concern may be self-preservation, and addressing internal challenges becomes essential. Security and Power Concerns: Democratic leaders are generally more focused on the state’s interests and the impact of foreign policy on the country’s power. Non-democratic leaders, on the other hand, may prioritize their own hold on power and popularity among the population. This distinction affects how leaders respond to foreign policy crises. Two-Level Game: Leaders often engage in a two-level game, balancing both external and internal considerations. They must ensure that their foreign policy decisions do not jeopardize their domestic support or endanger their leadership. In this context, leaders may choose policies that demonstrate strength and resolve to both external rivals and domestic audiences. Leaders’ Handling of Crises: Leaders may prefer to address crises themselves rather than relying on external powers or engaging in omnibalancing. In the case of Iran, it chose to take a more assertive approach by intensifying uranium enrichment, which served as a response to both external and internal threats to its leadership and credibility. Crisis-Induced Compulsion: When faced with a crisis, leaders may feel compelled to take belligerent or assertive actions to protect their power and reputation. This sense of compulsion can lead to more intense reciprocal responses, particularly in critical areas such as nuclear proliferation. The above underscores the complexity of decision-making during foreign policy crises. Leaders must consider both external and internal factors, including the potential impact on their domestic political standing

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and leadership survival. The response to a crisis can be shaped by the need to address multiple threats simultaneously, resulting in assertive actions to restore trust and credibility. When a foreign policy crisis erupts due to a state defecting from a cooperative agreement, it often triggers a loss of trust and confidence in the leadership of the affected state. People begin to question the competence of their leaders, particularly regarding their inability to anticipate or prevent the crisis when the cooperative deal was formed. In certain cases, the erosion of trust in leadership can escalate to the point where it poses a threat to the leader’s grip on power. This can lead to demands for leadership change, potentially resulting in the overthrow of the existing government. Many leaders in the developing world have been toppled by internal adversaries, with external invasions being relatively uncommon. The emergence of internal threats is often closely tied to external foreign policy crises. When leaders face an external threat or crisis, they must also consider how their response will affect domestic stability. In authoritarian or non-democratic regimes, the leader’s primary concern may be self-preservation, and addressing internal challenges becomes imperative. Democratic leaders typically place greater emphasis on the state’s interests and the impact of foreign policy on the country’s power. Conversely, non-democratic leaders may prioritize their own ability to maintain power and their popularity among the populace. This divergence influences how leaders respond to foreign policy crises. Leaders often engage in a two-tier decision-making process, where they must balance both external and internal considerations. They must ensure that their foreign policy choices do not jeopardize their domestic support or endanger their leadership position. In this context, leaders may opt for policies that project strength and determination to both external adversaries and domestic audiences. Leaders may prefer to address crises independently rather than relying on external powers or pursuing omni-balancing strategies. For instance, Iran chose to adopt a more assertive approach by intensifying uranium enrichment, which served as a response to both external and internal threats to its leadership and credibility. Faced with a crisis, leaders may feel compelled to take assertive or belligerent actions to safeguard their power and reputation. This sense of compulsion can result in more vigorous reciprocal reactions, especially in critical areas such as nuclear proliferation. In a nutshell, the above information underscores the intricate nature of decision-making during foreign policy crises. Leaders must consider an

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array of factors, including both external and internal elements, such as the potential repercussions for their domestic political standing and the survival of their leadership. The response to a crisis can be molded by the necessity to address multiple threats concurrently, leading to assertive measures aimed at rebuilding trust and reestablishing credibility.

Crisis-Induced Spill-Back A foreign policy crisis is characterized by the following factors: it poses a threat to fundamental values, requires a time-sensitive response, and carries an elevated risk of leading to war.15 Such a crisis only evolves into an international crisis when the state faced with this foreign policy dilemma issues threats to its adversary, which are reciprocated by the adversary. The International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project defines an international crisis as a situation where there is a change in the nature and/or an escalation in the intensity of disruptive interactions between two or more states. These interactions are accompanied by a heightened likelihood of military hostilities. This, in turn, destabilizes their relationship and alters the structure of the international system.16 In the context of security cooperation, when one of the participating states breaches its commitments or promises, especially if it is a longstanding rival, the state on the receiving end experiences a foreign policy crisis in the security domain. Responding to this crisis becomes crucial as part of crisis management. Crisis management can manifest through verbal or non-verbal actions. However, in the security realm, it typically commences with verbal exchanges and can escalate to belligerent and even violent policies and actions. While warfare may not be a probable response in the nuclear domain, other antagonistic military and non-military measures are employed to handle such crises. Although any form of defection is considered unacceptable, when security agreements are shattered by a defector who cannot be held accountable for their actions, it becomes imperative for the affected state to respond unilaterally, whether in a reciprocal or more adversarial manner. A crisis induces the need for action (functional pressure) and a sense of urgency due 15 Michael Brecher, Crises in World Politics (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1993). 16 Michael Brecher, Crises in World Politics (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1993), p. 3;

Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Crisis, Conflict, and Instability (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1989), pp. 5 and 19.

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to the potential for developments to reach a critical tipping point (time constraints). “A crisis will bring about a need to act (functional problem pressure) and a sense of urgency since things might without countersteering reach a tipping point (time pressures).”17 While war may not be imminent, a crisis in the security domain demands immediate action due to the urgency of safeguarding security interests and addressing domestic political considerations. Therefore, this kind of action can be termed “crisis-induced action.” However, within each policy domain, the outcomes or responses resulting from crisis-induced pressures are influenced by the specific decision-making mechanisms of the state and various contextual conditions, which will be discussed in the following chapter. In essence, the point is that a negative response in the form of a spill-back effect becomes obligatory. It might be argued that when the likelihood of war is low between two nuclear or nuclear-capable states, a foreign policy crisis should not necessarily trigger a belligerent response. Even in the absence of war, a crisis can still generate instability in a conflicted relationship. Stability does not solely hinge on the absence of war; the absence of crises is also a prerequisite for stability. When countries do not have wars, crisis can still generate instability in a conflict relationship. “If absence of war is a necessary condition of stability, then absence of war always precedes stability, but stability does not always occur in the absence of war, since absence of war on its own may not be sufficient to generate stability. Absence of crisis is also a necessary condition of stability.”18 In the context of the Iran nuclear deal and the United States’ withdrawal from it in May 2018, a significant crisis erupted for Iran, demanding a response. Iran’s reactions ranged from verbal accusations to threats of withdrawing from the deal and, indeed, partial withdrawal by exceeding the uranium enrichment limits prescribed by the agreement. Iran also intensified its focus on missile proliferation, a move strongly condemned by the United States and one of the reasons cited for its withdrawal from the deal. These responses reflect the security policies adopted by Iran’s leadership as part of their negative reciprocity strategy, considering domestic factors and facilitating conditions. As mentioned 17 Gerda Falkner, “The EU’s Current Crisis and Its Policy Effects: Research Design and Comparative Findings,” Journal of European Integration, 38(3), 2016, p. 222. 18 Saira Khan, Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation: The Case of IndiaPakistan (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 49.

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earlier, such spill-back responses are spontaneous and rapid. In the realm of nuclear affairs, Iran’s spill-back strategy involves reverting to its previous activities related to uranium enrichment and more. Crisisinduced responses tend to be particularly severe when the involved states are protracted conflict rivals. Michael Brecher states that where “multiple issues are at stake, cutting across simple coalitions of actors, the task of preventing crisis escalation is rendered even more difficult, even if each of the pre-crisis adversaries prefers accommodation: a crisis once set on a spiral path falls victim to its own upward dynamic.”19 This points out that when multiple issues are in play, involving various actors with complex coalitions, preventing the escalation of a crisis becomes even more challenging. Even if each precrisis adversary initially prefers accommodation, a crisis that begins down a path of escalation can become trapped in its own upward spiral. This is closely related to the fact that protracted conflict rivals tend to hold negative and hostile perceptions of each other, which they try to set aside when they decide to engage in cooperative efforts. The problem lies in the persistent doubt they harbor about their rivals’ benign intentions, even during the initial stages of cooperation. As a result, comprehensive trust is elusive. When a defection occurs in such an undertaking, these negative perceptions of the defector, who was originally a rival, make it easy and instinctive to resort to antagonistic decision-making in a crisis-prone environment. In this framework, misunderstandings and misperceptions are commonplace and exert significant influence on spill-back effects within the strategic game.

Misperceptions and Spill-Back Misperceptions and misunderstandings between conflict states can significantly amplify spill-back effects. This is not to suggest that the victim state lacks rationality when responding to the defection of another state from a cooperative arrangement. Instead, it highlights how misunderstandings, misperceptions, and preconceived notions of the enemy can influence these negative reciprocal behaviors. Reciprocal cycles are particularly susceptible to misperceptions and misunderstandings because reactions 19 Michael Brecher, Crises in World Politics (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1993), p. 155. See also, Michael Brecher, “Crisis Escalation: Model and Findings,” International Political Science Review, 17(2), April 1996, pp. 215–230.

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are contingent upon the initial actions, and “like begets like.” If a concession or a signal of cooperation is received and interpreted as a defection, reciprocity may recommend responding in kind, potentially turning a cycle of cooperation toward conflict. In the real world of international relations, where information is often noisy, decision-makers operate under less-than-ideal conditions and tremendous pressure. “Reciprocal cycles are especially vulnerable to misperceptions and misunderstandings because the reaction is contingent on the initial action and like begets like. As a result, if a concession or an action/message/signal of cooperation is received and interpreted as a defection, then reciprocity would advise returning in like action and a potential cycle of cooperation may instead veer toward conflict. If the message or signal is not received as intended, the result is misperception and unintended consequences. In the real world of international interaction in which there is a lot of informational “noise” and in which decision-makers operate in less-than-ideal conditions and under enormous pressure, cognitive heuristic devices are used all the time.”20 They frequently rely on cognitive heuristic devices, which can lead to misinterpretations of incoming information. Decision-makers hold images of their own country and that of the other, with the latter being especially significant in understanding signals from the other actor. Biases in interpreting information may result in trying to make new information fit existing preconceived images of the other actor, rather than altering those deeply ingrained perceptions. Biases in information interpretation result in misinterpretation of incoming information as it is easier to make new information “fit” the existing image regarding the other actor than to change that strongly held image.21 This is reinforced when rivals defect from a cooperative arrangement. This tendency is especially applicable to protracted conflict states, as rivals are prone to misperceiving each other’s intentions and capabilities.22 Misperceptions stemming from these deeply 20 Anat Niv-Solomon, Cooperation and Protracted Conflict in International Affairs: Cycles of Reciprocity (New York: Palgrave, 2017), p. 25. 21 Anat Niv-Solomon, Cooperation and Protracted Conflict in International Affairs: Cycles of Reciprocity (New York: Palgrave, 2017), p. 25. 22 A good illustration of misperception is given in Steve Fabick, “Enemy Images: A

Resource Manual on Reducing Enmity,” Peace Psychology, 2002. It is quoted: “Let us examine for a moment the new East–West conflict around the question of global terrorism. While the West views recent Islamic extremist terrorism as primarily an example of religious fundamentalism, the Arab world claims that this is a struggle against the social/political/ economic injustice and oppression by the West and its extreme materialism promoted

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ingrained images can lead to a cycle of antagonistic reciprocity instead of positive tit-for-tat reciprocity.23 This effect is amplified when rivals defect from a cooperative arrangement, as negative enemy images come to the forefront, prompting leaders to hastily adopt antagonistic policies as part of their spill-back reciprocal behavior. In situations where actors harbor negative images of each other, it becomes challenging, if not impossible, for a positive cycle to develop. This situation worsens when the enemy state fails to respect the rules of an agreement or insults the concerned state by defecting from it. The victim state may perceive that the defector never genuinely intended to cooperate in the first place. Some actors, who only latently accept their enemies, emphasize threats and punishment because they overtly reject permanent solutions based on compromise regarding fundamental issues. They may eventually be open to negotiations and interim compromises, especially if these agreements minimize humiliation. However, they will not pursue a lasting peace until their latent acceptance of the enemy becomes explicit. It is argued that actors “who only latently accept enemies emphasize threat and punishment, since they manifestly reject permanent solutions based on compromise regarding basic issues. They may eventually become open to some negotiations, however, and to what they assert are interim compromises. They may even come to favor such agreements if these are designed so that attendant humiliation is minimized. But such actors will not make permanent peace unless and until their latent acceptance of the enemy has become manifest.”24 This concept is evident in the context as the ultimate solution to global problems. Neither side recognizes the partiality of its worldview, in which a particular sector of human society is overdeveloped at the expense of other sectors. (In the West, the economic sector overshadows the socio-political and spiritual orders. In the Arab East, the spiritual sector overshadows both the economic and the socio-political orders.) There is little recognition that the current clash between East and West is primarily the clash of two unsustainable perspectives, challenged to become integrated into a mature whole. Neither viewpoint recognizes both the role of science and the role of religion in the grand historical movement toward material and spiritual emancipation, and social justice for the whole human family.” 23 Robert Jervis, Hypotheses on Misperception. World Politics, 20(3), 1968, pp. 454– 479; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976). 24 Noel Kaplowitz, “National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies: Psycho-political Dimensions of International Relations,” Political Psychology, 11(1), March 1990, p. 71.

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of US-Iran relations, where President Obama sought peace through the nuclear deal, but genuine American willingness for such an arrangement is questionable. Iran, on the other hand, quickly changed its policies regarding its nuclear program when the U.S. withdrew from the deal, driven by its deeply ingrained image of the U.S. as the “great Satan.” This led to vocal belligerence, strong statements, and antagonistic actions by Iran, reflecting a tit-for-tat strategy driven by misperceptions and a history of negative images. The perception of historical events can also fuel desires to recapture past periods of glory. Such perceptions may ironically lead to questioning present self-worth, especially if a nation no longer perceives itself as great. However, they can also serve as a source of encouragement for the future, with the belief that if the nation was once great, it can be great again. “Reflecting on past periods of greatness can sometimes inspire grandiose visions for the future. Consequently, the construction and reconstruction of a people’s historical identity can have significant effects on their international behavior international behavior.”25 This concept is highly applicable in the case of Iran. Iran cannot forget how it transitioned from being a prosperous and modern state in the Middle East to one with a shattered economy, largely attributed to decades of sanctions, a fate it often blames on the United States. While negative perceptions and images indeed make spill-back effects more likely, it is essential to look deeper into why these effects often manifest rapidly.

Pace of Spill-Back The pace of spill-back effects can be understood by considering the rational behavior of states in the international system. When states, especially long-standing rivals, engage in cooperation, they are well aware that the international system lacks a higher authority to enforce norms or punish violations of agreements. In such situations, states carefully assess the costs and benefits of maintaining antagonistic relations versus cooperating. Cooperation is, therefore, a product of rational decision-making by

25 Noel Kaplowitz, “National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies: Psycho-political Dimensions of International Relations,” Political Psychology, 11(1), March 1990, p. 52.

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states. No state is compelled to cooperate with its rivals unless it perceives a clear advantage in doing so. Security issues, being matters of high politics, require a rational approach to cooperation. In the case of the Iran nuclear deal, even though Iranian leadership had reservations about the United States’ true intentions, they ultimately concluded that reaching a deal in 2015 was preferable to facing indefinite sanctions, which were severely impacting Iran’s economy. Despite being the weaker party in its relationship with the United States, Iran acted as a rational actor in this context. Even Iran’s regional neighbors generally viewed it as a highly rational actor. It is asserted that “regional actors tend to view Iran as a highly rational actor.”26 This rational decision-making process underpins the pace at which spill-back effects occur. States will respond rapidly when they perceive that their security interests and strategic calculations have been significantly disrupted, as was the case with Iran following the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal. The issue of negative reciprocity and its pace are closely tied to the rationality of states. When states enter into cooperative agreements with their long-standing rivals, they do so in good faith, trusting their own calculations and strategic assessments. It’s challenging for them to accept the failure of their own judgment, as it questions their prudence and rationality in extending an olive branch to their rival. This challenge is not only relevant in democratic political regimes, where leaders might face scrutiny from the public and opposition, but also in authoritarian or non-democratic regimes, where leaders may still face internal questioning. States, especially in the realm of security, focus on achieving absolute gains from any cooperative endeavor. They aim to ensure that, even if there is an asymmetry in the gains received by the participating states, their own expected benefits are not compromised. In other words, they seek to safeguard their expected gains. This concern becomes even more pronounced in security-related matters. Therefore, the difficulty lies not solely in the fear of adversaries taking advantage of cooperative behavior but also in the perception of policy failures on their own part. This is what makes it exceptionally challenging for states when they feel cheated by other states in a cooperative arrangement. To rectify their own perceived failures and 26 II Hyun Cho, Global Rogues and Regional Orders: The Multidimensional Challenge of North Korea and Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 129.

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prevent a weakening of their position in the eyes of their domestic population, states must respond swiftly and decisively against the defector state. This rapid response is crucial, as it is closely tied to domestic politics. Even during a foreign policy crisis, especially when it pertains to security issues, states feel compelled to address it with a response that is both similar to or even more intense than the provocation they have faced. A fast-paced spill-back effect refers to an immediate and swift response by a state when it faces a situation in which another state has defected or acted in a hostile or antagonistic manner within a cooperative arrangement. In this context, “fast” means that the response is not delayed or drawn out; it happens promptly and decisively. This response is typically characterized by strong and antagonistic actions taken by the victim state. When a fast-paced spill-back effect occurs, it signifies the breakdown of the security community, a group of states that had previously integrated for specific goals or purposes. The sense of belonging and mutual trust within this community is shattered. States can no longer rely on the dependable expectations of policy behavior that existed within this cooperative framework. The immediate response also implies that the affected state does not seek help from external powers or other members of the arrangement. Diplomatic solutions are not actively pursued because the trust deficit caused by the defector’s actions erodes any belief in the effectiveness of third-party intervention. In essence, fast-paced spill-back effects demonstrate that the victim state does not want to depend on others or delay its response when confronted with defection or hostile behavior within a cooperative arrangement. Instead, it takes swift and assertive action to address the foreign policy crisis and maintain its reputation, both domestically and internationally. This rapid response is seen as a rational and strategic choice to protect its interests and credibility. The India-Pakistan conflict is a classic example of how protracted conflict rivals navigate cooperative arrangements and the subsequent breakdowns. The cycle of cooperation, defection, and swift reciprocal actions is a recurring feature in such relationships, driven by a complex interplay of domestic and international factors. The analysis of the IndiaPakistan conflict and its pattern of cooperative arrangements followed by defection and immediate reciprocal actions aligns with the broader concept of fast-paced spill-back effects and their dynamics. The dyad engaged in cooperative arrangements, such as summits or deals after

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both tested their nuclear weapons in 1998.27 Cooperative arrangements, like the Lahore Declaration and the Agra Summit, are attempts to build trust and find common ground in the midst of a long-standing conflict. However, these arrangements are fragile, given the deep-seated mistrust and hostility between the parties. When one side perceives the other as defecting from the cooperative path, it triggers a crisis. The immediate and intense reciprocal actions taken by both sides in response to defection are driven by several factors: Domestic Considerations: Leaders must respond swiftly to address the crisis in a manner that is acceptable to their domestic constituents. In democracies or even semi-democratic systems, leaders can face backlash and lose public support if they appear weak or incapable of defending national interests. Trust Deficit: Protracted conflict rivals often have a history of hostility and negative perceptions of each other. When one side defects from a cooperative arrangement, it reinforces the existing negative images and mistrust, making swift and assertive responses more likely. Security Concerns: In security-related issues, time is of the essence. The perceived threat of the adversary’s actions can create a sense of urgency, leading to immediate responses to protect national security interests. Desire for Deterrence: By responding swiftly and forcefully, states aim to deter further hostile actions by their rivals. This deterrence strategy is meant to signal resolve and prevent the crisis from escalating. Maintaining Credibility: Leaders want to maintain credibility both domestically and internationally. Swift and decisive action can demonstrate strength and resolve, bolstering a state’s reputation. Historical Precedents: Past experiences of defection and crisis in the relationship contribute to a pattern of fast-paced spill-back effects. These historical precedents shape decision-making and responses (Fig. 6.1).

27 E. Sridharan, “Economic Cooperation and Security Spill-Overs: The Case of India and Pakistan,” Stimson Center, February 2011, pp. 59–98.

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Influencing Conditions Lack of Loyalty

-Trust Deficit

-Defection

Absence of Confidence Building Measures

Ruptured Cooperative Agreement

Proliferation Spill-Back

Fast Spill-Back -Foreign Policy

-Domestic Policy

-Crisis Dynamics

-Leadership Roles

-Misperceptions

-Acute Insecurity

Fig. 6.1 Proliferation-related spill-back effect

Summary The chapter has probed the concept of spill-back policy, which comes into play when a cooperative arrangement is ruptured due to geographical or political factors caused by a member state. This concept serves as a counterpart to the spill-over effects discussed earlier, highlighting the intricate interplay between international relations and domestic policy. The connection between spill-back policies, negative reciprocity, the intertwining of foreign and domestic policy considerations, the role of crises, and the impact of misperceptions in shaping a state’s response when faced with a breached cooperative arrangement have been discussed. Furthermore, the swiftness with which states affected by such breaches react, a phenomenon termed “fast-paced spill-back,” was examined. This rapid response is characterized by immediate and assertive actions taken by the aggrieved state. These actions are influenced by a range of factors, including domestic political considerations, the erosion of trust between the involved parties, pressing security concerns, the need to deter further hostile actions, the desire to maintain credibility, and the weight of historical precedents. This discussion provides a theoretical framework for understanding why a state, particularly in the context of nuclear proliferation, may renew

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its interest in pursuing such capabilities when confronted with defections in a cooperative nuclear deal. Ultimately, spill-back policies and their expeditious nature shed light on the complexities of international relations, where the rupture of cooperative arrangements can swiftly lead to a resurgence of hostilities and a reevaluation of a state’s strategic objectives. These dynamics are instrumental in comprehending the intricate dance of cooperation, defection, and swift reciprocity in the realm of global politics. A state’s adoption of a spill-back policy is intended to shift its attention toward proliferation, while the swift progression of the spill-back process is influenced by the factors outlined in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 7

Fractured Deal and Triggers to Renewed Proliferation Interest

This chapter marks the culmination of the theoretical framework previously discussed in the two preceding chapters. It explores how various factors, including long-running rivalries, nuclear latency, the desire to regain prestige and identity, and the pursuit of trade and aid benefits, contribute to a state’s renewed nuclear ambition. Additionally, it emphasizes the role of major power dynamics and differences in shaping the conditions for renewed proliferation ambitions. By clearly defining the hypotheses and the relationships between these variables, it establishes a foundation for the subsequent chapters to look into specific case studies and empirical analyses. This structured approach will help readers understand the framework and its application in the context of the study.

Triggers to Renewed Proliferation Interest The research in this section addresses a fundamental question: “Under what conditions would a potential proliferator resume its nuclear ambitions when a nuclear agreement is fractured?” This question assumes two key points: first, that the nation’s original nuclear program had been halted or scaled back due to a prior nuclear agreement, and second, that the nation is inclined to resume its nuclear activities when the commitments of the agreement are disrupted by one or more parties. For instance, North Korea rekindled its nuclear ambitions when it perceived © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 S. Khan, The Iran Nuclear Deal, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50196-8_7

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the 1993 Agreed Framework as being fractured by the countries that helped establish it. There is substantial evidence to suggest that Tehran has taken steps to advance its nuclear program, as demonstrated and analyzed in the forthcoming case-study section, following the U.S. withdrawal from and fracture of the nuclear agreement. However, what motivates such nations to renew their nuclear ambitions simply because an agreement has been fractured? In other words, the agreement has not been terminated, nor has it become inoperative; it has simply deviated from its initial form. If, for instance, a Western liberal bloc country such as Germany, the United Kingdom, or France chose to withdraw from the nuclear agreement, would Tehran react in the same manner as it did, following Washington’s exit? Would Iran immediately opt to revert to nuclear proliferation if China or Russia withdrew from the agreement? This argument posits that while certain factors can ease a state’s renewed interest in proliferation, the question of renewed proliferation interest becomes more significant when the agreement is fractured by a state’s primary, long-standing rival. This forms the central platform from which renewed nuclear interest evolves. The lack of confidence in nuclear agreements, security arrangements, and integration frameworks is also pivotal in this context. An immediate shift toward a spill-back policy, as discussed in Chapter 5 concerning proliferation, is undertaken due to this fracture. What factors contribute to this confident pursuit of a spill-back policy? The facilitating factors bolster this spill-back policy and expedite the process of rapid proliferation under these circumstances. In other words, they provide a significant push to the state’s spill-back policy. The precipitating factor is the divergence among major powers regarding the nuclear issues related to the concerned state. When major powers within the agreement cannot reach a consensus on the nuclear issues involving the state for which the agreement was established, the concerned state perceives an opportunity to pursue its proliferation plans due to the existing discord among the agreement’s creators. To recap, when a primary long-standing rival state fractures a nuclear agreement, it sets off a chain of events that leads to a renewed interest in proliferation. This is primarily due to the increased sense of insecurity resulting from the rival’s exit and the severe erosion of trust in the cooperative arrangement. Consequently, an immediate shift toward a “spill back” policy occurs. This renewed interest in nuclear proliferation and the subsequent spill-back policy are influenced by four key facilitating

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factors: the presence of enduring rivalries, the nation’s status as a nuclearcapable but latent state, the desire to regain lost prestige and identity through assertive actions, and the pursuit of economic benefits and aid. Moreover, the precipitating factor, which involves major powers within the agreement disagreeing on the nuclear issues related to the concerned state, creates an environment conducive to pursuing this renewed nuclear policy. A comprehensive understanding of these factors and their interconnectedness is crucial for comprehending the framework of renewed proliferation ambitions in a potential proliferator. Two terminologies need to be operationalized at the outset—a fractured nuclear deal and renewed nuclear ambition. A “fractured nuclear deal” refers to a significant alteration in the state of a nuclear agreement from its original form. This transformation occurs due to either a “functional spill-back” or a “geographical spill-back” policy initiated by one or more states involved in the agreement, as stated in the previous chapter. In essence, when a nuclear deal is established, it outlines the participating actors and the intended goals. A “geographical spill-back” takes place when, in the post-deal period, the number of participating actors decreases, which may not be acceptable to the state for which the deal was initially designed. This becomes particularly concerning when the defector initiating the geographical spill-back is a rival state. For example, the US’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018 serves as a prominent example. On the other hand, “functional spill-back” occurs when one or more states within the agreement decide not to honor their commitments as outlined in the deal.1 For instance, in the case of the Agreed Framework, the U.S. and Japan failed to fulfill their commitments by not delivering Light Water Reactors to North Korea within the agreed-upon timeframe.

1 It can be argued that geographical spill-back and functional spill-back are intrinsically connected since a county that decides to not live up to its commitments to a deal may decide to exit from the deal. In other words, when a country exits from the deal, it has, in fact, also created a functional spill-back, However, the study uses the two separately because it is no point discussing a state’s disregard for its commitments pertaining to the deal when it exits from it. Its disregard is obvious due to its decision to exit from the deal. Thus, functional spill-back is used to understand that a country does not fully abide by the norms of a deal, but remains in the deal nonetheless.

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“Renewed nuclear ambition” refers to the revival of a state’s nuclear program that had previously been restricted, halted, or concealed. Essentially, this implies that the concerned state had the potential to pursue nuclear proliferation before implementing restrictions. It decided to veil its nuclear program, either as a unilateral decision, in response to international pressure, or as part of its commitments to a nuclear agreement. For example, shortly after the Islamic Revolution, Iran chose to stall its nuclear program based on the government’s ideological stance that a nuclear program was incompatible with its interpretation of Islam. Aspiring proliferators have also concealed their nuclear programs under international pressure, as seen in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s rule. States may also make a calculated choice to cap their nuclear programs as part of their commitments to a nuclear agreement. North Korea, for instance, expressed its intention to dismantle its nuclear weapons program as part of its deal with the U.S. and its allies, such as South Korea and Japan. As for “nuclear ambition,” it primarily refers to a program that is suspected of having military applications. Suspicion can arise due to the level of a state’s nuclear enrichment, which exceeds civilian needs, or due to the existence of a secretive program or facility that it refuses to allow inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Beyond Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, India, Pakistan, and Israel have also been associated with suspicious nuclear programs for extended periods. India and Pakistan ultimately conducted nuclear weapons tests in 1998, while Israel is considered a nuclear proliferator, though it has not formally declared or officially tested its nuclear weapons. The subsequent sections analyze the facilitating factors that contribute to the dynamics of a fractured nuclear deal and renewed nuclear ambition. These factors include enduring rivalries, the presence of nuclear latency, the significance of asserting oneself to regain lost prestige and identity, and the pursuit of trade and aid benefits. Long-Standing Rivalries as Catalysts When states find themselves embroiled in long-running conflicts, their inclination toward nuclear proliferation tends to increase. The more conflicts they are entangled in, the greater the likelihood of them pursuing

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nuclear weapons.2 This propensity is further amplified when regional states are engaged in conflicts with superpowers that possess nuclear arsenals. Simultaneous conflicts with major and minor regional powers that might be pursuing nuclear capabilities exacerbate this situation. Additionally, when these conflict rivals are allies, the likelihood of a state resorting to proliferation for deterrence purposes significantly rises.3 In dealing with an external threat in an asymmetric conflict, the lesser state typically faces three primary strategic options. First, it can choose to bandwagon with the source of the threat, essentially aligning itself with the stronger rival. Second, it may adopt a buck-passing strategy, seeking to rely on other states to counterbalance the threat while it takes a more passive or opportunistic role. Finally, the lesser state can opt to balance against the threat using its own capabilities, which may involve building up its military strength or forming alliances with like-minded actors to resist the threat independently. These options depend on the specific circumstances, regional dynamics, and the perceived risks and benefits for the lesser state. In the face of an external threat in an asymmetric conflict, lesser states like North Korea and Iran are unlikely to bandwagon with the source of the threat, such as the United States, due to deeply entrenched conflicts and perceived aggression. Buck-passing is also not a viable option as they cannot rely on other states to protect their interests in a complex, multipower region with unclear responsibilities and cross-cutting cleavages. Moreover, no other Asian country desires direct conflict with the US, making buck-passing infeasible for North Korea. Similarly, Iran lacks a regional state engaged in a long-running conflict with the US capable of deterring it. Thus, these states are compelled to rely on their own capabilities, including the aspiration to acquire nuclear weapons, as a strategic response to balance the persistent threat posed by their principal long-running rival, the United States. Indeed, balancing is often the most viable strategy for a state facing a long-running rival, particularly when that rival is a superpower. Balancing can take two main forms: internal and external. Internally, a state can 2 Saira Khan, Nuclear Proliferation Dynamics in Protracted Conflict Regions: A Comparative Study of South Asia and the Middle East (London and Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2002). 3 For detailed analysis, see Saira Khan, Iran and Nuclear Weapons: Protracted Conflict and Proliferation (London and New York: Routledge, 2010 and 2011).

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enhance its military capabilities through military buildup, technological advancements, and training to better defend itself against the external threat. Externally, a state can engage in balancing by forming alliances and partnerships with other nations that share similar security concerns, thus collectively strengthening their position vis-à-vis the threat. As noted by Iran specialist Karim Sadjadpour, Iran’s strategic isolation and a multitude of adversaries have driven it to primarily rely on its own capabilities for defense. He states that “Iran is one of the most strategically lonely countries in the world. It considers dozens of countries around the world its adversary, and its only reliable friend has been the Assad regime in Syria.”4 This context has contributed to Iran’s interest in acquiring nuclear weapons as a means of bolstering its security and deterring external threats, particularly from long-running rivals like the United States. Internally, North Korea initiated its nuclear program in the 1950s with assistance from the Soviet Union, primarily to counter the nuclear threat posed by the United States, which originated from South Korea. The decision to pursue nuclear weapons was driven by the belief that they offered a more cost-effective means of defense compared to conventional weaponry. As technology advanced, the cost of developing and deploying nuclear weapons became increasingly affordable for states. While it’s acknowledged that nuclear weapons can incur significant long-term social costs, states facing immediate security threats may discount these costs in the short term.5 Consequently, North Korea chose to internally balance its rival by acquiring nuclear capabilities. However, this motivation to possess nuclear weapons can be altered, stalled, or even reversed in some cases through security agreements or assurances. When lesser states face economic hardship due to sanctions imposed by Western nations due to their proliferation ambitions, they may consider the possibility of negotiating nuclear agreements to secure sanctions relief and economic benefits. Such agreements serve two primary purposes: they help revive their struggling economies, which can lead to changes in their domestic and international standing, and they temporarily reduce their security concerns in relation to their long-standing rival. Typically, states deter 4 “Iran Lacks Allies in Confronting the U.S.,” The Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2020. 5 Weiqi Zhang, “Neither Friend nor Big Brother: China’s Role in North Korean Foreign Policy Strategy,” Palgrave Communications, February 13, 2018.

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aggression from their adversaries by either possessing nuclear weapons or displaying intentions to do so. Effective nuclear agreements are likely to prevent conflicts, rendering the pursuit of nuclear weapons programs less strategically advantageous. In a nutshell, the establishment of nuclear agreements typically leads to an improvement in the overall security of the state for which the agreement is primarily intended. When a superpower, which is a long-standing rival, is a party to the agreement, it is expected that the concerned state will become less concerned about its other ongoing conflicts. This is because possessing deterrent capabilities to prevent wars in those conflict scenarios may be less necessary, as the principal rival, as part of the deal, can manage both major and minor regional powers. While these security improvements may not be explicitly outlined in the agreement, it aligns with the superpower’s strategic interests to maintain peace and security in the state for which the agreement was established, ensuring that the obligations of the deal are upheld. Consequently, the state, in all likelihood, will be a committed participant in the realm of non-proliferation. The primary motivation for pursuing nuclear weapons, which is to deter wars in conflict settings where hostilities can easily erupt,6 becomes less relevant when the state’s overall security is enhanced through the agreement. Moreover, concessions are often sought through proliferation threats, but when a deal provides economic assistance, these threats are no longer necessary. When the principal power withdraws from an agreement that the concerned state originally accepted due to the presence of this principal power and the implicit security guarantees it could offer against other rivals, the concerned state may lose interest in remaining within the cooperative arrangement or adhering to the established norms and commitments of the deal. In this context, the presence of other states that are parties to the agreement becomes less significant compared to the presence of the global rival. Consequently, the state once again finds itself in need of a deterrent capability against its primary global and regional

6 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House,

1979), p. 188; Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 50–51; Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security, 21(3), Winter 1996/1997.

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conflict rivals. The necessity to deter adversaries through the acquisition of nuclear weapons is as pressing as it was in the pre-deal period. It is argued that “Few relationships are as adversarial as that of the US and Iran, with Iran characterized for public consumption as the Evil Empire and the US the Great Satan. There has been plenty of duplicity and destructiveness on both sides since the Iranian Revolution rose against the Shah in 1979 and took US diplomats hostage. The resulting militant theocracy has been hostile to the US and Israel, and a sponsor of terrorism and Shia militias that have fired and fanned the flames of war in the predominantly Sunni Middle East region ever since. And each time the US or Iran has tried to connect with the other, deepened mutual distrust has run the effort into the ground.”7 A fractured nuclear deal exacerbates the situation for potential proliferators, making them even more resolute in deterring their long-standing adversaries from initiating wars. This determination arises because the adversary’s hostile intentions and aggressive stance are evident through its withdrawal from the agreement. Iran’s decision to resume uranium enrichment after the U.S. exited from the deal serves as a validation of this point. Similarly, when the principal rival fails to uphold its commitments within the agreement, the lesser state becomes more susceptible to the prospect of proliferation. This process is notably more intense than the pre-deal period for the same aforementioned reason. North Korea’s inclination toward proliferation became notably stronger after the Agreed Framework collapsed due to the U.S. and Japan failing to fulfill their commitments as part of the agreement. Interestingly, this heightened interest gains momentum from the latent nuclear status that these potential proliferators possess during the period of the deal. In other words, the presence of nuclear latency contributes to the desire to pursue proliferation. Nuclear Latency as Drivers Latency represents a stage in the realm of proliferation characterized by a state’s technical capability to produce nuclear weapons. Proliferation is far from being a one-step endeavor; rather, it is a multifaceted process that spans from the early stages of development to the actual testing of nuclear 7 Jeremy Kinsman, “U.S. and Iran: A Diplomatic Lesson for Canada,” Policy Magazine, May/June 2015.

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weapons. An operational nuclear program encompasses various phases, including the need for delivery vehicles to transport these weapons and the requirement for an effective nuclear strategy and doctrine to establish a credible and operational nuclear arsenal. Interestingly, some regional states may find themselves unable to progress through the entire program, either due to financial constraints or the close scrutiny of the international community over their illicit proliferation activities. Furthermore, some states may not even have the intention of reaching the culmination of the nuclear program’s lifecycle. For instance, prior to North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2006, there was a belief that Pyongyang aimed to maintain its nuclear program’s existence to enhance its bargaining position with major powers, particularly the United States. Intriguingly, some suggested that Iran may not have had the intention of developing nuclear weapons because, if it did, it would not have taken this long for Tehran to achieve that goal. Perhaps Iran’s objective is to position itself as a “threshold’ nuclear state.”8 Proliferation of nuclear weapons follows a complex ladder of steps, including the development of nuclear infrastructure, acquisition of technology and knowledge, nuclear testing, deployment of delivery systems, formulation of a nuclear doctrine, building an arsenal, and establishing operational procedures. Nuclear testing is the pivotal threshold that marks a state’s transition to being a declared nuclear weapons state. These steps are demanding, requiring significant resources, technical expertise, and secrecy, which, coupled with international scrutiny, make them difficult to traverse. As a result, despite the proliferation aspirations of some states, only a handful have successfully navigated this intricate pathway to becoming nuclear weapons states, highlighting the formidable challenges inherent in nuclear proliferation. Indeed, regional contending states like Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, Argentina, Brazil, and others have expressed interest or pursued nuclear weapons programs at various points in history. However, the complexity of developing nuclear weapons, including the technical, financial, and political challenges, as well as the international non-proliferation efforts and diplomatic pressure, has deterred many of these states from successfully acquiring such capabilities. The global commitment to non-proliferation, coupled with the inherent difficulties and risks associated with nuclear weapons development, has played a 8 Gwynne Dyer, “Unravelling Iran’s Nuclear Threshold Game,” Bangkok Post, July 29, 2020.

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significant role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states, thus contributing to global security and stability. Proliferation can be likened to a ladder, with each rung representing a crucial stage in the development of a nuclear program. This ladder consists of several steps, including: Nuclear Infrastructure: Establishing the necessary infrastructure for a nuclear program, including facilities for producing weapons-grade materials, such as separation plants for plutonium or uranium enrichment facilities. Acquisition of Technology: Acquiring the technical knowledge and designs required for building nuclear weapons. Full-Scale Nuclear Testing: Conducting full-scale nuclear tests, a significant milestone that officially designates a state as a nuclear-armed nation. Means of Delivery: Developing the means to deliver nuclear weapons, whether through aircraft capable of carrying nuclear payloads like F16s or through missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. Nuclear Doctrine: Formulating a nuclear doctrine that outlines the role and rules governing the use of nuclear weapons within a country’s overall national security strategy. Building a Nuclear Arsenal: Establishing a stockpile of nuclear weapons to support the nuclear doctrine. Deployment: Implementing operational procedures for handling and deploying nuclear weapons. Among these stages, nuclear testing serves as a critical threshold in the proliferation ladder. Every proliferator, whether vertical—existing nuclear states seeking to enhance their capabilities—or horizontal—states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons for the first time—must progress through these stages to become a nuclear power. These steps are far from easy, especially for potential proliferators whose covert nuclear activities are closely monitored by the international community. If proliferation were a straightforward process, the world would likely have seen many more nuclear-armed states instead of the handful that currently exist. Regional contenders like Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, Argentina, Brazil, and others would have likely achieved nuclear status by now if nuclear weapons programs were not as complex as they are. Three primary proliferation stages are identified here. The first stage represents the early phase of nuclear program development, characterized by the presence of a nuclear infrastructure and the likely existence

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of facilities for producing weapons-grade materials. During this stage, a state may have recently acquired a separation plant but has not significantly advanced its uranium enrichment activities. This phase is marked by the interest of external powers in offering incentives to encourage nuclear aspirants to dismantle their proliferation programs, and these incentives often take the form of concessions. Concessions can manifest as security assurances, either positive or negative, and/or economic benefits. Consequently, concessions are most substantial when states are in the early stages of developing their nuclear programs. This is because, during this period, it is relatively easier to reverse the program and impose non-proliferation measures on the aspirant. Since the investments made in the program are minimal compared to the later stages, there is a higher likelihood that the aspirant will reconsider its choices. The financial losses incurred at this stage may not be as significant as they would be in the later phases. It is also during this stage that states seeking to engage with the proliferant can offset the financial losses that the latter may experience due to dismantlement. However, it is important to note that states receive concessions only if they hold strategic importance in a region, there are credible reasons to suspect their intentions to develop nuclear weapons, and their decisions regarding proliferation could potentially trigger a domino effect in the region or have implications for extra-regional stability, leading to regional instability. The second stage represents a phase where nuclear technological knowledge and design have been effectively mastered, and uranium enrichment programs are operational. This stage is particularly alarming to the international community when it becomes known. To prevent would-be proliferators from further advancing their nuclear capabilities, various forms of sanctions—economic, political, and diplomatic—are imposed on these states. The belief is that sanctions will deter these determined states from fully pursuing nuclear weapon development. The IAEA endeavors to gather information about a state’s nuclear program, but it cannot conduct intrusive investigations without the invitation of the concerned state. Consequently, major powers have no choice but to resort to coercive measures, such as sanctions, to attempt to roll back the nuclear programs of states engaged in illicit nuclear activities. Notable examples of states subjected to sanctions during this stage of their nuclear weapons programs include Pakistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the U.S. obtained knowledge about its nuclear weapons capability. Other instances involve Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, among others.

