The Impact of Mining Lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan: Political, Social, Environmental and Cultural Contexts [1 ed.] 0367563398, 9780367563394

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series Information
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Figures and tables
Author Biographies
Foreword
1 Mining Lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan
Post-Soviet Context
Institutional Development in Mining Regimes
Country Context
Challenges and Contexts
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Environment
Mine Lifecycle and Community Challenges
International Context
References
Part I Exploring Mining – When Mining Comes to Town – Initiating Mining Infrastructure
2 A Pesky Story of Chinese Mining in Kyrgyzstan
Introduction
A Benevolent Investor Or a Gruesome Bogeyman?
A Pesky Story
Kyrgyzstan Gold Rush
Conclusion
Notes
References
3 Contestations Over Mining Policies and Mineral Ownership in Mongolia From the Socialist Period to the Present
Introduction
Mining During the Mongolian People’s Republic
The Case of Erdenet Mine: Who Benefits?
Post-Soviet Developments in Mineral Licensing and Ownership
Conclusion
Measures Taken By the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic
Conclusion
Notes
References
4 Gold Mining Conflicts in Kyrgyzstan: When Context and Culture Matters
Introduction
Historical Overview of Mining in Kyrgyzstan
Case Study: Aral
Shadows of the Soviet Past
Discussion
Conclusion
Notes
References
5 Filling a Hole? Compensation for Mining-Induced Losses in the South Gobi
Introduction
Methods
Mobile Peoples, Land Tenure and Development-Inducted Displacement
Herder Land Tenure in Mongolia
Resettlement and Compensation in Mongolia: Legal Stipulations and Cases
Complaints to CAO Against Oyu Tolgoi Regarding Resettlement and Economic Displacement
Land Tenure
Livelihood Impacts
Resettlement and Compensation in the Mongolian Gobi
Diversity of Approaches
Social Cohesion, Conflict and Double Impact
Conclusion
References
Part II Extracting Information – Community Engagement With Mining
6 Social Impact Assessment in Mongolia: Development and Trends
Introduction
International Practices of Social Impact Assessment and Their Implications
Evolution of Social Impact Assessment in EIA Laws and Guidelines in Mongolia
Consideration of Social Impacts Prior to Revisions to the EIA Law in 2012
Cases of Assessing Social Impacts in the EIA Legal Framework
Social Issues Specific to Mongolia Overlooked in Assessments
Development of SIA Methodology Through Consultation
Conclusion
Notes
References
7 Mining Melodrama in Mongolia: A Gurvantes Case Study
Notes From the Field, Nadia Mijjidorj, 2019
Mining and Community Conflict in Gobi Region – Case Study in Gurvantes, South Gobi
Experience From the Oyu Tolgoi Mine in Khan Bogd
Methods
Story
Tsesu Purevsuren
Companies
Government
Herders
Discussion
Notes
References
8 Does Transparent Information Empower Communities? Natural Resource Data Accessibility and Use Practices in Mongolia
Introduction
What Is the Most Relevant Problem for the Local Community Linked With Mining?
The Case of Dalanjargalan Soum – the Local Problems
What Problems Can Be Solved With the Help of Data?
Entry Point
Environmental Rehabilitation Issues
Mining Companies’ Economic Contribution to the Soum
Conclusion and Recommendation
Notes
References
9 Resource Extraction, Environmental Concerns and Social License to Operate in Kyrgyzstan
Introduction
The Environment and Resource Extraction in Developing Countries
Environment and Resource Extraction in Kyrgyzstan
The Environment, Resource Extraction and Social License
Environmental Concerns and Conflicts
Environment as a Part of SLO
Environmental Protection and SLO in Kyrgyzstan
Environmental Regulation of Resource Extraction in Kyrgyzstan
Stakeholders’ Power and Interest in Enforcing Environmental Safeguards
Implementation of Environmental Protection Measures
Conclusion and Policy Implications
References
10 Mining Shadows On Mongolia’s Environment and Heritage
Mongolia’s Ecological Traditions
Land Resources and Land Rights
The Environmental Costs of Mining
Mining’s Threat to Biodiversity
Toward a Sustainable Future
Notes
References
Part III Rehabilitating Land and Society
11 Reclamation: Lack of Awareness and Post-Mining Mismanagement in Kyrgyzstan
Introduction
Background to Kyrgyzstan
Methodology
Overview of Findings From Field Research
Naryn
Chatkal
Ala-Buka
The Challenges of Post-Mining Remediation
Conclusion
Notes
References
12 After Life-Of-Mine: Rethinking Mine Closure
The Afterlife-Of-Mine
The Mongolian Context
The Unbounded Mine
Beyond Closure
References
13 Looking Back and Looking Forward: Conclusions On Reducing Site Level Conflict Associated With Mining
References
Index

Citation preview

The Impact of Mining Lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan

This volume investigates how mining affects societies and communities in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan. As ex-​Soviet states, Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan share history, culture and transitions to democracy. Most importantly, both are mineral-​ r ich countries on China’s frontier and epi-​centres of resource extraction. This volume examines the challenges communities in these countries encounter on the long journey through resource exploration, extraction and mine closure. The book is organised into three related sections that travel from mine licensing and instigation to early anticipation of benefit through the realisation of social and environmental impacts to finite issues such as jobs, monitoring, dispute resolution and reclamation. Most originally, each chapter will include a final section entitled “Notes from the field” that presents the voice of in-​country researchers and stakeholders. These sections will provide local contextual knowledge on the chapter’s theme by practitioners from Mongolia and Central Asia. The volume thereby offers a distinctively grounded perspective on the tensions and benefits of mining in this dynamic region. Using Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan as case studies, the volume reflects on the evolving challenges communities and societies encounter with resource extraction worldwide. The book will be of great interest to students and scholars of mining and natural resource extraction, corporate social responsibility and sustainable development. Troy Sternberg is a senior researcher in the School of Geography at the University of Oxford, UK. He is the editor of multiple books, including Arid Land Systems (2019) and Societies and Climate Hazard Crises in Asia (Routledge, 2017). Kemel Toktomushev is a research fellow at the University of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan. He is the author of Kyrgyzstan: Regime Security and Foreign Policy (Routledge, 2016). Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo is a director of the International Institute for the Study of Nomadic Civilizations under the auspices of UNESCO. He is also a lecturer at the Department of Anthropology and Archaeology, National University of Mongolia.

Routledge Studies of the Extractive Industries and Sustainable Development

Mining and Sustainable Development Current Issues Edited by Sumit K. Lodhia Africa’s Mineral Fortune The Science and Politics of Mining and Sustainable Development Edited by Saleem Ali, Kathryn Sturman and Nina Collins Energy, Resource Extraction and Society Impacts and Contested Futures Edited by Anna Szolucha Regime Stability, Social Insecurity and Bauxite Mining in Guinea Developments Since the Mid-​Twentieth Century Penda Diallo Local Experiences of Mining in Peru Social and Spatial Transformations in the Andes Gerardo Castillo Guzmán Resource Extraction, Space and Resilience International Perspectives Juha Kotilainen Our Extractive Age Expressions of Violence and Resistance Edited by Judith Shapiro and John-​Andrew McNeish The Impact of Mining Lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan Political, Social, Environmental and Cultural Contexts Edited by Troy Sternberg, Kemel Toktomushev and Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo For more information about this series, please visit:  www.routledge.com/​series/​ REISD

The Impact of Mining Lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan Political, Social, Environmental and Cultural Contexts Edited by Troy Sternberg, Kemel Toktomushev and Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo

First published 2022 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2022 selection and editorial matter, Troy Sternberg, Kemel Toktomushev and Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Troy Sternberg, Kemel Toktomushev and Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-​in-​Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data Names: Sternberg, Troy, 1959– editor. | Toktomushev, Kemel, editor. | Ichinkhorloo, Byambabaatar, editor. Title: The impact of mining lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan : political, social, environmental and cultural contexts / edited by Troy Sternberg, Kemel Toktomushev and Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2022. | Series: Routledge studies of the extractive industries | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2021018894 (print) | LCCN 2021018895 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Mineral industries–Mongolia. | Mineral industries–Kyrgyzstan. | Communities–Mongolia. | Communities–Kyrgyzstan. Classification: LCC HD9506.M662 I67 2022 (print) | LCC HD9506.M662(ebook) | DDC 338.2/309517–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021018894 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021018895 ISBN: 978-​0-​367-​56339-​4  (hbk) ISBN: 978-​0-​367-​56341-​7  (pbk) ISBN: 978-​1-​003-​09734-​1  (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/​9781003097341 Typeset in Bembo by Newgen Publishing UK

Contents

List of figures and tables  Author biographies  Foreword  1 Mining lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan 

viii x xvi 1

T ROY S T E RN BE RG, K E ME L TO K TO MUSHE V AND B YA M BABAATAR I CHI NK HO RLO O

PART I

Exploring mining – when mining comes to town –​initiating mining infrastructure 

13

2 A pesky story of Chinese mining in Kyrgyzstan 

15

K E M E L TO K TOMUSHE V

Notes from the field: Mongolia: Chinese investment and the Belt and Road Initiatives

27

K H ATAN B O L D O I D OV AND BUD SURE N DAVAANYA M

3 Contestations over mining policies and mineral ownership in Mongolia from the socialist period to the present 

33

B YA M BABAATAR I CHI NK HO RLO O

Notes from the field: Conflicts between mining companies and the local population

47

A I SH A K ARPA E VA

4 Gold mining conflicts in Kyrgyzstan: when context and culture matters  A I M E E RI M T U RSALI E VA

57

vi Contents

Notes from the field: Relationships between local communities and mining companies

70

K U BA N ASHY RK ULOV

5 Filling a hole? Compensation for mining-​induced losses in the South Gobi 

76

ARI E LL A H E ARN AND BAYARSAI K HAN NAMSR A I

Notes from the field: The Tri-partite Council for dispute resolution in Khan Bogd, Mongolia

90

BATTSE N G EL LK HAMD O O ROV

PART II

Extracting information – community engagement with mining 

95

6 Social impact assessment in Mongolia: development and trends 

97

BAI GALM AA PURE VSURE N, TE GSHBAYAR DAR A M BA Z A R AN D P U RE VD ULAM LK HAGVASURE N

Notes from the field: Mongolia: Chinese Investment and the Belt & Road Initiatives

114

AI C H O L P O N ALI E VA (JO RUPB E KOVA)

7 Mining melodrama in Mongolia: a Gurvantes case study  120 TSE RE N N AD MI D MI JI D D O RJ AND TSE ND SUR EN P U R EV SUR EN

Notes from the field: Complaints about mining to MPs and its solution: the case of Gurvantes

138

AM ARZAYA NAMSRAI AND MUNK HUU NO ROV SA M BUU

8 Does transparent information empower communities? Natural resource data accessibility and use practices in Mongolia 

143

D E L GE RM AA B O LD BAATAR

Notes from the field: An untapped opportunity? The state of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in the Kyrgyz Republic after the 2016 validation ALT Y N A I S YDY KOVA

161

Contents  vii

9 Resource extraction, environmental concerns and social license to operate in Kyrgyzstan 

168

R AH AT S A B Y R B E KOV AND I ND RA OVE RLAND

Notes from the field: Kumtor’s struggle to secure a social license to operate

183

A K T I LE K TU N G ATAROV

Notes from the field: Herder perspective on Social License

185

BATBU YA N BATJAV

10 Mining shadows on Mongolia’s environment and heritage  195 E R D E N E BU YA N E NK HJARGAL

Notes from the field

211

S A I P I R A F U R STE NB E RG

PART III

Rehabilitating land and society 

219

11 Reclamation: lack of awareness and post-​mining mismanagement in Kyrgyzstan 

221

A LM AZ T C H O RO E V

Notes from the field: Mining closure in Mongolia

239

E N K H T SE TSE G SO SO RBARAM

12 After life-​of-​mine: rethinking mine closure 

243

S T E P H E N L E ZAK AND GANTULGA MUNK HE RDEN E

Notes from the field: Why Ala Buka worked – a study from Kyrgyzstan

252

N AZGU L A K S A RI E VA

13 Looking back and looking forward: conclusions on reducing site level conflict associated with mining 

259

J I LL S H A N K LE MAN

Index 

273

Figures and tables

Figures 0 .1 0.2 3.1

Map of Kyrgyzstan  Map of Mongolia  Impact of mineral policy changes on licence issuance and revenue collection  4.1 This map shows mining resistance areas in Talas region (Zoi Environment Network, 2012)  6.1 Number of DEIA reports in Mongolia  7.1 Gurvantes soum mining licenses  7.2 Gurvantes and Khan Bogd districts, Mongolia  9.1 Dimensions of social license to operate  9.2 Stakeholder power and interest in environmental protection in the resource extraction sector in Kyrgyzstan  9.3 Civil protests against the legislation permitting the moving of glaciers at Kumtor mining site  10.1 Eco-regions of Mongolia  10.2 Satellite image showing present-day Ulaanbaatar  10.3 Mining exploration licenses issued in Omnogobi Province, Mongolia  10.4–5 Satellite images of the Oyu Tolgoi mining site in 2011 and 2020  1 0.6–​8 Satellite image showing the Tavan Tolgoi coal mine in Omnogobi province  11.1 Solton-​Sary pasture and location of the mine. The mine is near the pasture that residents use every summer  11.2 Naryn Field Research participants  11.3 Chatkal valley  11.4 Chatkal Field Research participants  11.5 Abandoned mining site in Chatkal  11.6 Ishtamberdi deposit  11.7 Ala-​Buka Field Research  11.8 Abandoned mining site in Ala-​Buka 

xviii xviii 46 60 104 122 123 173 177 179 198 200 203 204 208 225 226 228 229 230 232 233 235

List of figures and tables  ix

Tables 6 .1 The social impact areas and associated sub-​impacts  6.2 Comparison of national and international social impact mitigation tools  7.1 Notable mining companies in Gurvantes  7.2 Key mining-​related issues in Gurvantes and Khan Bogd Soums. Information drawn from research analysis  8.1 Matrix of license data portals  8.2 Environmental data set roadmap  8.3 Environmental data accessibility by each license holder in Dalanjargalan soum  8.4 Local development fund transfers (in million MNT)  9.1 Assessment of Kyrgyz resource extraction sector using SLO dimensions  9.2 Pollution compensation rates in Kyrgyzstan  11.1 Overview of research themes  13.1 Table of contents for an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment  13.2 Scope of Kumtor gold mine closure planning 

101 108 121 127 153 156 158 160 174 178 226 264 266

Author biographies

Kyrgyzstan Aicholpon Alieva (Jorupbekova) is a managing partner of the law firm Kalikova & Associates. Aicholpon has more than 15 years of practical experience advising foreign investors, international organisations, Kyrgyz and foreign governments, research institutions and local companies on legal issues related to mining policy and legislation, foreign investments, project financing and mergers and acquisitions transactions in the Kyrgyz Republic. Aicholpon also acts as an Honorary Legal Adviser to the Ambassador of Great Britain in the Kyrgyz Republic. Aicholpon earned her master’s degree in law from American University, Washington, D.C. Aimeerim Tursalieva is a social researcher who studies natural resource conflicts in the Kyrgyz Republic from a sociocultural perspective. Aimeerim also used to work as a community development officer for the gold mining company in the Talas region of the Kyrgyz Republic. Aimeerim studied Peace and Conflict Transformation at the Swisspeace Academy and at the University of Innsbruck. Aisha Karpaeva is the Head of the Subsoil Use Policy Department of the State Committee for Industry, Energy and Subsoil Use of the Kyrgyz Republic. Aisha has a master’s degree in Environmental Sciences from the University of Tsukuba, where she studied conflicts between mining companies and local communities in the Kyrgyz Republic. Aisha also has master’s degrees of jurisprudence from the Kyrgyz State Juridical Academy and the Kyrgyz State Technical University. Aktilek Tungatarov is an executive director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Kyrgyzstan. Prior to this, Aktilek worked as the director of Sustainable Development at Kumtor and as the Executive Director of the International Business Council of the Kyrgyz Republic. Aktilek holds a master’s degree in International Development from the International University of Japan.

Author biographies  xi Almaz Tchoroev is a media professional with broad experience in producing current events, strategic communications and managing social media pages. Almaz received his master’s degree in international relations from the London School of Economics and Political Sciences. Currently, Almaz works for BBC. Altynai Sydykova has led Kyrgyzstan’s national EITI secretariat since 2016. Prior to this, Altynai worked as the leading specialist at the State Agency for Geology of the Kyrgyz Republic and researched extractives industry in the Kyrgyz Republic for local and international organisations. Altynai earned her master’s degree in Peace and Security from the OSCE Academy in Bishkek. Indra Overland is a research professor and a head of the Energy Programme at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). He previously headed the Russia and Eurasia Research Group at NUPI and has worked on Central Asia since 2001. He completed his PhD at the University of Cambridge in the year 2000, followed by a three-​year post-​doctoral project on Central Asia and the South Caucasus. He has carried out fieldwork in all Central Asian states and has been responsible for cooperation between the OSCE Academy in Kyrgyzstan and NUPI since 2007. Kemel Toktomushev is a senior research fellow with UCA’s Institute of Public Policy and Administration and an Assistant Professor of Political Science with UCA’s School of Arts and Sciences. Kemel is also a Co-​Principal Investigator for the project “Gobi Framework for Sustainable Infrastructure” between the University of Central Asia, University of Oxford, and Independent Research Institute of Mongolia. Kemel holds a PhD in Politics from the University of Exeter and a Master of Science in International Relations from the London School of Economics. He is also a Harvard Kennedy School’s Executive Education alumnus Kuban Ashyrkulov was the director of the gold and copper mining company in the Talas region of the Kyrgyz Republic and was also the chairman of the International Business Council of the Kyrgyz Republic. Kuban participated in the development of the new version of the Law on Subsoil of the Kyrgyz Republic, as well as other normative legal acts regulating the mining industry. Currently, Kuban works on the issues of economic development. Kuban received his MBA degree from the Academy of Management under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic. Nazgul Aksarieva is one of the most prominent experts in the field of natural resource management in Kyrgyzstan with a proven track record of conducting research in the context of extractive industries and infrastructure projects. Currently, she oversees business engagement processes at PeaceNexus Foundation-Kyrgyzstan.

xii  Author biographies Rahat Sabyrbekov is a post-​doc researcher at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek. His primary research interests include development and environmental economics. He holds a PhD degree in Economics from Norwegian University of Life Sciences and a master’s degree in International Political Economy from the University of Birmingham. Rahat has taught for many years at the Economics department of the American University of Central Asia and is the founding Director of the Center for Environment and Development at the American University of Central Asia. Saipira Furstenberg gained her PhD from the University of Bremen in 2017. After completing her PhD, she worked as post-​doctoral researcher on Central Asia Political Exiles (CAPE) Database project at the University of Exeter, UK. From 2018 to 2019, she taught Politics in Oxford Brookes University, UK. Saipira is specialised in post-​Soviet region of Central Asia. Her research examines sustainable development, mining, global governance and international dimensions of authoritarianism. Her work has been published in Central Asian Survey, Extractive Industries and Society, Open Democracy, The Conversation, The Foreign Policy Centre and EurasiaNet. Mongolia Amarzaya Namsrai is a politician and served as a member of the State Great Khural (Mongolian Parliament). Elected as an MP from South Gobi Province in 2016–​2020, she worked as a deputy chair of the committee of Mongolian People’s Party in the province from 2009 to 2016. She received an MA in Economics from the University of Agriculture and National Academy of Governance. Her political and research interest focuses on solving conflicts and legal issues around the rule of law, mining and local communities. Baigalmaa Purevsuren is a lawyer and researcher with a Bachelor’s (LLB) and a Master’s (LLM) degree in Law from the School of Law, National University of Mongolia. Since 2003, she has worked on promoting community development, disaster management and women and child rights. She has had grants from national and international civil society organisations, including UNDP and World Vision International –​Mongolia. Her research focuses on the socio-​economic impacts of development-​induced resettlement and compensation to local communities, especially for nomadic herders. Batbuyan Batjav is a social-​ economic geographer who has worked on nomadic pastoral issues in Mongolia for two decades. Formerly, Director of the Mongolian Institute of Geography, he has been a Visiting Scholar at the University of Oxford, Colorado State University, University of Arizona and Cambridge University. He is dedicated to strengthening pastoralism as a viable contemporary livelihood.

Author biographies  xiii Battsengel Lkhamdoorov is a nomadic herder and the head of Gobi Soil NGO in the South Gobi province. He was a founder of the Tripartite Council of the company-​ herders-​ local government at the Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold mine in Khanbogd, South Gobi, owned by Rio Tinto and the Mongolian government. He is an activist and works mainly on protecting nomadic herders’ rights to avoid and mitigate the impacts of mining in Mongolia. Bayarsaikhan Namsrai is a civil society and human rights expert and activist. Since 2001, she has worked on protecting human, community and environmental and development rights. She is the head of the Steps Without Border NGO and a member of Publish What You Pay coalition. She has specialised in developing policy and strategic documents and conducting advocacy for public interests while developing training modules and methodologies specific to Mongolia and supporting communities to protect their rights. Budsuren Davaanyam is a senior lecturer at the School of International Relations and Public Administration, National University of Mongolia. Her research focuses on Mongolia–​USA Educational Cooperation, Mongolia–​ China Relations, Mongolia’s Third Neighbour Policy and Soft Power. She is a PhD candidate at the National University of Mongolia and defended a PhD at the Shandong University of Qingdao. Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo is a lecturer at the Department of Anthropology and Archaeology, NUM and a Co-​Investigator of the Gobi Framework project “Mediation Model for Sustainable Infrastructure Development –​scaling up Praxis from Mongolia to Central Asia.” Previously, he worked as a lecturer at ISEK, University of Zurich and was a visiting scholar in the universities of Cambridge, Colorado in Boulder, UCL and Porto. He holds a PhD in anthropology, an MA in linguistics. His research focuses on pastoralism, political ecology, mining, diverse economies, nomadic cultures and development intervention. Delgermaa Boldbaatar works for promoting transparency and collective governance in the mining sector. She spent eight years in the Mongolia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Secretariat. Her current work at IFC focuses on fact-​based public discourse, mining revenue management and effective use of open data for trust-​building and improved community voice. She is a PhD Candidate and holds an MA in Public Administration. Enkhtsetseg Sosorbaram is an associate professor, Department of International Relations, School of International Relations and Public Administration, National University of Mongolia. Her research focuses on international political economy, energy policy, Russian and Eurasian studies. She received a PhD in International Economics, the National University of Mongolia in 2012.

xiv  Author biographies Erdenebuyan Enkhjargal grew up in a nomadic household in Dornogobi province of Mongolia. She currently is a PhD candidate at Doshisha University in Japan where her research explores how economic development and climate change are impacting traditional nomadic values. Gantulga Munkherdene is a lecturer at the Department of Anthropology and Archaeology, National University of Mongolia. He holds a BA in Social Anthropology and an MA in Development Studies at the University of Melbourne. His research focuses on mining, cultural heritage, development and capitalism in Mongolia. Previously, he worked as a lecturer at the Mongolian University of Science and Technology and a visiting scholar at the University of Copenhagen and Cambridge University in the UK. Khatanbold Oidov is the head of the Department of Political Studies, the Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences in Mongolia. He has worked for the Institute since 2006 in different positions, from an analyst to an academic secretary. He holds a PhD in Political Sciences and worked as a visiting scholar at the University of Kentucky and Central European University. His research focuses on democracy, corruption, political participation, political culture and governance. Munkhuu Norovsambuu is a senior lecturer at the Graduate school of Business, Mongolian University of Science and Technology and holds a PhD in Business Administration. She worked on the socioeconomic aspect of businesses, cluster analysis and model development for over ten years. She has also conducted consultancy on socioeconomic studies, feasibility studies and environmental impact assessments. Purevdulam Lkhagvasuren currently works at the World Bank-​financed “livestock commercialisation project” in Mongolia. She received an MA in Environmental Management at the University of Queensland in Brisbane, Australia. She has a decade of experience working in the mining and conservation sectors. Her research interests include climate change and community-​ based conservation. Tegshbayar Darambazar is a lecturer at the University of Finance and Economy and a board member of the Legislation & Policy Research Hub NGO. Her research focuses on extractive industry accountability and transparency, especially beneficial ownership and disclosure systems. She holds an MA in Social Science and a BA in Law and specialised in anti-​money laundering and counter financial crimes compliance. Previously, she worked in the private sector in Hong Kong and Mongolia and served as a public officer in the Mongolian government and cabinet. Tsendsuren Purevsuren holds an MBA from Stratford University and a BA in British and American Studies at NUM. She worked as a coordinator for the Amnesty International Mongolia and a research assistant in the Gobi framework project in 2018–​2019 and translator/​research assistant for the independent research team of Oxford University on Mongolia Oyu Tolgoi

Author biographies  xv mine case of Ombudsman at the International Finance Corporation in Mongolia in 2016–​2017. Tserennadmid Mijiddorj is an ecologist and recently earned a PhD at the National University of Mongolia. She worked as a research assistant in the Gobi Framework project. Since 2002, she has joined with Snow Leopard Trust until now to engage local communities to reduce human–​wildlife conflicts and seek eco-​friendly sustainable livelihood solutions. United Kingdom Ariell Ahearn is a departmental lecturer in Human Geography at the School for Geography and the Environment at Oxford University. Her expertise focuses on changing patterns of work, social relations and cultural values in rural Mongolia. She examines the connection between shifting economic and political regimes and the impact of these changes on social relations and notions of morality and values. Her research methods are ethnographic with field sites in rural and suburban Mongolia. Dawn Chatty is an Emeritus Professor in Anthropology and Forced Migration and former Director of the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, United Kingdom. She was elected a fellow of the British Academy in 2015. Her research interests include refugee youth in protracted refugee crises, conservation and development, pastoral society and forced settlement. She is the author of Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East Cambridge University Press, 2010, From Camel to Truck, White Horse Press, 2013 and Syria: The Making and Unmaking of a Refuge State, Hurst Publishers and Oxford University Press, 2018. Jill Shankleman gained her BA and PhD in sociology from the University of Essex in the UK and is particularly interested in the relationship between international investment and rural communities. She has written on the oil industry in conflict areas, and on the approach of Chinese extractive industry companies to social and environmental issues. Most of her working life is as a consultant to companies and banks, aiming to ensure that local voices are recognised and listened to. Stephen Lezak is a Gates Scholar at the University of Cambridge, where he researches the politics of climate change and extractive industry. He has also advised on sustainability policy in a variety of contexts, including working with two US presidential campaigns, the government of Mongolia, the Rocky Mountain Institute, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. His writing has been published in a variety of academic and popular outlets, including The Independent and Grist. Troy Sternberg is a geographer at the University of Oxford. As a specialist in desert environs and societies, he has spent much time in Mongolia and Central Asia. He feels travel is essential to understanding our world.

Foreword Dawn Chatty

This edited volume is a unique study based on many years of fieldwork in Mongolia and Central Asia by the editors and contributors. It explores the impact of the multinational extractive industries on national governments, regional and local pastoral populations. For nearly half a century, multinational extractive industries have been under scrutiny. This is particularly true for the petroleum industry in Africa and in the Middle East. Efforts by these corporations to win the trust of national governments and international lending bodies, such as the World Bank, have resulted in concrete measures to be developed over the decades to exhibit what is widely recognised as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). My own work in south eastern and northern Arabia to keep the petroleum industry focussed on its CSR eventually resulted in efforts to create win–​win outcomes for local pastoral communities affected by oil exploration, extraction and transportation to key ports for export.What is particularly unusual about this volume is that it examines the mining extractive industry’s recent presence in two ex-​Soviet states Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan. Not only does it address the difficult starting point –​national governments and local communities not accustomed to transparency, and co-​management, but it also addresses the concerns, anxieties and self-​expression of local pastoral communities most affected by the mining life cycles in their traditional territories. The idea for this research and volume emerged out of work at the Oyu Tolgoi mine in Mongolia. The research followed a long process through resource exploration, extraction and then finally mine closure.They also studied the herding communities’ early anticipation of group benefits and followed through to document the communities’ realisation of negative social, economic and environmental impact, disrupted expectation, lack of transparency and access to information, and the difficulty of achieving any voice or agency in terms of improving conditions and outcomes for their pastoral communities. This long process and, eventually, a positive transition with the study in Mongolia became the basis for a South–​South engagement for mining mediation and amelioration in Central Asia. In this contemporary era of “new silk roads” and international investment flows and social media facts and rumours, it is important that local voices are heard and influence national and international efforts at corporate social responsibility.The final sections of each chapter in this

Foreword  xvii volume –​“Notes from the field” –​present the voices of the “native” researchers and stakeholders. They provide a local context and distinctively grounded experience of multinational activities and lay bare the importance of accountability and responsibility-​sharing between the extractive industry, the national governments and the local pastoral communities on whose land these activities take place. Mining might benefit the nation as a whole, but leave much to be desired in its physical transformations of the pastoral landscape. Over the past 50 years or so, there has been growing international pressure for accountability, transparency and respect for human rights among multinational companies in extractive industries of oil and mining (Kimmerling, 2001; Feeney, 2004).This is widely mainstreamed at different levels of uptake in the CSR policies of these multinational companies. Every major international corporation now maintains a CSR unit and their websites regularly upload information on their good works.The notion of CRS is now well established in West Africa and the Middle East and is finding its way into parts of Central Asia and Mongolia where some but not all mining companies operating in these regions, are putting greater efforts into sound social investment policy and state concern –​on their websites –​with respecting the human rights of local peoples. Some multinational companies, following the examples from the Middle East oil industry (see, e.g., May et al., 1999; Rae and Chatty, 2001), actuated these policies through greater efforts at participatory planning workshops and win–​ win outcomes as well as partnerships with universities in Central Asia and in the United Kingdom. These moves have given mobile pastoral communities leverage in demanding the implementation of sound social performance policies from oil companies and other international bodies for their communities in the desert. In Central Asia and Mongolia, however, we are still in the early stages. However, with the example of successes in Mongolia and elsewhere, it is likely to be a much shorter road to accountability, transparency and respect for human rights among other herding societies of Mongolia and in Kyrgyzstan. The danger throughout is that when profits are high these CSR activities are strong and clearly visible; when downturns in these industries hit profits, these activities suffer. Whether transparency, accountability and respect for human rights of local communities adjacent to extractive industry activity continues to move in the direction of becoming remain mainstream in Central Asia or requires greater local activism and demands for rights by local communities remains to be seen.

xviii Foreword

Map 0.1  Map of Kyrgyzstan –​courtesy of Chris McCarthy.

Map 0.2  Map of Mongolia –​courtesy of Chris McCarthy.

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Foreword  xix

References Feeney, P. 2004. Comment on occidental’s land access and community relations standards and practices in Quichua communities in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Transnational Dispute Management (TDM), 1(2). Kimmerling, J. 2001. “Uncommon grounds:  Occidental’s land access and community relations standards and practices in Quichua communities in the Ecuadorian Amazon”, Law and Anthropology, 11:179–​247. May, P., with Dabbs, A., Fernandez-​Davila, P., Goncalves da Vinha,V. and Zaidenweber, N. 1999. Corporate Roles and Rewards in Promoting Sustainable Development:  Lessons Learned from Camisea. Berkeley: Energy and Resource Group, University of California. Rae, J., and Chatty D. 2001. Social Impact Assessment of Mukhaizana, Jiddat-​il-​Harasiis. Muscat: Petroleum Development Oman.

1  Mining lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan Troy Sternberg, Kemel Toktomushev and Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo

Our book investigates on how mining affects societies and communities in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan. These two ex-​ Soviet states share similar 20th-​ century history, traditional pastoralism and steppe culture and now democratic approaches to governance. Both mineral-​rich countries on China’s frontier are epicentres of resource extraction and resultant processes that reconfigure politics and economics. They also share community opposition and suspicion of foreign companies, factors that place mining at the centre of the national debate. Active civil society, high social media use and changing policies stir attention and uncertainty. There is a cycle of mining –​the repeated activities and challenges that countries and communities encounter on the long journey through resource exploration, extraction and mine closure. An investigation of mining starts with licensing, knowledge and instigation; travels from early evaluation and anticipation of benefit, goes through the realisation of social and environmental impact, then disrupted expectation and difficulty in achieving agency towards amelioration.With time comes the post-​struggle phase, whether through achievement or resignation, where direct confrontation evolves to seek accommodation or tentative acceptance of conditions and proceeds to finite issues such as jobs, monitoring, dispute resolution and land reclamation. Each chapter identifies and engages with a phase of the mining lifescycle in contemporary Kyrgystan and Mongolia. The goal is to understand processes in two states at the epicentre of mining development today. Resource extraction brings new challenges for citizens and governments and presents the enduring conundrum –​how to direct mining development for a country’s positive benefit. Much research has focused on mineral resources in South America and Africa (Conde 2017; Larmer and Laterza 2017) whilst the lifecycle of a mine in Inner Asia digresses through Soviet legacies, nascent democracies and engaged publics (Sternberg 2020). Here the industry is framed by international investment, China’s Belt and Road Intitiative, weak governance and a perceived lack of citizen and community benefit. This has led to a range of outcomes from episodes of violence in Kyrgyzstan to a negotiated community development agreement in Mongolia (Lezak et al. 2019). Understanding the life of a mine investigates the three phases  –​exploration, extraction and DOI: 10.4324/9781003097341-1

2  Troy Sternberg et al. rehabilitation/​closure –​that represent the extractive cycle. The book portrays the challenges that mining presents to communities and governments in developing countries. The Kyrgyzstan–​Mongolian perspective forms a basis to present South-​ to-​South country processes, engagement and understanding. Whilst conflict dominates the discussion, evolving regional practice includes efforts at mediation and amelioration. Mining predates current nation states in the region; 21st-​century transitions encourage applied knowledge of lifecycles that reflects contemporary realities. This era of “new silk roads,” international investment flows, inequality, social media fact and rumour, colour revolutions and political fatigue hosts transformative extractive dynamics. Our series of mining panoramas brings context and experience to the Inner Asian steppe region. Examination of contemporary society and new knowledge embeds the region in the global mining paradigm.This introduction outlines themes that frame the book’s chapters; an awareness of history, society and contemporary dynamics is key to understanding mining lifecycles in the region.

Post-​Soviet context Though few publications link research in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan, a productive comparison draws the countries together. Parallel histories and related development experiences highlight the similarities. Kyrgyzstan left the Soviet Union in 1991 and Mongolia abandoned socialism in 1990. Since independence, both nations have pursued versions of democracy and a market economy. Socialism, as practiced in these countries, has served as a foundation for transformation of property ownership, mining regimes and mineral resources management since the 1990s. Existing structures became a reference point for generations who grew up during the Soviet era and in the post-​socialist period (Humphrey 2002). Concepts of wealth distribution, state ownership and intervention and resource management have persisted to some degree in both countries. Though there were policy changes in mining, state ownership of mineral resources (e.g. Mongolia’s 34% interest Oyu Tolgoi mine) has repeated in the post-​socialist period. Moreover, the state continues equitable distribution of wealth in the form of cash transfers from mineral revenue. Constitutions and land laws of both countries mirror the legislation of the Soviet Union. There were two property rights -​one was “the state ownership of all land including soil, minerals, as well as forests” and the other was the “individual land use rights” recognised by the state (Osakwe 1985, pp.147–​8). Post-​socialist legal systems retained both rights which allowed people to use state ownership against private mining, hoping for a share of the wealth. It also legalised suppression of community opposition to state-​owned mines. On one hand, this post-​socialist system gave power to oligarchies to control mineral resources by manipulating people and communities against competitors. The case of Gurvantes in Mongolia shows how the local community and

Mining lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan  3 government target only one mine out of several in the same place. On the other hand, post-​socialist generations are influenced by the nostalgic memory of elders about honest people and equitable living conditions under socialism.This has shaped new, positive legacies of socialism ignoring past hardships of central planning, political oppression and colonial history in search for a more equitable and just society. This is evident in Mongolia where the public-​supported state ownership of the Erdenet copper mine though the government lost the case of nationalising the mine at all levels in court.This suggests that the shadow of socialism exists and passes from one generation to another through memory that shapes an improper the marriage of state and businesses.

Institutional development in mining regimes As most states inherited mineral title from a crown, monarchy, aristocrat or landlord, it legitimatised the absolute rights of state ownership of land and subsoil over people in the constitution (Flomenhoft, 2018; Scott, 2008). After 1990 private property regimes in Mongolia introduced the concepts such as “mining claim” or “usufruct through discovery” and “labour theory of ownership” in extractive industries. It justifies the resource claim of an institution or local people who discovered or depended on the resources and mineral deposits. This conception helped people benefit directly from subsoil and surface rights while resisting royal or state prerogatives over minerals (Mcdowell, 2004; Scott, 2008). The socialist government of Mongolia conducted mineral surveys and feasibility studies of the mineral deposits through state funding; post-​socialist governments passed this to the private sector. Artisanal miners demanded legitimacy to use and benefit from the mineral resources that they discovered or found in abandoned mining sites in competition with the state and private mining companies. This has raised questions about the state’s right to resources or to have shares in the mining projects and sets “free mining” against “resource nationalism.” One method to reduce the impact and costs of mining are environmental and social impact assessments. These can reduce conflicts among mining stakeholders, local residents and investors and address resettlement, compensation, benefit sharing whilst securing mining operations. However, Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan did not conduct adequate environmental and social impact assessment during socialism. Until the early 2000s, they relied on state power to distribute benefit through planning mining towns. As the state lost its power to impose agendas over private properties and mine sites, environmental and social impact assessments became prerequisites to mitigate impacts and sustain local livelihoods, presenting challenges in both countries. Mongolia preferred cash distributions during the mining boom in 2004–​12, whilst cost management developed slowly during bust cycle in 1997–​2004 and 2012–​19 (Dagys et al. 2020; Isakova et al. 2012). Study suggests that each mining cycle has a definitive role in developing institutions and both countries have not experienced full mining cycles of exploration, extraction and

4  Troy Sternberg et al. mine site rehabilitation after closure in the post-​socialist period. There are few closures of mines that started in socialist time to show development cost, benefits and rehabilitation. National governments and publics have the opportunity to discuss mining and commodity price cycles through the presence of civil society organisations and governance mechanisms. For example, Mongolia’s past political and economic dependence on the Soviet Union made it determined to have economic sovereignty.The government negotiated with mining stakeholders and revised legal frameworks thanks to democracy and pluralism. Some national or international corporate stakeholders opportunistically used the policy changes in property rights to grab state-​funded mineral deposits during bust cycles in 1997–​2004. When the resource boom cycle started in 2004 policy changed to create benefit and cost management institutions by distributing resource shares to people and encouraging civil society movements.

Country context Having sketched out the parallel political and institutional contexts of mining in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan, we now take the cases in turn to provide more detailed background for the chapters that follow. Mining contributes significantly to national gross domestic product (GDP), 28% in Mongolia and comprises ~87% of exports (MSIS 2021). In Kyrgyzstan extraction is ~10% of GDP, whilst remittances at 28% is the largest sector (WDI/​World Bank 2020). Here, the former’s coal, copper, gold and iron goes primarily to China (>80%) whilst the latter’s gold and precious metals are recorded as exports to Switzerland, Uzbekistan and Russia. Much is promised when licenses are granted, yet extractive employment is limited and often low-​skilled.This creates tension in both countries that have high poverty rates (28% in Mongolia, 22% in Kyrgyzstan). Balancing tax revenue, community and national benefit and pursuit of Sustainable Development Goals present ongoing issues. In Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia, extractives industries dominate political and economic discourses. In both countries (a)  mining has been identified as a strategic priority for development and as an indivisible element of domestic politics and (b) mining emerged as an issue of a much broader magnitude. It has already become evident that extraction is no longer solely about economic growth, but rather about social inclusion. Creation of favourable conditions for both mining companies to generate profit and for local communities to improve their quality of life should be viewed as the ultimate aim of mining development in the region.This is one of the reasons why the efforts of incumbent governments to develop the sector are consistently mired by growing communal anxieties. Unless the provision of welfare benefits from mining is extended to all stakeholders, mining will negatively impact political stability on both local and national levels. As steppe cultures evolved from a common nomadic background, pastoralists in Mongolian rangelands and mountain pasture in Kyrgyzstan have resisted

Mining lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan  5 the negative changes encountered with mining. Social disharmony, land and water degradation, lack of jobs and mistrust between citizens, companies and the state have led to conflicts. The process has divided rural and urban residents over perceptions of mining benefit to families, communities the country. Local resistance to mining and demonstrations were attempts to reverse unfavourable changes. Changing subsistence patterns, behaviour, attitudes and increased living costs are well documented in the following chapters. Influences modify institutions and organisations, including in social movements, governance, communities and civil society. Local or regional values and beliefs are likely to transition in the near future in ways that may affect culture. Kyrgyzstan’s visible Soviet heritage, Asian hospitality and natural beauty draws expatriates and tourists. Yet this image does not reveal the country’s real struggle. Kyrgyzstan is the only country in the region that survived two inter-​ethnic conflicts, witnessed two popular revolutions, ousted two corrupt presidents, and yet remains in a transition quagmire (Toktomushev, 2017). After gaining independence by default in 1991, Kyrgyzstan embarked on a journey away from its Soviet past towards market economy and a more democratic future. Despite being one of the smallest and poorest countries in the post-​Soviet region, Kyrgyzstan used to exhibit its free spirit, democratic changes and market reforms. Whilst Kyrgyzstan was considered an island of democracy, the mining industry came to represent the challenges the country faces. These visions were soon crushed by consistent economic failures and subsequent democratisation reversals. The dissolution of the Soviet Union exposed the stark dependency of Kyrgyzstan on Soviet central authority. The rapid breakdown of logistics chains and a lack of support from Moscow accelerated Kyrgyzstan’s economic decay. A  majority of population found themselves struggling over physical survival with chronic poverty reaching unseen levels. Spikes of western involvement only precipitated a unique environment in which authoritarian governance flourished (Owen et al., 2018). As a result, the upheavals of political, economic and social nature became the new normal for post-​Soviet Kyrgyzstan. The more the people yearned for changes, the more the country became mired in economic problems, corruption, criminality and clan-​based politics. Two popular uprisings in 2005 and 2010 did not live up to expectations and Kyrgyzstan remained a weak state vulnerable to internal and external insecurities. Kyrgyzstan’s rich mineral resources did not pull the country out of poverty. During Soviet times, small mining towns spread across the country with their own hospitals, schools and infrastructure. After the dissolution of the USSR these towns quickly fell into decay.The demise of the socialist economy exposed how unsustainable Soviet mining projects were in Kyrgyzstan. As a result, neither mining companies that survived the 1990s nor mining newcomers were able to match Soviet investments and benefits. Modern Kyrgyzstan found itself in an odd situation. The government is incapable of developing natural resources itself for the benefit of a wider population, yet there are few mining

6  Troy Sternberg et al. companies that are willing to invest in Kyrgyzstan. Despite expectations of both governments and local communities, the extractive industry comprises only 10% of Kyrgyzstan’s current GDP, and most of this comes from Kumtor mine that is due to close by 2026. Mongolia lives under the shadow of the former glories of Chinggis Khaan and the Empires of the Steppe nomads whilst sandwiched between two geopolitical superpowers, Russia and China. After 70 years of socialism, Mongolia chose policies to collaborate with global “third neighbours” to balance the influence of the border countries. It became close with the United States and European countries in politics and Japan and Korea in economic terms whilst improving the relationship with China. The centrally planned economy abruptly transitioned to a market economy following democratic changes. Membership in the IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank and the WTO, liberalisation and non-​alignment sped up Mongolia’s transformation toward uncertain future. Though a parliamentary democracy, there is a strong presence of socialist and liberal thought. Mongolia’s economy relies heavily on pastoral agriculture and mineral exports. Socialist era geological surveys were opened to foreign investors, identifying copper, coal, iron and fluorspar. Minerals and livestock products are not processed within Mongolia and the country imports most goods and food products from China and other countries. This makes Mongolia almost 100% dependent on foreign trade with or through China and Russia. Regional economic integration (such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative [BRI]) and proposed infrastructure projects feature the neighbours’ economic and political interests and increase Mongolia’s external debts. The national identity of Mongolia reflects its nomadic history. This culture and its year-​round pastoral grazing are well adapted and preserved in Mongolia. Nomadic culture shapes the way of living and individual and collective behaviours, such as adaptability to changing environments and uncertainty which connects people beyond physical and spatial boundaries. This makes pastoralists self-​reliant and conveys a strong sense of belonging to place and community. All Mongolian people share this background and it is the only nation that fully supports pastoralism. Over 1  million people, a third of the population, depend on herding livelihoods in rural regions that face serious threats from climate change and mining development. Pastoralists are entitled to use land and surface resources and often conflict with mine license holders who extract minerals under pastoralists’ common resource.

Challenges and contexts Concern about mining in Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia focuses on foreign investment, the role of China and its BRI, local jobs and extractive impact on environments and landscapes. The mining lifecycle presents many community challenges; in several ways the experiences in this book reflect the international mining context.

Mining lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan  7 China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Across Inner Asia, China’s $1 trillion BRI dominates infrastructure and investment (Sternberg et al. 2017). Framed as a “win–​win” for all, the programme favours major projects such as mines, roads, pipelines, energy and digital “corridors of connectivity.” Presented as the world’s largest development agenda, the details, standards and purposes are implied rather than clearly stated. Whilst governments enthusiastically welcome the investment and visible infrastructure, benefits may not be shared equally by communities. Two main issues dominate the public BRI debate –​jobs for locals and environmental damage. As relatively open countries, strong civil societies in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan have encouraged much debate about mining, BRI and governance.This has led to community action, cancellation of significant BRI investment and political uncertainty that has transformed into protest, contestation and violent conflict (Sternberg 2020). In Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia, resource extraction has attracted billions of dollars in investment. In each country, the largest mines (Kumtor, Kg., Oyu Tolgoi, Mg.) have been developed over 20+ years by western owners. More recently, Chinese investment by private and state-​ owned companies has dominated resource extraction at major and minor scales. Such operations often function as a “black box” for host communities, where little information is provided, top-​down (i.e. socialist) governments license mines and collect revenue, local job hiring rules are not enforced and financial and legal manipulations allow companies to not rehabilitate closed mines. Perceptions of environmental damage, including water sources and pasture, are widespread whilst effective monitoring is beyond the governments’ ability or interest. The rise of resource nationalism in election cycles and limited local benefit frustrates communities and leads to protests. In this context China’s BRI investments become easy and convenient targets for citizen’s anger. Several chapters in this volume (see Chapters 2, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13) highlight the role of Chinese BRI investment in mining lifecycles. Whilst local challenges and the struggle to benefit from mining at times appears endless, there have been some community-​driven outcomes. Protest peacefully closed a mine in Aral, Kyrgyzstan (Chapter  4) and a community development agreement was reached in Khan Bogd, Mongolia (Chapters 5, 7) whilst violence closed a mine after research was completed (Chapter  11). A  strong point is that across the region foreign mining is contentious, moving the issue beyond a BRI-​only context. As China leads in infrastructure investment, their mines receive much BRI-​focused attention. Environment Across global drylands, mining has a significant impact on environments (Sternberg 2020). By nature, extraction alters landscapes and can negatively affect water, pasture and ecosystems Ancillary impacts, such as fragmented

8  Troy Sternberg et al. territory, transport corridors and pollution often degrades land and reduces productivity. Fences, diverted or reduced water supply, exclusion zones and restriction on livestock may affect natural conditions with damage to the environment. Such processes often lead to steppe degradation and reduced livelihood viability. Extraction, digging up soil and mountains and mineral waste requires rehabilitation when a mine is closed. Mining:  (a) reconfigures the landscape, (b) directly affects soils, water and vegetation and (c) takes effort to restore to pre-​mining conditions. These processes are seldom adequately acknowledged and addressed. In fact, countries are poor at monitoring and enforcing environmental regulations. Altered landscapes have significant implications for communities. Water sources for humans, livestock and irrigation may be contaminated by chemicals and tailings residue from processing. Land disturbance and modifications by mining changes ecosystem productivity and affects herders, farmers and their livelihoods. This may also have implications for residents in the cold, continental dryland region where alternate land use or sources of water are limited or non-​existent. Precipitation, climate seasonality, extreme temperatures, limited infrastructure and environmentally dependent livelihoods expose residents to mine-​driven vicissitudes. Customary knowledge has enabled locals to deal with variability. However, there are few alternatives when roads or pipelines block migratory routes or separate farmers from fields (Chatty 1994). Natural balance may be upset in ways beyond communities’ ability to cope. Yet mining licenses are decided in capitals between governments and elites, near international airports and ministries. Fees generated, taxes and planning is centred in capitals, not the countryside. Environmental Impact Assessments may become negotiating tools rather than part of monitoring and subject to legal enforcement. To mitigate damage takes leadership, knowledge and strong governance seldom evidenced in Inner Asia. Each stage –​exploration, active extraction and rehabilitation after mine closure –​needs careful scrutiny. As with so many factors, this is a global phenomenon and challenge. Mine lifecycle and community challenges Despite dominating political and economic discourses, mining suffers from a pervasive lack of informed dialogue. As our forthcoming chapters expose, the lack of knowledge and information about mining operations magnifies rumours and existing antagonisms between key stakeholders. For example, in most mining-​affected localities of Kyrgyzstan that our researchers visited, local communities were often unaware of the key stages of the mining life cycle. As a consequence, a situation develops where many people and communities fear that cyanide is used at the exploration and prospecting phase, yet there are multiple areas with open pits and lagoons with contaminated water that have not been rehabilitated. It becomes important to improve environmental policy and strengthen understanding of extractive industries among key stakeholders,

Mining lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan  9 especially in times of the post-​COVID-​19 economic recession when the countries can benefit from resource-​generated revenues. It was hard to find any places without mining resistance in our field sites in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan. Communities are extremely sensitive about mining projects, foreign workers and environmental degradation related to mines. Mobile pastoralists and their interaction with mines often trails the production cycle. Seasonal grazing by pastoralists means sites are unattended for much of the year. During this absence, mining companies may conduct geological surveys; when herders return it may be too late for pastoralists oppose exploration or stop mines. Frustration often leads local communities to protest during extraction stage. In addition, limited information from companies and governments on mining disempowers local communities. Reports of pressure on civil society organisations and researchers for their opinions and opposition are common. Both countries are members of the Extractive Industries and Transparency Initiative. However, the material and data disclosed are different in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan. Due to limited information and current business practices, local communities can be mobilised against mining companies to demand jobs, environmental rehabilitation, benefit sharing and more extreme measures. The chapters in this edited volume show the power that such demonstrations can have as protest closed one mine after research was completed. Often ownership is later transferred to other political or business groups. Communities, for example in Mongolia, have changed tactics to advocate for local needs first before protesting for mine closure. Such strategies may benefit individuals who receive separate compensation but often leads to social disharmony and mistrust among communities. International context Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan are part of the global resource extraction narrative. The issues and challenges faced are endemic and well documented. The long history of mining development and its implications affect all host countries. This includes now-​ industrialised mining nations such as the US, Canada and Australia, rapidly developing countries like China, Chile, South Africa and Oman and a range of lower to middle income countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. For example, the location of the world’s biggest mines are for: copper-​gold –​Papua, Indonesia; diamond –​Orapa, Botswana; coal –​ Wyoming, US; iron ore –​Carajas, Brazil and nickel –​Siberia, Russia.The physical process of resource extraction is similar across minerals, something the chapters herein address. Laws, regulations, ownership, financing and the role of the state varies between countries. In Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan most mines are private with Oyu Tolgoi (see Chapter 7), one-​third owned by the government. In both countries resource nationalism increases as citizens seek more benefit and control over natural resources. In the last decade there have been expanding

10  Troy Sternberg et al. efforts to improve mining company action and impact in host countries through global initiatives (Lezak et al. 2019). These include practices outlined by the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank, strengthened Environmental and Social Impact Assessments, new legal frameworks, civil society initiatives and international financial, media and pressure group action. Here we examine the impact of mining lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan, a process that has evolved from the Soviet era through contemporary capitalism. Work in this volume highlights the political, social, environmental and cultural contexts of mining in the countries. Whilst several challenges are common across mining epicentres, our focus countries present unique perspectives, dynamics and experiences. Considered remote and at remove from global economic patterns, both countries have embraced new technologies and social media to exchange information, monitor mining and at times to document and organise changes to the status quo.This book ties the region into more global information streams and provides the outside world an accessible way to understand mining complexity in two key extractive countries on China’s frontier. Led by Kumtor gold mine in Kyrgyzstan and Oyu Tolgoi mine in Mongolia, this work shows the complexity of mining an international scale. In evaluating the process of mine exploration, extraction and rehabilitation, the natural resources of Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia are presented to a global audience. The book originates from the research project “Gobi Framework: Mediation Model for Sustainable Infrastructure Development” based at the University of Oxford, University of Central Asia and the Independent Research Institute of Mongolia. Over two years of intensive fieldwork, research teams in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan investigated the lifecycle of mining in both countries. This developed the concepts and scope of ideas and topics covered in the book. Key to this was the interaction with the diverse stakeholders involved in mining from local citizens and officials to ministries, legislative committees, civil society groups and companies. Chapters give a researcher’s perspective on extractive issues; to include the diverse range of local and national perspectives an original “Notes from the field” follows each paper.The “Notes” provide an opportunity for important voices to be represented in the book, including herders, community experts, NGOs, lawyers and practitioners who express their viewpoints on significant issues. Together the chapters and “Notes from the field” present the mining lifecycle in Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia.

References Chatty, D. (1994). Petroleum exploitation and the displacement of pastoral nomadic households in Oman. Center for Migration Studies Special Issues, 11(4), pp.87–​106. Conde, M. (2017). Resistance to mining. A review. Ecological Economics, 132, pp.80–​90. Dagys, K., Heijman, W.J.M., Dries, L., & Agipar, B. (2020). The mining sector boom in Mongolia: Did it cause the Dutch disease? Post-​Communist Economies, 32(5), pp.607–​ 42. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​14631377.2019.1689002

Mining lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan  11 Flomenhoft, G. (2018). Historical and empirical basis for communal title in minerals at the national level:  Does ownership matter for human development? Sustainability (Switzerland), 10(6) (1958), pp.1–​27. https://​doi.org/​10.3390/​su10061958 Humphrey, C. (2002). Does the category “postsocialist” still make sense? In C. Hann (Ed.), Postsocialism. Ideals, Ideologies and Practices in Euroasia (1st ed., pp. 12–​14). London and New York: Routledge. https://​doi.org/​10.4324/​9780203428115. Isakova, A., Plekhanov, A., & Zettelmeyer, J. (2012). Managing Mongolia’s Resource Boom, Working Paper No.138. Retrieved from www.ebrd.com/​downloads/​research/​ economics/​workingpapers/​wp0138.pdf. [accessed 12 February 2021]. Larmer, M., & Laterza,V. (2017). Contested wealth: Social and political mobilisation in extractive communities in Africa. The Extractive Industries and Society, 4(4), pp.701–​6. Lezak, S., Ahearn, A., McConnell, F. & Sternberg, T. (2019). Frameworks for conflict mediation in international infrastructure development: A comparative overview and critical appraisal. Journal of Cleaner Production, 239, p.118099. McDowell, A. (2004). Real property, spontaneous order, and norms in the gold mines. Law and Social Inquiry, 29(4), pp.771–​818. MSIS (2021). Mongolian Statistical Information Service. Available online at:  www.1212. mn/​tables.aspx?tbl_​id=DT_​NSO_​0500_​001V1&13999001_​select_​all=0&13999 001SingleSelect=&ISIC_​I_​select_​all=0&ISIC_​ISingleSelect=_​0&YearY_​select_​ all=0&YearYSingleSelect=_​2020_​2019&viewtype=table. [accessed 13 March 2021]. Osakwe, C. (1985). General principles of Soviet land law: Ownership and use of land in the Soviet Union. Acta Juridica, 1985, pp.147–​71. Owen, C. et  al. (2018). Interrogating Illiberal Peace in Eurasia. London:  Rowman & Littlefield. Scott,A. (2008). The Evolution of Resource Property Rights. Oxford: Oxford University  Press. Sternberg, T. (2020). Conflict and contestation in Kyrgyz mining infrastructure. The Extractive Industries and Society, 7(4), pp.1392–​1400. Sternberg, T., Ahearn, A. and McConnell, F., 2017. Central Asian ‘characteristics’ on China’s new Silk Road:The role of landscape and the politics of infrastructure. Land, 6(3), p. 55. Sternberg, T., Ahearn, A. and McConnell, F., 2020. From conflict to a Community Development Agreement: a South Gobi solution. Community Development Journal, 55(3), pp. 533-538. Toktomushev, K. (2017). Kyrgyzstan  –​Regime Security and Foreign Policy. 1 ed. London: Routledge. WDI/​World Bank (2020). World Development Indicators: Contribution of Natural Resources to Gross Domestic Product. Available online at: http://​wdi.worldbank.org/​table/​3.14. [accessed 12 February 2021].

Part I

Exploring mining –​ when mining comes to town –​initiating mining infrastructure

2  A pesky story of Chinese mining in Kyrgyzstan Kemel Toktomushev

Introduction Although Kyrgyzstan is endowed with significant deposits of gold, Kyrgyzstan was unable to benefit from its resources and remained one of the poorest countries in the post-​Soviet region. The Kyrgyz government’s efforts to expand the sector, improve legal framework and attract foreign investors were mired by an upsurge in conflicts in mining-​affected localities. The crude reality is that there are not that many investors willing to commit to the country, whilst the state itself is incapable of developing natural resources for the benefit of a greater population. In this context, Chinese investors appear to come to the Kyrgyz government’s rescue. Chinese companies seem to have a more adventuresome entrepreneurial philosophy and are willing to work even in highly risky environments. That said, many Chinese mining projects are marred by accusations of corruption and environmental damage. Although China presents itself as a benevolent leader responsible for the future of the region, multiple accounts of anti-​Chinese manifestations expose a much more complex picture. Accordingly, this chapter seeks to explore the challenges of building relationships of trust between Chinese investors and local communities in mining projects. Drawing on the findings of the fieldwork in 15 mining-​affected localities across the three regions of Kyrgyzstan with a particular focus on conflict in Solton-​Sary, the chapter will examine why Chinese mining projects are becoming the targets for the indigenous communal ire. Although the nascent drivers of mining conflicts in Kyrgyzstan are not exclusive to Kyrgyzstan and can be found around the world, local contexts still matter. Thus, the cases like Solton-​Sary should be studied in greater detail in order to devise solutions that can bring economic returns to private investors and concomitantly improve the quality of life in the country.

A benevolent investor or a gruesome bogeyman? One morning, residents of a mountainous village in Kyrgyzstan learned that one of their pastures became a site of mining exploration. New investors from China acquired a license to extract precious metals in the area. Thereafter, a DOI: 10.4324/9781003097341-3

16  Kemel Toktomushev conflict began brewing, as pastoral farmers accused the mining company of contaminating environment and poisoning local villagers and their livestock. Magnified by corruption allegations, frustrations over local and central governments’ indifference only contributed further to social grievances and anxieties. A tipping point was reached, when villagers decided to take matters into their own hands. Equipped with wooden sticks and garden tools, farmers raided the mine beating the workers on the way and forcing Chinese owners to run away from the site. The rejoice of the locals did not last long though, as their leader was later detained and charged. This is the plot of a currently much contested Kyrgyz movie called Meken or Homeland.The producers of the movie publicly accused state censors of banning the movie from release in local cinemas. Unable to secure those rights for nearly six months, the producers decided to upload the movie to YouTube free of charge, although soliciting donations from sympathisers. Since its premiere on the video-​sharing platform on 31 July 2020, in a period of just two weeks, the movie was viewed more than 1,200,000 times. With nearly 20,000 comments and 84,000 likes, most YouTube viewers lauded the new Kyrgyz drama and praised the work of the producers.The reception in social media was less unambiguous though.There were many critics who supported the government’s decision to ban the movie accusing its creators of inciting Sinophobic sentiments, because Chinese businessmen were portrayed as ruthless and greedy investors who were corrupting local officials to secure mining licenses. Mining is a lucrative, but highly unpredictable business sector with significant fluctuations in risks, and Kyrgyzstan is not an easy place to run a highly profitable enterprise. Always praised by international observers as “an island of democracy” in Central Asia, the country, however, has remained plagued by deeply entrenched political and economic challenges. Despite two popular uprisings that led to the ousting of two corrupt and autocratic presidents, Kyrgyzstan is still stuck in a quagmire of rampant corruption, criminality and clan-​based politics. Political, economic and social upheavals appear to become “a new normal” for the state that was once forecasted to become the Switzerland of Central Asia. The crude reality is that there are not that many investors willing to commit to the country, whilst the state itself is incapable of developing natural resources for the benefit of a greater population. In this context, Chinese investors appear to come to the Kyrgyz government’s rescue. Chinese companies seem to have a more adventuresome entrepreneurial philosophy and are willing to work even in highly risky environments. Moreover, with the arrival of Xi Jinping to the highest echelons of power in China, China’s policies towards its neighbours have significantly changed. Not only did Xi Jinping declare the pursuit of the Chinese Dream of Great Rejuvenation open, but the president of China also linked his new grandeur idea to the concept of the community of common destiny. The former assumes the return of China to the splendours of its ancient past, whilst the latter imagines China as an important regional player, whose prosperity is instrumental to the

A pesky story of Chinese mining in Kyrgyzstan  17 development of all its neighbours (China Daily, 2014; Jinping, 2015; Callahan, 2016; Xinhua, 2017;Von Hein, 2018). In this regard, unveiled in Kazakhstan in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) embodied a significant pivot in China’s plans to build a new Sinocentric order and promote neighbourhood diplomacy. Presented as a US$1 trillion initiative that will shroud the world with new and resurrected economic corridors, China-​led BRI has been such a popular buzzword for the past few years. What is more important is that BRI was portrayed as a commitment of China to play a more benevolent and responsible role in international relations (Wang, 2016; Xue, 2016; Liu, 2017; Minwang, 2018). As Xi Jinping asserted at the opening of the BRI Forum, China will steer the “new normal” of economic development and will promote innovative, sustainable and inclusive growth (Xinhua, 2017). This may explain why BRI’s top priorities are so wide-​ranging: from policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity and unimpeded trade to financial integration and people-​to-​people bonds. BRI even assumes the creation of the Digital Silk Road with a specific focus on artificial intelligence and big data. Accordingly, Chinese ambitious initiative elicited accolades from a great many actors, including a majority of states along the BRI route, as many observers praised BRI’s potential cathartic impact on small and underdeveloped states like Kyrgyzstan. For instance, Moody’s Investors Service (2015) advised that BRI’s Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road will bring tangible benefits both to China and to the emerging market sovereigns involved. Moody’s specified that countries of Central Asia are to be among the greatest beneficiaries of BRI. They are to benefit from spurring investments and positive economic spillovers, in addition to bilateral trade boosts. That said, even without BRI, China has already established itself as the Central Asia’s key economic player, and Kyrgyzstan became one of the greatest beneficiaries of Chinese economic outreach. In a span of 20  years, China emerged as the Kyrgyzstan’s main source of development finance and the largest source of foreign direct investments (FDIs). Chinese loans were used to fund large public infrastructure projects, from the modernisation of the Bishkek’s central heat and power plant to the construction of roads and electricity transmission lines. Kyrgyzstan’s active borrowings from the China Export-​Import Bank have even earned Kyrgyzstan a place in the list of the top states most susceptible to debt distress, as per the assessment of the Centre for Global Development (Hurley et al., 2018). Kyrgyzstan currently owes the Chinese bank nearly US$1.78 billion out of $4.1 billion of its total external debt. The total costs of public infrastructure projects financed by China can be estimated to reach nearly US$2.2 billion (Mogilevskii, 2019). In a similar fashion, China’s cumulative gross FDI inflow into the economy of Kyrgyzstan totalled US$2.3 billion, which comprises 25–​50% of total FDI to the country (Mogilevskii, 2019). Much of these FDI went into oil and gas and extractive industries, with a specific concentration in downstream petroleum operations, geological exploration and mining. According to various estimates, there are

18  Kemel Toktomushev currently 400–​2000 Chinese enterprises officially registered with the Ministry of Justice of Kyrgyzstan.1 At long last, the blooming of wholesale and retail markets in Kyrgyzstan is a stark example of China’s significant impact on the economy of the country and livelihoods of its residents. Whether Dordoi Bazaar in Bishkek or the Karasuu Bazaar in Karasuu, these markets emerged as the largest re-​export markets in Central Asia, through which Chinese goods flooded neighbouring Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Alff, 2017). Composed of double-​stack shipping containers, the bazaars are open for business 364 days a year, except for January 1, while their turnover is estimated to reach several billion dollars per year. After the demise of the Soviet Union and the opening of the borders with China, these markets quickly grew into small cities of their own, with their own infrastructure, residential areas, recreational facilities and private security. Dordoi alone is estimated to employ nearly 100,000 people, feeding a large cohort of people from traders and freighters to state officials and criminals. No wonder, the trade volume between Kyrgyzstan and China has been steadily growing since 2000s, and in 2018, Kyrgyzstan’s imports from China reached nearly US$1.94 billion, although the exports comprised US$61.24 million.2 Due to high volumes of informal trade, the real turnover might be much higher. The popular reception of China in Kyrgyzstan was rather bleak. While the ruling elites welcomed China’s greater economic presence in the country, local communities grew wary of China and sought to resist its outreach. Major communal concerns were related to potential negative spillovers from greater connectivity with China, which range from adverse environmental impacts and increased risks of a debt trap to impacts on structural governance problems and sociopolitical stability (Ghiasy & Zhou, 2017; Sternberg et al., 2017; Jaborov, 2018; Laruelle, 2018;Toktomushev, 2018; Moldashev, 2019). As for the narratives of BRI, they are practically non-​existent in public discourses. Despite the influx of Chinese capital projects to Kyrgyzstan, none of the stakeholders associate them with BRI. Even those projects that are financed through Chinese loans and complement BRI’s infrastructure philosophy of greater connectivity have never been presented as part of BRI as such. To be fair, Chinese counterparts were reluctant to give BRI labels to their projects in Kyrgyzstan as well. Investments from the Silk Road Fund, which was created after the unveiling of BRI to support infrastructure development in Central Asia, also did not reach Kyrgyzstan. Accordingly, BRI in Kyrgyzstan (as in broader Central Asia) needs to be viewed as an umbrella concept that unifies all China-​financed projects in the region. Such a generalisation, however, further complicates Chinese–​Central Asian communal relations, since more responsible Chinese investors can become the targets of public ire by simple association. As practice exposes, communal fears get only amplified by deeply entrenched Sinophobia. Although there are practically no studies of the sources of Sinophobia in Kyrgyzstan, the anecdotal evidence suggests that anti-​Chinese sentiments have been on the rise

A pesky story of Chinese mining in Kyrgyzstan  19 for the past two decades. The first Sinophobic mobilisations in Kyrgyzstan can be traced to the early 2000s and were related to the land swap deals. Hereafter, as Kyrgyzstan was attracting more Chinese capital, the number of anti-​Chinese protests also grew. These protests were of lesser magnitude than anti-​Chinese land-​related rallying-​cries and were mostly focused on localised issues. Whilst being smaller in scale, they were still quite effective in terms of achieving the desired effects and disrupting business processes. More importantly, despite Beijing’s efforts to position itself as a benevolent leader responsible for the future of the region, multiple accounts of anti-​Chinese manifestations exposed a much more complex picture, wherein the role of China and Chinese companies was less clear-​cut.

