The Impact of Populism on European Institutions and Civil Society: Discourses, Practices, and Policies (Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology) 3030734102, 9783030734107

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
Notes on Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
The Impact of Populism on the European Union: ‘The People’ and the Brussels Bubble
Tracing the Roots of Populism and the EU
The EU Institutions Facing the Populist Challenge
Populist Forces and Civil Society
Bridging the Theory/practice Divide: The Structure of the Book
Bibliography
The European Union Facing the Populist Wave
The Populist-Eurosceptic Mix: Conceptual Distinctions, Ideational Linkages and Internal Differentiation
Introduction
Populism and Euroscepticism: Two Distinct Concepts
Populism
Euroscepticism
Linkage Nodes: The Ideational Sources of the Populist-Euroscepticism Mix
Internal Differentiation: Left-Wing vs. Right-Wing Variants of Populist Euroscepticism
Conclusions
References
Populism and European Institutions: A Historical Perspective
The European Project: An Introduction
The First Phases of the European Project
A New Start of the European Project and Its First Cleavage with European Citizens
The Enlarged Political Arena of the European Project
The Emergence of Populism in the European Union
The Great Recession and Its Effects on Rising Populism
The First Reaction of the European Union and the annus horribilis
The Last Reaction of the European Union: A Conclusion
References
The Impact of Populism on European Institutions
The Discursive Construction of Migration and Democracy in the European Parliament: A Model of Reciprocal Influence Between Populists and Non-populists Through Polarization and Fragmentation
Introduction
Methodology
European Parliament Debates and Populism: What Are the Most Contested Issues?
Polarization: Reinforcing the Blocs, Increasing the Distance
Fragmentation: Eroding the Blocs, Decreasing the Distance
Conclusions
References
The Politicisation of the European Union and the Role of the European Parliament: Opportunities, Risks and Limitations
Defining the European Political Space in the Context of Constructive and Destructive Politicisation
Politicisation of EU Gender Policies: The Political Dynamics in the European Parliament Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality
References
The European Parliament’s Treatment of Religion in Times of Populism
Introduction—Religion and Populism
Religion in the European Parliament: Methodology
Results
Discussion: Different Impacts, Nuanced Debates
References
The European Commission and Reactions to the ‘Populist Turn’ in Anti-discrimination Policy
Introduction
The Success of Populist Parties and Euroscepticism
Populism and European Institutions
Methodology: Text Analysis of Populism and the Commission
The European Commission and Its Views on Nationalism and Populism
Populism and Political Discourse Analysis
The Commission's Civil Service and Populism
Conclusions
References
The Impact of Populism on European Civil Society
Facing the Threat of Populism: How the European Commission Can Reconnect with Citizens
The Impact of Populism on the European Rule of Law and Fundamental Values
The Roots of European Populism
How Does Populism Impact on the European Union?
Strengthening the European Public Sphere as a Response to the Populist Challenge
Safeguarding the Rule of Law
Fostering Political and Democratic Innovation of the Eurosphere
Paris Participatory Budgeting
Permanent Sortition Assembly in Belgium
Crowdsourcing the Constitution of Iceland with Citizens
Participatory Democracy Mechanisms at EU Level—The Way Forward
Sustaining Public Spaces by Supporting Civic Actors, Civic Education and Encouraging Interactions
References
Civil Society as Anti-Populism? Countering the Populist Threat and Campaigning for Change in the Discourse of EU-Level CSOs
Introduction
Populism and Civil Society: Contextual and Analytical Clarifications
Data and Methodology
Framing the Threat
Countering the Populist Threat: CSOs Calling for Action
Conclusion
Bibliography
The Interaction Among Populism, Civil Society Organisations and European Institutions
Introduction
Elements of the Economic and Societal Context
Economic Crisis
Cultural and Political Context
Demographic and Societal Context
Digitalisation
Impact of Populism on Civil Society Organisations
Impact of Populism Through Public Authorities
Regulatory Environment
Funds and Finance
Participation in the Decision-Making Process
Impact of Populism Through Public Discourse
Public Discourse and Values
Public Discourse: A Direct Impact
Safe Space
EU Institutions and Organised Civil Society
Conclusions
References
Europeanize to Resist: Civil Society vs. Populism
Introduction: Civil Society Under Pressure
Discrediting Narratives and the New Vulnerabilities in the Public Sphere
Difficulties in the CSOs’ Trickle-Down and Scale up
Legal Activism or Transnational Constitutionalism
Ideological Divides
Europeanize to Resist
References
Conclusions: Bursting the Brussels Bubble—How the Impact of Populism Can Be Exploited to Make the European Union Better
References
Index

Citation preview

PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

The Impact of Populism on European Institutions and Civil Society Discourses, Practices, and Policies Edited by Carlo Ruzza · Carlo Berti · Paolo Cossarini

Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology

Series Editors Carlo Ruzza, School of International Studies, University of Trento, Trento, Italy Hans-Jörg Trenz, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore, Firenze, Italy

Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology addresses contemporary themes in the field of Political Sociology. Over recent years, attention has turned increasingly to processes of Europeanization and globalization and the social and political spaces that are opened by them. These processes comprise both institutional-constitutional change and new dynamics of social transnationalism. Europeanization and globalization are also about changing power relations as they affect people’s lives, social networks and forms of mobility. The Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology series addresses linkages between regulation, institution building and the full range of societal repercussions at local, regional, national, European and global level, and will sharpen understanding of changing patterns of attitudes and behaviours of individuals and groups, the political use of new rights and opportunities by citizens, new conflict lines and coalitions, societal interactions and networking, and shifting loyalties and solidarity within and across the European space. We welcome proposals from across the spectrum of Political Sociology and Political Science, on dimensions of citizenship; political attitudes and values; political communication and public spheres; states, communities, governance structure and political institutions; forms of political participation; populism and the radical right; and democracy and democratization.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14630

Carlo Ruzza · Carlo Berti · Paolo Cossarini Editors

The Impact of Populism on European Institutions and Civil Society Discourses, Practices, and Policies

Editors Carlo Ruzza School of International Studies University of Trento Trento, Italy

Carlo Berti School of International Studies University of Trento Trento, Italy

Paolo Cossarini Department of Culture and Learning Aalborg University Aalborg, Denmark

Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology ISBN 978-3-030-73410-7 ISBN 978-3-030-73411-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73411-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover image: © Bildagentur-online/O hde/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

At the beginning of December 2019, as editors of this book, we organized an international research conference on the impact of populism on European institutions and civil society, hosted by the School of International Studies of the University of Trento. In the pre-pandemic world, populism appeared to be an immediate and major threat to the European Union: populist forces, especially of the far-right, were gaining momentum in several European countries and had been in government in Italy until a few months before our conference. Populists had already made their vociferous appearance in Brussels, where they were asserting their Eurosceptic, nationalist, often openly discriminatory and xenophobic ideas during parliamentary debates and through press releases, social media, and other means of communication. They could not be ignored. As academics, we were studying the challenges posed by populism and the reactions of European institutions and of several civil society organizations. The responses to populism, at least initially, appeared to be fragmentary, erratic, and sometimes even contradictory. They ranged from ignoring the threats posed by some populist forces, through fiercely opposing them, to incorporating some elements of populism. All these responses, however, seemed solicited by the perception of one major issue: EU institutions had to reconnect with citizens, and civil society organizations were called upon to mediate this reconciliation. Recognition of this urgent task was what induced us to organize a conference intended to be not simply an academic event, but a true v

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discussion among those forces that were studying and opposing populism. During the conference, academics, people from the European institutions, and representatives of civil society organizations expressed their points of view and discussed how they were responding to the challenges posed by populist forces. The debate was too stimulating and fruitful to finish that day. The themes and insights that emerged during the conference needed to be further explored and to be brought to a wider public. The process that started that day could be the beginning of a renewed conversation among different European actors, turning the threat of populism into a chance to build a better Europe. Therefore, we asked the participants to embark on a new adventure and elaborate what had been discussed during the conference into something that would eventually become this book. The arrival of Covid-19 partially shifted global attention towards another, even greater threat: that of a worldwide pandemic destined to claim the lives of millions, to severely hit the global economy, and to change people’s lives for many years to come. Nevertheless, populism did not go away. It soon became clear that populism would play a role in the management of the multiple pandemic-related crises, and that the consequences of a “populist” reaction to Covid-19 could be threatening. Suffice it here to mention the initial reactions of President Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, or President Donald Trump in the United States, who decidedly minimized the risks related to the virus, thus legitimizing the ideas (and the consequent behaviours) of those who did not consider Covid19 to be a threat, or even openly claimed that it was a hoax. Meanwhile, in Europe, far-right populist governments in Hungary and Poland were initially refusing to comply with the requirements of respecting the rule of law that would allow the approval and start of the “Recovery Plan for Europe”. Although this book was conceived before the start of the pandemic, and is therefore based on data, research, and facts that preceded the spread of Covid-19 and its socio-political consequences, its content talks to the present. It describes and analyses the impact of populism on the EU in a purer form, before the tidal wave of the pandemic came to mix things up and (temporarily) deflate old threats. We are confident that the analyses, insights, and suggestions found in this book can help academics and practitioners to better understand and react to populism, especially at a time when we must multiply our energies to face the challenges of the post-Covid-19 era.

PREFACE

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This book would not have been possible without the valuable assistance of several institutional bodies and Brussels-based civil society organizations, particularly those more affected by the success of populist politics, such as those advocating against discriminations and for human rights. They have been generous with their time and provided information on the distinctive perspective of organized civil society. We are particularly grateful to the School of International Studies at the University of Trento and its then Director Prof. Andrea Fracasso, for hosting, promoting, and partially funding the event that is at the basis of this book. Thanks also to our editor Ambra Finotello for supporting this project from the beginning and for providing useful suggestions and advice. Financial support for the event and the book has also been provided by the Italian Ministry of University and Research, through two distinct research grants: the PRIN 2015-40102915 project titled “Personalization, Institutionalization and De-Institutionalization: The New Dynamics of Power”, and the PRIN 2017 project titled “The transformation of democracy: Actors, strategies and outcomes in opposing populism in political, juridical and social arenas” (CUP E64I19003110005). As editors, we wish to acknowledge the assistance provided by Adrian Belton in the English language revision of the texts and to extend our gratitude to all contributors to this book. Trento, Italy December 2020

Carlo Ruzza Carlo Berti Paolo Cossarini

Contents

The Impact of Populism on the European Union: ‘The People’ and the Brussels Bubble Paolo Cossarini, Carlo Ruzza, and Carlo Berti

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The European Union Facing the Populist Wave The Populist-Eurosceptic Mix: Conceptual Distinctions, Ideational Linkages and Internal Differentiation Emanuele Massetti

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Populism and European Institutions: A Historical Perspective Roberto Santaniello

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The Impact of Populism on European Institutions The Discursive Construction of Migration and Democracy in the European Parliament: A Model of Reciprocal Influence Between Populists and Non-populists Through Polarization and Fragmentation Carlo Berti The Politicisation of the European Union and the Role of the European Parliament: Opportunities, Risks and Limitations Markus Warasin

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CONTENTS

The European Parliament’s Treatment of Religion in Times of Populism Alberta Giorgi

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The European Commission and Reactions to the ‘Populist Turn’ in Anti-discrimination Policy Carlo Ruzza

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The Impact of Populism on European Civil Society Facing the Threat of Populism: How the European Commission Can Reconnect with Citizens Assya Kavrakova Civil Society as Anti-Populism? Countering the Populist Threat and Campaigning for Change in the Discourse of EU-Level CSOs Paolo Cossarini The Interaction Among Populism, Civil Society Organisations and European Institutions Pierluigi Brombo Europeanize to Resist: Civil Society vs. Populism Luisa Chiodi Conclusions: Bursting the Brussels Bubble—How the Impact of Populism Can Be Exploited to Make the European Union Better Carlo Berti, Carlo Ruzza, and Paolo Cossarini Index

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Notes on Contributors

Carlo Berti holds a Ph.D. in Communication Studies from Auckland University of Technology. He is Postdoctoral Fellow at the School of International Studies, University of Trento. His research interests include political communication, populism, the European public sphere, and political corruption. Currently, he is working on a collaborative project on populism and the transformations of democracy. His research has been published, among other journals, in Journalism Studies, Media Culture & Society, Australian Journalism Review, and Punctum: International Journal of Semiotics. Pierluigi Brombo works at the European Economic and Social Committee, the EU institution representing civil society organizations, where he leads the unit in charge of “Relations with Economic and Social Councils and Civil Society”. He holds a Master’s Degree in Political Science and in Sociology and Social Research. He regularly publishes on social sciences and law reviews on the themes of EU governance, EU immigration policy, and EU family policy. Luisa Chiodi is Director of OBC Transeuropa since 2006. She obtained a Ph.D. at the European University Institute and a Master’s Degree in Political Science at the University of Milan. From 2003 to 2008, she was Lecturer on ’Eastern European studies’ in the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Bologna. She authored several academic publications and coordinated various research projects. Her main research interests focus on civil society and the transnational dynamics in the European space. xi

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Paolo Cossarini is Postdoctoral Researcher at the Department of Culture and Learning, Aalborg University (Denmark). Previously, he was Postdoctoral Fellow at the School of International Studies, University of Trento (Italy), and taught Politics and International Relations at Loughborough University (UK). His research focuses on populism and nationalism, Italian and Spanish politics, protest movements, and civil society organizations. He has published in European Politics and Society, Global Discourse, European Political Science, and Revista de Estudios Políticos, among other journals. He is co-editor of Populism and Passions. Democratic Legitimacy after Austerity (2019). Alberta Giorgi is Senior Assistant Professor at the University of Bergamo, Associate Researcher of the research groups GSRL (Paris) and CRAFT (Turin), and the research centre CES (Coimbra). She currently serves on the board of the research networks Political Sociology (ESA), Social Movements and Political Participation (SISP), Sociology of Religion (AIS). She works on the intersections of religion and politics— namely, secularism, and gender and religion. Among her publications: Handbook of Religion and Politics in Europe, Routledge (forthcoming), co-edited with E. Fokas. Assya Kavrakova is the Executive Director of the European Citizen Action Service (ECAS)—a pan-European non-profit association, based in Brussels, with 30 years of experience in empowering citizens to exercise their rights and campaigning for an inclusive and democratic Europe. She has more than twenty years of experience in senior management positions in the non-governmental sector and in-depth knowledge of European Citizenship, European Rights Framework, and EU civic participation mechanisms. She is also a member of the Board of EUobserver—a not-for-profit, independent online newspaper. Emanuele Massetti is “Montalcini” Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Trento, at the School of International Studies and in the Department of Sociology. He is an Associate Fellow at the Centre on Constitutional Change (University of Edinburgh) and a coeditor of the Journal of Common Market Studies—Annual Review. He has lectured on populism since 2011. He co-edited the volume The People and the Nation: Populism and Ethno-Territorial Politics in Europe (Routledge, 2020).

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Carlo Ruzza is Professor of Political Sociology at the University of Trento, founding member of the Research Network of Political Sociology (European Sociological Association), and advisor of the ECPR standing group Political Sociology. Professor Ruzza worked extensively on the changes in modes of political participation and in the related theoretical aspects. His research focuses particularly on the interaction between civil society organizations, social movement organizations and decision-making, particularly at EU level, and on the related implications for democracy. A second area of research is on ethno-nationalism and populism. He is currently working on anti-populism in the European institutions and civil society. Roberto Santaniello has a degree in Political Science and has worked since 1985 at the European Parliament. Since 1997, he has carried out public relations and communication activities at the European Commission’s Representation in Italy. He is a Journalist and a Professor of Law and European Integration Policies at the University of Roma Tre, and author of numerous essays and articles. He curates the Agenda of the European Union for the magazine “Il Mulino”. Markus Warasin is an EU civil servant working as head of unit in the European Parliament. He has joined the European Public Service in 2005 and is currently heading the parliamentary committee secretariat on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the EU. From 2017 to 2019, he was assigned to the Cabinet of the President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani. His previous work experience includes 10 years in managerial positions as head of unit in the areas of Women’s Rights and Gender Equality and in Communication Policy. Markus holds a Ph.D. in Political Theory and History of Ideas, and a M.A. in International Politics.

List of Figures

The Discursive Construction of Migration and Democracy in the European Parliament: A Model of Reciprocal Influence Between Populists and Non-populists Through Polarization and Fragmentation Fig. 1 Fig. 2

Most debated issues in the EP in relation to populism (2014–2019) (Source Created by the author) A model of reciprocal influence between populist and non-populist discourses in the EP

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The European Parliament’s Treatment of Religion in Times of Populism Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4 Fig. 5

Religion in debates at the European Parliament (Source Created by the author) Topics related to religion—2004–2009 (Source Created by the author) Topics related to religion—2009–2014 (Source Created by the author) Topics related to religion—2014–2019 (Source Created by the author) Word clouds: Islam (2004–2019) Christianity (2004–2019) (Source Created by the author)

126 127 128 128 130

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LIST OF FIGURES

Civil Society as Anti-Populism? Countering the Populist Threat and Campaigning for Change in the Discourse of EU-Level CSOs Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3

Fig. 4

Main themes in the texts of the CSOs, 2013–2019 (Source Created by the author) Conceptualisation of threats linked to populism in the texts of CSOs 2013–2019 (Source Created by the author) Conceptualisation of categories and subjects threatened by populism in the texts of CSOs, 2013–2019 (Source Created by the author) Co-occurrences ‘EU deficiencies’ in the texts of CSOs, 2013–2019 (Source Created by the author)

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The Interaction Among Populism, Civil Society Organisations and European Institutions Fig. 1

Civil society participation index (Source Highcharts.com/V-Dem)

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List of Tables

The Discursive Construction of Migration and Democracy in the European Parliament: A Model of Reciprocal Influence Between Populists and Non-populists Through Polarization and Fragmentation Table 1

Frequencies of frames related to migration

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The European Parliament’s Treatment of Religion in Times of Populism Table 1 Table 2 Table 3

Association of codes (2004–2009), in percentage Association of codes (2009–2014), in percentage Association of codes (2014–2019), in percentage

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The European Commission and Reactions to the ‘Populist Turn’ in Anti-discrimination Policy Table 1 Table 2

List of codes identified Co-occurrence between the code ‘European Values’ and other codes

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The Impact of Populism on the European Union: ‘The People’ and the Brussels Bubble Paolo Cossarini, Carlo Ruzza, and Carlo Berti

Populism has never been more scrutinized by scholars; it has never been more commented on by media and citizens; and, to some extent, it has never been more vigorously contested by ‘mainstream’ political parties. Populism’s pervasiveness has saturated public and academic debates, becoming a key concept in all branches of social and political studies. However, leaving aside the discussion about the use and abuse of the term, and despite the burgeoning literature, there are still aspects of populism that remain under-examined. One of them is populism’s impact on the European Union as a whole, by which is meant its institutions and the EU-based civil society organizations (CSOs). Undoubtedly, populism has been defined as a challenge for all European institutions and solidarity among Member States, to the point of questioning the existence

P. Cossarini (B) Department of Culture and Learning, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark e-mail: [email protected] C. Ruzza · C. Berti School of International Studies, University of Trento, Trento, Italy e-mail: [email protected] C. Berti e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 C. Ruzza et al. (eds.), The Impact of Populism on European Institutions and Civil Society, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73411-4_1

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of a European Union itself. Moreover, the wave of electoral successes of so-called populist parties across Europe has radically changed the political panorama in the continent over the past decade. This has fuelled a stream of public debate and academic research on the nature, the causes, and the consequences of this phenomenon and on the political and institutional responses to what is generally considered a danger to the EU and its values. Nevertheless, the scholarship has not yet developed an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of the nexus between the European machinery and populist politics. This has partly to do with the focus of current scholarly research, which has mainly examined single case studies or specific world regions (i.e. Latin and North America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, etc.); this lack of attention to the EU and its functioning has also partly to do with the type of research, which has recently been inclined to discuss the nature of the concept ‘populism’, rather than the impact of this phenomenon on institutional and political actors. In this regard, supranational bodies have been especially neglected by populism studies, and the EU is no exception. Accordingly, while the growing literature on populist politics has discussed the contested concept of populism and its current manifestations in various geographical contexts, only scant attention has been paid to the specific connection between this form of doing politics and the European Union as a specific political body. How is the growing pressure of populist narratives shaping the EU institutions? How do the discourses and practices of EU actors frame populism? To what extent are populist politics practised within the EU institutions? And, also, how does the EU react to populist forces? In order to address these questions, the study of populism has to be linked to the specific dynamics of the EU machinery and actors. This book starts from these ideas and aims to answer the above questions, thereby also filling an important gap in the study of populism and the European Union. To this end, it is committed to enhancing the analytical and conceptual tools available to address populism and its effects on the European institutions and civil society. Moreover, this book bridges the perspectives of scholars and practitioners, and it combines analyses from the academic world with ones conducted internally to the EU institutions. This is particularly important because dialogue between these two dimensions is very limited in European studies and research on populism. The contributions in this book furnish a theoretically informed

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and empirically substantiated examination of the impact of populist politics on the EU, and how the latter has adapted and responded to the ‘populist turn’ characterizing recent political developments throughout Europe as well as at the EU level. The discussions outlined above are present in different disciplines, but they lack a direct focus on the distinct impact that populism has on EU institutions, policymaking, and the EU-level civil society organizations. As the contributions in this book seek to show, focusing on the discourses and practices of all the actors involved in the broad EU decision-making process can yield new insights into the populism/EU nexus.

Tracing the Roots of Populism and the EU The multiple crises that the EU has suffered in recent years, such as the global financial and economic crisis, and the so-called refugee crisis, have created the conditions for the emergence of political narratives centred on the notions of sovereignty, identity, and nationalism. In this context, the share of votes for parties opposed to EU integration has steadily increased, while many Europeans are disenchanted with the Union and distrustful of its institutions and policymakers. Indeed, when the EU has been discussed in broad terms, populism has often been merged with other phenomena such as nationalism and Euroscepticism, which have frequently been labelled the most urgent challenges for Europe. Although the scholarship has stressed that populism originated outside Europe and emerged long before the birth of the European Union, in recent years populism has appeared in conjunction with Euroscepticism. In fact, with few exceptions, populist parties are also Eurosceptic, and vice versa. On considering the political actors that are currently labelled populist and Eurosceptic, it is immediately apparent that the populist-Eurosceptic mix can manifest itself in rather different forms, and many diverse phenomena have emerged across Europe. To name just a few contemporary examples, they range from right-wing parties such as France’s Front National, Viktor Orbán’s ruling Fidesz party in Hungary, the Freedom Party of Austria, the Swedish Democrats, Alternative for Germany, Italy’s League, the Dansk Folkeparti (DF), the UK Independence Party (UKIP), and Geert Wilders’ Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)—all of them generally considered to be examples of populist radical right parties (PRRPs)— to left-wing parties such as Spain’s Podemos , Greece’s left-wing Syriza,

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and Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise in France, and the heterogeneous example of the 5 Star Movement in Italy. Populism and Euroscepticism, in sum, can occur in tandem, and their connection takes different forms and can certainly be found on the ideological fringes of party systems. However, for the sake of clarity, it should be noted that populism and Euroscepticism are not exactly the same phenomenon. Although closely related to each other, they are inherently distinct at the conceptual and empirical levels. While populism can be defined as a broad set of ideas about the functioning of democracy, Euroscepticism concerns a more precise position in regard to the European project. Nonetheless, the connection between populism and Euroscepticism can be explained by the central features of populist politics and the nature of the European integration process and EU governance. Undeniably, while populism has been commonly defined as an anti-elitist ideology and rhetoric, the EU is widely understood as a quintessentially elitist project. In these conditions, opposition to the EU tends to be expressed in populist terms. Moreover, populism has been recently defined as a reaction to technocracy (e.g. Bickerton & Accetti, 2017; Moffitt, 2016). Consequently, the EU, commonly seen as the prototypical expression of technocratic governance, would fall within this type of characterization. The differentiation between technocracy and populism is then ‘premised on the question of who is best equipped to make decisions on behalf of a populace—‘the people’ for populism or those with the requisite expertise and specialist training for technocrats’ (Moffitt, 2019: 49). In this context, leaving aside discussion of the actual Euroscepticism of some of the aforementioned political parties, the relationship between populism and the EU also makes it possible to highlight another aspect: the nature of populism. The growing literature on populism has discussed its left- and rightwing manifestations both theoretically and empirically, and various models of analysis have been developed. As such, populism has been conceptualized as a particular form of political organization (e.g. Germani, 1978; Taggart, 1995), as a ‘thin ideology’ (e.g. Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Canovan, 1999; Kaltwasser et al., 2017; Mudde, 2004; Stanley, 2008), as a strategy (Jansen, 2011; Weyland, 2001), as a political style (e.g. Mazzoleni et al., 2003; Moffitt, 2016), and as a discourse (e.g. Laclau, 2005; Wodak et al., 2013). These approaches have various similarities with each other and, although they include different traits and variables, they all stress the people-versus-elite divide. Indeed, regardless of the

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theoretical and methodological standpoint adopted, the defining characteristic of all forms of populism is that they create a vertical, down-up split between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. This split has been at the core of the numerous conceptualizations of populism, in all the different geographical contexts in which this phenomenon has been analysed—from Latin and North America (e.g. De la Torre, 2010; Kazin, 1998), to Western and Eastern Europe (e.g. Betz, 1994; Mudde, 2007; Pirro, 2014; Rooduijn et al., 2014). Debates on the nature of populism have paralleled different types of explanations of the phenomenon. In the recent literature, two broad perspectives have emerged, namely the demand-side and the supply-side theories. Typically, demand-side explanations focus on the dynamics of globalization and its economic and socio-cultural consequences. Often intertwined, these theories stress various factors at the origin of populism, such as the rise of economic insecurity, ethnic and class resentment, welfare chauvinism, and a broader ‘cultural backlash’, meaning a reaction against the progressive cultural change that has occurred mostly in Western countries over the past few decades (Chambers & Kymlicka, 2002; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). On the other hand, various explanations have recently focused on the structure of party systems and institutions, seeking to link the rise of populism not only with the social demand side—as, for instance, does Cas Mudde (2007) about right-wing extremism—but also with the types of political groups and parties that have proliferated across Europe. In this regard, recent scholarship has particularly addressed the new types of actors and political organizations that have appeared—often labelled ‘anti-system parties’, ‘movement-parties’, or ‘digital parties’ (Gerbaudo, 2018; Zulianello, 2019)—as well as their styles and discourses—variously described as antagonistic, moralistic, simplistic, or emotional (e.g. Canovan, 1999; Cossarini & Vallespín, 2019; Laclau, 2005). This has also contributed to the discussion about the consequences that the surge of right- and left-wing populism across Europe has had for liberal regimes (e.g. change in party systems, polarization, fragmentation, and mainstreaming of far-right narratives) (e.g. Caiani & Graziano, 2019; Muis & Immerzeel, 2017). Following a similar pattern, the recent literature has also emphasized the normative implications of populism. While some studies stress populism’s democratic nature, in that it is a potential source for the renewal of representative politics and democratic institutions (e.g. Laclau,

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2005; Katsambekis, 2017), others emphasize the dangers for liberal values, pluralism, and human rights. From the latter perspective, it is argued that the perils for liberal democracy no longer stem from external authoritarian politics but from within, that is, from ‘disfigurations’ of liberal democracy itself (Urbinati, 2014). A flourishing literature has given various labels to this shift, branding current political systems as ‘illiberal democracies’ (Zakaria, 1997), ‘democracies without rights’ (Mounk, 2018), or ‘populist regimes’ (Müller, 2017). These normative considerations often parallel the dichotomy that exists within the burgeoning literature between the binary focus, on the one hand, and the ‘degreeism’ perspective on the other. Some approaches to populism adopt a binary stance and view populism in black-and-white terms—i.e. an actor is either populist or anti-populist, and this would be indicated by, for instance, its ideological positioning or by the language used. Other approaches instead account for the ‘grey areas’ between the two extremes, and acknowledge that there is a certain ‘degree of populism’ that all political actors may employ at some point (see, for instance, Moffitt, 2016). In sum, populism resonates with the broader crisis of democracy and political representation, and it fuels the idea of ‘corrupt’ governments against the ‘pure’ people. Hence, the opposition to technocracy is linked to Euroscepticism and nationalism and, ultimately, it echoes the idea of the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization. From inside and outside the communitarian institutions, in fact, a variety of populist politicians continue to claim that they are the real representatives of the people. They construct the EU institutions as elitist groups—the ‘winners’ of globalization—pursuing their own interests and aiming at their own political survival.

The EU Institutions Facing the Populist Challenge Populism and Euroscepticism, in all their forms, are no longer fringe phenomena but a political reality. The success of their narratives throughout Europe sparked fears of a populist surge in both the 2014 and the 2019 European Parliament elections. However, the outcomes of those elections are not necessarily to be seen as a massive increase in citizens’ support for populist parties; rather, they were indicative of the slow,

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though persistent, decline of the centre-left and centre-right parties— which, in turn, had hitherto been able to marginalize populists in the European institutions. At first glance, the impact of populism is mainly due to the emergence of a new party family, which can be broadly termed ‘populist radical right parties’ (PRR) (Mudde, 2007). Remarkable is the alliance of likeminded national parties and governments—e.g. Visegrád countries—that is materializing in Europe. Their policy agenda, especially on migration, will most certainly be at the core of political disputes within all European arenas. However, today’s populist parties seem to have shifted away from advocating outright withdrawal from the EU. Rather, major European populist parties across the continent want to use their power in the new European Parliament to transform the EU from the inside. They appear poised to sow discord and dysfunction in the European institutions from within. This is also why it is important to look at the different institutions and the EU machinery to assess the impact of populism nowadays. Populism has not represented a serious concern within the European Parliament until quite recently, although alarms were long ago activated for the radical right parties. Nowadays, the European Parliament is a target for populists since it is in and of itself illustrative of the Europeanism and transnationalism that they oppose. While an indirect impact of populist rhetoric is apparent in its ability to influence the broad political culture and to shape the public debate and policy agenda—remarkable in this regard is the inclination of leftwing parties to implement anti-immigration policies—populism’s power to tailor public policy at the EU level is still quite limited. This is so for a series of reasons. Firstly, the cordon sanitaire—that is, the alliance of all non-populist parties—has kept populists marginalized in recent political history, at both national and EU level. Secondly, the populists themselves have been unable to efficiently translate their discourse and rhetoric into concrete public policies, also due to their absence, irregularity, and meagre weight in the major political decision-making arenas. This applies not only to the European Parliament but also to the European Commission, the main decision-making and executive body of the EU. Although still largely immune to and untouched by the electoral success of populist parties, in recent years the European Commission has become more reactive to populism. Several prominent commissioners have warned about the current challenges to the European Project raised

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by populist politics and Euroscepticism. Moreover, from various quarters, commissioners are also asked to provide fresh and strong leadership on public policies and political narratives in order to halt the rise of populism, and in this way help overcome the disenchantment of citizens. At this level of the European governance, the worries are especially related to the impact of populists’ successful rhetoric and narrative on anti-elitism (and therefore on Euroscepticism) and their nativist antiimmigration stance. Consequently, the Commission has recently warned of populism’s inherent risks and its broad consequences for political institutions and civil society at large. While, from a wider perspective, it is possible to say that populism is closely linked to modern civil society— since the former is a way to do politics that appeals to the people to show the deficiencies of representative government—populism represents in and of itself an existential risk for the same civil society. As many have noted (e.g. Arato & Cohen, 2018; Müller, 2017), populist politics disrupt the liberal principles upon which civil society and representative democracy are founded.

Populist Forces and Civil Society There are several reasons why relations between CSOs and populists are difficult. A general one is the principled opposition of populist forces to intermediate social bodies, such as civil society organizations. The populists’ dislike of intermediary institutions is wide-ranging and characterizes left-wing and right-wing populisms. Since anti-elitism is a defining feature of populism, civil society groups are seen as elite formations which undermine the populists’ asserted cohesion of ‘the people’—a defining category of all populist ideologies, which is regularly present within the large conceptual contents that characterize them (De la Torre & Mazzoleni, 2019). A second feature connected to the ideological assertion of the cohesive nature of ‘the people’ is the refusal to attribute a superior status to ‘experts’. Civil society advocacy efforts are often based on claims to expertise not easily accepted by populist groups. A related aspect is the populists’ preference for conceptual and linguistic simplification. Because the politics of expertise are generally based on complex technical or social-scientific knowledge, CSO experts tend to be distrusted by populists. Thirdly, and with specific reference to the EU level, many CSOs have become institutionalized in the political environments in which they

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operate, where they often express the values of their funding institutions. At EU level, CSOs have been characterized by values concerning social and ethnic inclusion, strong environmental protection, and antidiscrimination policy in matters such as migration, religion, sexualities, and gender. These values are antithetical to populist conceptions. Thus, populists oppose EU-level civil society not only in general but also because it expresses the views of the specific policy sectors in which it operates. Fourthly, EU-level civil society is staffed by personnel that, because of the requirements of their jobs, are members of cosmopolitan elites. They often speak several languages, travel extensively, and have lived in several countries. As a result, they often have weak national affiliations. This paucity of nationalist values is incompatible with the nativist ethos of contemporary European radical right populism. Fourthly, EU populism is always Eurosceptic. Most EU-level CSOs are supporters of the ‘European Project’ because they tend to develop the taken-for-granted assumptions of the political environment in which they operate. Their Europeanism is thus a fundamental reason why they are incompatible with the current right-wing populist ethos. Euroscepticism is an important defining feature of the European radical right, which has formed a distinctive ideological platform in which populist elements and anti-elite anti-system features are merged with anti-EU sentiments. Nonetheless, while there are several reasons why Eurosceptic populist radical right parties (EPRR) are at loggerheads with organized civil society, there are also several reasons why right-wing populist actors do not eschew all CSOs. First, in ideological terms, while civil society is seen by the left as a means to promote equality, anti-discrimination, and the protection of vulnerable constituencies, it is also seen by the right as a means to achieve freedom from the state. The concept of civil society is sufficiently under-specified for different ideologies to frame its roles and functions differently (Chambers & Kymlicka, 2002). CSOs can, for instance, replace the state in service-delivery tasks. This feature justifies reliance on civil society for the neo-liberal anti-statist right. Less so for the EPRR formations, which are often statist and see the state as a redistributive device, although its benefits are to be limited to native constituencies. However, the boundary between neoliberal and pro-market formations and statist EPRR formations is flexible, and civil society service-delivery functions are often not seen in negative terms. Furthermore, civil society can be useful to EPRR as a means to campaign in favour of their signature

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law-and-order policies and their conservative agenda on matters such as combatting abortion rights, promoting ‘family values’, and other conservative issues such as uncompromising positions on drugs and end-of-life rights. Finally, civil society organizations can form part of ‘uncivil society’, that is, groups inspired by nativist and xenophobic values that form a linkage between like-minded parties and society and justify practices ranging from physical aggression against minorities to vigilante groups harassing minorities in the pursuit of security (Ruzza, 2020). For all these reasons, the attitude of radical right populists towards civil society is ambivalent. They accept and encourage their sponsored organizations while obstructing the much larger family of inclusivist anti-discrimination groups. This discriminatory allocation of rewards and punishment is not limited to the EU. It is a process documented in several non-EU countries, even if the relevant literature is still limited (Youngs, 2018). It is a process that has occurred over several years and which consists in the appearance of discursive spaces within which antipluralist views are accepted and normalized in a variety of public spheres, such as different social media, publications by populist-sponsored associations, and radical right governmental publications (Krzyzanowski ˙ & Ledin, 2017). At EU level, this process of selective support has its roots in processes that have occurred in Member States over recent years. It has been encouraged by populist parties in incumbent positions, which have also created their own quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations. Illiberal conservative civil society is not limited to a specific part of the EU. It emerges in the now vast range of countries with strong radical right populist parties, and it is becoming a visible signature policy when right-wing populist leaders meet transnationally. In addition to pursuing a conservative social agenda, populist governments are also hindering progressive civil society groups through a mix of financial disincentives, negative campaigns, and selective application of legislation, as has been shown in the case of Hungary—a country in which progressive civil society has undergone a process of ‘othering’ whereby its operations are filtered through a lens of ‘enemy politics’ by governing authorities (Majtényi et al., 2019; Nagy, 2017). Aware of this changing climate, civil society groups are increasingly worried and have in recent years organized several events to reflect on the impact of populism on civil society. It is therefore useful to examine

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how different sectors of EU-level civil society conceptualize and oppose right-wing populism. In the light of these considerations, this book stresses the politically disruptive nature of populism as a fundamental challenge to the EU. It assesses its impact on the whole EU machinery, the institutional actors, and the civil society organizations.

Bridging the Theory/practice Divide: The Structure of the Book This book seeks to disentangle all the relevant aspects of the nexus between populist politics and the European machinery, effectively bridging the academic perspective and the practitioners’ experience. Combining quantitative and qualitative discourse analysis, case studies, and first-hand experience, the book intends to furnish a critical and all-encompassing understanding of the impact that the recent rise of populism has had on the EU and its main actors, and how they have reacted to this challenge. Given this identitarian and ideational challenge, it is worth asking how European institutions and civil society organizations are reacting. The importance of this question and the potentially broad impact of populism in terms of ideas, political outcomes, and social dynamics require academia to step out of its comfort zone and deal directly with institutional actors, civil society organizations, and policymakers. Bringing together academics, members of European institutions and agencies, and leaders of civil society organizations, this book bridges the gap between research and practice. It explores and describes how populism has impacted on European institutions and civil society, and what their reactions and strategies to overcome the challenges posed by populists have been in recent times. Using a unique approach, the book combines academic research with direct practitioners’ experience to delve into how the EU is being changed by populism, and what have been the responses in terms of discourses, practices, and policymaking. The mix of scholars’ and practitioners’ perspectives certainly represents an innovation in the literature on populism and the EU, and as such, it raises important challenges. In order to deal with these challenges and cover the different dynamics of the EU machinery, the book is structured into four sections: a general, introductory one that considers the history and latest developments of the relationship between populism and the

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EU, and three sections corresponding to the three institutional spheres of decision-making, namely the EU Commission, the Parliament, and the EU-level civil society organizations. By means of this structure, the book seeks to disentangle how the populist threat was internally perceived by EU institutions and NGOs, what strategies they devised to react to it, and how these strategies were expressed and perceived in their institutional and public communications. The first section will place the book in the context of the literature on populism and European studies. Emanuele Massetti opens this section with his chapter ‘The Populism-Euroscepticism Compound: Conceptual Distinctions, Ideational Linkages and Internal Differentiation’. Through a conceptual and historical analysis, Massetti focuses on the interplay between these two political phenomena in both conceptual and empirical terms. Drawing on the recent scholarship on populism and Euroscepticism, his chapter furnishes a broad perspective that enables the reader to understand the big picture of current dynamics in the European context. While populism and Euroscepticism often overlap, they also refer to intermediate concepts, such as ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘economic nationalism’, which are often under-examined by scholars but work as traits d’union in the populism/Euroscepticism nexus. This first analysis is followed by Roberto Santaniello’s chapter ‘Populism and European Institutions: a Historical Perspective’. Santaniello explores how the European institutions have reacted to populism over the past ten years, and the political initiatives that the EU institutions have developed in order to give concrete answers to citizens. Adopting a historical perspective, Santaniello also stresses how the growing influence of populist politics has characterized the recent history of the European integration, pointing to some recent key episodes such as Brexit, the dispute over the rule of law in Poland and Hungary, and the so-called migration crisis. The second section focuses specifically on the European institutions and mainly comprises studies on key narratives and dynamics that have dominated the EU parliament and the Commission in recent years. The first chapter in this section, ‘The Discursive Construction of Migration and Democracy in the European Parliament: A Model of Reciprocal Influence Between Populists and Non-populists Through Polarisation and Fragmentation’ by Carlo Berti, develops a content and frame analysis of European parliamentary debates during the 2014–2019 term. Berti argues that narratives of politicians and anti-populist politicians influence each other bi-directionally, generating not only polarization but also a

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certain degree of fragmentation within two non-homogeneous blocks. Moreover, Berti observes that non-populists move towards populist arguments while, on the contrary, populists strategically use anti-populist arguments in the institutional procedures of the European Parliament. This chapter is followed by Markus Warasin’s analysis of the process of politicization of the EU. In his ‘The politicisation of the European Union and the Role of the European Parliament: Opportunities, Risks and Limitations’, Warasin focuses on the European Parliament as a highly politicized arena where political groups are the main agents and where most conflicts are fought along the lines of the parliamentary groups. Particular attention is paid to intra-group cohesion and intergroup coalition, which are key tactical elements in a politically competitive environment like the European Parliament. These dynamics are exemplified with the case study of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality. In similar vein, Alberta Giorgi develops an analysis of the narratives in the European Parliament by focusing specifically on the case of religion and religion-related topics. In her ‘The European Parliament Dealing with Religion in Times of Populism’, Giorgi investigates whether populism is an issue with respect to religious freedom and diversity. By means of a discourse analysis of a series of discursive loci, such as the EU parliament plenaries, the activities of the intergroup on Freedom of Religion or Belief and Religious Tolerance, and the EU Parliament external communication on Twitter, Giorgi assesses the impact of populism on how the European Parliament discursively engages with religion and its relationships with gender issues. In similar vein, Carlo Ruzza documents the Commission’s reactions to populism and the building of an anti-populist narrative. Drawing on text analysis and a series of in-depth interviews, Ruzza focuses on perceived violations of the rule of law and issues of discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, religion, and sexuality. His chapter ‘The Construction of Anti-Populism in the European Commission’ also considers how the Commission interacts with human rights and anti-discrimination civil society organizations, thus contributing to the broader creation of an opposition to the populist discourse. The last section includes analyses of the interplay between populism and the EU-level civil society organization. Opening this section, Assya Kavrakova investigates the relationship among populist politics, citizens, and the European institutions at large. In her ‘Facing the threat of populism: How the European institutions can reconnect with citizens’,

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Kavrakova advances some hypotheses about how EU institutions (should) act in order to be perceived as part of the solution, rather than part of the problem. Stressing the role of the European Commission as guardian of the Treaties, Kavrakova highlights the political and legislative strategies that the Commission has at its disposal to counter populism. These strategies include monitoring the rule of law EU-wide, fostering the development of a European public sphere and civic education, promoting the EU fundamental rights, and increasing the communication of EU values, as well as engagement in local communities, especially in non-metropolitan areas. Following Kavrakova’s take, Paolo Cossarini’s ‘Civil Society as AntiPopulism? Countering the Populist Threat and Campaigning for Change in the Discourse of EU-level CSOs’ move towards a closer look at civil society organizations. Drawing on a document and text analysis, Cossarini’s chapter explores the work of EU-based NGOs and tests the extent to which they build a counter-narrative to the exclusionary discourse implemented by right-wing populism. By means of both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of EU-level CSOs working on gender, race, religion, and migration, Cossarini inquires into the efficacy, scope, and reach of their work. This also makes it possible to sketch the broader political debate that lies behind the relationship between civil society organizations and the EU institutions, which in turn resonates with the following contribution in the book. Pierluigi Brombo’s chapter, ‘The Interaction among Populism, Civil Society Organizations, and European Institutions’, explores the interaction between populism and CSOs, stressing their key political role in articulating and aggregating citizens’ needs. Using an empirical case study, Brombo examines how digitalization creates direct channels between citizens and public authorities that question the intermediary role of CSOs. This chapter is followed by Luisa Chiodi’s ‘Europeanise to Resist: European Civil Society under Pressure’, which deals with the opportunities and limits of civil society organizations in coping with the populist challenge. Drawing on the Italian case, Chiodi shows how the creation of new transnational spaces endorsed by the European machinery is an opportunity for civil society organizations at national level. Chiodi highlights some cases of success, such as the reform of the Dublin regulation, the NGO activism in favour of the Istanbul convention, and LGBT legal activism to obtain civil unions. However, she also stresses the limits of these national organizations, pointing to their

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scant knowledge of the European decision-making process and limited awareness of the space for political participation at EU level. Overall, by collecting a variety of critical standpoints and perspectives, the book seeks to furnish an all-encompassing picture of how EU-level institutions and NGOs are being impacted on and influenced by populism, and how they are adapting to the new political environment in terms of the discursive construction of identities and issues, political and institutional practices, and policymaking. Several authors stress the often-unspecified and at the same time prominent character of the label ‘populism’, and therefore the ways in which this label is used to cover a range of actors’ strategic definitions of the nature of the challenge, and their desired responses. It shows that the success of populist formations can be conceptualized as a crisis for the EU, but that as documented in previous crises, it constitutes both a challenge and an opportunity for the EU. In the context of economic transformation, digitalization, distrust in politics and in public authorities, and strong environmental sensitivity across Europe and within the EU machinery, critically examining the impact of populist politics remains not only an essential task for scholars and practitioners, but an opportunity for EU actors to reassert their role and pursue the process of EU construction in novel ways.

Bibliography Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (Eds.) (2008). Twenty-first century populism: The spectre of Western European democracy. Palgrave. Arato, A., & Cohen, J. L. (2018). Civil society, populism, and religion. Routledge handbook of global populism (pp. 112–126). Betz, H.-G. (1994). Radicalism and right-wing populism in Western Europe. St. Martin’s Press. Bickerton, C., & Accetti, C. I. (2017). Populism and technocracy: Opposites or complements? Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 20(2), 186–206. Caiani, M., & Graziano, P. (2019). Understanding varieties of populism in times of crises. West European Politics, 42(6), 1141–1158. Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy. Political Studies, 47 , 2–16. Chambers, S. & Kymlicka, W. (Ed.). (2002). Alternative conceptions of civil society. Princeton.

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Cossarini, P., & Vallespín, F. (Eds.). (2019). Populism and passions: Democratic legitimacy after austerity. Routledge. De la Torre, C. (2010). Populist seduction in Latin America. Ohio University Press. De la Torre, c., & Mazzoleni, O. (2019). Do we need a minimum definition of populism? An appraisal of Mudde’s conceptualization. Populism, 1, 1–12. Gerbaudo, P. (2018). The digital party: Political organization and online democracy. Pluto Press. Germani, G. (1978). Authoritarianism, fascism, and national populism. Transaction. Jansen, R. S. (2011). Populist mobilization: A new theoretical approach to populism. Social Theory, 29(2), 75–96. Kaltwasser, C. R., Taggart, P. A., Espejo, P. O., & Ostiguy, P. (Eds.). (2017). The Oxford handbook of populism. Oxford University Press. Katsambekis, G. (2017). The populist surge in post-democratic times: Theoretical and political challenges. The Political Quarterly, 88(2), 202–210. Kazin, M. (1998). The populist persuasion: An American history. Cornell University. Krzyzanowski, ˙ M., & Ledin, P. (2017). Uncivility on the web: Populism in/and the borderline discourses of exclusion. Journal of Language and Politics, 16(4), 566–581. Laclau, E. (2005). On populist reason. Verso. Majtényi, B., Kopper, A., & Susánszky, P. (2019). Constitutional othering, ambiguity and subjective risks of mobilization in Hungary: Examples from the migration crisis. Democratization, 26, 173–189. Mazzoleni, G., Stewart, J., & Horsfield, B. (2003). The media and neopopulism. Praeger. Moffitt, B. (2019). Populism versus technocracy: Performance, passions, and aesthetics. In P. Cossarini & F. Vallespín. Populism and passions. Democratic legitimacy after austerity (pp. 49–64). Routledge. Moffitt, B. (2016). The global rise of populism: Performance, political style, and representation. Stanford University Press. Mounk, Y. (2018). The people vs. democracy: Why our freedom is in danger and how to save it. Harvard University Press. Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(3), 541–563. Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press. Muis, J., & Immerzeel, T. (2017). Causes and consequences of the rise of populist radical right parties and movements in Europe. Current Sociology, 65(6), 909–930. Müller, J. W. (2017). What is populism? Penguin, UK.

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Nagy, V. (2017). How to silence the lambs? Constructing authoritarian governance in post-transitional Hungary. Surveillance and Society, 15, 447–455. Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press. Pirro, A. (2014). The populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe. Ideology, impact, and electoral. performance. Routledge. Rooduijn, M., de Lange, S. L., & van der Brug, W. (2014). A populist Zeitgeist? Programmatic contagion by populist parties. Western Europe. Party Politics, 20(4), 563–575. Ruzza, C. (2020). Civil society between populism and anti-populism. In A. Hellström, O. C. Norocel, & M. B. Jørgensen (Eds.), Nostalgia and hope: Intersections between politics of culture, welfare, and migration in Europe. Springer. Stanley, B. (2008). The thin ideology of populism. Journal of Political Ideologies, 13(1), 95–110. Taggart, P. (1995). New populist parties in Western Europe. West European Politics, 18(1), 34–51. Urbinati, N. (2014). Democracy disfigured. Harvard University Press. Weyland, K. (2001). Clarifying a contested concept: Populism in the study of Latin American politics. Comparative Politics, 34(1), 1–22. Wodak, R., KhosraviNik, M., & Mral, B. (Eds.). (2013). Right-wing populism in Europe: Politics and discourse. A&C Black. Youngs, R. (Ed.). (2018). The mobilization of conservative civil society. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Zakaria, F. (1997). The rise of illiberal democracy. Foreign Affairs, 76, 22. Zulianello, M. (2019). Anti-system parties: From parliamentary breakthrough to government. Routledge.

The European Union Facing the Populist Wave

The Populist-Eurosceptic Mix: Conceptual Distinctions, Ideational Linkages and Internal Differentiation Emanuele Massetti

Introduction Populism and Euroscepticism have been on the rise in Europe for some decades, prompting the emergence and flourishing of their respective bodies of scholarship (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Canovan, 1981; Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2016; Hix, 2007; Kopecky & Mudde, 2002; Laclau, 2005; Mudde, 2004, 2011; Pirro, 2014; Prosser, 2016; Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008; Taggart, 1998, 2000; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002; Taguieff, 1995; Vasilopoulou, 2009). In spite of a different origin and a different geographical extent—populism is an older and global phenomenon while Euroscepticism is a European-only and a more recent one—the two have increasingly manifested themselves in tandem (Kneuer, 2019). As a consequence, a literature bridging the two bodies of scholarship has recently started to emerge (Dechezelles & Neumayer, 2010; Harmsen, 2010; Kneuer, 2019; Krouwel, 2007; Pirro & Taggart, 2018; Ruzza, 2009). Building on these studies, the present chapter discusses the connection between the two phenomena at a conceptual level. In

E. Massetti (B) School of International Studies, Trento, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 C. Ruzza et al. (eds.), The Impact of Populism on European Institutions and Civil Society, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73411-4_2

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doing so, it aims to prepare the ground for the more specific discussions developed in the other chapters of the book. More precisely, the chapter seeks to achieve three objectives, each pursued in a separate section. First, the lively academic debates on the definitions of the two concepts are presented in an attempt to provide some conceptual clarity. The second section analyses and discusses the main ideational linkages which help explain why the two phenomena tend to manifest themselves jointly. Then, the third section explores ideological varieties within the populistEurosceptic mix, focusing on the main differences between leftist-populist Euroscepticism (LPE) and rightist-populist Euroscepticism (RPE). In the conclusion, some brief considerations for a non-superficial evaluation and non-dismissive treatment of the populist-Eurosceptic critique are put forward.

Populism and Euroscepticism: Two Distinct Concepts Populism and Euroscepticism are different phenomena, both conceptually and empirically. Suffice it to observe that, while the latter has been present only in Europe and only since the second half of the twentieth century (i.e. from the start of the integration process), the former originated outside Europe in the late nineteenth century and has manifested itself in virtually all continents of the globe (De la Torre, 2015; Kaltwasser et al., 2017). Therefore, before investigating the ideational sources of the empirical convergence between populism and Euroscepticism in the European context, it is necessary to understand the specific contents of the two concepts. Providing this conceptual clarification is certainly not an easy task, given the ongoing debates in both the respective literatures. Nevertheless, identifying the distinct conceptual elements of populism and Euroscepticism is the precondition for pursuing the other two objectives of this chapter: identifying the ideational linkages between the two concepts (which can explain the empirical convergence); and singling out and discussing different types of populist Euroscepticism. Populism Defining populism has been (and still is) one of the most complex challenges for scholars of comparative politics (Canovan, 1981; Taggart, 2000; Taguieff, 1995). To complicate matters, a substantial part of the

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scholarship has been more concerned with discussing the conceptual category to which populism belongs than trying to identify its defining features. In particular, academics have disagreed on whether populism should be primarily considered an ideology (Canovan, 2008; Mudde, 2004; Stanley, 2008), a discourse (Laclau, 1977, 2005; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011), a frame (Aslandis, 2016; Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2017), a strategy (Jansen, 2011) or a type of organisational linkage (Barr, 2009; Weyland, 2001). While I do not question the value and rationale of this debate, I argue that it has overemphasised differences and downplayed similarities, thus representing more of an obstacle than a facilitator in the (already complicated enough) task of moving towards a clear conceptualisation. Firstly, the distinction among strategy, discourse and frame appears to be more superficial than substantive, given that the proponents of ‘populism as a strategy’ include also ‘populist rhetoric’ (i.e. discourse/frames) as a defining element of such a strategy (Jansen, 2011: 83). Secondly, the distinction between ideology and discourse/frame is blurred in the first place by the very advocates of ‘populism as an ideology’, because they specify that populism is, in fact, only a ‘thin ideology’ (Canovan, 2008; Stanley, 2008). A further move towards compromise can be provided by the work of Michael Freeden—the authoritative scholar of political ideologies who first formulated the concept of ‘thin ideology’ (Freeden, 1998). Indeed, he highlighted an important overlap between ideology and discourse: “ideology is one form of discourse but it is not entirely containable in the idea of discourse” (Freeden, 2003: 106). Confronted directly with the dilemma of classifying populism, he argued that it had a borderline nature, being located in-between (thin) ideology and discourse (Freeden, 2017: 10). While Freeden’s work makes a crucial contribution to reaching an acceptable middle ground in the debate on the conceptual category of populism, the definition proposed by Cas Mudde (2004) has emerged as a ‘centre of gravity’ in the literature, given its capacity to specify the core features of populism (De la Torre, 2015; Müller, 2016; Panizza, 2005a). Mudde identifies the defining features of populism in a description of society as divided into two antagonistic and internally homogeneous groups: the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elites’. He also considers the moral duty of politics to express the ‘general will’ of the people (Mudde, 2004: 543). This moral duty derives directly from the core concept of the

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democratic ideology (and one of the core concepts of democratic theory): the people’s sovereignty (Canovan, 2002). The popularity of Mudde’s conceptualisation is due to the fact that, although he sees populism as an ideology, the defining characteristics that he singles out are largely (if not fully) compatible with most of the definitions proposed by advocates of ‘populism as a discourse’, such as Laclau (2005) and Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011); as well as with those proposed by advocates of ‘populism as a strategy’, such as Jansen (2011). Moreover, Mudde’s definition has been substantiated by an empirical study comparing cases from different historical periods, in different world regions and with different ideological orientations (Rooduijn, 2014). This work found that the common features correspond to the three ideological elements proposed by Mudde—people’s centrality, anti-elitism and homogeneity of the people—plus a fourth element: proclamation of a crisis (ibid.). This last characteristic has also been highlighted in other prominent studies, either as a key feature (Taggart, 2000) or as a facilitating condition (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015). This conceptualisation clearly projects populism as a very salient phenomenon, because it connects it with a crucial issue in contemporary politics: the worrying distance between elites and common citizens in democratic systems. Yet, at the same time, the definition presents populism as a very general concept: it displays a high denotative capacity (i.e. it is very inclusive) but, as the other side of the coin, a low connotative capacity (i.e. it says rather little about the overall nature of the cases included in this definition). Not only are populist political forces not identifiable by specific policy positions (Taggart, 2000), but also the way in which they construct the meaning of the ‘people’ and of ‘elites’—as well as the way in which they build their arguments in denouncing the alleged betrayal of the people by elites—can change substantially. Indeed, the nature of populism—in-between thin-ideology and discourse/frame— means that virtually no political party is exclusively populist. Most (if not all) populist parties create a synthesis between populism and other (thin or thick) ideologies. It is this synthesis, in which the host ideology plays a decisive role, that connotes populist political forces in one direction or another. In Europe, scholarship has focused almost exclusively on right-wing parties, which have been the most successful populist actors (Akkerman et al., 2017; Betz, 1994; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2005; Wodak et al., 2013). With very few exceptions (Mudde, 2000; March, 2005), the

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low empirical consideration of other forms of populism in Europe has resulted in the conflation of populism with specific features of the radical right ideology, such as nativist anti-immigrant politics (e.g. Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008) and/or illiberal attacks against the rule of law (Bugaric, 2008). However, populism is not a political phenomenon exclusively or necessarily linked to radical-right ideologies and/or illiberal politics. Even in Europe, particularly since the outbreak of the economic crisis, the electoral growth of several new parties—such as Syriza and MeRa25 in Greece, the Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy, Podemos in Spain and Untamed France (FI)—has led scholars to the re-discovery of left-wing populism (Charalambous & Ioannou, 2019; Katsambekis & Kioupkiolis, 2019). These relatively new cases add to pre-existing leftwing populist parties, such as the German PDS/Die Linke and the Dutch Socialist Party (SP) (Hough & Keith, 2019; Lucardie & Voermann, 2019). As a result, it is now widely accepted that populism can be linked with very different ideological orientations—from inclusionary to exclusionary, from socialist to neoliberal, from secular to religious (Boriello & Brack, 2019; Ivaldi et al., 2017; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012; Otjes & Louwerse, 2015)—though it combines particularly well with radical (both left and right) ideologies (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2015). A further crucial sign of the chameleon-like nature of populism is that the normative debate on the relationship between populism and democracy has been lively but with inconclusive results.1 Euroscepticism The term ‘Euroscepticism’ denoting a generic opposition to European integration became increasingly used in the media from the late 1980s onwards, particularly after Margaret Thatcher’s famous Bruges Speech (Usherwood & Startin, 2013). This broad meaning of the term was brought into academia by the seminal work of Paul Taggart, who defined Euroscepticism as “the idea of contingent, or qualified opposition, as well

1 Positions on this debate range from advocates of populism as incompatible with democracy (Abts & Rummens, 2007; Crick, 2005; Urbinati, 2019), to advocates of populism as beneficial for democracy (Bobbio, 1987; Canovan, 1999, 2002), with many positioned in intermediate or open/agnostic positions (Huber & Schimpf, 2017; Meny & Surel, 2002; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012; Panizza, 2005b).