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Interestingly, there are occasions when a combination of concessions and sanctions are used during this stage to dissuade the proliferation aspirant from crossing the nuclear weapons testing threshold. For instance, North Korea in 1993 and Pakistan before conducting its nuclear tests following India’s tests in May 1998 are notable cases. In both situations, the U.S. sought negotiations with these countries to prevent them from crossing the testing threshold. In essence, both incentives and penalties may be employed during this stage of the program, although sanctions are typically preferred. Deals are often struck during this stage, and it is also the point at which states may unilaterally become latent proliferators due to their benign intentions or international pressure. Alternatively, they may be compelled to legitimize this status through a nuclear agreement, as was the case with Iran and the Iran deal of 2015. The third stage signifies that states have successfully crossed the nuclear threshold, which means they have conducted nuclear weapons tests. At this point, there is typically nothing left to negotiate, and these states are viewed unfavorably by the international community. They often face sanctions and are regarded as disruptors in the global system. The act of conducting nuclear tests does not elevate their status in the international arena. For example, both India and Pakistan faced sanctions after they tested their nuclear weapons in 1998. The status of latent states can remain static primarily under various conditions: Satisfaction with Civilian Nuclear Program: Some states may possess the technical capacity for nuclear weapons due to technological advancements but have no intention of pursuing nuclear weapons. They may be content with the civilian aspects of their nuclear program, such as nuclear energy generation or medical applications. These states have no motivation to cross the nuclear weapons threshold. Intentional Latency for Deterrence: Certain states intentionally choose to remain in a latent nuclear status as a means of establishing a deterrent capability against potential rivals. They may believe that the mere possession of latent nuclear capabilities can serve as a deterrent, discouraging aggression from adversaries. It is important to note that having the technical capability to build nuclear weapons and having the intent to possess them are not always

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aligned.9 In the context of proliferation risk assessment, it is important to consider both technical capability and intent. A capability decision, when a country sets out to develop and increase its latent capacity, “is analytically distinct from a proliferation decision, when the ultimate goal is possession of at least one functional nuclear weapon.”10 The decision to pursue nuclear weapons, known as a “proliferation decision,” thus, involves the ultimate goal of possessing at least one functional nuclear weapon. A useful framework to analyze a country’s proliferation decisionmaking is therefore that of “technical capability plus intent.” Latent proliferators, which have the potential to develop nuclear weapons but choose not to do so, generally do not have the motivation to cross the threshold into becoming nuclear-armed states. Examples of latent nuclear-capable states include Japan, Germany, and the Netherlands, among others. Japan, for instance, maintains a latent proliferator status, as it possesses the technical capacity to develop nuclear weapons but has consistently expressed its non-proliferation intentions. Japan is a signatory to the NPT and has implemented the IAEA Additional Protocol, allowing for more intrusive nuclear inspections. Additionally, Japan has concluded bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements with several countries, further underscoring its commitment to non-proliferation. Over more than six decades, Japan has demonstrated its firm stance on remaining a non-nuclear weapon state. Similarly, Germany has a welldeveloped scientific and technological base that could support a nuclear program if deemed necessary, but its actions and policies align with maintaining latent status. Canada, with its advanced nuclear technology base and uranium reserves, is another example of a latent proliferator that has consistently maintained its benign latency status. It has a developed nuclear technology base, which revolves around its domestically developed civilian Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) power reactor technology and large uranium reserves. CANDU reactors are heavy water designs that are fueled by natural uranium dioxide. Canada is currently

9 See Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security, 21(3), Winter 1996–1997. 10 Michael Malyshev, “Nuclear Latency and the Future Strategic Environment,” Strategic Insights, The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2015. https://www.files.ethz. ch/isn/189512/Nuclear%20latency%20and%20the%20future%20strategic%20environment. pdf.

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the world’s largest producer of uranium, accounting for 32 percent of world production.11 Latent states’ status can remain static when their stated policies and actions align, reflecting a commitment to maintaining their latent, nonnuclear weapon status. India and Pakistan both remained in a state of opacity regarding their nuclear programs until they conducted nuclear tests in 1998. Prior to their tests, they were considered latent proliferators with the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons but had not officially crossed the threshold. However, their nuclear tests transformed them into declared nuclear-armed states. Israel, on the other hand, continues to maintain its opaque proliferator status. While technically a latent proliferator, Israel has deliberately chosen not to openly declare its possession of nuclear weapons. This choice reflects its unique strategic and security considerations. It is also important to distinguish between latent proliferators and induced proliferators, as these terms describe different categories of states with varying motivations and circumstances related to their nuclear programs: Latent proliferators are states that possess the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons but have not officially crossed the threshold to become declared nuclear-armed states. They may or may not have the intent to acquire nuclear weapons. Examples of latent proliferators include Japan, Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands. These states are primarily characterized by their latent nuclear capacity. Induced proliferators are states that are pressured or influenced to change their latent proliferator status or have demonstrated their intent to proliferate due to specific factors, typically related to the actions or nuclear capabilities of rival states. Their decision to pursue nuclear weapons is often a response to the perceived threat posed by their nuclear-armed adversaries. Examples of induced proliferators include India and Pakistan, which developed nuclear weapons in response to each other’s capabilities and regional security dynamics. The central point to emphasize is that induced proliferators are usually engaged in protracted conflicts and are inherently prone to proliferation 11 Michael Malyshev, “Nuclear Latency and the Future Strategic Environment,” Strategic Insights, The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2015. https://www.files.ethz. ch/isn/189512/Nuclear%20latency%20and%20the%20future%20strategic%20environment. pdf.

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due to security concerns. The quest for nuclear weapons in such cases is primarily a function of their conflict engagements. However, the presence of a nuclear umbrella provided by a nuclear-armed ally can potentially deter induced proliferators from pursuing their own nuclear weapons. Iran represents a unique case as it is considered a latent proliferator and a candidate for induced proliferation. Iran’s latent status is based on its technical nuclear capacity, while its potential for induced proliferation is linked to regional security dynamics, including the presence of nuclear-armed neighbors. Situational factors, also referred to as precipitating factors, can play a critical role in shaping a state’s nuclear status. These factors occur when a situation or event forces a state to reconsider its nuclear status, which may have otherwise remained latent. For instance, a state with the technical capacity to build nuclear weapons may acquire an ambiguous nuclear status if specific circumstances compel it to consider a different status. However, it must be noted that situational factors can only influence a state’s nuclear status if the capacity to develop nuclear weapons already exists. The role of a major global power like the United States is pivotal in shaping the security and nuclear policies of states. Its influence, whether through coercion, diplomacy, or alignment with regional actors, can significantly impact a state’s choices and its position within the international community. The dynamics between major global powers and other states are central to understanding the complex landscape of international security and nuclear proliferation. Nuclear deals, such as the Iran nuclear deal, can be significant situational factors that affect a state’s latency status. When compelling and formal, these deals can shape a state’s nuclear status and provide a recognized framework for its intentions. A nuclear deal can be accepted by a state under various pressures, both domestic and international. The deal’s terms and timeframe can play a role in influencing a state’s decision to accept and abide by it. Domestic consensus may be easier to achieve when the status change can be reversed with the termination of the deal. In the case of Iran, the Iran nuclear deal compelled the country to accept a formal status of recognized latency. The deal was negotiated by a group of countries and had specific terms and timeframes that influenced Iran’s nuclear status. Iran’s acceptance of this status was not self-generated but a result of the pressure and negotiations involved in the JCPOA.

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Latency indeed poses significant challenges and concerns for policymakers, especially when states have capped their nuclear programs under pressure, but retain the capability and potential to quickly resume their pursuit of nuclear weapons if they choose to do so. Forced latency can be particularly concerning when a country is involved in a long-running conflict, as the desire to acquire a nuclear deterrent capability may be deeply embedded for security reasons. The consequences of forced latency in such situations could have significant implications. Overall, the status of being a latent proliferator highlights the complex interplay of technological, political, and strategic factors in the realm of nuclear proliferation, and it underscores the importance of international efforts to manage and monitor states in this category to prevent the resurgence of nuclear ambitions. The concept of latency in the context of nuclear proliferation highlights the potential risks associated with states that have the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons but have chosen to restrain themselves for various reasons. Following are some key points regarding the dangers of latency: Opportunistic Proliferation: States that have latent nuclear capabilities can quickly seize opportunities to advance their nuclear programs when the need or desire arises. This opportunistic approach can be triggered by changes in regional security dynamics, shifts in the international political landscape, or perceived threats. Deal Breakdown: If a nuclear deal or agreement with regional or global powers breaks down, latent proliferators may feel that they have fewer reasons to adhere to the commitments of the deal. This can lead to a resurgence of their nuclear ambitions. Erosion of Commitment: The longer a state remains in a latent status, the more its commitment to non-proliferation norms may erode. This erosion can make it easier for the state to justify resuming its nuclear activities, especially if it perceives a lack of benefits or security assurances from the international community. Monitoring Challenges: Even when latent proliferators are subject to monitoring as part of a nuclear deal, they may exploit ambiguities or gaps in surveillance to advance their programs covertly. Monitoring can provide a false sense of security, as states may hide their true intentions. Regional Instability: Latent states engaged in long-running regional conflicts are particularly susceptible to shifting their latent status in

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response to changing security conditions. The desire to possess a nuclear deterrent in the face of ongoing conflicts can be a powerful motivator. Rapid Advancement: States with latent capabilities can rapidly advance their nuclear programs once they decide to do so. This poses a significant challenge for the international community, which may have limited time to respond effectively. In essence, latent nuclear capabilities can act as a latent threat to nonproliferation efforts. States that possess these capabilities may not remain dormant indefinitely, and when circumstances align with their interests, they can quickly transition from latent to active proliferators, as evident in the Iranian case. This underscores the importance of robust nonproliferation agreements, effective monitoring, and diplomatic efforts to prevent proliferation and promote regional stability.

Swaggering to Establish Lost Identity and Prestige Swaggering as a strategy to reestablish lost identity and prestige is a behavior typically observed in states engaged in rivalries or adversarial relationships with other countries. The central point to highlight is that states typically don’t engage in military “swaggering” when they don’t have rivalries with other nations. Take Canada, for instance; it doesn’t need to flaunt its nuclear potential to enhance its prestige vis-à-vis the United States or any other country because it does not have rival states within the international system. However, countries embroiled in regional or global conflicts often exhibit a penchant for such displays. As part of its national celebrations, India parades its new missiles to showcase its technological prowess, particularly to its primary adversaries, China and Pakistan. Similarly, some countries embark on nuclear programs and uranium enrichment to underscore their scientific and technological achievements. This serves a dual purpose: it exposes their scientific prowess to the global community, satisfying domestic bureaucratic politics, and elevates their regional and international standing, possibly leading to a more prestigious global identity. While much has been written about the motivation behind acquiring nuclear weapons for these reasons, it’s distinct from the “swagger” motivation discussed in this study concerning renewed nuclear ambitions. The key point here is that only states engaged in rivalries are more likely to opt for “swaggering” with nuclear weapons. Swaggering involves demonstrating a state’s military capabilities, including its nuclear arsenal, to its rival or adversaries. The primary

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purposes of such displays are deterrence, prestige enhancement, and identity reinforcement. One of the main objectives of swaggering is to deter rival states from taking aggressive actions. By flaunting its military strength, including nuclear weapons, a country aims to signal to its adversaries that any hostile actions will be met with a strong and effective response. Swaggering can also serve as a means to boost a nation’s prestige on the global stage. By demonstrating advanced military capabilities, especially in the field of nuclear technology, a state can gain recognition and respect from the international community. In some cases, states engage in swaggering to reinforce their national identity. Nuclear weapons, often seen as symbols of power and technological prowess, can play a role in shaping a country’s identity and self-perception. Interestingly, swaggering is most commonly observed in the context of rivalries, where two or more states have contentious relationships. In such situations, the desire to outdo or intimidate the rival leads to public displays of military might. Swaggering can also have domestic political implications. Leaders use displays of military strength, including nuclear capabilities, to bolster their standing at home and demonstrate their commitment to national security. Some countries, especially in the developing world, engage in nuclear proliferation partly to gain international recognition and elevate their status. Possessing nuclear weapons can lead to a shift in how a nation is perceived by the global community. Regional powers also engage in swaggering to assert their dominance in their immediate neighborhood, although his can create tensions and escalatory dynamics in regional security. North Korea is an isolated country with limited regional support. Its swaggering with nuclear capabilities aims to attract global attention, secure economic aid, and negotiate from a position of perceived strength. Pakistan has historically engaged in swaggering, especially in the context of the Kashmir issue. It uses its nuclear capabilities to assert its importance in regional conflicts and enhance its prestige. Other states, often with rich historical and cultural legacies, engage in swaggering to reclaim a prestigious identity that they believe has been eroded or tarnished. These countries may feel insulted by their portrayal as rogue or pariah states and use nuclear capabilities to restore their self-image. Iran boasts one of the world’s oldest continuous civilizations, dating back to ancient times. “Iran is home to one of the world’s oldest continuous major civilizations, with historical and urban settlements dating back to

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7000 BC.”12 In the face of international isolation and negative perceptions, Iran may resort to nuclear swaggering to reestablish its historical and prestigious identity, challenging the pariah state label. In both categories, the connection between prestige and identity is significant. States aim to use nuclear capabilities not only as tools of deterrence, but also as symbols of their national pride and historical significance. The act of swaggering with nuclear weapons serves as a means to assert their importance, negotiate better terms in international relations, and regain lost prestige on the global stage. Understanding these motivations is crucial for analyzing the behavior of states engaged in nuclear proliferation and their interactions with the international community. The significance of the terms “lost” and “reestablish” is pivotal in understanding this context. States often aspire to regain what was once within their possession but has since been lost, signifying their desire to restore and reclaim what has slipped from their grasp. In the realm of nuclear proliferation, this becomes particularly problematic, as states in the arena of world politics inherently possess a natural instinct to recover what they perceive as their losses. Territorial disputes exemplify the most serious instances of this, as a state convinced it has lost land to another state is profoundly motivated to regain it. The imperative to reclaim lost territories fuels the adoption of new strategies and capabilities by states. A vivid illustration of this dynamic is the India-China conflict, where the memory of China’s surprise attack in 1962, resulting in the loss of a portion of Indian territory, remains etched in Indian consciousness. Similarly, the Arab–Israeli conflict operates on a zero-sum premise, driven by the Arab states’ determination to reacquire lost territories. The underlying principle is clear: anything that has been lost must be regained and reestablished. The concepts of “lost” and “reestablished” are indeed critical in understanding the motivations behind certain state actions, particularly in the context of territorial disputes and conflicts. These terms reflect the deeprooted desire of states to rectify historical grievances and regain what they perceive as rightfully theirs. Some key points to consider regarding these concepts are:

12 “New Evidence: Modern Civilization Began in Iran,” Xinhua, August 10, 2007.

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Territorial Loss and National Identity Territorial loss is often seen as a direct affront to a nation’s identity and sovereignty. When a state loses territory to another through conflict or historical events, it can lead to a sense of national humiliation and a desire to correct the perceived injustice. States may view the return of lost territory as not just a matter of practical importance but also as a matter of national pride and historical significance. The desire to regain lost territories can be deeply ingrained in a nation’s collective identity. Conflict and Strategies for Regaining Lost Territories Territorial disputes are among the most contentious and persistent conflicts in international relations. States may employ a variety of strategies, including diplomacy, negotiations, military force, and alliances, to regain control of lost territories. The pursuit of military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, can be motivated by a desire to strengthen a state’s position in territorial disputes. Possessing such capabilities can serve as a deterrent against further territorial encroachment. Zero-Sum Nature of Lost Territories Territorial disputes often take on a zero-sum character, where what is gained by one party is perceived as a loss by the other. In such situations, states are highly motivated to regain lost territories, and negotiations can be challenging due to the fixed-sum nature of the issue. Understanding the psychological and historical dimensions of territorial loss and the desire to reestablish lost territories is crucial for comprehending the motivations behind state actions, including their pursuit of military capabilities. It sheds light on why certain conflicts persist and why states may invest significant resources, including nuclear capabilities, in pursuit of their territorial objectives. The loss of identity and prestige is a deeply felt setback for certain states that once commanded global respect for their rich civilizations and identities but have seen these erode due to the policies of rivals or even their own contentious actions. The focus here isn’t on the reasons for their loss, but rather on acknowledging the fact that this loss has been intolerable

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to them. The underlying idea is that the unacceptable erosion of prestige or identity must be rectified. Iran, as previously mentioned, falls into this category, and its overarching objective is to reclaim the respect it once held, a move that would elevate its status both within its immediate region and on the international stage. When the goal is to recover lost identity and prestige, states often adopt a strategic policy of showcasing their military capabilities, a practice known as “swaggering.“ While there are alternative approaches, such as socio-economic and political development, that can be used to regain a lost identity, in today’s world, many states pursue swaggering and the acquisition of military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, as means to regain what they’ve lost. It’s argued that in Iran’s case, the pursuit of a nuclear program is closely tied to the aspiration to reverse past national humiliations, including historical events like the CIA’s overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 and the suffering endured from chemical weapons attacks by Iraq during the 1980–88 war. It is argued that “Iranians have experienced humiliations linked to the decline of the Persian Empire and more recently to the CIA’s overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 and the suffering of chemical weapons attacks by Iraq in the 1980–1988 war. Iran’s nuclear program aims significantly at reversing the national humiliations suffered and restore to Iran a sense of pride and prestige that comes with mastering nuclear physics.”13 Thus, Iran’s nuclear program is seen as a pathway to restoring a sense of pride and prestige linked to the mastery of nuclear physics. According to Homeira Moshirzadeh,14 the Iranian political elite’s discourse on the nuclear issue is shaped by two overarching “metadiscourses”: the discourse of independence and the discourse of resistance. These meta-discourses provide the framework for understanding Iran’s foreign policy in general, with a particular focus on its nuclear policy. The discourse of independence draws from various narratives, such as Iran’s glorious historical past, its historical victimization at the hands of invaders, and its experiences with colonial and imperial powers. Each of these narratives contributes to the discourse of independence by shaping elements of Iranian identity. The emphasis on a glorious past, for example, fosters national pride and self-confidence and showcases Iran’s 13 Thomas E. Doyle, “The Iranian Nuclear Controversy is also about Saving Face,” Washington Post, April 12, 2015. 14 Homeira Moshirzadeh, “The Discursive Foundations of Iran’s Nuclear Policy.” Security Dialogue 38(4), 2007, p. 528.

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potential as a great power. The narrative of victimization underscores Iran’s historical vulnerability due to recurrent invasions, often attributed to its geographical location.15 This narrative contributes to the perception of enduring insecurity. Lastly, the narrative of Iran’s colonial and imperial encounters highlights the suffering inflicted by European powers through invasion, intervention, and economic dominance from the nineteenth century onward. This narrative serves to explain Iran’s perceived underdevelopment, dependency, and weakness in the twentieth century, attributed to foreign interference.16 Unlike most proliferation aspirants, Iran’s unique historical experiences of humiliation, coupled with its rich civilization and Persian identity, have become driving factors behind its pursuit of nuclear capabilities. Acquiring nuclear capabilities is seen as a means to reestablish and consolidate these aspects of identity, particularly in the absence of alternative mechanisms. Further analysis of this complex dynamic is provided in the case-study chapter. This situation is exacerbated when Iran’s rich identity faces further insult, especially in the aftermath of its rival’s defection from a nuclear deal. In response, the resolve to showcase nuclear capabilities and regain lost prestige and identity becomes even more pressing. The case-study section examines how this factor applies to the Iranian context. The quest to regain lost identity and prestige is a powerful motivating factor for some states, particularly those with rich historical civilizations that feel they have suffered humiliations or setbacks in their modern history. This desire to restore a sense of national pride and prestige often shapes their foreign policy and can be a driving force behind their pursuit of military capabilities, including nuclear weapons. Key points are: Loss of Prestige and Identity: States that have experienced historical setbacks, invasions, or colonial domination may perceive a loss of prestige and identity. This loss can be deeply ingrained in the collective consciousness of the nation and can be seen as an affront to the country’s historical legacy. Swaggering as a Strategy: Swaggering, in the form of demonstrating military capabilities or pursuing advanced technologies like nuclear weapons, can be a deliberate strategy to regain lost prestige and assert 15 Homeira Moshirzadeh, ‘‘The Discursive Foundations of Iran’s Nuclear Policy,” Security Dialogue 38(4), 2007, p. 529. 16 Homeira Moshirzadeh, “The Discursive Foundations of Iran’s Nuclear Policy,” Security Dialogue 38(4), 2007, p. 529.

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a powerful identity on the global stage. It is a way to demonstrate to the world that the state is capable, resilient, and deserving of respect. Impact of International Agreements: The defection of a rival state from international agreements, such as a nuclear deal, can exacerbate the desire to regain lost prestige. It can be interpreted as a further insult to the state’s identity and a breach of trust, leading to a more urgent pursuit of military capabilities. Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities is often seen in this context. The historical narratives of Iran’s glorious past, victimization, and encounters with colonial powers contribute to its desire to regain a sense of national pride and prestige through mastering nuclear physics. The case of Iran provides a compelling illustration of how historical grievances can shape a state’s nuclear ambitions. The desire to regain lost identity and prestige is a potent motivator for certain states in the realm of international politics. This motivation can drive them to pursue military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, as a means to achieve their goals and restore their standing in the world. Understanding this dynamic is essential for comprehending their strategic choices and actions. Desire to Obtain Trade and Aid Benefits as Drivers Some regional states have pursued nuclear proliferation for economic and trade-related reasons.17 Particularly, developing countries and those facing status issues have sought to acquire nuclear weapons not only for security concerns but also for political recognition and economic advantages. With the exception of India, most proliferators have been motivated by these considerations alongside their security interests. Even when their primary objective wasn’t economic gain, countries have sometimes realized the economic benefits that come with nuclear weapons capabilities or weapons and consequently pursued them. For instance, although Iran initially had the financial means to develop nuclear weapons independently, it recognized the advantages of securing aid by using the threat of acquiring nuclear weapons, similar to how Pakistan and North Korea

17 George Quester, “Reducing the Incentives to Proliferation,” Annals, 430, March 1977; William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: An Interdisciplinary Perspective (Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982); Michael Mazarr, “Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea,” International Security, 20(2), Fall 1995.

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bargained with Western powers. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that states will consider reaping economic benefits when contemplating the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Moreover, when sanctions persist over extended periods, the financial burden becomes overwhelming, and states may seek economic benefits through sanctions relief, trade opportunities, and aid packages in exchange for concessions in the realm of nuclear proliferation. In essence, leveraging nuclear threats to obtain economic aid becomes an appealing strategy. Likewise, lesser states in the international system, aiming to enhance their international recognition and elevate their status, may use the nuclear threat as a means to attain these benefits. Iran, for instance, found itself in a position where it needed to bolster its status and gain international recognition following years of holding a lesser regional and global standing in the post-Islamic revolution era, as discussed in the preceding section. The desire to obtain trade and aid benefits has been a motivating factor for some states in their pursuit of nuclear weapons. While security considerations are often paramount in such decisions, economic and political incentives can play a significant role. Following are the key points to understand this aspect: Economic and Trade Motivations: States, especially developing ones, may seek nuclear weapons as a means to enhance their economic prospects. The acquisition of nuclear capabilities can potentially open doors to trade relationships and economic benefits. Access to nuclear technology and the status of a nuclear-armed state can make a country more appealing to potential economic partners. Political Recognition: For some states, achieving nuclear status is not just about security; it’s also a way to gain political recognition on the international stage. Being recognized as a nuclear-armed state can elevate a country’s status and influence in global affairs, potentially leading to economic benefits and increased trade opportunities. Bargaining Power: States may use the threat of acquiring nuclear weapons as a bargaining tool in negotiations with other countries or international organizations. They can leverage their nuclear ambitions to secure economic aid, trade agreements, or sanctions relief. North Korea and Pakistan are examples of countries that used their nuclear ambitions to negotiate for economic benefits. Both countries faced sanctions and international isolation but sought economic incentives in exchange for concessions in their nuclear programs.

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Sanctions Relief : When faced with protracted sanctions, states may see the acquisition of nuclear capabilities as a means to obtain sanctions relief. The promise of denuclearization or halting nuclear activities can be used as leverage to negotiate economic benefits. Status Elevation: States that feel they have a lesser regional or global status may view nuclear weapons as a way to elevate their standing. Iran, for instance, sought to strengthen its international recognition and status through its nuclear program. While security concerns are typically the primary driver of a state’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons, economic and trade motivations can also be significant factors. The desire to obtain economic benefits, enhance political recognition, and leverage nuclear ambitions in negotiations can influence a state’s strategic choices in the realm of proliferation. Understanding these motivations is essential for comprehending the complex dynamics of nuclear proliferation. The motivations for nuclear proliferation can be temporarily suppressed due to international pressures. However, it is crucial to recognize that once states understand they can gain economic benefits by leveraging the threat of acquiring nuclear weapons, they are likely to employ this strategy whenever possible. While a nuclear deal may initially temper such expectations, as the deal itself offers economic and trade advantages through financial aid or the lifting of sanctions and provides avenues for international recognition and status elevation, a breach of the deal can reignite the state’s inclination to use the nuclear threat for economic gain. In fact, at this stage, the state’s interest in wielding the nuclear threat becomes even more pronounced due to its frustration with the dealbreaker and the tensions that arise from the deal’s fracture. Furthermore, the breakdown of trust between the parties involved in the deal fosters an environment where disregarding ethical conduct in international affairs may appear acceptable. Complying with the expectations of the dealmakers loses significance, and consequently, the old practice of making threats through nuclear program development and capability acquisition reverts to the norm. Iran seems to be currently applying these principles as it focuses on its nuclear weapons program. The primary purpose of the Iran nuclear deal was “a quid pro quo: Iran agrees to nuclear restrictions in exchange for the financial benefits of sanctions relief, which would

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amount to billions and billions of dollars.”18 The primary objective then of the Iran nuclear deal was a mutual agreement: Iran accepted nuclear restrictions in exchange for the substantial economic benefits of sanctions relief, amounting to billions of dollars. Now that this possibility has faded, Iran is likely to seek to use its nuclear capability as leverage to secure aid in return for nuclear concessions, wherever feasible. The dynamics of nuclear proliferation are indeed complex, and the desire to derive economic benefits or use the threat of nuclear weapons as leverage in international negotiations can be significant factors. States that have or aspire to have nuclear capabilities often recognize the economic leverage that comes with it. They understand that possessing nuclear weapons or pursuing nuclear programs can be a powerful bargaining chip in negotiations, especially when seeking economic benefits such as aid packages or the lifting of sanctions. Nuclear deals, like the Iran nuclear deal, are often structured as quid pro quo agreements. In exchange for nuclear restrictions and compliance, states may receive substantial economic benefits, including sanctions relief and financial aid. However, when such deals are fractured or abandoned, the incentive for states to revert to using their nuclear ambitions as leverage increases. The fracture of a nuclear deal leads to a breakdown of trust between parties. When trust erodes, states may feel less obligated to adhere to international norms and expectations. This can create a situation where they are more inclined to use their nuclear programs as threats or bargaining tools. The antagonism that follows the breakdown of a nuclear deal can amplify a state’s willingness to use nuclear threats. The sense of injustice or betrayal can motivate states to adopt a more assertive stance and seek compensation for perceived losses. States that feel they have been treated unfairly or faced breaches of trust may become more willing to engage in tactics that are considered ethically questionable on the international stage. This can include using nuclear ambitions as a means of coercion. Iran’s case is illustrative of these dynamics. The Iran nuclear deal was structured around economic benefits in exchange for nuclear restrictions. With the deal fractured, Iran may indeed seek to use its nuclear capabilities as a bargaining tool to obtain aid or concessions in various international negotiations. While nuclear proliferation is often driven by a complex interplay of security, prestige, and strategic considerations, the 18 Zach Beauchaml, “Trump’s Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal, Explained,” Vox, May 8, 2018.

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potential for economic benefits and the use of nuclear threats in negotiations are factors that cannot be underestimated. The fracture of nuclear deals can further amplify these motivations, leading to more assertive and aggressive postures by states seeking to safeguard their interests. Understanding these dynamics is essential for analyzing and addressing nuclear proliferation challenges in the modern world. Precipitating Factor: Differences Between the Major Powers in a Nuclear Deal When major powers are in alignment on a particular issue for which a deal has been struck, it becomes challenging for the involved actor to defect or pursue a policy of functional backtracking for any reason. Essentially, the state in question becomes concerned about alienating other major powers as potential allies by adopting a non-cooperative or belligerent stance. Examining the North Korean case during the 1993 Agreed Framework period and comparing it to the present illustrates this point clearly. With the end of the Cold War, Russia had limited influence to assert itself, and China, as a regional power, was not in a position to pursue an assertive foreign policy agenda as it found itself somewhat isolated within the communist bloc. Consequently, North Korea adopted a notably unique approach of appeasement toward the United States. In essence, as Russia was integrating into the capitalist and democratic Western system and China was fostering amicable relations with the US in a unipolar world, North Korea felt uneasy and somewhat compelled to engage with the US, Japan, and South Korea in the early 1990s. As part of the Agreed Framework, North Korea even began dismantling its nuclear program at that time, leading the world to believe that a non-democratic country could also act responsibly as a nuclear player. The reasons behind the subsequent failure of that deal are a separate matter, but it’s essential to note that North Korea appeared significantly more accommodating and cautious back then compared to its stance today. As Russia began to assert its influence and China appeared to distance itself from the US on critical security issues, North Korea grew more confident in restarting its nuclear weapons program. The “somewhat bipolar” dynamics of today’s global politics have made North Korea more comfortable and resolute in its position. North Korea understands that the US is unlikely to cross the threshold of war with North Korea, given the potential consequences for its largest trading partner, China. The economic interests and risks

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involved are too significant for the US. As a result, this gap between the major players in global politics has played a pivotal role in making North Korea uncompromising in its nuclear policies. The role of major powers and their alignment in international politics indeed plays a crucial role in shaping the behavior of states, especially when it comes to sensitive issues like nuclear proliferation. The North Korean case highlights the significance of these dynamics. The alignment of major powers can significantly influence the behavior of states involved in sensitive negotiations, particularly in the realm of nuclear diplomacy. When major powers are in agreement on a particular issue, it can create a united front that exerts pressure on other states to comply with international norms and agreements. The post-Cold War period witnessed significant shifts in the power dynamics among major states. Russia’s integration into the Western system and China’s cooperation with the United States in the early 1990s had a notable impact on North Korea’s willingness to engage in negotiations and compromise. The concept of a “somewhat bipolar” world order, where major powers have competing interests and alliances, can affect the confidence and behavior of states. In the case of North Korea, a perceived gap or misalignment among major powers might embolden the state to pursue its own interests more assertively, as it believes that the risks of facing a united front of major powers are reduced. Economic factors and trade relationships between states also play a significant role. North Korea’s reliance on China as its largest trading partner and economic lifeline can shape its calculations. The economic stakes involved can deter more aggressive actions by the United States. Security considerations are paramount in nuclear diplomacy. States may assess the potential risks and consequences of their actions, including the possibility of military conflict. North Korea’s confidence in its ability to deter military action by the United States, in part due to China’s position, can affect its nuclear policy. The evolving alignment of major powers and their stance on nuclear issues can have long-term implications for global security. States may adjust their policies and strategies based on their assessments of major power dynamics. Iran presents another compelling example. While Iran’s nuclear program or its resurgence is a matter of concern for both Russia and China, these major powers do not share the same perspective as the United States regarding Iran’s motivations and ambitions in the nuclear domain. The relationship between the US and Russia is strained, and China has its own set of economic, security, and political competitions

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with the US. As a result, this situation creates a favorable environment for Iran, as it doesn’t feel excessive anxiety about the prospect of its regional and global allies aligning with the US against Tehran on the Iranian nuclear issue. The differing perceptions and assessments of Iran’s nuclear ambitions among major powers, particularly the United States, Russia, and China, contribute to the complex dynamics surrounding the Iranian nuclear issue. These differences can impact the strategies and policies pursued by these countries in response to Iran’s nuclear program. While Russia and China may not fully support Iran’s nuclear program, they have their own interests and considerations. Both countries have economic ties with Iran and may be less inclined to take a confrontational stance against Tehran. Additionally, they may view Iran as a regional partner in some contexts, which influences their approach. The strained relationship between the United States and Russia can affect their cooperation on various international issues, including Iran’s nuclear program. Russia may use its position on Iran to assert its influence and counterbalance U.S. actions in other regions. China’s competition with the United States in economic, security, and political spheres can influence its stance on Iran’s nuclear program. Beijing may be cautious about aligning too closely with U.S. policies, especially if it perceives such alignment as detrimental to its own interests. Iran’s awareness of these differences and its strategic calculations regarding major power dynamics can shape its approach to nuclear negotiations. It may seek to exploit divergent viewpoints among major powers to gain leverage in negotiations or to avoid excessive pressure. The Iranian nuclear issue has significant regional implications. Iran’s neighbors and other regional powers closely monitor these dynamics, as they can impact regional stability, security, and the balance of power. Multilateral diplomacy involving the major powers, alongside other stakeholders, plays a crucial role in addressing the Iranian nuclear challenge. These negotiations often require complex diplomatic efforts to bridge differences and find common ground. The Iranian nuclear issue is embedded in a complex web of major power dynamics, differing interests, and regional implications. Understanding how these factors interact is essential for assessing the prospects of diplomatic resolutions and managing the broader geopolitical consequences of Iran’s nuclear program. The end of the Cold War was once seen as heralding the “end of history” and the cessation of great power competition. Unfortunately, the post-Cold War world did not fully live up to this expectation. Great power

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competition “never fully went away even during the post-Cold War era; they were simply muted.”19 By the defining features of the post-Cold War international system, great power rivalries, thus, never entirely disappeared even during the post-Cold War era; they were simply restrained by the defining characteristics of the international system at the time. The main aspect was that there was “simply the sheer margin of American dominance, which muted great power tensions by making it unprofitable for revisionist states—those states that had some grievance with the existing international system—to push back against that system as strongly as they might have liked to do. The Russians were strongly opposed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion from the mid-1990s onward—which they viewed as a form of geopolitical competition being waged against them by the United States—but they were powerless to do much about it. The Chinese never stopped wanting to retake Taiwan or to once again become the leading power in the Asia–Pacific, but they were constrained from pursuing that goal too openly or explicitly at a time when the U.S. military enjoyed a vast preponderance of power in that area.”20 The primary factor at play was the overwhelming margin of American dominance, which dampened great power tensions by rendering it unprofitable for revisionist states—those with grievances against the existing international system—to push back strongly against that system. For instance, the Russians vehemently opposed NATO expansion from the mid-1990s onwards, which they viewed as a form of geopolitical competition waged against them by the United States. However, they were largely powerless to take substantial action. Similarly, China never abandoned its desire to reunify with Taiwan or regain its status as the predominant power in the Asia–Pacific region. Still, it was constrained from pursuing these goals too openly or explicitly, especially during a period when the U.S. military held a vast preponderance of power in the region. One thing remained evident: both Russia and China had to exercise restraint in their belligerent policies because time was not on their side. They may have disagreed with the U.S. on critical security matters, but their ability to voice these disagreements aggressively was constrained

19 Hal Brands, “Six Propositions about Great-Power Competition and Revisionism in the 21st Century,” The Future of the Global Order Colloquium, Fall 2017. 20 Hal Brands, “Six Propositions about Great-Power Competition and Revisionism in the 21st Century,” The Future of the Global Order Colloquium, Fall 2017.

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by their own domestic and economic vulnerabilities. The United States enjoyed a unilateral moment of influence during this period. In today’s world politics, competition among major powers appears to be more open and intense compared to the immediate post-Cold War period. As Hal Brands aptly notes, “Great power competition has returned in fuller and sharper form today because the systemic conditions for such competition have become more favorable—and because some of the great hopes of the post-Cold War era have now been dashed.”21 While the United States remains the dominant power in the international system, its margin of dominance has diminished since the 1990s and early 2000s, especially along the peripheries of authoritarian great powers like Russia and China, which have adopted more revisionist stances. The United States still possesses unrivaled global power-projection capabilities, but the balance of power has become much more contested in regions like the Western Pacific and Eastern Europe due to unfavorable geography and targeted military buildups by Moscow and Beijing. Consequently, the military constraints on great power competition are weaker today than they were two decades ago. Competition has escalated since President Donald Trump assumed office, and America’s relations with Russia and China are currently marked by a competitive dynamic, to say the least. The 2020 Coronavirus pandemic has introduced a new dimension of rivalry between China and the U.S., which is already significantly affecting regional security politics, including matters related to the Iranian nuclear deal. China and Iran are moving closer to finalizing a 25-year deal that will offer Iran economic and military benefits, primarily involving discounted Iranian oil supplies to China. These developments, alongside the evolving Iran nuclear deal and the burgeoning China-Iran agreement, played a pivotal role in fostering a new relationship between the United Arab Emirates and Israel, brokered by the U.S. in August 2020. These events serve as clear indications of the resurfacing and deepening rivalry between China and the U.S. Regarding European powers, American foreign policy has witnessed a shift, particularly since President Trump took office, with a diminishing emphasis on multilateralism. While it may not have appeared that American foreign policy had a clear strategic objective during this period, it did create a sense of insecurity among its European allies in the face 21 Hal Brands, “Six Propositions about Great-Power Competition and Revisionism in the 21st Century,” The Future of the Global Order Colloquium, Fall 2017.

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of emerging and unfamiliar global threats. President Trump’s significant address to the NATO is essential in this context. During his election campaign, Trump criticized NATO as “obsolete,” a sentiment he did not strongly emphasize during his first speech in Brussels in May. However, he notably did not explicitly reaffirm a commitment to Article 5, a cornerstone of NATO’s collective defense, during the ceremony.22 This omission left European allies standing alongside Trump visibly bewildered and amused. In response, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated to a crowd of political supporters one week after the Brussels speech that Europe “really must take our fate into our own hands.”23 These statements are significant because they erode the strong sense of security and solidarity that these powers enjoyed just a few years ago. Indeed, the foreign policy approach of the United States, particularly during President Trump’s tenure, has introduced significant shifts in the dynamics of its relationships with European allies. The Trump administration’s foreign policy approach, characterized by skepticism of multilateralism and a more transactional approach to alliances, created uncertainty and prompted European leaders to consider greater self-reliance in security matters. These developments have had a lasting impact on the dynamics of US-European relations, which continue to evolve under the Biden administration. The differences among these major powers are also evident in their approach to the Iran nuclear deal. Following the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, the deal’s remaining signatories—Germany, France, Britain, Russia, and China— have struggled to find effective ways to mitigate the impact of the new American sanctions.24 The United States has exerted pressure on these countries, albeit unsuccessfully thus far, to completely abandon the deal. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo emphasized during the Munich Security Conference in February 2020 that while there may be disagreements on how to handle the JCPOA, “when I talk to my counterparts here in Europe, everybody gets it. Everyone understands that these are folks who continue to build out their nuclear program. So there’s a 22 Conor Finnegan and Elizabeth McLaughlin, “Analysis: How Trump’s Foreign Policy has Affected Global Relations since Assuming Office,” ABC News, July 20, 2017. 23 Conor Finnegan and Elizabeth McLaughlin, “Analysis: How Trump’s Foreign Policy has Affected Global Relations since Assuming Office,” ABC News, July 20, 2017. 24 “Iran: Trump Wrong if He Thinks Tehran Regime Will Collapse,” The New York Times, February 15, 2020.

