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THE IMMEDIATE ORIGINS OP THE EUROPEAN WAR OF 1939

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Department of Political Science University of Southern California

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy

John M. Swarthout January, 1942

UMI Number: DP30234

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T h is dissertation, w r it t e n by ............. u n d e r the g u id a n c e o f h.%&. F a c u lt y C o m m itte e on Studies, a n d a p p ro v e d by a l l its m embers, has been presented to a n d accepted by the C o u n c il on G ra d u a te S tu d y a n d R esearch, in p a r t i a l f u l ­ f i l l m e n t o f re q u ire m e n ts f o r the degree o f D O C T O R O F P H IL O S O P H Y

D ean

Secretary D a t e ..

C o m m itte e on Studies

C h a irm a n

*

/

d F'

TABLE OP CONTENTS Preface Introduction CHAPTER I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII.

PAGE

THE CHARACTER OP WAR AS A N .INSTRUMENT OP POLICY IN THE MODERN W O R L D .............

11

FOREIGN POLICY (EUROPEAN STATES) IN PRAC­ TICE: EUROPE BETWEEN WARS. . . . . . .

33

BACKGROUND OP MUNICH; GERMAN-CZECH RELATIONS BEFORE 1938. . . . . . . .

58

PRELUDE TO MUNICH: THE NAZI nWHITE WAR11 TECHNIQUE’IN A C T I O N ..................

70

MUNICH:

BLOODLESS VICTORY................

120

PRAGUE:

THE CAST OP THE DIE .

.

137

.

176

.

BACKGROUND OP THE POLISH CRISIS: POLISH RELATIONS BEFORE MUNICH.

VIII. IX. X.

XI.

.

.

GERMAN.

.

PRELUDE TO WAR: THE POLISH CRISIS OF THE SPRING OF 1939 . . . . . . . . .

244

PREPARING FOR WAR: ALLIES, INCIDENTS, M O B I L I Z A T I O N S .........................

262

THE WAR BEGINS: TIONS

288

ULTIMATUMS AND REJEC­ . . . .

NEUTRAL PEACE EFFORTS AND THE SPREAD OF HOSTILITIES .

312

C O N C L U S I O N ............. , ....................

325

BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................

330

PREFACE

In the arsenal of the true historian, perspec­ tive is the most essential weapon*

Scholars of a

future day will, no doubt, synthesize the events which today are current on the international stage in a far clearer and more objective fashion than that which is now possible; for the student of today, far too many documents lie hidden in the obscurities of foreign office archives, and the inescapable personal bias which only the years can erase acts as an insurmountable obstacle to the true evaluation of all that conflicting mass of fact and fancy which tomorrow will so clearly appear in its true perspective*

The works of contem­

porary historians, judged objectively, make this too apparent• But this very difficulty is in itself a challenge, and in the welter of w a r ’s newest weapon, propaganda, our only defense is in the clearest analysis of the actu­ alities so artfully concealed# Truth is an unpopular goddess !

INTRODUCTION Whan, at 11:15 on the morning of September 3, 1939, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain informed the people of England by radio that 11All my long struggle to win peace has failed*1 and that '’consequently this country is now at war with G e m a n y , 11^ he climaxed a period of active diplomatic strategy extending over several years and ushered In an indeterminate period in which military strategy was to supple­ ment diplomatic tactics in the dealings among the world*s major powers.

Shortly after Chamberlain’s address, Edouard

Deladier, Premier of France, told the men and women'of his country:

nWe fight to defend our soil, our homes and our

liberties,*1 and France aligned herself with the belligerents. Two days and some hours before, the might of the German army had been unleashed upon Poland, and at nine o ’clock upon the morning of the third, Neville Henderson, the British Ambas­ sador at Berlin, acting upon telegraphic instructions from

■^The full text of the broadcast is given in the publi­ cation of the British Library on the Outbreak of the War, No. 5.

2

French Yellow Book, No. 18370, p. 403. A somewhat different translation is to be found in the British Outbreak of the W a r , No. 9, p. 21.

his government, had delivered a two-hour ultimatum to Herr von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, demanding 1 immediate evacuation of German forces from Polish soil* In actuality, the formal declarations of war were almost anti-climactic, since the German-Polish conflict had been in full swing since, at 4:45 on the morning of September 1, the German battleship Schleswig-Holstein Mbegan an inten-

2

sive shelling" of the Polish fortification of Westerplatte• British-French guarantees to Poland were almost without

reservation in the case of such a German move, and few doubted that they would be carried into effect. For the second time in two generations the people of Europe —

and later of most of the rest of the world *—

been plunged into "war.11

had

For the second time in less than

twenty-five years the world’s major nations adopted military techniques to supplement the regular economic and political techniques of diplomacy in the settlement of the conflicts between the objectives of their foreign policies.

The out­

break of "World War II" was a disaster of major proportions to the great mass of the people of the world; no event had occurred for two decades which was destined to exert such a profound influence upon their individual lives.

Historically,

B r i t i s h Blue Book, Ho. li8, p. 175. ^Polish Official Documents, Ho. 118, p. 126.

4 therefore, the beginning of the war takes rank among the great, important occasions of modern times, and the period preceding it becomes truly an ”historic” one from the standpoint of its significance. It is the primary purpose of this study to review, in so far as possible, the events which marked this period, within which might be said, in an exceedingly limited sense, to lie the 11origins” of this war.

Since it is the thesis of

this writer that what we call ”war” in the present-day world is but a substitution of a different type of technique — different set of rules, so to speak —

a

in the constant struggle

between nations to achieve certain national objectives, it has become necessary in many places to backtrack into history in the attempt to trace, if not the origins, the past development of certain phases of these constant conflicts.

The first

chapter contains in brief the writer’s analysis of ”war” as antonymous with ^peaceful diplomacy” rather than with ”peace,” as the outgrowth of a continuing conflict between the inter­ national objectives of different nations, and an analysis of the factors influencing the' formation of these objectives. This is followed by a short but essential review of the for­ eign policies of Europe’s major powers and a summary of the history of the twenty-odd years ^between wars.”

The largest

part of the dissertation is devoted to a more detailed review of the diplomatic happenings during the period of a year and

5 a half Just before the German invasion of Poland, commencing with the "acceleration of the diplomatic tempo" just preceding the settlement of the "Czechoslovak affair" at Munich* Available materials dealing with the period between Versailles and Munich are almost too profuse*

Historians,

Journalists, economists, and politicians have covered the events of the "twenty years of armistice" with a veritable welter of histories, diaries, discussions, arguments, and treatises*

There is much, however, not yet disclosed even

concerning this period, and for the few years just before the war itself a veil of diplomatic secrecy shrouds what is possibly the most important of materials*

In the interna­

tional scene, the almost universal acceptance of the doctrine that the end justifies any means is painfully apparent to political scientists and historians*

In no place is this

more obvious than in the release or suppression of pertinent documents which may by any stretch of the imagination be felt to prejudice the national cause, and in the interpretation of those which are currently available this must always be borne in mind* Amid the quantities of materials which have appeared since hostilities commenced, four documentary collections stand out, and if they are not basic, they are at least sanc­ tified by the approval of the issuing nations*

Each purports

to be a comprehensive compilation of pertinent key documents,

6 but, on the basis of previous experience, this claim, as will presently appear, is open to question# The publication of selected pre-war documents in 1 ‘‘colored-book* form is not a new development. During the World War the German White Book, the Russian Orange Book, the Austrian Red B o o k , the Belgian Gray Book, the British Blue Book, and the French Yellow Book were widely distributed# Each of these publications attempted to prove the wholehearted efforts of the government sponsoring the volume to preserve the dwindling peace.

Each was filled with embarrassing gaps

gleefully seized upon and exploited by opposition progagandists• Authorities now recognize that no one of the collections was wholly false and that no one of them, certainly, was wholly true.

The truth lay somewhere in between the claims so

extravagantly pushed by the opposing parties. Since the war the “truth* has been almost abundantly realized.

Revolutions in Germany, Austria, and Russia and the

consequent desires to discredit previous regimes in those countries led to a wholesale ransacking of diplomatic archives and to an extremely wholesome exposure of the documents therein to public view.

The Kautsky Documents of 1919 comprises 1123

1 Indeed, even in the late nineteenth century, Bismarck was to complain that “British diplomats. • • live in constant fear of the Blue Book.* Documents on the Events Preceding the Outbreak of War, p. LIII.

7 documents, in contrast to the meagre 27 of the German White Book of 1914.

The Austrian Red Book of 1919, edited by Dr.

Gooss for the Austrian Foreign Office, contains 352 documents as against 69 in the original.

The massive collection pub­

lished by the Soviet government in 1922 under the title Materi­ als for the History of Franco-Russian Relations from 1910 to 1914 shook the confidence of historians in Entente documents. And the British Foreign Office Documents, June 28th-August 4th, 1914, contains some 500 new documents and many important pas­ sages omitted from the British Blue Book.

Indeed, of the

major powers involved in the early days of the war, only France has failed to add to her published records, now much discredited 1 by the Russian revelations. It seems probable that the current rainbow-hued galaxy of Kriegsschuldfragebuchen is even less trustworthy than their precursors of 1914.

Naturally, each of the present war edi­

tions, taken by itself, points incontrovertibly to the guilt of designing statesmen in other (enemy) countries.

Each sounds

almost naive in its sincerity, and, naturally, each contains startling gaps in the narration of the development of pre-war diplomatic relations.

It is part of the purpose of this dis­

^Cf. G. P. Gooch, Recent Revelations of European Diplo­ macy, for an excellent review of some 300 of the most important documentary publications and other material appearing since the war and dealing with the period 1890-1919.

8 sertation to analyze these books, their claims, their revela­ tions, and omissions* Of the four publications, the most massive is the German White Book, the 482 documents of which present the -

■-



.................‘ V

German story of foreign relations between 1919 and 1939, with 1 particular regard to those concerning Boland and England* Book boasts of its size as proof of its accuracy* ”TJnlike the British Blue Book,1 modestly, _ ’ says its introduction 2 ”it (the White Book) is history, not journalism.” Less ponderous but more sedate is the British Blue Book.

3

The B lue Book contains an introductory commentary

on the 144 documents presented, but, like its predecessor of

Published in Berlin under the title, Dokumente zur Vorgeschlchte des Krleges; an English translation was released by the German Library of Information in 1940 under the title, Documents on the Events Preceding the Outbreak of W a r . The English edition contains '‘minor additions1* in the form of ”sum­ maries of official German replies to the British Blue Book, French Yellow Book, and so forth,” p. LI. This volume supplements an earlier German Library of Information release, i.e., the 26-document German White B o o k : Documents concerning the Last Phase of the German-FolYih” (Crisis*

German White Book, p. LI. ^Documents Concerning German -Pollsh Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1959*

9 1914, it offers no condemnatory analysis*

The selected docu­

ments are left largely to speak for themselves* Most readable of the "war books" is the French Yellow 1 Book*

The graco and vigor of the writings of the veteran

French diplomats, Coulondre, Francois-Poncet, and de la Tournelle, make the Yellow Book by far the most enjoyable of the war publications*

Its 370 documents assist also in filling

some, although not all, of the hardly understandable gaps noted in the Blue Book* Most obvious in its selection and omissions is the

2 Polish White Book*

Although published "to throw light on the

methods adopted by the leaders of the German Reich and the Soviet Union," the White B ook1s color is hardly indicative of the light which it throws on the question of the methods em­ ployed by the Polish government.

The wholesale omission of

materials obviously in existence and of great significance tends to cast particular discredit upon the White Book1s accuracy* In addition to these major compendiums, the reams of printed matter which have poured forth from the German and

^Published "by authority of the French Government" with the subtitle, Diplomatic Documents (1938-1959) — Papers rela­ tive to the events and negotiations which preceded the opening of hostilities between Germany on the one hand, and Poland, Great Britain and France on the other* ^Official Documents concerning Polish-German and Polish Soviet Relations, 195^-1959 *

10 British, propaganda services alone would fill many a book­ shelf, and much of this material deals with the crucial prob­ lem

of fCriegsschuldfrage —

war responsibility.

The reconciling of conflicting assertions is frequently a formidable task, and it has been found necessary in more than one instance to refrain from judging the truth or falsity of present-day claims and to present them merely as assertions of the antagonists.

It is here that the lack of historical

perspective is of necessity so apparent.

CHAPTER I THE CHARACTER OF WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY IN THE MODERN WORLD ’’War is politics continued by other (i.e. forcible) m e a n s . A d m i t t i n g the truth of this pertinent observation as to international technique in the past, the considerable limitation imposed upon the use of the word 11origins” in the title of this dissertation must be recognized.

The true

origins of war are a continuing characteristic and lie within the objects for which the state participates in international politics: the ’’acquisition of the means that enable a state to impose its will, execute its purposes.11

As such these

origins may be as truly called the origins of peace.

Inter­

national politics, whether warlike or peaceful, consist primarily of a struggle for political and economic advantage, ’’essentially a competitive struggle for power between sovereign members of state systems.”

As the infinite ambitions

•^Clausewitz, Karl von, On War. Quoted in Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics, p. 512.

2

Charles Hodges, ’’Why War,” in Francis James Brown, Joseph S. Roucek, and Charles Hodges, Contemporary World Politics, p. 7.

3

Schuman, op. cit., p. 513.

12 of nations are, in a finite world, in perpetual conflict, so these nations exist in perpetual conflict.

In times during

which international relations are marked by what we call npeaee,w the techniques of diplomacy, propaganda, economic and financial pressure, and threat of military and naval force, are directed toward the satisfaction of national ambitions; in times of war, these techniques are supplemented by force of arms • Thus the antonym of nwar,n in this sense, is not Mpeace,11 but ^peaceful diplomacy,11 and the distinction between them is a distinction between methods employed toward the same unvary­ ing object.

As one authority observes;

Both the peace and war techniques. . • are means to the same end; national power. Both are concerned with the acquisition and/or preservation of. . . power on the world map. At no time in international society has the issue been peace or war as alternative ends in them­ selves, toward one or the other of which states proposed to bend their whole energies. It is evident that a nation will rarely desire to employ the war technique where peace techniques will suffice for the accomplishment of its ambitions,

2

and both the direction of

■^Hodges, og. cit., p. 8. ^It is obvious that there have been occasions in the past when war was waged partly because of the satisfactions which arose from the very act of war-making. Thus Assyrians battled Hittites largely for the joy of physical combat, and medieval knights fought because ttit was the gentlemanly thing to do.n Bismarck*s wars were fought partly because war against a common external enemy serves a psychological purpose in cre­ ating national unity. (C!f. also Aristotle, Politics, p. 144). It is often charged today that the Fascist and Naz;i philos-

13 this ambition and its intensity are conditioned by the situa­ tion in which a nation finds itself:

i.e., its advantage in

the alteration or the maintenance of the status quo» and the state’s own estimate of its relative ability to employ the war technique successfully. When the foreign policies of two 1 nations become irreconcilable, a transition from the diplo­ matic methods of international conflict which we call peace into the military methods which we call war is inevitable unless one of the nations chooses to yield rather than to chance the greater cost of a military rather than a diplomatic defeat. It thus becomes evident that by woriginsw of war, we can mean no more than that portion of peaceful diplomacy which immediately precedes the outbreak of hostilities and acts as the transition between peace techniques and war techniques in the international scene —

i.e., that portion of the causal

ophies glorify war as an end in itself, and both Hitler and Mussolini are widely quoted in this regard. It is this author’s belief, however, that desire for war as war is greatly exagger­ ated as a ’’cause” in the adoption of war techniques in the search for world power. 1

It should be apparent that for purposes of this dis­ cussion the terms "nation” and ’’state,” used interchangeably, refer to the de facto governments which are in a position to formulate and effect foreign policies both at home and abroad. The degree to which they represent the will of their peoples, though important, is not pertinent in this connection.

14 chain in which the impaaae of peaceful diplomatic relations becomes increasingly apparent in the dynamic solution of international conflicts.

By this same reasoning, the true

origins of the current conflict are lost in antiquity, for it is but a step in the grand strategy whereby the nations of the world have lived and had their being.

Thus Pay, speaking

of the underlying causes of the World War of 1914-1918, writes that wany attempt to describe them adequately would involve nothing less than the writing of the whole diplomatic history of Europe since 1870, or rather from 1789; some ques­ tions go back to the age of Louis XXV, and even to that of 1 Charlemagne.11 The political and legal framework within which the nations of today function becomes of obvious importance in the study of the problems of foreign policy and the correla­ tive problem of war.

An understanding of the features of the

modern international system is essential to an understanding of the behavior of nations which sometimes is apparently peculiar# Essentially the characteristics of this system arise from one basic feature: national sovereignty.

Internationally

speaking, this world of sovereign states is an anarchic world# The very concept of sovereignty, legally fundamental to the

1

Sidney B. Pay, The Origins of the World War, pp. 32-33#

15 present-day international system, denies the possibility of of external control over the state.

The analogy of ftinter-

national society11 to ^domestic society1* extends very little further than to the similarity in nomenclature#

Interna­

tional law and international organization are virtually negated by the sovereignty concept.

Thus Schuman, in a crit­

ical mood, felt constrained to write: Sovereign States. . . are not parts of a larger whole, except in a formal sense, for a State System is not com­ parable to a national society or a national government* It is an aggregation of separate entities, each of which pursues its own interests by self-help and keenly resents any suggestion that its interests are to be subordinated to the interests of other States or of the whole community of States. There is as yet no winternational government1* worthy of the name, despite the hopes of proponents of the League of Nations. There is no international C o n s t i ­ tutional consensus.11 There is no international police force, no super-State monopolizing coercive authority, to be employed in the general interest. International law itself is only what States agree upon, and it is enforced by State action. Coercive power in international society resides not in central organs reflecting the general interests, but in particular States pursuing particular interests* HMy country right or wrong I11 is an accepted slogan of State behavior* Under these circumstances it is difficult to bring about the peaceable adjustment of inter­ state differences through procedures and principles laid down by an inchoate international community on the basis of general interests which are largely non-existent. Each State must rely upon its own strength. The struggle for power tends to involve coercion or threats of coercion, for States take what they can get and keep what they can hold. When coercion is threatened or openly resorted to, there is no effective international authority to repress the peace-breakers and preserve law and order. If anarchy involves the absence of government, the pursuit by each of his own ends, and the use of violence in the service of such ends, then the practice of international politics can indeed be described accurately as international

16 anarchy.^ Arising from the concept of sovereignty is a train of accompanying characteristics.

First among these is the great

emphasis placed upon nationalism day mores.

2

as a virtue in our present

Nationalism plays a powerful role in the determi­

nation of the course of action of both individual and state. Under the theory of nationalism as a virtue, the ''national welfare,11 in terms of "national honor," "national power," "national interests" — considerations —

at the expense, perhaps, of all other

becomes the determining factor in the selec­

tion of objectives of national foreign policy. tially selfish:

It is essen­

"In its present form," says Francis James

Brown, "it denotes dominant ethnocentrism, the aggressive — as well as defensive —

pursuit of self-interest by each group,

whether a minority within a state insisting upon autonomy of the 'we1 or 1ingroup1 feeling."

Its predominant quality, adds

1

Schuman, op. cit., p. 514. The League of Nations was in part an attempt to transfer a portion, at least, of the powers of sovereignty to an international organization. The story of the twenty years after Versailles is to considerable extent the story of the forced failure of the League to make effective use of siich powers. p ^The outstanding authority on this subject, the American historian C. J. H. Hayes, distinguishes among four uses of the term "nationalism." Essays on Nationalism, Chapter One. Here is meant a "condition of minHT”of a group. . • a loyalty to the nation or the nationality above all other loyalties." "Nationalism," In Brown, Hodges and Roucek, op. cit., p. 30.

17 another writer, is an irrational egocentric attitude of a 1 contiguous group. Its manifestations may be seen in many political and economic phenomena: • . . in massing armaments, always theoretically wholly for defense; in high tariffs, preferential trade agreements, and economic rivalry; in pageantry, songs, dances, and impassioned orations; in organized youth movements and patriotic societies; in decrees and legis­ lation.2 Breeding unity within a nation, "blind patriot ism11 produces primarily friction and conflict between nations. aggerated sensitivity for the "national honor,”

Ex-

more easily

offended than individual honor, leads to- often unjustified hatreds; exaggerated affection for national sovereignty removes in turn the most effective means for the solution of international conflicts.

"The national patriot,” writes

Schuman, "exalts his own state and holds others in contempt. He vigorously opposes any subordination o£ national Interests to international interests.

He gives his support to those

^■Louis Wirth, "Types of Nationalism,” American Journal of Sociology, May, 1936, p. 724. Communist theory substitutes loyalty to class for loyalty to nation, yet young comsumoles in the Soviet union today accept the solemn pledge: MI shall study military technique; I shall be supremely devoted to the great Socialist Fatherland; and I shall be ready at any time to give all of my strength, and, if necessary, life itself." Brown, _op. cit., p. 36. % r o w n , loc. cit. 3jn this connection see RV B. Mowat, International Rela ­ tions, p. 35; I. W. Howerth, "The Causes of War," in Julia E. Johnson, ed., Selected Articles on War — Cause and Cure, and A. C. Pigou, The Political Economy of War, p. 16.

18 policies of national self-seeking which breed war.

The power

interests of States are couched in the language of nationalism, and nationalism leads to conflicts more gigantic and disas­ trous than any which were possible before the nation-states 1 became unified*0 Nationalism, in its "My country, right or wrong11 form becomes thus an important part of the background for international conflict*

Fay, indeed, determined it to be

11one of the most important underlying causes of the /"first

2 WorldJ War;

its development since that time has been, if any­

thing, accelerated*

In its most modern f o m , it "increasing-

ly seeks to identify itself with a specific ideology of state* • • • The defense is still that of La Patrie» but it is more than La Patrie, it is a great ideal, communism, naziism, fasc­ ism, democracy *"4 An essential aspect of nationalism and more important

^Schuman, op. cit., p. 515* o

O p . cit., p. 44. Fay asserts that the other U n d e r ­ lying causes11 of the War of 1914-1918 are militarism, economic Imperialism, the system of secret alliances, and the activi­ ties of the newspaper press. This writer prefers to regard these factors as part of the whole international system based on sovereignty which makes possible the continuing conflicts between the objectives of national foreign policies which are the true "underlying causes" of "war," and as techniques by which nations attempt to carry out foreign policies once formed* * Brown, 6p» cit*, p* 36* 4 Ibid., p* 37*

19 perhaps even than the psychological aspects considered above, is the feature of international life known as ”economic nationalism,1* with its twin concomitants of economic imperial­ ism and ”protootion of the home market.”

Entirely self-

interested, self-centered to the utter exclusion of others, economic nationalism in its search for national self-suffi­ ciency and national profits and prosperity can well be considered as the primary factor among the causes of conflicts 1 between the objectives of nations. With the increase of 6tatism and the decline of laissez-faire policies in economics since 1920, economic nationalism as a factor in international relations became increasingly influential.

Economic planning

demands economic control; control in turn demands dominance over supplies of essential materials.

The objectives of for­

eign policy, particularly by states economically weak, thus tend to take on more and more the characteristics of demands for lebensraum, for ^insured sources of raw materials,** which no other nation, equally interested in domestic planning,

For an excellent discussion on economic nationalism as a cause for international conflict, c f . Alvord L. Hoeck, An Examination of the Basic Causes of International Economic Conflict, unpublished doctoral dissertation, the University of Southern California, 1933* Cf. also William E. Lingleback, ^Commercial Policies as Causes of International Friction,” Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Science, (July, 1930), pp. 119-20, and E. M. Patterson, ”The Perils of the New Economic Nationalism,” ibid., March, 1921, pp. 210 f f .

20 equally concerned over self-sufficiency, equally aware of the political value of control, may suddenly shut off*

Meanwhile,

with the development of etatism, the danger of such sudden stoppage of supply, for either political or economic reasons, grows with the growth of the power of the state over economic 1 activity within its "borders* Other characteristics of international life arise from these more important major features*

Since nations in an

anarchic world must serve as their own Enforcement agencies,n

This aspect of changing modern international rela­ tions has been strangely overlooked by most writers in the field, as well as by most economists of the ’’planned economy1’ school* Yet the tremendous effect of the growth of ’’economic etatism” upon international relations and upon economic imper­ ialism is obvious* Of* D. Mitrany, ’’Political Consequences of Economic Planning,” in Findlay Mackenzie, ed., Planned Society* Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow* pp* 641-662. ’’isolated national planning may, indeed,” says Mitrany, ’’lead to a much worse economic chaos than we now experience. . ♦ • Under a world system of national planning, most economic decisions in each country would in fact be political decisions. In such cir­ cumstances, the other national units would be exposed to fluctuations and to competition much more violent than under the present system. • • besides failing to advance interna­ tional efficiency, disconnected national planning would also fail to further international peace. . . . The unity of polit­ ical and economic structure thus being very real, the effect on international relations would be very dangerous* The state itself would become the responsible controller of all economic enterprise. Like any other body so responsible, it would tend to use all the means at its disposal to make a success of its activities, and its economic interests would thus become inextricably bound up with its political power.” Pp. 656-58. This is an extremely significant article*

21 it becomes obvious that, for all practical purposes, ltthis is a Great Power w o r l d T h e

objectives, the desires,

the activities of smaller nations are important only as they influence the activities of their more powerful brothers in their major dealings with other powers.

Further

it must be evident that these major powers possess to a great degree the '’privilege11 of establishing the rules of international procedure and of applying those rules* Lewis Carroll must have had the international world in mind when he put into the mouth of his mouse that instructive 2 ’’tale” of Fury and his prey. To the major powers of this anarchic world, meanwhile, armaments become as important as was the revolver to the frontiersman when the "law west of the Pecos” made every man his own policeman.

Thus ’’militarism,” according to the

maxim si vis pacem, para bellum*

The ’’dangerous and burdensome

1 Frank H. Simonds, and Brooks Emeny, The Great Powers in World Politics, p. 14. ^ ”Fury said to the mouse, That he met in the house 'Let us both go to law: I will prosecute y o u * Come, I'll take no denial: We must have the trial For really this morning I Tve nothing do do.* Said the mouse to the cur, 'Such a trial, dear sir, With no jury or judge, would be wasting our breath*1 •I'll, be judge, I'll be jury,” said cunning old Fury; 'I'll try the whole cause, and condemn you to death.'” ’’Alice's Adventures in Wonderland,” The Complete Works of Lewis Carroll, p* 40.

mechanism of great standing armies and large navies, with the attendant evils of espionage, suspicion, fear, and hatred,” Pay considered to he a ”second underlying cause of 1 the War#” Connected to militarism as a characteristic of anarchic modern international society is the ’’alliance system Not only oneTs own arms, hut those of promised allies may serve as implements for the securing of national objectives in the foreign field#

’’The greatest single cause of the

JjE*irst WorldJ War,”^ the alliance system persisted, if any­ thing with increased vitality after Versailles.

As before

1914, so before 1939 the system ’’gradually divided Europe into two hostile groups of Powers who were increasingly sust* 3 picious of one another# To Germans, Italians, Japanese and other non-status-quo powers, the League of Nations itself was an alliance by Prance, England, and the ’’rich” victors of the

1

O p # cit♦, pp# 38-39# Militarism did not die during the years following Versailles. Armament costs to the world in 1913 were thought fantastically high at $2,531,000,000, but the ”post-Y/ar decade of internationalism failed to limit armaments,” and by 1932 the world total had run to $3,800,000,000# After that year the lid came off: in 1934 the bill was over $5,000,000,000, in 1936, over $13,000,000,000 and in 1938, well over $17,000,000,000# Hodges, 0 £# cit. p. 19#

23 1

first World War for the perpetuation of the status quo#

Against this ^League Alliance” was developed the coalition of powers variously known as the ”Axis,” the ”Anti-Communist Alliance,” and so on# Within this world, in which full national sovereignty was jealously guarded, especially by the major powers, within which nationalism with its accompanying features of imperial­ ism, trade barriers, militarism and alliance-seeking was rampant, the nations of the world of 1920-1939 adopted and attempted to secure the objectives of their various foreign policies# The principal objectives of national policy are in the modern world threefold: military security, political power, and economic prosperity#

2

The proportion in which the achieve­

ment of one of these objectives may serve as the lodestar in the direction of national policy is partially dependent upon the relative political strength of different classes within the state.

Thus the pattern of wars may change as the domes­

tic balance of power between classes within the state is

*4?his concept of the League, repeatedly apparent as one reviews the diplomatic history of the years between 1932-1939, was adopted by some Americans as early as 1920# It played a part in the repudiation of the League by the Senate in that year. Cf. Henry Lodge Cabot, The Senate and the League of Nations, pp. 391-394, et passim. ^Cf. Simonds and Emeny, oj>. cit., pp. 29 et passim#

24 changed; the objectives which called irresistibly to Louis XIV might appeal but little or not at all to the dominant elements in post-Revolutionary Prance, and the foreign policy of England following the defeat of British landlords by the Manchester industrialists in the early nineteenth 1 century might be directed toward entirely new goals# More important in the selection of objectives of na­ tional foreign policy is the geographic, economic and demographic situation in which a state may find itself. In this regard, Simonds and Emeny state;that By reason o f . . . physical circumstances, states are divided into two classes. Of these, the first is composed of the nations whose territories are large and rich and whose ethnic unity has been achieved; the second, of the nations whose lands are exiguous and poor and whose unification is uncompleted. For the former, which are the sated and therefore contented states, security is the sole objective of national pol­ icy. For the latter, which are naturally dissatisfied, the chief goal must be the acquisition of what they lack#2

For an excellent discussion of the effect of the Indus­ trial Revolution upon foreign policy, cf. Francis Delaisi, Political Myths and Beonomic Realities, pp. 225 £t passim. See also J. F. C. Fuller, War and Western Civilization, 18321932. 20p. cit., p. 30. That these circumstances are hardly the result of the designing Intervention of divine providence is too obvious to demand specific emphasis. To a great ex­ tent they have been determined by the good fortune which enabled some nations to achieve national unity and industriali­ zation before others; (CLf* Delaisi, o-g. cit.), partially they are due to success in previous conflicts. All of the pre-war European boundaries were due to former conquests. Nations once rich, now poor, find it exceedingly difficult to regard a present status quo as sanctified by legal and moral warrant.

25 There thus arisen a static and a dynamic concept of international relations.

The nation already satisfied seeks

as the prime object of its foreign policy the preservation of a situation beneficial to its interests; the nation which finds its situation disadvantageous to itself adjusts its policy to a concept in which dynamic change plays a major role. The instruments of policy at its disposal will be devoted to the object which the circumstances dictate.

It is obvious

that the inauguration of military techniques will most often come from the nation whose interests lie in change, although a satisfied state may be more than willing to fight a wpreventiveM war in the face of losing peacetime struggle to i

i

preserve its advantageous position.

Thus Austria was anxious

to instigate war in 1914 in the face of growing pan-Slav 1 pressure which threatened to disrupt her heterogeneous Empire, and nations of the Holy Alliance engaged in military action against democratic uprisings in Italy, Spain and elsewhere.

2

^Cf. Pay, o p . cit. and Harry Elmer Barnes, Genesis of the World War. ^Indeed, the prime object of the Quadruple Alliance, into which the rulers of Austria, Russia, Prussia and Great Britain joined together after having restored the status quo ante bellum in 1814, was the Mvigorous prosecution of a war undertaken for the salutory purpose of putting an end to the miseries of Europe, of securing the future repose, by re­ establishing a just balance of power, and being at the same time desirous, should the Almighty bless their pacific inten­ tions, to fix the means of maintaining against every attempt the order of things which shall have been the happy conse­ quence of their efforts. . • .M J. Eugene Harley, Documentary Textbook on International Relations, pp. 16-17.

26 The conflict which exists between the search for security of the existing status quo on the part of satisfied states and the demand for prosperity which can be secured only through a revision of this status quo on the part of states less advantageously situated lies at the very core' of the problem of conflict in international affairs.

Histor­

ically, after every recent war that comes to mind, victor nations have seized upon the opportunity to create a situa­ tion favorable to themselves, and to assert simultaneously a doctrine in which change through force was declared illegal and immoral: illegal because it involved disruption of exist­ ing international contracts, and immoral because it brought about war.’*’ At the same time, the thesis has been developed that war has become so destructive that in the future even

2 the victors must lose#

Defeated nations have invariably

regarded such doctrines as preaching the perpetuation of in­ justice, and, upon recovering strength, have set about 3 repairing their positions by all means within their power. It is thus seen that a principal factor in the deter­ mination of the foreign policy which a nation pursues, is

^Simonds and Emeny, op. cit., pp. 34-35. 2

C f . such works as Sir Norman Angell, The Great Illu­ sion. and Homer Polks, The Human Costs of War. *

^Simonds and Emeny, op. cit., p. 35#

27 the situation in which it finds itself.

This situation is

effective in two w a y s : it not only influences directly the selection of the objectives of that policy, but it also determines largely the choice of means which the nation shall employ in the seeking of the goal.

Thus whereas both Germany

and Norway might find themselves in positions in which a forcible revision of the status quo would be advantageous, a strong and vitalized Germany might employ military techniques, whereas Norway would be forced to employ different means The primary factors inherent in a national situation exerting this dual influence are, as mentioned above, geo­ graphic, economic, and demographic.

Geographically, national

foreign policy is influenced by the location of the state with regard to the nearness of powerful neighbors, by the ease or difficulty with which its frontiers can be defended, by its proximity to trade routes and by the accessibility of raw materials.

2

In m o d e m life, the last of these influences

has become increasingly important.

Emeny states in this con­

nections For the size and effectiveness of national power is no longer determined alone by the extent of a nation’s territory and population, or by the wealth of its treas­ uries, or the strength of its armies and of its equip­ ment and munitions, but rather by its capacity for

1 Cf.

2

ante, p. 22.

O f . Fairgrieve, James, Geography and World Power» and R. H. Whitbeck and 0. J. Thomas, The Geographic Factor s Its Role in life and Civilization.

28 Industrlalization. And since large scale industrializa­ tion presupposes the possession or ready availability of vast quantities of the basic industrial raw materials, nature, through her unequal distribution of these, has rigidly set a limit to the number of states capable of achieving the status of Great Power #1 Closely allied to and interdependent upon these geo­ graphic factors are economic influences: the statefs position in industry, agriculture, or both; its status in the eco­ nomic and commercial markets of the world, and its productive ability to support its population.

A state's security, its

power and its prosperity depend upon its economic position, the degree of its industrialization, its place in the compet­ itive international scene.

Since the chief characteristic

of modern international economic life is the interdependence of participating nations,

2

the projection of these economic

factors into foreign policy is inevitable.

Population

pressure, too, determined by the relation existing between density of population and national production, may exert an 3 Influence upon the creation of foreign policy, particularly

b r o o k s Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials, p. 1. Cf., also the discussion ante, pp. 20-21 on the effect of eftatlsm upon this factor in the determination of foreign pol­ icy#

2 ££. Delaisi, op. cit., Part II, pp. 75-140, on nThe Economic Interdependence of the Modern World.n On the Impor­ tance of economic factors in the formation of policy, see Eugene Staley, Raw Materials in Peace and War, and Brooks Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Mater'ialsT 3 Cf. W. S. Thompson, Danger Spots In World Population, and C a r r ^ a u n d e r s , A. M., Population.

29 at a time when extreme world-wide economic nationalism makes the relief of that pressure through trade virtually imposs ible• Demographic factors influencing the formation of national policy have been of particular importance in the Europe of recent years#

The intermingling of racial groups

throughout eastern Europe has made practically impossible the drawing of frontiers without creating ethnic minorities# On the other hand, the rise of ethnic nationalism as a:psycho­ logical force approaching a passion has greatly intensified the significance of this factor.

Indeed, the desire to recover

lost provinces and unhappy minorities has been one dominating influence in the foreign policies of the defeated nations of 1

the last war# The influence of governmental form upon foreign policy has been much overrated#

2

Historical studies indicate that

very little difference exists between the conduct of ’’dic­ tator ships” and ’’democracies” in the conduct of their foreign relations#

Buss confirms this view when he says:

Dictatorships in themselves are not international menaces# Diaz of Mexico and Gomez of Venezuela were highly acceptable to the United States; Kemal Ataturk was an admitted factor for peace in the Hear East; Reza Shah of Persia is being courted by Russians and

*i

J‘C f # C# A# McCartney, Hational States and national Minorities; J. S. Roucek, The Working of the Minorities Sys­ tem under the League of Nations # % h i s is a basic assumption of this paper which, the writer fully realizes, it might take volumes of historical proof adequately to substantiate#

30 British; and Chiang Kai-shek of China enjoys the sym­ pathy of the entire.world* Dictatorships become men­ aces only when they are associated with aggressive nations* Fascism, the method of dictatorship, may be meat for the men of static nations, but it is poison in the hands of aggressors*^ On the other hand, ”Internal democracy does not seem to affect the conduct of a nation in its international

2

relations*”

In the interests of realism it becomes neces­

sary to ^distinguish between Russia and communism.

. •

between Fascism and the national objectives of Italy, 3 Germany, and Japan *11 Japan in her invasion of China is waging no holy war against ”Communism,” nor is Hitler attacking the same menace when he sends his troops against Moscow*

Neither is England fighting for the ndivine right

of kings” because she fights for the position of Haile Selassie as the !?rightful ruler” of Ethiopia*

It is essen­

tial to an understanding of national behavior that we strip the camouflage of superficial ”ideals” from the underlying Na t i onalism” and recognize the N a t i o n a l urge” beneath* Governmental form indeed may influence the ”spirit”

Claude A. Buss, ”Realities in World Affairs,” World Affairs Interpreter, Summer, 1939, pp* 169-70. One might add for consideration in this connection Pilsudski of Poland and Haile Selassie of Ethiopia* 2 Ibid.,

3

p. 170.

Loc. cit*

31 in which policy is carried out; it does not, however, create the situation which causes the selection of policy, although 1

it may arise from that same situation,

or as a step between

that situation and the execution of the policy dictated by it.

It seems to be an accepted fact that 11parliamentary

government Is incompatible with the possibilities that emerge out of the prospect of w a r .11 In summary, then, the objectives of national foreign policy are the acquisition or maintenance of security, prosperity, and ethnic unity.