A pesky story Whilst the creators of the aforementioned movie Meken claimed that any semblance to actual persons, places or events is fully fictitious, the storyline appears to be too familiar to the sociopolitical context of Kyrgyzstan. The plot vividly resembles the conflict that took place in August 2019 between the villagers of the Naryn region and Chinese workers. The Naryn region is the largest and yet most isolated region of Kyrgyzstan. The gold field itself is located in the high mountain pasture at 3,500 meters above sea level. This pasture is used by residents of the nearby villages Emgekchil, Min-​Bulak and On-​Archa and residents of the Naryn town. The deposit consists of Buchuk, Ak-​Tash and Altyn-​Tor sections and is estimated to have gold reserves of nearly 20 tonnes. China’s Zhong Ji Mining was exploring the Buchuk section of the Solton-​Sary field that was estimated to have approximately 11 tonnes of gold. Zhong Ji Mining was planning to complete the construction of a gold processing plant by 2020 and begin extraction of gold. However, the anti-​Chinese protest at the mine on 5 August 2019, turned into a mass brawl between the villagers and Chinese workers.3 At first glance, it appears that harmonious development of Kyrgyz economy is beneficial to all stakeholders and particularly to locals living in one of the poorest localities of the country. Although Kyrgyzstan is endowed with significant deposits of gold, Kyrgyzstan was unable to benefit from its resources and remained one of the poorest countries in the post-​Soviet region. The Kyrgyz government’s efforts to expand the sector, improve legal framework and attract foreign investors were mired by an upsurge in conflicts in mining-​affected localities. As a result, representing the largest extractive industry in the republic and accounting for nearly 87% of the country’s total value of minerals, gold mining still comprises less than 10% of Kyrgyzstan’s total GDP (Grenfell-​Shaw & Toktomushev, 2021). Moreover, most of such contribution comes from a single gold mine, Kumtor. Kumtor is one of the largest open-​pit gold mines in the world and the largest gold mine in Central Asia. From 1997 and by the end of 2019, the enterprise produced nearly 12.6 million ounces or 395 tonnes of gold.4 The Kumtor’s mine life is estimated to end in 2023, with gold ore

20  Kemel Toktomushev processing fully terminating by 2026. Its predominance in the sector and its looming closure certainly presents a challenge to the Kyrgyz government. As a result, despite being identified as a strategic priority for Kyrgyzstan’s economic growth, the development of gold mining industry in the country stagnated over decades. Currently, gold extraction is underway at 53 sites, whilst the exploration work is underway at 51 sites (Akchabar.kg, 2019). However, none of these sites, even combined, can compensate for the loss of contributions from Kumtor. Thus, it becomes less surprising why the government resorted to halting the release of Meken in cinema theatres across the country, as the government struggles not only to attract, but also to retain investments in the extractive industry. That said, resource nationalism has been a recurring and uneasy theme in Kyrgyz politics. As Janyl Moldalieva and John Heathershaw (2020) suggested, local communities in post-​Soviet Central Asia view land and its resources substantively as belonging to people. Accordingly, non-​Chinese companies engaged in mining also quite often fell victim to various manifestations of resource nationalism. For example, Z-​Explorer, initially owned by an Australian-​listed company, has been unable to restart the development of the Shambesai gold field since 2013 due to violent local protests, while South Africa Gold Fields Ltd was completely forced out of a copper extraction business in Kyrgyzstan after consistent arson attacks by local residents. Even aforementioned Canadian-​ owned Kumtor continuously suffers from changing contractual obligations, tax pressures and strong and often violent local resentments, notwithstanding its status of the largest foreign investment project in Kyrgyzstan. Yet, Chinese mining projects appear to earn the greatest notoriety. In the summer of 2019, our research team conducted a fieldwork in 15 mining-​ affected localities across the three regions of Kyrgyzstan.5 The fieldwork sought to investigate sources of mining conflict in Kyrgyzstan. Solton-​Sary was one of our target locations, and coincidentally our research team visited the area as part of the fieldtrip just few weeks prior to the now infamous events of August 5. The researchers felt that grievances against the mining company were long accumulating in the region, as anti-​Chinese sentiments were vividly strong. Local communities viewed Chinese investors with great distrust and suspicion. As one of the respondents asserted: When we hear China, we are afraid … We read it on the Internet.They use different chemicals. They can produce anything, even fruits and vegetables are not organic. Another herder complained to our researchers: The only information we have is they came and started digging on our pasture lands. We know only negative and bad side of mining. People only discuss the problems. Nobody is talking about the future.We don’t have any information on what the company is planning for the future.

A pesky story of Chinese mining in Kyrgyzstan  21 Within such a context of the lack of public knowledge about extractive industry and the lack of access to mining data, Zhong Ji Mining’s poor communication practices only contributed further to communal anxieties. One public hearing per year organised by the company to educate communities, address their complaints and report on the progress was not only ineffective for building trust between the stakeholders, but it fuelled further rumours about Chinese maleficent gold extractive practices. In private, government officials expressed similar viewpoints: Majority of [mining] conflicts arise because of the lack of information. They [mining companies] need to explain what kind of technology they will use to extract gold or even explain how much gold there is. Of course, the ecological consequences also need to be clarified, how many people will get jobs at the mine, how much taxes will be paid, and so on. Maybe if everything is explained from the beginning, people will not be caught by surprise when the works start. Right now, it has not done that way. The company comes, and a majority of the population does not even understand what the mining company wants to do. Obviously, there was a set of issues that kept compounding to burst at some point: from cattle mortality, fears of soil and water contamination and dissatisfaction with employment practices to the distrust in local self-​government bodies and the way they use funds received from the mining company. Besides, practically since the collapse of the Soviet Union, many residents of the Emgekchil village were involved in artisanal mining in the area. Over time hand tools were substituted to a more advanced mechanical equipment, whilst villagers managed to organise themselves into brigades of ten to work on a fly-​in, fly-​out roster basis. According to our interlocutors, each miner could have earned up to US$1,000 per month, exceeding the average salary in the region nearly sixfold. However, with the arrival of Zhong Ji Mining small-​scale miners lost their only source of income, whilst contributions from the company to the local budgets could not compensate for the losses. As one local respondent lamented: No, no, we don’t need their [Zhong Ji Mining] money. For example, they gave us 20 million soms. 20 million is one bag of gold. Our villagers went up two years ago and came back with one million 600 thousand soms. Ten boys extracted one million soms worth of gold. So, 20 million is nothing. 20 million is one bag of gold. Moreover, despite the proximity to the site, the Emgekchil village was legally entitled only a fraction of benefits from the mine, as the residents of the Min-​ Bulak village were considered to be main the main beneficiaries. In either case, retrospectively it is evident that the reactionary responses of Zhong Ji Mining to secure communal acceptance in the Naryn region were unsuccessful. The anti-​mining grievances were long accumulating in the region, and the Chinese

22  Kemel Toktomushev origins of the company only escalated the antagonisms. The conflict in August 2019 fully halted the work of the mine. The Solton-​Sary conflict exposed that the overlay of Sinophobia on resource nationalism produced a dangerous mixture that could easily trigger violent mobilisation of xenophobic sentiments against both the government and Chinese businessmen. Unfortunately, mining-​related conflicts like in Solton-​Sary are likely to continue across the country unless comprehensive measures are taken. There is already a burgeoning academic and policy literature on conflict prevention in mining-​affected localities of Kyrgyzstan (Oxus International and Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia, 2013; Gullette, 2014; Kotilainen et al., 2015; GIZ, 2016; Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia and Kalikova & Associates, 2017; Horrocks-​Taylor, 2018; Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development, 2018; International Business Council and Ernst and Young Audit Services LLC, 2018; Moldalieva and Heathershaw, 2020). These works not only seek to address the root causes of mining conflict, but they also provide recommendations to all stakeholders on how to mitigate anxieties and tensions. Whilst key themes in such reports overlap, local context also matters. However, taking into account a plethora of available literature on mining conflicts in Kyrgyzstan and a number of notorious examples, it appears that engaged stakeholders are still not willing to learn from the lessons of the past.

Kyrgyzstan gold rush For those familiar with mining disputes, the emergent drivers of conflict in the Naryn region are not particularly exclusive to Kyrgyzstan (Jenkins, 2004; Walton and Barnett, 2007; Urkidi, 2010; Arellano-​Yanguas, 2011; Triscritti, 2013; Mensah and Okyere, 2014; Hilson, 2016). The nascent issues identified include environmental concerns, employment and social packages, benefit sharing, role of local and central authorities, mining practices and public access to data in extractives. With a global rise of mining, environmental, economic, social and governance-​related factors accounted for a dramatic increase in the frequency of conflicts around the globe.Thus, stories similar to the Solton-​Sary conflict are common not only in the region, but across the world. Also, the rise of Chinese companies in global mining elevated Sinophobia as one of the standalone factors that can exacerbate the nature of mining-​related conflicts. In Kyrgyzstan, local communities identified the origins of the company as a nuisance factor that can contribute to mining-​related grievances. Local interlocutors stressed that Chinese businessmen were the least desired out of all investors in Kyrgyzstan. In their views, Chinese companies are profit-​driven agents that are disrespectful both to local communities and their livelihoods: They [Chinese investors] will never tell the full truth, they are not going to say, “I am doing this or that wrong.” I wish there was an international independent company, which would monitor the situation and check if the

A pesky story of Chinese mining in Kyrgyzstan  23 company is implementing everything that we agreed on, making sure that the contract is respected and results are shared with us. They [Chinese investors] come here, they do not respect our laws. I have not seen them respect international laws either … We are not telling them to bring the moon to us; we are just saying respect the laws. If it was a company from Switzerland or somewhere like that, probably we would agree. But when we hear China, we are afraid. Indeed, anti-​Chinese preferences that prevent Chinese investors from obtaining “a social license to operate” are an emerging trend in the politics of extractives. From Ecuador and Peru to Cameroon and Ghana, conflicts between Chinese mining companies and local communities are well documented (Crawford & Botchwey, 2016; Aquino, 2019; Kindzeka, 2019; Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, 2019). Often clouded by conspirological and ethnonationalist narratives, Chinese mining projects across the globe are becoming the targets for the indigenous communal ire. In most instances, anti-​Chinese grievances range from demands to provide better social packages to the communities affected by their projects to broader calls to stop alleged environmental pollution. A worldwide increase in mining conflicts that involve Chinese parties can be partially explained by objective reasons that Chinese mining companies became more active in international markets.The Chinese Dream of Great Rejuvenation and China’s respective “coming out” will only accelerate further Chinese penetration into the global mining industry. In Kyrgyzstan, in most instances, local communities are more aggrieved by internal domestic reasons than by external origins of the company. In most instances, it is the unmet expectations that tend to be one of the real and most significant drivers of conflict in mining-​affected localities of Kyrgyzstan. Such expectations arise because communities compare benefits and services received from Chinese investors with those provided at Kumtor or by the Soviet state. During the Soviet era, the booming of mining industry had a tremendous impact on country development. Six new towns and 14 urban-​type settlements appeared in the areas of mining activities in Soviet Kyrgyzstan (Bogdetsky et al., 2001, p. 80). As per Soviet regulations, mining enterprises were investing heavily into public infrastructure such as roads, energy systems, public transportation, kindergartens, schools and hospitals. Residents of mining towns were privileged with access to quality services, high salaries and additional perks of the Soviet system from free tickets to summer sanatoriums to special government awards (Bogdetsky et al., 2001). Nearly 67,000 people were employed in the extractive industry of Soviet Kyrgyzstan (Bogdetsky et al., 2001, p. 80). Rapid development of mining industry also had a multiplier effect on mining-​affected localities by generating new income opportunities. Since all those expenses were budgeted into production costs, the breakdown of the Soviet economy exposed how uncompetitive and unsustainable Soviet mining projects were. Neither mining enterprises that survived the collapse of the Soviet Union nor the government was able to maintain Soviet

24  Kemel Toktomushev commitments, and the decay of the mining towns and settlements quickly rolled in.The development of Kumtor only contributed to inflated expectations from mining projects. Whilst mining comprises approximately 10% of Kyrgyzstan’s total GDP, most of this share comes from Kumtor. Kumtor is one of the largest taxpayers and employers in the country. Therefore, it is unrealistic for any other mining company to match the benefits offered by Kumtor, and yet for local communities Kumtor remains a mining benchmark in terms of salaries, working conditions and social packages. Accordingly, in regions where public services and infrastructure is poor, expectations towards investors run high. Unmet expectations generate anxieties and grievances. Thus, any investor arriving to the mining scene of Kyrgyzstan is haunted by the Kumtor model and the Soviet past. Zhong Ji Mining was not an exception. Coloured by general feelings of Sinophobia, anti-​mining discontent turned violent from time to time forcing the company to react. In one of such instances, Zhong Ji Mining even paid an equivalent of approximately US$300,000 to the Min-​Bulak village and an equivalent of approximately US$200,000 to the Emgekchil village as part of the social package payments (Kyrtag, 2019), although according to the national legislation mining companies are not obliged to make such payments during the exploration phase. These developments may explain why the province with the lowest income per capita emerged as one of the most active sites of anti-​Chinese resistance in Kyrgyzstan, and such observations are pertinent to all states of Central Asia.To a varying degree of success “the Chinese question” has been instrumentalised by interest groups, political opposition and nativist actors across the region to rally against the government and Chinese investors. Even neighbouring Kazakhstan that has long boasted of its political stability was witnessing a surge of anti-​ Chinese protests for the past five years. Public fury began with the land reform that in the eyes of the public benefitted only Chinese investors, and then it extended to the Chinese businessmen who wanted to relocate their old factories to Kazakhstan.6 As it emerged, these stories turned out to be simple rumours, as there were no real investors from China, unlike in the Solton-​Sary case.Yet, the anti-​Chinese chatters were sufficient to mobilise the people against the perceived threat. Moreover, in the absence of Chinese binding safeguards for their own companies on responsible overseas investment, Chinese companies often suffer from negative publicity and occasionally make headlines for unethical business practices. Many Chinese projects in Central Asia are marred by accusations of corruption and environmental damage, and the resistance to the Chinese presence on the ground only increases. For instance, in 2019, two former Kyrgyz prime ministers received lengthy jail terms on corruption charges for lobbying the interests of the Chinese Tebian Electric Apparatus Stock Co. Ltd. (TBEA). The former president Almazbek Atambayev is also currently undergoing trial related to this case. TBEA won a US$386 million contract to modernise Bishkek’s central thermal power plant. Although TBEA is not involved in mining in Kyrgyzstan,TBEA’s business interests extend to extractives as well.

A pesky story of Chinese mining in Kyrgyzstan  25 It was reported in 2018 that TBEA allegedly received the licenses to develop gold mines in neighbouring Tajikistan until it recovers the funds used to build a US$349 million power plant in Dushanbe. TBEA has never been charged in Kyrgyzstan.As a practice, Chinese contractors are rarely indicted in Kyrgyzstan. In April 2016, another corruption scandal broke out in Kyrgyzstan involving Chinese Longhai and a US$100 million road construction project. Accusations of kickbacks from the Chinese vendor led to the resignation of the then-​Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan. However, Longhai remained the main vendor to complete the road project. Such cases certainly contribute to the perceptions that Chinese companies contribute to poor governance, economic hurdles and social injustices and yet enjoy impunity. At one of the meetings of the Security Council, the then-​President of Kyrgyzstan Sooronbai Zheenbekov even lamented that from 2009 to 2018, five chairmen of the State Committee for Industry, Energy and Subsoil Use of the Kyrgyz Republic were prosecuted for corruption and nearly 100 criminal cases have been initiated against officials of this agency that is responsible for the natural resource management in the country (K-​News, 2019).Yet not a single Chinese mining company faced trial.To the accusers of Chinese mining companies such statistics simply meant that Chinese corruption is so devious as to be beyond the reach of Kyrgyz prosecutors. There is growing evidence that Chinese companies perform more responsibly in the countries that have and can enforce higher governance standards (Vasquez et  al., 2018). However, the prospects that Kyrgyzstan can emerge as a flagship example of such a phenomenon also seem to be too unattainable. Since its independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan has seen at least 30 Prime Ministers and Acting Prime Ministers, and all Kyrgyz governments sought to fight corruption and promote government transparency and public accountability. Yet, governance problems remain the perennial challenge to the development of Kyrgyzstan. Corruption is deeply entrenched in all segments of the Kyrgyz socioeconomic fabric and finds manifestation in a variety of forms from petty to grand corruption.Transparency International’s recent Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Kyrgyzstan 126 out of 198 with a score of 29 out of 100.7 According to World Bank’s recent Worldwide Governance Indicators, Kyrgyzstan scores 16.35 out of 100 on control of corruption, and 17.79 out of 100 on rule of law.8 In the Resource Governance Index, Kyrgyzstan also ranks poorly with a composite score of 51 out of 100.9 Kyrgyzstan is also currently suspended from the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. As a result, as in the case of Solton-​Sary, perceptions that Chinese companies are contributing to social injustices often lead to violent manifestations of anger. For instance, in April 2018, residents of small southern town Kazarman set fire to the facilities of a gold-​processing plant owned by Chinese Makmal G.L Developing, accusing the gold company of environmental pollution.10 Protesters also pelted policemen who came to rescue the situation with rocks. In the north of Kyrgyzstan, a US$300  million Chinese refinery Zhongda11 consistently face such standoffs with local residents, while in February 2020,

26  Kemel Toktomushev anti-​Chinese protests in the Naryn region of Kyrgyzstan ended the prospects of a $280 million joint Sino-​Kyrgyz logistics venture.12 Even if genuine grievances are related more to internal political discontent, fears of China emerge as an effective trigger for mass mobilisations, since they appear to be the most common denominator to the problems of local communities. Chinese investors become convenient bogeymen for the aggrieved to unite against. In some instances, public ire targets even those Chinese companies, which have a more robust and responsible corporate culture, and which advocate for more sustainable and equitably mining practices. Moreover, “the Chinese factor” also adds a legitimising aspect to mass public protests. The governments are left with little choice, but to bandwagon with the demands of the protestors in order to avoid the “anti-​people” labels. Thus, with significant prejudices against mining and Chinese miners in particular, a way forward should be found on how to extract benefits for all stakeholders involved in mining processes. The cases like Solton-​Sary should be studied in greater detail in order to devise solutions that can bring economic returns to private investors and concomitantly improve quality of life in the country.

Conclusion Even though most mines in Kyrgyzstan are small with small contributions to GDP, these mines are very important, as they provide both localised opportunities and localised threats. Mining can stimulate economic development, attract foreign capital, generate local employment, promote downstream industries and incentivise the creation of a highly skilled labour market from mining-​focused universities to stock exchanges. Mining can equally deepen existing fault lines and outweigh all economic returns by damaging environment, fuelling inequalities and fostering political instability. Unfortunately, the latter appears to be the most common scenario in Kyrgyzstan so far. Whilst drivers of mining conflicts in Kyrgyzstan are not particularly exclusive to Kyrgyzstan as they are common across mining-​affected localities around the world, the overlay of Sinophobia on Kyrgyz resource nationalism produces a dangerous mixture that effectively triggers violent mobilisation of xenophobic sentiments. With a further rise of China, Chinese investments in global mining will continue its exponential growth. Chinese investments into Kyrgyz extractive sector will also increase, particularly taking account that there are not that many investors willing to commit to Kyrgyzstan. Thus, perhaps it is time for all stakeholders to realise that modern mining is about fairness, respect and trust and is no longer about simple acquisition of regulatory licenses and fulfilment of legal commitments. It is evident that unless comprehensive measures are taken and lessons are learned, the story of Solton-​Sary runs the risks of becoming a proverbial expression well beyond Kyrgyzstan.

A pesky story of Chinese mining in Kyrgyzstan  27

Notes from the field Mongolia: Chinese investment and the Belt and Road Initiatives Khatanbold Oidov and Budsuren Davaanyam Mongolia’s engagement with its neighbours has been a result of its geographical position between China and Russia. The relationship with China has had a long history of close ties in the fields of economy, history and culture. A joint working group on trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation between the governments of Mongolia and the People’s Republic of China has been operating since 1991. In recent years, cooperation between the two countries has increased in political, economic and social spheres, especially for trade and investment. China has growing influence in Mongolia through successful businesses that is often presented as part of the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI). Current and planned investments highlight economic relations based on agreements, commitments and cooperation. We believe that foreign relations and cooperation between the two countries goes beyond finance; it includes national values, practices, traditions and motives within which mutual cooperation and investment takes place. Whilst Mongolia’s foreign policy seeks to maintain friendly relations with Russia and China, investment has raised challenges. The expansion of Chinese enterprises in Mongolia has led to some disputes and conflicts between Chinese and Mongolian business entities. For example, increased Chinese investment may affect the country’s economic and political sovereignty. The Parliament of Mongolia adopted the Law on Foreign investment in 1993 which is dedicated to promote foreign investment, protect rights and property of investors, regulate the investment-​related relationship.The law is aimed at encouraging foreign investment in all respects and creating a favourable environment for investors. Revised in 2013, it protects rights, stabilises taxes and improves efficiency. China is the largest investor in Mongolia with bilateral agreements for 226 projects valued at US$19.5 billion in 2020. For China, the objective of the BRI programme is to promote collaborative projects. For Mongolia, Chinese BRI investment means reliance on Chinese soft loans and grants. The BRI is not a perfect fit with Mongolia’s current economic priorities. Mongolian leaders want to diversify the country’s economy by building a manufacturing base and reduce its near total dependence on the exports of natural resources. One approach for the two countries is to strengthen mutual understanding and trust for improved cooperation and economic benefit. Instead, Mongolia’s increasing dependence on conditional foreign investment affects national social and economic policy. With business has also come migration and

28  Kemel Toktomushev settlement of Chinese residents; this has become a major concern for the Mongolian government and ordinary citizens. China accounts for the majority of Mongolia’s exports with about 90% of the country’s trade passing through China. As a source of raw materials, Mongolia’s top exports in 2019 were coal ($2.8 billion) and copper ore ($2 billion). Chinese demand for resources has powered Mongolia’s growth and increased tax revenues. This is important as in 2017 the country received an International Monetary Fund financial support package. Currently, the main goals of the China Economic Corridor between Mongolia, Russia and China is to increase the trade, ensure the competitiveness of goods, facilitate cross-​border transport and develop infrastructure. However, of the 32 planned BRI projects included in the Mongolia, Russia and Program, 18 are ongoing projects whilst 14 have not been implemented. Hard infrastructure projects (roads, mines) are moving forward, while soft infrastructure (communication, business development) projects are lagging behind; the 56% implementation rate affects the claimed trade benefit for Mongolia. Though the Economic Corridor programme has been going on for four years the projects have not yet yielded many results. To understand economic cooperation on BRI projects some awareness of the fundamental Chinese approach is useful. The documents and contracts signed between Mongolian and Chinese governments are characteristically declarative so that engagement relies on (uncertain) mutual trust with China as the stronger party. To improve the trade structure and extend exports of mining and agricultural goods, the BRI can have a role in improving cooperation and resolving problems. By doing this, emphasis on the economic reasons for foreign investment can strengthen policy. The state has a policy to promote domestic investors; however, to do this whilst agreeing to BRI investment is difficult. Implementing policies aimed at developing the business sector, limiting foreign investment and companies from monopolising the domestic market can provide opportunities for domestic companies to grow and develop.The BRI can play an important role in resolving such issues through improvement of cooperative mechanisms.

Notes 1 For example, one of the Vice Prime Ministers of Kyrgyzstan asserted that there are 397 Chinese enterprises in the country and 170 more Kyrgyz-​Chinese joint ventures (his statements are available at:  https://​kaktus.media/​doc/​384957_​ vice_​premer_​ministr:_​komy_​to_​vygodno_​raskachivat_​sityaciu_​s_​kitaem.html). Tazabek.kg agency refers to more than 2000 official registered companies (www. tazabek.kg/​news:1550575/​). 2 The numbers are retrieved from the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade.

A pesky story of Chinese mining in Kyrgyzstan  29 3 Some media coverage of the event:  www.rferl.org/​a/​chinese-​gold-​mining-​ company-​suspends-​kyrgyz-​operations/​30097658.html; https://​uk.reuters.com/​ article/​us-​kyrgyzstan-​protests-​mining/​kyrgyzstan-​halts-​work-​at-​chinese-​gold-​ mine-​after-​clashes-​idUSKCN1UX200; https://​24.kg/​english/​125505_​_​Solton-​ Sary_​conflict_​19_​employees_​discharged_​from_​hospital/​; 4 The numbers are calculated based on the data available at www.kumtor.kg/​en/​ deposit/​production-​figures/​. 5 This research was part of the collaborative project “Gobi Framework for Sustainable Infrastructure Partnerships” between the University of Oxford, Independent Research Institute of Mongolia and University of Central and was funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF). 6 For instance, some of the news coverage:  www.bbc.com/​news/​world-​asia-​ 36163103; www.reuters.com/​article/​us-​kazakhstan-​china-​protests/​dozens-​protest​against-​chinese-​influence-​in-​kazakhstan-​idUSKCN1VP1B0. 7 The recent data can be assessed at www.transparency.org/​en/​cpi/​2018/​results/​kgz. 8 The data can be assessed at http://​info.worldbank.org/​governance/​wgi/​#reports. 9 The data is available at https://​resourcegovernanceindex.org/​country-​profiles/​ KGZ/​mining. 10 Some media coverage of the event:  https://​eurasianet.org/​kyrgyzstan-​protesters-​ set-​fire-​to-​gold-​processing-​plant-​under-​construction;     https://​akipress.com/​ news:      604887:_​b_​Protesters_​set_​Ji_​El_​Makmal_​Development_​company_​s_​ building_​in_​Toguz-​Toro_​on_​fire_​/​b_​/​; www.rferl.org/​a/​kyrgyzstan-​15-​protesters​arrested-​over-​unrest-​at-​gold-​mining-​site/​29172272.html. 11 Some media coverage of the event:  https://​eurasianet.org/​kyrgyzstan-​suspends-​ work-​at-​new-​chinese-​refinery; https://​akipress.com/​news:541314. 12 Some media coverage of the event: www.reuters.com/​article/​us-​kyrgyzstan-​china-​ investment-​protests-​idUSKBN20C1HA; https://​24.kg/​english/​143940_​Project_​ on_​construction_​of_​logistics_​center_​scuttled_​in_​At-​Bashi/​.

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3  Contestations over mining policies and mineral ownership in Mongolia from the socialist period to the present Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo

Introduction Mineral licensing in Mongolia is a highly politicised topic. Newly elected governments change licensing procedures and politicians often campaign to investigate an alleged illegal trade in licences. Set in the wider context of examining what triggers conflicts between local people, mining companies and government, this chapter examines how mining ownership and licences have been established, legislated and resisted in Mongolia. Particular attention will be given to how different understandings of ownership and use of mineral resources have been articulated through mining legislation, and the impacts that this has had on the relationship between the Mongolian state, its citizens, other states (including the USSR during the socialist period) and private mining companies. To explore these issues, this chapter will focus on the establishment of the Erdenet mine and how its development reflects the Mongolian state’s changing approach to mineral resource ownership and control. Research to date on mining in Mongolia has tended to document the process of glocalisation of extractive policies, its impacts, consequences and the actions of particular mining stakeholders. Global constitutionalism, as argued by Lander (2017: 295), modified Mongolia’s laws in favour of “private property and capital mobility to sustain and benefit the global market.” Mongolia lost constitutional power over its mineral resources to foreign investors operating within so-​ called supraterritorial constituencies. Bumochir (2020) has also questioned how different agencies promoted contradictory nationalist and neoliberal ideologies in extractive industries and argued that nationalist sentiments made neoliberal ideologies “Mongolised” or indigenised. Other researchers have focused on how the mineral sector is ruled by risks (Hatcher, 2014) and debated the notion of the resource curse and mining nationalism in the Mongolian context (Reeves, 2011; Jackson, 2014; Ganbold and Ali, 2017). Empson (2019) also suggested that cosmological beliefs underlie local concepts of mineral ownership. Extractive industries produced a “disorderly nature of changes” (Bonilla, 2017), in which different interest groups (governments, transnational corporations, local DOI: 10.4324/9781003097341-4

34  Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo businesses, local communities) seek to defend their own interests (Dalaibuyan, 2012; Dierkes, 2012; Blunt, 2014; Chuluun and Byambaragchaa, 2014; Empson and Webb, 2014; Meesters and Behagel, 2017). However, no single study exists which investigates the social transformation of resource rights in both socialist and post-​socialist Mongolia, creating a new mining order and leading to frictions between old and new concepts. The study of ownership, licences, resource extraction and the unequal distribution of benefits raises questions about whether cohabitation of different stakeholders, who desperately defend their interests in negotiations, is possible when they confront each other at the mining projects (Escobar, 1995; Pijpers and Eriksen, 2019). In seeking both to engage with this existing work on the politics of mining in Mongolia, and to extend debates in important new directions, I focus in this chapter on the contestation over mining regimes and, specifically, how this relates to changes in Mongolian notions of property and resource ownership.The monopoly of state ownership of land (surface and subsoil) and the absence of individual land ownership which existed under socialism were modified in the 1990s. The division of property rights separating subsoil and surface has led to competition between different actors such as companies with rights to mine subsoil, herders using surface pastures collectively, households and companies with rights to possess campsite land and the right to use surface resources, and the various state agencies responsible for different resources. I argue that the properties and property rights created in the socialist and post-​socialist periods have resulted in conflicts of policies leading to constant negotiations of mining stakeholders domestically and internationally. These are detailed in the case of Erdenet mine. In what follows I first analyse how Mongolia discovered mineral resources and intensified extractive programmes during the socialist period.Then I set out the context both of Mongolian concepts of resource ownership and a chronology of mining laws during the socialist and post-​socialist periods. I then illustrate these broader trends by focusing on Mongolia’s aspirations for economic sovereignty to resist an unequal and unfair relationship with the mining stakeholder, initially the Soviet Union and subsequently the Russian Federation, through the case of Erdenet mine that started production in 1978. I focus particularly on how different concepts of mineral ownership have complicated these bilateral arrangements and provoked protests leading to renegotiations. I conclude by reflecting on the wider implications of accelerated changes in mining licensing through the lens of cultural understandings of resource ownership and use.1

Mining during the Mongolian People’s Republic The Constitution of the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) in 1960 defined all subsoil, land and surface resources including production assets as “state property, that is, the wealth of whole people.” It was often interpreted that these resources belonged to all Mongolian citizens and the term “state socialist property”2 was used, copying Soviet laws (Osakwe, 1985). During socialist times, the

Contestations over mining policies  35 State, as owner of subsoil and surface resources, granted the land and surface resources for personal and organisational (enterprises) use with permissions at different levels. Mining-​related laws and regulations, including the “Law on Subsoil of MPR” of 1988, assigned mineral ownership to the State and use-​ rights to State enterprises, mirroring the law reforms in the Soviet Union. In the 1988 Law, there were two types of property rights over minerals: state ownership, and use rights by public organisations and cooperatives. All enterprises or mines had to sell minerals to the state at fixed prices and contribute to the production, social, investment and capital depreciation funds after paying taxes including royalties.Through these funds, mines used to share benefits with workers in many ways such as wages, awards, free resort stays, free trips, investment in workers’ social services, free cafeterias and building sport and cultural complexes. Importantly, however, all companies jointly owned by the Soviet Union and Mongolia, such as Erdenet Complex and Mongolrostsetmet, were exempt from any land and water fees and mineral royalties. The Soviet Union’s share was exempt from other income taxes, and MPR had no right to levy income taxes and royalties on the Erdenet complex. Geological surveys and explorations were conducted in Mongolia during the socialist period (1940–​90) and served as the foundation for the boom in private mining in post-​socialist democratic Mongolia from 1990. The Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) embarked on extensive geological surveys and explorations in Mongolia in 1939, cooperating with Soviet Union geologists (Marinov, 1981; Jamba et  al., 2012). When Mongolia became a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (Comecon) in 1962 after its membership in the UN, Comecon assisted Mongolia with industrialisation. In return, Mongolia hosted meetings of the Geological Commission of Comecon in Ulaanbaatar and cooperated to supply minerals to its member countries (Aline, 1971: 205). For example, Comecon recommended Mongolia and East Germany (GDR) to cooperate on geology in 1962. They signed an official cooperation agreement on geology and mining in 1965 and 1973, leading to multiple expeditions in 1965–​90 such as those exploring gold deposits in Selenge and Khentii provinces in 1962–​91, Tsagaan Tsakhir and Baidrag in Bayankhongor province in 1966–​70, and a zinc deposit in Sukhbaatar province in 1973–​82 (MRAM, 2012). In 1975, Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia started geological expeditions with Mongolia. During this time (1962–​90), Mongolia explored and mapped all the mineral deposits that are being used by the extractive industry today.These include significant deposits such as Centerra Gold’s Boroo gold project, Tsairt Mineral Chinese-​ Mongolian company’s Tomortei Zinc mine project, Chinese-​Mongolian Chinkhua company’s Nariin Sukhait coal projects, Rio Tinto’s Oyu Tolgoi project and Russian-​Mongolian Erdenet copper mines. However, most of these deposits were reported as newly discovered and explored by the licence holders rather than crediting the early geological surveys (Wu, 1999; Tse, 2001, 2003; Thalenhorst and Farquharson, 2004). These mineral deposits were explored and kept in the State Geological Databank until Mongolia opened it to Western investors in the 1990s.

36  Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo As geological expeditions increased in the 1970s, Mongolia established the Ministry of Mining and Geology in 1976 and transferred the State Geological Centre and the Central Geological Laboratory to the new Ministry. Mongolia had explored over 7,000 mineral occurrences and estimated the size of 800 mineral deposits by the late 1980s. Many other findings from geological exploration were taken out of the country between 1960 and 1990, mainly by Soviet geologists (Avirmed, 1991). After 28  years the Russian Federation returned part of the data in 2018 (Gantuya, 2018). This section illustrates the role of the Soviet Union and Comecon in early exploration of minerals in Mongolia and the institutionalisation of mineral exploration and knowledge at the level of the Mongolian state.

The case of Erdenet Mine: who benefits? Many studies on Mongolia (e.g. Luvsandorj et al., 1986; Dorian, 1991; Namjim, 2004; Jeffries, 2007; Sanders, 2010; Smith, 2015; Bonilla, 2017; Lander, 2020) failed to discuss the details of joint ventures between the MPR and the Soviet Union due to lack of information available and its state confidentiality. I raise these issues in this case study and analyse how Mongolia tried to defend its national interests in the mineral resources and mining agreements during and after the socialist period and what were the concepts and policies behind Mongolia’s protest. The Erdenet copper–​molybdenum mining and processing plant is located in north-​central Mongolia, 140 km from the Russian border and 330 km from Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia’s capital. The Erdenet mine base was constructed in 1974–​78 and additional processing lines and infrastructure continued to be built until 1989. It opened its first processing line with an annual capacity to crush 4 Mt of ore in 1978. Another four processing lines were completed in 1980–​89.The processing technologies improved significantly, and its yearly capacity grew to 32 Mt of ore in 2018 (Danilov et al., 2019). As Erdenet extracts ores with 1.0–​0.3% copper and 0.01–​0.02% molybdenum, it processes ores to produce concentrates with 29–​35% copper. Estimation of metal reserves in exploitable ores was 4.7 Mt in 1974, calculating enough for 40 years of operation from 1978 to 2018. After additional surveys and explorations, its estimated metal reserves increased to 7.8 Mt with lower-​grade ores in 1991 and 9 Mt in 2002–​4 including all reserves in low grade and deeper ores (Beskhmelnitsyn, 2001; Gerel and Munkhtsengel, 2004). In 2019, the Erdenet factory announced that it would operate for another 60 years until 2080, but they did not disclose the exact remaining metal reserves. In order to examine the role of the Erdenet mine in shaping the Mongolian State’s changing relationship to mineral resource ownership, it is necessary to set out the nature of the early legal agreements.The first agreement was established in 1973 after two years of negotiations and research. Mongolia intended to build a mine and smelter complex based on its explorations with Czechoslovakia in 1956–​71 and later with the Soviet Union during the time of development of

Contestations over mining policies  37 feasibility studies in 1971–​72. The total cost of the complex was estimated at 1.1 billion roubles according to the feasibility study of 1972 (Damdinsuren and Tungalag, 1991). Mongolia asked the Soviet Union to provide a loan for building this complex. However, the Soviet Union instead offered 596 million roubles on the following conditions: (1) it should be an ore concentrating joint venture, rather than a complex including a smelter; (2)  it had to export raw concentrates to a Soviet smelter at the prices set by the Soviet Union. The Political Bureau of MPR and the Council of Ministers decided to stick to the former proposal and negotiated with East Germany and Czechoslovakia for investment for a smelter complex but they refused in 1973. Another option was to seek cooperation with non-​socialist countries but this did not proceed as it was deemed to go against socialist ideology. Premier Tsedenbal’s decision “influenced the Political Bureau to consider the available funding and further assistance from the Soviet Union” (Erdene, 2019). M.  Damdinsuren (Damdinsuren and Tungalag, 1991) said that “Mongolia’s proposal to develop a copper smelter along with mines was vehemently opposed by the Soviet Union for its interest to supply Siberian smelters wanting cheaper copper ore from Mongolia on Soviet’s fixed prices.” He was the member of a government commission to negotiate the deal and build Erdenet factory in 1972–​5. He argued that it was almost like a Soviet-​owned mine exploiting Mongolia’s mineral resources on site. From 1986 to 1996, Prime Ministers and government officials, geologists and politicians all voiced their discontent about Erdenet (Avirmed, 1991; Batmunkh and Galdan, 1991; Byambasuren and Ganbold, 1991; Sodnom et al., 1991; Khurts, 1992). From the beginning, dissatisfaction about the unequal powers of the participants, inequalities in mining management and benefit-​sharing accrued and became ready to erupt at any time. After the Erdenet mine opened in 1978, it started to export all concentrate to the USSR. According to the agreement, Mongolia had no rights to sell its copper concentrate to a third country. In 1980, Premier Tsedenbal and the Mongolian government negotiated with N.K. Baibakov, the head of the Soviet Central Planning Commission, to get permission to export 10% of Mongolia’s share of concentrates to other countries (Shinkariyev, 2006: 349–​50).This quota helped, but there were grave problems related to fixed prices.The Erdenet mine was profitable for the Soviet Union but not for Mongolia. The Soviet-​imposed fixed price on the export of concentrates to the USSR caused Mongolia to lose over USD 10 million annually (Batmunkh, 2001: 204). The problem was that Mongolia had been heavily subsidising the Erdenet factory with 30–​40 million togrogs (MNT) (around USD 10–​13 million) annually since its start. For every ton of concentrate, Mongolia pumped in 114 roubles to fill the gap between the production cost of 489 roubles and export price of 375 roubles (Chuluunbat, 2013: 122–​3; Nadirov, 1995: 17). According to Prime Minister Byambasuren, “Mongolia alone paid the subsidy of 932  million togrogs [over around USD 300  million] in 1978–​84 which is equivalent to the loan Mongolia received for the building of the Erdenet factory” (Byambasuren, 1996:  96). This issue was raised by top Mongolian officials and it contributed to the destabilisation

38  Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo of Mongolian politics. The Mongolian government negotiated again with the Soviet delegates on the price system and payment of an additional incentive premium of 10% to Mongolia was agreed in June 1984 (Nadirov, 1995: 19), but kept top secret. This secrecy is the reason why there was no information or statistics about the real contribution of Erdenet factory to Mongolian GDP at this time, but only statistics about the size of production and exports. The temporary solution of low prices and an export quota did not make Erdenet factory beneficial to Mongolia, and it postponed the problems while maintaining absolute power of the Soviet Union at Erdenet. Protests against USSR domination at Erdenet factory and unequal benefits intensified after economic reforms started in 1988. Mongolian geology and mining specialists and government officials supported the protests, which were further fuelled by the Democratic Revolution in 1990.3 Many demonstrations were organised in Erdenet city and Erdenet factory workers appealed to nationalise the factory and disclose financial information while targeting unfair conditions for Mongolian workers. Newspapers and Mongolian geology professionals demanded the Soviet Union pay taxes including royalties, in line with Mongolia’s 1988 Law on Subsoil (Avirmed, 1991; Nabadchikov, 1991; Tamir, 2014). At the same time, geological and mineral associations were established and they, first, insisted that Mongolian members on the Erdenet Joint Venture Board “work only for the sole interest of Mongolia” and later “demanded them to resign” in December 1990 (Association of Geology and Mining, 1991). Prime Minister Byambasuren raised these issues of Erdenet in his official visit to the Soviet Union in January 1991, and intergovernmental commissions were set up.They worked on the details of the proposed agreement in April–​July 1991 (Oyunbileg, 1991). After lengthy negotiations in Moscow, both sides signed the second agreement on 1 July 1991, and it made significant progress on securing Mongolia’s ownership by increasing its share to 51% (USSR & MPR, 1991). Gaining control of Erdenet was a significant achievement for Mongolia for a number of reasons. First, this was the first time in the history of joint mines that Mongolia acquired the right to sell the products attributable to Mongolia’s 51% share at market price in freely convertible currency. The second achievement was the right to collect payment for subsoil use (royalty) at 8% of the value of annually sold products in 1979–​90 and 6% royalty starting from 1991, stated in Article 5 of the protocol annexed to the 1991 Agreement (USSR & MPR, 1991: 33–​4). Third, Mongolia gained the power to levy fees for water and land use, and the Mongolia and Soviet sides agreed to pay compensation of 7.9 million roubles for the water used in 1979–​90. It was decided that Erdenet will pay land use fees for 5,859 hectares which it uses. Fourth, the two sides agreed to pay 30% of corporate income tax to Mongolia in 1991 and determine future tax rates by a separate agreement. Fifth, Mongolian and Soviet workers and specialists should be equally treated and valued despite the additional pay for Soviet workers for their relocation and subsistence expenses. All these payments were used to write off Mongolia’s debt and did not contribute to Mongolian budget revenue.

Contestations over mining policies  39 Another achievement in the second agreement was to increase local employment with a decent and fair salary. Mongolian engineers and professional workers had struggled to get employment in joint ventures where expensive foreign specialists had dominated in the past (USSR & MPR, 1991). The ratio of Mongolian to Soviet specialists was 5:95% when the Erdenet factory opened with 3,000 workers (Heaton, 1980) in 1978. The proportion of Mongolian to foreign workers in Erdenet factory increased gradually, reaching 40:60% in 1991 and 84:16% (total 6,518 workers) in 2001 and finally 95:5 (10,000 workers) in 2018 (SDO, 2019). There were huge discrepancies in salaries of national and foreign specialists at Erdenet factory before 1992. For example, Mongolia was paying around USD 300 per day for Soviet experts (Bayarbaatar and Sonintogos, 1991). However, although the second agreement committed to reduce the transportation and per diem cost for Soviet specialists by 50% and to follow the same salary rate in the joint venture, foreign specialists still received an additional 60% of the salaries they had received in the USSR before coming to Mongolia. In reality, their salary was ten times higher and led to many protests in Erdenet. Overall, the signing of the second agreement was proof of the unfairness of the agreement made between the USSR and MPR in 1973. Finally, Mongolia became able to appoint a General Director independently and had power to manage the joint venture including finances, sales and ability to make contracts and improve the technology. Unfortunately, these brought more internal conflicts and corruption that will be discussed later. The second agreement was valid until 31 December 2002. In 1998, the Mongolian Government, led by the Democratic Party, had resigned due to an attempted privatisation of the Mongolian stake in Erdenet (Jeffries, 2007: 21); the next government also resigned over its approval of the privatisation of Russian shares in Erdenet (ibid., p. 23), and the general directors of Erdenet were removed in 1998 and 2000 due to political contest over controlling Erdenet factory. By 2002, Erdenet was exporting 80–​90% of concentrates to China. Political and business factions tried to privatise Erdenet stakes in both Mongolia and Russia and supplied the materials, spare parts and equipment supplied to Erdenet for extremely high prices (see detail in later parts). On 10 December 2002, the Russian Government took back its share of Erdenet from the Russian Zarubezhtsvetmet company that had illegally acquired it in 1997, after a five year court battle (Rojkova, 2002). Due to this court case, the Russian Federation requested Mongolia to postpone the deadline for negotiating a third agreement from 31 December 2002 to 1 March 2003. In order to postpone a second time, Alexei Valentinovich Mitrofanov, deputy chair of the Russian State Duma, introduced his protocol proposal in the State Duma Session 219 on 12 February 2003 as follows: I am proposing a draft resolution on the situation around the Erdenet mining and processing plant in Mongolia. […] The fact is that the situation is very urgent. We are talking about the Erdenet plant in Mongolia. So, a new agreement has not been concluded yet, and we have reached a

40  Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo situation in which Russia might lose its stake in Mongolia and, shall we say, in Mongolia itself which we also lost. We never considered Mongolia to be a foreign country, but now it is going to be a foreign country. Control of the plant is a significant political and economic influence in Mongolia, and now the negotiations are very unsuccessful on the part of the government. And I think it is necessary to urgently consider this issue, to instruct the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take this into its own hands and to make urgent, in two weeks, certain, so to speak, efforts. The [Erdenet] plant was built by the Soviet Union thirty years ago, we operated it, everything was fine. Now there are attempts by the Mongolians to take it over. Just as everything ends on March 1, and the Mongolians are waiting for March 1. In two weeks, the Mongolians will do a liquidation commission with us and wave goodbye to Auntie. State Duma, 2003 Mitrofanov’s speech clearly shows how mining stakeholders became heated in defence of their economic and political interests and how unequal cooperation ruled the relation between Mongolia and Russia. However, Russia pardoned Erdenet overdue loans as part of Russia’s forgiveness of Mongolia’s Big Debt in 2003. Considering this new situation, the parties signed the third agreement (Mongolia and Russian Federation, 2003) with the following revisions. First, Erdenet factory was reorganised as a Limited Liability Company following Mongolia’s company law of 1999 and foreign investment law of 1993. The agreement is valid for five years with an automatic extension of five years if there are no concerns from each side. Second, all taxes, including royalties, are included in the production costs. These taxes are determined by Mongolian laws. Before 2003, Mongolia was paying the loan with its royalties. As all loans were paid or cancelled in 2003, Erdenet became profitable for the Mongolian side (Infogeo, 2004). Third, the agreement removed all articles about salary and special treatment of Russian experts. Instead, it stipulated to follow market principles and the company’s charter following Mongolian laws and regulations. Fourth, the shareholders of Erdenet factory –​Mongolia and Russia –​started to appoint the members of the company board directly. The board received the power to appoint the general director and deputies and audit commission to run the enterprise effectively and independently from politics. The board also received the right to make a change in the property inventory. The new board decided to transfer the factory’s apartments to workers who had lived in them for years. By this agreement, Mongolia received full recognition of its sovereignty over mineral resources, legitimacy of Mongolian laws and regulations over the bilateral agreement and it made Mongolia an equal partner. Mongolia achieved this sovereign control after 30  years of constant negotiations, protest, controversies and fights. In order to keep a state monopoly, it seems that the state did not disclose information about Erdenet mine to its citizens, hiding behind state secrecy, bilateral agreements and business competition. Financial information, reports and audits

Contestations over mining policies  41 were not disclosed to the public even though the people of Mongolia own the mineral resources as declared in the Constitutions of both MPR and democratic Mongolia. When Russia left the agreement by selling its shares in 2016, Russia disclosed the details of the audit reports and bilateral agreements in Russia for public use, and these materials (USSR and MPR, 1991; Beskhmelnitsyn, 2001; Mongolia and Russian Federation, 2003; Davaanyam et al., 2018) enabled us to set out the details of this case. During the first agreement, Mongolia fought against power inequality, economic inefficiency and unfair benefit sharing. Mongolian authorities concealed this information from the public fearing that it would fuel public protest and damage cooperation with the Soviet Union. These assumptions continued throughout the history of Erdenet joint venture. It seems that the reasons to keep details of the agreements secret were strongly related to the private business interests of those in power in government and at the Erdenet factory since the early 1990s (Constitutional Court, 2018). Many politicians have been criticised for abuse of authority by selling products such as spare parts, machinery and goods to Erdenet at an extremely high price (Beskhmelnitsyn, 2001; Davaanyam et  al., 2018). The Mongolian term “baraa shakhakh,” “pumping” or inflating prices of goods or services to the State-​owned company, raises the question of ownership of the mine. Does it belong to the authorities representing the State or the whole people of Mongolia? Media speculations about Erdenet erupt and disappear during election times or before Board meetings of Erdenet factory (Jeffries, 2007). Political parties and interest groups compete to get their “own person” appointed as a general director of the “cow” (Orgilmaa, 2019). These led to an attempt to privatise Mongolian shares starting in 1996, and the government intervened by announcing an emergency in Erdenet in 1998. These interest groups and oligarchs across political parties, are rivals yet are united in hiding their “pumping” businesses since 1991 (Davaanyam et al., 2018). The general director of Erdenet factory provided a loan guarantee for one of these groups in his network without approval from the Board and Shareholders in 2009. Erdenet ended up losing USD 40 million in April 2019 after the Commercial Court’s order to pay 51  million and require negotiation through a mediator (Commercial Court, 2017). The fertile soil for these corrupt activities is that Erdenet factory is “closed” and does not disclose the details of running costs, especially, procurement, taxes and contracts. When Russia made its decision to sell its 49% share of Erdenet and Mongolrostsvetmet Mining Joint Venture in 2016, the Mongolian government, due to an alleged lack of capital, transferred its preferential rights to a private company, Mongolian Copper Corporation (MCC) LLC, owned by the Trade and Development Bank of Mongolia. The government led by the Democratic Party made this decision secretly before the parliamentary election on 29 June 2016. MCC paid Russian Rostech State corporation USD 400 million for the 49% share on election day. The Democratic Party was defeated by MPP. The new government set up a working group to investigate4 and announced that this private company bought Erdenet shares using government money (UB

42  Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo Post, 2019). According to the working group, it borrowed 72% of this money from the Mongolian government. Mainly Democratic Party members and private business groups were involved in this purchase. Again, as usual, speculation erupted in the media and hundreds of newspaper and internet posts were published and subsequently disappeared (Tatar, 2020). The State Great Khural (legislature) made a decision to take over 49% as public property by its resolution no. 23 on 10 February 2017.The MCC sued and this resolution was defeated at the three levels of courts and constitutional court in 2017–​18 (Constitutional Court, 2018). Parliament, government and president joined forces to revise the laws of court independence and gave power to the national security council to intervene in the national council of courts and removed some judges. Finally, the security council declared an emergency situation at Erdenet mine on 5 March 2019 and took control of Erdenet until now, January 2021 (SGH, 2020). L.  Oyunerdene and many other government officials described that it was fighting against a web of interest groups5 called MANAN, the abbreviation of the two ruling parties –​People’s and Democratic Parties. Interestingly, he compared government acquisition of Erdenet to what Kennedy did against organised criminal groups in the 1960s. The fight between those mining stakeholders or interest groups backed by political parties for the ownership of Erdenet mine is still continuing these days. The government is still reviewing all purchases, unprofitable contracts and restructuring management and organisations. Erdenet factory announced that it transferred MNT 936 billion to the state budget in 2019 compared to its MNT 184 billion in 2016, even though there was no increase in exports and commodity prices. Does this difference tell us how much money was siphoned off by those interest groups by corrupt activities, or is it another populist false information? There are no details about these tax numbers, and there are no procurement reports publicly available. As of January 2021, scandals about Erdenet factory are gradually disappearing from public attention, to be replaced by success stories without proof or details. However, the court battle between the Mongolian government and private business over 49% of Erdenet shares is still going on and it helped to give 2016 and 2020 parliamentary election victories to the MPP over the Democratic Party that supported private purchase. In post-​socialist Mongolia full state ownership of mineral resource and mines still has considerable public support.

Post-​Soviet developments in mineral licensing and ownership The new constitution of 1992 allowed people to own private property but did not grant private property rights on subsoil and natural resources. The new Constitution inherited the former State monopoly of ownership of subsoil and surface including pastureland, water, forest and wild animals as the “property of the State.” After 27 years of absolute state ownership in 1992–​2019, it amended the constitution by changing the ownership status from “property of

Contestations over mining policies  43 the State” to “public property of the State.” This was an attempt to blame State mismanagement of subsoil and other common properties and increase public control. However, Mongolia did not fully administer regulatory and contractual schemes between various public, private and communal right holders of surface and subsoil resources. The dominance of mineral rights or licences and mine properties over surface resource rights such as the right to use water, pasture and properties held by other stakeholders does not guarantee that mineral development will take place in an environmentally sustainable way, thus leading to conflicts, deprivation and dispossession. In this case, mineral and surface resource rights holders can be the state, national or multinational company, local company, herders, local community depending on the property rights such as ownership, possession, exploitation, lease, use, etc. Until 1997, the mines focused on employment rather than economic profitability.The 1994 mineral law adopted the key concepts of the former subsoil law of 1988, such as state monopoly on ownership of subsoil and surface resources. The only addition was that state allowed the lease of mineral deposits to private companies even though it retained state ownership and stakes on some minerals. In other words, all subsoil and mineral deposits, explored or unexplored, were owned only by the State until 1997.The Mongolian parliament retained exclusive ownership rights over precious metals, coal, uranium and oil classified as strategic deposits. Foreign companies could exploit strategic deposits through joint ventures by establishing an agreement with the Mongolian government. The private companies became eligible to own minerals after they paid relevant taxes and sold the specific amount of minerals to the government as agreed in the contract. Privatisation of surface assets such as mining buildings and infrastructure in the 1990s brought confusion amongst government and lease holders about overlapping property rights such as selling mines and pledging them as collateral in the bank. To sum up, the rights holding companies did not have the right to sell and pledge mineral deposits, and they only became eligible to own the products after paying all taxes and shares upon receiving permissions or set agreements from the State. The law of 1997 was a radical free mining law copied from Canadian mineral law. It introduced completely new mining concepts to Mongolia and it “overthrew” the State monopoly of mineral resources while giving exclusive exploitation rights through licence possession to the private sector for the first time. The problem of this law was that it gave an access to former state mineral resources to few business people and political elites. Even though the 1997 law announced that the state ownership of subsoil was unchanged, it created “possession rights” for the licences and provided “use rights” (right to exploit) on mineral deposits for public and private stakeholders. This licence possession right was a de facto mineral ownership right because the possessor was allowed to “sell” or transfer and pledge licences that give access to minerals undersoil. The last mineral law adopted in 2006 was a revision of the 1997 law with the reintroduction of strategic deposits as in the 1994 law. This new law has been amended 34 times in 2006–​20.

44  Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo In conclusion, the right to possess licences and the right to exploit minerals are often mixed and each gave different property rights to mining companies. The mineral laws of 1994, 1997 and 2006 all describe the licence as a document providing the right to exploit minerals. However, the meaning of exploit is different in these laws. In the 1997 and 2006 laws, exploitation is defined as the “separating and extracting minerals from the land surface and subsoil, ore stockpiles, tailings, course of water, increasing the concentration of their usable contents, processing, making production, selling and selling related activities” (SGH, 1997, 2006: 581). The 1994 law defined it as “mineral extraction, crushing, and basic and supplementary processing activities within the framework of the mine deposit area” (SGH, 1994:  968). These definitions specify what activities the licence holder can engage in. Before 1997, licence holders were not allowed to sell products without a government contract because the government leased its deposits or reserves to mining companies and shared expenses and benefits. However, since 1997, licence holders started to own minerals informally by transferring (actually selling secretly) and pledging licences to others, and it deepened unequal distribution of wealth and income. The sale of licences was legalised in the 2006 mineral law. Banks and companies do not only buy the licences but also the mineral deposits. This contradicts Mongolia’s constitutional right to own minerals and subsoil, thereby violating its territorial sovereignty, as argued by the public. These licence sales, pledging and buying State explored deposits have increased corruption, abuse of power, tax avoidance and illegality in Mongolia (IRIM, 2016; Biastoch, 2017). Underpinning these shifts in mineral rights and wider confusion and emerging inequalities regarding mineral licences and resources in Mongolia are both different perspectives about resource rights and problematically vague definitions regarding such rights. In post-​socialist Mongolia, the state lost its sovereignty over mineral resources through the provision of licences that were issued via the newly introduced concept of “possession” rights as enshrined in the 1997 and 2006 mineral laws. In legal terms, it says that “possession right is not ownership rights” and does not threaten national interest, sovereignty and independence. However, a closer analysis of these terms, practices and concepts tells a different story. Mining licensing and the ownership of mineral resources have been complex and politically fraught issues in Mongolia throughout both socialist and post-​ socialist periods. In this section, I set out and analysed the relationship between mining licences and resources rights, controversies regarding the unequal distribution of benefits from mining –​in terms of the share of resources, taxes, royalties, favourable conditions and timely revision of investment agreements in the interests of Mongolia and its people. Mineral policies changed four times through the adoption of new laws in 1988, 1994, 1997 and 2006, and this had a knock-​on effect on mining licensing. Underpinning each of these new laws has been a shift in how property and resource rights have been understood and legalised within the Mongolian system.

Contestations over mining policies  45 As of 2020, Mongolia has 1,689 mining licences and over 1,000 mines. Before 1997, over 30% of the territory had been investigated by geological expeditions that discovered minerals, as discussed in the geology section. Licences were granted within these areas from 1997 onward. The total area under exploration licence increased from 0 in 1997 to 5  million hectares in 1999, 36 million hectares or 24% of the land in 2002 and reached its zenith, 67.5  million hectares (45%) in 2004. Figure  3.1 shows the changes in active licences and fee collections corresponding to mining policy changes. The temporary drop in 2007 is due to individuals rushing to convert their exploration licences to extraction and transfer their licence registration to companies until three years of suspension started in 2010. This sharp increase and drop reflects not only the changes in mineral policies but also how government management such as control and registration of licence fee collection were inadequate. Approximately, 80% of all licences belonged to foreign individuals and entities in 2002, and one-​third of all licenced areas were held by four foreign and three domestic companies (World Bank, 2004: 7).

Conclusion At the turn of the new millennium, Mongolia was experiencing social disharmony, divisions and deepening social hierarchies among people and institutions including herders, miners, business people, office workers and different interest groups competing for access and rewards from the extractive sector. Considering these actors as mining stakeholders, stakeholder relationships are in a process of dynamic change and renegotiation. The findings reported here shed new light on ongoing negotiations and contestations regarding sovereign control over resources. Two conflicting mineral regimes are present, one superimposed on the other:  one socialist and the other post-​socialist. During the socialist period, Mongolia was not able to enjoy its mineral ownership rights due to unequal bilateral agreements that gave dominance to the Soviet Union, as shown in the case of Erdenet mine. Imported workforce, technology, material and loans from the Soviet Union left Mongolia indebted, dependent and with no right to sell its share of the copper concentrates to other countries with higher prices. This unequal agreement jeopardised national ownership rights specified in the UN resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (General Assembly Resolution 1803)  and other UN covenants of 1966. Continued negotiations between the MPR and Soviet Union and later with the Russian Federation contributed to shaping the concept of mineral ownership in Mongolia and ruled future investment agreements. However, the radical turn of mineral policy in 1997 enabled the rise of private mining by dispossession of mineral deposits owned by Mongolian government. Playing on the legal terms such as introducing possession rights of licences enabled people and private companies to “sell” licences that were valued by the subsoil minerals discovered

newgenrtpdf

46  Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo

Figure 3.1 Impact of mineral policy changes on licence issuance and revenue collection.

Contestations over mining policies  47 in the past by state funding. This cultural change in understanding of rights led to conflicts between subsoil and surface right holders. The mining licence and its former concept of “use permission” was transformed into de facto “mineral ownership” and it became a tool to accumulate capital by grabbing mineral deposits, as Harvey (2003) argued about accumulation by dispossession. At the same time, Mongolia’s struggle against the unfair economic relationship with the Soviet Union or others in the mineral sector has affected public opinion, which is divided over state ownership or state monopoly of mineral resources and property rights over subsoil and surface resources versus privatisation. Many people argue that the state should automatically own 50% of all minerals extracted by private and public companies and distribute the benefits to all Mongolians in ways like shares, cash awards, free travel, lifelong employment, free education, free health care and free infrastructure. This reminds us of the socialist system in which profits or surpluses were accumulated by central government that, in turn, redistributed them in local investments and subsidised products at fixed prices. The socialist era government and its public officials were totally different from the ones in post-​socialist Mongolia, who are motivated by their self-​interest to accumulate private property in a way unimaginable during socialism. Nevertheless, discontent about state mismanagement of costs and benefits of subsoil have led the public to protest against mining companies rather than the authorities, and revived a nostalgia for the absence of private property and the equal way of living where people felt less envy and suspicion. People still live by their partial memory of socialism in the post-​socialist Mongolia, retaining socialist concepts of property and ownership, despite the bitter history of the socialist past. This study contributes to the existing knowledge about post-​socialism by Humphrey (2002: 13) who argued that “when generations brought up under socialist regimes disappear from the political scene, the category of post-​socialism is likely to break apart and disappear.” As 30 years has passed since the end of socialism, we are left to witness changes –​reversal or a new order –​in the near future as the old generation is replaced with a new one.

Notes from the field Conflicts between mining companies and the local population Aisha Karpaeva Introduction In recent years, disputes between mining companies and the local population has become an important topic. Hence, the Kyrgyz government is paying greater attention to this issue. Kyrgyzstan, despite the potential to develop its mining industry, was unable to realise the existing

48  Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo opportunities due to numerous problems. One of the issues hindering the development of this sector concerns conflict situations between mining companies and the local population. Licensing process for subsoil use After gaining independence, in order to improve investment attractiveness and transition from a planned to a market economy, Kyrgyzstan made several attempts to improve the flaws in its mining regulatory system and ease administrative control. According to the Kyrgyz law dated 2 June 1997, licences for subsoil use were to be issued through tender, auction or direct negotiations. However, tenders and auctions were not organised until 2013. Licences were mainly issued through direct negotiations by the State Agency for Geology and Mineral Resources under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic. For this reason, local residents complained that licences were not issued openly and transparently. Additionally, the local population did not take any part in issuing the license for mining. Moreover, contributions to the local budget from mining companies and the interests of the local communities were not incorporated in the legislation. Main reasons for disputes Main causes for conflicts include the following:  issues related to the environment, lack of communication between interested parties, absence of available information from the mining company and government agencies on the mining project, distrust towards mining companies, a lack of transparency when issuing mining licences and mistrust towards government agencies (SCIESKR, 2018). Environmental damage that may arise or has resulted from mining operations was considered to be one of the main causes of tension. Local residents often complained about ecological damage, such as water pollution and environmental contamination. Additionally, residents complained about companies that failed to complete the reclamation process after mining.

Example. Conflict in Panfilov district, Chui region. LLC Neon Mining Company had a licence for geological exploration for gold and other metals. Local residents blocked the main road and impeded the geological exploration works.The local population were concerned that exploration works will pollute the river, which

Contestations over mining policies  49 is the only source of drinking and irrigation water in the area. The residents were worried that polluted water would contaminate the soil and negatively affect the health of the locals. Distrust towards state authorities and local government is another reason for conflict. The heads of local governments and local deputies regularly offer land for mining in return for financial rewards. These payments are not provided for by law. Additionally, the financial rewards from mining companies are not used openly and transparently. Indeed, most of the time, regional and local governments do not inform the local pollution about these funds or how they were expended.

Example. Conflict in Chatkal district, Jalal-​Abad region. Residents of Chatkal local government held a demonstration against the mining company operating in the region. The company had promised to build a bridge that would connect the village with the district capital. However the bridge was not constructed. After protests had erupted, it was revealed that Chatkal local government, LLC Booster mining company and a construction firm called Emko signed an agreement to build a bridge in Chandalash village. LLC Booster transferred the money (more than 8 million 222 thousand Kyrgyz soms) to Chatkal local government, who hired Emko to construct the bridge. However, the construction firm did not have a license to build a bridge. An investigation established that half of the money was expended to buy low quality building materials, which could not be used for construction.The other half was dispensed. The local state administration and local government bodies have the legal right to carry out explanatory works among the local population to prevent illegal interferences in the mining operations. However, local authorities and local governments have failed to complete this task. On the contrary, they often participate to organise protests. Example. Conflict in the Ishtamberdi mine deposit. According to LLC Full Gold Mining, the Chatkal district head, on behalf of the local residents, demanded that the mining company repair a 25-​km long road between Kyzyl-​Tokoi and Terek-​Sai villages in 2018. The mining company refused to fulfil this demand. Later, the Chatkal district head demanded a sponsorship assistance amounting to 8 million soms and warned that if the company refuses, the local residents would not let the company trucks pass through and would not allow the company to operate.

50  Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo Furthermore, in an attempt to secure the rights to the use of land, some companies make promises that are impossible to fulfil. These include vowing to employ local residents, constructing individual objects or handing out money to selected groups in the local community. Mining companies are often unable to realise these promises made to the local population, leading to further distrust and conflict. Thus, due to numerous reasons, the number of conflicts in many regions across the country has increased in recent years, which are often violent and well organised.

Measures taken by the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic The Government of the Kyrgyz Republic passed a new law on “Subsoil use” on 9 August 2012 (MJKR, 2012). The main difference of the law passed in 2012 from the legislation dated 1999 is that mechanisms to protect the interests of the local communities were inserted. Additionally, the new law increased the responsibilities of government officials, introduced concepts such as payments to the local budget to keep a licence, clarified the process of suspending or revoking a licence and simplified the procedure to issue rights for land use. From 2013, the State Agency for Geology and Mineral Resources under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic started to conduct explanatory works at mining sites and before auctions. Seminars and conferences were organised to encourage cooperation and reduce tension between stakeholders. Additionally, with the assistance of USAID, GIZ and EBRD explanatory works were conducted with the assistance of local residents. From 2014, the State Agency for Geology and Mineral Resources under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic conducted explanatory works on auction and tender preparations with the local population. In 2014, the State Agency organized 64 meetings, and in 2015, it arranged 62 meetings with the local residents. From 2014 to 2017, the number of conflicts decreased. The explanatory works with the local communities thus had a positive result. In order to further improve the legislation on mining, the Kyrgyz Republic adopted a new law on “Subsoil use” dated 19 May 2018.The new № 49 edition included many changes to the legislation (MJKR, 2018). Additional norms were introduced for funding reclamations works with a financial (bank) guarantee. In addition, the Kyrgyz government adopted Decree № 414 dated 27 August 2020 to reduce the risk of corruption, ensure transparency and involve all interested ministries and departments, local governments and local authorities when issuing a licence (GKR, 2020). This decree stipulates that licences for all minerals, except for water, will be issued through an auction. Thus, the government has taken numerous measures to resolve conflicts and reformed the legislation in 2012, 2018 and 2020. Some of these measures include: 2% from the revenue of mining enterprises is to be transferred to the local budget and regional development funds as a non-​tax payment; licence holding fees calculated per square kilometre/​hectare of the licenced area is to

Contestations over mining policies  51 be paid to the local budget; part of the funds received from auctions and tenders is to be transferred to the local budget; the licensees are obligated to open a bank account for reclamation works at the extraction stage; local governments are to participate in the decision-​making process of issuing licences; and investors working at a deposit considered to be of national importance are obligated to assist the local and regional communities in social development (MJKR, 2012).

Conclusion Changes to the legislation and other measures taken by the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic should have attracted investors, increased employment opportunities for the local residents, increased the mining companies’ contribution to the local and national budget and decreased the potential of conflict situations in areas affected by mining. However, despite these changes the number of conflicts has not significantly diminished. Hence, tension between mining companies and the local population arises not only due to environmental issues, mistrust towards mining companies, a lack of transparency when issuing licences and distrust towards government authorities, but also because of the unstable political situation and interests of certain groups in the area affected by mining. This issue was clearly demonstrated during the recent conflicts between mining companies and the local population. Example. After the political unrest following the parliamentary elections in October 2020, a number of large mining companies, such as LLC Eti Bakyr Tereksai, LLC Full Gold Mining, LLC Kaz Minerals Bozymchak, CJSC Kichi-​Chaarat, LLC Alliance-​Altyn and LLC Vertex Gold Company halted their operations in the Kyrgyz Republic.

Notes 1 It should be noted that researching licence-​related issues in Mongolia is challenging. The Mineral Resource Authority of Mongolia (MRAM) rejected our request to study the transfer of licence holders.Two research assistants who approached MRAM at different occasions ended up with no tangible results and were instead directed to Mongolia EITI information (see Boldbaatar in this volume). A team of academic researchers from the Department of Mining, University of Science and Technology in Ulaanbaatar refused to collaborate with us on licencing issues and the Mongolian KGB stopped our research of available materials on licencing at the National Archive and shredded the copies of the materials that we had requested. 2 There were other two forms of property in Mongolia. For agricultural collectives (negdel) and small-​scale cooperatives, their initial contributions and accrued outputs and equipment were the socialist property of their members. The negdel or

52  Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo cooperative council was supposed to represent all members and make decisions on its share, investment and redistribution. Personal property (aminii) included personal savings, housing (as distinct from state housing), clothes and a limited number of livestock. 3 Following the Democratic Revolution, free multiparty elections were held later in 1990 in which several parties participated. The Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP –​the party of government up till that time) won a large majority. Since that time the MPRP (later becoming the Mongolian People’s Party or MPP) and the Democratic Party have been the largest parties, often forming coalition governments with other parties. 4 See more about interviews and press releases by two sides disputed on Erdenet 49% shares: https://​vip76.mn/​vip276/​3. 5 See posts on Erdenet factory at University of British Columbia: http://​blogs.ubc.ca/​ mongolia/​?s=erdenet.