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as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” (Taggart, 1998: 366). Given the inclusive character of the definition, the need to distinguish among different types and/or to measure different degrees of Euroscepticism soon emerged in the literature. In particular, two major tendencies became predominant in the scholarship on party-based Euroscepticism: the North Carolina school and the Sussex school (Mudde, 2011). On the one hand, the North Carolina school primarily engaged with quantitative measurement of party positioning on European integration; and, more recently, it has dwelt on the salience of the European integration issue, producing a renowned and much used dataset based on expert surveys (Polk et al., 2017; Ray, 1999). On the other hand, the Sussex school drew a qualitative distinction between ‘hard Euroscepticism’, initially defined as outright rejection of European integration and/or opposition to membership of the EU, and ‘soft Euroscepticism’, initially defined as contingent or qualified opposition to European integration (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002). While the North Carolina school was not greatly concerned with conceptual and taxonomical issues, Taggart and Szczerbiak’s classification prompted a lively debate. In particular, it was criticised by Kopecky and Mudde (2002) primarily for the extreme inclusiveness of the ‘soft Euroscepticism’ category and for the conflation of views on the general idea of European integration and on the European Union as the current actualisation of the integration process (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002: 300). Taggart and Szczerbiak consequently sought to disentangle these two dimensions by distinguishing between Europhiles and Europhobes (i.e. pro/against the general idea of European integration), as well as between EU-optimist and EU pessimist (i.e. pro/against the current structure and trajectory of the EU) (ibid.: 301–302). The result was a two-dimensional typology consisting of four conceptual categories: Euroenthusiasm (Europhilia and EU-optimism), Euroscepticism (Europhilia and EU-pessimism), Euro-pragmatism (Europhobia and EU-optimism) and Euro-rejectionism (Europhobia and EU-pessimism) (ibid.: 303). Therefore, in this taxonomy, the term ‘Euroscepticism’ has a more defined meaning which partially overlaps with Taggart and Szczerbiak’s concept of ‘soft Euroscepticism’, while ‘Euro-rejectionism’ virtually coincides with the initial formulation of ‘hard Euroscepticism’ by Taggart and Szczerbiak.

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A further attempt to categorise Euroscepticism was made by Sophia Vasilopoulou, who distinguished three aspects: the principle of European integration; the current practice of the EU; and the future of European integration (Vasilopoulou, 2009: 5–6). Various combinations of support and opposition across these three aspects produced three types of Euroscepticism: Rejectionist (opposed to all aspects); Conditional (opposed to practice and future) and Compromising (opposed to future only) (ibid.: 7–8). Finally, Christopher Flood proposed a monodimensional scale, trying to combine a rudimentary measurement of the degree of support for/opposition to European integration with qualitative distinctions of types of Euroscepticism (Flood, 2002). Focusing on the EU as the main product of European integration (and the only available basis for further integration), Flood saw Euroscepticism as ranging from a minimum level of EU-minimalism (accepting the EU as it is but opposing further integration) to a maximum level of EU-rejectionism (supporting exit from the EU or opposing entry in the EU), passing through EU-revisionism (supporting EU membership but advocating a return to previous levels of European integration). Unfortunately, all these comparative politics’ studies have evident shortcomings. When individual cases are analysed, it is often difficult to place them unequivocally within a specific conceptual category. This is because the scope of European integration has grown so much and the issues emerging in EU politics are so various that it is virtually impossible that a political party does not voice some sort of criticism against the EU (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008). Moreover, most political parties change their stances on European integration over time, often doing so gradually (also in reaction to the ongoing integration process) but sometimes suddenly (Chari et al., 2004). Nevertheless, the conceptualisations, classifications and measurements provided by comparative politics scholarship should be praised for their attempt to make sense of an extremely complex reality. As regards explanations of Euroscepticism, scholarship has been rather divided between the North Carolina school, which stressed the importance of party ideology, and the Sussex school, which stressed the important of strategic considerations (Mudde, 2011: 15–17). For the purposes of this chapter, the scholarship focusing on the original cleavage and ideological orientations is of particular interest (Marks et al., 2002: 590; Marks & Wilson, 2000: 453). In general, many studies point to a relationship between a left–right ideological positioning and support for

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European integration that is described by an inverted-U curve whereby radical parties (both left and right) tend to be more Eurosceptic and mainstream parties (both left and right) tend to be more Europhile (Hix & Lord, 1997; Marks et al., 2002; Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2016). This finding is extremely important for the present study, because it identifies a characteristic shared by populism and Euroscepticism: their tendency to combine with radical (both left and right) ideologies. Other studies see the level of support for European integration as mostly correlated, in a linear way, with a different ideological dimension: the one that opposes green, alternative and libertarian (GAL) values to traditionalist, authoritarian and nationalist (TAN) ones, so that the latter pole is the repository of Euroscepticism (Hooghe et al., 2002). More recent works have focused on longitudinal variation, reaching the conclusion that the inverted-U curve relationship with left–right positions and the linear relationship with GAL-TAN positions are typical of recent decades, whereas in the 1950s the relationships were almost the reverse: left–right positions were linearly correlated (with the left being more Eurosceptic and the right being more Europhile), while GAL-TAN positions exhibited a sort of inverted-U curve (Prosser, 2016). Moreover, other studies have sought to reconcile ideology-based and rational-choice based explanations of party positioning. More specifically, Simon Hix has proposed interpretation of the inverted-U curve as a rational response to the policy output of the EU, which tends to be systematically in line with the preferences of centrist/mainstream parties, while being systematically distant from the preferences of radical parties (Hix, 2007). This approach would also explain why Euroscepticism in countries where the national median voter is to the left of the EU median voter (e.g. Scandinavian countries) derives primarily from the left; whereas Euroscepticism in countries where the national median voter is to the right of the EU median voter derives primarily from the right, as in the case of the UK (Hix, 2007: 134).

Linkage Nodes: The Ideational Sources of the Populist-Euroscepticism Mix In the European context, the incremental convergence, growing overlap and virtual identification between populism and Euroscepticism have become so evident that it is normally taken for granted and treated implicitly in the literature. The very fact that some scholars, such as Paul Taggart

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and Kas Mudde, have become leading experts in the respective literatures on populism and Euroscepticism signals the close connection between the two phenomena. Similarly, the fact that an authoritative scholar of normative theory like Michael Freeden, whose work has been increasingly involved in the debate on the conceptual category of populism, felt the need to intervene in this debate as a reaction to a major manifestation of Euroscepticism (i.e. the 2016 Brexit referendum) is further proof of the empirical fusion of the two themes. However, only few scholars have devoted some attention to the links between populism and Euroscepticism (Dechezelles & Neumayer, 2010; Harmsen, 2010; Kneuer, 2019; Pirro & Taggart, 2018; Ruzza, 2009). Because the two concepts remain clearly distinct, it is important to analyse the ideational/discursive linkages that, in the European context, determine the joint manifestation of the two phenomena (Kneuer, 2019). In this regard, two major linkages can be identified: one direct and one mediated by nationalism as a bridge concept. The first linkage between populism and Euroscepticism consists in the perfect fit between, on the one hand, the anti-elitist core of the populist ideology—see above (Mudde, 2004; Rooduijn, 2014)—and, on the other hand, the eminently elitist nature of both the process of European integration and the EU political system (Mair, 2013: 103–104). The elitist nature of the project and process of European integration has been widely acknowledged, discussed and explained in the literature (Bellamy & Warleigh, 2001; Haller, 2008; Streeck & Schmitter, 1991). Moreover, the disinterest of EU elites in what common citizens might think about their integration plans has been ‘confessed’ by a prominent member of the EU establishment: “We decide on something, leave it lying around, and wait and see what happens. If no one kicks up a fuss, because most people don’t understand what has been decided, we continue step by step until there is no turning back” (Jean-Claude Junker, in Der Spiegel, n. 52, p. 136). The main problem with what has been termed ‘integration by stealth’ (Majone, 2009) is that, while this process started at a time when the deciding elites were largely trusted by the masses— and “[t]his was the essence of the permissive consensus” (Mair, 2013: 114)—since then it has continued (and even accelerated) at a time in which citizens’ trust in elites has been diminishing throughout Europe (Kaina, 2008). Moreover, as in the case of the Lisbon Treaty, integration has been achieved by ignoring citizens’ opposition, even when this

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opposition has been clearly and formally expressed in popular referenda (Hobolt & Brouard, 2010). The elitist impetus of European integration couples with the elitebased nature of EU politics and with the pro-elite bias of EU policies. These latter are shaped by a cumbersome institutional structure which strongly dilutes legitimacy and accountability, presenting itself as a postdemocratic form of governance dominated by an opaque mix of executive, technocratic and lobbying elements (Hix, 1999; Magnette, 2001; Wallace & Smith, 1995). Although the role of the European Parliament has been gradually enhanced, particularly since the Lisbon Treaty, EU policymaking has remained largely insulated from democratic politics because there has been an evident mismatch between the available electoral channels—national vs. European elections—and the associated political debates—policies vs. European integration—(Mair, 2013: 108–109). In other words, the EU political system does not function according to the normal democratic dynamics of a government/opposition dialectic with (at least) an expectation of alternation. This ‘democratic deficit’ entails, on the one hand, the (input) legitimacy crisis that contributes to growing distrust vis-à-vis national and EU political elites alike (Follesdal & Hix, 2006), and, on the other hand, the gradual sliding of any type of potential opposition towards systemic (i.e. anti-system) opposition (Mair, 2007: 12). Moreover, in the long run, the ‘democratic deficit’ (i.e. issues of input legitimacy) has been increasingly translated into pro(economic)-elite policy outputs which raise symmetric issues of ‘output legitimacy’ (Scharpf, 1997). Especially in the past two decades, it has become apparent that the monetarist and neoliberal tenets embodied in EU treaties, institutions and frameworks are producing policies ever more distant from average citizens’ preferences and needs (De Grauwe, 2011; Matthijs, 2016; Steinberg & Vermeiren, 2016). Given all this, it should not come as a surprise that “Europe has become a key issue with which to launch a populist assault… it is one that unites, or at least shared by, the outsiders on both right and left” (Mair, 2013: 111). In other words, in contemporary European politics, “anti-EU positions are always linked to a populist discourse of criticism of the elite” (Reungoat, 2010: 303). Symmetrically, populist politics always include Eurosceptic positions because it has become virtually impossible to express an anti-elitist discourse without including the involvement of EU elites or, at least, national elites in EU-level politics (Harmsen, 2010; Pirro & Taggart, 2018).

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The second major linkage between populism and Euroscepticism lies in the semantic field surrounding the general concept of nationalism (Freeden, 1998), which represents an ideational bridge. Indeed, nationalism is solidly connected both to populism (Bonikowski et al., 2019; Brubaker, 2019; De Cleen, 2017; De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017; Meny & Surel, 2000) and to Euroscepticism (Avci, 2011; Hainsworth et al., 2004; Halikiapoulou et al., 2012; Wellings, 2010). Nationalism tends to emphasise as much the internal homogeneity of the nation-state as the differences and separateness among diverse nation-states (Smith, 1986). As a result, while nationalists are not necessarily against international co-operation, they are (by definition) against supranational integration, especially if the latter includes/foresees political integration. The link between member-state-based nationalism and Euroscepticism is therefore based on the opposition between the nationalist belief that political systems must be built on/for individual nations—in the form of nationstates (Gellner, 1983)—and the supranational character of the European Union.2 Symmetrically, nationalism is closely connected to populism due to the multiple meanings attached to the term ‘people’. Indeed, within the populist discourse, the ‘people’ can be understood as ordinary citizens often defined as follows: the ‘underdogs’ in domestic social and political affairs (people as plebs ); the legitimate body that, according to democratic theory, holds political sovereignty (people as demos ); and the homogeneous community that has a common origin, identity, purpose and destiny (people as nation) (Brubaker, 2019: 6; Meny & Surel, 2002: 185–214). Clearly, the nationalist tone of a populist critique is likely to be more evident when the people as nation is purportedly at risk (e.g. in the form of perceived challenges to national identity). However, on any occasion when threats to the people are seen to come from outside the nationstate, a certain blend of a populist-nationalist (or nationalist-populist) discourse is likely to emerge (Boriello & Brack, 2019; Verzichelli, 2019). Indeed, the inclusion of the people as demos in the picture—merging the democratic principle of people’s sovereignty with the nationalist principle of national sovereignty—can generate a powerful discourse (Basile & Mazzoleni, 2019). If the well-being of the people as plebs is also seen 2 Obviously, the ideational link between nationalism and Euroscepticism vanishes if we consider the case of European (or EU) nationalism (Wellings & Power, 2015). In this case, European nationalism would fit perfectly with strong support for European integration and would be completely at odds with member-state-based nationalist Euroscepticism.

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as being jeopardised by a ‘foreign’ intrusion, then all three meanings of the ‘people’ can easily interact with a nationalist discourse. It is all too easy to understand how, when the alleged ‘foreign’ intrusion is putatively operated by the European Union or by another EU member-state, the populist-nationalist discourse translates into a populist-Eurosceptic one. Indeed, since the EU can be seen not only as ‘outside’ but also as ‘above’ the nation-state, Eurosceptic nationalism can combine with the anti-elitist ethos of populism even better than tout court nationalism. Indeed, both empirical and theoretical studies are increasingly pointing out that populism, nationalism and Euroscepticism tend to manifest themselves jointly at an empirical level (Gifford, 2015; Halikiapoulou et al., 2012; Vines, 2014). These two strong ideological linkages—one direct and one mediated by nationalism—help explain why populism and Euroscepticism are empirically converging (Polk et al., 2017: 5). Populist parties do not attack only national elites for the way in which the memberstate is run. They also attack EU elites for the way in which the EU has been constructed and is run, thus influencing national policies. Moreover, populism tends to combine with nationalism in denouncing the EU’s growing interference with (and sometimes humiliation of) popular/national sovereignty. Indeed, it is a shared view that, in recent years, populism has thrived primarily because of shortcomings in the EU’s management of major crises, such as the financial-economic crisis that hit Europe in 2009–2015 and the refugee crisis of 2014–2016 (Kneuer, 2019; Pirro & Taggart, 2018). Yet it is also important to analyse how different parties forge different blends of populist Euroscepticism (or Eurosceptic-populism) and how they politicise certain crises and certain issues more than others. In other words, it is now time to explore the populist-Eurosceptic mix, with a view to pointing out important differences.

Internal Differentiation: Left-Wing vs. Right-Wing Variants of Populist Euroscepticism Two points can be drawn from the previous sections. First, both populism and Euroscepticism can combine with a variety of ideological orientations with a very marked attraction for radical-left or radical-right ideologies. Second, in the European context, populism and Euroscepticism tend to overlap empirically because of a perfect ideational fit between

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anti-elitism and criticism of European integration, often with the intermediation of nationalism. Indeed, the nationalist ‘glue’ solidifies the populist-Eurosceptic mix through the politicisation of the sovereignty issue (Boriello & Brack, 2019). Moreover, radical-right and radical-left ideologies direct it against specific elites or features/policies of the EU system of governance: while both radical-left and radical-right forces target political and economic elites, criticism of the intellectual elites and the politicisation of identity issues remain the almost exclusive remit of radical right forces. It is therefore convenient to start from a distinction between leftistpopulist-Eurosceptic (LPE) parties and rightist-populist-Eurosceptic (RPE) ones. Broadly speaking, LPE parties tend to adopt a type of Euroscepticism softer than that adopted by RPE parties (De Vries, 2018; Ivaldi et al., 2017; Treib, 2014). Of course, there are (or there have been) exceptional cases of LPE parties assuming a hard stance on European integration and membership of the EU, such as the Swedish Party of the Left—member of the European left-wing populist movement “Now the People!” (https://nowthepeople.eu/)—and, until the late 1990s, Sinn Fein (Charalambous, 2011). However, the most important LPE parties— Untamed France, Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, the German Left, the Left Bloc in Portugal and the M5S in Italy—do not pursue withdrawal or disintegration: rather, they demand democratic reforms at EU level. This is a clear sign (and a consequence of) the fact that they believe in the prospect of solving the EU’s democratic deficit through further European integration which would possibly lead to the creation of a European federal and fully democratic state. In their view, the EU’s bias towards neoliberal policies can be addressed by reforming specific parts of the treaties or specific directives/regulations (Ivaldi et al., 2017; Kotroyannos et al., 2018). The democratisation of the EU should be pursued through an institutional overhaul which ensures that all policies are determined by a process that responds to (and serves the interests of) European citizens. In line with the position of authoritative political theorists (Bellamy, 2010), they think that if the problem of input legitimacy (i.e. government by the people) is resolved, solution of the increasingly evident issue of output legitimacy (i.e. government for the people) would follow. Obviously, in the current context (i.e. in the absence of democratic and/or economic reforms at EU level), left-wing populist-Eurosceptic parties do not shy away from advocating the sovereignty of member-states vis-àvis the EU’s attempts to interfere with the domestic democratic process,

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especially if these interferences take the form of neoliberal austerity policies (Halikiapoulou et al., 2012; Ivaldi et al., 2017). But what matters is that, in principle, they would accept the transfer of sovereignty from the people (and the institutions) of member-states to the people (and institutions) of Europe, provided that the new European federal state has a fully democratic political system (Heine, 2010). According to this basic attitude, left-wing populist-Eurosceptic parties are more inclined to work constructively within the EU institutions, particularly the European Parliament, or to engage with consultative initiatives with a view to reforming the system in a democratic direction. Indeed, the first initiative for the creation of a truly European party (as opposed to the existing European party federations) and a constitutional assembly that should re-found the EU on democratic bases has been made by an LPE party: the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25, 2016). Although the project has not been successful in terms of votes, at least judging from the 2019 European election, it has represented an original attempt to combine populism, transnationalism and a Eurosceptic critique aimed at the creation of a truly democratic European Union (De Cleen et al., 2020). Most RPE parties—such as Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO), the Belgian Flemish Bloc/Interest (FB), the Bulgarian National Union Attack (NOA), the Danish People’s Party (DF), the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), the French Front National/National Rally (FN/RN), the Italian (Northern) League (LN/Lega), the Hungarian parties Fidez and Jobbik, the Polish Law and Justice (PiS), the Swedish Democrats (SD), the True Finns party (PS) and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)—are also highly vocal in denouncing the EU’s democratic deficit (Zúquete, 2018). However, their demands for democratic reforms at EU level tend be rarer and less systematic. Moreover, compared to LPE parties, they tend to give less credit to the pro-democracy promises or initiatives of EU institutions. This general stance is the consequence of the fact that they oppose the principle of an ‘ever closer Union’ on nationalistic and/or national-democratic grounds (Halikiapoulou et al., 2012; Ivaldi et al., 2017; Vasilopoulou, 2018). Firstly, some of these parties are against the idea of multi-national and multi-ethnic diversity within a polity, independently of the democratic issue (Mudde, 2007). Their nationalist ideology can only conceive or accept nation-state based political systems. Indeed, even within the member-state, they advocate illiberal ethno-national and

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nativist positions which often combine majority nationalism, assimilationist approaches towards native minorities, and exclusivist approaches towards immigrant minorities (Heinisch et al., 2018). Secondly, these parties do not deem it feasible to build a federal and democratic European state because they do not believe that it is possible to turn the diverse European peoples into a single European people. This basic scepticism derives from the connection between the people as demos and the people as nation, as well as from the conviction that the various European nations will never meld into a single European nation. To be stressed is that, far from being only the point of view of radical and irrational nationalist actors, this position is shared by authoritative political theorists, who see the empowerment of the diverse European peoples (demoi)—as opposed to an unworkable empowerment of an unlikely European people (demos )—as the only possible solution to the EU’s democratic deficit (Bellamy, 2019). On this view, without a single demos /people/nation there can never be a real EU democracy; hence, the EU’s democratic deficit cannot be solved through further transfers of powers at the EU level. The corollary that most RPE parties draw from the argument is that the only way to address the EU’s democratic deficit (as well as the EU’s multi-nationalism) is partial or total disintegration. But this does not mean that all RPE parties have always been ‘hard Eurosceptic’. In fact, the literature appears to be rather divided on this question, also as a consequence of parties’ changes of position over time. Using her typology of Eurosceptic positions, Vasilopoulou proposed that some RPE are rejectionist (e.g. the FN), some are conditional (e.g. the DF, FPO, LN and VB), and others are compromising Eurosceptic (e.g. the Italian National Alliance) (Vasilopoulou, 2011). However, other scholars writing in the dark days of the economic and refugee crises have described the overwhelming majority of RPE parties as ‘hard Eurosceptic’ (Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2016; Treib, 2014). More recently, it has been proposed that some RPE parties, such as the FPO and the LN, are intentionally adopting an equivocal position by straddling ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism (Heinisch et al., 2019). It is obvious that the ideological differences between LPE and RPE result in an emphasis on different issues, the use of different frames and the adoption of different positions on several policy areas connected to the EU. On widening the focus on policy preferences, it is possible to appreciate even more the liberal (actually radical progressive) character of most LPE parties’ stances, as opposed to the framing and positions adopted by

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most RPE parties. These differences are not confined only to immigration; they apply to a wide range of issues. For instance, Lombardo and Kantola (2019) show how alliances have been formed between feminist and left-wing populist movements, such as the Indignados, in contrast to the anti-gender rhetoric and initiatives of some right-wing populist parties.

Conclusions This chapter has pursued three main objectives. Firstly, it has sought to introduce the reader to academic debates on the respective definitions of Populism and Euroscepticism, thus providing some conceptual clarification. Secondly, given the empirical overlap between the two phenomena, it has highlighted the ideational sources of the populist-Eurosceptic mix. In this regard, it has singled out some linkage nodes by starting from the perfect match between (populist) anti-elitism and the elitist nature of both European integration and the European Union (i.e. the targets of Euroscepticism). Other important ideational links are provided by external ideologies, such as nationalism and radical (both left and right) ideologies. The third objective has been to highlight the different possible connotations of the populist-Eurosceptic mix, primarily according to whether it combines with left-wing or right-wing ideologies. LPE forces tend to propose a rather clear, albeit perhaps naïve, vision. Starting from the criticism of basic choices made by political and economic elites, they aim at the creation of a more democratic, more social (less neoliberal), more tolerant and, at the same time, more integrated Europe. In contrast, the position of RPE parties is more heterogeneous and contradictory, although it is perhaps less naïve on the democratic question. Starting from a harsh criticism of intellectual, political and economic elites, they remain attached to the tried-and-tested system of national democracy, refusing to consider the possible formation of a European supranational and democratic state. More importantly, while criticising the EU system for its democratic deficit, many RPE parties show a certain uneasiness with some basic principles of liberal democracy. Indeed, they do not seem particularly respectful of minority rights. Moreover, some RPE that have had the opportunity to be in office at national level for some time, particularly in central-eastern Europe (e.g. Hungary and Poland), have embarked on reforms that disturb the division of powers on which liberal democracy is based.

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These three objectives should be seen as preliminary to a fruitful discussion on populism and Euroscepticism in Europe. Such discussion falls outside the scope of this chapter. However, the conceptual analysis provided suggests that populist-Eurosceptic grievances should be taken into serious consideration. Populist Euroscepticism is emerging as the only real opposition in the EU multilevel system of governance. Therefore, the only way to maintain a government/opposition dialectic, so crucial for the survival of democracy, would be to genuinely engage with the populist-Eurosceptic critique. If liberal democracy can be seen as a convenient middle ground—and a normatively superior system—between the two extremes of elitist-liberalism and populistdemocracy, there may be margins for a fruitful compromise. From a liberal-democratic perspective, hiding the EU democratic deficit behind the illiberal reforms/proposals of some RPE parties is as deplorable as hiding the illiberal nature of those same reforms/proposals behind the EU democratic deficit. Moreover, ignoring the left-wing version of the populist-Eurosceptic critique, by automatically associating populist Euroscepticism with illiberal and authoritarian tendencies, means missing the most progressive proposals arising from that critique and reducing space for the expression of opposition within the system, rather than opposition to the system.

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Populism and European Institutions: A Historical Perspective Roberto Santaniello

The European Project: An Introduction The European project was conceived and implemented at the end of the Second World War and in the framework of the Cold War. The idea of a united Europe was not new, since a certain number of ideas, definitions, and initiatives had started circulating at the beginning of the nineteenth century. These ideas became more explicit and concrete at the end of the First World War. After the Second World War, a first concrete project, known as the ‘Schuman Declaration’, was accomplished. On 9 May 1950, the French Foreign Minister announced that France and Germany had agreed to operate their coal and steel industries under unified supervision. Schuman invited other European countries to join the Franco-German venture, and four other countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, and Italy) did so.

The opinions expressed by the author are personal, and should not be attributed to the institution for which he works. R. Santaniello (B) Via Nino Oxilia, Roma, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 C. Ruzza et al. (eds.), The Impact of Populism on European Institutions and Civil Society, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73411-4_3

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The Schuman Declaration opened the way for the Treaty of the Coal and Steel Community (CECA), which was signed in Paris on 18 April 1951. After a failed attempt to create a European Defence Community (EDC) and then a European Political Community (EPC), the six countries were able to reach an agreement on improving their economic integration. On 25 March 1957 they signed the Treaty of Rome, creating two new communities: the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) (Dinan, 2014). The original European Communities were focused on economic matters and in particular on market-related policies. The Treaty of Rome foresaw the creation of a common market based on free trade and fair competition integrated by a set of common policies (agriculture, transport) (Buonanno & Nugent, 2013: 5–6). The overall objective of the European Economy Community was to ensure economic and social prosperity for the Six Member States. The integration process was conceived for boosting growth and convergence and preserving Europe’s social model. The Treaty of Rome built an original institutional system for pursuit of these objectives. This system was influenced by the various theoretical models devised to stimulate economic integration or international cooperation, such as neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism, and the federalist model (Buonanno & Nugent, 2013: 23–38). The compromise reached among these models established a sui generis organisation based on check and balance principles. Two institutions, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, shared responsibility for decision-making. The Assembly of Strasbourg had only a marginal legislative role, while the Court of Justice was in charge of interpreting European law. On creating the European Communities, the liberal-democratic elites (represented by politicians such as Alcide De Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer, Paul-Henri Spaak) of the Six Original Member States decided to invest increasingly in a supranational level of activity and decision-making. Ideologically, the European project belongs fully to the liberal-democratic political heritage. This historical evidence is fundamental for understanding why today populists point to the European Union as the ‘perfect culprit’. Since populism claims to represent the ‘pure people’ (Mudde, 2004), it is by definition against the ‘others’, namely the elites, as represented in many cases by the European Union (Garton Ash, 2017).

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The First Phases of the European Project The original European project was extremely weak in terms of transparency and democratic accountability. Initially, the institutional and political dynamic was limited to a few institutional actors: only the European Commission and the Council were effectively involved in the decision-making process. According to the Treaty, the former had the exclusive right to propose draft legislation, and the latter had the full responsibility to enact European laws. The Parliamentary Assembly (the future European Parliament) only had a consultative role. Its rules were compulsory but not binding, so that its influence was extremely weak. By contrast, the fourth institutional actor, the Court of Justice, had much more influence in implementing the autonomy of the community system. European decision-making was restricted to the technical and ministerial levels, and only a few other actors could be associated with this political dynamic, such as the economic (above all) and social partners. They had a direct or indirect interest in the decisions concerning ‘negative integration’, elimination of the barriers to free trade and other common market rules (fair competition, agriculture, transport). Information to the general public was extremely poor, although all European institutions created small structures responsible for informing national media. This explains the permissive consensus among European citizens in favour of European integration in the first decade of the European project. The original institutional European system was perceived as an ‘elitist’ organisation with few links to European citizens. This trait was often the source of criticism. For the pro-European and federalist movements, it proved that the European Community was not sufficiently democratic. Whence derived their demand for the European Community to be transformed into a European federation. For others, mainly those nostalgic for nationalism, the European Community represented a risk of reduced domestic sovereignty and thus of limited citizens’ power. The concrete answer to this criticism was the capacity of the European institutions to deliver positive outcomes in terms of economic and social progress. For almost two decades, despite some crises, the European institutions, and mainly the European Commission, were able to achieve the objectives of ‘negative integration’. Benefiting from the post-war recovery and the expansion of world trade, the elimination of the barriers and quantitative restrictions on trade made the GNP growth of the Member States extremely high (Mody, 2018: 30–31). Following this great progress, the

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European project tried to switch to a higher speed, moving towards ‘positive integration’ and more interventionist policies. Concretely, this meant a first attempt to create an economic and monetary union. Meanwhile, criticism of the elitist character of the European project received new fuel from the concept of ‘democratic deficit’. With this term, pro-Europeans underlined that the policy expansion of the European institutions was not matched by a parallel expansion of democratic accountability at European level. National parliaments lost legislative powers without any transfer to the European Parliament. While pro-European and federalist movements called for more European democracy with further legislative powers for the European Parliament, a new front of criticism arose in the form of Euroscepticism. In the late 1970s, when the process of economic integration stalled, Euroscepticism gave voice to discontent about the capacity of the European Community to find policy solutions to the expectations of European citizens. The concept of Euroscepticism covered a wide range of meanings (Krouvel & Abts, 2007). Hard Euroscepticism rejected the entire European project, while soft Euroscepticism involved contingent and qualified opposition to European integration related to national interests and policy-oriented concerns. Soft Euroscepticism appeared to be compatible with support for the European project, while hard Euroscepticism fully rejected it. The emergence of Euroscepticism also triggered a decrease of the permissive consensus among European citizens.

A New Start of the European Project and Its First Cleavage with European Citizens The European Community reacted to the ‘euro sclerosis’ of the 1970s by delivering an institutional reform with the Single European Act (1986) and a strategic economic programme to implement a Single European Market (White Paper, 1985). After a first, failed attempt to transform the European Community into a Union as proposed by the European Parliament (Spinelli Project ), European leaders decided to reform the Treaty of Rome by strengthening the institutional instruments to complete market integration, and by introducing a specific distributive policy (economic and social cohesion) to stimulate economic convergence in Europe. In the late 1980s, when the success of the White Paper programme was consolidated and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, European leaders agreed to accelerate political and economic integration. The outcome of this reform

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process was the Treaty of Maastricht, which established the European Union. Amid the project to increase political and economic European integration, a first, deep cleavage appeared between European institutions and European citizens. Despite the progress of the new Treaty in terms of democratic accountability, citizens’ rights, and subsidiarity, the gap between European institutions and citizens visibly surfaced after its ratification process. A first sign came from Denmark. The negative result of the Danish referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht’s ratification was unexpected. Despite the opting-out clause foreseen for the participation of Denmark in the third phase of the economic and monetary union, the majority of Danish citizens rejected the new Treaty. The second sign, a real shock, came from France. Even if the outcome of the referendum was in the end positive, the warning was clear and direct. Almost half of French citizens (48.98%) expressed their opposition to the Treaty of Maastricht. The result of this referendum conducted in a founder country of the European project highlighted that any psychological and emotional link to the European Union was lacking. Furthermore, the political campaign of the parties against ratification was based on rhetorical and fake messages exploiting the public’s lack of knowledge about the European project. For the first time, under the pressure of Euroscepticism, the elitist character of the European political system was very explicitly questioned. To understand the intensity of this shock, it is important to note that the institutional provisions of the Treaty largely reduced the ‘democratic deficit’ by giving co-legislative power to the European Parliament. Furthermore, explicitly foreseen was a European citizenship granting tangible rights to the citizens of the European Union. These advances gave concrete answers to the pro-Europeans. On the other hand, introduction of the subsidiarity principle into the European political system gave explicit assurance to those concerned about the risk of the European Union becoming a ‘super-State’. In fact, this principle affirmed that ‘the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be achieved by the Member States’.1 This was a clear signal to the partisans of nationalism who were demanding that domestic sovereignty be safeguarded. 1 Treaty on European Union (1992), Office for Official publications of the European Communities, pp. 13–14, https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/ docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf.

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Nevertheless, the large majority of public opinion was unaware of these innovations. This ‘information deficit’ showed that it was urgent to guarantee more communication and transparency in the new European Union. This explains why European leaders, within the political package enabling Denmark to ratify the Treaty of Maastricht with a new referendum, decided concrete initiatives ‘to bring the Community closer to its citizens’.2

The Enlarged Political Arena of the European Project The Treaty of the European Union expanded the policy competencies of the European Community, giving a new political dimension to the original European project. The creation of the economic and monetary union and then of the common currency (the Euro), the introduction of new policies and reinforcement of the old ones, represented huge progress for European integration. Such progress modified the original paradigm of the European political system, which before the Treaty of Maastricht could be summarised with the formula ‘Smith abroad and Keynes at home’ (Gilpin, 1987: 355). ‘Negative integration’ stimulated the free market, thereby matching communitarian liberalism (Smith abroad) with public intervention in the economy (Keynes at home). Consequently, the area of democratic consensus remained restricted to the national level. After the new Treaty, the development of ‘positive integration’ through the implementation of a set of economic and distributive policies at European level enlarged the area of democratic consensus from the domestic to the transnational level. This shift marked the definitive end of permissive consensus among European citizens. Finally, the Treaty of Maastricht extended the democratic arena beyond national political frontiers. For the first time, public opinion could express its agreement or disagreement directly to European institutions and no longer indirectly through national authorities as in the past. In this regard, the results of the Eurobarometer, the survey with which the European Commission checks the opinion of European citizens, recorded less enthusiasm than before: a clear sign that Europeans 2 Treaty, Union, “Birmingham European Council” of the European Communities (1992): 7, www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20501/1992_october_-_birmingham_eng_. pdf.

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were discovering and judging the European institutions. Simultaneously with the expansion of the political arena at European level, the influence on European topics of the domestic political parties progressively increased. The mainstream liberal-democratic political families reinforced their transnational dimension, and their political confrontation took place along the traditional right/left spectrum. Other parties in the Member States found new fuel to expand their influence. Some of them adopted an explicit Eurosceptical stance in order to gain more political consensus at domestic level. Euroscepticism was located mainly in extremist parties. Their objectives were multiple: the first, more genuine, one was to induce the major parties to adopt Eurosceptic positions, especially on sensitive domestic issues. The second, more tactical, one was to win seats and thus have influence in forming coalition governments. At European level, the presence of Eurosceptic organised forces increased. After the 1994 European elections, the Europe of Nations (EN) group, with an anti-European programme, gained 19 seats. The European Democratic Alliance (EDA), a group with a nationalist programme, gained 26 seats. In 1999, the presence of Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament was confirmed. A new Eurosceptic group, ‘For Europe of Democracies and Diversities’ (EDD), gained 16 seats, and another new nationalist group, the Union for the Nations of Europe (UEN), gained 30. Meanwhile, during the 1990s the dialectic of the mainstream right and left parties found common ground in economic policies oriented towards fiscal stability and reaching the final stage of the economic and monetary union. This meant supporting public debt control policies to fulfil the Maastricht economic parameters. At national level, the extremist parties, especially those belonging to the left, exploited the general discontent of European citizens affected by austerity policies implemented to reduce public debts. This dynamic was well represented in the European Parliament, where the traditional liberal-democratic political families supported fiscal stability policies, while the other extremist parties of the left expressed radical disagreement. Stressing the negative economic situation and rising unemployment, exploiting the frustration of less affluent people, and the growing fear of the middle class, the narrative of these parties focused on the lack of a real common economic policy able to increase growth and employment. On the other side, the right-wing extremist parties were developing a new narrative focused on the risks arising from the lack of effective external border controls and from large flows of

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extra-communitarian migrants. While these parties leveraged emotional messages to increase the anxiety of the general public, European leaders replied with rational and concrete initiatives to find policy solutions to these issues. Once again the European Union needed to revamp its capacity to deliver policy solutions. As regards the economy, the legacy of the last European Commission led by Jacques Delors was a broad plan known as the White Book on ‘growth, competitiveness and employment’ (1994).3 This document suggested to the Member States a set of innovative policies to tackle the structural and technological problems of growth. This plan, which represented the first economic programme to renew the social economic model, was eventually rejected because financial agreement was lacking. As regards migration, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1996) responded to rising public concerns about massive inflows of migrants by giving a communitarian dimension to intergovernmental cooperation in home affairs such as immigration, external border controls, visas, originally foreseen by the Treaty of Maastricht. New institutional provisions opened the way to a new approach based on a communitarian method. Despite these advances, the extremist and Eurosceptic parties did not lose their political influence. On the contrary, these parties increased their pressure until they reached the level of the European Union, as the Austrian crises highlighted.

The Emergence of Populism in the European Union Populism became prominent in the European political debate after the success of Austrian party FPÖ and its participation in the government coalition. The Liberal Party (FPÖ) and its leader Jörg Haider represented a concrete example of a populist right-wing party with an explicit anti-European and xenophobic vision. The participation of this party in a government of the European Union provoked strong political reaction by the other Member States, which demanded disciplinary measures against the Austrian coalition. The European Union did not apply any formal sanction; nor did it take an official common position. Instead, another diplomatic solution was found. In order to reassert the common values and safeguard the spirit of European democracy, the fourteen other

3 Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1994.

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Member States suspended their bilateral diplomatic relations with the Austrian government. The Austrian crisis resolved by this strong diplomatic pressure was the first example of the direct influence of populism on the European project, even if the solution was reached outside the institutional framework of the European Union. Meanwhile, in the early 2000s the globalisation process was undergoing an extraordinary evolution. Globalisation meant growing interdependence of the world economies, cultures, and peoples brought about by cross-borders trade in goods and services, technologies, and flows of investments, people and information. The great effects of globalisation confronted the European Union with new challenges that required a renewed capacity for action in a new international environment. Growth and employment remained at the core of European citizens’ concerns. The Lisbon Strategy (2000) was the new strategic economic programme adopted by the European Union to accelerate economic development and employment and to respond to the challenges of globalisation. Among these challenges, growing inequalities gave populists a chance to expand their political ability to represent the ‘losers’ of globalisation. With the Lisbon Strategy, the European leaders promised ‘to make the European Union by 2010 the most dynamic and competitive knowledgebased economy, capable of sustainable economic growth, with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion and respect of the environment’.4 In July 2002, the European project achieved the historical objective of a common currency, the Euro. This new start was the conclusion of a long technical process conceived to adapt the economies of the countries of the Eurozone to the new common currency. In 2004, the European Union enlarged its political space with ten new Member States. The historical reunification of the Old Continent was finally almost achieved. On the other hand, the European project failed to achieve the extraordinary political goal of giving European citizens a constitutional treaty. This treaty was drafted by an ad hoc body, the Convention on the Future of Europe, composed of representatives of the governments, European institutions, and national parliaments. The draft Treaty issued by the Convention was then negotiated by a traditional diplomatic conference and signed in Rome, on 29 October 2004. Even if the new Treaty largely consolidated the provisions of the previous ones, while introducing new 4 Presidency conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23–24 March 2000, https://www. consilium.europa.eu/media/21038/lisbon-european-council-presidency-conclusions.pdf.

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institutional actors and rules, it opened a constitutional dimension in the process of European integration. This new dimension should have brought European citizens closer to European institutions by creating visible and tangible constitutional links between them. Despite its constitutional character, the entry into force of the new Treaty needed to be ratified by all Member States as a Treaty based on international law. Some countries (the first was the United Kingdom) decided to ratify the Constitutional Treaty by means of a referendum. The first two referendums organised had negative outcomes. In France, on 29 May, the Noes to the ratification won with 54% of votes (against 45.3% of Yeses). On 1 June, the Netherlands rejected the new Treaty with 61.3% of votes. These two results were ultimately decisive for the failure of the Constitutional Treaty. Both France and the Netherlands voted against the government. While in the latter country the political campaign ignored the substance of the referendum, in France the negative outcome of the referendum was a result of an intense anti-Europe campaign. The front against the Constitutional Treaty was highly composite: the extremist and populist right of the Front National, anti-globalisation movements, and part of the left wing. The Socialist Party was divided (for internal reasons), while the radical left joined the far right in exploiting a narrative critical of social dumping and delocalisation. The Polish plumber, thoughtlessly evoked in a speech by Frits Bolkestein (the Commissioner in charge of proposals for the liberalisation of services), became the symbolic scapegoat of the political debate. Ignoring the institutional progress of the new Treaty and its potential, the European Union was accused of being an agent of globalisation and excessively liberal or, conversely, illiberal. On the one hand the European Union was considered to foster uncontrolled deregulation, and the other hand to undermine the original principles of liberalism. The political debate in France again showed the distance between citizens and institutions, and a persistent lack of emotional sympathy with the European project despite the innovative constitutional dimension opened by the new Treaty. To overcome this communication deficit, which exposed European public opinion to the influence of rising populism, the European Commission launched the so-called Plan D (debate, dialogue, democracy). The aim of this plan was to engage European citizens in the political debate on the future of the European Union. Despite the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, a new treaty was signed in 2007. The Treaty of Lisbon incorporated almost all the provisions of the Constitutional

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Treaty except those with constitutional potential. The provisions creating emotional and visual links (European laws, anthem, flag, and motto) between European citizens and European institutions were removed at the request of the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the new Treaty introduced a number of innovations intended to increase democratic legitimacy. Among them, some concerned participatory/direct democracy by establishing participatory mechanisms such as citizens’ initiatives and structured dialogues to communicate with civil society.

The Great Recession and Its Effects on Rising Populism The pressure and the influence of populism increased when Europe was hard hit by the effects of a new economic and financial crisis, known as the ‘Great Recession’. Having started in the United States following the burst of a housing bubble and the failure of the Lehman Brothers Bank in 2007, the crisis put serious pressure on the economy of the European Union, and in particular on the financial stability of some Member States (Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain, the so-called PIGS). Even if slowly, the European institutions had the capacity to find solutions to the dramatic effects of the financial instability and the risk of a Greek bailout. The European Union adopted several measures establishing a new economic governance, such as reform of the Stability and Growth Pact, renewed macroeconomic surveillance, and introduction of the European semester. The Great Recession provided new fuel for populists and Eurosceptics at both ends of the political spectrum. The extremist parties further clarified their position and strategies. On the left wing, the main criticism focused on the asymmetry between the economic and monetary pillars of the European Union. Supporting the Greek politician Alexis Tsipras and his SYRIZA party, engaged in a difficult negotiation with the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, these parties called for ‘another Europe’, one more democratic and strongly committed to overcoming economic and social inequalities. On the right wing, the main criticism, as usual more influenced by nativism, focused on strong opposition to immigration. As the success of the UKIP, a new British party, highlighted, Euroscepticism started to turn openly into Euro-hostility (hard Euroscepticism). Since its creation in 1993, the United Kingdom Independence Party

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and its leader, Nigel Farage, had pursued the main purpose of taking the United Kingdom out of the European Union. In 1999, three of its members were elected to the European Parliament. In 2004 and 2009, the number of UKIP MEPs increased to 12 and then to 13. The outcome of the 2009 European elections was a general increase of representatives of populist parties from several countries. A new group, ‘Europe of Freedom and Democracy’ (EFD), could count on 30 members. This rise was driven by the Great Recession but, as observed above, the presence of these parties in the European Parliament started earlier. Populist parties, especially those with nationalist and conservative values, exploited the effects of the Great Recession and the growing anxiety of a large part of European citizens to increase their hostility against the role of the European Union in the globalisation process, and against immigration. Furthermore, following the refugee crisis of 2015, these populist parties sowed panic over the possibility of Muslim migrants radically modifying the European demographic balance. The narrative of the right-wing populist parties was developed around strong emotional messages intended to trigger anxiety and fear. They found the perfect tools to disseminate these messages in the new media. Thanks to the potentialities of social networks and the Internet, populist parties were able to reach out to the ‘people’. Using the same tools, they were able to exploit the growing impact and rapid spread of fake news (Krämer, 2014). In Scandinavia, in September 2010, the Swedish Democrats (a populist, nationalist party) gained 20 seats in the Swedish Parliament, entering it for the first time. In March 2011, in France, the Front National obtained about 15% of votes in the general local elections. In April 2011, the Free-Fins become the third largest party in the Finnish Parliament. Finally, in May 2011, the Freedom Party joined the government coalition in the Netherlands. These electoral performances evidenced the rise of populism at national level, but also its increasing weight in influencing the political agenda of the European Union through national governments.

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The First Reaction of the European Union and the annus horribilis Since 2010, the European Union and its liberal-democratic elites have been under heavy pressure. The narratives of populist parties, increasingly based on identitarian policies and nativism, required a new and strong commitment from the traditional liberal-democratic parties at both national and European level. The emotional and political links between European citizens and European institutions were still missing, however, as the low participation in European Parliament elections has proved. After 1979, when the members of this institution were for the first time elected directly by European citizens, turnout dropped consistently every five years, and from 1999 onwards it was much below 50% on average. To remedy this low turnout, the European Parliament, on the initiative of its President Martin Schultz, decided to introduce an innovation into the election process of the President of the European Commission. Known as the Spitzenkandidaten procedure, this was a method whereby European political parties, ahead of the European elections, appointed their candidates for the European Commission Presidency. The lead candidate of the largest party would have a mandate to assume the European Commission Presidency. This procedural proposal of the European Parliament relied on a new provision of the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 17.7 provides that the European Council shall propose a candidate for President of the European Commission ‘taking into account the elections of the European Parliament’. The legitimacy of this procedure was contested by some Member States, especially the United Kingdom. This new procedure, supported by mainstream political parties, had two different purposes. The first, more institutional, purpose was to increase turnout for the European elections in 2014 by involving people close to the political campaigns. The second, more political, purpose was to give more visibility to the mainstream political parties and thus slow down the loss of their vote preferences in favour of extremist parties. Furthermore, the political strategy of the liberaldemocratic groups was to revamp the traditional left–right cleavage and to minimise the surfacing of the anti/pro-globalisation cleavage and the anti/pro-European cleavage. The outcome of the European Parliament elections of 2014 showed that only the second purpose was fulfilled. The turnout was again disappointing, since only 43.8% of European voters went to the polling stations. By contrast, the expected growth of the populist parties was avoided. Thanks to the Spitzenkandidaten procedure,

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the attention was focused on the programmes proposed by the lead candidates, even if the national media generally ignored public debates among them. Following the new procedure, and after a difficult confrontation with the European Council, the European Parliament elected Jean-Claude Juncker, lead candidate of the European Popular Party (EPP), the largest group in the assembly. Presenting his programme in Strasbourg before the investiture vote of the European Parliament on 22 October, Juncker declared that ‘this will be the last-chance Commission: either we will succeed in bringing our citizens closer to Europe, or we will fail. Either we will succeed in making Europe a political whole that deals with the big issues and leaves the small ones alone, or we will fail’ (Juncker, 2014b: 37). Juncker proposed a political agenda for the following five years structured in ten priorities (Juncker, 2014a: 3–14). Among them, growth, unemployment, migration, and trade were the most important. The economic agenda was based on increasing European public and private investments to recover growth and jobs, and on the introduction of more flexibility into the Stability Pact to moderate austerity economic policies. A revamp of the social agenda was also foreseen. In regard to trade, the strategic approach focused on enlarging international markets through a new generation of trade agreements. The top priority was an ambitious transatlantic agreement with the United States based on a free exchange zone. In regard to migration, the political agenda was conceived to implement a structured European policy based on border management (external controls, irregular migration), protection (asylum policy), and integration (legal economic migration). Unfortunately, despite this ambitious plan, the European project was soon exposed to two huge shocks: the refugee crisis and Brexit. In 2015 and 2016, the European Union experienced an unprecedented migration crisis. This was a real humanitarian emergency that required the European Union to accept large number of refugees from the Middle East and Africa. Furthermore, fundamentalist terrorist attacks took place around these years, some of them made by disguised newcomers. Anxiety, fear, and concerns consequently spread among Europeans. Right-wing populist parties reacted to the migration crisis in two different ways. The first, economic, focused on the negative impact of migrants on wages, goods, health, and education services for European citizens. The second, more cultural and nativist, focused on the risks for preservation of the national language and civilisation. On this issue, right-wing populists

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often seemed to hold the European Union and the national governments hostage with their views. The second shock was the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union. In June 2016, 51.9% of voters chose to leave, whereas 48.1% voted to remain in the European Union. The Brexit vote was the result of several factors. Probably, the most important of them derived from deep cultural roots and reflected persisting resentment about loss of the Empire and the privileges and sense of entitlement associated with it (Bhambra, 2017). Moreover, the circulation of fake news items had an important role in spreading counter-factual arguments against the United Kingdom’s exit. Neutral facts about the British benefits from the European Union illustrated in the information campaign organised by the public authorities before the referendum were often dismissed as fake news. This was a severe blow for the European Union because it generated fear about a possible domino effect on other countries. According to Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon, the United Kingdom had to notify the European Council of its intention to withdraw from the European Union. Only in March 2017 did the British government send notification to the President of the European Council. The official negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Union started on 17 July 2017. The backlash for the European Union caused by these two shocks was very strong. Indeed, 2016 could be seen as the annus horribilis for Europe. The European Union tried to deliver efficient political solutions to tackle the migration crisis. A quota system was implemented to ease the pressure on those Member States most exposed to migration flows and asylum applications. This system, proposed by the European Commission, did not work because some countries, all belonging to the Visegrad Group (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia), refused to apply it. Especially the opposition of the Polish and Hungarian governments reflected their views on European values. In Hungary, Prime Minister and leader of Fidesz, Viktor Orbán, pursued his vision of an ‘illiberal democracy’. In Poland, the government was led by the conservative populist party ‘Law and Justice’. The Visegrad Group greatly values national sovereignty, and since the refugee crisis it has firmly opposed any solidarity among Member States. A cultural element of populism in Europe reflects another cleavage of the European Union, namely the opposite views of Western and Eastern Europe on multiculturalism. People in Eastern Europe tend

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to view the cosmopolitan values on which the European Union is based as a threat to their national identities (Krastev, 2017). Furthermore, the Polish and the Hungarian governments were engaged in curtailing democratic rights internally. The European Union reacted to this illiberal and antidemocratic evolution by triggering Article 7 of the Treaty of Lisbon. These provisions introduced a procedure designed to deter Members States from proposing policies that threaten democratic institutions and values. The influence of populist parties also involved external relations. A consultative referendum held in the Netherlands in March 2010 regarding the EU agreement with Ukraine risked jeopardising the future of the latter country. The entry into force of the trade agreement with Canada (CETA) was stopped for long time by the regional Assembly of Wallonia in Belgium. After the annus horribilis, the European political system, driven by consensus building, made the impact of populist aut-auts more dramatic. It also largely influenced mainstream parties at national level, where the migration crisis dominated the political and public debate. Some leaders of the liberal-democratic parties did not resist the temptation to mimic populist rhetoric, especially during electoral campaigns. Furthermore, policy choices focused on internal security by curbing the numbers of refugees. Following the Great Recession and the refugee crisis, the populist and the right-wing parties grew apace. Before and after each political election in the Member States, the media focused on the results of these parties and their anti-European influence in forming government coalitions. In Germany, after the 2017 federal elections, Alternative for Germany (AfD) became the third party in the Bundestag. In France, the National Rally (formerly Front National ) continued to exert a strong influence even though its leader, Marine Le Pen, lost the Presidential elections against Emmanuel Macron. In Italy, in 2018, two parties, the Five-Star Movement and the League (formerly Northern League), formed the first populist coalition government in Europe with a hard Eurosceptical stance.

