The Institutionalisation of Political Parties in Post-authoritarian Indonesia: From the Grass-roots Up 9789048518951

Table of contents :
Table of Contents
Preface
Acknowledgements
1. The Question of Institutionalisation
2. Genesis of Modern Political Organisation in Indonesia
3. Diminishing Grass-roots Influence During the New Order
5. Party Activities
6. Recruitment Approaches
7. Members’ Motivations and Participation in the Parties
8. Party Career and Intra-party Democracy
9. Progress of Party Institutionalisation and Its Role in Indonesia’s Democratisation
Glossary
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

The Institutionalisation of Political Parties in Post-authoritarian Indonesia

Publications Series General Editor Paul van der Velde Publications Officer Martina van den Haak Editorial Board Prasenjit Duara (Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore) / Carol Gluck (Columbia University) / Christophe Jaffrelot (Centre d’Études et de Recherches Internationales-Sciences-po) / Victor T. King (University of Leeds) / Yuri Sadoi (Meijo University) / A.B. Shamsul (Institute of Occidental Studies / Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia) / Henk Schulte Nordholt (Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies) / Wim Boot (Leiden University) The IIAS Publications Series consists of Monographs and Edited Volumes. The Series publishes results of research projects conducted at the International Institute for Asian Studies. Furthermore, the aim of the Series is to promote interdisciplinary studies on Asia and comparative research on Asia and Europe.

The International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) is a postdoctoral research centre based in Leiden and Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Its objective is to encourage the interdisciplinary and comparative study of Asia and to promote national and international cooperation. The institute focuses on the humanities and social sciences and, where relevant, on their interaction with other sciences. It stimulates scholarship on Asia and is instrumental in forging research networks among Asia scholars worldwide. IIAS acts as an international mediator, bringing various parties together, working as a clearinghouse of knowledge and information. This entails activities such as providing information services, hosting academic organisations dealing with Asia, constructing international networks, and setting up international cooperative projects and research programmes. In this way, IIAS functions as a window on Europe for non-European scholars and contributes to the cultural rapprochement between Asia and Europe. For further information, please visit www.iias.nl

The Institutionalisation of Political Parties in Postauthoritarian Indonesia From the Grass-roots Up Ulla Fionna

Publications Series

Monographs 11

Cover illustration: Oka Budhi / iStockphoto Cover design: Maedium, Utrecht Layout: The DocWorkers, Almere ISBN e-ISBN e-ISBN NUR

978 90 8964 536 4 978 90 4851 895 1 (pdf) 978 90 4851 896 8 (ePub) 754

© IIAS / Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2013 All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owners and the author of the book.

For Verdi, Devon and Austin – I am grateful to God to have your sustaining love

Table of Contents

Preface

9

Acknowledgements

11

1

13 15 17 18 20

The Question of Institutionalisation Role of Political Parties Parties in Democratic Transition Importance of Function Overview of the Book

2 Genesis of Modern Political Organisation in Indonesia Advantages and Challenges of Party Organisation after Independence Guided Democracy: Transition to Total Control

25

3 Diminishing Grass-roots Influence during the New Order Reformasi: Another Period of Transition

55 71

4 Party Organisation Elements of Party Organisation Party Administration in Malang Effects of Party Administration on Party Organisation Conclusion

75 75 80 89 93

27 50

5 Party Activities Importance of Party Activities Dynamics of Party Activities Party Activities in Malang Conclusion

95 95 98 109 114

6 Recruitment Approaches The Dynamics of Membership for Political Parties Perceptions of Recruitment Comparison of Different Recruitment Approaches Conclusion

117 117 120 131 136

7 Members’ Motivations and Participation in the Parties Motivation and Involvement in Political Parties Membership Dynamics The Contours of Members’ Participation Conclusion

139 139 144 159 164

8 Party Career and Intra-party Democracy Party Career Advancement as Proof of Intra-party Democracy Development of Party Career Party Career and the Implementation of Intra-party Democracy as a Sign of Party Institutionalisation Conclusion

165 165 169 182 185

9 Progress of Party Institutionalisation and Its Role in Indonesia’s Democratisation Little Steps Forward Stages and Paths to Institutionalisation in Malang Implications for Indonesia’s Democratic Transition Impact of Party Organisation on the 2009 Elections Where to Go From Here?

187 187 195 200 203 207

Glossary

211

Notes

215

Bibliography

233

Index

247

Preface

Indonesia’s democratisation has provided its political parties with the freedom to develop their organisational prowess and break away from the manipulation and suppression that they had suffered during the New Order era (1966-1998). This book assesses the extent to which these changes have become institutionalised by providing the first detailed examination of how the local party branches of four large parties have evolved in the period that has followed: Partai Golkar (Golkar Party), Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP, Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle), Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party), and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party) in Malang (East Java). Based on extensive fieldwork and observing the day-to-day operations of local branches in all four political parties, this book provides a new bottom-up perspective on how the activities, administration and membership of each party has changed, and what factors help explain why some political parties in Indonesia have managed to strengthen their institutional base more than others. This book offers a critical investigation of how political parties have contributed towards Indonesia’s transition process. It is the first indepth analysis of the grass-roots organisation of multiple parties after the 1999 and 2004 elections, and will be of particular relevance to those interested in Indonesian studies, democratic transition and the changing nature of political parties.

Acknowledgements

This book is based on my PhD thesis which was completed under the supervision of Michele Ford and Adrian Vickers. Special gratitude is due to David Reeve who has always provided encouragement and support – I am so proud and lucky to call him both a mentor and a friend. I am especially thankful for the guidance of Lily Rahim, Paul Fawcett, Ben Goldsmith and John Mikler whose constant encouragement was invaluable. This book would not have been possible without the help from grassroots activists in Malang such as Pak Aris, Pak Widodo and Pak Sophya. Their passion and vision for party organisation is contributing to the progress of demokrasi in Indonesia. I have also really appreciated the help of Tom Wells who has provided such thoughtful editing.

1

The Question of Institutionalisation

Because of their prominence in Western democracies, political parties have a reputation as the most established means of political participation. Political parties serve as an important vehicle for engagement in politics, and becoming a party member is a simple way to take a political stance. However, in Indonesia, the connection between political parties and political participation was undermined by two of Indonesia’s most prominent presidents, Sukarno (1945-1966) and Suharto (19661998). Sukarno is famous for his decision to ‘bury the parties’, while Suharto manipulated the party system to enhance his personal power. Sukarno and Suharto, Indonesia’s first two presidents, dramatically shaped the political landscape by controlling political parties and limiting their freedom to develop. Under Sukarno’s policy of Guided Democracy, parties were seen as a serious threat to presidential power. Sukarno created a system that allowed him greater control while diminishing party authority. Under Suharto’s New Order regime, the links between citizens and government became even more limited, and only a handful of people could participate in formal politics. The architects of the New Order argued that Indonesian citizens were better off not being involved in politics: instead, they should be a ‘floating mass’ that concentrated on economic development. As a result of this policy, Indonesian parties – with the exception of the government-backed political vehicle Golkar – were not allowed to operate at the community level. Their ability to channel political participation and recruit grass-roots members was thus limited. Since the fall of Suharto, political parties, both old and new, have had the freedom to operate and compete with one another nationally and locally. As this book shows, major parties have used this freedom to develop their organisations. I place particular emphasis here on the operation of their local branches and their management of members as indicators of their organisational capacities. But while Indonesian parties now have the opportunity to influence politics and society, and experiences from other countries show that parties can play a crucial role in democratisation, their role in Indonesia’s democratic process is still unclear. Around 180 political parties were established in Indonesia immediately after Suharto resigned in 1998. Despite this flowering, only 48

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THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

contested the 1999 elections and the feelings of euphoria lasted only a few years, as many Indonesians felt abandoned once the post-New Order parties entered government. After a 32-year period of ineffectiveness under Suharto’s New Order, Indonesian political parties were perceived as incompetent and dysfunctional. They had to prove to the citizenry that they were different from the old parties. In the case of these legacy parties, they had to demonstrate that they had changed. Despite great hopes from democracy activists that political parties would play a prominent role in the democratic transition process, trust in parties in Indonesia remains low because they have failed to convince Indonesians that they are different from the parties of the past. Is the continuing cynicism towards Indonesian parties at the local level justified? This book explores this question based on a case study of the rural and metropolitan branches of four different parties in the Malang district in East Java province. It employs a systematic framework to identify signs that parties have attempted to overcome their dysfunctional pasts by better organising themselves at the grass-roots level. Although parties’ success is usually measured by votes gained during elections, this success may be short-term unless a party is well-organised. Poorly organised parties depend on ephemeral factors such as a leader’s charisma for their success, while parties with solid organisational structures are better equipped to manage and cultivate long-lasting support. Weak organisation also means that parties are more dependent on patronage and money politics. The parties examined here have enjoyed various degrees of success in their attempts to organise themselves at the local level and connect with the grass-roots. Specifically, there have been important variations both between legacy and new parties and within each. While the four parties under consideration all exert some control and guidance from their central offices, the administrative set-ups of their local branches, their choices of activities, and their responses to local developments and issues are determined independently of their central executives. This independence means that differences can be found between local branches, and between the local and national levels. Although the variations in practices between branches indicate that they have the freedom to manage themselves, branches must carefully manage this freedom to ensure that they perform their functions effectively. This book suggests that although greater freedom has enhanced the development of Indonesia’s political parties, further progress in grassroots democracy will depend on their ability to create structures that permit more grass-roots political participation. At the same time, member and voter demands on parties and expectations of their performances will also be important factors in their development.

THE QUESTION OF INSTITUTIONALISATION

15

Role of Political Parties In recent decades, an increasing number of countries around the world have adopted democratic forms of government, whether of the ruling elite’s own accord, by popular demand, or through imposition by external forces. In Indonesia’s case, Feith (1962: 38-42) argues that the struggle against colonialism created resentment against injustice and the will to become independent. This had, subsequently, turned into a desire for democracy. Democracy was associated with ‘peopleness’ (kerakyatan) and was seen as an ideal system for ‘nation building’ and ‘educating people to greater national and civic awareness’ (Feith 1962: 41). Thus, upon independence in 1945, democracy was the political system adopted in Indonesia. Essentially, the basis of democracy is the rule of the people, with the guarantee of equal rights to participate in politics and free elections (de Tocqueville 1945; Dahl 1998; Huntington 1991). A democracy should ensure a citizen’s right to participate in free elections. Schattschneider (1960: 141) believes that democracy involves the participation of the people in the process of ‘defining the alternatives of public policy’, while Lipset focuses on how democracy gives ‘the largest possible part of the population’ the chance to decide on regular substitutions of government officials (in Vanhanen 2000: 251-252). These definitions of democracy are premised on the existence of political freedom and representation, and stress citizens’ participation in government. However, a comprehensive understanding of democracy requires a more sophisticated analysis of its prerequisites. Robert Dahl concentrates on member recruitment and participation in political parties. His criteria for a democratic process also include effective political participation and voting equality: both requirements point to the important role of political parties (1998: 37-38). For Dahl, democracy requires active citizen involvement in politics and elections. Elections are the mechanism through which citizens choose and cast their votes for candidates whom they believe are able to best represent them in government. Thus, participation in elections is the only way for citizens to ensure that their aspirations are communicated within formal political structures. The state ensures voting quality by providing a free, fair and proper means to vote. The state must ensure that elections are run fairly, for elections are the ‘lifeblood and backbone’ of democracy (Huntington 1993: 174). According to Dahl (1998), free elections where voters are able to cast their votes without feeling coerced by the government are the main indicator of an ideal democracy. As Dahl maintains, one of the key institutional conditions for democracy is a functioning party system. Gunther, Montero & Linz argue that political parties are crucial because they are the ‘principal mediators

16

THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

between the voters and their interests’ (2002: 58). Political parties are usually established as means of articulating political beliefs or ideology with the aim of gathering other people with similar ideas to strengthen their position to achieve outcomes that meet their aspirations. Whether they are members of the party they vote for or not, voters generally support a party because they agree with what they believe the party is fighting for. In other words, parties articulate and aggregate societal interests (Hofferbert 1998: 7). In many established democracies, political parties are experiencing decreasing membership and diminishing links between them and voters. The strength of party identification is also declining. In New Order Indonesia, the government had made voting compulsory for civil servants, while in the rest of the community voting was celebrated as the realisation of democracy. In contrast to democratic systems, where identification with a party can be seen as a psychological bond, one possibly influenced by voters’ election experiences and parental socialisation (Dalton & Weldon 2007), in New Order Indonesia voters’ attachment to parties was heavily influenced by the government. Since the fall of Suharto, however, parties have had the freedom to conduct recruitment campaigns, where voters can choose their parties independently. Thus choice of parties is now both influenced by the traditional pattern of patron-client relationships and a matter of individual freedom to choose, which can be influenced by parties’ recruitment campaigns. Linz (1997: 416) argues that new democracies will have even ‘fewer voters with a strong party identification’. While ‘people are actually freer to choose’ in new democracies than in the previous regimes, he writes, their ‘degree of loyalty is questionable’. It is arguably harder for parties to attract members because of a decline in the relationship between party membership and voting. Nonetheless, it is premature to suggest that the role of parties will eventually end or that they will be replaced by another institution. Parties remain ‘the main agents of political representation and… virtually the only actors with access to elected positions in democratic politics’ (Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 2). They thus continue to be the main vehicle for individuals to enter the government and one of the reasons individuals continue to join parties is so that they can contest elections and gather votes to fill parliamentary seats. Parties’ interests are served when their candidates accumulate enough votes to be elected into government, and party support strengthens candidates’ chances of election. Independent candidates are elected with other kinds of community support, usually from interest groups, but it remains rare for political leaders to build a support base outside an established political party.

THE QUESTION OF INSTITUTIONALISATION

17

Parties in Democratic Transition Theories of democratic transition suggest that political parties play a defining role in the transition. As Mainwaring & Scully (1995) and Pridham (1995) suggest, the key to establishing a democracy is strengthening democratic institutions, one of which is political parties. Political parties are important in democratic transitions regardless of the governmental system previously in place in a particular country. Linz & Stepan argue that there are certain paths that non-democratic regimes follow during democratisation, depending on the regime type (Linz & Stepan 1996: 62-64). But regardless of the regime type, Linz & Stepan argue, the existence of ‘free elections’, ‘rule of law’, and ‘lively civil society’ are among the necessary prerequisites. Political parties are vital to these prerequisites. Although different systems have different implications for the role of the parties, the essence of democracy is that there must be freedom and equality for all parties – which in certain situations could mean dismantling the ruling government’s party if the deposed regime had given it special privileges. As an example, in Eastern Europe, parties have played an important role in the management of conflict, the channelling of participation, national integration and the establishment of legitimacy. The parties grew stronger as a result of these activities, which in turn became a catalyst for further democratisation (Lewis 2001: 548). As Lewis points out, parties in newly-formed democracies are a ‘key institutional mechanism for coping with the tensions that underlie the emergence of conflict, and they need to rapidly develop to cope with immediate stress and demands of the early transition period’ (Lewis 2001: 552). They must function properly in order to support the democratic transition process. The pressures of the early transition period favour incumbent parties that benefit from existing structures (Randall & Svasand 2002: 16). However, as the transition progresses, both incumbents and new parties have similar opportunities to contribute to the democratic process, as long as they are organised and institutionalised. Many scholars argue that political parties are crucial to the success of democratic transition (Gunther, Montero & Linz 2002: 58; Dahl 1998: 57; Pridham 1995: xii; Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 27). Political parties are important partly because they are ‘agencies for forging links between citizens and policy-makers’ (Lawson 1980: 3). Here a party’s membership strength is key, as no party could claim it links citizens with government if it does not attract members. Parties with few members are limited in their ability to function as participatory linkages (Klingemann & Fuchs 1995: 136). Political parties in a young democracy can also shape further democratisation. Jupp argues that parties are essential to the ‘continued

18

THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

functioning of societies by resolving strains on social organisation and by legitimising governments’ (1968: 22). According to Taylor-Robinson (2001: 596), parties adopt a range of policies to show transparency in their internal decision-making and these policies affect the type of political system they adopt when in power. For example, legacy parties that encourage member participation will help democratic consolidation, but those that deny member participation will only ‘fill the vacuum’ in the transition period and hinder democratic consolidation (Taylor-Robinson 2001: 599). While incumbent parties may have used ‘undemocratic tactics to obtain power’ if they continue to do so it could hamper the application of democratic rules in the new regime (Taylor-Robinson 2001: 586). New parties should be selective about which policies and organisational structures they adopt. If they wish to garner public support, they need to respond to the public’s dissatisfaction with older parties by introducing more democratic measures.

Importance of Function In both new and established democracies, parties need to function effectively for democracy to work. In new democracies this is particularly important, as parties need to establish ways to accommodate different voter aspirations and compete freely. In this situation, the incumbent parties usually have a strong association with the former authoritarian government, while young parties represent aspirations for reform. As a democracy develops, different interests have to be channelled and mediated, and parties play an important role in representing them. Differences between incumbent and young parties may decrease as the incumbents try to attract more support by disassociating themselves from the old regime. When this occurs, competition between incumbents and young parties will be stronger, which can only benefit the transition process. To a large extent, competition among parties is, in effect, competition to attract grass-roots support, since garnering grass-roots support is the most essential way for a party to perform its function of linking citizens to government. To be effective in representing voters’ interests, a party needs to develop a strong grass-roots membership through recruitment (Vanhanen 2000; Mair & van Biezen 2001). Efficient parties help ensure that political demands are voiced to the government and that public opinion shapes policy. To play this role effectively, parties must have well-functioning branches. Mainwaring & Scully argue that major parties must have ‘somewhat stable roots in society’ in order for a democracy to stabilise; such roots help provide ‘regularity’ and make clear to people what a party represents (1995: 5). A party’s local branches are

THE QUESTION OF INSTITUTIONALISATION

19

crucial extensions of its central office in promoting the party’s platforms; parties must have a ‘presence at the local and national levels’ (Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 16). Janda & Colman argue that a local branch’s management and activities indicate how organised a party is (Janda & Colman 1998). A successful party not only wins seats, it also provides a wide range of services to members, which requires wellorganised local branches (Hofferbert 1998). Because they operate at the local level, party branches are parties’ direct representatives to the public and their means to connect with the community. This interaction enables the community to witness how branches are administered, which reflects the state of party organisation as a whole. As the sector of the party which ‘continually extends its membership and remains active outside the election period’ (Duverger 1964: xvi), a local branch is also responsible for managing all aspects of a party’s grass-roots operations. It is particularly vital for a party’s recruitment programmes, as it is the first point of contact for potential members. Despite the trend of declining party membership (Selle & Svasand 1991), studies have found that membership is still important for parties for three reasons. Firstly, notwithstanding financial support from the state, parties still rely on membership fees and donations. Secondly, members serve as ‘warm bodies’ which can fill official positions, both within the party and in public offices (Katz & Mair 1994: 14). Thirdly, parties rely on their members to project a mass party image, as ‘proof’ that they are ‘viable channels for political representation’ and to mobilise voters (Katz & Mair 1994: 14-15). Individual party members usually go directly to the nearest local branch to register with the party (Bille 1994). This procedure is crucial to the grass-roots recruitment process and parties typically have central recruitment strategies that are delegated to branches. The efficiency of branch offices in handling enquiries and their professionalism in conducting party activities can potentially encourage supporters to register as members. Conversely, failure to successfully or efficiently conduct these activities can deter potential members, or even persuade them to shift their allegiance to another party. Branch capacity is thus crucial to the success of a party’s recruitment activities and building local support. Although membership size is a greater priority for mass parties than cadre parties, cadre parties can also benefit from large memberships. It is easier for a large party to attract public attention (e.g. through political rallies), and members help give parties political legitimacy – they are proof that the party has support in society and ‘is rooted in the concerns and values of real people’ (Seyd & Whiteley 2004: 361). The role of members is particularly crucial during elections, when they provide parties with legitimacy and electoral votes. Members represent secure votes

20

THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

for the party, and a means of persuading non-members to vote for it. In addition, as Seyd & Whiteley’s study of British political parties suggests, membership is equally important when parties lose, since ‘in bad electoral times the existence of a core of loyal supporters is essential to a party’s survival and possible recovery’ (2004: 360).

Overview of the Book To understand parties properly, we need to examine their operations at the grass-roots level. In order to evaluate the progress towards institutionalisation of the parties in post-Suharto Indonesia, I will examine in some detail how and whether local branches perform their functions. In the chapters ahead, I begin with general observations about how branches perform their daily operations, then I will focus more concretely on how the branches conduct recruitment and manage their memberships. The book ends with an analysis of branches’ administration of local leadership successions. By examining these aspects of party operations, I aim to assess the state of these parties’ institutionalisation at the local level and their contributions locally to Indonesia’s democratisation. I focus on party branch organisation because aspects of branch activity such as daily administration and office management determine the capacity of parties to give form to their programmes at the grass-roots. While I also consider issues such as personalism, money politics and local circumstances, I emphasise the ‘nuts and bolts’ of how parties operate, as party organisation dictates how party activities and relationships with members are conducted. Party management also determines how parties deal with the public and connect with local communities. Better connections with communities can mean greater political participation and better representation of the community’s political aspirations, which are crucial to attempts by Indonesian reform-era parties to differentiate themselves from the parties of the New Order. By examining in detail internal party organisation during Indonesia’s democratic transition, I also hope to shed additional light on how parties attempt to build ‘stable roots’ (Mainwaring & Scully 1995). This first close study of how party branches operate provides the basis for a greater understanding of both contemporary grass-roots politics in Indonesia and grass-roots political organisations generally. Although there are disadvantages of applying theories developed from Western studies to Indonesia, they are nonetheless useful because Indonesian parties, and the international organisations that seek to influence their development, are strongly influenced by Western political theory. This book draws heavily on Kenneth Janda’s 1980 study on party organisation, which is a central work in comparative politics. Janda aimed

THE QUESTION OF INSTITUTIONALISATION

21

to expand the approach of Duverger’s classical Political Parties (1964), using a comparative analysis to investigate the development of different parties ‘where they are weak as well as where they are strong’ (1980: x). Janda’s book sought to explain the phases of party operation in different settings (1980: xi-xiii). Although my study is much less ambitious than Janda’s monumental analysis of 158 parties in 50 countries, its overriding aim is similar – to capture, compare and understand how parties organise themselves. Because of my focus on grass-roots political participation, I explore only two of Janda’s clusters of concepts, ‘degree of organisation’ and ‘involvement’ (1980: chapters 9, 12). Unlike Janda’s study, which looks at both internal and external factors that affect party organisation, I focus only on internal factors, while striving to provide detailed accounts of parties’ local management practices. Instead of translating evaluations of particular features of party organisation into numerical scores like Janda, I adopt a qualitative approach in order to generate contextualised findings. To gather information about party operations, I collected data through both direct observation and interviews with grassroots members and party leaders. I then interpreted the data within a structured comparative framework to determine the degree of specific aspects of party organisation and development. This book provides an in-depth consideration of the particular conditions of Indonesia’s democratic transition and places grass-roots party development squarely in the context of Indonesia’s political system. But to enrich my analysis of grass-roots party dynamics, I also draw on other studies on party organisation, including Blondel (1978), Scarrow (1996, 2005) and Appleton & Ward (1997). In particular, I adopt Blondel’s (1978) elaboration of the requirements of party organisation and Scarrow’s (1996) emphasis on the management of party membership. I also utilise Appleton & Ward’s (1997) indications of the level of innovation in parties. The four parties this book examines include two legacy parties – Partai Golkar (Golkar Party) and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP, Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle) – and two new parties – Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party) and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party). Voting results for the four parties in the 1999 and 2004 elections reveal variations at the three levels of administration: the national level, in East Java, and in Malang (kodya/municipality and kabupaten/regency).1 Despite a decline in support for it at the national level, Partai Golkar increased its support in East Java between the two elections. PDIP’s and PAN’s electoral support decreased at all three levels. PDIP has maintained its influence in kodya and kabupaten Malang, but support for the party has declined by 10 per cent or more in each area. By contrast, PKS managed to increase its votes at all three levels.2

22

THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

I chose to study Partai Golkar because as a former governmentbacked party it still has strong influence nationally. PDIP was selected because it is an incumbent party with a strong reform image. PAN and PKS were chosen because they are newer parties with opposing trends. PKS gained popularity between the two elections, while the popularity of PAN – despite leader Amien Rais’ pro-reform image – has declined. I elected to exclude other important new parties, like Partai Demokrat (PD, Democrat Party), because at the time of my fieldwork their institutional histories were too short. By drawing on both direct observations and interviews with party activists (members, cadres and local leaders), I have endeavoured to provide a rich and nuanced study of these four parties’ organisation at the local level, including a comparison of their kodya and kabupaten branches in the Malang district. I conducted my fieldwork from August 2005 to February 2006, when the parties were preparing to formulate an election strategy at the local level in preparation for the next legislative elections in April and presidential elections in July 2009. I chose to do my fieldwork between national elections in order to investigate the level of their activities when they were least active. I elected to study the area of Malang because Malang is Indonesia’s fourth-largest city and because the area includes a significant rural (kabupaten/regency) population, which is essential for capturing any possible differences between rural and urban Indonesia. Malang is also ethnically and religiously diverse. With a Muslim majority, it is known for its Christian seminary schools and the influence of its Chinese population. With a total of 38 kecamatan (sub-districts), it boasts a socio-economically diverse population in a wide range of occupations and also unemployment, which may influence people’s political aspirations.3 I conducted face-to-face interviews rather than using questionnaires with party activists because personal interviews usually yield more spontaneous and detailed answers than questionnaires. I interviewed party members, cadres and local leaders at the kodya, kabupaten and kecamatan levels to capture the diversity of the Malang community and the differences between different levels of membership; such differences are particularly crucial for data on member participation in parties and party careers.4 Interviewees were selected randomly from membership lists provided by the different branches of the parties. Though one disadvantage of personal interviews is that interviewees may have reservations about revealing their personal opinions to strangers, this risk was minimised by conducting repeat interviews. However, the limited time of the fieldwork period and the remoteness of the kecamatan restricted the number of follow-up interviews with local leaders and members at that level.5 I also engaged in personal observation of different aspects of

THE QUESTION OF INSTITUTIONALISATION

23

party organisation regularly throughout the fieldwork period and documented the ways in which the different branches operated in fieldnotes. While this study examines how party organisations have evolved since the beginning of the reform era, it is too early to tell how and when these developments may affect voting patterns. Yet future research should be able to determine the extent to which voting trends reflect parties’ levels of organisation, local activities, recruitment and member management.

2

Genesis of Modern Political Organisation in Indonesia

Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president, once remarked that Indonesian political parties ‘grew like weeds with shallow roots’ and were ‘interest top-heavy with petty-selfishness and vote-catching’ (1965: 265). From independence in 1945 until 1966, parties in Indonesia enjoyed postcolonial freedom. The early part of this period was characterised by dynamic political participation at the grass-roots level, and freedom for parties to pursue different ideologies. However, the period ended with political repression triggered by Sukarno’s fear of parties’ growing power. This period of transition, known as Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy), created the foundations for the political structures of the New Order (1966-1998). Shiraishi (1990) has argued that Indonesia’s early political parties grew out of the mass movement, or pergerakan, of the first few decades of the twentieth century. Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association, or SI), one of Indonesia’s first political organisations, began as a trading association in Central Java in 1912, but established a political party in 1917. The Indies Social Democratic Association (Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereniging, or ISDV), which underwent a number of name changes, eventually became the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party, or PKI). It was established due to a close alliance and support of Dutch Socialists. Organisationally, the SI and ISDV already had many similarities with political parties, such as well-established membership and leadership structures and financial arrangements. Aside from these movements, ethnically or regionally based organisations such as Young Java, Young Sumatran Union, Young Pasundan, Young Ambon, and Young Minahasa emerged in the 1910s with the aim of revitalising specific cultures (Reeve 1985: 2). Meanwhile, the religious group Muhammadiyah was founded in 1912 as a counterbalance against Dutch-initiated education and Christian missionaries (Reid 1974: 4). Conservative Muslims criticised Muhammadiyah for deviating from Indonesian Islam and adopting Western ways, however, and the more traditional Nahdatul Ulama (NU) was founded in 1926, as well as other less influential regionally based Islamic organisations (Reid 1974: 5). The mass nature of these organisations helped the parties they became establish strong membership bases.

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Growing opposition to colonialism in the last few decades of the colonial period before Indonesia’s 1945 independence created ideal conditions for the growth of political parties. Indonesia experienced tremendous growth in Western-style education in the 1920s (Reid 1974: 3), which, mixed with resentment of economic obligations such as paying taxes and rent in the midst of economic hardship, strengthened an awareness of class hierarchy. This awareness enabled parties to mobilise support, particularly among peasants (Shiraishi 1990: 302-307). Recognising the danger of these political movements, the Dutch colonialists decided to police them by implementing tougher regulations on meetings and cadre-training courses, while restricting the operation of their schools (Shiraishi 1990: 310-311). Meanwhile, the culture-based youth organisations that emerged in the various regions such as Sumatra, Sunda, Ambon and Minahasa, with the aim of revitalising their own cultures, eventually developed a nationalist awareness; in 1928 most of them pledged loyalty to the concept of ‘one country, one nation, one language’ (Reeve 1985: 2). This nationalist awareness became the basis of subsequent political organisations’ platforms, which focused on nationalism and campaigned against the unjust treatment of Indonesians by the Dutch (Reeve 1985: 3). The PKI revolted against the Dutch in 1926-1927. Although the revolt failed, it brought about even greater awareness of Indonesian nationalism. The new awareness was evidenced by the establishment of the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party, or PNI) in 1927, and the emergence of two strong political leaders, Sukarno and Hatta, along with a number of other significant figures associated with different political groupings, such as Sutan Sjahrir, Amir Sjarifuddin and Muhammad Thamrin. When the Japanese invaded Indonesia in 1942, they encountered strong nationalist sentiment amongst the educated. The opposition of political parties to the occupation was particularly strong (Reid 1974: 9-13). Independence was formally declared in 1945 upon the surrender of the Japanese, though it was not fully achieved until 1949. Having chosen a democratic political system, the new government decided that political parties should be encouraged, and it allowed the establishment of the reconstituted PKI (Anderson 1972: 176-178, 202-231). However, at the very beginning of the independence period, parties had very little influence in the country, and it was only after the government’s decision to empower the Syahrir cabinet in 1945 that the development of parties began to accelerate (Anderson 1972: 200-201). Against the backdrop of an ongoing military struggle against the Dutch, difficult economic conditions, and the increasingly anti-Communist stance of the government, the PKI launched another revolt against the central government in 1948 (Feith 1962: 10-11). The turbulent events of this early

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period were instrumental in determining the character of Indonesia’s parties, moulding their orientations, structures and activities. During the Old Order period (1945-1966), political parties were generally reliant for their growth and development on their capacity to attract popular support, particularly in terms of achieving electoral success. In order to establish themselves as national entities, it was crucial for the parties to build organisations that could manage the relationship between a central executive and branches scattered across the regions – a challenging task given the geographic spread of Indonesia and its limited infrastructure. This was particularly important for mass-based parties such as the PNI and the PKI. However, increasing interference from the state undermined the grass-roots structures of the parties, as President Sukarno, and later President Suharto, moved to assume much stricter control of party activities and grass-roots political participation. Sukarno was responsible for the beginning of the decline of the role of the parties in the political order, particularly after the implementation of Guided Democracy. But it was only after the 1971 elections that his successor, Suharto, forced the parties to fuse together and placed strict limits on their ideological freedom and ability to organise at the grassroots level. These rigid controls on grass-roots political participation created an apathetic political culture, one that only the most dedicated political activists were prepared to challenge before Suharto’s resignation in 1998.

Advantages and Challenges of Party Organisation after Independence Indonesia’s early parties and mass organisations developed platforms and ideologies that represented different grass-roots aspirations. The political parties of the early post-independence period could be differentiated according to their aliran, or ideological leanings. Islam was represented by the Nahdatul Ulama (Islamic Scholars Association, or NU), Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Islamic Association Party of Indonesia, or PSII), and Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims, or Masyumi). Nationalism was represented by the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party, or PNI), Persatuan Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesian Union, or PIR), and Partai Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesian Party, or Parindra); Communism by the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party, or PKI); and socialism by the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party, or PSI). The prevalence of public resentment against the colonial government created great opportunities for the parties to both attract support based on ideologies (Mortimer 1969: 8-9) and foster grass-

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roots mobilisation. Nonetheless, although parties existed at the village level, effective party membership – and thus active participation – was limited to specific areas and community groups (Feith 1971: 8). This seriously restricted their ability to effectively channel societal interests. Parties’ roles were still mainly restricted to the mobilisation of masses, despite circumstances after independence conducive to political organisations. While the drive to expand was strong and the popularity of the parties was growing, they faced serious challenges in their attempts to develop strong organisations at the local level. In general, with the exception of PKI, party organisation was focused on the central level; branches were set up but not developed further. Grass-roots supporters were mobilised, yet there was little interaction with them beyond that, and local branches failed to develop effective systems for member management (Feith 1971: 7-8). The branches demonstrated very little independence and creativity, relying heavily on parties’ central offices. In cases where branches had good resources, they tended to duplicate the activities of the central office, most notably by establishing local party publications. Party Organisation Parties, as mass associations, were originally set up to attract members by using an established set of activities and programmes. It should have been easy, then, for the political movements in Indonesia at the time to establish parties with strong grass-roots links. However, in practice there were great difficulties developing functioning networks across the regions. Parties were established during a time of struggle against the Dutch colonisers, which was followed by a period of fierce inter-party rivalry. Parties had few resources – and little incentive – to develop their local branches, resulting in weak branches and disoriented membership management. As a result, parties’ organisational functions were concentrated at the central level, while local branches were left to develop without central support. National politics absorbed most party attention and the nurturing of grass-roots branches was half-hearted – except in the case of the PKI, where local branches were set up for the sole purpose of creating a widespread network. The parties’ branches tended to be inactive after establishment. Rocamora argues that Indonesian political parties in the period before the 1955 election lacked strong roots in society; they were ‘factions within a definable national elite divided on the basis of more mundane differences in personal experience and outlook’ (1973: 144). The parties failed to harness public emotions to enhance their organisational development. Feith (1971: 7-8, 28-29) argues that local branches were ineffective in both the revolutionary periods of 1945-1949 and 1950-1953. In

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the first period, parties focused on the idea of ‘rally[ing] the peasantry’, but ‘effective party membership remained a category unknown at the village level’. In the second period, they concentrated on expanding their influence in cities and at the district level, abandoning the subdistrict and village levels (Feith 1971: 8). Feith also argues that the role of local branches was greatly overshadowed by the major parties’ occupational sub-organisations (1971: 9-10). Geertz’s study on Indonesian towns in the 1950s found a similar trend; in the town of Modjokuto (Pare) the sub-organisations were successful in ‘binding the parties to the local social system’ (1963: 13-14, 88). These sub-organisations – replacing the role of the local branches – created a link between the parties and the community. Because of the effectiveness of the sub-organisations in attracting and managing mass support, functions normally attributed to branches were mostly conducted by them. Given Indonesia’s size and diverse cultures, to be successful any organisation must have a strong presence across the country. The progress of the early political parties depended on their success in enlarging their memberships, which in turn depended on how many branches they established in different regions and how effectively those branches operated. Since parties were still in their infancy – as PNI leaders had realised by the mid-1950s (Rocamora 1970: 146) – expansion of party membership became the clearest indicator of organisational success. The demand for a large membership and the need to remain popular forced parties at times to adjust their policies quickly to accommodate public sentiments not in line with their original platforms. Yet despite their willingness to do so, the Indonesian parties of the 1950s were not able to establish active and extensive party organisations, with the exception of PKI. Parties focused on central politics while their national leaders competed for public attention, but they paid little attention to the establishment of well-organised local branches, which were mainly superficial structures. PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party, which was later described as ‘one of the most important and innovative [parties] in the world’ and the ‘first Communist party in Asia’ (Törnquist 1984: 2), was the most successful and well-organised party at the time. Originally established as the Indies Social Democratic Association (Indische SociaalDemocratische Vereniging, or ISDV), it then became the Perserikaten Kommunis di India (Communist Association of the Indies) and was renamed Partai Komunis Indonesia in 1920. The PKI’s Communist ideology was aimed at establishing a ‘people’s democracy’ – a government based on ‘the alliance of the workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class’ (McVey 1965: 7-47). For the PKI, organisational management was fundamental and its management strategies were centralist (Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia 1954: 17). The

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party had an extensive organisational structure, equipped with various supporting bodies established at every level of the organisational hierarchy (Van der Kroef 1965: 166). It had a Party Congress, a Central Committee and a Party Conference at the national level. At each level of local government it had a Major District Party organisation, a Major District Party Conference and a Major District Committee. This structure was reproduced at lower administrative levels. The PKI’s Central Committee (CC) had the authority to set up a party administrative body, known as an Island Party Conference, in each of Indonesia’s regions. Each of these bodies was administered by an Island Committee. The committees were under the direct supervision of either the Central Committee or a Major District Committee. The Central Committee also decided which cities, towns or districts required party conferences under the direct control of a Major District Committee. The same pattern was repeated all the way down to party units based in population centres, schools and workplaces (Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia 1954: 36-37). The party’s smallest unit was the branch. It was specifically limited to ten members at most. The PKI particularly encouraged and empowered grass-roots support for the party, by authorising as few as three members to set up the smallest branch of the party, which was called a ‘group’ or ‘basic party organisation’ (Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia 1954: 56). The complexity of these arrangements demonstrates the extensive nature of the party’s attempts to organise its grass-roots members and the premium it placed on ensuring central authority over branch offices. These measures also demonstrate the party’s emphasis on balancing grass-roots participation and central office control. Its success is reflected in the fact that by the end of the 1950s only 1.3 per cent of 1,449 sub-districts and 15.8 per cent of 21,047 villages were without a branch and that by 1959 there were around 22 Major District Committees and Island Committees (Hindley 1966: 86, 115). In addition to the hierarchical arrangement of its offices, the PKI had tightly controlled administrative mechanisms, structured by very detailed and specific regulations at each administrative level about the frequency of meetings and the terms governing the election of new committee members (Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia 1954). The PKI’s constitution regulated the power that different types of members had in meetings and decision-making processes, with specific rights allocated to ordinary and candidate members (the latter had applied for membership but were still serving the waiting period imposed by the party). The Central Committee had the ultimate power to decide the number of voting delegates, but local offices could influence internal decision-making. The National Party Congress was also influential in

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the party’s daily operations. Its responsibilities ranged from the revision and endorsement of Central Committee reports to the revision of the party’s programme and constitution. Communication mechanisms between offices at different levels in the hierarchy were also stipulated in detail. The lower party branch was expected to submit reports to a higher branch periodically. In return, the higher branch was responsible for arranging elections in the lower branch, which included the duty of administering a special election committee. Such specific rules provided strict guidelines for the party’s operation and ensured close working relationships between party branches at different levels. The party’s financial management was equally successful. In fact, in 1966 the PKI was ‘indisputably the wealthiest political party in Indonesia’ (Hindley 1966: 110). This success was due to its tight control over party finances, which primarily came from member dues pegged to members’ earning capacities (Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia 1954: 64). In addition, members holding party positions were expected to hand over all their earnings in return for a regular stipend, set by the respective party office. The PKI had regulations that determined the specific percentage and mechanism of income distribution and designated offices that dealt with financial matters (McVey 1965: 157). This regulation of staff salaries reflects the depth of staff commitment to the party. PKI’s financial arrangements also demonstrate the strong control that the central office held over the party’s daily operations. The PNI, the Indonesian National Party, was first established in 1927 as a radical nationalist party by Sukarno, then a young engineering graduate. The party was banned in 1930 (Feith & Castles 1970: 151-152), but was re-established in Kediri, East Java, in 1946. This second incarnation began a period when the party was defined by opportunism and conservatism (Rocamora 1970: 143). According to Rocamora, shifts in PNI ideology can be traced back to 1948 and 1952. In 1948, at its third congress, the party declared that it was based on the ‘principles of socio-national-democracy,’ or Marhaenisme, which was a response to the PKI’s increasing radicalism and its attraction of support from labour (Rocamora 1974:126-129). At its sixth congress in 1952, the PNI declared its Manifesto of Marhaenisme (Manifes Marhaenism) to be a ‘much more restrained’ ideology, which ‘outlined a new line of emphasis on economic anti-colonialism and support for national entrepreneurs’ (Rocamora 1974: 129-134). Marhaenism, Rocamora argued, was a strategic move aimed mostly at capturing the widest possible support in order to form a coalition government, ‘regardless of the incompatibility of the components of such a coalition’. Hindley (1966: 236-239) and Feith (1962: 243) note the PNI’s attempt in 1952 to approach PKI in order to boost its nationalist profile. Between 1956 and 1959, however, PNI

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stopped supporting the Communist PKI after losing the election to them and formed an alliance with NU (the Islamic Scholars Association) and Masyumi (the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) (Rocamora 1973: 158; Törnquist 1984: 81). This shift showed how easily the party changed its policies. Feith argues that the PNI’s unclear orientation was rooted in its desire to retain the possibility of cooperation with the other two major parties, Masyumi and PKI, despite their very different ideologies (1962: 243). Its opportunism was indicative of the party’s ideological instability and its overemphasis on voting results and participation in government. Despite its opportunistic tendencies, or perhaps even because of them, the PNI remained one of Indonesia’s most successful parties in this period. Scholars have pointed out that although the PNI was perceived to be dominated by Javanese aristocrats (Rocamora 1970: 143), it managed to attract public interest as a new party offering nationalism as an alternative to Islam, Christianity, or socialism. The PNI was successful in attracting votes in the 1955 elections also partly because of the popularity of its leaders (Rocamora 1973: 151, 154; Feith & Castles 1970: 153). At the same time, party members were successful in penetrating local bureaucracies. Together with the success of its recruitment approaches, these strategies enabled the party to transform itself into the largest in the country after the 1955 elections. Organisationally, the party’s authority lay in its national congresses. Between congresses, authority was vested in a Party Council composed of a chairperson, a vice-chairperson and at least fifteen members. The Party Council had the power to elect a Central Leadership Council, which controlled the formulation of party policy in consultation with the Party Council and was in charge of day-to-day operations (Rocamora 1974: 140-141; Sjamsuddin 1984: 6-7). From the beginning in the 1960s, the party also established two bodies as adjuncts to the Central Leadership Council: the Badan Musyawarah Front Marhaenis (Body of Marhaenist Front Dialogue), which acted as a discussion group, and the Badan Pembina Ideologi Marhaenisme (Body of Fostering Marhaenism Ideology), which spread Marhaenist propaganda (Sjamsuddin 1984: 710). At lower administrative levels, the party was represented by the Dewan Pimpinan Daerah (Regional Leadership Council, or DPD) at the provincial level and the Dewan Pimpinan Cabang (Branch Leadership Council, or DPC) at the district and municipal levels (Sjamsuddin 1984: 10). However, because of constant amendments to the party constitution at national congresses, the PNI’s organisational structures were rather chaotic during the period from 1946 to 1952. Only after the 1952 congress were more genuine efforts made to make improvements in party organisation, evidenced by stricter membership regulation and a major restructuring of the party’s central and

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branch organisations. A three-month period of provisional membership was instituted, and new members were obliged to pledge to follow decisions made by the congress, DPP and Party Council. There were also requirements for the Party Council to meet more frequently and the reinvigoration of local branches at levels higher than the district level. These changes gave more influence to village-level branches. Meanwhile reporting mechanisms to higher-level offices and criteria for meeting delegates were made stricter (Rocamora 1974: 140-147). Nonetheless, Rocamora noted that ‘PNI in fact never developed beyond a collection of leaders engaged in capital-city politics plus a few government officials and local leaders’, and that ‘except for a short period in 1946 and again in late 1949 and 1950, the national party leadership spent very little time organising at the local level’ (1974: 140). Liddle’s research in Sumatra between 1950 and 1964 suggests that local PNI leaders gained influence through their efforts to build the party’s support base by recruiting cadres and members into the party from plantation organisations of which they were in charge (1970: chapter 4). In the early 1950s there was limited connection between local branches and provincial and central offices (Rocamora 1970: 146): organisation was ‘loose’ and party discipline was ‘lacking’ (Feith 1962: 139). However, after 1953 local branches were recognised for their support in electoral campaigns and therefore local leaders demanded greater power (Rocamora 1973: 156). Reform was achieved by the establishment of the Badan Pekerja Kongres (Congress Working Committee, or BPK), which essentially gave decision-making power to local party leaders (Rocamora 1973: 157; 1974: 149). Thus, PNI’s growing popularity was also influenced by its flexibility, willingness to listen to supporters and capacity to adjust to popular demands. Decentralisation represented the party’s rather tardy attempt to empower local branches, triggered by the need to manage grass-roots support for election purposes. Rather remarkably, party success was achieved despite inefficiencies in the PNI’s financial management. The bulk of financial support for the PNI came from businesses, while membership dues accounted only for a small percentage of the party’s budget. The business community made financial contributions in exchange for permits and loans from PNI ministers in the cabinet at the time, which eventually prompted protests from local branches complaining of unfairness in profit sharing. Only around 3 to 10 per cent of the central headquarters’ budget came from membership fees (Rocamora 1974: 190). The party’s campaign budget for the 1955 election shows that almost 70 per cent of funds came from business contributors, while less than 14 per cent came from membership dues (Rocamora 187-189). The way election funds were used was also controversial, as the party directly paid village officials and even local strongmen to influence votes in its favour (Feith

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1971: 28). Efforts to establish another stable source of funding led to the establishment of the Yayasan Marhaenis (Marhaenist Foundation). According to Sjamsuddin, the foundation was in charge of coordinating fund-raising activities (1984: 9). Rocamora claims that the foundation was set up ‘ostensibly for socio-economic purposes, but in reality [it served] as a holding company to which the party transferred the ownership and management of its investments and other properties for tax purposes’ (1974: 191). Thus, the PNI’s financial management was inferior to that of the more self-sufficient and well-managed PKI. PNI not only abused its governmental position, but failed to establish secure sources of funding. Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, or Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations) was the country’s largest party in the early 1950s (Feith 1962: 134-135). It was established in 1945 by representatives of the majority of Islamic organisations as ‘the only political party for Muslims’ (Noer 1987: 47). Masyumi is an example of a successful Islamic party. It promoted Islamic law, but also exhibited democratic practices in its operations. Masyumi explicitly adopted Islam as its ideology and aimed to establish Islamic norms in Indonesian society and the state, although it did not explicitly promote the imposition of Syariah (Noer 1987: 118). Masyumi’s organisational structure clearly separated its legislative body (held by its muktamar, or congress, and its party council) from its executive (party chairperson) and advisory body (majelis syura). In terms of local organisation, the party’s structure reflected Indonesia’s different levels of governmental administration: daerah (provincial), kabupaten (district), kecamatan (sub-district) and ranting (village-level branch). Connections between the local and central branches were encouraged by the party, as demonstrated by the regulation stipulating that each branch must have a local majelis syura, which was represented on the central majelis syura. Meetings and decisionmaking processes were also strictly regulated by the party constitution – a feature of a well-managed organisation. But despite these regulations, Masyumi had problems with its decision-making structure caused by its status as an association of smaller Islamic organisations, particularly since each issue had to be discussed within the individual organisations (Noer 1987: 48-53). Feith notes that, apart from its Islamic political ideology, the party had no policy to unite its constituent groups (1962: 134-135). Furthermore, its indirect membership structure meant that the party relied heavily on the activities of its affiliated organisations at the grass-roots and consequently members may have developed closer associations with these organisations than with the party itself. Despite its complicated organisational structure, the party was effective in managing its finances. Masyumi funded itself through collection of members’ dues, as well as religious alms. Initiatives to expand party

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funding, such as requiring members to ‘tithe’ a percentage of personal income to the party or setting up a travel bureau for pilgrims to Mecca (hajj), encountered hostility among party supporters who considered these initiatives to contravene Islamic norms. Although not a political party, the Dar’ul Islam movement provides a useful comparison with political parties of this period. Despite its regional base, Dar’ul Islam represented a serious ‘ideological and military’ challenge to the young republic, since it effectively gathered support based on its objective of founding an Islamic state with strong military backing (Reid 1974: 157). Liddle’s Political Participation in Modern Indonesia includes the Dar’ul Islam movement as an important case study of political organisation in Indonesia. The movement was considered successful in gathering support for its guerilla wars (1948-1949). Methods used to maintain support for the movement ranged from Islamic discourse to intimidation and terror, and its success depended on coopting and intimidating village ‘headmen’ (Jackson 1980: 16). With heavy dependence on the peasantry for resources, the movement eventually resorted to violence, by robbery and by looting villages, to ensure the flow of funding (Dijk 1981: 103). Because of these measures, even after significant losses Dar’ul Islam was able to quickly recruit new members, regroup, and regain its strength (Jackson & Moeliono 1973: 13). Jackson & Moeliono’s research reveals that the movement took the form of a highly organised military society, with a structured civilian administration in the lower levels replicating its central government (1973: 13). This informal civilian administrative structure was formed by a network of traditional authority figures – village heads, religious teachers, economic teachers – who acted as advisors to common people, under the clear authority of a leading figure (Jackson & Moeliono: 1973: 22-35). Although not formalised in written law, this administrative structure proved strong in villages, based as it was on traditional bonds between leaders and regular members, and it was effective in mobilising the masses for the purposes of the movement. As these case studies of successful political organisations suggest, grass-roots management and participation was the key to ensuring party growth in this period. Overall, parties’ central organisations were wellmanaged and strictly regulated, with specific bodies having designated roles in daily operations. However, branches generally became inactive after their establishment as the result of a lack of organisational support from above. Parties used the branches more as symbolic indications of growth during election campaigns (Feith & Castles 1970: 8). As a result, although central parties were successful in elections, their branches were neglected. Party organisation was centred at the national level and the management of branch operations was seriously neglected.

