The Ins and Outs of the Predication 9067653489, 9789067653480

Table of contents :
Preface
Table of Contents
A typology of entities
Modal shifts and predication types
Non-restrictive relatives and the representation of complex sentences
Clause structure and modality in Functional Grammar
On zero terms and negative polarity
‘True’ reflexives and pseudoreflexives with particular reference to Serbo-Croatian
Nominalization and basic constituent ordering
A cognitive-pragmatic reconsideration of negative raising
Voice in Ancient Greek: Reflexives and passives
The possessive dative in Dutch: syntactic reanalysis and predicate formation
A representation of Latin relative clauses
Infinitive incorporation
Functional Grammar as a formal language
References
Author index
Language index
Subject index

Citation preview

Ins and Outs of the Predication

Functional Grammar Series This series comprises monographs and collections written in the framework of Functional Grammar. The aim is to seek explanations for a wide variety of linguistic phenomena, both language specific and cross-linguistic, in terms of the conditions under which and the purposes for which language is used. Editors:

A. Machtelt Bolkestein Simon C. Dik Casper de Groot J. Lachlan Mackenzie General address: Institute for General Linguistics Functional Grammar Spuistraat 210 NL-1012 VT Amsterdam The Netherlands

Other books in this series: 1. A.M. Bolkestein, C. de Groot and J.L. Mackenzie (eds.) Syntax and Pragmatics in Functional Grammar 2. A. M. Bolkestein, C. de Groot and J.L. Mackenzie (eds.) Predicates and Terms in Functional Grammar 3. Michael Hannay English Existentials in Functional Grammar 4. Josine A. Lalleman Dutch Language Proficiency of Turkish Children born in the Netherlands 5. Jan Nuyts and Georges de Schutter (eds.) Getting One's Words into Line

Other studies on Functional Grammar include S.C. Dik, Functional Grammar (1978), T. Hoekstra et al. (eds.), Perspectives on Functional Grammar (1981), S.C. Dik (ed.). Advances in Functional Grammar (1983). All published by FORIS PUBLICATIONS.

Ins and Outs of the Predication Johan van der Auwera Louis Goossens (eds.)

1987 FORIS PUBLICATIONS Dordrecht - Holland/Providence Rl - USA

Published

by:

Foris Publications Holland P.O. Box 509 3300 A M Dordrecht, The Netherlands Sole distributor

for the U.S.A. and

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for

Japan:

Sanseido Book Store, Ltd. 1-1, Kanda-jimbocho-cho Chiyoda-ku Tokyo 101, Japan

CIP-DATA

Ins Ins and Outs of the Predication / Johan van der Auwera and Louis Goossens (eds.). Dordrecht [etc.]: Foris. - (Functional Grammar Series; 6) With ref. ISBN 90-6765-348-9 SISO 805.1 UDC 801.5 Subject heading: functional grammar

ISBN 90 6765 348 9 ® 1987 Foris Publications - Dordrecht No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the copyright owner. Printed in the Netherlands by ICG Printing, Dordrecht.

Preface

Together with its twin volume (Getting one's words into line, eds. G. de Schutter and J. Nuyts), this collection offers a selection of papers from the Second International Conference on Functional Grammar, which was held at the University of Antwerp (UIA), from 1 to 5 September 1986. It bears witness that the framework set up under the name functional Grammar (FG) by Simon Dik (1978) continues to stimulate linguistic research on a wide range of topics and language data. While elaborating, refining, or challenging the theory of FG, these contributions, we think, will deepen our insight into the workings and organization of human language in several respects. The constitution of predications can be viewed as the central concern of FG. In a way, consequently, the title of this volume might be taken to cover about everything in the model. As it happens, the division of labour between the Word Order collection and this one excludes specific word order papers from our scope. Othe rwise, there is indeed considerable variation in the topics under discussion, which is the main reason why we have opted for an alphabetical arrangement according to the authors' second names. As will appear from the following survey, however, at least some of the contributions are concerned with issues that to some extent permit common denominators. At the same time it will emerge, we think, that there is some justification for saying that they cover some ins and certain outs of the predication. Clearly concerned with an aspect of the inside of the predication is S. Dik's Typology of Entities, which helps us to understand the 'coding' and 'behavioral' properties of terms. Entities are primarily viewed as ensembles, which at a more specific level encompass sets and masses; individuals are argued to be singleton sets. So-called classifier languages can leave ensembles undifferentiated for set/mass; the use of sortal classifiers result in set- or mass-uses. Non-classifier languages,

vi

PREFACE

on the other hand, are forced to make a choice whether the intended referent is described as a set or a Bass. build terns from

Nominalizations with

a

corpus

of

thirty

(verbal) predications. Working

languages

which

constitutes a fairly

representative sample of the languages of the world, J.L. Mackenzie shows

how

human

languages

exhibit

different

nominalization. He also demonstrates that there

degrees

is a

of

tendency for

'heavy* nominalization to correlate with Postfield ordering and for 'light' nominalization to be typical of Prefield ordering, moderate nominalization being

more equally

distributed across both classes

of language. Among the exceptions nominalization yielding

to

in

Persian,

the

tendency

organization; Hungarian, is accounted for cultural

as

pattern

of

relatively

is

terms with

to

have

degree of

is explained as a quasi-Postfield

us with a real exception,

other

metaphorizing

high

Prefield,

which provides

sharing

of

the

which

'European'

States

of

languages a

affairs (SoAs) as

ent it ies. Three authors explore relations as

the

question

predicate

whether

formation.

Serbo-Croatian treatment

of

they

Disagreeing

reflexive both

within the with

earlier

constructions,

'true'

and

predication as well

can be dealt with as instances of which

FG

treatments of

propose a unified

pseudo-reflexives

in

terms

of

predicate formation, D. KuSanda argues that true reflexives with se must be sharply distinguished from pseudo-reflexives,

because they

form highly transitive predications. On the other hand, one type of pseudo-reflexive construction passive

construction.

between the true passive admit

that

canonical

In

voice

shown to

and the passive

correlate of passivization. complex

is

order

R.

be

a

highly typical

pseudo-reflexive one, morphology Risselada

is is

not

FG should

a

necessary

concerned

with the

system of Ancient Greek, which besides an active and

a passive also has a medio-passive. as an

to

account for the similarities

instance of

The medio-passive

is regarded

valency reduction, which in FG is taken care of

by predicate formation. It is associated with a number of different interpretations, depending on the semantic function of the argument reduced. In order to capture the

so-called indirect

reflexive use

PREFACE

of

vi i

the

middle

passive,

she

distinguishes

a category of verbal

predicates implying a Beneficiary, which in spite of character

can

likewise

passive is viewed as

be

an

reduced.

instance

its satellite

The originally non-agentive

of

argument

reduction through

predicate formation which was reinterpreted as an agentive passive. W. Vandeweghe,

finally,

constructions,

discusses

Dutch

is viewed as the entity affected by the verb

and

possessive

which he relates to possessive

its

complement.

The

dative (pd)

constructions.

The pd

activity expressed

by the

relationship

between

constructions is captured by a predicate formation rule possessive

construction

as

Affect predicate;

the

semantic function

Affected.

its

the

two

taking the

input and resulting in a complex

original

possessor

The

argument

receives the

rule is limited in its synchronic

application, but the large number of

lexicalized complex

verbs in

Dutch shows that it has been very operative diachronically. Working with

examples from French, (perception verbs as well as

the verbs laisser, faire and aller), C. Vet demonstrates the use of the gramaaticalization

scale full predicate (stage one): predicate

formation (stage two): predicate operator (stage three). The second stage, in

which we get infinitive

related to Argument incorporation),

incorporation

(a feature closely

appears to

be reached

by all

the verbs considered. The third stage, which involves a clear shift in meaning and

which

exhibits

restrictions

on

the

use

of the

boundary

of the

infinitival form, is arrived at only occasionally. If

with

Vet's

paper

we

have

crossed

the

predication (at least where it deals with the creation of predicate operators),

we

predication,

are

be

it

also to

concerned varying

with

the

degrees,

in

'outs' the

of

the

remaining

contributions in this volume. Two

papers

discuss

relative

Vester concern themselves with They

argue

that

non-restrictive

other non-restrictive form part

of a

which have

clauses than

cline of

property of not being the status

clauses

the status

(RCs). M. Hannay and E. of non-restrictive

to restrictive

non-restrictive clauses

integrated

RCs.

RCs are more closely related to

into

the

core

of being either Orientation

RCs. Thus they which share the predication and or

Elaboration.

viii

PREFACE

The pragaatic functions

Orientation

and

Elaboration

subsuae the

'classical' FG functions Theme and Tail respectively. Accepting the position

that

restrictive

different constituents, clauses

explores

opposition in

the

and

non-restrictive

function

of

the

is taken

semantic Also

are totally

indicative:

subjunctive

the two types. The subjunctive in restrictive RCs is

found to be a Barker of non-specificity, RCs it

RCs

E. Vester's contribution on Latin relative

whereas in non-restrictive

to be an overt Marker of a (vague)

Circumstantial

function. Kahrel

and

understand only understood

Nuyts

deal

with

phenomena

which

we

can

if we go beyond the predication as it is currently

in

FG.

P.

Kahrel

concerns

hiaself

with

sentences

containing so-called

negative polarity itens (NPIs) and terns with

a 'zero quantifier*.

Rather

eleaents

that

require

than

the

describing

presence

Beans of a notion of pragmatic

the«

as linguistic

of Neg, he explains then by

conversion. Neg

contexts are viewed

as one possible instantiation of pragaatic conversion. Working fron a nuaber of instances of "Negative that neither

a purely

can give an

adequate

representational Functional treatnent expressing

account

level

Graiiar of

the

of

of

(PFG),

but

degrees

type

not

also of

(NR),

3. Nuyts argues

a purely pragaatic approach

thea;

the

KR-cases

various

Raising

syntactic) nor

we

need

accepted

(yet)

requires

by

recourse in

FG.

An

reference

Propositional

to a

Procedural adequate to a scale

Attitude.

Only

a

representation of this sort will trigger off a principled selection aaong various lexicalization and intonational features part in

the distinction

that play a

between raised and non-raised readings of

certain NR-cases. Modality is another phenoaenon that bursts the boundaries of the predication

stricto

Objective and

sensu.

K.

Epistenological

Hengeveld distinguishes Inherent, aodality.

Inherent

aodality types

represent SoAs and are expressed lexically by (derived) predicates; Objective

aodality

types

represent

the

speaker's

knowledge

concerning SoAs and are expressed by eabedding predicates/predicate operators; coamitnent

Epistemological with

regard

to

aodality the

concerns

the

speaker's

truth of a proposition, they are

PREFACE

ix

expressed

and

predication

operators. Using data (mainly) from Spanish, Hengeveld

by

»bedding

predicates/adverbials

demonstrates

that a FG which distinguishes these modality types, thea

as

Predication

operator,

Predicate, accounts for the

Predicate

scope

and linearizes

operator and (derived)

differences

that

hold between

then. In addition Hengeveld argues that we need a leftmost Mitigation/Reinforcement operators. L. predications

on

in FG can be refined, if we look at

Force

typology

a number

of

of data

the Bnglish modals, both in Present-day and in late

English.

Taking

exhibited by

operator

Illocutionary

Goossens' paper claims that the existing

connected with Old

operating

into

account

the predications

the

specific

which combine

well as the modality type realized by a

characteristics

with those modals as

given modal

in accordance

with those characteristics, Goossens finds evidence for a number of refinements in the present SoA-typology of FG: he makes a the distinction

of a subclass of cognizant

SoAs' situations

and events,

[controllable],

states,

as well as for

[situation-like]

case for

for the

features on

and [viewed

'hyper-

SoAs like

positively/negatively

by the deontee]. Finally, H. Weigand presents Koto, predications and

intended as

its present form it is a situations, entity Koto sentence situations

interpreted background

as

semantics

of

the

a

theory, which

model

between

system

includes

modality, aspect. A

situation,

relations

interpreted as entity information the

representation base. In

preliminary model

predicates, cardinalities,

is

with

a formal language based on FG

a knowledge

or

a

them.

elements.

couple of Terms

are

Although only

is given, it is emphasized that the

semantics must interact with a pragmatic component. Needless to say most of the here invite

further research.

Conference at the Free crystallisation May we

ideas and

investigations presented

We are looking forward to the Third

University of

Amsterdam in

1988 as

a new

point.

round off

with a

word of thanks. To the authors of this

volume for contributing, to the

editors

Georges

Nuyts, for the smooth and fruitful

de

Schutter

and

Jan

of

the

parallel

volume,

x

PREFACE

interaction, to the editors the

Publisher.

To

the

of the

Belgian

Functional Grammar National

Universitaire Instelling Antwerpen for Ann

Verschueren-Verhaert

typing/correction

for

a

Science

financial most

job.