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common understanding about the threat; we have tactical differences on how to proceed.”25 The key issue here is not the recognition of the threat but rather how to address Iran’s nuclear threat. The other powers involved in the deal aim to contain the problem through the JCPOA, which the United States does not believe is feasible. This fundamental difference in approach is a point of contention among these major powers, and Iran is well aware of it. These differences have shaped the trajectory of the JCPOA and continue to influence efforts to address Iran’s nuclear program diplomatically. Iran has leveraged these divisions to advance its own interests in negotiations. Iran has been keenly aware of these differences among the major powers. Tehran has sought to exploit these divisions to its advantage, especially in terms of economic and diplomatic relations. The differences between the major powers have had a significant impact on the JCPOA. While the deal technically remains in place, Iran has gradually reduced its compliance with its nuclear obligations in response to the reimposition of US sanctions. The deal’s future remains uncertain, and its effectiveness has been compromised. The change in U.S. leadership with President Joe Biden’s inauguration in 2021 brought hope for renewed negotiations and a potential return to the JCPOA. However, the negotiations have proven challenging, with both sides—Iran and the US—demanding certain concessions (Fig. 7.1).

Summary This chapter has laid out the core theoretical framework of the study, presenting its primary hypotheses and delineating the causal relationships between the dependent variable, renewed nuclear ambition, and the independent variables, including the prominence of long-standing rivalries, the existence of nuclear latency, the drive for swaggering to regain prestige and identity through nuclear weapons acquisition, and the pursuit of trade and aid benefits. Additionally, it has elucidated the precipitating factor—differences among major powers concerning the nuclear issue of the state in question—and how it creates an enabling context for a potential proliferator to rekindle its proliferation ambitions following a fractured nuclear deal. The framework posits that a state facing a disrupted nuclear deal is more likely to embark on a fast-track spill-back policy 25 “Iran: Trump Wrong if He Thinks Tehran Regime Will Collapse,” The New York Times, February 15, 2020.

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-Fractured Nuclear Agreement due to Absence of ConfidenceBuilding Measures and Defection

-Precipitating Factor •Differences between Major Powers about Nuclear iIsue of the State Concerned

Intensely Determined Proliferator

-Facilitating Factors • Salience of Long Running Rivalries •Existence of Nuclear Latency •Re-establishing Lost Prestige and Identity •Interest for Trade and Aid Benefits

Fig. 7.1 Triggers to Renewed Proliferation Interest

when the disruption is attributed to its primary, long-standing rival. This renewal of nuclear interest and spill-back policy is facilitated by four factors: persistent long-running rivalries, existing nuclear latency, the importance of swaggering to restore lost prestige and identity, and the pursuit of trade and aid benefits. The precipitating factor—disagreements among major powers within the deal regarding the state’s nuclear issue— creates an environment conducive to the pursuit of this revived nuclear plan. This theoretical framework serves as the basis for the subsequent three chapters, which focuses on the Iranian nuclear proliferation interest pre-deal, its restrained proliferation status during the functional phase of the original deal, and its rapid shift toward a spill-back nuclear policy in the post-fractured deal era.

PART III

Case Study: Iran

CHAPTER 8

Iran’s Nuclear Ambition and Its Conflicts in the Pre-deal Period

This chapter probes Iran’s nuclear program and its progression until 2015, examining the underlying motivations for its pursuit. It explores how Iran simultaneously engaged in protracted regional and global conflicts, shedding light on the factors that fueled its interest in nuclear proliferation. The chapter traces the origins of Tehran’s civilian nuclear program, which eventually raised suspicions of a potential military dimension. It offers a comprehensive overview of the different stages of Iran’s proliferation ambitions and its resilience in the face of Western sanctions, even under varying leadership, from moderates to conservatives. Iran’s strategy of denial and deception is analyzed in the context of its persistent involvement in three intractable conflicts. Ultimately, it is argued that Iran can be classified as a determined proliferator, driven by its perceived need for a deterrent capability to address multifaceted security concerns. Despite maintaining an official stance of peaceful nuclear pursuits, the chapter paints a complex picture of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and their intersection with its broader geopolitical dynamics. Iran has been involved in the development of nuclear capabilities, but has not produced nuclear weapons. In 2005, Iran publicized a fatwa issued by Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Khamenei, which prohibited the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons. However, this fatwa did not prevent Iran from conducting weapons-development work or retaining related records. Iran has pursued a nuclear hedging strategy © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 S. Khan, The Iran Nuclear Deal, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50196-8_8

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since the mid-1980s. This strategy involves developing dual-use nuclear facilities to have the capability to produce nuclear weapons if security circumstances change, despite the fatwa. Tehran faced obstacles in obtaining dual-use technologies due to sanctions and restrictions imposed by Western powers. To overcome these obstacles, Iran turned to the black market. A network led by Pakistani metallurgist Abdul Qadeer Khan supplied Iran with centrifuges and associated technology. Iran’s hedging strategy focuses on developing the capability to produce fissile materials, which are crucial for nuclear weapons. Fissile materials include highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium. Iran primarily focused on the enrichment route to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) for civilian purposes, which is allowed under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Enrichment to a higher level (HEU) can be used for weapons, although Iran claims it is for energy independence. The country has justified its pursuit of enrichment technology by claiming that it is essential for its national sovereignty and energy independence. Over the years, Iran has resisted pressure from the United States to abandon its enrichment activities. This primarily provides an overview of Iran’s nuclear program, its strategies, and its stance on enrichment technology. It also highlights the complex geopolitical context surrounding Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

History of Iran’s Nuclear Program The history of Iran’s nuclear program is a complex and contentious one, marked by various stages, international scrutiny, and diplomatic efforts. Following is a brief overview of key milestones in Iran’s nuclear program: Origins and Early Development, 1950s–1970s: Iran’s interest in nuclear technology dates back to the 1950s when it began receiving support for its nuclear program from Western countries, including the United States. The Atoms for Peace program provided assistance in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Iran signed the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1970, committing to use nuclear technology for civilian purposes only. Islamic Revolution, 1979: Following the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the overthrow of the Shah, Iran’s nuclear program faced disruptions and changes in leadership. The new Iranian government under Ayatollah Khomeini inherited the nuclear program, but expressed skepticism about its previous agreements.

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Post-Revolutionary Development, 1980s–1990s: In the 1980s and 1990s, Iran continued to develop its civilian nuclear program, including the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant with Russian assistance. However, concerns began to emerge about the dual-use nature of some nuclear technologies Iran was acquiring, raising suspicions about potential military applications. Revelations and International Concerns, 2000s: In the early 2000s, Iran faced increasing international scrutiny when the existence of its clandestine nuclear facilities, such as the Natanz uranium enrichment facility and the Arak heavy water reactor, was exposed. This revelation intensified concerns that Iran might be pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities alongside its civilian program. Diplomatic Efforts and Sanctions, 2000s–2010s: Diplomatic efforts, including negotiations between Iran and the P5 + 1 countries (the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), led to a series of agreements and attempts to address concerns over Iran’s nuclear program. These efforts included the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, which aimed to limit Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief. JCPOA and Its Aftermath: The JCPOA, reached in 2015, placed significant restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. However, the agreement faced challenges, particularly after the United States withdrew from it in 2018 and reimposed sanctions on Iran. This led Iran to gradually exceed JCPOA limits on uranium enrichment. Current Status, 2020s onwards: In September 2021, Iran’s nuclear program remained a subject of international concern and negotiations. Iran continued to increase its uranium enrichment levels and develop advanced centrifuges, while diplomatic efforts aimed to revive the JCPOA or negotiate a new agreement continued. Iran’s foray into nuclear capabilities traces its roots back to the era of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, during which the program was initiated. The driving force behind this endeavor was the Shah’s fervent personal desire to position Iran as a formidable player on the global stage with enhanced nuclear capabilities, which would, in turn, solidify the nation’s economic standing in the region. The Shah’s close and cooperative relationship with the United States after the US-UK sponsored coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in August 1953 significantly contributed to the initiation and development of Iran’s nuclear

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program, as it provided crucial technological and financial support.1 While it is vital to acknowledge the Shah’s pivotal role in these early stages, it is equally important to consider his ultimate goal, which was to establish Iran as a regional economic powerhouse. In pursuit of this objective, the Shah was guided by a belief in the effectiveness of conventional military strength as a deterrent, thereby regarding nuclear weapons as less credible in deterring potential threats.2 Historical accounts of this vary, with some asserting that the Shah also oversaw a nuclear weapons research program at the Amirabad Research Center. This program allegedly involved studies on weapon designs and the recovery of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel, hinting at a more nuanced approach to Iran’s nuclear ambitions.3 Regardless of the specifics of the Shah’s intentions, it is noteworthy that subsequent Iranian leaders, including Ayatollah Khomeini,4 Ali Khamenei, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmedinijad, and Hassan Rouhani all carried forward the torch of Iran’s nuclear program. Today, Ebrahim Raisi has continued the tradition of his predecessors in relation to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. This continuity in

1 As a component of the Atoms for Peace program, the United States extended offers of nuclear research facilities and training to its allies, with Iran being among the recipients of this initiative. The core objective behind this program was to encourage peaceful nuclear development while simultaneously discouraging the pursuit of nuclear weapons by these nations. In 1957, a significant milestone was reached when Iran and the United States inked a nuclear cooperation agreement. This pivotal agreement paved the way for the provision of essential nuclear infrastructure, most notably a five-megawatt light water reactor, along with associated laboratories. These facilities were commissioned at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) in 1967. The collaboration between Iran and the United States during this period marked a notable chapter in Iran’s nuclear history, reflecting the initial intent to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and scientific advancement. See Iran’s Strategic Weapons Program, an IISS Strategic Dossier (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 10. 2 Akbar Etemad, “Iran,” in Harold Muller, ed., A European Non-proliferation Policy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 212–213. 3 Anthony Cordesman, Iran and Iraq (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), p. 104. 4 After the Islamic Revolution, the pace of the nuclear program slowed down, but some reports indicate that the revolutionary government planned to use reactors smaller than those at the Bushehr site because of its desire to acquire nuclear weapons. See Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989–1990 (Boulder, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, 1990), p. 208.

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Iran’s nuclear pursuits suggests that the nation’s leaders, whether motivated by peaceful intentions or military aspirations, have consistently advanced the country’s nuclear capabilities over the years, making it a complex and enduring aspect of Iran’s strategic agenda. It is worth highlighting that Iran, as a signatory of the NPT in 1970, committed to the treaty’s objectives of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting disarmament, thereby pledging not to pursue nuclear weapons development. However, the trajectory of Iran’s nuclear program took a complex turn during the Iran-Iraq War, as Iraq repeatedly bombed Iran’s reactor projects in Bushehr, causing significant setbacks and damage to its nuclear ambitions. Following the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979, which led to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the country’s leadership, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, clandestinely pursued nuclear technology with dual civilian and potential military applications. During this covert phase, Iran reportedly received substantial assistance from nations such as China, Pakistan, and Russia. A formal nuclear cooperation agreement with China was signed in 1990, although cooperation had commenced in the mid1980s.5 Simultaneously, Iranian nuclear experts underwent training in China and Pakistan.6 Furthermore, Russia played a pivotal role in assisting Iran’s nuclear program, with agreements to sell two nuclear reactors in the 1980s and a later commitment to complete the Bushehr reactor, which had originally begun with German assistance during the Shah’s rule in the earlier stages of Iran’s nuclear journey.7 As a consequence of the deteriorating American-Iranian relationship, Iran found itself cut off from assistance provided by the United States and its allies. The United States exerted pressure on countries that sought to engage with Iran’s nuclear program, effectively blocking their involvement. In response, Iran sought alternative partners and agreements. Iran initially made arrangements with Pakistan and China for nuclear cooperation, as stated above. However, the United States managed to hinder parts of the Chinese agreement that would have supplied Iran

5 Anthony Cordesman and Ahmed Hashim, Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 297. 6 New York Times, May 8, 1989; Jane’s Intelligence Review, Special Report No. 6, May 1995, p. 14. 7 New York Times, January 8, 1995, p. A-8.

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with additional nuclear reactors. This obstruction marked the beginning of a pattern where the United States successfully blocked several Iranian nuclear contracts, compelling Iran to explore cooperation with nations and actors beyond American control. Starting in 1987, Iran started to receive nuclear plans and imports, including centrifuges, from unidentified foreign sources. Many suspect that these materials originated from the clandestine nuclear network led by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. A. Q. Khan’s network is believed to have aided several countries, including Pakistan, Libya, Iran, and North Korea, in advancing their nuclear programs. The countries involved in Khan’s network reciprocally assisted each other in areas where Khan’s expertise fell short.8 In 1992, Iran initiated agreements with North Korea, primarily centered around missile technology. North Korea provided Iran with missiles in exchange for funding to bolster its own missile program. Due to the contentious relationship that both Iran and North Korea had with much of the Western world, many details of their exchanges remain shrouded in secrecy and are not widely known.9 In the mid-1980s, Iran initiated its fissile material production efforts, which progressed slowly over two decades amid intense pressure from the United States aimed at preventing the acquisition of dual-use technology. However, around the early 2000s, Iran’s nuclear program experienced a significant breakthrough, marked by new leadership and access to black-market nuclear resources. In 2001, Iran began constructing an underground industrial-scale enrichment facility at Natanz. The following year, the exposure of this facility, along with a heavy water production plant at Arak, by an Iranian exile group, likely with information provided by Israeli intelligence, ignited a protracted international crisis over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Diplomatic efforts led by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, along with US attempts to impose sanctions at the United Nations, failed to convince Iran to halt its enrichment program. Despite a brief pause in enrichment in 2003–2004, Iran responded to sanctions by expanding its centrifuge operations, signaling its commitment to continuing its nuclear activities. This timeline underscores the complex and enduring nature of the Iranian nuclear issue, which has 8 Katherine Malus, “From Atoms for Peace to JCPOA: History of Iranian Nuclear Development,” Columbia University: Center for Nuclear Studies, September 9, 2018. 9 Katherine Malus, “From Atoms for Peace to JCPOA: History of Iranian Nuclear Development,” Columbia University: Center for Nuclear Studies, September 9, 2018.

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remained a central concern in global diplomacy and geopolitics for decades. In 2003, Iran took a significant step by welcoming the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through the signing of the Additional Protocol. This protocol granted the IAEA access to information and Iran’s nuclear facilities, enabling them to use advanced technology for comprehensive inspections of all nuclear sites within Iran. This move was seen as a measure to enhance transparency and cooperation with the international community regarding Iran’s nuclear program. However, three years later, in 2006, Iran withdrew from the Additional Protocol in response to the IAEA’s discovery of undisclosed aspects of its nuclear program. This withdrawal triggered the imposition of American sanctions. Shortly after departing from the Additional Protocol, Iran announced its intention to construct new nuclear facilities equipped with 2,784 centrifuges for uranium enrichment. Furthermore, in subsequent years, Iran announced its capability to produce HEU, which contains at least 20% uranium-235, the minimum enrichment level necessary for nuclear weapons construction. This marked a significant departure from the typical uranium enrichment levels, which range from 3% to 5% for peaceful nuclear power generation.10 Iran’s announcement regarding HEU enrichment raised international concerns, resulting in additional sanctions imposed on the country. It also led to covert actions aimed at impeding Iran’s nuclear development. In July 2010, a cyberattack targeted 15 nuclear facilities in Iran, causing centrifuges to malfunction. Although it is evident that a cyberattack was responsible for this incident, the identity of the perpetrator behind the attack remains undisclosed. These developments underscore the complex and contentious nature of Iran’s nuclear program and its interactions with the international community, particularly regarding concerns about its potential military dimension. The actions described above, particularly Iran’s signing of the Additional Protocol with the IAEA, its subsequent withdrawal from the protocol, the announcement of new nuclear facilities and capabilities, and the cyberattack on its nuclear facilities, can be understood in the context of a hedging strategy and the use of denial and deception tactics. Iran’s initial decision to sign the Additional Protocol can be seen as a 10 Katherine Malus, “From Atoms for Peace to JCPOA: History of Iranian Nuclear Development,” Columbia University: Center for Nuclear Studies, September 9, 2018.

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hedging strategy. By granting the IAEA greater access and transparency, Iran aimed to demonstrate cooperation and reduce international pressure and suspicion regarding its nuclear program. This move was a way to hedge against potential military action or harsher sanctions by presenting a more transparent image. Following its withdrawal from the Additional Protocol, Iran’s announcement of new nuclear facilities with advanced enrichment capabilities served as a hedging strategy. This allowed Iran to maintain a degree of ambiguity and uncertainty about its nuclear intentions. It created leverage and bargaining power in future negotiations with international actors. Announcing the capability to produce HEU was a hedging move to enhance its deterrence capabilities. By reaching the minimum enrichment level required for nuclear weapons, Iran could use this as a potential bargaining chip in negotiations or as a deterrent against potential military actions from adversaries. Iran’s withdrawal from the Additional Protocol can also be seen as a form of denial. It denied international inspectors the level of access and information they had initially agreed to, making it more challenging for the international community to assess Iran’s nuclear activities accurately. The announcement of new facilities can be considered a form of deception. By revealing these facilities, Iran could have been attempting to divert attention from other, undisclosed nuclear activities or facilities. It also introduced uncertainty about the true extent of Iran’s nuclear program. The cyberattack on Iran’s nuclear facilities can be viewed as a response to Iran’s denial and deception efforts. It was an attempt to disrupt Iran’s nuclear activities covertly and send a message that its covert actions would not go unanswered. Tehran’s actions related to its nuclear program, including signing, withdrawing from agreements, announcing new facilities and capabilities, and experiencing cyberattacks, thus, are interconnected with a broader strategy of hedging against potential threats and utilizing denial and deception tactics to maintain ambiguity and leverage in its nuclear dealings with the international community. These actions are part of Iran’s complex and dynamic approach to safeguarding its national interests in a highly contentious geopolitical landscape. The revelation in 2007 by US intelligence analysts that Iran had halted its work on nuclear weapons in 2003 but continued to acquire nuclear technology and expertise added a layer of complexity to the international

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concerns about Iran’s nuclear program.11 This assessment suggested that Iran may have taken steps to temporarily suspend explicit weaponization efforts but remained engaged in activities related to nuclear technology and enrichment, raising suspicions about its intentions and capabilities. These developments were central to the ongoing diplomatic efforts and negotiations concerning Iran’s nuclear program and its compliance with international agreements and safeguards.

Linking Iran’s Nuclear Pursuits to Persistent Conflicts Iran’s nuclear program is intricately connected to its protracted conflicts and broader geopolitical dynamics. Several key factors illustrate this connection: Security Concerns and Deterrence: Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities is often framed within the context of its security concerns. The country has been involved in protracted conflicts and tensions with various regional and global actors, including the United States, Israel, and some Arab states. Iran perceives nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence against potential adversaries, especially in a region marked by instability and rivalries. Regional Power Struggles: Iran’s nuclear ambitions have been seen as part of its broader efforts to assert itself as a regional power. By possessing advanced nuclear technology, Iran aims to enhance its regional influence and deter potential military interventions, especially in light of its involvement in regional conflicts such as the Syrian Civil War, Yemeni Civil War, and tensions with Saudi Arabia. Geopolitical Leverage: Iran’s nuclear program has often been used as a bargaining chip in its diplomatic negotiations and as a source of leverage in its interactions with the international community. The program provides Iran with a tool to extract concessions or negotiate for sanctions relief, as demonstrated in the case of the JCPOA negotiations.

11 Kali Robinson, “What is the Iran Nuclear Deal?,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 21, 2023.

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International Concerns and Proliferation Risks: Iran’s nuclear activities have raised concerns among neighboring countries and global powers. The fear of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East has led to increased tensions and competition among states in the region, with some seeking their nuclear capabilities in response to Iran’s program. Sanctions and Economic Pressure: The international community, particularly the West led by the United States, has imposed sanctions on Iran as a response to its nuclear program. These sanctions have exacerbated economic challenges for Iran and have contributed to the overall conflict dynamics in the region. Conflict Escalation Risks: The presence of a nuclear program in a volatile region introduces the risk of potential conflict escalation. The possibility of misunderstandings or miscalculations related to Iran’s nuclear activities could trigger broader conflicts, making it a central concern for regional and global stability. Iran’s nuclear program is, thus, deeply intertwined with its protracted conflicts, serving as both a response to security challenges and a source of tension in the region. It has complex implications for regional stability, diplomatic negotiations, and the broader dynamics of Middle Eastern geopolitics. Iran-US Conflict Iran’s nuclear program is closely connected to its conflict with the United States on the global stage. This conflict has evolved over several decades and is shaped by the following key factors related to Iran’s nuclear ambitions: Historical Tensions: The United States and Iran have a long history of tensions dating back to the 1979 Iranian Revolution when the US-backed Shah was overthrown. The US embassy hostage crisis further strained relations. These historical grievances have colored their interactions, including those related to Iran’s nuclear program. Perceived Threat: The US has expressed concerns that Iran’s nuclear program, especially its uranium enrichment activities, could lead to the development of nuclear weapons. The US has repeatedly

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stated that it will not tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran due to perceived threats to regional and global security. In 2002, President George W. Bush declares Iran, Iraq, North Korea an “axis of evil.“ US officials accuse Tehran of operating secret nuclear weapons program.12 Sanctions and Economic Pressure: The US has been a key driver of international sanctions against Iran as a response to its nuclear program. These sanctions have had a significant impact on Iran’s economy and have been a central point of contention in the US-Iran conflict. Diplomatic Efforts: Diplomatic negotiations and efforts to address Iran’s nuclear program, such as the JCPOA in 2015, have been a focal point of U.S.-Iran relations. The US has been a key player in these negotiations, and its stance on the JCPOA has evolved over time, with the US withdrawing from the agreement in 2018 and re-imposing sanctions. Regional Rivalries: Iran and the US are involved in regional conflicts and rivalries in the Middle East. Iran’s nuclear program is perceived by the US as part of Iran’s broader efforts to assert regional influence, which often puts the two countries at odds over issues like Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Security Dynamics: Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities is seen by some as a means of enhancing its security and deterrence against potential US military interventions or other forms of coercion. This has further complicated the US-Iran relationship. Global Diplomacy: The US has engaged in international diplomacy to address Iran’s nuclear program through various forums and organizations, such as the United Nations Security Council. Iran’s nuclear activities have been a focal point of discussions in the international community, and the US has played a central role in these diplomatic efforts. It is crucial to acknowledge that the protracted conflict between Iran and the United States, which has endured for almost four decades, initially stemmed from ideological differences and hostage-related issues. However, over time, this conflict has expanded to encompass a range of

12 “US-Iran Relations from 1953 Coup to 2023 Prisoner Swap Deal,” Reuters, September 10, 2023.

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contentious issues, including Iran’s support for terrorist groups, missile development, nuclear aspirations, and differences in political regimes, among others. Some argue that Iranians harbor a series of grievances against the US dating back to 1953 when the US played a role in the coup to overthrow Prime Minister Mossadegh. These grievances include incidents like the tragic downing of an Iranian airliner by a U.S. warship in 1988 and US support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. Therefore, it’s crucial to recognize the deep-rooted history of a tumultuous relationship between the two nations when discussing the nuclear issue. Thus, “History of a very troubled relationship between the two countries” is what is important to discuss when discussing the nuclear issue.13 The current Middle East regional order was essentially shaped by the United States, supporting one coalition, Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, against another, Syria, Libya, and Iran, and Iran has consistently aimed to expel US forces and undermine American regional allies.14 Iranians also often perceive an injustice in the international treatment of Iran compared to Israel, particularly regarding the NPT and the Additional Protocol, which Iran was subjected to while Israel, despite possessing nuclear capabilities since the 1960s, was not held to the same standards. The U.S. viewed Iran’s nuclear program as a significant threat due to concerns about regional nuclear proliferation, technology transfer to hostile entities, and an increased risk of conventional conflict and coercion.15 Given this complex history, a swift resolution of the enduring conflict is unlikely. The initial step for both parties would involve building trust and confidence. When President Barack Obama assumed office, he sought to explore opportunities for settling long-standing disputes and reorienting U.S. rhetoric toward Iran. However, for Iran, this was a pivotal moment to demonstrate its true intentions, not just in the energy sector but also regarding its nuclear program. The international community, led by the IAEA, needed

13 Interview with Farideh Fardi, December 3, 2007, in Saira Khan, Iran and Nuclear

Weapons: Protracted Conflict and Proliferation (London and New York: Routledge, 2011). 14 Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Doubleday, 1990), p. 506. Also see, Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), p. 222. 15 Matthew Kroenig, “Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike Is the Least Bad Option,” Foreign Affairs, 91(1), January/February 2012.

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assurance that Iran’s objectives did not include nuclear weapons development and that Iran was committed to transparent inspections and full disclosure, which Tehran had yet to provide. Iran’s nuclear program is, thus, a major source of conflict between Iran and the United States on the global stage. The program has been a point of contention, with the US expressing concerns about nuclear proliferation, imposing sanctions, and engaging in diplomatic negotiations. The US-Iran conflict is multifaceted and extends beyond the nuclear issue, but the nuclear program remains a central and highly contentious aspect of their global relations. Iran and the Regional Conflicts Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons can be contextualized within the framework of its security concerns, with the primary threat emanating from its neighbor, Iraq, which was an aggressive Arab country sharing its borders. The long-standing conflict between Iran and Iraq, dating back to 1959 over territorial disputes, culminated in one of the deadliest and most protracted wars of the twentieth century, spanning from 1980 to 1988. This conflict was driven by various factors, including contested borders and rights to the strategically crucial Shatt-al-Arab waterway, which served as a vital connection point between the Arab and Persian states. The Iran-Iraq War, marked by its immense human and economic costs, ended inconclusively, which many Iranians perceived it as a defeat since Iran accepted a cease-fire when it was extremely weak.16 This protracted and devastating war significantly influenced Iran’s decision to intensify its pursuit of a nuclear weapons program. Even during the war, Iran attempted to rebuild its Bushehr reactor with German assistance. In the war’s waning stages in 1987, Ali Khamenei, then the President of Iran, addressed the Atomic Energy Organization, emphasizing the urgent need for atomic energy as a means of national defense, given Iran’s history of external threats. He stated, “Regarding atomic energy, we need it now…Our nation has always been threatened from outside. The least we can do to face this danger is to let our enemies know that we can defend 16 Shahram Chubin, “Iran and the Lessons of the War with Iraq: Implications for Future Defense Policies,” in Shelley A. Shatl and Geoffrey Kemp, eds., Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 96.

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ourselves. Therefore, every step you take is in defense of your country and your revolution. With this in mind, you should work hard and at great speed.”17 This sentiment underscored the imperative for Iran to signal its capacity to defend itself, which in part fueled its determined push toward nuclear capabilities. Iran’s role in the Middle East, particularly in the context of the Arab– Israeli conflict, is notable despite its non-Arab status. This is primarily due to its Islamic ties with Arab nations, notably Syria, which faced security concerns following the Camp David Accords. Iran strongly opposed this accord. Moreover, after Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, President Hafez al Assad sought Iran’s assistance in establishing the Hezbollah guerrilla force and requested financial and military support. Consequently, Iran expanded its significant security alliances in the region. Despite underlying inter-Arab rivalries, these states tend to unite against their common enemy, Israel, which is considered their primary adversary. Iran’s involvement in the Arab–Israeli conflict is a multifaceted aspect of its regional strategy, and it is interconnected with its nuclear ambitions. Iran’s active participation in the Arab–Israeli conflict is driven by its geopolitical interests. Although Iran is not an Arab country, it has strong religious and ideological ties with Arab nations, particularly with Syria. This connection amplifies Iran’s influence and presence in the region. Iran vehemently opposed the Camp David Accords, which were aimed at establishing peace between Israel and Egypt. This opposition was rooted in its rejection of the legitimacy of Israel’s existence and its perception of the accords as detrimental to Arab and Palestinian interests. After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Iran played a crucial role in aiding the establishment of Hezbollah, a Shiite militant organization in Lebanon. This support included both financial and military assistance. Hezbollah has since served as a proxy force for Iran in its ongoing conflict with Israel. Iran’s involvement in the Arab–Israeli conflict allowed it to forge significant security alliances with like-minded nations and non-state actors that oppose Israel. These alliances provide Iran with leverage and a means to exert influence in the region. Thus, Iran’s nuclear ambitions are intertwined with its regional stance. While Iran insists that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, it has faced international scrutiny and suspicion regarding its intentions. The Arab–Israeli conflict, with Israel’s military

17 D. Segal, “Atomic Ayatollahs,” Washington Post, April 12, 1987.

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superiority, provides Iran with a strategic incentive to pursue nuclear capabilities as a deterrent. Iran perceives nuclear weapons as a means to establish a regional balance of power and deter potential adversaries, including Israel. The fear of a nuclear-armed Iran has led to increased tensions in the region and prompted neighboring countries to consider their own nuclear options, thus further destabilizing the region. The prospect of Israel possessing nuclear weapons has significantly contributed to Iran’s sense of unease and has served as an additional impetus for Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities. In November 1991, Iran’s Deputy President Ayatollah Mohajerani articulated this concern by asserting that if the Zionist regime, referring to Israel, has the privilege of possessing nuclear weapons, then all Muslim countries should have an equivalent right. He argued that Muslims should actively acquire expertise in the nuclear field to confront the perceived Israeli nuclear threat.18 This anxiety stemming from the potential for Israeli nuclear strikes has fueled Iran’s growing interest in achieving nuclear deterrence.19 The concept of deterrence suggests that by possessing nuclear capabilities, Iran aims to discourage any potential aggression from Israel or other adversaries. The idea is that the possession of nuclear weapons would make Iran a less appealing target, as the fear of nuclear retaliation would act as a deterrent against military action. In essence, the Israeli nuclear arsenal has played a crucial role in shaping Iran’s strategic calculus, prompting it to pursue nuclear capabilities not only as a means of regional influence but also as a deterrent against perceived threats from Israel. This dynamic has added complexity and tension to the broader regional security landscape in the Middle East. Iran’s active involvement in the Arab–Israeli conflict, especially through its support for Hezbollah and opposition to peace accords, is part of its broader regional strategy. This strategy is closely tied to its nuclear ambitions, as it seeks to bolster its position and security in a region marked by long-standing geopolitical tensions and rivalries. The pursuit of nuclear weapons can be seen as a response to these complex regional dynamics and as a means to enhance Iran’s influence and deter potential threats. 18 Shai Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), p. 137, fn48. 19 Shahram Chubin, “Arms Procurement in Iran: Ad Hoc Decision-Making and Ambivalent Decision-Makers,” in Eric Arnett, ed., Military Capacity and the Risk of War (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 226.

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Iran’s nuclear program is connected to regional security threats, particularly concerning Iraq and Israel in 2003 onwards, in several ways: Regional Power Dynamics: Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities is seen as part of its broader strategy to assert itself as a regional power. In the case of Iraq, the aftermath of the 2003 US-led invasion and the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime created a power vacuum in the region. Iran sought to fill this void by increasing its influence in Iraq, which raised concerns among neighboring countries, including Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, and intensified regional rivalries. Iraq’s Instability: The instability and political dynamics in Iraq have made it a battleground for regional influence. Iran’s support for Shia militias in Iraq and its involvement in Iraqi politics are sources of tension with the U.S. and regional actors. Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program are compounded by its actions in Iraq, leading to a complex web of regional security challenges. Israel’s Security: Israel views Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat. Iranian leaders have made hostile statements toward Israel, and the potential development of nuclear weapons by Iran is a top security concern for the Israeli government. Israel has taken a proactive stance against Iran’s nuclear program, including covert actions and international lobbying efforts to curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Regional Arms Race: The perception of Iran’s nuclear ambitions has led to concerns of a regional arms race. Israel is the only country in the Middle East known to possess nuclear weapons, and other countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia and Turkey, have expressed interest in acquiring nuclear capabilities if Iran were to develop them. This prospect adds to regional security instability. Conflict Resolution: Iran’s nuclear program has been a central issue in regional conflicts and negotiations, including those related to the JCPOA. The resolution of the nuclear issue has the potential to positively impact regional security dynamics by reducing tensions and creating opportunities for diplomatic engagement. Iran’s nuclear program is, thus, closely tied to regional security threats in the Middle East, particularly in the context of Iraq’s instability and Israel’s security concerns. The program has amplified regional rivalries and concerns about a potential arms race, making it a critical element of the

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complex security landscape in the region. Efforts to address Iran’s nuclear program are intricately connected to broader regional security challenges and diplomatic initiatives aimed at reducing tensions and promoting stability. The development of Iran’s nuclear weapons program illustrates that the primary driving force behind Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities has been the security threats posed by its long-standing adversaries: Iraq, Israel, and the United States.20 Iran’s enduring conflicts with Iraq and Israel, each spanning over half a century, coupled with its nearly four-decade-long feud with the United States, have forced Iran into a position where it faces a unique combination of challenges. While dealing with regional rivals entails a certain degree of symmetry in conflicts, facing a global superpower like the United States introduces an asymmetric dimension. Interestingly, although global attention has frequently centered on the Iran-Iraq and Arab–Israeli conflicts, in which Iran has been a prominent participant on the Arab side, the less-highlighted conflicts involving regional powers and global powers—specifically, the Iran-US and Iraq-US conflicts—have often been overlooked by the international community and scholars specializing in Middle Eastern geopolitics. This intricate dynamic reveals that in three out of the four enduring conflicts in the region, Iran has been a party, thereby facing the perpetual possibility of war initiated by any of its three adversaries, one of which wields global influence. Consequently, possessing a nuclear deterrent capability has become nearly indispensable for Iran as a means of averting the threat of wars that could be initiated by any of these three rivals, one of whom holds superpower status. Interestingly, two of Iran’s three adversaries possessed nuclear arsenals, with the United States being an acknowledged nuclear state and Israel maintaining an opaque nuclear program. Meanwhile, Iraq was suspected of harboring nuclear ambitions for more than two decades. Notably, although Iran’s primary bilateral conflict revolved around Iraq, driving its initial pursuit of nuclear capabilities to deter a war with its neighbor, its animosity toward Israel’s Zionist government provided an additional incentive for nuclear proliferation. However, over time, Iran’s motivations for maintaining its focus on nuclear development and ultimately striving to build a nuclear weapon evolved. After the end of the Cold 20 See Saira Khan, Iran and Nuclear Weapons: Protracted Conflict and Proliferation (London and New York: Routledge, 2011).

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War, the United States emerged as Iran’s paramount security concern, particularly since 2000, as the U.S. adopted more assertive foreign policies in the Middle East, including toward Iran. Consequently, while security considerations continue to underpin Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons, it raises a pertinent question: security against which specific country? Iran faces three adversaries, but when prioritized, the U.S. assumes the highest position, with Iraq at the lowest and Israel in the middle. This ranking is not due to Iran perceiving Israel as less of a threat, but rather because the Arab–Israeli conflict involves multiple powers, and other Arab states act as a check on Israel’s military actions. In contrast, both the Iran-Iraq and Iran-U.S. conflicts are bilateral intractable disputes, necessitating greater attention and preparedness for potential military confrontations. Iran’s nuclear capability, enabling it to deter U.S. aggression, plays a pivotal role in preserving its regional security. This situation mirrors India’s perspective on possessing nuclear capabilities as a deterrent against Chinese threats, thereby indirectly bolstering its security vis-à-vis Pakistan’s belligerent military posture. Iran’s unique geopolitical position has kept it embroiled in three long-standing rivalries with Iraq, Israel, and the United States,21 all of which show no signs of imminent resolution. Notably, the prospects for resolving the first two conflicts, involving Iran and Iraq or Israel, are minimal without U.S. mediation, an avenue the United States has shown limited interest in pursuing. Consequently, the specter of Iran’s potential nuclear proliferation has remained a matter of concern. Unlike some other nations in similar predicaments, Iran lacks the protective cover of an extended nuclear umbrella, as seen with countries like Japan or even South Korea, who rely on nuclear deterrence provided by their major power allies. In contrast, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are defacto nuclear states, while Israel possesses its own nuclear arsenal, readily deployable with short notice. These countries, facing enduring rivalries, enjoy a measure of protection through either their own nuclear capabilities or the extended nuclear deterrence provided by their superpower allies. Iran’s situation is markedly different. Consequently, Tehran’s only viable option has been the development of a nuclear capability capable of deterring potential adversaries from launching attacks on multiple fronts. In the context of the U.S.-Iran conflict, Iran has found it imperative to 21 See Saira Khan, Iran and Nuclear Weapons: Protracted Conflict and Proliferation (London and New York: Routledge, 2011).

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acquire such a capability to establish a strategic equilibrium with its global adversary. The imperative to attain a nuclear capability has thus been firmly rooted in the framework of Iran’s protracted conflict involvements and its need to ensure security amid these complex dynamics.

The Nuclear Program The development of nuclear weapons encompasses a multifaceted process, involving several critical components and demanding diverse technical capabilities and industrial resources. Firstly, the acquisition of bomb fuel is essential. Fissile materials like uranium-235 and plutonium-239 are employed in fission bombs due to their suitable physics and engineering properties. These materials undergo nuclear fission when triggered, releasing a substantial amount of energy. Hydrogen bombs, on the other hand, require the heavy isotopes of hydrogen, deuterium, and tritium, to initiate nuclear fusion, resulting in even greater energy release. Secondly, the process of weaponization is indispensable. It encompasses the intricate design, construction, and testing of nuclear weapons, including the development of bomb cores and detonation mechanisms while ensuring safety and reliability. Thirdly, means of delivery are crucial to transport the nuclear weapons to their intended targets. This entails the development of various delivery systems like intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarines, or aircraft, each requiring their own set of technical expertise and industrial capacity. Notably, North Korea’s ability to develop all three essential components over several decades highlights the formidable challenges involved in acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities, all within the context of international non-proliferation agreements that aim to prevent their spread and promote disarmament. Violations of these agreements can result in international sanctions and diplomatic consequences. To render uranium suitable for nuclear weapons, a process of enrichment is imperative, with the goal of reaching nearly pure uranium-235, typically around 90% concentration. This high level of enrichment ensures the rapid and sustained chain reactions necessary for the explosive yield of fission bombs. In contrast, nuclear reactors designed for electricity production and various peaceful applications operate effectively with

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significantly lower enrichment levels, typically between 3 and 5% uranium235, which balances energy production with safety.22 These reactors commonly utilize light (ordinary) water as both a coolant and moderator, slowing down neutrons to sustain controlled nuclear reactions. On the other hand, heavy water, where deuterium replaces regular hydrogen, serves as a moderator in reactors dedicated to plutonium production for weapons or specialized research, although it is less commonly employed due to the higher cost of heavy water production. The dual-use dilemma is a significant challenge associated with uranium enrichment. At low levels of enrichment, typically between 3 and 5% U-235, uranium is utilized as fuel in power reactors to generate electricity, providing a valuable and peaceful application of nuclear technology. However, as the enrichment levels increase, particularly beyond 20% U-235, the uranium becomes classified as HEU, which can be potentially weapon-usable. This creates a dilemma because the same technology and infrastructure used for peaceful energy production can, in principle, be repurposed to produce the highly enriched uranium needed for nuclear weapons.23 The IAEA plays a crucial role in monitoring and verifying the enrichment levels of uranium to prevent its diversion for military purposes, promoting transparency and international safeguards to address this dual-use challenge and strengthen nuclear non-proliferation efforts. The versatility of centrifuges poses a significant challenge in the context of uranium enrichment. Centrifuges are used in the enrichment process to increase the concentration of the fissile isotope U-235. The same centrifuge technology can be employed for producing both LEU, which typically contains less than 20% U-235, for peaceful purposes like nuclear power generation, and HEU, which contains 20% or more U-235 and can potentially be used for nuclear weapons. India’s 1974 peaceful nuclear test, codenamed “Smiling Buddha,” is an example that highlights the dual-use dilemma and the challenges it poses. India conducted this test, asserting it was for peaceful purposes, specifically for the development

22 Siegfried S. Hecker with Elliot A. Serbin, Hinge Points: An Inside Look at North Korea’s Nuclear Program (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2023), p. 18. Also see, Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin A. Valentino, “Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think About Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants,” International Security, 42(1), Summer 2017, pp. 41–79. 23 Siegfried S. Hecker with Elliot A. Serbin, Hinge Points: An Inside Look at North Korea’s Nuclear Program (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2023), p. 18.