The selection of the dominant

objective and the determination of foreign policy proper are conditioned primarily by geographic and economic considera­ tions.

Governmental form has little or no influence upon the

formation of policy, although it may affect the wspiritn In which it is carried out.

The late Frank Simonds expressed

these conclusions in precise form: Actually It is not because people are wise or stupid, educated or illiterate, good or bad, that their national policies are dynamic or static. Nor is it because their skins are white or yellow, or their language English, French, German, or Italian. Even forms of government whether democratic, fascist, or communist, have little to do with the question

1

^Dictatorships are usually products of Internal chaos, predicated upon a popular surrender of liberty in favor of self-preservation .11 Ibid., p. 169.

2

Harold Laski and Josef Hedlich, The Decline of ParGovernment, p. 10.

32 although they may dictate the spirit in which the na­ tional policies are pursued. Navalism, militarism, imperialism — these are only convenient indictments nations hurl back and forth at each other. But in fact if the Frenchman and the German (or the American and the Japanese) changed places they would exchange policies* What counts is whether peoples live on islands or continents, whether their countries are situated in Europe, Asia or America; whether they have natural re­ sources to supply their industry and food supplies to feed their populations. . . . A decent measure of prosperity, a reasonable degree of security, and in addition a fair measure of ethnic unity, these things together constitute the irreducible minimum of an ac­ ceptable national existence and therefore the sole basis for a real association between nations to Insure peace

^Quoted in Buss, og. cit., p. 167*

CHAPTER II THE FORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICY AS EXHIBITED IN PRACTICE;

EUROPE BETWEEN WARS

The application of the principles discussed in the previous chapter may he easily observed in the foreign policies of the major nations of post-Versailles Europe. In each case, geographic, economic, and demographic factors proved the decisive influences In determining the policy adopted.

Basic features of these policies are all-important

in the study of the diplomatic history of the years 19191939. 1

The foreign policy of Great Britain has always been a mystery to most of continental Europe.

Unpredictable by

continentals sometimes in the extreme, British actions

have

won for the behavior of the English Foreign Office the sobriquet of ttmuddling through,w and, since the mysterious is usually feared, have brought to Britain herself a nrepu­ tation £on the Continent] . . .

as bad as that of the Pope

For general references on British policy, c f . Schuman, op. cit.» pp. 459-464; Simonds and Emeny, op. cit., pp. 223-248; and Warner Moss, ^Britain and the Empire ,11 Brown, Roucek, and Hodges, op. cit., pp. 128-145. For more specialized treatment, cf. J. H. Richardson, British Economic Foreign Policy; ’’Great Britain’s Europe ,11 Fortune, December, 1938, pp. 91-96; Andre Siegfried, England’s Crisis; R. W. Seton-T/atson, Britain and the Dictators, and Eliot Janeway. ’’England Moves Toward Fascism,” Harpers, January, 1939, pp. 113—125.

34

X In Belfast *11

Yet an understanding of Britain’s unique

geographical and economic situation goes a long way toward exploding the mystery through explaining its origin# No better review of the fundamentals of British pol­ icy is available today than that contained in a Foreign Office memorandum by Sir lyre Crow in 1907, devoted in particular to Anglo-German relations*

Recognition of the

peculiar character of British geography forms the basis for Sir lyre’s discussion.

wThe general character of England’s

foreign policy,n he writes, His determined by the inimitable conditions of her geographical situation on the ocean flank of Europe as an island State with vast overseas colonies and o dependencies From the fact of this situation arise the major tenets of English policy. The first of these is the necessity for British domin­ ation of the seas.

Indeed, Britain’s nexistence and survival

as an independent nation are inseparably bound up with the 3 protection of preponderant sea power. The British navy must remain unsurpassed, particularly by that of any other European power.

^Warner Moss, ^Britain and the Empire ,*1 Brown, Roucek, and Hodges, o p . cit., p. 128. ^Quoted in ibid., p. 129. ^Loc. cit.

The second necessity arising from Britain’s insular position is that of coupling British policy with the desires of other nations.

"It would he hut natural,1' says Sir Eyre,

"that the power of a State supreme at sea should Inspire universal jealousy and fear, and he ever exposed to the danger of heing overthrown hy a general combination of the world.

. . • This danger can in practice be avoided (how­

ever),

...

on condition that the national policy of the

insular and naval State is so directed as to harmonize with the general desires and ideals common to all mankind, and more particularly (as well as much more accurately) that it is closely identified with the primary and vital interests of a majority, or as many as possible of the other nations•" It follows that England must sacrifice the hope of political dominion in many cases, hut the fact that the nation must need depend upon commerce causes her to insist that no other major power secure political dominion over great sections of the world.

Thus the third factor of British policy:

land, more than any other non-insular Bower t i c !

"Eng­

has a

direct and positive interest in the maintenance of the inde­ pendence of nations, and therefore must he the natural enemy of any country threatening the independence of others, and the natural protector of weaker communities."

p

36 The fourth cardinal principle of policy follows again in logical sequence: the balance of power must be preserved on the European continent* History shows that the danger threatening the inde­ pendence of this or that nation has generally arisen, at least in part, out of the momentary predominance of a neighboring State at once militarily powerful, economically efficient, and ambitious to extend its frontiers or spread its influence, the danger being directly proportionate to the degree of its power and efficiency, and to the spontaneity or ’’inevitableness” of its ambitions. The only check on the abuse of polit­ ical predominance derived from such a position has always consisted in the opposition of an equally for­ midable rival, or of combination of several countries forming leagues of defence PsicJ. The equilibrium established by such a grouping of forces is technically known as the balance of power, and it has become al­ most an historical truism to identify England's secular policy with the maintenance of this balance by throwing her weight now in this scale and now in that, but ever on the side opposed to the political dictatorship of the strongest single State or group at a given time. Much of the ’’ununderstandable” in British policy becomes intelligible when viewed in the light of the ’’Bal­ ance” :

British refusal to grant a ’’blank-check” guarantee

to Prance in 1920, the half-hearted British attitude toward the League of Nations, British failure to come soon enough to an understanding with Russia, British failure to inter2

vene in Spain, British vaccilation, British ’’appeasement ♦”

XIbid., p. 130. 2ln this connection attention is directed to Munich and the whole British policy of the period, ’’Despite the fact that in June, 1935, the people of Britain voted over­ whelmingly for a foreign policy founded firmly on collec­ tive security.1’ Pennington Haile, ’’The League of Nations,” in Brown, Roucek, and Hodges, ojo. cit., p. 446.

37 At no time during the years between wars was Britain any more willing to allow a dangerously dominant Franco-Russian bloc to upset the balance than was she later willing to see

1 a similar growth of German strength# Accounted for, too, by England's situation as an offthe-Continent power which was affected by, but not an intern­ al part of, the European balance, is the British position — often outright pro-German —

at the Versailles Conference,

2

1

Sir Eyre predicted accurately when he wrote in 1907: wSo long as England remains faithful to the general principle of the balance of power, her interests would not be served by Germany being reduced to the rank of a weak Power, as this might easily lead to a Franco-Russian predominance equally, if not more, formidable to the British Empire,wibid., p# 132#

2

Of., for instance, Lloyd George's so-called HFontainbleu Document 11 to Wilson, recommending wa settlement which a responsible German government can sign,** (Karl Friedrich Novak, Versailles, pp# 121-35), and Clemenceau's bitter reply, charging the British representative with suggestions which could come only from ^maritime nations which have not known an invasion,w and recommending in turn concessions to Germany of a commercial, naval, and colonial nature* Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, III, 249-52. Lloyd George’s position is summed up in this passage: nYou may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments to a mere police force and her navy to that of a fifth-rate power; all the same in the end if she feels that she has been unjustly treated in the peace of 1919 she will find means of exacting retribution from her conquerors. The impression, made upon the human heart by four years of unexampled slaughter will disappear with the hearts upon which it has been marked by the terrible sword of the great war. The maintenance of peace will then depend upon there being no causes of exasper­ ation constantly stirring up the spirit of patriotism, of justice or of fair play. To achieve redress our terms may be severe, they may be stern and even ruthless, but at the

38 and the subsequent period of British-German friendship so irritating to some French leaders.

England, with Mno

eternal friends and no eternal enemies, but only eternal interests ,11 could have no purpose in reducing Germany, an excellent customer as well as a prime factor in the contin­ ental equilibrium, to the status of a weak power. French policy differed from British as French geog­ raphy. differed from that of her neighbor across the Channel# Located upon the Continent rather than across from it, France formed an integral part of the European balance#

France was

a status quo state because of gains at Versailles and in view of her declining population and production; thus Francefs situation was in marked contrast to that of Germany and Italy# France could select as the prime objective for her foreign

same time they can be so just that the country on which they are Imposed will feel in Its heart that it has no right to complain. But injustice, arrogance, displayed in the hour of triumph, will never be forgotten or forgiven# nFor these reasons I am, therefore, strongly averse to transferring more Germans from German rule to the rule of some other nation that can possibly be helped. I cannot conceive any greater cause of future war than that the German people, who have certainly proved themselves one of the most vigorous and powerful races in the world, should be sur­ rounded by a number of small States; many of them consisting of people who have never previously set up a stable govern­ ment for themselves, but each of them containing large masses of Germans clamouring for reunion with their native land .11 Uovak, ££• cit., pp. 1 2 1 -2 2 .

39 policy during the post-war years nothing but security.'** ”It was this obsession for security,” writes Graham Stuart, ”that dictated French policy at the Peace Conference. Clemenceau was hot merely a vindictive old man imposing impossibly harsh terms upon a vanquished foe — he was also g a realistic leader of France•” To protect her newly-born hegemony upon the European continent — a major power —

even her position as

was to French policy-makers all-important;

the fact that this was bound to be doubly hard due to the decline of French power and population accounts in some meas­ ure for the harshness of French terms.

•**Ray Stannard Baker, biographer of Woodrow Wilson, thus summarizes French demands at the Peace Conference: ”1. French military control of the Rhine; 2. A permanent alliance of the great Powers to help France to hold it; 3. A group of smaller allies to menace Germany from the east; 4. Territor­ ial reduction of the German Empire; 5. Crippling of the German political organization; 6 . Disarmament of Germany but hot of the Allies; 7. A crushing indemnity; 8 . Deprivation of economic resources; 9. A set of commercial agreements preferential to France, and prejudicial to Germany. Here we have exactly what was in the minds of the leaders of the Old Order, and their programme for the coming peace. It is easy, of course, to cry out, as the Germans do, that this was a purely militaristic programme. Strong militaristic and im­ perialistic elements there certainly were in it, but the dominating element first and last was fear and a passion for security.” Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, II, 20-21. ^For a general discussion of French policy, c f . Graham Stuart, ”The Struggle of France for Hegemony and Secur­ ity,” Brown, Roucek, and Hodges, oj>. cit., pp. 146-64; Paul Vaucher, Post-War France; E. D. Schoonmaker, Our Genial Enemy, France; Schuman, op. cit., pp. 431-39; Simonds and Emeny, op. c it., pp. 199*^222; Alexander Werth, Which Way France? ; Maurice Thorez, France Today and the Peopleya Fron¥I

40 Frenoh policy from this standpoint was a reversal of that of pre-war years, before Versailles had radically modified the French position and while France still smarted under the.terms of the peace of 1870*

uViewed in retrospect,n

says Schuraan, "French policy from 1871 to 1914 presents the appearance, which is certainly not belied by the facts, of a progressive adaptation of diplomatic and military means to the great end of the revanche. • . the restoration of French hegemony over Europe.

. . . Post-war French policy has been

directed almost exclusively toward the attainment of. • • . Security.

• • at once and. • • ever since, the guiding slogan

of the Quai d fOr say.

«1

Toward this end France employed, generally, four principal techniques:

keeping Germany —

essentially during

these years the other half of the "Balance" —

weak; keeping

France strong; securing a train of allies; and supporting the League of Nations. dous reparations —

Thus French insistence upon tremen­

preferably over a long period of time —

obstinate objection to the Anschluss, occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, and countless other apparently heartless actions*

2

Thus the maintenance of the large French army, high

1

O p . cit., pp. 434-35. Ibid., p. 436.

41 expenditures for armaments concurrently with an extensive world-wide disarmament campaign in accordance with the treaty of Versailles#^

Thus the French alliance system, involving

Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia and Rumania in which the Germans could quite properly see

encirclement,!|

Q

and the French emotion following the refusal of the United States, and consequently England, to guarantee actively the French status quo —

a promise given in exchange for reluc-

tant French abandonment of her demand for the Rhine frontier#

3

And lastly, the strong French support for a more virile League of Nations armed with powerful sanctions against an ^aggressor1* bent on upsetting the status quo#

Such a strong plan 4 of sanctions was proposed in the Geneva protocol of 1924# One other contributing influence to French policy between 1934-1939 must be noted:

French dependence upon

British support, after the strengthening of Germany under Hitler had placed France at a disadvantage in case of a substitution of military for diplomatic techniques in the 5 effort to maintain the status quo# Indeed, during the

1 0f.

Shelby C. Davis, The French War Machine♦

^Stuart, ag. cit♦# pp# 147-50# *%angsam, The World Since 1914# pp# 186-87. 4 Ibid*,

5

pp# 196-97#

Or ttto maintain peace, i.e. French ascendancy#1* Schuman, oj>. cit., p. 438#

years 1937-1939, Prance gave the appearance of nthe tail on Britainfs kite” as French Mdemands” succumbed to British ^demands1* in the complicated joint Anglo-French diplomacy throughout those hectic years*’*’ As in the case of England, geography has played a major role in the formation of German policy, although in different ways*

Above all factors, the location of Germany

in the center of the European continent, for centuries the center of the nworld that matters ,11 has made of that nation an integral part of the balance of power; it has, too, given to German relations with other powers a special flavor, and to the German mental attitude, a special turn*

ttGeographcal-

ly,w wrote Frank Simonds and Brooks Emeny in 1935, nthe German situation is the simplest (among the major European powers) in that alone among the Great Powers of Europe her territory is completely restricted to that Continent*

Her

central location, moreover, gives rise to a problem of security as old as history, for now, as always, the position of the Germans brings them into collision with the Latin in the West and the Slav in the East* The psychological result of the German 11problem1* has been a state of mind in which fear of pressure from all

3-Cf• post* pp* 134-36, et passim*

43 sides has become almost a mania*

This

national claustro­

phobia, w or fear of nencirclement,n is as hard for Americans and British to understand as is vacillating British policy for the Germans, but it has in.fact as genuine a geographical basis as has British balance of power policy*

One authority

thus reviews the reality of the problem and its effects: Germany's central position in the heart of Europe is chiefly responsible for the disastrous reverses which have been so frequent in her history* They have balked her progress at every step, nipped every growing bud, doomed every hopeful development to a tragic ending. Ho one ever recognized this more clearly than did Bismarck himself* He saw that owing to her central position Germany might at any moment be endangered and overwhelmed by powerful coalitions, and the thought cost him many sleepless nights. The cachemar des coalitions with which a Russian diplomat once teased the Prince was anything but an imaginary nightmare. It was his clear realization, based on history and experience, of the fact that a ter­ rible danger continually hung over Germany's head* Viewed in this light, the foreign policy of the great Chancellor, which sometimes seemed so complicated, becomes astonish­ ingly clear and lucid.^* The fear of encirclement explains, at least in part, German land hunger.

Hitler has succinctly stated this

connection: The size of a people's living area includes an es­ sential factor for the determination of its outward security. The greater the amount of room a people has at its disposal, the greater is also its natural protec­ tion; because military victories over nations crowded in small territories have always been reached more quickly and more easily, especially more effectively and more completely, than in the cases of States which are territorially greater in size. The size of the

■**Richard von Kuhlmann, uPermanent Bases of German For­ eign Policy,w Foreign Affairs, January, 1931, pp. 181-82.

44 State territory, therefore, gives a certain protection against frivolous attacks, as success may he gained only after long and severe fighting, and, therefore, the risk of an impertinent surprise attack, except for quite unusual reasons, will appear too great. In the great­ ness of the State territory, therefore, lies a reason for the easier preservation of a nationfs liberty and in­ dependence, whereas, in the reverse case, the smallness of such a formation simply invites seizure. MObviously,n Hitler adds, Msuch a territorial policy {as that demanded^ cannot find its fulfillment in the Cameroons, for example, but almost exclusively only in Europe.

. . • For Germany, therefore, the only possibility

of carrying out a sound territorial policy was to be found in the acquisition of new soil in Europe proper•

From

Germanyfs position, the logical course for such conquest has always been eastward, against Poland, the Balkans, and Russia.

The historic policy of German Drang nach osten loses

much of its mystical aura when viewed in this light, and German relations with her eastern neighbors are more easily understood. With the growth of economic nationalism and domestic etatism, the Drang nach osten has taken on increased impor­ tance.

The uncertain position of any nation which, like

Germany, does not possess or control a large proportion of

1Mein Kamjof, p. 177. Ibid., pp. 179, 181.

45 its essential materials is obvious*

Such a nation is liable

not only to the shutting off of necessary sources of supply by political action but also to the closing of foreign markets by lack of foreign credit with which to purchase 1

essential materials.

To Germans, the acquisition of Lebens-

raum in the East arises from as real a need as does the British demand for control of the seas, essential to the maintenance of British lines of supply* The provisions of the Treaty of Versailles gave a particular twist to German objectives.

If French policy

Hbetween wars 11 reversed its aim and directed itself toward the sole objective of l,security,M i.e., the maintenance of status quo, German policy exhibited an exactly opposite trend.

As to German foreign policy, C. J. Friedrich says:

German foreign policy since the World War. . ♦ re­ volved around one central goal: te redress the balance of power in Europe, as established by the Treaty of Versailles. In this urge toward throwing off the fetters of a Treaty believed to be iniquitous and imposed by

C f . ante, pp. 19-20. Germany borrowed between 1924 1931 some fifteen thousand million reichsmarks. The effect of the crisis of the latter year and the subsequent growth of economic nationalism upon Germany was especially severe. Some observers have laid the rise of Hitler and the reversal of the previous German policy of international cooperation particularly to this factor. Cf. for example 6 . D. H. Cole, The Intelligent M a n rs Guide through World Chaos, pp. 86-94. For an excellent prophetic discussion of the economic ef­ fects of Versailles on Germany c f . John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, a Cassandra-like cry of no mean proportions*

46 force, German action in the international sphere bears a certain resemblance to French policies after 1871• The

reasons for this orientation of German

policy are

thus explained by Schuman: The Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919, humbled Germany to the dust and imposed upon her terms so severe as to render her impotent in European interna­ tional politics for many years* The Reich lost all its overseas colonies, Alsace-Lorraine, the Saar Valley, Eupen and Malmedy, the Polish corridor, part of Upper Silesia, and a portion of Schleswig. German investments and property abroad were seized. Germany’s coal produc­ tion was reduced by one-third, and her iron supplies by three-fourths • The German merchant marine was confis­ cated by the Allies. The German battle fleet was surren­ dered. The German army was limited to 100,000 men and was forbidden to possess tanks, heavy artillery, or air­ planes* The new German navy was restricted to six battleships of not more than 1 0 , 0 0 0 tons, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers, and no submarines. The left • bank of the Rhine and a fifty-kilometer zone on the right bank were demilitarized. The left bank and the bridge­ heads were subjected to military occupation for fifteen years. A Reparation Commission was appointed to fix Germany’s financial obligations to indemnify the victors g for civilian damages, pensions, and the Belgian war debt.

"German Foreign Policy" in Brown, Roucek and Hodges, o p . cit., p. 165. On the subject of German policy cf. also Schuman, ojd. cit., pp. 439-52; Simonds and Emeny, 0 £. cit., pp. 165-98; Schuman, Germany since 1918; major passages in Friedrich, Foreign Policy in the Making — the Search for a Balance of Power, and Ernst jfickh, Deutschland, das Herz Europas♦ An able summary of German policy since Hitler is contained in Stephen H. Roberts, The House That Hitler Built, and df ♦ also, Max Beer, Die Answ&rtige Po'fitik des PrltFen Reichs.

2 Schuman, o p . cit., pp. 445-46.

47 These provisions, moralized on the basis of the exclu1

sive war guilt of Germany, reduced that nation almost to a position of secondary importance in Europe*

Until this

situation was remedied, Germany could not look beyond the one primary objective of rectification.

Methods employed in

the attempt to reach that goal varied between the extremes of peaceful cooperation and outright use of force, but the objective remained constant. German policy since the war may on the basis of techniques employed be divided into three general parts. The first of these lies between the time of the reluctant signature of the Versailles treaty and 1925 and is marked by sullen acceptance of the treaty provisions, ^passive resistance 11 to the Ruhr occupation,

2

and the treaty with Russia,

that other nparish ,11 signed at Rapallo in April of 1922. Between 1925 and 1932, German policy under the leadership of Gustav Stresemann, until 1929, was one of reconciliation and 4 cooperation with western Europe. Through the Locarno pacts

^Exclusive German guilt was later flatly denied by some responsible American, British and French historians; e.g., cf. Fay, oj>. cit *, vol. 2, p. 558; Pierre Renouvin, The Immeediate Origins of the W a r , p. 355; G. P. Gooch, Recent Revel­ ations of European Diplomacy, p. 214, and Harry Elmer Barnes, World PoTitlcs in Modern Civilization, p . 315• ^Langsam, 5 Ibld.,

ojd.

cit., pp. 165-67.

p. 191, and of. post, p.

^Locarno treaties in Harley,

ojd.

274. cit., pp. 413-26.

48 Germany ''guaranteed11 her western boundaries (although dis­ tinctly not her eastern, the rectification of which became her primary immediate objective); Germany joined the League of Nations in 1926 and worked hard through its organs for 1

"peaceful change"; Stresemann called "the road ahead of us" 2 one of "international cooperation for national reconstruction." This conciliatory period ended with the rise of Hitler in 1932, after which "international cooperation" coupled with outright disavowal of military techniques in the pursuit of German military objectives was replaced by a policy Machia­ vellian in the extreme.

Force and threat of force to secure

the "rectification" of the Diktat von Versailles were repeatedly employed following 1934 with a success which seem­ ed, from the German standpoint, a justification of the reversal of policy.

Particularly noticeable as part of the

new policy was the use of the Hitler "one-step-at-a-time" technique: the presentation of a single fait accompli or a single demand, not in itself sufficient to justify retalia3 tory military action, at one time* The Nazi demands in

• Schuman, oj). cit., p. 451* 2

Quoted in Friedrich, oja. cit., p. 171*

Clausewitz spoke of this policy as "slow poisoning." Hitler, in Mein Kampf, claimed,to learn the technique from the allied treatment of Germany after the first world war* The Allies, he claimed, were "too smart to demand too much

49 any given crisis never seemed -unreasonable; in toto, however, by 1939 they began to appear extremely extensive and growingly objectionable. Britain, Prance and Germany were the principal actors in the diplomatic drama from which war arose.

At least two

others, however, demand brief attention here; Italy and Russia both played contributing, if subsidiary, roles. The position of Italy as a 11prisoner in the Mediter­ ranean'* has given to that state a particular interest in matters concerning other territories bordering on that sea.

1

at once. They limited their extortions always to that amount which in their opinion — and that of our German leadership — would momentarily still be sufficiently tolerable so as not to compel any fear of an explosion of popular opinion. The more, however, such isolated dictates were endorsed and cram­ med down, the less it seemed justified, because of some Iso­ lated further extortion or proposed humiliation, suddenly to do what had been done in the case of so many others: to offer resistance. This is just the *drop of poison* of which Clausewltz speaks: the characterlessness which, once begun, must always intensify itself and which gradually bur­ dens every future decision like the worst heritage. It can become such a terrible dead weight that a nation can hardly shake it off again, but finally declines to the nature of a slave race.1* Mein Kampf, pp. 971-72. 1

For general discussion on Italian policy cf • Simonds and Emeny, op. pit*, pp. 249-76;' Schuman, pp. cit., pp. 452-58; Henry R. Spencer, ''Expanding Italy," in Brown, Roucek and Hodges, op. c i t ., pp. 187-203; George Martelli, Italy against the World; Mario Palmieri, The Philosophy of Fascism, and Elizabeth Monroe, The Mediterranean in Politics.

Her geographical location has made her desire to turn the Mediterranean into an ’’Italian lake*1 and northern Africa 1

into one huge Italian empire*

Since she, like Germany,

belatedly came into the competition for empire, Italy’s efforts toward the realization of this goal have consistent­ ly run into embarrassing obstacles in the fact that most of the African continent was already preempted by the earlycomers among the European powers before the ’’resurrection” of the Italian state in 1870 and that the far-flung character of the British empire made necessary the maintenance of an ’’open Mediterranean” as part of the British life-line* Italy’s vulnerability and inherent physical weakness have contributed further to the character of Italian policy. In this connection Sc human says: Italy has always occupied the weakest interna­ tional position of any of the Great Powers. • . • Behind the facade of ultra-patriotic boastings and threats, Italy remains inferior to other Powers in the economic and strategic prerequisites of an effec­ tive role in power politics* She has consequently been reducedgto adroit maneuverings and complex bargainings to achieve her purposes — ancLshe has repeatedly met with failure and frustration*

^Cf. Spencer, ojc>. cit.# p. 190* o E.g., this was notable in the period before the first world war. This tendency toward ’’maneuvering” has been possibly the chief characteristic also of Italian policy since 1932*

Much of Italian expression of policy — tion of bluff and brag^ —

a combina­

is due to the necessity, for

Italy, of capitalizing on her -'nuisance valueM as her chief weapon in international competition* Since the World War, Italian policy' has been frankly revisionist.

Italian ambitions, frustrated at Versailles,

left the Italian still a distinctly second-class empire and but very little satisfied the Italian demands in Africa. The Italian dilemma arising in the 1930fs forced Italy once more into maneuvering 5 her African ambitions could be satisfied, with German colonies gone, only at the expense of France; her security in the north, where the new Italian Tyrol constituted an Austrian (German) irredentia. could be guaranteed only at the expense of Germany, her possible ally against France.

As before the first world war, Italy

wavered once more between opposing forces as Europe divided itself again after 1934* Soviet Russian policy has, like Germanyfs, been often surrounded in western minds with an aura of mystery arising partially from a misunderstanding of the Russian situation and partially from a sort of awe caused by the Russian

As for example Mussolinifs statement: wWe are a warlike nation and are likely to become increasingly warlike for that Is what we want to be." Quoted in Spencer, oj>. cit p. 188*

52 political structure.

Yet Russian policy becomes under1

standable in the light of Russian objectives*

”This policy,”

wrote Vera Micheles Dean soon after the start of the present war, 11especially since Lenin*s death in 1923, has been determined primarily not by ideological considerations, as often assumed in the West, but by the interests of the o national Russian state.” Commissar of Foreign Affairs Molotov only repeated a truism when he stated on August 31, 1939, that Soviet policy was "based on the interests of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and only their interests*n Russian geography differs from that of the remainder of the European powers in that Russia lies only fractionally within Europe itself; its eastern portion extends well into the hitherto little developed continent of Asia.

Further­

more, at least until recently, the expanse of Russia itself was but little developed, and vast resources remained to be exploited within the state itself.

After the Bolshevik

Revolution, the twin purposes of "building Socialism” and

^For data on Russian policy, cf. Schuman, op. cit., pp. 479-89; Simonds and Erneny, og. cit., pp. 277-302; Bruce Hopper, "Potentials of Soviet Foreign Policy,1’ in Brown, Roucek and Hodges, og. cit., pp. 204-25; Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs; Sir Bernard Pares, A History oT Russia, and D.N. Prltt, Light on Moscow: Soviet Pollcy^inalysed* ^Why Europe Went to W a r , p. 23* ^Statement at the Session of the Supreme Soviet of the W^S.S.R. 222 the Ratification of the Soviet-German NonAggression""Pact, August 5 1 . 193$ 9 p. 14.

53 industrializing Russia could but send Russian leaders on what Bruce Hopper calls ”The Unavoidable Quest for Peace, i.e., security from external attack# Russia’s western security has been menaced from two directions since 1917: by Britain and Prance in 1917 and the years following and, after the rise of Hitler, by Nazi Germany, whose leaders had openly expressed interest in Russian territory#

One authority states that

From Moscow’s point of view, Russia was confronted with a choice of two evils# Each time the choice was made purely on the basis of expediency. When Russia felt isolated by the Allies after the World War, it came to terms with Germany at Rapallo, and encouraged the activities of the Communist International in Europe and Asia .2 When Hitler launched his anti-Communist crusade, Russia came to terms with the Western powers, relegated the Comintern to the background, and advo- 3 cated a common front of ’democracies’ against fascism. Thus the orientation of Russian relations underwent a direct reversal as conditions affecting Russian objectives changed.

Indicative is the modification of Russian opinion

of the League from ”an association of hostile bourgeois Powers, either useless or dangerous from the point of view

■^Hopper, op. cit., p. 214. This author develops the thesis that Russia’s objective is security on her European frontier in order to develop a tremendous socialized state in Asia, nlearning in the West in order to teach in the East.” The Russian objective, therefore, ”to hold the West at bay while perfecting socialism in Russia, then to apply the new science and technique to the building of an entirely new civilization in Eurasia, self-sufficient and powerful.” This would force a 11peace policy of defense to the West.” p. 214. ^Cf♦ post, pp. 274-76. $Dean, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

Throughout the years

54 1

of Soviet interests *1 exposed, and,

to a wplace where aggressors can be g . • a certain instrument of peace.w

Among these five nations, Britain, Prance, Germany, Italy and Russia, rested the insecure peace of Europe from 1919 to 1939, within a system, the cornerstone of which was the legal concept of absolute state sovereignty.

The

first thirteen of these twenty years were marked by a con­ flict between that cornerstone and the contradictory thesis of !,collective security, ** with which were coupled the corol­ laries of **peaeeful change** and 11International justice.**

A

League of Nations, enfeebled from its origin by lack of representation of such nations as the United States, by a need of centralized power, by lukewarm support from its most important members and by repeated manipulation of its agen­ cies for national purposes, was yet to meet its first real

**between wars,** however, the U.S.S.R. **supported all inter­ national schemes and projects for the maintenance of peace, short of entrance into the League of Natiohs. . . . \ The U.S.S.R. Republics psicJ was the first Great Power to ratify the Kellogg-Briand Pact.** Schuman, op. cit., p. 488. ^Schuman, loc. cit.

2

This was written in 1932.

Stalin to the Eighteenth Congress of the Commun­ ist Party of the Soviet Union, 10th March, 1934, in D. N* Pritt, Light on Moscow, p. 176. Extracts from the speech, pp. 1 6 4 ^ ---- -------

55 test in 1932.

Collective peace moves such as the Kellogg-

Briand Pact of 1928 received lip-service by all nations throughout the thirteen-year period, but with wholesale reservations arising from the concepts of sovere5.gnty and nationalism and pertaining to matters involving ‘’national security ,11 “national honor,” and “national interests.”

The

period was marked, too, by an increasing economic inter­ dependence among nations which threatened chaos when Joined to strict national political independence. The years after 1932 were marked by the dramatic triumph of the old concepts of sovereignty and nationalism* The depression of 1929, ripening into the crisis of 1931, created world-wide distress of an almost unbelievable nature; and from the economic turmoil nation after nation sought its own salvation in economic nationalism and/or etatism.

“national salvation” through independent national

action became the accepted order of the day.

Nations rich

in raw materials sought to bring back prosperity through economic isolation, as did the United States through the Hawley-Smoot tariff of 1931; nations poor in needed goods accepted leaders who placed the blame for the world’s sorry plight upon the richer states and promised a solution to the problem through “the rectification of international in/ justices," if needs be by force, as did the Germany of Hitler in 1933.

56

The result was the rapid disintegration of interna­ tional machinery for the maintenance of peace#

The League

got its first real test when Japan marched into Manchuria in 1931 and failed miserably as its more powerful members refused to act; the disarmament conference of the same year broke up with no major accomplishments on its record, and a new arms race began#

The League as an instrument for col­

lective security became progressively more futile as its powerful members, with cynical frankness, failed to act when Germany in 1935 began open rearmament in violation of the Versailles treaty and reoccupied the Rhineland in March of 1936, when it made what amounted to an empty gesture toward Italy when that nation attacked Ethiopia in October, 1935, and when it almost totally ignored Italian and German inter­ vention in Spain after the outbreak of the Spanish civil war in July, 1936.

1

By March of 1938, when Nazi Germany annexed Austria, the concept of international cooperation for the preserva­ tion of peace was virtually defunct#

It was increasingly

apparent that the objectives of policy of Europefs major powers were coming into truly serious conflict; that the

^"For the events of these years, cf# Walter C# Langsam, The World Since 1914# An excellent brief review is found in Varian Fry, The Peace That Failed, and a longer one in Walter Millis, Why Europe Fights♦

conflict was on© for the successful determination of which each side might soon he willing to risk the use of military measures rather than to accept diplomatic defeat, and that another gigantic war was imminent. European diplomacy slipped smoothly hack into its preWar rut, from which it had never heen free, and speeded up its pace to meet the tasks before it*

CHAPTER III PRELXJDE TO MUNICH; GERMAN-CZECH RELATIONS BEFORE 1938 The ominous acceleration of the diplomatic tempo began with the period immediately preceding the historic conference at Munich on September 29, 1938*

It was to

lead to another bloodless Hitler victory, but one which was to be the last of this kind# Kgnrad Henlein, acting no doubt under instructions from Berlin, officially opened the Czechoslovakian crisis on April 24 when, speaking at Karlsbad, he put forward, in eight points, the demands of the racial minority which he represented.

Six of the eight points enunciated were

quite reasonable; they largely dealt with claims of selfgovernment for the Sudeten minority. of a drastic character:

The other two were

they demanded that the Sudeten

Germans be allowed to Hestablish National Socialism 11 and that the Czechoslovakian government shape its foreign policy so as to reach an understanding with Germany.

1

In

the light of later developments it is apparent that the specific characteristics of the Karlsbad proposals were

^The New York Times, April 25, 1938, G. E. R. Gedye, ”Czech Nazis Warn Prague To Accept Germans* Demands,” p. 1.

59 not, In themselves, important; their importance lay in the fact that, by their very unacceptability, they were intro­ duced as the occasion for the precipitation of the contro­ versy . Czechoslovakia was the logical successor to Austria as the recipient of Hitler’s attentions.

Possessed of

territory strategic in the extreme from a military stand­ point, it contained a heterogeneous population admirably suited to Hitler’s methods. The problem of Czech freedom and Czech frontiers had been one of the most perplexing to face the peace-makers at 1

Versailles.

The Czechoslovak commission, in making its

recommendations, had been forced to choose between the prin­ ciples of ethnic self-determination and of military strategy, and in the end French determination to weaken Germany and strengthen a possible new ally had won. were physically rather than ethnically

The new frontiers natural*1; their

western end, which extended to within 200 miles of Berlin, was marked by chains of almost impenetrable mountains on both the northern and the southern sides.

Bismarck had

described these mountains as na fortress created by God

^Cf. Nicolson, Harold, Peacemaking, pp. 93-96. The author was himself a member of the Czechoslovak Commission, and his book contains an excellent discussion of the prob­ lem facing the Commission.

60 himself*w^ But to grant this strategic frontier to Czechoslovakia, the peacemen at Versailles had been forced to include within the new state some three to three and a half million Germanspeaking and German-blooded people,

2

out of a total popu­

lation of something under 15,000,000# These Sudeten Deutsch, so called because the moun­ tains which form the frontier of Bohemia and Moravia are collectively known as the Sudeten, occupied the outer mountain fringe of the new Czechoslovakia, and, in the regions extending to a depth of some 20 to 50 miles from

1

Quoted in Hicolson, Why Britain Is at War, p. 75*

2

The census of 1921 listed some 3,125,624 Germans, or 23*6 per cent of the total Czech population of 13,613,172* To these figures the Sudeten minority objected vociferously, charging false entries and discrimination and pointing to the figures obtained in the General Elections of 1920, in which Germans cast 25*58 per cent of the vote* Elizabeth Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans , p* 124* Schuman, quoting from Die Hationalltaten in den Staaten Europas-Herausgeben im Auftrage des Europaischen Nationalitaten-Kongress, edited by Dr. Ewald Ammende in 1931, gives 3,218,005, or 23.6 per cent of the total population, as the number of Sudeten Deutsch. The pre-war Austrian census listed some 3,512,682 Germans in the ^Historic Provinces *11 At the peace conference Benes had claimed this figure to be 800,000 to 1,000,000 too high, while the Austrians claimed at St. Germain to be pleading for some 4,000,000 Sudeten Germans. (Wiskemann, o|>. cit., p. 8 8 .)

61

the frontier circling the western end of the state, made a majority of from 50 to 90 per cent of the population.

1

The relations existing between Czechs and these Germans had never been too friendly*

"Indeed," says Wiskemann,

"the conflict between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans had become the very condition of pre-War Austrian life."

2

After the war there arose a serious question of readjustment of relations between the two groups.

As Dr.

Gustav Peters wrote, the Sudeten German regarded the Czech as . . . a half educated. . . creature, to some extent saved by German influence, who is politically intoler­ able and unreliable, socially never satisfied and always pushing for his nation, while the Czech sees in the Sudeten German the invader, the remorseless conquerer, the apostle of world hegemony, the economic tyrant who only lives in the land in order to subject the Czech people socially, politically and in every other w a y . 3 Nevertheless, in 1919 the Great Powers accepted as inevitable the political union of the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans and left them to fight out their old quarrel, with the cardinal difference that the state was now to be

JL

Ari excellent map showing the distribution of minori­ ties in Czechoslovakia is included in ChmelarTs The German Population in Czechoslovakia, p. 218. o 3

Wiskemann, 0 |u c i t ., 272.

Der Neue Herr von Bohmen, quoted in Wiskemann, op. cit., p. 118.

62 controlled by the Czechs*

The reason for this action lay

primarily in the fact that ^Czechoslovakia needed its natural frontiers for reasons of international saf ety” ^ and that a strong Czechoslovakia would lie as a powerful bulwark

2 in the road of a renewed German Prang nach Osten.