Johan van der Auwera and Louis Goossens

kind

Series, to

Fund

and the

support. and

And to

efficient

Table of Contents

Preface

v

A typology of entities Simon

C. Dik

0. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Introduction Entities have mental status Construing and retrieving entities The insufficiency of Set Theory Typology of entities: first version Types of terms; types of nominal predicates Do we need individuals? Arguments for interpreting Individuals as singleton sets 8. Individuation of nasses 9. Sortal classifiers

Modal shifts and predication Louis

1 2 3 4 6 7 9 10 14 15

types

Goossens

0. Introduction 1. SoA-types in FG 2. Modality types and states of affairs 2.1. Situations and events 2.2. The predicate operators Prosp[ective] and Habfitual] 2.3. Controlled situations 2.4. SoA-types and aodality-types: a refined correlation 3. Data from diachrony 3.1. cunnan 3.2. magan 3.3. notan 4. Conclusion Notes Non-restrictive relatives and the representation of complex sentences Mike Hannay and Elseline Vester 0. Introduction 1. A basic functional description 2. Relative clauses within FG 3. Predication combining 4. The representation of non-restrictive clauses 5. Conclusion Notes

21 21 22 22 23 25 26 27 27 28 31 35 36

39 39 41 43 48 51 51

xii TABLE OF CONTENTS

Clause structure and modality in Functional Grammar Hengeveld

Kees

0. Introduction 1. Clause structure 2. Modality 3. Clause structure and modality 4. Illocutionary operators 5. Conclusion Notes

53 53 56 60 63 65 65

On zero terms and negative polarity Peter

Kahrel

0. Introduction 1. Zero quantification 2. Operators and conversion 3. Conclusion Notes 'True' reflexives and pseudo-reflexives with particular reference to Serbo-Croatian Dubravko Kutanda 0. Introduction 1. 'True' reflexives vs. other se constructions 2. S-C 'true' reflexives are two-place predications 3. Passive pseudo-reflexives (PPRs) 4. Conclusion Notes

67 69 71 74 75

77 79 80 83 91 91

Nominalization and basic constituent ordering J. Lachlan

Mackenzie

0. Introduction 1. Analysis of the data 2. Correlation between Postfield and nominalization 3. Towards an explanation Notes

93 94 100 102 105

A cognitive-pragmatic reconsideration of negative raising Jan

Nuyts 0. Introduction 1. A short survey of the literature 2. Against a syntactic NR-rule 3. Towards a cognitive-pragmatic account 4. The representation of the 'raised* construction 5. Conclusion Notes

107 107 108 111 117 120 121

TABLE OF CONTENTS

xiii

Voice in Ancient Greek: Reflexives and passives Rodie

Riaseiada

0. Introduction 1. Voice in Ancient Greek 2. Valency Reduction 2.1. Valency Reduction in FG 2.2. Valency Reduction in Ancient Greek 2.3. The passive 3. Conclusion Notes

123 123 127 128 128 132 135 135

The possessive dative in Dutch: syntactic reanalysis and predicate Willy

formation

Vandeueghe

0. Introduction 1. The relation between poss- and pd-construction 2. V-equivalents to expressing the Affect relation 3. Triggers for syntactic reanalysis 3.1. Object Promotion 3.2. Complex Predicate Formation 4. The reanalysis in a FG account 4.1. The rule 4.2. Productivity 4.3. Applicability 5. Conclusion Notes

137 138 141 143 144 145 146 146 146 147 150 150

A representation of Latin relative clauses Elseline

Vester

0. Introduction 1. Restrictive RCs 1.1. Definiteness and Specificity 1.2. Motivation 1.3. Conclusion 2. Non-restrictive RCs 3. Conclusion Notes

152 155 155 159 160 160 162 162

xiv

TABLE

OF

Infinitive

CONTENTS

incorporation

Co Vet 0. I n t r o d u c t i o n 1. A r g u m e n t I n c o r p o r a t i o n 2. I n f i n i t i v e s 3. P e r c e p t i o n v e r b s 4. O t h e r i n c o r p o r a t i n g v e r b s : verbs 5. F i n a l r e m a r k s Notes Functional

Hans

Granar

as

a fornai

laisser,

faire,

movement

163 163 165 168 173 176 177

language

ffeigand 0. I n t r o d u c t i o n 1. T h e K o t o l a n g u a g e 1.1. Terms 1.2. P r e d i c a t i o n s 2. S e m a n t i c s 2.1. The basic algebra 2.2. Information systems 2.3. Casts a n d scripts 2.4. Status and modality 2.5. Aspect 3. C o n c l u s i o n Notes

179 180 180 182 183 185 186 188 191 192 193 193

References

197

Author

211

index

Language Subject

index index

213 215

A typology of entities Simon C. Dik Institute

0.

of General Linguistics,

University of

Amsterdam

Introduction

FG is

based on

the assumption

that linguistic expressions can be

analyzed in t e n s of underlying predications, which in turn consist of predicate frames and term structures. Semantically, predications are interpreted as designating states of as designating

properties or

nating entities (E).

At

affairs (SoA), predicates

relations (P/H), and terms as desig-

the

level

of

the

predication

we have

developed a typology of SoA's, according to which SoA's are divided into a number of semantic types [¿control],

[¿dynamic],

in

terms

[+telic],

of

and

such

properties as

[jjaomentaneous ] .

This

semantic typology helps us understand a number of things concerning the coding

properties and

the behavioral properties (in the sense

of Keenan 1976) of predications. By expression

rules

which

intonational properties we understand constrain

the

coding properties

specify

the

form,

of constituents;

the

we mean the

order,

and the

by behavioral properties

properties concerning the rules and principles which formation

and

the

further

specification

of the

predication. Just as we need a typology of SoA's to account for the differences between predications, so we need a typology of P/R's to understand

a

number

of

differences

between

predicates,

and a

typology of E's to differentiate between terms. This paper concerns the

typology

of

E's.

semantic E types in help understand of terms. The

Such

terms of

a

the differential subject

typology will specify a number of

semantic distinctions

pertains

which make us

coding and behavioral properties to

what

Seiler

has

termed the

dimension of Apprehension, where this term is taken in the sense of 'how language grasps and objects or

represents

items' (Seiler

concepts

account of this 'dimension', Seiler and and

Stachowiak

(1982)

contain

aspects of the problems involved. number of

relevant studies

that

correspond to

1986:9). Seiler (1986) is a theoretical a

Lehmann (1982)

number

Independently

have recently

and Seiler

of detailed studies of of

this

work, a

been published in Craig

2

DIK

(1986) under the heading 'noun classes and categorization*. 1. Entities have mental There is a

mutual

'entity', in

status

relationship

between

the

notions

to E's, and E's are things that can be referred to by important to

'tern' and

that terms are expressions which can be used to refer realize from

reality', but 'things in representations.

The

the outset the liind':

same

terns. It is

that E's are not 'things in E's are

applies

to

mental constructs or

SoA's

and

P/R's, but we

concentrate here on the mental status of E's. There are reasons why

E's must

three main

be assigned mental status rather than 'real*

existence in the outside world. First, there are many about,

but

which

do

things which

not

exist

in

we can

refer to

and talk

reality. Think of mythical,

fictional, or hypothetical things, or of things which only occur in dreams or fantasies. Consider such cases as: (1)

Last night I dreamed themselves with bananas

(2)

In the highlands of New Guinea there are dogs. They feed themselves with bananas

(3)

Suppose there were ants as big as dogs, and that they would feed themselves with bananas

In (1) a dream world is claimed; (2)

of

ants as big as dogs. They fed

described for

pretends to

be a

which no

description of

real existence is

is that,

existential

world

once the

duced, they can be referred to what

exist; in

(3) a

is introduced in a way which signals that the

speaker does not believe such a important here

big as

reality, but it is

unlikely that anyone will believe that reality to counterfactual world

ants as

status

is

to

really

exist.

What is

dog-sized ants have been intro-

again and assigned

talked about,

no matter

to them. What we refer to,

then, is E's which have been mentally construed on the basis of the linguistic information

provided. Reference, therefore, is indepen-

dent of ontological commitment or existence in reality. The second argument is that we can refer to 'real' to the

things only

extent that we have some mental representation of them. For

ENTITIES

3

example, either

if

I want

be

'picture'

the of

descriptive such the

actual

refer

to

by

mental

which

directly virtue

the even

or

for

in

Roie,

already I

has

must to

give

be

able

things which

it

some

must

Rental

sufficient to

construe

are present

in

situation.

connected

the

Colosseum

addressee

talk

with

things

fact

the

about

experienced.

of

and

in t e r m s

second,

things

are

in

nowhere

Such

that

is

that we

reality

to

reference

we either of which

are

retrieving

mental

Johnson-Laird same

addressee

in

be perceived

or

can

possess we can

can

even

be

or

effective

can

then

construe

communicate

information.

Construing

correspond

the

true

these

representations

Entities

the

is

reason,

in

and exchange

(cf.

This

to my

referent,

for

and efficiently

otherwise

2.

intended

communicative

third

situations only

the

that

information

a referent.

The

to r e f e r

case

with

entities

representations.

1983)

the

or

'mental

They

real world outside

properties,

no matter

exist

pictures' us.

whether

in

'mental

which may

Referring

or

not

models'

or m a y

not

to some E

has

there

is

such

a

correspondence. Since

B's

distinguish (4)

The

are things

two main

that

usages

of

can be construed

in t h e m i n d ,

we

can

terms:

(i)

S m a y use a t e r m T in o r d e r to h e l p A c o n s t r u e a referent E for T, a n d t h u s i n t r o d u c e E into his m e n t a l m o d e l

(ii)

S may E for

u s e a t e r m T in o r d e r t o h e l p A r e t r i e v e a r e f e r e n t T, w h e r e E w a s a l r e a d y p r e s e n t i n h i s m e n t a l m o d e l

construction

indefinite typically

of

specific

referents

terms,

as

g u i d e d by definite

in

is

typically

(5);

terms,

the

as

in

(5)

Yesterday

in t h e p a r k

I saw

a black

Yesterday

in the park

I saw

the/that

If w e w i s h

to use we might

the

term

'refer'

distinguish

them

and as

of

through

referents

is

(6):

(6)

of u s a g e ,

achieved

retrieval

cat black

'reference' 'constructive

cat

again

for both

types

reference'

and

4

DIK

'identifying reference',

respectively. In

is to

cooperative action

be analyzed

as a

both cases,

'reference'

which can be analyzed

according to the schema: (7)

S refers A to E by leans of T

where, in all cases, E has the status of a mental construct. 3. The insufficiency In logic it

is

interpreted in

of Set Theory

customary

expressions

be senantically

Set

Theory.

Thus,

a

possible

world is

consisting of individuals, sets of individuals, sets of

sets of individuals, etc. Terms are or to

to

terms of 'possible worlds', the properties of which

are defined in terms of defined as

for

taken to

refer to individuals

sets; properties and relations are interpreted extensionally

according to the schemas: (8)

P = the set of all x such that P(x) is true

(9)

R = the set of all n-tuples xi, R(xi, X2, ..., xn) is true

X2, ...,

xn such that

Set Theory is construed on the basis of the primitive relation: (10) Any set

a c A

'a is a member of A'

thus consists

of members which can be counted. The number

of members a given set A has is the cardinal number of that set. We can conceive of the cardinal as a function which takes sets for its arguments and delivers numbers as values: (11)

c(A) = n

'the number of members of A = n'

This apparatus of Set Theory is not immediately applicable to terms involving mass nouns: (12)

There was 0/some/much water in the pool

Water does not obviously designate a set consisting of distinguishable and countable members.

It is

strange to

talk of

the number

ENTITIES

5

(rather than

the quantity)

out of this predicament:

of water.

There are two possible ways

(i) assume that mass terms, too, designate

sets; this requires that masses be interpreted as having (some kind of) members;

(ii) assume

this requires

that mass

terms do

not designate sets;

a specification of what type of E they do designate,

and it implies that not all E's have

the status

of individuals or

sets. If course

(i) is

taken, we

have to

assume that masses, just

like sets, do have members. He could assume, for example, thing

desginated

by

water

does

example, molecules) which could even if

this may

correspond to about them.

the way And it

and syntactic Finally, it

be true

of smallest parts (for

in principle

in some

in which

does not

differences

consist

that the

be counted. However,

'objective' sense, it does not

we conceptualize

masses and talk

make us understand the many semantic

between

count

nouns

and

mass nouns.

would be very difficult to specify the basic particles

of more abstract

'masses' such as in:

He did not feel much love for his dog

(13)

For these reasons, Bunt along the

(1985) has developed an

alternative theory

lines of course (ii). In this theory, Masses are distin-

guished from Sets, but both are

unified in

the higher

concept of

Ensemble, according to the following schema: (14)

ENSEMBLE has parts has size MASS has parts has measure

SET has parts has members

Ensembles are either Sets or Masses. Sets have members, Masses have measures. Therefore, Ensemble theory of the

primitive relation

cannot be

Masses can be said to have parts, i.e. can be Sets and

Masses. From

developed in terms

'is a member of'. However, both Sets and divided into smaller

this it follows that Ensemble theory can be

6

DIK

developed

on

the basis

(15)

A C B

This

primitive

'A is p a r t o f relation

'intersection', of Ensembles sane parts. then have

Typology

On

the

basis

following

Any a

of

consist

a

an

of

of E n t i t i e s ,

be used

'difference' in t e r n s

'is a « e m b e r

first

to d e f i n e

for

the

Ensembles.

of two Ensembles

of',

in a d e r i v a t i v e

particular

notions Identity

having

for

Sets,

the will

way.

version Bade above,

we

can now

set

up

the

E's:

Individual

Mass.

relation:

B'

then

the distinctions

typology

or

and

defined

Entities:

E is either Set

be

The notion

of

can

"union",

will

to b e d e f i n e d

4.

the prinitive

of

A

or

an Enseiible;

mass nay consist

which can be either

an Ensenble

of sub-Masses; Individuals

or

is

either

a Set

will

Ensenbles,

etc. This

typology

recursively

defines

ing: (16)

a.