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Party Activities Despite their failure to develop effective grass-roots branch structures, parties demonstrated remarkable focus in adhering to their platforms when organising their activities. These activities were centred on organisation-building, as well as raising public profiles. However, as they grew and became more influential, parties developed programmes that addressed social issues, such as the livelihoods of the poor. The more successful and organised an institution, the more significant its range of activities. Mainly, these activities were designed to garner sympathy and maintain support, largely in accordance with organisational platforms. Nationalist struggle was the main theme of political activities immediately after the 1945 declaration of independence. The followers of Dar’ul Islam were devoutly religious. Jackson & Moeliono’s research describes Dar’ul Islam villages in West Java as traditional communities with Javanese customs, such as hadjat. These communities also had high regard for Islamic religious teachers (Jackson & Moeliono 1973: 36, 49). A similar trend was shown by the Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party, or Parkindo). Formed in 1945, the party immediately joined the struggle against the Japanese. At the time, the party even had a People’s Army (Panah) Division, which complemented various Christian youth and women’s groups with close connections to the party. But various circumstances made it difficult for a Christian party, or indeed religious parties in general, to develop; nationalism attracted the greatest popular attention during this period. The Dar’ul Islam rebellion and Parkindo’s participation in the struggle against the Japanese both demonstrate these parties’ commitment to the new nation and suggest that few other activities were feasible in a period of armed struggle. After the Dutch formally transferred power in 1949, parties were able to shift their concentration to their internal organisation and develop a repertoire of non-military activities to promote their causes. Education and publishing were at the centre of PKI’s activities. The party had its own publishing firm (Yayasan ‘Pembaruan’, or Renewal Foundation) in Jakarta, and ‘half a dozen printing concerns and scores of booksellers and retail outlets’ (van der Kroef 1965: 182-203), which were involved in the party’s publications of periodicals, booklets, pamphlets and newspapers (Hindley 1966: 116). PKI was active in translating Communist books as well as publishing several party journals, including Kehidupan Partai (Party Life), Bintang Merah (Red Star) and an English-language periodical called Review of Indonesia. Most importantly, PKI published the Harian Rakyat newspaper daily, which enjoyed a dramatic increase in its circulation from 2,000 in 1951 to 15,000 in 1954 (Törnquist 1984: 77). By the late 1950s, the PKI’s regional organisations were also

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successfully producing their own publications – for example, Suara Ibukota (Jakarta), Warta Sunda (Bandung), Suara Persatuan (Semarang), Buletin PKI Djawa Timur (Surabaya) and Lombok Bangun (Mataram) (Hindley 1966: 93). PKI members working on plantations also sponsored regional publications to improve the party’s educational efforts (McVey 1990: 11-12). All of these publications were crucial in promoting the party’s ideology and programmes, and raised community awareness of them. In support of its Communist ideology, PKI also established the Universitas Rakyat (People’s University, or UNRA), which was intended to extend party members’ knowledge of Communism (Hindley 1966: 94-95), but also included other general subjects in the curriculum. This demonstrated its commitment to providing comprehensive education programmes for its members. The size of its funding allocation to education and publishing activities reflected the party’s priorities. Another focus of the PKI’s activities was of course mass mobilisation, which was realised through the party’s front groups. These included the peasant front Barisan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Farmers Front, or BTI), the youth front Pemuda Rakyat (People’s Youth), the women’s front Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Indonesian Women’s Movement, or Gerwani) and the labour front Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (All Indonesian Central Labour Organisation, or SOBSI) (Tornquist 1984: 74). The success and popularity of PKI’s front groups is further evidenced by the capacity of the Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat’s (League of People’s Culture, or LEKRA) to publish its own fortnightly journal, Zaman Baru (New Era) (Foulcher 1986: 27). These groups helped increase the party’s popularity partly by drawing in social interest groups. The various protests against government policies conducted by these groups were also important in boosting the PKI’s overall popularity. The PNI added party publications and training programmes to its activities in the 1950s. According to its annual reports, the PNI too was very active in publishing. It had its own newspaper, Suluh Marhaen, which was not only published nationally from Jakarta daily, but also had local and provincial editions. Aside from the newspaper, PNI regularly supplied other national media with news of internal party developments. The party also published books and brochures about its party platform and ideology. Another party focus was cadre training, although, as Rocamora notes, before 1960 the focus on cadre development was little more than lip service (1973: 164). However, after 1960 the PNI’s cadre-training guide suggests that the party regularly conducted cadre training (Partai Nasional Indonesia 1970). In addition to giving public speeches for local cadres, party leaders presented papers in response to invitations from universities or other educational institutions. The range of activities conducted by the party in this later period

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reflects its orientation towards enlarging its support base and spreading its ideology. In an effort to compete against PKI and Masyumi, PNI established several sub-organisations. These included the Kesatuan Buruh Marhaenis (Marhaenist Labourer Union, or KBM), Persatuan Tani Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Farmers Union, or PETANI), and Gerakan Nelayan Marhaenis (The Movement of Marhaenist Fishermen) (PNI Massa Marhaen 1970: 11). The wide range of PNI’s sub-organisations suggests the party had a strong focus on grass-roots mobilisation as well as members’ training and development. These groups played a significant role in attracting and sustaining support for the party. PNI’s attempt to establish occupational sub-organisations reflects the significance of this strategy for parties in general at the time and the relevance of these sub-organisations to occupational interests. Masyumi’s activities revolved around two main issues: the struggle against the Dutch government and the promotion of its Islamic platform. Masyumi chose to declare jihad (holy war) against colonialism by establishing and strengthening its own militia groups, Hizbullah and Sabilillah. At the same time, the party involved itself in government policymaking and diplomacy. Masyumi also actively campaigned against Communism and for free elections, as well as for the improvement of the education system and preservation of culture (Mahendra 1999: 85, 263-270). To promote and educate members on its party platforms, the party published books and regular propaganda about its programmes. These books included Kebudayaan Islam (Islamic Culture) and Falsafah Perjuangan Islam (The Philosophy of Islamic Struggle). Masyumi’s magazines and newspapers included Suara Partai Masyumi (The Voice of the Masyumi Party) and Berita Masyumi (Masyumi News) (Samsuri 2004: 96-98). These activities show the party’s significant organisational capacity and the importance of its strong, clear Islamic platform, which served as the foundation for all of its activities. Party activities usually intensified during election campaigns. In the 1955 election, Feith observes, the major parties’ campaign strategies were based both on their relationships with each other and their stances on particular issues. PKI used its election campaigns to strengthen its activities and propaganda, as well as intensify its cadre training, while government programmes designed to educate the electorate about the election were used to promote PKI’s agenda (Hindley 1966: 219). PNI, PKI and Masyumi used inter-party rivalry as a tactic to attract support, as demonstrated by the verbal attacks commonly found in their campaign speeches. Similarly, the issue of Communism was frequently used by Masyumi to attack PKI. However, beyond their campaign speeches, parties demonstrated diverse emphases in their campaign tactics. Masyumi preferred mass

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rallies in provincial capitals and residencies. The party also made election films, purchasing film units, amplifiers and recording equipment to use in their production (Feith 1971: 22). PKI and PNI also used mass rallies, but held them mostly at the district and sub-district levels. These two parties argued that smaller meetings were more effective in engaging participants and enabled parties to more easily ‘associate themselves in the village voters’ minds with men and symbols of authority already recognised by them’ (Feith 1971: 22). Another important tactic involved the display of party symbols, with PKI and Masyumi making substantial budget allocations for this purpose (Feith 1971: 26). The prevalence of these various campaign tactics demonstrates the major parties’ financial strength and fierce competition to attract grass-roots electoral support. However, the parties’ concentration on campaigning also reveals their preoccupation with election results rather than with establishing deeper grass-roots connections. In general, party activities during this period reflect the challenges of the Indonesian revolutionary struggle of the late 1940s and the strong inter-party competition of the early 1950s, which demanded the dedication of party resources for the 1955 election and beyond. As suggested, the major parties were particularly effective in the realms of publishing and education. Party publications were used as means of spreading ideologies as well as educating and informing supporters about party operations. Branches, sub-organisations and front groups also used publishing activities to maintain contact with supporters, as was the case for the PKI’s LEKRA front and the PNI’s local branches. However, the range of the parties’ activities discussed here suggests they placed little emphasis on direct interaction with their members. PKI was the most effective of Indonesia’s parties in this period in terms of publishing and education and the mobilisation of front groups to build support against government policies. However, PKI, PNI and Masyumi all relied heavily on grass-roots support, particularly during election campaigns. Their mass mobilisations would not have been effective without massive grass-roots support and their publications would have been pointless without readers. The parties’ heavy emphasis on publishing also suggests a high priority on spreading their propaganda. Recruitment Approaches For the Old Order parties, recruitment was essential, as members constituted a stable source of votes. The incentive to grow, particularly during the 1955 election period, led parties to abandon their strict organisational rules and admit members without screening them. Ideology was less important for attracting support than were party platforms, which provided supporters with a more realistic indication of a party’s policy

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orientation. However, in practice, party platforms could mean little to potential supporters in comparison to other factors, such as the charisma of party leaders. In fact, because their recruitment approaches focused on numbers, most parties tended to be opportunistic in their recruitment. PKI, which was very strict in both its regulations and practices, is the exception to this generalisation. PKI was nonetheless quite focused on enlarging its membership, as shown by its successive membership drives. Its first membership drive in 1952 was spurred by the party’s conviction that to recruit capable cadres, the party had to become a ‘mass, nationwide machine’ that could effectively penetrate society. When opposition to the emphasis on quantity emerged within the party, defenders of the policy argued that ‘quantity is necessary in order to achieve quality’, and claimed that the party’s organisational practices were adequate to ensure effectiveness. Strict membership requirements and the practice of criticism and selfcriticism were implemented to maximise effectiveness. By May 1952 the PKI had 100,000 members, and by March 1954 there were 165,206. The success of the first membership drive encouraged the party to conduct a second in 1954, and by February 1956 the party had one million members (Hindley 1966: 74, 80). PKI’s membership drives, the most intensive undertaken by any party at the time, are illustrative of the value that parties in general placed on building large memberships during this period. PKI’s recruitment strategy relied heavily on ideology and rigorous regulation. The party’s recruitment policies were based on the class status of prospective members. Although the basic criterion was simply that applicants had to be Indonesian citizens over 19 years of age, strict time requirements governed an applicant’s progress from candidate to member, depending on their ‘class origin’ (Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia 1954: 25-27). Peasants and other common people served the shortest time before being awarded full member status. In contrast, professionals and members of the national bourgeoisie experienced a longer ‘waiting period’ – the longest being two years (Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia 1954: 25-27). In addition to serving the waiting period, these candidates needed endorsements from at least two party members to be admitted. Membership requirements were stricter for the higher class. Former executives from other parties who wished to join PKI required endorsements from PKI members with at least five years’ uninterrupted membership, as well as from higher party officers (Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia 1954: 25-27). Another PKI strategy was to appeal to grass-roots interests through protests against the government. PKI’s activities – heavily geared towards gathering grass-roots support – may be considered a recruitment strategy, as it was through rallies and other actions that common people had

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the opportunity to connect with the party directly. The coordination of opposition to unpopular government policies proved successful in raising support for PKI. Campaigns conducted by PKI front groups at the grass-roots level acted as catalysts for interaction between the party and its supporters. PKI cadres assisted peasants in establishing many kinds of organisations (van der Kroef 1965: 195) and involved their members in non-political activities such as ‘organising the sharing of agricultural tools, arranging mutual assistance to hold feasts, build new water channels and help the victims of fires and floods’ (Feith 1962: 25). Wieringa says that Gerwani (Indonesian Women’s Movement) ‘set up crèches, gave literacy classes and cooking and sewing lessons, helped women in their agricultural tasks and encouraged them to engage in non-farming income-generating projects’. All of these activities were chosen upon discussion with Gerwani’s members (1992: 106). From such interactions, the PKI was able to create and strengthen its connections with the community. Rallies and other protests were an opportunity to represent the party as well as target specific issues, making it easier for peasants and workers to identify with the party. In this way, the activities of front groups served as an effective recruitment method for PKI. Other organisations relied both on leaders’ charisma and the development of party platforms that appealed to the public. Karim argues that PNI’s association with Sukarno, and its leaders’ public profiles, were very influential in its ability to gain support and sympathy (1983: 81). Sukarno often spoke out against Islamic and other popular groups, which bolstered his reputation and, by association, the party’s as an alternative to religion-based politics. Sukarno’s habit of visiting villages also contributed to PNI’s popularity. The prominence of ethnic Javanese, including Sukarno himself, in party leadership positions was an important factor in the party’s popularity as well. According to Karim, the party’s popularity among Javanese was enhanced by the Javanese tendency to follow their leaders (1983: 81). PNI also used patronage as a recruitment method, which was operationalised through the bureaucracy and civil service. Village officials instrumental in maintaining local support for the party were given governmental positions in return after party victory (Hindley 1966: 224; Feith 1962: 139). However, PNI failed to solidify its electoral support after the 1955 election; village officials either worked less to promote the party or transferred their loyalty to PKI (Hindley 1966: 224-225). Rocamora (1970: 147) has suggested that PNI’s reliance on patronage indicates that it appealed more to people’s financial motivations than their ideological commitment. Reliance on leaders’ charisma and patronage resulted in opportunistic members and candidates with little loyalty to the party. In Masyumi’s case, the widespread appeal of Islamic organisations across Indonesia was instrumental in building a support base. The

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party had strong support from local religious teachers. As Feith has pointed out, Masyumi’s principal sources of support were trading groups and increasingly powerful local religious leaders and Islamic community figures, particularly in rural areas (1962: 137-138). The only regions the party failed to penetrate were those populated with nonMuslims, such as Bali and Flores, or those dominated by the rival NU. At that time, many Muslims were drawn to the party’s Islamic image (Noer 1987: 54-55; Feith 1962: 135). This image was enhanced by the fact that the occupying Japanese had used Masyumi as a counterbalance against Indonesian nationalism, giving Muslim leaders strong positions that they used to mobilise the peasant masses (Reid 1974: 15). Masyumi’s power was also boosted by its strong position in the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Islamic religion’s official recognition and sponsorship by the government (Feith 1962: 138). In short, Masyumi relied heavily on Islam as its main asset for building support. Like PKI and PNI, Masyumi had occupational sub-organisations, including Sarikat Dagang Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Trade Association), Sarikat Tani Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Farming Association) and Sarikat Nelayan Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Fisherman Association) (Noer 1987: 56). It also had youth organisations such as Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement, or GPII) (Noer 1960: 48). In addition, the party had its own militias as well as an armed support base within its youth organisations (Mahendra 1999: 186-187). The party’s armies, Hizbullah and Sabilillah, were an important source of party membership. Hizbullah was an armed youth organisation set up during the Japanese occupation controlled by Masyumi. Sabilillah was a similar armed organisation consisting mainly of members of the older generation (Noer 1960: 47-48). Among Indonesian parties, Masyumi’s membership was particularly large, as it was the only party to permit indirect membership through associate organisations. The party effectively attracted support through its reliance on these organisations. Hefner characterises Masyumi’s mass membership drives of 1945 as evidence of open rivalry between Muslims and nationalists (1990: 198). Masyumi’s recruitment mechanisms, however, were not supported by adequate membership management systems. Furthermore, from the early 1950s onwards, the complexity of Masyumi’s links with its affiliated organisations cast doubt on the party’s effectiveness in general, which in turn led to internal pressure to introduce alternative party structures. Eventually the party solved this linkage problem by decreeing that all links between members of the ‘Masyumi family’ were to be ‘coordinated’ and ‘arranged’ by the party (Noer 1960: 49). Masyumi’s restructuring is a good example of the challenge faced by all major parties in this period to balance their size with their management capacity.

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In Masyumi’s case, the decision to centralise its structure underlines the seriousness of its attempt to transfer decision-making authority to the central office. This suggests that power-sharing with affiliates was seen as a serious threat to organisational unity. Again, Dar’ul Islam provides a useful point of comparison. Dar’ul Islam attracted supporters mainly through its commitment to rebellion, but also through promotion as a reward for ‘administration’ and ‘soldiery’ expanding the movement’s influence (Jackson 1980: 16). Its recruitment approach relied on the organisation’s ability to relate to the interests of potential recruits, while at the same time using force and intimidation when cooperation was hard to obtain (Jackson 1980: 16; Dijk 1981: 105). In most cases, it was the appeal of struggle against the state – perceived as unjust and corrupt – that attracted followers to the movement (Jackson & Moeliono 1973: 13). However, its ability to attract followers also depended greatly on patron-client relationships in villages, where clients obeyed authority figures, and indeed would go to war if told to do so (Liddle 1973: 13). The bond between patrons and clients at the village level acted as an effective recruitment mechanism for Dar’ul Islam, enabling it to remain powerful in the face of sustained military losses. This suggests that the Dar’ul Islam movement effectively exploited religious beliefs and traditional systems of social obligation to maintain its membership. Social and cultural factors, such as religion and patron-client influence, then, were instrumental in the recruitment policies of some of the early political organisations in Indonesia. Traditional social and cultural patterns were utilised by parties to attract new recruits. However, recruitment was primarily focused on serving the parties during elections: the structures required to further manage members once recruited were largely non-existent. Only PKI possessed aggressive recruitment mechanisms. The other major parties relied more on circumstantial advantages, such as leaders’ charisma and religion, to attract support. Thus, despite an encouraging environment for political participation, most of the parties failed to develop the systematic structures necessary to conduct one of a party’s most important functions – namely, recruitment and maintenance of membership. Motivation and Participation of Party Members Despite the focus on votes, parties were generally effective in cultivating members’ attachment to them, as indicated by mass turnouts for their rallies. However, the degree of attachment and participation depended on how radical the party was. For instance, Dar’ul Islam and PKI had more-attached members and demanded more personal sacrifices of them, such as requiring them to fight in a party militia (Dar’ul Islam),

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study Communism (PKI), or participate in continuous recruitment drives for new members (PKI). In contrast, PNI and Masyumi did not require their members to make such sacrifices, resulting in weaker member attachment. Because Masyumi was based on Islam, though, its members showed strict adherence to Islamic law. In the case of PNI, while members’ loyalty to the party leader, Sukarno, was secure, their loyalty to the party was weaker, given its opportunistic changes in platform and alliances. Each Indonesian party had different priorities and strategies to nurture members’ attachment and participation, and broader party objectives influenced the degree of loyalty that parties were able to inspire in their members. Janda (cf. 1980: 126) argues that an individual’s willingness to participate in organisational life depends on his or her commitment to the organisation’s objectives. The more radical the organisation, the greater a member’s attachment and involvement, and the more stringent the organisation’s membership policies, which ensure that only committed individuals succeed in becoming members (cf. Janda 1980: 126). Consequently, participation in parties and other organisations varies depending on the nature of the organisation as much as the individual member’s preferences. Janda’s analysis of the interaction between party radicalism and member attachment explains why radical parties and organisations such as Dar’ul Islam and PKI enjoyed much stronger member attachment, while PNI’s lack of ideological clarity and lax membership policies resulted in less-attached members. Followers of the Dar’ul Islam movement were motivated by a variety of factors such as resentment against the army and a lack of socioeconomic opportunity post-independence (Dijk 1981: 340-396). Islam had a strong influence, both as a religion and as the basis of power and authority in the community. However, the movement had no intent to proselytise, despite its Islamic ideology (Jackson 1980: 16-17). Also, being santri did not protect one from intimidation or violence by members of the Dar’ul Islam movement (Dijk 1980: 394). Patron-client relationships were influential in forming the basis of networks of relationships among villagers; they also strengthened these networks and ensured their longevity. Other influential factors in people’s decisions to join the Dar’ul Islam movement were the excitement of revolution, a lack of post-revolution work for militia veterans, and a desire to obtain public positions in the post-revolution period (Jackson & Moeliono 1973: 13-14). These three factors largely determined the strength of the movement. The movement’s objective to establish an Islamic state attracted supporters of other Islamic movements who considered themselves to be unjustly suppressed by the state. Patron-client relationships encouraged the organisation’s followers to abide by its rules and believe in its struggle. Villagers were willing to fight for their authority figures

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as a way of showing loyalty or paying their debts to them. Leaders of other Islamic organisations also encouraged their members to join the Dar’ul Islam movement when they felt that they were no longer capable of representing their members’ interests. As a result of these factors, the movement gave birth to the strongest rebellion in Indonesia’s recent history. It continued to attract new recruits, shaping political participation among members of the local community of West Java. Although it had no formal structure or arrangements, such as for due payments, the movement was successful in creating a common bond among followers, one strong enough to lead them to make great sacrifices to achieve the movement’s objectives. PKI’s strict management of its members reflected its commitment to party ideology. PKI had very specific rules and regulations concerning who and how members were admitted and treated in the party, as well as how they should contribute to party development. Upon full membership, members were required to study Marxism and Leninism. They were also required to have a deep understanding of party ideology and be active, at least insofar as attending party trainings. Further, they were expected to promote party unity, adhere to party regulations and remain loyal to the party. Members demonstrated their commitment by ‘actively taking part in party activities and faithfully executing party decisions’, as well as by ‘overcoming feelings of complacency and conceit’ (Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia 1954: 22-24). Members were evaluated on their participation in party activities and payment of dues. Failure to comply could result in immediate expulsion from the party. As a result, party members were dedicated to the party and ready to be mobilised when needed by the branches. PKI’s organisational structure defined the specific tasks of party branches. Special attention was paid to attracting more recruits. The branches were instructed to ‘carry out propaganda and organisational work among the masses’, ‘implement party decisions from above’, and ‘constantly pay heed to the sentiments and demands of the people by reporting mass sentiment and by aiding the people to solve the problems themselves’. They were also instructed to ‘draw in new members’, ‘collect dues and exercise discipline’, and ‘organise members’ study and disseminate party publications’ (Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia 1954: 57-59). The party made other specific demands on individual members as well. They were expected to closely interact with the community, explain party policies to the community and report developments to the party (Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia 1954: 2324). Another task of members was to secure contributors to the party; these contributors did not need to be party members but reasonably well-off. As van der Kroef argues, no Indonesian party cared for its members nearly as passionately as PKI. The party believed that ‘there are

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no stupid cadres and no bad cadres if they are well led and treated justly’ (1965: 178-179). In return for their loyalty and dedication, the party supported members with relevant training. It also created mechanisms for better interaction between the party hierarchy and regular members. Members had the right to vote, participate in discussions and publications and propose and criticise party decisions (Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia 1954: 24-25). Like the members of the PNI, PKI members faced party sanctions for ‘improper conduct’, ranging from a warning to expulsion. There were specific rules governing who should institute sanctions and who should approve them; usually a higher office was consulted in each case (Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia 1954: 66-67). The detailed and specific tasks of members and branches reflected the party’s meticulous administration of its organisation, with the results that members were well-versed in party doctrine and branches were active and aggressive in recruitment. In the PNI, members’ attachments to the party were unstable as a result of the party’s reliance on patronage and charismatic leadership and the absence of stringent membership requirements. The party paid little attention to the task of converting its electoral support into stable membership (Hindley 1966: 224). Although specific social groups were drawn to the party – namely, Indonesian aristocrats, civil servants and white-collar workers – the PNI also attracted those who supported revolution per se without wishing to take a particular position on political issues (Feith 1962: 143). Rocamora notes the weakness of the party’s membership policies and argues that PNI’s popularity was actually due to its failure to selectively screen new members (1970: 147). According to Rocamora, there was a significant difference between members admitted before 1954 and those admitted later; members admitted before 1954 were more committed to a ‘political movement’, while those who joined later were attracted to the party because it seemed ‘more and more like a Western-style political machine’ (1970: 147). In Masyumi, members’ levels of participation and attachment were heavily influenced by the party’s organisational structure. Its system of membership allowed individuals to be members of two different organisations simultaneously, which could compromise their loyalty to either one. Unlike PKI, which imposed strict organisational discipline, Masyumi had a loose structure and its members’ discipline and attachment could be directed towards affiliated organisations rather than the party itself. However, the party’s strict adherence to Islamic law cultivated active participation in the party. Although loyalty to the party may have been limited by its membership structure, the Islamic focus of Masyumi and its sub-organisations catalysed attachment to the party and participation in it. As Anderson notes, Masyumi had ‘no real rival

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for its constituency’, and so was able to depend on a more general sense of loyalty by individual Muslims to the community of the faithful (ummah) (1972: 224). Hence, the loyalty felt by Masyumi’s members was largely to Islam in general rather than the party in particular. The various organisations discussed here had the capacity to create a sense of attachment and belonging in their members, but differed in their commitments to provide and monitor cadre training. Though PNI had strong electoral support, it failed to strengthen its bonds with supporters through membership mechanisms. In contrast, a strong giveand-take existed between the PKI and its members, with the party taking care of its members and expecting them to contribute to the party in return (a contribution that was monitored quite closely). In the case of Masyumi, attachment to the party was, in effect, attachment to Islam, which resulted in generally strong loyalty. However, Masyumi’s membership system allowing dual organisational membership meant that the party had to compete with its affiliated organisations for members’ attachment. As individuals primarily joined the smaller affiliated organisations, their attachment to Masyumi was indirect. Thus, although emotional (PNI) and ideological (Masyumi) bases for party support were strong, except for PKI, parties failed to nurture members’ attachment. Party Career and Intra-party Democracy It is difficult to trace the course of party career advancement by grassroots members in this early period of Indonesian parties. As indicated, given Indonesia’s size it was difficult for the parties to maintain close contact with all party branches and in most parties (with the exception of PKI) central offices exerted limited control over branch management, including members’ careers within the party. Parties were still developing and therefore were forced to be creative and adaptable. Consequently, regulations were often not strictly adhered to, and at times parties relied on traditional patron-client relationships or social status to choose their leaders. In Dar’ul Islam, patron-client patterns strongly influenced choice of leadership. In this kind of traditional community, a leader’s status and legitimacy was based on the high regard the community showed him. Such community regard eventually propelled individuals into leadership positions, aside from the specific reward system used to expand the movement (Jackson 1980: 16, 197-202). Leaders’ legitimacy was mostly based on their social status, including that gained as an inheritance from parents. Status was usually linked to a leader’s familial connection with an important figure, his religious knowledge as a kyai (religious teacher), or a belief that he possessed mystical abilities, for example as a dukun (traditional healer or sorcerer) (Jackson 1980: 127, 272-273;

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Jackson & Moeliono 1973: 17). Education was also seen as an important quality in a leader (Jackson 1980: 137-138). Leaders were obeyed out of respect, but also out of a sense of hutang budi (debt of moral obligation). Because of the overwhelming cultural power of patron-client patterns, leaders were elected based on their religious and social status rather than popular support per se. PKI had specific career and leadership policies, as befitted its rigorous organisational and membership management system. Party regulations were consistent for each level of office. The PKI’s Central Committee had the ultimate power in internal elections, and was elected by the National Party Congress. Committee leaders were elected by their respective regional or local party conferences and approved by the higher office (for instance, a provincial leader needed approval of the central office, and so on) (Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia 1954: 5354). The relevant party conference would set up an election commission and administer it under the party regulations. Conditions for the nomination of candidates stipulated details such as length of service to the party: the longer the service, the higher the position for which he or she could be nominated. Although there were no membership levels stipulated beyond candidate and full-member level, the party required candidates to perform the duties of full members, but without having the right to vote and give opinions (Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia 1954: 29-30). The party reserved the right to extend or shorten the membership waiting period depending on how individuals performed their duties. If they were deemed to have failed to perform them adequately, the party could nullify their waiting period and thus deny them membership, upon consultation and deliberation within the respective branches (Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia 1954: 30-33). In short, PKI’s party career mechanisms demonstrated the rigour of its regulations and the extent to which local branches adhered to them. In Simalungun/Siantar, Liddle says that there was a fairly strict separation between the leadership of the party itself and that of the suborganisations, and that achievement in a sub-organisation did not normally lead to a position in the party (1970: 133). In this regard, party discipline in career promotion was higher in PKI than in PNI, where leaders of sub-organisations could ‘upgrade’ their leadership to party leadership (Liddle 1970: 129-131). PNI had strict, detailed and comprehensive national guidelines for cadre training and development. The party clearly defined which members should be cadres, and gave each level of the party structure responsibility for their own cadres. For instance, kader cabang (branch cadre) were trained by the branches, and kader pusat (central cadre) by the central office (PNI 1970: 1). PNI had two special groups of cadres, kader umum (general cadres) and kader khusus (special cadres). These groups

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differed in their purposes. General cadres received more general education than special cadres, who were trained for specific tasks. Examples of such special tasks included motivating sub-organisations associated with the party, occupying specific divisional positions within the party organisation and taking employment outside the party (PNI 1970: 2-6). PNI had a reward system for cadres who performed extraordinarily well: after special training, they received the title kader inti (core cadre). PNI also had specific follow-up procedures to evaluate the personal performance of each cadre. This comprehensive evaluation included specific sanctions to be applied in cases of misconduct, ranging from warnings to expulsion (PNI 1970: 4-5). In theory, PNI cadre management was regulated by the Departemen Pembinaan Kader (Cadre Development Department) of each branch, meaning that cadre training, evaluation and sanctioning were responsibilities of each office. Each office had to report regularly to the central office, which was responsible for developing training programme curricula. PNI’s administration of cadre management demonstrates the priority the party accorded to cadre development. But despite the existence of these rigorous regulations, the party remained loosely organised (Feith 1962: 139), and there was little contact between local, provincial and central offices (Rocamora 1973: 156). Hence there was a lack of effort in nurturing and coordinating grass-roots support. As a result, party discipline relied on the initiative of local leaders, without organisational support from the centre. This lack of support brings into question branch capacity and commitment to efficiently implementing cadre management programmes. Indeed, as Rocamora suggests, an overwhelming drive to expand led the party to recruit non-cadres and nonmembers as local leaders (1973: 155). This indicates an abandonment of intra-party democracy and the adoption of pragmatic strategies to choose local leaders. Liddle’s research on party organisation in Simalungun/Siantar in the 1960s found that, although elected, local PNI leaders relied on their own efforts to enhance their party profile (1970: 131), reflecting the lack of organisational discipline in career promotion. Attempting to establish as many local branches as possible, the party sometimes forewent the luxury of cadre and member screening, increasing the scope for regulatory violations. As with PNI, Masyumi’s loose structure made it difficult for the party to effectively nurture direct member attachment. In terms of membership management, the party only acted as a supervisory body for its affiliates. The leadership dynamics in Masyumi suggest that the party was centrally focused (Mahendra 1999; Noer 1987), relying on its affiliates for party development and growth at the local level (Noer 1987: 55-58). However, Mahendra’s study of Masyumi’s daily operations demonstrates its adherence to democratic principles. To wit: the debating

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practice conducted at the end of a chairperson’s term, where his or her performance was evaluated by the party leadership (1999: 126-134). Intra-party democratic principles were also seen in other party decisionmaking practices (Mahendra 1999: 134-138). The party’s preference for modern qualities is evident in the priority it placed on prospective leaders’ religious maturity and Western-style education (Mahendra 1999: 144-145). Thus, despite the party’s failure to nurture and manage grassroots support through membership and leadership management, party leadership was governed by progressive practices at the central level. Overall, parties were forced to make compromises to accommodate local conditions, regardless of the rules they had developed to govern party career and leadership succession. These compromises are largely explained by parties’ early stage of development. Individuals with ideological positions out of line with party platforms were often promoted out of necessity; indeed, former membership of a rival party was not a barrier to leadership promotion in some cases. This problem was particularly serious at the local level, indicating that although cadre development and monitoring systems existed on paper, branches often resorted to more expedient measures to manage leadership in the field. The key to overcoming this type of decision-making pragmatism was better support from the central office, as demonstrated by PKI, and strict adherence to party regulations, as shown by Masyumi’s central leadership. Albeit for Masyumi only at the central level, in both parties, leadership changes were heavily regulated and controlled by the central office, enabling branches to organise the succession process smoothly. In terms of party career, the regulated processes of leadership change at the central level and the opportunistic practices at the local level were often in conflict. But the parties had extensively documented systems for central leadership change and were able to conduct such change in orderly ways as well. For instance, PKI, PNI and Masyumi all adopted democratic measures quite strictly in their decision-making, including in leadership successions. However, while PKI and PNI both required members to be committed to the party, the pressures of growth often forced local branches of the PNI to adopt practical measures such as electing candidates without proper screening. The early parties thus were still facing difficulties in implementing national policies at the local level.

Guided Democracy: Transition to Total Control The establishment of Guided Democracy, which cemented the absolute power of Sukarno as president, signalled the end of a period of political dynamism in Indonesia. In Decline of Constitutional Democracy in

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Indonesia, Feith describes the period between December 1949 and March 1957 as a period of constitutional democracy, in which ‘parties were of very great importance’, ‘civil liberties were rarely infringed’, and ‘governments used coercion sparingly’ (1962: xi). However, these same characteristics caused serious problems in maintaining stability, with increasing conflicts evident between political leaders who also acted as party officials (Feith 1962: 325). Political instability at the centre was even more problematic for the nation as a whole, as it took place against a backdrop of increasingly violent regional rebellions (Jackson 1980; Dijk 1981). Feith & Castles recall that conflict intensified during the 1955 election and did not lessen afterwards (1970: 9). There was intense rivalry between the four major parties – PNI, Masyumi, Nahdatul Ulama (NU), and PKI – with ‘none of them having strong enough power to govern alone’ (Reeve 1985: 108). Sukarno came to disapprove of the civilian parliamentary system that precluded the armed forces from playing political roles (Reeve 1985: 108) and permitted in-fighting and inter-party conflicts. This system, in Sukarno’s view, represented a Westernised ‘50 percent plus 1’ style of decision-making inappropriate to Indonesia (Feith & Castles 1970: 9). By late 1956 there was a growing conviction in the government that ‘political reorganisation’ was required and that parliamentary democracy had been unsuccessful (Reeve 1985: 108). Frequent and rapid cabinet changes ignited and strengthened Sukarno’s intention to ‘bury the parties’ and adopt ‘Guided Democracy’.1 Guided Democracy was based on Sukarno’s conviction that the solution to continued inter-party conflict was the adoption of the principles of gotong royong (mutual assistance) and musyarah untuk mufakat (deliberation to reach consensus) (Feith & Castles 1970: 82). He insisted that this new system would create a form of democracy that was suitable for Indonesia, based on collectivism and family values (kekeluargaan) – a ‘democracy with leadership’ (Reeve 1985: 112, 116). Following his condemnation of the parties, Sukarno introduced the concept of the ‘functional group’ in 1957, which aimed to detach the occupation-based sub-organisations or organisasi massa (ormas, mass organisations) from the parties and put them under the leadership of a newly established Dewan Nasional (National Council). The Dewan Nasional stood alongside the cabinet to offer advice and sought to serve as ‘a reflection of society in the same way as the cabinet will be a reflection of parliament’ (Feith 1962: 542). However, after Sukarno’s efforts to negotiate these changes with parties failed, he attempted to ‘bury’ the parties completely on 5 July 1959, when Guided Democracy formally began. Under Guided Democracy, opportunities for political participation through parties changed dramatically, as party choices were now heavily determined and limited by the state. This new system placed Sukarno

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at the centre of power and severely restricted the parties, placing them under close scrutiny by the armed forces (Feith 1962: 593). By 1959 party membership was under heavy government control. Aside from requiring all parties to ‘accept and defend’ the national ideology and to change their constitutions accordingly, they were subjected to strict military control (Reeve 1985: 164; Feith 1962: 593). As a result, although 28 parties had contested the 1955 election, by 1961 the number of parties operating under Guided Democracy had reduced to just ten – PNI, NU, Partai Katolik (Catholic Party), Parkindo, Partai Indonesia (Indonesian Party, or Partindo), Partai Murba, Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (Islamic Association Party of Indonesia, or PSII), Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence, or IPKI), PKI and the Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Islamic Educational Movement, or Perti) (Feith 1962: 593). Masyumi and PSI were banned in 1960 because they were deemed to be ‘ideologically hostile to the president’ (Reeve 1985: 160). At the same time, the concept of the functional group, which had been in circulation since the 1920s, began to take on a more significant role in Indonesian politics. The initial close relationship between the parties and their occupational sub-organisations ultimately undermined the future and freedom of parties. The functional group concept was used to justify the severing of relationships between parties and suborganisations, a policy deemed to be essential to allow groups to concentrate on the improvement of the living conditions of their members (Hadiz 1997). As a further attempt to empower and enlarge functional groups, the armed forces were included alongside workers/employees, farmers, national entrepreneurs, religious teachers, intellectuals, the 1945 generation, artists, women and youth. This allowed the armed forces to take on a far greater civilian role (Reeve 1985: 125-126, 185197). By 1963 the government’s National Front2 contained ten parties and 241 functional groups, and in 1964 the functional groups formed a joint secretariat known as Sekretariat Bersama Organisasi-organisasi Golongan Karya Front Nasional (Joint Secretariat of Golkar Organisations within the National Front, or Sekber Golkar) (Reeve 1985: 243). The core of Sekber Golkar was the Serikat Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia (Union of Indonesian Socialist Karyawan Organisations, or SOKSI), which was anti-PKI (Reeve 1985: 191). By late 1969, the number of Sekber Golkar’s sub-organisations had risen to 200, and in November 1969 they were clustered under seven parental bodies called KINO (Kelompok Induk Organisasi/Mother Group of Organisations) (Hakim 1993: 40; Reeve 1985: 294). Growing in size and importance, this mass organisation became a prominent player, whilst the parties became increasingly irrelevant.

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Scholars have pointed to the ‘repudiation of Western liberalism’ and the ‘advocation of collectivistic democracy’ as important constructs of Guided Democracy (Reeve 1985: 109). The ongoing cabinet crises of the constitutional democracy period had provided a justification for Sukarno’s rejection of a Westernised ‘50 percent plus 1’ style of democracy. His determination to change the political system was manifested in his stripping of politicians of their party affiliations to create the Dewan Nasional (National Council). The promotion and empowerment of functional groups and the institutionalisation of the kekeluargaan (family) principle left parties even more debilitated and irrelevant. Sukarno argued that his collectivist doctrine of democracy was more Indonesian and thus more suitable than the previous system and imposed it through Guided Democracy, with himself at the centre of power (Feith 196: 580). The various regulations and restrictions on party operations signified the Sukarno government’s determination to curb their influence in politics. Ongoing hostile sentiment towards party politics, exacerbated by the 1965 alleged coup by the PKI, paved the way for Suharto’s policies of ‘economic construction’ and ‘modernisation’ (Ward 1974: 1), which further undermined the role of parties and ended political pluralism.

3

Diminishing Grass-roots Influence During the New Order

After the attempted coup, allegedly by the PKI, in 1965, Suharto took control and in 1966 he became Indonesia’s second president.1 During the period of his administration, known as the New Order (1966-1998), the operations and organisation of political parties changed dramatically. As we have seen, Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, was responsible for the beginning of the decline of the role of parties, particularly after the implementation of Guided Democracy. But it was only after the 1971 elections that his successor, Suharto, forced the parties to fuse together and placed strict limits on their ideological freedom and ability to organise at the grass-roots level. This increasing interference undermined the grass-roots structures of the parties. Political participation was severely limited by government policies of ‘golkarisation’ and ‘de-partyisation’ through which Suharto continued Sukarno’s efforts to limit the influence of political parties. These policies promoted the Army’s political role and Golkar’s growth, and the development of anti-party and pro-Golkar doctrines (Reeve 1985: 265). Upon coming to power, the Suharto government decided to support Sekber Golkar (Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya, or Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups), which became Golkar in 1971, as a response to popular anti-party sentiment and as an attempt to capitalise on the organisation’s popularity. After winning the 1971 elections, the government continued to use Golkar as its political vehicle,2 but forced the nine remaining parties into two.3 The four Islamic parties – NU, Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslims Party), Perti, PSII – were merged into Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party, or PPP). Also, the five Christian secular parties – PNI, Partai Katolik, Parkindo, Partai Murba, and IPKI – merged into Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party, PDI) (Reeve 1985: 332). It was henceforth illegal to form any new political organisations. The PPP and PDI were under strict control and suffered constant interference from the government. As a result, they were dysfunctional at the grass-roots: inactive outside the election period and powerless in the parliament. As Samson observed, the New Order government’s intrusion into Indonesia’s political organisations meant that ‘political parties were a negligible force’, merely ‘government-owned services adjusting

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and reacting to the initiatives of ABRI and Golkar’ and – quoting a New Order leader – ‘sparring partner[s] [ for Golkar] in the ring’ (1973: 132). The Suharto government built a system ensuring Golkar’s repeated victories in elections and giving it significant freedom to operate. Meanwhile strict regulations were imposed on PPP’s and PDI’s management and operation. The result of the processes of ‘golkarisation’ and ‘de-partyisation’ was a party system disconnected from the grass-roots, one that also manipulated and intimidated people at the grass-roots, thereby instilling political apathy in large sections of the community (Reeve 1985: 264-265; Gaffar 1992: 36-51). The structure of government during the New Order was aimed at ensuring Golkar’s superiority as an electoral vehicle, despite the government’s claim that it was not a political party. The manipulation of Golkar’s status, in addition to constant meddling from the government and the armed forces in both Golkar and the two remaining political parties, enhanced Golkar’s strength. Golkar was the only election competitor able to freely conduct campaign and recruitment activities between elections. Meanwhile, the dysfunctional parties – although enjoying popular support – were unable to harness that support to develop their organisations. The government maintained a ‘hegemonic party system’ through the use of a ‘repressive apparatus’ that supported de-politicisation (Gaffar 1992: 36-49), voter manipulation and control of the PPP and PDI (Liddle 1985: 83). Party Organisation Because of the severe restrictions placed on political activism during this period, PPP’s and PDI’s organisations were superficial at the national level, and just plain non-existent locally, while Golkar received significant government support. While the PPP and PDI did have branches at the municipal level, their presence there was merely symbolic, with no active daily operations. The New Order regime made sure that the two parties would not be able to grow by cutting their links with grass-roots supporters through heavy-handed military intervention and the introduction of the concept of the massa mengambang (floating mass). This concept stipulated that rural masses remain ‘undisturbed’ by politics except around election periods (Reeve 1985: 291). Any discussion of party organisation during the New Order must emphasise the influence of the government and the Indonesian armed forces on party life. Suharto himself played a strong personal role. As president, his command of the army gave him the means to exert authority over the political apparatus and the bureaucracy. His strategy involved the establishment of numerous structures to control political activities and prevent any threat to his ‘order’. These structures included

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Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence Coordinating Agency, or BAKIN), Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, or KOPKAMTIB), Operasi Khusus (Special Operation Agency, or OPSUS), and Direktorat Jenderal Masalah Sosial dan Politik (Directorate General of Social and Political Affairs, or DIRJENSOSPOL) (Gaffar 1992: 38). Aside from these organisations, within the bureaucracy itself the Department of Defence and Security (Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan/Dephankam) exerted wide-spread command in each regional capital and was responsible for ‘vigilance against internal subversion and many other activities on the borderline between military and civilian government functions’ (Liddle 1985: 72). Through these organisations, political activities were strictly monitored, discouraging political debate and limiting political participation. The authority of the army, enhanced by the role of Suharto as president and its significant role in the leadership of the apparatus of repression, was extended and institutionalised in other parts of government. The New Order government justified the civilian role of the army, the Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, or ABRI), using the concept of dwifungsi (dual function), which established it as both a military and sociopolitical force (Crouch 1978: 24, 39). Under dwifungsi, ABRI was able to increase its influence in politics through its personnel, particularly by heading government institutions and dominating state bureaucracy. Because of its wide-spread influence on government bodies – which extended to leadership positions – ABRI was able to establish control over political activities, including over the two remaining political parties and Golkar (Nishihara 1972). In short, the organisations of all electoral contestants were controlled by the government in its effort to ensure Golkar victories. The most basic and crucial of all forms of government intervention during this period were the initial formation of the compressed New Order parties; the forced adoption of Pancasila, the national ideology, under the asas tunggal (single basis) policy; and the idea of the massa mengambang. The ideological basis of the parties that became the PPP and the PDI were undermined by their forced fusion and a simplified dichotomy between ‘material development’ in the case of the PDI and ‘spiritual development’ in the case of the PPP (Reeve 1985: 290). Once the parties were fused together, the government took their ideological dismantling a step further by forcing the PPP and PDI to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideology under the asas tunggal policy, despite condemnation from statesmen (Prawiranegara 1984). Debates about the acceptability of the Pancasila ideology heightened conflicts within the PPP (Hakim 1993: 52). As a result, the party faced

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serious internal problems. The PPP’s popularity as evidenced in the 1982 election, when the party obtained 27.78 per cent of the vote (www. kpu.go.id), was considered a threat to the government, which had promoted a close association between Islam and Pancasila (Hakim 1993: 75). However, the party suffered more internal discord when it abandoned Islam as an ideology, which spurred the withdrawal of support by popular public figures in the 1987 election (1993: 76-95). The departure of NU, previously an important part of PPP, caused further damage to PPP’s voter base; the NU’s penggembosan (literally, tyre flattening) campaign encouraged its supporters to vote for Golkar instead, which helped reduce PPP’s parliamentary seats from 94 in 1982 to 61 in 1987. Meanwhile Golkar’s seats increased from 242 to 299 (Hakim 1993: 94). PPP’s organisational problems were a clear result of government intervention, strategically conducted to minimise any threat to Golkar. In the case of PDI, the government was initially successful in minimising the influence of the PNI in the party. But, as Aspinall (2005: 172176) has argued, Sukarno’s Marhaenism – the ideology of helping the ‘little people’ (rakyat kecil) – remained relatively influential. The limitations imposed on the use of Sukarno’s name in the party’s election campaigns (Ward 1974: 14) suggest that the government feared his lingering popularity. However, the legal requirement to adopt Pancasila as its ideology provided the government with significant control over the party’s activities and limited its ability to publicly invoke its nationalist heritage. It was only in the early 1990s, with the resurgence of Sukarno’s popularity, that the party was able to strongly exploit his charisma, most notably by the appearance of his children at party rallies (Aspinall 2005: 151; Liddle & Mallarangeng 1997: 168). As a result, the party increased its national vote from 8 per cent in 1982 to 11 per cent in 1987 (Komisi Pemilihan Umum 2004). But the New Order government still exerted substantial control over the PDI. As for the local organisational development of the fused parties, perhaps the most influential aspect of the New Order’s approach was the concept of the floating mass. This construct argued that mass-membership parties had created national instability and that the masses should concentrate on economic issues instead of political participation.4 The architect of this policy, Suharto’s confidant Ali Murtopo, was the army general assigned to guarantee that Golkar’s electoral performance was ‘effective’ (Crouch 1978: 266). Under this policy, student leaders and other talented people were co-opted to join Golkar, while those deemed potentially dangerous as enemies of the government were intimidated and oppressed. Theoretically, Golkar was subject to the same government regulations that limited the two political parties’ grass-roots activities. But, in practice, it was treated quite differently.5 Under the floating mass doctrine,

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the PPP and PDI were only permitted branches in district centres and towns; any political activities at the community level were forbidden.6 In contrast, Golkar was permitted to work at the village level through its many functional groups and government officials at all levels were automatically deemed to be members of Golkar and KORPRI (Samson 1973: 133).7 To project some semblance of an image of fairness in its treatment of Golkar and the two political parties, the government built offices for the three organisations, literally side by side in some cities.8 However, this did not mask the inequity of their situations and their different capacities to function as political organisations. As Hansen has noted, PPP and PDI opposed the government’s policy since it ‘opened the rural hinterland to Golkar dominance and limited the other parties to urban constituencies’ (1976: 149). Golkar’s success, as Liddle observed, represented ‘the army’s mobilisation of civilian bureaucracy including village officials’ and ‘the effective army-bureaucratic penetration of the villages’ (1992: 448). Similarly, there was a serious imbalance in government financial support for the two parties and Golkar. The PPP and PDI depended on small government subsidies and membership dues alone, as businesses were not interested in supporting them (Juoro 1998: 208). In contrast, although Golkar’s constitution deemed that Golkar’s sources of funding were membership dues, donations and ‘other undertakings’ (Anggaran Dasar Golongan Karya 1973: 6), in practice the government ensured that Golkar had access to substantial funding for its election campaigns. The most important sources of this funding were the Yayasan Dana Karya Abadi (Perpetual Work Fund Foundation, or Yayasan Dakab) and donations from large businesses (Tomsa 2006: 47-48). Because Yayasan Dakab was also a major stakeholder in large banks and companies associated with Suharto, his family and cronies such as Liem Sioe Liong (Robison & Hadiz 2004), Golkar’s funding resources were guaranteed. Suharto’s other foundations, including Supersemar and Dharmais, also provided large amounts of funding for Golkar, with no tax obligations no less (Chalmers & Bourchier 1997).9 The arrangements made by Suharto provided continuous funding support for Golkar, a significant factor in the success of its campaigns, inevitably putting the PPP and PDI at a disadvantage. Yet, despite its favoured position, Golkar experienced the most severe government meddling. The influence of the army (ABRI) was overwhelming, and perhaps inevitable given that ABRI had played a great role in the establishment of Sekber Golkar, and because ‘organisationally’ Golkar was ‘an amalgam of the armed forces and the civilian bureaucracy’ (Liddle 1988: 181). The closeness of Golkar and ABRI was institutionalised in the 1973 concept of Keluarga Besar Golkar (Golkar’s extended family), consisting of ABRI, KORPRI and Golkar.10 Although the

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relationship between these two organisations was frequently criticised (see, for example, Institut Studi Arus Informasi 1996), the close connection between ABRI and Golkar was repeatedly defended by invoking the dwifungsi concept,11 and by the government’s claim that cooperation was necessary to uphold Pancasila and the Indonesian Constitution of 1945. This close relationship meant that Golkar was not an independent organisation and the government could justify interference in its internal affairs through its own close connection with the army. Party Activities During the New Order period, the sporadic nature of party activities reflected the government’s emphasis on elections and every possible mechanism was put in place to ensure Golkar victories. Unlike Golkar’s activities, the activities that the two parties could organise between elections were limited in size and variety. The bulk of their activities were held around the election periods; outside these periods, the PPP and PDI were effectively forced into hibernation due to the restrictions on their grass-roots activities. The parties had to report to the authorities and get their approval before they could organise an event, and they were only permitted to hold social activities because the government decreed that political activities could trigger conflict. Golkar was subject to a much more lenient policy and given more freedom in its choices of activities (Ward 1974: 14; Liddle 1988: 181; Liddle 1992: 448). This double standard denied PPP and PDI the chance to adequately engage with their members or to fully develop their potential as parties by promoting themselves. Party activities were also closely controlled in the lead-up to elections. Regulations and policies affecting campaign activities reflected an extremely heavy-handed election policy, one shaped by fear of conflict, or simply opposition, or, more importantly, the spectre of a Golkar loss. In the first decade after taking power in 1966, the Suharto government banned questions on the Pancasila ideology and the 1945 Constitution. Criticism of the government was also banned. A three-day application period was required to gain permission to hold meetings (Ward 1974: 14) and campaign materials had to be submitted for approval seven days before a campaign event (Undang-undang Pemilihan Umum 1986, Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia nomor 37 tahun 1990). At the same time, the parties had to take care not to insult any religion or group (golongan), and not to let campaigns become battlegrounds for conflict or even comparison between organisations (Ward 1974: 14). In addition, the length of campaigns was later shortened, from two months in the 1971 and 1977 elections to 45 days for the 1987 election, and then to only 25 days (Ward 1974: 14; Radi 1984: 141, 170; Liddle

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1988: 181). These strict regulations were supplemented by intimidatory practices, particularly the use of the armed forces for purported security (Reeve 1985: 298). As Golkar was not a ‘party’, the rules concerning inter-election activities and campaigning conveniently did not apply to it. It was thus freer to choose its activities and organise its campaigns. The PPP and PDI protested after the 1971 election that government officials should not be allowed to campaign; that the two parties should have the freedom to nominate their candidates without government interference; and that the armed forces should be more neutral. But the government insisted that its measures were necessary to ‘guarantee the continuity of the New Order struggle’ (Hansen 1975: 150-151). Golkar’s greater freedom was substantially a result of its close relationship with the armed forces. ABRI’s support for Golkar was most obvious during the elections, when troops were assigned to maintain security. In practice, ABRI’s actions during these periods extended to intimidation and coercion of voters to support Golkar, as demonstrated in the 1971 election (see Nishihara 1972; Samson 1973: 127-128). Because election periods were the only times that the PPP and PDI could act more freely, they worked hard to utilise the opportunities those periods presented to organise activities as effectively as they could within the restrictions imposed by the government. However, organisational problems resulting from those restrictions affected the parties’ capacities to optimise their performances in election campaigns. For example, a report about the election in the city of Pontianak in 1987 noted that the parties were permitted a maximum of five mass rallies in the lead-up to the election.12 During the campaign, the PPP conducted five mass rallies, while Golkar and the PDI conducted five and three, respectively. In the same period, the PPP and the PDI staged public performances twice, while Golkar staged thirteen. Also while Golkar conducted public speeches (ceramah) fifteen times, the PDI did only twice. Golkar also held bhakti sosial (literally, social contributions) four times (Kantor Departemen Penerangan RI Kotamadya Pontianak 1987: 14-15). The PDI was considerably more creative than PPP in its choices of campaign methods and making full use of the pre-election period. For example, the party’s strategy for the 1987 elections was to choose specific candidates for relevant electorates – for instance, Muslim figures for Islamic electorates and Chinese businessmen to attract support from the Chinese community. Other PDI campaign methods included meetings, long marches, leaflets and a ‘sympathy’ or ‘smile’ campaign, mainly involving social work. The party also held carnivals for women supporters, with decorated traditional vehicles (Sukamto et al. 1991: 4, 6). However, the party’s declining popularity in the late 1980s presented difficulties in recruiting enough people to be juru kampanye (jurkam, or campaign

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persons), resulting in the cancellation of some of its scheduled rallies (Sukamto et al. 1991: 7-8). Although the election periods did present the parties with opportunities to promote themselves, it was challenging to maximise the use of these periods within the government’s boundaries. The PPP was severely challenged by the need to find an identity that appealed to voters after it was forced to formally abandon Islam as its party ideology. Although the party continued to use Islamic chants, it had to abandon its Ka’bah symbol (Hakim 1993: 98) and adopted a star instead. In the 1987 election, the PPP did not want to be seen as rebelling against the government by continuing to use an overtly Islamic symbol, and it was cautious about finding the right image that would appeal to supporters. As a result, the party was unable to maximise its campaign opportunities (Haris 1991: 111-117). A door-to-door campaign was substituted for mass public rallies, which would have attracted far more attention (Haris 1991: 112). The PDI was more brazen in violating the government’s regulations. In the 1992 election, the PDI gained a significant boost to its popularity when outspoken campaigners, including two of Sukarno’s children, Megawati and Guruh, and Kwik Kian Gie, a popular Chinese entrepreneur, openly condemned Indonesia’s political conditions by saying things like ‘our democracy is sick’, and likening the state to a ‘monarchy’ or ‘plutocracy’ (Aspinall 2005: 153). In contrast to the parties, Golkar’s close relationship with the armed forces meant that it had more freedom to organise activities both in and outside election periods. Golkar made good use of these opportunities, organising robust campaigns for public support and leveraging the loyalty of its sub-organisations to develop support. In the case of the 1971 election, these tactics ensured that Golkar had significant support even before the campaign period began (Nishihara 1972; Ward 1974: 85). Nishihara has pointed out that in the 1971 election Golkar had finished its essential campaigning before the official campaign period had even started, since the government election committee was dominated by Golkar and military officials (Nishihara 1972: 3). The government set up a special programme to educate parties about election practices, called OPSUS (Operasi Khusus, or Special Operation), but it was misused to reinforce Golkar’s position and to intervene in the parties’ conventions, creating splits and chaos (Nishihara 1972: 21). Crouch has noted that OPSUS was also used by the government to interfere in the internal affairs of PNI (this was before the fusing of the parties) and other parties in an attempt to minimise their chances of garnering support (1987: 265). An important part of the government’s attempt to ensure Golkar’s victory in the 1971 election was the cooptation and coercion of former PKI supporters, who were intimidated into switching their votes to Golkar. The results were big wins in formerly PKI areas, particularly in

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East Java (Ward 1974: 165; Crouch 1978: 268). Golkar was also given more opportunities for holding mass-rallies; meanwhile the media airtime of the parties was limited and their campaign speech texts were subject to prior approval (Nishihara 1982: 34-35). Before the election, Golkar set up a Bapilu (Badan Pengendalian Pemilihan Umum, or Body for the Managing of Elections) that was especially aimed at helping Golkar win by maximising votes from its sub-groups (Pandiangan 1996: 154). The concept karyawan, which was previously only used to refer to civil servants, was extended to workers in 1980, further broadening Golkar’s support base (Reeve 1990: 167-168). Golkar’s various functional groups would usually declare their kebulatan tekad (unanimous endorsement) to support Golkar and Suharto just before the elections (Vatikiotis 1998: 135). Golkar’s affiliated organisations such as Kokarmendagri vigorously campaigned for Golkar, arguing that its victory was the only way to achieve development and economic prosperity. Golkar’s sub-organisations attracted and strengthened support from different social groups, from pedicab drivers to devout Muslims. The influence of Kokarmendargi (which then became KORPRI), as well as the activities of other professional associations, were crucial in mobilising support for Golkar. Membership in these associations meant automatically voting for Golkar as well; failure to comply could result in a range of consequences, including dismissal from work and difficulties in finding other jobs (Samson 1973: 133). Civil servants were required to cast their votes in the workplace, further ensuring that they would vote for Golkar since the government had forced state employees to pledge their loyalty as well as their families’ loyalty only to Golkar and declared that failure to vote for Golkar was a form of treason (Rogers 1988: 261). As a result of Golkar’s close association with its functional groups, their campaign activities could continue outside the election period. With all these measures in place, by 1997 Indonesian elections had become ‘the most comprehensively engineered electoral process in the world’, with institutionalised structural manipulation that ensured Golkar would come out on top (Schiller 1999: 3). Yet Golkar also received genuine support from voters because of its development ideology, which appealed to the poverty-stricken nation (Samson 1973: 128). The combination of voluntary and coerced support made Golkar’s victories a foregone conclusion and thus legitimated the government and the influence of the armed forces (Samson 1973: 128). The mechanisms promoting Golkar were maintained throughout the New Order and were successful in sustaining public support for Golkar, and through it support for the government.