The old

frontier of Bohemia and Moravia was therefore preserved, and the future status of the German minority was guaranteed under a Minorities Treaty by which Czechoslovakia undertook to respect the racial rights of the Sudeten people*

wIt

cannot be said that successive Czech governments carried out

J. S. Roucek, “The Case for Czechoslovakia ,11 World Affairs Interpreter, Autumn, 1938, 239. 2 C f . Colonel E. Moravec, The Strategic Importance of Czechoslovakia for Western Europe for an excellent discus­ sion of the military and strategic value of the Czechoslovak state• . c i t ., pp. 119-120 for provisions of the Czech language laws and the Sudeten complaints. o

The Central-European crisis of 1923-24 seriously damaged Sudeten industry. Many Sudeten Deutsch had sub­ scribed heavily to Austrian war loans, honored by the Czech state to 75 per cent; and many of them ^speculated in German marks and lost with the 1923 German inflation.” (Roucek, loc. cit.) Meanwhile, artificial stabilization of the Kc at a fairly high level at the same time when German and Austrian currency collapse was ”annihilating the purchasing power of the chief customers of the Sudeten Germans 11 had a

65

German-speaking countrymen added to the psychological strain *1 The Minorities Treaty of 1919 had provided for ap­ peal to the Council of the League of Nations /by any inter­ ested party in case of violation of the Treaty provisions. No such appeal was ever received by the Council in regard to the Sudeten Deutsch, partially because of Sudeten distrust of Geneva as a 11Cz echo -French t rap ,11 partially because of the weakness of the German state in its relationship with the League during most of that b ody’s lifetime and partially because uDr. Benes’s position at Geneva was so strong that he could easily forestall Sudeten German petitions.”

Thus

the League, which possibly should have succeeded the Hapsburg dynasty as Central European arbiter, never fully assumed that position.

serious effect on Sudeten industry. (Wiskemann, op. cit., p. 145.) Of the 450,000 estimated unemployed in Czechoslovakia in 1923, ^clearly, the majority were Sudeten Germans normally employed by Sudeten German firms.” (L o c . cit.) After 1929, unemployment was relatively 2 . 2 per cent higher in regions over 50 per cent German than in other parts of the country. (Roucek, loc. cit.) ^■nThe Czechs were inclined not to be very sorry for the German working people when their wages fell or vanished, because the German standard of living was higher, and the Czechs thought it was time that Czechs lived as well as Ger­ mans in their own country.” (Wiskemann, op. cit., p. 146.) o

Ibid., p. 129. Note Schuman’s comment: ”The League is a political body. • • and is often tempted to sidestep embarrassing issues.” (International Politics, p. 319.)

66 The rise of Hitler to power in Germany increased the latent tension in Czechoslovakia, which'was at that time undergoing its most extreme economic distress.

The

Sudeten Hazi party, like its counterpart in Austria., which had received considerable support in the elections of 1932, drawing heavily from the Sudeten parties of the center, came under natural suspicion of intrigue with Germany* This suspicion led to the decision by the Czech govern­ ment to suppress the party, a decision only prevented from realization by the voluntary dissolution of the Hazis in October, 1933*^

Meanwhile, the local German police were

frequently replaced by Czech state officials under the enabling act of 1933, a procedure intensely irritating to the minority because of its likeness to !tforeign occupa­ tion 11 and because it increased already disproportional minority unemployment to the benefit of the majority* In circumstances like these, Herr Henlein approach­ ed the elections of 1935 with a call to the Sudeten Germans for the creation of a new party, the Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront.

MI appeal above all parties and estates.

. •

to the Sudeten German people ,11 he declared, 11and place myself

1

Hazd mayors and other local officials were tempora­ rily replaced by Government nominees •

67

1 at the head of the movement The new political organization began a campaign of considerable vigor and thoroughness upon a three-point platform: wdown with the Reds, down with the Jews, and unite in the spirit of the front-line soldiers like the leader Konrad Henlein who fought in the Great War.

At

the last moment, before the election of 1935, under pres­ sure from Prague, the name of the party was changed to Sudetendeutsche Partel, the name still indicating repre­ sentation of all the local Germans.

In the elections of

1935 the Henleinists demonstrated their strength by polling between 62 and 63 per cent of the total German vote.

Prom 1935 on until 1938 it was to become progressive

ly stronger.

^Wiskemann, oj>. cit., p. 202. Henlein was a young (then 37) Sudeten German, a war veteran, originally a gymnastic instructor and a bank clerk, who had become prominent in 1929 in the then secret Sudeten Kameradschaftsbund and in the Deutsche Turnverband. As early as 1931 his spiritual kinship with the National Socialists across the border in Germany could be easily seen in his words: ttWe declare war to the death upon Liberalism even behind the disguise of the cult of personality. Disciplined mass unities rule the present. . . . For men wish to be led in manly fashion .11 Henlein*s political record before 1935 had been, however, that of one apparently favoring active co­ operation in the Czech union. To Czechs who suspiciously noted the similarity between the new party, its platform and its followers, and the now forbidden Sudeten Nazi organiza­ tion, Henleinists pointed to the record of their leader and to the fact that other new leaders were largely men new in politics• 2 Ibld.,

pp. 204-205.

5 Ibid. .

p. 206.

68 How close were the ties existing at this time between the new Sudetendeutsche Partei and governmental officials in Nazi Germany there is no evidence to indicate*

Nicolsonfs

statement that 11In 1935 he (Hitler) placed himself in con­ tact with.

. . Konrad Henlein.

. . • Henlein was instructed

to reorganize the Sudeten Germans on Nazi lines and to tell all the Germans in Czechoslovakia how brutally they were being treated*w^ is entirely unsupported by evidence*

It

seems reasonable to suppose, however, that at some time between the organization of the party in 1935 and the Karls­ bad speech in April of 1938 some such contact was established* Certainly the concord with which the two men v/orked both before and after their relationship became open would lead one to believe that they were hardly strangers to each other and that their plans had been to some no small degree laid in concert*

And certainly, also, if Henlein*s party was not

directed from Berlin, even in its early days, its actions were all that the German Filhrer could have desired from a working collaborator* Thus when Hitler turned his eyes eastward following the ^liberation 11 of his former countrymen in Austria, it was with an active powerful ally across the border that he approached his problem*

Had there been no such ally, it is

^•Nicolson, Why Britain Is at W a r , p* 77*

69

probable that the Filhrer would have found it necessary to create one, for his plans obviously called for assistance from that quarter.

CHAPTER IV MUNICH:

THE NAZI WHITE WAR TECHNIQUE IN ACTION

The Nazi technique for the creation and development of crises leading to a "necessary" change in the existing status quo is nowhere more clearly illustrated than during the period between the annexation of Austria and the acquisition of the Sudetenland at Munich*

The method, as

now developed through repeated use, seems to include the following steps:

(1) Treaty with and assurance given to

the intended victim; reiteration of peaceful intentions in Europe*

(2) "Realization" by the German government and

German press of the resentment felt by the German minority in the state selected as next victim.

(3) Offering of terms

reasonable in themselves but presented in such a way that the government of the victim finds it impossible to accept them.

(4) The discovery or the creation of "incidents’*

within the victim state, resulting in (a) charges of govern­ mental inability to maintain order and (b) charges of "persecution 11 when strict governmental measures are taken* (5) Speeding up of press and speech campaign to a point of hysteria; issuing of charges of "atrocity," "persecution," and "unspeakable insult."

(6 ) Dark threats uttered meaning­

fully; strange military gestures made.

(7) Reassurance

given to other nations that "this is the last change to be

asked in the status q u o #1* tum delivered.

(8 ) Terms strengthened; ultima­

(9) Settlement or war#

The Nazi ucrisis!t technique, coupled with the larger none step at a time1* frame in which it was enclosed, is an important part of the pattern of European diplomacy since 1932.

It played havoc with conventional European diplomatic

practice, just as Nazi finance and economic policy played havoc with the customary methods of European financial and economic controls.

For this reason it deserves the place

which has been given to it by recent studies of Nazi foreign policy. This new method of crisis-building was followed with consummate skill in the game to gain control of Czechoslo­ vakia.

Indeed, the outline above makes an excellent one in

which to place the Czech episode for purposes of analysis. (1 ) Treaty and assurances to victim. The basis of German-Gzech diplomatic relations was the Arbitration Treaty of 1925^ providing that: All disputes of every kind between Germany and Czecho­ slovakia with regard to which the Parties are in con­ flict a 3 to their respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of

One of the group of arbitration conventions known as the !tLocarno Treaties .11 For text, see League of Nations publication, Arbitration and Security, p. 421. cf. a n t e , p.

72 diplomacy, shall be submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of Interna­ tional Justice. . . . This provision does not apply to disputes arising out of events prior to the present Con­ vention and belonging to the past. . . . All questions on which the German and Czechoslovak Governments shall differ without being able to reach an amicable solution by means of the normal methods of diplomacy, the settlement of which cannot be obtained by means of a judicial settlement as provided in Article 1 of the present Convention, and for the settlement of which no procedure has been laid down by other conven­ tions in force between the Parties, shall be submitted to the Permanent Conciliation Commission, whose duty it shall be to propose to the Parties an acceptable solu­ tion . . . . If the two Parties have not reached an agreement within a month from the termination of the labours of the Permanent Conciliation Commission the question shall, at the request of either Party, be brought before the Council of the League of Nations, -which shall deal with it in accordance with Article 15 of the Covenant of the League. . . • . . • The German and Czechoslovak Governments under­ take respectively to accept such measures, to abstain from all measures likely to have a repercussion preju­ dicial to the executing of the decision or to the arrange­ ments proposed by the Conciliation Commission or by the Council of the League of Nations, and, in general, to abstain from any sort of act ion. whatsoever which may ag ­ gravate or extend the dispute# It is obvious that any serious adherence to the provi­ sions of this article would eliminate most of the nincident

Article 1# joker# 2Article 17. 3 Article 18# ^Article 19#

The last sentence provides a suitable

73 provoking 11 which played so large a part in the Nazi "crisis 11 technique.

Hitler early swore such adherence.

On January

30, 1935, after the disturbance caused by the settlement of the Saar question, he promised the world in a speech to the Reichstag that "the German government is willing and deter­ mined to accept in its innermost soul the pact of Locarno, for the outlawing of aggression .11 ^ same year he declared:

And on May 21 of the

"The German Government will scrupu­

lously observe every treaty voluntarily concluded.

In par­

ticular they will hold to and fulfill all obligations arising out of the Treaty of Locarno, so long as the other partners are ready to stand by that Treaty.^

This seemed

even at the time a peculiar reversal from the policy intimated in Mein Kampf, where the Locarno Treaties are the 3 recipients of caustic comment# But Hitler reiterated his assurances, and on March 7, /

4

1936 he proclaimed that "Germany has no desire to attack 4 either Poland or Czechoslovakia ,'1 and a few weeks later

■^Quoted in London News Chronicle, September 28, 1938, "Hitler*s Promises ,'1 p. 12# % jOC. cit ♦ ^Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 971. ^Quoted in Nicolson, Why Britain Is at W a r , p. 73#

74 attacked those who still questioned his intentions.

nThe

lie goes forth ,11 he said, wthat Germany tomorrow or the day after will fall upon Austria or Czechoslovakia.

I ask

myself always: who can these elements be who will have no peace, who incite continually, who must sow distrust, who want no under standing?

« 1 Who are they?**

But the suspicions which were aroused after German troops entered Vienna on March 12, 1938, that Czechoslovakia might be next, were by no means confined to the minds of Czech governmental officials, although there they found fertile soil.

Hitler’s assurances that no such wicked

thoughts were in his mind were immediate.

They were con­

veyed to the House of Commons by Prime Minister Chamberlain in these words: I am informed that Field Marshal Goering on the 11th of March gave a general assurance to the Czech Minister in Berlin — an assurance which he expressly renewed later on behalf of Herr Hitler — that it would be the earnest endeavor of the German government to improve German-Czeeh relations. In particular on March 12, Field Marshal Goering informed the Czech Minister that German troops marching, into Austria had received the strictest orders to keep at least fifteen kilometers from the Czechoslovak frontier. On the same day the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin was assured by Baron von Neurath that Germany considered herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention of

1 Ibid., p. 73.

75

Oc tober, 1925.^ In the reported conversations between Goering and the Czechoslovak minister, the German Field Marshal used the strongest language: said*

2

nIch gebe Ihnen mein E h r e n w o r t he

And he added, we are told, that uthe Berlin Govern­

ment considered what was happening in Austria as a family affair, but that its relations with Czechoslovakia were of an entirely different nature*tt received equal reassurance#

The world, meanwhile,

uThe eternal dream of the

German people has been fulfilled,u he told the Reichstag# ^Germany wants only peace.

She does not want to add to the

sorrow of other nations It was, perhaps, only natural that the Czechs were not entirely lulled into a sense of security#

Hitlerfs word was

already suspected on the basis of past performance, and

Heville Chamberlain, In Search of Peace, p. 74. Ger­ many had repudiated the Locarno Treaties on March 7, 1936, and this statement regarding German acceptance of the mutual guarantee of the German-Czech frontier came, therefore, as a suprise # p Corbin, French Ambassador to London, March 13, report­ ing to Foreign Minister Paul-Boncour the terms of a note given by the Czech Ambassador to the British Foreign Office. French Yellow Book, p. 5. 3

De Lacroix, Minister to Prague, to Foreign Minister Delbos on March 12# Yellow B o o k , p. 4. Delbos was r e ­ placed as Foreign Minister on March 13. ^Time, March 17, 1939, p. 26.

76 there was growing suspicion that Hitler was making conscious use of what E. 0. Lorimer calls the ^’Principle of the Big L i e ."1 (2) Realization by the German government and press of the sad condition of the German minority and of the dangers of aggression from the foreign state. The German press campaign against Czechoslovakia began in intermittent fashion during the period of the Czech elec­ tions of 1935.

As Wiskemann puts it, nFrom this time onward

• • • stream of abuse began to issue from the Reich German press and wireless .11

Czechoslovakia, it was said, nhad

become the tool of the Bolsheviks, a Soviet spearhead in the center of Europe directly menacing western civilization, pointing as it does at Bohemia*s neighbor, Bavaria, that ancient home of Kultur*n

2

These press attacks became more vigorous early in 1937 when sensational accounts of communist activity in Czecho3 Slovakia began to appear in German papers. Atrocity stories also made their appearances, the most celebrated being that of a young Reich German who claimed to have been

1What Hitler Wants. Chapter II.

2

O p . c i t ., p. 236.

•St

C f ., for example, the Volkischer Beobachter of January 7, 1937, cited in Wiskemann, op. cit., p. 264*

77 tortured by the Czech police the previous November# Following an insignificant incident involving the arrest and immediate release of a Sudeten

deputy by Czech police,

in October, the Volkischer Beobachter had reached this point : At the cradle of the Czech State lies and hatred, murder and terror stood as sponsors. They have never forsaken the brief course of its life. . . . In Siberia during the War Czech deserters led by a crook began to murder and plunder unarmed German prisoners and a defenseless population. When these gangsters, honoured as heroes today, were brought back to their home. • . they continued their bloodthirsty handiwork# A little veiled threat was added to give emphasis: The Sudeten Germans must know that the whole German Volk stands behind them. . . . The parvenu political behaviour of the Czechs, whose aggressiveness no doubt pleases Moscow and is therefore indulged in, makes them into perpetual disturbers of peace in Central Europe, the bearers of the sole responsibility for the tension in this area. In Prague they had better observe that the days of German impotence are over, and that we regard the attitude to our Volksgruppen abroad, which have always shown themselves to be an orderly element, as the attitude taken up towards ourselves #2 The German press was quiet toward the Czechs for a short period after the conquest of Vienna, but the respite may have been due partly to a firm French and Russian stand, partly to a German desire to gain time for the consolidation

^Volkischer Beobachter, June 18, 1937. mann, og. cit., p. 264. ^Ibid., October 19.

267#

Cited in Wiske

Quoted in Wiskemann, og. cit., p#

78 1 of the new Austrian gains. The French and Russian position was based on similar treaties signed in May of 1935.

The first of these treaties,

signed on May 2, though not ratified by France until March of 1936, provided for mutual assistance between France and Russia in which each, in effect, agreed to come to the other *3 aid in case of attack by Germany.

The second, signed

i

on May 16, was between Russia and Czechoslovakia; again each agreed to aid the other if attacked by Germany, but only if France, in accordance with the first treaty, did the same.

2

Thus Czechoslovakia became, in effect, a diplomatic unit with France in her dealings with Russia; she was bound to aid Russia in case of attack only if France did so.

Russia, how­

ever, was bound to come immediately to the aid of either of her allies in case of attack upon them without waiting for the Council of the League, to which Russia now adhered, to 3 decide that aggression had occurred. This agreement, in turn, was in keeping with the Franco-Czech Treaty of Alliance

^The German reassurances to Czech officials after the Austrian annexation were coupled with repeated anxious queries as to the possibility of Czech mobilization. These actions the French and British laid to German fear. Yellow B o o k , p. 7. ^Cf. Wiskemann, og. cit., p. 236; Millis, op. cit., p. 132. ®This Franco-Russian treaty was, incidentally, pro­ nounced by the Law Officers of the Crown of the United King­ dom to be consistent with the Covenant of the League.

79 of the autumn of 1923, by which the two powers ^agreed to make common cause in case of aggression, or if a restora­ tion were attempted in Germany or Hungary, or if Germany should try to effect an Anschluss with A u s t r i a , w h i c h formed the keystone of French membership in the Little Entente• The day after the Anschluss was achieved, both France and Russia wdeclared that they would fulfill these engage­ ments [of 1935j,w and on March 18, Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov declared that the seizure of Austria was nan act of violence that endangered everyone ,11 and called for a conference of France, Great Britain, Russia and the United States to agree on ways for ^checking the further developments of aggression*

2

But in London, British statesmen were frantically wondering as to what support Britain would be expected to give France should the French aid a Czechoslovakia unexpect­ edly attacked by the Nazis.

On March 24, Prime Minister

Chamberlain finally gave a speech before the House of Com­ mons in answer to the Russian proposals* Chamberlain1s words^lackedodefiniteness* Germans, he

1

Stuart, "The Struggle of France for Hegemony and Secur­ ity ,11 in Brown, Roucek and Hodges, ojd cit., p. 148.

.

2 In Millis, 0 £. cit., p. 208.

80 said, were not to believe that ’’nothing would make us fight .11 But what might make the British fight the Prime Minister did not say*

That England might help Czechoslovakia in case

of a general European war was intimated, but the British government also made it clear that Britain would not make any previous commitments of certain aid to the Czechs (or the French and Russians) in case of further German aggression. In regard to the Litvinov proposals, Chamberlain objected to the idea of any such conference as that suggested on the grounds that 11it might seem like organizing Europe into two ideological blocks.”

Further, the Prime Minister added,

”the Soviet Go v e r n m e n t s proposals would appear to involve less a consultation with a view to settlement than a concerted action against an eventuality which has not yet arisen.” ^ By the time Henlein delivered his Karlsbad address late in April, the gentleness of the British attitude had apparently reassured the Germans, and the Nazi press was once again in full cry. iatory.

Again the British appeared concil­

Henlein, visiting England a few weeks after his 2

Karlsbad speech,

received assurances from ” important sources11

h n Search of Peace» p. 8 8 . ^The purpose of Henlein* s ’’surprise visit” was not clear, but, headlined the New York Times, '’British Hope of Czech Peace Rises,” May 13, 1938, p. 1*

81 1 that England would not be apt to fight*

On May 10,

Chamberlain himself apparently told a group of American and Canadian journalists that neither France nor England could fight for the defense of the Czechs even if they wanted to, that Czechoslovakia "could not survive in its present form,* and that "frontier revisions might be advisable*

This was, it would now seem, indicative of

the official British attitude.

Gedye reports that "as early

as March, April and May, 1938, persons responsible for the carrying out of British foreign policy towards Czechoslovakia told me that the aim was to prevent the Czechs defending themselves against the German threat.

Nicolson, oj>. cit., p. 79. o Joseph Driscoll, "Chamberlain Suggests Czech Revision Necessary," p. 5, in the Montreal Star N e w s , May 14, 1938* 3 G.E.R. Gedye, Betrayal in Central Europe, p. 496* On April 28, however, Daladier, the hew French premier, he 3d a hurried conference with Chamberlain at which French and British agreed to "continue to develop their policy of con­ sultation and collaboration for defense not only of their common interests but also those ideals of national and inter­ national life which had united their two countries." The "Military Alliance Binds Two Nations to Fight Together but Evades the Grounds," said the New York Times (April 30, 1938), p* 6 * British and French ministers to Prague so informed the Czech Foreign Office, at the same time urging the Czechs to make all possible concessions to Hitler*

82 During the third week in May, rumors began to develop of German army concentrations on the Czech border.

1

Coupled

as was this veiled threat with intense German press activity, these mysterious movements stirred the Czechs to action. On Friday, May 20, 400,000 Czech soldiers were ordered to war stations along the frontier, and one class of reserves was called up.

The French and British governments issued new

warnings to Berlin.

2

The French government, in particular,

made its position appear uncompromising, issuing a statement to the effect that wif Germany crosses the Czech frontier, that will automatically start war, and France will furnish 3 help to the uttermost .11 Although the German press continued to fulminate, nothing in the way of an invasion occurred, and by the end of May the Czech reserves were being sent home, and the world breathed more easily. Whether or not this prelude to the big show had sig­ nificance may never be known.

In England, the feeling for

the next few months seemed to be that the Czech crisis was over; that the Axis, met with a show of force, had backed down.

Mr. Chamberlain, dismissing Parliament for the

X For news of the events of the troubled week-end of May 21, see New York Times issues of May 20, 21, 22 and 23. p

^Dalton, op. c i t ., p. 70. Nicolson, op. cit., p. 80.

83 summer on July 26, was exceedingly optimistic*

Gone, he

felt, was the terrible tension of the past few months*

The

atmosphere, so heavy six months before, had inexplicably 1

lightened*

But from Germany throughout the. next two months

came word concerning increased military activity*

No one

outside Germany knew it at the time, but wone week after the May crisis, Adolf Hitler had given orders that there should be an immediate further increase in the German air forces and that every possible energy should be thrown into the task of bringing the great chain of fortifications along the French frontier.

• • to completion*”

And four times

throughout July and August the British Ambassador in Berlin was instructed to make representations to the effect that ^such abnormal (military) measures could not fail to be 3 interpreted abroad as a threatening gesture to Czechoslovakia .11 There are several possible explanations for the failure 4 of Germany to carry out an obvious threat. It is possible

^The Times, London (July 27, 1938), uMr. Chamberlain on His A i m s ,” p. 8 * ^Mlllis, o|>• cit., pp. 214-15* 2

Nicolson, o|>. cit., p* 81* 4

The Czechs were, at the time, working to come to some sort of agreement with Henlein. Whether they were in r e ­ ceipt of new terms directly from Hitler at the time of this first crisis neither German nor allied releases make clear*

84 that th© German military machine was not yet ready for in­ tensive action and that German military chiefs warned Hitler that any major war at the time might lead to disaster, and that the firm stand of the Czechs, French, British and Russians caused the Fiihrer to call a halt to proceedings which he had intended to carry through*

The intensifica­

tion of military action in Germany throughout the summer of 1938 would indicate that this interpretation might he correct.

It is possible also, however, that the entire

crisis was in the way of a false alarm by almost hysterical anti-Hazis.

The rumors of German military concentrations

in May were never later confirmed.

1

(3) The offering of reasonable terms. But the crisis was not over, nor was the diplomatic jockeying.

Early in July, British Foreign Secretary Lord

Halifax received a strange visitor, a certain Captain Fritz Vfiedemann, former superior to Adolf Hitler in the German army, now a sort of confidential adviser to the ex-corporal. Shortly after this strange visit, Halifax travelled to Paris where he talked long with French officials.

Directly

Or it may have been, as it has been suggested, merely that May is a poor time to start a war, if one is to be started at all. Most modern wars, including the World War of 1914-1918 and the present European War of 1939, were so timed as to begin at the end of the summer, after the crops were in. The later Munich crisis, at which Hitler proved more adamant, occurred, of course, in early autumn.

85 upon the Foreign Secretary’s return to London, the British announced that Lord Runciman, a well known figure in British politics, was to he sent on a special hut nentirely unoffi1

cialM mission to Prague.

The Runciman appointment was

apparently violently opposed hy the Czech government and not approved hy the French.

In the original British plan,

Runciman was to have heen designated as official ^mediator,” hut as the price of Czech acceptance this title was changed to °adviser ,11 and the status to that of ninvestigator, inde« 2 pendent of His Majesty's or any other government .11 The ,fwhyH of the Runciman investigation is still ohscure.

Dalton, whose writing is hound to he colored hy

its author's position on the opposition (lahor) benches in Parliament, remarks: executed visit —

nLord Runciman*s ill-conceived and ill-

he spent most of his week-ends, not with

the Czechs, hut in the castles of the German nohility — « 3 worse than u s e l e s s C e r t a i n l y indicative.

was

the choice of Runciman was

nMr. Chamberlain decided ,11 wrote New York Times

correspondent Kuhn, that nIt would he wise to send as a

***01iver Benson, Through the Diplomatic Looking Glass, p. 9. ^Ferdinand Kuhn in The New York Times, July 26, 1938, uBritain Will Name Runciman as Czech Mediator,M p. 1. ^Dalton, og. cit., p. 73.

86

mediator someone with authority enough to push the Czechs into some sort of an agreement which the Germans would accept^ way.

Chamberlain himself explained in his usual vague

Lord Buncixnan was going merely to investigate the

whole affair and to try to suggest something xywhich may help them,11 And the Prime Minister concluded that 11if only we could find a peaceful solution of this Czechoslovak question I should myself feel the way open again for a further effort for a general appeasement•

2

It is only too easy to see in

the Runciman mission, especially when viewed in connection with later events, part of a preconceived plan Involving all the developments destined to culminate at Munich,

Millis

wonders ^whether it was not Lord Runciman1s real task to break down the Czech resistance to such a proposal (for the ceding of the entire Sudetenland to Germany), managing affairs so that the Czechs would not or could not call upon France and Russia to defend them under their treaties and thus precipitate a war.”

Certainly the action of the

British government served to bring the German government Into the open as an active participant; with Lord Runcimanfs

^The New York Times, loc, cit, ^Dalton, loc, cit, ^Walter Millis, og. cit., p. 217,

87 assistance the Czecho-Sudeten problem uwas being transformed into an issue between Czechoslovakia and Nazi Germany*11 ^ Before the arrival in Prague of the British mediator on August 5, preliminary jockeying for position was already in progress between Henlein and Czech officials.

Discussions

had begun on June 14 on the basis of a proposal by the Czechs for a new nationalities law and a memorandum from Henlein embodying in general the eight points of the Karlsbad 2 address. Throughout the negotiations which followed, the German attitude was marked by the tendency to find nothing ^satisfactory11 and by the constant increase in German demands as the Czech government appeared to be approaching virtual surrender to previous German proposals. Runciman reached Prague on August 3 and immediately went into consultation with Czech and Sudeten leaders•

The

Czechs embodied most of the Runciman proposals in a nThird Plan,11 providing generally for Sudeten autonomy and ucantonization of Czechoslovakia*1 and handed it to Henlein on August 28.

Henlein promptly flew to Berchtesgaden to consult Hitler,

returning with the Nazi Puhrer’s flat rejection and the demand that settlement, if it were to be reached at all, must

1Ibid., p. 218. ^Henlein had flown to Berchtesgaden to visit Hitler on July 9; henceforth negotiations were to be more diffi­ cult.

88 b© on the basis of the eight-point program presented in June."** The German effort to confront the Czechs with •unaccept­ able demands is illustrated by the rapid change of the Nazi front after the presentation by the Czech government of its most far-reaching series of concessions, the so-called ^Fourth Q Plan11 on September 6* The ^Fourth Plan*- was virtually a complete surrender to the original Sudeten program*

Even

Lord Runciman, never too charitable to the Czech position, admitted that the new Czech proposals nembodied almost all the requirements of the Karlsbad eight points, and with a little clarification and extension could have been made to cover them all.^1

And Runciman adds a very pertinent obser­

vation when he says:

^Little doubt remains in my mind that

the very fact that they were so favorable operated against their chances•» 3 The **Fourth Plan,*1 when communicated to Hitler, must have come almost as a shock.

It was unacceptable to his

1 Millis, op. c i t *, p. 219. O

t.

The German version (in English) is contained in the German publication, News in Brief, September-November , 1938, Documents on the European Crisis * No. Ill , p. 148. ^**Lord Runciman to the Prime Minister,*1 British Pub­ lication: Miscellaneous No. 7, Correspondence Respecting Czechoslovakia, N o . l , p . 4 .

89 purposes, yet the time was not yet ripe, as later, for the admission that the Karlsbad program was "now not enough." There were other steps to be taken before the terms were strengthened.

These steps were taken soon enough, and nego­

tiations on the "Fourth Plan" were broken off almost imme­ diately until "the expiation of certain incidents (by the Czech government)

. • . will create the requisite atmosphere,

irremisible if negotiations are to be continued with any prospect of s u c c e s s O p e n e d again on the 10th, preliminary discussions were discontinued once more on the 13th following "further incidents," a remarkable address by Hitler at Nurem­ berg, the declaration of martial law in "certain areas" by the Czech government, and an ultimatum by the Sudetendeutsohe Partei demanding the immediate withdrawal of state police from the Sudetenland.

2

On the 14th Henlein gave the show away.

Negotiations, he said, could still be resumed, "though the eight Carlsbad demands could not provide the basis, for the 3 right of self-determination would now have to be considered." And on the 15th, following more of the local "incidents" now such a regular part of the program, the Sudeten leader added:

^■Report of the Deutsches Nachrichenburo, News in Br i e f , op., cit., p. 149. 2 It>ld., No. V, p. 154.

^Ibld., p. 155.

”We want to live as free German human beings I We want to have peace and work once more in our homeland I We want to go home to the Reich (4)

The discovery of incidents; charges of persecu­ tion and inability of the victim state to pre­ serve order*

On the same day on which the ’’Fourth Plan” was delivered to the Sudeten leaders, a huge annual party demonstration opened at Nuremberg*

Scheduled to last through a week of

parades and oratory, the '’Party Congress” was to be climaxed by a speech by the F&hrer himself on the last day*

Henlein

flew to Nuremberg to stay as Hitler1s guest* Already during the last part of August, ’’incidents” in keeping with the stage which the crisis had reached were being reported in the world-wide press*

On August 26 the

headquarters of the Sudeten-German party had been ’’forced to withdraw*

♦ • the instructions issued (to party members)

. • • which renounce the right of self-defense” because of ”the recent attacks on our comrades and members of our o national group by Marxian terrorists*” Czech ’’press agita­ tion”was also said to have led to 11grave calumniations of

Ibid., p. 156* ltHome to the Reich” reads better than it is* The Sudetenland was, of course, part of the pre­ war Austro-Hungarian Empire, not part of pre-War Germany*

2rbld.» p. 47.

91 the German army," necessitating the Reich government to deliver "two sharp diplomatic protests11 to Prague. V/ith the opening of the Nuremberg Congress, the rate of incidents across the border was properly accelerated to the point where, as we have seen, they "caused*1 the breaking off of the erstwhile negotiations.

.

The timing of and cir­

cumstances surrounding these events makes them subject to considerable suspicion.

"It is my belief," reported Runciman

later, "that the incident arising out of the visit of certain Sudeten German Deputies to investigate into the case of persons arrested for arms smuggling at Mahrisch-Ostran was used in order to provide an excuse for the suspension, if » 2 not for the breaking off, of negotiations.” and again:

I am convinced that this (resumption of negotiations on September 10) did not suit the policy of the Sudeten extremists, and that incidents were provoked and insti­ gated on the 11th September and, with greater effect after Herr Hitler?s speech, on the 12th September. Czech proclamation of martial law throughout the Sudetenland on September 13 merely Increased the conflict within the little country, and, as we have seen, the Sudeten leaders demanded its repeal.

Following the taking of "further measures"

h*>ia.. p. 47. % r l t l a h Correspondence respecting Czechoslovakia. p. 4. Loc. cit*

92 by the Czech government on September 16, the gravamen of the Sudeten charge changed from **inability to keep order11 to ^persecution.**

The Henlein ^appeal*1 —

issued from Germany,

where the Sudeten leader had now taken permanent refuge following a Czech order for his arrest for l*treason** —

of

September 17 is a curious mixture of the two accusations* nIn recent years,** he railed, 11the Czech wielders of power have let the mask fall.

The Prague government are no longer

masters of the situation against the Bolshevist-Hussite elements of the Czech nation.

...

In full knowledge of the

consequences, he (Benes) launches against the defenseless Sudeten-Germans with the Bolshevist-Hussite mob in the uni1 forms and formation of the hate-filled Czech Soldateska.** This same latter theme was further developed by the Sudeten leader on the next day*

**Sudeten Germans iw he appealed, **The

reign of terror of the Hussite-Bolshevist evil-doers in Prague still weighs upon you.

The Czech powers are trying

to suppress the liberty of the Sudeten-Germans with machine guns, tanks, and cannons*

Unspeakable suffering is the

result.**2

^Hews in Brief * o p . cit., p. 158* 2 Ibld., p. 160.

93 It Is quite probable that the hue and cry over "inci­ dents11 consisted of one part of truth to nine pafrts of exaggeration, another indication of the "manufactured" nature of the crisis*

While official German sources Insisted

in almost hysterical language^ that the situation in the Sudetenland during these early — —

and frequently interrupted

negotiations "was fast assuming the chaotic character of

civil war,"

Runciman, who may be taken as somewhat more

neutral, though not entirely so, claimed that when he "left Prague on the 16th September, the riots and disturbances in the Sudeten areas, which had never been more than sporadic, had died down*"

The more extreme Sudeten leaders had fled

to Germany, where they were "issping proclamations defying the Gzecho-Slovak Government*

I have been creditably in­

formed," the British peer concludes, "that, at the time of my leaving,

the number of killed on both sides was not more

than 70.

. . • I have no reason to expect any notable renewal 2 of incidents and disturbances." Runciman recommended the immediate withdrawal of the "extremely unpopular" State Police*

1 Ibid., p. 156*

2

Correspondence respecting Czechoslovakia» p. 6*

94 (5)

Speeding up of press and speech campaign; charges of ^atrocity” and *insult.”

The ^chaotic character” of the situation in the Sudetenland formed an excellent background for the press and speech campaign which was to accelerate all through the month of September.

Indeed, by the time the Nuremberg Congress was

well along on its career of parades and rallies, ”the German press campaign passed all limits." 1 It is possible once more that apparent British weakness gave the nG o u signal to the developments in the Reich.

On

September 7, the day after the Nazi convention opened in Nuremberg, the London Times, sometimes regarded as the 11off I2 cial voice” of the British Conservative Party then in power, published what was to become a famous editorial. was more than conciliatory toward the Nazis.

The tone

The Times, in

its usual sedate manner, suggested that uit might b© worth­ while for the Czechoslovak. Government to consider whether they should exclude altogether the project, which has found favor in some quarters, of making Czechoslovakia a more homogeneous State by the secession of that fringe of alien populations who are contiguous to the nation with which they are united by race.

. . the advantages to Czechoslovakia

•^Millis, o c i t . , o

p. 220.

^Unjustly” so regarded, says Nicolson, oj>. cit. , p. 81.

95 might conceivably outweigh the obvious disadvantages of losing the Sudeten German districts of the borderland.

Al­

though the British government denied, of course, responsi­ bility for the statement, this denial was not strengthened when, on the 11th, the Foreign Office withdrew na press statement which affirmed Anglo-French solidarity, in defer­ ence to a non-commital statement which Chamberlain.

• • made

at the same time.1* ^ So far had the situation gone when the Ffthrer, to the accompaniment of nSieg Heil, Sieg Heil, Sieg Heiliu from an immense crowd, mounted the rostrum in Nuremberg on September 3 12. His speech was astonishingly vituperative as he con­ demned for well over an hour uthat liar Benes and the crim„ 4

inal government at Prague•

He spoke as one deeply

^The Times, London, September 7, 1938, editorial: l,Nuremberg and Russia,1* p. 13. ^Benson, op. cit., p. 10* ^The speech was broadcast throughout the world. It is doubtful if anyone who listened to his radio that night will ever forget the enthusiasm — spontaneous or stimulated — which filled the audience throughout the long, dramatic wait which preceded the FuhrerTs appearance, nor the tremendous ovation — stimulated or spontaneous — which greeted his spotlighted entrance, nor the hysterical tone of Hitlerrs voice as he described the ^terrorization1* of his ’^comrades in the Sudetenland.** The entire speech is No. V. of the documents given in News in Brief, pp. c i t ., pp. 150-53*

4Ibld., p. 150.

96 insulted as he cried:

”lt becomes unbearable for us.

♦ ♦

when a great German people, apparently defenseless, is delivered to shameless ill treatment and exposed to threats.” Bitterly he railed of treatment of the Sudeten Germans by the Czechs.

The Sudeten Deutsch, he said, ttare being

oppressed in an inhuman and intolerable manner. struck for wearing white stockings.

• • brutally

• • terrorized or ma l ­

treated because they greet with a form of salutation which is agreeable to them.

• • pursued like wild beasts for every

expression of their national life.”

2

Hitler struck the new keynote of the Nazi campaign at Nuremberg.

The talk of Czech 11terror” and ”perse cut ion” was

to be reiterated over and over again by the Nazi press and Nazi speaker between September 12 and the time of the Munich meeting.

The Fdhrer himself was to cap the climax of this

phase of the Nazi strategy on September 26 when he delivered 3 another lengthy diatribe in the Sportpalast in Berlin. The Sportpalast speeeh was replete with references to Czech ^tyranny,” ^bestiality,” and ”shamefulness•”

In it Hitler

referred feelingly to the ”well-nigh 600,000 Germans.

. •

who had to leave Czechoslovakia” between 1918 and 1938 and 3-Ibid., p. 151. %iOC. cit. ^The Sportpalast address is given in toto in N ews4in Brief, o£. c i t ., pp. 168-73.