The Last Reaction of the European Union: A Conclusion Confronted with a dramatic crisis, both political and economic, European leaders found new solidarity in Rome during the celebrations for the 60th anniversary of the original treaties. On 25 March 2017, they adopted a

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Declaration that officially opened the post-Brexit era. The Rome Declaration5 is a political manifesto with which the 27 European leaders recognise that ‘the European Union is facing unprecedented challenges, both global and domestic: regional conflicts, terrorism, growing migratory pressure, protectionism and social and economic inequalities’. They continue by declaring that ‘together, we are determined to address the challenges of a rapid changing world and offer to our citizens both security and new opportunities’. Finally, the Declaration contains an agenda (Rome Agenda) setting the common objectives to fulfil. The European Union rapidly moved to the new elections of the European Parliament in 2019, fully absorbed by the complex and tiring negotiations with the United Kingdom on Brexit. The right-wing populist parties planned to unite to gain more weight in the next Parliament. The project was to create a political front called ‘Freedom Front’ which would comprise populist parties from six countries. The aim shared by the members of this front, as Marine Le Pen and Matteo Salvini underlined, was ‘to fight against Europe’ (New Europe, 2018), ‘taking back control’, and reinstating full domestic sovereignty. The consequent narrative spread the following conception: European elites had stolen people’s sovereignty, and the aim was to regain control of the economy, restore borders, close them to migrants and to the flow of free trade. Liberal-democratic political families, on the other hand, confirmed the Spitzenkandidaten method, although this time applying this procedure was more complex than in 2014. It was influenced by Emmanuel Macron’s decision to pursue the project of creating a new party (the future Renew Europe) on the model of En Marche in France, and to strengthen the French-German axis. As in 2014, the challenge once again was to increase the turnout at the European elections, while at the same time limiting the presence of populist parties in the new assembly. In order to improve the European public debate, the proposal was to create a transnational list to replace the British members, but it was eventually rejected by the European Parliament. To fight fake news stories, at the end of 2018 the European Commission launched an Action Plan on disinformation. Strengthening the Strategic Communication task forces of the European External Action Service, the plan was especially conceived in view of the European 5 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/25/rome-dec laration/pdf.

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elections. As predicted, the electoral campaign saw the opposition of proEuropeans and anti-Europeans, mainstream parties and extremist parties. Populist parties mobilised voters in order to obtain an anti-European majority and thus block the functioning of the European Union. A wellconceived information campaign organised by the European Parliament and the European Commission—#thistimeimvoting —had a very positive impact on citizens’ participation. The turnout increased to above 50% in the European Union. The outcome of the European elections was not a populist surge, but instead a further decline of the mainstream parties. The European People’s Party (EPP) obtained 179 seats (down from 216). The Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialist and Democrats (S&D) obtained 150 seats (down from 187). The liberal family created a new aggregation formed by the coalition of the old Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) and Macron’s list. This new group, Renew Europe, obtained 108 seats. The Green Party (riding the environmentalist wave supported by Greta Thunberg) increased its votes, obtaining 74 seats. The populist forces obtained 73 seats. Including the new United Kingdom Brexit Party, which received fewer votes than expected, the populists gained 102 seats. Adding these seats to those of the European Conservatives and Reformists group (ECR) and of other MEPs not attached to any group (NF, Not Federate), the Eurosceptics (hard and soft) could count on 175 members. The new populist group ‘Identity and Democracy’ (ID) became the fifth electoral group in the European Parliament. To be stressed is that this group gained the votes lost by the old Europe for Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) group, which received less electoral support than in 2014. The other Eurosceptic party, the ECR, decreased its share of votes mainly because of the collapse of the British Conservative Party, and the move of some member parties to the NF group. The first strategy of the populist forces was to sow discord and dysfunction in the European Parliament from within. The mainstream parties and the Greens reacted by creating a so-called cordon sanitaire aimed at preventing representatives of populist force from access to institutional posts in the European Parliament. In brief, derogating from the rigid D’Hondt method, this strategy fulfilled its purpose of isolating the

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populists of the ID group.6 However, the Spitzenkandidaten procedure did not work, because no lead candidate of the European parties was elected President of the European Commission. After long discussions among European leaders and cross-vetoes,7 on 2 July 2019 the European Council designated Ursula von der Leyen8 as candidate President. She was able to build up a majority inside the Assembly with an ambitious green plan and the idea of offering two vice-presidencies to the lead candidates of the S&D and Renew Europe groups. Consequently, the three main political families were all represented at high level. For the rest of the Commission, the designated president suggested a mix of members reflecting the political composition of the European Parliament (9 EPP, 9 S&D, 4 Renew Europe, 1 ECR, and 4 independents9 ). The European Parliament approved the designation of Ursula von der Leyen with 383 votes in favour (327 against and 22 abstentions). Then, after the hearing of each future member of the College, the European Commission received a final approval of the Parliament with 461 votes in favour (157 against and 89 abstentions). At the end of this new electoral cycle, as observed by several opinion leaders, the European Parliament seems more fragmented and less likely to build a stable coalition than before, even if two-thirds of the seats went to pro-European members. According to the same opinion leaders, in the coming years the major threat for the European Union could be the halt of policymaking. This could strengthen nationalist governments and undermine European citizens’ confidence in European institutions. The most dangerous outcome of populist influence is the paralysis of the European Union and its weakness on the international stage. As in the past, the European Union is called upon to deliver results and further implement the European project.

6 The result is that the ‘Identity and Democracy’ representatives do not have presidencies of parliamentary committees or the Vice Presidency of the European Parliament. 7 First Manfred Weber, PPE candidate, and then Franz Timmermans, S&D candidate,

were rejected for lack of consensus. 8 Ursula von der Leyen is a German politician, member of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). She was member of the German federal government from 2005 to 2019, first as Minister of Family Affairs and Youth, then Minister of Labour and Social Affairs. Finally, from 2013 she was Minister of Defence, the first woman with this responsibility. 9 The four independent members do not belong to any European group.

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For these reasons, the programme of the new European Commission is particularly ambitious. von der Leyen, the first woman to head this institution, has set six political priorities (von der Leyen, 2019) along three different dimensions: economic, societal, and external. On the economic dimension, the priority is to fully exploit the green (‘European Green Deal’) and the digital component of economic growth. Moreover, the economy should be more at the service of the European people, deepening the economic and monetary union, and reinforcing Europe’s social pillar. Regarding society, the priority is to protect European citizens and European values. One of the key issues is the adoption of a new Pact on Migration and Asylum. Moreover, the Commission aims at supporting European democracy by opening to the contributions of European citizens (through the Conference on the Future of Europe). On the external dimension, the priority is to make the European Union a real global leader with a strong, open, and fair agenda. The Commission also aims to develop an integrated and comprehensive approach to European security, including a common defence. Even if this is only a short summary of the Commission’s political agenda, it is clear that at the core of von der Leyen’s Commission programme over the next years is the intent to enhance the European Union’s capacity to deliver policy solutions for the new challenges raised by globalisation. It is also clear that its political vision has been conceived by adopting a renewed liberal-democratic version of the heritage underlying the European social model (Dalton, 2018).10 Without explicitly evoking the narratives of populism, it addresses all Europeans in order to respond to their needs and alleviate public discontent. This is how the European project is seeking to counter the illiberal vision virus (Zielonka, 2018). Meanwhile, another virus, COVID-19, suddenly appeared in early 2020 throughout the world and in Europe. Its effects are extraordinarily dramatic for Europe in term of loss of human lives and economic degrowth (–7.5% of GDP in 2020).11 The political consequences of the COVID-19 crisis could be equally dramatic for solidarity in the European 10 This programme seems to confirm the development of a new political left/right cleavage called GALVAN (Green Alternative Libertarian vs. Traditional Authoritarian Nationalist). 11 https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-performance-and-for ecasts/economic-forecasts/spring-2020-economic-forecast-deep-and-uneven-recession-unc ertain-recovery_en.

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Union. In the framework of the Recovery Plan endorsed by the European Council, the European Commission has proposed a new Recovery and Resilience Facility Fund amounting to 6725 billion euros.12 The innovation lies in the financing method chosen, since the new fund will be financed by the issue of recovery bonds guaranteed by the European budget. For the first time, the principle of debt mutualisation has been accepted at European level. In the context of such a dramatic pandemic crisis, with this historic innovation the European Union has shown itself ready not to leave European citizens alone but to consider them part of a community with a common destiny.

References Bhambra, G. K. (2017). Locating Brexit in the pragmatics of race, citizenship and empire. In W. Outhwaite (Ed.), Brexit: Sociological responses (pp. 91–100). Anthem Press. Buonanno, L., & Nugent, N. (2013). Policies and policy processes of the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan. Dalton, J. (2018). Political realignment economics, culture and electoral change. Oxford University Press. Dinan, D. (2014). Recast Europe. Red Globe Press. Garton Ash, T. (2017). European (dis?)integration in an age of populism. Lecture at the CEPS Ideas Lab. Gilpin, R. (1987). The political economy of international relations. Princeton University Press. Juncker, J. C. (2014a). Political guidelines for the next European Commission and opening statement in the European Parliament plenary session. A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change, Strasbourg, 15. Juncker, J. C. (2014b). Time for action–statement in the European Parliament plenary session ahead of the vote on the College. Krämer, B. (2014). Media populism: A conceptual clarification and some theses on its effects. Communication Theory, 24(1), 42–60. Krastev, I. (2017). After Europe. University of Pennsylvania Press. Krouvel, A., & Abts, J. (2007). Varieties of Euroscepticism and populist mobilisation: Transforming attitudes from mild Euroscepticism to harsh Eurocynicism. Acta Politica, 42(2–3), 252–270. Mody, A. (2018). Euro tragedy, a drama in nine acts. Oxford University Press.

12 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/?uri=COM:2020:456:FIN.

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Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563. New Europe. (2018). Salvini and Le Pen call for a European Freedom Front, keeping Bannon at bay. https://www.neweurope.eu/article/salvini-and-lepen-call-for-a-european-freedom-front-keeping-bannon-at-bay/. Von der Leyen, U. (2019). Political guidelines for the next European Commission 2019–2024. A Union that strives for more: My agenda for Europe, 16. Zielonka, J. (2018). Counter-revolution, liberal Europe in retreat. Oxford University Press.

The Impact of Populism on European Institutions

The Discursive Construction of Migration and Democracy in the European Parliament: A Model of Reciprocal Influence Between Populists and Non-populists Through Polarization and Fragmentation Carlo Berti

Introduction When populism and its impact on the European Union are discussed, a relevant issue is how non-populist forces react. Some claim, for instance, that populism and anti-populism have always co-existed, and that “for every populist actor asserting its presence, there are other anti-populist actors antagonising it” (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2019: 39; see also Stavrakakis, 2014). Populism and anti-populism are described as opposites, as antagonists with irreconcilable positions that combat each other in the political arena. Populists and anti-populists form two opposite blocs (Ruzza, 2020), and the moral and political divide between them makes “the discursive frontier between both camps […] impermeable, with the divide between populism and anti-populism becoming one of good and evil”, thus generating “a clear deadlock between the two sides” (Moffitt,

C. Berti (B) School of International Studies, University of Trento, Trento, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 C. Ruzza et al. (eds.), The Impact of Populism on European Institutions and Civil Society, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73411-4_4

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2018: 10). This antagonism expresses itself not just discursively, but also in the constant effort of non-populist political forces to exclude populist forces from political decision-making. This is the case, for instance, of the so-called cordons sanitaires which impede populists from reaching government positions (see Pauwels, 2011). However, the clear-cut antagonism between populists and anti-populists appears to be diminishing over time. Cas Mudde has highlighted that, given the current populist upsurge, “cordons sanitaires […] will become increasingly difficult to sustain” (Mudde, 2016: 30), not only at the national level but also at that of European institutions. The cordons sanitaires are, in fact, already fading away. Two examples of this can be provided, one at national level, and one at the level of European institutions. The first example is that of Italy, where a populist government (a coalition between the right-wing populist League and the Five-Star Movement, formed after the 2018 national elections) was succeeded, in late 2019, by a coalition of populist and non-populist forces (in particular, the populist Five-Star Movement and the non-populist Democratic Party). The second example is that of the European People’s Party (EPP) group in the European Parliament (EP): the group, formed mostly by non-populist forces, also counted among its members the Hungarian far-right populist party Fidesz. When Fidesz was suspended (but not expelled) from the EPP in 2019, after accusations of breaching the rule of law in Hungary, a difficult and long process ensued which clearly showed the increasing difficulties of excluding populist parties from mainstream politics. Only in 2021, eventually, Fidesz pulled out of EPP. Given the current political panorama across Europe, therefore, would it be appropriate further to explore the impact of populism beyond the populist/anti-populist antagonistic divide? While, certainly, the moral and political divide still resists, and the cordons sanitaires still work in many cases across Europe, other dynamics operate in the relationship between populist and non-populist forces. The case of the European Parliament is particularly significant in this regard, because it is probably one of the most visible arenas in which the separation among populism, anti-populism and non-populism is less clear.

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This chapter considers the 2014–2019 EP. The structure of that EP was particularly complex, with some visible contradictions in its composition in relation to the populist/non-populist divide.1 Perhaps the most visible of them was the presence of the far-right, Eurosceptic populist party Fidesz2 within the EPP group. The EPP group also had among its members the Italian centre-right party Forza Italia, which the literature generally considers to be populist, but which can actually be classified among the non-populists in the EP. The mix of populists and nonpopulists is even more evident in another parliamentary group, the ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists). Among its members, the ECR included the British Conservatives (Eurosceptic, but not populist), but also the far-right, Eurosceptic populist parties Brothers of Italy (Italy), Finns Party (Finland), Law and Justice (Poland). The group was cochaired by Syed Kamall (British Conservatives, non-populist) and Ryszard Legutko (Law and Justice, populist). Given the above-described complex situation, this chapter explores the discursive dynamics within the EP during the 2014–2019 term, in an attempt to understand how populism impacted on non-populist forces, and how these two “blocs” constructed and negotiated issues of importance for the EU. The chapter proposes a model of discursive interaction based on two main dynamics: polarization and fragmentation. The purpose of this model is to explain how populists and non-populists constantly affect each other’s construction of European issues, in an overall dynamic of reciprocal influence.

Methodology As part of a broader research project on the impact of populism on European institutions, this chapter makes use of a large database of documents comprising speeches, press releases, position and policy papers (see 1 For the purposes of this chapter, use will be made of the distinction between populists and non-populists, rather than anti-populists. The reason for this choice, which will become clearer in the conclusion, is that the chapter seeks to demonstrate that there is not a homogeneous anti-populist bloc, but rather a non-populist area in which different political actors have higher or lesser degrees of anti-populism, but may also share some features of the populist ideologies. 2 In this chapter, parties are defined as populist, far-right, far-left, and Eurosceptic according to the PopuList (Rooduijn et al., 2019). See https://popu-list.org/ (last accessed on 20 November 2020).

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Pejovic & Cossarini, 2020; Ruzza, 2020). While the database includes the discursive production of the European Parliament and Commission, and of several civil society organizations, the following analysis is focused on a subset of materials related exclusively to the European Parliament. This database consists of 240 documents (a mix of parliamentary speeches and press releases) that span across the 2014–2019 EP legislature. The documents were selected according to keywords representative of crucial themes concerning populism and anti-populism: populism, discrimination, hate speech, xenophobia, Euroscepticism, migration, Brexit, European democracy, European values (see Ruzza, 2020). Speeches made in the European Parliament were selected through the EP’s official online database,3 while press releases were gathered from the websites of the parliamentary groups. The documents were subsequently processed using the Atlas.ti qualitative analysis software, and a frame analysis (Ruzza, 2006) was conducted. This analysis showed that the main concern of the EP, in terms of its relationship with populism and anti-populism, was the issue of migration (see Table 1). Hence, the analysis focuses on this particular issue in order to conceptualize and exemplify the discursive dynamics generated by the presence of populists in the EP. Moreover, to strengthen the argument, the chapter briefly explores another relevant issue, namely the application of Art. 7 against Hungary in the EP: Hungary, during the 2014–2019 legislation, is in fact a perfect example of the potentially disruptive effects of populism in the EP dynamics. Fidesz, the party of Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, is a right-wing, Eurosceptic populist party that, however, belongs to the EPP group, which is proEuropean and non-populist. This, as will be shown, generates a series of contradictions and fragmentation within the non-populist arena. In order better to unpack the discursive dynamics of the proposed model, it is useful to look directly at the texts. Thus, the chapter will apply critical discourse analysis (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997) to a number of relevant excerpts from the dataset. Rather than focusing on large amounts of data, it is deemed more important in this case to show how fragmentation and polarization are discursively developed in both the populist and anti-populist arenas, as expressions of a reciprocal influence exerted differently on both sides.

3 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/debates-video.html.

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The next sections describe the proposed model of reciprocal influence between populists and non-populists in the EP and illustrate this model with a number of examples from speeches delivered to the EP during the 2014–2019 legislature.

European Parliament Debates and Populism: What Are the Most Contested Issues? The frame analysis of the dataset shows that there are specific issues more debated in the EP in relation to populism. As evidenced by Figure 1, these issues are Euroscepticism, Brexit and the clash between nations and the EU, democracy in the EU, human rights and discrimination, and migration. The migratory flow, however, has been the object of greatest concern and most intense debate since 2015, the year in which the immigration crisis peaked in Europe and thus became of utmost importance in the national and supranational political and public spheres (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1 Most debated issues in the EP in relation to populism (2014–2019) (Source Created by the author)

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The issue of migration is an excellent basis on which to explore the discursive interaction and reciprocal influence between populists and nonpopulists. The majority of the main populist forces during the 2014–2019 parliamentary term were right-wing and had strong anti-immigration positions. Several of these populist parties, moreover, were represented in the EP: this is the case, for instance, of the League and Brothers of Italy (Italy), Front National (France), or Law and Justice (Poland). It is also the case of Fidesz, the Hungarian far-right populist party, led by Viktor Orbán, which belonged to the EPP group, thus functioning as a sort of populist “black sheep” in a non-populist group. Anti-immigration stances are typical of right-wing populism, as well highlighted by Ruth Wodak’s description of exclusionary politics (Wodak, 2015). Recent literature has shown that European right-wing populists exploit the issue of immigration to increase their popularity and attack their opponents, including European institutions (e.g. Berti, 2020; Krzyzanowski, ˙ 2020). Immigration is used by populists as an instrument of political struggle requiring European institutions to respond and counter-attack both discursively and in terms of policymaking. The migratory crisis and its exploitation by populists, also in their speeches to the EP, required politicians from non-populist parties to devise strategies to respond to these continuous attacks. However, the response within the EP was anything but unified. Far from forming a coherent antipopulist bloc, non-populist forces in the EP responded to the populist anti-migration discourse with very different views and policy suggestions. Table 1

Frequencies of frames related to migration Non-populist

Migration Migration—Closed borders/Rejection policies Migration—Illegality argument Migration—Moral/humanitarian arguments Migration—Negative evaluation of migrants Migration—Sociocultural clash/Invasion Migration—Solidarity Migration control policies Totals Source Created by the author

70 – 4 42 1 – 25 9 151

Populist

Totals

35 10 9 4 13 10 2 3 86

105 10 13 46 14 10 27 12 237

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Table 1 shows the distribution of the different frames on migration in the discourses of populist and non-populist MEPs. The table depicts what may seem to be a marked difference in the two approaches: on the one hand, populists frame immigration as an illegal activity or a cultural invasion, they judge migrants negatively, and they call for closed borders and the rejection of immigrants; on the other hand, non-populists use humanitarian and moral arguments to discuss migrants, and they call for solidarity (both towards migrants and among Member States) and migration control policies. However, the framing analysis misses some significant features of the populist and non-populist discourses, which can only be observed by thoroughly examining the words of the MEPs. On closer inspection, Table 1 itemizes some particular influences of populist and non-populist reciprocal influence. To be noted is that the moral/humanitarian arguments are, in some instances, used by populists as well; similarly, there are some instances in which non-populists use the illegality argument or negatively evaluate migrants; finally, to be noted is that the idea of controlling migration through policymaking is used by both groups. The working hypothesis of this chapter is that, especially in relation to such contested issues as migration, populism has had a significant impact on the discursive production of the EP, and that this influence does not operate only in the direction of stronger polarization between the populist and non-populist blocs; it does so also in the incorporation by each bloc of features pertaining to the other one. Populists and non-populists, that is, do not simply react to each other with contrasting ideas; rather, they strategically use and incorporate features of their opponents in order to attempt to strengthen their position. A model of this reciprocal influence is suggested in Fig. 2. The model is based on two main mechanisms: polarization and fragmentation. Polarization is the mechanism by which populists attack non-populists, and non-populists react with a counter-attack, thus widening the distance between the two positions. Fragmentation, on the other hand, is the mechanism by which populists exploit a non-populist argument to adapt it to fit with their ideas, and the mechanism by which non-populists incorporate a populist argument in their discourse, usually softening it and making it less radical. Rather than reinforcing the two polarized blocs, this type of influence tends to merge some of their positions. If we imagine the populist and non-populist blocs as two walls, polarization is a reinforcement of both walls, while fragmentation generates rifts and cracks in

Fig. 2

Incorporation and re-elaboration of anti-populist elements

Populist attacks (anti-elitism, identity politics, etc.)

Reciprocal influence

Reaction to populist attacks

Fragmentation

POPULIST DISCOURSES

Fragmentation

A model of reciprocal influence between populist and non-populist discourses in the EP

Polarization

NON-POPULIST DISCOURSES

Polarization

Incorporation and re-elaboration of populist elements

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them: these fissures can sometimes be repaired, and thus result in further reinforcement (this happens when an argument of the opposite bloc is successfully incorporated), or otherwise they can widen until the entire structure of the wall is in danger (this is the case, for instance, of a populist idea becoming appealing to several non-populist forces, thus generating conflict and polarization within the same bloc). The next sections describe these two mechanisms in depth by using relevant excerpts from the EP speeches dataset. Translations in English, when necessary, are by the author.

Polarization: Reinforcing the Blocs, Increasing the Distance As seen in the first part of this chapter, polarization is a typical feature of populist communication, and thus a visible tendency in those environments where populists have political significance and a stronger voice. Here polarization is not described as a strategy or an effect, but rather as a dynamic mechanism of discursive interaction in which two sets of ideas and arguments oppose each other, thus generating (the impression of) two separate “blocs” that tend to attack and exclude each other, rather than engage in dialogue and negotiation. To explore the mechanism of polarization, we consider several excerpts from speeches given to the EP between 2014 and 2019, showing how populists and non-populists offer radically different perspectives, ideas and policy suggestions about immigration. As seen in Table 1, right-wing populists in the EP tend to have a negative view of migration. This is clear, for instance, from the following quote: Enough is enough! We can no longer welcome “migrants”. Basta! No way! […] What is stopping you from finally listening to our people, who are asking you to put an end, once and for all, to these totally anarchic migratory flows? There is an urgent need to protect our national borders and to implement a genuine European cooperation to effectively defend the external borders, drawing inspiration from the actions of Hungary yesterday and Italy today. (Nicolas Bay, Rassemblement National, ENF group)

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Bay, a member of the French far-right populist party Rassemblement National, emphatically juxtaposes the “people” (whom he claims to represent by calling them “our people”) to EU institutions, which he considers guilty of allowing “anarchic migratory flows” to enter Europe. Migration is thus seen as an invasion, which must be countered with stronger protection of national borders. In Bay’s nationalist perspective, EU institutions and migrants are the enemies of the national people. This is clarified in another quote from his speech: Mr President, it is no longer the Commission that decides on migration issues, but the nations that are taking over. Mr Macron and Mrs Merkel are isolated because their policy of welcoming illegal immigrants has now being very clearly rejected by the people. (Nicolas Bay, Rassemblement National, ENF group)

Here, Bay reinforces both anti-migrant stances (by introducing the argument of illegal immigration) and his nationalist, Eurosceptic, populist and anti-elitist worldview by claiming that European policies have been “rejected by the people”, so that the Commission cannot take any more decisions about migration. Marcel de Graaff, a member of the Dutch Party for Freedom and of the ENF group, expresses a similar view on migration: A second issue I would like to address is illegal migration. The EU is in a complete deadlock on how to deal with illegal migrants. The EU has no solutions. It doesn’t close its borders; it doesn’t expel rejected asylum seekers; it doesn’t fight Islamisation and radicalisation. […] He could start by making it a criminal offence to help illegal migrants […]. (Marcel de Graaff, Party for Freedom, ENF group)

Besides criticizing the EU’s migration policies and claiming that the only solution is closing borders and rejecting “illegal migrants”, de Graaff suggests criminalizing those who help migrants, referring to those NGOs that operate in the Mediterranean with search and rescue operations. This introduces a new enemy of the people, namely sea-rescue NGOs, which— together with migrants and EU institutions—endanger the people (see also Berti, 2020). Migrants are further negatively depicted by referring to their “Islamization and radicalization”: while certainly not all migrants coming to Europe are Muslim, let alone radicalized, de Graaff exploits

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this simplification to describe migrants as a homogeneous group characterized not only by the illegality of their presence on European territory, but also by a tendency to have radical religious beliefs. A similar discursive strategy is employed in a speech by Gerard Batten, a member of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP): If European governments were serious about combating this problem, they would do two things immediately. First, stop all overseas funding of mosques and imams. Second, end the mass immigration of Muslims into European countries. Only those migrants prepared to make a solemn and binding pledge that they reject the passages of hatred and violence should be admitted. (Gerard Batten, UKIP, EFDD group)

In this case, Batten exploits a “fallacy of difference” that “draw[s] a rigid dividing line” (Wodak, 2015: 54) between European citizens and migrants, who Batten discursively constructs as all Muslim (“mass immigration of Muslims”) and who should, just for being Muslim, “make a solemn and binding pledge that they reject the passages of hatred and violence”. This discourse underlies another fallacy, namely the fallacy of comparison (Wodak, 2015), according to which one’s own ingroup is superior to the outgroup (in this case, Europe is superior to Islam, thus suggesting that Muslims should somehow “convert” to European culture to be granted access to the EU). The fallacy of comparison is even more evident in the following statements by Marcel De Graaff: [The EU] opened its borders and spent billions to invite millions of uneducated people from a backward culture that will launch Europe straight back into the Middle Ages. Islam means gender inequality, polygamy, child marriage, slavery and honour killings. It means death for unbelievers. It means absolute power to a political and religious elite. (Marcel de Graaff, Party for Freedom, ENF group) When the EU continues on its present course, the future of Europe will be Islamic. That is the objective of the Islamic world, and that is the objective of the EU elite. It is the aim of the open border policy and it is the aim of this criminal mass immigration. Of course there are casualties of abuse, murder and rape. That’s the price to pay for the extermination of national identities. That is deliberate EU policy. There is only one obstacle on the road to the European caliphate, and that is the patriotic citizens who vote for patriotic parties. (Marcel de Graaff, Party for Freedom, ENF group)

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In this last quote, de Graaff argues that the EU elites are deliberately favouring an Islamic invasion of Europe, which only “patriotic citizens” can successfully oppose by voting for “patriotic parties” (that is, rightwing nationalist and populist parties). To summarize, the polarization mechanism operates within the populist bloc as a mix of Euroscepticism, nationalism, anti-elitism and criminalization of migrants. Migration is seen as either a failure of the EU supranational bodies to defend Europe’s borders and thus European identity, or as a conspiracy of the EU elites to destroy the national population. Both these worldviews are characterized by a typical Manichean division (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017) of the world into homogeneous, antagonistic groups: illegal, dangerous migrants and evil EU elites, on the one hand, and the good national people on the other. A number of non-populist MEPs, however, adopt a discursive strategy that does not simply underlie a radically different worldview, but explicitly attacks the populist perspective, thus increasing polarization. For instance, a press release by the S&D group states: Following the death of more than 50 people in the Mediterranean, S&D group vice-presidents Elena Valenciano and Tanja Fajon, said: We deeply regret the appalling loss of lives off the Tunisian coast yesterday. This is just the latest tragedy in the Mediterranean, with people dying trying to reach a better life in Europe. […] The EU must not allow this to happen. The EU of solidarity, the one that respects human dignity, cannot turn into an EU of selfishness and xenophobia. […] We cannot let ourselves be overrun by this wave of populism and xenophobia. (S&D group, Press release)

Here, the EP group frames migration as a humanitarian issue, and migrants are seen as people looking for a better life in Europe. The solution to the crisis is identified in European solidarity and, perhaps most importantly, populism is associated with xenophobia and seen as an enemy of the EU and migrants. The sharp opposition between populists and the EU remains, but the roles are inverted: the EU is constructed as good, a defender of human rights and the only possible solution to the migration crisis, while populism is seen as evil, characterized by “selfishness and xenophobia”. In another press release, the ALDE group makes the contrast between populism and the EU institutions even more explicit by directly attacking

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the Hungarian government (led by Orbán) which approved the construction of a fence to stop migrants from entering the country: Alde MEPs have today urged the European Commission, via a written parliamentary question, to react to new legislation on asylum rules that was yesterday approved by the Hungarian parliament. The National Assembly backed a package of amendments tightening the asylum and migration system in the country and approved a 175 km long, 4- metre high fence on the border with Serbia to stem the flow of migrants and refugees. […] At a time when a record of 60 million people globally are fleeing their homes due to war and oppression, it is unacceptable that Hungary wants to isolate itself by building up walls and refusing to deal with asylum applications. Hungary is bound to respect EU and international laws, such as the Geneva Convention. It is our duty, not an option, to show solidarity and guarantee asylum seekers a legally correct process. (ALDE group, Press release)

Also in this case, polarization is strengthened by opposing Hungary’s attempt to achieve isolation with the need to show solidarity and respect human rights and international laws. By inverting the roles once again, populists are constructed as illegal, and the EU as the defender of legality. ALDE, moreover, applies pressure on the European Council to revise the EU asylum system in such a way as to facilitate migration: How many more people have to die before the Council starts to realise that we need to revise the European asylum system and establish legal and safe ways for refugees to reach Europe? Granting asylum to people fleeing wars, conflicts and human rights violations is not a matter of choice, but a duty and an act of solidarity that all the 28 Member States are bound to respect through both EU and international law. We have managed to build a monetary union and are on our way to create an energy union. Now it is time to build a humanitarian union! (ALDE group, Press release)

Again using a humanitarian argument, the EP group demands the creation of a “humanitarian union” and highlights the risks that refugees take to escape from wars and human rights violations. A very similar perspective (a positive view of refugees, and a humanitarian argument) is expressed by MEPs of the Greens/EFA group and the EPP group, as shown by the following quotes:

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[This resolution] shows how united Parliament is in calling for solidarity both among Member States and also with refugees. […] Relocation is a very important tool for solidarity, but it is also a very important humanitarian tool. It obviously helps Members States which have received a lot of refugees, and it helps the refugees finally to find a place of safety and a place where they can build a new future. […] We are talking here about people who are fleeing from war and persecution […]! (Ska Keller, Die Grünen, Greens/EFA group)

To summarize, in the polarization dynamic populists tend to construct migration as an invasion by illegal, inferior and potentially dangerous people intent on causing a violent cultural clash and possibly the “Islamization” of the EU. This invasion is fostered by the EU’s lack of political will (or possibly a deliberate effort by EU elites to damage their own people), and the only solution is the will of patriots and nationalist parties to close the border and reject migrants. Non-populists, on the other hand, use polarization not just to support their ideas, but also to react with counter-attacks (in what, in many ways, is a deliberate anti-populist discursive effort), by constructing the migration crisis as a tragedy, caused by issues such as war, famine, human rights violations. In their perspective, populists are intolerant, xenophobic, and the real enemies of the European people and of migrants. The solution to migration, in their view, lies in solidarity towards migrants and among EU Member States. If polarization were to dominate the discursive struggle in the EP, the two blocs (populists and non-populists) would constantly maintain and reinforce their opposing ideas, and they would appear homogeneous and coherent. However, as the next section will demonstrate, another important dynamic takes place in the discursive environment of the EP. This dynamic, referred to here as “fragmentation”, erodes the homogeneity of the two groups, and allows populist and non-populist ideas and arguments to influence each other in a manner such to mix, merge and generate new ideas and perspectives.

Fragmentation: Eroding the Blocs, Decreasing the Distance Given the composition of the European Parliament during the 2014– 2019 term, it is possible to distinguish three different areas of the process

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of fragmentation. The influence of populist discourses generates fragmentation within the non-populist parliamentary groups, while the influence of non-populist ideas generates fragmentation within the populist ones. However, fragmentation also happens within the mixed groups, where both populists and non-populists are represented. In this case, there is a particularly strong need to negotiate the discursive identity of the groups by taking both populist and non-populist stances into account. The same happens in those cases in which there is a minoritarian populist component within an overall non-populist group: this is the case, as will be seen in this section, of the EPP, which has to re-negotiate its identity when its populist component (Hungarian party Fidesz) is accused by the Parliament of violating the rule of law. By once again considering the discursive construction of the issue of migration in the EP, it is possible to identify how fragmentation is developed by the different groups and MEPs. For instance, how do populist discourses influence the construction of migration by nonpopulist groups? The following quote from MEP Cecilia Wikström (ALDE group) is a good example of such influence: We must also do much better in returning those who do not qualify for international protection in a dignified manner. That would restore the credibility of the system. The most important measure to discourage people from dangerous trips across the Mediterranean would be to say that it is difficult to obtain international protection. There are no shortcuts here: only hard work. We need to put a resilient common European asylum system in place, and once again to deserve the respect – and live up to the expectations – of the citizens out there. (Cecilia Wikström, Liberal Party, ALDE group)

Differently from the humanitarian arguments seen in the previous section, here migration is treated as a problem for the EU, and the solution is identified in the need to discourage migrants from attempting to enter Europe. Most importantly, this solution is justified by a typically populist appeal to the people: rather than appealing to European values or human rights, Wikström claims that migration should be reduced in order to “deserve the respect – and live up to the expectations – of the citizens”. This type of argument resonates with the above-discussed claims by populists that migration is unwanted by European citizens, and badly handled (if not deliberately favoured) by EU elites. Wikström’s discourse produces fragmentation because it is based on an argument completely

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different from those seen in the previous section: in that case, migration was discussed on the basis of humanitarian arguments, by adopting the perspective of the migrant desperately trying to enter Europe, while in this case Wikström adopts the perspective of European citizens, describing them as a homogeneous group whose intent is to stop (or at least reduce) migration. Another speech by EPP leader Manfred Weber exhibits an even stronger influence of populist discourses on non-populist groups (Weber is a German politician, a member of the centre-right and pro-European CSU/CDU alliance). On discussing possible solutions to migration, Weber states: We want to help people from Syria and other regions who need our help. But one thing is clear: illegal migration has to be stopped. We have to destroy the inhuman business model of the smugglers and send illegal migrants, after a fair procedure, back home. […]I very often hear the argument that it is difficult to protect the border. […] I was on the other side of the continent on the Bulgarian-Turkish border. There the Prime Minister installed a 5-metre-high fence over more than 180 kilometres, and he showed that if you have the political will, then you can protect the border and stop illegal migrants from crossing borders, for example with a fence. We are looking to you to fight extremists. We have to solve problems, and that means that we are looking to Spain to protect borders against illegal migrants. (Manfred Weber, CDU/CSU, EPP group)

Here the humanitarian argument is simply used as a disclaimer in the first sentence, before Weber starts to adopt the illegality argument (seen in the excerpts from populist discourses in the previous section) and identifies the solution to migration in border defence. In this short excerpt, the adjective “illegal” in association with migrants is used four times, and Weber also uses the word “extremists” in the context of a speech on border defence against migration. The word “border” is used five times, and the EPP leader speaks positively about the construction of fences to stop migrants from entering Europe. The identification with the populist arguments here is nearly complete, and the dissonance between Weber’s arguments and the humanitarian arguments maximizes the visibility of fragmentation within the non-populist bloc. While the last example showed a non-populist politician adopting populist arguments to talk about migration, the next one illustrates exactly the opposite phenomenon. Matteo Salvini (leader of the League, an

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Italian right-wing populist party and member of the ENF group) talks about the need to stop migration by using a humanitarian argument: Last year, 3,000 people died in the Mediterranean, dead on the conscience of those who invite these people to leave. The only recipe is not Frontex, Triton, Mare Nostrum, Goofy, Pluto or Donald Duck, but it is to avoid that these people depart, by helping them not to escape from hunger and war. (Matteo Salvini, League, ENF group)

The contrast between Salvini’s speech and the previously seen discourse of other members of the ENF group is evident: while MEPs such as De Graaff or Bay starkly spoke out against migrants, Salvini adopts a humanitarian perspective to reach the same conclusion, namely that migration must be stopped. Salvini and his party have been notoriously characterized by anti-immigrant stances (e.g. Padovani, 2018; Richardson & Colombo, 2013), so the suspicion is that, in certain circumstances, Salvini uses the humanitarian argument only strategically, perhaps in order to accuse his political adversaries of being inhumane (this hypothesis is substantiated by previous research, see Berti, 2020). Hence this might be a good example of how fragmentation can only be “apparent”: a populist politician, in this case, strategically employs a non-populist argument in order actually to reinforce a populist idea. The resulting fragmentation is thus only apparent, because the non-populist ideas are not actually being merged and re-negotiated by populists. However, fragmentation within the populist bloc is not always apparent. In the following example, for instance, Laura Agea (a member of the Italian populist party Five-Star Movement) genuinely uses a humanitarian frame to talk about migration: A year after the tragedy of Lampedusa, the EU is still looking for a good idea to face a situation that can no longer be defined an emergency, but rather a routine. The repressive approach of the Stockholm programme and the Dublin agreement caused 22,000 dead, 3,000 only this year in the Mediterranean. […] Do you think it is possible to carry on with this irresponsible management of a complex and unstoppable phenomenon such as immigration? Do you think it is wise to continue to build walls around this fortress called Europe, while the Mediterranean becomes a huge cemetery? […] It is time for the EU to overcome its own fears, and to revise its approach to migration policies: no more migrants, but citizens to welcome and integrate. (Laura Agea, Five-Star Movement, EFDD group)

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In this quote, Agea criticizes the EU’s management of migration by claiming that Europe should not close its borders with walls, but instead do more to help migrants, whom—she claims—should rather be seen as “citizens to welcome and integrate”. Agea is a member of the same political group as Gerard Batten, who (as seen earlier in this chapter) blatantly spoke out against Muslims and demanded that migrants be only accepted after making “a solemn and binding pledge that they reject the passages of hatred and violence”. The fragmentation within the EFDD is evident in the contrasting tones of these two excerpts. In this case, it is not apparent but substantial, because the two politicians have opposite ideas about migration, its diagnosis and its treatment in terms of policymaking. Finally, it is important to consider how fragmentation works within mixed groups. The ECR group, in particular, comprises a balanced range of populist and non-populist parties. The two following quotes show how this can generate internal fragmentation in the group. Once again, the issue of migration is taken in consideration: Madam President, in 2015 over one million people arrived on Europe’s shores by irregular means. These people have fled war, famine, repressive dictatorships, economic hardship or a mixture of all of those combined. Their arrival has clearly sparked a huge debate in our societies as to where it is right to draw the line between compassion to those seeking a better life versus our actual political and financial capabilities to provide such relief. […] Europe’s neighbours are seeing a rapid population increase, a lack of job creation and, in Africa in particular, are increasingly troubled by future effects of climate change. Clearly more needs to be done to defend Europe’s external borders, but we cannot ignore, nor insulate ourselves from, the reasons that are pushing people to leave their homes in the first place. (Charles Tannock, Conservative Party, ECR group) Madam President, there are no internal border checks in the Schengen area. Therefore, the external border is a common concern for all Member States. We must have an effective way to monitor who comes in and who goes out if we want to prevent illegal immigration, cross-border crime and terrorism. (Jussi Halla-aho, Finns Party, ECR group)

Charles Tannock, a member of the British Conservative Party (nonpopulist) uses the humanitarian argument to frame migration, adopting the perspective of migrants coming to Europe to escape situations of conflict, repressive regimes, economic difficulties and even the effects

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of climate change. His perspective resembles that, for instance, of the Greens/EFA as seen in the previous quote by Ska Keller. Jussi Hallaaho (a member of the right-wing populist Finns Party), however, adopts the already-seen populist perspective that opts for border defence against “illegal” migrants, who are associated, in his quote, with crime and terrorism. In this example, fragmentation does not happen within the populist or non-populist bloc, but rather within a group in which populists and nonpopulists cohabit. However, the next example shows how the presence of a populist party in a non-populist group can generate fragmentation within the non-populist block. The example concerns Hungarian rightwing populist party Fidesz, a member of the non-populist group EPP. Fidesz’s leader, Viktor Orbán, has been Prime Minister of Hungary since 2010 and has been frequently accused by non-populist forces in the EP of attacking fundamental rights and the rule of law in his country. In the context of parliamentary debates on Hungary, EPP’s MEP Esteban Gonzáles Pons, in 2014, defended Orbán thus: Madam President, the European Parliament has already dealt many times with the Hungarian issue and, in all of them, the European People’s Party has declared its defence of fundamental rights and the rule of law. However we also consider that it is not acceptable to attack a member country for ideological reasons: the generic prejudice against a country is as dangerous as the denunciations that are going to be expressed here today. […] The European People’s Party trusts and believes in Hungary. In Hungary this year three elections have been held: on all three occasions Fidesz has won, a party that is a member of the European People’s Party. Bringing back, again, the Hungarian policy to this House may mean to continue the electoral campaign in Strasbourg when it was lost in Hungary. (Esteban Gonzáles Pons, People’s Party, EPP group)

The EPP’s defence of Orbán generated fragmentation within the nonpopulist bloc: non-populists of other groups, in fact, were also attacking Fidesz, as evident from this extract from an ALDE press release of 2015: […] This package of amendments is yet another sign of Hungary’s disintegration. The Hungarian Prime Minister is transforming the country into a mini-Russia. The Orbán regime’s lack of solidarity and of respect for the

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fundamental European values is appalling and the EU must react immediately, putting pressure on the Hungarian regime before it is too late. (ALDE, press release)

The example of Hungary and Fidesz shows the potential implications of fragmentation very clearly. These implications extend beyond the discursive level, and impact on the structure, functioning and overall orientations of the EP. The EP invoked Art. 7 against Hungary4 on 12 September 2018, after a report by MEP Judith Sargentini (Greens/EFA). However, several months passed before the EPP acted in accordance: Fidesz was suspended (but not expelled) from the EPP only on 20 March 2019. This shows that a single populist party can have a strong influence on the non-populist bloc and on the coherence and strength of its stance. Overall, fragmentation has introduced some populist elements into the non-populist block, such as the need to appeal to the people and, in relation to migration, a closer focus on border defence and illegality arguments. This, of course, divides the non-populist bloc, which cannot fully agree on what perspective to adopt on migration, and consequently what solutions should be pursued with policymaking. On the other hand, populist fragmentation seems to be either strategic (that is, exploited for discursive purposes, without substantially changing the populist perspective), or based on previously existing intra-group variability of the parties (as seen, for instance, in the case of EFDD).

Conclusions By suggesting a model of reciprocal influence in the discursive construction of European issues (and, in particular, migration) in the EP, this chapter has sought to show that populism can impact on the political arena in different ways. The influence between populists and non-populists is bi-directional; it can increase polarization, but it can also generate fragmentation. When populist forces are manifold, strong and cannot be completely isolated by means of cordons sanitaires, the non-populist bloc struggles to remain coherent and homogeneous and partially incorporates populist arguments and motives. The process can 4 Art. 7, if fully implemented, sanctions a country that is breaching the values of Art. 2 by suspending that country’s voting rights in the Council. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012M007 (Accessed on 18 November 2020).

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have positive or negative effects in the non-populist bloc, depending on how its political actors are able to re-construct and re-negotiate their identity in the light of these influences. However, as seen, the populist bloc, too, is far from being homogeneous. Some populist actors have to carefully balance their discourses and their membership of non-populist or mixed groups, while even fully populist groups such as the EFDD may exhibit internal fragmentation due to the variety of positions in different populist parties. What becomes evident in the context of the EP, however, is that the antagonistic, irreconcilable divide between populism and anti-populism is not necessarily the most likely outcome of the presence of populist forces in a political arena. While this antagonism certainly exists, not all non-populist forces are strongly anti-populist, and not all populist ones are fully populist. There is constant discursive struggle and negotiation of meanings in the EP, which moves in multiple directions: hence, some MEPs belonging to the EFDD populist group may contribute to constructing migration as a humanitarian emergency, together with anti-populist MEPs such as Ska Keller of the Greens/EFA; at the same time, non-populists such as Manfred Weber (EPP) and populists such as Gerard Batten (EFDD) or Marcel de Graaff (ECR) may share a populist/nationalist perspective on migration whereby migrants are seen as invaders, and border protection is the most important policy to pursue. While this chapter adopts a discursive perspective, it should not be forgotten that discourse and policymaking are interdependent: the discursive construction of an issue, especially in an institutional context like the EP, usually underlies a specific policy orientation. Thus, for instance, the speeches of EPP members in defence of Fidesz suggest a certain acceptance of Orbán’s populism, and this is confirmed by the restraint of the EPP in acting against Fidesz. Similarly, the large amount of fragmentation within the non-populist bloc (which dominated the EP in the 2014–2019 term), and especially within the EPP (a major force in the European Commission) could help to explain the difficulties of the EU in acting towards migration. The suggested model of reciprocal influence, moreover, is not valid only in the context of marked political fragmentation and polarization like the EP. This became clear when the new 2019 European Commission, led by Ursula Von Der Leyen, opted to name a migration portfolio

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“Protecting our European Way of Life”.5 This decision sparked a heated debate because the juxtaposition of “migration” and the “European way of life” with the idea that Europe needs “protection” from migration, appeared to many as resounding with (right-wing) populist rhetoric. Eventually, the title was changed, but elements of influence by populist rhetoric are still apparent in the new title: “Promoting our European way of life. Protecting our citizens and our values”.6 Rather than clear-cut antagonistic opposition, therefore, European politics appear to be moving in a direction where the dominant dynamic is reciprocal influence, with its mix of polarization and fragmentation. The effects of this dynamic can be very different and should be carefully analysed in the light of the various issues at stake.

References Berti, C. (2020). Right-wing populism and the criminalization of sea-rescue NGOs: The ‘Sea-Watch 3’ case in Italy, and Matteo Salvini’s communication on Facebook. Media, Culture & Society, 43(3), 532–550. Fairclough, N., & Wodak, R. (1997). Critical discourse analysis. Discourse as Social Interaction. In T. Van Dijk (Ed.), Discourse studies: A multidisciplinary introduction. Vol. 2: Discourse as social interaction (pp. 357–378). Sage. Krzyzanowski, ˙ M. (2020). Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism: Imaginaries of immigration, moral panics and the discourse of contemporary right-wing populism. Social Semiotics, 30(4), 503–527. Moffitt, B. (2018). The populism/anti-populism divide in Western Europe. Democratic Theory, 5(2), 1–16 Mudde, C. (2016). Europe’s populist surge: A long time in the making. Foreign Affairs, 95(6), 25–30. Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press. Padovani, C. (2018). Lega Nord and anti-immigrationism: The importance of hegemony critique for social media analysis and protest. International Journal of Communication, 12, 3553–3579.

5 https://www.euronews.com/2019/11/13/eu-commission-incoming-chief-changestitle-for-migration-portfolio-after-controversy. Accessed on 22 November 2020. 6 https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-europeanway-life_en. Accessed on 22 November 2020.

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Pauwels, T. (2011). Explaining the strange decline of the populist radical right Vlaams Belang in Belgium: The impact of permanent opposition. Acta Politica, 46(1), 60–82. Pejovic, M., & Cossarini, P. (2020). CSOs seen through the optic of the European Commission: Has the Commission’s perspective changed following the refugee crisis and the populist turn? European Politics and Society. https:// doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2020.1801182. Richardson, J. E., & Colombo, M. (2013). Continuity and change in antiimmigrant discourse in Italy: An analysis of the visual propaganda of the Lega Nord. Journal of Language and Politics, 12(2), 180–202. Rooduijn, M., Van Kessel, S., Froio, C., Pirro, A., De Lange, S., Halikiopoulou, D., Lewis, P., Mudde, C. & Taggart, P. (2019). The PopuList: An overview of populist, far right, far left and Eurosceptic parties in Europe. www.popu-lis t.org. Ruzza, C. (2006). Frame analysis. In K. Brown (Ed.), Encyclopedia of language and linguistics (pp. 3214–3221). Elsevier. Ruzza, C. (2020). The populist radical right and its discursive impact on EULevel civil society. European Politics and Society. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 23745118.2020.1801186. Stavrakakis, Y. (2014). The return of “the people”: Populism and anti-populism in the shadow of the European crisis. Constellations, 21(4), 505–517. Stavrakakis, Y., & Katsambekis, G. (2019). The populism/anti-populism frontier and its mediation in crisis-ridden Greece: From discursive divide to emerging cleavage? European Political Science, 18(1), 37–52. Wodak, R. (2015). The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean. Sage.

The Politicisation of the European Union and the Role of the European Parliament: Opportunities, Risks and Limitations Markus Warasin

Defining the European Political Space in the Context of Constructive and Destructive Politicisation Media portray the EU predominantly along national lines. The angle or perspective from which EU-related news stories are told are frequently one-dimensional and explain conflicting positions predominantly with a national focus. Hence, media framing, i.e. the media reconstruction of reality, looks for a national angle and describes the EU decision-making process largely as a battleground for national governments defending genuine national interests: the German national interest against the French; the national interest of the Franco-German engine opposed to other EU member states; the interests of the north against the south, or the west against the east; of the net contributors against the net receivers, etc.

M. Warasin (B) Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 C. Ruzza et al. (eds.), The Impact of Populism on European Institutions and Civil Society, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73411-4_5

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Whether a national leader won, lost, or tied, whether a representative was able to extract a concession to bring back home or capitulated to counterparts, is often more important than how members’ decisions affect the EU as a whole. (Kanter, 2019)1

This portrayal is not entirely wrong, and the formation of smaller alliances within the EU, such as the Euromed 7 initiative established in 2013 by seven Mediterranean countries in order to better coordinate issues of common interest within the EU, or the 1991-established Visegrad group comprising four central European countries, shows the attempt of governments to influence EU agenda setting more closely. However, media framing along national lines is only a small part of the total. For many years now, academic research has shown that the EU decision-making processes are more complex than used to be believed, that the political battles are fought along traditional left-right lines as well as along pro-and anti-European lines, and that each EU institution—from the European Commission to the Council or the European Parliament—is developing its own distinctive features and specific dynamics. In this context, the politicisation of the EU is influencing and re-shaping the EU institutions and EU-level civil society and has therefore become an important subject of study to understand European governance and its future. Among the most prominent researchers in this regard are Simon Hix (2006) and Swen Hutter, Edgar Grande and Hanspeter Kriesi (Grande et al., 2016). Hix argues that the EU has changed in recent years from a consensual to a contested system of governance. Until the early 1990s the EU was essentially a consensual system of governance. The result was the so-called ‘permissive consensus’, whereby citizens were content to delegate responsibility to their leaders to tackle the European integration project. However, this consensus collapsed in the early 1990s, which has resulted in much more contested attitudes towards the EU among Europe’s citizens. European integration no longer commands widespread support and a complex web of economic interests, social values, political preferences and national contexts shape individuals’ attitudes towards the EU. (Hix & Bjorn, 2011: 129)

1 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/04/european-press-corpseu-fails/587083/.

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If political elites continue with consensus politics, they risk provoking more public opposition to the EU. Politicising the EU agenda in domestic politics and at European level appears to Hix as the right sort of medicine for Europe. He defends the point of view that there is a visible left-right politicisation of the EU and that more of it is both possible and desirable, “since such a form of politicization would strengthen the public debate and clarify its terms” (Magnette & Papadopoulos, 2008: 7). Hix argues further: Rather than assuming that a European demos is a prerequisite for genuine EU democracy, a European democratic identity might well form through the practice of democratic competition and institutionalized co-operation. (Follesdal & Hix, 2006: 550)

According to Hix, the best politicisation platform is the European Parliament, where evidence of the forthcoming left-right politicisation of the EU is already visible: Voting in the European Parliament is increasingly along Left-Right party lines and decreasingly along national lines. In fact, the main political groups in the European Parliament are now more ‘cohesive’ in their voting than the Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. Congress and only slightly less cohesive than parliamentary parties in the national parliaments in Europe. (Hix, 2006: 15–16)

Contrary to Simon Hix’s view that politicisation will have mainly positive effects on the integration process, Swen Hutter, Edgar Grande and Hanspeter Kriesi shed some light on the negative effects of politicisation mainly driven by populist radical right parties which highlight the negative consequences of European integration. The main path towards the politicisation of Europe is dominated by Eurosceptic parties of the right. […] By challenging the pro-European consensus of mainstream parties and the political elite more generally, the populist radical right is seen as the most vigorous driving force of the politicisation of European integration. (Hutter et al., 2016: 24)

Hutter, Grande and Kriesi argue that in this context, politicisation is fuelled by multi-layered legitimacy conflicts, particularly by those concerning sovereignty, identity and solidarity.

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In cases in which European integration is politicised by the populist radical right, this process is driven by a specific type of issue being emphasised and a particular framing of European integration. More precisely, it focuses on constitutive issues and uses a cultural-identitarian framing. […] By emphasising constitutive European issues, the populist radical right puts the spotlight on fears of loss of national sovereignty, identity and financial resources. Furthermore, opposing European integration by reference to cultural-identitarian justifications is nurtured by the ‘nativist’ ideological predispositions of radical right parties. In this way, the populist radical rights has been successfully mobilising the potential losers from the further opening-up of national boundaries in western Europe since the 1990s. (Hutter et al., 2016: 24)

Contrary to Hix, Hutter, Grande and Kriesi emphasise the negative effects of politicisation on the integration process and identify a cleavage between pro-European and anti-European political forces, rather than a left-right divide: By putting Europe on the agenda and highlighting its negative consequences, the populist right exacerbates tensions within mainstream parties of the left and right, which can no longer so easily integrate European issues in their programmes. (Hutter et al., 2016: 25)

Finally, Hutter, Grande and Kriesi conclude that politicisation has added uncertainty to the system and is actually the wrong rather than the right sort of medicine for the EU: Our findings suggest that politicisation has led to a significant increase in political uncertainty for political elites. Because of the ubiquitous threat potential of politicisation, political decisions on European integration have become much less calculable than in the times of permissive consensus. (Hutter et al., 2016: 295)

However, the above-described understandings of politicisation embody two sides of the same medal and reflect the Janus-faced nature of politicising European policy-making. While in the past, the EU policy-making process was described as technocratic, governed by faceless bureaucrats, in recent years it has become increasingly difficult to build political consensus. When agreements are reached in Brussels, they are more contentious than ever; the European institutions seem fragmented; and

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the European political debate is becoming more and more conflictual. European integration polarises, and the political process has become remarkably politicised.2 The share of votes for parties opposed to EU integration has steadily increased in the past decade (Dijkstra et al., 2020): as many Europeans have grown disenchanted with the Union and distrustful of its institutions and policy-makers. At the same time, tensions between the national and the European level are increasing. Euroscepticism—in all its forms, from moderate to extremist—is no longer a fringe phenomenon (Manow & Döring, 2006: 10)3 but a political reality. It has become one of the most striking developments in modern European politics and will remain relevant in the near future. The politicisation of Europe is fuelled by multi-layered legitimacy conflicts, particularly by ones concerning sovereignty, identity and solidarity (Anders et al., 2018: 11). During the last decade the constitutional crisis, together with the financial and the migration crisis, brought these conflicts to the fore, thus damaging the image of the EU’s unity and labelling Europe as a cumbersome political system (Lübkemeier & Ondarza, 2017). These types of conflict are not entirely new and have always accompanied the integration process. They are intrinsic or natural to European integration because member states find themselves forced to accept shared sovereignty and common governance in order to best manage interdependence, for which they were originally not designed (Kauppi et al., 2016). For pro-European political actors, there has been little alternative to integration. Most of the heads of state and government that signed the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 were in the opposition when their respective countries had signed the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Nevertheless, European integration had a certain path-dependent nature, with little or no alternative. “Either we share our sovereignty, or we lose it”, said the former EU-Commission President Romano Prodi. Obviously, the pro-European

2 ‘Politicisation’ is a term often used to characterize the process whereby an issue is introduced into the political debate, transmitted from closed elite circles into the public arena or translated from apolitical into political terms. In this chapter, I consider the politicisation of EU policy issues more as a process of increased attention and conflict, addressing the ‘increasing contentiousness’ and ‘controversiality’ of European integration. 3 The working paper described Euroscepticism as a fringe phenomenon, by locating the vast majority of political parties in government and in opposition in the pro-EU space.

