The Indo-Pacific Theatre: Strategic Visions and Frameworks 1032306130, 9781032306131

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
List of figures
Contributors
Acknowledgements
List of abbreviations
Introduction
Part 1 Advancing an Effective Security Framework
Chapter 1 Strategising Institutional Arrangement in Japan’s FOIP: Quad, ASEAN and Tactical Hedging
Chapter 2 The Indo-Pacific Power: The United States, the Quad and the Making of a Megaregion
Chapter 3 Australia and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: A Strategy for the Defence of a “Rules-Based Order”
Chapter 4 India, the Indo-Pacific and the Quad
Chapter 5 Quad’s Roadmap: Anchoring Strategic Solutions in the Post-pandemic World
Part 2 Convergences and Divergences on China
Chapter 6 China and the US Indo-Pacific Strategy: From Donald Trump to Joe Biden
Chapter 7 US–China Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific: The Harding Way or the Harder Way
Chapter 8 An Indian Perspective of China’s Activities in the Indo-Pacific
Part 3 Unravelling the Regional Strategies
Chapter 9 ASEAN Centrality: Opportunities and Challenges
Chapter 10 Republic of Korea’s Indo-Pacific Approach: Reluctance and Prospect
Chapter 11 Geopolitical Aspects of European Union’s Approach to Indo-Pacific
Chapter 12 Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Converging Trends in European Union Strategy to Japan’s Vision
Part 4 The Quest for Economic Framework
Chapter 13 The Search for Alternatives in the Indo-Pacific: The Blue Dot Network and the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative
Chapter 14 Economic Architecture in the Indo-Pacific Region: India’s Tryst
Index

Citation preview

The Indo-Pacific Theatre

This book studies the internal framework of the Indo-Pacific region and examines the strategic issues faced by the countries that belong to it. Over the years, the Indo-Pacific region has become a prime driver of global economic growth and has generated considerable interest from countries both within and without. The region is now witnessing an intensified great power competition for greater geostrategic space, thus shaping the 21st-century world order. The volume focuses on the emerging strategies of the main actors involved in this competition. It discusses various key issues such as the purpose of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and its post-pandemic agenda, the conceptualisation of a Free and Open IndoPacific (FOIP) amid an intensifying Sino-US great power competition, the strategies of ASEAN and South Korea, China’s activities in the Indo-Pacific, economic architecture and supply chain disruption in the region, as well as the geopolitical strategy of the European Union for the Indo-Pacific. A crucial study of the Indo-Pacific region in the post-COVID-19 world, the book gives fresh insights into the areas of convergence and divergence in the strategic visions of the many regional actors. It will be of great interest to policymakers as well as students and academics in the fields of political science, international relations, foreign policy, geopolitics, security studies, strategic studies, as well as area studies, namely East and Southeast Asian studies, European Union studies, American studies and Australian studies. Srabani Roy Choudhury is Professor in Japanese Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. Over three decades of association with Japan, her research has centred on Japan’s regional economic strategy and is currently focused on the Indo-Pacific region. She has been promoting Japanese studies through her teaching and supervision at her university. She was a visiting faculty of the Graduate School of Development Studies, Nagoya University (2019). She has had the opportunity to visit and conduct research through visiting fellow programmes at Research Institutes for Economics and Business Administration Kobe university (2014), Keizai Koho Centre (Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs) (2012) and Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance (2012).

The Indo-Pacific Theatre

Strategic Visions and Frameworks

Edited by Srabani Roy Choudhury

First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 selection and editorial matter, Srabani Roy Choudhury; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Srabani Roy Choudhury to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Roy Choudhury, Srabani, editor. Title: The Indo-Pacific theatre: strategic visions and frameworks/ edited by Srabani Roy Choudhury. Description: London; New York: Routldge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2023. | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Identifiers: LCCN 2022028677 (print) | LCCN 2022028678 (ebook) | ISBN 9781032306131 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032378688 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003342311 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Indo-Pacific Region–Foreign economic relations– 21st century. | Indo-Pacific Region–Politics and government–21st century. | Indo-Pacific Region–Economic policy–21st century. Classification: LCC DS341 .I557 2023 (print) | LCC DS341 (ebook) | DDC 337.5–dc23/eng/20220707 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022028677 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022028678 ISBN: 978-1-032-30613-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-37868-8 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-34231-1 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003342311 Typeset in Sabon by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

Contents

List of figures Contributors Acknowledgements List of abbreviations

viii ix xv xvii

Introduction 1 SRABANI ROYCHOUDHURY

PART 1

Advancing an Effective Security Framework

11

1 Strategising Institutional Arrangement in Japan’s FOIP: Quad, ASEAN and Tactical Hedging

13

KEI KOGA

2 The Indo-Pacific Power: The United States, the Quad and the Making of a Megaregion

35

PETER HARRIS

3 Australia and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: A Strategy for the Defence of a “Rules-Based Order”

50

LAVINA LEE

4 India, the Indo-Pacific and the Quad G.V.C. NAIDU

73

vi Contents

  5 Quad’s Roadmap: Anchoring Strategic Solutions in the Post-pandemic World

89

TITLI BASU

PART 2

Convergences and Divergences on China

103

  6 China and the US Indo-Pacific Strategy: From Donald Trump to Joe Biden

105

WEIXING HU

  7 US–China Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific: The Harding Way or the Harder Way

126

ZHIQUN ZHU

  8 An Indian Perspective of China’s Activities in the Indo-Pacific

141

GAUTAM BAMBAWALE

PART 3

Unravelling the Regional Strategies

153

  9 ASEAN Centrality: Opportunities and Challenges

155

DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR

10 Republic of Korea’s Indo-Pacific Approach: Reluctance and Prospect 171 SANDIP KUMAR MISHRA

11 Geopolitical Aspects of European Union’s Approach to Indo-Pacific 188 JUAN LUIS LÓPEZ-ARANGUREN

12 Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Converging Trends in European Union Strategy to Japan’s Vision CARMEN TIRADO ROBLES

202

Contents  vii PART 4

The Quest for Economic Framework

221

13 The Search for Alternatives in the Indo-Pacific: The Blue Dot Network and the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative

223

ANIL WADHWA

14 Economic Architecture in the Indo-Pacific Region: India’s Tryst

235

SRABANI ROY CHOUDHURY

Index

255

Figures

  7.1 Trade Groups in the Asia-Pacific Region 131 14.1 The Noodle Bowl Syndrome 237 14.2 Composition of Members of the Two Mega Regional Trade Agreement. Numbers represent 2018 GDP in trillions of US Dollars240 14.3 RCEP VS CPTPP Scale 241 14.4 India’s Trade with RCEP Countries 248

Contributors

Dewi Fortuna Anwar is Research Professor at the Center for Political Studies-Indonesian Institute of Sciences (P2P-LIPI), and Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of The Habibie Center (THC). From 2010 to 2017, he served as a Deputy Secretary to the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia. He was Deputy Chairman for Social Sciences and Humanities—LIPI from 2001 to 2010, and Chairman of the Institute for Democracy and Human Rights—THC from 2010 to 2018. She obtained her PhD from Monash University, Melbourne in 1990, while her MA and BA (Hons) were from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London in 1982 and 1981, respectively. Juan Luis Lopez-Aranguren is Associate Professor of International Relations and Public International Law at the School of Law of the University of Zaragoza, Spain. He is also a member of the research group in Japanese Studies of the University of Zaragoza. He has been a visiting professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in Delhi, Kobe University (Japan), Dokkyo University (Japan), Brussels School of International Studies (BSIS) (Belgium) and School of Oriental and African Studies (Soas) (UK). His field of study is Globalisation and Asian Studies. He has also been a Japan Foundation Japanese Studies Fellow conducting a one-year postdoctoral research on Communication, Democracy and Policy-Making in Japan as an affiliated researcher in the Graduate School of International Relations at the International University of Japan (IUJ) and at Osaka University. He completed his International PhD in Communication, studying the impact of international communication in East Asian International Relations. He is also a member of the Japan Research Group of the University of Zaragoza and has been a visiting researcher at universities in New Zealand, China, India, United Kingdom and Belgium. Gautam Bambawale was a member of the Indian Foreign Service from 1984 to 2018. He was India’s Ambassador to Bhutan, Pakistan and China. He was stationed in Washington DC from 2004 to 2007 during

x Contributors

the Indo-US nuclear deal which transformed ties between the two countries. He has been India’s first Consul General in Guangzhou (China) from 2007 to 2009. He was Director of the Indian Cultural Centre, Berlin from 1994 to 1998. Ambassador Bambawale worked in the Prime Minister’s Office from 2002 to 2004. At the Ministry of External Affairs, he was Joint Secretary for East Asia from 2009 to 2014. He has dealt with China for 15 years of his 34-year diplomatic career. Ambassador Bambawale is currently Distinguished Professor, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Symbiosis International University, Pune. He is also Senior Adviser, Ola (the Indian ride-hailing firm). Titli Basu is Associate Fellow at MP-Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India. Her research interests include strategic affairs in East Asia, with specific focus on Japanese defence and security policy. She was Visiting Fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies (Ministry of Defense), Tokyo. Earlier she was Japan Foundation Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Social Science, The University of Tokyo. She has widely published in academic journals including Journal of Asian Economic Integration, India Quarterly, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Tamkang Journal of International Affairs etc. She often contributes to international platforms including East Asia Forum, Pacific Forum, The Diplomat, Lowy Interpreter, Global Asia, Asia-Pacific Bulletin and Asan Forum. Her opinion pieces have been published in Hindustan Times and The Japan Times. Srabani Roy Choudhury is a Professor in Japanese Studies at the Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Prior to joining JNU in 2006, she was in International Management Institute, where she conducted Cross-Cultural Management courses. For over three decades, her academic profile has involved teaching, supervision, and research pertaining to Japanese studies. As a doctoral candidate, in 1996, she was at the University of Tokyo as a recipient of a Japan Foundation fellowship. She has been a visiting scholar at the Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs (2012), Policy Research Institute (2012), Research Institute for Economic & Business Administration (2014), Kobe University and Graduate School of Development Studies (2019), Nagoya University. Her research interests include IndiaJapan relations, Japanese investment in India, and India-Japan multilateral engagement with a special focus on the developmental agenda. She has several publications to her credit, and her major works include edited books on Japan and SAARC Relations and India-Japan Relations @70. Peter Harris is Associate Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University, where his teaching and research focus is on international security, International Relations theory and US foreign policy. His work has

Contributors  xi

appeared in journals such as International Affairs, International Political Sociology, International Politics, Political Science Quarterly and Review of International Studies. He currently edits the “Indo-Pacific Perspectives” series for the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. Weixing Hu is UM Development Foundation Distinguished Professor and Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences at University of Macau. Before joining University of Macau in 2019, he was Professor of Politics and International Affairs at University of Hong Kong, where he taught over 20 years and served as Head of Department of Politics and Public Administration. He has been John M. Olin Fellow in National Security Studies at Harvard University, IGCC Postdoc Fellow at UC San Diego, and CNAPS Fellow at Brookings Institution. He has published five books and over 100 journal articles and book chapters. His latest publications include Contesting Revisionism: China, the United States, and the Transformation of International Order (coauthored, forthcoming), “Discerning States’ Revisionist and Status-Quo Orientations: Comparing China and the U.S.,” European Journal of International Relations, 25-2: 613-640 (2019) and “Xi Jinping’s ‘Major Country Diplomacy’: The Role of Leadership in Foreign Policy Transformation,” Journal of Contemporary China, 28:115, 1-14 (2019). Kei Koga is Assistant Professor at the Public Policy and Global Affairs Programme, School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. Previously, he was Visiting Fellow at Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); Japan–U.S. Partnership Fellow at the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), Tokyo; and Postdoctoral Fellow in the International Studies Program, The Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. His recent publications include Reinventing Regional Security Institutions in Asia and Africa (Routledge 2017); “Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ question: countering China or shaping a new regional order?” (International Affairs, 2020); “Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ Strategy: Tokyo’s Tactical Hedging and the Implications for ASEAN” (Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2019); “The Concept of ‘Hedging’ Revisited: The Case of Japan’s Foreign Policy Strategy in East Asia’s Power Shift” (International Studies Review, 2018); and “ASEAN’s Evolving Institutional Strategy: Managing Great Power Politics in South China Sea Disputes” (Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018). His current book project is titled Managing Great Power Politics: ASEAN, Institutional Strategy, and South China Sea. He received his PhD in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, USA. Lavina Lee is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Macquarie University, Sydney. She has commerce

xii Contributors

and law degrees from the University of NSW, an MA in International Peace and Security from King’s College, University of London, and a PhD in International Relations from Sydney University. Before joining Macquarie University, She was a political risk consultant with Control Risks Group. She is the author of the book US Hegemony and International Legitimacy: Norms Power and Followership in the Wars on Iraq (Routledge, 2010), and has published numerous articles, book chapters, research reports and commentary on Indian foreign and security policy, nuclear proliferation, US foreign policy and security relations in the IndoPacific. She also periodically publishes opinion pieces in The Australian, The Australian Financial Review, The Hindustan Times, the New Straits Times and specialist policy outlets such as the Lowy Interpreter and ASPI Strategist. She has led projects for the Australian government and thinktanks on opportunities and weaknesses of the “Quad,” Chinese influence in South-East Asia, the role of democracy promotion in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy and India’s role in the Indo-Pacific. Her work integrates academic and policy approaches, and she speaks widely to expert and lay audiences on international and security issues. In 2020, she was appointed to the Council of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute by the Australian Defence Minister. Previously, she was Director of the Institute for Regional Security. Sandip Mishra is Associate Professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. He has also worked at the University of Delhi for more than 12 years. He is also Honorary Fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies (ICS), Delhi and Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi. He writes a monthly column named East Asia Compass at the IPCS website and another column to The Korea Times newspaper. He completed his master’s degree in international politics from Jawaharlal Nehru University and obtained his MPhil and PhD degrees from the same university. He studied the Korean Language in Korea in 2006 and 2010 at the Yonsei University and Sogang University. He has been Visiting Fellow and Visiting Scholar at Korea National Defense University, Northeast Asia History Foundation, Kim Dae-jung Presidential Library and Museum, Institute for Far East Studies, Kyungnam University, Sejong Institute and Korean Institute for International Economic Policy. He has published several articles in Indian and East Asian academic journals along with book chapters and contributed opinion articles to newspapers such as Korea Times, Times of India, Indian Express, Financial Express, Pioneer, Tribune and Statesman. G.V.C. Naidu is the former founder-chairperson of the Centre for IndoPacific Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. He spe-

Contributors  xiii

cialises in the Indo-Pacific affairs, including political economy, maritime security and India’s engagement with this region. His visiting appointments include Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore; Japan Foundation Visiting Professor at the Daito Bunka University and Gakushuin University, Tokyo; Visiting Fellow at the EastWest Centre, Honolulu; Visiting Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs; Visiting Professor at National Chengchi University, Taipei; and Visiting Professor at National Chung Hsing University, Taichung, Taiwan. He has to his credit five books, five monographs and a large number of articles, chapters in books and research papers published in India and abroad. Carmen Tirado Robles graduated in Law Studies from the University of Zaragoza (1985-1990) and holds a master’s in European Communities from the Royal Institute of European Studies (1991-1992). Her PhD thesis in Law cum laude (1999) is titled “The cooperation in the matters of justice and home affairs in European Union: the legal mechanisms.” She holds a Diploma from the Centre for Studies and Research in Hague Academy of International Law (French section). She is also Director of Japan Research Group (University of Zaragoza); Director of the Master in Japanese Studies, Law, Society and Culture, University of Zaragoza as well as Director of the Department of Public Law at the University of Zaragoza. She has published more than 50 works including books, articles in specialised magazines and chapters in collective works and participated in conferences across the globe. She is currently directing six doctoral theses on topics related to Japan and has directed research projects financed by the Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities of Spain, Japan Foundation, Banco de Santander etc. Anil Wadhwa was a member of the Indian Foreign Service from 1979 to 2017 and has served as Indian Ambassador to Italy, Thailand, Oman and Poland. As Secretary (East) in the Ministry of External Affairs of India, he oversaw relations with Southeast Asia, Gulf and West Asia, Pacific and Australasia. He has served as Indian Ambassador and Permanent Representative to FAO, IFAD, WFP UNESCAP and worked with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague heading the Government Relations and Political Affairs and Media and Public Affairs Branches. He has served as India’s chief delegate to the East Asia Summit, ASEAN—India, ASEM, ACD, the Arab league, Mekong Ganga Cooperation and ARF meetings. Ambassador Wadhwa’s previous postings include stints with the Indian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, twice to the Indian Embassy in Beijing and in the Commission of India in Hongkong. He has led a CII task force for writing the Australia Economic Strategy report for the

xiv Contributors

Indian government. Ambassador Wadhwa is currently a Distinguished fellow with the Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi and serves as an Independent Director on the Boards of some corporate firms. Zhiqun Zhu is Professor of Political Science and International Relations and Chair of the Department of International Relations at Bucknell University. He was Bucknell’s inaugural Director of the China Institute (2013–2017) and MacArthur Chair in East Asian politics (2008–2014). He previously taught at University of Bridgeport, Hamilton College, University of South Carolina and Shanghai International Studies University. He was also Senior Assistant to Consul for Press and Cultural Affairs at the U.S. Consulate General in Shanghai. He is the author and editor of a dozen books, including A Critical Decade: China’s Foreign Policy 2008-2018 (2019); China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (2013); and New Dynamics in East Asian Politics: Security, Political Economy, and Society (2012). He has received many research fellowships and grants, such as two POSCO fellowships at the East-West Centre in Hawaii; a Korea Foundation/Freeman Foundation grant to do research in Korea; three senior visiting fellowships at the East Asian Institute of National University of Singapore; among others. A noted scholar on Chinese foreign policy, he is a member of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and is frequently quoted by international media on Chinese and Asian affairs. He maintains a popular column for ThinkChina in Singapore.

Acknowledgements

An edited book is an exercise of seeking involvement from scholars who, apart from contributing to the book, are affirming their faith in the editor. Thus, the first to be acknowledged must undoubtedly be those who have authored chapters and made invaluable contributions to this book. Uncertainty as a consequence of the pandemic had almost derailed the international conference on which this book is based. Japan Foundation’s Delhi team comprising of Miyata san, Noguchi san, Ishimaru san and Anushree san were instrumental in helping to reorient the conference to an online platform. Koji Sato san, the current director of the Japan Foundation, extended most needed support to complete this exercise. The patience with which Japan Foundation Tokyo, especially Ichikawa san, consented to move deadlines needs a special mention here. I am obliged to all of them for their assistance. Special thanks to Akihito Tanaka sensei, Ando san, Former Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Japan, Former Ambassador to Japan Deepa Wadhwa, Lauren Richardson, Ashok Kumar Chawla, Horimoto sensei, Takahiro Sato and Gavan Butler for their vital inputs along the way. Unable to fully defy the worldly norm of disengaging themselves, former students Titli and Debendra stepped in whenever asked to and restored faith in my mentorship. The student brigade of Chandrali, Parul, Swati, who became the backbone of the conference, volunteered limitless help in organising the conference and other associated work. Simran, Asmita, Aishwarya and Visieno for their timely help during the online event, Shahana for her support during the process of publication. It was onto them that I unloaded my work with confidence that they would get it done. I deeply appreciate this enthusiastic support from them. For me, a book is a lot about constantly reaching out to a set of friends; friends who are willing to endure my rambling, complaints and grumbling. To all of you, I’m grateful for tolerating me—Kumaraswamy for sharing his insights for publication, the scholarly inputs and keeping me focused on my

xvi Acknowledgements

goal and most of all for his patience whenever I reached out with my doubts. Sandip, for his calming and wise advice, Jayati for promptly directing me to Routledge, Reena, Rani and Salma for just being there. To the publishing house Routledge, the team Shashank Shekhar Sinha and Anvitaa Bajaj for their execution of this project, Suneethi R. Raja for preparing the index and Heba for the cover page of the South Asia Edition, I can only thank you for all your efforts to bring the project to a fruitful conclusion. To separately thank my family is not my philosophy, but I am always grateful for their presence and standing by me at all times. New Delhi, May 2022

Abbreviations

ACC Advance Chemistry Cell ACMECS Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy ACP African Caribbean and Pacific countries ACSA Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement ADEX Air Defence Exercises ADIZ Air Defence Identification Zone ADMM ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank AMM ASEAN Ministerial Meeting ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States Security AOIP ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation API Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients ARF Asia Regional Forum ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN-PMC ASEAN-Post Ministerial Conference ASEM Asia Europe Meeting AU African Union AUD Australian Dollar AUKUS Australia, United Kingdom and the US BDN Blue Dot Network BRI Belt and Road Initiative CAP Combat Air Patrols CBM Confidence Building Measures CHIPS Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors CJK FTA China-Japan and South Korea Free Trade Agreement COMCASA India‒US Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement COMFOR FFDJ Commander of the French Armed Forces in Djibouti

xviii Abbreviations

COMFOR FFEAU / Commander of the French Armed Forces in the   ALINDIEN United Arab Emirates and Commander of the Indian Ocean maritime zone COMSUP FANC Commander of the French Armed Forces in New Caledonia COMSUP FAPF / Commander of the French Armed Forces in   ALPACA French Polynesia and Commander of the Pacific Ocean maritime zone COMSUP FAZSOI Commander of the French Armed Forces in the South of the Indian Ocean CoRe Competitive and Resilient CPC The Communist Party of China CPEC China-Pakistan Economic Corridor CPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership CRFIM Center for the Fusion of Maritime Information CSIS Centre for Strategic and International Studies CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization DACT Dissimilar Aircraft Combat Tactics DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia) DFC Development Finance Corporation DFFT Data Free Flow with Trust DMZ De-Militarised Zone DR Disaster Response DSTIA Defence Science and Technology Implementing Arrangement DSU Defence Strategic Update EAS East Asia Summit ECO Economic Cooperation Organization ECOWAS Economic Community of the African States EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone EFTA East Asia Free Trade Agreement EPA Economic Partnership Agreement EPQI Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure ESCAP Economic and Social Commissions for Asia and the Pacific EU European Union FDI Foreign Direct Investments FOIP Free and Open Indo-Pacific FPDA Five Power Defence Arrangement FPWP Foreign Policy White Paper (Australia) FTA Free Trade Agreement G7 Group of Seven

Abbreviations  xix

GATT General Agreement on Trade and Tariff GDP Gross Domestic Product GoA Gulf of Aden GSOMIA General Security of Military Information Agreement HA Humanitarian Assistance HoA Horn of Africa IBEF India Brand Equity Foundation IDFC International Developmental Finance Corporation IFC Information Fusion Center IFC-IOR Information Fusion Center - Indian Ocean Region IMF International Monetary Fund IOC Indian Ocean Commission IORA Indian Ocean Rim Association IPOI Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative IPS (US) Indo-Pacific Strategy ISA Information Security Agreement JBIC Japan Bank of International Cooperation JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency JMSDF Japan Maritime Self Defense Force KOICA Korea International Cooperation Agency LDP Liberal Democratic Party LNG Liquefied Natural Gas LRMP Long Range Maritime Patrol MGC Mekong-Ganga Cooperation MH17 Malaysia Airline 17 MLSA Mutual Logistics Support Agreement NAPRCI Northeast Asia Plus Responsibility Community Initiative NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( NDICI Neighborhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument NLD National League for Democracy (Myanmar) NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty NSS National Security Secretariat ODA Official Developmental Assistance OPIC (US) Overseas Private Investment Corporation PLI Production Linked Incentive PMP Phased Manufacturing Plan PRC People’s Republic of China PTA Preferential Trade Agreements QSD Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue

xx Abbreviations

QUAD Quadrilateral Security Dialogue QVP Quad Vaccine Partnership RAA Reciprocal Access Agreement RECP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnerships ROK Republic of Korea SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SADC Southern African Development Community SAGAR Security and Growth for all in the Region SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organizations SDG Sustainable Development Goals SLOCs Sea Lanes of Communications SPT Six-Party Talks SRA Stringent Regulatory Authorities TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South East Asia TCOG US-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership TRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights TSD US-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue TSMC Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Seas UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNDP United Nations Development Program UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change USAID The United States Agency for International Development  USINDOPACOM US Indo-Pacific Command USPACOM U.S. Pacific Command WHO World Health Organisation

Introduction Srabani Roychoudhury

The Indo-Pacific as a geographical construct is a vast expanse of water bodies with a landmass consisting of all orders of nations and harbouring 65% of the world population. Essentially a maritime space, of two oceans—the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean—for time immemorable are navigated by nations for trade and livelihood. Two developments in the post-Cold War world order were instrumental in orienting attention to this region. First, the trade facilitation in the post Second World War, followed by rapid globalisation, fostered the Asia-Pacific region encompassing Japan, China, ASEAN countries and the newly industrialised countries namely South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong to a hub of production activity. As a networked ecosystem grew pulsating with integrated trade and investment, it became home to the second and third-largest economy in the world. Second, as Japan and China traded their position in the world economic order, China became more assertive by laying claims to territorial land, seas and air zones; the neighbouring nations raised alarms. Not only were neighbouring nations’ territorial rights contested by China, but the cause of protection of Sea Lanes of Communication for trade and energy also catapulted the Asia-Pacific zone into strategic concern. Since Asia-Pacific referred to the littoral states of Asia and the Pacific, deriving a nomenclature that captures the essence of the Asian century allowing a large number of actors to participate and help cope with China’s growing comprehensive power became desirable. The Indo-Pacific evolved from these needs and has a sound geoeconomics rationale as it allows for economic integration, but as a geopolitical construct, it is also about establishing “spheres of influence” and, as such, involves competition too. Today, this region is the centre of gravity of the world. Fostering the Indo-Pacific region originated from Japan when its leadership called for an expansion beyond the “Asia Pacific” in its foreign policy. Promoting the notion of “Confluence of the Two Seas,” with the DOI: 10.4324/9781003342311-1

2  Srabani Roychoudhury

overarching objective of warranting shared prosperity by securitising the maritime domain and gaining economic equitability, Japan drew attention to the Indo-Pacific theatre. Drawing convergence of major powers’ differing perspectives and strategic objectives became its central agenda. However, this transition was relatively slow as the major powers had their hesitations, apprehensions, misgivings and apathy. “Buy-in” by the maritime democracies, namely the US in the Pacific region, Australia in the juncture between Indian and the Pacific Ocean, the ASEAN nations that were geographically positioned in the middle encircled by both Indian and Pacific Ocean and India in the Indian Ocean took considerable time as each had to contend with domestic, economic and strategic concerns which were divergent.

Making of the Indo-Pacific Strategy While scholars on security observed the coming together of the nations as a way of containing China, the economist redefined this region as a “one long maritime corridor” because the region hosted many fast-growing economies and had the potential of connecting Southeast Asia, South Asia and Africa in a productive network. Both these outlooks warrant the nations to orient and train their compass on this region. Yet, though major powers are at work, the Indo-Pacific region continues to have its share of ambiguity, uncertainty and improbability as individual nations address their priorities, primacies and concerns. Ambiguity begins with defining the geographic sphere itself. By US National Security Strategy (2017), the Indo-Pacific extends from the west coast of the US to the west coast of India, referred to as Hollywood to Bollywood; Japan takes a more ambitious position as Abe stated in TICAD, Nairobi (2016), “What will give stability and prosperity to the world is none other than the enormous liveliness brought forth through the union of two free and open oceans and two continents.”1 For, India it includes the entire Indian Ocean and the western Pacific, as highlighted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his keynote speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018.2 Australia, which had a critical place for the Asia-Pacific in its strategic calculation, accepted the emergence of Indo-Pacific as a new theatre for economic and strategic concern in 2013. However, it was only in 2017 that it put forth a White Paper on Indo-Pacific and extended its mental map to include the sub-continent of India and maritime seas around it. Even the late entrant countries of Europe, France, Germany and the Netherland have differing imagined spaces. France, with territorial presence in both the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean a defacto “resident power,” Indo-Pacific covers France’s interest and thus accounts for a broad definition. Germany, a trading nation, accepts the region between the Indian and the Pacific Ocean as its reference for the Indo-Pacific. On the other hand, Netherland limits the Indo-Pacific covers the space between Pakistan and the Pacific islands.

Introduction  3

Ambiguity exists among nations about how they visualise their role and responsibility in the Indo-Pacific vis-à-vis rises of China. For Japan, tethered by a pacifist constitution and Obama’s retreat from “Asia Pacific rebalancing approach” and reality of assertive China in the economic and strategic realm, Abe advanced the concept of “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” formulated with conviction by Taro Aso (Aso, 2006),3 Abe followed this by his well-documented speech in the Indian parliament, “Confluence of the Two Seas” (Abe 2007).4 By so doing, Abe and Aso put forward a new diplomatic game plan for Japan, expanding its role to address nations’ concerns beyond its previous sphere of Asia, encompassing a larger arena than that envisaged as the sphere of influence in the past. The grand strategy of Japan was to create an association of like-minded nations to ensure a protective net and enable China to adhere to the rule of laws. Japan put forward its IndoPacific strategy as a theatre for “free and open seas” (FOIP). What started as a place of competition between China and Japan in the Indo-Pacific and put forth as a strategy by Japan, due to criticism by China and apprehension by the ASEAN nations, has been renamed as vision positioning Japan as a cooperative, collaborative nation incorporating developmental goals. Three foundational documents that have set out the US agenda in IndoPacific theatre are “National Security Strategy 2017”; “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting a Networked Region” (2019) by the Department of Defence; and “Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision” (2019). With each of these documents, the US’ stand against China has grown, and so also its commitment to the IndoPacific theatre. The US recognised China as a revisionist power and that in the Indo-Pacific theatre, a geopolitical tussle between free and repressive visions of the world order was in progress (NSS 2017).5 Renaming of US Pacific Command to US Indo-Pacific Command in 2018, followed by The US Defence Paper in 2019, which stated “the Indo Pacific is Department of Defense’s Priority Theater” because China was constructively “seeks to reorder this region to their advantage,”6 deepened US commitment and Indo-Pacific and progressively championed this nomenclature. The US agenda in the Indo-Pacific was laid out in its strategic paper in 2019. The paper encompassed a spectrum of areas in which the US participate in diplomatic, economic and peacebuilding activity. The Trump administration’s “Indo-Pacific Strategy” expands the “Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy” with a robust agenda of containing China and safeguarding its leadership in this region. As the Indian Ocean became a reference point, India’s role in the Indo-Pacific theatre ascended. India’s “Look East Policy” and “Act East Policy”—to connect and take advantage of the regional economic progress and growing strategic partnership with Japan—directed India’s attention to the Indo-Pacific region. The US, in particular, and the world at large, was keen to see India involved and participate in the cause of maintaining

4  Srabani Roychoudhury

order in the Indo-Pacific theatre. India’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific theatre has developed with caution and found nuanced mention in SAGAR policy 2015, bilateral summits meetings of India–Japan Partnership from 2017 onwards. Prime Minister Modi announced India’s Indo-Pacific vision in Shangri-La (2018) “free, open, inclusive region, which embraces us all in a common pursuit of progress and prosperity. It includes all nations in this geography as also others beyond who have a stake in it.”7 The emphasis on “inclusivity” created awareness among the observers as it necessarily directed to inclusion of China. The Indo-Pacific Strategy in Australia’s policy made its appearance in Defence White Paper 2013 when Australia recognised “the ongoing economic strategic and military shift to the Indo-Pacific.”8 It is in the Foreign Policy White Paper (2017) that Australia emphasised “open and prosperous Indo-Pacific” coupled with “strengthening and diversifying partnership across the globe.” A key line was that government would “lift the ambition of our engagement with major Indo-Pacific democracies,”9 including Japan, India and Indonesia. Further, it would “support a balance in the Indo-Pacific favourable to our interests and promote an open, inclusive and rules-based region, Australia will also work more closely with the region’s major democracies, bilaterally and in small groupings.”10 Southeast Asia is defacto the epicentre of the Indo-Pacific region by virtue of geographic location and being the fulcrum of economic growth. Featuring a large number of small and medium-sized nations, who have entrenched economically with China, they are caught between the “power rivalry” of the US and China. ASEAN as a forum have firmly positioned “centrality” of the ASEAN region, and its strategy looks at “shaping an open and inclusive regional architecture” based on its established network of relations.11 According to the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP 2019), centrality denotes that the grouping wants to maintain its central role in the evolving regional architecture in Southeast Asia and its surrounding regions. As many European nations join in giving their strategy in the Indo-Pacific theatre, it only accentuates strategist Gurpreet Khurana’s prophecy made in 2010 that the maritime domain of the Indo-Pacific is of great significance to the world order. As a resident power in this region, France has actively pursued to engage the EU to put forth a policy paper. Germany and Netherland Indo-Pacific policy paper has brought further clarity to the debate. These three nations agree that contributing to security and stability in the IndoPacific will safeguard the economic interests of the EU. “It is of European interest to preserve rules-based order and that a unipolar or bipolar regional order is not in European interest.”12 The strengthening partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region would necessarily benefit EU. In a nutshell, despite divergence in their strategies, there is a shared understanding, that the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean are a single shared waterway. What impacts one ocean has a consequence for nations nested

Introduction  5

in the other ocean. Further, by definition, securitisation through maritime dominance gains credence. Along with this, the concept of FOIP, which is embedded in each nation’s strategic calculation of the Indo-Pacific region, directly impacts the functioning of this region. What are the uncertainties that plague the nations? Undoubtedly it is how China will conduct itself and what positions the nations can take given their domestic and other international challenges. Japan’s problem with China arises on three fronts—economics, security and energy. It has an enmeshed economic relation with China that necessitated Japan to take a more cautious approach towards China, and as and when Japan’s foreign policy deviated from its “traditional policy of engagement,” like when Abe presented the “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”13 or proposed the “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,” China’s resentment and strong statements through officials’ channels ensured Japan softening its position. Most visible was to move its Indo-Pacific strategy to the Indo-Pacific vision. Similar hesitancy is witnessed in India’s and Australia’s positions to align in any security matter. While the onus of demise of Quad 1.0 (2006–2007) rested on Australia’s formal withdrawal, India too had deterred from taking a stand against China. Australia was again caught between its dependency on China economically and supporting an alliance system. For India, while relations with China have been at best working relations, yet to confront was considered detrimental as India preferred “Strategic Autonomy” as its foreign policy. Many Southeast Asian nations also suffer from the predicament of how to pacify China and appease Japan and US, as China has a strong economic and political hold. Some Southeast nations have allegiances to China due to their history but have recently been keen to pursue a more independent role. On the other hand, China has been swift in showing dissent and challenging major power actions and termed activities under Quad as Asia NATO. The EU also faces a similar predicament as small nations of the EU have large investments from China and are thus reluctant to take a strong position against China as desired by influential members of the EU. Thus, addressing security concerns in the Indo-Pacific has been intricate as fear of offending China has made diplomatic engagement challenging, problematic and awkward. The pandemic has worked in favour of bringing nations closer to the idea of containing China. As the world witnessed first, a health disaster that manifested itself into a pandemic, the origin of which was traced to China, and China showed no remorse. The following supply chain disruption, which slowed down the economy and added yet another dimension to a comprehensive security concern, showed how deeply entrenched the world economy is with Chinese economy. Further, China continued its aggressive stance in the South and the East China Sea by increasing military operations, a stand-off with India in Galwan in the Himalayan region, when India was facing its worst pandemic outrage and sanctions against Australia for

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seeking first-hand investigation on Covid spread from Wuhan. The need to cooperate and collaborate to delink the economies from China, to diversify the supply chain and to lessen dependence on China and securitise the Indo-Pacific region as a free and open waterway took shape in the Quad plus meet in 2020, the Quad ministerial meets (2020, 2021), and the Quad summit meets (2021, 2022). To the observers, a strong message that US-led liberal order would surely safeguard this region was strongly implied. ASEAN nations and South Korea have to contend with the improbability of why Japan did not consider them when creating a security net to contain or restrict China. For South Korea, which is a part of the alliance system, being left out from Quad has necessitated it to recalibrate its position in the Indo-Pacific theatre. Likewise, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore have queried why the “maritime democracies” nexus is limited to the four nations.

Free and Open Indo-Pacific Despite the ambiguities, uncertainty and improbability that consume nations in their participation in the Indo-Pacific theatre, the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) has established itself through Indo-Pacific strategies put forth by major powers. The notion of “free” politically means freedom and democracy, and in economic parlance, free enterprise, free markets and free of movement and connectivity. “Open” meant politically open society and economically open access to markets, resources and commercial routes. FOIP values, as enunciated here, imply that its design is to seek China’s conformity to the liberal order, in case China lays its stake. China’s growing assertive presence has acted as a catalyst to crystalise the FOIP objective. Through the free and open Indo-Pacific concept, the liberal order would like to share prosperity by securitising the maritime domain and gaining equitability through economic integration. Nonetheless, incorporating differing perspectives and strategic objectives would make no compromise to “rules-based global order.”

Frameworks in Indo-Pacific Theatre To fulfil FOIP’s vision, there is a need for an agreed framework. The pillar on which a security framework would shape was international rules, regulations and laws mapped by the international order. The economic framework based on shared prosperity necessarily meant drawing developing and developed nations into a network of a connected complementary ecosystem. Japan, the US, India and Australia formed The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or QUAD. Formulated to address concerns of the Indo-Pacific, it always harboured the desire to contain China. However, finding a common platform to institutionalise this framework has been elusive as fear of

Introduction  7

China’s reaction has kept Quad from naming the enemy. Hedging under the pretext of working in disaster management, vaccine role out, supply chain management or digitalisation, Quad has not come strong on security concerns, though these nations have bilateral, trilateral defence engagement. However, it plays a crucial role in binding these actors to the theatre. The development of AUKUS (September 2021), in which the strong alliance of the US, UK and Australia have come together to provide “deeper integration of security and defence-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains,” has finally addressed the much-needed security concern of this region. Close at the heels of AUKUS is the Australia–Japan “Reciprocal Access Arrangement” (January 2022), an agreement that “facilitate implementation of cooperative activities between the defence forces of the two countries and further promote bilateral security.”14 These quick moves are a sure indicator of a growing coalescence of a regional counterbalancing act and to formally institutionalise a security framework in the Indo-Pacific theatre. Two leading trade bodies that have emerged in the Indo-Pacific region are the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). With the failure of the World Trade Organization, as a production hub of the world, it was desirable to redefine economic order. These two trade groupings reduce trade barriers between the members and establish a smooth movement of goods and services, allowing economic growth and development. CPTPP agenda emerged as an alternative to WTO, addressed contemporary concerns and established the gold standard. RCEP was, on the other hand, arose primarily because these nations had free trade agreements (FTA) among themselves in what had emerged as a “noodle bowl” which had become cumbersome. Thus, it was conceived as a “developing world FTA.” The CPTPP and RCEP are the economic frameworks of the IndoPacific, which essentially pertains to the Asia-Pacific region. New in their operations, each having a distinct character, it presumes more excellent connectivity and networked economies. RECP, which will lower tariffs for its member economies, represent one-third of the world’s GDP. CPTPP, with a high bar of admission along with the requirement for unanimous support from all existing members (who have ratified the agreement), is a hurdle for any entrant. Nonetheless, a growing list of nations (UK, China, Taiwan) has placed their candidature. More recently, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), with an agenda to focus beyond trade and tariff and build an alternative, proposed by the US bringing two missing economies— the US and India—in a grouping with members of the other two. All this points to a robust engagement of powerful nations and small nations in economic diplomacy, wherein greater power rivalry will shape their direction. This book traverses the strategic visions and frameworks of major power who have joined forces to cooperate and collaborate to shape the

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Indo-Pacific region as a sphere of stability and prosperity. In the first section, “Advancing an Operational Security Framework,” the contributors map the major power stakers in the Indo-Pacific region and their engagement in Quad. It also draws upon the future road map of Quad and its current agenda to uphold the rules-based order. China’s position within this theatre has created complexity as it contests the liberal order with its own understanding of the region. The second section, “Convergence and Divergence on China,” ascertains the perspective of US and India about China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region. The section on “Unravelling the Regional Strategies” looks at ASEAN, South Korea and Europe. They play a critical role in the success of the vision established by the four maritime powers. Two chapters address the concerns of the new entrant EU in geopolitical context and its convergences with Japan’s concept of FOIP, which is yet to ink a policy paper. The economic integration which runs parallel to the security pursuit is addressed in the last section, “Quest for Economic Framework,” wherein the economic architecture, supply chain and blue dot network are discussed. If the Indo-Pacific as a vast region in which geographic dimension itself is an issue, the complexity and fluidity of this theatre add to its challenge, in turn, making this region an absorbing and engrossing study. The Indo-Pacific theatre has emerged as the “centre of gravity” of the world. The pandemic has driven the world into uncertainty and steered the major powers to look inward. Yet, it calls for greater global responsibility. Post pandemic dynamics of this region is fast evolving, pulsating with whirlwinds of activities, necessitating nations to relook, revamp and recalibrate their policies. Under this environment of unpredictability, narratives are bound to be revisited and re-examined. As nations led by the major powers work their way out of the pandemic crisis, strategic calculations and economic equations are orienting towards a new equilibrium. The major players in the Indo-Pacific have within them the power to show leadership to stabilise this region enabling growth and prosperity. As discussed in this book, the strategic visions and frameworks, which form the basis for the future, is the starting point for generating pathways of opportunity for equitability and harmony.

Notes 1 https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/afr​/af2​/page4e​_000496​.html accessed on December 28, 2021 2 https://www​.mea​.gov​.in​/Speeches​-Statements​.htm​?dtl​/29943​/Prime​+Ministers​ +Keynote​+Address​+at​+Shangri​+La​+Dialogue​+June​+01​+2018, first accessed in Aug 2018 3 Taro Aso, “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons “An Address by HE Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Occasion of Japan Institute of International Affairs Seminar, November 30,

Introduction  9

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

13 14

2006, first accessed on Dec 2006, https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/announce​/fm​/aso​/ speech0611​.html. https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/region​/asia​-paci​/pmv0708​/speech​-2​.html accessed on August, 23,2007 US Government (2017), National Security Strategy of the United States of America. P.45. US Department of Defense (2019) Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting a Networked Region. https://www​.mea​.gov​.in​/Speeches Statements​.ht​m? dtl/2​9943/​Prime​+Mini​sters​ +Keyn​ote+A​ddres​s+at+​Shang​ri+La​+Dial​ogue+​June+​01+20​18 first accessed in July 22, 2018 https://www​. aph ​ . gov​. au ​ / About ​ _ Parliament ​ / Parliamentary​ _ Departments​ / Parliamentary​_Library​/pubs​/rp​/rp1516​/DefendAust​/2013 accessed January 3, 2022 https://www​. aph ​ . gov​. au ​ / About ​ _ Parliament ​ / Parliamentary​ _ Departments​ / Parliamentary​_Library​/pubs​/rp​/rp1516​/DefendAust​/2013 accessed January 3, 2022 https://nsc​.crawford​.anu​.edu​.au​/sites​/default​/files​/publication​/nsc​_crawford​ _anu​_edu​_au​/2018​-09​/medcalf​.pdf https://asean​.org​/asean2020​/wp​-content​/uploads​/2021​/01​/ASEAN​-Outlook​-on​ -the​-Indo​-Pacific​_FINAL​_22062019​.pdf http://www​.realinstitutoelcano​.org​/wps​/portal​/rielcano​_en​/contenido​?WCM​ _GLOBAL​_CONTEXT=​/elcano​/elcano​_in​/zonas​_in​/asia​-pacific​/ari29​-2021​ -wacker​-europe​-and​-the​-indo​-pacific​-comparing​-france​-germany​-and​-the​-netherlands https://www​. dw​. com ​ / en ​ / abe ​ - advocates ​ - security​ - diamond​ - against​ - china​ / a​ -16538140 accessed January 10, 2022 https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/a​_o​/ocn​/au​/page4e​_001195​.html accessed on January 8, 2022

Part 1

Advancing an Effective Security Framework



Chapter 1

Strategising Institutional Arrangement in Japan’s FOIP Quad, ASEAN and Tactical Hedging Kei Koga

1.1 Introduction Realising “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) became one of the most important diplomatic agendas under the Abe administration from 2016. This vision has been gradually institutionalised in Japan’s foreign policy, as illustrated by Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s promise to pursue the FOIP concept (e.g. Sim, 2021). To date, the FOIP pillar is three-fold: (1) “promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation, free trade, etc.,” (2) “pursuit of economic prosperity” and (3) “commitment for peace and stability” (MOFA, 2021a). These principles are also taken over by the current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida despite his description of Abe as “conservative, dare I say hawkish” while calling himself “liberal, dovish.”1 Given the challenges that he faces domestically as well as externally, he positions Japan’s commitment to the FOIP as the fulcrum of Japan’s foreign policy. However, the FOIP concept is essentially evolutionary, and it was intended as part of Japan’s “tactical hedging.” Tactical hedging refers to “a declaratory policy doctrine that aims to utilise temporal strategic ambiguity to understand and determine whether any long-term strategy shift is necessary or possible” (Koga, 2019, p. 289). Japan has a specific diplomatic preference to expand its strategic horizon to the Indo-Pacific region to build a regional rules-based order based on the existing international order. Also, Japan aims to enhance the US-Japan alliance to check China’s assertive behaviour while continuously engaging with China, avoiding the full-fledged counterbalancing against China. To this end, Japan uses the FOIP vision to draw reactions from major regional powers and modify the FOIP vision by incorporating such reactions to avoid unnecessary tensions. In this setting, one of the most important diplomatic tools that Japan can utilise is regional multilateral institutions, which can set regional rules and norms to constrain state behaviour. Currently, Japan focuses on two institutions, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the DOI: 10.4324/9781003342311-3

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“Quad,” a quadrilateral group of Japan, the United States, Australia and India. On ASEAN, Japan has a long track record of supporting ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions in East Asia and has been a staunch supporter of the ASEAN Centrality. In its FOIP concept, Japan has begun to emphasise the importance of ASEAN Centrality in the Indo-Pacific region since 2018. On the Quad, Japan aims to institutionalise the grouping because four major regional powers can further enhance their strategic cooperation in constructing a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region. An inevitable question arises: how can Japan strategise its institutional arrangements in the Indo-Pacific? ASEAN and Quad are important institutions for Japan, but Japan has yet to devise a particular strategy toward regional institutions. In this context, this chapter argues that Japan’s tactical hedging has been useful in garnering political supports for the gradual institutionalisation of the Quad, which helps information-sharing and monitoring of the Indo-Pacific strategic situation and devise each member state’s strategy. At the same time, the tactical hedging enabled Japan to quickly respond to ASEAN’s general concern about its political marginalisation by the existence of the Quad by incorporating the ASEAN Centrality in its FOIP vision. Although the co-existence of the Quad and ASEAN has been ensured in the short term, the role of ASEAN is yet to be defined, potentially creating inter-institutional tension in the existing multi-layered institutional arrangement in the Indo-Pacific. To alleviate such potential tensions, it becomes necessary to establish an institutional linkage between the Quad and ASEAN, which contributes to maintaining communication channels, enhancing political assurance to ASEAN and exploring potential areas of cooperation and an institutional division of labour. Given its strong diplomatic relations with all member states in the Quad and ASEAN, Japan plays a crucial role in bridging the Quad and ASEAN. This chapter is structured in five sections. Section 1.2 will discuss the utility and limitations of regional security institutions in creating a rules-based order based on institutionalist theories in the International Relations field. It will also discuss how tactical hedging helps create and modify the regional institutional arrangement. Section 1.3 will analyse the existing multi-layered institutional arrangement in the Indo-Pacific region, whose major components are the US-led “hub-and-spoke” system and the ASEAN-led multilateral institutions, and its development from the end of the Cold War will be attempted. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 will examine the historical development of Japan’s use of tactical hedging to situate the Quad and ASEAN in its FOIP vision, respectively, and highlight institutional coordination gaps existing between these two institutions. Section 1.6 will analyse a potential utility of a “Quad-Plus” formula to fill such institutional gaps and Japan’s role in bridging the Quad and ASEAN.

Strategising Institutional Arrangement in Japan’s FOIP  15

1.2 Theoretical Frameworks for Institutional Arrangement: Institutions and Tactical Hedging Various types of security institutions exist globally (Koga, 2017a). Among them, the major ones are three-fold. One is “collective self-defence,” such as the US-Japan alliance and NATO, which ensures the member states’ national security by creating a legally binding mutual defence treaty. Another is “collective security,” such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the United Nations under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, which ascertains member states’ commitment for mutual defence assistance in advance and acts together to punish violators of rules when a conflict among the member states arises. Finally, the other is “cooperative security,” such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), where member states regularise security dialogues to build trust through such means as promotion of political and military transparency, mitigation of military and diplomatic tensions and exploration of areas of cooperation. Admittedly, the utility of security institutions has been frequently debated in the international relations field. Neo-realists, such as John Mearsheimer, argue that international institutions are essentially epiphenomenal because their internal structure only reflects an international power structure of the day. Institutions are established only when the member states perceive common threats (Mearsheimer, 1994/5). Once these threats disappear, security institutions will weaken because state interests are fundamentally conflictual under international anarchy, where there is no enforcement mechanism for international rules and laws. However, institutionalists, such as Keohane and Martin, argue that while institutions are likely to be created based on states’ common interests, these institutions would have their independent effect on state behaviour through such functions as reduction of transaction cost, promotion of information-sharing and creation of focal points for policy coordination (Keohane and Martin, 1995). They admit that institutions are not the panacea for international disputes and conflicts and cannot always activate their enforcement mechanism, if any, because of the uncertainty of member states’ commitment. However, for institutionalists, institutions have two essential functions, monitoring and information-sharing, which enable member states to devise their state strategies (Keohane and Martin, 2003). As such, institutionalists consider that institutions are more sustainable than a neo-realist expects. This resonates with the argument made by historical institutionalists, such as Ikenberry, that institutions are useful in maintaining the status quo because they tend to preserve the existing rules and norms (Ikenberry, 2001). For those who see institutions as useful, international security institutions have three main strategic strengths. First, international institutions are

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useful in reducing transaction costs, monitoring and sharing information. With less transaction cost, institutions can provide venues where member states can explore areas of cooperation and coordinate their policies. With information-sharing and monitoring, situational awareness will be strengthened, which is particularly important in understanding the dynamics of military balance. Second, institutions would increase the chance to enforce specific international rules and norms. This is indeed inherently difficult because such actions require member states’ firm commitment. However, if great powers’ interests come to be sufficiently congruent and those powers determine to cooperate, the institution will function as focal points for policy coordination. Third, institutions help to maintain rules and norms. The founders of the institutions embed their own rules, norms and principles, and in so doing, they attempt to ensure their own national interests. Given this, other member states would unlikely ensure relative gains vis-àvis those founders, yet they can still prevent more considerable loss by being members of the institution. These strengths are the reason why states invest their diplomatic and financial resources in the creation and maintenance of international institutions. On the other hand, states cannot take institutional strengths for granted because of two main reasons. First, institutions can collapse. Admittedly, institutions are relatively sticky because it is challenging to create, so the sunk cost will be considerable. However, when member states consider that an institution becomes a hindrance to pursuing their own interests, the members would withdraw from the institution. If certain members’ withdrawal triggers a defection cascade, the institution would likely collapse (Koga and Nordin, 2020). Second, institutions can also drift or decay. While their norms, rules and principles are intact and harmless, they may no longer sufficiently serve member states’ interests (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). If this becomes a case, member states lose their interests in sustaining their commitments, making the institutions relatively dysfunctional and less credible. These institutional changes are likely to occur when an international environment changes, particularly the balance of power. Under such a circumstance, states reassess raison d’être of institutions. In this process, the norms and rules are likely to be reinterpreted while institutional objectives are also modified (Koga, 2017a). Still, on balance, institutions are a valuable tool to formulate informed state strategy and institutional design arrangements in a region. Considering that security institutions are not guarantors of strategic stability in a region per se, establishing multiple institutions whose functions and membership are often overlapped would potentially reduce inter-state conflict. Indeed, this phenomenon is often seen in various regions—ASEAN and ASEANled institutions in East Asia, the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of the African States (ECOWAS) in Africa and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Shanghai

Strategising Institutional Arrangement in Japan’s FOIP  17

Cooperation Organizations (SCO) in South and Central Asia. Regional states attempt to establish a multi-layered institutional arrangement by combining various security institutions, aiming to maintain relatively stable expectations of state behaviour. By providing a set of rules, norms and principles and through iteration of actual practices, regional states attempt to find the best means to pursue their own national interest without violating those rules and norms. Of course, the proliferation of regional institutions itself is not a guarantor of norms compliance. At worst, it would counteract potential cooperation among the member states because it would create inconsistent rules and norms (e.g. Drezner, 2009). However, if such a well-coordinated institutional arrangement is successfully established, they would be able to nurture a certain pattern of state interaction within a region, thus creating a “regional order” (Bull, 2012; Hall and Paul, 1999; Hurrell, 2007; Alagappa, 2003).2 To be sure, an international and regional order can be either power-based or rules-based. If institutions compete with each other, they can be increasingly ineffective in creating a common set of rules and norms. Furthermore, such competitions would create inter-state tensions, and the exclusive nature of institutions is likely to emerge, creating political blocs. In this setting, those institutions can become a source of power-based regional order. On the other hand, if the multi-layered institutional arrangement is well managed, produces basic regional principles and clarifies a division of labour among the institutions, the arrangement will likely nurture certain regional rules and norms that shape state behaviour, resulting in a rules-based order. Among these two types, there is no normative preference for a power-based or rules-based order. However, if states attempt to ensure the durability of the international order, a multi-layered institutional arrangement can be a preferred option. That said, the feasibility of creating such an institutional arrangement depends on the stability of the strategic environment. When the regional strategic environment is stable, the purpose of a regional institution will be also relatively stable. The security issues—be it traditional or non-traditional—that regional institutions attempt to manage would likely remain the same and would not require a drastic institutional change in dealing with the immediate security environment. On the other hand, when the regional strategic environment becomes unstable because of such factors as power shift, the institutional purposes may not stay constant because of changes in member states’ strategy and the rise of internal demands for institutional change. Under this circumstance, the institutions would intentionally maintain their strategic vagueness to conduct a wait-and-see strategy. This is because instead of hastily deciding to change the institutions, the member states are likely to enhance communication channels among the member states for the purpose of information gathering about the future direction of the institution. In this way, the member states can understand changes

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in other members’ perceptions and the likelihood of changing their security policies. Thus they can determine whether they should conduct institutional change. Then, what approach can a state take if it wants to construct a multilayered institutional arrangement under an unstable strategic environment? Under this circumstance, “tactical hedging” is useful. As mentioned above, tactical hedging is “an ambiguous, temporal declaratory policy doctrine” (Koga, 2019, p. 289). The state thus needs to take the initiative to issue a specific policy declaration, drawing target states’ reactions to it. In so doing, the state gradually adjusts its strategy by understanding other states’ reactions and avoiding unnecessary provocation. The declaration should be ambiguous enough to be adjusted in the future but include the diplomatic principles and norms that the state prefers (Koga, 2019; Koga, 2020). For example, the term “democracy” can become a critical factor to trigger other states’ reactions in a region where several non-democratic states exist. This is because it implies a certain degree of domestic interference to promote democratic values in the region. If the state receives negative responses from regional states, the state can modify the term to soften its diplomatic stance, such as “respect for democratic principles” to avoid further provocation. As such, tactical hedging helps a state understand other states’ reactions, avoid creating inter-state tensions and adjust its strategy over time. In the process of conducting tactical hedging, a state also has an option to identify a core institution to pursue its strategic vision. However, such identification requires careful political consideration in three ways. First, it is necessary to understand the existing institutional arrangement in a region and the degree of political compatibility between such an arrangement and the core institution. If the existing institutional arrangement is not coherently organised, there is more room for the diversity of political principles and norms. However, if the institutional arrangement is coherent, the flexibility over political principles and norms would be low. Identifying a core institution that may have somewhat contradictory norms with those of the existing institutional arrangement would likely be dismissed or severely criticised by regional states. Second, a core institution should have clear compatible, comparative advantages over other institutions. In order to avoid reinventing the wheel, a state first needs to identify problems of the existing institutional arrangement, such as functional gaps, missing rules or contradicting principles. For example, if there is no enforcement mechanism to punish violators of regional rules in the existing arrangement, new security arrangements, such as a collective security mechanism or a great power coalition, could enhance the arrangement. If the membership of the existing institutions is highly exclusive, such as military alliances, creating a cooperative security institution would contribute to confidence building by providing a venue for inter-state dialogues. Further, in identifying a core institution, a state can

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propose to add a new function to the existing institution, such as a rulemaking mechanism, to address emerging security issues, such as international terrorism, climate change and digital infrastructure. This clarification also helps to illuminate a division of labour among the institutions. Third, a state needs to maintain consistency in its political principles and norms in a core institution. For example, if the core institution’s principle includes respect for international law, ignoring international law will likely undercut institutional credibility and legitimacy. This seems obvious, but when a state conducts tactical hedging, it sometimes becomes problematic because its strategy will be adjusted, depending on the state’s feedback from regional states. In this sense, tactical hedging does not provide an indefinite degree of policy flexibility, and so does a core institution. With these conceptual frameworks, the following sections examine the development of Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision toward the existing regional institutional arrangement.

1.3 Existing Multi-layered Institutional Arrangement in the Indo-Pacific Different scholars have discussed and characterised Asia’s multi-layered institutional arrangement differently (Buzan, 2003; Green and Bates, 2009; Cha, 2011; Koga, 2011; Kuik, 2015; Yeo, 2019; Koga et al., 2019b). Nonetheless, there is a consensus that Asia has two important institutional arrangements, the US-led bilateral alliance—the so-called “hub-and-spoke” system—and the ASEAN-led multilateral institutions. The US “hub-andspoke” system consists of a series of US bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, namely the US-Japan, US-South Korea, US-Australia, US-Philippines and US-Thailand alliances. These bilateral security institutions are essentially the by-product of the Cold War, which aimed to contain the spread of communism and counterbalance Soviet threats. Although the specific terms and functions differ extensively among these alliances, these mutual defence agreements have survived in the post-Cold War, expanding their roles to include national defence and the management of non-traditional security issues, such as humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR). In other words, these collective self-defence security frameworks have assumed the characteristics of cooperative security and function as a regional risk management mechanism, which can also address non-traditional security issues. Furthermore, this “hub-and-spoke” system has been increasingly networked since the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Because counter-terrorism requires transnational security cooperation, the US bilateral system was not necessarily an effective arrangement to rapidly respond to the transnational issue. As a result, US allies, such as Japan, Australia and South Korea, began to enhance bilateral and trilateral ties. Furthermore, the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami provided another diplomatic incentive

20  Kei Koga

to strengthen such cooperation, forming the “core group,” consisting of Australia, India, Japan and the United States. Although India is not a US ally, India’s relations with these states have begun to be more robust since the early 2000s, and new bilateral and trilateral security frameworks, such as the US-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) and the Japan-India Special Strategic and Global Partnership, emerged (Koga, 2021). While these frameworks were established to enhance non-traditional security cooperation, the members were democratic states that continuously checked China’s increasing economic and military influence. There was a geopolitical consideration (e.g. Silove, 2016). The newly emerging security partnerships have yet to assume a function of collective self-defence, but they serve as cooperative security and regional security management mechanisms. ASEAN-led multilateralism institutions are the other major regional security arrangements created during the Cold War. To ensure its regional autonomy amid the Cold War, ASEAN was established in 1967. In the 1970s, ASEAN established the ASEAN+1 framework with developed states and regional organisations, such as Japan and the European Community, to enhance its negotiation position vis-à-vis major international actors. Since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN has rapidly expanded its institutional security frameworks, establishing the ARF, the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). Given the lack of multilateral security institutions in Asia and ASEAN’s political desire to avoid diplomatic marginalisation by external actors, ASEAN made a diplomatic effort to place itself in the centre of Asia’s multilateralism. Functionally, the ASEAN-led institutions remain as cooperative security mechanisms, yet their geographical scope has expanded from Southeast Asia to a broader Asia, including the United States, Australia, India, New Zealand and Russia. In addition to these two institutional arrangements, there are other minilateral and ad hoc frameworks. They include the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) and the Japan-China-South Korea Trilateral Cooperation, as well as ad hoc frameworks, such as the US-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) and the SixParty Talks (SPT), which became inactive. The shortcomings of these institutions are that two dominant institutional frameworks often overshadow them as they are a single-issue framework—for instance, the SPT focused on North Korea’s nuclear development. Admittedly, most of these frameworks are situated in the Western Pacific, and there are several other institutions in the Indo-Pacific, such as SAARC, CSTO and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). However, these institutions, although they cover politico-security issues in the Indian Ocean, will not be included in this analysis for two reasons. First, the geographical scope of the Indo-Pacific region is still vague. But the common ground is

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the maritime areas broadly spanning from the entire Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean up until Western India (US Indo-Pacific Command, 2021). Of course, Japan considers that the Indo-Pacific region is conceptualised based on two oceans, the Indian and Pacific Oceans, which connect to Asia and Africa (MOFA, 2021b). However, Japan’s institutional outreach has yet to expand to the western part of the Indian Ocean. Second, regional institutions in the Indian Ocean region do not necessarily focus on security issues or are located adjacent to the maritime sphere. For example, SAARC mainly focuses on socio-cultural cooperation while CSTO’s and SCO’s geographical focus is on Central Asia. Thus, it can safely exclude those Middle East and African institutions. A region-wide institutional arrangement in the Indo-Pacific has not been fixed, and it has been gradually constructed based on these two institutional arrangements, namely the US “hub-and-spoke” system and the ASEAN-led multilateral institutions.

1.4 Development of Regional Institutional Arrangement in Japan’s FOIP Vision (1): Quad In the process of creating the Indo-Pacific regional concept, one of the most active players has been Japan. Indeed, Japan was the first state to launch the FOIP concept and steadily develop its vision since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 2016 speech at the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development in Kenya (MOFA, 2016). This speech emphasised the importance of the security and economic connectivity between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans and between African and Asian continents, given their vast potential for economic growth. Furthermore, to make the most of such a potential, Abe emphasised the importance of the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), the rule of law, the market economy and the non-use of force to resolve international disputes. Although this statement did not contain the term “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” it became the basis for Japan’s FOIP concept. The statement emerged in the changing strategic context of a broader Asia, where China’s economic and diplomatic influence was increasing, and its strategic challenge against the existing international order became more visible. On the security front, Japan experienced China’s assertiveness and encroachment in the East China Sea, particularly the Senkaku Islands, in 2010 and 2012 (Koga, 2016). At the same time, China’s maritime coercion and fait accompli behaviour in the South China Sea, such as land reclamation and militarisation, raised regional concern. While China-Philippines maritime confrontation in the South China Sea intensified from the early 2010s, including the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident, China’s challenge against the existing international order in Japanese eyes was decisive when China refused the ruling made by the South China Sea Arbitration Tribunal in 2016 (Ministry

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of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China, 2016). In addition, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched in 2013 and gained political traction in the Indo-Pacific region on the socio-economic front. China offered substantial development assistance to the regional states, including Malaysia, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. However, its standards were not always matched with international ones, such as environmental protection, financial soundness and human rights. For Japan, China’s 2015 victory of Indonesia’s infrastructure project on the high-speed railway between Jakarta and Bandung, despite Japan’s massive diplomatic efforts, became concerns over China’s increasing political and economic influences (The Straits Times, 2011). In this context, Japan considered it imperative to double down on maintaining and enhancing the existing rules-based international order in the IndoPacific, which had long diplomatically and economically benefitted Japan. In this context, the resurrection of the Quad became one of Prime Minister Abe’s strategic ambitions in pursuing its FOIP strategy. It is true that Abe’s 2016 political statement was essentially vague and that it did neither specify concrete policy actions nor identify core regional institutions to pursue it. However, its policy direction and a core institution were relatively clear— formulating democratic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and institutionalising the Quad. This Abe’s strategic vision on the Indo-Pacific and the Quad stems from Abe’s diplomatic experience in his failure to institutionalise the Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue (QSD) in 2007 and his 2012 op-ed, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond.” Abe’s political desire to institutionalise the QSD among the United States, Japan, Australia and India in 2007 resulted from the gradual development of Japan’s strategic relations with each of those three states. From the 2000s, particularly after the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Japan strengthened its economic and security ties with Australia and India, resulting in institutionalising the TSD, concluding the 2007 “Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation,” and formulating the JapanIndia Strategic and Global partnership (MOFA, 2006a; MOFA, 2006b). MOFA, 2007 Given the past successful experience of the HA/DR cooperation among the four in the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami event as the “core group,” Japan under the Abe administration considered that the time was ripe for institutionalising the democratic coalition, the QSD. Indeed, the first meeting was held in May 2007 at the occasion of the ARF meeting, and the four states joined India’s joint military exercise, the Malabar 07-02, in September 2007 for the first time (Chellaney, 2007; Panda, 2020a). Nevertheless, this formulation provoked China, which issued a diplomatic demarche to clarify the strategic intention of the four in May, resulting in India’s and Australia’s diplomatic hesitancy to institutionalise the Quad (Varadarajan, 2007) explicitly. This experience created diplomatic cautiousness in institutionalising the Quad. However, the Quad remained a core institutional framework in Abe’s strategic vision.

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The other is Abe’s 2012 op-ed in Project Syndicate, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” published just before he became Prime Minister of Japan. Explicitly expressing his concern about China’s assertive rise in the East and South China Seas, Abe argues that Japan needs to establish a democratic coalition in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly with Australia, India and the United States, in order to ensure the maritime commons, including the freedom of navigation, as well as political principles, such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights. He also envisions the four states’ cooperation with the United Kingdom and France as they are democratic states and have a specific military presence in Asia through the FDPA and the Pacific Fleet in Tahiti. This argument was put forward when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that Abe belonged to was not in political power, and thus, Abe had relatively less political constraint to express his diplomatic ambition. However, he continuously envisioned the Quad as the primary institutional framework for the Indo-Pacific region (Abe, 2021, p. 96). In addition to Abe’s political desire, the Quad is an ideal institution for realising Japan’s FOIP for four reasons. First, all member states are considered to be status quo powers, which consider the current international order beneficial to their own strategic interests. The current international order has been predominantly constructed and nurtured by the Western powers, particularly the United States, in the post-Cold War, and it has ensured security and economic prosperity for the US allies, including Japan and Australia. Since the 2000s, India has also strengthened its security ties with the United States, Japan and Australia, by which it has been able to expand strategic options to maintain its sphere of influence in South Asia. Given China’s increasing influences and challenges, they share the strategic objective to maintain the international order. Second, all members are democratic states, which essentially share similar political values and perspectives. The Indo-Pacific region is geographically vast, with many non-democratic states, and thus, regional institutions are mostly a mixture of democratic and non-democratic states. Because of these political differences, the regional institutions tend to value the non-interference principle to avoid discussing other member states’ internal affairs and prevent external intervention. On the other hand, since the Quad does not have such political constraints, they would be able to discuss how to promote democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. Third, the Quad member states are geographically spread in the IndoPacific region, which helped the member states have effective maritime domain awareness through information-sharing. As Abe’s Democratic Security Diamond briefly touches upon the Quad’s extensive geographical coverage, the United States has a global reach, which can cover the entire region, particularly in the Western Pacific. Japan is located in Northeast Asia and has strong ties with Southeast Asian states. Australia is positioned between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, which is also geographically

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proximate to Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. India is located in the middle of the Indian Ocean. Therefore, these four states cover the IndoPacific maritime situation well, and information-sharing helps each state to strategise its national security policy in the subregion. Fourth, each member state is one of the most militarily and economically capable states in their respective subregion. Economically, the Quad has the world’s largest economy (the United States), the third largest (Japan), the sixth largest (India) and the thirteenth largest (Australia) in terms of the GDP in 2021, while having the world’s largest military (the United States), the third largest (India), the ninth largest (Japan) and the fourteenth largest (Australia) in terms of military budget (The World Bank, 2021). China’s economic and military capabilities have been rapidly rising, situating itself as the second-largest military and economy globally by 2019. However, the aggregated material capabilities of the four easily exceed China’s. While it is still difficult to conclude concrete mutual defence treaties among them, even ad-hoc military cooperation can produce a certain deterrence effect if well-coordinated. In this sense, the Quad has been an important regional framework to serve Japan’s strategic objective in its FOIP—enhancing the existing rulesbased order. This is why Japan implicitly looked for formulating strategic networks with the three states that would facilitate the reactivation of the Quad, which is well illustrated by the initial official documents regarding the FOIP. For example, the 2017 Diplomatic Blue Book states that Japan aims to “strengthen strategic collaboration with India, which has a historical relationship with East Africa, as well as the US and Australia” (MOFA, 2017a; MOFA, 2017b). And yet, the primary concern about the Quad was whether they would agree with the idea of institutionalisation, given their economic interconnectedness with China. The 2007 experience about China’s concerns over the grouping still lingered, and further diplomatic discussion and careful coordination were required. In this sense, providing a vague declaration in the initial stage to see responses from three member states helped Japan understand their interests in the Quad. Drawing international attention to Japan’s FOIP vision was another challenge Japan faced. In fact, there were only 35 international news articles, including official press releases, from August 2016 to July 2017, which discussed Japan’s FOIP strategy.3 This indicates that there was little attention by international media about Japan’s initiative. However, after the United States incorporated Japan’s initiative into its Indo-Pacific strategy in September 2017, when the US-Japan summit was held, the international media began to pay significant attention to the FOIP concept, which helped draw reactions from regional states over the FOIP concept.4 In addition, the US strategic interests in the FOIP advanced Japan’s FOIP vision in two significant ways. One is that Japan was able to reach common principles of the FOIP with the United States, namely (1) “Promotion and

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establishment of fundamental values (the rule of law, freedom of navigation, etc)”; (2) “Pursuit of economic prosperity (improvement of connectivity, etc)”; and (3) “Commitment for peace and stability (capacity building on maritime law enforcement, etc)” (MOFA, 2017c). These agreements ensured US commitment to the Indo-Pacific and became the reference points to further develop bilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. The other is that Japan, the United States, Australia and India organised a seniorofficial-level Quad meeting in November 2017 (MOFA, 2017d). Although this meeting did not promise regularisation or institutionalisation of the Quad, this became the opportunity for further institutional development. In fact, by 2022, the Quad has evolved into a more institutionalised grouping, which holds summit meetings, regularises foreign ministerial meetings and has specific cooperative agendas and working groups such as critical and emerging technology, climate, COVID-19, infrastructure and maritime security (Koga, 2022). How does this Quad fit in the institutional arrangement in the IndoPacific region? Given the development of the US “hub-and-spoke” system in Asia that has begun to connect the “spokes,” such as Japan and Australia and to include its strategic partners, such as India, the Quad is situated in the extension of this US “hub-and-spoke” system. Because of their similar threat perceptions toward China’s assertive rise in the IndoPacific region, the institutional development of the Quad can be considered natural evolution. Indeed, when the timing of their threat perceptions over China is matched, the momentum for the Quad institutionalisation snowballed, converging their threat perception to a significant degree over time. The United States issued the 2017 National Security Strategy that regarded China as a “revisionist state” and has taken a tougher diplomatic stance against China; India’s border disputes with China intensified in Doklam in 2017 and Ladakh and the Tibet Autonomous Region in 2020 and 2021; and Australia’s relations with China deteriorated from 2018 when Australia passed foreign interference laws amid Australia’s rising concerns over China’s influence operations (White House, 2017; Ethirajan and Pandey, 2020; Packham and Westbrook, 2018). These deteriorations of bilateral relations between China and the Quad member states, which were perceived as an indication of changes in the regional balance of power, became a trigger for the institutionalisation of the Quad (Liu Zhen, 2021).