Types

of

Entities

Individual Mass Mass of Masses Set of I n d i v i d u a l s Set of Masses Set of Sets of I n d i v i d u a l s etc.

such E types

as

the

follow-

ENTITIES

7

5. Types of terms; types of nominal It

is

clear

that

we

predicates

can now divide t e n s into different types,

corresponding to the type of E that they can be used to refer to: (17)

Individual tern Mass tern Set term

John; this boy some water; much gold these boys; this family

More coiplex, however, is the question nouns (noninal typology of

predicates) into

E's set

up in

whether we

different types

(16a). The

can also divide according to the

main problem

is that most

nouns can be used to designate E's of different types. Consider: (18) a. b. c.

I saw a chicken in the garden I saw three chickens in the garden We had chicken for dinner

[Individual] [Set] [Mass]

(19) a. b.

He is very fond of wine [Mass] He chose two Italian wines for dinner [Set]

(20) a. b.

John was at the party too There were three Johns at the party

For this

reason Bunt (1985) concludes that we should not speak of,

[Individual] [Set]

for exaaple, 'mass nouns', but only of 'Bass occurrences' of nouns. The nouna

as such

they can be used there are

would then to refer

be neutral as to the type of E that

to. A

clear differences

problem with

in aarkedness

this view

is that

between such different

noun occurrences. Consider the following: (21) a. b.

There were too many chairs in the rooa There was too much chair in the room

[unmarked] [narked]

(22) a. b.

I would like sone butter, please I would like three butters, please

[unaarked] [narked]

(23) a. b.

I saw John last week I saw too auch John last week

[unaarked] [Barked]

Intuitively, we would like typically or

and requires soae service for

to

be

able

to

say

that

a

noun is

basically used in teras referring to certain E types, sort

referring to

of

extra other E

operation

to

be

pressed into

types. We can do so by dividing

noninal predicates over different subcategories in

teras of

the E

8

DIK

types that they can be used to refer to in unaarked 'basic' usage, and then allowing these noainals to be 'converted' froa one subcategory to another by a process of 'subcategorial conversion*. Following this line, we of noainals: (24)

may define the following subcategories

Type of nominal Count Noun (Nc) Mass Noun (Na) Collective Noun (Ncoll)

Between these

Designates singular plural Individual Set of Ind. Mass Set Set of Sets

subcategories, we

Example chair butter faaily

can define the following forms of

subcategorial conversion: (25) (26)

Nc -> Na There was too auch chair in the roon Na -> Nc I would like three butters please (= e.g. 'three slices of bread with butter')

(27)

Ncoll -> Na There was too auch faaily in the room

Within the fraaework of FQ, such 'subcategorial conversion' may be regarded as a for« of predicate formation which, in English, is not coded in any morphological signal on the noun. This analysis is strengthened if languages are found in which subcategorial conversions of this type are formally marked in one way or another. For example, the relation between Dutch pairs such as vogel 'bird' / ge-vogel-te 'poultry', or berg 'mountain' / ge-berg-te 'mountain range' could be interpreted as a form of conversion from count to mass or collective. Subcategorial conversion does have an obvious semantic effect on the input noun. For example, if Na is converted into Nc, as in (26), the output noun must be interpreted as referring to a Set, the members of which can in some way or other be individuated. On the other hand, a noun converted from Nc to Nm refers to an B as if it consists of some 'stuff' which cannot be individuated.

ENTITIES

9

6. Do ue need So far

Individuals?

we have

assumed without discussion that we need a distinct

K type of Individuals, as distinct from Sets. Brown (1985), other

hand,

has

interpreted as

suggested

that

singleton Sets,

Individuals

i.e. as

on the

Bay

themselves be

Sets which

have only one

member. Let us consider this question in somewhat »ore detail. Note,

first

of

all,

that

Set

Theory distinguishes

sharply

between individuals and sets consisting of only one individual: (28)

a

(29) a. b.

a e A {a} £ A

t

{a}

However,

when

we

'a is a leiber of A' 'the set of which a is the sole subset of A' consider

how

member is a

(30) could be represented in Set

Theory, there is no a priori reason why (31a) should be better than (31b): (30)

John is one of the winners

(31) a. b.

j c W {j} C W

Since,

as

we

saw

above,

'is

a

relation of Ensemble Theory, we might Another way

leiber

of' is not a primitive

even prefer

(31b) to (31a).

of saying this is that we could define 'Individual' as

a Set of cardinality 1: (32)

X is an Individual =df X is a Set I such that c(I) = 1

Alternatively, we could define an 'Individual'

as a

Set which has

no other non-empty parts than itself: (33)

X is an Individual =df X is a Set I such that for any Y, if Y C I and Y f 0, then Y = X

In both ways, we could arrive relation

'is

a member

at a

typology of

E's in

which the

of' need not occur, neither as a primitive,

10

DIK

nor as

a derived

relation. This

would imply that our typology of

B's set up in (16) could be simplified to the following: (33) a

ENTITY = ENSEMBLE

In other Sets or

words, all

B's are

Masses. Individuals

Ensembles; all

Ensembles are either

are particular kinds of Sets, defined

as in (32) or (33). 7. Arguments At first

for interpreting

sight, the

intuitively not

Individuals as singleton Sets

idea that

very appealing.

Individuals are

singleton Sets is

It seems strange to think of John

or this boy as indicating a Set of cardinality 1, or as a Set whose sole

non-empty

part

is

identical to itself. At second thoughts,

however, there are various linguistic arguments which could support such an interpretation. Let us consider soie of these. Argument

1.

Bvery

there is a fundamental

introduction

to

Set Theory warns us that

difference between

the membership

and the

subset relation, as in: (34) a. b.

John is a painter A painter is an artist

If

difference

this

is

so

j

c P P E A

fundamental,

however,

reflected in the linguistic form of (34a-b)? I language

which

has

distinct

verbs

V

member of' and W = 'is a subset of'. Of claim, as

is often

done, that

other) senses, since that

why is it not

do not

know of any

and W such that V = 'is a course it

does not

do to

be is ambiguous between these (and

amounts

to

begging

the

very question

involved. Moreover, if it is true, as suggested in Dik (1980), that be should be described as then

this

idea

grounds. If, then both

of

a

semantically

ambiguous

be

however, Individuals

(34a) and

(34b) define

is

empty

supportive verb,

not feasible on principled

are defined

as singleton Sets,

a subset relation which can, in

ENTITIES

II

both cases, be represented in the sane way. This corresponds to the fact that the FG representations for the underlying predications of the two constructions are essentially the s u e : (35) a. b.

J E P P C A

FG: P(x: J(x)) FG: A(x: P(x))

The semantic differences between the two constructions are then accounted for by the fact that J, in contrast to P and A, indicates a singleton Set. Argument 2. Consider the conjoined terms in: (36) a. b.

The boys and the girls went to the cinema John and the girls went to the cinema

Note that these conjoined terms are linguistically the same, no •atter whether Sets or Individuals are involved. Set Theory will no doubt represent the boya and the girls as the union of two Sets: (37)

B

U G

However, the union relation can only hold between Sets, not between Individuals and Sets. Therefore, it is not obvious how John and the girls should be analyzed according to Set Theory. If John, however, iB also interpreted as representing a Set, then the conjunction can be represented according to the same format as (37): (38)

J U G

Argument 3. Compare the following constructions: (39) a. b.

John is ill The boys are ill

If John is taken to indicate an Individual, (39a) could be analyzed as follows: (40)

I(j)

where the predicate I ('ill') is applied to the individual j ('John')- However, the boya in (39b) obviously designates a Set,

12

DIK

and thus, at first sight, the following analysis

would sees

to be

in order: (41)

1(B)

where

B

indicates

imply, however,

the

Set

that the

of

the boys in question. This would

predicate ill

can be

applied either to

Individuals or to Sets, a situation which is semantically difficult to evaluate. For that reason, standard logic would underlying structure

assume that the

of (39b) is in fact quite different from that

of (39a), along the lines of: (42)

Vx, xcB: I(x) 'For all x such that x is a member of B, I applies to x'

This, however, has the •ay be

wide apart

far-reaching consequence

from grammatical

form, a

that logical form

consequence which is

indeed accepted in standard logic. If, on

the other

hand, we

assume that

Individuals are Sets,

then (39a-b) can be represented in the same way: (42)' a. b.

I(J) 1(B)

where in

each case I is applied to a Set. This treatment, however,

raises a counter-argument against regarding Individuals

as single-

ton Sets: Countei—argument.

Some

predicates define properties/relations

over individual entities, some assign properties/relations to Sets. Compare: (43) a. b.

The boys are ill The boys are numerous

The difference can be paraphrased as follows: (44) a. b.

Boy1 is ill and boy 2 is ill, and ... and boy" is ill The Set consisting of "the boys' is numerous (= has relatively high cardinality)

How are we to take care of this difference when we do not differen-

ENTITIES

13

tiate between

Sets and

Individual m e m b e r s

of S e t s ?

In b o t h cases

the analysis would be the sane: (45) a. b.

1(B) N(B)

Note, h o w e v e r , (43a) and

that even

in

(43b) cannot

of the argument

term

interpretation.

It

Set

Theory

b e m a d e in t e n s

the boys'.

this term

is c u s t o m a r y ,

indicates a

therefore,

tive' and

a p p l i c a t i o n of predicates

collective

a v a i l a b l e to us, so that w e can (46) a. b.

between

and

predicates.

speak of

differ-

'distribu-

or, more

This

status

Set on any

to locate the

ill

'collective'

numerous,

distinction

ence in the predicates of d i s t r i b u t i v e and

and

the

of a d i f f e r e n c e in

same

briefly, method

is

write:

Id(B) Ne(B)

The d i s t r i b u t i v e

predicate

to the Individuals Sets w h i c h

in

are part

b e interpreted

Id

Set B

will now b e i n t e r p r e t e d (themselves defined

John

w h e r e the

to the w h o l e Set B. The same

is ill

analysis

the s i n g l e t o n

is

representa-

of:

Id(J) interpreted

as indicating that

Sets in J, w h i c h , since J in this

idual, coincide

applying

of B), w h i l e the collective p r e d i c a t e Nc will

as applying

tion can now b e used for the analysis (47)

as

as the singleton

w i t h J.

vs. c o l l e c t i v e predicates

The s e m a n t i c effect can

now

be

case

is

of u s i n g

graphically

I applies an

to

Indiv-

distributive

illustrated

as

f ollows: (48)

John and Mary are Id(J U M )

ill

(49)

John and Mary are Ec(J U M )

engaged

W e may

conclude

that the counter-argument

does not prevent

us from

14

DIK

defining Individuals as singleton Sets. 8. Individuation We can

thus say

Individuals,

of Masses that Sets

defined

ultimate parts of

as

Sets

ultimately consist subsets

can

which

thus

be

have

of smallest parts: cardinality 1. The

considered

as individuated

entities, each separate from the others, the nuaber of which can be counted. Masses do not have such individuated saallest parts. Their content cannot be counted; it can only be aeasured. However,

Masses

can

be divided into individuated quantities,

which can then be counted. Individuated

quantities Bay

be defined

by standard and non-standard quantity measures, as in: (50) a. b.

Three litres of wine [standard quantity) Three bottles of wine [non-standard quantity]

It is clear that, whereas ttine designates a Mass, the whole tern in this case designates a Set, naaely the set of

specified

quantities

of

the

Mass

represent one further way of converting

consisting of

a nuaber

in question. (50a-b) thus Mass expressions

into Set

expressions. It is

not iaaediately

bottle should be analysis

has

clear how expressions such as litre and

represented

been

in

suggested

underlying

in

ten

these quantity expressions as two-place noninal ing to

the scheaa

structure. One

Brown (1985). This is to regard predicates accord-

'x is a litre/bottle of y'. On this analysis we

arrive at structures such as: (51)

three bottles of wine (i3xi: bottle»(xi)(xj: winen(xj)) '3 entities xi that stand in a 'bottle* relation to wine'

Another approach would be bottle

represent

a

to

assune

particular

like

litre and

type of tern operator:

that

words

'measuring

unit', which can occur in such configurations as: (52)

(i3 bottle Xi: wine«(xi))

ENTITIES

A

15

problem

with

the

distinction affects

latter

representation

the measuring

is

that

the number

unit rather than the head noun.