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narrative did not contemplate the possibility of an anti-European politicisation. Ruzza (2019) describes the present state of the EU facing the ‘populist turn’ as follows: One can characterize the state of the EU facing populism as one of many institutions still looking for a solution to the overarching problem of their loss of legitimacy. (Ruzza, 2019: 138)

However, in parallel to the above-described downward spiral of constructive politicisation, Europe is also witnessing a different, pro-European sort of politicisation, mainly through parliamentarisation. The history of European integration is also a history of gains in legitimacy, most notably in the gradual upgrading of the European Parliament from the Common Assembly to the citizens’ chamber and the significant expansion of its competences in EU legislation. The politicisation of the European Union has taken various forms including negative and positive criticism, as well as resistance against and support for the political system. The Eurobarometer survey of May 2018, for instance, showed record support for the EU.4 Conducted in April 2018 on 27,601 people in 28 member states, the survey revealed one year ahead of the 2019 European elections that on average 60% of citizens believed that the EU membership of their country was a good thing while over two-thirds of respondents were convinced that their country had benefited from being a member of the EU. This was the highest score since 1983. Similarly, the results of the Eurobarometer survey carried out in November 2019 on the euro area showed that 76% of respondents thought that the single currency was good for the EU. This was the highest level of support since the introduction of euro coins and banknotes in 2002. The President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani (EPP, Italy), commented on the results as follows, clearly identifying the polarising tendencies in view of the elections: The next European elections will undoubtedly be a battle, not just between the traditional parties of the Right, Left and Centre but between those

4 Eurobarometer Survey 89.2: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/ be-heard/eurobarometer/2018/eurobarometer-2018-democracy-on-the-move/report/ en-one-year-before-2019-eurobarometer-report.pdf.

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who believe in the benefits of continued cooperation and integration at EU level and those who would undo what has been achieved over the last 70 years.5

Moreover, the politicisation of the European Union is not in itself a consistent or coherent phenomenon. It is asymmetric, changing intensity from one policy area to another; it is “differentiated” (De Wilde et al., 2016) and “punctuated” (Grande et al., 2016: 280), being characterised by significant variations over time, across countries and political arenas. Furthermore, the level of politicisation can vary from marginal or slight to intense, while attitudes towards European integration may range along a spectrum of positions from strongly in favour to strongly opposed (Dijkstra et al., 2020: 3). Whenever politicisation takes place, arguments driven by politics and ideology count more than arguments based on expertise, on practical constraints or time pressure. Hence, politicisation is neither good nor bad per se. If it allows democratic preference aggregation and promotes electoral competition— particularly in view of European elections—it reinforces democratic legitimacy. The expression of political dissent vis-à vis ‘Brussels’, often depicted as excessively bureaucratised and defending the ‘there-is-noalternative’ approach, obviously has its benefits and its risks. Within the three-dimensional policy space of party competition in Europe, pathdependent/mainstream/mass parties (“Volksparteien”) are challenged to position themselves as a moderate centrist alternative to the economic left-right, the social Green/Alternative/Libertarianism (GAL), the Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist (TAN) and radical pro-/anti-European integration parties, thus moving the European debate from “constraining” and occasionally “destructive dissensus” (Hodson & Puetter, 2019) to a “constructive dissensus”. However, while politicisation is a purely domestic phenomenon and is not manifest in all member states to an equal extent, it may have a de-legitimising impact in the member state or member states concerned. On the other hand, if politicisation is international—i.e. between countries—it carries the danger of positioning member states against each other (De Wilde et al., 2016). This is particularly the case when populist sovereignist political movements form the government or are part of a government coalition. In such cases, a clear 5 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/eu-affairs/20180522STO0 4020/eurobarometer-survey-highest-support-for-the-eu-in-35-years.

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differentiation between the ‘national interest’ and the party’s position becomes blurred. Thus, the strong commitment of European leaders (Xafa, 2018) to Europe’s single currency, the Euro, has triggered opposition from new Euroscepticism in several member states, while the obvious divisions in managing the migration crisis have opened a deep divide among European Union members. As Lewis Dijkstra et al. (2020) put it: The EU is therefore identified - together with migrants - as the main opponent. In party programme after party programme, electoral manifesto after electoral manifesto, the EU is depicted as a threat to national identity, to democracy and even to economic stability and progress. (Dijkstra et al., 2020: 742)

In practice, politicisation of integration means that important questions regarding the future of the European project—from the institutional setup to the recruitment of political leadership, from issues with economic significance (such as economic policy, fiscal policy, social policy) to policies related to sovereignty, identity and solidarity issues (such as immigration policy, cultural diversity) are subject to public debate in parliaments, in the media, as well as in other arenas of politicisation. These important questions are debated by an increasing number of politicisation actors in a controversial and divisive manner that distinguishes them clearly from each other and exacerbates their disagreement, thus deepening the cleavages and reducing the potential for consensus. Finally, the polarisation between political actors may occur within the political arena of a given Member State, but also between political actors of different member states or even between political actors of a EU Member State or a group of states, on the one hand, and the EU institutions on the other. The current phenomenon of politicisation is further characterised by the fact that the controversial and divisive positioning of the political actors refers not only to specific policy proposals but also to the integration process as a whole. The bad news is that the old days of ‘permissive consensus’ are over; the politicisation of the EU affects supranational decision-making profoundly and it is here to stay. The good news is that politicisation has manifold manifestations that produce not only negative but also positive criticism, and not only resistance against but also support for the political system.

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As the European Union and its policies have become more salient and visible at member states level, the EU cannot bury its head in the sand but must tackle the issue of politicisation head on. The institutions must be willing to allow key politicisation agents, in particular political parties which remain essential to the process, to voice their concerns, suggestions, their resistance and their support—in short their political input to the debate. Overall, the key question is whether the European Union is able to absorb the stress test of politicisation. The European Parliament is in many ways an example of best practice in absorbing politicisation. It is the only directly elected EU institution allowing for democratic preference aggregation, and it promotes electoral competition. It had this vocation at its beginning, as the Furler Report already stated back in 1963, 16 years before the first direct elections: […] le parlement doit exprimer les différentes courants d’opinion et centres d’intérêt d’un peuple et trouver entre eux un équilibre garantissant le bienêtre général. […] En outre, le Parlement européen doit remplir les mêmes taches que tous les parlements: il doit exprimer les différents courants de pensée afin d’arriver à les concilier.6

In the treaty-architecture, the EP is a co-legislator responsible for the democratic scrutiny of all EU institutions and establishing the EU budget together with the Council. At the same time, it is the most important arena for the politicisation of the EU and European policies. This becomes particularly evident during “critical events” (Anders et al., 2018: 11) such as European elections, as described by Alexander Clarkson (2019): A decade or two ago, heads of state would have treated the European Parliament election as a mere sideshow. Now, the increasingly visible concentration of collective power in the hands of EU institutions has made them prizes worth expending serious political capital to win. Everyone is jockeying to decide the EU’s future. It’s not an easy battleground on which to gain the upper hand. Successive crises — eurozone, migration, Brexit — created the necessity for cross-border political debate. But their fallout has polarized societies and envenomed national party politics. The high stakes electoral game for the future of the EU has sharpened the ideological 6 Report on the competencies and powers of the European Parliament: http://aei.pitt. edu/13815/1/doc.31.PDF.

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battle lines between rival party networks within the European Parliament and between political forces on a national level. This has made European consensus hard to find on, well, anything. Everyone — pro-Europeans and Euroskeptics alike — is jockeying to dominate the political debate and decide the EU’s future. And the best tool to do that: flamboyant acts of showmanship that harness European issues to their own advantage. That’s how the new generation of EU leaders — including Macron and on the other side, Italy’s far-right leader Matteo Salvini — are playing the EU game. (Clarkson, 2019)7

The last European elections in May 2019 took place in the context of increasing politicisation of the EU: the voter turn-out increased to 51%; traditional parties lost substantial ground, while the share of votes for parties opposed to EU integration had steadily increased over the last decade reaching close to one-quarter of seats in 2019; many elected members were newcomers (61%), so that the Parliament was more fragmented and less predictable than ever.8 The next section of this chapter focuses on the political dynamics of a parliamentary committee in the European Parliament, namely the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) as an example of a highly politicised arena within the EP. These dynamics mainly develop along the lines of the parliamentary groups; they are largely influenced by them and occasionally threaten to obstruct the EU policy-making process, leading to a deadlock.

Politicisation of EU Gender Policies: The Political Dynamics in the European Parliament Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality Because the work of the European Parliament comprises two main stages—the committee stage and the plenary stage—parliamentary committees have a very important role: they draw up, amend and adopt

7 https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-theater-europes-greatest-sho wman/. 8 VoteWatch report “European Parliament: current and future dynamics”, January 2020; https://www.votewatch.eu/blog/european-parliament-current-and-future-dynamics/.

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legislative proposals and own-initiative reports; they consider Commission and Council proposals and, where necessary, compile reports to be presented to the plenary assembly (Warasin et al., 2019). The vast majority of EU legislative acts are endorsed by early agreements—i.e. at first or early second reading, when parliamentary committees de facto drive the process. The trend towards early agreements is as strong as ever, reaching a record high of 89% in the 8th term. During the current legislative term, the EP has had 20 standing committees (22 if one includes the 2 subcommittees) as well as a couple of special ad hoc committees. They cover virtually every EU policy area and are the following: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee (ENVI); Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee

on Foreign Affairs (AFET)9 ; on Development (DEVE); on International Trade (INTA); on Budget (BUDG); on Budgetary Control (CONT); on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON); on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL); on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety on on on on on on on on on on on on

Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE); Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO); Transport and Tourism (TRAN); Regional Development (REGI); Agriculture (AGRI); Fisheries (PECH); Culture and Education (CULT); Legal Affairs (JURI); Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE); Constitutional Affairs (AFCO); Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM); Petitions (PETI).

9 The Committee on Foreign Affairs has two sub-committees: the Committee on Human Rights (DROI) and the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE).

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Each committee is headed by a chairperson and three or four vicechairs, who are elected according to the agreements reached at the Committees’ constituent meetings, so that the positions allocated to each political group reflect its size. Moreover, every committee has its own secretariat and a bureau. However, they differ very much not only in size—the number of members per committee may vary between 25 and 71 members—but also in their workload and work performance. As indicated in the Committee Statistical Report for the 7th Legislature— 2009–2014 (Pittella et al., 2009), compared to the other committees, the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality is a low performer with respect to legislative procedures; but a high performer with respect to non-legislative resolutions, which consist of political declarations rather than of legal acts. Finally, it is an average performer when it comes to public hearings with civil society and experts (European Parliament, 2014). The FEMM committee was established as an ad hoc committee following the first direct elections of 1979, and in 1984—after the second European elections—a standing committee was created. The EP was the first parliament ever to establish a committee on women’s rights (Brunn, 2004). Even though today, with the Lisbon Treaty, equality between women and men is one of the fundamental principles of community law, at the beginning the EU was much more worried about unfair competition or distortion of competition law between member states and less about women’s rights, as the following two quotes stress: In the course of history an interesting evolution has taken place in European gender equality policies. This story started in 1957 when the European Economic Community was founded and the principle of equal pay for equal work for men and women was included in the Treaty of Rome to avoid unfair competition and distortions in the free European market. Soon the Treaty article would evolve into a broader demand for equal rights related to work and result in a series of binding directives. In the eighties and nineties gender equality would increasingly enter other policy domains by means of non-binding soft law and gender mainstreaming. More recently, the EU has turned towards an approach of multiple discrimination which involves other grounds of discrimination, such as race and sexuality. (Debusscher, 2015: 1)

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Annex V of the European Parliament Rules of Procedures describes in detail the powers and responsibilities of the standing committees. Regarding the FEMM committee one reads: Committee responsible for: 1. the definition, promotion and protection of women’s rights in the Union and related Union measures; 2. the promotion of women’s rights in third countries; 3. equal opportunities policy, including the promotion of equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at work; 4. the removal of all forms of violence and discrimination based on sex; 5. the implementation and further development of gender mainstreaming in all policy sectors; 6. the follow-up and implementation of international agreements and conventions involving the rights of women; 7. encouraging awareness of women’s rights.10 The FEMM committee has occasionally been branded a ‘non-legislative committee’ or an ‘opinion-giving committee’, implying that it works neither on legislation nor on files, which are actually its competence, but instead provides opinions to other committees, which are in charge of the files. However, this is not correct. Parliamentary committees like the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, or the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, for instance, issue many more opinions than the FEMM committee does (European Parliament, 2014). The central role of the FEMM committee during the pre-Amsterdam phase and afterwards is unquestionable. Since its creation from one legislative term to the next, the committee has been the most prominent and important EP-arena for the promotion of equality between women

10 European Parliament: Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, Brussels 2017. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+ RULES-EP+20170116+TOC+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.

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and men.11 During the 8th parliamentary term from 2014 to 2019 over 60 MEPs were members or substitute members of the FEMM committee. However, not only from a global perspective but also from a European one as well, progress in achieving equality between women and men has been slow. This is also emphasised by the Gender Equality Index established by the European Gender Institute, which indicates that the average EU score is only 54 out of 100 (Barbieri et al., 2017). In the EU, women still earn on average more than 16% less than men12 ; while the gender pay gap in pensions is a high 38%.13 And when it comes to a forecast on gender equality under the current rate of progress, the European Commission concludes: Under current rates of progress, it will take almost 30 years to reach the EU’s target of 75% of women in employment, 70 years to make equal pay a reality and 20 years to achieve parity in national parliaments (at least 40% of each gender).14

To quote the report on the Gender Equality Index, the EU is only halfway towards reaching equality between women and men. At this slow rate of progress, it would still take around 40 years to even get close to gender balance in boardrooms (at least 40% of both sexes).15

But gender equality is not only an end in itself; it is also a means to an end. It is of vital strategic importance to the EU to increase labour-force participation, and raising the employment rate of women is crucial for meeting the Europe 2020 headline target of 75% of the population aged 20–64 being employed by 2020.16

11 EP Broschüre: Frauen im Europäischen Parlament, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ germany/resource/static/files/service/frauen-im-europaeischen-parlament-2017.pdf. 12 EC press release: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/8718272/307032018-BP-EN.pdf/fb402341-e7fd-42b8-a7cc-4e33587d79aa. 13 EC press release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-489_en.htm. 14 EC press release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-423_en.htm. 15 EC press release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1205_en.htm. 16 European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/eco nomic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-cor rection/european-semester/framework/europe-2020-strategy_en.

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In order to meet this target, during the present legislative term ‘Europe’ obviously needs to develop coherent policy initiatives based on a clearly articulated strategy. Since the beginning of the economic and financial crisis in 2008, high rates of unemployment in the EU countries, particularly among young people, have inevitably diminished citizens’ trust in European institutions. Furthermore, after every crisis, the image of the European Union has been damaged, and the EU has presented itself as a cumbersome political system. However, at the same time the European political system has developed from what was once an abstract idea into a supranational political actor, which not only reaches compromises and makes decisions, but also polarises. In the current political context of globalisation and new protectionisms, interdependence and the quest for independence, as well as demographic and climate change, Europe faces a financial crisis paralleled by a migration crisis. Hence any proposed legislative action from fiscal policies to migration policies becomes a potential cause of conflict, a crunch issue and an acid test for the EU’s resilience. Europe’s ability to cope with, adapt to, and quickly recover from financial and demographic shocks or challenges posed by international relations has been repeatedly called into question. The EU has entered a new phase characterised by issues of identity and values, social and political resistance, the potential risk of disintegration, the return of national stereotypes, the popularity deficit and the loss of trust— in short, by the politicisation of integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). In this framework, which is a poor match for an innovative policy on gender equality, the political dynamics within the FEMM committee are quite revealing and provide insightful findings. The level of politicisation in FEMM is intense, and the committee can rightly be considered the main arena for politicisation of the EU’s gender equality policy. Traditionally, the political groups are the principal actors in this arena, and most conflicts are fought between parliamentary groups. The independent organisation VoteWatch Europe17 regularly analyses the voting behaviour of members of the European Parliament. The overall results for the past five years (2015–2020) show rather high cohesion rates among the different political groups. However, it is important to stress that cohesion rates of political groups in plenary votes do not equal 17 VoteWatch.eu is an independent international NGO, based in London, which monitors the decision-making activities of the European Parliament and the Council. https:// www.votewatch.eu/blog/european-parliament-current-and-future-dynamics/.

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to the cohesion rates in the specialised committees. If one compares for instance the cohesion rates in all policy areas with the rates and voting behaviour in gender equality policies, the differences are striking. Indubitably remarkable is the implosion of cohesion rates within the EPP (up to minus 15%) and within ALDE (up to minus 8%). Moreover, there are significant changes from one parliamentary term to the next: analysis of all the votes which took place during the 7th parliamentary term between 2009 and 2014 show that three potential coalitions were possible in order to reach the absolute majority in the Chamber. 70% of the votes were characterised by a ‘grand coalition’ composed of the EPP and the S&D group—and sometimes including ALDE. Besides this first type, 15% of the votes were characterised by a ‘centre-right’ coalition of EVP, ALDE and ECR; and another 15% of the votes by a ‘centre-left’ coalition of S&D, ALDE, Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL. These findings confirm that from a holistic point of view with all policy areas included, the 7th term was largely dominated by the ‘grand coalition’; however, two alternative coalition-building options were successful. If one focuses on the votes in the FEMM committee between 2009 and 2014, one observes a rather different pattern with a clear left/right dimension: 90% of the votes were won by a coalition comprising S&D, ALDE, Greens-EFA and GUE-NGL. The relative influence of the different political groups within the FEMM committee, on the one hand, and within plenary sessions on the other, is remarkable. The different coalitions in the plenary and in FEMM, respectively, produced a variety of shortcomings during the 7th term. Occasionally, it also happened that reports which had initially been adopted at the committee stage were voted down at the plenary stage. This was for instance the case of the Estrela Report presented in 2013 or the Zuber Report in 2014. Die Unterstützung des Europäischen Parlaments für eine fortschrittliche Gleichstellungspolitik ist dabei keineswegs gesichert. So wurde der besagte Estrela-Bericht aus dem Jahr 2013, wenn auch sehr knapp, abgelehnt. Ebenso abgelehnt wurde der Zuber-Bericht über die Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern in der Europäischen Union aus dem Jahr 2014 […] (Pimminger, 2015: 6)

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During the 8th term, between 2014 and 2019, a similar trend can be observed, but with one significant difference: there are no longer coexisting possible majority constellations; instead, there is only one single coalition between the EPP and the S&D group, with the regular support of ALDE. Although the EP Rules of Procedure stipulate that the composition of the committees shall as far as possible reflect the composition of Parliament, this is not the case of the FEMM committee.18 Following the constitutive sitting in July 2014, a coalition of S&D, ALDE, GreensEFA and GUE-NGL commanded a majority of one vote over the other groups until shortly before the end of the first half of the term. This meant that while at plenary level no majority was possible other than a coalition between the EPP and the S&D group, the composition of the FEMM committee allowed for alternative coalition-building. This particular circumstance enabled the agents of politicisation in FEMM to cultivate a level of polarisation and conflict considerably higher than was the case for the plenary session. If one compares the cohesion rates of political groups in all policy areas with those specific to gender equality policies during the 8th term, conclusions similar to those for the 7th term can be reached. Again, the implosion of cohesion rates within the EPP group (minus 15%) and within ALDE (minus 6%) is striking; one also notes an increase in cohesion rates in the remaining centre-left groups. During the present 9th term (2019–2024) VoteWatch Analysis suggests that not only will the coalition between EPP, S&D and Renew Europe (former ALDE) continue to hold (it is currently the only coalition able to guarantee an absolute majority), but the Greens/EFA group will become increasingly part of majority building in the EP. This evidences a new shift of the overall balance of power in the Parliament towards the centre-left. Obviously, the data provided by VoteWatch should not be overestimated, and they may sometimes convey a slightly distorted picture. As Lorenzo Cicchi proved in his study, the data say little about the quality of the single vote. Indeed, in politically important vote sessions, the

18 Article 199 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+RULESEP+20170116+TOC+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.

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fragmentation of political groups may be much greater than the overall cohesion rates suggest. […] what is generally overlooked is that the high levels of party cohesion in the EP may be a ‘statistical artefact’, in the sense that a substantial number of divisive votes are drowned out by a large majority of votes where party groups are highly or almost completely cohesive. (Cicchi, 2017: 1)

However, the cohesion rates provide sufficient empirical evidence to assume that the European Parliament Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality as an arena of politicisation is much more polarised than the plenary arena. One of the many examples of the 8th term was the report compiled by Maria Noichl (S&D) in 2015. Like most FEMM reports, this was a nonlegislative report, and it was presented on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Beijing Platform for Action and on the Millennium Development Goals. In the same year, the Commission Strategy on Gender Equality expired. The aim of the draftsperson, Ms Noichl, was therefore to encourage the European Commission to draft an ambitious new strategy. It soon became evident that it was impossible to build a broad coalition on the matter that would enable the European Parliament to speak with one voice with the European Commission and the member states. Nevertheless, in June 2015 the resolution was adopted in plenary with 341 votes in favour, 281 against and 81 abstentions. Contrary to the usual practice, the draftsperson invited representatives of the political groups which had supported the resolution to participate in the subsequent press conference. Hence, Ms. Maria Noichl (EPP, Germany) held the press conference together with Ms Angelika Mlinar (ALDE, Austria), Ms. Malin Björk (GUE/NGL, Sweden) and Ms. Terry Reintke (Greens-EFA, Germany). During the press conference, the voting behaviour of the EPP group was criticised. In fact, 135 Members had voted against the resolution, while 53 had abstained. The vote proceeded against the dominant trend of a ‘grand coalition’ between EPP and S&D. The text could nevertheless be adopted, because for a non-legislative resolution only a simple majority (and not an absolute majority of at least 376 votes) is necessary. Furthermore, the votes in favour by some EPP members, as well as the numerous abstentions, also helped to pass the resolution. The joint press conference held by the ‘winners’ and the criticisms expressed against

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the ‘losers’ conveyed the impression of a vote highly polarised between FEMM-Members as agents of politicisation. The European Commission did not present a new gender equality strategy; an omission which was subsequent criticised by both the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Both institutions deplored the “downgrading” of the previous EC-Communication about the EU Gender Equality Strategy to a “strategic engagement” at the level of a staff working document. They unsuccessfully invited the Commission to adopt a new strategy, stressing that it should have the same status as the previous one, meaning that it should be officially adopted as a Communication.19 Thereafter, the new Von der Leyen Commission made a U-turn following the Parliament’s and Council’s concerns and drafted a new upgraded European Gender Strategy. Beyond the field of non-legislative files, also some legislative dossiers have encountered deadlocks. The most prominent example has been the amendment of the maternity leave directive in 2008.20 Although the European Parliament had concluded its first reading in 2010, the file did not receive enough support in the Council of Ministers. Because of the obvious lack of progress, the Commission decided in 2015 to withdraw its proposal.21 The same fate may await the Proposal for a Directive on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures.22 On this file, too, the EP has already concluded its first reading procedure, but an agreement in the

19 EP resolution on the Equality between Women and Men, 14 March 2017:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type = TA&reference = P8-TA-2017-0073&language = EN&ring = A8-2017-0046; Schlussfolgerungen des Rates zur Gleichstellung der Geschlechter vom 16. Juni 2016: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/06/16/epsco-conclu sions-gender-equality/. Outcome of the EPSCO council meeting 7 March 2016: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6781-2016-INIT/en/pdf. 20 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC). 21 Press release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5287_en.htm. 22 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52012PC0614.

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Council of Ministers still seems far away. A withdrawal by the EC because of the deadlock cannot be excluded. The directives were presented in 2008 during the 6th term and in 2012 during the 7th term. On both, the EP concluded its first reading during the 7th term: the first reading on the amended maternity leave directive under Edite Estrela (FEMM, S&D, Portugal) in 2010; and the directive on Women on Boards under co-rapporteurship by Evelyn Regner (JURI, S&D, Austria) and Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (FEMM, EPP, Greece) in 2013. In the European elections of 2014, neither Estrela nor Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou were re-elected. The EP therefore nominated new draftspersons in order to follow the files. Maria Arena (S&D, Belgium) and Iratxe García Pérez (S&D, Spain) on behalf of the FEMM committee, launched a rescue attempt and on 20 May 2015 submitted to the plenary a resolution on maternity leave calling on all institutions to conclude the file in a cooperative spirit. As happened during the vote on the Estrela Resolution in 2010, more than 60% voted in favour. However, the changing voting behaviour of the EPP group is evident: The Estrela Resolution was adopted in plenary with 390 votes in favour, 192 against and 59 abstentions.23 Out of 641 voting members, 255 were members of the EPP group. More than half of them (146) had voted for the resolution submitted by the S&D members. Only 25—less than 10%—had abstained. The motion for resolution submitted in 2015 was adopted with 419 votes in favour, 97 against, and 161 abstentions.24 Out of the 193 EPP members, only 30 voted in favour, 35 against and more than half of them (128) abstained. Whereas in 2010 more than half of the EPP members had voted in favour of the legislative resolution on maternity leave, in 2015 more than half of them abstained from voting on a non-legislative resolution. The deadlock in the Council of Ministers, as well the changing intergroup coalitions in the EP, could be used by the European Commission as arguments for withdrawing the proposal, because legislative files require

23 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+ PV+20101020+RES-RCV+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN; S. 174 ff. 24 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+ PV+20150520+RES-RCV+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN; S. 33 ff.

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absolute majorities during the second reading procedure. After the European elections in 2014, the possibility of achieving the required absolute majority during a second reading was less than obvious. Besides the typical manifestations of a more polarised debate, the EP Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality has also witnessed the ‘populist turn’ characterised by attempts at ‘destructive dissensus’. This has been for instance the case of recommendations by Committee coordinators which have been contested at committee level. As stated in the EP Rule of Procedures (rule 214, version February 2020), the political groups in the Parliament designate one of their members in each committee to be a coordinator. These coordinators meet on a regular basis to prepare decisions to be taken by the committee, in particular decisions on procedure and on the appointment of rapporteurs. The committee may delegate the power to take certain decisions to the coordinators, with the exception of decisions concerning the adoption of reports, motions for resolutions, opinions or amendments. Ideally, coordinators should decide by consensus. However, if consensus cannot be attained, the coordinators may only act by a majority that clearly represents a large majority of the committee and reflects the respective strengths of the various political groups. The Chair announces in committee all decisions and recommendations of the coordinators, which shall be deemed to have been adopted if they have not been contested. Although several decisions and recommendations have been adopted by the FEMM Coordinators representing a large majority of the committee, they have been subsequently contested when announced in committee. One of the several examples is the procedural vote on adoption of the Coordinators’ recommendation on the allocation of the Opinion on the “Determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law”. The original recommendation was confirmed in the FEMM meeting of 25 May 2020 by 26 votes in favour, 7 votes against and 1 abstention. Another example is the procedural vote on adoption of the Coordinators’ recommendation of 25 June 2020 on the FEMM opinion on the DROI report on “Human rights protection and the EU external migration policy”. The original recommendation was confirmed in the FEMM meeting on 13–16 July by the vote in committee, by 27 votes in favour, with 7 votes against and 0 abstentions. The contestation of the recommendation of the coordinators and the demand for a vote on it made the dissensus much more visible: while coordinators’ meetings are held behind closed doors, committee meetings are

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public and web streamed. Although the outcome of the recommendation could not be changed, the disagreement with the policy approach of a large majority of the political spectrum became more evident. Likewise, the isolation of the contesting group(s) was more apparent and clear. After the European Parliament elections of May 2019 and the presentation of the Von der Leyen team in September 2019, gender mainstreaming received unprecedented support from all Commissionersdesignate. Indeed, the designates to become EU-Commissioners had to undergo a process of scrutiny and evaluation before parliamentary committees. The first step in this process was the replies of Commissioners-designate to a written questionnaire containing two common questions on their general competence and impartiality as well as cooperation with and accountability to the Parliament. A further set of questions addressed specific policy matters linked to their portfolio. The written part was followed by oral hearings of all the candidates. The entire process was finalised with the vote of the Parliament in plenary in November 2019. For the first time ever, one of the written questions put to the Commissioners-designate referred to gender mainstreaming and ran as follows: “How will you implement gender mainstreaming and integrate a gender perspective into all policy areas of your portfolio?” All designates were supportive of the question and some of them outlined ideas already reflected in the Commission Work Programme adopted in January 2020 and titled: “A Union that strives for more”. Regarding internal EU policies, the Commission Work Programme stated that equality is a core value of the European Union and is a driver of economic growth and social well-being. The Commission would present a Gender Equality Strategy to address the key challenges that women face today, including gender-based violence, economic independence and access to the labour market. Proposals on pay transparency would be put forward. The Commission would also take action to promote equality and better inclusion of Roma people. A dedicated Strategy would help ensure the equality of LGBTI people across the EU. Particular attention must always be given to protecting the most vulnerable. The Commission would put forward an EU Strategy for Victims’ Rights (European Commission, 2020). Regarding the external policies of the EU, the Work Programme announced an Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women Empowerment in External Relations. Indeed, EU action is needed. It has been

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already pointed out above that the Vilnius-based European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), which supports the EU institutions and the member states in promoting equality between women and men and combating sex discrimination, commented on the situation of gender equality in the EU in 2015 thus: “With an overall score of 52.9 out of 100, the EU remains only halfway towards equality. Progress needs to increase its pace if the EU is to fulfil its ambitions and meet the Europe 2020 targets.” (Barbieri et al., 2017: 3). Remarkably, the European public seems to be supportive of an enhanced EU gender equality policy: a survey in May 2017 for the Standard Eurobarometer 87 shows—like the one of the previous year—broad support for the Europe 2020 headline target of 75% of the population aged 20–64 to be in employment by 2020.25 Fact-based analysis as well as surveys suggests the need for action. Neither of them, in this case, reflects the political dynamics of the highly politicised arena of a parliamentary committee. The FEMM committee is not only the most prominent and important EP-arena for the promotion of equality between women and men; it is also the main arena for politicisation of the EU gender equality policy. Because political groups are the main actors this arena and because most conflicts are fought along the lines of the parliamentary groups. Intra-group cohesion and inter-group coalition remain key tactical considerations in a politically competitive environment. And occasionally, as outlined above, particularly polarised topics may lead to a deadlock. At first sight, this may somewhat unsatisfactory. However, in the new phase that the EU has entered, politicisation has become a driving force of European integration dynamics. The organisation of the European debate at the level of both the Union and of Member states as well as the clarification and the politicisation of European issues are essential to giving life to European democracy on a daily basis. […] The future of Europe as a political project depends on being able to mobilise European public opinion on political issues. European political parties should make an essential contribution. (Priestley, 2010: 30)

25 https://data.europa.eu/euodp/it/data/dataset/S2143_88_3_STD88_ENG; https://data.europa.eu/euodp/it/data/dataset/S2130_85_2_STD85_ENG.

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In this context, the European Parliament has a competitive advantage over the other EU institutions, because it is used to functioning as an arena of politicisation. More and more policy areas are affected by the increasing politicisation, from fiscal policy to migration, from defence to international relations. Regarding gender equality policy, if and how rapidly Europe can complete the remaining half of the route towards equality will depend on the elected agents in the EP arena of politicisation.

References Anders, L. H., Scheller, H., & Tuntschew, T. (Eds.). (2018). Parteien und die Politisierung der Europäischen Union. Springer VS. Barbieri, D., Franklin, P., & Janeckova, H. (2017). Gender equality index 2017: Measuring gender equality in the European Union 2005–2015. European Institute for Gender Equality. Brunn, G. (2004). Die Europäische Einigung von 1945 bis heute.[Nachdr.]. Reclam (Reclams Universal-Bibliothek). Cicchi, L. (2017). The European Parliament’s political groups: between high cohesion and recurrent breakdowns. Research Notes on Parliamentary Democracy 3/2017. http://www.pademia.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ResearchNote_3_2017.pdf. Retrieved 2019–9-2. Clarkson, A. (2019, March 6). Europe’s greatest showman—What Emmanuel Macron’s open letter says about the future of European politics. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-theater-europes-greatestshowman/. Retrieved 2019-11-15. Debusscher, P. (2015). Gender equality policies in the European Union: Economic integration and feminist transnational advocacy. International Journal of Gender Studies, 4(8), 1–19. De Wilde, P., Leupold, A., & Schmidtke, H. (2016). Introduction: The differentiated politicisation of European governance. West European Politics, 39(1), 3–22. Dijkstra, L., Poelman, H., & Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2020). The geography of EU discontent. Regional Studies, 54(6), 737–753. European Commission, C. O. M. (2020). Commission Work Programme 2020, An union that strives for more. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/ cwp-2020_en.pdf. Retrieved 2019-10-5. European Parliament. (2014). StaR—Committee Statistical Report 7th Legislature 2009–2014. Follesdal, A., & Hix, S. (2006). Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and Moravcsik. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(3), 533–562.

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Grande, E., Kriesi, H., & Hutter, S. (Eds.). (2016). Politicising Europe: Integration and mass politics. Cambridge University Press. Hix, S. (2006). Why the EU needs (left-right) politics? Policy reform and accountability are impossible without it. Politics: The right or the wrong sort of medicine for the EU. Notre Europe Policy Paper Nr., 19, 1–28. Hix, S., & Bjorn, H. (2011) The political system of the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan. Hodson, D., & Puetter, U. (2019). The European Union in disequilibrium: New intergovernmentalism, postfunctionalism and integration theory in the post-Maastricht period. Journal of European Public Policy, 26(8), 1153–1171. Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: From permissive consensus to constraining. British Journal of Political Science, 39(1), 1–23. Kanter, J. (2019, April 22). The European press corps cannot cover the EU. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/04/eur opean-press-corps-eu-fails/587083/. Retrieved 2019-10-26. Kauppi, N., Palonen, K., & Wiesner, C. (2016). The politification and politicisation of the EU. Redescriptions: Political Thought, Conceptual History and Feminist Theory, 19, 72–90. Lübkemeier, E., & Ondarza, N. V. (2017, March 15). Im Schatten der Poly-Krise: Leitlinien für eine Erneuerung der EU nach dem Jubiläums-Gipfel in Rom. SWP Aktuell. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/akt uell/2017A15_lbk_orz.pdf. Retrieved 2019-2-10. Magnette, P., & Papadopoulos, Y. (2008). On the politicization of the European consociation: A middle way between Hix and Bartolini. European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) No. C-08-01. http://www.connex-network.org/ eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-08-01.pdf. Retrieved 2019-10-1. Manow, P., & Döring, H. (2006). Divided government European style? Electoral and mechanical causes of European Parliament and Council divisions. MPIfG Discussion Paper 06/8. http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp068.pdf. Retrieved 2019-5-15. Pimminger, I. (2015). Sag beim Abschied leise Servus. Aktuelle Entwicklungen in der EU-Gleichstellungspolitik. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Pittella, G., Vidal-Quadras, A., & Papastamkos, G. (2009). Activity report on Codecision and Conciliation, 14 July 2009–30 June 2014 (7th parliamentary term). European Parliament, 2014. Priestley, J. (2010, October). European Political parties: The missing link. Notre Europe Policy Paper Nr. 41. Ruzza, C. (2019). Populism, EU institutions and civil society. In Highs and lows of European integration (pp. 121–142). Springer.

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Warasin, M., Kantola, J., Agustín, L. S. R., & Coughlan, C. (2019). Politicisation of gender equality in the European Parliament: Cohesion and Inter-Group Coalitions in plenary and committees. In Gendering the European Parliament: Structures, Policies, and Practices (pp. 141–158). Rowman & Littlefield International. Xafa, M. (2018, November). Euro-area Governance reform: The unfinished agenda. CIGI Papers No. 203.

The European Parliament’s Treatment of Religion in Times of Populism Alberta Giorgi

Introduction---Religion and Populism This chapter explores whether and how the populist challenge has affected discussions on religion in the European Parliament. More specifically, it documents whether the increasing presence of populist actors in the European Parliament has resulted in increasing attention being paid to religious matters or in changes in the frames related to religions. Moreover, in light of the increasing preoccupation of the European Union with the rise of populism, it analyses whether the debates on populism include concerns about the role of religion in the populist discourse. In the remaining part of this section, I provide a brief overview of the current research on religion and populism, while in the next sections I will introduce the study, its methodology, and the results, which will be discussed in the last section. Systematic comparative research on the complex entanglements between religion and populism is still developing (Norocel & Giorgi, forthcoming): to date, apart from stand-alone essays (e.g. Brubaker, 2017; Camus, 2013; Minkenberg, 2018; Zúquete, 2017), only the

A. Giorgi (B) University of Bergamo, Bergamo, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 C. Ruzza et al. (eds.), The Impact of Populism on European Institutions and Civil Society, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73411-4_6

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edited contributions of Marzouki et al. (2016) and DeHanas and Shterin (2018a) have focused specifically on this topic from a comparative perspective (see also Fitzi et al., 2019). Research on religion and populism has focused on a variety of aspects. Recent studies have explored the sociocultural characteristics of the electoral support for populist parties, finding that religious voters are less likely to support radical-right populist parties (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009; Minkenberg, 2018; Molle, 2018). However, the results change if separate consideration is made of religious voters who do not regularly attend religious services—and who instead express a clear preference for radical-right populist parties (Immerzeel et al., 2013). A limited number of studies have analysed whether religious institutions support populist parties, ideas and movements (Smith & Woodhead, 2018) and whether religious actors adopt populist discourses and stances (Tranfic, 2019). Many inquiries have focused instead on populist actors, exploring how populist leaders mobilize religion in their political discourse (e.g. Schwörer & Fernández-García, 2020) and, more broadly, how populist parties make reference to religion (for a comparative overview see Minkenberg, 2018). Mainly religion plays a role in relation to the Manichean separation between ‘us’, the people and a series of ‘others’ which is one of the distinctive features of populism (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015; Ruzza & Fella, 2011; see also Wodak, 2015). According to Zúquete, two main streams of analysis, which in reality intersect, can be identified in this regard: analysis of the sacralization of politics, and analysis of the political use of religion (Zúquete, 2017). In the former case, scholars focus on the similarities between the political and the religious discourse, and point out, for example, the use of religious arguments, the sacralization of ‘the people’, or the ‘politics of salvation’ (de la Torre, 2015). According to DeHanas and Shterin (2018b), populism has a quasi-religious connotation, because in its advocacy on behalf of ‘the people’, ‘us’ acquires a sacred character. Zúquete (2013) speaks instead of missionary politics against anti-political disenchantment, citing the frequent appeals to restore the true democracy and the ‘true citizens’ will’ made by many radical-right populist parties. In this stream of analysis, populist discourse has the same characteristics as religious discourse and has a ‘style’ fundamentally different from the more traditional forms of political discourse. Analyses of the political use of religion focus instead on how religion becomes, in the populist discourse, a marker of identity and difference

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which separates the people from the ‘others’ (Roy, 2016). Some scholars use the concept of ‘religious populism’ to mark a difference from the other types of populism (Halliday, 1982; Zúquete, 2017). This use of religion has developed since the 1990s (Marzouki & McDonnell, 2016) and particularly in the past fifteen years (Brubaker, 2017). Populism conceives society as a homogeneous community, and it is a profoundly majoritarian discourse (Mudde, 2004): thus religion can be mobilized, first of all, as a dispositive of othering to mark the out-group (Wagenvoorde, 2019). In fact, populism is often connected to nationalism (Brubaker, 2017; Fokas, 2016; Minkenberg, 2018; Mudde, 2004). An example of religion being used to identify ‘the others’ is the discourse of populist leaders in the Netherlands: Pim Fortuyn and, later, Geert Wilders repeatedly warned against the rise of Islam, which allegedly threatened Dutch liberal values (Van Kessel, 2016). This ‘religiosization’ of ‘the other’ is most common in central or Northern Europe, and it is often coupled with the defence of women’s and LGBT + persons’ rights, and even feminism, allegedly endangered by multiculturalism—scholars speak about ‘femonationalism’ or ‘homonationalism’ to indicate the invocation of women’s or LGBT+ persons’ rights to stigmatize Muslim men (Arfini et al., 2019; Farris, 2017; Spierings, 2020). In other cases, the religious ‘other’ is opposed to the secular ‘us’—as in the case of the French Front National, whose leader Marine Le Pen claims that France must be defended against the threat of Islamization and radicalization (Roy, 2016). Liberal values or secularism characterize the nation that has to be protected from the religious ‘other’ with a form of cultural racism (Wodak, 2015). Islam is depicted as having values radically different from and incompatible with secularism and democracy, which are interpreted instead as markers of the Western world. The main populist narrative about Islam is that it is a threat to social cohesion, identity, and, in some cases, a physical threat— when reference is made to terrorism, which is entangled with Islam in some right-wing politicians’ discourses (Forlenza, 2019). In many cases, however, religion characterizes both the ‘others’ and ‘us’, not only marking the cultural outsiders but also identifying what is shared within a community. From this perspective, the role of different religions in the populist discourse depends on what is the religion, or religious heritage, that the majority share: that religion can furnish symbols and resources that can be mobilized in political discourse to identify ‘the people’.

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In secular Europe, the Christian religious tradition often takes the form of a vicarious religion practised by a minority but relevant to a majority (Davie, 2007). As Joan Scott (2018) and Roger Brubaker (2017) point out, the understanding of Islam often adopts the stance of old Orientalism whereby secularism can be articulated with Christianity: Islam, in fact, is conceived of as the other of the Western world, and this latter gains its identity precisely from comparison with the other, the Eastern world, depicted as a homogeneous and unified entity (Forlenza, 2019; Scott, 2018; Wagenvoorde, 2019). Hence, as Brubaker explains, Christianity is often “embraced not as a religion but as a civilizational identity understood in antithetical opposition to Islam” (Brubaker, 2017: 4). The ‘Christianity’ that is relevant to the populist discourse is not a doctrine, often it is not even a religion: rather, it is the shared tradition, the cultural heritage that characterizes the territory (Giorgi, 2019a, 2020).1 Specific religious traditions within Christianity—such as Catholicism, or Lutheranism—are rarely, if ever, mentioned by populist leaders, and religious hierarchies and the clergy are often the object of criticism (Marzouki et al., 2016).2 In other words, religion is a matter of b elonging, not a matter of believing (Roy, 2016): whence derives the importance of visible symbols, such as the crucifix, or the hijab, and the defence of space against the visibility of the ‘others’, as in the banning of minarets and burqas, which “would not fit” in Europe (see, e.g., Betz, 2013; Göle, 2011). The complex story of the display of the crucifix in Italian classrooms, which was debated twice at the European Court of Human Rights (Annicchino, 2010), is another case in point. In the discourse of the supporters, which

1 As Forlenza (2019) wrote, Christianity is also a common heritage—not just a religion.

Here, my argument is that it is specifically this aspect of religion, among the many meanings that religion and religiosity may have, that is important in mainstream right-wing populist discourse. 2 This intersects with the general decline in the role of religious authority as one of the results of the secularization process (see, e.g., Chaves, 1994) and the increasing conception of religion as a ‘choice’ (Taylor, 2007). In addition to personalized forms of religion, atheism or agnosticism, and traditional religious practices, religiosity in postsecular societies also assumes the form of disputing religious authority on theology and practice: this is the case, for example, of marginalized groups that demand institutional recognition and inclusion, such as Christian LGBT+ people (Giorgi, 2019b), or feminist theology, which re-interpret the sacred texts.

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included the radical-right populist Lega Nord, the crucifix was not a religious symbol: rather, it represented Italian culture, tradition and society (Beaman, 2015). In the same vein, Matteo Salvini, the Lega Nord leader, frequently publicly shows or kisses the rosary,3 defends the display of nativity in schools and makes reference to the Virgin Mary or to elements of popular religiosity, such as Medjugorje: all these cultural and material symbols are markers of a shared Christian identity which visibly characterize the ‘heartland’ of Europe. On the other hand, in countries where Islam predominates, Christians become the ‘others’—this is the case, for example, of Erdogan’s Turkey (Yabanci & Taleski, 2017; Yilmaz, 2019). One of the first studies on religious populism focused on the Iranian revolution guided by Ayatollah Khomeini, who presented himself as the true interpreter of religion against the elite (Halliday, 1982). Studying the relationships between populism and other religious majorities—Hinduism and Buddhism, for example—would also be particularly interesting for a comparative analysis that yields better understanding of the interweaving between religion and populism (Zúquete, 2017; Norocel & Giorgi, forthcoming). From this brief overview, it is apparent that religion is important for European populism: religious minorities, and Islam in particular, may be discriminated against; non-Christian Europeans and internal outsiders may feel excluded by populist claims; Christian actors may be supportive of populist actors, discourses and policies, which in turn may increase political and social polarization. Considering that the European Union is increasingly and publicly concerned about populism (Ruzza, 2018), it is important to understand whether and how this concern includes the role of religion. Moreover, given the increase in the number of MEPs elected from populist parties, it is important to explore whether this presence has changed the ways in which religion is discussed at the European Parliament, or whether attention to religious matters has increased.

3 https://www.euronews.com/2019/08/20/salvini-kisses-rosary-after-conte-criticismover-religious-symbols.

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Religion in the European Parliament: Methodology Broadly speaking, religion has a role in the project for European integration and its implementation (Foret, 2015). The current literature on religion and the EU shows that religion is often the subject of debate in the European Parliament, in the absence of specific policies on religions mediated by other subjects (Foret, 2014). In addition to foreign policy, in which the EU pays specific attention to the protection and support of religious freedom (Foret, 2015), many internal policies intersect with religious matters: this is the case, for example, of migration, anti-discrimination, education and culture, and security policies (Carrera & Parkin, 2010). A research programme that investigated the role of religion at the EU level (among the MEPs and in EU institutions and decision-making processes) found that individual religiosity and religious networks did not play a significant role in the selection of MEPs, in the electoral campaign for the European elections in many countries, or in MEPs’ socialization and ordinary lives once at the EP. However, MEPs believed that religion had a role in the European Parliament’s decision-making process and that it was a significant issue when discussing European identity (Foret, 2014). The research stemmed from the valueloaded debates on bioethical and multicultural issues which redirected political attention to religion, and religion attention to politics (see also Ozzano & Giorgi, 2016). Over time, the situation has changed. First of all, in recent years the number of MEPs from populist parties and movements in the EP has increased. In addition, the counter-radicalization and security policies put in place after terrorist attacks have contributed to the development of new ways to address religion and topics related to religion. Research shows in fact that the EP has increasingly paid attention to religion and religionrelated issues, but institutional inertia has limited the impacts of these potentially transformative factors in terms of policies and initiatives: Ultimately, the treatment of religion by European institutions does not differ much from past policies that had to deal with faith matters. Religion is only minimally acknowledged as an object in itself and is hollowed out of its normative content to be, instead, mobilised as an instrumental resource, as a mere cultural component or even as an empty signifier to reassert ‘European values’ and public order. (Foret & Markoviti, 2020: 13)

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In other words, even though attention to religion increases, the institutional logic prevails, and the debates on religion are ultimately depoliticized (Foret & Markoviti, 2019). Against this background, my research reported in this chapter focused on debates at the European Parliament. Its purpose was to determine how MEPs frame religion in relation to populism, whether discussions involving religion have increased, and how the ways in which religion is framed have changed over the years in relation to the increasing number of MEPs from populist parties. In order to assess whether and how discussions of religion in the European Parliament have changed, and whether or not religion is considered a problematic issue with respect to populism, I performed a content and frame analysis of transcripts of the European Parliament plenaries collected in the timeframe 2004–2019 (3 terms). Documents in the plenaries comprised debates, explanations of vote and transcripts of Questions during question time (QT). I used the MAXQDA software to code the texts and organize the analysis. First, I selected all the transcripts which included the words ‘religion’ or ‘religiosity’ for a general assessment of the importance of the topic of religion. Generally speaking, apart from the visits of religious leaders, such as the Roman Catholic Pope or the Dalai Lama, religion was a topic of discussion insofar as it represented a problem. In some cases, religion was used metaphorically, as in: “There is simply the quasi-religion that so much effort is going into establishing. In any case, reductions in carbon dioxide emissions are really only possible in Europe”.4 Although my analysis did not focus on the sacralization of politics (Zúquete, 2017), I decided against excluding these references, for two reasons. Firstly, metaphorical usage was quite limited and hence had a limited influence on the data. Secondly, this usage falls into an understanding of religion as irrational faith and potentially problematic, without deviating from the analysis. The second step involved fine-tuning the analysis by focusing on the specific religion under discussion and the problematic issue at stake. Therefore, I coded for the name of religion, the topic of discussion, and the reasons why religion might be an issue (as a source or a victim of discrimination, for example). More specifically, I was interested in understanding the framework in which religion was considered: whether it was, for example, a matter of terrorism and security, or

4 Thursday, 10 April 2008—Brussels (PV 10/04/2008—4), p. 4.

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part of a broader discourse on human rights and discrimination. Third, among the pre-selected documents I searched for keywords connected to populism (‘populism’, ‘far right’, ‘extreme right’) and analysed the coded segments in order to determine whether the issue of religion was indeed connected to the populist challenge.

Results The importance of ‘religion’ as a matter of discussion, both directly or mediated by other topics, clearly declines over time, as shown in Fig. 1: between 2004 and 2019 mentions of religion, religiosity and religious issues in broad terms decreased. Contrary to what might be expected, this also applies to mentions of ‘Islam’5 : although, in general, the data remain quite stable (in particular between 2014 and 2019), there is no sign of increased attention. The relevance of ‘religion’ as a matter of discussion, both as religious matters or mediated by other topics, seems to remain stable over time, as shown in Fig. 1: between 2004 and 2019 the mentions of religion, Religion(s) over time Religion Christianity Islam Other 0

500

1000 2014-2019

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Fig. 1 Religion in debates at the European Parliament (Source Created by the author)

5 And related words, such as: ‘Islamic’, ‘Islamist’, ‘Muslims’….

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religiosity and religious issues in broad terms have not changed much. Contrary to what may be expected, this is also the case for mentions of ‘Islam’: although, in general, data slightly increased, there is no sign of an over-attention. Matters concerning ‘Christianity’, instead, show a peak of attention in 2009–2014, while in 2014–2019 the attention decreases again. ‘Other’ religions, a category that includes both traditional world religions, such as Buddhism, Hinduism, or Jewish religions, as well as more recent or local religions, remain quite invisible in the debate, even though, as many scholars underline, the increasing visibility of Islam also brought the public attention to other religions and religious minorities (Beckford, 2014). Of course, mere numbers do not tell the entire story: when considering the topics at stake, in fact, differences emerge. Between 2004 and 2014 religion was, mostly, a matter of discrimination beyond the European borders, while between 2014 and 2019, in line with Foret and Markoviti’s (2020) results, the attention shifted to the topic of radicalization. As shown by Figs. 2 and 3, in 2004–2009 religion was mostly discussed in relation to reports about episodes of violence and discrimination beyond the European borders. However, other topics too were relevant: the role of religion in the potential EU membership of Turkey, for example, and religious freedom in the European Union. In 2014–2019, however, as shown in Fig. 4, the attention shifted to radicalization: while the status of religion—and Christian minorities in

Fig. 2 Topics related to religion—2004–2009 (Source Created by the author)

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Fig. 3 Topics related to religion—2009–2014 (Source Created by the author)

Fig. 4 Topics related to religion—2014–2019 (Source Created by the author)

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particular—outside Europe remained a concern, the prevention of selfappointed ‘religiously-inspired’ terrorism moved to centre stage. The main topic with respect to religion, in general, relates to radicalization and violence, within and outside Europe. From 2014 onwards, in fact, Europe faced an escalation in the number and violence of terrorist attacks that have been linked to the ‘IS-effect’ (Nasser et al., 2016): the Charlie Hebdo attack in 2015 had a huge impact on the debate. In response, the European Commission developed its counter-terrorism approach. It issued two communications, in 2014 and 2016, on the prevention of radicalization which the Parliament debated. As to be expected, different religions are matters of concern in relation to different topics: therefore, the analysis could be fine-tuned by considering the topic, the issue at stake, and which religion was the matter of concern (associations of codes6 ). In 2004–2009, as said, the main concerns regarded what was occurring outside European borders: discrimination on the grounds of religion and beliefs, discrimination against Christian communities, Catholics, and other religious minorities, particularly in Muslim countries (Fig. 5). The following excerpt, in which a member of the PPE comments on this topic, is a case in point: Mr President, over the decades, European states have learned to show a minimum of respect for the culture and religion of millions of immigrants. Alarmingly, the opposite is true for most of the home countries of the same people. It has become common in the Middle East, Asia and Africa for people who profess Christian beliefs to face social, political and economic discrimination. In practically all Muslim countries people who decide to join a Christian church risk their lives. The traditional Christian population in all those countries shows a dramatic decrease. Even in an officially secular country like Turkey, Christians face intimidation, harassment and even murder. One can but agree with the proposal by a well-known commentator that Turkey will only be ready to join the EU when it is just as easy to build a Christian church in Turkey as it is to erect a Turkish mosque in Germany today. I call on the Commission and the Council to pay urgent attention to this aspect in dealing with governments that do not allow even a minimum of respect and protection for their indigenous Christian minorities. (‘One minute speeches on matters of political importance’, 9/07/2007, p. 10) 6 I include here only the first 15 combinations.