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Recruitment Approaches The three New Order political organisations – Golkar, PPP, and PDI – had rather similar membership regulations, with open membership and undemanding screening requirements. The PPP and Golkar simply required that potential members be at least 17 years of age or married, and that they be literate and willing to participate in party activities (Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 1984: chapter 1; Anggaran Rumah Tangga Golongan Karya: chapter 2). More specific requirements for written formal membership requests and willingness to participate in party training were only added in later party statutes (Anggaran Rumah Tangga Golkar 1988: chapter 1; Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 1994: chapter 1). Like the PPP and Golkar, the PDI required that potential members be at least 17 years old (Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 1973: chapter 2). Initially, potential PDI members could be as young as 15 if they demonstrated a strong interest in political issues, but this clause was deleted in a later statute and replaced by the requirement of a formal written request (Anggaran Dasar Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 1989: chapter 6). All three organisations required that membership registration be completed at a local branch. The PPP and PDI permitted their branches to approve membership applications directly, whereas Golkar required approval from the central office. Aside from these requirements, there was no mention of specific recruitment methods or strategies in any of the three organisations’ constitutions. Although membership conditions and eligibility were clear, the inactivity of local branches – enforced by the floating mass concept (Reeve 1985: 291) – and the continuous political intimidation by the armed forces meant that most of the regulations were not implemented. The result of the government’s restrictions on political activity and the armed forces’ intimidation was that potential members were often apprehensive about any form of political participation (Gaffar 1992: 38-40). The government was thus able to effectively minimise the PPP’s and PDI’s attempts to encourage party registration. Because of these difficulties, the two parties concentrated on attracting popular figures as their electoral candidates. Despite Golkar’s obvious advantage of receiving government backing, which for its candidates meant a much greater chance of winning and thereby obtaining a governmental position, the other parties strived to field the best possible candidates. The PPP and the PDI also focused on getting the most popular public figures as juru kampanye (jurkam, or campaign spokespeople). Before 1987, PPP had a popular Indonesian singer, Rhoma Irama, in its jurkam team. The PPP also enjoyed strong endorsements from ‘eminent Muslim leaders’ such as the former Masyumi leader Muhammad Natsir

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and Nurcholish Madjid (Hakim 1993: 61). However, the party’s internal conflict harmed the party’s image and consequently some of these figures left to join Golkar after the 1987 election (Haris 1991: 120). Both PDI and Golkar benefited from the addition of former PPP supporters who looked for an alternative to the continuing conflicts in the party (Sukamto et al. 1991: 15; Liddle 1988: 182-183; Hakim 1993: 94). The PDI’s success in increasing its popularity was a product of both its own initiative and political conditions. In the 1987 election, the PDI received endorsements from actors and other entertainers, as well as popular religious figures recruited to attract the Muslim vote (Sukamto et al. 1991: 5-6). However, its main recruiting asset was the party’s ability to leverage the charisma of former President Sukarno. Initially the PDI had been banned from using Sukarno’s name, but with the advent of the government’s kerterbukaan (openness) campaign in the 1990s, the PDI could once more publicly claim Sukarno. Sukarno’s children became the centre of attention during the party’s public rallies for the 1987 elections, luring back party supporters and drumming up nostalgia for Sukarno’s heyday. When government support for Suryadi, failed to boost his campaign, the PDI’s popularity continued to rise, and one of Sukarno’s children, Megawati – despite blatant government oppression – assumed the party leadership. The oppression aside, the PDI was able to exploit the government’s openness campaign to use its main recruitment asset, Sukarno and his children. Sukarno’s charisma was so strong that Megawati’s aloofness was largely overlooked and she was associated with her father very closely (Aspinall 2005: 164-165). Despite Megawati’s famed aloofness, she attracted sympathy from Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), head of NU, which significantly boosted her prospects as an opposition leader (Liddle & Mallarangeng 1997: 168-169; Aspinall 2005: 167). The 1996 raid on PDI headquarters, although successful in ousting Megawati (Liddle & Mallarangeng 1997: 171), reflected the party’s capacity for mass mobilisation (Aspinall 2005: 178). At the grass-roots level, the PDI’s recruitment approach depended on indirect membership. Although the party tried to promote direct individual membership, in reality its membership and leadership were drawn mainly from formerly affiliated organisations. In fact, these organisations – mainly inherited from the PNI – served as the primary suppliers of grass-roots membership (Sukamto et al. 1991: 79). However, because of the various restrictions imposed by the government, grass-roots recruitment was hard to conduct effectively, and the PDI had to rely on sympathisers’ emotional support without being able to fully utilise that support in its activities. Similarly, the PPP’s grass-roots recruitment was minimal. During the 18 years of Naro’s leadership, the party only held a national convention (muktamar) twice (Haris 1991: 136). Although membership was open,

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the party’s Islamic image provided an opportunity for the party to particularly attract Muslims. As Hakim has argued, the government’s concept of floating mass, which stipulated that rural masses not be disturbed by politics except in election periods, was ineffective when it came to the PPP, particularly as the kyai-ulama (Islamic religious teachers and scholars) in the rural areas had little regard for government regulations (1993: 55). The connection between kyai and ulama was based on ‘unique dependence and obedience’ that was more powerful than government regulations, and thus few supporters became alienated from the PPP, at least until internal conflict erupted after 1977 (Hakim 1993: 55). However, the party had no specific mechanism for capitalising on this reserve of Islamic support, and although the PPP could escape the floating mass policy, internal conflict eventually caused its grass-roots support to dwindle, especially after NU stopped supporting the party in 1984. Although Golkar’s recruitment occurred automatically through membership in its affiliated associations initially, the organisation decided to adopt individual membership provisions in 1983.13 By June 1988 Golkar had issued over 26 million membership cards, and had nine million cadres, each of whom had the task of recruiting six to seven votes for Golkar.14 Even if its membership and cadre numbers were overstated, Golkar’s extensive network of sub-groups at the local level ensured substantial membership and support. At the same time, Golkar had the flexibility to adjust its policies significantly, something which the parties were not able to do because of the strict regulations on political parties’ organisation. Around the 1990s, Golkar adapted its approach to express a more Islamic tone in order to attract more Muslims. The move mimicked a number of Islam-friendly government policies, such as the passing of Islamic Court Law, which acknowledged the jurisdiction of the Islamic court in some areas; allowing Muslim students in government schools to wear a jilbab (female head-covering); the closing down of a tabloid newspaper (Monitor) on publication of a blasphemous article; the formation of Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim (the Indonesia/ Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association, or ICMI); and the establishment of an Islamic bank (Suryadinata 1997: 194-195).15 The evolution of Golkar’s recruitment approaches demonstrates the government’s priority to enlarge its support base, at the expense of the PPP and PDI. Members’ Motivation and Participation Government attempts to curb party operations were effective in ensuring that the two parties could not develop proper connections with their supporters. Due to passive and opportunistic recruitment approaches, members’ attachments to the parties were either based on patronage or

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near-blind loyalty, particularly because the PPP and PDI were not able to cultivate and deepen members’ support through regular grass-roots activities. Members’ participation in the parties was restricted to the campaign period, while opportunities for deeper engagement were cut off, as grass-roots branches were forced to be inactive by the government’s policies. However, Golkar’s privileged position enabled it to provide its members with material benefits that strengthened their attachment to the organisation. The undemanding membership requirements of the two parties also did little to cultivate active involvement by their members. According to the parties’ constitutions, the basic duties of members were to obey party regulations and support party undertakings, while their rights included the right to attend meetings and voice their opinions, vote for leaders, and offer corrections and suggestions to the central leadership (Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 1984: chapters 2-3; Anggaran Dasar Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 1973: chapter 2). Additional rights such as the right to attend party training, the right to vote and be voted as party leaders, and the right to be protected and defended by the party, as well as the duty to pay dues, were only added in a later party constitutions (Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 1989: chapter 3; Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 1994: chapter 2). But these party regulations meant little since the PPP and PDI had no capacity to implement them in the absence of functioning party mechanisms at the grass-roots. In general, Golkar had similar regulations regarding the rights and duties of members. But besides having to obey and carry out all organisation decisions, members had to reject any move that could hurt the organisation and to attend meetings (Anggaran Rumah Tangga Golongan Karya 1973: chapter 3; Anggaran Rumah Tangga Golongan Karya 1993: chapter 2). The rights of Golkar members included voicing their opinions, voting and being voted as staff, and receiving protection, cadre training and organisational skills from the organisation (Anggaran Rumah Tangga Golongan Karya 1973: chapter 4; Anggaran Rumah Tangga Golongan Karya 1993: chapter 3). Only Golkar required its members to pay dues, before that requirement was added to the parties’ constitutions, and it specifically identified cadre training as a member’s right from the beginning of the New Order (Anggaran Rumah Tangga Golongan Karya 1973: chapter 3; Anggaran Rumah Tangga Golongan Karya 1993: chapter 2). Thus, only Golkar made concrete demands from its members, but compensated by providing skills for them. And only Golkar committed to developing processes for better interaction with its members. The parties had little capacity to do so. Generally, the only visible member participation in the parties occurred during public rallies and the parties’ anniversary celebrations

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(Sukamto et al. 1991; Haris 1991). Deeper involvement from members was difficult to establish, as local branches at the sub-district level had limited authority and capacity to schedule activities, making cadre training and members’ involvement in party meetings hard to organise. However, conditions under the New Order created a sharp distinction between participation and attachment, and despite their incapacity to manage their members, both parties enjoyed strong loyalty from their supporters. This was particularly clear in the passion shown by supporters of both the PPP and PDI in defending their parties. In the most violent campaign period during the New Order, there were ‘frequent clashes between Golkar and PPP supporters’ (Eklof 1997: 1187). During an incident on 27 July 1996, Megawati supporters were attacked by PDI members who supported Suryadi, who was backed by the military and the police. The loyalty of Megawati’s supporters was remarkable given the intense intimidation and coercion used by the government. These cases indicate that loyalty to the two parties could not be curbed by coercion. It survived the limitations placed on the parties by the government, and remained strong despite the absence of mechanisms through which party members could regularly engage in party life. In the case of Golkar, although coercion and intimidation helped ensure strong electoral turnout, its developmentalist ideology also garnered support. Initially, Golkar had gained popularity as an alternative form of political organisation (Reeve 1985: 298), taking advantage of the parties’ negative images during previous governments, while promoting the idea of improving national economic conditions (Reeve 1985: 263, 298-299). Throughout the New Order, economic growth gave the government legitimacy and underpinned support for Golkar, because Golkar victories ensured that development – and party patronage – would continue. Eventually, its success drew members mainly for benefits such as ‘lucrative jobs in the bureaucracy and other affiliated organisations’ (Tomsa 2006: 44). But attachment to Golkar was at times also rooted in fear – for example, amongst the civil service, who had no choice but to support it. Party Career and Intra-party Democracy Because of restrictions on the parties’ grass-roots operations, party career dynamics mainly revolved around national leadership. At the national level, leadership was elected at a national convention, but the election process for leadership at lower levels received much less attention from the parties, mostly because those lower levels were not significant under the government’s floating mass policy. As a result, within the PPP and the PDI there was little prospect of meaningful regeneration and extremely limited means of monitoring individuals’ career

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advancement within the parties. Golkar was able to manage leadership changes better and more regularly with the support of its sub-organisations and its influence in village bureaucracy (Ward 1974; Liddle 1992: 448; Sanit 1994: 33). Nonetheless, intra-party democracy was weak in Golkar. Among the three electoral contestants, only the PDI provided a formal path for career progression through which it rewarded members’ commitment with promotions.16 In this regard, PDI transferred the rigour of its predecessor PNI in the formulation of its constitution. The party also had specific eligibility requirements for leadership candidates (Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 1973: chapter 9; Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 1989: chapter 9). The lack of formal mechanisms for career progression in the other organisations, particularly Golkar, indicated the low priority they accorded to membership management; as an organisation, Golkar showed poor organisational skills and low priority in nurturing members. Golkar’s constitution included no particular regulations concerning progression through different types of membership, except that leaders should be elected by the congress at the relevant level (Anggaran Dasar Golongan Karya 1973: chapter 9). Organisational difficulties within the PPP caused severe problems at both the national and local levels. The party consisted of different Islamic groups, which were all influential and powerful, a situation that had strong potential to create tensions, and indeed it spawned leadership conflict at the national level (Hakim 1993: 76-95). As a result, party leadership was dependent upon the party’s ability to compromise with its affiliated Islamic organisations, including NU and Muslimin Indonesia. This arrangement caused serious conflicts in the party after the 1977 elections, highlighted by the tension between the leaders of the PPP’s two major affiliates, NU and Muhammadiyah, which were two of Indonesia’s largest Islamic organisations. A feeling of desperation developed within the party, resulting in a proposal by PPP officials in 1983 that Suharto become the Pembina Utama (Chief Advisor) of the party (van Dijk 1984: 162-166). The proposal was outrageous given Suharto’s position at that time as a leader of Golkar. This conflict undermined support for the PPP, especially when NU’s leader, K.H. Achmad Siddiq, gave permission to NU members to vote for the PDI or Golkar, claiming that there was no Islamic principle preventing them from doing so (Romli 2006: 84). There were also serious problems within the PPP at the local level. In 1984, the party released a document detailing its internal problems and suggestions on how to overcome them. In this document, it was admitted that the organisation was poorly managed, and that there should be better financial systems and a more stringent selection process for leaders at all levels of the party (Team

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Perbaikan dan Pengendalian Operasional Posisi Partai 1984). In addition, the party’s approach to cadre training was unclear, and only after witnessing how Golkar managed this matter did the PPP realise that it would have to do the same (Haris 1991: 136). Within the PDI, leadership change was based largely on those elements that initially built the party. For example, the position of chairperson was given to former PNI personnel because PNI was the major element in PDI (Sukamto et al. 1991: 80). Other positions were given to representatives of the smaller parties that had been fused into the PDI. However, developments within the PDI from the late 1980s demonstrated the extent of the government’s control of the party’s internal affairs. The PDI had increased its share of the vote significantly in the 1987 and 1992 elections under the leadership of government-backed Suryadi; then Sukarno’s daughter Megawati, who was already a member of parliament, became party leader. Upon her election, the government began harassing her, such as by rejecting her choice of provincial party chair in East Java. An extraordinary congress under heavy military control was then held to re-elect Suryadi. Megawati’s supporters rejected Suryadi’s re-election, and a bloody clash erupted between supporters of both the candidates, resulting in a riot and looting on 27 July 1996 (Liddle & Mallarangeng 1997: 167). As in the PPP, barriers to recruitment at the grass-roots level in the PDI made it difficult for the party to apply a stringent policy on party regeneration. As mentioned, the government’s ban on the establishment of active branches prevented the two parties from tapping into their grass-roots support. As a result, the PDI focused instead on electoral campaigns and candidate recruitment. Thus, although there were strong indications of loyal grass-roots support, most notably evidenced by the support for Sukarno and the support from lower and middle classes (Aspinall 2005: 174-176, 186), the party could not develop it further. Aspinall suggests that grass-roots organisation was better managed after Megawati assumed party leadership, as indicated by the competition at the grass-roots between ‘relatively independent but marginal small entrepreneurs … and local party bosses’ (2005: 175). However, there was a lack of structure for career promotion and a lack of organisation in leadership succession; party cadres were identified by their occupations instead. In this regard, the PDI also failed to have a clear career management system. The strong loyalty to the parties at the grass-roots consequently failed to translate into anything more than sporadic activity, which could not be effectively channelled by the branches. Branch leadership was nonexistent and party career dynamics were focused on the national level instead. The government’s interference was highly influential in the parties’ leadership problems, as demonstrated by its rejection of

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Megawati as the PDI’s elected leader. The strong grip of the government on the parties at the central level ensured that the demands at the grassroots remained just that, demands, and the disconnected central party leadership had no power to harness them. Golkar had the advantage with regard to party career and other intraparty procedures, as its better, more extensive organisation operated more freely. Not only did Golkar’s extensive network of sub-organisations and favourable government regulations provide a steady supply of members, but career development and leadership matters were conducted in a top-down manner, under the influence of the bureaucracy and the military. Most notably, interference from the army, ABRI, was very clear in the party leadership. Many military figures held Golkar positions since the close relationship between Golkar and ABRI allowed for the transfer of personnel between the two entities, and most of the time dual posts were allowed (Pandiangan 1996: 153). Military figures dominated Golkar’s chairpersonship since its formation. Top posts in the national council also were held by military personnel, as were branches down to the district level (Pandiangan 1996: 34-35). Golkar’s DPD (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah or Regional Leadership Council) was dominated by ABRI figures, a clear example being L.B. Moerdani’s term, as he was ABRI’s highest commander (Institut Studi Arus Informasi 1999: 13). Even its sub-organisations were chaired by military men (Ward 1974: 26). But the most significant example of dual leadership in ABRI and Golkar was Suharto himself, who served both as Ketua Dewan Pembina Golkar (Head of Golkar’s Advisory Council) and as Indonesian president, a position whose incumbent automatically also held ABRI’s highest command.

Reformasi: Another Period of Transition After the Thai currency collapsed in July 1997, the Asian region quickly crumbled economically, as investors swiftly reassessed their business risks in the region. The Asian economic crisis caused the Indonesian rupiah to plummet against the USD and the banking sector to collapse. The government’s inability to meet the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) conditions for assistance worsened the economic turmoil. Meanwhile opposition to the government was gaining ground; some parts of the elite began to support PDI’s Megawati (Aspinall 2005: 177238). By 1998 government promises of economic growth were no longer able to subdue demands for political change. A string of street protests led by students, met by a violent response and government killings of students, clearly demonstrated the government’s inability to establish order, and Suharto finally stepped down in May 1998. His departure opened the door for dramatic change, and Habibie, his former deputy

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and appointed successor, quickly declared significant changes to appease opposition forces. Thus began the era of reformasi (reform). One of the most significant changes of the Habibie Interregnum was the immediate removal of the government’s ban on the formation of political parties. As many as 145 parties quickly registered, ranging from ‘major’ parties such as the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party, or PKB), with strong NU backing, to ‘obscure’ ones such as the Partai Perempuan (Women’s Party, or PP) and Partai Aliansi Rakyat Miskin Indonesia (Indonesian Poor People’s Alliance Party, or PARMI) (Suryadinata 2002: 75). PDI and Golkar suffered most as a result of this explosion of parties. The PDI splintered into at least five parties: the PDI (led by Budi Hardjono), the PDI-Perjuangan (led by Megawati), the Partai Nasional Indonesia-Massa Marhaen (Indonesian National PartyMarhaenist Masses, or PNI-Massa Marhaen), the Partai Nasional Indonesia-Front Marhaenis (Indonesian National Party-Marhaenist Front, or PNI-Front Marhaenis), and the Partai Nasional Indonesia-Supeni (Indonesian National Party-Supeni, or PNI-Supeni). All boasted a similar bull’s head symbol.17 Golkar also broke apart into the Partai Golkar (Golkar Party), Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (Justice and Unity Party, or PKP), and Partai Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong (Mutual Assistance and Family-Oriented Deliberation Party, or Partai MKGR). Islamic parties also sprouted forth, including the PKB, the Partai Keadilan (Justice Party, or PK) – which later became Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party, or PKS) – as well as Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Awakening Party, or Kami), Partai Ummat Islam (Islamic Community Party, or PUI), and Partai Masyumi Baru (New Masyumi Party, or PMI). In addition, Amien Rais, a pro-Reformasi figure closely associated with Muhammadiyah, formed the nominally secular party, Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party, or PAN) (Suryadinata 2002: 77-79, 85). The Habibie government then restructured the election system and set up a screening mechanism for the parties, which, in contrast to the New Order’s system, forced them to demonstrate that they had local branches as proof of their support base. The new system, regulated by Law No. 3/1999, required parties to have branches in at least fourteen provinces and fourteen districts/special regions. It also required them to have established committees (pengurus) in more than half of the provinces and in half of the districts and special regions (Undang-Undang RI No. 2/1999: chapter 11). These requirements meant that only popular parties could compete in the elections. More importantly, they highlighted the importance of having strong grass-roots connections for maintaining popularity.18 In the 1999 election, of the 48 parties that met the requirements to compete, 21 achieved parliamentary representation. The overwhelming

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majority of seats were obtained by PDIP, Golkar, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party, or PKB), PPP, PAN and Partai Bulan Bintang (Star Crescent Party, or PBB) (Komisi Pemilihan Umum 2004). In the 2004 election, only the parties that had received more than 2 per cent of the votes in the 1999 election were allowed to compete, forcing the less popular parties to reorganise, as was the case with PKS. Among the 24 parties contesting the 2004 election, Golkar was the top votegetter, followed by PDIP, PKB, Partai Demokrat (Democrat Party, or PD), PKS and PAN (Komisi Pemilihan Umum 2004). Although there were shifts in the major parties’ results between the two elections, the incumbents demonstrated sustained popularity in each. At the same time, some of the new parties showed signs of stabilising their support bases and therefore must now be considered major parties. Since reformasi, nominees for the position of president of Indonesia have been ultimately determined by coalitions rather than the party with the most votes in an election. Although PDIP performed extremely well in the 1999 election, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), the leader of PKB, was elected president,19 and it was only after his impeachment that Megawati began her term as president.20 In the 2004 election, although Partai Golkar received the most votes, it was a candidate from a new party, PD’s Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, that became president, and the first directly elected one, despite predictions that Megawati would remain president (Sebastian 2004: 268-269). Because of these unpredictable developments, scholars have argued that ‘power-sharing arrangements and coalition politics’ will have a continuing influence in national politics in Indonesia (Sebastian 2004: 256). At the same time, despite having a reputation as ‘power-hungry, selfish, and corrupt’, the parties remain the backbone of the political system in the post-Suharto period (Tan 2002: 485). An electoral law that was passed in 1999 (Undang-Undang No. 22/1999) gave the parties even greater influence in Indonesian politics. The regions were now able to conduct their own elections of local leaders (pilkada/pemilihan kepala daerah), creating new political ground for competition among the parties. It was against this background that the political parties entered reform-era politics. As we will see, the parties have proven that they can function at the national and local levels. Although they now have much greater freedom than they had for several decades, none of the parties – including the incumbents – and not even Golkar entered the postSuharto period with a well-established party organisation. This combination of circumstances has presented the parties with an unprecedented challenge, forcing them to move beyond merely attracting votes to undertaking initiatives to develop and solidify their role as conduits of political participation.

4

Party Organisation

The newfound freedom that followed the fall of Suharto in May of 1998 was a shock, a wake-up call, and a great opportunity for Indonesian political parties after a long period of slumber. In the vastly more open political climate of the era of reformasi, the parties – now numbering over a hundred – were able to devote far more attention to organising at the grass-roots. Indeed, the Habibie government’s electoral system required them to demonstrate that they had local branches as evidence of public support. In response, the parties developed different approaches to branch office management. But, in general, management of local branch offices relied more on the skills and initiatives of local leaders than on the branches’ relationships with their central party offices. The role of local party administrators was crucial in determining the efficiency of the branches and their management, as were staff skills and the swiftness of party responses to outside enquiries. To fully grasp the situation of the Indonesian political parties in this era, a discussion of party organisation more generally is helpful. In particular, it will be useful to understand what constitutes a well-organised political party, and how the relationship between a central party office and local branches can shape a party’s effectiveness.

Elements of Party Organisation Political parties are, of course, not simply comprised of legislative members and their support staff. Extra-parliamentary organisations are a crucial element, as they can ‘facilitate or stifle political participation’ (Scarrow 1996: 11). In his cross-national study of party organisation, Janda (1980) examined the array of party organs in 50 countries and the management of the relationship between local and national bodies. He argues that a well-organised party has an extensive organisation that extends to the smallest unit at the local level. One example is Thailand’s Democrat Party, whose supreme decision-making body encourages members to set up branches among constituencies in areas with no branches (Sejong Institute 2000). On the other hand, one of the weaknesses of South Korea’s New Democratic Party (NDP) in the late 1960s

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was that while the party had branches among all constituencies, they were closed outside the election periods. As in New Order Indonesia, interaction with masses was thus limited to campaign periods (Han 1969: 463). As Janda suggests, party organisation at the local level is pivotal in the institutionalisation of a party (see also Mainwaring & Scully 1995). However, there is little agreement about the specific variables that determine how organised a party is. Janda (1980: 98) defines ‘degree of organisation’ as the ‘complexity of regularised procedures for mobilising and coordinating the efforts of party supporters in executing the party’s strategy and tactics’. Dalton & Wattenberg (2000) argue that party organisation is most closely related to membership and member mobilisation in election campaigns. In The Handbook of Party Politics (2006), party models or party types1 are considered an essential element of party organisation. The Handbook suggests that member mobilisation is an indication of a member’s utilisation by the party, but also considers the administrative role of branches within the party structure and the issue of branch administration. For many scholars, strength of party organisation is strongly related to membership. Blondel (1978: 137-140) emphasises the importance of members. He presents four ‘ideal requirements of party organisation’. A party should be ‘large’, he writes, as smallness can be identified with failure, while a large party is seen as able to bring together a significant proportion of a community. A party should also be ‘unified’ since a disunited party causes concern among supporters and leads to disrespect by opponents. Blondel’s third prerequisite is that a party should be ‘dynamic’ – active, including by organising regular and frequent events to influence society. The fourth condition for party organisation is that a party should be ‘democratic’ and responsive to the views of its members; this implies that parties need to listen to, value and try to realise members’ wishes. All four of Blondel’s conditions demand solid organisation of party membership. A large party needs to recruit and develop a membership base; a united party is able to coordinate and manage its members well; and a dynamic party can leverage its members to organise and execute various party activities.2 However, the role of members is most influential in the fourth condition, that a party should be democratic: the party must accommodate their voices in its decision-making procedures. Scarrow (1996) contends that party organisation and membership management are key to achieving parties’ ultimate goal – to win elections. She argues that the need for party organisations initially emerged from the development of party membership and that organisational efforts are essentially aimed at managing a party’s relationship with its members to obtain maximum results. Scarrow’s analysis of party

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organisation in Europe begins with an examination of the costs and benefits of enrolling members for the party, and concludes that membership is beneficial overall, despite declining party membership triggered by the ‘levelling out’ of classes in society (1996: 8, chapter 2). In light of the difficulties parties face in returning to the glory days of mass membership, she contends that parties need to organise their members more intensively. For instance, parties in Great Britain and Germany have considered lowering registration requirements to attract more members and have promised to give members more influence in decision-making to spur deeper participation from inactive members (Scarrow 1996: 157-160, 169-171). These arguments suggest that successful parties not only need to have branches, but those branches need to be active and organised. Relations between central party structures and branch offices are important here, specifically the control and support of the central offices. The German parties described in Scarrow’s study have sophisticated organisational structures that build on a mutually beneficial relationship between the state and regional party offices. The state office provides the base for the regional office, while the regional office manages membership arrangements, campaign activities and community outreach programmes for the benefit of the party (Scarrow 1996: 55, 126-128, 134143). Janda (1980: chapter 9) also stresses the relationship between central and local party offices. He argues that well-organised parties tend to be strongly centralised, so that regional and local bodies have clear guidance from the central office, which, in turn, enables smooth implementation of party activities at the local level. However, as Deschouwer (2006: 298) points out, the higher echelons of a party must manage their relationships with branch offices carefully. This is critical since local party branches play important roles in parties, especially in election campaigns, where they are expected to organise local campaigns, hold public rallies and distribute leaflets (Deschouwer 2006: 298). How well the branches manage these tasks is partly dependent on guidance and support from the central office. Outside election campaigns, local branches are required to carry out parties’ organising activities, manage recruitment and build support at the grass-roots level. A high level of organisation within the branch office itself is key to enabling the branch to effectively manage these different tasks. In addition to these larger tasks, branches have to manage the more administrative aspects of their operation, such as record-keeping. Scarrow (1996: 66) and Janda (1980: chapter 9) argue that the ability to keep track of important figures, such as on party membership, enables a party to develop a better geographic and demographic knowledge of its members. The same can be said about keeping records of party activities. Branches’ ability to maintain detailed and up-to-date records of

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party activities can help them understand their current members better and to design future activities to attract wider support, if needed. The party branches examined in Scarrow’s study maintained contact with their members by assigning special bodies to certain neighborhoods, employing methods such as door-to-door dues collection (1996: 128129). Measures like these indicate a great emphasis on establishing and managing close control over local support and membership. Undoubtedly, parties need funding to operate, mainly for administration and organisation of events. Webb (1995) emphasises the importance of financial strength. Using the example of British parties, he suggests that resources and the capacity to deploy those resources effectively are two important indicators of organisational strength. In his discussion of parties’ financial position and staffing, he contends that a party that is able to sustain solid financial strength and have a professional internal organisation will be successful. For Janda (1980), financial arrangements reflect the level of centralisation in the party, and so can be used as an indicator of the relationship between local and national party offices. A larger central office role in financial matters indicates greater centralisation and thus a higher level of organisation (Janda 1980). South Korea’s NDP (New Democratic Party) offers evidence in support of Janda’s argument. Yet the NDP’s financial weakness at the central level was exacerbated, if not caused, by the absence of effective branch-level organisation (Han 1969: 457). Another significant aspect of party organisation is the physical condition of local administrative infrastructure. Szczerbiak (1999) points to the importance of the ‘nuts and bolts’ of party organisational structure, such as local offices, communication facilities and paid local party staff. He observes that local party offices in Poland that have not functioned in a ‘bureaucratic sense’ have generally been ‘single rooms fulfilling the basic function of a meeting place’ without a telephone or other facilities (Szczerbiak 1999: 529). Party branches rely on their employees, yet party employees are ‘one of the most under-researched fields in the study of political parties’ (Webb & Kolodny 2006: 337). How Parties Organize (Katz & Mair 1994) discusses party staffing in different Western democracies and examines the staffing arrangements chosen by particular parties. The book’s contributors argue that advanced parties demand skills and professionalism from their staffs, forcing the parties to hire paid professionals, either permanently or to perform specific tasks during election periods. Szczerbiak’s and Spirova’s studies of Central Europe develop arguments about party organisation in post-authoritarian contexts (Szczerbiak 1999; Spirova 2005). Like Indonesia, the countries involved are considered new democracies. In his study of Poland, Szczerbiak introduces an important difference between ‘old parties’ that survived the

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transition from Communism and ‘new parties’ established after the fall of Communism. Szczerbiak found that the new parties’ local offices mostly did not function in the ‘bureaucratic sense’ since they often consisted of a single room that served as a meeting place with limited communication facilities and no paid employees. For these new parties, membership dues are symbolic and play no significant role in party operations, while central party offices only provide minimal and occasional training sessions for party activists. In contrast, the old parties in Poland enjoy better facilities because of their financial strength and greater support from their central offices. Just as the older political parties in Indonesia inherited resources from the New Order era, the older parties in Poland inherited resources from the Communist era. Spirova (2005) examines the development of party organisation in Bulgaria. Her study focuses on membership size, the extensiveness of party organisation at the local level, the ratio of members to paid professionals in parties, and the approaches of party leaders towards recruitment and organisation-building. She found a positive correlation between the level of party organisation and success in building support and management at the local level (Spirova 2005: 601-609). Like Szczerbiak, Spirova argues that post-Communist parties tend to lack strong organisational structures and have weak links with society. She also asserts that parties in democratic transitional countries can follow a different developmental path than Western parties – they might ‘leapfrog’ stages in party organisation to reach current levels rather than replicate Western trajectories (2005: 601-602). I seek to identify parallel trends in Indonesia in order to determine whether the parties there are building their local organisations sufficiently to manage grass-roots support. It is important to identify a contemporary set of indicators of party organisation that can be applied in non-Western contexts. Appleton & Ward (1997) present a set of indicators of organisational innovation, or the ‘introduction of new structures and practices’, which they group into personnel, finances, activities and physical resources. The indicators for personnel include a clear division of labour and a shift from voluntary to paid staff. Financial indicators include fundraising techniques and subvention formulas (how parties distribute funds across the different levels of hierarchy). The indicators for activity include recruitment and affiliations with other organisations. The important physical resources are the party headquarters, satellite offices and new technology, since according to Appleton & Ward (1997: 353) the use of ‘computer or communication systems’ represents an ‘organisational adaptation’. In the following discussion of party administration at the grass-roots level in Malang, Indonesia, I evaluate parties’ performances using these indicators of organisational innovation. As I will show, local adminis-

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tration depends on a party’s physical, financial and human resources. When a local party branch boasts more organised administrative processes, it has a greater capacity to organise events and reach out to the public. Better administration, in turn, is closely related to party professionalism. This study associates professionalism less with salary and payroll than with the skills of the staff. Although incumbent parties have the benefits of experience and existing offices, efficiency depends more on a branch’s level of commitment and leadership. The younger parties may lack experience, but they have the advantages of fresh perspectives and better technology-related skills. The different pathways that the Indonesian parties have chosen have led to different levels of efficiency.

Party Administration in Malang Party administration at the local level is indicative of a party’s capacity to fulfil its obligations to grass-roots members. Local branches are the first real connection with a party that its members experience, which may result in a different picture of the party from the image that the party portrays in the media. The local branches of the four parties I examined – Partai Golkar, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Partai Amanat Nasional, and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera – had different administrative arrangements, which resulted in different levels of efficiency in dealing with administrative problems. There were differences among the parties and between branches of the same party when it came to staffing and office administration, and in the level of connection between central and local offices. Funding for the parties also varied and in some cases reflected the level of branch independence from the central office; but external donations were important to all of the parties’ finances. Partai Golkar (Golkar Party) Partai Golkar’s kodya (municipality) and kabupaten (regency) branches in Malang had similar administration arrangements during my fieldwork. In both offices, the party chose to have paid administrative staff oversee daily operations. These secretaries had sufficient administrative skills and experience, and received assistance from other office staff; both offices were constantly open for members and outsiders. However, the kodya leader demonstrated more initiative than the kabupaten leader in maintaining a close relationship with the central office; the latter leader was more occupied with his daytime job as Malang’s bupati (regent). Consequently, the two offices had different administrative policies on the handling of requests and enquiries.

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Partai Golkar’s local offices were generally well-organised and wellsupported financially. Administratively, Partai Golkar has benefited heavily from the support of the former New Order government. Aside from the extensiveness of the party’s sub-organisations, the party also had property assets, which none of the other three parties examined here possessed. At the time of my fieldwork, Partai Golkar owned its kabupaten office and was trying to buy its kodya office. Although such ownership has little to do with party organisation, it demonstrated the party’s significant resources. Similarly, the party’s strong financial position enabled it to employ a paid professional administrator in each of its local branches.3 This arrangement has benefited the party by providing it with solid archive organisation and administration. Both the kodya and kabupaten offices kept regular records of their operations, including activities and memberships. Partai Golkar’s kodya branch in Malang was located in an old house that had been converted to an office. When I visited it, the office consisted of meeting rooms and small offices for administrators. The office manager was a paid staff member, who handled administrative matters, including organising meeting schedules as well as the chairperson’s personal schedule. The office archive was well-maintained, with detailed records of activities and budgets, along with quarterly reports submitted to the central office and an inventory of furniture and other party assets in the building. Partai Golkar’s kodya office demonstrated solid management and active interaction with the central office, as reflected by the quarterly reporting of party activities to the central office. According to the kodya chairperson, the regular reports and overall branch organisation were his personal initiatives, and the central office did not insist on regular reporting from local offices. Partai Golkar’s kabupaten office was a purpose-built two-storey building. It had several small offices for the administrators, as well as for the chairperson, and a large hall on the upper floor which usually housed meetings. Like the kodya office, the kabupaten office was administered by paid staff members who maintained office records, including past election results.4 However, in contrast to the kodya office, this office did not submit reports to the central office despite maintaining good archives of party activities. The different practices I observed confirmed the kodya chairperson’s argument that relationships with the central office depended on the personal initiative of individual branch chairs. The two offices’ different relationships with the central office were reflected in the methods chosen by them for handling research interview requests. Although the kodya office required permission from the central office, the kabupaten office issued permission independently. In other words, although the kodya office was well-organised, it was reluctant to make independent decisions on interview permission, while the

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kabupaten office proved more willing to grant interviews without consulting the central office. Although both kodya and kabupaten were quite swift in their responses to external research queries in general, they had different processes there as well. The kodya office was insistent on central office permission for all research-related enquiries, and when asked about contact details for kecamatan (sub-district) leaders and activity records, the chairperson refused to cooperate without such permission.5 In the end, contact details for kecamatan leaders were obtained during party events, with limited assistance from the office. In contrast, it was easy to obtain updates on upcoming meetings and events from the kodya office, where a small blackboard recorded the meetings and activities of the week. There was no such arrangement for the kabupaten office, where updates were only received by making weekly telephone calls. This difference reinforced my impression that each office had considerable independence in managing its administration. At the same time, it also suggested a level of incoherence in the policies of the different branches. The two branches had similar arrangements for their finances. Funding for Partai Golkar operation and activities, according to party leaders, came from the regular budget of the central and provincial offices. The party also received money from fraksi6 members who were required to donate their salaries to the party. Nevertheless, donations from party supporters were very important and party leaders emphasised their gratitude to these loyal supporters. The reliance on donations from sitting members and key supporters suggests that members’ dues are a relatively insignificant source of party finances when compared with these other sources. Partai Golkar’s branches, although well-administered, did not use recent technology. For instance, computer use was quite limited and office administrators still relied on manual typewriters. Office secretaries thus typed official letters manually, just as they typed activity reports, and they manually attached photos and other documentation related to each activity.7 The offices were also not equipped with facsimile machines and communication was carried out mainly by telephone. But party activists demonstrated a strong preference for the use of mobile phones. Although they were the personal property of the individuals, the phone numbers were easily passed around and they were used for party purposes.8 The use of mobile phones was crucial for the kabupaten office, particularly because of the geographical size of the Malang area. It was convenient for the office to get hold of members and cadres on their mobile phones, since their occupations meant that they seldom had access to a landline.9 Organising meetings and events became easier among cadres as a result of this technology, as cadres could easily communicate among themselves. This suggests that the offices were

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efficient despite the absence of computers and fax machines, and that other technologies, specifically mobile phones, ensured that the branches could operate effectively. In sum, Partai Golkar branches were well-organised and the administrators proved able to successfully execute party activities, mainly because the party chose to have – and was able to afford – employed professionals to run its local branches. Branches had freedom to determine the nature of reporting mechanisms to the central office, which indicates that while the central office does provide funding for the branches, the latter retain independence to make their own decisions. As the examples above demonstrate, control and supervision from the central office depended upon the branch’s willingness to accede it and was not strictly regulated. Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party Perjuangan) There were significant differences in the administration of the PDIP’s local kodya and kabupaten offices in Malang. Although they had similar arrangements in terms of their choices of administrators, they differed in their levels of activity and their efficiency. The kabupaten office administrator was more efficient, as evidenced by the regularity of branch activities, while the kodya office was more erratic. The PDIP branches’ choices of office management and the characteristics of individual leaders played the determining roles in deciding the degree of activity of the branches. The fact that PDIP’s local branches were extremely independent from the central office helps explain the stark differences between them. The significant decentralisation of authority in PDIP extended to party finances. The party claimed that there was a certain amount of money given by the central office to local branches monthly, but it was spent by the branches on daily administration expenses. This indicates that support from the central office was insufficient. The problem was compounded by the fact that membership dues were also miniscule and collected irregularly. As a result, PDIP branches relied considerably on donations from local supporters to fund their activities. The insufficiency of members’ dues can be explained by the facts that recruitment was not a priority for the party and that party policy did not make dues obligatory for members. As a result, the local branches relied primarily on outside donors for funding. The PDIP’s kodya and kabupaten administrators demonstrated different approaches to office management. The erratic kodya office showed minimal organisational management, with the office administrator taking a limited role in office administration, while the efficient kabupaten

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administrator was more involved in party activities. PDIP’s predecessor, PDI, had been one of the three political parties permitted to contest the New Order elections and had been allocated kodya office space in a small complex of offices assigned to these three parties. When I visited it, the building had a small office for the kodya chairperson to use whenever he visited, and a meeting hall in the middle. It functioned both as the PDIP’s kodya office and the home of its office-administrator.10 The office was inactive most days, although the office staff, who were also the branch administrators, lived there.11 The administrators were essentially two loyal party supporters. They were paid by the party, but had few administration skills. The office-bearers tended to the office upkeep, but administration matters were handled by the office secretary, who rarely visited the office. The office did not keep records of its activities and there was no mechanism for reporting to the central office. The office-bearers did, however, maintain a membership database. The kabupaten office was more active generally. The branch headquarters were located in an office building with a meeting hall and small offices for the office administrator and chairperson. As in the kodya office, the administrator was essentially a party activist paid by the party. However, unlike her kodya counterparts, she did not live in the office, but was there during office hours and had the necessary administration skills to handle outside enquiries. She also demonstrated better awareness of party activities than the kodya office-bearers. The one aspect of branch operation that was standardised was the granting of research interview permission. In contrast to Golkar, interviews at all PDIP branches required permission, with the national leaders’ signatures, from the central office. This standard procedure meant that one letter could be used for all branches at the local level. The power of official permission for interviews from the central office was respected by local leaders.12 However, my requests and enquiries to the local offices were met with some delay in the kodya office. The kabupaten office was swift in responding upon the production of a permission letter, but kodya’s office-bearers only cooperated after insisting that the office secretary be contacted first. Only after a number of visits to the office and several telephone conversations with the office secretary did the office-bearers agree to share their membership database. Information on meetings and activities were also more difficult to obtain from the kodya office.13 Thus, local bureaucracy in PDIP’s Malang offices varied, with the kabupaten office being more active and responsive. Although the kabupaten office was more active than the kodya office, the latter was more technology-savvy. The kodya office-bearers maintained a membership database on a computer. However, the computer was kept at the back of the office, suggesting that it was only used for

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database purposes, not for overall office administration. At the kabupaten office, administration matters were handled using typewriters. When asked for the contact details of kecamatan leaders, the administrators handwrote the information – perhaps suggesting that even the typewriter was not often used in the office. Telephone was the only way to contact both offices, as no facsimiles were in use. As with Partai Golkar, personal mobile phones were widely used among party activists. However, it was more difficult to contact PDIP personnel than those of the other parties. The PDIP leaders’ governmental duties14 occupied their time more than party business, which came a distant second to their official jobs. This situation meant the kodya office was less active. For the kabupaten office, the office administrator, rather than the party leader, was critical in maintaining daily operations.15 With the exception of handling research permissions, in the PDIP local administration was left almost entirely to the discretion of branch managers. The two Malang offices of PDIP chose their own party activists to handle their administration, with the result that loyalty was given priority over skill; the kabupaten administrator had far better skills than her counterpart in the kodya office. As with Partai Golkar, although the branches received funding from the central office, external donations comprised the larger part of the branch budget. Connections between local branches and the PDIP central office were limited, as the branches were very independent. Yet such independence can create inefficient branches. Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party) As with PDIP, PAN’s central office delegated authority to its local offices to manage their own administration. As a result, the branches also received minimal support from the central office for their internal organisation. Instead, PAN’s administration at the branch level depended on the loyalty and dedication of the local leaders and cadres. The kodya office was run by its cadres and the kabupaten office by its leader; the offices were dependent on individuals’ willingness to sacrifice their time for the party. The almost total devolution of responsibility and authority had proven harmful to the efficiency of local operations, as the local branch activists possessed insufficient administration skills. PAN’s kodya office temporarily occupied the local assembly office at the time of my fieldwork. When the cadres subsequently rented a new office, they chose an old house, which they had to renovate before they could move in.16 The old house had several small rooms that the cadres planned to convert into offices and the living room was to function as a meeting hall. Archive-keeping and other administrative matters were chaotic at the temporary office, as the cadres, who were also the office

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administrators, had lost track of where files were kept.17 The kabupaten office was located in the kabupaten chairperson’s house, where he took care of administration of the office in addition to his other duties. Although the party had plans to move to a new, more ‘presentable’ office, moving presented difficulties since the kabupaten chairperson would need more involvement from other members and cadres to manage a separate office. The length of time and problems associated with finding new offices reflected the lack of assistance from the central office. The freedom given to branches by the central PAN office also meant that their responses to enquiries regarding research permissions were inconsistent. The central office delegated authority to the local offices to handle permission for research requests individually. In the case of the kabupaten office, because the main administrator was the chairperson, the process to obtain permission was straightforward. But it was a complicated matter for the kodya office, which took a fairly long time to issue the official letter.18 Despite its disorganised local administration, PAN showed a more coherent approach toward branch finances than PDIP. However, party policy did not oblige members to pay dues.19 Although branch offices had some connection with the central level of the party regarding funding, this was limited since funding for branch activities mainly came from its cadres who held seats in the local assembly. Each legislative member was required to donate 19 million rupiah per year to the party. The party saw these donations as a symbol of loyalty. As with Partai Golkar and PDIP, another source of funding was donations from supporters. PAN’s reliance on donations from cadres reflected the priority the party placed on recruiting capable cadres who could eventually be nominated for governmental seats. Both of PAN’s Malang offices had very minimal facilities. The kodya office at the local assembly had quite limited space, which restricted the use of various communication devices. A visit was the only way to contact the office, since it had no telephone, facsimile or computer system. Furthermore, without an appointment it was difficult to meet cadres and leaders on site, as the party leader’s work in his official position at the assembly made him difficult to meet and cadres were not always available. The limited use of technology also made it difficult for the branches to conduct daily operations effectively. The temporary kodya office functioned more as a meeting place for the cadres than an office because it lacked a proper office set-up. As the kabupaten office was located in a residential house, communication facilities there depended on the household’s arrangements. There was no facsimile or computer in this office either and communication relied on the use of a telephone. Contacting the office meant contacting the house, so the phone

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was answered by the chairperson’s family members rather than party office staff. The use of mobile phones was effective for the kabupaten office, as there was only one person to contact – the chairperson himself. On the other hand, although personal mobile phone numbers were easy to obtain for the kodya office, there was no clear division of labour there and thus obtaining information from that office was frustrating. Both the kodya and kabupaten offices proved inefficient as party offices. Due to the inefficient administration arrangements, the branches’ responses to my research enquiries were slow. It took a few visits to the local assembly office, as well as to the cadre houses, to find the relevant personnel to ask for contact details for kecamatan leaders. After that it took around five months to collect data because of the kodya office’s relocation. It took only weeks to get the same data from the kabupaten office, because the chairperson was responsible for all administrative matters. But there was very limited information available on party activities from either office. The kodya office was not functioning at all during its relocation period, while the only activity the kabupaten office held was its regular meetings. The absence of a permanent office for the kodya branch confused the cadres about their duties, while the kabupaten office proved to be too dependent on one person. That both PAN offices were administered by the local party leaders and cadres, who were not professional administrators, contributed to their administrative inefficiency. The cadres’ limited skills and the drawn-out process of office relocation led to chaotic archive-keeping and undependable responses to enquiries. This situation was exacerbated by a lack of support from the central level. The Malang branches of PAN were dependent on the commitment of individual leaders and cadres and their willingness to sacrifice their time, and in the kabupaten office’s case the chairperson’s time, for the party. Without these individuals’ dedication, PAN’s Malang branches would not have been able to operate. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party) Although PKS Malang’s administration was also handled by cadres (who were regular members), both local offices were extremely well-organised and the branches were able to execute their programmes regularly. Party bureaucracy was simple – as demonstrated by the swift response to my research permission requests. The PKS’s procedure for handling requests was straightforward and permission was granted in a short period of time. PKS cadres were also helpful in providing opportunities to meet with as many cadres as possible during their events. The cadres were not paid by the party, yet they demonstrated dedication and willingness to make sacrifices for the party, and had sufficient skills to

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handle administration issues. Interaction with the central office was adequate and well-structured, with local offices required to report their activities to the central office regularly, while having the authority to make their own administrative decisions. 20 PKS’s kodya office in Malang was located in a ruko complex. The office set-up was minimal. It consisted of a large room divided by temporary dividers to create small offices for party staff. The kodya chairperson rarely visited the office; however, he was very hands-on with party matters as he was always contactable. The office’s administration was efficient, with a clear division of labour. The cadres in charge of the different matters were quick to respond to enquiries. PKS administration was very efficient in handling enquiries even when they were made to individual cadres, which shows the cadres’ ability and commitment. The cadres maintained records of administrative matters, and coordination among the different divisions was well-organised.21 Although the kodya office had to move from the ruko to a rented house, the kodya branch’s activities were not disrupted by the move. The kabupaten office was located in a house converted to an office. The living room functioned as a meeting room, and the rooms were made into small offices for the chairperson and the party staff who were also cadres. Both offices kept records of their internal matters, which were reported to the central office regularly in line with party regulations. The regular reports kept the relationship with the central office active and served as a mechanism to ensure that the local offices adhered to regulations in the party constitution. However, control from the central office was balanced with the authority to decide and issue research permissions and party information locally. Both kodya and kabupaten staff responded swiftly to research requests and the division of labour was clear and efficient. The responsiveness of PKS was underpinned by the willingness and capability of their cadres, who were always efficient in responding without needing permission from the chairmen. Both branches were proactive in providing updates on upcoming activities. The cadres and leaders were eager to provide as much party information as possible, and their bureaucracy and administrative system were supportive of this aim. The relationship between local and central offices in PKS seemed ideal, with an appropriate measure of decentralisation. Similar coherence was shown in PKS’s financial management. In terms of funding for its activities, party leaders explained that aside from a regular budget from the central office, the party applied specific rules, based on Islam, to determine what leaders and cadres should contribute for the party’s advancement. Party officials and members who held government offices were required to donate to the party monthly, as were the cadres who held offices in local assemblies.

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Ordinary members were encouraged to pay dues, although those dues were not obligatory. The percentage of salary donated to the party was calculated using a complicated formula, depending on the positions of the leaders and cadres in a hierarchy. Party leaders proudly explained that such regulations were strictly adhered to.22 This strict application of the regulations further demonstrated PKS’s organisational efficiency. Of the four parties examined here, PKS demonstrated the widest use of computers in its branches. In both branches, correspondence was handled by computer, and staff were accessible by telephone; the kabupaten office also had facsimile and e-mail facilities. The use of computers in word-processing in particular allowed the office to issue official letters faster.23 The kabupaten office’s cadres regularly accessed the office e-mail account and responded to enquiries. Party leaders and cadres were also contactable through their personal mobile phones. Although party leaders were not always in the office,24 they oversaw office administration on a daily basis and gave instructions over the phone, thus simplifying office bureaucracy. The use of mobile phones was extensive among party cadres, as their numbers were listed in party leaflets for use by the general public.25 The use of a combination of communication methods was beneficial in creating a responsive party branch and, when combined with the responsiveness of the office in general, made PKS the most organised and agile of the parties in this study. Like PDIP and PAN, PKS relied on its cadres for office administration. However, PKS’s young cadres were considerably more capable of handling local party administration, not least because they were far more technology-savvy than the cadres of the other three parties. Extensive use of computers and e-mails in the kabupaten office demonstrated the branch’s embrace of innovation. The technological skills of the cadres were beneficial especially for the local offices’ regularly reporting to the central office. PKS proves the importance of keeping abreast of the latest technology to maintain vibrant organisations.

Effects of Party Administration on Party Organisation If the local offices and their staff are the ‘nuts and bolts’ (Szczerbiak 1999: 529) of a political party, then all four of the parties in this study, at least at a basic level, are organised parties, since the very existence of their branches shows that they have some local presence. The degree to which they are organised internally, however, differs significantly. These differences are demonstrated by their arrangements for local administration and local staff, record-keeping and record-reporting mechanisms, relationships with their central offices, financial support and general efficiency.

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The four parties showed different abilities to handle local administration. Three of them (PDIP, PKS and PAN) chose to have their own cadres as local administrative staff. This arrangement guaranteed the loyalty of the administrators, but produced different outcomes. With PDIP, although branch office administrators were employed by the party to attend to the office during business hours, they lacked the skills of professional staff. The effectiveness of PDIP office personnel was also a product of the different levels of activity in the different branches, which was heavily influenced by the initiative of individual leaders. The kabupaten administrator appeared more successful at managing the office, while the kodya office-bearers merely attended to the office, making no significant contributions to office administration. In PAN, on the other hand, the cadres were vital to the operation of the branches, since both the kodya and kabupaten offices were temporary (one being at the local assembly office, the other at the chairperson’s house) and the dedication of the cadres was the main element keeping the branches alive. However, although PAN cadres in administrative positions possessed some administrative skills, they were not paid and were not always available at the party office. In contrast, PKS cadres in charge of administration, who were also volunteers, had relevant skills and did their work effectively and efficiently. The efficiency of administration of the PKS branches showed that their young cadres were well-placed to support the party chairperson and to ensure that party programmes ran smoothly and all enquiries were handled properly. The fourth party, Partai Golkar, enjoyed tremendous financial strength, which enabled it to hire professional administrative staff. This arrangement proved effective and party branches were active and responsive to enquiries. Although in general the four parties showed a clear division of labour, with designated positions such as treasurer and secretary in their offices, the efficiency of these arrangements varied. While PAN experienced a lull in party activities due to its kodya office relocation, PKS managed to maintain its activities while searching for a new office, which suggests that PKS had a more efficient division of labour. And although both PDIP branches had cadres as office administrators and officebearers, the kabupaten staff evidenced more effective interaction with party leaders, who kept them abreast of party affairs, while the kodya staff were ineffective. Partai Golkar’s staff were the only ones wearing uniforms, which demonstrated their professionalism.26 The variations in party organisation were also shown by the different arrangements for record-keeping in the branches. Partai Golkar and PKS had well-managed record-keeping mechanisms, including for both membership databases and party activities. PDIP, on the other hand, had a membership database but no record of its activities. PAN had the most disorganised record-keeping mechanisms, since the staff had

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difficulties managing their archives as a result of the office move. Thus, in this respect, PAN clearly lacked party organisation, while the other three parties were well-managed. This study demonstrates that party branches tend to be individually organised, so much so that even two branches from the same party in the same geographical region can have quite different administrative arrangements. Although the central office provides the branch’s platform and ideology, the branches can choose and adapt central policies to fit local conditions. As we have seen, the local branches of each party had quite different kinds of relationships with their respective central offices. Partai Golkar and PKS branches had the strongest connections with their central offices, as demonstrated by their regular reporting to them. These regular reports fostered better interaction with the central office and ensured communication between the branch offices. However, there were variations between these two parties as well. PKS had an official requirement that the district branches report to the central office, while in Partai Golkar the operation of the kodya office demonstrated that an individual leader (in this case the chairperson) could be instrumental in creating a formal reporting mechanism, which may not be adopted by other branches. In short, PKS had a more structured relationship between its branches and its central office. In contrast, PAN’s and PDIP’s branches had no active relationships with their central offices. PAN’s branches received no assistance when facing difficulties managing local administration. The same applied to the PDIP’s kodya branch, where the central office had not intervened even though the branch office was inactive most of the time. Central offices thus have different approaches towards their branches. Some have more interest in making sure that the branches operate properly, while others do not perceive it as a party priority. There were also differences in the way the parties administered their websites, another indication of the level of party organisation. PKS and Partai Golkar were the only ones with national websites, which supports my general findings that they were the most organised of the four parties. PDIP’s official website was only set up after my fieldwork, in 2007, while at the time of this writing in 2012 PAN still did not have a website.27 PDIP’s relatively late adoption of a website dovetails with my other findings that it was the most decentralised of the four parties, while PAN had not seen the urgency of setting up a website. In terms of property ownership, Partai Golkar was the strongest financially of the four parties. It owned its branch offices and was the only party able to afford professional staff.28 According to Appleton & Ward (1997), this level of financial independence is a clear sign of a modern organised party. In contrast, the new parties, PAN and PKS, were still renting their branch offices during my fieldwork. However, PKS

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demonstrated that it could handle moving its kodya office without disrupting party activities, whereas the need to shift its own kodya office disrupted not only PAN’s current activities but its access to its records and files. The different effects of moving reflected the different levels of organisation within the party branches. In PKS’s case, it had developed a clear division of labour, with different tasks assigned to different cadres. As a result, the party operation continued to run smoothly during the search for a new office. In contrast, as PAN was reliant on cadres to handle all party matters rather than specific tasks, the search for a new office delayed all other activities. However, the old parties do not necessarily possess better resources. While the PKS suggests that older parties do have better resources, the lack of a permanent office location or professional staff does not necessarily disadvantage new parties. Also, while Partai Golkar was the strongest financially, this was not reflected in its use of technology in the branch offices. All of the branches of the four parties had telephone connections, but only PKS evidenced the full use of computers. While PDIP’s kodya office kept its membership database in a computer, PDIP’s kabupaten office did not have a computer. Partai Golkar’s and PAN’s archives were still manually organised as well, which suggests that these two parties, particularly Golkar, which had significantly better financial resources, did not see the use of modern technology as important. In the case of Partai Golkar, Webb’s use of financial strength as a measure of party organisation conflicts with Appleton & Ward’s emphasis on technology. Although the old parties have the advantage of experience, the lack of experience of the new parties does not limit their ability to develop, nor does it ensure that the old parties have the best systems. In fact, pre-existing party resources were of limited significance to local branch funding, as party leaders suggested that the parties’ income relied more on external contributions than on their own resources and central support. Although it was impossible to obtain a transparent financial report from any of the four parties,29 it is clear that the parties did not rely on members’ dues for new funding. This was partly because dues were not obligatory and perhaps partly because it is difficult to create an effective mechanism for dues collection at the branch level. Such an initiative would be especially difficult for the kabupaten offices, since it would be taxing for the parties given the broad geographical areas they cover.30 Instead of financing their branch activities through dues, all parties relied on donations from supporters. PKS, PAN and Partai Golkar also imposed monthly obligatory contributions on party members in the local assembly. However, the amounts of these obligatory contributions were not disclosed and thus it was difficult to determine how much the successful candidates contributed to the parties. PKS sources noted, though,

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that they financed their activities mainly from contributions from cadres and successful election candidates, which demonstrated the branches’ ability to adhere to the party’s national policy of applying certain rules for financing its operation – something the other parties were unable to do.31 The other three parties’ sources of funding were less transparent: aside from their regular budgets from their central and/or provincial offices, party leaders did not specifically identify the sources of donations to their parties. Although the amounts raised through other kinds of donations were difficult to determine, the fact that party leaders always expressed their gratitude to donors suggests that these donations were crucial for branch office operations. The absence of party fund-raising activities contributed to my impression that financial donations were largely not made transparently, such as through party functions, but rather were undisclosed contributions. As Szczerbiak found in his study of Eastern Europe (1999), however, the payment of membership dues does not always represent a significant connection between members and their parties. Indeed, my findings suggest that the connection between parties and members are created by other means. But funding is important because external donations could hamper the independence of the parties if the parties are heavily dependent on them. And if party independence is compromised, it could affect party institutionalisation (Mainwaring & Scully 1995).

Conclusion Scholars argue that party organisation is crucial for party institutionalisation and for the quality of democracy (Spirova 2005). Party organisation at the local level in the four Indonesian parties examined here varied considerably. In terms of party administration, commitment and dedication have to be combined with the relevant skills to ensure that party offices are organised well. Partai Golkar chose to have paid professionals with needed skills organise its branches, with favourable results, suggesting that paying skilled professionals fosters good office organisation. However, while PKS had the benefit of young skilled cadres who had both capacity and loyalty to the party, Partai Golkar did not. Delegation of authority from the central office also had different effects on the four parties’ administration. The PKS’s Malang branches demonstrated that they could manage this delegation of authority, and that a combination of central guidance and support and decentralisation of some aspects of decision-making aided the efficiency of the party, while making use of local resources allowed local offices to make routine decisions independently. Similarly, Partai Golkar’s kodya branch

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had a close relationship with the central office, yet demonstrated its independence in its handling of most of my requests and enquiries, albeit not as efficiently as PKS. Overall, PKS demonstrated the most solid organisation at the branch level, with clear mechanisms for reporting to the central office and swift responses to enquiries. Among the three other parties, although Partai Golkar proved its professionalism in managing its party organisation, it was slow to respond to enquiries. PDIP’s branches, on the other hand, demonstrated that the same administrative arrangements can have different implications even in the same party, as its kabupaten office was the more organised. PAN’s Malang offices were the most disorganised among the four parties, with party operations suspended during the search for a new kodya office, and the absence of a clear mechanism for reporting to PAN’s central office. But their deficiencies aside, the four parties demonstrated that they are capable of independently managing themselves. The mere fact that local branches exist suggests that Blondel’s first prerequisite of party organisation, that a party be large, was met. The parties were large enough to require representative offices at the kodya and kapubaten levels. The branches were able to organise local party offices that deal with membership and other local administrative matters, and generally managed to keep at least some level of connection with their central office, which Janda (1980) suggests is an important feature of a modern party. However, local party organisation is about more than just the existence of branches. Party branches have to organise party activities to raise public awareness of the party’s platform, since such activities are the realisation of party programmes at the local level and the branches are the bodies that execute them. The next chapter discusses the variety of party activities in Malang and how the branches organised them.

5

Party Activities

Like Indonesian political parties generally, Partai Golkar, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Partai Amanat Nasional and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera all have a strong preference for organising socio-cultural activities, mainly to attract as much attention and participation as possible. Party age has little to do with the capacity to organise these and other activities. Rather, it is the commitment and dedication found in a particular branch to organise activities that makes the difference. Young parties have proven just as able as the older parties to be active and creative in managing activities. But both the priorities and capacities of the parties vary, and reflect the level of party organisation. Betterorganised parties organise more activities compared with the less-organised ones.