97 the w214,000 forced to flee1* since May of 1938 from ^Benes* new answer, new deaths, new imprisonments, new arrests#* (6)

Threats', .military maneuvers * ' :

: v.'

'

The regular German military maneuvers were scheduled to begin on August 15#

But as the fateful day approached

and German reserves were called up by the hundred thousand, rumors began to drift out of the country that the ^maneuvers1* were tlbeing planned on a scale which began to look more like mobilization and less and less like maneuvers.

. . people in

half a dozen capitals were quite seriously laying bets as to whether the 15th of the month would prove *the Day* « 2 scheduled for the start of a second great European w a r # * Throughout late August and all of September the German army continued to conduct strange military movements near the Czech border which —

perhaps intentionally —

caused sus­

picion in the foreign press* Meanwhile, the Hitler press carried constant reference 3 to German military strength, and the Hitler speeches contain

1Ibld., p. 171.

2

Millis, og# c i t * * p# 218#

2 Benson, og* cit*, p. 12.

98 reiterated reference to the improving state of German arms Nor does the Filhrer leave it much in doubt that these arms would be employed, if necessary, to bring his “Sudeten Kamaraden11 once again into the bosom of the Reich.

At

Nuremberg he shouted to a listening world: I demand that the oppression of three and a half million Germans in Czechoslovakia shall cease and be replaced by the free right of self-determination. An end must be made of depriving these people of their rights. • . if these tortured creatures cannot obtain rights and assistance by themselves they can obtain both from us.* In the Sportpalast address, as we shall see, the Fdhrer was to make his intentions even more plain. (7)

Reassurance to other nations that this is the end of Nazi demands.

Reassurance to other powers constitutes an essential part of the Hitler program of “white warfare.'1

The world

must feel that if it but allows this one change in the status q u o , it may achieve “Peace in our time.'1

Essentially, such

reassurance is the essence of the Mone-step-at-a-timen tech­ nique which Hitler himself described so adequately in Mein Kampf and employed so successfully between 1932 and the

^The Nuremberg address reviews at some length the growth of German military might. News in Brief, oj>. cit., p. 152. See also the Sportpalast address, ibid., p. 172.

2Xbid., p. 151.

99 1 outbreak of war in 1939; during each of the Hitler-created crises which rocked Europe throughout those seven years, the Fiihrer swore by bell, book and candle the peaceful nature of his future intentions. —

**Big Lies1* each —

A list of these averments

makes an impressive array.

Throughout the last days of the Czechoslovakia crisis Hitler once more told a ’’Big Lie.**

Over again he reiterated

his promise of friendship to England and France, as in an interview with Ward Price on the 19th in which he said that !tNo one in Germany dreams of attacking France. no resentment against France. war with either.

We harbour

• • • Nor does any German want

And in the Sportpalast speech of the

26th he made two statements to the world —

statements to

take on increasing importance as later developments unfurled. 4 Said the Fuhrer: **We want no Czechs at all.** And he aver5 red with a pound of his fist for emphasis: ”It (the Sudeten settlement) is the last territorial claim which I have to

1

Cf. ante, pp. 48-49.

2 The London News Chronicle published such a list in . its issue of September 28, 1938, the day of Munich, **Hitlerfs Promises,1* p. 12.

^Ward Price in the London Daily M a i l , September 19, ’’interview with der Fiihrer: Germany Wants Peace,’* p. 7. ^News in B r i e f , o g . c i t ., p . 173.

5Ihid., p. 170.

100 make in E u r o p e B r i t i s h and French apologists were later to seize eagerly upon these words* (8)

Terms; more ,severe ; the ult imatum•..

German demands became steadily more severe after Hitler officially declared himself at Nuremberg*

The situation

looked serious indeed, with German forces threatening the Czech border and the Reich press in a frenzy of hatred for the little state.

In these circumstances the British Prime

Minister, in whose hands allied policy very largely lay, decided upon what appeared to be a wise course. to Adolf Hitler a personal note in which he said:

He wrote uIn view

of the increasingly critical situation, I propose to come over at once to see you with the view of trying to find a peaceful solution.w ^ The Prime Minister flew to Berchtesgaden on the 15th and met with Hitler for three hours.

German sources fail to

review the meeting other than to describe the rousing recep­ tion given to the Prime Minister by the German populace and to add that the informal conversation was followed by tea* But Chamberlain, speaking to the Commons on September 28, revealed that it had accomplished little*

^Quoted in Millis, og. cit., p. 222.

The Ffthrer was

101 ^polite1* but

Indeed, said the British leader,

Hitler made it 11perfectly definite11 that he mj»ant to bring the Sudetens back into the Reich —

which could hardly be

done under the Karlsbad demands, then the basis of the official German position —

and 11that rather than wait, he

would be prepared to risk a world war*11'*’ Indeed, the Nazi leader made his determination so plain that Chamberlain finally llasked him why he had allowed me to travel all that way, since I was evidently wasting my time* H 2 The conver­ sation closed with a Nazi promise that no invasion would be attempted until Chamberlain had had time nto consult his government *“ The position in which the Allied governments were now placed was a delicate one*

Stopping Hitler could be done

only at the terrible risk of a gigantic war*

On the other

hand, continued ^appeasement11 meant the sacrifice of a strong, although small, ally and of considerable prestige in the eyes of the other small states in eastern Europe*

Both

horns of the dilemma were sharp, but in the eyes of the conservative British government, still hoping, perhaps, that Hitler’s hidden aim was Russia, the latter horn appeared to

1

In Search of Peace, p* 187*

2

hoc* cit *

102 toe the less dangerous. 1 into the Nazi maw.

It determined to throw Czechoslovakia

Early on the morning of Sunday, September 18, Premier Daladier and his Foreign Minister arrived in London.

They

conferred with their British counterparts all day, and toy evening their decision was out.

2

The Anglo-French proposals

presented to the Czechoslovak government the next day incor3 porated 11all that Herr Hitler had asked for11 and demanded virtually complete surrender toy the Czechs. We (Daladier and Chamberlain) are tooth convinced (read the Allied letter to the Czechs) that, after recent events, the point has now been reached where the further maintenance within the boundaries of the Czecho­ slovak State of the districts mainly inhabited toy S u ­ deten Deutsch cannot, in fact, continue any longer without imperilling the interests of Czechoslovakia her­ self and of European peace. In the light of these con­ siderations, tooth Governments have been compelled to the conclusion that the maintenance of peace and the safety of Czechoslovakia’s vital interests cannot effectively toe assured unless these areas are now transferred to the Reich. This could toe done either toy direct transfer or as the result of a plebiscite. . . . We anticipate. • • that you may prefer. • • the method of direct transfer. The area for transfer would have to include areas with over 50 per cent of German inhabitants. . . . We are satisfied that the transfer of smaller areas based

^ C f ., ibid., p. 188. ^See The New York Times, September 19, "Britain and France Accept Hitler Demands on Czechs,1' p. 1. 3 Chamberlain to the Commons, September 28. In Search of Peace, p. 187.

103 on a higher percentage would not meet the case.

1

But the Allies recognized that the transfer of its nGod-created fortress* (to which divine handiwork the Czechs had added considerable improvement in the form of a nMaginot . line*) would leave the Czechoslovak state at the mercy of the Nazis.

Accordingly,

. . . His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom would he prepared, as a contribution to the pacifica­ tion of Europe, to join in an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against u n ­ provoked aggression. One of the principal conditions of such a guarantee would be the safeguarding of the independence of Czechoslovakia by the substitution of a general guarantee against unprovoked aggression in place of existing treaties which involve reciprocal obligations of a military character.^ Little time was given the Czech officials in which to reach an exceedingly difficult decision, since The Prime Minister must resume conversations with Herr Hitler not later than Wednesday (the 21st), and earlier if possible. We therefore feel we must ask for your reply at the earliest possible moment.5 The answer to the Czech government on the 20th was a flat *No.*

The plan, said the Czechs, was unacceptable;

arbitration at The Hague might do as a substitute proposal.

^•Documents respecting Czechoslovakia, pp. 8-9. plan is contained in toto on these pages.

4

The

2Ibid., p. 9. ^L o c . cit. 4ttpirst Czechoslovak Reply to Anglo-French Plan.* Cited in Benson, o p . cit., p. 13. This reply, curiously enough, is not in the British white paper on Czechoslovakian developments before Munich. Cf. also Gedye, og. cit., pp. 448-49.

104 It is still not too clear what pressure was applied between the time of this Czech refusal and the morning of September 21, when the Prague radio announced that **The Czechoslovakian government has been compelled by the irresistible pressure of the British and French governments to accept, under great affliction, the proposals prepared in London."

A communi­

que announcing that nThe government accepts the proposals as a whole and places special emphasis on the principle of the guaranties"

was handed to the British and French

ministers to Prague by the Czech foreign office on the next day. The wringing of this acceptance from President Benes and his governmental colleagues must have been a none too easy task.

It seems that on the night of September 20-21,

at 2:15, the British and French ministers at Prague roused 3 Benes from his bed and demanded a change of front. They n threatened*1 not only nabandonment by the British and French11 4 but also immediate attack by Poland and Hungary, both of which states were making threatening gestures toward b e ­ leaguered Czechoslovakia because of national minorities n The New York Times, September 22, 1938, ^Czechoslovakia Decides to Give TJp,ttp. 1. p

Ibid., September 23. This communique also is strange­ ly missing from the British white paper. ^Benson, op. cit., p. 13. 4Gedye, ££. cit., p. 450.

105 within the Czech frontiers.

Jan Masaryk, Czech minister to

London, was later to remind the British foreign office: nHis Majesty’s and the French Governments are very well aware that we agreed under the most severe presstire to the so-called

Anglo-French plan for ceding parts of Czecho­

slovakia.

We accepted this plan under supreme duress.

We

had not even time to make any representations about its ' unworkable features.w ^

And Chamberlain was to admit to

the Commons on September 28 that the British and French had 2 ^forced the Czechs to accept11 the Allied proposals. Meanwhile, on September 21, Chamberlain’s friend, Lord Hunciman, had presented his report.

Having returned

to London on September 16 following the break-down of nego­ tiations between Henlein and Benes, Runciman had already conferred with the Prime Minister before the drawing up of the Anglo^Frenchhproposals; it is thus possible that the investigator’sw counsels were instrumental in the creation of the Anglo-French plan, for its proposals bear a curious similarity to his recommendations. Runciman’s report showed Hmuch sympathy. Sudeten case.

• . with the

It is a hard thing to be ruled by an alien

Documents respecting Czechoslovakia, p. 16.

2

In Search of Peace, p. 188.

106 race,11 wrote the mediator, **and I have been left with the impression that Czechoslovak rule in the Sudeten areas for the last twenty years, though not actively oppressive and certainly not t e r r o r i s t i c , 1 has been marked by tactless­ ness, lack of understanding, petty intolerance and discrim­ ination, to a point where the resentment of the German population was inevitably moving in the direction of revolt*11 Furthermore, Local irritations were added to* • ♦ major grievances* Czech officials and Czech police, speaking little or no German, were appointed in large numbers to purely German districts; Czech agricultural colonists were encouraged to settle on land transferred under the Land Reform in the middle of German populations;. • • there is a very general belief that Czech firms were favored as against German firms. • • and that the State provided work and relief for Czechs more readily than for Germans. I believe these complaints to be in the main justified* Even as late as the time of my Mission, I could find no readiness on the part of the Czechoslovak Government to remedy them on anything like an adequate scale •-*Consequently, therefore, Runciman recommended ^immediate and drastic action11 in the settling of the Sudeten problem: . . . it has become self-evident to me that those frontier districts between Czechoslovakia and Germany where the Sudeten population is in an important majority should be given full right of self-determination at once. If some cession is inevitable, as I believe it to be, it is as .well that it should be done promptly and without procrastination. There is real danger, even a danger of civil war, in the continuance of a state of uncertainty. . . . Any kind of plebiscite or referendum would, I believe, be a sheer formality in respect of

^Documents respecting Czechoslovakia, p* 5*

107 these predominantly German areas. . .' I consider that these frontier districts should at once he transferred from Czechoslovakia to Germany, and, further, that measures for their peaceful transfer should he arranged forthwith hy agreement between the two Governments*^* Runciman realized, however, the extreme vulnerability of the Czechoslovakia that would remain.

ttJust as it is

essential for the international position of Switzerland that her policy should be entirely neutral, so an analogous policy is necessary for Czechoslovakia —

not only for her own fhture

existence but for the peace of Europe.11

In order to achieve

this end he asked . . . That the principal Powers, acting in the inter­ ests of the peace of Europe, should give to Czechoslovakia guarantees of assistance in case of unprovoked aggres­ sion against h e r .2 There is evident a distinct similarity between the Runciman proposals and the Anglo-French plan of September 19. Whether the Plan grew from the Report, or whether the report was so written as to agree with a pre-decided Plan, as 3 Dorothy Thompson suggests, is difficult to say. Both Plan and Report, however, must have pleased the master of Berchtesgaden.

^Ibid., p. 6. ^ Ibid., p. 7.

3

Let the Record Speak* pp. 230-232.

108 Yet when Chamberlain visited Hitler at Godesberg on the 23rd, the Anglo-French proposals were !,not enough*’1 An exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and the Fdhrer, before their scheduled conversation, revealed Chamberlain willing —

even anxious —

to cooperate in

delivering the Sudetenland and Hitler grateful that ”at last, after twenty years, the British Government, repre­ sented by your Excellency, has now decided for its part.

. .

to undertake steps to put an end to a situation which from day to day, and, indeed, from hour to hour, is becoming 1 unbearable•” But the exchange revealed also that Hitler might prove a difficult man with whom to cooperate and that his terms might continue to prove elusive.

He wrote;

I cannot conceal from your Excellency that the great mistrust with which I am inspired leads me to believe that the acceptance of the principle of the transfer of Sudeten Germans to the Reich by the Czech Government is only given in the hope thereby to win time so as, by one means or another, to bring about a change in contradiction to this principle. . . • My knowledge of Czech practice in such matters over a period of long years compels me to assume the insin­ cerity of Czech assurances so long as they are not implemented by practical proof. The German Reich is, however, determined by one means or another to termi­ nate these attempts, which have lasted for decades, to deny by dilatory methods the legal claims of oppressed peoples *

^ T h e Reichschancellor to the Prime Minister,” Cor­ respondence respecting Czechoslovakia,” pp* 11-12*

^Ibid., p . 13♦

109 The premonition which must have struck Chamberlain as he read this communication was justified; the memorandum which was given to him by the Piihrer for delivery to Prague asked for more than Hitler had before demanded.

The pro­

posals made by the German government with a view ^to bringing about an immediate and final solution of the Sudeten German problem11 read as follows: 1.

Withdrawal of the whole Czech armed forces, the police, the gendarmerie, the customs officials and the frontier guards from the area to be evacuated as designated on the attached map, this area to be handed over to Germany on the 1st Octo­ ber*

2.

The evacuated territory is to be handed over in its present condition. . . . The German Govern­ ment agree that a plenipotentiary representative of the Czech Government or of the Czech Army should be attached to the headquarters of the German military forces to settle the details of the modalities of the evacuation*

3*

The Czech Government discharges at once to their homes all Sudeten Germans serving in the military forces or the police anywhere in Czech State ter­ ritory.

4*

The Czech Government liberates all political prison ers of German race*

5*

The German Government agrees to permit a plebis­ cite to take place in those areas, which will be more definitely defined, before at latest the 25th November. Alterations in the new frontier arising out of the plebiscite will be settled by a GermanCzech or an international commission* All persons who were residing in the areas in question on the 28th October, 1918, or were born there prior to this date will be eligible to vote. A simple major­ ity of all eligible male and female voters will determine the desire of the population to belong

110

to either the German Reich or to the Czech State* During the plebiscite both parties will with­ draw their military forces out of areas which will be defined more precisely* The date and dura­ tion will be settled by the German and Czech Gov­ ernments together* 6.

The German Government proposes that an authori­ tative German-Czech commission should, be set up to settle all further details.1

These stiff proposals were made even more severe by the provisions of an appendix: The evacuated Sudeten German area is to be handed over without destroying or rendering unusable in any way mili­ tary, commercial or traffic establishments (plants)* These include the ground organization of the air service and all wireless stations. All commercial and traffic materials, especially the rolling-stock of the railway system, in the designated areas, are to be handed over undamaged. The same applies to all utility services (gas-works, power stations, &c.)* Finally, no food-stuffs, goods, cattle, raw materials, &c., are to be removed.2 Accompanying this strange communication was a map, more or less arbitrarily drawn, showing in red the sections of the soon-to-be mutilated Czechoslovakian State to be handed over immediately to the Uazis and in green the sections in which a later plebiscite would be held.

This map is not

given in the German sources, but the 11sketch map based upon

^Correspondence respecting Czechoslovakia, pp. 15-16. Virtually identical version in News in Brief, op. cit., pp. 166-167.

Ibid., p. 16.

Ill the original,11 appended to the first British white paper on on Czechoslovakian developments shows the marked districts 1 to exceed by some amount the predominantly German areas. One area destined by the drawing for a plebiscite is vir­ tually in the center of the country, around Iglau. Thus the German proposals differed from the BritishFrench in four important ways:

(1) the map, (2) the pro­

posal of the immediate withdrawal of Czech officials, (3) the demand for the Czech cession of all materials in workable condition, and (4) the setting of a one-week time limit. That the gap between the two opposing parties had been, if anything, widened since Czech surrender to previous Hitler propositions is apparent. Chamberlain was obviously disheartened.

ttIn my

capacity as intermediary, it is evidently now my duty — since your Excellency maintains entirely the position you took last night —

to put your proposals before the Czecho­

slovak Government,n he wrote to Hitler.

nSince the accept­

ance or refusal of your Excellencyfs proposal is now a matter for the Czechoslovak Government to decide, I do not p see that I can perform any further service here.11 . At the

^Ibid., opposite p. 22. The absence of this map from German source materials seems significant and gives weight to the drastic nature of the British ncopy.” 2 Ibld., p. 14.

112 same time, the following message was delivered to the Czech government by the British and French ministers at Prague: We have agreed with the French Government that the Czechoslovak Government be informed that the French and British Governments cannot continue to take tho responsibility of advising them not to mobilise*1 The Czechs took immediate heed to this advice, and once again it appeared that they would refuse to take the demanded Mone further step.1*

nMy Government has now studied

the document and the map,w wrote Minister Masaryk to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the 25th* It is a de facto ultimatum of the sort usually pre­ sented to a vanquished nation and not a proposition to a sovereign State which has shown the greatest possible readiness to make sacrifices for the appeasement of E u r o p e . Not the smallest trace of such readiness for sacrifices has as yet been manifested by Herr Hitler*s Government* My Government is amazed at the contents of the memorandum. The proposals go far beyond what we agreed to in the so-called Anglo-French plan* They deprive us of every safeguard for our national exist­ ence. We are to yield up large proportions of our carefully prepared defences, and admit the German armies deep into our country before we have been able to organise it on the new basis or make any preparations for its de ­ fence. Our national and economic independence would auto­ matically disappear with the acceptance of Herr Hitler1s plan.^ As to Czech acceptance or refusal of the new plan Masaryk was determined.

Ibid., p. 17. Ibid., p. 17.

113 My Government wish me to declare in all solemnity that Herr Hitler’s demands in their present form are absolutely and unconditionally unacceptable to my Government* Against these new and cruel demands my Government feel bound to make their utmost resistance, and we shall do so, God helping* The nation of St* Wenceslas, John Huss and Thomas Masaryk will not be a nation of slaves*^ All Europe was now in the midst of a full-bodied war scare*

The British fleet was fully mobilized; the French

called another half million men to the colors; workmen in Paris and London began frantically digging air-raid shelters in the public parks; gas masks were hurriedly distributed throughout England.

A statement made public by the British

Foreign Office declared that Britain and Russia would both stand by France should she go to the aid of her little ally.

2

Into the midst of this scene of hysteria, Hitler threw another vocal bomb*

Speaking at the Sportpalast

3

in

Berlin on Monday, the 26th, the Ffthrer reiterated and defended the Godesberg demands (and his own drawing of the frontiers 4 since ”1 am juster than Benes.” Hitler heaped abuse and

Loc. cit* 2

For news of these frantic days, see The Hew York Times, issues of September 25 through September 2^. ^Entire speech in Hews in B r i e f , o p * cit., pp. 168-

173. 4Ibid., p. 172.

114 villification upon the Czechs and their President, using such expressions as '’liars,1* "murderers," and "cheats#" "With regard to the Sudeten German problem," he shouted, "my patience is now at an end. with him (Benes) .

• • • The decision now lies 1 Peace or war. • . . We are resolved l"

Meanwhile, President Roosevelt, in line with the policy which he was to follow even more vigorously a year later when the Polish crisis had arisen, tried intervention.

On

September 26 he sent telegraphic appeals, based on the Kellogg-Briand Pact, to all four interested parties, Hitler, Benes, Chamberlain and Daladier, not to break off negotia-

2 tions over the Sudeten question.

The Allies, sensing an

active sympathizer, were quick to reply with praise for the 3 President’s words and promises to heed them well. Hitler’s position forbade such an

answer.

Accordingly his return

wire reminded the President of the history of the Sudetenland since Versailles and of the President’s own belief in selfdetermination; he added that the cession of the disputed areas could no longer be

delayed and that he must decline

German responsibility if

further developments should lead

to

1Ibld., p. 173. O The New York Times, September 26. "Roosevelt Appeals to Hitler and Benes to Negotiate," p. 1. Text of message, P* 4. Ibid., September 27. "Three Nations in Reply Praise R o o s e v e l t p . 1.

115 1 an outbreak of hostilities*

The P r e s i d e n t s return wire

instructed the Fdhrer that past errors must not doom the world to war today*

2

This exchange made up a part of frantic negotia­ tions continuing in Europe*

On Tuesday morning, the 27th,

Chamberlain, through Sir Horace Wilson, informed the German:; Chancellor that if Germany marched, France and England would 3 support Czechoslovakia* This warning was sandwiched into an exchange of letters on the 26th and 27th in which the Prime Minister and the Fiihrer reiterated their positions on the question of immediate occupation*

Chamberlain on the

26th requested **that representatives of Germany.

• « meet

representatives of the Czechoslovakian Government.

• • with

a view to settling by agreement the way in which the terri4 tory is to be handed over*1; Hitler in reply repeated his distrust of dilatory Czech practice, promised a ^formal guarantee for the remainder of Czechoslovakia1* and left it to Chamberlain’s judgment as to whether the British govern-

^"Ibid., September 28,{ nText of Hitler’s Reply to President’s Peace Plea,n p* 10. ^Ibid., **Text of Roosevelt’s Plea,** p* 9* ^Chamberlain to the Commons, September 28* of Peace * p. 196*

In Search

^Correspondence respecting Czechoslovakia, p* 20* Chamberlain had the day before secured consent of the Czechs to such a meeting* Ibid., p. 18.

116 ment should continue its efforts to "bring the Government in Prague to reason at the very last hour." 1 Tuesday evening, with the situation appearing to be almost hopeless, the British Prime Minister went on the air to deliver a grave address.

Although serious, however,

Mr. Chamberlain was still a little vague.

He told the

English people of Hitler’s adamance and promised to meet fire with fire.

He informed them of his own state of mind,

that if he "were convinced that any nation had made up its mind to dominate the world by fear of force, I should n 2 feel that it must be resisted.' But he did not burn his bridges.

He referred to the plight of Czechoslovakia as a

"quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing.

...

However much we may sympathize with a

small nation confronted by a big and powerful nation," he said, "we cannot in all circumstances undertake to involve the ushole British Empire in war simply on her account." And he reassured his audience that "after this SudetenGerman question is settled, that is the end of Germany’s 3 territorial.ambitions in Europe."

1 Ibid., p. 22. ^ In Search of Peace, p. 175.

Srbid., p. 176.

117 In keeping with this latter sentiment, on the next morning he directed two Ttpersonal messages ,11 one to Hitler and the other to HitlerTs Axis partner, Mussolini* Hitler Chamberlain was almost humble.

To

nI feel certain,** he

wrote, **that you can get all essentials without war and without delay**; and he offered to come to Berlin and to guarantee with the power of the British and French govern1

ments the promises which Prague might make.

To Mussolini

Chamberlain directed an urgent appeal that the Italian Duce intercede in Berlin: German Chancellor

nI trust your Excellency will inform

jsio^jthat you are willing to be represented

(at the proposed conference) and urge him to agree to my proposal which will keep all our peoples out of war.1-

It

was to be at Mussolini*s request that Hitler was to agree at 11:40 the next day, two hours and 40 minutes before the 3 zero hour, to postpone mobilization. At 2:45 on the afternoon of September 28 the House of Commons, summoned b y the Prime Minister, assembled in

^British publication Miscellaneous Ho. 7, Further Documents respecting Czechoslovakia, p. 2.

2

Loc. cit.

^Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission, p. 170. The Haliau Ambassador to Berlin, Signor Attolico, paid four visits to Hitler in three hours on the morning of **that supreme­ ly critical Wednesday , 11 and fphoned to Rome some 20 times. The British Ambassador makes much of Mussolini*s appeals to Hitler,

118 anxious mood.

The scene has been touchingly described by

an eye witness.^

Chamberlain, looking nhaggard and w o r n ,11

began to detail the story of the negotiations since May. He had reached the events of the twelve hours Just past when 4la stir was noticed in the Peer’s gallery.

Lord Halifax,

who had been listening intently, was suddenly seen to leave his place.

A minute later a sheet of paper was passed down

the Treasury bench.

It was handed to Sir John Simon who

glanced at it and then tugged at the Prime Minister’s coat. Mr. Chamberlain ceased speaking, adjusted his pince nez, and read the document which Sir John held up to him. whole features, his whole body seemed to change.

His

He raised

his face so that the light from the ceiling fell full upon it.

The lines of anxiety and weariness seemed suddenly to

have been smoothed out.

For a few minutes longer he con­

tinued his narrative of events.

And then he disclosed the

nature of the communication which he had that moment received. ’I hav e , 1 he said, ’something further to announce to the House yet.

I have been informed by Herr Hitler that he

invites me to meet him at Munich tomorrow morning.

He has

insisting that ^nothing but Haliau intervention could well have forced open the door which Hitler had slammed behind him at the Sportpalast. on the Monday•w L o c • cit•

"Sjicoison, 22* c i t ., pp. 88-91.

119 also invited Signor Mussolini and M. Daladier.

Signor

Mussolini has accepted, and I have no doubt M. Daladier will also accept.

I need not say what my answer will b e . 1

wThere was a momentary hush of astonishment followed by an outburst of cheering such as the House of Commons has seldom witnessed.

Members of all parties rose in their

places and waved the papers in their hands. quarter past four in the afternoon. been speaking for over an hour.

It was then a

The Prime Minister had

After a few perfunctory 1

words from the leaders of the opposition, the House adjourned.”

1 Ibid., pp. 89-90

CHAPTER V MUNICH:

BLOODLESS VICTORY

Thus the stage was set for the "armistice at Munich,w for such it turned out to b e •

The Munich agreement was

drawn up in twelve hours on the 29th by the representatives of the four great powers, England, France, Italy and Germany* Strangely enough, Russia, who might be considered to be more deeply concerned in the fate of Czechoslovakia than was 1

England, was not invited to participate in the conference; more strangely still, the representatives of Czechoslovakia, who might be considered to be most deeply concerned of all, were not admitted to the conversations*

They, M. Masaryk

and M. Mastny, were "confined in an anteroom 11 throughout the p discussions which were to decide the fate of their country* 5 Generally, the Munich Treaty was an Axis success* The four nations represented, having nalready reached In

^The Russians were not invited to Munich, it was later explained, because "the British Government knew that Hitler and Mussolini would reject such a suggestion*" Dalton, o p * cit., p. 77. P

. cit*,

Nicolson, ojd

p. 92.

51

*

Copies of the Munich same, are to be found in the specting Czechoslovakia, pp. pp. 9-12, and News in Brief,

accord, all substantially the British Further Documents re­ 3-6, in the French Yellow B o o k , o p * cit*, pp. 178-79*

121 principle 11 an agreement wfor the cession to Germany of the Sudeten German territory,w agreed further on the following ^terms and conditions governing the said cession11: 1

. The evacuation will begin on the 1st October*

2.

The United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by the 10th October, without any existing installations having been destroyed and that the Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacua­ tion without damage to the said installations*

3*

The conditions governing the evacuation will be laid down in detail by an international commission composed of representatives of Ger­ many, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia*

4*

The occupation by stages of the predominantly German territory by German troops will begin on the 1st October. The four territories ma.rked on the attached map will be occupied by German troops in the following order * the ter­ ritory marked No. I on the 1st and 2nd of October, the territory marked No. II on the 2nd and 3rd of October, the territory marked No. Ill on the 3rd and 4th and 5th of October, the territory marked No. IV on the 6 th and 7th of October. The remaining territory of preponder­ antly German character will be ascertained by the aforesaid international commission forthwith and be occupied by German troops by the 10th of October.

5.

The international commission referred to in paragraph 3 will determine the territories in which a plebiscite is to be held. These terri­ tories will be occupied by international bodies until the plebiscite has been completed. The same commission will fix the conditions in which the plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the conditions of the Saar plebiscite. The commission will also fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the plebiscite will be held*

122 .

The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international commission* This commission will also be entitled to recom­ mend to the four Powers, Germany, the United Kingdom, Prance and Italy, in certain excep­ tional cases minor modifications in the strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be transferred without plebiscite.

7.

There will be a right of option into and out of the transferred territories, the option to be exercised within six months.f^om the date of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak commission shall determine the details of the option, con­ sider ways of facilitating the transfer of population and settle questions of principle arising out of the said transfer.

6

8

*

The Czechoslovak Government will within a period of four weeks from the date of this agreement release from their military and police forces any Sudeten Germans who may wish to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government will within the same period release Sudeten German prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment for political of­ fences.

The terms of the agreement were supposedly softened by the provisions of an wAnnextt providing for the promised French-British guarantees as ncontained in paragraph 6 of

,, 2

the Anglo-French proposals of the 19th September.”

Germany

and Italy further agreed to give a similar guarantee Mwhen the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled *11

A further ^Declaration *1

Further Documents respecting Czechoslovakia, pp. 3-4. 2 Cf.

post., p . 102•

^Further Documents respecting Czechoslovakia, p. 5.

123 provided that ,Mthe problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, if not settled within three months by agreement between the respective Governments, shall form the subject of another meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the four Powers here present.!t ^ A ^Supplementary Declaration 11 referred ttall questions which may arise out of the transfer of the territory 11 to the International Commission,

2

to be composed, by the terms of

a still further appendix, of the German Foreign Secretary, the British, French and Italian Ministers to Berlin, and a 3 Czech representative. The map

which accompanied the agreement in explan­

ation of paragraph 4 was, on its face, a minor Chamberlain 4 victory. It differed considerably from that which was attached to Hitlerfs Godesberg demands In that it reduced the areas to be automatically ceded by about 50 per cent. At 1:30 were handed by

on the morning of the 30th, the Munich terms Mr, Chamberlain and M. Daladier

to the still

■*TjO c # cit. 2

Loc . cit. 5 I bid.t

4

p, 6 .

A ^sketch map based on original *1 is appended to the British Further Documents respecting Czechoslovakla» opposite p. 6 , Significantly once more, no map accompanies the Ger­ man publication.

124 waiting Czech representatives* Mussolini were not present.

Herr Hitler and Signor

Ho comment on the terms was

permitted to the agonized Czechs.

nIt had,1* records M.

Mas&ryk, ttbeen explained to us in a sufficiently brutal manner that it was a matter of condemnation without appeal and without possible modification .*1

There is a touch of

irony in the telegram from Foreign Minister Bonnet to Minister de Lacroix in Prague asking the latter to assure Benes nof the admiration felt by myself and my countrymen for the strength of character and the admirable self-control shown by all Czechoslovak leaders, whose clearsightedness has done so much to protect their country from the horrors of w a r .n ^ When Chamberlain returned to London and Daladier to Paris late on the afternoon of the 30th, the crowds which greeted the returning negotiators at their respective 3 destinations cheered them to the echo# Two of the British leader’s remarks made directly upon his return have become famous, partly because of their merits as quotable expres­ sions, partly because of their, serious defects as prophecies#

. cit *,

■^Quoted in Nicolson, ojd

pp. 92-93.

^French Yellow Book, p. 13. It has been told that Daladier, flying home from Munich, saw a vast crowd waiting at the Paris airport; b e ­ fore landing he told the pilot to circle the field carefully since he nwas afraid they were there to lynch him.” When he did land, the crowd nmobbed him with joy. Millis, op. cit., p. 230.

125 ’’T his / 1 he exclaimed to the shouting throng at the airport, waving an autographed piece of paper over his head, ttmeans peace in our time .11

And on hi 3 arrival at Downing street

he told the excited mob which surrounded his car, 11This is not the first occasion on which a British Minister has returned from Germany bringing Peace with Honour*n ^ The paper which the British Prime Minister regarded as the basis for wpeace in our time *1 was not the Munich accord.

It was instead a new promise from the Fiihrer —

and much like those Hitler had made so often before.

It

was signed by both Chamberlain and Hitler, and it read beautifully: We, the German Fuehrer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting to­ day and are agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for both countries and for Europe. We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again. We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of dif­ ference, and thus to contribute to assuring the peace of Europe.s

^The New York Times, October 1, 1938, MPeace with Honor, says Chamber la inT1*”"p* !• ^Copies in German in German Dokuments, p. 209, and in English in German Documents, p. 26 b f there Is none, strangely, in British B l u e "B o o k •

126 By both the French and the British governments, the the Munich agreement was regarded — as a victory*

at least publicly —

Chamberlain spoke of bringing home ’’Peace

with Honour*,” and to a critic who remarked that Hitler had made promises before he retorted, ”Yes, but on this occa­ sion he has made them to me. ”"** Bonnet informed ’’all diplomatic posts1’ on October 3 of the points scored — paper — (1)

by the Allies at Munich.

on

Summarized, they were:

The occupation was to be over a period of ten days

instead of all at once, as by the Godesberg demands.

(2)

The new frontier was to be fixed by an international com­ mission instead of unilaterally, as Hitler had demanded. (3) Germany ’’gave up the idea of a plebiscite in regions with a strong German majority,” — precedent.

a possibly dangerous

(4) The regions in which plebiscites were to

be held were to be determined by the international commis­ sion rather than by Hitler.

(5) Germany ’’conceded to the

population the right of option *to be included in the transferred territoriesif”

(6 ) Germany accepted a Czech

representative on the international commission ”on an equal footing.”

(7) Germany accepted (with reservations)

an international guarantee of the new Czech state.

(8 )

Taken as a whole, the Godesberg plan was in many respects

^Nicolson, og. cit., p. 96.

127 a veritable armistice convention concluded after victori­ ous military operations on the part of Germany; the Munich 1 agreement has the character of a settlement* But the German gains were greater still*

If at

Munich Hitler had not secured all that he had previously asked, he was to gain it all — order*

and more —

in very short

And to Germany, as to the Allies, time was still

important*

Particularly in regard to the Siegfried line

were the N a z i s

to find the next twelve months helpful.

And when war did arrive it found the British and French without active allies which they would have had in 1938; Czechoslovakia was gone; the Balkans were distrustful, and Russia had changed from an active friend into a pas­ sive enemy* It is possible that had the Allies stood firm, there would have been neither war nor settlement*

Rumors from

Germany have told of frantic army demands that the Filhrer cease his dangerous diplomacy since the army would not fight or could not win*

Ambassador Henderson relates the

story of a German Cabinet meeting in which Air Marshal Goering Mvehemently accused Ribbentrop of inciting to wartt and speaks of Goering*s intervention as not the least important nof the various factors which induced Hitler to

^French Yellow B o o k , pp. 14-15*

128 abandon his idea of a Czech w a r ,'1 ^ Dalton reports — neglecting to mention his source of information — Goering-Hitler conversation: Goering.

,t*There must be no war,* said

‘The people will not have it . 1

TGive me two more days.

the same

Hitler replied,

Chamberlain and Daladier will be

so impressed by my methods that they will accept ray terras. If I fail, I shall kill myself.*'* But Hitler did not fail; Czechoslovakia became his without the loss of a man.

The means of peaceful diplomacy

had sufficed; the use of military measures proved not yet to be necessary to secure for Germany the ends which the Fiihrer desired.

In retrospect it is easy to see that the

limitless aggrandizement of German power never ceased to be the dominant objective of the German moves throughout this crisis; it was in the failure to realize the vastness of Hitlerfs ambitions that his opponents made their most ser­ ious error, for it is evident that they consistently endeavored to attach to him some finite objective. In contrast to this lack of grasp of the German grand strategy, Hitler, on his part, but too well realized that:then^superficially solid front of the Allies against him was still underlain by a conflict of national interests.

^Sir Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission, p. 168. ^Dalton, op. cit., p. 83.

129 Indeed, in this realization lay the Fiihrer’s most potent weapon*

Had in reality a firm coalition of interests

existed in opposition to the German position, a far dif­ ferent decision might have been reached at Munich.

In

fact, however, the interest of Czechoslovakia was the only one diametrically opposed, prlma facie, to that of the Reich.

Prance and Russia, both tied by alliance to the

Czechoslovak state, found their primary interests in the opposition of any growth of German power which would threaten Franco-Russian hegemony on the continent, al­ though the immediate situation did not involve truly personal gain or loss to either. But it was in the British position that the joker lay.

As Palmerstone remarked:

ltBritain has no eternal

i

friends and no eternal enemies; she has only eternal inter­ ests •”

And Englandfs interests at the time, it is now

apparent, did not seem to her leaders to be synonymous with those of her supposed allies.

Britain, fighting to

maintain the nBalancen on the continent in keeping with hei* historical policy, was still opposed as much to a toopowerful Franco-Russian bloc as to a too-powerful Germany. For the nonce, rather than to destroy the only continental counterweight to the Franco-Russian entente, Britain was willing to throw Czechoslovakia into the hands of a Germany

130 still, in the eyes of British leaders, not dangerously strong* With this realization of the continued British posi­ tion as an arbiter between two continental blocks, neither of which England wished to see too powerful, it is possible to understand the superficially strange British behavior both before and after Munich.