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of nuclear energy. However, it used plutonium produced in a reactor that was ostensibly meant for civilian purposes to fuel the explosive device. This case illustrates how a country can leverage its civilian nuclear program and infrastructure to pursue a military nuclear program. The same facilities, technologies, and materials that are intended for peaceful applications can be repurposed for military uses, blurring the line between peaceful and military nuclear activities. In response to this test, India faced international scrutiny and criticism, and it was not until 1998 that India openly declared itself a nuclear-armed state, conducting additional nuclear tests that further highlighted the dual-use nature of nuclear technology and the challenges it presents for global non-proliferation efforts. This dual-use capability underscores the importance of stringent international controls and safeguards, as well as the need for transparency and monitoring to prevent the diversion of enriched uranium for military purposes. Various international agreements and organizations, such as the NPT and the IAEA, play crucial roles in overseeing and regulating the use of centrifuge technology to mitigate the proliferation risks associated with this dual-use dilemma. The Iranian nuclear program provides another pertinent example of the dual-use dilemma and the enrichment status prior to the nuclear deal in 2015. Iran’s nuclear program had raised concerns within the international community because of its potential dual-use nature. Iran claimed its nuclear activities were for peaceful purposes, primarily nuclear energy generation and medical research, but there were suspicions that it could also be pursuing nuclear weapons. Before the JCPOA, Iran had significantly advanced its uranium enrichment capabilities. By 2015, Iran had amassed a substantial number of centrifuges and enriched uranium to levels nearing 20% U-235. This level of enrichment was a matter of concern, as uranium enriched beyond 20% is typically classified as HEU and could be potentially weapon-usable. Iran’s uranium enrichment levels in 2015, prior to the JCPOA, were significantly lower than they are today following the breach of the JCPOA by the United States and Iran’s subsequent increase in enrichment activities. Notably, even when Iran was not allowing the IAEA to inspect its nuclear sites, its pace of proliferation was not as high as it is today, when it is under IAEA’s watch or at least should be, under the terms of the JCPOA. In 2015, Iran had committed to limiting its enrichment to below 4% U-235, well below the 20% threshold that can raise proliferation concerns. After the US withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and Iran

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began breaching its commitments, its uranium enrichment levels have risen, with some levels reaching closer to 20% U-235, which has indeed raised concerns about the pace of proliferation. The fear of the international community in the pre-2015 was that Iran’s advancement in uranium enrichment technology could enable it to develop nuclear weapons, which had broader implications for global nonproliferation efforts and regional security. The negotiations leading to the JCPOA were aimed at mitigating these concerns by placing limitations on Iran’s nuclear activities and enhancing international monitoring, with the primary goal of ensuring that Iran’s nuclear program remained exclusively peaceful and did not pose a proliferation threat. Under the agreement, Iran agreed to significantly reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium and limit its enrichment to below 4% U-235, well below the HEU threshold. In exchange, sanctions against Iran were eased, and the international community aimed to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program remained exclusively peaceful. The deal was a diplomatic effort to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons by placing restrictions on its enrichment activities and enhancing transparency and monitoring, thereby mitigating the dual-use dilemma. However, the future of the JCPOA and Iran’s nuclear program remained subject to geopolitical developments and diplomatic negotiations. The development of a nuclear program is a time-consuming endeavor, particularly when states engage in clandestine processes, which can stretch the timeline further due to secret agreements and the need to navigate supplier restrictions. It’s crucial to emphasize that while capability development may indeed take years, the critical factor to assess is the intention behind these efforts. Iran’s drive to acquire nuclear weapons became markedly more pronounced in the post-2001 period. This was driven, in part, by a sense of shame and humiliation resulting from being labeled a rogue state on the international stage. However, the primary driver was the security threats generated by Iran’s categorization as a rogue state. Iran’s engagement with the United States in an asymmetric and longstanding conflict played a significant role in pushing it toward clandestine efforts to advance its nuclear program. The impact of this asymmetric conflict on Iran’s decision-making was evident in the 1990s when Iran showed disinterest in extending the NPT unless the five nuclear powers, the vertical proliferators, agreed to dismantle their nuclear weapons. Iran’s foreign minister at the time, Ali Akbar Velayati, called for the nuclear states to halt weapons-grade nuclear material production and facilitate

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the transfer of nuclear energy technology to other states in need of alternative energy sources.24 Iran also found Washington’s double standards in nuclear policy, particularly regarding Iran and Israel in the Middle East, unacceptable, as it exacerbated the asymmetry and perceived threat in the U.S.-Iran conflict. After the 2003 Iraq war, Iran did not rule out the possibility of war being waged against it and felt the need to intensify its nuclear enrichment efforts while making them transparent to deter potential U.S. military action. The focus was primarily on the United States, and Iran was deeply concerned about U.S. intentions at that time. In 2005 and 2006, a series of revelations emerged regarding Iran’s nuclear program, indicating its accelerated pace. In April 2007, Iran announced progress in installing 3,000 centrifuges at the Natanz underground enrichment facility. However, it was believed that Iran would not have the capacity to build a nuclear weapon before 2008 or 2009 because, with a fully operational 3,000-centrifuge enrichment plant, Iran could only produce highly enriched uranium (enriched to over 90%) for a nuclear weapon within a timeframe of 9–11 months. Iran’s nuclear capabilities have been a source of global concern and apprehension for over two decades, as stated above. Despite consistent claims by Iran’s leadership that the country’s nuclear activities were not geared toward weaponization, its uranium enrichment efforts and a history of deceptive practices fueled deep mistrust within the international community. Iranian statements and interactions with Pakistani scientists raised alarms, leading the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to issue a warning in 1992 that Iran had the potential to develop nuclear weapons. While Iran maintained its commitment to the 1968 NPT, it insisted on the recognition of its “right” to enrich uranium before making any concessions in its nuclear program.25 This stance further complicated international efforts to address Iran’s nuclear activities. Identifying each of these key events and their connection to Iran’s nuclear program is pertinent: Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988): The Iran-Iraq War had a significant impact on Iran’s nuclear program. During this protracted war, which

24 “Iran Reject NPT Unless all Nuclear Weapons are Scrapped,” Deutsche PresseAgentur, April 21, 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com. 25 Jonathan Tirone, “Iran Nuclear Deal,” Washington Post, September 1, 2020.

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began in 1980 and lasted for eight years, Iran recognized the importance of developing a deterrent capability. This realization led to a more serious focus on advancing its nuclear program as a means of ensuring its security, given the use of chemical weapons by Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein. CIA Warning (1992): By November 1992, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) issued a warning that Iran could develop nuclear weapons by the year 2000. This report underscored growing concerns within the international community about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its progress in this direction. Axis of Evil Designation (2002): In January 2002, President George W. Bush included Iran in his “Axis of Evil” states during his State of the Union address. This designation heightened tensions and portrayed Iran as a major security threat, further motivating Iran to pursue nuclear capabilities as a deterrent, particularly in the context of the U.S. military action against Iraq that followed within a year. Uranium Enrichment (2006): Iran’s decision to begin uranium enrichment in April 2006 marked a significant milestone in its nuclear program. Enrichment is a key step in the development of nuclear weapons, and this move raised international concerns and prompted the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to take action. UN Sanctions (2006): In response to Iran’s uranium enrichment activities and amid concerns about its nuclear program, the UNSC imposed its first round of sanctions on Iran in December 2006. Unilateral sanctions were also imposed by the US and the European Union (EU).26 These sanctions aimed to pressure Iran to suspend its enrichment activities and address international concerns about the potential weaponization of its nuclear program. Uranium Enrichment Progress (2006–2013): Over this period, Iran continued to make advancements in uranium enrichment, accumulating enough enriched material that could potentially be used to develop a nuclear bomb. This progress intensified international apprehensions about Iran’s nuclear intentions. In 2009 Britain,

26 Michal Onderco, Networked Nonproliferation: Making the NPT Permanent (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2022), p. 102.

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France and the United States announced that Iran is building a secret uranium enrichment site at Fordow.27 Preliminary Agreement (2013): Diplomatic efforts to address Iran’s nuclear program began in earnest in 2013. In 2013 Hassan Rouhani is elected Iran’s president on platform of improving Iran’s relations with the world and its economy.28 The interim Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) agreement, reached in November 2013, marked a pivotal moment in these negotiations. It aimed to limit Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief, signaling a shift in diplomatic engagement regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Diplomatic negotiations aimed at reaching a preliminary agreement to curtail Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief commenced between Washington and Tehran by 2013.29 Iran’s enrichment of uranium and its pursuit of nuclear capabilities were complex issues influenced by a combination of factors, including regional security dynamics and its relationships with other countries. Its nuclear program evolved over the years in response to regional conflicts, security concerns, and international pressures. The Iran-Iraq War and the subsequent regional dynamics underscored the importance of a nuclear deterrent. U.S. actions, such as the “Axis of Evil” designation and the invasion of Iraq, further motivated Iran to pursue nuclear capabilities. Tehran’s uranium enrichment activities led to international sanctions, while diplomatic efforts, beginning with the JPA agreement in 2013, sought to address and regulate Iran’s nuclear program. These events collectively depict the complex and interconnected nature of Iran’s nuclear journey in the context of regional and international dynamics. While Iran maintained that its nuclear program was for peaceful purposes, there were always suspicions within the international community that it might be seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Tehran’s enrichment activities and its stance on nuclear negotiations could easily be seen as part of a broader strategy to address its global security concerns and

27 “US-Iran Relations from 1953 Coup to 2023 Prisoner Swap Deal,” Reuters, September 10, 2023. 28 “US-Iran Relations from 1953 Coup to 2023 Prisoner Swap Deal,” Reuters, September 10, 2023. 29 Jonathan Tirone, “Iran Nuclear Deal,” Washington Post, September 1, 2020.

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regional conflicts. By advancing its nuclear program, Iran also sought to strengthen its position in regional geopolitics. The negotiations leading to the JCPOA provided a platform to address these concerns, offering Iran sanctions relief and economic benefits in exchange for stringent limitations on its nuclear activities and enhanced international monitoring. So, in a way, the JCPOA did provide an avenue for addressing Iran’s broader security and regional concerns through diplomatic means, alongside the focus on nuclear issues.

Summary The chapter focuses on the Iranian nuclear program and its progression up until 2015, shedding light on Iran’s overarching desire to proliferate. It also explores Iran’s simultaneous involvement in protracted conflicts at both regional and global levels to gain a comprehensive understanding of what drives its interest in proliferation. The chapter initiates by examining the inception of Tehran’s civilian nuclear program, which later raised suspicions of having a military component. It provides an in-depth look at the lifespan of Iran’s proliferation ambitions and the various stages it went through over the years. Additionally, it discusses the imposition of sanctions by Western nations, particularly the United States, highlighting Iran’s determination to continue its nuclear program despite facing significant challenges and changes in leadership, including moderates and conservatives. The strategy of “denial and deception” employed by Iran is also analyzed within the context of its engagement in the three enduring conflicts it has been involved in. Despite officially maintaining that its proliferation activities were for peaceful purposes, the chapter suggests that Iran could be categorized as a determined proliferator. The chapter ultimately underscores Tehran’s pursuit of a deterrent capability to address its security concerns across different fronts. It highlights Iran’s motivation for nuclear capabilities as a response to the complex security environment it faces, even as it maintains the official stance of pursuing peaceful purposes for its nuclear program.

CHAPTER 9

The Deal and Iran’s Muted Nuclear Status

Abstract This chapter focuses on Iran’s nuclear status between 2015 and 2018, a period when Iran, the United States, and the other parties to the nuclear deal were fully committed to its implementation. This phase is characterized as a trust-building period, during which the loyalty and adherence of all deal members were particularly significant. Patience was emphasized as a key virtue for both Iran and the other members, as they needed to observe and evaluate each other’s compliance with the deal’s commitments. During these years, often referred to as the “sunshine” years of the deal, all parties involved honored the rules of the agreement, signaling an optimistic future of increased cooperation. The chapter highlights that Iran’s nuclear program was effectively capped and placed under strict surveillance by the IAEA. There were no grounds to suspect Iran of deceiving the international community regarding its nuclear activities. Iran complied with its proliferation commitments and demonstrated its willingness to abide by the terms of the deal. Under the accord, Iran relinquished 97% of its uranium fuel, significantly reducing its capacity to produce nuclear weapons. The country also maintained its stockpile well below the threshold required for the production of a single bomb. Rigorous and regular inspections conducted by the IAEA, as well as the affirmation of compliance by the United States, further validated Iran’s adherence to the deal. The chapter emphasizes that Iran’s nuclear behavior during this period was directly influenced by the lifting of major Western sanctions that © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 S. Khan, The Iran Nuclear Deal, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50196-8_9

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had been imposed for decades. It was expected that the consolidated nuclear deal would pave the way for increased socio-economic and political interactions between Iran and the United States, eventually fostering an environment to resolve their long-standing conflicts. An intriguing aspect explored in this chapter is the recognition of Iran as a latent proliferator, which emerged as a result of the nuclear deal. It probes deeper into the concept of the “life of proliferation” introduced in the previous chapter. The analysis examines Iran’s latency status and explores the potential for it to transition from a recognized latent proliferator to an active proliferator. Overall, this chapter provides a detailed account of Iran’s nuclear status between 2015 and 2018, highlighting the success of the deal in capping Iran’s nuclear program, ensuring strict surveillance, and building trust among the deal members. It also examines the implications of the deal on Iran’s status as a latent proliferator and explores the possibilities of its transformation into an active proliferator. Keywords Nuclear Deal · Commitment · Arak · Natanz · Heavy Water · Enrichment Level · Trust Building · Loyalty · Implementation · Sunshine Years · Compliance · Inspections · Muted Proliferator

This chapter investigates Iran’s nuclear status between 2015–18. These were the years when Iran and the US, along with the rest of the deal members, were fully committed to the nuclear deal. This was the trustbuilding period, a period when loyalty of the deal members was most salient. This was also the period when patience was of utmost importance. For both Iran and the other members, it was important to wait and see whether or not the states could be trusted. For Iran, it was important to see that the deal members abide by the commitments of the deal. For the other members, it was important to know that Iran lives up to its proliferation commitments. During these years, often referred to as the “sunshine” years of the deal, all parties involved honored the rules of the agreement, signaling an optimistic future of increased cooperation. The period signaled an optimistic future of more cooperation between the parties concerned. The chapter demonstrates that Tehran’s nuclear program was capped and was under strict International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) surveillance. There remained no reason to suspect Iran

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of deceiving the international community pertaining to its nuclear activities. During this period and under the accord, Iran gave up 97 percent of its uranium fuel, which is basically enough to make at least a dozen bombs, and kept its stockpile much below the one-bomb threshold. This was also a period when Iran was subject to rigorous and regular inspections. The IAEA as well as the US believed that Tehran was complying. Iran’s nuclear behavior was a direct function of the withdrawal of some of the major Western sanctions it faced for decades. The expectation was to see a consolidated deal with more interactions between Iran and the US on socio-economic and political levels, which would eventually create an environment to terminate their long-running conflict. An interesting part of this chapter is where it demonstrates that during this muted proliferation period, Iran became a recognized latent proliferator. This was a direct product of the nuclear deal. Here, the life of proliferation, demonstrated in the previous chapter, is explained further. Iran’s latency status is analyzed to demonstrate the feasibility of turning that status into a potential proliferator. However, Iran, the United States, and the other parties to the nuclear deal were fully committed to the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). As stated above, the phase is characterized as a trust-building period, during which the loyalty and adherence of all deal members were particularly significant. Patience was emphasized as a key virtue for both Iran and the other members, as they needed to observe and evaluate each other’s compliance with the deal’s commitments. The JCPOA resulted from 20 months of hard bargain and intense negotiations leading to an understanding between P5 + 1 and Iran.1 The deal has been touted as a potential beginning of a thaw in US– Iran relations. It aims at preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon capability and enabling Iran to resume normal relations with the world by lifting bilateral and multilateral sanctions.2 The JCPOA was concluded despite intense opposition and strong objections by American allies in the Middle East including Saudi Arabia and Israel and was supported by many

1 James A. Russell, The Iran Nuclear Agreement: The Negotiations Leading to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). 2 Seyed Hossein Mousavian, ed., The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide, (London and New York: Routledge, 2018).

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world and regional powers such as China and Russia.3 The deal has implications for the domestic and foreign policies of the US and Iran, US-Iran protracted conflict, and nuclear non-proliferation.

Understanding the Period, 2015–2018 This period was marked by a comprehensive commitment to the nuclear deal by both Iran and the United States, as well as other parties involved.4 The concept of “trust-building” is highlighted, indicating how the commitment and loyalty of all parties were crucial during these years. The period is significant because it corresponds to a critical phase of the Iran nuclear deal’s implementation. During these years, there was heightened attention on how both Iran and the United States,5 along with the other deal members, navigated the terms of the agreement.

Comprehensive Commitment to the Nuclear Deal The period was marked by a comprehensive commitment to the deal. Iran and the United States, along with the other countries involved in the JCPOA, often referred to as the P5 + 1 or E3 + 3, demonstrated a robust and comprehensive commitment to the nuclear deal. This commitment extended to abiding by the stipulated terms and conditions of the agreement. Most important in this context is how much Iran lived up to its commitments to the deal. While much has been written on Iran’s efforts to abide by the norms of the JCPOA, it is important to provide summaries of the primary reports of the IAEA during these years.

3 Daniel H. Joyner, Iran’s Nuclear Program and International Law: From Confrontation to Accord, (Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2016). Also, see, James A. Russell, The Iran Nuclear Agreement: The Negotiations Leading to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Gerhard Mangott, The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Comprehensive Guide, (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2020). 4 Ray Takeyh, “The Iran Nuclear Deal” Paved with Good Intentions,” “The Iran Nuclear Deal: Paved with Good Intentions” New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2018; Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014). 5 Dina Esfandiary, “Unpacking the Iran Nuclear Deal: Can It Last?” Survival, October– November 2017.

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Since 16 January 2016, JCPOA’s Implementation Day, the Agency has verified6 and monitored Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the deal. It was reported that “Iran has not pursued the construction of the existing Arak heavy water research reactor (IR-40 Reactor) based on its original design. Iran has not produced or tested natural uranium pellets, fuel pins, or fuel assemblies specifically designed for the support of the IR-40 Reactor as originally designed, and all existing natural uranium pellets and fuel assemblies have remained in storage under continuous Agency monitoring (paras 3 and 10). Iran has continued to inform the Agency about the inventory of heavy water in Iran and the production of heavy water at the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) and allowed the Agency to monitor the quantities of Iran’s heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced at the HWPP (para. 15). On 30 August 2016, the Agency verified that Iran’s stock of heavy water had reached 126.5 metric tonnes. Throughout the reporting period, Iran had no more than 130 metric tonnes of heavy water (para. 14).”7 Transparency is a crucial aspect when it comes to nuclear programs. Nuclear programs, especially those involving the development and possession of nuclear weapons, have far-reaching implications for international security, diplomacy, and stability. Lack of transparency can lead to misunderstandings and miscalculations among nations. Ambiguity about the intentions and capabilities of a nuclear program can raise suspicions and trigger responses that could potentially escalate tensions. Transparency helps build trust among nations. When countries openly share information about their nuclear activities, it can reduce suspicions and promote confidence in their intentions. Trust is essential to prevent arms races and promote cooperation. Transparent nuclear programs reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation. When countries that possess nuclear technology provide verifiable information about their activities, it also

6 Robert J. Einhorn, “Verifying the Iran Nuclear Deal: A New Approach?” Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, June 2017. 7 IAEA, Report by the Director General, “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic

Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),”GOV/2016/46, September 8, 2016. GOV/2016/46 - Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/16/09/gov2016-46. pdf).

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becomes easier to monitor and prevent the illicit spread of nuclear know-how to non-nuclear states or non-state actors. Transparency within the JCPOA framework was instrumental in addressing concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, building trust among the parties, and contributing to regional and international stability. Transparency measures in the JCPOA were primarily designed to prevent covert nuclear activities that could lead to the development of nuclear weapons. By granting the IAEA access to both declared and undeclared nuclear sites, the deal aimed to ensure that there were no hidden facilities or activities. The provisions of transparency of the JCPOA were crucial in building international confidence in Iran’s nuclear program. By allowing independent inspections and verification, the deal sought to provide reassurance to the international community that Iran’s nuclear program was being used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Prior to the JCPOA, there were concerns about the potential military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. Transparency measures, including allowing the IAEA to investigate these concerns, were important in addressing past suspicions and moving toward a more stable and cooperative relationship. According to the IAEA report on transparency, “Iran has continued to permit the Agency to use on-line enrichment monitors and electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to Agency inspectors, and to facilitate the automated collection of Agency measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices (para. 67.1). Iran has issued long-term visas to Agency inspectors designated for Iran as requested by the Agency and provided proper working space for the Agency at nuclear sites and facilitated the use of working space at locations near nuclear sites in Iran (para. 67.2). Iran has accepted additional Agency inspectors designated for Iran (para. 67.3). Iran has continued to permit the Agency to monitor—through measures agreed with Iran, including containment and surveillance measures—all uranium ore concentrate (UOC) produced in Iran or obtained from any other source, and reported by Iran to the Agency. Iran also provided the Agency with all information necessary to enable the Agency to verify the production of UOC and the inventory of UOC produced in Iran or obtained from any other source (para. 69).”8

8 IAEA, Report by the Director General, “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231

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The transparency demonstrated by Iran in complying with the JCPOA was a key factor in enabling diplomatic engagement and negotiations. It allowed for constructive dialogue and confidence-building among the parties involved. As the report indicates, Iran took steps to increase transparency regarding its nuclear program in accordance with the agreement. Iran allowed IAEA inspectors access to its declared nuclear facilities and provided information necessary for monitoring its nuclear activities. This included regular inspections, real-time monitoring, and access to information related to uranium enrichment levels, centrifuge production, and other nuclear-related activities. Interestingly, in November 2018, some months after the US exit from the JCPOA by the Trump administration, IAEA reported that Iran was still following the clauses of the deal. It was reported by the Director General of IAEA that “Iran has not pursued the construction of the Arak heavy water research reactor (IR-40 Reactor) based on its original design. Iran has not produced or tested natural uranium pellets, fuel pins, or fuel assemblies specifically designed for the support of the IR-40 Reactor as originally designed, and all existing natural uranium pellets and fuel assemblies have remained in storage under continuous Agency monitoring (paras 3 and 10).”9 This was in regard to heavy water and reprocessing. IAEA also reported10 that Iran has continued to inform the Agency about the inventory of heavy water in Iran and the production of heavy water at the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) and allowed the Agency to monitor the quantities of Iran’s heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced at the HWPP (para. 15). On 3 November 2018, the Agency verified that the plant was in operation and that Iran’s stock of heavy water was 122.8 metric tonnes. Throughout

(2015),”GOV/2017/48, November 13, 2017. GOV/2017/48 - Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/11/gov2017-48. pdf). 9 IAEA, Report by the Director General, “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),”GOV/2018/47, November 12, 2018. gov2018-47.pdf (https://www.iaea.org/ sites/default/files/18/11/gov2018-47.pdf). 10 IAEA, Report by the Director General, “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),”GOV/2018/47, November 12, 2018. gov2018-47.pdf (https://www.iaea.org/ sites/default/files/18/11/gov2018-47.pdf).

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the reporting period, Iran had no more than 130 metric tonnes of heavy water (para. 14). As for enrichment and fuel, at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, there have been no more than 5060 IR-1 centrifuges installed in 30 cascades, which remain in the configurations in the operating units at the time the JCPOA was agreed (para. 27). Iran has withdrawn 33 IR-1 centrifuges from those held in storage for the replacement of damaged or failed IR-1 centrifuges installed at FEP (para. 29.1). Iran has continued the enrichment of UF6 at FEP. Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67 percent U-235 (para. 28). Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67 percent U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). The quantity of 300 kg of UF6 corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium. As of 4 November 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67 percent U-235 was 149.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.11 One of the key points highlighted in the report was that Iran had not pursued the construction of the Arak heavy water research reactor (IR40 Reactor) based on its original design. This indicated that Iran had halted any activities that would have been inconsistent with the limits set by the JCPOA. The commitment to halt construction was an essential aspect of the agreement to prevent the production of plutonium for potential use in nuclear weapons. The IAEA report also confirmed that Iran had refrained from producing or testing natural uranium pellets, fuel pins, or fuel assemblies specifically designed for the support of the IR-40 Reactor, as originally intended. This commitment indicated that Iran was actively avoiding actions that could contribute to the reactor’s operational capabilities for potential military purposes. Importantly, the report highlighted that all existing natural uranium pellets and fuel assemblies, which could potentially be used in the IR-40 Reactor, were under continuous Agency monitoring. This demonstrated Iran’s serious commitment to transparency and accountability by allowing the IAEA to maintain oversight and verify that these materials were not diverted for any unauthorized use. 11 IAEA, Report by the Director General, “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),”GOV/2018/47, November 12, 2018. gov2018-47.pdf (https://www.iaea.org/ sites/default/files/18/11/gov2018-47.pdf).

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Following summarizes the key points of Iran’s continuous compliance to the JCPOA even in 2018: Heavy Water Production and Monitoring: Iran continued to inform the IAEA about its heavy water inventory and the production at the HWPP. The fact that Iran allowed the Agency to monitor the quantities of its heavy water stocks and production indicates its commitment to transparency. What needs to be highlighted here is that this level of monitoring is crucial to ensuring that heavy water, which can be used to moderate certain types of reactors, is not being produced in excess of the limits set by the JCPOA. Quantity of Heavy Water: The IAEA’s verification on November 3, 2018, that Iran’s stock of heavy water was 122.8 metric tonnes and that it had not exceeded 130 metric tonnes throughout the reporting period (with appropriate monitoring) suggests Iran’s adherence to the agreement’s restrictions on heavy water production. This confirms that Iran maintained its heavy water production within the defined limits. Enrichment at Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant: Iran’s adherence to the JCPOA’s limits on enrichment is indicated by the information provided. The number of centrifuges that were installed and operational at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) remained within the confines of the JCPOA’s stipulations. Additionally, Iran’s decision to withdraw damaged or failed centrifuges for replacement aligns with the agreement’s provisions for maintaining operational efficiency. Enrichment Level and Stockpile: Iran’s enrichment activities at FEP were within the parameters defined by the JCPOA, as indicated by not enriching uranium above 3.67 percent U-235. The fact that Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile did not exceed 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67 percent U-235 further demonstrates its adherence to the agreement’s limits. Uranium Enrichment Quantities: Specific quantities of uranium enriched up to 3.67 percent U-235— 149.4 kg as of November 4, 2018—show that Iran was clearly maintaining its enriched uranium stockpile well below the agreed-upon limit. This data confirms Iran’s commitment to controlling its enriched uranium levels as per the JCPOA.

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The provided information from the IAEA reports indicates that Iran was abiding by the commitments it made under the JCPOA. The reports verify Iran’s compliance with restrictions on heavy water production, the number of centrifuges, enrichment levels, and uranium stockpile quantities. These findings reflect Iran’s willingness to adhere to the limits and transparency measures established by the JCPOA, even in the absence of the US’s participation in the agreement. Thus, it was stated that “Iran implemented (its commitments to the JCPOA) fully/correctly for three years. Iran continued full implementation till May 2019.”12 The IAEA’s report served as a concrete example of Iran’s continued compliance with the JCPOA even after the US withdrawal. Despite the challenging circumstances brought about by the exit of a major participant, Iran demonstrated its commitment to the nuclear deal by adhering to the limitations and restrictions that the JCPOA had outlined. This report further affirmed that Iran was acting in accordance with the commitments it made under the agreement, reinforcing the importance of international cooperation and verification mechanisms in maintaining non-proliferation efforts. The impact of lifting long-standing Western sanctions on Iran’s nuclear behavior is important in this context. Iran’s cooperation and compliance were influenced by the prospect of improved socio-economic and political interactions with the United States and other parties. The lifting of sanctions paved the way for a more constructive engagement.

Trust-Building and Loyalty The concept of “trust-building” is a central theme. During the 2015– 2018 timeframe, all parties to the deal—Iran, the US, and others— worked to build and foster trust among each other. This trust was vital for the smooth implementation of the JCPOA. The commitment and loyalty of all parties were essential elements in this trust-building process. The information from the IAEA reports underscores Iran’s commitment to trust-building and loyalty within the context of the JCPOA. Despite the absence of the US from the agreement, Iran’s actions demonstrate its dedication to building trust and maintaining loyalty to the terms of the deal. Iran’s continued reporting of its heavy water inventory,

12 Interview with Seyed Hossein Mousavian, September 10, 2023.

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production, and enrichment activities to the IAEA highlights a commitment to transparency. By allowing the Agency to monitor these activities, Iran builds trust by demonstrating openness and accountability. Iran’s actions in adhering to the specified limits for heavy water production, centrifuge installation, and uranium enrichment levels reveal its loyalty to the JCPOA’s provisions. This demonstrates Iran’s commitment to the agreement’s terms and contributes to building trust among the other deal participants. Iran’s cooperation with IAEA verification processes and continuous monitoring of its nuclear activities underlines its willingness to undergo scrutiny. This commitment to monitoring builds trust by providing assurance to other parties that Iran is adhering to the deal’s obligations. Iran’s efforts to ensure that its enriched uranium stockpile did not exceed the agreed-upon limit reinforce its loyalty to the JCPOA’s objectives. This commitment to keeping stockpiles within defined boundaries showcases Iran’s intention to uphold the agreement’s terms. Despite the withdrawal of the US from the JCPOA, Iran’s continued compliance with the deal’s provisions demonstrates its loyalty to the international commitments it made. This dedication to maintaining compliance serves to build trust among the remaining participants in the agreement. In a nutshell, the information from the IAEA reports indicates that Iran’s actions reflect its interest in trust-building and loyalty within the framework of the JCPOA. By remaining transparent, adhering to limits, cooperating with verification processes, and sustaining compliance despite challenges, Iran demonstrates its commitment to building trust and maintaining loyalty to the agreement’s terms. Commitment’s role in trust is important in this context. It implies that the commitment of all deal participants was instrumental in cultivating the necessary trust. Their dedication to the deal’s objectives and their willingness to adhere to the agreements fostered an environment conducive to cooperation and mutual understanding.

Crucial Years of Implementation This timeframe is often viewed as the initial phase of actual JCPOA implementation, during which the practical execution of the agreement’s provisions was underway. It marked a critical juncture in testing the resolve of all parties to the deal in honoring their commitments. The “Crucial Years of Implementation” refer to the initial phase of actual

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JCPOA execution, marked by practical implementation of the agreement’s provisions. During this period, Iran played a pivotal role in demonstrating its commitment to the deal’s objectives. The timeframe tested the determination of all parties, including Iran, to uphold their commitments and fulfill the terms of the agreement. Iran’s engagement in the practical execution of the JCPOA’s provisions showcased its willingness to translate the agreement’s terms into tangible actions. By taking concrete steps, such as limiting its heavy water production and adhering to enrichment caps, Iran demonstrated its commitment to the deal’s objectives. The “Crucial Years of Implementation” were a critical juncture for Iran to prove its resolve in honoring its commitments. By faithfully following the stipulated limits on nuclear activities and cooperating with international monitoring, Tehran demonstrated its seriousness in fulfilling its obligations. Iran’s willingness to be transparent about its heavy water production, enrichment activities, and compliance with inspection mechanisms reinforced its dedication to building trust. By cooperating with the IAEA’s monitoring, Iran underscored its commitment to maintaining a transparent and accountable nuclear program. Iran’s actions during this period aimed to build global confidence in its peaceful nuclear intentions. The steps it took to align its nuclear activities with the JCPOA’s provisions were instrumental in reducing concerns about potential proliferation risks. Iran’s commitment to practical implementation fostered a positive diplomatic atmosphere. Its adherence to the agreement contributed to an environment of cooperation among the deal’s participants, enhancing prospects for peaceful relations and international stability. The “Crucial Years of Implementation”within the JCPOA’s initial phase, thus, marked a significant period for Iran. By translating its commitments into concrete actions, cooperating with monitoring mechanisms, and demonstrating transparency, Iran played a key role in ensuring the success of the deal’s execution. This phase underscored Iran’s dedication to fulfilling its responsibilities and building confidence among global stakeholders.

Optimism and Expectations The period between 2015 and 2018 was also characterized by an air of optimism and positive expectations. Parties involved in the deal likely anticipated that this phase of strong commitment could lay the groundwork for improved relations and greater cooperation in the future. This

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introduces the chapter’s temporal focus and the core theme of trustbuilding during the years 2015–2018. It underscores the pivotal role played by the comprehensive commitment of all parties to the nuclear deal, highlighting how this commitment was integral to fostering trust and cooperation among the participants. This chapter explores how this atmosphere of trust impacted various aspects of the nuclear deal’s implementation and broader diplomatic dynamics. The period was a phase of significance for Iran’s engagement with the JCPOA. During this time, Iran displayed a pragmatic approach in fulfilling its commitments under the agreement, which led to an atmosphere of optimism and positive expectations. Iran’s decision to abide by the constraints outlined in the JCPOA, such as limiting its heavy water production, adhering to enrichment levels, and cooperating with IAEA inspections, demonstrated its commitment to the deal’s terms. This practical engagement signaled Iran’s intention to move away from nuclear proliferation concerns and engage positively with the international community. Iran’s actions during this period contributed to building optimism among the parties involved. By showing a genuine willingness to follow through on its commitments, Iran set a positive precedent that signaled its intention to maintain a peaceful nuclear program. The parties involved, including Iran, likely anticipated that the strong commitment to the JCPOA during these years could pave the way for improved diplomatic relations. Iran’s engagement and compliance were essential to fostering an environment of trust, which could lead to greater cooperation in the future. Iran’s commitment to the deal not only influenced its nuclear behavior, but also impacted broader diplomatic dynamics. The positive approach taken by Iran contributed to the JCPOA’s success and its potential as a foundation for building constructive relationships. All of these indicate that Tehran’s pragmatic engagement during the years 2015–2018 was instrumental in creating an optimistic and positive atmosphere surrounding the JCPOA. Iran’s adherence to the agreement’s provisions contributed to building trust among the parties and led to the anticipation of improved relations and cooperation. Iran’s case highlights the pivotal role of comprehensive commitment in fostering a climate of trust and optimism within the framework of the JCPOA.

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Trust and Patience During the Sunshine Years The section explains the significance of patience during this period. During the period covered by the chapter, 2015–2018, the notion of patience held a crucial role. Patience in this context refers to allowing sufficient time for both Iran and the other parties to the JCPOA to observe and assess each other’s actions regarding the implementation of the agreement’s terms. Patience was a strategic approach taken by all sides to ensure that they could accurately evaluate and gauge the commitment of one another. It elaborates on how both Iran and the other deal participants needed time to observe each other’s actions and adherence to the terms of the deal. This patient observation was seen as a virtue in the context of building trust. The term “sunshine years” emphasizes the positive and cooperative atmosphere that prevailed during this phase. Both Iran and the other parties to the deal exercised patience as they observed each other’s actions and adherence to the agreement’s terms. This patient observation was considered crucial for establishing mutual trust, discussed before. The term “Sunshine Years” captures the positive and cooperative environment that characterized this phase, suggesting an atmosphere of optimism and collaboration. It is important to note the virtue of patience as a key factor in cultivating trust among all participants and sets the tone for understanding the significance of this phase in the context of building a foundation of cooperation and transparency. The concepts of patience, trust, and Iran’s status as a muted proliferator during the period between 2015 and 2018 are interconnected within the context of the JCPOA implementation. Iran’s designation as a “muted proliferator” during these years reflects its commitment to the JCPOA’s nuclear constraints. The patient observation and trustbuilding atmosphere of the “Sunshine Years” were pivotal in verifying Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA’s provisions. The trust established through transparency, patience, and adherence to the agreement’s terms reassured the international community that Iran was abiding by its obligations, thereby confirming its muted proliferation status. The positive and cooperative atmosphere of the “Sunshine Years” encouraged Iran to uphold its obligations, including limiting uranium enrichment and adhering to inspections. This environment facilitated Iran’s muted proliferator status, as the cooperative context incentivized Iran to restrain its nuclear activities. Trust-building, patience, and adherence to the JCPOA signaled Iran’s intention to use its nuclear program for peaceful purposes.

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This contributed to international confidence that Iran’s nuclear ambitions were restrained and aligned with the goals of the agreement. Iran’s adherence to the JCPOA’s constraints during this period enhanced its international image. The trust cultivated through patient observance of its actions bolstered the perception that Iran was genuinely committed to the principles of non-proliferation, counteracting concerns of unchecked nuclear advancement. This patient and trust-building environment of the “Sunshine Years” created a context in which Iran’s muted proliferator status could be recognized and validated. The positive atmosphere incentivized Iran to maintain compliance with the JCPOA’s provisions, contributing to international confidence in its restrained nuclear ambitions and reinforcing the broader goals of non-proliferation and global security.

Observing Adherence to Deal Terms This section suggests that the participants in the JCPOA recognized the importance of not rushing to conclusions or judgments. Instead, they allowed time to pass to observe how each party was adhering to the specific provisions outlined in the agreement. This methodical approach aimed to ensure that any conclusions drawn were based on concrete actions and behaviors. Virtue of Patient Observation for Building Trust: This highlights that this patient approach was considered virtuous in the context of trust-building. By not hastily making judgments or assumptions, all parties aimed to establish a foundation of trust that was built on the actual actions and behavior of each participant, rather than on speculation or conjecture. Sunshine Years and Positive Atmosphere: The term “sunshine years” metaphorically signifies a period of positivity and cooperation that prevailed during these years. It underscores the notion that a positive atmosphere was created by the patient observation and trust-building efforts of all parties. This term implies that the relationship among the deal participants was characterized by openness, collaboration, and a shared commitment to the success of the JCPOA. Impact on Diplomatic Atmosphere:

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The patient approach to observation contributed to fostering an environment of open dialogue and mutual understanding among the deal participants. This positive diplomatic atmosphere, in turn, facilitated the effective implementation of the JCPOA’s provisions and created space for addressing potential challenges or misunderstandings. Thus, the role of patience in the years 2015–2018 within the context of the JCPOA is salient. It explores how the virtue of patient observation was integral to building trust among all parties. This approach contributed to the creation of a positive and cooperative atmosphere—referred to as the “sunshine years”—which set the stage for successful implementation of the JCPOA’s provisions and enhanced diplomatic interactions.

Implementation and Surveillance This section outlines the practical outcomes of the trust-building period. It discusses how Iran’s nuclear program was constrained and kept under strict surveillance by the IAEA. The absence of reasons to suspect Iran’s deceptive nuclear activities is emphasized, as the IAEA inspections confirmed Iran’s compliance with the deal’s provisions. Practical Outcomes of Trust-Building: This addresses the tangible results of the trust-building period during the years 2015–2018. It focuses on how the commitment of all parties to the JCPOA led to certain concrete outcomes that supported the objectives of the agreement. Constraining Iran’s Nuclear Program: One of the significant outcomes of the trust-building phase was the effective constraint imposed on Iran’s nuclear program. As part of the JCPOA, Iran agreed to limit and curtail certain aspects of its nuclear activities, ensuring that they remained within the parameters specified by the agreement. IAEA Surveillance and Strict Oversight: It underscores the crucial role played by the International Atomic Energy Agency in the oversight and surveillance of Iran’s nuclear program. The IAEA’s strict monitoring mechanisms ensured that Iran’s activities were closely watched and assessed, adding a layer of transparency and accountability to the process. Absence of Deceptive Activities:

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It emphasizes that the trust-building period was characterized by the absence of reasons to suspect Iran of engaging in deceptive nuclear activities. This is significant because it signifies that the mechanisms in place, including IAEA inspections, were effective in providing assurance that Iran was adhering to the commitments outlined in the JCPOA. IAEA Inspections and Iran’s Compliance: The role of IAEA inspections is pivotal. They provided independent verification of Iran’s compliance with the deal’s provisions. By confirming Iran’s adherence, these inspections bolstered the credibility of the agreement and the trust among the deal participants. With regard to the overall impact on trust, the above points imply that the practical outcomes—such as the constraints on Iran’s nuclear program and the rigorous IAEA surveillance—contributed to enhancing the trust between Iran and the other parties involved. The transparency and cooperation facilitated by these measures were fundamental to the positive atmosphere of cooperation during these years. It demonstrates how Iran’s nuclear program was controlled, monitored, and verified through strict IAEA surveillance, leading to an absence of reasons to suspect any deceptive nuclear activities. This trust in Iran’s compliance, bolstered by transparent mechanisms, contributed to a positive and cooperative diplomatic environment during the period covered.