And if both nouns take a plural, as in: (53)

three bottles of peas (i3 bottle xi: pean(xi))

then it is not from; unless

immediately clear

where the

plural on

peas

cones

we consider this as a kind of redundant plural, which

is not unreasonable in view

of

the

fact

that

it

cannot freely

alternate with a singular in this construction: (54)

»three bottle of pea

Measuring units

specify a certain quantity of what is indicated by

the noun with which kinds

of

units will secondary

entity

they combine. that

be used

indicate what

noun designates, since different measuring

for different

'classifying'

Secondarily they

role links

types of

things. Although this

them to so-called classifiers,

they should not be equated with these. The primary role

of measur-

ing units is to specify some quantity. True classifiers do not have that role. We must therefore either follow Lyons guishing

between

'mensural'

and

'sortal'

(1977) in distin-

classifiers,

subsume the measuring units under the classifiers at now

consider

the

true

'sortal'

or

not

all. We shall

classifiers in the light of our

typology of E's. 9. Sortal

classifiers

Sortal classifiers, in the languages that have them, typically come in two types, as illustrated in: (55) a. b.

three animal elephant three flat blanket

'three elephants' 'three blankets'

(56) a. b.

three dog dog three stone stone

'three dogs' 'three stones'

In the type illustrated in (55) the classifier specifies a superordinate category (a hyperonym) with respect to the noun: an elephant

16

DIK

is a kind of aniaal; a blanket is a kind of flat thing. In the type illustrated in (56) the fact, in

'repeats'

classifier

the

head

noun. In

such 'repeater constructions' the classifier and the head

noun are typically the s u e word. Classifiers of this type

have the

following recurrent proper-

ties across languages (cf. Allan 1977): (i) they

aust occur

if the

nuiber of

term containing the head noun; in only

occur

nuaber of

on

its

own

if

entities is specified in a

other words,

the head

noun can

there is no indication at all of the

entities involved.

Thus, a

typical classifier language

has the following pattern: (57) a. b. c. (ii) in

John saw elephant in jungle "John saw (one/iore) elephant in the jungle' »John saw three elephant in jungle John saw three aninal elephant in jungle the ordering of the tera, nuaeral and classifier are never

separated from each other by the head noun. Thus: (58)

three aninal elephant aniaal three elephant elephant three aniaal

»three elephant aniaal »aniaal elephant three elephant aniaal three

This property signals that there is an intiaate nuaeral and

connection between

classifier. In a sense, the presence of the classifier

•akes it possible fo the numeral to occur. (iii) it is exceptional for the head to be aarked for plural in the classifier

construction.

In

fact,

languages in which plural Barking is

classifiers

only

either totally

occur

in

absent, or at

lost optional. (iv)

classifier

languages

typically

have

a

classifiers, which together classify

all

The

necessary

restriction

'classifiable'

is

the

liaited

number of

classifiable nouns. since probably all

classifier languages also have nouns that do not take classifiers. (v) in many classifier languages the

classifiers also

play a role

in aotinoring anaphoric relations of coreference. Thus, we Bay find

ENTITIES

17

such constructions as the following: (58) a.

John shout he animal 'John shouted see then'

see

3

animal

elephant,

but

in a

sense, they

the head noun, so that it quantity, however. aptly

called

quantities) iD

can be

Rather, they them

terms

and

litre

individuate that which is indicated by counted. They

do not

specify a

designate some property or attri-

bute of that which is indicated by the head noun. has

not see

that he saw three elephants, but I did not

Classifiers are similar to measuring units such as bottle in that,

I

Greenberg

(1978)

'unit counters': they specify units (not:

of

which

the

head

noun

referent

can be

counted. We should now address two questions: (a) what is the status of classifiers in term structure? (b) what is the status of the head noun in relation to the typology of Entities? As for question (a), it is clear that some such analysis as that of (51)

is

not

specifies

a

feasible

for

classifiers.

property,

not

a

relation

For

example,

between

'animal'

'elephant'

and

something else. Since the

classifier designates

a property, we might consider

analyzing it as a restrictor on the term variable: (59)

(3 x: animal(x):

elephant(x))

However, this does not account for the intimate numeral and

classifier, and

connection between

it is not feasible in the case of the

repeater construction. No sense whatsoever could be made

of a terra

structure such as: (60) For these

(3 x: dog(x): reasons I

dog(x))

believe that it is plausible that the classi-

fier is a particular type of term operator, as illustrated in:

18

DIK

(61) a. b.

(3 animal x: elephant(x)) (3 dog x: dog(x))

The function of such

tern operators

would then

be to individuate

the head noun referent, so as to turn it into a Set expression. As

for

question

(b),

it

will

languages those nouns which require status of

way to

clear that in classifier do

not

have the

count nouns: they can only be used to refer to Sets when

they have been extended by a they carry

be

classifiers

no suggestion

account

for

languages would

the

be to

classifier; when

of individuation behavior

assuie that

of

used on

their own,

or number. A plausible

head

nouns

they have

in classifier

the basic status of

•ass nouns: taken in isolation they do not

imply any individuation

or quantification. A word such as elephant

in such a language could

then be taken to signify 'elephant-stuff', a meaning which can only be individuated, and thus Bade ready for referring to Sets, through the addition of either a mensural or a sortal classifier. Several authors (e.g. Serzisko 1982; Kolver however,

that

this

following reason: for distinguishing

assumption

even in

cannot

be

maintained,

classifier languages

mass nouns

1982) have argued, for

the

there are reasons

from other nouns. For exanple, mass

nouns could be defined as those nouns which

can only

be individu-

ated through measuring units, not through classifiers. We will then find a pattern such as: (62)

WATER (aass noun) three bucket water •three liquid water

'three buckets of water' 'three waters'

(63)

BANANA (non-mass noun) three basket banana three fruit banana

'three baskets of bananas' 'three bananas'

If mass nouns in can only

classifier languages

be individuated

(63) is not a mass noun. noun either,

it must

are defined

through measuring Since we

be something

saw that

as nouns which

units, then BANANA in it cannot

different from

be a count

either mass or

count. According to Kolver (1982)

we

may

assume

that

a

noun like

ENTITIES

BANANA

19

in

(63)

indicates

the banana-property. entities; to b e

it

able

must

be

nouns

tions

in a s e n s e ,

this

idea

is

can be

usage

is B A N A N A there

'incarnation*

can

be

banana

but

also

fruit,

contextualization, like.

Whatever

entity

or

in

to.

in

that used

in

on

through

most

their

intimation in

status:

that

Let us now

by

banana

is

And

it

to t h e

(65)

by

indicate

classifier

languages

in s u c h

construc-

in

to

trees

is

and,

one

with

banana or

not

however, that

the

is

or

does

the have

referred

concept

to s o m e t h i n g

more

suitable

of m a s h e d b a n a n a s (64),

'something*

can refer

type of

it c o u l d b e

that

only by

to is

virtue

it.

typology

of E's

set up

in

(33a):

ENSEMBLE

SET (Ncount) typology

(66)

suggests

MASS (Nmass) the

following

hypothesis:

N o u n s t h a t t a k e s o r t a l c l a s s i f i e r s in c l a s s i f i e r l a n g u a g e s are Ensemble nouns, undifferentiated for Set/Mass, and n e u t r a l as t o i n d i v i d u a t i o n a n d q u a n t i f i c a t i o n

I do believe ization of t h e

of

that

this

hypothesis

classifiable

typology

describe

the

of E's

, we are

of

nouns. (65).

typological

In n o n - c l a s s i f i e r sion

the

classifier

own,

to what

a bowl

BANANA

there

is a t t a c h e d

as

garden:

also be

BANANA

return

the

one or m o r e

this usage.

the concept

can

to

garden

is n o

it c o u l d

Rather,

the

found

is d e s i g n a t e d

object

the noun

referred

This

defined

be used

entities.

in q u e s t i o n

There

In t h i s

of

('Begriff')

cannot

as:

(64)

by

concept

concept

'reified',

to d e s i g n a t e

A problem with the

the pure

The pure

forced

On

the

when

a choice

correct

it s t r e n g t h e n s

the basis

parameter

languages, to m a k e

embodies If s o ,

of this

involved forming whether

as

character-

the

we

follows:

a referring

the

validity

hypothesis

intended

expresreferent

20

DIK

is t o

be described

however,

this

referent

as

the

intended

precise, into Mass.

as a Set

choice

is n o t

an Ensemble, referent

however,

is

we can

o r as a M a s s .

In c l a s s i f i e r

languages,

forced

us.

describe

upon

leaving unresolved i n d i v i d u a t e d or optionally

a format which unequivocally

not.

turn

We

can

the q u e s t i o n If w e w i s h

the Ensemble

designates

either

a

a

whether

to b e

more

expression Set

or

a

Modal shifts and predication types Louis Goossens Department of Germanic Languages, University of Antwerp

Introduction*

0.

A typical

feature of modals

tions w h i c h bring along question

in

this context

imposed

on

those

in Goossens

Steedman

shift to

take

the diachronic

their epistenic in

according

to

calls

sodality

type

a preliminary

E p i s t e n i c modals 'situations',

"events'.

As

I

answer to this

as a

rule

whereas

pointed out

require

deontic

and

there, one way

shift from f a c u l t a t i v e or deontic modals

counterparts,

is

to look

the combining p r e d i c a t i o n ,

In this paper

upon

w h i c h must

it

to

as involving

change from

a

'event'

X will try to p r o v i d e

some further

to a

better understanding

nically and d i a c h r o n i c a l l y . necessity used

of

adopting

of the At

refinenents

SoA-types

in

sane

tine

the

different yielding

synchro-

illustrate

entity,

case

in

reflecting, some

basic

FG.

world'.

of our

in FG. A

as

Dik SoAs

inquiry,

let's

'state of affairs'

(1978)

puts it,

'what

can be classified dynamism and

this typology

is the

nuclear

tion, i.e. predicates, whether b a s i c or d e r i v e d , w i t h their

into

control,

types of SoA: states, p r o c e s s e s , positions

actions. The correlate for arguments.

the

of the sort

of SoAs within

types, according to the p a r a m e t e r s four

First

contributes

FG

the status of S o A - t y p e s

is a conceptual

we

and g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s

B e f o r e e m b a r k i n g on the s p e c i f i c points briefly recall

of SoAs

(English) n o d a l s , both

the

in this paper in the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n

be

clarification

area. The c l a r i f i c a t i o n w i l l serve a double purpose.

we want to demonstrate that a refined treatnent

can

obvious

have to be

'situation'.

in this

1.

the

predica-

An

any restrictions

I presented

(1985a).

(1977)

facultative m o d a l s to view

structure.

nodal.

E c h o i n g work of others what

argument

is w h e t h e r

predications

realized by a given question

is that they c o m b i n e with

their own

and

predicanuclear

22

GOOSSENS

From the start Dik made clear to

further

research.

that his

Obviously,

classification

is open

new proposals must be motivated

linguistically. Such motivation has

been adduced

for the features

[+ Change] (or Telic) and [+ Momentaneousness], which Vester introduces as a refinement of dynamic SoA-types. See

(1983)

also De Groot

(1985) . The data with the should

that I

basic

am going to explore in this paper confront us

question

revisions

going beyond

in

to

the

the SoA-typology

Conceptually, it is not difficult to think of SoAs as expressible

restricted

of

predication.

is

be

whether

nuclear

what

necessarily

the nuclear predication. The addition of

satellites and of temporal or aspectual specifications to a nuclear predication may

affect the

way in

case in some world*. My position broader conceptual

view of

which it reflects

in

this

paper

SoA-types can

'what is the

is

that

be accepted

such a

as a valid

perspective within which work on SoA-types can be undertaken. In section 2 Present-day

we

English

present data,

a to

number proceed

of

findings

with

an

relating to

analysis of Old

English data in a diachronic perspective in section 3. 2. Modality

types and states

2.1. Situations

and

of

affairs

events

As I have argued in Goossens (1985a),the basic insight behind a division of SoAs into two hyperclasses, is that non-epistemic facultative and deontic) modals SoAs, i.e. the

conceived

former

as

'being

'events',

Situations not only include

the

case*.

Steedman

the latter are called

states and

(i.e.

with controlled

actions and positions, whereas epistemic modals

SoAs which are labels

typically combine

require (1977)

'situations'.

processes, but

also other

SoA-types if they are in the progressive or perfective. The

distinction

explains

why

the

naturally interpreted as deontic ((1) ((2), (3), (4) and (6)) respectively. 1

and

following (5))

and

sentences

are

as epistemic

MODAL SHIFTS

23

(1)

John may speak Dutch [unprefixed action; nornally a permission]

(2)

John may be speaking Dutch [progressive action; normally

(3)

John must be Dutch [state; normally epistemic]

(4)

John may still grow an inch or two [process; normally epistemic]

(5)

John may stay where he is [position; normally permission]

(6)

John may have stayed where he is [perfective position; normally epistemic] In order

to illustrate

the opposition between facultative and

epistemic we can resort to can't English)

or

stressed

won't

(positive

{will

stricted

in its volitional

(7)

John can't be Dutch [state; epistemic]

(8)

John can't work any harder [action; facultative]

(9)

John won't be Dutch [state; epistemic]

(10)

John can't temic]

can is not

epistemic in

is becoming more and more re-

sense):

John won't work harder [action; facultative - if phrasable as 'refuses to']

(11)

epistemic]

have worked

not a

harder

future tense

we

have

indicated

the

validation of situations vs. not

absolute.