Importance of Party Activities Parties demonstrate their organisational abilities in part through routine and frequent events for their members. Ideally, these events occur in branch offices as well as in the parties’ central offices, since institutionalised parties are present at both local and national levels. Also, local branches must be active so that their presence is felt by the local population. Party activities are the simplest way for a party to promote itself. Through its activities, a party can advertise itself, its interests and its platform to the general public. However, parties must do more than just organise activities that appeal to the community. To be truly effective at the branch level, they must have routine intra-party procedures such as meetings (Mainwaring & Scully 1995). Members should be able to predict and expect what their party does, so that it will be easy for them to participate in party activities. In studies of political parties, the term ‘activity’ is used to measure how much parties do, particularly after elections (see, for example, Fisher et al. 2006). Blondel (1978: 107) argues that party activities mainly concern the application of party policies. Ideal parties, he asserts, have clear ideologies which are promoted through the frequent and routine execution of their activities. Blondel posits that ideal party

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programmes should ‘aim to achieve [a] good or just society’, be consistent and be able to ‘implement party goals through detailed policies’. Like Mainwaring & Scully (1995), Blondel emphasises the routine execution of activities, but the main feature of his argument is his focus on the impact of different ideologies on the implementation of parties’ programmes (1978: chapter 6). As a result, his analysis gives insufficient attention to activities that parties undertake other than campaigning or spreading propaganda. In Selle & Svasand’s (1991) study of European parties, the party platform is considered the basis of party activities. Selle & Svasand relate the decline of party membership to the orientation of party activities, which they see as an indication of parties’ focus. Their argument helps us better understand parties’ behaviour and their choices of activities. According to Selle & Svasand, parties began to decline when their activities ‘changed from emphasis on political issues, ideology, and organisational questions to more social and cultural activity’ (1991: 465). Parties lose interest in more political activities and switch to socio-cultural ones when they try to ‘increase participation and improve contacts between local organisations’ (Selle & Svasand 1991: 465). Although the Indonesian situation is clearly different than Europe’s, there is a welldocumented tendency to substitute social and cultural events for political events in Indonesia, not only by political parties but also by other mass institutions such as trade unions (see for example Uhlin 1997: 119-120; Beeson & Hadiz 1998: 9). In her study of political parties in Germany and Britain, Scarrow (1996) argues that party activities are part of parties’ organising strategies and can be categorised into three groups. The first group of activities is concerned with maintaining local branches, while the second concerns participation in local government. The third group of activities is designed to reach out to the community. Efforts to raise funds and to recruit and retain members make up Scarrow’s first category, while activities related to contesting local elections make up the second category. The third category includes the widest variety of activities. According to Scarrow, parties’ community outreach activities can range from regular public meetings, leaflet-drops and door-to-door sales of party literature to public park clean-ups and the provision of televisions to the elderly (Scarrow 1996: 113-143). The most comprehensive study of party activities was conducted by Janda (1980). His monumental cross-national study of 158 political parties argues that more mature parties engage in a wide range of activities. According to Janda, a party’s primary objective is to place its candidates in the nation’s legislature. This objective is pursued by competing openly in elections, attacking other parties, or working outside election periods to force sitting legislative members to resign in order to increase access

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to governmental seats (1980: chapter 7). In addition to this narrow strategy, Janda argues, a ‘broadly-oriented’ party engages in various other activities which are not directly related to its primary objective of gaining power in the nation’s legislature. The range of activities that Janda observed focused on improving members’ well-being and building links between members and the government. He contends that in order to develop breadth of activity, parties should be service-providers as well as political avenues for their members. Janda divides the repertoire of party activities into four groups: ‘operating mass communications media (radio, TV, newspapers)’, ‘operating party schools (as distinguished from general education)’, ‘passing resolutions and platforms’ and ‘publishing position papers’ (1980: 85-89). Janda does not include party meetings in his list of party activities, instead dealing with them as a separate indicator of party organisation. However, he considers them the most basic form of party activity. They offer members a way to become involved more deeply in a party organisation, while they offer parties a direct way to canvass members’ opinions. Party meetings also reflect the effort required of parties to manage their branches and various internal bodies. Well-organised parties have branches which meet regularly (Janda 1980). The variety of meetings held by the local branches discussed in this chapter serve as an indicator of party organisation. The more organised the branch, the greater the variety of meetings it holds. South Korea provides a comparable example to Indonesia of parties in transition. Political participation was heavily controlled in South Korea until the country experienced the ‘third wave’ of democratisation in 1987 (Heo & Stockton 2005: 674-675). One study of Korean parties described a specific process they used to raise awareness of voters’ concerns (Sejong Institute 2000: 7). This process involves recording incoming telephone calls to party headquarters from all members, making notes of members’ opinions, conveying them to relevant party committees and regularly reporting local developments to party authorities. Korean parties also conduct political education, encouraging voters not to vote for corrupt politicians. These activities serve as a way for parties to interact with grass-roots members and to listen to their wishes and aspirations. Although Steinberg & Shin view Korean parties as the weakest link in the country’s democratic transition, as they are ‘transitory’ and tend to come and go (Steinberg & Shin 2006: 517-523), activities connecting parties with members function as avenues of political participation. More importantly, these activities prove that even when parties are not as institutionalised as those in mature democracies, they can encourage political participation. But the ability to foster participation depends on how much a party prioritises its relationship with the community. In South Korea, this is an important priority for parties.

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In Indonesia, as we will see below, where I examine the variety of activities of my four parties in the Malang area using Janda’s measurements of the breadth of party activity, the parties’ activities generally indicate their strong tendency to promote a positive party image. Of course, this is understandable given the tarnished image of New Order parties. The parties evidenced a wide range of activities during my study. These activities encompassed different objectives ranging from raising awareness of their party platforms to membership retention to public relations (e.g. provision of disaster relief). The parties mainly used these activities to attract support. With the exception of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), their choices of activities were guided less by party platforms than by what they believed would attract crowds. Party ideologies were merely ideas largely unrelated to daily operations.1 Local branch officials played a defining role in choosing and administering party activities. Thus, the frequency and effectiveness of activities depended on the level of local branch organisation. The branches’ ability to organise events also showed their level of unity, which Blondel (1978) suggests is demonstrated by the capacity of parties to involve members and cadres in organising and attending party events.

Dynamics of Party Activities The various activities held at the local level in Malang by the branches of each of the four parties showed their priorities and attitudes towards both party members and the general public. Generally, the parties exhibited high regard for their relationships with members and the public and wanted to maintain close connections with them. Nonetheless, the parties chose different strategies to remain popular. These strategies revolved around organising public events to draw attention to themselves or privately helping particular communities. No matter which strategy parties chose, their activities reflected the significance they accorded to building and sustaining public support. Partai Golkar Partai Golkar’s kodya and kabupaten branches in Malang both held regular events. The range of Partai Golkar’s activities was extensive, from religious activities to the provision of services to members and the community in general. Although there were no activities geared toward recruiting new members, the party’s desire to win elections was reflected by its efforts to engage the community. Various socio-cultural party activities were aimed at maintaining communications with the community, with the objective of serving people’s needs as means of persuading

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them to vote for the party or retaining their vote. The management of Partai Golkar’s various activities indicated that the branches were wellorganised. Partai Golkar’s activities were focused on establishing a stable relationship with the community. The most prominent example was called Jaring Asmara (Jaring Aspirasi Masyarakat, or Netting the Community’s Aspirations).2 This programme was aimed at maintaining a dialogue with local communities and understanding their specific needs.3 It took the form of direct dialogues between party cadres or leaders4 and members of the community. Typically, in such dialogues the party received requests from community members for specific facilities, such as for health services or school buildings.5 The party then decided internally which requests to fulfil and how to manage them.6 Meeting these needs was seen as crucial for maintaining support and thus election votes.7 The priority the party placed on building facilities for the community suggests that it still maintained its New Order ideology. During the New Order era, Partai Golkar’s predecessor, Golkar, relied heavily on what Indonesian observers called ‘developmentalism’, which meant that its support base was maintained by fulfilling the base’s economic and security needs.8 Under Suharto, this was realised through the development of infrastructure. Partai Golkar’s ongoing attachment to its developmentalist ideology suggests that it had not entirely escaped its association with the New Order. However, it also reflected the fact that this ideology was extremely successful in drawing support and attention from voters. In this sense, Partai Golkar opted for a pragmatic attachment to popular ideology that worked, instead of taking the risk of adopting a new formula without a proven track record. Partai Golkar in Malang demonstrated a particularly strong commitment to establishing communication with the community. Its community dialogues were extensions of regular dialogues between party leaders and cadres from different kecamatan (districts) held at the party office. Partai Golkar’s kodya office held the widest variety of weekly meetings.9 The office housed the regular and irregular meetings of both the kodya and kecamatan branches, including monthly meetings and division meetings.10 The kodya office also held regular dialogues between its legislative members and party cadres and members. These dialogues, called reses in Indonesian, were held as follow-up meetings between the party and the candidates elected by the party, as ‘proof that election is not the end of the relationship between party candidates and the people who elected them’.11 Reses are a party’s initiative to engage, listen to and try to give back to the community. Party cadres usually bring their complaints and particular concerns to these meetings, such as the need to develop particular facilities in their area, or complaints about an

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election promise that government has not met for their neighbourhood. In response to such complaints, I observed during my fieldwork, an elected candidate would typically explain the government’s reasons and priorities in implementing policies, in the hope that the concerns were addressed.12 These regular meetings were useful in maintaining close relationships between party cadres and in providing a forum for discussion of current party issues and organisation of events. The kabupaten branch faced different circumstances when organising meetings for its cadres. According to the party administrator, because the kabupaten area is large,13 it was generally not feasible to hold meetings more frequently than once a month. Distance created hurdles to setting up regular meetings, and the different occupations of party cadres kept them busy at different times.14 Fortunately, with mobile phone technology, it was easier to communicate with different kecamatan (which are smaller geographical areas) to decide on the time to hold regular kecamatan branch meetings.15 The kabupaten office was generally less active in organising meetings than the kodya office.16 Other socio-cultural activities reflected Partai Golkar’s emphasis on its relationship with the public. The party provided services for the community and party members. In response to bad economic conditions and difficulties finding employment, the Partai Golkar’s kodya branch put one of Malang’s mall developers in contact with its members in the hope that they would secure employment.17 Members wishing to take part in this job recruitment opportunity had to register their interest with the party. As it turned out, the developer offered scores of jobs to members with suitable qualifications. This kind of employment service is provided regularly by Partai Golkar, with potential employers identified and approached by the party.18 The party also provided educational services and publications for members and the community. At the national level, the party published a tabloid called Ikrar (literally oath), which promoted its platform and postSuharto image (Romli et al. 2003: 149). At the local level, the party had schools managed by the party’s foundation, Yayasan Pengembangan Ilmu dan Karya (Foundation for the Development of Science and Vocation). The foundation focused on early education, including kindergarten and elementary school, but the party intended to develop it further to offer education at higher levels. Partai Golkar also had its Lembaga Pengelola Kader (Cadre Development Council, or LPK), which aimed to develop cadres’ practical skills, such as sewing or craftsmanship, to allow them to generate income through self-employment if they could not find other work. These services were established for members exclusively. Despite having the potential to attract members, they were not actively promoted to the general public, which reflected the party’s position that membership enlargement was not a priority.

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The party also used religion in its activities. During my fieldwork, Partai Golkar held regular istighosah19 and pengajian20 in the kodya office for cadres. These religious events were usually complemented by speeches, either from party leaders or religious leaders. The speeches usually had strong themes about organisational consolidation, and the party provided material for media coverage of community issues. The party used these get-togethers as means to strengthen the bonds between different sub-organisations, while also focusing on special themes from time to time. For example, around an election period, party leaders would emphasise the importance of electoral success, or discuss a local election issue.21 During the fasting month of Ramadhan, the party held weekly istighosah and buka puasa bersama (communal fast-breaking) for party cadres. Partai Golkar officials believed that these religious events were important for character-building, and they were held regularly even outside of the fasting month.22 By organising religious activities, the party sought to improve its image as well as serve members’ needs. The party demonstrated some sensitivity in picking the right moments and the right events to boost its image. For example, around late 2005, there were allegations that traditional staple foods sold by street merchants had been contaminated by illegal preservatives.23 Street merchants suffered as a result. Their livelihoods were threatened because their sales decreased dramatically.24 Teaming up with a local newspaper, Partai Golkar gathered together around 50 of the affected merchants, mainly bakso25 and tahu26 street traders. Then party members and the community were invited to a special event, Makan Bakso Bersama (Eating Bakso Together), where the merchants served them free meals.27 Also, the kabupaten office distributed breeding cattle to local farmers. This programme was aimed at ‘demonstrating the party’s will to improve people’s living standard and not just to use them as a voting machine’.28 The bakso event and cattle distribution programme support Pak Andi’s observation that ‘the party shifts its focus during non-election periods from political to economic issues’. Partai Golkar had a wide range of activities designed not just to serve its membership, but to reach the general public. In addition, the party ran numerous events to commemorate the anniversary of its founding. The range of activities included sporting competitions (usually open to the general public, both to participate in and watch),29 religious and traditional ceremonies,30 as well as public entertainment.31 Dialogue with the public was promoted during the anniversary celebrations by inviting famous party elders to speak to the community. Thus, even on special occasions such as anniversaries, Partai Golkar remained focused on engaging the community through dialogue

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and services.32 The dialogues with party elders also served as means to promote the party platform and ideology. That Partai Golkar’s Malang branches were generally able to manage a wide range of activities was an indication of the party’s sophisticated organisation at the branch level. The party’s tabloid, schools and member employment network showed the party’s ability to organise itself. Partai Golkar’s activities also demonstrated that maintaining and enhancing its popularity was a priority. Although this did not translate into aggressive recruitment campaigns, it led to various efforts at public engagement to build greater community identification with the party. Every activity organised by Partai Golkar was geared towards drawing crowds. The publicity helped achieve the party’s basic goals of building a fresh post-New Order image and attracting votes. Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan As we saw in the previous chapter, the PDIP’s kodya and kabupaten branches exhibited different levels of organisation and activity. The kabupaten office was the more active and organised of the two. It housed regular discussions among party cadres, while the kodya office was largely inactive.33 PDIP’s activities in the kabupaten branch generally focused on maintaining the party’s relationship with local communities. While also aimed at providing updates to the community, party activities in the kodya area were dull and irregular. Recruitment activities were also non-existent in this branch. In line with the central party strategy, the focus was on maintaining a positive image amongst supporters in order to keep them voting for the party during elections. PDIP’s kabupaten office was frequented by cadres from different kecamatan since it was convenient for them to meet there to hold discussions with party leaders.34 These informal discussions took place on almost a daily basis.35 The office also held formal monthly meetings, chaired by the kabupaten chairperson to discuss the latest developments in party activities and news from other parties. Sarasehan (informal discussions aimed mainly at creating closer relationships) were also regularly held for cadres in the office. Another activity organised by the kabupaten office was bhakti sosial (community service), which, according to the office-keeper, was held in different kecamatan. One of the bhakti sosial events was focused on the kabupaten office building itself: members and cadres donated their time to paint the office. Bhakti sosial served as a form of party service to the community as well as a partyawareness-raising event.36 The kabupaten secretary gave an interesting example of an activity that is common in the general Indonesian community, typically among women, but not usually undertaken by political parties. He initiated a

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programme under which four kecamatan (districts) in the kabupaten organised regular arisan.37 These get-togethers were used by cadres to identify developments in different areas and exchange ideas and experiences in handling various issues. The participating kecamatan hoped to enlarge this event and invite other kecamatan to join the branch’s arisan group. Potentially, non-members could also be invited in the future, so the cadres could approach and persuade them to join the party.38 If this scheme was successful, arisan could be an alternative point of engagement between the party and the public, which could lead to new membership commitments. Thus, aside from improving the relationships between cadres from different kecamatan, the arisan could also be a recruitment activity. Around the time of the party’s anniversary, the kabupaten office had a busy schedule of activities aimed at providing services to the general public. Aside from inviting Sukarno’s daughter Megawati to give a speech at the peak of the anniversary celebration, the office organised a ritual cattle sacrifice (penyembelihan hewan kurban)39 and provided free medication for the general public for two days. A blood donation clinic was also held on one of the weekends, with doctors and nurses especially invited from Surabaya at the party’s expense. However, it was difficult for such services to reach members effectively, given the size of the kabupaten area.40 The party could provide little in the way of transportation, although some car-pooling was donated by individual party cadres or members.41 Thus, the services were ineffective, despite party efforts, as the obstacles imposed by distance and transportation costs were difficult to overcome. Party members were aware of the difficulties in generating participation over a large area and in relying on individual sacrifice to boost turnout. In response, the branch initiated free home renovations for the poor in different kecamatan as an anniversary event. The kecamatan cadres had the task of nominating and choosing several homes for renovation at the party’s expense. However, this strategy had a limited impact, as the costs of renovation did not allow the party to concentrate on more than one kecamatan.42 It was difficult for party services to reach faraway regions and thus these services were only enjoyed by a limited number of people. The party probably also had difficulties fulfilling election promises in remote areas, which would suggest that it needs to be more cautious in formulating its promises. In contrast to its kabupaten branch, PDIP’s kodya branch seldom organised activities. The office staff suggested to me that regular meetings at the kodya level were held at that office, but the records I saw on the details and timing of the meetings suggested that communication and coordination problems existed between the office-keepers and the party’s secretary.43 The branch used to hold a weekly political lecture,

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where its cadres would have an open political discussion with members and supporters, but these events were no longer organised by the branch.44 The office-keepers also claimed that regular bhakti sosial were held by the party in different kecamatan, usually in the form of cleaning certain neighbourhoods in the city. However, bhakti sosial seemed to be the only kind of regular activity held by the party.45 There was only one other activity organised by the kodya branch, which was a buka puasa bersama (communal fast-breaking) during Ramadhan.46 This was a rare occasion for the office, which by my observations was usually empty and locked. What’s more, the relatively small office space could not accommodate the 200 or so party members, cadres and community members who flocked to the buka puasa bersama event. The usual padlocking of the kodya branch office starkly underlined its passivity. Indeed, it created the impression that the party and the branch essentially went into hibernation outside election periods. Nobody was at home.47 Even during the party’s anniversary celebrations, the kodya branch held fewer activities than the kabupaten branch. It only held bhakti sosial and distributed sembako (nine essential groceries for Indonesian households) to the general public.48 This contrasted starkly with the various events held by the kabupaten office to commemorate the same events.49 Thus, different levels of activity can take place at the local level within the same party, indicating limited influence or supervision from the central or provincial offices to ensure that branches remain active. The different levels of activity can also reflect incoherence in the relationships between offices from the same party. Such incoherence, of course, can hurt effectiveness in executing party strategy in the long term. PDIP is one of Indonesia’s biggest parties, thanks to its national leaders’ popularity. Like Partai Golkar, PDIP did not engage in aggressive campaigns to enlarge its membership during the period of my fieldwork, focusing instead on efforts to maintain its supporters’ sympathy. But unlike Partai Golkar, PDIP’s national profile was not supported by an effective branch structure. Its kabupaten branch in Malang had failed to overcome the challenges of the physical size of the area it served. In this respect, its strategy was undermined by its failure to reach as many people as possible. While the party’s kodya branch did not face the same geographical challenges, it was even less active. Partai Amanat Nasional PAN was the least active of the four parties at the branch level during my study period. PAN’s Malang branches were preoccupied with their internal management and had abandoned other party activities. There was a pergantian pengurus (change in office bearers) in both the kodya and

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kabupaten branches, while both branches spent several months looking for new offices to rent.50 Since the cycle of locating a new office and moving was repeated almost yearly, their inability to organise other party activities seemed likely to continue.51 Their general inefficiency resulting from the office moves seriously disrupted the implementation of party programmes at the local level. For many months, PAN’s kodya branch did not even have an office, which of course made it difficult to organise and manage the branch. When interviewed, cadres from PAN’s kodya branch were optimistic that they could organise monthly party meetings once a new office was found and rented.52 In fact, once a new office was located, PAN cadres held frequent informal meetings there.53 Party meetings were conducted at night and lasted until morning if there were urgent matters to be discussed. However, these meetings were the only activities held by the kodya office. As noted, during my fieldwork period PAN’s kabupaten branch was using the chairperson’s house as its office while trying to find a new building to rent. Party meetings were also held in the chairperson’s house. Although the branch tried to have regular monthly meetings, the fact that the chairperson took care of all administration matters personally meant that in practice PAN’s kabupaten branch only met once every two months.54 Despite the infrequency of these meetings, they (along with elections of office-bearers) comprised the main activities of 55 PAN’s kabupaten branch. The meetings were crucial for the continuance of the party at the local level, since without them the branches would have been inactive. In addition to these meetings, PAN’s kabupaten branch provided emergency help for victims of a flood around kabupaten Malang. But this was the only public activity undertaken by the branch outside anniversary celebrations.56 According to party leaders, PAN’s activities peaked during its anniversary celebrations. Events during the anniversary included a ‘long march’, the distribution of free medication, and public performances. PAN used these performances as vehicles for religious activities, as it is an Islamic party. However, such events only occurred during the party’s anniversary celebrations, and outside the anniversaries the party’s activities were confined to its regular meeting programme, unless there was an emergency like the flood. This showed the party’s inward concentration on internal organisation, which contradicted the national policy of enlarging the party’s membership. During my fieldwork, PAN’s Malang branches organised fewer activities than did the branches of the other three parties. The branches did not really engage the community and were extremely passive when it came to recruitment and building support. PAN failed to organise activities to engage the general public and thereby attract potential

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members. Rather, in PAN’s Malang branches the election of new local leaders was considered a particularly important activity. Although other activities were essentially abandoned, electing new office holders was not. The party’s emphasis on these internal elections and other inhouse activities demonstrated that the branches were more concerned with internal organisation than outward self-promotion. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Generally, PKS’s activities during my study were heavily motivated by the dakwah movement, which aims to spread Islamic teachings. PKS’s Malang branches demonstrated creativity in the variety of activities they organised at the local level; they made an obvious effort to hold events with an Islamic theme that captured the imagination of the general public. The party’s sophisticated management of its activities indicated an advanced level of branch organisation in Malang. Party activities were also strong indicators of party policy on particular issues, such as the role of Islam in daily life, and of the party’s recruitment policies. The frequency and variety of recruitment-focused activities showed how much PKS in Malang prioritised recruitment. PKS’s aggressive recruitment campaigns included the distribution of flyers and pamphlets at least once a month.57 On one occasion during my fieldwork, this distribution was conducted in the city bus terminal, where two female cadres approached people getting off public transport to give them flyers.58 The flyers contained invitations to join the party and contact information for cadres in different kecamatan. This act was not only simple and direct; it reached out to members of the community and increased their knowledge of the party. Another type of regular recruitment activity by PKS was an ‘open house’ held by the party in venues such as public libraries and exhibition halls. Organised at least once a month, these open houses consisted of information displays showing what the party stood for and did. These events usually lasted for two to three days. The party would set up the venue with a number of booths to display the attributes and activities of each of its divisions.59 Typically, visitors would have the chance to ask cadres directly about the party. Cadres at each of the booths took the initiative to engage with visitors and start conversations.60 In addition to the divisional booths, the exhibitions featured a special booth for applicants who wished to register as party members. There were also Islamic sermons and Islamic book exhibitions during the events.61 Like its flyer distributions, PKS’s open houses reached the public directly and were successful in attracting new members.62 The party’s attitude towards recruitment was also shown through its commitment to recruitment follow-up activities. In its training of

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recruits, PKS employed specific techniques to improve their skills. PKS saw three aspects of a cadre that required development: pemikiran (way of thinking), hati (emotional well-being) and fisik (physical condition).63 The PKS’s Pak Sophya elaborated:64 With regard to the intellectual aspects, we have activities concerned with exploring perspectives of Islam and general knowledge. The timing can be flexible, sometimes once every three months. The emotional aspect is about the relationship and closeness of a cadre with God, so we don’t shape cadres who are smart in terms of logic but empty in spirit. We hold events at mosques and in relation to Ramadhan… Physical activities consist of scout-like activities, like pramuka.65 [We improve] skills in the field, outdoors. So a cadre is not sickly, [he/she] must be physically strong. This is done regularly, and a cadre has to go through them all. PKS also used physical activities to attract supporters to the party. The kodya and kabupaten branches in Malang joined forces to hold a ‘long march’ across the city just before the start of Ramadhan in 2005.66 Participants, drawn from party cadres and their families, gathered at the city square. They were dressed all in white and carried PKS banners, flags and headbands. The participants were on foot, or used non-motorised vehicles, such as becak67 or bicycles. They yelled out verses from Al-Qur’an, reminding people to prepare for Ramadhan, and to ‘have pure hearts’ to welcome the fasting month. They also yelled chants glorifying the party as clean and responsible. The event was well-organised, with the police escorting the 200-strong group as they walked across the city. The objective of attracting attention was clearly met, as the march slowed the traffic. Some bystanders chanted along with the crowd. This event was designed to raise the public’s awareness of the party and to project an active and Islamic image. PKS’s kodya branch held rather unusual Islamic-motivated activities as well. The branch had an information session for Muslim couples planning to marry. The free session focused on how to build a good marriage according to Islam, and what wives and husbands should do within their marriage.68 On another occasion, the branch hosted an exhibition of artistic caricatures, which featured drawings of Islamic figures.69 This event was used to declare the party’s support for an antipornography law.70 These activities showed the party’s commitment to the dakwah movement and the role that dakwah plays in Indonesia’s political landscape more generally. The party sought to creatively engage the public with different aspects of Islam. Specifically, it targeted young Muslims with its recruitment campaign.

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Aside from its activities targeting external audiences, PKS held internal activities. Both the kodya and kabupaten branches had regular meetings for their cadres once a month. During my fieldwork, both offices also held internal elections, where they voted for candidates for the position of provincial chair.71 The cadres’ votes were tallied and brought to the provincial level by their representatives. At the provincial meeting, each branch office had a single vote in the election of the chair. PKS’s intraparty procedures were evidence of the party’s commitment to democracy and demonstrated its solid organisation and well-structured decision-making processes. During Ramadhan, PKS’s kabupaten office held a dialogue between party cadres and religious scholars from the party.72 On this occasion, cadres had the opportunity to seek guidance on religious as well as party matters. The event featured presentations on the party’s activities, focusing on those of the different divisions. The cadres’ questions mainly concerned recruitment, particularly how to attract other community members to the party. There were also specific questions on how to recruit older members of the local community, since they usually already had attachments to other parties.73 The issues raised during the dialogue confirmed the party’s commitment to recruitment and the extent to which party cadres made recruitment their priority as well. The questions also demonstrated that the cadres were skilled at observing trends within their communities and identifying potential obstacles to party growth. During the same event, there was a session on financial matters. A representative from an Islamic bank, Bank Muamalat, gave a presentation that featured a debit card designed specifically to accommodate the needs of PKS members. The card had the PKS symbol on it and was only available to PKS members. It was based on Islamic law, which forbids the paying of interest.74 The party had created a marketing segment for financial institutions, in this case an Islamic bank. The card suggested possible further growth of the party, and was seen by the bank as a business opportunity. More importantly, the party’s engagement with a bank demonstrated its effort to engage with aspects of modern life. Like PAN, PKS also provided assistance to flood victims in the kabupaten area. PKS’s kabupaten branch collected food and medicine from party members to be donated to the victims. The affected villages were isolated by flood waters and government bodies were having trouble reaching the remote villages. But PKS, along with a number of other organisations, travelled to the affected areas by boat and distributed food and medicine.75 Once the flood water subsided, the office also organised bhakti sosial to help locals rebuild their homes. Initiatives like these showed the party’s desire to build good relationships with the community as well as establish a positive image.

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The local branches also demonstrated their support for central office endeavours. Several issues of the party’s national magazine were displayed on a table at the branch offices and local leaders were quick to hand them to guests and point out matters that the party was working on. The magazine, called Saksi (literally, witness), focuses on current affairs. Regular magazine features included profiles of PKS leaders and ‘Question and Answer’ columns on Islamic issues.76 The magazine targets young Muslims, as is evident from the trendy language employed instead of the more formal style usually found in magazines for more mature audiences. For example, the magazine uses words such as ngetrend (popular), nyampein (usually menyampaikan, to convey) and naek (usually naik, to climb). The magazine is distributed and sold nationally. It showed the party’s breadth of activities and its effort to reach all aspects of its cadres’ everyday lives. The breadth of activities indicated the party’s solid organisation, which gave it the capacity to run a commercial publication. PKS’s dedication to organising public activities suggested that the party was focused on building relationships with the public and enlarging its membership base. PKS’s Malang branches undertook a busy programme of wide-ranging activities that showed a high level of branch organisation. The Islamic orientation of its activities was of course consistent with PKS’s Islamic platform.

Party Activities in Malang The ability of Malang’s party branches to independently organise activities suggests that, in contrast to the New Order era, the parties now valued being active at the local level and believed that the right to undertake such activities was no longer solely a Golkar privilege. The political parties were no longer controlled by the government and were now able to decide on their own actions. If ‘party organisation matters’ for institutionalisation (Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 5) and Janda’s indicators (1980) of party organisation are applied, then the four parties all showed clear signs of institutionalising. They had the freedom to choose the activities they wanted to hold and to decide on their schedules.77 The activities described above demonstrated that all four parties remained active to a greater or lesser extent outside election periods, rather than hibernating until the next election, as was the practice under the New Order. Partai Golkar and PKS exhibited the widest range of activities. Partai Golkar managed schools for its members, as well as providing ways for members and cadres to obtain employment by linking them with potential employers or teaching them new skills. Providing education is one

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of Janda’s (1980) indicators that a party is mature and well-organised and that its activities are aimed at ‘providing for [the] welfare of party members’. PKS’s activities included running a national party magazine, another indicator on Janda’s list. A party magazine serves the purpose of mass communication and ‘propagandising ideas and programs’ (Janda 1980). PKS’s services for members also included a one-stop office for the public to get help and advice on health issues as well as other problems. This initiative, called Pelayanan Rakyat Adil Sejahtera (Service of Just and Prosperous People, or PRAS), was launched in August 2006 after my fieldwork. According to local news sources, the party launched this service on 61 sites in East Java. The range of services included health, education, social problems and culture. The services also extended to economic issues, science and technology, law and politics. One of the PKS’s health priorities was to educate the public on hygiene and healthy living (suarasurabaya.net 2006). The recruitment-driven PKS also engaged in more recruitment activities than the other three parties. Partai Golkar’s and PDIP’s activities were geared more towards maintaining a positive image. But both Partai Golkar and PKS demonstrated that they were modern parties that conducted a wide range of activities. This, in turn, indicated that they were well-managed (Janda 1980). The local offices of both parties also demonstrated solid organisation in their management of activities. In contrast, PDIP and PAN were relatively inactive. The PDIP’s kodya office and both offices of PAN were poorly organised. Though differences in activity between the branches of a single party can suggest different priorities and management practices, the case of PDIP suggests that the level of branch activity also depends on local personnel. In fact, their dedication is the single most important factor in a party’s organisation of activities. The chairperson’s role was crucial in determining the activities of each office of the four parties, and local party leaders’ personalities had much more impact than their outside occupations on a party’s level of activity. For instance, Partai Golkar’s kabupaten chairperson was also the Malang bupati,78 yet the party’s office remained active, while the PDIP’s kodya chairperson also served as Malang’s mayor, but the PDIP’s kodya branch was largely inactive. The four parties’ main concerns, as indicated by their activities, revolved around two central themes: increasing public support and maintaining the basic mechanisms of their organisational structures. To maintain their organisational structures, the parties conducted regular meetings. The four parties held regular internal meetings for their cadres and staff despite the difficulties distributing invitations and gathering cadres for the kabupaten offices. Even the least organised party, PAN, managed to administer a leadership change while abandoning its other activities. These internal activities are crucial for party organisation. The

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regular internal meetings were a clear sign that the four parties could ‘maintain local organisations’, which is one indication that they are well-organised (Janda 1980). However, although the parties promised their members influence and power in decision-making, ordinary members were not invited to party meetings. As a result, only cadres had a real chance to exercise influence. This limited opportunities to develop greater political participation, although members generally expressed satisfaction with the decision-making processes in their parties. Their apathetic attitude could be attributed to political participation patterns during the New Order era, when there was very limited public involvement. Such apathy is convenient for parties, as it means that they are not pressured to create mechanisms to involve a large number of members. While internal activities are necessary to maintain the structures of a party, external activities prove that parties are active and seek to build community relationships outside election periods. These kinds of activities are extremely important in the Indonesian context. All four of the parties examined in this study held externally focused events, which suggest that they wished to be more than election vehicles. These external activities increased public knowledge and awareness of the parties, helping members of the community identify what each party represented. Thus, they were attempting to develop ‘stable roots in society’ (Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 5). Their external activities also allowed the parties to become familiar with local needs and circumstances. Each party raised awareness of its aims and built familiarity with itself in the community by involving the public in party activities. Although the parties conducted different activities, all of them attempted to hold activities at the grass-roots level. For instance, bakti sosial (baksos) activities carried out by PDIP and PAN were usually conducted in kelurahan79 (for the kodya office) or villages (for the kabupaten office) and locals were invited to participate.80 PKS also reached out directly to the public through the distribution of flyers and public events. By involving local people in their activities, the parties established a direct connection with the community at the grass-roots level. The parties strengthened this connection by efforts to provide services for members of the public or helping them on an irregular or onetime basis. One example involved PDIP cadres helping to find a drowned local teenager. Also, Partai Golkar always invited local community members to join in activities such as a makan bakso bersama or panggung hiburan (entertainment stages), along with distributing cattle to be bred by local people. Meanwile, PDIP organised events for the public such as the distribution of sembako (nine staple food ingredients), while PKS and PAN helped the various kecamatan affected by floods. These irregular activities showed that the parties actively sought

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various ways to strengthen their relationships with the general public and to thereby create a positive image. Religion was one of the most popular means adopted by the parties to develop a positive image in the community. All four of the parties used Islam to encourage public participation in their activities. Events such as pengajian and istighosah were held regularly by Partai Golkar and PKS (in the case of PKS, pengajian was also a staple in its training programme). Although PAN is theoretically based on the multi-faith doctrine of Pancasila, it nevertheless projected a strong Islamic image, evidenced by the inclusion of religious preachers in the party’s anniversary celebrations. All of PKS’s activities were Islam-oriented, including the information session for couples, the caricature exhibition of Islamic figures, and the ‘long march’ that featured chants of verses from AlQur’an. PDIP also chose to hold communal ‘fast-breaking’ events during Ramadhan, another example of the use of Islam. Since Islam is the dominant religion in Indonesia, it is a smart strategy for parties to use it as a plank in their platforms.81 Sport was another popular choice. Some of the events commemorating Partai Golkar’s anniversary included brisk walking and a soccer competition, while PKS held its ‘long march’ across Malang. The sports that the parties chose reflected their aim to attract as many spectators as possible. This was most obvious with activities like the ‘long march’ and the brisk-walking competition, which had the participants walking around town, drawing attention from spectators.82 Soccer, chosen by Partai Golkar, is also a popular sport in Indonesia that attracts large numbers of spectators. Thus, through their choice of sport as a party activity, the parties aimed to raise their public profiles. Socio-cultural events were used by the four parties to attract interest from the general public as well. According to Selle & Svasand’s study of European parties, that is undesirable, as it indicates a decline in public interest in political activities and parties themselves (Selle & Svasand 1991: 465). But this is not necessarily the case in Indonesia, where the emphasis on socio-cultural events simply reflected the parties’ attempts to attract more public support, which led sometimes to recruitment, in other cases to electoral votes. It is easier in the Indonesian context to engage the public and party members in recreational social and cultural activities than in purely political meetings. For Partai Golkar, which had various sub-organisations and a special focus on organising its bodies internally to project organisational success externally, organising sociocultural events was an attempt to broaden interest in its sub-organisations, which in turn could attract wider public interest in the party. In short, in the Indonesian context, organising socio-cultural activities is an effective means of enlarging party participation and interest from members and non-members alike rather than a symptom of political desperation.

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Janda’s (1980) detailed measures of a party’s progress towards institutionalisation are helpful in the Malang context. Again, his four categories of activities are operating mass communications media, operating party schools, passing resolutions and platforms and publishing position papers. PKS undertook activities in three of these categories: it published its magazine, Saksi; conducted regular recruitment and leaflet distribution that supported the passing of resolutions and platforms; and published position papers.83 Partai Golkar organised a public school which prioritised its members. But the other two parties, PDIP and PAN, did not organise any activities in the four categories. Using Janda’s indicators, PKS and Partai Golkar definitely showed higher levels of organisation than PDIP and PAN. However, the socio-cultural activities of all four parties served a different but equally important purpose than institutionalisation. They engaged the general public and thereby attracted greater interest in the party and potentially electoral support. The diverse activities of the four parties’ local branches also indicated an interesting trend in party development. Unique activities such as Partai Golkar’s Jaring Asmara programme of dialogues with the community, the arisan get-togethers held by the PDIP’s kabupaten branch and PKS’s Bank Muamalat debit card showed that the parties were using creativity to identify activities and programmes which could attract more support. The parties were trying to make their activities more interesting and relevant to people’s everyday lives and to create the impression that they were not just involved in politics, but in other aspects of life. However, the impact of such creativity on party membership levels remains to be seen. The parties tended to favour one of two general approaches in their outreach activities: either aggressively recruiting members or maintaining a connection with the public. In practice, an emphasis on attracting crowds to party events reflected a wish to increase their popularity with the general public, while an emphasis on specific recruitment events suggested a belief in the need to enlarge the branch’s membership. The main differences between the parties’ programmes were in their orientations and ranges of activities, and in their branches’ different levels of commitment to organising them. The incumbent parties, Partai Golkar and PDIP, were more focused on maintaining awareness of themselves in the community, while PKS was driven to develop its membership base.84 PAN’s activities were seriously hindered by its administrative problems, suggesting that party management should be an important priority for the party, but its national-level policy suggested that it was oriented towards recruitment. My research shows that, at one level, the more active a branch is, the greater the community’s awareness of the party, and thus the greater the party’s chance to attract and recruit members. Conversely, the more inactive the branch, the fewer people

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that know about the party, and the less interested they are in joining it.85 However, recruitment activities also depend on a party’s orientation. PKS, the party that prioritised grass-roots recruitment, was the only party that demonstrated a commitment to organising recruitment activities. On the other hand, Partai Golkar, which was also extremely active, sought to raise its public profile without necessarily recruiting new members.

Conclusion Their activities at the local level indicates that Partai Golkar, PDIP, PAN and PKS had more developed organisations than New Order parties and were developing ‘stable roots in society’ (Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 5). However, these case studies demonstrate that independence from a central office can be detrimental if a party branch is unable to sustain itself, as was the case with PAN. Thus, there are both advantages and disadvantages to high levels of local freedom for parties and local branches suffer if they are not capable of self-management. Not all theories of party development derived from Western democracies are appropriate for assessing the progress of Indonesian parties. In the Indonesian context, parties’ decisions to emphasise socio-cultural activities reflect increasing interest in public engagement rather than a decline in the parties, and the public has shown a strong wish to be involved in them. These socio-cultural activities are crucial for familiarising the public with parties and their platforms. Such familiarity is necessary if parties wish to increase involvement in their political activities. But some aspects of party development theories derived from Western democracies are applicable to Indonesia. According to Janda’s (1980) indicators, Indonesian parties show signs of institutionalisation, as manifested in their management and organisation of local activities. These local activities enable them to connect with the general public. However, differences in the frequency and range of the activities of the four parties here demonstrated that they were at different stages of institutionalisation. The incumbent parties did not always exhibit a wider range of activities than the newer parties. Although Partai Golkar had the widest range of activities in Malang, PDIP only undertook a limited range of activities. PKS was involved in a wider range of events than PDIP. Thus, party age does not automatically translate into greater engagement in activities; a party’s objectives and orientation are more consequential. Although efforts to stay active represent a step forward in a party’s institutionalisation, the progress of Indonesian parties must be determined using other indicators as well. The parties now have the freedom

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to recruit directly at the grass-roots level, which was denied them under the New Order. The next chapter discusses the parties’ attitudes towards grass-roots recruitment by investigating the perspectives of their leaders and members on the importance of recruitment to a party’s success.

6 Recruitment Approaches

One indicator of the progress of the local organisation of political parties is recruitment. The degree of coherence between a party’s national policy and its local application is of particular concern here, as it reflects a local branch’s degree of organisation (Janda 1980) and the extent to which regulations issued by the party’s central office are followed.

The Dynamics of Membership for Political Parties Recruitment is widely regarded as an indication of party success (Klingemann & Fuchs 1995; Vanhanen 2000; Mair & van Biezen 2001). In his classic study of political parties, Duverger (1964) argues that parties can be differentiated by their emphases on recruitment. Traditional mass parties aim to expand their membership, while cadre parties rely on the quality of members to attract financiers. Although traditional parties are more focused on membership numbers than are cadre parties, grass-roots members play important roles in both. Duverger classifies grass-roots members according to their roles in a party, from the least to the most passionate and involved: ‘supporters’, ‘adherents’, ‘militants’ and ‘propagandists’ (1964: 61). Yet grass-roots members are no longer featured widely in the modern literature on political parties (Burrell 1986: 48). Contemporary discussion of party recruitment is dominated instead by analyses of strategies for the recruitment of candidates for elections and public office. In the Handbook of Party Politics, Norris (2006) argues that recruitment is crucial for political parties as it is the means of ‘electing representatives at local and national level’, and for filling positions in important agencies such as ‘non-governmental organisations and government branches and federal agencies’. Her argument focuses on the destination of party recruits rather than their origins, and ignores the practices of grass-roots recruitment. Thus grass-roots recruitment is overshadowed in significance by the objective of placing recruits in public positions. A political party’s success as an organisation is, in fact, decided in large part by how successful it is in acquiring candidates who are able to offer choices to voters (Sanbonmatsu 2006: 233). Candidate recruit-

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ment is a basic function of political parties, and a party that fails in this area ‘surrenders its elemental opportunity for power’ (Sanbonmatsu 2006: 234, citing Seligman). In this sense, recruitment at the grassroots level is merely the first step in inducting potential candidates into public positions. Political studies conducted in the United States have tended to focus on individuals, and as a result parties have seemed less significant than the candidates themselves (for example Dutwin 2000; Jamieson 2000; Hagen 2000). However, other scholars have argued that the ‘process of recruitment’ is one of the most important functions of parties (Scarrow 2006: 89) because it determines the mechanism of candidate selection and nomination (Sanbonmatsu 2006: 235). A party organisation sets regulations that determine how individuals join the party and decides whether those individuals are eligible to stand as candidates on that party’s behalf. And local party branch organisation is crucial for the election of party candidates. The emphasis on candidates in the scholarly literature that deals with recruitment reflects a prominent trend in Western democracies: namely, the decline in party membership. This decline indicates that grass-roots recruitment for political parties has weakened; parties struggle to recruit members and are perceived by the public to have declining importance. Yet the decline of political parties is still the subject of debate, particularly over whether it is a widespread phenomenon or merely a ‘nation-specific’ one, and there are ‘conceptual ambiguities and measurement problems’ in distinguishing between changes in a party system and a genuine decline in parties (Reiter 1989: 325-328). Nonetheless, if the number of parties and the size of their memberships are used as indicators, parties are indeed suffering a decline in some Western countries (Selle & Svasand 1991: 460). Also, in many Asian countries, parties exhibit ‘undemocratic’ characteristics such as ‘the hierarchical domination by leaders, the prominence of personality and personal ties, and lack of transparency in decision-making’, all of which feed doubts and cynicism towards political parties (Sejong Institute 2001: 2).1 This contributes to a lack of political participation and a decline in party membership. Thus, although the causes of party decline may differ between mature and transitional democracies, the effects are similar.2 The decline in membership of a party narrows the competition among party members to become a candidate for office. It also opens up opportunities for dedicated members to play more determinative roles in the party. Von Beyme emphasises the importance of members to party organisation, arguing that parties are born from their members and that well-organised parties are those that are able to organise their voters (1985: 159-160). Scarrow (1996: 27-51) compares the costs and benefits of members and lists only two costs that parties have to pay

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(programmatic costs and opportunity costs), while the benefits number eight (legitimacy, direct electoral support, outreach, financing, labour, linkage, innovation and personnel). Thus, although contemporary discussions of the role of party members tend to bypass grass-roots recruitment, members and membership remain crucial for political parties and therefore parties still compete with one another to build their membership bases. The importance of grass-roots recruitment is reflected in discussions of party institutionalisation. Scholars include various aspects of recruitment as part of the institutionalisation process. Panebianco (1988) and Janda (1993) point out that reliance on leaders’ charisma as a party recruitment strategy is a strong hindrance to party institutionalisation. They argue that parties must not rely on an individual’s persona to attract support, although admiration for party leaders usually does contribute to the base of support for a party. Parties should be able to appeal to would-be members on the basis of their programmes and platforms instead. Burrell (1986: 49) argues that parties’ ‘vitality’ is shown by continuing to attract new members, suggesting that ideally parties should continue to innovate and develop rather than trading on the charisma of particular leaders. Thus, a party which prioritises recruitment will have specific recruitment strategies. As Scarrow (1986) observes, parties provide incentives for individuals who perform the tasks that the parties value most. Studies on recruitment practices reveal that when a party considers recruitment a priority, it will aggressively seek to attract members, such as by offering incentives. Seyd & Whiteley (2004: 360-361) view the promises that parties make to members about their influence in decision-making as a crucial step in party institutionalisation. Scarrow (2005: 6) identifies intra-party democracy as a specific requirement for institutionalisation, one that signifies the allocation of power in decision-making to members. These arguments suggest that luring potential members with promises of greater power is a strong sign that recruitment is a party priority. For example, Britain’s Labour and Conservative Parties promised potential members that they would exert more influence in the parties through the adoption of intra-party direct democracy (see Seyd 1999: 383). The Canadian New Democratic Party adopted the same strategy, giving members a ‘meaningful role in party decision-making’ (Cross & Young 2004: 429). The Scottish Socialist Party, which considers recruitment ‘an essential part of what they do’, attempts to recruit members by running membership stalls and social events (Opinion Leader Research 2005: 21).3 Another important factor in the success of parties’ recruitment strategies is the position of the party within the wider political milieu. As Selle & Svasand (1991) point out, when a party has little influence in

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political decision-making, it may suffer from a decrease in the quality of its recruitment, which in turn can force the party to lower its membership requirements. Hence, parties which have not been successful in elections could be forced to lower their membership entry requirements. Selle & Svasand present a Norwegian case study where parties worked to enlarge their membership bases but still experienced low participation rates (1991: 462-467), highlighting the fact that parties sometimes have to choose between large and active memberships. It is important for a party to formulate effective recruitment strategies to not only attract members but also to cultivate their attachment and involvement.

Perceptions of Recruitment Scarrow (2005: 12) argues that a party wishing to develop its organisation at the local level will delegate recruitment to its local branches. This suggests that the strength of a party’s grass-roots membership base depends on the efforts of its local branches to organise recruitment and their ability to do so. In this chapter I examine the management of party recruitment by the local branches of Partai Golkar, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Partai Amanat Nasional, and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera. The two incumbent parties, we will see, chose to focus on maintaining high numbers of votes in elections rather than larger memberships. These older parties, PDIP and Partai Golkar, were less active in recruiting than the newer parties because they relied on loyal supporters accumulated over a long period of time. On the other hand, the younger parties, PKS and PAN, saw recruitment as crucial for developing their support bases. However, although PKS and PAN both believed that recruitment was quite important, at the local level only PKS was aggressive and efficient in organising recruitment activities. PAN was unable to conduct recruitment effectively due to its chaotic local administration. The diverse approaches to recruitment adopted within each party indicated that while recruitment policy was specifically regulated by a party’s constitution, at the local level recruitment very much depended on the particular circumstances of the branch. Partai Golkar During the period of my fieldwork, Partai Golkar put more emphasis on attracting and maintaining votes than it did on attracting members. Partai Golkar did not prioritise the recruitment of new members, as it had been able to rely on its existing membership for success in the

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1999 and 2004 elections, which proved that it had a solid base of loyal supporters. It had done very well in elections during the New Order as well,4 and despite allegations of foul play, the level of genuine support for the party remained significant.5 As evidence of its strength, the party successfully nominated its party chairperson, Akbar Tandjung, for the position of chair of DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, or People’s Representative Council) after the 1999 election, and support for the party was crucial in the election of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) as the fourth president of Indonesia in 1999.6 Aside from its existing support base, Partai Golkar had other assets. One of the advantages of being an incumbent party with a wide network of sub-organisations, or unsur-unsur, is that the party could delegate the tasks of promoting its platform and attracting attention to these bodies, which extended all the way down to the community level (Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas 2004: 404). Some of these suborganisations had formed the core of Sekber Golkar when it was established in 19647 and they had developed so rapidly that they had to be brought together into seven main groups.8 After the fall of Suharto in 1998, the party had faced various internal conflicts,9 and as a result one of the KINOs (Kelompok Induk Organisasi, or Parent Groupings of Organisations), the MKGR (Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong), left the party and founded its own party. However, the other KINOs remained active in local communities. Some of the most active KINOs at the time of my study were the Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia (Indonesia’s Young Generation of Renewal, or AMPI), Himpunan Wanita Karya (Women’s Functional Group, or HWK), Majelis Dakwah Islamiyah (Islamic Proselytising Council), Satkar Ulama (Satuan Karya Ulama, Ulama Functional Union), Al Hidayah (literally: the divine enlightenment), Angkatan Muda Partai Golkar (Young Generation of the Golkar Party) and Keluarga Intelek Muda Partai Golkar (Young Intellectual Families of the Golkar Party). These groups had extensive operations at the local level. Leadership of these groups afforded prestige, which is often used as a means to enter local bureaucracy – creating closer connections between these groups and government. As a result of its lack of emphasis on mass membership, Partai Golkar’s recruitment policies were rather passive. Although Partai Golkar’s pre-1999 election platform claimed that one of its functions was to recruit quality cadres through a merit-based system to fill public positions, the party’s AD/ART (Anggaran Dasar/Anggaran Rumah Tangga or Organisation Statutes/Bylaws) did not specify particular requirements for grass-roots applicants seeking membership, which would be a strong indication of a more stringent recruitment policy.10 In terms of grassroots recruitment, there was no specific formulation of strategies, despite the platform promising party members more power in decision-making

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(Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas 2004: 396). The party adopted this approach as a way of establishing itself as an independent party, free from the influence of the government and the army.11 Giving members more influence was one way the party sought to attract new support in the post-New Order period. According to studies of recruitment strategies in the British context, the promise of more power is an incentive that attracts party members (Seyd 1999; Seyd & Whiteley 2004). However, in stark contrast with the British parties studied by Seyd & Whiteley, Partai Golkar did not actively hold specific recruitment activities where its more democratic structure could be promoted and enhanced access to decision-making roles could only be enjoyed by existing party members. The party’s national recruitment approach projected an attitude of complacency and passivity, combined with a heavy reliance on sub-organisations for recruitment. Still, the party had evolved. In its national policies of recruitment, Partai Golkar showed two signs of institutionalisation. Firstly, there was the party’s decision to assign recruitment responsibilities to local offices, giving them power to assess membership applications. Scarrow (2005: 12) argues that giving an official body responsibility for recruitment and power to reject applicants is a sign of an institutionalised party.12 Secondly, and more importantly, institutionalisation was evident in the local branches’ capacity to maintain coherence between national policies and grass-roots practices. In its kodya and kabupaten offices in Malang, Partai Golkar’s recruitment approaches echoed the approaches adopted at the national level. The leaders in kodya and kabupaten Malang were very confident of the level of public support enjoyed by the party, which had membership numbers of 2,800 in the kodya and 15,000 in the kabupaten in 2008.13 The kodya chairperson did not identify member recruitment as a party priority and mentioned that the most important thing for the party was to consolidate its sub-organisations, or unsur-unsur.14 Such confidence in the party’s public support was fueled by a belief that other parties had failed when given the chance to govern. As one Golkar leader said: ‘Other parties who previously criticised Golkar turned out to be unable to lead, so people came back to Golkar’.15 The kodya chairperson, Pak Aries, specifically argued that the unsurunsur were one of the keys to the party’s success. He believed that the consolidation of the various groups would strengthen the party, particularly because they had intimate knowledge of the various communities in which they operated.16 This local knowledge was significant in establishing relationships with the local community, as well as in anticipating the actions of rival parties in particular areas. The chairperson made particular mention of two of the sub-organisations, HWK (Himpunan Wanita Karya, or Women’s Functional Group) and AMPI (Angkatan

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Muda Pembaruan Indonesia, or Indonesia’s Young Generation of Renewal).17 Pak Aries indicated that he paid special attention to these groups, arranging for regular discussions with their representatives.18 The kabupaten secretary, Pak Andi, supported the notion that the unsur-unsur were significant for Partai Golkar’s recruitment. He specifically mentioned religious groups (kelompok-kelompok agama) and professional groups (kelompok-kelompok profesional). Since these groups interacted with the community directly, they were good at drawing in potential members and persuading them to join the party. Pak Andi also explained that the party held events relevant to the different groups to create opportunities to mingle with the community, and emphasised the party’s confidence in the ability of these groups to attract support.19 One example of how these groups interacted with the community and played a recruitment role for the party was seen in an HWK meeting held in kecamatan Kepanjen (a subdivision of kabupaten Malang).20 The meeting was followed by a bazaar which was open to the public. During this event, party members and cadres chatted with visitors and gave explanations about the party and its activities.21 Pak Andi claimed that the unsur-unsur were the backbone of recruitment in kabupaten Malang, as they were responsible for the registration of 60 per cent of new members. This suggests that the unsur-unsur were indeed useful in drawing attention and support and that the party successfully made use of these organisations to ‘realise its vision and mission’ (Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas 2004: 404). The members of Partai Golkar’s unsur-unsur and other Golkar cadres played even more important roles in recruitment where they held public positions in the local community, such as head of the RW (Rukun Warga, Community Association) or RT (Rukun Tetangga or Neighbourhood Association).22 Around 40 per cent of recruitment in the kabupaten region was accomplished by these pamong desa (village officials). Holding public positions gave Partai Golkar cadres an advantage in their efforts to attract members, as patron-client relationships are still dominant in this setting. Villagers have strong respect for their village officials, who they tend to follow when making their political choices.23 Pamong desa who were also Partai Golkar cadres used these patronclient relationships to influence villagers to support the party. The concentration of Partai Golkar members in local administrative structures allowed the party to remain prevalent at the grass-roots, a fact reflected in the party’s passive recruitment strategy. In short, Partai Golkar focused on candidate recruitment, while grass-roots recruitment at the local level was passive in the sense that it relied heavily on its affiliated organisations. The party’s lack of a specific recruitment tactic was perhaps reflected in the different answers given by Partai Golkar members when asked why they had chosen to join

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the party. These answers included: to improve their organisational skills; because Partai Golkar had competent people and was a modern organisation; because family members had asked them to join; and simply because they were looking for something to do.24 Because of Partai Golkar’s inherited advantages as a legacy party and the solid work of its sub-organisations and cadres in ensuring continuing support for it, there was no need for aggressive recruitment campaigns. Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan Although PDIP lacked the same extensive network of sub-organisations, its own incumbent status had bestowed other privileges that it could use to maintain public support, particularly the enduring charismatic power of the party’s leaders. Support for the party was heavily based on the personal charisma of Sukarno (also known as Bung Karno) as a party pioneer, and his daughter Megawati as the current party leader. Megawati’s leadership and the lingering admiration for her father had created a stable and long-lasting support base, particularly in the traditional PNI stronghold of Java (especially East Java) and amongst Christian and Catholic voters in Eastern Indonesia (Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas 2004: 367). The star quality of these two individuals continued to attract and sustain support for the party. PDIP aimed to develop its support base further by courting the votes of the younger generation of Indonesians.25 But although it acknowledged the need to expand its support base, PDIP failed to develop more aggressive recruitment policies. Before the 2004 election, it was clear within the party that both the quantity and quality of its human resources were lacking, and goals were set to overcome this problem (Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas 2004: 365).26 However, although the PDIP attempted to improve the quality of its cadres by conducting various training programmes (Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas 2004: 365-366), no specific national-level policy was formulated to attract more members. The only reference to recruitment in the party constitution states that one duty of members is to bring in at least one new member.27 The actual application of this duty, however, depended on the commitment of the individual member, I observed, as there was no sanction for failure to do so. At the local level in Malang, this regulation was not enforced. The party constitution also has provisions for a special one-month training programme to be completed by applicants who wish to register to become members.28 However, in practice the formulation of these regulations left opportunities for violations at the local level. A comparison between PDIP’s national recruitment policy and its local application in Malang showed a number of other discrepancies,

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generally caused by the inefficiencies of the local branches. For example, at the national level, PDIP had assigned an official body to decide on membership applications,29 but locally in Malang the inactive nature of the branches meant that no such body existed. One case study of PDIP in East Java more generally revealed that support for the party was dwindling, as its recruitment mechanisms were disorganised and the party’s image was tarnished by party cadres involved in various legal cases (Yanuarti in Romli 2003: 115-116). Like Partai Golkar, PDIP sought to use pamong desa (village officials) as its means of recruitment. However, the party’s Pak Bambang admitted that there was far more involved in this approach than simply helping villagers meet their needs. PDIP’s decision to trade on the influence of village officials reflected a pattern for incumbent parties, one that clearly distinguished them from the new parties, who may not yet have cadres holding government positions. The only other mention made of this particular recruitment tactic in the interviews I conducted was in reference to the important role of cadres in the recruitment process. One PDIP grass-roots recruitment strategy relied on personal approaches by cadres, persuading individuals to join the party. Pak Bambang stressed the importance of adopting a ‘sensitive’ approach. He explained that each cadre needed to know how to speak to different kinds of people – for instance, both urban and rural people – in order to be effective and create a positive image for the party.30 Like Partai Golkar, during my fieldwork PDIP was focused more on attracting votes than recruiting members, which was reflected in its efforts to gain sympathy from the community. Pak Bambang believed that people would remember if they received a good impression of the party, and would base their vote on it. As an example, he described how PDIP cadres had helped find the drowned boy mentioned earlier, and how the PDIP had solidly won an election in that village shortly afterwards. One method of personal approach used by the PDIP was to organise events where cadres could interact with the general public, such as through pengajian or bhakti sosial. Pak Bambang emphasised that such social events should appeal to the public so as to effectively reach as many people as possible and give cadres an opportunity to interact directly with the public. He also revealed that PDIP had a particular interest in providing facilities for villagers as a strategy for attracting their votes. Pak Bambang explained that the party tried to be sensitive to the needs and demands of villages, and attempted to help them where possible. For instance, when a village’s bridge was broken or when sanitation facilities needed fixing, PDIP tried to lend a hand by providing money and labour to help the villages fix them. Pak Bambang argued that this strategy was effective in persuading people that the party cared about them.31 The strategies described by Pak Bambang suggest a preference