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Fig. 5 Word clouds: Islam (2004–2019) Christianity (2004–2019) (Source Created by the author)

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The possible accession of Turkey to the European Union as a member state also raised concerns: on the one hand, many MEPs pointed out discrimination in Turkey against religions (in general) and other minorities; on the other, the accession of a large country inhabited by a Muslim majority was discussed in terms of social cohesion and potential difficulties of coexistence with the European Christian majority (on the EU debate see, for example, Shakman Hurd, 2010). MEPs favourable to the accession of Turkey tried to counter these arguments by turning them into a valuable asset, as the following quotation, from a member of the PSE, clarifies: But above all, by opening up to a country that is secular but where the majority religion is Islam, the Union would make a major contribution to peace and mutual understanding between peoples in these times of increasing tension, aggravated mistrust and conflict between Muslim and Christian countries. This contribution, over and above its symbolic significance, is of major strategic importance. (‘Turkey’s progress towards accession’, 13/12/2004, p. 10)

Some of the debates mentioned the role of Christianity in the EU, as well as the government of religious diversity within the European borders (on this topic see, for example, Koenig, 2007). Many of the arguments echoed the debate of the early 2000s on the opportuneness of making reference to the Christian roots of Europe in the constitution of the EU (Ozzano & Giorgi, 2016). Hence, in the debate on forms of ‘Dialogue with churches and non-denominational organizations’ (5/09/2005), the positions ranged from a defence of secularism to a plea for acknowledging the role of Churches in Europe. An example of the former argument is provided by the following extract from a speech by an MEP belonging to the ALDE group: “Yes, freedom of religion is a fundamental right in the European Union, but separation of Church and State is one of the basic principles underpinning our modern society” (p. 4). At the other end of the spectrum, a member of the Polish national-conservative Christian democratic and right-wing populist party Law and Justice countered thus: “Marx once said that religion is the opium of the people. One hundred and fifty years have passed since then, and there is no longer any point to such idiotic statements. Churches of all denominations, including the Catholic Church, are a part of Europe” (p. 3).

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The debates also touched upon terrorism and religion-related violence, both within and outside Europe, with specific reference to Islam (Tables 1 and 2). In 2009–2014, instead, the main topic of discussion in terms of religion was religious freedom outside European borders with regard to all the different religions and regions involved, among them Nigeria, China and the North African region. In addition to discrimination on the grounds of religion and beliefs, the debate increasingly adopted the language of rights to frame the concerns (on this topic see Giorgi, 2018). A member of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, for example, stated: the number of cases of religious violence has multiplied recently throughout the world, causing concern and indignation. Banning the exercise of religious faith is a blatant infringement of fundamental rights and of international law, which stipulates that the right to faith is inalienable and self-evident. (Situation of Christians in the context of freedom of religion (debate), 19/01/2011, p. 11)

Table 1 Religion

Association of codes (2004–2009), in percentage Topic

Issue

R_general ReligiousFreedom_extraUE Religion_discrimination_racism R_Christians ReligiousFreedom_extraUE Religion_discrimination_racism R_Islam ReligiousFreedom_extraUE Religion_discrimination_racism R_Islam EU_Turkey Religion_problem_coexistence R_general EU_Turkey Religion_discrimination_racism R_other ReligiousFreedom_extraUE Religion_discrimination_racism R_general ReligiousFreedom_UE_equality Religion_discrimination_racism R_Christians RoleReligion_UE_sec Religion_identity_culture R_Catholic ReligiousFreedom_extraUE Religion_discrimination_racism R_general ReligiousFreedom_UE_equality Religion_right R_Islam ReligiousFreedom_UE_equality Religion_discrimination_racism R_Islam Terrorism_fundamentalism_violence Definition R_Christians EU_Turkey Religion_discrimination_racism R_Islam EU_Turkey Religion_discrimination_racism R_Islam ReligiousFreedom_extraUE Religion_problem_coexistence

Source Created by the author

2004–2009 19 14 11 7 6 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 100

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S TREATMENT OF RELIGION …

Table 2

133

Association of codes (2009–2014), in percentage

Religion

Topic

Issue

R_Christians R_general R_Islam R_Christians R_general R_Christians R_Islam R_general R_Christians R_Islam R_general R_other R_Christians R_Islam R_Christians

ReligiousFreedom_extraUE ReligiousFreedom_extraUE ReligiousFreedom_extraUE ReligiousFreedom_extraUE ReligiousFreedom_extraUE ReligiousFreedom_extraUE ReligiousFreedom_extraUE ReligiousFreedom_extraUE ReligiousFreedom_extraUE ReligiousFreedom_extraUE ReligiousFreedom_extraUE ReligiousFreedom_extraUE Discrimination_Christians_EU ReligiousFreedom_extraUE RoleReligion_UE_sec

Religion_discrimination_racism Religion_discrimination_racism Religion_discrimination_racism Religion_right Religion_right Religion_identity_culture Religion_problem_coexistence Religion_identity_culture Religion_problem_coexistence Religion_identity_culture Religion_problem_coexistence Religion_discrimination_racism Religion_identity_culture Religion_right Religion_identity_culture

2009–2014 22 17 14 6 6 6 5 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 100

Source Created by the author

The discussions touched upon the possible tensions related to the pacific coexistence of different religions, paying attention to the role played by religious identity, and Christian and Muslim identities in particular. In reporting the violence of Boko Haram in Nigeria,7 for example, the President-in-Office for the council, speaking on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, commented that: “the Boko Haram crisis has also brought the best out of many Nigerians such as Muslims and Christians protecting each other” (p. 2). Other MEPs mentioned instead the “religious conflicts between the Islamic North and the Christian South” (p. 3), and “the persecutions and killings of Christians” (p. 4). Also, in 2009–2014 MEPs started to raise their voices about what some of them defined as discrimination against Christians in (and by) the European Union: the protection of women’s and LGBT+ rights, and concerns about potential discriminations against Muslim immigrants, led some MEPs to denounce unfair treatment suffered by the Christian majority and to urge acknowledgement of the role of Christianity in Europe. 7 Situation in Nigeria, Debate; 14/03/2012.

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For example, one MEP without group membership at the European Parliament, elected in the Democratic Unionist Party (Northern Ireland), during a debate on the ‘Situation of Christians in the context of freedom of religion’ (19/01/2011) protested that: This year, we celebrate the 400th anniversary of the King James Bible, yet today, to express beliefs founded upon the contents of the Bible is often deemed unlawful. We face a situation where Christians are being excluded from certain professions because of their faith and hauled before courts because of their faith. In the United Kingdom, equality laws are being used more as a sword than a shield, to punish expression of Christian faith. This marginalisation of Christianity was exemplified recently by the Commission in the publication of their diary: Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, Jewish and Chinese festivals were marked – yet there was nothing about Christian celebrations. I have no doubt that this was no accident, no oversight and I find it deeply regrettable. (p. 7)

This excerpt illustrates how the self-appointed defenders of Christianity had started to adopt the language of rights to frame majority religion as an endangered minority, using expressions such as ‘Christianophobia’ and ‘Christianophobic acts’. During the same debate, another MEP, from the PPE, commented that. The European Union fails to provide sufficient defence for Christians because the Union is terrorised by political correctness, which suppresses freedom of religion. The ideology of laicism ties our hands and suppresses freedom of religion. The Union finds it hard to protect and defend Christians worldwide because it does not respect Christian philosophy itself. Some Members also disagreed with religious leaders making speeches in our Parliament. (p. 16)

The main argument here is based on comparison between Christianity and the other religions. While in the previous term Christianity was defended as intrinsic to European identity, in 2009–2014 the main framing strategy focused on reclaiming for Christianity the same rights as granted to other religions, downplaying the power role associated with the status of majority religion in Europe. In 2014–2019 term, however, there was another twist (Table 3). In recent years, the topics of discussion have changed: even though religious discrimination and persecutions in the world (Asia and Middle

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S TREATMENT OF RELIGION …

Table 3 Religion

135

Association of codes (2014–2019), in percentage Topic

Issue

R_Christians ReligiousFreedom_extraUE Religion_discrimination_racism R_Islam ReligiousFreedom_extraUE Religion_discrimination_racism R_general ReligiousFreedom_extraUE Religion_discrimination_racism R_Islam Terrorism_fundamentalism_violence Definition R_Islam ReligiousFreedom_extraUE Definition R_Islam ReligiousFreedom_extraUE Religion_problem_coexistence R_Islam ReligiousFreedom_UE_equality Religion_discrimination_racism R_Islam Multiculturalism_incompatibility Religion_intolerant_threat R_Islam Terrorism_fundamentalism_violence Religion_problem_coexistence R_Islam Terrorism_fundamentalism_violence Religion_intolerant_threat R_general ReligiousFreedom_extraUE Religion_problem_coexistence R_Christians ReligiousFreedom_extraUE Religion_problem_coexistence R_Islam Terrorism_fundamentalism_violence Religion_discrimination_racism R_Islam Multiculturalism_incompatibility Religion_problem_coexistence R_Christians ReligiousFreedom_extraUE Religion_right

2014–2019 21 17 13 9 7 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 100

Source Created by the author

East in particular) remain a central topic, many discussions now consider what happens within the European borders and touch upon terrorism and violence, as well as radicalization, in relation to Islam. MEPs try to disentangle the relationship between Islam and self-appointed ‘religiouslyinspired’ terrorism. Some MEPs reason that the European Union is fighting extremism, not Islam, while others instead affirm the intrinsically intolerant nature of Islam and the incompatibility between Islam and democracy. The following excerpt, from the speech made by a member of the UK independent party during a debate on ‘Recent terrorist attacks’ (8/07/2015), illustrates how for some MEPs the issue is related to the degree of fundamentalism of Muslims. The problem is that the extremists and the fundamentalists actually choose the bits that they like in order to satisfy their bloodlust and earn themselves 72 virgins in paradise, although nobody has actually come back to confirm that they get them. Western liberal democracies must make it plain that extremist, fundamentalist Islam has no place in western society. We all come into contact with moderate, peace-loving Muslims every day. They are not the problem. (p. 9)

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Other MEPs instead warned against Islam itself, as shown by the following quotation from a speech made by a member of the Europe of Nations and Freedom group during the debate following the Charlie Hebdo attack (27/11/2019): The problem is not IS. The problem is Islam. Islam cannot be reconciled with our Western values and I ask this Parliament the question of conscience: do you want to guarantee the primacy of our Western values in the EU? Then you must fight Islam. We must stop foreign funding for mosques, expel hate-imams and close national borders to Islamic countries. (p. 17)

This position voices the populist reference to Islam as the ‘other’ of Europe discussed in the first section. In this specific case, the othering is spatially constructed: Islam is not compatible because it is not “Western”. The issue of religious coexistence has gained increasing prominence in debates concerning religion: religion can be either the ground of or the reason for discrimination, and different religions can have difficult relationships with one another. However, the Parliament also records success stories, such as the one described by a MEP from the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats: There is a crucial need for interfaith dialogue and cooperation. I have seen the success of this work in my own hometown, Manchester, where Jewish and Muslim communities are working together to combat hatred and discrimination. Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia cannot be seen as a Jewish-Muslim problem, but rather a European issue jeopardising the democratic fundamental rights and the values of all EU citizens. Embracing diversity is the only way forward if we are to find hope. (Rise of antisemitism, islamophobia and violent extremism in the EU, 11/03/2015, p. 10)

Indeed, the words used to discuss Christianity and Islam focus on different aspects. Christianity (on the left) is connected to ‘us’ (we), Europe and religious rights. The discussions deal with communities that are discriminated against, freedom, religious institutions (such as the Church) and values. They also involve the institutional dimension (parliament, government), calling for the respect? of minorities against persecution. Besides

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Europe, some other geographical locations—Turkey and Iraq—are recurrent. Considering the 3 periods, other countries appear to be significant, such as India (2004–2009), Pakistan, Egypt and Nigeria (2014–2019), and Syria (2014–2019). Discussions involving Islam, instead, are clearly organized by a binary understanding of Islam as something different from ‘us’—‘we’, at the centre of the cloud, is the word most frequent used when dealing with topics related to Islam; also, the ‘we’ at the centre shows the perspective from which the discussion is organized. This resonates with what was discussed in the introduction: Christianity comes to represent European (Western) identity, which is defined as different from the ‘other’ (Brubaker, 2017; Scott, 2018). Words related to Islam are also ‘terrorism’, ‘security’ and ‘violence’. Broadly speaking, security has become an increasing concern at the EP and in broader society (Foret & Markoviti, 2019). Also, institutional matters of democracy and government are mentioned. Other relevant topics are community and society, and also dialogue and freedom. Women are also mentioned in discussions related to Islam in order to either support or undermine the narrative according to which Islam endangers women’s (and LBGTQ + ) rights. On discussing the EU strategy for equality between women and men in 2015 (27/11/2019), for example, a MEP from the Dutch populist Party of Freedom stated: In 40 pages of text there’s not a single word about Islam, that ideology with medieval views on the position of men and women. Because according to Islam, the testimony of a man is worth as much as that of two women and a man may marry more than one woman and a woman only one man, and in matters of inheritance the woman does not receive the same as a man in her position. This is an ideology that is increasingly gaining ground in the EU and a Gender Equality Commission that forgets to mention this in a report on gender equality is really not worth a look. (p. 7)

Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan are often mentioned—and in 2004–2009 also Iran attracted attention. In 2014–2019 the discussion included Daesh and Isis, and the danger that they represent for the European Union. Rarely do the debates on religion explicitly deal with populism. In 2004–2009 one MEP spoke about the ‘theocratic populism of Syria’, while in 2009–2014 the intersections mainly concerned Islam. Apart from one mention of the ‘Buddhist populist mainstream’ in Myanmar,

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the topics mentioned involved ‘populists’ against ‘Islam’—such as in the case of the clash between the member of a populist party and Muslim worshippers in Bulgaria, or when an MEP listed among the ‘populist subjects’ the protests against minarets and Islam in Europe. In 2014– 2019, instead, ‘populism’ more clearly entered the MEPs’ vocabulary and the intersections increased and expanded their range, although their number remained limited. Four frames emerge. As in 2009–2014, so in 2014–2019 ‘populism’ was framed as inciting hatred against Islam through the posting of fake news and hate speech on digital platforms, for example, or through the overlap they make between terrorism and Islam. This is the othering strategy well known in the literature (e.g. Brubaker, 2017; Roy, 2016). A slightly different frame depicts populism as discriminatory against all religious minorities—not necessarily Islam. One representative of the European Conservative and reformist group, for example, linked populism with “so-called ‘discussion’ of the Holocaust, and verbal and physical violence against Jews in European cities” (Combating antisemitism, 31/05/2017, p. 3). From this perspective, the populist attack (or discrimination) against religious minorities is relocated into general defence of majority rule (see Urbinati, 2018). A third frame instead proposes the connection between populists and the discursive mobilization of Christianity in terms of national or European identity—which mostly emerges in the debates on Hungary. One example is the speech by an MEP from the French Green party commenting on populism and nationalism in Hungary: However, a modern state and an open society cannot be based on a religion. Otherwise, the atheists, Jews, Muslims and people of other persuasions would not feel comfortable in this country. That is precisely what many people in Hungary today find oppressive. The nationalist and chauvinist atmosphere makes them uncomfortable. (Recent political developments in Hungary, 18/01/2012, p. 29)

Nonetheless, this frame is also interpreted as praise for the courage of Hungary in defending Christianity, countering the allegation of ‘populism’. Commenting on the revised Constitution of Hungary, one MEP for example maintained: “As a Christian-Democrat, I am absolutely delighted that there is a reference to God and Christianity, because it is a fundamental part of our culture and our history and I think it is

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far better to have it included than excluded and creating a godless society” (Revised Hungarian constitution, 8/06/2011, p. 14). Yet another frame concerns the parallelism between ‘populism’ and ‘radical Islam’, both considered as extremist points of view. This is particularly interesting because it stems from the attempt to find a middle ground between populism and fanaticism, as illustrated by the following excerpt, in which a socialist MEP discusses the right to freedom of expression and respect for religious beliefs (15/02/2006): We want to send a clear signal today: we are determined to ignore new provocations, which cannot be used by extremists in Europe and in the Muslim world to inflame violence and intolerance and create new myths about each other. We have seen it so many times before from xenophobic and populist parties in Europe and from the extremist movements in the Muslim world. We say ‘no’ to those who claim it is ‘them against us’. (p. 5)

The parallelism is identified precisely in the Manichean opposition between ‘us’ and ‘them’, which can be found in fundamentalism as well.

Discussion: Different Impacts, Nuanced Debates By considering the multiple intersections of populism and religion, this study has sought to determine whether populism has in fact had an impact in discussions on religion at the European Parliament. The aim has not been to identify the populist arguments adduced to defend Christianity or warn against Islam. Rather, the purpose of the analysis has been to understand the topics and frames associated with religion and to assess whether there has been a change due to the increase of populist MEPs (and discussions on populism). As the analysis has shown, there has in fact been a change during the last term of the EP: the discussions concerning religions touch upon what occurs within the European borders, traditionally a topic of reluctance for the EP (Foret & Markoviti, 2019). Whereas until 2014 religion was something to be taken into account when discussing other countries and continents, since 2014 it has become something that matters to Europe as well. At first, MEPs discussed discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief in Europe, with some MEPs claiming for Christianity the same treatment as granted to other religions. From 2014 onwards,

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Islam came to prominence as a matter of debate in relation to terrorism and radicalization, and in relation to the identity of Europe. Religion is in fact a matter of belonging, as Roy (2016) put it: therefore, religion is discussed in relation to immigration and European identity. This may be partly related to the changes in the topics concerned—in particular, to the increasing importance of counter-radicalization policies (Foret & Markoviti, 2020). To some extent, however, it is also related to changes in the composition of MEPs. This can be seen, in particular, in the increasing attention paid to what some MEPs call ‘discrimination against Christians’ in Europe and by the European Union, and in the less evident and yet present increasing ‘genderization of racism’ (or femonationalism, Farris, 2017), whereby Islam is depicted as discriminatory against women (and, in some cases, against LGBT+ people). The increase in the number of MEPs elected in the ranks of populist parties, combined with the growing attention to populism within and outside the European Parliament, has led to the increasing importance of religion as a matter of debate. More broadly, the references increase to the binary conceptualization of Christian and Muslim as opposing and radically different identities. In line with the literature pointing out the re-enactment of the colonial discourse’s use of religion as an othering device (Brubaker, 2017; Scott, 2018), Christianity and Islam are often opposed in the EP debate. This is not to say that the EP has become the champion of Christianity against the Muslim threat: the study only accounts for the fact that this frame is increasingly put forward in the EP discussions and, therefore, that it is a significant matter of debate. However, this analysis does not distinguish between those who support this view and those who want to counter this understanding of the relationships among Islam, Christianity and Europe. The debate is complex, vocal and still ongoing, and it intersects with many different and delicate topics. The most relevant feature is that the populists in power (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015) do not change or modify their discourse in the EP arena. MEPs from populist parties have contributed to changing the matters discussed in relation to religion, and the alleged binary opposition between Christianity and Islam has become the most important frame. As a consequence, the increasing number of populist MEPs in the EP will lead to discussion of religion mostly as a matter of identity and culture. It is safe to assume that the related policies will change as well. However, this risk appears to be underestimated by MEPs. The analysis has also shown that those who raise concerns about populism rarely

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express disquiet about the role of religion in the populist discourse, and those who raise concerns about discrimination against religion rarely frame it in terms of populism. Warnings against populism mostly regard the possible discrimination against minorities, such as sexual minorities, or Roma groups, and against migrants. On some occasions, also the antiMuslim attitude is called out. However, the role of Christianity is treated with more ambiguity in populist discourse, and it is rarely described as a matter of concern. Only in the debate on Orban and Hungary was attention directed to how Christianity has become a central aspect of Hungarian national identity. Nonetheless, even on that occasion only few MEPs warned against the connection between the prominence of one religious tradition and the possible discrimination against minorities. Many other MEPs instead praised the courage shown in explicitly acknowledging the role of Christianity in Hungarian culture, or they maintained that it would not be a problem. For European MEPs, Christianity appears to be a delicate matter for discussion: the complex debate on the Christian roots of Europe, and the fact that all the European treaties, while fostering equality and non-discrimination, state that religion is a countryrelated topic, testify to the attentive and balanced approach that the European Union has tried to maintain with respect to religion (Foret, 2015). However, the presence of populist MEPs is likely to unbalance the EU approach to religion in the next few years.

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The European Commission and Reactions to the ‘Populist Turn’ in Anti-discrimination Policy Carlo Ruzza

Introduction This chapter examines the impact of populism on the European Commission. It frames this impact in the general context of the reactions of all European Union (EU) institutions to populism. After a brief general introduction on the meaning of populism and its impact on the European Union, it focuses on reactions of the European Commission (henceforth Commission) at three levels—the level of Commission presidents, the level of the college of Commissioners, and the civil service of the Commission. Overall, the chapter argues that the Commission has been, and still is, worried about the successes of populist parties. However, these successes appear to have declined to some extent during the COVID19 pandemic, and this has given the Commission a new impetus to relaunch the European project. As has often, but not always, been the case, while undermining some aspects of the European project, crises also furnish opportunities to expand it. This may happen when, among other factors, path-dependencies resulting from earlier integration decisions

C. Ruzza (B) School of International Studies, University of Trento, Trento, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 C. Ruzza et al. (eds.), The Impact of Populism on European Institutions and Civil Society, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73411-4_7

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stimulate the mobilisation of interests in the consolidation of integration (Schimmelfennig, 2018). These path-dependencies may involve a variety of institutional processes, as pointed out by post-functionalist theories. However, it is argued here, they may also result from perceived threats to cherished values and the self-definitions of a key body of professionals at the core of the European project—the Commission in its political wing and in its civil service. This chapter argues that the threat raised by populist formations to the legitimacy of European integration has deeply affected the Commission, and that it has mobilised a reaction that has resulted in a strengthening of some aspects of the European project. To substantiate this point, the chapter will examine how populism has affected the Commission’s various echelons and how they have reacted. Discussion of the Commission and populism cannot ignore the broader geopolitical context in which it operates. However, it is also important to acknowledge that the Commission is internally fragmented, and while a thematic analysis can reveal its overarching reactions to populism, the views of the Commission need to be framed in terms of types of actors, organisational sub-domains with different functions, and time frames. Thus, this chapter will start by framing populism in the historical context that has shaped European integration and by considering some of its organisational dynamics most affected by populism. The Commission is a transnational bureaucracy structured in a complex set of entities that differ in their organisational cultures, functions, and histories. Over recent decades, the political climate of member states has been significantly affected by the electoral successes of populist parties, particularly populist parties of the radical right. These victories impinge on the EU in several ways and are therefore highly consequential for the EU project and several of its institutions. Secondly, the impact of populism on the Commission is filtered by its effect on other EU institutions, notably the European Parliament (EP). Brief discussion of this impact will therefore be necessary. Thirdly, the impact of populism is shaped by the political cultures of the Commission and the changes that have characterised it over the years. Consequently, a section of this chapter will discuss this impact, which cannot be inferred solely from the policy output of the Commission. It also needs to be documented on the basis of how the issue of populism is conceptualised in the political and policy texts of the Commission and in the political culture of its civil servants. Thus, the same section will also present empirical research on a range of texts.

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The Success of Populist Parties and Euroscepticism Populism is not a new phenomenon. It is often conceptualised as a political ideology that focuses on a cleavage between elites and ‘the people’ seen as an undifferentiated and all-encompassing constituency of individuals perceiving themselves as excluded from power (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). In this perspective, over the years, there have been several EU right-wing populist movements and parties that have thematised an emerging ‘people versus elites’ cleavage. They have also stressed the resentment that accompanies perceptions of exclusion and betrayal among social constituencies that perceive themselves as culturally and economically marginal. However, anti-elitism is a broad characterisation that leaves the concept of populism under-specified. Therefore, several additional characterisations are utilised to make its usage more precise, such as right-wing and left-wing populism. These specifications have also included attempts to differentiate populism’s distinctive traits from other features with which it often co-occurs, such as an anti-system political style, authoritarianism, or a nationalist ethos (De Cleen et al., 2018). The question of what is considered populism is important not only in academic terms, but more broadly in terms of how its supporters and its opponents aim their political activities. It is therefore useful to examine how the Commission has conceptualised populism, how it has set out to oppose it, and on which aspects it has sought compromise. This chapter will focus on these aspects. In particular, the distinction between nationalism and populism is essential in Europe because of the long history of nationalism. Emphasis on the concepts of ‘the nation’ or ‘the people’ produces different constructs and may lead to diverse types of movements, although both concepts may also co-occur (Brubaker, 2019; Kaltwasser et al., 2017). An integration of populism and nationalism is typical of the European Union and tends particularly to occur at the EU level, where nonnationalist populisms are under-represented. Except for some regionalist ethno-nationalisms, the nationalisms active within EU institutions are generally of the right. When nationalisms and populisms occur together, they usually combine the populist anti-system stance with extreme right anti-migrant exclusionism. This chapter will only focus on these parties. However, the distinction between a nationalism-driven concept of populism and one with a main emphasis on ‘the people’ is important for the analysis of anti-populist movements. In the opposition against radical

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right populists (RRPs), it is useful to consider whether nationalism is included and how prominently. Nationalism is the ideology against which the EU has defined its existence, and it should not be conflated with populism, although it often co-occurs with it. The impact of RRPs is a politically and socially important issue because the substantial expansion of European nationalist populisms of the past few decades has been attended by a shared sense of alarm which dates back some decades. Right-wing populisms have included the extreme right ethno-nationalist populism of the Italian Northern League in the late 1980s, as well as Pim Fortuyn’s LPF in the Netherlands, and the extreme right populism of Jörg Haider’s FPÖ in Austria and Jean-Marie Le Pen’s FN in France. All these movements, and most of the ones that followed, were characterised by a strong right-wing positioning. So too, though less markedly, was the centre-right neoliberal populism of the media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi in the 1990s. During the early 2000s, most European right-wing populisms embraced and then radicalised an anti-EU stance. Nationalist populists saw the European Union as the outcome of an elitist social and political project to be combatted through the reassertion of national allegiances. A connection among the EU, nationalist sentiments, and a populist ideology emerged within EU institutions, but it received only scant scholarly attention. And even when academics focused on this party family, they considered only the EP, without attention to its impact on other institutions. This inattention obscured the vital role that the EU level can play in providing a common platform to populist parties in the Parliament, in shaping several key policies that involve populist actors in the Council and other institutions, and in documenting reactions of the EU Commission. The Commission’s role in agenda-setting, particularly in crucial policy areas such as migration, is notably affected by member states’ general political climate and other EU institutions. Populist actors have been instrumental in spreading alarm about the impact of migration flows and therefore, the necessity for a stricter migration policy in several member states (Ruzza, 2018; Wodak, 2015). More broadly, populism has impacted on anti-discrimination policy by, for instance, undermining human rights policies, views on the role of civil society groups, and commitment to the rule of law (Ruzza, 2014). However, it would be reductive to conceptualise the impact of populism only in terms of the signature policies of populist actors or the communication strategies of the EU. The EU needs and seeks cultural

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and political legitimacy. For this reason, the opposition to populism is critical in discursive terms. By and large, the Commission has been an opponent of RRPs. Thus, the Commission’s role should be defined as that of engaging in various forms of anti-populism, which is performed in a variety of ways through its full range of policies, its institutional dynamics, and its external political discourse. The Commission’s role in the public sphere includes a constant presence in social media, and it addresses key issues such as reactions to the populist turn in member states and responses to accompanying phenomena, such as Brexit (Pejovic & Cossarini, 2020; Ruzza & Pejovic, 2019). In opposing populism, institutions such as the Commission are forced to specify how they understand it, and what aspects they oppose. That is, they must explain why they see the joint nationalist and populist ideologies as detrimental to the process of EU construction. However, before populism attracted the attention of the Commission, nationalism was its main target.

Populism and European Institutions The successes of nationalist and then nationalist-populist parties in several member states and in the EP came slowly, and it gradually impacted on not only the political activities of the Commission but also its civil service, which was very politicised from the outset. As several historical works show, the European project was never a project merely focused on maximising prosperity and security. A federalist blueprint was present at the beginning of the process of European construction, and for several decades, it prevailed over competing interpretations of the nature of the process (Beland & Cox, 2011; Parsons, 2011). Thus, an integrationist approach has always characterised the large majority of the EU’s personnel, and particularly the Commission, even if this feature may have declined to some extent over time (Hooghe, 2001). Thus, a revamping of nationalism as advocated by right-wing populist actors has always conflicted with the political culture of EU institutions. Nonetheless, historically, nor was a fully federalist programme espoused by the architects of EU integration, who generally preferred the term ‘integration’ to ‘federation’ precisely because it was less constraining (Anderson, 2021). Consequently, there has always also been sufficient space for support for, or at least tolerance of, a degree of nationalism among the advocates of the process of EU construction, so that the

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nationalist blueprint has been potentially viable for its institutionalisation in the structure of EU institutions. The tension between an intergovernmental and integrationist perspective reflects the dualism implicit in the integration process, but nationalism clearly remained controlled and delimited by the disquieting evidence of the damage that its extreme forms had caused in the previous decades. Only later did stronger versions of nationalism re-appear and accompany growing opposition to the process of European construction. When this initially occurred, the ideology and the concept of populism were still not relevant or used to interpret European political events. For several years, nationalism was accepted and partially institutionalised like all dominant ideologies have been institutionalised in the European project. This took place also because of the distinctive and institutionally necessary propensity for compromise that has always characterised the EU policy style and facilitated the absorption of all ideological standpoints into the EU framework. In a weakly authoritative institutional framework that lacks the constraining power of a nation-state, all ideological standpoints need to be fully taken into account and to some extent incorporated. This ambivalence has characterised the EU since its inception. In describing the reactions of the Commission to populism, it is useful to start by briefly reviewing the political discourse of the presidents of the Commission. It is also useful to examine the views on populism and nationalism expressed by other key Commission actors, such as the Commissioners and their civil service, who have stated their opinions on this subject. A methodology for this purpose will now be proposed.

Methodology: Text Analysis of Populism and the Commission The EU Commission produces a large number of texts of different kinds. Most of these texts have no relevance to the analysis of populist discourse, how it is conceptualised, reactions to it, or connections made among related issues. Moreover, the word ‘populism’ is rarely used in legal documents, and not even in speeches aimed at the general public. References to RRPs might be obvious to a reader but not identifiable through a single-word analysis. For this reason, first created for the research reported here was a shortlist of keywords to identify which Commission’s texts were potentially

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relevant to the thematic area of populism and anti-populism. This list was based on an initial exploratory analysis which suggested keywords that would facilitate the identification of relevant texts. Available sources of EU texts were then examined by selecting Commission documents that contained references to at least two of the themes identified by the chosen keywords, which were: Populism, Discrimination, Hate speech, Xenophobia, Euroscepticism, Migration, Brexit, European democracy, European values. Commission documents were downloaded from the EU website and comprised speeches, press releases, and communications to the EP and other institutions of Commissioners and Commission presidents. By progressing from 2013 until the end of 2020, a database was created whose internal composition was a first finding on who in the Commission discussed themes defined by the keywords mentioned above. A second finding concerned the more detailed content of these texts, which were examined and classified by adding new codes after scoring them. For instance, the frame Euroscepticism, which was one of the initial keywords, was defined as relating to fundamental criticism of the EU. The frame Democracy in the EU , which was not one of the initial keywords, was identified by the text analysis because RRPs are often accused of undermining European democracy. References to Democracy with explicit or implicit reference to RRPs were then used to select excerpts from the previously selected texts. This code was defined as including all explicit references to a variety of issues relating to democracy in the EU and including threats raised by RRPs. The unit of analysis was a meaningful portion of the text, or ‘frame’, which in some cases was a sentence, or a paragraph if consecutive sentences repeated the same concept. A team of four analysts coded the texts identified. After practising on a small sample of texts and discussing the outcomes, they attributed additional codes in order to document the full thematic range that characterises Commission’s texts that discuss issues where populism is implicitly or explicitly significant. At the end of the process, codes that had appeared only a few times were merged with more frequently occurring ones. This methodological approach is frequently utilised in the social sciences, and it is generally characterised as a type of frame analysis (David & Baden, 2017). This thematic analysis provides an understanding of how frequently the Commission conceptualises RRPs, how it understands populism when it discusses it, and the hierarchy of concepts through which it frames issues that are seen as connected to the range of themes

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central to RRPs’ political discourse. The analysts retrieved 206 populismrelevant documents during the period 2013–2020 and identified 45 codes. Each coded excerpt identified as relevant by the analysts could then be classified with one or more codes. This furnished understanding of code frequencies, of co-occurrences, and of the entire thematic space that these documents discussed. After the text analysis, some identified codes were retained but also aggregated into larger units, thus producing more general codes. For instance, a broader definition of the code Populism would encompass Solutions to populism, Populism as a threat to the European Project, EU reactions to populist policies, and Populism in Hungary, thereby significantly increasing the relevance of this topic. However, by disarticulating the code Populism between a generic reference to the issue and specific contents that qualify it better, it is possible to understand why and how populism matters for the Commission. This methodology should be conceived as a structured way to read EU texts. The frequencies of interpretive codes, or frames, are indicative of their centrality in the Commission’s discourse, but the methodology remains mainly interpretive and has to rely on excerpts as examples of the frames identified. Small differences in frame frequencies should not be over-interpreted. Nevertheless, substantial differences in the number of frames reveal the varying priorities of different actors. Before discussing the results of the frame analysis, it is necessary to briefly outline the views of the Commission on nationalism and populism in historical terms.

The European Commission and Its Views on Nationalism and Populism Like other political and social institutions, over the years, the Commission has been ambivalent on several issues and has embraced emerging social and political ideologies to gain legitimacy. The impact of radical right populists is filtered by the mix of prevailing ideologies shaping the EU at any moment in time. A brief characterisation of these changes is useful. There are several periodisations of how the EU has changed its ideas over time. The first characterisation of the nature of the EU’s attitude to nationalism took place under the presidency of Walter Hallstein (1958–67), whose approach was strongly federalist and distinguished by its rejection of the nationalist sentiments that had engendered the Second World

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War. For Hallstein, and for the first groups of architects of the European project, a strong federalist ethos was the best way to curb the extreme nationalisms that had led to the war (Dedman, 2009: 18). Hallstein fought fiercely to buttress the Commission’s role against any neglect by the Council—which was sometimes intent on undermining other EU institutions—as several of his speeches demonstrate (see, for instance, Hallstein, 1966). A second important feature of this period was the depiction of the European project as a cosmopolitan globalist project, particularly in the sense of a transatlantic project, to be protected from inter-state manoeuvres—an undertaking spurred by transnational layers engaged in informal ‘constitutionalisation’ of the European project (Vauchez, 2015: 21). This globalist project coexisted with neoliberal elements, as well as with a federalist ethos. From the outset, although several of its supporters differed in their philosophies, they agreed on the value of free-market competition and therefore against economic nationalisms (Denord & Schwartz, 2010). Thus, Hallstein, for instance, emphasised his opposition to the ‘economic nationalism inherited from the past’ (Hallstein, 1958). These elements laid the basis for a project that was principled in nature and strongly opposed to a radical right viewpoint, which was often not only anti-globalist but also protectionist and inimical to the neoliberal ethos of ‘big business’, which was seen as culturally and economically threatening the local communities that right-wingers attempted to represent—that is, the ‘losers of globalisation’ as the relevant literature describes them (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Thus, from its inception, the EU represented an arch-enemy for extreme right-wingers. These founding principles were never substantially changed thereafter. Successive presidents continued along this path. However, other significant changes took place with another two-term president—Delors. His advocacy of a social dimension included attention to inclusive policies, which although never achieved, once again grated with the ethos of right-wing populists. The same can be said several years later about the presidency of Romano Prodi, who took office after the crisis-ridden presidency of Santer. He attempted to relaunch the European project with new and explicit efforts to constitutionalise the EU, which he pursued by also attributing a unique and essential role to organised civil society. This role was enshrined in the influential White Paper on Governance, and the several dedicated committees that wrote it constituted other areas of

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disagreement between RRPs and their opponents (European Commission, 2001; European Commission et al., 2001). In emphasising the role of intermediary associations, the White Paper opposed the disintermediation ethos of RRPs, for which European civil society was simply part of an international elite that had to be combatted as a remote traitor of ‘the people’. Moreover, empowering civil society meant accepting its priorities and notably its focus on anti-discrimination, human rights, and social inclusion of minorities—themes which, as said, were undermining the ‘natural’ unity of ‘the people’ posited by populists. Prodi’s priorities had an ambivalent impact. On the one hand, issues related to the role of civil society and more generally to the preferences of citizens in decision-making processes acquired visibility and some viability within EU institutions. On the other hand, the ambitious process of constitutionalising the EU failed after its 2005 rejection by French and Dutch voters. The more substantial EU integration process opposed by right-wing Eurosceptics was shown to be also unpopular with many EU citizens. The uneasy relationship between RRPs and the Commission presidency continued in the following years. In 2007–2011, the financial crisis increased the ranks of the ‘losers of globalisation’—a social category to which scholars have attributed the renewed significance of populism. In that period, the solid link among strong nationalism, Euroscepticism, and populism interpreted mainly as anti-elitism began to acquire broader scholarly relevance. Academics interpreted the emergence of populism in several ways, but two explanations attracted most support. One concerned disenchantment with the neoliberal turn in Western economies because of its impact on the poorer and less skilled sections of the population, which in a highly globalised economy were increasingly facing competition from migrants. The second explanation centred on cultural resentment engendered by the cultural changes induced by significant migration flows. In both cases, a renewed focus on migration defined populism and nationalism as mainly characterised by an anti-migrant ethos. Measures intended to restrict immigration became signature policies of the populist right and a major political opportunity for emerging populist leaders. In this respect, to be noted is that the next Commission president— José Manuel Barroso—began openly to criticise populism, which became a strong and shared concern during his two terms. In 31 documents included in the textual dataset, he makes reference to populism 28 times, often as a threat to the EU . If one considers all items relative to RRPs,

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which include codes relative to the extreme right, to populism, and to Euroscepticism, Barroso’s mentions of these codes amount to 58 instances in the 31 documents sampled for this actor. Even when the analysis is restricted to Barroso’s remarks on populism, this code was third in his list of most frequently used frames. The first most frequent Barroso frame was extolling European values, and the second was European solidarity. Populism for Barroso was related to another defining topic often included in academic definitions of populism—Xenophobia, a code that occurred 15 times, and Euroscepticism as a threat, which occurred 11 times. Thus, the image arises of a president of the Commission who was worried by populism, which he saw as undermining the European project in its founding values and as spurring xenophobic reactions in a general context of mounting negative views of the EU. His main purpose was to reaffirm a neoliberal ideology, a framing that constituted a trademark of his presidency and a contentious position for RRPs, which generally adopt an ideology of social nationalism (Anderson, 2021: 13). The following excerpt illustrates Barroso’s viewpoint. Faced with the resurgence of populism, extremism and xenophobic feelings, we have again to stand up clearly for this core value we believe in: freedom. And we have to reject all kinds of stereotypes and prejudices. Confronted with the challenge of a fast-changing globalised and interdependent world, we have to be emboldened by the daring of our founding fathers. A Europe which had been reconciled and unified and had defeated totalitarian regimes cannot turn into a fearful and worried Europe. We have to be true to our own values of peace, freedom and respect for human dignity. (Barroso, 2014)

After Barroso, concerns about populism combined with worries about the extreme right and Euroscepticism remained central to the attention and speeches of the next Commission presidents. They occurred a fifth more frequently in the speeches of Junker (18 times in 7 documents). In his one term in office, RRPs were again expanding. The migration crisis of 2014–2015 further strengthened RRPs, and it made Migration even more the defining issue of the populist party family. In the meantime, the issue of ‘illiberal democracy’ was broadening the RRPs’ repertoire by including even stronger opposition to civil society organisations and more substantial concerns about social conservatism.

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These new themes started to reverberate in Brussels, where conservative civil society associations were beginning to establish a presence which, while remaining marginal, grew over time (Ruzza, 2021). With populist leaders such as Orbàn still in the European Popular Party, although suspended, and with a geopolitical situation in which there arose populist leaders like Boris Johnson in the UK and Trump in the USA, it appeared that RRPs were becoming at least partly institutionalised. Some of their values were becoming more broadly accepted. The previously undisputed ethos of globalisation was beginning to be more widely questioned. After the financial crisis, the EU grew more intergovernmental as heads of state were significantly taking over in deciding EU actions. This was justified with the need for rapid decisions, and it accelerated a process of presidentialisation of the EU rooted in re-emerging nationalism. In this context, the Commission appeared weakened. These perceptions are reflected in the discursive framings of Junker, who appeared not only more worried about populism but also more concerned about Euroscepticism. His sampled documents show acknowledgement that the European project is in trouble and include, like for Barroso, calls for European solidarity and European values. Similarly, the analysis of Junker’s speeches identifies the similar code EU Self-praise, which indicates a congratulatory tone in assessing the actions of the EU. Thus, similarly to Barroso, despite their different ideological backgrounds, for Junker the RRPs constitute a threat to a cherished image of a solidaristic and value-defined EU. A couple of short examples of his views on populism will suffice. Right across the world, we have seen populist movements wanting – and sometimes succeeding – to subvert the Rule of Law and create divisions and disharmony in our communities. (Junker, 2017) The other continents do not understand the rise of stupid, pernicious forms of populism that are in danger of rending Europe asunder, a Europe that has been so patiently built step by step, conviction by conviction, over the past decades. (Junker, 2016)

During the von der Leyen presidency, the entire EU framework has been shaken by the COVID-19 crisis. Her focus has to some extent shifted away from debating populism. However, it has been increasingly

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considered indirectly in the predictable context of Brexit and in relation to populist-endorsed conspiracy theories related, for instance, to COVID-19—a theme to which the EU has started to pay more systematic attention (see, for instance, the website identifying conspiracy theories | European Commission).1 However, in the context of COVID-19, several observers have noted that the still ongoing crisis has revealed the weakness of RRPs. Their dislike of experts has backfired when they are in decision-making roles. Conversely, the Commission, an institution that makes expertise its overarching credo, has in several ways benefitted. Overall, the EU has reacted to this unexpected and momentous challenge with sufficient unity, speed, and efficacy (Christiansen, 2020). It is, however, too early to consider this issue comprehensively. Nonetheless, the Commission of recent years is very different from the ambitious Commission intent in pursuing a constitutionalising strategy of a decade ago. It is less ambitious partly because its attempts at legitimation have generally failed, but also because its personnel have different backgrounds and have been less committed to the European project for years. The committed Europeanists of a few decades ago are retiring. The top echelons of the Commission used to have a legal background or just below in the hierarchy they often had even a background in European studies, but after the reforms of recent decades, particularly the Kinnock reform and the long time taken to implement it fully, they now tend to have a management or business background and are more concerned with output efficacy than with legitimation (Anderson, 2021: 13). Over the years, successive reforms have changed the culture of the Commission in important ways, often institutionalising principles of New Public Management (Georgakakis, 2017). For some Commission personnel, the RPPs threat does not have a strong emotional impact because they may be sympathetic to a less ambitious and more intergovernmental union, just as RRPs desire (Dehousse & Thompson, 2012). Nonetheless, many others civil servants still see RRPs as a threat. Aware of these views, RRPs see a less ambitious Commission as possibly less of a target for RRPs. With Christiansen (2020), it can be argued that if the dream of a strong and legitimated EU has failed, the Commission together with other EU institutions has 1 https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/coronavirus-response/fighting-disinf ormation/identifying-conspiracy-theories_en.

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shown a remarkable ability to ‘muddle through’ and even expand its powers, as it has often done in periods of crisis (Christiansen, 2020). These include the financial crisis and the current COVID-19 crisis, where the Next Generation EU initiative may have taken a substantial new step towards European financial and political unification and possibly retrieved some of the legitimacy that other crises undermined (Picek, 2020). Even so, RRPs remain among the main threats to the Commission because their existence and their political discourse clash with many aspects of the Commission’s ethos, even when account is taken of its internal diversity, which should not be ignored when considering populism. Nonetheless, the origins of the Commission’s anti-populist discourse that previous paragraphs summarised have remained. The Commission has solidified a set of views that have remained largely shared over the years. Thus, the aversion to nationalism of the early years, the rejection of the populist xenophobic discourse of subsequent times, the concern about other grounds of discrimination, the emphasis on expertise, the appreciation of intermediate bodies of civil society, and the valuing of the rule of law of recent years have solidified in a political discourse that constitutes the foundations of the European project against which opposition by RRPs is directed. However, it should be noted that the Commission discourse extends beyond the ethos of its presidents. The Commission is, on the one hand, a hierarchical bureaucracy and is therefore shaped by its president’s views, at least in the way it presents itself in the public sphere and in the way its strategic ‘high politics’ objectives are devised and implemented. On the other hand, below its Commissioner and top bureaucratic levels, it is also a decentralised structure where its units are governed by different ideologies. In the words of the classic study by Michelmann (1978), it is a set of ‘cottage industries’ where every directorate differs somewhat in priorities and taken-for-granted assumptions (see also Georgakakis, 2017; Michelmann, 1978). Thus, the impact of populism is more direct in the areas of the Commission guided by principles that are most at loggerheads with the radical right populist ideology. These are typically areas concerned with signature populist policies, notably migration policy and anti-discrimination policy, since these are the areas in which confrontations tend to be stronger. This is because the ‘politics of the enemy’ ethos of populism tends to emphasise national belonging and cultural roots, while both migrants and minorities, such as sexual ones, are defined as outsiders. For this reason, the rest of this chapter will mainly focus on these issue areas.

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Populism and Political Discourse Analysis Using the methodology described above, the political discourse analysis identified the most frequent concepts in the Commission’s discourse. These are presented in Table 1. The code European Values (all the Table 1 List of codes identified

European values Populism Discrimination Solidarity Xenophobia Extremism Gender equality Solution for European challenges Migration Radicalisation Future of Europe Hate crime EU self-praise Solution for Euroscepticism EU reaction to populist policies Solution for populism Evoking the past Euroscepticism as a threat Democracy in the EU European identity European project in trouble Populism in Hungary Rebutting Europhobic myths Need to create a counter-narrative Populism as a threat to the European project Criticism of discrimination against minorities Clash between national and EU levels Criticism of enemy politics and scapegoating Online extremism as a threat Cooperation with other international bodies Violation of law Violation of the rule of law Monitoring role of EU bodies Populism in Poland Illustrations of right-wing extremism Reasons for the surge of populism Source Created by the author

273 124 119 119 100 79 77 74 73 69 55 53 37 37 35 31 27 25 24 23 23 20 20 18 18 17 15 15 15 14 14 14 13 13 10 10

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actual codes identified and utilised in the frame analysis are capitalised and set in italics for ease of identification) is in absolute terms the most frequent code, showing a persistent preoccupation of the Commission with advancing and protecting the European project. A second family of codes concerns preoccupations with populism. A third set of codes concerns issues that are seen as thematic areas affected by the populist threat, which include discrimination in its various forms. However, it should be noted that Discrimination for the Commission concerns gender and ethnicity above all other grounds for discrimination. While article 19 of the Amsterdam Treaty identifies and sets out to oppose five forms of discrimination (action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation), only gender and ethnicity appear prominently. In response to these threats, the third code emphasises the necessity to enhance social solidarity. Other codes often specify and clarify the nature of these three types of codes. However, there are also codes that are part of the RRPs’ signature concerns, such as the code Radicalisation, which refers to Islamism, or general codes such as concerns about the Future of Europe. The second set of findings from content-analysing the Commission’s texts is provided by a co-occurrence analysis of populism with other codes. Of the keywords utilised to construct the dataset, the frame populism occurred 124 times; the next frame among the keywords used to select texts was discrimination (119 times) and then Migration (73 times). Other keywords appeared less frequently. Thus, the Commission is concerned about ‘populism’ and uses it as an interpretive lens when discussing a range of issues. By checking which codes co-occur with populism, it is then possible to identify some of these issues. Excerpts that discuss populism will also discuss other issues in the rest of the same document. However, an initial step is to identify which specific issues are discussed jointly within the same excerpt, that is, within the same sentence of a short paragraph. The codes most frequently associated with populism are European values, which occurs 18 times, and Solutions to populism which also occurs 18 times. Hence, populism is mainly understood as a threat to European values, confirming the constant pro-EU stance of Commission officials. Moreover, populism is seen as ‘a problem’ which needs to be solved, and the Commission takes a pragmatic problem-solving approach in addressing it. The third most frequent code co-occurring with populism

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is Migration (10 instances). The next most frequent codes are Euroscepticism (9) as a threat and Extremism (7). Thus, views of populism are invariably negative, showing the anti-populist nature of the Commission’s political discourse. As said, textual data were collected and analysed for the period 2013– 2020. This comprises the entire eighth legislature of the EP, one year before and one after. An analysis of the timing of populist concerns did not reveal significant patterns in terms of proportions of mentions of all populist frames on the number of documents for each year. This indicates that populism is a long-standing concern of Commission personnel that has not varied significantly over time, as Populism was already a concern at the beginning of the legislature. It varies, however, if one looks at how often specific actors in the Commission mentioned the frame Populism, regardless of the length of their tenure in office. For instance, Pierre Moscovici, European Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs from 2014 to 2019 made direct frequent and alarmed references to RRPs—the highest level as a proportion of the documents scored. Moscovici is followed by Frans Timmermans, who from 2014 to 2019 dealt with the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Cecilia Malmström who in the same period served as European Commissioner for Trade, and Vera Jourova as the European Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality in the same period. Other Commissioners mention these themes less frequently. Dealing with issues relevant to anti-discrimination policy, as in the case of Vera Jourova, or issues concerning human rights as in the case of Timmermans, leads to a professional concern with RRPs. Consequently, a variable that explains their propensity to address these themes is their portfolio as Commissioners, but this does not constitute a full explanation, because some ministers with economic portfolios are also interested in these issues. In some cases, an alternative explanation appears to be the political and personal background of Commissioners, such as the socialist and in his youth Trotskyist Pierre Moscovici. Nonetheless, the individual differences are secondary to the overarching concern of the Commission with RRPs, and particularly the fact that this preoccupation is connected with the European project. This emerges from Table 2, which sets out the co-occurrences of codes with the most frequent code in the entire sample, i.e. European Values. All the co-occurring codes are relevant to the RRPs dimension. While some of these codes were part of the sample selection procedure, many

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Table 2 Co-occurrence between the code ‘European Values’ and other codes

Migration Populism Xenophobia Discrimination Solidarity Evoking the past Extremism Solution for Euroscepticism Solution for populism Criticism of discrimination against minorities European project in trouble Populism in Hungary

29 18 18 17 16 11 10 9 9 7 7 7

Source Created by the author

others were not and provide information on how the Commission conceptualises reactions to RRPs. As said, this analysis shows that radical right populism is first and foremost interpreted by the Commission as a threat to the European project. However, a second observation is that, by defining EU values in terms of these codes, particularly in terms of migration-related concepts, the Commission restricts the scope of its actions. It can consequently either call for conflicting measures—such as encouraging both the human rights of migrants and their forced relocation—or call for ‘humanitarian compassion’ as the foundation of EU values, as in the excerpt below. My strong devotion to the area of asylum is due to the fact that it boils down to the very fundament of humanitarian compassion. And this is, and should continue to be, at the core of the EU’s values. (Malmström)

As an instance of policies that can be implemented at member-state level and that are in some ways contradictory, one can consider the following excerpt. Just after the migration crisis, Avramopoulos stated: We strongly condemn all forms and manifestations of intolerance, including public incitement to racist or xenophobic violence or hatred. … The EU is facing a crisis like no other before. Either we stand firm and find solutions in line with our values, or we will see ourselves and our Europe change beyond recognition, back to a past that no one wants to experience again. (Avramopoulos, 2016)

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Then, in the following paragraphs, he considers the ‘Cologne facts’ when during the New Year celebrations migrants assaulted women and argues that ‘We want to build a humane, but fair and strict migration and borders policy’. The populist turn could have been countered more effectively if from the start the RRPs threat had been defined more prominently in terms of rule of law, or other aspects where a less controversial, more political viable set of policies could be devised, rather than concerns about xenophobia and other migration-related issues on which also centre-right parties are often ambivalent.

The Commission’s Civil Service and Populism While the political components of the Commission are more likely to acknowledge their anti-populist views and may be institutionally encouraged to profess their concerns, the opinions of civil servants are less easily recorded and less publicly documented. Civil servants are reluctant to give interviews on such political sensitive topics as populism. At all levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy, the Commission likes to use the refrain ‘we do policy, not politics’, and this is particularly the case of civil servants working in operational units. However, some indication is available from the texts that they produce for internal consumption. To this end, two Commission internal publications were identified and content analysed. One was the newsletter Graspe, which is produced by the Commission’s civil service for internal circulation (www.graspe.eu). The group describes itself as follows: The Reflection Group on the Future of European Public Service discusses the European public service, its role, missions, modernisation and questioning. Officials want to participate in the discussion on reform and development of the trades. We are reflecting on the place of international trade unionism - the trade unions of the institutions and particularly of the European Commission.

The second, related source is the Union for Unity (U4U)—a think tank created by officials of the European institutions involved in Graspe since the year 2000 and representatives of staff at the European institutions. There are other newsletters that reflect the concerns of EU civil servants, but these two publications are searchable by subject and provide a view of opinions within the civil service over the years. The Union for Unity

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newsletter consists of only a few pages published about every four months and with a circulation restricted to EU institutions’ personnel. A combined search of issues relevant to RRPs which included the terms ‘populism’, ‘nationalism’, and ‘Euroscepticism’ yielded 70 results. Thus, ‘populism’ and the related terms ‘nationalism’ and ‘Euroscepticism’ denote relatively frequent concerns of EU civil servants. All the instances identified describe nationalism and Euroscepticism in scathing terms, thus reproducing the public discourse of the Commission. In addition, the two publications provide academic reading lists of works on populism and reproduce reports on the causes and consequences of populism (see, for instance, Lamy, 2018). The Graspe newsletter also reproduces publications of Europhile think tanks, such as, for instance, the European Policy Centre (https://www.epc.eu/en). These might, for instance, include reports on the likely future of EU institutions, paying particular attention to the impact of populism (see, for instance, Staff-Reporter, 2019). Articles on populism tend to be critical of how the European institutions have reacted to its spread. For instance, the July 2017 issue of Graspe notes: Faced with fractures caused by a loss of political capital and trust, the responses of the European institutions and those of the Member States have been, to say the least, little convincing. The result was a rise of Euroscepticism: every time the European Union is perceived as unable to solve crises the citizens appear very unwilling to give new powers, although seemingly necessary, such as, for example, in the global struggle against terrorism. The populist parties exploit such failures and feed the crisis of democracy. (Staff-Reporter, 2017a)

A firmer approach in confronting RRPs is often advocated: for instance, on issues such as the rule of law in Visegrad countries. Graspe occasionally focuses on specific topical issues, as in issue 36 of 2019 on climate change and the environment, and in this context, populism is connected to broad political changes. Hence, populism is conceptualised as a general concern that cuts across several issue areas which EU personnel think should be more central to institutional action.