Compliance and Inspections Here, the focus is on the rigorous inspections that Iran underwent during this period. The IAEA’s role in verifying Iran’s adherence to the deal is highlighted, along with the affirmation of compliance by the United States. These factors collectively contributed to validating Iran’s commitment to the terms of the agreement. Rigorous Inspections and Iran’s Adherence: This directs attention to the comprehensive and thorough inspections that Iran underwent during the years covered by the chapter (2015–2018). The inspections were a crucial element of the JCPOA’s implementation, aiming to verify Iran’s adherence to the terms of the agreement. IAEA’s Verification Role:

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The IAEA played a central role in the verification process. The IAEA’s mandate involved inspecting Iran’s nuclear facilities, monitoring activities, and assessing data to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program aligned with the constraints specified in the JCPOA. United States’ Affirmation of Compliance: This highlights the role of the United States in affirming Iran’s compliance with the deal. The United States, as a key player in the JCPOA negotiations, had an essential responsibility in evaluating and publicly confirming that Iran was fulfilling its commitments. Collective Validation of Commitment: These combined efforts—rigorous inspections by the IAEA and the United States’ confirmation of compliance—formed a strong foundation for validating Iran’s commitment to the terms of the JCPOA. The validation was crucial in maintaining the trust and confidence among the parties involved. Transparency and Accountability: The inspections and verification processes underscored the principles of transparency and accountability that underpinned the JCPOA. By conducting thorough inspections and assessments, the parties ensured that the agreement’s objectives were being met and that all parties were held accountable for their commitments. Credibility of the Agreement: This implies that the rigorous inspections and verification mechanisms enhanced the credibility of the JCPOA. The fact that Iran’s compliance was confirmed through independent assessments and the affirmation of major stakeholders contributed to the agreement’s legitimacy. The above points draw attention to the extensive inspections carried out in Iran during the trust-building period, 2015–2018. It underscores the critical roles of the IAEA in verifying Iran’s adherence and the United States in confirming compliance. It suggests that the combination of these efforts played a pivotal role in validating Iran’s commitment to the terms of the agreement, enhancing transparency, accountability, and the credibility of the JCPOA.

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Iran becomes a Muted Proliferator In the span of thirteen reports from January 2016 to August 2018, IAEA consistently verified that Iran remained within the limits specified by the JCPOA, apart from a couple of minor instances of slight excess in heavy water stockpiles in 2016. Notably, the IAEA reports for 2017, which provided more detailed information compared to the previous year, indicated that Iran’s Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) stockpile was significantly below the maximum allowed by the JCPOA. Despite the authoritative and consistent reports confirming Iran’s adherence to the agreement’s terms, there were critics who attempted to construct a narrative of Iranian violations.13 One such critic was Mike Pompeo, who, while serving as the Director of the CIA, reportedly conveyed to aides in the spring of 2017 that Iran was violating the agreement, even though evidence was lacking. This sentiment emerged after a comprehensive briefing from agency analysts who concluded that Iran was in line with the JCPOA’s stipulations. This illustrates how preconceived notions can shape perceptions, leading to allegations of misconduct despite a lack of substantiated evidence.14 Furthermore, in April and July of 2017, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who would later be succeeded by Pompeo, officially certified to Congress that Iran had indeed met the compliance requirements set forth by the JCPOA. These compliance certifications indicated a consistent view from within the U.S. administration that Iran was abiding by the terms of the deal. Despite these certifications and the factual reporting from the IAEA, critics of the JCPOA maintained their stance on Iranian non-compliance. It is worth noting that some critics questioned the validity of these compliance certifications, arguing that they did not conclusively validate Iran’s adherence to the agreement.15 However, both White House talking

13 Mark Fitzpatrick, Uncertain Future: The JCPOA and Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, chapter one, p. 43. 14 See, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, “The Iran Nuclear Deal: What’s at Stake?” Middle East Policy, Summer 2017. 15 William J. Burns, “Did Iran Cheat? The Iran Deal and Its Consequences,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2019.

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points and statements from the State Department spokesperson asserted Iran’s compliance.16 In analyzing this situation, it becomes evident that the varying perspectives17 on Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA were shaped not solely by the facts presented by authoritative sources like the IAEA and the US State Department, but also by preconceived beliefs, political agendas, and interpretations of compliance certifications. This situation underscores the complexities of assessing international agreements, where factual reporting can be influenced by broader narratives and perceptions.18 One must note the JCPOA established a notably rigorous monitoring framework, considered the most intrusive ever adopted by the IAEA globally. Under this agreement, Iran committed to provisionally apply the terms of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol. This protocol grants the IAEA the authority to access any site where there are suspicions of activities related to fissile material. While the Additional Protocol has been widely accepted and is currently in force in 133 countries, it is not obligatory under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Seyed Hossein Mousavian makes an interesting statement on the JCPOA. He states, “We should not think of JCPOA as the first agreement after the Revolution. 12 years of negotiations led to this. Negotiations led to 170 pages of agreement. There are lot of holes in the NPT. As for the JCPOA, this was practically a document of NPT-2. If it was going to be successful, it would be a model to use in the Middle East, and that would be a problem for Israel. We lost the possibility of expanding the JCPOA beyond Iran. It was the biggest achievement of non-proliferation for conflict management on every nonproliferation conflict in the world…Because it is not easy to negotiate for 12 years on technical issues; how you can go beyond NPT to create an objective towards non-proliferation.”19 Essentially, Mousavian highlights that there were gaps and ambiguities in the NPT, suggesting that the JCPOA served as the practical extension or enhancement of the NPT. He emphasizes the complexities of negotiating technical issues for over 16 Mark Fitzpatrick, Uncertain Future: The JCPOA and Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, chapter one, p. 43. 17 Robert S. Litwak, “The Iran Nuclear Deal: Breakthrough or Failure?” Survival, February–March 2017. 18 Kelsey Davenport and Alicia Sanders-Zakre, “Iran’s Compliance with the JCPOA: A Critical Assessment,” Washington D.C.: Arms Control Association, October 2018. 19 Interview with Seyed Hossein Mousavian, September 10, 2023.

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a decade and the importance of moving beyond the NPT to foster nonproliferation objectives. As part of the JCPOA, Iran aimed to ratify the Additional Protocol within eight years, effectively making it a permanent aspect of their commitment. This move reinforced the significance of the JCPOA’s stringent monitoring provisions, emphasizing Iran’s dedication to transparency and non-proliferation measures. As for Iran’s behavior during the period between 2015 and 2018, this period was marked by Iran’s commitment to the JCPOA, including adhering to constraints on its nuclear program, allowing strict inspections, and cooperating with international bodies to ensure transparency, all of which made Iran a muted proliferator. However, Iran still remained a latent proliferator by default.

Latent Proliferator Too? The narrative takes an interesting turn by introducing the concept of Iran as a recognized “latent proliferator.” This recognition is attributed to the nuclear deal. The term “life of proliferation,” introduced previously, is revisited to explain this latent status further. The JCPOA has turned Iran into a “recognized latent proliferator.” This part explores Iran’s transition to being recognized as a latent proliferator. This is a crucial concept introduced in the chapter that signifies Iran’s potential ability to develop nuclear weapons quickly if it chose to do so. Transformation from latent to active proliferator is easily possible. The section analyzes the latent proliferator status and explores the feasibility of Iran transitioning from being recognized as latent to becoming an active proliferator. It sets the stage for the next phase of the chapter’s discussion. It was discussed in the theoretical chapters, which explore the factors that contribute to such a transformation, including changes in international dynamics, domestic politics, or shifts in the security landscape. In cases where countries possess latent nuclear capabilities and have constrained their nuclear programs due to external pressure, they retain the ability to resume and advance these programs at their discretion. This is the central concern policymakers have with latent nuclear states, as they can swiftly transition to building nuclear weapons without requiring significant time or additional capacity. This issue highlights the primary challenge associated with latent nuclear status. While some countries, like Canada and Japan, are also latent, but have no interest or intention to proliferate, the situation differs for regional states that harbor the desire

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and rationale to acquire nuclear weapons. If these states suspended their nuclear pursuits in response to international pressure or to feign disinterest, it suggests that their motivations are distinct from cases like Canada or Japan. The essential point is that policymakers have chosen not to militarize their civilian nuclear endeavors. For regional nations that either feign non-proliferation, cap their programs, or adhere to agreements preventing nuclear weapon development, there exists the potential for them to resume their programs if circumstances or opportunities change. If these agreements collapse, these countries are more inclined to reinitiate their nuclear activities, as they feel less bound by their commitments and their existing latent capabilities facilitate a quicker resurgence of proliferation efforts. This underscores the peril associated with latency. The concept becomes a potent catalyst for proliferation, especially when agreements falter or fracture. Illustrating this phenomenon, Iran serves as a pertinent case study. The country has been regarded as a latent proliferator due to its controversial nuclear program. Under international pressure and through negotiations, Iran agreed to the JCPOA in 2015. This agreement placed restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief. The JCPOA effectively capped Iran’s nuclear program and placed it under thorough monitoring. However, critics of the deal expressed concerns similar to those previously mentioned. They argued that Iran, as a latent nuclear state, could potentially exploit its technical know-how and latent capabilities to swiftly advance its nuclear weapons program if it chose to do so. In 2018, the United States withdrew from the JCPOA, citing perceived flaws and concerns about Iran’s compliance. Subsequently, Iran gradually began to exceed some of the JCPOA’s limitations on its nuclear activities. While Iran maintained that its nuclear pursuits were for peaceful purposes, these actions raised international concerns about the country’s potential to pivot toward weaponization should the circumstances shift in that direction. The Iran case underscores the intricate nature of latent nuclear states. The country demonstrated its ability to ramp up nuclear activities quickly after the constraints were lifted, illustrating the risks associated with latent capabilities, discussed in the case-study chapter. This example aligns with the broader argument that latent nuclear states, if motivated, can swiftly transition to active nuclear weapon development, fueled by their existing knowledge and capacities.

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Latency represents a pivotal phase within the realm of nuclear proliferation, stemming from a state’s possession of the technical prowess required for crafting nuclear weapons. This capability can arise from technological advancement, and nations might opt to confine their pursuits to civilian applications of nuclear technology. Alternatively, these states might deliberately choose to remain latent, as doing so could bestow upon them a form of deterrence against their adversaries. The crux of the matter lies in the fact that a significant proportion of such states intentionally opt for latency, discussed in the theory chapter. In the process of evaluating the risks associated with proliferation, it is essential to recognize that the capacity to construct nuclear weapons and the national security motivations to acquire them are not always synchronous. Nations can possess the scientific and technological resources to embark on weaponization, but their decision to forgo immediate weapon development might be motivated by complex strategic considerations. In essence, the presence of latent capabilities doesn’t automatically equate to a pressing intention to weaponize, and this distinction is crucial for gauging the potential for nuclear proliferation. The decision to develop latent capabilities, wherein a country seeks to enhance its technical potential without an immediate aim for nuclear weapon possession, is fundamentally different from the decision to actually proliferate and possess functional nuclear weapons. This distinction can be effectively analyzed through the framework of “technical capability + intent.” This approach is particularly insightful for understanding a country’s decision-making process regarding proliferation. Countries categorized as latent proliferators often find it unnecessary to surpass the threshold of latency and advance into full weaponization. Noteworthy examples include nations like Japan, Germany, and the Netherlands. Japan, an exemplar of this category, stands as a model adherent to the NPT. It holds the distinction of being the first non-nuclear weapons state to both sign and implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, a measure that facilitates more comprehensive monitoring. Japan’s commitment to its stance is also evident in the bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements it has established with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. Over the past six decades, Japan’s steadfastness in maintaining its latent status, rather than transitioning to a nuclear weapons state, is evident. Canada, with its well-established nuclear technology base, exemplified by its domestically developed CANDU reactor technology and substantial uranium reserves, is another case in

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point. Notably, Canada maintains a significant share of global uranium production. The key takeaway from these instances is that these nations effectively harmonize their thoughts with their actions. Their consistent actions underscore their commitment to preserving their non-threatening latent status. Thus, the nuanced decisions of latent proliferators underscore the divergence between building technical capacity and actually pursuing nuclear weapon possession. Countries like Japan and Canada demonstrate a steadfast dedication to their latent status, showcasing the congruence between their intentions and actions. Formal nuclear deals can also be instrumental in shaping a country’s latency status. Such arrangements, while not imposed on a state, can exert compelling force on it to accept the deal temporarily. The fact that these deals often have defined timeframes makes it advantageous for latent proliferators, as the status change can be contingent on the contract’s termination. Moreover, acquiring domestic consensus becomes less challenging in such circumstances. Iran presents a distinct case among latent proliferators. The nuclear deal with Iran compelled the country to accept recognized latency status, disregarding its intentions or motivations for pursuing nuclear weapons. While Iran needed the deal to lift sanctions and improve its economy, it did not independently decide to abstain from proliferation. Unlike other latent proliferators who voluntarily chose to maintain their latent status, Iran’s decision was influenced by the need for economic relief. The nuclear agreement essentially imposed recognized latency upon Iran for a specific period of 15 years. While this legitimizes Iran’s latent status for the duration of the agreement, Tehran retains the ability to change its nuclear status once the contract expires. Recognized latency arises from a combination of technological capacity, intent, and situational factors. The case of Iran exemplifies how external forces can compel a country to accept a latent status, unlike other latent proliferators who make the decision autonomously. This distinctive scenario highlights the dynamic interplay between intent, capability, and external pressures in shaping a nation’s nuclear stance. Iran’s perspective on nuclear proliferation in the pre-JCPOA period was influenced by its strategic and security considerations, as well as its desire to develop a nuclear program for peaceful purposes. However, this perspective was often met with international suspicion and concerns about potential military dimensions of its program. Iran consistently maintained that its nuclear program was intended for peaceful purposes, primarily to meet its growing energy needs. The country argued that as a signatory to

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the NPT, it had the right to develop a civilian nuclear program for energy, medical, and scientific purposes. Iran also emphasized its right to develop its nuclear capabilities as a matter of national sovereignty and technological advancement. It saw its nuclear program as a symbol of its scientific and technological progress and was determined to develop a self-reliant nuclear industry. Its perspective on nuclear proliferation was heavily influenced by its security environment. The country viewed itself as facing regional security challenges, including conflicts and rivalries in the Middle East and in the global level with the US. As a result, it argued that having a credible nuclear deterrent could enhance its national security and deter potential adversaries. Consequently, Iran’s decision regarding its nuclear status in the aftermath of the 15-year period stipulated by the nuclear deal is highly contingent on the resolution of its ongoing conflicts. Iran is embroiled in long-standing rivalries with Iraq, Israel, and the United States. The complexities of these rivalries suggest that they are unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future, especially given the current geopolitical landscape. The Trump administration’s firm anti-Iran stance and withdrawal from the nuclear deal have exacerbated tensions between Iran and the United States. The enduring rivalry between the two nations appears to be far from resolution and could potentially escalate further, introducing a new dimension of animosity. In light of these circumstances, Iran’s quest for a deterrent capability remains a significant concern. Unlike countries such as Japan, South Korea, India, and Pakistan, which either possess nuclear weapons or are under the nuclear umbrella of powerful allies, Iran lacks such protection. This vulnerability prompts Iran to consider pursuing nuclear weapons as a means of enhancing its security against its global power rival, the United States, and other regional adversaries. The rhetoric surrounding Iran’s nuclear energy program and its capabilities can be used strategically to signal its readiness to pursue a nuclear weapons program if the need arises. While Iranian officials have officially denied seeking nuclear weapons, Iran possesses the technical knowledge and capability to build such weapons if it chooses to do so. IAEA’s Director General Rafael Grossi states, “Iran does not have nuclear weapons. A distinction must be made between having nuclear weapons and being able to create them.”20

20 “Iran Has No Nuclear Weapons: IAEA Chief,” Tehran Times, August 29, 2023.

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Iran’s decision regarding its nuclear status hinges on the resolution of protracted conflicts and its security concerns in a region marked by enduring rivalries. The absence of a comprehensive resolution to these conflicts, particularly with the United States, suggests that Iran’s latent nuclear capabilities could be transformed into active weaponization if circumstances evolve. Iran’s strategic posturing and statements from key figures indicate that its nuclear intentions remain contingent on regional and global dynamics. Top of Form.

Summary The chapter highlights that Iran’s nuclear program was effectively capped and placed under strict surveillance by the IAEA between 2015–18. In essence, this chapter probes the details of the trust-building period, examining Iran’s nuclear status, compliance with the JCPOA, and the recognition of its latent proliferator status. The narrative also lays the groundwork for exploring the dynamics of latent to active proliferation in the subsequent discussions. There were no grounds to suspect Iran of deceiving the international community regarding its nuclear activities. Iran complied with its proliferation commitments and demonstrated its willingness to abide by the terms of the deal. Under the accord, Iran relinquished 97 percent of its uranium fuel, significantly reducing its capacity to produce nuclear weapons. The country also maintained its stockpile well below the threshold required for the production of a single bomb. Rigorous and regular inspections conducted by the IAEA, as well as the affirmation of compliance by the United States, further validated Iran’s adherence to the deal. The chapter emphasizes that Iran’s nuclear behavior during this period was directly influenced by the lifting of major Western sanctions that had been imposed for decades. It was expected that the consolidated nuclear deal would pave the way for increased socio-economic and political interactions between Iran and the United States, eventually fostering an environment to resolve their long-standing conflicts. An intriguing aspect explored in this chapter is the recognition of Iran as a latent proliferator, which emerged as a result of the nuclear deal. It focuses deeper into the concept of the “life of proliferation” introduced in the previous chapter. The analysis examines Iran’s latency status and explores the potential for it to transition from a recognized latent proliferator to an active proliferator.

CHAPTER 10

US Exit from the Deal and Tehran’s Intense Proliferation Interest

This chapter examines how Tehran’s proliferation aspirations evolved following Washington’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal in 2018. As outlined in the previous chapter, Iran displayed significant restraint concerning its nuclear enrichment program and faithfully adhered to the commitments of the agreement between 2015 and 2018, earning recognition in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports for its compliance. The Trump administration’s decision to exit the deal and reinstate sanctions on Iran, coupled with punitive measures against countries legally trading with Iran, compelled Iran to retaliate and apply counter-pressure on the United States. Whether Iran’s commitment to the deal during 2015–2018 was a strategic move to potentially proliferate at a later date remains uncertain, but it is evident that Tehran sought to build trust and address commitment issues during that period. Unfortunately, Iran’s proliferation ambitions escalated from low-to-moderate prior to the deal to moderate-to-high following the US withdrawal, intensifying its pursuit of nuclear activities and the desire to demonstrate that resolve compared to the pre-deal era. Iran has breached the nuclear deal by exceeding its agreed-upon uranium limit, displaying a stronger inclination toward proliferation, influenced by the US departure and a lack

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of trust in security arrangements. This heightened proliferation activity is the most rapid observed in comparison to previous periods, underscoring the intensified pursuit of security and prestige objectives in the aftermath of failed agreements.

Tehran’s Shift in Proliferation Approach in Mid-2019 In 2018, the United States distanced itself from the nuclear deal, while European powers aimed to salvage and uphold their end of the commitments. They continued trading with Iran, with Washington allowing this for an additional year. However, in April 2019, the US terminated waivers that permitted some countries to buy Iranian oil, a move that greatly angered Iran. Consequently, in May 2019, Iran issued a notice indicating its intention to gradually withdraw from the deal, unless the Europeans could shield its economy.1 As tensions resurfaced between Washington and Tehran following the US withdrawal, they escalated notably in the spring of 2019. Incidents included attacks on ships in or near the Strait of Hormuz, where a significant portion of global oil exports transits. In June, Iran shot down an American drone, and American bombers were poised for a retaliatory strike just minutes away from their Iranian targets when President Trump ultimately called it off. In July, the US claimed to have downed an Iranian drone. Concurrently, the IAEA confirmed that “Iran broke the 300 kg limit on July 1st, followed by the 3.67% purity threshold on July 8th.”2 The United States strongly criticized Iran’s expansion of sensitive nuclear activities, including the accumulation of low enriched uranium and the enrichment of uranium beyond 3.67%.3 Trita Parsi emphasized that Iran’s actions were directly linked to the fact

1 “The Nuclear Deal Fueling Tensions Between Iran and America,” The Economist, July

22, 2019. 2 “The Nuclear Deal Fueling Tensions Between Iran and America,” The Economist, July 22, 2019. 3 “US Sanctions Entities Linked to Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Deccan Herald, July 19, 2019. https://www.deccanherald.com/international/world-news-politics/us-sanctions-ent ities-linked-to-irans-nuclear-program-748081.html.

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that “Trump went after all of Iranian oil,” causing economic pressures that Iran found increasingly challenging to manage.4 Iran had anticipated that the economic benefits it gained from the nuclear deal would persist through the support of European powers even after the US withdrew from the agreement, but this expectation was not met. Instead, the American administration, since President Trump’s ascent to power, pursued a strategy of crippling the Iranian economy. Parsi pointed out, “You can’t pursue economic warfare and not expect it to lead to military warfare.”5 Washington had sought this new dynamic, yet it struggled to manage Tehran’s retaliatory actions.6 It is crucial to highlight that while Iran’s hostilities with the US reignited after Washington’s exit from the deal, Tehran initially aimed to retain economic benefits from the agreement for as long as possible. It remained in the fractured deal, albeit with dissatisfaction. However, once the US directly targeted Iran’s economy, the situation deteriorated, and what might have been a gradual process for Iran swiftly transformed. Iran boldly declared its new uranium enrichment level to the world, a move that might have taken longer if not for the US administration’s use of derogatory rhetoric. Although the US had labeled Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984, in April 2019, it “named the Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran’s premier military force, a terrorist organization, the first time it has applied that designation to a state institution.”7 Iran’s expectation that signing the nuclear deal would not only bring sanctions relief, but also foster a state-tostate understanding about its commitment to global order was shattered. The US quickly forgot the goodwill Iran had demonstrated by signing and implementing the deal for two years, and instead, Iran received new

4 Interview with Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President, Quincy Institute, Washington, D.C., August 7, 2019. Parsi is an expert on US-Iranian relations, Iranian foreign policy, and the geopolitics of the Middle East. 5 Interview with Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President, Quincy Institute, Washington, D.C., August 7, 2019. 6 Interview with Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President, Quincy Institute, Washington, D.C., August 7, 2019. 7 David Warner, “Why the U.S. and Iran Are at Loggerheads Again,” The Washington Post, August 20, 2019.

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derogatory labels from the US administration. Notably, Iran had previously been part of the “Axis of Evil” states under the Bush administration, which influenced its nuclear policies after 2002.8 The shift in policy took several years and involved numerous secret and open negotiations between Iran and the United States and its allies to eventually hammer out a nuclear deal. The Brazil, Turkey, US, and Iran initiative of 2010 was one such effort. Interestingly, this initiative was not accepted by Hillary Clinton in the end, as she believed that Iran was still concealing some of its nuclear program-related information. It must be noted that it was the same Clinton who later showed enthusiasm for advancing the nuclear deal in 2015. This underscores that the US, under the Obama administration, would not have signed the deal unless Iran was seen as genuinely committed to fulfilling its obligations. Iran had to demonstrate its intent to honor the deal’s clauses. The US’ willingness to engage in negotiations with Iran on multiple occasions instilled a sense in Iran that this enduring rivalry could potentially be resolved over time. The US had moved beyond the “Axis of Evil” era, and with the change of administration under President Obama, antagonistic policies were gradually replaced by expectations of improved relations in other areas. Regrettably, the new labeling of Iran after many years not only stirs tensions in Tehran but also suggests that there might be no end in sight for the protracted US-Iran conflict. Iran’s current policies, which take into account national security and prestige interests, are a result of these strategic decisions. The spill-back policy was formulated under these circumstances.

Tehran Adopts a Spill-Back Strategy The spill-back effect of the fractured nuclear deal has been notably striking in Iran. What is particularly noteworthy is not only the direction of Iran’s actions regarding its enrichment levels, but also the manner in which it is pursuing these activities. Iran is openly and unapologetically advancing its proliferation efforts, seemingly indifferent to the potential consequences. It no longer appears to be concerned about the repercussions of its proliferation-related actions, a shift that Trita Parsi attributes to US policies. He contends that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is 8 See Saira Khan, Iran and Nuclear Weapons: Protracted Conflict and Proliferation (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).

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primarily driven by the US, emphasizing that Iranians were not necessarily aiming to build a nuclear bomb but rather sought the option to do so. “They wanted an option to build the bomb.”9 The pace and intensity of Tehran’s advancements in the nuclear sphere are indeed alarming, but even more concerning is its current unreserved attitude. Parsi argues that “U.S. hostility was and is responsible for this. Since the 1990s Iranians prepared against one major aggressor—the US.”10 That situation was muted for two years during the deal period, which once again changed and this time in a more blatant way due to US’ continuous and open hostility toward Iran. Sanctions triggered a tremendous degree of inflation in Iran in 2019 and “undermined domestic support for President Hassan Rouhani’s government, which negotiated the nuclear deal. Iranians feel duped. The nuclear deal was supposed to yield economic advantages for Iran, but renewed US sanctions have shattered that expectation.”11 In 2022, the White House had begun to express its growing concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. The White House stated, “it ‘definitely worries’ that Iran could have nuclear weapons within the coming weeks after the country fast-tracked its estimated procurement timeline from a year’s time.”12 The US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated about Iran’s nuclear program, “Their program has galloped forward.”13 He and the White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki blamed the speedup on Trump Administration’s decision to pull out of the JCPOA. Psaki stated that since that period, “Iran has accelerated its nuclear program and reduced cooperation with international inspectors.”14 Barbara Slavin in her testimony to the Subcommittee on National Security in September 2023 states in a detailed manner, “Iran waited a year after Trump’s

9 Interview with Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President, Quincy Institute, Washington, D.C., August 7, 2019. 10 Interview with Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President, Quincy Institute, Washington, D.C., August 7, 2019. 11 David Warner, “Why the U.S. and Iran Are at Loggerheads Again,” The Washington Post, August 20, 2019. 12 Katherine Fung, “White House ‘Worries’ Iran Could Be Nuclear Weapon Ready in Weeks,” Newsweek, April 26, 2022. 13 Katherine Fung, “White House ‘Worries’ Iran Could Be Nuclear Weapon Ready in Weeks,” Newsweek, April 26, 2022. 14 Katherine Fung, “White House ‘Worries’ Iran Could Be Nuclear Weapon Ready in Weeks,” Newsweek, April 26, 2022.

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withdrawal in 2018 before it began to exceed the limits set under the JCPOA. It has now gone very, very far. According to the latest IAEA report, while Iran has slowed its accumulation of uranium enriched to 60 percent, it has more than 3000 kilograms of enriched uranium — 10 times that allowed under the JCPOA, which limited Iran to 300 kilograms of low enriched uranium. Iran now has 500 kilograms of 20 percent uranium and more than 120 kilograms of 60 percent uranium. None of this would exist if Trump had not violated American commitments and incentivized Iran through a ‘maximum pressure’ strategy that has patently failed.”15 Her statement highlighted that Iran’s nuclear program escalated significantly after a one-year wait following Trump’s 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA, with Iran now possessing substantial amounts of enriched uranium well beyond the JCPOA’s limits, attributing this development to Trump’s violation of American commitments and his “maximum pressure” strategy which proved ineffective. Iran has made explicit declarations that it will not passively endure economic punishment by the US, and it has indeed confirmed exceeding the agreed-upon caps on its enriched uranium stockpiles and surpassing permissible levels of purity,16 marking an unprecedented shift. In the period before the nuclear deal, Iran adopted a more subtle approach to its nuclear program. From 2003 to 2015, Iran never openly disclosed its enrichment or purity levels, reflecting the hope for potential negotiations with the US aimed at sanctions relief in exchange for nuclear program limitations.17 Presently, Iran appears untroubled by its overt statements 15 Testimony of Barbara Slavin to the Subcommittee on National Security, the Border and Foreign Affairs, Sept 15, 2023, in Joe Cirincione, “Barbara Slavin on Why We Must Free American Prisoners Held by Iran,” Strategy and History, September 15, 2023. 16 David Warner, “Why the U.S. and Iran Are at Loggerheads Again,” The Washington Post, August 20, 2019. 17 See Seyed Hossein Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012); National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2007). Available: http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/ Reports%20and%20Pubs/20071203_release.pdf, July 20, 2016; G. Porter, Manufactured Crisis: The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare (Charlottesville: Just World Books, 2014); T. Rauf and R. Kelley, “Assessing the IAEA ‘Assessment’ of ‘Possible Military Dimensions’ of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Atomic Reporters, 2015, Available: http://www.atomicreporters.com/2015/12/assessing-the-iaea-assessment-of-possib lemilitary-dimensions-of-irans-nuclear-programme/, July 20, 2016; Richard Rosecrance, “After NPT, What? Department of State, 1968, Policy Planning Council, Resources

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and the revelation of its enrichment levels. In mid-August in 2019, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) revealed that its enriched uranium stockpile had risen from 300 to 370 kilograms, with Iran asserting its commitment to further developing its nuclear program.18 During a parliamentary meeting, it was disclosed when and under what conditions the renewed enrichment commenced. Iran’s Member of Parliament, Hussein Naqawi Husseini, reported that Chief of the AEOI Ali Akbar Salehi emphasized the implementation of directives from Supreme Revolutionary Guide Ali Khamenei following the US’ withdrawal from the internationally supported nuclear deal.19 Salehi also underscored Iran’s intentions to restart activity at the heavy-water nuclear reactor at its Arak facility.20 By mid-July of that year, European experts conveyed their concerns to CNBC, highlighting two particularly worrisome developments related to Iran’s nuclear program. They expressed apprehension over Iran’s threats to surpass its JCPOA enrichment cap of 3.67%, an amount designated for civilian energy production, and the possibility of reversing the modernization process of its Arak heavy-water research reactor.21 Under the nuclear deal, this reactor was being altered to eliminate its potential for nuclear weapons development.22 Subsequent IAEA reports, as of the end of August 2019, have provided evidence of Iran’s escalating breaches of the nuclear deal. The IAEA, still tasked with monitoring the 2015 agreement, confirmed Iran’s gradual withdrawal from the accord in retaliation for the US’s departure from the agreement and the

from the National Security Archives Nuclear Documentation Project,” 2015. Available: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb253/doc27.pdf, July 20, 2016; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Hearing, Statement for the Record by Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper—Worldwide Threat Assessment of the United States Intelligence Community, 31 January 2012. Available: www.dni.gov/files/documents/New sroom/Testimonies/20120131_testimony_ata.pdf, July 20, 2016. 18 “Iran’s Stockpile of Enriched Uranium Increased 25%,” Middle East Monitor, August 19, 2019. 19 “Iran’s Stockpile of Enriched Uranium Increased 25%,” Middle East Monitor, August 19, 2019. 20 Adam Taylor, “Emergency Talks on Nuclear Deal Constructive but Inconclusive, Iranian Minister Says,” The Washington Post, July 28, 2019. 21 Natasha Turak, “Iran Nuclear Deal ‘Isn’t’ Dead Yet as EU Leaders Scramble to Save It,” CNBC, July 15, 2019. 22 Natasha Turak, “Iran Nuclear Deal ‘Isn’t’ Dead Yet as EU Leaders Scramble to Save It,” CNBC, July 15, 2019.

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reinstatement of sanctions, which severely impacted Iranian oil sales. Iran has openly stated its intent to progressively exceed the deal’s limits on its nuclear activities, applying pressure on parties striving to salvage the agreement. The IAEA reported Iran’s violations, including surpassing the 202.8 kg limit on its enriched uranium stock and exceeding the 3.67% cap on fissile purity allowed for uranium refinement. In a verbal update the IAEA disclosed that Iran was enriching uranium to 4.5% purity and had amassed 213.5 kg of enriched uranium. The quarterly report to member states confirmed that Iran has accumulated 241.6 kg of enriched uranium and is maintaining enrichment levels at approximately 4.5%.23 These violations, announced by Iran and confirmed by the IAEA, were intended to increase pressure on JCPOA signatories to provide additional economic incentives. It is important to note that uranium enriched to 3.67% is suitable for peaceful purposes but falls far short of the 90% threshold for weapons-grade levels. At the 4.5% level, it can contribute to powering Iran’s Bushehr reactor, the country’s sole nuclear power plant.24 The UK’s Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt assessed then that “Iran is still a good year away from developing a nuclear bomb.”25 Diplomats have expressed concerns that “Iran is stifling a United Nations probe of its alleged storage of nuclear equipment and radioactive material in Tehran,” “heightening worries about Iran’s activities at a critical juncture for the fate of the 2015 nuclear deal.”26 What is Iran’s current nuclear status? During a recent address at the US Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium, Seyed Hossein Mousavian emphasized that the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal had far-reaching consequences and was detrimental for both Washington and Tehran. Several key reasons support this assertion. Since the withdrawal, Iran has significantly escalated its nuclear activities. Informatively, it has elevated its uranium enrichment levels to nearly 60%, well beyond the 3.67% limit mandated by the deal, and has amassed 23 Francois Murphy, “Iran Goes Further in Breaching Nuclear Deal, IAEA Report Shows,” Reuters, August 30, 2019. 24 “UN Atomic Watchdog: Iran Still in Violation of Nuclear Deal,” Israel Hayom, September 1, 2019. http://isrealhayom.com/. 25 Natasha Turak, “Iran Nuclear Deal ‘Isn’t’ Dead Yet as EU Leaders Scramble to Save It,” CNBC, July 15, 2019. 26 Laurence Norman, “Iran Curbs U.N. Probe into Tehran Nuclear Equipment Site,” The Wall Street Journal, September 2, 2019.

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substantial stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. This rapid expansion has substantially reduced Iran’s potential breakout time, with estimates now indicating that it could acquire enough weapons-grade uranium for an initial nuclear warhead in just approximately 12 days, a stark departure from the one-year timeframe stipulated by the agreement.27 In a recent interview Mousavian stated, “The JCPOA allowed Iran only below 5 percent enrichment. Then Iran went to 20 percent, then to 60 percent, and then to 84 percent and, they were going to 90 percent.”28 These developments underscore the heightened urgency and complexity of the situation. It is crucial to recognize that when the JCPOA was initially signed, Iran was widely believed to be just a few months away from accumulating sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon. With the deal’s implementation, this “breakout timeline” was extended to over a year. “Iran’s breach of the restrictions—which cover the size of its stockpile of low enriched uranium and a commitment to limit enrichment—does not dramatically change that timeline, but over time it could shrink it. Even with enough fissile material for a bomb, Iran would still have to master nuclear weaponization, the complicated process of developing the capability to detonate and deliver an explosive device.”29 This means that while Iran’s breaches of the restrictions, encompassing the size of its low-enriched uranium stockpile and a commitment to limit enrichment, may not dramatically alter this timeline immediately, and they could gradually diminish it. Even if Iran were to amass enough fissile material for a bomb, it would still need to master nuclear weaponization—a complex process involving the development of the capability to detonate and deliver an explosive device. The pivotal point lies in the fact that the significance of these breaches does not lie solely in their immediate impact on Iran’s nuclear weapons capacity, but rather in the potential they create

27 Seyed Hossein Mousavian, “Iran Nuclear Deal: How to Get it Right, Middle East Eye, September 6, 2023. 28 Interview with Seyed Hossein Mousavian, September 10, 2023. Mousavian is a former chief of Iran’s National Security and Foreign Relations Committee and scholar who served on Iran’s nuclear diplomacy team in negotiations with the EU and International Atomic Energy Agency. He is a Middle East security and nuclear policy specialist at Princeton University. 29 Philip H. Gordon, “Is Iran’s Nuclear Program Back for Good,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 8, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/expert/philip-h-gordon.

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for dismantling the entire agreement. This, in turn, opens the door to steps that could significantly expedite Iran’s progress in that direction. As the incentives multiply and the means to pursue their interests are explored more earnestly, several factors come into play, with a substantial trust deficit being one of the most critical aspects contributing to Iran’s heightened proliferation aspirations in the post-fractured deal era. Presently, the IAEA is expressing concerns over Iran’s refusal to allow the installation of monitoring and surveillance equipment, raising doubts about the agency’s ability to effectively verify Iran’s compliance with nuclear agreements. Specifically, the IAEA is worried about its capacity to detect any potential diversion or future diversion of advanced centrifuges, which are crucial machines used in the enrichment of uranium to levels necessary for nuclear weapons. This situation creates a risk scenario where Iran might accumulate a covert inventory of advanced centrifuges, which could potentially be deployed in the future at undisclosed enrichment facilities or during a breakout at officially declared nuclear sites. These concerns highlight the importance of transparency and cooperation in international efforts to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear technology and prevent the development of nuclear weapons. IAEA reported that for “more than two and a half years Iran has not provided updated declarations and the Agency has not been able to conduct any complimentary access … to any sites and locations in Iran.”30 Reports from the United Nations nuclear watchdog, as disclosed to Reuters, however, indicate that Iran has scaled down its production of uranium enriched up to 60% purity, a level close to the roughly 90% threshold considered weaponsgrade. Additionally, Iran has taken steps to dilute a small portion of its stockpile enriched to 60%. However, it is important to note that despite these adjustments, Iran’s overall stockpile of enriched uranium continues to grow. Under the theoretical definition provided by the IAEA, Iran currently possesses nearly enough uranium enriched to 60% purity that, if further refined, could be used in the production of three nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Iran also holds sufficient quantities of uranium enriched to lower levels, which could potentially be utilized to manufacture additional nuclear devices. In September 2023, the IAEA’s Director

30 Adam Kredo, “Iran Can Produce 10 Nuclear Bombs in 4 Months, Watchdog Says, as Biden Releases $6 Billion to Tehran, Its Weapon Capacity Expands,” The Washington Free Beacon, September 11, 2023.

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General reported that Iran has expelled IAEA’s most experienced inspectors. He “condemned Iran’s ‘disproportionate and unprecedented’ move to bar multiple inspectors assigned to the country, hindering its oversight of Tehran’s atomic activities.”31 Such situations underscore ongoing concerns and the need for international monitoring and diplomatic efforts to address Iran’s nuclear activities and their implications.32 The Institute for Science and International Security has reported that Iran possesses the necessary resources and technical expertise to rapidly produce weapons-grade uranium. According to their analysis, Iran could potentially produce enough material for six nuclear weapons within the span of one month, with the capability to increase that number to eight within two months, nine within three months, and ten within four months.33 These findings, based on a review of the latest disclosures from the IAEA regarding Tehran’s nuclear stockpile, highlight the urgency and complexity of the international community’s efforts to monitor and manage Iran’s nuclear activities to ensure they are used for peaceful purposes and prevent the development of nuclear weapons.

Trust Deficit Becomes the Pillar of Spill-Back Strategy Iran’s erosion of trust in multilateral diplomacy has become increasingly evident. The effectiveness of regimes and agreements hinges on the respect they receive from major powers involved in them. When that respect falters, as is the case with Iran post-JCPOA, smaller states grappling with insecurity can no longer rely on these confidence-building measures. European experts argue that President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal has significantly “undermined the value

31 “UN Nuclear Agency Slams Iran for Barring Inspectors from Monitoring Program,”

Aljazeera, September 16, 2023. 32 Arshad Mohammed and Francois Murphy, “Iran’s Nuclear Slowdown May Help Ease Tensions with US,” New Straits Times, September 10, 2023. 33 Adam Kredo, “Iran Can Produce 10 Nuclear Bombs in 4 Months, Watchdog Says, as Biden Releases $6 Billion to Tehran, Its Weapon Capacity Expands,” The Washington Free Beacon, September 11, 2023.

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of multilateral diplomacy.”34 The JCPOA is often cited as a noteworthy example of successful multilateralism and diplomacy, as it brings together countries with divergent foreign policy stances, including the US and its European allies, Russia, China, and Iran. Regrettably, the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal has weakened the standing of “international law and institutions.”35 Furthermore, the legitimacy of the JCPOA is rooted in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which explicitly prohibits Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons capability. However, the US has undervalued the significance of the NPT. Additionally, the authority of the JCPOA is derived from the endorsement of the United Nations Security Council through its Resolution 2231. With its decision to renege on its commitments without valid justification, Washington has conveyed the message that international obligations can be discarded at will36 —a reflection of the often-cynical nature of international politics, prompting neo-realists to repeatedly caution against placing excessive faith in international regimes and emphasizing that laws are made with the understanding that they may be broken, particularly in situations where today’s allies can become tomorrow’s adversaries.37 In line with these neo-realist perspectives, Iran now recognizes how the US’s preference for “maximum pressure” over compromise has devalued diplomacy as an effective tool for addressing international crises in cases involving entrenched conflict states. The American decision to fracture the nuclear deal has precipitated new challenges concerning trust in interstate relationships, casting doubts on the possibility of conflicting states cooperating in good faith and forging lasting friendships, particularly in Iran’s perspective. It is essential to distinguish between normal states collaborating on various issues 34 “The US and the Iran Nuclear Deal: Rejoining Is Wiser than Destroying: A European Joint Call on the US to Reconsider Its Approach to the JCPOA,” European Leadership Network, May 8, 2019. 35 The US and the Iran Nuclear Deal: Rejoining Is Wiser than Destroying: A European Joint Call on the US to Reconsider Its Approach to the JCPOA,” European Leadership Network, May 8, 2019. 36 The US and the Iran Nuclear Deal: Rejoining Is Wiser than Destroying: A European Joint Call on the US to Reconsider Its Approach to the JCPOA,” European Leadership Network, May 8, 2019. 37 Joseph Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 116–140.