1.5 Development of Regional Institutional Arrangement in Japan’s FOIP Vision (2): ASEAN The other major institution is ASEAN, and it is concerned about the Quad development. Given its democratic orientation, the Quad institutional framework would potentially confront ASEAN’s institutional objectives, norms and principles, namely regional autonomy and the ASEAN Centrality.

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One of the ASEAN’s fundamental institutional objectives is to maintain regional autonomy in Southeast Asia by preventing external actors, preeminently regional powers, from excessively interfering with Southeast Asian regional affairs without consent (Koga, 2014). Because of this objective, Southeast Asian states have emphasised the importance of the noninterference principle, and thus, they did not have to question the types of the domestic political system. Given their shared colonial experiences, this institutional principle and norm have remained even in the post-Cold War, while its means to maintain the principle and norm has changed. Rather than excluding external powers, such as the United States, China, Japan and Russia, ASEAN has begun to include them into its institutional frameworks. ASEAN’s objective has been to prevent itself from being diplomatically overshadowed by newly established regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), potentially led by great regional powers, such as the United States (Koga, 2017a). In so doing, ASEAN has been able to constrain their behaviour by ASEAN’s institutional norms, particularly its non-interference principle (Koga, 2018). This is well illustrated when ASEAN included those external powers through ASEANled institutions, such as the ARF and the ASEAN+3. Of course, the political risk of such inclusion exists—regional powers would hijack the forums and use them for their interests. However, ASEAN has also devised a new institutional principle to avoid it, the ASEAN Centrality. The ASEAN Centrality has yet to be clearly defined by official documents, but through this principle, ASEAN retains the chairpersonship of the ASEAN-led institutions with agenda-setting capacity (Koga, 2017a; Koga, 2021). The geostrategic situation in the Post-Cold War Asia also helped ASEAN nurture such a principle because great power tensions in East Asia between the United States, Japan and China prevented them from taking a decisive political leadership in the region, and there was virtually no multi-purposed multilateral framework, except for ASEAN, where all regional states were able to discuss political, economic and security issues together. In this setting, ASEAN has become the regional focal point in East Asia. With this diplomatic advantage, ASEAN proliferated regional institutions in a broader Asia, including the EAS and the ADMM-Plus, to ensure the ASEAN Centrality in the region. In fact, the initial silence of the Quad member states concerning the role of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific raised Southeast Asia’s concerns about the Quad’s strategic intention. Singapore was concerned about the direction of the Quad because it did not mention the role of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific (Yong, 2018). At the same time, since the Quad could be interpreted by the anti-China democratic coalition, some members, including Indonesia, emphasised the importance of openness and inclusivity of regional cooperation (Suryadinata, 2018). This reaction was not surprising, considering that Southeast Asia is geographically located at the centre of the Indo-Pacific

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region and has vital SLOCs in the South China Sea and essential choke points, including the Malacca Strait that connects the Indian and the Pacific Ocean. As part of its tactical hedging, Japan quickly responded to these Southeast Asian concerns and made two modifications in its FOIP vision. First, Japan decided to drop the term “strategy,” from its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” because some ASEAN member states expressed their concerns that the “strategy” would aim at China or at least would be perceived as such by China (Nikkei Shimbun, 2018). Second, Japan included ASEAN in its FOIP conceptual map and emphasised the ASEAN Centrality in the Indo-Pacific region. This response was widely shared among the Quad member states, and the 2018 Quad senior-official-level meeting expressed their strong support for the ASEAN Centrality in the Indo-Pacific region (MOFA, 2018). Nevertheless, two problems remain in the institutionalisation of the Quad. First, the Quad states have yet to clarify the strategic role of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific. From 2018, the Quad has repeatedly emphasised the importance of the ASEAN Centrality and has reiterated it in the Leaders’ Summit Meet in September 2021, yet it is unclear what the Quad expects from ASEAN and how the member states envision the Quad’s relations with ASEAN. Second, ASEAN has not discussed what role ASEAN desires to play with the ASEAN Centrality, either. Indeed, ASEAN issued its perspective on the Indo-Pacific, the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (AOIP), in June 2019, which emphasised the importance of the ASEAN Centrality in the region (ASEAN Secretariat, 2019). One of the AOIP’s objectives is to neutralise the intensification of US-China great power rivalry in Southeast Asia, and thus, its strategic emphasis was “openness” and “inclusivity.” However, this does not address what the ASEAN Centrality in the IndoPacific region means. Indeed, the Indo-Pacific is a wider geostrategic region, which ASEAN cannot reach out. In the AOIP, ASEAN clearly states that it would not intend to establish a new institution covering the Indo-Pacific region but rather cooperate with other regional mechanisms in the region. In this context, it remains unclear how ASEAN can maintain the ASEAN Centrality. Currently, the Quad and ASEAN do not face any institutional competition as the Quad rhetorically expresses its support for the ASEAN Centrality. However, as the institutionalisation of the Quad proceeds without clarifying the future of the Quad-ASEAN relations, there will be tension between these two institutions, which would disrupt the process of creating a multi-layered institutional arrangement in the Indo-Pacific region. If the Quad members aim to maintain the existing rules-based order and build a new rules-based regional order on the existing one, ASEAN’s support will become imperative, and the institutional division of labour needs to be discussed.

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1.6 New Institutional Arrangement: A “Quad-Plus” Formula and Role of Japan If the current institutional development of the Quad and ASEAN is not sustainable, what institutional arrangement can the Quad pursue in the future? Is it possible to invent a new regional institutional arrangement without losing its comparative advantages in the Indo-Pacific region? The answer lies in establishing an institutional linkage between the two, where member states can hold dialogues and promote cooperation. Currently, the Quad and ASEAN do not have any institutional linkage, and their policy dialogues are generally conducted through ASEAN-led platforms, such as ASEAN+1. In November 2020, for instance, Japan and ASEAN issued the Joint Statement on Cooperation on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, by which both promised to seek synergy between Japan’s FOIP and ASEAN’s AOIP (ASEAN Secretariat, 2020). Although both did not produce any action plan, the statement specified potential areas of cooperation, including maritime security, quality infrastructure, digital economy and the fourth industrial revolution, and the counter-COVID-19 cooperation. However, this is essentially a bilateral arrangement, which does not overview the regional institutional arrangement. On the other hand, the Quad and ASEAN have shared principles in the Indo-Pacific region. The AOIP stipulates 12 international principles, including the ASEAN Centrality, openness, transparency, a rules-based framework, good governance, respect for sovereignty and respect for international law, which resonate with those of the Quad member states. While several points require further clarification, such as democracy and human rights, ASEAN generally supports those principles, as illustrated by the ASEAN Political-Security Blueprint 2025 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2016). In this context, the better coordination mechanism that can be created between the Quad and ASEAN is based on a “Quad-Plus” formula (Panda, 2020b, p. 5; Koga, 2021).5 Unlike the ADMM-Plus, which is the defence ministers’ meeting of the ASEAN member states, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the United States, this formula does not have any fixed membership or fixed agenda. Instead, this facilitates an informal dialogue, where participants can conduct information-sharing and explore a potential area of cooperation. There would be no institutional obligation to regularise the meeting, but it has an option to do so if necessary. Moreover, because the Indo-Pacific region is a broad geographical area from the Indian and Pacific Oceans, over which the existing regional institutions have difficulty covering, some regional states are more willing to focus on subregional cooperation. In this sense, as the AOIP suggested, it is vital to conduct inter-regional cooperation through the existing regional institutions, and the “Quad-Plus” formula becomes the basis of the forum that can help create such a linkage, particularly between the Quad and ASEAN.

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Also, this “Quad-Plus” formula provides a venue where all participants discuss on equal footing. In the ASEAN-led institutions, the ASEAN Centrality generally prevents non-ASEAN members from directly setting agendas without ASEAN’s consent. Although this mechanism enables ASEAN to manage great power tensions, their agendas are likely to be limited. On the other hand, the forums with a “Quad-Plus” formula would provide more freedom in setting agendas. The Quad member states are essentially the forum convener, but it does not mean that they are the only actors that can set agendas. Moreover, since the participants do not aim to regularise the dialogue with specific partners or conclude multilateral agreements every time they meet, it can also function as a confidence-building measure in the Indo-Pacific region. Further, this formula provides various means to explore multilateral and minilateral cooperation between the Quad and the ASEAN member states. Given 14 states altogether in the Quad and ASEAN and their diverse material capabilities, the collective action problem would likely ensue, and the members would face difficulty reaching consensus over cooperative actions in the Indo-Pacific region. However, even if inter-institutional cooperation is difficult, participants can bilaterally, trilaterally or minilaterally explore potential areas of cooperation and move into concrete collaborative actions, such as coordinated capacity-building programs and joint military training. In fact, this Quad-Plus format was already realised in the counterCOVID-19 cooperation between the Quad member states, New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam, in March 2020 (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020). Considering this precedence as one multilateral mode, the Quad and ASEAN could consider a possibility of spin-off cooperation with fewer members, depending on their capacities and geographical focus. In addition, given ASEAN’s concern about the maintenance of and the Quad’s strong support for the ASEAN Centrality, both ASEAN and the Quad can create a tentative geographical division of labour. As ASEAN’s core geographical and institutional interests rest on Southeast Asia and its institutional frameworks in East Asia, the Quad can mainly focus on other geographical areas, such as Northeast Asia and South Asia. Starting from non-traditional security issues, such as HA/DR, digital infrastructure and counter-pandemic, the member states in both institutions can informally decide focused geographical areas. Obviously, such a geographical division of labour can be overlapped and not clearly delineated, which requires political trust to overcome. This is precisely why a political dialogue between the Quad and ASEAN is necessary to sustain their co-existence in the IndoPacific region in the long term. In applying a “Quad-Plus” formula to the Quad-ASEAN relations, Japan plays a significant role. This is because Japan has developed strategic trust with Southeast Asian states since the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine, which emphasised Japan-ASEAN relations as an equal partner, while Japan has

30  Kei Koga

cultivated substantial political, security and economic relations with the United States, Australia and India, particularly since the end of the Cold War (Koga, 2017b; ISEAS, 2021). Japan’s tactical hedging focuses on constructing a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region based on the existing international order, incorporating regional states’ perspectives and gaining political support from them. In building a regional order, Japan also maintains the flexibility to engage with China, mainly when China follows the international order, which ASEAN considers an appropriate approach to mitigate great power rivalry in the region. In this sense, Japan is a key in bridging the Quad and ASEAN.

1.7 Conclusion Japan has been conducting tactical hedging through its FOIP vision to maintain and enhance the existing rules-based order and shape a regional order. In this process, Japan aims to institutionalise the Quad as one of the most critical Indo-Pacific regional institutions. The Quad functions as the venue for information-sharing and monitoring the Indo-Pacific situation among the member states. Although the member states’ strategic interests in the region are not always congruent with each other and its institutional development is not always straightforward, China’s assertiveness and challenges against the international order have triggered the gradual institutionalisation of the Quad, which served the realisation of Japan’s FOIP vision. Nevertheless, the Quad institutionalisation would potentially disrupt the current multi-layered institutional arrangement in the Indo-Pacific. One of the most important regional institutions in the Indo-Pacific is ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions, which advocate for the importance of the ASEAN Centrality. The institutionalisation of the Quad would be disruptive because the Quad, a group of major regional powers, could diplomatically marginalise ASEAN. ASEAN’s concern over this possibility is not desirable for Japan and other Quad member states because they would need regional states’ political support, particularly the ASEAN member states, in creating a regional rules-based order. The Quad has responded by explicitly expressing its strong support for the ASEAN Centrality. At the same time, ASEAN also emphasised the importance of ASEAN Centrality in the Indo-Pacific region by issuing the AOIP. However, both the Quad and ASEAN have yet to clarify what they mean by the ASEAN Centrality and ASEAN’s strategic role. Although this strategic ambiguity helps both institutions co-exist in the short term, the ongoing institutionalisation of the Quad would likely expand its role in the region, which may result in institutional competition. Furthermore, the establishment of new minilateral frameworks, such as AUKUS, has also complicated the future of the institutional arrangement in the Indo-Pacific region. While AUKUS is a military-oriented minilateral

Strategising Institutional Arrangement in Japan’s FOIP  31

grouping, it would also potentially expand as “AUKUS-Plus,” by which Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States would invite their allies and partners in the specific areas of security cooperation. However, given its military-oriented nature, ASEAN’s participation would likely be limited. To address these potential problems, creating the institutional linkage between the Quad and ASEAN first becomes crucial. Being transparent in the institutionalisation of the Quad and providing a venue to discuss potential inter-institutional cooperation not only reassures ASEAN but also clarifies the distribution of labour in the Indo-Pacific region. To this end, formulating an ad hoc, informal framework—a “Quad-Plus” formula— would be useful. The realisation of Japan’s FOIP vision requires a long-term constant national effort, and one of the crucial areas in this effort is to organise a new multi-layered institutional arrangement, which has not yet well strategised. In this sense, it is vital for Japan to actively bridge the Quad and ASEAN as Japan has strong ties with all member states.

Notes 1 Tobias Harris, “Fumio Kishida’s Principles Are About to Be Put to the Test,” Foreign Policy, October 4 2021, https://foreignpolicy​.com​/2021​/10​/04​/fumio​ -kishida​-new​-japanese​-prime​-minister​-ldp/. 2 While the concept of regional/international order varies by scholars, this chapter takes a minimalist approach. 3 Using the “Nexis-Uni” database with the keywords “Japan” and “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,” there are 35 English news articles, including all official press releases, from August 1, 2016, to July 31, 2017. 4 Using the “Nexis-Uni” database with the keywords “Japan” and “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,” there are 175 English news articles, including all official press releases, from August 1, 2017, to December 31, 2017. 5 This is similar to Panda’s idea that the Quad Plus “would allow participating nations to create a strategic alignment…”

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32  Kei Koga .org​/joint​-statement​-of​-the​-23rd​-asean​-japan​-summit​-on​-cooperation​-on​-asean​ -outlook​-on​-the​-indo​-pacific​-2/. Bull, H. (2012). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Fourth Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Buzan, B. (2003). Security architecture in Asia: The interplay of regional and global levels. Pacific Review 16(2), 143–173. Cha, V. (2011). Complex patchworks: US alliances as part of Asia’s regional architecture. Asia Policy 11, 27–50. Chellaney, B. (2007, July 29). ‘Quad Initiative’: An inharmonious concert of democracies. The Japan Times. Drezner, D. (2009). The power and peril of international regime complexity. Perspectives on Politics 7(1), 65–70. Ethirajan, A., and Pandey, V. (2020, May 28). China-India border: Why tensions are rising between the neighbours. BBC News. Green, M., and Gill, B. (Eds). (2009). Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Community. New York: Columbia University Press. Hall, J., and Paul, T.V. (1999). International Order and the Future of World Politics. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Hurrell, A. (2007). On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ikenberry, J. (2001). After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ISEAS. (2021). The state of Southeast Asia 2021: Survey report. https://www​.iseas​ .edu​.sg​/wp​-content​/uploads​/2021​/01​/The​-State​-of​-SEA​-2021​-v2​.pdf. Keohane, R., and Martin, L. (1995). The promise of institutionalist theory. International Security 20(1), 39–51. Keohane, R., and Martin, L. (2003). Institutional theory as a research program. In C. Elman and M. F. Elman (Eds). Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field (pp. 71–107). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Koga, K. (2011). The US and East Asian regional security architecture: Building a regional security nexus on hub-and-spoke. Asian Perspective 35(1), 1–36. Koga, K. (2014). Institutional transformation of ASEAN; ZOPFAN, TAC, and the Bali Concord I in 1968–1976. Pacific Review 27(5), 729–753. Koga, K. (2016). The rise of China and Japan’s balancing strategy: Critical junctures and policy shifts in the 2010s. Journal of Contemporary China 25(101), 777–791. Koga, K. (2017a). Reinventing Regional Security Institutions in Asia and Africa: Power Shifts, Ideas, and Institutional Change. Oxon and New York: Routledge. Koga, K. (2017b). Transcending the Fukuda Doctrine: Japan, ASEAN, and the future of regional order. CSIS Japan Chair Working Paper. https://csis​ -website​-prod​.s3​.amazonaws​.com​/s3fs​-public​/170401​_Japan​_SEAsia​.pdf​?fEe​ _O7OZFMmS2g7NiPUB​_sG4HlOxUpjT. Koga, K. (2018). ASEAN’s evolving institutional strategy: Managing great power politics in South China sea disputes. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 11(1), 49–80. Koga, K. (2019). Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ strategy: Tokyo’s tactical hedging and the implications for ASEAN. Contemporary Southeast Asia 41(2), 286–313.

Strategising Institutional Arrangement in Japan’s FOIP  33 Koga, K. (2020). Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ question: Countering China or shaping a new regional order? International Affairs 96(1), 49–73. Koga, K. (2021). Japan’s strategic vision on Indo-Pacific institutions: Quad, quadplus, and ASEAN centrality. In J. Panda (Ed). India-Japan-ASEAN Triangularity: Between Alignment and Alliance. Oxon and New York: Routledge. Koga, K. (2022). Quad 3.0: Japan, Indo-Pacific and minilateralism. East Asian Policy 14(1), 20–38. Koga, K., and Nordin, Z.H. (2020). Institutional collapse and shifting balance of ontological security: Role of Malaysia’s dual identity in the decay of ASPAC in the 1960s and 1970s. Pacific Review 33(5), 842–871. Koga, K, Oba, M., Jimbo, K., and Cooper, Z. (2019). U.S.-Japan cooperation on Indo-Pacific regional architecture. Asia Strategy Initiative, Policy Memorandum #3. Kuik, C.C. (2015). An emerging 3rd pillar in Asian architecture? AIIB and other China-led initiatives. Asia Pacific Bulletin, 305, https://scholarspace​.manoa​ .hawaii​.edu​/bitstream​/10125​/35832​/1​/apb​%20no​.305​.pdf. Mearsheimer, J. (1994/5). The false promise of international institutions. International Security 19(3), 5–49. Ministry of External Affairs. (2020). Foreign secretary’s conference call with counterparts from Indo-Pacific countries. March 20, https://mea​.gov​.in​/ press​ - releases​ . htm ​ ? dtl ​ / 32592 ​ / Foreign ​ + Secretarys ​ + Conference ​ + Call ​ + with​ +counterparts​+from​+IndoPacific​+Countries. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2016). Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China on the award of July 12 2016, of the arbitral tribunal in the South China Sea arbitration established at the request of the Republic of the Philippines. July 12, https://www​ .fmprc​.gov​.cn​/nanhai​/eng​/snhwtlcwj​_1​/t1379492​.htm. MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan). (2006a). Trilateral strategic dialogue joint statement: Australia-Japan-United States. March 18, https://www​.mofa​.go​ .jp​/region​/asia​-paci​/australia​/joint0603​-2​.html. MOFA. (2006b). Joint statement toward Japan-India strategic and global partnership. December 15, https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/region​/asia​-paci​/india​/pdfs​/ joint0612​.pdf. MOFA. (2007). Japan-Australia joint declaration on security cooperation. March 13, https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/region​/asia​-paci​/australia​/joint0703​.html. MOFA. (2016). Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the opening session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) (Saturday, August 27, 2016) (Kenyatta International Convention Centre (KICC), Nairobi, Kenya). https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/afr​/af2​/page4e​_000496​.html. MOFA. (2017a). Priority policy for development cooperation FY2017 (International Cooperation Bureau, MOFA). https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/mofaj​/gaiko​/oda​/files​ /000259285​.pdf. MOFA. (2017b). Diplomatic bluebook 2017. https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/files​ /000287676​.pdf. MOFA. (2017c). Japan-U.S. working lunch and Japan-U.S. summit meeting. November 6, https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/na​/na1​/us​/page4e​_000699​.html. MOFA. (2017d). Australia-India-Japan-U.S. consultations on the Indo-Pacific. November 12, https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/press​/release​/press4e​_001789​.html.

34  Kei Koga MOFA. (2018). Japan-Australia-India-U.S. consultations. June 7, https://www​.mofa​ .go​.jp​/press​/release​/press4e​_002062​.html. MOFA. (2021a). Free and open Indo-Pacific. February 1, https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/ mofaj​/files​/000430632​.pdf. MOFA. (2021b). Free and open Indo-Pacific. February 13, https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​ /mofaj​/files​/000430632​.pdf. Nikkei Shimbun. (2018, November 13). Indo taiheiyo, kieta ‘senryaku’ seifu ga ‘Koso’ ni shusei [Indo-Pacific: Disappeared ‘Strategy’: The Japanese government altered it to ‘Vision’]. Packham, C., and Westbrook, T. (2018, June 27). Australia to pass foreign interference laws amid rising China tensions. Reuters, https://www​.reuters​.com​/ article​/us​-australia​-security​-review​-china​-idUSKBN1JN0BY. Panda, A. (2020a, October 19). Australia returns to the malabar exercise. The Diplomat, https://thediplomat​.com​/2020​/10​/australia​-returns​-to​-the​-malabar​ -exercise/. Panda, J. (2020b). Quad plus: Form versus substance. Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Special Issue, 3–13. Silove, N. (2016). The pivot before the pivot: US strategy to preserve the power balance in Asia. International Security 40(4), 45–88. Sim, W. (2021, January 29). Japan can lead the world on multilateralism, says PM Suga at WEF event. The Straits Times. Streeck, W., and Thelen, K. (2005). Introduction: Institutional change in advanced political economies. In W. Streeck and K. Thelen (Eds). Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies (pp. 1–39). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Suryadinata, L. (2018). Indonesia and its stance on the ‘Indo-Pacific’. ISEAS Perspective 66. The Straits Times. (2011, October 1). Indonesia defence bidding process for highspeed rail project after Japan angered at being rejected. The World Bank. (2021, February 14). World Bank open data. https://data​ .worldbank​.org​/indicator​/MS​.MIL​.XPND​.CD​?most​_recent​_value​_desc​=true. US Indo-Pacific Command. (2021, February 13). USINDOPACOM area of responsibility. https://www​.pacom​.mil​/About​-USINDOPACOM​/USPACOM​ -Area​-of​-Responsibility/. Varadarajan, S. (2007, June 14). Four-power meeting drew Chinese demarche. The Hindu. White House. (2017). National security strategy of the United States of America. December 20. Yeo, A. (2019). Asia’s Regional Architecture: Alliances and Institutions in the Pacific Century. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Yong, C. (2018, May 15). Singapore will not join Indo-Pacific bloc for now: Vivian. The Straits Times. Zhen, L. (2021, February 7). How the US plans for the first Quad summit with leaders of Japan, Australia and India could be the first steps towards ‘mini-Nato’ to counter Chinese influence. South China Morning Post.

Chapter 2

The Indo-Pacific Power The United States, the Quad and the Making of a Megaregion Peter Harris

2.1 Introduction What is the purpose of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“the Quad”), and what is its future? This chapter suggests answers to these questions from a US perspective. The chapter argues that the Quad has the promise to fulfil two important functions for the United States. First, and most obviously, the Quad is a forum to facilitate military and political cooperation between four major powers—the United States, India, Japan and Australia—who share anxiety about the rise of China (Pan 2014). Second, however, the Quad represents an attempt to institutionalise the idea of a unified Indo-Pacific megaregion that stretches from the Arabian Sea to the Western Pacific. This is a more ambitious project than just routinised strategic cooperation among four like-minded states. If US leaders succeed at using the Quad to encourage a broad group of states to view themselves as inhabiting a common Indo-Pacific home—and especially if members of the Indo-Pacific come to be defined by a shared interest in resisting China—then the geopolitical topography of 21st century will have been transformed to America’s significant strategic advantage.1 Viewed in this light, the Quad is most important to the United States because of its potential to catalyse the institutionalisation of a favourable Indo-Pacific regional construct. Indeed, the Quad is uniquely valuable to the United States because it is the only international grouping that is explicitly premised on the idea of Indo-Pacific powers having security interests in common. This makes it likely that Washington will continue to invest in the Quad as a set of institutions for the foreseeable future.2 By itself, however, the Quad will not be enough to convert the idea of the Indo-Pacific into a cohesive regional security community that exists in opposition to China. One problem is that, upon closer inspection, the Quad members can be observed to have somewhat divergent views on how the Indo-Pacific concept should be wielded in international politics. Another issue is that some of the would-be region’s small and middle powers oppose any framing of the Indo-Pacific that might intensify great power competition. It remains to DOI: 10.4324/9781003342311-4

36  Peter Harris

be seen whether the United States can overcome these barriers to institutionalising its preferred conception of the Indo-Pacific. The chapter is organised as follows. Following this introduction, the second section argues that regional constructs sometimes emerge in world politics because of shared security interests among states. It suggests that how states choose to define their geographic neighbourhood can provide important clues about how they view their security environment. The third section applies this argument to the Indo-Pacific case, suggesting that the Quad members’ joint promotion of the Indo-Pacific idea suggests a shared reading of the Asian security environment in the shadow of China’s rise. The fourth section considers how institutions such as the Quad might help entrench the perception of aligned security interests such that commonalities can persist over the long term while also drawing attention to the barriers to institutionalisation that exist in the case of the Indo-Pacific. The fifth section explores some possible futures for the Quad and implications for US foreign policy.

2.2 Regional Nomenclature and National Interests Why do regions exist in world politics? The obvious answer is that international actors require nomenclature to describe different parts of the globe. However, this truism only serves to raise another question of how actors decide upon the definitions of regions. For scholars of International Relations, any answer to this second question must begin from the understanding that naming world regions is a political act. There is no such thing as a natural or neutral world region (Kohlenberg and Godehardt 2021). All regional constructs—all groupings of states and territories—have geopolitical or geoeconomic implications. In the 1970s, for example, the United States promoted the idea of a Pacific Rim region that included itself, Japan and the newly industrialised countries of East Asia. This was a strategic move to redefine the region along a particular dimension—economic policy—that would advance the US’ goal of cultivating a neoliberal trade and investment regime in East Asia while encouraging “amnesia” about the Vietnam War (Cumings 1994). The “Asia-Pacific” is a similarly political construct (Dirlik 1992), which evokes an understanding of East Asia that emphasises its relationship to the Pacific Ocean—on the other side of which, of course, lies the United States. One pathway to successfully conjuring a world region is via states’ intersubjective definitions of their security interests. The North Atlantic is the archetype of a world region that was constructed because of shared security concerns. Before World War II, the North Atlantic did not exist as a meaningful regional construct. Since the late 1940s, however, the idea of a North Atlantic region has mattered enormously in world politics, helping to orient the military and security policies of some of the world’s most powerful

The Indo-Pacific Power  37

states. As argued below, one reason that the North Atlantic construct has survived for more than 70 years is that it has been codified and institutionalised via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, whatever the explanation for the North Atlantic’s longevity as an organising idea in international relations, it is clear that what began as a pragmatic response to the onset of the Cold War has become something permanent. A regional construct that originally was meant only to describe the purview of a new military alliance has evolved into something else: a common geographic home for states that share a persistent intersubjective definition of their security interests (Lindley-French 2015). The case of the North Atlantic illustrates how regional nomenclature and national interests can be endogenous to an intersubjective reading of the international security environment. The idea of a North Atlantic region was invoked and institutionalised because states as far apart as the United States and Greece and Turkey shared a common perception of the Soviet Union as a threat to their national security; the regional label and the mutual decision to create a collective security organisation were outgrowths of states’ underlying security interests.3 At first, this harmonisation of security interests was organic—the result of similar but independent conclusions that the Soviet Union’s vast material power posed a challenge to international security. Over time, however, the practice of regional belonging—performed, in this case, via routinised participation in NATO’s military structures—has had the effect of maintaining an alignment of perceived interests over the long term despite changing international circumstances (Sjursen 2004). Might the Indo-Pacific follow a similar trajectory to the North Atlantic? At present, the Indo-Pacific can be regarded as an incipient region in world politics—one that, like the North Atlantic, has arisen because of an organic alignment of security interests among states. This chapter draws particular attention to the security concerns of the Quad members—Japan, India, Australia and the United States—each of which has a perceived interest in balancing against China in strategic terms (Pan 2014). However, it is important to emphasise that the future of the Indo-Pacific as a construct will depend upon its acceptance and internalisation by a much wider group of states (see Doyle and Rumley 2019), including small and middle powers and regional organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). As Rory Medcalf has put it, there is, therefore, a “contest to define Asia conceptually” (Medcalf 2018; see also Medcalf 2020). On the one hand, the Quad members (and others in their orbit) may succeed at making the Indo-Pacific into a meaningful construct that encourages states along the entire maritime rim of South and East Asia to view themselves as facing similar geopolitical challenges. Alternatively, however, it might transpire that the Indo-Pacific is too thin of a construct to orient the foreign policies of such a diverse group of states, especially given that there are

38  Peter Harris

already multiple historical geographies that cut against the idea of a unified and overriding Indo-Pacific frame.

2.3 The Birth of the Indo-Pacific The genealogy of how the Indo-Pacific label came to be used in international diplomacy seems to support the idea that it is, in part, a rhetorical strategy to encourage a shared understanding of the Asian security environment (Medcalf 2020). However, most scholars agree that the idea of the Indo-Pacific took on international significance in 2007 when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe used the concept (although not the exact phrase) in a speech to the Indian Parliament (Matsuda 2018; Rossiter 2018). Abe argued that material relationships between the states of the Indian Ocean and those of the Pacific Ocean had become so great that Japan now had a compelling interest in the future of both oceanic spaces.4 From this view, developments on one side of the Strait of Malacca had such significant impacts upon politics, economics and security on the other side of the strait that the distinction between the two spaces was becoming irrelevant. For all intents and purposes, the Indian and Pacific Oceans had become conjoined to create a single geographic megaregion—a historical moment that Abe called the “confluence of the two seas” (Abe 2007). Abe can be considered a norm entrepreneur in this regard—a leader who successfully proposed and propagated a new way of thinking about regional constructs in Asia. During his second term as Prime Minister, Abe (2016) also coined the (now familiar) “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept, which went beyond merely defining the Indo-Pacific as a geographic megaregion to call for a specific set of rules and institutions that ought to govern international interactions in the space (Hosoya 2019). India was the first to endorse Japan’s view of the Indo-Pacific, albeit with some important qualifications. Following the first Malabar exercise in 2007 (when all Quad members plus Singapore had participated in a maritime-security show of strength), India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh showed noticeable reluctance to single out China. This would become a pattern: when the Quad reemerged in 2017, for example, India continued to stress the need for “inclusivity” (Roy-Chaudhury 2018). Australia, too, has been anxious in the past to avoid antagonising China. In 2008, Canberra’s formal withdrawal from Quad aborted the security quadrilateral. Nevertheless, the idea of an Indo-Pacific region persisted in Australian thinking and returned to prominence with the government’s 2013 Defence White Paper, helping to shape perceptions of Australia’s geopolitical interests in a changing world (Scott 2013; Medcalf 2013; Medcalf 2014). Since then, Australian leaders have converged on using the vocabulary of the Indo-Pacific and have hardened in their views against China, even if their actions in foreign policy have not always matched

The Indo-Pacific Power  39

those that would be expected of a truly committed Indo-Pacific power (Taylor 2020). The United States was the last Quad member to adopt the language of the Indo-Pacific in its official documents—namely, the 2017 National Security Strategy. Part of the reason that the United States was late to embrace the language of the Indo-Pacific, perhaps, is that America is not an obvious candidate for belonging to the Indo-Pacific—even if the US government insists that it is a bona fide “resident power” in the region (Scott 2018, p. 22). Certainly, the United States has a stronger case for belonging to the AsiaPacific or Pacific Rim than any regional construct that includes the Indian Ocean. However, whether it is a resident power or an external power, the United States has a strong perceived self-interest in balancing against a rising China. By extension, the United States has an enormous stake in the future of the Indo-Pacific construct because it would greatly serve America’s interests if a broad group of states could be encouraged to converge on the idea of sharing a common interest in countering Chinese influence. For this reason, US leaders have grabbed onto the concept of the Indo-Pacific with abandon since 2017, determined that the United States will be at the political centre of the Indo-Pacific even if not the geographic core. Under President Trump (Scott 2018) and President Biden (Rogan 2021), the Indo-Pacific and the Quad have been afforded a high level of strategic significance. In 2018, the Pentagon even renamed US Pacific Command (USPACOM) to US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM)—a major symbolic declaration that the United States now regards the security of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean as the same. To recapitulate, the conjuring of the Indo-Pacific as an intersubjective idea among Quad members happened because of choices made by all four states in response to prevailing strategic conditions in Asia. Namely, the IndoPacific has arisen out of a shared perception that the states of the Indian Ocean littoral and those of the Asia-Pacific experience similar material conditions in the 21st century, and so ought to view their interests through a common regional lens. The naming of this megaregion did not originate in the United States. It was Japanese, Indian and Australian leaders who took the lead in propagating the idea that the Indian Ocean and the western half of the Pacific Ocean constitute two halves of a single megaregion. Only later did US officials take advantage of the nomenclature. Even so, the emergence and acceptance of the Indo-Pacific is a convenient outcome from America’s perspective because it allows US leaders to portray the rise of China—something that might otherwise be regarded as local to the Western Pacific, Northeast Asia, the Eurasian interior or the Pacific Rim—as a geopolitical event that affects (and binds together) three of its most important security partners. Thus, the Indo-Pacific construct is something that the United States has a keen interest in institutionalising and maintaining over the long term.

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2.4 Institutionalising Convergence What are the chances of the Indo-Pacific regional construct taking root in world politics? Will it ever motivate the foreign policies of states beyond those of the Quad? Can the Quad members arrive at a common definition of what the Indo-Pacific is and should be? If history and political science theories can provide any guidance, it seems likely that the future of the Indo-Pacific as an animating idea will depend, in part, upon its degree of institutionalisation. Rationalist models of international cooperation show that institutions can serve as focal points for fostering converged ways of thinking among states (Botcheva and Martin 2001; Martin and Simmons 1998).5 Constructivist theorists of international relations agree that institutions can shape the ideas, identities and behaviours of states—albeit for different reasons (e.g., Finnemore 1996).6 In the case of the North Atlantic, described above, both of these mechanisms seem to have been operative: without NATO, it is doubtful that the states of the so-called North Atlantic could have maintained an alignment of interests and identities because the organisation (NATO) itself played such a key role in creating and disseminating ideas of sameness (see, e.g., Sjursen 2004; Gheciu 2005 and 2019). Students of international politics in Asia will be aware of many examples of institutions serving to engender patterns of regional belonging. The AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation, for example, has constituted a successful effort to institutionalise the idea of the Pacific Rim over the past several decades. ASEAN has been even more successful at shaping the interests and policies of its member states, such that a regional identity can now be observed to exist in terms of politics, economics and diplomatic cooperation. At the other end of the Indo-Pacific, the Gulf Cooperation Council works relatively effectively to help Gulf Arab states formulate, solidify and act upon common interests, especially regarding their opposition to Iran. Failed attempts to foster regional belonging and togetherness might include the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Eurasian and Economic Union—all international organisations that never quite had the effect of fostering a sense of common purpose among their members.7 As noted above, the Quad is the only formalised international forum that explicitly draws upon the idea of the Indo-Pacific. As such, the fate of the Quad must be regarded as closely related to that of the Indo-Pacific construct. Given its membership—one Pacific power, one Indian Ocean power, one power that is situated at the literal confluence of the two oceans and one power mostly located outside of the region—the Quad has the obvious potential to routinise the performance of belonging to the Indo-Pacific and thereby reify the perception that Indo-Pacific nations share common interests. Moreover, the emerging system of “Quad-Plus” arrangements—a series of ad hoc discussions between the Quad members and smaller powers such as Singapore, South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand—suggests that

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the Quad might even be able to precipitate a cascading effect, with nonQuad members also coming to internalise and accept the existence of an Indo-Pacific as a direct result of the Quad’s work. Even so, there will be barriers to institutionalising the Indo-Pacific via the Quad as a set of institutional arrangements. Indeed, there are reasons to believe that even a thin notion of an Indo-Pacific region might falter (He and Feng 2020). One question is whether one or more of the Quad states will undergo a unilateral rethinking of national interests such that multilateral cooperation against China becomes less appealing. Take Japan, for example. Despite Abe’s lofty description of the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific being conjoined, the reality is that Japan’s core security interests relate to Northeast Asia. Events in the Persian Gulf—America’s interest in managing the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry, for example—are simply not as important to Japan as the North Korean nuclear issue, Taiwanese security, or control of the East China Sea. Nor are India’s territorial disputes with Pakistan and China. If push came to shove in the Persian Gulf, South Asia or the Indian Ocean, would Japan’s political leaders and domestic public support military policies to act upon the idea that Japan belongs to the same regional security community as India? At the very least, there are reasons for scepticism. In the economic sphere, Japan has an abiding interest in maintaining open sea lanes in both the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. More generally, Japan can be expected to support the idea of a rules-based international order—in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. However, these economic and diplomatic concerns are not the driving forces behind the Indo-Pacific as a regional construct: the logic of international security and anxiety over China’s rise are what breathe life into the idea of the Indo-Pacific (Pan 2014). Even in the recent past, Japanese leaders were unwilling to participate in security initiatives west of the Malacca Strait. Of course, within Japan there is a range of political opinions on these questions. Some domestic actors call for Japanese foreign policy to become much more ambitious and wide-ranging while others caution against militarism and binding multilateral commitments. However, the bottom line is that Japan’s participation as a truly Indo-Pacific power must be regarded as uncertain at best. Moreover, suppose Japan—whose leaders played such a prominent role in articulating the existence of the Indo-Pacific and pushing for the formation of the Quad in the first place—cannot be counted upon to lead in the Quad’s evolution into an Asian NATO. Such an outcome would surely raise questions about the future of the Indo-Pacific as a construct and the Quad as an enduring set of institutions. There are also reasons for scepticism that India will continue to view itself as belonging to the same regional security community as the other Quad members. Some scholars have argued that the Indo-Pacific construct might be too broad to sustain a convergence of interests between India and the United States, for example, because it requires the two powers to

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confront their differences in subregions such as the Persian Gulf (Pant and Raj 2018). Meanwhile, New Delhi has no real history of involvement in the Pacific to the East. Rather, India’s core security interests relate to South Asia (its land borders with Pakistan and China) and the Indian Ocean (its ambition to be the leading naval power from the Arabian Sea to the Straits of Malacca). India’s most pressing security threats come from the north, a political reality reinforced in 2020 by deadly skirmishes with Chinese troops along the Line of Actual Control. These security concerns—ones that have the demonstrated potential to result in lost Indian lives—are not ones that the Quad as a maritime alliance can help with (Pant and Raj 2018). Even if the Quad was to morph into a more conventional collective security organisation along the lines of NATO, Indian leaders must have their doubts as to whether the United States, Japan or Australia would be willing to fight in defence of small pockets of Himalayan territory.8 Indeed, New Delhi has some non-trivial self-interested reasons to avoid the Quad becoming an avowedly anti-China organisation: its overall approach to China has been one of “evasive balancing” (Rajagopalan 2020)—a combination of policies to reassure Beijing while engaging in strategic balancing—that depends, in part, upon the plausible deniability of the Quad being an Asian NATO. Of all the Quad members, Australia is perhaps the most natural IndoPacific power because it sits literally at the junction of the two oceans. Australian anxiety about the rise of China is well documented, and Canberra has long been part of US-led strategic efforts to balance against China in strategic terms, including through intelligence-sharing and by playing host to US troops. However, as was seen in 2008, Australian leaders face compelling economic incentives to align with China—or, at least, maintain a productive relationship with Beijing—on at least some issues. Given Australia’s deep economic ties to China, it will be difficult for leaders to sustain a diplomatic and military strategy that jeopardises the trade and investment relationship. Indeed, the practice of Australian foreign policy already seems to deviate somewhat from that which might be expected from a government committed to the idea of an Indo-Pacific security community (Taylor 2020). In any case, Australia is also the smallest military power of the Quad, spending only half of what India spends on defence. Even if Australia could be regarded as reliably committed to the Quad as an informal or formal alliance structure, therefore, it is questionable how or whether the Australian Defence Force—which comprises just over 85,000 active personnel—could render meaningful assistance to Japan or India in the event of war with China.9 Even America’s participation in the Quad cannot be taken for granted over the long term. The Trump administration was responsible for integrating the language of the Indo-Pacific into official speeches and strategic documents. However, President Trump was also responsible for weakening international perceptions of US credibility. After Trump, US allies will

The Indo-Pacific Power  43

always have to contend with the possibility that leaders in Washington will abandon them whenever it suits their domestic political interests to do. This is especially true in the context of domestic calls for US domestic renewal and military restraint. To be sure, President Biden’s promise to strengthen the US-led alliance system (including organising virtual and in-person Quad summits) can be read as an attempt to portray US commitments to the IndoPacific and Quad as unwavering. Yet the uncertainty of the Trump years will be difficult to forget, and the threat of massive swings in US foreign policy will loom large for some time to come. The implication is that, while it is obviously advantageous from the US perspective for India, Japan and Australia to share a mutual concern about China’s rise, it is far less obvious that the other three Quad members will continue to believe that US allyship is something that can be relied upon going forward. At this point, it is worth remembering that all of the Quad members are cross-pressured when it comes to making the Indo-Pacific an organising principle of their foreign policies. That is, shared security concerns about the rise of China are not the only set of factors that act upon national leaders. Other material realities matter, too. This is not to say that Prime Minister Abe was wrong in 2007 to argue that a “confluence of the two seas” had taken place—that political, economic and security affairs in one ocean are intimately connected with developments in the other. That much is true. But is the idea of the Indo-Pacific (and the shared security environment that it conjures) more compelling than the logic of belonging to the Asia-Pacific, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia or the Persian Gulf? As of now, there are powerful reasons to doubt this to be the case. When Narendra Modi talks about a “Neighbourhood First” policy, for example, he means South Asia and the Indian Ocean island states. Few in India believe that the country’s “neighbourhood” includes countries as far away as Japan. Bringing the Indo-Pacific construct to the point where it can supersede these pre-existing (and discrete) regional communities, each with their political logics and security dynamics, will be a difficult task.

2.5 The Future of the Quad: Coalition, Catalyst or Collapse? The twin futures of the Indo-Pacific as a construct and the Quad as a set of institutions are interrelated. If the Quad’s members persist in believing that they share a common set of security interests—and if these exigencies are thought to be so serious that they take precedence over other pressing considerations—then the Quad as an institution will surely endure. In turn, the Quad’s success will help ensure that the conjuring of the Indo-Pacific takes root among the Quad’s members. However, this is a crude stylisation of what the future might look like for the Indo-Pacific. This section explores some more specific possible scenarios for how the Quad and the idea of the

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Indo-Pacific will fare in the coming years—including an analysis of how the other (non-Quad) powers view their interests in a changing regional context. The most expansive outcome for the Quad, of course, is that it evolves into a collective security organisation along the lines of NATO. Such a future is regularly contemplated in academic and popular commentary. Furthermore, there is some precedent for this in Asia—namely, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the Baghdad Pact and the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (ANZUS) Treaty. Of these, however, only the ANZUS alliance has survived intact. The others fell victim to changes in the domestic politics of the signatories, or else simply failed to engender a shared sense of purpose among member states.10 Of course, the history of the North Atlantic security community provides the most successful model here—a community of states that came together in the face of a perceived material threat (the Soviet Union) and agreed to form an alliance for the mutual security of all. This would, perhaps, be the ideal outcome for the United States, which is already committed to the defence of Japan and Australia and would only be adding India to its list of treaty allies. Even so, it is possible that Quad states will be reluctant to entertain legally binding commitments to aid one another in a time of war. This is especially true given that India and Japan are both involved in territorial disputes with China, while the United States is committed to the military defence of several countries with which Beijing could feasibly go to war. Formalising the Quad would thus be a consequential decision, one that national leaders would not take lightly. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the Quad could evolve into a de facto Asian NATO without a mutual security treaty. This is because even binding security commitments are only credible if they exist alongside a convergence of material interests among the signatories. If such an alignment of interests does not exist in practice, treaties of the alliance are essentially meaningless in world politics. Nobody believes that states will come to the military aid of one another if it is not in their interest to do so—even in the presence of legally binding commitments. Yet, if there is already a true convergence of security interests—if Japan, India, Australia and the United States genuinely view China as a common security threat, such that an attack on one is tantamount to an attack on all—then there is no need to formalise the agreement. Viewed in this light, the goal of those wanting the Quad to succeed must be to solidify the perception of common security interests in the shadow of China’s rise, which can be done with or without a binding treaty of alliance. What if the Quad breaks down? As discussed above, such a failure must be regarded as a distinct possibility. After all, the Quad will cease to have any practical importance if one or more of its members come to view their security interests as significantly divergent from the others. Such a divergence could happen slowly—because, for example, the economic pull of

The Indo-Pacific Power  45

China proves to be too powerful Quad states to resist11—or it could emerge as the result of an exogenous shock—that is, a crisis moment such as a hot war between China and a Quad member. India and Japan are critical in this regard because of their geographic locations at the opposite ends of the Indo-Pacific region. What stake does Japan have in India’s border disputes with China? Would India go to war over the Senkaku Islands? The answer to these questions, most probably, is “none” and “no.” This means that the fracturing of the Quad as an informal alliance must not be ruled out in the event of an escalating conflict involving China.12 Another potential scenario is that the Quad-Plus series of ad hoc arrangements brings small and middle powers into the Indo-Pacific’s narrative framework and the strategic (Quad-centric) framework of balancing against China. New Zealand, for example, has participated in some Quad-Plus dialogues and has now switched to using the language of the Indo-Pacific in some of its official documents (Scott 2020). South Korea and Vietnam have also participated in Quad-sponsored discussions, while Singapore has even participated in multilateral naval exercises alongside the core Quad members. These developments point to a future where the Quad serves as the nucleus of an anti-China coalition of regional powers that cooperate on international security matters and in economics, diplomacy and other areas of common concern. However, it would be wrong to assume the inevitability of such an outcome. Some key regional actors, most notably ASEAN (see, e.g., Choong 2019), have independent visions of how the Indo-Pacific region ought to be concretised in terms of international cooperation—visions that do not always align with how the Quad members would like to see regional integration proceed. Some analysts have viewed Modi’s call for an “inclusive” Indo-Pacific as a concession to ASEAN, a statement of reassurance that India does not support the creation of rival blocs in Asia. Moreover, while other Quad-Plus partners such as New Zealand might have begun to use the language of the Indo-Pacific in their official pronouncements, this does not mean that they will be committed to making the Indo-Pacific synonymous with an anti-China grouping. Indeed, some small and middle powers might never see their security interests as well served by an Indo-Pacific construct defined in opposition to China. Some of these governments might be content for Quad members to shoulder the burden of balancing against China, but few seem ready to commit themselves to a framing of regional politics that places them unnecessarily at odds with Beijing. Absent a major event to force a stark reassessment of the international security environment; then, it seems unlikely that the Indo-Pacific region will become home to the anti-China cordon sanitaire that some in the United States seem to hope for. More likely, perhaps, the Quad’s need to foster partnerships with more minor powers will force its members to temper their rhetoric about creating an exclusionary

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Indo-Pacific, as Modi in India already seems to have done to a certain degree.

2.6 Conclusion The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue was first convened in 2007, the same year that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe began to discuss the idea of the IndoPacific as a unified region. It is not possible to say that the former flowed as a direct consequence of the latter. However, it is likely that the two events were related—that ideas of interconnectedness and common regional belonging served as a necessary precondition for the formation of joint security institutions. For the Quad to survive and thrive as a set of institutions, the idea of the Indo-Pacific will have to strengthen among its member states. Without this unifying idea in place, it will become much more challenging to sustain a joint front against China—still less to bring other regional powers into the incipient regional community. For now, the members of the Quad have each independently concluded that multilateral cooperation serves their national interests in the context of a shifting distribution of power in the region. The Quad (including any future Quad-Plus arrangements) is currently the best instrument that the United States has for institutionalising this organic convergence of interests such that a common view of the Asian security environment might persist into the future. In other words, it is via the Quad that the United States can most easily establish itself as a meaningful Indo-Pacific power. However, the United States will not be acting in a strategic vacuum and will have to contend with the fact that other states—Quad and non-Quad members alike—have their national interests to safeguard (e.g., Liu 2020). In the long run, it will likely turn out that these other regional actors have much more of a decisive say over the meaning of the Indo-Pacific— whom it includes and what it should look like—than decision-makers in Washington.

Notes 1 Not all analysts agree that the Indo-Pacific concept serves US interests, with some arguing that the concept risks leading the United States down the path of strategic overstretch. See, for example, Jackson (2021) and Goldstein (2020). Nevertheless, for the time being, a preponderance of officials in the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations seem to have been convinced that the IndoPacific is a strategic frame well worth promoting. 2 It is appropriate to describe the Quad as a “set” of institutions because the dialogue between the four Quad members seems to be evolving into a constellation of “Quad Plus” arrangements that include Singapore, Vietnam, South Korea, New Zealand and others. See Smith (2020). 3 Greece and Turkey became members of NATO in 1952, three years after the organisation was founded.

The Indo-Pacific Power  47 4 At around the same time, analysts began to note how economic and security factors were pointing towards India and Japan sharing a common set of material interests. See Khurana (2007). 5 As Botcheva and Martin (2001) argue, it is also possible that institutions can fail in this endeavour, even causing divergence among participating states. 6 Of course, realist scholars of International Relations disagree that ideas or institutions can significantly alter states’ perceptions of their core security interests. See Mearsheimer (1994-1995) and Schweller (2001). 7 Notably, there are no pan-Asian international organisations with universal membership of Asian nations. Every other continent has a pan-continental regional organisation: North America has NAFTA, Latin America has Mercosur and the Americas as a whole have the Organization of American States; Africa has the African Union; Europe has the European Union and Council of Europe and Oceania has the Pacific Islands Forum. 8 President Trump’s offers to mediate solutions to the conflict with China were regarded as less than helpful both in India and China. 9 For context, the numbers of active personnel serving in the other Quad countries’ armed forces are 1.4 million for India, 1.3 million for the United States and around 250,000 for Japan. 10 Even military cooperation between the United States, Australia and New Zealand has faced serious challenges in the past—namely, as a result of Wellington’s opposition to nuclear weapons and the logistical problems that this has posed when it comes to New Zealand cooperating with the US Navy. 11 To reiterate, Australia’s departure from the Quad in 2008 put paid to quadrilateral military dialogue for the best part of a decade, highlighting just how important these economic considerations can be—and how much they can operate in the opposite direction of security pressures. 12 The disappearance of the Quad would not necessarily imply the erasure of the Indo-Pacific as a meaningful idea in regional politics. For example, the US military has already renamed US Pacific Command (USPACOM) as US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). If other states organise their military and foreign-policy bureaucracies along similar lines, it is possible that the Quad will have succeeded in leaving behind a legacy of the Indo-Pacific as an idea that permeates the policies and processes of states across the region.

References Abe, Shinzo (2007). The Confluence of the Two Seas. Speech to the Parliament of the Republic of India, 22 August 2007, https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/region​/asia​-paci​ /pmv0708​/speech​-2​.html. Abe, Shinzo (2016). Address at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development. Kenyatta International Convention Centre, Nairobi, 27 August 2016, https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/afr​/af2​/page4e​_000496​.html. Botcheva, Liliana and Lisa Martin (2001). Institutional Effects on State Behavior: Convergence and Divergence. International Studies Quarterly, 45(1), 1–26. Choong, William (2019). The Return of the Indo-Pacific Strategy: An Assessment. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 73(5), 415–430. Cumings, Bruce (1994). What Is a Pacific Century—And How Will We Know When It Begins? Current History, 93(587), 401–406. Dirlik, Arif (1992). The Asia-Pacific Idea: Reality and Representation in the Invention of a Regional Structure. Journal of World History, 3(1), 55–79.

48  Peter Harris Doyle, Timothy and Dennis Rumley (2019). The Rise and Return of the IndoPacific. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Finnemore, Martha (1996). National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gheciu, Alexandra (2005). Security Institutions as Agents of Socialisation? NATO and the ‘New Europe’. International Organization, 59(4), 973–1012. Gheciu, Alexandra (2019). NATO, Liberal Internationalism, and the Politics of Imagining the Western Security Community. International Journal, 74(1), 32–46. Goldstein, Lyle (2020). Pivot to Asia? We Have Been Here Before, and It Doesn’t Work. American Conservative, 30 December 2020, https://www​.the​amer​ican​ cons​ervative​.com​/articles​/pivot​-to​-asia​-weve​-been​-here​-before​-and​-it​-doesnt​ -work/. He, Kai and Huiy Feng (2020). The Institutionalisation of the Indo-Pacific: Problems and Prospects. International Affairs, 96(1), 149–168. Hosoya, Yuichi (2019). FOIP 2.0: The Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open IndoPacific Strategy. Asia-Pacific Review, 26(1), 18–28. Jackson, Van (2021). America’s Indo-Pacific Folly: Adding New Commitments in Asia Will only Invite Disaster. Foreign Affairs, 12 March 2021, https://www​ .foreignaffairs​.com​/articles​/asia​/2021​-03​-12​/americas​-indo​-pacific​-folly. Khurana, Gurpreet S. (2007). Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation. Strategic Analysis, 31(1), 139–153. Kohlenberg, Paul J. and Nadine Godehardt, eds. (2021). The Multidimensionality of Regions in World Politics. New York: Routledge. Lindley-French, Julian (2015). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: The Enduring Alliance, 2nd ed. New York: Routledge. Liu, Feng (2020). The Recalibration of Chinese Assertiveness: China’s Responses to the Indo-Pacific Challenge. International Affairs, 96(1), 9–27. Martin, Lisa and Beth Simmons (1998). Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions. International Organization, 52(4), 729–757. Matsuda, Takuya (2018). Making Sense of the Indo-Pacific Strategy: An Inheritance from the Past. Asia Pacific Bulletin, 9 May 2018, https://www​.eastwestcenter​.org​ /publications​/making​-sense​-the​-indo​-pacific​-strategy​-inheritance​-the​-past. Mearsheimer, John J. (1994–1995). The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security, 19(3), 5–49. Medcalf, Rory (2013). Defence White Paper 2013: Treading Water in the IndoPacific. The Interpreter, 3 May 2013, https://www​.lowyinstitute​.org​/the​ -interpreter​/defence​-white​-paper​-2013​-treading​-water​-indo​-pacific. Medcalf, Rory (2014). In Defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australia’s New Strategic Map. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 68(4), 470–483. Medcalf, Rory (2018). Reimagining Asia: From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific. In Gilbert Rozman and Joseph Chinyong Liow (eds.), International Relations and Asia’s Southern Tier: ASEAN, Australia, and India (pp. 9–28). Singapore: Springer. Medcalf, Rory (2020). Contest for the Indo-Pacific: Why China Won’t Map the Future. Melbourne: La Trobe University Press. Pan, Chengxin (2014). The ‘Indo-Pacific’ and Geopolitical Anxieties about China’s Rise in the Asian Regional Order. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 68(4), 453–469.

The Indo-Pacific Power  49 Pant, Harsh V. and Abhijnan Raj (2018). Is India Ready for the Indo-Pacific? The Washington Quarterly, 41(2), 47–61. Rajagopalan, Rajesh (2020). Evasive Balancing: India’s Unviable Indo-Pacific Strategy. International Affairs, 96(1), 75–93. Rogan, Tom (2021). Countering China, Biden Rightly Doubles Down on the Quad. Washington Examiner, 7 February 2021, https://www​.washingtonexaminer​.com​ /opinion​/countering​-china​-biden​-rightly​-doubles​-down​-on​-the​-quad. Rossiter, Ash (2018). The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” Strategy and Japan’s Emerging Security Posture. Rising Powers Quarterly, 2(2), 113–131. Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul (2018). Modi Spells Out a Free, Open, Inclusive Indo-Pacific Policy. IISS Analysis Blog, 7 August 2018, https://www​.iiss​.org​/blogs​/analysis​ /2018​/08​/modi​-free​-open​-inclusive. Schweller, Randall L. (2001). The Problem of International Order Revisited: A Review Essay. International Security, 26(1), 161–186. Scott, David (2013). Australia’s Embrace of the ‘Indo-Pacific’: New Term, New Region, New Strategy? International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 13(3), 425–448. Scott, David (2018). The Indo-Pacific in US Strategy: Responding to Power Shifts. Rising Powers Quarterly, 3(2), 19–43. Scott, David (2020). New Zealand Picks Up on the Indo-Pacific. Asia Pacific Bulletin, 17 March 2020, https://www​.eastwestcenter​.org​/publications​/new​-zealand​-picks​ -the​-indo​-pacific. Sjursen, Helene (2004). On the Identity of NATO. International Affairs, 80(4), 687–703. Smith, Jeff M. (2020). How America Is Leading the “Quad Plus” Group of 7 Countries in Fighting the Coronavirus. Heritage Foundation, 1 April 2020, https://www​.heritage​.org​/global​-politics​/commentary​/how​-america​-leading​-the​ -quad​-plus​-group​-7​-countries​-fighting​-the. Taylor, Brendan (2020). Is Australia’s Indo-Pacific Strategy an Illusion? International Affairs, 96(1), 95–109.

Chapter 3

Australia and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific A Strategy for the Defence of a “Rules-Based Order” Lavina Lee

3.1 Introduction Australia’s relationship with China has been deteriorating for some time, but in the year of the Coronavirus pandemic, relations took a truly toxic turn. Since 2016, the Australian government has taken some hard—and in some cases world-leading—decisions actively challenging Chinese policies. Australia, for example, was one of the first countries to publicly describe the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration decision on the South China Sea dispute as legally binding and to call on China to abide by it (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade [DFAT], 2016a). It was the first country to bar Huawei from participating in the rollout of 5G networks citing national security concerns. This set a global precedent for the characterisation of Huawei and ZTE as instruments of a foreign government (Pearlman, 2018). In 2018, Canberra also raised Beijing’s ire by enacting foreign interference laws that implicitly acknowledged Chinese covert influence and (dis)information campaigns in Australia over public debate, media, educational institutions and politicians from both major parties (Borys, 2018). However, what tipped the relationship to a poisonous level was Australia’s leading call in April 2020 for an independent international inquiry into the origins of the Coronavirus pandemic (Bagshaw, 2020). Beijing’s response has been furious, threatening and at times unrelenting. At the end of April 2020, China’s Ambassador to Australia issued a thinly veiled threat of impending economic coercion by publicly suggesting that the Chinese public would no longer visit Australia or buy Australian beef and wine. Over the course of the year, China introduced a range of prohibitive tariffs, behind the border restrictions, and imposed opaque and unexplained customs delays on a range of Australian exports, including barley, beef, wine, lobster and timber, as well as blocking the unloading of Australian coal at major Chinese ports (Sullivan, 2020). Australia’s export losses due to Chinese economic coercion have been estimated at approximately AUD 20 billion as of the end of 2020 (Waldron, 2020). In November 2020, China’s embassy in Australia issued a list of 14 grievances about Australian DOI: 10.4324/9781003342311-5

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policies—including all of the above—that it demanded the Australian government reverse as a precondition of any improvement in the bilateral relationship (Hitch & Hayne, 2020). Australia has not, however, backed down and instead initiated cases against China at the World Trade Organization and used global platforms such as the G7 to warn of the dangers to democracies if Chinese economic coercion remained unopposed (Hawley & Hawke, 2021). This policy stance presents a puzzle. China has been Australia’s largest trading partner and biggest export destination for some time, and it is this trade relationship that helped Australia avoid economic recession for nearly 30 years until 2020. Why then has Canberra taken such forwardleaning positions against Beijing when it has so much to lose? This chapter will explain why Australia has been an early champion of the Indo-Pacific, as both a geographic construct for defining the limits of its strategic interests and as a strategy to defend the US-led liberal international order under which it has prospered since 1945. It will start by situating Australia’s strategy to promote a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) within the two dominant strands of Australian foreign policy—the dependent ally and middle power traditions—and argue that the FOIP is consistent with and mutually reinforcing both. It will then explain the contours of the strategy, namely what the FOIP vision means to Australia ideationally, and then describe and analyse how this vision has been put into operation in policy terms. Australia’s FOIP strategy has involved four main facets: firstly, expanding Australia’s sovereign military capabilities to deter attacks on Australian soil and project power into the Indo-Pacific region; secondly, doubling down on its alliance with the United States, including deepening military cooperation, to assist the US to continue to project power into the region and prolong its primacy for as long as possible; thirdly, significantly deepening its relationships bilaterally with Japan and India as significant regional democracies; and finally, supporting the development of the Quad as the primary and most consequential multilateral quasi-institution, bringing together the region’s major democracies to counter China’s comprehensive challenge to the foundations of the US-led liberal order. It will be argued that Australia views the region as one that is still under active contestation. As such, Canberra is willing to make short-term sacrifices and bear Chinese retaliation, whilst actively building coalitions among like-minded states and using middle power diplomacy to maintain a balance of power in the region conducive to its interests and liberal values. For Canberra, Australia’s longterm security depends on it.

3.2 Enduring Themes in Australian Foreign Policy Australia’s enthusiastic adoption of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) as a concept and strategy to defend the post-World War II liberal rules-based

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international order can be placed within the context of two enduring traditions in Australian foreign policy: the “dependent ally” and the “middle power” traditions. These two traditions have sometimes conflicted with one another, particularly in periods of history where Australia’s strategic priorities diverged significantly from its US alliance partner and/or where the latter’s policy has taken a unilateralist and anti-multilateral turn. However, where the FOIP is concerned, the two traditions are mutually reinforcing and primarily aligned. Of the two, the dependent ally tradition has a longer historical pedigree harking back to Australia’s origins as a small penal and then a colonial offshoot of the British empire. Moreover, its political leaders have long displayed an innate sense of insecurity about the nation’s defence given its small population, vast and rich territory and proximity to much more populous or powerful non-European nations to its North and East (Taylor, 2020, p. 97). In the words of Coral Bell, the obvious “strategy to cope with that problem” was the “cultivation” of what Australia’s most influential Prime Minister Robert Menzies described as “great and powerful friends” (Bell, 2016, p. 1). Australia’s defence strategy up until the fall of Singapore in 1942 depended heavily upon the might of the British Royal Navy to maintain open sea lines of communication and to balance against and deter expansionist tendencies by any rising great power in the Far East, namely, Imperial Japan (Bell, 2016, p. 2; Lockyer, 2017). From this point, and as British power continued to fade after World War II, Australia’s dependency shifted firmly to the United States, with the resurgence of Japanese militarism, and from the 1960s, the spread of communism in Asia caused the greatest anxiety (Bell, 2016, p. 2; Taylor, 2020, p. 97). In 1951, Australia and the United States formalised their alliance relationship through the Australia New Zealand United States Treaty (ANZUS), which continues to form the bedrock of Australian defence strategy and planning. The ANZUS treaty commits the parties “to meet the common danger” in case of an “armed attack” on either country’s armed forces or territory in the Pacific (ANZUS Treaty, 1951, art. IV and V). Whilst this does not meet the NATO standard of a security guarantee, the relationship between the two countries is strong, with considerable expectations on both sides that the US will come to Australia’s aid in the event of a major attack. The alliance provides Australia with other significant benefits. It is a force multiplier for Australian military capabilities, a means by which Australia aims to anchor the United States to the Asia-Pacific, and importantly gives Canberra regular opportunities and privileged access to influence decisionmaking in Washington (Bisley, 2016, p. 406). Australian and US forces have developed a very high degree of interoperability, with Australian forces fighting in every major US military action in the last century, however controversial, including the Korean War, Vietnam, the first Gulf War, Afghanistan and Iraq (Australian Embassy in the United States, 2021).

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Australian forces also benefit from a high level of intelligence-sharing with their American counterparts—including through the “five-eyes” arrangement—as well as access to advanced military technology, joint development opportunities and training that they would be unable to replicate independently (Australian Department of Defence [DOD], 2016, p. 122; Bisley, 2016, pp. 405–406; O’Neil, 2017). The new AUKUS partnership (including the United Kingdom) provides a clear and direct example of the access to cutting-edge technology and joint development opportunities that the alliance brings to Australia. In return, Australian defence capabilities are structured not only around the defence of Australian territory and approaches but also to provide niche contributions to US-led operations, and importantly, to further US force projection into the Asia-Pacific. For Australia, US presence in Asia has been a force for stability and continues to be essential to the maintenance of a favourable balance of power in the region. Just as Australia sought to prevent the rise of Japan as a regional hegemon, it too seeks to prevent Chinese dominance of the Indo-Pacific, particularly as Chinese policy under President Xi has become more coercive towards regional states, dismissive of international legal rules and expansionist in relation to territorial claims. Australia’s FOIP strategy is premised on doubling down on the ANZUS alliance and efforts to extend United States regional primacy, both of which are consistent with its dependent ally foreign policy tradition. The second consistent—if somewhat cyclical (Ravenhill, 1998, pp. 317– 318)—theme in Australian foreign policy, harking back as far as the end of World War II, is that of “middle power diplomacy” or middle power activism (Ungerer, 2007; Cooper, Higgott & Nossal, 1993, pp. 17–19). Various Australian foreign ministers have cast Australia as a middle power (Carr, 2014, p. 76); however, Australia’s middle power diplomacy is most commonly associated with the self-conscious construction and promotion of such an approach by Gareth Evans, Australia’s foreign minister, from 1988 to 1996. In Evans’ own words: The characteristic method of middle power diplomacy is coalition building with “like-minded” countries. It also usually involves “niche” diplomacy, which means concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having, rather than trying to cover the field. By definition, middle powers are not powerful enough in most circumstances to impose their will. Still, they may be persuasive enough to have like-minded others see their point of view and to act accordingly. (Ungerer, 2007, p. 547; Evans & Grant, p. 344) During this period, Australia became an avid diplomatic practitioner of multilateral coalition-building, pursuing liberal internationalist interests

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and values around trade liberalisation, WMD non-proliferation and postconflict diplomacy (Ungerer, 2007, p. 547; Ravenhill, 1998, p. 315). Whilst Liberal governments from 2013 onwards have not framed their foreign policy overtly within the “middle power” tradition, they have taken strong positions defending a liberal rules-based international order even prior to the promotion of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific using middle power methods. This includes Australia’s strong positions and advocacy for a firm international collective response—as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council from 2013 to 2014—to the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 (DFAT, 2014) and Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea. From September 2014 to 2018, Australia also played a strong role in the US-led military coalition in the collective self-defence of Iraq against the ISIS insurgency (Hurst, 2014). Australia’s effective adoption of a “free and open” Indo-Pacific vision and strategy (explained further below) is consistent with its historical middle power identity in its aims and methods. A commitment to middle power activism is based on a combination of pragmatism and principle. On the former, middle powers, unlike the great powers of the day, do not have the capacity to effect change at the global level on their own and therefore must use the power of persuasion to build consensus and coalitions of the willing outside of and within multilateral forums that give lesser powers a global platform for advocacy. In terms of principle, middle powers are more likely to champion principles, norms and rules that appeal to the larger number of weaker states that prosper in a rules-based system that restrains the powerful and reflects a wider range of interests. Australia promotes the FOIP in defence of a liberal international world order that constrains the powerful according to the rule of law and promotes liberal economic and political values. It then approaches this objective via diplomatic advocacy, building coalitions of like-minded states within existing norms/institutions, or creating new diplomatic or security groupings (minilateral forums) when there is greater urgency to act.

3.3 Australian Values, the FOIP and the “Rules-based International Order” Unlike Japan or the United States (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA], 2017; US Department of State, 2019; US Department of Defence, 2019), the Australian government has not issued a “Free and Open IndoPacific” strategy document as such. However, the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper identified the promotion of an “open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific region in which the rights of all states are respected” (DFAT, 2017, p. 3) as one of five objectives of fundamental importance to Australia’s security and prosperity. Since then, the words “free,” “secure” and “resilient” have at times been added to the phrase and

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are used regularly in official statements (including as part of the Quad) and speeches by the Prime Minister and senior ministers (Biden, Modi, Morrison & Suga, 2021). Canberra’s interpretation of these terms should be read within the context of Australia’s firm commitment to a “rulesbased international order.” These are essentially the institutions and norms associated with the US-led post-World War II liberal order under which Australia has prospered and is now considered under unprecedented threat (DOD, 2020). Canberra defines the word “free” in terms of both security and political values. In security terms, freedom means the ability of all states in the region—especially the smaller and weaker—to make sovereign economic and strategic decisions free from external coercion of all kinds by powerful states (DFAT, 2017, p. 3). In his speech to launch the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull emphasised, for example, that “we will never agree that might is right. The rules-based order protects us all, and it protects us [Australia] in particular” (Turnbull, 2017b). Similarly, in a major speech to the Shangri-la Dialogue, he argued that strategic competition should remain “within the framework of international law not winning through corruption, interference or coercion” (Turnbull, 2017a; Australian Associated Press, 2017). Further, Australia has consistently called on China to abide by the South China Sea arbitration ruling (Payne, 2021). With respect to political values, the term “free” applies within the state and means freedom from foreign interference (covert operations) in domestic decision-making and the proper functioning of Australia’s liberal democratic institutions (DFAT, 2017, p. 12). Externally, whilst the FOIP is associated with taking active steps to support free societies (i.e., liberal democratic societies) within the Indo-Pacific, Australia is reticent to “impose values on others” such as overtly including democracy promotion in its foreign policy. Nonetheless, Canberra does use foreign policy tools, including aid to encourage and support good governance in the region. Moreover, it is unapologetic about being a “determined advocate of liberal institutions, universal values and human rights” diplomatically (DFAT, 2017, p. 11). In keeping with this, Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison has begun to lead the call for liberal democracies around the world to work together to proactively “support, defend and (where necessary) renovate” liberal institutions (with special reference to reform of the World Trade Organization) and to safeguard “a world order that favours freedom over autocracy and authoritarianism” (Morrison, 2021). Australia has also begun to put values at the centre of its diplomatic relations with China, including by making highly critical diplomatic statements about severe human rights abuses against ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang and Beijing’s suppression of democratic rights and freedoms in Hong Kong, including at the UN Human Rights Council (Hurst, 2020; Payne & Mahuta, 2021).