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Contestations over mining policies  55 Mongolia and Russian Federation (2003) ‘Agreement between Government of Russian Federation and Mongolia on the activities of the Russian-​ Mongolian limited liability company “Erdenet” Enterprise’. Moscow: Bulletin of International Treaties, p.  7. Available at:  www.mid.ru/​foreign_​policy/​international_​contracts/​ 2_ ​contract/ ​-​/​ storage-​viewer/ ​bilateral/ ​ page-​1/​4 6166?_​storageviewer_​ WAR_​ storageviewerportlet_​ a dvancedSearch=false&_​ s torageviewer_​ WAR_​ s torage viewerportlet_​keywords=Эрдэнэт&_​storageviewer_​WAR_​storagevi. [Accessed 6 July 2021]. MRAM (Mineral Resource Authority of Mongolia) (2012) Mongolian-​ German Cooperation in Geology. Ulaanbaatar. Nabadchikov, A. (1991) ‘Treasure mountain-​subject of controversy or whom does the Mongolian-​Soviet economic cooperation bother (Predmet razdora-​Gora sokrovish ili komu mishayet mongolo-​sovetskoe economicheskoe sotrudnichestvo)’, Izvestiya, 2 March, p.  5. Available at:  https://​dlib.eastview.com/​browse/​doc/​24445843. [Accessed 6 July 2021]. Nadirov, Sh. G. (1995) Tsedenbal, 1984 (Tsedenbal, 1984 god). 1st edn. Moscow: BiG-​ N Publishing House. Namjim.T (2004) The Economy of Mongolian, 2nd volumes (Mongol ulsiin ediin zasag). Ulaanbaatar: Science Academy of Mongolia. Orgilmaa (2019) ‘Good luck to Erdenet and Rosgeo! Dig it again’, baabar.mn, 7 December, pp. 1–​ 7. Available at:  http://​baabar.mn/​article/​erdenet-​rosgeo-​d-​ amjilt-​khusie-​dakhiad-​ukh. [Accessed 6 July 2021]. Osakwe, C. (1985) ‘General principles of Soviet Land Law: Ownership and use of land in the Soviet Union’, Acta Juridica, 1985, pp. 147–​71. Oyunbileg,T. (1991) ‘It is not wrong to hurry up (Yarakhad buruudakhgui)’, Il Tovchoo, 10 May. Pijpers, R. J. and Eriksen,T. H. (eds) (2019) Mining Encounters: Extractive Industries in an Overheated World. 1st edn. London: Pluto Press. Reeves, J. (2011) ‘Resources, sovereignty, and governance:  Can Mongolia avoid the “resource curse”?’, Asian Journal of Political Science, 19(2), pp. 170–​85. Rojkova, M. (2002) ‘Erdenet returned (Erdenet vernulsya)’, Vedomosy, 18 December. Available at:  www.vedomosti.ru/​newspaper/​articles/​2002/​12/​18/​jerdjenjet-​ vernulsya. [Accessed 6 July 2021]. Sanders, A. (2010) Historical Dictionary of Mongolia. 3rd edn. Lanham, Toronto, Plymouth, Toronto, Plymouth: Scarecrow Press. SCIESKR (2018) State Committee for Industry, Energy and Subsoil Use of the Kyrgyz Republic (2018), Guidebook for conflict management in mining industry of the Kyrgyz Republic. Available at:  www.gkpen.kg/​images/​Investor’s%20Guidebook_​ english.pdf (accessed 1 December 2020). SDO (2019) Statistical Bulletin, Statistics Division of Orkhon. Orkhon. SGH (1994) ‘Minerals Law’, Toriin Medeelel. Mongolia, 11(30), pp. 968–​99. SGH (1997) ‘Minerals Law of Mongolia’, Toriin medeelel. Mongolia: Toriin medeelel, 7(62), pp. 581–​622. SGH (2006) Minerals Law of Mongolia (revised). Mongolia.Available at: www.legalinfo. mn/​law/​details/​63?lawid=63. [Accessed 6 July 2021]. SGH (2020) ‘SGH resolution 74: Extension of emergency situation in Erdenet’, Toriin medeelel, 37(1090), pp. 1361–​2. Shinkariyev, L. (2006) Tsedenbal and his time:  documents, letters and memoirs II (Tsedenbal tuunii tsag uye: barimt bichig, zakhidal, durdatgal). Ulaanbaatar: Monsudar Publishing House.

56  Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo Smith, M. J. (2015) Treasure Underfoot and Far Away:  Mining, Foreignness, and Friendship in Contemporary Mongolia. Princeton: Princeton University. Sodnom, D., Avirmed, S. and Sonintogos, E. (1991) ‘Scandalous one year (Duuliant negen jil)’, Il Tovchoo, 10 January. State Duma (2003) Records of Russian State Duma Meeting Session 219 (Khronika zasedaniya Gosudarstvennoy Dumy 219). Moscow, Russian Federation. Available at: http://​api.duma.gov.ru/​api/​transcriptFull/​2003-​02-​12. Tamir, C. (2014) ‘Anti-​Soviet sentiment in Mongolia (Zovloltiin esreg uzel Mongold)’, MUIS Erdem Shinjilgeenii bichig Sociology, 9(25), pp. 1–​11. Tatar (2020) Bought 49% of Erdenet by State money. Available at: http://​tatarnews.mn/​ og (accessed on 3 September 2020). Thalenhorst, H. and Farquharson, G. (2004) Technical Report on the Boroo Gold Mine Mongolia for Centerra Gold Inc. Toronto. Tse, P. (2001) ‘The mineral industry of Mongolia’, US Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook, pp. 171–​ 3. Available at:  www.usgs.gov/​centers/​nmic/​asia-​and-​pacific. [Accessed 6 July 2021]. Tse, P. (2003) ‘The mineral industry of Mongolia’, US Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook, (June 2003), pp. 171–​ 4. Available at:  www.usgs.gov/​centers/​nmic/​ asia-​and-​pacific. UB Post (2019) ‘L.Oyun-​Erdene reports on fundraising scheme for Erdenet’s 49% stake deal’ UB Post newspaper, 6 March. Available at https://​theubposts.com/​l-​oyun-​ erdene-​reports-​on-​fundraising-​scheme-​for-​erdenet-​s-​49-​stake-​deal/​. [Accessed 6 July 2021]. USSR & MPR (1991) ‘Agreement Between USSR and MPR on the Activities of the Soviet-​Mongolian Joint Mining and Processing Enterprise “Erdenet” for 1991–​2002 (Soglashenie mezhdu pravitelstvo SSSR y pravitelstvo MNR)’. Moscow, Soviet Union and Mongolian People’s Republic:  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, p. 37. Available at: www.mid.ru/​foreign_​policy/​international_​contracts/​. [Accessed 6 July 2021]. World Bank (2004) Mongolia Mining Sector:  Managing the Future. doi:10.1017/​ CBO9781107415324.004. Wu, J. C. (1999) ‘The mineral industry of Mongolia’, US Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook, pp. 151–​155. Available at: www.usgs.gov/​centers/​nmic/​asia-​and-​pacific. [Accessed 6 July 2021].

4  Gold mining conflicts in Kyrgyzstan When context and culture matters Aimeerim Tursalieva

Introduction In March 2011, Kyrgyzstan was shocked by the news that residents in the village of Aral, Talas oblast (region), burned down the local office of Gold Fields LLC, a South African mining company (Tynan, 2011). Half a year later, an attack was made on horseback, but this time on the company’s geologist camp. The entire camp was burned down and the company employees were held hostage (Lunyashin, 2011). This audacious attack by the villagers showed that neither local nor central authorities, nor the company could prevent these devastating events. There was clearly no well-​coordinated cooperation between the local authorities, the company and the local population. Moreover, the company did not even suspect that events would get out of control and acquire such a destructive character. This story was exceptional, but it accurately reflected the problems of the mining industry in the country. Starting from 2011, the newly formed government of Kyrgyzstan promised to do everything possible to make the Kyrgyz mining sector work. Politicians pointed out how important it was for the socioeconomic development of the country, thereby implying a general need for modernisation (Bennet, 2011; Lunyashin, 2011; Trilling, 2011). All of the government’s efforts to breathe new life into the mining industry in Kyrgyzstan were met by various evolving conflicts across the country. Weak governance, low levels of trust and a lack of cooperation between the mining companies and local communities were the main reasons for the ongoing mining conflicts (Oxus International, 2011; Bogdetsky and Novikov, 2012; Gullette and Kalybekova, 2014; Ocaklı et  al., 2020). The reviewed literature on gold mining conflicts in Kyrgyzstan has mainly focused on understanding mechanisms of how government institutions “cooperate” or “fail to cooperate” with investors and communities (Gullette and Kalybekova, 2014; Ocaklı et al., 2020). Studies in other parts of the world have focused on understanding the changing perceptions which “local” and “traditional” communities have of mining from a cultural lens (Godoy, 1985; Ballard and Banks, 2003; Jacka, 2018).Yet there is a lack of research that focuses on understanding local community voices in Kyrgyzstan. DOI: 10.4324/9781003097341-5

58  Aimeerim Tursalieva This chapter provides insight into the social dynamics which influenced mining activities in Aral village,Talas region, Kyrgyzstan.The case of Aral village demonstrates that the failure to take local inter-​communal clan relations, community divisions and historically shaped mining perceptions seriously impacted investors’ long-​ term sustainable cooperation with local people. Moreover, building an inclusive engagement strategy in a situation of absent or weak state institutions and a local population with little knowledge of mining was challenging for the company. It required extra effort and financial resources, which many mining companies at the exploration stage do not do in Kyrgyzstan. Gold Fields LLC, with high social and ecological standards and principles, tried its best to genuinely engage with local communities and to build long-​term cooperation with all existing stakeholders. Unfortunately, with the closure of the company in 2016, all work was suspended. The company’s experience clearly demonstrates instructive aspects:  to build an inclusive community strategy requires not only personnel and resources but also solid knowledge of the complex communities. This article is based on my experience as a Community Liaison Officer for the gold mining company Talas Copper Gold LLC1 (hereafter the Company) between 2011 and 2014, in Aral village of Talas region, and later as a researcher in the gold mining area. Talas region saw many gold mining protests starting from 2007, especially around Kopuro Bazar, Bekmoldo and Aral villages, that became the subject of research and case studies to better understand gold mining resistance in the region (Oxus International, 2011, 2013; Doolot and Heathershaw, 2015; Moldalieva and Heathershaw, 2020). During my work as Community Liaison Officer I spent most of my time in Aral village. My main duty was to inform and engage with communities, especially with women and youth. I also conducted opinion surveys and needs assessments in Aral.

Historical overview of mining in Kyrgyzstan Gold mining in Kyrgyzstan has a rich history. The earliest records of placer mining date back to the second millennium BC in the lower parts of Chatkal River (Appel et  al., 2004). Chinese sources provide evidence of placer gold mining in 751 BC around the Fergana valley, and Arabic manuscripts from the 10th and 11th centuries showed that gold was mined in Karakhanid State (present Kyrgyzstan) (Appel et al., 2004). Amalgamation was already being used, as well as the sheepskin method, which is still used in remote areas of Sary-​Jaz, Kyrgyzstan (Bogdetsky and Novikov, 2012). The first Kyrgyz Geological Office was opened in 1938 to manage all geological studies and activities. Development of mining in the Soviet era was promising and massive:  rapid expansion of urban cities and development of infrastructure (Bogdetsky et  al., 2001). The extraction sector in Kyrgyzstan became significant during World War II, contributing 15–​18% of the USSR`s total production of lead, 40–​100% of mercury, 100% of antimony and 15% of uranium (Zozulinsky, 2007). By 1989 Kyrgyzstan was the third largest producer

Gold mining conflicts in Kyrgyzstan  59 of mercury in the world and by 1990 took third place in the world antimony production after China and Bolivia, producing 17,608 tons of antimony (Bogdetsky et al., 2001). The significant development of a mining industry at that time allowed development of local communities by building towns, networks of schools, day nurseries and kindergartens, specialised secondary schools, hospitals and cultural institutions. Around 6 out of 22 towns in Kyrgyzstan and 14 out of 29 urban-​type communities sprang up near the mineral mining (Bogdetsky et  al., 2001). Throughout Kyrgyzstan there were villages with strategically important mining activities. These villages were on “moskovskoe obespechenie” meaning Moscow support and provision. This meant food and other needed supplies were delivered directly from Moscow via air routes or train. According to Soviet regulations, expenses for the infrastructure of all settlements were included in the production costs and maintained at the expense of the mining enterprises. The provision of public transport and communication, as well as providing various high-​paid job positions, boosted development of the service sector. In the 1980s the coal industry alone was responsible for more than 50% of Kyrgyzstan production, and it involved almost 60% of the whole industrial labour force of Kyrgyzstan (Bogdetsky et al., 2001). It led to the influx of highly qualified specialists and the formation of new cultural centres. In terms of social protests against mining, there was little to tell and no cases of conflict were recorded (Bogdetsky et  al., 2001). First, the expropriation of pastures was limited, and was compensated for by jobs resulting from the mining industry and by the allocation of alternative lands. Local population resettlements, or displacement, did not take place in Kyrgyzstan due to the fact that there was no private ownership of land, but rather public ownership: state and collective. In both cases, decisions on land allocation and redistribution were centralised. Second, mine workers had the opportunity to improve their social status and were generally well respected. The outstanding workers were given special government prizes and awards and were nominated to lead companies, administrative and state agencies (Bogdetsky et al., 2001). Kyrgyzstan’s extraction sector went into a sharp decline following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. In the last two decades, the Kyrgyz government has worked to reform the mining industry and simplify licensing mechanisms in order to make it more attractive for international investors. Currently the contribution of this industry to the country’s economy is not yet significant but its importance might increase in the near future. In 2017 the government set ambitious plans and put into operation a couple of large-​scale and 30 small-​scale mines (NRGI, 2017). As a consequence, the government started to explore a number of mining sites. But almost all mining companies face a similar problem: the opposition of the local residents (Oxus International, 2011, 2013; Honkonen, 2012; Tiainen, 2012; Sternberg, 2020). Generally, there is a big gap between the government’s mining agenda and the rural population’s attitude towards regulations, knowledge and power.

60  Aimeerim Tursalieva

Case study: Aral Talas region has been the most active part of the country in terms of social protests against mineral explorations, starting from 2010 (Bennet, 2011; Oxus International, 2011, 2013; Tynan, 2011; Zoi International Network, 2012; Doolotkeldieva, 2015; Moldalieva and Heathershaw, 2020). There are several mining deposits in Talas region with considerable reserves of gold, copper and molybdenum:  Jerui, Andash, Taldy Bulak, Chonur, Aktash (Figure  4.1). The conflicts around Jerui mining deposit (the second biggest mining site in Kyrgyzstan after Kumtor) were largely political  –​local and outside interests were in rivalry for its ownership which destabilised the situation around the mining site (Doolot and Heathershaw, 2015). Compared to Jerui, Andash (owned by Kentor Gold) was less involved in global politics but rather in local interests and disputes. Apart from ongoing conflicts around Jerui and Andash deposits, gold mining protests in Aral started to gain momentum from 2010, culminating in the dramatic events of 2011 (Bennet, 2011).

KAZAKSTAN CHINA TADJIKISTAN

Figure 4.1 This map shows mining resistance areas in Talas region (Zoi Environment Network, 2012).

Gold mining conflicts in Kyrgyzstan  61 Aral is a highly clan stratified village in the north-​east of Talas region with a small municipal government structure, and a population of 5,200 people (Aral Passport, 2018). The village is predominantly agricultural and the inhabitants largely maintain themselves by animal herding (55%) and farming (40%) –​only 5% work as small-​scale entrepreneurs and own small shops, a bakery, a blacksmith, etc. (Aral passport, 2018). There are different small development projects that are being implemented in water-​related issues, but the biggest so-​called development project in the village from 2005 till 2015 was the exploration activities of the South African gold mining company Gold Fields LLC at Taldy Bulak2 deposit, which has reserves of 120 tons of gold and 800,000 tons of copper.The Company established its geological camp 2–​3 km east of the village and conducted exploration activities near the pastures and farm lands from 2005 till 2016. Upon arrival in Aral in 2005, the Company made agreements with the Ayil Okmot (village authorities) to pursue its exploration works, set up its geological camp outside the village and started its drilling operations on Taldy Bulak. The management and working style of the Company was very much at a distance. The Company didn’t interact with local residents, because all agreements were made with the Ayil Okmot, which was responsible for informing local residents about the Company and its drilling activities. Due to the fact that the Ayil Okmot had a weak legitimacy and no capacity, it failed to properly inform the population of Aral about upcoming economic and social changes. The Company supported small cultural and social projects initiated by the local residents, like supporting local schools by providing computers, or participating in national celebrations, attending public meetings, but relied totally on the Ayil Okmot to manage community issues. The absence of official policies of the Company on grievances, hiring, compensation schemes and reports on drilling caused discontent among the local residents. Environmental grievances multiplied and residents complained that radiation levels had gone up, water quality worsened and even that there were fewer fish in the rivers. The Company did not take seriously the fact that unrest at other mines in the area, like Andash and Jerui, could have a strong impact on the mood of people in Aral as well. In 2010 the Company opened a community office as an attempt to improve community engagement activities. Unfortunately, the level of dissatisfaction had reached its highest point and in March 2011 villagers burnt down the Company’s local office in the village. And half a year later in October a group of young men on horseback attacked the geological camp with homemade explosives and held Company employees hostage (Bennet, 2011). These destructive events demonstrated that a large-​scale information campaign was urgently needed in Aral. In 2012, Gold Fields bought Orsu Metals’ 40% of the stake in Talas Copper Gold to become the full owner, and completely changed the company’s management style from a restrained to a more open and transparent one. In January 2012 the Company, the State Committee for Industry, Energy and Subsoil Use, the regional Talas government, the Aral Ayil Okmot and

62  Aimeerim Tursalieva a local Commission3 composed of representatives from the village, signed a Partnership Agreement to run until 2015, stating that the Company’s main interest was in finishing exploration works while the local population required implementation of essential social and infrastructural projects (Reuters, 2012). The Partnership Agreement was designed to communicate on pressing issues and to foster decisions from the side of the community. The Company introduced a so called shared “cash box” which was filled and refilled from drilling activities, USD 10 per 1 drilled metre, which by the end of 2012 had accumulated USD 175,000 (Aral Social Investment Fund, 2012). The newly formed Commission made decisions on spending the socioeconomic fund (“cash box”) and hiring policy. The creation of the Commission seemed to be a great chance for interaction and communication for Aral and for the Company. The Commission included representatives of all major clans, members of Ayil Okmot, school teachers, youth and kvartals4 and it was granted the power to decide on the community projects, hiring procedures, allocation of the Aral Investment Fund, goodwill projects and many other community-​related issues. Due to the high degree of fragmentation in the village, it was always difficult to make any decision regarding the distribution of funds allocated by the Company. But with the creation of the Commission, the community engagement strategies of the Company had changed. The Commission became a small version, a miniature of Aral village. This way made it easier for the Company to disseminate information, introduce new policies, accept community grievances and make collective decisions. In practice it was a difficult and exhausting communication process within the Commission itself but it brought significant changes for the Company and for the local community in Aral in terms of dialogue building. Commission members were too diverse, representing different clans and agendas, to easily achieve a collective decision. It took a long time and extra recourses from the side of the Company such as hiring a facilitator or involving third parties to foster the dialogue. The Company took a number of other steps to make activities more transparent: conducting monthly public meetings, producing reports on drilled metres, organising tours of the drilling sites for the local population, informing almost on a daily basis each step of the company through its weekly newsletter Aral Jarchisy. This intense engagement of the Company with the local community created a new “public space” where discussions and debates became an everyday routine for the village. The Company built a social space or platform and brought together different actors with different agendas. For some period of time Company was considered as one of the successful companies, in terms of community engagement strategies and practices (Tazabek, 2014). Despite the community interaction mechanisms which were developed, Aral turned out to be much more complicated than it seemed at first glance. My observations of social interactions in Aral, during my work as a Community Liaison Officer, revealed that groups always compete with each other for

Gold mining conflicts in Kyrgyzstan  63 resources. Competitions broke out between clans; social classes; poor and rich; and different locations: upper or lower Aral or kvartals. Like many other villages, Aral had undergone many changes in its history:  during the Tsarist epoch, Soviet administration and the time of post-​Soviet independent Kyrgyzstan with its own social transformations. There were different phases of “making” and “unmaking” of Aral which might demonstrate to us various artificial ways of creating divisions, either administrative or cultural, within the population of this place (Beyer 2009). In Soviet times Aral used to be the collective farm “Communism,” under which the Soviets brought five villages together from 1940 onwards, destroying the previous tribe-​oriented organisation of residence (Beyer, 2009). The Soviets destroyed the residential patterns of nomads by merging all together into one collective farm in pursuit of administrative and territorial divisions. However, even if people were merged into one collective farm, “Communism,” the members of the clans were settled on the same territory close to each other. Therefore, in Aral everyone knew in which part of the village a particular clan was settled. In Aral, there are more than 20 self-​declared large and small clans. Within the first kvartal six different clans were identified, as in the fourth quarter. The second and the third kvartals included members of 10 and 13 clans, respectively. During community meetings in Aral the second and third kvartals were most difficult in terms of decision-​making regarding new hiring policy and in these particular parts of the village relationships were complex and antagonistic. Among them there were more influential clans that played an important role in decision-​making. Although some less influential clans always tried to get involved in the key processes of the village, there were also clans that lived apart and didn’t take an active part in the life of the village. The arrival of the Company changed the status of the Chokoi clan radically. More avtoritetniy (well respected) clans like Aksak Boru, Chokoi and Kesek Sary are using their status and benefiting from the mining activities of the Company. But definitely, Chokoi clan gets most of the benefit from them. They rent their land to the Company, get compensations and many other privileges. We, the ordinary people get almost nothing from mining activities. Male respondent, notes from the field, November 2012 The Chokoi traditionally used the arable land surrounding the Taldy Bulak deposit and as a result benefited more in comparison to the other groups by renting their land slots and getting compensation. To build a better relationship with the Chokoi, the Company funded publication of a book on the genealogical tree of the Chokoi clan. Chokoi clan members considered themselves always as native to the area and some other clans as incomers. The rising dominance of the Chokoi challenged existing social hierarchies and the balance of power. Since the beginning of the Company’s drilling operations, the Chokoi

64  Aimeerim Tursalieva were under attack by other tribes. The major clans of Aral like Aksak Boru, Chokoi and Kesek Sary excluded other smaller clans in the village from the benefits of the Company. To include small clans and fairly distribute job vacancies, the Company had divided Aral into four kvartals, each with its own allocation. But after a year it was clear that the Company kvartal system fuelled even more tensions among local communities because kvartal leaders manipulated job positions and the Company was not able to prevent it. There are many clans living in Aral, also different nationalities, we have a Kazakh community as well.We try to achieve our order by peaceful means. Aral has a second name, Vtoroi (second) Afghanistan in Talas oblast. In the upper part of the village people are richer than in the lower part. In the upper part are living more influential tribes. If the Company wants to bring peace to this village it better give jobs to workers from Alakchin and Kytai clans. They live in extreme poverty. But they are not that willing to integrate into our village, they always step out from village celebrations and make their own events. Bolungon booru jeit,5 that is why their life conditions are not getting better. School teacher, male, notes from the field, January 2011 People in Aral often said that Aral is a second Afghanistan, implying that there are always conflicts here, be it among the villagers or enmity with other villages. The term was coined by local people long ago, and young people especially liked to voice this term proudly when it came to conflicts or misunderstandings in the village. Here people were used to disputes and there had always been reasons for conflicts and social strife between different social groups. And the Company, by introducing new resources such as jobs, training, educational programmes and other community benefits, transformed existing power relations and the so-​called “social order” of Aral. As the quotation above shows, keeping order and peace among all groups in the face of strong social segregation has always been very difficult for Aral. Historically social order was maintained by the Aksakal Sotu (court of elders) or/​and manaps (patrons). But with the post-​1991 reform and the turn to neoliberalism, increasing monetisation of social bonds and corruption led to the side-​lining of the Aksakal Sotu. However, manaps or “protectors” continued exerting informal influence over herding and tribal groups (Beyer, 2009). The Ayil Okmot as the main government body in the village deals with the administration and distribution of the land, but doesn’t regulate the economy and the social organisation based on pastoralism. Hence, the Ayil Okmot does not reflect the real constitution of the power in village and its attempts to reconcile different groups have little effect. Under such conditions –​withdrawal of the state and the weakness of its institutions –​it is very challenging for companies to build inclusive cooperation with all local stakeholders.

Gold mining conflicts in Kyrgyzstan  65

Shadows of the Soviet past To improve community engagement processes in 2011, the Company opened an information office in Aral village, where every villager could find information on the following issues:  partnership agreement and conditions, Aral social investment fund, grievance policy, hiring policy, goodwill policy, report on ecology, biodiversity of Aral, list of social projects implemented by company, vacancies, job application form. To avoid continuous and groundless ecological complaints from the Aral community, the Company conducted ecological baseline studies. The results were widely published and disseminated among the local stakeholders to inform about existing ecological issues and changes. The Company set up an environmental inspector team in Aral consisting of school students, young people, community leaders and women. They were taught to monitor water, soil and air quality and present the results to the community quarterly. All these efforts brought some basic environmental knowledge to the community of Aral but the Company was continuously blamed for destroying the environment of Aral village. From the very beginning of the Company’s operation, local people were concerned about the impact of drilling operations on the local environment, especially on pastures. In an opinion survey in ten village districts near mining deposits in Talas region, SIAR (2013) found that almost 90% of respondents said that the main reason for protests against mining was because of environmental concerns; people in ten villages (including Aral) were convinced that the environment is damaged through drilling activities and 53% believed that it caused a serious problem with radiation. One of the company’s most ardent opponents said: We brought independent environmental experts to Aral. We got into debt to provide them with accommodation and food. And after we all received the results of the environmental evaluation. And the conclusion was that there are no environmental problems in this village. This is complete nonsense. It’s a shame that the people of Aral by their own carried out this independent environmental impact assessment, but the company fraudulently influenced the results of the examination. Now the drilling holes on Taldy Bulak are open, we have to close them. At the moment, radiation from those holes is spreading with the wind. Male, Aral Community meeting, March 2012 The drilling activities carried out by the Company caused a lot of apprehension and fear among the local people. These environmental fears were connected with the 1998 cyanide spill at Kumtor, which was reported everywhere in the media and transformed people’s perceptions of mining dramatically (Oxus International, 2013). And another argument –​the fear of radiation –​was rooted in Kyrgyzstan’s long history as a uranium producer in the Soviet Union (Oxus International, 2013; Nogoibaeva, 2015).

66  Aimeerim Tursalieva We get jeribizdi (our land) from our grandfathers, they passed to us this land pure and clean. And our responsibility is to pass it to our grandchildren as pure as possible. They (investors) destroyed the country! And now they came to destroy our village. They think that we are not educated and do not differentiate what is good and what is bad. The Soviets destroyed our land, took our gold and left. No one develops us, they are not interested that we are developed.They take our gold and go but we stay in Aral. And it is on us to decide whether we live on iyik (sacred), tazaa (clean) or uulangan (poisoned) jer. School director, female, Aral Community Meeting, August 2011 The local population in Aral are animal herders, moving to different pastures from year to year over a wide area. People are economically dependent on pastures, forests and high fields where they graze their livestock. The land, be it farmland or pastures, is a part of everyday life in Aral and a guarantee of economic stability as well as emotional well-​being. In Aral every villager was given farmland and grassland in the areas of the former encampments where their ancestors had lived. The allocation followed tribal lines and people genuinely cherished memories of their forefathers through the land –​jer. The neighbouring mining project of Kentor Gold was not able to proceed with actual mining because the mining deposit was partly within an old graveyard. Kentor Gold proposed various ways to move the graves, but for people of Kopuro Bazar to disturb the silence of ancestors was not acceptable. Along with young people who opposed the company because of environmental concerns were also relatively older people who, to one degree or another, had witnessed Soviet industrialisation.Their attitude towards the Soviet industrialists and the private investors was equally negative. Another environmental leader in Aral said: Imagine that the entire mountain will be demolished to the level of the river, then there will be a foundation pit, and where will all this go. How much explosives will be needed, combustible oils, and then the air, earth, water will be filled with chemicals? (People shout: it will be filled!) And where will all this go? In our body, through water, food products like potatoes, meat. All these chemicals will not just disappear, with moisture it will rise up and again fall down to us with precipitation. Bizdin jer bizge taarynat (our land takes offence at us). If you punish jer, then jer will punish you. Even the great Soviet Union could not prevent the tailings catastrophe in Kyrgyzstan. Male, Aral Community Meeting, September 2013 The older generation are more often concerned about “tailings,” “radiation” or “poisoned land” in their environmental complaints compared to the younger generation. Nogoibaeva (2015) in her research in Batken region writes that

Gold mining conflicts in Kyrgyzstan  67 Soviet attempts at modernisation brought ecological damage to the region which led to the emergence of incurable diseases, and as a consequence people associate mining initiatives with negative effects, particularly with health problems. The Soviets didn’t give a good example of responsible mining and rehabilitation (Honkonen 2012; Gullette and Kalybekova, 2014). Most of the uranium dumping sites were poorly covered and maintained, which has resulted in poor health of the communities residing near ex-​Soviet mining facilities. Although Talas region was not much exposed to mining activities during Soviet times, people heard stories from other regions.

Discussion The arrival of the Company in 2005 made the local community aware of the questions and fears around the upcoming industrialisation, technological and digital knowledge and development. It was a big change for a small village like Aral. After eight turbulent years which included serious community resistance, the signed Partnership Agreement in 2012 promised to be a platform for dialogue and cooperation between the different actors in the drama. It brought together the Company with its expanding mining activities, the government with its weaknesses but still with its administrative functions, and the local population with its clan divisions and its lack of knowledge and distrust of mining.Yet the social dynamics around mining were very complex and centred on social divisions and clan affiliation. Aral demonstrated that local social dynamics were more complex that one could imagine. With its many clan groups and division into kvartals, Aral was exceptionally diverse compared even to neighbouring mining villages like Kopuro Bazar or Bekmoldo. There was limited mixing between different social groups and divisions. The social fragmentation got more critical when the Company in 2007 slowly introduced more resources such as educational grants for students, new job positions, the Aral development fund and other possibilities.These new opportunities offered by the Company improved some villagers’ social capital and contributed to the preservation of established networks. The Company, without realising, reinforced existing inter-​clan rivalry which made collective decision-​making impossible and exacerbated economic inequalities in Aral. Due to its lack of capacity and resources, all the Ayil Okmot’s attempts to mitigate emerging new social realms in Aral were unsuccessful.With the formation of the commission and its vigorous activities, the Ayil Okmot began to lose its little influence on the local population. The Commission for some time became very prominent and a driving force in the village. Researchers state that the influx of money disturbs and dramatically transforms the existing traditional local patterns where mining starts (Godoy, 1985; Ballard and Banks, 2003). With the intensive work of the local Commission and discussions on the Aral Development Fund the relationships between different clans became tense. Feelings ran particularly high at meetings

68  Aimeerim Tursalieva when the Commission made decisions on the allocation of money, where each member of the Commission acted in the interests of his clan or kvartal. It took a little time until the members of the Commission realised that it was necessary to decide not only for the sake of their kvartal or clan, but for the sake of the whole village. The work in this Commission required the members to develop some new social skills to think about the development of the entire community, but not individual clans or families. In the Kyrgyzstan context the formation of such Commissions might be very helpful and important for the effective work of the mining companies with the local population. For such commissions not to lose their relevance and prestige among the local population, a clearly and correctly built structure and Commission policy is necessary. But this requires more commitment from companies and government and the allocation of additional resources and patience. Development of mining in the Soviet era was on a massive scale but the ambitious industrialisation of the era ended with the Soviet Union’s collapse. The “promised development” did not last long and people were left to cope with the multifaceted consequences, especially environmental damage. But the extreme fear regarding radiation in Aral and other villages of Talas had no empirical basis. Baseline studies of the area proved that radiation was not an issue in the Talas region and background radiation levels were much lower than in other regions (Academy of Science of Kyrgyz Republic, 2011). Communities in Aral and nearby villages which were on the verge of promised development through mining feared environmental disaster, like the communities who faced it after the Soviet modernisation. In addition to multi-​ton tailing dumps and damaged ecology, Soviet industrialisation left a very specific perception of mining as moskovskoe obespechenie or “full provision and support.” This coined term later influenced residents’ perception of today’s investors in Kyrgyzstan. The local population treat investors as donors (Nogoibaeva, 2015) or as like a Soviet enterprise where funds were generously provided to the local communities. The local community in Aral, referencing Soviet style “full provision and support,” demanded the Company should build roads, schools and hospitals for the village, which were not its direct responsibility. Investors or a mining company, in the Aral community’s perception, were somewhere between the Soviet “full provision and support” enterprise and a donor. In addition to this the Company, in order to not lose their social licence and proceed with their mining activities, temporarily played the Soviet model of “full provision and support,” or donor, instead of clearly presenting their economic interests. As a result, it was difficult for the local population to define the boundaries of their desires and the Company’s capabilities for more constructive negotiations and planning. Thus, it is important to take seriously historically shaped perceptions of mining. This allows awareness of how to engage with local people’s perception of mining, which has been shaped by earlier experiences, such as the legacy of Soviet mining.

Gold mining conflicts in Kyrgyzstan  69 In recent years environmental awareness in the country has been increasing and being environmentally aware is slowly becoming a new trend.Anti-​uranium protests in 2019 proved that city people (Bishkek) are becoming powerful advocates for the ecological rights of the regions (Sternberg, 2020). Previously many gold mining protests were limited to the affected regions, involving only people living around those mines. One of the interesting observations in Aral, along with the complicated social dynamics, was cultural attachment and people’s attitude to jer. For the people of Aral to see how mountains or hills around mining deposits were physically demolished was emotionally disturbing. People did not want to admit that the Taldy Bulak deposit/​mountain may soon disappear.Taldy Bulak was not only a deposit or a mountain for them, but it was also understood as jailoo (pasture) or the Land of Ancestors. As a concluding observation here are recent developments from Kopuro Bazar, near Aral, which was a hotspot of gold mining conflicts in the past. The village of Kopuro Bazar abandoned gold mining, and immediately proclaimed itself as a completely organic village. Recently products from this village went through ecological certification and made their first delivery to eco-​stores in Bishkek (Bio KG, 2020). Within a short time, this village turned from being a centre of mining conflicts to an organic area that supplies its organic products to big cities of the country. Nowadays Kopuro Bazar is associated not with protests against gold mining, but with organic food products. Hence, consideration of such new trends and new value orientation is important for mining companies and government structures, in order to run inclusive social and community campaigns.

Conclusion In Kyrgyzstan, given the weakness of state institutions and their inability to implement mining licences, companies have to build inclusive stakeholder engagement strategies on their own. It is important to embrace all local stakeholders even if the structure is broad, and to be innovative in building public spaces and platforms for dialogues with local communities. In the case of Aral, creation of the Commission which included representatives of all major clans, central, regional and local government, and the kvartals brought significant changes for both the Company and the local community. As a result, the Company tried to employ social diversity of the village well and promote better decisions by integrating diverse viewpoints and creating trust but it did not expect that social dynamics would be too complex and sophisticated to resolve. The case of Aral demonstrates that it is not easy to capture the complexity of existing local social dynamics within communities. Moreover, local communities around mines transform and change continuously after the arrival of the mining companies. Thus, it is important to study local communities and their changing perceptions towards mining and development in order to build long-​ term sustainable cooperation and development.

70  Aimeerim Tursalieva

Notes from the field Relationships between local communities and mining companies Kuban Ashyrkulov Introduction Similar to other mountainous countries, Kyrgyzstan has rich extractable resources and mineral deposits. Hence, as in many other states around the world, Kyrgyzstan has also encountered repeated conflict situations between mining companies and local communities. Indeed, a small-​ scale confrontation could quickly escalate and lead to damages such as mining camps being burned, equipment stolen and employees beaten. As a direct participant of numerous conflict situations, I would like to discuss problems concerning the relations between mining companies and local communities. Parties involved The conflicts under review involve the national and local government, mass media and non-​governmental organisations. Each of the parties mentioned above can influence the situation in terms of reaching a compromise or escalating the dispute by their actions or inaction. The law stipulates that national and local government must provide access to the licenced deposit site. However, the national level authorities leave this issue to the local government, who often fail to ensure law and order on the ground. Mass media also plays an important role in settling conflict situations by providing objective and open information. On the other hand, there are cases when the mass media escalated the confrontation between parties by not providing the information in full or specifically working to protect the interests of one group in particular. Causes When analysing the main causes of a conflict, often they are related to the environment and disturbances to the everyday life of local residents. This can be due to a lack of public information available about the mining project, the process of exploration and extraction, blasting operations, utilisation of chemical substances, waste storage, water usage and so on. Another important cause is the distrust of local residents towards both the investor and national government authorities. There is strong opinion among many that the process to obtain a license and permit for mining is corrupt, as well as a lack of belief that investors follow norms to protect the environment. Additionally, local communities often express feelings of

Gold mining conflicts in Kyrgyzstan  71 social injustice, as economic benefits from mining can been seen in central areas of the country, while far away villages are left with little, not to mention a polluted environment. Furthermore, there are hidden players and invisible stakeholders, whose interests centre on stopping the extraction works. An interested party could be a local elite struggling to keep hold of their influence and power in the community or a group attempting to get a contract with the mining company where settling the dispute is part of their bargaining strategy. Also, one cannot rule out the concept of unfair competition, where some mine developers instigate an artificial dispute to lower the price of the licence and receive the permit for the deposit for themselves. Hence, certain groups in a local community or national authorities could be used to achieve these objectives. Certainly, not all mining companies are “warm and fuzzy,” who follow each and every norm set out in the legislation.There are some companies, both international and local, who use the corrupt government system and feeble socioeconomic situation in the regions to break the rules. Since the Kyrgyz justice system does not guarantee the inevitability of punishment for breaking the law, some companies are ready to pay-​off government officials, while the authorities are ready to take bribes and the local residents are not afraid of using force during confrontations. Weak state authorities with an inability to take responsibility to defend its economic interests in the mining sector or politicians who earn points through populism also contribute to conflict situations. The recent uranium mine story is an excellent example of how the lack of objective information, mixed with a weak government structure could lead to the whole uranium mining sector being closed down. This in turn has directly impacted the investment climate in the country and the gold mining sector because the rural population strongly believe that extracting gold involves uranium mining. Hence, in the eyes of the locals the radiation phobia outweighs all of the economic benefits from developing a gold deposit. Solutions After the 2010 revolution, the number of local conflicts related to mining has increased significantly. As a result, the Kyrgyz government has made substantial changes to the country’s legislation. Innovative concepts such as a more balanced distribution of taxes to the local and central budgets, a 2% deduction for the development of local infrastructure, fees to retain licences, and compulsory social packages were all brought into law, which in turn decreased the number of confrontations. With regards to the environment, the issue of post-​mining reclamation has traditionally caused tension. Questions such as what will happen after the closure of

72  Aimeerim Tursalieva a mine, who will restore the damage caused to the environment and the ecosystem, and which party will pay the costs thereof remain unanswered. Under the new law, the mining company has to open a reclamation fund with an approved formula to calculate deductions to the account. Hence, the deductions allow for the gradual formation of a fund that would remunerate for the reclamation process. However, mining companies are not obliged to disclose information about the details of the fund, the amount of money accumulated or at which bank the account has been opened. Indeed, these factors have exacerbated the distrust of local communities towards the mining companies. Mining companies in the Kyrgyz Republic are constantly working to reduce the potential for conflict in the regions. A large number of mining companies are part of international initiatives, such as the UN Global Compact and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and others with a view to improve relations with local communities. However, these initiatives have not been effective in some situations. Mining companies have introduced the principles of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to create and strengthen their image to the outside world. Nonetheless, they tend to initiate CSR elements that are often limited to one-​time charity acts without a systematic approach or long-​ term strategy. Consequently, CSR actions do not greatly contribute to improving the relationship with the local communities. On the contrary, incorrect CSR practices could significantly harm the company. For example, criticism or negativity could occur if the mining company listens to the requests and assists certain groups of the local community and rejects the call for support from others. For that reason, a mining company’s CSR policy and strategy has to be meticulously thought out, taking into account many factors including employment policies, ensuring a safe working environment, equal treatment of local and foreign employees, environmental compliance and other aspects. Along with the negative patterns of conflict resolution and cooperation, there are numerous positive examples as well. Some companies have managed to establish a rewarding relationship with local communities by endorsing open policies and active dialogue, implementing programmes to develop local infrastructure, as well as training and recruiting local residents. Conclusion There is no universal solution to the issue at hand. The experience of multiple countries and companies demonstrates that adherence to the principles of openness and transparency is the foundation for a successful system to resolving conflicts between mining companies and the local

Gold mining conflicts in Kyrgyzstan  73 communities.This can be strengthened through several mechanisms, such as regular public hearings, information offices located in the village, joint committees and commissions, open days at the mining site, the creation of hot lines, joint development strategies in the village and many other methods. I am confident that the correct recipe for Kyrgyzstan is similar to the approach mentioned above  –​mutual openness, objective information and a willingness to conduct open dialogue between the parties involved in the conflict.

Notes 1 Talas Copper Gold LLC was owned by South African mining company Gold Fields LLC (60%) and Orsu Metals (40%). In 2012 Gold Fields became the sole owner. Talas Copper Gold LLC was later bought by Australian mining company Robust Resources, and in 2013 resold to Manas Resources (Tazabek, 2014). 2 Talas Copper Gold owned licences for another three nearby deposits (Bashkol, Kentash, Korgontash). 3 The Company initiated formation of the Commission to mobilise local stakeholders in Aral in December 2011. 4 The Company divided Aral into four kvartals (quarters) or districts, aiming to treat each district equally. 5 “Who is not willing to integrate lives in hunger,” Kyrgyz proverb.

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5  Filling a hole? Compensation for mining-​induced losses in the South Gobi Ariell Ahearn and Bayarsaikhan Namsrai

Introduction Mining of any kind requires a significant transformation of land and land use. The removal of minerals not only involves sophisticated methods of digging deep holes and tunnels, but it also requires extensive infrastructure to remove and export valuable minerals  –​pipelines, roads, railroads and transport to move the loads. Equally as holes get deeper, tailings and pilings accumulate and occupy even more land. In this sense, land expropriation and mining go hand-​in-​hand. Land expropriation not only involves the involuntary displacement of people living in the area, but the transformation of an ecosystem –​the displacement of flora and fauna, waterways and natural features of the landscape. Land expropriation is often treated as another step in the process of engineering a mine: first remove the people, then start digging. In many cases, proposed mine sites are perceived by mining executives as a “terra nullius” or empty land to begin with. Robert Friedland, the CEO of Ivanhoe Mines, the mine which developed Oyu Tolgoi in the South Gobi, infamously celebrated a supposed lack of people at his proposed mine site in the South Gobi, “The nice thing about this, there’s no people around.” (York, 2005). A  pervasive lack of understanding of customary and common land tenure by investors and resettlement consultant teams continue to plague contemporary large-​ scale investments projects (Schwartz et al., 2018), echoing historical legacies of colonial land grabs (Banner, 2005). The undervaluing of human connection to land, and the overvaluing of extraction has led to many losses for local communities. In 2020, Rio Tinto destroyed ancient sacred caves in Australia, a permanent loss of cultural heritage which cannot be reconstructed. Displaced people are often worse off following resettlement (Adam et al., 2015; Vanclay, 2017; Wilson, 2019). In this chapter, we explore the field of resettlement and compensation in Mongolia. As of December 2020, Mongolia was host to 2,692 licences (37.6% exploration and 62.3% exploitation), which affects the lives of a large portion of the rural population (MRPAM, 2020). Geologically valuable regions often correspond with crucial areas of pasture and water for the county’s mobile pastoralists (henceforth, herders), illustrating the co-​occurrence of water availability in arid regions DOI: 10.4324/9781003097341-6

Filling a hole?  77 and the presence of minerals such as gold, copper and coal which requires large-​scale open pit mining. Understanding processes of resettlement and compensation in Mongolia is challenging. Resettlement and compensation-​related information is not available to the public in EITI reporting and much information is protected by non-​disclosure agreements. Official complaints to international investors such as the IFC and EBRD as well as local court cases highlight unresolved policy issues related to resettlement and compensation. These include questions of herder common property rights and customary land ownership (ezemshil), the applicability of free, prior and informed consent and decision-​making around appropriate resettlement and compensation for herders displaced by mining.This chapter offers a preliminary analysis of themes regarding compensation and resettlement in the South Gobi province of Mongolia based on original fieldwork and triangulation with available grey literature. The themes identified in the research provide areas for further empirical research and the development of appropriate policy in line with international human rights principles. Beyond the Mongolia case, we are interested in how international standards related to resettlement and compensation in the cases of major infrastructure projects and mining can more appropriately understand and address the livelihoods of mobile pastoralists and mobile people. Sedentary societies, including the presence of fixed assets and private property, are considered to be the “normal” case in resettlement practices. Although there are more efforts by development banks, such as FMO, to develop rights-​based approaches to ensure livelihood restoration for informal and marginal livelihoods, there remain gaps in understanding mobile livelihoods and tenure systems from a project resettlement point of view.

Methods This chapter is based on qualitative fieldwork conducted from 2016 to 2020 in the Gobi provinces of Mongolia. Our field site locations are Khanbogd soum and Gurvantes soum of Umnugovi province, and Airag soum of Dornogovi province. Our focus on the Gobi provinces is due to density and diversity of mining operations in this region. An original motivation for this research was to understand the co-​existence of mining and mobile pastoralism since the rapid development of mining in rural areas in the past decade and the nature of conflicts emerging between these forms of rural land use. Khanbogd soum is dominated by Oyu Tolgoi, a mega mine managed by Rio Tinto, which received significant investment from the IFC. Gurvantas, on the other hand, has a total of 36 mining licences issued to 24 companies in the soum (EITI Portal Mongolia, 2019). Eighteen of the licences are for coal and the remaining are for salt, gold, copper, agalmatolite, zinc, jasper, crude oil and construction materials. These companies include smaller Mongolian private companies, joint ventures and international companies; our research focuses on 11 of these Gurvantes-​based mines.

78  Ariell Ahearn and Bayarsaikhan Namsrai Interviews and focus groups with local herders, NGO leaders, mining company management staff and government leaders make up the majority of the data and were conducted over the course of 5  years (from 2016 to 2020). Interviews and focus group were done in the Mongolian language, transcribed into Mongolian and later translated into English. A  total of 270 interviews were conducted as well as focus groups. Additionally, a number of participatory workshops were held in Ulaanbaatar, Dalanjargalan and Airag soum including individuals from Mongolian government ministries, herders, lawyers, NGOs and company management. The participatory workshops were also recorded and summarised in both Mongolian and English. Transcripts and workshop summaries were coded using NVivo to identify themes related to compensation and resettlement. Both the Mongolian and English transcripts were coded in NVivo, which yielded a rich set of codes reflecting concepts in the Mongolian language. Grey literature such as publicly available company resettlement action plans, reports from organisations such as EITI Mongolia and the Open Society Foundation were triangulated against the field data. This short chapter will cover the main themes found in our analysis. This work represents a collaboration between Oxford University and Steps Without Borders NGO in Mongolia. Steps Without Borders has been monitoring the implementation of the laws in the mining sector since 2008, reporting to national and UN treaty committees, conducting policy research since 2014 and presenting proposals at theoretical and practical conferences. Our aims are not only to produce rigorous academic research, but also to impact Mongolian policy and to encourage human rights in the mining sector.

Mobile peoples, land tenure and development-​inducted displacement Large-​scale infrastructure and investments usually involve some form of displacement of households living in a project area. The way in which people are removed and the standards followed in the process vary widely depending on the location and national governance regime. Vanclay (2017) notes that in many cases, governments use their eminent domain powers to remove people, sometimes forcibly from concession sites. Companies with investments from IFC or the World Bank are required to comply with their internal performance standards. In this section, we highlight wider themes in the literature regarding development-​induced displacement of mobile peoples in order to put the Mongolian case in dialogue with broader global themes. Beyond Mongolia, development-​induced displacement of mobile pastoralists has been examined in the context of wildlife reserves (Chatty, 2002), mining (Mkutu et al., 2019) and agricultural and energy development (Yenneti et al., 2016; Mehta and Srivastava, 2019). Pastoralist lands are enclosed or taken out of use in order to establish conservation areas or enable industrial development. Yenneti et al. (2016) analysed land acquisition around a large-​scale solar park in

Filling a hole?  79 Gujarat.The land designated for the solar park was considered to be government land, but was a site actively used by both pastoralist communities and small-​scale farmers. Government authorities characterised the land as “waste land” and denied the long history of pasture and farming-​based livelihoods present on the lands. Yenneti et al. (2016) describe a process of accumulation by dispossession where the aligned interests of company and state both justified and enabled land expropriation. Similarly, the case of hydroelectric development in Ethiopia (Fratkin, 2014) illustrates the intersecting dynamics of regional development and government policies which present pastoralist livelihoods as developmentally deprived, and therefore in need of resettlement. Resettling pastoralists and agro-​pastoralists into villages in this case is characterised by government actors as a pathway to progress and modernity, illustrating a blatant disregard for indigenous land rights. As Fratkin highlights, the lack of legal protection for pastoralist land rights has enabled such land expropriation by the state and corporate actors. These approaches are equally illustrated in rural development schemes in Tibet and Inner Mongolia (Yeh, 2005), where pastoralist lands have been enclosed, pastoralists have been resettled to villages and access to former lands regulated within state-​led development and conservation schemes. The links between global conservation projects and forced resettlement of indigenous groups and mobile pastoralists has been well documented (Chatty and Colchester, 2002) and movements to decolonise conservation (see e.g. Survival International and the Dana Declaration) have gained steam. As Gilbert (2014) has argued, the territories of nomadic peoples are often misrepresented as “terra nullius,” or empty land, and land rights for people who move are poorly understood and accounted for in international law. Gilbert writes, “Legally most national land legislation, land tenure systems, and property rights regimes do not recognise nomadic ownership of land.The specificities of land rights for nomadic peoples, which often involve informal collective land sharing usage, are usually not recognised as constituting land rights” (p.  90). Indeed, interpretations of land rights and related compensation in the context of mining in Mongolia is limited to individual household private possession contracts for winter and spring campsites rather than land which is collective used and critical for rural livelihoods. Gilbert (2007) also points out that international legal norms on property rights are ill-​equip to adequately account for and protect indigenous people’s ontological and epistemological relations with place and space. Here, the naturalised concept of individual, alienable rights in property is recognised as central to mainstream property law, with the main alternative presented as State or public ownership; Gilbert states: the socialist or communist approach to collective ownership did not contest the division between State territorial sovereignty and individual property rights, for even though the notional of individual property in land was suppressed, the only collective ownership that was recognized was State ownership. (2007: p. 114)

80  Ariell Ahearn and Bayarsaikhan Namsrai This is particularly important for the Mongolian context, as the current post-​socialist property rights regime inherited the concept of State ownership of land in the countryside. Mobile pastoralist herding communities raises further questions on how we understand resettlement and processes of resettlement. Although sedentary people  –​whether they are farmers or bankers  –​practice mobility as a key aspect of their livelihoods; for example, a daily commute, or to access markets and key inputs for agriculture, mobility within pastoralist livelihoods is also a defining factor in sociocultural practices and livelihoods. Household arrangements are generally not fixed; in the Gobi households may camp together during a winter season and live separately the next year. This flexible engagement with the landscape should not translate to a lack of rights or claim to traditional territories and is indeed central to local livelihoods and mitigation of environmental risks. In a study of resettlement policy and practice in the mining sector, Adams et  al. (2015) noted a lack of attention and understanding of the role of families, households and wider social networks in resettlement-​ related livelihood restoration policies, despite the known importance of these relationships in rural livelihoods. They write, “One prominent tendency is for companies to place a greater emphasis on the building of ‘houses’ as opposed to the development of ‘households’ ” (emphasis in the original; p.  585). The gendered and spatialised nature of herder households in Mongolia has enabled many households to continue herding around mining installations, perhaps allowing observers to reach the conclusion that displacement has not taken place. However, as Mezhoud and Oxby’s (2013) work on pastoralists displaced in the context of conflict and war has emphasised, “the lack of clear allocation of land rights to nomadic herders … helps to hide their dispossession and makes it officially invisible and nonexistent” (p. 61). In this sense, though herders may continue their livelihoods around mining sites, this should not be taken as a sign that displacement and dispossession have not taken place. Herder land tenure in Mongolia Mobile pastoralism continues to be widely practiced in rural Mongolia, with livestock husbandry of goats, sheep, cows, horses and camels well suited to the climate extremes of this arid high-​altitude geography. While rural livelihoods have been transformed by structural adjustment programmes, political reform, economic crisis and large-​scale development projects since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, traditional forms of land tenure are practiced and formalised through local governance institutions (Ahearn, 2016). The Mongolian constitution designates rural land as State public land. Private plots of land are only available for sale in settlements and urban centres; indeed, Mongolian citizens are entitled to up to 0.07 hectares of land in Ulaanbaatar, and up to 0.5 hectares in soum centres (Maydar, 2009:  p.  183). There was a push to privatise rural land following the collapse of the Soviet

Filling a hole?  81 Union by institutions such as the ADB (Sneath, 2001, 2003) in the 1990s. Despite pressure from donors, Mongolia passed a Land Law in 1994 (amended in 2002)  which stipulated different tiers of land ownership and possession rights (Barcus, 2018). From 2007, a new Pastureland Law was drafted which introduced the idea of legal possession of pasture by herder groups, but this law has been under discussion since 2016 (Undargaa, 2017). With the passage of the 1994 Land Law, herders were entitled to register their winter camps (ovoljoo) and spring camps (khavarjaa) under the head of household name and receive a certificate of possession for a period of years. The Land Law further stipulates that pasture, water points such as wells, and salt licks are designated for “common purposes” (Dalintai et  al., 2012:  p.  54). The local implementation of this law varies according to region but is generally in the hand of local government councils (Dalintai et  al., 2012). For example, some local counties (soum) allow a household to register multiple winter camp sites, while other counties restrict winter camp possession rights to one per household. Possession contracts for winter and spring camps were supported by some scholars as a means to reduce competition for pastures and to provide a way to resolve disputes around winter camp use. However, in practice many herder households have not formalised their winter camp possession rights in the form of a land certificate, as local understandings of ownership continue to be practiced according to traditional ideas of occupancy and use which are widely accepted and legitimised through local governance councils and administrative processes (Ahearn, 2016). Mongolian conceptions of nature (Humphrey et al., 1993), which emphasise custodial rather than exclusive relations with land, are reflected these local practices of land use. Within the Land Law, there is acknowledgement of common use of wells, water sources, pastures, salt marshes and other types of land. These communally owned resources are both place-​specific, layered and multiple. Practices of seasonal and daily mobility requires such flexible use of pasture. Indeed, mobile tenure is a key livelihood strategy and way that herders are able to generate abundance from environmental conditions which are highly variable (see e.g. Krätli and Schareika, 2010). Here, custodial practices of land use, relations with nature, sociocultural values and practices are not characterised by extractive industrial land use practices (Bumochir et al., 2020). In the following sections, we will further unpack the legal stipulations for resettlement and compensation in Mongolia, and present findings on resettlement and compensation practices in Mongolia.

Resettlement and compensation in Mongolia: legal stipulations and cases Mongolian laws related to land use and ownership, mineral use and exploitation and the governance of natural resources are complex and at times contradictory. This section will provide an overview of the key laws and legal articles related to herder land tenure and legal references to resettlement and compensation

82  Ariell Ahearn and Bayarsaikhan Namsrai for major infrastructure and mining projects. Two recent court cases related to compensation and resettlement are presented in order to illustrate the legal reasoning and interpretation by the courts. The Mongolian constitution stipulates that land, including the subsoil, forests, water resources and wildlife is the property of the state. As Fernandez-​Gimenez and Batbuyan (2004) have stated, “private ownership of pastureland has never existed and is unconstitutional” (p.  142). Beyond the Constitution, there are a number of laws which provide further details on the regulation of land and natural resources. These include the Law on Land Subsoil, the Forest Code, the Law on Land Fees, the Land Law, the Mining Code, the Environmental Impact Assessment Law and others. As written by Tumenbayar (2002), since the transition to a market-​based economy, herders have had the de facto right to use land according to Mongolian herding traditions. During the socialist period, herding was regulated through collectivisation and principles of the command economy (Ahearn, 2018). Prior to the socialist system, the Qing dynasty had strict rules around land use with Buddhist monasteries and aristocrats playing a strong managerial role in land use practices. In the contemporary period, although it is understood that herders have a right to use land, it is not explicitly protected in law. According to Tumenbayar, “none of the provisions of the land laws and regulation recognises the traditional land rights of herders –​the most common and continuous users of land in Mongolia” (p.  8). Likewise, the  Mongolians State does not consider herders to be an Indigenous group, which would provide certain protections in international law such as Free, Prior and Informed Consent Processes. State public lands are granted both mining rights and traditional pastoral land rights. This issue poses a significant contradiction, as the government allocates land to two different entities for two different purposes, but the state does not intervene in land rights disputes. Additionally, although local pastoral land use is regulated by local government councils and rules, this is not the case for mining operations which may be present on the same land. Here, the leverage of local governments to regulate and manage mine land use is limited. As a result of the lack of clear regulation on land acquisition and resettlement, there are constant land disputes and misunderstandings between the mining and infrastructure project implementers and local herders. The lack of clear methods, standards and regulations for relocation and compensation has put both parties at risk and the government is unable to protect their interests. Out of the thousands of mining companies operating in Mongolia today, only a small fraction, such as Oyu Tolgoi, are required to comply with internationally recognised such as the IFC performance standards. Outside of investor compliance requirements, companies must find ways to interpret the murky nature of national laws and regulations. Much of the public discussion related to resettlement in Mongolia is focused on compensation rather than the concept and practices of resettlement itself. According to Article 41 of the Mongolia Minerals Law (2006):

Filling a hole?  83 if a license holder caused damage to wells, winter camps, private and public housing and other buildings and historical and cultural monuments during exploration and mining activities, the damage shall be fully compensated to the owner or possessor. If necessary, the costs associated with their relocation [shall also be compensated]. However, the form of compensation is up to companies to decide and arrange and is often protected from public knowledge through non-​disclosure agreements signed by herders. Complaints to CAO against Oyu Tolgoi regarding resettlement and economic displacement The Oyu Tolgoi gold and copper mine in Khanbogd county of Mongolia’s Umnugobi province is an internationally recognised mega mining operation and has been scrutinised by international and domestic NGOs for its social and environmental impacts. Two complaints made against the company to the IFC’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman in 2011 and 2012 by local herders were made publicly available in English and Mongolian (CAO Complaint, 2019). The first complaint lodged in October 2012 focused on the 2004 Relocation Programme and “Compensation without Relocation” (economic displacement) programme which began in 2011. At the time of the 2004 Relocation, Oyu Tolgoi LLC was known as Ivanhoe Mines Mongolia Inc LLC, and was managed by Canada-​based Ivanhoe Mines. According to publicly available documents (Dalaibuyan and Namkhai, 2014), in 2004, 10 households comprising 16 families who had winter camps in the mine licence area were resettled. Ivanhoe Mines agreed to provide employment, educational assistance, relocation assistance and restocking of herders. The nature of the resettlement planning and decision-​making process is largely confidential and protected by confidentiality agreements. The CAO complaints regarding the 2004 resettlement process state “All households were made to select a spot for construction of their new winter camp, after which the Company provided transportation and relocated herder households. Many households resisted relocation, but gave in when the local government threatened forced eviction” (CAO Complaint, 2012:  p.  2). The Complaint goes on to detail the hasty nature of selecting new locations for herder winter camps. During interviews in 2016, an elderly herder stated that they were relocated and provided with a new wooden shelter and corral but were not offered a full resettlement package. She explained: I heard people were given things. As [OT] did not bring or offer us anything I did not think of it and did not go after it. I was satisfied with the enclosure they build us. As we had plenty of livestock and comfortable livelihood, I did not think of anything else.

84  Ariell Ahearn and Bayarsaikhan Namsrai This statement indicates that local herders lacked an understanding of the extensive potential future impacts associated with a mega mine, and failure of resettlement teams to adequately brief herders and provide social and livelihood protections. In other cases, herders were not included in the original 2004 resettlement because they were not physically relocated in their winter camp location at the time when resettlement deals were being made. The conclusion of the CAO complaints arrived nearly eight years later in 2019. The Guardian trumpeted: “An Example to All: the Mongolian herders who took on a corporate behemoth –​and won” (Guardian, 2019). While the resolution of the complaints were indeed a positive example of tripartite dialogue, negotiation and compromise, the extent to which this case represents a “win” for herders in the long term is questionable. The extra-​legal nature of the complaints means that underlying national policy issues regarding involuntary displacement, land rights, compensation and restoration of livelihoods were never fully addressed from a national policy perspective. However, OT’s resettlement action plan did put a spotlight on how private companies make decisions regarding resettlement and compensation of local herders living in mining licence areas. This case presents one example with a publicly available resettlement action plan and related audits. As part of the complaint resolution, a compensation claims committee (TPC Joint Statement, 2017) was established which went on to provide compensation for additional households who were overlooked in the 2004 and 2011 resettlement procedures Land tenure In Gurvantes soum, Umnugovi aimag, Agmining LLC, a South Koreaninvested company, received the gold mining licence No. MV-​014917 in 2009 covering an area of 2,881.79 hectares until 2039. Nine herder families had been herding livestock in the company’s licenced area for 10–​35 years. As soon as herders learned that a mining licence had been issued for their long-​term land, they applied to the soum governor in 2016 to secure their land tenure for winter camps and obtained a 60-​year land tenure certificate. However, Ag mining LLC appealed to the Administrative Court to overturn the decision of the soum governor to allow herders to own land in the licenced area and to relocate nine herder households without compensation. The court ruled that the governor’s decision to issue a land possession certificate in 2016 after the licence was issued in 2009 was invalid because there was no evidence that the herders had lived there for many years. Therefore, it was decided that nine families would be relocated from their winter camps and it would not be possible to provide compensation due to the lack of land rights certificates. This case exemplifies the expectation that herders are entitled to compensation if they have secured land possession certificates for winter camps prior to the establishment of a mining licence. Many herders have not obtained winter and spring camp possession certificates as they continue to use the land according

Filling a hole?  85 to locally accepted and widely practiced norms. Additionally, the decision of this case reveals the lack of authority of local governments in land management, which the Land Law designates. Livelihood impacts There is a group of fluorspar deposits called Baruun Tsagaan Del in the 2nd bag (sub-​district) of Airag soum of Dornogovi aimag. There is also a deep unexplored Tsagaan Del cave not which is considered to be an important natural architectural form. In the Tsagaan Del cave, herders used to store meat and milk in the summer as a “refrigerator.” Nine herder families lived in this area since ancient times, engaged in pastoral livestock breeding. Since 2006, 12 fluorspar mining licences have been issued and occupy a 5 km long by 4 km wide rectangular area around the Tsagaan Del cave. In addition, 11 companies and 11 herder households live on a 25 km road that transports fluorspar to the railway. For many years, the noise, vibration, dust and deaths of animals from blasting, mining and transportation, as well as the death of animals in dug holes, and the intimidation of children and women by workers who do chores and work along the road, has been very stressful. Meanwhile, herders have repeatedly spoken to the management of the mining company and the local government, both orally and in writing, and no action has been taken. During this period, 12 companies ignored social issues and did not pay compensation to households, and in 2019, herders were required to relocate immediately. Due to the number of mines operating in this region, it is challenging to hold a particular mine accountable for the livelihood damages and social impacts. Explosions from 12 mines in the region shake the traditional ger housing and stress livestock. The dust generated from transport from all companies equally impacts herd and household health. In addition, Mongolia does not conduct social impact assessments and does not have a damage assessment system in place, making it difficult for NGOs to identify and prosecute the impact of a particular company in litigation on behalf of the public interest.

Resettlement and compensation in the Mongolian Gobi One of our key findings from our research is the diversity of approaches to resettlement and compensation found across our field sites. Oyu Tolgoi is distinguished as a mega mine with investment from the IFC, which requires compliance with IFC performance standards. Even with this high level of standard, existing Resettlement Action Plans fail to understand and account for indigenous mobile tenure practices, and limited focus to households who owned winter and spring possession contracts within a specific distance from the mine licence area or mine infrastructure. This static and fixed approach to resettlement did not align with the actual ways in which land was used and households were organised.

86  Ariell Ahearn and Bayarsaikhan Namsrai Diversity of approaches In regions such as Gurvantes, resettlement and livelihood restoration plans are not built into the mining development process. In many cases, resettlement and compensation are conflated. Rather than determining a sufficient relocation site in dialogue with the local community, herder households enter individually into negotiation with the company for a compensation package which is normally dominated by cash compensation. Resettlement action plans do not exist as far as we observed. In many cases, herders only receive compensation after complaining to the company, and the nature of these negotiations are not shared with other herders who might be similarly affected by mining operations. In Gurvantes’s Baysakh bag, an official explained: Khairkhan Tolgoi company visited families in the far end.We heard people’s whispers that they are offering 50 million tugrik and we keep hearing that. Since the company doesn’t need any permission from us, they don’t communicate with us. When they visit the families within an impact zone they confuse them by saying that such and such family agreed to that many millions and after much going to and fro they trick them and the families are left with a few tugrik. A company in Gurvantes, who voluntarily based their resettlement approach on the EBRD’s prior resettlement in Mongolia, explained how they determined herder resettlement packages. They stated: The amount of damage caused by the relocation is related to the value of winter camp. We hired a property company to make an evaluation winter camp and other properties. Their evaluation methodology does not meet the expectation of the citizen.They use a different method where they calculate exploitation time and cost of transportation. When that method is used, the value becomes low. Of course, the citizen will propose his value which includes realistic expenses he had. Apart from realistic expenses they also add future dividends. We do realise that if we make their current income disappear we need to compensate it. Therefore, we offer them jobs and see what opportunities we have to help them. For example, if they start a business we look into how we can support it. Since it is not our decision, we cannot meet their every demand. Of course they want maximum compensation, but we do not know how to keep the fine balance and do not have ideal version of the solution. While this company manager’s statement takes a more positive approach to engaging with local herders, it also reveals serious inadequacies in understandings of resettlement and the importance of livelihood restoration. The focus on compensation for winter camps and winter camp infrastructure completely disregards common lands, seasonal camps, pasture and water points used in

Filling a hole?  87 spring, summer and fall. Additionally, offering a job at the mine is conflated with a type of livelihood support, which ignores herders’ rights to live and practice traditional livelihoods which herders perceive as an inheritance and multigenerational enterprise. Mobile pastoralist livelihoods, which provide the next generation with security and connection to homeland, cannot be easily equated to working in a mine (often limited to specific age and gender groups). Another Gurvantes company explained that their resettlement impact zones are determined from the environmental impact assessment: There is an organization which determines the impact zone. They have whole team of experts to do a study on the dust, impact, how many household are in our impact zone, how many wild animals, how much land or vegetation impacted, etc. Company X does the environmental impact assessment. There is also another company which does the offset protection assessment, named Company Y. They determine all the impacts from the mining and size of the impact zone. And they will determine the offset protection area. In this case, the impact zone corresponds to understandings of environmental impacts rather than socioeconomic impacts. This is a common practice amongst the companies we interviewed in Gurvantes. A more extreme example from Gurvantes is the company who insisted: Companies paid taxes to the Central Government. And we are paying money to the soum government, and even to the bag. The Government is not doing its work.The Government is supposed to admit that they already gave the permission [to mine]. So, the Government is supposed to be fair, right and beneficial for everyone. Instead, the Government is giving pressure on all sides. The Government is not working the way it should be. Why does the Government take taxes from us? Why did they give us permission [to mine]? The Government is supposed to regulate this household’s issues though its policy. The Government should have a policy to resettle these households. But, now these people make complaints and want to get something from the company over and over again. It is true that the people overstepped the bounds … I  paid my tax to the Government and I  am creating employment opportunities and jobs. This is a social responsibility. In this particular case, the company manager felt that the only responsibility of the company was to pay taxes, and all other issues related to resettlement and compensation should be taken care of by the Government. Social cohesion, conflict and double impact Families who move away from their traditional camp and pasture sites are often rejected and shunned from new host pastures. A 67-​year-​old herder from

88  Ariell Ahearn and Bayarsaikhan Namsrai Khanbogd, who worked in a collective during the socialist period taking care of pregnant ewes and female goats, was resettled in 2011 by Ivanhoe Mines at the start of Oyu Tolgoi’s development. She recounted an incident in 2013 when their household planned a move to Tsogttsetsii region to access better pasture during a difficult year. She explained: Pasture to the west became bad, so we spent the spring near Dukht and the pasture was there bad too. So, we panicked and moved to Tsogttsetsii. Our livestock were really weak. So, we asked and hired a passing truck to ferry our livestock. The driver was exhausted from ferrying livestock day and night. On the [Coal] Trans road our truck collided with another vehicle. All the people in the truck were injured in their legs and one of them sustained a bad injury to the stomach.The truck was ruined and there was no benefit from moving. Our livestock did not fatten up, pasture and water did not suit them in the north. Local people were hostile towards us and said that we sold our nice pasture to foreigners and did not let us drink from their water and did not let us build our ger.They scolded and chased us away.We sustained a bad loss … Households which lack water and pasture due to the activity of Oyu Tolgoi are pushed out. When they arrive at the new place, local people accuse them of selling off their land to outsiders and ostracize them. My children must have felt it fully when we moved to the north. Since then my children say that it is not worth moving anywhere, because everywhere we went there was pressure and gossip. I feel that it is difficult to carry that burden. When we move somewhere else we experience a lot of such pressure. In Gurvantes, herders who receive compensation to leave their camps experience a similar form of conflict from nearby households. Households from a heavily affected mining area in Bayasakh bag moved into a neighbouring bag due to environmental conditions. A bag governor explained, “Last year we had a bad time [due to harsh weather conditions] and had to move to another bag. We had no choice, but to move. When we went there we were called beggars from Bayasakh bag who sold their homeland.” These examples are numerous, and not only signify the hostility towards herders who are seen as “sell-​outs” by other herders. The breakdown in social cohesion means that herders who were resettled are unable to move easily to new locations in response to harsh climatic conditions. The animosity from other herders has a sedentarising effect on resettled herders, which in turn negatively affects livelihoods and mental health. The hostility from herders who were not included in compensation packages indicates a type of violation of the principle of common land tenure. Compensating herders who have a winter camp possession certificate within 3 or 5 kilometres from a mine site fails to recognise the many other households who cross into these so-​called “impact zones” in order to graze their herds, access salt marshes, water sources

Filling a hole?  89 or spiritual sites. The resentment of uncompensated herders arises from the understanding that a much larger group of herders –​perhaps an entire bag or soum should be collectively compensated as they use the land collectively and flexibly. A common issue in the South Gobi fieldsites where we worked was additional pressure put on pasture and water resources by displaced herders who were squeezed onto pasture that was already occupied by existing herders. A  herder in Khanbogd who was displaced onto the pasture of another bag explained: The double impact is we came from that site and moved around 20 km and settled here, where there is a household here and there.We are stealing from their pasture. Those households would not like that, they are resentful. Also folk from Toson came and settled here and are grazing their animals and making the pasture scarce. Making the pasture disappear. In other words, a household which used to come and spend the summer here will have no summer camp, because I moved here. Khanbogd Herder These excerpts from our data only scratch the surface of the issues revealed through our five years of research. By presenting these excerpts and themes, we emphasise the important of approaching resettlement from a human rights and spatial justice perspective.