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for an indirect approach to attract sympathy, rather than direct, aggressive recruitment. But Pak Bambang was concerned that this was the only method being employed by the party, and he believed that the party should be doing more, especially with competition from new parties.32 In the absence of clearly structured institutional recruitment practices, party members in Malang asserted that PDIP’s main pulling power was the charisma of the Sukarno family and the enduring respect the public had for them. In 2008, PDIP’s kodya branch had around 61,000 members and PDIP kabupaten had around 133,500 members.33 When asked for their reasons for joining the PDIP, members gave answers such as their ‘admiration towards Bung Karno’s family’, the fact that it was ‘the party that cares the most for the ordinary citizens’, and ‘the person I have always idolised is Bung Karno’.34 Aside from Sukarno’s profile, to some extent the party’s strength came from its ideology. Interviews with local leaders revealed that the party was confident in its ideology and that its ideology was the ‘glue’ that kept party activists committed.35 However, while PDIP’s official ideology is Pancasila, the ‘ideology’ referred to by party members and cadres was more closely associated with the party’s image as a party of the ‘common people’, or ‘little people (wong cilik)’.36 In sum, discussions with party leaders indicated that the application of national recruitment policies varied according to the requirements of each village. Hence there were diverse approaches and discrepancies with national policies. PDIP’s main goal was to ensure that people voted for it during elections rather than joined as members. As a result, little attention was paid to nationally mandated recruitment mechanisms, such as the one-month mandatory training course for potential members.37 Both national policy and local recruitment practices relied on supporters’ attachments to Bung Karno and his family, and perceptions of the party as partai orang kecil (the ordinary/little people’s party). Partai Amanat Nasional showed the greatest incoherence between national policies and the local application of recruitment strategies in the Malang area. Aggressive recruitment was a priority in PAN’s national-level policy, but local branches failed to execute it. At the national level, the priority placed on recruitment was reflected in a programme called Mabita38 (Masa Bimbingan Calon Anggota, or Potential Member’s Socialisation Period). This programme is an ongoing effort to raise awareness of the party and promote it. The programme starts at the basic level of party cadre (Kader Amanat Dasar) in the kabupaten and goes to the highest level of party cadre (Kader Amanat Utama) at the central office. The programme was supplemented by visits to towns and villages during PAN

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my study, as well as by the presidential campaign of the party’s Amien Rais, which created additional awareness and support for the party (Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas 2004: 232). PAN’s primary source of support was Amien Rais himself, who appealed to Indonesia’s young generation as a pioneer of the reform movement, suggesting that PAN, like PDIP, is a charisma-based party. Rais’s profile as a Muslim scholar enhanced PAN’s capacity to attract well-educated members. PAN’s attempts to raise public awareness of the party resulted in successful party penetration at the kecamatan level. PAN’s goal of enlarging itself was reflected in its declaration of its status as an open party for semua kalangan (all groups) (Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas 2004: 231). However, in practice, this approach presented a major challenge in that Amien Rais was also a leader of a large Muslim organisation, Muhammadiyah.39 Thus, the ‘open policy’ was closely associated with, and limited to, Muhammadiyah sympathisers. What’s more, the party’s constitution states that party members should be prepared to dedicate their time and wealth to the party, further limiting involvement.40 While ostensibly an open party, PAN’s actual practices limited member registration and suitability for candidacy in elections. The closeness between PAN, Rais and Muhammadiyah sparked criticism of the party’s ideology. Observers have noted that PAN has a strong pluralist base,41 but, in practice, the party has tended to utilise its association with Muhammadiyah. PAN’s failure to develop an open membership was reflected in its tendency to favour candidates with a Muhammadiyah background (CSIS 2005). I found that some members were attracted to the party because of its association with this Muslim organisation. Inconsistencies in the implementation of the party’s ideology demonstrated a lack of ideological focus in PAN’s administration. PAN’s administrative problems were clearly reflected in its recruitment difficulties. The party’s local branches generally recognised recruitment as important and requiring improved performance. Kabupaten office chairperson Pak Widodo expressed concern that party members had been swayed to join other parties – especially PKS – and believed that the party should formulate a more effective recruitment strategy.42 He also stressed the importance of party training for cadres because ‘cadres at beginner level are easier to switch parties’, so they needed to be convinced to stay in the party. He likened party choice to ‘switching between television channels’, given the freedom to choose among so many parties. Another reason recruitment was important to PAN was its heavy reliance on donations from party supporters and members. Pak Widodo saw donations as a symbol of loyalty. Although the kabupaten office did not impose dues payments on members, they were encouraged to contribute nonetheless.43

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Despite claims by the party’s Malang branches that members had a significant role in the party, particularly as an important source of funding, branch efforts to attract new recruits were minimal and erratic. Pak Widodo explained that, generally, recruitment was conducted using a one-on-one approach. In 2008, membership figures stood at 2,500 for the kodya office and 80,000 for the kabupaten office.44 For PAN, then, like PDIP, local recruitment depended heavily on the commitment of cadres, who paid private visits to potential members to try and persuade them to join the party. This approach was usually followed by an invitation to attend party activities, usually in the form of bakti sosial/baksos. But PAN’s approach was more systematic than PDIP’s. When explaining it in detail, cadres noted that the recruitment process started at the ranting level,45 where the ranting leaders would build a database of potential members and then ask cadres to follow up with a personal approach.46 The same method was applied to new members, who, after registering, were also approached by cadres and enrolled in training programmes. These measures, although apparently beneficial, were in fact heavily dependent on the will and commitment of cadres, as they were not enforced by the party. Consequently, although theoretically recruitment should have been a continuous process, in reality cadres faced serious difficulties in carrying out their duties due to branch disorganisation. The lack of organisation of PAN’s Malang branches was, in fact, the biggest obstacle to recruitment. As explained in previous chapters, both branches were looking for new offices during my fieldwork, which meant that they could only organise minimal activities. Their inefficiencies led to the abandonment of party recruitment activities as well. Without a physical office as an organising point, it was difficult for the branches to conduct any recruitment activities at all. In the kodya office, a handful of dedicated cadres had their hands full with administrative matters, while in the kabupaten branch the chairperson was handling almost all party matters himself, making it unrealistic for him to organise recruitment effectively. Although PAN’s national policy documents clearly identified recruitment as a significant priority, the application of this policy at the local level depended on local circumstances. While PAN’s policy of empowering local offices to manage recruitment suggests that the party was institutionalising (Scarrow 2005), the fact that its local branches were unable to manage recruitment suggests that this policy had failed. The party’s dependence on local branches was also complicated by its reliance on the participation and contributions of members for tasks associated with the party’s daily operation, which demanded a steady stream of highly dedicated new recruits. PAN Malang demonstrates that although branch leaders’ commitment is crucial for a party office’s smooth operation, it is not sufficient, and that there also needs to be

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significant involvement from a relatively large number of cadres and members. Most importantly, PAN’s recruitment failure reaffirms that branch organisation is vital for ensuring that parties are capable of executing their programmes. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera PKS is an excellent example of a party with an aggressive recruitment policy that has been successfully implemented. At the national level, the PKS recruitment policy aimed to create high-quality cadres who would make capable leaders (Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas 2004: 324). The party’s policies on registration and recruitment were specific and rigorous during my study. The stringent registration policy was reflected in PKS’s constitution, which specifies clearly that in order to become a member an interested person must present a formal, written request to the central secretariat through Dewan Pimpinan Daerah (DPD, or Regional Leadership Council) (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 2006).47 After submitting the request, the individual is enrolled in specific training programmes at the local level, which he or she must complete before being officially recognised as a member by the DPD. At the local level in Malang, PKS’s general recruitment strategy involved open recruitment using two specific methods. The formal method involved specific actions such as putting up banners, distributing flyers and holding open houses. This was complemented by a more informal approach, where cadres made personal approaches to members of the public. The party branches ensured that formal recruitment activities were conducted regularly in order to reach as many people as possible. The party cadres who made the personal approaches were at that time mainly Muslim students. As a result, prospective recruits were often approached at schools and campuses.48 This practice reflected the party’s focus on young Muslim intellectuals. The cadres were organised by the local ranting and interested would-be members were advised to contact cadres there.49 These schemes resulted in membership figures of 4,000 for the kodya branch and 2,600 for the kabupaten branch by 2008.50 The PKS’s emphasis on aggressive recruitment reflected the important role members played in the party. Interestingly, given its focus on young middle-class Muslims and its identity as an Islamic party, PKS did not require potential members to be Muslims. However, the party induction ceremony required members to recite Arabic verses usually known only to Muslims, and as PKS kabupaten leader Pak Sophya pointed out, the party attracted supporters using Islamic values. PKS’s overt Islamism meant that it had to compete with other Islamic parties to attract supporters and members. Pak Sophya stressed that PKS

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offered an alternative to the other parties, however, and that according to Islam the party’s organisation was important: Because we are an Islamic party, what we emphasise is people’s rights and duties as Muslims. This is not only about being ‘faithful’ – there is also the aspect of organisation. We emphasise that the disorganised ‘good’ will lose against organised ‘bad’. And Islam is a good thing, [but] when not organised well, it is unreliable. [So what we do] translates to the processes of enlightenment. 51 also hoped to explicitly differentiate itself from other parties on the basis of its work ethic. Pak Sophya argued that PKS was better than other parties because

PKS

the orientation of other parties perhaps is funding issue, etc. In our case, we work for a faith that is abstract, but we believe in it. When the others are tired of working, we keep going; this is because of motivation. This is what is being built.52 Another way in which PKS incorporated Islam into its party ideology was through its effort to convince potential members that PKS was the best choice to help renew the country.53 Pak Sophya pointed to the importance of PKS’s role in this process: Generally, we want to change everything for the better. At the national level and beyond, to create a good society. When everything improves, later on the party image as an Islamic party will improve. Besides that, the role of PKS as an Islamic party really exists, and the nuance of service for the people will be created. And we would also like to stress [that we are a] professional party, meaning a party that is amanah,54 so people will have a choice, have hope, in PKS with the good individuals. We start internally first, by showing a good example. 55 In order to convince supporters that they were being offered something new, the party also focused on being a ‘clean’ party, that is, free from the corruption and money-related violations associated with the older parties. The party insisted that it operated on Islamic faith and distanced itself from any practice that violated Islamic laws. This suggests that PKS’s goals centred on building a society that adhered more closely to Islam rather than simply filling public positions in the government. PKS’s approach, which identified Islam as a vital component to be incorporated into every Muslim’s daily life, aimed to convince Muslims to

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examine their adherence to the Islamic way of life, consider what they needed to do to improve, and identify what the party could offer to assist them. These aims showed the party’s commitment to taking an integrated Islamic approach to party-building, whose members could set an example to others about Muslim values and lifestyle. Interviews with party members in kodya and kabupaten Malang indicated that the PKS’s strategy of attracting support by creating a positive image had been successful. New members were convinced to sign up because they believed PKS was different from other parties and that party members were model Muslims.56 The strategy of going directly to the grass-roots was also seen as positive by members, and it created a sense that the party genuinely cared about the people. As indicated by my interviews with PAN leaders, PKS was successful in persuading members of other parties to switch their allegiances.57 As mentioned, PKS was generally more aggressive in recruiting members than the other three parties. Its strategy was more direct and intensive, and it reached down to the grass-roots level. The party branches organised and executed their recruitment strategies according to the national policy, thereby replicating those of their more established counterparts in Western democracies. In terms of recruitment strategy, then, PKS showed clear signs of institutionalising, with coherence between national policy and local application, and the delegation of recruitment responsibilities to local offices.

Comparison of Different Recruitment Approaches The freedom of the four parties’ local branches to conduct recruitment was a clear change from the practices allowed by the New Order government. As we will see, they have made use of their new opportunities to connect with people at the grass roots and engage them in party activities. Scholars believe that by recruiting members, parties give citizens the chance to be actively involved in politics and elections – an important prerequisite for democracy (Dahl 1998: 37-38). The freedom of parties to function independently fosters progress toward institutionalisation, which is crucial if parties are to contribute to the democratic transition process in new democracies (Mainwaring & Scully 1995). The efforts by the four parties examined here to engage with their members and society in general suggest that they were making progress in involving people in politics (Dahl 1998: 37-38). These efforts also clearly indicate the parties’ recognition of the importance of their members as a source of candidates for party positions, and of the importance of their participation in party activities. Moreover, the parties’ acknowledgement of their members was growing. The most important indicator

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of this acknowledgement was their granting of greater power to their members in internal decision-making. The parties’ regulations clearly state that party members are to be consulted in decision-making. Party members indicated that these rules were applied strictly, and that they were able to take part in party meetings and influence party decisions. These efforts are another indication that the parties were making progress toward institutionalisation. Giving greater power to members also showed application of the principles of intra-party democracy which, according to Scarrow (2005), indicates party institutionalisation as well. However, the parties did not specifically promote their promise of greater decision-making power for members externally in their recruitment campaigns. Although members confirmed that they had greater say in their party, the fact that the parties did not actively promote that in their recruitment campaigns suggested that this tactic was not seen as important in attracting support. The four parties also showed signs of institutionalising in their delegation of the management of recruitment to local branches (Scarrow 2005). Such delegation is a clear sign that party organisation is sufficiently developed to distribute power to subordinate offices. Cadres played a very important role in recruitment in each of the four parties. Cadres from each party adopted the same method, namely a personal approach. But while PKS cadres and leaders demonstrated awareness of the significance of recruitment for their party and thus gave attention to it, PAN leaders, who shared their conviction that recruitment was important, did not give any specific attention to it. The cadres of Partai Golkar and PDIP, though they generally employed a personal approach during party events, could be sporadic in their recruitment efforts. There were also more significant variations in how the parties approached recruitment, which raised questions about the progress of institutionalisation. As incumbent parties, Partai Golkar and PDIP had similar approaches to maintaining their existing support bases. However, they went about this in different ways. While Partai Golkar relied on the work of its sub-organisations, PDIP placed more emphasis on providing care and assistance to local communities. In both cases, though, reliance on pamong desa for recruitment pointed to the continuing importance of patronage as a means of broadening support. Partai Golkar’s sub-organisations focused on maintaining the party’s popularity in order to retain votes. Seeking new member registrations was less important, although welcome. Partai Golkar no longer had the advantage of automatic recruitment of government officials as it had during the New Order,58 and now had to create an independent image and conduct its own recruitment. But recruitment was not a party priority due to its extensive existing support base. PDIP’s own low-key approach to recruitment was shown by its reluctance to enforce the party’s rule that each

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member must recruit another member. However, while the charisma of PDIP’s leaders was key to maintaining PDIP’s support base, Partai Golkar relied on its platforms and new image to maintain support. For these two incumbent parties, the priority was not to sign up new members, but to convince voters – whether members or not – to keep voting for them. The incumbents had the advantage over the new parties of having existing resources which could be utilised to attract sympathy and cultivate a network of support. Partai Golkar relied on its existing unsurunsur (sub-organisations) to exert influence at the grass-roots level. PDIP utilised the lingering admiration felt in the community for Bung Karno and Megawati to sustain the party’s immense support base.59 These advantages put the incumbents in a strong position relative to the young parties, who were in an earlier phase of building public support and networks. Partai Golkar’s and PDIP’s access to pamong desa as an important means of recruitment was another advantage that they shared. This recruitment strategy was more feasible for incumbent parties than new parties, as they tended to have more personnel working in the village administration. But while Partai Golkar clearly acknowledged the influence of pamong desa in attracting people to the party, PDIP said that it was more difficult to use pamong desa for recruitment than other methods. In practice, then, the use of pamong desa in recruitment might actually be limited to Partai Golkar only. As new parties, PAN and PKS felt more urgency to recruit than did Partai Golkar and PDIP. They needed to build membership bases which could support them, especially during elections, based on the premise that members provide more secure votes than non-member supporters (Scarrow 1996). However, the two parties differed in the aggressiveness of their recruiting, with PKS clearly the more aggressive. While PKS conducted frequent recruitment activities, PAN failed to organise any recruitment campaigns at the local level during the period of my study. Though PAN relied heavily on its leader’s charisma for recruitment, PKS’s main recruitment weapon was its image. More importantly, PAN’s local organisational problems created difficulties in executing party programmes, while PKS, although equally young, demonstrated a more mature local organisational capacity. Thus, the practices associated with incumbency and newness do not explain all the similarities and differences between the four parties. Indeed, all four parties attracted members through their images. Partai Golkar’s electoral successes can be attributed to both the popularity of its new image and the loyalty of its support base from the time of Suharto.60 PKS experienced strong growth in its support base due to its image as a clean Islamic party.61 PDIP’s image as the nationalist party of

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the ‘little people’ aided its recruitment programme, while PAN’s close association with Muhammadiyah contributed to its popularity. However, two of the four parties also relied significantly on leaders’ charisma to attract support. As we have seen, some PDIP and PAN members became members out of fondness for their party leaders, Megawati and Amien Rais, respectively.62 On the other hand, Partai Golkar and PKS members were more interested in their parties’ programmes and images.63 Janda’s model of party organisation that necessitates party programme to be the main point of attraction for potential members, would suggest that PDIP’s and PAN’s progress towards institutionalisation was less advanced than that of the other two parties (Janda 1993: 167). This notion is strengthened by Panebianco’s argument that ‘the absence of a founder’s charisma predicts strong party institutionalisation’ (1988: 50-52). However, while one of the parties reliant on a charismatic figure is an incumbent party (PDIP), the other (PAN) is not. This indicates that party age has little to do with dependence on charismatic leaders to attract support. Incumbents may be as incapable as younger parties of creating a party attachment beyond admiration for a leader. At the national level, the four parties all claimed that human resources were a priority. However, my research suggests that local party branches may face challenges in executing such a policy. In Partai Golkar’s case, the branches were crucial in coordinating the activities of sub-organisations, while PDIP’s branches had to be sensitive in identifying local community needs. For these two parties’ branches, organisation and coordination were key to ensuring that different tasks were conducted. Although PAN and PKS both aimed to sign up as many new members as possible, the effectiveness of this strategy depended on the branches’ ability to implement it. The extraordinary difference between PAN’s and PKS’s recruitment strategies in Malang was due to different levels of efficiency in their party organisation. PAN’s local branches in Malang were overwhelmed by their lack of administrative efficiency, resulting in an almost total cessation of their activities. PKS, on the other hand, had much better organised branches which were able to maintain the party’s activities in the face of similar challenges. Branch organisation plays a crucial role in the member registration process. Although all four parties had regulations that specifically required members to formally apply for registration, in practice it was difficult to apply these regulations strictly, especially in the case of the new parties. When the new parties were first established, applicants were usually admitted as members directly. Only relatively recently did the new parties attempt to enforce their own rules. The incumbent parties were even less likely to implement a formal registration process; members stated that they had registered without making a formal request. Some supporters of the incumbent parties had joined party activities

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without registering beforehand, and were issued membership cards as a result. Thus, despite being more mature organisations, the incumbent parties did not find it necessary to strictly apply their member application rules. One explanation is their steady existing support, which made the need to sign up new members less urgent. These divergences between formal registration requirements and local practices for the different parties raise questions about the level of coherence between their national and local administrations. The most prominent divergence between central policy and local implementation was seen in recruitment, such as PDIP’s rule of one member bringing in at least one more member, which was not enforced. While the parties’ formal regulations may indicate that a process of institutionalisation was occurring, this might not be the case at the branch level. The local offices may face difficulties that the national policy did not anticipate, with the offices’ inefficiencies compromising the party’s overall image. Furthermore, a lack of coherence between national and local policies may indicate a lack of party organisation, which in turn raises doubts about the actual extent of a party’s institutionalisation. Although they chose different recruitment methods and approaches, the parties shared a similar objective. All four parties sought to make connections with the local community. Partai Golkar aimed to achieve this by using its sub-organisations to engage local people. PDIP and PAN conducted community-based activities such as bhakti sosial. In contrast, PKS chose to distribute leaflets in public places, so that the cadres could directly interact with the general public. But no method of recruitment was exclusive to a particular party, suggesting that the parties were open to adopting different methods to connect with the community. By running membership stalls and social events to attract members, PKS displayed a very active recruitment strategy, in contrast to the other parties, who chose more passive means of attracting members. As described by its local leaders, PKS’s recruitment policies were also cohesive. The recruitment efforts of the other parties, on the other hand, were half-hearted and individualistic, though they recognised the importance of recruitment. PKS was also successful in managing local activities. However, PKS’s approach to such management was still not as aggressive as those of parties described in studies of other countries. For instance, the type of sacrifice by leaders and the incentives given to those who perform a party’s most important tasks, as Scarrow (1996) describes in her study of parties in Germany and Britain, were not apparent in the four parties here. Even within PKS, which made recruitment its top priority, there was no specific reward for cadres who did one-on-one recruiting. Thus, the parties’ recruitment approaches may need to be revisited after future elections. It is possible that poorer

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election results will force the parties to become more flexible and change their recruitment tactics. Although Indonesia is still a transitional democracy, its parties have the same difficulties attracting members as parties in more mature democracies. While Indonesian parties have a new-found freedom to organise themselves, they also have to compete to win votes, which translates into competition to attract party members as well. People, of course, have the freedom to change the parties they vote for between elections. Yet the parties’ recruitment strategies that I have described did not anticipate members switching parties. With the exception of PKS, the parties were not aggressive in their recruitment, despite electoral volatility, which suggests that they should be more vigilant in formulating strategies to draw support. The PAN leader’s comparison of choosing a party with switching channels on television demonstrates concern over the strength of party attachments. But with indications that public trust in parties is declining in Indonesia (Tempo 2005), party membership in Indonesia may well decline too. Indonesians are becoming less attracted to parties, viewing party membership as increasingly unnecessary compared with the pre-New Order era, and so many people are choosing to be unattached party supporters instead. As Linz argues, new democracies exhibit a trend of having ‘fewer voters with strong party identification’ (Linz 1997). As a result, Indonesian parties face serious challenges in creating greater participation.

Conclusion We saw earlier that Partai Golkar and PKS showed greater organisational prowess at the local level than PDIP and PAN, and that is true on the specific matter of recruitment as well. PDIP’s and PAN’s reliance on their leaders’ charisma as a recruitment strategy limited their ability to attract supporters other than people attracted to the party leaders. In both cases, their party programmes were either unpopular or neglected in their recruitment campaigns. But, ideally, party leadership changes should occur regularly, which can leave such parties with essentially no means of attracting support. Both PDIP and PAN exhibited poor branch organisation and discrepancies between their national recruitment policies and their local practices. The adherence of their local branches to the recruitment regulations laid down by their central offices was inconsistent. This suggests that the failure of parties to focus on party programmes rather than individual leaders is correlated with party organisation. Simply put, betterorganised parties promote platforms to attract support, while poorly

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organised parties are unable to shift attention from their leaders to their programmes. Beyond recruitment, party branches are also responsible for creating a solid party-member relationship that can sustain the party. For members, this relationship occurs at the branch level. The next chapter examines the relationship between parties and their members, and the role of local party organisations in managing members.

7

Members’ Motivations and Participation in the Parties

So, what should parties do after attracting and recruiting grass-roots members? Ideally, they should build on the resulting momentum and ensure that these members will be attached and active. However, deep involvement in party life depends on individuals’ aspirations, supported by party efforts at engaging them in meaningful participation. In Malang, the lack of effort by the parties to fully engage their members resulted in a tendency towards creating passive memberships, including people who joined a party just to obtain a membership card but had little knowledge of party organisation. Local party branches faced challenges creating and strengthening members’ attachments, particularly given the diverse motivations of their members and unresponsive membership management policies at the local level.

Motivation and Involvement in Political Parties Scholars argue that members’ attachments to political parties are crucial for the success of those parties, mainly because of the influence of attachments on voting behaviour. Dalton & Wattenberg write that ‘longterm loyalty’ and ‘repeated experience with a preferred party’ determine a voter’s choice; at the same time, party attachment gives the party a stable support base (Dalton & Wattenberg 2000: 21). Strong attachment is also usually manifested in a greater willingness of members to participate in party activities such as rallies. Affection for a political party usually translates to fondness for the political system as well (Dalton & Wattenberg 2000: 21). Thus, strong support for a party tends to mean strong support for the political system. Parties are greatly dependent on members’ attachments during elections. Burrell (1986: 49-50) argues that a party’s vitality can be observed when members are more than just ‘nominally committed’, but truly involved in a party’s efforts to win elections. Besides being a reliable source of votes, scholars argue, party members are relied on by parties to participate in party activities. Turnout for these activities helps create the impression that the parties are popular. Thus, parties greatly benefit from continuous member participation.

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To create strong participation, parties have to tap into members’ motivations to join the party in the first place. Although research on motivation is complex, it is generally noted that members join parties to gain ‘influence, material favors, information, social benefits, or mental satisfaction’; they also stand to lose money, time, and alternative opportunities (Heidar 2006: 304). Scarrow (2005) describes six main motivations to join a party: to express a political conviction, to learn more about politics, to participate in politics, to help fulfil personal political ambitions, to gain social benefits, and to gain economic benefits. As we have seen, the decision to join a party can also be influenced by the incentives provided. Janda (1980: 128) provides the simplest categorisation of incentives. He argues that there are three basic incentives to registering as party members: material incentives (monetary rewards), solidary incentives (the benefit of associating with friends) and purposive incentives (derived from the ‘stated ends of the organisation’ or patronage benefits). The decision to join a party also generally depends on the social context: whether it fills a need to belong to an entity as a reflection of religious, class, or ethnic identity. It can be influenced by the will to change a particular government policy as well (Heidar 2006: 302, 304). Heidar presents examples of studies from different countries in Europe and the United States on the motivations behind members’ applications to join a party. He argues that ideology plays a defining role in members’ decisions to join, as well as in their ongoing commitment to the party. Heidar points to a study by Paul Sabatier (1992), who developed ‘commitment theory’, which argues that ‘individuals join and become active in a political organisation because of their strong ideological sympathies with the organisation’s political goals’. That is particularly true for newly formed parties (Heidar 2006: 304).1 One study on members of a Danish party found that 54 per cent of them chose to join because of the party’s ideology (Pedersen et al. 2004).2 Thus, party ideology is one of the most important factors in a potential member’s decision to join a party. Scholars argue that, ideally, members’ involvement in a party goes further than simply signing up and obtaining a membership card. Members’ involvement in the ‘life’ of a party is a sign of that party’s maturity. One cross-national study measured members’ contributions to a party organisation in terms of their intensity, ranging from attending meetings at varying frequencies to taking part in electoral campaigns to offering financial support.3 Janda (1980: 126-132) deems members’ involvement an essential indicator of a party’s institutionalisation. He defines involvement as ‘the intensity of psychological identification with the party and as the commitment to furthering its objectives by participating in party activities’ (Janda 1980: 126). Janda argues that

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involvement can also be measured by membership requirements, membership participation, doctrinism and personalism (Janda 1980: chapter 12). Membership requirements vary from the least to the most costly, according to Janda: no requirement, registering as party members, paying dues, and serving a probationary period. The more costly the requirement, the greater the level of member involvement.4 Duverger categorised party members according to their ‘degrees of participation’. He differentiated them from the least to the most passionate and involved: ‘supporters’, ‘adherents’, ‘militants’ and ‘propagandists’ (Duverger 1964: 61). Although parties benefit from more ‘propagandist’ members, who actively promote the party and recruit more members, in reality most members are ‘adherents’ who merely sign up and vote for the party.5 Janda (1980: 129) adopts Barnes’s classification of membership participation: nominal members (the least involved), followed by marginal members, then participants, and militants (the most involved).6 In nominal member parties, most members are members ‘in name only’, and do not participate beyond registering as members. Marginal member parties are those where most members exhibit some interest in party activities by occasionally attending meetings or performing party tasks. In participant member parties, most party members attend meetings regularly and perform party tasks occasionally. A party can be described as militant if most members attend all party meetings and provide a ready source of labour for all party activities. Janda argues that meeting attendance represents a basic level of party participation, while partaking in other activities shows deeper member involvement (1980: 129). This argument suggests that, at a minimum, active members should attend party meetings. However, European case studies have suggested that party activism is declining. Member participation in Ireland’s Fine Gael party was considered a crucial form of support for the party, but despite party loyalty, only a small portion of members actually spent time participating (Gallagher & Marsh 2004: 409, 413). Thus, support for parties does not necessarily translate into greater participation in party activities. Parties typically depend more on members’ votes than on their contributions in the form of activities. Studies on Danish parties reveal that one-half of members do not participate in party-related activities other than paying dues, a smaller portion attend local meetings only occasionally, and about one in seven are very active during and outside elections (Pedersen et al. 2004: 380). This suggests that low participation in European democracies is normal and that parties can still function despite it. Studies on Western democracies have also revealed that, generally, members join a party to express their support and then become inactive afterwards (Heidar 2006: 306). Also, these parties depend on a handful of committed cadres for their daily operations and the execution of their

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activities (Heidar 2006: 306). Hence, party organisation depends less on the percentage of members who are active and more on how involved the active members are. This trend is a consequence of the enlargement of parties. According to Weldon (2006) and Mair & van Biezen (2001), as parties become large and their bureaucracy becomes more complex, individuals require more commitment to be able to navigate through the organisation. This need for greater commitment then became a screening mechanism for members; only the more committed would stay active in the party. As a result, there was a smaller percentage of active party members. Parties have to find a way around these trends to create stable participation patterns among members. The low rate of member participation suggests that more weight should be given to other factors in deciding the level of party involvement. Janda uses the term ‘doctrinism’ to describe the amount of influence a party’s written literature has on members and its usage as reference (1980: 130). For Janda, a higher level of involvement is indicated by the existence of unifying party literature, the adherence of members to it, and the frequency of its use (1980: 130-131). His cross-national research suggested that most parties actually did not have a ‘discernible written literature to which party members refer in an effort to justify party activities’, and that only a handful of parties had any documents to which they continually and frequently referred. Janda also found that although parties do have constitutions, members usually did not use them as strict guidance; they used them more casually and in an unbinding way. Janda also uses ‘personalism’ as an indicator of party involvement. ‘Personalism’ refers to the strong alliance that members have with party leaders as the basis of their support for the party. Janda argues that although allegiance to particular leaders is important in many contexts, in well-organised parties involvement should not depend on allegiance to particular leaders (Janda 1980: 132). ‘Personalism’ and ‘doctrinism’ suggest that in a well-organised party organisation, members’ attachments to the party should be influenced by other factors than affection towards a particular leader, and that there should be a defined party literature that guides party activities and is frequently referred to by members. Thus, members should be attached to an organisation, its platforms, and its programs, and not to its people at the top. But, in the Philippines, personalism is strong. Its society is heavily influenced by networks of patron-clients of extended blood and marital relatives, landlords and tenants, and bosses and subordinates (Gonzales 2001: 257). Consequently, parties in the Philippines are based on individual leaders; people gather quickly behind the figures they support, and disperse equally as quickly when those individuals lose influence (Gonzales 2001: 277). Party loyalty is very low and people easily switch their support from one party to another.

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When applied to South Korea, Janda’s theory on party organisation suggests that South Korean political parties are still a long way from becoming institutionalised. Helgesen points out that South Korean parties are dependant on their leaders, and that ‘the leader is the party’ (Steinberg & Shin 2006: 518). ‘Personalism’ plays a much larger role in building the bases of support for these parties than other factors such as party platforms. Members of South Korean parties are attracted to their parties out of non-ideological motivations such as ‘money, personal power, blood relations, and the like’, and recruits join in order to obtain power and rewards, which brings greater power to the party leaders to whom they are loyal (Steinberg & Shin 2006: 522). As a result, political parties are ‘the weakest link’ in democratic processes in South Korea, and are established, diminished, or changed according to their leaders’ will. Thus, although Korean parties are showing more signs of maturing amid the democratic transition process in South Korea,7 heavy reliance on personalism has hindered their institutionalisation. A comprehensive and effective recruitment approach promotes stronger attachment to a party as an institution rather than to party personnel. But while such an approach develops a membership base, the degree of attachment and participation within parties varies. Members are involved in their parties in different ways and degrees. The variable intensity of participation has attracted much attention from scholars who have wished to examine the sacrifices members make for their chosen parties. Participation in party activities is generally measured by time spent to do party tasks and by the specific tasks performed for the party.8 In cases of low involvement and membership decline, parties need active members to make a greater commitment (Scarrow 1996: 195). Both parties’ efforts to increase participation and members’ own desires to take part in party operations contribute to members’ participation. However, one study on party members in India revealed that members’ decisions to actively participate in parties sprang more from internal motivations than the parties’ efforts to engage them (Prasad 1983), although the parties’ efforts to penetrate different social strata helped link people with the political system (Prasad 1983: 110-112). Election periods in India attracted the highest intensity and frequency of active party involvement; the main activities were propagandising, campaigning and getting out the vote.9 Outside elections, party activists acted as ‘brokers’ or ‘expeditors’ of involvement and were involved with parties’ social functions and activities, and arbitrated disputes (Prasad 1983: 110). Participation in Indian parties was high and members stayed active even in the absence of election-related activities, which helped sustain India’s democracy, the world’s largest. Although some Indonesian parties have aggressive recruitment methods, and individuals are free to choose a party, their choice of party is

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often still swayed by community leaders. As in India, in New Order Indonesia (1966-1998), election periods triggered intense party activities. But outside those periods, as we have seen, the parties did very little. In the changed circumstances of the reform period, parties have more freedom and thus can take more active roles in community life. However, their influence on political participation is still limited primarily to involving members and supporters in their socio-cultural activities. As a consequence of parties’ limited capacity to foster participation, active political participation through parties heavily depends on individuals’ desire to take part in party meetings, and in their efforts to advance their party careers so as to be potential party candidates. In Indonesia, members join particular parties for party-specific reasons, such as the party’s image, or for more general reasons, such as wanting to learn more about organisations and politics. Whatever the basis of their initial attraction to a particular party, it can be utilised by that party to create a continuing and increasing sense of attachment. The relationship between parties and members is heavily influenced by parties’ efforts to cultivate the attachment of their members. Such efforts may take the form of holding awareness-raising programmes, requiring party dues, or organising party events. Parties that fail to undertake such efforts have low levels of member familiarity with the party. Generally, such parties have no specific programmes to familiarise members with their party constitutions and party regulations. As a result, members have limited knowledge of them, including about their rights and duties as members. Another consequence of members’ inadequate knowledge of their parties is less attachment among ordinary members, shown by their low levels of participation in party activities compared with the participation of party cadres. In Indonesia, party dues are ineffective in creating attachment, as they are not usually obligatory, leaving party activities as the main means of involvement. As with Western parties, deeper participation in party activities is limited to party cadres and leaders, who demonstrate greater passion and willingness to make sacrifices for their party. Party members in Indonesia are generally reluctant to get more involved in party politics, as party life takes a back seat to their primary occupations, and thus their connections with parties are limited. However, members generally feel that such limited interaction with their parties is sufficient, in contrast with the ideals of greater involvement.

Membership Dynamics The relationships between Partai Golkar, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Partai Amanat Nasional and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera and

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their members were manifested during my study in the attachment of those members to their parties and their involvement in party activities, mainly in paying dues and participating in party events. But different forms of interaction created varying degrees of attachment. Also, levels of participation and attachment differed between members, cadres and leaders, with individuals in higher positions in the parties being the more active. More importantly, the parties played a crucial role in cultivating members’ willingness to actively contribute and participate. The degree and intensity of attachment depended on how the parties managed and cultivated it. Partai Golkar Partai Golkar members’ patterns of motivation and participation were still influenced by the structures the party inherited from the New Order period during my fieldwork, but it had also been successful in creating and promoting a fresh new image. Alongside the influence of the old regime, persuasion from family members and personal interest in learning more about politics and organisations influenced the decisions of new members to join the party. However, generally, members’ involvement in party activities was limited to party cadres and because of limited opportunities for participation by ordinary members, participation in party politics (i.e. party careers) was limited to cadres and leaders. Cadres were more motivated to participate, as party career advancement was highly affected by involvement in party events. Members’ motivations for joining Partai Golkar varied considerably, from persuasion by family members who were already members to a desire to find activities post-retirement. There was also a member who said that he joined because ‘Partai Golkar is modern and it has highquality personnel’.10 As evidence of the influence of the legacy of the New Order government, another member claimed that he was in the party because he was in the bureaucracy during Suharto days. The range of answers from party members about their motivations for joining confirmed that the party had no specific recruitment scheme to attract new members and that it relied on its new image as well as existing members inherited from the New Order government. This suggests that the party’s supporters did not place a high value on ideology. Although there was no urgency to build a stronger platform, doing so would benefit the stability of the party’s support in the long run, as a clearer platform would provide a more reliable means of maintaining attraction to the party.11 Upon joining Partai Golkar, members received no special awarenessraising about the party constitution. However, although there were members who had only vague ideas of how they should interact with

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the party, other members demonstrated awareness of the party’s AD/ART (Anggaran Dasar/Anggaran Rumah Tangga) and could correctly identify what was expected of them.12 The varied level of knowledge of party duties and rights points to different levels of involvement of members in the party – the more involved the members were, the better their knowledge of their rights and duties. As there was no sanction for members who failed to participate in activities,13 individual will was the only determinant in decisions to be active in the party. The members stated that they attended party rallies, regular meetings and party pengajian (Islamic study groups), while cadres indicated that they were assigned different tasks during different party events which were rotated among cadres.14 Members and cadres thus had certain responsibilities that they fulfilled by attending party events and helping organise them. Cadres showed deeper involvement than ordinary members. Cadres were usually assigned bigger roles in coordinating the events, while members were usually only invited to attend. Deeper involvement served as the party’s recognition of the cadres’ position and importance in the party. In Partai Golkar’s kodya branch, the chairperson paid special attention to the cadres, regularly calling them to his office during party events to have private discussions with them. This special regard of the party chairperson contributed to their commitment to party activities. Similarly for Partai Golkar’s kabupaten branch, there was a close relationship between party leaders and cadres, as they seemed to meet up regularly outside the party.15 Thus, for the cadres, one of the benefits of attending party events was special recognition from the party leader. General members received information on what the party and other parties were doing, whether such information was formally presented by party leaders or informally gleaned from casual chats with other participants in the events. Their various motivations and benefits kept the active members and cadres attending party events. However, the portion of members and cadres who took part in party activities was still a minority compared with the members who were inactive, despite special attention for active cadres.16 Although general turnout to party events was quite good,17 those who turned out were from certain groups of people; the same cadres and members kept turning up at different party events. Yet, in any case, it would have been difficult, or even impossible, to accommodate all members at party events. Party activities were intended and designed for a limited number of participants, with invitations only distributed to party cadres. The choice of whether to participate in party activities was, of course, affected by the practice of only including some members and cadres, but it also depended on individual members. In terms of party career aspirations, the choice of being

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inactive indicated that the individuals were not interested in pursuing party careers, since more involvement in party activities would introduce members to party officials and leaders, improve their public image and enhance their opportunities for party career advancement.18 But the absence of a special induction mechanism meant that members had little knowledge of a party career even if they chose to pursue one. When asked about how they could advance to higher membership levels, members indicated that they should be active and dedicated to the party.19 This reflected the absence of a clear promotion mechanism in the party. Members’ lack of knowledge was a consequence of the absence of both a clear party policy and party efforts to familiarise its members with the policies it did have. Upon registering, members were issued membership cards, which contained details such as the member’s name, address and date of birth. The card served as a special form of identification for the members. The same details were recorded in party files maintained by local branches. Theoretically, the branch then reported developments in the membership database to its central office.20 Although the party did not prioritise recruitment, development of the membership base was considered important and worth reporting to the party’s higher authority. However, this kind of reporting was not a standard procedure required in all branches. Although the kodya branch reported its membership statistics regularly, the kabupaten office, while also maintaining a membership database, did not report to the central office regularly. Irregular updating meant that the kabupaten database was not accurate, especially considering that former members did not report decisions to cease their memberships.21 Increases in membership were accurately recorded, but not decreases, and even where reports to the central office were made, they did not accurately convey membership decline. Inaccurate recording of membership numbers had no implications for party finances, however, since the party did not impose dues payments on its members. Concerns about members’ economic difficulties had discouraged the party from making dues obligatory.22 The absence of member dues contributed to the lack of interaction between the party and ordinary members. Regular dues payments would have created a form of frequent interaction between members and the party, whereby members and the party would have had to contact each other to ensure that the payment was made. As dues were not imposed, there was one less kind of interaction. Indeed, for many members, interaction with the party ceased immediately after they signed on. Only members who were genuinely interested in party life took the time to take part in party activities. Typically, the same group of people attended different party events. In both Partai Golkar’s kabupaten and kodya branches, these were the people who had already become party cadres and were active

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in party divisions (women, youth and so on) or in the party’s suborganisations. Other members were inactive and thus could not be mobilised or used by the party. Although Partai Golkar’s AD/ART did not regulate the level of participation expected of its members, it did specify their rights and duties. Members who did not participate in party activities could not exercise their rights and they did not perform their duties (as one of which was to participate in party activities). Partai Golkar’s constitution specified that one duty of members was to actively conduct party programmes (aktif melaksanakan program-program Partai Golkar) and that two of their rights were to speak and cast votes (bicara dan memberikan suara) (Partai Golkar 2005). Failure to participate in party activities denied members the opportunity to exercise their rights and spelled failure to perform their party duties. The handful of people who attended party activities naturally had a far better knowledge of party activities than those who did not; the latter were aware of a considerably shorter list of party activities.23 Party cadres were also the beneficiaries of a special course on leadership by the party, which served both to enhance their skills and acknowledge their involvement in the party. Participation was rewarded by greater acknowledgement and service from the party, which resulted in closer affection of members towards the party. The contours of member participation were shaped by the party’s own efforts and the local environment. One important influence on members’ levels of participation in Partai Golkar was the fact that party life was a second occupation for most members, even leaders. The kabupaten secretary explained that he had to make many sacrifices for the party; for example, because he had to pay transportation costs for the cadres who visited his house, he had to sell his wife’s jewelry.24 The personal sacrifices compounded the difficulties caused by the fact that party life took place only after members performed their day jobs.25 Passion for the party could only be realised after their working hours.26 Hence, interviews with party members for this study were conducted during party events, or during their leisure time, which usually meant late afternoon at their residences. The members only came to the party offices when they needed to, usually for meetings. Party life was secondary to their main occupations and deeper involvement depended on individual will and motivation.27 Although the involvement of more members would mean greater democracy in the party, members were satisfied with the current arrangement which left the choice of deeper involvement to the individual. Members generally felt that their level of participation in the party was best for their lifestyles and sufficient political involvement. Thus, the ideals of greater involvement did not apply to Partai Golkar. The

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feelings of satisfaction of the members suggest that their needs to be involved were met and that deeper involvement was not desired, particularly given the difficulties of integrating more people. Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan Members’ attachments to PDIP were based heavily on the party’s ideology and the appeal of Bung Karno (Sukarno), as well as on persuasion by other members. Upon joining the party, the members had different approaches to their duties, and some became more involved in party activities than others. At the same time, party branches created opportunities and ways for the individuals to be more involved. However, activities in PDIP were limited to bhakti sosial and regular meetings, which hindered stronger and more frequent involvement from members. Consequently, members had little knowledge of the party beyond that expressed through their uniform commitment to supporting Sukarno and the party’s image. When asked why they joined PDIP, some members mentioned that they had been asked by friends who were already members.28 This suggested that some members put effort into attracting other members as required by the party’s AD/ART. However, this was entirely left to individuals’ discretion. As a result, attempts to bring in other members were sporadic and conducted without specific instructions from the party or sanctions for failing to do so. More commonly, members’ decisions to join were a result of their admiration for Bung Karno. This admiration was directed also at his daughter Megawati, especially after the party’s internal leadership conflict in 1996-1997, and many members said that they became more attached to the party during the proMeg days.29 PDIP members were still heavily influenced by personalism, which contradicts Janda’s prescription for strong party organisation (1980). The party had failed to develop a platform that could sustain public support beyond that for its leaders. Furthermore, it showed no effort to channel the support for its leaders to support for its programmes and platforms; it settled on enjoying the immense popularity of these charismatic figures.30 PDIP’s image as the party of the ‘little people’ (wong cilik), which is perceived as part and parcel of the party’s ideology, also influenced members’ decisions to join. They believed that joining would enable them to ‘fight for the interests of common people’.31 The wong cilik ideology was originally derived from Sukarno’s concept of Marhaenism, based on his perceptions of the socio-economic problems of the 1930s. Marhaen was the name of a poor farmer, ‘impoverished by owning his means of production’, who represented an overwhelming majority of Indonesians of the time.32 Sukarno’s understanding of Marhaenism

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was deeply reflected in his view that an ideal political party was one that accommodated the interests of the largest section of the community. PDIP inherited the ideological roots of the radical nationalist PNI that Sukarno had earlier established and led. The role of ideology in the party resembled its role in more mature democracies, where people identify with what a party fights for (Heidar 2006). However, the party had yet to develop this ideology further to strengthen its support base. Members and cadres generally expressed strong passion for the party and had been members since it was known as PDI, which suggested that they were loyal. When asked whether anything could sway them to support other parties, most members and cadres responded that nothing could make them shift their allegiance. However, supporters’ loyalty had not been fully utilised by the party to strengthen party attachment. For example, the registration process for members varied, with some members claiming they had to submit a copy of identification and others claiming that there was no special requirement, that they ‘simply joined’ (masuk begitu saja). These varying practices showed that the branches had failed to adhere to the regulations stated in the party’s AD/ 33 ART on member registration requirements, and that there was no formally regulated registration process. Furthermore, there was no specific mechanism to familiarise new members with the party such as an induction: as a consequence, members held only vague ideas of their rights and duties in the party.34 Induction programmes for members and cadres were determined by local branches at the kecamatan level (ranting). Members and cadres from different ranting offered varying accounts of what the party did in an effort to familiarise them with the party. Although there was one local leader who mentioned cadre orientation, the rest of the cadres claimed that they had received none.35 Thus, not only did the branches fail to apply national regulations that required that members be given a one-month training programme and cadres a cadre course (kursus kader),36 there were variations in how different branches conducted recruitment and how they treated members and cadres. The inconsistent registration process and the absence of a uniform party awareness-raising programme meant that the party missed opportunities to reinforce members’ feelings of attachment. What’s more, there was a lack of knowledge of procedural mechanisms required to advance party careers. The members gave vague answers when quizzed about what they thought they should do to achieve a higher position in the party and whether they knew promotion procedures.37 Cadres demonstrated similar inability to explain party procedures. When asked what they could do to become party leaders and how the party regulated promotion, they focused on more general matters, such as the importance of becoming a dedicated member to gain the trust of other

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members. They failed to mention specific measures that were allowed or regulated by the party to obtain promotions.38 As members had limited initial interaction with the party upon registering, one important symbol of association with the party was the membership card, which also served as a form of party identity. The party branches kept records of their members and updated them regularly.39 However, since there were inconsistencies in members’ registration processes, where some members simply identified themselves as members without undergoing formal registration, the membership card was not entirely effective as a marker of party identity. As the registration process was not fully adhered to, member status was unclear as well. Members who ‘simply joined’ without ever formally registering and thus did not carry membership cards were not recorded in membership records. The party’s lack of effort to enhance member attachment was also indicated by the absence of member dues. Members who joined the party after 1999 were not aware of any dues structure and members who had joined earlier claimed that it did exist at one time but was later scrapped by the party.40 The party’s AD/ART, however, still listed paying dues as one duty of members at the time of my fieldwork (PDI Perjuangan 2005: 58). Dues were another example of inconsistencies between central party regulations and practice at the local level. These inconsistencies suggest that it was difficult for the branches to adhere to the national constitution and that there was little control from the central office to ensure the application of national policies. Despite the absence of attachment mechanisms such as party awareness-raising programmes and member dues, the party made effective use of the events that dominated party activities – party meetings. The party’s emphasis on meetings as a form of party activity meant that the processes through which members voiced their opinions had an important place in the party. The significance of freedom of expression in PDIP as a means of accommodating ‘the wishes of the people’ was noted by party leaders.41 The advantage of making meetings the dominant activity in the party was that members and cadres gained a better understanding of democratic measures in the decision-making process and directly experienced them. My interviews revealed that members were satisfied with the practice of voting and felt that their views were being heard by the party. Leaders were elected at the local level through voting, with the leaders claiming that voting was the method freely chosen by members when they were elected. Member participation differed between the PDIP’s kodya and kabupaten offices in Malang. The stark disparity between the variety and frequency of activities of the two branches meant that the level of attachment of members to the parties in the different branches differed as

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well. As party activities were the most obvious way in which members could participate in PDIP, limitations on the number of activities meant limitations on the chances for members to get involved. Malang’s kabupaten members had a wider variety of events, while kodya members only experienced regular meetings and bhakti sosial. The turnout for party activities – quite apart from their frequency – also sheds light on how active members generally were. Turnout during party activities was generally good, with the kodya’s buka bersama held during the fasting month attended by around 200 people; members, cadres and general public were all invited to the event. Even with the limited variety of party activities, committed members and cadres demonstrated loyalty by dedicating their time to the party and voicing their opinions. Kabupaten events also were attended by party cadres and members, but the community service activities were not as successful at drawing the general public.42 The choice to be active in the party, even for leaders, was highly subjective. PDIP’s kodya leader, who was also Malang’s mayor, was the chairperson of an inactive office, suggesting that he prioritised his mayoral duties more than his party commitments. In contrast, PDIP kabupaten’s chairperson was frequently in the PDIP office even though he also held an office at the kabupaten assembly.43 Thus, even in neighbouring branches, PDIP leaders had different approaches to conducting and managing their party leaderships. This reflected the fact that individual leaders in PDIP had the authority to manage their respective offices. The cases of kodya and kabupaten Malang suggest that party branch leaders have the biggest influence in determining whether the branch is active or not. As with Partai Golkar, individual motivation was the only real driving force behind members’ levels of activeness in PDIP. There was no sanction or special mechanism to ensure that members participated actively in party events.44 As a consequence, some ordinary members claimed that they did not attend party activities at all. Other ordinary members uniformly described their roles in party activities as contributors of suggestions and as listeners to discussions to understand the party’s programmes. When asked about the benefits gained from being active in the party, the interviewees gave answers that varied from having opportunities to make new friends to learning about politics, to understanding the policies made by local assemblies. These answers suggest that PDIP functioned not only as a political learning centre, but as a social community. They also confirmed the commitment of members and cadres to the party, as association and attachment to the party were perceived as positive for their personal development. In sum, PDIP enjoyed strong loyalty from its members. The party’s image and its leaders’ charisma drew supporters to the party and

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created strong affection for it. Although the party’s effort to strengthen the bonds of its members was minimal, members remained faithful and active. The disadvantage of having a limited variety of party events was at least partly offset by the fact that PDIP’s meetings created a forum in which members could voice their opinions, which contributed to the intra-party democracy practised in internal elections. In short, although the party was reluctant to create more stable member attachment that was not based on charisma, PDIP actively promoted democratic measures in its daily operation. Partai Amanat Nasional Similarly, PAN members were drawn to the party by its image and the high profile of its leader, Amien Rais. However, as indicated earlier, the party’s kodya and kabupaten branches in Malang faced challenges caused by inefficiencies in office management which disrupted party activities in both branches, effectively excluding regular members from participation in party activities. In a nutshell, PAN’s organisational problems caused members’ attachment and involvement to deteriorate to the level where only highly motivated cadres were involved. When asked what made them choose to join the party, PAN members offered answers that ranged from disappointment in other parties to personal association with the Islamic organisation Muhammadiyah.45 However, the most popular response concerned their admiration for Amien Rais. Evidence of the party’s success in raising awareness of itself was limited to their strong public association of Amien Rais with the party: no member indicated that they joined the party because of its platform or programmes. Rais was a stronger attraction than the party platform itself and PAN’s recruitment strategy seemed to have been successful only in promoting Rais’s popularity, not in improving the public’s knowledge of the focus and workings of the party. In both the kabupaten and kodya branches, the mechanism of registering with the party was unclear; party members stated that they simply joined without having to provide formal documentation. This practice not only violated party regulations,46 it showed a lack of member registration procedures at the local level. Although the branches updated their membership databases occasionally, the lack of organisation seriously jeopardised their record-keeping, particularly for the kodya office.47 Furthermore, the absence of registration mechanisms showed that PAN’s local branches were poorly organised. As an extension of the absence of a standardised procedure to register members, PAN’s local branches did not have a standardised practice in issuing membership cards, despite the party’s national policy of doing so. The kodya office’s organisational chaos meant that registration

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was equally chaotic, as potential members could not even locate a physical office where they could sign up. Meanwhile, although the kabupaten chairperson said that membership cards were supplied, members at the ranting level claimed otherwise. Party identity served as the main basis of association with the party (while members from the other three parties showed pride in their membership cards).48 The inconsistent issuance of membership cards meant that many PAN members did not have a physical manifestation of party identity.49 That some members received cards while others did not was further evidence of the lack of coherence in administrative procedures. The lack of party attachment fostered by the lack of membership cards was worsened by the absence of membership dues as well. The kabupaten chairperson echoed leaders from other parties on the matter of dues, explaining that dues would be a burden for members. Members at the grass-roots level said that they were never asked to pay dues.50 In the kodya office, although the cadres insisted that payment of dues was encouraged, it was impossible for them to ensure that the payments were actually made, as they were struggling to find a new office. The failure to collect dues was another area where the local branches demonstrated inconsistencies with national regulations.51 With dues not imposed by the party and the issuance of membership cards incoherent, the party relied on members’ involvement during party events as a main mechanism of interaction between the party and its members. One activity that was crucial for PAN’s member management was its cadre orientation programme. PAN showed much better organisation in providing an induction programme to its new members than it did in its registration procedures. Members confirmed to me that they had attended awareness-raising programmes run by the party, while cadres and local leaders asserted that they had pembekalan kader (cadre skills training).52 This is consistent with the claims of the kabupaten chairperson who explained that all members were given a special orientation to improve their organisational skills and knowledge of the party.53 The training created stronger attachment of members to the party, and was especially important given that registration and dues procedures were lacking. It also reflected coherence between the national recruitment focus and the commitment from the local branches to manage the awareness-raising process. As explained in previous chapters, the ability to hold party activities was highly dependent on the efficiency of branch management. In PAN’s case, the period when both the kodya and kabupaten branches were looking for new offices restricted further the already limited interaction between the party and its members. During this period, members, in fact, had no interaction with the party at all. Even the cadres who were deeply involved in party affairs claimed that party meetings

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were called only when necessary; there were no regular meetings. As a result, the party relied on the efforts of a handful of party activists who remained passionate about the party and were willing to sacrifice a great deal – to the extent, in the case of the kabupaten office chairperson, of letting his house be used as the party’s office. As in other parties, those PAN activists who devoted extra energy to the party had regular jobs to attend to.54 Nonetheless, their enthusiasm for the party was reflected in their efforts. For example, as the new kodya office was an abandoned old house, the cadres cleaned the building, painted it and ordered the furniture. But the degree of attachment of PAN’s ordinary members to the party was severely limited, as crucial factors for engaging with its members were missing from the party’s strategy. There was no coherence to the member registration requirements and process; no party dues were expected from members; and party activities were irregular and dependant upon branch efficiencies – or, rather, inefficiencies. PAN’s limited interaction with its members risked the loss of those members to other parties, since it was difficult to cultivate and maintain their loyalty with limited and irregular activities. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Members’ motivations for joining PKS were dominated by a desire to look for a worthy alternative party to other parties. PKS’s popularity was boosted by its religious activities and grass-roots approach, which also played important roles in recruitment. All PKS members were referred to as cadres and members very actively participated in party events. The cadres had vast knowledge of the party, including its multiple membership levels and how cadres could achieve leadership positions in it. The involvement of cadres in the party was facilitated by the range and variety of events it held. Party branches also demonstrated solid organisation in managing registration and their regular activities. PKS cadres said that they were attracted to the party because it had a positive image as an Islamic party and because they had been unhappy with the parties with which they were previously associated.55 The party boasted a clean image, and the activities of its cadres in grass-roots communities and its dakwah movement to spread Islamic teachings created a good impression on would-be members. Cadres also stated that they were attracted by the party’s programmes and the successes of its grass-roots activities on campuses56 and its campaigning through posters, banners and leaflets; these activities drew potential members’ attention. Members were also drawn to its routine pengajian (Islamic study groups), which complemented its printed materials.