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For Australia, an “open” Indo-Pacific has a dual meaning. Economically, it means a global and regional economy based on liberal economic principles, i.e., open investment environments, open markets, free trade, protection of intellectual property, improved connectivity and infrastructure financing arrangements (in response to the BRI) that are based on “strong, transparent rules, promote fair and open competition, and are transparent and non-discriminatory” (DFAT, 2017 pp. 4 & 44). Openness also refers to a region where states enjoy the freedom of navigation and overflight. An “open” Indo-Pacific then is one that supports the conditions for free trade to work successfully, notably the maintenance of peace and stability, free access by all to the global commons, the protection of individual and corporate rights to property, open market access and reciprocal trade. Australia’s strategy aimed to defend a FOIP region is premised on the view that China is no longer content to accept and work within the prevailing US-led liberal international order but is actively and comprehensively undermining the political, military, economic and normative basis of this order. At the same time, Australia recognises that the continued dominance of the United States is no longer assured, and as such, the longevity and strength of this order are uncertain (DOD, 2016, p. 41). However, rather than accepting that Chinese regional hegemony is inevitable, and with it, the demise of the liberal order, Australia aims to do what it can on its own, with the United States and other like-minded democracies, to defend and promote that order, compete for influence with China across the region and to actively “shape the character of our region” into the future (DOD, 2020, p. 38). What then is Australia’s strategy to achieve these aims?

3.4 Australia’s FOIP Strategy: Countering Chinese Policy Whilst Shaping the Regional Environment in the Long Term In the short term, Australia’s FOIP strategy has been reactive, focused on countering or blocking specific Chinese policies/initiatives assessed to have adverse effects on the liberal order. However, over the long term, to achieve the objective of shaping the regional environment, Canberra’s strategy seeks to: first, deter further moves by Beijing to change the status quo by altering the latter’s cost/benefit calculations; secondly, compete with China (in concert with others) for influence over smaller regional states by offering a more attractive and beneficial alternative to a Sino-centric world; thirdly, assist smaller states to maintain an independent foreign policy by helping them to build their military capabilities and supporting the resilience of their domestic institutions from foreign interference; and fourth, build consensus among democracies, within and beyond the Indo-Pacific, to defend liberal institutions and norms and impose costs on Beijing where needed.

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Policy and action to implement this strategy can be categorised into a number of lines of effort: policy and planning targeted towards safeguarding Australia’s military capabilities and national security; activities to strengthen the capability of the US-Australia alliance and US force projection in the Indo-Pacific; collective initiatives among the Quad countries across a broad range of domains; and finally initiatives directed towards building consensus and resolve among democracies beyond the Indo-Pacific to counter Chinese activities that are already undermining core aspects of the liberal rules-based order. 3.4.1 Boosting Australian Self-Reliance and Capabilities to Deter Since the 2016 Defence White Paper release, Australia has committed to substantially upgrading its defence capabilities in line with an uncertain, risky and deteriorating regional environment. In 2020, the Australian government published a new defence policy document, The Defence Strategic Update (DSU), which assessed that the prospect of high-intensity conflict in the Indo-Pacific had increased significantly and concluded that a 10-year strategic warning time for a major conventional attack could no longer be assumed (DOD, 2020, p. 14). Further, there could also be no or minimal warning time to speak of for some contingencies—such as cyber-attacks on civilian infrastructure or grey-zone activities. As a result, Australia no longer had the time to “gradually adjust” the modernisation and expansion of Australia’s military capabilities but needed to do so with urgency (DOD, 2020, p. 14). In making this assessment, the DSU referred to increased strategic competition between the US and China, the assertive use of power by China to pursue influence in the region, the potential for the establishment of new military bases (by the latter) in Australia’s immediate region (with particular sensitivities concerning the Pacific) and the use of coercive activities—including the incorporation of grey-zone activities—in ways that challenged state sovereignty (DOD, 2020, p. 12). In these circumstances, Canberra committed to further sustained growth in the defence budget to build capabilities to defend and deter, despite the economic strain caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Notably, whilst the 2016 Defence White Paper declared the intent to increase defence spending to 2% of GDP by 2020–2021, under the DSU, the defence budget will exceed that target reaching 2.19% of GDP in 2021. Measured from a 2019–2020 baseline, Canberra will spend AUD 575 billion on defence over the decade, with AUD 270 billion directed to defence capability alone (Hellyer, 2020b, p. 7; DOD, 2020, p. 34). In addition, significant investments in Australia’s submarine warfare capabilities were announced in 2016, including AUD 90 billion for 12 new conventionally powered “regionally superior” submarines (see below), AUD 35 billion for nine high-tech Hunter class frigates (Kerr, 2021; Greene, 2018), as well as enhancements to maritime intelligence,

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surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and upgrades to infrastructure on Australia’s Cocos Islands in the Indian Ocean (Graham, 2016). The 2020 DSU went further still based on an assessment that military modernisation in the region has accelerated appreciably since 2016 with new weapons being introduced (advanced strike, maritime surveillance, A2/ AD capabilities and cyber-attack capabilities) with greater “range, speed, precision and lethality” putting “Australian military forces at greater risk over longer distances” (DOD, 2020, p. 13). The DSU sensibly acknowledges that Australia cannot “match the capability of major powers” (DOD, 2020, p. 27). Nevertheless, Canberra seeks to invest in the capability to “hold potential adversaries’ forces and infrastructure at risk from a greater distance” from Australia and enhance self-reliance (DOD, 2020, p. 27). Accordingly, over the next decade, up to AUD 100 billion is budgeted to develop, for the first time, a long-range missile capability including offensive systems such as hypersonic weapons, but also ballistic missile defence (Hellyer, 2020a, p. 8) as well as AUD 15 billion to improve cyber capabilities (DOD, 2020, p. 38; Brook & AAP, 2020). The aim is to deter by denial, rather than punishment, via holding China’s forward operating bases closer to Australia’s maritime and air approaches at risk (Hellyer, 2020a, p. 23). Against the background of this heightened regional threat assessment, the announcement of an “enhanced trilateral security partnership” between Australia, the UK and the United States, known as AUKUS, should be understood. The agreement committed the parties to deepen “information and technology sharing,” “integration of security and defence-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains” and “significantly deepen cooperation on a range of security and defence capabilities” (Australia, the UK and US, 2021). The centrepiece of AUKUS is the unprecedented agreement by the US and the UK to support Australia to acquire eight nuclearpowered (but not nuclear-armed) submarines, with Australia cancelling its AUD 90 billion contract with France to acquire conventionally powered submarines on the same day. With the first of these submarines unlikely to enter service until the early 2030s, Australia will likely seek to lease one or more nuclear submarines from its AUKUS partners in the meantime to add to its existing, albeit ageing, fleets of Collins-class conventional powered submarines. Less focused upon, but with greater short to medium-range impact on Australia’s high-tech capabilities, is the trilateral commitment to collaborate on joint development of cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and additional undersea capabilities. With the help of its “great and powerful friends,” Australia is putting itself in a position to make a significant contribution to the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific.

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3.4.2 Australia within the US Alliance: Enhancing Joint Capabilities and US Power Projection The substantial investment in defence capabilities is also designed to strengthen Australia’s contribution to the US alliance and enhance joint capabilities to deter and deny Chinese coercion. Here, Canberra goes beyond the mere alliance management, i.e., doing just enough to demonstrate alliance commitment to Washington but not so much as to risk substantial economic or military losses, as per Australia’s niche military contributions to the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Maintaining a favourable balance of power in the region is considered a primary strategic interest; hence, Canberra has doubled down on the alliance and is fully committed to working closely with the US to enhance joint capabilities, extend US force projection and ultimately enable the US to extend its presence as a balancing force. As mentioned above, US and Australian forces have developed a very high degree of interoperability and share many of the same defence platforms, with 60% of acquisition spending coming from the US in 2016. Australia is also included in the US National Technology Industrial Base, with the intent to increase participation in US Supply chains and joint defence research, development and innovation (AUSMIN, 2020). For example, over 50 Australian companies contribute to the global F-35 program, and in 2021 the two countries announced a joint project—the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment—to advance air-breathing hypersonic cruise missile technologies (Harper, 2021). The AUKUS agreement will likely accelerate and expand these ambitions. In addition, Australia will continue to play an integral role in the alliance’s surveillance and early warning systems via the positioning of signals intelligence facilities integral to US systems, such as the joint US-Australian facility at Pine Gap. Since 2012, US marines have been deployed annually on a six-month rotation to conduct exercises and train with the Australian Defence force in Australia’s Northern Territory. This reached a peak of 2,500 marines in 2019 (prior to COVID-19) for warfighting exercises, including the biennial civil-military Exercise Talisman Sabre, involving around 33,000 US and Australian personnel and which focuses on mid-intensity, high-end warfighting. US and Australian troops have also been involved in other trilateral exercises with Japanese forces (Exercise Southern Jackaroo) (DOD, 2019) and the Philippines (Exercise Carabaroo) (DOD, 2021a). The US-Australia Enhanced Air Cooperation program, which commenced in 2017, centres on air-to-air integration activities, including fifth-generation fighters, and the development of infrastructure in Northern Australia to support increased rotations of US aircraft for exercises, training and force projection (DOD, 2021b). As relations with China have deteriorated over 2020, the two countries began an ongoing force posture review exploring options to enhance US

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force projection into the Indo-Pacific, particularly Southeast Asia. In 2020, it was announced that a US-funded strategic military fuel reserve would be created in Darwin (McCormack, 2021) and that significant upgrades to the Tindal air force base Southeast of Darwin would commence, ostensibly to boost joint military strike power and strengthen deterrence capabilities. This includes building two earth-covered magazines, a munitions assembly conveyor shelter, a “fuel farm,” and the extension of the runway to potentially accommodate the US Air Force’s long-range bomber, the B-52 Stratofortress, as well as Multi-Role Tanker Transport aircraft (McLennan, 2020). More recently, the United States has expressed its interest in storing more munitions and pre-positioning defence equipment in Australia’s Northern Territory and incorporating Australia into US military supply chains through the co-production of precision-guided weapons within Australia. Joint force projection capabilities into Asia will also be boosted with the joint PNG-Australia-US expansion to the deep-water naval base at Lombrum on Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island announced at APEC in 2018, with the first phase completed in 2019 (AAP, 2019). 3.4.3 Harnessing the Collective Might of the Indo-Pacific Democracies: Japan, India and the Quad Beyond Australia’s alliance with the United States, the 2016 FPWP declares that Canberra will “lift the ambition of our engagement with major IndoPacific democracies … to promote and protect a shared vision for the region and to support a balance in the region favourable to our interests” (DFAT, 2017, p. 37). Implicit in this statement is the assumption of shared values and interests among democracies in supporting a liberal international order, with democratic Japan, Indonesia, India and the Republic of Korea singled out in this regard. The most significant and comprehensive cooperation has been achieved first with Japan, and more recently with India, in bilateral and trilateral formats (with the United States) and as part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue that was re-constituted in November 2017. The need to create broader-based coalition partners as part of Australia’s FOIP strategy recognises the relative decline in US power vis-à-vis China and that Washington cannot succeed in balancing Chinese capabilities alone. 3.4.3.1 The Australia-Japan Bilateral Relationship As the security environment in the Indo-Pacific has declined over the last decade, Australia and Japan have drawn closer to one another to the extent that they could be considered quasi-alliance partners. Canberra and Tokyo are deeply committed to promoting the vision of a FOIP, sharing deep concerns and threat perceptions about China’s assertive and coercive behaviour in the South and East China Seas, use of coercive economic practices for

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political ends and efforts to extend a sphere of influence over smaller Asian states using the Belt and Road Initiative primarily and now vaccine diplomacy to do so (Government of Australia & Government of Japan, 2020). As allies of the US, both face similar uncertainties about the extent of US commitment to their security, particularly during the tenure of the Trump administration, as well as the relative decline of US predominance, and have consciously deepened ties to one another to act as a force multiplier of allied power. Australia and Japan elevated their relationship to a “Special Strategic Partnership” in 2014, in line with Japan’s 2013 National Security Strategy and Prime Minister Abe’s “proactive contribution to peace” foreign policy (MOFA, 2014). The strategic partnership is now highly institutionalised with Annual summits at the Prime Minister’s level and among Defence and Foreign Ministers (2+2). In addition, major agreements deepening defence cooperation have now been signed, including in 2017 an upgraded Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) for mutual logistics support that allows Japanese defence forces to play an expanded security role (Parameswaran, 2017). Others include the 2012 Information Security Agreement (ISA) on the sharing of classified information, the 2018 General Sharing of Military Information Agreement on broader intelligence-sharing, the Defence Technology Cooperation Agreement 2014 on defence trade and joint research, development and production of military equipment and an Economic Partnership Agreement in 2015. Furthermore, in January 2022, the two countries signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), which represents Japan’s first agreement covering the military presence of foreign forces on its sovereign territory since the 1960 US Status of Forces agreement (MacArthur Bosak, 2019). On the economic front, both countries have prioritised the promotion of the economic principles of the FOIP vision, which are in direct competition with China’s Sino-centric BRI for support among smaller states in the IndoPacific. It is this strand of the FOIP that remains a significant weakness given the absence of the United States in major new regional trade agreements. Both have been key to salvaging the Obama-led Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement in the form of the 2018 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and continue to lobby Washington to join this agreement. Both have also signed the 2020 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) as it promotes core economic principles of the FOIP and at least formally binds Beijing to the same, even if Canberra’s experience of economic coercion by Beijing shows that this is no guarantee of compliance. With Japan having withstood a similar campaign in 2010 with a Chinese ban on the export of rare earths, Canberra has found in Tokyo a diplomatic partner willing to stand with it in “opposing coercion and destabilising behaviour by economic means” (Government of Japan & Government of Australia, 2021). As the two key

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Pacific allies of the United States, the expanding institutionalisation and coordination of defence cooperation and policy between the two countries have broader significance, paving the way for deeper trilateral cooperation between Japan, Australia and the US and therefore further enabling US force projection and presence in the Indo-Pacific. 3.4.3.2 The Australia-India Bilateral Relationship Australia has directed significant energy over recent years to build bilateral relations with India, attempting to overcome some scepticism among the country’s leadership and foreign policy elite about Australia’s value-add and reliability as a strategic partner. Such perceptions stemmed largely from Canberra’s previous policy banning the sale of uranium to India (reversed in 2011) and the decision to withdraw from the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in February 2008 under Chinese pressure. However, Australia’s tough policy stance toward Beijing in recent years appears to have quelled these doubts. From Australia’s perspective, the desire to advance closer ties to India is based on a combination of economic, strategic and values-based interests. Australia’s adoption of the Indo-Pacific as a single economic and strategic system is based first on the fact that its crucial maritime trade routes astride both the Indian and the Pacific Ocean. As such, severe disruptions to freedom of navigation in one ocean directly impact the other, fusing both security and economic interests together. For Australia—as well as Japan and the US—the Indo-Pacific construct has the potential to bring the strategic weight of India into play in support of the FOIP, significantly adding to the maintenance of a favourable balance of power across the region. Chinese acknowledgement of a “Malacca Dilemma” (Ji, 2007) and its fear of maritime interdiction shows that Beijing is aware of the current and potential uses of India’s strategic assets in the Bay of Bengal—such as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Accordingly, Australia hopes to encourage and enable India to play a greater strategic role both in the Eastern and Southern Indian Ocean and in Southeast Asia and to play a greater part in deterring Chinese activities that could disrupt open access to crucial SLOCs. For India, whilst its primary maritime geostrategic interests continue to lie within the Indian Ocean region, it too is highly dependent on open sea lanes of communication into the Pacific to build upon trade ties to East and Southeast Asia under its 2014 Act East policy. Whilst the major flashpoints between India and China arise from clashes over Beijing’s “salami slicing” tactics along the 3,488 km un-demarcated “Line of Actual Control” between the two countries (the ongoing crisis in Ladakh being particularly severe), and its strategic and military support for Pakistan, New Delhi’s threat perceptions have also risen in the maritime sphere. Indian strategists have become increasingly aware that if Beijing succeeds in exerting hegemony

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over the Western Pacific, the PLAN will be free to expand its already growing power projection capabilities into the Indian Ocean, encroaching even more directly into India’s South Asian backyard and stoking its fear of encirclement. For the four Quad states, treating the Indo-Pacific as one strategic system plays to their combined strengths and magnifies Beijing’s maritime weaknesses in having to cover long sea lines of communication alone. On the other hand, treating the Indian Ocean and the Pacific as separate spheres gives Beijing strategic advantages it would not otherwise have. In recent years, as India’s threat perceptions of China have increased, the Australia-India relationship has grown in leaps and bounds. In 2020, the two countries elevated their bilateral relationship to that of a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” issued a joint declaration on a “Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” and concluded nine agreements. Included in the latter are three agreements that meaningfully advance defence and security cooperation: a Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) which allows for the reciprocal use of bases, humanitarian and disaster relief cooperation, port and passage exercises; The Defence Science and Technology Implementing Arrangement (DSTIA) which facilitates collaboration between the defence science and technology organisations in both countries; the Australia-India Framework Arrangement on Cyber and Cyber-Enabled Critical Technologies Cooperation covering the security and trade aspects of artificial intelligence, quantum computing and robotics (Payne, 2020); and an MoU on mining, processing and trade of critical and strategic minerals, including rare earths (to facilitate Australian supply of such rare earths) between the two countries. Both also agreed to upgrade their engagement to the level of foreign and defence ministers (2+2) biennially, similar to arrangements with Japan and the United States (Republic of India & Government of Australia, 2020). Finally, the newly signed MLSA will provide opportunities for both countries to use each other’s strategic assets—the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Australia’s Coco’s islands, for example—to extend the presence of their forces in the Eastern and Southern Indian Ocean and around the Malacca, Lombok and Sunda Straits, particularly for the purposes of monitoring and surveillance of Chinese naval and submarine activities under coordinated patrols (Baruah, 2020). 3.4.3.3 The Indo-Pacific Democracies and the Quad Australia’s FOIP strategy is based on the premise that Chinese policies present a broad-based and comprehensive challenge to the liberal rules-based order across all domains—strategic, economic, ideational and institutional— and that as a middle power, it is unable to meet the challenge to defend that order alone. As such, and in keeping with Australia’s historical practice of middle power diplomacy, Canberra has looked to build even broader coalitions among democracies to counter the adverse effects of Chinese policies

64  Lavina Lee

and behaviour. This includes the coordination of policies, joint advocacy in regional and global institutions and pooling resources to offer an alternative and more attractive regional order to the Sino-centric one offered by Beijing. The primary exemplar of this strand of Australia’s FOIP strategy is the Quad, re-established in November 2017 as a new regional grouping bringing together the four most capable and forward-leaning democracies in the region. From a military perspective, the primary value of the Quad is to signal to Beijing that the four states share the intent to counter and thereby deter future Chinese actions to further change the status quo. The steady elevation of the Quad to the level of a leader’s summit in March 2021 and expanding agenda introduces a greater element of uncertainty in Beijing’s calculations as to the collective responses the four countries may contemplate to defend the liberal order. India’s invitation to Australia to join the India-US-Japan Malabar naval exercises in November 2020 (Indian Navy, 2020) was a significant step forward in advancing interoperability, habits of trust whilst enhancing the credibility of the deterrent threat to Beijing. India’s ongoing and violent border clash with China in Ladakh appears to have overcome New Delhi’s reticence to be seen as “ganging up” against China (Lee, 2016) and forced a reassessment of its previous strategy of non-escalation. India’s openness to military (and other) cooperation within the Quad sends Beijing the message that it is prepared to impose costs for the latter’s expansionist behaviour. The Quad is well placed to augment joint capabilities and complicate China’s two ocean strategy by working to improve four-way interoperability; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capacities and informationsharing; logistics cooperation for power projection; and the development of joint defence capabilities. Whilst India is the only member of the Quad without an alliance relationship with the United States, it has signed important military cooperation agreements with Washington (and similar agreements with Australia and Japan) that pave the way for close cooperation in all of these areas (Saran & Verma, 2019). The India-US Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) signed in 2018 allows New Delhi access to secure and encrypted defence communications equipment from Washington, as well as real-time data sharing with the United States and allied forces such as Australia and Japan on previously restricted communications channels. This will enable both greater interoperability of Quad country military forces and enhance their combined maritime domain awareness (Panda, 2018). In addition, all four countries have signed logistics agreements with one another, facilitating the reciprocal use of military facilities to further collective power projection. This includes strategic assets such as Australia’s Cocos Islands military base, HMAS Stirling, India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands bases and the US base at Diego Garcia (Lee, 2020).

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In addressing China’s economic challenge to the liberal rules-based order, the Quad has yet to act together to counter China’s use of the BRI infrastructure funding to create a closed Sino-centric economic system that favours Chinese State-owned and private enterprises. In some cases— such as Sri Lanka and the lease of Hambantota Port—the BRI has created opportunities for Beijing to gain potential strategically useful footholds in maritime states via debt-trap diplomacy. The Quad states are also concerned about elite capture, the undermining of liberal democratic political and economic norms and significant opportunities for elite corruption that arise from the non-transparent, non-competitive and closed tendering processes under which BRI contracts are negotiated (Lee, 2019). Thus far, in November 2018, Australia, Japan and the United States have signed a Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the Indo-Pacific (Governments of Australia, Japan & the US, 2018) to coordinate and facilitate the mobilisation of private sector investment capital for infrastructure projects, digital connectivity and energy infrastructure. Whilst the initiative will promote best practice standards for “quality” infrastructure investment already championed by Japan—i.e. projects that are economically feasible and sustainable use transparent and open tendering and terms, create local jobs, transfer skills and considers social and environmental impacts—it is poorly funded by the three governments, has not attracted private partners and cannot, in its present form, hope to compete with the up to US$1 trillion offered via the BRI (Harris, 2019). This significant gap in Quad’s FOIP strategy has been recognised by the Biden Administration (Strangio, 2021). Over the course of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic and the simultaneous deterioration of political relations with Beijing for all four Quad states has revealed the security risks associated with their dependency on Chinese suppliers for critical medical supplies and finished goods. In response, in 2021, the Biden Administration signed an executive order authorising an effective whole-of-government 100-Day supply chain review (The White House, 2021); Australia, India and Japan formally launched the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) (Government of Australia, Republic of India and Government of Japan, 2021) and the Quad Leader’s Summit created a Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group which in part aims to encourage cooperation on the diversification of “telecommunication equipment suppliers and future telecommunications technology” (particularly 5G) and to “convene regular dialogues on critical technology supply chains” (Governments of Australia, India, Japan and US, 2021). Given the complexity of comprehensively “decoupling” economic relations with China, the focus is on detaching strategic supply chains for goods such as semiconductor chips, automobiles, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications and rare earths (of which Australia is a critical supplier) and relocating them to countries who are “trusted” allies and partners (Seidel, 2021). This geopolitical separation of regional supply chains has the potential not only

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to ensure the resilience of the Quad countries’ economies from Beijing’s coercive economic practices but could also increase the attractiveness of the FOIP by providing economic benefits to trusted developing countries in the region. Japan, for example, has offered subsidies to businesses to relocate from China back to Japan, Southeast Asia, as well as India and Bangladesh (Palit, 2020; Gakuto, 2020). Finally, the Quad Leader’s Summit revealed the ambition of the four countries to become a positive provider of global public goods—another means of underscoring the attractiveness of their FOIP vision and demonstrating that democracies are as capable (or more) as autocracies—in the form of a Quad Vaccine Partnership. Each Quad member will contribute to the partnership to deliver at least 1 billion COVID-19 vaccines based on their individual strengths by the end of 2022. The Quad is actively competing with Beijing’s vaccine diplomacy, which has been tarnished with accusations that access to Chinese vaccine supplies comes with political strings attached, such as support for the BRI (Stuenkel, 2021). The second Leader’s Summit held in September 2021 suggests that we can expect the Quad members to redouble their efforts to fulfil their vaccine commitments in 2022.

3.5 Conclusion Australia’s strong commitment to advancing a vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, undeterred by Beijing’s threats of further economic coercion, can be understood as being consistent with the two major strands of foreign policy thinking evident since 1945, namely the dependent ally and middle power traditions. Australia has long sought to balance against and deter expansionist tendencies by any rising great power in Asia—even before the rise of China—and has historically turned to “great and powerful friends” external to the region to do so. There is no doubt that Canberra views the United States’ presence in Asia as a necessary and stabilising force for good, and in the face of an expansionist and revisionist China, seeks to further US force projection and commitment to the region into the future. As a liberal middle power, the deterioration of the liberal international order that the US has led since 1945 is considered to be a serious threat to Australian values and material interests by allowing the creation of a regional Sino-centric order in which the rule of law no longer holds, and sovereign equality is no longer respected. Accordingly, Australian strategy seeks to defend a world order that is hospitable to liberal middle powers based on international law, the peaceful settlement of disputes, freedom from coercion by stronger states and one that is supportive of open economies and societies. Further, it does so by using tools that suit the strengths of middle powers and downplays their weaknesses, namely active multilateral diplomacy and the cultivation of coalitions amongst like-minded democracies. For Australia, the future character of the Indo-Pacific has not yet been decided, and it is therefore

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incumbent on middle power democracies to do what they can, alone and in concert with others, to shape Chinese behaviour whilst there is still an opportunity—albeit a narrowing one—to do so.

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70  Lavina Lee Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2017). Diplomatic Bluebook 2017: Japanese diplomacy and international situation in 2016. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/files​/000290287​.pdf. Ji, Y. (2007). Dealing with the Malacca Dilemma: China’s effort to protect its energy supply. Strategic Analysis, 31(3), 467–489. Kerr, J. (2021, May 22). Funding threat hangs over future submarine program. The Australian. https://www​.theaustralian​.com​.au​/special​-reports​/funding​-threat​ -hangs​-over​-future​-submarine​-program​/news​-story​/827​aef2​3757​bef9​5adc​822d​ 7acd696ec. Lee, L. (2016). Abe’s democratic security diamond and new quadrilateral initiative: An Australian perspective. Journal of East Asian Affairs, 30(2), 1–41. Lee, L. (2019). Democracy promotion: ANZUS and the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy. US Studies Centre Research Report. https://www​.ussc​.edu​.au​/analysis​ /publication​-alert​-democracy​-promotion​-anzus​-and​-the​-free​-and​-open​-indo​ -pacific​-strategy. Lee, L. (2020). Assessing the Quad: Prospects and limitations of quadrilateral cooperation for advancing Australia’s interests. Lowy Institute Analyses. https:// www​.lowyinstitute​.org​/publications​/assessing​-quad​-prospects​-and​-limitations​ -quadrilateral​-cooperation​-advancing​-australia. Lockyer, A. (2017). Australia’s Defence Strategy: Evaluating Alternatives for a Contested Asia. Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing. MacArthur Bosack, M. (2019, April 10). Slowly blazing the trail with the AustraliaJapan reciprocal access agreement. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​.com​ /2019​/04​/slowly​-blazing​-the​-trail​-with​-the​-australia​-japan​-reciprocal​-access​ -agreement/. McCormack, T. (2021, March 18). Fuel reserves is about more than storage. ASPI Strategist. https://www​.aspistrategist​.org​.au​/increasing​-northern​-australias​-fuel​ -reserves​-is​-about​-more​-than​-storage/. McLennan, C. (2020, February 24). Tindal’s might upgrade – Some of the finer details. Katherine Times. https://www​.katherinetimes​.com​.au​/story​/6645547​/ tindals​-mighty​-upgrade​-some​-of​-the​-finer​-details/. Morrison, S. (2021, June 9). Address to the Perth USAsia Centre, Perth, WA. https:// www​.pm​.gov​.au​/media​/address​-perth​-usasia​-centre​-perth​-wa. O’Neil, A. (2017). Australia and the “Five Eyes” intelligence network: The perils of an asymmetric alliance. The Australian Journal of International Affairs, 71(5), 529–543. Palit, A. (2020, September 10). The resilient supply chain initiative: Reshaping economics through geopolitics. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​.com​ /2020​/ 09​/ the​-resilient​-supply​-chain​-initiative​-reshaping​-economics​-through​ -geopolitics/. Panda, A. (2018, September 9). What the recently concluded US-India COMCASA means. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​.com​/2018​/09​/what​-the​-recently​ -concluded​-us​-india​-comcasa​-means/. Parameswaran, P. (2017, January 18). Why the new Japan-Australia military pact matters. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​.com​/2017​/01​/why​-the​-new​-japan​ -australia​-military​-pact​-matters/. Payne, M. (2020, June 4). Media release: Australia and India agree new partnership on cyber and critical technology. June 4 2020, https://www​.foreignminister​

Australia and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific  71 .gov​. au​/ minister​ /marise​ -payne​ /media​ -release​ /australia​-and​-india​-agree ​-new​ -partnership​-cyber​-and​-critical​-technology. Payne, M. (2021, July 12). Marking the 5th anniversary of the South China Sea Arbitral Award. https://www​.foreignminister​.gov​.au​/minister​/marise​-payne​/ media​-release​/marking​-5th​-anniversary​-south​-china​-sea​-arbitral​-award. Payne, M. & Mahuta, N. (2021, March 23). Australia and New Zealand joint statement on human rights abuses in Xinjiang. https://www​.foreignminister​.gov​.au​/minister​/ marise​-payne​/media​-release​/joint​-statement​-human​-rights​-abuses​-xinjiang. Pearlman, J. (2018, August 24). Australia bars Huawei from 5G tender in a move likely to irk China. The Strait Times. https://www​.straitstimes​.com​/asia​/ australianz​/australia​-bars​-huawei​-from​-5g​-tender​-in​-move​-likely​-to​-irk​-china. Ravenhill, J. (1998). Cycles of middle power activism: Constraint and choice in Australian and Canadian foreign policies. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 52(3), 309–327. Republic of India and Government of Australia. (2020, June 4). Joint statement on a comprehensive strategic partnership between Republic of India and Australia. https://www​ . dfat​ . gov​ . au​ / geo​ / india​ / Pages​ / joint ​ - statement ​ - comprehensive​ -strategic​-partnership​-between​-republic​-india​-and​-australia. Saran, S. & Verma, R. (2019). Strategic convergence: The United States and India as major defence partners. ORF Special Report. https://www​.orfonline​.org​/research​ /strategic​-convergence​-the​-united​-states​-and​-india​-as​-major​-defence​-partners​ -52364. Seidel, J. (2021, March 18). Quad looks to Australia for rare earth elements usually supplied by China. News​.com​.au​. https://www​.news​.com​.au​/technology​ /innovation​/military​/quad​-looks​-to​-australia​-for​-rare​-earth​-elements​-usually​ -supplied​-by​-china​/news​-story​/fff​696d​2958​4b11​9250​2958​7987b2731. SIPRI. (2020). Trends in world military expenditure: Factsheet 2019. https://www​ .sipri​.org​/sites​/default​/files​/2020​-04​/fs​_2020​_04​_milex​_0​.pdf. Strangio, S. (2021, May 28). US official flags future quad infrastructure push. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​.com​/2021​/05​/us​-official​-flags​-future​-quad​ -infrastructure​-push/. Stuenkel, O. (2021, June 11). Vaccine diplomacy boosts China’s standing in Latin America. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy​.com​/2021​/06​/11​/vaccine​ -diplomacy​-boosts​-china​-in​-latin​-america/. Sullivan, K. (2020, December 17). China’s list of sanctions and tariffs on Australian trade is growing. Here’s what has been hit so far. ABC News. https://www​.abc​ .net​. au​/ news​/ 2020​ -12​ -17​ /australian​ -trade​ -tension​-sanctions ​-china​-growing​ -commodities​/12984218. Taylor, B. (2020). Is Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy an illusion? International Affairs, 96(1), 95–109. The Australian Embassy in the United States. (2021). Australia-US defence relationship. https://usa​.embassy​.gov​.au​/defence​-cooperation. The White House. (2021, February 24). Executive order on America’s supply chains. https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/briefing​-room​/presidential​-actions​/2021​/02​/24​/ executive​-order​-on​-americas​-supply​-chains/. Tiezzi, S. (2019, May 31). Is China ready to take its economic coercion into the open? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​.com​/2019​/05​/is​-china​-ready​-to​-take​-its​ -economic​-coercion​-into​-the​-open/.

72  Lavina Lee Turnbull, M. (2017a, June 3). Keynote address at the 16th IISS Asia Security Summit, Shangri-la Dialogue. https://www​.malcolmturnbull​.com​.au​/media​/ keynote​-address​-at​-the​-16th​-iiss​-asia​-security​-summit​-shangri​-la​-dialogue. Turnbull, M. (2017b, November 23). Speech – Launch of the government’s Foreign Policy White Paper. https://www​.malcolmturnbull​.com​.au​/media​/speech​-launch​ -of​-the​-governments​-foreign​-policy​-white​-paper. Ungerer, C. (2007). The ‘Middle Power’ concept in Australian Foreign Policy. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 53(4), 538–551. US Department of Defence. (2019, June 1). Indo-Pacific strategy report: Preparedness, partnerships and promoting a networked region. https://media​.defense​.gov​/2019​ /Jul​/01​/2002152311/​-1/​-1​/1​/DEPARTMENT​-OF​-DEFENSE​-INDO​-PACIFIC​ -STRATEGY​-REPORT​-2019​.PDF. US Department of State. (2019, November 4). A free and open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a shared vision. https://www​.state​.gov​/wp​-content​/uploads​/2019​/11​ /Free​-and​-Open​-Indo​-Pacific​-4Nov2019​.pdf. US Department of State. (2021, April 29). US security cooperation with Australia Fact Sheet. https://www​.state​.gov​/u​-s​-security​-cooperation​-with​-australia/. Waldron, S. (2020). The logic of China’s economic coercion on Australian agriculture. Future Directions International Report. https://www​.futuredirections​.org​.au​/ publication​/the​-logic​-of​-chinas​-economic​-coercion​-on​-australian​-agriculture/.

Chapter 4

India, the Indo-Pacific and the Quad G.V.C. Naidu

4.1 Introduction The Indo-Pacific has progressed from a conceptual stage to emerge as the new reference point around which most countries are formulating policies. It is gaining ground principally for two reasons: one, because it reflects the current geostrategic and geoeconomic realities better wherein the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions are coalescing; and two, in many ways, it is the new global centre of gravity both geopolitically and geoeconomically. From Australia and the United States to Japan and India and ASEAN to several EU member countries, the Indo-Pacific is the new construct and the focal point of their policies and strategies. India has become a key player bridging the two regions, but it has not enunciated any specific strategy vis-à-vis the IndoPacific. However, indications suggest that it has morphed the Act East policy into an Indo-Pacific policy, which informs the broad template of its approach. In the backdrop of profound shifts the region is witnessing, besides the Indo-Pacific, the resurrection of the Quadrilateral dialogue acquires considerable salience, not simply as an endeavour to countervail an assertive China so that regional power balance is maintained but also to create a regional order that is stable and enduring which can ensure that certain universally recognised norms are adhered to the so-called “rules of the game.” The Quad is not a military alliance in the traditional sense but is more than a dialogue mechanism. It creates a mutually acceptable geostrategic agenda and promotes greater security cooperation among the four countries. It is most likely to incorporate a few other countries that are broadly in consonance with the Quad’s objectives. A critical dimension of both the IndoPacific and the Quad is the attitude of India. After considerable reticence, New Delhi now is more forthcoming in making the Indo-Pacific the cornerstone of its new policy than ever before. It has also become an enthusiastic partner in the Quad and its various activities and strategically aligns more closely with the US and Japan. These developments will likely usher in a new narrative on regional security. At the heart of these developments is a rising China which is posing a multitude of challenges. DOI: 10.4324/9781003342311-6

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The security discourse in the region stretching from the East Indian Ocean to the West Pacific has been largely stuck in the “post-Cold War” paradigm, which was supposed to be transient. It did not lead to a more discernible new order in part because both geopolitical and geoeconomic changes have been swift and fundamental. So long as China stuck to its avowed “peaceful rise” thesis, India aspiring to partake in the regional dynamics, Japan trying to carve a niche for itself, the US underwriting regional security by continuing its security alliances and forward deployments, and ASEAN taking a proactive role in managing regional affairs through several multilateral mechanisms, there did not arise an urgent need to take concerted steps to craft a new security architecture. However, in some ways, the above is changing. Certain notable developments are a rising China that has forsaken its peaceful rise narrative and is no more subtle in its attempts to assertively challenge the status quo, ASEAN’s limitations in managing regional affairs1 and for a large part in the aftermath of the Cold War, the US got bogged down in prolonged wars in Afghanistan and the Middle East and thus was able to pay limited attention to Asia, whereas both Japan and India had been tentative in their actions. Meanwhile, vital shifts began to occur in economic relations within the region, with China at its heart with its remarkable transformation from being a source of cheap labour to leading the regional value chain and becoming a major exporter of capital. With China becoming an economic behemoth and thus, the principal driver of extraordinary regional economic dynamism, Japan’s gradual marginalisation (although still a formidable economic power), the US not able to match up to the Chinese economically and India’s inability to become a power of consequence economically, the region began to witness a quiet revolution in its economic composition, which is also reflecting in its geopolitics. Probably the issue that began to ring alarm bells loudly was China’s mammoth US$1 trillion enterprise called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), purported to develop infrastructure and improve connectivity across the length and breadth of the Indo-Pacific region, which when completed by most estimates will most likely yield rich geopolitical dividends. Secondly, the post-Cold War political flux has intensified, accentuating security uncertainties. Growing economic cooperation has failed to dispel the historical baggage of suspicions among several countries about their neighbours. Thus, a combination of factors and developments has contributed to creating a new paradigm in the Indo-Pacific. In this complex environment, most analyses suffer from a major pitfall: they tend to focus purely on geopolitical issues or on geoeconomic developments than viewing regional security in a broader perspective of an interplay between the two. In this region, economics is security, and hence the binary of economics and security needs to be taken together to grasp developments better.

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Parallel to the emergence of the Indo-Pacific, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the “Quad” came into the narrative and is under the spotlight for diverse reasons. Notwithstanding claims to the contrary, the Quad is targeted at China ostensibly in response to its growing aggressive posture, especially with respect to the territorial disputes and its attempts to challenge the status quo and become a pre-eminent regional power. The Quad is also an attempt to craft a new regional security order and frame certain universally accepted norms for the conduct of relations among the nations in the region. Against the above backdrop, it is essential firstly to understand the IndoPacific construct and how employing it as a framework to fashion a new security order that is viable and lasting will ensure regional peace and stability and continued economic prosperity is the issue. Secondly, a crucial aspect will be how India perceives the Indo-Pacific and what kind of policy it frames centred on this. Finally, how the Quad, along with an expanded version in the form of Quad-Plus, would aid in creating regional power balance and thus a stable order, especially given that ASEAN-led security multilateralism has failed to make much headway, which in many ways these two are inter-linked, are a few issues that need greater attention.

4.2 Defining the Indo-Pacific Even though the Indo-Pacific has been around for more than a decade, conceptually it still appears to be a little vague, primarily due to a lack of clarity on its geographical contours. Normally, it is difficult to imagine a region without defined physical boundaries. However, it is conceivable in Asia to have a region that becomes a reference point, not necessarily with clearly delineated geographic confines. That has been the case ever since the idea of Asia was propounded by the Europeans who looked at the vast region initially in cultural terms, calling it “Oriental” without actually defining where it began and ended except vaguely implying that it comprised what lay between Turkey and Japan. However, the two well-known countries were India, because it had trade links with Mediterranean Europe and China, due to robust trade links by the Silk Road to Central Asia and Europe. Indeed, it was a Japanese scholar, Kazuko (Tenshin) Okakura, who for the first time proposed the idea of “Asianism” in the early 20th century who saw shared history and cultural ethos in the region from India to China and from Japan, the Korean Peninsula to Southeast Asia (Okakaura, 1920). His premise was that the civilisational dimension predates the Christian era wherein three distinct subregions—Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the Indian Subcontinent—shared innumerable common traits such as religion and spirituality, language and literature, dance and drama, art and architecture, etc. to varying degrees. The terminology such as the Near East, Middle East and the Far East were coined by the Europeans, seen from their

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perspective of geography, and thus the conception of the region acquired a different hue. Consequently, for most part of history until recently, the West and the East had different conceptions of what constituted Asia. Regions and subregions began to take some shape during the Cold War when the US got involved in the wars such as Korea and Indochina in a big way and felt the need to evolve subregional strategies rather than apply one over-arching regional policy. However, there has never been strict adherence to or a definition of a region/subregion. Consequently, partly in response to the Cold War exigencies and partly to better appreciate distinct cultural and other differences, the idea of subregions came to the fore within the ambit of larger regional conception. The creation of “area studies” programs in a big way, especially in American universities, gave a significant push to study of subregions with greater focus. The Far East was replaced with several nomenclatures such as Asia and Pacific, Asia-Pacific, Pacific Rim, Pacific Asia and more recently East Asia for better clarity. Ever since the Indo-Pacific came into prominence in the early 2010s, it has raised several questions and doubts, such as countries and/or regions that can be considered as belonging to the Indo-Pacific (Pardesi, 2020). Whether it is a kind of exclusive club that includes only certain countries? Will it subsume current themes such as East Asia and the Indian Ocean? What will be the future role of the extant regional/subregional multilateral organisations? Finally, is the Indo-Pacific a geopolitical or geoeconomic concept or both? Given that it is a dynamic process, the Indo-Pacific, as conceptualised above, potentially can undergo changes just as the Far East has transitioned to Indo-Pacific, passing through Pacific Asia, Asia and the Pacific, AsiaPacific and East Asia in the past six decades or so. Whereas for the US and Australia, for instance, the Indo-Pacific is what comes under the purview of the Honolulu-based US Indo-Pacific Command, Japan has not indicated, but presumably, it covers the West Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions, which is what India has begun to indicate in more recent official pronouncements. Yet, if one were to lay out certain parameters such as history, culture, geopolitics and geoeconomics, the region comprising the East Indian Ocean and the West Pacific Ocean can be considered the Indo-Pacific. It must, however, be mentioned that in Asia, regions and subregions are primarily imaginary and thus nomenclatures and geographical contours, as mentioned above, are a dynamic process and hence can change depending on fundamental developments. By definition, the Indo-Pacific cannot be an exclusive club, and the existing frameworks and organisations, including ASEAN and others, will remain key components (Medcalf, 2018). Although geopolitics dominates the discourse on the Indo-Pacific, however it cannot be divorced from geoeconomics if one takes into account profound shifts in regional economic cooperation and integration, on the one hand, and the robust growth of regional value chains on the other. Due to a variety of reasons, the region is witnessing a major churn and thus in a state of political

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flux characterised by unprecedented economic dynamism, on one hand, and numerous security challenges, on the other. Thus, the Indo-Pacific is still a work-in-progress in terms of how it will help shape a new regional order.

4.3 India and the Indo-Pacific Shinzo Abe’s address to the Indian Parliament entitled “The Confluence of the Two Seas” on August 22, 2007 gave germination to the idea of the IndoPacific (Abe, 2007). As it began to garner more comprehensive support, he came up with the Free and Open Indo-Pacific idea during his address to the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development on August 7, 2016, in Nairobi (Sahashi, 2019).2 President Trump rolled out the Free and Open Indo-Pacific in late 2017 and even rechristened the Honolulu-based Pacific Command as the Indo-Pacific Command. Then Australia released its Foreign Policy White Paper in November 2017, which replaced the AsiaPacific with Indo-Pacific. On the other hand, India was the last to embrace the Indo-Pacific conception, probably because it had been crafting a new Indian Ocean strategy besides the Look/Act East policy.3 Taking advantage of its pre-eminent status in the Indian Ocean, India sought to make use of this historic opportunity that was presenting itself so that it could fill the power void created by the end of the Cold War. As part of this strategy, it also fashioned new strategies towards the Persian Gulf and Africa, especially the eastern and southern regions facing the Indian Ocean. There was a robust Look East policy which was launched in the early 1990s with ASEAN at its core. New Delhi was reluctant to subsume, especially the Indian Ocean, into the more expansive Indo-Pacific regional configuration. It was concerned that this might cause it to forego the strategic upside it was beginning to enjoy. Till recently, it appears these concerns continued to impact India’s approach to the Indo-Pacific to an extent. However, the fact that the IndoPacific has replaced the Indian Ocean Division in the Ministry of External Affairs suggests that India is coming to terms with the new construct viewing this as accruing certain strategic advantages thrusting it to a key position. New Delhi has not enunciated any new policy formulation, nor has it taken any new notable steps keeping the Indo-Pacific in view. However, it appears to have morphed its Look East/Act East policy into a kind of IndoPacific policy. Hence, a brief review of this policy is in order. The Look East policy came about in the background of the Indian economy facing a severe crisis in 1990, and decades of earlier autarkic policies had kept the country backward while East Asia was galloping, logging eye-popping growth rates. The end of the Cold War came as a godsend so that New Delhi could revamp both its economic and foreign policies. Intending to align and partake in the remarkable economic dynamism of East Asia, then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao took a series of steps in what came to be known as the Look East policy. While the economic dimension was the driving

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force, political and strategic dimensions also became prominent. Realising the need to hitch its wagon to ASEAN, India established several institutional mechanisms—prominently the Dialogue Partnership and annual Summit Meeting—with the regional organisation besides actively participating in the ASEAN-led regional multilateralism such as the ARF, EAS and the ADMM-Plus. Simultaneously, India also strengthened bilateral relations with select ASEAN members. Bilateral defence and strategic relations with most ASEAN countries made remarkable progress due to several security challenges the region was facing, not least being a rising China and the intensifying contest over the sovereignty of islands in the South China Sea. The most unnerving was the closure of America’s largest overseas military bases in the Philippines in 1992 and scaling down forward deployments in Japan and South Korea. In this background, many countries found it expedient to engage India more robustly, given its potential to counterbalance China militarily and to an extent economically. After a long hiatus, Japan began to cosy up to India starting from the early 2000s (Yoshimatsu, 2019; Katagiri, 2020). India’s relations with China too began to take off, especially on the economic front. India’s economic stakes in East Asia began to grow rapidly (nearly 30% of trade, for instance). Some of the top investors in India were countries such as Japan, South Korea and Singapore. Consequently, India entered into comprehensive economic partnership agreements with ASEAN and Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea and negotiated with several others. By the time Narendra Modi announced the Act East policy in 2014, East Asia was amid fundamental shifts. China had abandoned the peaceful rise posture and embarked on a new path of assertiveness, Japan had virtually given up most on its post-World War II pacifist policies, the US was becoming active in regional affairs once again and ASEAN was constantly on the quest to ensure its centrality was not undermined and that its engagement of great powers remained robust. As events began to unfold in East Asia, New Delhi felt the urgent need to reinvigorate its engagement, convinced that its economic future lay with this region and that developments there would affect its interests more profoundly. Thus, the main traits of the Act East policy are to enhance its role and involvement in East Asian affairs, further deepen defence and strategic ties with friendly countries, augment its soft power by taking advantage of strong cultural influences and, not least, increase its economic bonds manifold as they have remained the weakest link. China certainly loomed large in the new policy. For the first time, India fully embraced the Indo-Pacific concept more than a decade after Shinzo Abe expounded it by unveiling its approach during Prime Minister Modi’s keynote address to the Shangrila Dialogue in June 2018. He reiterated the idea of Security and Growth for all in the Region (SAGAR, which means “ocean” in Sanskrit) that he had proposed earlier in 2015. He said:

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The Indo-Pacific is a natural region. It is also home to a vast array of global opportunities and challenges. Increasingly the destinies of those of us who live in the region are linked with each passing day. Today, the calling is to rise above divisions and competition and to work together. The ten countries of South East Asia connect the two great oceans in both the geographical and civilisational sense. Therefore, inclusiveness, openness, and ASEAN centrality and unity lie at the heart of the new Indo-Pacific. India does not see the Indo-Pacific Region as a strategy or limited members club. Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate. Furthermore, by no means do we consider it as directed against any country. A geographical definition, as such, cannot be. India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific Region is, therefore, a positive one.4 By affirming that the Indo-Pacific is inclusive and not directed against any country, he reassured China, which had apprehensions about it. PM Modi also made several observations on India’s Indo-Pacific approach. One, “It stands for a free, open, inclusive region, which embraces us all in a common pursuit of progress and prosperity. It includes all nations in this geography as also others beyond who have a stake in it”; two, ASEAN Centrality; three, a rules-based regional order; four, “freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce and peaceful settlement of disputes following international law”; five, open, balanced and stable trade environment; six, connectivity; and seven, It is normal to have partnerships based on shared values and interests. India, too, has many in the region and beyond. We will work with them, individually or in formats of three or more, for a stable and peaceful region. However, our friendships are not alliances of containment.5 After defining the Indo-Pacific6 comprising the Indian and West Pacific Oceans, Modi has expressly stated that the new policy towards the region will be centred on the new concept. Realising that much of Indo-Pacific’s action would be in the maritime domain, he announced a formative step by launching the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) that he outlined during his speech at the East Asia Summit in November 2019.7 It is supposed to be “a cooperative effort to translate principles for the Indo-Pacific into measures to secure our shared maritime environment” with seven areas of cooperation: “maritime security; maritime ecology; maritime resources; capacity building and resource sharing; disaster risk reduction and management; science, technology and academic cooperation; trade, connectivity and maritime transport.”8 The proposed architecture is open, cooperative and inclusive. Any two or more nations can start collaborating in a particular sector. Other nations can join in at any point if they perceive value in the collaboration. Hence, it will be a loose mechanism that is expected

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to evolve over time since collaborations with relevance and value will gain more participants.9 While Australia was the first to extend support to the IPOI,10 Japan expressed “willingness to discuss concrete cooperation based on the initiative” in November 2019.11 Moreover, Japan “agreed to be the lead partner in the connectivity pillar” in October 2020. In addition, Vietnam and the Philippines agreed to enhance cooperation “in line with India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and the ASEAN’s Outlook on Indo-Pacific” in August and November 2020, respectively. The IPOI is steadily garnering support due to its potential to address specific pressing issues in the IndoPacific maritime sphere. Another vital step that New Delhi took was to create the Indo-Pacific Division in the Ministry of External Affairs in April 201912 to deal with “matters relating to the Indo-Pacific, India-ASEAN relations, East Asia Summit, Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and Ayeyawady-Chao PhrayaMekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS).”13 India hosted two separate major events on December 13–14: the Delhi Dialogue-XI with ASEAN on December 13, 2019, with the theme “Advancing Partnership in the Indo-Pacific,” and the Sixth Indian Ocean Dialogue with IORA member states on the theme “Indo-Pacific: Re-imagining the Indian Ocean through an Expanded Geography.”14 From the above, it is evident that India shifted its position from being indifferent to the idea to fashion a new Indo-Pacific policy beginning from Modi’s 2018 speech realising belatedly that the idea was fast catching up the imagination of policymakers and analysts alike across the region, while it dithered. Notwithstanding the fact that China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) forced New Delhi’s hand in which the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) constituted a major component (besides China’s involvement in building infrastructure in India’s immediate neighbours such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and the Maldives). CPEC touched a raw nerve in India because it included the Gilgit-Baltistan region, which is part of what India calls Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, on which New Delhi has claims. The tense three-month military standoff at the Doklam (India-China-Bhutan) trijunction in 2017 and China’s growing forays into the Indian Ocean were other factors prompting India to embrace the IndoPacific. The consolidation of India-Japan-US Trilateral, which led to the revival of Quad 2.0, was yet another development for India to take a stand on the Indo-Pacific. Now the question is, what are the likely strategic upsides that New Delhi saw in espousing the Indo-Pacific concept? For one, India will occupy a pivotal position in a much larger region in the emerging Indo-Pacific security calculus. Two, since Indo-Pacific is emblematic of the confluence of two of the world’s fastest-growing regions, it offers India considerable scope to

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play a more prominent role in the larger context. Three, as the focus invariably shifts from the continental to the maritime domain, India, as the preeminent power possessing the largest navy in the Indian Ocean, will become a crucial player if it plays its cards right in the emerging maritime equation. Four, given that China looms large in East Asia, the Indo-Pacific framework undercuts its weight with the addition of India and the Indian Ocean (hence China’s opposition to the Indo-Pacific). Finally, the relaunch of the Quad brought a new element to the regional security in which India has become a key power in the emerging regional power balance.

4.4 India and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue The origins of the Quad can be traced back to the December 2004 tsunami that devastated the Aceh province of Indonesia. The Indian Navy was the first to dispatch ships to provide succour, soon joined by other major navies. However, one of the problems the Indian Navy faced was coordinating relief activities with its counterparts, such as the US and Japan, in particular, due to entirely different communication and other systems.15 As these navies started interacting more closely, it became imperative for them to promote “interoperability” for better coordination in the event of a crisis or conflict. With Tokyo taking the initiative, clear signals started to emanate from mid2006 onwards that Japan, the US and India would hold consultations on East Asian security (O’Neil and West, 2020). America’s leading think-tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, began to hold a series of Track-II roundtable meetings from June 2006 onwards with representatives from these three countries to prepare the ground.16 During the Indian Prime Minister’s meeting in December 2006, Prime Minister Abe proposed the idea of a dialogue among countries that shared certain commonalities (as part of his “Arc of Democracies” idea) (Abe, 2012; Satake, 2020). A reference to this was made in the Joint Statement: “The two leaders share the view on the usefulness of having dialogue among Japan, India and other like-minded countries in the Asia-Pacific region on themes of mutual interest.”17 In early 2007, Abe came up with the idea of a Quadrilateral dialogue with Australia as the fourth country (Lee, 2016). In April 2007, India, Japan and the US held their first-ever maritime exercises off Okinawa. In May 2007, the officials of these four countries met unofficially. The most unambiguous indication was that these three powers and Australia were forging close military links as part of an informal Quadrilateral initiative aimed at East Asian security (read China threat). In June 2007, Beijing issued a demarche to these countries seeking details about the four-nation meeting. India and Australia assured Beijing that it was merely a dialogue. It was followed by a second low-key, informal meeting of senior officials attending the August 2017 ARF meeting in Manila on the sidelines. The upshot of these confabulations was the September

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2007 five-nation (India, Japan, the US, Australia and Singapore) military exercises held in the Bay of Bengal hosted by India as part of the Malabar Exercises. These were the most comprehensive exercises held in the IndoPacific region spread over six days, and no question that they were militarily consequential. An Indian Ministry of Defense publication stated that some 27 ships (14 from the US Navy, eight from Indian, two each from Japanese and Australian and one from the Singapore navy) took part in these manoeuvres. These included three aircraft carriers (one nuclear-powered American carrier USS Nimitz), a nuclear submarine, and the rest comprised surface combatants such as guided-missile cruisers, guided-missile destroyers, destroyers, frigates, fleet tankers, corvettes, fleet tankers, and helicopters and carrier and shore-based fighter aircraft. According to the Indian Ministry of Defense publication, Sainik Samachar: Over the next six days, intensive work-up and complex exercises were conducted round the clock in all three dimensions (under-water, surface and air) that included Dissimilar Aircraft Combat Tactics (DACT), cross deck landings by aircraft and helicopters between various ships, strike and combat air patrols (CAP) by fighters operating from aircraft carriers, air defence exercises (ADEX), combined anti-submarine exercises (CASEX) with the nuclear-propelled submarine USS Chicago, gun firing. They opposed transit in the area of threat. In addition to this, counter mechanisms to other maritime threats that affect all countries, such as marine terrorism, piracy at sea, human arms and drug trafficking, were also practised. Shore-based aircraft, namely Long Range Maritime Patrol (LRMP) TU-142M of the Indian Navy and P-3C Orions from US Navy and Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF), also participated in the exercise operating out of Chennai.18 A series of interactions at both official and unofficial levels and the exercises mentioned earlier created a perfect setting for the Quad to take off, although New Delhi wanted to keep it an informal arrangement as it did not want to upset China. However, the Quad came to an abrupt end as under the Labour Party government led by Kevin Rudd that came to power in February 2008, Australia decided to withdraw. What riled the Indians was that then Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith announced it in response to a question from the media in the presence of visiting Chinese foreign minister that Canberra would not be proposing a Quad meeting again. That was the end of Quad 1.0. However, that was not the end of Japan-India-US. Trilateral, which was seen as far more consequential because the strategic heft that Australia could bring would not be that significant anyway. It would have made a colossal material difference had India withdrawn, for it is a significant military power and not part of the American alliance system. Hence, New Delhi continued to focus on consolidating the Trilateral,

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thanks also to relentless efforts by Shinzo Abe, whose main objective was to find ways to counterbalance China. However, a perceptible shift in attitude can be seen since the nationalist BJP’s ascent to power in 2014, which began to move decisively closer to the US and Japan (coincidentally led by right-wingers Donald Trump and Shinzo Abe). China’s increasingly assertive actions led New Delhi to shed whatever the little reticence it had earlier and throw its lot behind the Quad when it was resurrected.19 In September 2019, the foreign ministers of these four countries met to relaunch the Quad as a formal consultation mechanism (unlike the previous attempt which was an informal arrangement). New Delhi also agreed to participate in the Australia-India-Japan trilateral dialogue at the foreign secretary level (in addition to the Australia-IndiaIndonesia trilateral that was started in 2017). An important facet to be noted is that, parallel to the progress on the Quad, bilateral military ties and security interactions have also started expanding rapidly among these; the most important, among others, is the high-level “2 plus 2 mechanism” comprising the foreign and defence ministers to promote defence and security cooperation. Whereas the alliance partners, the US, Japan and Australia, already had this arrangement for a long time, India is a new entrant.20 From an Indian perspective, the Quad is important because it offers a crucial role to India in shaping the security order in the Indo-Pacific (Pan, 2014). Whatever the claims that are couched in diplomatic lingo, the twin principal objectives of the Quad are to counterbalance China and to create a stable regional balance of power. The Quad also provides considerable strategic latitude in dealing with China for many small and medium countries in the region. A series of military standoffs along the border in recent past, especially the 2017 Doklam and the 2020 Ladakh incidents, which forced China to backtrack (the first time that it has done in the past nearly 50 years), clearly drove home the point that India is probably the only country in Asia that can stand up to China’s pressure tactics and match militarily. However, India’s biggest shortcoming is that it cannot match China’s economic prowess, imposing severe constraints. For Quad to emerge as a pivotal mechanism to manage the Indo-Pacific affairs, it needs to pay attention to two aspects. Firstly, to create a robust economic agenda comparable to China’s BRI. A few initiatives have been taken in this regard. One, the May 2015 Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure; two, October 2018 India-Japan Development Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, including Africa; and three, the US, Japan and Australia Blue Dot Network Initiative launched in November 2019 “to promote quality infrastructure investment is open and inclusive, transparent, economically viable, financially, environmentally and socially sustainable, and compliant with international standards, laws and regulations.”21 Among the above three, only Japan has committed about US$110 billion in collaboration with the Asian Development Bank (in which Japan is the largest shareholder). It

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does not appear that the Quad is in a position to match China’s US$1 trillion BRI plans. Thus, China will continue to have enormous leverage when using its financial might. No question that India’s short-sighted policy to withdraw from the RCEP will severely undermine the strategic advantage it otherwise enjoys. It was also reported that trade ministers of Japan, India and Australia agreed to create a resilient supply chain in the Indo-Pacific to balance China’s dominance,22 but no details are made available on how this can be done. Secondly, to get countries such as Vietnam, South Korea and Indonesia on board in some capacity is not easy unless the scope is expanded beyond China and develops an attractive non-security agenda. Nevertheless, a small beginning appears to have been made when US Deputy Secretary Steve Biegun reportedly invited representatives from Vietnam, New Zealand and South Korea to join the Quad officials to discuss ways to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020.23 The pandemic has fast-tracked Quad with a virtual summit followed by an in-person summit organised by Biden. Unfortunately, the agenda had no mention of China, which necessarily foretells that there is no consensus between the members. However, China looms in the shadows and warrants a discussion.

4.5 The China Factor China looms large in every sense in the length and breadth of the IndoPacific. Poised to become the world’s largest economy overtaking the US much sooner than was earlier predicted, it poses various challenges in geopolitical, economic and technological arenas, thus engaging this behemoth will be the biggest test. As it rises like no other great power ever in history, it strives hard to change the status quo that is best manifested by the aggressive way it pursues the disputed territories and the endeavour to become the pre-eminent power in East Asia. It is both a source of significant concern and a principal driver of economic growth and hence a major challenge to deal with. China opposes the Indo-Pacific framework because it is proposed by the US that “trumpets the outdated Cold-War mindset, confrontation between blocs and geopolitical rivalry. What it upholds is nothing but the dominating role of the US and its hegemonic system.”24 Thus, the Indo-Pacific is seen as an attempt to contain China. However, China has evolved its own strategy in the Maritime Silk Road, which basically encompasses the Indo-Pacific. Hence, Beijing may be more amenable to the Indo-Pacific idea as it has done on several occasions whereby it joined them after criticism, such as the CPTPP (China was the biggest critic of ASEAN at the time of its founding). Moreover, if a pan-IndoPacific institutional structure is created, it will help allay China’s concerns. However, unlike the Indo-Pacific, Quad is a different proposition since it is, as explained above, not only aimed at China but also an attempt to

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create a new regional security order that will not necessarily suit Chinese interests.

4.6 Conclusion Because the Indo-Pacific region is already the global centre of gravity and becoming the prime driver of global economic growth, it generates considerable interest by countries both within and outside, including the EU, that have high stakes in the region. Hence, the region is also witnessing intensified great power competition for greater geostrategic space. Thus, the Indo-Pacific is as much a geoeconomic construct as it is geostrategic. Credit must go to Japan, which has been the fountainhead of many new, practical ideas in East Asia/Indo-Pacific in economic and security realms, including the Indo-Pacific and the Quad.25 The definitional aspect continues to vex the Indo-Pacific, but that should not be a major concern since it has always been a dynamic process driven by several factors. Asia-Pacific, East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, etc. never had any fixed boundaries as such, even if imaginary. Many of them came into common parlance relatively recently. The Indo-Pacific template serves many valuable purposes. A major upside is the larger footprint it offers so that the great powers will have more manoeuvrable room, thus reducing the contest, which in turn can contribute to regional stability. On the other hand, the Quad is an exclusive club and aims to establish a regional balance of power, keeping China in mind. Although Quad 1.0 faltered, its second avatar appears to be consolidated, mainly because it is institutionalised with official interactions at the foreign minister level. Whereas the most visible manifestation of the Quad is the military exercises, the bilateral security and defence links are also expanding. Enlisting the support of crucial powers in the region as part of the Quad-Plus will immensely help it realise its objectives. Since the ASEAN-led security multilateralism has failed to make much headway either in addressing security challenges or creating a new regional order, the Quad appears far better placed to counterbalance China and shape a new order because three major powerful countries back it. There is no question that India is emerging as a key player, thanks in part to the emergence of the Indo-Pacific, which has brought the Indian Ocean and thus India into sharp focus. However, India has not articulated its Indo-Pacific policy more lucidly, although broadly—though a bit belatedly—it endorsed the idea. Strategically India has a lot more to gain with the employment of the Indo-Pacific construct as the new template, but it also warrants greater responsibility and intensified participation in regional affairs, both economic and strategic; otherwise, it will remain a marginal player as it has been by and large. One has to wait and watch whether or not India will live up to the expectations and potential.

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The key is to engage China through a kind of carrot and stick policy, which would go a long way to make the Indo-Pacific a successful new geostrategic and geoeconomic framework that can help deal with some fundamental issues dogging the region and also help regional economic dynamism continues uninterrupted.

Notes 1 For example, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), launched in 1994 to eventually become a dispute settlement mechanism (1995 ASEAN Concept Paper), is no more than a talk shop today. Similarly, other initiatives such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), both the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meetings (ADMM) and the ADMM-Plus (the seven Dialogue Partners of ASEAN) have made little progress in dealing with regional security issues. 2 Abe said: “What will give stability and prosperity to the world is none other than the enormous liveliness brought forth through the union of two free and open oceans and two continents. Japan bears the responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion, and making it prosperous.” https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/afr​/af2​/page4e​ _000496​.html 3 A separate Indian Ocean Division was created in the Ministry of External Affairs in 2016. 4 “Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s keynote address at Shangri La dialogue,” June 1, 2018, https://www​.mea​.gov​.in​/Speeches​-Statements​.htm​?dtl​/29943​/ Prime​+Ministers​+Keynote​+Address​+at​+Shangri​+La​+Dialogue​+June​+01​+2018 5 Ibid 6 The issue regarding the Indo-Pacific geographic boundaries remains unsettled from an Indian perspective is apparent when, during an address to the Delhi Dialogue, the External Affairs Minister said, “While the nations of the eastern Indian Ocean and States on the connecting seas leading to the Pacific are defining their vision of the Indo-Pacific, there is room for a western Indian Ocean version of this concept too. In line with the view that the Indo-Pacific naturally includes our western ocean neighbours in the Gulf, the Island nations of the Arabian Sea, and our partners in Africa, India’s approach to this concept led us to recognise that both geographical extremities of the Indo-Pacific and everything in between should ideally have their own indigenously evolved approach to the Indo-Pacific.” “Valedictory address by External Affairs Minister at 11th Delhi Dialogue,” December 14, 2019, https://www​.mea​.gov​.in​/Speeches​-Statements​.htm​?dtl​/32212 7 Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speech at the East Asia Summit, November 4, 2019, https://www​.mea​.gov​.in​/Speeches​-Statements​.htm​?dtl​/32171​/Prime​ _Ministers​_Speech​_at​_the​_East​_Asia​_Summit​_04​_November​_2019 8 Subhasish Sarangi, “Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI): India’s Indo-Pacific concept translated into action,” United Services Institution, November 11, 2020, https://usiofindia​.org​/publication​/cs3​-strategic​-perspectives​/indo​-pacific​ -oceans​-initiative​-ipoi​-indias​-indo​-pacific​-concept​-translated​-into​-action/#:~​ :text​=The​%20IPOI​%20proposes​%20cooperation​%20in​,trade​%2C​%20connectivity​%20and​%20maritime​%20transport 9 Ibid 10 India and Australia will work closely to develop, with all interested partners, the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI).

India, the Indo-Pacific and the Quad  87 11 “Joint Statement—First India-Japan 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting,” November 30, 2019, Indian Ministry of External Affairs, https:// www​ . mea​ . gov​ . in​ / bilateral​ - documents​ . htm​ ? dtl ​ / 32131 ​ / Joint ​ + Statement+​ +First ​ + IndiaJapan​ + 2432​ + Foreign​ + and​ + Defence ​ + Ministerial ​ + Meeting#:~​ :text​=MOTEGI​%20Toshimitsu​%2C​%20and​%20Minister​%20of​,bilateral​ %20security​%20and​%20defence​%20cooperation 12 This is in addition to the Indian Ocean Division that was created in January 2016. 13 “Indo-Pacific Division Briefs,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, February 7, 2020, https://mea​.gov​.in​/Portal​/ForeignRelation​/Indo​_Feb​ _07​_2020​.pdf 14 Since 2018, The Indian Navy began to host the Indo-Pacific Regional Dialogue represented by 23 countries, including Israel and the UK. 15 The navies of India and the US began joint exercises in 1992 but were briefly suspended following India’s nuclear tests in 1998. However, those were basic passage exercises. 16 “The United States, Japan, and India: toward new trilateral cooperation,” August 16, 2007, CSIS, https://csis​-website​-prod​.s3​.amazonaws​.com​/s3fs​-public​/legacy​_files​/files​/media​/csis​/pubs​/070816​_us​_j​_ireport​.pdf 17 “Towards Japan-India strategic and global partnership,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, December 15, 2006, https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/region​/asia​-paci​/ india​/pdfs​/joint0612​.pdf 18 “Exercise Malabar-2007: a major step towards fine-tuning maritime capabilities,” Sainik Samachar, September 15, 2007, http://sainiksamachar​.nic​.in​/englisharchives​/2007​/sep15​-07​/h1​.htm 19 Despite intensified Australia’s lobbying, India did not accede to joining the Malabar Exercises in 2018 and 2019. 20 India-US began their 2+2 talks in December 2018, India-Japan in November 2019 Japan and India-Australia in December 2019. 21 https://www​. state ​ . gov ​ / blue ​ - dot ​ - network/#:~ ​ : text ​ = The ​ % 20Blue ​ % 20Dot​ %20Network​%20aims​,standards​%2C​%20laws​%2C​%20and​%20regulations 22 Business Standard, September 2, 2020, https://www​.business​-standard​.com​ /article​/economy​-policy​/india​-australia​-and​-japan​-to​-form​-pact​-on​-supply​ -chain​-resilience​-120090101509​_1​.html 23 Times of India, March 28, 2020, https://timesofindia​.indiatimes​.com​/india​/ india​-quad​-plus​-countries​-discuss​-covid​-19​-battle​-economic​-resurgence​/articleshow​/74861792​.cms 24 “China says border standoff with India bilateral issue criticises US’ Indo-Pacific strategy”, Press Trust of India, October 28, 2020, https://www​.theweek​.in​/wire​ -updates​/international​/2020​/10​/28​/fgn40​-china​-ld​-indous​.html 25 Japan is also responsible for myriad others such as APEC, the ARF, EAS, the TPP (now CPTPP), etc. Even RCEP has its roots in Tokyo’s proposal in the early 1990s to create a pan-Asian trade bloc (Mahathir Mohamad came up with rehashed EAEC) when the EU launched a common market and NAFTA came up in North America.

References Abe, Shinzo (2007). “Confluence of the two seas”, Speech by Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India, August 22. Abe, Shinzo (2012). “Asia’s democratic security diamond”, Project Syndicate, December 27.

88  G.V.C. Naidu Katagiri, Nori (2020). “Shinzo Abe’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Japan’s recent achievement and future direction”, Asian Security, Vol. 16, Issue 2, 179–200. Lee, Lavina (2016). “Abe’s democratic security diamond and new quadrilateral initiative: An Australian perspective”, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 30, Issue 2, 1–41. Medcalf, Rory (2018). “Reimagining Asia: From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific”, in Rozman G. and Liow J. (Eds.), International Relations and Asia’s Southern Tier. Singapore: Asan-Palgrave Macmillan Series. O’Neil, A., and West, L. (2020). “The quadrilateral security dialogue and IndoPacific resurrection without renewal?”, in Bhubindar Singh and Sarah Teo (Eds.), Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific. London: Routledge. Pan, C. (2014). “The “Indo-Pacific” and geopolitical anxieties about China’s rise in the Asian regional order”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 68, Issue 4, 453–469. Pardesi, Manjeet S. (2020). “The Indo-Pacific: A “new” region or the return of history?”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 74, Issue 2, 124–146. Sahashi, Ryo (2019). “The Indo-Pacific in Japan’s Foreign Policy”, CSIS Working Paper 2019, https://www​.wita​.org​/wp​-content​/uploads​/2019​/04​/FINAL​_ Working​-Paper​_Ryo​-Sahashi​.pdf. Sarangi, Subhasish (2020), “Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI): India’s IndoPacific concept translated into action,” United Services Institution, November 11. Satake, Tomohiko (2020). “The future of the quadrilateral security dialogue: Possibilities and challenges”, in Bhubhindar Singh and Sarah Teo (Eds.), Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific. London: Routledge. Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka (2019). “The Indo-Pacific in Japan’s strategy towards India”, Contemporary Politics, Vol. 25, Issue 4, 438–456.