In

the

'normal'

reading.

events through

next

two

para-

[perfective action;

Obviously, for all of these instances, we can say no that

-

The

epis-

more than linguistic

modality is therefore

subsections

we provide

further

quali ficat ion. 2.2.

The predicate

operators

A first point where exemplified by (12) and (12)

Prosp[ective]and

refinement (13).

John may come tonight

appears

Hab[itual] to

be

in

order, is

24

OOOSSENS

(13)

John must go to the dentist quite regularly According to

what was

that both these sentences

said in

2.1., our prediction should be

are deontic:

non-progressive, non-perfective

facultative in Present-day English). but in

combine with a

may and

must are not

The prediction

is borne out,

can also interpret (12) and (13) as epistemic,

addition we

be it that John may he reading and

the modals

action (and

coming

tonight

is better

in the epistemic

that John must be going to the dentist quite

regularly

is at least as good. What is going on? [Prosp] (or

Semantically

(though neither of these is very expression). The make

events

the

combining

predication is

[Future]) 2 in (12) and [Hab] (or [Repetitive]) in (13) salient: they

get no grammatical

point then would simply be that [Prosp] and [Hab]

also

compatible

with

epistemic

modals;

the event

prefixed by Prosp or Hab can acquire 'situation-like' properties. There is,

however, a

complication. Deontic

volitional ones (within the with

a

[Prosp]

SoA

(again

this

modals as well as

group) 3

facultative

normally combine

'prospectiveness'

is not very

salient and is left unexpressed, at least in English). As [Prosp] actions

a result

and positions are compatible with both deontic and

epistemic must and may or with both volitional

and epistemic will,

which considerably weakens, it would seem, the discriminative force of the event: situation opposition, and hyper-SoAs within

therefore their

status as

FG. The way to partially restore the distinction

in this context is to emphasize again the epistemic reading

marked character

of the

in (12) and the fact that a progressive would be

more current as an alternative. With respect to (13), there is no such [Hab]

with

any

of

the

non-epistemic

context, the noteworthy point is that

favoured correlation of modality

types.

only epistemic

In this

modals would

have a progressive predication as a current alternative. The gist

of it

all is

that an

event prefixed

by [Prosp] or

[Hab] can shift category by acquiring a feature which we label, perhaps

a little

awkwardly, [+

however, the more current alternative of

choose to

situation-1 ike]. There is, turning the

event into a

MODAL SHIFTS

25

situation by Beans of [Progr]. Note in

addition that

in combination with facultative Bodals,

Hab (or Rep[etitive]) can also prefixed

to states,

as illustrated

by (14) and (15):« (14)

John can be absent-minded

(15)

Boys will be boys In

instances

like

these

there

is

a

shift

away

from the

subject-internal meaning which is characteristic of the facultative modal. 5

(14)

means

both

that

John

has

absent-minded and that occasionally he iB that boys

typically exhibit

all the

the

capacity of being

absent-minded; (15) says

characteristics that go with

boys because somehow that is the way they want to has been

called 'existential'

possible stages in the

and can

transition of

be said

be. This pattern to be

facultative to

one of the an epistemic

meaning (which has been developed by will, but not by can).6 2.3. Controlled

situations

With respect to the claim that situations trigger off epistemic readings, the

following sentences

can be

adduced as counterexam-

ples . (16)

You must be more polite to your mother

(17)

The men selected must be six feet tall at least

(18)

You must have finished before I come back

(19)

You must scene

(20)

Why won't he be nicer to her?

(21)

I can't be whispering if at the same whistle that 'got-to-do-my-best'-tune.

be whispering

Sentences (16)-(19)

to Celia when Orlando enters the

time

I

naturally invite a deontic interpretation,

(20) and (21) a facultative one, in spite of the fact that polite,

have to

be more

be six feet tall and be nicer are as a rule states, whereas

in the others an action is prefixed by Perf or Progr. Obviously, there are pragmatic

(or contextual)

reasons why it

26

is

GOOSSENS

the

non-epistemic

rather

than

the

epistemic

reading

that

suggests itself. In (16), (18) and (19), the deontic interpretation follows fron

the fact

that we

get a

sole indication of futurity for the with a

non-past modal

'be lore

second-person subject, plus

combining SoA

(in combination

polite* is easily understood as a

non-realized SoA; 'before I cone back' and 'when Orlando enters the scene* are

normally futurity

Barkers). For

(17) we nay imagine a

context in which the hearer will have to take care tion of

the SoA

of the realiza-

expressed (though here an inferential interpreta-

tion is quite acceptable as well). (20) is a question and therefore not open

to an

an ability,

epistemic reading; (21) actualizes the negation of

because

there

is

an

i/°-clause

which

considers an

obligation which is incompatible with 'be whispering'. At the

level of the SoAs with which the modals in (16) to (21)

combine, however, an additional point must be made.

All these SoAs

are made to fit the deontic or facultative context, because somehow they are viewed as controlled (or controllable) by by whoever

is responsible

for the

the subject (or

selection in (17)).7 Note that

for (16) and (20) one could also argue that a state ( b e nicer) has

been turned

into an

polite,

be

action by predicate formation. In

the other instances we can only interpret the

combining situations

as such, i.e. as 'something being the case', but with an additional meaning

dimension

that this

situation is viewed as controllable/

controlled. An FG representation would ously

optional)

feature

of

have to

include this

situations;

as an (obvi-

(18), for example, would

contain the following predication:® (22)

[perf

[finish»

(you)**

]*ctlon

jsituation [ +

2.4. SoA-types

and modality-types:

a refined

controllable]

correlation

Taking into account the foregoing we can establish ing correlation SoA.

between the

the follow-

different modality types and types of

MODAL SHIFTS

27

Epistemic socials (i)

as a rule combine with situations, i.e. states, processes, perfective SoAs, progressive SoAs

(ii)

are occasionally compatible with prospective and habitual events, which are then viewed as [+ situation-like]

Deontic and facultative models (i)

as a rule require an event, i.e. non-perfective action or position

(ii)

are also tions

compatible

For facultative aodals there

a non-progressive,

with controllable/controlled

is an

additional qualification: they

can coobine with [Hab] SoAs (including states) to produce tial' meanings which

can

be

regarded

as

turn to

readings.

a number of diachronic data to see how they

can enrich our insight they will

'existen-

contaminations between

facultative (internal) readings and 'external* Let's now

situa-

into states

of affairs.

At the

same time

be used as a (partial) testing-ground for the hypotheses

formulated so far. 3. Data

from

diachrony

In Goossens English

(1985c) and (1987) I

samples

of

cunnai?,

what we know about their later demonstrate

from

these

aagan

development we

analyses

about. In this context those shifts point

of

what

they

have

to

present analyses and aotan.

of late Old

Taking into account can to

some extent

how new developments are coming are looked

at from

the view-

tell us about the ways in which we

conceptualize SoAs. 3.1.

cunnan From the

making its of 200)®

cunnan

sample

it can

be demonstrated

how cunnan is

appearance onto the modal scene. In 64 * (of the sample

cunnan

arguments, some

is

a full

predicate, meaning

'knowing' (cognizant)

'know'. It

entity (xi) and some

has two 'know-

able' entity X2. Those cases are not considered here. The ability-sense, which is

still

very

marginal,

appears to

28

GOOSSENS

have developed along the following path: X2 is realized by means of an infinitive (in a bit less than 20 % of the sample), that we

which means

get the shift from 'knowable entity' to a SoA. This SoA is

typically one that involves cognizance (as in (23)), combined with

agency (for

or cognizance

which we use 'potency' as a cover term)

(e.g. (24)) (23)

Forgif me wisdom f)»t ... ic cunne tocnawan betwux Give me wisdom that ... I can/may discern between god and yfel good and evil 'Give me wisdom so that I may discern between good and evil' (¿KCHom II, 45 336.28)

(24)

Ne canst huntian buton aid nettum Not can you hunt except with nets 'You can't hunt except with nets' («Coll 61) The relevance for our discussion of SoA-types is as follows. In

the acquisition

of

cognizance have

a special

cognizance want

of

an

in their a

better

ability-sense part to

pure form term)

are

for

cunnan

SoAs involving

play. Note that SoAs involving

(henceforth 'cognizant states,

SoAs', for

but then states which are

compatible with ability (and the other non-epistemic modalities for that matter).

A recognition

of cognizant

states as distinct from

other states within FG's SoA typology seems therefore in order. 3.2. mag an In late Old English magan is still predominantly modal. This

is duly

reflected in

(1987). At the same time the sample indicates from this

subject-internal type

a facultative

the sample analysed in Goossens the increasing shift

of meaning towards the 'external'

meanings which in later English develop into the permission reading that may will acquire and, later still, into its epistemic sense. Working

with

the

categories

internal, internal/external and

external, we found the distribution presented in table I. 1 0

MODAL

SHIFTS

29

Table

A

I:

Distribution

Internal

B

MAGAN

We

give A,

B

100)

Internal/External

47

plify

(total

C

External

28

one and

instance C

per

25

category:

(25),

(26)

and

(27)

exem-

respectively.

(25)

ne bii he para ahta h l a f o r d ponne hi ne dslan n o t is he of the goods lord when then not distribute ne m e g not can 'he is n o t t h e l o r d of t h e g o o d s if he can't share them o u t * ( « C H o m I, 4 66.5) [general ability, not the "physical ability* w h i c h u s e d to be the core m e a n i n g of aagan at an earlier s t a g e of the language]

(26)

...

J u d a s ... s m e a d e wi& hi hu he Crist him Judas d e l i b e r a t e d w i t h them how he Christ to-then belzwan mihte betray might 'Judas deliberated with them how he might betray Christ t o t h e m ' ( « C H o n I, 1 2 6 . 2 2 ) ( J u d a s ' a b i l i t y is d e p e n d e n t on his personal ability and on 'external' arrangements)

(27)

&urh eastdael m z g o n b e o n g e t a c n o d e p a on through east may be s i g n i f i e d t h o s e t h a t in g e o g o & e to g o d e b u g a i f o r p a n &e ... youth to G o d turn because 'Through the east we nay signify those that c o m e to w h e n t h e y a r e y o u n g ' (fiCHom I , 8 1 3 0 . 2 3 ) Looking

external I could

for

the

possibility discern

is

'track' takes

along

place,

correlated

which

the

I found

with

the

shift

that

type

of

from

God

internal

to

the m a i n

factor

that

SoA

which

aagan

with

comb ines. As under

is A

to

be

expected,

and

B,

and

categories, first

two

cognizant

there

is

categories states

non-cognizant

ones.

we

states

typically in C.

a striking and

(e.g.

Moreover,

in

the

'see', there

is

non-states

states

difference

those

geseon

get

Though

occur

between

third.

the

striking

the

those

In A

tocnawan

('events')

in

and

three in

the

B we

get

'know'), presence

in

C

among

30

GOOSSENS

the 'external' instances of passives ((27) happens, all

is an

instance): as it

in our sample give rise to an external

five passives

interpretation. It is tempting, therefore, to think of passives as belonging to situations (and SoA-type

of

of passivization as a process which may affect the

the

illustrates,

nuclear

some

of

salient) permissive

predication).

these

However, can

instances

sense as

well. This

as

(27)

also

be given (a not very

would be

an argument to

maintain their original event-status. A consideration teaches us,

I

of the

think,

that

following present-day English examples passives

(which

typically

build on

original actions) can go either way: (28)

John won't be convinced

(29)

John must be convinced

(28) and

(29) are ambiguous between an epistemic and a non-episte-

mic reading. In (28) stressed won't can be to'

(the

facultative

reading),

in

paraphrased by

'refuses

(29) must can be interpreted

deontically. In those cases the normal reading would be to take 'be convinced' in a process or action meaning. If we interpret (28) and (29) epistemically the natural reading is words,

it

would

seem

that

passives

a stative can

situation:event dichotomy (the emphasis

go

can be

one. In other

either way in the on the action-pro-

cess or on the resulting state). Looking at (30) and (31), however, we find that other passive events do not

readily invite

a stative

interpretat ion. (30)

John must be told straight away

(31)

John won't be kept out of this

In

these

both

proceed to a obligation;

cases

the

non-epistenic (31)

SoA retains its event-character and we interpretation

as meaning

the future tense reading). The that

passives

from

'refuses to', conclusion

[+contro1]-verbs

events and situations, whereas

(we

take

(30)

as an

at least if we exclude therefore

seems

to be

sometimes alternate between

(more often?)

they simply maintain

MODAL SHIFTS

31

their event-status. 3.3. so tan Diachronically, the

main question

about Old

English aotan is

how it developed an obligational sense, whereas its core is clearly permissive.