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The member registration process in PKS was well-organised by the local branches. The cadres explained that there was a standard form that they had to fill out to register, which was then processed by the local branches. The local branches then followed up and explained the membership requirements to the potential cadres. Membership was treated as a binding agreement between the individuals and the party. Each member had to be initiated in an official ceremony, after he or she passed the selection process in the party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 2006). During the ceremony, the member had to read and sign the ‘promise of loyalty’, which was witnessed by the leader of the structural level (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 2006). Members were then given a copy of the agreement, which they kept. The process of membership registration in the party was very formal and procedural, which contributed to the sense of responsibility of members after being officiated as members. This mechanism added to the already strict membership requirements in the party, and created greater commitment to the party (Janda 1980: 127). Cadres had the task of explaining the rights and duties of cadres to the newly registered members, which required them to be well-versed with party regulations. PKS exhibited solid organisation, as there was a standard national procedure of membership application which was strictly followed. The new cadres were told about the consequences and requirements of membership and were given to understand that their presence at the pengajian was one requirement of advancing to a higher level of membership. These pengajian raised the cadres’ party awareness as well as their understanding of Islam. The cadres learned more about the party during the events, with the sermons both preaching Islamic values and promoting the party and its work. As a result, cadres gained solid knowledge about the party, including their prospects for a party career. In my interviews with them, the cadres accurately pointed out the membership levels that they had to go through and that the majelis syuro,57 as the highest authority in the party, decided on party leadership at the national level. The cadres also demonstrated an understanding of the role of voting as the main decision-making procedure in the party, including for the election of leaders other than the party’s national leader. They knew that the party’s constitution stipulated that national leadership change was one of the majelis syuro’s tasks. The party issued a membership card to all registered members, a procedure organised at the kecamatan level. The card was issued once the cadre was registered. PKS grouped cadres into three categories: anggota kader pendukung (supporting cadres – those who actively supported every party activity), anggota kader inti (nucleus cadres – those who had undergone various party-related skills training and who the selection committee deemed to have passed the trainings) and anggota

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kehormatan (honorary members – those who had given special service to the party’s struggle and had been sworn in by the Central Leadership Council) (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 2006). The strict registration mechanisms and extensive awareness-raising process adopted by PKS had created a high level of attachment amongst cadres towards the party. This attachment was further enhanced by the party’s efforts to regulate its finances, particularly the contributions from cadres.58 Although dues were identified in the party’s AD/ART as one of the party’s main sources of financing, in practice, as with the other parties, dues were not obligatory. However, PKS cadres were strongly encouraged to contribute financially to the party on the grounds that it was their religious obligation to do so.59 Cadres revealed that instead of making the dues obligatory, PKS organised a regular sodaqoh60 contribution for them during the pengajian which was used for party operations. The amount of the sodaqoh was not fixed, and therefore was less of a burden than fixed dues. Although cadres were not obligated to pay party dues, their involvement in party activities was compulsory if they wished to continue or advance their level of membership among the categories referred to above. The minimum requirement for continuance of membership was attendance at party events.61 Involvement in party events was crucial for career advancement in PKS. Although there was no practical sanction for being inactive, party activities became a selection mechanism for cadres. Commitment to the party was the main requirement for career enhancement, aside from various trainings. By making involvement compulsory, PKS secured the commitment of cadres and guaranteed turnout at its events. Unlike those of the other three parties, PKS’s activities were mainly conducted at the kecamatan level, making it easier for the party to accommodate all members since the kecamatan branches had closer relationships with their members and needed fewer resources to gather local members than did the kodya and kabupaten offices. In addition to demonstrating PKS’s solid grass-roots organisation, this capacity to include all of its members in its activities ensured ongoing interaction between the party and its members, which enhanced internal democracy. PKS’s pengajian played a crucial role in forming and cultivating cadres’ involvement, since their participation in party events routinely started with their attendance at pengajian.62 PKS’s regular pengajian were especially efficient at drawing the attention of potential members. At the kecamatan level, these pengajian were held routinely,63 demonstrating the dedication and commitment of the party branches in organising activities. The pengajian also served as a method of training for the registered cadres. Although not mentioned by party leaders as a recruitment method, interviews with cadres at the local level revealed that pengajian, to which they were invited by existing cadres, had provided their first

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contact with the party. These pengajian were successful in creating a positive image for the party as an Islamic party, which triggered wider interest among would-be members. As a method of training, the pengajian were aimed at the spiritual needs of the cadres and were held for all levels of membership. The cadres demonstrated that they were well aware of their roles in the party, as indicated by their specific answers when asked about their functions. The cadres stated that they needed to be positive role models so that PKS continued to be perceived positively, was successful in the dakwah movement and was able to recruit high-calibre cadres. The uniformity of their answers demonstrated PKS’s success in familiarising the cadres with the party’s vision and mission and in particular with its focus on recruitment. As a result of the high level of interaction between the party and its cadres, the cadres had a solid knowledge of the party’s activities. The activities that cadres mentioned in their interviews with me ranged from practical training workshops for the villagers64 to social activities such as the provision of free medication and second-hand clothes collection for the poor. The party also held religious activities aside from pengajian, such as zakat65 collections, discussions with religious leaders and study of Al-Qur’an. Cadres emphasised the spiritual benefits of their membership, such as the feeling of being closer to God, and being empowered to support the dakwah movement in accordance with Al-Qur’an. One extension of the successful communication between the party and its cadres was the gathering of feedback from the grass-roots level. This was implemented through a routine dialogue between members of the local assembly and PKS cadres. Interviews with cadres disclosed that these ‘special reviews’ were conducted every three months in some kecamatan. These dialogues, which resembled Partai Golkar’s Jaring Asmara programme, created a sense of being listened to and cared for amongst cadres, who felt that the party accepted and accommodated their interests through these interactions. There were also other benefits that the cadres claimed they received from being party activists; for example, the workshops provided by the party, which cadres felt were useful for improving their personal knowledge. Some cadres felt that they benefited by knowing more about recent developments in the country, as they could engage in discussions on such topics with other cadres and leaders. Dedication to the party was further strengthened by the specific cadre trainings, resulting in well-equipped local leaders with a deep understanding of party strategies. When interviewed, they gave specific answers on what the party did to recruit, uniformly identifying particular strategies involving personal approaches, as well as public events. The kecamatan leaders also demonstrated creativity in designing local

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recruitment efforts, with one leader claiming that he had recruited a number of Islamic youth groups in his area.66 The local leaders had authority to decide and create specific events that they thought would be appropriate for pursuing the party’s interests. There was considerable coherence between national and regional policy on the priority of recruitment and local offices strictly obeyed the central office’s instructions. Leaders’ commitment to the party was shown by their availability in the local party offices, despite their daytime jobs. PKS successfully created strong member attachment by requiring that members be active in the party in order to continue and advance their membership. This requirement appealed to the all-Muslim cadres, particularly because the main component of the party’s holistic approach involved religious activities. PKS’s strategy resulted not only in dedicated cadres, but also sound knowledge of the party. The attachment and commitment of cadres and leaders were demonstrated by their swift responses to party matters that needed attention, indicating a mature party organisation. The range of activities in which PKS cadres were involved showed the party’s success in improving not only the spiritual well-being but also the practical skills of its cadres. They were keen to be involved in as many events as possible and had a good grasp of party operations. As a consequence of the active party-member relationship, cadres’ high degree of commitment to the party could be maintained.

The Contours of Members’ Participation The votes that each of the four parties received in the 1999 and 2004 elections proved that they all had significant bases of support. But as the case studies above show, the parties managed this support very differently. The main difference was that the younger parties, PKS and PAN, tended to place greater emphasis on cultivating deeper knowledge of the parties’ affairs among their members than did the older parties, Partai Golkar and PDIP.67 The parties also had different views on the importance of members’ active involvement. Although some theories suggest that parties depend on members’ attachment at the very least as a sure basis of votes (Dalton 2000; Burrell 1986), the four parties here had different focuses at the local level when it came to managing such attachment and their interaction with members. The attraction of would-be members to particular parties was initially a product of sympathetic views or the wish to gain certain benefits through them. Interaction between parties and members then started with the registration process and continued with parties’ management of membership cards, party dues, awareness-raising programmes and participation in party events. Better-organised branches created more-involved members.

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The different ways that the parties managed the support of their members reflected their priorities, as well as the level of organisation of their local branches. While the incumbent parties, Partai Golkar and PDIP, enjoyed stable support bases, their different local organisational structures created different patterns of member involvement. Partai Golkar demonstrated greater commitment to creating avenues for party members to stay involved in the party, whereas PDIP’s inactiveness generally inhibited members’ involvement. The young parties, PKS and PAN, were still developing their support bases, but had different approaches. While PKS showed a high level of dedication to fostering member attachment, PAN struggled to implement its basic recruitment policies. Thus, although the incumbents had the advantage of larger existing support, PKS cultivated its support base more. Members expressed varying motives for joining the parties. Members of PDIP pointed to party ideology as their main driving force, which conforms to Heidar’s argument about the strength of ideology in attracting party support (2006). Image was also crucial for the parties when it came to attracting members. In my interviews with them, members and cadres from all of the parties mentioned party image as something that drew them to their party and led them to register. Partai Golkar, whose image was closely associated with Suharto, nonetheless enjoyed a new image of a modern party, while PDIP and PAN benefited from their association with reform in Indonesia. For PKS, its Islamic and clean image was most instrumental in drawing members. The charisma of their leaders was critical to PDIP’s and PAN’s images. The charisma of Bung Karno and personal admiration for him drove recruitment at the grass-roots level for PDIP, suggesting that personalism was a very strong component of support for the party. PDIP’s ideology as partai wong cilik (party of the common people) also attracted a lot of sympathy. Similarly, Amien Rais drew support for PAN. In contrast, PKS benefited from its commitment to organising regular events, which attracted and maintained support for the party. For Partai Golkar, its suborganisations were crucial in maintaining party influence at the local level and the consistency of the party’s level of public support. Personalism in PDIP and PAN posed challenges for both parties. Panebianco (1989) contends that reliance on leaders’ images for support suggests that parties are not yet institutionalised and that a mature party should attract members not by its leaders but by its platforms. Janda’s concept of personalism refers more to loyalty to leaders. He believes that ideally most members should not be motivated by personalism (1980: 131-132).68 In the four Indonesian parties, personalism at the local level played an important role in branch operations, as the relationship between leaders and cadres affected the efficiency of the branches. Partai Golkar cultivated a culture of loyalty to its leaders by

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paying a lot of attention to members and cadres. But the lack of effort by PDIP’s kodya branch and both of PAN’s branches at developing better connections between their leaders and members resulted in distant relationships between them, which contributed to their organisational problems. On the other hand, the close relationship between cadres and leaders in PKS was evidenced by their personal interaction in the party’s local offices, where the leaders treated the cadres like family members. Thus, the better-organised party, PKS, demonstrated strong personalism at the local level, contradicting Janda’s argument (1980). For Indonesian party branches, loyalty and closeness to leaders improved their efficiency, as the connections ensured close working relationships. Members of the four parties can be classified according to Janda’s (1980) categories of nominal, marginal, participant and militant members. The most active and participative members belonged to PKS, as the party made participation compulsory for members. Members enjoyed and benefited from taking part in party events, making PKS members militants according to Janda’s scale. Partai Golkar’s members best fit the participants category, although active members were a small portion of the whole membership. PDIP’s and PAN’s members can be categorised as nominal members, merely registering with the party and engaging in limited, if any, interaction afterwards. Since party institutionalisation requires active membership involvement, PKS was the most successful of the four parties in cultivating members’ attachments. Janda (1980) pointed out that the main incentive for party members’ participation is material, which can be distinguished into solidary incentives (the benefits of associating with friends) and purposive incentives (derived from the stated ends of the organisation or patronage). Members of the four parties here mainly received solidary benefits, with satisfaction and a sense of being accommodated the main responses I received when I asked them what benefits they felt they received as members. This suggests that these members generally viewed parties as means to socialise and interact, and were not motivated by patronage benefits. This is in line with the sense of satisfaction members had with their limited participation: most members merely wanted to associate with people with similar political opinions. The four parties demonstrated significant variety in their membership policies and requirements, and in the implementation of central party regulations. While Partai Golkar’s and PKS’s branches implemented their party membership policies consistently, PDIP and PAN exhibited varying practices among the different kecamatan.69 PDIP’s and PAN’s local offices also exhibited incoherence between the standard practices regulated in their AD/ARTs and the application of membership policies at the local level. In the case of PAN, there were also members who stated that they had not gone through a formal registration process,

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making it difficult to differentiate between party supporters and registered members. Although PAN issued membership cards only inconsistently, the four parties generally did issue membership cards to registered members. Partai Golkar, PDIP, and PKS all issued these cards in a disciplined way. However, though the leaders from higher levels of PAN claimed that such cards were issued, the kecamatan offices seemed to have difficulties applying that policy, as evidenced by the number of members who did not have a membership card. The application of membership policies by PAN’s regional and local offices was incongruent. As for their awareness-raising programmes, the four parties all applied different policies. Only PKS had a rigorous awareness-raising system in which all new cadres had to participate. Although PDIP’s AD/ART stipulated that new members participate in a one-month party training programme, in practice the party failed to apply this requirement. Similarly, while Partai Golkar’s AD/ART stated that new members had to accept the party’s doctrine and programmes, the party did not organise a special induction programme for its new members. In the case of PAN, there was supposed to be a standard new-member-awareness-raising programme, but both Malang branches failed to conduct it. Thus, only PKS showed coherence between party regulations and local practices in providing inductions for new members. Janda argues that parties should have a ‘discernible’ literature that is frequently consulted by party members and thus practise doctrinism (1980: 131). In my interviews with party members, responses to my questions bearing on knowledge of individual rights and duties as party members and party leadership, which indicated consultations with official party documents, including constitutions, were used as measures of doctrinism. PKS members demonstrated better knowledge of party documents than did members of the other three parties. The responses from PKS members uniformly and specifically referred to particular sections of the party’s AD/ART, indicating their familiarity with these documents. In the cases of the other three parties, the answers did not reflect knowledge of the contents of party documents. PKS thus demonstrated a higher level of doctrinism than the other parties, indicating greater institutional maturity. One similarity between all four parties was that dues were not obligatory. As a result of economic difficulties of members after Indonesia’s economy collapsed, the four parties decided to ignore provisions in their 70 AD/ARTs referring to obligatory dues. PKS strongly encouraged members to make ‘voluntary’ contributions, but the other parties had no alternate mechanism for attracting contributions from ordinary members. For these parties, enforcing payment of member dues would not be effective in any case given their limited party-member interaction.

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The lack of party dues meant that finances available for activities designed to strengthen a sense of belonging to the parties were also very limited, forcing the parties to rely heavily on other ways to maintain the loyalty of their members. This meant that party activities had even more significance in maintaining and strengthening the relationship between parties and their members, since activities were the only way members could take part in and contribute to the party. Party events determine whether parties’ relationships with their members are maintained regularly; the more established and regular the activities, the more stable the relationship. In the cases of Partai Golkar and PKS, activities were held regularly, which ensured a level of predictability for members. But PKS was more successful than Partai Golkar in engaging members, by the regular pengajian that were held in the different kecamatan. As most activities were concentrated at the kodya and kabupaten levels, however, kecamatan members had fewer activities in which to participate. Consequently, the members at the kecamatan level exhibited a weaker level of involvement. A similar trend was evident in PDIP, where kabupaten members and cadres were more involved in the party than their kodya counterparts. PAN, on the other hand, held only a few meetings at irregular intervals. Overall, PKS cadres (who, again, were actually regular members as well as cadres) were more involved in party events than members of the other parties. In light of Janda’s (1980) argument that attending party meetings is a minimal form of participation, the level of participation of most members in the four parties was low. The dynamics of membership and the parties’ efforts to manage their memberships influenced the quality of party cadres in Malang. The deeper the members’ involvement, the better their knowledge of their party. PKS cadres demonstrated greater knowledge about their party’s regulations, their duties, and what they could do to advance their party careers than did members and cadres of the other parties. The latter group gave more vague and general answers when asked the same questions, indicating more limited knowledge of their party organisations and the specific tasks they were supposed to undertake. Since PKS was the only party to conduct a systematic awareness-raising programme, it can be deduced that this programme contributed to this result. As a result of its thorough engagement with its members, PKS also fostered better organisational skills amongst its grass-roots kecamatan leaders than did the other parties. The various training programmes provided for cadres resulted in leaders who were not only committed to the party, but who were able to manage their offices well – as proven by the success of the party’s kecamatan branches in organising regular local pengajian. PKS grass-roots leaders also showed creativity in their recruitment efforts by targeting local Muslim youth groups. For the other

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three parties, activities were mainly centered at the kodya and kabupaten levels. The more effort a party makes to equip its cadres with skills and knowledge, the more benefits that party receives from having active grass-roots branches.

Conclusion The work of the local branches of Partai Golkar, PDIP, PAN and PKS was crucial in moulding support for these parties. However, the four parties adopted different policies for interacting with their members and their branches engaged in varying practices at the local level. This suggests that the parties not only viewed the roles of their members differently, but managed their memberships differently as well. PKS was the most promising party in terms of its level of maturity as indicated by the elements identified by Janda, because PKS was the most successful in creating a culture of solid attachment of members. It was also the most successful in creating benefits for members that kept them involved in the party. As a consequence, PKS cadres were – again to use Janda’s argument – more militant than members of the other parties. The other parties showed trends similar to parties in the more mature Western democracies, where greater attachment and participation is limited to party cadres, while ordinary members are satisfied just having a membership card. These parties rely heavily on a handful of cadres who are willing to devote their time and resources to their party work. Given this limited participation from cadres and the efforts of these parties to become more involved in national and local politics, they have to manage their leaders and cadres well. Parties do this by formulating mechanisms to select and choose the individuals who are seen as capable and fit to represent them. The dynamics of such mechanisms are detailed in the next chapter.

8

Party Career and Intra-party Democracy

Party branches’ organisational prowess can be seen in whether they practise what they preach. If they respect democracy, they should implement it within their organisations and how they manage party careers and internal leadership provides indications of how successful their organisations are.

Party Career Advancement as Proof of Intra-party Democracy In the theoretical literature on democracy, intra-party democracy is deemed crucial for ‘effective participation’ and ‘voting equalities’, two elements of Dahl’s definition of democracy (1998: 37-38). Theorists argue that voting makes for equal rights among party members and guarantees that their voices matter, and that parties’ efforts to implement democratic principles in their own organisations are key to projecting honesty and transparency. The granting of greater power to members is one means of convincing supporters of a party’s genuineness and its desire for members to be heard and counted in the party. As explained earlier, parties employ various strategies to recruit aggressively, one of which is to give more power to members in internal decision-making. The implementation of intra-party democracy has been heavily influenced by parties’ efforts to adopt changes that could attract more supporters – for instance, by promising more power to potential members, particularly after election losses (Pennings & Hazan 2001: 269). By allowing greater member participation, parties hope to increase members’ ‘sense of involvement’, and open up their party to other groups and ideas (Pennings & Hazan 2001: 268). Parties also project democracy in their membership and leadership management. For example, they might try to create equal opportunities for all eligible candidates in leadership elections. Duverger has pointed out that parties have not necessarily practised democratic measures in electing their leaders, noting that the principles of ‘practicality’, ‘autocracy’ and ‘heredity’ were traditionally seen as equally valid bases of leaders’ elections and influenced parties in Europe (1964: 133).1 He also noted that the application of democracy in leaders’ elections at the local level is more

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difficult than at the national level (1964: 136). In the early 1960s European parties were still in an early stage of implementing intra-party democracy, and they often resorted to ‘traditional’ and ‘practical’ ways of choosing leaders. Indonesia’s principles of musyawarah and mufakat, or deliberation and consensus, were initially encouraged as a way to suppress ideological differences among parties in the late 1950s. Indonesia’s president at the time, Sukarno, was ‘moving in the direction of rejecting ideological divisions as harmful and destructive’, and promoting musyawarah-type institutions ‘organised internally on commonalities of interests and occupations’ (Reeve 1985: 35). Similarly, early European parties attempted to develop mechanisms for decisionmaking that would ameliorate conflict. In Indonesia’s musyawarahbased decision-making culture, voting was irrelevant because it was thought to invite conflict between different opinions.2 The missing aspect of democracy in both the European and Indonesian cases was the prerequisite of equality and fair treatment for everyone. As we have seen, Indonesian parties have generally not practised intra-party democracy in their internal leadership elections, either due to local circumstances or government intervention. The current parties face further challenges in doing so as they enlarge their memberships, since, as Weldon argues, larger parties need more complex organisational structures, which may give members more chances to participate but result in a decrease in intra-party democracy (2006: 468, 474). However, while the fear of such a decrease is valid for parties in Indonesia at the national level, it should not deter them from taking account of each member’s vote in deciding local leaders. Norris (1995) differentiates between party leaders at the national level and sub-leaders at regional and branch levels. She argues that national leaders have an incentive to meet public demands in order to accumulate votes, but that the sub-leaders are driven more by principles, and that they usually do not pursue a party career (Norris 1995: 31). However, in a decentralised system such as contemporary Indonesia’s, people can run for office at the local level as well as the national level, and thus Norris’ argument that local leaders do not have governmental career aspirations has limited value for Indonesia. It is important to find out whether the current political possibilities in Indonesia have changed local officials’ career orientations and whether local leaders’ perceptions of parties as vehicles for obtaining government seats have been fed by decentralisation. The objective of serving the party held by most party officials may well change with the opportunity to promote their careers locally. Norris argues that party staff at the branch level are usually volunteers with strong beliefs and high levels of dedication to the party, who are prepared to attend lengthy meetings in the hope that they may be able to

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influence the ‘direction of party policies’.3 This argument suggests that leaders at the local level have great loyalty to their party, rather than using it to occupy a governmental position or reach the national party leadership level. Parties benefit from such loyalty and use the commitment of local leaders to develop their party organisations locally. While advancement in a party career is generally limited to national cadres, in decentralised systems local party staff have opportunities to enter local government, which may compromise their commitment to building party structures. Even without changes to local staff’s motivations caused by decentralisation, party branches of course still have to manage local leadership matters. Local party organisation depends on the capacity of the branch to conduct a range of functions, one of which is ensuring leadership change. Studies of political parties argue that changes in party leadership should be frequent and that there should be competition for those positions and mechanisms through which members can criticise their leaders (Janda 1980: 108-111). There should be fairness in the election of office-holders and eligible individuals should all have the same chance to be nominated. The same conditions pertain at the local level. An organised local branch is one that is able to manage leadership change frequently, and incorporate feedback and criticism from other members in the process. Local leadership succession is a local level party decision. Decisionmaking within parties in democratic systems is a clear indication of whether the parties ‘practice what they preach’ (Scarrow 2005: 3). According to Scarrow, the inclusion of members in decision-making within a party is the essence of intra-party democracy, with intra-party democracy an indicator of institutionalisation. Scarrow suggests that the implementation of intra-party democracy can be observed from the ways parties select their candidates for elections and how they conduct processes of party deliberation and leadership change (Scarrow 2005: 10). Leaders should be selected through a process involving member voting and a clear party procedure should guide the whole process; the absence of regulations creates dissatisfaction among members (Scarrow 2005: 10). Thus parties must make their selection processes transparent. Elections should be conducted openly and fairly, and members should be familiar with the conditions of party career advancement. A party career essentially entails the process of candidate nomination as the mechanism of promotion within the party. Through this process, candidates who are deemed qualified to occupy governmental or local leadership positions are identified and chosen. A party with sound intra-party democracy demonstrates its willingness to grant power to members to elect their candidates, and provides equal opportunity for all eligible members. Parties in Asia demonstrate a variety of ways in

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which compromises are made between the principle of intra-party democracy and central control. When parties give more power to their members, their central structures lose some control over party processes. However, parties also thereby show that they are putting more effort into giving power to grass-roots members, and even non-members, and thus can attract more sympathy. It can be difficult to achieve a balance between giving up power and attracting support when formulating effective and inclusive methods of nomination of candidates. In Asia there have been efforts by parties to reform their organisational management in order to improve their decision-making processes by creating more responsible authoritative bodies. The Philippines’ Liberal Party abolished its Steering Committee, replacing it with a larger body with more representative members.4 In Thailand, the Democrat Party and the New Aspiration Party also shifted the authority to make decisions to more accountable bodies.5 These decisions suggest that parties realise the importance of greater participation by members in decisionmaking. The trend of creating greater accountability and responsibility of members is also evident in some Western countries. Norwegian parties comprehensively apply intra-party democracy, including in membership ballots,6 candidate selection and preferential voting7 (Heidar & Saglie 2003: 228-231). The roles of local branches in implementing these initiatives are crucial, and give them and their members more involvement. Regular members have more power and decision-making processes are democratic. In terms of party career, there is greater transparency for individuals and members have more influence in decisionmaking. The sections below on the four parties examined here discuss how local leaders are promoted and whether there is fair competition. Parties require active participation for individuals to climb the party career ladder. Dedication to the party is perceived as a strong sign of loyalty and treated as the most important prerequisite to advancing in all of the parties. However, members at the kecamatan level perceive great difficulty in advancing their careers, while kodya/kabupaten members have a better chance at being nominated to compete in local elections. To improve their chances of advancement, kecamatan members would have to relocate to become members of a higher-level office, which would be a major undertaking for most members. During my fieldwork, only PAN and PKS had clear sets of policies to guide cadres who were pursuing advancement in their party careers, with specific requirements and conditions to be met to advance to higher membership levels. The other two parties, Partai Golkar and PDIP, had no specific career advancement paths. Instead, would-be leaders relied solely on individual effort to gather support in order to obtain a leadership position, suggesting a

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lack of transparency in the promotion mechanisms. However, in all four of the parties, leadership positions were legitimised by voting, which demonstrated the use of democratic measures in internal decision-making.

Development of Party Career The four parties had diverse policies for determining how members and cadres could advance their careers within party structures. Their national policies revealed how the parties managed the support and loyalty of their members and cadres. In practice, however, the newer parties demonstrated superior capacity to implement central office regulations, while the incumbent parties faced difficulties applying central policies stringently. Generally, support and loyalty manifested themselves in individuals’ deep involvement in party activities, which usually translated into an ability to secure party positions. However, the various dimensions of the mechanisms through which loyalty led to higher party positions differed. Partai Golkar Malang’s Partai Golkar leaders and cadres described a particular pattern for advancing in the party. The first prerequisite was a high level of involvement in party activities to build a personal profile in the party. The formal requirements of the party included party training, which was only provided after individuals proved their dedication to the party through their involvement in party activities. After this training, cadres were usually assigned a staff position within a local branch. The next step was less transparent, with some leaders claiming they had been appointed and some having been voted in by other members. The procedure for career advancement in Partai Golkar did not reflect clear career policies, but the party had adopted democratic processes of leadership change. To advance in Partai Golkar, individuals relied heavily on their own efforts and initiative. They needed to feel their way through opaque party networks since the party constitution offered only vague criteria for career promotions. Monitoring of careers within the party was limited to the monitoring undertaken as part of the role of local leaders in providing prospective cadres with opportunities to take responsibility for party initiatives at the branch level. Thus, although internal elections for leadership positions were conducted democratically, there was no transparency in the progress of an individual’s career. Partai Golkar benefits from the strong loyalty of its grass-roots members, who are generally determined to develop the party itself rather

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than using it as a means to enter government. This was reflected in my interviews with local leaders, who, although they did not specifically rule out the possibility that they would take office, claimed that they did not plan to use the party as a way to achieve public office.8 This sentiment resonated mostly among leaders at the kecamatan level, but even kodya and kabupaten leaders refused to appear ambitious by claiming bigger aims than serving the party. It should be noted that the current system disadvantages ambitious kecamatan leaders, as they would have to serve in the kodya/kabupaten office before having a real chance of being nominated as a candidate in a local election. Nonetheless, the wish to remain in the party showed that parties are not always conceived as primarily stepping stones to enter government. In Partai Golkar, loyalty was cultivated by leaders’ deep involvement in the party from the time they became party cadres – the stage at which party careers essentially begin. In both the kodya and kabupaten branches, cadre status was obtained as a result of members’ dedication to the party, as evidenced by their regular involvement in party activities: without exception, cadres and leaders claimed that they were always very active in party events9 when explaining their success in raising their personal profiles in the eyes of other members and leaders. Their commitment to attending party events built up their personal profiles, which attracted the attention of other members and leaders. Activeness in party events also demonstrated their dedication to the party, which was the most important prerequisite for election to a higher position in the party.10 Their perception of how to advance strengthened their personal attachment to the party, resulting in a willingness to make more effort to contribute to party events than other ordinary members. The importance of greater involvement overshadowed the official role of the party in ensuring fairness in party career progression, since the party did not provide any structured mechanisms for individuals to be recognised for their commitments to the party other than voting in internal elections. In Partai Golkar, successfully advancing one’s party career started with success achieving a cadre position in the party. Yet although cadre status was an important stepping stone in establishing a party career, there were no clearly structured mechanisms at the local level for the identification of cadres. Partai Golkar’s AD/ART (Anggaran Dasar/Anggaran Rumah Tangga, Organisation Statutes/Bylaws) describes cadres as ‘members who are screened based on these criteria: ideology, achievement and dedication, leadership, independence, who must undergo leadership and cadre training’, while party staff (pengurus partai) had to have, among other qualities, at least five years of service with the party (Partai Golkar 2005). However, at the local level, the implementation of these regulations was not strict. All cadres confirmed

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that specific cadre training was provided by the party. The provision of training suggests that the party perceived cadres as individuals who were important to the party and must be equipped with relevant skills and knowledge. Nevertheless, my interviews with cadres revealed that although most cadres had undergone specific cadre training, others had become cadres automatically when they became party staff at the local branches. In addition, the process did not incorporate checking for specific conditions required by the party’s AD/ART. Among the conditions mentioned in the party regulations were that leaders had to have previously served as cadres with commendable achievements and dedication, possessed capability and were acceptable in their respective offices, had not been involved in G-30-S/PKI,11 were capable of working collectively, and had been active in the party for at least five consecutive years (Situs Partai Golkar 2005: ART Chapter Twelve). The interviewees did not mention any specific measures undertaken to ensure or measure the extent to which candidates met these requirements – which means that the activeness of cadres was sufficient to convince other members to vote for them. After obtaining their positions as cadres, members wishing to advance in the party could expect to be promoted as leaders. All the local leaders interviewed indicated that they had held other positions as cadres in the party prior to being elected to their current positions. The positions mentioned by the leaders included staff positions at one of the party’s sub-organisations and treasurer and divisional staff of the same branch where they were later elected as leaders. This indicates that the party felt leaders would – and should – have greater knowledge of party processes than that expected of ordinary members, and that this knowledge had been obtained from their prior experiences as cadres in other party positions. This suggests that career advancement required superior knowledge and organisational skills, which, in the case of Partai Golkar, can be obtained from service in party positions rather than from a dedicated programme of party training. Despite the lack of clarity and the erratic means and ways of advancing careers within the party, Partai Golkar implemented democratic measures in cadres’ promotion. The cadres interviewed for this study claimed that they had been elected either by the party staff or members of their particular branch. Local leaders at the kecamatan level also claimed that they were elected democratically by the members. However, the application of intra-party democracy was limited to the election of local leaders. While the formal mechanism through which leaders were elected was voting, the members and cadres revealed that at times they were simply ‘appointed to positions’ by members – suggesting that there was no voting involved, but just agreement among members that a few particular members should be promoted. Thus,

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intra-party democracy was only partially adopted in Partai Golkar and transparency for career advancement at levels below leadership was seriously lacking. Nevertheless, the achievement of even this level of intraparty democracy was a breakthrough for Partai Golkar, which is known for engaging in rampant money politics and lacking transparency in decision-making. The pattern of career advancement in Partai Golkar suggested that both local branches adopted policies which mixed intra-party democracy with less transparent conditions for promotions. In particular, campaigns for internal promotion relied heavily on candidates’ networks. Because of the close relationship between cadres and local leaders, party cadres were generally in a better position to exert influence than ordinary members, as cadres were usually more popular and widely recognised, and thus it was easier for them to lobby other members for promotions or local elections. Meanwhile, ordinary members had to get leaders’ attention by building their party profiles in order to gain other members’ support for promotion within the party. However, there were significant variations in the practices that individuals engaged in to advance their party careers. Practices at the local level suggested that the party no longer acted as a mass membership party, but was tending instead towards the career advancement mechanisms associated with a cadre party. Instead of adopting aggressive recruitment, the party placed great emphasis on nurturing its cadres and equipping them with the skills required to occupy party positions or to be promoted as party candidates in elections. Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan In the PDIP, career paths were highly dependent on individuals’ efforts. It was up to the cadres and leaders of a particular branch to build personal profiles so that they would be promoted to higher positions in the party. As in Partai Golkar, the conditions imposed on party career advancement by the central party apparatus were not strictly adhered to in practice at the local level. The different levels of efficiency of the two local branches in Malang affected members’ opportunities to participate in party affairs, with kabupaten members having a better chance to participate than kodya members. As a consequence, there was also a significant difference between the branches in the possibilities for career advancement in the party, with kabupaten members having a better chance of advancing. Party activists demonstrated strong loyalty to the party through their long years of service.12 However, unlike activists within the local branches of Partai Golkar, many PDIP activists perceived involvement in the party, in particular in leadership positions, as a stepping stone to

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enter into government. For instance, when asked about his wish to represent the party in the parliament, one leader indicated that all cadres would share this objective. PDIP leaders said that they believed it was only ‘natural’ that joining a party was associated with the objective of entering local parliament. But there were also leaders who wished to concentrate on developing the party instead. Commitment to developing the party was demonstrated particularly by leaders who still remained active in the party after serving in the parliament. Leaders also expressed a desire to see the party win the next election after losing the last one, and they claimed that this was their strongest motivation to stay in the party. They believed that PDIP can only serve the people if it occupies the government. As a result, they said that it was imperative for the party to win the next election, and they were committed to seeing that realised. As with Partai Golkar, regular involvement in party events played a critical role in creating individual members’ profiles in the PDIP. Cadres and leaders claimed that their active participation in party events had helped them get promoted to their current positions. However, there were differences between the kabupaten and kodya offices in their commitment to organising events. The kabupaten office was much more successful at organising frequent events, which meant that there were more opportunities for kabupaten members to improve their individual profiles. Members at the kecamatan level revealed that they had organised fewer activities than those at the kabupaten level, with most members at both levels singling out baksos/bakti sosial (literally, social work) as the only kind of activities in their communities. Thus, cadres at the kabupaten and kecamatan branches had less chance to promote their careers than did kodya cadres. My interviews also revealed that PDIP cadres and leaders felt more obliged to be active once they were elected or appointed to their current positions. Party leaders uniformly claimed that they had served in previous positions, such as office secretary, prior to being elected as leaders, or at the very least had been cadres. This confirmed that involvement in party activities and personal dedication to the party were the most important factors in advancing within PDIP, since participation in party events was the most obvious proof of individuals’ dedication to the party. The absence of a standard procedure for promotion in the party made participation even more important. Participation and dedication had replaced the standard requirements for promotion, becoming unofficial conditions for nomination to leadership positions. Yet, the PDIP’s regulations specified particular conditions for individual promotion. PDIP’s AD/ART sets out specific conditions such as length of service and previous positions as requirements for promotion to particular party positions (PDI Perjuangan 2005: 55-56). The party’s AD/ART

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does not impose specific requirements on cadres, but it specifies how leaders should be elected at different levels of offices (PDIP Perjuangan 2005: 31, 34, 36). The party requires leaders to be elected by voting at the respective office (PDI Perjuangan 2005). In Malang at the time of my fieldwork, both local branches used voting to elect leaders, indicating that intra-party democracy was strictly applied in local leadership changes. However, as with Partai Golkar, there were discrepancies between the party’s central regulations and their application at the local level. When asked about the official procedure for becoming leaders in the party, cadres responded that they did not know of any specific requirements. Their responses included: ‘I think these things are regulated in the party documents, but I do not remember’; ‘Party leaders need to demonstrate that they can be trusted with such responsibility’; and ‘It is an evolution that cannot be manipulated, candidates need to fight for it and they have to be intelligent and dedicated’. My interviews also revealed that the nomination process was rather flexible. Leaders claimed that they had to put their names forward if they wanted to be nominated and if there was more than one candidate, voting had to be conducted. At the same time, the local branches did nothing to monitor individuals’ achievements or contributions. In the case of the kodya office, it would be difficult to conduct such monitoring when the branch was inactive, but no monitoring process was in place in the kabupaten office either. This suggests that at the local level the mechanisms of career promotion were uncertain and unregulated. According to the PDIP constitution, the requirements for being promoted to the rank of party cadre included being ‘loyal and obedient’, and having ‘proven activeness in party activities’ (PDI Perjuangan 2005: 53). However, these kinds of qualities are difficult to measure, which makes it difficult to create mechanisms that encourage open competition for promotion. Having vague indicators makes it even harder for the party to establish a proper monitoring system to ensure fairness and transparency in career promotion, and makes it unlikely that local offices will feel obliged to follow central party policy on party career. Further difficulties were demonstrated in the party’s effort to provide proper training for cadres. In terms of cadre management, the party constitution assigns responsibility for providing training of potential members and cadres to a special Badan Pendidikan dan Pelatihan Partai (Council of Party Training and Education, or BADIKLAT). At the local level, however, the evidence suggested that cadres were not properly informed of the purpose of the training and the format of the training was unclear. When asked whether they received party training, cadres associated such training with ‘consolidation meetings’ or ‘meetings to deepen understanding on party ideology’ rather than anything procedural. These answers suggest

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that there was in fact no formal training and cadres were confused about what they could achieve with training. As a consequence of the lack of a systematic party career mechanism, promotion to the rank of cadre and to leadership positions depended on an individual’s success in convincing other members that he or she should be promoted. Members revealed that they had witnessed party activists lobbying personally to gather votes to be elected as leaders or to improve their chance of being selected as an electoral candidate. One leader also indicated that he had been cheated by another candidate who had managed to move the leader’s name to a lower position on the candidate list: as a leader, this interviewee should have topped the list, but the other candidate had pushed down his name to third on the list. This meant that he was less likely to get votes, as the names lower on the list would only get votes after the ones above them.13 The leader claimed that the other candidate had managed to push his own name up on the list by lobbying with other members of the party branch. Another violation was described by a local leader who claimed that his secretary was involved in money politics and changed the order in the candidate list. These violations suggest that the party has much to improve in terms of the process and mechanism of candidate selection. Although personal lobbying is always important, and, as Duverger (1964) noted, exists even in the more mature Western parties, parties should provide a level of support and certainty for longstanding members with regard to their party career pathways, since uncertainty about party procedures could deter members from being committed to party life. In short, there was a serious lack of party apparatus involvement in local party career processes in the PDIP. The imbalance between the frequencies of the kabupaten and kodya offices’ activities worsened the situation, since heavy reliance on activism as the only determinant of party career promotion created a serious disadvantage for the less active branches, the kodya’s. Furthermore, in contrast to Partai Golkar, where local leaders’ high levels of involvement with cadres may have discouraged blatant violations by other cadres and served as an informal monitoring process, such violations seemed to have occurred often in PDIP. The application of intra-party democracy was overshadowed by infringements and unfairness. PDIP Malang needs to formulate clearer career management policies. Partai Amanat Nasional Malang demonstrated an outstanding focus on career management at the local level. Although the lack of activities during my fieldwork period meant that opportunities to participate in the party were non-

PAN

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existent for a long period of time – seriously affecting members’ chances to build personal profiles through active participation – party branches demonstrated their commitment to cadre training and regular leadership changes. The practice of party training and career promotion procedures mandated at the central level was strictly applied by PAN’s Malang branches. The branches were disciplined in making sure that all cadres received relevant training as regulated by the central office and local leaders were elected by voting. But party training and career promotion were the only areas in which PAN’s branch organisation was efficient. Unlike in Partai Golkar, and to a lesser extent in PDIP, there was a strong perception amongst PAN cadres that the party should serve as a stepping stone to entering government. Kecamatan leaders and PAN cadres indicated their wish to enter the government through the party. According to PAN’s AD/ART, cadres are ‘party members who are or have been staff and/or have undergone party cadre training’, and ‘party members who are or have been members of government assemblies representing PAN’ (DPD PAN Kabupaten Blitar 2005: 8).14 This provision indicates that party training is essential for career promotion for members, although it also heavily privileges members who have served in government. With regard to party leaders, the constitution requires that individuals have served or are serving in legislative or executive bodies, aside from having to contribute according to party regulations (DPP PAN Kabupaten Blitar 2005: 24).15 In this sense, PAN focused on service for the party or the assemblies as prerequisites for career promotion. The clarity of criteria for advancement in PAN created certainty for members who wished to further their careers, but at the same time the criteria were also very restrictive, and only those who excelled could advance in the party. Party cadres’ ambitions for government office were reflected in the fact that their loyalty to the party was low. Interviews with kodya and kabupaten leaders revealed that PAN leaders were pessimistic about the party’s future prospects and they pointed to the decrease in PAN’s votes in elections and the trend of party members switching to PKS; they were apprehensive of the difficulties the party faced in building a stronger support base. Another factor to consider about loyalty was the imbalance in the prospects of grass-roots leaders being chosen as candidates. There was pessimism among the cadres in the kecamatan about their chance to advance to government. Leaders at the kodya and kabupaten branches had a better chance at being chosen as candidates in national elections. Kecamatan leaders were extremely cognizant of the fact that they had very little chance of advancing to those positions. When asked whether they wished to enter the government via the party, they responded by pointing out their disadvantage of being leaders in lower-

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level offices and noted that they needed to develop their respective party offices instead for the time being. They were aware that they had to promote their careers at the kodya and kabupaten levels first to stand a better chance of obtaining candidacy status in a national election. For the sub-district (kecamatan) leaders, to move to the district (kodya/kabupaten) level would be a major change, because it would most likely involve relocating. That party responsibilities were still secondary priorities for most members made grass-roots members’ prospects for promotion even grimmer. As with Partai Golkar and PDIP, participation in party events determined the development of personal profiles of members at the local level. Despite the fact that the party was moribund during my research, the cadres and leaders I interviewed claimed that they were heavily involved in party activities and perceived it as a precondition for their current positions. However, PAN’s stringent requirement that cadres undergo specific party training was also implemented locally and had proven very helpful in building the specific skills that the party wanted in its cadres. PAN’s recruitment policy specifically aimed for high-quality individuals, and the consistency of the party’s provision of skills training for cadres was in line with this strategy. Proven dedication to the party and the trainings were two important requirements of cadres and my interviews suggested that cadres and leaders indeed had superior party knowledge. Trainings for cadres in different kecamatan were usually held simultaneously and managed by the kodya or kabupaten offices. The trainings were typically held in sessions over 2-3 days, conducted by the party’s cadre section chairperson and motivational speakers. The sessions covered topics such as party knowledge and leadership skills.16 As a result of their commitment to training, the kabupaten leader was well-versed in party policies (recruitment, membership trends, activities), while kodya cadres demonstrated their knowledge of party finances (such as contributions to be made by candidates). PAN was also successful in implementing a national policy for the election of cadres and leaders. While local leaders were elected by their members, cadres were chosen by a local committee (DPP PAN Kabupaten Blitar 2005: 12). Cadres and members confirmed that both local branches had strictly adhered to these policies. Career management was important for the party. Even when more basic procedures such as the issuance of membership cards were absent, local branches strived to ensure that career promotion proceeded according to the party’s rules. The party’s focus on leadership changes in Malang despite its branches’ administrative difficulties demonstrated its high regard for democratic internal succession. Their difficulties maintaining their organisations aside, the branches were committed to ensure that they met

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the party constitution’s requirement for five-year leadership terms. In the kodya office, the election meeting took place in a cadre’s residence, further demonstrating the branch’s determination to ensure that this process took place on time. Similarly, the election meeting for the kabupaten office took place at the secretary’s residence. The high priority accorded to internal elections even during a time of administrative upheaval indicated that leadership was highly important in the party and that leadership change, in fact, signified the continued existence of the branch. The importance of leadership change was also signified by an interesting trend in the career paths of leaders, which benefited the position of the secretary in the party. During the leadership change meeting, both the kodya and kabupaten offices elected their secretaries to be their chairmen. This suggests that the secretary position was important in the party. This status seemed to me justified by the secretaries’ high level of service to the party. As noted earlier, the kabupaten secretary allowed his house to be used as the party office, while the kodya secretary hosted many party meetings in his home. The secretaries also handled most administrative matters, which showcased their skills to other members. Yet the secretarial position did not always lead to higher leadership positions – local leaders held various other positions prior to being elected as leaders. However, previous positions in the party were important for career advancement as a means of demonstrating members’ dedication to the party and skills. PAN demonstrated much better management of party careers than PDIP, as evidenced mainly by its dedication to cadre training, even though PAN’s lack of activities limited members’ opportunities for deeper participation. Party career in PAN was influenced by commitment, participation in party trainings, as well as prior party positions. PAN also demonstrated its focus on cadres’ career development by its commitment to leadership change through processes of intra-party democracy during difficult administrative times. Although the application of central party regulations concerning party careers depended on the efficiency of local branches, which in fact were inactive and inefficient, there was an extraordinary focus on career management and the branches strove to apply central policies at the local level. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Among the four parties, PKS was the only one with specific membership sub-categories and clear career policies. In addition, the party’s comprehensive socialisation programme for all members resulted in a high level of awareness of the party’s regulations on career advancement. The transparency of the advancement process indicated not only the effec-

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tiveness of party policy, but also the party’s success in familiarising all cadres with the procedures. Participation in party events was crucial for admission to basic membership of the party, but there were other specific requirements for advancement to the next level of membership, involving a programme of specific training that was strictly adhered to at the local level. Changes in party leadership at the local level were made through democratic voting processes. PKS cadres were the only ones in this study who could rely on party policies as the basis of their career advancement. The clarity of the party’s requirements for career progress also meant that opportunities for misconduct during internal electoral processes were substantially reduced. PKS created opportunities for cadre participation through the regular pengajian (Qur’an study group) that local branches organised weekly. These pengajian were also considered one of the requirements to pursue a party career, since they constituted a form of training for lowerlevel membership. For higher levels of membership there was another skills training that cadres had to complete before advancing to the next level. Cadres demonstrated in my interviews with them that they were aware of what they had to do to climb the career ladder in the party; their answers were specific and detailed when pointing out the various trainings required for different levels. The active interaction between the party and its cadres was an important mechanism for increasing cadres’ awareness of the requirements of career progress in the party. As explained earlier, in PKS specific training programmes were mandated for each level of membership and every member had to go through each of these before advancing to a higher membership level. These training programmes were embedded in the three levels of membership in PKS, each of which had several internal categories. The first level of membership was anggota kader pendukung (support cadre membership), which had two levels: anggota pemula (beginner members), who had gone through Training Orientasi Partai (Party Orientation Training); and anggota muda (young members), who had gone through pelatihan kepartaian tingkat satu (first level of party training). The second level of membership was anggota kader inti (nucleus cadre members), which had four levels: anggota madya (intermediate members), who had gone through pelatihan kepartaian tingkat dasar dua (second basic level of party training); anggota dewasa (mature members), who had gone through pelatihan kepartaian tingkat lanjut (advance level party training); anggota ahli (expert members), who had gone through pelatihan kepartaian tingkat tinggi (high level party training); and anggota purna (veteran members), who had gone through pelatihan kepartaian tingkat ahli (expert level party training). The third level of membership was anggota kehormatan (honorary members), a category for special individ-

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uals who had made extraordinary contributions to the party. Specific trainings to advance to higher levels of membership demonstrated party procedure in screening individuals and produced committed leaders. The success of PKS’s socialisation programme was obvious in the uniformity of the responses I received from cadres when I asked them whether they wished to use the party as a stepping stone for entry into parliament. They all said no. Their loyalty to the party was also evidenced by their claims that they had no wish to move to another party. Another indication of their loyalty was that all PKS cadres claimed that it was up to the party whether they would be assigned a public position or whether they stayed in the party structure. According to the party’s policy, a designated internal party council would decide on candidates for local and national elections, and the cadres were aware of this procedure. Local leaders demonstrated even better knowledge and accuracy in their answers to questions concerning party career than did cadres, pointing to specific decision-making mechanisms referred to in party documents. For instance, when asked about how decisions were made in the party, leaders pointed to the role of Majelis Syuro (PKS’s national decision-making body), indicating a deep level of knowledge of party operations. The accuracy of their answers was indicative of PKS’s success in familiarising cadres with its rules and regulations. Along with the various trainings for different levels of membership, PKS had rigorous central policies regarding an individual’s membership status in the party, which were applied strictly at the local level. For example, cadres had differential rights to attend activities at the office that issued his or her membership card. This meant that junior members only had the right to attend events at the regional level.17 Different levels of membership carried other rights as well. ‘Beginner’ members only had three rights: to participate in party events at the kecamatan level, to participate in party training and to obtain membership cards. ‘Intermediate’ to ‘expert’ members had a more extended list of rights, including to be given fair treatment when voicing opinions, to voice criticism in the party and to vote and be nominated for party positions (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 2006).18 This system served as a way to motivate cadres to climb the membership ladder. At the same time, the provision of better rights for members at higher levels, particularly the right to be nominated and vote, meant that it was compulsory to be committed to party activities if members wished to advance in their careers and to be involved in the party’s internal elections. The trainings required for different levels of membership reinforced the party’s membership system and acted as a screening mechanism for cadres wishing to advance in their careers. PKS also specified other

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factors in cadres’ career progress. Potential leaders had to have demonstrated qualities such as strong moral values and a commitment to justice, a strong political and legal perspective, as well as meet specific age requirements (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 2006). However, of these variables, only age requirements could be readily measured. The other less measurable qualities were similar to the requirements of other parties and were emphasised less than the rigorous trainings that were strictly implied. In addition, PKS had specific requirements for leadership at each level of office. The chairperson at the provincial office had to be an ‘expert’ member, while at the regional office he or she had to be an ‘intermediate’ member.19 These specific requirements showed the clarity and rigorousness of PKS’s leadership policies. The strict regulation of membership and leadership in the party ensured that promotion and leadership changes were conducted smoothly. In terms of decision-making for selecting leadership, there were standard procedures to be followed at the local offices20 and elections, as well as other forms of decision-making, had to be conducted by voting (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 2006). Like the other parties, PKS strictly applied voting mechanisms in internal elections at the local level. During my fieldwork, the kodya and kabupaten Malang branches conducted their internal elections around the same period, as leaders from both offices indicated that there were certain deadlines they had to meet for the completion of leadership transition. The party also pioneered a regulation which ensured that once a candidate was elected into government seats, he or she had to give up any positions held in the party.21 This policy reduced the possibilities of corruption and misconduct by ensuring that the party received full attention from its leaders and staff. With the passing of this regulation, the party demonstrated its rejection of one of the practices of the New Order that allowed individuals to occupy dual positions, which opened up opportunities for violations. The party portrays a clean image. The main feature of party career progression in PKS was the clarity of the party’s policy and its direct connection to party membership levels. PKS had clear guidelines for all members who wished to pursue career development, and guaranteed transparency and fairness for all members. PKS policy also ensured that electoral candidates were chosen by the party council and forced these candidates to choose between serving in a government position or staying in the party. The strict application of procedures reduced the possibilities of foul play and corruption in the party. Compared with the other three parties, PKS was clearly superior in its regulation of career management and strict implementation of national policies. The party’s success with reproducing these policies at the local level created effective and committed local leaders.

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Party Career and the Implementation of Intra-party Democracy as a Sign of Party Institutionalisation The management of party careers within the four parties suggests that the newer parties were more focused on putting training mechanisms in place which not only acted as screening methods, but also as means of equipping members and cadres with necessary skills and knowledge of the party and its organisational structure. There was a serious absence of a monitoring system among the two incumbents, particularly PDIP, whose local branches abandoned party training for cadres altogether. In Partai Golkar, the monitoring process relied on local leaders, who played an influential role in nurturing cadres and had close and constant interaction with them. In both incumbent parties, regulations were vague and difficult to implement and the branches had a very limited role in monitoring career progress. Through party management, parties can showcase their progress in creating opportunities for members. The central party institutions of the four parties each made an effort to create such opportunities. However, they faced difficulties ensuring that those conditions were met at the local level. Career promotions were regulated in the parties’ constitutions, which provided varying levels of detail about procedures for career advancement, including through the election of cadres and leaders. Incumbent parties’ regulations concerning party career were vague and difficult to measure. As a result, they had only a very limited monitoring system and cadres often had to resort to their own individual efforts to promote themselves. Local branches had difficulties monitoring individual careers. The absence of clear guidelines for career promotion also meant that there were a significant number of violations, where members and cadres felt treated unjustly as a result of personal lobbying from other candidates. The incumbent parties failed to minimise such possibilities by failing to impose greater control from higher party authorities. In contrast, the newer parties had a stronger focus on career management, with stringent national policies that were strictly applied at the branch level. Both PAN and PKS devoted considerable attention to nurturing and educating their cadres through cadre trainings. For PAN, despite organisational problems at the district level (kodya and kabupaten), subdistrict (kecamatan) branches demonstrated great commitment to ensuring that training was conducted for all cadres. The PKS cadre-training programme was compulsory and automatic, as part of the programme was embedded in the party’s regular pengajian. Both PKS and PAN were also successful in conducting local leadership elections on time – which for PAN was particularly extraordinary given the chaotic district branches’ administration. This suggests that the younger parties felt

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more urgency to have organised career management systems, while the incumbents relied more on traditional practices of appointment rather than more selective procedures of monitoring and voting. Although career management distinguished the incumbents from the young parties, in all cases aspirations for promotion depended heavily on the individual. Party careers were not generally seen as a promising occupation in Indonesia and most local party leaders still held regular jobs. However, there were members and cadres who exhibited a strong desire to reach higher party positions. These individuals were the backbones of the branches. In turn, their participation and dedication helped improve their profiles in the party. To be called a ‘cadre’ is an acknowledgement from the party that the individual has served the branch,22 and those who aspire to leadership positions usually start from holding a party position as a cadre. However, the parties treated their cadres differently. They were valued by Partai Golkar, PKS and PAN, where they occupied party staff positions and benefited from their close relationships with leaders. In PDIP, on the other hand, promotion to the status of cadre was not regulated in practice. Although they too were close to local leaders, PDIP’s cadres did not receive the benefit of further training as cadres from other parties did, mainly because the branches were not committed to organising training programmes. More importantly, the parties’ treatment of cadres with regard to party career advancement differed. While PKS’s clear policy meant that its cadres benefited from knowing what to do and what to expect, the other three parties had vague requirements for screening the promotion of cadres. Thus, only PKS cadres could rely on party policy documents, while cadres of other parties had to rely on their own ideas to determine how best to advance their party careers. Despite possible violations and unfairness in career management, all four parties demonstrated their commitment to democratic measures in leadership change. Although personal lobbying still played an important role in building support for individuals, the widespread use of voting brought a certain level of fairness to the process. All the parties’ branches valued input from members and implemented democratic decision-making by using voting mechanisms in leader elections. Leadership elections at the branch level served as proof that the branches ‘practice what they preach’ (Scarrow 2005) and implement democratic measures to elect their leaders. The existence of clear procedures for leadership change and the implementation of voting in leader elections suggest that the parties were making progress in institutionalisation. The four parties all regarded participation as the main requirement and main expression of loyalty, dedication and capacity. In PKS, membership could only continue if cadres were active in party events. Partai

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Golkar, PDIP, and PAN cadres and leaders claimed that involvement in party events was crucial to achieving advancement within their respective parties. Cadre status in Partai Golkar, PDIP and PAN seemed to be accorded automatically to members who were active. In these parties, there was no official ceremony to elect cadres and, despite the list of qualities defined in party constitutions, there was no procedure specified to choose them. In some cases, cadre positions were accorded to members who were assigned staff positions in the party, suggesting that these positions were perceived as important and could only be filled by members who had proven their ability and dedication to the party. Only after serving as party staff could cadres expect to be nominated as leaders. But only a limited portion of members could and did dedicate their time to intense participation in party affairs and thus achieve cadre positions. This meant that active participation acted as a screening method to separate active members from non-active members. The parties’ approaches to party careers differed significantly between the incumbent and the newer parties. PKS had strict and clear policies on career advancement within the party. It managed to regulate membership advancement and leadership by requiring that specific conditions be met in order for individuals to advance in their membership or be nominated as leaders. The party also created party bodies to safeguard the fairness of career advancement processes, and to minimise possibilities of misconduct in the implementation of its rules. In this regard, PKS demonstrated maturity and sound organisation at the local branch level and a high level of local adherence to national level policies. Similarly, unlike its attitude towards party organisation, PAN showed discipline in implementing national career management policies. Although activities were very rarely held, PAN’s Malang branches successfully managed leadership change at the district level, and procedures for career promotion were adhered to by sub-district branches. In contrast, Partai Golkar and PDIP relied on vague qualities and less transparent procedures for monitoring career progress. It was hard for the branches to determine whether cadres had achieved the desired level of loyalty (Partai Golkar) and strong ideology (PDIP) for career promotions; these criteria were not only hard to measure for the branches, regardless of whether they tried to put a system in place, but they also left room for violations and unfairness. It is important for the parties to realise possibilities of misconduct and ensure that members are protected from it. However, there was no indication that the incumbent parties planned to deal with this matter, particularly as local leadership changes had been conducted smoothly to date. Aside from these differences, the incumbents and young parties shared some similarities in terms of how they were perceived as vehicles to enter governmental positions. With the exception of Partai

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Golkar, interviews with local leaders suggested that, in line with Norris’ argument (1995), for local leaders party career takes a back seat to members’ motivation to be involved in government. However, local leaders were also committed to the welfare of their local branches and wished to see the branches develop under their management; that was seen as more important than the progress of their individual careers in the party. Only a few party activists succeed in achieving national leadership positions and local leaders were aware of this. As a result, party activists tended to focus on their own localities, since they were unlikely to relocate just for a better chance to promote their party career. They also tended to prioritise their non-party occupations. Finally, leadership change was treated as important in all four parties. Frequent changes of leadership in the branches showed the parties’ ability to manage succession at the local level. It also indicated that the relationships with the respective parties’ regional and central offices had been maintained by leader election mechanisms that required branches at the lower level to be represented at the higher level. This procedure ensured regular contact between party offices at different levels and at the same time guaranteed that local branches had a say in decision-making processes at higher offices. At the same time, offices at higher levels had to give their approval and approve the new leaders. Well-managed succession and leadership change at the four parties is a strong sign of party institutionalisation (Janda 1980). More importantly, implementation of intra-party democracy is a crucial indication that the parties were distancing themselves from traditional practices of leadership, such as appointment by a higher office, which is important for the progress of party organisation.