Conclusion In Mongolia, lack of attention to the complexity of mining’s impact on livelihoods and rural society are commonplace. In our research, we observed a lack of incentives for licence holders to provide compensation and resettle herders according to widely accepted international standards. The findings from our research demonstrate a general theme related to the power of companies to approach land use according to their own priorities and interests. Herder mobility is poorly understood and is not addressed as an integral element of local livelihoods in the arid Gobi. In this context, what does herder rights and security of tenure look like in the face of such large-​scale land transformations and developments? How can a human rights-​based approach be standardised in rural Mongolia, where hundreds of mines are transforming the landscape? The lack of consistent standards which are relevant for the specific forms of mobile land use and tenures of Mongolian herders poses risk for local peoples as well as companies themselves. The consideration of human rights in land expropriation is a critical issue in contemporary Mongolia and central to developing a mining sector which values humans and their stewardship of local environments.

90  Ariell Ahearn and Bayarsaikhan Namsrai

Notes from the field The Tri-​partite Council for dispute resolution in Khan Bogd, Mongolia Battsengel Lkhamdoorov In 2011, Oyu Tolgoi (OT) mining company’s infrastructure work started in full swing. Herders who were directly affected by the mine created an NGO called “Gobi Soil” to organise protests to protect our rights in Khanbogd soum. There were many protesters; this caught public and media attention. We took the key issues to the NGO “OT Watch” where we learned there is a mechanism at the World Bank for complaints from local people affected by companies that received their loans. In November 2012, Gobi Soil made two complaints that this operation violated local people’s rights. These were accepted for review by the World Bank Ombudsman. On 15 March 2013, we sat with Oyu Tolgoi face to face across a table to talk; in order to discuss our problems we must first exchange information. It was impossible for us to oppose an assessment conducted by a professional organisation, by OT and the World Bank. Now thinking back, it was quite funny. We wanted compensation for the damage the mine caused, but we did not know what we were demanding and wanted to receive. We were given stacks of materials, yet we did not know what to read. We did not know how to exchange information or how to read the conclusion. We did not know how to use the materials we demanded. Local people did not know anything. I left school after receiving eight years of education and became a herder. So, the Ombudsman from the World Bank gave us many hours of training on how to prepare for negotiation –​how to look at a problem, to discuss possible resolutions, to not fight. At first when we saw an OT person we automatically got angry. Our NGO advisors taught us a lot. Looking back, we entered without much preparation. Now, if we receive a report we are able to see the conclusion and see what kind of recommendations were given –​it means we improved. For negotiation, it was important to unite our stances. We started the Tri-​partite Council (TPC) in 2015 that brings together the herders, OT mine staff and the local government. Herder representatives were elected from over 380 herder families of Khanbogd Soum. The most important step was the creation of a mechanism which resolves issues so each side can present their issues at TPC meetings. Negotiation was hard –​just to establish the rules and regulations we argued for six months. Our advisors helped train us about being at the negotiating table, to listen, to present information to herders in understandable way. For example, the company needs to dig the ground. Herders’ representatives talk with herders and

Filling a hole?  91 listen to their opinions. Then, the herders’ opinions will be discussed at TPC meeting. This helped solve issues for all sides. Many projects were born from TPC meeting and from our decisions much work was initiated. The TPC agreed to employ a team of trusted independent experts to address the issues. At that time, we did not even know which buttons to press to switch on a computer.We had only Nokia phones, there were no Android smart phones.We set tasks for the experts on water diversion, the environment, social impact assessment, compensation for mining impacts and resettlement. They evaluated possible loss of ecological balance and our chance to preserve and hand down our traditional nomadic way of life. In 2017, we received a long report. For herders, who were away from papers and documents reading the report was difficult. It was like first-​ year pupils doing their homework. The report was for our benefit so we had no choice but to sit and work on them for ourselves. The herders’ complaint resolution agreement was signed in 2017. The recommendation says that families who were left out from resettlement in 2004 and 2011 should be compensated if they meet TPC’s agreed criteria. When the recommendations by the experts are fulfilled (water wells, compensation, training, etc.) then the herders’ complaints will be resolved. Some of the points are on the stage of successful realisation and some are on paper and we are working towards fulfilling them. By 2018, we received 153 claims, 60 claims that were missed earlier. Other claims are being discussed, 50 claims were rejected and some arrived too late.We cannot make everybody’s wishes come true –​it is not magic. The most important step was creating a mechanism to resolve issues. Each side can present their issues at a TPC meeting. We discuss a herder’s problem in a way that benefits as many herders as possible.When families’ claims are approved and they receive their compensation then herders understand the TPC and the work it is doing. Using different ideas without giving up your position is the best strategy to resolve problems and stays clearly in my mind. This is proving to be very useful in today’s TPC procedures. Recently, I visited Gurvantes Soum to give training to local herders about our work. When any project comes to their land the herders must be ready to call the other side to the negotiating table. Now, the time has come for us to evaluate what will be TPC’s future aim and direction. At first, the aim was the resolution of the complaint; in the future we will try to keep such a mechanism which deals with all types of problems. The TPC is the best possible council. We designed the rules, we have cooperated and seen what was possible and impossible. We saw ourselves what was working and not working, what was the criteria to consider that something is complete.The TPC will be able to solve any problems in the future, with or without the Ombudsman.

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Part II

Extracting information –​ community engagement with mining

6  Social impact assessment in Mongolia Development and trends Baigalmaa Purevsuren,Tegshbayar Darambazar and Purevdulam Lkhagvasuren

Introduction This chapter reports on the development of a social impact assessment (SIA) guideline on mining for the Government of Mongolia, as part of the Gobi Framework1 project, a mediation model for sustainable infrastructure development. To develop the guideline, researchers aimed at identifying measures to minimise the harm and maximise the benefits from activity in the extractive industry and major infrastructure projects more generally. In the following sections, we will analyse current practices of assessing project impacts in Mongolia by reviewing existing legal frameworks, publicly available detailed environmental impact assessments (DEIA) and field work findings. Next, the details of the proposed SIA guidelines will be discussed in comparison to international best practices. Finally, we will conclude our findings and lessons learnt for a wider audience including researchers and practitioners working in this field. Mongolia has lacked experience in SIA during both the socialist and post-​ socialist periods. During the socialist period, the government constructed mine-​based settlements or mine towns, where the herders who had been using the land had no formal title to it. Where herders are forced to move due to mining activity, the current government still takes no responsibility for finding them resettlement places and ensuring their livelihoods. The mining company only compensates herders for the cost of moving or damage caused to their private property. International practices of conducting SIAs are considered to be key to building consensus between companies and local communities and ensuring that the benefits of development are maximised and costs minimised, especially the costs borne by local people (Ganbold and Ali, 2017). Although the Government of Mongolia developed environmental impact assessment (EIA) guidelines in 2006 and 2010, it has not yet adopted legal guidelines for SIA. Guidelines are composed of: (a) the government procedural regulation managing institutional relations on conducting and approving assessments and (b) a methodology adopted by relevant ministries for assessing a proposed project. The existing legal requirements for EIAs do not include an explicit DOI: 10.4324/9781003097341-8

98  Baigalmaa Purevsuren et al. social component, despite the clear links between the environment and rural livelihoods in Mongolia. There is no doubt that the extractive industry has contributed significantly to the national economy. According to the Mineral Resource and Petroleum Authority of Mongolia (MRPAM, 2020), the extractive sector comprises almost 30% of Mongolia’s GDP, over 80% of export products and over 70% of foreign direct investments. Between 1996 and 2017, more than 10,000 mining licenses were granted to companies, some of which have been annulled, transferred, terminated or the project has completed. As of December 2020, around 4% of Mongolia’s territory is covered by 2,692 mining licenses, of which 36% are for exploration and 64% for exploitation, affecting the lives of a large section of the population (MRPAM, 2020). The natural resources of Mongolia are “state public properties,” as stated in the Constitution of Mongolia. When the state manages natural resources on behalf of its people, it is important that it maximises benefits to the citizens, while minimising risks that exploitation of these resources can entail, such as environmental and social risks.This seemingly clear constitutional arrangement is, however, not that straightforward in actual practice, as many interests collide and oftentimes citizens are left with no tangible benefits (Blunt, 2014; Empson and Webb, 2014; Fraser et al., 2017; Lander, 2020). Herders are critical about the way mining companies conduct their businesses without local community consensus and ignore negative impacts on local communities after the start of operations (Cane et al., 2015). The international community has raised questions around the potential adverse effects on society of developing the extractive sector. For example, the UN Human Right Council expressed concerns that nomadic herders’ rights to pasture, hay fields and water resources were infringed upon by mining activities on their traditional lands; their free and informed consent was not obtained when licenses for mining in their traditional territory were granted; and compensation to herders affected by mining projects was not adequate. The Committee urged Mongolia to carry out human rights and EIA processes before mining licenses were granted and ensure that all stakeholders affected by such projects effectively participated in the assessment processes (HRC, 2020). Our field work and research shows that over the past 30 years herders have been removed from their homelands without appropriate resettlement areas and compensation for their losses of pastureland, water sources, livestock and even religious sites due to mining license allocations (Bonilla, 2017; Meesters and Behagel, 2017; Byambaa and de Vries, 2019, 2020; Fraser et al., 2019; Sternberg et al., 2019) As a result, civil society groups and local leaders increasingly demand that the government should completely shut down all mining activities that prevent them from maintaining their traditional nomadic lifestyle (Bumochir, 2020). At the same time, herders produce meat, milk and dairy products crucial for domestic food security (Finke, 2003; Ichinkhorloo, 2018). Livestock are central to rural livelihoods and are inheritable assets for their future generation (Finke, 2012; Undargaa and McCarthy, 2016). Decision-​makers have

Social impact assessment in Mongolia  99 not adequately considered how mining operations impact herders and the local community as well as food security and the rural economy more broadly. Thus, managing the risks and negative social and environmental impacts due to mining operations should be prioritised by the government. Mining projects and government officials often highlighted the positive impacts rather than negative social issues during our research and stakeholder consultations. We argue that most mining projects did not adequately assess social issues in potentially impacted areas and local communities for the following reasons. Firstly, earlier mineral and environmental laws in post-​socialist Mongolia were designed to increase budget revenue from extractive industries and did not regulate the social protection of local communities. Secondly, even though the EIA law has been in place since 1998 and SIA is referenced within the 2012 EIA law,2 the government of Mongolia did not draft any SIA guidelines until the Gobi Framework project suggested SIA drafting. Thirdly, mid-​level officials and small-​and medium-​sized companies prefer a deregulated business environment. During stakeholder consultations and development of proposed SIA guidelines, officials from the mining ministry and its agency for mineral resources and petroleum claimed they would be an “extra burden to mining businesses,” and the mining companies were reluctant to cooperate in pilot SIA guidelines (GF, 2020a). These mindsets originated in the totalitarian command socialism coupled with a lack of attention to or understanding of ethical business practices in post-​socialist Mongolia.

International practices of social impact assessment and their implications The legal basis of SIA first emerged in 1969/​ 70 when the US National Environment Policy Act (Burdge and Vanclay 1996) was passed, establishing the President’s Council on Environmental Quality incorporating an early version of SIA. Since then, SIA has been introduced to many countries around the world through organisations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, by mandating social and economic impact assessments as a condition for funding. There are no legally binding international agreements related to SIAs. However, there are a few basic documents that oblige governments to prevent human rights violations and restore violated rights. For example, Article 1.2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to which Mongolia acceded in 1976, states: All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-​ operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

100  Baigalmaa Purevsuren et al. Examples of the main documents and principles related to SIA, approved by international organisations and implemented as standards, include the International Finance Corporation’s “Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability” (IFC, 2012). Performance standards are followed by IMF-​funded projects such as the Oyu Tolgoi mine. Minerals sector researchers and civil society activists have become more familiar with these standards in the Oyu Tolgoi resettlement and compensation case (CAO, 2020). UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights are gaining acceptance in the country and businesses are beginning to develop sensitivity to human rights. In 2018, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a working group with the participation of government, private sector and civil society organisations to develop a Business and Human Rights Action Plan. The principles of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), Social License to Operate, and Equator Principles are being discussed, and starting to be recognised by the Mongolian public. Relevant guidelines and standards of the Asian Development Bank, World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development are also being followed by project implementers who received funding from these IFIs. Conceptualising the SIA required examination of the literature. Vanclay et al., (2015: 1) give a definition of SIA: Social impact assessment is the process of analyzing and managing the intended and unintended consequences on the human environment of planned interventions (policies, programs, plans, projects) so as to bring about a more sustainable and equitable biophysical and human environment. This handbook outlines a new understanding of SIA, considering the social impacts in a much broader sense than the limited issues often considered in EIAs (such as demographic changes, job issues, financial security and impacts on family life). These aspects emphasised by Vanclay et al. (2015) have been utilised in developing the SIA methodology in Mongolia. Table 6.1 provides eight categories for assessing social impact, which should be done on three levels: impact on the individual, on the family and on the community (GF, 2021).

Evolution of social impact assessment in EIA laws and guidelines in Mongolia The environmental and social regulations of Mongolia’s extractive industry have evolved gradually in the past three decades, shifting from a focus on pure economic development to more attention on environmental protection. Social impact issues were not visible until 2012 when a newly adopted EIA law obliged the government to develop SIA guidelines in parallel with environmental and health impact assessment guidelines.3 However, social issues were not completely absent from EIA laws and guidelines before 2012. The subsoil law of Mongolia in 1988 required mines to develop an environmental protection plan.

Social impact assessment in Mongolia  101 Table 6.1 The social impact areas and associated sub-​impacts 1. Lifestyle (not including cultural aspects): income; occupation and employment; family work and family planning; lifestyle and traditional herding; cost of living; and child labour; female labour, daily household workload. 2. Personal and property rights: land use rights; land productivity; level of living; land, pastureland, water and forest resources; livestock and productive assets; price of goods, housing. 3. Local inclusion in decision making and community governance: ability of local people to obtain project information; their ability to participate in project decisions which affect their lives; public consultation and public information by governors and chairs of Citizens Representatives Khurals (councils) at province, district and subdistrict level; and grievance mechanisms. 4. Beliefs, values, language, and culture: beliefs; language and communication; local customs, traditions, and religion; clothing, food; sites of cultural heritage and traditional significance; sites of religious or spiritual significance; and tangible and intangible cultural heritage safeguarding. 5. Community wellbeing: trust, relationships; income and inequality; information access and exchange; access to, and quality of, public health and educational amenities; elderly, child, marginalised, single parents, low-​income people’s rights, livelihood, income; crimes and violations; domestic violence; and relationship between local citizens and administration. 6. Environment: natural resources (pastureland, water, forest, animals, fish, plants); quality and availability of food; ambient noise, pollution and smell; and risk of ambient blast and dust. 7. Community health and wellbeing: community transmitted and non-​ transmitted diseases; community physical health and safety; risk of exposure to physical harm; livestock health; and social vulnerability. 8. Passion, fear, and anxiety: public safety; passion related to their children and future; concerns and fears related to the pastureland, homeland; ambiguity related to employment; vision and motivation; and fears and anxiety related to the project and associated activities. Modified from Vanclay et al., 2015: 2.

The EIA law of Mongolia was first adopted in 1998, then was revised in 2012 along with other environmental laws such as the Law on Water and Law on Air. Similar to the Minerals Law, the EIA Law was amended in 2015 and 2017. The Minerals Law of Mongolia and EIA Law are key laws regulating the extractive sector. When a company obtains a mining license to operate, they have to carry out an EIA on the mine and its associated infrastructure. The law requires a company to conduct three types of assessments:  (a) an environmental baseline study (EBS); (b) a general environmental impact assessment (GEIA) and (c) a DEIA if the Ministry of Environment requires it, based on the results of the general EIA. The Ministry of Environment, according to the EIA Law of 1998, had developed EIA guidelines in 2006 after a World Bank review (World Bank, 2006) and in 2010 after implementing the UNDP project Strengthening Environmental Governance in Mongolia –​Phase 1 (2007–​10). The revision of

102  Baigalmaa Purevsuren et al. the EIA law in 2012 brought new changes, one of which was to assess not only environmental but social as well as “health impacts of mining projects” (Snyder et  al., 2012; Johnston et  al., 2019). Clause 7.7 of the EIA law states that the Government of Mongolia shall approve procedures and guidelines that specify how environmental, health (HIA) and social impacts of a given project shall be assessed, approved and validated. Following the 2012 EIA Law revisions with the help of the UNDP Environmental Governance Project Phase 2, the government was expected to adopt EIA, SIA and HIA procedures and methodologies separately reflecting Strategic and Cumulative impact assessments (StIA, CuIA): that is, three sets of procedures and methodologies. However, the government adopted procedures only for EIA and Environmental StIA and CuIA in 2013 (government resolution no.  374). Based on this procedure, the Ministry of Environment developed EIA methodology in 2014 (Minister’s order no. A-​117) based on the previous EIA guidelines of 2006 and 2010. The Ministry of Health followed by developing HIA methodology in 2014 (Minister’s order no. 413) which was not implemented due to absence of procedures. Unfortunately, probably due to lack of knowledge and expertise, as of early 2021 SIA guidance has never been developed separately by any government agency. Consideration of social impacts prior to revisions to the EIA law in 2012 The Mongolian government developed EIA guidelines (combination of procedure and methodology) in 2006 and 2010 under 1998 EIA law. Despite significant flaws, the EIA guidelines included reference to a few random social issues inconsistently (World Bank, 2006; Dorjsuren et  al., 2015; IGF, 2017a). The 2006 EIA guideline made only generalised statements on social impacts. It required information on the number of workers the project would employ and their working conditions, and suggested the study of social hierarchies in the impact area and local people’s opinion about the project. However, reference to these issues was vague without clear instructions. In 2010, new assessment guidelines were developed through a tender process in which a professional team of environmental assessors, researchers and consultants developed an updated set of guidelines. This process coincided with increased public awareness of environmental and social issues related to mining. The new guidelines included changes in health and nutrition, job creation, poverty reduction, migration and issues related to cultural and historical significance of the impacted area in addition to social issues. Socioeconomic, cultural and environmental sections assess mining impacts on religion, history, culture, traditional knowledge and regional issues. Although the 2010 guideline was not well structured or user friendly, it served as the foundation for social, health and environmental methodologies. Even though the SIA methodology did not yet exist, during our stakeholder consultation sessions, the government and mining companies explained that: (1) DEIA and (2) feasibility studies assess mining social impacts and (3) local development agreement can stand in for a social management plan.As per recent

Social impact assessment in Mongolia  103 amendments to the Minerals Law (2012), extractive projects that have secured their mining license have to make an agreement with local sums (districts). While a local development agreement or community development agreement (Sternberg et  al., 2019) is not exactly a benefit sharing agreement in a classical sense (Blunt, 2014), it is somewhat similar and companies and local sum authorities often include funding support for items such as “building kindergarten at sum centre,” or “support local Naadam celebration.” While there are flaws to current local development agreements, even more worrying is the way these agreements are developed and agreed upon. When we visited Airag and Dalanjargalan sums of Dornogobi province and interviewed herders and local communities, we learned that many mining companies make an agreement with the province governor and all funding from those agreements goes to the province budget, not to the sum. Moreover, even local government officials have indicated that they are not aware of what sort of clauses are included in those agreements, and do not think any funding comes to the local county budget which hosts the mine. To prevent such flaws, we have included specific sections on how to make a benefit sharing agreement as part of the SIA process and how to ensure its transparency and implementation. Mongolia’s DEIA guidelines specify that the DEIA studies shall consider the social impacts of mining projects, particularly: impacts on local transport, communication and energy infrastructure; changes to local population composition, culture and education level; and how projects may affect local communities’ livelihoods through changes in land use.While these are certainly good attempts to capture the social impacts of mining, they are not comprehensive and also never sufficiently fulfilled in practice. As per the “Procedure to Conduct the Feasibility Study” (separate from EIA), the SIA methodology needs to be included in the Feasibility Study. Definitions and methodologies to assess social impacts in this Procedure to Conduct the Feasibility Study are vague, requiring companies to “predict” the health safety and the job-​specific hazards (without any assessment) and “envision” the risk monitoring and prevention training expenses, while having a safety plan for employees and identifying the health and technical necessities for the company (GF, 2020b). These predicted impacts need to be juxtaposed with mineral valuations and expected profits to compare the pros and cons of the project. Furthermore, feasibility studies are approved by the Minerals Council of the Ministry of Mining and reviewed by geologists only, who have no obligation to assess the social aspects of the study. Suggested social assessment sections which need to be detailed in the DEIA, the Feasibility Study or the local development agreement seem to have no link to one another and lack robust plans for monitoring and mitigation. In contrast, experts and civil society practitioners (Beck et al., 2007; Gibson and O’Faircheallaigh, 2011; Cane et  al., 2015; Naalakkersuisut, 2016; IGF, 2017b; IRMA, 2018; Kvam, 2018) argue that even though SIA processes have always had a vast scope, a mere collection of data could not resolve the issues for the community affected by mining. Moreover, the law only requires a company to conduct such assessments after obtaining an exploitation license, which

104  Baigalmaa Purevsuren et al. means both the EIA and the social data are conducted or collected only during the mining phase, not before. The procedure on EIA defines the structure and content of the EIA. When a project is implemented, it needs to compare baseline data with changes in the environmental management plan. In other words, we argue that the social impacts assessed within the EIA guidelines are a “depiction of numbers collected from various sources with no further purpose or prospective targeted actions” to solve or mitigate social issues either by the government or the companies. Thus, the social information in countless reports submitted by the mining companies to the government bodies is rarely evaluated to justify the future government policy steps.

Cases of assessing social impacts in the EIA legal framework We were able to study the current practice of conducting EIAs by consulting the website of the Environmental Information Centre, the Institute of Meteorology and Hydrology, Ministry of Environment. In total, 8,560 GEIA reports and 6,206 DEIA reports were uploaded for public view in this database (EIC, 2020) (see Figure 6.1). Currently, 102 companies have been licensed by the Ministry of Environment to conduct an SIA, 21 of which are in mining (EIC, 2020). Analysing these reports is challenging because only five sections of each report have been uploaded into the database. The sections available for view are the: report registration sheet, impact mitigation plan, risk assessment, environmental management plan and monitoring evaluation plans. All other key documents such as the project background information, how impacts were measured and assessed, how local communities were consulted and the

Number of DEIA reports 700

650

600 506

500

434

417 400

336

302

272

300

142

100 1

1

12

36

55

88

Figure 6.1 Number of DEIA reports in Mongolia.

250

245

208

200

0

372

142

Social impact assessment in Mongolia  105 decision of the local Citizen Khural about the project are missing.Viewing all the reports may reveal a widespread copy–​ paste syndrome by companies working in the same region. Experience of SIA among these companies is questionable because one cannot see a substantial analysis of social impacts from the current EIAs. In Dornogovi province alone, a total of 248 detailed EIA reports were registered for 2001–​20, of which only 97 main reports are available to view.The remainder are supplementary reports. According to Clause 8 of the EIA law, the detailed EIA report should include at least 20 sections in 9 important categories, such as environmental background, potential adverse effects, their intensity and prevalence and assessment of environmental and human health risks. Dalanjargalan sum has 404,000 hectares of land with a population of 2,800 people in 821 households. Over half of the population live by herding livestock (see https://​dornogovi.nso.mn). The sum has over 100 mining licenses, covering almost two-​thirds of the territory, mainly in fluorspar, coal, iron, limestone and semi-​precious stones. The Dartsagt iron ore project in Dalanjargalan has a proven reserve of 47  million tons of iron ore and its licensed area is 907.49 hectares of land. The project is owned by Taisheng Development LLC, subsidiary of FeOre Limited registered in Hong Kong, and Beyond Compare Limited registered in the Netherlands (FeOre Limited, 2012). The company also operates an iron ore project in the neighbouring sum of Bayanjargalan. The company received its mining license in 2012 and had the Durvun Talst Ecology company conduct a DEIA in 2017 with projected operation for 2017–​34 but it has not started as of early 2021 (Durvun Talst Ecology, 2017). Before the Dartsagt project was approved, a GEIA conducted by the Ministry of Environment listed necessary assessments in the DEIA including risks regarding: (1) violation of local communities’ land tenure and use rights, (2)  negative impact on their social status, (3)  resettlement needs, (4)  threats to health, (5) livelihoods and (6) historical and cultural values. A GEIA dated 22 March 2015 with reference number 05/​3159 by the Ministry of Green Development and Tourism concluded with an order to the company to start exploitation after conducting a DEIA and by “developing a mitigation plan to reduce negative impacts on livelihoods of local community” in the recommendation number 12 (Durvun Talst Ecology, 2017: 4). However, it seems that Durvun Talst did not conduct a social assessment of the above-​mentioned potential impacts in their DEIA. As the detailed environmental assessment report is not available in full, we could not find the social impact section. In the sections on “Recommendations for Prevention, Reduction and Mitigation of Negative Impacts” and “Environmental Protection Management Plan,” there were no social impact-​related measures. The areas of discussion were environmental issues such as air quality, surface, subsoil, soil cover, plant resources and fauna without any social implication. Only in the section on water resources, it suggested that “regular monitoring of water sources including herders’ wells and help herders if there is an impact” (Durvun Talst Ecology, 2017: 3). If we do not count the “recommendation to ensure occupational safety and health issues

106  Baigalmaa Purevsuren et al. in employment contract and give attention to the hygiene in the canteen” as a SIA, there are no social issues covered in the report. It is impossible for such a big project to conclude that there are no households or herders to be affected and resettled by the project. The DEIA completely ignored herders’ access and use of land surface resources in the project area. It also overlooked herders’ seasonal pasture use, common property resources and access to water sources mentioned in the environmental sections. If we see the environmental management plan, budgeted at MNT 553 million for 5 years in 2017–​22, the planned activities include sampling and measuring water levels of wells and springs within a 5 km radius of the mine. How can the assessment company fail to consider the use of water sources by herders and the local community given that they are crucial for local livelihoods? The report also missed the assessment of archaeological and palaeontological sites completely, and simply recommended the project implementer to contact professionals if the company encounters such findings. Since the assessment company did not identify any negative social impacts, nothing will be done for the local community to reduce such impacts. The DEIA (Nature Friendly, 2012) of the Undai river regime of the Oyu Tolgoi mine shows that baseline socioeconomic sections cover quite limited information such as number of children who are in school or number of livestock each household owns. In this same report, access to infrastructure and job creation are identified as positive social impacts, and changes to water supply and pasture, air pollution and dust creation as negative impacts. In response to those identified impacts, socioeconomic mitigation measures were determined as regular project information disclosure and reporting of project environmental monitoring results to herders. Such mitigation measures are not adequate compared to very comprehensive mitigation measures that were identified regarding the environmental impacts of the project. The ESIA (Green Trends, 2015) of Coal-​to-​Synthetic Gas Extraction Plant of Wuhuan Engineering company in Baganuur is one of few assessments prepared which is in compliance with World Bank standards. The Green Trends EIA company assessed social and environmental impacts by using a standard approach on social issues such as positive impact of job creation, SMEs and local economic capacity building. Socioeconomic issues assessed included economic status, demographics, education, health and religion. A list of 164 potential environmental and social impacts of the project were identified where 24% of them were assessed as low impact, 63% as medium, 5% as high and 9% as positive (Green Trends, 2015: 5–​6). Out of 175 impacts, social impacts on the local community numbered 41 (28 negative and 13 positive impacts) and were included in the mitigation and management plan which was loosely shaped around employee health and safety, job creation and local procurement (p. 6/​44–​6/​48). The major drawback is that it did not analyse mitigation issues thoroughly in consultation with the local community to consider how to ensure sustainable livelihoods. The assessment methodology is not clearly stated in the report. Most importantly, the assessment company

Social impact assessment in Mongolia  107 reported that it conducted a community survey in 2016 as part of the project, but there is no sign of it. Other widespread practices of finding solutions for social impacts are the legal requirement for a direct consultation meeting between the herder community and mining companies, under supervision of local government. This initiative is supported by donors including Open Society Forum, think tanks and civil society organisations. Such consultations are backed by clause 41.1 of the Mineral Law about monitoring of local development funds, clause 18.4 of EIA law about consultation between the assessment company and local people, and the General Administration Law and Public Hearing Law. However, these initiatives are not sustainable as they suggest a temporary solution based on voluntary mechanisms and mining companies do not have to comply. Additionally, the results of the meeting are not taken into consideration in mining planning or implementation. If a community is heavily against a mine, the meeting results are simply minuted and submitted to the government as part of the legal requirement. This is not a process of FPIC or even participatory decision-​making. It is simply an opportunity for consultation and discussion. For example, in Dalanjargalan, Dornogovi province, the subcounty Citizens Khural organised a public discussion between all mining companies and the local citizens to resolve the accumulated social impacts that contributed to problems to the community since the heavy operations of mining began in 2020. Both companies and residents were actively involved in it and, as agreed during the discussion, groups of eight families were assigned to each company to resolve their identified social issues. Due to the unequal powers of stakeholders and herder lack of negotiation skills, the local people requested mining companies to solve specific problems such as requesting winter food supplies for livestock or routine medical check-​ups for elderly, but not long-​term solutions to social negative impacts. This case shows that SIA must be legalised and force all mining stakeholders, especially mining companies, to comply with SIA regulations and the rule of law. The last example of mitigating social issues voluntarily by mining companies and the local government is the attempt to create a local development fund, which often attracts politicians. As the Conflict of Interest Law of Mongolia restricts a government agency from making decisions on a company which has given funds to it, it has become impossible for the companies to give contributions directly to local government. Rather, companies have established a local non-​governmental organisation to manage the funds from mining companies. However, discussion with the local community revealed that such funds have been used not for the community’s benefit but for the traditional gaming praises by the biggest or the most influential company’s beneficial owners and it became a source of lobbying public officials, conflict of interest and political contributions. The Government of Mongolia’s attempts to solve social problems cannot be denied (see Table 6.2). Still, approaches on SIA have failed to be effective. Our findings have shown two things:  (a) the earlier methods of problem solving,

108  Baigalmaa Purevsuren et al. Table 6.2 Comparison of national and international social impact mitigation tools

1

2

3

At the international level

In Mongolia

-​ Environmental impact assessment -​Social impact assessment -​Health impact assessment -​Human rights impact assessment Stakeholder engagement plan

-​ Conducted

Land/​Compensation agreement Resettlement action plan

4

Benefit sharing agreement

Community development plan

Social investment programme

5

Grievance mechanism; Ombudsman

6

Environmental audit Social audit

-​Conducted inadequately -​Conducted inadequately -​Not conducted According to the relevant law, a cooperation agreement is concluded with the local government, but it is only a bilateral agreement between the local government and the licensee. Land and water use contracts are concluded in accordance with relevant laws. Compensation is not covered by specific agreements or plans. There is no legal regulation. Not considered in the framework of special agreements and plans. No legal regulation. No specific agreement. The Cooperation Agreement with the local government covers the issue of benefit sharing to some extent, but the conclusion of the agreement is insufficient. No specific agreement. The Cooperation Agreement with the local government covers some issues such as providing jobs for local people and local procurement, but the conclusion of the agreement is insufficient. No specific contract. It is considered within the framework of the cooperation agreement with the local government. In practice, it is common for companies to make irregular, unplanned, and random investments based on local government requests as part of corporate social responsibility. No legal regulations. Both IFC and EBRD investments have received complaints from local communities, but these rely on the standards of the financier. Conducted. Legal regulations are in place. Not conducted. There are no legal regulations.

Authors compiled by reviewing Mongolian legal framework.

which were in place from 2013 to 2021, have been ineffective, and (b) social impacts need to be systematically assessed using social science methods, considering risks, influencing factors and impacts identified by the project-​ affected community itself with a proper negative impact mitigation plan that they can monitor themselves. As one can see from the summary of comments

Social impact assessment in Mongolia  109 received from citizens, herders and public officials of different communities affected by mining activities, local citizens’ awareness of impending impacts have increased in some areas but not all (MME, 2012). Over ten laws contain similar requirements to identify impacts and risks to property and personal interests and ensure a socially and ecologically friendly environment for the people. However, having such laws does not mean that they have actually been realised in practice as the methodology to conduct the assessment was not defined. Thus, like the EIA, the methodology of the SIA was deficient and the most effective way to monitor should be through the management plan which should be reviewed annually together with the environmental management plan and involve all stakeholders equally.

Social issues specific to Mongolia overlooked in assessments When social issues are discussed under the umbrella of EIA in Mongolia, mining stakeholders often overlook the country’s sociocultural and economic foundation which is pastoral nomadism. Herders’ dependence on the environment, the social organisation of herder families (Ichinkhorloo and Yeh, 2016), and their entitlement to resources (Leach et al., 1999) are the key determinants of herders’ quality of life. Thus, the major changes in people’s daily lives since mining operations began in rural areas include: income from livestock reduced as their wool is contaminated and fetches less money; number of livestock reduced due to lack of resettlement places and adequate pastureland; poor nutrition for livestock caused by the unrestored environment, as well as conflicts between herders as families are squeezed into smaller areas of available pasture. This affects herders’ livelihood not only now but into future generations. Other social issues discovered during the Gobi Framework Project (field works in 2018–​19) and consultants’ discussions include: limited access to and reduction in clean water; lack of jobs in mining companies for local people; lack of compensation and resettlement policies; unfair valuation of their assets; increased stress and health-​related problems due to blasting of mine holes; loss of land titles by herders; forced resettlement; dust from unpaved roads created by mining companies; lack of monitoring of environmental management plans; lack of discussions, notifications and public engagement prior to the licensing and local development agreements; absence of accountability and association between environmental restoration and license extension. Mining companies need to assure permanent jobs for the local community, according to the local development agreement. In addition to these issues, due to a lack of comprehension of map coordinates and the mismatch between official names of locations and local references, governors of provinces may approve exploration licenses proposed by the government which involve works at key sites of cultural heritage, traditional significance or nomadic settlements. Conflicts between the companies and the local people may go to court for cases lasting up to three years, during which time companies suspend all activities, including environmental management,

110  Baigalmaa Purevsuren et al. restoration and local payments. Furthermore, in a battle of unequal powers, there aren’t many cases where a local community has won a settlement.

Development of SIA methodology through consultation To eliminate the existing regulatory gap discussed above and ensure thorough assessment of mining social impacts, Mongolia needs a very effective regulatory mechanism. In early 2020, a Government Working Group was created to address the policy gaps on SIA guidelines and resettlement issues. The Working Group members included the Geology and Mining Policy Coordination Department of the Ministry of Mining and Heavy Industry; the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Management of the Ministry of Nature, Environment and Tourism; the Department of Environment, Geology and Mining Inspection, Professional Inspection Agency; Population Development Department of the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection; the Public Health Department of the Ministry of Health; Steps without Borders NGO; and the Gobi Framework Project of the University of Oxford. The lead of the working group is the Sector Management and Coordination Department of the Cabinet Secretariat of the Government of Mongolia. In developing the group’s methodology, it was decided that defining the social impact of the project on the local area in a broad sense would be a key issue, and that identification of the area of influence, and compensation and resettlement issues would be considered as part of the management plan. Therefore, the authors of this chapter, a social scientist, an environmental specialist and a lawyer, conducted research and consultation on SIA guidelines between May–​July 2020 and October–​January 2021. Consultations involved more than 200 people, including herders, lawyers, public officials such as social workers, Citizens’ Representative Khural members, sum and bag (subdistrict) governors, land managers, environmentalists, professional inspectors and representatives from the EIA companies and extractive industry companies. The guidance developed also incorporated key components from international and domestic human rights, SIA principles and methodologies and domestic law. Twelve meetings, discussions and trainings were organised during the Project and 136 suggestions and recommendations were received which were incorporated into the draft Social Impact Assessment Methodology, which we submitted to the Working Group on 21 January 2021 (GF 2021). Stakeholder engagement activities began with meetings with representatives of several different ministries and government agencies, namely, the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET), Ministry of Labour and Social Protection (MLSP) and Mineral Resources and Petroleum Authority of Mongolia (MRPAM). Additionally, we organised a number of workshops to hear the views of various actors in the field. The objective in all of our meetings was to introduce our work developing the SIA guideline and receive their feedback and comments to ensure practicality, usefulness and relevancy of the guideline for the Mongolian context.

Social impact assessment in Mongolia  111 Our first meeting was with officials of the MRPAM. MRPAM officials were totally against the guideline. They saw the SIA process as an extra burden for mining companies in addition to the existing EIA process, whereby mining project proponents must obtain a “no rejection” or “support project” official letter from the local sum government. Furthermore, MRPAM officials argued that local communities or herders should not have any say over mining projects, since such projects are key contributors to Mongolian economy and are approved at Government and Parliament level, but herders tend to be against mining and often try to stop any project. Many mining operations are in delay due to herders’ opposition or civil society protests, they further argued. MET officials were supportive of the guideline development process, but were concerned that they would not possess the skills or resources to evaluate any SIA reports submitted to their Ministry for review and approval. When we met with the MLSP officials, they stated that the Ministry has very limited experience with SIA, let  alone mining SIA, except for a few assessments they had done of the social implications of certain national level policies or programmes. The MLSP specialists provided some useful suggestions on the potential scope of the mining SIA, but were not keen on becoming the main body that guides and approves it. After conducting some open discussions with government officials, our team headed to Airag and Dalanjargalan sums of Dornogobi province to have one-​ on-​one interviews and focus group discussions with herders and local government representatives.We chose the location because these sums have the highest number of mining licenses in Mongolia. Mines in these sums were Chinese-​ owned and Mongolian-​operated coal, iron ore and mostly sparry mines. In our discussions with herders and local government officials, some common themes emerged: local communities do not get meaningfully consulted, mining project implementers do not conduct SIA, environmental and social mitigation measures are generally absent, and conflicts between companies and local herders are regular. According to local people, civil society organisations together with herders had organised many local protests against irresponsible mines and sent official requests for help to Parliament working groups and committees, but were yet to see any result. According to local herders and officials, the biggest challenges they face due to unregulated and not cooperative mines are loss of pasture and water, therefore, loss of livelihoods. In consultation with stakeholders, we came up with our own indicators in the eight general categories shown in Table  6.1. For instance, to understand how mining may have impacted local communities’ way of life, one could look at how household income generation activities have changed. The main source of income could have shifted from livestock production to working at mining or supplying goods and/​or services to mining. Again, in the vicinity of Oyu Tolgoi mine, light vehicles and motorcycles have proliferated and many herders now use these instead of traditional transport such as pack animals. Another item in this category is cost of living. Before Oyu Tolgoi mine was established, there were fewer hotels or supermarkets locally compared to today. As a result,

112  Baigalmaa Purevsuren et al. the general population’s purchasing power has changed, increasing the cost of living in the area. Similar to this example, we have defined specific indicators for each of the eight general categories and included them in the guideline. One of the challenges that surfaced during guideline development was different stakeholders’ varying degree of prior understanding about SIA. When we introduced the scope of the guideline to stakeholders, some thought it was too comprehensive, and would require lengthy time and resources to complete, while others argued more items need to be added to the list. Another argument was that if the guideline requires such broad scope to be covered in the study, it would become too burdensome and unachievable by small-​scale local companies. Some criticised our team for thinking only about mining giants such as Oyu Tolgoi, which was not the case. Currently in Mongolia, EIAs are done by researchers working for the EIA firm. However, in our guideline, we suggested SIAs should be conducted by a mixed team consisting of local community members as well as researchers, the reason being that local herders and communities tend to distrust independent researchers and often accuse them of being bought by mining project proponents. Many herders also blame government officials for giving out mining permissions to companies that do not meet set criteria. Therefore, to avoid such challenges for SIA, we suggested a mixed team of local community members and independent firms to conduct the study. Local representatives in the SIA team, however, must include representatives from women, vulnerable groups, disabled individuals and local authorities in the impact assessment. Energy Resources LLC (ER) is a Mongolian-​ owned and -​ operated coal mining company located in Tsogtstsetsii sum of South Gobi province. Due to the employment offered by ER, many people have moved from Ulaanbaatar to Tsogtstsetsii, become permanent residents and got elected in local positions such as Citizens’ Khural. However, civil society organisations tend to see this phenomenon negatively, arguing that those elected for local government who also work for a private company may make decisions favourable to the company. To avoid such misunderstanding and challenges, in our guideline, we specified that people must have resided in the area for at least ten years to be selected for the SIA team on behalf of the local community. While the SIA development process presented its challenges as well as opportunities, we believe that the newly developed SIA methodology is innovative and advanced in the following ways. The principles to be followed in assessments are elaborated in detail. Although civil servants suggested that the principles should be made concise as the principle of fairness in public administration was already established, we sought to detail them clearly so that the draft methodology would be more advanced and consistent with common international trends. In particular, it is a crucial principle that local people and other stakeholders participate in decisions that affect their lives and livelihoods without any pressure or intimidation and with objective information. In addition, the SIA should be a process that can continuously improve, the assessment should be carried out by trained professionals, the livelihoods of local people

Social impact assessment in Mongolia  113 should not be worsened, the project implementer should realistically plan and implement activities to increase the benefits of the project, resettlement should be the last resort, a proper compensation programme should be implemented and a grievance mechanism should be in place. The grievance mechanism (in Mongolian, mechanism for reviewing and resolving suggestions and complaints) has been expanded in terms of content. The word “suggestion” has been added first, because local people need to get information about local projects and be able to submit suggestions, and if this need is not fulfilled, their suggestions are likely to turn into complaints. Second, the inclusion of this mechanism in the methodology has the advantage of empowering local people, preventing violations of citizens’ rights and creating real opportunities for the restoration of violated rights. Mongolian governments may have been dragging their feet over a regulatory framework for mining SIAs in the past 20 years. However, now more than ever it’s crucial to hear local communities’ views on mining development to ensure their livelihoods are not jeopardised. For this important endeavour, while the SIA guideline is a first step, it would only gain its full power by being integrated into EIA regulation and actively implemented by critical line ministries such as the MLSP together with the MET.

Conclusion Because of missing elements in the regulations of Mongolia, people’s rights have been continuously transgressed. The Laws of Mongolia do not define what social impacts are, or the scope and methodology of the SIA. By studying the legal environment and reviewing existing practices of assessing social impacts, we have made the draft methodology more comprehensive. Recommendations from civil society, researchers and the international community convinced us that it is important to accept the SIA is much more than the prediction steps within an environmental assessment framework, and that the current approach of collecting certain social statistics within the EIA did not create any benefits to the community. This is evident in thousands of DEIA reports conducted in Mongolia leading to more conflicts rather than solutions. These documents tell us to consider the social impacts caused by the sector in a more precise way, with a wider scope, by assessing the impacts on an individual, on the household, on the local community, on the region and on the country, with the aim of increasing the positive impacts while eliminating the negatives ones. We aimed at ensuring the compliance of the SIA with internationally accepted standards and best practices. Requiring a mandatory consultation with the affected community prior to the mining exploration phase through the documented evidences submitted along with the SIA report by the assessment companies is one of the solutions proposed by the team.Training of stakeholders to identify unique social impacts in their area, approving the planning and results of various documents presented by the extractive industry companies

114  Baigalmaa Purevsuren et al. to the government agencies and ensuring that the follow-​up, monitoring and inspection reports are outcome-​led and open to the public should be prioritised for successful implementation of the SIA in Mongolia. As there were many concerns about the extra burden to the companies of adding the SIA to the mandatory documents, it was designed to be conducted in tandem with the EIA, meaning: (a) environmental baseline study together with social baseline study, (b) GEIA together with general SIA, (c) DEIA together with detailed SIA and (d) environmental–​social management plan as one document.

Notes from the field Mongolia: Chinese Investment and the Belt & Road Initiatives Aicholpon Alieva (Jorupbekova) The Kyrgyz Republic is a beautiful mountainous country in Central Asia that shares a border with China, and three former Soviet republics: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan, which declared independence from the Soviet Union almost 30 years ago, has lately been referred to as a new go-​to tourism destination and praised by popular travel magazines for the hospitality of its people and the unspoiled beauty of its sky-​scaring mountains. Indeed, these very mountains, which are considered by the nomadic Kyrgyz people as their home, the origin of their ancestors and a gift to future generations are now the source of heavy tension among the people, the Kyrgyz government and mining companies. Soviet Kyrgyzstan saw some mining activity, including heavy uranium production in the 1960s. However, in comparison to other more industrialised Soviet republics, Kyrgyzstan remained largely agricultural. In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed, and Kyrgyzstan became independent and solely responsible for its own economic growth. With the purpose of boosting its economy, the new Kyrgyz government identified mining as an industry which could easily attract foreign investment and generate, in a comparatively short period of time, substantial revenues. Hopes for the country’s mining industry were high, especially considering that there were a fair number of good quality deposits already discovered by Soviet geologists ready for exploitation. With the exception of Kumtor gold deposit, the Kyrgyz government has not been able to attract suitable investors for the past 30 years. On the contrary, questionable investors from different countries have come and gone as dubious deals were entered into by the government. Promises of a better life, high paying jobs and regional development were made to people by mining companies and the state but rarely, if ever, delivered. As mines remained undeveloped, their titles repeatedly changed hands behind the scenes without the knowledge of, or benefit to, the state or

Social impact assessment in Mongolia  115 the people. There have been a number of legal disputes around mining projects, and as a result, the Kyrgyz government has squandered fortunes in legal fees and investor compensation. Over the years, people’s dissatisfaction with mining companies and the government responsible for the regulation of the mining industry has grown. The process of awarding mining rights was centralised and done without the input of local residents and local authorities. Local residents residing near licensed areas and civil society organisations have often accused the government of being corrupt and mining companies of being non-​transparent and non-​compliant with environmental legislation. The genuine concern of people, especially those residing near mine sites, arose from the fact that for many years mining companies operated behind closed doors. Within such companies, there were no established practices of: (a) sharing information with the public, (b) public discussions of their plans and activities and (c) social and environmental impact. As a result, local opposition to exploration and mining projects grew.The information gap created by mining companies and the state was filled with rumours and fictitious tales such as the one about the two-​headed sheep being born as a result of mining pollution. Starting from 2010, interest in gold projects and the intensification of exploration and mining activities increased as the price of gold rose steadily. Increased on-​site operations led to various conflicts between companies and local residents on employment, environmental and other issues. The number of such conflicts peaked in 2010–​ 15 and in some cases, these resulted in road blocks, the destruction of property, hijacking of mining equipment and even the hostage taking of workers of mining companies. For example, in 2011, a small group of local residents set on fire the geological camp of one of the exploration companies in Talas, located in the west of Kyrgyzstan claiming that the exploration company’s activities were causing harm to their livestock. Later, in 2013, at Shambesai gold deposit located in the south of Kyrgyzstan, local residents opposed to the development of the mine blocked access to the mine site, demanded from miners that they leave the village and hijacked their bulldozer and took over the company’s office in the village. Finally, from 2013 to 2015, residents of several villages located near Bozymchak copper and gold deposit regularly blocked roads to the mine claiming that dust from blasting works caused harm to their health and property, and that heavy vehicles used by the mining company were destroying village roads. Indeed, the environmental concerns of the local residents were valid. Existing environmental legislation in Kyrgyzstan consisted of 2–​3 framework laws which required an EIA for mining projects. EIAs were first adopted in 1999, and a bylaw stating how EIAs must be implemented was established only in 2015. The administration of the laws was poor as the state lacked knowledge about up-​to-​date environmental standards in mining. In addition, it did not have sufficient human and financial resources

116  Baigalmaa Purevsuren et al. to monitor and hold mining companies accountable.With the exception of a handful of larger companies who are accountable for their environmental practices to Western shareholders or financiers, the vast majority of the 1,500–​1,700 exploration and mining companies operating in Kyrgyzstan are unlikely to meet minimum standards for carrying out EIAs. In some cases, EIAs are carried out on the basis of outdated statistical and scientific data, without even site visits. In the majority of cases, despite the legal requirements, the EIA materials are not publicly accessible. On the contrary, they are regarded by the companies and state environmental agencies as documents containing commercial information, thus not subject to disclosure to third parties. Public consultations, which are required by law and are key for carrying out EIAs, are often not conducted at all. Meanwhile, when such consultations are conducted, in most cases they appear to be orchestrated by the companies or state or local authorities which are more interested in the economic proceeds from mining than in becoming aware of any related environmental risks. There are no publicly known mining projects in Kyrgyzstan that were cancelled or development techniques or technology that were changed as a result of an EIA. This indicates that EIAs are regarded merely as a formality and as something that needs to be overcome before exploration and mining commences. In the absence of other significant and long-​term income generating industries, the Kyrgyz economy today will not survive without proceeds from the mining industry. Mining companies are able to operate successfully only if there is open and continuous dialogue between all stakeholders which addresses the genuine environmental concerns of local residents residing near mine sites. The following recommendations are encouraged:  the Kyrgyz government should work continuously on the improvement and administration of environmental legislation; mining companies should voluntarily undertake any obligations to follow best industry environmental, employment and mining safety practices; and local communities, when their rights are violated, should resolve them through lawful mechanisms only.

Notes 1 A collaboration between the School of Geography and Environment of the University of Oxford, the University of Central Asia and the Independent Research Institute of Mongolia, see https://​gobiframeworks.ouce.ox.ac.uk. 2 EIA law of 2012 Article 7.7 specifies that the government of Mongolia has to develop EIA, SIA, HIA guidelines and methodologies. See more in the www.legalinfo.mn/​ law/​details/​8665. 3 For this and other laws and regulations, see www.legalinfo.mn.

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7  Mining melodrama in Mongolia A Gurvantes case study Tserennadmid Mijiddorj and Tsendsuren Purevsuren

Notes from the field, Nadia Mijjidorj, 2019 The spring dust storm and cold wind was not pleasant for us when we arrived in Gurvantes Soum (district) centre in May 2019. We struggled to find a place to stay for several weeks because now there were too many options. Gurvantes has expanded a lot since the first time I visited in 2003.Things had dramatically changed in the last ten years, the chronology coinciding with mining activities in the area. I was remembering my first time in Gurvantes Soum long ago for snow leopard research and conservation projects. 2003 was my very first official trip; everything was so new and interesting for me that I can recall it like yesterday. The small, ordinary village had no electricity, very few people and everyone knew each other. At the time my colleague and I were strangers in the soum, everyone saw us with curious eyes and watched every single movement. After 16 years I returned to a much bigger soum where the population had rapidly increased (2005–​3,742; 2019–​10,142) because of mining. People don’t know each other as much, like in a big city. No one looks at me like a stranger because now I was one of many strangers.With the mining boom, the soum has many hotels for visitors, right now I’m staying one of them. Before there was no hotel and people welcomed us in their homes. I used to stay with Oyuntseren, who was a local doctor and had been involved with conservation activities since 1999. Today she is an active community leader and a senior coordinator of the Snow Leopard Project. Recently she said: everyone used to know each other. Over the last 4–​5 years a lot of outsiders have moved in looking for mining. This has transformed Gurvantes into a suburban place with inadequate shelter and more crime. On the positive side, almost everything people need is available here. Some options are much better than in UB (the capital). This is a great change that has resulted from mining coming to town. Along with hotels, there are several guanz “cafeteria” restaurants and karaoke bars lining the street like in an urbanised area. Most were created for people who arrived for work related to mining such as truck drivers, mine workers and DOI: 10.4324/9781003097341-9

Mining melodrama in Mongolia  121 outsiders on short visits. This may appear to help develop the rural town and increase income and jobs. But site-​specific study revealed this is more a rescue for herders who lost many livestock in dzuds (extreme winter) and droughts (Mijiddorj et al., 2019).This short-​term work is not sustainable if mining activities stops and dramatically impacts livelihoods in local communities (Stern, 1994; Kojo, 2010; Dagvadorj et al., 2018). Mining activities create unfavourable conditions, increased risk to herders and alters traditional practices while causing irreversible environmental damage. I realised mining issues in Gurvantes are a much bigger issue than snow leopards (predators that may eat livestock) to local people. Great changes lead to rural transformation and social inequalities.

Mining and community conflict in Gobi region –​case study in Gurvantes, South Gobi Gurvantes Soum (district) in South Gobi, Mongolia, presents a microcosm of mining issues in Mongolia. The area had no previous mining history, then mining exploded in the early 2000s (Table 7.1). Now 268,708 hectares covering 14.2% of the area are registered with mining exploration licenses (Figure 7.1). There have been at least 27 mining licenses issued for the district and there has been an increase in artisanal small-​scale mining, here called “ninja mining.”The size varies from mega-​projects to individual ninja mining. The district provides a window into the complex interactions resource extraction entails as communities, companies and governments pursue conflicting agendas and outcomes. Mining clashes with customary herding, the main community livelihood. Powerful national forces and foreign businesses compete for land and resource access. Uncertainty, corruption and disappointment may not be addressed or compensated by uneven local development, promises of future benefit and meeting a national agenda (Marshall, 2001; Sneath, 2006). Here, as a detailed case study, we document an inevitable process that awaits mining expansion across Mongolia (Sternberg et al., 2020). As the major industrial sector in Mongolia, extractive industries account for approximately 30% of GDP in 2017 (Export.gov, 2017). Since the early 2000s the mining boom has intensified extraction of gold, coal, copper resources due to unrestrained Table 7.1 Notable mining companies in Gurvantes Company

Start date

Type

Ownership

Qinghua-​MAK mining MAK LLC Agi Manangiin Toromkhon South Gobi sand Resources Usukh Zoos LLC Javklant Ord LLC Coal Trans LLC

2003 2008 2009 2009 2014 2015 2017

Coal Coal Gold Coal Coal Coal Coal

Mongolian/​Chinese Mongolian Korean Chinese Mongolian/​Chinese Chinese Mongolian

122  Tserennadmid Mijiddorj and Tsendsuren Purevsuren

Figure 7.1 Gurvantes soum mining licenses. There are 130.487.8 ha area under extracting and 268,708.8 ha area registered as exploring mining licenses which covers over 14.2% total area of Gurvantes soum.

allocation of mining licenses (Byambajav et al., 2011). Despite the significant increase of mineral extraction that benefited economic growth and development, they also bring unintended and negative consequences to local people and environments (Myadar and Jackson, 2019). Similar to developing countries across the world, mining-​related conflicts are becoming a common phenomenon in Mongolia (Mott MacDonald, 2005; Conde, 2017) (Figure 7.2). Often conflict arises between locals and companies due to misunderstandings and lack of engagement. Communities and company decision-​makers are meant to develop local-​level social and environmental obligations to reduce negative impacts of various projects (Meesters and Behagel, 2017). Many local people do not know whether Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) exist and have no information about companies’ social responsibilities. Collaboration agreements and contracts between companies and local administrations are required to be open for public examination according to Mongolia’s anti-​corruption and mineral laws (Mongolian General Administrative Law, 2015). Yet few people have the courage to ask for contracts in order to review the content.The limited input from local people into the EIA plan and local level agreement (LLA) creates inequality among the public. Often EIAs do not meet the standard requirements

Mining melodrama in Mongolia  123

Figure 7.2  Gurvantes and Khan Bogd districts, Mongolia (Mayaud and Sternberg, 2017).

or may lack ground-​truthing. Some LLAs are made by companies and local government without follow-​up, citizen or third-​party oversight. Common land rights for pasture and water sources, managed by local government administrative processes, often get disregarded in favour of exclusive land use demanded by open pit extraction (Byambajav, 2012). Although mining activities may be helpful for local development, too many mining activities displease local people and have little community benefit. Many herders express exhaustion and annoyance with mining impacts and consequences. As I remember, one male (50ish) herder said, “initially those companies promised to do many things in the Gobi, now you see at soum center only few sandwich buildings are here. I don’t think this is development.” In Gurvantes, one way to save land from mining is to identify land for “local special needs” for a five-​year period (Mongolian Land Law, 2006). This must be approved by the aimag’s (province) citizen khural (parliament). For example, in 2011, the Snow Leopard Conservation Foundation, together with local government and herders support, initially designated Tost Bagh as a “Local Protection Zone” to safeguard the land from mining activities as stated protected land is under state protection (Mongolian Land Law, 2006). Later in 2017, the area was officially designated a State Nature Reserve as local protection status was not adequate

124  Tserennadmid Mijiddorj and Tsendsuren Purevsuren to reject existing mine exploration licenses. The reserve was created to ward-​ off the existing license of South Gobi Coal Trans and culminated in a political crisis in 2019 and the suspension of Mak’s license by the prime minister. Resulting conflicts cannot be solved unless the causes of conflict are understood (Madalina, 2016). Therefore, we were interested to learn and understand about the main and leading causes of conflict in the area. The main goal of this case study research was to investigate the current situation in Gurvantes soum (Figure 7.2), where mining conflict has intensified since 2010 between diverse stakeholders and from pressure by the mining sector. In this chapter, we take a personal approach to illuminate the context and challenges in our case study. Based on our extensive experience of working in this district and researching mining-​ related issues in Mongolia, this method allowed us to experience conditions, develop in-​depth understanding of the conflicts and establish a credible platform to investigate the hot-​spots of mining conflict. Our research explores the way to develop responsive, transparent and effective governance institutions with different stakeholders which can mediate disputes and ensure that development is sustainable and inclusive. Additionally, this study aims to present local settings for conflict resolution mechanisms that can be implemented by local community groups.

Experience from the Oyu Tolgoi mine in Khan Bogd The most famous mine in Mongolia is Oyu Tolgoi (OT) in Khan Bogd (KB) Province, South Gobi (Jackson, 2015). In 2016, our team1 from the University of Oxford went to Khanbogd district in South Gobi Province to conduct interdisciplinary social and environmental research on herders’ complaints against OT Company under the mediation of Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), International Finance Corporation of the World Bank. When the 2016 research commenced, a Tri-​Partite Council (TPC) had just been organised and TPC members (selected herders, mine staff and local government) were participating in trainings led by the CAO (CAO, 2017). Our research team met with TPC members, company people, local government officials and 100 households which were randomly selected households. The complaint process provides a model that may be suitable for large mining companies in the country (Sternberg et al., 2020). Here, we briefly describe the KB context to provide essential insight into mining-​community interaction and dispute resolution processes that were investigated in Gurvantes Soum. Herders and their elected representatives on the TPC were angry with the OT Company for their water use, damaging the pasture and creating dust (Jackson, 2015). During our focus group meetings, people described how their traditional herding was damaged as herders cannot move as they used to. Because of the mining company, there is much new infrastructure in the district, for example, the airport fenced mine license area, extracted mining concentrate which in tailing pits, hundreds of bore holes drilled to locate water, etc. These holes made people very angry: herders told us that there were camels

Mining melodrama in Mongolia  125 standing next to the boreholes; they wondered why the camels were standing where there is no water. Later, the herders found out that the camels heard the sound of water dripping in the borehole. Herders complained and asked OT company people about this. Finally, it was revealed that the pipes may connect water from the shallow to deep aquifer source used for mining. This made the herders very angry. Several households’ wells had dried up and OT was now delivering water to them. The other major issue was otor (livestock) movement. Many herders’ summer camps where OT is now. Here Bor Ovoon Zadgai was the only freshwater spring in the area. Every summer, nearby people came to water their animals. But since OT started, there has been no summer or otor movement in the area. Displaced otor movements went to other bags (subdistricts) or even other soums (districts). But people already in the area discriminated against the incoming herders, saying “you have sold your land to OT” whether they were compensated or not. In 2016, herders’ representatives were same as regular herders, they were angry, they didn’t know how to deal with the company or government. But with training and practice, they became knowledgeable, skilled and very professional; most of them were elected to the local government khural (assembly). OT resettled around 10 households in 2004 and compensated 89 households in 2011 with jobs, training, education for children, etc. Most of the herders who were compensated or resettled were from Javhlant Bag, Gaviluud Bag near the mine. Very few were from distant Bayan Bag and none from faraway Nomgon and Khairkhan Bag. There was conflict between bags as people from Nomgon Bag thought that TPC people only worked for Javkhlant and Gaviluut bag. Through discussion the herders came together; then with engagement, the community resolved their differences with the mine. The work of the TPC was essential, leading to cooperation between the mine, the local government and the herders. A  Community Development Agreement was reached between the OT mine and the community (Sternberg et al., 2020; Guardian, 2019). When our research team returned to KB in 2018, things were very different. Many more people had been compensated as a result of the new agreement. People from Nomgon Bag was happier than before. There was also public compensation for the community (wells, slaughterhouse, trainings, etc.). Now TPC members  –​herder’s representatives, mining staff and local government officials  –​understood each other much better and worked more effectively together. It was clear that the CAO training and mediation was very useful. Knowing this was possible in Mongolia and the South Gobi Province provided the background for this chapter’s Gurvantes case study.

Methods This chapter is drawn from insights and lessons learned from two months of intensive fieldwork in Gurvantes Soum, Mongolia, in the spring of

126  Tserennadmid Mijiddorj and Tsendsuren Purevsuren 2019. Writing is presented through a personal perspective to stress lived experiences and encounters with mining in the case study area. The authors have much related experience in Omnogovi Province. This includes 15+ years of research in Gurvantes (Mijiddorj et al., 2019) and conducting >100 socioeconomic interviews2 in KB Soum about the impact of the OT mine (CAO, 2017). The combination of expertise and local knowledge enabled a dynamic case study in Gurvantes that incorporated various stakeholder perspectives. Based on 59 interviews, 4 focus groups and local participant observation, here we present a layered perspective of mining in the district. This highlights the recurring issues and slow evolution of practice and recognition of mining’s significant impact in Gurvantes since 2003. This case study exemplifies the current situation of mining-​impacted areas and challenges embedded in the relationship between companies, local decision-​ makers and herding communities. The methods we used to collect data involved in situ interviews in formal (offices) and informal (home) settings with a range of stakeholders. These included meetings with seven mining companies and representatives. The prominent firm was South Gobi Sands (SGS) where officials included the safety trainer, chief community relation officer, environmental expert and the biological diversity specialist. MAK Company’s (Mongolian owned) mining director and environmental officers and the hydrologist, environmentalist and lead engineer at Chinkhua Mak Company (Mongolian/​Chinese owned) were interviewed. We also met with South Gobi Coal Trans (owned by a Mongolian Member of Parliament), Ususkh Zoos and Korean-​ owned AGM which extracted gold. Several local government officials (soum governor, bag [rural subdistrict] governors, the environment officer, livestock manager, etc.) were interviewed as well as herders, townspeople, media, etc. throughout the district. In total, more than 100 people participated in the research. Participant observation included mine inspections, visits to herder dwellings, informal talks and countryside survey through >1000 km driving over two months living in Gurvantes. This qualitative case study describes the field site and the intricate relationships between different stakeholders. The samples were balanced to include a range of perspectives. Our experience with the OT mine in KB and conditions in Gurvantes highlighted several differences between the two sites in the same province. The number of companies and community engagement varied greatly. Whilst several issues were similar, overall the context was location-​specific. Table 7.2 identifies key points at the two sites that framed our investigation and understanding. The research follows in first-​person voice to capture the sense and spirit of the case study.The fieldwork recognises that experienced researchers also have a personal voice that is appropriate for communicating findings. More academic forays into the social impact of mining in Mongolia are available in other works (see Jackson, 2015; Myadar and Jackson, 2019).