Explained thus is Chamber-

l a i n ^ peculiar softness to Hitler; a softness viewed with suspicion by several writers.’*’ Throughout the entire negotiations, Chamberlain serving as the apparent ringmaster of the Allied diplomatic

E.g., van Paassen, a source itiich needs possible qualification, who insists that unot a single one of Hitler's major moves had been undertaken without a consultation (and the approbriation) of the inner circle of the British cab­ i net .11 The pre-Munich events he calls a ^collossal dupery .*1 Benes, he says, surrendered, but to Chamberlain, nnot to Hitler ,11 and only after !1he had before him a secret Ultima­ tum. • . containing a veiled threat. . * if Prague should dare to invoke the aid of Moscow.** Information both as to the Russian offer of support and as to the report of the French general staff recommending immediate attack were, he claims, deliberately falsified by Bonnet. For corrobora­ tion of his claim re the Russian offer, van Paassen cites Le Voltiguer, October 19, 1938, Le Peuple of the same date, and Leonhard Ragaz, in the November, 1938, issue of Neue Wege and quotes challengingly from Le Temps. The citation re the bellicose nature of the general staff report is to an unanswered and undenied statement by Leon Jouhaux, secretary of the General Confederation of Labor. Days of Our Years, pp. 484-85. Cf. also Gedye, op. cit., pp. 495-97, and D. N. Pritt, Light on Moscow, p. 52.

131 performers, seemed not only willing but anxious to win for the Ffthrer whatever the latter might wish to secure from Czechoslovakia at the expense of the Franco-Russian coalition*

Indeed, the Prime Minister’s sole condition

appeared to be the assurance that whatever bargain might be arranged should have the appearance of a British-dictated 1 deal* Whereas Czechoslovakia, of course, and to a lesser extent her Franco-RussIan Allies, exhibited during the crisis a genuine concern with the retention of Czechoslovak power and independence, Britain seemed, superficially, most interested in the maintenance of the British Hface*,? Explained too is the strangest feature of the nego­ tiations, the complete absence of Russia from the counsel tables*

It can easily be seen that this absence was not of

Russian choosing.

As early as March 18, the U.S.S.R.,

through LItvinoff, had proposed an t!ant I-aggression *1 con­ ference of Russia, France, the U.S.A. and herself, and to » this proposed conference, Chamberlain’s had been the principal objection.

2

When Kalinin, titular head of the

U.S.S.R., announced on May 11 that Russia would carry out her undertakings to Czechoslovakia ltto the letter,n and

1

C f . ante., Chamberlain’s personal letter to Hitler of September 287 P* 117*

20f. ante., pp. 80-81.

132 when, on August 25, the Soviet Ambassador in Washington repeated this promise, it was the total lack of response 1

from London which kept Moscow at a r m ’s length#

And the

suggestion of September 2 from the Soviet government, repeated at Geneva on September 11, for a ” joint demarche of U.S.S#H., Britain and Prance in favour of the Czechs and of the use of Article 11 of the Covenant of the League p

of Nations”

was blanketed once more by complete British

silence toward the proposal#

Later, at Munich, the absence

of Russia was due in large part to British refusal to de­ mand —

or even request —

Russian presence#

It is hard

not to see in British treatment of the U.S#S#R. throughout the years between Versailles and Munich — a year more — politics#

and indeed for

the British pursuit of Balance of Power

The English Conservative government still feared

Communist Russia as much as, if not more than, Nazi Germany* Indeed, it has been suggested — reason —

possibly not without

that a corollary to the British "appeasement” pol­

icy was the endeavor to crystallize the conflict between the German and Russian ambitions in central Europe.

Gedye

quotes ”persons responsible for the carrying out of British

1 D.

N# Pritt, Light on Moscow, p. 51#

2 Loc# cit#

133 policy1* as claiming that "in return, this surrender £of Czechoslovakia^ . . . would lure Hitler away from an attack on Prance and Britain into a series of aggressions in the East culminating in a violent clash between him and Russia." Van Paassen adds that at Berchtesgaden and Godesberg, Chamberlain "achieved what he had constantly striven for — he turned Hitler eastward." reached by D. N. Pritt.

2

A similar conclusion was

Pritt cites a series of "incidents"

in the conduct of the Baldwin and Chamberlain governments, terminating at Munich, to prove "quite certainly.

• • that

they (the Allies) were pursuing with more or less consisten­ cy a policy of diverting by one means or another the force and aggressiveness of Hitler eastwards against the Soviet 3 Union.*' Seen in this light, Munich ceases to be a British diplomatic failure and becomes a British diplomatic victory. So long as the objective of England was the maintenance of the Balance, and so long as British leaders considered the Franco-Russian bloc as dangerous to British interests as was the Axis, the course of the British government could be

^Gedye, 0 £. cit., p. 496. ^van Paassen, ojd

. cit.,

. cit.,

^Pritt, ojd

p. 53.

p. 487.

154 nothing but the pursuit of a policy designed from the b e ­ ginning to end in Czech surrender rather than active CzechPranco-Russian collaboration. in "bumbling diplomacy1* — tion^" —

The British failure lay not

so much the current interpreta­

but in a serious error in the judgment of British

interests:

the underestimation of comparative German

strength in the continental Balance and the failure to real­ ize where this German strength, combined with growing German ambition, might lead* Prance, indeed, suffered a diplomatic defeat, and Daladier*s fear that he might be mobbed by a realisticminded crowd on his return from Munich was justified. French hands were tied.

But

Though Prance, as a part of the

Balance itself, might wish to fight to maintain the French hegemony, she could not fight without active British aid. Thus France suffered a diplomatic blow at the hands of her enemy and her friend rather than chance, with but Russian support, a much more serious military beating from her enemy alone•

^For instance Hieolson’s: "He (Chamberlain) and his adviser, Sir Horace Wilson, stepped into diplomacy with the bright faithfulness of two curates entering a pub for the first t im e ; they did not observe the difference between a social gathering and a rough house .11 Op. c i t ., p; 106. Dalton, Millls and Benson also give the impression of an England suffering diplomatic defeat at Munich because of the child-like "bumbling 11 of her leaders.

135 Italy1s role in the Munich developments was that of constant capitalization of her nuisance value, at which Mussolini proved to he particularly adept.

Throughout the

pre-Munich period, Mussolini repeatedly proclaimed the strength of the Axis and Italy’s place at the side of Ge r ­ many.

Speaking at Trieste on September 18, the Duee

proclaimed his own "demand" for the solution of the Czech problem, and threatened that, in the event of general war, ’'Italy knows on which side she will be."^*

This stand he

reiterated at Treviso on the next day, at Padua on the 24th, at Vicenza on the 25th and at Verona on the 26th.

In each

case bluster was the better part of Mussolinifs verbal valor.

In each case condemnation of the Versailles Treaty

ran side by side with condemnation of the Czechoslovak

2 ’'mosaic state."

Italy, if her own demand for expansion

was to be satisfied, was tied as closely to Germany as was France to England. And so was the international European picture as Europe began to recover from her biggest and most terrifying war scare in 20 years.

Germany and Italy, still cursing

at Versailles, were advancing in solid front along the

1

Hews in Brief, op. cit., p. 160. o

Loc. cit.

136 northward leg of the Rome-Berlin Axis.

Germany, increas­

ing in strength and self-confidence, would fight, now or soon, if the objectives which her Piihrer had in mind could not be satisfied by ordinary diplomatic procedure; Italy was building fences for the time when, with a swing of the Axis southward, she herself might further benefit from a change in the status q u o .

England, nearing the end of an

eastward swing of her Balance of Power policy, her conser­ vative leaders still fearing Russia possibly more than Germany and still thinking of chastisement of a too-fat Prance, was teetering slowly toward the other side of the Balance as her military —

and some political —

leaders

became increasingly cognizant of the enlargement of German strength and of the value of new German weapons •

And Par i s ,

caught on the horns of a dilemma, was forced to follow where Britain led.

It seems apparent now that the question

of the day was Britain1s to answer.

When English leaders

realized the rapid readjustment of the Balance, and British strength was thrown into automatic and adamant opposition to further German growth, there would be war#

CHAPTER VI PRAGUE:

THE CAST OP THE DIE

As to til© Munich, and Versailles settlements one writer observes:

"Compared to the treaty of Munich,

Versailles was a veritable Gibraltar*

The abandonment of

Munich probably constitutes a record for the speedy rele­ gation of an international agreement to the scrap of paper category .'1 ^

The abandonment apparently began on

the day after the treaty was signed; it was completed on March 15 of the following year. In the occupation of the ceded areas, the German armies paid little attention to the Munich agreement. The International Commission established in accordance with the Munich pact decided to hold no plebiscites at all and produced by October 5 a new map which bears far more similarity to the one which accompanied Hitlerfs Godesberg!s demands than it does to that drawn at Munich.

2

This increase in the size of German gains was partly due to the insistence of the German representatives, headed by State Secretary von Weizs&cker, and also to the able

^Benson, o p . cit *, p. 22. 2

The commission's map is reproduced in Hews in Brief, o p . cit., p. 185.

138 "backing given to the Nazis by the British representative, Neville Henderson.

The major crisis in the Commission’s

work arose over the question as to extent of the areas to be handed over without plebiscite, and as to the meaning of the vaguely-worded ” 50 per aent majority” provision; the Germans demanded occupation ”up to the language line drawn in the Austrian maps of 1910,” and this demand the Czechs refused,

insisting that the determination of the

areas should be

based on the Czech map of 1923, ”by which

time the prewar position had been considerably modified. Henderson’s unstinted support of the Nazi position was an absolutely determining factor; a combined British-German front was unbreakable. claimed that he

The British Ambassador later

chose his position because he ”hoped there­

by, firstly, to avoid plebiscites, secondly, to pin the Germans down to a line of their own choosing.

. • and

thirdly, because the German contention was actually. . • 2 the better founded of the two theses. The only com­ missioner to protest the Commission’s decision was

■^Henderson, o p . cit., p. 174. ^Ibid., p. 175. Elsewhere Henderson remarked that ”The German attitude toward the latter (the meaning of the 50 per cent provision) was, as it happens, in accordance with the text of the Munich Agreement and the Anglo-French proposal which preceded it.” P. 174. This seems question­ able. The stated object of the Munich accord was to bring Czech areas with present German majorities into the Reich, and the Munich map certainly was based on this idea.

139 apparently the Italian representative#

1

The acceptance of the 1910 boundary made plebiscites superfluous#

By October 10 the Commission apparently

deemed the situation to be sufficiently under control lffor the meetings of the political section of the International „ 2 Commission to be discontinued sine d i e #11 Henderson left 3 soon after for London, and the Commission which was to serve as a watch dog over the Sudeten cession abandoned, for all practical purposes, its ungrateful task into the tender hands of the German army#

Having won original Czech

surrender for the Nazis, the Allied representatives appar­ ently felt their duty to be done and left the Germans to finish the task of leading the Czech negotiators in the ways of wisdom#

Nicolson, 0 £. cit., p..98. Henderson praises highly Signor Attolico*s ^untiring efforts for peace. . . . He was (says the British Ambassador). . • absolutely whole-hearted and selfless in the persistence of his exertions to save Europe from the horrors of war; and he devoted his great tact and energy to that sole purpose .11 Og# c i t #, p. 171# The bond between the Italian and the Englishman may be indicated by the remark made by Attolico to Henderson on the way down to Munich: 11The communists have lost their chance; if they had cut the telephone wires today between Rome and Berlin there would have been war,Mpp# 170-71# Both regarded the pre­ vention of war as a Communist defeat and, consequently, as a western European victory# ^Henderson, o^. cit., p. 175. ^Because of !lill h e a l t h . H e was not to return until the middle of the following February#

140 The v/ork of the Commission is largely shrouded in mystery*

It is obvious that as a nwatch dogn the body

failed dismally —

indeed it made very little, if any,

effort to succeed — * in its task; one wonders if the Coinmission*s own estimate of its objective was synonymous with that set for it by the Munich agreement.

One wonders,

too, at the reason for the cloak of secrecy thrown about the group’s activities.

It Is significant that British,

French and German official sources are all nearly silent on the actual dealings of the group.

The few scattered inci­

dental references to the Commission’s activities have a sort of vague, evanescent quality which apparently emanates from an extreme disinclination on the part of the interested parties to be too specific concerning a phase of the agree­ ment intended only as a sop to world o p i n i o n O n e

can but

The British official communications, including the Blue B o o k , are virtually silent on the whole matter; Hender­ son, in his Failure of a Mission and in his official report, passes In such a hypnotically smooth way over the story of the Commission that one is reminded of the German criticism that Henderson, like the British diplomats of Bismarck’s day, wrote with an eye to the Blue B o o k . References in the French Yellow Book are limited to an incidental comment in a report from Francois-Poneet to Bonnet on October 4 that ’’They (the German representatives) assume the attitude of victors who have the right to formulate imperative demands*1* (p. 17). The German war publications contain no reference to the Commission at all, treating the Czechoslovak crisis as disconnected with the coming of war a year later. It is difficult to believe that such able diplomats as Henderson and Francois-Poneet would have left their governments so

141 feel that the Commission, -under orders, regarded its duty as an unpleasant formality to he concluded only for the sake of appearances and as rapidly as possible.

The claim is

often made by Allied apologists that the G-erman army exceeded- even the dictates of the Commission in regard to 1

the area to be occupied;

the fact that no protest by the

Commission was ever made public lends credence to the view that this body regarded its functions as of a purely formal nature.

The eventual territory occupied by the Germans

went ttfar beyond anything contemplated at Godesberg ,11 and contained 51 per cent of Czechoslovakia*s coal mines, 55 per cent

of its glass industry, 49 per cent of its textile

industry, one third of its total population, and 14 of its 27 largest towns.

2

The Czechoslovak-Hungarian border dispute, meanwhile, continued apace.

Direct negotiations, begun on October 9,

broke down on October 13, and after the exchange of several notes the states involved determined to submit the affair to Germany and Italy for settlement, either because of German

strictly uninformed on the developments of such an important matter as the International Commission was claimed to be after Munich as Allied releases would lead one to conclude. ■4s.g., Nicolson, 0 £. c i t ., pp. 97-98.

2Xbid.t p. 98.

142 pressure or because of distrust of Britain and Prance.

The

International Commission did not concern itself with the matter#

On November 2, therefore, von Ribbentrop, German

Foreign Minister, and Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister, met in Vienna and determined the appeal, drawing another map which gave most of South Slovakia to Hungary, but which left w the actual delineation of the frontiers1* up to a Czechoslovak-Hungarian Commission#

1

That the matter was

still far from settled was to appear later# Hitler delivered one more blast at England at Saar2 brucken on October 9 before he settled into a mood of friendship for the Allies which was to last for several months.

The Fiihrerfs main attention at Saarbrucken was

devoted to Duff Cooper, Churchill and Eden, all of whom were becoming active in opposition to the Chamberlain policy of

1

The Vienna Award, News in Brief, o p . cit., p. 194. Poland, after a series of threatening gestures against Czechoslovakia, received Teschen from the dismembered state on October 1. For the attitude of the Poles toward the Munich negotiations, of. post, p. 2 Speech at Saarbrucken, News in B r i e f , o p . cit., pp. 188-89. Extract in the publication of the German Foreign Office, Dokumente zur Vorgeschicte des Krieges, pp. 209-10, Documents, pp. 255-56. In the German language publication, important passages have a more belligerent ring. Even the title is more ominous: Warnung vor britischer Hetzpolitikem.

143

1 conciliation*

"It is only necessary for Mr. Duff Cooper,

Mr. Eden, or Mr. Churchill to come into power in England for peace to he disrupted ,11 he said*

llWe know for certain

that it would he the aim of these men to start a new World War immediately*"

2

British opposition.

And he condemned the attitude of the "it would he well if people in England

gave up certain airs and graces of the Versailles epoch," Hitler asserted*

"We will not tolerate admonitions to

Germany as hy a governess*

Statesmen should concern them­

selves with their own affairs and should not continually take a hand in the problems of other countries." But after Saarbrucken the attitude of Germany toward her western neighbors was one of conciliation.

As we have

seen, on September 30, in a joint declaration, the Fiihrer and Chamberlain agreed that Germany and Britain were "never 4 to go to war with one another again." This was followed by a similar treaty with Prance, signed after negotiations at Hitler*s suggestion by Bonnet and von Ribbentrop in Paris on December 6 .

1 Cf.

post., pp.

145-47.

^llews in Brief, oj). cit., p. 188. ^L o c . c i t ♦ 4 Cf.

ante, pp. 125-126.

144 Generally, the Franco-German treaty followed its predecessor between Germany and England, but' it dealt more specifically with the relations between the two Powers* Its three main provisions were as follows: (1)

The French Government and the German Government fully share the conviction that pacific and neighborly relations between France and Germany constitute one of the essential elements of the consolidation of the situation in Europe and of the preservation of general peace. Consequently both Governments will endeavor with all their might to assure the development of the relations between their countries in this direction*

(2)

Both Governments agree that no question of a territorial nature remains in suspense between their countries and solemnly recognize as perma­ nent the frontier between their countries as it is actually drawn*

(3)

Both Governments are resolved, without prejudice to their special relations with third Powers, to remain in contact on all questions of importance to both their countries and to have recourse to mutual consultation in case any complications aris­ ing out of these questions should threaten to lead to international difficulties .1 Hitler, meanwhile, spoke often to the French Minister

about Franco-German harmony.

^There is,** he told M. Coulon-

dre (the then new French Minister) on November 23, '’no cause for conflict between Germany and France. ah ex-Serviceman, I know what war is.

...

I am

I want to spare my

people these trials; even an alteration of the frontier b e ­ tween our two countries would not be sufficient justification

F r e n c h Yellow B ook, p. 35*

145 for the sacrifices it would entail*

That is my opinion, and

« 1 I know it is also that of President Daladier*” The German press also entered upon a period of conciliation of the French*

"The newspapers of the Reich are prodigal in

expressions meant to please France,

wrote Francois-Poneet

2

on October 4, and both he and Coulondre reported the same impression in later messages* Thus for the months remaining in 1938 the German attitude was one of a nation peaceful and calm because a great wrong had been righted*

Hitler spoke at Saarbrucken

of those "two great statesmen, Chamberlain and Daladier,” who had recognized where their services to the eternal peace of Europe iay and had acted accordingly.

To judge from the

almost effusive personal friendliness of Hitler, Chamberlain might well continue to speak of the legacy of Munich as "Peace with honour 11 and ''Peace in our time." But in both England and France no such public mood of friendship prevailed. In the House of Commons Churchill 3 and Eden became progressively more insistent upon Allied

1 Ibld.,

pp. 30-31.

2 Ibid..

p. 17.

®It will be remembered that both Churchill and Eden had steadfastly opposed appeasement. Cf. Churchill, While England Slept, Step by Step, and Blood, Sweat and Tears, and Eden, For e igri Af Ta i r s jNew York: 'Harc'o'urT, Brace and Co*) Their thesis: ""There has never been a moment up to the present when a firm stand by Britain and France together with the many countries who recently looked to them would not have called a halt to the Nazi menace.” Written October Step by Step, p. 251*

146 rearmament, and they were joined on the day after Munich by Duff Cooper who resigned from the Chamberlain cabinet in protest*

The resigning First Lord of the Admiralty ex­

plained to the Commons his departure from the Cabinet in true ChurchiIlian words i The Prime Minister has confidence in the good­ will and in the word of Herr Hitler. . . * The Prime Minister may be right. I can assure you, Mr. Speaker, with the deepest sincerity, that I hope and pray that he is right. But I cannot believe what he believes. I wish I could. . . . I have given up the privelege of serving as Lieutenant to a leader whom I still regard with the deepest admiration and affection. I have ruined, perhaps, my political career. But that is a little matter; I have retain­ ed something which is to me of greater value — I \ can still walk about the world with my head erect. Churchill himself was violently condemnatory of the Munich pact.

For some four years this British politician

had been playing the role of Cassandra, realizing as he did the profound changes in the potential balance of power arising from Hitler’s breaking of the shackling Versailles provisions.

To one who grasped, as Churchill did, the

significance of German mechanized rearmament, and who saw, as Churchill did, that Czechoslovakia to Hitler was not the end, but just a step in the campaign to secure German dominance on the continent, Munich could appear as nothing but a serious error in the carrying out of British balance

Q u o t e d in Hicolson, o|>. c i t ., p. 94.

147 of power policy.

1

Speaking to the Commons on October 5,

Churchill bitterly, and reasonably accurately, traced the effects of the Munich agreement and the F&hrer's future course.

venture to state ,11 he said, 11that in future

the Czechoslovak state cannot be maintained as an indepen­ dent entity.

• . • Czechoslovakia will be engulfed in 2 the Nazi regime .11 f*The system of alliances in Central

Europe upon which France has relied for her safety has been swept away.

. . . The road down the Danube Valley to the

Churchill's realization of British tactics as design­ ed primarily for external effect is evident in his state­ ment to the Commons on October 5: nThere never can be any absolute certainty that there will be a fight if one side is determined that it will give way completely. When one reads the Munich terms, when one sees what is happening in Czechoslovakia from hour to hour, when one is sure, I will not say of Parliamentary approval but of Parliamentary acquiescence, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer makes a speech which at any rate tries to put in a very powerful and persuasive manner the fact that, after all, it was in­ evitable and indeed righteous: when we saw all this — and everyone on this side of the House, including many members of the Conservative Party who are vigilant and careful guardians of the national interest, is quite clear that nothing vitally affecting us was at stake — it seems to me that one must ask, What was all the trouble and fuss about. • • once it had been decided not to make the defense of Czechoslovakia a matter of war, then there was really no reason, if the matter had been handled during the summer in the ordinary way, to call into being all this formidable apparatus of crisis .11 Blood» Sweat and Tears, pp. 56-57.

2 Ibid., p. 60.

148 Black Sea, the road which leads as far as Turkey, has been opened.

In fact.

. • it seems to me that all those coun­

tries of Middle Europe.

• . will, one after another, be

drawn into this vast system of power politics.

. • radi-

1

ating from Berlin .11

wThe German army at the present is

more numerous. . • than that of Prance• Next year it will g grow much larger.n wAnd do not suppose that this is the end.

This is only the beginning of the reckoning.

This is

only the first sip, the first foretaste of a bitter cup 3 which will be proffered to us year by year. . . Churchill joined with others in England and in Prance in recommending tfall out 11 armament *4

On all sides Allied

leaders spoke of warming to the utmost .11

Even Chamberlain,

on October 3, told the House of Commons:

nFor a long period

now we have been engaged in this country in a great program

"*~Ibid., pp. 61-62. 2 3

Ibid., p . 63. Ibid., p. 6 6 .

4 E.£., Churchill said in his speech to the people of .the United States on October 16: nWe must arm. Britain must arm. America must arm. If, through an earnest desire for peace, we have placed ourselves at a disadvantage, we must make up for it by redoubled exertions.w Ibid., p. 73. E.g., also Sir John Simon at Sheffield on the 13th, Kings­ ley Wood to the Commons on the 16th and Duff Cooper in Paris on December 10, all summarized in the German Docu­ ments, pp. 238, 243, and 248*

149 of rearmament, which is daily increasing in pace and vol-cone.

Let no one think that because we have signed

this agreement between these four Powers at Munich we can afford to relax our efforts in regard to that program at this moment•■**** And Daladier in Prance told the Chamber of Deputies on October 4:

’*The French, who all want to save

Prance, must now consider themselves in a permanent state 2 of mobilization for the cause of peace and for the country•’*

The full-fledged armament race now proceeding at breakneck pace was exhibited on the floors of the world's stock exchanges.

Charles Hodges estimates that within four weeks

after the Munich deal, shares of ten leading arms firms increased in value by over one hundred millions of dollars —

$107,075,000.

The value of Vickers shares alone increased

a 3 by over $40,000,000.

The talk of arms, suspicion and hatred which filled the Allied countries, particularly England, had no better effect upon Germany than would a similar German campaign have had upon the Allied countries.

**We were.

• • aston­

ished,w said von Ribbentrop to the Foreign Press Associa­ tion in Berlin on November 7, ttthat the first answer to the

~*~In Search of Peace, p. 206.

2

Daladier, In Defense of France, p. 102.

^In Brown, Hodges and Roucek, o£. cit., p. 9.

150

spirit of Munich took the form of the slogan ‘Peace is saved, therefore arm to the utmost . 1

The new armament

fever in several countries is accompanied by renewed efforts of incorrigible war agitators.*

1

The Fdhrer'

himself, repeatedly through the months following Munich, privately emphasized the regret which he felt over the expression of a fundamental antagonism 11 which he ^discover-

2 ed in the British attitude.1*

He was ^disappointed with

the sequels of the Munich Agreement. the meeting of the Four.

He had believed that

. • would have marked the begin­

ning of an era of consultation and improved relations. He cannot see that anything of the kind has occurred.

• . • • • •

Great Britain is sonorous with threats and calls to arms." Publicly, speaking at Weimar on November 6 , Hitler declared himself ready to disarm, lvbut only on one condition: war mongering must be disarmed first I As long as the rest of the world only talks of disarmament and continues its infamous war-monger ing, we assume that it only wants to steal our arms in order to prepare for us again the fate of 1918-1919."4

■^German Documents, p. 242. ^Francois-Poncet to Bonnet on October 19, French Yellow B o o k , p. 19#

22

.

^Francois-Poncet to Bonnet on October 20, ibid., p. a

^Documents, p. 242#

151 And the personal attacks upon the Ffthrer by British press and speakers hardly improved the German feelings toward nself-satisfied Albion.1*

Reports by Ambassador

Br&uer in Baris and Ambassador von Dirksen in London during the last month of 1938 are replete with accounts of the oral and written attacks upon Hitler with which English leaders regaled their countrymen#

1

These attacks

were repeatedly protested to Lord Halifax by von Dirksen. On the occasion of the publication by the Hews Chronicle on January 4 of a bitterly anti-Hitler article by H. G# Wells, the German Ambassador nprotested very strongly.

. •

and pointed out that the Embassy during the past few months had unfortunately been forced to complain with increasing frequency about vilification of the Fiihrer.

. . . fTheselJ

numerous defamations of the head of the German State ,*1 von Dirksen added, Mand the impossibility of obtaining adequate satisfaction hurt German national feelings, and would have 2 a detrimental effect on Anglo-German relations •** Such speeches as that of Duff Cooper at the Theatre des Ambassadeurs in Paris on December 10, in which the ex-Minister was reported as asserting, **with a subtle reference to Geimany,1*

1 2

C f . Documents, pp. 235-63#

Ibid., p. 249.

152 that 11All past civilizations.

• • had been destroyed by

peoples who, although superior in numbers and strength, were culturally inferior,"^ caused Hitler apparent pain. To Francois-Poneet the Filhrer delivered "against that country ^BritainJ against her selfishness and her childish belief in the superiority of her rights over those of others, one of those tirades which he has already delivered ,*2

several times in public."

In the midst of this growing mood of animated sixspicion, toward the end of the year two further indications of trouble-to-come might be witnessed in Europe:

one was

the sudden development of agitation from the south end of the Axis, and the other was the official attitude of the German government on the subject of the proposed guarantee of the new Czechoslovakian borders* The Italian agitation began in earnest during the first week in December.

France’s ace diplomat, Francois-

Poncet, recently transferred from Berlin to Rome, attend­ ing a meeting of the Italian Chamber, was astounded to hear Italian Foreign Minister Ciano interrupted by shouting Deputies "spontaneously" screaming for "Tunis !n and the

1 Ibld. , O

p. 248.

^Francois-Poneet to Bonnet on October 20, French Yellow B ook, p. 22.

153 balconies adding to the clamor with shouts of* ^Corsica! Nice I

Savoy

By the middle of the month the crisis was

in full swing, with full-fledged demonstrations in the streets of Paris and Rome, and then, suddenly as it had started, the Italian agitation temporarily died*

On

December 17 Mussolini wrote to Daladier cancelling the Franco-Italian Colonial Treaty of 1935 on the grounds that Italy’s new Empire gave her new "rights.** France and England stood firm in the face of a claim to property actually possessed by one of them.

On

December 14 the French Foreign Minister declared to the Chamber of Deputies, "France will never consent to give up

2

an inch of territory.1*

Daladier left for a colonial tour 3 in December and made brave speeches in Corsica and Tunis.

He returned to Paris Just In time

to have tea with

Chamberlain and Halifax, on their

way to Rome for adis-

Later, on March 26, Mussolini said, 11In the Italian note of December 17, 1938, Italian problems with regard to France were clearly defined, problems with a colonial character. These problems have a name. They are: Tunis, Djibouti, Suez.1* That specific aims had been mentioned at all was flatly denied three days later by Daladier, and the letter was duly published as proof. C f . Daladier, In Defense of France» p. 210.

2 Quoted in Benson, op. clt., p. 24. 3Xbid., p. 29.

154 cussion with Mussolini in which the French colonies would undoubtedly play an important part.

The French fear was

the Italian h o p e : that Chamberlain might suggest a confer­ ence on Mediterranean problems.

Apparently Daladier1s

influence was stronger than the Duce*s, for the Englishmen went, talked and returned, and no Mediterranean Munich emerged; Britain refused to appease with French colonies .1 The Italian desires were not dead, however, and by the end of January the Italian problem was destined once more to be the basis of a minor crisis. Whether Hitler would or would not back Italian claims was a question.

No substantial backing for Mussolinifs

actions came from Berlin.

Indeed it was Just at this time

that Germany was dickering for a friendship pact with Paris, signed on December 6 , and Franco-German relations were, on the surface, unusually cordial.

During the Bonnet-von

Ribbentrop negotiations, the French Minister was assured that the "struggle against Bolshevism1* was the sole basis for the Axis; the "recent demonstration in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, which in his opinion involved no gov­ ernment responsibility.

. • {appeared^ to have made no

1Very little news as to the Rome discussion emerged. The British press commented vaguely that "The Prime Min­ ister and Lord Halifax seem to have brought back with them . . . a more precise knowledge of Italy*s ruler and his ambitions," The Manchester Guardian, January 20, editorial: "Mr. Chamberlain Returns," p. 1$.

155 particular impression on the German Minister, who * • • Caffected^J in the circumstances to consider the Mediterranean question as outside the scope of German interests .11 Although the official German Diplomatisch-Politische Korrespondenz mildly pointed out, in connection with the Chamberlain visit to Home, that nBritain was obviously interested in a stable peace in the Mediterranean, that stable peace was impossible as long as Italy1s claims went unrecognized, that Britain ought to support those claims,” there was certainly no evidence that Hitler was talcing more than a passive friendly Interest in the program of his southern ally. The promised Czech guarantee, meanwhile, had been apparently forgotten by both members of the Axis.

?ftiile

in Paris, von Ribbentrop had promised that upon his return to Berlin he would ^re-examine. . . the question of the setting up of the international guarantee, the principle of which was asserted by Germany in Protocol No. 1."

But

when, on December 21, M. Coulondre, acting on request of his government, queried German State Secretary von Weiz&cker

^•Bonnet to the major French diplomatic posts, Decem­ ber 14, 1938. French Yellow B o o k , pp. 39-40. 2

. cit.,

Benson, ojd

p. 30.

^Bonnet to the major French diplomatic posts, Decem­ ber 14, 1938. French Yellow B o o k , p. 41.

156 on tli© subject, he received a most reticent reply.

^Could

not this matter ,11 asked von Weizs&cker, Mbe forgotten?w ^ Later, on February 7, M. V. de LaCroix, French Minister in Prague, reported on a conversation between M* Chvalkovsky, Czech Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Hitler and von Ribbentrop in Berlin, in which the Germans had insisted 11emphatically

that it was not possible to give a German

guarantee to a State which does not eliminate the Jews , 11

2

and had demanded a reduction in the Czech army* Following 3 a written request on February 8 to the Reich Foreign Office, the French government received the German terms for carrying into effect the guarantee.

These terms were

obviously impossible, especially from the point of view of Czechoslovakia.

They were:

(1)

Complete neutrality of Czechoslovakia*

(2)

The foreign policy of Czechoslovakia must be brought into line with that of the Reich; adhesion to the Anti-Comintern Pact is deemed advisable*

(3)

Czechoslovakia must immediately leave the League of Nations.

■^Coulondre to Bonnet, December 21, ibid., p. 46.

^de LaCroix to Bonnet, February 7, ibid., pp. 56-57. srbia., pp. 59-60.

157 (4)

Drastic reduction of military effectives.

(5)

A part of the gold reserve of Czechoslovakia must be ceded to Germany. A part of the Czechoslovak industries having been ceded, a part of the gold-reserve must accordingly pass into the hands of Germany.

(6 )

The Czechoslovak currency from Sudetenland must be exchanged for Czechoslovak raw materials•

(7)

The Czechoslovak markets must be open to the German industries of Sudetenland. No new industry may be created in Czechoslovakia if it competes with an industry already existing in Sudetenland.

(8 )

Promulgation of anti-Semitic laws analagous to those of Nuremberg.

(9)

Dismissal of all Czechoslovak Government em­ ployees who may have given Germany any ground for complaint.

(10)

The German population of Czechoslovakia must have the right to carry Nazi badges and to fly the National-Socialist flag. '*•

And on February 28 in a note verbale, the German F o r ­ eign Office informed the French Ambassador that not only would Germany refuse to guarantee Czechoslovakia, but also that she regarded any attempt by the western powers to so guarantee the Czechs as ^aggravating *1 to the situation and as an ftinadequate safeguard against.

. . differences aris«2 ing and multiplying and leading to conflicts.

Ibid., pp. 60-61. These materials, in line with the German treatment of the war as an isolated occurrence, are not in any of the German war books.

2Ibid., p. 62

158 These developments did not fall to make themselves evident in Britain and France, and Axis solidarity was met by Allied solidarity and a stiffening of the Allied backbone*

On February 6 Chamberlain told the Commons:

" It is impossible to examine in detail all the hypothetical cases that may arise, but X feel bound to make it plain that the solidarity of interests by which France and this country are united is such that any threat to the vital interests of France, from whatever quarter it came, must evoke the immediate cooperation of this country,"^* a sentiment which was gratefully reiterated by Daladier in Paris*

And on the 21st Chamberlain announced that Britain

would spend over 4 500,000,000 on armaments in the next 2 year* It is possible that these new Allied statements of policy frightened the Axis away from any prospective western grab, but if so it merely frightened Hitler into another central European grab.

The Nazi tactics were

similar to those used six months before.

On March 10, DNB

reported that Father Tizo, leader of the Slovak provincial cabinet within the rump Czechoslovak state, who was deposed

^-The Times (London), February 7, 1939, "Britain and France: Prime Minister’s Statement,” p. 14* ^Ibid., February 22, "Cost of Defense: lai n ’s Speech ,11 p. 7*

Mr. Chamber­

159 by President Hacha

1

for refusing to suppress Hazi-inspired

autonomy movements, addressed an appeal to Berlin*

On

March 11 and 12 military movements in Germany in the direction of Austria were noted in Berlin, and Czech terror 2 was again playing a big role in the German press. On the 13th Tizo went to Berlin and discovered that Hitler wanted na free Slovakia.”

On the 14th von WeizsMcker informed

the British Ambassador that the German government regarded 4 the Tizo government as the Monly legal government.” That night Hacha flew with Chvalkovsky to Berlin and held an all night conference with Nazi officials, ending at 4:30.

At 6:00 a.m., the two Czech officials, on the 15th,

joined von Ribbentrop and Goebbels in the following brief communique: The Czech State President declared that in order to reach a final appeasement he placed the fate of the Czech people and of the land trustingly in the hands of the Fiihrer of the German Reich. The Filhrer accepted this declaration and gave ex­ pression to his decision that he placed the Czechj. people under the protection of the German Reich.

■^Benes resigned directly after Munich and was replaced by Hacha. p. 67.

^Coulondre to Bonnet, March 13, French Yellow Book, ------------ ---- — ^Coulondre to Bonnet, March 14, ibid., p. 72. ^Coulondre to Bonnet, Later, March 14, ibid., p. 73.

p. 6 .

®The London Times, March 15, 1939, ”Hacha Sees Hitler,” 9 9 9 9

160 The German a rmy was already in Czechoslovakia, and within three hours Prague had been occupied,

Hungary

occupied and annexed Ruthenia on the 16th, and Slovakia became an official protectorate of Germany on the 18th. Munich and all that went with it were gone. The meeting between Hitler and Hacha has been the subject of some interesting reports.

That given by

Coulondre, hardly acceptable as an unbiased review, is nevertheless dramatic enough to bear repetition here. The Filhrer stated very briefly that the time was not one for negotiation but that the Czech Ministers had been summoned to be informed of Germanyrs deci­ sions, that these decisions were irrevocable, that Prague would be occupied on the following day at 9 o*clock, Bohemia and Moravia incorporated within the Reich and constituted a Protectorate, and whoever tried to resist would be ”trodden underfoot” (zertreten). With that, the Fiihrer wrote his signature and went out. It was about 12:30 a. m. A tragic scene then took place between the Czech Ministers and the three Germans. For hours on end Dr. Hacha and M. Chvalkovsky protested against the outrage done to them, declared that they would not sign the document presented to them, pointed out that were they to do so they would be forever cursed by their people. Dr. Hacha, with all the energy at his command, fought against the Statute of Protectorate which it was intended to im­ pose on the Czechs, observing that no white people was reduced to such a condition. The German ministers were pitiless. They literally hunted Dr. Hacha and M. Chvalkovsky round the table on which the documents were lying, thrusting them con­ tinually before them, pushing pens into their hands, incessantly repeating that if they continued in their refusal, half Prague would lie in ruins from aerial

161 ■bombardment within two hours, and that this would be only the beginning. Hundreds of bombers were awaiting only the order to take off, and they would receive that order at six in the morning if the signatures were not forthcoming by then. President Hacha was in such a state of exhaustion that he more than once needed medical attention from the doctors who, by the way, had been there ready for service since the beginning of the interview. The Czech Ministers having stated they could not take such a decision without the consent of their Government, they received the answer that a direct telephonic line existed to the Cabinet of Ministers then in session at Prague and that they could get in touch with them im­ mediately. It is a fact that such a line had been laid down in Czech territory by members of the German m i no r ­ ity, without the knowledge of the authorities. At 4:30 in the morning, Dr. Hacha, in a state of total collapse, and kept going only by means of injec­ tions, resigned himself with death in his soul to give his signature. As he left the Chancellery, M. Chvalkovsky declared: "Our people will curse us, and yet we have saved their existence. We have preserved them from a terrible massacre." * Of immediate importance was the question as to whether Britain and Prance wo^^ld fight over this violation of Munich.