Conclusion The four parties’ efforts to facilitate party career management suggest mixed results for their progress on institutionalisation. On the one hand, with the exception of PKS, the parties had unclear party career paths, forcing individuals to rely on their own efforts to build their personal profiles, usually almost exclusively through their active participation in party activities. PKS demonstrated itself to be the most organised in career management due to its rigour in applying national regulations at the local levels. But PAN demonstrated outstanding commitment to ensuring strict adherence to its national career management policies. Meanwhile, the incumbents, Partai Golkar and PDIP, lagged behind in terms of transparency, both with regard to their nationallevel regulations and in practice through their local promotion mechanisms.

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PKS demonstrated the most sophisticated membership management system. In contrast to Partai Golkar, PDIP and PAN, where membership levels only consisted of ordinary members, cadres and leaders, PKS had a complex structure of membership levels through which members had to pass before becoming eligible to contest for a leadership position. This structure suggests that it was more difficult and took more commitment to climb the party career ladder in PKS than in the other three parties. The fact that it was harder to advance in PKS suggests that its cadres must have a greater commitment to the party. This also had implications for party loyalty, as PKS members were less likely to be interested in switching to other parties if they did not progress in their party career. The four parties’ progress towards institutionalisation has reached different stages, which are not necessarily correlated with the length of time each party has existed. Although the young parties have the disadvantage of inexperience, the incumbents’ entrenched practices may hinder their aspirations for renewal. Furthermore, at the local level the parties need to adjust to particular conditions. The four parties have different internal capacities and resources for dealing with issues at the grass-roots level. Their local characteristics are not based on a welldeveloped support system from their central offices. Rather, they are determined by the commitment and resourcefulness of local administration. The ones with greater capacity and resources have a better chance of overcoming local challenges and thus show more advanced development. The next chapter discusses in detail the specific aspects of the progress of party organisations in Indonesia, as well as the lack of such progress, and how they have influenced the advancement of democracy in Indonesia.

9 Progress of Party Institutionalisation and Its Role in Indonesia’s Democratisation

My examination of Partai Golkar, PDIP, PKS and PAN has found that the organisational superiority of one party over another depends on the commitment and skills of local party personnel, as well as local resources.1 More institutionalised party branches have greater capacity to conduct activities and programmes and provide channels for political participation, while less institutionalised branches, similar to the dysfunctional New Order parties, tend to be passive and ineffective.

Little Steps Forward Applying Western theories to Indonesia can be problematic, particularly because Western democracies are much more advanced and their parties are more institutionalised than those in Indonesia, where parties have never fully developed. However, Western theories can still serve as a benchmark for assessing party progress and the stage of party development in Indonesia. Moreover, these theories remain the sole standards of measurement available for this kind of analysis in any setting, including the transitional democracies of Eastern Europe and other developing countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa. Using these measures, Indonesian parties on the whole have made significant progress in their organisational management at the grassroots level. Their ability to build ‘stable roots in society’ and establish local presences (Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 5, 16) is demonstrated by the mere existence of their branch organisations and the frequent activities the majority of them hold. Compared with the Old and New Order parties, the current parties have more genuine local presences. Their local branches remain active beyond elections, in stark contrast to the parties of the New Order period. Consequently, the branches of the current parties, as those parties’ local representatives, are able to project and promote party platforms and programmes at the local level, which in turn familiarise the public with them. That the parties can maintain local branches has also demonstrated their ability to manage their organisations, as well as to recruit members and facilitate their participation in party activities.

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This study has also shown the importance of the ‘nuts and bolts’ of everyday structures and processes for local party organisation. Facilities and resources such as party offices, communication tools and finances are crucial for the efficiency of a branch. The commitment of party personnel, who expend their time and effort for the branches, is also enormously important for party organisation. So is branch management. But no single one of these factors determines the efficiency of branch organisation: they are all closely related. For example, strongly committed personnel are more likely to both desire good communication facilities and be able to find the resources to obtain them. And better communication facilities increase the effectiveness of the organisation’s management, which in turn allows staff to develop better programmes. Thus, the best scenario for party branches is one where all of the ‘nuts and bolts’ of party organisation are present. Party Organisation Unlike the New Order parties, but like Indonesia’s early political organisations, the parties in the reform era have the freedom to operate independently at the grass-roots level. This freedom, as we have seen, has enabled them to develop much more fully. In the reform era, the parties’ local branches have chosen diverse administrative arrangements; for example, some offices are staffed by cadres, others by professional administrators. The fact that these decisions were made locally is evidence of the branches’ freedom to operate independently. Indeed, although the relationships between central and local party offices are more active than in previous eras, the parties’ central organisations still have little control over local branches, provide little administrative support and offer only general and non-binding policy guidance. In addition, monitoring and reporting mechanisms, I found, were irregular and seldom enforced. One drawback of the local branches’ freedom to operate independently is that it has limited their connections with parties’ higher-level structures – so much so that when branches faced difficulties, as with PAN, they received little, if any, help from the central office. As a result, branches’ ability to use their freedom to build stable connections with society and strong local structures remains dependent on other factors. Commitment from party personnel, whether leaders or cadres, exerts the most important influence on branches’ levels of organisation. Simply put, parties with more committed personnel have more organised and professional branches.2 However, party organisation also improves with better administrative skills and resources, such as financial and technological resources. Access to a regular supply of funding is important to branch administration. This study found that the

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incumbent parties, particularly Partai Golkar, had steady funding sources. This was an advantage that the newer parties were unable to match, as reflected by PAN’s inability to manage its branches, which was no doubt exacerbated if not partially caused by financial problems. Difficulties finding a regular supply of funding were a serious hindrance to PAN’s continuing operations at the local level. Party funding is an extremely sensitive issue in Indonesia.3 Transfers of funds from parties’ central offices to local branches were very limited, my interviews suggested, and as a result the branches relied on external donations. Party funding practices have changed little since the Old Order, in that parties’ financial strength still depends primarily on external sources (with the exception of PKS).4 However, party officials were extremely unwilling to provide me with more detailed information on this matter. The parties’ reluctance to share their financial information may suggest that their local branches have responsibilities to unknown external donors which could limit their freedom. With the exception of PKS, the parties’ lack of transparency about finances enabled them to maintain support through patronage. The simple fact that party branches are able to organise themselves independently at any level is a genuine breakthrough in Indonesia. Yet, this same independence can present challenges for the branches in situations where they are unable to support themselves independently. As earlier chapters showed, some local party branches in Malang lacked administrative support, funding and/or the commitment required to ensure uninterrupted party activities. Given the varying capacities of political parties in general, not all parties can operate smoothly and some still need intense guidance and support, be it from their central office or other entities. Failure to ensure continuity at the branch level disrupts broader party operations and in a competitive environment like post-Suharto Indonesia, support for a particular political party can easily move to another, better organised party. Party Activities At the local level, Partai Golkar, PDIP, PKS and PAN demonstrated that they are no longer merely vote-getting machines that only operate during election periods, as was the case under the New Order. Rather, they are active political channels for members of the community. The case studies presented here suggest that parties project and give form to their policies through their choices of activities at the local level. The independence of the branches of the four parties was clearly demonstrated by the variety of activities they held and their diverse approaches towards issues like recruitment. This variation, along with PKS’s strong

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preference for Islamic-themed activities, confirms that the central government no longer controls parties’ behaviour. It also suggests that the freedom branches have within party structures to choose their own local administrative arrangements extends to freedom to choose their activities. Such decisions about local party branch activities lie with local party personnel. The lack of central office monitoring means that branch leaders and other key personnel have control over the kinds of activities particular branches organise. Ultimately, it also means that they have influence over whether a particular branch is active or not. The independence of the branches is manifested in the different kinds of events held by branches of the same party. Although this freedom forces the different branches to be better organised, it also highlights the heavy reliance of the parties’ central offices on the branches. If the branches are unable to organise events efficiently, national party programmes cannot be implemented at the local level. The trend towards decentralisation in decision-making about party activities is another breakthrough in Indonesia. In the Old Order period, although parties’ local branches actively organised their own events, they tended to choose similar activities to those held by their central offices. For instance, in the post-independence period (i.e. after 1945), PNI’s branches chose to create local publications mirroring the central office’s orientation. In contrast, PDIP’s twenty-first-century donor darah (blood donation) programme was a purely local initiative. However, their independence also led the parties to choose, at times, popular activities favoured in previous eras, such as the PDIP kabupaten office’s arisan (the rotating credit scheme with monthly draws), which was used earlier by PNI and PDI (Aspinall 2005: 172). In this sense, freedom not only spawned greater creativity by reform-era parties and the development of a wide range of different activities, it also gave them the option of retaining well-established social events and programmes. The variety of activities held by their local branches shows the parties’ different levels of creativity. The more organised parties were better at gauging which type of event would be popular at a particular time. The best example of this was Partai Golkar’s decision to help bakso vendors when they needed help re-establishing the food’s popularity and reputation after allegations of contamination with formalin. PKS demonstrated its ability to keep up-to-date with its members’ lifestyles by teaming up with an Islamic bank to create customised bank cards. PDIP and PAN had no equivalent programmes, and only stepped up their activities around party anniversaries. Ultimately, the activities chosen by the four parties are indicative of their local organisational capacities. The frequency of their events also reflects their organisational capacities as well as the commitment of their leaders and party personnel to promote the party in the local

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community. An event’s success, in turn, indicates the level of public support enjoyed by the party. In this sense, party events are crucial in projecting the party’s image and platforms. Since a successful event requires good organisation, a branch’s capacity to organise and administrate itself is crucial in ensuring a party’s presence at the local level. Recruitment Approaches Their grass-roots recruitment efforts are the most significant proof of the four parties’ independence after the fall of Suharto in 1998.5 Yet the emphasis on leaders’ charisma and party programmes to attract voters that was seen in Sukarno’s Indonesia decades ago still can be seen today. PDIP maintains the PNI’s traditional practice of attracting support through charismatic leaders, while PKS, similar to PKI, pursues a partyprogramme-based recruitment strategy. Patronage also provides means and motivations for recruitment, particularly for well-endowed parties such as Partai Golkar. For PDIP, the high visibility of the party’s national leader and the role of local leaders in local government may explain why it remains popular despite its lack of organisational capacity. The responsibility of local branches for managing recruitment illustrates both the tendency towards decentralisation in political parties and progress towards party institutionalisation in Indonesia. Successful recruitment drives demonstrate that parties are able to connect to the grass-roots and are making it possible for the public to participate in politics through local party structures. Of course, local branches compete with one another to attract support and members can be swayed to switch from one party to another, which highlights the importance of formulating effective recruitment. Volatility in party affiliation, as shown in the case of PAN, has created greater urgency to develop effective recruitment and retention strategies. The perceptions of the importance of recruitment of the branches of the four parties correlate with the age of the party. The incumbent, or older, parties generally do not perceive the need for a larger formal membership base. Naturally, the younger parties need to attract more members to compete with the incumbents and therefore practise more aggressive recruitment. The implications of these different policies can be seen at the local level, with the younger parties clearly viewing recruitment as crucial to their operations and aiming to recruit more members, while incumbents seem to focus more on their party’s image and popularity in order to maintain votes in elections. However, local branches’ recruitment practices are influenced by local leaders’ attitudes toward recruitment and the availability of party resources. In Malang, leaders’ opinions reflected their respective parties’ attitudes towards recruitment, suggesting coherence between central

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and local office approaches to this issue. Nonetheless, the recruitment strategies chosen by local leaders are also heavily influenced by local conditions. For instance, local leaders can be persuaded to respond to particular community needs, especially if it involves competition with other parties in the area. This further demonstrates the independence and power of local leaders and their importance in deciding the roles of local branches. The branches of the four parties showed some creativity with regard to recruitment. This was particularly true for PKS’s branches, which were not only extremely active in organising pengajian to attract members, but also penetrated youth groups in schools. PKS’s regular open houses, the flagships of its recruitment strategy, also served as confirmation that it recruited aggressively. However, none of this was possible without resources. National policy requires sufficient support to be effectively implemented at the local level. While PAN’s national policy clearly prioritised recruitment, unlike PKS it was unable to execute this policy because of the difficulties it experienced financing and managing its Malang branches. Of all the factors examined in this study, recruitment was the strongest indicator of the new-found freedom of post-Suharto parties to organise at the grass-roots. The ability of parties to directly recruit at the grass-roots signified the disappearance of the New Order’s policy of ‘floating mass’ (which stipulated that rural masses be ‘undisturbed’ by politics except around election periods) and parties’ new capacity to operate at the local level. However, recruitment practices also demonstrated the extent to which central parties relied on local branches. As the case of PAN suggests, such reliance has the potential to jeopardise the implementation of parties’ national policies at the local level, particularly if branches are poorly organised. Members’ Motivations and Participation According to theories of party institutionalisation, party platforms should be the real point of attraction for members (e.g. Janda 1980) and theories of democracy and democratisation associate greater political participation with higher levels of democracy (e.g. Dahl 1998). This study has found that some Indonesian parties still rely heavily on leaders’ charisma to attract members and that for most parties participation is limited to party elites, though their participation remains secondary to their primary jobs. While in the Old Order ideologies played a very important role in the construction of party identity, the reform-era parties are similar to the New Order parties in that party ideologies serve as mere slogans and ideas largely unattached to party operations. To make matters worse, parties are having problems operationalising their

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ideologies, preferring to adopt more populist or practical ways of engaging with society.6 Except for PKS, ordinary members of the party branches examined here had little knowledge of their parties and were not engaged in party life. In short, participation in party life was superficial for the bulk of party members. Theories of institutionalisation identify a party’s platform as the main attraction for the members of a well-institutionalised party, while charisma is seen as detrimental to party progress. This study found that PDIP and PAN were lagging behind Partai Golkar and PKS in their use of party platforms as points of attraction. After participating twice in general elections, PAN urgently needs to develop a more attractive platform that can develop party popularity beyond the charismatic appeal of its leader Amien Rais. PDIP faces an even grimmer outlook: despite its age and experience, the party is still unable to attract support beyond the charisma of its pioneer, Sukarno, and his daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri (although her personal dominance of the party suggests that support for it will remain relatively strong). In contrast, Partai Golkar has been able to erase, to a considerable extent, its links with Suharto by building a new image as a modern party. PKS has also been able to direct public attention to its platform rather than its leaders. Since party leadership and the charisma of party pioneers are difficult to maintain over time, PDIP and PAN are more likely to sustain voter support by building appealing party platforms than relying on the attraction of their leaders. PKS’s success in creating an attractive platform has underpinned its success in solidifying member attachment. On the other hand, the low levels of member participation in Golkar, PAN and PDIP reflect the challenges these parties face in managing points of interaction with their members. My interviews with their members suggested that these parties relied on their images and/or patronage to attract as many members as possible, but that they could strengthen their relationships with their members through better use of membership cards, improved dues structures and more regular activities. In practice, the parties relied mainly on their activities to maintain attachment, as membership cards were not always issued and dues were no longer imposed. Since branch organisation is absolutely crucial to the ability to organise activities, it is also key to the successful cultivation of members’ participation. Thus, although the parties are alive and generally well today, participation in them is still limited to cadres. In large part, ordinary members are barely involved, as they only occasionally attend meetings or events. The limited interaction between parties and their ordinary members means that the importance of their cadres is heightened. They are the backbone of the branch organisations and largely determine party efficiency and vibrancy at the local level. Some parties have made a conscious effort to focus on cadres rather than on their ordinary members

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because their areas of operation are extensive and full participation from every member would be hard to accommodate. But while ordinary members are only peripherally involved with their parties, they are generally happy with their levels of participation. They do not necessarily seek more than a superficial connection with their party or a greater understanding of it. Although this is consistent with trends in modern democracies (Linz 1997), it raises questions about the quality of political participation in Indonesia and the effectiveness of democracy there, particularly in the early stage of the country’s democratic transition. It suggests difficulties establishing a more participatory political culture. If Indonesian parties perceive greater participation to be important, they need to formulate more strategic and pragmatic measures to attract not only support but also deeper involvement, both from their members and the broader public. Party Career and Intra-party Democracy The four parties examined here had little influence over the progress of an individual’s party career. Compared with Old Order parties, in which career progress was generally highly unregulated because of the limited scope of central office-local branch relationships, the reform-era parties demonstrated great commitment to aiding local cadres’ careers. However, like New Order parties, most of the reform-era parties have unclear policies on career development, and thus regulation is lacking. But they generally emphasise superior knowledge and personal qualities in the individuals to be promoted. The newer parties have more stringent mechanisms in place for equipping cadres with relevant skills and knowledge before promoting them to higher positions than do the incumbent parties. The newer parties have thus made a stronger commitment to ensuring that promotions are based on merit and are transparent and fair. The clearer the policies, the better the organisation, and the better its ability to anticipate and handle conflicts between cadres over advancement opportunities. Although I found that personal lobbying was a key factor in gaining party support, party career policies gave members opportunities for career advancement (if they chose to pursue it) and allowed the party to screen candidates in a way that ensured that more committed members advanced within the party. Commitment to regular leadership renewal and the implementation of intra-party democracy in choosing new leaders are signs of party institutionalisation and here the parties also showed some progress. While party career promotion always involves personal lobbying and is less transparent than promotion in the bureaucracy or military, the parties can benefit from demonstrating even greater commitment to fairness and transparency in managing members and their party careers.

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But the parties’ commitment to intra-party democracy represents a significant advancement from Old and New Order parties. The parties of the post-Suharto period appear to be quite serious about implementing democratic measures internally and as a result are more capable of undertaking democratic leadership change. In this regard, the parties are role models in their use of voting in their decision-making processes, which demonstrates their commitment to formal democratic processes to determine branch leadership succession. However, aside from active participation, which is critical for career advancement because it shows a member’s dedication and willingness to make sacrifices for his or her party, and gaining experience as a party cadre, there is not much else that individuals can do for career advancement. Besides lobbying, that is. Only PKS has a stringent system for monitoring advancement. It stipulates that cadres must pass through specific membership levels before reaching leadership positions. In contrast, the other parties only have vague requirements concerning a candidate’s track record of dedication, participation and personal moral values. As a result, individuals have greater opportunities to advance through money politics. The lack of guidelines and clarity in the parties’ internal monitoring can also create confusion over who should be nominated for promotion and unfair treatment. Therefore, although parties’ efforts to conduct leadership change frequently and democratically are commendable, truly transparent party processes require parties to be more involved in individual career monitoring to ensure fairness for all members and cadres. Overall, although Indonesian parties have made clear progress, they still have a long way to go to achieve even some of the standard measures of institutionalisation. The parties have demonstrated progress in their capacity to freely and independently operate at the grass-roots level and their local branches’ ability to manage their resources and determine the foci of their activities. However, most parties still rely primarily on their national leaders’ charisma for support and practise unfair and opaque career management. Progress in institutionalisation has been limited almost entirely to general branch organisation and, with the exception of PKS, has not extended to membership management.

Stages and Paths to Institutionalisation in Malang Partai Golkar and PKS are clearly more institutionalised than PDIP or PAN. Tomsa has written about the ‘uneven institutionalisation’ of Indonesian parties at the national level (2008). Tomsa argues that the continuing strength and popularity of Partai Golkar is sustained by the failure of other parties to institutionalise effectively. Although Partai Golkar was

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strongly challenged by the rapid rise of Partai Demokrat in the 2004 and 2009 elections, this study supports Tomsa’s thesis for the parties’ local branches. Partai Golkar has maintained its solid organisational capacity at the local level, while among the other three parties, only PKS has a real chance of matching Partai Golkar’s level of organisation. Partai Golkar Although it has promoted a new image, Partai Golkar still enjoys a number of advantages over the other parties because of its dominant position in the New Order period. Its main advantages are its extensive network of sub-organisations at the local level and its opportunities for engaging in money politics. Partai Golkar has the strongest structure and the best resources, including financial reserves and valuable properties. In addition, administratively, the party has the most experience and the deepest understanding of the demands of managing a sophisticated organisation. As a result, it has been able to maintain a strong presence and stay active at the community level. The importance of Partai Golkar’s legacy from the Suharto era is obvious from the party’s level of organisation. It owns its offices and has the ability to employ salaried administrators, despite the absence of compulsory membership dues. This clearly separates it from the other three parties. However, as Tomsa has argued, Partai Golkar’s reliance on its past strengths, particularly financially, is not in accord with its new image as an independent party (2006: 47-48, 85-86). The party’s financial prowess has definitely been influential in its electoral success, but results from the 2009 elections also suggest that solid grass-roots organisation needs to be supported by a united central headquarters. Although Partai Golkar showed well-organised administration at the branch level during my fieldwork, it still has a strong sense of apathy about increasing members’ attachment. Membership enlargement is not a priority for party officials because of the influence of the party’s sub-organisations. This same over-confidence has contributed to complacency among officials about engaging members, reflected in the total absence of membership induction efforts. This contrasts with the party’s commitment to its administrative practices, such as the management of membership registration, the issuing of membership cards, and the provision of party training. Such commitment could have been extended to induction activities in order to equip members with better knowledge of the party and increase attachment to it. Furthermore, there is no process through which cadres’ career progress is monitored. My observations during party activities suggested that local leaders have significant influence over who progresses within the party, as there is no specific mechanism for cadre election other than the ‘natural’

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selection based on active participation. A better member management system would allow the party to impart greater transparency and certainty to the process of member progression within the party. Ultimately, such a system would attract more party support, particularly as Partai Golkar does not rely heavily on leaders’ charisma. However, voters sometimes choose irrationally and emotional attachments remain a strong determinant of Indonesian voter preferences.7 Thus, in Indonesia, incentives for parties to improve their member management systems remain weak. Yet, even with its flaws, Partai Golkar remains the best-organised party in Malang. Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan The PDIP enjoys remarkably loyal grass-roots support. But, like its predecessors, the PNI and PDI, it lacks managerial expertise at the local level. The party’s heavy reliance on its image and its leaders’ charisma has resulted in strong popularity, but organisationally there are numerous inconsistencies between its national policies and their implementation at the local level. The PDIP’s Malang branches lack resources and professionalism, and in the case of the kodya office this resulted in a rather erratic scheduling of activities during my study. The kabupaten office performed better organisationally; not as the result of better resources, but because of the greater dedication of its party personnel. Fortunately for the party, members’ near-blind loyalty and enthusiasm has carried the party to strong election results. Although its poor local organisation should not affect support for it in the short run, the party would no doubt benefit from better organisational management. The PDIP demonstrates that strong election results can have little or no correlation with a party’s level of institutionalisation in Indonesia. At the local level, PDIP’s branches have serious organisational weaknesses which could undermine its support base in the long run. Branches operate independently, with no sign of any reporting mechanisms to the central office. Branch-level autonomy has not led to good local outcomes. The party has struggled to organise regular activities and as a result has failed to attract significant public attention. Branch management of members is also poor. No induction for new members or training for cadres is offered. Members’ attachment to the party has not been strengthened through party programmes, and most members have little knowledge of what the party stands for. The lack of monitoring of party careers has resulted in significant irregularities in career advancement, giving rise to dissatisfaction among members and cadres. In fact, the party’s only progress in institutionalisation is its commitment to democratic measures in decision-making, including in meetings and in the election of leaders – a stark contrast to the practice of

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the earlier PNI, which at times abandoned its own membership management system to elect local leaders. Despite their weaknesses, however, PDIP’s local branches remain popular and the party remains attractive to local voters. Megawati’s leadership has been the single most significant factor in attracting and sustaining PDIP’s support base. It is unlikely that objective assessments of its organisational capacity by the public will undermine support for the party in the short to medium term. The party will probably enjoy tremendous popularity as long as Megawati continues as its leader. However, the fact that the party relies so heavily on its leader’s charisma is another sign of its lack of progress towards institutionalisation. In Malang the party has benefited from local leaders’ status as government officials (walikota and bupati); their positions provide patronage benefits for members and voters which serve as an incentive to continue their support. PDIP should learn from the experiences of its predecessor, PNI, which, in addition to the charisma of Bung Karno, utilised strong grassroots management to build more sustainable grass-roots support. Partai Amanat Nasional was the least organised of the four parties in the Malang area during my fieldwork. Its branches had barely survived the organisational inefficiencies caused by their lack of planning and internal structure. PAN’s branches shared many of the attributes of PDIP’s branches. However, in some important aspects – such as the problems that members and potential members had locating branch offices – PAN’s situation was considerably worse. PAN’s branch organisation depended on the willingness of a handful of individuals to keep the party alive. Although these cadres and leaders were dedicated, they lacked the capacity to ensure that routine tasks, like moving offices, did not totally disrupt party operations. Even basic administrative tasks were completed only sporadically. At the same time, there were no reporting or support mechanisms from the central office to ensure that the branches were able to operate. As the branches struggled to maintain a presence, activities had to be kept to a bare minimum. PAN’s case demonstrates that a lack of organisational efficiency seriously disrupts member management. Its chaotic branch organisation and lack of activities severely limited its relationship with members. Registration processes differed between branches and branches were internally inconsistent when issuing membership cards. Member dues would have been impossible to impose even if PAN had wished to. Like the other parties, PAN leaders indicated that they had no intention of imposing dues, despite a lack of large financial reserves. The one area where PAN performed better than any other party PAN

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was in its dedication to cadre training and leadership succession at the grass-roots level. Though PAN leaders were concerned about the party’s ability to retain existing members, aggressive national recruitment was seriously hindered locally by poor branch organisation. To make matters worse, support for the party nationally had been dwindling, with internal conflicts evident at the central level.8 Like PDIP, PAN relies almost entirely on leaders’ charisma to attract support, but unlike Megawati’s stardom, the popularity of PAN’s leaders is declining. To substantially improve its election chances in the longer term, the party needs to invest substantial resources in its local branches in order to ensure that activities are frequent and regular. Only by doing so can the party improve its image, thereby attracting more members and establishing a better local support base. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera In contrast to PAN, PKS has exhibited maturity in party organisation and member management. Throughout the three elections of 1999, 2004 and 2009, the party was able to develop a very strong support base, as evidenced by the increase in its votes. PKS’s success at the national level was reflected in, and supported by, local branch organisational structures and practices. PKS branches are well-organised and they actively and frequently organise events. Moreover, the party’s aggressive recruitment policy has been consistently and energetically implemented by the branches. The party also has the most rigorous membership structures and is the only party with strict policies on career progression. Coherence between national and local policies has been achieved without compromising branch independence. PKS’s organisational success reflects cadres’ commitment and professionalism. PKS’s cadres express their passion for the party in their dedication and service to it. Although branch staff are essentially party volunteers, they are dedicated to party tasks and have the skills to conduct them efficiently. As PKS appeals to a young, educated demographic, the party has access to relatively high levels of technological knowledge, which has also contributed to its level of administrative organisation. The cadres are very professional in their work to boot, as demonstrated by their swift responses to my research enquiries. The growing popularity of PKS can also be attributed to its strategy of maintaining an Islamic image, particularly in its activities. Although most Indonesians are only nominally Muslim, PKS has been successful in tapping into the growing Islamism in the country. All party activities I observed revolved around two themes, Islam and recruitment, with the latter reflecting the party’s emphasis on enlarging its membership.

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has also been successful in drawing on cadres’ support to recruit more members. This was reflected in cadres’ enthusiasm to learn more about recruitment strategies and in local leaders’ creativity in designing recruitment events. At the local level, then, the party has demonstrated its ability in and commitment to organisational management, and more importantly in managing members’ support. As a result, not only does the party have well-organised branches, it also has members who are emotionally attached to it and passionate about it. As the democratic transition period has progressed in Indonesia, PKS has clearly shown that age has nothing to do with a party’s organisational capabilities. With the loyal grass-roots support that it has cultivated so diligently, the party has developed a stable support base in a remarkably short time. Organisationally, it is clearly superior to PAN and PDIP in terms of its activities and administration, and in some areas it is stronger even than Partai Golkar. Although its strict membership requirements might serve as a hindrance to attracting wider support – particularly amongst sections of the community who do not wish to become deeply involved with a political organisation – the party presents a strong case that a new party can play a crucial part in the democratic transition process if it can put in place the policies and management structures required to attract and maintain the support of voters. PKS

Implications for Indonesia’s Democratic Transition As political theorists have argued, political parties play a key role in democratic transitions as vehicles for accommodating different interests (Gunther, Montero & Linz 2002: 58; Dahl 1998: 57; Pridham 1995: xii; Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 27; Lawson 1980: 3). But studies on parties in democracies and democratic contexts have been based on more mature democracies. While such studies provide important theoretical and comparative insights, it has been necessary for our purposes to examine parties squarely within the context of Indonesia in order to determine their significance in its democratic transition. It is clear that parties remain the most prominent channel of political participation in Indonesia and candidates for government seats still use them as their main vehicles. This suggests that parties are a key institution for upholding democracy, educating people about democracy and applying democratic rules at the grass-roots level there. It is imperative that parties are further institutionalised for Indonesia’s democratisation to succeed. Indonesian parties face many challenges. Indonesians are still learning about democracy and political participation, and parties have no realistic reference points in other nations as they seek to develop their organisations. Although political participation was lively in the post-

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1945 independence period and during the Old Order, even then parties were not fully institutionalised. Although early parties engaged in wideranging activities and had branches across the country, they still responded largely to the situation on the ground rather than affirmatively implementing party regulations in their daily operations. For example, PNI abandoned its recruitment policy and promoted cadres from other parties without following its own screening procedures because it was more practical to do so.9 During the New Order, parties’ development was severely stunted as a result of the government’s heavy hand and the restriction of political participation. Now, Indonesian parties must deal with many serious obstacles in their quest to prove that they can be effective and accountable political channels.10 Furthermore, since decentralisation has brought local politics to the fore, local party branches have become a vital focus of party reform. One may argue that the current situation among Indonesian parties is rather typical of a post-authoritarian system. Scholars have noted that electoral competition often ‘does little to stimulate the renovation or development of political parties’ in post-authoritarian contexts (Carothers 2002: 15). Since Indonesia’s transition to democracy began almost a decade and a half ago, parties may still require significant time to develop further. The legacy of decades of corruption and money politics makes it particularly hard to escape these practices in the reform era. For the parties, especially the incumbents, it is convenient to fall back on such familiar practices, especially when accountability is not enforced (Choi 2003: 194). When a local PDIP cadre felt that his rights had been violated when a more junior cadre gained a higher rank on the party’s political candidate list, it showed that the party still lacked stringent policies for governing party careers and that the system still allows such practices. Johnson has argued that parties’ ability to mobilise mass support makes them apathetic about ‘political education or dialogue with the population’ (2002: 733). She believes that there has been a decline in party legitimacy in Western democracies caused by parties’ disengagement with the community. In Indonesia, these arguments hold only partly true. The better institutionalised parties – in Malang they are Partai Golkar and PKS – have established regular dialogues with local communities. Furthermore, because these dialogues are conducted between party representatives in local assemblies and party cadres, accountability is improved. However, the other parties still appear apathetic about engaging the public, as shown vividly by PDIP’s padlocked branches and PAN’s chaotic local administration. More genuine efforts to improve local organisation will improve the parties’ images, which in turn will enhance their approval ratings and legitimacy.

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Regardless of the imbalance in parties’ progress in Indonesia, there have been remarkable developments in the country’s democratic transition. But there have also been real concerns about where the country is headed. For instance, Choi warned against the danger of ‘undemocratic consolidation’, where the guiding rules of political behaviour seem to be democratic, but the substance of the system – those practices that have become habitual – is far from democratic (2003: 194). Hadiz has argued that an ‘illiberal form of democracy is already entrenched in Indonesia’. He noted that lower-level government officials and previous ‘henchmen and thugs’ in the government now claim to be ‘reformers’ but continue to promote the unfair accumulation of wealth that began under the New Order (2004a: 64).11 Indeed, the legacy parties, Partai Golkar and PDIP, have failed to adopt fully democratic leadership selection practices or achieve transparency in their membership management, despite having adopted the formal structures of democracy internally. Meanwhile, the adherence of the newer parties to more democratic internal party processes will be meaningless unless they can attract larger support in elections, which will give them greater influence nationally. Undemocratic practices have remained strong in Indonesia. In comparison with the theoretical ideals of political parties, the picture is quite grim in some ways. Although other parties are clearly lagging behind Partai Golkar, even Golkar cannot be considered strongly institutionalised, Tomsa believes (2006: 251). If an experienced party with a strong organisation like Partai Golkar is still far from being mature by Western standards, then Indonesian parties in general have a long way to go to become fully institutionalised. Liddle & Mujani argue that Indonesian parties are choosing to ignore their organisations because leaders’ personalities and charisma are still important influences on voter behaviour (Liddle & Mujani in Tan 2006: 107). However, all is not doom and gloom. In fact, the Malang case gives reasons to be optimistic. In particular, party members strongly voiced to me their satisfaction with how their parties worked, and their sense that they were listened to. Thus, although progress has been far from ideal, the four parties in this study to a great extent fulfilled the political needs of their members when compared with their New Order predecessors. This suggests that the parties are operating according to democratic prerequisites of political participation (Dahl 1998: 37-38). Indeed, Indonesian parties act as ‘principal mediators between the voters and their interests’ (Gunther, Montero & Linz 2002: 58), and ‘articulate and aggregate societal interests’ (Hofferbert 1998: 7), as through Partai Golkar’s suborganisations and PKS’s and Partai Golkar’s regular dialogues with local electoral candidates.

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Impact of Party Organisation on the 2009 Elections Nonetheless, the ultimate goal of political parties is to win votes. Indonesia’s general elections in 2009 were the most crucial elections so far. Would Indonesia revert to authoritarianism, or move forward with democracy? Experts such as Mietzner pointed to the success of the Partai Demokrat (Democrat Party, or PD) in 2009, with the party’s Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono re-elected as president, as a significant sign that a party can repeat its success of the previous election.12 Observers were optimistic that the 2009 election had consolidated Indonesian democracy (Sherlock 2009) and national surveys indicated that public support for the state of the country’s democracy was strong.13 Yet, challenges remain. In particular, patronage and money politics. The main hindrance to further progress of party institutionalisation in Indonesia is still reliance on patronage and money politics. Financial power was a key ingredient in Prabowo Subianto’s run for the vice-presidency alongside presidential candidate Megawati in 2009.14 Thus, despite all the praise for the success of this third free election after the end of the New Order, some of which hailed Indonesia as ‘the best functioning democracy in Southeast Asia’ (East-West Center, 2009), questions remain about the extent of parties’ role in Indonesia’s democratic transition. An important new trend was confirmed in the 2009 election. A new breed of parties emerged – ones that were established mostly as political vehicles for their leaders. This trend started in the 2004 election with President Yudhoyono (SBY) and his Partai Demokrat, and there is now a growing number of parties that were established purely based on the power and influence of their leaders. Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia Movement, or Gerindra) was founded in 2008 by former general Prabowo, ex-president Suharto’s son-in-law. Although it only obtained a low percentage of votes in 2009, it very strategically used mass media to promote itself15 and the party’s publicity attracted voters’ attention. Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (People’s Conscience Party, or Hanura Party) projects a similar image, as it is headed by a former army general, Wiranto, who like Prabowo was allegedly involved in various human rights abuses and was Prabowo’s arch-rival during the end of the New Order. The party managed to gather 3.77 per cent of the votes in 2009 (KPU 2009). Thus, personality and charisma remain main draws for parties. Gerindra and Hanura were established on the basis of their leaders’ charisma which allowed them to run in presidential elections.16 Parties have not been able to escape their heavy reliance on leadership, further damaging their chances of institutionalisation. However, this trend can also be interpreted as confirmation of the openness of Indonesian democracy – any individual with leadership ability and charisma can

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establish a political party, something which was banned during Suharto’s reign. A democracy should rely on the electorate to decide whether to place dubious individuals in power and the decisions of the majority of Indonesians not to vote for these parties greatly boosted confidence in the progress of democracy in Indonesia. Another important trend is that parties have continued to rely on the recruitment of celebrities and public figures as leaders rather than breeding candidates internally. Although only a handful of these celebrities collected enough votes to be elected in 2009 ,17 the drive to recruit ‘instant cadres’ has demonstrated the reluctance and failure of most parties to be consistent in recruitment and cadre training. In this sense, member management has been greatly ignored by the parties. The 2009 election results in general reflected the tough competition that the parties are facing. At the national, kabupaten and kotamadya levels, three of the four parties examined here suffered declines in votes from the 2004 election. Only PKS managed to increase its votes nationally, and only marginally – from 7.34 per cent to 7.88 per cent – yet it still lost votes at the other levels. The largest decline was suffered by PDIP in kabupaten Malang, where its percentage of votes declined by 12 points from 2004; the smallest decline was recorded by PKS at the kabupaten and kodya levels, with drops of 0.19 and 0.26 percentage points, respectively. By comparison, Partai Golkar lost 7.13 percentage points nationally, 5.74 percentage points in the kodya and 9.18 percentage points in the kabupaten. PAN lost 0.43 percentage points nationally, 3.12 at the kodya level and 1.33 in the kabupaten. As we have seen, Partai Golkar and PKS were more organised in Malang than PDIP and PAN. Yet, Partai Golkar fared worst among the parties in the 2009 elections relative to 2004. Rather than looking at straight changes in their percentages of votes, let us now examine the changes as a proportion of the votes they received in 2004. In 2009 Partai Golkar lost 33 per cent of its 2004 vote total at the national level and an astonishing 55 per cent and 45 per cent at the kabupaten and kodya levels, respectively, making its average loss about 44 per cent. In contrast, PKS recorded a gain of 7.4 per cent at the national level and losses of 6 and 3.4 per cent at the kabupaten and kodya levels, thus averaging a loss of a mere 0.7 per cent. The PDIP lost an astounding 56 per cent of its votes at the kabupaten level; with 24 and 32 per cent decreases at the national and kodya levels, its average loss was 37 per cent. PAN’s average loss of 32.6 per cent came from losses of 52 per cent in the kabupaten, 39 per cent in the kodya and 6.7 per cent at the national level. Thus, PKS lost the least votes, Partai Golkar the most, with PDIP and PAN in between. The abysmal performances of PDIP and PAN in 2009, particularly in kodya and kabupaten Malang, can be attributed to a substantial degree

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to their chaotic branch organisation. This time around, PAN’s reliance on charisma in national leadership could not make up for its poor branch organisation. PAN, which clearly struggled to maintain its very existence in Malang, will struggle even more in the future if it does not improve its branches. The disparity in the electoral performances of the better-organised parties, PKS and Partai Golkar, was caused by more complicated factors. PKS’s prioritisation of branch organisation yielded stable election results for both the kodya and kabupaten. The party’s frequent activities, most notably its flyer distribution and pengajian, proved effective as marketing and campaign efforts. The case of Partai Golkar, however, is much less straightforward. Although at the local level Golkar’s branches kept active, it was suffering from problems of national leadership. Former party chairperson Akbar Tandjung recalled in his book The Golkar Way that these problems grew more serious after his leadership period ended in 2004. One party leader even became the presidential candidate of another party.18 The party’s leadership problems seemed to have worsened the party’s deteriorating image amidst the rise of PD. Voters increasingly viewed PD as the party with the best programmes, the party that cared the most about the people, and the one with the best image.19 LSI (Lembaga Survey Indonesia/Indonesian Survey Foundation), citing its 2008 survey, even warned Partai Golkar and PDIP of the ‘threat’ that PD posed to the two parties and said that unless they worked hard to convince voters in the remaining time before the 2009 election that they deserved people’s support, their leadership would end.20 That proved to be accurate. Still, for Partai Golkar, party unity, which was highlighted by Blondel (1978) as key to party organisation, proved invaluable. Public perceptions of the ruling PD government were highly positive21 and Partai Golkar attracted the most swing votes among the parties. Golkar attracted an average of 5 per cent of swing votes during 2005-2008.22 Partai Golkar’s votes in the 2009 elections demonstrated the importance of unity to party organisation, in particular for maintaining party strength amidst the establishment of new parties. Yudhoyono’s Partai Demokrat managed to triple the votes it received in the 2004 election in 2009.23 A series of national surveys conducted to investigate voting tendencies revealed that the rising popularity of PD and President Yudhoyono came at the expense of other parties. Voter support for PD and Yudhoyono had been rising since November 2008, with about 19 per cent of respondents preferring the PD over any other party; such support peaked in February 2009, with the figure reaching 24 per cent.24 According to the same data, PDIP would have received 17 per cent of votes and Golkar 16 per cent at that time.25 The parties must have known of these survey results well before entering the 2009 election period, but they were unable to anticipate voter trends very well.

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Yet Indonesian political parties in general have made serious progress and shown increasing maturity. The party system is open to changes and challenges from newcomers, and competition is free and largely fair. Voters can be selective and the need to attract swing votes requires that parties constantly improve. However, Partai Golkar, PKS, PDIP and PAN have yet to demonstrate strong commitment and capacity to progressing further. Whilst the incumbents Partai Golkar and PDIP remain serious contenders in elections, particularly given their long existences and influences on national and local politics, the developing parties PAN and PKS continue to search for the right formulas to attract votes (with PKS arguably doing better at this). At the same time, parties based on leaders’ charisma like PD, Gerindra and Hanura have shown the ability to attract voter interest through the right figurehead. When all is said and done, it is going to take a few more elections to be able to fully assess the extent of the parties’ organisational capacities, and the kind of party that will survive and succeed in the years ahead. While it would be overly simplistic and naïve to argue that organisational capacity will be the determining factor for electoral success in Indonesia in the near future, a commitment to improving their local presences would benefit the four parties. Failing local branches have contributed to failure to attract more votes. Electoral performances will no doubt still be determined to a substantial degree by the extent of party resources and irregular practices such as money politics. However, parties with less access to the resources required for patronage can improve their electoral chances by improving their organisational capacities and commitment at the local branch level. Table 1

Election results in Kodya and Kabupaten Malang, in comparison with East Java and National results: Partai Golkar, PDIP, PKS and PAN Contestant Year

Kodya Malang

Kabupaten Malang

National

1999 2004 2009 1999 2004 2009 1999 2004 2009

Partai Golkar

PDIP

PKS

PAN

16.30% 12.78% 7.04% 18.32% 16.75% 7.57% 22.44% 21.58% 14.45%

41.64% 27.78% 18.89% 38.47% 28.63% 12.60% 33.74% 18.53% 14.03%

0.76% 7.67% 7.41% 0.40% 3.13% 2.94% 1.36% 7.34% 7.88%

10.94% 7.99% 4.87% 2.90% 2.56% 1.23% 7.12% 6.44% 6.01%

Source: Pemilu 1999 dalam Angka (Komisi Pemilihan Umum), Suryadinata et al. (2002), Suryadinata et al. (2005), Komisi Pemilihan Umum Malang (2009)

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Improving local party organisation may become even more consequential as local politics become more prominent. The pilkada/local elections not only highlight the independence of local party branches from their central offices, they also bring a new set of challenges. In the new decentralised system, parties have to perform better in national elections to attract popular candidates for local elections.26 They have to do more than simply compete – they also have to create alliances and co-operate with other parties, often with different ideologies, to improve their chances of winning local elections.27 This competitive environment gives greater importance to local branches. Better-organised branches have more capacity to manage local competition due to their greater opportunities to connect with the public. Therefore, party organisation will gain much more importance as changes to the political process are felt across Indonesia. Parties will only be successful amid healthy competition if they become more organised. Freedom and fairness are likely to be features of Indonesia’s future elections. With local politics gaining more importance, parties have greater chances to not only participate in but also contribute to the democratic transition. But local elections will require parties to have solid local organisation in order to compete with other parties effectively. Although the levels of institutionalisation seen in Western parties may not be reached by Indonesian parties in the short term, they will be forced to institutionalise faster in order to compete in the new political environment. Current developments in Indonesia’s democracy are a mix between old ways of operating and efforts to establish modern, efficient organisations. Parties still benefit from traditional patterns, such as patronclient relationships, to garner support. However, there are clear signs of a shift towards new forms of operation, particularly in the greater use of technology, but also in the creativity suggested by branch initiatives and local activities. In their decision-making, parties now use both voting and the Sukarno-initiated musyawarah untuk mufakat, or deliberation to reach a consensus. In terms of political party structure, Indonesian democracy remains unique.

Where to Go From Here? Despite the progress Indonesian parties have shown and the requirements of the political system for even more, there have been more reasons for pessimism than optimism about the parties’ capacity to contribute to democracy. In addition to the challenges of premanism, money politics and legal disputes (Choi 2003; Makki 2005; Mahkamah Agung Indonesia 2006), parties face significant problems achieving

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higher levels of institutionalisation. Although some parties have made significant progress at the local level, they have yet to achieve a number of essential requirements of institutionalisation. Chief among these is ‘ideological or programmatic linkages between voters and parties’ (Mainwaring & Torcal 2007: 210). Parties such as PDIP and PAN have been unable to create such linkages. Moreover, credible claims have been made that Indonesian parties face an ideological crisis and that party choices are based on irrational factors such as ‘culture, religion, and personalism’ rather than policy (Centre for Strategic and International Studies 2005; see also Liddle & Mujani 2006; Choi 2007). Though democratic processes are evident in local decisionmaking and, to some extent, career promotion, personalism – endemic since the Old Order era – remains highly influential. It has been manifest in the processes through which candidates for local elections are chosen by local branches. Studies indicate that branches choose their local election candidates mainly on the basis of their affluence and popularity rather than on criteria such as party affiliation or rank in the party’s internal career system (Mietzner 2007: 251-252; Mietzner 2008: 243). Hence, the abundance of well-known and wealthy candidates with no clear party affiliation.28 Parties face a particularly difficult challenge competing in elections at both the national and local levels. As this study has shown, the central offices of Indonesia’s parties are often virtually independent from their local branches, with the branches receiving minimal support and guidance for local operations. In terms of local elections, this lack of connection has manifested itself in internal conflicts, such as with the PDIP, where the party’s central office dismissed local branch personnel for nominating candidates different from those approved by the central leadership (Choi 2007: 341). Central policies are often ignored at the local level. Yet, despite these challenges, Indonesian parties have the opportunity to add a new and more dynamic local dimension to Indonesian politics as the patterns of local politics become more established and local branches more experienced. Local politics are, of course, not completely divorced from developments at the national level, since national results determine whether parties can compete in local elections.29 However, the dramatic political changes that have thrust parties further into local politics will force party strategists to show greater care in managing their local operations. The ways parties’ local branches juggle the demands of national and local elections and manage these different arenas, particularly in light of the 2009 results, will reveal more about their organisations and strategies. Better-organised parties might not necessarily establish successful track records in both general and local elections, but they are likely to have clear strategies in anticipating and

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tackling election failures by reorganising themselves or creating alliances with other parties. Although major parties have a much better chance of success in local elections, smaller parties have the potential to challenge existing political patterns by creating alliances. This possibility offers endless scenarios, where parties with differing ideologies work together locally. Collaboration between parties that hold very different ideological positions could reduce the importance of ideology for attracting support. Local politics represents an important new focus for scholarly attention on Indonesia’s political system, particularly as local elections increasingly become a key arena in which political parties compete, and over local rather than national issues. Poor electoral results at the local level may force parties’ central offices to pay more attention to their branches or to be more aggressive in recruiting more members. Indeed, failure to do so could mean the end of the party, as betterorganised branches may be able to better attract support. Local elections may also persuade parties to establish better member management systems, ones which ensure transparency and fairness in career progress. However, it will be extremely difficult in the near future for parties to restrict local election candidacies to those who have climbed the internal party career ladder, as parties still reap substantial benefits from candidates’ financial contributions, and thus there remains a bias toward selecting wealthy candidates. Overall, parties’ willingness to undertake changes that promote further institutionalisation will depend on their perceptions of the importance of organisational capacity for electoral success, both nationally and locally. Future research might focus profitably on how election results influence party strategies on local organisation, recruitment and member management.

Glossary

AD AMPI

ART BADIKLAT

BAKIN

baksos BPK BTI

Dephankam DIRJENSOSPOL

DPC DPD DPR G30S/PKI

Gerwani GPII

HWK ICMI

IMF IPKI

ISDV

Anggaran Dasar (Organisation Statutes) Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia (Indonesia’s Young Generation of Renewal) Anggaran Rumah Tangga (Bylaws) Badan Pendidikan dan Pelatihan Partai (Council of Party Training and Education) Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence Coordinating Agency) bakti sosial (social work) Badan Pekerja Kongres (Congress Working Committee) Barisan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Farmers Front) Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan (Department of Defence and Security) Direktorat Jenderal Masalah Sosial dan Politik (Directorate General of Social and Political Affairs) Dewan Pimpinan Cabang (Branch Leadership Council) Dewan Pimpinan Daerah (Regional Leadership Council) Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People’s Representative Council) Gerakan 30 September/Partai Komunis Indonesia (The 30th September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party) Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Indonesian Women’s Movement) Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement) Himpunan Wanita Karya (Women’s Functional Group) Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim (the Indonesia/Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association) International Monetary Fund Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence) Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereniging (Indies Social Democratic Association)

212 Jaring Asmara Kami KBM KINO

KOPKAMTIB

LEKRA

LPK

Mabita Masyumi NU OPSUS PAN

Parindra Parkindo PARMI

Parmusi Partai Golkar Partai Hanura Partai MKGR

Partai Murba Partindo PBB PD PDI

PDIP

Perti PETANI

PIR

THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Jaring Aspirasi Masyarakat (Netting the Community’s Aspirations) Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Awakening Party) Kesatuan Buruh Marhaenis (Marhaenist Labourer Union) (Kelompok Induk Organisasi/Mother Group of Organisations) Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat’s (League of People’s Culture) Lembaga Pengelola Kader (Cadre Development Council) Masa Bimbingan Calon Anggota (Potential Member’s Socialisation Period) Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims Association) Nahdatul Ulama (Islamic Scholars Association) Operasi Khusus (Special Operation Agency) Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party) Partai Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesian Party) Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party) Partai Aliansi Rakyat Miskin Indonesia (Indonesian Poor People’s Alliance Party) Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslims Party) Partai Golongan Karya (Functional Groups Party) Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (People’s Conscience Party) Partai Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong (Mutual Assistance and Family-Oriented Deliberation Party) Partai Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak (Common People’s Deliberation Party) Partai Indonesia (Indonesian Party) Partai Bulan Bintang (Star Crescent Party) Partai Demokrat (Democrat Party) Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party) Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle) Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Islamic Educational Movement) Persatuan Tani Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Farmers Union) Persatuan Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesian Union)

GLOSSARY

213

Partai Keadilan (Justice Party) Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party) PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) PKP Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (Justice and Unity Party) PKS Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party) PMI Partai Masyumi Baru (New Masyumi Party) PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party) PNI-Front Marhaenis Partai Nasional Indonesia-Front Marhaenis (Indonesian National Party-Marhaenist Front) PNI-Massa Marhaen Partai Nasional Indonesia-Massa Marhaen (Indonesian National Party-Marhaenist Masses) PNI-Supeni Partai Nasional Indonesia-Supeni (Indonesian National Party-Supeni) PP Partai Perempuan (Women’s Party) PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party) PSI Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party) PSII Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Islamic Association Party of Indonesia) PUI Partai Ummat Islam (Islamic Community Party) RT Rukun Tetangga (Neighbourhood Association) RW Rukun Warga (Community Association) Satkar Ulama Satuan Karya Ulama (Ulama Functional Union) Sekber Golkar Sekretariat Bersama Organisasi-organisasi Golongan Karya Front Nasional (Joint Secretariat of Golkar Organisations within the National Front) SI Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association) SOBSI Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (All Indonesian Central Labour Organisation) SOKSI Serikat Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia (Union of Indonesian Socialist Karyawan Organisations) UNRA Universitas Rakyat (People’s University) Yayasan Dakab Yayasan Dana Karya Abadi (Perpetual Work Fund Foundation) PK

PKB

Notes

Chapter 1 1 2 3

4 5

See table 1 for election results for the four parties nationally, in East Java, and in kodya and kabupaten Malang, on p. 206. PKS contested the 1999 election as Partai Keadilan (PK, Justice Party). The kecamatan in the kodya have typically urban population, while those in the kabupaten are usually mostly rural. The people in Malang engage in a wide-range of occupations, from businessmen to fishermen. All PKS’ members are called cadres and thus the interviews were conducted with cadres and leaders for this party. In any case, it is impossible to ensure that interviewees would be entirely open and truthful. This is particularly the case for questions about party finances. It was beyond the scope of this study to conduct large-scale independent studies of issues like this.

Chapter 2 1

2

The phrase was used by Sukarno in speeches at least twice: once on 28 October 1956 at a meeting of youth delegates from all parties and once on 30 October 1956 at a teachers’ union congress. For excerpts from these speeches, see Feith & Castles (1970: 81-83). The Front was a council which consisted of party and functional group representatives (Reeve 1985: 47, 94, 124-127, 129, 243).

Chapter 3 1

2

3 4

The alleged coup was called Gerakan 30 September /Partai Komunis Indonesia (G30S/PKI, The 30 September Movement by Indonesian Communist Party). For a full discussion of the coup, see for example Anderson & McVey (1971) and Crouch (1987: 97-157). For the rest of this chapter, the term ‘political parties’ refers only to the PPP and PDI. During the New Order, the government claimed that Golkar was not a party despite its function as an electoral vehicle for the regime. The PKI was banned in 1966 after its alleged coup in 1965, leaving only nine parties. Initially the PPP declared Islam as its ideology, although Pancasila and the 1945 national constitution were established as the bases of the party (Anggaran Dasar Partai

216

5

6

7

8 9

10

11

12 13 14

15 16

THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Persatuan Pembangunan 1973: 1). However, the government forced the parties to adopt Pancasila as the sole ideology through an MPR decision (II/MPR/1983) and the National Law No. 8, 1985 (Hakim 1993: 69). For example Law No. 3/1975, No. 3/1985, No. 8/1985, and Government Regulation No. 20/1976. See Undang-undang Tentang Partai Politik, Golongan Karya, Ormas dan Keanggotaan Pegawai Negeri Sipil dalam Parpol atau Golkar (1991). Although the PPP and PDI constitutions claimed to have grass-roots branches at the sub-district and village levels (Anggaran Dasar Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 1984: chapter 7; Anggaran Dasar Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 1973: chapter 6), under Law No. 3/1975, the parties and Golkar could only have a commissioner with a few assistants at the sub-district level (Babari 1987: 606). The fact that there was no mention of lower level administration supports the argument that, despite its official approval in 1975 (Babari 1987: 606), the concept of the floating mass was actually enforced before the 1971 election (Reeve 1985: 291). Golkar’s constitution also decreed that structurally it consisted of a Central Level Organisation (Organisasi Tingkat Pusat, administered by Dewan Pimpinan Pusat/ Central Leadership Council), a Provincial Level Organisation (Organisasi Daerah Tingkat I, administered by Dewan Pimpinan Daerah Tingkat I/Provincial Leadership Council), and a District Level Organisation (Organisasi Daerah Tingkat II, administered by Dewan Pimpinan Daerah Tingkat II/District Level Leadership Council) (Anggaran Rumah Tangga Golongan Karya 1973: chapters 8-9). KORPRI is Korps Karyawan Pegawai Republik Indonesia (Karyawan Corps of Civil Servants of Indonesia), and a karyawan is an individual member of a functional group (Reeve 1985). Examples of this can be seen in Surabaya and Malang, East Java. Yayasan Supersemar was allegedly the channel through which millions of USD of state money, meant for scholarships, instead found their way into the private account of former president Suharto. The lawsuit against the president first lodged by the state in 2000, and then relodged in 2007, amounted to USD 1.54 billion (The Associated Press 2007). KORPRI is Korps Karyawan Pegawai Republik Indonesia (Corps of Civil Servants of Indonesia). The concept of karyawan – heavily based on the family principle (kekeluargaan) and the functional group – was established by ABRI personnel to refer to ‘member of a functional group’. For an extended discussion of these concepts, see Reeve (1985: 191-192). Army General Hartono said in 1996 that every ABRI member was a Golkar cadre. Former Information Minister Harmoko once said that Golkar and ABRI were ‘two but one’. See Gaffar (1996) and Eklof (1997: 1190). Successive election laws did not specify the number of mass rallies, only the length of campaign period. Even before that, in 1973 Golkar reported that it trained 560 cadres in ten provinces (Reeve 1985: 326). It must be noted that these claims were received with much skepticism over whether the numbers were exaggerated and criticisms were made of the quality of new recruits (Reeve 1990: 154-155). As Suryadinata noted ‘if the PPP became less Islamic because of the government law, Golkar gradually became more Islamic’ (Suryadinata 1997: 194). Ordinary members (anggota biasa) can become cadre members (anggota kader) once they can prove their loyalty and obedience to the party, as well as capacity to initiate activities within the party. The promotion was suggested by the respective branch and approved by the central office (Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 1973: chapter 5; Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 1989: chapters 6-8).