Chapter 5

Quad’s Roadmap Anchoring Strategic Solutions in the Post-pandemic World Titli Basu

5.1 Introduction Conceptualisation of a “free” and “open” Indo-Pacific (FOIP) amid an intensifying Sino-US great power competition has led to strategic coordination and alignment of mutual interests amongst a network of democratic powers. Whether it is the recent shoring up of the Anglo-Saxon alliance with Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) or reinforcing the Five Eyes, intelligencesharing network or the resurrection of Quad after a decade-long hiatus— major powers are debating and firming up their respective geopolitical and geoeconomic verticals of the Indo-Pacific strategy, both within the frame of domestic political imperatives and broader international relations. As the FOIP construct gained momentum in the power corridors of the Indo-Pacific capitals, Quad has gained strategic heft and dominated policy debates on managing the emergence of a Sino-centric order. However, despite the power asymmetry and divergences in the strategic culture of each Quad member, the potency of this framework has often generated a sharp response from Beijing and is now designing an authoritarian red Quad.1 While the arrival of AUKUS has intensified the debate on the vitality of the Quad, there is an emerging consensus that AUKUS and Quad, with their respective well-defined mandates, will play a complementary role in maintaining the strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific. While AUKUS initially touched a nerve in Paris and stunned a few traditional US allies, it positioned the UK at the heart of the Indo-Pacific. Japan, for one, holds a positive attitude, and some even argue that in addition to the American submarines, if Canberra pursues nuclear submarines and deploys them in the key theatres, for instance, at the South China Sea or closer to Taiwan, that will make strategic sense. Compared to AUKUS, which is anchored on military technology, Quad is focused on delivering global public goods.2 Drawing from the shared universal values on one hand and depth and scope of the strategic congruence in their respective bilateral relations on the other, Quad powers have brought in the collective capacities in search for solutions shaping the post-Covid order. However, as they join forces DOI: 10.4324/9781003342311-7

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to synergise capabilities, it is essential to critically analyse the uncertainties and nuanced fault lines in each stakeholder’s approach to Indo-Pacific. It is critical to grasp the divergences among the Quad powers in terms of perception of order and alliances, China strategy, trade multilateralism and many others. For instance, unlike America’s formal treaty alliance partners, whose primary objective remains stabilising and supporting the US-led liberal international order, India envisions a multipolar order, and Delhi’s issue-based multi-alignment has yielded rich dividends as it maximises options while pursuing “independence.”3 India’s quest to protect strategic equities has reenergised the debate on strategic autonomy vis-à-vis alliances. But analysing the policy discourse in Delhi suggests that even though India is pragmatically tapping into the real world of convergences and greater “realism” is shaping policymaking,4 formal alliance framework is neither pursued nor offered to India. In undoing the narrative of a reluctant power, India has envisioned its role as a stabilising power, and as such, has shaken off the “hesitations of history,”5 as it aims to be a rules-shaper instead of a passive player. Thus, India has joined forces with democratic powers in the Quad format to search for solutions to post-pandemic challenges and not bind itself in treaty alliances. Furthermore, Quad powers lack synergy on what the Indo-Pacific economic architecture should entail. While Tokyo and Canberra understand the strategic contours of shaping regional trade architecture and, as such, boldly led agenda-setting in mega free trade agreements, America’s departure from the CPTPP and India’s unresolved issues within RCEP underscore uncertainties on trade multilateralism—an important pillar in the economic vision for the Indo-Pacific. Also, there are divergences on critical issues like writing rules for data governance and constructing a new regime underpinned by Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT), data privacy, payments, digital taxation and e-commerce. Meanwhile, even as the Quad powers have a shared agenda concerning advancing climate mitigation, adaptation, technology and finance in pursuit of the Paris Agreement, and they are playing with concrete ideas, whether it is the Clean-Hydrogen Partnership or the Green-Shipping Network, there are nuanced undercurrents in their respective approaches towards UNFCCC’s “common but differentiated responsibilities.” The fault lines on climate equity and inclusivity need to be narrowed.6 But these divergences have not constrained Washington, Tokyo, Canberra and Delhi to engineer a win-win combination where there is a convergence of interests and bring together resources to deliver on the collective responsibility of upholding the rules-based order. Sino-US strategic contest today is driven by the pursuit of tech supremacy. Imparting strategic clarity, managing regional expectations, shaping alternative solutions and charting targeted deliverables have gained urgency following the pandemic. In this

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regard, Quad has stepped up in balancing values and strategy, resources and delivery. The core of the conversation entails de-risking supply chains without compromising competitiveness, balancing strategic vulnerabilities of high technology and national security, strengthening global governance and advancing the rules-based order. In fact, complementing the Quad, there is an explosion of trilateral geometries in the Indo-Pacific, especially within the Quad countries, for instance, the US-Japan-Australia, India-US-Japan and India-Japan-Australia. These trilateral partnerships/agreements/collaborations have driven the conversation on issue-based strategic alignments, incubated ideas, and created alternative solutions: India-Japan-Australia Resilient Supply Chain Initiative following the pandemic or the US-Japan-Australia Blue Dot Network before the pandemic. As the US-China strategic competition intensifies, democracies are doubling down on synergising strategies to preserve the rules-based order. Situating Quad in the post-pandemic world and the intensifying Sino-US strategic contest under the Biden presidency, this chapter critically analyses the role of Quad on the key vertical of high-tech supply chains. While maritime security is an important pillar of the Quad framework, more so with the launch of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) having the potency to deliver public goods by tracking dark shipping and rendezvous at sea, it remains outside the scope of this chapter.

5.2 Mapping the Post-Pandemic Pulse Even before the pandemic, the robustness of the US-led international system and implications of China’s ascent in the international order constituted the key questions making policy elites weigh their strategic choices. The COVID-19 pandemic has further sharpened the fractured power structure and the contested rules of the international system. Thus, the post-pandemic international relations debate revolves around whether COVID-19 has presented a “reordering moment,”7 or it only hastened the basic direction of international history.8 And yet, others are arguing that COVID-19 will accelerate a “multiplex world.”9 US-China strategic competition over technological and ideological supremacy is a pre-pandemic phenomenon. President Xi Jinping has nurtured high strategic ambitions and articulated a defined timeline to achieve the centenary goals. China is relentless in its pursuit of seeking equal status with Washington and bridging the power parity at the global level, and engineering a hierarchical order in Asia, with Beijing at the zenith, thus advancing Xi’ Jinping’s vision of a Chinese century encapsulated in the narrative of “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” To this end, the Chinese Communist Party propagates a Sinicised value system,10 aimed at reinstating Beijing as a pre-eminent power. President Xi Jinping has presented alternative ideas, concepts and institutions to achieve equity in international

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politics and systematically employed a series of geostrategic and geoeconomic tools to consolidate power. Nevertheless, the pandemic exposed leadership deficit, not just the US’ waning global leadership but also the failure of multilateral institutions. Meanwhile, Chinese actions post-pandemic has further alienated itself from the advocates of the rules-based order. Response to the pandemic has considerably diluted American leadership as Washington attempted to divert attention from its failed governance at home to Chinese institutional statecraft in the World Health Organization. Meanwhile, China’s larger legitimacy-building project was challenged by the Fang Fang phenomenon at home and aggressive wolf warrior diplomacy globally. Thus, a school of thought argues that “neither a new Pax Sinica nor a renewed Pax Americana will rise from the ruins.”11 While Biden presidency is determined to reinstate American leadership in international politics, the question remains: can Washington afford to go it alone in defending the liberal international order? Fortunately, Biden has anchored the US’ FOIP and China strategy on the strength of American allies. Pursuing geopolitical and geoeconomic goals in such challenging times demand collective leadership from democratic powers in not just setting the rules, norms and principles but delivering on the shared responsibility of creating global public good in the post-pandemic order. In this regard, the Quad powers have a vision and position themselves to provide strategic solutions. Not just the US, but Australia, Japan and India have demonstrated stern resolve individually and collectively in addressing critical questions, whether it is initiating the global conversation on the origin of the virus or creating secure alternatives to high-tech supply chains. Post-pandemic, economic statecraft has gained priority in strategic thinking. Predatory economic tools employed in great power politics are increasingly becoming the focus of the national security debate in the Quad capitals. Beijing has systematically incorporated economic and financial tools into its foreign policy with the aim of realising its grand strategic ambitions. Whether through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or Made in China 2025 programme, geoeconomic instruments of statecraft are at play in China’s strategy. Today’s national security debate in the Quad capitals entails securing high technologies, foreign investment regulations in strategic sectors and safeguarding against COVID-19 bargain hunters, attaining self-sufficiency in strategic metals and mineral supply, effectively strategising developmental aid, etc. Safeguarding against the weaponisation of trade, technology and foreign investments dominates the conversation today, not just in the Quad capitals but also in Europe. Policy elites are taking tangible steps. As the China conversation in Washington moves towards a bipartisan consensus on strategic rivalry (marking a stark departure from Richard Nixon’s China rapprochement and subsequent pro-engagement policies), it has not

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only sanctioned a few Chinese corporate giants in high-tech sectors and issued executive orders barring US investments into some Chinese firms, America’s China strategy is embedded in progressive policies such as the Innovation and Competition Act, which includes the Strategic Competition Act. Meanwhile, Japan is also guarding against Chinese “predatory” tactics. Tokyo has instituted an economic unit at the National Security Secretariat (NSS), unleashed a series of policy measures, including subsidising manufactures in the “China exit” strategy, revised the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act to secure information and technology from foreign interference and tightened regulations on the land acquisition near strategic assets like bases, Self-Defense Force facilities and nuclear plants. Australia has demonstrated firm resolve by enacting a series of laws, including the National Security and Foreign Interference laws, establishing the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme, and Australia’s Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Act to guard against Chinese inroads. India, for its part, has reviewed its FDI policy, subjected Chinese FDI to mandatory screening and banned a few Chinese apps, including TikTok, for invasive data collection. China itself is adjusting to the realities of a trade war and subsequently post-COVID-19 high politics. Beijing has engineered the dual circulation strategy, and how its policy choices play out on global recovery will have far-reaching implications. It is important to note that China will remain an indispensable engine in the post-pandemic economic recovery as the second most powerful economy, and a zero-sum approach may not be ideal. Economic interdependence nurtured not just through intense trade and investment flows, but also deeply integrated supply chains and production networks make the conversation on decoupling complicated. Thus, models like China plus one is being weighed. UNCTAD data shows that in 2020, Beijing’s share of global trade increased to around 15%. Deeper economic integration with China through mega-FTAs like RCEP further complicates the game. Thus, managing risks and reinforcing national security are crucial while engaging in business with China. As strategic technologies define the great power play, policymakers prioritise one of the key questions today is how to secure high-tech supply chains, be it semiconductors, fifth-generation telecommunication networks or rare-earth? Decoupling deeply rooted supply chains built over decades presents a gargantuan challenge in the immediate term. Nevertheless, the post-pandemic need to engineer safe and secure alternative lines of supply while balancing developmental goals and wealth creation, national security and cost-competitiveness of technology presents difficult policy choices. However, it also presents fresh opportunities for policy planners in Quad capitals to collectively make use of the transformative potential of strategic technology, which often drives power distribution in international politics.

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5.3 Making of a Democratic Tech Agenda In today’s digital age, geopolitics and technology are deeply enmeshed. America has called upon “the free world” to join forces against Beijing’s “high-tech authoritarianism.” As technology contributes to national power, the objective of Quad powers should be to collectively craft common rules, norms and standards governing critical and emerging technologies. Quad has focused on four key verticals: setting technical standards, 5G diversification and deployment, horizon-scanning and technology supply chains.12 One key area where strategic rivalry is becoming pronounced is 5G. National security vulnerabilities have pushed the Quad leaders and several European powers to restrict high-risk Chinese vendors from selling 5G equipment. Advancing secure and open networks, including Open RAN, which moves 5G networks from a proprietary towards a more diverse setup, is driving the conversation. But Open RAN technology is yet to fully mature. This opens opportunities for the Quad powers to collectively build a secure tech ecosystem by recognising the imperative of collaboration and acknowledging the strengths and weaknesses in different areas of innovation. In advancing a diverse, resilient and secure telecommunications ecosystem, Quad’s Track 1.5 industry dialogue on Open RAN deployment and adoption, which the Open RAN Policy Coalition anchors, will be useful. The recent Memorandum of Cooperation on 5G Supplier Diversification and Open RAN will be a force multiplier. In this regard, the US and Japan have recently launched the Competitive and Resilient (CoRe) Partnership to bolster competitiveness by investing in R&D and deploying secure networks. The focus is on next-generation mobile networks including 5G and 6G, or “Beyond 5G.” The objective is not just to alleviate supply-chain risks but to play a productive role in creating rules for telecommunication standards. They made a US$4.5 billion commitment and further intended to pursue cooperation in third countries and launch a Global Digital Connectivity Partnership to advance the digital economy. India and Australia should co-opt. In fact, bringing in other democracies that are key players in the 5G game like South Korea should also be considered. As Special Strategic and Global Partners, India and Japan have already initiated cooperation in 5G technologies. The role of the private sector is indispensable as it often drives strategic-technology innovation and R&D and develops technologies both of strategic relevance and commercial applications. In this regard, cooperation between Japan’s Rakuten and India’s Jio on 5G to design a telecom supply chain is at work. Rakuten’s 5G network is working with Indian tech companies and collaborates with Sterlite Technologies for hardware and HCL, Wipro and Tech Mahindra for software. Meanwhile, Japanese companies like NTT and NEC have joined

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forces to realise a made in Japan 5G alliance. NEC is also targeting the Australian market. Australia has been a frontrunner in realising the risks of Chinese 5G networks. As the Quad intensifies collaboration on 5G and beyond, Australia’s software development companies are a forceful value addition in this domain. Another priority area in high politics today is a semiconductor which is increasingly becoming a key factor in maintaining economic competitiveness and vitality. Semiconductors are positioned front and centre in the economic security conversation across Quad capitals. Quad’s Common Statement of Principles on Critical Technology Supply Chains facilitates cooperation on semiconductors. Additionally, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) will be an enabler in setting the rules governing high-tech supply chains. Separately, Washington is gearing up to weave a chip alliance (Chip 4) with Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, aimed at setting up a resilient semiconductor supply chain. In high tech, the attention has been on R&D, design and innovation, but it is imperative to build industrial competitiveness and supply chains. While the US leads in design and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, it accounts for just 12% of chip manufacturing capacity as opposed to 37% in 1990. Japan’s share in international semiconductor sales has dipped to 10% compared to 50% in 1988. The recent global shortage has underscored the urgent need to re-evaluate supply chain resilience and security. What do the Quad powers bring to the table? While America leads in design, Japan is a frontrunner in semiconductor manufacturing material, Australia hones critical materials and advanced mining capabilities, and India prides itself on its skilled human capital. But this may not be enough. Quad should bring in major players like Taiwan and South Korea into the high table. It addresses the semiconductor conundrum since Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp. (TSMC) and South Korea’s Samsung Electronics are global leaders producing highly advanced chips. In this regard, Quad will need to ensure that Japan-South Korea bilateral historical baggage does not cloud the larger geostrategic equation. The conversation on semiconductors has gained domestic politics in all Quad capitals. For instance, President Biden has prioritised building a “China-free” tech supply chain and working with allies on semiconductors, electric-vehicle batteries and rare-earth metals. The semiconductor industry has stepped up a spending plan within the CHIPS (Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors) for America Act. Meanwhile, Japan’s growth strategy is geared towards the domestic production of advanced semiconductors and batteries by funding the development of manufacturing technologies. The goal is to secure supply chains by luring American manufacturers to establish operations, thereby strengthening economic security within the framework of the US-Japan alliance. The ruling Liberal

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Democratic Party has formed a Diet group on semiconductor strategy led by Akira Amari and supported by Shinzo Abe and Taro Aso. Luring TSMC is becoming a priority, and Japan and the US are successful as the company is setting up plants in Arizona and Kumamoto. India has also initiated several schemes to crowd investments to support an electronics manufacturing ecosystem. India has committed around US$30 billion as it aims to emerge as an international hub for electronics manufacturing with semiconductors as the foundation.13 The objective is to become an international hub for Electronic System Design and Manufacturing. To this end, India focuses on advancing a sustainable semiconductor and display ecosystem. Intending to infuse renewed momentum in electronics manufacturing, it has unveiled globally competitive incentives targeting semiconductors, display manufacturing and design companies. The focus remains on Silicon Semiconductor Fabs, Display Fabs, Compound Semiconductors / Silicon Photonics / Sensors (including MEMS) Fabs, Semiconductor Packaging (ATMP / OSAT) and Semiconductor Design.14 The expectations from the Quad Semiconductor Supply Chain Initiative need to be realistic in terms of mapping capacities, recognising vulnerabilities and reinforcing supply-chain security. Going ahead, Quad should collectively develop resilience in every stage of the supply chain upstream and downstream and create a robust ecosystem rather than focusing on only re-shoring and national self-sufficiency in manufacturing.15 Quad should also explore other potential areas of cooperation on strategic resources like rare-earth refining and production technologies16 or even submarine fibre-optic cables. China has not hesitated to leverage its near-monopoly in the rare-earths sector, as one witnessed in the case with Japan in 2010. In 2020, while Beijing accounted for 58% of the global rare-earths production, Washington accounted for 16%, Australia 7% and India 1%. Australia hosts the sixth largest reserves of rare-earth minerals, and India has 6% of the global reserves. If the Quad powers join forces, tangible progress can be realised. America has opted for processing Australian ores in the US, and Japan is considering the possibility of joining in. Regarding submarine fibre-optic cable, which is crucial in carrying global data, an area where the Chinese footprint is increasing rapidly, Quad should strategise smartly. While American and Japanese companies cater for 70% of the market, Australia weighs in creating a regulatory framework, and India hosts an important landing point for cables that transit the Indian Ocean.17 The conversation today on the rationale of weaving coalitions of likeminded democracies to regulate advanced technologies has a political context. As such, strategic vulnerabilities in critical technologies and related supply chains present opportunities for the Quad to join forces for practical cooperation in high technology.

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5.4 Vaccine: Between National Interest and International Responsibilities Vaccine nationalism and the deep inequities between vaccine haves and have-nots are self-defeating. The economics of vaccine R&D, complexity of patent rights, potent pharma lobbies and technology transfer on one hand and imbalance inequitable distribution of vaccines in low-income countries on the other are delaying humanity’s best chance in defeating the virus. While dilemma in balancing national interest and international responsibilities led a few advanced economies to opt for narrow vaccine nationalism, Asian powers have opted for aggressive vaccine diplomacy, as seen in the case of India and China. However, vaccine diplomacy is also a double-edged sword since it is a delicate game of balancing domestic needs and managing global perceptions. For instance, while India has garnered global respect for shipping millions of vaccine doses under its Vaccine Maitri Programme, national debate intensified on policy prudence as its domestic battle against the second wave of the pandemic tested national capacity in containing the virus. In April 2021, WHO has estimated that while wealthy nations enjoyed 87% of the 700 million administered doses, low-income nations received around 0.2%. Stalling “vaccine apartheid” will be contingent on advanced economies’ ability to share vaccines with the least developed economies over corporate profits. In this regard, Quad partners have nuanced differences in their approach. For instance, India has led a proposal aiming at temporary Covid vaccine patent waiver at WTO’s Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) with the objective of ensuring timely and affordable production and equitable distribution of the vaccine. But the US under the Trump presidency remained opposed to any such waiver, a position recently reversed by President Biden following pressure from the Democrats. Meanwhile, Australia and Japan have remained hesitant on the critical issue of patent waiver. COVID-19 vaccines may be perceived as a public health issue; it also holds a strategic edge as it is increasingly becoming a great power instrument for leveraging influence. China and Russia are employing vaccine diplomacy as a soft power tool. Beijing is employing Sinovac and Sinopharm vaccines as instruments to counter the American narrative projecting China as part of the problem rather than a solution. While the discourse on the efficacy of Chinese vaccine is politicised, the vaccine itself may come with strings attached, as witnessed in the case of Brazil’s18 sudden shift in stance on Huawei or reported Chinese attempts in Latin American nations to influence their position on Taiwan.19 In contrast, America initially focussed more on the domestic vaccination programme, leaving space for China to leverage vaccine geopolitics. However, with the recently launched Quad Vaccine Partnership (QVP), things are looking to change.

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Aligned with COVAX, the QVP is a complementary collaborative initiative looking at financing, manufacturing and distributing vaccines. The partnership charts the division of responsibility with regard to expanding safe vaccine manufacturing in India for export, endorsed by Stringent Regulatory Authorities (SRA). Institutional capacities of the United States Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC) are employed to manage finance, logistics for production, procurement and delivery of safe and effective vaccines. The Quad powers have delivered over 670 million doses, including 265 million doses to Indo-Pacific. Quad has donated millions of Made in India vaccines to Cambodia and Thailand. In addition, QVP aims to develop manufacturing at Biological E Ltd. with the target of producing around 1 billion vaccine doses by 2022. How is the Quad Vaccine Partnership going to deliver? DFC will fund Biological E. Ltd.’s aim to produce one billion doses of vaccines, including the Johnson & Johnson one, by 2022. JICA will extend concessional loans to India to support manufacturing for export. Meanwhile, the Indian Department of Biotechnology is reportedly facilitating JIBC’s negotiation with manufacturers so that companies can procure direct funding, similar to the DFC and Bio E arrangement.20 Equally important is battling vaccine misinformation, advancing vaccine preparedness and delivery, building a skilled workforce and immunisation capacity. Bolstering last-mile vaccination is the goal. Australia is shouldering the key responsibility of contributing US$77 million, advancing last-mile delivery support in Southeast Asia. This is in addition to its existing commitment of US$407 million for regional vaccine access, offering vaccine coverage to nine Pacific Island countries and Timor-Leste. The Quad powers individually have shouldered responsibility; for instance, the US and Japan have stepped up in helping Taiwan with a few million Covid vaccines as Taipei accused China of obstructing its deal with BioNTech. Likewise, Australia has extended financial and technical support to the Pacific and Southeast Asia. However, collectively, Quad Vaccine Partnership can be a game-changer as the global health crisis is far from over. As the world braces to fight against the ever-changing variants, the ability to deliver safe vaccines fairly and equitably not just at home but to the international community provides the Quad with the opportunity to demonstrate its legitimate agenda to create global public goods that has no strings attached.

5.5 The Game of High-Quality Sustainable Infrastructure Reimagining infrastructure, regional connectivity and economic corridors with Quad’s US$50 billion commitment towards infrastructure assistance and investment in the Indo-Pacific over the next five years have emerged

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as a potent instrument for leveraging geostrategic influence. As such, great powers have often invested in engineering grand designs, be it China’s Belt and Road, G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), Europe’s Global Gateway, etc. Japan has been a seasoned player in the game of quality infrastructure. Through its Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI), Tokyo has emerged as a frontrunner over the decades in advancing high-quality infrastructure in some of the key theatres in the Indo-Pacific, especially Southeast and South Asia. Quad needs to draw lessons from the wealth of experience Japan has in this domain and step up its game. Around US$48 billion has been offered by Quad partners in infrastructure financing since 2015 in the Indo-Pacific.21 With the newly set up Infrastructure Coordination Group, mapping regional infrastructure gaps, coordinating technical assistance and capacity building and delivering transparent, high-standards infrastructure should be prioritised. In this regard, public and private resources will have to be leveraged. Moreover, Quad’s attention on debt sustainability and transparency through its Debt Management Resource Portal makes it stand apart. Additionally, Quad must aim to align with the existing mega-infrastructure initiative, be it the B3W or Europe’s Global Gateway or even the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, and tap new opportunities regarding digital connectivity and health security and climate. Quad has prioritised advancing green-port infrastructure and clean-bunkering fuels in building a Green-Shipping Network. Interestingly, a Quad Shipping Taskforce is set up with the aim of decarbonising the shipping value chains. The target is to set up Quad low-emission or zero-emission shipping corridors by 2030. A network is being fostered with Los Angeles, Mumbai Port Trust, Sydney (Botany) and Yokohama ports.

5.6 The Way Forward While Quad cannot afford to be another empty talk shop, garnering resources amid the pandemic-induced economic downturn will be a challenge. Furthermore, effective cooperation in high tech also has to navigate investment challenges, information security and export controls. Globalisation led to niche specialisations, reduced redundancies, concentrated production and increased productivity, but efficient global supply chains and huge dependency on Chinese manufacturing increased vulnerabilities and compromised resilience. Thus, while re-engineering supply chains, Quad will do well to collaborate with other democratic powers like Taiwan, South Korea, European and Southeast Asian countries—each of whom boasts technological prowess and niche manufacturing capabilities. This will also align well with the FOIP vision of Quad powers. In this regard, bringing Taiwan to the table will help ease the supply chain conundrum and demonstrate support for democratic values against authoritarian forces. It also projects

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Quad’s strategic confidence to defend the rules-based order as opposed to Beijing’s revisionism. The Quad powers need to consider a concerted longterm approach in their investments and weigh the strategic landscape while rebalancing and diversifying the supply chain. Presenting innovative solutions, shaping the post-pandemic order is Quad’s endgame. US-China trade war and the subsequent COVID-19-induced supply-chain disruptions affecting strategic items presented a litmus test for major powers. As a result, high-technology supply chains have become the new battleground of great power competition. Hence, Quad’s agenda-setting should be followed by an action-oriented partnership, aimed not just at global goods delivery but also at rule-setting in technology since it is at the centre of the geostrategic and economic contest. To this end, Quad powers will be tested in terms of their respective asymmetric national capacities and a few policy gaps. Nevertheless, it is united by the asset of democratic values and commitment to upholding the liberal rules-based order as against illiberal power-based order, thus creating greater salience for the Quad.

Notes 1 Rajiv Bhatia, “Democratic Quad vs China’s Quad,” Hindustan Times, July 19, 2021, https://www​.hindustantimes​.com​/opinion​/democratic​-quad​-vs​-china​-s​ -quad​-101626615380664​.html. 2 “Defence Committee: Oral evidence: The Navy: Purpose and procurement, HC 168,” House of Commons, September 21, 2021, https://committees​.parliament​ .uk​/oralevidence​/2758​/html/. 3 “External Affairs Minister’s speech at the 4th Ramnath Goenka Lecture, 2019,” November 14, 2019, http://www​.mea​.gov​.in​/Speeches​-Statements​.htm​ ?dtl​/32038​/External​+Affairs​+Ministers+  speec​h+at+​the+4​th+Ra​mnath​+Goen​ ka+Le​cture​+2019​. 4 “EAM’s interaction at USIBC India Idea Summit,” Ministry of External Affairs, July 22, 2020, https://www​.mea​.gov​.in​/interviews​.htm​?dtl​/32863​/EAMs​_interaction​_at​_USIBC​_India​_Idea​_Summit​_July​_22​_2020. 5 “External Affairs Minister’s speech at the 4th Ramnath Goenka Lecture, 2019,” Ministry of External Affairs, November 14, 2019, https://mea​.gov​.in​/Speeches​ -Statements​.htm​?dtl​/32038​/External​+Affairs​+Ministers​+speech​+at​+the​+4th​ +Ramnath​+Goenka​+Lecture​+2019. 6 Aparna Roy, “On the climate crisis, a four-point agenda for Quad meeting,” Hindustan Times, September 23, 2021. 7 Robert D. Blackwill and Thomas Wright, The End of World Order and American Foreign Policy, Council Special Report No. 86, The Council on Foreign Relations, May 2020, https://cdn​.cfr​.org​/sites​/default​/files​/report​_pdf​/ the​-end​-of​-world​-order​-and​-american​-foreign​-policy​-csr​.pdf. 8 Richard Haass, “The pandemic will accelerate history rather than reshape it,” Foreign Affairs, April 7, 2020, https://www​.foreignaffairs​.com​/articles​/united​ -states​/2020​-04​-07​/pandemic​-will​-accelerate​-history​-rather​-reshape​-it. 9 Amitav Acharya, “A ‘Third Way’ for world order after COVID-19,” Think Global Health, July 21, 2021, https://www​.thinkglobalhealth​.org​/article​/third​ -way​-world​-order​-after​-covid​-19.

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10 Nadège Rolland, “China’s vision for a new world order,” The National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report, January 2020, https://www​.nbr​.org​/wp​-content​/uploads​/pdfs​/publications​/sr83​_chinasvision​_jan2020​.pdf. 11 Kevin Rudd, “The coming post-COVID anarchy,” Foreign Affairs, 2020, https://www​.foreignaffairs​.com​/articles​/united​-states​/2020​-05​-06​/coming​-post​ -covid​-anarchy. 12 “Fact sheet: Quad leaders’ summit,” The White House, September 24, 2021, https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/briefing​-room​/statements​-releases​/2021​/09​/24​/ fact​-sheet​-quad​-leaders​-summit/. 13 “Cabinet approves programme for development of semiconductors and display manufacturing ecosystem in India,” Press Information Bureau, December 15, 2021, https://www​.pib​.gov​.in​/PressReleasePage​.aspx​?PRID​=1781723. 14 Ibid. 15 Pranay Kotasthane, “Siliconpolitik: The case for a quad semiconductor partnership,” ISAS Working Paper, April 26, 2021, https://www​.isas​.nus​.edu​.sg​/papers​ /siliconpolitik​-the​-case​-for​-a​-quad​-semiconductor​-partnership/. 16 “Quad tightens rare-earth cooperation to counter China,” Nikkei Asia, March 11, 2021, https://asia​.nikkei​.com​/Politics​/International​-relations​/Indo​-Pacific​/ Quad​-tightens​-rare​-earth​-cooperation​-to​-counter​-China. 17 “Quad can pool resources to prevent China from dominating global tech,” Mint, June 28, 2021, https://www​.livemint​.com​/news​/quad​-can​-pool​-resources​ -to​-prevent​-china​-from​-dominating​-global​-tech​-11624867288690​.html. 18 “Brazil needs vaccines. China is benefiting,” The New York Times, March 15, 2021, https://www​.nytimes​.com​/2021​/03​/15​/world​/americas​/brazil​-vaccine​ -china​.html. 19 “Experts say that China is using vaccines to push its agenda in Latin America, and the US is behind the curve,” NBC News, May 23, 2021, https://www​.nbcnews​.com​/news​/world​/china​-using​-vaccines​-push​-its​-agenda​-latin​-america​-u​-s ​ -n1268146. 20 “India, Japan discuss ways to take forward Quad vaccine plan,” Economic Times, June 8, 2021, https://economictimes​.indiatimes​.com​/news​/economy​/ foreign​-trade​/india​-japan​-discuss​-ways​-to​-take​-forward​-quad​-vax​-plan​/articleshow​/83320905​.cms​?from​=mdr. 21 “Fact sheet: Quad leaders’ Summit,” The White House, September 24, 2021, https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/briefing​-room​/statements​-releases​/2021​/09​/24​/ fact​-sheet​-quad​-leaders​-summit/.

Part 2

Convergences and Divergences on China



Chapter 6

China and the US Indo-Pacific Strategy From Donald Trump to Joe Biden Weixing Hu

6.1 Introduction Over the last few decades since 1972, the relationship between China and the US has experienced several episodes of twists and turns, from strategic cooperation to engagement, to engagement plus hedging and strategic competition. With the rising Chinese power and growing suspicion of each other’s strategic intentions, US-China relations have become more competitive since the Trump administration. The worsening of US-China relations, like the relationship itself, is too complicated and complex to summarise in a few words. During the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, Washington pursued an engagement plus hedging policy towards China. Although the two countries competed in many areas, they still could cooperate in economic relations and regional and global governance issues. However, the Trump administration has made a breakaway from his predecessors’ China policy regarding basic assumptions, policy goals and how the policy was conducted. This has accelerated the deterioration of the relationship, which started from Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” policy. The most significant foreign policy legacy of Donald Trump left behind for the Biden administration is that he has completed the change of basic parameters of the US-China relationship. A new consensus emerged in the United States during the Trump administration that China is the US’ most threatening security challenge and serious competitor. The US-China relationship is then viewed no longer as mutually beneficial but, instead, as a zero-sum game and more contentious one at that. According to the 2017 US national security strategy, China is “a strategic rival that challenges American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.”1 To respond to Beijing’s rising challenge, Washington began to adopt a comprehensive competitive strategy towards China with greater tolerance of bilateral friction and even confrontation. To stage a comprehensive competition against China, the Trump administration, for the first time, outlined a “whole-of-government approach” to rival the Chinese rising influence and power. DOI: 10.4324/9781003342311-9

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Despite some differences from Trump’s approach to China, the central theme of President Biden’s China policy remains the same. Biden attempts to strike a delicate balance between competition and cooperation on a range of issues, from economic relations, COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, geopolitical rivalry to working with allies on values-based responses to China. President Biden said that the US and China “need not have a conflict” but that both sides were likely to engage in “extreme competition” on the global economic stage.2 Designating China as the US’s most formidable competitor, the Biden administration began to restore alliances and re-engage in the world to counter Beijing’s growing influence and coercive behaviour. Secretary of State Blinken, in a telephone conversation with China’s top diplomat Yang Jiechi, indicated that Washington would hold China accountable for its attempts to threaten the stability of the IndoPacific region, including the Taiwan Strait. In addition, the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, published by the White House shortly after Biden took office, calls for further strengthening America’s enduring advantages to prevail in the strategic competition with China or any other nation.3 Within this new strategy, the Indo-Pacific region is an important part of the US national security strategy. The Biden administration intends to take on China in a smarter competition over Trump to compete and contain China’s rising influence via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and other means among those countries along the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

6.2 The United States and China: A New Framework for Strategic Competition From the end of the Cold War, the US policy towards China largely swung between “engagement” and “containment” up to the first decade of the 21st century. As a nuanced policy, the US-China policy is premised on the expectation that a “peaceful, stable, and prosperous China” is in the American interest. China’s economic and political opening would lead to its emergence as a constructive and responsible world power. Thus, while in the short run, Washington keeps its dominant military posture in the Asia-Pacific to hedge against China’s rise and make sure the United States’ leading position would not be challenged, Washington pursues a long-term policy of engaging China and getting the Chinese system peacefully evolved. From Clinton to Obama, this “engagement plus” policy has played out well without any significant problems. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick argued in 2005 that, after a 30-year policy of integrating China into the world economy, “we now need to encourage China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system.”4 When Obama first came to office in 2009, his administration held high expectations that Beijing could be more cooperative with Washington in addressing the global financial crisis and other thorny regional issues.

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There were even discussions about a possible “G-2” between Washington and Beijing to manage global governance issues. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg signalled to China that Washington wanted to build a more stable and cooperative relationship with China based on “engagement and reassurance.” In his words, “Washington would not oppose China’s rise to great power status, but China needs to cooperate with the United States on an array of issues that the two countries have in common or have overlapped interests in.”5 However, Obama’s “engagement and reassurance” policy did not last long. It was quickly reversed in 2010–2011 and replaced by a new “Pivot to Asia” policy to rebalance against China’s rising power and influence in the Asia-Pacific. Many American commentators blame China for the policy reversal. They argue that Chinese leaders did not reciprocate Obama’s goodwill and spoiled US-China cooperation over issues like climate change, the North Korean crisis and the Iranian nuclear issue. Others believe the more fundamental reason is that China’s rapid economic power growth and military capabilities have made Beijing more confident and even assertive in foreign policy. With increasing power, Beijing demands more respect from Washington and other Western powers on issues concerning China’s “core national interests.” In recent years China has even stepped up efforts to transform various international institutions and regimes. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, Beijing has become more confident in conducting an ambitious foreign policy of “major-country diplomacy” (大國外交 daguo waijiao) and BRI to become a world power by the mid-21st century.6 The US-China relationship, once again, has come to a critical juncture. The changing balance of power and Washington’s failure to determine China’s development course have questioned the fundamental assumptions of the US-China policy. History has proved that American power cannot shape China to its liking.7 American policymakers and elites have realised that 40 years of US engagement policy has failed to produce what they have hoped for, and this policy must change. As two senior officials of the Obama administration observe, the record has become clear that, Washington once again put too much faith in its power to shape China’s trajectory. All sides of the policy debate erred: free traders and financiers who foresaw inevitable and increasing openness in China, integrationists who argued that Beijing’s ambitions could be tamed by greater interaction with the international community, and hawks who believed that China’s power would be abated by perpetual American primacy.8 In debating what went wrong, two camps of views seem to emerge on managing the great-power relationship with China. One approach puts a premium on international order and integrates China into this order. The other approach emphasises containing and limiting China’s ability to overturn

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the order while defending American interests more firmly and forcefully. Nevertheless, despite their differences, both camps want to transcend “business as usual” and get tough on China on all fronts. Against this background, the Trump administration lost no time designating China as a “revisionist power” and strategic competitor. The administration issued a series of strategy documents to turn the corner on China. These documents included the “2017 US National Security Strategy,” “2018 US National Defense Strategy,” “2018 Nuclear Posture Review,” “2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report” and “2019 Department of State: A Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Designating China as a challenger to the American economy, values and security, the Trump administration had returned to “principled realism” to compete with China and openly acknowledged that the two countries are in strategic competition. The previous US administration recognised the more pernicious aspects of China’s rise but did not make such an open call for ending the engagement and starting power rivalry. Trump’s new China policy reflected a fundamental reevaluation of how the United States understands and responds to the rise of China and raised it to the position of primary geopolitical threat, overtaking Russia and other threats to US national security. In breaking away from the past and recognising China as a long-term strategic competitor, the Trump administration began to take a “whole-of-government” competitive approach towards China. Guided by principled realism, Washington sees “no value in engaging with Beijing for symbolism and pageantry, and instead demanded tangible results and constructive outcomes.” According to the “US Strategic Approach to the PRC,” the US competition necessarily includes engagement with the PRC. However, the engagements are selective and results-oriented, with each advancing US national interests.9 As the US-China relationship undergoes fundamental changes, a new framework for US-China strategic competition is emerging. Several important points can be made about this emerging framework of strategic competition. First, as Henry Kissinger once said, the good old days are gone for US-China relations, and we will never go back to what we were; the US-China relationship needs to be reconceptualised and reoriented.10 The base for the relationship used to be “strategic partnership” against the former Soviet Union (before 1992) and against global terrorism (September 11) and then global governance and managing regional conflict and nuclear non-proliferation. When the relationship lost its strategic value, economic relations stood as the “ballast stone” to stabilise it. Now, as the trade war is underway and the decoupling is on the rise, what will be the new base? How could the relationship be reoriented as the balance of power between the two countries has shifted? Competition, not cooperation, has become the focus of bilateral exchanges. The risk of confrontation and even conflict increases as we see a “spiral of negative rhetoric” attacking each other. Even worse, if we say competition is the main theme of the relationship, what is

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the focus of competition, and how could the competition be managed? Will the two sides keep the communication channels open? Will the two economies be decoupled? The bad news is there is little dialogue between the United States and China as Washington does not want to “cater to Beijing’s demands to create a proper ‘atmosphere’ or ‘conditions’ for dialogue.”11 The shadow of what Graham Allison calls “Thucydides’s Trap” lingers.12 Second, the current round of strategic competition has become more comprehensive as the Trump administration expanded the competitive space and introduced multiple instruments of power and coercion into the game. The Trump administration has become more hostile in both words and deeds. Within the American policy community, nobody is talking about balancing competition with cooperation in other areas. The broad competition has extended from the South China Sea, cybersecurity to trade war, technology cutoff, military buildup, ideology and even the Taiwan and Hong Kong issues. Trump’s “whole-of-government” approach maximised pressure on China in various ways to bring Beijing to its knees. There are five areas in which the Trump administration is trying to knock China down—control over the Indo-Pacific rimland, trade and the economy, China’s quest for alternative technical standards, the pursuit of technological dominance and Chinese military advancement.13 However, the contestation is complex due to close economic ties between the United States and China and the interconnectedness of global trade networks. When the US-China trade war began, political observers warned that a new Cold War was emerging, and sustained power rivalry for decades may lead to hostility and undue pessimism in international relations and world politics. As US-China relations hit a new low, both sides were recruiting allies, making the world more divided. As a result, Washington moved away from strategic ambiguities to strategic clarity in competition with China, and structural competition became less manageable. Third, the new strategic competition has found a robust domestic constituency on both sides. The “internalisation” of great power competition is not good news and reminds people of the Cold War-type of confrontation and power rivalry. The China-bashing is becoming part of US domestic politics and electoral campaigns. In the United States, there is a rising propensity to blame China for policy failure or almost everything unsatisfactory. This trend has become bipartisan, and, worse even, American public opinions on China have become more negative. The COVID-19 pandemic has led to a decline in people-to-people contact and has become the source of resentment. There are diverse resentments towards the Chinese government that have accumulated across the US political system, entangled with the election and partisan politics. American elites and the populace alike have become more alienated from China. The new domestic politics in China also respond to international criticism negatively, especially to Trump’s blame-shift of his mishandling of the pandemic. The nationalistic sentiment

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in China, unlike before, is less about grievance and instead gives way to a rise of new “wolf warrior diplomacy” (戰狼外交 zhanlang waijiao). Nationalistic sentiment on both sides reinforces the dynamism of hostility towards each other and will make the competition prolonged and challenging to manage.

6.3 What is in the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”? The concept of “Indo-Pacific” is a geostrategic construct. It highlights the political and security linkage between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It implies a two-ocean strategy of treating the Indo-Pacific as a single operation theatre or strategic space. In some sense, it highlights the prospect of future major power competition being playing out more in this broader maritime area than on the continent. Moreover, the concept alludes to India’s strategic importance in the region and elevates its role in the global geostrategic equation when “Indo” was prefixed to the Pacific. Yet, the term “Indo-Pacific” was not an American creation. The use of the term has gained growing significance in the US official documents, and the role of India has also gained greater interest in the US Asia policy. From the George W. Bush administration, Washington began to pay more attention to its relations with India. President George W. Bush visited India in March 2006 and signed the US-Indian civil nuclear agreement. During the Obama administration, President Obama visited India twice in 2010 and 2015, respectively. Although the Obama administration did not explicitly use the Indo-Pacific term, Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review 2010 put “securing sea lanes of communication for freedom of navigation, global commerce and international energy security” as strategic interests of the US in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered a speech entitled “US Involvement in Asia-Pacific” in Hawaii, using the concept of “the Indo-Pacific basin.”14 In 2011, she published an article in Foreign Policy, emphasising the importance of the Indo-Pacific region to US strategy. She pointed out that “stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas, the region spans two oceans — the Pacific and the Indian — that are increasingly linked by shipping and strategy.”15 In July 2013, the then Vice President Joseph Biden visited India and Singapore. During the trip, he declared that the United States considered the IndoPacific region an integral part of the future of Asia. Moreover, in Obama’s National Security Strategy report, although the phrase “Indo-Pacific” is not adopted, it includes India in the Asia-Pacific region, emphasising the need to strengthen its strategic and economic partnership with India.16 During Obama’s tenure, Washington’s foreign policy focus was “pivot to Asia” or “rebalancing” to the Asia-Pacific. The Indian Ocean was not explicitly mentioned, but it was implicitly included in the concept of the Asia-Pacific. A new trilateral dialogue framework between the US, Japan

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and India was initiated during the first term of the Obama administration. It was finally kicked off in 2015 by Secretary of States John Kerry in Obama’s second term. The Obama administration did not clearly define India’s role in the “rebalancing” strategy. However, the visible progress in the quadrilateral cooperation among the US, Japan, India and Australia during the Obama time was a clear indication that India and the Indian Ocean are included in the US–Asia strategy and are part of the US rebalancing to Asia. Nevertheless, Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy is nothing new but continuing Obama’s rebalancing to Asia by another name. Since Trump came to office in January 2017, he looked for a new phrase in Asia policy to distinguish his foreign policy from Obama’s “rebalancing to Asia.” Susan Thornton, then-acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, made it clear in March 2017 that “the ‘Pivot’ to Asia is over.”17 But in the early months of the Trump administration, there was no clear strategic vision for formulating a new Asia strategy. Trump is a businessman-turned-politician. He is a more pragmatic and issue-oriented president. He put more emphasis on issues like the North Korean nuclear issue and the US trade imbalance. Trump’s “America first” thinking emphasised “American interests and national security” in foreign policy. That has primarily transformed the purpose, rationale and operation of US foreign policy carried out by previous administrations. While Trump took a transactional approach to foreign affairs, key foreign policy and national security team members followed a more traditional approach in conducting US diplomacy and foreign policy formulation. A little more than a half-year into the office, the Trump administration began to articulate a relatively straightforward “IndoPacific” strategy. In September and October 2017, Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Rex Tillerson visited India successively. The visits showed the great importance Washington attaches to India. In September of 2017, New Delhi agreed to invite Australia to participate in the Malabar Exercise for the first time. This was the first time that the United States, Japan, India and Australia have held military exercises together, marking important progress of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. On October 18, 2017, Secretary of State Tillerson presented a vision of the US “Indo-Pacific” strategy in a speech entitled “Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next Century” at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC. For the first time, as he pointed out, “the Indo-Pacific, including the entire Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific and the nations that surround them, will be the most consequential part of the globe in the 21st century.”18 During his visit to India, he further elaborated on the Indo-Pacific idea. In the same month, Mattis told a Senate Armed Services Committee during a Congressional hearing that “[In] a globalised world, there are many belts and many roads, and no one nation should put itself into a position of dictating ‘One Belt, One Road ,’” an apparent reference to the Chinese BRI.19

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President Trump spoke on the American vision for “a Free and Open Indo-Pacific” at the APEC Summit on November 10, 2017, in Vietnam. In the speech, he described that the “Indo-Pacific” is a place where countries, with diverse cultures and many different dreams, can “all prosper side-byside and thrive in freedom and peace.”20 The new US Indo-Pacific vision was an attempt to link to India’s “Look East” policy adopted since 1992 and Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy promoted by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. During the 31st ASEAN Summit in Manila in 2017, officials of the United States, Japan, India and Australia restarted the Quad that had been suspended for ten years. In December 2017, H. R. McMaster, Trump’s National Security Advisor, stated that the new vision for Indo-Pacific imagines “a community of nations that are strong, independent, and thriving”— and “a future of many dreams for the people of the region.”21 Thus, it is clear that the “Indo-Pacific” as a geopolitical concept has gained currency among regional countries in recent years. Moreover, at the end of 2017, the Trump administration officially incorporated it into its national security strategy.

6.4 The US Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Competition with China For the United States, China will remain the most important greatpower competitor for an extended period. According to the “US Strategic Approach to the PRC,” the Trump administration had adopted “a competitive approach to the PRC, based on a clear-eyed assessment of the CCP’s intentions and actions, a reappraisal of the United States’ many strategic advantages and shortfalls, and a tolerance of greater bilateral friction.”22 This new US competitive strategy is multidimensional. There are three broad areas in which Washington wants to take tough measures confronting China’s challenges to US economic interests, values and security. Among different initiatives, the US Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) is a core competitive strategy aiming at China. The main objective of the US IPS is to provide strategic alternatives to undermine China’s growing influence, via BRI or other means, among those countries along with the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In response to the shared or similar concerns regarding China by Japan, Australia and, to some extent, India, the IPS is also intended to consolidate the American network of allies and partners in the region to countervail China’s increasing military presence in the Indo-Pacific. In this sense, the Trump administration’s IPS has become a new driving force transforming the present regional political, security and military environment. Although the US Indo-Pacific Strategy still has problems of ambiguity and lacks operational details, it has already generated new debate across the region, and new strategic narratives are emerging. As the momentum of the Quad is restored, big power rivalry returns to regional politics. ASEAN is looking to keep its “centrality” in

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regional institution building and regional security dialogues. For ASEAN, it would be ideal for regional states to integrate the US IPS and China’s BRI for maximum economic benefits and minimum security risk. The future geostrategic competition among regional powers, the US IPS, China’s BRI, the Quad will correlate with other regional initiatives, and they will define factors shaping the future regional security environment. Among these factors, how the US-China strategic competition will play out and how US-China relations will evolve would be critical for regional international relations. The US-China relationship defines geopolitics in the 21st century. The ongoing trade war and the present coronavirus crisis have pushed US-China relations to their lowest point since the Cold War. On top of this, the US IPS came out when the American debate over its China policy, started in the second term of the Obama administration, has come to a broad consensus, which calls for an overhaul of the US-China relationship and the US-China policy. Trump’s China policy has more change than continuity from those of his predecessors. There is growing bipartisan pressure on Trump to be tough on China and redirect the US-China relationship.23 The Obama administration adopted a more multilateral policy towards economic issues, reflected in its TPP initiative and attracting China to cooperate with the US on climate change and other global governance issues while handling security issues in bilateral approaches. The Trump administration had adopted bilateral policies on economic issues, exerting unprecedented pressure on almost all trading partners, including allies and forcing them to sign bilateral trade agreements with the US President Trump has been resolved to fight a protracted trade war against China. Trump himself did not seem interested in multilateralism and having a US regional strategy for Asia. However, his foreign policy and the national security team were keen to pursue a coordinated regional strategy vis-à-vis China. As put in the US National Security Strategy, the US will “redouble our commitment to established alliances and partnerships, while expanding and deepening relationships with new partners.”24 The Pentagon is actively promoting the transformation of the bilateral alliance system into an Asian version of NATO. The revival of the Quad is considered a key leverage against China in the Indo-Pacific region. Unlike Obama’s “pivot to Asia,” the Trump administration has adopted a tit-for-tat strategy to respond to China’s BRI challenge. The Trump administration believed that China’s BRI uses an ambitious geoeconomic endeavour to project its strategic influence across the Eurasian continent, from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and Africa. If successful, China will host most of the world’s economic centres and control major trading routes and will have access to natural resources around the globe. The US still possesses enormous leverages such as military supremacy, multiple alliances, influential Western-led international organisations and soft power to balance the China challenge. Different from the US containment strategy against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the IPS is trying to contain China in

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those places where the US has vital strategic interest and can work with its allies to build a “chain” that traverses the Western Pacific and East Indian Oceans to encircling China from different directions. One key IPS strategic goal is to stop Beijing from challenging Washington’s sea power in the IndoPacific. In other words, Washington is trying to cut off Beijing’s “maritime silk road” so that Beijing can only expand through the “economic belt” on land. A Chinese scholar argues that in this way, Washington can increase potential risks for China because countries along the “belt” are economically poor and politically turbulent, such as countries in Central Asia, West Asia and North Africa; in contrast, countries along the “road” are relatively economically prosperous and politically stable.25 If Beijing cannot get enough wealth from first-world countries to support its expansion in the poor areas, it may eventually lead to a severe overdraft of China’s capabilities. One of the critical elements in the US competitive strategy is to increase efforts to bring India to its side against China. It is a troubling sign for China, given the profound problems between the two Asian giants. Yet, it is something new for Beijing. Washington has used all efforts to lobby India to its side or transform India into part of the Western alliance. What is alarming for Beijing is that India has become a key component of the US IPS. There is no easy way out between India and China for solving their territorial disputes over 100,000 square kilometres on the border and geopolitical rivalry between the two rising powers. The danger of conflict is always there, and nationalistic sentiments on both sides are strong. For India, New Delhi’s embracing the IPS would enable the country to obtain a substantial strategic advantage over China. It would help to improve India’s international status and obtain advanced weapons and technologies from the United States and Japan. To some extent, it could increase its bargaining chips in the competition with China. Some observers believe that if Beijing tries to take a tough approach against New Delhi in a conflict between the two, Washington could hold it back. On the other hand, if Beijing tries to compromise with India, New Delhi could rely on the Quad to further blackmail Beijing.26 For Washington, India is a major sea power in the Indian Ocean. It can help the United States to balance China’s expansion in the Indian Ocean and reduce the US burden in maintaining the security linkage between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and carrying out a two-ocean strategy in the region. In this way, Washington can deploy more strategic resources in the Western Pacific to counter China’s growing presence. Another card Washington could play with China is Taiwan. The Taiwan issue has been an old problem in the Sino-US relationship. It is now reemerging as a new political irritant for Beijing. The uncertainty and stakes brought up by playing the Taiwan card could be devastating for the future relationship. The magnitude and scope of Washington’s support to Taiwan under the Trump administration had surpassed previous US administrations.

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Trump had a markedly different view of Taiwan from his subordinates and aides, although they are trying to increase support for Taiwan. Trump used the Taiwan issue as a weight to pressure Beijing for concessions on economic and trade issues. His subordinates and aids looked at it more from a strategic perspective. Moreover, lawmakers on Capitol Hill have joined the play. They have initiated Taiwan-related bills that call on the executive branch to pressure those countries with diplomatic relations with Taiwan not to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The frequency of American warships passing through the Taiwan Strait has increased significantly since 2018. The Taiwan issue is now increasingly viewed in linkage with the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The lawmakers and policymakers in the administration consider that Washington’s strengthening of its strategic relationship with Taiwan can threaten the CPC’s rule. If Beijing is deemed incapable of achieving China’s reunification, it will be met with resentment and harsh criticism from the Chinese public. Like Taiwan, the start of Hong Kong’s anti-extradition bill protests in June 2019 provided Washington with new leverage to check Beijing. Hong Kong’s protest movement and Beijing’s proposed new national security law on Hong Kong have made the city quickly become a focal point of political wrestling between Washington and Beijing. The Trump administration’s sanctions on Beijing for its new security law will further worsen the US-China relations. On the South China Sea issue, the Trump administration was more determined to use all means to curb the expansion of China’s military power effectively. In 2017, the US military launched a “freedom of navigation operation” four times in the South China Sea, five times in 2018 and nine times in 2019. The Pentagon announced that China would no longer be invited to the annual “Rim of the Pacific” military exercise as of 2018. In recent years, the US military has increased the frequency of joint military exercises with countries with territorial disputes with China. Australia also increased military pressure on China in the South China Sea during Malcolm Turnbull’s tenure as prime minister. In April 2018, China and Australia’s navies confronted each other in the South China Sea for the first time. To push back Beijing’s efforts to promote its political and economic model to the rest of the world, Washington is more proactive to fight an ideological war against China. This could be a new front for Sino-US rivalry under the Indo-Pacific strategy. The US national security strategy labels the US-China rivalry as “a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order.” For decades, the American elites have believed that the US could transform China into a free and democratic country through moderate “engagement.” However, they have become increasingly disappointed with China in recent years. Instead of embracing the values of freedom and democracy, China is constantly using liberal international institutions to make itself stronger and appealing to other countries. From Obama’s second term, Washington has adopted a hedging policy with clear characteristics of

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realism on China. Senior officials in the Trump administration have inherited Obama administration policies in an attempt to increase pressure on China. It seems that senior officials like Secretary of State Michael Pompeo no longer expect that the US can change China’s behaviour and its political system through engagement policies. Instead, they believed that Washington must take a harsh stance on China and isolate it internationally. They began to make extremely unfriendly remarks against Beijing and even tried to alienate the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people. As part of an overall strategy, Washington makes efforts to force the countries in the Indo-Pacific region to take a side between China and the United States on political, economic, security and even technology issues.

6.5 China’s Response to the US Indo-Pacific Strategy As the US-China great power rivalry has come to the fore, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the key regions where their tussle for power and influence occurs. US-China strategic competition will affect almost every geographic region and functional area in international relations of the 21st century. This section of the chapter focuses on how China perceives and responds to the US IPS. Since the Trump administration rolled out its “Free and Open IndoPacific” strategy in 2017, Beijing has not responded formally. Rather than raising alarms as they did over the original Quad a decade ago, the Chinese official comments on the US IPS have been restrained and cautious.27 When asked whether the IPS and the Quad were meant to contain China in the region, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi used the “seafoam” analogy to elaborate his view on the issue. It seems there is never a shortage of headline-grabbing ideas. They are like the seafoam in the Pacific or the Indian Ocean. They may get some attention but soon will dissipate. Contrary to the claim made by some academics and media outlets that the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” aims to contain China, the four countries’ official position is that it targets no one. I hope they mean what they say and that their actions will match their rhetoric. Nowadays, stoking a new Cold War is out of sync with the times and inciting block confrontation will find no market.28 Wang Yi’s remarks contain subtle messages regarding the Chinese attitude towards the Indo-Pacific concept and the IPS. First, Wang did not brush aside the challenge brought up by the IPS. He acknowledged there are claims that the IPS targets China, but he challenged if the Quad governments can openly state their target is China. He fully understands that New Delhi, Canberra and Tokyo would not explicitly state that their “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” is targeted towards China. Second, despite the emerging

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China threat narrative brought up by Washington, Beijing still believes that regional states should focus on East Asia and Asian existing cooperation mechanisms and achievements in the region, not distracted by the IndoPacific initiative. As he remarked in a China-ASEAN function, regional states should focus on cooperation and consensus-building without engaging in confrontational games or forming factions of small cliques.29 Another important message in Wang’s speech was that the US Indo-Pacific initiative could be something like the “seafoam” that comes and goes. This reminds people to think whether the new US initiative would be something here to stay or something like Obama’s “pivot to Asia.”30 To the Chinese, Trump’s IPS lacked the clarity and impetus necessary to become an enduring strategy concept for the region, and its prospects are far from certain. Beijing’s cautious and sometimes dismissive response includes both pessimistic and optimistic assessments. On the pessimistic side, we find increasing pessimistic assessment of the Trump administration’s China policy and Indo-Pacific strategy within the Chinese policy community. More and more Chinese government officials and scholars began to discuss the Washington pressure in playing a more competitive game with China, a much more challenging and malicious game than Obama’s “pivot to Asia.” By the IndoPacific strategy, the Trump administration was determined to engage in an overall confrontation with China and to mobilise its allies and like-minded countries to countervail China’s rising influence in the region and all aspects of international competition. Unlike Obama’s rebalancing to Asia, the Trump administration and elites in Washington had gone beyond any doubt to conclude that China is the number one threat to future American national security, and Beijing is using all means, including BRI and technology warfare such as Huawei 5G network, to undercut the American power all over the world, and, for that, Washington must use all means to push it back. In almost all Chinese research publications, we can find the consensus that Americans have crossed the line, and the China-US relationship will never go back to the “old good days.” As the Chinese people are advised to be prepared for the return of major power competition, the popular sentiment in the country is also changing. Anti-American commentaries in Global Times are getting more applause. In an interview with Financial Times concerning Washington’s effort of revitalising its alliance system to contain China’s rising influence and BRI projects, Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Le Yucheng stated: “China welcomes regional initiatives, but we are firmly against any attempts to use the Indo-Pacific strategy as a tool to counter the BRI or even contain China.”31 There is a danger of the downward spiral of deteriorated mutual perception between China and the United States. As the tension between the two countries, caused by economic and political disputes, keeps rising, the mutual negative perception is reinforced. Many American political elites share a narrative that Washington’s longstanding policy of “engagement”

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towards China has failed, and the US needs to get tough on China. This disillusionment provides the basis for a bipartisan consensus of “getting tough on China.” Meanwhile, the Chinese elites have interpreted that the US returns to a containment policy on China. From the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy to the Nuclear Posture Review, they all collectively point to China as the number one strategic competitor for the US. So, the IPS is part of this national competitive strategy against China. This perception loop reinforces each other across the Pacific Ocean. For the Chinese, they understand that Washington will use all possible means to impede the rise of China in the region. China’s BRI and its relations with regional states, such as Japan, Australia and India, and the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean will be adversely affected. The US military is likely to deepen its involvement in the South China Sea through the IPS. However, the current US Indo-Pacific Strategy also gives Beijing some reasons for a less pessimistic assessment. As it stands now, the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” still lacks clarity and has problems in its feasibility and future implementation. This leads some Chinese analysts to argue that the IPS may only have limited impacts on China.32 Both internal and external constraints will impede its implementation. Internally, the Trump administration’s financial difficulty and personnel changes constitute obstacles for the Trump administration to implement the IPS fully. There are external constraints as well. The US and its partners, especially India, may have different policy preferences regarding the IPS interpretation and implementation. Smaller countries like ASEAN members have remained reluctant to take sides between the US and China. The implementation of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” objective requires leadership. Can Washington lead and unite the region for this ordinary course? Trump had vowed to “make America great again,” and his “America first” policy was often at odds with regional states and multilateral institutions. “My job is not to represent the world,” he had declared. He resolutely withdrew from various international regimes, such as the Paris Climate Change Accord and UNESCO, to put “America first” into practice.33 Trump himself had little interest in consolidating relationships with allies instead of demanding that countries like Japan and South Korea have a more significant share of military spending. Instead, he had pressured them regarding trade.34 Nor was he interested in America’s leadership in Asia, being absent from ASEAN summits twice and the APEC summit once. Trump’s apathy towards multilateralism gives Beijing the leeway to influence regional politics. The original IPS objective was to unite American allies to contain China’s growing influence. However, Beijing has taken advantage of Trump’s blunders to improve relations with its Asian neighbours. China has territorial disputes with ASEAN countries in the South China Sea, some being US allies or partners Washington is supposed to support.

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However, compared to the Obama administration, Trump was simply not adept at exploiting their conflicts with China, and, as a result, China has improved relations with these countries better than during the Obama tenure. One scholar observes that the Trump administration has left small- and medium-sized countries in the Asia-Pacific region frustrated and worrisome because ASEAN’s dominant role in managing East Asian security and institution building has declined.35 One of the focal issues of the IPS concerns the coordination with those countries that have territorial disputes with China. However, the conflict between Japan and China over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands has cooled down in the last two years. The divide between Beijing and Canberra lies solely in human rights and ideological issues. Beijing and New Delhi have become patient about the territorial dispute. All three governments want to avoid letting Beijing think that the IPS aims to contain China and confront Beijing.36 Ten years ago, the Obama administration rolled out the “pivot to Asia” or “rebalance to Asia” strategy, which redirected the US post-9/11 strategic focus from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region. The “pivot to Asia” and its policy measures created considerable pressure on Beijing’s international posture in Asia. At that time, instead of responding to the “pivot to Asia” in a tit-for-tat approach, Beijing avoided head-on-head confrontation with the Belt and Road Initiative, a grand strategy type of geoeconomic plan. Ten years later, in response to the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy, the overwhelming majority of China’s international relations scholars and think tank people believe there is no need for Beijing to take tit-for-tat action to counter the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, at least for the time being. Instead, China should respond to the IPS and the emerging anti-China narratives in a more constructive, peaceful and positive manner to mitigate possible national security risks emanating from the American IPS and further extend China’s international influence in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. The complex balancing strategy is neither advocated by scholars nor accepted by the government. Beijing prefers soft balancing and institutional balancing against Washington.37 This is the Chinese way to respond. This Chinese way of responding needs action more than rhetoric. China’s BRI is viewed as a vehicle for China to extend its strategic influence and even establish a military foothold in selected strategic locations. Economic leverage gives China access to more locations for action. Chinese international relations scholars believe China should best use its BRI projects and benefit local people and hosting countries. If more dividends are paid to BRI-participating countries, that is more telling and attractive than what the US IPS could offer. In some sense, the US IPS could also be complementary to BRI. The financial burden of China can be mitigated if the US is willing to increase the investments of infrastructure in the countries along the Belt and Road Initiative.38

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Some Chinese scholars argue that the Indian Ocean and the Pacific link is part of globalisation. It is in China’s economic interest to engage more in the Indo-Pacific. Beijing should not perceive the IPS as an attempt by Washington to block the BRI because China cannot undertake infrastructure construction in developing countries alone. Beijing should actively seek Indo-Pacific countries’ support for China to take advantage of this opportunity to expand power in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.39 Some even suggest that China should accept the concept of IPS and propose its own Indo-Pacific strategy. Since the US Secretary of Defense claims that the Indo-Pacific is open, China could well consider some way of joining it.40 Similarly, it was suggested that Beijing actively participate in the IPS before it can dilute or disintegrate it.41 The solidarity among the Quad members is not strong enough to move it forward as a NATO-like entity in the foreseeable future. The Quad is unlikely to do substantial damage to China. Japan, India and Australia want to balance and hedge against Beijing’s rising power, but they also want to take advantage of the booming Chinese economy. The US allies are not very sure of Washington’s policy direction and preference under Donald Trump. They are hesitant to follow the American leadership by the Trump administration’s new strategic initiatives. So that gives China a chance to compete with the US. On many occasions, President Xi could win more applause than President Trump.42 Now that China has become the largest trading partner of the US, Japan, Australia and India, respectively, Beijing is confident that they cannot choose to offend China lightly. In response to the US IPS, Beijing’s real challenge and top priority lie in developing and consolidating friendly relations with ASEAN countries.43 Beijing is now taking the US exit from the TPP as an opportunity to develop multilateral mechanisms with Southeast Asian countries to change their “hedging” strategy against Beijing. Some scholars stress that Beijing should try to eliminate ASEAN’s doubts and fears about China and strengthen cooperation with them regarding non-traditional security to build mutual political trust. In particular, Beijing should accept ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific framework and support ASEAN’s leading role in East Asia’s security affairs, taking advantage of the discontent of Trump among Southeast Asian countries to expand China’s influence.44 Beijing is quietly taking a strategy of inclusive and exclusive institutional balancing against the US.45 Deepening its relationship with Russia is another area for Beijing’s attention. Some Chinese scholars have pointed out that Moscow is also worried about IPS, and, thus, Beijing could increase its cooperation with Moscow by supporting the Great Eurasia initiative.46 There is a suggestion that Beijing should ally with Moscow in response to pressure from the US alliance system.47 However, the vast majority of Chinese scholars disagree with it, and the Beijing leadership has not accepted such suggestions. They are confident that Washington will not pose much of a threat to China and that Beijing

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simply needs to maintain a partnership rather than an alignment with Moscow. Recently, however, there have been media reports that Beijing and Moscow are discussing how to “provide military help to each other.”48 A scholar has commented that the possibility of an alliance between the two sides is increasing, but there will be no covenant.49 Competing with the US in the soft power domain is also important for Beijing to answer Washington’s new challenge. Beijing has attached great importance to promoting the Chinese culture and values overseas. The Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda system has created a huge team to promote the BRI in developing countries which is considered the secret reason why Beijing has been more successful in foreign policies than Washington.50 Washington has no counterpart, and it is challenging to set up such a team. Thus, while the US is more helpful to many countries, the people of these countries are not grateful for this assistance. In addition, while some Asian countries worry about China’s ascent, they want China to balance out the US dominance. Some liberal democracies, while ostensibly endorsing American values, actually want to see Beijing have ideas and values that are different from Washington’s so that they can avoid Washington’s bullying and finger-pointing. While liberal democratic values are more attractive, many third-world citizens feel more comfortable dealing with the Chinese than Americans. For example, after Rodrigo Duterte came into power in 2016, he was dissatisfied with US criticism of his human rights record and improved relations with Beijing. Aung San Suu Kyi’s policy on Muslims has been criticised by Americans, so she had improved her relationship with Beijing in 2019. Washington’s involvement in Sri Lanka’s domestic affairs brought pro-Chinese politicians to power. Washington’s strategy of democracy promotion has backfired, and Beijing has become a beneficiary of Washington’s rigid human rights policy.

6.6 Conclusion The US-China relationship has fallen to its lowest point in the last four decades since the normalisation of relations between the two countries in 1979. It was not surprising that the relationship for Biden’s first 100 days had a bumpy start. Although the downward spiral for continuing deterioration was stopped, it would be impossible for the relationship to return to what it was during the decades of so-called “engagement.” The curtain for a long-term US-China strategic rivalry has been lifted, and the competition will affect all aspects of international relations in the Indo-Pacific region. The future US-China power play in the Indo-Pacific will be multidimensional, transcending the competitive dynamics Obama’s “rebalancing to Asia” brought to the region. Washington will continue to build up its military capability in the Indo-Pacific region to balance against the rising Chinese military power. The United States will seek to strengthen and expand its

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alliance and partnership under the name of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” to undermine China’s growing influence via BRI or other means in the region. Washington will continue to use regional issues like the South China Sea, Taiwan and Hong Kong to pressure China, and the struggle for moral support will continue. However, returning to the Cold War seems not in the best interest of all stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region.

Notes 1 The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” December 2017, https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/wp​-content​/uploads​/2017​/12​/ NSS​-Final​-12​-18​-2017​-0905​.pdf. 2 President Biden’s interview CBS, February 7, 2021, https://www​.cnbc​.com​/2021​ /02​/07​/biden​-will​-compete​-with​-china​-but​-wont​-take​-trump​-approach​.html. 3 The White House, “The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” https:// www​.whitehouse​.gov​/wp​-content​/uploads​/2021​/03​/NSC​-1v2​.pdf. 4 Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State, Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations New York City, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” September 21, 2005, https://2001​-2009​.state​.gov​/s​/d​/former​/ zoellick​/rem​/53682​.htm. 5 James B. Steinberg, “Administration’s Vision of the U.S.-China Relationship,” Keynote address at the Center for a New American Security, Washington, DC, September 24, 2009, http://www​.state​.gov​/s​/d​/former​/steinberg​/remarks​/2009​ /169332​.htm. 6 Weixing Hu, “Xi Jinping’s ‘Major Country Diplomacy’: The Role of Leadership in Foreign Policy Transformation,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 28, No. 115 (2019), pp. 1–14. 7 Jisi Wang, “Did America Get China Wrong? The Engagement Debate,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 97, No. 4 (July/August 2018), pp. 183–195. 8 Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 97, No. 2 (March/April 2018), p. 60. 9 White House, “United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” 26 May 2020, p. 9. 10 For a good discussion, see Leah Bitounis and Jonathon Price, eds., The Struggle for Power: U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century (Aspen Strategy Group Report, Aspen Institute, January 24, 2020), https://www​.aspeninstitute​.org​/ publications​/the​-struggle​-for​-power​-u​-s​-china​-relations​-in​-the​-21st​-century/. 11 White House, “United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” p. 8. 12 Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2017). 13 Ashley Tellis, “The Return of U.S.-China Strategic Competition,” in Strategic Asia 2020: U.S.-China Competition for Global Influence, edited by Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019). 14 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Engagement in the Asia-Pacific,” US Department of State, October 28, 2010, https://2009​-2017​.state​.gov​/secretary​/20092013clinton​/rm​/2010​/10​/150141​.htm. 15 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, http://foreignpolicy​.com​/2011​/10​/11​/americas​-pacific​-century/.