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and protracted conflict states attempting to do the same. While cooperation amid protracted conflict is conceivable, it is not easily achievable when states lack a genuine commitment to the process.38 One of the most formidable obstacles lies in altering the image of the adversary, a challenge applicable to conflict-ridden states across the board. In situations where states have engaged in enduring rivalries over extended periods, as seen in the case of the US and Iran, the difficulty of reshaping enemy perceptions can impede the path to negotiation. Achieving this transformation requires relentless efforts and substantial evidence of goodwill from both parties to bring them to the negotiating table for the purpose of hammering out a deal. Third-party involvement or direct state-to-state gestures are not initially trusted, further complicating the process. Interestingly, discussions about a potential mutual agreement between the US and Iran began shortly after the Iraq war of 2003, where the “idea of starting a deal based on mutually beneficial interests gained currency.”39 Unfortunately, this episode turned out to be another failed attempt at fundamentally reshaping the US-Iranian relationship.40 Several years later, President Obama initiated a “diplomatic outreach aimed at dismantling the enemy images of the Iranian leadership.”41 However, Iranian leaders did not interpret Obama’s signals as indications of his peaceful intent due to the profound lack of trust between him and Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The initial years of the Obama administration were primarily dedicated to setting the stage for trust-building between the United States and Iran. While America took the diplomatic initiative and moved away from

38 Saira Khan, “China-US Relations: Competition and Cooperation Under Enduring Rivalry,” International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention, Toronto, March 2014. See Frederic Wehrey et al., Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2009), p. 166. 39 See Frederic Wehrey et al., Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2009), p. 166. 40 See Frederic Wehrey et al., Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2009), p. 167. 41 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

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maximum pressure tactics, it also conducted a test of Iran’s intentions during President Obama’s first term in office. The pivotal breakthrough in the US-Iran nuclear issue occurred during the second term of the Obama administration. The JCPOA was the outcome of extensive negotiations that substantially alleviated US concerns—though not entirely eradicated—about Iran potentially breaching the NPT and developing nuclear weapons. The agreement also held the promise of addressing Iran’s core interests, as the restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program were linked to the lifting of US and UN sanctions against Iran. The negotiation process and the time required to build trust in each other’s intentions spanned nearly two years, constituting a formidable challenge. Trita Parsi asserts that “against all odds, after twenty-two months of intense negotiations, the P5+1 and Iran finally reached a nuclear agreement that in one move avoided two disasters: war with Iran and an Iranian path to a nuclear bomb.”42 Indeed, the positive outcomes of these negotiations may not have materialized without addressing the issue of enemy images through face-to-face meetings between the Iranian foreign minister and the U.S. Secretary of State. Nicholas Wheeler contends that “trust was crucial to the signing of the JCPOA, and a key factor in its development was the face-to-face interactions between US Secretary of State John Kerry and his Iranian counterpart, Javid Zarif.”43 In the context of the potential revival of the JCPOA, Mousavian stated, “JCPOA was the product of Iran-US direct negotiation. Without a direct negotiation, conflict management is not possible.”44 Engaging in direct negotiations, fosters the establishment of trust. Trust, as underscored, does not materialize overnight, and altering negative perceptions of the enemy and their intentions is a time-consuming process. Despite President Obama’s 2009 Norwuz address serving as a “limited signal of conciliation,” U.S. and Iranian decision-makers remained entrenched in adversarial views of one another, operating under the assumption of each other’s bad faith intentions. The expectation that limited conciliation would prompt immediate Iranian reciprocation was unmet, largely due to a profound underestimation of the depth of fear and suspicion harbored by Iranian leaders toward 42 Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 373. 43 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 44 Interview with Seyed Hossein Mousavian, September 10, 2023.

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the United States. If the Obama’s White House expected the limited conciliation to trigger immediate Iranian reciprocation, “US decisionmakers underestimated the depth of fear and suspicion felt by Iranian leaders towards the United States.”45 In the context of enduring rivalries, changing enemy images is a formidable challenge, and building confidence requires substantial concessions, particularly from the stronger party. Trita Parsi quotes a senior official from the Obama Administration, who stated, “We tried very hard to think of a win–win” not because we wanted to do Iran a favor, but because there was no other way to get a deal.”46 This underscores the critical point that initiating a negotiation process and ultimately reaching an agreement, even one involving significant concessions, is exceptionally challenging when protracted conflict rivals have entrenched images of each other as adversaries. These states tend to adhere to familiar operational codes, making it imperative to extract the negative enemy image from their system before they can earnestly engage in cooperative endeavors. Iran managed to shift its perception of the US from being a malevolent force to a cooperative partner, primarily concerned with safeguarding Iran’s economic and regional interests through the JCPOA. Interestingly, immediately after reaching the JCPOA, Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif tweeted, “The Iran Deal is not a ceiling but a solid foundation. We must now begin to build on it.”47 Tehran was quick to envision positive spill-over effects. In private discussions, Secretary of State John Kerry was informed by Zarif that once a deal was secured, and there would be a mandate to address other regional issues as well.48 On the potential of spill-over effects, Mousavian elaborated, “There would be spill-over effects (if the JCPOA functioned effectively). In fact, when Iran only agreed to the principles of the agreement Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) in November 2013, immediately they invited Iran to international talks on Syria. For the first time Iran participated. International and 45 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 46 Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 373. 47 Jeffrey Goldberg, “John Kerry on the Risk of Congress ‘Screwing’ the Ayatollah,” Atlantic, August 5, 2015. 48 Jeffrey Goldberg, “John Kerry on the Risk of Congress ‘Screwing’ the Ayatollah,” Atlantic, August 5, 2015.

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regional participants along with Iran hammered out options on conflict resolution on Syria. Iran also agreed to start negotiations on Yemen with EU4 (Germany, UK, France, and Italy). These were two very constructive negotiations between Iran and Europe on Yemen only when Iran agreed to the terms of the nuclear deal. So, these are spill-over effects.”49 This does not imply that cooperation on additional levels would materialize instantly; both Iran and the U.S. needed to exercise patience, understanding that comprehensive cooperation would be a gradual process,50 as is often the case with spill-over effects. In the context of long-running rivalries, building trust between new cooperative partners is an inherently time-consuming process. The foundation of trust relies heavily on respecting commitments, a crucial aspect in such scenarios, as stated in the theory chapter. Initially, there was a sense of optimism among Iranians who believed that Tehran and Washington had taken the first of many steps toward reducing their enmity, as articulated by President Rouhani when he stated, “I believe we have taken the first step towards decreasing this enmity.”51 However, this optimism was short-lived in Iran. It is also important to emphasize that commencing a deal with enduring rivals is an exceedingly challenging endeavor, primarily due to the deeply ingrained negative enemy images each party holds of the other. When one of the parties breaches a commitment, it not only revives the old adversarial image but also exacerbates the prospects for contemplating new cooperative ventures. The fracture of the deal rekindled negative memories of the U.S. that Iran had portrayed since the postShah era. Moreover, the new image is even more derogatory compared to the previous one. Consequently, Iran’s leaders have resorted to using derogatory terms to describe the US, mirroring the derogatory language employed by Washington to characterize Tehran. In the realm of nuclear proliferation, the perceived threat posed by countries often hinges more on their intentions rather than their actual activities. For instance, India and Israel are often regarded as responsible proliferators, while during Saddam Hussein’s era, Iraq, and more 49 Interview with Seyed Hossein Mousavian, September 10, 2023. 50 Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy (New

Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 373. 51 De Luce, “After Iran Deal,” Interview with President Hassan Rouhani, 60 Minutes, September 20, 2015.

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recently, Iran, were viewed differently due to their antagonistic stance toward the West and the United States in particular. This distinction highlights that the intentions of proliferating states carry significant weight. Even when Iran’s nuclear activities were relatively moderate, its vehement anti-US sentiment made addressing Tehran’s nuclear program a priority. Iran’s leaders consistently referred to the US as the “great Satan,” prompting successive US administrations, including those of Bush and Obama, to pursue a strategy of maximum pressure against the Iranian regime, driven by the belief that sanctions would compel Iran to yield.52 However, President Obama recognized that this path could ultimately lead to Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon or a military conflict with the US, so he pivoted to a different approach. Obama understood that “the maximum pressure path eventually would lead to Iran getting a bomb or the US bombing Iran. It would not lead to Iran’s capitulation.”53 Engaging in secret negotiations with Iran in Oman, he embarked on an unexpected strategy: compromise with Tehran. This approach resulted in the successful nuclear deal, as Trita Parsi notes, “It worked. American flexibility elicited Iranian flexibility. Goodwill begot goodwill. Respect unclenched fists on both sides.”54 Since the fracture of the nuclear deal in 2018, Iran has exhibited a shift in its policy, openly demonstrating a resolute intention to advance its nuclear program through uranium enrichment, coupled with assertive statements directed at the United States, as previously discussed in this chapter. While the enrichment itself is a cause for concern, the manner in which Iran openly declares its intention to disregard the nuclear deal’s commitments exacerbates the situation. As highlighted earlier, this has triggered a strong spill-back effect, marked by a rapid acceleration in proliferation activities. Furthermore, classified imagery in the possession of the US government revealed Iran’s preparations for a rocket launch in August 2019. While Iran claimed it was for launching a peaceful satellite, the US viewed it

52 Trita Parsi, “Trump’s Iran Terrorist Designation Is Designed to Lock in Endless Enimity,” The Guardian, April 12, 2019. 53 Trita Parsi, “Trump’s Iran Terrorist Designation Is Designed to Lock in Endless Enimity,” The Guardian, April 12, 2019. 54 Trita Parsi, “Trump’s Iran Terrorist Designation Is Designed to Lock in Endless Enimity,” The Guardian, April 12, 2019.

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as a means to further Tehran’s missile development.55 The trust deficit resulting from the American exit from the nuclear deal has created a unique incentive for Iran to pursue its nuclear program. Retired Air Force Col. Cedric Leighton, a CNN military analyst, suggests that Iran is not only seeking to acquire advanced technologies but also intends to employ them to enhance various military aspects.56 He further asserts that Tehran is in fact “trying to actually say, no matter what obstacles you put in our way, you’re going to come in and you might sanction us, but those sanctions are going to be absolutely worthless because we are going to try and try again to make our weapon systems at least a regional factor, if not a global factor.”57 Thus, Leighton contends that Iran is conveying a message that no matter the obstacles or sanctions imposed, and they are determined to strengthen their weapon systems, potentially becoming a regional or even global force to be reckoned with. In a speech in 2018, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, claimed that he had opposed the JCPOA and had warned President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif not to trust the Americans.58 Scholars analyzing the crisis involving Iran after JCPOA’s fracture highlight the significant challenges of building trust in international politics.59 Iranian leaders have been making assertive statements regarding uranium enrichment levels, often citing the American decision to renege on its commitments as a justification for their actions. As Seyed Hossein Mossavian states, “Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement and violation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2231 as well as other international commitments has damaged US credibility abroad. There is now a widespread belief among policy makers in Iran that the United States will simply not live up to its end of the bargain, no matter what that 55 Barbara Starr and Ryan Browne, “US Officials Expecting Iran to Launch Rocket in Coming Days,” CNN , August 16, 2019. 56 Barbara Starr and Ryan Browne, “US Officials Expecting Iran to Launch Rocket in Coming Days,” CNN , August 16, 2019. 57 Barbara Starr and Ryan Browne, “US Officials Expecting Iran to Launch Rocket in Coming Days,” CNN , August 16, 2019. 58 Ray Takeyh, “The Real Reason Iran Has Been Provoking Trump,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 22, 2019. 59 Nicholas J. Wheeler, “US-Iranian Relations and the Crisis of Trust,” The Birmingham Brief , University of Birmingham, August 1, 2019. Also, see Nicholas J. Wheeler, Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

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bargain is. This naturally raises the important question: What guarantees are there that the United States will remain committed to the deal in the post-Biden era?”60 The US withdrawal from the JCPOA and its subsequent violation of international commitments, such as UN Security Council Resolution 2231, have significantly eroded trust in American diplomacy and reliability among Iranian policymakers. This withdrawal has created a substantial trust deficit for Iran in its interactions with the United States. The skepticism regarding US commitment to agreements has now become deeply ingrained, making it challenging for Iran to have confidence in any future deals, regardless of the terms. This situation underscores the vital importance of reestablishing trust and demonstrating commitment to diplomatic agreements for any successful negotiations or diplomatic efforts in the future. Is that conceivable? It is believed that the Iranians “will not want to cave in to the US pressures, so no new agreement will be accepted to Iran.”61 The question of whether the United States will maintain its commitments in the post-Biden era remains a central concern for Iran and the international community at large. This profound lack of trust in the United States, the world’s preeminent power and Iran’s primary adversary, fuels Iran’s determination as a proliferator, seemingly unstoppable in the foreseeable future. Intriguingly, this determination is reinforced by Tehran’s latent capabilities, which were capped during the period of the nuclear deal.

Latency Helps Spill-Back The possibility of both the spill-back effect and a rapid pace of proliferation in Iran can be attributed, in part, to the latent nuclear status that Iran maintained before and during the nuclear deal. In the predeal period, discussing Iran’s latent status was a sensitive issue, but it became more openly acknowledged after 2015. Iran stands out as the only country that has been officially recognized as a latent proliferator.

60 Seyed Hossein Mousavian, “Nine Hurdles to Reviving the Iran Nuclear Deal,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 19, 2021. 61 Interview with Steven Saidman, Ottawa, February 24, 2020. Saidman holds the Paterson Chair in International Affairs at Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, Ottawa. Formerly, he was the Canada Research Chair in International Security and Ethnic Conflict at McGill University. Montreal. His research focuses on the international relations of ethnic conflict and comparative civil-military relations.

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As discussed in a previous chapter, a state’s latent status is influenced by its technological and financial capabilities, as well as its intention not to pursue nuclear weapons. What sets Iran apart from other latent proliferators like Japan, Canada, and Sweden is that it was essentially coerced into accepting this status. The Iran nuclear deal created a situation where Iran’s underlying motives for acquiring nuclear weapons were overlooked, and it was compelled to adopt a latent status. While Iran certainly had a strong economic incentive to engage in negotiations and abide by the nuclear arrangement, it did not willingly decide to forgo nuclear weapons. Iran’s primary goal was the removal of sanctions and the improvement of its economic conditions, along with a desire to break free from the isolation caused by sanctions. Some argue that Iran’s nuclear latency is also linked to its identity politics, as it sees nuclear capability as a means to maintain political independence,62 especially in the face of threats from Sunni-majority countries like Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Iran understood that the nuclear deal was a 15-year commitment, after which it could potentially change its nuclear status if necessary. In this sense, the six world powers effectively imposed recognized latent proliferator status on Iran,63 unlike other latent proliferators that voluntarily chose to remain latent. Iran’s latent nuclear status played a crucial role in its ability to pursue its new spill-back strategy. Unlike starting a nuclear program from scratch, Iran’s prior latent status allowed it to quickly resume uranium enrichment to higher levels. While the Trump administration argued that this was a fundamental flaw of the nuclear deal, it remains uncertain whether Iran would have unveiled its nuclear program again if its economic conditions had significantly improved over the next 13 years. The deal provided Iran with a taste of the benefits of globalization, integration, and regional diplomacy, offering a glimpse of the advantages of participating in a liberal world order characterized by peace and cooperation. However, in the absence of such improvements and amid economic pressure and diplomatic isolation, Iran has chosen to employ its nuclear latency as a means of threatening the United States, its primary intractable conflict rival. The 62 Interview with El Sayed Ghannam, Security and Military Affairs Deputy Head of Egyptian Mission in Iran, 2010–2011, Washington, August 10, 2019. Ghannam also served in Tehran from 2009–2010 to 2011–2013. 63 See Saira Khan, “Iran: A Recognized Latent Proliferator?,” International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention, Baltimore, February 21–25, 2017.

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evolving situation underscores the complexities of Iran’s nuclear strategy and its relationship with the international community. In the face of economic pressure, renewed sanctions, and diplomatic isolation following the U.S. withdrawal, Iran chose to adopt a more confrontational stance. It began to exceed the limits set by the nuclear deal and publicly declared its intentions to disregard certain commitments, such as uranium enrichment caps. These actions suggest that Iran is leveraging its latent nuclear capability as a means of applying pressure on the U.S. and its allies. While Iran’s actions indicate a willingness to escalate tensions, it remains uncertain whether it would have chosen this path if economic conditions and diplomatic relations had continued to improve under the nuclear deal. The latent status gave Iran flexibility, allowing it to resume nuclear activities but not requiring it to do so. The evidence for Iran’s latent nuclear status playing a pivotal role in its spill-back strategy can be seen in several key aspects. Iran’s ability to quickly resume uranium enrichment at higher levels, particularly after the U.S. withdrew from the nuclear deal, is indicative of the advantages it gained from its latent status. During the deal period, Iran maintained its nuclear infrastructure and expertise, making it relatively straightforward to restart enrichment activities when the deal’s economic benefits eroded. Iran’s capacity to swiftly resume uranium enrichment, especially at higher levels, following the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal underscores the strategic advantages it accrued during its latent status under the agreement. Throughout the deal’s implementation, Iran meticulously upheld its nuclear infrastructure and retained its nuclear expertise. This deliberate preservation of its nuclear capabilities allowed Iran to effectively and rapidly restart its enrichment activities when the economic incentives and sanctions relief promised by the deal began to erode. Unlike a country starting its nuclear program from scratch, Iran did not need extensive time or resources to rebuild its nuclear infrastructure or retrain its scientists. Instead, it capitalized on the technological and scientific advancements achieved during the deal’s tenure, expediting its return to higher-level uranium enrichment. This rapid resurgence in nuclear activities highlights how Iran’s latent status not only acted as a deterrent during the deal’s lifespan but also positioned it for a more assertive nuclear posture when the geopolitical landscape shifted with the U.S. withdrawal and the reimposition of sanctions. Iran already possessed an advanced nuclear infrastructure, including centrifuges and enrichment facilities, prior to the JCPOA. While the deal

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required Iran to reduce its uranium stockpiles and limit its enrichment capacity, it did not dismantle its existing infrastructure. This meant that Iran retained the capability to quickly scale up enrichment activities when needed. With regard to technical expertise, Iran had a cadre of experienced nuclear scientists and engineers who had been working on the country’s nuclear program for years. This expertise allowed Iran to efficiently operate and maintain its nuclear facilities, including its centrifuges, without the need for prolonged retraining or technical development. Additionally, during the JCPOA, Iran maintained a latent knowledge base related to nuclear technology. While it limited some aspects of its enrichment program, it continued research and development activities that expanded its understanding of nuclear processes. This latent knowledge could be quickly applied to ramp up enrichment activities. The JCPOA allowed Iran incremental scaling, meaning, to gradually increase its enrichment levels over time, going from the initial limit of 3.67% to slightly higher levels. This incremental scaling enabled Iran to make measured advances in enrichment while staying within the boundaries of the deal, ensuring that it did not immediately violate its commitments, but still moved closer to higher-level enrichment. In essence, Iran leveraged its pre-existing nuclear infrastructure, technical know-how, latent knowledge, and incremental scaling permitted by the JCPOA to swiftly change its uranium enrichment levels during the initial years of the agreement. In essence, Iran’s latent nuclear capability provided it with strategic options. While the nuclear deal temporarily constrained Iran’s nuclear ambitions, it also preserved its technical knowhow and infrastructure. These factors, combined with economic motivations and the changing geopolitical landscape, contributed to the rapid transformation of Iran’s uranium enrichment activities.

Protracted Conflicts Fuel Spill-Back If the nuclear deal had proceeded as planned without the US withdrawal, Iran’s future decision regarding its nuclear status would have hinged on its involvement in ongoing protracted conflicts after the initial 15 years. Iran currently finds itself embroiled in three enduring rivalries with Iraq, Israel, and the US simultaneously, with little hope of resolving the first two without addressing the last one. The Trump administration’s

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hostile stance and withdrawal from the nuclear deal have only exacerbated tensions with Iran, evident in policies like the travel ban affecting the relationship. This enduring rivalry is likely to intensify, “protracting the protracted conflict further.”64 Iran, facing the U.S. as its primary global power rival, will likely continue seeking a deterrent capability. As a country without an extended nuclear umbrella, unlike Japan or South Korea, Iran remains vulnerable to regional rivals with nuclear capabilities, making its potential for proliferation a significant concern. In contrast, other nations facing enduring rivalries benefit from their own nuclear weapons or those of their powerful allies for protection. Iran’s situation is unique in that it has both security concerns that drive a desire for nuclear weapons and the advantage of being a recognized latent proliferator, allowing it to potentially advance its nuclear weapons program in other aspects. Ahmad Khatami, a senior member of Iran’s Assembly of Experts with close ties to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, emphasized the importance of a nuclear missile for Iran to confront the U.S. and its allies, while also referring to the United States in derogatory terms.65 Although Khatami claimed that Iran has no intention of building a nuclear bomb, he acknowledged the country’s possession of the knowledge and capability to do so, framing nuclear energy as vital for Iran.66 Iran’s 40th commemorations of the Islamic revolution featured anti-American slogans, and President Hassan Rouhani asserted that the country would not seek permission to develop various types of missiles, emphasizing their role in Iran’s military strategy. He stated, “We have not asked and will not ask for permission to develop different types of … missiles and will continue our path and our military power.”67 Khatami’s 64 For more information on ‘Protracting the Protracted Conflict,’ See Saira Khan,

“Nuclear Weapons and the Prolongation of the India-Pakistan Conflict,” in T. V. Paul, ed., India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 156–177. 65 Adam Krefeld, “Iran Claims to Have Formula for Nuclear Bomb: Tehran Threatens Nuclear Force Against U.S., Israel, Allies,” The Washington Free Beacon, February 19, 2019. 66 Adam Krefeld, “Iran Claims to Have Formula for Nuclear Bomb: Tehran Threatens Nuclear Force Against U.S., Israel, Allies,” The Washington Free Beacon, February 19, 2019. 67 Adam Krefeld, “Iran Claims to Have Formula for Nuclear Bomb: Tehran Threatens Nuclear Force Against U.S., Israel, Allies,” The Washington Free Beacon, February 19, 2019.

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remarks, implying Iran’s technical capability to produce nuclear warheads, mark a significant departure from years of denial regarding the military nature of its nuclear program. This suggests a concerning shift in Iran’s stance on its nuclear capabilities and intentions. The “maximum pressure” tactics of the Trump administration, including the assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, and Israeli actions against Iran, such as sabotage, bombings, and assassinations, have not achieved their intended goals of reducing the perceived threats posed by Iran. Despite these measures, Iran has continued to advance its nuclear program and maintain its regional influence. The complex geopolitical landscape in the Middle East, historical context, and differing interpretations of these actions contribute to ongoing debates about their efficacy in addressing the Iran-related challenges. The Trump administration pursued a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, which involved imposing strict economic sanctions and withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal. The aim was to pressure Iran into renegotiating the deal and curbing its nuclear program. This strategy did not lead to a change in Iran’s behavior and may have even exacerbated tensions. The killing of General Soleimani in a US drone strike in January 2020 was a significant escalation in tensions between the US and Iran. Israel, too, has taken various actions against Iran and Iranian forces, including covert operations, cyberattacks, and airstrikes in Syria and elsewhere. While these actions may have disrupted some Iranian activities, it is argued that they did not deter Iran’s pursuit of its nuclear program. Joe Cironcione states, “All of the “maximum pressure” tactics of the Trump administration, including the assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, have not reduced the threat. Nor have the Israeli attacks on Iran and Iranian forces, including assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, sabotage of nuclear facilities and bombing of Iranian military positions in Syria. Iran has only grown stronger; its nuclear program advanced further.”68 As stated in the previous section, Iran’s latent status provides it with the capability to develop nuclear weapons when deemed necessary, and the current circumstances appear to be conducive to that shift. In the absence of trust in negotiated agreements, with commitments being tenuous, a superpower unable to fulfill its responsibilities, and the need for nuclear

68 Joe Cirincione, “What’s the Deal with Iran?,” Strategy and History, September 7, 2023.

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weapons amid multiple enduring conflicts, Iran finds itself in a situation where rebuilding its nuclear weapons program becomes relevant. Additionally, the potential for gaining economic and political concessions further incentivizes this move. Iran’s latent status offers the flexibility to reinvigorate its nuclear program, using it as a means to assert influence and pose a threat to the global powers responsible for upholding the world order. Given these factors, Iran’s nuclear status is undergoing a transformation. An important aspect to consider at this juncture is Iran’s increased level of antagonism, particularly following the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018. This heightened antagonism may indicate that Tehran was less concerned about the US, a protracted conflict rival, leaving the deal, and more worried about other countries in the deal refraining from trading with Iran. This perspective is not surprising, given Iran’s strategic objectives at the time. As previously discussed, Iran was willing to be part of a nuclear deal that compromised its security interests because of its dire economic situation. The country sought to transition from its isolated status through the deal, and this was a calculated strategic decision. Trita Parsi argues that Iran aimed for “de-securitization” through the deal, as sanctions had isolated the country to the point where even its participation in the Olympics was overshadowed by discussions of the nuclear issue. “De-containment” was a pivotal aspect of the deal for Iran.69 While economic benefits were a priority, Iran also sought to leverage its geopolitical influence, which had been stifled during the sanctions period. In the regional context, Iran had been excluded from negotiations regarding Syria, despite its involvement in the Syrian conflict and its historical ties to Damascus. However, the signing of the nuclear deal brought about a change, with the US now calling on Iran to participate in negotiations concerning Syria.70 The nuclear deal provided Iran with significant benefits, and among them, the most crucial was sanctions relief. However, beyond economic gains, the deal allowed Iran to present a new image of itself to the world, which held immense importance for Tehran. Improved relations with the United States, with whom Iran had maintained a hostile stance 69 Interview with Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President, Quincy Institute, Washington, D.C., August, 7, 2019. 70 Interview with Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President, Quincy Institute, Washington, D.C., August, 7, 2019.

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since the 1979 revolution, and the resolution of long-standing conflicts were also objectives. Iran’s broader goal was to integrate into the global system, particularly the global economy. While economic benefits remain paramount, the integration aspect may have been overshadowed by the economic considerations. Iran’s economy is heavily reliant on trade, even though major Asian countries like China and India continue to engage in trade with Iran, albeit with some reluctance due to concerns about US sanctions.71 European trade is of utmost importance to Iran, and it is vital for Iran to ensure that its provocative activities, such as missile tests and uranium enrichment, exert enough pressure on the US to lift restrictions on European countries trading with Iran. Consequently, the spill-back effect of the fractured nuclear deal has become more pronounced, with the US hindering European countries from trading with Tehran. Bargaining with the enrichment program has been integrated into Iran’s strategic calculus to achieve these objectives.

Unlocking Bargaining Potential by Leveraging Spill-Back Effects Iran, unlike North Korea, never attempted to extract concessions from the West by leveraging its nuclear program as a threat. One of the key distinctions lies in Iran’s consistent stance regarding its nuclear program. Iran consistently asserted that its program had a civilian purpose, which rendered it incapable of using it as a tool to menace or gain financial and political concessions from the West. This fundamental difference sets Iran apart from North Korea. North Korea’s economy has long been in dire straits, necessitating economic assistance to rebuild it. Additionally, North Korea sought political recognition and aimed to break free from its political isolation by rekindling relationships with major world powers that had imposed sanctions due to its pursuit of nuclear weapons, especially the United States, with which it had a history of conflict. Pyongyang initially employed its nuclear program and later its actual weapons to secure concessions on both economic and political fronts, purportedly in exchange for dismantling its program, a commitment it ultimately reneged on. Conversely, Iran’s ambiguous nuclear status prevented it

71 Interview with Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President, Quincy Institute, Washington, D.C., August, 7, 2019.

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from capitalizing on similar opportunities. Despite suspicions that it was enriching uranium for nuclear weapons, Iran consistently asserted that its program was solely intended for peaceful purposes. This stance effectively categorized Iran as a low-to-medium proliferator, concealing any proliferation intentions. Consequently, Iran’s undisclosed nuclear status hindered its ability to engage in bargaining with the United States.72 The United States and Western powers harbored doubts regarding Iran’s genuine intention not to pursue nuclear weapons, as previously discussed in the section that focused on the significance of intentions versus nuclear activities. They understood that Iran sought to improve its economy, and to achieve that objective, sanctions needed to be lifted. The promise of sanctions relief was contingent upon Iran discontinuing its proliferation activities, which ultimately led to the negotiation and signing of the 2015 nuclear deal. Iran, in turn, perceived the economic advantages associated with its engagement in the deal. The implementation of the agreement resulted in the lifting of sanctions, representing the most substantial financial benefit for Iran. Furthermore, by entering into the deal, Iran initiated a more amicable relationship with major global powers, notably the United States. This elevated Iran’s political standing on the global stage. These were the two principal rewards that Iran reaped from its participation in the nuclear deal. It is essential to recognize that Iran did not alter its declared nuclear status during or after the deal. It consistently maintained that its nuclear program had peaceful intentions. Consequently, Iran could not exploit its nuclear program as a bargaining chip with the United States or the West in the same manner as North Korea. However, as the United States distanced itself from the deal and imposed new sanctions, Iran’s primary benefits were placed in jeopardy, prompting a reconsideration of its nuclear stance. A nuclear program openly aimed at acquiring nuclear weapons would undoubtedly place Iran in a similar position to North Korea, where concessions could be sought in exchange for dismantling such a program. This prospect rekindles Iran’s interest, as an already recognized latent proliferator, in reviving its nuclear program. It is essential to understand that Iran was not oblivious during the decades when North Korea engaged in negotiations with the West to secure economic benefits 72 See Saira Khan, Nuclear Proliferation Dynamics in Protracted Conflict Regions: A Comparative Study of South Asia and the Middle East (Aldershot, Vermont and Sydney: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2002).

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and sanctions relief by leveraging its nuclear weapons program as a threat. Iran, in contrast, did not want to openly declare its intention to possess nuclear weapons, perhaps to avoid appearing weak and in need of recognition. However, this perspective has evolved over time. Iran now recognizes the importance of developing effective bargaining skills to secure its survival in an unpredictable international system. Senior Iranian officials currently believe that Tehran can compel Washington to return to the negotiation table. They also anticipate that even former President Donald Trump might express interest in visiting Iran to explore further diplomatic possibilities. Hashmatollah Falahat-Pisheh, Director of the Council for National Security and Foreign Policy of the Iranian Parliament, stated that Iran could adopt a strategy to coax the United States back into negotiations. President Rouhani also expressed in a speech to foreign ambassadors in Tehran that if the United States were to express regret for its policy toward Iran, the Islamic Republic would be willing to accept it and engage in talks.73 Scholars and experts believe that Iran can adopt a more assertive stance regarding the nuclear deal and the values of the NPT to negotiate more effectively in the realm of non-proliferation. Seyed Hossein Mousavian suggested in 2019 that instead of Iran’s current policy of a gradual, stepby-step exit from the nuclear deal, Tehran should consider abandoning it entirely and simultaneously suspend its membership in the NPT. This approach could create an opportunity for negotiations with the United States, focusing on ‘nuclear rights versus commitments’ within the NPT framework. Under such an agreement, the US would need to lift all nuclear-related sanctions against Iran in exchange for Iran’s commitment to maintain a nuclear program exclusively for peaceful purposes, consistent with the NPT. He states, “Instead of Iran’s current policy of a gradual, step-by step exit from the nuclear deal, Tehran should abandon it altogether and simultaneously suspend its membership of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Then, there could be an opportunity for negotiations with Trump on ‘nuclear rights versus commitments’ within the NPT framework. Such an agreement would require the US to abolish all of its nuclear-related sanctions against Iran, in exchange for Iran’s commitment to maintain its nuclear program as an exclusively peaceful

73 “Iranian Cleric: Iran Possesses ‘Formula for Nuclear Bomb’,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, February 19, 2019.

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one, within the framework of the NPT.”74 What is significant here is not just whether Iran will entertain a new deal, but the confidence among policymakers and experts that the US will return to the negotiating table, driven by Iran’s assertive nuclear policies. The former Iranian diplomat, Amir Mousavi, mentioned in an interview with the Lebanese Al-Mayadeen channel that he was aware of President Trump’s desire to visit Iran for direct talks with Tehran, similar to his diplomatic approach with North Korea. Mousavi noted that President Trump has approached five countries, including Arab, European, and Asian nations, to mediate between Iran and the United States.75 These beliefs are not unfounded, as Iran’s new nuclear policy is expected to compel the US to engage in negotiations with Tehran once again. The optimism stems from the fact that Iran has openly threatened the world with its nuclear program activities, prompting renewed diplomatic efforts. Ray Takeyh argued that Iran’s provocative actions are driven by its desire to return to the negotiating table, but first, the regime needs to construct a narrative of success.76 Neutral diplomats are advising Iran to exercise patience, as they believe that the US will eventually return to the negotiating table with Iran.77 74 Seyed Hossein Mousavian, “What Could Make a Rouhani-Trump Deal Possible?” Middle East Eye, September 13, 2019. 75 “Iranian Cleric: Iran Possesses ‘Formula for Nuclear Bomb’,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, February 19, 2019. 76 Ray Takeyh, “The Real Reason Iran Has Been Provoking Trump,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 22, 2019. 77 Interview with the Ambassador of Brazil to Bangladesh, João Tabajara de Oliveira Júnior, April 22, 2019. The interview’s primary objective was to gain insight into Brazil’s perspective on Iran’s potential actions in the realm of nuclear proliferation, particularly in light of Brazil and Argentina’s past proximity to developing nuclear weapons in the 1980s, a development that was ultimately reversed. During the interview, the role of the United States in influencing this decision was explored, along with a discussion on Brazil’s 2010 initiative to facilitate a diplomatic agreement between Iran and the US, shedding light on the reasons behind its ultimate failure. He argued that Brazil’s amicable relations with its neighbors, combined with its commitment to denuclearization, played a crucial role in these decisions. Moreover, the potential for economic agreements and joint inspections to influence the policies of rivals like Brazil and Argentina was discussed. It was emphasized that Brazil’s consistent adherence to its commitments served as a significant confidence-building measure for Argentina. The interview also touched upon the establishment of a peace and cooperation zone in South America during the 1990s, highlighting Brazil’s efforts to ensure the security of its smaller neighbors. Initially, there was

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It was anticipated that the United States will eventually come to realize that former President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal was not a wise move. However, convincing the United States to return to the negotiating table has historically proven to be challenging. As mentioned earlier, even during the Obama administration, the United States thoroughly scrutinized Iran’s nuclear program before entering into the nuclear deal. The United States had long been skeptical of Iran’s claims that its nuclear program was solely for civilian purposes, which is why previous attempts by other countries to negotiate with Iran had failed. There is the memory of the Brazilian diplomat recalling the strenuous efforts made by his country and Turkey in 2010 to reach a deal with Iran, which came very close to being accepted by Iran.78 However, thenSecretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed her doubts, stating, “Every step of the way has demonstrated clearly to the world that Iran is not participating in the international arena in the way that we had asked them to do and that they continued to pursue their nuclear program.”79 Therefore, Iran’s expectations may remain unfulfilled unless it can demonstrate a willingness to be a responsible international actor, which its current nuclear posturing does not reflect. The Biden administration has currently taken steps to facilitate the release of five American citizens who were detained in Iran. To achieve this, the administration issued a blanket waiver that allows international banks to transfer $6 billion in frozen Iranian assets from South Korea to Qatar without the risk of U.S. sanctions. As part of the agreement, the administration has also released five Iranian citizens who were held in the United States. This diplomatic effort represents a significant development in the ongoing negotiations between the two countries and

suspicion regarding Brazil’s intentions, but the nation’s focus on transparency created an ideal environment for collaborative efforts to thrive. The interview further focused on the nuances of asymmetric conflicts, where the responsibility lies with the stronger party to initiate changes from hostility to friendship while upholding commitments to foster trust. Additionally, it was suggested that a change in the US administration could be a catalyst for new diplomatic initiatives. The Ambassador underscored the importance of “strategic patience” for Iran in response to the developments in the nuclear realm, which were seen as predictable given the actions of the current American administration. 78 Interview with the Ambassador of Brazil to Bangladesh, João Tabajara de Oliveira Júnior, April 22, 2019. 79 Alexei Barrionuevo and Sebnem Arsumay, “Brazil and Turkey Near Nuclear Deal with Iran,” May 16, 2010.

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aims to address humanitarian issues while potentially contributing to improved bilateral relations. The Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi said that “his government will decide how it will spend $6 billion.”80 Given the multiple crises on President Biden’s plate, including the Ukraine conflict, domestic issues, and the need to maintain stability on various fronts, it appears that he sought to engage Iran in a more cooperative manner to avoid adding another significant crisis to the list, namely the Iranian nuclear issue, and prevent any potential military support for Russia. Iran’s engagement with the international community, including the United States, can influence its position in global forums. Positive developments can affect the dynamics of negotiations on broader issues, such as the nuclear program. The arrangement is beneficial for Iran in monetary terms, which is partly a product of Iran’s threshold nuclear status. It is believed that “even if Iran can’t use any of the $6 billion to buy arms, money is fungible and it possibly could free up funds that could be used against US interests.”81 The “deal will also slightly reduce Iran’s pariah status.”82 The current administration, recognizing the challenges of returning to the comprehensive 100-page JCPOA and the potential for escalating tensions, has engaged in indirect negotiations with Iran aimed at de-escalation. These talks have reportedly resulted in unwritten understandings wherein Iran commits to capping its uranium enrichment at 60%, ceasing proxy conflicts in Syria, and discontinuing missile transfers to Russia. In exchange, the United States has signaled its intention not to tighten sanctions, seize oil-bearing tankers, or pursue punitive resolutions at the United Nations or the IAEA. While these understandings may lack a formal agreement, they reflect a mutual desire to mitigate tensions and could be implemented unilaterally by each party.83 The success of such arrangements depends on sustained diplomatic efforts and the ability of both sides to uphold their commitments in the absence of a formal accord.

80 NBC News, September 12, 2023. 81 Joseph Cirincione, “What’s the Deal with Iran?,” Strategy and History, September

7, 2023. 82 Joseph Cirincione, “What’s the Deal with Iran?,” Strategy and History, September 7, 2023. 83 Aron David Miller, “There Are No Good Deals with Iran: But the Biden Administration’s Latest Negotiations with Tehran Are Still the Best Option Available,” Foreign Policy, August 14, 2023.

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Viewed from the perspective of Iran, these reported understandings represent a significant gain. By capping its uranium enrichment at 60%, ending proxy conflicts in Syria, and ceasing missile transfers to Russia, Iran potentially secures a measure of legitimacy for its nuclear program while avoiding tighter sanctions and punitive measures from the United States. Mousavian states, “In Iran, there is still a school of thought that thinks engagement is possible. Another group wants to think the trust issue is important. Conflict will continue. Iran feels that the hostility will continue and they want to keep the deterrent option open. Let’s keep our stockpile. Let’s keep 60% enrichment level. Breakout time must be kept to 10 days in case they are going to attack. Let’s also have temporary engagement. ‘No deal, no crisis,’ is a partial conflict management.”84 This approach also allows Iran to maintain its threshold nuclear status, preserving its nuclear capabilities without incurring the full weight of international sanctions. However, the broader implications of these understandings remain a subject of debate, as they must be assessed in light of regional security concerns and the potential consequences for the wider Middle East.

Iran’s Nuclear Swagger, Persian Identity, and Regional Dominance Through Spill-Back Iran aspires to elevate its standing by enticing the United States back to the negotiation table. This is a nation steeped in cultural richness and deeply proud of its Persian heritage. Over the centuries, Iran has undergone three revolutions, with the latest being the Islamic revolution. These revolutions shared a common thread: foreign powers exploiting Iranian resources. Throughout its history, Iran has witnessed the rise and fall of three distinct dynasties spanning more than 500 years. Since the Islamic revolution, there has been a pronounced “Persianization of Islamic culture”85 within Iran. Iranian leaders have consistently harnessed 84 Interview with Seyed Hossein Mousavian, September 10, 2023. 85 An interview conducted on April 17, 2019, with Tariq Karim, who held the position

of Bangladesh’s Ambassador to Iran from 1991 to 1995, offers valuable insights into his deep understanding of Iran’s Persian identity and its impact on the country’s approach to foreign relations. During his diplomatic tenure in Tehran, Ambassador Karim gained a nuanced perspective on Iran’s cultural and historical heritage, which profoundly influences its foreign policy decisions. This interview serves as a window into how Iran perceives and engages with the world through the prism of its distinctive Persian identity, shedding light on the intricacies of its international relations.