On October 4, 1938, Daladier had told the Deputies:

"We brought (at Munich) the Czech nation the support of international guarantees.

France and Great Britain pledged

themselves immediately and without reservations."» 2 And a British Foreign Office Official Report of October 4 stated that: •^To Bonnet, March 17, French Yellow B o o k , pp. 96-97. Def>ense of France, p. 186.

162 The House will realize that the formal treaty of guarantee has yet to be drawn up and completed in the normal way. • . • Until that is done, technically the guarantee cannot be said to be in force• His Majesty*s Government, however, feels under a moral obligation to Czechoslovakia to treat the guarantee as being now in force.l In the crisis the Allied attitude was due for a 2 change. On March 13, two days before the 11Crunch ,11 Bonnet and Sir Eric Phipps consulted on a Czech inquiry regarding the Munich guarantee and determined that it did not apply*

Both governments soon made known their atti­

tudes regarding the guarantee.

Chamberlain, speaking on

the 15th, told the Commons that ’*In our opinion the situa­ tion has radically altered since the Slovak Diet declared the independence of Slovakia.

The effect of this declara­

tion put an end by internal dispute to the state whose frontiers we had proposed to guarantee .11 ^

Britain and

^Quoted by Chamberlain in speech to the House on March 15. In Search of Peace, p. 263. Churchill on Octo­ ber 5 ridiculed the' British guarantee• ttHis Majesty*s Government,” he said, ^refused to give that guarantee when it would have saved the situation, yet In the end they gave it when it was too late, and now. for the future, they r e ­ new It, when they have not the slightest power to make it good. Blood, Sweat, and Tears, p* 58* ^Churchill’s term, Step by Step, p. 301. ^Although the Czech question receives brief discus­ sion in the British Blue Book and quite full discussion In the French Yellow BoUkT”neither the Czech request nor the Allied decision are mentioned. Indeed, except for the pro­ tests given to Germany, the Allied war books give no con­ sideration at all to even the possibility of enforcement of the Franco-British guarantee. ^In Search of Peace, p. 263. Generally, His Majestyfs Loyal Opposition agreed with the decision of His Majesty's

163 Prance nevertheless protested against the German action as !la complete repudiation of the Munich agreement and a denial of the spirit in which the negotiators of that agree­ ment hound themselves to co-operate for a peaceful settle­ ment .M^

Such a protest was an obvious political neces­

sity; as Bonnet aptly put it in his appeal to the British government for a joint protests . . . If we were to accept without protest so ex­ plicit a violation of the Munich Agreement it might lead to a doubt as to the good faith in which Britain and Prance had embarked on September 29 on a political settlement whose whole justification was, by liberat­ ing the Sudeten, to safeguard at the very least the independence and integrity of a more homogeneous Czechoslovakia placed under an international guarantee. The Governments who gave their assent to a compromise intended to assure the survival of Czechoslovakia, cannot to-day watch in silence the dismemberment of the Czech people and the annexation of their territory without being accused in retrospect of complaisance and moral complicity. The enforced submission of the Prague Government, brutally imposed by German pressure,

Government, but hardly on such palpably ridiculous grounds. nIt is no use going to their (the Czechs1) aid when they are defenseless ,11 Churchill said in the House of Commons on March 14, wif we would not go to their aid when they were strong. Therefore I agree entirely with those who think we should not intervene at the present time. We cannot. That is the end of i t .11 Blood, Sweat, and Tears, p. 96# Chamberlain on the 15th was~Tollowed to the rosTrum by Eden, who spoke to a cheering House about the possibility of a coalition of peace-loving countries to stand against: further aggression. Chamberlainrs speech is not in the British Blue Book, nor is Bonnetfs defense of the policy to' the""'Deputies in the French Yellow Book. Both books ive only those official' statements^wEIcE ring true to heir expressed aim to fight aggression, as Bonnet’s m e s ­ sage to London on March 16 suggesting joint protest.

f

lAs reported by Halifax to the Lords, March 20, Blue Book, p. 13. The French protest is given in the French Yellow Book, pp. 95-96.

164 cannot be invoked to absolve Great Britain and France from their moral obligation in the eyes of their own people and of those of other States as well as of the Czechoslovak nation* They owe it to international opinion, as well as to themselves, to register a formal protest .1 And the Soviet government, in reply to notification from the German government, protested more vigorously still the Nazi decision to incorporate Czechoslovakia into the Reich and to make a protectorate of Slovakia*

The written

protest signed by the Peoplefs Commissar for Foreign Affairs, after contesting the legality of President H a c h a fs assent to the Berlin proposal, ended in this challenging note: The Government of the U.S.S.R. cannot recognize the incorporation of Czechia in the Reich nor that of Slovakia in one form or another, as legal or as in conformity with the generally accepted rules of inter­ national law, or with justice, or with the principle of self-determination. Not only does the German Government’s action not avert any of the dangers threatening world peace but it actually tends,to mul­ tiply them, to disturb the political stability of Central Europe, and, finally, to deal a new blow to the feeling of security of nations.^ The German seizure of Czechoslovakia meant money in Hitler’s bank and a good deal of additional power to the

^French Yellow B o o k , p. 87. 2 f Quoted in notification by the French Charge d ’A f ­ faires in Moscow, M. Payart, to Bonnet, March 19* French Yellow B o o k , p. 108.

165 Reich,

Bohemia and Moravia contained 85-90 per cent of

what was left of the Czech industry (including the Skoda works) and 90 per cent of the hank deposits.

Some

$90,000,000 in gold in the Czech National Bank was a particular boon to a nation badly in need of foreign exchange#

1

And possibly Hitler received badly needed 2 workers for the under-staffed German industries# Hitler's defense of the Prague surprise was fully given in his long-awaited speech to the Reichstag on April 28, in which he answered President Roosevelt's tele­ gram asking for a common European guarantee against further aggression.

For the first time the principle of the re-

incorporation of Germans into the Reich was dropped, and in place of it was substituted the claim ”That long after the ethnographic principle had been made invalid.

(jsicJ

Germany should take under her protection her interests dating back a thousand years, which are not only of a polit* 3 ical but also of an economic nature* ' The Czech people,

1 Cf. Josef Hane, "Czechs and Slovaks since Munich,” Foreign Affairs, October, 1939, pp. 102-115#

^Hanc, op. cit., reports 100,000 Czech workers trans­ ferred to the Reich in June, 1939, alone# Coulondre, writ­ ing to Bonnet, speaks wildly of the ”5,000,000 workers which Germany needed for . . . an emergency” to come from the Czech ranks, French Yellow B o o k , p. 104# ^News in Bri e f , May-June, 1939, Germany and the Brit­ ish Policy o?~Encirclement, p. 51. The entire speech, pp#

16^ 61 #

166 said Hitler, were of different stock from the German, but ”in the thousand years in which the two people have lived side by side, Czech culture has in the main been formed and moulded by German Influences ♦” Czech economy*

The same is true of

Close contact between the two races has

resulted in ”a period in which both the German and the Czech nations flourished, every estrangement was calami­ tous in its consequences

This is due, said Hitler, to

the fact that **the gigantic mass of people living in Central Europe, crowded together in a confined space can only ensure its livelihood by the highest intensity of work and consequently of order *11

This order, built up over

2 2000 years, the statesmen at Versailles destroyed* The reason for the establishment of an independent Czechoslovakia at Versailles Hitler found, with some reason, in the desires of the w peacemaker s’* to create a ^satellite state, capable of being used against Germany*n This state, containing as it did so much ’’foreign national property*

* . was utterly incapable of survival

on

. • alone*”

strength.

It could be maintained

’’only by means of a brutal assault on the national units

1Ibid., p. 48. 2Xbid., p. 46.

167 which formed the major part of the population#

This as ­

sault was possible only in so far as protection and assistance was granted by the European democracies,1’ which demanded in return that Czechoslovakia be ’’prepared loyal­ ly to take over and play the role which it had been assigned at birth#”

Thus grew a vicious circle#

”The

more this state tried to fulfill the task it had been assigned, the greater was the resistance.

. . • And the

greater the resistance, the more it became necessary to resort to oppression#”

Hitler found additional proof of

the aggressive character of Czechoslovakia1s role in ’’the observation of the French Air Minister, M. Pierre Cot.

• •

that the duty of this state# • • was to be an aerodrome for the landing and taking off of bombers, from which it would be possible to destroy the most important industrial centers in a few hours#”

The destruction of this aerodrome

had nothing to do with ’’hatred of the Czech people,” for whose national characteristics Hitler earlier spoke with 1

great respect#

Ibid#, p# 49# Hitler adds as a further duty ’’a s ­ signed to this state” the somewhat incongruous one of providing ”a bridge to Europe for Eolshevik aggression#” Accusing the British conservatives of purposely preserv­ ing a ’’bridge for bolshevik aggression” seems to be drawing a pretty long bow# The Pierre Cot quotation Hitler had already referred to in his Wilhelmshaven speech on April 1#

168 As for charges of violation of the Munich pact, Hitler might have borrowed from Chamberlain# The contention that this solution is contrary to the Munich Agreement can neither be supported nor confirmed. This Agreement could under no circum­ stances be regarded as final, because it admitted that other problems required and remained to be solved# We cannot really be reproached for the fact that the parties concerned — and this is the d e ­ ciding factor — did not turn to the Pour Powers but only to Italy and Germany; nor yet for the fact that the state as such finally split up of its own accord and there, was consequently no longer any Czechoslovakia* Ho reference is made, of course, to the pressure from Berlin upon Prague and Bratislava, nor to the intense barrage of radio propaganda from Vienna which preceded the break-up by some three weeks* Although London and Paris did no more than to pro­ test, and although Chamberlain's speech of March 15 was conciliatory in some passages, appeasement was at an end# It was now impossible for leaders in London (and Paris) to remain blind to the rapidly changing balance of power, and the extent of German alms could no longer be hidden* Self-determination for the German minority groups had

1

Ibid#, p# 51. Von Hibbentrop insisted to Coulondre on March 18 that Bonnet had given to him in Paris after the signing of the declaration of December 6 the assurance that Czechoslovakia would no longer be the subject of an exchange of views.” (Coulondre to Bonnet, Yellow B o o k , p# 98). This charge Bonnet indignantly, emphatically and categorically denied, Yellow B o o k , p. 105.

169 been one thing; the seizure of Bohemia and Moravia was something else again, particularly when followed closely by a German-Roumanian Trade Treaty, apparently forced by German pressure.

Chamberlain found himself flying in the

face of increasing hostility, both within the House and within his own Cabinet, and Daladier was suffering similar­ ly in France.

Churchill, writing on the 24th, was merely

repeating what he and others said on the 15th when he wrote:

’’The blow has been struck.

Herr Hitler.

• . has

broken every tie of good faith with the British and French statesmen who tried so hard to believe in him.

. . . The

entire apparatus of confidence and goodwill which was being sedulously constructed in Great Britain has been shattered into innumerable fragments.

It can never again

be mended while the present domination rules in Germany.11'*’ Two days after Prague Chamberlain took the bull by the horns.

Speaking at Birmingham he bitterly attacked

Herr Hitler and threw appeasement down the drain. I was convinced that after Munich the great major­ ity of the British people shared my hope, and ardently desired that that policy (of appeasement) should be carried further. But today I share their disappoint-ment, their indignation, that those hopes have been wantonly shattered. . . . What has become of this declaration of nHo further territorial ambition?” What has become of the assurance

1 Step by Step, p. 302.

170 that nWe d o n ’t want any Czechs in the Reich?’* What regard has been paid here to that principle of selfdetermination on which Herr Hitler argued so vehemently with me at Berchtesgaden. . * .? . . . Is this the end of an old adventure, or is it the beginning of a new? Is this the last attack upon a small State, or is it to be followed by others? Is this, in fact, a step in the direction of an attempt to dominate the world by force? I do not believe there is anyone who will question my sincerity when I say there is hardly anything I would not sacrifice for peace. But there is one thing I must except, and that is. . • liberty. . . . I feel bound to repeat that, while I am not pre­ pared to engage this country by new unspecified commit­ ments operating under conditions which cannot now be foreseen, yet no greater mistake could be made than to suppose that, because it believes war to be a senseless and cruel thing, this nation has so lost its fibre that it will not take part to the utmost of its power in resisting such a challenge if it were made.^Daladier followed Chamberlain’s steps.

The day after

the Prime Minister’s Birmingham speech the Premier asked the French parliament for power to govern by decree. Speaking to the Senate he, too, asked questions: The Munich agreement? Destroyed. The mutual declar­ ation of Franco-German collaboration? Violated in letter and spirit. All this has disappeared. . . . Today, and in the hours to come, we shall have to face events that may develop dangerously. . . .

•^British Blue B o o k , pp. 5-10. It is interesting to compare this speech of Chamberlain’s with that of Churchill after Munich. Cf. ante , pp. 147-48.

171 This is a heavy task in front of us# We have to insure this country*s safety, the safety of freedom, otherwise than by w o r d s : we have to insure it by action# We must have that which gives value to the life of men, whatever their country, the great ideal of justice and liberty.^These words were followed by action#

The British and

French Ambassadors to the German capital were recalled, and the German Ambassadors in London and Paris went home to Berlin# It is true that members of the government in both England and France long before saw signs of the approach­ ing climax#

Duff Cooper in his resignation speech of

October 3 had said, uThe Prime Minister has confidence in the good will and in the word of Herr Hitler#

• • •

The

Prime Minister may be right. he believes.

• • but I cannot believe what Q I wish I could.” Eden, Churchill and Mor­

rison carried on the theme throughout the next six months# And that acute observer, Coulondre, wrote to Bonnet as early as December 15: • • # seems to me. Reich.

”The will for expansion in the east

• • undeniable on the part of the Third

. . # The first half of Herr Hitler*s programme —

the integration of the Deutschtum into the Reich — been carried out.

has

. .; now the hour of the Lebensraum has

^In Defense of France, pp. 196-202# a**te *, '

146#

172 come#

Indeed, the enlightenment of Chamberlain, Halifax,

Daladier and Bonnet must have been a gradual process, as repeated Nazi refusals to implement the Munich pact took on an increasingly menacing aspect. this connection:

Benson observed in

wTo satisfy the appetite of the Axis

would require concessions in the west as well.

The gradual

realization of this fact by Chamberlain was the most important diplomatic d e v e l o p m e n t of January#w

2

But it was on March 15 that the nappeasers,” seeing, were forced to believe that to which they had wished to remain blind: that the danger to the balance lay in the growing power and ambitions of Germany.

The importance of

this enlightenment can hardly be minimized.

Throughout

British and French literature published after the outbreak of the war on the following September and justifying the Allied battle, one finds repeated mention of the nIdes of March” as the turning point of Western policy, the time when the Western powers realized that they must fight if they would stop the ’’German Octupus.”

Viscount Cranborne,

explaining ”Why Britain Fights,” writes of the German move into Prague as without question the occasion for the

^French Yellow B o o k , p. 42. ^Benson, og. c i t ., pp. 28-29.

173 awakening of British perception*

It was a ’’Nazi blunder,”

says the Viscount, for It let the cat out of the bag. • • it gave the lie once and for all to the oft-repeated thesis that he (Hitler) only sought to include peoples of Germanic origin in the Reich. His aims were not demonstrated. . . . He intended nothing less than the domination of Europe. . . • The effect on Britain was electric. The issue was now one from which, in any view, she could no longer disassociate herself .1 Harold Nicolson develops a similar thesis.

The

British, he argues, fight only when aroused by both per­ sonal fear and personal outrage; of the momentous ’’Ides of March” he says: Ever since 1933 Adolf Hitler has titivated one or the other of these two emotions but, until he tore up the Munich agreement last March 15 and marched into Prague, he did not provoke them both at once. Until that vital date half the people of Great Britain were angry without being frightened, and the other half were frightened without being angry. The combination of menace and humiliation which Herr Hitler contrived on the Ides of March united these two h a l v e s Elsewhere Nicolson writes: ”ln twelve hours the great majority of people in England realized that the policy of appeasement had failed completely.

...

It was now clear

that Herr Hitler was out for loot and conquest.

The dread­

ful day might come when he would cease murdering small and distant countries of which we knew little, and start

lnWhy Britain Fights,” Foreign Affairs, January, 1940. book).

^t’Why Britain Is at War,” (Condensation from the Readers Digest, February, 1940, p. 99.

174 nl

attacking u s . 1

And Lord Lloyd, whose short hook is given weight hy an introduction by Lord Halifax, while accepting Austria and Munich says of Prague:

”And so Hitler turned his

back on his whole political philosophy of racialism and deliberately incorporated alien peoples within the frame work of the Third Reich.

. . • These astonishing and swift

events were in effect a declaration of war. European system.”

• . on the

2

With ChamberlainTs speech of the 17th and Laladier’s of the 18th, the Allied gauntlet was down.

Halifax, talk­

ing to the Lords on the 20th, gave it an additional flaunt by emphasizing that when wthere is no apparent guarantee against successive attacks ,11 then ”wider mutual obligation, in the cause of mutual support.

• • if for no other reason

than the necessity of self defense” is dictated.

”His

Majesty’s Government,” he added, ”have not failed to draw the moral from these events, and have lost no time in placing themselves in close and practical consultation. with other Governments concerned.”

. •

On the 23rd Chamber-

lain, in answer to a question by Labor Leader Atlee, told

3-Why Britain Is at War (the book), p. 104.

2

The British C ase, pp. 69, 73.

^Blue Book, pp. 16-17.

the House that if the German government was **seeking by successive steps to dominate Europe.

. • . His Majesty*s

Government feel bound to say that this would rouse the successful resistance of this and other countries who prize their freedom.” ^ Thus the revision in British policy which seemed bound to bring war to Europe had come.

Prom then on the

continent was to live in a state of diplomatic tension which was to be broken only by war.

The importance of

the change was not lost to all of Britain’s acute observers; for example, The Manchester Guardian commented The Prime Minister’s speech on Friday night (March 17) was the gravest from any Prime Minister since G r ey’s on August 4, 1914. It marks a decisive change in our national policy, but from it there can be no going b a c k .2

1

Ibid., p. 17. 2 The Manchester Guardian, March 19, 1939, Minister’s Speech,1 1 ]?. 7.

’Prime

CHAPTER VII BACKGROUND TO THE POLISH CRISIS:

GERMAN-POLISH

RELATIONS BEFORE MUNICH If Hitler was warned by the ominous sound of British and French official speeches, he took a long time to show it.

On March 17 he delivered an !,economic ulti­

matum 11 to Roumania demanding German control of Roumanian oil, and, despite hurried Anglo-Russian diplomatic move­ ments, a trade agreement providing for concessions of considerable value to Germany was signed on March 23. Meanwhile on March 22 the Lithuanian government felt the pressure of German diplomacy and surrendered Memel and surrounding country to the Reich.

The German army marched

in on March 23 and the Lithuanian Diet ratified the treaty on the 30th.

1

Simultaneously the German press began one of its ominous campaigns against Poland, referring to treatment of the German minority in that country by Warsaw.

On

March 21 von Ribbentrop talked at length with M. Lipski, Polish Ambassador to Germany, presenting what amounted to demands for virtual cession of Danzig and for a German

^■For events of these historic weeks, c f . The New York Times, issues March 15-30.

177 highway across the Polish corridor*

Chancellor Hitler,

said von Ribbentrop, felt the matter to he urgent and advised the Polish diplomat that conversations on the matter wshould not be delayed, lest the Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland was rejecting all his „1 offers*” This had an ominous ring, particularly after the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the virtual occupation of Slovakia which hipski told von Rihbentrop 2

was obviously a move Mdirected against Poland*n

The atten­

tion of the world turned at once to the Polish state, and there it remained until the crash in September* The German case, ethnically speaking, was far weaker in Poland than it had been in the Sudetenland*

Although

Danzig was admittedly a German city, little of Poland proper was predominantly German-populated*

There had been

three and a half million Germans in Czechoslovakia; there 2

were only about one million in Poland*

■^Lipski to Foreign Minister Beck, March 21, Polish White B o o k , p. 63. 2Loc.

olt.

One authority quotes the 1931 census to show the German population in Poland as 1,092,080, about 3.4 per cent of a total population of 32,092,080* (Stefan Karski, Poland Past and Present, p. 32). Buell, writing in 1939, cites the same census to show a German-language minority of only

178 These Germans in Poland, furthermore, were not set­ tled in a comparatively compact group, as had been the case in the Sudetenland, but were scattered in groups throughout the country*

small

The larger number of them

were located, it is true, in the former German provinces of Poznan, Pomorze, and Silesia, but a full 20 per cent was to be found in the province of Lodz, which had belonged to Russia before the first World War, where their ancestors had settled a century or so before to dominate the textile industry of that locality.

About 45 per cent of the

German population altogether lived outside of the former German provinces, forming MGerman ’islands 1 surrounded by huge non-German majorities.”*** According to Polish statis­ tics, Germans in Poznan in 1931 numbered 193,100 and

741,000, but adds that "Germans believe that the number is larger 11 and charge "that a person speaking both Polish and German, which is common in mixed areas, is likely, for political reasons, to tell the census taker that his maternal language is Polish*w (Poland, Key to Europe, p* 245). Schuman gives the figure as of 1921 as 1,159,194. (International Politics, p. 314)* Undoubtedly there was a large emigration of Germans from Poland after the war; Buell says about one million left the provinces ceded to Poland after 1921, l o c . c i t . Germans claim that "By the middle of 1939, 1.4 million Germans had left Posen, West Prussia and East Upper Silesia under pressure by Polish authorities.u (German Library of Information, Polish Acts of Atrocity Against the German Minority in Poland, p. 76). ^Buell, o£. cit., p. 246. Cf. also J. C. Hesse, "The Germans in Poland,1' Slavonic Review, July, 1937.

179 constituted 9.2 per cent of the population, in Pomorze, 105,400, or 9.8 per cent, and in Silesia, 90,600, or seven per cent.'*' This peculiar intermixture of German-Polish popu­ lation in Poland has arisen from the history of Baltic Europe.

For centuries throughout the middle ages,

Poland served as the /battleground in prolonged conflict between Teuton and Slav.

Essentially, that conflict was

a struggle for the right to expand into the fertile plains lying between Russia and the western Europe of which Germany was the eastern outpost.

The struggle was not an

uneven one; the advantage changed from year to year.

It

was marked by extreme brutality and by the Intense effort of both sides to colonize and to hold with the plough land previously won with the sword.

2

In the end, with the

partition of Poland In the late 1 7 0 0 Ts, nThe fight lasting five hundred years between Poles and Germans for the eastern Baltic was finally decided in favor of Germany."

^Buell, l o c . c i t .

2

C f . Morrow, The Peace Settlements In the GermanPolish Borderlands, pp. 5 f f •; Pirenne, Histoire de 1 1Europe des Invasions au XVI Bibole, pp. '570 et passim. ^Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte 1 m Neunzehnten Jahrhundert, vol. 1, p. 65, quoted in Buell, o^. c i t ., p. 50.

180 The German efforts at colonization in central Europe during the Middle Ages were exceedingly important to m o d e m Germany.

The American historian Thompson draws a parallel

between them and the similar expansion of the American population into contiguous territory throughout the nine­ teenth century: What the New West meant to America, that the New East meant to medieval Germany. Each region beckoned the pioneer, the young and lusty of every generation, who sought for cheap lands and new freedom in the wilderness. What Jackson and Clay, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois meant to the history of the United States between 1815 and 1850, that Albrecht the Bear and Leo­ pold of Babenberg, Brandenburg and Austria, meant to Germany in the 12th century. • • • But for this splen­ did achievement Germany today would be a narrow strip of territory wedged in between the Rhine and the Elbe, and the German nation and Germanic culture would exist in the reduced dimension of a minor European state and people.?* In a similar vein, the German historian Treitschke w r i t e s : •: In the countries on the right of the Elbe, our nation once carried out the greatest and most fruit­ ful schemes of colonization which Europe has seen since the days of the Roman Empire; for here it suc­ ceeded in obliterating the usual distinction between colony and motherland so completely that these coloniz­ ed lands formed the nucleus of our new system of states, and since Luther’s time were able to take part in the intellectual progress of the nation, as equal allies of the older stock. ^Feudal Germany, cited in Richard and Grisela MBnnig, e Danzig, pp. 67. ^Adolf Hausrath, Treitschke, His Doctrine of German Destiny and of International Relations. together with a Study of His Life and W o r k , p. 201. (A translation of articles of Treitschke)•

181 After the partition of Poland toward the end of the 18th century, German settlement in German Poland was ac­ celerated, accompanying strenuous efforts to "Germanize" the Poles within the Reich.

German outpost colonies

meanwhile were scattered extensively throughout much of central Europe, in the Baltic countries, in Hungary, in Roumania, even in Serbia.

German influence through German

"Baltic Barons" was extremely important in the Russian court 1

until the time of the World War.

The German colonies in

central and eastern Poland were largely of the nature of these ■‘outposts" and were settled both during the Middle Ages and after the Partitions. The peace men who met at Versailles found few more difficult problems facing them than those arising from the necessity of setting boundaries for the new Polish state. Wilson 1 s thirteenth point had provided "An independent Polish State.

• • which should include the territories inhabited

by indisputably Polish population, (and) which should be a s ­ sured a free and secure access to the sea." ®

But the

^■Cf. Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolu­ tion, p.~B 8 . o &Wilson*s Fourteen Points, in Harley, ojd. cit., pp. 34-35. The advocacy of a free Poland was made diplomatically possible by the elimination of Russia from the Allied forces in 1917. It is interesting to speculate on what a similar elimination of England would have made possible in the same way.

182 delineation of ^territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations 0 proved to be a far mightier task than the mere recognition of the existence of such territories* Hor was °free and secure access to the seaw as susceptible of accomplishment as it had been of statement*

The extreme

nature of the demands of the Polish delegation, far exceed­ ing those justifiable on purely ethnic grounds, served as an additional complication to the problems caused by the mixed nature of the population of the border regions* 1 The problem of Poland was as important to the Confer­ ence as it was perplexing*

Such importance and complexity

were increased by the geographical setting of the country* Lying as it does in the middle of the vast plain stretching from Prance across Germany into Russia, Poland has never had l,natural° or easily defended boundaries; this fact has served not only as a temptation to other powers to conquer and settle, but also as a temptation to Poland to expand its frontiers well beyond what ethnic principles might justify*

2

Past Polish history has been largely a succession of periods of conquest and grandeur and periods of partial or total

1 « , For a thorough analysis of the problem, c f • Morrow, The Peace Settlement in the German-Polish Borderlands♦

2Buell, og* cit*, p. 17.

subjugation.

Nor has Poland ever had really secure access

to the sea.^

And lying between Germany and Russia, the

Polish territory has always been of considerable commercial and strategic importance.

While the commercial value of

the region has declined since the Middle Ages, its strategic importance from a military and diplomatic standpoint has increased.

2

This characteristic could but

increase the interest of the great Powers at the Confer­ ence •

To call the new Poland of 1919 a pawn on the

Conference chessboard might be an understatement, but to call her a chess piece of greater importance such as a Bishop or a rook might be a reasonably accurate analogy. Neither ethnic nor strategic considerations, taken alone, could dictate a settlement both "just1* and "prac­ tical."

Trouble too might be expected to arise from the

concept of an historic boundary.

As is the case through­

out Europe, the Polish-German boundary has varied exten­ sively throughout the ages; the problem which thus arises in attempting to set a just "historic boundary" is the virtually insoluble one of selecting the right moment in

1 Buell, loc. c i t ♦ 2

Cf. R. H. Lord, "The Resurrection of Poland," in A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, H. W. V. Temperley, ed., vol. 6 , p. 219.

184 history at which the "historic" boundary might be said to exist*

The Polish delegation to the Conference, quite

naturally, demanded a restoration of the Polish territories as they existed at the height of Polish power, just before the first partition of Poland in 1772, at which time the Polish-German boundaries were those originally set by the 1

Polish-dictated Treaty of Thorn in 1466.

The Polish

delegation "demanded the return of territory inhabited by a majority of Poles; it also laid claim to other territories for economic, historic, or strategic

reasons.

These Polish claims received strong support from the French representatives.

In the words of M. Pichon, France N

3

wanted a Poland "grande et forte, tres forte."

To

Clemenceau in particular, "A fstrong 1 Poland was a neces­ sity.

Between the barriers of the Democracies in the West

and the power of Poland in the East, Germany would be kept A in order, in subjection." And Poland (with Czechoslovakia) could serve as a barrier between actual Russian Bolshevism

^Ending the Polish-won Thirteen Years War. o p • cit., p . 69•

Buell,

2

Loc. cit.

^Quoted in C. F. Langsam, The World Since 1914, p. 111. ^Karl Friedrich Novak, Versailles, p. 108.

185 and possible future German Bolshevism*

1

But a similar support was not to be found from Britain*

To Lloyd George, representing a power primarily

naval and affected far differently from France by terri­ torial disposition on the Continent itself, Poland was of little moment*

”ln Poland,” writes Novak, ”he saw a

nation of rebels whom he would never willingly have assisted against Britain’s former ally, Russia.

He still

hoped that the day would come when the Bolsheviks would be overthrown; then the old Russia would reappear in some form and he would enter into friendly relations with her* He had no love for the Poles*”

Indeed, his opinion of

In reply to the charge of Lloyd George that ”too severe territorial conditions will be playing the game of Bolshevism in Germany,” Clemenceau wrote to Wilson that an opposite treatment would have ”precisely this result* • • • If these people (the new states In central Europe), es­ pecially Poland and Bohemia, have been able to resist Bol­ shevism up to now, it is because of a sense of nationality* If violence Is done to this sentiment, Bolshevism will find these two peoples an easy prey, and the only barrier which at the present moment exists betv/een Russian Bolshe­ vism and German Bolshevism will be shattered* The result will be either a confederation of Eastern and Central Europe under the domination of a Bolshevist Germany, or the enslavement of the same countries by a reactionary Germany, thanks to the general anarchy. In both cases the Allies will have lost the war*” ”General Observations on Mr* Lloyd George’s Note of March 26,” In Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, vol. 3, p. 250*

2 Novak, op. cit., p. 90*

186 the Polish people was low • wrote:

To Wilson and Clemenceau he

"The proposal of the Polish Commission that we

should place 2,100,000 Germans under the control of a people which is of a different religion and which has never proved its capacity for stable self-government throughout its history must, in my judgment, lead sooner or later to a new war in the East of Europe#

1

Pour areas in dispute between Germany and Poland rose as particular puzzlers to the Conference:

East

Prussia, Danzig, Pomorze (the Corridor) and Upper Silesia# Psychological, ethnical and geographical factors combined to make of each of these districts a virtual land of nightmares to the Versailles peace men#

In the end the

Conference was forced to a series of compromises which, *

like so many compromises, had little basis in logic and thoroughly pleased no one#

See "Some considerations for the Peace Confer­ ence Before They Draft Their Terms ,11 the so-called "Fontainbleau Document," in Hovak, op* cit#, p. 120# The British Prime Minister was to play the unpleasant role of a Cassandra. "I am," he wrote, " . . . strongly averse to transferring more Germans from German rule to the rule of some other nation than can possibly be helped. I can­ not conceive any greater cause of future war than that the German people, who have certainly proved themselves one of the most vigorous and powerful races in the world, should be surrounded by a number of small States, many of them consisting of people who have never previously set up a stable government for themselves, but each of them con­ taining large masses of Germans clamouring for reunion with their native land." Loc# cit#

187 East Prussia caused the least worry of the four* The "first German colony ,11 East Prussia had been conquered and settled by the Teutonic Knights in the 13th century *^ The original "East Prussians ,11 against whose repeated aggressions the Knights directed their martial efforts at

2

the request of Polish Duke Conrad of Moravia, finally 3 died out altogether in the 17th century* The population, now almost entirely German, remained under the rule of the Knights until the Treaty of Thorn, by which the area became a feudal fief of the Polish Crown and was separated from the Holy Roman Empire by the loss of territory in the 4 lower Vistula* With the disappearance of the Order of the Knights in 1535, the East Prussian ruler became the 5 secular Duke of Prussia* Polish leaders conducted more or less serious campaigns during the 15th and 16th c e n ­ turies to colonize part of the territory with people known

^Or rather "resettled*" The Knights well nigh ex­ terminated the original population to make room for the large number of German peasant farmers who followed them into the region. Pirenne, Histoire de 1*Europe des In­ vasions au XVI Siecle, p* 375TZ 2

Stanislaw Zajaczkowski, Rise and Fall of the Teutonic Order in Prussia, p* 21* 5 Ibid.. 4 Morrow,

p. 35. o p . c i t ., pp. 5, 244.

^Zajaczkowski, ojd. cit., p. 53*

188 as "Mazurians," but generally the district remained thor­ oughly Germanized, and in 1657 the Great Elector secured

1 recognition of his status as independent "Duke of Prussia *11 The Partitions in the late 1700*s joined East Prussia to other German territory by the acquisition of Polish terri­ tory, and Prussia became for the first time a "coherent 2 kingdom *'1 Prom 1800, East Prussia became increasingly 3 "one of the strongholds of German patriotism." In view of the almost purely German character of East Prussia, the Conference could do little but to reject Polish demands for outright control of the area.

Agree­

ment was reached, however, upon the holding of a plebiscite in the areas peopled by the t!Mazurians."

These plebiscites

were accordingly held on July 11, 1920, and, since the vote recorded was overwhelmingly in favor of Germany, the 4 district was ceded in toto to that country*

1

.

Morrow, ag. G i t . , p. 5.

2

Robert H. Lord, The Second Partition of Poland,

p. 29. 3 Buell, og. cit., p. 70. 4 Sarah Yfembaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War, volume 1, page 140*

189 The geographic and economic situation of Danzig made of it a more difficult problem.

Situated at the mouth

of the Vistula, Danzig dominated the up-river Polish in­ ter iory and in the hands of a foreign power would bear the same relationship to the Poles that Spanish-controlled New Orleans bore to the American frontiersmen in Tennessee and Kentucky before the purchase of Louisiana in 1803* Essentially Danzig makes a part of a geographical unit with the plains through which flow the upper Vistula and its tributaries.

This patent fact both Poles and French have

emphasized with a good deal of poetic logic.

WC*etait

^DanzigJ le debouche natural,w wrote a French authority, ude toute une immense region interieure.

La Vistula, nee

en pays polonais, sur les flanes des Garpathes de Galicle, roulalt ses eaux parasseuses a travers la vaste etendue des forets et des plaines de la Pologue centrale; puis elle A venait mourir dans la Baltique, sur une cote p olonaise. t / C 1etait comme une loi de la geographie et de l ^ i s t o i r e que ce beau fleuve coulat tout entier en territoire polonais, \. V \ .jusqu^ 1 1endroit ou sa derniere goutte d*eau se perdait dans la m e r .11 ^

Jm

^

Georges Gayet Lacour, in preface to Slawski, L yAcoes de la Pologue k la M e r , Et les Int^rets de la Prusse Orientale, p. ii.

190 But however close be the geographic tie that bound Danzig to Poland, the city was ethnically bound as tightly to Germany*

Settled in close conjunction with East

Prussia, the Vistula port remained under the Order of the Teutonic Knights until 1457, when, following disputes with, the Knights, it requested and received from Polish King Casamir a charter granting it a status as a political^en­ tity,. practically independent

it remained as a !,free

city 11 until the second partition of Poland in 1793, although nominally under the jurisdiction of Poland by the Treaty of Thorn in 1466#

2

In the second Partition, Danzig was

given to Prussia, under whose jurisdiction it remained until 1920, except for a seven-year period following the 3 Napoleonic Treaty of Tilset in 1807* In 1920 the popu­ lation of the Vistula port, approximately 200,000, was 4 overwhelmingly German*

1

Morrow, o|>. cit*, p. 23* Danzig joined the Hanseatic League in an endeavor to strengthen its posi­ tion in the 14th century* L o c * cit* 2 Loc. cit* Ibid., pp. 23 ft, 4 Buell says 95 per cent, o£. cit ♦, p* 354* German sources place the figure at 96 per cent, Facts in Review, August 16, 1939, p* 3, and the M&nnigs, oj>. cit*, p* 55* There is little or no question about the character of the city being almost totally German*

Paced with these two utterly conflicting factors, the Conference resorted to an unusual device suggested by .Danzig1s history*

Article 102 of the Treaty of Versailles

provided that *the principal Allied and Associated Powers undertake to establish the town of Danzig. City.

• • as a Free

It will be placed under the protection of the 1

League of nations.*

Germany was required by Article 100 2 to renounce sovereignty, and Germans in the territory, by

Article 105, were given the option of leaving the city within a year or of renouncing German citizenship in favor 5 of Danzig citizenship. The post of High Commissioner, to be filled by appointment by the League itself, was created 4 and given considerable authority, A constitution, to be drawn up by the League High Commissioner and representa­ tives of the Free City, was to be under the protection of 5 the League, Disputes between Danzig and Poland were placed under the jurisdiction of the commissioner,

1 Quoted in Schuman, op. cit., pp. 748-49. Ibid.. p. 749.

6

192 The narrow strip of territory to the west of the new Free City, called by the Foies the district of ”Pomorze,tf presented another ticklish problem.