China and the US Indo-Pacific Strategy  123 16 The White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” February 2015, https://obamawhitehouse​.archives​.gov​/sites​/default​ /files​/docs​/2015​_national​_security​_strategy​_2​.pdf. 17 Ankit Panda, “Straight from the US State Department: The ‘Pivot’ to Asia Is Over,” The Diplomat, March 14, 2017, https://thediplomat​.com​/2017​/03​/ straight​-from​-the​-us​-state​-department​-the​-pivot​-to​-asia​-is​-over/. 18 Rex Tillerson, “Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next Century,” CSIS, October 18, 2017, https://www​.csis​.org​/analysis​/defining​-our​-relationship​-india​-next​-century​-address​-us​-secretary​-state​-rex​-tillerson. 19 Hearing Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, Second Session, January 25, 2018, https:// www​. uscc ​ . gov ​ / sites ​ / default ​ / files ​ / transcripts ​ / Hearing​ % 20Transcript​ % 20-​ %20January​%2025,​%202018​_0​.pdf. 20 Donald Trump, “Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO Summit,” The White House, November 10, 2017, https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/briefings​ -statements​/remarks​-president​-trump​-apec​-ceo​-summit​-da​-nang​-vietnam/. 21 LTG H.R. McMaster, “Reclaiming America’s Strategic Confidence,” The White House, December 2, 2017, https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/briefings​-statements​/ remarks​-ltg​-h​-r​-mcmaster​-reagan​-national​-defense​-forum​-reclaiming​-americas​ -strategic​-confidence/. 22 White House, “United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” p. 1. 23 Trump administration has continued some of the Obama administration’s policies. In terms of economy, the purpose of Washington has always been to make China more open to the principles of free markets and respect US-led rules. In terms of security, the IPS has also continued the “rebalancing” strategy, such as shifting more strategic resources from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region, strengthening defence relations with India and gradually increasing its containment in the South China Sea. 24 The White House, “The United States National Security Strategy,” December 2017, https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/wp​-content​/uploads​/2017​/12​/NSS​-Final​-12​ -18​-2017​-0905​.pdf. 25 Huang He, “Meiguo diyuan zhengzhi zhanlue yanbian zhongde ezhi siwei: cong xuanzexing ezhi Dao yintai zhanlue” (The Containment Rationale in the US Evolving Geopolitical Strategy: From Selective Containment to the Indo-Pacific Strategy,” The Journal of Shenzhen University (Humanities and Social Sciences Edition), No. 1 (2018), pp. 72–78. 26 Ye Hailin, “Yintai gainian de qianjing yu Zhongguo de yingdui celue” (Prospects of the Indo-Pacific Concept and China’s Strategy to Respond), Yinduyang jingjiti yanjiu (Journal of Indian Ocean Economic Studies), Vol. 26, No. 2 (2018), pp. 10–12. 27 See Joel Wuthnow, “Why China Discounts the Indo-Pacific Quad,” PacNet, No. 55, August 7, 2018, https://www​.pacforum​.org​/analysis​/pacnet​-55​-why​ -china​-discounts​-indo​-pacific​-quad. 28 Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s remarks at the press conference, the National People’s Congress session, March 8, 2018, http://www​.xinhuanet​.com​/politics​ /2018lh​/2018​-03​/08​/c​_1122508612​.htm; also see Huanqiu website, https:// china​.huanqiu​.com​/article​/9CaKrnK6SMi. 29 Foreign Minister Wang Yi discusses the Indo-Pacific concept at the ChinaASEAN dialogues, Bangkok, Thailand, July 31, 2019, https://www​.fmprc​.gov​ .cn​/web​/wjbzhd​/t1685012​.shtml. 30 However, Wang Yi may be too optimistic, and IPS are obviously not just “sea foams.” Even if Trump steps down, this strategy will continue. For a similar

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31 32 33 34

35

36

37

38 39 40

41

42 43 44 45

view, see Hal Brands, “Trump has Been (Partly) Good for US Foreign Policy,” Bloomberg, July 16, 2019, https://www​.bloomberg​.com​/opinion​/articles​/2019​ -07​-16​/trump​-has​-been​-partly​-good​-for​-u​-s​-foreign​-policy. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Le Yucheng stated in an interview with Financial Times, September 26, 2018, https://www​.fmprc​.gov​.cn​/web​/wjbxw​ _673019​/t1598794​.shtml. Chen Jimin, “Telangpu zhengfu yintai zhanlue: zhengce yu xiandu” (Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Policy and its Limitations), Heping yu fazhan (Peace and Development), No. 1 (2018), pp. 37–38. The White House, “Remarks by President Trump in Joint Address to Congress,” February 28, 2017, https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/briefings​-statements​/remarks​ -president​-trump​-joint​-address​-congress/. “Remarks by President Trump to US and Japanese Business Leaders,” US Ambassador’s Residence, Tokyo, Japan, November 6, 2017, https://www​ .whitehouse​.gov​/briefings​-statements​/5769/; “Remarks by President Trump and President Moon of the Republic of Korea in Joint Press Conference,” Blue House, Seoul, Republic of Korea, November 7, 2017, https://www​.whitehouse​ .gov​/briefings​-statements​/remarks​-president​-trump​-president​-moon​-republic​ -korea​-joint​-press​-conference​-seoul​-republic​-korea/. Indonesia and South Korea, in particular, may feel embarrassed because they are undoubtedly dwarfed. Zhou Fangyin and Wang Wan, “Aodaliya shijiao xiade yintai zhanlue Ji Zhongguo de yingdui” (Indo-Pacific Strategy and China’s Response: From the Australian Perspective), Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), No. 1 (2018), p. 36. Zhao Minghao, “Meiguo zheng Fuyu yintai zhanlue shizhi neirong,” pp. 57–59; Peng Nian, “Jingti yintai zhanlue shixinhua” (Be Alert on the Substantiation of the Indo-Pacific Strategy), Global Times, July 30, 2018, p. 14, https://opinion​ .huanqiu​.com​/article​/9CaKrnKaScS. Hard balancing focuses on increasing a state’s relative power by internal or external efforts to cope with a threatening state; soft balancing refers to the efforts to undermine the relative power of the threatening state through diplomatic coordination and institutional constraints. Kai He and Huiyun Feng, “If Not Soft Balancing, Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and US Policy Toward China,” Security Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2008), pp. 363–395. Zhang Jiadong, “Meiguo yintai changyi jiqi DUI Zhongguo de yingxiang,” p. 23. Zhao Huasheng, “Yintai zhanlue yu da ouya: renzhi yu yingdui,” pp. 41–42. Pang Zhongying, “Zhongguo Huo keyi jiaru yintai lai yingjie he yingdui yintai tiaozhan” (Perhaps China Could Join the Indo-Pacific to Meet the Challenge from the Indo-Pacific), Huaxia Times, June 10, 2019, p. 7, http://www​.chinatimes​.net​.cn​/article​/87169​.html. Zhang Jiegen and Li Hongmei, “Aodaliya DUI yintai zhanlue de renzhi yuanyin Ji yingdui” (Australia and the Indo-Pacific Strategy: Perceptions, Causes, and Responses), Yinduyang jingjiti yanjiu (Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review), Vol. 27, No. 3 (2018), pp. 46–71. Zhang Jiadong, “Meiguo yintai changyi jiqi DUI Zhongguo de yingxiang,” p. 19. Fang Changping, “Mei Yintai gouxiang Yi qudai yatai zaipingheng?” (Is the US Indo-Pacific Strategy Replacing the Pivot to Asia?), Huaxia Times, May 2, 2018, p. 38. http://www​.chinatimes​.net​.cn​/article​/76927​.html. Zhang Jie, “Dongmeng ban yintai yuanjing” (The ASEAN Version of the IndoPacific Vision), Taipingyang xuebao (Pacific Journal), No. 6 (2019), p. 12. China and the United States are conducting two forms of institutional balancing in the Asia-Pacific. The first form is inclusive institutional balancing, which

China and the US Indo-Pacific Strategy  125

46 47 48 49 50

refers to binding each other within the Asia-Pacific institutions; the other form is China-US exclusive institutional balancing, which means keeping each other out. Huaigao Qi, “China-U.S. Institutional Balancing in the Asia-Pacific and Its Implications to China’s Foreign Policy Choices,” Asian Journal of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2019), pp. 1–19. Zhao Huasheng, “Yintai zhanlue yu da ouya: renzhi yu yingdui,” pp. 45–46. Yan Xuetong, “Jiemeng shi lengzhan siwei?” (Is the Alliance with Other Countries a Cold War Strategic Thinking?) Global Times, April 20, 2017, https://mil​.huanqiu​.com​/article​/9CaKrnK26vo. Cao Xin, “Zhong’e hui jiemeng ma?” (Will China and Russia Form an Alliance?) Financial Times Chinese, November 4, 2019, https://cn​.ft​.com​/story​ /001084981​?archive. Ibid. David Shambaugh, “The US Gives More to ASEAN than China Does,” South China Morning Post, August 7, 2018, https://www​.scmp​.com​/comment​/insight​ -opinion​/united​-states​/article​/2158490​/us​-gives​-more​-asean​-china​-does​-aseanjust.

Chapter 7

US–China Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific The Harding Way or the Harder Way Zhiqun Zhu

7.1 Introduction: From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific Is China’s rise an opportunity or a threat to other countries? This is one of the most frequently asked questions by students and observers of international politics today. The answer depends on where one stands and how one looks at China’s development. It will be naïve to think that China’s rise will be smooth sailing and only generate opportunities and benefits. Still, it will be prejudiced and disingenuous to suggest that China is evil and its rise is a threat to everybody. A more balanced view is required to fully comprehend China’s role in today’s world to leverage the opportunities associated with China’s rapid development while managing the challenges it poses. However, it is easier said than done. One of the responses from the United States is to push for the concept of “Indo-Pacific,” which may turn out to be divisive and counterproductive if it were indeed designed to counter China’s rise. The Asia-Pacific region is a major hub of global economic, commercial, military, diplomatic, strategic and cultural interactions in the 21st century. As a result, government officials and scholars worldwide have quickly switched their labels for Asia from “Asia-Pacific” to “Indo-Pacific” in recent years. The Trump administration (2017–2021) emphasised the term “IndoPacific,” and Trump himself helped popularise it during his first Asia trip in November 2017 as US president. “Indo-Pacific” as a geopolitical concept first appeared in European publications in the 1920s. For example, it was mentioned in retired German general Karl Ernst Haushofer’s Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean. However, in recent years, several countries, including the United States, Japan, Australia and India, have rekindled their interest in this concept and expanded their security cooperation. While all these members have denied any connection of their cooperation to China, there is no doubt that the rise of China has led them to balance that rise and perhaps contest the emerging new hegemon (Zhu, 2017). The “Indo-Pacific” is both a place and an idea. It is the region central to global prosperity and security. It is also a metaphor for collective action. If diplomacy fails, it will be the theatre of the first general war since 1945 (Medcalf, 2020). DOI: 10.4324/9781003342311-10

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At the core of “Indo-Pacific” is the Quad, or Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, an informal strategic forum for the United States, Japan, Australia and India. While not a formal military alliance like NATO, some see the Quad as a potential counterweight to growing Chinese influence and alleged aggression in the Asia-Pacific region (Lendon and Wang, 2021). The “Quad” was born in crisis. In December 2004, the continental shelf off the coast of Indonesia shifted two metres due to a tsunami, creating one of the largest tidal waves in modern history and a nearly unprecedented humanitarian crisis around the Indian Ocean. With millions displaced and hundreds of thousands killed, the Indo-Pacific region desperately needed help. Together, Australia, India, Japan and the United States coordinated rapid humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to people in need. The four countries held the first quadrilateral meeting at the ministerial level on the sidelines of the 2017 ASEAN Summit in Manila. Quad heads of state met for the first time virtually on March 12, 2021. The leaders were careful not to target China in their speeches or mention China in the joint statement. However, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan remarked after the Quad summit, “The four leaders did discuss the challenge posed by China, and they made clear that none of them had any allusions about China” (Business Standard, 2021). With China being identified as America’s primary strategic competitor, it is hard to imagine that a new multilateral mechanism spearheaded by the United States is not aimed at China. In a joint statement after the meeting, the Quad leaders said: “We bring diverse perspectives and are united in a shared vision for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. We strive for a region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion.” “Today, the global devastation caused by COVID-19, the threat of climate change, and security challenges facing the region summon us with renewed purpose” (Joint Statement, 2021). However, the statement appears to contain contradictory messages. To handle common threats such as climate change, China’s cooperation is indispensable. Furthermore, the group claims to be inclusive, yet it is anchored by democratic values. So, the fundamental question is: how does China fit in the group? No matter how one packages them, political or strategic alliances naturally divide nations. Many questions about “Indo-Pacific” remain unanswered. For example, do the Quad nations think they can combat the global challenges without China’s cooperation? What is the ultimate objective of the Quad? Is the concept “Indo-Pacific” stabilising or destabilising the region? Is it dividing or unifying the region? Among Asian countries, Japan has been a keen advocate for “IndoPacific” and Quad. Championed by then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Quad officials held their first meeting in 2007 as an informal strategic group after the four countries participated in the rescue efforts following the

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tsunami in Indonesia in 2004. As tensions with China grow, Japan views the Quad and “Indo-Pacific” as vital to defending its national interests. It appears Japan has not been adjusting to the changing global power structure well after China overtook it to become the second-largest economy in 2010. Japan is also eager to expand cooperation with the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing alliance, said Defense Minister Taro Kono, expressing hopes for the framework that would allow the country to obtain key classified information at an early stage (Nikkei Asia, 2020). The “Five Eyes” is an intelligence-sharing relationship between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States and the United Kingdom. Though Japan enjoys high levels of cooperation with the Five Eyes countries, the argument for Japan to formally become the “sixth eye” has strengthened in the face of China’s growing military and cyber capabilities. In recent years, the Quad countries have increased joint military exercises to address what they consider common threats to maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, a not-so-subtle reference to Chinese activities in the South China Sea and East China Sea. From the beginning, the Quad has been America-centred, with Japan and Australia closely coordinating with Washington and India being less enthusiastic. All four nations have had turbulent relations with China lately. There is no doubt that China is the main reason these countries are binding together. As Japan’s Nikkei Asia commented following the March 2021 Quad summit, the four countries agreed to cooperate in providing COVID-19 vaccines to developing countries to “counter China’s influence” (Nikkei Asia, 2021). The Quad countries have also joined hands to build a rare-earth procurement chain to counter China’s dominance in supplying these crucial elements to makers of everything from smartphones to electric vehicle batteries. However, perhaps one should not exaggerate the influence of the Quad. After all, China is the biggest trading partner of all four nations. An antagonistic relationship with China does not serve these countries’ national interests. Talmiz Ahmad, who served as Indian ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE, pointed out, “Clearly, the Quad riles China as a hostile grouping, but hardly serves the security interests of its members” (Ahmad, 2021). The grouping neither shares a strategic vision nor is it animated by a shared agenda. India’s priority security concern lies in its northern border with China, not the vast Indo-Pacific region.

7.2 Deteriorating US–China Relations All potentially explosive issues in Asia can be interpreted in the shadow of US–China competition: the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Korean Peninsula and the India-China border. The US– China strategic rivalry has heightened tensions in all these areas. Therefore, the key to a peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific is to judiciously manage the complex US–China relations.

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China’s diplomacy appears to be more confident and aggressive now. China’s “Wolf Warrior diplomacy,” which has dramatically tarnished China’s image as a peacefully rising power, has widespread support within China. Chinese diplomats think they are defensive since China is always singled out for harsh criticism by Western governments and media. The Chinese ask: why can other powers practice assertive diplomacy, not China? There seem to be double standards here (Zhu, 2020a). They also ask: has China made any new territorial claims? Who else is “militarising” the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait? Who controls more islands than China in the South China Sea? The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ambition is to turn China into a “strong, democratic, civilised, harmonious, and modern socialist country” and realise the “Chinese Dream” by the mid-21st century. Whether China will supplant the United States to become the dominant global power is far from clear. Still, China indeed aims to be the pre-eminent power in Asia and revitalise its historical status. To project itself as a responsible global power, China has developed new initiatives to expand trade and promote global development. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become a hallmark of China’s contemporary diplomacy. However, as US–China rivalry intensifies, the United States seems bent on countering China’s rapid expansion in power and influence. From the Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia to the Trump administration’s popularisation of the term “Indo-Pacific” and launching the trade war, the US government has taken active measures to address the China challenge. Though President Biden may eschew the confrontational approach favoured by his immediate predecessor, he has outlined “extreme competition” with China in the years ahead (Biden, 2021b). In fact, as a recalibrated approach, the Biden administration has been working with US allies and partners to coordinate their China strategies. The US National Defense Authorization Act for the fiscal year 2021 has budgeted US$2.2 billion to establish the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), aimed at enhancing America’s deterrence and defence posture; increasing readiness and capability in the Indo-Pacific region and deepening cooperation with allies and partners including India, Australia and Japan, amid China flexing its muscles in the region. However, the Biden administration is unlikely to change US policy towards Asia that emphasises rivalry with China. If the heated meeting in Alaska between top diplomats from the two countries in March 2021 is any indication, tensions between the United States and China are likely to stay in the next few years, heralding more challenges for the Indo-Pacific region. Most countries in Asia do not want to be forced to make the painful choice between the United States and China. Instead, they wish to maintain a strong security alliance with the United States and simultaneously keep dynamic economic ties with China. The signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in November 2020 is a

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clear sign that regional countries wish to dampen the US–China rivalry and more actively engage China constructively. Moreover, at the end of 2020, China and the EU reached a comprehensive investment agreement despite US concerns. Obviously, US allies and friends may not necessarily follow Washington’s confrontational approach towards China even if they share US concerns about the China challenge. China’s potential membership in the new Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) will be another opportunity to further integrate China into the rules-based multilateral institutions. Looking ahead, both challenges and opportunities exist with China’s rise. (See Figure 7.1 for memberships of RCEP and CPTPP.) Perhaps a modus vivendi can be developed to address external concerns about China’s rise while acknowledging China’s legitimate pursuits. The technological rivalry has become a vital dimension of the strategic relationship between the United States and China today. Huawei, the Chinese multinational telecommunications company, symbolises this new type of strategic competition. Huawei was founded by former People’s Liberation Army soldier Ren Zhengfei as a private company in 1987. It has become a global leader in 5G wireless technology, and its services and products are widely available worldwide. Huawei’s success has alarmed many in the West. The US government has labelled Huawei as a national security threat due to its suspected link to the Chinese government and its alleged role in assisting the Chinese state’s surveillance system. The US government has not only banned Huawei in the US market but also pressured US allies such as EU countries and Israel to abandon Huawei services and products. The Trump administration’s attempt to prohibit TikTok in the United States was another example of how new technologies complicate the already difficult US–China relationship. Clearly, new technologies have contributed to the growing tensions between the United States and China. Healthy competition could benefit both countries. But, unfortunately, the technological rivalry has become a destabilising factor in the US–China strategic relationship. It is unrealistic to expect the relationship to improve drastically soon. The reason is simple: there is bipartisan consensus in Washington that the United States must be tough in dealing with China. In recent years, American public opinions have turned against China too. A 2020 Gallup survey shows that only 20% of Americans surveyed viewed China favourably (Younis, 2021). No matter who is in the White House, the US government will push hard against China’s challenges. However, it is difficult to improve the bilateral relationship since fundamental problems are deeply rooted in their political systems, and the global power restructuring remains unresolved.

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Figure 7.1 Trade Groups in the Asia-Pacific Region. Source: Adapted from “The Economic Intelligence Unit”

Among the security hotspots, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea appear most dangerous. The Chinese consider Taiwan an internal matter as part of the unfinished civil war of the 1940s. Until the late 1990s, the majority of people in Taiwan still regarded themselves as Chinese. Now the majority of people in Taiwan consider themselves Taiwanese, not Chinese anymore. The United States has continued to support Taiwan’s democracy and separate identity from China by providing political, moral and military support to Taiwan. As Taiwan pursues de jure independence, China has vowed to unify with the island by force if necessary. A domestic law—The Taiwan Relations Act—obligates the United States to help Taiwan defend itself. As a result, the Taiwan Strait has become a highly explosive area, where a war between the United States and China is not inconceivable. China’s sweeping claim in the South China Sea clashes with several other claimants in Southeast Asia. In 2016 an international tribunal ruled against China’s claim based on history. The Chinese military has built artificial islands and beefed up its deployment in the region. On the other hand, the United States, who is not a claimant, has insisted that the South China Sea is international waters where the US military has the freedom to operate. Any misjudgement on either side may lead to a direct military clash. Militarisation of the region has increased the likelihood of direct military conflicts. Other areas of potential confrontation include human rights, trade and global governance. For example, the United States and China sharply disagree on the latest developments in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. While China considers these as domestic issues within China’s sovereignty, the United

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States and others accuse China of severely violating liberty and human rights.

7.3 Managing US–China Relations As US–China relations remain tense, politicians and think-tankers in Washington have a free rein now to demonise China. China’s high-tech advancement is considered a threat to US national security. Its BRI was labelled by US officials, including former Vice President Mike Pence, as a form of “debt-trap diplomacy” (Pence, 2018). Former FBI Director Christopher Wray repeatedly and publicly called China “the most significant threat” to the US and called for “a whole-of-society response by us” to the perceived Chinese threat (Wray, 2020). Mike Pompeo, on his very last day as Trump’s secretary of state, made a highly controversial statement, calling China’s policies in Xinjiang “genocide” and “crimes against humanity” (NPR, 2021). The Biden administration echoed such accusations. After taking office, Biden described China as America’s “most serious competitor” in his first foreign policy speech. In the speech delivered at the US Department of State on February 4, 2021, Biden said, We’ll confront China’s economic abuses; counter its aggressive, coercive action; to push back on China’s attack on human rights, intellectual property, and global governance. But we are ready to work with Beijing when it is in America’s interest to do so. (Biden, 2021b) In December 2021, the Biden administration announced a “diplomatic boycott” of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, which China said had poisoned the atmosphere for bilateral cooperation. It will be highly challenging for the United States to garner support from others in a new cold war against China. Leaders from key US allies and partners such as former German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong explicitly opposed forming an alliance against China (Mai, 2021; Feng, 2020). Blaming Chinese expansionism on the United States’ mistakes is not just self-centred and therefore faulty but also analytically dangerous. The United States needs a strong, competent and capable government, based on at least a limited political consensus about what kind of nation the United States wants to be. The United States must put its own house in order first. Without such rebuilding at home, any attempt at competing abroad will be futile (Westad, 2020). Broadly, there are two ways of dealing with a rival: the “Harding way”1 or the “harder way” (Zhu, 2021). The “Harding way” aims to disadvantage one’s opponent by intentionally harming them to win in a competition. This method seems to have found its way to the rivalry between the United States

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and China today. The US strategy that is intended to frustrate or contain China has plunged the US–China relationship to a historic low and is detrimental to the interests of both countries. The United States can do better by handling the China challenge in a “harder way.” Facing challenges from China’s rise, the United States has yet to develop a reasonable, fair and sustainable China policy. The United States can perhaps exploit the contradictions between the CCP’s two main aims: maintaining economic growth and conducting an expansionist foreign policy. The Trump administration’s confrontational approach towards China, including its treatment of Huawei, smacked the “Harding way” of handling competition from China. Labelling China as the largest national security threat, the Trump administration launched the whole-of-government and whole-of-society campaigns against China, attempting to block China’s advancement and suppress China diplomatically. The Biden administration continued to focus on the competitive dimension of the bilateral relationship without developing a strategy to revive bilateral cooperation. The “Harding way,” which shows no sportsmanship in competitions, is also doomed to fail in international politics. First, history shows that punitive policies against one’s adversaries have a meagre chance of success in international relations. For example, despite heavy and persistent international sanctions, North Korea has achieved nuclear state status, and decades of US embargo against Cuba have failed to transform the island nation. Second, the days are gone when the United States can inflict injuries upon China without hurting itself. China’s US$14.3 trillion economy is about 70% of America’s US$21.4 trillion now. China was able to control the pandemic within its borders and was the only major economy that grew in 2020, during which it also overtook the United States as the world’s top destination for new foreign direct investment. China’s economic power is strong enough to withstand America’s trade war. Third, few other countries have joined or will be part of the US-led coalition against China. Even the Quad, the most high-profile club wary of China in the Indo-Pacific, is trying to hide its anti-China identity. No other countries have expressed interest in joining the club. Countries from Southeast Asia to Europe have refused to be part of a new cold war against China. The “harder way” means the United States will work with other countries to engage in a smart and constructive competition with China. The United States will work harder—be smarter, become more innovative and take up the China challenge more confidently from a position of strength. In Washington, foreign policy hawks who have dominated the China discourse prefer the “Harding way.” However, isolating or constraining China will only create a resentful, revengeful and uncooperative China and push China further away from a democratic path that the West has long hoped China would pursue. The “harder way” is a better approach that serves America’s national interests. A smart and constructive engagement with China

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remains a more sustainable option and has a better chance of turning China into a more cooperative, rules-based international player. As Singaporean scholar and former diplomat Kishore Mahbubani and others have noted, most countries want good relations with both the United States and China, and they will not willingly choose the US over China (Mahbubani, 2021). The relationship of the US with China is not like that with the Soviet Union. There will be competition, but there is also deep cooperation. To the extent that there is a war of ideologies, the West’s freedom and democracy remain more attractive. The real challenge they face is not China but restoring these values at home (Wolf, 2021). Indeed, to consider China as an ideological or cultural threat to democracy demonstrates a lack of confidence among democratic states. According to a 2021 CBS poll, 54% of Americans surveyed said that “other people in America and domestic enemies” posed the “biggest threat” to American society now, and only 8% believed such threat came from “foreign countries” (Cohen, 2021). Indeed, Americans must invest in education and infrastructure to stay competitive globally. Managing rising powers has never been easy, but it does not have to end in conflict. Engaging China in a smart competition is not endorsing China’s policies and behaviours, but it can potentially influence China’s future development.

7.4 Focusing on the Big Picture: The Case of India–China Relations India, under British rule, maintained formal relations with the Republic of China (ROC). ROC President Chiang Kai-shek and his wife Madame Soong Mei-ling visited India and met with Indian leaders, including Mahatma Gandhi, in 1942. India aided China’s war against the Japanese invasion. The end of the British Raj led to the creation of two separate states in 1947—India and Pakistan. Two years later, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was formed when Chiang’s ROC government lost the Chinese Civil War and fled to Taiwan. India recognised the PRC in December 1949, and the ROC subsequently cut official ties with India. On April 1, 1950, India became the first non-communist country in Asia to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC (Zhu, 2020b). Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai paid a friendly visit to India in 1954. In the same year, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru became the first head of government from a non-communist country to visit the PRC. The two leaders became major advocates of the so-called “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” or Panchsheel. Both attended the Asian-African Conference—the Bandung Conference—in Indonesia in 1955 and promoted the “Bandung Spirit” of solidarity, friendship and cooperation. The slogan “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai” (India and China are brothers) captured

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the intimacy of the relationship between the two ancient and yet new countries in the 1950s. In 1959, the 14th Dalai Lama, after a failed uprising, escaped Tibet and found refuge in India, where he has since been in exile. The border dispute and India’s hosting of the Dalai Lama created a considerable divide in IndiaChina relations in the late 1950s. India-China disputes started in the 1950s and culminated in a bilateral war in 1962, which plunged the relationship into a deep freeze. Relations remained frosty for much of the 1970s and 1980s until Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s historic visit to China in 1988. Three years later, Chinese Premier Li Peng visited India, restoring the tradition of mutual visits at the prime ministerial level after decades of suspension. As the two largest developing nations, India and China share many interests and have significantly expanded spheres of cooperation. Notably, China and India are members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the New Development Bank, headquartered in Shanghai, China and headed by well-known Indian business executive K.V. Kamath. India was also a founding member of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), established in 2015. In addition, India and Pakistan are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the most significant international organisation promoting security and economic cooperation among Eurasian countries. In recent years, China’s commercial expansion into South Asia, especially the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as part of the BRI, has raised major concerns in India. In addition, India is also irritated by China’s continued opposition to its membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group by insisting that India is not a signatory of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). On the other hand, China is vigilant of India’s participation in the Quad. It is concerned that India may be officially joining the United States as part of Washington’s “Indo-Pacific” strategy to counter China’s rise. China is surrounded by several hotspots in its strategic rivalry with the US, including the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and the Korean peninsula. From the realist perspective, the last thing China wanted was the formation of an India-US alliance against China. Following the 2017 military standoff in the Doklam/Donglang area, which brought the two sides dangerously close to a border conflict, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping held two informal summits in Wuhan and Chennai, respectively. They highlighted the deep historical connection between the two ancient civilisations and vowed to cooperate in the rapidly changing contemporary world. Such high-level commitments suggest that India and China are willing and capable of improving relations while maintaining stability along their borders. The Indian attitude concerning China, however, has changed to some extent after the Galwan

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valley skirmishes of 2020, which saw the death of 20 Indian soldiers. India acted with an uncharacteristic rigour to Chinese excesses and banned 200 Chinese apps while imposing other economic sanctions on Chinese companies and products. However, bilateral trade, investment and people-topeople exchanges have significantly increased in the past decade. China has emerged as India’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade volume reaching US$77 billion in 2020. India is a leader in the non-aligned movement and has maintained an independent foreign policy since 1947. Unlike the United States and Japan, the Indian government has not shown much enthusiasm and has wisely taken a restrained approach towards the “Indo-Pacific” concept, mindful of China’s sensitivities. For India, such a concept is neither new nor particularly exciting since India’s “Look East” and “Act East” policies already consider themselves part of dynamic Asia. If India joins an antiChina camp as some might have hoped, India’s relations with its largest trading partner will undoubtedly deteriorate, and Asia will become more unstable. As the two largest developing nations of the world, India and China share more common interests than other big powers. Some people in India are concerned about G-2, which economist Fred Bergsten first coined, later expanded and promoted by historian Niall Ferguson and former US official and World Bank President Robert Zoellick, to refer to a world controlled and managed by the United States and China. Yet, it is a premature concept, not a reality. It is not officially endorsed by either the United States or China. It is unrealistic to expect longstanding border disputes to disappear overnight. But both India and China can think out of the box and perhaps turn the disputed areas into a de-militarised zone (DMZ) or a natural conservation zone. It is encouraging that both militaries pulled back troops from the border to avoid direct contact near Pangong Lake in early 2021. In January 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru, who later became India’s first premier, said to Paul Feng of China’s Central News Agency: “If China and India hold together, the future of Asia is assured” (Feng, 2017). Indeed, if the two Asian powers focus on their shared interests in development and promote pragmatic cooperation that benefits both countries, the future of the Indo-Pacific region will be auspicious.

7.5 Conclusion: A Rising Tide Lifts All Boats Quad nations have been careful not to be overtly anti-China. A joint statement issued after the first Quad summit in March 2021 made no mention of China—the very reason why the group supposedly exists. A joint op-ed issued by the four leaders similarly danced around the inconvenient topic

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of China, focusing instead on COVID-19, vaccines, climate change and assorted generalities such as “challenges presented by new technologies” (Chowdhury, 2021). China has become the dominant economic power in Asia and the largest destination of global foreign direct investment. It is the largest trading partner of almost every country in the Indo-Pacific, including all Quad nations. It is hard for the Quad to form a coherent and consistent policy towards China with intertwined economic interests. A truly free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific will help promote stability and prosperity in the region and serve the long-term interests of all countries. However, suppose this concept turns out to be a divisive vision for Asia; in that case, regional countries should oppose it since it will destabilise the region and add fuel to the fire in an area with several hotspots. As the two largest emerging powers, India and China must coordinate their stand on regional issues. Human security is of primary importance to humanity now and into the future. The global health crisis caused by COVID-19 illustrates how vulnerable humans are. In this rapidly changing world, global health crises, climate change and even mental health are rapidly gaining centre stage. Climate change and non-traditional security challenges pose a more severe threat to nations than anything else. All countries have a stake in addressing these challenges in this interdependent world. Therefore, the international community should focus on bringing nations together to deal with global challenges and promote human security instead of dividing them into opposing camps. China’s rapid development in the past four decades is unprecedented in world history. Lifting 750 million people out of poverty is perhaps the greatest achievement in human history. Through trade, investment and aid, China has also helped many developing countries grow. As a result, China’s image in most developing countries tends to be more positive. Though the Chinese government is not interested in exporting any ideology or policies, some developing countries even wish to copy the “China model.” A healthy competition between the United States and China serves everyone’s interests. However, treating China as the enemy and designing policies to counter China’s every move has become a significant obstacle to a normal US–China relationship. A modus vivendi must be developed to address concerns about China’s rise while acknowledging China’s legitimate pursuits. For a long time to come, China’s priority will remain domestic development to raise living standards for the 1.4 billion people. One does not have to agree with every policy of China, but it is simply counterproductive to treat China as a threat since “the China threat” may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Having weathered the COVID-19 pandemic and withstood the US-launched trade war, China has become even more confident in foreign

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policy, leading to more anxieties in the United States and several of China’s neighbours. In the final analysis, China needs to be sensitive to other countries as its power continues to grow. It should aim to be loved, not feared, by others. Meanwhile, other countries should not become paranoid about China’s rise. Competition is inevitable, but it must be fair and smart. If all parties focus on common interests, there are many opportunities for cooperation in the post-COVID world.

Note 1 Nancy Kerrigan and Tonya Harding were ice skating rivals in the early 1990s. In January 1994, Kerrigan was attacked with a 21-inch baton by someone hired by Harding’s ex-husband. Kerrigan quickly recovered and won a silver medal in the 1994 Winter Olympics. Harding finished 8th and was subsequently banned for life by the US Figure Skating Association. Out of this, one of the biggest sports scandals in history derived the term “the Harding way.”

References Ahmad, Talmiz (2021, March 10), “Quad: Strategic Opportunity or Quagmire?” The Hindu. Auslin, Michael R. (2020), Asia’s New Geopolitics: Essays on Reshaping the IndoPacific. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Bajpai, Kanti, Selina Ho, and Manjari Chatterjee Miller (eds) (2020), Routledge Handbook of China–India Relations. London and New York: Routledge. Biden, Joe, Narendra Modi, Scott Morrison and Yoshihide Suga (2021a, March 14), “Opinion: Our Four Nations are Committed to a Free, Open, Secure and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region,” The Washington Post. Biden, Joe (2021b, February 4), Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World. Washington, DC: US Department of State Headquarters, Harry S. Truman Building. https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/briefing​-room​/speeches​-remarks​ /2021​/02​/04​/remarks​-by​-president​-biden​-on​-americas​-place​-in​-the​-world/. Business Standard (2021, March 13), “Quad Leaders to Hold In-Person Summit Later this Year: US NSA Sullivan,” White House. https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​ /briefing​-room​/statements​-releases​/2021​/03​/12​/quad​-leaders​-joint​-statement​-the​ -spirit​-of​-the​-quad/. Chowdhury, Debasish Roy (2021, March 18), “Quad is Key to Biden’s Strategy in Asia, but the Four-Way Alliance is Ambiguous and Contradictory,” Time. https://time​.com​/5947674​/quad​-biden​-china/. Cohen, David (2021, January 17), “Poll: We Have Met the Enemy and It Is Us,” Politico. Feng, Da Hsuan (2017, July 16), “Meeting Ground for India, China,” The Statesman. Feng, John (2020, November 19), “Singapore Will Not Join Biden’s “Cold War– Style” Coalition against China, Says PM,” Newsweek.

US–China Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific  139 Joint Statement (2021, March 12), “The Spirit of the Quad,” The White House. https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/briefing​-room​/statements​-releases​/2021​/03​/12​/ quad​-leaders​-joint​-statement​-the​-spirit​-of​-the​-quad/. Kapur, Ashok (2019), Geopolitics and the Indo-Pacific Region. London and New York: Routledge. Lendon, Brad and Selina Wang (2021, March 9), “As China Tensions Linger, Biden Prepares for the First Summit with Key Asia-Pacific Leaders,” CNN. Mahbubani, Kishore (2021, January–March), “Biden and China: Friends or Foes?” The ALUMNUS, Issue 124, National University of Singapore. Mai, Jun, (2021, January 27), “Merkel Backs Xi on Need to Avoid New Cold War but Presses China on Human Rights, Transparency,” South China Morning Post. Medcalf, Rory (2020), Indo-Pacific Empire: China, America and the Contest for the World’s Pivotal Region. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Nikkei Asia (2021, March 10), “Quad Leaders to Agree on Vaccine Aid to Counter China Influence.” ——— (2020, August 14), “Japan Wants De Facto ‘Six Eyes’ Intelligence Status: Defense Chief Kono Expresses ‘Grave Concerns’ about China’s Maritime Activity.” Pence, Mike (2018, October 4), “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy toward China,” Washington, DC: The Hudson Institute. https://trumpwhitehouse​ . archives​ . gov​ / briefings​ - statements​ / remarks​ - vice​ -president​-pence​-administrations​-policy​-toward​-china/. “Pompeo Accused China of Genocide. Experts Say that Term is Complicated,” NPR, January 21, 2021. https://www​.npr​.org​/2021​/01​/21​/959134663​/pompeo​ -accused​-china​-of​-genocide​-experts​-say​-that​-term​-is​-complicated. Singh, Zorawar Daulet (2020), Powershift: India–China Relations in a Multipolar World. Delhi, India: Pan Macmillan Publishing India Pvt. Ltd. Turner, Oliver and Inderjeet Parmar (eds) (2020), The United States in the IndoPacific: Obama’s Legacy and the Trump Transition. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Westad, Odd Arne (2020, December 10), “The US Can’t Check China Alone: What the State Department Gets Wrong about Beijing,” Foreign Affairs. Wolf, Martin (2021, February 2), “Containing China Is Not a Feasible Option,” The Financial Times. Wray, Christopher (2020, July 7), “The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party to the Economic and National Security of the United States,” Washington, DC: The Hudson Institute. https://www​.fbi​ .gov​/news​/speeches​/the​-threat​-posed​-by​-the​-chinese​-government-​ and​-the​-chinese​ -communist​-party​-to​-the​-economic​-and​-national​-security​-of​-the​-united​-states. Younis, Mohamed (2021, March 1), “China, Russia Images in US Hit Historic Lows,” Gallup News. https://news​.gallup​.com​/poll​/331082​/china​-russia​-images​ -hit​-historic​-lows​.aspx. Zhu, Zhiqun (2017, November 23), “Is Indo-Pacific the “New” Pivot?” The National Interest. ——— (2020a, April 14), “Uneasy Dance between an Elephant and a Dragon: 70 Years of Diplomatic Relations between India and China,” ThinkChina (Singapore).

140  Zhiqun Zhu ——— (2020b, June 29), “China Is so Fixed on the US, It May Lose India,” Al Jazeera. ——— (2020c, May 15), “Interpreting China’s “Wolf Warrior” Diplomacy,” The Diplomat. ——— (2021, February 11), “Competing with China: The “Harding Way” or the “Harder Way”?” The Hill.

Chapter 8

An Indian Perspective of China’s Activities in the Indo-Pacific Gautam Bambawale

8.1 Introduction The concept of the Indo-Pacific as a natural region with geopolitical overtones came into focus when the Boxing Day tsunami struck different parts of our geography on December 26, 2004. In its aftermath, Naval ships of India, Japan, Australia and the United States discovered that they were running into each other in their efforts at humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Soon after that, then Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe delivered his famous speech at the Indian Parliament on the Confluence of the Two Seas on August 22, 2007, suggesting that Japan and India as two democratic polities needed to work together to ensure this region remained free and open and had special responsibilities towards it.1 By then, it had already become apparent that the Indo-Pacific was crisscrossed and straddled by the sea lanes of communication. Increasing an enhanced Asian prosperity and the continent’s ever-growing participation in international trade ensured that vast amounts of goods were seamlessly carried over these waters. While traditionally the United States referred to this part of the world as the Asia-Pacific, China’s ever-increasing economic and political profile and transformed ties with India since 2005 eventually led the Obama administration to rebalance or pivot towards Asia and the Indo-Pacific. The then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton used this terminology, indicating her endorsement of the Indo-Pacific concept. Moreover, the Trump administration unequivocally and repeatedly spoke of the Indo-Pacific and gave new importance and meaning to this geography. On November 10, 2017, at Da Nang, Vietnam, President Trump himself stated, I’ve had the honor of sharing our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific – a place where sovereign and independent nations, with diverse cultures and many different dreams, can all prosper side by side and thrive in freedom and peace.2

DOI: 10.4324/9781003342311-11

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Later, the Trump administration once again indicated its seriousness by renaming the US military Pacific Command as the Indo-Pacific Command. This was not merely a matter of nomenclature but indicated Washington’s utter sincerity in placing greater emphasis on this region not merely from a military perspective but also politically as well as economically. Similarly, the establishment of the Blue Dot Network by financial institutions of Japan, Australia and the United States to undertake infrastructure development in the region and beyond was a significant move.3 While it was not aimed at challenging China’s Belt and Road Initiative, it did indicate that an alternative was available not merely in terms of financing for development but more significantly in the norms which would apply to such infrastructure development. Finally, the Trump administration’s clear enunciation of China as a peer competitor and its calling out of that nation for its actions, leading eventually to the early declassification of its “US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific” of 2018 a few days before the swearing-in of President Biden,4 were all indicators of the approach of the United States towards the Indo-Pacific Region. Today, other countries and entities are placing increasing focus on the Indo-Pacific, with ASEAN having announced its Outlook in June 2019.5 France has clearly indicated that it sees itself as an Indo-Pacific player via its overseas territories and the fact that 93% of its exclusive economic zone is located in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. France also has 1.5 million French people living in this region and has 8,000 soldiers stationed there. Increasingly, France participates in freedom of navigation operations in the region. Germany and the Netherlands are some other European nations that have enunciated their policies and objectives in the Indo-Pacific. The UK’s tilt towards the Indo-Pacific can be gleaned from its policy paper “Global Britain in a Competitive Age—The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,” in which it states that this region matters not only for its security and economy but also as it has “global ambition to support open societies.”6 As nations focus on the Indo-Pacific, India’s geopolitical location draws attention and relationship with India gains precedence. With the common concern of maintaining rules-based order where China plays a disrupting role, India’s perspective of the Indo-Pacific and its view of Chinese activities in the Indo-Pacific will enable convergences at bilateral, minilateral and trilateral levels. For India, the Indo-Pacific construct is in a large arc, with many concentric arcs with India as the common centre. Herein lies India’s focus in which the South China Sea becomes critical. This chapter discusses India’s approach towards the Indo-Pacific, sketching out China’s activities in South China Seas, and states that India’s philosophy of “one world one family” and normative approach towards international relations will work towards greater good for this region.

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8.2 India’s Approach to the Indo-Pacific While the United States sees the Indo-Pacific as stretching from Hollywood to Bollywood, that is, from the west coast of the US to the west coast of India, New Delhi’s approach to the region is to visualise it as a wider arc in consonance with its own national interests from the east coast of Africa to the west coast of America.7 In keeping with this vision, India’s approach to the Indo-Pacific Region is different in small but subtle ways from that of other countries. India’s basic approach to the Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) was first spelt out in a seminal address by Prime Minister Modi to the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore in June 2018, when he clarified that the “Indo-Pacific is not a strategy or a club of limited members.”8 Neither is it directed against any country. The important key aspects of India’s Indo-Pacific approach are: (1) inclusion, (2) openness and transparency, (3) a common rules-based order for the region evolved through discussion and dialogue, (4) peace, (5) prosperity, (6) ASEAN Centrality, (7) freedom of navigation and unimpeded commerce (peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law) and (8) respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of all States. It is clear from this enunciation that India stands for a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region where all can participate in the pursuit of progress, development and prosperity. This position implies that the Indo-Pacific concept is neither directed against any one country nor aims to exclude particular geography from its ambit. All countries in the region must follow this approach for it to work. There cannot be other members who do not see things in this light and are willing, able and happy to exclude others. It is a two-way street, and all must play by these rules. Southeast Asia is obviously at the mid-point of the region, and hence the centrality of ASEAN is vital. ASEAN’s structures for cooperation, coordination and dialogue have already been constructed, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) process of annual meetings. Once again, for India, peace combined with prosperity is the critical goal for the region, and this must apply to all countries individually and to the global commons. A very basic tenet is that all countries—big and small—have an equal stake in this process and must not merely have their say but also partake of the fruits of development. There is no place here for the traditional balance of power politics, a sequential approach to growth or the concept of a hierarchy of nation-states based on relative comprehensive national power. Realpolitik must give way to enlightened self-interest. Flowing from these premises is the natural corollary that the region must be based on a common rules-based order, which itself evolves through dialogue amongst all nation-states of the region and those from outside, firmly guided by the concept of equality of states. One power, flexing its military muscle in order to have its own way, must be forsaken. Peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law is critical to this enterprise.

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Observing and respecting international covenants, laws and conventions is absolutely necessary for this approach to work smoothly. A rising power cannot attempt to flex its muscles in this region to challenge a retreating or waning power, for such approaches is the recipe for enormous power politics to play themselves in this theatre with all the attending downsides for the vast majority of nation-states which basically may not want to get drawn into this tug-of-war and be forced to take sides. This fear has been expressed openly by many leaders in Southeast Asia, most recently by Singapore PM Lee Hsien Loong in his article in Foreign Affairs where he states that both the United States and China are important to Asia but that Asian countries do not want to be forced to choose between the two. Furthermore, if either attempts to force such a choice … they will begin a course of confrontation that will last decades and put the long-heralded Asian Century in jeopardy.9 Unfortunately, it appears as if China has made decisions during the COVID19 pandemic to no longer bide its time but to show its strength to one and all. It has been very assertive on its own periphery, whether in Hong Kong or Xinjiang, but more importantly for us in its neighbourhood, whether in the South China Sea, in the Taiwan Strait, in the Senkaku Islands, which Japan claims, on its disputed border with India, and in response to demands by Australia for an impartial investigation into the origins of the novel coronavirus. China appears to be signalling that its time has come. Even as it aspires for multipolarity at the global level, it is the clear and unquestioned hegemon in what it would like to see as a unipolar Asia. China’s wolfwarrior diplomacy is in one with this approach to international relations. Enveloping the ideas and the vision of the Indo-Pacific from which it flows, India went a step further to enunciate SAGAR—Security and Growth for All in the Region10—thereby fleshing out its philosophy, approach and actions in the Indo-Pacific Region. India’s policy measures, whether with the ASEAN 10, or with the island states of Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius, or its activities with Japan, Australia and the United States as well as with France and Russia, all aim at ensuring security and growth for all countries in the Indo-Pacific Region. In turn, such an approach flows seamlessly from India’s vision of the “World is One Family” or “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam.” If the world indeed is one family, only then does the good for all become the common objective and not the philosophy of “to each his own” where individuals maximise their individual gains. This, in turn, is a philosophy based on the brotherhood of humankind. For those who always consider international politics in terms of comprehensive national power and the balance of power, such normative ideas may perhaps have no place while considering international relations. However, India’s thinking is steeped in normative terms. Good versus bad, ethical or virtuous versus evil,

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right and wrong are important to all Indians whose ethos is permeated with ideas of dharma and adharma. Hence, righteousness becomes a measure in the conduct of international relations too. As eloquently described by Dr. S. Jaishankar, India’s current External Affairs Minister, in his book The India Way, these deeply held ideas are bound to permeate India’s foreign policy goals, objectives and actions too.11 More recently, an Indo-Pacific Ocean’s Initiative (IPOI) has been proposed by India12 as an open, non-treaty-based global initiative. Identifying seven pillars (1) maritime security, (2) maritime ecology, (3) maritime resources, (4) capacity building and resource sharing, (5) disaster risk reduction and management (6) science, technology and academic cooperation and (7) trade, connectivity and maritime transport, India proposed a broad and inclusive approach to the region. Other nations are invited to participate in this cooperative and inclusive framework. Australia has chosen to lead on marine ecology, Japan on connectivity, while India has opted to lead on disaster risk reduction and maritime security. India will wait and see how others react to these cooperation possibilities in the Indo-Pacific since it will also help gauge those nations’ positions and stands on such issues.

8.3 China’s Activities in the South China Sea The disputes amongst various contesting nations in the South China Sea involve islands and reefs, banks, shoals and other features. Pushing its nine-dashed line claim, China believes that much of the South China Sea belongs to it.13 The various countries with disputes in this geography desire to retain or acquire rights to fishing stocks, crude oil and natural gas, which are potentially abundant. Since 2013, China has become much more forward-leaning in its actions and activities in the South China Sea and has resorted to artificial islandbuilding in the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands.14 In September 2015, during a visit to the United States, President Xi Jinping of China made a public commitment at the White House not to “militarise” artificial islands. This statement was taken seriously by many observers, analysts and governments even though China had already built airstrips on some of these islands. However, by the end of 2016, satellite imagery accessed by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think-tank, clearly exhibited that China had built point-defence capabilities on many of these islands, including large anti-aircraft guns and close-in weapons systems. Clearly, promises made even by the President of China have a short shelf life. In 2013, the Philippines formally initiated arbitration proceedings against China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) of UNCLOS, arguing that China’s historical claim of areas in the South China Sea as depicted by its nine-dashed line was illegal as per the UN Convention, the disputes in this geography came to a head. On July 12, 2016, a tribunal under the

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PCA published a clear and binding ruling that China’s claims to historic rights related to the nine-dashed line were unlawful. It went on to state that China’s activities “exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements.”15 The tribunal also ruled that neither the Spratly Islands nor Scarborough Shoal can support human habitation in their natural state. Hence, no nation is entitled to claim an exclusive economic zone around them. The ruling implies that the vast majority of resources in the southern part of the South China Sea belong to the coastal states there, namely the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and Vietnam. The tribunal also condemned China’s land reclamation activity in constructing artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands, stating this had caused “severe harm to the coral reef environment,” thereby also violating its obligations under UNCLOS to protect fragile ecosystems. China had neither accepted the arbitration nor participated in the proceedings, which it said had been unilaterally initiated by the Philippines. This did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. China’s Foreign Ministry reacted to the tribunal’s decision on July 12, 2016, itself stating, China “solemnly declares that the award is null and void and has no binding force. China neither accepts nor recognises it.” President Xi of China went on to add that China’s “territorial sovereignty and marine rights” in the seas would not be affected by the ruling.16 In 2012, China created Sansha City, a new administrative unit to encompass the South China Sea, covering 200 million square kilometres and 200 features.17 In April 2020, China further expanded its claims over the South China Sea by approving two new administrative districts or divisions under Sansha City named Xisha and Nansha, which are the Chinese names for the Spratlys and Paracels. Simultaneously, China’s Civil Affairs and Natural Resources Ministries formally released the names of 80 geographical features, many of which are underwater at high tide. Some scholars refer to these small steps that China takes in the South China Sea as “salami slicing” implying a slow accumulation of small and stealthy actions, none of which justify a significant tactical escalation by other countries but that over time add up to a major strategic shift.18 Each passing year with greater volume, China has also increasingly objected to the freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) undertaken by the US Navy in the South China Sea. In December 2020, China announced that its southern theatre command had “expelled” the USS John S. McCain, a US Navy destroyer “after it trespassed into China’s territorial waters off Nansha Islands in the South China Sea.”19 Increasingly, UK, France and Australian naval vessels have joined the US Navy on such FONOPS in the South China Sea to establish that these are not Chinese territorial waters but open seas. As far back as July 2011, the Indian naval vessel INS Airawat on a friendly visit to Vietnam had been contacted on open radio when it was at a distance

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of 45 nautical miles from the coast of Vietnam by a caller identifying himself as the Chinese Navy stating that it was entering Chinese waters. No ship or aircraft was visible from INS Airawat, which proceeded on her onward journey as scheduled. It is quite apparent that China is strengthening its maritime claims and control around features in the South China Sea through these slow but steady steps and actions. Its increased EEZ encroachments, enhanced presence around features occupied/administered by other states and attempts to exclude the US and other warships from the region aim to consolidate its territorial claims. All this continues despite a clear verdict by the tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Philippines case that China’s so-called historic rights in the South China Sea do not stand the scrutiny of international law, particularly the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea. China has attempted to engage the ASEAN states in discussions first on a declaration of conduct and later on a code of conduct of parties in the South China Sea. The Declaration was negotiated and signed on November 4, 2002, which, while reaffirming the freedom of navigation and overflight as provided for by universally recognised principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, still attempts to bind the countries to the resolution of disputes through consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned. Building greater trust and confidence amongst the parties through cooperative activities also characterises the Declaration. In other words, there is a strong emphasis on resolving disputes in the South China Sea through discussions amongst the parties concerned rather than relying on institutions established by broader international law and a rules-based system. Nations that are not a party to the disputes are obviously meant to stay out of resolution discussions and negotiations. Negotiations on a Code of Conduct that aims to implement the Declaration have meandered on for almost two decades with no success. This appears to suit China beautifully as it continues with its steady actions in the South China Sea, aiming to realise its claim to almost all of that water body. The other claimants are reacting all the time to Chinese overtures and attempts to change the status quo. To us in India, this sounds familiar as it reflects China’s actions on our disputed border, where it constantly attempts to change the status quo on the ground about the Line of Actual Control. Furthermore, the asymmetry between China on the one hand and the smaller, less powerful ASEAN nation-states on the other is such that if other, larger powers are kept out of the equation, then China stands to benefit. Although the Code of Conduct is now to be finalised by the end of 2021, this appears unlikely to be realised. Since December 2008, the PLA Navy (PLAN) has been conducting antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden (GoA) and off the Horn of Africa (HoA) as part of a larger international task force. These operations enabled

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the PLAN to test its strength and gain invaluable experience operating far from its own shores. It also did not raise any eyebrows in other countries as there was a crying need for it at that time, and it was an international operation. China has also continued these operations, including the provision of escort task forces (ETFs), although the piracy threat has faded. Moreover, since February 2016, China has started to build a naval base in Djibouti. It seems evident that the objectives of the anti-piracy operations of the PLAN have evolved from protecting Chinese shipping interests to a strategic forward deployment that ensures the presence and rise of Chinese sea power in the Indian Ocean. Sometimes the ships deployed to the Gulf of Aden by the PLAN have refuelled in Sri Lanka. Significantly, China has also commenced deploying its submarines in the Indian Ocean, not as part of the anti-piracy operations, but on their own. This rising Chinese sea power has led some analysts to predict that India and China would perhaps have clashing interests in the Indian Ocean, which in turn would further fuel competition and rivalry between the two Asian powers.

8.4 How India Views Chinese Activities in the Indo-Pacific Passing mention has been made to the INS Airawat incident off the coast of Vietnam in July 2011. When the incident became public knowledge at the end of August 2011, the Ministry of External Affairs of India stated India’s general approach to this issue by saying, “India supports freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of passage in accordance with accepted principles of international law. These principles should be respected by all.”20 In January 2015, the then US President Obama visited India and the two countries issued, among other documents, a US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region. The critical parts of this document that contain both the signatory nations’ views state “Regional prosperity depend on security.” “We affirm the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea.” Further, “We call on all parties to … pursue resolution of territorial and maritime disputes through all peaceful as per the universally recognised principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”21 On July 12, 2016, after the international tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration of UNCLOS gave its ruling in the case brought before it by the Philippines, the Government of India reacted with the following statement: India has noted the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the matter concerning the Republic of the Philippines

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and the People’s Republic of China. India supports freedom of navigation and overflight and unimpeded commerce, based on the principles of international law, as reflected notably in the UNCLOS. Sea lanes of communication passing through the South China Sea are critical for peace, stability, prosperity and development. India urges all parties to show the utmost respect for the UNCLOS, which establishes the international legal order of the seas and oceans.22 Let us also take a closer look at Prime Minister Modi’s seminal speech at the Shangri La Dialogue in 2018 for pointers on India’s position on Chinese actions and activities in the Indo-Pacific Region. Modi had said, our common prosperity and security require us to evolve, through dialogue, a common rules-based order for the region. Moreover, it must apply equally to all individually as well as to the global commons. Such an order must believe in sovereignty and territorial integrity, and equality of all nations, irrespective of size and strength. These rules and norms should be based on the consent of all, not on the power of the few. This must be based on faith in dialogue and not dependence on force. It also means that when nations make international commitments, they must uphold them. Modi had gone on to say, Asia of rivalry will hold us all back. Asia of cooperation will shape this century. So, each nation must ask itself: Are its choices building a more united world or forcing new divisions? It is a responsibility that both existing and rising powers have.23 It can be seen from all of the above that India stands entirely for a rules-based world order, where all nations are not merely involved in the rule-making process, and their views and voices are heard in this dialogue process but also where all nations—big and small—abide by these rules. Hence, India does not see in good light Chinese actions in the Indo-Pacific theatre, particularly the South China Sea, where it attempts to unilaterally change the status quo through small actions that have large strategic implications when combined together. Moreover, China has blatantly violated and not adhered to its promises not to “militarise” newly reclaimed islands, shoals and other physical features. It has also done the same with the international arbitration tribunal’s ruling under UNCLOS. Furthermore, responsibility for such divisive situations rests not merely with existing powers but with rising powers too. Therefore, attempts to “divide and rule” vis-à-vis ASEAN is frowned upon. Recently, and earlier too, India itself has experienced similar Chinese action and behaviour on its disputed border with its northern neighbour,

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particularly in the Ladakh region since summer 2020, where there had been a standoff between troops of the two sides for ten months. On our border, too, China has attempted, like in the South China Sea, to change the status quo on the ground through small but cumulative actions, each of which is not aimed at alarming but which, taken together, have a serious significance. Hence, for India, it is a question of taking a stand and position that applies equally to its border areas with China and the South China Sea or the Senkaku Islands. In China’s actions around the globe, India clearly sees its desire to compete with the United States to bring about multipolar world order, but on the Asian stage, China believes it no longer needs to either hide its strength or bide its time but instead that it is and should be recognised as the number one power. In other words, China thinks that the 21st century is not an Asian Century but instead is a Chinese Century. Therefore, all nations, within the region and outside, must acknowledge China as the hegemon in Asia and understand their place in the pecking order. India does not accept this proposition, nor do many other Asian states like Japan. Smaller nations, particularly in South East Asia, fear the consequences of a unipolar Asia.

8.5 Conclusion India’s approach to Asia and the Indo-Pacific stems from its situation, interests and domestic philosophy. Norms have played a significant role in Indian life—at the individual level, at the family level, at the clan or village level and at the national level. Correctly understanding and differentiating right from wrong, good from evil, is of fundamental importance. Dharma and adharma are basic to Indian thinking and have been internalised over the centuries of our civilisation. This also permeates India’s international thinking both in approach and in practice. India has continued and will continue to bring to the table a normative approach to the conduct of international relations. Of course, we shall pursue our national interests and take all necessary steps to achieve those goals. However, we shall also distinguish between good and evil, right from wrong. Stemming from such philosophical approaches, India believes in Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam—the world is one family. India does not follow a balance of power hypothesis. We do not believe that big fish should eat smaller fish. Instead, we feel that the tide should raise all ships together. So, when one believes that humankind is interrelated, then it can be concluded that a rules-based order arrived at through consultation, discussion and negotiation with all is the ideal form of international relations. A collective approach maximises global good and welfare rather than an overtly individualistic one. The importance of the Indo-Pacific Region is immense for us in India, and as our External Affairs Minister, Dr S. Jaishankar, stated recently, “even as

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our footprint is increasing, our responsibilities are also growing.” At one level, there are different versions of the region—either free or authoritarian—at another level, there is a need to harmonise the individual interests of states with their collective benefit “in ensuring that the global commons are better secured.”24 Given India’s basic philosophy in international relations that the World is One Family, India will unswervingly pursue policies that result in the greatest benefit to all. As has been argued so ably by Minister Jaishankar, such a normative approach that distinguishes right from wrong, good from evil, is an important aspect of the “India Way” of conducting foreign policy, including in the Indo-Pacific Region.

Notes 1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, www​.mofa​.go​.jp, “Confluence of the Two Seas” Speech by H.E. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India on August 22, 2007. The speech was highly appreciated by the Indian audience and accelerated the transformation of Indo-Japan ties. 2 The White House, www​.whitehouse​.gov Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO Summit, Da Nang, Vietnam on November 10, 2017 3 U.S. Department of State, www​.state​.gov​/b​;ue​-dot​-network It includes financial institutions of US, Japan and Australia. 4 The document can be accessed at www​.trumpwhitehouse​.archives​.gov 5 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), https://asean-org/asean-outlook-indo-pacific/, issued on June 23, 2019. 6 Global Britain in Competitive Age the Integrated Review of Security Defence Development and Foreign Policy https://assets​.publishing​.service​.gov​.uk​/government​/uploads​/system​/uploads​/attachment​_data​/file​/975077 7 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://mea​.gov​.in​/Speeches​ -Statements​.htm​?dtl​/33162/ Speech by Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla at London on November 3, 2020. 8 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://mea​.gov​.in​/Speeches​ -Statements​.htm​?dtl​/29943/ Speech by PM Modi at the Shangri La Dialogue, Singapore on June 1, 2018. 9 Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore, in Foreign Affairs July/August 2020 in an article entitled “The Endangered Asian Century – America, China and the Perils of Confrontation” which was accessed at https://www​.foreignaffairs​.com​/articles​/asia​/2020​-06​-04 10 Prime Minister’s Office, India, www​.pmindia​.gov​.in​/en/. PM Modi first enunciated the SAGAR doctrine while on tour to Mauritius in a speech delivered at the commissioning of Coast Ship Barracuda presented by India to Mauritius. 11 Dr S. Jaishankar, The India Way – Strategies for an Uncertain World, Harper Collins, India 2020. 12 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, www​.mea​.gov​.in​/Speeches​ -Statements​.htm​?dtl​/32171/. PM Modi’s speech at the East Asia Summit in Thailand on November 4, 2019. 13 Srijan Shukla, “What is the Nine-Dash Line? The Basis of China’s Claim to Sovereignty over the South China Sea,” The Print, July 28, 2020, accessed at www​.theprint​.in. 14 Lynn Kuok, How China’s Actions in the South China Sea Undermines the Rule of Law, Brookings, Washington, DC, November 2019.

152  Gautam Bambawale 15 Stefan Talmon, The South China Sea Arbitration: Observations on the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Chinese Journal of International Law, Volume 15, Issue 2, June 2016, Pages 309–391, https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/chinesejil​/jmw025 last accessed on May 15, 2021. 16 Tom Phillips, Oliver Holmes and Owen Bowcott, “Beijing Rejects Tribunal’s Ruling in South China Sea Case,” The Guardian, July 12, 2016. 17 Zachary Haver, Sansha and the Expansion of China’s South China Sea Administration, Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, May 12, 2020. 18 Abhijit Singh, China’s Assertive Behaviour in the South China Sea and the Implications for India, ORF, New Delhi, May 13, 2020. 19 CGTN, PLA Expels U.S. Destroyer from Territorial Waters off Xisha Islands, February 5, 2021, accessed at www​.news​.cgtn​.com. 20 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Incident Involving INS Airavat in the South China Sea, September 1, 2011, accessed at www​.mea​.gov​ .in​/media/. 21 U.S. Administration, U.S. – India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia – Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, January 25, 2015, accessed at www​.obamawhitehouse​ .archives​.gov/. 22 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Statement on Award of Arbitral Tribunal on the South China Sea under Annexure-VII of UNCLOS, July 12, 2016, accessed at www​.mea​.gov​.in. 23 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue, June 1, 2018, accessed at www​.mea​.gov​.in. 24 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, EAM’s Remarks at CII Partnership Summit 2020, www​.mea​.gov​.in.

Part 3

Unravelling the Regional Strategies



Chapter 9

ASEAN Centrality Opportunities and Challenges Dewi Fortuna Anwar

9.1 Introduction From an unpromising beginning, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has emerged as the primary determinant of regional order in Southeast Asia. Since its establishment on August 8, 1967, ASEAN has succeeded in developing mechanisms as well as regional norms and codes of conduct that promote regional cooperation and peaceful settlement of disputes. Though still far from perfect, ASEAN has transformed the formerly conflict-ridden Southeast Asia into a security community where open warfare between member states is becoming increasingly unlikely (Acharya 2014). ASEAN has also played an important role in managing Southeast Asia’s relations with extra-regional powers, ensuring the region’s strategic autonomy while acting as the main driver in developing a more comprehensive regional architecture. However, while ASEAN has much to celebrate, looking ahead, ASEAN cannot be complacent. ASEAN unity remains a challenge, and as in the past, ASEAN members can easily be pulled in different directions by competing major powers. Moreover, ASEAN’s institutional capacity remains limited, challenging its centrality in managing relations with extra-regional powers. ASEAN sets a great store on its centrality in the development of a wider regional architecture involving countries outside of the ten ASEAN member states. The ASEAN Centrality is explicitly written in the ASEAN Charter signed in Singapore on November 20, 2007 and came into effect the following year. First, under the heading of “Purposes,” Article 1, Point 15 states that one of the purposes of ASEAN is “to maintain the centrality and proactive role of ASEAN as the primary driving force in its relations and cooperation with its external partners in a regional architecture that is open, transparent and inclusive.” Secondly, Article 41 on “Conduct of External Relations,” Point 3 stipulates that “ASEAN shall be the primary driving force in regional arrangements that it initiates and maintains its centrality in regional cooperation and community building.”1 DOI: 10.4324/9781003342311-13

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The emphasis on ASEAN Centrality should not be seen as a manifestation of ASEAN’s overweening conceit or highly unrealistic ambition to lead a region with several major powers with much greater resources and capacity present. On the contrary, the ASEAN Charter simply formalises the role that ASEAN has already ably undertaken for decades as the primary convenor of regional forums and meetings, both in bilateral and multilateral settings with its Dialogue Partners. These include the various ASEAN Plus One dialogues, ASEAN Plus Three (with China, Japan and South Korea), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since 1994 and the East Asia Summit (EAS) since 2005. Nevertheless, ASEAN wants to safeguard its centrality because of its firm belief that only an ASEAN-driven regional architecture would observe the three cardinal conditions it holds dear. These are firstly maintaining Southeast Asia’s strategic autonomy, secondly ensuring an inclusive regionalism and thirdly preventing anyone’s power or a concert of powers from exerting regional hegemony. Moreover, given that in the nottoo-distant past Southeast Asia had been repeatedly used as the primary theatre of competition and conflicts among the major powers, it has become a credo for ASEAN that the subregion’s security and stability rely on ASEAN taking a proactive role in managing its relations with external powers. Notwithstanding its many shortcomings, ASEAN has undoubtedly become the focal point of intra-regional relations in Southeast Asia and a major determinant in the region’s relations with the rest of the world. For all regional organisation members, including Indonesia, ASEAN has become the cornerstone of their respective foreign policy (Anwar 1995). Moreover, ASEAN is generally recognised as the most successful regional grouping among the developing countries and the second most successful one after the European Union. As such, despite its lack of real power in terms of military capability or economic clout, ASEAN’s voice and role in regional and international fora have been quite significant.

9.2 Factors Supporting ASEAN Centrality The Asia-Pacific, now expanded to the Indo-Pacific region, is home to two super powers, the United States and China, several middle powers including Japan, India and Russia (Lowy Institute 2021) as well as a multitude of security challenges, both traditional and non-traditional. However, there is an absence of more comprehensive regional institutions, among others, because of a history of conflicts and mutual suspicions involving major powers, notably between China and the United States and between China and Japan, which makes it difficult for these countries to collaborate. At the same time, Southeast Asian countries that have suffered from long periods of western colonialism, Japanese military occupation and China’s interventions are jealous of their sovereignty and strategic autonomy and are unwilling to cede regional leadership to an external power.

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While ASEAN has fundamental weaknesses as a regional organisation of mainly developing countries with highly heterogeneous memberships and weak institutionalism, it must be acknowledged that there is no better viable alternative to ensure the development of an open, transparent, inclusive and collaborative regional architecture that would be acceptable to all of the stakeholders. As a regional organisation with limited real power capacity that does not threaten anyone, ASEAN’s desire to play a role as a primary regional convenor has received wide-ranging support from other countries, a selected few of which have become ASEAN dialogue partners and members of ASEAN-led wider regional mechanisms. In contrast, a regional architecture initiated, driven and dominated by one or more major powers and seeking to exclude other rival powers would not be acceptable or sustainable and may lead to conflicts, if not wars.2 The history of Southeast Asia that became a theatre of major power conflicts and proxy wars throughout the 20th century provided valuable lessons about this basic reality. Thus, while on the one hand ASEAN’s underlying diversity constitutes a weakness, on the other hand ASEAN’s openness and its willingness to engage with different external powers have been made possible by its sheer diversity. ASEAN’s desire to play a central role in managing intra-regional relations and relations with external powers has been supported by its wellestablished norms, values and principles. Among these is the ASEAN value, which stresses the importance of dialogues and deliberations to reach consensus, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), which calls for the settlement of disputes through peaceful means and prohibits the use or threat of force to resolve conflicts. Moreover, ASEAN has opened the TAC for accession to other countries and has made accession to the TAC as one of the preconditions for membership in the ASEAN-driven East Asia Summit. In addition, ASEAN Centrality has been made possible by the presence and support of its dialogue partners for the growing array of ASEAN-centric regional mechanisms, with the objectives of promoting regional peace, stability and prosperity through dialogues and various areas of cooperation.

9.3 ASEAN Centrality in Action: ASEAN Plus Formula When it was established on August 8, 1967 in Bangkok by the five non-communist countries in the region, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, ASEAN was primarily designed to end conflicts among the regional members and promote peace and stability within the region. The unwritten objective of the grouping was undoubtedly to contain the spread of communism through the development of each member’s national resilience and their collective regional resilience (Anwar 2000). Creating a friendly and peaceful regional environment enabled the ASEAN members to concentrate on solving their internal problems, particularly on

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developing their economies. Although ASEAN does not have any official objection to communism, until the end of the Cold War, the membership of ASEAN was restricted to non-communist countries, and the only new member admitted was Brunei, which joined the association in 1984 shortly after achieving its independence from the British. This anti-communist and development-oriented characteristic of ASEAN helps to explain both the earlier emphasis placed by ASEAN on fostering close cooperation with major industrialised countries and international development agencies on the one hand and the strong support shown by the latter towards ASEAN on the other. ASEAN established formal dialogue relations with several industrialised countries, which in the beginning mostly took the form of recipientdonor relations. The dialogue relationship, in fact, constitutes a central and indispensable part of ASEAN cooperation and contributes significantly to ASEAN’s success, for the dialogue partners not only provide the necessary funding to carry out various ASEAN projects, but of even greater importance their formal recognition of ASEAN gives the association prestige at home and abroad (Nishimura 2017). Furthermore, the annual gathering of the foreign ministers of the dialogue partners in different ASEAN capitals to attend the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) not only brings direct economic benefits to ASEAN through various cooperation projects, but it certainly adds lustre and importance to the association as a whole. The expansion of the dialogue relations in recent years shows that to become an ASEAN-Dialogue Partner is a coveted position, not least because the ASEAN-PMC also provides an opportunity for the Dialogue Partners to interact with each other. Consequently, ASEAN has also served as an interlocutor for countries that may not otherwise have relations with each other. With the end of the Cold War and the settlement of the Cambodian conflict, the ASEAN vision of one Southeast Asia came to be realised. By 1999 all ten Southeast Asian countries have become full members of ASEAN. Although the fight against communism is no longer an issue, the importance of the dialogue relationship has not diminished, for it has developed its own momentum. In fact, the breaking down of ideological barriers has made it possible for ASEAN space to expand its dialogue relationships to include The People’s Republic of China and Russia. With the United Kingdom accorded a full dialogue partner status in August 2021, ASEAN has currently developed full dialogue partnerships with 10 countries (Australia, Canada, China, Japan, New Zealand, Russian Federation, South Korea, United Kingdom, United States) plus one regional organisation, namely the European Union, and one multilateral aid agency, namely the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The first eleven dialogue partners participate in the ASEAN PostMinisterial Conference (ASEAN-PMC), the forum which brings together the foreign ministers of ASEAN and the dialogue countries every year following the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (ASEAN Secretariat).