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Persian culture to advance their interests and distinguish themselves from Arab culture. This cultural distinction plays a pivotal role in shaping Iran’s identity and aspirations. The US withdrawal from the nuclear deal has been viewed as an affront by Iran, and even if a new deal were to materialize, it would represent a form of victory for Tehran. Iran is currently showcasing its nuclear activities and missile proliferation as a means to assert its Persian pride on the regional and global stage. This pride is deeply rooted in Iranian history, and the country’s role in the region is intrinsically linked to its cultural identity. As Trita Parsi argues, Iran is “sensitive to containment and isolation,”86 and sanctions have only bolstered Iranian resolve to confront perceived imperialist powers like the US. Karim adds that sanctions have solidified Iranians’ determination to stand strong in the face of adversity.87 In this context, Iran sees itself as a regional leader, a role deeply intertwined with its Persian heritage and identity.88 Iran holds a pivotal position in the Middle East, and strategic analysts emphasize that excluding Iran from regional dynamics or attempting to address security issues in the region without its involvement is an untenable approach.89 The nuclear deal had the effect of elevating Iran’s significance in the region, but the unraveling of the agreement has had a detrimental impact on its status and influence. Iran places great importance on the regional political and security dynamics, given its historical leadership role in the Persian Gulf region. However, the United States has shifted its attention toward Saudi Arabia, Iran’s arch-rival in the region, which has been a source of frustration for Iran. Trita Parsi noted, before the present Saudi-Iran rapprochement, that Iran’s missile program primarily focuses on regional actors, with Saudi Arabia and Israel possessing longer-range missiles. He also highlighted the significance of precision in missile technology, especially when

86 Interview with Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President, Quincy Institute, Washington, DC,@@ August, 7, 2019. 87 Interview with Ambassador Tarik Karim, Dhaka, April 17, 2019. 88 Interview with Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President, Quincy Institute, Washington,

DC, August, 7, 2019. 89 Interview with Munshi Faiz Ahmed, Ambassador and Chairman of Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Dhaka, April 20, 2019. He served as Bangladesh’s Ambassador to China.

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nuclear warheads are involved, which Iran is actively pursuing.90 Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of nuclear reactors from the US was perceived as a security threat by Iran, further straining regional tensions. The United States’ prioritization of Saudi Arabia over Iran in the region was primarily seen as an affront to Iran’s Persian identity and pride. Trita Parsi argues that American hegemony in the Middle East, particularly through its close relationship with Saudi Arabia, undermines Iran’s regional stature and is perceived as an insult by Tehran. Iran was well aware of the US’s hegemonic interests in the Middle East even before the nuclear deal was signed, and while “they did not expect the U.S. to be entirely honest,”91 they felt compelled to join the deal to escape the isolation orchestrated by Washington, which aligned with the interests of Saudi Arabia and Israel. Iran’s strategic considerations revolve around three key factors: the conflict between American imperialism and Iranian nationalism, the historic rivalry between Arabs and Persians, and the sectarian divide between Shia and Sunni Muslims. The Iranian approach to the United States is heavily influenced by some key dictums, as articulated by Karim.92 Iran recognizes the special relationship between the United States and countries like Saudi Arabia and Israel. From Iran’s perspective, much of what the United States does concerning Iran primarily serves the interests of these two nations. Iran feels that American actions against it are often aimed at benefiting Israel and Saudi Arabia.93 Iran perceives a glaring double standard in how the United States deals with nuclear proliferation issues. For example, North Korea has been appeased in the past and continues to receive diplomatic efforts despite its nuclear program. Iran believes that this differential treatment is due to North Korea’s activities not posing a direct threat to Israel

90 Interview with Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President, Quincy Institute, Washington, DC, August, 7, 2019. 91 Interview with Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President, Quincy Institute, Washington, DC, August, 7, 2019. 92 Interview with Ambassador Tarik Karim, Dhaka, August 7, 2019. 93 Interview with Ambassador Farooq Sobhan, President, Bangladesh Enterprise Insti-

tute, Dhaka, April 18, 2019. He was the Bangladeshi Ambassador to the Peoples Republic of China from 1987 to 1990.

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or Saudi Arabia.94 This perceived double standard is deeply troubling to Iran. President Trump’s domestic political considerations also played a significant role in shaping Iran’s behavior. Trump’s support base included influential groups like the Christian Right, Jewish Lobby, Arms Lobby, and White Supremacists, who have specific interests and views regarding Iran. These groups have Islamophobia.95 Iran believed that President Trump’s administration was influenced by Islamophobia. This perception influenced Iran’s approach to its relationship with the United States. Iran saw elements within Trump’s support base, such as White Supremacists, who harbor Islamophobic views. The perception added to Iran’s sense of humiliation and frustration in its dealings with the United States. It was viewed as a factor that made diplomatic engagement with Iran less likely due to domestic political considerations within the US. Any efforts to appease Iran could negatively affect Trump’s relationship with these support groups and impacted his chances in the then upcoming elections. It is argued that the “Iranian decision to go for the bomb would reflect Iran’s sense of pride and humiliation and public demands that the government defend the nation. In Iran, any remaining advocates of diplomacy will be pushed out of the way, discredited by the American president. Building the bomb would be consistent with the psychology and politics of the moment, but it would also be in line with what scholars have learned about past preventive strikes aimed at nuclear programs. The most studied case is the Israeli bombing in 1981 of Saddam Hussein’s Osirak nuclear reactor.”96 All of these factors contribute to Iran’s sense of humiliation and a lack of respect in its dealings with the United States. Scholars argue that if Iran were to pursue nuclear weapons; it would reflect a combination of national pride, humiliation, and public demands for the government to defend the nation. This could also lead to a shift away from diplomatic solutions in Iran’s policy-making circles. Iran’s missile tests are directly related to its regional challenges. These tests, such as the

94 Interview with Ambassador Farooq Sobhan, President, Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, Dhaka, April 18, 2019. 95 Interview with Ambassador Farooq Sobhan, President, Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, Dhaka, April 18, 2019. 96 Jim Walsh, “How Donald Trump Pushed Iran to the Nuclear Bomb,” The Philadelphia Tribune, July 26, 2019.

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Shahab-3 medium-range missile test in July 2019, symbolize Iran’s determination to address the perceived humiliation and insults it faces in the region due to American foreign policies favoring Saudi Arabia and Israel. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has emphasized that if the United States wants to discuss missile limitations, and it should begin by addressing the supply of missiles to Arab states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE that pose a threat to Iran.97 This highlights Iran’s commitment to maintaining its missile capabilities in the face of regional challenges. Iran’s decision to pursue nuclear proliferation is influenced by the United States’ destabilizing actions in the Middle East and its perceived bias toward Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Trump administration’s policies, including vetoing on the Yemeni issue and imposing sanctions on Iran, had exacerbated tensions in the region. Iran saw these policies as part of an American effort to undermine its influence and destabilize the region. Additionally, Iran’s improved relationship with Iraq and the presence of extremist groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda contribute to its security concerns. Iran views its nuclear program as a means to address the shame and humiliation it perceives in regional and global politics. The belief that the US has created a perpetual conflict in the Middle East further motivates Iran to maintain a strong position in the region. Consequently, Iran will not change. Rather it will proliferate.98 The gap between major powers in the nuclear deal provides Tehran with a strategic advantage in pursuing its proliferation strategy.

Spill-Back Is Boosted by Major Power Differences The crucial factor to consider is the divergence among major powers regarding the Iranian issue and how this divergence provides a conducive environment for Tehran to pursue its proliferation efforts under this context. This aspect is noteworthy as it highlights the influence of major power divisions on the proliferation decisions of a nation inclined toward proliferation. As mentioned earlier, the remaining signatories of the nuclear deal continue to maintain positive relations with Iran, acknowledging the contentious relationship between them and the United States 97 Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, “In Escalation, Iran Tests Medium-Range Missile, U.S. Official Says,” New York Times, July 25, 2019. 98 Interview with Ambassador Farooq Sobhan, President, Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, Dhaka, April 18, 2019.

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concerning Iran’s nuclear program. Despite increasing pressure from the United States, the United Kingdom expressed its support for the Iran nuclear deal prior to the G7 summit in August 2019, as confirmed by a British diplomatic source.99 France also sought to align its stance on Iran with Britain’s before the summit. A French official emphasized the importance of unity among the major European powers (France, Britain, and Germany) on the Iran issue.100 The year 2019 witnessed strains in the traditionally close US-UK alliance.101 Therefore, in addition to the imperative for Iran to employ the spill-back strategy in response to Trump’s antagonistic stance, the divergence between these powers and the United States created a robust stage for Iran to navigate its policies. Trump’s decision regarding the JCPOA left the United States isolated from its Western allies, who had invested over two years in negotiating the agreement involving seven countries, including France, Germany, and Britain.102 A European official, speaking on condition of anonymity, conveyed to Seyed Hossein Mousavian that Western nations have no plans for military cooperation with Iran. Furthermore, the official disclosed that both the United States and Europe do not intend to seek an extension of UN Security Council restrictions on Iran’s arms imports, which are set to expire in October under Resolution 2231. Additionally, the official indicated that Europe has no immediate plans to utilize the snapback mechanism to reinstate UN sanctions against Iran.103 The reported statements from the European official do indicate a difference in approach between the United States and Europe regarding certain aspects of their policy toward Iran. Specifically, the decision not to extend UN Security Council restrictions on Iran’s imports of arms and the willingness to refrain from employing the snapback mechanism to restore UN sanctions suggest some divergence in strategy. It is possible that Iran could perceive these differences 99 Britain Continues to Back Iran Nuclear Deal ahead of G7,” The National UAE, August 24, 2019. 100 “Britain Continues to Back Iran Nuclear Deal ahead of G7,” The National UAE, August 24, 2019. 101 Gideon Rachman, “US-UK Relations: Strains in the Greatest Alliance,” Financial Times, July 12, 2019. 102 Katherine Fung, “White House ‘Worries’ Iran Could Be Nuclear Weapon Ready in Weeks,” Newsweek, April 26, 2022. 103 Seyed Hossein Mousavian, “Iran Nuclear Deal: How to Get It Right,” Middle East Eye, September 6, 2023.

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as an opportunity to seek concessions or navigate international sanctions more effectively. Iran, like many nations, often seeks opportunities to advance its interests by leveraging differences between major international players, such as the United States and the European Union (EU).104 Differences in policy, priorities, and approaches between these two entities create a diplomatic opening for Iran to pursue its goals. In the context of the Iran nuclear deal, Iran seeks to exploit any divergence between the US and EU regarding the agreement’s revival, potentially using this gap as a means to gain concessions or to secure more favorable terms. However, it is important to recognize that the US and EU also share common interests and objectives when it comes to regional stability and non-proliferation, so the extent to which Iran can exploit these differences remains subject to negotiation and diplomatic maneuvering. Iran is also keenly aware of China’s interest in establishing positive relations and conducting business, given the significant investment opportunities available in Tehran. Beijing is increasingly focused on exporting infrastructure, and negotiations for contracts are underway.105 China stands to benefit significantly in Iran through its involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).106 Some experts believe that the BRI represents a new era of global competition between the United States and China, where Chinese investment in development and infrastructure projects could bring economic and strategic advantages to Beijing at the expense of the United States.107 Iran is well aware of this evolving dynamic. Moreover, the escalation of tensions between the United States and Iran has occurred concurrently with a similar trend in US-Chinese relations. This situation has created more room for closer ties between China and Iran, driven by shared trade and geostrategic interests. It has “widened the space for closer Chinese-Iranian ties based on shared trade

104 Interview with Steven Saidman, Ottawa, February 2, 2020. 105 Interview with Munshi Faiz Ahmed, former Chairman of Bangladesh Institute of

International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), a former Ambassador to China, April 20, 2019. 106 Interview with Munshi Faiz Ahmed, Ambassador and former Chairman of Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), April 20, 2019. He was Bangladesh’s Ambassador to China from 2007 to 2012. During his time in Beijing, he gathered extensive knowledge on China’s BRI and its implications for world politics. 107 Sagatom Saha, “China’s Belt and Road Plan is Destroying the World,” The National Interest, August 18, 2019.

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and geo-strategic interests.108 President Donald Trump’s actions have played a significant role in facilitating this development.109 Currently, China has become an indispensable economic partner for Iran. Chinese companies have invested over $5 billion in upgrading Iran’s gas refining and oil infrastructure and have been involved in other developmental projects over the past decade. In 2018, the Chinese state-owned investment firm CITIC Group established a $10 billion credit line for Iran, and China Development Bank pledged an additional $15 billion. This economic cooperation further strengthens Iran’s position and provides it with alternatives to traditional Western partners, which is particularly relevant given the current state of US-Iranian relations and the uncertainty surrounding the nuclear deal. During President Xi Jinping’s visit to Iran in January 2016, President Rouhani made a significant announcement, stating that China and Iran were planning to establish economic ties with an estimated value of up to $600 billion. This declaration marked a pivotal moment in their relationship. China has emerged as Iran’s second-largest trading partner, following the United Arab Emirates. The trade volume between the two nations has experienced substantial growth over the years, starting from $1.6 billion in the 1980s to $15 billion in 2007, and peaking at approximately $45 billion in 2014–2015. However, by 2018, this figure had reduced to $33.39 billion.110 China’s involvement with Iran extends beyond economic ties, as it is closely connected to Iran’s military infrastructure and views the country as a crucial component in resolving Middle Eastern issues.111 Some experts argue that Russia and China may also capitalize on the situation. It was anticipated that in the near future, the United States, Israel, and Saudi 108 Mercy A. Quo, “US-China Tensions: Impact on China-Iran Ties,” The Diplomat, June 3, 2019. 109 Mercy A. Quo, “US-China Tensions: Impact on China-Iran Ties,” The Diplomat, June 3, 2019. 110 Mercy A. Quo, “US-China Tensions: Impact on China-Iran Ties,” The Diplomat, June 3, 2019. 111 An interview conducted on April 20, 2019 with Munshi Faiz Ahmed, former

Chairman at the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). His notable diplomatic assignments include a significant tenure as Bangladesh’s Ambassador to China from 2007 to 2012, along with earlier responsibilities as the Second Secretary from 1984 to 1989. Over the span of a decade, Ambassador Munshi Faiz Ahmed gained a profound understanding of China’s internal political dynamics, its global diplomatic

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Arabia would intensify their efforts to compel Iran to denuclearize, and Iran’s response to this pressure could be influenced by the reactions of China and Russia.112 It is worth noting that the growing gap between the United States and Russia has been a direct outcome of the military strategy pursued during the Trump administration, characterized by increased military spending and the abrogation of Cold War-era treaties. Both Russia and China are developing their own military strategies in response to these developments.113 Stephen Cimbala highlights a significant aspect of the international landscape by pointing out that Russia perceives NATO enlargement and US missile defense deployments in Europe as provocative actions that threaten its security. In response, Russia seeks to maintain a larger arsenal of usable nuclear weapons and launchers deployed in Europe. On the other hand, the US and NATO view Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its destabilization of eastern Ukraine, and its frequent reminders of its nuclear capabilities as provocative and destabilizing factors in European security. Consequently, NATO has heightened its preparedness across the spectrum of deterrence.114 These strained and fragmented bilateral relationships between major powers provide Iran with a favorable environment to pursue its spill-back strategy and seek the benefits discussed in this chapter. The complex dynamics among these global actors contribute to the evolving landscape of nuclear proliferation and international security. The Ukraine conflict and the subsequent deterioration of relations between Russia and the West have indeed elevated Iran to a position of notable importance in Russia’s international partnerships. In the weeks leading up to Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Russian President Vladimir Putin were in discussions about finalizing a comprehensive 20-year cooperation agreement aimed at expanding their relations across various sectors. As a result, Russia has

engagements, and its worldview. This interview provides valuable insights into his extensive experience and expertise in deciphering China’s intricate domestic politics and its role on the world stage. 112 Interview with Ambassador Farooq Sobhan, President, Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, Dhaka, April 18, 2019. 113 Simon Tisdall, “The Nuclear Arms Race Is Back,” The Guardian, August 17, 2019. 114 Stephen J. Cimbala, “The Trump Nuclear Posture Review: Three Issues, Nine

Implications,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 12(2), Summer 2018, p. 11.

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come to depend on Iran in ways that were previously inconceivable before February 2022. Iran’s military support has made a substantial impact on Russia’s ability to sustain its involvement in the challenging Ukraine conflict.115 Iran, once considered a secondary actor on the international stage, has now emerged as one of Russia’s most significant collaborators in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. This shift underscores the evolving dynamics of geopolitical alliances in response to the changing global landscape. The ongoing war in Ukraine has catalyzed an unprecedented level of cooperation between Russia and Iran, spanning military, economic, and political realms. Iran’s deepening ties with Russia over the past decade have become increasingly important for Tehran. As a result, Iran is motivated to maintain and strengthen these relations rather than jeopardize them by going against Russia. The partnership with Russia encompasses various strategic, economic, and geopolitical aspects, making it a valuable asset for Iran’s foreign policy objectives. This consideration underscores Iran’s commitment to preserving its relationship with Russia as a significant and dependable ally in the region and on the international stage. This partnership has gained momentum due to the rise of anti-Western hardliners in both Moscow and Tehran, aligning their interests in countering Western influence. However, the implications of this burgeoning Russia-Iran alliance raise concerns for the European Union and European nations. It could potentially prolong the Ukraine conflict, complicate efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear program, destabilize the Middle East, and challenge Western influence in global governance institutions. The evolving dynamics between Russia and Iran underscore the need for vigilant diplomacy and strategic responses to navigate this complex geopolitical landscape. Thus, scholars state, “The war in Ukraine has fundamentally changed the Russian-Iranian relationship. The cooperation between the two countries has reached unprecedented levels, evident in the use of Iranian drones by Russia in Ukraine. The two countries have increased their efforts to jointly resist Western sanctions and political isolation. Iran also continues to expand its nuclear program at alarming

115 Ellie Geranmayeh and Nicole Grajewski, “Alone Together: How the War in Ukraine Shapes the Russian-Iranian Relationship,” European Council on Foreign Relations, September 6, 2023.

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levels – with no opposition from Moscow.”116 Russia, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a party to the JCPOA, can exert significant diplomatic influence. Its closer ties with Iran may lead to more diplomatic support for Iran’s nuclear ambitions, potentially softening international stances on Iran’s nuclear program. In fact, it has been stated that “Russia doesn’t want JCPOA. This is about Iran and the US, but there are some other countries. Russia doesn’t want US-Iran to cooperate and to engage on the regional issues.”117 With Russia’s reluctance to support the JCPOA, Iran sees an opportunity to leverage Moscow’s position to its advantage in pursuit of its nuclear ambitions. Iran can also exploit the lack of a unified international front and use Russia’s opposition to potentially secure more favorable terms in any negotiations. It must be noted that Iran’s “look East” policy is driven by a fundamental objective that goes beyond economic development and political support against Western pressure; it seeks to secure the survival of a regime, whose domestic support has faced challenges. The support of Moscow and Beijing has become crucial for sustaining this regime from an external perspective. As a result, Iran often makes concessions to accommodate Russian or Chinese interests and, at times, proactively tries to align with their perceived objectives. This strategy reflects the complex interplay of domestic and international dynamics as Iran seeks external backing to navigate its internal challenges and withstand Western pressures.118 Given the backdrop of Iran’s “look East” policy and its reliance on external support, particularly from Moscow and Beijing, the focus on Iran’s nuclear program becomes a key aspect of its international strategy. Iran’s nuclear activities are not only a matter of national interest, but also a crucial component of its foreign policy and negotiations with major powers. The nuclear program holds strategic significance in Iran’s efforts to secure diplomatic and economic support from its Eastern partners while navigating complex global dynamics.

116 Ellie Geranmayeh and Nicole Grajewski, “Alone Together: How the War in Ukraine Shapes the Russian-Iranian Relationship,” European Council on Foreign Relations, September 6, 2023. 117 Interview with Seyed Hossein Mousavian, September 10, 2023. 118 Ali Fathollah-Nejad, “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and the Nature of Iranian-

Russian Relations,” Middle East Institute, March 21, 2022.

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Iran and Saudi Arabia recently unveiled a significant breakthrough in their relations, brokered by China. This development marks a momentous shift in a region where decades of hostility and a formal severing of ties in 2016 had defined their interactions. However, the full impact of this rapprochement on the Middle East remains uncertain, as both nations are engaged in a proxy war in Yemen and continue to support opposing factions across the region. This diplomatic achievement holds strategic significance for China, positioning it as an alternative global power amid perceived US disengagement from the Middle East. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to China in February 2023 set the stage for this trilateral announcement, where both leaders pledged to enhance security and economic cooperation. Notably, this marked the first formal state visit to Beijing by an Iranian leader in over two decades. For Iran, this agreement comes as a diplomatic win amid mounting challenges, including international isolation over human rights concerns, a contentious nuclear program, and its support for Russia’s actions in Ukraine, providing Tehran with a valuable diplomatic triumph.119 As stated before, Iran has strategically deepened its diplomatic ties with Russia and China, a shift influenced in part by the ongoing Ukraine conflict. This pivot toward closer relations with Moscow and Beijing has been motivated by shared interests, including opposition to what they perceive as Western dominance in global affairs. Iran’s active participation in organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) group has facilitated stronger economic, political, and security bonds with these nations. This strategic diversification of alliances is significant not only for countering Western pressures, but also for Iran’s nuclear aspirations. Russia and China have consistently supported Iran in international forums regarding its nuclear program, potentially enhancing Iran’s leverage and bargaining position in negotiations. Furthermore, technological and military cooperation with these partners empowers Iran in the nuclear realm. BRICS has now expanded to include Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.120 While the accusation that Iran has provided drones to Russia for use in the conflict in Ukraine highlights the complex and 119 Adam Gallagher, Sarhang Hamasaeed, and Garrett Nada, “What You Need to Know About China’s Saudi-Iran Deal,” The United States Institute of Peace, March 16, 2023. 120 Seyed Hossein Mosavian, “Iran Nuclear Deal: How to Get It Right,” Middle East Eye, September 6, 2023.

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multifaceted nature of Iran’s engagements with these nations,121 BRICS’ invitation for Iran to join suggests that the organization prioritizes economic and geopolitical cooperation over concerns about Iran’s nuclear aspirations, indicating a pragmatic approach to international relations. Has the deteriorating relationship between the United States and Iran pushed Iran closer to the BRICS group? Trita Parsi states that back in the 1990s, when the US imposed extraterritorial sanctions on Iran, it appeared to drive Iran into closer cooperation with Russia and China. Fast forward 45 years, and it is evident that Iran has been moving toward stronger ties with both Russia and China. The imposition of “financial sanctions has incentivized these countries to develop non-dollar trade mechanisms.”122 This shift also means that the United States no longer wields exclusive authority in determining whether Iran is considered a pariah state or not. Iran’s decision to join the BRICS indicates that the United States has lost some of its “gatekeeping capacity,”123 marking the end of the unipolar moment. In the 1990s, the US could unilaterally designate countries as pariah states, but this dynamic has now changed, as illustrated by Iran’s alignment with the BRICS nations. Iran’s evolving international relationships, including its closer ties with Russia, China, and participation in the BRICS, can be seen as advantageous for the country, providing potential economic benefits, diplomatic leverage, and reduced dependency on Western powers.

Comprehending Iranian Spill-Back Effects of Fractured Nuclear Deal As discussed in the theory chapter, the success of cooperation on one level often sets the stage for even more successful cooperation on other levels, as trust and cooperation tend to build incrementally. In 2017, Parsi emphasized that for the Iran nuclear deal to be sustainable in the long run, there might be a need for a

121 Seyed Hossein Mosavian, “Iran Nuclear Deal: How to Get It Right,” Middle East Eye, September 6, 2023. 122 “Biden Unfreezes $ Billion for Iran in Hostage Swap, Funding Terrorism?!: Rising,” Interview of Trita Parsi, The Hill, September 12, 2023. 123 “Biden Unfreezes $ Billion for Iran in Hostage Swap, Funding Terrorism?!: Rising,” Interview of Trita Parsi, The Hill, September 12, 2023.

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broader opening between the United States and Iran. Both countries lacked the capacity to compartmentalize the nuclear deal and keep it unaffected by escalating tensions in other aspects of their relationship.124 Therefore, the two nations faced a choice between two options: continue with the deal, use it as a means to build trust and address other contentious issues in their relationship, or perpetuate their rivalry in other geopolitical realms and risk undermining the deal over time. Understanding cooperation amid protracted conflicts is crucial in the context of US-Iran relations.125 Economist Akbar Ali Khan has argued that interstate economic relations can significantly influence both internal and external political dynamics. He posits that over a 15-year period, and Iran’s political landscape could change, with a potentially stronger opposition and a weakening of the fundamentalist regime’s hold on power. Iran’s external relations could also evolve during this period, a key consideration in the Obama administration’s rationale for pursuing the nuclear deal.126 Nobel Peace Prize laureate and prominent economist, Mohammad Yunus, underscores the idea that the future is uncertain and that positive changes can occur over time. He stated, “we can’t assume what will happen tomorrow based on today. Berlin Wall disappeared—what does it tell us?”127 He draws a parallel with the fall of the Berlin Wall, emphasizing that even key figures like Gorbachev could not predict the exact moment when such transformative events would happen. This highlights the notion that change often occurs unexpectedly and is driven by various forces. Yunus further argues that as people find solutions

124 Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 373. 125 Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 373. 126 Interview with Dr. Akbar Ali Khan, Prominent Economist, Dhaka, April 9, 2019. 127 An interview conducted on January 17, 2019, featured Dr. Mohammad Yunus,

a distinguished Nobel Peace Prize laureate and accomplished economist. Dr. Yunus is renowned for his groundbreaking work in microfinance and poverty alleviation. This interview provided a unique opportunity to comprehend the wisdom and insights of a global icon who has dedicated his career to finding innovative solutions for addressing poverty and fostering economic empowerment, particularly in developing nations. Dr. Yunus’s perspectives and experiences offer valuable lessons in the fields of economics, social entrepreneurship, and peace-building, making this interview a significant source of inspiration and knowledge.

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to their problems, the significance of traditional structures and frameworks, including those of states and governments, may diminish. The rise of non-state actors like WikiLeaks has already challenged the secrecy of governments, and as technology continues to advance, governments may lose some of their relevance. He suggests that while nuclear weapons might be important in the short term, they may become less significant in the future as global dynamics evolve. He states, “Gorbachev told me that when the Berlin Wall fell, he didn’t know that it will fall on that day. So, the controller often doesn’t know when things will happen. In the future, things will thus change. Structures and frameworks of the past will change due to compulsion. When people can solve their problems, then even states and governments will not matter. Nothing will be secret anymore due to non-state actors like Wikileaks. There will be more and more of these non-state actors in the world. Governments are exposed by these actors. When technology becomes more prevalent, governments will not matter anymore. Nuclear weapons may be important in the interim period—not in the future. Military establishment does not want to decrease their arsenals due to past framework, but such frameworks will change with the change in the lives of the people.”128 The concept of cooperation, integration, transparency, and trust-building leading to further integration is a key element in Yunus’s perspective. He believes that as interactions between people and nations increase, old paradigms of rivalry in international relations could gradually shift, and greater cooperation and understanding might become possible. When cooperation efforts fail for any reason, it not only results in the failure of the intended purpose, but can also lead to a situation where the party involved disintegrates more rapidly. This can result in increased 128 Interview with Dr. Mohammad Yunus, Nobel Peace Prize Winner and Economist, Dhaka, January 17, 2019. Dr. Mohammad Yunus, a Nobel Peace Prize-winning economist, is a forward-thinking and insightful individual who has a keen understanding of global dynamics and the potential for unexpected shifts in the world order. His reference to the fall of the Berlin Wall as an example of transformative change occurring unpredictably underscores his perspective that traditional structures and frameworks, including governments, may undergo significant changes as people find innovative solutions to their problems. Dr. Yunus also recognizes the growing influence of non-state actors, like WikiLeaks, and the impact of advancing technology on the relevance of governments and nuclear weapons in the future. His visionary outlook and ability to anticipate evolving global trends make him a compelling and knowledgeable interviewer, well-equipped to engage in discussions on a wide range of topics, including economics, geopolitics, and social change.

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arrogance and antagonism in its policies. Iran, since mid-2019, has been following this path. The breach of trust related to the nuclear deal and its commitments has left Iran deeply dissatisfied. As a consequence, Iran has been focusing more on its nuclear program, likely with the intention of developing nuclear weapons in the near future. Akbar Salehi, the VicePresident and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization (AEO) in Iran then, acknowledged that while the nuclear agreement imposed certain limitations on Iran, it did not affect the pace of development in the Iranian nuclear industry. He admitted that the nuclear agreement placed certain limitations on Iran, but “it does not affect the pace of the development of the (Iranian) nuclear industry.”129 The failure of cooperation can have severe and negative consequences, surpassing those of a situation where cooperation was never attempted. The IAEA’s Director General Rafael Grossi states in the context of US’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, “The American move triggered Iran to abandon obligations over time. Although this agreement has not been declared dead, it has become an empty shell.”130 He further confirms that “Iran has the nuclear materials necessary for several nuclear weapons, but I must emphasize that Iran currently does not have any nuclear weapons.”131 Integration failures can have far-reaching consequences, including the potential for increased antagonism, loss of trust, and a shift in policy objectives. The situation in Iran serves as a poignant example of how such failures can impact a nation’s behavior and strategic choices. The Iranian case provides a compelling example of how integration failures can lead to rapid changes in policy and behavior, particularly in the nuclear realm. Iran’s experience with the nuclear deal serves as a vivid illustration of this phenomenon. When the JCPOA was negotiated and 129 “Iranian Cleric: Iran Possesses ‘Formula for Nuclear Bomb’,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, February 19, 2019. 130 “Iran Has No Nuclear Weapons: IAEA Chief,” Tehran Times, August 29, 2023. 131 “Iran has No Nuclear Weapons: IAEA Chief,” Tehran Times, August 29, 2023. The

statement by the UN nuclear chief emphasizes that Iran possesses the nuclear materials required for producing several nuclear weapons, but it underscores that Iran does not currently possess any operational nuclear weapons. This distinction is crucial in the context of international efforts to monitor and regulate Iran’s nuclear activities. It acknowledges Iran’s capability in terms of nuclear materials while confirming that there is no evidence of Iran having developed nuclear weapons at the present time. This distinction reflects the ongoing efforts to ensure compliance with international agreements and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

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implemented, it represented a form of integration between Iran and several major world powers, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, and Russia. The deal was designed to address concerns over Iran’s nuclear program by placing limitations on its nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief and the promise of normalized international relations. However, in May 2018, the United States, under the Trump administration, unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed sanctions on Iran. This abrupt shift in US policy marked a significant failure of integration and shattered the trust that had been built through the deal. In response to this integration failure and the subsequent economic pressure from sanctions, Iran embarked on a path of fast spill-back in the nuclear realm. The Iranian leadership, feeling betrayed by the United States and its Western partners, decided to increase its focus on its nuclear program. This included steps such as exceeding the agreed-upon limits on uranium enrichment, resuming activities at previously dormant nuclear facilities, and advancing its nuclear capabilities. This swift and assertive action in the nuclear realm can be seen as a direct consequence of the integration failure. Iran’s leaders no longer believed that diplomacy and integration could secure their interests and address their security concerns. Instead, they viewed nuclear advancement as a means to regain leverage and ensure their security, particularly in the face of what they perceived as hostile actions by the US.

Summary Chapter 9 provides a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s shifting stance toward proliferation, placing significant emphasis on the influence of the United States’ withdrawal from the nuclear deal and the resultant erosion of trust in security arrangements. It depicts Iran’s shift from being a low-to-moderate proliferation aspirant before the nuclear deal to a moderate-to-high proliferation aspirant following the United States’ withdrawal from the agreement. The chapter chronicles Iran’s partial departure from the nuclear deal, specifically its breach of the agreedupon uranium limit set in the 2015 accord. Despite a year of compliance in the post-US withdrawal period, Iran has amassed sufficient uranium for multiple nuclear weapons and resumed enrichment activities at the Fordow underground facility. This change signifies a notable escalation in Iran’s proliferation ambitions, reflecting a stronger commitment to nuclear activities and a desire to assert its resolve compared to the pre-deal

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era. It probes deep into the motives driving Iran’s current uranium enrichment activities, drawing a sharp contrast between its present proliferation efforts and past actions. This change signifies a notable escalation in Iran’s proliferation ambitions, reflecting a stronger commitment to nuclear activities and a desire to assert its resolve compared to the pre-deal era. The chapter also underscores that this heightened proliferation activity has occurred at a rapid pace compared to previous periods, emphasizing Iran’s intensified pursuit of security and prestige objectives in the wake of failed diplomatic agreements. More importantly, the chapter highlights that Iran’s current pace of proliferation is the most rapid observed thus far, illustrating the heightened determination of states to pursue their security objectives when faced with the failure of diplomatic agreements. Furthermore, the chapter offers a nuanced examination of the multifaceted factors contributing to Iran’s accelerated proliferation activities. It highlights long-standing rivalries, the presence of nuclear latency, the desire to reclaim lost prestige and assert its identity, and the anticipation of trade and aid benefits as significant facilitators. Additionally, it sheds light on the role of precipitating factors, particularly the differences among major powers involved in the deal, in reigniting Iran’s interest in proliferation.

PART IV

The Final Chapter

CHAPTER 11

Conclusion

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, is an agreement reached in 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 countries, US, UK, France, Germany, Russia, China, and the EU, with the aim of ensuring Iran’s nuclear program remains peaceful and preventing it from developing nuclear weapons. Key provisions include limiting Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity, reducing its enriched uranium stockpile, converting the Fordow facility to a research center, and granting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) extensive monitoring rights. In return, sanctions were lifted, and the deal began implementation in 2016, with a duration of 15 years and ongoing IAEA verification thereafter. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to limit its uranium enrichment capacity by reducing its centrifuges and maintaining enrichment levels below 3.67%, well below what is needed for weaponsgrade uranium. It also committed to reducing its enriched uranium stockpile by 98% to a maximum of 300 kilograms for 15 years. The Fordow nuclear facility was repurposed into a research center, prohibiting enrichment activities at that site. The IAEA gained extensive access and monitoring rights to ensure Iran’s compliance, including regular inspections and the ability to investigate suspicious sites. In exchange for Iran’s compliance with these nuclear restrictions, the P5+1 countries lifted or suspended economic

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and financial sanctions imposed by the US, EU, and the United Nations (UN). The JCPOA’s implementation began on January 16, 2016, with a 15year duration, although some provisions last longer. After this period, Iran would have more flexibility in its nuclear program, still subject to IAEA monitoring and verification to ensure its peaceful nature. According to reports from the IAEA, Iran was found to be in compliance with its obligations under the JCPOA during the initial two years of the agreement. However, a significant shift occurred when Donald Trump was elected as the 45th President of the United States in November 2016. Throughout his campaign and subsequent presidency, Trump consistently voiced strong criticism of the JCPOA, often characterizing it as a “bad deal.” His objections to the JCPOA primarily revolved around his perception that it was too lenient toward Iran and failed to address crucial issues, such as Iran’s ballistic missile program and its regional activities. In April 2017, the Trump administration initiated a comprehensive review of its Iran policy, with a focus on evaluating whether to continue certifying Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA and assessing whether the agreement aligned with the national interests of the United States. On May 8, 2018, President Trump officially announced the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA, a decision that was made despite opposition from other signatories to the agreement, European allies, and the IAEA’s confirmation of Iran’s compliance with its nuclear commitments. Subsequent to the withdrawal, the United States reinstated sanctions on Iran, including secondary sanctions targeting entities engaged in business with Iran. The decision by the United States to exit the 2015 Iran nuclear deal did not lead the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China to follow suit. Instead, these nations reaffirmed their commitment to upholding their obligations under the JCPOA, with the aim of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons while allowing it to maintain its missile capabilities. As of the current situation, Iran possesses a significant quantity of highly enriched uranium, which raises concerns about its potential ability to develop multiple nuclear weapons. According to reports from the United Nations nuclear watchdog, Iran has reduced its production of uranium enriched to approximately 60% purity, a level close to the threshold of about 90% considered weapons-grade. Additionally, Iran has initiated steps to dilute a portion of its stockpile enriched to this level. However, it is crucial to emphasize that despite these adjustments, Iran’s

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overall stockpile of enriched uranium is still expanding. According to the IAEA’s theoretical definition, Iran currently possesses nearly enough uranium enriched to 60% purity that, if further processed, could be used in the development of three nuclear weapons.1 Moreover, Iran also maintains substantial quantities of uranium enriched to lower levels, potentially allowing for the manufacture of additional nuclear devices. This situation highlights persistent concerns and underscores the importance of ongoing international monitoring and diplomatic efforts to address Iran’s nuclear activities and their potential ramifications. The central objective of this book is to investigate the root causes and motivations behind Iran’s actions within this complex geopolitical context. The book’s central argument posits that Iran’s pursuit of pre-nuclear deal proliferation activities can be understood through the lens of its protracted conflicts with Iraq, Israel, and the United States, all of which were unfolding simultaneously. The JCPOA held the potential to serve as a pivotal instrument in resolving the long-standing rivalry between Iran and the United States, a development that could have subsequently eased tensions in Iran’s relationship with Israel. Furthermore, the prospect of a more amicable American presence in Iraq had the potential to assuage Tehran’s concerns stemming from evolving developments in Baghdad. For Iran, the JCPOA’s significance is intricately tied to its primary rival, the United States, as the long-term objective was the resolution of conflicts with Washington. However, the US withdrawal from the agreement, coupled with allegations of Iran sponsoring terrorism, has heightened Tehran’s sense of threat and compels it to contemplate nuclear deterrence as a potential strategy in the event of a future conflict with the United States. Moreover, the United States’ intention to transfer nuclear reactors to Saudi Arabia, a regional adversary of Iran, underscored Washington’s inconsistent approach to security policies in the Middle East. The breakdown of the nuclear deal has further fostered a substantial trust deficit between the parties involved, creating a menacing environment for the weaker state in the asymmetric conflictual relationship, which ultimately seeks to bolster its military security through the acquisition of a deterrent capability. Assurance of security through international agreements has become unreliable, and confidence-building measures have lost their credibility, consequently prompting accelerated proliferation efforts. 1 Phil McCausland and Dan De Luce, “Iran Enriching Uranium to Near WeaponsGrade Levels, Nuclear Watchdog Warns,” NBC News, March 8, 2023.