Mining melodrama in Mongolia  127 Table 7.2 Key mining-​related issues in Gurvantes and Khan Bogd Soums. Information drawn from research analysis Issues

GURVANTES

KHAN BOGD

Mines   Mine size Ownership Compensation  Financial  Resettlement  #recipients Role of politicians  Local   Members of parliaments Protests  Verbal  Physical Water key issue Protected are impact Media attention Corruption, bribery Herder conflict Complaint mechanism

Many Small and large Mongolian, Chinese, Korean

One Mega International Corporation

Limited Limited 100

Yes Yes

Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes High No

Yes Yes Yes No Yes Possible Low Yes-​TPC

Story Tsesu Purevsuren Having never been in Gurvantes before, I had imagined it would be the same as Khanbogd Soum. But very different geographical areas were waiting for us. Strangely, there were few households affected by the mines compared to KB. In fact, I couldn’t see any households around. I was about to think that there were few families affected by the mines and that the conditions were not as bad as at OT. In Khanbogd, there was one mine with many households affected, resettled or compensated. In KB, we can clearly see the households around the mine or other mining-​related infrastructure when driving around. There were different mine impact zones, including the airport, many boreholes, roads and tracks, powerline and similar changes. One can clearly see what is going on with herders; if the family lives within 5 km from infrastructure they might have been compensated. If the household is farther away, they might not have compensated and they may have complained and filed a compensation claim. But Gurvantes was a different situation and the landscape was less easy to read. Unlike Khanbogd, Gurvantes is a very hilly place. We realised that the households were hiding behind the hills. Even if we found the herders, it is hard to imagine what the issue might be related to mining activities because there are many different companies operating in the area. For example, four

128  Tserennadmid Mijiddorj and Tsendsuren Purevsuren companies extract one big deposit, so in a way they are attached to each other. If there is a household near that mining area, they are affected by all of the mines. But companies divided responsibility for households, making the situation much more complicated than in Khanbogd. Compared to OT, in KB, Gurvan Tes mines were smaller and easier to arrange interviews. The meetings with mining companies were very good. All the mines offered tours inside the sites which contributed to understanding the mining process.We kept comparing the numbers of people who have been compensated from KB to Gurvantes. Each mine said that they compensated only a few households, at most between 5 and 10. Compensation in Gurvantes was money to buy a house and fence in the soum centre (value ~US$17,500–​ 21,000). A  major issue for mining and the community was electricity for mining and development. Gurvantes soum imports electricity from China. The Chinese/​Mongolian Chinkhua MAK Company imported electricity to the three soums of South Gobi. The system is prone to breakdowns; if the electricity cuts, it takes a week or more to be fixed. This became our biggest challenge as we could not charge our cell phones, computers or have a shower for days. Companies We started our interviews with companies to understand mining issues before meeting with locals; our first week of field work took place at mine sites. We did not have links to mining people, so asked the soum darga (governor) for assistance. First, he directed us to SGS. The company was originally a Canadian investment that was sold to Hong-​Kong companies. SGS compensated and resettled two households but there are five more households to deal with. Though the company is no longer Canadian, it was very western in standards and culture. It has good and bad impacts. For example, we met a herder who was supposed to be compensated. Already, the 70-​year-​old woman has waited many years to solve her compensation issue. “I got my winter camp from my grand-​grandparents and wanted to give it to my children. It is 1.5 km away from SGS mine stockpile. Mining started and it became impossible to live there anymore.” Then we headed to MAK, which is a Mongolian company. There were not multiple levels of bureaucracy like in other companies. When we explained our project, they directly brought us to the mining director’s office. He did not hesitate to meet us even though we did not have an advance appointment. The director said he met anyone who had an issue by himself without a middle man –​ this is much easier to solve a problem. MAK Company belongs to a Member of Parliament, so anyone can guess about their connections to the central government. Later, when we were meeting with herders, most people complained that they did not like the way MAK does Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). For example, they build a school, dorm or road and present it to the town in a ceremony. Locals perceive that MAK gets the money back afterwards from the

Mining melodrama in Mongolia  129 Mongolian government. People think that they act like they do positive things, but really, they just pocket state money. Then we met with the Mongolian and Chinese joint venture company Chinkhua Mak. I was expecting to hear about many complaints and conflicts from locals about this company because of the Chinese name. It was actually the reverse of what we expected. There were no complaints nor conflicts from herders or local government –​the company follows the rules and regulations. Instead of the Chinese, we found that locals blamed the Mongolian company MAK for problems in meetings. The reason was that they have a coal washing facility, so locals think that they use too much water. It is clear that the most important thing is water for the Gobi people. I had a thought that maybe the locals are just against Chinese mining, that if it is a Chinese mine the community makes trouble. When meeting with Chinkhua Mak we realised that is not the main issue. If the mine is polluting the environment and makes a mess for herders, it doesn’t matter if it is Chinese or Korean or Mongolian. The reason MAK Company has problems with locals is about water –​already the Gobi has no water. When MAK opens a coal washing facility or crushing plant, they are like outsiders seeking benefit, whether the company is foreign owned or not. Herders feel that soon the water will be gone. Then we met with smaller Chinese and Mongolian companies and a very new Mongolian company. The four companies previously mentioned (SGS, MAK, Chinkhua MAK, Ususkh Zoos) are lucky in that they did not face community protests because they extracted in an area south of the soum.The mines have extracted the Nariin Sukhait group of deposits for about 20 years. When Chinkhua Mak first started, herders and locals had no idea about mining. Thus, mines that started early did not face much conflict. The community talked about how they had no knowledge at that time. One herder said that he didn’t know what would happen after 10 years. He was admiring the giant equipment and techniques, but never realised how bad it is for the environment, herding and for health. As the spring water, nature and pasture has been destroyed the damage is irreparable. “We don’t want to have more companies destroy other lands,” the locals say. People are most angry with the first companies because of how they use water, because they do not hire locals and similar complaints. There are still families who have compensation or resettlement issues. But, most people do not have many issues with the mines. Newer mines in the community have been challenged a lot in recent years. Why? It is not because first four mines are good and new ones are bad. It is just that the first companies taught them how bad it is to have mining. They see it by themselves over a time. Locals told us that there were 16 springs under the deposit that the 4 companies are extracting. All are now gone. So, herders wanted to protect the rest of the land. For example, locals stopped one of the smaller Chinese mining for four years. Herders blocked the roads, made protests, brought activists from the capital and did everything they could do to stop the mine. Herders reported that the company hired some gangs to stop the protest. It worked for one of the protests, but they couldn’t hire the thugs all the

130  Tserennadmid Mijiddorj and Tsendsuren Purevsuren time as probably it cost a lot. Then companies started dealing with households one by one.They also started a fund for the bag this company is extracting now. But the conflict has not finished. After the various compensation deals and what was spent for operations and to the community, Chinkhua MAK is out of money. In addition to the community fund, the company also promised to pave 18 km of road to transport coal to the Chinese border. But they cannot make payments for this because of financial problems. So the company, in addition to the community, has a conflict with the road construction subcontractor. We had an opportunity to witness road-​blocking during our field work, but it wasn’t herders this time! It was the subcontractor hired to pave the road over two years ago. It seems road blocking is the best protest method against mining across the Gobi. If there is any problem, all strikes are held on roads. This blocks the transfer of coal to China. From this experience, people think that projects labelled “strategic deposits” are beneficial for both the state and locally. So, herders think that big strategic deposits like Nariin Sukhait are ok but smaller deposits like Javkhlant Ord, Mongol Chadal and South Gobi Coal trans should not be used. Our next visit was to a very interesting company South Gobi Coal Trans. It is a new company, but has a big backer in the national parliament, a former Minister of Finance. Though just starting, it has created big sensations across the country. First, it is located on the mountain named Tost Tosonbumba, which is home to snow leopards. Because of this, the Snow Leopard Trust international NGO tried to make it a protected area.While they were working on this, one of the biologist of the Snow Leopard trust died in unexplained circumstances. Perhaps for political reasons, people suspected mining company involvement though the case was not confirmed. The second big issue is that the company is extracting right next to a stream which called “Oasis” by locals. It is one of the few streams that hasn’t dried up, so people are willing to give up anything to protect their only water source. The only vegetable garden in the whole soum is located there. Now local activists are protesting and suing the company –​they have participated in over 30 legal trials and have lost all. Then, one journalist who is also a politician started attacking South Gobi Coal Trans. As president of the Mongolian Union of Journalists, he brought 26 media representatives to Gurvantes for a press conference on mining. The journalists held a national discussion on Tost Tosonbumba; perhaps they thought they could cancel the company’s license by either media pressure or in the election period. An interesting question was the role of the lead journalist – did he care about the environment, or want to attract public attention? His attitude was negative, yet he was doing good things. This reflects the sensitivity of mining issues that can affect parliamentary elections. One example is how the district was encouraged by a judge to settle a dispute with SGS.With much effort, this was done and an agreement was reached. The company returned one mining license for a symbolic $1. More than a year later, after the negotiator had left the country the deal was called into the

Mining melodrama in Mongolia  131 Capital City Court. It was stated that the $1 was incorrectly paid, that it should have been issued by the citizen’s parliament rather than paid in cash. Thus the transaction was invalid, the agreement nullified and the license was returned to the company. In this way the community lost faith. Our mining visits were interesting. We also visited a Korean gold mine far from the town and other mines in the north part of the soum. The company AGM was extracting gold and other minerals in the north part of the Gurvantes soum near Golden Mountain, a protected area, yet the government allowed the license. Compared to other districts (baghs) this area has few households. The main concern of local people is ‘Rashaan’, which means ‘magical water-spring’, near the mine sites. It may get polluted or shrink due to mining impacts. This spring is well known and thought to cure illnesses so should have some from protection from potential damages. All the mines interviewed stated that there are no clear regulations on compensation. There is only one sentence in the law which says “parties should agree/​make a deal” (Mongolia Mineral Law, 2006). Most mines said that the government has the burden of compensation. Thus, some mines say that they should not compensate locals or build roads because they have paid their taxes to the central government. They argue that having paid tax, the government should deal with local compensation issues, roads and impacts. One of the mining officials told us their secret policy to deal with locals. Instead of giving a cash or other things, it is better to buy herders a two-​room apartment in the capital. In that case, they will not come back and complain again. This seems to be the way smaller mine deal with such issues. Companies have stopped this practice. The bigger companies have adapted international standards used by other companies. Government We observed the local government often takes a neutral approaches towards mining related issues. They cannot criticise the mines because the central government already gave the license; the local government can do nothing about the permit. Nor can the government be cruel with the locals because they will be defeated at the next election. This can help officials remain popular and get re-​elected. One mine staff said “there is a difference between the two years after the election and two years leading up to next election.The governor starts encouraging mutual understanding, a year passes, then they work urgently to see the results and it takes two more years.” By our second week of fieldwork, we had a much better understanding about our fieldsite, but we still struggled to find households. The local government was very helpful in locating herders.We interviewed the bagh officials and asked them to come with us to households and organise focus group meetings in each of the four baghs. In Khanbogd, the local government tended to agree with OT mine. One of our interviewees from Khanbogd soum government said that realistically they learned from OT rather than monitored them. But

132  Tserennadmid Mijiddorj and Tsendsuren Purevsuren in Gurvantes, it is different because the companies are not big international giants and there are many different types of mines in Gurvantes. Big national companies may have a lot of power and skip the local government. Others are willing to work closely with the government.The biggest challenge in working with the local government was being accused of corruption. In interviews, government officials said the local government has no power and that they have no right to cancel the licenses. It is very hard for them to be in the middle between the central government, herders and a company. “Herders complain to us, but all we can do is stop the operation for several days, and give a notice to fix the problem,” the soum government stated. The community blames the government for not doing anything, yet the local government does work to protect herders’ rights and protect the land. Local officials want the central government, parliament members and the Ministry of Mining to be honest with the public about the soum’s limited role in licensing mines.The soum governor said “the head of the State agency or department who makes a decision must come and tell the truth. Enough of making us quarrel amongst ourselves. It is just not working out.” The communities want the government to pave a road from Dalanzadgad (the province capital) to Gurvantes as dust from trucks affects three soums Noyon, Sevree and Gurvantes. Herders have protested and mining companies complain yet the road remains unpaved. Mine staff stated `fixing roads needs to be done by the central government rather private companies. There is no rule that the government must demand the mining companies to fulfill its own duties. Government should do their job. Local government often pushes companies to do such work as part of Corporate Social Responsibility efforts.’ Little has been done while soum governments want companies to build a paved road – it is good for the next election. Gurvantes Soum centre people, especially business owners, also fight with the government because a different road was used before mining started. Then mining trucks created a new road, really dirt tracks, that disturbed the soum. Soum people think that if there is a paved road direct to the Chinese border without passing the soums, then soum businesses will become bankrupt. The only paved roads from the mines –​SGS, Chinkhua MAK, MAK, Usukh Zoos –​ are to the border. Local government wants the mine to build the road as part of their CSR efforts. Herders The most interesting part of the study was engaging with the herders. We learned about a lot of conflicts because of mining, including clashes between herders, and sadly, even inside families.The land is vast but few places have water, and mines are working in those few places. Thus, herders have no choice but to stay in the vicinity of the mines. City people would never understand their situation, even soum centre people do not understand the herders. Sometimes,

Mining melodrama in Mongolia  133 outsiders think that the herders just want to keep taking money from the mine they are next to. But this is a misunderstanding. Herders said that if it is windy, they can’t see anything. The area is covered by a dust storm. We witnessed this situation when our team went to the border.The dust was so bad that we could not see the road and had to stop the car. This was far from mine sites compared to what households near mining experience. Imagine how hard life is next to a mine. It is clear that some people look for benefits from the mine. Some people in the soum, aimag (province) or in UB have received money from the mines by protesting. Mines may think whoever shouts is just trying to get money. But if we consider herders, poorer herders with around 200–​350 livestock may consider compensation. If an agreement can be reached with the mine they may be ready to move. One of our interviewees had 250 livestock and got compensation from one of the smaller Chinese mines  –​50  million tugrug (US$17,750). With this money, she bought a house in the soum centre for 30 million ($10,600) and a car. Her husband continued herding whilst she took her children to the soum centre. A key issue is that the community was unprepared for rapid change that came with mining. Most families who receive compensation have a similar situation. They will be happy to move to the soum centre, buy a car and have money for a few months or even a few days. Lives changed quickly and even when compensation was given herders’ financial literacy was poor as they had never received a large cash payment. One female herder in Javkhlant Ord expressed how she wished she “could have received compensation money like a salary by monthly payment or on quarterly basis rather than accepted by one go.” This highlights why bulk cash payment should be avoided. Soon, all is spent and the car will break down. The person will try to work in mining but there are few jobs. Perhaps they have to sell the house and try to become herders again. But they no longer have an ovuljuu (winter camp site) as one ovuljuu costs around 50–​60 million tugrug ($17,750–​$21,000), sometimes even more.When they go to the countryside, other herders in the soum will bully them as if newcomers, saying “you sold your land why are here now? Go away.” This is a major social problem resulting from mining. The other type of herders are those with more than 500 livestock. One interviewed household had 1,300 livestock. She said that her income is 90 million tugrugs ($32,000) per year. The money is earned all at one time in the spring. If the herder gets 90 million tugrug every spring who would want to get 50 million tugrug to go elsewhere? This type of herder only wants to keep their ovoljuu and keep life as it is. But they will be pressured by a mine. The mine keeps saying that “most people sold the land rights, that only you are left, if you don’t agree we will start anyway. Then you won’t get a penny and it will become hard to live here.” This puts the herder in a difficult situation. If they continue living next to the mine the dust, noise, blasting, etc. is unbearable. Sometimes, livestock wander into the mine and are lost forever.

134  Tserennadmid Mijiddorj and Tsendsuren Purevsuren There was one household who had few livestock. A strong mine arrived and built a huge fence near their pasture. Since the animals cannot pass the fence the livestock have to cross the road. There is not much pasture as other companies are also on that side of the road. We asked if they cannot move to another bag but said the female herder told us: it very scary to move Tost bag. They call at us that you sold your land to mining.You shouldn’t come here, some even have thrown stones to get us to go away. So I do not want to increase my livestock. I wish to have very few livestock that can feed me and my kids. There is no more pasture and I can’t herd the animals by myself. She and her husband got divorced not long ago.The reason was again mining and the misunderstandings that came with it. A new stone excavating company started working near her ger. They told soum people to come to the site and dig the stone. She and her husband were in line outside of the fence waiting for work. In a crush, people started to break-​in and the security guard hit her.Then, her husband fought with the guard and was jailed. The most serious thing was that the detective showed him a document with the wife’s fake signature saying her husband, not the security guard, had started the fight. This was not true. The outcome was that the husband suspected she got money for herself from the company and let him be jailed. Thus, he wanted to divorce. Unfortunately, she had no idea how to clear her name or sue the company. She was too little next to the company, no one cared about her complaint. She asked us to help her on the legal issue. As outsiders, it is very sad to see how in a developed era, people have been violated with no right to information and knowledge and are weak compared to those who have money. Mongolia talks about human rights, but actually human rights mechanisms are not in in national law. The herder kept saying that she was afraid to move to another place because of people’s attitudes. Actually, the exact same thing was happening in Khanbogd when we started research there. In 2016, people spoke about how they were bullied when they move to different soum, or went on otor (seasonal) movement. People in other soums were jealous of them having OT and believe that all the Khanbogd people got lots of money from OT. As is customary, anytime the weather is bad or there is no grass herders have to move. Now, people lock wells to not let outsiders herd near their land. Locals yell at herders who migrate in, say how bad that they are selling the land and that they have no right to graze their livestock there. It is Mongolia’s nomadic culture to move around but people are changing a lot. But now traditional ways are almost gone in the areas with mining. When we came back to KB in 2018, a herder from Khanbogd had shot another herder from Tsogttsetsii because of a well. One of them died and other went to prison.The man from Khanbogd moved to Tsogttsetsii with 1,000 livestock. The weather was really bad that year. Livestock were dying. So when he

Mining melodrama in Mongolia  135 went there, the Tsogttsetsii herder yelled at him for selling the land to OT. It was very hard to see one’s own livestock dying whilst someone locked the well and did not give water. So the man shot the herder who refused to share the well. It is a crazy thing that can happen in Gurvantes too. Because of all these difficulties, people don’t trust each other. They suspect the government of accepting bribes. There is a case in Gurvantes that one family’s son and daughter-​in-​law sued each other because of the land. The brother and sister-​in-​law left their pasture to the sister to live on for a while until they found their own pasture. But then the mining arrived and gave a compensation to the sister’s husband, leading to the lawsuit. Besides individual herder interviews, focus groups were done in each bag. In every bag people were very active on the focus group meetings. For one focus group we had to drive 4 hours to go to the Korean mine area on a very bad road. Since we had travelled that far, we decided to organise a focus group meeting on a same day. And after the mining interview, we arrived at the ger (tent home) where the nearest households had gathered. Surprisingly, the people were in another meeting about artisanal mining. After waiting two hours, our focus group started 7 or 8 pm.The household cooked for us and the Bagh Darga complained that they never cook for just him! After the meeting we came back to town at 3 am in the morning. In this way our field work was very intense, and interesting. We witnessed a snow storm in May in Gobi. People said that climate changes over the last few years were because of the mining –​who knows? Locals may interpret that four people died in that snow storm in part because of spiritual reasons. Like Tibetans, Mongolians sometimes think too many land disruptions (mining) disturb the motherland; that this cause changes to weather, snow and droughts that are bad for people.Therefore, less rain and frequent dzuds and droughts are happening.

Discussion In Gurvantes, most of the local people’s livelihoods are directly linked with land and water sources, mining companies’ ecological footprints are much higher to influence environmental changes. At the same time, it negatively influences and disturbs social changes such as domestic violence, alcohol abuse, rising divorce rates, displacement and misunderstanding. Yet mining’s dramatic impact on local communities has been ignored in much of Mongolia (Kemp et  al., 2011). The government and mining industry claim that social dynamics, rather than mining, are responsible for community changes. Our research identified the challenge faced by communities that are struggling to adjust to mining.The lack of engagement and cooperation, limited local rights and knowledge and damage to livelihoods reflect community neglect. As risk increases, local trust has fallen “down on the floor.”3 Trust decreased when community expectations failed (Dagvadorj et al., 2018). Misinformation and mistrust are everywhere. Companies hide behind technical words and jargon

136  Tserennadmid Mijiddorj and Tsendsuren Purevsuren and promise blue skies that the residents never see. Disappointment is directed at the local and national government, members of parliament and the companies that exploit the resources. Mining produces strong feelings among local people. The topic is very political and some people are very cautious to speak about it. There is insufficient explanation and understanding about mining impacts. How can herders be expected and prepared to deal with mining companies? During the process of applying for extracting licenses, mining companies promise many things to local people, such as employment with well-​paid jobs and local development improvements. None of the companies mention environmental damage and water issues in local areas. According to LLA contracts, mining companies should employ local people, but in reality they employ very few people from local areas and after a few months, companies find ways to fire the local people like claiming they could not perform well and violate work rules, etc. Often people migrate from rural areas to the soum to get registered as a local resident. Then they get employment at a mining company whose human resource manager and field managers are relatives. In this way the Gurvantes Soum population significantly increased from 3,742 in 2005 to 10,142 people in 2019 (NSOM, 2020). Much literature states that information is crucial factor to shape trust (Veiga et al., 2001; Moffat et al., 2014).Yet there are no clear methods for companies to deliver information and we witnessed empty government information boards. The lack of engagement and updates from mining companies collapses local people’s expectations and decreases trust. This intensifies the knowledge gap and increases conflict among stakeholders. Mining impact, land degradation, fights over compensation and land rights reflect some of the disputes between families, relatives, government and companies. Corruption, manipulation, competition between herders, leaders taking advantage and decisions made without consultation negatively affect the district. We noticed there is a lack of consultation with local people over land issues, compensation and resettlement. Therefore, often local people lost rights for the negotiating stage with mining companies. Furthermore, such challenges intensify household and relatives level conflict that divides communities, relatives and partners for sake of money to break the relationship. According to The Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance (2018), responsible mining means “respect human rights, aspirations of affected communities, provides safe, healthy and respectful workplace while minimizing environmental harms and leaves positive legacies.” But none of the companies fulfil such requirements in Gurvantes; therefore, local people often complain and protest against mining companies. Since mining is the biggest industry in Mongolia, there are always political and economic consequences. Often mining licenses are allocated and approved by higher decision-​makers (Ministry of Mineral Resource Authority) without adequate information. Decisions are announced and agreed to by local government. Rural (soum and bagh) officials understand the multiple challenges pastoralism encounters, yet the district government lacks authority, adequate

Mining melodrama in Mongolia  137 training or central government backing to regulate mining.Therefore, all parties need to better cooperate and understand each other with mining companies required to get positively manage relationship with local communities (Hilson, 2002). It is very difficult to balance everything. Despite bringing economic wealth, mines can cause number of adverse impacts to local communities. There are many negative examples of how mining activities disrupt local lives and people’s sustainable livelihoods. Beyond animals and land, mining impacts people’s mental health, attitudes and social ethics. It is common for locals to think and act as if they are rich because they live near a big source of mineral resources. This attitude brings them debt and bankruptcy. Life values have changed towards money and materialism rather than humanity. Often when drinking women express a sense of frustration and meaninglessness in life because they are now settled in town without work. There are money problems, more domestic violence and there are incidences of young women being assaulted. Mining companies and decision-​makers need to consider the social disturbance of mining activities, not just blindly pursue economic growth. Development and community benefit will be key to mining in Mongolia. There are ways forward. This starts with clear standards for compensation and resettlement. People affected by mining activities require adequate compensation and standardised relocation plans to cover their losses. Current compensation and resettlement packages discriminate among local people. The lack of information and transparency creates confusion and intensifies conflict. Mining company community relation officers state the lack of standards are a problem for companies. As one mining company manager said, “if nationwide compensation and rehab standards were approved it could’ve been easier for mining companies as well. Now we are dealing with various types of people and some of them demand too much.” Clear national standards on social and environmental impact assessments, resettlement and compensation would benefit communities. Next, engagement and inclusion of local people in mining development are essential. Public hearings and participation have become a critical issue in environmental and social assessments. It encourages both parties to be transparent and open and develops effective participatory practices (Pohjola and Tuomisto, 2011). Environmental and social impact assessments need to effectively include local people’s feedback and concerns. Although in both study areas there have been some positive changes in local areas such as better facilities for education, health and basic amenities. Gurvantes and KB share the same challenges of social disruption; now values have shifted to desire for money over protecting the environment and social health. The fact that controversy and confrontation dominated the whole participatory process in Gurvantes indicates that more work is needed, particularly to reach consensus among stakeholders. Having effective public consultation brings huge benefits for local communities (Joyce, 2001). In Mongolia, relevant legal regulations are urgently needed to safeguard communities and balance mining

138  Tserennadmid Mijiddorj and Tsendsuren Purevsuren with development goals and protection of herding communities. Communities affected by mining activities need the power to hold companies responsible for a series of social, economic and environmental changes. In this process, KB is a positive example. The cooperation between herders, mine and government could be a model for Gurvantes and other soums in Mongolia. Instead, the lack of action by government agencies result in civil society groups acting where the government lacks capacity. After the mining boom, civil society has been essential to protect local people’s lives and livelihoods against corrupted official decision-​makers. Enforcing the accountability of local and central government officials is essential. Many residents think and expect we, as researchers, can solve their problems –​in fact we cannot. We draw to a close with the story of Bayar of Bayasah bag who had the title of “Best Herder,” awarded by the government for having 1,000 livestock. His winter camp was affected by mining activities; for this, he compensated by the mining company and left his land. He bought a house in the soum centre with the compensated money. Then he struggled to herd because he no longer had pasture to graze. Sometimes he temporarily moved from Bayasah to Tost Bagh, but the residents did not accept him, calling him a person who sold the ancestral land to enemies. He no longer has the courage to be herder. Now he has settled in the soum centre where he is unemployed. Amongst a land of promise, mining has done little for most members of the community.

Notes from the field Complaints about mining to MPs and its solution: the case of Gurvantes Amarzaya Namsrai and Munkhuu Norovsambuu In Mongolia, there continue to be complaints about mining throughout the country. This is a brief overview of how Members of Parliament (MPs), including Omnogobi Province’s N. Amarzaya (2016–​20), received, investigated and worked to resolve dozens of community complaints about drinking water sources, endangered snow leopard habitat and livestock pastures. Since 2010 the area licensed for coal mining in the province’s largest district, Gurvantes Soum (see map), has been the centre of ongoing disputes and protests. In the district South Gobi Coal Trans (SGCT), a Chinese company, exports coking coal to China. Years of debate questions whether their license area overlaps with the habitat of snow leopards called Tost and Toson Bumba (TTB) mountain ranges. In 2012–​16, women MPs proposed a resolution to make TTB a protected nature reserve. This was approved by Parliament but the boundaries were not set at the time. MP Amarzaya and others continued efforts to define the reserve boundaries in the 2016–​20 parliamentary session. Success in

Mining melodrama in Mongolia  139 2019 protected the reserve from mining exploration as licenses must not overlap with water and forest resources. Complaints and resolution Since mining exploration intensified in the TTB area in 2011, local citizens sent petitions to MPs, the President and the Prime Minister several times per year requesting they monitor and protect the land. When N. Amarzaya, MP, met with local citizens they demanded operations stop and organised a demonstration and staged a sit-​in protest. Complaints stated “consent must be obtained from local citizens and inhabitants who will suffer impact and discussion must be organized” (Article 18.4) and “detailed environmental impact assessment must be presented to the local citizens who are expected to experience impact” (Article 10.5) in the Law on Detailed Environmental Assessment. The citizens claimed the issuance of 35 exploration and mining licenses on 288,813 hectares of land in the soum was a violation of rights of local citizens. The complaints alleged that South Gobi Coal Trans violated laws and forged the state inspection conclusion. They also asked MPs to check the legality of SGCT’s license. The community wanted responsible mining, reduced environmental damage, tangible development from mining and clear benefit to the people of Gurvantes. Disputes escalated between the special protected area and mine license area in 2016–​18. Requests demanding clear boundaries and a management plan with participation of the local citizens was officially sent by MPs to the Ministry of Environment and Tourism; Ministry of Mining; Mineral Resource Agency; Professional Inspection Agency and similar for resolution. MPs questioned the Prime Minister and held Parliamentary discussions on rights related to Tost and Toson Bumba. Though TTB was now under special protection, the boundaries were not clearly demarcated. Therefore, there was a risk that mining operation would continue in that area. For this reason in 2016, MP Amarzaya pursued official channels to establish the boundaries and resolve disputes about mine licenses.Working with the local “Unagan Nutag” (native land) partnership, Amarzaya’s request to the Ministry of Environment and Tourism contributed to an expanded nature reserve based on the Gurvantes Citizen Council’s resolution. In April 2018, the government took Tost and Toson Bumba under state special protection. It was agreed that administration of the nature reserve would be established in Gurvantes with the Snow Leopard Trust responsible for research and the soum government would pay for administrative costs. This was a significant collective achievement by the soum,

140  Tserennadmid Mijiddorj and Tsendsuren Purevsuren local community and MPs. However, SGCT’s licensed area was carved out from the protected area boundaries. MP Amarzaya demanded clarification of this, including by letter to the Anti-​Corruption Agency and Prosecutor’s Office. After continued citizen and parliamentary pressure in 2019, the government finally cancelled the SGCT license. The government started to monitor mining in the region and the nature reserve was established at 896,500 hectares. Summary Local attempts were made to resolve mine and special protected area boundary complaints. Citizens sent repeated requests to MPs and the Government without success. Only when MPs and the local government worked together did the central government address the issues. Though much time was lost in bureaucratic stages, the issue was resolved. Inspection of violations led to the mining license of South Gobi Coal Trans LLC being cancelled in August 2019. Issues surrounding TTB and adjacent areas are an example of how to establish mining and protected area boundaries with the participation of local citizens. Then, mines can operate responsibly with less environmental damage. We observe that if organisations from the local government and the ministry work through coordinated efforts and operate within the established system the process protects communities, saves stakeholders’ time and reduces financial risk.

Notes 1 Team included Tsesu Purevsuren, who conducted 2019 fieldwork in Gurvantes, and researchers from the University of Oxford. 2 Conducted by Tsesu Purevsuren and Dr Ariell Ahearn. 3 Nadia Mijjidorj.

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8  Does transparent information empower communities? Natural resource data accessibility and use practices in Mongolia Delgermaa Boldbaatar

Introduction Countries endowed with abundant natural resources should have more opportunity for development within a short period of time than countries without natural resources. However, many countries could not exploit their underground resources for equitable development due to their weak governance (Humphreys et  al., 2007; Dobbs et  al., 2013; NRGI, 2015). Thus, given their relative dependence on natural resources for economic growth and social development, getting the resource governance right is crucial. To ensure the right governance, in recent years transparency and accountability initiatives have emerged as a potential solution among the host and donor governments, international non-​governmental organisations as well as investors (World Bank, 2003; Humphreys et  al., 2007; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2008). Supporters of transparency advocate for its importance during the early stages of resource development to promote fair competition between firms and mitigate corruption risks during licensing, awarding of contracts and auctions by reducing information asymmetry and by extension ensuring the credibility of government negotiations (Humphreys et  al., 2007; Biastoch, 2017). Transparency in resource taxes paid to governments, and in sovereign wealth fund savings and transfers, can allow citizens to hold their government accountable for its expenditures (Bauer et  al., 2014). Moreover, in the later stage of mining development, transparent information and participatory monitoring of environmental issues by citizens would empower local communities to demand accountability and increase their voice to protect their living area (Fraser and Kunz, 2018; Pareja et  al., 2018). At a broader level, evidence indicates that transparency can attract foreign investment (Frynas, 2010), increase trust and help to combat corruption (Eigen, 2007) and promote democratic participation through information sharing (Karl, 1997; Florini, 2007). The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), launched in 2003, is one example of an effort to reverse the resource curse and strengthen resource governance. Under this initiative, 53 resource-​rich countries have disclosed, in open data DOI: 10.4324/9781003097341-10

144  Delgermaa Boldbaatar format, a cumulative 424 fiscal years of government revenues amounting to US$2.64 trillion between 2003 and 2019 (EITI, 2020). Unfortunately, many scholars have criticised the transparency and accountability initiatives and doubted their impact on the desired outcomes such as decreased corruption and improved decision-​making (Gaventa and Mcgee, 2013; Sovacool and Andrews, 2015; Rustad et al., 2017).Those disclosing information –​the government and private sector –​may hope that it is being used by citizens to increase effective decision-​making, empowerment and trust building at the local level. Informed and empowered citizens are arguably the most important element of all these efforts and actions for stronger accountability in resource governance, because their actions affect the political decisions around new policies. However, in a recent study, Boldbaatar et  al. (2019), I  and co-​ authors identified the barriers to using the disclosed information to improve accountability in the case of community benefit sharing and water usage agreements in Mongolia. Boldbaatar et al. (2019) drew the conclusion that transparency could foster improved resource governance by following a seven-​ step path from non-​ disclosure. This framework is built upon existing knowledge from the literature on social accountability, resource governance and transparency. I must note that this is not a completely new framework but rather it adopted elements of wider insights into social accountability (O’Meally, 2013; Kosack and Fung, 2014; Lieberman et al., 2014; Fox, 2015) and applied them in the case of a particular intervention in resource governance. Thus, the disclosure efforts should be useful and mobilised, then they should bring the public voice and empowerment. After that, collective actions and political will are needed to reach the final stage, “improved resource governance.” In the early stages, for transparency to be useful, the key driver from the demand side is the technical capacity of civil society to make sense of open data. From the supply side, the key enabler is that the government’s disclosure should meet minimum standards of open data including disaggregated, accessible, understandable and timely data. The intermediary’s role, including active media, opinion leaders and academics who interpret and communicate a large body of data to the community, is the essential piece of the larger puzzle. Despite the above-​mentioned case study by Boldbaatar et al. (2019), natural resource data and surveys and case studies which use it are rare in Mongolia at the moment. However, in January 2020, the International Finance Corporation (IFC)  –​a member of the World Bank Group  –​published a sector-​specific data assessment titled “Data in Action: Natural Resource Disclosures for People and Progress” which covered the Mongolian case. The assessment found five main data challenges which demonstrate the issues raised by Boldbaatar et al. (2019).These are: (1) the data and information provided often fail to match the needs of end-​users, including communities, civil society, media, companies and investors; (2) the quality of the data is poor –​not timely, accurate or in usable formats; (3) access to data is limited and data sets are not digitised or open, or they are stored on complex and difficult to access dashboards; (4) data users’

Natural resource data accessibility  145 capacity is limited; (5) communities mistrust the private sector and the information they disclose (IFC, 2020). Then how can we deal with data challenges and improve the capacity of data users in the natural resource sector? Is it doable or feasible? Where is the entry point? From the perspective of data science, the concept of “data literacy” has emerged as a key priority over the past couple of years as a requirement of the data revolution. According to Bhargava et al. (2015: p. 7), data literacy in the age of data is “the desire and ability to constructively engage in society through and about data.” This definition differs from other definitions of data literacy by its concept of social inclusion. It is emphasised that building communities’ technical capacity or promoting data literacy should not be solely based on new technologies or mediums, rather it should involve empowering people to keep governments accountable, solve local problems and navigate their own data ecosystems and societies in ways that are meaningful and effective for them. In sum, data literacy is possible when people are empowered to collect, access, monitor, analyse, interpret, contextualise, visualise and communicate the data to create change in their communities. In this chapter, I simply try to find the entry point of improved data usability for problem solving in the case of Dalanjargalan soum (district) of Dornogobi aimag (province). This soum is located 300 km southeast of Ulaanbaatar, in the Gobi region. The type of land in Dalanjargalan is divided into the Gobi and steppe regions. The Gobi climate is usually dry and windy and water scarcity is the top concern for the local community. In recent decades in Dalanjargalan, medium-​and small-​scale mining has been developed and conflict between the company and local community is increasing. The reason why I  chose this soum is twofold. First, it’s the second highest soum out of hundreds of soums by its total number of mining licenses. To date, 100 licenses are active in Dalanjargalan (EITI Mongolia, 2020). Second, it has been highlighted in social media and some central media by its protest against mining companies, and the reporters and other researchers are shining a light on its high vulnerability in terms of the environment and herders’ concern about their health due to the thick dust clouds. I begin by briefly summarising and prioritising the issues and problems among mining companies and the local community and testing how these questions can be answered with the help of currently available data. This chapter will not evaluate the challenges of data usage from the perspective of the local community. For instance, usability may vary depending on data users’ level of capacity, including skills for data searching, downloading and cleaning for further analysis. Hence, it analyses the data challenges from the supply side including the data disaggregation level, completeness, linkage with other government data sets, and then matches this with the community’s demand for information. To do so, I  collect and access available open data in the natural resource sector and analyse and contextualise it to consider its understandability. This sample narrative will provide key insights around data-​related challenges in the natural resource sector in Mongolia and provide key recommendations to the respective stakeholders.

146  Delgermaa Boldbaatar

What is the most relevant problem for the local community linked with mining? There is a widespread recognition that mineral developers need to gain a “social license to operate” (SLO) from local communities in order to avoid potentially costly conflict and exposure to social risks (Prno and Slocombe, 2012). Given the complexity of mineral resource developments, differences in interests and priorities will often result in disagreements between companies and local communities. Lost productivity due to temporary shutdowns or delays in connection with those conflicts at major mining projects has been estimated as costing up to US$20 million per week (Franks et al., 2014). Moreover, due to the expansion of mineral extraction worldwide, conflicts between mining companies and local communities have been increasing. While fewer than 50 conflicts were recorded annually up to the year 2000, the numbers have steadily risen to 250 conflicts in 2016 (Conde and Le Billon, 2017). Conflicts or disputes may cover a broad range of issues depending on the local context. For instance, there may be governance-​related issues such as the interests of small-​scale miners, insufficient inclusiveness (consultation), corporate power and corruption issues; or economic-​related issues such as inequitable distribution of benefits and use of those revenues; or issues related to the environment and local community rights including rehabilitation, health and safety, land issues and resettlement (ICMM, 2015). At the global level, conflicts related to the environment, health and safety, land issues and inclusiveness are prioritised as the most prominent issues. In Mongolia, the mining sector is a significant contributor to the economy –​ 88% of total exports, 24% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 24% of the national budget revenue as of 2018 (BDO, 2019a). The distribution of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) types in Mongolia reveals the relative importance of FDI into exploration of natural resources, which constitutes 81% of total FDI project value since 2012 (IFC, 2018). In sync with the National Sustainable Development Vision 2030, the Government of Mongolia (GoM) aims to attract foreign investors to explore the country’s untapped resource potential and to build stronger infrastructure in the South Gobi region, thereby increasing the mining sector’s competitiveness. However, fostering better information sharing with local communities is essential for the SLO, since mining companies operate in the pastureland areas where nomadic herders produce meat and dairy products by raising livestock. Meanwhile, in 2019 the agricultural sector still contributed 11% to GDP. A quarter of the total population, comprising 233,000 herder families, are living in the countryside raising 71 million livestock (Mongolian National Statistical Service, 2020). Sixty per cent of herder families raise hundreds to thousands of livestock per family, relying on the pastureland. According to the literature review, the majority of problems that worry local communities are listed as reduction in the land available for pasture (Dagvadorj et al., 2018); pollution or drying of rivers due to mining water discharge in the northern area (Stubblefield et  al., 2005); water scarcity and decrease of wells in the Gobi area (Suzuki,

Natural resource data accessibility  147 2013); dust storms generated by wind, as well as transportation of large volumes of mineral ore by unpaved roads (Dalaibuyan et al., 2018); mortality of livestock (Gankhuyag, 2013) and resettlement and compensation complaints. In addition to the environmental issues, there are common debates around unfair distribution of mining revenue to the local budget or insufficient contribution to households through the corporate social expenditures, employment and procurement policies (Boldbaatar, 2015; Adam Smith International, 2017, 2018; Steps Without Borders NGO, 2017). To ensure the mining sector benefits the local community, the GoM made it mandatory to establish a community development agreement (CDA) for all mining projects. Since 2014, 169 contracts have been established with mining companies and made publicly available as per EITI global standard (GoM OSF EITI, 2020). Mostly these contracts aim to improve job creation, local procurement and projects that would add value to the local economy. However, local communities’ awareness of the mining companies’ economic benefits and contribution to their livelihood is low and many questions are unanswered. On the other hand, the GoM has been supporting open and transparent government for the last decade, joining different global initiatives such as the International Budget Partnership (2005), the EITI (2006) and the Open Government Partnership (OGP) (2013) while establishing a chapter of the Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (2012). All these initiatives promote disclosure of information and citizen participation to combat corruption and strengthen accountability mechanisms. Furthermore, the country has made significant efforts towards good governance, passing numerous pieces of legislation such as the Law on Information Transparency and Right to Information (2011), the Law on Preventing Conflict of Interest in Public Service (2012), the Integrated Budget Law (2011), the Law on Glass Account (2014), the Law on the Amendment to the Law on Petroleum (2014), the General Administrative Law (2015) and the Law on Public Hearing (2015) (OGP, 2016). In fact, under the EITI multi-​stakeholders’ platform and its leadership, the Law on Transparency of Mineral Resources Sector has been drafted and is under discussion. Ensuring the legal background and overseeing the implementation of the commitments under several transparency initiatives is not the province of the GoM alone, but also many central (19) and local (32) government organisations are participating actively in the information disclosure process as per EITI standard to compile and submit the required information to the EITI portal and independent auditor for the annual reconciliation process. Given the current efforts of the GoM on transparency and openness, I would not argue lack of information or accessibility. There are tons of information if you look for it. For instance, under the EITI initiative all revenues collected from the mining sector have been disclosed by the government and mining companies in an open data and disaggregated format through the e-​reporting system since 2015. Moreover, to contextualise those fiscal numbers, non-​fiscal information including license allocations, fiscal regimes, resource contracts, beneficial owners, jobs created, environmental rehabilitation and water usage

148  Delgermaa Boldbaatar data has been collected and publicly disclosed through the EITI Mongolia annual reports as per the new EITI standard. Besides a dedicated platform like EITI, individual government organisations such as the National Statistical Office (NSO), Mineral Resources and Petroleum Authority (MRPAM), Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Environment and Tourism also publish statistical information related to the mining industry through their websites as part of their mandate or it is made available upon request. The government data sets are not the only source of information. There is a growing good practice that bigger companies disclose their corporate social responsibilities and environmental information on a voluntary basis. In sum, the data related to the mining industry in Mongolia exists and is often made public through different platforms with different formats. However, I would argue that current transparency and disclosure efforts do not match local needs that would help people to solve their local problems, so targeted or subnational transparency is needed. Data credibility and usability is also another issue. I  remember one incident when I  was working as a communications officer in the EITI Mongolia Secretariat; we were producing subnational EITI handbooks and handing them out at roadshows. One day I received a call from the local mayor complaining about the inaccuracy of the data cited in the handbook. Right away I checked the details. Then I realised that due to the way the data were aggregated and not divided down to the project level (soum), a share of a donation from a mining company was mistakenly reported as going to that mayor. Actually, that donation was given to the neighbouring soum, since the license was allocated at the borders of the two soums.The other case is that when we use the data sets on companies’ reported production from the EITI portal, we see some errors or confusion in the unit of measurement for minerals, for example, tonnes or 1,000 tonnes. If the number is unusual, we always double check with government statistics. These kinds of data inaccuracy sometimes occur, but knowing how often or how big such errors really are depends on the usage or examination of the data sets. It is problematic to ignore all the current efforts at information disclosure because of some data inaccuracy. My point is that in Mongolia, it is still uncertain how the data sets disclosed by the government or private companies are contributing to solve local issues or empowering local communities with data-​driven stories to demand them to be accountable. Thus, I will examine this data usability in the next section by asking: (1) what is the local problem and citizens’ FAQs? (2) Is there any available data that could provide answers? (3) If not, where are the data gaps and bottlenecks?

The case of Dalanjargalan soum –​the local problems Dalanjargalan soum is located in Dornogobi aimag, 300 km southeast of Ulaanbaatar. Its total land area is 404,590 ha and the Trans-​Siberian railway and road pass through the soum territory. The soum is subdivided into five baghs –​ the smallest administrative unit, and its total population is 2,982, of whom 495

Natural resource data accessibility  149 (16%) were herders at the end of 2019. At the end of 2019, 196,000 livestock were recorded, showing a 27% increase within three years. By the number of livestock, the soum ranked at 3rd place out of 14 at the aimag level, while the aimag, with 2.4 million livestock, ranked 16th out of 22 at the national level. The agricultural sector contributes 30% to the aimag’s GDP while the mining and processing industry contributes 15% (Dornogobi Statistical Office, 2020). According to a survey of 74 households that was conducted in Dalanjargalan soum in 2016 (Daley et  al., 2018), the two main sources of cash income were “herding own livestock” (26%) and “formal employment in the local government” (30%). From the environmental and climate perspective, Dalanjargalan’s natural regions are included in the Gobi but the northern part of the area belongs to the steppe zone. The Gobi steppes with their combined desert/​steppe ecosystem consist mainly of lowlands, rocky hills and eroded groves. The combination of dry and continental climate, permanent wind and dust storms affects the vegetation in the region.The soum contains the Ikh Nart nature reserve, a protected zone where one of the last remaining populations of Argali wild mountain sheep (Ovis ammon) and Siberian Ibex (Capra sibirica) can be found. Although water is scarce in the Gobi region, the local community believes that Ikh Nart nature reserve provides enough pure water sources for the animals and plants. But, sources of drinking water are becoming an issue (Citizens Representative Khural of Dalanjargalan soum, 2014). Mining in Dalanjargalan includes coal, iron and fluorspar production, plus construction materials, legal or illegal artisanal/​small-​scale fluorspar and semi-​ precious stone mining, and some factories processing cement, fluorspar and coal. The soum ranked second at the national level by its total number of mining licenses.To date, 100 licenses are active belonging to 76 entities in Dalanjargalan. The licensed area covers 19% of Dalanjargalan’s territory, with 9% of the total area for exploitation and 10% for exploration (EITI Mongolia, 2020). Mining operations started in 1998 with coal production by privately owned Mongolyn alt MAK LLC (MAK), one of the top 20 companies in the sector. This was followed by gravel extraction for Ulaanbaatar railway Joint-​Venture Company and a few other coal, iron and fluorspar productions.Two major iron companies and various small-​scale fluorspar companies work there, but some of them have already shut down their operation. In recent years, in Dalanjargalan the mineral processing and construction material industries have opened up and grown rapidly. In fact, in 2019 the processing industry contributed 45% to Dornogobi aimag’s Gross Industrial Production and Sales, similar to coal production (44%). The aimag is one of the five financially self-​sufficient aimags in Mongolia based on the mining industry, thus it does not receive a subsidy from the state budget (Dornogobi Statistical Office, 2020: p. 94). According to Daley et  al. (2018), there is a common understanding that almost every household in Dalanjargalan has engaged somehow in artisanal mining, or that everyone in certain areas has worked for small-​or medium-​ sized fluorspar mining companies run by Chinese people. However, general

150  Delgermaa Boldbaatar understanding and knowledge about mining operations in the soum was very low among the community. Moreover, households highlighted several environmental concerns in relation to the activities of mining companies in the soum. First was the creation of uncontrolled, unmaintained roads leading to dust and pastureland degradation, and also livestock being run over at night by company trucks, with no compensation paid. Second was the reported reduction in levels of both surface and underground water, as well as the open disposal of contaminated mine water, affecting the quality of local water sources. Third, deep shafts from mining operations on land that was often not subsequently rehabilitated were reported to have become a main cause of livestock death. Finally, it was reported that the dust and smoke created by mining companies caused health problems among herders and affected livestock quality. In addition, in some places up to 20 households could be using one public (open access) well, causing disputes and increasing the workloads of herders in managing and maintaining the wells, and pasture around such wells was becoming increasingly degraded. Mining was widely regarded as the main cause of pastureland degradation and water scarcity. Recently the situation in Dalanjargalan soum has been reported by several media channels followed by social media posts. According to the reporters, the main issues were highlighted as:  illegal launch of operations without an environmental impact assessment and land usage agreement, safety issues with leaking industrial water containing chemicals, irresponsibility about rehabilitation that left 353 shafts in an area of 55,000 ha, thick dust clouds arising from transportation and processing and reduced numbers of wells and water scarcity (Erdenebulgan, 2019; IKON, 2019). Moreover, the issue was also promoted on social media by several civic activists and civil society organisations.

Box 8.1 Examples of social media posts about Dalanjargalan soum conflicts. Source: www.facebook.com/​bayarsaikhan.namsrai/​ posts/​2496813627226107, www.facebook.com/​watch/​ ?v=299835160905463 Besides environmental issues, challenges related to governance also give rise to conflict between the community and the industry. For instance, according to the revised (2017) and previous Minerals Law of Mongolia, the community has the right to participate in the license allocation process. The process was regulated in 2016 so that when the company requests an exploration license, the MRPAM should determine whether the application is acceptable in the requested area and then should ask the local government for their approval. The local government should organise a soum and bagh citizens’ meeting regarding the license request and then reply with a decision in writing within

Natural resource data accessibility  151 30 days (BDO, 2019b). Mongolia is a unitary state with a central government and three levels of subnational governments. Outside the capital city, these levels are the aimag (province), the soum (district) and the bagh (subdistrict). At the subnational level, Citizens’ Representatives Khurals or parliaments are elected every four years at aimag and soum level. The political party which gains more seats in the khural nominates the local governor (Legal Information Portal, 2020). In other words, citizens make the decision whether they will allow an exploration license or not through khural representatives or by directly participating in related meetings, and then the local government conveys their decision to the central government. However, in practice, the local community thinks that in many cases, these formal meetings to decide about mining activities in the soum were not called, with the result that people perceived mining companies to just come and run their activities without informing the local people. Furthermore, in their understanding, the initial mining license was supposed to be given only for a five-​year period, for exploration work, and during this time the bagh khural was supposed to have an important role in overseeing the company’s activities and ensuring it conducted a proper environmental impact assessment and paid taxes. However, the local community understands that it did not always work like that in practice, and that follow-​up of mining company activities was often limited. For example, mining companies were supposed to provide an independent environmental impact report to the soum governor once every two years, but most participants in the 2016 survey had not seen such reports nor were they aware of any follow-​up, nor even of them having been prepared (i.e. through having witnessed site inspections in their areas) (Daley et al., 2018). Another issue is that Dalanjargalan soum could be experiencing a conflict of interests of the local government and decision makers due to political power and influence. Several cases were reported in which the bagh meeting said NO to the license allocation, but the result was different, enabling the company operation based on a higher-​level decision. This type of outcome was also reported in the process of negotiating the CDAs. According to the General Administrative Law, the local government shall organise public hearings before establishing CDAs. But, in the Dalanjargalan case, the aimag Governor decides what to include in the CDA on behalf of the local community by using a template agreement, which might create a conflict of interest and minimise the benefit sharing for the affected community. Moreover, the company representative thinks that the community doesn’t have the knowledge to engage with businesses and deal with local politics. Even if the company tries to hold community consultations, the community doesn’t know how to engage with them and doesn’t even trust them. Thus, the industry thinks it is important to train the local government at soum and aimag level to support this process. In other words, due to communities’ lack of knowledge and capacity, and political influence in the local government, the citizens’ participation in decision making is lacking, all decisions have been made at the aimag level, the issue of conflicts of interest is increasing judging by the recent decisions made, the process of

152  Delgermaa Boldbaatar selecting representatives for the local decision-​making body is unclear and weakened; thus, collective governance to ensure transparency and accountability in the natural resource sector is not effective (Dornogobi Governor’s Office, 2017; Namsrai, 2020). In sum, in the Dalanjargalan case, the local problem is mainly related to environmental rehabilitation, dust created by heavy transportation, pastureland degradation due to illegal artisanal miners and lack of responsible mining and water scarcity issues that would impact herders’ livelihood. Moreover, the community is opposed to accepting new mining licenses due to their current negative experiences, weak governance and distrust that the mining companies would improve their livelihood economically.

What problems can be solved with the help of data? Entry point License and production information is the entry point. If companies are unidentified and the area covered by operations is unknown, then local communities are not able to look for data. License data can be found from two sources. One is the EITI portal and the other one is the MRPAM Cadastre system. The difference between these two data sources is in their data maintenance and usability. MRPAM is the government agency which allocates the licenses and monitors the implementation of the related laws. The agency maintains a geological database and collects geological survey plans and reports from all license holders annually. Thus, the most up-​to-​date and valid data appears in the MRPAM Cadastre system. However, it has several disadvantages including that it cannot be searched by aimag or soum and does not show the license dates.The EITI data portal is administered by the EITI secretariat.1 As per EITI global standard, the license data is mainstreamed from MRPAM to the EITI portal. However, the EITI portal administrator decides how often to update the license information, which means the data set is not in real time. Its advantage is that the license data is upgraded as user friendly by showing more options for search tools (by aimag, soum, company, registration number, location etc.), showing the license dates and visualising the coordinates on the Google map. I compared the advantages and disadvantages of the two different data sources (see Table 8.1). With the help of currently available data, communities can explore where and when a license is allocated, in which area, where it is in relation to people’s winter location or hometown, who is extracting what type of minerals, whom they should spotlight and demand their accountability. In addition, the license data is differentiated according to whether it is under exploration or extraction with numerous types of information. So, in many ways these data sets are useful for the community to differentiate the exploration companies from the mining companies to scrutinise their operation. Furthermore, there is a growing practice that active civil society organisations like the Publish What

Natural resource data accessibility  153 Table 8.1 Matrix of license data portals

EITI Portal

MRPAM Cadaster system

Advantages

Disadvantages

 Searchable by aimag and soum  Shows license allocation and end dates  Searchable by company name and registration number  Visualised on the google map  Downloadable on excel  More user friendly  Real-​time information  Shows coordination of licenses, but not downloadable.  Map shows additionally the state or locally protected areas, new license applications, strategic deposits, artisanal or small-​scale mining areas

× Connected with MRPAM Cadaster system automatically but updates the information annually × No coordination information for further use × Non-​searchable by aimag and soum × Only able to find if the company name is known × Doesn’t show license dates × HTML data which is difficult to re-​use

Source: Author.

You Pay (PWYP) Coalition in Mongolia are using the license data for public awareness, law enforcement and strategic advocacy. For instance, according to the law, since 2009 it has been prohibited to grant an exploration and exploitation license near to rivers or water and near or in forest reserve areas, to protect the country’s ecosystems. So, this case was monitored by several PWYP coalition member organisations in some gold mining areas by mapping the license coordinates overlapping with river boundaries. In another case, one PWYP member organisation carried out strategic advocacy against illegal license allocation in the gold mining area of Zaamar soum, in collaboration with local NGOs and the community, investigative journalists and international organisations. Firstly, they  mapped the license information and increased public awareness.Then they collected all related legal documents and facts with the help of investigative journalists, and actively communicated them via social media. Finally, they won in court, getting the allocated license cancelled.This is an example of how the civil society is using the license information in Mongolia. However, I would say that the license information is only the entry point for further investigation or data navigation to solve the problems. Empowerment on legal knowledge, investigation and active communication is a vital part of strategic advocacy. Besides tracking the active licenses, the community can participate in the decision-​making process in the early stage of mining development. In 2015, where exploration licenses were able to be allocated after five years of Presidential veto, 70% of applications were rejected by the local government (MRPAM, 2018). Thus, the GoM again changed their approach starting from 1 January 2018 to one of applications only through a tendering procedure.

154  Delgermaa Boldbaatar However, the revised Minerals Law still guarantees the community participation in the allocation process. For instance, the law says that before the tendering procedure, the MRPAM shall select a potential area for exploration and then should inform the relevant local government officially in writing. The aimag Governor shall collect the votes from the related soum khural’s and aimag khural’s representatives within 45 days and reply to the central government. Then the MRPAM should organise the tendering process for the approved areas. Once the license is allocated with support from the community, the local government and khural are obliged to oversee whether the company uses that land for the initial purpose (exploring), whether it rehabilitates the environment and pays the local taxes. Secondly, at the stage of changing the exploration license to one for mining, the central government plays the decision-​maker role by evaluating related documents during the tendering process. However, the local government has the right to indirectly influence the decision by scrutinising the applicants’ execution of minimum requirements such as environmental rehabilitation, community development plan, etc. In the Dalanjargalan case, using the currently available license data, I could find that 12 new exploration licenses were allocated for the years 2016–​19, with one license covering a significantly larger area compared with all the existing licenses. That company was mentioned in the media reports that I cited above, as being irresponsible and linked with a politically exposed person. Moreover, I  could search the beneficial owners, linkages of licenses to the group company and its politically exposed persons from www.opendatalab.mn. This kind of data mining and investigative efforts using linked data is vital in the mining sector and this would empower the citizens to demand accountability. Production data is very important for the local community to better understand who is extracting the resources and who pays how much royalties to the budget as per production volume. This kind of disaggregated data is only accessible on the EITI portal and EITI annual reconciliation reports. In contrast, the production data is completely aggregated in the MRPAM monthly statistics although they collect all the details by each license holder. As per EITI standard, the production data has been collected from the companies on a voluntary basis since 2011 by its reporting template. That means data for previous years, for e­ xample 2000–​10, is not accessible. Since 2015, the EITI has collected production data from the companies at the project level (by each license), which enabled much more meaningful usability for local communities. The only concern or disadvantage is that this data set may have some technical errors on the production unit (1,000 tonnes or tonnes) due to the lack of validation. However, we still use this data set for contextualising the local mining scale for a broader view. In addition to this data set, the data miner can extract MRPAM reported mining activity plans and reports by each company from the EITI reconciliation reports for the year of 2010–​18. The value of this data set lies in cross-​checking the production data reported by the company or filling in the missing data if the company has not reported.

Natural resource data accessibility  155 In the Dalanjargalan case, using the above-​mentioned data sources, the community can understand who the large-​scale miners are, how much each pays in royalties, and can demand more jobs and corporate social responsibilities. Using production data, I could make an analysis of such elements as large-​scale miners over the long-​term vs recently opened mines which extracted huge amounts of resource within a year, small-​scale miners that might be selling fluorspar by purchasing from the artisanal miners, and increase and decrease of mineral production over the last decade. However, I should note that data searching and cleaning for the above analysis had some bottlenecks that might affect data usage and proper analysis. For instance, production data is aggregated, incomplete and contains some technical errors. Some years’ data sets are in PDF format which took a lot of time and effort to collect and clean. In sum, at the entry point, the license and production information are available in Mongolia and if they use this information, the community can improve their knowledge and voice to demand the accountability that really concerns them. Environmental rehabilitation issues In Dalanjargalan, environmental information was in high demand by the local community. According to the Environmental Protection Law (EPL) and Environmental Impact Specific Assessment Law (EISAL), communities have the right to access and demand the disclosure of certain information for their safety. For instance as per EPL, the project implementer and environmental assessor shall present the environmental impact assessment report to the project impacted community (article 10.5); the implementation of the environmental management plan shall be presented and reported to the local residents, government and project impacted families (article 14.1.2); the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) shall publicly inform about projects included in the environmental impact assessments through their website (article 18.1). Moreover, as per EISAL, the government shall ensure the transparency of process and decision-​making about environmental protection and resource allocation (article 4); and the environmental information database should be publicly open (article 33.4). There are three main data sources that provide environmental information in Mongolia. 1. The Environmental Information Center (EIC) and MET annual reports. 2. National and Aimag Statistical Offices. 3. EITI Portal and annual reconciliation reports. I was able to search 18 types of data sets, covering various timeframes, such as land degradation, climate data sets, environmental impact assessments, geo data sets and so forth (See Table 8.2).

156  Delgermaa Boldbaatar Table 8.2 Environmental data set roadmap Data sets

Dornogobi level records

Dalanjargalan soum level records

Timeframe

Content

42

17

2018

Water database   Drilled wells

17 places were recorded that covered 1.1 ha area

355

n/​a

n/​a

 Boreholes

1022

n/​a

n/​a

Environmental Impact Assessment Database   General assessment

Location, coordination Location, coordination

219

65

2007–​19

114

36

2001–​19

n/​a

n/​a

n/​a

133

24

2011

Soil and water contaminate level was raised above standard level

NSO data set Surface water database

6

n/​a

2007, 2011, 2014, 2016–​17

Monthly wind speed

n/​a

n/​a

2005–​20

Monthly sum of precipitation Monthly air pollution EITI data set Portal Rehabilitation data set

n/​a

n/​a

2005–​20

n/​a

n/​a

2002–​20

Number of surface water sources, protected, recovered, dried out Sainshand area only covered Sainshand area only covered Sainshand area only covered

60

19

2018–​19

1190

326

2010–​19

EIC Data set Degraded land inventory database

Detailed assessment Desertification database Geodatabase on ecological health

Environmental protection costs

Reports in PDF by each company Reports in PDF by each company Geodata

Area and cost of rehabilitation by each company Costs by each reported company

Natural resource data accessibility 157 Table 8.2 Cont. Data sets

Dornogobi level records

Dalanjargalan soum level records

Timeframe

Content

50% deposit of environmental protection costs Annual reports Unsatisfactory rehabilitation work survey

1190

326

2010–​19

Deposits by each reported company

27

n/​a

2018

Rehabilitation works

n/​a

n/​a

2013–​18

Water usage data

4

n/​a

2017–​18

Waste management data

2

n/​a

2017–​18

License number, company name, land area Company name, mining and rehabilitation costs Water usage agreement, water source, usage by m3, grey water usage practice Type of waste by m3

Source: Author.

Data sets were in various formats including HTML, PDFs, Excel and GIS. Reports on climate change, environmental rehabilitation and environmental impact were accessible, covered historical timeframes and were disaggregated at the soum level. But valuable data sets for the local community including on degraded land and rehabilitation work were outdated, incomplete and required technical capacities to interpret and visualise for a better understanding. For instance, in the selected soum case, 38 general environmental assessments and 26 specific assessments and management plans were accessible out of 72 active mining licenses at the EIC. In other words, one-​third of license holders’ total environmental impact assessment is publicly open. However, this does not mean that reports on actual implementation are available and measurable to assess its fulfilment. Thus, here we can make a conclusion that the required information is absent and incomplete (See Table 8.3). Secondly, the community can search the EITI reports to find out what funds have been deposited by each license holder to cover their environmental responsibility, where they did the rehabilitation and so forth. If the license holder fulfils their obligation, this deposit should be paid back to the company; if not, the government will use the funds deposited to rehabilitate the environment. Based on the available data, I  could find that especially for the years 2012–​16, not every company was depositing the environmental protection cost

158  Delgermaa Boldbaatar Table 8.3 Environmental data accessibility by each license holder in Dalanjargalan soum Criteria

Exploitation Under With With licenses extraction accessible accessible as per EIGAs EISAs EITI data

Number of  72 licenses Data accessibility 100% rate compared with total exploitation licenses

Reported Reported rehabilitation deposits works via EITI

21

38

26

8

16

29%

53%

36%

38%

22%

Source: Author.

in the special account for environmental protection although they were mining; the government collected 251 million MNT (US$90,000) in the account in the last nine years, but the community still had concerns about shafts remaining in the ground, thick dust and leaking toxic chemicals. Although EITI has been collecting annual reports on environmental rehabilitation work by the relevant governments (which reported by companies to the government) since 2013, I could find only nine companies’ data on 1–​3 years rehabilitation work. This really makes me ask whether current efforts to compile such data on environmental rehabilitation are useful enough for the local communities experiencing direct impact. However, given the existing information, at least the community may wish to ask why other environmental impact assessments are missing, and why some companies did not deposit 50% of environmental protection costs for better compliance with the law. Despite the above-​mentioned possibilities of data usage and the efforts and good practices by EITI and MET regarding disclosure of information on the environment, it is still difficult to answer community concerns related to heavy dust, mine shafts and degradation of land using currently available data sets alone. Thus, it is important to pay attention to the disclosure of environmental protection plans and reports at the local level and other contextual information around land degradation, climate change and small-​scale miners’ information. Moreover, participatory monitoring by citizens may fill the information gap and reduce local conflicts. For example, in Khanbogd soum of Umnugobi aimag, an independent local NGO has been monitoring the well-​water level, dust, wildlife and pastureland around Oyu Tolgoi mine site since 2015, engaging with 100 herder families. Herders collect the data every three days and disseminate the results via different channels.Thirdly, as mentioned earlier, there are barriers in the format of data and the lack of standardisation which deter or exclude data users. Thus, standardisation and capacity building of environment-​related information disclosure is needed here to add value to the current work on disclosure and data usability for community problem-​solving.

Natural resource data accessibility  159 Mining companies’ economic contribution to the soum In most cases, the community only sees the negative environmental and social impacts of the mining companies in a visual and direct way, so thinks the sector is not economically beneficial. Without knowing the mining companies’ economic contribution, local consultation would be ineffective. Since this kind of disclosure, including tax payments and social expenditure, is the main disclosure practice in Mongolia under the EITI standard, every local resident can access this data set with the help of intermediaries or by themselves and improve their knowledge for effective engagement in the local consultation.The mining companies’ tax payments and donations have been reported since 2006. As part of the EITI reconciliation process, 98% of total revenue is audited annually by an independent auditor. I  reviewed all the data sets on tax payments and donations of the mining companies in Dalanjargalan soum for the years 2006–​ 18 and did following analysis. •

•

• • •

For the last 12 years, 16 companies operated in the soum and paid taxes equivalent to 21 billion MNT2 (US$7.5 million) to the national budget. Half of this was paid by only two iron ore companies. I recall here from the production data that one iron ore company operated for five years (2011–​ 15) and has already closed. Coal mining operated longest in the soum. To date, six companies have contributed a quarter of the total revenue (US$1.7  million) while the recently opened construction material industry “MAK cement’ also contributed US$1.7 million in 2017/​18. Fluorspar mining has a long history in the soum, however the economic data says this sector contributed only 5% of the total tax collection. As for the local tax, 521 million MNT (US$186,000) was paid by 15 companies to the subnational budget over the last 12 years. In last 12 years, 10 companies have provided donations to the soum government totalling US$350,000. One company’s CSR for society seemed quite unique in that building a kindergarten in the soum in 2018 cost US$285,000, which means previous CSR works and donations by the other companies contributed only 20% of the total over the whole time period.

This kind of analysis is helpful to understand the context and conduct a cost–​ benefit analysis on behalf of the local community. In Mongolia, it is becoming crucial to understand how much economic benefit is gained by paying how much environmental and social cost. Another useful data set that might be interesting for the local community is Local Development Fund transfers and their disbursement, as almost 30% of this fund is composed of the mining royalties. As per the budget law, most revenues go to the national budget and are re-​allocated to the local budgets through treasury dedicated transfers and different funds including social

160  Delgermaa Boldbaatar Table 8.4 Local development fund transfers (in million MNT) Local development fund transfers

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

Total

Dornogobi aimag Dalanjargalan soum Soum percentage

8130 231 3%

10146 126 1%

4741 73 2%

5579 184 3%

2307 99 4%

3275 68 2%

6795 188 3%

40973 969 2%

Source: Author compiled from http://​onhs.mof.gov.mn/​.

insurance and local development funds. The data says that Dalanjargalan soum received 969 million MNT (US$350,000) for its local development fund over the last seven years (see Table 8.4). This represents 2% of the funds received by the aimag. From here, people may raise the question whether current legislation and policy on subnational revenue sharing is equitable? On a final note, every local community wants to know how the mining sector is affecting their household livelihood by getting more information on employment and local procurement. Unfortunately, due to the lack of social and economic statistics at the soum level and project level disclosure on local procurement and job creation, it is complicated to look at the whole picture of the mining sector’s contribution to the local economy. In sum, I  tried to answer the local community’s information needs and prioritised concerns using currently available data. The general conclusion is that EITI’s and other linked data sets on license and production information serve as an entry point for information seekers. Environmental data sets are insufficient to answer local concerns around water and environmental rehabilitation. However, currently available data sets empower the local community to demand full or targeted disclosure for the public good. Finally, the tax data set related to a mining company’s economic contribution was completely usable from the EITI portal.With help of this data set, the community can understand the context and effectively engage in the local consultation. However, more information on jobs and procurement related to the local context was inaccessible at the moment.

Conclusion and recommendation This chapter aimed to answer how the currently available data on natural resources is helping to solve local problems in the case of Dalanjargalan soum of Mongolia. This soum was selected as a case study because of its high number of licenses, rising conflicts among stakeholders and active national media and civil society engagement in the issues. Based on the secondary source analysis, the main concerns and frustrations of the Dalanjargalan community were related to environmental issues such as insufficient rehabilitation by the irresponsible large-​and small-​scale mining companies and individuals, thick dust created by transportation and its impact on land degradation and water scarcity.

Natural resource data accessibility  161 The GoM joined transparency initiatives like EITI and OGP a long time ago to ensure proper resource governance. EITI data sets related to the licenses, production, tax collection, donations and some environmental information provide entry points to the local community to find clues for further navigation. However, this alone is insufficient to help local communities solve their problems and meaningfully engage with the stakeholders for better accountability and resource governance. The information in high demand from the community side, such as environmental impact assessments, implementation plans and reports, is incomplete or absent and requires high technical skills and professional knowledge to contextualise the obtained data sets. Moreover, not only the environmental information but also that on local procurement and job creation is hard to access. Therefore, to fill this information gap, it is important to act collectively on purposeful transparency that matches the community’s information needs. This does not mean to rely on disclosure from the government side, but rather to encourage and share good practices of inclusive data collection and engagement, including citizens’ participatory environmental monitoring programs, collection and discussion of information on the processing industry, small-​scale miners’ operations, local level procurement and so on. Finally, contextual and cross-​sectoral data disclosure at the soum level (health, land, climate change, social and economic statistics, employment) and different stakeholders’ collaboration in such disclosure is becoming vital to create a narrative with the whole picture. Everybody who engages with data and its usage should take a broader view of it in order to realistically help local nomads improve evidence-​based public discourse and decision making in the natural resource sector.