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In addition, ASEAN also developed sectoral dialogue relationships on specific limited economic and technical issues. To date, there are four ASEAN sectoral dialogue partners, namely Norway, Pakistan, Switzerland and Turkey. In addition, there are the so-called “development partners,” which currently comprise four countries, namely Chile, France, Germany and Italy. The association has also developed cooperation with other organisations such as the Andean Group, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic and Social Commissions for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (ASEAN Secretariat). There are at least four rationales for ASEAN dialogue partner relations (Hamzah 1992, pp. 69–72). These are: (1) to provide technical and development assistance for common ASEAN projects; (2) to obtain trade and economic concessions through ASEAN collective lobbying for both the group as a collective and the individual members; (3) to strengthen political relations between ASEAN as a group and individual ASEAN members with the dialogue partners; (4) to boost ASEAN economic standing and enhance ASEAN status as a whole. These four rationales were especially true in ASEAN’s dialogue relations with the industrialised partners during the early years of ASEAN. However, in later years ASEAN-Dialogue Partners’ relations have become more mature and based on relative equality in which cost for common projects are shared, and concessions are given and taken by both sides. ASEAN’s dialogue relations with other developing countries further emphasise this equality and reflect ASEAN’s growing confidence and relative prosperity. ASEAN’s economic relations with its industrialised Dialogue Partners have undoubtedly played an important role in promoting the collective interests of ASEAN and the interests of individual members. The ASEAN members have utilised the dialogue relationships to demand economic concessions from the Dialogue Partners, whether on behalf of ASEAN as a whole or in support of one particular member. ASEAN has acted chiefly as a cohesive unit which considerably enhances its bargaining position vis-àvis a third party. For instance, during an aviation dispute between Australia and Singapore in 1978–79, Australia found that it had to confront all of the ASEAN members instead of just Singapore. In addition, ASEAN countries work closely to demand market access from the Dialogue Partners. Unlike the European Union, ASEAN does not have a common foreign and security policy. Despite this lack, however, ASEAN has developed wellfunctioning relations based on the ASEAN+1 formula with its dialogue partners individually, with regular meetings and covering wide-ranging issues at the regional level. The formal forum for ASEAN-Dialogue Partner relations is the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) which follows immediately after the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), which

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is represented by the Foreign Ministers of the participating countries. Thus, the ASEAN-PMC is the highest decision-making body for dialogue partnership relations. During these meetings, ASEAN has an advantage over the Dialogue Partners as the former can meet the latter on an ASEAN+1 basis and an ASEAN+ 11 basis (the current numbers of Dialogue Partners excluding the UNDP); while the latter have not really coordinated themselves as a block to face ASEAN. The benefits of the ASEAN-Dialogue Partners’ relations have clearly not been one-sided in favour of ASEAN. As mentioned at the beginning, the industrialised countries’ enthusiastic support for ASEAN was initially heavily influenced by strategic considerations, for ASEAN was regarded as an important shield against communism in Southeast Asia. At the same time, all of the original ASEAN members enjoyed relative political stability and very rapid economic growth, making the ASEAN region a very promising market and investment destination for the Dialogue Partners. ASEAN has also been one of the most successful regional organisations which plays an important role in the wider regional and international fora and whose support can prove to be useful for the various Dialogue Partners. The many benefits of becoming the Dialogue Partners of ASEAN have led to expanding membership in recent years, though ASEAN tries to keep the numbers manageable.

9.4 ASEAN Centrality in Action: Promoting Wider Regional Political and Security Cooperation The establishment of ASEAN-Dialogue Partners’ relations has spawned several other ASEAN-centric or ASEAN-related wider regional mechanisms which bring together ASEAN and the Dialogue Partners in different permutations. The first to emerge was the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the first and so far, the only supra-regional forum for holding multilateral political and security dialogues in the Asia-Pacific, now widened to include the IndoPacific region. Initially, the idea was to expand the ASEAN-PMC agenda to include discussions on regional security issues in the light of the changing regional dynamics after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the emergence of multipolarity and new threats to regional security due to the increasing fluidity and uncertainty of intraregional relations, coupled with the new opportunities presented by the breaking down of the ideological barrier that had divided the Asia-Pacific region into two antagonistic blocks, led ASEAN and the Dialogue Partners to the conclusion that regional security must be discussed at the multilateral level. When this idea was first mooted in 1993, neither China nor Russia was a Dialogue Partner. However, it was inconceivable to engage in a multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific without the participation of these two countries. Finally, it was decided to establish a separate forum

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in 1994, called the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which would include China and Russia besides ASEAN and the Dialogue Partners and North Korea, India and other South Asian countries. The primary objective of the ASEAN Regional Forum is to promote peace and stability in the wider Asia-Pacific region through cooperative security by promoting Confidence Building Measures (CBM) and Preventive Diplomacy (Emmers 2003). The ARF currently has 28 member states spanning the Indo-Pacific region, is truly inclusive and meets annually at the level of foreign ministers. The current members of the ARF are the ten ASEAN member states, the eleven ASEAN full dialogue partners, plus Mongolia, North Korea, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste. Concerns about intensifying major power rivalry, marked by the rise of China, which is seen to be challenging the status quo and the pre-eminent position of the United States, has pushed ASEAN to intensify regional dialogues on political and security issues at the highest level. The East Asia Summit (EAS), launched in December 2005, was first conceived as the continuation of the ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, South Korea). However, fear that China would come to dominate such a grouping led to the widening of the EAS memberships to include Australia, India and New Zealand and later the United States and Russia, thus broadening the geopolitical meaning of East Asia. Indonesia was among the ASEAN countries most opposed to developing an exclusive or Asian countries’ only wider regional architecture, preferring instead to engage all of the major powers to ensure the development of a “dynamic equilibrium” among the major powers (Anwar 2018). The membership of Russia in the EAS had to wait until the United States acceded to the TAC so that both countries could join at the same time, which finally took place in November 2011 in Bali, thereby completing the circle of participating powers that can counterbalance each other. There are three criteria for membership in the (EAS) set by ASEAN; namely, the country concerned must be a full dialogue partner of ASEAN, has acceded to the TAC and has significant economic relations with the ASEAN countries. The EAS meets annually at the heads of government level following the second ASEAN summit in any given year. The growing discourse about the Indo-Pacific with the emergence of various initiatives from different countries, such as the concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” put forward separately by Japan and the United States, has also galvanised ASEAN to propose its own concept that will ensure its continuing centrality. Indonesia took the lead in drafting the ASEAN’s concept, pushing for its acceptance by all ASEAN member states and mobilising the support of the dialogue partners. “The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (AOIP), adopted by ASEAN in 2019, has four key elements: a perspective of viewing the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions not as contiguous territorial spaces but as a closely integrated and interconnected region, with ASEAN playing a central and strategic role; an Indo-Pacific

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region of dialogue and cooperation instead of rivalry; an Indo-Pacific region of development and prosperity for all; and the importance of the maritime domain and perspective in the evolving regional architecture. The principles outline, among others, the importance of strengthening ASEAN Centrality, openness, transparency, inclusivity and a rules-based framework, as well as adherence to international laws. Furthermore, the ASEAN Outlook would be guided by the purposes and principles contained in the TAC. There are four broad areas of cooperation, namely maritime cooperation, connectivity, UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 2010 and economic. However, there is leverage for other possible areas of cooperation. The ASEAN Outlook is to be primarily driven by ASEAN-led mechanisms, especially the EAS and the ARF, while recognising the potential for cooperation with other regional mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions (Anwar 2019). In addition to the ASEAN-centric mechanisms mentioned above, there has also developed a proliferation of more specific or technical ASEANled initiatives, such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Plus, which was established in 2010. The ADMM-Plus brings together the defence ministers of ASEAN member states and its eight dialogue partners in the East Asia Summit (EAS), seen as a natural expansion of the ADMM that was established in 2006, focusing primarily on nontraditional security issues. In addition, the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), which held its first inaugural meeting in 2010, has also spawned the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) two years later, comprising the members of the EAS to foster regional cooperation on maritime issues (Muhibat 2017). The ASEAN regional mechanisms actively promote broader regional political and security dialogues and cooperation and stress the principles of openness and transparency. The main objective of ASEAN-led regional mechanisms on political and security is to promote cooperative security that seeks common ground between the various regional stakeholders rather than collective defence, which distinguishes friends from foes. At the same time, the inclusive nature of ASEAN-centric regional mechanisms is also intended to prevent any one power from becoming too dominant by ensuring the existence of dynamic equilibrium among the major powers within a cooperative framework.3

9.5 ASEAN Centrality in Action: Promoting Wider Regional Economic Cooperation ASEAN Centrality is also played out in the economic sphere. Significant development has been the establishment of the ASEAN Plus Three, which brings together the ten ASEAN members with China, Japan and South Korea. The ASEAN Plus Three forum has come about as the East Asian

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countries’ response to the 1997–1998 financial crisis that swept through the region and the pressures put by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the affected countries to carry out painful structural reforms. The primary aim of the ASEAN Plus Three cooperation is to prepare these countries better against future financial shocks and increase their ability to help each other in time of need. So far, the ASEAN Plus Three forums consist of two separate gatherings of ministers, namely the economic ministers and the finance ministers. The first meeting of the ASEAN Plus Three Economic Ministers took place on May 3, 2000 in Yangon. Despite the impressive list of cooperation agenda compiled by the ASEAN Plus Three Economic Ministers, the meeting of the Finance Ministers attracted the most attention because they decided to provide an alternative form of funding to supplement the existing sources of international funding. The East Asian countries’ desire to establish an Asian Monetary Fund led by Japan during the early days of the financial crisis was sharply criticised by the IMF, the United States and the European Union because of concerns that access to such an alternative fund would weaken the commitment of the crisis-hit countries to carry out painful but necessary economic reforms and financial restructuring. Therefore, while no moves have been made towards the establishment of the Asian Monetary Fund, during their second meeting on May 6, 2000 in Chiengmai, Thailand, the ASEAN Plus Three Finance Ministers decided to launch the Chiang Mai Initiative, which widens the currency swap agreement that already exists among the five original ASEAN members to all ASEAN members and expand the currency swaps and repurchase deals on a bilateral base among the 10 ASEAN countries with Japan, China and South Korea (Stubbs 2002). At the same time, there has also been a proliferation of ASEAN Plus One free trade agreements (FTA) between ASEAN and other countries or entities. To date there are the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, the ASEAN-China FTA, the ASEAN-India FTA, the ASEAN-Japan FTA, the ASEAN-South Korea FTA and the ASEAN-Hong Kong FTA. Efforts to coordinate all of these disparate FTAs have led to the agreement on establishing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnerships (RCEP) in November 2020 between the ten ASEAN member states, Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. However, India, which participated in the ASEAN-led negotiations that started in 2012, in the end, decided not to sign the RCEP agreement.

9.6 Internal Challenges to ASEAN Centrality While ASEAN sets great store by its centrality, and the ASEAN-dialogue partners have also frequently expressed formal support for ASEAN Centrality, ASEAN faces several challenges in performing its expected role

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effectively. There are at least five major internal challenges currently confronting ASEAN Centrality. First, ASEAN’s great diversity, with member states having different political systems, strategic outlooks and levels of economic development, poses a significant challenge to ASEAN cohesiveness and solidarity. The challenges of diversity have become even more acute with the expansion of ASEAN to include the three communist countries (Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) and Myanmar. Given that ASEAN makes decisions by consensus, particularly on political and security issues, decision-making has often been based on the lowest common denominators. The diversity within ASEAN has been exacerbated by the divergence of values held by the member states, particularly regarding democracy and human rights. As a result, ASEAN is in danger of being split between countries that have embraced democracy and human rights as universal values and those that have not. Second, as mentioned earlier, ASEAN is not a supranational organisation. While it has become more institutionalised over time, the ASEAN Secretariat remains relatively weak, with limited mandate and resources. The Chair of ASEAN, which rotates annually among the member states with differing capabilities, can at times lead to a less robust role in stewarding the large numbers of ASEAN regional mechanisms and over 200 meetings annually on a wide range of issues. Third, domestic crises also frequently distract various ASEAN member states by forcing them to focus inward and reducing their ability to pay attention to regional issues. Almost all ASEAN member states have suffered from various crises, such as the Asian financial crisis, which in Indonesia led to a multidimensional crisis in the late 1990s–early 2000, prolonged political instability such as happened in Myanmar and Thailand, natural disasters or pandemics. The COVID-19 pandemic that has swept throughout the world since early 2020 has also affected the ASEAN region as a whole, with Indonesia suffering from the largest numbers of people infected and dying of COVID-19, forcing all countries to focus their attention on dealing with the public health crisis and its social-economic impacts. Fourth, the role of Indonesia as the most prominent member of ASEAN and seen as a natural leader within the regional body has at times been inconsistent. Indonesia could not play a leadership role in ASEAN in the immediate post-Suharto period as Indonesia grappled with social-economic crises and its difficult transition from authoritarianism to democracy. At the same time, the outlook and priorities of different presidents also affect Jakarta’s role in ASEAN. After Indonesia’s foreign policy activism and regional leadership during the Yudhoyono presidency (2004-2014), President Joko Widodo pursued a more economically oriented foreign policy that emphasised bilateral engagements over multilateralism, triggering concerns that Indonesia was sidelining ASEAN.

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Fifth, the latest military coup in Myanmar, which took place in February 2021 and ended the country’s decade-long experiment with democracy, is a domestic crisis with wide-ranging regional implications. From the beginning, Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN has posed challenges to the regional body. Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997 while it was still ruled by a military junta that had imprisoned the civilian political leader Aung San Suu Kyi and annulled the election, which was won by the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Suu Kyi in 1988. As a result, several western countries imposed sanctions on Myanmar, which affected ASEAN relations with its western partners, particularly with the European Union, until the sanctions were lifted when Myanmar started its transition to democracy in 2011. The military’s latest refusal to recognise the result of the November 2020 election that was overwhelmingly won by the NLD, the arrest of political leaders including Aung San Suu Kyi and the military’s seizure of power have led to large-scale internal conflicts in Myanmar between pro-democracy activists supported by the armies of rebelling ethnic minorities against the military junta. The latest political crisis is clearly of major concern to ASEAN since Myanmar’s internal conflicts and humanitarian crises have regional implications, weakening ASEAN resilience as a whole. Equally important, a number of countries have again imposed sanctions against the junta, which could also affect ASEAN’s relations with a number of its dialogue partners if ASEAN were seen to be shielding the junta. Moreover, ASEAN’s standing has been tarnished in the eye of the pro-democracy supporters in Myanmar because ASEAN is seen to be accommodating the military in its search for a political solution.

9.7 External Challenges to ASEAN Centrality China’s increasing economic dominance and assertive foreign policy have increasingly challenged ASEAN’s unity and strategic autonomy. Several ASEAN countries have become economically dependent on China, making them more vulnerable to pressure not to act against China’s interests, particularly on the South China Sea issue. Disputes over the South China Sea, which is claimed in parts by Taiwan and four ASEAN countries, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, and in its entirety by China, have become more fraught amid China’s aggressive policy in asserting its claim. This fact was clearly demonstrated in the unfortunate incident in 2012 when for the first time in its history, ASEAN foreign ministers failed to issue a Joint Communique after their meeting in Phnom Penh as the host Cambodia, at the behest of China, opposed the inclusion of a passage critical of China in the draft of the Joint Communique (Bisley, 2018). At the same time, geopolitical rivalry between the United States as the incumbent superpower and China as an ascendant great power threatens to pull ASEAN members in opposite directions. China’s steady rise as a

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comprehensive power to rival the United States, and what it may portent for the international order in general and for regional security in particular, has preoccupied the attention of both scholars and policymakers in the past decade. Debates about the possible trajectory of US-China relations, whether these two superpowers will be able to develop a working relationship with each other or whether their interests will inevitably collide, particularly in the East Asian region, have fed both hopes and anxieties. Graham T. Allison (2017), in his book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap, describes that out of 16 cases of rising powers challenging the established powers throughout history, 12 had resulted in wars, and thus cautions that a violent clash between China and the United States is a distinct possibility unless both sides take the necessary steps to avert it. In Southeast Asia, there are growing anxieties that ASEAN and its ten member states may be forced to choose between China and the United States. It was not that long ago that Southeast Asia was divided ideologically between the anti-communist and pro-communist camps. At the same time, internally, many Southeast Asian countries battled over different ideologies and external alignments that dominated the Cold War. Given the great diversity among ASEAN member states and within many of the ASEAN countries, taking a side in the current United States–China rivalry carries the very real risks of not only dividing ASEAN but also of exacerbating the internal divisions that still exist within some of the member states. Such a scenario would clearly undo much of the progress that has been achieved by individual Southeast Asian countries and weaken ASEAN’s role as a whole. In addition, the revitalisation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) comprising the United States, Japan, Australia and India aimed explicitly at constraining China’s regional hegemonic ambitions can also pose a challenge to ASEAN Centrality. While the Quad was initiated in 2007 on the sideline of an ASEAN-hosted East Asia Summit in Manila, it remained moribund until 2017 when the leaders of the four Quad countries met at another ASEAN Summit in Manila. Since then, the Quad has become more active in deterring China through closer military cooperation between the member states. While the challenging security role played by the Quad is not seen as a competition to ASEAN-led regional architecture, the hardening stance between the Quad members towards China undoubtedly makes ASEAN’s task of promoting inclusive dialogues towards cooperative security even harder.

9.8 The Limits of ASEAN Centrality ASEAN Centrality usually refers to ASEAN’s role in managing relations with external powers. Nevertheless, it is also important to look at ASEAN Centrality from the perspective of intra-ASEAN relations. Given the nature of ASEAN, its great diversity, relatively weak institutionalism

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and decision-making by consensus, particularly on political-security issues, the regional body can only make agreements based on the lowest common denominators. As a result, ASEAN’s regional mechanisms are often seen as little more than “talk shops” not suitable for dealing with more controversial or complex issues. It must also be noted that ASEAN has so far refrained from conducting ASEAN-wide multilateral military cooperation or exercises to prevent the organisation from becoming a defence alliance, preferring the bilateral or trilateral approaches instead. Within ASEAN, minilateral initiatives are also considered more practical in dealing with specific security challenges that may only involve a few countries, such as piracy in the Strait of Malacca or terrorist activities in the Sulu Sea. In the wider Indo-Pacific region, the emergence of the Quad and other beyondASEAN minilateral initiatives, including those involving some ASEAN member states with non-ASEAN regional partners, is a clear recognition of the limits of ASEAN Centrality. Furthermore, as an organisation comprising mainly developing countries, ASEAN has little capacity to deal with serious crises. During the Asian financial crisis that began in 1997, which affected several members of ASEAN, particularly Indonesia, there was not much that ASEAN as an institution could do to assist the member states. ASEAN was sidelined since it was not yet in a position to extend substantial economic assistance. At the same time, member countries put much higher priorities on their relations with the traditional donor countries such as Japan, Western Europe and the United States. Similarly, ASEAN has not been able to play a significant role during the COVID-19 pandemic, with member states relying more on their individual efforts and bilateral relations with non-ASEAN partners to assist in the supply of vaccines. Equally important, while there are several territorial disputes between ASEAN member states, so far, they have been unwilling to make use of ASEAN in resolving these disputes, despite the fact that the First Bali Concord of 1976 stipulates that a High Council can be formed to deal with intra-regional disputes. Thus, ASEAN has succeeded in defusing regional tension, but attempts to resolve certain disputes once and for all have been left to bilateral efforts or to the adjudication of the International Court of Justice in the Hague, as had been the case with the overlapping claims over Sipadan and Ligitan between Indonesia and Malaysia. These challenges continue to pose obstacles to the realisation of the ASEAN Community and ASEAN Centrality.

9.9 Conclusion Despite its many shortcomings, ASEAN has been lauded for its important role in maintaining regional harmony among its member states and increasingly for its ability to act as the primary convenor of wider regional

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engagements with major external powers, including the United States and China. While not designed to resolve conflicts, ASEAN-centric regional mechanisms have had considerable success in confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy, thus contributing to the general milieu of regional peace and stability, that can be contrasted favourably with many other conflict-prone regions where competing great powers’ interests also intrude, such as the Middle East. ASEAN’s effectiveness in carrying out its many expected functions, internal and external, is predicated upon its continuing cohesiveness and ability to engage with all powers equally. Ensuring and preserving the strategic autonomy and agency of the Southeast Asian region has been the primary objective of ASEAN since its establishment at the height of the Cold War in 1967, even when all of the five founding members belonged to the non-communist/anti-China camp. The enlargement of ASEAN to include countries that had belonged to the opposite camp during the Cold War has undoubtedly made it harder for ASEAN to reach a consensus on important strategic issues, but the doctrines, principles and objectives of ASEAN have now been codified in the ASEAN Charter that all of the member states signed in 2007 and ratified in 2008. With the development of national and regional resilience, the majority of ASEAN member states have, to a considerable extent, overcome their historical fragility and vulnerability to external subversions, and together they have been able to foster the necessary confidence and ability to engage with major external powers on more equal terms. ASEAN Centrality is derived from a combination of factors, including the perceived gaps and needs for beyond-ASEAN regional architecture, ASEAN’s role as the primary regional convenor and support from the dialogue partners. ASEAN Centrality most often refers to its driving seat-role in promoting beyond-ASEAN political-security cooperation, particularly through the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit. In addition, ASEAN multilateral mechanisms have played an important role in fostering regional dialogues and cooperation, particularly during times of tension between the major powers. ASEAN Centrality is now facing several serious internal and external challenges, including domestic crises in a number of ASEAN states, particularly Myanmar, the rise of China as a superpower and the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China. The viability of ASEAN Centrality first and foremost depends on ASEAN cohesiveness, solidarity and willingness to take collective action. However, due to ASEAN’s structural problems, ASEAN Centrality also faces clear limitations. Southeast Asian diversity is generally seen as a weakness as it affects ASEAN’s unity and ability to reach a consensus on sensitive issues. However, as noted by Reid (1993), Southeast Asia’s strategic location along the maritime trade route between the Chinese empire and Japan to the North and the many great empires to the West, as well as its production of

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rare spices and woods that were in high demand throughout the rest of the civilised world, had made Southeast Asia a hub of early globalisation since ancient times, with the period between 1450 AD and 1680 AD marked as the region’s age of commerce. As a result, Southeast Asian merchants, rulers, cities and states had a central part in the trade that flowed from and through their region. Hence, ASEAN’s inclusive approach to a more comprehensive regional architecture has a historical antecedent in its pre-colonial past and is strongly influenced by the peoples’ open outlook towards diverse external influences. Southeast Asia is the most diverse region in the world, for only here that one can find almost all of the great civilisations and world religions living side by side. The diversity in Southeast Asia does not only exist between countries but also within countries. Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam, different variants of Christianity are all well represented. As we ponder the challenges that ASEAN faces in ensuring its centrality in managing relations with major external powers, it is worth remembering the earlier history and best practices that had marked Southeast Asia with its openness and ability to engage as equals with all comers. To quote Reid: As Southeast Asians dramatically shape their present, they need not be inhibited by their immediate past … . An earlier period offers abundant evidence of creative responses to rapid economic change, a variety of social forms, a variety of political and intellectual possibilities. (Reid 1993, pp. 329–330)

Notes 1 ASEAN Documents and brief analyses about the various aspects of ASEAN Cooperation can be downloaded from the ASEAN Secretariat website: www​ .aseansec​.org 2 Southeast Asian countries still remember Japan’s wartime imperialist policy of establishing a Japanese-dominated “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” 3 Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa put forward the concept of “dynamic equilibrium” under the second term of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2009-2014). “Dynamic equilibrium” is regarded as more favourable than a balance of power as it emphasises greater collaboration between the different powers within the East Asia Summit.

References Acharya, A. (2014). Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia. ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. London and New York: Routledge. Allison, G.T. (2017). Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Anwar, D.F. (1995). Indonesia in ASEAN. Foreign Policy and Regionalism. Singapore: ISEAS.

170  Dewi Fortuna Anwar Anwar, D.F. (2018). Indonesia’s Vision of Regional Order in East Asia Amid US-China Rivalry. Asia Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April), pp. 57–63. Anwar, D.F. (2019). Indonesia and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. International Affairs, Vol. 96, No. I (January), pp. 110–129. Anwar, D.F. (2000). National versus Regional Resilience? An Indonesian Perspective. In da Cunha, Derek (ed) Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security. Singapore: ISEAS, pp. 81–97. Bisley, N. (2018). The South China Sea as a Symptom of Asia’s Dynamic Security Order. In Feng, Huiyun and He, Kai (eds) US-China Competition and the South China Sea Disputes. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 98–115. Emmers, R. (2003). Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF. London: RoutledgeCurzon. Hamzah, B.A. (1992). Dialogue Partners. In Sandhu, K.S., et al. (eds) The ASEAN Reader. Singapore: ISEAS, pp. 69–72. Lowy Institute (2021). Lowy Institute Asia Power Index. 2021 Edition. https:// power​.lowyinstitute​.org/ Muhibat, S.F. (2017). AMF and EAMF: An Uncertain Future? RSIS Commentary, 111–2 June. Retrieved from https://www​.rsis​.edu​.sg​/rsis​-publication​/rsis​/co17111​ -amf​-and​-eamf​-an​-uncertain​-future/#​.YRqaeNMzZN0. Nishimura, H. (2017). Snapshots on the ASEAN Story: ASEAN’s Strategic Policy Needs and Dialogue Partners’ Contribution. In Pitsuwan, S., Nishimura, H., Intal Jr, P., Chongkittavorn, K., and Maramis, L. (eds) ASEAN @50. Volume 1. The ASEAN Journey: Reflections of ASEAN Leaders and Officials. Jakarta: ERIA, pp. 315–350. Reid, A. (1993). South East Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680. Volume II: Expansion and Crisis. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Stubbs, R. (2002). ASEAN Plus Three. Emerging East Asian Regionalism? Asian Survey, Vol. XLII, No. 3 (May/June), pp. 440–455.

Chapter 10

Republic of Korea’s Indo-Pacific Approach Reluctance and Prospect Sandip Kumar Mishra

10.1 Introduction The Republic of Korea (South Korea) appears reluctant to overt partner in the Indo-Pacific strategy. The reluctance of South Korea could be attributed to an “open secret” that the strategy is meant to counterbalance China’s “assertiveness” (He and Mingjian, 2020). South Korea agrees with the stated objectives of the Indo-Pacific strategy, such as the “free, open, inclusive and transparent” Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, it is ready to contribute to the process (Yeo, 2020a). However, South Korea is aware that China looks at any countries’ Indo-Pacific strategy as a strategy that is targeted against it. Therefore, South Korea does not want to annoy its largest trading partner China by formally joining the Indo-Pacific strategy. Furthermore, South Korea’s “distancing” from the Indo-Pacific is also because of the Japanese prominence in articulating the Indo-Pacific strategy (Mehta, 2019). Even though South Korea participated in the Quad-Plus talks in 2020, which were held to deal with the health and economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic, its reservation with the Indo-Pacific strategy continues. South Korea’s foreign policy has generally been over-occupied with North Korea and the great powers involved in Korean and regional politics, such as the US, China, Japan and Russia (Chun, 2012). It did not have space to give sufficient attention to other countries except economic engagements with them. However, after coming to power, South Korean President Moon Jae-in pronounced the New Southern Policy to engage with the ASEAN countries and India actively. Since 2017, South Korea has forged close cooperation with these countries not only in economic but also in security-strategic domains (Kwak, 2018). South Korea underlines that New Southern Policy is its own version of the Indo-Pacific strategy. Thus, South Korea’s approach towards the Indo-Pacific strategy is primarily to avoid being sucked into the great power politics but to try to engage with the Indo-Pacific countries through its more benign New Southern Policy. However, it must also be emphasised that even though South Korea is reluctant to be a partner in any counterbalance strategy targeted against DOI: 10.4324/9781003342311-14

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China, South Korea’s military alliance with the US means that in any final calculation, South Korea would go along with the US in any future strategic contingency in the region.

10.2 South Korea’s Reluctance towards Indo-Pacific Strategy Until now, South Korea’s approach towards the Indo-Pacific strategy appears to be of avoidance. Even though South Korea has been a treaty ally of the US for around seven decades and is closely involved with the previous articulations of regional strategy of the US, it is not comfortable with the Indo-Pacific strategy (Yoon, 2019). South Korea could avoid the idea when there were discernable changes in the US policy towards the IndoPacific region before the Trump administration. Nevertheless, when the US began to use the term Indo-Pacific strategy in its official documents, South Korea has increasingly found it difficult to avoid it. In November 2017, the US President surprised newly elected South Korean President Moon Jae-in when he proposed in a bilateral meeting that South Korea should also join the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (Indo-Pacific strategy). The initial reaction of South Korea was that the goal of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” is not inconsonant with South Korea’s foreign policy goals, and the Chief Economic Advisor of the Moon Jae-in administration flatly rejected the idea. He asserted that the idea does not promise any economic or strategic benefits to South Korea, and thus, South Korea politely rejected Trump’s proposal. Moon Jae-in reportedly has said in the Korean media that “it is difficult to understand the purpose of the Indo-Pacific strategy” (Roh and Lee, 2017). The Special Advisor to South Korean President for foreign affairs and national security, Moon Jung-in, raised the issue of “exclusivity” in the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy, making it difficult for South Korea to be part of it (Kim, 2019). South Korea feels that the contests between the US and China through the Indo-Pacific strategy and Belt and Road Initiative would become the next great game in the region. It would only have problematic consequences for South Korea, whose interests align with the countries and the region’s stability (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea, 2019b). Gradually, indirect and direct pressures of the US along with changing geopolitics of the region made it more difficult for South Korea to sustain its avoidance of the Indo-Pacific strategy. Australia approached South Korea, and in a summit meeting with the Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott in 2017, South Korea agreed to be Australia’s “key partner” in the IndoPacific era and also underlined that both the countries had maintained a semi-alliance for years (Government of Republic of Korea, 2017). After several pulls and pushes on June 30, 2019, Moon Jae-in expressed that South Korea would cooperate with the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy. However, the

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South Korean stance has not been forthcoming on the Indo-Pacific strategy in general. South Korea, on several occasions, kept stating that the country did not have any formal position on the Indo-Pacific strategy. In the subsequent South Korean official positions, it was pretty clear that South Korea was reluctant to be part of the formal articulation of the Indo-Pacific strategy.

10.3 South Korea Keen to an Alternate—New Southern Policy South Korea tries to avoid being part of the Indo-Pacific articulation by bringing in its New Southern Policy for the region and expressing that there is a convergence between the two. Hence, South Korea could be allowed to focus on its New Southern Policy exclusively. The New Southern Policy is part of Moon Jae-in’s Northeast Asia Plus Responsibility Community Initiative (NAPRCI) which he started at the beginning of his term (Kim, 2017). The initiative aimed to resolve South Korea’s security dilemma caused by the US-China strategic rivalry in the region. It acknowledged the importance of the four major powers of the region—the US, China, Japan and Russia—along with South Korea’s special interests in its relations with North Korea. However, Moon Jae-in administration also understood the need to go beyond Northeast Asia for more political and economic opportunities, advantages and leverages towards these key countries (Zhang, 2018). The NAPRCI has three pillars: a) Platform for Peace Community (inheriting the previous administration’s Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative), b) New Southern Policy (meant for ASEAN and India) and c) New Northern Policy (meant for Russia, China and Mongolia). The New Southern Policy, in particular, is of importance as previous South Korean administrations, despite having some interests, were not able to give sufficient importance to this region. By the New Southern Policy, ASEAN and India’s relations were elevated to the level of South Korea’s relations with the four major powers in the region (Kim, 2020). It is important to note that Moon Jae-in immediately sent his special envoy to ASEAN and India and the US, China, Japan and Russia on resuming power. Interestingly, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was the fourth head of state whom Moon made the first phone call after assuming power (even ahead of Russia). South Korea has created multiple mechanisms to promote and execute its New Southern Policy, and President Moon Jae-in visited the Southeast Asian countries and India within the first two years of his term (Yeo, 2020b). South Korea argues that through its New Southern Policy, it is keen to have functional involvement on the common issues of the Indo-Pacific strategy of the US. South Korea wants to strengthen “cooperation between the New Southern Policy and Indo-Pacific strategy… rather than joining

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a monolithic form of Indo Pacific strategy” (Choi, 2019). In June 2019, during his meeting with Donald Trump, Moon Jae-in said that “under the regional cooperation principles of openness, inclusiveness and transparency, we have agreed to put forth harmonious cooperation between Korea’s New Southern Policy and the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea, 2019a). In the 2+2 meeting between the US and South Korea foreign and defence ministers in Seoul in March 2021, the joint statement mentioned that both countries are committed to strengthening the bilateral alliance to promote peace and prosperity not only on the Korean peninsula but also in the Indo-Pacific region. South Korea also argues that it has not deliberately brought in the New Southern Policy to avoid taking a stand on the Indo-Pacific strategy. The policy is part of almost a two-decade-old South Korean quest to have a coherent and active regional policy in Asia. Even though the attempts were less noticeable on the ground, the quest of South Korea to create and build its image as an active middle power was inherent in these attempts. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun stated in 2003 that as a middle power, South Korea would like to be a regional balancer between China and Japan. It would also like to be a regional hub of cooperation in the security and economy (Choi, 2009). The next President of South Korea, Lee Myung-bak, started the “New Asia Initiative” and “Green Growth” project, which were meant to reach out to regional countries through constructive agenda and seek their cooperation and, in consequence, have a more important role for South Korea in the region (Lee, 2009). The Lee Myung-bak administration’s “Global Korea” was also meant to seek South Korea’s middle power role in the region by working along with existing institutions such as ASEAN, G-20 and East Asia Summit and trying to create such institutions in future. The previous President of South Korea, Park Geun-Hye, also launched her Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) (Park, 2012). It was also related to the South Korean quest for a more prominent middle power role in the region. Thus, the New Southern Policy of Moon Jae-in government must be seen by connecting it with the quest of South Korea to become a middle power which shapes up the regional equations through its independent and constructive interventions rather than just responding and aligning one way or other to great power politics in the region. The South Korean quest, expressed through the New Southern Policy, could be seen not only in the rhetoric and high-level visits but also on the ground. On April 14, 2020, South Korea, in a special ASEAN+3 summit, underlined that it would like to utilise the ASEAN-ROK Cooperation Fund, which is of about US$110 million, to help COVID-19 in the region (Lee, Chidong, 2020). Over time, South Korea has given the highest priority to the ASEAN countries in the dispersal of its Official Developmental Assistance (ODA), and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) announced in May 2019 that it would double its official developmental

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assistance to six of the ASEAN countries by 2023 (Yonhap News Agency, 2019). In 2019, South Korea and ASEAN countries, in a commemorative summit, expressed that both of them would like to work for “global peace, security, prosperity and sustainable development” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea, 2019c).

10.4 Connects with China South Korea’s avoidance of the Indo-Pacific strategy is based on pragmatic consideration of the country’s national interests. Even though South Korea is a security ally of the US, it has significant connections with China. As China is quite hostile to the idea of the Indo-Pacific strategy, South Korea has to tread carefully. South Korea is aware that China is essential for two of its most important foreign policy goals—economic growth and dealing with North Korea. Thus, South Korea feels that it would not be prudent to join any covert strategy meant to counterbalance China. China has been the number one trading partner of South Korea since 2004, and right now, South Korea has more bilateral trade with China than the US and Japan combined (Friedan, 2019). South Korea’s economic dependence on China is quite substantial, and in 2019, almost 25% of its merchandise exports (around US$136.2 billion) were with China alone. It is more important for South Korea as the foreign exports of the country make almost 45% of its GDP. It means that almost eight per cent of the South Korean GDP is just made up of its exports to China (Ferrier, 2020). The earning of South Korea through the Chinese tourists every year is also an essential component of the South Korean tourism industry. In such a scenario, it would not be an easy decision for South Korea to decouple its economic interests from China. Seoul’s any move closer to the Indo-Pacific would be considered to have enormous consequences for its economy. It is also important to remember that South Korea joined Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as one of its founding members in March 2015 (Panda, 2015). The US was not happy with South Korea joining the AIIB, but South Korea considered that sustenance of its economic growth is closely linked with China. Even though as a security ally of the US, it would remain restrained to move closer to China in the security domain, in the economic domain, it has hardly much choice but to work with China. The US insisted that South Korea join Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), and because of provocative North Korea nuclear and missile tests, South Korea was compelled to allow installation of THAAD in the country. In July 2016, the decision to deploy THAAD missile defence batteries in South Korea was announced (The US Department of Defense, 2016). It was announced that the missile defence system was meant to deal with the threat emanating from North Korea, but China reacted very strongly. As it became evident that the THAAD could be installed in South

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Korea, China began to take retaliatory actions against many South Korean businesses, entertainment industries and tourists coming from China. A South Korean company Lotte provided land for installing the THAAD batteries, and it had to suffer specifically along with other South Korean companies in China. Lotte’s 75 department stores out of 99 in China got closed down because of the protests and other administrative and tax reasons (Yang and Jin, 2017). It was also reported that Hyundai Motors’ sales in China dropped 52% after the emergence of the THAAD issue. Even the number of Chinese tourists visiting South Korea also showed a decline of around 40%. Although the Mon Jae-in administration tried to damage control by pledging “three nos” with China in October 2017, the South Korean economy has to lose around US$25 billion (Stangarone, 2019). These “three nos” included a point that refrains South Korea to transform its security cooperation with the US and Japan into a trilateral military alliance. South Korea is also aware that for any improvement in inter-Korea relations and resolution of North Korean nuclear and missile issues, the role of China would be the most critical. This is because China has maximum leverage over North Korea, and almost 90% of North Korea’s external trade happens with China alone (Su, 2018). Thus, China is the main window for North Korea to the outside world. From 2011 to 2018, the Chinese President Xi Jinping and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un did not meet each other, and it was reported that the gap between the two countries has become quite wide (Chen, 2016). However, just before his summit meeting with South Korea and the US, Kim Jong-un visited China and apparently, both countries got reconnected. Between March 2018 and June 2019, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un met the Chinese President Xi Jinping five times, and several high-level officials of both countries visited each other (Albert, 2019). This was the phase when North Korea had denuclearisation talks with the US and inter-Korea talks with South Korea. However, prior to most of these important talks, the North Korean leader visited China and made it evident that any possibility of reaching out to North Korea, bypassing China, was impossible. From the South Korean perspective, the great power game, reflected in the US-China contests or Indo-Pacific strategy, is detrimental to Korean interests. Therefore, South Korea tries to keep its distance from the IndoPacific strategy and even other networks that China could perceive as targeted against it. For example, when in November 2019, the US, Japan and Australia launched the Blue Dot Network to advance high-quality infrastructure projects in the region, South Korea kept itself away from this network along with the Economic Prosperity Network (The US Department of State, 2019a; Lee, Haye-ah, 2020). It is pretty apparent that South Korea has accepted “duel hierarchy” in the world (Ikenberry, 2016, p. 10). In the economic domain, South Korea is not in a position to avoid China, but in the security-strategic domain,

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South Korea has to rely on its alliance with the US. In South Korea, there is an expression kyungjungAnmi (an economy with China and security with the US), which indicates the separation of South Korean reliance on the two countries. South Korea understands that any hot contest between the US and China would be problematic for the South Korean interests as it would force South Korea to take one or another side.

10.5 Japan as the Initiator of the Indo-Pacific and South Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy Another important reason for the South Korean reluctance to the idea of Indo-Pacific strategy is Japan’s role in it. Japan has been quite proactive in articulating the idea of Indo-Pacific strategy, and South Korea worries that this posture of Japan would enable it to be more assertive and move away from its peace posture enshrined in its peace constitution. South Korea is concerned about the rise of assertive China. However, Seoul considers it equally problematic to be part of a plan that can encourage Japan to be assertive (Yonhap News Agency, 2013; Chosun Ilbo, 2013). South Korea’s historical experience and memory foretell that choosing between an assertive China and an assertive Japan means choosing between the bad and the worse. Moon Jae-in’s chief economic advisor said in 2017 that the IndoPacific strategy is a Japanese initiative to link Japan with the US, Australia and India. South Korea does not see any vital role for itself in the process (Kim, 2018). In the last few years, the bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan have deteriorated considerably. Even though both the countries signed a final and irreversible agreement to resolve the issue of comfort women in 2015 (Kim and Park, 2015), South Korea’s Moon Jae-in administration, after coming to power in 2017, decided to review it (Jung, 2017). The South Korean court also ordered Japanese businesses to compensate the South Korean individuals who suffered because of wartime forced labour. Japan considered the South Korean moves inappropriate and announced to remove South Korea from the “white-list,” which means that certain Japanese imports to South Korea have to take permission every time they want to do so. South Korea also retaliated by threatening to move out of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and removing Japan from its “white-list” (Mishra, 2019). In late 2020, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga refused to participate in an annual trilateral meeting between the top leaders of China, Japan and South Korea which was scheduled to be held in Seoul. He put the condition on South Korea that it should satisfactorily resolve wartime forced labour (The Japan Times, 2020). Even though Japan and South Korea have been security allies of the US in the region for the last seven decades, the trust level between Seoul and Tokyo has been low. With the increased contests between the two countries

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over colonial history, comfort women issue, wartime forced labour issue and territorial disputes such as Dokdo/Takeshima islands, both countries have constantly competed with each other. South Korea sees renewed Japan’s “assertiveness” over all these issues in the last two decades in the context of Japan’s quest to become a “normal power” (Pongsudhirak, 2020). From the South Korean perspective, the rise of aggressive leaders such as Shinzo Abe in Japanese politics reminds them of the imperial and militaristic Japan of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Thus, it is not a welcome prospect for South Korea (Kwon and Benham, 2016). While looking at the Indo-Pacific strategy, South Korea thinks that the rise of China is an important matter of concern. Still, in the process of dealing with rising China, if Japan again gets aggressive and assertive, it would be equally, if not more, problematic for South Korean interests. South Korea feels that in the Indo-Pacific strategy, Japan appears to have considerable space to raise its strategic stature, and it may result in Japan’s unapologetic stand in the regional contests. South Korea may also cite the recently concluded first summit meet of the Quad countries, which mentioned the abduction issues between Japan and North Korea at par with North Korea’s denuclearisation. From South Korea’s vantage point, it shows Japan’s influence in shaping up the Indo-Pacific agenda, and it would be difficult for South Korea to agree with it (Mishra, 2021). Thus, South Korea prefers to move forward in regional politics through its New Southern Policy. South Korea feels that it would ensure at least two benefits if it moves through its New Southern Policy in the region. First, it would mean that South Korea would be able to maintain the autonomy of its foreign policy (Choe, 2021), which also means that it may not have to necessarily agree with the US support to Japan and its role in regional politics. Second, South Korea would continue its middle power diplomacy more independently (Howe and Park, 2019). Both the issues are significant for South Korea in the changing regional equations. In recent years, South Korea faced lots of unpleasant experiences in its relations with the US, such as Trump’s forced revision of their bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA), US’ unreasonable demands to share more financial burden for the US soldiers stationed in South Korea and US’ demand to purchase more defence equipment from the US (Terry, 2020). It is expected that many frictions between the US and South Korea would be mitigated during the Biden administration. However, South Korea has realised that to be prepared for any unpredictable leadership in the US; it has to diversify its relations and assume relative autonomy in its foreign policy decision-making. South Korea has also seen deterioration in its relations with Japan and the emergence of a considerable gap in both countries’ foreign policies. South Korea may expect a new beginning with Japan in the Fumio Kishida era, but it would be careful to keep its options open. South Korea also aspires to be an active player in regional politics through its middle power diplomacy. South

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Korea feels that it has economic, technological and cultural capabilities to assume such a role. Through its New Southern Policy, it can use its capabilities to increase its space in regional politics. Even after consistent pressure from the US to openly endorse the IndoPacific strategy, so far, South Korea has been reluctant to embrace it. In 2018, during the Third ROK-US Senior Economic Dialogue, South Korea agreed on a joint statement that said that both the countries would “work more closely together in implementing the New Southern Policy and the Indo-Pacific strategy” (Yeo, 2020a). In November 2019, a US report on the Free and Open Indo-Pacific acknowledged South Korea’s New Southern Policy and considered it part of the Indo-Pacific strategy (The US Department of State, 2019b). South Korea has also released a factsheet with the US (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, 2019). Three central pillars of the New Southern Policy—people, peace and prosperity—are linked to the critical elements of the US Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. Therefore, South Korea’s overtures through its New Southern Policy are not considered contrary to the Indo-Pacific strategy (Lee, Jaehyon, 2020).

10.6 Lack of Clarity and Consistency about the Indo-Pacific Concept Even though there are few common expressed objectives of the Indo-pacific strategy, such as a rule-based order, economic prosperity and greater connectivity across the regions, the term has a different meaning for different countries, and it keeps changing with time. Among the four major countries considered to be the initial proponents and the lynchpin of the Indo-Pacific strategy, Japan and Australia seem to be more directly posing their version Indo-Pacific strategy against China. Under the Trump administration, the US moved closer to the Japanese and Australian positions. However, India remained the most reluctant partner of the Indo-Pacific strategy (Lalwani, 2019). India kept insisting on “inclusiveness” which meant that India would like to make the articulation a normative one in which participation of the maximum number of regional countries is possible. It means more space for Southeast Asian countries and even China if it agrees to work as per the normative standard. Actually, in the last few years, there has been a progressive attempt to reach out to Southeast Asian countries because of the above reason. In the last few years, there have been two legs of the Indo-Pacific strategy. First, a multilateral involvement of maximum countries and second, concretising the Quad through regular ministerial meetings. So far, there have been three ministerial meetings of the Quad. Another important feature of the Indo-Pacific strategy has been the oscillating intents and actions of the four major participants in the articulation. For example, Japan, which began with being the most ardent proponent of

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the Indo-Pacific strategy, has not been using the word “strategy” in the last few years and now uses “Indo-Pacific vision” (Koga, 2019). Contrary to Japan, India, a “reluctant partner,” has become more active after its military face-off with China on its border since the mid-2020. In addition, domestic politics and leadership changes of Quad member countries have affected the Quad countries’ intent and participation in the Indo-Pacific strategy. It has been argued that the newly elected President of the US, Joe Biden, may have slightly changed the US position on the Indo-Pacific strategy. After coming to power, Biden has avoided using the word Indo-Pacific “strategy,” and instead, he talks more about Indo-Pacific “region” (Strangio, 2020). One can conclude that the attempt to coordinate among the four major countries’ position on the Indo-Pacific strategy has not been sufficient. The nature and course of the Indo-Pacific strategy have been closely linked with the Chinese intent and behaviour in the region. The more assertive and active China becomes more traction for the Indo-Pacific strategy in the regional countries (Huang, 2020). Thus, it is a strategy in making, and rather than comprehending it as a fixed or defined strategy, it must be seen as an evolving strategy that had a non-linear course in the past, and it would remain so in the future. South Korea’s prudent policy of “wait and watch” and “careful balancing” (Yoon, 2021) appears to be a reasonable choice in the above context. South Korea does not want to commit to a strategy that is still in the making, and leading proponents of it keep changing/modifying their positions, which has a definite negative impact on South Korean economic growth and dealing with North Korea. In March 2021, when South Korea had a 2 plus 2 meeting with the US, it was pretty clear that the US was trying to carefully observe nuanced differences in South Korea’s approach towards the Indo-Pacific compared to Japan and India. South Korea appears to be more focused to pursue its New Southern Policy and repairing its alliance with the US. It would let the Indo-Pacific strategy move forward, take a more precise shape and orientation and decide about it afterwards.

10.7 South Korea’s Structural Location and Indo-Pacific Notwithstanding the reluctance of South Korea with the Indo-Pacific strategy, it is important to underline that South Korea is a security ally of the US. The security alliance between the two countries has been long and robust and survived a few rough phases. It appears to remain the same in the foreseeable future. In any contingency in the future, if the US stubbornly demands South Korea’s participation in the Indo-Pacific strategy, South Korea has little choice but to ultimately join the initiative (Park, 2019). Until the IndoPacific strategy is relatively fluid or the US–China rivalry does not cross the critical line, South Korea has space to prioritise its New Southern Policy over the Indo-Pacific strategy. However, in case of any urgency, South Korea could be structurally counted as part of the Indo-Pacific strategy, and the

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country has no real choice but to participate in the articulation. However, it is also understood that if South Korea grows its regional defence cooperation, it would be helpful for the US interests in the Indo-Pacific. South Korea exports arms to some South Korean partner countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines. It limits the spread of Russia and Chinese influence in the region, and results go along with the US interests in regional politics (Harold, 2019, p. 108). South Korea also has multilateral exercises with the Rim of The Pacific, which are also indirectly helpful to US interests. Actually, even though South Korea and the US have been apparently working separately in the ASEAN region, South Korea has been a “value multiplier” for the US in the Indo-Pacific region (Ferrier, 2020, p. 101). It is also pertinent to emphasise that South Korea does not reject or oppose the Indo-Pacific strategy. As mentioned earlier, there are multiple versions of the Indo-Pacific strategy, and South Korea might feel comfortable or agree with a few of them. When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi articulated a “free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific” formulation, South Korea appeared to be quite close to such formulation. As India sought to prioritise its Act East Policy to reach out to regional countries and be an actor in benign Indo-Pacific strategy, South Korea too would prefer to connect its New Southern Policy with the Indo-Pacific Strategy (Mishra, 2018). Furthermore, South Korea is also in agreement with the stated goals of the Indo-Pacific strategy, such as making the region “free, open and inclusive.” The only limitation is that because of its national interests and its relationships with China and Japan, officially, South Korea would try to avoid or delay its formal joining to the Indo-Pacific strategy. South Korea is an export-led economy, and its external dependence on energy is quite substantial. In this context, South Korea would like to have stable maritime trade and exchanges, and the stated objective of the Indo-Pacific strategy seeks to achieve such goals. South Korea has also been unhappy with the unilateral announcement of China’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea in 2013. Part of the Chinese ADIZ overlaps with the South Korean ADIZ (Kim and Cha, 2016). South Korea also got adversely affected by China’s “overreaction” when the THAAD batteries were installed in South Korea.

10.8  COVID-19 Pandemic, Biden Administration and South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Approach China is being accused of being complacent in dealing with the COVID-19, which became a pandemic. Also, amidst the pandemic, China got involved in a border face-off with India, passed Hong Kong Security law and increased its South China and the East China Sea activities. It led to growing antiChina feelings across the region. However, South Korea’s exchanges with China in health and economic activities have been quite remarkable during

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the pandemic period (CGTN, 2021). At the pandemic’s peak, in early May 2020, South Korea became the first country to arrange special visa protocols for health workers, government officials and people in the business of both countries to visit each other (Xinhua, 2020). It might not be good news for the Indo-Pacific strategy that when one of the reluctant partners of the Quad—India—appears more overt and determined in its Indo-Pacific strategy, Japan and South Korea appeared to be relatively cosy with China in their economic exchanges. Even though South Korea participated in a Quad-Plus meeting, it was primarily meant to discuss the health and economic repercussions of the pandemic and how to deal with it. In the first telephonic talks between the new President-elect of the US Joe Biden and South Korean President Moon Jae-in, Biden reiterated that South Korea is the “lynchpin of the security and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region” (The US Department of State, 2021). However, such a statement is neither new nor of much consequence. In November 2020, South Korea also refurbished its New Southern Policy as New Southern Policy Plus by emphasising in-depth cooperation with the targeted countries and underlining ASEAN centrality, but its reluctance with the open endorsement of the Indo-Pacific strategy remained elusive (Do, 2020). It seems that South Korea is closer to the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) (Choi, 2020), which was adopted during the 34th ASEAN summit in Bangkok in 2019. It emphasised that the ASEAN would remain central in any formulation for the IndoPacific, and it would try to minimise great power frictions in the region. For the same reason, South Korea prefers to approach the Indo-Pacific region first through its New Southern Policy in which ASEAN has the central position, then through its alliance with the US. When neither option is available, it approaches it through the Indo-Pacific strategy. Currently, South Korea’s emphasis is on option one, which positions South Korea in a more independent light. COVID-19 pandemic is also expected to bring more non-traditional elements in the Indo-Pacific strategy such as health, climate change and global supply chain, which have been disrupted because of the pandemic. In such a situation, it would be less problematic for South Korea to join the IndoPacific strategy. For example, South Korea participated in a Quad Plus Meet in March 2020. The US, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, India and Vietnam also participated, and the meeting deliberated only two specific issues—health and economic implications of the pandemic. South Korean Vice Foreign Minister had several rounds of preparatory and procedural meetings with the Quad countries (Embassy of the Republic of Korea to the Republic of India, 2021). In November 2020, South Korea, along with Japan and Australia, joined Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP), in which China will be the most critical player (Korea JoongAng Daily, 2021). Despite a few objections of the US and India’s walkout from the RCEP,

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South Korea went ahead with the RCEP. It indicated that South Korea is determined to keep walking on the tightrope regarding the Indo-Pacific strategy. South Korea is aware that articulations of the Indo-Pacific strategy would still take several twists and turns, and its future is still not sure. Thus, it would be prudent for South Korea not to be one of the prime movers of such articulation and wait for more clarity to emerge. It means that the future of Indo-Pacific Strategy would determine the future of South Korea’s approach towards the Indo-Pacific strategy, and South Korea is least desperate to make its stand clear and coherent.

10.9 Conclusion In brief, South Korea’s approach towards articulating the Indo-Pacific strategy is pragmatic and prudent. The open secret of the Indo-Pacific strategy to target China makes it difficult for South Korea to join it officially. South Korea may agree with most of the stated goals of the Indo-Pacific strategy, but it would like to wait and watch the future course of the formulation of the Indo-Pacific strategy and then decide its choice. South Korea would like to continue its profitable economic exchanges with China. At the same, it is also confident that in any contingency, its security alliance with the US would be able to compensate its reluctance towards the Indo-Pacific strategy. In the future, the course of contests between China and the US would determine the future approach of South Korea towards the Indo-Pacific strategy.

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186  Sandip Kumar Mishra Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea (2019a, June 30). Opening remarks by President Moon Jae-in at the joint press conference following Korea-U.S. summit, https://english1​.president​.go​.kr​/BriefingSpeeches​/Int​erKo​rean​Relations​ /618. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea (2019b, November 2). ROK-US fact sheet, http://www​.mofa​.go​.kr​/www​/brd​/m​_4080​/down​.do​?brd​_id​=235​&seq​ =369707​&data​_tp​=A​&file​_seq​=4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea (2019c, November 26). Partnership for peace, prosperity, and people, Co-chairs’ statement of the 2019 ASEANRepublic of Korea commemorative summit, 7, file:​///C:​/User​s/Cea​s/Dow​nload​ s/FIN​AL%20​-%20C​o-Cha​irs'​%20St​​ateme​​nt​%20​​of​%20​​the​%2​​02019​​%20AS​​ EAN​-R​​OK​%20​​Comme​​morat​​ive​%2​​0Summ​​it​.pd​​f. Mishra, Sandip Kumar (2018, November 4). Third way in the Asia Pacific. The Korea Times, https://m​.koreatimes​.co​.kr​/pages​/article​.asp​?newsIdx​=258040. Mishra, Sandip Kumar (2019, August 21). Insulating cooperation from contestation: The Japan-South Korea dispute. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, http:// www​.ipcs​.org​/comm​_select​.php​?articleNo​=5613. Mishra, Sandip Kumar (2021, March 31). Unwarranted QUAD entry into North Korea’s denuclearisation. The Korea Times, https://www​.koreatimes​.co​.kr​/www​ /opinion​/2021​/04​/197​_306377​.html. Panda, Ankit (2015, March 28). South Korea joins the AIIB. The Diplomat, https:// thediplomat​.com​/2015​/03​/south​-korea​-joins​-the​-aiib/. Park, Cheol Hee (2019, March 26). South Korea is a hesitant but friendly US ally in the Indo-Pacific. Council on Foreign Relations, https://www​.cfr​.org​/blog​/south​ -korea​-hesitant​-friendly​-us​-ally​-indo​-pacific. Park, Geun-hye (2012, November 12). A plan for peace in Northeast Asia. The Wall Street Journal, http://www​.wsj​.com​/articles​/SB1​0001​4241​2788​7323​8947​0457​ 8114​3102​94100492. Pongsudhirak, Thitinan (2020, September 4). Abe legacy in Japan is a ‘normal’ nation. Bangkok Post, https://www​.bangkokpost​.com​/opinion​/opinion​/1979463​ /abe​-legacy​-is​-japan​-as​-normal​-nation. Roh, H. and Lee, S. (2017, November 9). Cheong: ‘Trump, IndotptaepyeongyangAnbodongcham Jeans … UrinSuyog An Hae’ (Blue House: Trump proposes to join Indo-Pacific Security … We do not accept). Yonhap. Stangarone, Troy (2019, October 30). Did South Korea’s three Noes matter? Not so much. The Diplomat, https://thediplomat​.com​/2019​/10​/did​-south​-koreas​-three​ -noes​-matter​-not​-so​-much/. Strangio, Sebastian (2020, November 20). Is Biden preparing to tweak the IndoPacific strategy?The Diplomat, https://thediplomat​.com​/2020​/11​/is​-biden​ -preparing​-to​-tweak​-the​-indo​-pacific​-strategy/. Su, Fei (2018, October 24). China’s potential role as security guarantor for North Korea. 38 North, https://www​.38north​.org​/2018​/10​/fsu102418/. Terry, Sue Mi (2020, July 3). Trump allows a cornerstone of the US defense strategy in Asia to wither. Foreign Affairs, https://www​.foreignaffairs​.com​/articles​/north​ -korea​/2020​-07​-03​/unraveling​-us​-south​-korean​-alliance. The Japan Times (2020, October 13). Japan tells South Korea it will skip trilateral summit over wartime labor row, https://www​.japantimes​.co​.jp​/news​/2020​/10​/13​ /national​/japan​-south​-korea​-trilateral​-summit​-wartime​-labor/.

Republic of Korea’s Indo-Pacific Approach  187 The US Department of Defense (2016, July 8). US to deploy THAAD missile battery to South Korea, https://www​.defense​.gov​/Explore​/News​/Article​/Article​/831630​/ us​-to​-deploy​-thaad​-missile​-battery​-to​-south​-korea/. The US Department of State (2019a, November 3). 2019 Indo-Pacific Business Forum showcases high-standard US investment, https://asean​.usmission​.gov​ /2019​-indo​-pacific​-business​-forum​-showcases​-high​-standard​-u​-s​-investment/. The US Department of State (2019b, November 4). A free and open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a shared vision, https://www​.state​.gov​/wp​-content​/uploads​/2019​/11​/ Free​-and​-Open​-Indo​-Pacific​-4Nov2019​.pdf. The US Department of State (2021, March 18). Secretary Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Republic of Korea President Moon Jae-in before their meeting, https://www​.state​.gov​/secretary​-antony​-j​-blinken​-secretary​ -of​-defense​-lloyd​-austin​-and​-republic​-of​-korea​-president​-moon​-jae​-in​-before​ -their​-meeting/. Xinhua (2020, May 14). China-S. Korea cooperation against Covid-19 effective, exemplary: Xi, http://www​.xinhuanet​.com​/english​/2020​-05​/14​/c​_139054494​ .htm. Yang, Heekyong and Jin, Hunjoo (2017, June 16). As missile row drags on, South Korea’s Lotte still stymied in China. Reuters, https://www​.reuters​.com​/article​/ lotte​-china​-idUSL3N1JC3BA. Yeo, Andrew (2020a, July 20). South Korea and the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy. Centre for Strategic and International Studies, https://www​.csis​.org​/ analysis​/south​-korea​-and​-free​-and​-open​-indo​-pacific​-strategy. Yeo, Andrew (2020b, July 28). South Korea’s new southern policy and ASEANROK relations. The Diplomat, https://thediplomat​.com​/2020​/07​/south​-koreas​ -new​-southern​-policy​-and​-asean​-rok​-relations/. Yonhap News Agency (2013, January 7). Worrisome Abe statement, http:// english​.yonhapnews​.co​.kr​/yhedit​/2013​/01​/07​/53​/510​0000​000a​en20​1301​0700​ 8100315f​.html. Yonhap News Agency (2019, May 17). S. Korea’s aid agency to double ODA to ASEAN countries by 2023, https://en​.yna​.co​.kr​/view​/AEN​2019​0517​009000325. Yoon, S. (2019, April 1). A free and open Indo-Pacific region: The South Korean perspective. The National Interest. Yoon, Sukjoon (2021, March 22). The South Korea-US 2+2 talks: Who came out ahead? The Diplomat, https://thediplomat​.com​/2021​/03​/the​-south​-korea​-us​-22​ -talks​-who​-came​-out​-ahead/. Zhang, Huizhi (2018). The strategic choice of ROK facing the Sino-US competition. East Asian Community Review, 1, 127–145.

Chapter 11

Geopolitical Aspects of European Union’s Approach to Indo-Pacific Juan Luis López-Aranguren

11.1 Introduction In the last 150 years, one of the most critical developments in global dynamics has been the crystallisation of the Indo-Pacific as one of the leading global epicentres. The American naval historian and strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan is credited with predicting at the end of the 19th century that “whoever dominates the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia and the fate of the world will be decided in its waters” (Brewster, 2010, p. 2). Later, the German geographer and politician Karl Haushofer (1924) predicted the arrival of what he called “the Pacific Age.” Moreover, more recently, in 2009, the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated that “one of the most drastic global changes that would take place in this century would be the shift of the centre of gravity of international relations from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean and Pacific” (Atlantic Council, 2009). Indo-Pacific is a maritime concept and is the confluence of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. The seas and oceans are the vectors that allow territorial powers to expand and project their strong or soft power beyond the limitations of their territories. The sea, thus, becomes the environment where the geopolitical possibilities of nations reach their limit. Ian Morris (2010) already explained it, highlighting that the reason why Europe had become a global power since the 15th century, expanding its civilisation throughout the planet, was precisely because Europe was a peninsula of peninsulas. It offered easy access to the sea for any idea, product, military force and revolution that wanted to be exported and imported. Therefore, the sea has been an accelerator of social evolution in civilisations with the strategic advantage of easy access. For this reason, the approach to the future evolution of the global dynamics from a maritime perspective rather than a land-based one may be more practical when defining possible future scenarios. Consequently, perhaps it is more appropriate to speak of an Indo-Pacific era rather than a continental Asian century since these oceans resemble a canvas where the old and new, regional and global, collectivist and DOI: 10.4324/9781003342311-15

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individualists dispute the projection of their interests, their spheres of influence and their identities until they achieve a global reach (Lopez-Aranguren, 2021). Europe has a historical and natural advantage in maritime terrains such as the Indo-Pacific. In this geopolitical dimension, this Indo-Pacific initiative started as part of Japan’s need to encourage its assertiveness in security matters, a condition that has also generated proposals to reform its intelligence services (Lopez-Aranguren, 2016), improve the intelligencesharing with South Korea (Lopez-Aranguren, 2017), adapt its legislation to its external security needs (Tirado, 2019) and face new threats like terrorism (Lopez-Aranguren, 2019) or territorial conflicts such as the escalation of frictions with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (Lopez-Aranguren, 2018). Due to this strategic and geopolitical importance, almost all the major global powers have taken a stance on the Indo-Pacific. However, European Union (EU) and major European countries were conspicuously absent from this bandwagon until recently when the EU, Germany, France and the Netherlands published their respective strategies on the Indo-Pacific. The chapter attempts to analyse the European approach to the Indo-Pacific, first from country-specific perspectives and thereafter from the perspective of the European Union. Section 11.2 seeks to summarise the reasons for the importance of the Indo-Pacific for the region. The following section analyses the Indo-Pacific strategies of France, Germany, the Netherlands and the EU before concluding the main findings of this research.

11.2 The Geopolitical Importance of the Indo-Pacific for the EU The general importance of the Indo-Pacific region for the EU does not need to be elaborated at length. The region is home to two of the three major economies of the world—China and Japan. Moreover, there is complex interdependence between the United States and the major economies of this region. Together, the United States, China and Japan represent more than 45% of world GDP. The fifth-largest economy in the world, India, is also in this club with a potential for future growth capability of multiplying its size by 2.5 times in the next decade. In addition, the geographical and demographical importance of the region is undeniable. The region encompasses five recognised nuclear powers: the United States, Russia, China, India and Pakistan. It also encompasses the rogue nuclear state of North Korea. The Indo-Pacific region, however, is vital for the EU also for very specific reasons. The EU Joint Communication on the Indo-Pacific, released in September 2021, summarises these reasons very succinctly. The European Union is the top investor, one of the largest providers of development

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cooperation and one of the top trading partners in the Indo-Pacific (EU Joint Communication on Indo-Pacific, 2021). Together, the Indo-Pacific and Europe account for over 70% of global trade in goods and services and account for foreign direct investment flows of over 60%. Moreover, four out of ten of the EU’s biggest trade partners lie in the region (ibid). As per the EU strategy, the region is also crucial to the EU because of the concentration of strategic maritime chokepoints here, which are vital for EU trade. These include the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, and the Malacca Strait in the South China Sea. The increasing Chinese aggression in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea poses a major danger to these chokepoints and to the waters of the region in general. The EU Joint communication also refers to the Chinese military buildup in the region, with Chinese military spending increasing from 20% to 28% of the global expenditure from 2009 to 2019. The EU strategy mentions explicitly that the security contingencies in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait may directly impact European security (EU Joint Communication on Indo-Pacific Strategy, 2021). The region’s significance for the EU also lies in the Indo-Pacific region being an important source of global environmental challenges (ibid). IndoPacific contributes one of the largest shares in global carbon dioxide emissions. The EU strategy on the Indo-Pacific states that “the region’s share in global carbon dioxide emissions has grown from 37% to 57% since 2000. The region will account for more than 70% of growth in global energy demand by 2030.” The Indo-Pacific strategy also mentions the need to uphold the principles of democracy and human rights, which are under threat in the region, as also a reason for the EU’s interest in the Indo-Pacific. In addition, ensuring transparency in trade rules and practices is also a factor that is significant for the EU.

11.3 Europe’s Geopolitical Approach to the Indo-Pacific Despite the geopolitical importance of the Indo-Pacific, the European Union, as a supranational entity, did not announce a defined strategy for the IndoPacific until April 2021. This was only an initial outline of the strategy. The EU launched a more detailed strategy on the Indo-Pacific as recently as September 2021. Apart from the EU, only three countries—France, Germany and the Netherlands—have produced official national documents to develop a strategy in this area. The rest of the members of the European Union do not have any domestic strategy to date. This is especially glaring in the cases of Spain and Italy, which are significant maritime powers. It is, however, important to mention that despite the delay in publishing an Indo-Pacific Strategy, the EU has always been interested in Asia as a region. This becomes evident in the European Union Global Strategy of 2016, which explicitly highlights the interconnection between European

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prosperity and Asian security because Europe’s trade with Asia depends on Asian stability (Luthra, 2021). Moreover, the EU also increased its bilateral and multilateral engagement over the last decade with Asian countries and with groupings such as Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS) and Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) among others (Luthra, 2021). Therefore, this chapter will analyse the four European geopolitical approaches to the Indo-Pacific: the pioneering approach of France, the approach of Germany and the approach of the Netherlands and, finally, the strategy of the EU for the Indo-Pacific. 11.3.1 France’s Approach to the Indo-Pacific France has been the pioneer nation in Europe in offering a national approach to the Indo-Pacific in 2019 by publishing its strategic document entitled “France and Security in the Indo-Pacific” (Ministère des Armées, France, 2019). It highlighted that France is formally an Indo-Pacific nation due to its overseas departments, Mayotte and La Réunion. Furthermore, the document indicated that 1.6 million French citizens lived in French overseas departments and territories, 200,000 French Nationals live in the Indo-Pacific states and the region encompasses 465,422 km2 and 93% of its Exclusive Economic Zone (Ministère des Armées, France, 2019; Ministère de L’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères, France, 2019). Thus, France has become one of the most critical geopolitical projection pillars of Europe in the Indo-Pacific (Grare, 2020b). Additionally, in a new strategic move in which it limits China’s international projection, France has declared India as its preferred partner in Asia (The Hindustan Times, 2020), thus displacing the weight that China could have in this international architecture in general and in the European Union in particular. France’s approach is very focused on security, both in the face of traditional and non-traditional threats. This is evident in the fact that it was France’s Ministry of Defense (Ministère des Armées) that published the strategy. Furthermore, France highlighted the importance of the Indo-Pacific for Europe and itself and announced its commitment to this area of the planet with the following words in this strategic document: France pays particular attention to the Indo-Pacific region. As stated in the 2017 Defence and National Security Strategic Review, its stability is paramount for international security. In the Indo-Pacific area, the military assertiveness of a growing number of established or emerging powers presents many challenges to multilateralism and increases the instability and unpredictability that confronts nations. Terrorism has severely struck Europe over the last few years, reshapes and spreads to the Indo-Pacific. This worrying evolution requires a joint mobilisation

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of the international community. Upholding stability in the Indo-Pacific, which is a source of overall prosperity thanks to its economic dynamism, demographic growth and technological innovation, is essential. This has to be set within the framework of an international order based on dialogue and the respect of multilaterally set rules. (Ministère des Armées, France, 2019) The geopolitical importance of this region for France is reflected in the economic data that this document provides (Ministère des Armées, France, 2019). France exported 66.44 billion euros to the Indo-Pacific in 2018, excluding defence equipment, equivalent to 34% of all exports outside the European Union and 14% in total. Similarly, France has imported 95.93 billion euros from the Indo-Pacific (excluding defence equipment). This represents 40% of all imports from outside the European Union and 17% in total. Likewise, France’s FDI Stocks in the Indo-Pacific reached 108 billion euros in 2017, and Indo-Pacific’s FDI Stocks in France reached 35 billion euros in 2016. Regarding the number of French nationals in overseas departments located in the Indo-Pacific (Ministère des Armées, France, 2019, p. 3), the document indicates that the most populated region is formed by the islands Mayotte, Réunion and Scattered Islands, with 1,100,000 inhabitants. New Caledonia follows it with 282,000 inhabitants, French Polynesia with 276,000 inhabitants and the remaining regions with hardly any permanent population: Clipperton Islands, Walls and Futuna, and French Sub-Antarctic and Antarctic Territories. Likewise, France has nationals in other Indo-Pacific nations, indicating in approximate numbers the scales of each country: More than 30,000 in China and Australia (each); between 10,000 and 30,000 in Japan, Thailand, India, Bhutan, New Zealand and Madagascar; between 3,000 and 10,000 in Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, South Korea, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia and East Timor; and less than 3,000 in the remaining countries. France also details the specific security risks in the Indo-Pacific, namely North Korea’s nuclear programme and terrorism. France has deployed 7,000 military personnel throughout the IndoPacific, 4,100 in the Indian Ocean and 2,900 in the Pacific Ocean, to protect this territory and this population. France has divided its military forces into five joint regional commands, namely COMSUP FAZSOI (Commander of the French Armed Forces in the South of the Indian Ocean), COMSUP FANC (Commander of the French Armed Forces in New Caledonia), COMSUP FAPF/ALPACA (Commander of the French Armed Forces in French Polynesia and Commander of the Pacific Ocean maritime zone), COMFOR FFEAU/ALINDIEN (Commander of the French Armed Forces in the United Arab Emirates and Commander of the Indian Ocean maritime zone) and COMFOR FFDJ (Commander of the French Armed Forces in

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Djibouti) (Ministère des Armées, France, 2019). COMFOR FFDJ is especially sensitive since Djibouti is at the entrance to the Red Sea (one of the main routes of imports and exports of the EU through the Suéz Canal), and China has opened its first overseas military base in this region. These expansive regional commands and the more extensive definition of “Indo-Pacific” that France uses are also indications that France places as much importance on the Indian Ocean as the Pacific. This is not the case with the United States, which employs a narrower definition of the Indo-Pacific, stopping at the western shores of India (The United States Department of State, 2019; Morcos, 2021). France also collaborates with the regional centres dedicated to the surveillance of maritime spaces and sea lanes of communication of the Indo-Pacific. Three French officers contribute to these goals within the Information Fusion Center-Indian Ocean Region located (IFC-IOR) in New Delhi, the Information Fusion Center of Singapore (IFC) and the Regional Center for the Fusion of Maritime Information (CRFIM) located in Madagascar. Arms cooperation with Indo-Pacific nations also plays a vital role for France to securitise this region (Ministère des Armées, France, 2019). India stands out in first place and far ahead of the second position, with 13,184 million euros from 2008 to 2017; in second place is Singapore, with 2,279 million euros; in third place, Malaysia, with 1,768 million euros; in fourth place, South Korea, with 1,532 million euros; in fifth place, Indonesia, with 1.342 million euros; in sixth place, Australia, with 751 million euros. Though the announcement of the AUKUS alliance between Australia, the United States and the UK on September 15, 2021 served a blow to France and has undoubtedly deteriorated the relationship between Paris and Canberra and damaged the Transatlantic cooperation, it is not likely to affect France’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific. This is because France, like all the other players, has its interests to preserve in the Indo-Pacific. 11.3.2 Germany’s Approach to the Indo-Pacific Germany, for its part, was the second European country in developing a national strategy for the Indo-Pacific and has offered a more multidimensional approach. Germany published its new policy for the region on September 1, 2020, in a 70-page document titled “Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific” (The Federal Government, Germany, 2020). Germany has emphasised the need for multilateralism when addressing the challenges in the Indo-Pacific while urging NATO to expand its agreements with Japan and South Korea. Likewise, it highlighted the need to support rules and not powers when defining the dynamics of this area, issuing a veiled warning to the Chinese negotiating strategy of relying on bilateralism to expand its global influence (Grare, 2020a).