Through this terri­

tory was found the sole remaining possibility for ,!free and secure access to the sea 11 for the new Polish state, Danzig itself hardly meeting those qualifications*

1

Furthermore,

it had been an integral part of Polish territory before the Partitions, and despite German efforts at Prussification, the majority of inhabitants of Pomerania undoubtedly retained their Polish character throughout the period of German rule*

2

The district, therefore, was given to Poland

outright, in spite of bitter German resentment arising from the separation of East Prussia from the Fatherland, with a provision requiring a Polish-German treaty guaranteeing to Germany the right of transit across the

corridor” thus

It is probable, as one authoritative observer claims, that Wilson originally intended only to guarantee to Poland the use of the Vistula river, leaving control of the Baltic coast to Germany* Even after yeoman service in the presen­ tation of "a memorial and maps” by the Polish leader Braowski who set himself to ^repair this state of things” in Washington, ”Wilson was still not quite convinced* ■ Only later did ”the course of events. . • clear the misunder­ standing •” W. J* Rose, Poland, p* 57*

2

Even the German census of 1910 admitted that the majority of the inhabitants of the territory later ceded to Poland were Polish. Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Parist vol. 2, p* 2147

193 1 created. An even more serious controversy arose from the problem of Upper Silesia, a district which had not been a part of the Polish domain since 1335 when it was given by Polish King Casamir to the Bohemian (Czech) crown as 2

the price of peace in the west*

It had been In Prussian

hands since Its conquest from the Habsburgs by Frederic 3 the Great in 1742* The people themselves, while speaking the Polish dialect were far from wholeheartedly Polish in thought; many were opposed to division and 4 favored autonomy* The first draft of the Treaty of Versailles gave almost the entire Upper Silesian district to Poland on the grounds that most of Its inhabitants were Polishspeaking*

To this provision the German delegation made

a particularly strong protest, offering in argument the

1

Buell, og* c i t *, p* 71*

2 Rose, Poland, p* 24* 3 Buell, loc♦ c i t ♦ 4 W. J* Rose maintains that the major part of popu­ lar sentiment favored a regime of autonomy* See The Drama of Upper Silesia, p. 168*

^Langsam, og. cit*, p* 116*

194 1 historical facts mentioned above;

the German position

received some strong support from Lloyd George, wwhose intransigeance was lessening *-1

One of the very few

modifications made in the original Versailles draft, therefore, concerned the withholding of Upper Silesia from Poland until a plebiscite had indicated the desires of the Silesian people*

When this plebiscite was

finally held, on March 20, 1921, 707,605 voted for Ger4 many and 479,559 for Poland* Of the communes, 754 showed a majority favoring adherence to Germany, while 699 indicated a majority having a preference for incorporation into Poland*

The Poles immediately claimed all

the area with a Polish majority, in opposition to the German position that the entire region made an economic unit and could not- be divided without inviting disaster

6 to the whole area*

Action was delayed for some time,

1

Buell, l o c ♦ c i t * o

Langsam, loc * cit* The British War Minister is reported to have once said that one might as well give a clock to a monkey as Upper Silesia to the Poles* Buell, oj • cit • , p • 24:* ^Langsam, og. cit*, P* 116* ^Buell, o£. cit., p. 72*

SLangsam, erg. cit., p* 118* ^Boo. cit*

195 thereafter, particularly due to disagreement between England and Prance over a possible solution,

1

and the

2 matter was finally referred to the League Council*

This

body in turn accepted the recommendations of a special committee, and in accordance with these recommendations Silesia was partitioned so as to give Germany the major part of the population and area, but to leave Poland with most of the economic resources*

Thus ’’Poland acquired

53 of the 67 coal mines, 9 of the 14 steel and rolling mills, all of the zinc and lead foundries, about threefourths of the coal-production area, and 1 1 of the 16 .. 3 zinc and lead min e s • Although bitterly attacked for this reason by the Germans, the line was probably about as fair from the standpoint of self-determination as 4 could reasonably have been drawn* It would have been surprising, perhaps, if the relations existing between Germany and the newly-born

1

Loc * c i t * Ibid., p. 119.

3

Loc * cit♦

4 Cf. Wambaugh, og* cit * * pp. 259 ff* The plebis­ cites were policed by a Polish wCItizens Guard,1’ and German sources claim that ”As a result, over 100,000 Upper Silesians were unable to vote, in the plebiscite of March, 1921, for remaining in the Reich.” Polish Acts of Atrocity against the German Minority in Poland. p. 12*

196 Polish state had been anything but “unfriendly from the beginning of the new Polandfs career.

Poland’s relations

with all her neighbors, basically affected by central European geography and featured by intense Polish aggres­ siveness, were anything but smooth between 1919 and 1

1939,

but her relations with Germany, at least until

1933, were ^worse than with any other power•ll Underneath all surface factors making for unfriendliness between the two nations lay from the outset the same factor which made for constant PolishGerman conflict before the Partitions: rivalry for control of and the right to expand on the central Euro­ pean plains, essentially a rivalry for existence. conflict was felt in both Warsaw and Berlin.

This

It underlay

the intensely aggressive policy of Poland between 1918 and 1934, and formed the basis for German refusals to

^•Poland engaged in bitter wars with both Russia and Lithuania and almost came to blows with Czecho­ slovakia almost before the ink placed on her birth cer­ tificate at Versailles was dry* Her dealings with those countries remained those of one suspicious rival and another down into 1939. The Polish-Lithuanian boundary remained closed to commerce until shortly before the German invasion. C f . the excellent discussion in Buell, o p . cit., pp. 320 ?T., and a significant article by Smogorzewski on ^PoTish Foreign Policy ,11 Contemporary Review, July, 1938.

^Buell, op. cit., p. 330.

197 accept Germany’s eastern settlement at Versailles as permanent during the same period.

Bismarck recognized

the intensity of the conflict; as early as 1886 he stated accurately the German position when he declared that 11we will never consent to the restoration of Poland.

Between

Prussia and Poland there is a struggle for e x i s t e n c e ^ Partly "because of this underlying feeling, leaders of the German Republic after 1920 nnever could believe that Poland was more than a ftemporary’ state (saison Staat),n

2

and throughout the years between Versailles

and 1934 the rectification of what, to Germans, were the '’injustices1* of the Versailles provisions for her eastern boundary remained a cardinal objective of German foreign policy.

Germans never forgot Danzig, the Corridor, and

Upper Silesia.

The German collaboration with the League

of Nations and western Europe during the late 1920’s involved the acceptance of Germany’s western frontiers; it most emphatically did not involve a like acceptance of the eastern German boundary.

Within a month after the

signature of the Locarno Treaties by which the Weimar Republic accepted as final the Versailles boundaries in

^Quoted, Ibid., p. 73.

2Ibid., p. 330.

198 the West, Stresemann, the great German peace leader ■under whose guidance the policy of reconciliation with the western powers was followed, wrote to the Crown Prince that **the third great task of Germany is the readjustment of our Eastern frontiers, the recovery of Danzig, the Polish Corridor and a correction of the frontier in Upper Silesia.”'*' This feature of the German policy of collaboration and reconciliation with France, England and the League did not escape the Poles; indeed the foreign policy of the Weimar Republic they found ” symbolized” in Stresemann 1s statement made but shortly after the Locarno Treaties were signed: I turn to speak of our Eastern frontiers* Both the Czech and the Polish Foreign Ministers. • • wished to collaborate in preparing the Treaty of Locarno. • • • They were chiefly anxious to obtain a pact of non-aggression, that is to say, a pact which would have seriously engaged us to abstain from all initiative. That engagement we have under­ taken in the West, but we have refused it for the East. Membership of the League of Rations does not exclude war any more than anything else. I would be very grateful if all those who talk of the League of Rations would read its Covenant at least once. It is extraordinarily interesting in regard both to what it says and to what it does not say. The League of Rations allows war if agreement is unattainable on political questions. ^

^“Gustav Stresemann, His Diaries, Letters, and Papers, vol. 2, p. 503. o

Quoted in Polish White B o o k , p. 4; italics appear as indicated.

199 On the surface, three problems In particular created constant friction between the two nations: Polish treatment of the scattered German minority in Poland, the status of Danzig, the latter itself in a sense a "minority 11 problem of a unique character, and the existence of the Corridor#

Each of these demands

brief attention in the light of their later importance. For the protection of the minorities under the rule of the new Polish state,

1

Poland, like Czechoslo­

vakia, was forced to sign with the principal Allied Powers a minorities treaty almost identical with that 2 imposed upon Czechoslovakia# To this treaty the Poles, ---------

AThe German minority was not the only, nor even the most numerous, in Poland. Although extreme Polish demands for non-Polish territory in the West had been r e ­ fused by the Versailles Conference, no such obstacle to Polish imperialism had been placed in the East, and the boundary wrung from Russia by the Treaty of Riga in March, 1921, after a bitter and bloody war gave to Poland a large though docile minority. For this aspect of early Polish-Russian relations, Cf. Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs, vol. 1, pp. 238 ff. Schuman cites Ammende’s Die Nationalitaten in den Staaten Europas to show, as of 1921, a total Polish population of 2 7 , 1 7 6 . 7 1 7 , w l l o m o n i y 18,814,239 were Polish by race; minorities other than German include: Ukranians, 0,898,431; Jews, 2,110,448; White Russians, 1,060.237; Lithuanians. 68,667: Russians, 56,239; Czechs, 30.628; others, 78,634# Op. c l t ♦, p# 314. This Polish imperialism was denounced by LToyd George, General Smuts ana other British authori­ ties. Cf. ante. 185-86# and Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, I, pp. 44, 62. ®Cf. ante. p. 62; Schuman, op. c i t ., p. 316, In general.“"the ^treaty, the first or bne minorities treaties, promised protection of life and property without regard to race, religion, freedom of religion, guarantee of citizen­ ship, equal political and legal rights, freedom to use the minority language, and minority schools. The treaty is contained in the German Documents, pp. 5-7.

200 more than intensely conscious of their nationalism and more than intensely jealous of their newly acquired sovereign status, objected bitterly on the grounds that the major powers, although themselves containing minority groups, were bound by no like obligations#^

The Polish

Parliament, when ratifying this ^Little Versailles Treaty ,11 requested the government to act if possible in such a way as to reconcile its provisions with 11full

B 2

Polish sovereignty•”

In accordance with the provisions of the Minorities Treaty, the Polish Constitution adopted shortly after the establishment of the new state

provided that every

citizen should have the right to preserve his nationality t* 3

and cultivate his language and national qualities.”

To this objection the major powers replied that such practices were customary when a new state was to be established, M. Clemenceau reminding M. Paderewski by letter four days before Poland signed the unwelcome' treaty on June 28, 1919, that ttit is to the endeavors and sacrifices of the Powers in whose name I am addressing you that the Polish nation owes the recovery of its inde­ pendence. • • . It is on the support which the resources of these Powers will afford the League of Nations that for the future Poland will to a large extent depend for the secure possession of these territories#w Temperley, op # c i t ., V, p. 432# 2

S. J. Paprocki, Minority Affairs and Poland# P • 18#

^uell, op. cit., p. 241#

201 A series of laws adopted in 1924 specified minority privileges in regard to languages and schools, but was limited in application to those of Ukranian, White 1

Russian and Lithuanian nationality and speech#

Germans

and others of the smaller minority groups were, however, generally granted similar rights under the Minorities x. 2 Treaty#

But the Germans were never satisfied that the Polish government was carrying out, or meaning to carry out, the treaty provisions#

German sources claim that

the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities. • • was « 3 broken fronr the day on which it was signed#” German war publications abound with incidents of Polish mis­ treatment of the German minority as expressed in the 4 „ reports of German officials in Poland# ”In the course

For the French text Guetzevitch, La Pologne, p#

of these laws, cf. 99#

Mirkine-B#

^Excepting the Jews, who alone were not considered as covered by the Minority Laws. Cf. L. P. Mair, The Protection of Minorities, p. 95# •K

German Documents, p# CXV# ^ C f . ibid., pp# 3 ££•, particularly the reports of the German Consul-General in Posen, Liltgens to the German Foreign Office on April 12, 1923, pp. 13-14, and March 2, 1933, pp* 29-30, and the speech of the German-National delegate Spickermann in the Polish Sejm, January 23, 1923, pp. 10-13#

202 of twenty years of Polish domination ,11 says one German publication, tfthe Germans in Poland had learned to suffer.

...

The German minority felt the deep hatred

for everything German instilled in most Poles by ins idi ous propaganda.n The German minority raised two objections in par­ ticular to Polish actions:

attempted forceful Poloniza-

tion of the German minority and seizure of German-he Id lands.

Poland, complained the Germans, was following a

consistent and planned campaign, begun as soon as independence was achieved, to Polonize both the economic life and the cultural and educational institutions of the German-inhabited districts*

This Polish policy, it was

charged, was well summed up by Polish Premier Sikorski as early as 1923, when speaking in the town hall in Posen, he said: • • . it is to the immediate interest of the minor­ ity that this historic process which is called de-Germanization of the western voivodeships, and which is carried out after long-continued oppression by the Prussian Government, should be carried out as soon and as rapidly as possible. Perfectly excusable mistakes have, indeed, been made in this connection. As long as Poland was not yet recognized as an international factor she could not risk administering elementary justice, as every judiciary [sicJ act on international territory was impeded as an act of violence.

•^Polish Atrocities, p. 77.

203 The stronger is always right, and the weaker is considered defeated and thrust into the background* I hereby state that. • • our previous leniency and irresolution will have to undergo a radical change* By 1931 the German Consul-General in Posen was reporting to the German Foreign Office that ^Even Polish quarters now admit with cynical frankness that the process of de-Germaniz&tion has made considerable progress during the last few years.

.1

2

Specifically, German charges were similar to those made by the Sudentendeutsch against the Czech gov­ ernment: that Germans were discriminated against in connection with civil service positions; that German-owned foundaries and mines were ^nationalized 11 to get them out of German hands; that pressure was brought to bear on employers to hire Poles rather than minority-group m e m ­ bers; that no opportunity was given to employ the minority ''mother-tongue11 in official matters and, most particularly, that systematic efforts were made to destroy i

the German system of schools in the German-inhabited areas* This last complaint received special emphasis as well as

■**As reported in the Poaener Heueske Bachrichten. April 12, 1923. Quoted in German Documents, p. 15* ^On September 25, 1931.

Ibid., p. 19*

®J. C. Hesse, MThe Germans in Poland ,11 Slavonic Review, July, 1937.

204 1 particular substantiation.

By 1937, figures on the

school campaign 11 in Silesia showed only about onethird as many students in German minority schools as

2 there had been in 1937,

and a similar situation existed 3 in the other German-populated districts.

By 3L923 this element of Polish policy was bring­ ing deep resentment: w . . • the German school system, once in such a flourishing condition especially in the western provinces, is now completely ruined. We have been deprived of our school grounds and of our school buildings which we and our fathers before us had built with our private means, we have continually been pre­ vented from acquiring other buildings to be equipped as German private schools, former German teachers have been forced to leave the country since it was demanded of them that they should master the Polish language within an exceedingly^short space of time — .a sheer impossibil­ ity for all those who held appointments in communes where the population was principally or entirely German. And now that we have, to the best of our ability, been training auxiliary teachers, the authorities refuse to recognize them and place obstacles in the way of fully trained German teachers seeking appointment. Finally, fully qualified teachers of German nationality are prohibited from teaching even in private German schools. Over and above this, there are the well-known machina­ tions by which ancient school systems are divided into several districts, so that the number of school children is reduced to below 40, the minimum enrollment for public schools *11 German-national delegate Spickermann to the Sejm, January 23, 1923. German Documents, p. 13.

2

Buell, og. cit., p. 248.

. c i t ., pp. 219-20.

276 20-year period*

Rumors of actual collaboration from time

to time reached western ears until as late as 1937, when the execution of eight Russian generals and the replace­ ment of the German high command were laid to discovery of collusion between the military forces.^ With the advent of Hitler in 1933 the outlook in western eyes was for immediate estrangement of the two powers.

Mein Kampf is replete with hatred of communism 2 and of yearnings for the Ukraine, and the Hitler pre­ election speeches, * e.g. —

nIt is better to be in a

German prison than at liberty in Soviet Russia1* — laid the basis for a friendly relationship.

hardly

But on May

5 the German Fdhrer announced the ratification of an indefinite extension of the Treaty of Berlin of 1926 be3 tween Germany and Russia. This treaty, providing for mutual friendship and non-aggression, had fallen due for renewal in 1931, but ratification had been continually postponed until Hitlerfs act.

Legally the Treaty of 1933

continued in force until the pact of September, 1939. 1

Vera Micheles Lean, Why Europe Went to War, p. 22.

^ C f ..ante, pp. 2 2 0 -2 1 .

S0f* Pritt, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

277 Relations became strained in 1934, when Russia concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with Prance# Prom then until 1939 the verbal antagonism was intense# Pew of Hitler's speeches fail to contain unflattering reference to the Bolsheviks.***

In his April 28 defense

of the Prague move Hitler gave as his object in incor­ porating Bohemia and Moravia into the Reich the establishment of a ^bulwark against Bolshevik aggres-

2

sion.1*

And throughout the Polish reports of the

German-Polish conversations of the winter and spring of 1938-1939 are to be found statements of German leaders that 11the community of interests between Germany and Poland, so far as Russia is concerned, was complete.

Por

the Reich, Russia, whether Tsarist or Bolshevist, was equally dangerous .11 wrote Ndel,

n0 n three separate occasions ,11

the German Government was reported to have

proposed co-operation with Warsaw against the U#S#S#R.-

*^A selection of the most inflammatory of these is given in the Polish publication on The Origin of the German-Polish Conflict, pp. 9-20. sCf. a n t e , pp. 167-68.

1939.

^Beck's minutes of Hitler conversation of January 5, Polish White B o o k , p. 53.

^NiJel to Bonnet, April 30.

Yellow Book, p. 135.

278 Nevertheless, the Allies should have taken heed# Hitler might make tremendous political capital out of anti-communism, "but Allied leaders must have been aware of the opportunistic nature of the Hitler technique in the field of foreign relations.

Hitler had amply

demonstrated that while his objectives remained constant, his methods might vary widely as circumstances at any 1

given time seemed to dictate#

Hitler Germany, like

England, lfhad no eternal friends and no eternal enemies, but only eternal interests ,11 and that the enemies of today might easily become the friends of tomorrow as those interests were differently affected, Allied leaders must have known; that the Fdhrer was perfectly capable of temporarily reversing his policy, despite previous statements of position, the zigzag course of German relations during the years since his ascension to power 2 made absolutely clear#

1

It should be clear that this technique was no Hitler invention. It is an accepted principle of inter­ national relations that to nations objectives remain fairly constant, while means to them may vary#

2 The declaration of war by Germany on Russia in the early summer of 1941 seems to indicate the accuracy of this interpretation and to discount, at least, such interpretations as that of the Contemporary Review that ^Hitler's anti-Soviet bluffn was no more than a ^gigantic piece of political fraud.** Quoted In Fritt, op. c i t .,

279 Certainly by the summer of 1939, when EnglishRussian discussions were bogging down over the questions of Allied guaranties to Russia’s Baltic neighbors and Polish permission to Russian troops to cross Polish ter­ ritory in case of German aggression, the Allies, judging from their own documentary presentations, had sufficient warning.

Coulondre warned as early as May 9 that Herr

Hitler wmay draw nearer R u s s i a , a n d on May 22 added that von Ribbentrop appeared to contemplate a partition of Poland dependent upon a Russo-German agreement.

To

him wsuch a reconciliation seemed, in the long run, both 2 indispensable and inevitable. On June 1, both Coulondre

p. 23. There is much merit in Miss Deans*s view that "Naziism and communism [were 1 more compatible with each other than either of them could be with western democracy • • • • Hitler’s domestic struggle against communism was dictated not so much by ideological differences as by his iron determination to achieve national unity. . . . What he did was to wrest leadership of revolutionary forces from the Communists, whom he denounced more for their affiliation with the Communist International, directed from Moscow, than for their actual program. . • ^Hitler’s ^ anti-communism coincided with the strategic and political interests of the German national state .11 O p . cit., pp. 21-23. A historical study of German for­ eign policy, both before and after the 1939 pact, gives strong emphasis to the view that Hitler’s objection was not to communism per se but to Russia, whose power and birth rate he feared and whose lands he coveted, and to the interpretation of the 1939 agreement as an opportunis­ tic device suitable for temporary service under a given set of circumstances. ^Yellow B o o k , p. 145.

2Ibld., p. 163.

280 and Henderson warned that a speeding up of the Russo1

Allied pact was essential, wrote from Hamburg that

and on July 4, Mr# Garrean

Commercial circles in Hamburg

• • • are under the impression that, if some agreement is not shortly concluded between London, Paris, and Moscow, the Soviet Government will be prepared to sign a pact of « 2 non-aggression with the Reich * 1 But if Tory England seriously sought an alliance with Communist Russia —

a move justified by the same

force that caused Liberal Grey to seek alliance with Absolutist Czar Nicholas, the preservation of the balance 3 of power — she either failed to believe that the men­ ace of a Russo-German alliance was near, intimating a lack of suspicion hard to credit, or else ran sincerely into insuperable difficulties#

The negotiations began

shortly after Prague, Russia proposing a joint AngloPolish-Prench-Russian alliance, against any aggression in Europe, and England countering with a proposal that

1 Ibid#,

2 3

p. 170.

Ibid*, p* 201#

The same force, indeed, might have prevented a ser­ ious and sincere effort to come to an accord* British conservatives held no love for the prospect of a growing communist power* Cf* post, p# 287.

281 Russia aid the Allies should they fight for Poland or Rumania.

1

Russia objected, naturally, to the lack of

reciprocity, and asked also for assistance to Russia should she fight against aggression in the Baltic.

After

some deliberation the British and French embodied in a new proposal carrying a guarantee of assistance to Russia in case of direct attack, but the new plan still lacked any reference to the Baltic states.

This was the

position when, on May 31, Foreign Minister Molotov spoke before the Supreme Soviet.

2

After reviewing the

events of the past few years and attacking both the ItaloGerman agreement which he characterized as ltbasically of an offensive character 11 and the policy of appeasement Molotov continued: . . . certain changes in the direction of counter­ acting aggression are to be observed in the policy of the non-aggressive countries of Europe. . . . How serious these changes are still remains to be seen. As yet it cannot even be said whether these countries are seriously desirous of abandoning the policy of non-intervention, the policy of non-resist­ ance to the further development of aggression. May it not turn out that the present endeavor of these countries to resist aggression in some regions will

1Cf.

ante, p. 249.

^The elevation of Molotov to the position Commissar to replace Litvinov who ^resigned ’1 on in itself an indication of the way the wind was Litvinov was extremely pro-Ally and pro-League; shared neither of these views.

of Foreign May 3 was blowing. Molotov

282 not serve as an obstacle to the -unleashing of aggres­ sion in other regions? . . . We must therefore be vigilant. We stand for peace and for preventing the further development of aggression. But we must remember Comrade Stalin*s precept nto be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by war mongers who are accustomed to have others pull our chestnuts out of the fire for them* * Molotov then proceeded to review the negotiations to that date, announcing that Britain and Prance had finally agreed to the ^principle of mutual assistance.

. .

on the basis of reciprocity in the event of direct attack toy aggressors ,11 but adding that this proposal was so nhedged around by reservations.

• • that it may prove to

M 2 be a fictitious step forward.”

Further, no progress

had been made 11from the standpoint of reciprocity 11 regard­ ing the guarantee of central and eastern Europe. minimum conditions Molotov found necessary:

Three

(1) 11An

effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression 11 between Britain, Prance, and the U. S. S. R.; (2) a guarantee against aggression to all the states of central and eastern Europe, and (3) a concrete agreement regard­ ing the nforms and extent of the immediate and effective

^Molotov, nSpeech to the Supreme Soviet ,11 May 31, unpublished manuscript (distributed by Russian Embassy), pp. 4-5.

2It)id. , p. 7.

283 1

assistance 0 to be given in case of aggression*

On

these points Russia seemed adamant. Britain went part way toward meeting these conditions in June by sending William Strang, of the British Foreign Office, to Moscow with instructions to offer British and French aid to Russia in case of in­ direct attack11; Moscow demanded more concrete proposals. Finally in early July, the western states agreed to guarantee the Baltic states, provided Russia would guar­ antee in turn Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. To this Russia agreed (despite some hesitancy over the fact that neither the Netherlands nor Switzerland had yet established diplomatic relations with her) provided that military agreements with Poland and Turkey could be arranged.

Military missions were finally sent from Brit­

ain and France on August 11, despite the fact that the treaty itself had not yet been signed. The military discussions continued for 10 days and then all negotiations collapsed. stood in the way of success —

Whatever else may have

and little is clear about

the actual course of the negotiations —

one insurmount­

able obstacle was the flat refusal of the-Poles to allow

1 Ibid., p. 6.

284

Russian troops to march through.their territory, if neces­ sary, to fight the German Reichswehr.

Here "both the

Poles and the Russians remained firm; whatever BritishFrench pressure was brought to bear on Poland was not sufficient to change the Polish policy, and Russia refused to consider a guarantee to Poland without this Polish permission* 11to

11Just

try , 11 said Molotov on the 31st,

reach an agreement, when assistance on the part of

the XJ. S. S. R. is declared beforehand to be unnecessary

«1

and intrusive *'1

There is considerable confusion regarding this final ten days of discussion.

In discussing the breakdown

of negotiations, Molotov charged that the sending of the British and French missions to Moscow was a ltmake-believe at negotiations*w

He said:

It is enough to mention that the British and French military missions came to Moscow without any definite powers and without the power to conclude any military convention# Indeed, the British m i l ­ itary mission arrived in Moscow without any mandate at all; and it was only the demand of our military mission that, on the very eve of the breakdown of

Molotov, Speech to the Supreme Soviet, August 31, p. 5. Compare this Polish position to the constant Polish policy of resisting all dangerous moves by either Germany or Russia. Poles possibly could not forget the Russian part in the partitions, a part in which the use of Russian troops on Polish soil for the purpose of Mprotecting 11 Poland played a part. Cf. Lord, The Second Partition of Poland, pp. 470-76.

285

negotiations, they presented written credentials. But even these credentials were of the vaguest ^ kind; that is, credentials without proper weight. It is possible that Britain and Prance, alarmed by current rumors concerning Increasing friendliness in Russo-German relations, refused to reveal any military secrets in the staff talks.

This might be indicated by

the statement of Halifax to the Lords on August 24 that “for some time past there had been rumors of a change in the relations between the German and Soviet Governments, but no hint of such a change was conveyed by the Soviet Government to His Majesty*s Government or the French 2

Government .'1

Certainly it is a strange thing that the

negotiations have received so little discussion in any of the Allied war books.

Both the British and the French

books ignore the matter almost completely, and the Polish White B o o k , half of which is devoted to PolishSoviet relations, makes no mention at all of discussions between Russia and Poland over the matter of Russian right of passage.

Indeed, there is no document given

between July 8 , when rumors of German-Russian trade dis­ cussions were denied (in three lines) and August 23, when

Molotov speech of August 31, p. 5. ^Blne B o o k , p. 114.

286 the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed*

Even

in the final report of the Polish Ambassador to Moscow (which runs for 20 pages) there is nothing more than a mention of a ’’favorable attitude to the Anglo-FrancoSoviet negotiations 11 and this cryptic statement: . . . I gave M. Molotov a resume" of our attitude (evidently in late May). We could not accept a one-sided Soviet guarantee. Nor could we accept a mutual guarantee, because in the event of a conflict with Germany our forces would be completely engaged, and so we would not be in any position to help the Soviets. Also we could not accept collective negotiations. . . . ^ The Russian version of the breakdown would appear to win a decision by default.

The British and French, beyond

the issuing of charges of ’’treachery1* and the statement that the discussions ’’had proceeded on a basis of mutual trust when the bombshell was flung down,1*

have offered

little information on the actual progress of negotiations. The full story, if it ever reaches print, should make interesting reading.

At present one is led to the con­

clusion that Allied efforts to come to an agreement were at best half-hearted and that British leadership, conser­ vative and anti-communist in the extreme, still felt a

1

Polish White B o o k , p. 208. o

Chamberlain, on August 24.

Blue Book, pp. 108-09.

287 necessity for prevention of the growth of communist power centered in Moscow*

British balance of power politics

would seem to have placed British conservatism on the . horns of a dilemma *1 The important thing, however, was not the cause of 2 3 the Russian change of front — na cynical volte face,w said Chamberlain —

but the effect of that apparent

turnabout*

Berlin thought, perhaps, that the pact woiild 4 cause the capitulation of Poland and of her Allies* If so, Berlin was in for a disappointment*

Some authorities strongly question British sincer­ ity. Miss Dean writes: lfThe truth of the matter is that the attitude of the Allies toward the Soviet Union had been determined throughout not by ethical considerations but by considerations of power politics. The AngloSoviet negotiations epitomized the principal difficulties which, since 1933, had blocked concerted action by France and Britain, on the one hand, and the U.S.S.R., on the other, against Nazi Germany. Until Germany had cast the die by invading Poland, and thus left Britain no choice except to carry out its pledge to Warsaw, the Chamberlain government had feared to do anything that might strengthen the Soviet Union, hoping against hope that it might avoid both a Soviet alliance and war with the Reich.w Why E u ­ rope Went to W a r , o p * c i t *, p. 15* Cf. also Pritt, o p . c i t ., pp. .23-25• g Stalin was later to explain the Soviet front in general terms. After the outbreak of the German-Russian war in 1941, he told reporters: nUo peaceful nation could refuse a peace accord with a neighboring power even if such monsters and .cannibals as Hitler and Ribbentrop were found at its head.1* Los Angeles Times * July 3, 1941, **Nazi Troops Sweep Through Russia ,11 p. 7* ^Chamberlain, broadcast to the German people on September 4. Blue B o o k , p. 195.

4Coulondre to Bonnet, August 24, Yellow Book, p. 297.

CHAPTER X THE WAR BEGINS:

ULTIMATA AND REJECTIONS

There was little sign of weakening in London, Paris, or Berlin after the announcement that Russia had determined to play in the German back yard*

In London

the Cabinet met on the 22nd and determined to call Parliament (adjourned some days before to the great dis­ gust of Churchill, Eden, et al) into special session on August 24*

Also on the 22nd Chamberlain wrote and

sent to Hitler a letter which repeated all over again the British attitude and added a further suggestion —

for

a truce in the n¥Jar of Nerves 11 now so well under way* Three main points stand out in the Chamberlain note: First: It has been alleged that, if His Majesty’s Government had made their position more clear in l.'ST14, the great catastrophe would have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that allegation, His Majesty’s Government are re­ solved that on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding* Second: I cannot see that there is anything in the questions arising between Germany and Poland which could not and should not be resolved with­ out the use of force, if only a situation of confidence could be restored to enable discussions to be carried on in an atmosphere different from that which prevails today* Third: These difficulties, however, might be miti­ gated, if not removed, provided that there could

289 for an initial period be a truce on both sides — and indeed on all sides — to press polemics and to all incitement. If such a truce could be arranged, then, at the end of that period, during which steps would be taken to examine and deal with complaints made by either side a 3 to the treatment of minor­ ities, it is reasonable to hope that suitable conditions might have been established for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland upon the issues between them (with the aid of a neutral intermediary, if both sides should think that that would be helpful).-*This letter Henderson delivered on the 23rd, before doing so “making some preliminary remarks 11 concerning the possibility of Anglo-German cooperation.

The British

Ambassador asked the Fiihrer “to read the letter not from the standpoint of the past but from of the present and the future.“ ated. “

Hitler* s retort was nviolent and exagger­

Throughout the whole conversation he was “excitable

and uncompromising** as he had been reported to be before Munich and Prague.

His recriminations against England and

English intervention were bitter and prolonged.

The

Czechs, he asserted, “would have been independent today if England had not encouraged them in a policy hostile to Germany.

He insinuated that the Poles would be tomorrow,

if Britain ceased to encourage them today .11 promised an answer

But he

to Chamberlain within two hours*

^Blue Book, p. 97.

290 time*

1 The Hitler answer of August 23 is divided into

eight major points: (1).

^Germany has never sought to enter into con­

flict with England11; in fact, she restricted her own interests 11to gain the friendship of Great Britain.* (2)

**The German Reich has, however, . . interests

.

• •impossible to renounce.



.• the German City of Danzig .11 (3)

• • . One of these. • • is

’^Germany was prepared to settle the problem

of Danzig and of the Polish Corridor by a very generous proposal *11

British actions neffactively destroyed any

inclinations on the part of Poland to negotiate on a basis which would at the same time be acceptable to G e r ­ many •w (4)

The British guarantee was taken by the Poles

as attblank cheque 11 to terrorize lion Germans domiciled in Poland. (5) Government

11the

one and a half mil-

„ 2

tfThe Reich Government informed the Polish a short time ago that they would not tolerate 11

Henderson to Halifax, August 23, Blue Book, pp. 98-100. 2

This is too high a figure. footnote.

C f . a n t e , pp. 177-78

291 a continuation of n these developments in silence *11 (6 )

Regarding Chamberlain1s assurance that Britain

would fight for Poland, 11If Germany is attacked by Brit­ ain, she is prepared and determined to fight *11 (7)

British mobilization measures*

. • are solely

directed against Germany ,11 according to Chamberlain’s letter*

In the event uof such military measures being

taken, I shall order the immediate mobilization of the German armed forces .11 (8 ) problems* those who.

1fThe question of a settlement of European . • cannot be decided by Germany but.

* * by

* * have steadily and obstinately opposed 11 a

revision of Versailles*

111 have struggled to achieve a

friendship between Britain and Germany, but. . • British diplomacy . . .

has served to convince me of the hope­

lessness of the attempt.11^ When Hitler delivered the note to Henderson, some hours after the first interview of the 25rd, he nhad recovered his calm but was not less uncompromising* longer.

• • did he trust Mr* Chamberlain*

No

He preferred

war, he said, when he was 50 to when he was 55 or 60. » 2

^•German White Book, pp. 17-19*

2 Henderson’s Final Report, p* 262.

292 Things were looking distinctly down*

Britain con­

tinued to mobilize, and on the 24th, Parliament met and passed in one day the Emergency Powers Bill*

Chamberlain

delivered an important address in which he remarked on the similarity of the situation to that preceding Munich and Prague and stressed again Britain’s willingness to negotiate 11if we were once satisfied.

* * that the

intentions of others were the same as our own."

However,

he added, of first importance is "our determination to resist methods of force*'' hope of peace.

The speech held out little

"Today," the Prime Minister said, "we

stand in the imminent peril of war."^

Support from the

Commons for Chamberlain’s firm position was well-nigh unanimous*

Labor Leader Greenwood and Liberal Leader

Sinclair, and Eden, always zealous for collective security, jumped heartily on the verbal band wagon.

In

the House of Lords, Halifax, delivering a similar — indeed well-nigh identical —

address, received similar

support# At the same time things were happening in central Europe: the Danzig Senate named Albert PBrster Supreme Head of the City of Danzig; Beck Informed Kennard that

1 Blue Book, pp. 107-12*

293 1 the situation was extremely grave;

uBel'warned Beck

twice in one day to take no initiative without previous 2 consultation with Britain and Prance; incidents became 3

so frequent that they had to be listed in daily reports; Goering informed the Polish Ambassador that Danzig was now a minor matter; the important obstacle to peace was 4

now British intervention* The sands of peace were running rapidly out when Britain and Poland signed on August 25 the long-awaited formal treaty of mutual assistance to replace the previous verbal agreement.

To run for five years, with automatic

extension thereafter in the absence of six months notice to the contrary, the essential articles were as follows: Article 1 Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hostilities with a European Power in con­ sequence of aggression by the latter against that Contracting Party, the other Contracting Party will at once give the Contracting Party engaged in hos­ tilities all the support and assistance in its power.

•*~Blue B o o k , pp.

1 1 8 - 1 9 .

2 Yellow B o o k , pp. 3 Ibid,,

p .

2 9 4 - 9 5 .

2 9 9 .

^Reported, Kennard to Halifax, August p.

1 1 9 *

2 5 .

Blue Book,

294 Article 2 (1) The provisions of Article 1 will also apply in the event of any action by a European power which clearly threatened, directly or indirectly, the in­ dependence of one of the Contracting Parties, and was of such a nature that the Party in question con- . sidered it vital to resist it with its armed forces* Article 3 f

Should a European Power attempt to undermine the independence of one of the Contracting Parties by processes of economic penetration or in any other way, the Contracting Parties will support each other in resistance to such attempts* Should the European Power concerned thereupon embark on hostilities against one of the Contracting Parties, the provisions of A r ­ ticle 1 will apply* Article 4 The methods of applying the undertakings of mutual assistance provided for by the present Agreement are established between the competent naval, military and air authorities of the Contracting Parties* Article 7 Should the Contracting Parties be engaged in hos­ tilities in consequence of the application of the present Agreement, they will not conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement *1 Whether impressed by this document or whether sin­ cerely searching for peace, Hitler on the 25th ^resolved to make a fresh attempt to arrive at an understanding with England**« 2

He received Henderson once more, and the

^Polish White Book, pp. 100-101 2German White B o o k , p. 8 .

295 German White Book and Henderson1s report agree that this was on Hitlerfs initiative — • and uonce more with com­ plete frankness explained to him his conception of the situation, and communicated to him the main principles of a comprehensive and far-sighted agreement between Germany and England which he would offer to the British Government once the problem of Danzig and the Polish 1

Corridor had been solved .11

Again Hitler 11spoke calmly 2

and with apparent sincerity.n

*The principal features

of his declaration were the following: 1) The acts of provocation committed by Poland had been intolerable. . . . In the preceding night twenty-one new frontier incidents had occurred. On the German side the utmost discipline had been displayed. All the inci­ dents were due to British provocation. . . . If the Polish Government declared themselves not responsible, this merely proved that they were unable to keep control over their own people. 2) Germany was resolved under all circumstances to put an end to these Macedonian conditions on her eastern frontier. . . . 3) The problem of Danzig and the Corridor would have to be solved. . . . 3 The Ftlhrer had always been strongly in favor of

•4jOC. cit. ^Henderson* s Final Report, p. 263. ^German White B o o k , pp. 19-21.