This

is

not

to

say

that aotan can semantically be

reduced to just Permission and Obligation. aotan-sample

In the

analysis of the

the following categories suggested themselves:

A Permission (an

external possibility

human/institutional/divine

authority)

A/B Permission/Obligation

(instances

which is

which

dependent on some

were

both compatible

with a permission and an obligation reading) B Obligation (the external authority creates an obligation) A/C Permission/Ability also some focus on

(besides

the

permission

subject-internal potential,

element there is though in

none of

these instances we get a purely internal meaning) (A/B)/D (Permission/Obligation)/Contingency

(the

impact

of some,

human or other, authority has been considerably weakened; other and vaguer external

circumstances are involved; the realization of the

SoA appears as contingent) A/E Permission/Wish (in addition to

the

permission,

there

is an

overtone that the SoA is wished for) Disregarding most

of the

syntactic contexts

guished in my earlier analysis, I

present the

which I distin-

distribution of the

relevant subtypes in table II. The distinction between positive and negative sentences is retained, because it is relevant I want to discuss next.

for a point

32

GOOSSENS

Table II: Distribution of motan (total 100)

Positive A

A/B

B

A/C

(A/B)/D (P/0)/Cont

Perm.

Perm/0

Obi.

Perm/Ab

31

4

12

9

Prohib ition

Absence of Obi.

Prohib/ Neg.Ab.

17

2

6

3

A/E Perm/Wish 16

Negative

As can be inferred from this table, 10E motan atill has a clear permission core, giving rise to (A/B)/D,

A/E)

on

the

instances under B) on exemplify categories

one

all

sorts

of

blends

(A/B, A/C,

hand, and shifting to obligation (the

the other.

The four

instances which follow

A and B, both in a positive and in a negative

context. (32)

ealswa bealdlice mot se feowa clypian god hin to as confidently may the slave call God him to fmder ealswa se cyning father as the king 'as confidently as the king the slave can call God his father' (CCHom I, 19 260.23) [positive permission]

(33)

we motan eow secgan eowre sawle pearfe, licige eow we must you tell of your soul need please to-you ne licige eow, pzt ... not please to-you in order that 'we must tell you about your souls'need, whether it please you or not* («CHom I, 17 (App) 182.240) [obligation ]

MODAL SHIFTS

33

(34)

... and hi to £am men cwsdon (3e xr gehsled wss, and they to the nan said that before cured was Hit is halig restendag; ne most &u styrigan (?ine it is holy rest-day; not must you move your beddinge bed "and they said to the man who had been cured: "This is a holy day of rest; you cannot/may not/must not move your bed"' (iCHom 2 42)

(35)

Cristene men ne aoton healdan nu 4a ealdan s Christian men not need observe now the old law lichamlice ac ... bodily but 'Christians no longer need observe the old law bodily, but ...' (iECHom II, 15 151.36) [Absence of obligation] An analysis of the

with these earlier.

kinds of

two deontic We

typically

instances quoted

SoA that

we find

in combination

modality types confirms what we postulated get

we have

controlled

SoAs

("events').

In the

actions in (32), (33) and (34); for (35)

we may hesitate between an action and a position. Besides, we get a few instances

of states,

but, typically,

cognizant states (as in

(36)). (36)

he ... fancode georne gode (3«t he hine geseon he thanked eagerly God that he him behold aoste might/could 'he thanked God eargerly that he could behold him' (iCHom I, 142.23) There is one instance where a situation (process) is viewed as

controllable, namely (37). (37)

&a se eadiga laurentius ... bemznde flat he ne when the blessed laurentius complained that he not •oste mid his lareowe (>rowian: fa ... could with his teacher suffer : then 'when the blessed Laurentius complained that he could not suffer with his teacher' (jECHomI,29 418.5) As is

to be expected, the differentiation of SoAs developed so

far does not help to account for the shift from the permission core to the

obligational meaning of must in later English. What are the

factors then that have played

a

part

in

this

change?

A closer

34

GOOSSENS

inspection

of

my

they exhaustively

sample

has revealed two. Without claiming that

'explain' the

shift, I

think they

are at least

ingredients in whatever nay count as a real explanation. 11 A first denied

factor relates

permission

oversimplifying

amounts

"logical*

to the

negative instances

under A. A

to

obligation-not-to;

to

an

equation:

n

PERM

p

use an

= OBL w p. Under

negation the distinction between a permission and an

obligation is

largely neutralized. This leaves us with the positive instances, however, as well as with those where the cases under

negation is

B, positive

factor, a more precise

external to

and negative).

the obligation (the

At this

characterization of

point our second

the SoAs,

may help to

uncover what is involved. In a

permission some authority (the speaker in cases where the

permission is created by case of

the very

speech act,

the hearer

in the

a requested permission, or some other authority) is viewed

as not obstructing/requested not to obstruct the realization of the SoA with

which the

an authority realization

is of

permission is concerned. In an obligation such

viewed the

as

SoA

exerting

that

its

authority

towards the

the obligation concerns. A crucial

point here is the appreciation of the SoA by the one who is granted the permission, or, who is held to attend to the realization of the 'obligated' SoA. In the case of a permission viewed positively,

the permitted

negatively (as unwelcome, as difficult etc.). The combination modal

expressing

permission

with a SoA which in the negatively, gives

(at

of a

least in the majority of cases)

given context

can be

taken to

be viewed

rise to an obligational meaning. This is what we

witness in the obligational 'viewed negatively'

SoA is

in the case of an obligation this SoA is viewed

instances in

our sample.

The feature

is saliently present in all the cases under B.

In (35) for example, this appears from the added phrase

licige eow

ne licige eow ('whether it please you or not'): the 'deontee' (as a rule the subject of aotan, here the we) finds it the hearers

{eow) about

difficult to tell

their souls' need to the extent that what

he has to say may displease them. How should such a feature ("viewed negatively or

positively by

MODAL SHIFTS

35

the deontee') be integrated into FG? As far as I can see, this is a pragmatic feature to be

attached

to

events

or controllable/con-

trolled situations. The justification, as I hope to have demonstrated, is linguistic in that

it

helps

to

explain

the

shift from

permissive to obligational. 4.

Conclusion Let's review

for the

the foregoing, both with respect to its relevance

characterization

respect to

of

the implications

predication of such

types

in

an enriched

FG

and with

characterization

for a treatment of modality. (i) There are reasons to

introduce

two

classes

of 'hyper-SoAs',

which (for want of a better term) we label events and situations. Events

are

controlled

SoAs,

they

encompass

unprefixed

(i.e.

non-perfective and non-progressive) actions and positions. Situations are concerned with 'what is the case'

and uncontrolled;

they

Perf(ective)

include

states

and

Progr(essive) SoAs (obviously

processes

and

and

'aspectual' considerations govern the

combination of Progr with the basic SoAs) Epistemic modals (i.e. deontic

as a

rule require situations, non-epistemic ones

and facultative

modals) combine

with events. This,

however, is no more than a (strongly) preferential correlation. (ii) Among the basic SoA-types cognizant states have to be recognized as a separate class, distinct predicates

(like

know,

from other

understand,

states. They include

see, hear etc.) with a first

argument we may call cognizant. Cognizant states differ from other SoA-types in that

in unprefixed

occurrence, they freely combine with both epistemic and non-epistemic modals. 1 2 (iii) Another predicate operator

(besides

appears

of

to

affect

the

status

Perf

and

Progr) which

a basic SoA is Hab(itual) (or

Rep(etitive)). Hab SoAs appear to be compatible with both epistemic and non-epistemic modals. It is

not clear

to me,

however, whether Hab SoAs should be given

36

GOOSSENS

the status of a hyper-SoA like those in (i). (iv) Passivization can both with

the

control

leave an

disensión

(in

Obviously, state-passiveB can be

event controlled

the

case

assigned

or do away

of a state-passive).

to

situations

and are

compatible with epistemic modality. (v) Situations

can be

qualified by

a feature controlled/control-

lable. This Bakes then compatible with non-epistemic modals, though they retain

their character

of being

concerned with 'what is the

case'. (vi) Events can be further characterized [viewed

positively

by

the

deontee]. Such features may

by a

(pragmatic) feature

deontee] or [viewed negatively by the help

to

account

for

the difference

between permissions and obligations. Summing

up

at

the

level

formulated above advocate the SoA-type (cognizant

of the FH>

The principles when

eration

here,

affairs

(SoA

knowledge

The

uttering

- i.e.

in

this

property

of

(>H>)

intended here, particularly, the

mic cf.

and

Q

1983:396).

modality; Horn

or

various

SoA

Thus

in

some the

the SoA in

N)

degrees

ranges of

one,

for

only

(Mx)

degrees

non-absolute

More

in

(Q)

affect

relation-

polarity

(in

(De Schutter

and

cases

of

not

the

the

level

concepts).

only

consider

SoA

world

'x' h a v i n g

a Q does

of

examples

the q u a l i f i c a t i o n

deontic modality

the

of

the

concerning both

from a b s o l u t e

considstate

piece

In

person

but

modality

X only

under

in

(9).

representational

(normally,

involves of

type

particular

but

the SoA,

and

paper

non-occurrence

items,

discussed

understand

a small

involves

complex

Q

of

concerned with

entities -

a

(sic - at

the reasoning

this

of the

with

are

to

conversation).

lexical

is

(In t h i s

but

and

concerned

are no

is a

(1978))

occurrence

construction

is

the

system

suffice

a

this

negativity

concerned, over

the

this

will

"crazy-ness"

there

of

representational

in

relationship

examples

Nuyts

paper

expression

conceptualization

the speaker

existence

ship), our

>H>

the

uttered

provided

of the

this

following

the speaker

to be

syntactic

crazy-ness

behind

(1985).

Basically,

choice

N/Mx

>

Nuyts

>

with

is

episte-

identical

likelihood

the

possible

positiveness

qualification

of

in

of

the a

-

the

world SoA,

gradual

NEGATIVE

order and

RAISING

from

rather

resulting

implies

chically

equal:

that The

use

they

that

neither

(10)

Probably

This

he

construction

must

share

Since

some

from

handle

to u s e

this

too

recourse

to t h e

The (9)

the

at

are

this

hierai—

(Which does

not

constructions

s u c h as

(la-b),

He m i g h t

as

well

crazy expresses of

FG/FPG

in s y n t a c t i c in

this

representational

is,

various level

of options

the with

it

case,

same meaning. (5a-d)

in t h e

is a g a i n

terms

Thus

it

grammar.

inappropriate

(the structural

too,

level

then,

of

one will

contained

can

embedded

clause)

either

(in t h e m a i n

clause)

positive

PA-predicate

course,

about

degrees

is o f

the

the

to

changes

have

in

to

(9)

is r a t h e r (3b-7b)

an

are

(11),

this

a

has

to

take

as

the

in

expression on

some

the

(at

the

(in

can

least

express

such

(3a-b)

latter if the

or

as

of

value

prediin

of

the

Q.

view,

it

(la-b),

are not.

Of

other,

above

possibilities

a

with

(7a-b)).

to e a c h

the

in the

propositional

the

exact of

the

number

the Q

SoA

and he

and

of the

while of

a

expressed by means

options

pairs

choice

with

has

realizing

(3a-b)

the basis

utterance

in m e a n i n g ,

shows

his

To s t a r t

of

one,

(2a-b),

the

conceptualization

a negative

incorporation

that,

see why

or

can be

to a t t u n e

note

related which

PA

negative

contained

appropriate

respect, easy

or

for

or n e g a t i v e ,

a positive

And

of

the speaker

expression

positive

it.

determine

in F G / F P G .

(la-b),

particularly the

of n e g a t i v e type

speaker

to get

In this

make either

(PA)

various

types

disposal,

speaker

attitude

factors

realizations

the p r e d i c a t i o n s

in c o n s t r u c t i o n at h i s

what

alternative

The

schema

the other.

neutral, that

below.)

of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n

fundamental),

alternatives

and

Note

factors

conceptualization.

basically

question the

order

totally

SoA.

level.

between

cate

via

the

(10).

is n o t

level

of

over

obliged

relationship

are much

(9).

scope

the perspective

this

common

has

s u c h as

negative

and modality

- see

is n o t

constructions

rather

negativity

interfere

to e x p r e s s

etc.

to

the polarity

do n o t

speaker

(2a-b),

positive

in a b s o l u t e

analysis mean

113

(3a-7a) Consider of

using

114 NUYTS

PA-predicates for expressing various degrees of PAs. of

predicates

on

this

(The placement

scale is intuitive. The classification

is

only intended to be roughly appropriate.