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Conclusions The Commission’s values and priorities analysed through its texts confirm a bureaucratic and political body still very much committed to advancing the European project and intent on categorising other political events, such as the advent of right-wing populism, in those terms. Taken all together, the analyses of populism reported in this chapter suggest a Commission mainly concerned with a pragmatic problem-solving approach to the issue. In this pragmatic approach, the Commission examines the negative implications for the European project and what can be done to alleviate them. It consequently focuses on such issues that can be framed as solutions for populism. It also focuses on topical issues related to populism, such as the situation in Hungary and Poland. While noting and supporting distinctive European interests is part of the Commission’s rules of employment, its civil servants appear to do this with ‘principled commitment’ (Georgakakis, 2017: 98). This is because (i), as Georgakakis (2017) shows, they often came to their jobs with a favourable interest in European integration and thus perceive populism as a threat to their values, and (ii) because they embraced the role of ‘custodians of Europe’ with commitment and with a taken-for-granted disposition that is best described with the Bourdeausian term habitus. As part of this habitus, they value their cultural expertise, their transnational dispositions and resources, and they are often even staunchly anti-state in their attitudes (Georgakakis, 2017: 63). Valuing expertise, and not only general cultural expertise but also specific technical knowledge, and being anti-state are some of the features that make the Commission’s personnel most suspicious of RRPs. The dismissal of expertise by populists is well encapsulated by UK politician and rumoured populist Michael Gove’s statement that “we have had enough of experts”. Rejection of expertise is therefore a key feature of the populist worldview that clashes with one of the defining features of the Commission’s civil servants. Similarly, their opposition to the role of member states in the process of European policymaking amounts to a reiteration of their institutional duty to transcend state-level nationalism. A substantial citation from the Graspe newsletter epitomises these sentiments. Our understanding is that great forces are at work in the shadow of populism and its European declinations, within and outside the various breeding grounds where they blossom. For some decades, they feed on

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populisms and at the same time as they feed them. These forces, often organised as real castes, perceive themselves, consciously or unconsciously, but rightfully, as the downgraded of tomorrow. They therefore strongly resist almost everything, ready to do everything, including engaging in the worst politics, like in other tragic moments of European history. They have found their banner in discrediting the European project ad nauseam. They find their best enemy in the populist parties. They have found the best way of safeguarding their powers and their position rent in the division of roles with them [the populists]. It is in the felted corridors of the diplomatic quarters of the European member states that reside the hard core of this anti-European reaction. Forged in the same mould, hardened by communal rituals and participation to innumerable cocktail parties and other receptions that shape their diplomatic activities, welded to the top of their respective pyramid in the big funnel of European affairs constituted by the General Affairs Council and the Council of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) in Brussels. They are carriers of a widely shared vision of their function and future role. This European army represents the most compact force and, typically, the most powerful one in the operation of denigration and sabotage of the European project. (Staff-Reporter, 2017b)

The above citation well encapsulates the state of long-term conflict that the arrival of RRPs has engendered in Brussels and the militant approach that beyond an image of passionless technical competence animates and defines the European Commission. Nonetheless, at the same time, the Commission is aware that RRPs have had, and presumably will have, difficulty in significantly affecting EU policies. This has been reported in three personal interviews conducted in 2019, and it has also been also noted by Junker (Nielsen, 2021). The limited role of RRPs has also been documented in relation to the ‘cordon sanitaire’ that constrains their presence in the EP (Brack, 2015). The reason for this limited role despite the Commission’s alarm and shared political discourse is that the danger of populism and the valuedriven reactions of the Commission have several dimensions, but these do not result in a strong policy impact. Opposing populism is an attestation of personal identity. It is an attestation of professional identity among Commission workers. It is also a way to contribute to a myth-making exercise on the nature and ‘historical mission’ of the EU. Several authors have argued that the EU has often searched for political legitimacy by defining itself in terms of shared mythologies which have changed over time.

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Among them is the myth of a distinctive commitment to the environment, to a ‘social dimension’ but especially to human rights (Della Sala, 2010; Smismans, 2010). The struggle against populism is the latest version of this political programme. It is useful as a self-defining exercise, but defining populism in terms too close to issues where the EU has a limited legal basis, and to issues that can be dealt with at memberstate level, does not result in policy effectiveness. Thus, defining RRPs as thematically connected to the migration crisis is not going to elicit a strong and successful intervention by EU institutions (Schimmelfennig, 2018). As long as the ‘populist turn’ can be marginalised by EU institutions, this is not a problem, but it could become one if the populist threat escalates further.

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Picek, O. (2020). Spillover effects from next generation EU. Intereconomics, 55(5), 325–331. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-020-0923-z. Ruzza, C. (2014). Civil society actors and EU fundamental rights policy: Opportunities and challenges. Human Rights Review, 15(1), 65–81. Ruzza, C. (2018). Populism, migration, and xenophobia in Europe. In C. De la Torre (Ed.), Routledge handbook of global populism. Ruzza, C. (2021). The institutionalisation of populist political discourse and conservative uncivil society in European Union. Nordicom Review, 42(1), 119–133. Ruzza, C., & Pejovic, M. (2019). Populism at work: The language of the Brexiteers and the European Union. Critical Discourse Studies, 16(3), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/17405904.2019.1605300. Schimmelfennig, F. (2018). European integration (theory) in times of crisis: A comparison of the euro and Schengen crises. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(7), 969–989. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017. 1421252. Smismans, S. (2010). The European Union’s fundamental rights myth. Journal of Common Market Studies, 48(1), 45–66. Staff-Reporter. (2017a). Grasp Newsletter 31—Tribune libre: Dans l’ombre des populismes, les fossoyeurs de l’Europe. Grasp—Reflection group on the future of the European civil service, 31. Staff-Reporter. (2017b). GRASPE—Groupe de Réflexion sur l’avenir du Service Public Européen Reflection Group on the Future of the European Civil Service. Retrieved from https://graspe.eu/info.htm. Staff-Reporter. (2019, April). Challenge Europe: Yes, we should! EU priorities for 2019–2024. EPC—European Policy Centre. Vauchez, A. (2015). Brokering Europe: Euro-lawyers and the making of a transnational polity. Cambridge University Press. Wodak, R. (2015). European identities and the revival of nationalism in the European Union. Journal of Language and Politics, 14(1), 87–109.

The Impact of Populism on European Civil Society

Facing the Threat of Populism: How the European Commission Can Reconnect with Citizens Assya Kavrakova

The Impact of Populism on the European Rule of Law and Fundamental Values The Roots of European Populism Populism is a multi-faceted phenomenon with diverse roots and manifestations depending on geographical, historical, cultural and socio-economic circumstances (Lessenski & Kavrakova, 2019; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). No single factor causes populism; rather, there is an interplay of factors which feed on and reinforce each other. These factors can be defined as ‘primary’—socio-economic and cultural—and ‘additional’. Factors of the latter kind are context-related and include the crisis of representative democracy, the lack of innovation of traditional parties, online disinformation and weak communication of the achievements of the European project (Lessenski & Kavrakova, 2019). Socio-economic and cultural factors (primary factors) are the strongest contributors to the ‘anxieties’ and ‘fears’ of the population often invoked by populists. They may come in different combinations depending on the

A. Kavrakova (B) Avenue de la Toison d’Or 77, Saint-Gilles, Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 C. Ruzza et al. (eds.), The Impact of Populism on European Institutions and Civil Society, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73411-4_8

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characteristics of different social groups and/or on the concrete circumstances of different geographical regions. It is often the case that while middle-income groups fear loss of status, the strongest factor for lowerincome groups is the fear of loss of jobs and income. Even within the same country, different factors can take precedence in its different regions and among different segments of the population (Lessenski & Kavrakova, 2019). Citizens in non-metropolitan and rural areas which are structurally weak1 are particularly vulnerable to populist narratives. This is evident from their voting choices at both national and European elections, and it is due to several reasons. Economic and social infrastructure decline in these regions predetermines ‘citizens’ agendas’ which are quite different from the national and the European ones because they reflect the everyday problems and challenges encountered by those living there—precarious working conditions, worries about money, lack of employment opportunities, etc. The lack of adequate response by the political establishment to the problems encountered by citizens leaves the latter with a strong sense of abandonment, unfairness and disadvantage. This results in negative attitudes towards ‘others’, especially migrants, whom people in these regions devalue as a reaction to their own experiences of devaluation (Hillje, 2018). The collapse of structures for social dialogue and debate at local level impacts negatively on social bonds in local communities. This, in combination with the inaction of the traditional parties in reaching out to rural areas and socio-economically disadvantaged regions, reinforces the feelings of abandonment and disconnect among citizens which are exploited by populists.2 Additional, complementary factors which pave the way for populist narratives are the crises of representative democracy and the lack of political innovation by the mainstream parties, resulting in diminished trust in them and a search for ‘miraculous’ solutions by the disappointed voters for their real problems, which the populists offer 1 Conditions in 28 (of a total of 361) districts in Germany are ‘very strongly’ or ‘severely’ below average, according to a response from the German Government to a parliamentary question on this topic tabled by the Green parliamentary group in February 2017 (Hillje, 2018: 4). 2 For more information: Hillje, J. (2018) undertook 500 interviews in France and Germany in socio-economically disadvantaged regions where high proportions of rightwing populist voters live by listening to people who are otherwise only ever spoken about.

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abundantly (Lessenski & Kavrakova, 2019; Roberts, 2015). Promises to involve citizens more directly in the decision-making process—by means of referenda, for example—seem to resonate particularly well with those who are frustrated with democracy as currently practised because they feel not represented or heard. Moreover, current societal challenges, such as online disinformation are useful for populists, who are skilful in exploiting all the attributes and deficiencies of the social media and online platforms in their communication strategies, including manipulations (Gerbaudo, 2018). The rapid cycle of news, polarization and encapsulation through echo chambers works to their advantage. In the words of a European expert with experience in media, there are two specific problems: “The first aspect, which is specific to the online environment, is the amplification (through algorithms, etc.) which gives a lot more visibility to these fake news…The second factor behind disinformation is a recent challenge of ‘l’esprit des Lumières’, of the notion of scientific progress, of reason” (Lessenski & Kavrakova, 2019: 149). A key finding of a recent academic research study3 on populism is that there is no single online populist strategy. The frequency, tone and topic of social media (Facebook in particular) usage by populist actors differs from country to country, actor to actor, and over time (Bennett et al., 2020). National contexts and specific features (elections, campaign traditions, social media usage) are again the factors influencing these strategies. Although in general the populist narratives on Facebook define citizens as victims, there is a difference between the right-wing and the left-wing populist discourses. The former emphasize the victimization resulting from corruption, immigration and outside control from Brussels; the latter portray the people as the victims of corrupt elites and financial interests (Bennett et al., 2020). Although national elites are more frequently mentioned than supranational elites, Euroscepticism and 3 DEMOS (Democratic Efficacy and the Varieties of Populism in Europe) is a project funded from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 822590. It is carried out by 15 partner institutions in Europe and involves 10 disciplines. DEMOS investigates the phenomenon of populism through the lenses of democratic efficacy. The concept combines attitudinal features (political efficacy), political skills, knowledge, and democratic opportunity structures. The concept is understood as a condition of political engagement needed to address the challenges of populism.

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anti-European sentiment feature strongly in populism (Bennett et al., 2020; Ruzza, 2009). Lack of knowledge and understanding among citizens of the European Union’s added value at local level creates a positive context for the Eurosceptic narratives promoted by populists. The close links between Euroscepticism and populism are due to two main factors. First, populists find in the European Union a convenient enemy that they can blame with impunity. While populists are skilful communicators and command multiple communication channels, the predominant opinion is that the European Union has a poor communication strategy. Interviews conducted with citizens in Austria, France, Italy and Poland revealed that there is a very low level of understanding and knowledge about the functioning and the contribution of the European Union, even in France and Italy, which are founding Member States. Secondly, at a deeper level, the EU represents values which the populists oppose because it is an example of everyday practice in liberal democracy and transnational cooperation (Lessenski & Kavrakova, 2019). How Does Populism Impact on the European Union? Regardless of the diversity of its determining factors, specificities and strategies, the overall populist narrative is detrimental to the European project. On the one hand, it exploits and further invokes Euroscepticism; on the other, it represents a serious threat to the European rule of law and fundamental values as stipulated in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union.4 European institutions and actors are most often presented as the supranational elites whose actions and goals run counter to those of the putative ‘people’ (Bennett et al., 2020). This is sometimes reinforced by the fact that national politicians often claim that any success in implementation of their strategies is their own achievement, unlike failures, which are usually a result of what ‘Brussels’ has decided and imposed. The strong anti-European sentiment of various populist right-wing actors resulted in the establishment of the Europe of Nations and Freedom group in the European Parliament in 2015 with 36 seats. This was replaced after the European elections in 2019 by the Identity and Democracy (ID) group of 73 members.

4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2012/art_2/oj.

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Populism, moreover, can be a serious threat to democracy and pluralism. The European Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.5 Moreover, the EU is bound by its Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is the mandatory source of primary law for both the European Union and the Member States.6 Populist narratives always portray populist actors as the true representatives of ‘the people’, discrediting the elites and the current establishment of representative democracy guaranteed by separation of powers and institutional checks and balances (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). In populist narratives, the concept of democratic legitimacy prevails over the principle of the rule of law (Castellà & Simonelli, 2019: 5). Because populists view representative democracy as the rule of the majority, they disregard other basic features, such as pluralism and respect for the rights of minorities. Once they reach power, populist parties tend to destroy the basic features of constitutional democracy and blur the separation of powers by undermining the independence of the judiciary, transferring substantial law-making power to the government and abolishing limits to presidential mandates (Castellà & Simonelli, 2019). While majoritarian preferences may legitimize populist policy reforms, they are particularly harmful for unpopular minorities, such as citizens with low incomes, Roma people, migrants and LGBTQ communities, which can easily become the scapegoats and the losers of policy changes because they are excluded from the decision-making process and their voices remain unheard. This process induces the decline of participatory democracy, decreases the quality of policy-making, and inevitably fosters social and political polarization (Bartha et al., 2020: 78–79). Once in power, populists deliberately diminish the space for public debate by taking control of the media and harassing civil society organizations. This results in the so-called shrinking civic space7 which is part of the wider trend of autocratization occurring at global and national level. 5 Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). 6 It came into effect with adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009,

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT. 7 CIVICUS defines ‘civic space’ as the bedrock of any open and democratic society, where citizens and civil society organisations are able to organize, participate and communicate without hindrance. This can only happen when a state abides by its duty to protect

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Attacks on the civic space, the democratic space for political contestation, and the rule of law are different strategies pursuing the same objective: to gradually silence dissent and concentrate power in the hands of a few (Henckes & Godfrey, 2020). The case of Hungary is a clear example in this regard: the country has been downgraded by the latest Freedom House Nations in Transit report from one of the three democratic frontrunners in 2005 to a non-democratic country in 2020 as a result of the gradual erosion of democracy and centralization of power by Viktor Orbán which led, in March 2020, to the adoption of an emergency law that allows the government to rule by decree indefinitely. While initially justified with the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic and repealed by the Hungarian Parliament in June 2020, this legislative measure raised serious concerns. In April, the European Parliament approved a statement that said Hungary’s measures were ‘incompatible with European values’,8 and the European Commission vice-president V˘era Jourová expressed ‘increased concerns over the rule of law’ (Wanat & Eder, 2020). Moreover, according to some analysts, despite repeal of the law the government is still more powerful than before the coronavirus crisis because this ‘creates a legal basis for the use of newer extraordinary and unlimited government powers’ (Novak, 2020). Among the region’s waning democracies, according to Nations in Transit 2020, Poland continues to stand out for the systematic, targeted and aggressive nature of the government’s attacks on judicial independence and will join hybrid regimes and autocracies if it continues on this course (Csaky, 2020). Finally, populists do not support solidarity; rather, they polarize politics and society through the use of an ‘us versus them’ rhetoric (Wodak, 2015). Stronger polarization works in favour of populist political parties because it increases their support. This is why they are not only responsive to existing cleavages among citizens but are also shaping them through the use of Manichean discourses (Bartha et al., 2020: 10). Discrediting ‘the out-groups’ was the most common strategy employed by the populist discourse both in the last European elections and during non-election its citizens and respects and facilitates their fundamental rights to associate, assemble peacefully, and freely express their views and opinions. 8 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20200512IPR78917/hun gary-s-emergency-measures-meps-ask-eu-to-impose-sanctions-and-stop-payments.

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periods. Populist actors discredit, denounce, criticize or stigmatize ‘the others’ using negative traits, mistakes, unlawful or immoral behaviour (Bennett et al., 2020: 40).9 Online disinformation helps the populist agenda in this respect. Social media allow populists to strengthen their credentials as being outside the system while criticizing mainstream media as driven by alleged political correctness and, thus, hiding important information. Moreover, the architecture of social media allows more direct and unmediated communication and avoidance of the professional media gatekeepers, enabling more antagonistic, negative or ‘uncivil’ discourse including wordplay, sarcasm, criticism, labelling, slurs, personal insults and group insults (Engesser et al., 2017; Bennett et al., 2020). Thus, as confirmed by academic research, populism constitutes a threat to both representative and constitutional dimensions of contemporary democracies. Populism is a threat to the European public sphere per se because it often tries to undermine democracy, rule of law and pluralism.

Strengthening the European Public Sphere as a Response to the Populist Challenge The agonistic pluralistic approach to the public sphere distinguishes between the notions of a ‘public space’ and a ‘public sphere’, where the former is a constituent element of the latter and includes society-initiated and state-initiated publics and the new spaces of communication, interaction and collective action that they create (Sicakkan, 2016). Sicakkan defines the European public sphere as ‘a web of 1) existing historical and new publics, public spaces and discourses of political order 2) networks and social and political actors and most importantly 3) a transcendent public space (the Eurosphere) of transgressing public and the new European-scale political cleavages and agons that they generate in interaction with other publics and public spaces of Europe’ (Sicakkan,

9 Bennett et al. (2020: 40) defines ‘the others’ as: (a) geographical others already in the country (asylum seekers, immigrants), (b) geographical others outside the country (foreigners), (c) geographical others outside the country who are (potentially or in fact) approaching the country (refugees, immigrants), (d) political/ideological, (e) legal (criminals, paedophiles), (f) cultural/ethnic (other cultural values or patterns), (g) religious, (h) gender, (i) economic: the poor (losers, the unemployed) (j) economic: the rich (wealthy people, the winners) or (k) any other specific out-group.

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2016: 24). According to Sicakkan, it is the Eurosphere (intentionally build by the European elites in order to facilitate the establishment of a European public sphere) with the historically existing other public spaces at different levels, which makes the European Public sphere possible and acts as its driving force. It can be argued that strengthening the European public sphere may effectively narrow the space conquered by populists if it involves strengthening at least three of its dimensions. Firstly, it is imperative to safeguard the rule of law to uphold democracy and pluralism, without which there can be no public sphere. Secondly, there is a need for a democratic innovation of the Eurosphere that allows for citizens’ collaborative engagement manner and meets their expectations of more direct involvement in decision-making between elections. Finally, it is essential to support and sustain public spaces and their actors and encourage informed interactions between publics at different levels to foster debate and the implementation of policies tailored to local needs. Safeguarding the Rule of Law According to the agonistic pluralism perspective of the public sphere, conflicts are an ordinary part of politics as long as they involve encounters between adversaries and not enemies. The danger of institutional dissolution lies in the extent to which parties perceive one another as enemies which need to be eliminated (Sicakkan, 2016). In order to ensure a ‘safe space’ for pluralistic conflicts and contestations which contribute to the further building of the agonistic European Public sphere, the rule of law must be safeguarded throughout the EU as the basis for democracy and the prevention of autocracy. However, the instruments for safeguarding the rule of law in the hands of the Eurosphere are limited. Unlike the effectiveness of the accession criteria of the European Union on reforms of the negotiating countries (the so-called Copenhagen criteria10 ), which include the rule of law, the membership leverage on the Member States is limited once they have acceded to the EU. In the political domain, EU safeguards against extremism in politics are achieved by 10 The Treaty on European Union sets out the conditions (Article 49) and principles (Article 6[1]) with which any country wishing to become an EU member must conform. The political criteria include stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.

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exercising peer pressure (such as monitoring developments in the rule of law, issuing recommendations) and supervising implementation of the European legislation in the Member States (Kavrakova, 2009). It is only in recent years that the EU has sought to devise and agree upon some more specific measures designed to remedy political shortcomings, such as financial sanctions and invocation of Article 7, none of which has yet been fully implemented. The Eurosphere ‘Guardian of the Treaties’11 is the European Commission. It monitors whether EU laws are applied correctly and on time and takes steps if a Member State fails to do so. These measures may include formal infringement proceedings against the country in question, referral of the matter to the Court of Justice, and a second referral if the issue is not settled before or after the court decision, with a request for financial penalties. The infringement proceedings are used when there is a concrete violation of an EU law. For example, in April 2020, the European Commission launched an infringement procedure against Poland for ‘Violation of EU Law by the legislative changes affecting the judiciary’.12 The Treaty of Amsterdam13 has envisaged a much more severe sanctioning mechanism—the so-called ‘nuclear’ option of article 7 TEU— designed to remedy ‘serious and persistent breach’ of European fundamental rights, freedoms and values, including democracy and the rule of law. This mechanism is designed in two stages: a ‘preventive phase’14 empowering one-third of Member States, the European Parliament and the Commission to initiate a procedure whereby the Council can determine by a four-fifths majority the existence of a ‘clear risk of a serious breach’ in a Member State of the EU values proclaimed in Article 2 TEU.15 Before deciding if this is indeed the case, there should be a hearing of the Member State concerned, to which recommendations can 11 https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/what-european-commis sion-does/law_en. 12 https://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/infringements-proceedings/infringem ent_decisions/?lang_code=en. 13 https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_of_ams terdam_en.pdf. 14 Article 7, par.1 TEU. 15 The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democ-

racy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in

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be addressed. The European Commission has activated this prevention measure against Poland, while the European Parliament has initiated one against Hungary. The second stage,16 which may result in depriving the Member State concerned of voting rights in the EU decision-making process, can be triggered by the European Commission or by one-third of Member States, after the Member State in question has been invited to submit its observations. It is the European Council that finally determines the existence of the breach by unanimity, after obtaining Parliament’s consent, which makes many experts sceptical about whether implementing this second phase will ever be feasible. The Council decides the suspension of voting rights by qualified majority. Additional soft measures at the disposal of the European Commission include the EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, the Rule of Law Review Cycle and the annual reports on application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. These last are examined and debated by the Council, which adopts conclusions in their regard, and by Parliament, in the framework of its annual report on fundamental rights in the EU. The EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law was launched by the European Commission in 2014 with the aim of ensuring effective and coherent protection of the rule of law. It comprises three stages: Commission assessment (structured dialogue between the Commission and the Member State), followed if necessary by a Rule of Law Opinion; a Commission Rule of Law recommendation; and follow-up by the Member State to the recommendation. This framework was recently applied for the first time to Poland. In July 2019, the European Commission launched a Rule of Law Review Cycle17 comprising an annual Rule of Law Report monitoring the situation in the Member States in relation to the rule of law, and which forms the basis of interinstitutional dialogue. The report covers judicial protection by independent courts, separation of powers and enforcement of EU law, but also corruption, media pluralism and elections.

which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail. 16 Articles 7.2 and 7.3 TEU. 17 (COM[2019] 0343).

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The effectiveness of the soft measures, however, depends entirely on the follow-up actions taken. The experience of Bulgaria and Romania with the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) in reforming the judiciary, fighting organized crime and corruption since the accession of the two countries to the European Union in 2007, has proven that this monitoring mechanism has very limited impact in regard to its intended purpose and is largely ineffective. The main reason is that the problem-solving in this case is of a political not technical nature. Keeping the measure within the technical domain does not work if the problem is political, and it should be addressed by political means (Kavrakova, 2009). A measure much more potentially effective because of its feasibility to inflict costs on decision-makers is the one recently proposed by the European Commission Regulation on the protection of the Union budget in the case of generalized deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States, and which links EU funds to respect for the rule of law. If adopted, this instrument will enable pressure to be put on Member States violating the rule of law and fundamental rights. Considering the substantial financial leverage of the European Union on the governments of Poland—the biggest net beneficiary of the EU budget (e12 billion net in 2018)—and Hungary ranked just behind Poland (e5 billion net in 2018, more than 4 per cent of its GDP), this mechanism has the potential to provide effective political leverage in safeguarding the rule of law and European values in these two countries. However, the aforementioned measure should be balanced with increased direct European funding to support civil society and other democratic actors in the countries in question, the purpose being to prevent the sanctioning of non-democratic governments at the expense of the citizens and civil society and to support the civic and public spaces. Such direct support is important because shrinking civic space is often accompanied by decreased actual funding and restrictive legislation on funding for civil society organizations (CSOs). These latter are subject to restrictions in accessing public and private funding on a national level as national programmes are being cut, and financial and administrative burdens are put in place, including limitations on access to foreign funding. Civil society organizations in non-metropolitan areas in Poland, for example, are in a financially precarious position because such organizations are largely dependent on local authorities for funding and report the negative effects of a populist government. CSOs are active socially,

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but financial problems make it difficult for them to carry out their statutory activities, which address socio-economic difficulties in the regions. Concerning the populist anti-immigration narrative, services for migrants are particularly difficult to implement (Lessenski & Kavrakova, 2019: 119). The case of Poland is particularly interesting because its citizens are largely pro-European and the country’s European membership is seen as a bulwark against populism, for it enjoys high support despite a generally Eurosceptic, populist government. While the European Union is the main target for populists—vilified as a source of evil for the people, threatening cultural and ethnic homogeneity, instilling foreign (i.e. liberal) values, etc.—the very high public support for EU membership in Poland (80%) constrains populist attacks against the European Union because populists do not want to clash with the majority of the public (Lessenski & Kavrakova, 2019). Fostering Political and Democratic Innovation of the Eurosphere One of the successful narratives of populists, which resonates well with citizens—possibly because of the crisis of representative democracy—is the promise of direct democracy. While citizens consider it an opportunity to be heard by politicians, experts and civil society activists are nearly unanimous in their criticism of direct democracy in its current forms, warning of serious drawbacks, especially regarding referenda (Lessenski & Kavrakova, 2019). With a new deliberative-collaborative model of democracy emerging worldwide, however, there are new methods of citizen engagement that can be implemented as complementary to the current model of representative democracy in order to strengthen it and to respond to the demands of citizens for more co-creation of solutions in the decision-making process at all levels. The potential of digital democracy, although still under-researched, is significant in this regard, with positive examples at local and national level demonstrating that it can provide added value to democratic engagement. An assessment conducted by the European Citizen Action Service (ECAS) of 27 national case studies on co-deciding with citizens using ICT from around the globe (European Citizen Action Service, 2016) suggests that crowdsourcing tools, especially as a component of democratic innovation, can enhance participation by involving citizens and civil society beyond

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the typical stakeholders, including young people. It can also ensure a learning process for both citizens and decision-makers through a real-time exchange of views and opinions on the content and process of policies and policy-making. Fresh and innovative ideas for shaping policy based on the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ can emerge, introducing ‘hidden’ expertise into the debate. Finally, it increases the legitimacy of policy-making, which is an ever-increasing necessity in the EU (ECAS, 2016). Crowdsourcing legislation with citizens, participatory budgeting, and citizens’ assemblies of randomly selected citizens are only some examples of democratic innovation, which, if embraced by EU decision-makers, can reduce the gap between themselves and citizens and narrow the space for populism. While the methodologies are clear and have already been tested at local and national level,18 there are some important conditions which should be in place in order to ensure success. First, decision-makers should use digital tools to interact with young people where they are naturally—in the digital space—instead of waiting for young people to engage in politics as currently practised. Second, digital democracy methods should be applied as complementary to traditional ones because there is no evidence that they alone can ensure representativeness. Moreover, to explore the full potential of ICT in enhancing democracy, democratic innovations should go hand in hand with sound policies to ensure privacy, tackle the digital divide, promote new media and digital media literacy and combine online and offline activities. This is important in order to ensure inclusiveness of both the younger generations, who spend a lot of time online and are not interested in traditional forms of political participation, and the older generations. Both may, when misinformed, make poor choices with a detrimental impact on the outcome of elections. In order to transform ad hoc practices of democratic innovation into a structured and sustainable decision-making process, it is essential that decision-makers apply them on a regular basis, ensure a sound outreach and communication to citizens in order to secure their informed participation, and commit to a follow-up process of what and how the citizens’ input will be taken on board when making the decisions. Moreover, there is a need to develop and consistently apply a universally applicable assessment methodology of democratic innovation initiatives and practices, 18 Examples: Ireland’s Citizen Assembly—https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/ and France’s Citizens’ Convention on Climate—https://www.conventioncitoyennepourleclima t.fr/.

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including the digital democracy ones, in order to ensure a solid learning curve based on analysis and evaluation of case studies, data and feedback mechanisms. The outcomes and the lessons learnt from the assessment should inform improved digital democracy and democratic innovation policies over time. The following examples of successful collaborative decision-making with citizens on different subjects and at different levels can be applied at the EU level in order to complement representative democracy with collaborative elements of participatory democracy. Paris Participatory Budgeting Participatory Budgeting is a decision-making process whereby citizens deliberate and negotiate over the distribution of public resources (Wampler, 2007). Paris has implemented a citywide participatory budgeting system on all types of policy issues since 2014. It started as a small pilot project, with the city of Paris proposing fifteen projects that could be funded with up to about 20 million euros and letting citizens vote on the projects in which to invest, via the ballot box or online. Within two years, participation increased from 40,000 voters in 2014 to 92,809 in 2016 (Cabannes, 2017), representing 5 per cent of the total urban population. Today, Paris Budget Participatif is an official platform that lets Parisians decide how to spend 5 per cent of the investment budget from 2014 to 2020, amounting to around 500 million euros (Lironi, 2018). Permanent Sortition Assembly in Belgium Sortition is a sampling technique used to select a group of participants equally divided by gender and proportionally representative of age demographics, geographic location and education level.19 In March 2019, the Parliament of the German-speaking Belgian community (Ostbelgien, 77,000 inhabitants) unanimously decided to establish a Permanent Sortition Assembly in Belgium. A permanent ‘Citizens’ Council’ (Bürgerrat ) composed of 24 randomly selected citizens serving for 18 months will have the task of selecting topics and setting the agenda, each year, for several ‘Citizens’ Assemblies’ (Bürgerversammlungen). These assemblies (maximum 3 per year) will be composed by means of sortition and age,

19 More information is available at https://participedia.net/method/5507.

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gender and education quotas. The council will decide their size and the duration of their work. The assemblies will present recommendations to the German-speaking Parliament, which will discuss them (if they reach a 4/5 majority support in the citizens’ assembly) and will take a justified decision whether or not to follow them. The Belgium Permanent Sortition Assembly has the ambition to serve as a laboratory for the rest of Europe and is supported by international experts. Crowdsourcing the Constitution of Iceland with Citizens Crowdsourcing is ‘an online, distributed, problem-solving and production model that leverages the collective intelligence of online communities to serve specific organisational goals’ (Brabham, 2013: 1). One of the most interesting examples of crowdsourcing legislation is the one concerning the Icelandic Constitution (Lironi, 2020). In 2008–2010, Iceland was suffering a severe financial depression with an impact on its political and economic establishment. The government decided to embrace an inclusive approach in rewriting the Icelandic constitution in order to regain trust and legitimacy from citizens (Bruno, 2015: 17). In 2010–2012, the Parliament and the Prime Minister of Iceland invited citizens to join a crowdsourcing process to co-create Iceland’s new constitution (Landemore, 2015) so that it more closely matched their values and beliefs. The process moved through several phases. It started with randomly selected citizens discussing the Constitutional values and concluded with twenty-five citizens, who drafted the Constitution. All the contributions were crowdsourced nation-wide and a non-binding referendum took place in October 2012, with 49% voter turnout. The proposal was approved by two-thirds of the voters, but the Constitutional reform never took place because it ultimately stalled in the Parliament because of internal Icelandic party politics (Gylfason, 2013). More than six years later, the Icelandic government decided to resume the effort to reform the constitution using wide public engagement, but this time ensuring that there was sufficient support from all Icelandic political parties. In the period of seven years (by the end of 2025), party leaders will hold regular meetings in the Parliament to discuss the progress of the constitutional revision, together with the Prime Minister. The public engagement process is being led by a combination of experts in the field of participatory democracy including academia and civil society, and it will be based on the outcomes of the following three main methods and steps:

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1. an opinion poll conducted to determine the core values of the Icelandic people and map the public’s view on the topics covered by the revision of the constitution 2. a ‘Better Iceland’ (betraisland.is) crowdsourcing forum organized to ensure online deliberation and facilitate constructive suggestions on amendments, arguments and votes for or against proposals 3. deliberative Polls administered face-to-face. These have already taken place on 9 and 10 November 2019, being supervised by the University of Iceland in cooperation with Professor James Fishkin, originator of the concept of Deliberative Polling and the Stanford Centre for Deliberative Democracy. The results were analysed and presented to the media. Whenever the party leaders produce a constitutional reform text, this will be published on the government’s online public consultation forum to receive feedback from the public through further engagement methods. Participatory Democracy Mechanisms at EU Level—The Way Forward Although Art. 11 (1) TEU provides a legislative framework for citizens’ involvement in the decision-making process, existing forums for citizen participation in the EU have proven ineffective in remedying the democratic deficit for several reasons (Lironi, 2016). While the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) is a unique supranational agenda-setting instrument of participatory democracy, which has gained popularity in recent years, it is not for ‘everyday’ use. It requires significant resources and mobilization, and its impact on the EU legislation remains limited. The online EU public consultations of the European Commission are highly technical and mainly used by organized interests. They are not user-friendly and accessible to the public, and there is a general lack of awareness among citizens that this tool exists as a form of e-participation. Moreover, minimum standards of consultations are binding only for the European Commission in the policy-making process. Several other e-participation and sortition projects have been started on an individual ad hoc basis by some EU institutions or politicians. However, although welcome, they lack harmonization and institutional support across the EU. For example, the European Commission has been co-funding e-participation projects, and some Directorates-General

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(DGs) have been working on their own platforms, while Members of the European Parliament are using digital tools to reach out to their constituents more often (Lironi, 2016). The crises of representative democracy currently afflicting the EU calls for more innovative forms of citizen engagement in order to regain citizens’ trust in the European project and reconnect with them. The legislative framework at EU level (article 11 TEU) provides a basis for strengthening the principle of representative democracy by complementing the existing participatory toolbox with methods for engaging citizens who are not represented and want to contribute directly in a deliberative-collaborative manner. This is all the more important because the European Union has not yet been able to create basic media institutions of the general European public sphere. There is a lack of panEuropean media channels available to European citizens, and the current COVID-19 crises have re-emphasized the ultimate importance for the EU to digitalize its direct links with citizens further. Crowdsourcing legislation can provide an effective platform for citizens wanting to participate and engage in the EU legislative process. The European Commission can establish a channel parallel to the online consultations for organized interests, and specifically designed to tap into the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ and engage citizens by crowdsourcing their ideas and input. The European Commission can initiate participatory budgeting at EU level to engage citizens in deciding how to spend a percentage of the EU budget and introduce sortition as a mechanism for citizen engagement in certain policy areas. The long-awaited Conference on the Future of Europe, which will take place in 2021, represents a great opportunity for testing the combination of different innovative online and offline methods for debating thematic and structural issues, the results of which should be assessed and sustained. One of the structural reforms, along with enhancing the democratic toolbox at EU level, is the introduction of transnational voting lists for the European Parliament in order to stimulate both politicians and citizens to act as Europeans. At present, the European elections are still second-order elections. National elections held in the same period take precedence, and politicians act nationally rather than as Europeans (Bennett et al., 2020: 61). This is partly due to the refusal of the traditional European parties to embrace democratic innovation in terms of reforming the system by introducing transnational lists, despite constant

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calls for it from civil society and some politicians, and attempts to create transnational movements (e.g. DiEM25). Sustaining Public Spaces by Supporting Civic Actors, Civic Education and Encouraging Interactions According to Cheneval and Nicolaidis (2016), the common European public space is not meant to bring about a unique European people, but rather to serve as the setting that provides each political arena with resources to address questions important for the respective publics, and encourage democratic national conversations informed by interconnecting democracies. Sicakkan (2016) promotes the multiplicity of public spaces in a public sphere and the possibility of a fragmented and segmented public sphere. Overall, there is consensus that the European public sphere has a strong bearing on the development of a European identity as a space of debate where collective identities are constructed, and political communities are created (Hennen, 2020). Strengthening the European public sphere, therefore, involves strengthening both the Eurosphere and the European public sphere’s public spaces with their actors and the interactions among them. As an integral part of the European public sphere, the local spaces of debate and discussion and the civic space at all levels are essential for limiting the space for populism (Lessenski & Kavrakova, 2019). Those are exactly the spaces where place-sensitive policies (Iammarino et al., 2018) can be discussed as the best option for confronting the economic decline, weak human resources and low employment opportunities which are at the root of ‘the geography of EU discontent’ and the best method to both stem and reverse the rise of anti-establishment voting which is threatening not only European integration but also economic, social and political stability itself (Dijkstra et al., 2018). While sustaining these spaces is mainly in the hands of their publics, the European Union and the European Commission can support them by supporting the civic space and its actors—civil society organizations and networks—by fostering formal and informal civic education and by facilitating multi-stakeholder interactions and exchange. The phenomenon of shrinking civic space is deeply embedded in a wider trend of regressing democratic space and authoritarian resurgence and must be responded to accordingly. Although in some circumstances it would be wise to frame the response as focused solely on civil space,

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it would be difficult to succeed in the response without considering the wider political sphere of broader contestation (Henckes & Godfrey, 2020: 43). Pan-European networks, whether created in a top-down manner— by the European Union and with its support—or independently, also as a reaction to the former, are the backbone of the European Public Sphere because they keep the already-existing collective actors and their public spaces linked (Sicakkan, 2016). The European Commission should empower civil society organizations at the European level but also in the regions to deliver their mission and play their role of ‘speaking on behalf of those who are underrepresented and advocating for the marginalised, and to educate and create a kind of genuine bond between different communities’ (Lessenski & Kavrakova, 2019: 157) by ensuring independent funding from populist governments and players. The digital public spaces created bottom-up outside the digital communication infrastructure of the Eurosphere, and which link EU citizens and publics transnationally, are an important part of the European public sphere and should be supported as well. The Commission can foster and fund the exchange of good practices and encourage political and democratic innovation at national, regional and local levels. The need to invest in formal and informal civic education includes education on active citizenship, democracy, the EU and national competencies, populism, online disinformation, EU fundamental rights and values and, especially, respect for minorities and their role in an inclusive democratic society which has been undermined by populists. Developing in-depth knowledge on the specificities of the populist phenomenon and a blueprint (strategic framework) for tackling populism is, therefore, a necessary basis for devising tailor-made strategies that work at local level (Lessenski & Kavrakova, 2019). This is specifically important given that despite global convergence, post-communist democratization and EU integration pressure, inhabitants of Europe embody a heterogeneous populace with diverse values and political attitudes. In North-Western Europe, democratic mentalities are prevalent (Denmark and Norway—90% of the population), while almost two-thirds (62.2%) of Europeans seem to lean towards sceptically non-democratic or anti-democratic mentalities, especially in the post-communist countries, the post-Soviet countries and in South-Eastern Europe (Klicperova-Baker & Kostal, 2016).

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Finally, the European Commission should boost internationalization and Europeanization through exchanges—horizontal, vertical and multistakeholder—involving actors of different public spaces at all levels in order to support the international spread of democratic culture as the basis of the European public sphere. While isolation works in populists’ favour because it exploits fears of the unknown and of those who are different, internationalization and Europeanization broaden horizons and foster the acceptance of ‘others’ through personal experience (Lessenski & Kavrakova, 2019).

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Civil Society as Anti-Populism? Countering the Populist Threat and Campaigning for Change in the Discourse of EU-Level CSOs Paolo Cossarini

Introduction Populism, it has been argued, emerges on the terrain of modern civil society, and yet it ultimately entails an existential risk for civil society’s fundamentals (Arato & Cohen, 2018). Undeniably, populist politics appeal to the people in order to warn about the limits of ever-growing elitist systems and to condemn different types of material and political inequalities. However, populism’s essentialist stance often betrays a deep tension with some key principles upon which civil society and liberal democracy are founded. This tension is undoubtedly linked to the definition that one gives to populism and thus to democracy. On the one hand, many have emphasised the necessary link between populism and democracy—they are “fellow travellers” (Arditi, 2004)—and also stressed populism’s democratic nature: populism as the “authentic voice of democracy” (Lasch, 1996: 105), or the “the ideology of democracy” (Canovan, 2002),

P. Cossarini (B) Department of Culture and Learning, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 C. Ruzza et al. (eds.), The Impact of Populism on European Institutions and Civil Society, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73411-4_9

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it being potentially the core of democratic politics, and a source for the renewal of democratic institutions (Canovan, 1999; Laclau, 2005). On the other hand, populism has been seen as the opposite of liberal pluralism (Mudde, 2004) and as intrinsically anti-democratic (Müller, 2017), on the grounds that behind all populist manifestations there lies the belief that current liberal institutions and procedural mechanisms are useless and no longer responsive to citizens’ demands. This chapter starts from this contradictory relationship among populism, democracy, and civil society, and it assesses the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) at the EU level as a counter-force to a specific form of populist politics, namely its radical right manifestations which in recent years have been on the rise in Europe. Over the past few decades, EU-level CSOs have emerged as key actors in fighting discriminations, and their work involves tasks such as mapping violent and discriminatory acts, re-framing public discourse on different types of discriminations, and lobbying at the European level. However, the pressure recently applied by the populist radical right (PRR) on CSOs and actors across Europe is representative of the threats to which civil society is subject. Attacks on sea rescue NGOs in the Mediterranean, refusals to accept refugees fleeing war zones, and bans on organisations working for LGBT rights are just a few examples (e.g. Berti, 2020). As one might expect, the tension between PRR forces and civil society is driven by multiple factors that essentially relate to ideological variables. First and foremost, EU-based CSOs defend and promote a set of inclusive, cosmopolitan, liberal, and social-democratic values that the PRR largely reject. Indeed, because CSOs are seen as promoting a progressive vision of the social reality, and as connected to left-leaning movements, they are often the target of the exclusionary narrative of PRR groups, which instead express a conservative backlash (e.g. Alexander et al., 2020; Norris & Inglehart, 2016; Ruzza & Sanchez Salgado, 2020). Moreover, CSOs operating within the orbit of the EU institutions are seen as part of the supranational system led by remote elites which ultimately represent the opposition to the ‘ordinary people’, whom populism is supposed to represent. In this vein, CSOs are often criticised also for being intermediary bodies that alter the direct link between rulers and ruled (e.g. Urbinati, 2015). In this context, this chapter focuses on the role of several EU-level CSOs working in the main fields of discrimination, i.e. gender, race, religion, and migration. Drawing on a document and frame analysis, the

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chapter investigates the extent to which the narrative of those CSOs is alternative to the exclusionary discourse implemented by populist radical right forces. Although the recent literature has stressed the increasing importance of a nationalist and socially conservative strand of civil society that promotes an exclusionary narrative and is thus often framed as ‘uncivil’ society (e.g. Keane, 1999; Rosenblum et al., 2002; Ruzza, 2009), this chapter argues as follows: (a) CSOs are fully aware of the populist turn: all the civil society groups examined have incorporated reactions to the ‘populist turn’ into their discourse; (b) they frame populism as a threat to liberal-democratic values; (c) they build a counter-discourse based on the defence of human rights, rule of law, and pluralism. Moreover, it emerges in the chapter that (d) CSOs tend to emphasise the risks associated with the rise of populism that are most relevant to the values and strategic aspects of each organisation. Overall, although the longestablished—often naive—narrative that CSOs are groups promoting only inclusionary policies is to be avoided, the chapter stresses that the EUlevel CSOs put forward a shared ideational agenda which emphasises the key role of intermediary bodies for the European project and more broadly for liberal democracy. The chapter is structured as follows. First, it describes a theoretical framework which serves as the basis for conceptualisation of the link between populism and civil society. In this regard, the chapter sees the contrast between PRR forces and civil society as a movement/countermovement dynamic. Second, the dataset and the methodological standpoint are presented. Third, the last two sections develop the analysis, which evidences how civil society frames populism and how it narratively constructs an opposition to it.

Populism and Civil Society: Contextual and Analytical Clarifications In this chapter, the term ‘civil society’ is used to refer to the broad network of organisations that operate neither as part of government nor as private market organisations (Theocharis, 2011). EU-level CSOs are organised in a network-based structure, and they normally take the form of umbrella organisations consisting of various national groups. Historically, CSOs have played a crucial role in the consolidation of Western democracies (Tilly, 1978), and they have been seen as key actors in

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promoting the EU’s legitimacy. CSOs have a direct role in disseminating the EU’s fundamental rights regime (Thiel, 2017), being active in human rights promotion, the anti-discrimination fight, and democratic support—the principles that shape the ideational underpinnings of the European project. Importantly, these values coincide with the areas where the diverse kinds of CSOs operate, so that the EU and CSOs form a principle-based coalition that seeks to promote liberal and cosmopolitan ideals within both national and supranational policies. In accordance with this perspective, civil society has been recognised by the EU institutions as a major driver of democratic development: The most prosperous functioning democracies are those where civil society can thrive, where every group can have its voice heard and where civil society can freely monitor government activities. An active and vibrant civil society acts as a bridge between people and their authorities.1

However, the values of CSOs and EU institutions diverge from those disseminated by the populist radical right (PRR). In fact, these ‘European’ values and their promoters have been targeted by populist actors particularly hostile to the cosmopolitan and inclusionary vision of EU institutions and the majority of CSOs. By contrast, PRR groups promote a mix of populism, nativism, identity politics, a Manichean worldview, and an authoritarian stance, as Mudde (2010) rightly stressed. This is accompanied by economic protectionism, and the securitisation of migration issues, that is, a “closed-border” and “law-and-order” rhetoric (Mudde, 2010; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Rydgren, 2005; Wodak et al., 2013; Cossarini, 2018). Recent cases of PRR parties in Northern Europe undoubtedly add nuances to this categorisation: rather than being directly opposed to pluralism and liberalism as such, these parties reconfigure traditional liberal values in their own populist terms. They often invoke liberal defences of free speech, secularism, and individual freedom. For instance, they portray groups such as homosexuals as part of ‘the people’ versus allegedly dangerous ‘others’ (often Muslims). In doing so they “display a more ‘civic’ and liberal democratic face” (Pels, 2011: 27) compared with older PRR parties. 1 European Commission, Speech. Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations: Address at the Civil Society Forum on Southern Neighbourhood, 28 May 2015.

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Nevertheless, the PRR’s overall narrative stands in opposition to both elitism and pluralism by claiming that there should be no intermediary space between the allegedly ‘virtuous’ people and the ‘corrupt’ elites. Besides obvious differences between left- and right-wing forms of populism, at its core populism comprises the claim that ‘the people’ constitute the legitimate sovereign from which all justifications of political actions derive, and a conceptualisation of the social realm as split into two opposite social blocs. This triggers an anti-elitism feeling against those in power and an anti-pluralism (see, for instance, Müller, 2017). The consequence of populist anti-pluralism is that the political leaders are the only legitimate representatives of ‘the people’, while those organisations and intermediary bodies designed to check political power in liberal democracies—be they the judiciary, the media, or NGOs—are delegitimised. Hence, in populist narratives, the concept of democratic legitimacy often prevails over the principle of the rule of law. Anti-elitism and anti-pluralism are at the core of the collision between CSOs and populist politics, since the latter creates a hostile climate towards all associations that act as intermediaries. Indeed, in recent years, populist parties have radically reshaped the political landscape across Europe, and at the EU level. Their success in the 2014 and 2019 European elections—though not majoritarian—has altered the composition of the EU institutions and has also impacted on organised civil society. To undermine the legitimacy and the efficacy of CSOs, many PRR leaders have used the professionalisation of NGOs and their reliance on foreign funding in order to portray CSOs as part of the elite. Moreover, the frequent attacks against foreign-funded NGOs fall directly within the narrative of CSOs as elitist organisations working against the people’s interests and national sovereignty (Rodríguez-Garavito & Gomez, 2018: 19). Interestingly, Rodríguez-Garavito and Gomez stress the main types of action that populists employ to curb the work of CSOs. They combine obstructing foreign funding, placing burdens on the operational capabilities of CSOs, controlling the work of independent media, and sullying CSO campaigns. In this vein, a study conducted by the European Economic and Social Committee (Lessebski et al., 2019) confirmed that CSOs cite the lack of financial and human resources as the most important obstacles that they face in populist times. Along the same lines, this chapter delves into the impact of populism on the EU institutions and civil society organisations, and the way in which these institutions and group react. Drawing

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on a large database of documents (see also Pejovic & Cossarini, 2020; Ruzza, 2020), first explored in what follows is how CSOs frame populism and then the extent to which they call for action to counter the exclusionary discourse popularised within mainstream politics by PRR parties and movements.

Data and Methodology This chapter draws on a thematic and frame analysis of the texts produced by well-known EU-based CSOs. This type of analysis involves mapping the content and identifying the salience of certain themes and patterns of meaning within qualitative data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Frame analysis, moreover, makes it possible to grasp the way in which discursive acts and specific narratives are constructed (Caiani et al., 2012; Snow, 2013). The chapter therefore describes a content and frame analysis of the CSOs texts intended to identify the CSOs’ discursive interpretations of populism: that is, the way in which those CSOs frame the populist challenge and how they respond to it. The dataset analysed consisted of various types of document produced by several EU-level CSOs. This database comprised 460 documents published between January 2013 and December 2019 and collected from the major civil associations that focus on the main areas of discrimination on which the EU focuses: that is, gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, and related issues such as rule of law and immigration. Thanks to this wide time span, it was possible to identify variations in the salience of certain themes and frames over time, as well as to track the evolution of the CSOs’ discourse. All texts were retrieved from the official webpages of civil society organisations. As regards types of document, they were annual reports, press releases, open letters to the EU institutions, statements, speeches, and policy notes on concrete measures to be implemented (by either the EU or Member States). The data selection in this chapter was made to sample a relevant set of data epitomising the discourse of EU-level CSOs. Since civil society organisations publish diverse types of documents, some keywords were used to filter them and identify the most relevant ones. These are: populism, discrimination, hate speech, xenophobia, Euroscepticism, migration, Brexit, European democracy, and European values. In addition to these, some more topics were used to select and map the civil society’s discourse, in particular those topics related to different types of

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discrimination, such as human rights violations, LGBT, race and racism, gender and sexual discrimination, and religion-related issues. These topics and keywords were taken to guarantee the pertinence of the documents to the analysis, while allowing for the manageability of the dataset. Moreover, when the documents were longer, fewer were selected for that specific year in order to maintain balance in the sample of documents. The CSOs covered by the research were the following: European Association for the Defence of Human Rights (AEDH); The European Women’s Lobby (EWL); International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA); The European Grassroots Antiracist Movement (EGAM); The European Network Against Racism (ENAR); A Jewish Contribution to an Inclusive Europe (CEJI); European Roma Grassroots Organisations Network (ERGO); The European Roma Information Office (ERIO); European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC); Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student (FEMYSO); European Humanist Federation (EHF); Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS EUROPE); European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE); Civil Society Europe (CSE); European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development (CONCORD); Open Society Foundation (OSF). Besides these, a few ‘conservative’ NGOs were also considered. They were, Agenda Europe, European Christian Political Movement (ECPM), Federation of Catholic Family Associations in Europe (FAFCE), and the Observatory on Intolerance and Discrimination against Christians in Europe (OIDACE). The content and frame analysis was computer-assisted. The coding was carried out using Atlas.ti and was mostly inductive, since the texts of the CSOs underwent a thorough reading that made it possible to identify empirically the most relevant concerns of the CSOs as well as the recurrent frames associated with populism. The frame analysis is also illustrated with excerpts from the documents in the subsequent sections.