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This is facilitated by the fact that nuclear weapons development is deemed more achievable under conditions of nuclear latency, a status that Iran currently maintains. On the domestic front, Iranian leaders perceive America’s withdrawal from the JCPOA as a betrayal aimed at crippling Iran’s economy, diminishing its regional influence, and promoting regime change. Additionally, Iran’s strong Persian identity makes it particularly intolerant of perceived insults on any level. The US withdrawal from the agreement and its branding of Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism have deeply offended the proud Persian nation. A nuclear-capable Tehran could potentially garner substantial economic and military assistance from the United States, thereby emphasizing Iran’s Persian identity on the global stage. Finally, the fracture of the alliance among the major powers in the JCPOA, including China, Russia, Japan, and the European nations, all of which expressed dissatisfaction with America’s withdrawal from the agreement, has provided Tehran with an opportunity to reconsider its commitments. Iran’s renewed interest in proliferation can be attributed to the complex interplay of global, regional, and domestic political dynamics, which continue to shape its strategic calculus. Diplomatic endeavors aimed at reinstating the JCPOA to curb Iran’s nuclear activities face significant hurdles today, particularly in light of Tehran’s involvement in providing arms to Moscow during the conflict in Ukraine and amid domestic unrest in Iran. Nonetheless, it is imperative to underscore the ongoing relevance of the JCPOA in both global and regional contexts. Despite Iran having acquired enough enriched uranium to potentially produce several nuclear bombs, it currently lacks a viable nuclear weapon design and an appropriate explosive detonation system. An effective JCPOA, borne out of successful diplomacy, holds the potential to impose constraints on Iran’s enriched uranium and heavy water stockpiles, subjecting its nuclear program to rigorous scrutiny through IAEA inspections. The JCPOA, as a product of astute diplomacy, can serve as a pivotal tool for addressing the enduring conflict between Iran and the United States, offering a paradigm of conflict resolution through negotiation and compromise rather than resorting to military action. A revitalized JCPOA has the potential to draw Iran closer to the Western world, thereby affording Western powers greater influence over Iran’s military support to Russia. By capping Iran’s existing nuclear program, the JCPOA can significantly reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation in the volatile Middle

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East, thereby contributing to regional security stability. This underscores the continued salience of the JCPOA, even in the face of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile, as a crucial instrument for non-proliferation and the potential improvement of US-Iran relations. Confidence-building measures inherent to the JCPOA, alongside their spillover effects, hold the promise of easing conflict resolution with the United States and fostering a more constructive relationship. The JCPOA, by establishing strict limits on Iran’s nuclear program and subjecting it to robust international inspections, engenders a sense of transparency and accountability. These measures can gradually rebuild trust between Iran and the United States, paving the way for broader diplomatic engagements. Moreover, the successful implementation of the JCPOA can serve as a model for resolving disputes through dialogue and compromise, rather than confrontation or military action. This sets a positive precedent that can be applied to other contentious issues in US-Iran relations. Additionally, improved relations between Iran and the Western world, as a result of JCPOA compliance, may open channels for dialogue and cooperation on regional conflicts, contributing to greater stability in the Middle East. As Mousavian states, “If JCPOA was implemented correctly, Iran and US would continue high level direct talks. Saudi-Iran rapprochement would have started much earlier. Negotiations on Syria and Yemen would have gone further…these would have a great impact on regional peace and stability and Iran-US relations.”2 Ultimately, the JCPOA’s confidence-building measures and their ripple effects offer a pathway toward conflict resolution and a more constructive relationship between Iran and the United States. The book is structured into three main sections. The first section serves as an exploration platform of the Iran nuclear deal and its subsequent breakdown, while also providing an overview of the existing scholarly viewpoints regarding the consequences of the United States’ withdrawal from this accord. In the second section, the theoretical framework underpinning the study is developed, encompassing three critical chapters. These chapters look at the advantages of cooperative arrangements between rival states, the potential spill-over effects across various domains, the reactions of states affected when such cooperative agreements are disrupted by their adversaries, and the key factors, both primary

2 Interview with Seyed Hossein Mousavian, September 10, 2023.

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and precipitating, that shape a victim state’s decision to pursue nuclear proliferation under altered circumstances. The third section applies this theoretical framework to the Iranian nuclear situation, consisting of three chapters that scrutinize Iran’s proliferation status prior to the deal, its relatively restrained nuclear activities during the initial years of the agreement, and the swift escalation of its proliferation endeavors following the US withdrawal from the agreement. A comprehensive conclusion synthesizes the study’s findings, extracting theoretical and policy implications and highlighting the potential applicability of the study’s theory to other instances involving nuclear agreements between enduring rival states. Chapter 1 of the book furnishes a comprehensive overview of the Iran nuclear deal, offering intricate insights into the negotiations and diplomatic deliberations that culminated in its establishment. It meticulously examines the JCPOA’s stringent limitations imposed on Iran’s nuclear program, elucidates the intricate mechanisms for monitoring and verification, and delineates the extent of sanctions relief extended to Iran. Moreover, this chapter conducts a nuanced analysis of the advantages and drawbacks experienced by both Iran and the United States within the context of the agreement. It also delves into the broader repercussions of the deal, shedding light on its impact on global non-proliferation endeavors. Chapter 2 centers on the pivotal US decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal and the far-reaching global proliferation concerns it generated. This chapter methodically dissects the rationale presented by the Trump administration, scrutinizes the perceived shortcomings of the nuclear deal from its vantage point, and looks into the repercussions of this withdrawal within the landscape of Iranian nuclear dynamics. Additionally, it accentuates the implications of the US exit for the domain of multilateral diplomacy and the broader security framework. In Chapter 3, a critical analysis is conducted on prior research pertaining to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, with a focus on highlighting the constraints that have hindered a comprehensive understanding of the present circumstances. This chapter emphasizes the necessity for a theoretical framework capable of elucidating Iran’s renewed interest in nuclear pursuits, addressing the gaps that persist within existing scholarly discourse. In this context, the chapter introduces the innovative concept of “spill-back policy” and underscores the influence of protracted conflicts in molding the dynamics of proliferation. The theoretical framework laid

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out in this chapter serve as the basis for further development in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 4 offers the study’s theoretical framework, which incorporates the theory of integration to shed light on cooperation between long-standing adversaries. It highlights that protracted conflict states can cooperate on critical issues like proliferation under specific conditions. The challenge lies in initiating negotiations, as states engage in rational cost–benefit assessments before committing to cooperation. Building trust and convincing domestic constituencies are time-consuming tasks, as rivals initially lack confidence in each other’s intentions. However, once cooperation begins, adherence to the agreed-upon rules is crucial to its success, as defection must be avoided. Trust is cultivated over time through rule adherence, leading to habitual cooperation. Patience and optimism are vital during this phase, as spill-over effects of cooperation become evident and are eventually institutionalized. Such cooperation can transform the nature of the conflict, potentially leading to its resolution between protracted conflict states. In Chapter 5, the concept of “spill back policy” is introduced, focusing on how a victim state reacts when a cooperative arrangement is disrupted, often due to a member state’s geographical or political factors. It distinguishes spill-back policy from the spill-over effects discussed previously and highlights connections between spill-back, negative reciprocity resulting from the interplay of foreign and domestic policy, crises, and misperceptions. The chapter concludes by emphasizing the rapid pace of negative reciprocal spill-back effects when a cooperative deal ruptures. It offers a theoretical framework to comprehend a state’s renewed interest in nuclear proliferation when faced with defectors in a previously enthusiastic nuclear agreement. While a functioning cooperative arrangement yields positive outcomes, its failure creates a trust deficit and residual effects that accelerate nuclear weapons development. This heightened insecurity makes the affected state a more determined and serious proliferator, rendering it difficult to halt. The theory is applied to the current Iranian nuclear proliferation scenario, demonstrating how a spill-back policy is initiated by a state that has lost interest due to defections and expedited by factors discussed in the subsequent chapter. The next Chapter 6, outlines the core theoretical arguments of the study and presents its primary hypotheses. It establishes causal connections between the dependent variable, renewed nuclear ambition, and

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several independent variables, including the significance of enduring rivalries, the presence of nuclear latency, the pursuit of prestige and identity through nuclear acquisition, and the desire for trade and aid benefits. The precipitating factor, namely differences among major powers regarding the state’s nuclear issue, is also explained as a crucial element. The chapter posits that a state facing a fractured nuclear deal, particularly with its primary rival, is inclined to pursue a swift “spill-back” policy. It details four facilitating factors and the precipitating factor, which collectively enable the renewal of nuclear ambitions. The subsequent three chapters examine the Iranian nuclear proliferation interest, pre-deal dynamics, the period of restrained proliferation during initial years of the deal when all parties adhered to its clauses, and the accelerated spill-back nuclear policy in the post-fractured deal period, applying this theoretical framework. Chapter 7 provides a comprehensive exploration of Iran’s nuclear program and its broader proliferation aspirations leading up to 2015. It looks at Iran’s simultaneous engagement in protracted conflicts, both regional and global, to illuminate the factors triggering its interest in nuclear proliferation. The chapter offers insights into the inception of Tehran’s civilian nuclear program, which eventually raised suspicions of a military component. It details the progression of Iran’s proliferation ambitions, including various stages of development. Additionally, the chapter underscores Iran’s resilience in pursuing its nuclear program despite Western sanctions, particularly from the United States. This determination was evident across different leadership periods, encompassing both moderates and conservatives. The chapter also examines Iran’s “denial and deception” strategy within the context of its enduring engagement in three intractable conflicts. Ultimately, the chapter positions Iran as a resolute proliferator, even as it officially maintained that its nuclear activities were solely for peaceful purposes. It underscores Tehran’s pursuit of a deterrent capability to address its multifaceted security concerns across various fronts. Chapter 8 examines Iran’s nuclear status from 2015 to 2018, a period characterized by full commitment to the nuclear deal by Iran, the United States, and other involved parties. These were trust-building years, marked by demonstrated loyalty and the importance of patience in assessing each party’s commitment. Iran’s nuclear program was effectively capped and closely monitored by the IAEA, with no suspicions of covert activities. Iran’s compliance with the deal, which included relinquishing 97% of its uranium fuel, was evident. This period of muted proliferation

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also saw Iran recognized as a latent proliferator, a result of the nuclear deal. The chapter underscores the potential for this latent status to evolve into active proliferation. Chapter 9 illustrates Iran’s shifting proliferation aspirations, transitioning from a low-to-moderate aspirant to a moderate-to-high one after the US fractured the nuclear deal. Iran, having partially withdrawn from the JCPOA, breached uranium limits set in the 2015 agreement. Following a year of JCPOA compliance post-US withdrawal, Iran now possesses enough uranium for several nuclear weapons and has resumed enrichment at the Fordow facility. There is concern that if the U.S. imposes further sanctions despite its own non-compliance, and Iran might withdraw from both the JCPOA and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran’s recent proliferation actions, marked by increasing uranium enrichment and reduced cooperation with inspectors, underscore its determination in the face of deteriorating trust in security arrangements. This chapter explores the motivations behind Iran’s current uranium enrichment activities, compares them to previous periods, and emphasizes the unprecedented speed of Iran’s proliferation efforts. It offers a causal explanation of these activities, drawing on facilitating factors such as enduring rivalries, nuclear latency, the pursuit of prestige, and the desire for trade and aid benefits. The role of the precipitating factor—differences among major powers over Iran’s nuclear issue—is also analyzed. Through comprehensive research encompassing primary and secondary sources, coupled with in-depth analysis, this study has effectively demonstrated the applicability of its proposed theory within the context of the Iranian case, specifically concerning the JCPOA. The theory aligns with the initial phase of JCPOA implementation, characterized by Iran’s full compliance and the commitment of all deal parties, notably the United States, to uphold their obligations. During this period, Iran’s readiness for broader negotiations on various levels was palpable, indicating a willingness to engage in diplomatic overtures beyond the nuclear realm had the JCPOA proven effective.3 Importantly, these early years of the JCPOA brought a newfound sense of security to 3 As Seyed Hossein Mousavian states, “Rouhani administration was also thinking that this (the JCPOA) is the first step of many. The opponents, whether it was Israel, the Zionists, the hawks in the US or the Republicans, they were afraid if this deal would lead to further negotiations and further grand bargain between Iran and the US. Therefore,

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Iran, underscoring the tangible impact of the nuclear deal on regional stability and Iran’s strategic calculus. Furthermore, the study highlights that Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA endured even after the United States’ withdrawal from the agreement in 2018. This continued adherence can be attributed to Iran’s anticipation of change and the expectation that its trade relationships, particularly with the European Union and other remaining parties, would persist despite the US withdrawal. This demonstrates Iran’s willingness to uphold its end of the nuclear deal in the hope of sustaining economic and diplomatic ties with other signatory nations. The study’s findings reveal a significant shift in Iran’s course of action in 2019, marked by a resumption of uranium enrichment and a notable change in rhetoric by its leaders. During this period, Iran began openly discussing its enrichment activities, seemingly disregarding the potential consequences. Furthermore, Iran denied access to IAEA inspectors, signaling its departure from JCPOA compliance. This shift reflected a loss of faith in confidence-building measures, with trust in international partners becoming a contentious issue. The atmosphere of enmity with the United States, which had shown signs of improvement with the JCPOA’s implementation, resurfaced, accompanied by the use of derogatory language to describe the US. Iran’s growing frustration was compounded by new sanctions, yet it continued uranium enrichment unabated. This transformation in Iran’s stance can be attributed to the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal under the policies of Donald Trump, a decision perceived as lacking strategic foresight. It was interesting to note that by the time of this shift in Iran’s approach, the initial belief that the effective implementation of the JCPOA could lead to broader and more substantial negotiations with the United States had dissipated among Iranian decision-makers. Instead of pursuing the prospect of spill-over effects into other domains for conflict management and potential resolution, Iran began contemplating the concept of spill-back effects. This shift represented a notable departure from the earlier optimism and signaled Iran’s adoption of a more deterrent strategy, as evidenced by its pursuit of uranium enrichment at

they killed the deal just because of this reason. For them, they wanted to kill the first step to stop further steps.” Interview with Seyed Hossein Mousavian, September 10, 2023.

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higher levels. The notion of spill-back effects came to replace the previously envisioned spill-over effects, marking a significant evolution in Iran’s strategic calculus and its approach to addressing longstanding conflicts. The study’s most intriguing finding pertains to the rapid pace of the spill-back effect. Before the nuclear deal, Iran was indeed enriching uranium, but at a noticeably slower rate. However, the fracture of the deal, primarily due to the United States’ nonparticipation, transformed Iran into an intense proliferator. Subsequently, Iran significantly escalated its uranium enrichment efforts, progressing from the JCPOA-restricted levels to 20% enrichment and further up to 60%—a level it currently maintains. Some sources even suggest that Iran may have enriched uranium to as high as 84%. It is stated that the “risk posed by Iran’s nuclear program is more urgent today than ever, and the options available to the United States and its partners appear more limited and far less easily obtained.”4 Thus, the urgency of the threat presented by Iran’s current nuclear program has increased significantly, and finding viable solutions for the United States and its allies has become a more challenging and constrained task. This accelerated proliferation trajectory underscores the profound impact of the JCPOA’s breakdown and Iran’s determination to advance its nuclear capabilities. The study’s findings shed light on the key factor that facilitated Iran’s rapid proliferation: its pre-existing status as a latent proliferator. This latent status proved to be a crucial advantage, as it made Iran’s progression toward its nuclear weapons aspirations considerably more feasible. When a nation already possesses the infrastructural elements and knowledge associated with nuclear proliferation, it significantly streamlines the path toward advancing its nuclear capabilities. In Iran’s case, this latent status provided the essential groundwork that allowed it to swiftly move forward with its nuclear ambitions, contributing to the accelerated pace of its proliferation efforts following the breakdown of the JCPOA. Additionally, the study reveals that Iran’s determined momentum to fast-track its proliferation efforts was intricately linked to a combination of factors. Firstly, its engagement in triple protracted conflicts, both regionally and globally, heightened its perceived security challenges and the perceived utility of nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Secondly, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons was intertwined with a strategic desire to 4 Suzanne Maloney, “Addressing Iran’s Evolving Threats to US Interests,” Brookings, September 15, 2023.

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regain lost prestige and affirm its national identity on the international stage. Lastly, the prospect of acquiring trade and aid benefits through nuclear weapons acquisition served as a potent incentive, further motivating Iran’s swift pursuit of these capabilities. These complex interplays of strategic considerations and regional dynamics played a significant role in driving Iran’s rapid nuclear proliferation agenda following the breakdown of the JCPOA. The study brought to light the notable differences among major powers regarding the nuclear issue of the concerned state, which created a conducive platform for a potential proliferator to renew its ambitions. Iran astutely capitalized on these divergences.5 In 2019, as it resumed uranium enrichment, Iran was keenly aware of the discord between European powers and the United States over the JCPOA, with the Europeans expressing dissatisfaction over the US departure from the deal. Iran leveraged this rift and strategically engaged with China, recognizing the latter’s interest in integration through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This engagement aimed to secure benefits and draw closer to China. Simultaneously, Iran maintained its longstanding alliance with Russia, a dependable military supplier and ally. Iran has strategically bolstered its diplomatic ties with Russia and China, a pivot partly influenced by the ongoing Ukraine conflict and broader shifts in global politics. Iran’s alignment with Russia remained steadfast, even as Russia engaged in military action in Ukraine. This alignment toward closer relations with Moscow and Beijing has been driven by shared interests, including opposition to what they perceive as Western dominance in global affairs. Rather than condemning Russia, Iran actively supplied critical military equipment such as drones and missiles to support Russia in its conflict. This dynamic has facilitated the development of a robust triangular relationship between Iran, China, and Russia, providing Iran with a protective shield as it continues its uranium enrichment efforts toward a level where it can potentially produce a significant number of nuclear weapons. The study’s findings demonstrate that Iran’s proactive engagement in international organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) group has facilitated stronger economic, political, and security connections with 5 Suzanne Maloney, “Addressing Iran’s Evolving Threats to US Interests,” Brookings, September 15, 2023.

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these nations. This strategic diversification of alliances carries significant implications, not only for countering Western pressures, but also for Iran’s financial independence and geopolitical positioning. Iran’s recent entry into the BRICS further underscores its commitment to forging partnerships that can potentially enhance its leverage and bargaining power in international negotiations, particularly concerning its nuclear aspirations. Its entrance into BRICS not only signifies its deepening ties with Russia and China but also serves as a symbolic departure from its prior “pariah state” image as identified by the US. In this evolving multipolar world, the ability of the US to unilaterally assign such identities to states is diminishing, highlighting the shifting dynamics of global power and diplomacy. Central to the success of the agreement was the pivotal role played by the IAEA in verifying Iran’s compliance with its nuclear-related commitments. However, it is essential to emphasize that the challenges faced by the IAEA in the wake of the JCPOA’s breakdown were not of its making. The United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and Iran’s subsequent resumption of proliferation activities had significant implications for the IAEA and global non-proliferation efforts. The IAEA’s ability to ensure compliance with nuclear safeguards and its reputation as an impartial arbiter in global nuclear governance faced considerable challenges following the partial demise of the agreement. By considering the complexities surrounding the JCPOA’s breakdown, this research highlights the challenges faced by the IAEA, through no fault of its own, in maintaining effective nuclear safeguards and upholding the principles of non-proliferation in the global security landscape. Understanding these implications is crucial for developing strategies to strengthen nuclear governance and preserve the integrity of international agreements in the face of complex regional security challenges. In today’s complex and rapidly evolving global security landscape, rebuilding trust in the IAEA is paramount for advancing non-proliferation efforts. As nuclear-armed states continue to modernize their arsenals and emerging powers seek to assert their nuclear capabilities, maintaining effective safeguards and upholding the principles of the NPT have never been more critical. International cooperation, transparency, and a reaffirmation of the IAEA’s impartial role in nuclear governance must be on the agenda of non-proliferation efforts. Only through renewed trust and collaborative actions can the international community work toward a safer, more secure, and non-proliferating world.

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The situation with Iran’s nuclear program sets a concerning precedent for countries within the NPT framework, as it raises questions about the credibility and efficacy of international and multilateral agreements. While Iran’s actions cannot be entirely blamed, as it initially complied with the terms of the JCPOA, the breakdown of the agreement pushed Iran toward renewed proliferation efforts. Currently, Iran has enriched uranium up to 60%, prompting concerns and discussions in the United States about potential responses. While Congress remains a hurdle for returning to the JCPOA, alternative temporary arrangements are being explored, albeit requiring congressional approval. These developments offer Iran certain advantages, including a reduced breakout time for potential nuclear weapons production and increased international attention. However, these informal arrangements may not fully substitute the JCPOA’s comprehensive, formal, and multilateral framework that imposed clear obligations on Iran. As asserted, “This informal arrangement does not substitute the JCPOA. In this agreement there are some elements of the JCPOA, like Iran giving more access to the IAEA and not escalate the current level of enrichment… Here (with the temporary arrangement), they will stop at 60 percent. At least it is something! This short-term agreement is a positive step.”6 The critical question remains whether these informal arrangements can serve as a platform for confidence-building between the US and Iran and pave the way for broader negotiations on less controversial, but impactful issues that could contribute to conflict resolution. The answer, unfortunately, appears to be in the negative, raising concerns about the durability of international agreements and the prospects for conflict resolution in this complex geopolitical context. The US’s move toward establishing “understandings” rather than formal agreements with Iran is a pragmatic approach given the complex dynamics surrounding Iran’s connections with Russia, its nuclear aspirations, and its role in the region. This approach allows for flexibility and dialogue while avoiding the need for formal Congressional approval, which could face opposition due to various concerns. It reflects the recognition that maintaining some level of engagement with Iran is essential for preventing it from further advancing its nuclear program and potentially rupturing its relationship with Russia. Additionally, external factors such

6 Interview with Seyed Hossein Mousavian, September 10, 2023.

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as the China-brokered deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia may be influencing the US’s decision to pursue informal agreements as a precursor to potentially revisiting the JCPOA. Nevertheless, the significance of formal agreements and the JCPOA’s role in nuclear non-proliferation remains crucial and should not be underestimated. The imperative of renegotiating the original JCPOA through diplomatic means cannot be overstated. Its failure and the resumption of unconstrained nuclear activities by Iran could set off a perilous regional nuclear arms race. Neighboring states like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt might feel compelled to pursue their nuclear capabilities to counter Iran’s perceived threat, exacerbating regional tensions and instability. Although Iran and Saudi Arabia have recently reached a China-brokered deal, such arrangements can be fragile and subject to change, particularly in the evolving geopolitical landscape. Saudi Arabia, in particular, seeks to pivot toward China and diversify its alliances in response to shifting global dynamics, potentially altering regional dynamics. A nuclear-armed Iran could also embolden its proxy groups and allies, further destabilizing the already volatile Middle East and escalating conflicts, all while the US shifts its focus to other global challenges involving Russia and China. The economic ramifications of heightened sanctions have the potential to worsen unemployment and poverty rates within Iran. This, in turn, could give rise to greater social inequality, discontentment, and civil unrest among the populace. A significant deterioration in economic conditions resulting from the JCPOA’s failure and ensuing sanctions may catalyze public dissatisfaction and frustration with the government, potentially leading to protests, demonstrations, or other forms of social upheaval. Iran’s economic instability and domestic challenges can also spill over into regional dynamics. As Iran grapples with economic strains, it might seek alternative avenues to assert influence, including support for proxy groups or more assertive regional policies. This, in turn, could exacerbate tensions and conflicts in the already volatile Middle East. Moreover, the collapse of the JCPOA and the imposition of increased sanctions may impact regional power dynamics, influencing Iran’s relations with neighboring states and potentially worsening existing rivalries and conflicts, especially concerning countries like Saudi Arabia and Israel. Since there is only talk about informal arrangements on the Iranian nuclear issue, can it be said that the JCPOA is dead? “I think it’s in comma, in CCU,” states Mousavian. They (the US) want to keep a door open in case the democrats would win in the next election. If in

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the next 18 months the temporary arrangement between Iran and the US works, the conflict between them is deescalated, regional tensions are decreased, and if the democrats win in the next elections, they may revive the JCPOA. Before the presidential election, the chance of revival is low. There would be a chance of a peace-meal approach, like the temporary one. Direct negotiations in September/October are a possibility. It would help to contain regional conflict. We have to wait and see (about JCPOA). There is a chance that there will be direct negotiations between Iran and the US. There is also a that negotiations between Iran and P5+1 can happen in October. If the temporary arrangement is successfully implemented and if P5+1 can negotiate again, it is not impossible to revive the JCPOA.”7 In other words, the United States appears to be maintaining an open door for potential diplomatic engagement with Iran, especially if there is a Democratic victory in the upcoming election. The success of the temporary arrangement between Iran and the US over the next 18 months could lead to de-escalation of tensions, decreased regional conflicts, and potentially pave the way for a revival of the JCPOA. While the chances of resurrecting the agreement before the presidential election are slim, there remains a possibility of a phased or interim approach, possibly through direct negotiations in September or October. This prospect holds the potential to help stabilize the region. The situation regarding the JCPOA is, thus, fluid, at best, and the outcome hinges on the success of the temporary arrangement and the willingness of both Iran and the P5+1 to engage in negotiations, which could lead to a revival of the nuclear deal. The breakdown of the JCPOA would significantly undermine the international non-proliferation regime and cast doubt on the effectiveness of diplomatic initiatives aimed at curbing nuclear proliferation. This could lead to decreased trust among signatories of other non-proliferation agreements and impede future negotiations with nations pursuing nuclear programs. Additionally, the JCPOA established robust monitoring and verification mechanisms to ensure Iran’s compliance, and the collapse of the deal might result in the loss of these critical oversight tools, making it more challenging to monitor Iran’s nuclear activities and identify potential breaches. A failed JCPOA could also disrupt the dynamics of regional

7 Interview with Seyed Hossein Mousavian, September 10, 2023.

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alliances, with countries that formerly supported the deal, such as European powers and Russia, potentially adjusting their positions. This could lead to fragmented approaches in dealing with Iran and complicate efforts to address regional conflicts and security issues. It is important to note that these are potential consequences, and their actual impact will depend on a variety of factors, including the actions and policies of the parties involved. Nevertheless, the failure of the JCPOA and the deterioration of U.S.-Iran relations would likely have far-reaching and significant implications for regional stability, ongoing conflicts, and endeavors to prevent nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. The permanent failure of the JCPOA would have profound implications for US-Iran relations and the broader Middle East region. The longstanding conflict between the two nations, which originated in the late 1970s, would likely persist and potentially intensify. While the JCPOA was not designed to resolve the underlying US-Iran conflict, it did offer a glimmer of hope by creating a platform for cooperation in the nuclear realm. Progress in this area could have paved the way for increased cooperation and confidence-building measures, potentially contributing to the resolution of the entrenched US-Iran conflict.8 Evaluating the consequences for US-Iran relations and the wider Middle East, including the risks of heightened conflicts, increased proxy warfare, and the potential emergence of a regional nuclear arms race, becomes essential. The breakdown of the Iran nuclear deal and rising tensions between the US and Iran also heighten the likelihood of direct military confrontations. The absence of diplomatic channels and breakdowns in communication could lead to misjudgments, increasing the chances of unintended conflict, a pattern witnessed in the past. A deteriorating US-Iran relationship is also likely to fuel an escalation in proxy conflicts throughout the region. Iran may expand its support for and activation of proxy groups, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, or various Shia militias in Iraq, as a response to perceived US pressures or encroachments. The JCPOA was crafted with the primary goal of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. It achieved this by imposing stringent restrictions and robust monitoring mechanisms on Iran’s nuclear program. By 8 As Trita Parsi states that the Iran nuclear deal “has proven that US-Iran enmity is not inevitable. It has proven that diplomacy can be triumphant.” See Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2017).

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certifying the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities, the JCPOA not only promotes regional and global stability but also bolsters the framework of the NPT. This agreement represents a critical pillar in the broader effort to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons, demonstrating the power of diplomacy and multilateral cooperation in addressing complex international challenges. The JCPOA sets an important precedent for resolving similar proliferation challenges diplomatically. Its success demonstrates that negotiations and multilateral agreements can be effective tools in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. By upholding the JCPOA, and the international community reinforces the message that diplomatic solutions are preferable to military actions. It is crucial to emphasize that the connection between the revived JCPOA and the Ukrainian war is not direct, and the actual impact would be influenced by a range of factors, including the decisions and policies of the relevant nations and international stakeholders. However, a reinstated JCPOA could potentially foster a more favorable atmosphere for peaceful resolutions. Achieving this would necessitate ongoing diplomatic initiatives, regional collaboration, and a comprehensive strategy to address the intricate dynamics of the Ukrainian conflict. While the JCPOA may not offer a solution to all the complexities in contemporary world politics, it does provide a response to the challenges of proliferation and stability in one of the world’s most volatile regions. Furthermore, it could serve as a model for resolving protracted conflicts through dependable multilateral diplomacy.

Index

A Additional Protocol, 42, 53, 167, 168, 172 Adoption Day, 27, 29 A failed JCPOA, 280 Agreed Framework, 126, 127, 132, 151 Agreement, 39–48, 50–52, 54–59 Ahmedinijad, Mahmoud, 164 al Assad, Hafez, 174 Alignment, 139, 151–153 Ali Khamenei, 164, 173 Antagonism, 237, 259 Antagonistic policies, 99, 104–106, 118 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 78 A.Q. Khan’s network, 166 Arab-Israeli conflict, 174, 175, 177, 178 Arak, 28, 32–34 Arak heavy water research reactor, 191, 193, 194 Argentina, 133, 134

Asymmetric protracted conflicts, 103 Atomic Energy Organization, 173 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), 219 Axis of Evil, 171, 184, 185 Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 102 Ayatollah Khamenei, 16 B Balancing, 129, 130 Ballistic missile program, 39, 49–51, 59 Bandwagon, 129 Bargaining power, 148 Belligerent response, 115 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 250, 276 Biden, Joe, 156, 157 Brazil, 133, 134 Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), 255, 256 Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) group, 276, 277 Britain, 249

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 S. Khan, The Iran Nuclear Deal, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50196-8

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INDEX

C Camp David Accords, 174 Canada, 137, 138, 141 Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU), 137 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 145 Centrifuges, 52, 55, 194–196 Cheating, 76, 94 China, 1, 3–5, 51, 56, 58, 63, 64, 81, 88, 90, 96, 126, 141, 143, 151–156, 163, 165, 224, 238, 245, 246, 250–252, 255, 256, 260, 265, 266, 268, 276, 279 Civilian Nuclear Program, 136 Civilian purposes, 162, 181 Clinton, Hillary, 216 Cold War, 78, 81 Commitment and loyalty, 190, 196 Communication, 76, 77, 80, 91, 94 Comprehensive review, 266 Concessions, 131, 135, 136, 148, 150, 157 Confidence-building, 193 Confidence-building measures, 43, 51, 75, 78, 267, 269, 274, 281 Conflict, 4–7 Conflict escalation, 67, 68 Conflict escalation risks, 170 Conflict management, 84, 95 Conflict resolution, 95, 176 Conflict termination, 78, 95 Cooperation, 6, 62, 64, 67–71, 75, 76, 78, 80–85, 87–96, 269, 271, 273, 277, 281, 282 Cooperative arrangement, 99–106, 109, 111, 116–118, 120–124 Cooperative atmosphere, 200, 202 Council for National Security and Foreign Policy of the Iranian Parliament, 240 Credibility, 109, 111–114, 121–123

Credibility of the agreement, 203, 204 Credibility of trust, 76 Crisis-induced compulsion, 112 Crucial Years of Implementation, 197, 198 Cyberattack, 167, 168 D Deal breakdown, 140 Deceptive activities, 202 Defection, 76, 81, 84, 85, 94, 96, 146, 147 Deficit of trust, 85 Democratic leaders, 110, 113 Democrats, 110 Denial and deception, 161, 167, 168, 186, 272 Deployment, 133, 134 Desire for deterrence, 122 Deterrence, 129, 136, 142, 143, 168, 169, 171, 175, 178 Diplomatic channels, 35 Diplomatic dialogue, 58 Diplomatic engagement, 193 Dyad, 82, 83 E E3/EU+3, 17, 27, 29 Economic and trade motivations, 148, 149 Economic pressure, 170, 171 Egypt, 172, 174 Enduring rivalries, 79, 81–83, 90 Enrichment activities, 162, 170, 181, 182, 184, 185 Enrichment level and stockpile, 195 EU4 (Germany, UK, France, and Italy), 228 Europe, 56 European nations, 268

INDEX

European powers, 81, 96 European Union (EU), 17, 18, 23, 27–30, 265, 266, 274

F F16s, 134 Fast-paced spill-back, 121–123 Financial and political concessions, 238 Foreign and domestic policies, 106, 108, 109, 123 Foreign policy crisis, 109–111, 113–115, 121 Fractured nuclear deal, 127, 128, 132, 157 France, 1, 3, 12, 17, 23 Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, 194, 195 Functionalism, 77, 78, 89, 91

G Geopolitical leverage, 169 Geopolitics, 167, 170, 177, 186 Germany, 1, 3, 12, 17, 23, 40 Global diplomacy, 167, 171 Great Satan, 132

H Habit of cooperation, 88–91, 93 Heavy water designs, 137 Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP), 191, 193, 195 Heavy water reactor, 32, 33 Heavy water stocks, 191, 193, 195 Hezbollah, 174, 175, 281 Highly enriched uranium (HEU), 162, 167, 168, 180–183 Hostage, 132 Hostility, 217, 242, 244, 255

285

I Identity reinforcement, 142 Impact on nuclear proliferation, 99 Implementation, 40, 51, 58 Implementation Day, 27, 29 Increased bitterness, 105 India-China conflict, 143 India-Pakistan conflict, 121 Insecurity, 108 Inspections, 24–26, 28, 35 Institutionalized, 75, 78, 89, 94, 96 Integration, 75, 77, 78, 89, 91–93, 96 Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 179 International agreements, 70, 71, 147 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2, 25–28, 33, 35, 42, 52, 53, 57, 128, 135, 137, 167, 168, 172, 180, 181, 265–268, 272, 274, 277, 278 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports, 191–194, 196, 197, 205, 213, 221 International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) surveillance, 188, 202 International inspectors, 42, 53 International sanctions, 45, 47 Iran, 1–7, 11–72, 126–130, 132–136, 139, 142, 143, 145–150, 152, 153, 155–157, 161–179, 181–186, 213–257, 259, 260, 265–270, 272–282 Iran’s Supreme Leader, 102 Iranian leadership, 64 Iranian nuclear deal, 100, 101 Iranian nuclear program, 6, 7 Iranian nuclear proliferation interest, 272 Iranian statements, 49 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA), 3

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Iran-US relations, 269, 281 Iran-US relationship, 102 Iraq, 4, 128, 133–135, 145 Iraq War, 165, 172, 173, 183, 185 Islamic leaders, 64 Islamic Republic, 63, 69 Islamic Revolution, 128, 162, 164 Israel, 4, 169, 172, 174–178, 183, 189

J Japan, 127, 128, 132, 137, 138, 151, 268 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 1–5, 11–13, 15–19, 23, 25–37, 39–53, 55–60, 62, 64–70, 72, 107, 163, 169, 171, 176, 181, 182, 186, 189–208, 212, 217–221, 223, 224, 226, 227, 230, 231, 233, 234, 243, 249, 254, 259, 260, 265–270, 273–282 Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), 227

K Kerry, John F., 19, 20 Khan, Abdul Qadeer, 162, 166 Khatami, Mohammad, 164 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 162, 164

L Latent proliferator, 189, 207–210, 212 Lebanon, 174, 281 Legitimate government, 110 Level of enrichment, 1 Libya, 133, 134, 166, 172 Light water reactors, 127 Long-running conflicts, 100, 128, 129, 140

Low-enriched uranium (LEU), 52, 162, 180 Loyalty, 188, 189, 196, 197 M Major powers, 126, 127, 133, 135, 151–153, 155–158 Managing proliferation concerns, 71 Maximum pressure, 3, 61, 65, 218, 224, 226, 229, 236 Means of delivery, 134 Middle East, 45, 215, 221, 236, 244–246, 248, 251, 253, 255 Misperceptions, 116, 117, 119, 123 Missile program, 39, 49–51, 59 Missiles, 134, 141 Mossadegh, Mohammad, 145 Multilateral agreements, 35, 41, 56, 57, 278, 282 Multilateral diplomacy, 153 Multi-power region, 129 Muted proliferator, 200, 201, 207 Mutual trust, 87, 88 N Natanz underground enrichment facility, 183 National interests, 81 National security concerns, 69 Natural uranium pellets, 191, 193, 194 Negative reciprocity, 109, 115, 120, 123 Negotiated deal, 81 Negotiation, 62–64, 69, 70 Neo-functionalism, 77, 91, 92 Neo-realist, 81 Netherlands, 137, 138 Non-proliferation, 11, 12, 14, 15, 22, 29, 31, 34–37, 68–72, 131, 133, 135, 137, 140, 141

INDEX

Non-proliferation efforts, 66 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 154, 156, 252 North Korea, 82, 83, 125, 127–130, 132, 133, 135, 136, 142, 147, 148, 151, 152, 238, 239, 241, 246 Nuclear accord, 62 Nuclear activities, 189, 191–193, 197, 198, 200, 202, 203, 208, 212 Nuclear agreements, 61, 125–128, 130, 131, 136 Nuclear-capable states, 115 Nuclear deal, 39–42, 45, 48–50, 52–55, 58, 59, 188–190, 196, 199, 207, 210–212 Nuclear doctrine, 133, 134 Nuclear facilities in Iran, 167 Nuclear infrastructure, 133, 134 Nuclear latency, 125, 128, 132, 157, 158 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 42, 81, 162, 165, 172, 181–183, 218, 224, 226, 240, 241, 273, 277, 278, 282 Nuclear program, 161–174, 176, 177, 181–186 Nuclear proliferation, 46, 47, 51, 53, 55, 57, 62, 65, 67–71 Nuclear Talks, 52 Nuclear testing, 133, 134 Nuclear warheads, 134 Nuclear weapons, 128–151, 157

O Obama administration, 216, 225–227, 242, 257 Obama, Barack, 11–15, 18–21, 37, 50, 54, 119, 216, 225, 226, 229

287

P P5+1, 1, 2, 12, 18, 21–24, 26, 40 Pace of spill-back effects, 119 Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza, 163, 165 Pakistan, 128, 135, 136, 138, 141, 142, 147, 148, 165, 166, 178 Patience, 188, 189, 200, 202 Patience and optimism, 271 Permanent failure of the JCPOA, 281 Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council, 40 Persian Empire, 145 Plutonium, 162, 164, 180, 181 Political and geographical spill back, 101 Post-Cold War, 152–155 Post-fractured deal, 158 Post-revolutionary development, 163 Pre-deal, 132, 158 Prestige enhancement, 142 Procurement Channel, 66, 67 Proliferation, 267–273, 275–282 Proliferation risks, 170, 181 Protracted conflicts, 4, 75, 76, 78–80, 82, 87, 96, 225, 227, 234, 235, 237, 257 Putin, Vladimir, 19, 252 Q Quantity of heavy water, 195 R Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi, 164 Raisi, Ebrahim, 243, 255 Rational calculations, 82, 84 Rational decision-making, 119, 120 Realist, 81, 84, 87, 88 Reciprocity, 80, 83, 93–95, 99, 101–105, 117, 118, 124 Regaining lost territories, 144 Regional arms race, 176

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Regional concerns, 48, 49 Regional conflicts, 39, 44, 59, 169, 171, 176, 185, 186 Regional dynamics, 69 Regional instability, 135, 140 Renewed nuclear ambition, 125, 127, 128, 141, 157 Renewed proliferation interest, 126 Retaliatory, 67 Revelations and international concerns, 163 Rouhani, Hassan, 12, 13, 15–17, 20, 21, 164, 185, 217, 228, 235 Russia, 1, 3, 5, 12, 17–19, 23, 51, 56, 58, 63, 81, 88, 96, 126, 151–156, 163, 165, 224, 243, 244, 251–256, 260, 265, 266, 268, 276, 278, 279, 281 S Saddam Hussein, 128 Salehi, Ali Akbar, 219, 259 Sanctions, 11–13, 15, 18, 20–22, 24, 26–31, 33, 34, 36–41, 45–48, 52, 56–60, 213, 215, 217, 218, 220, 226, 229, 230, 232, 233, 236–240, 242–245, 248–250, 253, 256, 260 Sanctions relief, 11, 15, 20, 21, 23–26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 37, 130, 148–150, 270 Saudi Arabia, 4, 232, 245–248, 252, 255 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 242 Shah, 132 Soviet Union, 78, 81 Spill-back, 62, 67, 68, 71, 101, 104, 106, 108, 115, 116, 118–120, 124 Spill-back effects, 119 Spill-back policy, 126, 157, 158, 216, 271

Spillover, 92, 93 Spill-over effects, 5, 7, 269, 271, 274, 275 Spill-over effects of cooperation, 76, 96 Status elevation, 149 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 78 Strategic objectives, 124 Sunshine Years, 200–202 Swaggering, 141–143, 145, 146, 157, 158 Swift retaliation, 99 Syria, 130, 133, 134 T Temporary arrangement, 278, 280 Termination Day, 27, 29 Territorial loss, 144 Terrorism, 39, 41, 44, 47–49, 59 Theories, 81, 91 Threshold, 133, 134, 136–138, 151 Tit-for-tat reciprocity, 101–104, 118 Trade, 76, 77, 94 Transition Day, 27, 29 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), 41 Transparency and accountability, 194, 202, 204 Trump administration, 156, 266, 270 Trump, Donald, 2, 3, 39–48, 52, 54–59, 65–67, 72 Trust-building, 51, 188–190, 196, 197, 199–204, 212 Trust-building years, 272 Trust deficit, 222, 223, 230, 231 Trust failure, 100 Two-level game, 111, 112 U U-235, 180–182

INDEX

UAE, 248, 255 Ukraine, 268, 276 Ukraine conflict, 243, 252, 253, 255 United Kingdom, 1, 3, 12, 17, 23 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 26, 27, 29 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2231, 1, 26–28, 41, 49, 230, 231 United Nations (UN), 17, 27, 29, 266 United States’ Affirmation of Compliance, 204 United States (US), 1–7, 11, 12, 16, 17, 19–24, 26–31, 33, 34, 36, 37, 40, 43, 45, 51, 52, 54–59, 62–64, 66, 68, 72, 76, 78, 81–85, 87, 88, 92, 96, 129, 130, 133, 139, 141, 151–157, 162–166, 168–173, 177, 178, 181–186, 213–219, 223–231, 233, 234, 236–238, 240, 241, 243, 245–252, 254–257, 259, 260, 265–270, 272–281 UN sanctions, 166, 184 Uranium enrichment, 12, 23–26, 28, 29, 34, 100, 111–113, 115, 116 Uranium enrichment activities, 85

289

Uranium enrichment capacity, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 34 Uranium enrichment progress, 184 US intelligence, 168 US-Iran conflict, 171, 173, 178, 183 US Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium, 220 US withdrawal, 213, 214, 224, 231, 233, 234, 237, 245, 260 V Verification, 11, 15, 19, 22–26, 28, 33, 35, 37 W Weaponization, 169, 179, 183, 184 Western nations, 249 Western sanctions, 161 Y Yemen, 269, 281 Z Zarif, Mohammad Javad, 19, 20 Zero-Sum Nature, 144