In general, there seems to

of variability

in the degree of polarity

be a

considerable range

expressed

by

each

predicate,

contextual

factors.)

the

precise

value

being

due to

(U) N impossible

doubt

uncertain

not-believe

+

possible

not-know

believe

not-impossible

improbable It is conceptually express

a

(not

negative

pragmatically -

PA

opposite positive PA

about

a

see below)

(N being the turning point)

about the negated

each time SoA

(la-b), (3a-7a), and (3b-7b) express 'he is

in the

crazy'. But

(3a-b) definitely

PA-predicate does not only

the polarity of the PA expressed, but also its modal is

only

a

correspondence between

their negatives, and PAs and their rather

positive

negative in (3b)

and

The

rather

does

negative proposition negative

not

opposites, in

negative

indicated

the

(which,

before

can

the case

for

the

change

main

clause

of be

influences

other way,

(lb)

(5a)

and

course,

is

correlated

utterance

weaker

is weaker (6a).

clause

from

the

a

the

modality that the

matter

with

one

(i.e.

with

a

more

This

than

(8),

of

modality)

variable

in our

negative in

explicitly

negative

closer to N in (11)) than the utter-

ance with an equivalent, but less explicitly negative Thus

of the

too. Note

the degree of explicitness of the

the PA-predicate. An PA-predicate is

value, and as

lexical items and

in (3a) to its positive alternative in (3b).

in

constructions, viz.

influence

PAs. Thus, the main

compensate

expressed by the predicate in some weakness-effect

to

or to express the

The negative there

equivalent

proposition,

about the same Q of the

such,

know

not-improbable

proposition. Thus, do not.

certain

probable

and

relationship

(5d) and (6d) are seems

to

hold

PA-predicate. weaker

than

even between

NEGATIVE

RAISING

115

non-incorporated clearly the

weaker

and

than

differences

with

a number

confirmed

The

about

difference etc.

is

these this

rather

variants respect

(10)

as

small,

clearer

such

functional

as

focal

of e i t h e r

value

this

account).

(5a)

also

the

topicality (5b) w i l l

The a Q

of a

as

o f t h e Q,

a significant

(cf.

De Schutter

But

the

(la-b)

reduce

choice

to

between

nature,

alternatives

and

in

such

as

of either, chosen

the p r o p o s i t i o n or v i c e

versa.

pragmatic

the n e g a t i v i t y

on

clause);

or b o t h

the main

in

an

too).

they

can

have

intonational

stress

on

(10) m i g h t

chosen

if

be

other

(the

hand,

between in

focal, of

the

but

focal SoA

in

chosen

modality

can b e

an

Focus

is

of

Hence,

a strong

clause

the n e g a t i v e there

compo-

not.

does has

the modality

kinds

two

that

(5b)

result

can be

different

the

is

in t e r m s

the

E.g.,

then,

negativity)

embedded

stress

(i.e.,

(5b),

between

distinction

factor.

the of

and

the

and

or

for

in g e n e r a l

(5a),

it,

the principles

the

in the

of

a much

(1985)

whereas

if t h e Q

part

allow

topical

distinction vs.

(10), in

(5a)

(which will

on

or a

functional

modality

to

difference

between

topical

clause,

It

alternain

certainly

pragmatic

compared

and the negativity

result

explain

(6b-6c).

the speaker's

difference

be

is a s t r o n g

and

of

or f o c a l i t y

topical,

if t h e r e

reasons

can

alternatives

consideration

(5a-b),

(the

probably

while

is

case

allows

of

factor

the

the

in o u r p a i r s .

and

in c o n t e x t ,

in

to be

into

distinction

in

(9))

seems

take

proposition

value,

can,

factor

for

(3a-7a),

choice between

(6a-6d)

e x p r e s s e d by and

observation

speaker's

these

well.

Utterances

nents

the

completely among

too.

the variants

The main can

kind,

are

tested

utterances

(la-b),

between

rather

we

of this

(5b-5c),

(6b) -

responsible

choice

in t h e m o d a l i t y

relevant.

be

variants this

for

these nearly

whether

(5a-5d),

and

relationships

might our

alternatives

of

the results

weakness

variable

account

as

equivalents

and

between

(5b)

- informally

however,

the

does

such

hardly

is,

(I h a v e

Dutch

about

this

and the other

undoubtedly

the

weakness

question

everything tives

So, in

variants:

(6c).

speakers,

intuitions

utterances.) (3b-7b),

and

between

of native

my

difference

incorporated

(5c)

focal

intonational for -

different which

in t h e

is a r a t h e r

will

embedded

small

prag-

116 NUYTS

matic distinctiveness

between the

of (9). The negativity

in itself nay still be in focus: this can be

marked by intonational stress on If

this

analysis

accurate, this

at

of

once

pragmatic functionality

modality and the SoA components

not.

the

differences

implies

that

of FG,

the

of utterances

matter, as is claimed in the current

in pragmatic terms is determination

of the

is not a post-predicational

(i.e.

Dik 1978-based) version

but a pre-predicational matter, as is claimed in FPG.

(That

the pragmatic functions deserve a more central place in the grammar has been recognized

in a number of other publications

ture as well - e.g. Hannay 1985, Bolkestein propose a pre-predicational

in FG-litera-

1985. But

status of the pragmatic

they do not

functionality.)

Pragmatic functions such as Topic and Focus must be assigned on the basis of

representational

level

(9), since

choice of the underlying predications.

they co-determine

the

In fact, there is a need

for

pragmatic notions at an even more basic level. For the differentiation between the alternatives on the back to network

decisions on

which is relevant

and

the

communicative

speaker's hypothesis is

whether

of the

discourse

a SoA

in

a

be

carried

in the

situational

under

consideration or

network

(CSN

a

important factor nature, has

negative

viz.

the

been

at this

the question

present

form,

in the

and whether the

modality of the SoA has been under discussion or not. assignment of topicality/focality

situa-

to the hearer's knowledge of the

SN). One

discourse-functional positive

world knowledge of

in a particular communicative

with respect

same facts as involved level

(9) can

(SN in (9) - i.e. the complete piece of

the speaker tion)

basis of

the basis of a comparison of the situational

in (9) is strongly

In fact, the (but certainly

not uniquely) determined by the need to create utterances which are adequately

discourse

thematicity/rhematicity (9) at

the level

bound,

and

as

such it is sensitive to the

and givenness/newness

of

the

elements in

of the SN/CSN (which represents the level of the

discourse/text) (cf. De Schutter and Nuyts 1983:389, 392 has been noted before - e.g. Hannay

(1985) - that these

pragmatic notions, which are only implicit in the

ff.).

(It

discourse-

FG conception of

the pragmatic functions at the sentence level, should obtain a more

NEGATIVE

RAISING

117

explicit role in FG. FPG provides room for The problem with the ences and hardly

similarities between

accessible

extensive

corpus

on

purely

analysis

is

that the differ-

variants are very subtle, and thus intuitive

might

insight into the variety of determination

their,introduction.)

PA-construction-type

be

factors

grounds.

Probably,

an

helpful in gaining a better involved.

At

least

for the

of the discourse functional factors this would be the

case; but I doubt that the other aspects the intricate

semantic interaction

be enlightened

in

required. But

whatever the

how one will ever

that be

way.

In

of the

phenomenon - e.g.

of polarity and modality - can any

case,

further

research is

ultimate picture will be, I do not see

able

to

account

pattern of relationships and factors

fully

for

the intricate

involved with a model which is

less sophisticated than FPG. 4. The representation

of the

'raised'

construction

A different aspect of accounting for the relationship

between

(lb),

the PA-constructions

(2b), etc.

on the

involves

one hand,

and

constructions of the type of (4) on the other hand. As mentioned 2.,

in

the

traditional

pragmatic

PA-constructions have been representation as

(4). But

(4) the negative is distinct, while,

clained

approach to

as we

to NR, the

underlying

the problem with that claim

is that in

and thus

the

'raised'

same

strongly focal,

have

in

pragmatically

quite

have noted in 3., in the PA-constructions,

the negative is not pragmatically distinct at all. Rather, it seems that a

construction such

as (lb), for example, can be assigned at

least three different readings, in which the negative each time has a different noted that three

functionality (lb) can

different

intonation

difference, viz. the

main

with

clause

or

negative and predicate, variant would with stress on

(scope).

In this respect, it should be

be pronounced

rather be believe.

with

contours,

a neutral with either

a

(at which

least) the following clearly

(slightly rising) clear with

uttered with

mark

this

intonation in

intonational break between stress

on

don't

the non-reduced

(but this do not),

or

118 NUYTS

The reading which has tional pragmatic

been under

consideration

in

the tradi-

approach, then, is the one with the stress on the

negative. This reading is more or

less equivalent

to (4), indeed,

and its meaning can conceptually be represented as (12). (12)

not > =

I.e.,

the

speaker

negates

(holding the view) that main clause entirely

the SoA

predicate does

proposition

the

SoA which involves his believing 'x is

'believe he is crazy' is

in

the

scope

crazy' might

not express

of

be true.

in

itself

a

SoA,

which is

the main clause negative. Whether the

speaker will use (lb) or (4) for that purpose most probably on purely

The

modality anymore; and the

depends

pragmatic factors, such as the degree of focality of the

negative, or the desire of the speaker to

'echo' the

utterance in

which a hearer has claimed that the speaker holds the belief that x is crazy. The meaning of the reading of (lb) with

stress on

believe

can

be conceptually represented as (13). (13)

not Q

In this

utterance, the speaker denies that the view which he holds

with respect to the predicate. Thus, by uttering hold a Again,

embedded

SoA

iB

the

one

expressed

unlike the case conceptually represented

(lb) this way the speaker clearly suggests that he does

view on believe

the Q

of the

SA, but

he leaves

open which one.

does not express modality here.

Only the utterance of (lb) with neutral intonation clause is

a genuine

PA-construction

tically equivalent to (la)). negative is

somehow

involved

(only

As indicated,

in the main

this reading is semanin this

utterance the

in expressing the combination of the

modality and polarity factors in the Q in schema ally,

by the in (12),

(9), and

function-

it simply constitutes a unity together with the verb.

But how

should we

handle these different

relationships

in our

NEGATIVE

RAISING

119

g r a m m a r ? First, consider (lb), and

(4).

construction, tion.

It

is reasonable

it in a cleft case)

status

factivity)

seems

cleft

acceptable

but that not,

A

which of

such

at

the as

to

it is not

(it is p o s s i b l e

to

accounted

for

constructions (lb) and

in b a s i c a l l y are handled to

accept

(Dik

he has

again, the

done

that he

such as

1980a:210ff).

(4)

done

do

not

of

to Dik's

allow

the negative.

treatment

this account,

of

cleft

representation

in common w i t h non-focal u t t e r a n c e s

necessary

in (9)

clefts and

same SoA.

to account

In this respect, note also

and p s e u d o - c l e f t s underlying functions, postulated

requires the

predication

with

excommunicating in FG.

representation,

it

for what

the

is not

really

in the

and

degree can

pseudo-cleft

which

have no

nevertheit

level

treatment of

of

a special

distribution

pragmatic

function

of

seems of the

grammar, for

clefts type of

pragmatic

assignment

deeper

n e c e s s a r y at all to introduce in the

a

But

the u t t e r a n c e s have in

If one is w i l l i n g to introduce a

arbitrary c o m p l i c a t i o n

to

pseudo-clefts

that Dik's fixed

for

syntax,

So, in these cases

introduction a

of us

again to take r e c o u r s e to a representational

indicated

that

The same remark

In

express the

means

(one reading o f ) (lb) and

constructions. less b a s i c a l l y

should be

rules would b e inappropriate.

FG-representations

distinctiveness

it, upon

pseudo-cleft

This

to the FG/FPG principles

for the fact that for the speaker

b e m a d e with respect

or less

embedded it hardly

has

(4) can express the s a m e SoA, w h i l e they only differ

common.

epistemic

the

different u n d e r l y i n g p r e d i c a t i o n s

in terms of s y n t a c t i c

of p r a g m a t i c

kind

it an

the

in

the same way as cleft and

in FG

(4), for, according

correlation then,

noun'

give

nature).

it seems that constructions

necessary

account

that

say not

and thus is of quite a d i f f e r e n t

is

follow

'dummy

can

once p r e d i s p o s e s

SoA

usually

f o c u s s i n g upon

is not a c o n s t r u c t i o n w h i c h can be used for f o c u s s i n g

In any case,

it

and

e.g.) which

cleft

construc-

does not

the insertion of a

(so,

(13) of

to the

argue that it is a cleft

requires

element

independent

reading akin

in linguistic structures,

construction

status

predication.

(4) is functionally

to a s s u m e that, since not

status

or another

(the

relationship between

and one might even

h a v e an independent (the

the

In principle,

as

level of this more

then one can

120 NUYTS

sinply assume has been

the pragmatic

argued above),

placement

of

functions to be pre-predicational

and to

constituents,

determine not

but

also

the

(as

only the syntactic

elementary

choice of

construction types and the lexical elements in them. On the accept

other hand,

three

consider the

different

readings of utterance representations

underlying

(lb). Doing so

would cause

we should

for

the

three

problems for the

in FG, for then it would be necessary to find a way

to mark the differences in matters these underlying do this.

question whether predications

It is

sufficient to

three readings

of

predications. But, at the

scope

handle the

conceptual

of

the

negation in

again, it is not necessary

level

distinction between

to our

of representation, and to

assume that in expressing them, the different

representations

are

mapped onto one predication, viz. the one with a negative as predicate

operator

in

the

main

clause.