Framing the Threat What do CSOs talk about? How do CSOs frame populism? These questions are significant because by addressing them one can gain an idea of what is at stake according to the wide range of civil society organisations that operate at the European level. The database thematic analysis yielded insights on the main topics and concerns for the EU-level CSOs. Figure 1 shows the first ten topics that concern the EU-level CSOs. It also displays the variation over time of these themes. As one might expect,

Fig. 1 Main themes in the texts of the CSOs, 2013–2019 (Source Created by the author)

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the main topics of CSOs relate to the diverse kinds of social and political issues that each organisation works on, and especially to the various types of discrimination and human rights violations that they address. The notions of ‘discrimination’ and ‘human rights’ are indeed the ones most common and recurrent throughout the timeframe considered. ‘Migration’ and ‘racism’ emerge as topics of increasing importance, with a peak in 2016 and 2018, respectively. They are most probably linked to the so-called refugee crisis and its political and social consequences. Interestingly, the concepts of ‘violence’ and ‘women’ are also among the terms that most frequently appear in the texts of the EU-level CSOs. This is indubitably linked to the core concern of most of the CSOs with all types of rights violations, on the one hand, and with gender-related issues on the other hand. Moreover, also to be noted is that CSOs are somewhat self-referential because they regularly talk about themselves in their texts. What is important for the purpose of this study is that ‘populism’, at least as a concept, is not frequently present in the texts of the CSOs. The thematic analysis revealed that the term ‘populism’ was not as salient as other terms in the documents analysed—and therefore in the narrative of civil society as a whole. It was less used than other concepts, such as racism, hate speech, discrimination, far-right politics, which, although connected to the former, are not the same. Populism was not among the top ten themes. It actually appeared along with ‘nationalism’ 98 times in the 460 documents considered, and it came after many other topics, such as ‘environment’, ‘Roma’, ‘Islamophobia’, and ‘sexual discriminations’. It must therefore be acknowledged that CSOs have been aware of the rise of populism and at the same time have incorporated the ambiguous grammar of populist politics into their discourse: Although populism is difficult to define, it shows several recurrent features: it promotes direct democracy, claims a direct link between the government and the people and rejects the established political system; it offers immediate and demagogical solutions to people’s day to day problems; it spreads simplistic and antagonistic images such as the sovereign nation, the “sane” people vs. the “corrupted” and “technocratic” elites; it idealises the nation and its perceived traditions, fuelling the criticism of any supranational political system; it holds an anti-globalisation discourse aimed at protecting vulnerable people from the consequences of the competitive capitalist market. (European Humanist Federation, October 2013)

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In this vein, closer inspection of the texts of the CSOs during the 2013– 2019 period reveals that populism was normally associated with, and often followed by, a series of political terms that belong to the right-wing, when not far-right, type of politics. ‘Racism’, ‘hate speech and crime’, ‘far-right politics’, and ‘nationalism’ are the most common concepts that emerge when the CSOs talk about populist parties or movements, either in power or in opposition. The analysis also confirms that this association was recurrent during all the years analysed, with a peak located between 2017 and 2018. This confirms what was noted in the study conducted by the European Economic and Social Committee (Lessebski et al., 2019), which rightly pointed out that CSOs do not distinguish populism—understood in terms of the juxtaposition of ‘the people’ against ‘the elite’—as a separate issue to tackle; rather, they seek to tackle other related phenomena such as xenophobia, racism, or hate speech. Moreover, a thorough analysis of these texts reveals that the most common frame associated with populism is the idea of a threat (current or imminent) raised by particular political parties and movements. (Front National, Fidesz, Northern League, are those most frequently cited in the documents.) [...] hate speech and divisive rhetoric inextricably pervade and threaten all aspects of our lives, most notably in the context of populism and extremism. (ILGA-Europe, 11 February 2019)

This threat is especially connected to a specific narrative which features an anti-immigration, anti-civil society, anti-EU, and anti-rule of law stance; and most of the time it is linked to given countries, such as Hungary, Poland, and Italy. In other words, populism does not stand alone in the discourse of CSOs; rather, it comes in a compound of associated concepts that shape its naturally elusive meaning. When the CSOs talk about populism, they clearly mean right-wing populism, and they frame it as a threat against which civil society must build a counter-force. Furthermore, with an unintended reference to what has been called “populist hype” (Glynos & Mondon, 2019), CSOs seem to be aware of the risk that giving PRR a disproportionate attention might carry. […] Let’s not sanitize these parties and their leaders by calling them “populists” […] As well as disproportionate media attention, these parties have

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a disproportionate influence on mainstream parties – and this is where the real danger lies. (ECRE, 24 March 2017)

On inspecting the co-occurrences between the aforementioned terms in Fig. 2 and the idea of a ‘threat’ to the EU’s values, it emerged that ‘human rights’ and ‘rule of law’ were the terms that most frequently cooccurred in the discourse of the CSOs considered. Hence, civil society is essentially concerned about the impact of right-wing populism on (i) the implementation and defence of essential human rights and (ii) respect for the basic rule of law across Europe. While this might seem a redundant remark, it nevertheless reaffirms the type of threat represented by the more ambiguous concept of ‘populism’. Civil society, in this regard, appears to be particularly concerned about these two essential liberal values. Moreover, in the texts analysed there appeared to be

Fig. 2 Conceptualisation of threats linked to populism in the texts of CSOs 2013–2019 (Source Created by the author)

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some specific subjects of discriminations which can be mainly linked to ethno-racial, religious, and sexual/gender issues (e.g. migrants, Muslims, Jews, Christians, women, LGBT people, etc.) (Fig. 3). Unsurprisingly, the dataset out in the above graph parallels the main themes treated in the CSOs’ texts as shown in Fig. 1. These discriminatedagainst subjects, furthermore, point to another central aspect in the PRR narrative, namely the construct of ‘the people’. It is commonly affirmed that populists claim that ‘the people’ are the only people (Müller, 2017: 27). The implication of this claim is that only those considered to belong to ‘the people’ deserve full recognition as rights holders. Evidently, this assertion clashes with the universalistic conception of human rights standards for which all people, regardless of their gender, origin, sexuality, religion, etc., are rights holders. Moreover, the CSOs’ texts confirm that PRR forces have a problematic relationship with liberal values. Recent scholarship, in fact, has stressed that PRR groups tend to selectively pick-and-choose the most appropriate and useful parts of liberalism and transform them for their Women Gr=94 Sexual exploitation Gr=78 Roma Gr=144 Religious Issue Gr=100 Race Gr=409 Migration Gr=422 Islamophobia Gr=152 Gender Gr=289 Antisemit* Gr=36

Fig. 3 Conceptualisation of categories and subjects threatened by populism in the texts of CSOs, 2013–2019 (Source Created by the author)

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own illiberal purposes (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Mounk, 2018). Apart from a few Northern exceptions, the unenthusiastic attitude towards individual and collective freedoms indicates that the commitment of these forces to some key components of liberalism is weak. As the above figure shows, this is particularly clear as regards race, origin, and religion (i.e. race, migration, religion-related issues in the figure), as well as when gender equality and LGBT rights are discussed. Most often, the defence of these subjects and groups only serves to demonise alleged Others, notably those who do not belong within the radical right vision of society. Likewise, over the years CSOs have especially stressed violations of the rule of law within the EU. Already in 2013, The European Humanist Federation warned about “radical populist movements” and their “harmful consequences for the rule of law and democracy” (European Humanist Federation, The European Union and the Challenge of Extremism and Populism, 2013: 5). The restrictions of civic space in many countries are linked to an antidemocratic development globally that questions the universality of human rights. At the root of this are attempts by rulers to concentrate power and evade accountability to people. The democratic space is put at risk also in European countries (as demonstrated in CIVICUS Report) due to similar non-democratic, populist and nationalist trends. (Concord, 13 March 2018)

In November 2018, a series of NGOs, among which CONCORD Europe, European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN), European Movement International, European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), European Women’s Lobby, and European Network Against Racism, signed a Call for action, “Democracy under attack”, in which they stated: Our democracies are under attack. The rise of hate, divisive, and socially and environmentally destructive political forces– including in many EU countries – are putting our democracies at risk. They are undermining democratic institutions and the rule of law by fomenting inequality and discrimination and by seeking to muzzle independent media, nongovernmental organisations, trade unions, the judiciary, women, and marginalised groups, including ethnic and religious minorities, LGBTI people and people with disabilities. Democracy should mean working in

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the best interests of all, and not of some at the expense of others with less power. (Call for action, “Democracy under attack”)

In this context, CSOs are primarily framed, in its own texts, as an essential player in fighting discrimination, implementing human rights, protecting the rule of law, and ultimately as a pillar of democracy in the European political landscape.

Countering the Populist Threat: CSOs Calling for Action Although the statements and press releases are characterised by a large amount of self-referential rhetoric, CSOs emerge as a force countering the threat of populism-nationalism or, more broadly, the diverse forms of discrimination following the rise of PRR groups. CSOs, their calls for action, and the policy measures that they advocate are generally framed as a response to this threat. They are framed as a force that contributes to solidarity building through different types of actions. These actions range from various forms of campaigning—e.g. denouncing dangers for the rule of law, protecting the rights of minority groups, and ultimately strengthening itself, i.e. supporting a vibrant civil society—through policy-making, to legal advocacy. “Populism is here to stay” affirmed the NGO European Humanist Federation in October 2013, also stressing the urgent need to strengthen the EU mechanisms to counter the rise of far-right parties across Europe. Pointing to the need for action, this organisation also highlighted a general concern among CSOs about the efficiency of the EU in fighting PRR forces. This is all the more concerning than the EU has been more and more perceived as inefficient to solve EU citizens’ daily problems, whereas populist parties have been proposing short term and easy demagogical solutions […] So far, the responses of the EU towards the rise and deeprootedness of populist ideas have been rather limited, partly because of the limits of existing EU mechanisms and partly because of a lack of political will from Member States. (European Humanist Federation, The European Union and the Challenge of Extremism and Populism, October 2013)

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Indeed, the European Economic and Social Committee’s study on the impact of populism (Lessebski et al., 2019) pointed out that a lack of European support, and specifically a lack of financial and human resources, were the most important difficulties of CSOs in dealing with the radical right populist surge (Lessebski et al., 2019) (Fig. 4). A content analysis of the CSOs’ texts between 2013 and 2019 confirmed that the EU, despite being the primary recipient and interlocutor of all organisations, was perceived as lacking in various respects. Specifically, the threat raised by far-right politics was one of the greatest dangers, and actions to face it were among the greatest deficiencies. Interestingly, migration and racism do not score as high as they do in the graphs measuring the salience and relevance of themes and threats. This suggests that CSOs consider the EU’s response to the issues related to these two aspects as more adequate and effective.

Fig. 4 Co-occurrences ‘EU deficiencies’ in the texts of CSOs, 2013–2019 (Source Created by the author)

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Furthermore, as one might expect, the activities of CSOs that can help combat rising PRR forces are mainly those that promote EU values, civic education and engagement, direct democracy, support to minorities, refugees, and migrants, and those that tackle online disinformation. This is confirmed by the analysis of CSO documents, which shows that civil society organisations have a direct impact on three specific, and connected, aspects of EU politics: (1) human rights and rule of law; (2) anti-discrimination; (3) ‘solidarity, and community building’—in the sense of creating a bond of unity around a common goal. All this is also reflected by the numerous joint calls made by different networks of NGOs. Since the early 2010s, CSOs have been aware of the “[…] urgent need for the EU to defend itself as a community of values, based on democracy, protection of the minorities and the rule of Law with a global, strong and coordinated action” (European Humanist Federation, October 2013). In this context, in the documents analysed, CSOs emerged as key actors in disseminating the EU fundamental rights regime. They can be crucial in this regard because they can perform a necessary monitoring role, help put human rights into practice, and identify the disjuncture between institutional discourses and practices. EU action is overdue. We the undersigned call on the European Union and European governments to respond to this threat and to: 1) Uphold the rule of law. The EU has a duty to ensure governments uphold the rule of law, as European citizens suffer the consequences of restrictions on freedom of speech and of assembly, constraints on media and academic freedom, election interference, the normalisation of hate speech and hate crimes, and political and corporate corruption. These last years have shown how the EU and national governments have been unable to turn words into action on the ground. 2) Apply zero tolerance for hate speech and cyber-violence. 3) Defend the right for people to campaign for the public interest. Human rights defenders, trade unionists, environmental activists and non-governmental organisations are on the frontline of battles to defend the public interest in many EU countries. (Open Call for action, “Democracy under attack, November 2018)

Antiracist organisations, for instance, are part of a broad group of antidiscrimination organisations. In the issue area of anti-racism, the main actors are CSOs focusing on citizenship, migration, xenophobia, and

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ethnic discrimination, and working on the ground of Article 13 (now Article 19 of TFEU). CSOs call for action: With xenophobic populism on the rise across Europe and the globe, this is an appeal for leadership to uphold the rights and values that have been founding principles of the European Union for 60 years. Together, we need to prevent legitimate concerns about migration management from being hijacked and used to derail the European project. Only a Europe that really stands by its values can be a strong and credible leader in a world shaken by increasing populism and so-called alternative facts. European history is full of people who were forced to flee their homes due to war and persecution. (168 NGOs’ Open Letter to Head of States and Government, 9 March 2017)

In this context, specific calls have stressed different types of situation, from the so-called refugee crisis to racism and discrimination in given countries where the rule of law is under threat. EU-level CSO calls for “a stronger commitment and action of the European Union, Member States, institutions and civil society to fight racism, discrimination, far-right and xenophobic movements”2 are in line with the role that the EU institutions assume for CSOs. The role of civil society as a dispenser of ideas and narratives, for instance, has long been stressed in the Commission’s discourse (Pejovic & Cossarini, 2020). In the ‘refugee crisis’ context, the Commission has underlined the CSOs’ role in ‘debunking the myths’ about smuggling and irregular migration. CSOs are recognised as an important factor influencing public opinion amid the ‘war’ between those political and societal forces in favour of ‘open-door’ policies and those hostile to the reception of asylum seekers. As Commissioner Jourová rightly warned, the worry and dismay of all social categories should not be dismissed: We need to take the concerns and fears of European citizens seriously. We must engage with those who feel frustrated or neglected by mainstream politics, who feel left behind in an age of globalisation and digitalisation, for whom some of the populist slogans sound promising. In this context

2 CSOs’ Joint Press Release, January 2015.

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we also must make clear that fundamental rights are not a ‘niche concern’ only for minorities.3

In parallel with that acknowledgement, CSOs recognise the role of all EU institutions, also urging their greater involvement in national and local issues. ILGA-Europe, for instance, voices the concerns of LGBT people, stressing the violations of their rights especially in Eastern and Southern countries: “We urgently call on candidates for the European Parliament to step up against the current threatening wave of populism and extremism, and make a commitment to protecting, supporting and empowering the citizens they represent, and their fundamental rights” (ILGA-Europe, 12 February 2019). Similarly, the European Association for the Defence of Human Rights has long focused on the situation in Hungary: We urge you to show your support to civil society, press freedom, academic freedom, the independence of the judiciary, the rule of law and fundamental rights. The changes introduced by Hungary’s government are not a matter of national discretionary power: the European Union has to take a strong stance, as the UN and Council of Europe did. (AEDH—Call on the LIBE Committee members to adopt a strong resolution on the situation in Hungary)

Hungary, in this context, has become one of the main targets of all those CSOs working on rule of law and promotion of human rights. A joint statement in support of Hungary’s civil society and discriminated minority groups provides insight into the willingness of CSOs to create a panEuropean narrative able to counter the PRR’s nationalist and exclusionary discourse: Together, we will work to create a Europe that truly respects human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail. (Joint Statement, Civil Society Europe, 16 May 2017)

3 European Commission, Speech by Commissioner Jourová, 10 years of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency: A Call to Action in Defence of Fundamental Rights, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 28 February 2017.

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Moreover, the content and frame analysis of CSO documents has shown that the concept of solidarity is one of the central ideas linked to the different crises that Europe has undergone in recent decades—refugees and asylum seekers; euro crisis; rise of PRR; and nationalism-populism. ‘Solidarity’ as a code occurs over 450 times in a simple word count and is directly linked to similar codes—such as human rights, rule of law, environment, and social justice—that, all together, are useful for grasping the idea of community-building. In the current political landscape, CSOs urge an additional effort to furnish solidarity by both the EU and the Member States. Likewise, CSOs’ texts show that the willingness to express more solidarity, especially with immigrants and refugees, has become a new political dividing line that in recent years has split the EU between those Member States more in favour of and those hostile to this specific idea of a solidarity-based Europe.

Conclusion By considering the EU-level CSOs’ discourse and by means of content and frame analysis, this chapter has shown that CSOs are aware of the populist climate across Europe and within the EU institutions. At the same time, the civil society discourse shows that the majority of organisations frame this ‘populist turn’ as a threat to the values at the core of liberal democracy and the EU project. Importantly, the types of threat that the EU-level CSOs stress are largely coincident with the risks generated by the rise of PRR forces, as the recent literature on radical- and far-right politics has demonstrated (e.g. Mudde, 2010). This chapter has examined the role of civil society in facing PRR forces and pointed out that CSOs do not frame populism as a separate issue to tackle; rather, their targets are related discriminatory phenomena such as xenophobia, racism, or hate speech. Populism therefore appears in CSOs’ texts as a synonym for the threat raised by specific radical right forces. This has important analytical consequences. Undoubtedly, the idea of CSOs as groups exclusively defending inclusionary policies must be debunked, since so-called uncivil society organisations have been emerging across Europe and at the EU level. These organisations display a distinctive anti-universalistic and anti-cosmopolitan ethos that has grown over the years, often in parallel with the rise of PRR forces and their exclusionary narrative. Despite the emerging

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‘uncivil’ society, and the much-needed critique of a simple characterisation of CSOs as endorsing only progressive ideals, the chapter has stressed that the left-leaning civil society is still strong and willing to fight discriminatory politics. While aware that a vibrant civil society is not in itself a guarantee of a good democratic life, the moralised paradigm that CSOs of this type put forward, associated with tolerant and cosmopolitan views, still acts as a prominent critical voice against the PRR’s rise. Furthermore, this critique should be associated with the values and organisational principles of each organisation, although the progressive-leaning EU-based CSOs share a common programme that defends the central role of civil society in the European project. Likewise, the chapter has also linked the EUlevel CSOs with an alternative discourse that is part and parcel of their campaign for change, which is based on human rights, respect of the rule of law, and a form of solidarity-driven pluralism—in direct opposition to the nationalist, exclusionary, and socially conservative conception promoted by PRR groups.

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The Interaction Among Populism, Civil Society Organisations and European Institutions Pierluigi Brombo

Introduction Populism has a strong impact on civil society organisations (CSOs), alongside other factors with which it combines, such as economic crisis, new economic and environmental paradigms, demographic and societal changes, and digitalisation. This chapter will examine how the populist assumption that nothing must stand between “the people” and the leadership means that all intermediary bodies, as CSOs are by definition, must be curbed and limited to a non-political role. The impact of populism on European CSOs is more significant at national level than at EU level. Indeed, as we shall see in the second part of this chapter, this impact operates through public authorities that are led or influenced by populist forces and through a public discourse and public sphere dominated or strongly shaped by them. These situations occur

The book only reflects my views and in no way the ones of the institution I belong to. P. Brombo (B) European Economic and Social Committee, Bruxelles, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 C. Ruzza et al. (eds.), The Impact of Populism on European Institutions and Civil Society, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73411-4_10

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much more frequently in some member states than in the EU institutions, the large majority of which are still dominated by non-populist forces embracing the values of CSOs. The same applies to the public sphere, which in the EU is largely influenced by progressive parties and ideologies opposed to populism. Moreover, CSOs are an active and vocal part of what is called the “Brussels bubble”, which they feed with ideas while constituting a precious transmission belt between the EU institutions and EU citizens. This chapter will therefore focus more on the national level where the negative impact of populism on CSOs is stronger. But it will also examine, in the third part of the chapter, how the relations between CSOs and EU institutions have evolved in response to a populist upsurge. This chapter explores the interactions between populism and CSOs in European states along several dimensions: firstly, the influence of the public authorities, notably those including populist forces, on CSOs; secondly, how populism influences public discourse against CSOs; thirdly, the challenges that the lack of a safe space poses for CSOs. All the EU institutions seem to be moving in the same direction, exploring new avenues of direct and deliberative democracy rather than participatory democracy through CSOs, and choosing to fund them more on a project basis than structurally, thus undermining their autonomy and stability. However, CSOs still play a crucial role as channels of communication between individuals and public authorities. They also play a key political role in gathering and voicing people’s needs, demands and positions, and in fighting populism, of which they are not simply the victims.

Elements of the Economic and Societal Context When considering the impact of populism on civil society organisations (CSOs), it should be noted that this impact does not occur in a closed environment where populism is the only factor to affect civil society. Civil society exists and operates in a context which also comprises other factors helping to shape its characteristics and development. Before exploring the influence of populism on civil society, it therefore seems appropriate to examine these other factors that combine, mix and interact with populism to shape organised civil society. These factors can be grouped into four broad categories, namely: the economic crisis that hit Europe in 2008, with effects which have lasted for several years even after the end of the crisis itself; an ideological and societal context which has seen both the rise of new models

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critical of deterministic views geared to continuous economic growth, and an emerging environmental awareness; the demographic and societal changes affecting societies; and digitalisation, which increasingly infiltrates people’s lives and social relations, as well as affecting their political behaviour and, ultimately, radically transforming the whole of society. Economic Crisis The effects of the economic crisis have had a significant impact on civil society, as indicated by Youngs (2019: 21), who writes that “[t]he post-2009 economic crisis in Europe gave rise to a wide range of community-based self-help activism, while dissatisfaction with EU institutional opaqueness has inspired an increasing number of “citizens” lobbyists’ to engage on specific problems that blight European politics”. By examining this point in greater detail, we can specify the various ways in which the effects of this crisis have been felt. Firstly, in practical terms, the crisis has led to a decrease in the resources made available to organisations by the public authorities. Although it is not homogeneous, this problem is nevertheless found in the vast majority of European countries (FRA, 2018: 29). This decrease is all the more problematic because, according to data from the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA, 2018: 30), CSOs depend to a great extent on public funds. This point will be explored further when considering how the decrease in public funds for CSOs is particularly evident in cases where governments are led by or composed of populist parties. A second factor which has an impact on CSOs is the general decrease in public funding allocated by public authorities to social policies, the sector in which CSOs are most active. This explains and further emphasises the first point, because this decrease leads to a reduction in funding for social activities carried out by CSOs. Besides having an impact on the amount of funding received by CSOs, the cutback in funding for social policies also affects such organisations via another route. It exacerbates the social effects of the economic crisis, aggravating social hardship and social inequalities, thus increasing the need for social action by CSOs. This means that CSOs are compelled to focus more on their activities as service providers, to the detriment of their advocacy activities. We shall consider this point in greater detail, along with its repercussions on CSOs’ political and democratic activities, in later sections. However, it can already be

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concluded that the decrease in funding allocated to social policies has an impact on CSOs in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Cultural and Political Context As regards the rise of new societal and political views and models, the influence on CSOs is indirect, but no less significant as a result. Such views and models provide operating context for CSOs, affecting, for example, their political leverage and increasing their outreach, recruitment of volunteers, and ability to raise private funds. There are two main new models, both of which are linked to the concept of sustainable development. The first is concerned with the economy and development, while the second focuses more on environmental protection. With regard to the former, new economic and societal models are becoming established and gaining traction not only in scientific circles but also among the public. They are inspired by an awareness that a productivist, consumerist, liberal model based on the illusion of continuous economic growth cannot be sustained in the long term and cannot lead society and economy to general well-being. The crisis in 2008 and the ensuing slow recovery have given rise to alternative “post-growth”1 models of economic development, or to “degrowth”2 models, which take an even more radical approach. Such approaches stand as an alternative to an economic model based on and geared to economic growth. Instead, they aim for a less quantitative type of development based on objectives of personal well-being, egalitarianism and environmental sustainability. The growing sense that, after the COVID-19 crisis, it will be necessary to return to a less consumerist and productivist life is very much on the same lines, making these reflections even more interesting. The second model is linked to a new ecological and environmental awareness, and it interlinks with the first one because now emerging are 1 According to the Post Growth Institute, “‘Post-growth’ is a worldview that sees society operating better without the demand of constant economic growth. It proposes that widespread economic justice, social well-being and ecological regeneration are only possible when money inherently circulates through our economy”. 2 According to the Degrowth and Research (2020) website, “Sustainable degrowth is a downscaling of production and consumption that increases human well-being and enhances ecological conditions and equity on the planet. It calls for a future where societies live within their ecological means, with open, localized economies and resources more equally distributed through new forms of democratic institutions”.

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new circular economy and shared economy models driven by respect for the environment. These involve a veritable paradigm shift, to the point that the objective is no longer growth, which requires the use of environmental resources, but rather environmental protection, which shapes and drives the economy and development. This approach has been reflected in civil society, giving rise to new movements, such as Fridays for Future, which, while not currently considered a part of organised civil society, may eventually become established. Yet they clearly have already an impact on the EU political agenda, which now sets the Green Deal as its mainstream priority.3 While it is the task of political scientists to study and measure the causal nexus between the two, one can already note that EU institutions take this movement very seriously. In a short time, its leader, the Swedish activist Greta Thunberg, has been invited to address the European Environment Council (of Ministers) and (twice) the Environment Committee of the European Parliament; she has met the previous and the current president of the European Commission on several occasions; and she has been invited to the European Economic and Social Committee plenary session. Demographic and Societal Context With regard to the demographic and societal changes affecting societies, various aspects of them have an impact on CSOs. Firstly, the ageing of the population has a direct impact on the organisations, and it is reflected in the rise in the average age of their members and, in particular, of their managers. Moreover, as already discussed in relation to the increase in marginalisation and social inequalities, this creates and fuels greater care needs to which CSOs, as social services providers, respond, especially when the state or the market do not intend to deal with them. Similarly, the increasing immigrant population, in terms of both flow and percentage of the population, calls for growing action by CSOs to help with social inclusion. New, more flexible, temporary and, unfortunately, more unstable forms of work also make it more difficult for average citizens to organise their free time and therefore be able to offer a structured and ongoing commitment to volunteering for CSOs.

3 https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en.

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Digitalisation The effects of digitalisation take various forms, and they are closely linked to the relationship between populism and civil society organisations, given that populist activities make extensive use of social media and information technologies. “Populist parties and movements have proven particularly deft at developing strategies to capture new audiences through social media, putting in place permanent, targeted campaigns—often based on fear and polarisation, because these are the emotions that are most likely to attract attention and keep individuals online—in order to maintain and continuously grow their voter base. As a result, social media is helping to amplify the voice of fringe groups, with less than 0.1% of users across Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Poland generating around 10% of content related to politics and the European elections around January 2019”. Moreover, digitalisation and social media change citizens’ behaviour and their political expectations. Having got used to rapid (instant) action such as likes, followers and spontaneous comments, they have become accustomed to and expect direct and immediate outcomes when they show support for or criticise a situation (EESC, 2017: 19). This need for a quick and simple response is the perfect substrate for the development of populism, since its main weapons are its own responsiveness and the ability to churn out ready-made answers. A second aspect that populism exploits is echo chambers, through which social media and search engines provide the users with information, sites and advertising relating to their interests, as shown by their browsing habits. This ends up confirming the users’ own views and opinions by showing them a reference community, or “filter bubble” as it is called, which increasingly resembles them (Pariser, 2011). It creates a polarisation in which there seems to be increasingly less room for different opinions and more nuanced and moderate positions. Another aspect of digitalisation which has an impact on CSOs is the fact that “digital technologies are creating a new type of social fabric and a fertile ground for the spread of a wide variety of “non-establishment” stakeholders and networks” (EPSC, 2019: 20). New forms of expression and citizen participation are emerging: for instance, digital campaigns, fundraising, online petitions, online consultations and genuine tools for online participatory democracy. As an example of the growing importance of these tools, to be mentioned here is the “Grand Débat” (Great Debate) organised by the French president of

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the Republic, Emmanuel Macron, to consult and debate with citizens on their expectations and demands regarding the future of the country. Despite the use of citizens’ assemblies and complaints books, the main tool was by far the online consultation, which reached two million contributions. The Internet and social media also make it possible to organise protests or movements without the need, as was the case in the past, for permanent and structured bodies (Youngs, 2019: 83ff). Examples of this are the Arab Springs, the protests in Hong Kong, the young people of Fridays for Future, the Yellow Vests in France or the Sardines movement in Italy. The question remains of how these movements are able to have a real and structural impact on politics (Youngs, 2019: 52–79), but this issue falls outside the scope of this chapter. Besides the technical opportunities offered by IT, there is also another feature of these movements, and it concerns our above point on ad hoc activism and the reduction of commitment to long-term projects. According to some (e.g. Youngs, 2019: 9), the rise of these new forms of civil activism requires the term “civil society” to be re-thought, with a view to the “old civil society” being replaced by a new civil activism. We shall see later that this claim seems excessive. One final aspect to be stressed, due to its widespread use by populist movements, is the spread of fake news. This occurs both because of IT tools and social media and because of a tendency by large sections of the population to use them as a single source of information and, in particular, to believe them uncritically (Pew Research Center, 2018).

Impact of Populism on Civil Society Organisations Before beginning our discussion of how populism influences and impacts on organised civil society, it seems appropriate to define populism, or rather to select a definition to which we will refer from the many that exist in the academic community. We will use the definition by Cas Mudde (2004), according to which populism is “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people”. In this respect, it is worth noting that Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the European project, believed that civil society organisations were the “elites of Europe”, a term to which he gave a positive connotation. He understood them to be living economic and social forces which should be given an institutional voice by establishing the

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Economic and Social Committee4 (Varsori, 2000: 52). This assembly, set up by the 1957 Rome Treaty, is composed of 326 members, drawn from economic and social interest groups in Europe, who represent civil society organisations’ voice in the EU decision and policy-making process. Their task is to issue opinions on matters of European interest, thus advising the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. In the following subsections, we shall therefore examine the interactions between populism and European civil society organisations and in particular how the former impacts on the latter. This impact takes various forms, and it comes about through different channels, which will be presented under three headings: through the public authorities— in particular Member States’ governments and the EU institutions— through public discourse and through the public space. Impact of Populism Through Public Authorities Populism’s impact on civil society organisations is effected by the public authorities in various ways. Before examining these in detail, to be stressed is that while this impact is naturally greater in states ruled by governments led or supported by populist parties, it is also perceptible in others. This is because mainstream parties, especially those located on the centreright of the political spectrum, tend to follow more populist policies so as not to lose votes to their right. As highlighted by Bertelsman Stiftung’s Sustainable Governance indicators (EPSC, 2019: 2), this results in the deterioration of democracy in Europe. Mainstream parties and the governments that they support are influenced by populism through its impact on public discourse and in the political arena, as well as through its capacity to set the political debate’s agenda (EPSC, 2019: 6). As we shall see in later sections, the same applies to some extent to the EU institutions which, though largely anti-populist, are inevitably affected by the growing influence of populism in society and in national political systems. We can identify three channels through which populism has an impact on civil society organisations via public authorities: regulatory environment, funding and financing, and participation in the decision-making process. This analysis will be largely based on the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) paper on Challenges facing civil society organisations 4 Currently the European Economic and Social Committee. See https://www.eesc.eur opa.eu/en/about.

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working on human rights in the EU (FRA, 2017). Although the paper focuses on organisations dealing with human rights, the data and information that it provides can easily be applied to all CSOs. It is worth noting that the situation has not evolved positively in the past few years: according to the FRA (2018: 3), “more than half of the civil society organisations which responded [to the consultation carried out by the FRA] consider that overall in the past three years the situation for civil society in their country has deteriorated or strongly deteriorated”. It is quite clear, and confirmed by several sources,5 that this is due to the rise of populism and the birth of populist governments. Regulatory Environment This subsection depicts the legal hurdles encountered by CSOs as well as their failure to comply with their members’ rights. These hurdles can take three forms: Freedom of association. CSOs must deal with registration procedures which are becoming increasingly complicated and expensive, thus discouraging or making it difficult for them to apply. For example, in Hungary, the new Civil Code introduced by Orban’s government requires registered CSOs to have their founding documents amended through a lengthy and resource-intensive process (FRA, 2017: 22). Another hurdle relates to the limits and checks imposed on CSOs in their “political” and advocacy activities (FRA, 2017: 21–22). Again, rules on the prohibition or dissolution of CSOs are applied widely on the pretext of implementing anti-terrorism laws and particularly anti-money laundering legislation (FRA, 2017: 23, 26). A final hurdle relates to restrictions on entry into the country imposed on CSOs, particularly those working in the field of human rights. Freedom of opinion, expression and information. The main hurdle here is defamation legislation. According to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), “in a number of OSCE participating States, defamation laws are reportedly used to silence, and sometimes even

5 See the country reports of the missions carried out by the Group on Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law of the European Economic and Social Committee (2019a) as concerns Poland, Hungary and Austria, confirmed also by (More-Hollerweger et al., 2019, p. 7) as concerns Austria and Hungary.

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imprison human rights defenders” (FRA, 2017: 24). This is notably the case of Austria and Hungary. Freedom of peaceful assembly. Unjustified restrictions are imposed on CSOs’ right of assembly on the basis of the content of the message that they support, as in the case of Poland and the Netherlands. Blanket restrictions and bans on assembly are also often imposed, as in Romania and the Czech Republic. In general, it appears that the policing of assemblies is becoming increasingly strict in populist states but also, to a lesser extent, in other states which seem to be influenced by the general antiCSO trend (FRA, 2017: 24–25). Thus, in France for example, as found by a mission organised by the EESC group on Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law (FRRL), “the entry into force of the law on ‘the maintenance and reinforcement of public order during demonstrations’ in April 2019 has led to a deterioration in the otherwise solid legal protection of the right to demonstrate in France. […] CSOs criticised the fact that the right to demonstrate was being curtailed through a large number of disproportionate and unjustified arrests, and through the use of excessive force by security forces. CSOs also mentioned the abuse of custody (garde à vue) as a means of neutralising activists—notably environmental activists—and preventing them from taking part in protests. They lamented that complaints brought against the police had not led to consequences” (EESC, 2019a: 21). Funds and Finance This is a very important factor for the existence of CSOs, and it is crucial in determining their room for manoeuvre because they depend very largely on government funding (FRA, 2017: 30–31). “Public funds often enable CSOs to contribute to the public good in terms of service delivery, especially in the field of social services” (More-Hollerweger et al., 2019: 9). In Central and Eastern Europe in particular, it can be noted that “Public funding sources (e.g. EU funds, government funds) have a fundamental role in the funding of CSOs in all countries, implying that no civil society can thrive based on private funding and/or foundations alone” (More-Hollerweger et al., 2019: 10). Although there is a lack of comprehensive data for all EU Member States, a reduction in public funding has been registered in many of them, such as Romania, Hungary, Croatia and Bulgaria (More-Hollerweger et al., 2019: 11). According to the mission report of the FRRL’s EESC group, this has also been the case in Austria and France. As regards the

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latter, although clearly not led by populist parties, France seems to have issues with CSO freedom because they are seen as part of the “vieux monde” that should be swept away by the “nouveau monde” personalised by the president of the Republic, Emmanuel Macron, and his “vertical relationship”6 with citizens. By this he means the state’s direct relationship with its citizens without any intermediary body between them, thus taking an approach very similar to the populist credo. Hence, in France, “in a context of scarce resources, public and private financing available for CSOs has decreased. Associations are particularly badly affected by this situation. According to the representatives met during the mission, they are seen only as easy budgetary adjustment variables, while their civic, democratic, social and economic functions are forgotten or even challenged” (EESC, 2019a: 21). Here it is evident that the factor of populism interacts with the economic crisis and the slow recovery that has followed. Again, as noted earlier, analysis of what happened with the 2008–2009 crisis may be particularly relevant to the present economic crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. Besides the quantity, what also counts to a great extent in CSO funding is the distribution of funds to organisations close to governments, notably those led or supported by populist parties. This has been reported in Hungary, Poland, Croatia (FRA, 2017: 30) and Bulgaria (More-Hollerweger et al., 2019: 8) and has led to the paradox of the creation by the government of so-called GONGOs: government-organised non-governmental organisations (EESC, 2017b: 27). “These CSOs colonize the civil society and attempt to mimic its purpose and actions, which creates an environment consisting mostly of government-supportive CSOs and limits the diversity in civil society. This is principally the case in Romania, Serbia, Croatia and Hungary” (MoreHollerweger et al., 2019: 12). It seems useful to present Hungary as a case study as, although “loyalty to political sides and parties is not a Hungarian specialty, yet nowhere else has the emerging civil society and the media been captured by the political parties to such a degree ´ as in Hungary” (Pap & Sledzi nska-Simon, ´ 2019: 78). The mechanism through which it operates sees “State funding to NGOs and other civil society groups […] distributed through the National Cooperation Fund (NEA), whose nine-member council is dominated by government and parliamentary appointees” (UN Refugee Agency, 2017). In 6 See his interview in “La Nouvelle Revue Française” (https://www.lanrf.fr/), May 2018, where he says “assumer totalement la ‘verticalité’ du pouvoir”.

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particular, “One of the central figures of the system is the president of the National Cooperation Fund, and founder of and one of the spokespersons for Civil Alliance Forum (CÖF) at the same time. CÖF practically operates as an outsourced division of the ruling party Fidesz, and lacks a transparent financial background. Since 2010, CÖF has organised a number of pro-government protests, the so-called Peace Marches (Békemenet), and communication campaigns consisting of billboards, TV and newspaper ads to discredit opposition parties and politicians during election campaigns. In addition to this, CÖF constantly proposes legislation restricting CSOs dealing with human rights. Important members of the network of pseudo-civil society organisations are advocacy-type GONGOs, whose activities and topics of choice resemble NGOs involved in fighting corruption and protecting human rights, however, they are obviously tied to the cabinet. These organisations are created to counterbalance government-critical voices; their aim is to defend the steps taken by the government with their seemingly professional and independent comments, substantiate Fidesz’s claims, and react to statements critical of the government” (EU-Russia Civil Society Forum, 2017: 106). CSOs’ dependence on public funding is even more crucial in countries such as Hungary and Slovakia where severe limitations on foreign funding (FRA, 2017: 35) deprive CSOs of an alternative source of funds. Moreover, administrative requirements for applying for funds and reporting on their use are becoming increasingly burdensome and often unbearable for small organisations. Another clear trend emerging throughout Europe is the shift in allocation of public funding from advocacy to service provision (health, education, social affairs) (FRA, 2017: 32). This tendency seems to fit with the above-mentioned approach of populism that conceives a direct link between the state and citizens with no intermediary bodies to mediate or balance it. In this approach, it is obvious that civil society organisations are discouraged from playing any political role and must limit themselves to providing social services. This shift in the allocation of funds to CSOs only as service providers has an obvious impact on their capacity to play a participatory democratic role as well as on their watchdog and litigation capacity. Funds tend also to be provided to an increasing extent for operations rather than for structural expenses, thus making CSOs more vulnerable and dependent on the evaluation by authorities of each operation. In the UK, “[m]ore than 80% of the government funding received by charities is now in the form of contracts for delivering services rather than grants to support their work, compared

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to 49% in 2000/2001” (EESC, 2017b: 30). This makes CSOs more vulnerable, increasing their dependency on, and consequently decreasing their autonomy from, governments. Moreover, CSOs end up competing for funds with the business sector, which is often better equipped and more professional. As a result, CSOs are struggling to survive and fulfil their purpose (EESC, 2017b: 27). Participation in the Decision-Making Process Participation in the decision-making process is a crucial way in which CSOs can participate in democracy and facilitate civic involvement. Since populism claims to represent people directly with no need for intermediation, it is not surprising that this role is being brought under pressure. As a consequence, access to public affairs is hindered by lack of information and transparency on policy and legal initiatives, making it difficult for CSOs to know how to perform their role in a participatory democracy. This appears to be especially true in Bulgaria and Romania (EESC, 2019a: 10). The situation is also critical in Austria, where “Regarding the consultation of CSOs in drafting legislation, CSOs said that their contributions were now being largely ignored, which had not previously been the case. CSO representatives did not feel that the consultation process could be regarded as a real partnership and said that they were not being taken seriously as experts” (EESC, 2019a: 24). There also seems to be a lack of clear rules and procedures, producing a grey area in which it is difficult for CSOs to know if, when and how they can intervene in the decision-making process (FRA, 2017: 43–36; 2018: 9–10). Moreover, despite some good practices, such as in Estonia, most of the EU states lack the determination and capacity to really involve civil society organisations in the decision-making process (FRA, 2017: 40). The situation is well illustrated by the graph below, which shows the evolution of the civil society participation index7 in those countries led by populist parties. It depicts the decrease from the time, indicated with

7 Drawn up by the V-Dem Institute, University of Göteborg, this index is composed of the following elements: “Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymakers; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?”.

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Fig. 1 Civil society participation index (Source Highcharts.com/V-Dem)

a blue spot on the curve, at which populist parties joined the government, thus highlighting a temporal nexus between the two aspects. This nexus is not surprising in the light of the approach of populism aimed at establishing a direct link between the leader and “the people” with no intermediation. We see, in fact, that those countries that are led by populist forces, and especially those that do not seem fully in line with democratic values, tend to curb the political and democratic role of CSOs and the open participation of citizens in the decision- and policy-making process (Fig. 1). Impact of Populism Through Public Discourse The impact of populism on CSOs through public discourse may operate both indirectly, when populist parties, movements and governments seriously criticise and undermine the values underpinning the action and the

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very existence of CSOs, and directly through negative public discourse and smear campaigns targeting civil society organisations. Public Discourse and Values In order better to define how the values inherent in the existence and action of CSOs are being brought under pressure in an environment dominated or influenced by populism, the features and values of populism need to be identified. According to Inglehart and Norris (2016), the three main features of populism are anti-establishmentarianism, authoritarianism and nativism. These characteristics favour majority democracy as the expression of “the people”, which should not be limited by any checks and balances or the rule of law. Therefore, the totally free expression of what “the people” have decided implies that minorities should in the best-case scenario be neglected and not considered worth defending or empowering, and in the worst-case scenario be the target of attacks. Moreover, “populism favours mono-culturalism over multiculturalism, national self-interest over cooperation and development aid, closed borders over the free flow of peoples, ideas, labour and capital, and traditionalism over progressive and liberal social values” (EESC, 2017b: 23). These values obviously contradict the values unpinning CSOs, such as solidarity, tolerance, inclusion, democracy and belief in and respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights. To be stressed is that that they also clash with those values that, besides being at the core of CSOs, are also the founding principles of the EU: overcoming national interests, sovereignty and multilateralism. The spread in European societies of values fundamentally opposed to those of CSOs obviously affects their credibility and legitimacy and “is considered a major impediment to the work of the organisations. This not only includes limited funding, but also preventing people from volunteering” (EESC, 2017b: 139). As noted by the European Political Strategy Centre, “The philosophy of ‘majoritarianism’ that drives populism can lead to a backtracking on rights and protections of minority groups, undermining checks and balances. Finally, their systematic use of propaganda—in some cases combined with ownership of printed and audiovisual media—helps to spread a uniform way of thinking and talking in public” (EPSC, 2019: 6). As a consequence of this cultural and political environment that increasingly favours these values, CSOs are being brought under pressure, as analysed in the following subsection.

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Public Discourse: A Direct Impact Before analysing how negative public discourse negatively influences CSOs, to be stressed is that it does not represent the views of the majority (Vandor et al., 2017: 49). However, it exists, seems to be growing, and has a major impact on CSOs, particularly when it is expressed by parties that are in the government or by members of the government itself: “hate speech, criminalization of CSOs and their work and fake news are threats impeding the space of CSOs, especially in the field of human rights, the support of migrants and the watchdog and advocacy organizations” (More-Hollerweger et al., 2019: 13). The credibility of CSOs is being questioned more and more frequently by the public authorities, and in some countries, civil society organisations are even subject to state harassment. Such discourse is often relayed by media close to populist parties and “Seeking to reach the largest possible audience, journalists deal mainly with the most scandalous and the most successful stories” (Vandor et al., 2017: 64). This generates a loss of credibility and trust in CSOs which are presented at best as organisational mastodons caring more for themselves than for the mission of taking care of people, and at worst as behaving scandalously. Thus, “Some CSOs have been called ‘Soros knights’ in the media, which subjects them to constant stigmatization and has had a negative effect on their daily functioning. Citizens have grown suspicious of them, resulting, on the one hand, in an increasingly negative public perception of the activities of all NGOs, and, on the other hand, preventing them from getting funding from municipalities” (EESC, 2019a: 17). As highlighted by EPSC (2019: 18), CSOs and activists “are more often targeted by cyber violence and online hate speech, as well as wider ‘silencing strategies’ meant to push them out of the public sphere”. In countries ruled by populist parties and especially in the so-called illiberal democracies, the government tends to exert a form of influence or control, directly or indirectly, on the media. This seems to be notably the case in Hungary, where an “uneven media landscape helped the incumbent political elite in creating a situation where the governing Fidesz party enjoys an unchallengeable dominance in the media, which robustly amplifies political messaging on behalf of the Government and the Fidesz party, parallel to hindering opposition forces media campaigns” (Political Capital, 2020: 29). This control on the media has a direct impact on CSOs as the “authorities use their influence in the media to discredit CSOs and their attempts to raise sensitive

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topics in the public sphere. CSOs and academics are often labelled as enemies in pro-government media, which has a negative influence on the general image the public has of them. A list of organisations that were said to be financed by George Soros was published in a pro-government daily newspaper” (EESC, 2019a: 19). A similar situation has been reported in Poland, where “there had been campaigns to discredit CSOs in the media, such as accusations of financial impropriety against some organisations” (EESC, 2019a: 13). In Romania, “This pressure on CSOs took the form of stigmatisation and creating obstacles to their access to funding. […]. Some organisations reported that threats had been made against them” (EESC, 2019a: 10). As underlined in (FRA, 2017: 49), “Such attacks may create an atmosphere that provokes verbal or physical attacks against human rights defenders and encourages their harassment and persecution, thereby putting their security at risk. A hostile public discourse often creates the impression that human rights defenders are ‘legitimate targets’ for harassment and intimidation”. Two features of negative public discourse and smear campaigns need to be underlined because they aggravate the situation. The first is that members and even heads of governments are attacking CSOs. Thus, “In a speech of 26 July 2014, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Mr Victor Orbàn, referred to the NGOs [Non-governmental Organisations] receiving EEA grants as ‘paid political activists who are trying to help foreign interests’, and made other critical comments (using the term ‘mercenaries’) with regard to such NGOs in another speech of 15 September 2015” (FRA, 2017: 50). The former Italian deputy prime minister, Mr. Salvini, has often attacked NGOs saying that they cooperate with human trafficking smugglers to bring irregular immigrants into Italy. In this environment, so critical of CSOs, even non-populist governments end up by criticising them. Thus, the French president, Mr. Macron, referring to those NGOs active in the Mediterranean Sea to save immigrants, said that they end up supporting smugglers. Similarly, “According to [CSOs] representatives met during the mission [of the EESC group on FRRL], a process is underway in France of criminalising organisations whose sole purpose is to save human lives. Some also mentioned smear campaigns against CSOs by private actors” (EESC, 2019a: 21). The second factor aggravating the situation is the fact, noted by the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA, 2017: 50), that these attacks are often directed against individual members of CSOs, thus laying the basis for physical attacks, threats and intimidation, as will be seen later in

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the chapter. Indeed, as related by the EESC group on FRRL, “According to participants [in the fact-finding mission], this general climate of stigmatisation increased the level of fear, for example a negative portrayal in the media could lead the individual involved to receive an increased number of death threats” (EESC, 2019a: 19).

Safe Space As regards threats, intimidation and physical attacks, there is unfortunately a lack of comprehensive data (FRA, 2017: 47), not least because “only a quarter of the organisations that experienced such incidents reported them to the authorities”. It is worrying that “Activists seem to accept intimidation and even attacks on people and property as ‘part of the job’” (FRA, 2017: 47). However, it is clear that there is a growing amount of such attacks as detailed by the reports of the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA, 2017), which in turn refer to sources such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe and EU umbrella organisations such as Civic Space Watch. “Most CSOs reported mainly verbal and online threats and attacks or being targeted by negative media campaigns and digital security threats. However, as many as 15 organisations said that their staff or volunteers had been physically attacked for reasons linked to their work. Furthermore, 20 organisations reported damage to their premises (such as vandalism, graffiti and broken windows)”. Moreover, it should be noted that these attacks “not only affect the directly targeted individuals, but also intimidate other CSO members, which can hamper the activities of the organisations in question” (FRA, 2017: 48). As a consequence of this, the FRA reports that burnout, depression and other mental health issues are registered and spreading widely among CSO activists (FRA, 2017: 48–49).

EU Institutions and Organised Civil Society Although the EU institutions are opposed to populist forces, they nevertheless have to come to terms with the growth of populism in many Member States. This happens for political reasons because the EU is influenced by the general political atmosphere, and for institutional reasons because the European Parliament, but above all the European Council and the Council of Ministers, have seen an increasing number of populists

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among their members in recent years.8 This inevitably impacts on the EU institutions’ behaviour towards civil society organisations, especially when, in an attempt to speak to citizens and thus prevent populists from monopolising this direct dialogue, they tend to bypass intermediary bodies and organisations such as CSOs. This section will examine the approach taken by the EU institutions towards civil society organisations. It will do so in connection with other aspects analysed in the first sections, such as digitalisation and new societal paradigms. The European Union institutions, particularly the European Commission, have often been accused of having a democratic deficit. While this charge was initially limited to the academic world, it has become more popular in politics and among the general public. It is linked with the profound transformations brought about by digitalisation such as hyperconnectivity, demand for immediate impact and feedback, demand for more transparency and accountability, distrust in institutions and authorities, new forms of civic activism, and the rejection of any intermediation in the expression of individual needs and demands (JRC, 2019: 16–22). Faced with these challenges, the EU institutions, and in particular “the Commission, ha[ve] also turned to ‘direct democracy’ in a further attempt to reduce democratic deficit” (EESC, 2017b: 33), as well as to try to speak and listen more directly to citizens, thus counteracting populism. In this regard, to be noted is that the Commission is making increased use of consultations, notably online (EESC, 2016). Increasing the number of consultations was one of the main efforts made by the previous Commission to listen to people’s expectations with the Better Regulation package. This required each Directorate-General to carry out consultations before launching any legislative initiative. The new Commission, alongside the Parliament and the Council of Ministers, has maintained this focus with the Conference on the Future of Europe. This project, announced by European Commission president, Ms. Ursula von der Leyen, when presenting her Political Guidelines, intends to give Europeans a greater say on what the European Union does and how it works for them. The Conference will be a complex process lasting several months and using a wide range 8 Even though these parties gained less ground than expected in the last European Parliament elections, they nevertheless acquired more seats, especially if their seats are combined with those of parties such as Fidesz, which are theoretically in the European People’s Party but are definitely to be considered populist.

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of existing and new tools to increase its outreach and strengthen ways for people to shape future EU action. The launch of the Conference, due to start on 9 May 2020 but delayed because of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, is clearly an attempt to listen more directly to citizens. Although the features of the Conference have not yet been finalised, it is already apparent that civil society organisations will not have a specific role in the bodies created to lead the Conference. Even the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) seems to go in this direction. This procedure, established by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, gives citizens the right to directly participate in setting the legislative agenda of the EU by proposing a legislative initiative in a specific field. Once a policy proposal is supported by the verified signatures of one million EU citizens, the European Commission is obliged to consider that proposal and can decide or not to bring it forward in the legislative process. The ECI “was introduced as a new approach to get Brussels closer to the European people. As a channel for mass mobilization organized around a specific legislative proposal, the ECI departs from previous procedures that gave preference to formal and informal consultations or ‘dialogues’ with TSOs [third sector organisations] based in Brussels” (EESC, 2017b: 35). Another aspect to be underlined concerns the approach taken by the EU institutions to funding for CSOs, which seems to replicate the above-mentioned national trend of funding CSOs for specific projects rather than structurally (EESC, 2017a: 31). CSOs are consequently becoming more vulnerable to contingencies and, for example, have experienced a severe financial crisis because of the interruption of EU funds following the freezing of their activities during the COVID-19 outbreak. As underlined by a CSO representative, “Our main problem is the lack of core funding. […] With no core staff we are voluntary managers for employees, which is challenging. […] Lack of such funding results in a huge stress within the organization”. In order to deal with this problem, the FRA asked the European Commission (and Member States) to address this issue by “favouring multiannual and core funding over shortterm projectbased funding, which would allow for a more sustainable basis for the work of CSOs as well as longterm planning” (FRA, 2017: 10).

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Conclusions The chapter has highlighted the many challenges imposed on CSOs by populism in Europe. It has focused on the national level, where the impact of populism on civil society organisations is stronger. Throughout the chapter it has been stressed that this is the consequence of the tendency of populist forces to see CSOs as an obstacle to the desired direct relationship between “the people” and the leader. The chapter has examined the channels through which populism exerts a negative impact on civil society organisations. It operates through populist public authorities, notably by posing administrative, legal and financial burdens, and through the growing weight of populism in public discourse and in the public sphere, which creates a negative atmosphere around and against CSOs. We have seen how this tendency also influences, to a certain extent, EU institutions notably by inducing them to favour a direct dialogue with citizens, thus bypassing CSOs. However, civil society organisations should not be seen only as possible victims of populism; they can and should play a crucial part in the EU political system in countering it. They constitute a channel for communication between citizens and the EU institutions, as proven by their role in facilitating and improving tools for representative democracy: they encouraged people to vote in the last EP elections and to take part in EU consultations because, according to the Court of Auditors, they let people know when an EU consultation has been launched. They have also been instrumental in ECIs, supporting those that have proved successful. CSOs can also play a crucial role in fighting populism by promoting EU values as well as civic education and engagement, by working on social issues, thus facilitating social cohesion and integration, by playing a specific role in fighting digital populism through educational and awareness-raising campaigns, by creating a positive European public sphere and by providing bottom-up and widespread oversight and fact-checking tools to combat fake news. It can therefore be concluded that EU institutions should support CSOs in their crucial political role both by supporting an open and inclusive democracy and a vibrant active citizenship thanks to the intermediary role of CSOs, and by curbing populism notably in its aspects contrary to EU values: respect for human dignity and human rights, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law. To this end, EU institutions should

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not cede to populist forces the monopoly on proximity to citizens but should engage with them in a dialogue with the following features: credibility, which requires that promises and speeches are followed by policies and concrete acts impacting positively on people’s lives: bidirectionality and not mere top-down communication; structural and stable integration in the policy- and decision-making process. However, the crucial feature of this dialogue relates to the central topic of this chapter: it should be built on the relationship and the cooperation between EU institutions and civil society organisations, and it should be based on common values and be ready to counter any approach that undermines them. In this sense, the populist wave that has hit Europe can be seen as an opportunity for the EU institutions to better understand the importance of opening the EU project to a more inclusive democracy. This should allow citizens to express their will and participate in the policy- and decision-making process not only by voting every five years to choose their representatives in the European Parliament, which is representative democracy, but also by participating in civil society organisations and through them in policy framing and the preparation of decisions on the development and future of the Union and its policies, which is participatory democracy.9

References EU-Russia Civil Society Forum. (2017, April). 2016 report on the state of civil society in the EU and Russia. European Court of Auditors. (2019). Special report n. 14- ‘Have your say!’ Commission’s public consultations engage citizens, but fall short of outreach activities. European Economic and Social Committee. (2016). EU public consultations in the digital age: Enhancing the role of the EESC and civil society organisations—Study. European Economic and Social Committee. (2017a). Financing of civil society organisations by the EU—Opinion. European Economic and Social Committee. (2017b). The future evolution of civil society in the European Union by 2030—Study.

9 See the “Participatory democracy—A success story written by the EESC” in https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/publications-other-work/publications/par ticipatory-democracy-success-story-written-eesc. Accessed on 13.6.2020.

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European Economic and Social Committee. (2019a). Fundamental rights and the rule of law—National developments from a civil society perspective, 2018– 2019—Report of the Group on Fundamental Rights and Rule of Law. European Economic and Social Committee. (2019b). Societies outside metropolises: The role of civil society organisations in facing populism—Study. European Economic and Social Committee. (2020). Participatory democracy—A success story written by the EESC. https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/ publications-other-work/publications/participatory-democracy-success-storywritten-eesc. Accessed 13 June 2020. European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC). (2019). 10 trends shaping democracy in a volatile world. Fundamental Right Agency. (2017). Challenges facing civil society organisations working on human rights in the EU. Fundamental Right Agency. (2018). Civil society space: Views of organisations— Conference paper. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra2018-ec-colloquium-paper-civil-society-space_en.pdf. Accessed 27 Mar 2020. Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2016). Trump, Brexit and the rise of populism: Economic have-nots and cultural backlashes. Faculty Research Working Paper Series. Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission. (2019). The future of government 2030+—A citizen centric perspective on new government models. More-Hollerweger, E. Bogorin, F.-E., Litofcenko, J., & Meyer, M. (Ed.) (2019). Civil society in Central and Eastern Europe. Monitoring 2019. ERSTE Stiftung. Mudde, C. (2004). The populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563 ´ Pap, A. L., & Sledzi nska-Simon, ´ A. (2019). The rise of illiberal democracy and the remedies of multi-level constitutionalism. Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies, 60(1), 65–85. Pariser, E. (2011). The filter bubble: What the Internet is hiding from you. Penguin UK. Pew Research Center. (2018). https://www.journalism.org/2018/05/14/ in-western-europe-public-attitudes-toward-news-media-more-divided-by-pop ulist-views-than-left-right-ideology/. Accessed 29 Mar 2020. Political Capital. (2020). https://www.politicalcapital.hu/search.php?article_r ead=1&article_id=2533. Accessed 11 June 2020. Postgrowth Institute. (2020). https://www.postgrowth.org/. Accessed 24 Mar 2020. Research and Degrowth. (2020). https://degrowth.org/definition-2/. Accessed 24 Mar 2020. UN Refugee Agency. (2017). Freedom in the World 2017–Hungary.

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Vandor, P., Traxler, N., Millner, R., & Meyer, M. (2017). Civil society in Central and Eastern Europe: Challenges and opportunities. Erste Foundation. Varsori, A. (Ed.). (2000). Il Comitato Economico e Sociale nella costruzione europea. Marsilio. V-Dem—University of Gotebörg V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset v10”. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10. 23696/vdemds20. Youngs, R. (2019). Civic activism unleashed: New hope or false dawn for democracy? Oxford University Press.