Notes from the field An untapped opportunity? The state of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in the Kyrgyz Republic after the 2016 validation Altynai Sydykova After independence in 1992, Kyrgyzstan opened up its mining sector for exploration. Five years later, a Canadian investor started operations on what was to become the largest Western-​operated gold mine in Central Asia –​Kumtor. Since then, mining has been a significant source of government revenue. Realising the substantial economic contribution of the mining sector to the economy, Kyrgyzstan was one of the first countries to implement the EITI, an international initiative promoting transparency of mining revenue. Implementation of the EITI in each country is supported by a coalition comprised of the government, companies and civil society at the national level. In Kyrgyzstan, the Multi-​Stakeholder

162  Delgermaa Boldbaatar Group (MSG) ensures regular development of transparency reports on standard EITI rules. The EITI Board evaluates country compliance with EITI standards every three years during the validation exercise. Until 2010, the EITI consisted of 12 principles and focused on the disclosure of tax revenues from mining and the reconciliation of tax data. In 2013, the EITI became a standard encompassing the whole value chain in the mining sector. Transparency in EITI countries must exist throughout  –​statistical data and management of state-​owned mining enterprises. Since 2019, the process includes identification of beneficial license owners and environmental indicators. Kyrgyzstan’s government issued its first EITI report in October 2004. Subsequently, the country attained EITI compliance status by adopting and integrating the 12 principles. From 2010 to 2016, Kyrgyzstan was considered compliant with EITI standards. As the initiative progressed, the government stopped its active involvement. This was particularly noticeable in 2011–​15 when the chairman did not participate in MSG meetings. In February 2016, the EITI Board suspended Kyrgyzstan and recommended 22 actions that needed to be taken in the next three years to reclaim compliance.This field note describes the obstacles encountered by the MSG in preparation for the 2019 EITI validation. Validation challenges Reliance on external support The EITI in Kyrgyzstan was supported by the United Kingdom, the World Bank’s Multi-​Donor Trust Fund and other international sources. Before 2016, donors contributed ~$100,000 annually for implementation. While this ensured the EITI Secretariat’s independence, it created EITI dependency on donor support. The last EITI support grant expired in 2015 whilst mining expanded –​licenses increased from 1,359 in 2016 to 2,571 in 2018. Despite the State Committee’s (Industry, Energy and Subsoil Use) efforts, the government denied EITI funding. Aid arrived for the 2019 report yet not all of the planned data sets were included. Civil society representatives wanted to see additional data streams, such as the implementation of environmental and health safety requirements and rehabilitation works. Such tasks were excluded by the Independent Administrator due to limited funds. Most significantly, no databases were developed or improved upon to meet the EITI Standard. The State Committee responsible for the EITI coordination had included provisions for the disclosure of license and social agreements in the 2018 reform of the Law on Subsoil Use, but it lacked the technical capacity to disclose thousands of licenses or funding for digital transformations to make reporting available. Consequently,

Natural resource data accessibility  163 Kyrgyzstan again failed to live up to its EITI potential but did address technical recommendations. Limited local impact The EITI should benefit citizens whose rights and interests may be at risk. EITI principles lacking a communication strategy or civil society capacity development have produced mixed results. For instance, 20 local non-​ governmental organisations in the capital and mining-​ impacted regions have distributed information to communities, organised regional mining-​related discussions and disseminated EITI data. NGOs were also dependent on external support. By 2019, past findings had lost relevance, decreasing stakeholder benefit. Political instability Five prime ministers and three state committee chairmen left office between 2015 and 2019. Such frequent changes create uncertainty and decision time gaps disrupting productive EITI implementation.The EITI Secretariat struggled to engage the new Prime Minister before validation deadlines. One lesson learned was the inclusion of parliament members in the MSG as the Jogorku Kenesh provided invaluable support in 2018–​ 19. Deputies have open access to government data, support regulatory reforms and put pressure on government representatives. Importantly, they are elected for five years and are a stable source of political support. The government, civil society and companies understand the EITI and are ready to work towards its implementation. Political support from alternative branches of power  –​the parliament or the president  –​may further improve the implementation process. Summary Kyrgyzstan presents an unusual EITI case. It is a country that has held membership for more than decade and meets the preconditions for success: it has an open civil society, a rapidly developing mining sector and gaps in transparency, yet despite these aspects, it struggles to live up to its potential. When the EITI transformed into a reform-​inspiring tool, it coincided with a lack of international mining support programmes in Kyrgyzstan. The EITI reliance on external funding played a key role in the lost opportunity for improved EITI implementation. Similar to the Mongolian case, the local communities in Kyrgyzstan demand more data than prescribed by international standards. In Kyrgyzstan, most local activities went unfunded. The MSG implemented 22 technical recommendations. Disclosure of data in accordance with

164  Delgermaa Boldbaatar the 2016 EITI Standard is an achievement for Kyrgyzstan. However, the country must now go on to develop viable data disclosure tools, as in Mongolia, and improve engagement with local communities on resource governance. Transparency is necessary for Kyrgyzstan where corruption is rampant. The EITI remains an untapped opportunity; its success depends on political effort to ensure funding. The 2020 elections to the Jogorku Kenesh is an important event for the country’s parliamentary system and the mining sector will be central to the political discourse. This could provide momentum to stress the importance of EITI implementation for the overall benefit of the country. Otherwise, Kyrgyzstan may lose its last remaining independent, mining-​related institution.

Notes 1 The EITI Secretariat was funded by the World Bank from its inception in 2007 until 2018. Now, the Asian Development Bank funds the operational costs including the salaries from 2019 to 2021. 2 The Mongolyn alt MAK LLC payment was excluded due to the difficulty in differentiating the Eldev mine contribution from the remaining top mines, Nariin sukhait and Aduun chuluunii khundii.

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9  Resource extraction, environmental concerns and social license to operate in Kyrgyzstan Rahat Sabyrbekov and Indra Overland

Introduction In the Kyrgyz context, the mining sector is an important source of budget revenue and the government emphasises its strategic importance and value to the national economy. However, environmental concerns fuel conflicts between mining companies and local communities throughout Kyrgyzstan and make it difficult for the companies to obtain a social license to operate (SLO). An SLO is a form of informal social contract which provides legitimacy for operations and highlights local and community expectations (Prno & Scott Slocombe, 2012; Wilson, 2016; Demuijnck & Fasterling, 2016; Gehman et al., 2017). The numerous conflicts with local communities at Kyrgyz exploration and mining sites indicate that an SLO is frequently missing. The objective of this chapter is to assess the environmental dimension of SLO, examine current government policy in Kyrgyzstan and make policy recommendations. For this purpose, the chapter lays out the role of environmental concerns in triggering conflicts with local populations, provides a summary of what SLO means in the context of mining, and reviews the state of environmental regulation in the Kyrgyz resource extraction sector and its role in obtaining an SLO. The environment and resource extraction in developing countries Extraction of mineral resources is one of the economic sectors that has the largest direct and visible impacts on nature (Bebbington et  al., 2018; Sonter et al., 2018; Werner et al., 2019). Resource extraction alters the land cover and natural ecosystems surrounding sites of extraction (Latifovic et al., 2005; Qian et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2020). The world has seen many cases of mismanaged resource extraction projects which have become disasters for the natural environment (e.g. Garcia et al., 2017; Schwarz-​Herion & Omran, 2020). In the early 2000s, growing concerns about the negative impacts of mining lead to the global initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, the World Bank’s Extractive Industries Review and the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development.These initiatives raised awareness of the DOI: 10.4324/9781003097341-11

Resource extraction, environmental concerns  169 negative practices in extractive industries, and many governments followed suit and started implementing good governance practices (Haufler, 2010; Corrigan, 2014, 2017; David-​Barrett & Okamura, 2016). The establishment of global standards and best practices helped establish principles of transparency and good governance as global norms and has been hailed as a success. However, the evidence that such global initiatives have secured environmental protection standards and good governance is mixed (Szablowski, 2007; Buxton, 2012; Rustad et al., 2017;Van Alstine, 2017; Bassey, 2019). It is expected that global resource extraction will continue to grow as global consumption of materials continues to rise (Chow, 2003; Beretta, 2007; Wiedmann et al., 2015). Humankind has yet to learn how to decouple economic growth from the consumption of natural resources (Zhou et al., 2018). Despite increased efficiency in the use of materials, consumption, and therefore also extraction, of raw materials is still rising, and decoupling is not happening (Overland & Sovacool, 2020). Moreover, extraction of some minerals is set to grow as the world moves away from fossil fuels, because new energy technologies require new materials. For example, rising sales of electric cars have driven a sharp increase in the demand for cobalt, lithium and nickel (Hensel, 2011; Ljunggren Söderman et al., 2013; Ali et al., 2017; Agusdinata et al., 2018; Church & Crawford, 2018). Today, much of the world’s mineral resources are extracted in developing countries. Their governments welcome foreign resource extraction projects because they bring capital and extractive technology to the country. Mining projects are seen as source of quick cash and typically do not require the implementation of difficult reforms or adjustments on the part of host governments. Thus, in developing economies with constrained state funds, resource extraction projects are highly attractive to elites and are also believed to increase the economic well-​being of the wider citizenry through the provision of increased budget revenues and jobs. However, mineral resource development also has negative effects. In addition to macroeconomic risks such as revenue volatility and corruption, addressing the negative environmental impacts of resource extraction projects is one of the major challenges facing policymakers (Cragg, 1998; Behrens et  al., 2007; Dubiński, 2013). The environmental damage caused by resource extraction is disproportionately high in developing countries with weak institutions and low environmental protection standards (Bhattarai & Hammig, 2004; Tamazian & Rao, 2010; Johnson, 2019). The question of how environmental protection is addressed in the extractive sector in developing countries is therefore important (Slack, 2012; Lim et al., 2015). Environment and resource extraction in Kyrgyzstan It is no coincidence that, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the largest volume of foreign investment in Kyrgyzstan was in a gold mining project launched by Canadian company Centerra in 1997. In the 1990s, the Kyrgyzstan’s

170  Rahat Sabyrbekov and Indra Overland industrial sector was bankrupt (Windell et  al., 1995; Abazov, 1999). Thus, the arrival of a large investor bringing its own technology and financial resources for an activity that did not require complex industrial processing facilities looked like a godsend to the government. Following the (financial) success of operations at Centerra’s Kumtor mine, the Kyrgyz government started seeing the extractive sector as a key area for generating foreign investment and state budget revenues. This can be seen in national strategies where resource extraction is often cited as a priority for reducing poverty and attracting foreign direct investment and praised and highlighted as a growth generator. In the decade from 2010 to 2020, taxes on resource extraction made up around 10% of the national budget, and gold was the largest export item. Therefore, it is not surprising that the sector enjoys support from the government and continues to grow. As stated above, the extraction of mineral resources has a direct impact on nature  –​highlighting the importance of sound and well-​designed environmental policy. However, the general national environmental policy of Kyrgyzstan, which applies to all sectors, is still underdeveloped.The government is struggling with unprecedented levels of urban air pollution, growing residential and industrial waste, the degradation of pasture land and low resource-​use efficiency in all sectors of the economy. As a result, in the 2020 assessment of progress on the Sustainable Development Goals, Kyrgyzstan scored low on the sustainable use of natural ecosystems and on sustainable production (NSC KR, 2020). The government body responsible for environmental protection –​the State Agency for Environmental Protection and Forestry (SAEPF) –​has lower status than the ministries and thus has a limited influence on national development policies and programs. Resource extraction sites in Kyrgyzstan are typically located in remote mountain areas. In these areas, local communities are heavily dependent on natural ecosystems as they are engaged in subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry (Sabyrbekov, 2019). Environmental disruptions can have direct impacts on local livelihoods, and local populations are thus worried about potential threats to the ecosystems they depend upon for pasture, agricultural land and drinking water (Wooden, 2013; Fumagalli, 2015; Horrocks-​Taylor, 2018; Pomfret, 2018; Ocaklı et al., 2020). Resource extraction is of particular concern because of its potential adverse environmental effects and potential to diminish local community wellbeing. Natural resource extraction can exacerbate pre-​existing issues of dwindling natural resources by accelerating the impacts of pasture degradation, livestock growth and climate change. Over the three decades since the country achieved independence, reports of environmental damage from resource extraction have been widely publicised and discussed. The largest gold mine  –​Centerra-​ operated Kumtor  –​has received vast negative media coverage. In 1998, one year after the opening of the mine, there was a cyanide spill into the Barskoon River but despite protests and concerns about environmental safety, mining continued. The mine caused problems again in 2017, when the company was granted a hotly debated permission to move a glacier, and again in 2020, when the company declared two

Resource extraction, environmental concerns  171 employees missing after a landslide at the mine. However, despite the concerns raised, clear failings and considerable public scrutiny, the Kumtor mine continues to operate. It is widely recognised that the Kyrgyz government’s resource extraction regulations do not meet the international standards, and the safety of natural ecosystems has become a topical issue in the country (Honkonen, 2013; Doolot & Heathershaw, 2015; Furstenberg, 2015). There is currently no comprehensive national assessment of the environmental impact of the resource extraction sector in Kyrgyzstan. However, many independent assessments of the water and waste dumps at individual sites attest to the considerable pollution and high future risk caused by exploration and resource extraction activities (Kojobaev et al., 2016), providing mounting evidence of the adverse effects of mining on the country’s environment. The environmental damage from resource extraction in Kyrgyzstan comes primarily from tailing ponds, air and water pollution and landfills. In 2009, there were more than 50 tailings sites (Torgoev & Aleshyn, 2009), and by 2019 this number had reached 93.

The environment, resource extraction and social license Environmental concerns and conflicts Since 2010, Kyrgyzstan has seen many conflicts between local communities and mining companies, the latter of which are primarily funded by foreign investors. The conflicts have taken many forms, from people blocking roads to destroying machinery or protesting in front of state buildings. Despite the government’s efforts to dissipate tensions, conflicts still occur, ostensibly driven by environmental concerns. Government officials do not believe that concerns about the environment are the true cause of the protests but that they are driven by misinformation and a lack of knowledge about the mining projects (Ocaklı et al., 2020). The non-​state actors involved, however, maintain that the source of the conflicts lies in the lack of competence of the central government and its failure to enforce existing regulations. Following waves of protest, the government commissioned independent surveys of public opinion in 2012 and 2015 in six different locations in the country (EFCA, 2017). These opinion surveys, conducted after violent protests, showed that the negative impacts on human health, deterioration of land, air pollution and use of toxic materials were the main concerns of the local communities (EFCA, 2017). For example, 72% of respondents were confident that resource extraction would cause significant environmental damage. Moreover, the respondents believed that the long-​term environmental and health costs would outweigh the short-​term economic benefits of mineral resource extraction. Despite assurances from the companies and the government that there would be adherence to strict environmental standards, the mining projects failed to gain local trust and thus failed to obtain an SLO.

172  Rahat Sabyrbekov and Indra Overland According to the literature, while the potential for environmental damage is important, it tends not to be the sole reason for such conflicts. A large body of research that finds these conflicts result from many compounding factors (Martinez-​Alier, 2001; Hilson, 2002; Jenkins, 2004; Bebbington et  al., 2008; Kemp et al., 2011). A lack of trust in national procedures, such as license distribution and environmental impact assessment, has also led to high levels of distrust in government and industry among local communities (EITI, 2015). Furthermore, local communities are also often economically independent from the state since the state-​provided services are low in quality or entirely absent (Steimann, 2011). Ocaklı (2020) has found that conflicts around resource extraction in Kyrgyzstan are often linked to widespread cases of corruption in the sector becoming public knowledge. The most popular policy recommendation is to increase the transparency of industry regulation and provide more information to local communities (e.g.Tiainen et al., 2014). However, this approach has largely been unsuccessful, and environmental concerns continue to fuel the conflicts. In the next sections, we will provide a possible explanation as to why this is happening. Environment as a part of SLO An SLO is a form of informal social contract which provides legitimacy for action and highlights local and community expectations (Prno & Slocombe, 2014; Mercer-​Mapstone et al., 2017). Environmental concerns are frequently one of the key components of an SLO, particularly in cases of resource extraction. The literature on SLO in the mining sector has been emerging since the concept was introduced in the early 2000s (Boutilier, 2014; Moffat et al., 2016; Heffron et  al., 2018). There is no common definition, but the general consensus is that SLO indicates the broad acceptance of an industrial activity (such as resource extraction) by a local community.Thus, an SLO is an informal approval of the planned activities of a company at a site of operations by the local community. The importance of understanding and analysing SLO is greatest in places where law enforcement is weak and/​or trust in the state is low (Joyce & Thomson, 2000; Moffat & Zhang, 2014; Zhang et al., 2015; Debrah et al., 2018) The concept of SLO has always been rooted in concern about environmental impact. In fact, the concept of (an absence of) SLO originally emerged in a description of a conflict between resource extraction companies and a local population over environmental impacts (Thomson & Boutilier, 2011; Syn, 2014). Today, the term is applied across the natural resource industries. In general, provision of an SLO is understood to be based on four dimensions which form a pyramid:  economic legitimacy, sociopolitical legitimacy, interactional trust and institutionalised trust (Figure 9.1).The stability of the pyramid requires that the mining project is strong in all four dimensions. To make things even more complex, an SLO can exist at the society or community level.

Resource extraction, environmental concerns  173

Institutionalised trust

Socio-political legitimacy

Interactional trust

Economic legitimacy

Figure 9.1 Dimensions of social license to operate (adapted from Lehtonen et al. 2020 and Thomson & Boutilier, 2011).

Empirical findings from around the world suggest that the success of earning an SLO depends on many variables, including economic benefits to the community (Whitmarsh & Palmieri, 2009), perceived fairness/​ distribution of benefits (Alexander & Aberneth, 2019), social norms (Leonard, 2019) and trust in government (Lehtonen et  al., 2020). It is therefore no surprise that the success criteria of SLO are very specific to the context and location where the resource extraction takes place. In the following sections, we will review the concept of SLO and its environmental dimensions in the Kyrgyz context. Environmental protection and SLO in Kyrgyzstan Clearly, many mining companies operating in Kyrgyzstan have not obtained an SLO from the local community and environmental concerns are a major point of distrust (see Table 9.1). Paradoxically, despite officially having high priority, the sector is mired in conflict between local communities and mining and exploration companies. As noted above, the sides disagree on the causes of conflict: the government blames a lack of information and a failure among the population to see the benefits of mining, while NGOs argue that there are genuine local concerns about damage to ecosystems. A brief review of published papers on the consequences of mining in Kyrgyzstan shows mounting evidence of bad practices at many mines and serious management challenges at Soviet tailings sites (Torgoev et al., 2002; Sevcik, 2003; Vandenhove et  al., 2006; Bekbolotova & Toychubekova, 2014). It also

174  Rahat Sabyrbekov and Indra Overland Table 9.1 Assessment of Kyrgyz resource extraction sector using SLO dimensions Economic legitimacy

Socio-​political legitimacy

Interactional trust

Community costs & benefits • Economic benefits are clearly expressed at national and local levels • The state has introduced changes to maximise economic benefits such as contribution to the region’s development fund and a social package of benefits for the local community

Institutional quality Effective • The government communication has been striving between to increase stakeholders transparency. • Competency However, of the state to corruption is communicate widely reported with all throughout stakeholders the country is low (Cokgezen, 2004; • Communication Engvall, 2018) between • Institutional companies and misalignment of communities or environmental NGOs is poor protection between state bodies • The state is unable to ensure that environmental standards are upheld at resource extraction sites • Outdated environmental damage compensation scheme

Institutionalised trust Full trust in the state and companies • Local communities often disregard central government’s assurances about high safety levels of mining projects • The general public has little trust in state agencies, and official promises, especially in rural areas • Communities do not trust mining companies to protect the environment

Source: Adapted from Boutilier and Thomson (2011).

indicates that environmental policy is poorly enforced, perhaps even more so in the extractive industries than in other sectors. Analysis of the SLO of the resource extraction sector in Kyrgyzstan shows that, while the bottom part of the SLO pyramid in Figure 9.1 (Thomson & Boutilier, 2011) is addressed, other parts remain unresolved. Although the Kyrgyz government has been pushing hard to increase economic legitimacy through ensuring mandatory and voluntary monetary contributions to local communities, aspects of sociopolitical legitimacy are much harder to address, since this depends on the overall efficiency of governance at the national and sector levels. The fact that the environmental impact assessments are conducted by the State Committee for Industry, Energy and Subsoil Use and not the state

Resource extraction, environmental concerns  175 institution dedicated to environmental protection, the SAEPF, underscores the weak role of the State Agency for Environmental Protection in the regulation of the sector. The State Committee for Industry does not prioritise environmental protection and is incapable of developing and enforcing proper environmental regulations (Makhmudova & Matsui, 2019). The same pattern can be found in many countries (Aryee, 2001; Bassey, 2019; Caramento, 2020; O’Faircheallaigh, 2020). There is a misalignment between institutional roles and policy implementation when it comes to environmental regulation in the resource extraction sector. The State Environmental Protection Agency is the main state institution responsible for environmental regulation. However, the role of the Agency is very limited in terms of overseeing actual mining operations. Moreover, the national mineral resources regulatory system is not capable of controlling the exploration and mining activities of companies (NRGI, 2017). From an environmental perspective, the government sees resource extraction as being like any other industrial sector (Ocaklı et al., 2020). Hence, the government addresses only direct environmental impacts and risks, for example, making sure that the tailing ponds do not leak and that lands are re-​cultivated. Activities related to mining and exploration treat environmental damage as a typical externality, and the less evident and long-​term impacts such as disruption of natural habitats or consequences of climate change are not assessed. The government tries to resolve mining conflicts by providing more information about the economic benefits and by instituting direct monetary benefits for local communities. For example, the government and resource extraction companies use so called “social packages” as a tool to build an SLO. According to Article 30 of the Subsoil Law, a social package is an agreement between the subsoil user (mining company) and the government about assistance for the socioeconomic development of the territory where resource extraction takes place (GovKR, 2018). The law does not explicitly indicate environmental protection as a priority in such agreements but the regulation states that the social package may include infrastructure development, capacity building or training activities as well as local employment opportunities. The government usually takes a narrow view of resource extraction, seeing it from a one-​dimensional economic perspective. This fully aligns with the way the mining companies see things. The lack of priority for environmental concerns can also be detected in the environmental damage compensation scheme. Perhaps the greatest weakness of the current environmental policy with regard to resource extraction in Kyrgyzstan is that the compensation scheme is outdated and primarily targeted at generating budget revenues without consideration for the full spectrum of costs resulting from diminished natural capital and ecosystem services. Current resource extraction policy prioritises short-​ term economic benefits, and its environmental safeguards are largely based on policies from the Soviet period. Modern approaches to environmental economics, which recognise a wide range of functions and valuations of the natural environment are not included

176  Rahat Sabyrbekov and Indra Overland in the Kyrgyz system. For example, the concept of ecosystem services –​benefits that humans receive from nature  –​is not recognised. Moreover, the trajectory of climate change in recent years has shown that treating environmental damage as an externality is very costly in the long run (Stern, 2007; Tol, 2008; TEEB, 2010). In addition, to the poor environmental regulation of the sector, the government does not assess the value of natural capital. Thus, the Kyrgyz government currently sells its natural resources cheaply, because the costs of natural capital and ecosystem services, not to mention cultural services, are not included in the calculations. So, the weakness of the SLO appears to be well justified based on the existing environmental protection practices. Environmental regulation of resource extraction in Kyrgyzstan As discussed above, while SLO has many aspects, social and environmental expectations are key. The government and companies in Kyrgyzstan are currently looking at both sets of expectations primarily through an economic lens. For instance, the social aspect is being addressed primarily through adjustments to the Tax Code and agreements on voluntary contributions to local community development. However, the environmental component gets much less attention and has not been explicitly targeted. Companies are trying to meet community expectations, but economic priorities remain their main focus. Ensuring that a company will follow environmental standards is a complex task and requires scrupulous assessment and a multi-​stakeholder approach. For instance, if one is to account for the contraction of ecosystem services as a result of mining activity, then a detailed analysis of ecosystem services and natural capital consumption by different stakeholders must be carried out. Another challenge is that, even if all of the proper assessments are conducted, it is difficult to establish trust. Firstly, because environmental regulation is conducted by the government, which already has low trust among local communities, and, secondly, because the communities are sceptical of the companies. This indicates that there is a role for an impartial third party in whom local communities may trust and who has the power to oversee assessments, for example, independent lawyers, an NGO, a group of academics or international consultants.

Stakeholders’ power and interest in enforcing environmental safeguards To answer the question why the environmental regulation is weak in the extractive sector, we looked into the power and interest distribution among stakeholders. Four stakeholders influence environmental safeguards in Kyrgyzstan:  the State Committee for Industry, Energy and Subsoil Use; the SAEPF; local government bodies; and resource extraction companies.

Resource extraction, environmental concerns  177 The State Committee for Industry, Energy and Subsoil Use is the central executive authority responsible for the development and implementation of state policies on subsoil use, as well as for ensuring that resource extraction projects are implemented in accordance with approved standards and safeguards. The SAEPF is the authorised body for the implementation of policies and regulation of relations in the field of environmental protection and the use of natural resources, ensuring environmental safety and environmental management. The local government office represents the central government and in mining projects is in charge of safety provision at resource extraction sites, equipment and re-​cultivation works. Resource extraction companies conduct exploration or mining activities. Based on analysis of the mining legislation, we observe that, among these stakeholders, the State Committee for Industry, Energy and Subsoil Use has much power over, but little interest in, environmental protection; the SAEPF and local government have more interest in, but little power over, environmental protection; and the resource extraction companies have little power over environmental regulation and low interest in environmental protection itself, since it adds additional costs (see Figure 9.2). The most powerful stakeholder, SCIES, is focused on the short-​term immediate economic benefits of resource extraction projects, both for the national government and the resource extraction companies. As noted above, SCIES treats environmental safeguards in resource extraction as in any other industrial project. Thus, its role is limited to the formal assessment of (narrowly defined) ecological risk relating to resource extraction projects and the issuance of licenses. By contrast, the SAEPF, which has the highest capacity to ensure environmental protection, is not fully involved in environmental impact assessment.

High State committee for industry, energy and subsoil use Stakeholder power Mining companies

State agency for environmental protection and forestry Local government

Low Low

Stakeholder interest

High

Figure 9.2 Stakeholder power and interest in environmental protection in the resource extraction sector in Kyrgyzstan. Source: Authors.

178  Rahat Sabyrbekov and Indra Overland As a result, the level of environmental regulation in resource extraction remains inadequate.

Implementation of environmental protection measures The current extractive industries environmental regulations in Kyrgyzstan do not meet international standards (Tiainen et al., 2014; Makhmudova & Matsui, 2019). Resource extraction activities threaten livelihoods, ecosystems and biodiversity. For example, while many exploration and mining sites are not located in protected areas, the literature indicates that they are still often located in biodiversity hotspots (Dzhenbaev & Kaldybaev, 2015). Currently, mining sector regulation policy is not aligned with the country’s natural capital preservation strategies. This is mainly because the State Committee for Industry, Energy and Subsoil Use does not have the capacity to provide a comprehensive environmental impact assessment, while the SAEPF is not involved in mining regulation. One environmental protection instrument which is in place is monetary compensation for pollution. However, the rates are very low, even by low-​ income country standards (see Table 9.2). This clearly provides little incentive for companies to reduce pollution or minimise waste. Even these lax requirements are hard to implement, given the government’s lack of capacity for pollution monitoring. For example, there are no effective and precise measurements of emissions from mobile sources (i.e. from transport), even in urban areas, and the national authorities are presently actively updating the air pollution measurement system for the capital city (Sabyrbekov & Ukueva, 2019). Currently, there is no mechanism to measure the actual emissions at resource extraction sites, either. Hence, the government cannot realistically measure emissions at exploration or mining sites. Furthermore, according to the legislation, the payments for pollution go to the national-​level budget, meaning that the local communities do not see this money. This undermines the efforts of the companies to obtain their SLO. The latest large-​scale study done by the Natural Resource Governance Institute involved a detailed inventory of all tax and non-​tax payments from resource extraction companies into the national budget of Kyrgyzstan, but the authors could not find any information on environmental payments (NRGI, 2017).

Table 9.2 Pollution compensation rates in Kyrgyzstan Pollution type

Soms per ton

US cents per ton

Air pollution Wastewater discharge Waste and resource extraction dump

3.24 10.50 3.24

4 14 4

Source: GovKR (2015).

Resource extraction, environmental concerns  179 The report also found that no state agency is formally dedicated to controlling such environmental payments.

Case study: contested permission to move glaciers at Kumtor mining site Kumtor is the largest operating mining project in Kyrgyzstan and is operated by Kumtor Gold Company (KGC, a subsidiary of Centerra Gold). The mining project is often portrayed as the driver of the national economy and the company claims that it has spent 4 billion dollars in salaries, fees, taxes and other payments since its start in 1994. In 2014, the company started lobbying for changes in the Water Code that would allow for the removal of glaciers at its mining site. In 2015, the changes were approved after two readings, but were later withdrawn. Once again, in 2017, the Government submitted a proposal to the National Parliament to change the Water Code to allow Kumtor operator Centerra to move two glaciers. The justification was that, if the glaciers were not moved, mining might become very difficult or impossible. The government argued that the mine was a large contributor to the national economy and that the current Water Code was creating a barrier for economic development. Interestingly, the government was explicit that the changes to the Code be applicable only to the Kumtor site, adding the names of the two glaciers near Kumtor to the legal text (Article 62 and 67 of the Water Code). In 2017, the Government’s initiative sparked large protests among experts, activists and NGOs (Azattyk, 2017). The protesters argued that

Figure 9.3 Civil protests against the legislation permitting the moving of glaciers at Kumtor mining site. Source: Kloop Media.

180  Rahat Sabyrbekov and Indra Overland the new legislation meant de-​facto approval of the elimination of the glaciers (see Figure 9.3). The government tried to legitimate the initiative by organising discussions with NGOs and a joint visit to the mining site. In November 2017, the change in the Water Code was approved by a sweeping majority vote in the parliament. The protests were not only fruitless but also meaningless because the destruction of the glaciers had been ongoing for many years by that point. Satellite images of the Kumtor site from 2014 to 2015 marked the first recorded instance of glacier retreat caused by mining activity, providing undeniable proof that the mining operation had cause the destruction of ice caps and damage to the permafrost (Jamieson et al., 2015; Evans et al., 2016). Thus, the adoption of the changes in the Water Code just legalised the destruction of the glaciers that had already been occurring over several years.These glaciers were sacrificed to economic development.While the destruction was later legalised, the Kumtor case showcases the inability of the Kyrgyz government to enforce environmental regulations in the mining sector. Over the course of its operations, the Kumtor mine has been subject to many inspections, but environmental concerns have never stopped the operation of the mine. Kumtor was simply too big to fail. The destroyed glaciers are the price that Kyrgyz society paid to keep the mine operating. This case demonstrates that the environmental regulations were poorly administered, and in fact the regulations were changed to satisfy the mining company’s requirements.With an increasing number of mines across the country, the risk of new violations is high.

Conclusion and policy implications Resource extraction can potentially enhance the economic wellbeing of local communities, increase government revenues and contribute to the development of remote rural areas. The Kyrgyz government is increasingly reliant on extractive industries as a source of budget revenues and foreign direct investment.The mining sector is regularly praised for its contribution to the economy, despite scant objective evidence of its economic importance. However, the environmental cost of the sector is on the rise. Furthermore, significant environmental costs stemming from poor environmental regulation of exploration and mining activities threaten the natural ecosystems of the country. Over the 30 years since Kyrgyzstan achieved independence, the country has accumulated new mining-​associated environmental risks in addition to the tailings inherited from Soviet times. The environmental protection institutions in the country are weak and lack the capacity to enforce the existing regulations in most areas. The situation in the extractive sector is

Resource extraction, environmental concerns  181 even worse because the environmental protection agenda has been marginalised for the sake of short-​term immediate monetary benefits. Therefore, it is not surprising that environmental concerns have become a major cause of protests across the country, and have made it difficult for companies to build an SLO at many exploration and mining sites. Population surveys highlight environmental concerns among local communities, and studies done at operating mining sites show inadequate handling of environmental protection. While the government has not conducted a comprehensive national assessment of the environmental impacts of extractive industries, we can observe that numerous accidents have taken place revealing systemic flaws in operations, both at the largest mining site and at many small sites, reflecting the poor regulation of the sector. In addition, analysis of the environmental regulations applicable to exploration and mining activities shows that the state does not have an effective system of environmental regulation or enforcement. The State Committee for Industry does not have the necessary capacity to address the environmental risks involved but is still responsible for environmental impact assessment, while environmental protection has been placed outside its scope of work. The State Agency for Environmental Protection, within whose scope of work this does lie, has a limited role in the regulation of the environmental impacts of the resource extraction sector. The government focuses on the economic benefits of resource extraction and, amid growing protest, has taken steps to reduce conflict by increasing the fiscal contribution of resource extraction projects to local community development through a number of mandatory and voluntary initiatives. Often, we see that the mining companies donate funds for infrastructure development and voluntarily contribute to other needs of the local communities. However, these attempts have largely failed to address the most often stated reason for these conflicts  –​the failure to protect the natural environment. Uni-​dimensional economic benefits are not enough to build an SLO. While the government’s priority in collecting the highest taxes possible and attracting more investment is understandable, this speaks only to the short-​term economic horizon, while bad environmental policy creates long-​term issues and result in higher future economic costs. The inadequacy of the current environmental protection measures is exemplified by the damage compensation schemes. The size of the payments for pollution is very low, removing incentives for companies to reduce waste and minimise their impact on ecosystems. One would expect better scrutiny and regulation in an environment where local peoples’ livelihoods and biodiversity are at stake. Moreover, the collection of fees for environmental damage is done in a non-​transparent manner, and the spending of these funds cannot be traced within the state budget. Since achieving an SLO is dependent upon the extent to which the local community trusts the government, the conflicts fuelled by environmental concerns are likely to continue to happen. Trust in the government’s

182  Rahat Sabyrbekov and Indra Overland technocratic ability and political fairness are at comparatively low levels in the modern history of Kyrgyzstan. This low trust in the national government is a key factor in the existence of resource extraction conflicts. This distrust is also driven by the inability of the state to ensure environmental safeguards. However, in this case, the lack of trust has substantive foundations. The current environmental protection standards in the extractive sector of the country are low and the cost accounting systems assess only direct land-​use changes, for example, landfills or waste. So far, the Kyrgyz government has tried to resolve resource extraction conflicts through national legislative instruments encouraging greater transparency, broader distribution of information about the work of government and greater monetary contributions to local communities. However, these measures are insufficient in the context of weak regulatory adherence and enforcement. In order to address the environmental component of SLO in resource extraction in Kyrgyzstan, the government will need to address a greater challenge: it must ensure that its resource extraction governance has the trust of the population and the inclusion of various stakeholders in natural resource governance (Overland, 2018). Much of the literature on mining in Kyrgyzstan finds that a major source of conflict is the lack of trust.Thus, a general policy recommendation is to improve the overall trust of the local communities in the central government –​a task that is hard to fulfil in the Kyrgyz context where corruption is widespread (Engvall, 2014; Collins & Gambrel, 2017). So far, the government has been unsuccessful in this, judging from anecdotal evidence of corruption, non-​transparent license distribution (Tiainen, 2012). Compared to the government’s claim that local environmental concerns stem simply from a lack of knowledge, we argue that the low levels of trust in government capacity to ensure that environmental standards are met is well justified. The environmental regulations currently surrounding mining sites are outdated, enforcement is weak, and the dedicated state body does not have the capacity to, or interest in, implementing sound environmental protection regulations. The existing environmental regulation of the mining industry in Kyrgyzstan has already allowed for globally unprecedented actions such as the moving of a glacier, and many other disasters are waiting to happen. If the Kyrgyz government wants to secure SLOs for mining operations, it should adopt a new approach, placing a greater emphasis on comprehensive environmental protection policy. The environmental safeguards should be treated as a priority in the operation of mines and during geological exploration. The provision of transparency is clearly not enough. Below are a few specific steps it should take to improve its policy. Firstly, it should adopt a holistic environmental impact assessment mechanism that follows the modern instruments of sustainable resource extraction and accounts for changes in natural capital and ecosystem services. This implies that the national accounting system needs to be amended to give a monetary value to the benefits that are currently not captured, for example, biodiversity and carbon absorption. This will also enable tracing of the dependence of the

Resource extraction, environmental concerns  183 local population on key ecosystem services and assessment of the impact of exploratory and mining works on the wellbeing of the local community. Secondly, the government should empower the SAEPF to design and implement environmental protection measures in the mining sector. If the first step is to be implemented, then this will require a much more active role on the part of SAEPF in regulating exploration and mining activities. The Agency has already been piloting a natural capital approach in forest management policies, so the extractive sector can benefit from this expertise as well. Thirdly, environmental protection should be prioritised in decisions on the feasibility of mining projects. This will require enhanced capacity of the state bodies to assess and forecast potential damage from exploratory and mining activities over the short-​and long-​term. Fourthly, the transparency of payments for environmental damage and other related fees should be improved. The current inadequate environmental payments and non-​ transparent methods of collection and use should be abandoned. Finally, the role of non-​governmental environmental protection stakeholders should be enhanced. Independent organisations should play a greater role in ensuring environmental protection in remote areas. This step also includes the involvement of academia, for example, to assess the trade-​offs between economic benefits and loss of natural capital or investigate other relevant research topics.

Notes from the field Kumtor’s struggle to secure a social license to operate Aktilek Tungatarov KGC is a unique goldmining project in the Kyrgyz Republic. It has been the country’s largest employer, taxpayer and exporter for many years and provides ~10% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP. The country’s excessive dependency on one company provides Kumtor with continuing strong support from the government in its struggle to secure an SLO. Nevertheless, the Kumtor mine has experienced protests and riots from its key stakeholders –​local communities, some of which have led to criminal cases and even to the imprisonment of dozens of people. Dr Elliott Jaques defines the SLO as the social contract a company has with the social license holders (employees, trade unions, communities, government) for them to manifest a positive intention to support the business’s short-​and long-​term objectives by “providing managerial leadership that nurtures the social good and also gives the foundation for sustainable growth in organizational results.” Kumtor is the first and largest private investment company in Kyrgyzstan and the biggest gold mine in Central Asia. It serves as a good

184  Rahat Sabyrbekov and Indra Overland example of industry best practice, develops labour skills and supports local development. Kumtor is probably the only mine in Kyrgyzstan that commits to international standards and requirements and supports the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.Though the company is exemplary, Kumtor lacks support from the majority of the country’s population and local communities. For instance, some perceive KGC as a fraudulent foreign investor supported by the central government. Obtaining an SLO remains a challenge for Kumtor –​so, what is the reason for this paradoxical situation? There are two main reasons for this conundrum –​politics and transparency. Importantly, citizens and communities believe Kumtor’s mining agreements (1994, 2004, 2009)  are not economically beneficial for the Kyrgyz Republic. Concurrently, the government supports KGC as it is the country’s primary tax source. These factors stoke public distrust and addressing these issues is a great challenge. Secondly, Kumtor (and its owner, Centerra Gold Inc.) needs to earn and sustain its SLO. Key to this include transparency and information about the mine with particular regard to the environment, procurement and employment. The main environmental issue is damage caused to glaciers by mining. KGC has been unable to successfully communicate to most of its stakeholders that the activities of the mine are not the main cause of de-​glaciation in the Kyrgyz Republic. Relocation of Davydov and Lysyi glaciers is the biggest concern in this regard. The local population believe that relocation means destruction since the opposite was not proven. Procurement and employment at Kumtor are two extremely sensitive economic issues leading to the perception that everything about Kumtor is corrupt. A  lack of information and engagement with both job-​seekers and potential local firms/​contractors affects opinions. For instance, many are unaware that KGC is exempt from import VAT (12%) (see the Restated Investment Agreement of 2009), and thus believe the company is not interested in working with local providers, preferring to make payments abroad. Explaining why it is economically beneficial for KGC to import goods and services from abroad and the demands of shareholders to reduce costs could clarify matters. Appropriate responses to all job applications, project proposals and commercial offers could also considerably improve public opinion about Kumtor, its reputation and achieving an SLO. Another issue that significantly influences the company’s reputation is the highway between Barskoon village and Balykchy city (~150 km) heavily used by Kumtor trucks. It is one of the worst and narrowest roads in the country making it dangerous for drivers, passengers and local inhabitants alike. The government and local population have high

Resource extraction, environmental concerns  185 expectations of KGC to rehabilitate this highway considering increasing gold prices and company revenues. The government has never included this road rehabilitation project into its yearly budget instead preferring to rely on these expectations. Meanwhile, KGC has no intention to make a gratuitous investment into the project. As a result, local communities are left with one of the worst roads in the country with no solution in sight. While addressing the question raised in the chapter whether community or social investments of mining companies create shared values and fulfil the obligations required of the SLO, it is vital to recognise that these represent only a small part of a sustainable development programme of any mining company. Ideally, company leadership and all departments shall realise and commit to working in a way that satisfies the shareholders’ current needs without compromising the needs of future generations. Unfortunately, this is not the case for Kumtor or any other mining project in the Kyrgyz Republic. Kumtor is of great importance for the country’s economy and its inevitable closure will come with a significant socioeconomic shock. Needless to say, losing the largest private employer and taxpayer will certainly have a devastating impact on the nation’s welfare. Therefore, thinking about ways to address the gaps that will arise after Kumtor closes is essential. The current absence of dialogue and actions between the country’s leadership and investors on this vital issue show that terms such as “sustainable development” and “corporate social responsibility” mean little in today’s economic climate. Herder perspective on social license Batbuyan Batjav In the Mongolian steppe herders and mines now co-​exist, but it is not a fair relationship. Mines have all the power and money. The herders have little chance to speak for themselves. They have strong opinions and clear insights about the good and bad aspects of mining. Whilst conducting research in Sukhbaater Aimag, Mongolia I spoke with the herders Baatar and Tamir. Here are their words on what has happened at their homes. According to the herders, the presence of a mining company in the neighbourhood becomes another factor to increase vulnerability. “Mining has negative effects on our community. If in the past climate change affected traditional grazing movement, now mining has added to it,” said Baatar from Erdenetsagaan soum. Herders lost access to some of the grazing territory of their four seasonal traditional grazing pasture areas. As a consequence, herders are forced to graze in the same place

186  Rahat Sabyrbekov and Indra Overland longer, resulting in overgrazing and pasture degradation. Therefore, some herders moved to other locations, leaving their homeland. The gazelles even fled. The location of the mine is on a gazelle migration route, the gazelle has moved far away now. However, from time to time, dead gazelles are trapped in iron barbed wire fencing that is built around the mining company territory. Therefore, mining adversely affects humans and wildlife. “As we understand the mining law in Mongolia, it has legal provisions that say it is necessary to include the voice of the local community as a key factor before obtaining permits to start mining operations.” Unfortunately, according the herders view, this is not fulfilled. “We still do not know how they obtained the permits.We were all opposed to have mining here.” Chinese mining companies tried to use different methods to obtain permits. They give bribes to make herders change their mind. They visit herders’ ger (home) and offer money, goods and even food, which caused outrage and disgust among the community. “I heard the story how one of the members of our community asked the Chinese people to leave his ger” because they offered food and gifts. The head of the family was very angry, saying, ‘the land is not for sale and we don’t want anything from you, go back to China. Our ancestors ordered: do not give land even if God asks.” Baatar said that: there is a lack of information about these mines. We do not know exactly what is mined here. Our local official says one thing, but another source says something different. For example, we met a Mongolian worker/​drilling engineer, who worked inside a mine. He said that the officially announced fluorspar mining exploration is in reality gold mining. Such darkness creates mistrust and conflict. Herders want true information and transparency. Herders are afraid for their future, the future is unclear. Due to the current situation herders organized several protests. They asked for an explanation from the local authority.“They don’t react as if they are on their side. Most herders believe they are bribed.” Each time they raise this topic when they have a chance at local community meetings and events herders do not get answer. Therefore, “we turned to an NGO for help. We contacted a few NGOs, which deal with mining abuse. Unfortunately, these didn’t help either, therefore, we turned to the relevant mining authorities, and we even turned to the Minister of Mining Industry. We have a suspicion that at the highest level people are corrupted

Resource extraction, environmental concerns  187 At the end of the conversation, Mr Baatar said there is a connection between pastoralists and nature. The respect and worship of nature was passed on for generations. Those who betrayed this tradition were punished. We had a case where two members of one family who worked for that Chinese mining company died suddenly. Also the livestock number of that family did not increase. People said that god had punished them. There is another side of mining operations when mines treat the local community responsibly. This could be confirmed by the case story of Tamir from an area where a different mining company operates. Here, the joint Mongolian–​Chinese “Tsairt” mining company carries out a program of cooperation with the local authorities that creates the condition where local herders have access to information about the company’s activities. “The company organises a regular open-​door day, where they provide a tour, and I was able to visit to see how the mining operates,” said Tamir. “Besides that, the company provides job opportunities. I know a few herders got jobs at the mine. Of course before that they took a training course and even got a certificates.” In addition to this, the mining company administration provides scholarships for a university education for a family member in our community. For other age groups there are also opportunities. For example, I have a job to look after the deep well that provides water to the mine processing factory. My job is to keep the motor running and if necessary, repaired. I  got this job because of my skill to do technical things. From time to time mining engineers come to check. In one such visit I met a Chinese co-​worker. We communicated using hand language. The salary from this mining company job provides a significant part of his family income, although Mr Tamir has his own livestock. The number has increased since he came to this area. My homeland is in another part of Sukhbaatar Province from where I was forced to leave, to search for better life. It happened because of dzud (extreme cold conditions) in 2010. In the natural hazard event I lost nearly all my livestock. After me, the number of new-​comers/​ herders coming to settle here has gradually increased. According to his view, “conditions for the animal husbandry are good, the pasture is not too bad but the water is not enough to expand grazing area. Therefore, I dug two new wells.” However, he admitted concern on

188  Rahat Sabyrbekov and Indra Overland how the mining is developing. The flow of large trucks has increased. The drivers of big trucks create a new roads on the steppe that have a bad impact on soil cover and “the dust that wind blows on you grazing becomes a big issue. When we look at the lungs of sheep that are used for food, they are black.” Summary As the interviews show, herders have clear impressions of mining impact. The case that we saw in Tsairt mining company benefits through building communication with the local community and being transparent. The case from Erdenestagaan soum was a different experience, where herders are afraid for the future, the future is unclear. We need to know what herders think and design mining regulations so their lives can continue. The mines, the government and international agencies need to better understand rural lives when they come up with big programmes like “SLO.” What we are talking about is people’s lives. We Mongolians believe in the harmony of our world. Mining has to respect this.

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10  Mining shadows on Mongolia’s environment and heritage Erdenebuyan Enkhjargal

The ancient belief systems of Mongolia’s nomads have long been interwoven with the natural world. In the traditional Mongolian worldview, “the blue sky is the father, the earth the mother,” and nomads perceive themselves as dutiful children dependent on nature to survive instead of guardians or protectors of nature. For outsiders, this inherent dependence on nature, as Robin W.  Kimmerer expresses in her book on indigenous wisdom Braiding Sweetgrass (Kimmerer 2013), “radically undermines the dominate Western view that land should be used for economic benefit, and if we leave behind a devastated landscape but have made a ‘profit’ we are celebrated for having done well.” Traditionally, Mongolians believed the land, mountains and water have their own spirit (sawdag and lus), in other words, nature is a living being not a resource to be exploited. As traditional Mongolian nomadic culture dictates, because land and water offer life, in return we1 must offer gratitude, care and protection. Over the past three decades, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, markets and market thinking have come to be embraced as the leading framework for rebuilding Mongolian society (Rossabi 2005). This idea that almost everything can be bought and sold has rapidly transformed Mongolians’ traditional eco-​centric worldview.The effects of these market values can be most strikingly observed in Mongolia’s countryside, where national and multinational mining corporations have been granted more than 2700 active mining and exploration licenses (MRPAM 2020) on land, which has traditionally been viewed through the nomadic lens as having its own inalienable rights. While mining offers the potential for generating affluence and prosperity, it also comes with a trade-​off: the deterioration of the natural environment, the erosion of traditional ecological values and livelihoods of rural Mongolians and, ultimately, diminishing hopes for a sustainable future, a future “that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs,” (World Commission 1987: p. 44; Mensah 2019). This chapter explores the intersection of natural resource extraction, traditional ecological values and nomadic life in Mongolia. It investigates how mining ecology has transformed the environment, threatened biodiversity and in turn influenced the traditional belief systems and social values of Mongolia’s DOI: 10.4324/9781003097341-12

196  Erdenebuyan Enkhjargal nomads. It argues that eco-​centrism is the very pathway for Mongolia to achieve a sustainable future and concludes by asking whether nature should be treated as a private commodity or a public good protected for future generations and what is the best way forward? Over a lifetime of herding in the Mongolian countryside, I have witnessed these changes first-​hand and hope my perspective will offer new insight into how the mining industry is reshaping our relationship with the natural environment, our belief systems and each other.

Mongolia’s ecological traditions Once the steppe has been plowed, will the native plants and animals still be found? Many animals have already moved away or disappeared. What’s left but a stark landscape with little room to practice our traditional way of life. Can the steppe recover? Will the mining companies not spare some land from development? When a mining company takes our land how is it any different from preventing us to speak in our own language or practice our traditional culture? We feel our traditional way of life is being stripped from us. Protection of the environment and our identity are fully entwined. (Herder Z, 40, Dornogobi Province2) The traditional Mongolian worldview has long been rooted in the intrinsic value of nature. For millennia, nomads have grazed the grasslands of Central Asia, developing a closeness to the natural world that has defined Mongolia’s identity and cultural heritage into the modern age. Shaped by ancient shamanistic beliefs that emphasise reverence for nature and biological kinship, the Mongolian nomad views land as an infinite, open and unlimited space (Sanjid 1998) a resource not to be governed, but shared, nurtured and its natural laws obeyed. In the nomadic worldview, land and nature is the provider of all; shelter and food, the overall source of health and wellbeing. Land is a sacred depository of ancient wisdom; a connection to past ancestral knowledge, closely guarded by spiritual entities (Gazariin ezen or Savdag) that we nomads have worshipped for safety and protection since time immemorial. By extension, reverence for animals, plants and other non-​human kinfolk are woven into this belief system. The very being of the nomad depends on a healthy, well-​balanced and preserved nature, for in the nomad’s eyes the fate of humanity is inextricably interwoven with the fate of nature itself (Sukhbaatar 2001). From the 13th century, these eco-​ centric beliefs became codified and protected, part of the oral law code of the Mongols, known as Yasaa or Ikh Zasag, the “Great Law,” established by Genghis Khan (Nyambuu 1995). Under these rules, it became forbidden to pollute the land or the water, and casually killing wildlife and animals was also prohibited (Amarkhuu 2000). Acting against these codes was punishable by death. The influence of Tibetan Buddhism, which emerged as a state religion in the 16th century, reinforced the ideology of interconnectedness with the natural world, and taught that even a small disruption to the environment could have a negative influence over the Earth (Chimedsengee

Mining shadows on Mongolia’s environment  197 et al. 2011). Safeguarding of nature was so central to the identity of Mongolia and Mongolians that in 1778, the Mongolian government, forward-​thinking as it were, formally recognised the protections of Bogd Khan Uul (Saint King Mountain); 40,500 hectares of forested mountains that lay directly south of the then capital city Urgoo (present-​day Ulaanbaatar), making it the world’s oldest national park (Sukhbaatar 2001). Mongolians have traditionally given symbolic names to mountains and rivers as a show of respect for nature and nature deities. This reverence has been extended to Mongolian names, which include references to natural places, such as mountains and rivers; for example it is not uncommon for a family member to be named Altai or Tuul.3 The native traditions and socioecological practices that promoted a harmonious coexistence between humans and nature, remained deeply ingrained in Mongolian society until the late 20th century when changes to the social tapestry uprooted Mongolia’s ecological culture and connection with nature. Nothing has been more disruptive and transformative to Mongolia’s environment, biodiversity and traditional ecological worldview than the rapid emergence of the free market economy and expansion of the mining industry.

Land resources and land rights According to the Mongolian Mining Law, mining companies shall obtain permission to operate from the smallest provincial administrative government. During our annual autumn “bag” committee meeting we rejected the French mining company’s proposal, but they ignored our decision and got approval from the “soum”4 committee. They do not have our approval. We are desperate now. The mining company has armed military guards around the mining sites. They say really nice things on their website or to the media about how they involve locals in their operation but in reality it is a lie, they won’t even let us go near the mine. I think we have the right to know what is going on our land, if they really follow the safety measures for mining uranium, or the other chemicals they inject into the groundwater. Their old drilled boreholes are everywhere in our summer camp area, abandoned and the covers are broken. (Herder S, 43, Dornogobi Province) Nearly 80% of Mongolia’s terrestrial land area is grassland, a fragile, but important ecosystem that has been preserved through long-​ standing environmental traditions by pastoralists since at least 3000 BC (Miller et al. 2020). More than 1.56 million square kilometres, the Mongolian steppe, including desert-​steppe and forest-​mountain steppe, is the largest remaining common grazing area in the world (Hilker et al. 2013). Forests cover 11% of Mongolia’s territory; and wetlands, including marshlands account for 15,000 square kilometres.The Gobi Desert, Asia’s second largest desert, stretches for more than 1.3 million square kilometres from the borders of China in the east to Kazakhstan in the west. Because of the variety of ecological zones (Figure 10.1), Mongolia is considered

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Figure 10.1  Eco-​regions of Mongolia. Map courtesy of Chris McCarthy.

Mining shadows on Mongolia’s environment  199 a cradle of biological diversity for its concentrations of birds, mammals, reptiles, fish and invertebrate species. Beneath the ground, Mongolia is rich in mineral deposits including significant deposits of gold, copper, molybdenum and uranium (Bulag 2009). Today, some 24% of Mongolia’s 3.1 million population continue the traditional pastoral way of life on the steppe (NSO 2020), herding their five kinds of animals (sheep, goats, horses, camels and cows/​yaks) on seasonal migration routes between their summer and winter grazing lands. During the Mongol dynasties, land was always regarded as belonging to the state represented by the king (khaan), though he was never seen as a proprietor. The king had no authority to sell or exchange the land, rather, he was a means for guaranteeing land security and national consolidation. Even during the Soviet regime, when land was state property, there were few land-​ related social problems, owing to the fact that while the state enjoyed a monopoly on land ownership, land remained the foundation of nomadic liberty (Sarlagtay 2010). Pressure on Mongolia’s land resources was also minimal, owing to a sparse population, controlled mining and a centralised livestock management system, known as negdel, which prevented overgrazing and exploitation of pastureland due to highly structured and regulated mobility lifestyles (Humphrey and Sneath 1999). However, since 2000, urbanisation (Figure 10.2) and free market ideology have brought to the surface a rather foreign concept to the Mongolian nomad, that of private land ownership. Traditionally, Mongolia did not recognise boundaries or limits. Land in a nomadic society was considered to be limitless, impossible to divide and possess, a resource to be shared between all life that came to depend on it. To attempt ownership of land was equivalent to attempting to own the air we breathe. While attempts to privatise land in Mongolia date back more than a thousand years, mostly stemming from foreign pressure, it was not until the democratic transition in 1994 that private ownership of land would take root and be permitted by constitutional law (Sarlagtay 2010). While a debate remained in government about whether a change in traditional land governance would diminish the rural economy and ecological culture, the concept of land ownership finally received confirmation in 2002. Largely due to pressures linked to foreign aid (Rossabi 2005), the Mongolian government adopted the “Law on Allocation of Land to Citizens of Mongolia for Ownership,” ushering in the most divisive challenge to the preservation of Mongolia’s cultural and nomadic heritage. Missing from the law were legal protections for the traditional users of the land and for biodiversity. The longstanding spiritual, ethical and ecological beliefs, central to the nomadic worldview, were silenced in favour of the loud echoing chorus that the market economy, and mortgaging of its land resources, would bring Mongolia into the modern world. International organisations like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund trumpeted Mongolia’s mineral resources as a source of countless development opportunities. Twenty-​five years later, privatisation of Mongolia’s natural resources has exacted a heavy price on the environment, and those same organisations have issued warnings

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Figure 10.2  Satellite image showing present-​day Ulaanbaatar. Between 1990 and 2016, Mongolia’s urbanisation rate increased from 52% to 67.8% putting added pressure on the city’s aging infrastructure (World Bank, 2015). Many of the urban migrants are from rural areas who claim economic forces as well as environmental degradation are making it more difficult to live life as a nomad. Image courtesy of Google Earth.

Mining shadows on Mongolia’s environment  201 that Mongolia has fallen trap to the corrosive impacts of the “resource curse” (Bin et al. 2017; World Bank 2020a). In 2009, in response to concerns that mining posed a threat to the natural environment, the Mongolian government passed the “Law of the Prohibition of Mining Operations in the Headwaters of Rivers, Protected Zones of Water Reservoirs and Forested Areas.” The law, which became commonly known as “The Law with the Long Name,” does not apply to “minerals of strategic national importance” or operations deemed to have an impact on Mongolia’s national security and economic development, and was largely seen as an ambiguous attempt that favours mining companies.

The environmental costs of mining It’s been 25 years since the mine started working near our winter camp. Almost immediately our animals started getting sick.The disease they suffer is tragic. It’s very common to find their intestines covered with cancer, not only one organ, but the lungs, kidneys, liver and the heart. We tried to alert the mine, but it always ends up that the mining company brings government officials and the police with them. We thought the police were supposed to protect us but it is the opposite. The foreign owned mining company has bribed every single level of government in Mongolia, except our “bag” committee. Our bag committee is always supportive because they live here, and first handedly experience everything that is going on. We the Gobi people have never asked anything from the government, we did not ask them to feed us, or give us money, even during the consequent dzud years, the government did not help us with a single bale of hay. We just want to live peacefully on our ancestors’ land. (Herder O, 54, Dornogobi Province) For nearly 70 years, during the time Mongolia’s economy was controlled by the Soviet Union, agriculture and herding were the core elements of economic productivity. While some mining activity took place, it was not until after Mongolia gained independence in 1990 that the country, experiencing a painful economic transition, opened up its mining industry to foreign investment (Pistilli 2020). By 2000, approximately half of all export revenue came from the mining industry, with agriculture contributing the other 50% (Fujita et  al. 2013). The rapid expansion of the mining industry meant that by 2018, mining products were responsible for about 90% of exports and 23% of Mongolia’s overall GDP  –​in a little over a decade mining resulted in a doubling of Mongolia’s economy (Manlaibaatar 2018). The majority of mining sector growth occurred during 2004–​12 when it achieved a 9% average growth rate, making the country one of the fastest growing economies in the world and earning it the nickname “Minegolia” (Dagys et  al. 2019). For the first time, Mongolia saw a surplus on its balance sheet, which allowed for vast improvements in living standards (Asian Development Bank 2017).

202  Erdenebuyan Enkhjargal By 2014, two-​digit economic growth dropped the poverty line from 33% to 19% (World Bank 2020b). The persisting headlines that championed mining as an economic model shrouded the consequences that treating nature as a commodity was having on Mongolia’s steppe lands. Even as the environmental record of the mining sector received mixed reviews, with the knowledge that many operations were managed in a suboptimal way, the government chose to continue support for the development of the mining industry. As of 2020, the Mineral Resource Authority of Mongolia has granted 1677 mining licenses covering a total area of 16,395 square kilometres, and 1,105 exploration licenses covering roughly 56,701 square kilometres (MRPAM 2020). Analysis of these exploration licenses reveal that several are located in protected areas, a clear violation of the Mongolian Law on Protected Areas (Farrington 2009). More than half of the total exploration and exploitation mining licenses issued are situated in the Gobi region, particularly Omnogobi Province (Figure 10.3), an area with a fragile ecosystem and limited water –​rainfall in the desert ranges between 0 and 50 mm per year (Batima 2013).The Gobi, meaning “waterless place” in the Mongolian language, is home to important endemic flora and fauna, including several endangered species (Shiirevdamba 2003). The region, which includes seven provinces,5 is also home to roughly 6000 nomadic households (NSO of Mongolia 2020). In 2009, the Mongolian government signed the “Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement” to develop one of the largest copper-​gold mines in the world (IMF 2010). The deal, struck with Canada-​ based Turquoise Hill Resources is majority owned (51%) by mining giant Rio Tinto, is the largest mining investment to ever be licensed in Mongolia. It is believed that once at full production capacity, the mine will increase Mongolia’s GDP by 30–​35% (Manlaibaatar 2018). Located in Omnogobi province, Oyu Tolgoi (Figures 10.4–​10.5) has been seen a symbol of the promise of mining to revive Mongolia’s struggling economy and to propel the nation into a new era of prosperity (Jackson 2018a), but the consequential damage to the environment and herder lifestyles has been far less discussed and much less quantified. Unexpected consequences due to many medium-​and large-​scale mining developments that have started as a result of the deal with Oyu Tolgoi, have further threatened the environment. Hundreds of nomadic families have become vulnerable due to the resulting habitat fragmentation. The cascading effects of mining development in the Gobi is most strongly felt on the region’s most precious resource: water, for which all life depends. Mining requires water, and Oyu Tolgoi and Tavan Tolgoi, two of Mongolia’s largest mines, require a disproportionate amount. To ensure that Oyu Tolgoi could process ore into copper concentrate, the Mongolian Water Authority has permitted the mine to use up to 870 litres of water per second, nearly 20 million gallons daily. Most of the water is taken from nearby resources, including the Undai River, an ephemeral river that flows close to the open pit of the mine (Meester and Behagel 2017). Boreholes and building of pipelines into Gunii Khooloin aquifer, diversion and damning of the Undai river and relocation of

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Figure 10.3 Mining exploration licenses issued in Omnogobi Province, Mongolia. More than half of all exploration and exploitation mining licenses have been issued in the Gobi region, particularly in Omnogobi, which is home to two of Mongolia’s largest mines, Oyu Tolgoi and Tavan Tolgoi.The Gobi includes 7 of Mongolia’s 21 provinces and is home to roughly 6,000 nomadic families, many of whom have grazed their herds of animals here for generations. Map courtesy of the Mineral Resource and Petroleum Authority of Mongolia.

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Figures 10.4–​10.5 Satellite images of the Oyu Tolgoi mining site in 2011 and 2020.The mine, just one of several hundred in the Gobi, has converted more than 8,500 ha of traditional grazing land for its mining operations. The mine has been criticised for its massive use of the region’s water, already a scarce resource in the Gobi, that local nomadic families have depended on for generations. The Mongolian Water Authority permits the mine to use up to 870 litres of water per second, nearly 20 million gallons daily. Water is pumped to the surface and transported by pipeline 35 kilometres from the Gunni Khooliin aquifer. Images courtesy of Google Earth.

the Bor-​Ovoo spring, have visibly resulted in a decrease of surface water as well as shallow well water forcing herders onto one another’s pastures, which are now crowded and overpopulated (Gobi Soil NGO 2013). In addition, dust created by mining operations covers soil and vegetation, inhibiting the regeneration of plants on which herders and their animals depend (Jackson 2018b). In 2013, herders living in the vicinity of Oyu Tolgoi filed a complaint with the World Bank, a large investor in the mine, arguing that the mine was threatening their way of life. Facing growing pressure from herder groups and NGOs, the Bank established the Tri-​ Partite Council (TPC), a group of representatives for the herders, local government and mine, to help mediate and resolve issues related to land and water. Following several years of negotiations, the TPC reached an agreement which included 60 separate commitments to address mining impacts to pasture and water resources, including assessment and monitoring, community relations and compensation for loss of livelihoods (Sternberg et al. 2020). While the agreement represents an important victory for herder rights, numerous challenges remain and many herders continue to

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Figures 10.4–10.5 Cont.    

express doubts that the mine is following through with their commitments to safeguarding the environment. In interviews6 conducted with herders from Khanbogd, the site of Oyu Tolgoi, following the publication of the CAO Dispute Resolution Conclusion Report (CAO 2017), they continued to express their concerns that Oyu Tolgoi was using outside experts to mislead the public about the true impacts the mine was having on the environment. In the words of one herder: We have lived here for our entire life. Bor-​Ovoo spring has dried up, Undai river significantly decreased. Most importantly, the shallow water table we use to drink and water our herd has significantly dropped. We are almost not able to keep our way of life. Oyu Tolgoi has agreed to dig more deep water wells and maintain it for us according to the dispute resolution as well as other things they promised to do. They paid compensation money but the mining impact on other non human species, can never be compensated. We feel like it is not an adaptation at all, but selling out our morality to greed, but do we have any other choice? We do not trust Oyu Tolgoi’s water management because many of the boreholes that Oyu Tolgoi has drilled do not meet basic standards. Many wells are broken and empty. We are too weak to fight against it. (Herder S, 43, Omnongobi Province)

206  Erdenebuyan Enkhjargal From the locals’ perspective, Oyu Tolgoi has destroyed a site of significant spiritual, cultural and ecological value, with the mining company refusing to acknowledge local belief systems toward the land. By draining the aquifer and relocating the spring, and neglecting the rights of wildlife to these water sources, Oyu Tolgoi has been seen as imposing their own philosophical views on land and water use, which run contrary to the traditional ecological heritage of the local nomadic herders, who view the land as a source of identity, purpose and belonging. By neglecting these traditional values, Oyu Tolgoi has further perpetuated the Western view that land is of no value unless there is economic benefit (Jackson 2018a). Yet, mining companies also need healthy ecosystems, and a view that simply prioritises profit maximisation recklessly damages the biodiversity and ecological services that underpins economies, provides food, fuel, building materials and freshwater, and helps manage and mitigate the impacts of climate change (UNEP 2018).

Mining’s threat to biodiversity There was a 6-​legged baby goat born in my herd last spring. I have been a herder for my entire life, I inherited this life from my ancestors. I have never seen this kind of thing in my 60  years of herding. We told the authorities. This is not only happening in my herd; all of my neighbors have experienced similar problems since 2000 in the mining area. The government sent a group of people to study if mining was the source of the problem, but they ended up concluding that the fault was our own. Ironically because we herders don’t know how to avoid inbreeding, despite herding for generations? We are really offended by the government. One of my relatives had asked that me and my family move to their pasture lands to join them. But we know if we move to a new area, our animals would not survive the first winter. They are used to the Gobi vegetation and the weather. Animals have feelings too, they get homesick, and that can make them weak during their first winter in a new environment. (Herder M, 62, Dornogobi Province) The Gobi region of Mongolia is an expansive space of fenceless pasturelands that nomadic herders have traditionally shared with a variety of biological diversity, including many migratory ungulate species, such as wild Bactarian camels and Takhi horses, both of which have been recognised as endangered by IUCN. Because of the wide-​open space  –​the Mongolian Gobi is one of the largest terrestrial migratory spaces remaining in the world –​animals are free to migrate, following seasonal grass and water supplies to mate and produce offspring (Schaller 2020). Migration is a fundamental process that has contributed to the health and wellbeing of the natural ecosystem for millennia, and impacts to these ancient movements by mining operations can have important implications for herders and ecological functions (Ito et al. 2013).

Mining shadows on Mongolia’s environment  207 For many species, like the Mongolian gazelle (Gazella subgutturosa) and khulan (Equus hemionus), seasonal migration is essential for survival, especially in a harsh arid environment where grass and water availability are limited. Migration patterns typically follow a west to east pattern in the autumn months, as the eastern part of the Gobi connects with the steppe, where grasses grow higher than the snowfall. During migration, herds face countless obstacles that often results in loss of life. In recent years, climate change has accelerated the rate of change in the Gobi environment, including an increase in “dzud,” severe winter conditions in which large number of livestock die due to starvation,7 and drought making it more difficult for adaptation and survival. These challenges are compounded by the introduction of linear and large-​scale infrastructure, often linked to the mining industry, which include railways, highways and pipelines that have broken Gobi habitats into smaller, non-​contiguous patches, decreasing the movement and capacity of wildlife (UNEP 2011). Mine operations and heavy machinery create dust, noise and pollution which also disturbs wildlife and prevents their movement. Habitat fragmentation and ecosystem disturbances increases the risk of extinction of local wildlife populations, because population size and genetic diversity decrease (Harris et al. 2009). An example of how mining development can disrupt wildlife can be seen at Tavan Tolgoi (Figures 10.6–​10.8), one of the world’s largest untapped coal mines, located 240 km from China. The construction of a paved road linking Tavan Tolgoi with Oyu Tolgoi has divided habitat used by gazelle and khulan, blocking the migration of core populations and restricting grazing patterns (World Bank 2017). This creates direct competition between domestic livestock and wildlife on grazing areas, raising the potential threat of a decline in wildlife species and ultimately extinction (Ito et al. 2005). The planned construction of a direct coal rail link with China would further extend ecological separation increasing the likelihood of a decline in wildlife numbers. Roads and railways have been linked to multiple negative impacts on wildlife habitats (Tombulak and Frissell 2001). Protection of wildlife is not only important for the preservation of nature and Mongolia’s nomadic heritage, but also for the ecological heritage of all of Central Asia because Mongolian species may one day be needed to repopulate species that have become locally extinct elsewhere in the region (Finch 1996; Reading et al. 2015). Biodiversity offset management plans, which are designed to compensate for the adverse impacts mining development has on local biodiversity, have not been well defined in Mongolia. Oyu Tolgoi, which signed a biodiversity offset management plan agreement in 2015, has come under criticism for the credibility of its offset projects, highlighted by a lack of capacity among local administration to implement and monitor offset projects. Baseline studies were conducted too late, often after environmental impacts occurred (Tricarico 2017). In addition, biodiversity offset management plans offered by international mining companies are less likely to protect species unrelated to human interest and exhibit a lack of sensitivity to local ecological and cultural heritage

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Figures 10.6–10.8 Satellite image showing the Tavan Tolgoi coal mine in Omnogobi province. Infrastructure development around Tavan Tolgoi, including the construction of a road linking the mining site with the border of China, has led to fragmentation of the environment that has acted as a barrier for migration of the Mongolian gazelle and khulan. Images courtesy of Google, CNES/​Airbus and Dr Buho Hoshino.

(Vyawahare 2020). In remote areas, where independent monitoring organisations have less capacity to monitor biodiversity offset management projects, there is often inadequate commitment and transparency of commitments by mining companies (Bidaud et al. 2020). In summary, Mongolia’s biodiversity is another area in which mine operations and mining have cumulative negative impacts that are often difficult to correct and reverse. The rapid escalation of the mining industry in the last decades should encourage Mongolia to do more to protect the country’s unique biodiversity. Impacts to biodiversity have important implications for nomads in general, as biodiversity performs important ecological functions, including redistributing nutrients, which is particularly important in a region where vegetation productivity is high variable and irregular.

Toward a sustainable future Over the last two decades, the development of Mongolia’s mining industry has undoubtedly contributed to the country’s GDP, providing work opportunities and increasing the standard of living. However, whether economic growth has

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Figures 10.6–10.8  Cont.    

Figures 10.6–10.8  Cont.    