296 Anglo-German understanding. . . . He approved of the British Empire and was prepared to give a personal undertaking for its existence and to stake the might of the German Reich to that end provided that (1 ) his colonial demands, which were limited and could he settled by peaceful negotiations, were fulfilled. . . . (2 ) that his obligations to Italy remain untouched. . . . (3) he wished also to emphasize Germany’s unalterable resolution never again to enter Into conflict with Russia. The Fflhrer would then be prepared to enter into agreements with Great Britain which. . . safeguard the existence of the British Empire, but if neces­ sary would guarantee German assistance for the British Empire. . • . The Fiihrer would then also be, ready to accept a reasonable limitation of armaments . • -. . Finally the Fiihrer renewed his assurances that he was not interested in western problems. . . • If the British Government would consider these suggestions, they might end in a blessing not only for Germany but also for the British Empire. If the British Government rejected the suggestions, war would be inevitable• • • • The Fiihrer repeated that . . . this was his final proposal. Immediately after the settlement of the German-Pollsh question he would approach the British Government with an offer .-*• During the conversation Henderson apparently told Hitler that wHis Majesty’s Government could not consider his offer unless it meant. Poland.

. . a peaceful settlement with

Herr Hitler said:

fIf you think it is useless, 2 then do not send my offer at all . ’w Henderson, however,

1

Loc. cit. This agrees substantially with the Hen­ derson report in the Blue B o o k , pp. 120-21. p

Henderson’s report, Blue Book, p. 123.

297 took the proposal by plane immediately to London where it was perused by the Cabinet

for three days before a

reply was sent on the 28th. Following his conversation with Henderson, Hitler received Coulondre, to whom he also gave a d e c l a r a t i o n 1' for transmission home, containing no more than a re­ statement of the German position in regard to Poland and a statement that he wished no war with France*'*'

That

night Daladier went on the air with another restatement of the French position* It is possible that war

was temporarily avoided on

the night of the 25th and 26th by views• believe.

this newest exchange of

Henderson reported that he uhad some reason to • • that the order for the German army to

advance into Poland was actually issued for the night of 2 the 25th-26th of August.M In the afternoon of the 25th telephone communications between Berlin and London and Paris were cut off for hours; all military attaches in Berlin were refused permission to leave the city; a system of rationing foodstuffs came into force on the 27th;

1 Yellow B ook, pp. 502-304*

2 Henderson1s Final Report, p. 262.

298 certain precautionary measures were taken regarding air­ ports; important official affairs scheduled for the immediate future were cancelled*

A reprieve of one week

was, perhaps, gained by these events* Biggest news of the next two days was the exchange of letters between Daladier and Hitler.

These two

letters reveal no change of position or of basic policy, but they are of interest because of the fervent sincerity which rings in both of them.

These are the important

excerpts: Daladier to Hitler, August 26 The French Ambassador in Berlin has sent me your personal message. . . . I owe it to our two peoples to say that the fate of peace still rests solely in your hands. . . . Unless you attribute to the French people a conception of a national honour less high than that which I myself recognize in the German people, you cannot doubt either that France will be true to her solemn promises to other nations, such as Poland. . . . I can personally guarantee the readi­ ness which Poland has always shown to have recourse to methods of free conciliation. . . • Like myself, you were a soldier in the last war. . . . If the blood of France and that of Germany flow again, as they did twenty-five years ago, each of the two peo­ ples will fight with confidence in its own victory, but the most certain victors will be the forces of destruction and barbarism *1

1 Ibid., p. 311*

299 Hitler to Daladier, August 27 I appreciate the concern you have expressed. . . . As an ex-soldier, I know as well as you do the hor­ rors of war. . . . The German people renounced two provinces which once belonged to the old German Reich. • . • The voluntary limitation of German claims in the West cannot however be regarded as an acceptance of the Dictate of Versailles in all other fields. . • • Year by year I have tried earnestly to achieve the revision of this dictate through negotiation. This proved impossible. Many enlight­ ened men of all nations believed and were convinced that revision was bound to come. . . . I made an offer to the Polish Government which actually shocked the German people. . . . I could only make it once. . . . May I ask you, M. Daladier, how you as a French­ man would act if, by the unfortunate ending of a bravely-fought war, one of your provinces were separ­ ated by a corridor in the possession of an alien power, and a large city — let us say Marseilles — were prevented from bearing allegiance to France, while Frenchmen in this territory were being perse­ cuted, beaten, maltreated and even murdered in a bestial manner. You are a Frenchman, M. Daladier, and I therefore know how you would act. I am a German, M. Daladier.... If fate decrees that our two peoples should fight one another once more over this question, it would be from different motives. I for my part, M. Daladier, would fight with my people for the reparation of an Injustice,^while the others would fight for its retention. The reply of the British Cabinet took three days to prepare.

During this time the British government received

assurances from Beck that he would enter Into direct negotiations with Germany,

2

and it is possible that the

1

German White Book, pp. 22-25.

2 NBel to Bonnet, August 28.

Yellow Book, p. 332.

British note also received French approval*

On the 28th

Henderson finally delivered the British note which was divided into eight sections. The text of the note contained but two new elements (1) British acceptance of the German proposal for an Anglo-German agreement provided the Polish-German dispute was first peaceably settled, and (2 ) a suggestion for direct negotiation as the next step in line, with assur­ ance that Poland*s acceptance had already been received* Otherwise the note was merely a long review of the general situation, with emphasis, as usual, on Britain*s willingness for a peaceful settlement coupled with her determination to stick by her obligation to Poland.^ That day incidents reported from Warsaw and Berlin

2

increased;

France closed her German frontier, suspended

all private telephone calls abroad, and established strict censorship* The next evening the Hitler reply to the British note was ready*

The Fiihrer and Henderson spent 25

^Blue B o o k , p p • 2

126-28•

Poland, on the repeated insistence of Britain and France, apparently issued a series of orders to her army to ignore all but extreme provocation. Allied sources, of course, insist that the "incidents 11 were large Germanprovoked. Yellow Book, p. 118 et passim* Blue B o o k , p* ii® — Passim* The~Polish White B o o k , pp. 124-26, lists some 27 German violations of the Polish frontier between the 23rd and 31st of August*

301 minutes in conversation restating positions and then the German reply was delivered.

Henderson read the note in

Hitlerfs presence: a general review of the situation, from the German standpoint, charges of extreme cases of atrocities during the past few weeks, a repetition of the German demands for Danzig and the Corridor and S a f e ­ guarding of the German minorities ’1 remaining in Poland* As for the English proposals, Hitler was of the prospects of.

skeptical.

• .

. . direct negotiations 11 hut

nevertheless agreed to enter into direct discussion.

As

for guarantees to Poland, the Reich was nno longer in a position to. . • participate in any guarantees, without . . • the U.S.S.R.”

But, to demonstrate her interest in

peace and her friendship for Great Britain, Germany tldeclared herself willing to receive a delegate appointed by the Polish Government by the evening of August 30, 1939, provided that this delegate should be invested with full power.

• • to make a final d e c i s i o n . T h i s ,

Henderson pointed out, !thatte den Klang, elnes Ultima -

„2

turns♦w

Hitler heatedly disagreed.

The time was inserted

^■German White Book, pp. 27-32. At what point along the line the German demands included the whole Corridor it is difficult to discover. Coulondre reported the new German demands to JJgo far beyond Danzig and to bear equal­ ly on the Corridor ’1 on August 7. Yellow Book, p. 250. ^Hendersonrs Final Report, p. 266.

302 just because of the urgency of the moment, when two rival armies were glaring angrily at each other across a fron­ tier*

German proposals, Hitler added, would be drafted

before the hour set, and, if possible, these would be first placed before the British government* Where the idea of a negotiator with full powers originated, few know. by London or Paris.

It may have been suggested to Hitler Some of Chamberlain’s statements

would indicate that there was other correspondence between the powers than that which was released, but officially the Allied powers negatively disclaimed all responsibil­ ity by accepting none.

Apparently, however, Hitler’s

interpretation of the British proposal involved a Polish representative whose sole task would be the signing of a previously prepared German plan. This was bad news. limit was more ominous.

But the idea of a 24-hour time Britain needed time.

London wired Henderson at two a.m. on the 30th sug­ gesting that it was nof course, unreasonable to expect that we can produce a Polish representative in Berlin today, and the German Government must not expect this.”'*' Henderson’s reply was to the point:

^Blue Book, p. 139*

MI had made similar

303 observation to Herr Hitler yesterday evening, his reply being that one could fly from Warsaw to Berlin in one and a half h o u r s . H e n d e r s o n advised, however, pressure on Prague to "swallow this eleventh hour effort."

And

Coulondre, informed by Henderson of the proposition, wired to Paris his advice that the Polish plenipotentiary proceed to Berlin without delay. At 2:45 on the afternoon of the 30th a wire to Hitler was sent, through Henderson, promising an official reply "later in the afternoon."

At 5:30 another wire

reached the British Ambassador instructing him to request Hitler to do something, if possible, about German sabotage on the border and in Danzig. received a fourth telegram — which Berlin had been waiting.

2

At 6:30 Henderson

this one the answer for It was negative.

"We can­

not advise," it said, "the Polish Government to comply

L o c . oit. 2 A discussion — seven pages long — on the situa•tion in Danzig on August 28, charging increasing mobili­ zation (to 18,000 fully equipped men) and increasing agitation^against Poland can be found in the Polish White Book. Zawadowski to Beck, pp. 111-19. The Yellow Book also contains running reports from Coulondre, N 8 el, a n d die la Tournelle concerning incidents, press, and mobilization.

304 with this procedure (suggested by Hitler) which is wholly unreasonable .11^

The telegram suggested that Germany deal

instead in the customary diplomatic manner with the Polish Ambassador in Prague. Here again there is a strange lacuna in the Allied documents.

Howhere in the British, French, or Polish

papers is revealed any correspondence between London and Warsaw inquiring about Polish willingness to accept the plan.

Yet the delay of almost a whole day before inform­

ing Berlin merely that !?Britain could not advise Warsaw 11 seems absurd under the circumstances.

Whether British-

French pressure was extended and failed, or whether, indeed, no correspondence at all took place, no one but those in high places in the nations involved can say. At midnight the official British reply to Hitler’s offer was delivered at the Chancellery; it involved little more than an enlargement upon the 6:30 telegram, and an ^express reservation *1 to the German plan to present a ready-made solution to the Poles.

This solution, the Brit­

ish government insisted, would, of course, be Mfully examined during the discussions *1 to assure that it met with nthe essential conditions which His Majesty’s

^Blue Book, p. 142.

305 Government have stated and which in principle the Ger­ man Government have expressed their willingness to accept .'1

A temporary "modus vivendi" for Danzig was

offered to "prevent the occurrence of incidents tending to render German-Polish relations more difficult."

1

This document was also handed to the Polish Govern­ ment the night of the 30th, and Beckfs reply at noon on the 31st accepted the British proposals.

By now, however,

it was probably too late for anything to check the coming of war —

by anything save capitulation which, it was

obvious, was far from probable by either side.

This ap ­

peared particularly true when, on the 30th, an official Polish communique announced the taking of "the defensive military measures demanded by the situation" — 2 mobilization.

general

Thus, on the night of the 30th, when Henderson brought the British reply to von Ribbentrop, he was met by a man in a towering rage•

Warsaw had replied to his

friendly gesture with mobilization.

In reply to the

Blue B o o k , p. 143. This last suggestion, almost the equivalent of giving Danzig to Germany, seems pretty much of a contradiction of the earlier British stand.

2 Polish White Book, p. 109.

306 British note (so claims the Henderson report) von Ribbentrop ”produced a lengthy document which he read out to me as fast as he could, in a tone of utter annoyance* Of the sixteen articles in it I was able to gather the gist of six or seven, but it would have been quite impos­ sible to guarantee even the exact accuracy of these without a careful study of the text itself.

When he had

finished, I accordingly asked him to let me see it.

Herr

von Ribbentrop refused categorically, threw the document with a contemptuous gesture on the table and said that it was now out of date (ttberholt), since no Polish Emis1

sary had arrived in Berlin by midnight.” The 16-point plan which von Ribbentrop had read to Henderson remained a mystery until the next evening. Meanwhile London put pressure on Warsaw to have Lipski see von Ribbentrop as soon as possible. On the 31st Lipski and von Ribbentrop played a little game.

Shortly after noon Beck wired Lipski to see

the German government concerning direct negotiations

Henderson* s Final Report, p. 270. The German story differ si ”The proposals. • • were none the less communi­ cated and explained in detail to the British Ambassador.” German White B o o k , p. 9. The White Book makes much of the fact that the Germans ”had spent two days waiting in vain for a Polish plenipotentiary.” Loc. cit.

307 1 under the British plan.

Accordingly, at 1:00 p.m.,

Lipski asked for an interview with von Ribbentrop.

At

3:00 p.m. von WeizsMcker called the Polish Ambassador to ask "whether he wanted to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs as a special plenipotentiary or in some other capacity."

M. Lipski replied:

"In his capacity of A m ­

bassador."

Herr von Weizs&cker "took note of the informa-

tlon" and ended the conversation.

2

At 6:30 p.m. Lipski was received by von Ribbentrop. Their conversation was also short, if not too sweet. The German Foreign Minister inquired if Lipski had "spe­ cial plenipotentiary powers."

Lipski said no.

Von

Ribbentrop then asked if the Polish Ambassador knew of the terms of the German proposal, supposedly delivered by London to Warsaw. information."

Lipski answered that he had no "direct

And at that, Lipski took his leave.

Directly after this interview, von Ribbentrop re­ leased to the press, the radio, and the diplomatic corps in Berlin the 16 points which he had refused to allow Henderson to see.

1

Apparently the terms of the document

Polish White Boo k , p. 109.

2 Loc.

clt.

508 had not been made officially known to London; nor were they known at all to Warsaw before this time.

The

demands themselves were relatively moderate, even though they still asked for more than Poland had ever declared herself ready to give*

Their very moderateness, however,

makes the sincerity in which they were offered appear subject to suspicion.

It seems more than possible that

Germany had no desire to have them accepted but wished to appear as a wronged nation trying to do the right things.

The demands

(1)

Danzig shall be returned to the German Reich • • •

(2)

The Polish Corridor shall Itself decide whether it shall become part of the German Reich or remain with Poland.

(3)

For that purpose, a plebiscite shall be held in this territory. All . . . who were domi­ ciled In this area on the first of January, 1918, or who were born there on or before that day. • . shall be entitled to vote. Germans who have been expelled from this territory shall return for the purpose of registering their votes. . • an International Commission like the one formed in connection with the Saar plebiscite, and consisting of members appointed by. • • Italy, the U.S.S.R., France and Great Britain, shall be formed im­ mediately, and placed in charge of this ter­ ritory. . . the territory shall be evacuated by the Polish military forces, by the Polish police and by the Polish authorities.

(4)

Gdynia.

(5)

• . . t h i s plebiscite shall not take place before a period of twelve months.

. . i s not Included In this area.

509 (6 )

. . • Germany’s lines of communication with East Prussia and Poland’s access to the sea may be. . . ensured.

(7)

The allocation of this territory shall he decided on hy the absolute majority of the votes cast.

(8 )

. . . Germany shall, should the territory he returned to Poland as a result of the plebiscite, he given an exterritorial traffic zone. . » one kilometre in width. . • . Should the result of the plebiscite he in favor of Germany, Poland shall have the same rights. . . to Gdynia.

(9)

In the event of the Polish Corridor being returned to the Reich, the latter declares herself prepared. • . for an exchange of population.

(10)

. . . rights claimed hy Poland within. . . Danzig shall he negotiated in exchange of equal rights for Germany at . . . Gdynia.

(11)

. . . Danzig and Gdynia, neither of these places shall he provided with means of military defence sic •

(12)

The Peninsula of Hela. . . shall he demil­ itarized.

(13)

. . . both parties agree to submit (minority) complaints to an International Commission of Investigation. . . . Germany and Poland hind themselves to indemnify the minorities for any economic damages.

(14)

. . . Germany and Poland mutually agree to safeguard the rights of their respective minorities hy most comprehensive and bind­ ing agreements for the purpose of . . . the preservation of their national customs, habits and traditions . . . . Both parties undertake not to draft. . . the minority into military service.

510 (15)

. . . In case of an agreement, Germany and Poland declare themselves prepared im­ mediately to order* • • the demobilization of their respective armed forced*

(16)

Any additional measures required to hasten the carrying through of the above agree­ ment shall be mutually agreed upon between Germany and Poland.-*■

That night considerable activity took place in Berlin.

Henderson was instructed again to launch a final

appeal to Hitler — ' to inform him that the Polish govern­ ment was attempting to establish contact through Lipski and to ask if he would accept a suggestion for a modus 2 vivendi regarding Danzig and involving M. Burkhardt* In the early hours of September 1, Henderson wired back this concise message:

“Written communication was made to

the Ministry for Foreign Affairs early this morning in 5 the sense of paragraph 2 of your telegram of 31st August.” In Paris the cabinet met. In Warsaw news arrived that the Swastika had been hoisted in Danzig* And at 4:45 on the morning of September 1 the

^German White Book, pp. 33-35* 2

Blue Book, p. 155* 3L o c . cit*

.31-1 Schleswig-Holstein began to shell Westerplatte#

Inside

of an hour German troops were entering Poland on all fronts# The war was on#

CHAPTER XI NEUTRAL PEACE EFFORTS AND THE SPREAD OF HOSTILITIES During the ten days preceding September 1, diplo­ matic maneuvers were further complicated by a series of neutral efforts to call a halt to the advancing hostil­ ities*

In no case did the efforts develop Into any

stage of serious negotiation, but they are of interest as showing the concern of neutrals in the general issue of peace or war* The first formal neutral appeal came from King Leopold of Belgium on behalf of the Oslo states, broad­ cast by*His Majesty, on August 23*

The appeal was

largely a sentimental one, warning of a ’general holocaust should war break out and economic collapse even If it did not.

''There Is no people. . • which would wish to

send its children to death,” the King asserted, ”In order to take away from other nations the right to existence•” No formal plan for settlement was proposed, but the King solemnly expressed the wish "that the men who are r e ­ sponsible for the course of events” should employ ”open negotiation.

. . in a spirit of brotherly cooperation*”^

1PollsH White Book, pp. 97-98.

Leopold was followed in his efforts by President Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII whose efforts were made known on August 24*

Roosevelt1s first gesture was a

message to King Victor Emmanuel of Italy asking for that monarch's active assistance through the formulation of "proposals for a pacific solution to the present crisis •" What effect this message had in Rome it is impossible to surmise, but the King's formal reply mentioned only that ■*I have immediately transmitted your message to my Govern ment*

• . • We have done and are doing everything posn

sible to bring about peace and justice*”

2

At the same time, Roosevelt addressed messages to Hitler and President Moscicki of Poland*

In these notes,

Roosevelt was more specific; he suggested that all dis­ putes be handled by one of three methods:

(1 ) direct

negotiation; (2) impartial arbitration, or (3) concilia­ tion, selecting as conciliator na National of one of the American Republics *11

In any case, the President added,

"it is understood, of course, that each nation will agree to accord complete respect to the independence and ter-

W e

Book, p. 181

2Ibld., p. 182.

314 ritorial Integrity of the o t h e r . T o Hitler Roosevelt added several passages on American opinion regarding conquest and aggression. Moscicki answered Roosevelt almost at once (August 25) thanking the President and assuring him that Poland was ready for direct negotiation or conciliation.

2

Roosevelt quoted in toto this answer in a second tele3 graphic appeal to Hitler to usave countless human lives .'1 Herr Hitler did not bother to answer either of these notes. Interesting as a sidelight is the appeal sent to Hitler, Mussolini, and Moscicki by Prime Minister McKenzie King of Canada on the 25th.

Unlike Roosevelt, King re4 ceived answers from each of his addressees. Pope Pius 1 formal announcement was broadcast to the

world on the same night that the Roosevelt messages were announced, August 24.

The Popefs appeal was fervent, and

it was hardly apt to be approved in Nazi circles:

1 Ibld.,

2

p. 183.

Ibid., pp. 183-84.

5 Ibld..

p. 184.

4Cf. Yellow Book, p. 310.

315 Once again a critical hour strikes for the great human family. . . * Behold us then with all of you who in this moment are carrying the burden of so great a responsibility in order that you may hear. # • the voice of Christ. . . . It is by force of reason and not by force of arms that Justice makes progress; and empires which are not founded on Justice are not blessed by Cod. . . . The danger is imminent but there is yet.time, nothing is lost with peace; all may be with war. . . • Let them begin negotiations anew. Conferring with goodwill and with respect for reciprocal rights they will find that to sincere and conscientious negotiators, an honorable solution is never precluded# 3* The first offer to act as mediator was made on August 29 by Leopold of Belgium and Queen Wilhemina of Holland —

both of whom doubtless felt a deep, geograph­

ically conditioned interest in the preservation of peace. The offer was made to five nations:

Britain, Prance,

Germany, Italy and Poland, and from each was received a formal expression of appreciation.

Hot one of the five

made any move, however, to carry the proposed mediation into actual operation# Hot one of these proposals received more than per­ functory notice by the belligerents-to-be# as each of them was in Its own way —

Interesting

and Important as

some of them no doubt were for political purposes —

all

of them together couldn’t hold a candle in importance to

1 Blue Book, pp. 190-92

316 the light that blazed forth in the Kroll Opera House at 10:10 a.m. on the morning of September 1 as Adolf Hitler stepped to the microphone to address the Reichstag, Germany, and the world. Hitler’s address, perhaps the most crucial of a career which had careened from climax to climax, synthe­ sized everything the Chancellor had been saying for some months.

Highlights of the speech were expressed in the

following words: —

w . . • the dictated Treaty of Versailles.

Danzig was and is a German city.—

The German minori­

ties. ♦ ♦ were ill-treated in the most appalling manner.— I have attempted to change this intolerable condition of things by means of peaceful proposals. • • these proposals have been rejected.— Danzig.—

Poland.

obligations.

Poland virtually began a war against

• • never thought of fulfilling her

• • to the minorities.—

The Polish Ambassa­

dor was informed that . . . Germany would no longer stand aside. —

I accepted a proposal of mediations.

British Government.

. . of the

. . The Polish Government did not

send an authorized representative. —

My love of peace.

my endless patience should not be confounded with. cowardice.—

Polish general mobilization. —

frontier incidents. —

. •

. .

twenty-one

I now have decided to address Poland

in exactly the same language applied by Poland to us.—

317 The frontier between Germany and Prance is final. — have no other aims in the future. — firstly,

. . . Danzig.

. . secondly,

We

Our aims: . . . . . • the Corridor

. . . thirdly, . • a change in Germanyfs relations to Poland.—

I will carry on this fight in one word I have

never known: me.

Capitulation.—

. . Goering.—

H e s s •—

Should anything happen to

Should anything happen to Goering.

. •

If our will is so strong that no emergency can

break it, then our will and good German sword will master.

. • Germany —

» 1 Sieg H e i l r 1

The French Cabinet met an hour before Hitler spoke and ordered complete mobilization.

Parliament met in

London in the afternoon and enacted a war appropriations bill of 500,000,000 pounds. before the Commons.

At 6 p.m. Chamberlain went

!,The time has come ,11 he said, nwhen

action rather than speech is required.

...

I prayed

that the responsibility would not fall on me to ask this country to accept the awful arbitrament of war. I may not be able to avoid that responsibility.

I fear • . •

German troops crossed the Polish frontier this morning at dawn and are since reported to be bombing open towns* In these circumstances there is only one course open to

German White Book, pp. 36-42.

518 us.

His Majesty’s Ambassador in Berlin and the French

Ambassador have been instructed to hand to the German Government the following document: . . • Unless the German Government are prepared to give His Majesty’s Government satisfactory as­ surances that the German Government have suspended all aggressive actions against Poland and are pre­ pared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will without hesitation fulfill their obligations to Poland. . . . If the reply to this last warning is unfavorable, and I do not suggest it is likely to be otherwise, His Majesty’s Ambassador is Instructed to ask for his passport.. In that case we are ready At 9:30 that evening Coulondre and Henderson deliv­ ered this ultimatum.

Chancellor Hitler, said von Ribben­

trop, would have to reply himself, and that therefore an immediate answer was impossible.

Von Ribbentrop (says

German White Book) told the Ambassador that nGermany could not accept the view expressed in the notes that she had attacked Poland .0 One last effort was made, during the delay before Hitler’s answer, to reestablish peace in Europe, and this by the one man who stood a chance of success: the Italian

1

Blue B ook, pp. 157-61. Note that the "ultimatums” bear no time limit; this is unusual.

^German White Book, p. 10.

319 Duce.

How much Mussolini had already tried to do is

an open question; Chamberlain in his speech of September 1

made a queer allusion that has not yet been fully

explained by British sources.

More recent French and

Italian releases, however, have thrown a little more, light on the subject.

The Prime Minister said:

through­

out these last days of crisis Signor Mussolini also has been doing his best to reach a solution.'*'*'

Apparently

he referred to Mussolinifs offer on August 31, through Count Ciano, to the effect that England and France might agree, nto invite Germany to a conference which will take place on September 5 with the object of examining the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which are the causes of the present trouble*rt This offer France accepted; answered also in the affirmative.

3 4

Britain, apparently, On the 2nd the offer

was made to Germany, incorporating an additional feature:

1

Blue Book, p. 161.

^Francois-Poncet to Bonnet, August 31, Yellow Book, p . 349. ^Bonnet to Francois-Poncet, September 1, Yellow Book, p. 365. 4The only source available on the British acceptance is the speech of Count Ciano on December 16 before the Chamber of Fasces and Deputies, p. 35. (Published in pam­ phlet form, Rome) •

320 that troops should be left in their positions at the time.^

Hitler apparently inquired of Britain and Prance

whether their recent communications were in the nature of ultima turns, and, receiving answers in the negative, accepted the Mussolini proposal*

Britain, personified by

Halifax, on the other hand, wsent a successive request,” insisting upon the necessary condition of the removal of all troops in positions of occupation.

2

Italy, deciding

that this was impossible, for nNo one, for obvious reasons, could accept the responsibility of presenting or recommending this request to the Fiihrer,” abruptly dropped the whole thing* The German White Book is pretty much in error when it states that nThe German and the French Government ^sic replied in the affirmative to this proposal, while the British Government refused to accept it.”

But the White

Book is referring to two different offers: that of August 31, which the French (and apparently the British) ac­ cepted, and that of September 2, which the Germans accepted but the British rejected, and about which France did nothing, although Ciano1s attitude to Francois-Poncet on

^German White Book, p. 43* ^Ciano, speech of December 16, p. 35. Cf. also Francois-Poncet, September 2, Yellow B ook, p. 394.

321 the 2nd was that Daladierfs speech of that day automatically withdrew French acceptance.

1

Chamberlain and Halifax carefully expressed Britain^ revised position on the Italian plan in identical statements to the two Houses on September 2# left for a peaceful settlement — draw her troops.

2

Some hope they

if Germany would with­

Reaction in the House was antagonistic

to the delay, and this may have made up Chamberlain 1s mind to wait no more. thought for one moment. he said.

”l should be horrified if the House • . that I . . . was weakening,”

He was awaiting the communication from the

French government concerning a time limit, and felt ”certain that I can make a statement to the House of a definite character tomorrow.

. • I anticipate that there 3 is only one answer that I can give the House tomorrow.” Daladier addressed the Chamber of Deputies on the

2nd also.

He, too, reviewed the Italian offer, indicating t

a somewhat closer relationship to it than had Chamberlain. Said Daladier:

”Even yesterday we were still trying to

unite all the forces of good will.”

The French Premier,

^Francois-Poncet, September 2, Yellow Book, p. 398. 2Blue Book, pp. 172-74.

®Loc. cit.

322 in an ominous wax* talk, also reviewed the events of the past several months and received his most prolonged !

applause on the statement:

”Prance and England cannot

look on When a friendly nation is being destroyed, a foreboding of further onslaughts eventually aimed at England and France#” ^ Daladier met with his cabinet at 7:30 in the evening, during which time the time-limit message for which Chamber­ lain was waiting must have been prepared#

The British

Cabinet met in midnight session, and they must have had the French word by then.

The next morning at 5 o fclock,

Halifax telegraphed instructions to Henderson to leave with the German government at 9:00 a.m. an ultimatum that meant business: it carried with it a two-hour time limit. It mentioned the British message of two days before and the fact that no reply to the British demand for with­ drawal of troops had yet been received#

And it concluded:

I have accordingly the honour to inform you that, unless not later than 11 a.m., Britain Summer Time, today, 3rd September, satisfactory assurances to the above effect have been given by the German Government and have reached His Majesty 1s Government in London, a state of war will exist between the two countries as from this hour.

^Yellow B ook, pp. 384-92. M. Daladier*s memory must have been short. It was not so long ago that France and England had looked on while several nations were destroyed.

2Blue Book, p. 175.

323 The German reply began with a bang:

nThe Reich

Government and the German people refuse to be handed, to accept, and, still less, to comply with demands amounting to an ultimatum made by the British Government .*1

It

was an anti-climax; it was not received until 1 1 :2 0 , when England and Germany had already been at war for 20 min ­ utes.

Five minutes before Prime Minister Chamberlain had

told the world from Downing street that nthis country Is now at war with Germany.

...

We have a clear conscience.

. • . Now may God bless you all and may He defend the right.

For it is evil things that we shall be fighting

against, brute force, bad faith, injustice, oppression and persecution.

And I am certain that the right will

prevail.*^ Chamberlain was not the only British leader to ad­ dress the people by radio on that fateful day. Sinclair 3 and Greenwood, leaders of the opposition, joined their voices to that of the Prime Minister.

Chamberlain

returned, himself, later, to address the German people, to whom he gave the English version of the months that

^•German White B ook, p. 45. 2 British Library publication: pp. 16-17. •3

The Outbreak of War,

These speeches are also in The Outbreak of War.

524 had gone before.

And at 7:00 in the evening British

subjects heard their King, from Buckingham Palace: There may be dark days ahead. . • • But we can only do the right as we see the right and reverent­ ly commit our cause to God. If one and all we keep resolutely faithful to it, ready for whatever ser­ vice or sacrifice it may demand, then, with GodTs help, we shall prevail. . . . May he bless us and keep us all. England and Germany had been at war for six hours

2 when France entered the fight.

Goulondre was received

by the German Foreign Secretary at 12:30 and delivered the French ultimatum verbally, setting 5:00 a.m. as the time limit. Germany.

And from 5:00 p.m. France was at war with

The French people heard their Premier over the

air at 8:30 in the evening. of France: upon us.

He told the nMen and Women

We are waging war because it has been thrust

. • . I n rising against the most frightful of

tyrannies, in honouring our word, we fight to defend our soil, our homes, our liberties.

...

The cause of France

is identical with that of Righteousness.

...

It will be

victorious. • • • Vive la France.1’ ■ Sleg Hell I Long Live the King I

Vive la France 1

The war was on in earnest I 1 Ibld..

2

p. 3.

It has been rumored that France made one last effort at a peaceful solution the morning of the 3rd. If so, this would account for the delay. ^Yellow Book, pp. 403-04.

CONCLUSION If history is the laboratory of the social sciences, the study of history takes on added meaning to those en­ gaged in the discovery of solutions for social problems. An understanding, therefore, of the historical background of the origins of the war of 1939 assumes a vast import tance amounting almost to a necessity if the elusive: goal of world peace, in itself of vital urgency, is to be gained.

It seems wise to search for conclusions to be

reached from a study of the background of this conflict. War within an international system such as that at present employed throughout the world arises from the conflicts which exist, and are bound to exist, between the objectives of policy of independent nation-states. It occurs when such conflicts become so acute that the conflicting nations are willing to risk the use of mili­ tary techniques to supplement the diplomatic, economic, and financial techniques with which foreign policy objectives are customarily sought to be achieved. The objectives of national foreign policy are to­ day primarily security and the comparative prosperity arising from the possession of material plenty.

The

selection of the objective, as well as some of the means

326 to be used in its realization, is determined by the situation In which a nation finds itself: if the nation possesses material plenty, its policy must revolve around the search for security; lacking such plenty, it must seek to secure such goods and supplies.

Economic

nationalism, particularly in times of economic depression, intensifies the conflict thus arising from the resulting competition for possession or control of the world’s resources• A study of the diplomatic history of Europe in the years preceding the outbreak of war in 1939 reveals the growth of conflict between two groups of European powers to the point where military techniques were brought into play.

The foes were matched by 1932; the conflict became

more open during the succeeding years; the die was cast on March 15, 1939, when Nazi occupation of Prague caused English leaders to realize the danger to British objec­ tives arising from the further growth of German power. This realistic interpretation would seem to make this war inevitable, indeed to make war itself inevitable in the modern world.

To this writer this conclusion is

inescapable, so long as emphasis is placed upon the conditioning phrase nin this modern world” as it has existed in the past.

The fetish of ”national interest,”

327 worshipped to the exclusion of all other considerations, forces the creation of national policies which must conflict in the world of today; the concept of absolute sovereignty forbids the ultimate solution of such con­ flicts other than through military means.

The sole

alternative would seem to be the destruction of both the concept and the fetish and the creation of a political interdependence within which an economic interdependence can survive and flourish.

Two means to such an end pre­

sent themselves: world conquest and world cooperation, and huge obstacles stand in the way of both* It is difficult within the framework of the above concept of war in the modern world to arrive at a simple generalization as to war guilt.

It seems apparent that

none of the nations since involved wished war as such; they desired instead the spoils of victory: the satisfac­ tion of their national ambitions through the revision or the maintenance of the status quo, and they were all willing to risk the costs of military conflict in the search for such satisfaction.

The war today is, however,

a very real war, whatever the makers of policy in the warring nations may have intended, and upon its outcome rests the decision as to whose objectives shall be secured.

The waging and the winning of the war are there-

328 fore, to all the countries involved# The statements of war aims with which the world has been deluged since September of 1939 possess the vague qualities peculiar to such statements in all wars* Important as they are to the topic at hand, as indicative of the things for which people believe themselves to be fighting, they can find no place in this dissertation

'

other than that given to them in the foregoing pages.

The

same limitation must apply to statements of position on the question of war guilt.

It seems fitting, however,

to conclude with words from the mouths of men who played major roles in the pre-war drama.

Among the many avail­

able statements of position, the following pair seem to this writer to present the opposing arguments in succinct fashion.

The first is from Anthony Edenfs speech to the

National Association of Manufacturers in New York on December 5, 1939j the second is from Hitlerfs address to the Reichstag on April 28 of the same year.

Said Eden:

Let us then sum up, and in so doing let us seek to look into the future. What do we see? We see a world vigorous and vital, but ruthless and challenging: a world where force is for many the only instrument of policy# In such conditions we know that we must believe in ourselves to live. We know that we must champion our ideals, and the faith to which we hold with an equal strength, or others which we abhor will take their place.

529 We know that we are destined in our land and in our generation to live in a period of emergency of which none can see the end. If throughout that testing time, however long or short it he, we hold fast to our faith, cradle It in stone, and set steel to defend It, we can yet hand on our inher­ itance, of freedom to the generations that are to come. And said Hitler: Providence has granted that I might fulfill my lifefs task — to raise my German people up out of the depth of defeat and to liberate it from the bonds of the most infamous dictate of all times# For this alone has been the aim of my actions# I have been moved by no other idea than that of win­ ning back the freedom of the German nation, restoring the power and strength of the Keich, overcoming the internal disruption of the nation, remedying its isolation from the rest of the world, and safeguard­ ing the maintenance of its independent economic and political existence* I have worked only to restore that which others once broke by force. I have desired only to make good that which satanic malice or human unreason de­ stroyed or demolished# I have therefore taken no step which violated the rights of others but have only restored that justice which was violated twenty years a g o # ^

^Anthony Eden, Foreign Affairs, pp. 338-39. ^ ’Germany and the English Policy of Encirclement,11 Hews in Brief, June 29, 1939, p. 46.

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332 ______________Why Europe Went to W a r * (World Affairs Pamphlet!, No. 77* New York: Foreign Policy Asso­ ciation and National Peace Conference, 1939. 48 pp. Delaisi, Francis, Political Myths and Economic Realities. New York: The Viking Press, 1927. 446 pp. de Wilde, Popper, and Clark, Handbook of the War♦- Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1939. "258 pp. Eden, Anthony, Foreign Affairs. New York: Brace and Co'-., 1§3§7 366 pp.

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New York:

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Fischer, Louis, The Soviets in World Affairs, a History of Relations between the Soviet Union and*"the Rest of the World. London: J. Cape, 1930. 2 vols. Folks, Homer, The Human Costs of War. and Bros., 1920. 325 pp.

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London:

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Hambloch, Ernest, Germany Rampant; A Study in Economic Militarism. New York: Carrick and Evans, Inc., 1939. 297 pp. Harley, J. Eugene, Documentary Textbook on International Relations. Los Angeles: Suttonhouse, 1934. 848 pp. Harper, S. N., York: D.

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London:

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Johnsen, Julia E*, editor, Selected Articles on War — Cause and Cure. New York: H* W. V/ilson Co*, 1926* 350 pp. Jones, (F. Elwyn, The Attack from Within: the Modern Tech­ nique of Aggression. Hammondsworth Middlesex *~ England: Penguin Books, Ltd*, 1939. 213 pp. Kain, Ronald Stuary, Europe: Versailles to Warsaw* New York: H. W* Wilson Co *, 1939 (Reference Shelf Series). 456 pp. Karski, Stefan, Poland, Past and Present * G* P. Putnamrs Sons, 1§33. 160 pp.

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Keynes, John Maynard, The Economic Consequences of the Peace * London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1§19* 279 pp. Krofta, Kamil, Europe at the Crossroads. 1936. 51 p p .

Prague:

_____________ A Short History of Czechoslovakia* York: McBride, 1934* 198 pp* Langsam, Walter C., The World Since 1914. Macmillan Co., 1934• 723 pp.

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New York:

Laski, Harold J., Germans — Are They Human? Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1941* 8 pp. tion.

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London:

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335 Lloyd George, David, The Truth about the Peace Treaties* London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1938. 2 vols* Lloyd, Lord, of Dolobran, The British Case * The Macmillan Co., 1940. 93 pp*

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