Europeanize to Resist: Civil Society vs. Populism Luisa Chiodi

Introduction: Civil Society Under Pressure In the past few years, the shrinkage of spaces for action by civil society1 has not spared the most advanced democracies and the member countries of the European Union (Amnesty, 2019). In 2018 Civicus Monitor, the alliance that tracks civic issues globally, identified 11 European member states in which civic space had become ‘narrowed’ or ‘obstructed’ (Civicus, 2020). In particular, humanitarian organizations engaged in search and rescue activities in the Mediterranean since 2016 were the target of an extensive smear campaign insinuating that NGOs collude with migrant traffickers, with important consequences for the public’s perception of the credibility of all organizations engaged in cooperation, solidarity, and promotion of human rights.2 Besides defamation, 1 I apply a standard definition of civil society as the sphere of non-coercive association between the individual and the state that includes formally organized non-governmental organizations (NGOs), social movements, and individual activists. 2 An overview can be found here: ‘4 mesi di attacchi alle ONG in 40 articoli’, Infocooperazione, 23-8-2017, https://www.info-cooperazione.it/2017/08/4-mesi-di-attacchialle-ong-in-40-articoli/.

L. Chiodi (B) OBCT/CCI, Trento, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 C. Ruzza et al. (eds.), The Impact of Populism on European Institutions and Civil Society, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73411-4_11

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in various EU countries civil society organizations (CSOs) have been subject to repressive measures and various forms of intimidation including complaints, sanctions, and even arrests of their members. This criminalization of solidarity has affected in particular those organizations involved in initiatives in favour of migrants and asylum seekers, and it has had a chilling effect on all kinds of solidarity initiatives (Binder, 2019). The anti-civil society turn followed the post-Cold War era, which was dominated instead by the idea of the ‘power of the powerless’, to use a well-known expression introduced by Vaclav Havel as one of the leaders of the dissidence movement in Central Europe. That is, the civil society that had been fundamental in the fight against communist regimes for almost three decades was considered a crucial actor to consolidate democracy (Cohen & Arato, 1994). Wide academic debates discussed the role of civil society also in international politics, being stimulated to do so by numerous cases of mobilization (Keane, 2003). For instance, during the wars in the Balkans, while states played power politics and were unable to intervene adequately to stop the conflict, civil society actors assumed a pivotal role in the peace and reconciliation processes (Abram & Bona, 2016). Still in 2015, NGOs engaged in saving migrants stranded at sea in the Mediterranean were generally described by mainstream media as heroes taking collective responsibility for saving lives.3 Then, from 2016 onwards, the narratives were overturned and civil society organizations started to receive strong criticism, when not explicit political attacks, while solidarity initiatives were literally criminalized. The rise of populism in the European public sphere had a role in this reversal that led to a decline of public trust throughout Europe in NGOs, especially those working with migrants (Boeri et al., 2018). In contrast, with the worsening of the situation, the EU and private foundations alarmed by the situation began to finance initiatives to contrast this shrinkage of civil spaces within EU member states.4 This chapter seeks to contribute to the recently opened debate on the consequences of the rise of populism for civil society organizations 3 When in 2016 Gianfranco Rosi won the Berlin Film Festival’s Golden Bear prize with his documentary film Fuocoammare (Fire at Sea), about the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean, the situation was already changing. 4 Together with Central European countries, Italy has been included by major EU foundations in the Civitates programme: https://civitates-eu.org/strong-and-resilient-civil-soc iety/.

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in Europe (e.g. Boeri et al., 2018; Horton, 2019; Siim et al., 2018). It examines in particular Italian civil society, and its relationship with the European political space, since it used to be considered one of the most vibrant in Europe, but lately has been struggling to respond to populist political elites successful in imposing their own agenda. More specifically, the chapter explores whether there have been opportunities at EU level that Italian CSOs have exploited to protect the democratic spaces at home. Although there is a left-wing populism and there have been left-wing populist attacks on civil society in Italy, the chapter focuses predominantly on the struggle with right-wing political forces because their rejection of transnational dynamics, be they migrant flows or the Europeanization of political issues, has dominated the public sphere in the past few years. The chapter first describes the impact of populism on Italian civil society and discusses the spread of discrediting narratives against NGOs. It then examines the complex national/European dynamics that make the lives of civil society organizations particularly complex. It concludes by citing evidence that the current crisis is making the European political space emerge.

Discrediting Narratives and the New Vulnerabilities in the Public Sphere The rise in migration flows from 2015 onwards created the momentum for populist forces to attack NGOs with their inflammatory narratives. After migrants, CSOs were among the first targets of public disparagement. Moving from the far-right positions of the Northern League, the discredit had a contagion effect across the entire national political spectrum. It was the Five Star Movement (5SM)’s representative Luigi Di Maio who coined the famous epithet of the ‘sea taxi’ to describe the role of NGOs engaged in rescue at sea operations in the Mediterranean. While the main 5SM founder Grillo referred to the ‘shadowy role of NGOs’ in the field, backing right-wing allegations of human trafficking, the then centre-left Minister of the Interior, Marco Minniti, corroborated suspicions about NGOs by imposing adoption of a ‘code of conduct’ for their operation (Barthélemy, 2018). In fact, populist attacks on civil society in Italy had started years before, already during the war in Iraq in 2004, with the wave of harsh criticism launched against a few NGO volunteers victims of kidnappings in war zones, but at that time populist forces were not mainstream. Described as

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irresponsible youths that cost high sums of ransom money to the national community, NGO workers became the target of narratives against civil society engaged in international politics that gradually grew in intensity and impact (Mantellini, 2015). But the strong public criticisms or explicit political attacks became mainstream after 2016 in connection with the immigration upsurge. Then, with the mounting success of populist political forces, not even the Italian scholar, Giulio Regeni, who was tortured and killed for conducting research work in Egypt, was spared reproaches, allusions, and accusations in a major national public debate (Del Pero, 2019). Paradoxically, with their disparaging narratives, populist political leaders popularized the term ‘non-governmental organization’ and its acronym in Italy, where it had hitherto not been frequently used in the national public sphere, where the terms ‘association’ and ‘civil society organization’ were most often applied.5 What is noticeable is that the narratives used to discredit civil society workers and volunteers in Italy followed the same pattern as elsewhere in Europe: NGOs were presented as a privileged elite, criticized for being self-appointed rather than elected; naive as well as out of touch from ordinary citizens’ lives, sometimes even taking advantage of their position against the general interest (Brechenmacher, 2019; Divjak & Forbici, 2017). Even examination of a very localized case in Italy shows the astonishing similarities among the narratives used to attack CSOs: when in 2018 in Trento the new populist local government, led by Salvini’s League, decided to drastically curtail the copious budget devoted to local associations working in the field of international cooperation, it did so by criticizing the self-referentiality of their work, the naivety of their aims, and their vested interests (Vignola, 2020). The accusation of colluding with human traffickers was repeatedly shown to be false, but indignation at non-governmental organizations rescuing migrants still survives (Edelman Trust Barometer, 2019). As elsewhere in Europe, the first consequence was a decline of public trust in civil society accompanied by a cutback of resources that further worsened the situation (Poledrini, 2018). What the notorious trials of Cédric Herrou (Henry, 2020) in France and of Carola Rackete (Ziniti, 2020) 5 Here I use the term ‘populist forces’ to refer to those actors that claim to represent or speak for the ‘people’, seen as a virtuous and homogeneous actor opposed to the corrupted élites. They include not only far-right groups but also all those actors that argue along these general lines, cutting across left-right divisions (Bonikowski et al., 2018).

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in Italy, which ended with acquittal on all charges, show is that it was not only a question of reputation. The risk of having to face trials or pay heavy fines had a further negative effect, that of discouraging the spread of spontaneous solidarity initiatives that were visible throughout Europe in response to the so-called refugee crisis (Graf Strachwitz, 2019). Italy’s traditionally vibrant civil society (Berruti, 2008) has been struggling to respond to populist political elites, especially because the media amplify their messages and influence public opinion accordingly (EU-Logos, 2019). Populists are interesting for the mainstream media even when in opposition because their radical positions and sensational slogans easily circulate, while civil society organizations generally have the problem of being under-reported in the media. The electoral victory of the two main populist political forces, the 5SM and Lega, in 2018 induced the mainstream media to give them even greater space and to amplify their influence further. When some media did criticize the populist messages, they ended up being accused of colluding with a privileged elite detached from reality (Vignola, 2020). Since the media are experiencing a profound crisis in Italy, as elsewhere throughout the world, due to the digital transformation and the collapse of their business model, they are particularly vulnerable to criticism and often ready to abandon their watchdog role (Blassnig et al., 2019). Populists tend not to describe themselves as part of the elite, and they claim to be the only legitimate representatives of the people. Organized groups structuring the social realm are generally seen as obstacles rather than assets: they are presented as unnecessary since the leader can have a direct dialogue with the electorate (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Now more than ever, social networks evidence the possibility of disintermediated public and direct communication (Bobba, 2019; Engesser et al., 2017). However, social networks can easily be misused to encourage online hate speech or to generate so-called storms, attacking single individuals or organizations with a variety of possible accusations (OBCT, 2018). CSOs have been attacked via social networks in many ways, but a typical conspiracy theory used to delegitimize their work with wide resonance in Italy, as well, has been the accusation of being agents of foreign interests by receiving funds from donors, and in particular from the foundation sponsored by George Soros. Another device used to silence the critical voices of CSOs has been the use of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP). These are suits for defamation that may

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incur expensive fines, when not the risk of criminal charges. SLAPPS are not a prerogative of populist politics, because they are often used by economic forces with the requisite financial means to threaten CSOs or journalists. But also political groups clamp down on critical speech by intimidating activists with the threat of draining their resources (due to the cost and time involved) and in turn reducing their political engagement (Greenpeace, 2020; Pierobon & Rosà, 2019). The Italian context reminds us that civil society is always much less powerful than the state or the political elites in power. Over-expectations concerning the role of civil society in a democracy may be seen as part of the post-1989 enthusiasm that ended up hiding the fragility of the ‘powerless’ or the dramatic imbalance in power between the two. As argued by Evans (1996: 1122), the state can positively engage with civil society, but limits to state-society relations are mostly to be attributed to governments rather than societies.

Difficulties in the CSOs’ Trickle-Down and Scale up Among the consequences for civil society of the rise of populism has been the worsening of the capacity to overcome traditional problems in collective action on a European scale. This aspect emerges clearly when considering a field where European CSOs traditionally played a significant role: that of protection against discrimination. The EU legal provisions in regard to anti-discrimination were the result of European civil society mobilization from the 1990s onwards. However, since the legal protection that had emerged from various bottom-up mobilizations was uneven, there was a need for further reform to ensure a EU-wide minimum level of protection against discrimination on any grounds (race; gender; religion; age; disability) and in various fields (employment, training, social protection, health care, etc.) (Xenidis, 2017). Even though the European Parliament (EP) in 2008 approved a so-called horizontal directive on equal treatment intended to reorganize the field, the Council of the EU did not adopt it. Despite the constant efforts to have the reform approved, for over 10 years it has been blocked in the absence of unanimity among member states (Iglyo, 2018). Initially, the member states that opposed the directive on equal treatment expressed concerns in regard to subsidiarity, given the practical and economic impact of the new provision, and its encroachment on areas of national competence like education, etc. (Paradis, 2008).

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However, with the rise of right-wing populist parties in the European space, opposition to a comprehensive reform has grown exponentially. In her speech to the EP plenary session in 2014, ALDE member Sophie in’t Veld, who had been shadow rapporteur for the directive, harshly criticized the political stalemate, openly denouncing the technical obstacles as false justifications: ‘Let us recognize, since 2008 the political climate has changed and a lot of parties that are in government today are under a lot of pressure of rising populist parties that are racist, xenophobic, misogynistic, antisemitic, homophobic, anti-gipsy, islamophobic’ (PersBrusselD66, 2014). Clearly the rise of parties in the European space was reflected in European politics, but the political dispute on the ‘horizontal directive’ occurred in Brussels in the confrontation between International NGOs and EU institutions; it had limited impact at the national or transnational levels. Brussels-based civil society organizations, which invariably encounter major difficulties in influencing dynamics at member-state level, could not mobilize national organizations and public spheres in support of this much-needed reform. The civil society organizations in Brussels have a hard time in ‘trickling down’ (transmitting and communicating) their instances to the national organizations and creating political dynamics where EU citizens live and, in this case, suffer uneven protection against various forms of discrimination. The problem of trickling down from Brussels to national contexts mirrors the opposite difficulty of scaling up for local NGOs at EU level or mobilizing transnationally with European networks from the local level. Thanks to the existing anti-discrimination directive, Italy equipped itself with an equality body—the so-called Ufficio Nazionale Antidiscriminazioni Razziali (UNAR, National Office against Racial Discrimination)—but transposition of the directive into the national legal system was inadequate. In particular, the UNAR, contrary to the EU indications for the establishment of national equality bodies, turned out to be subordinate to political power. All international reports on the implementation of international agreements concerning anti-discrimination stressed the UNAR’s lack of independence. These included reports resulting from the monitoring of the implementation of the Framework Convention by the Consultative Committee of the Council of Europe (UNAR, 2012). Although Italian NGOs working in the field are aware of the problems of the national equality body, in terms of lack of independence and resources, they often do not know that UNAR was established to

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implement a EU directive; nor are they generally aware of European monitoring reports (Vivona, 2019). What is worse in this case is that the UNAR became involved in media scandals that delegitimized it for a public opinion which did not even know about its existence. Before the vulnerable groups in the country were made aware of the support on which they could have relied, the UNAR acquired notoriety as public body that funds deceptive cultural associations which host gay sex parties (Santarpia, 2017). The attacks against the UNAR constitute another example of the populist turn in Italy. Moreover, what the example of the UNAR shows is that Italian civil society missed the opportunity to use what could be called the ‘Helsinki mechanism’, that is to say, the practice of transnational monitoring that originated from the Helsinki process in the Eastern bloc and that is the best legacy of the communist regimes. At that time, the dissident movements in Central Europe took advantage of the reports that monitored implementation of the CSCE’s (Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe) agenda to push for the advancement of human rights at home, relying on the international visibility of those reports (Snyder, 2011). Following the dissidents’ example of using transnational spaces to advance democracy at home, today in a much-improved context, European CSOs could use the monitoring reports by UN, OSCE, CoE, and EU institutions and agencies to open public debates and push for democracy and human rights at home. However, during training sessions conducted by the Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT) for two years with hundreds of Italian activists engaged in the field of antidiscrimination, what emerged was that hardly any of them were familiar with the EU decision-making process, with any kind of international monitoring; nor were they aware of the EU directives that could support their work.6 The Italian CSO activists proved unaware of the IOs critical reports on the lack of independence of the UNAR and therefore could not rely on them to press for a more autonomous equality body or more funds to protect citizens against discrimination. It is therefore not surprising that when the European Commission organized a consultation on how to strengthen the role and the function of equality bodies and fill 6 For more details on the training sessions conducted by OBCT and where the findings originate, see: Il Parlamento dei Diritti, https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Progetti/ Il-parlamento-dei-diritti.

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the gap in standards across the EU, only one Italian civil society organization participated, even though most national stakeholders were aware of the country’s problematic situation (European Commission, 2018). Without adequate tools to deal with the anti-civil society turn, Italian CSOs have not yet been able to take advantage of the European political space to scale up their cause. As signalled by the launch of a few initiatives to raise awareness about how the EU decision-making process works, and thus influence it for the general interest, this is an issue for civil societies in several member states and not only in Italy.7 It is not easy to achieve effective coordination between civil society initiatives at local and national level while reaching a transnational dimension, thereby maintaining territorial roots while establishing coordination at European level. This was also evident when Italian civil society mobilized against the criminalization of solidarity by organizing a march in Milan in 2017. The organizers could consider linking up at European level only after working to coordinate the initiative at national level (Chiodi, 2017). It was indeed a step forward compared to the past as it was an attempt to transnationalize the response to the attacks, but it had limited success. The European-wide campaign was launched in 2018 to present a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) asking the Commission to stop EU member states punishing life-saving volunteers was not successful: the campaign obtained only 45,000 signatures against the requisite threshold of 1 million (WeMove.eu, 2018). Indeed, the criminalization of civil society organizations entailed immediate legal consequences at national level, while the ECI addressed the EU level. Yet, it is an issue at national level due to the failures at EU level to implement the common asylum policy and to address the migratory waves. Overall, it is clear that the complex functioning of the local, national, and European levels of governance makes the lives of CSOs difficult in ordinary circumstances and even more so at times of crisis such as when they are subject to harsh populist attacks.

7 See for instance The Good Lobby, a non-profit start-up popularizing participatory democracy among European citizens https://thegoodlobby.eu/about/ or the European Fundraising Association, which has recently published a handbook (EFA, 2020) with a similar purpose.

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Legal Activism or Transnational Constitutionalism While the Helsinki method is underexploited in the European public sphere, this does not mean that it is completely absent; indeed, it has sometimes been successful in advancing civil causes. For instance, when responding to populist attacks against ratification of the CoE’s Istanbul Convention, the Italian feminist movement used the Helsinki mechanism with success. Describing the work carried out in the last few years to present the shadow report to GREVIO—the independent expert body responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention)—the lawyers involved stressed the importance of the experience and its relative novelty for Italian civil society.8 Media coverage of these cases was generally limited and—what is more—national, regional, and local authorities were not really aware of how to deal with international conventions, nor were judicial bodies. This problem emerged in the shadow reports for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which highlighted that there were no judicial proceedings in which the international law had been invoked (Piattaforma Lavori in Corsa, 2017). While public opinion is little informed about these initiatives, their limited circulation also entails that pressure from populist parties often strikes back before public opinion gets to know and take advantage of the Helsinki mechanism. Just as with the UNAR, it was via disinformation campaigns that the Istanbul international convention became the object of public discussions (EUvsDisinfo, 2020). And it was when the Italian Minister of Interior Matteo Salvini attacked the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and its monitoring mission, threatening budget cuts to the UN, that the Helsinki mechanism gained visibility in Italy (Hale, 2018). Even worse, according to Amnesty International, the European Commission refrained from launching an infringement procedure against Italy for discrimination against Roma people in 2017 to avoid a Eurosceptic backlash in the following parliamentary elections (Amnesty Italia, 2017). Indeed, there are other cases

8 During the seminar organized in Trento in 2019 ‘La partecipazione della società civile: presentazione del rapporto ombra predisposto per il GREVIO’, https://webmag azine.unitn.it/evento/giurisprudenza/60725/l-attuazione-della-convenzione-di-istanbulin-italia-il-ruolo-della.

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in which CSOs have proved not only resilient to populism but also fully proactive in promoting their causes. While European NGOs have had to face the use against them of legal instruments criminalizing solidarity, they have also learned to resort to legal activism to advance their causes in the field of migrant protection and fundamental rights. Legal activism—a term that denotes all initiatives that rely on European legal provisions and European courts—has emerged as an important means with which civil society can use the emancipatory potential of the law in a democratic context. Strategic lawsuits have enabled LGBT organizations to make progress in the field of civil unions in some EU countries, Italy included. Similarly, civil society organizations active in protecting asylum seekers’ rights have obtained some important results by appealing to the European Court of Human Rights (Ferri, 2017). As highlighted by Blokker (2018), when social actors engage with transnational law to strengthen democratic guarantees at home by referring to specific rights or principles, they contribute to the constitutionalization of Europe, because they affirm the importance of European law and European institutions, and of a transnational legal order which binds and guarantees civil rights and produces a virtuous circle for the protection of democratic institutions in the EU. The scant knowledge of the European decision-making process and the limited awareness of the space for political participation at EU level that civil society could use to respond to populist challenges are gradually changing (Troncota & Loy, 2018). While populists argue in favour of regaining sovereignty against EU integration, many CSOs move in the opposite direction. Social and political changes produced, among other factors, by migration generate new opportunities for resilience as well as reaction. The example of the Dublin regulation reform is especially revealing of the ‘learning by doing’ process of the EU political space experienced by Italian NGOs facing challenges. Since the Common European Asylum System is a full-fledged EU policy field, in 2017–2018 Italian civil society organizations, think-tanks, and academics with long experience of working with asylum seekers had clear ideas on what reforms were needed, and were able to convincingly propound them. Gianfranco Schiavone, president of the NGO Italian Consortium of Solidarity (ICS) and vice-president of the Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI), contributed to the European Parliament reform of the Dublin regulation (Bruni, 2018). He stressed his surprise at finding that ‘the European Parliament in the end proved to be a living structure

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that is able to interact with the outside’, with MEPs ready to listen to the advice of NGOs active in the field of migration in order to draw up the new common provisions in the field (Collettivo Checkmate, 2018). What made the difference in 2017–2018 was the virtuous connection established between Italian CSOs and the political representative, the MEP Ellie Schlein, who was working as shadow rapporteur in the reform process. In the end, the reform was blocked by the Council of the EU, which voted against the text proposed by the European Parliament. However, a positive step forward was made at the time, and one can expect that Italian CSOs will build on important political experiences like this one. Another example is provided by transnational civil society mobilizations led by prominent migrant associations, such as, for instance, the alliance between Croatian NGOs and Italian and other international NGOs which work to provide support to asylum seekers on the Balkan route. They urged the European Parliament to ensure that the European Commission carried out investigations on the gross human rights violations committed by Croatian police at the Bosnian border (Vale, 2020). While they harshly criticize the EU, they have contributed to its constitutionalization by advocating shared responsibilities for asylum seekers at the EU borders. Moreover, although they complain about the isolation that they suffer as a result of the criminalization campaign, their struggle has openly challenged the populist demands for pushbacks at any costs at the European borders.

Ideological Divides Civil society is clearly not a monolith; rather, it is constituted by organizations representing several interests and identities. This chapter has highlighted how populist leaders have attacked CSOs, especially on migration issues, and how they prefer to address the electorate directly, stressing the personal relation between the leader and the people. This idea of disintermediation is first of all functional to combatting ideological adversaries. Populists support and create alliances with non-profit organizations that mirror their views and help their cause. In Italy, the 5SM has advocated for more direct democracy, questioning the functioning of parliamentary representation, but it has been successful in organizing local political committees that fuel its electoral campaigns, and it regularly works with CSOs.

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As for the right-wing populists, they too are often well organized at grassroots level. But we can also find cases of civil society organizations that are ideologically close to them, for instance in the field of ‘family protection’ as emerged during the World Congress of Families (WCF) organized in Verona in May 2019. Some claim that far-right organizations are alien to the idea of civil society. Graf Strachwitz (2019), for instance, stresses that what can be considered civil society in a formal sense often belongs to the dark side of civil society organizations in a normative sense. The Southern Poverty Law Center argues that the WCF is an example of a ‘hate group’ (Hatewatch Staff, 2019), defined as one that vilifies others ‘because of their race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation or gender identity – prejudices that strike at the heart of our democratic values and fracture society along its most fragile fault lines’ (Southern Poverty Law Centre, 2020). However, there are ambivalent examples even among the farright populists that normally exclude vulnerable groups, minorities, minority interests, or institutional guarantees to protect them (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). The first openly populist government in Italy was based on a written agreement reached between the two main populist Italian parties in 2018. It included, on request to the Lega, the farright wing component of the coalition, a new ministry for disability and family issues in charge among other things of ‘protecting, supporting and integrating citizens with disabilities’ (G.R., 2018). Clearly, the intention was to consider the interest of Italian nationals only. Nevertheless, a notable feature of contemporary populist cultures—the notion that the essentialized view of the nation and its interests are the core of policymaking—evolved from past nationalist cultures that discriminated against disabled people (Brubaker, 2020). The Europeanized public sphere is a space of debate and contestation about a common future, where even radically different opinions are exchanged and where civil society includes all those actors that accept democratic institutions. European CSOs work in a regulated environment where they can exert more leverage than the national ones. They can link with EU institutions and use the European governance system to induce national institutions to respect fundamental rights and increase their space to work for the common good. More than being ideologically against the idea of a civil society constituting an intermediary realm between state and society, what some populists seem to reject is the possibility of the Helsinki mechanism of additional external control. In the

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name of sovereignty, populist forces often spurn the European constitutional process and, hostile to multilateralism, they oppose the affirmation of legal spaces beyond national borders. Yet, paradoxically, in the last few years, populist organizations and political parties have shown a remarkable capacity to network at international level. While arguing against multilateralism and in favour of sovereignty, they have appeared able to mount transnational initiatives with considerable impact on public opinion.

Europeanize to Resist European civil society is often seen as the last recourse available to resolve many of the political stalemates in third countries, as well as in the EU space. Whenever a new strategy to keep democracy afloat or to relaunch EU integration is sought, the idea of resorting to civil society resurfaces. Civil society seems somehow to be the victim of its own post-1989 success, in terms of presence and capacity for intervention in the international arena and in the public sphere. The post-1989 enthusiasm for civil society and the idea of the power of the powerless ended up by obscuring the limits of this state-society model, the dramatic imbalance in power relations between the state or political society and civil society, at national and European levels. If civil society is to acquire some kind of visibility or even an actual cultural hegemony, it needs the support of political elites or the momentum created by social movements. What government is in power at any given time makes a substantial difference to civil society’s chances of success or failure. Indeed, if CSOs could Europeanize their action, taking full advantage of the Helsinki mechanism, they would have more space for action and resilience to pressure from hostile politics at home. The European Union offers the widest Helsinki mechanism available for national civil societies, from monitoring to true sanctioning with, for instance, the infringement procedures. However, it must be acknowledged, as this chapter has discussed, that there are many obstacles to the creation of new transnational spaces for civil society from the grassroots up to the European level. Such obstacles consist of ambivalent dynamics with the media when populism emerges; the relations between Brussels-based umbrella NGOs and nation-state ones; the need for political interlocutors able to engage with them positively; and the degree of technical complexity of the EU decision-making process. At the same time, there is a considerable risk that European public opinion remains unaware of the wide potential of the Helsinki

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mechanism. The latter has not yet been fully exploited, regardless of the great expectations that followed the end of the Cold War, and its crisis began before it became a fully fledged tool to advance civil society’s instances and democracy at home. Indeed, the European public sphere is growing, and debates are increasingly Europeanized. This is probably one of the reasons why populists more vigorously combat the EU today, and why some spaces of civic action at EU level are sought by friends and foes of European civil society.

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EUvsDisinfo. (2020). Disinfo: Real purpose of Istanbul Convention is to abolish the family institutions. https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-real-purpose-of-the-ist anbul-convention-is-to-abolish-the-family-institution/. Evans, P. B. (1996). Government action, social capital, and developments: Reviewing the evidence of synergy. World Development, 24(6), 1119–1132. Ferri, F. (2017). Detenzione in centri di accoglienza, un commento sulla sentenza Khlaifia vs Italia, 21 febbraio. Associazione per gli Studi Giuridici sull’Immigrazione (ASGI). https://www.asgi.it/allontamento-espulsione/det enzione-centro-accoglienza-sentenza-khlaifia-italia. G.R. (2018). Governo. Nasce il nuovo Ministero delle Disabilità. Quotidiano Sanità. http://www.quotidianosanita.it/governo-e-parlamento/articolo.php? articolo_id=62458. Graf Strachwitz, R. (2019). What lies behind the concept of civil society? Shifting perspectives in Germany and beyond. In Activizenship (Vol. 3, pp. 46–51). Greenpeace. (2020, July). Sued Into Silence. https://storage.googleapis.com/ planet4-eu-unit-stateless/2020/07/20200722-SLAPPs-Sued-into-Silence. pdf. Hale, V. (2018, September 11). Salvini Hits Back at UN as new human rights chief orders probe into Italy ‘Racism’. Breibart. https://www.breitbart.com/ europe/2018/09/11/salvini-un-human-rights-italy-racism/. Hatewatch, S. (2019, March 27). Anti-LGBT Hate Group World Congress of Families to Convene in Verona. Southern Poverty Law Centre. https://www. splcenter.org/hatewatch/2019/03/27/anti-lgbt-hate-group-world-congressfamilies-convene-verona. Henry, M. (2020). Aide aux migrants: la justice relaxe Cédric Herrou, 13 Mai, Mediapart. https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/130520/aide-aux-mig rants-la-justice-relaxe-cedric-herrou?xtor=CS7-1047andutm_content=buffer cbdfeandutm_medium=socialandutm_source=Twitter_Mediapartandutm_cam paign=CM. Horton, T. D. D. (2019). Filling the fulfillment gap: NGO refugee responses in a time of rising populist-nationalism. Master thesis, University of California. https://escholarship.org/content/qt3v2520h0/qt3v2520h0_n oSplash_bdde71aabe737af1d16682900d533650.pdf. Iglyo. (2018). Joint NGO Statement on the 10th Anniversary of the Horizontal Directive. https://www.iglyo.com/7274-2/. Keane, J. (2003). Global civil society. Cambridge University Press. Mantellini, M. (2015). Greta, Vanessa, gli imbecilli e Facebook, 4 gennaio. Il Post. https://www.ilpost.it/massimomantellini/2015/01/04/greta-vanessagli-imbecilli-facebook/. Mudde C., & Kaltwasser R. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.

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Vivona, V. (2019). Equality, you know what I mean? European datajournalims network. https://www.europeandatajournalism.eu/eng/News/Datanews/Equality-you-know-what-I-mean. WeMove.eu. (2018). Criminalizing humanity. https://act.wemove.eu/campai gns/criminalising-humanity. Xenidis, R. (2017). Grant Shaking the normative foundations of EU equality law: Evolution and hierarchy between market integration and human rights rationales (EUI Working Paper). European University Institute. https://cadmus. eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/45489/LAW_2017_04.pdf?sequence=3. Ziniti, A. (2020). “Carola Rakete agì correttamente”: le motivazioni della Cassazione sul caso Sea Watch, 20 febbraio, La Repubblica. https://www.rep ubblica.it/cronaca/2020/02/20/news/sea_watch_la_cassazione_su_carola_ agi_correttamente_seguendo_le_regole_di_soccorso_in_mare_-249076754/.

Conclusions: Bursting the Brussels Bubble—How the Impact of Populism Can Be Exploited to Make the European Union Better Carlo Berti, Carlo Ruzza, and Paolo Cossarini

Those who have a good knowledge of the environment surrounding the European institutions (academics and practitioners alike) are certainly familiar with the concept of “Brussels bubble”. The plethora of offices, functionaries, politicians, lobbyists, and other figures that, working in close contact with each other daily, keep the European Union alive seem to be aware that they live in a separate world. The heart of this world is in Brussels, surrounded by a metaphoric bubble which might be invisible to the eye but is nonetheless well perceived by both those inside and outside it. Those who are inside the bubble are aware that, outside it, little is known about the reality of the EU institutions, their rules, procedures,

C. Berti (B) · C. Ruzza School of International Studies, University of Trento, Trento, Italy e-mail: [email protected] C. Ruzza e-mail: [email protected] P. Cossarini Department of Culture and Learning, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 C. Ruzza et al. (eds.), The Impact of Populism on European Institutions and Civil Society, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73411-4_12

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practices, and competences. They are also aware that, in order really to understand what happens across the EU, what the worries and needs of such a diverse population are, an enormous effort is necessary. An effort that is not always made. On the other hand, outside the bubble, European citizens often do not have a precise idea of the functioning of EU institutions1 ; there is, moreover, a general belief that those inside the bubble (perceived as elites, as well explained by Massetti in Chapter “The Populist-Eurosceptic Mix: Conceptual Distinctions, Ideational Linkages and Internal Differentiation”) are not fully aware of the needs of European citizens. This impacts on citizens’ trust in the European Union, and some of the latest figures demonstrate that it is a persisting problem. The Summer 2020 Eurobarometer, for instance, records a 43% average level of trust in the EU, but a decrease in the number of countries where the majority of citizens trust the EU (from 18 to 15), and an overall decline of trust in 17 countries (European Union, 2020). The bubble has been described as “a transnational political field with a particular elite habitus” (Busby, 2013: 204) often perceived from the outside as a “depersonalised, self-sustaining institutional complex” (Kauppi, 2011: 150). The existence of the Brussels bubble is due to several factors, such as a lack of efficient communication between the inside and the outside. This is made worse by the fact that citizens and institutions often speak different languages: a genuine, supranational European public sphere is missing, being substituted by parallel national spheres that only occasionally discuss European issues (Berti & Loner, 2020; Kriesi & Grande, 2015; Nulty et al., 2016). As a consequence, European elections are perceived as second order (Hix & Marsh, 2011), increasing the sense of distance between nations and the EU. Politicians themselves, moreover, contribute to the existence of the bubble by acting and speaking inconsistently inside and outside the EU institutions, thus generating the perception (as well highlighted by former President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz) that they are “out of touch”.2 This cleavage between the inside and the outside of the bubble has opened a space for new political forces. These forces are not necessarily a 1 https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2019/05/17/what-do-europeans-know-aboutthe-eu-before-they-go-to-the-polls/. Accessed on 4 December 2020. 2 https://www.politico.eu/article/martin-schulz-politicians-out-of-touch-in-brusselsbubble/. Accessed on 1 December 2020.

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threat to the EU and, as argued by Stavrakakis (2014), should not all be categorized as populist. However, among these forces are Eurosceptic and nationalist ones, which in many cases have successfully situated themselves in the space that separates the European elites and European citizens. By reclaiming national sovereignty, and exploiting the widespread perception of distance between citizens and EU institutions, these populist forces have managed to maximize polarization. However, by doing so, they may have inadvertently helped to burst the Brussels bubble. The well-known populist claim to be the vox populi (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017) has spread within the bubble, forcing the European institutions to recognize the gap between them and European citizens, and consequently to seek a way to reconnect with the people. As Massetti showed in Chapter “The Populist-Eurosceptic Mix: Conceptual Distinctions, Ideational Linkages and Internal Differentiation”, the elitist character of the EU governance, which contributed to generating a broad range of Eurosceptic populist forces across the continent, was bound to be eventually directly challenged by these forces. Chapters “The Discursive Construction of Issues in the European Parliament: A Model of Reciprocal Influence Between Populists and Non-populists Through Polarization and Fragmentation” and “The Politicisation of the European Union and the Role of the European Parliament: Opportunities, Risks and Limitations” have shown that populism is now a significant force within the European Parliament, both in numerical terms and because of its capacity to influence debates and policy-making. The EP bubble was the first to burst, with populists already gaining strength in 2014, and reinforcing their presence after the 2019 elections. This has generated a shift in the topics of debate (for instance towards migration, religion, democracy, and the rule of law), and in the variability of positions among MEPs, parties, and groups. The political forces within the EP have been induced either to re-negotiate their positions by taking account of the ideas brought by populists or to strengthen their opposition to populism, as shown for instance in Chapter “The Discursive Construction of Issues in the European Parliament: A Model of Reciprocal Influence Between Populists and Non-populists Through Polarization and Fragmentation” for the case of migration. By furnishing insights into the FEMM Committee, Warasin (Chapter “The Politicisation of the European Union and the Role of the European Parliament: Opportunities, Risks and Limitations”) has shown how populists have contributed to the politicization of the EP by exploiting destructive

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dissensus to polarize the debate further. Increased politicization, especially in the case of the EP, can become an opportunity to explore new dynamics and alliances, and to strengthen intragroup cohesion and intergroup collaboration: from this perspective, the impact of populism can have positive effects for the EP. The downside, however, is the risk that populism may have a more disruptive effect, causing intragroup fractures and increased intergroup disagreement. The direction taken by the EP will probably become clear in the near future, and it could be different depending on the issue at stake. As seen in this book, for instance, while on gender equality the EP seems to have increased cohesion and collaboration to counter populists, the situation is quite different in regard to two other important topics—migrations and Hungary—where the EP acts in a more fragmented way. The growing strength of populist forces in the EP has obviously captured the attention of the European Commission as well, despite its capacity to maintain a stricter cordon sanitaire against populism. The Commission’s bubble has not been directly infiltrated by populist forces; rather, it has been slowly consumed from the outside. Somehow, as shown by Ruzza in Chapter “The European Commission and Reactions to the ‘Populist Turn’ in Anti-Discrimination Policy”, the EC has had to react to populism. It has done so mainly in two different ways. First, it has addressed the issues raised by populism and by the civil society, in an attempt to demonstrate real attention to citizens’ needs. This attitude, as argued by Santaniello in Chapter “Populism and European Institutions: A Historical Perspective”, has been a defining feature of the Von der Leyen Commission from the outset. One of the priorities declared by the newly appointed Commission was, in fact, that of “Promoting our European way of life” by “protecting our citizens and our values”.3 These words sound like an attempt to mirror populist themes, but at the same time shift them to the European level: rather than a nationalist perspective on citizenship and protection, the Commission appears to be trying to build a more genuine European identity based predominantly on respect for the rule of law, and a “New Pact on Migration and Asylum”. Added to the call for a European Green Deal, and the more recent plans to address the multifaceted challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, this amounts to an evident attempt to reconnect with EU citizens. While the eventual 3 https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-europeanway-life_en. Accessed on 4 December 2020.

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success of this endeavour is by no means certain, it demonstrates the will of the EC to respond to the challenges posed by populists. Ruzza also shows the ambivalence that the Commission experiences when opposing populism. On the one hand, populism is perceived as a party-political issue, and the Commission seeks to avoid taking an openly political stance. Populist parties are represented in the EP, and instead of identifying and opposing them directly, the Commission prefers to refer to populism in general terms. On the other hand, the refrain “we do policy, not politics” clashes with an overarching attempt to defend and protect the European Project, which is understood in strongly normative terms by many Commission actors. Thus, in the Commission’s texts, references to “European values” abound when referring to populism. Particularly in its internal communications, the Commission appears scathing when considering the role of populist actors. However, the severe judgement on populist actors can only be partly reproduced in its public communications, for two sets of reasons. Firstly, populists’ signature policies tend to touch upon issues that also divide “conventional” politics, such as attitudes towards migration policy, which differentiate the centreright and the centre-left. Similarly, there are conventional centre-right actors that sponsor relatively illiberal policies on lifestyle issues in fields such as sexualities and abortion rights, and the boundary between them and illiberal populists is not always apparent (Ruzza, 2021). For these reasons, the Commission is unlikely to take strong positions. Secondly, several signature issues of populists are often scarcely communitarized, and insisting on them would intrude in Member States’ domains. Issues such as migration and border control fall within this category and are also particularly controversial (Schimmelfennig, 2018). An expanding area of conflict is instead the “rule of law” debate, which has set governments with a populist component against the rest of the Union. On these issues, the Commission (and the Parliament) has recently taken more decisive positions but only after years of ambivalence. Moreover, as previously noted, the Commission has recently taken a more decisive approach in fighting populist-endorsed conspiracy theories and fake news. Responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have publicly shown an affinity between the populist mindset and conspiracy theories (Bergmann, 2018). Reactions have included several populist actors embracing conspiracy theories in the health field, but also their gradual loss of credibility and possibly diminishing appeal for a wide range of electorates. This may result in a decrease or even a reversal of the appeal

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of populist actors in the EU as well. At the same time, it has given the Commission a chance to reclaim a role in public discourse, a chance to utilize the pandemic crisis to enhance Europeanization processes, and a chance to combat the neglect of expertise of which populist actors are often accused and reassert an image of policy effectiveness as the engine of European solidarity and driver of rationality and policy effectiveness. Nonetheless, Commission actors’ strong normative commitment is evident from their wholehearted sponsoring of anti-populist CSOs, such as those engaged in human rights and anti-discrimination policy. The EC has reacted by increasing its interaction with Brussels-based CSOs so as to reconnect with the groups that they represent. In her chapter, Kavrakova has highlighted the potential benefits of such a change of attitude of the EC: the populist turn, she argues, should be exploited by the EC (and the other EU institutions) to elaborate ways to reconnect with citizens. CSOs, for their part, have not been passive witnesses of the populist turn. Their role in the fight against populism and in defence of the EU may at first sight have appeared marginal. This is by no means true: the importance of CSOs in shaping the future of Europe and the relationship among citizens, EU institutions, and populist forces has recently attracted some scholarly attention (see for instance Ruzza & Sanchez-Salgado, 2020; Lindellee & Scaramuzzino, 2020). In Chapter “Civil Society as Anti-Populism? Countering the Populist Threat and Campaigning for Change in the Discourse of EU-Level CSOs”, Cossarini has conducted an in-depth analysis of how CSOs can influence the public debate, at European level, on major issues such as gender, race, religion, and migration by sustaining narratives that counter those of right-wing populists. CSOs thus contribute, together with anti-populists in the EP and EC, to challenging the discriminatory and exclusionary rhetoric of far-right, populist parties such as Fidesz, Law and Justice, or the League. However, CSOs seem to struggle more at the national level, especially in countries (such as Italy, Poland, and Hungary) where right-wing populists are particularly strong, and Euroscepticism is dominant. Both Brombo and Chiodi have made us aware of this issue in their chapters. Chiodi (Chapter “Europeanize to Resist: Civil Society vs. Populism”), in particular, highlights the need for national-level CSOs to “europeanize” so that they can increase their discursive and political power: a gap in the knowledge of how EU institutions work is identified as a major problem for organized civil society in several nations. The solution is, in fact, a reinforcement of the relationship between the supranational (EU) and

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the national levels which could empower local CSOs and, at the same time, enable the EU to reconnect with its citizens at a more local level. In Chapter “The Interaction Among Populism, Civil Society Organisations and European Institutions”, however, Brombo stresses that the EU should do more to help CSOs in their work and thereby support participatory democracy at national level. As right-wing populism generates obstacles for national CSOs (in the form of administrative, legal, and financial boundaries, but also discursively by publicly delegitimizing them), the EU should avoid falling into the trap. Instead of bypassing CSOs in an attempt to reconnect directly with citizens, the EU should recognize organized civil society as a fundamental intermediary body that can play a crucial role in fighting populism. EU governance should consequently support (discursively, but also financially), defend, and cooperate with national CSOs. As a whole, the variety of perspectives collected in this book offers a global picture of how European institutions and EU-level NGOs are being influenced by the rise of populism and, at the same time, how they are adjusting their functioning and their discourse to the new sociopolitical milieu. Moreover, this book points to at least three critical dimensions of populism and, hence, to three intertwined lines of development for the field of populism studies in the EU context. The first one parallels the longstanding academic debate about the nature of populism. While populism is a multifaceted phenomenon with diverse origins and manifestations, there are some common traits that every definitions stresses. More importantly, it is unquestionable that there is a certain degree of abuse of the term within the academic world and in public debate. As shown by the interventions of both scholars and practitioners in this volume, the problem is that populism has acquired a pervasive nature. However, if populism is everywhere— and everybody can be called populist—then it risks being nowhere in particular, becoming a loaded word (Brubaker, 2017). Over the last years there has been a “populist hype” (Glynos & Mondon, 2019)—which not all have been aware of—that, while pushing the pervasiveness of populism, has to some extent reinforced the idea that populism lacks of a distinctive nature. The widespread use and abuse of the signifier “populism” has indeed contributed to some common conceptual conflations in the public debate. The burgeoning literature in this field has in fact not prevented populism from being merged with a number of analogous—albeit different—concepts, such as far- and radical-right,

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nationalism, Euroscepticism, authoritarianism and alike (De Cleen et al., 2018). The contributions in this book show how this type of reasoning is still common and widespread, and at the same time they open up the possibility to think beyond common simplifications. This is directly connected to the second line this volume stresses, namely the type of research that has to be conducted on populism. While the scholarly debate on the nature of this phenomenon remains an essential task, this book highlights the need to widen the research field. In order to examine the heterogeneous impact of populist politics a methodological pluralism has to go hand in hand with a broad perspective that bridges different levels of study. Sociopolitical, historical, and normative lens have to be applied to the analysis, and this has to deal with the various levels of political governance. Taking the EU and its machinery as an object of study means being aware of the various institutional, political, socio-economic and sociocultural variables that play a role in the European milieu, and specifically in the surge and success of populist politics. The contributions in this volume take into account these multiple variables, also exposing critical points in the interpretation of the EU and its relationship with right-wing populism. Debunking the analogies with similar concepts and phenomena—such as nationalism and radical right politics—the wide perspective of this volume contributes to open up the field of research. This leads to the third line of development, that is, the normative value of populism. Here too, this volume advocates for a broad perspective that incorporates both scholars and practitioners into the analysis. The normative perspective, as shown in this book, is as important as the sociological, discursive, and empirical examinations, and critically contributes to the evaluation of populism. The chapters of this volume reaffirm to some extent the widespread belief in the scholarship that considers populism—essentially in its right-wing manifestation—as antithetical to liberalism, although they also add some nuances. Undoubtedly, the scholarship agrees on the fact that left-wing forms of populism tend to be more inclusive, and therefore can be more seriously considered as incorporating elements of liberalism. However, the EU has been object of criticism from specific forms of populism, i.e. populist radical right (PRR) form of politics, which has represented the national-populist conjuncture which the EU has been facing over the last decades. These populist forces in the European context have arisen from specific and differentiated political, economic, and cultural circumstances. Drawing their support from

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specific swathes of the population, they have been seen as a challenge for mainstream politics. They advocate for major changes along different ideological lines, also according to the different geographical milieu of each of them. As such, the dominant scholarly approach largely contends that populism is to be associated to a form of “illiberal democracy” (Mudde, 2004: 561; Zakaria, 1997). Takis Pappas (2019), for instance, argues that populism and liberalism diverge along three main lines: liberalism’s idea of consensus and moderation versus populism’s antagonistic politics; the presence of multiple cleavages in liberalism versus the single cleavage in populism, i.e. “the people” versus “the elite”; and the essential role of constitutionalism and checks and balances in liberalism versus the push for majoritarianism in populism. While some contend that populism “is a profoundly illiberal and, in the end, directly undemocratic understanding of representative democracy” (Müller, 2014: 484), others say that populism epitomizes the rise of democratic illiberalism, noting that “populism is antiliberal but it is not antidemocratic” (Krastev, 2007: 60). Notwithstanding, this book also demonstrates that right-wing, Eurosceptic, and nationalist populism has not had only negative effects on the EU; it has also created opportunities for positive actions. First and foremost, it shows that any discussion of the consequences of populism for liberal systems has to go through an in-depth analysis that takes into account its multidimensional aspects. Moreover, bridging the theory/practice divide reinforces the quality of the debate about the nature and normative value of populism, and that carries important consequences for the EU as well. While political confrontation at the EU level has increased over the last years, as shown by the contributions in this volume, the hostility as such has not necessarily to be seen as harmful. Undoubtedly, while nativism and exclusionary ethnic nationalism remain the core ideological compass of populist forces, confrontation risks to drift into illiberal stances. However, the a priori demonization of populism risks (a) to play into the hand of populism itself and (b) to be condemned to scientific and political failure. The positive equilibrium in which populism may potentially have a vitalizing effect on the EU politics depends on a variety of variables, and as demonstrated by all authors in this book, it depends on all actors involved. In European terms, populism may end up bursting the Brussels’ Bubble. Once the Bubble has burst, there is most likely no way back. Initially left without defence, over the past years the EU has suffered the attacks of increasingly strong populist forces, most often on the far-right spectrum

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of politics. However, the initially disruptive impact of these forces has caused a broad range of reactions which have led to the emergence of new, potentially positive, dynamics. All those entities, movements, and groups which are challenged by populism on a daily basis, both at national and supranational level, have started a discussion of which this book is a vivid example: EU institutions, national and supranational CSOs, and even academics have met each other to try and find new approaches and novel solutions to the populist challenge. The outcome of this discussion will be decisive for the future success (perhaps even the survival) of the EU.

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Index

A Adenauer, Konrad, 46 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), 62, 80, 81, 83, 87, 108–110, 131, 249 Alternative for Germany (AfD), 3, 34, 60 anti-semitism, 136, 138 austerity, 34, 51, 58 Austrian Freedom Party (FPO), 34, 35, 52

B Barroso, José Manuel, 156–158 Brexit, 12, 29, 58, 59, 61, 62, 73, 101, 151 Brothers of Italy, 71, 74 Brussels bubble, 220, 264, 265 Buddhism, 123, 127 Bulgarian National Union Attack (NOA), 34

C Charlie Hebdo, 129, 136 Christianity, 122, 127, 131, 133, 134, 136–141 Civil Society Europe (CSE), 203 cordon sanitaire, 7, 62, 168, 266 Covid-19, 64, 147, 158–160, 180, 191, 222, 229, 238, 266, 267 crisis crisis of democracy, 6 economic crisis, 3, 25, 219–221, 229 financial crisis, 55, 107, 156, 158, 160, 238 refugee crisis, 32, 56, 58–60, 205, 213, 244, 247 cultural backlash, 5 D Danish People’s Party (DF), 34, 35 De Gasperi, Alcide, 46 Delors, Jacques, 52 democracy digital-, 186–188

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 C. Ruzza et al. (eds.), The Impact of Populism on European Institutions and Civil Society, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73411-4

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INDEX

liberal-, 6, 36, 37, 135, 197, 199, 201, 215 media democracy, 187, 190 representative-, 175, 176, 179, 181, 186, 188, 191 Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25), 34, 192 Di Maio, Luigi, 245

E elitism, 201 anti-, 8, 24, 33, 36, 80, 149, 156, 201 En Marche, 61 EU EU-minimalism, 27 EU-rejectionism, 27 EU-revisionism, 27 Euro-enthusiasm, 26 European Association for the Defence of Human Rights (AEDH), 203, 214 European Christian Political Movement (ECPM), 203 European Citizen Action Service (ECAS), 186 European Conservative and Reformist group (ECR), 62, 138 European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), 203 European Grassroots Antiracist Movement (EGAM), 203 European Green Deal, 64, 266 European Humanist Federation (EHF), 203, 210, 212 European Network Against Racism (ENAR), 203, 209 European Popular Party (EPP), 58, 70–72, 74, 81, 83, 84, 87–89, 98, 108–110, 112, 158

European Roma Grassroots Organisations Network (ERGO), 203 European Roma Information Office (ERIO), 203 European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), 203 European Women’s Lobby (EWL), 203, 209 Europe for Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), 62, 79, 86, 88, 89 Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD), 51 Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD), 56 Euro-pragmatism, 26 Euroscepticism, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 21, 22, 25–29, 31–33, 35–37, 48, 49, 51, 55, 73, 80, 97, 100, 156, 158, 161, 164, 166, 177, 178, 268, 270 Eurosphere, 181–183, 192, 193 Extremism, 5, 135, 136, 161, 164, 182, 206, 210, 214 F Farage, Nigel, 56 Federation of Catholic Family Associations in Europe (FAFCE), 203 femonationalism, 121, 140 Fidesz, 59, 70–72, 74, 83, 87–89, 206, 230, 234, 237, 268 Finns Party, 71, 87 Five Star Movement (5SM), 25, 245, 254 Fortuyn, Pim, 121, 150 Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student (FEMYSO), 203 fragmentation, 5, 13, 71, 72, 75, 82–90, 110

INDEX

Fridays for Future, 223, 225 Front National/National Rally (FN/RN), 34 Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), 214, 221, 226, 235, 236

G Great Recession, 55, 56, 60 Grillo, Beppe, 245

H Haider, Jörg, 150 hate speech, 72, 138, 153, 202, 205, 206, 212, 215, 234, 247 Hinduism, 123, 127

277

K Keller, Ska, 82, 87, 89 L Laclau, Ernesto, 4, 5, 21, 23, 24, 198 La France Insoumise, 4 Law and Justice (PiS), 34, 59, 71, 74, 131, 268 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 150 Le Pen, Marine, 60, 61, 121 LGBT, 14, 198, 203, 208, 209, 214, 253 liberalism, 50, 54, 200, 208, 209, 270, 271 Lisbon Strategy, 53 M Macron, Emanuel, 60–62, 102, 225, 229 Malmström, Cecilia, 163 Moscovici, Pierre, 163 Muslim, 56, 78, 79, 86, 121, 129, 131, 133–136, 138–140, 200, 208

I Identity and Democracy (ID), 62, 178 ideology, 4, 23–25, 99, 134, 137, 149, 150, 152, 157, 160, 225 illiberal, 10, 25, 34, 37, 54, 60, 64, 209, 267, 271 illiberal democracy, 6, 59, 157, 234, 271 immigration, 36, 52, 55, 56, 73–75, 77, 78, 85, 100, 140, 156, 177, 202, 246 International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), 203, 214 Islam, 79, 121–123, 126, 127, 131, 132, 135–140 Islamophobia, 136, 205

N nationalism, 3, 6, 29, 31–33, 35, 36, 47, 49, 80, 121, 138, 149–152, 154–156, 158, 160, 166, 167, 205, 206, 215, 270, 271 Next Generation EU , 160 Northern League (LN/Lega), 34, 60, 150, 206, 245

J Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS EUROPE), 203 Jobbik, 34 Jourová, V˘era, 163, 180, 213, 214 Juncker, Jean-Claude, 58

O Open Society Foundation (OSF), 203 Orbán, Viktor, 3, 59, 74, 81, 87, 89, 180 Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT), 247, 250

278

INDEX

P Party for Freedom (PVV), 34, 78, 79 people ‘the people’, 4–6, 8, 23, 24, 31, 33, 34, 78, 83, 88, 120, 121, 131, 149, 156, 177, 179, 186, 197, 200, 201, 205, 206, 208, 219, 232, 233, 239, 247, 254, 265, 271 sacralization of, 120 Podemos , 3, 25, 33 polarization, 5, 12, 71, 72, 75, 77, 80–82, 88–90, 123, 177, 179, 180, 265 populism degree of –, 6, 13, 27, 269 populist narratives, 2, 201 populist turn, 3, 98, 113, 151, 169, 199, 215, 268 religious populism, 121, 123 Prodi, Romano, 97, 155, 156 Progressive Alliance of Socialist and Democrats (S&D), 62, 63, 80, 108–110, 112

R racism, 121, 203, 205, 206, 211–213, 215 genderization of–, 140 Recovery Fund, 65 refugee, 60, 81, 198, 212, 215 refugee crisis, 3, 32, 56, 58–60, 213, 247 Religion, 9, 13, 14, 119–127, 129, 131–134, 136–141, 162, 198, 202, 203, 208, 209, 248, 255, 265, 268 religious minorities, 127, 129 Renew Europe, 61–63, 109

S Salvini, Matteo, 61, 84, 85, 102, 123, 235, 246, 252 Schuman Declaration, 45, 46 Sinn Fein, 33 society ‘uncivil’, 10, 199, 215, 216 solidarity, 1, 59, 60, 64, 74, 75, 80–82, 95, 97, 100, 161, 164, 180, 210, 212, 214–216, 233, 243, 244, 247, 251, 253, 268 sovereignty, 3, 31, 33, 34, 47, 49, 59, 61, 95, 97, 233, 253, 256, 265 people’s sovereignty, 24, 31, 61 style, 5, 120, 152 political–, 4, 149 Swedish Democrats (SD), 3, 34, 56 Syriza, 3, 25, 33, 55 T Tajani, Antonio, 98 Thunberg, Greta, 62, 223 Timmermans, Frans, 163 Treaty of Amsterdam, 52, 183 Treaty of Maastricht, 49, 50, 52 Treaty of the Coal and Steel Community (CECA), 46 True Finns party (PS), 34 Trump, Donald, 158 Tsipras, Alexis, 55 U Ufficio Nazionale Antidiscriminazioni Razziali (UNAR), 249, 250, 252 Union for the Nations of Europe (UEN), 51 United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), 3, 34, 55, 56, 79 V Visegrad Group, 59, 94

INDEX

Von der Leyen, Ursula, 63, 64, 89, 111, 114, 158, 237, 266 W Weber, Manfred, 84, 89 Wilders, Geert, 3, 121

279

X xenophobia, 72, 80, 153, 157, 161, 164, 165, 202, 206, 212, 215 Y Yellow Vests , 225