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This view has been summarised in the statement by German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas (Federal Foreign Office, Germany, 2020). He states, Our prosperity and our geopolitical influence in the coming decades will depend on how we work together with the countries of the Indo-Pacific region. That, more than anywhere else, it is where the shape of the international rules-based order of tomorrow will be decided. We want to help shape that order – so that it is based on rules and international cooperation, not on the law of the strong. Some analysts from the realist school could argue that the most explicit symbol of change in the international order is that when voices are raised from the West criticising the law of the strongest, the West is no longer the strongest. In any case, in the transition of powers, orders and international legitimacies that the world experiences, opportunities and possibilities for reinvention arise for new and old global actors. In this way, in this new scenario, the old European actors have the opportunity to redefine their geopolitical role in the world by adopting new strategies. In this sense, Germany’s strategy is based on seven pillars (The Federal Government, Germany, 2020): 1) Strengthening multilateralism; 2) Tackling climate change and protecting the environment; 3) Strengthening peace, security and stability; 4) Promoting human rights and the rule of law; 5) Strengthening rules-based, fair and sustainable free trade; 6) Rules-based networking and the digital transformation of regions and markets; and 7) Bringing people together through culture, education and science. Germany announces that these seven pillars seek to achieve eight goals (The Federal Government, Germany, 2020, pp. 9–10): 1) Peace and security; 2) Diversifying and deepening relations; 3) Neither unipolar nor bipolar; 4) Open shipping routes; 5) Open markets and free trades; 6) Digital transformation and connectivity; 7) Protecting our planet; and 8) Access to fact-based information. To achieve these eight goals, Germany relies on seven principles that guide its strategy in the Indo-Pacific (The Federal Government, Germany, 2020): 1) Promote coordinated European action (based on the EU Global Strategy 2016); 2) Bet on multilateralism by strengthening economic, political and security ties with Indo-Pacific nations; 3) Support an Indo-Pacific based on rules-based order; 4) Incorporate the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations to the actions carried out in the IndoPacific; 5) Defend Human Rights; 6) Promote the inclusiveness of all nations involved in the Indo-Pacific to strengthen peace, security and stability in the region; and 7) Promote partnerships between equals and with Indo-Pacific nations in third countries and to share global responsibilities.

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11.3.3 The Netherlands’ Approach to the Indo-Pacific The Netherlands has been the third European nation to offer a national strategy for the Indo-Pacific (in November 2020), offering the shortest document (10 pages) and publishing only in Dutch at the source. In it, the Netherlands, like Germany, articulates its strategy based on eight dimensions of strategic interest (Government of the Netherlands, 2020, p. 1): the defence of the international legal order, the promotion of democracy and human rights, security and stability, sustainable trade, safe passage and maritime security, address the climate change, global healthcare and poverty reduction. The Netherlands also highlights the integration of its strategy into coordinated action within the EU by stating that: The Netherlands would like to see the EU develop its own vision of the Indo-Pacific, aimed at promoting EU cooperation with the region based on a distinctive EU agenda to protect and promote our interests. At the same time, the Netherlands must consider how it can contribute to an EU agenda by strengthening its bilateral ties with the countries of the Indo-Pacific. (Government of the Netherlands, 2020, p. 2) On the question of strategic alliances, the Netherlands advocates finding common grounds with like-minded nations such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and India and engaging in strategic collaborations with ASEAN. Without explicitly mentioning China, the Netherlands is positioning itself within the evolving security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. 11.3.4 The EU’s Strategy for the Indo-Pacific From the factsheet of EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy of April 2021 and the more detailed EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific announced in September 2021, one can deduce EU’s stand on the Indo-Pacific. The EU’s release on the Indo-Pacific strategy heralded the end of a long silence by the EU on the region. EU’s commitment to the region materialised in the announcement made by the EU’s High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, Josep Borrell, “From trade and investment to connectivity, climate action and security, we have a big stake in the Indo-Pacific and should do our part to keep the regional order open and rules-based.” The EU strategy does not leave much scope for ambiguity when it states that “The region’s growing economic, demographic, and political weight makes

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it a key player in shaping the international order and in addressing global challenges. The EU intends to increase its engagement with the region.” This is a significant leap in the EU’s foreign policy, which transitioned from a complete reluctance to use the term Indo-Pacific to explicitly stating the need to increase the EU’s commitment in the region. The EU strategy on the Indo-Pacific outlines the EU’s rationale for strengthening its engagement in the region, explains the principles that will guide its engagement in the region and presents its approach to partnerships and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Finally, it lays out how it will achieve its vision of collaboration and cooperation with its partners. The main elements of the EU strategy are focused on non-traditional security and environmental issues such as ocean governance, green transition, connectivity and human security issues. However, the strategy also details defence and security as one of the seven priority areas of the EU strategy. While this is an important element of the strategy, the EU is severely lacking in terms of its military capability in the region except for the case of France, which has a substantial military presence. Therefore, its contribution to this region is questionable. The strategy talks about EU’s Comprehensive Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions as one of the mechanisms for greater security cooperation in the region; however, it is worth noting that none of the 18 EU CSDP missions listed on its website is presently east of Somalia (Delhi Policy Group, 2021). Moreover, the “Enhanced Security Cooperation in and with Asia” project mentioned as another platform encompasses only non-traditional security issues (ibid). Analysis of the strategy also reveals that the EU, unsurprisingly enough, takes an ambiguous stance towards China. It talks about “inclusivity” and “cooperation” on the one hand, and on the other hand, it also takes a strong stance against China when its mentions Chinese “military buildup,” “Taiwan Strait” and “South and East China Sea.” While recognising human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Tibet is conspicuously absent from the strategy, it also talks about the progress achieved in concluding the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China. There are several such examples of mixed messaging towards China in the document. A significant departure visible in the strategy regarding the EU’s approach to the region is the emphasis on diversifying partnerships beyond China. EU seeks to go beyond its traditional partners in the region (Japan and ASEAN) and makes multiple references to Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, India and South Korea (Mohan, 2021). It is important to mention at this juncture that while the strategy talks about how far the India-Europe relations have evolved, it fails to give due importance to India in several important areas. This is especially glaring in the section on building “Resilient and Diversified Value Chains” in the region and the world. The EU strategy is severely myopic in failing to see the importance of India as a pivot in diversifying the global supply chains and building more resilient value chains. A possible reason for leaving out India could be not to challenge China beyond a certain point.

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Several scholars have suggested that one of the reasons for this European parsimony concerning China is the economic dent made by China in the heart of the EU through its Belt and Road Initiative (Pejsova, 2018; Heiduk & Sulejmanovic, 2021). The so-called “chequebook diplomacy,” a term used to refer to the Chinese BRI, could have been the main impediment to the fruition of a serious community interest in developing some kind of strategy in the region that could upset the Asian giant. Therefore, it is not surprising that the nation’s most critical of how China landed in Europe, such as France and Germany, have also been the first to have developed their national strategy. It is also important to note that, even though the European (and other) nations backing the FOIP take special care not to officially present this initiative as a rival, threat or alternative to the BRI, the geopolitical implications of both these models are apparent. Therefore, if one were to accept the view that the European Union is torn between a more pro-BRI stance and a more pro-Indo-Pacific one, one would find a clear disruptive line of an economic nature at the heart of the EU. The more prosperous nations—France, Germany and the Netherlands—have taken a pro-Indo-Pacific stance. On the other hand, the poorest nations (especially those in southern Europe that have not recovered from the 2008 crisis) have adopted a more pro-BRI stance. Therefore, the “chequebook diplomacy” plays a fundamental role in the geopolitical projection of European nations and the question of European cohesion and its capacity to coordinate itself geopolitically. This radical break in geopolitical terms within the EU represents a severe obstacle for European projection in the Indo-Pacific and reaching future strategic agreements between European partner states. The commitments made with China may prevent the European nations that have signed them from supporting or giving approval to more assertive European positions regarding the Asian giant on human rights, state interventionism in markets with European participation, Chinese military expansionism at sea or China’s treatment of ethnic minorities (such as the Uighurs) or political assertiveness (such as in Hong Kong). There are several concrete examples of this disjuncture visible in the EU. Greece, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia in 2016 prevented the EU from taking a clear and strong stance on the South China Sea tribunal ruling (Fallon, 2016). A survey by a European think-tank found that 12 EU member states named China as one of their key partners (Reuter & Grare, 2021). It also found that Belgium, Bulgaria, Latvia, Portugal and Romania see the Indo-Pacific strategy as an anti-China tool (ibid). Fear of Chinese coercion and the lure of Chinese investments work together to create a considerable rift in the European Union. The case of Lithuania is a good example of Chinese coercion in Europe, as China downgraded diplomatic ties with Lithuania after Taiwan opened a de facto embassy in Lithuania (Bermingham, 2021). These implications can also extend to other international areas that would be vital for the EU. An example of this would be the opening of the first

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Chinese military base abroad in Djibouti, which would allow China to project its military presence in the Gulf of Aden, a vital geostrategic point through which a large part of the supply of crude oil, products and raw materials from the EU travel. Likewise, this could compromise the European position on the trade war between the United States and China, the EU position on the clashes between China and Japan in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the role of Europe in redefining a new balance of powers in a multipolar world. The undeniable rift in Europe on the question of China not only damages Europe’s role in the Indo-Pacific region but also compromises the EU’s own ability to operate in the future as a coordinating entity with one voice.

11.4 Conclusion The tremendous global importance of the Indo-Pacific region is expected to increase over time due to socio-economic and demographic factors, such as population growth in these regions, their economic growth and the greater assertiveness of actors such as China and India. This implies that the IndoPacific has fundamental importance for the security, the economy and the international projection of the European nations, who cannot ignore this reality without a high cost in these dimensions. Yet, despite this importance, as of November 2021, only three European nations have developed national strategies in this region: France in 2019, Germany and the Netherlands (both at the end of 2020). Each of these strategies responds to the national needs of each actor that produces them. In the case of France, the Ministry of Defense is the body that has developed it, highlighting the role of France as an Indo-Pacific nation primarily because of its overseas departments in the region. This factor makes France’s strategy focus intensely on the security aspect—traditional security against other military threats and more multidimensional security. Further, France is also betting on the fight against climate change, poverty, criminal organisations, piracy and natural disasters in this region. Germany’s strategy is built on seven pillars, including infrastructure development, promoting sustainable international trade, promoting human rights and digital transformation. In the German strategy, the commitment to multilateralism stands out, prioritising the search for solutions in collaboration with other Indo-Pacific nations on a multilateral basis rather than developing a purely assertive strategy or national agreements. Compared to France, the focus is more on economic issues and less on security. The Netherlands’ strategic document on the Indo-Pacific is the shortest and least specific document among the three nations. Nevertheless, it highlights the importance of implementing its national projection integrated within the EU, stressing the need for alliances with similar nations such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, India, South Korea and the ASEAN (naming three out of four Quad members).

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The EU strategy on the Indo-Pacific, although delayed, is a crucial development in global geopolitics. The delay in the generation of the European strategy is most likely to have been caused by a lack of cohesion and unity among the EU. The initial outline of the strategy in April 2021 hinted at the dominance of the German approach over the French approach, as the focus was more on economic engagement with the Indo-Pacific. The subsequent detailed strategy of September 2021 reflects a more balanced integration of the German and French strategies on Indo-Pacific, with a substantial focus on both security and economic endearment with the region. In the EU strategy, the EU does not shy away from making a strong commitment to the region but does not take an overtly anti-China stance. This reflects the continued importance of Europe’s economic engagement with China. It is also important to mention that the EU strategy on the Indo-Pacific does not mean the rift in the EU pertaining to China has ended. There are several states that are part of the Chinese BRI and hesitate to take a stance on the Indo-Pacific strategy. These are also the nations that have suffered the most from the economic crisis of 2008 and, therefore, have been the most dependent on investment from foreign powers such as China. The opposite trend is also very apparent because the nations that have adopted national strategies on the Indo-Pacific, such as France, Germany and the Netherlands, are also the most economically advanced nations of Europe. Although correlation does not imply causation, the dividing line between these two groups of nations is clear.

References Atlantic Council. (2009). Transcript: Kissinger’s Remarks at 2009 Makins Lecture, January 15, 2009. https://www​.atlanticcouncil​.org​/commentary​/transcript​/ transcript​-kissinger​-s​-remarks​-at​-2009​-makins​-lecture/, Retrieval date: April 1, 2021. Bermingham, F. (2021, December 1). Keeping big brothers at bay: Why Lithuania is taking on China. South China Sea Morning Post. https://www​.scmp​.com​/ news​/china​/diplomacy​/article​/3157869​/keeping​-big​-brothers​-bay​-why​-lithuania​ -taking​-china. Brewster, D. (2010). An Indian sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean?, Security Challenges, 6(5), 1–20. Delhi Policy Group. (2021, April). DPG Indo-Pacific Monitor. https://www​ .delhipolicygroup ​ . org ​ / publication ​ / indo ​ - pacific ​- monitor ​/ volii​- issue ​- 3​- 2280​ .html. Fallon, T. (2016). The EU, the South China Sea, and China’s successful wedge strategy. AMTI Update, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. https://amti​.csis​ .org​/eu​-south​-china​-sea​-chinas​-successful​-wedge​-strategy/. Federal Foreign Office, Germany. (2020, September 1). “Germany – Europe – Asia: Shaping the 21st century together”: The German Government adopts policy guidelines on the Indo-Pacific region. https://www​.auswaertiges​-amt​

200  Juan Luis López-Aranguren .de​/en​/aussenpolitik​/reg​iona​lesc​hwer​punkte​/asien​/german​-government​-policy​ -guidelines​-indo​-pacific​/2380510, Retrieval date: April 1, 2021. Government of the Netherlands, Netherlands (2020). Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia. https://www​ .government​.nl​/binaries​/government​/documents​/publications​/2020​/11​/13​/indo​ -pacific​-guidelines​/Indo​-Pacific​+Guidelines​+EN​.pdf, Retrieval date: April 1, 2021. Grare, F. (2020, October 15). Germany’s new approach to the Indo-Pacific. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment​.org​/2020​/10​/15​ /germany​-s​-new​-approach​-to​-indo​-pacific​-pub​-82978, Retrieval date: April 1, 2021. Grate, F. (2020, October 21). France, the other Indo-Pacific power. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment​.org​/2020​/10​/21​/ france​-other​-indo​-pacific​-power​-pub​-83000, Retrieval date: April 1, 2021. Haushofer, Karl (1924). Geopolitik des pazifischen ozeans. Berlin: Vowinckel. Heiduk, F. & Sulejmanovic, N. (2021, January). WP NR. 01. German Institute for International and Security Affairs. https://www​.swp​-berlin​.org​/fileadmin​/ contents​/products​/arbeitspapiere​/WP​_EU​_Indopacific​_Heiduk​_Sulejmanovic​ .pdf, Retrieval date: April 1, 2021. Lopez-Aranguren, J. L. (2016). The communicative dimension and security in Asia-Pacific: A communicative-viewing proposal for reform of the Japanese Intelligence Services. UNISCI Discussion Papers, 41, 29–52. https://doi​.org​/10​ .5209​/rev​_RUNI​.2016​.n41​.52673. Lopez-Aranguren, J. L. (2017). Rational choice theory and international communication: A proposal for a new interpretation of article 21 of the Japanese constitution. Osaka University Law Review, 64, 111–134. https://ir​.library​ .osaka​-u​.ac​.jp​/repo​/ouka​/all​/59680​/oulr064​-111​.pdf. Lopez-Aranguren, J. L. (2018). Las dimensiones geopolítica y comunicativa de la disputa por las islas Senkaku/Diaoyu a través de la historia. In C. Tirado (Ed.) El agua en Japón. Una aproximación jurídica y social (pp. 205–250). Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch. Lopez-Aranguren, J. L. (2019). De los panfletos de mayo de 1968 a los foros digitales del siglo XXI: Oportunidades y desafíos de la comunicación internacional en la articulación global de los movimientos sociales. E. Postigo (Coord.) Mayo del 68. Una época de cambios, un cambio de época, Vol. II (pp. 13–22). Madrid: Editorial Universidad Francisco de Vitoria. Lopez-Aranguren, J. L. (2021). El Indo-Pacífico como nuevo eje geopolítico global. Global Affairs, 3, 6–11. https://www​.unav​.edu​/documents​/16800098​ /20568125​/Global​+Affairs​+Journal​+3rd​+Edition​.pdf​/1d5b7906​-743c​-5f87​-fcc8​ -8d10278dfbb8. Luthra, G. (2021). The assessment of the European Union’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Issue Briefs and Special Reports. The Observer Research Foundation. https:// www​.orfonline​.org​/research​/an​-assessment​-of​-the​-european​-unions​-indo​-pacific​ -strategy/. Ministère de L’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères, France. (2019). French Strategy in the Indo-Pacific “For an Inclusive Indo-Pacific”. https://www​.diplomatie​.gouv​.fr​ /en​/country​-files​/asia​-and​-oceania​/the​-indo​-pacific​-region​-a​-priority​-for​-france/, Retrieval date: April 1, 2021.

Geopolitical Aspects of European Union’s Approach to Indo-Pacific  201 Ministère des Armées, France. (2019). France and Security in the Indo-Pacific. https:// www ​ . defense ​ . gouv​ . fr​ / layout​ / set​ / print​ / content​ / download​ / 532754​ / 9176250​ / version​/3​/file​/France​+and​+Security​+in​+the​+Indo​-Pacific+-​+2019​.pdf, Retrieval date: April 1, 2021. Mohan, G. (2021). Assessing the EU’s new Indo-Pacific strategy. LSE Blogs. https:// blogs ​ . lse ​ . ac ​ . uk​ / europpblog​ / 2021​ / 09​ / 24​ / assessing ​ - the ​ - eus ​ - new ​ - indo ​ - pacific​ -strategy/. Morcos, P. (2021). France: A bridge between Europe and the Indo-Pacific? Commentary. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. https://www​.csis​ .org​/analysis​/france​-bridge​-between​-europe​-and​-indo​-pacific. Morris, Ian (2010). Why the West Rules—For Now: The Patterns of History, and What They Reveal about the Future. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Pejsova, E. (2018, March). The Indo-Pacifica passage to Europe? BRIEF 3, Connectivity & Security along the Road, EUISS – Series. European Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). https://www​.iss​.europa​.eu​/sites​/default​/files​/EUISSFiles​/ Brief​%203​%20The​%20Indo​-Pacific​_0​.pdf, Retrieval date: April 1, 2021. Reuter, M. & Grare, F. (2021). Moving closer: European views of the Indo-Pacific. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr​.eu​/special​/moving​-closer​ -european​-views​-of​-the​-indo​-pacific/. The Hindustan Times. (2020, September 9). France describes India as the foremost Asian strategic partner. https://www​.hindustantimes​.com​/india​-news​/france​ -describes​-india​-as​-foremost​-asian​-strategic​-partner​/story​-rJm​sUIW​ze24​pfh3​ Ekip7yL​.html, Retrieval date: April 1, 2021. The United States Department of State. (2019, November 4). A Free and Open IndoPacific. Advancing a Shared Vision. https://www​.state​.gov​/wp​-content​/uploads​ /2019​/11​/Free​-and​-Open​-Indo​-Pacific​-4Nov2019​.pdf, Retrieval date: April 1, 2021. Tirado, C. (2019). Las recientes reformas legislativas en materia de política exterior y seguridad en Japón. Política exterior de Japón, 3, 69–86.

Chapter 12

Free and Open Indo-Pacific Converging Trends in European Union Strategy to Japan’s Vision Carmen Tirado Robles

12.1 Introduction The post-Cold War period witnessed a shifting contour in international relations and globalisation which integrated economics over geographical distance. Over time, the fulcrum of economic activity realigned around the ASEAN region resulting in the Asia-Pacific zone becoming the hub of global production activity. The resultant was crisscrossing sea lanes for commercial purposes. In addition, China rose in rank and overtook Japan as the second-largest economy globally. Focus under Obama was to pursue a “pivot” to East Asia, focusing the United States’ diplomacy and trade in the region, necessitated by the anxiety of US alliance, namely Japan, as China asserted by laying territorial claim of Senkaku islands and incursion in ADIZ of Japan, developing infrastructure policy of “String of Pearls” and “Belt and Road Initiative,” sending coastguard ships, submarines in the South China Sea or in the name of protection from piracy in the Indian Ocean and building artificial islands called Spratly island or Djibouti in the Indian Ocean. Sustaining an ecosystem based on free and rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region gained currency as a way to protect sea lanes and securitisation of this region. The concept of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is said to be traced back to the article by Indian naval officer Captain Gurpreet Khurana, who first wrote about this geopolitical concept in early 2007, in a paper titled “Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation” (Khurana, 2007).1 At that time, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific was primarily a geographic concept that described the maritime space that stretched from the coasts of East Africa and West Asia through the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific Ocean to the coasts of East Asia. The Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe presented his foreign policy plan based on democratic values and trained Japan’s interest beyond Asia to the Indo-Pacific. Since then, the Indo-Pacific region has grown as a vision and framework in most nations’ foreign policy outlines, including European nations.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003342311-16

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Abe also put forth a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) to institutionalise the concept of FOIP and worked to form an informal framework with major democracies of this region, namely, India, Australia and the United States. As a result, Japan, Australia, the United States and India began to refer to this expression in official statements and documents and, together with the Indo-Pacific concept, the idea of the Quad was developed in 2017 by focusing on seven topics that promote the liberal international order: freedom of navigation and overflight, maritime commons, respect for international law, a rules-based order, improved connectivity, maritime security, non-proliferation and the fight against terrorism. The Quad was a forum through which it was envisioned to cooperate to reach a consensus in the above matters such that China can be deterred in its ambition. Upon resuming the initiative in his second term, Abe, addressing the Diet, talks of the vast expanse of sea between the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean, which had harboured prosperity of the region because of freedom of navigation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). From this vision flowed the guidelines of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” which began as a strategy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007), but due to China’s protest and ASEAN’s concern which swiftly changed to vision, it became the mainstay of Japan’s foreign policy since 2016 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). The three pillars that Japan established as core to its FOIP concept were: one, promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation, free trade etc., to maintain fundamental principles of the international order, which are the foundation of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific; two, the pursuit of economic prosperity by improving physical connectivity, people-to-people connectivity and institutional connectivity; and three, commitment to peace and security in the region by increasing capacity building, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, counter-terrorism, anti-piracy,2 etc. Europe as a region was also affected by the international environment. The shift to Asia-Pacific and then Indo-Pacific had distanced this region from the location of activity. While Northeast Asia was tentative about the changing powershift, Europe was inward-driven to form an effective European Union, thus consuming energies of the leaders of European nation-states to understand, negotiate and form a cohesive unit for the greater good of the region. However, the powerful nations of the Union, namely France, trained their focus on the Indo-Pacific because of its territorial interest and trade needs. The deepening economic engagement of Japan with the European Union, followed by China’s increasing footprint in trade and investment and its venture through the Belt and Road Initiative, the Indo-Pacific region drew the attention of nations like Germany and the Netherlands. This chapter works first, by showing how Japan has integrated FOIP in its foreign policy with other initiatives ranging from active participation in United Nations and consolidating its position in the international arena.

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Further, this chapter, then, defines the road map through which Europe has inked its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy and reflects on the EU IndoPacific Strategy.

12.2 The FOIP as an Element of Japanese Foreign Policy for Global Cooperation The FOIP, at the moment, is a political initiative not yet supported by specific legal norms. Therefore, one can conclude that the FOIP was the most important feature of Japan’s foreign policy under the Abe administration. However, it is not an isolated initiative in the Japanese foreign policy priorities. It is part of a solid strategy promoted by Abe to regain Japan’s position on the international scene as a global Asian power. Indeed, with these and other initiatives that we will see below, Japan seems to want to overcome its position as a low-profile country or its reactive foreign policy approach (Sato, 2019), improve its military status and move beyond its “cheque book diplomacy.” Abe administration was forthcoming in buttressing the vision of FOIP with other initiatives, which showcased its role as a pre-emptive, proactive and tactical nation-state. At the turn of the century, Japan made significant inroads in many regional architectures, be it ASEAN, ARF or East Asia Forum. It also signed many comprehensive treaties with its neighbours and reached out to like-minded nations. Having entrenched itself through economic diplomacy, Japan negotiated TPP in the absence of the United States and effectively parleyed with China in RCEP to ensure that China did not highjack the forum (Yorizumi, 2019). The launch of the concept of human security at the United Nations: although this concept appears for the first time in the 1994 Human Development Report3 within the United Nations Development Program, Japan (in addition to Norway and Canada), has, as a country, integrated this concept into its foreign policy priorities and has concretised it in specific actions.4 Japan’s role as a proactive contributor to peace is changing the passive profile that the country had presented since the end of World War II with the Yoshida Doctrine, to position itself at the beginning of the 21st century as a regional power in Asia, deepening the relations with neighbours in this environment like South Korea, Australia, ASEAN and India, the main protagonists of the FOIP, and strengthening relations with other allies on the international scene (especially with the EU and its Member States and Latin America). Added to this is the continuation of their relationships with the United States, which Koizumi, Abe, Suga and now Kishida successfully manoeuvred except for occasional disagreements. This position at the international level is also consolidated in the United Nations, with Japan presenting itself as a determined and solid candidate for a permanent

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position on the Security Council. In this regard, Japan relies on a recent internal reform of its security policies, with a new interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution by the Cabinet since 2014 and a renewed legislative package on security and defence approved by the Diet in 2015, significantly increasing Japan’s ability to contribute to the security of the region. Furthermore, Japan’s interest in strengthening its ties with specific international organisations beyond the United Nations, especially with NATO and the EU, is increasing. It should not be forgotten that Japan and the EU have very recently adopted the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) that is accompanied by a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA).5 Although it is a somewhat programmatic text or a declaration of intent, it makes Japan’s interest in the EU very clear economically, politically and strategically. Japan’s leadership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiation after the United States left in 2017 has also been decisive in consolidating its international position. Indeed, with President Trump’s arrival, the United States withdrew from this important association agreement, and Japan took over in an unexpected way and managed to complete the process of what is now known as TPP-11, which was signed in Santiago de Chile on March 8, 2018. The leadership displayed by Japan was unprecedented and attracted much attention at the time. Gascón Marcén (2020) remarks that the United States’ abandonment of the TPP pushed Japan and the EU to seek other forms of cooperation and significantly boosted the negotiation of the EPA between the EU and Japan. While the TPP-11 is a compact agreement with only seven articles, Article 1 incorporates the TPP as the 12 originating countries agreed. In this way, TPP-11 became the legal means to bring the original TPP back to life. The Japanese government appears to recognise the TPP as an important agreement supporting Japan’s economic and commercial interests and geopolitical and security interests in regional stability and order (Mulgan, 2016). ODA is a foreign policy instrument to boost investment and connectivity. It is widely recognised that Japan’s ODA has focused on infrastructure projects and has paved the way for Japanese foreign direct investment (Ossorio Torres, 2020). Currently, approximately 60% of Japan’s ODA goes to Asia and 20% to Africa, corresponding to the FOIP regions of interest. Furthermore, Japan’s ODA is also central to FOIP as a security-focused understanding of FOIP leads to an emphasis on ODA measures that attempt to balance China’s growing power (Yamamoto, 2020). In any case, the link between ODA and FOIP is evident since the White Paper for Japanese ODA of 20176 has a first part titled “Dynamism created by combining Two continents and Two oceans” and within it, a section dedicated to “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.” The Japanese proposal for Society 5.0, launched by the Japanese Business Federation (Keidanren) and by Shinzo Abe’s Cabinet, was presented at the

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CeBIT fair in Hannover in 2017 but appeared for the first time in an official document in December 2015, in the framework of the “V Basic Plan of Science and Technology of the Japanese Government.”7 Despite the above narrative, some have seen the Japanese FOIP initiative only as a response to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Nagy, 2018; Cho, 2019; Castellanos, 2020) and the possibility that they may be compatible initiatives is also analysed (Hosoya, 2019). The truth is that the Chinese proposal may be seen as counterbalanced by this Japanese proposal, but this opinion is relatively narrow, and this is not the main motivation of the FOIP. There are two visions, BRI and FOIP, of the same geographic space that compete to use investments in infrastructure as the backbone to enable security alliances in Asia. In any case, Japan always prefers and defends an order based on rules and not one based on power, which would favour China. Indeed, Japan’s defence of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific joins the behaviour that characterises other intermediate powers (Nagy, 2019). Furthermore, Japan highlights the importance of international laws and norms in preventing instability and conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. From this international legal perspective, Japan is launching a series of actions that, as pointed out, reinforce its image as a peaceful, democratic country. Added to this is the recent security and defence policy reform, which gives Japan a certain autonomy from the United States (Tirado, 2019). Furthermore, since 2019, as a result of the signing of the two major Economic and Strategic Association Agreements, Japan has reinforced ties with the EU. While nations of the Indo-Pacific region have developed their narratives of FOIP, which can be gleaned from various foreign policy frameworks, Europe as a region was slow on the take-off. EU’s need for an Indo-Pacific strategy stems from its deepening interest with Japan on the one hand and also its wariness of China’s motive on the other. Therefore, it is of interest to the trajectory that the EU took in incorporating FOIP in its foreign policy.

12.3 Free and Open Indo-Pacific and European Union: An Almost Deserted Legal Landscape The EU has not yet approved any relevant legal commitment concerning the Japanese initiative, and the truth is that, until very recently, it continued talking about Asia-Pacific and not the Indo-Pacific in official documents, bilateral agreements or statements in general. In contrast, although there is no express reference to the FOIP, the European Union had adopted some commitments in relevant areas, such as the September 2019 document entitled “EU-Japan Association on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure.”8 Esteban and Armanini (2020) present an alternative governance model to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative through a paradigm of infrastructure development

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based on sustainability and a level-playing field. This initiative is very interesting because it brings Japan and the EU back together in a normative approach after launching the two Association Agreements mentioned above. Nevertheless, the impact of the EU-Japan partnership would depend on the financial resources that will be mobilised to implement this initiative. This was seen in the Europe-Asia Connectivity Forum, where it was found that there is a consensus on sustainability, at least at the political level. For now, this document is just a commitment that should be reflected in new standards, but it will not require the approval of new regulations; as indicated in the Agreement itself, “whenever possible, cooperation in the framework of the Connectivity Partnership would take place through existing dialogues and cooperation frameworks, and in particular in the context of the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement and the Economic Partnership Agreement.” At the XXVI EU-Japan Summit, both parties’ interest in this partnership and the understanding that connectivity should be environmentally, economically, fiscally and socially sustainable and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Concept focus on quality infrastructure was visible. The commitment refers to the specific regions where cooperation will focus on the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, IndoPacific and Africa. In this somewhat hopeful outlook, we must mention the Agreements that the EU has been signing in recent years with the most important countries within the FOIP. In this regard, we have already cited the two Agreements of the EU and Japan9 that constitute the framework of their cooperation. The Economic Agreement aims to liberalise and facilitate trade and investment and promote a closer economic partnership between the EU and Japan. To do this, it focuses on the elimination of customs duties and the relaxation of non-tariff barriers, which were the ones that represented a significant obstacle for European companies. At the same time, the Agreement protects geographical indications: more than 200 European agricultural products, defined by their specific geographical origin, are to be protected in the Japanese markets, and the same is the case with Japanese products in the European markets. The Strategic Agreement, which is much shorter and not very specific (more a declaration of intent than a binding pact), aims to guarantee closer political and economic collaboration on a wide range of bilateral, regional and multilateral issues. There are too many issues that this Agreement wants to cover, including the fight against weapons of mass destruction, serious international crimes, terrorism (including its financing), illegal trade in small arms, corruption and organised crime, cybercrime, etc. We must also highlight the Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Australia, of the other.10 In this Agreement, the EU and Australia decide to step up their existing strategic relationship and work together in several areas that will be important

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for the growth of the FOIP. This is not just a mere statement of intents at the political level such as the reinforcement of their common values (democracy, human rights and the rule of law or the promotion of international peace and stability, including crisis management coordination) but also in more pragmatic fields, such as economics or trade. Indeed, in this respect, we have the enforcement of competition legislation and regulations, the support for international tax cooperation or a global rules-based framework for trade in raw materials. Specific actions are also taken in fields such as the transport of goods and passengers, including high standards of safety, environmental protection and the promotion of civil protection measures to minimise the impact of natural and man-made disasters. India is also a significant power in the FOIP. The longstanding EU-India relationship is based on a 1994 Cooperation Agreement.11 This boosted political, economic and sectoral cooperation, although the focus is on commercial and economic issues. EU-India relations have evolved significantly since the commencement of annual summits in 2000. In 2004, the official declaration of the EU-India Strategic Partnership took the relationship a step further. The partnership has evolved and has seen enhanced commitment from both sides over the last two years. An Agenda for Action 2020 was adopted jointly at the 2016 EU-India Summit. At the October 2017 EU-India Summit, the two sides agreed on a common vision of global governance, shared values and principles. There is, therefore, a positive momentum for the EU to restate its engagement towards India. The EU and India have regular foreign policy and security consultations. They pursue cooperation on security issues such as counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, counter-piracy/maritime security, non-proliferation and disarmament. All this activity can enrich the content of the FOIP when the EU decides to present its own vision. India presented its own vision of FOIP in November 2019, despite initial hesitations (Thankachan, 2021). Finally, the close collaboration and strategic relations between the EU and its Member States and the United States based on a common history and a shared set of democratic values are key to both partners’ security and prosperity. Unfortunately, the Trump administration took a fundamentally different approach to trade relations between the European Union and the United States. It put its national interests first and tried to rebalance trade deficits with other countries, putting pressure on its partners by imposing high tariffs on certain products to protect its industry and improve its commercial access to partner countries. These actions of the Trump administration weakened the American position in the region (Esteban, 2016). With the change of government in the United States on January 20, 2021, an opportunity had opened up to debate and define a stronger transatlantic partnership. This will be essential to reactivate cooperation in multilateral forums, like FOIP, and current challenges and crises in foreign affairs and security, especially the global pandemic, economic recession, climate change, trade barriers, the

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rise of China, digital transformation and growing technological competition, as well as to defend democracy and human rights. There is, as of yet, no general Association Agreement between the EU and the United States like the ones we have seen with Japan, Australia or India. However, there are some specific agreements in areas such as protecting personal data or PNR.12 That may be interesting for the FOIP. As is known, the United States has materialised its vision of FOIP on a legal basis, the Asia Reassurance Act (ARIA), which implies its own legal framework that renews its commitment to Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, Gover (2019) considers that, at the legislative level, it is more focused, with more resources, and implies strategic thinking and long-term involvement. Therefore, it protects the values and interests of Americans through relationships with allies and partners. In this way, it intends to seek solutions associated with Chinese growth but promote Sino-American dialogue and cooperation on issues of common interest. Regarding the concept of FOIP in the European Union as a legal basis for developing this initiative, we can find a solid network of international treaties with the countries that are considered the major powers of the FOIP, Japan, Australia, India and the United States. These are primarily general agreements and, in other cases, specific agreements in areas that may or may not have a close relationship with the priorities of the FOIP. It is also important to consider a new document presented by the Commission, and the High Representative called the “Joint Communication on the EU’s IndoPacific Strategy” on September 16, 2021.13 However, this document is of a political nature and is not legally binding.

12.4 European Views of FOIP A more encouraging picture has also begun emerging in recent times. The EU and several Member States have presented their own vision of FOIP, which have some convergences and divergences. As regards the member states, it is important to remember that such actions are closely related to the national interests of each country and are not related to an altruistic interest in contributing to the construction of a common vision by the EU. It is in this context that we must consider the initiatives of France, Germany and the Netherlands. France has 1.5 million French people living in the Indo-Pacific region and has 8000 soldiers stationed there. France has presented its own vision of the FOIP, approving the document “La France et la sécurité en Indopacifique,” published in June 2018 and revised in May 2019. France’s commitment to the FOIP materialised at the June 2019 Summit in the four pillars of cooperation: maritime safety, climate change, environment and biodiversity and, finally, quality infrastructure. For France, the security challenges in the region are located in four areas: in the first place, the North Korean

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dossier, an area in which the document highlights the role of France both in the United Nations Security Council and in the EU; secondly, the law of the sea, since France is a leading civil and military maritime power, supports the strict application of the UNCLOS and regularly exercises its maritime and air traffic rights, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region; thirdly, France notes the role of the French armed forces in the Indo-Pacific area since they play an active role in operations to fight illegal trafficking (drugs, illegal fishing, etc.); and finally, in terms of the fight against global warming, France worked very hard to conclude the Paris Agreement in 2016. In general, the French document focuses on the sea and defence law and neglects cooperation in other areas. As already indicated, these documents reflect the national interests of these countries in the area. For example, France interprets the problems in the China Sea as global and not regional problems. It considers itself an “insular state in the Indo-Pacific” (Duchâtel and Moham, 2020). It should also be taken into account that the vision of the French FOIP has been prepared by its Ministry of Defense so that security issues play a preponderant role. Guitton (2019) presented the priorities of the French strategy, pointing out that it is about guaranteeing the security of French citizens, territories and interests. Second, France wishes to contribute to the security of the regional spaces surrounding the overseas territories through military cooperation and enhanced defence diplomacy. Third, France wants to preserve free and open access to common spaces such as the sea, airspace and cyberspace. Securing maritime communication routes is, in particular, one of the main concerns. Fourth, France participates in strengthening the multilateral mechanisms that are essential for maintaining regional stability. Finally, lessons must be learned from the natural disasters that have hit the region to better prepare as it will undoubtedly multiply with climate change. In more general terms, efforts are focused on guaranteeing respect for international law, such as freedom of navigation and overflight, consolidation of the non-proliferation regime and strengthening multilateral dialogue and consultation processes. Germany was the second European country to present its conception of FOIP, in September 2020, with the Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific document. Germany pays more attention than France to minimise conflicts with China and seeks a more “inclusive” Indo-Pacific, including the possibility of cooperation with China on issues such as climate change. Since Germany does not want to choose between the United States and China, it separates itself from the American version of FOIP and prefers to remain neutral. However, Europe, especially Germany, is crucial for the United States in its competition with China. Therefore, one can already see some advances under the Biden administration, such as joint sanctions issued against Chinese officials. The German Indo-Pacific guidelines describe a gradual increase in security engagement in the region, including port calls, joint exercises and the protection of global maritime trade routes. However,

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it must not be forgotten that economic interests are also at stake. Germany is a major exporter to China, which is why critics have argued that Berlin has taken an overly cautious stance to preserve its lucrative ties with Beijing (Heydarian, 2020). Germany addresses this issue from a much broader perspective than France, beyond peace and security, and includes diversifying partnerships, supporting open maritime routes, open markets and free trade, digital transformation and infrastructure connectivity, as well as climate change. Another important element of the German approach is the centrality of ASEAN. The other bilateral partnerships find mentions in the context of existing initiatives. It is unclear if Germany is interested in the various bilateral, trilateral and minilateral agreements emerging in the region. As Delage Carretero (2021) points out, in ASEAN, the positions are not coincidence either. Several partners do not agree to exclude China and fear that this doctrine will cause an external intervention in their political systems since all are not democracies. Therefore, their position has been ambiguous, with only Indonesia and Singapore speaking more explicitly. What is clear is that Germany and France are leading the debate on policy guidelines at the EU level in the Indo-Pacific. With growing Dutch economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific and taking cognisance of the initiative of France and Germany, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands presented, on November 13, 2020, a document that emphasises the need for the EU to present a joint vision of FOIP (“The Netherlands believes that it is desirable for the European Union to develop its vision of the Indo-Pacific.”).14 Moreover, it calls on the organisation to deepen its ties with regional powers such as Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, India, and the Southeast Asian nations like Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam, who share concerns about China’s rise in the region. Unlike France, Germany and the Netherlands, the UK has yet to announce an official Indo-Pacific strategy. Nonetheless, for several years it has increased British activity in the Indo-Pacific.15 That supports the UK’s three foreign policy objectives of promoting prosperity, protecting the rulesbased international system and being a “force for good” in the world. Brexit may help the UK to seek allies in other parts of the world. However, many conditions must be considered to consolidate the UK as an FOIP country. Heritage and Lee (2021) are already advancing that the UK would join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which is progressing to become a reality. The UK is also catching up in the military sphere and strengthening security cooperation with several Indo-Pacific countries, including Japan. The EU must not forget that it maintains close ties with countries specially interested in the FOIP, such as India, Australia or New Zealand, as Commonwealth membership unites them. However, we must also consider that a more regional presence from the UK would likely be received poorly in China.

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For now, only three member countries of the EU have indeed taken the step of expressing their strategic vision of the Indo-Pacific. Being drivers of EU, their visions have given a bearing, direction and trend which will encourage more member states to present their version amalgamating national interest with common goals of FOIP (Esteban and Armanini, 2021). This will accelerate European Union to put forward EU Indo-Pacific Strategy (Strangio, 2020).

12.5 The EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Converging economic interest along with the complex international environment in which one is witness to great power competition, a search for “balance of power,” a need to protect the “rules-based order”, the strategic and political interests and common values with many of the FOIP countries are in tandem to that of the European region and hence, beneficial. Therefore, despite the obstacles,16 the next logical step has been to approve a political document that can serve as a basis for subsequent legal commitments. As a result, the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy was released on September 16, 2021. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Spanish Josep Borrell, published on his blog,17 on March 12, 2021, a document entitled “The EU needs a strategic approach for the IndoPacific.” There he pointed out the importance for the EU of proposing a European approach to the Indo-Pacific. His statement almost became prophetic because the EU has recently presented its own vision of FOIP. The main elements of the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy appear in the Joint Communication, which highlights seven priority areas for EU action: (1) sustainable and inclusive prosperity, (2) green transition, (3) ocean governance, (4) digital governance and partnerships, (5) connectivity, (6) security and defence and (7) human security. All these elements were present in Abe’s proposal. This is adequate proof that the EU Strategy on the Indo-Pacific is an invitation to its partners in the region (Japan being the most important) to tackle common challenges and uphold international law and the values and principles to which the EU is committed. To implement this strategy, the EU intends to coordinate the efforts of its regional and multilateral partners and coordinate the different views of its member states on the Indo-Pacific. To this end, it will reinforce implementation through summits, ministerial meetings, dialogues and future agreements with partners in the region. Some concrete actions that the EU proposes, and that may be of special importance, are, for example, the strengthening of the networks of association agreements and cooperation with countries of the region (the proposal cites Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand, India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, even ASEAN or ACP countries) and not only refers to trade

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agreements but also to areas such as connectivity, fight against climate change and environmental degradation or digital partnership. Cooperation on research and innovation is also proposed under “Horizon Europe” with like-minded Indo-Pacific countries such as Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Singapore. Another field of action is the governance of the oceans in the region, which includes increasing EU support for the Indo-Pacific countries’ fisheries management and control systems and also ensures improved naval deployments by the EU Member States to help protect maritime communication lines and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific.18 Regarding the financing of the strategy, the Neighborhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), Global Europe is included, as well as guarantees a combined financing instruments supported by the European Fund for Sustainable Development “Plus”. In addition to the private sector, European and international financial institutions are included. It will be necessary to see if this mode of finance will be feasible and enough to carry out the European proposal. On the other hand, relations with the United States are likely to be a problem in the future. The proposal names the United States only twice, and just the day before the publication of the joint communication, a new alliance led by the United States had been announced in the region (AUKUS) that did not include any European country. This led the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, to comment on the possibility of the European Union seeking greater strategic autonomy in the world. As the theatre shifts from the Transatlantic to the Indo-Pacific, the centre of activity for the European region lens is far away from their immediate neighbourhood. However, with globalisation and deepening the economic interest of major member states of the EU, the inking of the Indo-Pacific strategy augurs well. It helps position European interest in FOIP, assures nations in the Indo-Pacific region towards EU commitment.

12.6 Conclusion Among all these elements, it is necessary to highlight the fact that both the EU and Japan have established themselves in recent years in the international community as defenders of the rules-based order, and it is clear that they share other values such as democracy and human rights, which are expressions that are repeated multiple times in this EU document. In other words, although interests in the Indo-Pacific may indeed differ between Japan and EU member states (and amidst the EU member states), the community of values can be a good starting point to reach beneficial results for both actors. The work has just begun in the European Union. The EU proposal, its concrete actions and the planned financing must proceed with establishing

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legal norms in the form of international agreements that are binding on the states. This European proposal does not significantly alter the influence of the EU in the Indo-Pacific, nor does it clarify the position of the EU on the rivalry between the United States and China. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that it places the EU on the map of the Indo-Pacific, whose absence so far was too striking. The extent to which the commitment of the member states of the EU and the Indo-Pacific states will transfer to reality will become apparent as the world rebalances itself in the postpandemic era.

Notes 1 In this chapter, the author explains that the term Indo-Pacific refers “to the maritime space comprising the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific” and recalls that India has “vital interests in the security of sea routes. At the same time, India is beginning to converge with those of Japan, the economic powerhouse of Asia, which being an island state is critically dependent on Pacific and Indian Ocean ‘maritime lifelines.’” 2 https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/files​/000407643​.pdf 3 This new concept of human security equates security with people rather than territories, with development rather than arms. Japan opts for a very concrete interpretation of the concept. Although Japan admits the double aspect of the concept—freedom from fear and freedom from want—it has gradually turned towards the aspects that link human security and liberation from extreme deprivation situations and refer to the structural causes that link security and development. As is known, this concept appeared for the first time in 1994 in the United Nations Human Development Report. Retrieved from: http://hdr​.undp​ .org​/en​/content​/human​-development​-report​-1994 4 This is a clear example of Japanese diplomacy in recent decades, whose objectives are focused on recognising Japan by the international community as a power with a positive sign, moving away from the idea of a militaristic, invading countries from World War II. The concept of human security fits very well with this idea of positive Japanese diplomacy revolving around the idea of the individual, on the humans. In this sense, Tanke (2021) points out that for Japan, complying with human security requirements positively affects its international identity and recognition. 5 There is an abundant bibliography in English about these two Agreements, in which, Berkofsky (2020) and Gilson, J. (2016) are magnificent examples. Spain, contribution to this analysis, to give an overview of the significance of these Agreements, especially from the European point of view, has leading authors like Cisneros Cristóbal, P. (2019), Gascón Marcén, A. (2019) or Tirado Robles, C. (2020). 6 This document recalls in its foreword that “economic growth in emerging and developing countries is becoming vital to the stable growth of the entire global economy,” and “as a responsible member of the international community, Japan needs to hold high the banner of ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’ based on the principle of international cooperation.” Retrieved from https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​ /policy​/oda​/page22e​_000860​.html 7 Defined in this document as a super-smart society where science, technology and innovation (STI) will also be strategically utilised in international collabo-

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8 9

10

11

12

ration to help address both domestic and international issues. Retrieved from https://www8​.cao​.go​.jp​/cstp​/kihonkeikaku​/5basicplan​_en​.pdf. It is a very brief document, with only ten points contained in three scarce pages in which the values shared by the two actors are revealed. Retrieved from https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/files​/000521432​.pdf Agreement between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership (OJ L 330, 27.12.2018, p. 3–899). Retrieved from: https://eur​-lex​.europa​.eu​ /legal ​ - content​ / EN​ / TXT/​ ? uri​ = CELEX​ % 3A22018A1227​ % 2801​ % 29​ & qid​ =1613297529020 and Strategic Partnership Agreement between the EU and the EU countries, on the one hand, and Japan, of the other (OJ L 216, 24.8.2018, p. 4–22). Retrieved from: https://eur​-lex​.europa​.eu​/legal​-content​/EN​/TXT/​?uri​ =CELEX​%3A22018A0824​%2801​%29​&qid​=1613297529020. The agreement has been provisionally applied, in areas such as the political dialogue and cooperation in regional and international organisations, since October 4, 2018. Retrieved from https://eur​-lex​.europa​.eu​/legal​-content​/ES​/ ALL/​?uri​=uriserv​%3AOJ​.L_​.2017​.237​.01​.0005​.01​.ENG#. In 94/578/E.C.: Council Decision of July 18, 1994, concerning the conclusion of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of India on Partnership and Development retrieved from: https:// eur​-lex​.europa​.eu​/legal​-content​/EN​/LSU/​?uri​=celex​%3A21994A0827​%2801​ %29. This Agreement includes the partnerships with countries in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation which also includes agreements with other countries in the region that are also interested in the FOIP proposal, such as the Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and Pakistan on partnership and development fields (Decision 2004/870/E.C.), the Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and Bangladesh on partnership and development (Decision 2001/332/E.C.) or the Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and Sri Lanka on Partnership and Development (Decision 95/129/E.C.). Nor should we forget the close relations established between the EU and ASEAN, which manifested in the European Parliament resolution of October 3, 2017, on EU political relations with ASEAN. Retrieved from https://www​.europarl​.europa​.eu​/doceo​/document​ /TA​-8​-2017​-0367​_EN​.html, and that has been staged for 23 years in the successive summits between the two international organisations, the last one held on December 1, 2020, via video conference, retrieved from: https://www​.consilium​.europa​.eu​/es​/press​/press​-releases​/2020​/12​/01​/co​-chairs​-press​-release​-of​ -the​-23rd​-asean​-eu​-ministerial​-meeting/. What allowed companies to send data from the EU to the US was an Adequacy Decision of the European Commission on the United States, known as the Privacy Shield (Decision 2016/1250), which was annulled by the CJEU last year (Judgment of the Court of July 16, 2020, Case C-311/18, Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd, Maximillian Schrems). Now the two sides are negotiating a new legal basis but are in force an agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on protecting personal information relating to the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences (OJ L 336, 10.12.2016). Regarding PNR Agreements (Passenger Name Record, for its acronym in English), these are some international agreements signed since 2004 between the European Union and the United States. Their purpose is to share specific data about passengers on commercial flights between Europe and North America. The objective of these agreements is the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist activities and certain transnational crimes. Some examples of specific agreements between the EU and the United States are the Agreement between

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13

14 15

16

17 18

the United States of America and the European Union on the protection of personal information relating to the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences (OJ L 336, 10.12.2016), Acquisition and cross-servicing Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America (OJ L 350, 22.12.2016), the EU-US Agreement on the use and transfer of PNR to the US Department of Homeland Security (OJ C 258E, 7.9.2013) or the Agreement on mutual recognition between the European Community and the United States of America. Joint Declaration (OJ L 31, 4.2.1999). Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Brussels, 16.9.2021 JOIN (2021) 24 final. Retrieved from: https://ec​.europa​.eu​/info​/sites​/default​/files​/jointcommunication​_indo​_pacific​_en​.pdf “Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia” (Retrieved from: https://www​.government​.nl​/documents​/publications​/2020​/11​/13​/indo​-pacific​-guidelines). In 2018, three Royal Navy ships deployed to the Indo-Pacific region: the HMS Albion and the frigates HMS Sutherland and HMS Argyll. In the same year, the UK opened a new naval support facility in Bahrain that will be capable of supporting the new aircraft carriers HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales (Vaughn, Mix and Belkin, 2018). In addition to the political or strategic reasons (López-Aranguren, 2022 or Iuppa. 2020), there also exist some obstacles of a legal nature: some Member States, like Italy, Greece, Portugal, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary, have committed themselves to the Chinese Belt and Road strategy, so in the case of these countries, joining an EU initiative about the FOIP would not be very welcome by China. But the most important impediment is found in the particularities of the EU as an international integration organisation. Given EU institutional structure, the conclusion one can draw is that to adopt a European commitment to the FOIP, the unanimous agreement of all 27 member states is mandatory. Currently, the 27 members do not have a unified vision of the FOIP; their interests are not the same and are, at times, divergent. Retrieved from: https://eeas​.europa​.eu​/headquarters​/headquarters​-homepage​ /94898​/eu​-needs​-strategic​-approach​-indo​-pacific​_en Céline Pajon, a few months ago, just pointed out these three key areas: maritime security, connectivity schemes and the promotion of the rule of law, areas that are clearly specified in these examples of concrete actions (“The EU-Japan partnership in the Indo-Pacific: opportunities and challenges,” ARI 31/2021, Retrieved from: http://www​.realinstitutoelcano​.org​/wps​/portal​/rielcano​_en​ /contenido​?WCM​_GLOBAL​_CONTEXT=​/elcano​/elcano​_in​/zonas​_in​/asia​ -pacific​/ari31​-2021​-pajon​-the​-eu​-japan​-partnership​-in​-the​-indo​-pacific​-opportunities​-and​-challenges.

References Berkofsky, A. (2020, April 9). Moving beyond rhetoric? The EU-Japan strategic partnership agreement (SPA). Institute for Security & Development Policy, Issue Brief (pp. 1–6). Retrieved from: https://isdp​.eu​/content​/uploads​/2020​/04​/EU​ -Japan​-SPA​-IB​-09​.04​.20​.pdf. Castellanos, R. (2020, September 8). Quad, la alianza para frenar a China en el Indo-Pacífico. El Orden Mundial. Retrieved from: https://elordenmundial​.com​/ quad​-alianza​-china​-india​-japon​-australia​-estados​-unidos​-asia/.

Free and Open Indo-Pacific  217 Cho, I.H. (2019, November 21). Dueling hegemony: China’s BRI and America’s free and open Indo-Pacific strategy. The Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, vol. 2, no. 4, Air University Press. Retrieved from: https://www​.airuniversity​.af​.edu​/JIPA​/ Display​/Article​/2017062​/volume​-02​-issue​-04​-winter​-2019/. Cisneros Cristóbal, P. (2019). El acuerdo de asociación económica entre la Unión Europea y Japón: negociación, contenido y análisis de los elementos clave. In C. Tirado Robles and F. Barberán Pelegrín (Coords.) Derecho y relaciones internacionales en Japón: Desde el Tratado de Amistad, Comercio y Navegación de 1868 (pp. 173–210). Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza. Delage Carretero, F. (2021). El dilema Indo-Pacífico de la ASEAN. Global Affairs Journal, no. 2, March. Retrieved from: https://www​.unav​.edu​/documents​ /16800098​/20568125​/Articulo​_Fernando​+Delage​.pdf​/67c96b9d​-0ae1​-577e​ -bfc7​-3fd28645a9d6. Duchâtel, M. and Moham, G. (2020, October 30). Franco-German divergences in the Indo-Pacific: The risk of strategic dilution. Institut Montagne, Blog. Retrieved from: https://www​.institutmontaigne​.org​/en​/blog​/franco​-german​-divergences​ -indo​-pacific​-risk​-strategic​-dilution. Esteban, M. (2016, November 17). Trump y el baile de alianzas en el Sudeste Asiático. ARI 80/2016. Real Instituto Elcano. Retrieved from: http://www​ .realinstitutoelcano​.org​/wps​/portal​/rielcano​_es​/contenido​?WCM​_GLOBAL​_ CONTEXT=​/elcano​/elcano​_es​/zonas​_es​/asia​-pacifico​/ari80​-2016​-esteban​-trump​ -baile​-de​-alianzas​-en​-el​-sudeste​-asiatico. Esteban, M. and Armanini, U. (2020, February 4). The EU-Japan connectivity partnership: A sustainable initiative is awaiting materialisation. ARI 12/2020. Real Instituto Elcano. Retrieved from: http://www​.realinstitutoelcano​.org​/wps​/ wcm​/connect​/30f63c6d​-ae1a​-49f2​-b52b​-86d7c7935dc9​/ARI12​-2020​-Esteban​ -Armanini​-EU​-Japan​-connectivity​-partnership​-sustainable​-initiative​-awaiting​ -materialisation​.pdf​?MOD​=AJPERES​&CACHE​​ID​=30​​f63c6​​d​-ae1​​a​-49f​​2​-b52​​b​ -86d​​7c793​​5dc9.​ Esteban, M. and Armanini, U. (2021, March 10). European Indo-Pacific strategies: Convergent thinking and shared limitations. ARI 30/2021. Real Instituto Elcano. Retrieved from: http://www​.realinstitutoelcano​.org​/wps​/portal​/rielcano​ _en​/contenido​?WCM​_GLOBAL​_CONTEXT=​/elcano​/elcano​_in​/zonas​_in​/ari30​ -2021​-esteban​-armanini​-european​-indo​-pacific​-strategies​-convergent​-thinking​ -and​-shared​-limitations. Gascón Marcén, A. (2019). Las relaciones entre Japón y la Unión Europea: pasos hacia una auténtica relación estratégica. In C. Tirado Robles and F. Barberán Pelegrín (Coords.) Derecho y relaciones internacionales en Japón: Desde el Tratado de Amistad, Comercio y Navegación de 1868 (pp. 211–244). Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza. Gascón Marcén, A. (2020, February 4). Society 5.0: EU-Japanese cooperation and the opportunities and challenges posed by the data economy. ARI 11/2020. Real Instituto Elcano. Retrieved from: http://www​.realinstitutoelcano​.org​/wps​/portal​ /rielcano​_en​/contenido​?WCM​_GLOBAL​_CONTEXT=​/elcano​/elcano​_in​/zonas​ _in​/asia​-pacific​/ari11​-2020​-gascon​-society​-5​-0​-eu​-japanese​-cooperation​-and​ -opportunities​-and​-challenges​-posed​-by​-data​-economy. Gilson, J. (2016). The strategic partnership agreement between the EU and Japan: The pitfalls of path dependency. Revue d’integration europeenne=Journal of European integration, vol. 38, no. 7, pp. 791–806.

218  Carmen Tirado Robles Gover, T. (2019, January 22). Trump’s “Asia pivot” a well-timed move: Jakarta Post contributor. The Straits Times. Retrieved from: https://www​.straitstimes​ .com​/asia​/se​-asia​/trumps​-asia​-pivot​-a​-well​-timed​-movejakarta​-post​-contributor. Guitton, A. (2019). Quelle stratégie pour la France en Indo-Pacifique? Les Grands Dossiers de Diplomatie, no.53, La démographie: un enjeu géopolitique majeur, Juin–Juillet. Heritage, A. and Lee, P.K. (2021, January 8). ‘Global Britain’: The UK in the IndoPacific. The Diplomat. Retrieved from: https://thediplomat​.com​/2021​/01​/global​ -britain​-the​-uk​-in​-the​-indo​-pacific/. Heydarian, R. (2020, September 5). Germany wades into the Indo-Pacific fray. Asia Times. Retrieved from https://asiatimes​.com​/2020​/09​/germany​-wades​-into​-the​ -indo​-pacific​-fray/. Hosoya, Y. (2019, January). FOIP 2.0: The evolution of Japan’s free and open IndoPacific strategy. Asia Pacific Review, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 18–28. https​:doi​.org​/10​ .1080​/13439006​.2019​.​1622868. Iuppa, G. (2020). An ‘Indo-Pacific’ outlook for the European Union. European Institute for Asian Studies, Briefing paper 7/2020. Retrieved from: https://www​ .eias​.org​/wp​-content​/uploads​/2019​/07​/IPO​-Briefing​-Paper​.pdf. Khurana, G.S. (2007). Security of sea lines: Prospects for India–Japan cooperation. Strategic Analysis, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 139–153. https​:doi​.org​/10​.1080​ /097001607013​55485. López-Aranguren, J. L. (2022). La proyección estratégica de la UE en el IndoPacífico. Cuadernos Europeos De Deusto, no. 3, January., pp. 29–49. https://doi​ .org​/10​.18543​/ced​-03​-2022pp29​-49. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2006). Policy speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 165th session of the diet. September 29, 2006. Retrieved from: https:// japan​.kantei​.go​.jp​/abespeech​/2006​/09​/29speech​_e​.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2007). Confluence of the two seas. Speech by HE Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India, August 22, 2007. Retrieved from: https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/region​/asia​-paci​ /pmv0708​/speech​-2​.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2016). Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the opening session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI), August 27, 2016. Retrieved from: https://www​.mofa​ .go​.jp​/afr​/af2​/page4e​_000496​.html. Mulgan, A. (2016). Securitizing the TPP in Japan: Policymaking structure and discourse. Asia Policy, no. 22, July (pp. 193–222). Retrieved from: https://www​ .jstor​.org​/stable​/pdf​/24905123​.pdf​?refreqid​=excelsior​%3A7​b645​14e9​9778​d369​ efb9​6154​9a38ea8. Nagy, S. (2018, July 24). It is too early to write off the Indo-Pacific strategy. The Japan Times. Retrieved from: https://www​.japantimes​.co​.jp​/opinion​/2018​/07​/24​/ commentary​/japan​-commentary​/early​-write​-off​-indo​-pacific​-strategy/. Nagy, S. (2019, April 7). A key role for Japan in the Indo-Pacific. The Japan Times. Retrieved from: https://www​.japantimes​.co​.jp​/opinion​/2019​/04​/07​/commentary​/ japan​-commentary​/key​-role​-japan​-indo​-pacific/. Ossorio Torres, M. (2020). La apuesta de Japón ante los desafíos globales actuales: análisis de las políticas de cooperación internacional y de ayuda oficial al desarrollo. Mirai. Estudios japoneses, no. 4. https://doi​.org​/10​.5209​/mira​.67538.

Free and Open Indo-Pacific  219 Retrieved from: https://revistas​.ucm​.es​/index​.php​/MIRA​/article​/view​/67538​ /4564456553819. Pajon, C. (2021). The EU-Japan partnership in the Indo-Pacific: Opportunities and challenges. ARI 31. Retrieved from: http://www​.realinstitutoelcano​.org​/wps​ /portal​/rielcano​_en​/contenido​?WCM​_GLOBAL​_CONTEXT=​/elcano​/elcano​ _in​/zonas​_in​/asia​-pacific​/ari31-​ 2021​-pajon​-the​-eu​-japan​-partnership​-in​-the​-indo​ -pacific​-opportunities​-and​-challenges. Sato, Y. (2019). Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The old geography and the new strategic reality. The Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, vol. 2, no. 4, Air University Press. Retrieved from: https://www​.airuniversity​.af​.edu​/JIPA​/Display​/Article​ /2017062​/volume​-02​-issue​-04​-winter​-2019/. Strangio, S. (2020, November 18). Following France and Germany, the Netherlands pivots to the Indo-Pacific. The Diplomat. Retrieved from: https://thediplomat​ .com​/2020​/11​/following​-france​-and​-germany​-the​-netherlands​-pivots​-to​-the​-indo​ -pacific/. Tanke, S. (2021). Japan’s narrative on human security: International norms, diplomatic identity and recognition. Japan Forum, vol. 32, no. 4. https://doi​.org​ /10​.1080​/09555803​.2021​.1876140. Retrieved from: https://www​.tandfonline​ .com​/doi​/full​/10​.1080​/09555803​.2021​.1876140​?scroll​=top​&needAccess​=true. Thankachan, S. (2021). India and the free and open Indo-Pacific: Present. Global Affairs Journal, No. March 2. Retrieved from: https://www​.unav​.edu​/documents​ /16800098​/20568125​/Articulo​_Shahana​+Thankachan​.pdf​/f53917a9​-a0a5​-81a5​ -f44b​-4ad01d747ea9. Tirado Robles, C. (2019). La reforma de la política de seguridad y defensa japonesa ¿un paso previo a la reforma constitucional? Ascenso del nuevo espacio IndoPacífico (pp. 231–241). Mira Editores/Fundación Seminario de investigación para la paz, Zaragoza. Tirado Robles, C. (2020). Acuerdo UE-Japón. In A. Blanc Altemir (Dir.) La Unión Europea, promotora del libre comercio. Análisis e impacto de los principales acuerdos comerciales (pp. 51–74). Thomson Reuters Aranzadi. Vaughn, B., Mix, D.E. and Belkin, P. (2018, December 20). France, the United Kingdom, and the free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP): Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, In Focus. Retrieved from: https://fas​.org​/sgp​/crs​ /row​/IF11052​.pdf. Yamamoto, R. (2020). Understanding Abe’s free and open Indo-Pacific vision through Japan’s development assistance. Issues & Insights, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 7–11. Yorizumi, W. (2019, March 14). What TPP means for Japan and the Global economy. Nippon​ .com​ . Retrieved from: https://www​.nippon​.com​/en​/in​-depth​/ d00472​/what​-tpp​-means​-for​-japan​-and​-the​-global​-economy​.html#.

Part 4

The Quest for Economic Framework



Chapter 13

The Search for Alternatives in the Indo-Pacific The Blue Dot Network and the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative Anil Wadhwa

13.1 Introduction Whether it is the Western Pacific, Australia and Japan or the Line of Actual Control on the Indo-Chinese border, the Indo-Pacific faces the brunt of China’s aggression, unjustified territorial claims, bullying and policies aimed at cornering resources. China has continued with the occupation and artificial creation of islands, their militarisation in disputed waters of the South China Sea and incidents of denial of fishing, passage and drilling in territorial waters claimed by countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, etc. have intensified. It regularly intrudes into Japanese territorial waters in the East China Sea off its Senkaku islands and has stepped up incursions in the Taiwanese waters and airspace. China has advanced territorial claims on specious grounds, but it has been emboldened due to the effect of COVID-19 on the economies of the region. China has used intensive outreach to neutralise growing unease by assisting selected ASEAN countries in the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. It has also advanced subsidised 5G telecommunications networks and established a dependency wherever possible. In infrastructure, China has a formidable presence in many countries of the region through its Belt and Road Initiative. Countries affected have responded with a mixture of protests, trepidation, appeasement, balancing and haplessness. China has ensured a lack of consensus within ASEAN on its actions. Given the lack of adequate resources and funding available in the world today, most countries in the ASEAN and the Pacific Islands cannot but view China as an economic opportunity, closing their eyes to its aggression and aggrandisement.

13.2 Rising China in the Indo-Pacific As Chinese power and influences rise, even as the US influences wane, China’s aggressive Indo-Pacific policies have been used to bolster its economic and military strategies and further enhance its overall gross national strength. In 2013, President Xi Jin Ping first revealed details of the Silk Road Economic DOI: 10.4324/9781003342311-18

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Belt in Kazakhstan and later, the Maritime Silk Road in Indonesia.1 These proposals resulted in the “One Belt One Road” or the “Belt and Road Initiative.” The Belt and Road Initiative has eventually boiled down to infrastructure development, but its geostrategic ramifications have been felt widely. The United States endorsed the Japanese idea of the “Free and Open Indo Pacific,” intending to counter the growing geostrategic dominance by China. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the Indo-Pacific has been the primary theatre of geostrategic competition due to the Belt and Road projects and the consequent changes it has brought about in Chinese thinking. India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are affected by the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative activity which runs through the Pakistan-occupied Indian territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Japan came up with an alternative “Quality Infrastructure” plan and initially set aside US$200 billion for infrastructure in the countries where China was using the Belt and Road rollout to make inroads. President Trump was clear, and the US National Security Strategy unveiled during his tenure articulated this—that it was China that was seeking to displace the United States in the Indo Pacific and beyond by coercing countries and pushing its own brand of governance. The United States sees China’s militarisation of artificial and other disputed islands in the South China Sea as an attempt to restrict the free movement of trade which undermines regional stability.2 Many analysts see the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, riding on the back of a financially flushed and dominant China, as a disturbing expansion of Chinese dominance. The initiative is opaque and has stoked concerns about high debt levels and Chinese control, leading to acquiring strategic infrastructures like ports and airports. Moreover, the Belt and Road Initiative is increasingly being seen by many as a fig leaf for military expansion. However, governments in the region and beyond have struggled to offer an appealing and competing alternative. For the moment, it seems that the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative will continue to influence the geopolitics of the world, especially the Indo-Pacific. The objective of preserving Chinese economic motives is bound to increase the role of the Chinese PLA and Navy, which, in turn, will drive and exacerbate insecurity among other regional and outside powers who have a stake in the Indo-Pacific. To meet the challenge of growing Chinese influence and threats perceived by the others in the Indo-Pacific and beyond has obviously drawn attention from those adversely affected.3 One of the ways forward, for example, is for the Quad countries to work together on infrastructure projects as an alternative to the Chinese BRI by pooling resources. This would include funding made available by various countries at different stages for the region like Japanese FDI in ASEAN, Leading Asia’s Private Sector Infrastructure Fund (LEAP) created by ADB with JICA; the US$60 billion funding—through the (BUILD) Act and the US$1.5 billion appropriations per year up to 5 years through (ARIA) Act of the United States, as well as an Aus. $2

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billion funds for infrastructure advanced by Australia for the Pacific region. The 14 members of the FIPIC grouping (Forum for India Pacific Island Cooperation) are provided US$200,000 each year by India for developmental projects. This is in addition to the ASEAN India fund, the ASEAN India Green fund and the US$1 billion credit facility announced for digital and infrastructure connectivity in 2015. These resources can be pooled for a few model projects as capability demonstrators. India also can consider joining others in specific infrastructure projects. Japan and India, for example, have always expressed the hope of working together in infrastructure-related projects in the Indo-Pacific, although they have nothing to show for their intentions. Japanese companies have not been enamoured by the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor proposal (since Japanese companies had inadequate supply chain linkages with Africa as opposed to Asia). In contrast, the Japanese/Indian project of jointly developing the East Container Terminal in Colombo, Sri Lanka, has been denied by the current government, citing trade union pressure, but many attributes this development to Chinese pressure and instigation. It remains to be seen if the alternate proposal to allow Indian and Japanese Companies to develop the West Container Terminal in Colombo will go through smoothly, without Chinese subterfuge and impediments. The United States sees the Chinese creating unsustainable debt burdens in the Indo-Pacific countries, resulting in strategic concessions. The Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Trilateral Forum was initiated in 2018 as an alternative by the United States, Japan and Australia to enable their private sector to engage with their respective governments for investing in connectivity and infrastructure projects in the region. The US Congress also passed a BUILD (Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development) Act in the same year to meet the challenge by China in the countries of the Indo-Pacific. An Indo-Pacific Business Forum was organised in Thailand in November 2019 by the United States, Japan and Australia. It was here that the Blue Dot Network concept was unveiled. In addition, the three partners (who are also militarily aligned) conveyed that they planned to certify infrastructure projects including ports, roads and bridges around the world (with a focus on the Indo-Pacific), which will meet higher levels related to development and construction as far as safety, transparency, accountability and sustainability are concerned.4 The stated purpose was for private investors—including Insurance and Pension Funds—to have the confidence that along with the government, they could get ready to meet the requirements for infrastructure, estimated at US$94 trillion over the next two decades in the world. Closer to home, the ADB expects that the infrastructural needs of the Indo-Pacific alone could be worth US$1.7 trillion a year through 2030— the reason why China is interested in the largest share of the spoils. The idea is promising but faces questions many months after announcing the system to be followed for certification and funding. There will not be any desire on

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the part of recipient countries to use more of their funds while waiting much longer for infrastructure needs which are invariably urgent—as compared to, for example, the Chinese BRI funds—and these are questions that will need satisfactory answers if the initiative is to succeed.