The

conceptual

distinction

between them is indicated, then, by using other expressive such as intonation, which can mark

the specific

devices,

conceptual

status

of the negative. 5.

Conclusion

The picture here is

very

of PA- and related constructions which I have sketched incomplete

sufficiently clear

and

fragmentary.

Yet,

in deciding whether FG needs expansion, and if tion. I

have indicated

each

not only

utterances, but

time for the

so, in

what

necessary

to

between this

these predications

assume that

additional

the FG-predications, and co-determine the predications,

functional

role

direcbetween

accept a

level

not only

in

differences

also for their conceptual

ties. And each time, it is necessary to functions operate sion of

it was

of representation than the underlying predications

FG if one is to account, between these

hope

a number of different relationships

constructions, for which it is deeper level

I

to show that this topic can play a central

similari-

the pragmatic

and the level of the actual

expres-

but also the very basic constitution of

itself.

Hence, the above analysis suggests the following

conclusions:

NEGATIVE

121

RAISING

(i) It indicates the need for a much and for

more abstract

more powerful

representations

model than FG,

than the underlying

predica-

(ii) As such, it also indicates that one of the principles

underly-

tions in FG.

ing Dik's conception of FG, viz. that a linguistic theory should be concrete, and

as close

utterances, might the

Wittgensteinian

functional levels of

as possible

to the

surface of

linguistic

in fact be untenable. Rather, it seems to confirm

approach

claim to

that

a

language

consistent

application

automatically

of a

leads to abstract

argumentation.

(iii) Therefore, the above analysis appears to confirm the FPG-view that

speaking

is

essentially

a

matter

of

finding

an optimal

lexicalization and syntactic expression for a thought, in the light of an intricate network of underlying cognitive-pragmatic

relation-

ships .

NOTES *

I am grateful to J. van der Auwera, M. Bolkestein, S. Gillis, I. Goossens, C. de Groot, L. Mackenzie, G. de Schutter, and J. Verschueren; and to M. Hannay for pointing out some small but unpleasant mistakes.

Voice in Ancient Greek: Reflexives and passives Rodie Risselada Department of Classics, University of Amsterdam

0.

Introduction*

In Functional Graaaar, the syntactic function Subject is defined as 'that constituent which refers to the point

of

departure

(or

state of affairs in

entity which

is taken

as a

perspective) for the presentation of the

which it

participates' (cf.

Dik 1978:87-88).

Subject assignment is relevant only in those languages in which the function

Subject

arguaent

but

is

Bay

not

be

autonatically

assigned

to

possibility leads to an opposition

assigned

to

the

first

other arguments as well. This of

voice,

naaely

an unaarked

active voice, which indicates that Subject is assigned to the first arguaent, versus

a

narked

passive

voice,

which

indicates that

Subject is assigned to another arguaent. Languages with a clear-cut active-passive opposition are e.g. Dutch, English and Latin. The Ancient Greek voice addition

to

an

active

so-called aiddle voice.

systea is

and

a

more conplicated,

passive

The aiddle, which

voice,

it

is only

since in

has a third, to sone extent

fornally distinguished froa the passive, expresses various types of reflexivity

and

cannot

assignaent. In this

be

article, I

Greek voice systea on

the

basis

defined

in

teras

of

Subject

propose a unified treataent of the of

the

FG

concept

of Valency

Reduct ion. 1. Voice in Ancient Greek In addition to the active-passive opposition, exeaplified in: (1) a.

b.

the

ho aner zeugnusi tous hippous the aansubj yokesAct the horses 'the aan is yoking the horses' hoi hippoi zeugnuntai hupo tou andros the horsessubj are-being-yokedxp by the aan 'the horses are being yoked by the nan' [Mp = middle-passive]

Greek

voice

systea

contains another opposition, naaely that

124

RISSELADA

between

active

and niddle,

terms

of

reflexivity.

verbal

morphology,

(together between

with

in

infinitive four

tense

(2)

infinitive

are

the

is

an

is t h a t

Ancient

tenses

large group of Greek

given

in

verbs

middle

in the

Creek

distinguish

example,

of a

the active,

in

in all

As

usually,

factor

encoded

does not

middle.

endings

of

the

active

The

defined,

in

(the

(2)

the

so-called

and passive

in

the

middle

and

stems:

present aorist perfect future fact

passive

being

complicating

voice

and mood),

and

endings

thematic verbs)

latter

extra

which

tense

the p a s s i v e

the

An

middle

-ein -sai -kenai -sein

that,

are not

in

justified

label

instance,

a sentence

thematic

verbs:

passive

-esthai -sasthai -(th)enai -sthai -sesthai -(th)esesthai

the

formally

so-called

present

and

distinguished

'middle-passive like

(3)

perfect leads

voice'. can

tenses,

to the

In

morphologically

the present

have

a

number

of

tense,

for

different

interpretat ions: (3)

ho stratos the armysubj a. b. c.

(a)

is

'the army 'the army 'the army the

speaking,

to b y

(...)

is p r e p a r i n g i t s e l f ' is p r e p a r i n g ( . . ) f o r is b e i n g p r e p a r e d '

so-called

conceptually referred

paraskeuazetai prepareSHp

direct

reflexive

the Agent and

the Subject,

(b)

the

itself'

interpretation, Qoal

so-called

indirect the

in w h i c h ,

conceptually

speaking,

Beneficiary

identical

and

to by

(3) b ' .

(c),

are

present,

cf.

referred

in

which,

identical

is t h e

interpretation, usually

are

Agent

the Subject;

and

reflexive and

a Qoal

the is

(3b').

ho stratos p a r a s k e u a z e t a i tas naus the armysubj preparesMp the shipsGoai ' t h e a r m y is p r e p a r i n g t h e s h i p s f o r i t s e l f '

finally,

is t h e s o - c a l l e d p a s s i v e

interpretation,

in w h i c h

the

VOICE IN ANCIENT GREEK

Subject

has

the

1Z5

semantic

function

Goal. An Agent phrase «ay be

present, as in (I). Thus, the presence or absence of certain other sentence (a

Goal; an

Agent phrase)

interpretation. An indication is also given by verb,

since

not

all

Meaning

reflexive

the

of

of

others. In fact, languages,

to a

activities or

performed with respect

the

to se

is

of the

involved,

the direct

the

restricted

most

relatively small

group of verbs

treatments, which Bay normally be

oneself

reflexive verbs

cf. French

verbs

middle-passive

one. This use is restricted denoting physical

the meaning

verbs allow these three interpretations. As

regards the lexical uae

elements in the

usually points to the correct

laver

as

well

of this and

as

with

type are

Dutch

zich

respect to

found in many wassen,

'to

wash'. Some Greek examples are: (4)

active louein 'to wash'

direct reflexive middle louesthai 'to wash oneself, to take a bath'

guanazein

gumnazeBthai

keirein

On the

'to drill'

'to cut off'

keiresthai

'to drill oneself, to exercise'

'to cut one's hair, to shave'

other hand, the middle-passive of verbs denoting activities

that one

usually does

e.g. blaptein

not perform

'to harm' or daknein

with respect

as direct reflexive. For that purpose pronoun in

the accusative

case is

to oneself (like

'to bite') cannot be interpreted the active

plus a reflexive

used, cf. (5b);

see also Cock

(1981:6-7). Note that a passive interpretation of (5a) is perfectly possible. (5) a.

b.

blaptomai I-harm«p *'I am harming myself' [dir. refl.] 'I am being harmed' [pass.] blapto emauton I-harBAct myselfAcc 'I am harming myself'

Unlike the

direct reflexive use, the indirect reflexive use of the

126 RISSELADA

middle-passive is However, here

not restricted

too, the

to certain

types of activities.

restriction holds that it must be possible

to perform the activity denoted by the verb

both in

one's own and

in somebody else's interest. In other words, it must be possible to add a Beneficiary 1 . For instance, the middle-passive of a verb like esthiein

'to

eat', which

ciary , could never holds for

does not normally combine with a Benefi-

have an

the verb ainein

indirect reflexive

meaning; the same

'to praise', something one normally does

in the interest of the Qoal, cf. (6). (6)

tainoumai ton paida I-praisettp the boysoai 'I am praising the boy for myself'

An interesting fact is that

when

the

coreferential

reflexive use) or the coreferential Beneficiary use) is emphasized or reflexive pronoun cf.

contrasted, the

in the

(7); see also Cock (1981:7-8), Huijgh

(7)

(indirect

active may

accusative or

Goal

(direct

reflexive

be used

plus a

dative case respectively, (1975:360).

sfeas te autous keirontes kai tous hippous themnefi and selfAcc shavingAct and the horsesAcc 'shaving both themselves and their horses' (Hdt. 9,24) The passive use of

cally

restricted,

the middle-passive,

but

may

occur

in

finally, is

not lexi-

the case of all transitive

verbal predicates, in some cases even if the second argument is not marked by the accusative case in the active (cf. Mulder forthc.) Furthermore, there

is another

in the case of a restricted causative meaning. In means of which the physical

situation

the active,

Agent brings of

use of the middle-passive voice

number

of

verbal

predicates

these verbs denote an action by about a

change in

of control expresses

of

the

either

physical situation

(8b)

but is

part of

are (8a) and (9a). Depending on the degree

Subject, that

the mental or

the Goal. This causative semantic feature,

however, is not encoded in the morphological form, their meaning. Examples

with a

the or

the

middle-passive

Subject

changes

its

that

change

comes

a

of

these verbs

own

mental or

about

in its

VOICE IN ANCIENT GREEK

situation

127

(9b):

(8) a. b.

ageirein ageiresthai

'to gather together' 'to gather, to assemble'

(9) a. b.

egeirein egeiresthai

'to rouse, to awaken' 'to wake up'

(8b)

i8

an

action;

the

semantic

I

middle-passive as 'pseudo-reflexive'. process; the

semantic function

[transitive] [intransitive]

function

Agent. Following Rijksbaron (1984),

of

the

characterize

Subject is

this

type of

(9b), on the other hand, is a

of the

Subject is Processed. This

type of Biddle-passive can be characterized as Summarizing, the

[transitive] [intransitive]

'pseudo-passive'.

middle-passive can be used with the following

meanings : 2 (10) i. ii. iii. iv. v.

direct reflexive indirect reflexive 3 pseudo-reflexive pseudo-passive passive

2. Valency It must

Reduction

be clear

account for

that Subject

voice oppositions

all the uses of

the

phenomena

a

in

predicate

middle-passive. On number

Croatian, Turkish,

rules

have

that

(cf. Vet 1985;

Schaaik

1983a; for

Dik

predicate formation 1987). In fact,

rules within

other

hand, similar

been

described

in

terms of

a

Dik and discussion the theory

Ovozdanovic 1981; Van of

the position of

of FG,

see De Groot

there seem to be strong indications that, at least

diachronically, valency Greek opposition

the

affect the valency of the verbal

predicates involved 1985;

principle used to

of other languages (e.g. French, Serbo-

Hungarian)

formation

assignment, the

in many languages, does not explain

reduction plays

an important

role in the

active : middle-passive, although on a synchronic

level such an analysis is not entirely unproblematic, of the passive meaning of the middle-passive.

esp. in view

128 RISSELADA

2.1

Valency Seduction

Dik (1983a)

in FG

proposes to

capture a number of different

detransiti-

vization operations in various languages by neans of a general rule of

predicate

formation

that

results in a valency reduction. The

input is an n-place verbal predicate, the output predicate. The

effect

of

n-place relation of the

the

predicate

input predicate

is an (n-l)-place

fornation

rule is: the

applies to

n-1 entities.

Applied to a two-place input predicate, this rule can be formalized as in (11): Valency Reduction Predicate Formation 4

(11)

input:

predv

output: Meaning: The element R is

the formal The one

can be either

first

the

(i = 1,2)

marker of

the reduced

argument left or

the

second

nature of the

in the output

predicate

argument

the input

of

its semantic function may or may not have undergone

a change. Thus, this operations which

(xi)

the relation expressed by predv applies in xi

derived predicate. predicate, and

(xi ) (x2)

predv-R

general

result in

rule

covers

a

number

of specific

various interpretations, all marked by

the same formal marker R. 2.2

Valency

Reduction

In my opinion, express

R,

the

in Ancient

Ancient

i.e. they

Greek

Greek

signal

a

middle-passive reduction

verbal endings

of the valency of the

(active) input predicate. Reduction of the second

argument leads

interpretation, as is shown in (12):

to a

direct

reflexive

129

VOICE IN ANCIENT GREBK

(12)

Direct Reflexive Predicate Formation input:

predv * c t

output:

(XI)AI

predv HP

(XJ)SO

(XI)A