210  Erdenebuyan Enkhjargal been equitable is questionable, particularly for those living in rural areas, who have traditionally lacked access to the benefits provided by economic expansion. Research on the impacts of the mining industry on rural households has found that short-​term household income has only increased by 7%, and only for those living in “soum” centres near a major mining site (Manlaibaatar 2018). Centres with no mining experienced no increase in short-​term household income. The economic effect on incomes for nomadic households near mining sites showed no positive change, however, the negative effects resulting from pasture and water degradation are severe (Manlaibaatar 2018). Despite 25 years of applying free market thinking, the percentage of people living below the poverty line has changed little in Mongolia. In 1995, 36% of Mongolians were living in poverty. Today, 29% of Mongolia’s population are considered poor. In addition, 15% find themselves living on the margins, extremely vulnerable to economic shocks and ecological change (ADB, 2019). Families do not have the economic resilience to survive a natural disaster such as “dzud” or prolonged drought (The Research Institute of Labour and Social Protection of Mongolia, 2018). The ecological and social challenges created by the mining sector has led international organisations like The World Bank, originally a proponent of mining development, to call on Mongolia’s government to reduce its dependence on the mining sector. The World Bank found that out of every dollar in mineral revenues Mongolia has generated over the past 20 years, only one cent has been saved for future generations, this includes investing in environmental protection and social welfare programs (The World Bank 2020c). Yet, despite these concerns, we continue to see an expansion of mining exploration and natural resources extraction, often on traditional pasture lands and near water sources. As pastureland continues to be diminished, the result is a vicious cycle of intergenerational impacts for families, that includes displacement, loss of livelihood, traditional ecological knowledge and identification with ancestral lands (Jackson 2018b). Mongolia’s drive to sell minerals and prop up its economy has increased well beyond the limits that the natural environment can support. There are virtually no areas of Mongolia that are not prone to environmental degradation as a result of the mining industry. Historically, cultures that have crossed this limit and overexploited its natural resources have experienced degradation and declining productivity of the land. While nature can be forgiving, it cannot do so indefinitely, and persistent abuse may lead to irreversible environmental damage. Mongolia’s nomadic herders, who depend on the health and balance of the environment for their wellbeing, are the unwilling victims of this land degradation. Land resources are the base on which Mongolia’s nomads largely depend and proper appreciation of traditional ecological knowledge is therefore an essential prerequisite to their optimum use. While the mining industry could be a valuable component to Mongolia’s economic development, current institutional and legal frameworks do not adequately provide protections for the environment and local herder communities living near mining areas.

Mining shadows on Mongolia’s environment  211 In the process of rethinking the future of Mongolia, the key element is respect and acknowledgement of our traditional cultural heritage and any strategic development plan must be holistic, based on the effective and enthusiastic participation of all Mongolians, including nomadic herders. The question of sustainable development is really a question about whether we are willing to concern ourselves with the wellbeing of Mongolia’s nomadic herders and respect their wisdom and knowledge, wisdom that calls upon us to care for the earth so that it may be enjoyed by future generations. Only by considering our very important cultural traditions of environmental stewardship and protection of the natural environment will Mongolia be able to achieve sustainable development in the future.

Notes from the field Saipira Furstenberg “Our country is very rich, however the rapacious behaviours of our leaders leave us unable to transform our natural resources into economic growth.” I have heard such sentences many times in the conduct of my field work in Kyrgyzstan back in 2015. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan’s economic development has heavily relied on its mining sector. Kyrgyzstan was among the first country to adopt neoliberal market reforms in Central Asia. In the early 1990s, the Akayev administration embraced a wide range of privatisation reforms, allowing liberalisation and internationalisation of the mining sector and offering attractive mining opportunities for international investors. The privatisation of mineral resources sector contributed to developing country’s economy and attract foreign direct investments. Today, Kyrgyzstan is one of the most open and liberal economies in the region. However, while economic growth has improved the living standards of the population, it has also resulted in depletion of natural resources and the degradation of ecosystems. Throughout the years, public concern about environmental issues has been on the rise. In majority of the cases, the population blamed their local officials for not solving environmental degradation produced by the economic activity. As a result of ecological mismanagement, the country is faced with significant environmental challenges ranging from ozone layer depletion, to biodiversity loss, desertification and land degradation. Another danger represents the melting of glaciers caused by the global warming. The extraction and processing of natural resources such as gold and uranium further contribute to the environmental degradation. Yet, despite the country’s efforts to develop and liberalise its mining sector, the country failed to turn its natural resources into economic

212  Erdenebuyan Enkhjargal growth and sustainable development. Social discontent has grown, often violently, over mining practices, revenues sharing and environmental erosion resulting from mining operations. Villagers living around mining sites accuse corrupt politicians and companies of stealing their natural resources to the detriment of their local livelihoods: “we barely see the profits from our natural resources, the money extracted from the mining is pocketed by our local leaders or by the extractive companies.” They also accuse extractive companies for causing environmental harm by destroying their pasture lands, contaminating their water and rivers: “our rivers are poisoned, our homes get filled with dust, our kids get sick from the pollution produced by mining.”Villagers often complain about mining operations hindering free cattle grazing in pastures. In other instances, residents criticise companies for abandoning mining sites without taking time to restore them after they have finished explorations: “the company comes and opens up a mining site without taking into account pasture lands, once they finished with their explorations, they just go, leaving all the infrastructure behind.” In parallel to this narrative, there is a general belief among the local population that mining could be much more. At the heart of these grievances lies the ambiguous feeling about mining and its human and environmental impact. On one hand, mining contributes to economic growth. Indeed, many of the villagers were grateful to extractive companies for providing them with employment as it sustained their families, enabled them to send their children to schools and to cover their health-​care costs. On the other hand, there is a lot of negativity around mining operations, as many believe that only few people would benefit from mining extraction, while the rest are left behind. In many cases, residents blamed local authorities for failing to protect its interests and selling natural resources and land to foreign companies. In other instances, local leaders were criticised for acting in their own interest and appropriating most of the profits from the foreign company without consulting the local population or recognising its needs: “we have little knowledge about mining operations and revenues produced from the extractive sector,” “mining companies don’t make any efforts to understand us or to listen to us.” Additionally, due to lack of transparency and accountability over the management of natural resources, there is in general a low level of trust in local authorities and extractive industries: “we do not know who is telling the truth, but we have a general understanding of how things work at the mining site.” One of the key drivers of social discontent with mining operations in Kyrgyzstan has been linked to environmental concerns:  “we need to protect our natural resources and use them wisely.” There is deep belief among the local population that mining operations cause land degradation and water contamination. The lack of communication

Mining shadows on Mongolia’s environment  213 and transparency around mining activities feeds an atmosphere of suspicion and fear around mining operations. The widespread allegations of pollution by mining companies often forces local communities to quickly jump to assumptions that mining operators are responsible for damaging the local ecosystem, while in reality this might not always be the case. Additionally, a poor legal environmental framework, a weak government response to environmental concerns and lack of information contribute to exacerbating the perceived environmental threats of mining activities to local livelihoods. The absence of solid institutions and adequate monitoring mechanisms for environmental regulation are key elements that insulate mining companies from the risks associated with poor environmental performance, leading them to neglect environmental regulations around mining sites. The local population has little power to raise its environmental concerns as the financial and physical costs associated with their complaints are too high. Furthermore, there is little understanding among local authorities on how to conduct environmental and socioeconomic assessments and how to integrate these into local policies. Unequal redistribution of natural resources rents, lack of transparency in the management of natural resources and low participatory decision-​ making frameworks around mining trigger social conflicts around mining sites. Moreover, the growing resistance to mining operations in Kyrgyzstan further reveals a closed environmental agenda strongly echoing a “resource nationalism” discourse, permeated by a profoundly anti-​imperial and, ultimately, anti-​authoritarian political sentiment. The local population has strong feelings about fighting foreign intrusion and exploitation of natural resources to protect national sovereignty. Social protests in the mining sector as such articulate wider political ideas and socioeconomic and environmental struggles. Solving the social discontent and allowing mining to reach its full potential that benefits local communities will require broader national discussions and institutional reforms. These would include strengthening the legislative framework, increasing transparency and accountability in the resource governance sector, and giving local communities a more central role in decisions over natural resources. Further, progress would require stronger government oversight in the management of its natural resources sector and in translating the profits from its mining tax revenues into tangible socioeconomic improvements. To address the shortcomings in environmental regulations, the government should build capacity and expertise to conduct Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), and take concrete steps to mitigate socioeconomic impacts of mining operations. The local population should be involved in the process of EIA and have full access to information on mining operations. It is the responsibility of mining companies and local

214  Erdenebuyan Enkhjargal authorities to meaningfully involve local populations in mining activities. Such discussions are opening urgent questions on how to promote mining sector with integrity while at the same time boosting social economic development in the country. Yet, the inability of the current and past governments to engage with the above issues suggests that mining conflicts in Kyrgyzstan are likely to continue. Community mobilisation around environmental issues is likely to intensify and could even turn into a bigger political movement as such platforms provide citizens with an opportunity to voice their frustrations and grievances. As long as the government and extractive industries will continue to disregard environmental impacts and the wellbeing of communities and society on which they depend, social and environmental challenges will continue to rise.

Notes 1 The author, Ms Erdenebuyan Enkhjargal, grew up in a nomadic household in Dornogobi province of Mongolia. She currently is a PhD candidate at Doshisha University in Japan. Her research explores how economic development and climate change impact traditional nomadic values. 2 Quotations that precede each section were taken from phone interviews conducted in September 2020 are used to provide additional first-​person perspectives on the impacts of the mining sector on local livelihoods. 3 The Altai Mountains, a mountain range in Central and East Asia that extends into Western Mongolia, has been central in Mongolian cosmology. The Tuul River is a river in central and northern Mongolia that is revered as sacred. In Mongolia, natural sites have historically been treated with respect and protected by taboos. 4 A soum is a second-​level administrative subdivision of Mongolia. The 21 Provinces of Mongolia are divided into 331 districts. Each district is again subdivided into bags, which sort nomadic households in the district into groups, without a permanent human settlement. 5 Gobi provinces, known as aimags in Mongolian, include Bayankhongor, Dornogovi, Dundgovi, Govi-​Altai, Govisumber, Omnogovi and Sukhbaatar. 6 Phone interviews with herders were conducted by the author in September, 2020. 7 During the winter of 2009–​10, Mongolia suffered through a severe dzud in which 80% of the country’s territory was covered with 200–​600 mm of snow resulting in the death of 8 million, or roughly 17% of the country’s entire livestock population (Jacobs, 2010).

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Mining shadows on Mongolia’s environment  215 Batima, P. (2013) ‘Vulnerability of Mongolia’s pastoralists to climate extremes and changes’, Climate Change and Vulnerability and Adaptation. London: Routledge. Bidaud, C., Schreckenberg, K., Jones J. P.  G. (2018) ‘The local costs of biodiversity offsets: Comparing standards, policy and practice’, Land Use Policy, 77, pp. 43–​50. Bin, G. L., Gupta, P., Jiangyun, Y. (2017) ‘From natural resource boom to sustainable economic growth: Lessons from Mongolia’, International Economics, 151, pp. 7–​25. Bulag, U. E. (2009) ‘Mongolia in 2008: From Mongolia to Mine-​golia’, Asian Survey, 49(1), pp. 129–​134. Chimedsengee, U., Cripps, A., Finlay, V., Verboom, G., Batchuluun, M., Khunkhur, B. (2011) Mongolian Buddhists Protecting Nature: A Handbook on Faiths, Environment and Development. Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia:  The World Bank, Alliance of Religion and Conservation [online]. Available at: www.arcworld.org/​downloads/​Mongolian%20 Buddhist%20Environment%20Handbook.pdf Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO). (2017) ‘Multi-​DisciplinaryTeam and Independent Expert Panel Joint Fact Finding’ [online]. Available at:  www.cao-​ombudsman.org/​ documents/​MDT_​IEP_​FINALREPORT_​ENG.pdf Dagys, K., Heijman, W. J.  M., Dries, L., Agipar, B. (2019) ‘The mining sector boom in Mongolia:  did it cause the Dutch disease?’, Post-​Communist Economies, 32, pp. 607–​642. Finch, C. (1996) Mongolia’s Wild Heritage:  Biological Diversity, Protected Areas, and Conservation in the Land of Chingis Khan. Boulder, CO: Avery Press. Farrington, J. (2009) ‘The impact of mining activities on Mongolia’s protected areas: A status report with policy recommendations’, Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management, 1(3), pp. 283–​289. Fujita, N., Amartuvshin, N., Ariunbold, E. (2013) ‘Vegetation interactions for the better understanding of a Mongolian ecosystem network’, The Mongolian Ecosystem Network. Japan: Springer, pp. 157–​184. Gobi Soil NGO. (2013) Members of Undai River protection working group. Complaint issued in 2013 [online]. Available at:  www.cao-​ombudsman.org/​cases/​document-​links/​ documents/​UndaiRiverComplaint_​Feb32013_​ENG.pdf Harris, G.,Thirgood, S., Hopcraft, J. G. C., Cromsigt, J. P. G. M., Berger, J. (2009) ‘Global decline in aggregated migrations of large terrestrial mammals’, Endangered Species Research, 7, pp. 55–​76. Hilker,T., Natsagdorj, E.,Waring, R. H., Lyapustin, A.,Wang,Y. (2013) ‘Satellite observed widespread decline in Mongolian grasslands largely due to overgrazing’, Global Change Biology, 20(2), pp. 418–​428. Humphrey, C and Sneath, D. (1999) The End of Nomadism. Durham: Duke University Press. International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2010) Mongolia:  2009 Article IV Consultation, Third Review Under Stand-​by Arrangement, and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria—​Staff Report; Staff Supplement; Public Information Notice and Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Mongolia [online]. Available at: www.mongolbank.mn/​documents/​moneypolicy/​imf/​2009.pdf Ito, T.Y., Miura, N., Badamjav, L., Enkhbileg, D., Takatsuki, S., Tsunekawa, A., Jiang, Z. (2005) ‘Preliminary evidence of a barrier effect of a railroad on the migration of Mongolian gazelles’, Conservation Biology, 19(3), pp. 945–​948. Ito, T.Y., Lhagvasuren, B., Tsunekawa, A., Shinoda, M., Takatsuki, S., Buuveibaatar, B., Chimeddorj, B. (2013) ‘Fragmentation of the Habitat of Wild Ungulates by Anthropogenic Barriers in Mongolia’, PLoS One, 8(2), e56995.

216  Erdenebuyan Enkhjargal Jackson, S. (2018a) ‘Abstracting water to extract minerals in Mongolia’s South Gobi Province’, Water Alternatives, 11(2), pp. 336–​356. Jackson, S. (2018b) ‘Imagining the mineral nation:  Contested nation-​ building in Mongolia’, The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 43(3), pp. 437–​456. Jacobs, A. (2010) ‘Winter leaves Mongolians a harvest of carcasses’, The New York Times [online]. Available at: www.nytimes.com/​2010/​05/​20/​world/​asia/​20mongolia.html Kimmerer, R. (2013) Braiding Sweetgrass: Indigenous Wisdom, Scientific Knowledge, and the Teachings of Plants. Milkweed edition. North America: Milkweed. Manlaibaatar, Z. (2018) ‘Уул уурхайн салбарын орон нутгийн өрхийн амьжиргаанд үзүүлэх нөлөө:  Монголын жишээ’, Эдийн засгийн судалгаа, эрдэм шинжилгээний хүрээлэн. (in Mongolian). Meester, E. and Behagel, H. (2017) ‘The social licence to operate: Ambiguities and the neutralization of harm in Mongolia’, Resource Policy, 53, pp. 274–​282. Mensah, J. and Casadevall, S. R. (2019) ‘Sustainable development:  Meaning, history, principles, pillars, and implications for human action:  Literature review’, Cogent Social Sciences, 5(1), 1653531. Miller, A. R. V., Spengler, R., Haruda, A., Miller, B., Wilkin, S., Robinson, S., Roberts, P., Boivin, N. (2020) ‘Ecosystem engineering among ancient pastoralists in northern Central Asia’, Frontiers in Earth Science, 8, 168. Mineral Resources and Petroleum Authority of Mongolia (MRPAM). (2020) [online]. Available at: www.mrpam.gov.mn/​public/​pages/​165/​2020.01.stat.report.eng.pdf NSO (National Statistic Office of Mongolia). (2020) [online]. Available at: www.1212.mn/ ​ t ables.aspx?TBL_ ​ I D=DT_​ N SO_​ 1 001_​ 0 21V1&fbclid=I wAR1XMf9xa2PRXTr0T51dUa9BG00HcnHcwsyVd0X0_ ​ 7 fIkpD- ​ M IBX GADm01o Nyambuu, K. (1995). Чингис хааны Их засаг хууль. (in Mongolian). Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. Pistilli, M. (2020) ‘Exploration work providing opportunities in growing Mongolian economy’, Investing News [online].Available at: https://​investingnews.com/​innspired/​ exploration-​work-​providing-​opportunities-​in-​growing-​mongolian-​economy/​ Reading R.P.,Wingard, G.,Tuvendorj, S., Amgalanbaatar, S. (2015) ‘The crucial importance of protected areas to conserving Mongolia’s natural heritage’, Protecting the wild, parks and wilderness, the foundation for conservation. Washington, DC: Island Press, pp. 257–​265. Rossabi, M. (2005) Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commissars to Capitalists. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. Sanjid, J. (1998) Гаднаас гал гуйдаггүй:  Монголчуудын байгаль хамгаалах зан заншил (in Mongolian). Sarlagtay, M. O. (2010) Mongolia:  Managing the transition from nomadic to settled culture [online]. Available at:  https://​apcss.org/​Publications/​Edited%20Volumes/​ RegionalFinal%20chapters/​Chapter19Sarlagtay.pdf Schaller, G. (2020) Into Wild Mongolia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Shiirevdamba, T. (2003) ‘Flora and fauna of the Gobi Desert’, Mongolia Today: Science, Culture, Environment and Development. London: Routledge. Sternberg, T., Ahearn, A., McConnell, F. (2020) ‘From conflict to a community development Agreement: A South Gobi solution’, Community Development Journal, 55(3), pp. 533–​538. Sukhbaatar, O. (2001) Sacred Sites of Mongolia. Alliance for Religions and Conservation. Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia: The World Bank [online]. Available at: http://​documents1. worldbank.org/​curated/​en/​907471468060539219/​pdf/​33100.pdf

Mining shadows on Mongolia’s environment  217 The Research Institute of Labour and Social Protection of Mongolia. (2018) ‘Herder Livelihood Survey’ [online]. Available at:  http://​r ilsp.gov.mn/​upload/​2018/​eng//​ 2018%20-​%20Malchdiin%20aj%20baidliin%20sudalgaa%20EN.pdf Tombulak, S. C. and Frissell, C. A. (2001) ‘Review of Ecological Effects of Roads on Terrestrial and Aquatic Communities’, Conservation Biology, 14(1), 18–30. Tricarico, A. and Richter, R. (2017). Blessed Are the Last for They Shall Be First!: How the “Last Resort” Option of Biodiversity Offsetting Has Become a Key Tool for Rio Tinto to Legitimize Its Controversial Oyu Tolgoi Copper Mine in Southern Gobi Desert in Mongolia. Retrieved from: https://​urgewald.org/​sites/​default/​files/​Mongolia-​briefing.pdf UNEP. (2011) Barriers to Migration, Case Study in Mongolia [online]. Available at: www. cms.int/​ s ites/​ d efault/​ f iles/​ p ublication/​ I nf_​ 2 3_​ M igration_​ B arriers_​ W WF_​ Mongolia_​E.pdf UNEP. (2018) Moving the Global Mining Industry Towards Biodiversity Awareness [online]. Available at:  www.unenvironment.org/​news-​and-​stories/​story/​moving-​ global-​mining-​industry-​towards-​biodiversity-​awareness Vyawahare, M. (2020) ‘Raze here, save there: Do biodiversity offsets work for people or ecosystems?’, Mongabay [online]. Available at: https://​news.mongabay.com/​2020/​ 02/​raze-​here-​save-​there-​do-​biodiversity-​offsets-​work-​for-​people-​or-​ecosystems/​ World Bank. (2015). World development indicator. Washington D.C. http://data. worldbank.org. Accessed 8 January 2021. World Bank. (2017) Mongolia: Systematic Country Diagnostic [online].Available at: https://​ documents.worldbank.org/​en/​publication/​documents-​reports/​documentdetail/​ 576101543874150141/​mongolia-​systematic-​country-​diagnostic World Bank. (2020a) ‘Mines and Minds:  Leveraging natural wealth to invest in people and institutions’, Mongolia Country Economic Memorandum [online]. Available at: https://​openknowledge.worldbank.org/​handle/​10986/​34551 World Bank. (2020b) Mongolia Poverty Update 2018 [online] Available at:  https://​ documents.worldbank.org/​en/​publication/​documents-​reports/​documentdetail/​ 532121589213323583/​mongolia-​poverty-​update-​2018 World Bank. (2020c) Accelerating Mongolia’s Development Requires Shift “from Mines to Minds” [online]. Available at:  www.worldbank.org/​en/​news/​press-​release/​2020/​ 09/​ 1 7/​ a ccelerating-​ m ongolias-​ d evelopment-​ requires- ​ a - ​ s hift- ​ f rom- ​ m ines- ​ t o-​ minds-​world-​bank World Commission on Environment and Development. (1987) Our Common Future, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Part III

Rehabilitating land and society

11  Reclamation Lack of awareness and post-​mining mismanagement in Kyrgyzstan Almaz Tchoroev

Introduction Mineral resources of Central Asia attracted great powers throughout the 19th century during “The Great Game.” After gaining independence, the Central Asian states continued to draw considerable interest from abroad. The regional leaders see the raw materials as an opening for rapid economic development (Horrocks-​Taylor, 2018). The mining industry provides an opportunity to develop remote regions, attracting much needed investment and creating employment (Tiainen et  al., 2014). Yet, this sector is facing multiple issues, including friction with the local population. Mining continues to be a sensitive topic in Central Asia with environmental concerns being the major dispute that arise between the local population and mining companies. The Soviet-​era tailing pits are a reminder to the local residents that mining can have lasting damage to their livelihoods.The tailing dumps created decades ago from uranium processing plants continue to cause problems to this day. Indeed, mine closure practices in Central Asia remain to be a “novel and undeveloped concept” (Faizuldayeva, 2016: p. 1). Post-​mining reclamation –​or lack of it –​is one of the major issues related to this industry.There still remains a considerable number of mines located around the world which have not been closed in an adequate manner (Fields, 2003). The definitions of reclamation, rehabilitation and restoration are also debated among academics and in policy papers (Lima et al., 2016).These terms are often used interchangeably by academics and government officials. Hence, there are calls to consistently use similar terminology when it comes to mine closure among academics, environmentalists, regulators and policy makers (Wali, 1996). Clear definition of these terms is considered to be one of the key steps to mitigating negative mining legacies (Lima et  al., 2016). The Central Asian states continue to define these terms vaguely, which has led to unrealistic targets of post-​mining management. Although the region consists of independent countries with separate jurisdictions, the legacy of the Soviet Union means that they have a common definition to reclamation. Central Asian states refer to mine closure as “liquidation” and divide the process into technical and biological phases (Faizuldayeva, 2016). Due to ill-​defined terminology, the current DOI: 10.4324/9781003097341-14

222  Almaz Tchoroev legislation is not enforced in full, with companies operating in the area either misinterpreting the law or using loopholes to avoid reclamation processes. This chapter presents the results of the field research conducted in Kyrgyzstan during the summer of 2019. This small Central Asian state has an abundance of small-​and large-​scale mines throughout the country. These mines are located near glaciers, pasture lands, rivers and springs that local herders and villagers use on a daily basis. The field research conducted in Naryn (northern Kyrgyzstan), Ala-​Buka and Chatkal regions (southern Kyrgyzstan) investigated the environmental concerns raised by the local population, NGOs and government officials. Through interviews and focus group discussions, local residents raised multiple concerns, where post-​mining reclamation was one of the key issues. The chapter will begin with background information on Kyrgyzstan and the importance of mining to the country, followed by the methodology used during the field research in three different sites and the overview of the findings from these mountainous regions.This section develops the villagers’ perspective on the mining sector, including the main disputes and concerns faced by the local population. Then the chapter will discuss the challenges of post-​mining reclamation, issues in the legislation and lack of information on post-​mining management among the local government and population.

Background to Kyrgyzstan Central Asian states are strategically located near Russia and China, the two regional hegemons. For centuries, these five countries (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) had to balance between the influence of Russia and China. Although there are unprecedented historical ties with Russia, in recent years China has become the main investor in the region. For example, in the past decade Chinese foreign direct investment into Kyrgyzstan amounted to US $2.3 billion or up to 50 per cent of the foreign investment received (Mogilevskii, 2019). The increased presence of China has led to mass protests in Central Asian states. Local population is concerned about the inflows of Chinese workers, environmental damage and corruption (Jardine, 2019). Mountainous Kyrgyzstan does not have oil or gas reserves; however, it is rich in mineral resources, which include gold, molybdenum, iron ore, aluminium, tin, mercury and rare earth metals (Tiainen et al., 2014). For this reason, the small state was used as a resource base by the Soviet Union (Kronenberg, 2014). For decades, Kyrgyzstan would have to fulfil the so-​called request of the central planning organ of the USSR. Thus, Kyrgyzstan and other states in the region worked hard to fulfil the yearly plan, rather than paying attention to the concept of post-​mining remediation (Faizuldayeva, 2016). As a consequence, tailing dumps throughout Central Asia, such as Mailuu-​Suu in Kyrgyzstan, continue to cause major problems. Despite these issues, mining is an important part of Kyrgyz industry, accounting for 29.2 per cent of the overall economy (National Statistics Committee, 2017). One of the largest mines in the world is located in Kyrgyzstan. Kumtor Gold

Reclamation  223 Mine accounts for close to 10 per cent of the country’s GDP (World Bank, 2019). Due to overreliance on one mine, the government of Kyrgyzstan is attempting to diversify its economy by attracting investors into other medium and large mines. Investors mainly from Russia and China are interested in these projects. However, with outdated laws and widespread corruption local residents believe that foreign investors are able to extract minerals without paying attention to environmental damage, directly affecting their health and livelihood.

Methodology A total of 262 people participated in the semi-​structured interviews in Naryn, Chatkal and Ala-​Buka regions of Kyrgyzstan.While six national level stakeholders were interviewed in the capital Bishkek. These three sites were chosen due to the high level of conflicts between the mining companies and the local residents. The local media coverage of the community-​level conflicts demonstrated the need for an effective mediation model in the region, especially when it comes to environmental concerns. Out of the 262 respondents, 130 were face-​to-​face interviews and 32 focus group (131 participants) discussions. The interviews included all interested parties:  local residents, herders, government officials, NGOs, mining company representatives and national level stakeholders. The majority of the interviewees were residents of remote regions directly affected by mining, which provides an additional element to the research. To conduct the interviews, we had a local guide that the residents knew well and respected. Through this step we were able to discuss sensitive issues openly. Interview questions were divided into eight sections:  Demographic Information, Livelihood and Socioeconomic Dynamics, Mining in the region, Conflict and Trust, Knowledge/​Information Transmission, China/​Sinophobia, Trainings/​Lectures conducted in the area and Environment/​Climate. These included general questions such as knowledge about mining in the area to specific questions such as mechanisms of complaint, whether the legislation protects the local residents and the role of Chinese investment in developing the region. Interviews and group discussions lasted from 10 minutes to over an hour, depending on the knowledge of the interviewee. The interviews were recorded with the consent of the interviewee and notes of the interview were taken whenever the participant did not want their voice to be recorded. Upon completing the interviews, the data was coded into multiple categories:  Conflict management, Environment/​ Climate, Information/​ Knowledge, Infrastructure, Institutions and Socioeconomic. Each category had multiple subcategories to provide further detail. For example, for Environment/​ Climate category, the subcategories were Nature, Pollution, Reclamation and Resources. Although the interviews were conducted in three different regions of the country with varying background on mining, there were clear similarities to impact of mining and distrust to investors (especially Chinese investors). Consequently, these interviews demonstrate the overall dynamics of the impact of mining in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia as a whole.

224  Almaz Tchoroev

Overview of findings from field research Field research conducted in the summer of 2019 in three areas of Kyrgyzstan demonstrated that the local population distrusted investors due to the impact of mining on the environment. There were concerns that water was being contaminated, pasture lands and forests destroyed impacting the livelihood of local residents. Moreover, interviews with local villagers, including regional and local government officials, showed that they were not clear or aware on the processes of post-​mining land remediation. The majority of mining companies operating in Naryn, Ala-​Buka and Chatkal remain closed to the local population. This has only exacerbated the distrust and lack of information which has fuelled severe conflict in the area. In all three regions, main road was blocked by activists, in some instances residents clashed with foreign workers leading to arrests and further distrust between the local population and investors. Naryn The territory of Naryn region is 70 per cent mountainous, situated within the Tien-​ Shan mountain range. Hence, livestock and agriculture are the main income generating components of the regional economy. The mineral resources of Naryn include ferrous (iron), rare (mercury, antimony, tungsten) and noble (gold) metals. These deposits were well researched during the Soviet era (Asanov et al., 2004). Naryn has a history of artisanal mining; however, the practice decreased during the Soviet era. Once Kyrgyzstan gained independence, economic hardship pushed thousands of residents to return to small-​scale mining around Naryn. From the 1990’s, Emgekchil village residents in Naryn district extracted gold in the Solton-​Sary pasture lands, with 70–​90 per cent of the households in the village directly or indirectly involved in artisanal mining (Soulier and Bekboeva, 2018). During the field research, one of the interviewees explained how artisanal mining was organised in the Emgekchil village. Before the villagers were forced to stop mining in Solton-​Sary, the local population organised ten brigades with ten miners each and started using sophisticated mechanical equipment, which substantially accelerated the gold mining process. As a mine employee explained to us: Close to 300 people worked there. Every month few kilograms of gold were extracted by the locals. Kilograms of gold, imagine that. In one month up to 20 kilograms of gold would easily be sold by the locals…20 kilograms of gold in one village; there are 600 families here. We divided everything between us. Field Research, EC_​Mine_​Employee_​01

Reclamation  225 Once the artisanal mining had stopped, a large number of residents lost their income. The majority of residents in Emgekchil village are still unhappy that the deposit area was given to a foreign investor. Hence, the Naryn district saw serious conflict in 2011, 2018 and 2019 between the locals and the Chinese mining firm. The conflict between the locals and mining company arose for multiple reasons, one of them being environmental concerns. The field research in the region was conducted in the pasture lands near the Solton-​Sary mine and villages that use these pasture lands (see Figure  11.1). The mine is being developed by a Chinese company called Zhong Ji Mining, holding a prospecting license and a gold production license in Solton-​Sary since 2012. In 2018, Zhong Ji Mining announced that the company has started the construction of gold processing plant, investing US $100 million. The construction process was supposed to be completed by 2020, with extraction works continuing until 2030. During the field research conducted in 10 June to 15 June 2019, 113 respondents participated (see Figure  11.2) in face-​ to-​ face interviews (38 respondents) or focus group discussions (73 respondents). Close to 90 per cent of the residents who participated in the research raised concerns about environmental issues related to mining. The local population did not trust the company would complete the reclamation process, fearing that their pasture lands would be damaged, leaving them without their income from livestock (Table 11.1).

Figure 11.1 Solton-​Sary pasture and location of the mine. The mine is near the pasture that residents use every summer. Source: Almaz Tchoroev

226  Almaz Tchoroev

Naryn region participants Herders

0

NGOs

11 3 4

Residents

7 33 26

Government

29 Female

Male

Figure 11.2 Naryn Field Research participants. Source: author’s own creation Table 11.1 Overview of research themes Category/​Node Conflict management

Environment/​Climate

Institutions

Infrastructure Socioeconomic

Information/​Knowledge

Themes Conflict Mechanism Protests Social package Trust Nature Resources Reclamation Pollution Informal Corruption Formal Company Health Development fund Livelihoods Formal Informal Training

Number of references 3 396 340 92 99 401 77 17 51 66 386 1 1 104 115 263 212 221 67 97 113 313 93 73 166

Reclamation  227 The majority of the residents pointed to the previous experiences of mining companies disappearing without completing the reclamation processes. As one resident put it: These mines started working during Soviet times.They extracted iron, gold and other minerals. They destroyed our pasture lands and left it like that. They dug up in many areas and never put the top soil back in place. They extract gold next to the rivers that we drink from, our livestock drinks from…They always tell the locals that everything will be left as found but we don’t trust them. Field Research, NN_​Resident_​01 The common fears focused on water contamination, pasture land destruction, air pollution and reclamation. Lack of information concerning reclamation plans is also one of the key issues raised by the interview participants (Table 11.1). Both local residents and local government officials did not have full information on the reclamation plans of the mining company. A government official explained that: They tell us that reclamation will be completed. But what is the plan? What is the timeframe or how long should we not use the pasture land? Can our livestock eat the grass in those areas? We don’t have answers to these questions. Field Research, MB_​Gov_​04 Indeed, the mining firm does not have a consistent system for addressing concerns raised by the locals. The Chinese company has hired a special representative from the local population who is responsible to provide two-​party communication channel. However, the representative does not have the full information either and is not trained properly to address these issues. The lack of information and mistrust has led to hundreds of villagers clashing with the employees of the Chinese firm in August 2019, resulting in 20 people being injured and the mine halting its operations (Reuters, 2019). Local media cited community concerns for environmental standards, mistreatment of local employees as the source of the tensions. However, there is a belief that the conflict arose due to some parties being interested in continuing artisanal mining in the area. After the events in Solton-​Sary, the Chinese Embassy in Kyrgyzstan made an unprecedented statement expressing “serious concern” and demanding for “thorough investigation” and to “fairly and appropriately resolve the situation” (24.kg, 2019). Despite the history of artisanal mining in Naryn, the residents are relatively new to foreign mining companies investing in the region. Although Chinese mining firm contributed a considerable amount of money to social projects in the area, the local population continue to mistrust the investor due to a lack of information and miscommunication.

228  Almaz Tchoroev Chatkal Although Naryn and Chatkal are located in two different areas of the country, livestock and agriculture are the main income generating components of the two regional economies. Similar to Naryn, Chatkal is a remote, mountainous, scarcely populated region. The area borders with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. However, in comparison to the northern region of the country, Chatkal has a long history of mining (see Figure 11.3). Hence, in comparison to other mining areas in the country, Chatkal region seems to have relatively low tension between the mining-​affected communities and large mining companies despite over 60 licenses being given out by the state. Field interviews in Chatkal indicated that the perception of the local residents regarding mining is mixed.The field interviews were conducted between 2 July and 6 July 2019, where 64 respondents participated in face-​to-​face interviews (45 respondents) and focus group discussions (19 respondents). Out of the 64 respondents, 45 per cent of them shared a positive and 30 per cent neutral perception on mining activities (Figure 11.4). The region clearly sees tangible benefits from the mining industry, such as employment and infrastructure development. For instance, the Kanysh-​Kiya Local Self Government has increased its budget from 8 million to 68 million Kyrgyz soms since 2000’s. Kanysh-​Kiya is one of the few Local governments that does not get subsidised by the Central Government in Kyrgyzstan.

Figure 11.3  Chatkal valley. Source: Almaz Tchoroev

Reclamation  229

Chatkal region participants 0 1

Company

2

NGOs

1 18

Residents

25 4

Government

13 0

5

10

15 Female

20

25

30

Male

Figure 11.4 Chatkal Field Research participants.

Nevertheless, the revenues from mining is distributed asymmetrically. Central villages such as Kanysh-​Kiya receive more economic and social benefits, while villages located further away from the mine do not get any benefits despite being affected by the mine too. The previous practices of the mining companies played a major role in forming a relationship between the local population and the mining companies. For example, unlike other areas of the country, mining firms in Chatkal had agreed to open local offices. This allows local residents to complain or talk to the representatives of the mining companies without having to travel to the capital. Of course, there are still concerns related to employment and environmental damages. As one of our interviewees pointed out, mining companies are building schools, kindergartens and roads, but will the youth stay and live here if the ecology is damaged? Additionally, one must point out that large companies operating in the area are close to moving from exploration to the extraction phase. This new phase may create tension and trigger conflict, especially concerning the tailing pit and gold processing plant. Local residents have major concerns regarding placer gold mining, where small-​and medium size mining firms dig along Chatkal and Kassan-​Sai rivers (Figure  11.5). Most of these mining firms either belong directly to Chinese companies or operate with Chinese investment. These companies predominantly hire Chinese workforce, causing friction with the locals: The locals are unhappy about the placer mining firms. They don’t hire us or provide assistance to the locals in any way. They have their own mission and nothing else interests them. Field Research, CS_​Resident_​07

230  Almaz Tchoroev

Figure 11.5 Abandoned mining site in Chatkal. Source: Almaz Tchoroev

There are a small number of Kyrgyz and Russian firms operating as well. The residents believe that the environmental damage these mines cause outweigh the benefits (Table 11.1). The local population, due to the historic background in mining, understand that placer gold mining companies are not contaminating the water with cyanide. However, the water is dirty because of the mining operations. Local farmers irrigate their fields with this water, which leads to a layer of mud covering their vegetation. As one government official explained: Look at the plants, look at our grass. If you compare it to the plants we had five years ago, you will cry in despair. Previously when you walked to the grass fields, it would cover the height of a person. Now it barely reaches the height of the stomach. When you went to the mountains and walked through the grass, you would lose your child because it was so high. Now we don’t have that anymore. This means farmers have less feed for the winter. Field Research, CS_​Gov_​02 Besides mining, the Chatkal region is dependent on livestock. If the farmers are unable to prepare enough feed during the summer for the winter period, this may lead to widespread conflict.

Reclamation  231 Additionally, reclamation after placer mining is a major issue as well: They are taking our pasture lands. They dig everything and leave. Our environment is damaged by them.They dig near the river and leave without doing anything to restore what they have done. Nobody controls them, we spoke about this issue to parliament deputies when they came. We told them that these companies do not complete the reclamation processes. Field Research, AJ_​Resident_​03_​2019 These mining companies have little incentives to rehabilitate the mined pits. To save time and money, these mining companies tend to exploit most of the licensed area, then sell the remaining part to another company before completing the reclamation processes (BBC Kyrgyz Service Sapar programme, 2019). When the local population approach the new company to complete the reclamation; the new firm only completes the areas they worked on, without paying attention to the full licensed area: They work for 2 years or so, then they sell it to a different investor. Our laws allow them do to that. They work for 2 more years; the firm does not talk to the local community about reclamation. I haven’t seen any land that had gone through the reclamation process. At the beginning they tell us that if they cut down one tree, they will put back 100 trees. I haven’t seen that once. Field Research, JB_​Resident_​05 As a result, Chatkal has a large concentration of uncultivated land, with pit holes visible alongside the river. Failure to rehabilitate the land in Chatkal has led to detrimental environmental consequences and mistrust to the mining sector. The environmental damages are visible to the eye when driving next to the river. Whereas, local farmers claim that the yield from their lands are considerably smaller in comparison to few years back. Post-​ mining mismanagement has overshadowed the positive economic impact from the larger mines. Although the field research found that majority of Chatkal residents understand the benefits from the mining sector, the situation may easily deteriorate and lead to protests that occurred in early 2000s. Ala-​Buka Compared to Naryn and Chatkal,Ala-​Buka has a softer climate, allowing farmers to grow fruits and vegetables instead of relying only on livestock. Additionally, in comparison to Naryn and Chatkal, Ala-​Buka is a densely populated region, which borders Uzbekistan. One of the biggest mines in Kyrgyzstan is located in the area, the Ishtamberdi deposit (Figure 11.6).The mine has 50 tons of gold reserves and it is considered to be the third largest deposit in the country, after Kumtor and Jerui. However,

232  Almaz Tchoroev

Figure 11.6 Ishtamberdi deposit. Source: Almaz Tchoroev

local experts claim that Soviet geologists established that the deposit has 78 tons of gold (Asanov et al., 2004). The mine was discovered in 1934, while exploration works were completed between 1981 and 1986 (Asanov et al., 2004). Field research conducted between 7 July and 11 July 2019 demonstrated that the majority of the residents had concerns over environmental pollution. During the field research, 85 respondents answered specifically tailored questions regarding the mining sector in the region. The field research team conducted 47 face-​to-​face interviews and 11 focus group (38 participants) discussions (Figure  11.7). 45 per cent of the respondents had negative perceptions on mining operation. Out of 85 respondents, 21 per cent had positive views and 34 were neutral because they were not affected by the mining process. One of the main concerns for the local residents was water pollution (Table 11.1). The majority of the villages in the region do not have access to clean water. They drink and use the water from the river on daily basis. As a representative from a local NGO explained: When Ishtamberdi started working all the chemicals were poured into the water. There are villages near the mine, they drink water from the river. They catch fish from the river. After a while the locals started having skin

Reclamation  233

Ala-Buka region participants 1

NGOs

4 24

Residents

28 11

Government

17 0

5

10

15 Female

20

25

30

Male

Figure 11.7 Ala-​Buka Field Research.

rushes, because the water was polluted, contaminated with chemicals. The company had to stop that practice because of the protests. But the problem is still not solved. I have a close friend living in that area. Her children have all sorts of skin problems. Field Research, AB_​NGO_​01 Rumours of water contamination had led to residents protesting and blocking the road. The last major conflict in 2016 involved 2,000 people. The local residents suspected that the mining company was draining the tailing pit water into the river. In 2019, employees working at the Ishtamberdi deposit published similar videos, showing chemicals being stored incorrectly and pouring into the river (Bars Media, 2019). The local residents also claim that they have tested the water using their own method.They have placed three frogs in a container full of water from the river where the waste had been allegedly dumped: I am a nurse, so I am interested in laboratory work. We have uploaded the video into YouTube. We placed frogs in the water that we took from the river flowing from Ishtamberdi. They died within 10 minutes. That is why the locals protested. Field Research, JB_​Resident_​03 Post-​mining damaged lands, tailing pits and waste dumps full of water next to the river are visible when driving through the region. Over the years, these waste dumps drain into the river, which worries the residents. Moreover, the

234  Almaz Tchoroev mining affected community complain that environmental damages had led to a dramatic decrease of the number of fish in the river: There are no fish in the water these days. We use the water that flows from Ishtamberdi. Previously it was not like this. When I came to this village in 2001, we would catch buckets of fish. It is not like this now. We can only catch one or two fish a day. Field Research, JB_​Resident_​01 The government agency responsible for environmental protection claim that all the necessary tests have been conducted. The Ecological Technical Inspection stated that tests proved that the water is not polluted. However, local residents do not trust them: They did not conduct proper environmental testing…Those experts who came here, they openly stated that they did not test everything. They were sent from Bishkek. What does the mining company need? The company needs government papers stating that testing was done. I believe that these experts should come and explain to the people what they found. Provide evidence that there is no environmental pollution. At the end no one is responsible. Field Research, AB_​NGO_​02 Lack of information concerning water pollution has led to mistrust, negatively impacting the mining sector in the region. Placer gold mining has also caused friction between the local community and the mining firms. Similar to Chatkal, small and medium companies in Ala-​ Buka extract gold on the riverbed, leaving without completing the reclamation process (see Figure 11.8). There are areas where gold was extracted ten years ago without rehabilitation of the affected area (BBC Kyrgyz Service Sapar Programme, 2019). The locals claim that the majority of the land used near the river were forests before minerals were extracted. As a local government official explained: They are polluting the land. Our resources are being taken out of the country. Although they are paying taxes, it was supposed to belong to the people. There were trees that have been growing for centuries, forests that were growing for many years, they come and cut it down. Reclamation processes are not completed. Field Research, AB_​Gov_​08_​2019 The local population only see the negative results of the mining sector, such as lagoons filled with contaminated water, abandoned equipment and open pits. The placer mining firms use the loopholes in the law to sell off the company after extracting gold from the main licensed areas. As a result, this issue became

Reclamation  235

Figure 11.8 Abandoned mining site in Ala-​Buka.The locals claim that company left the area three years ago without completing reclamation processes. Source: Almaz Tchoroev

a source of conflict in the region, with locals wanting to declare a moratorium for small companies. Post-​mining land remediation is non-​existent in many parts of the country. However, Ala-​Buka has a small area which has been fully rehabilitated –​both technical and biological reclamation has taken place. Local experts believe that this piece of land is the only area in the country that has been fully rehabilitated after mining.The post-​mining management success serves as a great example of what restored land should look like after mining.

The challenges of post-​mining remediation The field research in Ala-​Buka, Naryn and Chatkal demonstrates that local government officials and residents have a rudimentary understanding of reclamation. Indeed, some interviewees, including government officials believed that technical reclamation or filling the pit holes after mining was the final process. Lack of information and vague wording in the legislation are the main reasons for this issue. Ala-​Buka region is a great example of mining companies using the loopholes within the law to avoid the expensive process of reclamation. One of

236  Almaz Tchoroev the questions asked from the local residents was whether the current legislation protects their interests. The overwhelming answer was that the current laws do not strengthen their position. Kyrgyzstan has inherited the post-​mining management laws from the Soviet era (Faizuldayeva, 2016).The current legislation is outdated and lacks the clarity that is required in the modern age (Makhmudova and Matsui, 2019). Similar to other Soviet-​era technical standards, the norms adopted by Kyrgyzstan from the Soviet laws do not have detailed instructions and guidelines for mining companies and residents living in mine affected areas (Lawrence et al., 2018). Fundamental aspects of mining closure legislation are included in the Law on Subsoil use, adopted in 2012 and amended multiple times (Ministry of Justice, 2012). The law covers multiple issues related to mining, such as protecting the water and land resources, while highlighting the rational use of the resources. Article 47 ties post-​mining closure with an engineering design that the local government receives before the mine starts its operations and a transfer of money into the reclamation fund from the beginning of explorations (Faizuldayeva, 2016). The engineering design and the fund must be approved by the Local government before the firm can start working. However, how this fund will be used in the future or how local governments can access the money if the mining firm refuses to complete reclamation processes and specific issues such as inflation are not clear in the legislation (BBC Kyrgyz Service Sapar programme, 2019). The field research demonstrated that the majority of the local residents did not know that a reclamation fund existed. Meanwhile government officials, although they were aware of the reclamation fund, did not have the full information on the legal mechanism to use the fund. Furthermore, the requirements stated in the Law on subsoil use are supported by the Law on Environmental Protection (1999), in which Article 6 requires mining companies to pay a compensation for environmental damages, including the execution of reclamation processes (Ministry of Justice of the Kyrgyz Republic, 1999). Hence, Kyrgyzstan does not have a specific or separate article within the legislation that focuses only on reclamation; instead, there are regulations within existing Articles to administer post-​mining management. Additionally, despite multiple changes made to these existing Articles within the legislation on remediation of damaged lands, key aspects that would recognise new technologies or types of reclamation were not introduced (Makhmudova and Matsui, 2019). Currently, the mining companies begin their work by agreeing to complete technical and biological reclamation within two years after the extraction phase is concluded. As demonstrated in the field research, lack of detail is used as a loophole by mining companies. Another problem is the definition of the word reclamation within the regulation. The legislation does not provide a clear definition of the term and does not classify different types of reclamation processes (Makhmudova and Matsui, 2019). As argued by academics throughout the world, clear definition of terminology is a key aspect in mitigating negative mining legacies (Lima et  al., 2016). The lack of detailed definition means that interested parties involved in

Reclamation  237 the mining processes understand or interpret the law differently. This was clear to see during the field research, where the government officials claimed that the law is clear and mining firms are following them, while NGOs involved in protecting the environment and local residents stated that the regulations lack detailed explanations. This was summed up by an NGO official in Ala-​Buka who stated that: The law is not clear on when the reclamation has to be completed. There are companies who have worked here five years ago and left. When you ask, they say it is conserved, they will complete reclamation when they are done. I’m sure you saw it; they extracted gold and left it. It has been five years. Within that time, they sell it to a different company. Meaning that land will never be used again, reclamation will not take place. Field Research, AB_​NGO_​02 Moreover, regulations do not include a detailed explanation of the processes of reclamation. The law generally states that the land and territory must be restored after mining. However, the regulations do not discuss the responsibility of the investor when it comes to specific mining infrastructure and equipment, such as waste dumps or tailing pits (Lawrence et  al., 2018). As a result, old equipment and post-​mining waste dumps are visible near the rivers in Ala-​ Buka and Chatkal (Figure 11.5, and 11.8). Additionally, the timeframe when the reclamation has to take place is not specific. As the NGO representative in Ala-​Buka went on to explain: No, there is no timeframe. The law is not clear; it contradicts as well. They wrote that reclamation must be completed after the mining company is done working in the licensed area. But if they have 1000 hectares of licensed land, does that mean reclamation will be completed once all of the work on that land is done. Or is it block after block? This needs to be clearly written in the reclamation project…Now they have licensed land for 100 hectares. By the time they finish work on that land, the company is sold three times to different owners. Field Research, AB_​NGO_​02 As discussed above, the law states that remediation of damaged land must take place within two years after mining works had been completed or by blocks, meaning that once minerals from one area had been extracted, reclamation is completed before moving into the next area. The type of reclamation depends on the plan that had been agreed with the local government. Lack of awareness from village leaders means that they agree to a plan that is not in the interest of the local community. Indeed, field research in three regions of the country demonstrated that some regional level officials are unaware of reclamation processes. Other government officials admitted that regulation lacks clarity, leading to mining

238  Almaz Tchoroev companies using the loopholes in the law. Without a detailed timeframe and framework within the regulations, mining companies are able to exploit the land and leave without  the financial burden of restoring the damaged area. Furthermore, a moratorium on inspection of mining firms by the State Environmental and Technical Safety further hinders the ability of Local government officials to demand reclamation. The officials from the State Inspectorate for Environmental and Technical Safety, which is the only state body responsible for monitoring environmental violations, state that they do not have the right to force the mining companies to complete reclamation processes or dictate when reclamation must take place (BBC Kyrgyz Service Sapar programme, 2019). These issues have pushed the mining affected communities to demonstrate, block roads and even attack the company premises. This in turn has led to mining companies working closely with the security services. Multiple interviewees, including some government officials admitted that company representatives visit the police station before meeting with the residents. Some participants claimed that they are still called to the police station for participating in demonstrations two years ago. However, as shown in multiple mining depots, including Solton-​Sary, this method is not effective.

Conclusion Mining has been an important sector for Central Asian states, including Kyrgyzstan. This sector has allowed these developing countries to attract much needed foreign investment. Kyrgyzstan does not have resources such as oil or gas, which means the mining sector will continue to be the economic locomotive in the future. Despite the importance of this sector to the economy, field research conducted in Naryn, Chatkal and Ala-​Buka demonstrated that legal frameworks for environmental protection, in particular post-​mining management lack clarity and detailed guidelines. The term reclamation is not defined or fully explained in the existing legislation in Kyrgyzstan. A clear and simplified definition of terminology from the earliest possible stage would benefit the interested parties. Academics propose to define reclamation according to specific targets, with an end objective of “restoring the previous ecosystem” (Lima et al., 2016: p. 233). This may be difficult to achieve; however, there is an example of such case in Ala-​Buka. Moreover, the current legislation does not provide a timeframe or methodology on how remediation of damaged land should take place. The legislation only states that the mining company must complete technical and biological reclamation once mineral extractions are realised. Lack of detail has led to mining firms finding loopholes within the law to avoid the expensive costs of reclamation. Since the laws still use outdated Soviet standards, international norms are not followed by mining companies operating in the country. The consequences are detrimental to the environment. Driving along the highway between Chatkal and Ala-​Buka, one can see lagoons filled with waste water, abandoned mining equipment and land that had not been restored, despite

Reclamation  239 mining works being completed over five years ago. Local residents claim that forests had been destroyed and their water contaminated by investors. Additionally, our interviews with local government officials and residents revealed that they were not clear or aware of the processes of post-​mining land remediation.They have a basic understanding of reclamation with some officials believing that technical reclamation is enough. Policy of the mining companies to remain closed has further fuelled discontent among the mine affected community. The focus on socioeconomic benefits has dwarfed the environmental impact of mining. Indeed, Kyrgyzstan seems to be focusing on socioeconomic benefits of mining rather than environmental issues and its impact to the mining affected community. Despite fundamental issues in the law, friction between the local community and investors, small and large companies continue to receive licenses to mine. Field research conducted both in the North and South of Kyrgyzstan demonstrates that post-​mining poor governance, vague and outdated laws, as well as lack of awareness regarding reclamation processes lead to severe conflict between the local population and investors.

Notes from the field Mining closure in Mongolia Enkhtsetseg Sosorbaram Following the collapse of the Communist regime and transition to a market economy in the 1990s, the Mongolian government aimed to open all the mines that were deemed potential prospects during socialist times. As of 2020, of the 2,800 special licenses granted for prospecting and mining natural resources, 1,697 are for operation and 954 for prospecting. Due to reformations of laws regulating mining, no new licenses were granted for five years since 2014.1 Policies regarding mine closure procedures have not been implemented in a coordinated manner between the General Authority for Specialized Inspection, the Ministry of Mining and Heavy Industry and the Ministry of Environment, Green Development and Tourism. For example, according to section 45.1 of the law regulating natural resources, “mine closure procedures are to be initiated one year before operations fully close.” But in section 14.1.3 of the law, which concerns the environmental effects of mining, “mine closure plans are to be submitted three years before closure.”This discrepancy shows that state agencies are not properly coordinating their actions. Ore mines currently operate at an average depth of 50–​300 m, which requires legal regulations for mine closure. Major mining projects registered with the Minerals Authority are planned to mine and develop gold, coal, iron ore, construction materials, fluorspar and other materials.

240  Almaz Tchoroev In the next five years, the closure of gold and fluorspar mines is most salient, while in the medium term (6–​20 years), the issue of closing iron ore and coal mines will become more significant. Mongolia’s current regulatory framework is inadequate, and government should work closely with the private sector to mitigate the consequences of mine closures. According to Article 9.10 of the Law on Environmental Impact Assessment, mining license holders must prepare an Environmental Management Plan. An annual report on the implementation of the plan must be prepared and approved by a state commission. The license holder must deposit 50 per cent of the budget required to implement the plan each year, which will be returned when the mine is closed based on implementation of the license holder’s obligations as set out in the plan. Experts estimate that the collateral or bond is rather nominal and would be insufficient to effect rehabilitation upon sudden mine closure. As of 2016, collateral pledged by all mining project implementers operating in Mongolia was 10.5 billion in local currency (MNT) (US $3,680,000), half paid by major mining companies including Erdenet Mining Corporation, Oyu Tolgoi LLC, Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi LC, Baganuur LC, Boroo Gold LLC and Mongol Alt LLC. Rehabilitation collateral deposited by the companies implementing the so-​called mega projects Oyu Tolgoi and Tavan Tolgoi is estimated at only about US $500,000. As of 2016, approximately 7,000 hectares of land were damaged during the operation of the above two mines. The deposit is insufficient to rehabilitate even 5 per cent of the land. Mining projects affect the local economy, as more than 30 per cent of the working-​age population may be drawn in to work in the mines or provide services to the mines. If a mining company suddenly shuts down, unemployment and poverty increase. For instance, the Nalaikh mine was closed in 1989 after a flammable gas explosion. As a result, Nalaikh district encountered many social problems, including unemployment and poverty, because there was no contingency plan for sudden closure. As Mongolia’s rapidly developing mining sector already makes a significant contribution to the economy, the Government’s Action Plan for 2016–​20 includes the goal of “creating a legal environment for the secondary use of minerals and bringing mine closure and rehabilitation to international standards.” In 2017, the Ministry of Mines and Heavy Industry launched a comprehensive legal reform at all levels of the sector, ranging from the establishment of mineral resources to the opening and closing of mines, technology and safety of mines, all of which is a sign of a new era in Mongolia’s mining sector. In sum, Mongolia has made great progress in the mining sector over the past 30 years but is still working on the problem of closure and rehabilitation.2

Reclamation  241 References 1. IGF Mining policy framework assessment of Mongolia: www.iisd. org/​system/​files/​publications/​mongolia-​mining-​policy-​framework-​ assessment-​en.pdf?utm= 2. New Mining Law draft is under discussion:  /​www.mmhi.gov.mn/​ public/​forum/​id/​214

Notes 1 Mineral Resources and Petroleum Authority, https://​mrpam.gov.mn/​public/​pages/​ 165/​2020.11.stat.report.mon.pdf 2 IGF news:  www.asmhub.mn/​mn/​news/​igf-​mongolyn-​uul-​uurhajd-​bajgal-​orchny-​ menezhment-​sul-​bajna

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242  Almaz Tchoroev Lima A.T., Mitchell K., O’Connell D.W., Verhoeven J., and Cappellen P. (2016). The legacy of surface mining: Remediation, restoration, reclamation and rehabilitation. Environmental Science and Policy, 66, pp. 227–​233 Makhmudova G., and Matsui K. (2019). The remediation policy after mining works in the Kyrgyz Republic. Resources Policy, 61, pp. 304–​310. Ministry of Justice of the Kyrgyz Republic (1999). Zakon ob ohrane okruzhajushei sredy. [online] Ministry of Justice Centralized Data Bank. Available at: http://​cbd.minjust.gov. kg/​act/​view/​ru-​ru/​218?cl=ru-​ru [Accessed 06 January, 2020]. Ministry of Justice of the Kyrgyz Republic (2012). Zakon o Nedrah. [online] Ministry of Justice Centralized Data Bank. Available at:  http://​cbd.minjust.gov.kg/​act/​view/​ru-​ ru/​203760 [Accessed 05 January, 2020]. Mogilevskii R. (2019). Kyrgyzstan and the Belt and Road Initiative. Working Paper #50. [online] The Institute of Public Policy and Administration, University of Central Asia. Available at:  www.ucentralasia.org/​Resources/​Item/​2153/​EN [Accessed 23 April, 2020]. National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic (2017). Kyrgyzstan: Brief Statistical Handbook 2014–​2016. Bishkek: The National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, pp. 1–​31. Reuters.com (2019). Kyrgyzstan Halts Work at Chinese Gold Mine After Clashes. [online] Reuters. Available at:  www.reuters.com/​article/​us-​kyrgyzstan-​protests-​mining/​ kyrgyzstan-​halts-​work-​at-​chinese-​gold-​mine-​after-​clashes-​idUSKCN1UX200 [Accessed 10 January, 2020]. Soulier M., and Bekboeva N. (2018). Gold Mining Industries and Local Livelihoods in Rural Naryn. [online] Berlin Geographical Papers, Centre for Development Studies, Freie Universität Berlin. Available at:  www.geo.fu-​berlin.de/​geog/​fachrichtungen/​ anthrogeog/​zelf/​Medien/​download/​Berlin_​Geographical_​Papers/​BGP48_​Naryn_​ 2018.pdf [Accessed 25 April, 2020], pp. 29–​40. The World Bank (2019). The Kyrgyz Republic Country Snapshot. [online] The World Bank in the Kyrgyz Republic. Available at:  http://​pubdocs.worldbank.org/​en/​ 747371571374524945/​Kyrgyz-​Republic-​Snapshot-​Oct2019.pdf [Accessed 25 May, 2020]. Tiainen H., Sirinen R., and Novikov V. (2014). Mining in the Chatkal Valley in Kyrgyzstan –​Challenge of social sustainability. Resources policy, 39, pp. 80–​87. Wali, M.K. (1996). Ecosystem Rehabilitation Volume 1: Policy Issues. Hague: SPB Academic Publishing.

12  After life-​of-​mine Rethinking mine closure Stephen Lezak and Gantulga Munkherdene

The afterlife-​of-​mine What does it mean to say that a mine has closed? In the American West, where one of us grew up, abandoned mines are scattered across the mountains and high desert. Some of these sites have been turned into museums, portraying the difficulties of life during the American gold rush. But the majority just slowly recede into the landscape. Often times, they’re visible from highways and hiking trails as collapsed buildings and crooked railroad tracks. In either case, the sites carry a sense of abandonment and exhaustion. They’re relics of a bygone era when the riches of the earth were relatively forthcoming to a lucky prospector and his pickaxe. More than a century later, what mining that still takes place in the American West has become a regulated and mechanised industry. Mines open with a great deal of controversy, regulation and publicity. And when they shut, they become ghostly places, often draining the energy from nearby towns as workers move away and the local economy falters. In Mongolia, where the other one of us grew up, the situation could hardly be more different. Across the steppe, great numbers of “closed” mines have experienced a sort of afterlife. They have become the nuclei of an informal and largely illegal mining industry that involved tens of thousands of enterprising Mongolians. Unlike the ghost towns of the United States, closed mines in Mongolia became hotspots for the nation’s bustling post-​socialist informal economy, giving rise to a modern-​day gold rush. Although industrial development had long since ceased, these sites became vibrant centres of commerce and extraction, complete with gers (yurts) selling hot food and staple goods. It is as though closed mines in Mongolia have followed the opposite trajectory as those in the United States. In the mining industry, these afterlives are of relatively little concern to operators and investors. Breaking ground on a new mine is heralded with fanfare and controversy.The shuttering of the site is often muted by contrast.These closures are difficult to plan for, and few incentives exist to encourage care in the process, despite the hazards involved. “Reputations are rarely built by closing a mine” (Laurence, 2006: p. 285). But in recent decades, stakeholders have become more aware of the importance of the closure process (Fourie and DOI: 10.4324/9781003097341-15

244  Stephen Lezak and Gantulga Munkherdene Brent, 2006). Mines can continue to play a lively role in landscapes, long after the commercial developer has packed up and left. Tailings dam failures, acid mine drainage and unemployment are some of the hallmarks of the afterlives of mines. These impacts span physical and economic geographies and may occur wherever mining takes place. In Mongolia, the afterlives of mines became the focal point of a national political controversy, emphasising the role that closed mines can play in shaping livelihoods and laws across a vast expanse of territory. It is through this lens that this chapter explores the social and ecological lives of abandoned mines in Mongolia, focusing on how the industry-​wide concept of mine closure fails to capture the dynamic role that these sites continue to play in rural livelihoods, long after industrial operations cease. Ultimately, we suggest that the very concept of a mine’s “lifecycle” distorts reality by equating closure with a sense of an ending. This myth of mine closure divests industry of responsibility for the afterlife of mines by suggesting that there is nothing to be responsible for. We propose that recognising and responding to these afterlives will facilitate better policymaking and practice, while helping to align extractive industries in Central Asia with national and regional sustainable development agendas.

The Mongolian context Bataa was only 14 years old when his family’s herd perished between in the harsh winter storms that arrived in 2000 and 2001. In the spring of 2002, desperate for a new livelihood, they moved to Üvürchuluun, an abandoned gold mine in Bayankhongor province. From the year they arrived, Bataa worked as an artisanal miner, going to the mines in breaks between school and university. After graduating from high school, he enrolled in a university in the capital city of Ulaanbaatar and graduated in 2010 with a degree in journalism. He worked for several TV stations as journalist and producer. But even then, when he had time away from work, he returned to the mines in his home province. His salary as a journalist would not support him and his girlfriend. Eventually, seeking for a more stable livelihood, they got a loan from their relatives in 2012 and started a new business:  a small shop in Bumbugur. It wasn’t successful. Unable to pay back the loan, they went back to the mines. In the past years, they managed to return the loan and are now still working at the mines, saving money with the hopes of beginning a new life in the capital city. Stories like Bataa’s are commonplace in Mongolia today. The first few years of the 21st century saw a “peoples’ gold rush.” Three harsh consecutive winters from 1999 to 2002, known in some places as the udaan (long, lingering) zud (High, 2017), arrived just as the Mongolian economy was beginning to re-​ establish itself independent from Soviet assistance. These winter storms killed 11 million animals –​roughly one-​third of the total number recorded in the national livestock census (Mahul and Skees, 2007) –​and left families unable to support themselves by herding. Thousands of Mongolians turned to small-​scale mining as a way to make ends meet.

After life-of-mine: rethinking mine closure  245 Unlike the United States, the history of mining in Mongolia is relatively young. It was only in the 1970s, and in particular following the establishment of the Erdenet copper mine, that industrial mining found a foothold (High, 2017). A flurry of mineral development followed, steadily ramping up before reaching a fever pitch in the late 2000s and early 2010s (Lander, 2020). The same period witnessed a series of whipsaw economic shifts, from the collapse following the end of the Soviet era to the boom times of 2009–​12, when Mongolia’s economy was among the fastest-​growing in the world. As the nation rocked from deep poverty and widespread unemployment to supporting a Porsche dealership and glass skyscrapers, the mining industry clung on. The prosperous years were characterised by enthusiastic foreign investment in gold, copper, silver, coal and other mineral resources. Extraction provided employment, tax revenue and a feeling of hope (Lander, 2020). But in the depth of economic recessions or political instability, mines were swiftly abandoned by bankrupt developers and collapsed public corporations. In these instances, sudden mine closure left behind large-​scale impacts and the promise of unclaimed wealth. But despite their abandonment, mine sites continued to actively influence the social, political and ecological landscapes around them. Artisanal miners arrived to sift through mine tailings or resume exploration where the industrial extractors left off. Ordinary folks went to the mines en masse, seeking both relief from poverty and the prospect of wealth (High, 2017). Many were nomadic herders who had lost their animals; others were urban Mongolians who had lost their jobs. These men and women found an economic backstop in panning for gold in the tailings of shuttered mines. Early pioneers of this democratic gold rush would carry green plastic pans, giving rise to the epithet, ninja miner, a reference to the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles (Grainger, 2003). Their work is difficult and dangerous. Small-​scale mining involves hours of digging, panning or tunnelling, usually in unstable soils or bedrock (Munkherdene, 2011). A combination of alcohol, factions and the tensions and fear of illegal work fuel violence in and around camps (High, 2017). For many families, committing to artisanal mining meant relocating their homes for a season or more, requiring herders to leave their animals in the care of friends or relatives. Nevertheless, artisanal mining took off in a fervent gold rush. By 2006, the estimated number of artisanal miners in Mongolia ranged from 30,000 to 100,000 (World Bank, 2006). What began in the shadow of industrial mining soon emerged as an economic and environmental force to rival it. Surreptitious prospecting of mine tailings became gradually more conspicuous. Eventually, semi-​ permanent ninja camps swelled to resemble miniature towns, complete with restaurants and small shops (High, 2017). And miners’ technology evolved, too, as high-​ grade deposits were depleted. Green plastic pans were left behind in favour of gas-​powered water pumps and sluice boxes (High, 2017). Later, in the Gobi and adjacent steppe region, “dry technology” (khuurai arga) was developed to use smaller volumes of water to separate gold from soil (Munkherdene, 2011).

246  Stephen Lezak and Gantulga Munkherdene Most recently, hard-​rock mining with explosives and mercury amalgamation have been used as well, raising a new set of concerns about mercury poisoning (Munkherdene and Sneath, 2018). Artisanal mining quickly became a subject of humanitarian inquiry in response to injuries, deaths and crime linked to the mining camps. And as more Mongolians joined in the gold rush, miners’ environmental impact grew as well. This created tensions among herders, who accused the miners of contaminating surface water and inadvertently poisoning livestock (High, 2017). In due course, ninja mining became a part of the national political conversation, and a frequent target for environmentalist groups, who characterised the miners as reckless and irresponsible. A series of policy interventions followed with mixed results (Lezak, 2017). Starting in 2005, the Mongolian government and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation worked to develop a pathway to legalise small-​ scale mining. Beginning in 2010, small-​scale miners were permitted to create cooperative-​style partnerships, providing they met certain criteria. Some of these qualifications were –​arduous or contradictory. For instance, cooperatives could only mine on land that local governments had classified for small-​scale mining. But large, established mining companies had already secured rights to vast gold deposits across the country. What’s more, these big players have little incentive to collaborate with small-​scale miners. In this case, the land available to legal small-​scale miners tended to be marginal. Incoherencies such as these made the legal pathway appear and often without clear benefits (Munkherdene and Sneath, 2018). The first official census of small-​scale miners in Mongolia found that 13,400 people worked in the small-​scale mining partnership in 2012 (Mongolian Statistic Office, 2012). As of May 2020, the website of the National Federation for Artisanal and Small Scale Mining lists 86 partnerships with 6,500 small-​ scale miners (National Federation for Artisanal and Small Scale Mining, 2020). But these numbers only record miners in legal cooperatives; there is no official census of how many small-​scale miners are working illegally. Such an undertaking would present an immediate challenge: who is a miner? Like drivers for ridesharing companies, artisanal mining can be a primary source of income or a means to supplement a livelihood. It is rarely an activity that people identify with in a vocational sense. In some gold rich regions, such as Bayankhongor Province, small-​scale mining remains integral to local economies. In other places, such as in Ulaanbaatar, mining is more commonly used as a quick means to earn cash when the calendar demands it, such as before holiday celebrations (New Year, Tsagaan Sar and Naadam) or before the start of the school year. The economic landscape is as textured as the earth itself. Artisanal mining in Mongolia is a small sliver of a global phenomenon. In 2019, the World Bank estimated that 40 million people work as artisanal miners, calling it “the most important rural non-​farm activity in the developing world” (World Bank, 2019). It is also closely linked to inexorable advance of 20th century globalisation, which created markets for commodities capable of linking

After life-of-mine: rethinking mine closure  247 continents. This political economic history provides crucial context for why abandoned mines look so different in emerging economies and post-​socialist landscapes than they do in the Global North. In the past two centuries, global centres of extraction shifted from Europe and North America to Latin America, Africa and Asia (Lezak et  al., 2019). This change owed to a number of parallel events. First, natural resources in the “Global North” became progressively rarer following the Industrial Revolution, as high-​grade deposits were mined to exhaustion (Mudd, 2004, 2009). A 1991 United States Geologic Survey booklet wryly declares that “the grizzled prospector with a burro [donkey] is no longer a significant participant in the search for mineral deposits” (Kirkemo, 1991). In response, miners and investors turned to other parts of the globe in search of high-​grade ore bodies. A second factor in this shift was the roll-​out of progressively stricter environmental regulation in North America and Europe. These laws made mining costlier within local regulatory frameworks. Third, regulation in the Global North accompanied an opposite movement among emerging economies, which strove to attract foreign direct investment by deregulating economies, often at the insistence of groups such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organization (Maconachie and Hilson, 2013). These deregulatory regimes were particularly powerful in post-​Soviet nations, where the logic of “shock therapy” legitimised capitalist exploitation with few of the restraints imposed in the Global North. And finally, extractive industries were drawn to parts of the world where governments were absent, weak or corruptible. The sum of these parallel threads was a global mineral sector that concentrated new development in rural regions of emerging economies.