13.3 Blue Dot Network The Blue Dot Network announcement followed the US International Developmental Finance Corporation (DFC) establishment in 2018, which was a replacement for the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). The DFC is now in possession of at least twice the financial prowess (up to US$60 billion) of the OPIC; it can invest in equity instead of merely lending. It supports US foreign policy objectives and is modelled on the Japan Board for International Cooperation (JBIC) and the development finance arm of Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). The effort requires regional partners, and India, which has championed the cause of free choices in the region and has come up with cogent arguments in opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative, is ideally placed to assume this role. This model has already been successfully demonstrated. In 2019, a US-Japan joint statement announced a US$10 billion investment in LNG and expedited private funding for this purpose. Another announced project related to “Smart Cities” in ASEAN. In India, a similar investment has already taken place in the training of procurement professionals in the state of Maharashtra. In addition, there are ongoing US projects to help Indo-Pacific countries evaluate contracts and debt sustainability. USAID is now partnering with India’s Development Partnership Administration for cooperation in third countries.5 Discussions are on with the EU and others for cooperating in the framework of the Blue Dot Initiative. The G20 grouping agreed on principles for quality infrastructure in Osaka in 2019. There will be a natural tendency for many other countries to endorse and adopt these principles.6 The G7 Charlevoix Commitment on Innovative Financing for Development, as well as the Equator Principles, which recommended that financial institutions assess and manage environmental and social risks in power-related infrastructure, will also become relevant in this context. Japan’s vision of taking the lead in building consensus on the “principles for Quality Infrastructure investment,” which is the bedrock of the Blue Dot Network, has come to fruition. The lending practices of the Chinese banks are not transparent. Since the Blue Dot Initiative has not fleshed out these terms, it is not easy to compare them. However, the stated purpose clearly points to transparency in lending practices for the projects under the initiative. When it was launched, the three governments espoused that the Blue Dot Initiative was not a response to any other initiative like the Belt and Road. Neither was competing with

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China in this regard. The United States, though, has an interest in promoting infrastructure by bringing innovative companies, technical expertise and the rule of law principles to combine with pension and insurance funds wanting returns. The governments of the three countries, unlike China, cannot fund the infrastructure needs. However, they can mitigate the environmental, health, social and safety, inflation and foreign exchange risk by taking equity and lending support to these projects, which would leverage private capital, thus enhancing and building confidence. India has not joined this initiative yet, but India’s particular interest is that under the Blue Dot Network, transparency and financial viability will be the critical standards for infrastructure initiatives undertaken in the region of Indo-Pacific and its vicinity.7 India has already used the publicprivate partnership model for several infrastructure projects, particularly in this century. Despite this, the country has a large infrastructure deficit, and some essential projects leading up to 2040 can significantly benefit from these standards, transparent funding and related requirements.8 The Blue Dot Network cannot be seen as a counter to the Belt and Road Initiative because it does not provide easy funding with few questions asked and can be a cumbersome way of fulfilling infrastructure needs.9 The Initiative will require enormous refining for the following reasons: First, developing poorer countries, short of funds always look for direct and easy finances which the Blue Dot Network cannot provide unlike the Belt and Road Initiative which provides immediate, short-term financial relief. Second, the Blue Dot Network will require a complex coordinating network to be put in place amongst diverse institutions across countries for grading projects against specific standards. According to analyst Ozeke Herguner Bilgen, the Belt and Road initiate can be likened to a “doer.” At the same time, the Blue Dot Initiative can be equated with a “certifier.”10 Nevertheless, the initiative has evoked a strong response in China. The “Global Times” of China reacted in November 2019 by conveying that the Blue Dot Network will certainly not succeed. The narrative from China opined that if the United States sought to bring countries to its camp and force them to choose between China and the rest who offer costly and cumbersome initiatives, it would be detrimental to the host nations in Asia in particular and the region at large by acting as a destabiliser. The way forward is to standardise large, symbolic projects with transparent financing and complete the much-needed projects on time. Private capital cannot match Chinese State Capital. The emphasis on high infrastructure standards will not deter Southeast Asian countries if China continues to disburse faster, risk-averse and more responsive funds instead of reliance on opaque bank funding.11 On its part, India needs to modernise infrastructure finance. India also needs to provide incentives through policy intervention and create a flourishing market in corporate finance so that the large projects become transparent. The silver lining is that the Blue Dot Network projects

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will raise money from across the world at competitive rates due to the transparency and standards it will bring. All in all, the partners in the Blue Dot Network need to increase the pool of projects which carry adequate funding; and provide technical help to the Indo-Pacific countries to manage the Belt and Road Initiative Projects, e.g., through the multilateral development banks, which could be seen as politically neutral technical arbiters.

13.4 Resilient Supply Chain: Impact of COVID-19 Just as the Blue Dot Network was unleashed and was being talked about as emerging as an alternative initiative to the Chinese Belt and Road approach, the pandemic hit across the world with full force in 2020. The outbreak of the pandemic brought about an unprecedented halt in manufacturing operations across countries. This resulted in a supply disruption beyond the countries’ preparedness for usual contingencies. Over the past few decades, China and a few other countries have emerged as manufacturing hubs in the Indo-Pacific. Multiple factors such as economies of scale, lower labour costs, access to technology, government support to industry etc. drove this trend in China. This also led to the development of new sea routes for trade and, consequently, favourable sea freight and, in turn, further concentration of manufacturing. With the onset of the pandemic, the economic benefits of this strategy started to be compared with the supply chain risks and consequent risk of a complete shutdown in operations that emerge from this approach of outsourcing manufacturing, and therefore creating dependencies. Diversification then emerged as a prominent risk mitigation measure. This trend coincided with the aggressive policies of China in the region, which targeted several countries, using trade as a weapon, bringing in fears of supply chain disruptions caused by overdependence. The latest in this direction is the Chinese attempts to tighten and control exports of rare earths from China to countries like Japan, creating artificial barriers and delays for Australian imports. Several countries, therefore, started reducing their import reliance and diversifying their sourcing centres to ensure business continuity. The COVID-19 pandemic has forced thinking about the security of supply chains, reliable sources and reliance on trustworthy digital technologies and critical raw materials, such as Lithium and rare earth minerals. To begin with, trade tensions between the United States and China, which preceded the pandemic, and got exacerbated in 2020, have accelerated the breakup of the world’s technology supply chains. This is exemplified by the US officials contacting Taiwanese chipmakers to draw them over to an affiliation with the United States instead of continuing as suppliers of China. As a result, consumer electronics makers have been rethinking their China exposure, with Taiwanese companies such as Casetek, Wistron and Merry

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selling important assets to Chinese companies.12 US companies have also been forced to limit their China ambitions due to geopolitical realities. A new system of regional—rather than global—supply chains now appears likely to emerge, emphasising “nearshoring.” Countries like India, which has an ample supply of cost-effective labour and technical talent, obviously want to use this opportunity to galvanise manufacturing and work with other like-minded countries in the region to reduce China’s dependency factor. Last year, the Japanese government set aside the US$2.3 billion for the shift of critical industries from China to Japan, out of which 10% was set aside for a shift to the Southeast Asian countries, India and Bangladesh. However, in this proposed shift, except for a few companies in the electronics sector, India has been left behind by countries like Vietnam, Taiwan and Thailand, which have been the preferred destinations for most such companies. The main challenges that India will need to overcome in this endeavour are administrative and regulatory hurdles, cheaper credit, easing of land acquisitions, improvement of infrastructure, reduction in logistics costs by making this sector more efficient and regulating a huge unorganised manufacturing sector.13 So, this initiative by India to woo companies out of China has met with limited success, it was around the same time that the Summit meeting between Japan and India was anticipated, and one of the issues on the agenda which Japan brought in was cooperation in the field of resilient supply chains. With this agenda on their minds, the Commerce and Industry Ministers of India, Japan and Australia put forward an initiative at a virtual meeting on September 1, 2020, where they spoke about the need for a free, fair, inclusive, non-discriminatory, transparent, predictable and stable trade and investment environment and in the light of the pandemic disruption, to shun protectionism.14 There were also discussions at the working level among senior officials in the weeks leading up to this meeting. The necessity and potential to enhance supply chain resilience in the Indo-Pacific were flagged as necessary, and the need for regional cooperation was recognised. The officials were directed to work out details of the new initiative. Other countries in the region were called upon to participate in the initiative. There was recognition that business organisations, individuals, universities, thinktanks will need to contribute to the success of this initiative. Underlying this initiative was the realisation that price fluctuations and availability of critical products will require diversification of supply chains to mitigate the risks of overdependence on a particular source for inputs. As per an Indian Ministry of Commerce Press Release issue on this occasion, the idea was to provide the core pathway for linking value chains in the region by creating a network of reliable long-term supplies and appropriate capacities. There is a clear realisation that it is vital to work with countries

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with a similar bent of thinking to be dependable suppliers for ensuring resiliency in the region’s supply chains. Japan has already launched cooperation with the ASEAN over supply chains and will find it easier to dovetail this initiative with its ASEAN linkages.15 The Indian minister Piyush Goyal identified market-oriented policies, demography, growth potential, fiscal state of play, including existing debt burdens and geopolitical strategy as important parameters to identify like-minded countries and partners. Accordingly, the Resilient Supply Chains Initiative was formally launched on April 28, 2021. In 2019, India, Japan and Australia’s combined GDP were US$9.3 trillion, and their trade in goods and services was US$2.7 trillion and US$0.9 trillion, respectively. First and foremost, therefore, these countries must increase the share of their own trade and investment in the Indo-Pacific. This, however, is lacking so far. For instance, between Japan and India, Indian and Japanese global exports were doing well in many products, but the exports from India to Japan, for a competitive product, were limited. This is common for many products, especially agricultural produce, steel, agrochemicals, plastics, carpets, clothing, footwear, marine products, etc. The Resilient Supply Chains Initiative, therefore, should also help these partners to enhance their trade. In this context, the Australia-India agreement on cooperation on critical minerals and rare earths is especially relevant, as these two countries have a complementary interest. While Australia is keen to find alternative export markets for its minerals, India needs rare earths to bolster its advanced manufacturing sector and its e-mobility programme. If the initiative is successful, the partners can look to replicate the model in the Quad context. This was discussed in the Quad meeting in Tokyo on October 6, 2020. There was an agreement to set up a working group on critical and emerging technologies (such as telecom and biotechnology) and their new standards, innovation and supply chains. Most of the Quad countries have China as their most prolific trading partner and each of the Quad partners imports more from China than from its other partners in the Quad. The United States remains the largest export market for Japan and India. Therefore, there is a need to create larger interdependencies within the Quad. Australia and India have taken some internal steps to help roll out the initiative. In Australia, PM Scott Morison has unveiled a plan on October 4, 2020 to invest US$107 million in a new supply chain resilience initiative and spend more than US$1.7 billion on a “modern manufacturing initiative” focused on six priority areas for support. “Supply chain resilience” will focus after the COVID-19 pandemic exposed Australia to the risks of not having enough capacity to quickly ramp up production of many critical items like personal protective equipment. After the trade retaliatory measures undertaken by the Chinese against Australia across the board, the government is keen to reduce this dependency as much as possible. In

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order to make India an attractive global hub for the manufacturing, the government of India has reduced the corporate tax rate to 25% and rolled out the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) and the Phased Manufacturing Plan (PMP) schemes. The PLI incentive scheme has already been rolled out for electronics and Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs). As per the IBEF website, Ibef​.or​g, on November 10, 2021, the Indian government approved a package extending the Production Linked Investment Scheme to ten more sectors—Advance Chemistry cell (ACC) battery, electric/technology products, Textile products: MMF Segment and technical textiles, Automobiles and Auto Components, food products, pharmaceuticals and drugs, White goods (Air Conditioners, LEDs), telecom and networking products, high-efficiency solar PV modules and speciality steel. This has now been extended to three more sectors, including telecom. The scheme should encourage design-led manufacturing and ensure benefits flow to the micro, small and medium enterprises. Under the PLI scheme, the incentive to each sector will be for a 5–7-year period, and the quantum of the incentive will be based on India’s pricing differential vis-à-vis other competing nations in those areas. Overall, the government has identified 24 focus sectors as part of its manufacturing push under the PLI and PMP schemes. These include footwear, ethanol, ready processed food, aluminium, gym equipment, glass and ceramics, toys and sporting goods, drones, robotics and electric vehicle equipment. Of these, a few sectors have been identified as priorities with potential for domestic manufacturing and import substitution through import restrictions and quality control orders such as toys and footwear. Senior officials of India, Japan and Australia are initially focused on their trade with the rest of the world—from commodities to the steps of completed products in ten key sectors. These sectors are petroleum and petrochemicals, automobiles, steel, pharmaceuticals, textiles and garments, marine products, financial services, IT services, tourism and travel services and Skill development. This list will go through further consultations. Each country is bound to have its favourite sectors. However, there is a need for specific steps to bring about resilient supply chains amongst themselves, including facilitation of trade and investment and diversifying production base to their own countries or common partners. The ministers identified the need to use their full capabilities, digitisation of trade procedures and adopt electronic documents necessary for facilitating trade and ensuring that resilience is built up in supply chains. Usually, an initiative such as this would require the participants to agree on preferential investment rules, key tariffs specific to these supply chains, quality standards, rules of origin for determining value addition, cross-border data flow rules and dispute settlement mechanisms.16 However, from all accounts, and given the geostrategic situation in the region, all three participants are keen to launch the initiative as early as possible, utilise the existing

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bilateral agreements between countries and, as they go along, put in place further measures for trade facilitation and work with as many like-minded partners as possible in the Indo-Pacific region to bring about diversification and reduce dependency. After all, in the post-COVID world, countries will look foremost to invest in partnerships with nations they can rely upon and trust to act consistently with their agreements—be it on trade, infrastructure, defence, supply chains, cyberspace or technology.

13.5 Conclusion The fact that the initiative has still not been fleshed out despite the stated intention to do so by the end of 2020 has raised some critical questions on the success of the supply chain resilience initiative.17 The degree of conviction and convergence is significant in this respect. India would look to the Australian market, for instance, for the pharmaceutical industry, Japan to India for the automobile industry and Australia to India and Japan for agriculture and dairy and food processing industry. ASEAN is unlikely to partially decouple from China due to Chinese offshoring in their countries. India, Australia and Japan have faced aggression from China and will be more inclined to do so, just like the United States, which sees China as a geostrategic threat in the technological and strategic space. However, even here, the economic dependency factor will be important for Japanese, Australian and Indian companies. The other constraint arises from picking specific sectors as winners—like semiconductors, medical devices, textiles, chemicals, rare earths and automobile components. Each partner country will naturally have specific sectors which it will back. There will be a temptation to reduce tariffs on intermediate products while increasing them for finished products, thus distorting trade. With its large market, supply networks and reliable infrastructure along with a still affordable labour force, China offers a big attraction, and companies are still wary of shifting to other markets even if their home countries would like them to do so. Reconfiguration for high investment sectors is also difficult post-Covid. Better supply chain management will require a focus on technology, freer cross-border data flows and strengthening of digital trade protocols. Countries will need to adopt better economic policies and improve both forward and backward linkages to effectively benefit from resilient supply chains. Country-specific steps are necessary if the initiative is to succeed. India, for instance, needs to simplify labour laws, improve infrastructure and improve its digital economy. Japan needs enhanced productivity, and Australia needs to mitigate the effects of high wages. The United States needs to improve and protect its technological progress. To sum up, the enabling environment in the partner countries aims to improve their supply chain resilience in a cooperative manner, which needs real focus and improvement.

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Notes 1 Jiang, Li Ming (2020), “The Belt and Road Initiative; geo-economics and Indo Pacific security competition,” International Affairs, Volume 96, Issue 1, January 2020, pp. 169–187, https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/ia​/iiz240. 2 Indian Express (2020), “What is the Blue Dot Network, on the table during Trump visit to India,” February 26, 2020,  accessed February 17, 2021. 3 Rajah, Roland (2020), “Mobilising the Indo Pacific infrastructure response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative in South East Asia,” Lowy Institute, April 30, 2020,  accessed February 13, 2021. 4 Mercy, Kuo A. (2020), “Blue Dot Network: The Belt and Road alternative,” The Diplomatist, April 7, 2020,  accessed February 15, 2021. 5 Kartha, Tara (2020), “Why India US thrust on Blue Dot Network may make China see Red?”, in The Print, February 28, 2020,  accessed on February 13, 2021. 6 US Department of State. (2019), Blue Dot Network, November 4, 2019. 7 Basu, Nayanima (2020), “Blue Dot Network – US answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative that India’s interested in,” The Print, March 10, 2020,  accessed February 17, 2021. 8 Economic Times (2020), “Blue Dot Network a worthy initiative,” Editorial, February 27, 2020,  accessed February 10, 2021. 9 Rajah, Roland (2020), “Mobilising the Indo Pacific infrastructure response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative in South East Asia,” Lowy Institute, April 30, 2020,  accessed February 13, 2021. 10 Ozeke, Herguner Bilgen (2020), “A new global infrastructure initiative: The Blue Dot Network,” Lexology, October 16, 2020,  accessed February 10, 2021. 11 Walden, Max (2019), “What is the Blue Dot Network and is it really the West’s response to China’s Belt and Road project?”, ABC News, November 9, 2019,  accessed on February 7, 2021. 12 Kynge Janes Nikkei: new cold War speeds up Asia’s supply chain break up. 13 Indian Express (2021), “India not a preferred place for firms leaving China,” February 15, 2021,  accessed on February 19, 2021. 14 Palit, Amitendu (2020), “The resilient supply chain initiative: Reshaping economics through geopolitics,” The Diplomat, September 10, 2020,  accessed February 13, 2021. 15 Sharma, Kiran (2020), “Japan, India and Australia aim to steer supply chains around China,” Nikkei Asia, September 1, 2020,  accessed February 10, 2021. 16 Palit, Amitendu (2020), “The resilient supply chain initiative: Reshaping economics through geopolitics,” The Diplomat, September 10, 2020,  accessed February 13, 2021. 17 Heydon, Key (2020), “Open Forum: Supply chain cooperation comes to the fore,” Open Forum, September 25, 2020,  accessed February 7, 2021.

Chapter 14

Economic Architecture in the Indo-Pacific Region India’s Tryst Srabani Roy Choudhury

14.1 Introduction The world’s economic growth and development were fuelled by international trade and resulted in global integration. Governed by General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) and then taken over by World Trade Organization (1995), the open trade system, international capital flow and investment grew by 8.2% per year, and between 1980 and 2011, the global trade in goods and services grew from US$2.7 trillion in 1980 to US$23 trillion by 2011.1 The economic conditions’ deterioration started in the second half of 2018 and further in 2019 due to trade tensions between the United States of America and China, fears of a disorderly Brexit in Europe and a negative global output outlook. In addition, available data for 2020 indicate a sharp decline in trade growth (about 8%),2 largely due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Global trade and investment growth were pinned on various types of agreements between nations to enable growth through “comparative advantage.” The composition of trade became complex as services gained weight within the basket of goods and services and called for new directions to address the movement of services. The advances in communication, information technology and continuous progress in shipping and containerisation shrunk time, distance, reduced cost and digitised many services. The liberalised trade order led by the US and dominated by G7 in World Trade Organization found discussions in the Doha Global Round of Trade negotiation (2001) politically unwieldy as new political heavyweights of emerging nations—China, Brazil, India, South Africa—had differing agenda. This demanded a more polycentric approach with concessions to the emerging nations, resulting in an inconclusive end to the negotiations in the Doha round, leaving open countries to work out alternative means of engaging in trade and investment both at bilateral and multilateral levels. The resultant outcome was a proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTA), free trade agreements (FTA) and economic partnership agreements (EPA). These became the “dominant method of regulating DOI: 10.4324/9781003342311-19

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international economic relations,” predominantly to liberalise trade in goods and services (Mansfield and Milner, 2012). This idea caught the attention of nations in Asia. Starting with the Japan-Singapore EPA in 1999, nearly all Southeast Asian nations began to propose, negotiate and sign varying degrees of PTA/FTA/EPA among themselves and countries worldwide. The rest of the Asian nations also joined the bandwagon, and as of December 2020, the stock of PTA with at least one party from the Asia-Pacific region, 184 trade agreements are in force, 19 are signed and pending ratification and 95 are still under negotiation.3 This is mainly driven by the ASEAN-centric global supply chain, trade and financial flows and is popularly known as “Noodle Bowl syndrome,” captured in Figure 14.1. The reasons for the proliferation of bilateral FTAs and few plurilateral FTAs in Southeast Asia are essentially rooted in the uncertainty over little progress made under the WTO framework and the pressure of FTAs established in other regions. Moreover, while the rise of China resulted in a pulsating production hub, it also necessitated these small states to look for market integration to improve productivity to counter the intensified competitive pressure from the economic emergence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). A longstanding puzzle that countered this region was that while multilateral agreements followed from the bilateral agreements in most regions, this region did not have functional multilateral till of late. The answer lies in the power competition within the region (Yamamoto, 2013; Bobowski, 2015), the constant presence and intervention of the US (Baldwin, 2007), the lack of ideology for regional integration (Esengul, 2011) and also a lower level of institutionalisation. This shows that apart from economic need, political factors also shape the environment to move to multilateral agreements. Herein lies the changing political complexion of this region wherein “Asia-Pacific” gave way to “Indo-Pacific,” both as a geoeconomic and geopolitical construct. Indo-Pacific as a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) was promoted by Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, in 2016, which necessarily looked at the integration of this huge expanse of land and sea to conduct both economic and political activity under a “rules-based order.” Today, this has been well accepted and has become the bottom line for the liberal order. However, while FOIP as a concept is well received, there has not been a defining road map for establishing it. Economic integration of this region required nations to put aside political differences and negotiate a deal that can create an environment for free flow of goods and services, characterised by the avalanche of inchoate trade and investment grouping. The advent of the “mega-regional” trade agreement in the Indo-Pacific region has become the most significant economic architecture in this region. Since 2010, one has witnessed this region’s governments launch to negotiate two trade agreements, Transatlantic Partnership Agreement (TTP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Agreement

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RCEP SOUTH KOREA

CHINA

ASEAN CAMBODIA

LAOS

MYNAMAR INDONESIA PHILIPPINES THAILAND BRUNEI MALAYASIA VIETNAM SINGAPORE

JAPAN

AUSTRALIA

NEW ZEALAND HONGKONG CANADA

CHILE MEXICO PERU

CPTPP

INDIA

USA Economic Partnership Agreement or Trade Agreement

Figure 14.1 The Noodle Bowl Syndrome. Source: Adapted from https://globalriskinsights​.com​/2021​/01​/a​-big​-deal​-signing​-of​-the​-regional​ -comprehensive​-economic​-partnership​/the​-complex​-web​-of​-asia​-pacific​-trade​-deals​-2/

(RCEP). Since then, each of these trade agreements has been signed by its members and await ratification in their respective nations. During the process of negotiations, it became apparent that these trade agreements, though meant for economic cooperation, have underlying strategic and political dimensions. Impingement of external factors has delayed the signing of these two mega-regional trade agreements.

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The Indo-Pacific region is the world’s new theatre, and the two megaregional trade agreements will be instrumental in driving the trade and investment. A recent development has been the Indo- Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Currently it comprises fourteen members4—seven belong to both CPTPP and RCEP and four nations are members of RCEP and three members US, India and Timor are new entrants. The two-mega trade agreements along with the IPEF are the pillars that embody the economic architecture of the Indo-Pacific region. This chapter, however, draws attention to the two mega-trade agreement and addressed two issues. It first compares the two mega-trade agreements on their membership, features, scope and accession, and it then reasons India’s dilemma of engagement in trade agreements and its withdrawal from RCEP.

14.2 The Economic Architecture: The Mega-Regional Trade Agreements According to the World Economic Forum, mega-regionals are deep integration partnerships between countries or regions with a major share of world trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). Beyond simply increasing trade links, the deals aim to improve regulatory compatibility and provide a rules-based framework for ironing out differences in investment and business climates. (July 2014) The CPTPP and RCEP have all the qualities to qualify as mega-regional agreements. However, they differ in content, features and character. 14.2.1 Origin and Timeline of the Mega-Regional Trade Agreements Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) has its origin in the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement among “P4.” This was formed in 2002 with Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore as members. The agreement came into being in 2005 and aimed to liberalise all trade and was looked upon as a foundation to an FTA among Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries. However, this agreement scaled to a different level when the US in 2008 and Japan in 2013 joined as it brought number one and three economies into its membership. Along with these two nations, Australia, Canada, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru and Vietnam also joined, which led to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Though promoted by the US under Obama’s administration, TTP saw the US exit with a change of guard in the white house. After a brief hiatus, under the leadership of Japan, it returned in a new avatar as CPTTP.5 Japanese economic reconstruction minister Toshimitsu Motegi on the sidelines of the

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APEC Summit meeting in November 2017, explained, formerly the TPP with full 12 members, and after the US withdrawal was temporarily called TPP-11. However, after many rounds of negotiations in 2017, the Ministers agreed to name the new agreement as CPTPP (AGL legal news). CPTPP was signed in March 2018, and by December 2018, it had a ratification by six of its members, bringing it into force. CPTPP has been formed on the principle of creating a “gold standard in a trade agreement” and looks beyond the WTO standards. CPTPP sets a high standard in the chapters covering customs and trade facilitation, standards and technical trade barriers, investment, services, intellectual property, e-commerce, government procurement, State-Owned Enterprises, labour, environment, regulatory coherence, transparency and more. The CPTPP has moved beyond other FTAs. Its provisions are more profound and broader, and its basic rules apply equally among all signatories, even though some developing country members (e.g., Vietnam) have more extended time periods to implement some of the commitments. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is an outcome of power politics in this region. The competition between China and Japan had different ideas on the appropriateness of an economic architecture in terms of membership and agenda. It began after the Asian financial crisis when Japan bid to open Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), which was successfully blocked by the US and contested by China (Hamanaka, 2008). As a way forward, ASEAN+3 (10 ASEAN nations and China, South Korea and Japan) was initiated. This group negotiated and adopted a series of financial programmes (Yamamoto, 2011). With progress made in financial regionalism, there was a growing interest in inking a trade agreement to compete with other regions. Shortly, both China and Japan proposed plans to create a regional group as both had compelling motives to influence this region. China made a move to conduct a joint study on an ASEAN-PRC FTA, East Asia Free Trade Agreement (EAFTA) in November 2000 and had it accepted in the ASEANPRC summit in 2001 with a timeline for establishment in 2010. This sent Japan on a reactive mode to put on the table to ASEAN nations JapanASEAN+6 Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (adding India, Australia and New Zealand). The China EAFTA was limited to trade in goods. In contrast, Japan’s proposal was more comprehensive, considering investment, services and other matters as has been Japan’s modus-operandi concerning economic agreements. A power rivalry ensued with each coming up with studies EAFTA and CEPA. Seeing the contest between the two nations, ASEAN attempted to bridge the two by forming “ASEAN Plus Working Groups,” including ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6. However, with strong disagreement between China and Japan on membership and agenda, this proposal fell through. Finally, accepting the need for a regional trade agreement in this region, China and Japan jointly proposed the RCEP in 2011 (Yamamoto, 2018).

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Formal negotiation of RCEP began in November 2012 at the 21st ASEAN Summit, wherein ASEAN+6 endorsed the RCEP framework. Negotiations were not easy between such a diverse group of nations differing in the political and economic outlook and having longstanding issues between them. Apart from the power rivalry, the concerns of developing nations like Cambodia and Laos needed attention. India too had its concerns: market access to Chinese goods, movement of labour in the service sector, or protection of intellectual property rights. In 2019, after 28 rounds of negotiation, India opted out of the deal, serving a blow to this mega-regional trade agreement. After eight years and 29 plus rounds, amidst the COVID-19 disruption, RCEP, a multilateral trade agreement, came into being in November 2020, when 15 nations (ASEAN +5) signed the agreement. Its objective is to harmonise the existing networks into a single, cohesive set of trade rules, with chapters addressing 21st-century trade issues in services, e-commerce, telecommunications and intellectual property. ​ 14.2.2 Membership Start to finish, both the CPTPP and RCEP lost a member due to the nation’s domestic concerns. However, the CPTPP loss of the US was more significant as it was the world’s largest economy. Moreover, TPP (as it was called under US leadership) attempted to politically exclude China from the preferential trading partnership. In RCEP, India’s exit meant losing a partner to Japan, who would throw its weight and help create a balance within the group. Both the RCEP and CPTPP have an overlap of six nations, of which Japan and Australia play a critical role as they straddle these mega- trade agreement. Both these nations have an issue with China on the economic and strategic

Figure 14.2 Composition of Members of the Two Mega Regional Trade Agreement. Numbers represent 2018 GDP in trillions of US Dollars. Source: Compiled by author

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front. The CPTPP, under Japan’s leadership, advocated agendas that make China’s entry rather difficult. In RCEP, during negotiation, Japan and Australia countered China by setting goals for transparency in investment and intellectual property rights in line with TPP/CPTPP. Within the RCEP, for the first time, free trade has been established between China-Japan and South Korea-Japan and the potential formation of CJK FTA. Yet another yardstick for any multilateral trade agreement about membership is the scale of the group. “Mega” defined in the introduction is visible in Figure 14.3. In terms of scale, the CPTPP agreement represents about 10.9% of GDP, 7.1% global trade and nearly 500 million people. The exit of the US has definitely costed this group in terms of its scale. However, the determination of these AsiaPacific nations led by Japan to establish this multilateral trading group reconfirms the confidence of these nations in terms of economic gains in support of trade liberalisation. RCEP covers a market of 2.2 billion people, or almost 30% of the world’s population, with a combined GDP of US$26.2 trillion or about 25.6% of global GDP and accounts for nearly 12.4% of global trade. The RCEP lost out on India, which has a large market and a sizable population. Thus, it has emerged as the most important regional trade agreement in terms of economic size and population and has strong potential to surpass the European Union as it encompasses many vibrant economies. 14.2.3 Features The CPTPP aims to set a new global trade standard and incorporate new and emerging issues by holding forth five key features. Firstly, it aims to create comprehensive market access that eliminates tariffs and other non-trade

Figure 14.3 RCEP VS CPTPP Scale. Source: Author Presentation of the World Bank data

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barriers and services and investment barriers. Secondly, it aims to create a regional agreement by facilitating the development of production and supply chains among TPP members. Thirdly, it employs an approach of crosscutting trade issues through building on work done in the APEC and other fora by incorporating four new cross-cutting issues: regulatory coherence, competitiveness and business facilitation, small- and medium-sized enterprises and development. Fourthly, it focuses on new trade challenges by addressing emerging trade issues caused by digital technology. Fifthly, it is a living agreement that allows for updating the agreement in response to potential trade issues in the future and new issues stemming from expanding the agreement to include new countries. The RCEP aims are rather limited to that of the CPTPP. By forming this group it brings together a single set of rules and procedures for accessing preferential tariffs across the region. First, it sets standardised rules of origin for all participating countries. Second, it allows including multiple countries to calculate origin rules and access to preferential duty rates, which is crucial for the global supply chain. Third, standardised documentation requirements enable speed and transparency. Fourth, harmonise disparate rules of origin and provide certainty and consistency in managing the supply chain across the region (KPMG, 2020). 14.2.4 Scope The CPTPP negotiation has resulted in an exhaustive document running over 30 chapters, addressing the whole gamut of concerns within the trade of goods, services and investments. New areas were adopted, namely, environment and labour. The environment chapter addresses commercial activities, endangered species trade, logging zone, etc. The chapter on labour includes protection of worker rights, minimum wage and decent working hours. It also calls for no use of forced labour and child labour.6 The CPTPP takes a hard line on state-owned enterprises (SOE). The agreement does this through two key principles. First, it creates a level playing between privately owned and SOEs by addressing trade distortions that favour SOEs engaged in commercial activities, particularly by addressing discrimination and tradedistorting subsidies. Second, flexibilities in provisions are limited, and some flexibilities are granted to public health, animal health, public security, etc. On the other hand, transparency is incorporated in every chapter, mainly in rule-making, allowing for input provision and time for adjustment. To many, the RCEP is less ambitious than that of the CPTTP in scope and depth. It has a substantive 20 chapters, including a few addressing 21st-century concerns, namely e-commerce and intellectual property. Depth of coverage in goods tariff is not automatically eliminated. However, it eliminates non-tariff barriers, facilitates trade development and encourages transparency. It devotes extensively to “rule of origin” that would apply to businesses

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seeking to qualify their goods as originating for RCEP purposes. In services, it is limited. The member states set out their respective detailed commitments (positive list) and/or non-conforming measures (negative list) in opening up their service sectors to their strategic trade partners in the following manner: “Negative list” approach—Australia, Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea; “positive list” approach—Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. It is in investments that one witnesses depth. By use of negative listing, it opens all sectors unless it is explicitly listed. New provisions on intellectual property with a close eye on the digital trade and counterfeit products go beyond WTO standards. Due to pandemic measures, reorientation of provisions under e-commerce was made. This included acknowledging the validity of electronic signatures and maintaining the current practice of not imposing customs duties for electronic transmissions between member states. Under prohibiting clause listed in the RCEP noteworthy is a requirement to use or locate a computing facility in a certain territory to conduct business in that territory and prevent the cross-border transfer of information unless otherwise provided to achieve public policy objectives and protect security interests. While RCEP also addresses government procurement, its requirements are less stringent than CPTPP. To enable development, RCEP recognises the developmental dimensions of trade and allows flexibility for developing countries, less developed nations and capacity programmes (Tan et al., 2020). The distinctive nature of RCEP members has necessitated extensive flexibilities to address concerns while engaging in trade in goods and services and investment. Almost all provision includes wide-ranging flexibilities. The shortfall of RCEP is visible as it does not have any investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. 14.2.5 Accession Accession criteria in any group underlie the inclusiveness of its members towards the nations that desire to join the group. In this, the political considerations often play a more prominent role than that of the economic one. CPTPP is a case in point. It has detailed conditions for adding new members, giving priority to APEC members. The growing interest in CPTPP membership is palpable as one considers the list of countries seeking membership. While South Korea and Thailand have shown interest and would have less cause of worry, Taiwan, which has sent in its notification to join CPTPP,7 will test the members as China will raise its concern as it has also shown interest in joining CPTPP.8 The UK has also formally applied.9 This brings a new dimension to this group as it is far beyond the geographical region on which this forum was initiated. For a grouping that looked like a non-starter, post-pandemic interest shown by China

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and other nations points to a more robust economic diplomacy that will consume this trade group. RCEP approach to accession criteria has been very open and inclusive. It has allowed accession to any nation or separate customs territory 18 months after its entry into force. However, a special provision is made for India, as it had been one of the original negotiating states, and its accession will not require the waiting period. Both CPTPP and RCEP qualify as mega-regional FTA and encompass a large Asia and Pacific region. CPTPP membership is mainly upper-middle economies like Mexico, Chile and Peru. With an agenda to create a benchmark, CPTPP is today considered narrower but deeper with a set of high-level standards in many of its chapters. Noteworthy is that RCEP is ASEAN-centric and has a bandwidth of least developed economies and the world number two and three. The negotiations had to incorporate concerns of countries like Laos and Cambodia. In so doing, it stands as broad and shallow. What remains unclear is the neglect that both the groups have shown to “Small and Medium Enterprises” (SME). Both have committed to building a website to encourage SMEs to take advantage of the trade expansion activity, but it is understood that it is often very complicated. Among RCEP members, the consensus was that major dissemination of information and negotiating within RCEP needs to be addressed domestically for SMEs.

14.3 India’s Tryst India had a delayed start at integrating its economy with the global world. The 1990s ushered in the liberalisation of the Indian economy. The buzzword of the economic policy was liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation. Among many policies that inked India’s transition, the “Look East Policy” by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao was a diplomatic attempt to integrate with the vibrant economies of Southeast Asia and East Asia. This policy marked a considerable shift in India’s perspective towards the world, ushering in India’s renewed confidence in India’s Asian destiny. “Look East Policy” was mentioned for the first time in the Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs in 1996 (MEA, 1996: 7, 118). I.K. Gujral had stated that, What look east really means is that an outward-looking India is gathering all forces of dynamism, domestic and regional and is directly focusing on establishing synergies with a fast consolidating and progressive neighbourhood to its East in Mother Continent of Asia. (Gujral, 1996) This approach resulted in rapid engagement with ASEAN, Japan and Korea, leading to foreign direct investment flow from Japan and Korea in sectors

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like automobile and electronics, which had opened to foreign participation with certain restrictions. Indian economy began its growth phase assisted by the changing technological and economic environment. With the spur of information technology, India found a special place because of its talented, skilled and low-cost technocrats, who were in great demand across the sector. As India gained confidence in its global outing, the “Look East Policy” encouraged India to seek out new markets in the countries in the east of India. The globalised world of the Post-Cold War period created new dynamics in the foreign policy engagement for India, necessitating a trajectory change for India. Thus, the second phase of this policy began in 2000 when the policy extended itself to engage more deeply with ASEAN, Japan and Australia. This new phase also saw a shift from economic engagement to security and strategic cooperation. While bilateral engagement with neighbouring countries and Southeast Asia grew, India’s relationship with Japan grew in stature. India-Japan bilateral relations found a firm footing with Prime Minister of Japan Mori. During his visit to India (2000), he declared “Global Partnership between Japan and India in the Twenty-First Century.” Between 2000 and 2012, this relationship reached a strong bond in which strategic partnership was also included. World dynamics also saw a sea change during this time frame. China’s growing presence in the Indo-Pacific region, the changing priorities of the US, the newly industrialised nations within the Southeast and the tilt of the world economic activity to the Asia-Pacific region necessitated a new set of equations among nations of this region. India, which had progressively opened itself in its economic engagement, now drew close to like-minded nations of East and Southeast Asia to proactively push for a relationship in areas of security and strategic considerations. Regionalism also made its presence felt in the Asia-Pacific region as ASEAN became a dominant force. On the economic front, one witnessed many FTA/EPAs. Though in Asia most of these were bilateral agreements, there were beginning of some trilateral agreement talks. For fear of being left out, India ventured to draw a comprehensive economic partnership agreement with Japan, followed by South Korea and Singapore. These EPAs were comprehensive as they looked beyond trade in goods and services and incorporated developmental concerns, which suited India as it needed assistance in building its infrastructure. The EPA was looked upon to boost India’s trade with these nations and enable India to gain entry into their markets. By 2014, when Prime Minister Modi began his tenure, India had reached a respectable place in the world economy. Its stature in world diplomacy had also gained prominence mainly because of the rise of China and the power contest that had emerged in the Asia-Pacific region. China had not only taken over as the second-largest economy in the world, but it was, time and again, flexing its muscle by staking territorial claims in the East China

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Sea, South China sea and for India closer to home through its economic overtures in neighbouring states and its presence in the Indian Ocean. Thus, when Modi announced the “Act East Policy,” it was considered an opportune overture to reorient and reclaim lost grounds in the region that was the fulcrum of world economic activity and the hotbed of power contest. The objective of “Act East Policy” was to promote economic cooperation and cultural ties and develop a strategic relationship with countries in the Asia-Pacific region through continuous engagement at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels, thereby providing enhanced connectivity to the States of the North Eastern Region, including Arunachal Pradesh with other countries in India’s neighbourhood. Based on this objectivity, India strengthened its strategic relations with its three pillars in this region: Japan, ASEAN and South Korea. While India’s engagement in strategic cooperation in this region grew and India became a party to many multilateral moves, its economic partnership did not yield benefits. India had a trade deficit with all the East Asian countries, which had only grown over time. Asia-Pacific gave way to Indo-Pacific, placing India in a geographical centrality. This created an environment for India to play a more significant role in international relations. India diverted its attention to security and strategic concerns, and the lens of economic development shifted to infrastructure and connectivity. This meant companies with a large pool of money for investment were in demand, leaving the micro, small and medium sector unattended. Around this time, the formulation of RCEP took shape. The groundwork was laid down in 2012, when participating countries, including India, adopted the “Guiding Principles and Objectives” for negotiating the RCEP. Thus, when Modi announced the Act East Policy, it seemed to create a synergy with the negotiation of this mega-trade agreement. The proponents of RCEP claimed that it accounted for 36% of the world population, with India and China as part of this. With the three largest economy China, Japan and India, it would account for over 50% of world GDP. 14.3.1 Reasons Behind Abstaining from RCEP Compulsions of domestic economic interest and societal concern have resulted in India vacillating between liberalising or protecting its economy. The dilemma for India in economic policy centres around three broad areas—generating employment, developing a domestic industrial base and gaining technological advancement. In addition, the “Make in India” initiative straddles a fine line of commitment to foreign participation and protection of the domestic economy. As an original member of RCEP, India was party to the negotiation and had put forward India’s approach to RCEP by drawing out a line of actions to integrate into the RCEP framework. However, over time, it became clear that other members were not willing to concede to India’s request. As a result, Prime Minister Narendra Modi withdrew by stating, “whenever I

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try and gauge India’s interest in light of her joining RCEP, I do not get an answer in the affirmative; neither did Gandhiji’s policy of self-reliance, nor my wisdom allows me to join RCEP.”10 India has always been tentative about how far it would go to being “open” in its economic integration. For the ASEAN nations, FTA with India was restricted in terms of market opportunities. At the initiation of the negotiation, India proposed a three-tier approach to tariff reduction for the member countries: • • •

ASEAN, where it planned to reduce tariffs at 80% of tariff lines With countries like Japan and South Korea, where it had CEPA, it would provide 65% tariff lines 42.5% of tariff line for countries like China, Australia and New Zealand with whom India does not have any existing trade agreement (Cote and Chandra Jena, 2015; La, 2017).

However, the above-differentiated approach did not find credence with other members as all countries looked at a more significant reduction of tariff line as a part of RCEP. Two developments, one the operation of CPTPP; two China-US trade war, gave China enough reason to push other members to conclude and enforce the agreement by 2020. India’s comparative advantage lies in the service sector, and India pursued to gain full market access in trade in services. Unfortunately, services require liberal entry and exit of human resources, impinge into visa rules of host nations and also adversely impact the employment of host nations. India specifically called for easy access with a favourable visa regarding fee waiver and duration of stay. However, India found strong resistance from Australia and Singapore in liberalising the movement of people. ​ From Figure 14.3, it is clear that India has a negative trade deficit with most RCEP members. Thus, India appealed for Special and Differential treatment (S&DT) as it had a significant trade deficit with RCEP nations. India wanted this favour for its manufacturing sector, mainly the textile and garments and dairy sectors, which would be disadvantaged. Due to India’s economic size and geostrategic location, this found little sympathy with many RCEP members. India contested this claim by drawing attention to Japan’s agricultural sector in CPTPP, wherein “special agricultural safeguard measures” have been executed. Under S&DT, India also sought an extended transition period which too was denied. As a final attempt to protect the manufacturing and dairy sector, India called for auto-triggered snapback measures in the agreement to protect its domestic market since it feared a deluge of manufacturing goods flooding the Indian market from China and dairy products from Australia and New Zealand. India also raised concerns about rules of origin in the agreement. India has always been wary about its origin for a product, be it CEPA with Japan

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80000 EXPORT IMPORT TRADE DEFICIT

60000

40000

20000

0

ASIA

JAPAN

SOUTH KOREA

CHINA

NEW ZEALAND

AUSTRALIA

-20000

-40000

-60000

Figure 14.4 India’s Trade with RCEP Countries. Source: Author Presentation of World Development Indicators, World Bank 2020

and South Korea or RCEP. Usually, in any country’s agreement from where a product is exported, India quantified the percentage of the product made in the exporting country. In RCEP, India feared that China would use Cambodia /Laos to send its product using the Duty-Free Quota. India reasoned that the highest value addition with indigenous inputs produced in a member country to be exported to India could solve India’s concern of Chinese goods being routed through the third country. COVID-19 has reinforced that the world would be driven by data technologies and data transfer among business groups critical to gaining comparative advantage. As an advanced trade agreement, RCEP made provisions to facilitate e-commerce among its members. They are: • • • •

Non-discriminatory treatment of digital products like software, etc. Promotion of cross-border data flows, that is, transfer of data regionally Prohibition on data localisation Online personal data protection to create a robust environment of E-commerce (Gaur, 2020).

India’s domestic norms of data residency called for localisation, and as per the Reserve Bank of India directive, data related to payments made digitally stored within national borders. Therefore, India introduced “data residency,” which meant that personal data would be stored in the country and

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transferred on approval from the competent authority. This was discussed among members and rejected as it would hamper digital trade across the region and act as a non-tariff barrier to e-commerce. India also wanted concession concerning base rate year. RCEP negotiation had put the base rate of 2014 for slashing import duties after completing the negotiations, which was expected to be completed by 2015. However, due to differences of opinions among members, negotiation continued well into 2019. Meanwhile, India had raised import duties in its budgets and had changed tariff rates on many products. Thus, it requested to shift the base rate year to 2019. This shift could have allowed for lesser liberalisation and favoured the Indian domestic market. However, members refused to accommodate India’s interests. The negotiation rounds for India had been trying and often dissuading. Previous to 2019, India had found itself in a tight spot concerning the rule of origin, data residency and concern about the movement of working professionals to enable harnessing competitive advantage in the service sector. The fallout of getting minimal concession and other domestic challenges led to the withdrawal of India from RCEP.

14.4 Road Ahead While India justifies its withdrawal from RCEP, however, as India had not shown much angst about the above reasons during the long-drawn negotiation, members found themselves in a quandary. While Japan, which backed India in this group to enhance liberal order presence and counter China, was visibly disappointed, most other members, including China, opined that it was a loss for India as much as RCEP. Concession for India’s accession was made in the trade agreement, show causing inclusiveness of RCEP. The debate of whether India lost an opportunity to integrate with the world’s most dynamic growth centre will continue to attract attention. The argument put forward for withdrawal rest on the unpreparedness of India’s economy to counter market competition. India has sizeable domestic demand that has often fallen trap to protectionism, ensuring domestic industrialist safe heaven. But with the aspiration of becoming a $5 trillion economy by 2024–2025, unless India can match world standards and use exports as a means of development, it will never fulfil its dream. COVID-19 has revealed significant fallouts of overreliance on one supply chain. For instance, Japan has called for a supply chain plus one initiative, essentially signalling Japanese companies based in China to diversify and create independent supply chains. Through such moves, India can reap the benefit of integrating. However, staying out of RCEP prevents many companies from relocating to India.

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Realising the pitfalls in the manufacturing sector, the current regime has promoted many policies to enhance the competitiveness of this sector. Taking a multipronged approach, the government has put forward the “Make in India Initiative” and, of late, “Atman Nir bar Yojana” to nurture innovative and world-class companies. To increase capacity building, a skill development programme for different levels of workers and ease of doing business for foreign companies have been initiated to create a structure for rapid industrialisation. With industrial revolution 4.0, which has identified new sectors for industrialisation, India must attempt to find a place in these sectors rather than fighting to gain market in sectors in which China, ASEAN already has a head start. Of late, as more nations show interest in joining CPTPP, a narrative has grown in India to place its candidature for membership to CPTPP and thus, counter the undoing of withdrawal from RCEP. The argument is that China is not a part of CPTPP, which is the main threat to India in joining RCEP and by joining CPTPP, India will solve the problem of being left out of the pluralist trade agreement. However attractive this may sound, it is flawed on two accounts. First, CPTPP is far more advanced in its agreement and is more stringent with tariff reduction, its level playing on intellectual property and labour. Second, the rationale put forward for India’s withdrawal from RCEP is also validated for CPTPP. Though one may argue that for trade in services (which is India’s strength), CPTPP provisions aid India. One must also draw attention to the fact that joining CPTPP, India is subject to all its provisions and cannot be limited to sectors. India’s withdrawal from RCEP after years of negotiation has tainted its image among the nations and with the announcement of IPEF, attention was yet again drawn to India as its decision would significantly change the dynamics of this platform. Modi, while affirming India’s intention, stated, “The Indo-Pacific region is the centre for manufacturing, economic activities, global trade and investment,” he said. History is witness to the fact that India has been a major centre in the trade flows of the Indo-Pacific region for centuries. It is worth mentioning that the world’s oldest commercial port was in Lothal in my home state of Gujarat, India. Therefore, it is essential that we find common and creative solutions for the economic challenges of the region. (PM Modi, 2022) Following this Ministry of External Affairs’ official position has been “to collaborate with partner countries under the IPEF and work towards advancing regional economic connectivity, integration and boosting trade and investment within the region” (MEA India, 2022). However, experts have drawn

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lines, as some view it as a second chance to pivot back economically, especially since China has been kept out (Pubby, 2022; Buddhavarapu, 2022), which was one reason behind RCEP withdrawal, while others call for cautions as they opine that contrasting views on digital commerce, labour and environmental standards (The Hindu, 2022) may result in an yet another tryst.

14.5 Conclusion The two mega-trade agreements, which so far formed the pillar of economic architecture in the Indo-Pacific region, have ensured bringing a large number of nations under simpler and minimal rules, thus encouraging more expansive trade, which would lead to growth and economic wellbeing. The underpinning of these trade deals has political overtures. RCEP, despite ASEAN centrality, clearly gives China a decisive advantage in seeking more markets, including Japan and South Korea, as there is no FTA between the three. The continuing US-China trade war gives China to leverage the RCEP to effectively use the ASEAN production network to create more synergies and nullify the implications of the trade war. Post-pandemic fragile world economy required connected regional economic order. Desired directions were needed from this group, which can be the guardian of the rules-based order and assurance of economic growth agenda. With American leadership in the hands of Democrats, it was hoped that America would join CPTPP. Taking account of his domestic compulsions, Biden framed an alternative model which the US administration touted as a part of its Indo-Pacific strategy. The IPEF announced in May 2022 in the sideline of the Quad Summit by Biden, draws two major economies into the economic architecture—the US and India. The IPEF is structured under four modules—supply chain resiliency, decarbonisation and infrastructure, fair and resilient trade and tax and anti-corruption measures. While the modules incorporate new areas of economic engagement, it is clear that this is an “economic trade partnership” and not a “trade agreement” and thus will not look at “reduction of tariff.” Most nations welcomed this move from the US as it raised US commitment in this region, however, the fact that it is perceived as an alternative to China’s economic endeavours in the region, will influence decision-making in many of the Asian nations. Already questions of its intention, function and durability have risen. Clarity will emerge as the framework unfolds and nations get to working out details through its ministerial meetings. India’s withdrawal from RCEP had a significant implication. As a member of Quad, and its geo-political and geo-economic position, India is at the very fulcrum of the region and it is imperative that it engages economically with this region. India has a window in IPEF, through which it can find an outing to push forward its agenda of economic engagement.

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With geopolitics beginning to contribute significantly to the construction of economic alliances, the list for economic cooperation continues to lengthen. Today it includes the reorganisation of regional supply chains, digital cooperation, cheap clean energy to name a few. The search for an IndoPacific trade and economic compass is likely to hasten activities in these mega-trade agreements and the IPEF to provide an ecosystem for the free and open trade, investment and development regime. While the idea of IndoPacific gains more robust constructs and structures, given its divergences, it will be a while before it emerges as one geopolitical and geoeconomic entity.

Notes 1 World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2013, https://www​.wto​/org​/ english​/res​_e​/booksp​_e​/wtr13​.2​_epdf. Accessed on September 23, 2020 2 https://unctad​ . org​ / system​ / files​ / official​ - document ​ / ditctab2020d4 ​ _ en ​ . pdf Accessed on March 18, 2021. 3 https://www​. unescap ​ . org ​ / kp ​ / 2020 ​ / preferential​ - trade​ - agreements​ - asia​ - and​ -pacific​-20202021 Accessed on February 20, 2020. 4 IPEF was initiated on May 23, 2022 by the US, and the following countries joined it: India, Australia, Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, and Fiji. 5 It was briefly called TPP-11. 6 More onerous conditions inside Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei are not applicable post-US withdrawal and addressed during ratification. 7 https://focustaiwan​.tw​/politics​/202012150009 accessed on March 28, 2021. 8 https://www​.gtreview​.com​/news​/asia​/93979 accessed on March 28, 2021. 9 https://www​.gov​.uk​/government​/news​/uk​-applies​-to​-join​-huge​-pacific​-free​ -trade​-area​-cptpp accessed on March 28, 2021. 10 https://economictimes​.indiatimes​.com​/news​/economy​/foreign​-trade​/view​-by​ -saying​-no​-to​-rcep​-pm​-modi​-has​-kept​-india​-first​/articleshow​/72028437​.cms​ .accessed on Sep 29,2020.

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Index

Abe, Shinzo 2–3, 5, 22, 38, 43, 46, 77, 83, 202–5; “Arc of Democracies” idea 81 ADMM-Plus 78 African Union (AU) 16 Andean Group 159 “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” 3 ASEAN Centrality 155–6, 182; in economic cooperation 162–3; external challenges 165–6, 168; factors supporting 156–7; internal challenges 163–5, 168; limits of 166– 7; multilateral military cooperation 167; as a primary regional convenor 157; rationales and benefits of dialogue partner relations 157–60; regional mechanisms 160–2, 167–8; sectoral dialogue relationships 159 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 80, 191 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 135, 175 Asianism 75 Asian Monetary Fund 163 Asia Reassurance Act (ARIA) 209, 224 Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond 22–3 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 4, 8, 13–14, 25–7, 40, 74, 76, 204, 211, 223; ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) 162; ASEAN Defense Ministers MeetingPlus (ADMM-Plus) 20; ASEAN+1 formula 159; ASEAN India fund 225; ASEAN India Green fund 225; ASEAN-led multilateral institutions 19–20; ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) 162; ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) 159; ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP)

4, 27–8, 161–2; ASEAN Plus One dialogues 156; ASEAN Plus One free trade agreements (FTA) 163; ASEAN Plus Three 156, 161–3; ASEAN Plus Working Groups 239; ASEAN PostMinisterial Conference (ASEANPMC) 157–60; ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 15, 78, 161, 191, 204; bilateral defence and strategic relations 78; centrality 27; regional multilateralism 78; support of FOIP 25–7 Australia 7, 231; Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) 61; alliance with US 52–4, 59–60; cases against China 51; defence budget 57; defence capabilities 53; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 226; diplomatic relations with China 50–1, 55; economic ties with China 42; FOIP strategy 51–66; foreign policy 52–3; India relationship 62–3, 230; Japan relationship 7, 60–2; middle power diplomacy 53–4; military capabilities 57; perception of China 44–5; perspective on Indo-Pacific 62; relations with China 25; rule-based international order 54–6; security and prosperity 54; sovereign military capabilities 51; stance in South China Sea arbitration 55; supply chain resilience initiative 230 Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (ANZUS) Treaty 44, 52–3 Australia–India–Japan trilateral dialogue 83 Australia–Japan “Reciprocal Access Arrangement” 7

256 Index Australia–UK–US (AUKUS) trilateral security pact 7, 58, 89, 193, 213 Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) 80 Baghdad Pact 44 Bandung Conference 134 Biden, Joe 39, 65, 84, 91–2, 95, 97, 105–6, 129, 132–3, 142, 178, 180, 182, 210, 251 Blue Dot Network 8, 83, 91, 142, 176, 226–8; as an alternative initiative to Chinese BRI 228 Blue Dot Network Initiative 83 BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) 135 BUILD (Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development) Act 225 Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 111, 145 cheque book diplomacy 204 Chiang Mai Initiative 163 China 1, 73–4, 202, 245, 251; actions post-pandemic 91–3; activities in South China Sea 21, 131, 145–8; Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) 181; assertiveness and encroachment in East China Sea 21; Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 22, 61, 74, 80, 92, 106, 113, 117–19, 206, 223–4, 226; development assistance to regional states 22; economic and diplomatic influence 21–2, 43; economic and political hold 5–6; EU’s approach 196–8; Indo-Pacific policies 223–6; Maritime Silk Road 224; North Korea’s trade with 176; postpandemic politics 91–3; problem with Japan 5, 13; relationship with Russia 120–1; response to US IndoPacific strategy 116–21; rise of 126, 137, 178; share of global trade 93; Silk Road Economic Belt 223–4; Sinicised value system 91; South Korean companies in 176. see also US-China relations “China exit” strategy 93; in tech supply chain 95 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 80, 135

CHIPS (Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors) for America Act 95 Clean-Hydrogen Partnership 90 collective security 15 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 15, 20–1 Commonwealth of Independent States 40 Communist Party of China (CPC) 115–16, 133 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 7, 61, 130, 211, 238–9, 250; accession criteria 243–4; approach to state-owned enterprises (SOE) 242; features 241–2; as mega-regional FTA 244; membership 240–1; scope and depth 242–3; vs RCEP 241–3. see also Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) 15 “Confluence of the Two Seas” 1–2 core group 20, 22 COVID-19 pandemic 65, 84, 137, 181, 223, 235; impact on supply chains 228–32 data governance 90 debt-trap diplomacy 132 Defence Science and Technology Implementing Arrangement (DSTIA) 63 Delhi Dialogue 83 East Asia Summit (EAS) 20, 78, 191 East China Sea 223 Economic and Social Commissions for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) 159 Economic Community of the African States (ECOWAS) 16 Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) 159 economic partnership agreements (EPA) 235 Economic Prosperity Network 176 Economic Union 40 EU–India Strategic Partnership 208 EU–Japan partnership 205, 207

Index  257 Eurasia 40 Europe 203; geopolitical approach to Indo-Pacific 190; see also France, approach to Indo-Pacific region; Germany, approach to Indo-Pacific region; the Netherlands, approach to Indo-Pacific region; Global Europe 213; Global Gateway 99; views of FOIP 209–12 EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy 195–8, 212–13; Comprehensive Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions 196; cooperation on research and innovation 213; fisheries management and control systems 213, 216n18; general importance 189; main elements 196; priority areas 212; stance towards China 196–8; strategic maritime chokepoints 190 Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) 162 Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI) 99 Five Eyes 128 Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) 20 “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” or Panchsheel 134 France, approach to Indo-Pacific region 142, 191–3, 198–9, 211; arms cooperation 193; conception of FOIP 209–11; FDI Stocks in the Indo-Pacific 192; French nationals in the Indo-Pacific 192; geopolitical importance 192; military personnel in the Indo-Pacific 192–3; strategic document 191–2; surveillance of maritime spaces 193 Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) 5–8, 19, 77, 89, 92, 112, 116, 118, 122, 127, 161, 179, 197, 202, 236; ASEAN Centrality in 14; Australia’s adoption of 51–66; EU and 206–9; human security 204–5, 214n3; Japan’s defence of 206; link between ODA 205; pillars 13, 203; Quad, role of 21–5; regional institutional arrangement in 21–5; vision 13, 24–5 freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) 146

free trade agreements (FTA) 7, 235–6, 247 General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) 235 General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) 177 Germany, approach to Indo-Pacific region 142, 193–4, 198–9, 211; conception of FOIP 210–11; pillars 192 Global Digital Connectivity Partnership 94 global trade and investment growth 235 Green-Shipping Network 90 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 40 Gulf of Aden (GoA) 147 Horn of Africa (HoA) 147 India 7, 179–80, 189, 226; “Atman Nir bar Yojana” 250; AustraliaIndia relationship 62–3; conception of FOIP 208; dharma and adharma thinking 150; domestic norms of data residency 248; economic partnership agreements 78; EU–India relations 208; as global hub for manufacturing 231; Indo-Pacific approach 77–81, 143–5; investments in electronics manufacturing 96; Look/Act East policy 3, 77–8, 112, 136, 245–6; “Make in India Initiative” 250; “Neighbourhood First” policy 43; perception of China 44–5; perception of Chinese activities in Indo-Pacific 148–50; perspective of Quad 81–4; philosophy in international relations 150–1; Production Linked Incentive (PLI) and the Phased Manufacturing Plan (PMP) schemes 231; relationship with China 5, 78, 114, 134–6; security concerns 42; territorial disputes with Pakistan 41; top investors in 78; trade with RCEP countries 248; Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam concept 150–1; withdrawal from RCEP 246–50 India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF) 231

258 Index India-China disputes: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 135; Dalai Lama issue 135; Galwan valley incident, 2020 135–6; military standoff in Doklam/Donglang area 135 India-Japan-Australia Resilient Supply Chain Initiative 91 India-Japan Development Cooperation 83 India–Japan relations 4; cooperation in 5G technologies 94–5; infrastructurerelated projects 225 India–Japan–US Trilateral 80–1; maritime exercises 81–2 Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) 191 Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) 20, 80 India–US Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) 64 India–US–Japan Malabar naval exercises 64, 81 Indonesia 4, 6, 22, 26, 60, 81, 83–4, 127–8, 134, 146, 157, 167, 181, 192–3, 211–12, 223–4, 243; ASEAN’s concept 156, 161, 164, 167; Covid-19 pandemic impacts 164; role in ASEAN 164; tsunami of 2004 127–8 Indo-Pacific Business Forum 225 Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) 7, 95, 238 Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Trilateral Forum 225 Indo-Pacific megaregion 35 Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) 78–80, 145 Indo-Pacific powers 35 Indo-Pacific region 1–6, 106, 141, 188–9, 238; Abe’s strategic vision on 22; barriers to institutionalising 41; China and 84–5; construct 38–9; defining 75–7, 126; foreign policy 4; future of 43–6; geographic boundaries 79, 86n6; idea of 75–6, 78–9; India and 77–81; Japan’s view of 38; maritime environment 79; multi-layered institutional arrangement in 19–21; Oceans 21; post pandemic 8; regional configuration 76–7; region-wide institutional arrangement in

21; terminology 75–6; trilateral geometries 91; US’s view of 39, 43 Indo-Pacific strategy 2–6; China 116–21; India 77–81, 143–5; South Korea 171–3, 177, 179–83; US 110–21, 180–1 international relations 40; postpandemic 91–3 Japan 1–2, 7–8, 78, 180, 189, 202, 231; abduction issues with North Korea 178; Australia-Japan relationship 60–2; cooperation with Five Eyes countries 128; core security interests 41; Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 205, 207; foreign policy 5, 204– 6; global exports 230; infrastructure projects 225; Japanese diplomacy 204, 214n4; National Security Secretariat (NSS) 93; ODA 205; Partnership for Quality Infrastructure 83; perception of China 44–5; problem with China 5, 13; proposal for Society 5.0 205–6; “Quality Infrastructure” plan 224; relation with South Korea 177–8; role as a proactive contributor to peace 204; role in Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiation 205; Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) 205, 207; tactical hedging 13; views on Quad and Indo-Pacific 128 Japan–ASEAN relations 29–30 Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation 22 Japan Board for International Cooperation (JBIC) 226 Japan–China–South Korea Trilateral Cooperation 20 Japan–India Special Strategic and Global Partnership 20, 22 Khurana, Gurpreet 4 Malacca Dilemma 62 Maritime Silk Road 84, 114, 224 Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 99 Mearsheimer, John 15 Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: accession criteria 243–4; features 241–2; membership 240–1; origin 238–40; scope 242–3

Index  259 Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) 80 Menzies, Robert 52 middle power activism 53–4 Modi, Narendra 2, 43, 78, 135, 149, 181, 244–7 Morrison, Scott 55 multilateralism 118 Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) 63 Myanmar military coup, 2021 165 National League for Democracy (NLD) 165 National Security Secretariat (NSS) 93 Nehru, Jawaharlal 136 Neighborhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) 213 the Netherlands, approach to IndoPacific region 142, 195, 198–9, 209, 211 New Development Bank 135 New Zealand 40, 84 non-interference principle 23 North Atlantic 36–7 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 15, 37, 40, 44 Northeast Asia Plus Responsibility Community Initiative (NAPRCI) 173 Obama 61, 105–7, 110–11, 113, 116, 119, 129, 141, 148, 202 Okakura, Kazuko (Tenshin) 75 Pacific Rim region 36, 39–40, 76 power structure, post-pandemic 91–3; technological and ideological supremacy 91 preferential trade agreements (PTA) 235–6 Quad–ASEAN relations 27–30, 166–7 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) 5–6, 8, 14, 22, 73, 75, 80, 127, 166, 179, 203, 230; ad hoc arrangements 45; America’s participation in 42–3; approach to China 42; bilateral military ties and security interactions 81–4; Common Statement of Principles on Critical Technology Supply Chains 95; Critical and Emerging Technology

Working Group 65; data governance 90; future of 43–6; Green-Shipping Network 99; India perspective of 81–4; Indo-Pacific democracies and 63–6; infrastructure assistance and investment in Indo-Pacific 98–9; Japan’s view 128; joint military exercises 128; military cooperation agreements 64; powers 89–90, 92, 99–100; Quad-Plus 6, 28–30, 40, 46n2; tech agenda 94–6 Quad Semiconductor Supply Chain Initiative 96 Quad Vaccine Partnership (QVP) 66, 97–8 Rao, Narasimha 77, 244 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 7, 61, 129–30, 163, 182–3, 204, 236–9, 246–51; accession criteria 244; approach to accession criteria 244; features 242; India’s withdrawal 246–51; as megaregional FTA 244; membership 240– 1; scope and depth 242–3; vs CPTPP 241–3. see also Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TransPacific Partnership (CPTPP) Resilient Supply Chains Initiative 230 Ruud, Kevin 82 Samsung Electronics 95 Scarborough Shoal incident, 2012 21 seafoam analogy 116–17 Sea Lanes of Communication for trade and energy 1 Security and Growth for all in the Region (SAGAR) 4, 78 security institutions 15–19; bilateral 19; cooperative security and function 19; essential functions 15; humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) 19; membership 18; multi-layered institutional arrangement 17; powerbased and rules-based international and regional order 17–19, 41; process of conducting tactical hedging 18–19; reasons for decline of 16; rules, norms and principles 16; states’ common interests on 15; strategic environment 17–18; strategic strengths of international 15–16; utility of 15

260 Index Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 16–17, 21, 135 Shangri La Dialogue 55, 78, 149 Silk Road 75, 84, 114 Silk Road Economic Belt 223–4 Six Party Talks (SPT) 20 Smart Cities 226 Smith, Stephen 82 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 16, 20–1 South China Sea territorial disputes 21, 78, 131, 145–8, 165, 190, 223 Southeast Asia 4, 20, 23, 43, 60, 62, 66, 75, 98–9, 120, 132, 134, 143–4, 156, 166, 169, 179, 211, 227, 229, 236, 244–5; ASEAN vision of 158, 160; diversity 166, 168–9; FOIP vision 27; Quad’s strategic intention in 26–7; regional autonomy 26; US-China power rivalry 27 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 44 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 159 South Korea 29, 40, 45, 84; bilateral trade with China 175–7, 181–2; Indo-Pacific strategy 171–3, 177, 179–83; Middle Power Diplomacy 177–9; New Southern Policy 171, 173–5, 178–80; relation with Japan 177–8; relation with US 178 Soviet Union 37 Strategic Autonomy 5 Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) 65 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 162, 194 sustainable infrastructure 98–9 Suu Kyi, Aung San 165 tactical hedging 13, 18–19, 30 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp. (TSMC) 95–6 Taiwan Strait crisis 106, 114–15, 190 Taro Aso 3, 96 tech agenda 94–6; 5G diversification and deployment 94–5; Open RAN deployment and adoption 94; semiconductor manufacturing and supply 95; setting technical standards 94 Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) 175–6

Third ROK-US Senior Economic Dialogue 179 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 97 Transatlantic Partnership Agreement (TTP) 236 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 61 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) 157, 161–2 Trump, Donald 3, 39, 42–3, 61, 77, 83, 97, 105–6, 108–9, 111–20, 129–30, 133, 141–2, 172, 174, 179, 208, 224 Turnbull, Malcolm 55 UK, approach to Indo-Pacific region 142, 211 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 147 United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Seas (UNCLOS) 145–6, 148–9, 210 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 158 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 159 United States (US) 7, 189, 235; Asia policy 110, 113; bilateral alliances in Asia-Pacific region 19; China strategy 93, 105–8, 113, 117, 133; “hub-andspoke” system 14, 19; human rights policy 121; Indo-Pacific strategy 110–21, 180–1; military actions 52–3; National Security Strategy 2, 106, 113, 118; Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) 226; perception of China 44–5; “Pivot to Asia” policy 105, 110, 113, 117, 119; strategy of democracy 121; Trump’s “America first” thinking 111. see also Free and Open IndoPacific (FOIP) US–China relationship 128–32, 137, 165–6; areas of potential confrontation 132; Biden’s approach 106, 129, 132; “engagement and reassurance” policy 107; managing 132–4; Obama’s approach 105, 107, 111; strategic competition 90–1, 106–10, 112–16; Taiwan issue 106,

Index  261 114–15, 128, 131–2; technological rivalry 130–1; trade war 100, 109, 113; Trump’s approach 105–6, 108–9, 113, 118 US–India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region 148 US–Indian civil nuclear agreement 110 US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) 3, 38, 47n12, 76–7 US International Developmental Finance Corporation (DFC) 226 US–Japan alliance: Competitive and Resilient (CoRe) Partnership 94; semiconductor strategy 95–6 US–Japan–Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) 20

US–Japan–South Korea Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) 20 US Pacific Command (USPACOM) 38, 47n12, 142 vaccine nationalism 97–8, 128 Vietnam 6, 29, 40, 45, 80, 84, 112, 141, 146–8, 164–5, 182, 192, 211, 223, 229, 238–9, 243 Vietnam War 36, 52 wolf warrior diplomacy 110 World Health Organization (WHO) 92, 97 Xi Jinping 53, 91, 107, 120, 135, 145, 176, 223