NOTES

217

17 The PDIP then distinguished itself by introducing a white nose. 18 It is important to note that even in the drastically different new system, the government still does not allow regional parties, communist and socialist parties (Undang Undang RI No. 2 tahun 1999: chapters 3, 16). 19 The secret dealings between the parties that resulted in Gus Dur’s election were called ‘dagang sapi’ (cow trading), because of their likeness to market-trading processes (Tan 2002: 489), signifying the indecency of the process. It must also be noted here that Megawati had significant support from the military, as a result of the combination of her own decision not to directly oppose ABRI and internal conflict within ABRI itself, which resulted in a non-oppositional stance from the military (Aspinall 2005: 158, 161, 164, 194-195, 265, 272). 20 In the indirect system imposed by the 1945 constitution, the president and vice-president were elected by the people’s consultative assembly (Liddle 2000: 35). This contrasts with the direct system, implemented in 2004, in which the people cast their votes directly for the presidential candidates. The direct system minimises the chance of deal-making between parties that could disadvantage the genuine victor in an election, as in the 1999 election when Gus Dur lobbied the major parties for the presidency despite his initial promise to back Megawati, whose PDIP gained the most votes. The direct system that was subsequently adopted opened the opportunity for candidates from any party that gained more than 5 per cent of the votes to compete, enabling Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, whose Partai Demokrat only gained 7 per cent of the votes, to contest and eventually win the presidency. For a full discussion of the presidential elections in 1999 and 2004 see Liddle (2000, 2005).

Chapter 4 1

2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9

Maurice Duverger’s 1964 classic ‘Political Parties’ was the most famous initial attempt to categorise parties into mass and cadre parties – with mass parties concentrating more on quantity and cadre on quality of members. Duverger’s simple typology became the starting point for subsequent efforts to develop more sophisticated typologies, for instance ones by Panebianco (1988), Olson (Hofferbert 1998), Wolinetz (Hofferbert 2002), and Gunther & Diamond (2003) . Blondel recognises possible conflicts that can arise from the various prerequisites (1978: 142-143). Although the staff happened to be party supporters, they were paid to be in the office during office hours. The office administrator explained that there were requests from students doing various research projects for past election results, which the party was happy to provide (Interview with Partai Golkar Kabupaten’s office administrator, Mbak Yuni, 21 January 2006). This was the case even after he spoke to central office representatives who assured him that official permission was in process. Indonesian legislative bodies consist of different fraksi or fractions. Different parties, or coalitions of parties, make up different fraksi. The record book of Partai Golkar’s kodya was complete with descriptions, photos and receipts related to various activities. The easiest way to contact party leaders and cadres was through their mobile phones and they readily gave out their personal numbers. Many of kabupaten’s members and cadres were farmers and fishermen, who were difficult to contact unless they had mobile phones (Interview with kabupaten secretary Pak Andi, 2 February 2006).

218

THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

10 The office administrator lived at the back of the building. 11 The main office door was padlocked and visitors had to go around the building to find the office administrators who lived there with their families. 12 Some local leaders curiously asked about the official permission, referring to the national leaders’ signatures as ‘sakti’ – which literally means invincible and powerful. 13 The kabupaten administrator quickly handwrote the contact details of kecamatan leaders upon the first visit to the office. Kabupaten staff were more responsive in regularly updating party activities. However, generally both offices only gave information about meetings or other events after being contacted weekly by telephone. 14 PDIP Kabupaten Malang’s chairperson was Malang’s bupati, and the kodya’s secretary heads a fraksi (fraction) at the local assembly. 15 Kabupaten administrator, Mbak Sum, explained that the chairperson visited the office ‘a few times a week (Interview with kabupaten office bearer, Mbak Sum, 12 October 2005). The kodya chairperson only visited the office when meetings were held (Interview with kodya’s office-bearers, 27 September 2005). 16 At the end of the fieldwork period, office cleaning had not yet finished. 17 The branch moved to new offices every year, which made it hard to keep the files in one place (Interviews with party cadres, 7 February 2006). 18 The staff change for the kodya office meant that responsibility for handling requests was also transferred to the new office secretary. When asked about the request, the new secretary claimed that the request was lost and a new one must be lodged. 19 Even those members who do pay their dues make only a small contribution to the budget, since dues were set around Rp. 5000 (Interview with kabupaten leader Pak Widodo and party cadres, 7 December 2005 and 7 February 2006). 20 Ruko or rumah toko is typically a two- or three-storey building in which the lower floor is used as a shop or restaurant, with the occupants living in the upper floor(s). 21 The request for research permission for this study was directed to the cadre in charge of recruitment and cadre matters, Pak Amir, who quickly responded by setting up a meeting for the next day. Although the research request was submitted to Pak Amir, permission was written up by the office secretary and it was ready in a few days. 22 Pak Sophya believes that this is one of the reasons why PKS has been successful (Interview, 7 October 2005). 23 It usually took the office less than a day to issue official letters. 24 The kabupaten chairperson usually came to the office in the afternoon after his teaching commitments were finished. As noted earlier, the kodya chairperson rarely came to the office, but he was always reachable by mobile phone and ready to respond. 25 Kecamatan cadres’ mobile phones were listed as contact details on various leaflets for prospective members. 26 They wore safari suits, known in Indonesia as official uniforms for civil servants. Staff of other parties wore casual wear. 27 PKS’ official website is: www.pk-sejahtera.org, Partai Golkar’s is: www.golkar.or.id and PDIP’s is: www.pdi-perjuangan.or.id, while PAN does not have an official website. 28 The frequency and scale of Partai Golkar’s activities also proves that it has, to use Webb’s (1995) argument, ‘available resources’ to be utilised for party purposes. 29 Janda, who did a cross-national study on parties, argued that funding matters are the most difficult party issues to examine (Janda 1980). Tomsa confirmed this case in Indonesia’s context with his study on Partai Golkar (2006). 30 Area coverage of the kabupaten offices makes it difficult to collect dues, and the party would have to think about transportation expense and possibly labour expense as well. 31 For the other three parties, Partai Golkar, PDIP and PAN, membership dues are only made obligatory in parties’ AD/ART. Their application at the local level is not effective.

NOTES

219

Chapter 5 1

2 3 4

5

6

7

8 9

10

11 12

13

14

15

Partai Golkar’s, PDIP’s and PAN’s ideology is Pancasila, while PKS’ is Islam (Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas 2004: 395, 367, 305, 232). Pancasila is Indonesia’s national ideology which consists of five (panca) articles (sila). These (and their symbols) are: belief in one god (a star), humanitarianism (banyan tree), national unity, consensual democracy (a bull’s head) and social justice (paddy and cotton). However, the parties have different priorities and orientations that are associated with their ideologies as well, which are also discussed in Chapters Six and Seven. Jaring literally means a fish net, but in this context it refers to the process of capturing something. The acronym Asmara literally means romance. These objectives were stated by Partai Golkar’s representative at the kodya assembly where he held a formal discussion with party cadres on 9 September 2005. At times the party is represented by a legislative member from Partai Golkar to enhance the image that the party does not only aim to secure votes during elections, but it also cares for the community after elections. Data from the reses held in 9 September 2005. Reses derives from the word ‘recess’. In Indonesia the word is used to describe occasions when representatives in government assemblies take breaks in between their official duties to hold discussions with members of the party they represent. Decisions are made based on the most useful facilities to provide or by identifying the most needy sections of the community. These considerations were demonstrated at an internal party dialogue with party cadres, when the cadres had various requests to be considered by party leaders, held on 9 September 2005. Partai Golkar’s kodya leader indicated that this kind of political communication is the party’s priority rather than recruitment (Interview with kodya chairperson, Pak Aries, 9 September 2005). For a full discussion of this matter, see ‘Multiple Sclerosis di Tubuh Golkar’ (Kompas, 13 Desember 2004). Meetings held in the kodya office range from regular meetings between and within kecamatan committees in the kodya area, to ad hoc or urgent meetings on emergency matters – such as coordination meetings to help tsunami victims in early 2005. The office administrator maintains a small blackboard with details of various meetings for that particular week. For example, the women and youth division and the division of religion meet regularly at the office. One example of an irregular meeting was the meeting to discuss efforts to help tsunami victims in Sumatra. This statement was made in the opening of one reses, held on 9 September 2005, by Partai Golkar’s kodya chairperson, Pak Arief. For example, in the 9 September 2005 reses, cadres brought forward the need for school buildings in their area, while others complained that the government’s promise to convert a local hill into a green reserve park had not been implemented. According to Mbak Yuni, one of two office administrators in the party’s kabupaten office, it is even difficult to distribute invitations to the different kecamatan since some of them are a two-hour drive or more from central Malang (Interview, 21 January 2006). For example, some cadres are farmers who are usually busy during the daytime, while others are fishers, who work during the night (Interview with kabupaten secretary Pak Andi, 2 February 2006). The kabupaten secretary, Pak Andi, explained that he communicates with his cadres frequently via his mobile phone.

220

THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

16 Office administrators explained that the branch often combines meetings to make it more practical for party cadres, especially those who have to commute long distances to reach the party office. 17 On this particular occasion the employer was from Malang Town Square, a large new mall in Malang. 18 The kodya chairperson, Pak Arief, is well-known in the Malang business community. He has the influence to persuade potential employers to recruit party members. 19 Istighosah is a communal prayer usually held in special circumstances. 20 Pengajian is a term used to describe Islamic Al-Qur’an study groups, Islamic religious lectures, or Islamic religious study circles. 21 Personal communication with Partai Golkar cadre, Pak Anto, 5 December 2007. 22 An office administrator explained that pengajian are held monthly at party office (Interview with Pak Aries, 9 September 2005). 23 The chemical at the heart of these allegations was formalin, normally used to embalm corpses. 24 Typically Indonesian street merchants have low incomes and their families survive from day to day on their earnings. 25 Bakso is a dish of Indonesian meatballs served with tofu and noodles. It is usually sold door-to-door by street vendors. 26 Tahu (tofu or soya-bean curd) is a staple food in Indonesian households. Street vendors usually serve it fried with petis (shrimp paste) and raw green chili. 27 The event was packaged with a stage and dangdut performance (a form of popular Indonesian music). Local public figures were also especially invited. 28 This comment was made by Partai Golkar’s kabupaten secretary, Pak Andi, in the interview on 2 February 2006. 29 Regular sporting events include soccer and brisk-walking competitions. 30 The party holds istigotza or communal prayer. Golkar Kodya Malang held events such as tumpengan (a tumpeng is a cone-shaped yellow rice eaten with meat, fried egg and other dishes) which is a Javanese thanks-giving tradition. 31 There was an all-night Javanese puppet (wayang kulit) exhibition, as well as stage performances. 32 The party also holds a mass ruwatan free for the public. Ruwatan is a traditional Javanese ceremony believed to eliminate bad karma and invite good fortune. 33 The office is normally padlocked except when the branch holds activities. 34 The office is located in the middle of the most populated kecamatan (which are also nearest to Malang city) and the chairperson also frequents the office 3-4 times in a week. 35 According to the office keeper, cadres visit the office daily to meet colleagues from different kecamatan and at every party visit there are always 4-5 cadres at the office. 36 Interview with Pak Bambang Siswanto, 11 October 2005. 37 Arisan is a rotating credit scheme with a monthly lucky draw, where participants pay the same amount of money and roll a dice to choose who among them gets the total amount of money collected. The winner has to repay the amount in the following months but cannot roll the dice again until everyone else has won. 38 Pak Bambang explained that this is what they hope to achieve eventually with the arisan rounds. 39 This is an annual Islamic ritual, celebrated as a national holiday in Indonesia, where wealthier members of the community donate slaughtered cows and goats to the needy. It is one of Islam’s five duties that are obligatory for those who can afford it. 40 As previously explained, for some of furthest kecamatan from the city of Malang, travelling time to PDIP’s kabupaten office could take over two hours.

NOTES

221

41 During one interview with a party cadre, he explained that he usually teams up with other cadres in his area to provide transportation for others to go to party events. He would provide the car, while the others chip in for petrol and food expenses. 42 Office keeper Mbak Sum explained that the objective is to serve different kecamatan every year. She explained that doing more than one kecamatan would be too expensive for the party’s budget. In this case it was kecamatan Pakisaji (Interview with office keeper, Mbak Sum, 12 October 2005). 43 The party secretary organises meetings at the kodya level. On several different occasions, the dates and times for regular meetings reported by the secretary were different to those reported by office keepers. 44 Interview with kodya office-keepers, 27 September 2005. 45 When asked about other activities held by the party, the office-keepers replied that there were no others. 46 It was held on the 28 October, 2005. 47 Except when there are meetings or activities in the office, the office is padlocked and visitors have to go through the back door to look for the office-keepers. 48 Sembako is an abbreviation of sembilan bahan pokok (nine staple ingredients), consisting, amongst others, of rice, oil, salt, sugar and salted fish. 49 When asked about other events to commemorate the party’s anniversary, the officekeepers said that no others were held. 50 During most of the fieldwork period the staff occupied the fraksi office at the kodya branch’s assembly office. They only moved to the new office at the end of January 2006. The meeting to appoint new party officers took place at one of the party cadres’ houses. 51 Offices are leased on a yearly basis, so unless the lease is renewed, branches are forced to seek a new office annually. 52 Interview with PAN kodya’s cadres, 7 February 2006. 53 They explained that as soon as they finished daily tasks they went straight to the office to meet up. Most of the cadres do not have 9-5 jobs, so they have considerable flexibility in their schedule. They have naps in the office and really make it their home (Personal observation during visits to PAN’s kodya office, 4-9 February 2006). 54 PAN’s kabupaten chairperson, Pak Widodo, explained that he had to personally drive to the 33 different kecamatan to deliver the invitations. 55 Like PAN’s kodya branch, the party elected a new chairperson and other office-bearers during the fieldwork period. The current chairperson, whose house was also the party’s office, was the branch secretary at the beginning of my fieldwork. 56 Some kecamatan in the kabupaten were flooded during November 2005, including kecamatan Sumbermanjing Wetan, which is also one of the furthest from Malang city. Pak Widodo claimed that he gathered some cadres and visited the flood area during November 2005 (Interview with Pak Widodo, 7 December 2005). 57 Interview with PKS kodya branch Cadre Section chairperson, Pak Amir, 30 September 2005. 58 This was held in September 2005, in Malang’s main bus terminal, Arjosari. 59 Some of the different sections in the party are: seksi ekonomi (economic section), seksi kewanitaan (women’s section), and seksi kader (cadre section). 60 Personal observation during open house held at Malang’s public library, September 2005. 61 During one particular open house a preacher spoke on how to manage money according to Islamic law and there was an Islamic book discussion. 62 Pak Amir explained that up to 100 new members signed up during one open house (Interview with PKS Kodya Malang’s Cadre Section chairperson, Pak Amir, 30 September 2005).

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63 Interview with kabupaten chairperson Pak Sophya, 7 October 2005. 64 Interview with Pak Sophya, 7 October 2005. 65 Pramuka stands for Praja Muda Karana (from Sanskrit), the Indonesian term for scouts. 66 This event was held on 2 October 2005. 67 Becaks are three-wheeled pedicab taxis used for short-distance destinations in Indonesian cities. 68 Interview with PKS Kodya Malang’s Cadre Section chairperson Pak Amir, 5 February 2006. 69 This event was held at city square (alun-alun Malang) (Interview with PKS kodya branch Cadre Section chairperson Pak Amir, 30 September 2005). 70 PKS has declared its support for the application of the Rancangan Undang-Undang Anti Pornografi dan Pornoaksi (proposal for new anti-pornography laws) (Interview with PKS kodya branch Cadre Section chairperson, Pak Amir, 30 September 2005). 71 Pak Sophya explained that the kodya election was attended by the representatives of the kecamatan who had previously gathered to elect the provincial leader (Interview with kabupaten chairperson Pak Sophya, 5 February 2006). 72 The event, called Silaturahmi Tokoh dan Buka Bersama, was held on 16 October 2005. 73 The answer to such questions suggested that the cadres maintain a good image and close relationship with the people. 74 Islamic law does not allow banks or individuals to make profit that does not adhere to the principles set out in the Qur’an. 75 Pak Sophya showed me a newspaper article covering PKS cadres handing out food (Interview with kabupaten chairperson Pak Sophya, 30 September 2005). PKS was also ‘the best organised political organisations in providing relief’ in Aceh after the 2004 tsunami (Aspinall 2005: 28). PKS has also been active in establishing a Jakarta-based labour NGO known as the Indonesian Labour Foundation (Personal communication with Michele Ford, 26 July 2007). 76 In issue 19, volume VII, the magazine started with an editorial on Schappelle Corby, an Australian woman arrested and jailed for bringing cannabis into Bali. The case created a controversy because the Australian media portrayed her as innocent. 77 Party leaders claim that the central and provincial offices allow them to make their own choice of activities. Although they do consult the higher offices, usually the activities are approved. (Interviews with leaders of PKS, PAN, PDIP and Partai Golkar, September 2005 to January 2006). 78 Bupati is the administrative head of a kabupaten. 79 A kelurahan is a smaller administration unit, below the kecamatan level. 80 Usually the party has to ask local authorities for permission to hold baksos. Typically such permission is easy to get as the benefit goes to the community itself. 81 Religious acts have a more altruistic image compared with, for example, sembako distribution, which could be interpreted as a vote-buying effort. 82 Parties usually increase their visibility during such events by providing banners and placards featuring their name and/or logo. Also, a mobile event tends to draw more spectators than a static one. 83 PKS’ leaflets usually include a short explanation of party orientation and objectives. See Appendices A and B for samples of PKS leaflets. 84 Although PAN claims to prioritise recruitment, its local branches have not organised any specific recruitment events. 85 This is the case unless there are extraordinary circumstances, such as when people join the party as a job requirement (such as during New Order), or if they join under the influence of other people (family members or friends).

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Chapter 6 1

This observation is taken from a conference which involved representatives of parties from Cambodia, Japan, Indonesia, Korea, Mongolia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand. 2 Seyd points to an earlier argument which suggests that the decline in party membership has occurred because ‘individual lifestyles have altered’, and the ‘political marketplace is now full of other organizations competing successfully for individual’s time and commitment’, and that ‘party leaders have alternative, and more efficient means of communicating with voters’ (1999: 383). 3 Similar attempts have been made by German and British parties. See Scarrow (1996: 52-86). 4 Golkar received 62.97 per cent of the votes in the 1971 elections, 62.1 per cent in 1977, 63.9 per cent in 1982, 73.1 per cent in 1987, 68.1 per cent in 1992 and a high of 74.5 per cent in 1997 (Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas 2004: 389). 5 The outer islands of Indonesia (outside Java) were responsible for more than 25 per cent of Partai Golkar’s votes in the 1999 and 2004 elections. Interestingly, the Partai Golkar stronghold areas changed between the two elections (especially in the outer islands) from Sulawesi, Sumatra and Irian Jaya in 1999 to Aceh, Bali, West Sumatra, Lampung, Central Java and East Kalimantan in 2004. See Suryadinata (2002: 105) and the KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum/Electoral Commission) website (Komisi Pemilihan Umum 2004). 6 Gus Dur’s party, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB or National Awakening Party) only received 12.6 per cent of the votes in the 1999 election (Suryadinata 2002: 103). 7 Sekber Golkar was initially established to accommodate the various functional groups not represented in parliament. The army saw this also as another opportunity to curb the growth of communism in the country (Institut Studi Arus Informasi 1999: 99; Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas 2004: 389). 8 The groups of seven KINOs were: Kosgoro cooperatives association, SOKSI (Serikat Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia or Union of Socialist Karyawan Organisations), MKGR (Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong), Profesi (profession), Ormas Hankam (consisting of veterans, civilians who were security personnel, army wives), Gakari (Gabungan Karya Rakyat Indonesia or Grouping of the Karya of the Indonesian People), Gerakan Pembangunan (Development Movement). For extensive discussion of the KINOs see Reeve (1985: 294-297). 9 There were two main groups within the organisation, the group of Akbar Tandjung (former Youth and Sport Minister who was a close Suharto ally) and Edi Sudradjat (former army general). Sudradjat lost and created his own party, Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (Unity and Justice Party) (Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas 2004: 391). 10 This is one of its efforts to escape from its past practices of collusion and corruption in cadre and candidate selection (Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas 2004: 400). 11 Aside from the stigma of being the government’s political vehicle, the old Golkar was also accused of being too influenced by the army (ABRI/Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or Indonesian Army) (Institut Studi Arus Informasi 1996). 12 Membership conditions are: the applicant is aged at least 17 or has been married, is able to read and write, is willing to abide by party regulations and take part in party activities, and is willing to be screened by the local party office. For details see Partai Golkar’s AD/ART (Partai Golkar 2005). 13 Personal communication with the kodya and kabupaten offices, 16 September 2008.

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14 Interview with kodya chairperson Pak Aries, 9 September 2005. Unsur literally means element. 15 Interview with kabupaten secretary Pak Andi, 2 February 2006. 16 Interview with kodya chairperson Pak Aries, 9 September 2005. 17 AMPI was particularly active during the reign of Suharto, with an image as the most important youth wing of Golkar. 18 He holds meetings with these groups at least once a month. Also, he always makes time for them whenever they want to see him (Interview with kodya chairperson Pak Aries, 9 September 2005 and personal observation during party visits). 19 Interview with kabupaten secretary Pak Andi, 2 February 2006. 20 This event was held in January 2006. 21 HWK is a women’s organisation, but their husbands, who are usually also Partai Golkar’s cadres, were also involved at the social event. 22 Rukun Warga is a small administration unit in the local community, which usually consists of around 15 neighbouring households. Rukun Tetangga is a larger administration unit. One Rukun Tetangga consists of several (usually around five) RWs. 23 Members from Kecamatan Ngajum claimed that they went to the pamong desa to register as party members (Interview, January 2006). 24 Interviews with Partai Golkar members, January 2006. 25 In its effort to achieve this, the party recruited popular artists in its rallies (Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas 2004: 367). 26 A statement to this effect was made by a PDIP cadre in the party’s fraction at national assembly website (Fraksi PDI Perjuangan 2007). Maruarar Sirait’s article is titled ‘Pemuda PDI Perjuangan sebagai Pelopor dalam Mencapai Cita-cita Proklamasi Kemerdekaan Agustus ’45’ (‘PDI Youth Strugglers as Pioneers in Achieving the 1945 Proclamation of Independence’s Aims’). 27 One of the duties of members is ‘menjaring dan menyaring sekurang-kurangnya satu calon anggota baru’ (attract and screen at least one potential new member). See PDIP’s AD/ART (PDI Perjuangan 2005: 58). 28 The other conditions are quite general, such as the applicant has to be at least 17 years old or is married, must be willing to abide by party rules and willing to take part in party activities. 29 Applicants who wish to be members must write an official letter requesting to become a member of the local party office (at the kecamatan level). The relevant party office has to make sure that the applicant has met all requirements and it has the right to reject applications. For details please see PDIP’s AD/ART (PDI Perjuangan 2005). 30 Interview, 11 October 2005. 31 Pak Bambang said, ‘often when we helped like that, during the elections they will remember, “oh, right, back then PDIP helped fix the bridge”’ (Interview with kabupaten secretary Pak Bambang Siswanto, 11 October 2005). 32 Pak Bambang stopped short of specifying how the party could improve its recruitment tactic (Interview with kabupaten secretary Pak Bambang Siswanto, 11 October 2005). 33 Personal communication with PDIP cadre, 19 September 2008. 34 Interviews with party members, October 2005-January 2006. 35 Pak Bambang specifically pointed to the fact that party activists receive no salary from the party, and that is specific proof of ‘kekuatan ideologi partai’ (the strength of the party’s ideology) (Interview with kabupaten secretary Pak Bambang Siswanto, 11 October 2005). 36 Observers of Indonesian politics have criticised PDIP of not being consistent in prioritising the ‘little people’, as Megawati’s government produced no particular policies addressing this large section of Indonesian community. The party’s claims of

NOTES

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40

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44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58

59

60 61 62 63

225

nationalism also came under fire as under Megawati’s presidency there were sales of national assets. For details, please see CSIS (2005). When asked, PDIP members stated that there were no special requirements for registration (Interviews with members, October 2005-January 2006). Mabita is a party socialisation programme, aimed at improving knowledge of the party and organisation skills of members (Interview with kabupaten chairperson Pak Widodo, 7 December 2005). Muhammadiyah is a socio-religious organisation, established in 1912 in Yogyakarta, which aims to adapt Islam to modern Indonesian life. It claims to have around 40 million members. PAN realises that members’ contributions are vital for the party’s operation. PAN requires its election candidates to pay Rp 3 million for administration costs and make a Rp 5 million contribution to the campaign fund (Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas 2004: 231). The pluralist ideology was one of the motivations for establishing the party: to accommodate the socially and ethnically diverse groups in Indonesia. See Aliansi Bhinneka Tunggal Ika’s website (2007). Interview, 7 December 2005. Monthly dues were no longer imposed due to the prevailing difficult economic conditions in Indonesia. In the case of kodya Malang, dues are no longer required at all (Interview with PAN members, January 2006). Interviews with Pak Widodo and kodya cadres, 18 September 2008. Literally ‘branch’, ranting is party branch at kecamatan (sub-district) level. Interview with PAN cadres, 7 February 2006. DPD is the party’s office at kotamadya/kabupaten level. Interview with kodya branch Cadre Section’s chairperson Pak Amir, 30 September 2005. The flyers and leaflets distributed by PKS have contact details of cadres to contact for each kecamatan. See Appendix B. Personal communication with PKS cadres, 15-17 September 2008. Interview with Pak Sophya, 1 October 2005. Interview with Pak Sophya, 1 October 2005. Because of loyalty of adhering to party ideology in its activities and operation, observers have named PKS as the only Indonesian party with clear ideology (CSIS: 2005). Amanah means trustworthy and responsible according to Islamic norms. Interview with Pak Sophya, 1 October 2005. Interview with party cadres, 16 October 2005. The chairperson of PAN Kabupaten Malang admitted that PKS has swayed PAN’s members towards their party. During New Order, government officials were automatically made members of Golkar. Golkar also enlarged the range of its cadres by enforcing the concept of karyawan, previously only for civil servants but in the 1980s it was extended to workers (buruh). See Reeve (1990: 167-168). It must be noted here that PDIP also has sub-organisations, but their role in local recruitment was not acknowledged in the interviews, suggesting that their functions were different from Partai Golkar’s. The party has a new paradigm and slogan: Bersama Kita Maju (Together We Progress) (www.golkar.or.id). Interview with members, October 2005. Interviews with members, January 2006. Interviews with members, October 2005-January 2006.

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Chapter 7 1

2 3 4

5

6 7

8 9

10 11

12

13 14 15 16

Other motivations such as influence of family and friends, or material benefits, could act as strong motivators in other instances, but they are ‘less socially acceptable’ (Heidar 2006: 305). Other reasons mentioned are: support for the party, specific party policies and party leader (Pedersen et al. 2004: 369). The rise of the Internet also created visiting the party website as another form of member involvement (Heidar, cited in Katz & Crotty 2006: 306-307). Janda defined membership requirements as ‘criteria that the party imposes on an individual who wishes to participate officially in the party’s activities’. Requirements vary among parties, from the mere need of ‘individuals to profess support of the party to attend its local meetings’ to more costly/severe requirements that the individual is admitted initially only as a provisional member for a trial period (communist parties usually apply this policy). Merely signing a membership card is judged to be the least costly requirement. It is more costly to pay dues and still more costly to go through a probationary period before achieving membership. Any party that imposes a probationary period for membership probably requires dues and payment of dues requires registered membership (Janda 1980: 126). ‘Supporters’ are people who agree with party doctrines, but remain outside the organisation, while ‘militants’ are regularly involved in party meetings, campaigns and activities (Duverger 1964: 61, 110). Janda compared Barnes’ classification with other similar ones from Duverger & Milbrath (1980: 127). Steinberg and Myung Shin note that other prerequisites of a democracy have developed better, such as free elections, a free press and a lively civil society (2006: 521522). See for example Burrell (1986) and Cross & Young (2004). Prasad groups activities such as educating the voters, explaining party manifesto, holding mass meetings, making speeches, distributing posters, pamphlets and leaflets as propaganda and campaign work. The second group includes: providing transportation, establishing personal contacts with influential people, visiting villages, wards and houses to mobilise voters (1983: 110). Interview with party member Moh. Soleh, 10 January 2006. Observers have compared Partai Golkar with parties that have a stronger ideological base, such as PDIP and PAN. In the absence of an attractive platform, Partai Golkar cannot compete with other more ideologically-driven parties on ideological grounds. See ‘Multiple Sclerosis di tubuh Golkar’ (Kompas, 13 Desember 2004). Although there are other members who simply responded ‘I don’t know’, other members rightly pointed out that they must ‘maintain the party’s reputation’ and that they can ‘achieve a certain position in the party as well as in government’, statements included in the party’s AD/ART (Interview with members, January-February 2006). The AD/ART specified no sanction for failure to participate in party activities, although it is one of the member’s duties (Partai Golkar 2005). At times they are in charge of transportation, documentation, etc. (Interviews with party members, January-February 2006). Personal observation, January-February 2006. Partai Golkar kodya and kabupaten members are said to be in the thousands (Interview with kodya chairperson Pak Aries, 9 September 2005), but attendance at party events was in the hundreds at the maximum (Personal observation, September 2005-January 2006).

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17 Kodya meetings are usually attended by around 70 participants, mostly cadres representing different kecamatan. The same participants attend other party activities, along with public members and invitees (Personal observation, September-November 2005). 18 Members acknowledged that they need to be involved in party activities to get noticed by party leaders and other members (Interviews with party members, JanuaryFebruary 2006). 19 Interview with party members, January-February 2006. One party leader also had a similar conviction that in order to be chosen as a candidate during elections he must lobby and convince other cadres and members of his rights and qualification to be promoted, so that the others support him (Interview with party leader from kecamatan Ngajum Pak Bambang, 3 February 2006). 20 Interview with kodya chairperson Pak Aries, 9 September 2005. 21 This notion was expressed by Pak Aries himself when he mentioned that the current database on membership was due for an update, whereby the members have to be individually contacted and asked about the continuance of their membership (Interview, 9 September 2005). 22 Interview with kodya chairperson Pak Aries and kabupaten secretary, 9 September 2005 and 2 February 2006. 23 When asked about what party activities that they knew of, they explained that the party holds regular activities like meetings as well as the various events such as cattle distribution (in the kabupaten) and pengajian (in the kodya office), as well as regular party bhakti sosial. 24 Pak Andi explained that his cadres had to travel for hours to get to his house and he did not have the heart to ask them to leave without giving them something. Fortunately for him, his wife was very understanding of this situation (Interview with kodya secretary Pak Andi, 2 February 2006). 25 As a consequence, party meetings always took place during night time, after normal office hours (Interview with kabupaten administrator Mbak Yuni, 21 January 2006). 26 Pak Andi was a lawyer, so he could only be in his Golkar Kabupaten office after his work commitments were done. The same case was shown by Pak Aries, the kodya chairperson, who only attended his Golkar office once his business commitments were done for the day. 27 When asked whether they were happy with how the party works, members and cadres claimed that they were satisfied (Interviews with party members and cadres, JanuaryFebruary 2006). 28 Interviews with members and cadres, September-October 2005. 29 ProMeg stands for pro Megawati, a slogan of Megawati supporters during the government’s effort to topple her leadership in 1996-1997 (Interviews with party members and cadres, September-October 2005). 30 Interviews with local leaders and cadres revealed their pride on the fame of Bung Karno and Mega, and their beliefs of the strength of these individuals to attract support (Interviews with party leaders and cadres, September-October 2005). 31 One cadre, Didit Eko, claimed that he joined the party because he wanted to create programmes to improve the livelihood of common people (Interview, October 2005). 32 Scholars have noted the resemblance of this ideology to Marxism. Reeve noted that Marhaenism is Marxism ‘adjusted to Indonesian reality’. For a full discussion of Marxism please see Reeve (1985: 29-29). 33 PDIP’s AD/ART regulates that members must have a written statement to confirm their willingness and commitment to be members (PDI Perjuangan 2005: 28). 34 When asked what their rights and duties are, PDIP members gave vague answers such as: ‘to enlarge the party’, ‘getting legal assistance’ and ‘to be present during meetings

228

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THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

to know better what party programmes are’ (Interviews with members, SeptemberOctober 2005). Only one leader from kecamatan Lowokwaru said that there was a specific cadre programme (Interview with cadres, September-October 2005). Requirements on specific trainings are regulated by PDIP’s AD/ART (PDI Perjuangan 2005: 51, 53). Members’ answers included statements that ‘essentially [one] must be active in the party’, ‘one must go to grass-roots level’, ‘one must understand what people want’ and even simply, ‘I don’t know’ (Interviews with members, September-October 2005). For example, one cadre actually answered that such procedures are regulated in party AD/ART, but he was not familiar with them (Interview with cadres, September-October 2005). As mentioned in Chapter Four, the kodya office has developed a membership database, and the kabupaten office has a membership book. Although kodya office-keepers claimed that the database was updated regularly, the frequency of the updates seemed rather inadequate. For instance the database that was presented for this study indicated that when members passed away, their names were not deleted and they were simply marked accordingly. Furthermore, there was no checking process on existing members to see whether they were still members; so possibilities that members had left the party could not be verified. Similar problems happened also with the kabupaten members’ book. PDIP scrapped member dues as a gesture to ease the financial burdens of members in difficult economic times (Interviews with party members, September-October 2005). Interviews with party leaders, September-October 2005. The blood donation event ran for the whole day but participants were from the party’s own cadres and members only. He visits the kabupaten office whenever his schedule allows him to, which is roughly 3-4 times per week. PDIP’s AD/ART gives the right for the party to expel members from the party for serious violations, but failure to participate in party activities is not one of them. See PDIP’s AD/ART (PDI Perjuangan 2005). Examples of answers included being ‘disappointed with other parties (kecewa dengan partai lain)’ and ‘because I am a member of Muhammadiyah (karena saya anggota Muhammadiyah)’ (Interviews with party members, January-February 2005). PAN’s AD/ART clearly regulates potential members to write a request letter to apply to become members, which the party will consider and issue membership cards upon approval. See PAN’s AD/ART (DPD PAN Kabupaten Blitar 2005: 15). During the process of finding a new office, the kodya office lost most of its documents (Interview with party cadres, February 2006). For example, Partai Golkar’s members proudly flashed their membership cards when asked about their contact details. Duverger argued that a cadre party does not necessarily have to give out membership cards to members (1954: 71-73), but interview data from other parties in the Malang area suggests that they are an important symbol of affiliation in the Indonesian context. Interviews with Pak Widodo and members, 7 December 2005 and January-February 2006. PAN’s AD/ART clearly states dues as one of the member’s duties (DPD PAN Kabupaten Blitar 2005: 15). Pembekalan means to bring supplies (usually food) for a long journey. This training is not mandated by party regulations – PAN’s AD/ART does not make any reference to training (DPD PAN Kabupaten Blitar 2005: 15).

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54 The kabupaten chairperson has his personal business and the kodya cadres have various occupations such as teachers and public servants. 55 Interviews with members revealed that some of them had been members of PAN. Other members did not name their previous party affiliation, although indicated that they joined another party before (Interviews with party cadres, October-November 2005). 56 PKS cadres claimed that the young polite cadres were impressive in drawing sympathy (Interviews with cadres, September-October 2005). 57 According to PKS’ AD/ART, majelis syuro is the highest council in the party with the authority to establish the party’s vision and mission, regulations and recommendations at the national level, as well as appointing the party’s national leader and other strategic decisions. See PKS’ AD/ART (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 2006). 58 PKS’ AD/ART regulates that the sources of the party’s finances are: iuran rutin anggota (members’ dues), sumbangan (donations) and hibah (transfer of wealth) from members and supporters (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 2006). 59 Pak Sophya argues that this method has been effective in persuading members to pay (Interview with kabupaten chairperson Pak Sophya, 7 October 2005). 60 Sodaqoh is a form of voluntary monetary contribution, usually for the poor. 61 There are conflicting regulations in the party’s AD/ART. While at jenis dan jenjang keanggotaan (type and level of membership) it is explained that all levels of cadres have to undergo training, the section on keanggotaan (membership) explained that anggota kader pendukung (supporting cadre) are those who actively support every party activity – with no mention of a training requirement (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 2006). 62 Ford & Tjandra (2007) have found that PKS’ labour NGO, the Indonesian Labour Foundation, also uses this technique for educating factory workers about their labour rights. 63 Cadres claim that it is the party activity that they are most active in, as it is held weekly in all kecamatan (Interviews with cadres, September-October 2005). 64 Some of the trainings mentioned by cadres were how to make coconut-based food products and finance management for mosques (Interviews with cadres, SeptemberOctober 2005). 65 Zakat is Muslims’ obligatory contribution to be made to the poor. 66 The leader from kecamatan Kepanjen indicated that he had approached local Remaja Masjid (Mosque Youth) groups (Interview with Pak Pribadi Luhur, 20 October 2005). 67 It must be noted that PAN does have this same priority, but its application is seriously disrupted by local organisational failure in Malang. 68 Janda’s argument is applicable to the local level because it also refers to candidates. Parties’ local leaders are often nominated as candidates in local elections. For instance, Partai Golkar’s kabupaten chairperson is Malang’s bupati (district head), and PDIP’s kodya chairperson is Malang’s walikota (mayor). 69 Some members claim that there was no specific requirement, others said they had to produce identification (Interviews with members, September-October 2005). 70 See AD/ART of the four parties. Data on the decisions and reasons for cancelling members’ dues is drawn from interviews with party leaders (September 2005-February 2006).

Chapter 8 1

Having said this, he argued that parties have to ‘take the greatest care to provide themselves with leadership that is democratic in appearance’ (Duverger 1964: 134).

230 2

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THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

As discussed in Chapter Two, the musyawarah concept was based on Sukarno’s opposition towards Western democracy, where ‘fifty per cent plus one’ represents a victory. As a replacement, Sukarno proposed discussion and deliberation to reach consensus (musyarawah untuk mufakat) to formulate the best decision (Feith & Castles 1970: 9, 82). Norris argues that although sociability serves as a less important incentive that can be met by other social groups. See Norris (1995: 31). The larger body, the Directorate, has a subgroup of 15 members that meets daily to make quick decisions, which still have to be approved by the Directorate as a whole (The Sejong Institute 2000: 3). Thailand’s Democrat Party moved the decision-making power to a smaller group within the previously responsible body, while the New Aspiration Party gave the power to a larger newly-assembled body (The Sejong Institute 2000: 3). Heidar & Saglie note that membership ballots on policy and personnel questions have been implemented in other European parties (2003: 228). Preferential voting happens when ‘voters (not members) choose the individuals who represent their party in parliament’ (Heidar & Saglie 2003: 229). When asked what they wanted to do beyond serving as leaders and whether they wished to enter the government, the answers suggest that they would stay in the party, develop the party and hoped that the party would win the election again (Interviews with cadres and leaders, January-February 2006). Interviews with cadres and leaders, January-February 2006. When asked what they thought they should do to advance their careers in the party, cadres and leaders identified excelling in party activities as one essential condition (Interviews with cadres and leaders, January-February 2006). G30S/PKI is an abbreviation for Gerakan 30 September-Partai Komunis Indonesia – an alleged coup by the Indonesian Communist Party which created fear of communism in Indonesia and rejection of any association with such a movement. When asked about what could make them switch to another party, some members claimed that they would do so if the party’s national leadership changed (Interviews with members, September-October 2005). Interview with leader from kecamatan Jabung, Pak Winarto, 10 October 2005. The AD/ART document was published by DPP Kabupaten Blitar based on the party’s national convention held there. The word used by the AD/ART is actually ‘melunasi kewajiban kontribusi’ or (having) fully-paid contribution duties referring to financial contribution as suggested by kodya cadres. Personal communication with kabupaten chairperson, Pak Widodo, 17 December 2007. Specific regulations on which office should issue membership cards are available on PKS’ website (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 2006). In the party constitution, fair treatment is defined as ‘protection against any form of injustice treatment caused by their participation and or comments/input they make during meetings, or when they are implementing or conducting the will of the party’ (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 2006). The higher the office, the higher the level of membership (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 2006). One example is that leader election at provincial level begins with the kodya and kabupaten internal election to have one vote to be entered at the provincial level. A similar policy has since been adopted by PAN. Except for PKS where all members are referred to as cadres.

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Chapter 9 1

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16

Possible explanations for the superiority of Partai Golkar and PKS include the influence of Partai Golkar’s long established patronage network and PKS’ Muslim brotherhoodderived ideology. PDIP’s and PAN’s lack of commitment and skills, demonstrated in this study, appear to be derived from over-reliance on charisma and personalism. An additional cause of PAN’s problems is its lack of resources, mainly funding. However, an extensive investigation to examine these issues is beyond the scope of this study. In this regard, the current parties show similar attributes to the parties of the Sukarno period, where local leaders were the determining factor in the respective office’s level of organisation – as shown by Liddle’s research (1970). See Mietzner (2007, 2008) for a detailed discussion of party funding. See Chapters Two and Three for a discussion of party funding matters. While the Old Order parties were free to recruit, they focused heavily on boosting membership numbers for elections. As noted in Chapter Three, New Order parties had very limited freedom in grass-roots recruitment. An example of this argument is PAN, which despite declaring itself as an open party, cannot escape a close association with Muhammadiyah in attracting members. Chapter Seven provides a full discussion on PAN members’ motivation to join the party. Chapters Five, Six and Seven provide a full discussion on the role of ideologies for the four parties. For further discussion on this matter see for example Centre for Strategic and International Studies (2005) and Choi (2007). Since its establishment PAN has suffered from splits between its main party leaders. See Sugiarto (2006: 10). See Chapter Two for a full discussion on PNI’s organisation. See Suryadinata (2002) for a comparison of the parties competing in the 1955 and 1999 elections. In another article, Hadiz pointed out that money politics is deeply engrained in Indonesian politics and within party structures (2004b: 618). Mietzner, ‘Chaos and Consolidation’, Inside Indonesia 97, Jul-Sep 2009. Although in the 2004 election the Democrat Party only managed to get around 7 per cent of the votes, it was successful in catapulting SBY into presidency. In the 2009 election, the party had almost tripled its votes. The party’s success is the first, as the winners of 1999 and 2004 (Partai Golkar and PDIP, respectively) failed to repeat their wins in the subsequent elections. In a survey done by Lembaga Survey Indonesia (LSI, Indonesian Survey Institution) after the 2009 elections, 65 per cent of respondents expressed their satisfaction of the implementation of democracy, and 78 per cent of respondents agreed that democracy is the best political system for Indonesia (LSI: Kualitas Pelaksanaan Pemilu dan Konsolidasi Demokrasi, 2009). The author spoke with a voter who claimed that her whole village was given 2 kilograms of rice and were transported to the polls on the election day by Prabowo’s people. One LSI study has identified Gerindra as the party with the television advertisement that 51 per cent of respondents remembered, with PS having 42 per cent, Partai Golkar having 31 per cent and Hanura having 22.6 per cent. See LSI, ‘“Silent Revolution”: Kampanye, Kompetisi Caleg, dan Kekuatan Partai Menjelang Pemilu 2009’ (Jakarta: LSI 2008), in www.lsi.or.id Indonesian election law only allows for individuals that have party affiliation to run for presidency.

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17 Mietzner noted that one of the parties that was the most aggressive in recruiting celebrities and public figures was PAN, who listed 19 out of a total of 45 celebrities. In the end only two of these personalities were elected (Mietzner 2009). 18 For a detailed discussion on the national leadership problems, please see Tandjung, The Golkar Way: Survival Partai Golkar di Tengah Turbulensi Politik Era Transisi (The Golkar Way: Golkar Party’s Survival in the Middle of Transition Era’s Political Turbulence) (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2007), pp. 118-26. 19 PS leads with 28 per cent respondents identifying it as the one with the best programmes, with Partai Golkar and PDIP trailing with 10 and 11 per cent respectively. PS also convinced 28 per cent of respondents as being the most caring for the people, and PDIP and Partai Golkar scored 12 and 10 per cent. In terms of party image, 27 per cent of respondents rated PD highly, while PDIP had 10 per cent and Partai Golkar 8 per cent. See LSI, Efek Calon terhadap Suara Partai Menjelang Pemilu 2009: Trend Opini Publik – Updated 8-18 Februari 2009 (Jakarta: LSI, 2009), pp. 37-38. 20 Ibid., p. 1. 21 The LSI survey suggested that president SBY had an overwhelming lead against other presidential candidates since 2006 and this correlates quite closely with the choice towards his party, PD. For details please see LSI, Efek Calon terhadap Perolehan Suara Partai Pemilu 2009, op cit., pp. 40-54. 22 PKB also had a similar percentage as Partai Golkar. See LSI, Kecenderungan Swing Voter Menjelang Pemilu Legislatif 2009: Trend Opini Publik (Jakarta: LSI, 2008). 23 PD gathered 7.45 per cent in 2004 and 20.85 per cent in 2009 (KPU 2009). 24 Lembaga Survei Indonesia, Efek Calon Terhadap Perolehan Suara Partai Menjelang Pemilu 2009: Trend Opini Publik, Updated 8-18 Februari 2009 (Jakarta: LSI, 2009), p. 17. 25 Ibid. The same survey indicated that preference towards PKS and PAN were hovering around the percentage that they ended up getting, at 6 and 3-4 per cent respectively. 26 Law No. 32/2004 Article 59 stipulated that only political parties or party coalitions holding at least 15 per cent of seats in local assemblies are eligible to nominate candidates for governors or mayors/regents (Choi 2004: 331). 27 For instance, the Partai Golkar-PKS alliance in Riau’s gubernatorial election (2005), Partai Golkar-PDIP in Banten (2006), Sragen (2002), Kabupaten Malang (2005). Cooperation between Partai Golkar and PKS is seen as unusual since PKS is a stern anticorruption promoter while Partai Golkar has a heavily corrupt New Order past. The alliance between Partai Golkar and PDIP is also perceived as unusual given the history of the two parties (see Chapter Three). 28 Mietzner (2007: 251-252) noted that for his gubernatorial candidacy in Jakarta, Adang Daradjatun allegedly paid Rp. 14-150 billion to the PKS. 29 Only political parties or party coalitions holding at least 15 per cent of seats in local assemblies are eligible to nominate candidates for governors or mayors/regents (Article 59 of Law No. 32/2004 on regional administration).

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Index

‘floating mass’ 13, 192 1945 independence 13, 15, 25-28, 34, 36, 42, 52, 60, 190, 201, 215, 217, 224 administrative set-ups 14 Amien Rais 22, 72, 127, 134, 153, 160, 193 cadre parties 19, 117, 217 charisma 14, 40-41, 43, 58, 65, 119, 124, 126-127, 133-134, 136, 152, 160, 191-193, 195, 197-199, 202-203, 205-206, 231 democratic institutions 17 democratic transitions 17, 200 democratisation 13, 17, 20, 97, 192, 200 Demokrasi Terpimpin 25; see also Guided Democracy donations for parties 19, 59, 80, 8283, 85-86, 92-93, 127, 189, 229 elections 14-17, 19, 21-22, 27, 31-32, 35, 38, 43, 48, 55-56, 60-61, 63, 6566, 69-70, 72-73, 76, 84, 95-96, 98, 102, 105-106, 108, 117, 120-121, 126-127, 131, 133, 135-136, 139, 141, 143, 153, 159, 165-170, 172, 176, 178, 180-183, 187, 191, 193, 196, 199, 202-209, 219, 223-224, 226, 229, 231 Golkar 13, 21-22, 52, 55-64, 66-69, 71-73, 80-86, 90-95, 98-102, 104, 109-114, 120-123, 125, 132-136, 144148, 152, 158-164, 168-177, 182-187, 189-191, 193, 195-196, 200-202,

204-206, 215-220, 222-229, 231232 grass-roots membership 18, 65, 120 Guided Democracy 13, 25, 27, 50-51, 53, 55 Hatta 26 ideology 16, 29, 31, 34, 37, 40, 4445, 52, 57-58, 60, 62-63, 68, 91, 96, 99, 102, 126-127, 130, 140, 145, 149, 160, 170, 174, 184, 209, 215, 219, 224-225, 227, 231 incumbent parties 17-18, 80, 113114, 120, 125, 132-134, 160, 169, 182, 184, 189, 194 Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereniging, or ISDV 25, 29 institutionalisation 20, 53, 76, 93, 109, 113-114, 119, 122, 131-132, 134135, 140, 143, 161, 167, 183, 185-186, 191-195, 197-198, 203, 207-209 legacy parties 14, 18, 21, 202 local branches 13-14, 18, 20, 28-29, 33, 39, 48-50, 64, 68, 72, 75, 77, 80-81, 83, 85, 91, 94-97, 109, 113114, 120, 122, 125-128, 131-132, 134, 136, 147, 150, 153-154, 156, 160, 164, 168, 171-172, 174, 177-179, 182, 185, 187-192, 195-196, 198-199, 206-208, 222 Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia 27 mass movement 25 mass parties 19, 117, 217 money politics 14, 20, 175, 195-196, 201, 203, 206-207, 231

248

THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Muhammadiyah 25, 69, 72, 127, 134, 153, 225, 228, 231 Nahdatul Ulama 25, 27, 51 nationalism 27 New Order 13-14, 16, 20, 25, 55-61, 63-65, 67-69, 71-73, 76, 79, 81, 84, 98-99, 102, 109, 111, 114-115, 121122, 131-132, 136, 144-145, 181, 187189, 192, 194-196, 201-203, 215, 222, 225, 231-232 organisational capacity 13, 190, 206 PAN see Partai Amanat Nasional 21 Partai Amanat Nasional 21, 72, 80, 85, 95, 104, 120, 126, 144, 153, 175, 198 Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan 21, 80, 83, 95, 102, 120, 124, 144, 149, 172, 197 Partai Demokrat 22, 73, 196, 203, 205, 217 Partai Indonesia Raya 27 Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 21, 72, 80, 87, 95, 98, 106, 120, 129, 144, 155157, 178, 180-181, 199, 229-230 Partai Komunis Indonesia 25, 27, 29-31, 40, 45-46, 48, 215, 230 Partai Nasional Indonesia 26-27, 37, 72 Partai Sosialis Indonesia 27 party activities 14, 17, 19-20, 22-23, 27-28, 34, 36-41, 45, 56-65, 67-68, 76-79, 81-84, 86-88, 90, 92-114, 120, 122-123, 128-129, 131, 133-135, 139-149, 151-155, 157-159, 163-164, 169-170, 173-175, 177-178, 180, 184185, 187, 189-190, 193, 195-201, 205, 207, 216-218, 220-228, 230 party capacity 19-20, 27, 33, 37-38, 42, 47, 49, 65, 67-68, 78, 80, 93, 95, 98, 109, 122, 127, 133, 144, 157, 167, 169, 183, 186-187, 191-192, 195-196, 198, 206-207, 209, 216 party identification 16, 136

party ideologies 25, 27, 32, 39, 9596, 98, 192-193, 207, 209, 219, 231 party image 19, 98, 130, 160, 232 party management 13, 17, 19-21, 23, 28-29, 31, 33-35, 42, 45, 47-50, 56, 69-70, 75-76, 79, 81, 83, 88, 99, 104, 106, 110, 113-114, 120, 132, 135, 139, 153-154, 159, 165, 168, 174-175, 177-178, 181-188, 195-200, 202, 204, 209, 229 party membership fees 19, 33 party memberships 19-20, 29, 40, 81, 118, 120, 139, 147, 163-164, 166 party mobilisation 28, 37-39, 59, 65, 76 party operations 19-21, 31-32, 34-35, 39, 49, 53, 55-56, 66, 68, 79-81, 8586, 93-94, 98, 121, 141, 143, 157, 159-160, 180, 189, 191-192, 198, 201, 208 party or branch administration 2021, 34-35, 43, 46, 49, 55, 76, 78-91, 93, 105, 120, 127, 133, 182, 186, 188, 196, 200-201, 216, 222, 224225, 232 party organisation 19-21, 23, 28, 30, 49, 56, 73, 75-76, 78-79, 81, 90-95, 97, 109-110, 118, 132, 134-136, 139140, 142-143, 149, 159, 167, 184185, 188, 199, 205, 207 party organisations 13, 20, 23, 2529, 33-36, 38-39, 41-49, 51-52, 55-57, 59-60, 62-65, 68-69, 71, 75-76, 79, 81, 89, 96, 101, 108, 111-112, 114, 117, 121-124, 132-135, 137, 144-145, 148, 160, 163, 165, 167, 171, 177, 186-188, 193, 196, 200, 202, 207208, 222 party platforms 19, 26-27, 29, 36, 38-41, 50, 97-98, 112-114, 119, 133, 136, 142-143, 149, 160, 187, 191-193 party professionalism 19, 78, 80, 90, 94, 197, 199

INDEX

party services 19, 55, 98-100, 102103, 110-111 party system 13, 15, 56, 118, 206 patronage 14, 41, 46, 66, 68, 132, 140, 161, 189, 193, 198, 203, 206, 231 PD see Partai Demokrat 22 PDIP see Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan 21 Persatuan Indonesia Raya 27 personalism 20, 141-143, 149, 160, 208, 231 PKI see Partai Komunis Indonesia 25 PKS see Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 21 PNI see Partai Nasional Indonesia 26 political participation 13-15, 20-21, 25, 27, 43, 45, 51, 57-58, 64, 73, 75, 97, 111, 118, 144, 187, 192, 194, 200, 202 political parties 13-17, 20, 25-29, 35, 55-58, 66, 72-73, 75, 78-79, 84, 9596, 102, 109, 117-119, 139, 143, 167,

249 189, 191, 200-203, 206, 209, 215, 232 recruitment 15-16, 18-20, 23, 32, 3944, 46, 56, 64-66, 70, 77, 79, 83, 100, 102-103, 105-108, 110, 112-113, 115, 117-129, 131-137, 143, 145, 147, 150, 153-155, 157-160, 163, 172, 177, 189, 191-192, 199, 201, 204, 209, 218-219, 222, 224-225, 231 Sarekat Islam 25, 27 socialism 27, 32 Suharto 13, 16, 20, 27, 53, 55-60, 63, 69, 71, 73, 75, 99-100, 121, 133, 145, 160, 189, 191-193, 195-196, 203204, 216, 223-224 Sukarno 13, 25-27, 31, 41, 44, 50-51, 53, 55, 58, 62, 65, 70, 103, 124, 126, 149, 166, 191, 193, 207, 215, 230231 transition 14, 17-18, 20-21, 25, 79, 97, 131, 143, 181, 194, 200-203, 207

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Monographs See Seng Tan: The Making of the Asia Pacific. Knowledge Brokers and the Politics of Representation Monographs 10, 2013 (ISBN 978 90 8964 477 0) Duncan McDuie-Ra: Northeast Migrants in Delhi. Race, Refuge and Retail Monographs 9, 2012 (ISBN 978 90 8964 422 0) Eka Srimulyani: Women from Traditional Islamic Educational Institutions in Indonesia. Negotiating Public Spaces Monographs 8, 2012 (ISBN 978 90 8964 421 3) Kah Seng Loh, Edgar Liao, Cheng Tju Lim and Guo-Quan Seng: The University Socialist Club and the Contest for Malaya. Tangled Strands of Modernity Monographs 7, 2012 (ISBN 978 90 8964 409 1) Olena Mykal: The EU-Japan Security Dialogue. Invisible but Comprehensive Monographs 6, 2011 (ISBN 978 90 8964 163 2) Chaiyakorn Kiatpongsan: The EU-Thailand Relations. Tracing the Patterns of New Bilateralism Monographs 5, 2011 (ISBN 978 90 8964 164 9) Rituparna Roy: South Asian Partition Fiction in English. From Khushwant Singh to Amitav Ghosh Monographs 4, 2010 (ISBN 978 90 8964 245 5) Jeroen de Kloet: China with a Cut. Globalisation, Urban Youth and Popular Music Monographs 3, 2010 (ISBN 978 90 8964 162 5)

Masae Kato: Women’s Rights? The Politics of Eugenic Abortion in Modern Japan Monographs 2, 2009 (ISBN 978 90 5356 793 7) Alex McKay: Their Footprints Remain. Biomedical Beginnings Across the Indo-Tibetan Frontier Monographs 1, 2007 (ISBN 978 90 5356 518 6)

Edited Volumes Barak Kalir and Malini Sur (eds.): Transnational Flows and Permissive Polities. Ethnographies of Human Mobilities in Asia Edited Volumes 7, 2012 (ISBN 978 90 8964 408 4) Gregory Bracken (ed.): Aspects of Urbanization in China. Shanghai, Hong Kong, Guangzhou Edited Volumes 6, 2012 (ISBN 978 90 8964 398 8) Dipika Mukherjee and Maya Khemlani David (eds.): National Language Planning and Language Shifts in Malaysian Minority Communities Edited Volumes 5, 2011 (ISBN 978 90 8964 271 4) Birgit Abels (ed.): Austronesian Soundscapes. Performing Arts in Oceania and Southeast Asia Edited Volumes 4, 2011 (ISBN 978 90 8964 085 7) Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner (ed.): Frameworks of Choice. Predictive and Genetic Testing in Asia Edited Volumes 3, 2010 (ISBN 978 90 8964 165 6) Wen-Shan Yang and Melody Chia-Wen Lu (eds.): Asian Cross-border Marriage Migration. Demographic Patterns and Social Issues Edited Volumes 2, 2010 (ISBN 978 90 8964 054 3) Gijsbert Oonk (ed.): Global Indian Diasporas. Exploring Trajectories of Migration and Theory Edited Volumes 1, 2007 (ISBN 978 90 5356 035 8)