The unbounded mine Across the mining industry, geologists and investors dedicate great attention to “life of mine” –​the anticipated remaining years of economically viable production at a given site. The term suggests that when an operator departs, the mine is somehow dead. But this death is a perspective trick: it only works when viewed from a certain angle. It often makes sense in the ghost towns of the American West. But in the Mongolian steppe, where vibrant small-​scale mining frequently follows industrial extraction, many abandoned mines seem more alive than ever. In these landscapes, the end of industrial extraction may simply mark the transition from one chapter of a mine’s “life” to the next. This isn’t to say that Mongolia doesn’t have ghost towns. Minerals that are not exchanged in the informal economy are of no use to artisanal miners. This explains the little-​known place called Mardai. Beginning in the 1980s, Russian Soviets developed a uranium mine in Dornod Province, in north-​ western Mongolia. Like many similar sites associated with the Soviet nuclear program, it was home to a secret city, absent from official maps but home to 10,000 Russians who operated the mine and lived in the surrounding town. Although ordinary Mongolian citizens were prohibited from visiting the city,

248  Stephen Lezak and Gantulga Munkherdene Mardai was known as the only place in Mongolia where fresh fruits could be purchased year-​round (Jansen, 2014). The mine was shuttered in 1995, four years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and during a deep economic depression in Russia. The Russian occupants left. What remains today is a collection of disintegrating Soviet apartment blocks, with tall grasses growing from the rubble. Nomadic herders have returned to graze their animals, despite their suspicions that the abandoned mine has poisoned the available water. Recent photos show goats climbing upwards to pick through the ruins of collapsed buildings, their heads level with the few remaining second-​story windows (Sokhin, n.d.). But even here, the extractive past rumbles on. While the original mine pit has long been filled with water, artisanal miners from around the region will dig for fluorite in the nearby soil. Meanwhile, a Russian–​Mongolian joint venture is seeking to resume uranium extraction (Edwards, 2016). Of course, artisanal mining is only one of several ways in which closed mines can continue to act within landscapes. When tailings dams collapse, they can cause catastrophic flooding, such as the Brumadinho mine in Brazil that killed more than 250 people in 2019. Acid mine drainage jeopardises clean water and destroys aquatic wildlife. In northern Sweden, sections of the city of Kiruna are being relocated as subsidence from an underground mine threatens the stability of the ground. Put one way, mines are haunting these landscapes. In another sense, the land is simply continuing to act and react to human activity. Upon examination, closed mine sites seem less inactive than discourse would suggest. Viewed as something more than inert spaces, we begin to understand how two geologically identical mines may lead different afterlives based upon a seemingly infinite set of variables. In this way, mine sites are more-​than-​ geologic.They are unbounded and hard to predict, participating in social, political and ecological landscapes beyond their immediate perimeters. The fallacy of the dead mine is owed in part to the judgment that geology is inert, passive and anti-​social. Since the Enlightenment, European societies have understood agency as belonging exclusively to biological life (i.e. something with DNA (Povinelli, 2016)). In this ontology, rocks, climate, rivers and mountains do not act or react; things are done to them, on them, or about them. But just as contemporary psychology has disproven the myth of the rational mind, contemporary earth science has shown that life and non-​life are both active participants on local and planetary scales. Climate change itself demonstrates how geology and biology are linked by actions and reactions. Many human actions upon the earth have reactions that extend beyond our ability to predict. In Mongolia, the vitality of the earth is widely understood in both spiritual and literal terms. This became particularly manifest in the post-​Socialist period. For instance, in 2009, the President of Mongolia officiated an ovoo ceremony  –​a religious rite at a mountain or hill. The moment seemed to represent  a newfound synergy between Mongolia’s post-​socialist spirituality (religion was banned in the Soviet era) and the democratic era. David Sneath,

After life-of-mine: rethinking mine closure  249 who was present at the time, writes that “the ovoo ceremony embodied or enacted the relations between human and superhuman forces associated with the land” (Sneath, 2018a: p. 181). That is, the more-​than-​human agency of the landscape is obvious not simply in an aesthetic sense, but in a practical ontology of environmental governance. Mongolian cosmology did not produce the outcomes of artisanal mining across the countryside. But it offers a more congruent framework for understanding, and even expecting, how human–​geologic relationships unfold at closed mines. In this understanding, mines are rowdy characters in the local ecology of things. By contrast, mine operators headquartered in London, Vancouver or Sidney, assume the passivity of closed sites. Their assumptions are rooted in the economic, political and geologic particulars of Europe and North America; they also underlie a systematic failure to predict and intervene in the politics of shuttered mining operations in places like Mongolia. Artisanal mining reshaped the North American West in the 19th century. Gold rushes in the Dakotas, California, Alaska and elsewhere made up the first wave of foreign settlers across much of the continent (Turner, 1950). But today, despite the persistence of extreme poverty in many rural parts of the United States, artisanal mining has become a predominantly recreational activity. In this transformation, the labour of artisanal miners has been made into a leisurely pastime. These recreationists won’t be found panning for gold in the tailings of abandoned mines –​that would defeat the recreational goal of going out into nature and connecting with the colonial nostalgia for a wild West. Following the same lineage as fishing or hunting, the former livelihood of the rural poor has become the pastime of the urban privileged (Cronon, 1996). The reverse took place in Mongolia, where livelihoods rooted in artisanal mining followed commercial extraction. David Sneath describes how out-​of-​ work miners in the 1990s applied their technical and geologic knowledge to initiate the first wave of artisanal gold mining, relying on the release of previously confidential state mineral surveys (Sneath, 2018b: p. 197). These miners knew that the threshold for the economic viability of their labour was lower than for the commercial operators who had abandoned many of these sites in the years before, or were forced into bankruptcy (International Council on Mining & Metals (Wall, 2005)). Some of these artisanal miners were able to return to the same state-​owned mines that had employed them before the collapse of the Communist government. In this way, commercial mining provided both the map and the territory to Mongolia’s artisanal miners. These mirror-​image histories point to the importance of political economy in the mining sector. In particular, the economic volatility of modern Mongolia was essential to making closed mines sites of interest to the informal labour economy. If not for the economic crash of the early 1990s, perhaps these landscapes would have remained untouched, visited only as part of environmental remediation efforts. Instead, economic collapse drove a substantial part of the Mongolian population away from the urban centres –​where Soviet-​supported enterprise and government offered employment and education –​and out into

250  Stephen Lezak and Gantulga Munkherdene the countryside, where animal agriculture provided a backstop against food insecurity (Shi, 2011). Roughly, 50% of Mongolians were unemployed between 1990 and 1995, giving rise to an informal economy that became a critical replacement for the highly structured labour force that had characterised the latter part of the Communist period (Ahearn, 2018). Within a matter of years, many Mongolians’ capacity to make ends meet depended on families’ ability to raise livestock or participate in this “scavenger economy” (Munkherdene and Sneath, 2018). In 2006, when artisanal mining had spread across the nation, the informal sector accounted for an estimated 60% of Mongolia’s total economic activity (Lahiri-​Dutt and Dondov, 2017). Economic contexts like these are characteristic of resource frontiers, which unsettle places in physical and social ways (Tsing, 2005). This was true for both the 19th-​century American West and early 21st-​century Mongolia. In the contemporary United States, by contrast, the frontier has been effectively exported elsewhere and the economy made relatively stable. This is one reason why the informal labour economy in the contemporary American West is relatively small. In Mongolia, by contrast, economic turbulence had a double effect in facilitating artisanal mining. First, turbulence created the complementary conditions of need and hope that motivate people to seek out fortunes in unlikely places. Second, turbulence upsets systems of land ownership and use rights. Licensed mining companies are usually bound by obligations to steward the land. Failure to do so –​such as by permitting water contamination –​can lead to losing social and legal licenses to operate. But when these firms go bankrupt or suspend operations, so does their role as caretakers.The fences are cut, and private property itself becomes a commons reshaped by crisis. Legal and labour geography also shapes the relationship between disturbed landscapes and human occupants. Following the collapse of the Communist government in the 1990s, rural Mongolians felt the presence of the government vanish from the landscape. Some came to understand this as the reawakening of land spirits that had been dormant during a time when the government projected power across the countryside (Pedersen, 2011). In the democratic era that followed, government appeared to retreat from rural areas. In a legal landscape with limited regulatory power and widespread corruption, both corporate and artisanal miners were able to act with limited accountability. In many instances, industrial actors would fail to monitor or rehabilitate mine sites after operations had ended. For rural Mongolians, the same lack of governance allowed illegal artisanal mining to boom. On both environmental and social fronts, this institutional absenteeism gave mines (formal and informal) opportunities to unsettle local landscapes. A less formal but equally powerful institution plays a role in mitigating these after-​lives:  labour. In rural Mongolia, herding families rarely rely on a single revenue stream, and full-​time employment in the Western sense is relatively uncommon. Rather, rural Mongolians braid together their livelihoods from a variety of sources, often including the sale of meat, fibre and dairy from their herds. These livelihoods combine subsistence activities with waged

After life-of-mine: rethinking mine closure  251 ones, muddling Marx’s distinction between alienated and unalienated labour (Marx, 1988). Artisanal mining fits naturally in this context. It mixes both subsistence (living off the land, not having a “boss”) and alienation (producing things one doesn’t consume). These arrangements echo Anna Tsing’s work with matsutake mushroom foragers: “it is looking for your fortune, not doing your job” (Tsing, 2015: p. 77). Artisanal miners bridge the globalised sphere of anonymous commodity flows with the hyper-​local world of subsistence. Like Tsing’s research participants, many Mongolian artisanal miners insist that their labour is not ajil (work). One Mongolian miner, when asked what it might be instead, replied “money, just money.” These labour practices are also adapted to mobility. Nomadism and travelling across long distances are central to the contemporary Mongolian identity (Myadar, 2011). This familiarity helped make artisanal mining more congruent with existing labour traditions. As with the gold rushes of 19th-​century North America, prospectors are mobile. For Mongolia’s artisanal miners, individuals or families were willing to travel to a mine for a weekend, a school holiday or a season. Weak legal institutions, flexible labour and high mobility empowered artisanal miners to feel that they were settling a score. International firms were extracting and exporting value out from underneath their feet, while avoiding taxes and regulation (Lahiri-​ Dutt and Dondov, 2017). As industrial mines concentrated wealth into the hands of foreigners and a growing class of oligarchs in Ulaanbaatar, many Mongolians rushed to claim their share of the wealth that they felt was their birthright (Lahiri-​Dutt and Dondov, 2017: p. 127). It would be wrong to stop here, as if to suggest that the afterlife of mines is determined purely by the affairs of humans aboveground. Geology is also a potent actor in this realm. For instance, a mine deep underground will likely have a smaller long-​term footprint in social and environmental contexts than an open pit mine. This sort of geology played a particular role in Mongolian and North American artisanal mining, both of which were dominated by placer deposits –​loose, gravelly substrate containing flecks and nuggets of gold. Had these minerals been trapped in hard-​rock deposits and required more expense, technology and risk to extract, then the artisanal mining boom in both settings would likely have unfolded differently. Another crucial spatial dimension is the colocation of mining activity with human residents. Remote mines, such as those in Arctic Canada or on the seafloor off the coast of Namibia, will have relatively few unscripted interactions with people following their closure.While Mongolia is the world’s least densely populated country, it is still accessible to a large number of highly mobile people. Industrial mining sites across the steppe lie within view of herders’ camps and within reach of cellular signal. These earthly dimensions are equally important determinants of post-​closure futures. Taken together, these many contingences –​economic stability, cultures of labour, legal geography and mine geology  –​must be understood as central

252  Stephen Lezak and Gantulga Munkherdene elements that determine the fate of mines after industrial closure. These factors explain why contemporary American mines seem inert while Mongolian ones seem so lively. But this divide is much more than an academic observation. Mining companies and regulators routinely fail to recognise the potential of abandoned mines to change human and non-​human landscapes. This is partly due to the chronically ad-​hoc approach that the mining industry takes when planning for social and environmental contingencies (Lezak et al., 2019). But it also reflects the nature of the resource frontier. Mine managers from the Global North may be unprepared for (or unconcerned with) second-​order effects that unfold as a consequence of industrial extraction. This ignorance or negligence will persist as long as industrial actors are able to avoid accountability for a mine’s post-​closure life.

Beyond closure Closed mines are not dead mines. While this chapter has focused on the small-​ scale miners of Mongolia, the same chapter written about another region might emphasise tailings dams, groundwater contamination or the repurposing of abandoned sites for brownfield development. In any event, policymakers and industry alike must resist the temptation to represent abandoned sites as places of absence, although the literal hole in the ground invites such judgment. Perhaps the more appropriate frame of mind would recall that nature abhors a vacuum. Open space invites opportunity. Such an outlook should encourage industry and regulators to plan much more proactively around mine closure, with an eye toward reintegrating closed sites into social and environmental landscapes rather than simply locking the gates and walking away.

Notes from the field Why Ala Buka worked –​a study from Kyrgyzstan Nazgul Aksarieva Kyrgyzstan is a country whose economy is highly dependent on mining revenues. However, the government has been losing ground over the past ten years in terms of investment attractiveness. One of the main reasons for this, along with political instability and corruption, concerns conflicts between investors and local communities. Investor–​community conflicts have grown to the level of national importance, due to the powerlessness of the state, and the positions of local communities have started to shape the country’s investment and fiscal policy. As a result, many large international investors have curtailed their activities in Kyrgyzstan. Despite the series of failures in the mining sector, the positive experience of remote regions such as Ala-​Buka and Chatkal could be illustrative.

After life-of-mine: rethinking mine closure  253 Some factors have allowed these regions to create an environment suitable for successful development processes in the Kyrgyz context. One of the main influences behind the loyal attitude of the local population towards mining activities concerns the historical heritage of the Soviet Union in the mining industry. During the Soviet Union, 90% of the current territory of the Kyrgyz Republic was subject to geographical exploration. During the same period, large-​scale mining facilities with reserves of gold, coal, uranium, rare earth metals and other minerals were introduced. The mining industry operated uninterruptedly, mainly due to the authoritarian style of the Soviet period. During this period, gold and antimony mills and a uranium mine were opened in the Ala-​Buka and Chatkal districts. In the Soviet period, the mining industry had been a catalyst for the rapid development of infrastructure, education and living standards through employment. As a result of this experience, the memory and positive experiences of coexistence in the territory affected by mining activities were formed among the local population. Another factor ensuring the loyalty of the local population to the mining industry is the efficient cooperation between local authorities and mining companies. At the beginning of operations, each company inevitably faces protests and conflicts at the local level. In other words, each new stage of the mining companies’ activities (prospecting, exploration and production) is accompanied by conflicts. During this period, it is crucial to build the right policies to gain the trust of local communities. Several companies in the region have been operating steadily for more than ten years, and have been able to move from the exploration phase to the production of finished products when many other fields across the country remain undeveloped after the exploration period. These success stories were made possible by several factors: -

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Investors from neighbouring CIS countries. Territorial proximity, common history, a unifying language and a similar mentality become a basis for trust. In most cases, local people prefer investors who speak the local language and understand their mentality. For example, investors who come from afar or from countries with which there has historically been animosity are automatically placed in the category of irresponsible investors from the start. Rights and obligations. Unfortunately, many local people often believe that they have the right to demand certain conditions from the investor, which must be met by the companies. However, these people do not realise that there are always obligations along with rights. Investors are partially responsible for the distorted perception of reality by the population. Often, companies, in the pursuit of

254  Stephen Lezak and Gantulga Munkherdene investment security and when planning implementation, rely on the local community to buy back money and finance infrastructure for which the local government is not in a position to take responsibility. But companies in the region have chosen a different practice namely, they have started to foster social responsibility among the local population. In other words, to benefit from a company, the local people must contribute to development processes. In this way, people in remote villages offer to the mining companies their services, which provides a stable income and develops the local economy. It should be noted that such companies are pursuing a long-​term plan, and have trained local people in doing business, agriculture, sewing and many other things. In return, the local people are not dependents, but rather partners who invest their labour, receive benefits and appreciate the opportunities given to them. -

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Geographical location. The regions under consideration are the most remote and inaccessible in the entire country. Accordingly, the population of such regions often live below the poverty line, residing in villages with underdeveloped infrastructure, without access to public services and social benefits. With the emergence of mining companies, employment and business opportunities opened up, and the development of local infrastructure, commercial and social services began. As a result, companies were perceived as the embodiment of progress and development. Transparency and accountability. The main reason for investor–​ community conflicts concerns a lack of information available to the public. As banal as it may sound in the age of digitalisation and information oversupply, local people, including local governments, often cannot access basic information about the activities of mining companies operating in their territory. As a result, rumours and speculation are born, mainly on environmental issues, which become the basis for conflicts. For instance, in Ala-​Buka, it should be noted that companies have not only provided the necessary information to the local people but have also managed to establish a regular process of information exchange between the company and the community. Responsibility of investors. Kyrgyzstan is a country of unfulfilled promises. The population is overwhelmed with empty promises from politicians, officials and investors alike. As a result, today it is almost impossible to gain the trust of the local population. However, it is worth noting some positive examples, which, although rare in the history of Kyrgyzstan, are the first steps in forming cooperation between the population and investors. For example, a company operating in Ala-​Buka, at the insistence of the local community, redesigned the location of a tailing dump from a place close to a drinking water

After life-of-mine: rethinking mine closure  255

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source to an area unsuitable for agricultural activities. Meanwhile, another company, and so far the only one in the country to do so, restored a fertile soil layer and planted perennial plants. Statehood. Most of the above items might have been missed had it not been for the active and professional head of the local administration. The human resource potential of the state is the Achilles’ heel of Kyrgyzstan. However, in the above-​mentioned region, the head of the local administration together with the companies worked jointly on the implementation of socially oriented projects based on the needs of the population, which ensured the transparency of sources and execution of the local budget, and greater participation of the local communities in decision-​making processes. As a result, the district, which was considered as a subsidised area and extremely conflict-​prone, was transformed into one of the most profitable and wealthiest regions in the country.

To consolidate the success of the local administration, special attention should be paid to the distribution of revenues from the mining industry. During field research in 2019, many respondents from Ala-​Buka district noticed that the infrastructure development and improvement of social services are observed only in the district centre, as well as in villages located close to deposits. As a result, there is a growing protest potential in the neglected areas nearby that may eventually turn violent. All the above-​mentioned factors interacting and complementing with one other have created unique conditions that have contributed to the cooperation between the investor and the local community. However, it should be noted that this experience has not been scaled up at the national level. The main reasons for this include the politicisation of the mining industry, the lack of a strategic vision for the mining industry development and weak HR capacity of state structures at national and local levels. Moreover, in recent years, there has been an increase in anti-​ Chinese sentiments, which is linked to the population’s concerns about the country’s territorial integrity, debt obligations to China to be refunded in the near future (1–​2 years), historical facts about confrontations with China and other factors. For example, while in the past conflicts against Chinese investors took place mainly in the mining industry, in which Chinese investors make up an overwhelming majority, today local communities are resisting relatively secure projects such as FEZs, taking into account the lost opportunities and benefits. Despite the successful example of Ala Buka at the national level, the district administration is having trouble replicating the experience for other subsoil users operating in the region. In conclusion, I  would like to note that there is no ideal recipe to ensure cooperation between the local community and the investor. Many

256  Stephen Lezak and Gantulga Munkherdene factors mentioned above can work positively or negatively depending on the context. And while this case is seen as a positive example, peace and cooperation are extremely fragile notions in any given region. The slightest external factor can destroy years of hard work by companies and local government. Therefore, investors and the government need to continually support whichever kind of fragile peace that exists. Acknowledgements: The authors are grateful to Lia Cioni, Fiona McConnell and Troy Sternberg for their comments on previous drafts.

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After life-of-mine: rethinking mine closure  257 Maconachie, R., Hilson, G. 2013. Editorial introduction:  The extractive industries, community development and livelihood change in developing countries. Community Development Journal 48, 347–​359. Mahul, O., Skees, J. 2007. Managing Agricultural Risk At The Country Level: The Case Of Index-​Based Livestock Insurance In Mongolia (Policy Research Working Paper No.WPS4325). Working Paper, Washington, DC: The World Bank. Available at:  http://​elibrary. worldbank.org/​doi/​book/​10.1596/​1813-​9450-​4325 (Accessed: 7 April 2020). Marx, K. 1988. Estranged labor, in: Milligan, M. (Tran.), The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and the Communist Manifesto. Prometheus, Amherst, NY, USA, pp. 67–​105. Mongolian Statistic Office. 2012. Bichil uurkhai erkhlegchdiin sudalgaanii negdsen tailan. (Research Report of Small Scale Miners). Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. Mudd, G.M. 2004. Sustainable Mining: An Evaluation of Changing Ore Grades and Waste Volumes. Conference Paper, International Conference on Sustainability Engineering & Science, Auckland, New Zealand, 6–​9 July 2004. Available at:  https://​users.monash.edu.au/​ ~gmudd/​files/​2004-​SustEngSci-​SustMining.pdf (Accessed: 25 March 2021). Mudd, G.M. 2009. Historical Trends in Base Metal Mining: Backcasting to Understand the Sustainability of Mining. Available at:  https://​users.monash.edu.au/​~gmudd/​files/​ 2009-​CMS-​03-​Base-​Metals.pdf (Accessed: 25 March 2021). Munkherdene, G. 2011. Burzaij baina uu? Ninja nar, tednii zohion baiguulalt hiigeed ami zuulga (Are You Getting Loaded? Ninjas, Their Organization and Livelihood). Meeting Point Press, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. Munkherdene, G., Sneath, D. 2018. Enclosing the gold-​ mining commons of Mongolia:  The vanishing ninja and the development project as resource. Current Anthropology 59, 814–​838. Myadar, O. 2011. Imaginary nomads: deconstructing the representation of Mongolia as a land of nomads. Inner Asia 13, 335–​362. National Federation for Artisanal and Small Scale Mining [WWW Document], 2020. Available at: https://​bichiluurhai.mn/​en/​ (Accessed: 23 October 2020). Pedersen, M.A. 2011. Not Quite Shamans:  Spirit Worlds and Political Lives in Northern Mongolia, Culture and Society after Socialism. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. Povinelli, E.A. 2016. Geontologies: A Requiem to Late Liberalism. Duke University Press, Durham. Shi, A. 2011. Rural Out-​Migration and Family Life in Cities in Mongolia (No. 65159). Background Paper, Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at:  https://​documents. worldbank.org/​curated/​en/​432631468323707757/​pdf/​651590WP0P12230on0v2 0final00PUBLIC0.pdf (Accessed: 6 April 2020). Sneath, D. 2018a. Nationalizing civilizational resources:  sacred mountains and cosmopolitical ritual in Mongolia, in:  Mongolia Remade:  Post-​ Socialist National Culture, Political Economy, and Cosmopolitics. Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, pp. 175–​192. Sneath, D. 2018b. Mongolia Remade: Post-​Socialist National Culture, Political Economy, and cosmopolitics. Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam. Sokhin,V. n.d. The End of Mardai. Photo Essay. Available at: www.vladsokhin.com/​work/​ mardai/​#1 (Accessed: 1 September 2020). Tsing, A.L. 2005. Friction:  An Ethnography of Global Connection. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Tsing, A.L. 2015. The Mushroom at the End of the World:  On the Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

258  Stephen Lezak and Gantulga Munkherdene Turner, F.J. 1950. The significance of the frontier in American History, in: Turner, F. and Bogues, A. (Eds.) The Frontier in American History. Holt, New York, pp. 1–​38. Wall, E. 2005. Working Together: How Large-​Scale Mining Can Engage with Artisanal and Small-​Scale Miners. Report. London: International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM). Available at:  www.commdev.org/​pdf/​publications/​Working-​together-​ How-​large-​scale-​mining-​can-​engage-​with-​artisanal-​and-​small-​scale-​miners.pdf (Accessed: 16 March 2020). World Bank. 2006. Mongolia:  A Review of Environmental and Social Impacts in the Mining Sector. Working paper, Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at:  https://​ documents.worldbank.org/​en/​publication/​documents-​reports/​documentdetail/​ 583011468274233098/​mongolia-​a-​review-​of-​environmental-​and-​social-​impacts-​ in-​the-​mining-​sector (Accessed: 25 March 2021). World Bank. 2019. Shining a Light on a Hidden Sector [WWW Document]. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at: www.worldbank.org/​en/​news/​feature/​2019/​06/​19/​ shining-​a-​light-​on-​a-​hidden-​sector (Accessed: 14 March 2020).

13  Looking back and looking forward Conclusions on reducing site level conflict associated with mining Jill Shankleman

As a researcher and consultant who has worked with extractive and natural resources businesses worldwide over the past 30  years, I  have been asked to provide some concluding observations on the papers in this excellent volume. My focus is on the issues raised in the papers in this volume, and on what experience internationally and from the region offers in terms of standards, tools and practices that could be of value to policy makers, mining companies and their investors, communities and their advisors and advocates. This concluding paper starts with high level observations, then picks out specific insights from the papers, and finally identifies my conclusions on what is needed in terms of guiding concepts, regulation and capacity building to reduce conflict associated with mining. Like the papers in this volume, my focus is on Central Asia but many points are relevant to the mining sector worldwide, especially those countries with a short history of mining where knowledge, institutions, legislation and experience is not yet well developed. The papers in this volume make an important contribution to the literature on mining, conflict and Central Asia, with a focus on Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan. Both countries have as a matter of policy, and with considerable success, sought to expand the mining sector since leaving the Soviet Union (Kyrgyzstan) or it’s tutelage (Mongolia). Mining accounted for 24% of GDP and the government’s budget in Mongolia in 2019 (Boldbaatar, 2021) and 10% of the national budget in Kyrgyzstan (Sabyrbekov and Overland, 2021)). Both countries have a one large flagship western-​owned mine, plus a mix of smaller scale industrial mines and artisanal miners, and large unmined deposits of metals and minerals essential to the green and information economies, such as copper, fluorspar and gold. In both countries, as in resource-​r ich –​areas worldwide, mining brings economic benefits at the national level, but causes local damage to the environment and pre-​existing livelihoods and creates social and individual stress as people and communities adjust to rapid, exogenous change. The particular value of this volume is that the papers focus, through various lenses, on how people in mining areas experience the presence of mining and use this “bottom up” lens to identify better ways of producing the metals and minerals we all need. DOI: 10.4324/9781003097341-16

260  Jill Shankleman Several papers provide Central Asian examples of the damaging impacts of mining that have been experienced in other parts of the world too. These include the displacement of artisanal miners when large mining companies are granted licenses to extract resources, leaving the displaced miners without income or with employment in the industrial mine that is less rewarding (Toktomushev, 2021); people displaced from mine sites finding that one-​off compensation provided a previously unheard of sum of money, but does not provide the basis for a long-​term alternative livelihood (Mijiddorj and Purevsuren, 2021); and systems for mines providing funds for local development failing to match local expectations or priorities (Sabyrbekov and Overland, 2021) or captured by local elites. The papers discuss local environmental damage to land and water from mining operations and mine wastes and the resulting damage to the health of people and livestock and the productivity of the land (Enkhjargal, 2021; Sabyrbekov and Overland, 2021; Reclamation, Lezak et al., 2021). Two papers (Mijiddorj and Purevsuren, 2021) highlight that promises to employ local people  –​often part of mining agreements between companies and government –​fail to meet expectations. This may be where local people have been self-​reliant farmers or herders unused to the rhythms and demands of wage employment so employment is not sustained, or a reflection of lack of detailed public information at the mine project level on employment (Boldbaatar, 2021). Conflict between utilitarian and indigenous understanding of the value and rights of, and to, land, water and resources are described for Mongolia (Enkhjargal, 2021) and have strong parallels to the conflict between indigenous peoples and mining companies found in Canada, Australia and in Latin America. Some impacts and issues have a particular character in Central Asia because of its specific geography, history and demographics. In addition to the drastic change brought in by the end of the Soviet Union 30 years ago, both countries inherited a strong geological database from the former Soviet Union that enabled new mining areas to open up for industrial and artisanal mining relatively quickly, “out-​of-​work miners in the 1990s applied their technical and geologic knowledge to initiate the first wave of artisanal gold mining, relying on the release of previously confidential state mineral surveys” (Lezak and Munkherdene, 2021). Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan are squeezed between Russia and China and following a roll back of Russian presence have seen an influx of Chinese mining companies that overlays on historic tensions (Toktomushev 2021); both countries have a heritage of Soviet environmental regulation inadequate for mining, taking a narrow approach to identifying impacts and permitting pollution against payment of pollution charges.The Soviet model of mining left behind both extensive pollution and a social model for mining known as moskovskoe obespechenie or “full provision and support” (Tursalieva, 2021) in which mines also provided local housing, schools, clinics roads, etc. So community facilities were better than in areas without mines. Central governments, local governments, communities, farmers, herders and mining companies have all been involved in navigating expansion of the mining industry in a more

Looking back and looking forward  261 market-​driven economy with quite different boundaries to the role of the mine company. As one author observes, “It is very difficult to balance everything” (Mijiddorj and Purevsuren, 2021). While some mines have been developed successfully in Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia, many have faced protests and some efforts to develop new mines have failed entirely, “Since gaining independence, Kyrgyzstan has not had a single mine that operated without conflict between the investors and the local population” (Tchoroev, 2021). This is a function of complex interactions between inadequate legislation and enforcement; failures in communicating honestly and openly with people affected by mining, alongside unmet promises of local benefits, often mixed with local and national politics. Quotes from fieldwork reported in these papers provide a stark reminder that faced with the change that mining brings, people have questions that are rarely addressed by mining companies or in impact assessments or in the increasing amount of data that is becoming available through schemes such as The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). People have very practical and immediate questions such as “Can our livestock eat the grass in those areas?” Much data is now available in Mongolia on what mining licenses have been granted, to whom, and how much is being produced. But similarly consistent data on environmental matters is lagging, “valuable datasets for local community including degraded land, rehabilitation work related datasets were outdated, incomplete and required technical capacities to interpret and visualize for a better understanding.” (Boldbaatar, 2021). Gaps in laws and regulations to avoid negative impacts on people and the environment range from the limited scope of impact assessments (e.g. addressing only a narrow range of environmental factors in the part of a mining concession that is intended for initial development); very limited assessment of impacts on people’s livelihoods, culture and access to resources and broad requirements about post-​mining restoration that lack specificity about what exactly must be done to restore the environment, by whom and when.Weaknesses in central government environment ministries and gaps in the capacity of local officials to assess plans and monitor if companies are complying with their legal obligations and commitments further limit the effectiveness of legislation. Where there are systems for consulting with communities and for local input into decision making, this is often formulaic, with no mutually comprehensible exchange of information, or in locations where there is already hostility to mining, “controversy and confrontation dominated the whole participatory process in Gurvantes.” Power imbalances between mining companies and people harmed are stark, “She was too little next to the company, no one cared about her complaint” (Mijiddorj and Purevsuren, 2021). Mining is needed for the green economy, and the extraction of some minerals is set to grow as the world moves away from fossil fuels, because new energy technologies require new materials. For example, rising sales of electric cars have driven a sharp increase in the demand for cobalt, lithium and nickel (Sabyrbekov and Overland, 2021). However, mining cannot avoid environmental damage because metals and minerals are thinly spread through rock,

262  Jill Shankleman so that large volumes have to be moved in order to extract valuable elements. For commercial exploitation, copper deposits generally need to be in excess of 0.5% copper, and preferably over 2% (Copper Development Association, 2001). For gold, and depending on depth and thickness of the ore zone, concentrations of 2 g/​ton or more are likely to be viable (Mining.com, 2017). Mining is water-​intensive, so impacts on water are a major issue everywhere. Miners use water to transport ore and waste, mine and process ore, cool and clean equipment and rehabilitate mines. Over 250 megalitres of water is required to produce a tonne of gold. Mining companies also relocate huge volumes of freshwater though dewatering procedures necessary to enable safe mining access (State of Play, 2019). As many papers in this volume report, the demands of the mining industry for water, and the impacts on water resources, is a constant source of conflict, exacerbated in desert areas such as parts of Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan. The authors in this volume are not concluding that mining should be stopped, but that it needs to be done in a way that does not damage local environments, livelihoods and social fabric. The core high level questions for the regulation of mining are therefore under what circumstances can mining be permitted, how will damage be minimised, and how and into what state will land be restored after mining is ended? Key issues highlighted in this volume as contributor to mining-​ related conflict are weaknesses in regulation of the mining industry, especially when new mines are permitted and when mines are closed; failures in communication and dispute resolution between mining companies and communities affected by mining, and fundamentally different conceptions of the relationship between people and the earth, including land, water and the metals and minerals embedded underground. The papers in this volume highlight areas where regulation should be strengthened, starting from ensuring that there is a powerful environmental ministry that has the right to set environmental conditions for mining and this role is not left in the hands of ministries whose priority is business or industry (Sabyrbekov and Overland, 2021). Note that currently Kyrgyzstan lacks an environmental ministry with the competent authority being the State Environmental and Forestry Agency, a body with limited power and resources. Other priorities are strong impact assessment laws and regulations; building the capacity of local administrations to play their part in evaluating and monitoring mining projects; defining and delivering restoration, and facilitation of effective community engagement throughout the lifetime of mines and mining. Most challenging of all, is finding a way to enable mining that respects and enables traditional land use, especially expansive pasturage, to continue and to recognise also where this is not achievable and the social cost of mining is too high or conventional models of mining must be adapted to drastically reduce footprint, for example, using emerging techniques of precision mining, in-​pit processing, closed cycle water systems.

Looking back and looking forward  263 Regarding effective regulation, especially before new mines are developed, international standards for risk and impact assessment have developed significantly since environmental impact laws were first written in many countries, often based on the UN and World Bank standards of the 1980s (IISD, no date). In the “old” standards, the focus was on environmental factors with social aspects largely ignored except for a listing of socioeconomic benefits such as taxes that would be paid and numbers of people employed. Further, the scope of impacts was often drawn narrowly looking only at activities within the project, for example, digging a mine pit, rather than including the related facilities and operations such as access roads or housing. The old approach focussed on a one-​off evaluation of whether impacts on air and water met regulatory limits, with submission of an impact assessment a pre-​requisite for giving permission to proceed. For mines in particular, where extraction often proceeds in stages across a concession (license) area, impact assessments have often failed to take account of future developments and not been repeated as new areas are exploited. Local consultation is often been a procedural rather than a substantive process, with a focus on documenting that public meetings have been held rather than on ensuring that stakeholders have sufficient information to comment meaningfully, and without the need for mine developers to take account of what people say. Starting from the issue of the International Finance Corporation’s “Social and Environmental Performance Standards” in 2006, and reinforced in the 2012 revised standards, many of the weaknesses in early approaches to impact assessment are addressed (International Finance Corporation, 2012). Similar approaches are in the standards established by the World Bank for lending to governments (The World Bank, 2018a), and the 2019 EBRD Social and Environmental Policy that applies to both public and private sector financing (EBRD, 2019). The key innovations are greater attention to social impacts and on indirect and cumulative social and environmental impacts as well as direct impacts; the explicit requirement to consider all associated facilities, including elements such as roads or power plants that are developed by others, for example, government because of the mine; an explicit impact mitigation hierarchy  –​avoid, minimise, mitigate, compensate; clear specifications for substantive stakeholder engagement with a focus of people likely to be directly affected, and especially on vulnerable individuals and communities, and conclusions in the form of explicit plans for environmental and social management, monitoring and reporting. Note that these standards are very helpful in showing an improved approach to impact assessment for individual mining projects. They do not provide clear guidance on the scope and approach to the area level, strategic, assessments that are needed in locations where a number of mining projects are being developed that have overlapping and cumulative impacts. The World Bank has published detailed guidance, including the specification for the contents of a social and environmental impact assessment at the level of

264  Jill Shankleman individual projects such as mines (World Bank, 2018b).Table 13.1 below shows the table of contents for an ESIA, greater detail can be found in World Bank online documentation. This standard for impact assessment are supported by a set of performance standards that set out detailed expectations for how specific impacts should be managed. These include standards for employment (based on International Labour Organisation conventions); for workplace health and safety; for pollution prevention and efficient use of natural resources including energy and water; for avoiding negative impacts on community health safety and security (e.g. from mine tailings and from heavy vehicle traffic into and out from the mine); for managing any unavoidable resettlement of people so that their standard of living and livelihood is not damaged and the affected people are fully involved in decisions about how and where they are relocated; for conservation of biodiversity and the natural environment; for understanding impacts on land used by indigenous communities and securing their prior consent, and for identifying and avoiding impacts of tangible and intangible cultural heritage. The World Bank has also published detailed technical guidelines on environmental health and safety management for many industrial sectors including mining (The World Bank, 2007). These set out detailed expectations on environmental management; mine closure and de-​commissioning, and performance indicators and monitoring; occupational health and safety; community health, safety and security. Together, these materials provide a robust basis for laws, regulations and the practice of comprehensive social and environmental impact assessment of mines (and other large infrastructure projects) that could inform the further development of impact assessment in Central Asia so that negative impacts are better understood and mitigated before mines are developed. Closure of industrial mining sites that are no longer operational is often very badly managed leaving environmental and social damage and triggering conflict, as evidenced in several of the papers in this volume and in international

Table 13.1 Table of contents for an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment 1. Executive summary 2. Legal and institutional framework 3. Project description 4. Baseline data 5. Environmental and social risks and impacts 6. Mitigation measures 7. Analysis of alternatives 8. Design measures to reduce impacts 9. Key measures and actions for the Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) 10. Appendices Source: The World Bank 2018b.

Looking back and looking forward  265 work on mining (Beckett et al., 2020). The challenges in ensuring responsible mine closure are technical, for example, how to make an over-​or underground pit and tailings dams safe, how to prevent pollution of water and soils when active water management stops; socioeconomic, for example, how to restore the site so that it can be used for non-​mining purposes, how to provide alternative employment; and financial, how to ensure that during the active lifetime of the mine, sufficient funds have been saved to cover the costs of closure and monitoring. Irresponsible closure includes failure to make mines safe; derelict equipment and buildings left to rot; communities left without employment and services such as water and electricity they had access to when the mine was operational and contaminated or distorted land that cannot be used for agriculture or grazing. The structure of the mining industry, where mines are bought and sold, can mean that as resources are extracted and mine becomes less productive, it is sold on to weaker companies lacking the knowledge, resources or interest in effecting responsible closure. A mine operator might just abandon an unprofitable site. Most countries include provisions on mine closure in legislation, but this is often inadequate because it focusses only on immediate issues of safety, includes weak financial provisions and in not enforceable when a mine operator goes bankrupt. Mine closure is an area where international standards offer some pointers on what regulation should cover, and how mining companies should plan for closure but with important gaps. The World Bank EHS Guidelines for Mining (The World Bank, 2007) are clear at that: Closure and post-​closure activities should be considered as early in the planning and design stages as possible. Mine sponsors should prepare a Mine Reclamation and Closure Plan (MRCP) in draft form prior to the start of production, clearly identifying allocated and sustainable funding sources to implement the plan. For short life mines, a fully detailed Mine Reclamation and Closure Plan (with guaranteed funding) as described below should be prepared prior to the start of operations. A mine closure plan that incorporates both physical rehabilitation and socioeconomic considerations should be an integral part of the project life cycle. The World Bank, 2007 Technical guidance on closure planning, especially to ensure long-​term safety and pollution control is produced, for example, by organisations such as the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM, 2019). Mines operated by the largest international companies include planning for mine closure in the early stages of mine development, and increasingly recognise the social as well as the safety and environmental aspects of closure; put aside funds to manage closure and communicate with government and communities about the timing of, and plans for, closure. For example, the huge Kumtor gold mine in Kyrgyzstan reviews its conceptual closure plan every three years and has made public through its annual environmental report, detailed information on

266  Jill Shankleman Table 13.2 Scope of Kumtor gold mine closure planning Tailings management facility (tmf) closure Waste rock dump closure Post-​mining land use Socioeconomic impacts of mine closure Social impacts of mine closure including family violence Closure costs Source: Kumtor Gold Company (2019).

when it expects to close, and its approach, commitments and financing (Table 13.2). However regulations, guidance and practice are especially weak as regards the social impacts of mine closure, on people who gain their livelihood from the mine as employees or suppliers, on the community organisations that are supported by the mine, the local and national government that receive taxes. For example, the $59 mn. financial plan for closure of Kunmtor mine includes nothing to address the large set of negative social impacts that the company reports as anticipated from closure (Kumtor Gold Company, 2019). ICMM, which represents the largest international mining companies that are committed to responsible mining provides some broad guidance on social closure, focussing on the importance of identifying the social impacts of closure at a site level, working with communities and governments to encourage development of alternative livelihood opportunities, and including social costs in mine closure budgets. Social transition for mine closure recognises risks associated with local dependence on the mine and consequently creates opportunities to encourage the development of sustainable post-​closure options. The mine can build capacity of local communities and their governments to meet their needs without the mine’s involvement. ICMM, 2019: p. 43 And that: The local community should be involved in the development of the closure vision and the post-​closure land use(s). Social investment should be aligned around the shared vision for a post-​mining future which should be inclusive of local communities’ input in identifying their development priorities and support activities that contribute to their lasting social and economic wellbeing.This should be done in partnership with government, civil society and development agencies, as appropriate. ICMM, 2019: p. 27 However, this provides no insight into what standard of performance is expected and where the responsibilities of a mining company end and those of government begin.

Looking back and looking forward  267 The weakness in regulations and detailed guidance reflects an absence of substantive consideration and consensus within governments or the mining industry worldwide about how to prevent people and communities from social and economic damage when mines close, and on what is the responsibility of a mining company, and what the responsibility of government. Discussion of mining closure rarely considers the potential for small-​scale mining including recovery from tailings, as discussed by Lezak (Lezak and Munkherdene, 2021). In the same way that mining cannot be carried out without some environmental damage, aspirations to restore ecological integrity and leave behind sustainable communities must be tempered by realism; engagement with the people affected and sufficient funding to create the best possible post-​mining legacy. A major project on social aspects of mine closure currently underway is beginning to close knowledge gaps. The Social Aspects of Mine Closure Research Consortium is a multiparty, industry–​university research collaboration established in 2019 to conduct research that challenges accepted industry norms and practices, and demands new approaches that place people at the centre of mine closure. The consortium is an initiative of The University of Queensland’s Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining. A  wealth of papers is emerging from this consortium, including the very useful concept of reframing mining as a temporary land use, which positions post-​mining land use as intrinsic to the mine lifecycle, including the planning and operational phases. Rehabilitation and restoration during operations tend to have a narrower remit, and focus on returning sites to their pre-​mining state, which in many cases of large-​scale, open-​cut mines is unrealistic (Holcombe and Keenan, 2020) The consortium includes some large-​scale mining companies. Dissemination of the results across the industry and into governments that ultimately steer how mine closure is managed will be important in improving practice. Poor communications between mining companies and governments contribute to conflict, and conflict resolution processes are not a standard part of the legal framework for mining. In contrast to the complex and relatively unexplored questions of managing the social impacts of mine closure, the topics of community engagements and stakeholder consultation are extensively covered in the literature on responsible mining (IFC, 2007; Zandvliet and Anderson Mary, 2009; ICMM, 2015). Good practices are often not followed because mining companies and mine operations are led by geologists, engineers and accountants who lack knowledge or understanding of the importance of communicating seriously with communities and reject the time and resources that good processes require; because community engagement is not yet a recognised profession within the industry, and the role is often given to people without the necessary skills; and because community voices are not embedded into the highest levels of mining company decision-​making. A powerful example where these failures coalesced into tragedy is the destruction of the Jukaan Gorge aboriginal heritage sites in Australia. Rio Tinto has acknowledged the need to pay far more attention to these risks, raising the level of social and cultural expertise

268  Jill Shankleman within the business and appointing a senior Indigenous leader as chief advisor, Indigenous Affairs who has a direct reporting line to the chief executive (Rio Tinto, 2020). Improvements in community relations require that the imbalance in power and information between mining companies and communities is redressed. This could be achieved through embedding in regulations, some or all of the following practices already adopted in some mining jurisdictions and some mining projects. Canada has a system of public hearings to share information on proposed major projects, and gain feedback to the project’s social and environmental impact assessment. Hearings form part of the legal process of approving (or rejecting) projects. An independent panel accepts submissions in writing and in person from interested parties through a public process that can also include providing support to people and organisations that wish to provide evidence but lack the technical or financial resources to do so effectively. An example is the Grassy Mountain Coal Project in Alberta for which submissions were closed in January 2021 and the panel is now deliberating on the advice to provide to government. Over 5,000 submissions were made ranging from individuals to NGOs to business organisations. In Peru, since 2001, in an effort to align the interests of the national economy, local people and mining companies, 50% of government revenues from mining are distributed to the regions and municipalities hosting the project. Regional and local authorities must allocate these resources to finance public investment projects providing universal access to public services and generating benefits for the community (EITI, no date). At project level, the success of the Tri-​Partite Panel in resolving herder-​company disputes around the Oyu Tolgoi Mine in Mongolia provides a model (IFC Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, 2013).The panel includes representatives of the mining company, herders and the local government and operates through a facilitator and secretariat to systematically vice and address concerns. Although this panel was established as a result of disputes, it is a model that could be required as part of permitting for new mines, to ensure that from the outset, there is an effective system for ongoing communications and dispute resolution. Key to the success of the Oyu Tolgoi Panel is that it is comprised of members who have equal authority within the process, and has its own financial resources enabling it to, for example, commission studies and investigations. In the case of Oyu Tolgoi, the panel was financed by the dispute resolution mechanism of the IFC, but the costs of panels could be incorporated into annual licensing fees. In an oil sands mine in Canada, I saw another successful approach in which the company paid for a small team of independent environmental experts selected by the communities to assist the communities to analyse and respond effectively to the mine’s impact assessment and environmental management plans.Tursalieva (2021) reports a similar approach in a mine company initiative to establish a Commission representing all parts of the community and local government in Aral, Kyrgyzstan.This followed failed efforts at resolving conflict through community spending and deployment of community relations officers. She concludes that:

Looking back and looking forward  269 In Kyrgyzstan context the formation of such Commissions might be very helpful and important for the effective work of the mining companies with the local population. For such commissions to not lose their relevance and prestige among local population a clearly and correctly built structure and Commission policy is necessary. But this requires more commitment from companies and government and the allocation of additional resources and patience. However in the specific Aral case, a history of conflict, the scale of change and the social complexities meant this was not enough to save the mine, which closed in 2016. mine “was too big to digest,” “local social dynamics were more complex than one could imagine” and “the presence of the mine itself changed community and local government dynamics” (Tursalieva, 2021). The most challenging question raised in the papers in this edited volume is whether and how fundamentally different indigenous and materialistic approaches to mining are.This arises in many mining areas, particularly in Latin America, but is rarely as well explained as in Enkhargal’s paper, discussing the Oyu Tolgoi mine: By draining the aquifer and relocating the spring, and neglecting the rights of wildlife to these water sources, Oyu Tolgoi has been seen as imposing their own philosophical views on land and water use, which run contrary to the traditional ecological heritage of the local nomadic herders, who view the land as a source of identity, purpose and belonging. Enkhjargal, 2021 International standards offer a solution to this problem.Where mines impact on indigenous peoples land, then free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) must be secured before mining can start. FPIC is embodied in UN instruments, notably the ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (ILO, 1989) and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN, 2007). FPIC is incorporated into international social and environmental standards such as the IFC Social and Environmental Performance Standards (IFC, 2012) and the commitments by members of mining industry organisations such as ICMM (ICMM, 2013). Although conceptually simple and ethically robust, FPIC is extremely complex in practice. One of the main complexities is establishing a decision-​making process –​who is involved, how, how are decisions made when, as is to be expected, there are differences of opinion within and between indigenous communities? What happens when circumstances change, such a new generation has new opinions, or unexpected mine impacts and consent is withdrawn? Other challenges are legal and financial. Unless a mining concession requires that the company secure FPIC, then they have the right to mine in any case. Linked to this, by the time the need for FPIC is established, the company has invested heavily in exploration and planning. FPIC becomes a process of

270  Jill Shankleman determining the price for consent rather than an open process that could allow for rejection of mining. Social and environmental conflict related to mining is unavoidable, but the risk and intensity can be reduced by applying the tools and techniques described in this paper. We all depend on the products of mining, and unlike the oil industry, there is no scenario under which we will not need metals and minerals. Beyond minimising adverse impacts of mining on mining areas, in the 21st century, the mining industry and governments could promote “low footprint” mining including, for example, precision extraction and in-​situ processing technologies; alternatives to tailings dams, closed cycle use of water and deploying renewable energy. In parallel, the focus needs to shift from extraction to incentivising the “circular economy” such that every gram of material extracted from the earth is used and reused.

References Beckett, C and Dowdell, E and Monosky, M and Keeling, A. (2020). Integrating Socio-​ Economic Objectives for Mine Closure and Remediation Into Impact Assessment in Canada. Research Report. Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador. (Submitted). Available on https://​research.library.mun.ca/​14487/​. (Accessed: 13 February 2021). Boldbaatar, D. (2021). ‘Does the transparent information empowers community? Natural resource data accessibility and use practices in Mongolia’, in Sternberg, T., Toktomushev, K., Ichinkhorloo, B. (eds). The Impact of Mining Lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan:  Political, Social, Environmental and Cultural Contexts. Abingdon, Routledge. Copper Development Association Inc. (2001). ‘Introduction to Copper:  Mining & Extraction’. Available on www.copper.org/​publications/​newsletters/​innovations/​ 2001/​08/​intro_​mae.html. (Accessed: 13 February 2021). EBRD (2019). Social and Environmental Policy. Available on www.ebrd.com/​news/​ publications/​policies/​environmental-​and-​social-​policy-​esp.html. (Accessed:  13 February 2021). EITI (no date). ‘Peru: Tax and Legal Framework’. Available on https://​eiti.org/​peru#tax-​ and-​legal-​framework. (Accessed: 14 February 2021). Enkhjargal, B. (2021) ‘Shadows of a mega-​mine:  environmental tracks and traces’, in Sternberg, T., Toktomushev, K., Ichinkhorloo, B. (eds). The Impact of Mining Lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan:  Political, Social, Environmental and Cultural Contexts. Abingdon, Routledge. Holcombe, S. & Keenan, J. (2020). Mining As a Temporary Land Use:  Transitions and Repurposing. Brisbane: Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining.The University of Queensland. Available on www.mineclosure.net/​elibrary/​mining-​as-​a-​temporary-​ land-​use-​industry-​led-​transitions-​and-​repurposing. (Accessed: 14 February 2021). ICMM (2013). ‘Indigenous Peoples and Mining’. Available on www.icmm.com/​position-​ statements/​indigenous-​peoples. (Accessed: 14 February 2021). ICMM (2015). ‘Understanding Company-​ Community Relations Toolkit’. Available on www.icmm.com/​en-​gb/​guidance/​social-​performance/​understanding-​company-​ community-​relations-​toolkit. (Accessed: 14 February 2021).

Looking back and looking forward  271 ICMM (2019). ‘Integrated Mine Closure: Good Practice Guide’ (2nd edition). Available on www.icmm.com/​en-​gb/​environment/​mine-​closure/​integrated-​mining-​closure. (Accessed: 14 February 2021). IFC (2007). ‘Good Practice Guide on Stakeholder Engagement’. Available on www.ifc.org/​ wps/​wcm/​connect/​topics_​ext_​content/​ifc_​external_​corporate_​site/​sustainability-​ at-​ i fc/​ p ublications/​ p ublications_​ h andbook_​ s takeholderengagement_​ _ ​ w ci_​ _​ 1319577185063. (Accessed: 14 February 2021). IFC Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (2013). ‘Mongolia; Oyu Tolgoi’. Available on www.cao-​ombudsman.org/​cases/​case_​detail.aspx?id=196. (Accessed:  14 February 2021). IISD (no date). ‘EIA Timeline’. Available on www.iisd.org/​learning/​eia/​eia-​essentials/​ timeline/​. (Accessed: 13 February 2021). ILO (1989). ‘Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’. Available on www.ilo.org/​dyn/​ normlex/​en/​f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_​ILO_​CODE:C169. (Accessed: 14 February 2021). International Finance Corporation (2012).‘Social and Environmental Performance Standards’. Available on www.ifc.org/​wps/​wcm/​connect/​Topics_​Ext_​Content/​IFC_​External_​ Corporate_ ​ S ite/ ​ S ustainability- ​ A t- ​ I FC/ ​ Policies- ​ S tandards/ ​ Perfor mance-​ Standards. (Accessed: 13 February 2021). Kumtor Gold Company (2019).‘Annual Environmental and Social Report’, p. 100.Available on www.kumtor.kg/​en/​environment-​protection/​kumtor-​environmental-​reports/​. (Accessed: 14 February 2021). Lezak, S. and Munkherdene, G. (2021).‘The Social Lives of Closed Mines’, in Sternberg,T., Toktomushev, K., Ichinkhorloo, B. (eds). The Impact of Mining Lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan: Political, Social, Environmental and Cultural Contexts. Abingdon, Routledge. Mijiddorj,T and Purevsuren,T. (2021).‘Mining and community conflict in Gobi region-​ case study in Gurvantes South Gobi’, in Sternberg,T.,Toktomushev, K., Ichinkhorloo, B. (eds). The Impact of Mining Lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan:  Political, Social, Environmental and Cultural Contexts. Abingdon, Routledge. Mining.com (2017). ‘Making the Grade: Understanding Exploration Results’. Available on www.mining.com/​web/​making-​the-​g rade-​understanding-​exploration-​results/​. (Accessed: 13 February 2021). Rio Tinto (2020). ‘Statement, Jukaan Gorge’. Available on www.riotinto.com/​en/​news/​ inquiry-​into-​juukan-​gorge. (Accessed: 14 February 2021). Sabyrbekov, R, and Overland, I. (2021). ‘Resource extraction, environmental concerns and social licence to operate in Kyrgyzstan’, in Sternberg, T., Toktomushev, K., Ichinkhorloo, B. (eds). The Impact of Mining Lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan: Political, Social, Environmental and Cultural Contexts. Abingdon, Routledge. State of Play.org (2019). ‘Understanding the Global Mining Ecosystem’. Available on www.stateofplay.org/​state-​of-​play-​ecosystem-​low-​footprint-​mining-​innovation/​. (Accessed: 13 February 2021). The World Bank (2007). ‘Environmental Health and Safety Guidelines: Mining. Available on www.ifc.org/​wps/​wcm/​connect/​595149ed-​8bef-​4241-​8d7c-​50e91d8e459d/​ Final%2B-​ % 2BMining.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=jqezAit&id=1323153 264157. (Accessed: 13 February 2021). The World Bank (2018a). ‘Guidance Note 1: Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts’. Available on http://​documents1.worldbank.org/​ curated/​ e n/​ 1 42691530216729197/ ​ E SF- ​ G uidance- ​ N ote- ​ 1 - ​ A ssessment- ​ a nd-​ Management-​ o f- ​ E nvironmental- ​ a nd- ​ S ocial- ​ R isks- ​ a nd- ​ I mpacts- ​ E nglish.pdf . (Accessed: 13 February 2021).

272  Jill Shankleman The World Bank (2018b). ‘Environmental and Social Standards’. Available on www. worldbank.org/​en/​projects-​operations/​environmental-​and-​social-​framework/​ brief/​environmental-​and-​social-​standards. (Accessed: 13 February 2021). Toktomushev, K. (2021). ‘A pesky story of Chinese mining in Kyrgyzstan’, in Sternberg, T.,Toktomushev, K., Ichinkhorloo, B. (eds). The Impact of Mining Lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan:  Political, Social, Environmental and Cultural Contexts. Abingdon, Routledge. Tursalieva, A. (2021). ‘Gold mining conflicts in Kyrgyzstan: when context and culture matters’, in Sternberg, T., Toktomushev, K., Ichinkhorloo, B. (eds). The Impact of Mining Lifecycles in Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan: Political, Social, Environmental and Cultural Contexts. Abingdon, Routledge. UN (2007). ‘Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’. Available on www.un.org/​ development/​desa/​indigenouspeoples/​wp-​content/​uploads/​sites/​19/​2018/​11/​ UNDRIP_​E_​web.pdf. (Accessed 14: February 2021). Zandvliet L. and Anderson Mary B. (2009).‘Getting it Right: Making Corporate-​Community Relations Work’. Available on www.cdacollaborative.org/​publication/​getting-​it-​r ight-​ making-​corporate-​community-​relations-​work/​. (Accessed: 14 February 2021).

Index

Note: Page numbers in italic indicate figures and in bold indicate tables on the corresponding pages. Adam, A. B. 80 Ala-​Buka, Kyrgyzstan 231–​235, 232–​233, 235, 252–​256 Amarzaya, N. 139–​140 Aral village, Kyrgyzstan 268–​269; social dynamics and expansion of mining in 67–​69; Soviet past of 65–​67; Talas Copper Gold LLC in 60, 60–​64 Batbuyan, B. 82 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China 6, 7; in Kyrgyzstan 17, 18; in Mongolia 27–​28 Bhargava, R. 145 Boldbaatar, D. 144 Bumochir, D. 33 Centre for Global Development 17 Chatkal, Kyrgyzstan 228–​230, 228–​231 Chinese investors in Kyrgyzstan, early 15–​19 closure, mine 239–​240, 264–​267; afterlife-​ of-​mine and 243–​244; Mongolian context of 244–​247; unbounded mine and 247–​252 Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation 35 Dalanjargalan soum district, Mongolia 145, 160–​161; data on 152–​160, 153, 156–​157, 158, 160; local problems in 148–​152 Daley 149 data, natural resource: conclusions and recommendations on 160–​161; environmental rehabilitation issues 155–​158, 156–​157, 158; introduction to

mining 143–​145; license and production information as entry point of 152–​155, 153; local problems in Dalanjargalan soum and 148–​152; on mining companies’ economic contribution to the soum 159–​160, 160; relevant problems for local communities and 146–​148 Digital Silk Road 17 displacement of mobile peoples 78–​81 Empson, R. 33 Enkhjargal, E. 269 environmental impact assessments (EIA) 97, 98; cases of assessing social impacts in Mongolian 104, 104–​109, 108; in Mongolia 100–​104, 101; SIA methodology developed through consultation and 110–​113; social issues specific to Mongolia overlooked in 109–​110 environmental impact of mining 7–​8, 168–​169, 171–​172, 201–​206, 203–​205, 260–​262 Environmental Impact Specific Assessment Law (EISAL) 155 Environmental Information Center (EIC) data 155, 156–​157 environmental protection: implementation of 178, 178–​179; social license to operate (SLO) and 171–​176, 173, 174; stakeholders’ power and interest in enforcing 176–​178, 177 Environmental Protection Law (EPL) 155 environmental rehabilitation data 155–​158, 156–​157, 158 Erdenet Mine 36–​42

274 Index Extractive Industries and Transparency Initiative (EITI) 9, 143–​144, 147–​148, 261; data 155–​158, 156–​157; data on mining companies’ economic contribution to the soum 159–​160, 160; in Kyrgyz Republic after the 2016 validation 161–​164 Fernandez-​Gimenez, M. E. 82 foreign direct investments (FDIs) 17 free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) 269–​270 Friedland, R. 76 Gilbert, J. 79 Grassy Mountain Coal Project, Alberta, Canada 268 Gurvantes soum district, Mongolia: companies in 128–​131; discussion on 135–​138; field notes 120–​121; government of 131–​132; herders of 132–​135; mining and community conflict in 121, 121–​124, 122–​123; research methods on 125–​126, 127; solution to complaints about mining in 139–​140; Tsesu Purevsuren of 127–​128

4–​5; development of environment and resource extraction in 169–​171, 260–​261; early Chinese investors in 15–​19; economic development in 19–​22; environmental concerns and conflicts in 171–​172; Extractive Industries and Transparency Initiative (EITI) after 2016 in 161–​164; gold deposits in 15, 19–​20; gold rush in 22–​26; historical overview of mining in 58–​59; Kumtor Gold Company (KGC) in 179–​180, 183–​188, 265–​266, 266; lack of awareness and post-​mining mismanagement in 221–​239; liberalisation and internationalisation of mining sector in 211–​214; mining in international context and 9–​10; mining legislation in 50–​51; mining resistance in 9; Naryn territory 224–​227, 225–​226; political corruption in 16, 25; post-​Soviet context 2–​3, 5–​6, 65–​67, 114–​116, 169–​171, 259; social dynamics and expansion of mining in 67–​69; social license to operate (SLO) in 168–​188; Soviet mining in 23–​24; successful mining in 261; Talas region mining and local resistance 60, 60–​64

Harvey, D. 47 Heathershaw, J. 20 Humphrey, C. 47

Lander, J. R. 33 land tenure 80–​81; court cases 84–​85 life of mine 247

Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance 136 International Council on Mining and Metals 265 International Finance Corporation (IFC) 10, 144–​145, 263 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 199, 247

Meken 16, 19–​20 Mezhoud, S. 80 Mineral Resource and Petroleum Authority of Mongolia (MRPAM) 98 mining 1–​2; Belt and Road Initiative and 6, 7; biodiversity threat of 206–​208, 208; challenges and contexts for 6–​10; closures of 239–​240; conflicts between local populations and companies involved in 47–​50, 57–​58, 70–​73, 121, 121–​124, 122–​123, 171–​172; in country context 4–​6; different interest groups in 33–​34; environmental impact of 7–​8, 168–​169, 171–​172, 201–​206, 203–​205, 260–​262; free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) and 269–​270; government measures on 50–​51; growing concerns about negative impacts of 168–​169, 201; institutional development in regimes of 3–​4; in international context 9–​10; lifecycle and community challenges of 8–​9; mineral rights laws and 42–​45; most relevant

Khan, G. 196 Kimmerer, R. W. 195 Kumtor Gold Company (KGC) 179–​180, 183–​188, 265–​266, 266 Kyrgyzstan 1–​2, 26; Ala-​Buka 231–​235, 232–​233, 235, 252–​256; anti-​Chinese sentiment in 18–​19, 21–​26; Belt and Road Initiative and 17, 18; challenges and contexts for 6–​10; Chatkal 228–​230, 228–​231; Chinese imports in 18; conflicts between mining companies and local population in 47–​50, 57–​58, 70–​73, 171–​172; country context

Index  275 problem for local community linked with 146–​148; post-​mining reclamation (see post-​mining reclamation); recommendations for effective regulation of 263–​265; under state socialism 34–​36; water issues with 262 Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) data 155, 156–​157; data on mining companies’ economic contribution to the soum 159–​160, 160 Moldalieva, J. 20 Mongolia 1–​2, 195–​196; Belt and Road Initiative in 27–​28; challenges and contexts for 6–​10; complaints against Oyu Tolgoi gold and copper mine in 83–​84, 124–​125; conflicting mineral regimes in 45–​47; country context 5–​6; ecological traditions of 196–​197; ecoregions of 197–​199, 198; efforts toward sustainable future in 208–​211, 209; environmental impact of mining in 201–​206, 203–​205; Erdenet Mine of 36–​42; geological exploration in 35–​36; government response to complaints about mining in 139–​140; growth in mining licenses in 45, 46, 76; institutional development in mining regimes 3–​4; introduction to mineral licensing in 33–​34; land laws in 81, 82; land tenure cases in 84–​85; local governments in 131–​132; Minerals Law of 82–​83, 103, 149; mining closure in 239–​240, 243–​252; mining during Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) in 34–​36; mining in international context and 9–​10; mining resistance in 9; mining’s threat to biodiversity of 206–​208, 208; mobile peoples, land tenure and development-​induced displacement in 78–​81; natural resource data accessibility and use practices in 143–​164; post-​ Soviet context 2–​3, 259; post-​Soviet developments in mineral licensing and ownership in 42–​45, 260–​261; relevant problem for local communities linked with mining 146–​148; resettlement and compensation in 81–​89; social impact assessment in 100–​104, 101; traditional land resources and land rights in 197–​201, 198, 200; Tri-​partite Council for dispute resolution in Khan Bogd 90–​91, 124–​125, 204, 268; worldview

in 195; see also Gurvantes soum district, Mongolia; South Gobi, Mongolia Mongolian Copper Corporation (MCC) 41–​42 Naryn, Kyrgyzstan 224–​227, 225–​226 Nogoibaeva, E. 66–​67 Ocaklı, B. 172 Oxby, C. 80 Oyu Tolgoit (OT) mining company 202–​206, 203–​205, 268; complaints against 83–​84, 124–​125; Tri-​partite Council for dispute resolution in Khan Bogd, Mongolia and 90–​91 pastoralist herding communities 80–​81, 82; Gurvantes soum district, Mongolia 133–​135; social cohesion of 87–​89 post-​mining reclamation: Ala-​Buka 231–​235, 232–​233, 235; challenges of 235–​238; in Chatkal 228–​230, 228–​231; conclusions on 238–​239; introduction to 221–​222; mining industry in Kyrgyzstan and 222–​223; in Naryn 224–​227, 225–​226; overview of findings from field research on 224–​235; research methodology on 223; research themes in 226 reclamation see post-​mining reclamation resettlement and compensation in Mongolia 81–​85; diversity of approaches to 86–​87; social cohesion, conflict and double impact in 87–​89; South Gobi 85–​89 Russia, Erdenet Mine and 36–​42 Sneath, D. 248–​249 Social Aspects of Mine Closure Research Consortium 267 social impact assessment (SIA) 263–​264, 264; cases in EIA legal framework 104, 104–​109, 108; conclusions on 113–​114; evolution in EIA laws and guidelines in Mongolia 100–​104, 101; international practices and implications 99–​100; introduction to 97–​99; methodology developed through consultation 110–​113; social issues specific to Mongolia overlooked in 109–​110 socialism, mining under 34–​36

276 Index social license to operate (SLO) 146; conclusion and policy implications 180–​183; environment, resource extraction and 171–​176; environmental protection and 173–​176, 174; environmental regulation of resource extraction in Kyrgyzstan and 176; environment as part of 172–​173, 173; implementation of environmental protection measures and 178, 178–​179; introduction to 168–​171; stakeholders’ power and interest in enforcing environmental safeguards and 176–​178, 177 South Gobi, Mongolia: Dalanjargalan soum district 145; Gurvantes soum district (see Gurvantes soum district, Mongolia); introduction to 76–​77; mining’s threat to biodiversity in 206–​207; mobile peoples, land tenure and development-​ induced displacement in 78–​81; research methods on 77–​78; resettlement and compensation for 85–​89; see also Mongolia Soviet Union, the 2–​3, 259; demise of 5, 18, 195; Erdenet Mine, Mongolia, and 36–​42; mining by 23–​24

State Committee for Industry, Energy and Subsoil Use 174–​175, 176–​177, 183 Talas Copper Gold LLC 58, 60, 60–​64 Tebian Electric Apparatus Stock Co. Ltd. (TBEA) 24–​25 Tibetan Buddhism 196 Tri-​partite Council (TPC), Khan Bogd, Mongolia 90–​91, 124–​125, 204, 268 Tsagaan Del cave 85 Tsing, A. 251 Tumenbayar, N. 82 Vanclay, F. 78, 100 World Bank 10, 25, 199, 204, 210, 246, 263–​265 World Trade Organization 247 Xi Jinping 16, 17 Yenneti, K. 78–​79 Zheenbekov, S. 25 Zhong Ji Mining 19–​22